Process and Personality: Actualization of the Personal World With Process-Oriented Methods 9783110328424, 9783110328059

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Gudmund J. W. Smith – Ingegerd M. Carlsson (Eds.) Process and Personality Actualization of the Personal World With Process-Oriented Methods

PROCESS THOUGHT Edited by Nicholas Rescher • Johanna Seibt • Michel Weber Advisory Board Mark Bickhard • Jaime Nubiola • Roberto Poli

Volume 17

Gudmund J. W. Smith Ingegerd M. Carlsson (Editors)

Process and Personality Actualization of the Personal World With Process-Oriented Methods

ontos verlag Frankfurt I Paris I Ebikon I Lancaster I New Brunswick

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

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2008 ontos verlag P.O. Box 15 41, D-63133 Heusenstamm www.ontosverlag.com ISBN 13: 978-3-938793-89-3 2008 No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use of the purchaser of the work Printed on acid-free paper ISO-Norm 970-6 FSC-certified (Forest Stewardship Council) This hardcover binding meets the International Library standard Printed in Germany by buch bücher dd ag

Published in remembrance of Ulf Kragh

CONTENTS Introduction Gudmund Smith and Ingegerd Carlsson 1. What is perceptgenesis really about? Gudmund Smith 2. Perceptgenesis: its origins, accomplishments and propects Juris Draguns 3. A mosaic of seven perceptgenetic themes Ulf Kragh 4. A note on the concept of stimulus in perceptgenetic theory Anders Zachrisson 5. Defense mechanisms in psychosomatic groups: a heuristic model Mikael Henningsson 6. Defense mechanisms and posttraumatic symptoms among male Bosnian and Croatian refugees in psychiatric treatment Gunilla Kivling Bodén and Elisabet Sundbom 7. Influence of gender and age in the defense mechanism test among adolescents and adults Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom 8. Mature and immature defenses. A study of repressors and trait anxiety groups Ingegerd Carlsson and Fredrik Neuman 9. Heart rate variability during the meta-contrast technique Peter Jönsson 10. Perceptgenetic techniques in the study of cognitive styles and defense mechanisms: from assessment toward psychotherapy Uwe Hentschel and Juris Draguns 11. Which type of norm for S-CWT research? Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi & Alberto Siracusano 12. Pilots and ground officers investigated by process tests of

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creativity, extraversion, and stress control Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnér & Gudmund Smith 13. Vision forming and brain storming: different aspects of creativity captured by a perceptgenetic measurement and other measurements of creativity Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson 14. Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue: microgenesis in the 21st century Joseph Glicksohn 15. Actualization and causality Jason Brown Name Index Subject Index Contributors

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT Among all people who inspired and helped organize the meeting in Delphi, the breeding ground of this book, we particularly want to thank Dr. Dimitri Kyriazis, himself an expert in the application of the DMT.

INTRODUCTION Gudmund Smith and Ingegerd Carlsson The present book is an extended as well as updated version of contributions to a conference on microprocesses, or perceptgeneses, as termed in the present context. The conference was held in Delphi, Greece, October 2000. Most participants in the conference are represented in the book but additional researchers in the field were invited to contribute. The book is a collection of theoretical essays and original empirical work especially written for the illumination of a subject particularly urgent when the attention of psychological inquiry, as the present authors see it, has for a long time been focused on surface phenomena. We know how differentiated and complicated the processing of sense impressions is and how difficult to uphold a strict distinction between stimulation, on the one hand, and processing, on the other. Such a distinction is still often maintained in present-day theorizing. Still, many of us pride ourselves on the victory of rationalism over subjective speculation in psychology. But even the so-called cognitive revolution has left much of the traditional infrastructure intact. Starting with sense data as the source of mental life, certain traditionalists strive to follow how these data are processed by various receptors, organized centrally according to principles reminiscent of classical associationism, and stored in chambers of memory. To be sure, during the last years there have been efforts in all ‘camps’ of research to operate with a more differentiated model of perception and sensory data processing. For example, it is interesting to note that, after decades of resistance to any intimation of the existence of processes beyond conscious control, experimentation on subliminal stimulation has mushroomed during the nineties. At the same time as the existence of an unconscious world has become an irrefutable empirical fact, it is difficult for many to explain why subliminal processing does not necessarily produce the same results as found at the supraliminal level and hence that the preconscious world may not be an enfeebled copy of the conscious one, but something qualitatively different.

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The relevant adjustments recently introduced into the theoretical mainstream have long been anticipated by proponents of perceptgenesis (or microgenesis), as will be partly documented in the contributions of this volume. But adjustments alone will not do—there are, in fact, four rather fundamental theoretical presuppositions and tendencies that need to be questioned. First, psychologists tend to operate with an all too simplified model of the storage of information, a ‘picture of memory’ which has as its precursor the theory of engrams inherited from Plato. Memory is often thought of as a locker, or a system of lockers, and the deposits in these lockers are regarded as accessible in principle. If not, it is not uncommon to borrow the concept of repression from psychoanalysis to account for the unavailability. But the notion of 'repression' as used in cognitive psychology has none of the dynamic underpinnings of the original concept. Second, psychologists tend to operate with a strict and often artificial distinctions. For example, the 'memory system' is distinguished from the 'perception system', and these in turn are taken to be separate from ’personality’, which is presented as a theoretical category of its own. Given these distinctions, the connection between these factors is difficult to explain and usually ignored. Feelings and emotions, in particular as they affect as unconscious forces our conscious deliberations, thus are perceived as a particular problem, challenging the traditional presumption that thinking and feeling belong to different spheres. Third, traditional descriptions of the contents and inner dynamics of personality aspects, often unsystematic but insightful and engaging, have been replaced by multidimensional schemata based on sophisticated statistical programs. Unfortunately, the so-called traits defining these dimensions are frequently treated akin to semi-permanent features (like traditional abilities), or substance-like objects. This partiality for mechanistic theorizing and reification—additionally supported by the metaphor use of digital processes and the mind as computer—runs the risk of neglecting a thorough phenomenological analysis of the data.. Oddly enough, the tendency towards ‘mechanistic’ theorizing threatens to estrange psychology from important trends in modern biology, e.g., the emphasis on interaction and process.

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Fourth, focusing rather on stability and permanence than on dynamic restructuring and change, contemporary personality psychologists tend to find the developmental perspective unrewarding. These four presuppositions and tendencies are all abandoned in perceptgenetic (microgenetic) according to which our conception of the world is created by processes originating in personal experiences. Sense impressions are not primarily looked upon as starting-points for mental activity but as constraints for what the creative perceptgenetic processes are allowed to sculpt. Perception, in this view, is thus deeply embedded in the broader dynamics and structures of the subjective, personal world. Even if it sounds strange, tangible objects ”out there” may, for instance, be constructed and regarded as extensions of memory processes (cf. particularly Brown, 2002). Thus viewing our psyche as a succession of processes shaping the personal world has proved to be immensely rewarding. Over the years, perceptgenetic researchers have developed a variety of efficient tests to serve the in-depth descriptions of how the individual functions in different situations. Among many possible examples let us just choose the selection of competent air plane pilots or trustworthy car drivers, the correct diagnosis of psychiatric ailments, or spotting creative talent in children and adults. Since all of us in contemporary society are confronted with steadily increasing demands on our mental resources, any attempts at refining personality theory and making it more realistic would be of paramount importance. Five chapters (1, 2, 4, 14, 15) are mainly concerned with theory. Gudmund Smith´s text (1) may serve as a general introduction to the basic topic of the present book, i.e., process and its signification for a theory of personality. While some of the contributors still regard psychoanalysis as the most promising grid for micro-process theorizing, Smith expresses some doubt and vouches for an independent micro-process theory of personality. This is, indeed, the position taken by Jason Brown (15) who has developed a process-oriented theory of his own, based on his experience with patients suffering from aphasia as well as inspirations from philosophers like Henri Bergson, and Alfred North Whitehead. Having a clear philosophical angle Brown´s contribution is placed at the end, preceded by

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Joseph Glicksohn (14) who paints an alternative context using Hughlings Jackson and Heinz Werner as anchor points. The chapter by Juris Draguns (2) gives a well-informed account of the history of perceptgenetic (PG) research and experimentation and an assessment of its prospects, while Anders Zachrisson (4) focuses the adjustment of the personal world to common-sense reality, not concealing his psychoanalytic preferences. In other chapters (3, 8, 9, 10, 11) theoretical and methodological themes are sandwiched. Ulf Kragh (3) treats some essential topics seldom cultivated in perceptgenetic writings. One of these problems concerns the classical problem of associations, seen by Kragh as PG prestages of perception. Other problems highlighted in a PG context are the connection between PG and ontogeneses and between body and mind. Ingegerd Carlsson and Fredrik Neuman (8) show that the Meta-Contrast Technique can be used to open the door to the inner world of repressors, i.e. people who are obviously “blind-folded”. With the use of screening inventories, the repressor group was separated from a “true” low-anxious group as well as from a high anxious group. When tested with the Meta-Contrast Technique, the three groups were all found to differ from each other. The results in the repressor group were in line with other research that describes these people as inclined to develop psychosomatic symptoms. In his study, Peter Jönsson (9) demonstrates, timely in the present context, that the threat stimulus used in the Meta-Contrast Technique has indeed a noticeable somatic effect. Using heart-rate variability he got a measure of sympathovagal balance. A threatening stimulus picture presented below or above the subjective threshold was clearly related to that balance, indicating a freezing reaction with enhanced attention. Uwe Hentschel and Juris G. Draguns (10) vouch for the use of perceptgenetic diagnostics as a preparation for efficient therapeutic work. They list eight potential topics of psychotherapy research in which PG methods may be successfully employed. Alexis Rubino, Frederica Tozzi, and Alberto Siracusano (11), seasoned users of the Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT), dwell on the adaptive aspects of process methodology and demonstrate how norms used in that test could be made more efficient by further emphasizing the process approach.

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The volume also contains original work from applied contexts. In two studies, Mikael Henningsson (5), and Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom (7), employ partial squares discriminant analysis to demonstrate the reliability and validity of the Defense Mechanism Test as a diagnostic tool in different contexts. Henningsson manages to define patients with a chronic fatigue syndrome as a group different from other clinical groups and Fransson and Sundbom are able to capture the influences of age and gender on the use of defenses; females, for instance, preferred different variants of the perceptual defense “identifications with the opposite sex”. They also found particular characteristics in refugees suffering from posttraumatic disorder. Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson (13) compared perceptgenetic and traditional measures of creativity in a sample of children and explored the relationship between creativity and the results of a self-image inventory. Among other things, Hoff and Carlsson draw the conclusion that a creative disposition does not necessarily imply that the child holds her/himself in high esteem. Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnér and Gudmund Smith (12) are able to discriminate within a group of fighter pilots and between pilots and ground officers, using both the Creative Functioning Test, the Serial Color-Word Test, as well as a process test of extraversion-introversion (the so-called Spiral Aftereffect Technique, to be described in that chapter). In this exploratory study of personality patterns, the pilots formed subgroups that were, when compared afterwards, significantly separated in age and competence, as well as in other categories that had been established on the basis of questionnaires with open questions about their work and their interests.

1. WHAT IS PERCEPTGENESIS REALLY ABOUT? Gudmund J.W. Smith This chapter outlines the basic framework of perceptgenetic (PG) theory: that reality is not a mere reflection of outside givens but a construction of them. The mostly implicit pulses involved in this construction can to a certain extent be reconstructed by means of special techniques. PG methods and applications have often been tied to psychodynamic assumptions. The advantages and disadvantages of such an attachment are discussed. One advantage is the focus on process in psychodynamic theory and practice; but a disadvantage is its lack of a modern theory of perception. Instead of borrowing from psychoanalysis PG might as well build a theory of its own; there is no lack of useful ingredients. The survey is throughout linked up with the subsequent chapters in the book.

INTRODUCTION Perceptgeneses are usually identified with ultrashort processes protracted for observation by means of special techniques, tried already in the twenties in Germany and Italy (see Draguns, 1983, and Chapter 2). These techniques imply that stimuli are presented ”piecemeal”, starting from time or illumination (or, loudness) values below the visual (auditory) threshold, and systematically prolonged or increased until correct recognition. The sequence of reports from the test subject of what he/she has seen (heard) at these stimulus presentations constitute a perceptgenesis (PG in the following). The creation of a PG would hardly be more than harmless play were it not for a crucial assumption: The PGs somehow reflect how we construct our representation of reality - in daily life, at least in case the stimulus situation is comparatively novel and significant. As the experimenter soon learns, all too well-known stimuli, or stimuli devoid of meaning, do not produce processes such as the term is understood here.

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This basic assumption in PG research has been called in question, particularly by orthodox perception psychologists. One of the critical points would be that constructive processes operating in daily life are not repeatedly interrupted for observation and reporting. Kragh and Smith (1970) dealt with this objection but refuted it by pointing out, among other things, that ordinary perception is not an uninterrupted staring at the object but series of intermittent fixations. Without intermittence the object would dissolve. Moreover, if PGs were not more than artifacts their intimate connections with a multitude of other observations would be incomprehensible. The naive realist is bound to be disturbed by the elusive character of PGs. They apparently unfold outside immediate awareness. But the observant perceiver might notice that there is more to everyday perception than a momentary photographic reproduction of outside reality. Our scrutiny of the world around us is usually accompanied by emotions, sudden impulses, intuitive ideas, vague forebodings, etc. One way to comprehend this continuous simmering would be to see it as remnants of early PG stages or of PGs never completed as conscious percepts (cf. Chapter 3). Only if habituated to the utmost can perception become totally detached. As just pointed out, experimenters working with PG methodology soon found out that reuse of stimuli with the same subjects resulted in impoverished PGs. The sequence of reports reached the stage of correct recognition with fewer and less varied stages in between. Repetition resulted in increasing automatization (Smith, 1991). This could be understood as a device for economizing, transforming to routine strenuous efforts at mastering a new situation. What made PGs more than theoretically interesting was the discovery that they could be applied with obvious success. One of the first uses was in the selection of future air force pilots. Ulf Kragh applied stimulus pictures with an innocuous, central identification figure and a peripherally placed threatening person (the Defence Mechanism Test, DMT, Kragh, 1985 and Chapter 3). By scoring various distortions in the reporting of the threat as reflections of defensive operations he got an indication of the degree of inside turmoil in the applicant. And the more defensive the distor-

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tions, the more dangerous the imminent deflection from the ultimate task of the pilot: an optimal control of the outside events flashing by. The obvious interindividual variation between PG protocols also encouraged the use of PG methods for clinical purposes. A technique originally based on attempts at utilizing subliminal stimulation, the Meta-Contrast Technique, MCT (Smith, Johnson, Almgren, & Johanson, 2001), was applied already in the fifties. Here the contrasting stimuli, contrary to the procedure in the DMT, consisted of two different pictures. While the viewer was adjusted to the second stimulus beforehand, the first stimulus, incongruent with the second one or implying a threat to its central character, was only introduced by small steps, PG fashion. The intention of this arrangement was to find out how the subject accepted the intrusion of controversial stimulation into a situation which he had identified beforehand. The MCT was proven successful as a clinical tool (Smith, 2001; see also Chapters 8 and 9). It could also be remodeled to serve specific purposes, e.g. the analysis of flight phobia (Amnér, 1997). At the same time the use of the DMT was extended to new problem areas, like traffic accidents (Svensson & Trygg, 1994). Its utility in clinical practice was effectively demonstrated by Sundbom and her associates (Sundbom, 1992; Sundbom, Jacobsson, Kullgren, & Penayo, 1998; and Chapters 5, 6, and 7). One of their most obvious feats was to separate borderline patients as a particular category in a sea of neurotic and psychotic disturbances, and also to identify the symptom profile of people complaining of chronic fatigue (Henningsson, 1999). Andersson (1995) developed a special variant of the DMT termed the Defense Mechanism Technique, modified (DMTm) implying, among other things, the use of representatives of both sexes at the place of the threat as well as at the place of the central figure (the hero), and a revision of the scoring scheme. A further development introduced stimulus motifs referring to, among other things, early attachment and separation. This was tried out with favourable outcome by Nilsson (Nilsson & Svensson, 1999).

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PG WITHIN THE FAMILY OF PROCESSES The reality around us, as comprehended by PG theory, is constructed by micro-processes, mostly outside awareness and subjectively colored from the start. This does not imply a solipsistic interpretation of reality. The bouquet of many possibilities typical of early process stages is soon thinned out under the constraints of stimulus. The sequence of events representing a PG has all the hallmarks of a regular process, i.e., a successive transformation of meaning from one stage to the next combined with an interdependence of consecutive stages. This does not rule out sudden metamorphoses in the chain of phases, particularly not if the personal involvement in the perceptual event was intense from the start. But the definition of PGs as processes does not make their alignment within the greater family of adaptive processes wholly unproblematic. While the sequence of events leading, in due course, to increased mastery of a new situation or task, in for instance the Serial Color-Word Test (SCWT, with its in-built contradictions) is open to the inspection by the subject him-/herself - we recognize how our mastery increases or varies over the trials - PGs are usually hidden or only indirectly reminding us of their existence. Moreover, the aim of adaptation is to adjust our behavior to outside givens while PGs underlie the construction and acceptance of them. This presupposes a mutual, and complicated, interdependence which deserves to be studied in more detail, perhaps experimentally (see also Chapter 12 and 13). Generally speaking, adaptive processes present the subject’s adaptive encounters with reality from the outside, perceptgeneses these encounters from the subjective inside. Still, these two kinds of processes share the typical process attributes mentioned above. Their affinity can be exemplified by the concordance of adaptive serials and PGs when studied in the same individuals. Let us take regression in psychosis as an example (cf. Smith, 2001). The adaptive serial can be illustrated by an aftereffect phenomenon, i.e. the successive adjustment to negative visual afterimages initiated by a colored stimulus and thereafter projected on a screen. The usual unfamiliarity with visual after-

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images makes possible a sequence of qualitative transformations until the subject’s view of the phenomenon is settled. The chain of reports of the afterimage appearance is normally adapted by degrees to the understanding that afterimages are subjective phenomena projected onto physical reality. This is not so in cognitively immature children. To them the afterimage is as real as the surface upon which it appears. Consequently, while adult afterimages grow in size proportionally to the distance of the surface from the eye, childish images remain more or less size-constant. And they usually retain the color of the inducing stimulus, not the contrasting, negative hue experienced by the normal adult. Table 1.1. Process-oriented methods. Adaptive Serials The Visual Afterimage Test (AI) The Spiral Aftereffect Test (SAT) The Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) The Serial Picture-Word Test (S-PWT) Genuine Perceptgenetic Methods A. Single Stimulus, Tachistoscopic Presentation The Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) The Defense Mechanism Technique, modified (DMTm) The Perceptgenetic Object Relations Test (PORT) B. Single Stimulus, Reversed Genesis The Creative Functioning Test (CFT) C. Double Stimuli, Tachistoscopic Presentation The Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT) The Flight Situation Test (FST) The Identification Test (IT), several versions D. Single Stimulus, Amauroscopic Presentation i.e., systematic change in illumination

The trademark of psychotic adult patients is that they intermittently revert to size-constant, positive images. Since we know what childish images are like we have every reason to call these abrupt changes regressions. In the same way the psychotic individual in traditional PG tests reports impressions of sudden shifts, either to early stages in the sequence of descriptions or, more blatantly, to so-called zero-phases where nothing can be seen but blackness or chaos. The test patient has lost his/her grip on the road to real-

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ity. Such intermittent losses of control are also evident in tests of cognitive skills, for example, the Serial Color-Word Test (see Table 1 and also Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001). This was only one example among many that processes at different levels of actualization share formal characteristics. They also share the fate of abbreviation upon repetition. If the experimenter intends to bring about processes optimized for close scrutiny, the participant should be unacquainted with the stimulation entertained in the experiment. It may sometimes be necessary, for instruction purposes, to open the door slightly to the experimental situation. But a door wide open may ruin the experiment completely (cf. Smith, 2007).

PERCEPTGENESIS AND PERSONANLITY THEORY What could be more sensible than to regard process as the very hub of personality theory? But the essence of contemporary personality theory seems elusive. The most typical reference in periodicals devoted to personality research is to some sort of factorial construction, e.g., the so-called ”big five” (see Wiggins, 1996). Here personality is described as a complex of interacting, reified components or traits worked out on the basis of systematized self-descriptions. For a hard-headed scientist neither theory nor its empirical fundaments would look impressive. But it can be demonstrated that traits are relatively stable units, at least in normal adult people. The disadvantage with that kind of theory is that it limits the psychological description to a few mechanistic assumptions. The developmental perspective is usually ignored and perception, like in classical psychoanalysis, relegated to a marginal existence. The concept of process thus does not seem fit for commonplace personality theory. Still, process would not necessarily be a too impalpable ingredient among the reified traits making up the factorial space called personality. As pointed out by Rapaport (1967), process with a slow rate of change eventually acquires the stability of a structure, or of a standing wave. This fitting metaphor was employed by the evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith and, originally, by the mathematician Alan Turing. But while traits are abstract entities, structure,

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even if seemingly solidified, refers to process, i.e., to concrete life events (see also Chapter 15).

PERCEPTGENESIS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Perhaps psychoanalysis fits the concepts of process and structure better. Here the developmental perspective is necessarily dominant. And psychoanalysis was the obvious frame of reference in the early days of PG research and speculation (see also Chapter 4). The Defence Mechanism Test, for instance, was primarily supposed to uncover defense mechanisms in the psychoanalytic meaning of that term. Anna Freud´s classification of defenses served as a natural reference grid. PG techniques held a particular advantage when it came to probing psychoanalytic presumptions experimentally. Westerlundh and Sjöbäck (1986) used an amauroscopic technique, i.e., they protracted the PG with systematic increases of illumination instead of prolonging exposure times. Presenting conflict-laden stimuli at low intensities, they asked if these influenced a subsequent PG in the way presumed by psychoanalytic theory. This presumption was found to be resonably tenable. A theoretical scheme constructed to fit results from DMTm (DMTmodified) was used by Andersson in several investigations and later adopted by Ryhammar (Andersson & Ryhammar, 1998; Ryhammar, 1996). Now it was not classical psychoanalysis that served as sponsor but rather such deviants as Melanie Klein and Heinz Kohut. Another member of the extended Kleinian group, John Bowlby, inspired Nilsson (Nilsson & Svensson, 1999) in his choice of pictures for the Perceptgenetic Object Relations Test (PORT). These pictures refer, as already said, to early attachment, separation and the Oeidipus constellation in the child’s social development. But the adaptation of PG to psychoanalytic theory, in spite of many successful combinations, still remains controversial in many respects. As we all know, psychoanalysis is a many-headed dragon. Not a few psychologists, like George Klein (1970), distinguish between psychoanalysis as a bundle of clinical observations and assumptions, and psychoanalysis as a metatheory. Klein adopted an attitude of reserve against the latter. In a

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penetrating analysis of this level of psychoanalytic theorizing, starting with Freud´s neuroscientific project for an encompassing theory, Brown (2000, and Chapter 15) has pointed out that many salient features of the metatheory really derive from old-fashioned associationism. According to Brown this theory seems to be made up of solid, i.e., separate, objects in interaction. Typical is the view of perception as distinct from memory. But, as Brown sees it, ”memory is brought to bear on perception, not after it is recorded”, as analysts will have it, ”but in the original process through which it is recorded” (p. 51). These reminiscences of century-old associationism - typical also of much presentday cognitive psychology - may explain why psychoanalysis remains problematic even to outsiders who are positively inclined to many of its basic tenets; and also why it seems difficult to establish a constructive dialogue between psychoanalysis and PG in its academic costume. This is true even in fields of common interest, like anxiety and defense, or when the question arises where to test key assumptions empirically, in therapy or in the laboratory (see also Chapter 11). An additional reason could be the increasing emphasis on therapeutic problems and consequent decreasing concern for theoretical issues. Anyhow, to the practising psychoanalyst findings made in a laboratory, even a PG one, do not seem necessarily relevant. When rethinking is demanded it is easy to regress to what Brown (2000) calls ”the solid architecture of associationism.” But PG is still closely tied to psychoanalysis. One of its main attractions is the attempt to give a comprehensive picture of personality. Even if the concept of personality is rarely entertained in psychoanalytic writings, the goal of inquiry is still some kind of central principle steering the individual´s mental life and actions. Most PG people would be apt to identify personality with such an organizing center. Thus defensive mechanisms are not understood as additional tools to be used in the service of adaptation and inner composure but as part and parcel of a dynamic system of processes. Unfortunately, as already intimated, an aspect of personality functioning particularly dear to PG research, namely perception, remains marginalized in psychoanalytic theories, old as well as contemporary. Two central psychoanalytic foci, evident not least in everyday clinical work, are development and emotion. A person ripped off from his mental

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history can never be fully understood. In the same way workers in the PG tradition regard the present as an actualization of the past. The ongoing renewal at the spearhead of reality construction cannot be comprehended without reference to the phases preceding the final phase. Defenses emerging in late sections of a PG are often foreboded in early sections, e.g., by signs of anxiety or uncertain identity. It is also equivalent with psychoanalytic presumptions to see development as a hierarchy of subsequent phases, differing not only in distinctness but above all qualitatively. Thus preconscious experiences should not be regarded as weak copies of conscious ones - they are different. Like in psychoanalysis, emotions in the PG model are not just substances added to existing cognitive structures. They are intrinsic attributes of the processes of construction. Usually early sections of these processes are more dominated by emotions, eventually yielding to more and more objective, person-independent structures in late sections. But emotions are never totally absent, at least not in normal persons. Without emotions perceptgeneses cannot unfold in a virtual representation of reality. In order to serve as mortar in the process of reality construction, however, emotions have to be available for reconstruction (as demonstrated in experiments with children, Smith & Carlsson, 1990) or, to use equivalent terms, the level of ”procedural knowledge” (Schachter, 1987) must be made accessible to categorical (reality-proximal) organization (see also Smith & Carlsson, 2005).

OTHER ASSOCIATIONS A focus on process implies, at least as the present writer sees it, actualization of a biological perspective (see also Chapter 14). The term biological is often understood in a narrow physiological sense, a reduction of explanations to neurochemistry or kindred topics. But biology is a life science in a much wider meaning, including adaptation, competition, cooperation, desire, and striving towards a goal. It is paradigmatic that Jason Brown (e.g., 2000) found PG to be a useful theme in this neurobiological theorizing but at the same time used neurological data as a general frame in his picture of human perception and action. Moreover, like Luria he finds

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many facets of neuroscientific speculation to be obsolete, e.g., one-sided localisation of mental faculties to certain parts of the brain or treating memory as some sort of reservoir with specific chambers for various kinds of memorizing. This latter caricature of biological thinking is, of course, no suitable partner for dynamic PG theory. Brown is arguably no reductionist. His perhaps most eloquent book (Brown, 1991) could very well be read as a textbook in psychology. But among psychologists with a psychodynamic leaning there still lingers a hesitation towards any association with neuroscience. At the same time workers using the PG arsenal of methods have extracted many dividends via such associations. Examples, among several others, are studies of demented and other brain-injured people (Johanson, 1991), patients with brain tumors (Lilja, 1992), and patients exposed to organic solvents (Lindgren, 1992). The validity of signs of anxiety in the MCT was proven by means of experiments using brain imaging, i.e., a demonstration that experiences fed by renewed confrontation with these signs corresponded to increased frontal blood flow in the cortex. Such increases had previously been associated with bursts of anxiety (Johanson, Risberg, Silfverskiöld, & Smith, 1986; see also Chapter 9). As already pointed out by Dixon (1971), the most solid proofs of the existence of subliminal perception were neurophysiological. Neurological and mental perspectives can obviously enrich each other without necessarily resorting to causal bridges between them (see also, Carlsson, 1992; Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000).

CONCLUSIONS The practical utility of many PG methods, as illustrated in the following chapters, may tempt us to sacrifice PG theory for the sake of convenience. The applied psychologist thus appeals to the manual in order to find solutions for diagnostic problems. That kind of practice is not recommendable, however. Without theory the clinical psychologist is enslaved by the manual. And where the manual is uncertain the a-theoretical practitioner is totally deserted. Not even the most ardent advocate of the adaptation of PG methods to practical ends can abjure a theoretical background. Where theory is not ex-

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plicit it is very likely to be implicit, unconsciously steering basic assumptions and prejudices. When you have to proceed outside the scope of your manual there is a great risk that you adopt theories foreign to the correct application of PG data. One of the obvious temptations is a variety of stimulus-response explanations, still taught by conservative teachers at our universities. The present chapter has discussed some possible reference systems. The conventional personality theories, with their background of factorial solutions, were dismissed as insufficient, mainly because they are unable to accommodate process in their universe of reified traits. Not even revised mainstream cognitive psychology, as reflected in, e.g., Stadler and Frensch (1998), seems to be a useful partner. Even if most cognitive psychologists nowadays accept subliminal perception as part of the individual´s information processing, they seem reluctant to regard non-consciousness as, in principle, qualitatively different from consciousness. Moreover, the hereand-now thinking characterizing much of cognitive science, and its therapeutic applications, makes it unsuited to a context where a developmental perspective is a sine qua non. Psychoanalysis was considered as a more serious alternative. For many of the early perceptgenetic researchers it was the only reasonable option; in this respect they differed, indeed, from the original Aktualgenese people (see also Chapters 2, 3, 4,). It was no coincidence that defense mechanisms were chosen as the first objects of study. The hypothetical parallel between PGs and life history was given high priority as an object of study. The notion of PGs as rooted in a broad spectre of potentialities, to use Brown´s term, of which only a fraction are actualized, also reflected kinship with psychoanalysis. In this perspective phases in a PG could hardly be described as pale reflections of the end-phase, i.e., of stimulus. While looking for suitable partners to serve as racks for the stream of fresh discoveries in PG laboratories, one may reasonably ask if PG itself does have enough theoretical depth and stability to accommodate its own empirical data. To be true, PG thinking appears to be the only sensible alternative to a more orthodox form of cognitivism, at least as long as the latter cannot divest itself of the remnants of mechanistic thinking, once inherited from the behaviorism of the early twentieth century. While PG

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methods have presented ample proof of their efficiency as diagnostic and prognostic tools PG theory has, at the same time, gradually consolidated its position as the embryo of a full-fledged theory of personality. According to PG theory, perception is the actualization of the potentialities aroused at each moment of renewed adaptation or growth. The success of the PG methods depends on their incisiveness: they do not merely scratch the surface, or end-product, of adaptive processes but lay bare hidden, preconscious contexts and causations, e.g., the hierarchical organization of early and late, immature and mature in the adaptive arsenal and, concomitantly, the individual’s history. One important feature of PG protocols is the early dominance of emotions. At the same time, only emotions can guarantee the inner continuity of PGs, from the seemingly chaotic beginnings to the perceptual end-station. The role of defensive strategies in normal as well as pathological cases and the influence of anxiety on their discharge has been a natural object of study. And these strategies are not seen as extrinsic forces impinging upon the psyche but as intrinsic characteristics of its adaptive landscape. It has been the pride of present-day personality psychology to be able to demonstrate the stability of traits or factors derived by way of questionnaires. As pointed out previously in the present text a shift from traits to PG processes need not imply that stability is substituted for accidental change or chaos. Endstages in PGs may sway with shifts in the stimulus situation, but in the preceding stages the process characteristics are usually more stable, as demonstrated, e.g., in studies using the Serial Color-Word Test (see also Chapter 11). It was even suggested that individually typical PGs eventually acquire the hallmarks of “standing waves”. A systematized description of such waves, a PG phenomenology, is still a task for the future. The inevitable consequence of the above reasoning is that a PG personality theory should not deal with late phase phenomena, or even with processes compressed because of repetition. Thus much of the psychology of perception is outside the PG province, likewise social psychologies dealing with temporary attitudes, or any psychology lacking an in-depth perspective.

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However, the term percept-genetic points to a want in the theoretical background of PG, namely it’s one-sided emphasis on perception. This is obviously a consequence of the test arsenal. In Brown’s (e.g. 2001) writings, for instance, perception and action supplement each other. While perception is finally enclosed by sensual strictures action meets other obstructions in the real world, as the subject sees it. This does not imply that, like late-phase phenomena, action should be excluded from PG theory - it belongs there.

REFERENCES Amnér, G. (1997). Fear of flying: A manifold phenomenon with various motivational roots. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Andersson, A .L. (1995). DMTm - Defense Mechanism Technique, modified. Lund: Department of Applied Psychology. Andersson, A .L. & Ryhammar, L. (1998). Psychoanalytic models of the mind, creative functioning, and perceptgenetic reconstruction. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 21, 359-382. Brown, J. W. (1991). Self and process: Brain states and the conscious present. New York: Springer-Verlag. Brown, J. W. (2000). Mind and nature. London: Whurr. Brown, J. W. (2001). Foreword. In G.J.W. Smith, The process approach to personality. New York: Plenum. Carlsson, I. (1992). The creative personality: Hemispheric variation and sex differences in defence mechanisms related to creativity. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Carlsson, I., Wendt, P., & Risberg, J. (2000). On the neurobiology of creativity. Differences in frontal activity between high and low creative subjects. Neuropsychologia , 38, 873-885. Dixon, N. F. (1971). Subliminal perception: The nature of a controversy. London: McGraw-Hill. Draguns, J.G. (1983). Why microgenesis? An inquiry on the motivational sources of going beyond the information given. Archives of Psychology, 135, 5-16.

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Henningsson, M. (1999). Defense strategies in psychosomatic groups. Umeå: Department of Applied Psychology. Johanson, A., Risberg, J., Silfverskiöld, P., & Smith, G. (1986). Regional changes in cerebral blood flow during increased anxiety in patients with anxiety neurosis. In U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns (Eds), The roots of perception. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 353-360. Klein, G. S.(1970). Perception, motives, and personality, New York: Knopf. Kragh, U. (1985). Defense Mechanism Test. Stockholm: Persona. Kragh, U. & Smith, G.J.W., (Eds) (1970). Perceptgenetic analysis. Lund: Gleerup. Lilja, Å. (1992). Psychoneurooncology: Psychological dynamics in glioma patients. Lund: Department of Psychology. Lindgren, M. (1992). Neuropsychological studies of patients with organic solvent induced chronic toxic encephalopathy. Malmö: Malmö General Hospital. Nilsson, A., & Svensson, B. (1999): PORT - Percept-Genetic ObjectRelation Test. Lund: Department of Psychology. Rapaport, D. (1967). The theory of attention cathexis. In M.M. Gill (Ed.) The collected papers of David Rapaport. New York: Basic Books, pp. 778-791. Ryhammar, L. (1996). Creative functioning, perceptgenetic reconstruction, and organizational conditions for creative activity. Lund: Lund University Press. Schachter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: History and current status. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 501-518. Smith, G J. W. (1991). Perceptgenesis: A frame of reference for neuropsychological research. In R.E. Hanlon (Ed), Cognitive microgenesis. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 135-142. Smith, G J. W. (2001). The process approach to personality. New York: Plenum. Smith, G J. W. (2007). A vademecum for experimental process research. In F. Riffert (ed), Perception reconsidered. The process point of view. Wien: Peter Lang, pp. 127-137.

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Smith, G J. W. & Carlsson, I. (1990). The creative process. Psychological Issues, Monograph 57. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Smith, G J. W. & Carlsson, I. (2005). Subjective prerequisites for the construction of an objective world. In R.D.Ellis & N.Newton (Eds), Consciousness and emotion. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 3-21. Smith, G J. W., Nyman, E., Hentschel, U., & Rubino, I.A. (2001). S-CWT - the Serial Color-Word Test. Frankfurt: Swets & Zeitlinger. Smith, G J. W., Johnson, G., Almgren, P.-E., & Johanson, A. (2001). MCT - the Meta-Contrast Technique. Lund: Department of Psychology. Stadler, M.A., & Frensch, P.A., (Eds.) (1998).Handbook of implicit learning. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Sundbom, E. (1992). Borderline psychopathology and the Defence Mechanism Test. Umeå: Department of Applied Psychology. Sundbom, E., Jacobsson, L., Kullgren, G., & Penayo, U. (1998). Personality and defenses: A cross-cultural study of psychiatric patients and healthy individuals. Psychological Reports, 83, 1431-1437. Svensson, B. & Trygg, L. (1994). Personality, accident proneness, and work adaptation. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Westerlundh, B. & Sjöbäck, H. (1986). Activation of conflict and defense: The amauroscopic technique. In U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns (Eds.), The roots of perception. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 161-215. Wiggins, J. S. (1996). The five-factor model of personality. New York: Guilford.

2. PERCEPTGENESIS: ITS ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND PROSPECTS Juris G. Draguns The cumulative yield of five decades of perceptgenetic research was reviewed, with a focus on direct perceptgenetic instruments, such as the Defense Mechanism Test and the Meta-Contrast Technique. Perceptgenesis has been investigated over a wide range of topics, from its usefulness in personnel selection and diagnostic differentiation to the explorations of its characteristic features in artistic and scientific creativity. New and emerging areas of inquiry were identified, such as the psychophysiological concomitants of perceptgenetic progression, and models for the investigation of the entire threat-anxiety-defense sequence were prepared. The ultimate goal of perceptgenetic research remains the integration of its formulations and findings into a comprehensive structure of contemporary psychology that recognizes the importance and ubiquity of process.

THE ORIGIN OF PERCEPTGENESIS The Beginnings As a term, concept, and topic of investigation, perceptgenesis (PG) originated around the midpoint of the twentieth century. Its seeds were sown by Gudmund Smith (1949) in his research on afterimages in twins. Kragh (1955) crystallized the perceptgenetic modus operandi by developing techniques that continue to be used to this day. In a series of articles Smith (1952, 1954, 1957) articulated the distinctive features of the perceptgenetic conceptual framework and mapped research directions that have been pursued ever since. Five decades later, time is ripe for taking stock of the accomplishments of PG, both empirically and conceptually. To this end, the following questions will be posed: What are the fundamental attributes of PG, and what, if anything, differentiates it from related and overlapping ap-

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proaches? What is the knowledge that has been gained in the course of research on perceptgenesis? What difference, if any, has it made, theoretically and practically, in a variety of applied human endeavors? What is its current status, conceptually and empirically? What problems have been resolved, and what conceptual and methodological hurdles remain to be overcome? Finally, what are the new vistas of investigation that have been opened, but as yet not explored, and what research questions remain to be pursued? These questions are asked by a sympathetic observer who, although not a member of the original perceptgenetic research team at Lund University, has followed the evolution of the perceptgenetic orientation with fascination, ever since the appearance of Kragh' s (1955) landmark monograph. As an outsider who has been strongly influenced by the PG in his thinking, research, and clinical operations, he now extends this outlook to a selective and personal appraisal of the accomplishments and prospects of the perceptgenetic enterprise. Perceptgenesis: What Is Distinctive About It? It is difficult to pinpoint the defining features of PG. Indeed, Smith (1999a) does not clearly set it apart from the more inclusive concept of microgenesis. In his words, PG is "alternatively termed microgenesis, a process of construction of reality, proceeding from subjective stages to more and more externalized impressions, partly unconscious, abbreviated and automatized after repeated confrontations with the same stimulus" (p.347). And yet, PG and microgenesis are not interchangeable terms, even though the difference between the two concepts is subtle. Moreover, microgenesis is more inclusive; it encompasses both perception and thought (Bachmann, 2000). Smith and Hentschel (1980) pinpointed three distinct perceptgenetic emphases: process oriented, functionalistic, and psychodynamic. Thus, perceptgenesis was explicitly conceived in a personalistic and adaptational context. Within this framework, the process of identifying and making sense of a stimulus was construed as an avenue of expressing individuality by imposing meaning and structure on the basis of personal experiences (Smith, 1999b). Brown (2001) put it more succinctly: “PG is a theory both of object formation and personality” (p. viii).

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Early portions of PG are marked by subjectivity and often accompanied by affect; the end of the process objective and veridical representations clearly predominate. Perception is conceived as an event that unfolds in time while personality is viewed not as an aggregate of stable and static traits but as a process. By means of perceptgenetic techniques of stimulus presentation an attempt is made to replicate personal processes of adaptation that occur over protracted periods of time. In the course of these progressions, a person's mechanisms for coping with reality challenges and personal threats are mobilized, applied, and modified; choices are made, conflicts are resolved, and psychodynamic aspects of PG are thereby brought to the fore (Cegalis, 1984,1991). Smith, (1999b) described it as follows: (1) When focusing personality as process intrapsychic events are particularly illuminated, events which are both individually typical and recurrent; (2) The distinctive nature of a process is represented by its temporal characteristics as well as its content and intrinsic meaning; (3) These events can be studied in different time perspectives: macroor ontogenetic, meso- or serial (adaptive), and microgenetic; (4) In case these events are recurrent they are termed structures; (5) Structures, in their turn, can be described as processes with a slow rate of change (p. 269). Clearly, the perceptgenetic approach is embedded in personality, in contrast to the older ventures of studying percepts in the course of their emergence. Of the three pioneers of microgenetic investigation and research, Sander's ( 1928/1961) focus was upon perceptual development within a comprehensive holistic framework; Werner's (1948,1957) concerns were centered upon the generic features of all developmental sequences; and Gemelli's (1928) fascination was concentrated upon the interface between cognition and perception. None of these major contributors was primarily interested in microgenesis as an avenue for the exploration of individuality. In contrast to these classical contributions, the thrust of perceptgenetic research effort was from the very beginning directed at the development of innovative techniques that would be congruent with the paramount per-

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ceptgenetic objective of capturing the individually characteristic features of perception in process. Perceptgenetic Techniques Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). DMT was developed by Kragh (1955) in an attempt to apply microgenetic techniques for the systematic exploration of personality in process. To this end, thematic stimuli are presented, depicting an external but psychodynamically and symbolically significant threat to the main person, or hero, in the picture. This picture is shown to the person at 22 successive exposures, from 10 to 2000 milliseconds. Scoring is focused on the prerecognition responses to the threatening stimuli which are assumed to represent defense mechanisms, ranging from repression to reaction formation. In light of the current test manual (Kragh, 1985), DMT has demonstrated its usefulness in a variety of personnel, clinical, and personality contexts. An impressive amount of consistent validational findings has been obtained, and interscorer reliability for the various defenses has been found to be high. Specific results will be described in later sections of this chapter. Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT). MCT (Smith, Johnson, Almgren, Johanson, 2001) involves repeated presentation at tachistoscopic exposure speeds of pairs of stimuli, one of which is exposed right before the other. The first stimulus is presented at subliminal speeds. It is not recognized, but it affects the response to the subsequently exposed, clearly supraliminal, stimulus. The first stimulus is designed to represent a threat to the person who is depicted in the second stimulus. The first stimulus upon the second triggers manifestations of anxiety and/or defense in responding to the second stimulus. Applied in a variety of mental health and psychosomatic contexts, the MCT has yielded positive and replicated findings. The MCT has also produced promising results in relation to creativity, both in young adults and aged people. Both interrater and test-retest reliability has been found to be high, and validity, defined as diagnostic differentiation, has shown a high degree of correspondence to clinical criteria. Smith et al. (2001) also reported on some recently developed specialized versions of MCT, such as the Test of Flight Phobia, Test of Self Confrontation, and

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Identification Test all of which have demonstrated their diagnostic usefulness. Creative Functioning Test (CFT). CFT, as described by Smith and Carlsson (1990), consists of reproductions of still lives that are first presented tachistoscopically at gradually increasing exposure times to the point of correct recognition. Once this series of presentations is completed, the order is reversed and the stimuli are presented at ever shorter exposure times. Not clinging to the correct representation and being able to engage in subjective responses has been found to be associated with various external indicators of creativity in samples of research scientists, professional artists, university students, and children of various ages. Serial and Adaptation Measures. In addition to the above tests, which Smith (2001) has described as “genuine perceptgenetic methods” (p. 45), investigators of PG have extensively utilized a variety of measures that involve repeated and serial presentation of the same stimuli. These techniques are exemplified by the Stroop Color Word Test and Visual Aftereffects. Like the perceptgenetic techniques described above, these measures allow the experimenter to observe the process and change in the person’s response to the stimulus. However, no genesis of an actual percept occurs. For that reason, these techniques are considered in the present context to be relevant to PG, even though, in the narrow sense of the term, they are not perceptgenetic. Consequently, they will not be systematically considered in this chapter.

EARLY RESULTS OF PERCEPTGENETIC RESEARCH PG as the Third Way: Beyond Projective Tests and Personality Inventories The first accomplishment of the perceptgenetic research program was the demonstration of its relevance for practically oriented personality assessment. Since the earliest contributions by Sander (1928/1961), sporadic attempts were undertaken to construct personality tests on a microgenetic basis. These efforts, however, lacked continuity, and Draguns (1991) concluded that none of the techniques "have been investigated systematically on extensively enough to quality as tests with established psychometric properties, that is, adequate data on their reliability and validity. Thus,

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they provide a variety of choices for interested researchers. It is premature, however, to recommend any of them for individual-centered personality assessment." (p. 27) In contrast to these intermittent research forays, perceptgenetic studies have proceeded apace in a variety of applied contests for five decades. As a result of this continuous effort, a format and rationale of personality assessment has come into being that is distinct from both self-report and projective tests. The difference from the self-descriptive paper-and-pencil instruments is obvious and requires no elaboration. The features that set perceptgenetic approaches apart from projective techniques are in part overshadowed by readily apparent if superficial similarities. Both projective and perceptgenetic instruments are indirect avenues of personality appraisal; the person expresses, rather than directly reveals, his or her individuality , and does so while ostensibly being engaged in doing something else. Moreover, both of these modes of personality assessment lend themselves easily to psychodynamic interpretation. Their differences are less obvious and can be easily overlooked. Jenkin (1957) pointed out that attempting to impose meaning upon gradually emerging stimuli is an operation that is more conducive to reality testing than to an unbridled flow of fantasy. Hentschel (1980) emphasized that perceptgenetic procedures are unique in that they make possible the differentiation of phases of percept emergence, corresponding to early and late levels of personality organization. Moreover, in contrast to prominent projective tests such as the Rorschach and TAT , DMT and MCT were explicitly designed to be scored for specific defense mechanisms. Sources of Perceptgenesis: Coalescence of Influences Several developments converged to bring the perceptgenetic approach into being. Preexisting microgenetic techniques for protracting the perceptual process and retarding the identification of stimuli by tachistoscopic and other means constituted one point of departure. The availability of TAT and other thematic stimuli paved the way for the construction of visual scenes that would foster identification with the central person or hero. The new concept of perceptual defense, just introduced by Bruner and Postman (1949) at the time, offered a model of defensive operations that could be

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observed under laboratory conditions, albeit it represented an admittedly simplified replica of defenses as they occurred in real life. It should be mentioned that, in the course of discussion at the Delphi Conference on Perceptgenesis in 2000, Ulf Kragh stated that perceptual defense did not loom large as an explicit influence in the formative period of perceptgenesis. Still, it may have been part of the prevailing Zeitgeist that focused upon perception as an avenue for studying personality. More to the point, the emerging psychoanalytic ego psychology of the 1940’s and 1950's provided an explanatory framework within which a central role was accorded to defense mechanisms, a pivotal concept in perceptgenesis. These influences coalesced with William Stern’s (1918, 1938) preexisting concept of personality as an unitas multiplex, an integrated structure whose highly differentiated parts coexist in harmony or dissonance, while being inextricably bound with the supraordinate totality of the person’s experience. In Stern’s example, dreams represent the unitas multiplex of a person’s aspirations and impulses. Similarly, his or her strivings are channeled upon an emerging percept that is personally relevant and cognitively complex. As a byproduct of several decades of investigation, information has been amassed about the experience of perceptgenesis. As pointed out by Smith (1984), stabilization and automatization are the pivotal components of this progression. As Smith and Carlsson (2005) put it, perceptgenesis can be construed “as a release step by step of the objective percept from the embrace of subjectivism.” The process is experienced as saltatory rather than continuous; graphically represented, it would appear more zigzagging than linear. This observation, confirmed not only by the perceptgenetic pioneers at Lund University (cf., Smith, 2001), but across at least three generations of microgenetic researchers (cf., Bachmann, 2000; Brown, 1991; Cegalis, 1991; Flavell & Draguns, 1957; Graumann, 1959; Linschoten, 1959; Sander, 1928/1961), provides a suggestive justification for dividing perceptgeneses into stages. Of course, stage is an abstraction, but its application to perceptgenesis it is bolstered by the natural points of disruption and discontinuity that just pop into the view of perceptive observers. Another recurrent feature in perceptgenetic accounts pertains to the arousal of feelings in the early and intermediate portions of the per-

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ceptgenetic sequence. Again, this mobilization of affect progresses more erratically than cumulatively, sometimes erupting suddenly, unexpectedly, and perhaps disproportionately. Outside of PG in the narrow sense of the word, this phenomenon has been systematically demonstrated by means of GSR's (Frőhlich & Laux, 1969), evoked EEG potentials (Beck & Frohlich, 1984), other EEG indicators (Beyn, Volkov & Zhirmunskaya, 1963), and semantic differentials (Draguns, 1967; Petrenko & Vasilenko, 1977). In light of these observations, imposition of meaning that fits the structure and form of the emerging stimulus involves extension of an adaptive effort over time. Cegalis (1991) enumerated nine distinct processes in the course of microgenesis; all of them appear to apply equally to perceptgenesis: 1. Stages (or phases) of microgenetic perceptual development are described as qualitatively and quantitatively different at different microtime intervals (between absolute and differential thresholds) in terms of percept content, affective participation, and structural properties. 2. Microgenetic processes may vary in their directionality and in their end products. Percepts may be aborted in the course of microtime development, and the aborted products of this truncated development may emerge in consciousness or behavior. 3. Microgenesis, as a description of stimulus indeterminacies or stimulus representation, must be understood in terms of (1) the effect and contribution of past experience and (2) the context of personality structure and function. 4. The general quality of perceptual experience can be characterized as a progression from distorted and nonveridical to less distorted and more veridical. 5. Subjective experience can be characterized as proceeding from confusion to organized meaning and understanding. 6. Percept quality can be described as progressing from less clear to more clear. 7. Changes in the sense of subjective control over perception can be described as proceeding from alienation (egodystonic or dissocia-

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tive) to percepts identified with a sense of belonging to the self, that is, non-dissociated and self-controlled. 8. The affective experience accompanying early as opposed to later stages of perception can be characterized as a change from unpleasant high arousal to pleasant lower arousal. 9. The meaning of a percept and its verbalized referent can be said to undergo progressive differentiation and specification. When meaning is defined as verbal representation, the phenomenon of microgenesis can be quantified and given a rudimentary structural definition. (Cegalis, 1991, p. 111). In elaboration of Cegalis’ second point, it should be added that perceptgenetic experiments have provided striking, though complex, demonstrations of the impact of subliminal stimuli upon the subsequent course of PG. Thus, amauroscopic, i.e., subliminal, yet relative prolonged but low intensity, exposure of aggressively or sexually arousing pictures has led to the incorporation of DM’s against aggression and sexuality during the subsequent stages of PG (Westerlundh, 1976, 1984).

CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH: THE INCREASING VARIETY OF PERCEPTGENETIC INVESTIGATION Not unlike an actual perceptgenetic sequence, research on perceptgenesis has evolved toward differentiation, specification, stabilization, and integration. Yet, the end phase is not even in sight as new vistas are being opened and novel applications and implications continue to emerge. Below is a listing of some of the active and productive areas of study: (1) Operationalization of defense mechanisms (DM’s) in the act of their emergence by means of the DMT, MCT, and other techniques and the concerted exploration of their antecedents, correlates, and consequences goes back to Kragh's (1955) seminal investigation. The flow of subsequent studies has never abated. This effort fits in with the recrudescence of DM's in contemporary theorizing and research (e.g., Cramer, 2000; Hentschel, Smith, Draguns, & Ehlers, 2004; Sjöbäck, 1973; Vaillant, 1992,1993). It is increasingly recognized that of the multitude of psychoanalytic concepts,

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DM’s lend themselves best to operationalization. Moreover, they have yielded a coherent body of empirical findings (Draguns, 2004; Kline, 1972; Kyriazis, 1991). Perceptgenetic approaches have played an increasingly prominent role in this enterprise. (Draguns, 1991; Kline, 1988: Kragh & Smith, 1970; Smith, Kragh, & Hentschel, 1980; Smith & Hentschel, 1993: Smith & Westerlundh, 1980; Westerlundh & Smith, 1983). One of the most important conclusions derived from the accumulated perceptgenetic research is that the DM’s originally described by Freud (1894/1964) in the intrapsychic context, are also triggered in response to significant external reality threats. More broadly, perceptgenetic research results are consonant with the notion that DM’s can be activated by the experiences of incongruity, ambiguity, unanticipated change, and ultimately, chaos (Smith and Carlsson, 2005). Such activation becomes even more likely if the confusion and disorientation experienced is pertinent to the self (Draguns, 2004). Another important advance, based on perceptgenetic observations, is the specification of the relationship between the several prototypical danger situations posited in psychoanalytic theory and the specific defense strategies observed on DMT (Bäckström, Ozolins, Persson, & Sjöbäck, 1995). Over and above these findings, it is worth emphasizing that, DMT, MCT, and their several derivatives provide the opportunity for directly scoring DM's in a reliable and theoretically grounded manner. In general, percept-genetic theory has been estimated to have a low hypothesis quotient, i.e., its predictions have been found to have a high degree of testability (Madsen, 1986). (2) In addition to DM's, MCT can be scored for anxiety, (Smith et al, 2001; Smith & Carlsson, 2005). Four levels of anxiety are distinguished in the MCT threat series. These levels of anxiety have been studied in relation to their antecedents, either spontaneously occurring or deliberately provoked by the experimenter (e.g., Westerlundh, 1984) and in their interplay with a variety of defense mechanisms. Anxiety is not directly scored on the DMT (Smith & Hentschel, 2004). At the risk of simplification, it can be said that anxiety is expressed in perceptgenetic procedures through the communication of distress and helplessness, as well as through symbolic representations of threat. By contrast to anxiety, defenses become manifest mainly through perceptual distortions and transformations. The vicissi-

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tudes of both anxiety and defense, in the course of PG have been thoroughly investigated from early childhood through adolescence (Smith & Danielsson, 1982). (3) Two early reports (Kragh, 1955; Smith & Kragh, 1955) documented striking parallels between the chronology of biographical events and the sequence of their representation in the perceptgenetic series. Subsequently, this phenomenon was further scrutinized on the case level by Kragh (1986) who formulated explicit predictions about the occurrence and sequence of specific events in a person's life experience on the basis of their appearance on DMT. More recently, Westerlundh and Terjestam (1990) focused on women who had experienced loss of their mothers through divorce. They were able to confirm a trend toward the correspondence of this loss between PG and the year in life in which separation from mother had occurred. Of a total of 38 predictive statements, Kragh (1986) in his study was able to confirm 28 on the basis of the person's recollections. These findings go far beyond the formal correspondence between ontogenesis and microgenesis postulated in Werner's (1957) orthogenetic principle. Not surprisingly, they have provoked a great deal of skepticism. Yet, reports of perceptgenesis recapitulating biographical events have survived the imposition of methodological safeguards against suggestion and other artifacts. When and why do these phenomena occur? This question should guide further systematic research by blending Kragh’s pioneering, innovative and flexible, approaches with new research designs that permit the investigation of complex and seemingly intractable phenomena. (4) Hentschel (1980) extended perceptgenetic research to the investigation of cognitive styles in relation to the DMT. He was able to demonstrate substantia1 canonical correlations between isolation and adaptation to interference tasks and to the low productivity of free associations as well as between projection and sharpening. The relationship between repression and cognitive styles proved to be more complex, and consistent positive correlations with the cognitive style of leveling that were hypothesized on the basis of ego-psychology, failed to materialize. Also relevant to this issue are the studies that have sought to correlate DMT and MCT scores with the regulative styles observed in serial procedures such as the Color Word Test (e.g., Rubino & Siracusano, 2004). These perceptgenetic ef-

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forts constitute the most systematic attempts extant to discover links between the stylistic and defensive aspects of adaptation. (5) Another novel line of research has been opened by Ozolins (1989) who studied defense patterns in relation to bodily movements and other modes of nonverbal behavior. On the DMT, distinct modes of correlates were established between these variables and the two distinct and often contrasting defenses of isolation and repression. This contrast was especially striking when the threatening vs. neutral character of the situation was taken into account. As hypothesized, repressors tended to be generally more motorically restless while persons relying upon isolation as their principal defense exhibited motoric rigidity and “froze” in the face of stress. (6) One of the earliest and most remarkable achievements of the DMT was its ability to predict success and failure in military pilot training (cf., Kragh, 1970), a finding that was subsequently extended and confirmed on the basis of accident records in Sweden (Neuman, 1978) and Greece (Kyriazis, 1991). Successful and unsuccessful pilot candidates were characterized by distinctive progressions of DM's. This conclusion was found to be applicable to other stressful military and civilian occupations such as long distance truck drivers (Svensson & Trygg, 1994) and naval attack divers (Vaernes, 1982). Moreover, defensive functioning has been found to vary with the nature of danger and the occupational context. Thus, perceptgenetic instrumentation has carved a unique niche in providing predictors of performance in occupations that have the reputation of posing formidable challenges for personnel selection. (7) In the clinical context, a lot of information has been gathered, beginning with Kragh's (1955) identification of the characteristic DM's of obsessive compulsives. By this time, data on DM’s are also available for conversion disorders (Sundbom, Binzer, & Kullgren, 1999), depressives (Kyriazis & Karaminas, 1986), hysterics vs. obsessive compulsives (Nilsson, 1983), eating disorders (Gitzinger, 1993), borderline personalities (Sundbom, & Armelius, 1992), suicidal individuals (Fribergh, TräskmanBenz, Öjehagen, & Regnell, 1992), and several other syndromes. Psychosomatic disorders have been prominent topics of recent perceptgenetic research (e.g., Hennigsson, 1999), and the relevance of perceptgenetic tech-

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niques for neuropsychological differentiation has been persuasively asserted by CarIsson, Lilja, Smith, and Johanson (1991). (8) Inverted perceptgenesis has proved to be a prominent and productive avenue for the study of creativity (Hentschel & Schneider, 1986; Smith, 1999a; Smith & Carlsson, 1990; Smith & Carlsson, in press). On the Creative Functioning Test (CFT), Lund University researchers have found, that serial presentation from clarity to disappearance provides useful data pertaining to creativity. Noncreative individuals tend to cling to the, previously seen, clear representation; creative persons realize new possibilities by structuring the vanishing image. This finding has been validated against consensual criteria of creativity in a variety of scientific and artistic endeavors. Perceptgenetic research on creativity has been embedded in a systematic multimethod program of studies pursued at Lund University for more than a decade. (Smith & Carlsson, in press). It is worth noting that the course of Gestalt decomposition and disappearance was observed and described by Gemelli (1928) and Sander (1939/1962b), without, however, either of these pioneering contributors recognizing the potential of “microgenesis in reverse” for differential psychology and, in particular, for the assessment of creativity. (9) A new and surprising extension of perceptgenetic methodology involves cross-cultural research. It is exemplified by a study by Sundbom, Jacobsson, Kullgren, and Penayo (1998) in which normal, schizophrenic, and borderline individuals were compared by means of the DMT in Sweden and Nicaragua. As a result, perceptgenetic measures have demonstrated their relevance for the resolution of basic issues at the interface of culture and psychopathology. Proceeding from this foundation, it would be interesting to explore the relationship of perceptgenetically established DM’s to cultural dimensions, such as those that have emerged from Hofstede’s (2001) multivariate worldwide comparisons. In particular, his construct of uncertainty avoidance intuitively appears to be relevant to perceptgenetic operations, which centrally involve coping with ambiguity and complexity. Moreover, are there detectable differences in PG between individualistic and collectivistic cultures and between masculine and feminine ones? Hofstede’s (2001) recent integration of several decades of research inspired by his original investigation contains a treasure trove of

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hypotheses some of which may be applicable to PG. No simple, clear-cut differentiation across cultures is anticipated, but complex, yet meaningful, interactions are expected to emerge. (10) When perceptgenetic research was initiated, available research designs were geared to hypothesis testing of well developed concepts by means of neat, objective data. Analysis of variance reigned supreme, especially in North America. There was a manifest disjunction between prevailing modes of statistical analysis and typical perceptgenetic data. In the ensuing decades, perceptgenetic researchers have both sought and developed modes of data analysis congruent with their research problems and objectives. In particular, the soft modeling approach described by Henningsson (1999) fits the requirements of many PG research problems. Henningsson has described some of the specific techniques for applying soft modeling such as principal component analysis and partial least squares of latent structures, both of which have already been successfully utilized in perceptgenetic research. (11) In the fifty years since their emergence, perceptgenetic techniques have virtually traversed the progression from research tools to clinically applicable measures. During the Conference on Perceptgenesis in Delphi, it was fascinating to hear about specific perceptgenetic observations in a variety of clinical contexts. Little of this information is as yet available to the professional public at large. Together with the accumulated research findings, such clinical reports would further facilitate the use of perceptgenetic measures in concrete “real life” situations for the benefit of actual help seekers.

LOOKING AHEAD: AN EXPANDED AGENDA FOR PERCEPTGENETIC RESEARCH A cursory review of perceptgenetic research has been completed, albeit with gaps and omissions. What are the future tasks for this continuing enterprise? Below is the listing of some of the issues that demand being tackled and resolved. (1) Perhaps the major perceptgenetic contribution has been the operationalization of emerging DM’s in response to a gradually appearing

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threat. Proceeding from this foundation, an ambitious challenge is to make the entire sequence of threat-conflict-defense sequence (Smith & Hentschel, 1993) observable. To this end, verbal reports of perceptgenesis should be supplemented by a number of psychophysiological indicators of reactivity, as anticipated for example in the study by Frőhlich and Laux (1969) and implemented in research on cortical slow potentials (contingent negative variations) in relation to attention control (Glantzmann & Frőhlich, 1986), in studies of evoked potentials as unconscious indicators of cognitive control (Ehlers & Munz, 1986), and in observations of variations of EEG alpha waves before and during the recognition of visual stimuli (Emrich & Heinemann, 1966). Indeed, potentially useful biological measures are legion, even though each of them comes with specific problems and difficulties of incorporating it into the experience of perceptgenesis without disrupting its course. Moreover, the originators of PG have explicitly placed it within a biological framework (cf., Smith, 1954, 1991, 1999b, 2001). Concurrently, a neuropsychologically oriented current of microgenetic thought has come into being and has gathered momentum during the last three decades (Brown, 1977, 1988, 1991; Hanlon, 1991). Further steps toward integration of perceptgenetic research with these trends would be salutary. More recently, perceptgenetic researchers have actively and sequentially pursued the search for points of contact with new procedures, such as regional Cerebral Blood Flow, Positron Emission Tomography, and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (cf. Hentschel, Smith, & Draguns, 2004). Respiration, lateralization, cardiac and skin relativity, and endocrine parameters are being studied by means of these indicators in relation to DMT, MCT, and other perceptgenetic measures. Cegalis (1991) has proposed a specific model for bridging the gap between the phenomenal transformations observed in perceptgenesis and the psychophysiological and neuropsychological processes that accompany and underlie these changes. A volume has been devoted to exploring the interface between subliminal perception and supraliminal microgenesis including PG (Hentschel, Smith, & Draguns, 1986). Along similar lines, Lieberman (1974) has taken steps toward extending the microgenetic progression below the absolute threshold. He thereby initiated the investigation of sub-

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liminal perception as a prestage of microgenesis (cf., Draguns, 1986); such efforts can be extended, for example to the DMT stimuli. (2) At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact that the gist of PG is the emergence, evolution, alternation, elaboration, and enrichment of meaning. It is a process in which affect and cognition vie for dominance and are eventually integrated at the service of coming to grips with a segment of reality that is difficult to apprehend instantaneously. This phenomenon is only partially captured by the verbal description upon which researchers have traditionally relied. Its supplementation by drawings and sketches, initiated in the early days of perceptgenesis (Kragh, 1955), should be further developed and systematized. In addition to it, systematic information should be collected not only about denotative but also about connotative meaning of the stimuli at all stages of their presentation. This has been done by Draguns (1966) and by Petrenko and Vasilenko (1977) who found that affect shifts tend to precede changes in the perception of picture. This conclusion is broadly consonant with Zajonc’s (1980, 1984) formulation that assigns primacy of affect over cognition and precedence of preferences over inferences in a variety of operations that require personal judgment. In a more elaborate fashion, Kreitler and Kreitler (1984) proposed 21 dimensions of meaning assignment, and these attributions could be systematically investigated across perceptgenesis, subject to overcoming technical and practical difficulties in simultaneously collecting information of such scope and complexity. (3) The question of what motivates perceptgenesis has rarely been broached and never fully answered (Draguns, 1983). The heuristic principle proposed by Linschoten (1959) may in part guide such progressions, and the old formulations of German holistic psychologists ( cf. Herrmann, 1976) about the pull toward meaning deserve a searching second look. In going beyond these formulations and postulating more explicit motivational mainsprings, perceptgenetic instruments such as DMT provide an almost ideal arena of exploration. To act on the basis of incomplete information is an adaptive imperative (Bleger, 1967). Waiting for all the facts to be there before commitment or decision is a self-defeating and ineffectual strategy of adaptation. Perceptgenetic procedures then may provide a

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miniature replica of personal coping with the ubiquitous ambiguity of human condition. (4) Perceptgenetic scoring systems started out with the catalogue of the classic defense mechanisms going back to Anna Freud (1946). In the meantime, additional defense mechanisms have been described and named (Draguns, 2004). A welcome development is the operationalization of some of these more recently introduced mechanisms, as exemplified by the criteria for splitting, mirroring, and idealization proposed and applied by Kyriazis and Karamlinas (1986) in their research on depression. Independently, Nilsson (1995) formulated scoring criteria for splitting and several other primitive DM’s prominent in borderline personality disorders. So far, however, there have been no attempts to operationalize the higher level defenses such as altruism, humor, suppression, anticipation, and sublimation (Vaillant, 1992). Are these defenses encountered in the course of PG, in particular with the stimuli as they are currently constituted? This is a question that could be potentially answered, especially by investigating PG protocols of individuals above the average in personal maturity and in coping with stress. (5) Historically, DMT and other perceptgenetic techniques did not originate as standard psychometric tests. Consequently, they were not validated on a succession of random or representative samples. Indeed, in light of the perceptgenetic investigators’ orientation and objectives, such a procedure would be pointless. As data have accumulated, so has information on reliability and validity. Current MCT (Smith et al., 2001) and DMT (Kragh, 1985) manuals contain relevant normative findings on normal and pathological samples that are comparable to those on other tests. Additional data are not so much needed on test norms as on differences in DM’s and other scorable variables across demographic lines. For example, Gitzinger (1988, 1991) is one of the few researchers who has raised the question of gender differences in DM’s. It would also be interesting to ascertain variations in perceptgenetic scores across age, years of schooling, and socioeconomic class. (6) Proceeding in the opposite direction, one can envisage increasing individualization of perceptgenetic techniques, with “custom-made” stimuli eventually devised for a specific person in a specific situation. Stepping-

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stones to that end are the construction of such measures as the Test of Flight Phobia, Test of Self Confrontation, Identification Test (Smith et al., 2001), and Perceptgenetic Object Relations Test (Smith, 2001). A further step is suggested by the procedures of an overlooked study on subliminal perception by Emrich and Heinemann (1966) who ascertained, by means of inquiry and free association, personally arousing emotional stimuli for each of their participants. Similarly, it is not past imagining that an artist could create a picture representing a threat described by the client in the course of the interview. Specific themes and features of stimuli could also be computer generated. Such pictorial stimuli could then be presented tachistoscopically, by means of the meta-contrast procedure, or by other techniques of stimulus impoverishment or protraction. Appropriate analyses for N=1 could then be applied, as Kragh (1986) has already done in his case studies of micro-macro correspondence. (7) While perceptgenetic research has been systematically implemented since the 1950’s, experimentation on microgenesis in the broader sense of the term has also proceeded apace, more fitfully and in spurts rather than continuously. What this effort has yielded must be pinpointed and assessed in order to integrate it with the store of perceptgenetic research. The pursuit of such an ambitious goal is beyond the scope of the present chapter. However, a limited number of research based conclusions on microgenesis can be identified. The first of these comes from the systematic study of the neurophychological aspects of microgenesis (Brown, 1991; Hanlon, 1991), and it calls into question some widely shared conclusions of an earlier era. Graumann (1959), for example, dismissed the idea of a temporal phasic development of standard, apparently instantaneous percept as phenomenologically untenable. Now neuropsychological indicators have accumulated that point to a process that is extended across micro time and has affinities with the theoretically postulated, prototypical microgenetic or perceptgenetic sequence as specified by Cegalis (1991) and Smith (2001). These findings suggest that perceptgenesis is not an artificial or atypical progression, but that it is germane to the understanding of a broad range of perceptual activity. The other conclusion comes from Bachmann’s (2001) thorough and perceptive analysis of microgenetic experimentation. It points to organic growth rather than to a logical “com-

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puterlike” decision tree of sequential judgments in the course of microgenesis. Finally, Gicksohn’s, (1995) model posits a succession of multiple drafts of experience in the course of perceptual process, and as such is directly relevant to perceptgenesis. (8) A perceptive critic (Prinz, 1986) has identified three basic – and controversial – tenets that underlie PG as a theoretical framework and research enterprise. Briefly stated, they posit that perception is an active, transformative, and elective process rather than a passive, automatic, and instantaneous reaction. Assumptions cannot be proved nor are they subject to refutation. They can, however, be scrutinized for the extent of their congruence with the available and pertinent facts. Research findings on PG, as recapitulated in part in this chapter, document their substantial consistency with the above three premises. What remains contestable is the notion that the experimental techniques devised to investigate PG reproduce real-life perceptual processes. However, contemporary exponents of PG (e.g., Smith, 2001) explicitly construe PG as a reconstruction rather than a replica, of percept emergence. Findings reviewed herein can be regarded as pertaining to a variety of perceptual activities that require effort and time, a position that is acceptable to both sympathetic and more critical analysts of PG (Madsen, 1986; Prinz, 1986). (9) The amount and variety of knowledge gained about and through perceptgenesis is impressive; the impact of these findings upon practical and applied pursuits has been substantial; and the outlook for new advances and discoveries is promising. One may ask then why perceptgenetic concepts and findings have not yet become part and parcel of the core conceptualization of psychology. It is extraordinary that an otherwise erudite and perceptive review of the current status of defense mechanisms in psychology (Cramer, 2000) contains no mention of perceptgenetic contributions. Similarly, two recent encyclopedias of psychology (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2001: Kazdin, 2000) have no entries for either microgenesis of perceptgenesis. This state of affairs, deplorable though it may be, poses a dual challenge. Psychologists of other outlooks should take increasing note of the yield of perceptgenetic research, and contributors to perceptgenesis must intensify their efforts to integrate their conclusions and insights into the unified structure of psychology.

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REFERENCES Bäckström, M., Ozolins, A., Persson, B., & Sjöbäck, H. (1995). Dangersituations and defence strategies. Psychol.Res.Bull.: 35, (2). Bachmann, T. (2000). Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Beck, R. & Froehlich, W. D. (1984). Visual evoked potentials in a microgenetic task of object recognition. In: Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality, ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G., Draguns, & U.Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp. 247-262. Beyn, E. S., Zhirmunskaya, E. A., & Volkov, V. N. (1967). Electroencephalographic investigations in the process of recognizing images of objects during their tachistoscopic presentation I. Neuropsychologia, 5: 203217. Bleger, J. (1967). Simbiosis y Ambiguëdad (Symbiosis and ambiguity). Buenos Aires: Paidos. Brown, J. W. (1977). Mind, Brain, and Consciousness. New York: Academic Press. Brown, J. W. (1988). The Life of the Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Brown, J. W. (1991). Self and Process. Brain States and the Conscious Present. New York: Springer-Verlag. Brown, J. W. (2001). Foreword. In: G. J. W. Smith The Process Approach to Personality. New York: Kluwer/Plenum, pp.v-xiv. Bruner, J. S. & Postman, L. (1949). Perception, cognition, and behavior. J Pers., 18: 14-31. Carlsson, I., Lilja, Å., Smith, G. J. W., & Johanson, A. M. (1991). Application of a perceptgenetic methodology to neuropsychology. In: Cognitive Microgenesis: A Neuropsychological Perspective, ed. R. E . Hanlon. New York: Springer, pp. 106-121 Cegalis, J. A. (1984). On the role of conflict in microgenesis. In: Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality, ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp. 107125.

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Cegalis, J. A. (1991). Microgenesis: A genesis from prototheory to general psychology. In . Cognitive Microgenesis: A neuropsychological perspective, ed. R. E. Hanlon. New York: Springer, pp. 106-131. Craighead, E. W. & Nemeroff, C. (Eds.) (2001). Encyclopedia of Psychology and Neuroscience. New York: Wiley. Cramer, P. (2000). Defense mechanisms in psychology today. Amer.Psychol., 55: 637-646. Draguns, J. G. (1967). Affective meaning of reduced stimulus input: A study by means of the semantic differential. Canad. J.Psychol, 21: 231241. Draguns, J. G. (1981). Why microgenesis? An inquiry on the motivational sources of going beyond the information given. Arch. Psychol., 135, 5-16. Draguns, J. G. (1984). Microgenesis by any other name…In: Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality , ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, J. G. & U. Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp 3-18. Draguns, J. G. (1986). Subliminal perception as the first stage of the perceptual process: Can personality be revealed so early in the sequence? In: The Roots of Perception, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.331-352. Draguns, J. G. (1991). Microgenetic techniques of personality assessment. In: Cognitive Microgenesis: A Neuropsychological Perspective, ed. R.E. Hanlon. New York; Springer-Verlag, pp. 286-315. Draguns, J. G. (2004). Defense mechanisms in the clinic, the laboratory, and the social world: Toward closing the gaps. In: Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 55-76. Ehlers, W. & Munz, D. (1986). Evoked potentials as unconscious indicators of cognitive control. In: The Roots of Perception, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 361-380. Emrich, H. & Heinemann, L. G. (1966). EEG bei unterschwelliger Wahrnehmung emotional bedeutsamer Worter (EEG in subliminal perception of emotionally significant words). Psychol. Forsch., 29: 285296.

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Flavell, J. H. & Draguns, J. G. (1957). A microgenetic approach to perception and thought. Psychol. Bull., 54, 197-217. Freud, A. (1946). The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, S. (1894). The neuro-psychoses of defense. Standard Edition, 3: 45-61. London: Hogarth Press, 1964. Fribergh, H., Träskman-Bendz, L. Ojehagen, A., & Regnell, G. (1992). The Meta-Contrast Technique: A projective test predicting suicide. Acta Psychiat. Scand, 86, 473-477. Froehlich, W. D. (1984). Microgenesis as a functional approach to information processing through search. In: Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality, ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp.19-52. Froehlich, W. D. & Laux, L. (1969). Serielles Wahrnehmen, Aktualgenese, Informationsintengration und Orientierungsreaktion: I. Aktualgenetisches Modell und Orientierungsreaktion [Serial perception, microgenesis, and integration of information during orienting reaction: I. Microgenetic model and orienting reaction]. Z. Exp.Angew. Psychol.,. 16, 250-277. Gemelli, A. (1928). Il comparire e il scomparire delle forme (Appearance and disappearance of Gestalten). Contributi di Laboratorio della Psicologia e Biologia, Università del Sacro Cuore, 3, 385-436. Gitzinger, I. (1988). Operationalisierung von Abwehrmechanismen (Operationalization of defense mechanisms) Unpublished diploma thesis, University of Freiburg, Germany. Gitzinger, I. (1993). Defense styles in eating disorders. In: The concept of defense mechanisms in contemporary psychology , eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith. W. Ehlers, & J.G. Draguns. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 404411. Glanzmann, P. G., & Fröhlich, W. D. (1986). Anxiety and covert changes of attention control. In: The roots of perception, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 381-400. Glicksohn, J. (1995). Multiple drafts of subjective experience viewed within a microgenetic framework for cognition and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,18: 807-808.

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Graumann, C. F. (1959). Aktualgenese. Die deskriptiven Grundlagen und theoretische Wandlungen des aktualgenetischen Forschungsansatzes. Z.Exp.Angew.Psychol. 6, 473-499. Hanlon, R. E. (Ed.). Cognitive Microgenesis: A Neuropsychological Perspective. New York: Springer-Verlag. Henningsson, M. (1999). Defensive Strategies in PsychosomaticGroups: A Soft Modeling Approach to Defense Mechanism Test Data. Umea, Sweden: Department of Applied Psychology, Umea University. Hentschel, U. (1980). Kognitive Kontrollprinzipien und Neuroseformen (Cognitive styles and types of neurosis). In: Experimentelle Personlichkeitspsychologie, ed. U. Hentschel. & G. Smith. Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, pp.227-321. Hentschel, U. & Schneider, U. (1986). Psychodynamic personality correlates of creativity. In: ). The Roots of Perception, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.249-271. Hentschel, U., Smith, G., & Draguns, J. G. (Eds.) (1986). The Roots of Perception. Amsterdam: North Holland. Hentschel, U., Smith, G., & J. G Draguns (2004). Defense mechanisms and their psychophysiological correlates. In: Defense mechanisms: Theoretical, research, and clinical perspectives, ed. U. Hentschel , G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.611-634. Herrmann, T. (1976). Ganzheitspsychologie und Gestaltpsychologie (Holistic psychology and Gestalt psychology). In: Die Psychologie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Band 1, Die europäische Tradition. Zurich: Kindler-Verlag, pp. 573-658. Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s Consequences. Comparing Values, Behaviors Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations (Second edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Kazdin, A. (Ed.) (2000). Encyclopedia of Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. Kline, P. (1987). The scientific status of the DMT. Brit. J. Med. Psychol., 60:, 53-59. Kline, P. (2004). A critical perspective on defense mechanisms. In: Defense Mechanisms, Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, ed.

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U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 43-54. Kragh, U. (1955). The Actual-Genetic Model of Perception-Personality. Lund: Gleerup. Kragh, U. (1970). Parallelisms between percept-genesis and onto-genesis. In: Percept-Genetic Analysis, ed U. Kragh & G. Smith. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup, pp. 135-150 Kragh, U. (1985). The Defense Mechanism Test Manual. Stockholm: Persona. Kragh, U. (1986). Life panorama under the microscope. A paradigmatic case study. In: The Roots of Perception, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 145-160. Kragh, U. & Smith G. J. W. (Eds.) (1970). Percept-Genetic Analysis. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup. Kreitler, S., & Kreitler, H. (1984a). Meaning assignment in perception. In: Psychological processes in cognition and personality , ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp. 173-192. Kyriazis, D. A. (1991). Personality aspects in aircraft accidents. Proceedings at the Air Forces Flight Safety Committee Europe, Athens, October 1991. Kyriazis, D. A. & Karaminas, N. (1986). A study of perceptual defences in depression detected by means of a perceptgenetic technique (D.M.T.). Hellenic Armed Forces Medical Review, 20 (Suppl. 1). Lieberman, H. J. (1974). A study of the relationship between developmentally determined personality and associated thought styles and tachistoscopic exposure time as reflected in conflict resolution. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The Pennsylvania State University. Linschoten, J. (1959). Aktualgenese und heuristisches Prinzip. Z.Exp.Angew.Psychol, 6, 449-473. Madsen, K.B. (1986). A metatheoretical analysis of the percept-genetic personality theory. In: The Roots of Perception, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 447-454.

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Neuman, T. (1978). Dimensionering och validering av perceptgenesens försvarsmekanismer. En hierarkisk analys av piloters stressbeteende. FAOrapport nr. C55020-H6. Nilsson, A. (1983b). Application of a percept-genetic approach to separation and oedipal conflict problems in primitive-hysteria and obsessivecompulsive neurosis. Arch.Psychol, 135-148. Nilsson, A. (1995). Differentiation between patients with schizophrenia and borderline disorders in the Perceptgenetic Object-Relation Test (PORT). Brit. J.Med. Psychol.,68, 287-309. Ozolins, A. R. (1989). Defence Patterns and Non-Communicative Body Movements. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Petrenko, V. F., & Vasilenko, S. V. (1977). O pertseptsivnoi kategorizatsii (On perceptual categorization). Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seriya Psikhologiya, 14(1), 26-34. Prinz, W. (1986). Looking at some New Look problems from an information processing point of view. In: The Roots of Perception, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J.G. Draguns. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 419-427. Rubino, I.A. & Siracusano, A. (2004). Regulative styles and defenses: Some relationships between the Serial Color-Word Test and the Defense Mechanism Test. In: Defense Mechanisms in Contemporary Psychology: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.415-431 Sander, F. (1962a). Experimentelle Ergebnisse der Gestaltpsychologie (Experimental results of Gestalt psychology). In: Ganzheitspsychologie, eds. F. Sander & H. Volkelt. Munich: Beck’sche Verlagshandlung, pp.73112 (originally published in 1928). Sander, F. (1962b). Gestaltwerden und Gestaltzerfall (Genesis and breakup of gestalten). In: Ganzheitspsychologie, eds. F. Sander & H. Volkelt. Munich: Beck’sche Verlagshandlung, pp. 113-118 (originally published in 1939). Sjöbäck, H. (1973). The Psychoanalytic Theory of Defensive Processes. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup. Smith, G. (1949). Psychological studies in twin differences with reference to afterimage and eidetic phenomena as well as more general personality

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characteristics. Studia Psychologica et Paedagogica, Series altera, Investigationes III. Smith, G. (1952). Development as a psychological reference system, Psychol.Rev., 59: 363-369. Smith, G. (1954). The place of physiological constructs in a genetic explanatory system. Psychol Rev., 61: 73-76. Smith, G. (1957). Visual perception – an event over time. Psychol.Rev. 64: 306-313. Smith, G. (1984). Stabilization and automatization of perceptual activity over time. In: Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality, ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel. New York: Hemisphere, pp. 135-142. Smith, G. (1999a). Perceptgenesis. In: Encyclopedia of Creativity. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, pp. 347-354. Smith, G. (1999b). Trait and process in personality theory: Defined within two contemporary research traditions. Scand. J. Psychol., 40: 269-276. Smith, G. (2001). The Process Approach to Personality: Perceptgeneses and Kindred Approaches in Focus. New York: Kluwer/Plenum. Smith, G. & Carlsson, I. (1990). The creative process. A functional model based on empirical studies from early childhood to middle age. Psychological Issues, Monograph, 57, New York: International Universities Press. Smith, G. & Carlsson, I. (2005). Subjective prerequisites for the construction of an objective world. In: Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception, ed. R.D. Ellis & N. Newton, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp.3-21. Smith, G. & Carlsson, I. (in press). Creativity under the northern lights: Perspectives from Scandinavia. In: International Handbook of Creativity, eds. G. Kaufmann & R. Sternberg. New York: Cambridge University Press. Smith, G. & Danielsson, A. (1982). Anxiety and defensive strategies in childhood and adolescence. Psychological Issues, Monograph, 52. New York: International Universities Press. Smith, G. & Hentschel, U. (1993). Percept-genetic methodology. In: The Concept of Defense Mechanisms in Contemporary Psychology: Theoreti-

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cal,Research, and Clinical Perspectives, ed. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, W. Ehlers, & J.G. Draguns. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 101-121. Smith, G., Johnson, G., Almgren, P. E., Johanson, A. (2001). MCT manual. The Meta-Contrast Technique. Lund, Sweden: Department of Psychology, Lund University. Smith, G. & Kragh, U. (1955). Do micro-genetic sequences reflect life history? Acta Psychologica, 11, 504-512. Smith, G., Kragh, U., & Hentschel, U. (1980). Historische und methodologische Übersicht. (Historical and methodological survey). In Experimentelle Persönlichkeitspsychologie , ed. U. Hentschel & G. Smith. Wiesbaden, Germany: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, pp. 31-63. Smith, G. & Westerlundh, B. (1980). Perceptgenesis: A process perspective on perception-personality. Rev. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 1: 94-124. Stern, W. (1918). Person und Sache: System der philosophischen Weltanschauung. Zweiter Band: Die menschliche Persönlichkeit (Person and object: System of a philosophical worldview, Second Volume: Human personality). Leipzig: Barth. Stern, W. (1938). General Psychology from a Personalistic Standpoint (translated by H. D. Soerl). New York: Macmillan. Sundbom, E., & Armelius, B-Å. (1992). Reaction to DMT as related to psychotic and borderline personality organization. Scand. J.Psychol., 33: 178-188. Sundbom, E., Binzer, M. & Kullgren, G. (1999). Psychological defense strategies according to the Defense Mechanism Test among patients with severe conversion disorder. Psychother. Res., 9(2): 194-208. Sundbom, E., Jacobsson, L., Kullgren, G., & Penayo, U. (1998). Personality and defenses: A cross-cultural study of psychiatric patients and healthy individuals in Nicaragua and Sweden, Psychol.Rep., 83: 1331-1347. Svensson, B. & Trygg, L. (1994). Personlighet, Olycksbenägenhet och Yrkesanpassning (Personality, accident proneness, and work adaptation). Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Vaernes, R. J. (1982). The Defence Mechanism Test predicts inadequate performance under stress. Scand. J. Psychol., 23: 37-43. Vaillant, G. E. (1992). Ego Mechanisms of Defense. Washington: American Psychiatric Associaton.

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Werner, H. (1948). Comparative Psychology of Mental Development. New York: International Universities Press. Werner, H. (1957). The concept of development from a comparative and organismic point of view. In: The Concept of Development, ed. D.B. Harris. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 125-147. Werner, H. (1976). Aggression, Anxiety, and Defense. Lund, Gleerup. Werner, H. (1984). Perceptgenesis and the experimental study of conflict and defense. In: Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality , ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp. 145-164. Werner, H. & Smith, G. (1983). Percept-genesis and the psychodynamics of perception. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 6: 597-640. Werner, H. & Terjestam, Y. (1990). Memory activation and perceptual processing: On the idea of microgeny/ontogeny correspondence. Psychol. Res. Bull. 30(6). Zajonc, R.B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. Amer. Psychol., 35: 151-175. Zajonc, R.B. (1984). On the primacy of affect. Amer. Psychol., 39: 117123.

3. A MOSAIC OF SEVEN PERCEPTGENETIC THEMES Ulf Kragh This paper pays attention to a number of crucial problems that could be successfully tested by means of percept-genetic methodology, or have already been preliminarily tested with promising results. Reference is mostly made to the author’s own invention, the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). One problem is how very early stages in a micro-process should be understood, another how the succession of meanings in such a series relates to life history, a challenging but controversial theme. In the third section the mindbody question is briefly touched, and in the fourth section an intriguing experiment on lying is suggested. Aggression is an issue discussed in section 5 and the defense of repression in section 6, partly in comparison with the defense of isolation. Finally, in section 7, the often neglected issue of color is taken up.

A MOSAIC OF SEVEN PERCEPTGENETIC THEMES The following seven topics are all related to the perceptgenetic (PG) frame. The first three of them are loosely interconnected, whereas the remaining four stand more isolated. Only brief presentations will be given here. 1. Associations and pre-stages of perception This issue was raised at the very beginning of PG ("actual genetic") research, but in spite of its essential implications, the early experiments in the late fourties, performed by J. Flensburg, have not been repeated. Flensburg's aim was to investigate the "association of likeness". He presented, in the tachistoscope, about 30 slides with photos of faces (three ages: children, grown-ups, and old people, and of both sexes) ten times each from 1/50th to 1/2 seconds, and in random order. After a few months, all photos were shown separately at "full time” and the subjects were asked to tell whether they had seen them before. Provided the answer was negative, they were encouraged to report any association that might appear. One pre-

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liminary finding was that the contents of the associations very frequently seemed to coincide with reports obtained from the early tachistoscopic presentations of the photo in question, and that these contents were closely related to early experiences in the subject's life, sometimes even layered in chronological order. Two preliminary statements could be formulated: (1) Pre-stages of perception ordered in a PG mode (P-phases), are equivalents of associations, the latter being normally reconstructed after the establishment of perception/recognition, and (2) the order of P-phases (in tachistoscopic PGs) correspond temporally with the subject's historical development. The first point is, of course important for bridging the gap between the psychology of perception and the conceptual and methodological frames of psychoanalysis. Early PG experiments by Kragh (1955) demonstrated a shortage of P-phases in compulsive subjects compared with a control group. This is in agreement with clinical findings of the difficulties compulsive persons have in producing free associations (cf, e.g., Fenichel, 1955). The second point, the "parallellistic", or "micro-macro" hypothesis, has even more far-reaching implications. 2. The "parallelistic" hypothesis, and some notes on memory. There are a few psychologists who accept, while the majority reject this hypothesis; there also exists only a rather limited number of investigations with direct relevance, five of them my own (Kragh, 1955, 1970 a and c, 1984, 1986) , and another two by Kyriazis and Karaminas (1986), and by Westerlundh and Terjestam (1990). However, many formulations in recent PG literature seem to imply some acceptance of the "parallellistic" hypothesis. One major contra-indication would stem from the fact that it is deviant from "common sense" - and foreign to most paradigms in psychology. Yet already Werner (1957) maintained that in tachistoscopic experiments and what he called "microgenesis" ' there is a development in stages from less differentiated (diffus) and less articulated (komplex) visual informations towards differentiated (gegliedert) and articulated (abgehoben) ones, and that these stages correspond to ontogenetic development in experi-

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ments with children (Hemmendinger, 1953). The approach, however, was restricted by almost exclusive reference to "general psychology" and the use of geometrical stimuli or line drawings (just in one case Rorschach cards). Even Werner himself could not understand how to link reports from a tachistoscopic experiment with the temporally stratified exploration of a single personality (personal communication). A similar conceptualization also characterized the "Leipzig school": Krueger (1924) and Sander (1930), the former, however, transgressing the limits of "pure" phenomenological description of visual contents in his Strukturpsychologie, both of them underlining the close interrelations between cognitive and emotional components in early phases of the Aktualgenese. It is true that many restrictions and exceptions impede the assessment of the parallellistic hypothesis. Such factors are in first hand (provided technology is OK): retesting before the lapse of some months - one year; too directive instructions; the subject's paucity of verbal expressson; her or his tendency to report only what was seen clearly, with full conviction; defenses that stamp all or most of the contents of the P-phases, e.g., "the sculpture of an old man" as the only contents in a whole series using the DMT (Defense Mechanism Test). The hypothesis in question is closely related to a general theory of memory. In contrast to the venerable simile of "memory traces" written on a wax tablet, given by Plato in his dialogue Menon, and re-modernized many times thereafter, PG theory tries to conceptualize - and operationalize memory in terms of one or many PG series. This implies reference to a genuinely psychological frame, not recurring to analogies taken from "modern" neuro-physiology (which has, of course, methods and concepts of its own). A PG with a father-son picture motif for example would, under "favorable" conditions, recapitulate a (male) subject's relationship with his father, temporally layered, in abridged form, and mostly organized according to primary process. The emotionally most loaded and most important phases of his life would come to the fore in the contents of one or more early phases. This theory admits the possibility that personality - including all memories - may be "condensed" in an inconceivably compact present moment

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(cf. Leibniz' "representatio multitudinis in unitate" in his definition of mind). Just some specific sector(s) would, however, normally be available to reconstruction and to awareness at each specific instant, and a still more narrow sector in the PG experiment. It should be noted that theoretical considerations as well as practical ones have been decisive for the arrangement of presentation times (tachistoscopic PGs) in geometrical progression. Corresponding to this technical device, the "impact of time" during man's life course likewise seems to decrease with age, as if obeying to the psycho-physical "law of diminishing returns". A final speculation in this context concerns the concept of "synchronicity", formulated by CG. Jung. Here it may, perhaps, be used to denote the hypothetical coincidence between the historical succession of experiences in the subject's life time, and a sequence of their pre-conscious precipitates in terms of a series of PG phases. Identity of sequential pattern would generate presence of the past in the present (cf. S:t Augustine: "praesens praesentiae"). 3. Body and mind - a perceptgenetic approach. It is of course presumptuous to raise here this monumental and eternal problem. My excuse is that a specific PG approach may add a modest empirical aspect to it. The first PG phase, P1, is the one where the subject starts seeing something meaningful; that is the definition given in the DMT, and elsewhere in PG tachistoscopic experiments. But in many cases one can generally speak of a zone "below" or prior to the threshold of meaning formulated in words or drawing. This zone extends between "absolutely nothing" and "perhaps a..". It has not been specifically investigated; it may be characterized as pre- preconscious or unconscious, which is not however, identical with the "system Ucs" of psychoanalysis. In the latter defenses are e.g.classified as unconscious ego structures, whereas in DMT the precipitates of the defenses may be registered on a par with other (preconscious) contents of the P-phases. It is tempting to formulate the assumption that the realm between no-meaning and meaning constitutes the borderline zone where reference

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to a neuro-physiological frame ends, and that of psychology begins. (For a penetrating analysis, with a partly different outlook, see Dixon, 1984). The empirical exploration of this zone may shed some light on theoretical issues (e.g., of psycho-physics), and perhaps generate applications. In order to maximize the effect of the (tachistoscopic) PG method for the purpose at hand, the most relevant stimulus would consist in a picture motif of a loving mother's face together with one breast, as seen from below, i.e., from the sucking infant's view (no child/hero since the baby has not yet a delimited self). Optimally, the experiment should be performed with small children, 4-6 years of age, that is at the earliest stage for applying a PG (the number of presentations should be quite restricted!). It would also probably be appropriate to use extra short presentation times. The experimenter ought of course to be particularly keen on exploring the weakest hint of meaning at the initial presentations. 4. Sequels of lying. I am certainly not going to deal, in this brief discourse, neither with life-style as portrayed by H. Ibsen - or with defenses in general, most of them falsifying to some extent the self and/or the object. Even the more restricted task of discussing how the defenses of denial (A. Freud) and negation (S. Freud) relate to each other or to lying, will not be tried; just a short note on the momentary act of lying, in the light of an experimental device. There has not yet been tried, to my knowledge, any such approach. This experiment investigates the immediate consequences of lying, by using short-time presentation of a subliminal stimulus preceded by a supraliminal set-inducing one. The former may be any picture motif, the latter consists in the instruction to the subject, not to tell what has really been seen but something else. A few casual observations indicate that the subject, when lying, in that very instant forgets what was really seen, which is also henceforward lost. The substantiation of these preliminary findings would demonstrate an essential effect of lying: the destruction of preconscious "reality" (maybe together with a loss of the faked contents). The structural precipitates of experiences would normally be conserved in their genuine cognitive/emotional shape: the preconscious "tells the historical truth" ("wie es

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eigentlich gewesen ist" - Ranke), though in a condensed symbolic dress. Lying seems to destroy this order. It may also be worth while studying how such an experimentally induced lie, at some point in a PG series, would influence the rest of that same series. 5. Aggression - a fatal problem of mankind. The aggressive-destructive forces in man have always been, and still are, among the most challenging problems society has to handle. After the introduction of Christianity in Europe, a massive defense of reaction formation was instituted as a barrier against destructive overt behaviour ("love your enemy", "turn the other cheek"). Means for the implementation of the wished-for conduct were, among others, threats of eternal punishment in hell. However, reaction-formation proved not really successful, and aggression found its outlet in the back way, too, in disguise. Nowadays hell has lost most of its deterring power, letting free straight-forward violence, increasing in modern society due to so many frustrations, in children as well as in grown-ups. Although there is much disagreement concerning the origins of aggression, there exists some unanimity regarding the paramount role of frustration as the trigger of it. The problems of minimizing, or rather optimizing frustrations, and of canalizing or coping with aggression in infancy and later, are of long standing in psychology and pedagogy. Many of the findings during the preceding decades derive from clinical practice, but there is not very much experimental work that focuses on the preconscious structure of aggression; one particularly important contribution has, however, been presented by Westerlundh (1976). A crucial difficulty met with in the handling of aggression is related to its two-fold nature: a destructive force on one hand, and a source of creative activity, on the other. Using the perceptgenetic Identification Test and the Creative Functioning Test, Smith, and Smith and Lilja (1999 and 2000) have presented highly instructive and original papers illuminating this problem. The application of suppressive or defensive manoeuvres against aggression has the effect of obstructing both its manifestations. Psychoana-

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lytic ego psychology even maintains that de-cathected, neutralized aggressive components are necessary for the formation of the ego. In perceptgenetic research mainly one particular aspect of the submanifest structure of aggression has been subject to analysis, viz.: the one related to anxiety in the oedipal situation. Such is the case in the DMT, and in other tachistoscopic tests involving threat against a hero-person. However, these methods have not explicitly focused on the aggressive component as such and its vicissitudes in the PG series, but on defenses. Two signs of defense in DMT, however, "identification with the aggressor" and "intro-aggression" lend themselves more directly to the investigation of latent (preconscious) precursors of manifest aggressive behaviour. Data from the methods in question may also be used for an analysis of other features, like the impact of defenses on the hero's motor activity, facial expression, etc. In a PG investigation with aggression between two boys as the stimulus motif, Kragh and Kroon (1970) contrasted a group of wayward boys and a control group: the findings are tentative and in need of cross validation. 6. Repression: an evasive concept. Doubt has been raised concerning the relevance of the coding of repression in PG tests on defense; some aspects of this issue will be discussed. (a) As we know, S. Freud initially used the term repression as defense in general, restricting it afterwards to denote one particular species among defenses. According to "classical" psychoanalytic theory, repression has a direct connection with the oedipal situation, a period with marked masturbation and overall motor activity. A. Nilsson (1994) has pointed out the general antithetic relationship between the underlying wish/need/affect, and the defense against it. The antithesis to vivid motion is stiffness, paralysis, and to excitement, emotional freezing, which is in agreement with the overall characteristic of repression in the DMT (c.f. also Freud's analysis of the "wolf mans" dream, and Kragh & Smith, 1970). Repression has also been conceptualized as the blocking of ideational contents to consciousness while preserving the affect (the opposite is valid for isolation). This description would not apply to repression in the DMT-

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like tests, in which both affect and ideational contents are transformed into symbolic presentations with the quality of stiffness and inertia. (b) In some "animal responses" in the DMT, coded as repression, information regarding movement is lacking but should be explored, if possible (if movement is not recorded, repression is coded). There are a few striking examples of this variant of repression: that of an owl, in infantile animal phobia (Kragh, 1970c), and of a "Dalmatiner dog" (Kragh, 1984) in agoraphobia, in a late phase of the DMT. The latter instance demonstrates a combination of repression (dog), isolation (white dog), and anxiety "leaking through" defense (black dots). Reference may also be made here to Freud's famous cases of "little Hans" (a horse), and the "wolf man" (white wolves sitting in a tree). Compare also with Rubino et al. (1992), who contrasted a group of conversion patients with a "normal" one, and found "animal responses" to be the ones differentiating specifically among the DMT signs. (c) The characteristic of "stiffness" in DMT repression is not always easy to distinguish from "dead" ("mutilated", etc.) person, coded as introaggression. The "differentia specifica", however, would be the quality of stiffness and inertia in repression vs. that of destruction in introaggression. (d) Cooper and Kline (1986, 24) repeated an experiment from the sixties (Kragh, 1970b), in which the frequency of defenses in an "ordinary" DMT was compared with that of a picture with the same central figure together with a non-threatening peripheral person (other changes of configuration were minimized). They were able to confirm the findings viz.: that the removal of threat was accompanied by an overall reduction of defenses; in their experiment, however, repression made an exception. Accordingly, they express doubt regarding this defense sign in the DMT. From a psychodynamic stand-point his criticism would not apply, since a significant difference between the two experimental conditions would not be predicted: even a non-threatening oedipal picture motif provokes anxiety and mobilizes repression in subjects prone to such a defense. Stronger defenses may also be substituted for repression at an increase of threat/anxiety (cf. follow.), notably in these subjects. (e) According to "classical" psychoanalytic theory there would exist, as a rule, a relationship between an increase of signal anxiety, and the activa-

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tion of relatively stronger defensive activity. A trial experiment was devised to test this proposition: one male subject had signs of repression at the place of the threatening person in the DMT, consistently through all the P-phases. A parallel DMT picture was then presented, and repression showed up in the same way during the first third of that series. The subject was now given the instruction: "there is a threatening man above the young boy in the center." According to cognitive "set" psychology the subject should of course see the threatening old man, but instead a white spot appeared. This was quite in line with the theory of defense. A stronger defense should become activated: isolation effaces the internal structure of the threatening face, while repression maintains some. (f) Analysing DMT signs of defense from various aspects Bäckström (1994) found repression to be specifically linked with threats of bodily injury. Construct validity of repression (as in DMT) was demonstrated by Westerlundh and Sjöbäck (1986) in experiments on subliminal effects of sexually provoking stimuli. 7. Color in perceptgenesis Color in tachistoscopic PGs has been investigated only little, and never as a separate issue. This has mainly been due to the almost exclusive use of black-and-white-stimuli. However, "black painting" and "white painting" are signs coded in the DMT and elsewhere, the former indicating anxiety and the latter isolation defense. White (stimulus-inadequate) color seems to have a twofold function: to cover blackness, and to efface structure. Localized color other than black and white is coded in the DMT as a variant of regression. It must, however, be admitted that the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon is not well understood although clinical findings as well as other criteria seem to substantiate the assumed regressive character of color responses (Rubino, Pezzarossa, & Ciani, 1991; Svensson & Trygg, 1994). Kohut’s (1976) remarks that dreams in color of narcissistic patients "often appear to signify the intrusion of unmodified material into the ego’s in the guise of realism, and the egos inability to integrate it completely" (p.172). One clinical case may prove illustrative. A grown-up male patient, diagnosed as schizophrenic, saw in the 3-4 first phases of both DMT se-

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ries, a person centrally placed. Thereafter he saw, in just one phase in both series "a red sunset over the sea". Two variants of regression are coded: deterioration of contents, and color. Though it was indeed tempting to prod into the traumatical background of this early DMT phase, I had to refrain for ethical reasons (the handling of massive anxiety ensuing). To inquire into regressive contents would be another instance of "testing the limits" of meaning – cf. theme 3 – I can note just one example where color (in many P-phases) did not indicate regression, in the DMT of quite a successful manager. Systematic investigations with colored stimuli presented tachistoscopically have not been published, but one example may be worth mentioning. The stimulus was a woman wearing a green blouse, together with a man in a blue cap. In the first phases the subject saw two children playing joyfully and harmoniously with each other on a green meadow. The scene then changed to two children standing on each side of a blue brook, separating them. The green color of the meadow has been displaced from the woman's blouse, and the blue color of the brook from the mans cap. Hypothetically, green has been used to characterize harmony, and blue alienation. In the PG after-image test the stimulus is a sketchy, oval red face. The breadth of the after-image is measured, and the color recorded. One well established result indicates a close relationship between dark and large afterimages, and (more or less chronic) anxiety. This finding would correspond to the interpretation of “dark painting" as coded in the DMT and other tachistoscopic PGs.

FINAL REMARK The reader is certainly left with many open questions, and many results and investigations omitted. However, my intention was primarily to turn the attention to some fields, which to my mind are as yet little explored, though of considerable interest for PG theory as well as for its applications.

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REFERENCES Bäckström, M. (1994). The Defence Mechanism Test at a Turning Point. Doctoral dissertation, Lund: Department of Psychology. Cooper, C. & Kline, P. (1986). An evaluation of the Defence Mechanism Test. British Journal of Psychology, 77:19-31. Dixon, N. (1984). The conscious-unconscious interface. Contributions to an understanding. In: From Private to Public Reality, eds. G.J.W. Smith, W. Fröhlich, & U.Hentschel, Bonn: Bouvier, pp. 55- 66. Fenichel, O. (1955). The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hemmendinger, L. (1953). Perceptual organization and development as reflected in the structure of Rorschach test responses. Journal of Projective Techniques, 17:162-170. Kohut, H. (1976). The Analysis of the Self (4th printing). New York: International Universities Press. Kragh, U. (1955). The Actual-Genetic Model of Perception Personality. Lund: Gleerup. Kragh, U. (1970a). Pathogenesis in dipsomania. In: Percept-Genetic Analysis, eds. U. Kragh & G.J.W. Smith. Lund: Gleerup, pp. 160-178 and 359-391. Kragh, U. (1970b). Percept-genetic defensive organization with threatening and-non-threatening peripheral stimuli. In: Percept-Genetic Analysis, eds. U. Kragh & G.J.W.Smith. Lund: Gleerup, pp. 118-121. Kragh, U. (1970c). A case of infantile animal phobia in adult perceptgenetic organization. In: Percept-Genetic Analysis, eds. U. Kragh & G.J.W. Smith. Lund: Gleerup, pp. 151-160. Kragh, U. (1984). Studying effects of psychotherapy by the Defence Mechanism Test - two case illustrations. In: From Private to Public Reality, eds. G.J.W. Smith, W. Fröhlich, & U. Hentschel. Bonn: Bouvier, pp. 73-82. Kragh, U. (1986). Life panorama under the microscope: a paradigmatic study. In: The Roots of Perception, eds. Hentschel, G.J.W. Smith & J. Draguns. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 145-159.

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Kragh, U. & Kroon, T. (1970). An analysis of aggression and identification in young offenders by the study of perceptual development. In: Percept-Genetic Analysis, eds. U. Kragh & G.J W Smith. Lund: Gleerup, pp. 190-199. Kragh, U. & Smith, G.J.W. (Eds) (1970). Percept-Genetic Analysis. Lund: Gleerup. Krueger, F. (1924). Der Strukturbegriff in der Psychologie. In: Bericht ub. d. VIII. Kongress exp. Psychol. Jena: Fischer, pp. 31-56. Kyriazis, D. & Karaminas, N. (1986). A study of perceptual defences in depression detected by means of a perceptgenetic technique (DMT). Hellenic Armed Forces Med. Review, 20, Suppl. 1. Nilsson, A. (1994). The Mechanisms of Defence within a Developmental Frame of Reference. Lund: Gleerup (2nd ed.). Rubino, I.A., Pezzarossa, B, & Ciani, N. (1991). A study of schizophrenic outpatients with the Defence Mechanism Test. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 73:515-530. Rubino, I.A., Saya, A., & Pezzarossa, B. (1992). Percept-genetic signs of repression in histrionic personality disorder. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 74:451-464. Sander, F. (1930). Structure, totality of experience, and Gestalt. In: Psychologies of 1930. Murchison, Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, pp. 188-204. Smith, GJ.W. (1999). Aggression, redefined and empirically studied. Psiciatrica e Psicoterapia Analitica, 18:7-13. Smith, GJ.W. & Lilja, A. (2000). Aggression: Destructive and constructive aspects. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 90:609-623. Svensson, B. & Trygg, L. (1994). Personlighet, Olyckfallsbenägenhet i Trafiken och Yrkesanpassning. Tre Perceptgenetiska Studier. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Werner, H. (1957). The concept of development from a comparative and organismic point of view. In: The Concept of Development, ed. D.B. Harris. Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press. Westerlundh, B. (1976). Aggression, Anxiety and Defense. Lund: Gleerup. Westerlundh, B. & Sjöbäck, H. (1986). Activation of intrapsychic conflict and defence: the amauroscopic technique. In: The Roots of Perception, eds.

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U. Hentschel, G.J.W. Smith, & J. Draguns. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 161-215. Westerlundh, B. & Terjestam, Y. (1990). Memory activation and perceptual processing. On the idea of microgeny-ontogeny correspondence. Psychological Research Bulletin XXX, No 6. Department of Psychology, Lund University, Sweden.

4. A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF STIMULUS IN PERCEPTGENETIC THEORY Anders Zachrisson In the perceptgenetic model of perception-personality, the relationship between the determination of stimulus and the content of the last phase is crucial and complex. The way these two concepts belong to different conceptual levels is discussed. In the perceptual process, the last phase content is the end-product of a process of construction and at the same time the starting point for a reconstruction of the individual, subjective weft in the perceptual process. Percept-genetic techniques, e.g. tachistoscopic presentation of a picture in a series of exposures, aim at an uncovering of these processes. For this to give meaningful results, thorough stimulus analysis and careful “calibration” of stimulus and the experimental situation is necessary. In percept-genetic theory perception is not conceived as an instantaneous registration of stimulus, but as a process in which the percept is formed, appearing in consciousness as an end-product of that process. This process has distinct characteristics. Under normal circumstances, it is very rapid. We experience it as instantaneous. With special techniques, the process can be “stretched out” and become open for analysis. One such technique is tachistoscopy, where the same picture is subject to a series of gradually prolonged exposures, starting with a very short one (e.g. 10 ms). The report from such a series of exposures is called a percept- genesis. Perceptgeneses form highly individual patterns, but typically show a transition from specifically individual, subjective contents in the beginning to more stimulus-close, "objective", reality-directed contents in the end (Kragh, 1955; Smith, 1963). We can formulate this as the successive construction of stimulus in the perceptual process. At the same time, the process involves an elimination of individual, subjective contents in favour of stimulus-close material. By means of techniques like tachistoscopy, this

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individual, subjective weft in the early phases of the process can be reconstructed and form the basis for an analysis of aspects of personality development of the individual.

STIMULUS AND THE LAST PHASE REPORT Percept-genetic theory thus conceives perception as a movement from the specifically individual towards stimulus-directed behaviour, and stimulus forms a point of reference for the perceptual experience. How shall we understand this? Within percept-genetic theory, we can put the question thus: what is the relation of the stimulus to the last phase in the perceptual process? Kragh (1955, p. 16-17) makes a distinction between two aspects of the stimulus-concept: stimulus as "physical agent" (the configuration of points that forms the picture) and stimulus as something perceived, with all its phenomenological qualities (the motif). This last aspect, (N)stimulus in Kragh's terminology, is closely related to the last phase of the individual. As a rule they coincide (op. cit., p. 68), but the phenomenological qualities of the stimulus is "... generalized as ´objective´ and constant" (p. 17). In the Defense Mechanism Test e.g., (N)stimulus can be a general description of the picture, a young man sitting at a desk and an older man with a threatening face behind him. The last phase reports of this picture in a group of subjects will be individual variations of this motif. The general formulation above contains both practical and epistemological problems of wide scope. Later I will discuss the practical question (the determination of stimulus). First, we will have a look at the theoretical connections. As our starting-point, we take the thesis that phase contents in a perceptgenesis, i.e. the reports from the series of exposures, have references both to earlier phases in the series and to the last phase. In percept-genetic terminology, the last (conclusive) phase is called C, the phases before C are called P-phases. If we mark their place in the series by index, we can express the thesis in this way:

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n-1 (1) ΣP → Pn ← C This means that the individual phase content is determined by both the preceding phases and the last phase. (Note that ΣP does not refer to the sum of phases but to their serial organisation, i e the series as Gestalt). However, the perceptual process is characterized by distinct displacements between the components in this function. We thus have the following scheme for the process from the first phase, (P1), to the last, (Pn) in a series of exposures with increasing exposure time: 0 ΣP → P1 ← C 1 ΣP → P2 ← C ↓ n-1 (2) ΣP → Pn ← C \__/ In the last line, both Pn and C refer to the last phase in the perceptgenesis. This double-position elucidates the relation of the last phase to the concepts construction and reconstruction. When the analysis of the perceptual process starts from the first phase (P1), the last phase is the endproduct of the individual’s process of construction (Pn in the scheme). The last phase constitutes the starting-point when the analysis starts from the end. Then it is regarded as absolute, and transforms the preceding phases in a uniform manner. In this sense it constitutes "a representative of reconstruction” (C in the scheme, Kragh, 1955, p. 70). These processes, construction and reconstruction, (indicated by the two vertical arrows in the scheme) explain the direction of the perceptual process towards the last phase (construction); and the successive elimination of alternative directions of development in favour of the "correct" end-phase (reconstruction) (op. cit. p. 69). It is on this level the area of psychology is constituted in percept-genetic theory: in the dual processes of the construction of reality and the reconstruction of meaning.

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Scheme 2 shows the relations between successive phases in the perceptual process. It is an attempt to represent this process. Now, we will take this scheme as a basis for an interpretation of the percept-genetic experimental situation: tachistoscopic presentation of a stimulus picture with successivly prolonged exposure time, and time being the only experimental variable. Let us start with scheme 1: First we substitute S (stimulus) for C (conclusive phase). This is nota bene, an interpretation, a transition from one level of concept-formation to another. Later in this paper, I will try to analyze the relationship between these two concepts. n-1 Second, On is substituted for ΣP. O represents the personality structure and index the developmental phase in the life-history of the individual. This interpretation rests on a fundamental idea in percept-genetic theory: In the actual-genetic model of perception-personality, the assumption is made, that the act series is to be regarded as a micro-model of the onto-genesis of personality (...) the serial patterns of any (...) act series would reflect the ontogenesis (life history) or personality conceived of as a developing system of adaptive events, where each actual event is regarded as a function of the series of preceding events to which it belongs (Kragh, 1955, p. 31). Scheme 1 will then get this form: S → Pn ← 0n (3) (3b) Or in an equivalent formulation: S ←→ On → Pn The content of a phase in a percept-genetic series (what the subject perceives in that exposure) is a product of S (the picture) and aspects of the subject’s personality structure at the corresponding level of development (On). Now, let us make the same substitutions in scheme 2, and indicate the time-dimension: T St1 ←→ O1 → P1 i St2 ←→ O2 → P2 m e ↓ Stn ←→ On → Pn (4) \__________/

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The indices of S, t1, t2 etc, denote the series of exposures of the stimulus picture with gradually increased exposure times. The schemes 2 and 4 belong to different conceptual levels in the theory, and we called scheme 4 an interpretation of 2. This is not to be understood as a deduction of 4 from 2. We could as well have gone the other way, from 4 to 2 (an operational definition?). The point is to make the conceptual relationships clear. In scheme 4, the vertical dimension is temporal, denoting the gradual prolongation of stimulus exposure time in the experiment. In scheme 2, the corresponding dimension is construction/reconstruction, denoting the frame of reference for understanding perception as process. It is on this level, scheme 2, that we can claim the continuity of the motif (the identity of the last phase) in percept-genetic experiments without being guilty of the classical stimulus-error. Scheme 4 makes clear certain features of the stimulus concept in perceptgenetic theory. Traditionally, in experimental psychology one makes a sharp distinction between dependent and independent variables. The methodological interpretation of the classical stimulus-organism-response scheme (S-O-R) rests on that very dichotomy. This can not, however, be maintained in a percept-genetic view, because stimulus is not independent of the individual's response. The stimulus-picture, (the (N)stimulus) in a perceptual experiment, can only be defined as an end-product: the experimenter’s or a groups’ average description or the subject’s last phase behaviour. The relation between S and R in the S-O-R scheme is thus reduced to “two different aspects of the same end-product of development” (Kragh, 1955, p 62). This is clear for stimulus in a strict sense, the exposed picture. Stimulus can, however, also be taken in a wider sense, and in addition to the picture include the experimental situation: the exposure times, the light intensity in the tachistoscope and in the test room, the instruction a s o. These elements in the experimental situation can of course be manipulated as independent variables. Then, however, we must observe that the experimental situation is designed to make the prestages in the perceptual process accessible for analysis. Perception in the experimental situation is equivalent to perception in ordinary circumstances (for a discussion of this statement,

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see Kragh & Smith, 1970, p. 20-22), but it is too swift to be studied without special techniques. These (percept-genetic) techniques function as tools or media, in analogy with e.g. the microscope, designed to make the process accessible to analysis. The point of the argument is that the distinction between dependent and independent variables is a problematic one in the investigation of perceptual processes. We can not define the external world as stimulus independent of the individual perception of it.1 The stimulus has a meaning for the observer; therefore, it cannot be treated as an independent variable. Another consequence is that we must revise the position of the stimulus as a "cause" of responses. The percept is not the effect of a chain of occurrences starting in the stimulus. It is the resultant of stimulus and organism as a dynamic system. This is the meaning of the double arrow between S and O in scheme 4. However, the relation between the two components changes in the perceptual process. The stimulus increases in importance as determinant. (In scheme 2, this corresponds to the increase in importance of the last phase as a reference). However, stimulus is only one determinant in the process; the personality structure of the individual is the other (the percept-genesis conceptualized as a succession of adaptive states, reflecting the personality structure). Stimulus as determinant is thus the percept-genetic correspondent to stimulus as a "cause" in traditional S-R-experiments. In its general form, this is valid for all kinds of percept-genetic experimentation. If we limit our discussion to a specific picture in a tachistoscopic experiment, it is possible to be more precise. In the Defense Mechanism Test, for instance, the pictures are designed to function in analogy with the psychoanalytic theory of defence mechanisms; depicting a threatening person turned towards an “innocent” hero figure. By such an interpretation of the picture,

1

Epistemologically, percept-genetic theory is related to the Neo-Kantian position (P. Natorp, E. Cassirer). The distinction between the two schemes above indicates the touch of the percept-genetic stand. We note that Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenological approach to knowledge is quite close to percept-genetic thinking. In his analysis of the physiological reflex-concept, he concludes: "The adequate stimulus cannot be defined in it self and independent of the organism; it is not a physical reality, it is a physiological or biological reality" (Merleau-Ponty, 1965, p. 31).

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the stimulus as a determinant is qualified. Such a qualification of stimulus is referred to as "stimulus as operator".

THE DETERMINATION OF STIMULUS Above, we made a distinction between two ways of describing stimulus. One way is based on the optical properties of the stimulus. The picture is treated as a "configuration" of points with varied lightness and is given no meaning. It lacks phenomenological content. Such a determination of the picture can be used to maintain physical equivalence in mass production of a given picture. In a broader sense this type of stimulus can in addition to the picture also include the experimental situation. The relevance of such a determination is related to the replicability of the experiment and in comparisons of experiments (Kragh, 1955, p. 16-17). The other aspect of the stimulus, (N)stimulus, the motif, refers to the picture as it is perceived, with its phenomenological qualities. It is related to the last phase concept, but differs from the (individual) last phase in being interindividually constant, with a higher degree of inter-subjectivity. We cannot determine (N)stimulus by reference to any individual last phase, including the experimenter’s (op. cit. 20). For practical reasons we can resort to the average last phase (in a sample of individuals). As Kragh (p. 17) notes, the objectivity of the determination is thereby heightened. However, even if this is accepted as an approximation, it does not solve the principal problem. Because the last phase descriptions (in the sample) show a variation, we have to determine the limits for what is "correct" within this variation. And this variation is dependent on the level of description. The more specific and detailed the description is (the more subtle qualities that are recorded) the less absolute is the individual's stability of the last phase percept (op. cit. 138), and the bigger is the variation of last phase descriptions in a sample. If the descriptions are limited to general classes: two persons, a table a s o, the correspondence

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within a group will approach perfection. This has, as we will see later, interesting consequences for some percept-genetic applications.2 The situation is not necessarily a problematic one. If, in an experiment, stabilized last phases are recorded for all subjects and if they broadly coincide with the test leader's last phase on the description level used in the data analysis, there is no problem. The test leader's, the group’s average and the individual subject's last phases broadly coincide and can be generalized to (N)stimulus. (That this is the case is an implicit assumption in traditional psychology of perception). Problems arise with deviations from the above case. I shall discuss two such complications, both related to Defense Mechanism Test. 1. In the testing of a group of subjects, not all will reach a stabilized last phase within the series of exposures. And, in order to keep down the spreading of information about the picture in the group, it is often unsuitable to add a long time exposure to the regular series. This problem can be evaded by a stimulus analysis on a separate group of subjects, asked to describe the picture at long time exposure. The result of such an analysis makes the basis for the (N)stimulus definition and for the determination of the criteria for "correct" descriptions (C-phase criteria i the DM-test). The stimulus analysis can of course also be used for the reversed case, (in the construction of a new picture): to adapt the picture to the Cphase criteria already given in the test manual, and to reduce the variation in last phase descriptions of it. 2. In the testing of clinical cases or in advanced personality analyses, where the specific meaning of the picture for the subject is essential, we have reasons to reckon with differences between the (N)stimulus definition and the subject’s last phase. Usually this can be checked by adding a long time exposure that gives a stabilized last phase. If this last phase deviates from the (N)stimulus definition, we have a problem. To which last phase 2

The problematic nature of the ‘objective’ definition of reality also has interesting consequences in the philosophy of science. There too, we find solid arguments to substitute inter-subjective for objective (Zachrisson & Zachrisson, 2005).

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shall the earlier phases in the series be referred; to the established (N)stimulus definition or to the subject’s individual last phase? Shall we score signs of defence mechanisms on P-phase level if the same structures appear in the last (stabilized) phase of the subject? If we keep to the line of argument I have followed, the subject’s own last phase should be referred to, and the answer is no. However, there can be another possibility, making the matter more complicated: even at long time exposure, the perceptual defences are at work, helped by the relatively low stimulus intensity. The subject's description is still on P-phase level, and his reality testing is deformed by quite dominating perceptual defenses. The strategy in such situations must be determined from case to case by careful phenomenological analysis of the qualities of the perception. How distinct is the impression of the picture, how strong is the subject's conviction of the "objectivity" and accuracy of his perception, how stabilized is the percept, a s o? Nevertheless, the problem remains in its principal form. In fact it is a general psycho- diagnostic problem, touching on the position of the very health concept. Which conception of reality shall prevail in the diagnostic situation, the patient’s psychic reality, the doctor’s or a socially established standard? This is on a sociological level equivalent to the question of the (N)stimulus definition. And further: which variations in the conception of reality shall be tolerated (C-phase criteria), a s o? Such questions are inherent in the application of any psycho-diagnostic system. On the level of society it seems possible to make the determinations that are needed (the broader perspective makes use of more general descriptions), but is it possible on the level of individual experience?

CHANGING THE STIMULUS PICTURE: SOME PERCEPTGENETIC ISSUES What happens in the percept-genesis of a picture if some physical characteristics of it, e g the darkness or contrast, is changed? Changes in

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the picture can, in principle, affect the percept-genesis in two ways: they can lead to displacements of the threshold phases in the series, and they can entail structural changes in the genesis. The first point is a matter of course in percept-genetic experiments. For such an experiment to give interesting results at all, the series of exposures must cover the developmental process of the percept, i.e. give enough Pphases. This depends partly on the experimental conditions, especially the series of exposure times, partly on the physical characteristics of the picture. Unsuitable contrast or relative degree of darkness in the picture can give a too precipitous or too slack development of the percept and a too late first phase or a too early last phase in the series. This will result in reduced amount of information because part of the P-phase sequence is not recorded at all or is condensed in few phases. A "calibration" of the instrument in this respect, is a sine qua non in any kind of percept-genetic experiment. Probably a change in contrast in the picture will also result in structural changes in the percept-genesis, because the condensation of phases increases or decreases. However, more interesting causes for structural changes are those that can be referred to changes in the motif (content) of the picture, the (N)stimulus. A change of content means a change of stimulus as operator. Different motifs will therefore activate different partstructures and conflict-areas in the personality (Kragh, 1985; Zachrisson, 1967). Choice of, and variation of, motif must be related to theory and to the aim of the investigation. Now, every developmentally oriented personality theory stresses the family relationships of the individual, the relationship to parents, siblings, partner (and one-self). Therefore, pictures containing one or more persons in different situations are most common in percept-genetic investigations. Those pictures are related to fundamental factors in personality development and give more relevant information for issues in the psychology of personality, compared to pictures of e.g. objects. On the other hand, such pictures can be relevant in the investigation of perceptual processes from the point of view of general psychology. The comments above refer to percept-genetic experimentation in general. For the Defense Mechanism Test the discussion can be more concrete

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because the test is specified in two respects. First, stimulus as operator is determined. The pictures are constructed to uncover defensive structures in the perception of a threatening person directed towards a central figure (hero). Second, the subject´s reports from the test session are interpreted in accordance with a coding manual also including precise C-phase criteria. These two points are related in such a way that a majority of the subjects’ last phase (the average last phase) of the picture ought to be placed within the limits of the C-phase criteria. If not, the relation of the test reports of that picture to the theory of defence mechanisms cannot be maintained.3

CONCLUSION In percept-genetic theory, the distinction between dependent and independent variables in perceptual experiments is a complicated matter. Stimulus as motif, with its phenomenological qualities and the meanings it evokes in the individual, can only be determined by reference to the end phase behaviour of the researcher, a group or a subject. These aspects of a stimulus can not be objectively determined in any definitive way. ‘Objectivity’ has to be approached by a registration and comparision of a number of last phase descriptions. What we can aim at, is a reasonable degree of inter-subjectivity through such an analysis of stimulus. A stimulus analysis can have different aims: to determine a stimulus picture in an experiment, or the adaptation of a picture for special use, e.g. in reference to an existing coding manual with specified end-phase criteria. In addition, any percept-genetic experimental or test situation has to be adjusted, in order to release enough pre-phases in the perceptual process to make an analysis possible and meaningful. Without such an adjustment of the experimental situation and without a careful stimulus analysis the results will easily be spurious or of doubtful value. 3

It is true that e g a "neutral" father-son-picture can activate perceptual defence structures. In clinical cases, we often meet with this (Kragh, 1970). In such cases however, we have to derive the anxiety provocation from the anamnestic connection of the phase (the life history). We cannot refer it to the subject´s last phase, if this is in agreement with the (N)stimulus definition of the picture, i.e. denote a neutral relation.

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REFERENCES Kragh, U. (1955). The Actual-Genetic Model of Perception-Personality. Lund: Gleerup. Kragh, U. (1970). Percept-genetic defensive organization with threatening and non-threatening peripheral stimuli. In: Percept-Genetic Analysis, eds. U. Kragh & G.J.W. Smith. Lund: Gleerup, pp. 118-121. Kragh, U. (1985). Defense Mechanism Test Manual. Stockholm: Persona. Kragh, U. & Smith, G.J.W., (1970). The Developmental Paradigm of Perception-Personality. In: Percept-Genetic Analysis, eds. U. Kragh & G.J.W. Smith. Lund: Gleerup, pp. 13-39. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1942). The Structure of Behaviour. London: Methuen & Co, 1965. Smith, G.J.W. (1963). Process – a biological frame of reference for the study of behaviour. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 4: 44-54. Zachrisson, A. (1967). Variation av Stimulusmotiv i Anslutning till DMtestets Metod och Teori. Lund: Dep. of Psychology, Lund University, Sweden. Zachrisson, A. & Zachrisson, H. D. (2005). Validation of psychoanalytic theories. Towards a conceptualisation of references. Int. J. Psychoanal. 86:1353-1371.

5. DEFENSE MECHANISMS IN PSYCHOSOMATIC GROUPS: A HEURISTIC MODEL Mikael Henningsson This study had two aims. First, to compare a chronic fatigue syndrome group to other clinical groups according to their responses to Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). Secondly, to use the DMT data from the groups chronic fatigue syndrome, multiple chemical sensitivity, conversion disorder and healthy controls to create an empirical model describing the differences and similarities in defense patterns between the groups. The results showed that the chronic fatigue syndrome group used defense patterns that was most alike the none-patient group, when contrasted to the other two patient groups. When contrasted only with the non-patient group some clear differences appeared but these differences had another quality than the differences between e.g. multiple chemical sensitivity and nonpatients. After that, all four groups were used to create an empirical model describing how the groups were related to each other according to the use of different defense patterns. All four groups were clearly separated in the model and the results from this model were then generalized to a theoretical model describing defense styles in psychosomatic groups. This model suggests a Two-axis evaluation, based on the concepts Relational Focus and Defense Style, of how the individual effectuates his/her defenses. The implication of the model for clinical work is also discussed. In an earlier study (Henningsson & Sundbom, 2000), we showed that there are both similarities and differences when comparing the defenses between the clinical groups multiple chemical sensitivity and conversion disorder, as captured by the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). The similarities consisted of a common tendency to use defenses that strongly inhibited a correct perception of the threatening stimuli. The conversion disorder group used a defense style based primarily on distortion while the multiple chemical sensitivity patients relied more on a blocking strategy.

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A third group of interest in this context is the patients suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome. Chronic fatigue syndrome is a condition defined by a constellation of somatic and neurocognitive symptoms (Fukuda, K., Straus, S., Hickie, I., Sharpe, M., Dobbins, J., & Komaroff, A., 1994). Studies have shown that more than 2 % of the population in Western countries fulfills criteria for this syndrome (Evengård, Schacterle, & Komaroff, 1999). A gender difference is found with a dominance of women. Pathogenetic mechanisms are not yet understood but disturbances detected in the central nervous system raise issues whether different forms of stress on the organism, such as, for example, psychological or physical stress, may be causative agents. Therefore an interesting question is: How do they function in situations of emotional pressure with the need for a strategy to act adequately? Modern psychodynamic self psychology focuses on intersubjective relatedness, and the structuralizing effects on mental representations, including the body-self image. In this perspective the conceptualizing of bodyexperience is seen as an element of self-experience (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992). To the extent that affect states are not integrated, or coped with, defenses against affect become necessary in order to preserve the integrity of a weak self-structure and maintain compensatory self-esteem. According to Tomkin’s theory the affects are important to the individual’s experience of connection between bodily sensations and his/her representational world, the so-called fusion power of affects. Psychosomatic states and disorders may be seen as remnants of arrests in this aspect of affective and selfdevelopment. In compliance with this view, we need to examine the organizing principles within an individual’s self structure in order to understand his or her defensive strategies (Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997). We need to know how integration of different affect states into the individual’s self-experience is functioning and to what extent there is a need to keep these affect states out of conscious awareness. The aims of the present study are: (a) to compare the chronic fatigue syndrome group to other clinical groups by projecting this group’s DMT data onto already existing multivariate models depicting patients from the comparison groups, and (b) to create a new multivariate model for finding discriminating defensive patterns between the groups chronic fatigue syn-

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drome, multiple chemical sensitivity, conversion disorder and healthy controls. Finally, a theoretical model describing the organizing principles for defenses in psychosomatic groups is suggested.

MATERIALS AND METHODS Participants Fifteen chronic fatigue syndrome patients, all of them fulfilling the criteria (mean = 42.3 years; range 28-52, all females) were assessed using the DMT. These patients participated in a larger treatment project at Huddinge University Hospital, Sweden (Söderberg & Evengård, 2001). All but two of the patients had previously held qualified jobs. At the time of the study, two of the patients were working full-time and five part-time. The following contrast groups were used: multiple chemical sensitivity (n = 10; mean = 46,8 years; range 30-55, 6 females and 4 males) and conversion disorder (n = 10, mean = 43,6 years; range 27-54, 5 females and 5 males) according to the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). A more detailed description of these patient groups is found in Henningsson and Sundbom (2000). The non-patient group was mixed, recruited from a DMT database of healthy controls, and age matched as well as possible (n = 14; mean = 42,1 years; range 35-52, 11 females and 3 males). Most of these subjects consisted of ward staff and workers. Defense Mechanism Test The test was administered with the standard apparatus, instructions, and light conditions (Kragh, 1985). However, only one of the two standard pictures was used and no distracting stimulus was applied. Most of the distortions of the picture motif were scored using the criteria in the manual. The list of the 130 DMT variables is summarized in Sundbom, Binzer, and Kullgren (1999). Many of the variables are based on the frequency of the perceptual defenses described in the manual. Furthermore, general characteristics of the threshold values are specified, for example, the exposure at which the Hero or the threat of the Peripheral person is reported for the first time, as well as the level in the percept genesis (early, middle, or late)

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at which the reactions occur. Variables of sex and age (1-2) and several of those describing the test situation (126-129) were excluded because they are not usually coded in the DMT. Interrater agreement on the 124 variables, rated by three experts on the test, has shown that the variance related to effects of these raters, using Eta values, had an average of 2 %. Ratings were made under blinded conditions (Henningsson & Sundbom, 2000). The DMT interrater reliability coefficient in the present study was 0.90 based on 15 cases (five randomly selected cases from each patient group) and blindly coded by two trained judges. Partial Least Squares (PLS) discriminant analysis Multivariate projection methods represent an important development for clinical research, which often involves data sets containing more variables than subjects. Statistical methods are needed that can handle matrices with more variables than subjects without increasing the risk of type I (false positive) errors. At the same, they must be powerful enough to be able to use all the information in the matrix to identify real relationships and avoid type II (false negative) errors. Multivariate projection methods like Partial Least Squares (PLS) in latent structures, (Wold, Albano, Dunn, Esbensen, Hellberg, Johansson, & Sjöström, 1983; Ståhle & Wold, 1988), provide promising approaches in psychopathology (Henningsson, Sundbom, Armelius, & Erdberg, 2000; Sundbom, Binzer, & Kullgren, 1999). The purpose of these methods is to project all the subjects and variables on a minimum of information bearing orthogonal dimensions, yielding a good economy of information, while simultaneously maximizing the correlation between the descriptors of the system (X) and the observed selectivity (Y). We may say that this method sorts redundant noise from relevant information. The PLS solves the problem of “overfitting” by using crossvalidation criteria to estimate the level of significance in the model. The Q2 value expresses the goodness of prediction of the PLS model. A Q2 value larger than 0.10 indicates a significant predictive power of the model. The VIP (variable importance in the projection) value is a measure of the importance of a single variable. Variables with VIP values larger than 1.0 are the most relevant for explaining Y. However, this approach involves a change in how the researcher asks statistical questions, as it is no longer possible

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to discuss the variables separately. The graphic presentation of the data provides useful information about sensitivity and specificity of the subjects. (For a more detailed description, see Henningsson, Sundbom, Armelius, & Erdberg, 2000).

RESULTS Chronic Fatigue Syndrome predicted against Multiple Chemical Sensitivity and Conversion Disorder Groups To make a comparison between patients with chronic fatigue syndrome and the groups of multiple chemical sensitivity, conversion disorder, and non-patients, the chronic fatigue syndrome patients were projected onto an already existing PLS-model (Henningsson & Sundbom, 2000). This original model is presented in Figure 1.

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Figure 5.1. PLS-scores for all original cases in the psychosomatic model. CO = Conversion Disorder, MC = Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, NP = Non Patients. Elipse = Hoteling T2 (0.05).

The main result of the previously mentioned study was that the clinical groups, located to the left in the figure, showed evidence of many more non-emotional defenses (e.g. delay of thresholds and identification with opposite sex) as compared to the non-patients portrayed to the right. However, the way the groups manifested this difference was specific for each of the clinical groups. The multiple chemical sensitivity patients group was characterized above all by a blocking style (e.g. a lateness of perception),

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while the defensive strategy of the conversion disorder group was mainly distortion of content. Figure 2 below shows the projections of the chronic fatigue syndrome patients onto this model. CF

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Figure 5.2. Predicted scores in the psychosomatic model for the Chronic Fatigue Syndrome group. Elipse = Hoteling T2 (0.05)

The figure shows that most of the subjects in the syndrome group, with a few exceptions, are located in the right-hand part of the model defined as the non-patient area (cf. Figure 1). Consequently, the chronic fatigue syndrome group seems to use similar kinds of defenses as those of the nonpatient group. Furthermore, in order to compare these patients with psychiatric patients, they were projected onto a previous PLS model consisting of DMT data from the groups schizophrenic disorder, borderline personality disorder and healthy controls (Sundbom, Jacobsson, Kullgren, & Penayo, 1998). The result was the same; the chronic fatigue syndrome seemed to use defenses like non-patients. PLS Analysis of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Non-Patients

However, PLS models are relative, i.e., they always try to maximize the differences between the groups in a specific model. This means that the similarity between chronic fatigue syndrome patients and non-patient groups in the presented models is dependent on these groups’ relation to the other groups in the model. Therefore, to make a more detailed exami-

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nation of whether there are any DMT differences between the syndrome group and a healthy group, a new PLS analysis was carried out involving only these two groups. Two significant PLS components according to cross-validation criteria were obtained. In total, they formed a PLS model explaining 92,7 % of the variance in group affiliation by 16,9 % of the variation in DMT variables (Figure 3). The model seemed to have strong predictive power, since the goodness of prediction (Q2) was quite high (Q2 = 0.62). 6 4

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Figure 5.3. PLS-scores. CF = Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, NP = Non-Patients. Elipse = Hoteling T2 (0.05).

Figure 3 shows that the two groups are completely separated from each other. The non-patients are positioned in the upper right-hand part of the picture and the chronic fatigue syndrome group in the left-hand part. This means that there are significant differences between the groups in how they respond to the stimulus picture in the DMT. In order to examine the substance of these differences, we need to look at the loadings of the DMT variables, i.e., the most important variables according to their discriminating power. This result revealed that the chronic fatigue syndrome group is characterized primarily by a difficulty in perceiving the aggressive facial expression of the peripheral person, together with the defenses of denial (negation) of aggressive affect, and reaction formation. Compared to these

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patients, the non-patients show good reality orientation. It is important to remember that the differences between the groups are not defined by single variables, but by the pattern of DMT variables with high loadings. Thus, the result of this model shows that there are significant differences in defenses between the chronic fatigue syndrome group and non-patients. This contrast only becomes evident when the influence of other groups such as those with multiple chemical sensitivity or conversion disorder is removed (cf. Figure 1). This means that the differences between chronic fatigue syndrome and non-patients have another quality than the differences between multiple chemical sensitivity, and non-patients.

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PLS 1

Figure 5.4. Projection of subjects in the four-group PLS model. CO = Conversion Disorder, MC = Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, CF = Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, NP = Non-Patients. Elipse = Hoteling T2 (0.05).

An empirical model of psychosomatic defenses in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, and Conversion Disorder: A PLS analysis In order to study the similarities/dissimilarities among the three patient groups and vis-à-vis a healthy group, an additional PLS analysis was performed. A two-dimensional model was obtained. Only the first component was significant according to cross-validation criteria, but since the eigenvalue for the second component was definitely over 1.0 (2.70), it could be used for description of these groups. For predictive use, though, this com-

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ponent should be handled with precaution. In total, 24% (9% + 15%) of the variation in DMT variables accounted for 42% (21% + 21%) of the modeled variance in group affiliation. The projection of the subjects onto this model is illustrated in Figure 4.

CONVERSION DISORDER

Manipulating sex of Hero or Pp (29, 95, 98) Manipulating age of Hero or Pp (103, 112, 113, 114)

MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY

Late perception of Hero, Pp or attribute (4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 21) Hero disappears (51)

NON-PATIENTS

Introaggression (84, 85, 90) Many Pp (16) Many threats perceived (9, 37) Sad Hero(35)

CHRONIC FATIGUE SYNDROME

Denial of affect (64, 66, 67) Threat disappears (62) Identification with aggressor (77)

Figure 5.5. The most discriminating variables in the empirical chronic fatigue syndrome –nonpatient – multiple chemical sensitivity – conversion disorder model. (The numbers in the table indicate the variable number in the DMT list, see Sundbom, Binzer, & Kullgren, 1999).

The figure shows that the four groups in the model are fairly well separated, with one group in each corner of the model. To understand the contents of the two components used in this projection, we will examine the variable pattern used to establish them. Variables with VIP (Variable Importance in the Projection) values > 1.00, and characteristic for some of the four groups are schematically summarized in Figure 5.

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Distorting Defense Style

4

1

Distorting negative object

Distorting negative affect

Objects Relational Focus

Affects Relational Focus

3

2

Blocking negative object

Blocking negative affect

Blocking Defense Style

Figure 5.6. Theoretical model showing relational focus and defense style in different psychosomatic groups.

Common features for non-patients and the chronic fatigue syndrome group are a high degree of affect-loaded contents in their responses to the DMT, but differences exist between the groups. The non-patients distort the contents by using introaggressive defenses, while the most outstanding characteristic for the chronic fatigue syndrome group seems to be blocking of the negative affect. The conversion disorder group does not focus primarily on the negative affect of the stimulus picture but rather tries to distort the persons (hero and peripheral person) in the interpersonal situation exposed in the picture. Patients suffering from multiple chemical sensitivity, on the other hand, seem to use a strategy whereby they block the existence of one or both of the persons in the stimulus picture, thereby preventing the threatening situation from occurring in the first place. These four approaches seem to illustrate different ways of handling the anxietyprovoking situation induced by the stimulus picture in DMT. Based on the content of the two main components a heuristic model is suggested.

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DISCUSSION A Heuristic Model As stated before the multiple chemical sensitivity patients, the conversion disorder, and the healthy groups differed in their handling of the threat in the DMT (Henningsson & Sundbom, 2000). We called these differences distorting and blocking defense styles. It appears that the same defense styles are found between non-patients and chronic fatigue syndrome, although the level of psychological functioning differs (Figure 3). This assumption was also confirmed by the last four-group model above (Figures 4), where two components could be used to describe the groups’ different ways of handling the situation induced by the test. Based on these empirical results, we suggest a model for description of psychological defenses in psychosomatic states, consisting of two main dimensions: (1) objects–affects issues (level of relational focus) and (2) distorting–blocking maneuvers (defense style). This model is presented in Figure 6. This model has much in common with that of McWilliams (1994) for diagnostic purposes. She describes two main dimensions that must be considered in psychoanalytic diagnosing: a developmental dimension and a typological dimension. The developmental dimension primarily examines the maturational level of the individual and the typological dimension considers the defensive style. The two main dimensions in our model can be used to describe the four styles of defensive strategies (groups 1-4 in Figure 6) in terms of organizing principles of defensive strategies (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992). The organizing principle of the first group is a relational focus on the affect level. One could say that the objects (the persons in the picture) are stable and not subject to debate. The main defensive strategy is distortion of affect in the form of introaggressive defenses aimed at maintaining a psychological balance, even if this group is able to recognize the threat correctly in the end. This means that this group has adaptive defenses and good reality testing, even when they are exposed to the anxiety-provoking stimuli in the DMT. The non-patients illustrate this group.

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The organizing principle of the second group is also characterized by their relational focus on an affect level. The difference compared to group 1 (non-patients) is that they do not primarily distort the affect when under pressure. Instead, they tend to use a defense strategy based on denial of aggressive affect in order to maintain psychological balance. This group has no problem with reality testing and no distortion of objects, but one could say that these subjects invalidate the negative affect above all through the use of affect-blocking strategies. The group is illustrated by the chronic fatigue syndrome patients. The third group is much like the second one (chronic fatigue syndrome), but with the important difference that they have their relational focus on the object level. For this group, the objects are not as stable as for the first two groups, and their defensive style is to block the object from consciousness. Instead of denying only the affect itself, this group denies the whole object, including the negative affect. In DMT, this is expressed as an inability to perceive any anxiety-provoking elements at all. It would seem that these subjects disrupt the representation of relational context in order to invalidate the negative affect. The group is illustrated by the multiple chemical sensitivity patients. The fourth group is characterized by an organizing principle with the relational focus on the object level, but they do not block the objects, like the multiple chemical sensitivity group. Instead, they either distort the person expressing the negative affect or the subject against whom the affect is directed. This defensive strategy totally disables the affect in the uncomfortable situation, but at a high cost. The group is illustrated by the conversion disorder patients. This heuristic model might have some implications for the assessment and treatment of patients with psychosomatic problems. The twodimensional model of defensive strategies might be used to elucidate the patient’s awareness of how the affects are handled. Finally, it must be remembered that this model is a theoretical construction built on multivariate DMT models with relatively few subjects in the samples. The empirical findings supplied us with a substantial foundation to this generalization, but one final step has to be done: to test the theoretical model empirically in “harder” models. This means that we must formulate hypotheses about

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psychosomatic functioning, derived from the model describing relational focus and defense style, and then investigate the correctness of these hypotheses using a more “hard modelling” procedure. Of course, the usefulness of the model in a clinical setting must also be examined. When the model is validated according to these conditions, we will know something about its value in diagnostic and psychotherapeutic settings.

REFERENCES American Psychiatric Association: (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. Fourth Edition. Washington, DC: APA. Evengård, B., Schacterle, R.S., & Komaroff, A.L. (1999). Chronic fatigue syndrome: New insights and old ignorance. J Int Med., 246:455-469. Fukuda, K., Straus, S., Hickie, I., Sharpe, M., Dobbins, J., & Komaroff, A. (1994). Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. A comprehensive approach to its definition and study. Ann Int Med, 121:953-959. Henningsson, M, & Sundbom, E. (2000). Interrater reliability among three judges on 130 Defense Mechanism Test variables: a multivariate approach. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 91:959-969. Henningsson, M., & Sundbom, E. (2000). The Defense Mechanism Test and "Multiple Chemical Sensitivity": A comparative study of defensive structures in different diagnostic groups. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 91:803-818. Henningsson, M., Sundbom, E. Armelius, B-Å., & Erdberg, P. (2000). PLS Model Building: A Multivariate Approach to Personality Test Data. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 42:399-409. Kragh, U. (1985). DMT-Manual. Stockholm: Swedish Psychology International AB. McWilliams, N. (1994). Understanding Personality Structure in the Clinical Process. New York. Guilford Press. Orange, D. M., Atwood, G. E., & Stolorow, R. D. (1997). Working Intersubjectively. Contextualism in Psychoanalytic Practice. Hillsdale, NJ, Analytic Press. Stolorow, R. D., & Atwood, G. E. (1992). Contexts of Being: the Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life. Hillsdale, NJ, Analytic Press.

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Sundbom, E., Binzer, M., & Kullgren, G. (1999). Psychological defense strategies according to the Defense Mechanism Test among patients with severe conversion disorder. Psychotherapy Research 9(2):184-198 . Sundbom, E., Jacobsson, L., Kullgren, G., & Penayo, U. (1998). Personality and defenses; a cross-cultural study of psychiatric patients and healthy individuals in Nicaragua and Sweden. Psychological Reports, 83:13311347. Söderberg, S., & Evengård, B. (2001). Short-term group therapy for patients with chronic fatigue syndrome. Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy 70(2):108-11. Wold, S., Albano, C., Dunn, W., Esbensen, K., Hellberg, S., Johansson, E., & Sjöström, M. (1983). Pattern recognition: Finding and using regularities in multivariate data. In: Food research and data analysis, eds. H. Martens & H. Russwurm. London, Applied Science Publishers, pp.147-188.

6. DEFENSE MECHANISMS AND POSTTRAUMATIC SYMPTOMS AMONG MALE BOSNIAN AND CROATIAN REFUGEES IN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT Gunilla Kivling Bodén and Elisabet Sundbom The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between responses to the projective Defense Mechanism Test and the post-traumatic symptom level as measured by the self-report Harvard Trauma Questionnaire. The results showed that it was possible to identify two main patterns of perceptual reactions on the test, one positively and the other negatively correlated to the level of post-traumatic symptoms. A blocking defense style as well as a lack of affective responses characterized patients with a high post-traumatic symptom level, while patients with a low symptom level were characterized by many different perceptual distortions and more verbal expressions of affects. Symptoms from all three symptom clusters of post-traumatic stress disorder as well as feelings of shame and guilt, and a general distrust of other people, were associated with a blocking defense style. However, the results also give rise to another interpretation, namely, that the blocking reactions for those with high symptom levels were simply perceptual delays caused by their extreme arousal and anxiety, and had nothing at all to do with a different defense style. One area of interest in research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is to identify core features and underlying psychological mechanisms of posttraumatic stress reactions. Horowitz’ (1986) theoretical model of the alternation between intrusive and avoidance symptoms has had a great impact on the understanding of PTSD. Avoidance symptoms are seen as means to prevent or deal with anxiety partly by avoiding trauma-associated stimuli (external and internal), and partly by a general emotional numbing. A variety of methods based on the DSM criteria of PTSD (American Psychiatric

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Association, 1980, 1987, 1994) have been developed for the assessment of post-traumatic symptomatology (e.g., Allen, 1994; Miller, Kamenchenko, & Krasniasnski, 1992) and have been used in different traumatized groups as well as in factor-analytical studies focusing on PTSD symptom structure (e.g., Watson et al., 1991; Foa, Riggs, & Gershuny, 1995). The findings from these studies vary between different traumatized groups and across samples of seemingly similarly traumatized persons, and thus far have not given any unambiguous answers to questions about the existence of a general core of post-traumatic reactions. Furthermore, these studies are not easy to compare, since they have different designs and the assessment instruments used address somewhat varying symptoms. In a study using the self-report Harvard Trauma Questionnaire among severely traumatized Indo-Chinese refugees (Mollica et al., 1992) the most frequently reported symptoms were intrusion and intentional avoidance, while the inability to recognize emotions, i.e., numbing, was one of the least frequent symptoms in this group, despite the fact that 70% of the subjects had a PTSD diagnosis. Re-experiencing symptoms and an avoidance of thoughts about the war were also the most frequent symptoms among severely traumatized Bosnian refugees, while numbing symptoms along with arousal symptoms had a comparatively low frequency (Weine et al., 1995). A comorbidity between PTSD and other anxiety disorders, depressive, and dissociative disorders, which is not only due to symptom overlap, has been frequently observed (e.g., Bleich, Koslowsky, Dolev, & Lerer, 1997; Carlier, Lamberts, Fouwels, & Gersons, 1996; Bremner et al., 1992). In a study of van der Kolk et al. (1996) PTSD, dissociation, somatization, and affect dysregulation seemed to represent a spectrum of adaptations to trauma and often occurred together but in various combinations over time among traumatized treatment-seeking and non-treatment-seeking subjects. These results correspond well with the modern psychodynamic view of PTSD, which has been greatly influenced by the work of Krystal (1985, 1988), who stressed the impact of traumatization on expression and tolerance of affects. He noted a high prevalence of psychosomatic diseases both among war veterans and in his work with concentration camp survivors. Van der Kolk et al. (1996) emphasized the fact that a one-sided focus on

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the DSM definition of PTSD can obscure the psychodynamic understanding of post-traumatic reactions. According to Krystal, the potential for psychic trauma is related to the nature of the trauma, the nature of self-representation, the way a danger is evaluated, and the entire perceptive, cognitive, and affective apparatus whereby such an evaluation can be effected. One primary function for this seems to be the process of perception. From a psychological point of view the common pattern in perceptual selection is its regulation for the purpose of avoiding painful affects. Trauma survivors, after trauma in adulthood, cannot use affects as signals in information processing as a result of regression in their affective development. Individuals who are able to tolerate the particular affect involved can allow themselves greater perceptual freedom. Conversely, individuals who tend to block their perceptions show impaired affect tolerance and/or a disturbed ability to keep signal affects within a range that is comfortable for them. Defense against affects – the numbing symptoms – may range from extreme to a more partial reduction in both affect and awareness while the dissociative defenses may sever completely any connection between affect and cognition. Just as numbing represents one extreme of trauma-related symptomatology, at the other pole is the realm of overwhelming affect – the arousal symptoms – stimulated by memory-specific external and internal cues. Besides dissociation, somatization, acting out and paranoid ideation are other important defense strategies when trauma is massive and prolonged and the feelings evoked are so violent that more advanced defense operations are not enough (Varvin & Hauff, 1998). Few studies on traumatized groups explicitly focusing on defense mechanisms have been reported despite the central role of defenses in a psychodynamic view on trauma. In three studies of differently traumatized groups, (Birmes, Warner, Callahan, Sztulman, Charlet, & Schmitt, 2000; Romans, Martin, Morris, & Herbison, 1999; Schmidt Pedersen & Elklit, 1998), using the self-report Defense Mechanism Style Questionnaire-40 (DSQ-40) (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Bond, Gardner, Christian, & Sigal, 1983) only a few specific defenses were received associated with PTSD or trauma.

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Projective techniques have shown themselves to be promising as a complement to traditional diagnostic methods such as self-reports and interviews in traumatized groups (e.g., Hartman et al., 1990; Swanson, Blount, & Bruno, 1990; Salley & Teiling, 1984; van der Kolk & Ducey, 1989). A more extensive use of projective methods has been advocated (Allen, 1994; Frank, 1992), and during the nineties there was an increase in reported studies using the Rorschach test on trauma survivors (e.g. Allen, 1994; Frueh & Kinder, 1994; Frue, Leverett, & Kinder, 1995; Kaser-Boyd, 1993; Levin, 1993; Sloan, Arsenault, Hilsenroth, Handler, & Harvill, 1996). The Rorschach findings from these studies of different traumatized groups such as Vietnam veterans, traumatized civilians, and traumatized children are concordant across groups in showing impaired reality testing, low stress tolerance, an ineffective, affectively unmodulated coping style in stressful situations, and a tendency to avoid emotional situations. Bearing in mind Krystal’s statement about perceptual selection and its regulation for the purpose of avoiding threatening affects, the perception test called the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) (Kragh, 1985) is of special interest. The DMT is in part a projective test. It is based on psychoanalytic and perceptgenetic theory and has been used in various fields such as in aviation and stress research (Olff, 1991; for overview). Perceptgenetic theory and methods, such as the DMT, have been developed to map out the developmental patterns underlying our experience and our behaviour. The basic perceptgenetic assumption is that the world we perceive is created from ourselves by means of brief, most often preconscious processes. Since perceptgenesis is a reflection of personality, one important purpose of perceptgenetic research has been to unveil basic individual characteristics (Westerlundh & Smith, 1983). Interest in validation of the DMT against independent clinical criteria in terms of diagnoses and syndromes has increased over recent years in the assessment of different disorders within the psychiatric and psychosomatic fields, among adults as well as adolescents (e.g., Fransson, Sundbom, & Hägglöf, 1998; Sundbom, Bintzer, & Kullgren, 1999; Sundbom & Bodlund, 1999; Sundbom, Jacobsson, Kullgren, & Penayo, 1998). In the treatment of patients with severe traumatic experiences it is very important to take in consideration their difficulty in integrating the trau-

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matic experiences without being overwhelmed by them. A careful assessment of the patient’s capacity of, for example, regulation and expression of affects and defense operations should precede such therapeutic work. In the present study, defensive reactions were examined among massively traumatized male Bosnian and Croatian refugees by means of the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). The main purpose was to investigate how defense mechanisms are related to the expression of posttraumatic symptoms as measured by the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ) (Mollica et al., 1991; 1992). The following questions were addressed: Are higher vs. lower levels of post-traumatic symptoms associated with different patterns of defenses? If this is true, which specific post-traumatic symptoms or clusters of symptoms differentiate best between these defense patterns?

MATERIALS AND METHODS Participants The participants were male refugees from the former Yugoslavia, who had been traumatized by organized violence during the war and the ethnic persecutions, and who were granted political asylum by the Swedish immigration authorities. At the time of the study, which was conducted between February, 1995 and August, 1996, they were outpatients at a Swedish psychiatric unit specifically set up for the treatment of this target group. Patients were referred to the unit in different ways, e.g., by primary care physicians and local refugee counsellors. Some were self-referred. The patients were informed about the study and asked about participation after a minimum treatment period of one month. Two patients did not agree to participate, two were excluded due to psychotic symptoms, and one patient broke off participation. Twenty-one people (mean age 37.6 years; range 22-58) participated in the study. Eighteen participants were Bosnian Muslims, two were Muslims from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and one was self-identified as being of Croatian national heritage. Mean length of residence in Sweden at the first contact with the clinic was 18.6 months (range 2.5-36.0). There was no significant age difference between the group and drop-outs (t = 0.81; df = 24; p = 0.42) and they were also com-

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parable with regard to ethnicity and residence time in Sweden. Two persons had an educational level of 8 years, 14 of 11-12 years, and 5 people of more than 12 years. All had been employed or self-employed before the ethnic persecutions and the war started. Fourteen participants were married, five were single, one was widowed, and one was divorced. Two had undergone psychiatric treatment on one occasion in their country of origin. One of these had a documented, war-related PTSD diagnosis from his native country, but no history of psychopathology before the war. The Defense Mechanism Test A detailed description of this method is given in chapter 5. The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire Mollica et al. (1991, 1992) developed the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ) for measurement of traumatic events and post-traumatic symptoms among traumatized Indo-Chinese refugees. This self-report instrument was chosen because it was constructed for use in a similarly traumatized population with a high base-rate of PTSD symptoms, which we presumed to be the case in the Bosnian-Croatian group as well. Although Mollica et al. (1992) pointed out that there may be differences in PTSD symptom structure between different refugee groups depending on cultural interpretations of trauma events or possible culture-specific reactions to severe traumatization in general, there do seem to be apparent similarities between the group in the present study and the Indo-Chinese refugees. Both groups are refugees, the effects of which probably interact with those of organized violence, and there are also similarities with respect to what kind of organized violence the two groups had been exposed to (e.g., Bernstein Carlson & Rosser-Hogan, 1991; Mollica et al., 1992; 1993; 1999; Weine et al., 1995; Weine & Laub, 1995). The trauma events section of the HTQ contains questions about experiences of 17 trauma events related to war and other organized violence. The symptoms section consists of 30 symptom descriptions, of which 16 are drawn from the criteria for PTSD in the DSM III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). The other 14 symptom items were added by Mollica et al. (1992) as typical symptoms in the Indo-Chinese refugee group, and

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have also proved to be characteristic symptoms of torture victims (e.g., Allodi, 1985), for example, dissociative experiences and feelings of shame, guilt, and hopelessness. The mean score of all symptom items, on a scale ranging from “not at all” (=1) to “extremely” (=4), constitutes the participant’s total symptom score. With a mean score of 2.5 as the cut-off limit for a PTSD diagnosis, the sensitivity and specificity of the original IndoChinese versions were 78% and 65%, respectively, with DSM III-R PTSD independently diagnosed by the treatment team as the criterion (Mollica et al., 1992). In a later study of Vietnamese former political prisoners, the symptom scale, with an adjusted cut-off point, proved to have a sensitivity of 0.98 and a specificity of 1.0 using the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM III-R as the PTSD criterion (Smith Fawsi et al., 1997). Mollica et al. (1992) reported a test-retest reliability of 0.92, inter-rater reliability of 0.98, and internal consistency of 0.96 (Cronbach’s alpha) for the symptoms section in the Indo-Chinese refugee group. The internal consistency in the present study sample was 0.89 for the total symptom list and, for the 16 PTSD items and the 14 PTSD-related symptoms, 0.81 and 0.83, respectively. Since the cut-off limit for PTSD used by Mollica et al. (1992) in the Indo-Chinese group could not automatically be applied to a refugee group of a different cultural background, the average symptom score was used as a continuous variable in the present study. This also served to eliminate overestimated differences close to the cut-off limit. A professional translator, who was well aware of what a delicate matter language could be as a consequence of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, translated the HTQ into Serbo-Croatian. In addition, a professional interpreter was present at the administration. Partial Least Squares (PLS) discriminant analysis The statistical multivariate projection method Partial Least Squares discriminant analysis (Henningsson, Sundbom, Armelius, & Erdberg, 2001) was used in the present study. A detailed description of this method is given in chapter 5.

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PROCEDURE The participants gave their written informed consent. The investigation took place at the psychiatric clinic. They were assessed regarding depresssive symptoms and the DSM III-R criteria of PTSD in a clinical interview performed by their psychiatrist on average two months after intake. The DMT and the HTQ were performed after an average of four months after intake, and were administered by a clinical psychologist well experienced in clinical work with traumatized refugees and in the use of interpreters. For each participant the same interpreter was used during the interviews and testing as during his therapy sessions, i.e. the people were used to the presence of an interpreter and had accepted their respective interpreters.

RESULTS Seventeen people (81 %) met the DSM III-R criteria for PTSD in the clinical interview, and 11 persons (52 %) had depressive symptoms of varying degrees. There was no significant difference in the mean symptom ratings on the HTQ between participants with and without depressive symptoms (t = .58; df = 19; p = .57). The average number of experienced trauma events reported on the HTQ was 13.0 (SD = 3.3) with a range of 5.0 - 17.0. The most commonly reported traumatic events were: lack of food or water (n = 21), ill health without access to medical care (n = 21), lack of shelter (n = 21), being close to death (n = 20), unnatural death of family member or friend (n = 19), murder of family member or friend (n = 18), murder of stranger or strangers (n = 18), and imprisonment (n = 17). The mean score of all 30 symptoms of the HTQ was 2.4 (SD = .41, range 1.8 - 3.4), of the 16 proper PTSD symptoms 2.6 (SD = .46, range 1.9 - 3.8), and of the 14 PTSD-related symptoms 2.2 (SD = .47, range 1.4 - 2.9). In other words, post-traumatic symptoms were frequent in the group, and also the four people who had not met the PTSD criteria (DSM III R) in the clinical interview reported post-traumatic symptoms to some degree on the HTQ. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the mean symptom rating on the entire HTQ and the number of reported trauma events was r = .46 (p = .04).

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Table 6.1. Variable Importance in the Projection (VIP) values of the 12 Defense Mechanism Test variables associated with a high level of post-traumatic symptoms Var. no. VIP value Description of the DMT variables Blocking defense style Disappearance and reduction 19

2.79

Attribute disappearance, Middle

20

2.28

Attribute disappearance, Late

23

1.03

Hero reduction, Middle

24

2.19

Hero reduction, Late

25

1.49

Peripheral person reduction, Early High threshold values:

4

1.06

First meaningful percept is seen late

12

1.06

First Hero is seen late

13

1.21

First Peripheral person is seen late Distorting defense style Interchanges of sex

29

1.02

Many changes of sex, Hero

30

1.61

Many changes of sex, Peripheral person Affective responses Introaggression (Turning aggression against oneself)

87

1.35

Hero without Peripheral person, Middle

3

1.05

High anxiety in the test situation

A PLS model was established for the DMT variables (X) and the average symptom score on the entire HTQ (Y). Two significant informationbearing dimensions (component 1 and component 2) according to crossvalidation criteria were obtained. In total 16.9 % of the variance in the DMT variables accounted for 93.5% of the variance in the symptom

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scores, i.e. R² = .93. The Q² value (the goodness of prediction) of the model was .37. In component 1, 8.4 % of the variance in the DMT variables predicted 74.9 % of the variance in the symptom scores, while in component 2, a further 18.6 % of the variance in the symptom scores was accounted for by another 8.6 % of the variance in the DMT variables. Of the 124 DMT variables, 25 were excluded because of zero variance, i.e. 99 variables contributed actively to the model, but of these only 37 had a more substantial (greater than average) influence on the model with Variable Importance in the Projection (VIP) values larger than 1.00. In Tables 6.1 and 6.2, these 37 DMT variables and their corresponding VIP values are presented. Table 6.2. Variable Importance in the Projection (VIP) values of the 25 Defense Mechanism Test variables associated with a low level of post-traumatic symptoms Var. no. VIP Description of the DMT variables value Blocking defense style Disappearance and reduction 22

1.17

Hero reduction, Early

26

1.22

Peripheral person reduction, Middle High threshold values:

14

1.45

First Attribute is seen late

21

1.14

No Attribute is seen Repression

40

1.13

Total

46

1.18

Peripheral person, Middle

47

1.36

Peripheral person, Late

Distorting defense style Introjection 110

2.34

Stereotyped Hero

Defense mechanisms and post-traumatic symptoms among refugees 112

1.21

Hero >34 years old

113

1.05

Peripheral person < 26 years old

101

Identification with opposite sex 95

1.23

Total

97

1.13

Hero, Early

98

1.40

Hero, Middle Isolation

48

1.09

Total

56

1.08

Whiteness of Hero Affective responses Introaggression (Turning aggression against oneself)

35

1.49

Hero is sad

84

1.72

Total

85

1.30

Many different variants

86

1.60

Hero without Peripheral person, Early

89

1.22

Hero with Peripheral person, Early

90

1.37

Hero with Peripheral person, Middle

91

1.54

Hero with Peripheral person, Late Reaction formation

75

1.04

Peripheral person, Late

125

1.63

Sexualization of the relationship between Hero and Peripheral person Denial (negation)

66

1.24

Middle

As shown in Table 6.1, a high post-traumatic symptom level was associated with a pattern of DMT variables primarily consisting of an over-all lateness and fluctuations in the perception of the persons/attribute in the

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stimulus picture (var. nos. 4, 12-13, and 19-20, 23-25, 29-30, respectively), a high anxiety level in the test situation (var. no. 3), but also to some extent associated with turning aggression against oneself (var. no. 87, e.g. Hero is perceived as sick, hurt or depressed). Table 6.2 shows that a low level of post-traumatic symptoms was associated with much more varied defensive strategies. Among the 25 DMT variables with VIP values above 1.00, a stereotyped wrongly perceived Hero with regard to age or sex (var. no. 110) had an outstandingly high VIP value (2.34), but there were also other massive distortions, such as turning aggression against oneself (var. nos. 35, 84-86, 89-91), perceiving the threatening Peripheral person as younger (var. no. 113), identification with the opposite sex (var. nos. 95, 97-98) and signs of sexualization between the persons (var. no. 125). Further distortions were an explicit negation of the threat (var. no. 66) and reaction formation (var. no. 75). Additionally, a PLS analysis was carried out to obtain information about how the specific post-traumatic symptoms or clusters of symptoms were associated with the defenses. The DMT data (X) of the 16 patients with the lowest and highest average HTQ symptom scores (range: 1.3-2.3 and 2.63.4, respectively) were related to the 30 HTQ symptom ratings (Y). In Table 6.3, the symptoms with a goodness of prediction value greater than .10 (Q2 value) are presented. Sixteen of the 30 HTQ symptoms contributed significantly to the association with the different defense patterns. Specific symptoms from all three clusters of PTSD as well as shame, guilt, and feelings of distrust to other people were the most important ones that could be predicted by the perceptual defenses.

DISCUSSION The overall aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between responses to the projective Defense Mechanism Test and the posttraumatic symptom level as measured by the self-report Harvard Trauma Questionnaire among severely traumatized refugees from the former Yugoslavia. The results showed that it was possible to identify two main patterns of perceptual reactions on the DMT, one positively and the other

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negatively correlated to the level of post-traumatic symptoms. The main defensive strategy associated with a high post-traumatic symptom level consisted of a one-sided reliance on a blocking behavior style connected with a lack of affective responses to the stimulus picture (Table 6.1). The other pattern, associated with a low symptom level, was characterized by a number of various perceptual distortions and more verbal expressions of affects (Table 6.2). The blocking defense style associated with a high symptom level was manifested in a late and unstable perception of the gestalten in the stimulus picture. These defenses, coupled with the lack of affective responses, seemed to be ineffective, considering that a high anxiety level in the test situation accompanied them. The symptoms most associated with this blocking behavior were specific symptoms from all three symptom clusters of PTSD as well as feelings of shame and guilt and a general distrust of other people (Table 6.3). The low-scorers dealt with the threatening part of the stimulus picture by using a varied set of distortions, for instance, by perceiving the threatening Peripheral person as younger, thus making him less of a threat. Signs of sexualization between the gestalts (for example that they hug each other) might have had the same function. A low level of post-traumatic symptoms was also associated with more abundant expressions of affective responses - massive signs of turning aggression towards the self, reaction formation, and an explicit negation of the threat. In other words, these people had an ability to verbalize affective responses, and thus there seemed to be a reverse relationship between this ability and post-traumatic symptoms. Furthermore, individuals with low levels of post-traumatic symptoms showed a stable but stereotypical distorted perception of the Hero gestalt or the self-representation, as if they were striving to keep any possible picture of themselves constant, and this is in vivid contrast to the fluctuating perceptions of the gestalts in the stimulus picture among individuals with high scores. In sum, as compared to persons with high levels, people with low symptom levels seemed to have access to a greater number of varied and successful perceptual defense strategies for dealing with anxiety. In Krystal’s terms, individuals with low symptom levels allowed themselves a greater perceptual freedom. The blocking operations and the difficulty to

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recognize painful affects among patients with high levels of post-traumatic symptoms seem to be in agreement with Krystal’s view (1985) that trauma may cause intolerance to painful affects to the degree that perception is suppressed. Following Krystal’s reasoning, it remains to be explained why participants with low post-traumatic symptom levels were not affected in the same way, considering that they had also been exposed to severe traumatization. One explanation may be found in their comparatively smaller trauma exposure, as reflected in the modest correlation between symptom level and the number of reported trauma events. The results also raise the crucial question of whether people with more post-traumatic symptoms preferably used blocking strategies even prior to the traumatization. However, given the nature of post-traumatic reactions, the present results also give rise to another interpretation, namely, that the blocking reactions of those with high symptom levels were simply perceptual delays caused by their extreme arousal and anxiety, and had nothing at all to do with a different defense style. The lack of affective responses on the DMT that characterized persons with high post-traumatic symptom levels is consistent with the close relationship between PTSD and problems of affect regulation found by van der Kolk et al. (1996) and with the view that a “locking down” of the affective system, causing numbing symptoms, is an essential part of PTSD (Foa et al., 1995). The inability to cope effectively with stressful situations, manifested in a high anxiety level, can also be recognized from Rorschach studies of PTSD patients (Hartman et al. 1990; Swanson et al. 1990). The present results seem to differ from previous studies of defenses among trauma-victims (Birmes et al., 2000; Romans et al., 1999; Schmidt Pedersen & Elklit, 1998). Again this brings to the fore a discussion of the differences in findings due to different assessment methods used in defense studies: self-report instruments, projective methods, or interviews (Perry & Ianni, 1998, Davidson & MacGregor, 1998).

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Table 6.3. Descriptions and Goodness of Prediction (Q2 values) of the most differentiating symptoms. HTQ item no Q2 value Symptom description (abbreviation) Intrusion H1

0.26

Recurrent thoughts or memories of the trauma Avoidance

H4

0.20

Detached and withdrawn from people

H11

0.16

Avoiding activities reminding of the trauma

H13

0.32

Less interest in daily activities Arousal

H6

0.14

Exaggerated startle reaction

H7

0.38

Concentration difficulties

H8

0.11

Difficulties sleeping

H10

0.29

Irritable or outbursts of anger Distrust

H26

0.16

Others are hostile

H27

0.12

No one to rely on

H30

0.32

Someone I trusted betrayed me Dissociative

H28

0.11

Found out about actions that I can not remember Others

H20

0.27

Survival guilt

H21

0.11

Hopelessness

H22

0.27

Shame of traumatic experiences

H24

0.12

Feeling as if I am going crazy

The present findings seem to have implications when traumatized refugees are assessed for psychotherapy. The triggering of an overwhelming affect is integral to the definition of what constitutes traumatic stress. Integration of the trauma involves re-experiencing and symbolization. Many issues must be covered in the assessment for psychotherapy, for example,

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the post-traumatic symptom level, the severity of the trauma and the subjective meaning of the traumatic experience, earlier experiences, and the basic modes of defensive functioning. In other words, blocking from consciousness (denial) or distortion of content (disavowal) has to be considered when assessing these patients’ suitability for different therapeutic techniques. Thus, for patients with a strong blocking defense style and lack of affective responses associated with a high post-traumatic symptom level and strong feelings of shame, guilt, and distrust of other people, the supportive elements in the psychotherapy are suggested to be important parts of the treatment. A secure life situation and a secure therapeutic setting are particularly important conditions for establishing a working alliance with these individuals, which may take a considerable time (Varvin, 1998; Varvin & Hauff, 1998). Patients with a low symptom level, on the other hand, characterized by a distorting defense style and with an ability to verbalize emotions, seem to be more suitable for expressive therapy. The finding that people with lower post–traumatic symptom levels had better defenses in the form of using a distorting defense style and an ability to pronounce affective responses may seem particularly impressive, considering the comparatively great homogeneity in the entire research sample with regard to traumatization and symptom level. The result contributes to the construct validity of the DMT. It gives support to previous DMT studies, where the type of defense style (blocking or distorting) was shown to be one significant discriminator between different clinical groups (e.g., Henningsson, 1999). Our conclusion is that the DMT and multivariate modeling of data may be useful methods for future replication studies in finding discriminating patterns of perceptual defenses among severely traumatized patients and for use in psychotherapy research. A shortcoming of this study is the lack of a contrast group with no posttraumatic symptoms but comparable to the study group with regard to culture, age, sex, and other relevant background factors. Furthermore, the sample was small and consisted of male subjects only. Although the predictive validity (Q² value) was comparatively high in the present study and the PLS method permits statistical analysis of a small number of individuals in relation to the number of variables studied (Henningsson et al., 2001)

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the results need to be replicated in preferably larger groups of welldiagnosed refugees from the former Yugoslavia before generalization.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was supported by grants from the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. The authors wish to thank Richard F. Mollica and Yael Caspi-Yavin for permission to use the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire in this study, and Per-Axel Karlsson for his psychiatric assessments of the subjects. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee, Faculty of Medicine, University of Umeå.

REFERENCES Allen, S. N. (1994). Psychological assessment of post-traumatic stress disorder. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 17: 327-349. Allodi, F. (1985). Physical and psychiatric effects of torture: Canadian study. In: The breaking of bodies and minds: Torture, psychiatric abuses and the health professions, eds. E. Stover & E. O. Nightingale. New York: Freeman, pp. 66-78. American Psychiatric Association. (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Author. American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (3rd ed., revised.). Washington, DC: Author. American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. Andrews, G., Singh, M., & Bond, M. (1993). The Defense Style Questionnaire. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 181:246-256. Bernstein Carlson, E., & Rosser-Hogan, R. (1991). Trauma experiences, posttraumatic stress, dissociation, and depression in Cambodian refugees. American Journal of Psychiatry, 148:1548-1551. Birmes, P., Warner, B. A., Callahan, S., Sztulman, H., Charlet, J-P., & Schmitt, L. (2000). Defense styles and posttraumatic stress symptoms. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 188:306-308.

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Bleich, A., Koslowsky, M., Dolev, A., & Lerer, B. (1997). Post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. An analysis of comorbidity. British Journal of Psychiatry, 170:479-482. Bond, M., Gardner, S., Christian, J., & Sigal, J. J. (1983). Empirical study of self-rated defense styles. Archives of General Psychiatry, 40:333-338. Bremner, J. D., Southwick, S., Brett, E., Fontana, A., Rosenheck, R., & Charney, D. S. (1992). Dissociation and posttraumatic stress disorder in Vietnam combat veterans. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149:328-332. Carlier, I. V., Lamberts, R.D., Fouwels, A. J., & Gersons, B. P. (1996). PTSD in relation to dissociation in traumatized police officers. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153:1325-1328. Davidson, K., & MacGregor, M. W. (1998). A Critical Appraisal of SelfReport Defense Mechanism Measures. Journal of Personality, 66(6):965991. Foa, B. E., Riggs, D. S., & Gershuny, B. S. (1995). Arousal, numbing, and intrusion: Symptom structure of PTSD following assault. American Journal of Psychiatry, 152: 116-120. Frank, G. (1992). On the use of the Rorschach in the study of PTSD. Journal of Personality Assessment, 59:641-643. Fransson, P., Sundbom, E., & Hägglöf, B. (1998). A comparative study of adolescents in psychiatric care assessed using the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) and the DSM- IV classification system. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 52:527-536. Frueh, B. C., & Kinder, B. N. (1994). The susceptibility of the Rorschach Inkblot Test to malingering of combat-related PTSD. Journal of Personality Assessment, 62:280-298. Frueh, B. C., Leverett, J. P., & Kinder, B. N. (1995). Interrelationship between MMPI-2 and Rorschach variables in a sample of Vietnam veterans with PTSD. Journal of Personality Assessment, 64:312-318. Hartman, W. L., Clark, M. E., Morgan, M. K., Dunn,V. K., Fine, A. D., Perry, G. G., & Winsch, D. L. (1990). Rorschach structure of a hospitalized sample of Vietnam veterans with PTSD. Journal of Personality Assessment, 54:149-159.

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Henningsson, M. (1999). Defensive strategies in psychosomatic groups. A soft-modeling approach to Defense Mechanism Test data. Doctoral dissertation, Department of Applied Psychology, University of Umeå, Sweden. Henningsson, M., Sundbom, E., Armelius, B-Å., & Erdberg, P. (2001). PLS model building: A multivariate approach to personality test data. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 42:399-409. Horowitz, M. J. (1986). Stress response syndromes. New Jersey/London: Jason Aronson. Kaser-Boyd, N. (1993). Rorschachs of women who commit homicide. Journal of Personality Assessment, 60:458-470. Kragh, U. (1955). The actual-genetic model of perception-personality. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup. Krystal, H. (1985). Trauma and the stimulus barrier. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 5(1):131-161. Krystal, H. (1988). Integration and Healing: Affect, Trauma, and Alexithymia. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press Levin, P. (1993). Assessing posttraumatic stress disorder with the Rorschach projective technique. In: International Handbook of Traumatic Stress Syndromes, eds. J. P. Wilson & B. Raphaels. New York: Plenum Press, pp.189-200. Miller, T. W., Kamenchenko, P., & Krasniasnski, A. (1992). Assessment of life stress events: The etiology and measurement of traumatic stress disorder. The International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 38: 215-227. Mollica, R. F., Caspi-Yavin, Y., Bollini, P., Truong, T., Tor, S., & Lavelle, J. (1992). The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire. Validating a cross-cultural instrument for measuring torture, trauma, and posttraumatic stress disorder in Indochinese refugees. Journal of Nervous and Mental Desease, 180:111-116. Mollica, R. F., Caspi-Yavin, Y., Lavelle, J., Tor, S., Yang, T., Chan, S., Pham, T., Ryan, A., & de Marneffe, D. (1991). The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ). Manual. For use with Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese versions. Harvard program in refugee trauma. Harvard school of public health. Mollica, R. F., Donelan, K., Tor, S., Lavelle, J., Elias, C., Frankel, M., & Blendon, R. J. (1993). The effect of trauma and confinement on functional

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health and mental health status of Cambodians living in ThailandCambodia border camps. JAMA, 270:581-586. Mollica, R. F., McInnes, K., Sarajlic´, N., Lavelle, J., Sarajlic´, I., & Massagli, M. P. (1999). Disability associated with psychiatric comorbidity and health status in Bosnian refugees living in Croatia. JAMA, 282:433439. Olff, M. (1991). The DMT method in Europe: state of the art. In: Quantification of Human Defense Mechanisms, eds. M. Olff, G. Godaert, & H. Ursin. Berlin: Springer Verlag, pp. 148-171. Perry, J.C., & Ianni, F. F. (1998). Observer-rated measures of defense mechanisms. Journal of Personality, 66(6):993-1021. Romans, S. E., Martin, J. L., Morris, E., & Herbison, G. P. (1999). Psychological defense styles in women who report childhood sexual abuse: A controlled community study. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156:10801085. Salley, R. D., & Teiling, P. A. (1984). Dissociated rage attacks in a Vietnam veteran: A Rorschach study. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48:98-104. Schmidt Pedersen, S., & Elklit, A. (1998). Traumatisation, psychological defence style, coping, symptomatology, and social support in HIVpositive: A pilot study. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 39:55-60. Sloan, P., Arsenault, L., Hilsenroth, M., Handler, L., & Harvill, L. (1996). Rorschach measures of posttraumatic stress in Persian Gulf War veterans: A three-year follow-up study. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66:5464. Smith Fawsi, M. C., Murphy, E., Pham, T., Lin, L., Poole, C., & Mollica, R. F. (1997). The validity of screening for post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression among Vietnamese former political prisoners. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 95:87-93. Sundbom, E., Binzer, M., & Kullgren, G. (1999). Psychological defensive strategies according to Defense Mechanism Test among patients with severe conversion disorder. Psychotherapy Research 9(2):184-198. Sundbom, E., & Bodlund, O. (1999). Prediction of outcome in transsexualism by means of the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) and multivariate modeling: a pilot study. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 88:3-20.

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Sundbom, E., Jacobsson, L., Kullgren, G., & Penayo, U. (1998). Personality and defenses: A cross-cultural study of psychiatric patients and healthy individuals in Nicaragua and Sweden. Psychological reports, 83:13311347. Swanson, G. S., Blount, J., & Bruno, R. (1990). Comprehensive system Rorschach data on Vietnem combat veterans. Journal of Personality Assessment, 54:160-169. Van der Kolk, B. A., & Ducey, C. P. (1989). The psychological processing of traumatic experience: Rorschach patterns in PTSD. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 2:259-274. Van der Kolk, B. A., Pelcovitz, D., Roth, S., Mandel, F. S., McFarlane, A., & Herman, J. L. (1996). Dissociation, somatization, and affect dysregulation: The complexity of adaptation to trauma. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153:83-93. Varvin, S. (1998). Psychoanalytical psychotherapy with traumatized refugees: Integration, symbolization, and mourning. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 52:64-71. Varvin, S., & Hauff, E. (1998). Psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy with torture survivors. In: Caring for victims of torture, eds. J. M. Jaranson & M. K. Popkin. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press, pp.117129. Watson, C. G., Kucala, T., Juba, M., Manifold, V., Anderson, P. E. D., & Anderson, D. (1991). A factor analysis of the DSM-III post-traumatic stress disorder criteria. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 47:205-214. Weine, S. M., Becker, D. F., McGlashan, T. H., Laub, D., Lazrove, S., Vojvoda, D., & Hyman, L. (1995). Psychiatric consequences of “ethnic cleansing”: Clinical assessment and trauma testimonies of newly resettled Bosnian refugees. American Journal of Psychiatry, 152, 536-542. Vojvoda, D., & Laub, D. (1995). Narrative constructions of historical realities in testimony with Bosnian survivors of “ethnic cleansing”. Psychiatry, 58, 246-260. Westerlundh, B., & Smith, G. (1983). Perceptgenesis and the psychodynamics of perception. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 6, 597640.

7. INFLUENCE OF GENDER AND AGE IN THE DEFENSE MECHANISM TEST AMONG ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom The aim was to study gender and age differences in a group (N =100) of healthy adults (n = 67) and adolescents (n = 33) assessed by means of the projective percept-genetic Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). First, gender differences within the adults and the adolescents were investigated separately. Secondly, similarities and dissimilarities, in respect of gender differences, between these two groups were compared. Thirdly, the relation between gender and age was investigated by studying all the participants simultaneously. The test protocols were scored in respect of 124 DMT variables and analyzed by means of partial least squares (PLS) discriminant analysis including a pattern analysis of the DMT variables. The results showed significant gender differences in the adult as well as the adolescent group. The gender differences within each group revealed obvious similarities, although differences were also found. A common feature in the DMT pattern for the females was different variants of the perceptual defense identification with the opposite sex, while the common features for older and younger males were less obvious. However, when the subgroups (adult female, adult male, girl and boy) were scrutinized simultaneously they were all significantly separated from each other. Adult males and females were separated by the same dimension, while separate dimensions were needed to separate both the boys and the girls. It was concluded that both gender and age (adolescent/adult) must be considered in the DMT. Adolescence is often described as a transition between childhood and adulthood. There are however conflicting opinions about how this transition proceeds. One ”school” emphasizes the existence of a ”normative crisis” as a healthy step in adolescent development (Blos, 1967; Erikson, 1968). Another ”school”, supported by empirical findings, describes the same development as smoother and far less dramatic for the majority of

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adolescents (Coleman & Henry, 1990; Offer & Boxer, 1991). These two views imply different interpretations of the adolescent transition, which make it interesting to compare adolescents with adults. Empirical studies of gender- and age differences in relation to projective tests are rather scant and hard to interpret. In a meta-analysis focusing on aggression Hyde (1984) found reasonably reliable but not large gender differences. It was shown that the method of measurement influenced the magnitude of obtained gender differences. For example, gender differences tended to be larger when projective tests were used compared to self-report questionnaires. In Bäckström (1994) a variant of the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) with different picture material was used to investigate gender differences among male and female students. The overall results showed that men and women reacted differently to threat themes. Women compared to men had, among others, a higher rate of identification with the opposite sex i.e., they assigned wrong gender to the figures. Carlsson and Smith (1987) using the projective test Meta Contrast Technique (MCT) found considerable gender differences among a group of youngsters. The boys scored higher on isolating defenses while girls showed a preference for sensitivity-projection defenses. Another example of gender differences in projective tests has been presented by Waehler and Zaback (1991) using the Draw-A-Person test. They found that female subjects drew the opposite sex much more often than male subjects and that this was associated with low self-esteem in men but not in the women. Age differences in coping and defenses in a sample of subjects aged 10-77 years were investigated by Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larsson, and Hobart (1987). They found increasing maturity in coping and defense with a leveling off during adulthood. These results indicate that one could expect to find different defense mechanisms in adolescent and adult samples. We have earlier studied typical DMT patterns for adolescents belonging to different diagnostic groups (Fransson & Sundbom, 1997; Fransson, Sundbom, & Hägglöf, 1998). The results from these studies were compared to the results from very similar studies performed on adults (Armelius & Sundbom, 1991; Sundbom & Kullgren, 1992). The comparisons between adolescents and adults revealed surprisingly similar patterns for corresponding diagnostic groups, for instance, both adult and adolescent

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patients with borderline features were characterized by introaggression. It was therefore called into question whether the DMT is sensitive to differences between adults and adolescents, or whether the axiomatic differences between adults and adolescents are somewhat exaggerated. In the study (Fransson & Sundbom, 1998) we showed considerable gender differences in DMT patterns among a heterogeneous group of adolescents, consisting of three sub-groups; borderline, psychotic and nonpatients, all of which showed considerable gender differences separately. When both gender and diagnostic group membership were considered simultaneously, it was found that gender influenced the diagnostic pattern of DMT responses. It was concluded that gender must be considered when the DMT is used on adolescent populations. A question raised in that study was whether these results were typical not only for adolescents but also for adults. The main purpose of the present study was to investigate discriminating gender and age related patterns in DMT responses among a group of nonpatient adults and adolescents. From our earlier findings two questions are addressed: First, are there any differences in DMT patterns between adult males and females? If so, what are the similarities and dissimilarities, in respect of gender differences, between these adults and a group of adolescents? Second, are there any significant differences in DMT patterns between adult males and females, adolescent boys and girls when these four groups are analyzed together in a common Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis?

MATERIAL AND METHODS Participants One hundred non-patients were assessed using the DMT. Two comparison groups were formed. One group of adults (n = 67; mean age = 32 years; range 21-46; 33 women and 34 men) mainly consisting of medical personnel and university students. The second group consisted of adolescents, upper secondary school students (n = 33; mean age = 17 years; range 1619; 18 girls and 15 boys). The DMT was examined by psychologists, well trained in this method.

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The Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) The test was administered according to the DMT manual (Kragh, 1985). In the present study only the first of the two standard pictures was used. The responses were scored according to a list of 130 DMT variables earlier described in Sundbom, Binzer and Kullgren (1999). (Six of the variables were excluded, as they are not proper DMT variables). The variables consist of the defenses described in the manual and further clinically relevant responses not systematized in the manual. Some of the variables were also scored according to whether they occur early, in the middle or late in the percept-genesis. The reason for this is that both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that defenses may have different implications depending on where in the percept-genesis they occur (Sundbom, 1992). Interrater agreement for blindfolded judgments regarding these variables have recently been studied and found to be high (Henningsson & Sundbom, 2000). Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis The statistical multivariate projection method Partial Least Squares analysis (Henningsson, Sundbom, Armelius, & Erdberg, 2001) was used in the present study. A detailed description of this method is given in the chapter by Henningsson.

RESULTS Comparison between adult females and males To study the relationship between the two adult groups (males and females) a PLS analysis was carried out on all the 67 subjects. One significant information-bearing dimension (PLS 1) was found. PLS 1 showed that 7% of the variance in DMT variables explained 61% of the modeled variance in group membership. In Figure 7.1 the PLS scores of each subject are plotted against each other.

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F 4

F

M 2

PLS 2

F

M M M

0

F

F FF M

M

M M MM MM M M M MM M

-2

M

M

M

M F

F

FF F F

F F F

MM M M M

F

F F F F F M

M M M M M

FF FF F F F

F

F F

F

-4 -6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

PLS 1

Figure 7.1. PLS scores. Projections for each individual plotted in a twodimensional window created by the first significant and the second nonsignificant PLS dimensions. M = male; F = female. Table 7.1. Discriminating DMT variables (loadings > ± .15) for males and females. Variable

PLS 1 (loadings)

14 112

Males -.21 -.19

48 59 99 98 95 97

-.17 -.15 Females .23 .18 .16 .15

19 18 20 33

.19 .17 .16 .17

Description of DMT variables First Attribute is seen late Introjection: Hero > 34 years Isolation Total Hero and Peripheral person are separated Identification with the opposite sex Hero (late) Hero (middle) Total Hero (early) Disappearance Attribute (middle) Attribute (early) Attribute (late) Aggressive Hero

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Figure 7.1 shows that the males are located in the left part of the window and the females in the right part. The gender groups are fairly well separated, although some overlapping does occur. According to the first and significant dimension, 93% of the subjects are correctly classified. This PLS model can also be used to determine the most influential DMT variables in the separation of the two groups. In Table 7.1 the most important variables (loadings > ± .15) are presented. Table 7.1 shows that the most distinguishing features for the adult males are to perceive the Attribute late, a too old Hero gestalt and isolation responses. Adult females are characterized by many variants of identification with the opposite sex (perceiving a man instead of a woman), as well as Attribute disappearance and aggressive Hero.

4

PLS 2

2

B

B

B B

0

G G G G G GG G G GGG

B

G

B B B B

B -2

G

G B

G B B

G G

B

-4

B -6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

PLS 1

Figure 7.2. PLS scores. Projections for each individual plotted in a twodimensional window created by the first significant and the second nonsignificant PLS dimensions. B = boy; G = girl.

Comparisons between adolescent boys and girls In Fransson and Sundbom´s study (1998) the relationship between the two adolescent groups (boys and girls) was analyzed by a PLS analysis on all the 33 participants. However, the results from that study were only cursorily described and are therefore presented more in detail in the context of

Influence of gender and age in the defense mechanism test

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the present study. One significant information-bearing dimension (PLS 1) was found showing that 10 % of the variance in DMT variables explained 75% of the variance in group membership. Figure7.2 shows that the boys are located in the left part of the window and the girl subjects in the right part. One can also see that the gender groups are well separated. According to the first dimension, 100 % of the subjects are correctly classified. In Table 7.2 the most discriminating variables are presented. Table 7.2. Discriminating DMT variables (loadings > ± .15) for boys and girls. Variable no.

PLS 1 (loadings)

Description of DMT variables

Boys 19 20 18

-.24 -.20 -.16

112 74

-.16 -.16 Girls

99 95 102 101 14 29 10

.31 .25 .19 .15 .30 .16 .16

Disappearance Attribute (middle) Attribute (late) Attribute (early) Introjection: Hero > 34 years Reaction formation Pp (middle) Identification with the opposite sex Hero (late) Total Pp (late) Pp (middle) Attribute is seen late Hero changes sex Correct picture is seen late

Table 7.2 shows that Attribute disappearance is the most distinguishing feature for the boys together with a too old perceived Hero and some reaction formation responses. Girls are characterized by many variants of identification with the opposite sex and also some aspects of lateness of perception, especially concerning the Attribute.

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Comparisons between adult females and males and adolescent girls and boys Finally the relation between gender and age was investigated by a PLS analysis carried out on all the subjects jointly (N = 100). Four dummy variables were created composed of adult female, adult male, adolescent girl or adolescent boy. The reason for this design was that we wanted to study differences and similarities between the four groups as unbiased as possible. Three information-bearing dimensions (PLS 1, PLS 2 and PLS 3) were significant and accounted for 52 % (21 % + 20 % + 11 %) of the variance in group membership with the help of 14 % (5 % + 5 % + 4 %) of the variance in the DMT variables. The results are depicted in Figure 7.3.

Figure 7.3. PLS scores. Projections for each individual plotted in a threedimensional space created by the three significant PLS dimensions. B = adolescent boy; G = adolescent girl; M = adult male; F = adult female. The size of each circle indicates how deeply within the three-dimensional model separate subjects are located.

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Figure 7.3 shows that the first dimension (t 1) is responsible for the separation of males toward the left and females toward the right. The second dimension (t 2) is accountable for the separation of the girls located in the lower part of the figure. Finally the boys, in the front of the figure, are separated from the other groups by the third dimension (t 3). Although some overlapping did occur in all the three dimensions it was possible to separate all the four groups significantly from each other. Accordingly the same dimension separates the adult males and females, while separate dimensions are needed to separate both the adolescent girls and boys. The VIP value showed that the number of unique variables (unique = the only group with positive regression coefficients and VIP value > 0.8) for each group were quite different. The rank order was adult females, girls, males and boys showing from eleven to one unique variable for each group. Consequently the female persons seemed to react with more unique distortions than the males.

DISCUSSION The main aim of this study was to investigate discriminating gender patterns in DMT among healthy adults and adolescents. The overall result showed that gender seems to have a substantial influence on the DMT responses in both populations. When gender differences within the adult and the adolescent groups were compared, it was found that the most typical feature of adult females and girls compared to their male counterparts was a misjudged gender of the Hero and/or Peripheral person gestalts. Common similarities were also found within the masculine groups as both adult males and boys perceived a too old Hero gestalt. Also the magnitude of the gender differences within the adolescent and adult groups showed similarities. This could lead to a premature conclusion that girls are identical to adult females and boys identical to adult males, in terms of the DMT. However, this did not seem to be the case, because all groups (adult female, adult male, girl and boy), when scrutinized simultaneously, were significantly separated from each other. An interesting finding was that adult males and females were separated by one single dimension, representing opposite poles with diametrical values on significant variables. On

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the contrary, boys and girls were separated by one dimension each. Thus, adult gender differences can be described as two sides of the same coin, while adolescent gender differences better can be described as two coins. These findings touch upon the discussion that boys and girls may follow somewhat different developmental trajectories according to Erikson’s (1968) psychosocial stages. How can we interpret the obtained gender differences? The first plausible explanation is that they are caused by different stimulus-pictures. Against this hypothesis stands the fact that gender differences have been revealed in many different areas e.g. self-image (Offer & Boxer, 1991), defense mechanisms (Levit, 1991), and aggression (Hyde, 1984). In particular the results of Carlsson and Smith (1987) indicate that the gender differences in this study might be genuine. They also found gender differences with another projective perceptgenetic test (MCT), although both sexes were presented with the same stimulus-pictures. Also the results of Bäckström (1994), using a DMT like method, are pointing in the same direction. The obtained age differences would in any case be expected as adolescents and adults, according to Erikson (1968), are supposed to struggle with quite different psychosocial dilemmas. How can we understand that both adult and adolescent females were characterized by identification with the opposite sex, compared to their male counterparts? It is not easy to give these results a crystal-clear interpretation. However, similar findings from other studies have indicated that women more than men seem to be disposed to identify with the opposite sex (Matsumoto, 1996; Waehler & Zaback, 1991 and Intons-Peterson, 1988). Another significant DMT variable separating the genders in both the adult and adolescent groups was Attribute disappearance. This defense strategy is not included in the DMT manual, but still proved to be important in this context. A Hero perceived to be too old characterized both boys and adult males, compared to their female counterparts. One might interpret this as a slightly omnipotent compensation for a threatened self, as the boy in the stimulus-picture is transformed into an adult man. In the case of the boys this pattern was also strengthened by reaction formation: “trying to cheer

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up a bit”. This is well in line with results from several studies showing that men, as measured by personality inventories, tend to be more assertive (Feingold, 1994). It should be noted that the comparisons of perceptual defenses in the present study with defense mechanisms and other personality traits obtained in other studies should be made with caution. First, the construct validity of the concepts of defense mechanisms is far from unambiguous (e.g. Guldberg, Höglend, & Perry, 1993). For example Olff, Godaert, Brosschot, Weiss, and Ursin (1991) found poor agreement between defenses in the DMT and other methods of assessing defense mechanisms (e.g. Defense Mechanism Inventory). Second, straight-off comparisons between results obtained by more traditional statistical methods and multivariate projection methods respectively, are also doubtful. The main conclusion of the results is that both gender and age (adolescent/adult) must be considered when the DMT is used. In the research context these differences can be dealt with by using separate PLS models or by carefully matched groups according to gender and age. In clinical practice knowledge of the critical DMT variables is important.

REFERENCES Armelius, B-Å., & Sundbom, E. (1991), Hard and soft models for the assessment of personality organization. In: Quantification of Human Defense Mechanisms, eds. M. Olff, G. Godaert, & H. Ursin. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer Verlag, pp. 138-147. Blos, P. (1967), The second individuation process of adolescence. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 22:162-186. Bäckström, M. (1994), The Defence Mechanism Test at a Turning Point. Doctoral Dissertation. Department of Psychology, Lund University. Carlsson, I., & Smith, G. J. W. (1987), Gender differences in defense mechanisms compared with creativity in a group of youngsters. Psychological Research Bulletin, 27(1), Lund University. Coleman, J. C., & Henry, L. (1990), The nature of adolescence (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. Erikson, E. (1968), Identity, youth and crisis. New York: Norton.

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Feingold, A. (1994), Gender differences in personality: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 116:429- 456. Fransson, P., & Sundbom, E. (1997), Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) and Kernberg’s theory of personality organization related to adolescents in psychiatric care. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 38:95-102. Fransson, P., Sundbom, E., & Hägglöf, B. (1998), A comparative study of adolescents in psychiatric care assessed using the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) and the DSM-IV classification system. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 52:527-536. Fransson, P., & Sundbom, E. (1998), Gender differences and the Defense Mechanism Test: a comparative study of adolescents in psychiatric care and healthy controls. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 39:93-99. Guldberg, C. A., Höglend, P., & Perry, J. C. (1993), Scientific methods for assessing psychological defenses. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 47:435446. Henningsson, M., Sundbom, E., Armelius, B-Å., & Edberg. P. (2001), PLS Model Building: A Multivariate Approach to Personality Test Data. Scandinavian Journal of Psycholoy. 42:399-409. Henningsson, M., & Sundbom, E. (2000), Interrater reliability among three judges on 130 Defense Mechanism Test variables: a multivariate approach. Perceptual and Motor skills, 91:959-969. Hyde, J. S. (1984), How large are gender differences in aggression? A developmental meta-analysis. Developmental Psychology, 20:722-736. Intons-Peterson, M. J. (1988), Gender concepts of Swedish and American youth. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. Kragh, U. (1985), DMT Manual. Stockholm: Swedish Psychology International AB. Labouvie-Vief, G., Hakim-Larson, J., & Hobart, C. J. (1987), Age, ego level, and the life-span development of coping and defense processes. Psychology and Aging, 2:286-293. Levit, D. B. (1991), Gender differences in ego defenses in adolescence: Sex roles as one way to understand differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61:992-999. Matsumoto, D. (1996), Culture and psychology. Pacific Grove, USA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

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Offer, D., & Boxer, A. M. (1991), Normal adolescent development: Empirical research findings. In: Child and adolescent psychiatry: A comprehensive textbook, ed. M. Lewis. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. Offer, D., Godaert, G., Brosschot, J. F., Weiss, K. E., & Ursin, H. (1991), The Defense Mechanism Test and questionnaire methods for measurement of psychological defenses. In: Quantification of Human Defense Mechanisms, eds. M. Olff, G. Godaert, & H. Ursin. Berlin: Springer Verlag. Sundbom, E. (1992), Borderline psychopathology and the Defense Mechanism Test. Doctoral dissertation, Department of Applied Psychology, Umeå University. Sundbom, E. & Kullgren, G. (1992), Multivariate modeling and the Defense Mechanism Test: a comparative study of defensive structures in borderline, other personality disorders and schizophrenic disorders. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 86:379-385. Sundbom, E. Binzer, M., & Kullgren, G. (1999), Psychological defense strategies according to the Defense Mechanism Test among patients with severe conversion disorder. Psychotherapy Research, 9:184-198. Waehler, C. A., & Zaback, T. P. (1991), Sex of figure drawings and selfesteem. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 73:683-688.

8. MATURE AND IMMATURE DEFENSES. A STUDY OF REPRESSORS AND TRAIT ANXIETY GROUPS Ingegerd Carlsson and Fredrik Neuman To investigate defense mechanisms, repressors (n= 14), highly anxious (n = 37) and low anxious (n = 7) groups were tested with the Meta Contrast Technique (Smith, Johnson, Almgren & Johanson, 2001). The division into repressors and anxiety groups was made on a larger group (N = 140), which was also investigated with respect to experienced access to preconscious processes, here operationalized as memory for dreams. The results were that the repressors got higher scores on immature defense mechanisms than the highly- or low anxious groups (p = .04 versus p < .05). The repressors as well as the highly anxious group were higher on a measure of overall defense than the low anxious group (p < .05 in both comparisons). Regarding separate defense categories a difference was found for repression, which was more frequent in the highly anxious than in the low anxious group (p = .003). Memory for dreams differed only in the men. The male repressors scored significantly lower than the highanxious men (p < .02). The immature defenses in the repressors were discussed in terms of regressive reactions speculatively due to a lack of symbolic functioning concerning anxiety-arousing areas, i.e. alexithymia. The repressor concept has traditionally been used to signify people with heightened recognition thresholds for anxiety-provoking stimulation (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). Repressors also show an obvious inconsistency between how they describe themselves – calm, happy, with high self-esteem – and their outer appearance, as others perceive it. Inspired by psychoanalytic defense mechanisms theory, the idea has been that a repressor uses strong defensive structures in order to uphold an image of him/herself that is quite different from the more objective reality, as others see it.

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To test this inconsistency a classification was made by Weinberger et al. (ibid.) by way of psychological scales, one that measured social desirability and another scale measuring anxiety level. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was, according to the constructors, measuring affect inhibition and protection of self-esteem. Those high on social desirability and low on anxiety were thus termed repressors, while other groups were labelled true low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious. Weinberger et al. (ibid.) found that the repressors were more stressed (according to three physiological and three behavioral measures) than the true low-anxious people despite claims of lower trait anxiety. Subsequent empirical research has found that repressors show high reactivity on a number of physiological measures, but report very little negative affect, presumedly because they are highly motivated to maintain a positive image of themselves (as reviewed in Weinberger & Davidson, 1994). Research has also supported the claim that the repressor is not a so-called other-deceiver, i.e. actually aware of his or her own feelings but aiming at making a good impression on others (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998; Weinberger & Davidson, 1994). Instead, a more or less conscious ambition to maintain strict emotional control appears to result in an inward “blindfold” as well. The psychodynamic theory of an active avoidance of conflicting, anxiety-arousing stimuli thus seemed an appropriate frame to the repressor concept. When it came to particular defense mechanisms it was suggested that the mechanism of projection was relevant for repressors, since it would seem a convenient strategy to attend to negative material in others when avoiding it in oneself. Empirical support for this suggestion was found by Newman, Duff and Baumeister (1997). The repressive individual thus appears unwilling to attend to negative material emanating from the own self. This reluctance ought to manifest itself not only concerning the awareness of negative feelings, but with respect to certain other psychic material as well. Especially this should hold true for less easily controllable material, closer to the primary process, for instance his or her dream-life. Thus, one aim of the present study was to investigate the participants’ degree of closeness to their own dreams.

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As suggested by Weinberger and Davidson (ibid) repressors tend to use combinations of strategies pertaining to different degrees of (verbal) awareness. It furthermore seemed obvious that these strategies include quite reality-distorting mechanisms, such as turning a fact into its opposite (I am not nervous, on the contrary I feel calm and happy). Therefore it appeared relevant to conceive of their defenses not only as combinations of different strategies, similar to the early classification made by Anna Freud (1946). It also seemed important to include a distinction between different levels of maturity, in line with for example Vaillant (1992). A distinction between maturity levels would possibly differentiate between levels of verbal awareness as well. Therefore, in an exploration of the defensive make-up of repressors we settled on the Meta-Contrast Technique, or MCT, first published in a standardized version by Smith and Nyman (1961). The MCT has been thoroughly validated in different clinical and non-clinical groups, consisting of adults as well as children. It was considered particularly suited for the present study since a distinction is included, within each of the main defense categories, between variants that are typically used by children and more mature variants. As stated in a recent manual; “direct denial of the threat, typical of the preschool age children, must, for instance, be interpreted as a regressive reaction when it appears during latency and thereafter” (Smith, Johnson, Almgren, & Johanson, 2001, p. 33). The above empirical and theoretical work led to the following hypotheses. 1. Repressors will describe themselves as less close to their dream-life than the low- and high-anxious groups. 2. Repressors will have more signs of projection in the MCT than the other groups. 3. Repressors will have more immature defenses than the other groups.

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METHODS Participants Participants were recruited from undergraduate courses at three different departments within the humanities and social sciences. They filled out questionnaires on trait anxiety, social desirability and dreams. On the form the participant could volunteer to take part in a psychological experiment. A total of 140 students answered the form and constituted the group that was classified into repressors, low-anxious and high-anxious groups, to be described in the results section. Of the total group, 58 people volunteered for further individual testing with the MCT. The Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory In the present study the trait form in the Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) was used. It contains 20 anxiety-related statements about one’s general mood, assessed on a 4-grade scale. For reliability and validity data, see Spielberger (1983). A Short Form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Rudmin (1999) developed a short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Besides aiming at a shorter version, another goal was to attain a better balance between positive and negative items. The resulting Norwegian short form consisted of 10 items instead of 33, and showed better inter-item correlation means and a mean closer to the mid-point of the response scale than the original scale. A drawback was a slightly lower Cronbach’s alpha (.65), since alpha tends to decrease with fewer items. The form was translated to Swedish for the present study and a response scale from 1 – 4 was used, equal to the STAI. This was a change from the original form that used yes or no, in an effort to get a broader distribution of data. Dream questionnaire The questionnaire contained a form constructed for this study with the following six questions about dreams. 1. How often do you dream (once a month or less, once a week, almost every night)? 2. How often do you re-

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member what was in your dream (very seldom, sometimes, pretty often)? 3. How often do you have unpleasant dreams or nightmares (rather often, sometimes, almost never, never)? 4. Do you dream in color (yes, no, I don’t know)? 5. What are your dreams like (often realistic and ordinary, often imaginative and “unreal”, both realism and “unreality”)? 6. Have you ever experienced “paranormal” dreams, like for instance dreams that came true, telepathic dreams or other “weird things” (never, once, several times)? The Meta Contrast Technique In the MCT, early influences of an anxiety-arousing subliminal picture can be registered and spotted as changes in a habituated, supraliminal, picture. The subliminal stimulus is successively prolonged and finally appearing as a structure in its own right. During the process it is supposed to give rise to defense mechanisms, revealed in verbal reports and non-verbal behavior. In the present study we used the version with a subliminal grimacing face (the threat) masked by a picture of a young person (the hero). For a thorough overview of theoretical background and empirical validation, as well as experimental specifications, see the manual (Smith, Johnson, Almgren, & Johanson, 2001). A computerized version was used in this study. Reliability of the MCT. As stated in the manual, inter-rater and test-retest correlations between trained judges have been close to the statistical ceiling. In the present study 20 protocols were drawn at random and scored by the experimenter (junior author) and by another, trained, judge (senior author). In seven of these protocols there were one or two slight differences, mainly concerning tendencies or due to oversights. After a second scoring of all protocols there remained ten protocols on which the experimenter was unsure, and also one or two more general concerns. These instances were thoroughly discussed and if certainty was not reached a third (trained) judge was called in. Scoring of the MCT. The scoring of the protocols made use of all main categories in the manual, briefly described in the following. Anxiety. Signs of anxiety often imply that the hero picture is described as becoming darker, or that there are marked exaggerations of black parts in

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the picture. The manual divides the signs into mild, moderate, or grave anxiety. Regression. All regressive signs imply a return to a more immature defensive level, and the depth can be defined as the difference between the baseline level and the final level. The different categories vary from very concrete experiencing (for instance that the participant sees him/herself in the picture, or describes clear colors in the black and white picture), to sudden perceptions that everything is chaotic or nothing is perceived, to defensive regressions (where an advanced sign of, for instance, isolation is replaced by an immature one). Projection – sensitivity. Projective signs appear early in the development. Categories 1 – 3 include clear projective answers (for example perception of plain movements or that the threat is described as a nice and friendly, living, person). Signs of sensitivity indicate that the individual reacts early in the testing to the influence of the subliminal threat by perceiving slight changes in the habituated picture of the boy. Transformations of a sensitive type belong in category 4 (for example changes in picture perspective or posture of the hero). To be classified for sensitivity at least two such changes must be scored. Uncertain, single responses (but not sensitivity) were scored as a tendency to projection. Repression. Efforts to de-cathect the threat are subsumed under the heading of repression. The grouping presupposes that the adult strategy of repression originates at the behavioral level in the preschool age. According to the manual, immature signs of repression are found in subcategories 1 – 2 (for example eye-shutting behavior, when the participant closes his eyes, yawns heavily, turns his head away, looks down, etc, after a quick glance at the screen, or that he or she sees only parts of the threat, the tip of a nose instead of a whole face). In categories 3 – 5, at more mature levels, the threat becomes for example a lifeless (harmless) mummy, or is dressed up, transformed into a bike, tree, flowerpot, or other common object. A vague response was coded as a tendency to repression. Isolation. The different categories in isolation all strive to separate the threatening emotion from the hero figure. Categories 1 – 3 are considered to come low in the hierarchy (for example to increase the distance to the threat, either literally walking backwards from the screen, or perceiving

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that the threat is placed further away on the screen, or even to state that it is not an angry monster anyway). Categories 4 – 6 imply greater cognitive maturity (for instance reports that the threat is turned away, or is transformed into a white distinct light, or hidden by a protecting surface). A vague or unsure response was scored as a tendency. Depression. Depressiveness implies a stereotyped, monotonous and often long series of reports of a misinterpreted threat figure, indicative of inhibition. Category 1 contains more immature, childlike expressions (for example that the boy is crying). Categories 2 – 3 consist of more or less massive stereotypical series (at least five reports in a row of an unchanged misinterpretation of the threat). Also included is so-called softened stereotypy, in which the series is slightly changed, indicating depressive tendencies. Quantification of the separate defense categories. For regression, projection and depression a clear sign got two points and tendencies one point. Sensitivity got one point, if no projection was scored. For the categories of isolation and repression, scores in more than one subcategory earned three points, one subcategory was given two points, and a tendency earned one point. Overall defense sum. In order to gain information about overall defense score for each individual, a sum was calculated containing the points for all categories. The maximum thus was twelve – which was a theoretical maximum, since depressive stereotypy excludes most other defenses. Immature defense sum. To quantify immature defense, as regards regression and projection, those categories were considered immature and every sign got two points, with one point for a tendency or for sensitivity. In the categories of repression, isolation and depression, two points were given if the protocol got a score in an immature sub-category and one point for a tendency. The maximum thus was ten points.

RESULTS Trait Anxiety Mean for trait anxiety was 41.6 (SD = 9.47) in the whole group. No sex difference was found (men: M = 39.8, SD = 8.8, versus women: M = 42.4, SD = 8.76, n.s.).

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Social Desirability The social desirability mean was 27.3 (SD = 4.08) in the whole group. A negative correlation was found with trait anxiety (Pearson’s r = -.20, p = .02, two-tailed). No sex difference was found (men: M = 27.1, SD = 4.35 and women: M = 27.4, SD = 3.98, n.s.). Classification into Repressor, Low-Anxious and High-Anxious Groups For social desirability the median (= 27) was used to split the participants into high and low groups. The median on trait anxiety (= 41) was considered somewhat high, and finally the 40th percentile (= 38) was used. Thus, the repressors had scores below the cut point on trait anxiety and above the median on social desirability, the low-anxious group had scores below the cut point on both tests, while the high-anxious group had a high score on trait anxiety and could be either high or low on social desirability. Table 8.1 shows number of males and females and means and standard deviations for age, trait anxiety and social desirability, for the three categories in the whole cohort and in the MCT subgroup. Trait Anxiety in the Three Groups. The groups differed significantly on an ANOVA (F (2, 137) = 101.05, p = .000). On post hoc tests (Dunnett) the high-anxious group was significantly higher on trait anxiety than the lowanxious and the repressor groups (mean differences = 14.21 versus 15.18, p = .000). The latter groups did not differ. Social Desirability in the Three Groups. An ANOVA for the three groups yielded F (2, 137) = 23.55, p < .000. The repressor group got higher scores than both the low- and high-anxious groups (Dunnett’s mean difference = 6.41 versus 3.68, p < .000). The high-anxious group was higher than the low-anxious (mean difference = 2.73, p < .000). Dreams The intention was to form an index with the six questions concerning perceived closeness to one’s dreams. The answer categories were assigned numbers and were reversed for questions 3 and 4. However, significant correlations were found only between the first three questions (p < .01,

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Spearman’s rs, 2-tailed), which were put together to an index with a minimum of 2 and maximum of 9. The median in the group became 7. On the index the women had significantly higher points than the men (MannWhitney U = 1344.0, p < .001, 2-tailed). A difference between groups was found only in the men, where the repressors had lower points than the male high-anxious group (Mann-Whitney U = 64.00. p < .02, 2-tailed). The repressors and the low-anxious group did not differ. Table 8.1. The distribution of participants in the three groups, as well as the number of men and women and the means and standard deviations for age, trait anxiety and for social desirability in the whole cohort and in the MCT subgroup Repressor Low-anxious High-anxious n = 37 n = 19 n = 84 Number of women (men) 25 (12) 11 (8) 63 (21) Age, M (SD) 24.16 (4.87) 23.42 (6.88) 23.49 (4.83) Trait anxiety, M (SD) 32.41 (3.44) 33.37 (4.36) 47.58 (7.17) Social desirability, M (SD) 30.41 (2.95) 24.00 (2.11) 26.73 (3.99) MCT subgroup (n) n = 14 n=7 n = 37 Women (men) 7 (7) 5 (2) 31 (6) Age, M (SD) 22.67 (2.77) 22.00 (2.83) 23.14 (4.08) Trait anxiety, M (SD) 32.27 (3.71) 34.00 (2.83) 47.49 (7.35) Social desirability, M (SD) 29.67 (2.82) 23.57 (2.07) 26.57 (3.62)

MCT Thresholds. A calculation was made to find out if the groups differed at which exposure level they first described a (mis-) representation of the threat stimulus. The means lay between 22.0 - 23,2 ms. which was not significant when tested with ANOVA. Anxiety. No significant difference was found for anxiety. The separate defense categories. As regards the single categories the only significant difference was found in the category of repression. More highanxious people had signs of clear repression (2 or 3 points) than those in the low-anxious group (the contrast was 19 – 18 versus 7 – 0, p = .03, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). The repressors got an intermediate place. Overall defense sum. As can be seen in table 2 both the repressors and the high-anxious group scored higher on overall defense than the low-anxious group (p < .05, versus p = .03, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). It could be

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noted that a sum as high as eight points was reached by two participants, both in the repressor group. Immature defense sum. Table 2 also shows that the repressors got higher scores on immature defense than both the high- and the low-anxious groups (p = .04, versus p < .05, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). It was moreover noted that nobody in the low-anxious group got any points for immature defense. Table 8.2. Number of Participants in the Repressor and Anxiety Groups with Low (0 – 2) or High (3 – 8) Points for Overall Defense and for Immature Defense Overall defense Immature defense 0–2 3–8 0–2 3–8 Repressor group 7 7 7 7 Low-anxious group 7 0 7 0 High-anxious group 19 18 30 7

DISCUSSION As hypothesized, the category of immature defense in the MCT was able to distinguish the group of repressors from both the low-anxious and the high-anxious groups while the dream index separated the repressors and the high-anxious group; the latter however only in the men. Thus the repressors had a larger share of immature responses and the male repressors described a more distant relationship to their dreams. The dream index did not discriminate in the women, who scored generally high. The hypothesis about projection was not supported – the repressors did not have more projective signs. Since the number of participants was small in the repressor group, and, especially, in the low-anxious group, this may have contributed to the lack of difference as regards projection. If we consider the low-anxious group, they had less of overall defense than both the high-anxious group and the repressors. They moreover had fewer signs of repression than the high-anxious group. This appears reasonable, given that a low-anxious individual per definition is less easily aroused and thus should become little influenced by the anxiety-arousing stimulus in the MCT. It is unfortunate that the low-anxious group comprised only seven individuals, but the small share in this group with respect

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to defense mechanisms seems to indicate that the separation between the groups had some success. Future investigations with larger cohorts are needed in order to attain both larger and more extreme sub-groups than in the present study as well as to cross-validate the results. Also more research is warranted on the short form of social desirability that was used. However, research has not supported the notion that different social desirability measures would have a differential impact on the identification of repressors (Furnham, Petrides, & Spencer-Bowdage, 2002). The present results on overall defense are interesting to compare with the results in a study of creativity where participants either very high or very low in creativity were tested on both trait anxiety and with the MCT (Carlsson, 2002). Here, the creative group got significantly higher points on overall defenses than the low-creative group. The score for overall defense furthermore showed a positive correlation with the score on creative fluency. Also, high creativity was associated with higher anxiety-levels when measured with the MCT as well as the STAI. These results indicate that a high score on overall defense in the MCT is not a measure of strong defensiveness. Rather, as was reasoned by Carlsson (ibid.), an aptness to make shifts between different defenses during the testing may indicate a flexible cognitive style and tolerance of anxiety. This idea was supported by findings in a group comprising 171 youngsters who were tested both on creativity and on the MCT (Carlsson & Smith, 1997). Those with high creativity showed more varied defenses, while the low creative youngsters were significantly gender typed, i.e. low creative males had more isolation whereas their female counterparts had more projection and sensitivity. Furthermore, the category of repression was the sole category to have a positive relation to creativity, but at the same time youngsters with scores in three different categories were significantly more creative than those with only repression or accompanied by either isolation or projection. Of particular relevance for the present results was another finding in Carlsson and Smith (ibid.), namely that unlike repression taken as a whole, the specific subcategory of immature repression showed an opposite pattern, since it was significantly negatively related to creativity. The conclusion was drawn that more symbolic repression indicated better neutralization and hence a cognitively more mature defensive function.

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The authors compared their results on repression with Fenichel (1945), who used the term successful repression as an equivalent of sublimation. The same total scoring of immature defense as in the present study was not made by Carlsson (ibid.) or by Carlsson and Smith (ibid.), which limits the comparison with the present results. The way that the measures in the present study were constituted meant that there was an overlap between overall defense and immature defense, since projection and regression were part of both. This implies that the overweight for immature defense in the repressors was due specifically to scores in the sub-categories of immature isolation and repression. The tentative conclusion can be drawn that the repressor is less well equipped with tools of symbolization when handling negative and conflict-loaded material. Thus, the high-anxious individual is more prone to shift between defenses belonging to both early and late developmental levels, whereas the repressor’s efforts have a stronger regressive flavour. The formulation made with reference to creative functioning by Kris (1952) of “regression in the service of the Ego” thus seems more fitting to the high-anxious group, while the repressors have more affinity to the type of regression which was described by Fenichel (1946) as something that happens to the Ego, due to “a peculiar weakness of the ego organization” (p. 160). Since repressors apparently have limited conscious access to their bodily reactions (e.g. Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997; Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979), the concept of alexithymia, or the impaired capacity to construct mental representations of emotions and instead to focus on somatic sensations (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997) could be part of the specification of this peculiar weakness. Another formulation suggests alexithymia to be a cognitive state of externally oriented thinking with an emotional instability associated to the inability to cope with stressful situations (Zimmermann, Rossier, Meyer de Stadelhofen, & Gaillard, 2005). In research on psychosomatic disease the repressor concept has been pertinent. In a long-term study of patients with heart disease, repressors had a significantly worse prognosis while the high-anxious group had a longterm benefit of treatment (Frasure-Smith, Lesperance, Gravel, Masson, Juneau, & Bourassa, 2002). Fibromyalgia patients compared with healthy controls were more defensive and alexithymic (Brosschot & Aarsse, 2001).

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When the MCT was tested on psychosomatic groups, immature defense was found to be more prevalent in alcoholics than in controls (Öjehagen & Smith, 1993) and in patients with psychosomatic diseases versus controls (Smith & van der Meer, 1993). The immature signs in the MCT were moreover found to increase with the duration of the psychosomatic illness (Smith & Amnér, 1995). As stated by Lundh (2002), research on alexithymia would probably benefit from measures not solely dependent on selfassessment. The MCT seems to be such an implicit measure. To summarize, the present research supported the hypothesis that repressors, in contrast to high- and low-anxious people, would show an overweight of immature defenses and thus respond with meagre symbolic functioning on the MCT. Immature defense has earlier been coupled with psychosomatic symptoms and alexithymia and it was even suggested by Sifneos (1988) that alexithymia is the opposite of creativity. It is a likely prediction that repressors will be particularly low on tests of creativity – the combination of both was not found when searched for, and seems not yet to have been tried in empirical research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to thank Gudmund Smith for solving the most persistent MCT “knots”.

REFERENCES Brosschot, J. F., & Aarsse, H.R. (2001). Restricted emotional processing and somatic attribution in fibromyalgia. Int. J. of Psychiatry in Medicine, 31(2):127 –146. Carlsson, I. (2002). Anxiety and flexibility of defense related to high or low creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 14(3-4):341-349. Carlsson, I., & Smith, G. J. W. (1997). Creativity correlated with defense and gender. In Research into Rorschach and projective methods, A.M. Carlsson, A. Cederström, & H. Janson, eds., Stockholm: Swedish Rorschach Society, pp. 59 – 69.

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Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. J. of Consulting Psychology, 24:349 – 354. Derakshan, N., & Eysenck, M. W. (1998). Working memory capacity in high trait-anxious and repressor groups. Cognition and Emotion, 12(5):697 – 713. Fenichel, O. (1946). The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Frasure-Smith, N., Lesperance, F., Gravel, G., Masson, A., Juneau, M., & Bourassa, M. G. (2002). Long-term survival differences among lowanxious, high-anxious and repressive copers enrolled in the Montreal heart attack readjustment trial. Psychosom. Med. 64 (4):571 – 579. Freud, A. (1946). The Ego and Mechanisms of Defence. New York: International Universities Press. Furnham, A., Petrides, K. V., & Spencer-Bowdage, S. (2002). The effects of different types of social desirability on the identification of repressors. Personality and Individual Differences, 33 (1):119 – 130. Kris, E. (1952). Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art. New York: Int. Univ. Press. Lundh, L-G. (2003). We need implicit measures of alexithymia. In The Third International Conference on the (Non)Expression of Emotions in Health and Disease, eds. J. Denollet, I. Nyklicek, & A. Vingerhoets. Tilburg, the Netherlands, p. 101. Newman, L. S., Duff, K. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1997). A new look at defensive projection: Thought suppression, accessibility, and biased person perception. J. of Personality and Social Psychology:155 – 162. Öjehagen, A., & Smith, G. J. W. (1993). Defense mechanisms in alcoholics attending outpatient treatment: Results from the MCT. Scandinavian J. of Psychology, 34:282 – 288. Rudmin, F. W. (1999). Norwegian short-form of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. Scandinavian J. of Psychology, 40:229 – 233. Sifneos, P. E. (1988). Alexithymia and its relationship to hemispheric specialization, affect, and creativity. Psychiatr. Clin. North Am. 11 (3):287 – 292.

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Smith, G. J. W., & Amnér, G. (1995). Inflammatory bowel disease and infantile emotional fixations. Psychological Research Bulletin, 35 ( 6). Department of Psychology, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. Smith, G. J. W., & Nyman, G. E. (1961). A serial, tachistoscopic experiment and its clinical application. Acta Psychologica, 18:67 – 84. Smith, G. J. W., Johnson, G., Almgren, P-E., & Johanson, A. (2001). MCT. The Meta-Contrast Technique, Manual. Department of Psychology, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. Smith, G. J. W., & van der Meer, G. (1993). Alexithymia in two groups of psychosomatic patients: Morbus Crohn and Ulcerative colitis. In: Experimental Research in Psychosomatics, U. Hentschel & E. H. M. Bontekoe, eds. Leiden: DSWO Press. Spielberger, C. D. (1983). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Vaillant, G. E. (1971). Theoretical hierarchy of adaptive ego mechanisms. Archives of General Psychiatry, 24:107 –118. Weinberger, D. A., & Davidson, M.N. (1994). Styles of inhibiting emotional expression: Distinguishing repressive coping from impression management. Journal of Personality, 62:587 – 609. Weinberger, D. A., Schwartz, G. E., & Davidson, R. J. (1979). Lowanxious, high-anxious, and repressive coping styles: Psychometric patterns and behavioral and physiological responses to stress. J. of Abnormal Psychology, 88 (4):369 – 380. Zimmermann, G., Rossier, J., Meyer-de-Stadelhofen, F., & Gaillard, F. (2005). Alexithymia assessment and relations with dimensions of personality. European J. of Psychological Assessment, 21 (1):23 – 33.

9. HEART RATE VARIABILITY DURING THE META-CONTRAST TECHNIQUE Peter Jönsson The present chapter focuses on cardiovascular reactivity during emotional induction using pictorial stimuli. Specifically, the balance between the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous system, the sympathovagal balance, measured by power spectrum analysis of heart rate variability, was examined during the performance of the percept-genetic MetaContrast Technique. Heart rate variability was studied in normal individuals with higher or lower levels of trait anxiety, when exposed to either a threatening (an angry face) or a non-threatening target stimulus (a flower), employing the percept-genetic Meta-Contrast Technique. The target stimuli were backwardly masked and presented below and above the subjective threshold for conscious recognition. The ratio between the low and high frequency components in the power spectrum density of the HRV was used as a measure of the sympathovagal balance. The main finding indicates that the threatening stimulus was related to lower sympathovagal balance than the nonthreatening one in high anxious individuals. This was the case when the target stimuli were presented both below as well as above the subjective threshold. The different targets did not influence the sympathovagal balance differently in persons with low trait anxiety. It was proposed that the lower sympathovagal balance in high trait anxious individuals when exposed to the threatening stimulus mirrored a freezing reaction with enhanced attention and information processing.

EMOTION Emotions are action dispositions that reflect central activation and preparation for actions (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Lang, 1995). A similar view was held by Darwin (1872/1948) who proposed that affective expressions had evolved primarily because they prepared and motivated the organism for action. Later, Tomkins further developed this theory and argued

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that affects function as analogue amplifiers that create experiences of urgency within the organism (Tomkins, 1995). According to Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert (1990) emotions are organized biphasically along a dimension ranging from aversive (defensive, avoidance, and escape) to appetitive behavior (approach, attachment, and consummatory behavior). Furthermore, emotions involve evaluative processes that entail an explicit behavioral valence that disposes the organism to approach or withdraw from particular stimuli or contexts. Stimuli are explicitly evaluated and categorized into positive or negative valence classes, and behavioral dispositions are activated entailing bivalent tendencies toward (e.g. approach, acquisition, consumption) or away (e.g. avoidance, escape, rejection) from stimuli (Berntson, Boysen, & Cacioppo, 1993; Cacioppo, Klein, Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993).

PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSES WHEN VIEWING EMOTIONAL PICTURES When people are shown slides with unpleasant or aversive content, heart rate (HR) decelerates, the activation of the facial corrugator muscle around the eye increases (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Dimberg & Karlsson, 1997), and the magnitude of the eye blink startle reflex increases (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1990; Vrana, Spence, & Lang, 1988). When shown pleasant pictures quite the opposite occurs; HR and the activation of the facial zygomatic muscle increases (Lang et al., 1993; Dimberg & Karlsson, 1997), and the startle blink reflex decreases (Bradley et al., 1990, Vrana et al., 1988). However, besides that physiological autonomic responses covary with the parameters of valence and arousal, the autonomic responses are also dependent on the context. When people imagine or think about unpleasant events they respond with HR acceleration (Vrana & Lang, 1990), but show HR deceleration when shown unpleasant pictures (Lang et al., 1993). As noted by Lang (1995) this is similar to findings in animal research. HR and blood pressure decrease in response to a conditioned tone (associated to a shock) when animals are physically restrained, whereas they increase when the conditioned signal is presented to freely behaving animals (Iwata &

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LeDoux, 1988). Viewing pictures is a situation resembling the former condition. Like a freezing animal or an attentive predator the viewer is immobile (Lang, 1995).

HEART RATE VARIABILITY (HRV) The functions of the two branches of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) cannot be viewed as a single continuum ranging from sympathetic to parasympathetic control. Instead the autonomic control ought to be described in a two-dimensional space (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991). Hence an emotional stimulus may produce coactivation of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system depending on which activational input is greater, the consequent heart rate response can be acceleratory, deceleratory, or unchanged from a prestimulus level (Cacioppo et al., 1993). For example, an increase of both sympathetic and parasympathetic activity, as well as a decrease, may result in an unchanged HR. However, power spectrum analysis of heart rate variability (HRV) provides a tool to study the balance between the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous system, i.e. the sympathovagal balance (for a review see Berntson et al., 1997). Three different frequency bands, reflecting neurally mediated oscillations, have been distinguished within the power spectrum of the HRV. The high frequency band (HF) around 0.25 Hz is related to respiratory sinus arrhythmia and is almost exclusively due to parasympathetic influences reflecting vagal activity (Akselrod et al., 1985; Eckholt & Lange, 1990; Pomeranz, et al., 1985). A region around 0.1 Hz constitutes the medium frequency band (MF), which mirrors the baroreceptor feedback loop controlling blood pressure, the Mayer-waves. The MF band is supposed to reflect both sympathetic and parasympathetic activity, but mainly the latter. Fluctuations above 0.1 Hz seem to be mediated solely by the parasympathetic system. (Akselrod et al., 1985, Eckholt & Lange, 1990). Finally the low frequency band (LF) below 0.09 Hz has been related to the rhenin angiotensin system and thermoregulatory mechanisms (Hyndman, Kitney, & Sayers, 1971; Kitney, 1975), and is proposed to reflect a mixture of both parasympathetic and sympathetic activity (Akselrod et al., 1981; 1985; Eckoldt & Lange, 1990).

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The ratio between LF/HF has been proposed as an index of the sympathovagal balance and is suggested to be a valid estimate under many psychological situations, especially when the interest is in the study of changes in the sympathovagal balance under various conditions (Akselrod, 1995; Berntson et al., 1997). HRV during emotional responding Prior research on intraindividual HRV changes during emotional responding indicates that the vagally mediated HF- HRV covary inversely with emotional valence. Thus, in response to pictorial stimuli of negative valence HF-HRV magnitude is greater than to pictorial stimuli of positive or neutral valence, or during baseline recordings (Carruthers & Taggart, 1973; Jönsson, 2004; Jönsson & Sonnby-Borgström, 2003; Wittling, et al., 1998). However, recent studies have also shown that HF-HRV may be related to emotional arousal rather than valence (Frazier, Strauss, & Steinhauer, 2004), or not to differ between films containing various emotional content (Palomba et al., 2000).

PREATTENTIVE PROCESSING OF EMOTIONAL STIMULI A great number of studies have reported that we can be influenced by emotional stimuli even when presented below a level for conscious awareness. For example, subliminally presented pictures of happy and angry faces influenced subjects’ judgments of novel visual patterns (Chinese ideographs), indicating that emotionally valenced information can be processed at a preattentive level (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995). However, threatening information may have stronger influences than pleasant when presented subliminally. In a study by Öhman, Dimberg, and Esteves (1989) subjects were classically conditioned to expect a shock when an angry or a happy face was presented. When the stimuli later were presented at a supraliminal level both angry and happy faces evoked a skin conductance response (SCR). When presented subliminally only the angry faces gave a similar response. In a later study Öhman and Soares (1994) exposed phobic related stimuli (snakes and spiders), and

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non-phobic related stimuli (flowers and mushrooms) to spider phobics, snake phobics and a control group. The spider phobic group reacted with enhanced SCR to pictures of spiders both when presented subliminally and supraliminally, but not to the other stimuli. The same was the case for the snake phobic group in relation to snakes, whereas the control group showed enhanced SCR for neither stimulus. Also cardiovascular responses discriminate between emotional pictorial stimuli of different content when presented at very short exposures. Thus, HF-HRV was greater, and phasic HR responses were more deceleratory to pictures of angry faces presented subliminally, than to pictures of happy faces (Jönsson & Sonnby-Borgström, 2003).

AIMS OF THE STUDY Physiological assessments such as electrodermal activity, heart rate, and electromyographic responses, just mentioning a few, have commonly been correlated to psychological phenomena like emotions. However, less has been done to study the balance between the two branches of the ANS in different emotional moods. The purpose of the present study was to examine the sympathovagal balance (LF/HF ratio) in normal subjects when viewing pictures with different emotional valence. As mentioned above when people are shown unpleasant pictures HR decelerates, but accelerates when shown pleasant ones (Lang et al., 1993). One question at issue was whether people exposed to a threatening stimulus react with lower sympathovagal balance than those exposed to a non-threatening one. Further, the pictures were backwardly masked and presented both under and above the subjective threshold in order to study possible influences at preattentive as well as at controlled processing of visual information. Additionally, the test participants completed a state and trait anxiety inventory with the intention to investigate if anxious people differ regarding sympathovagal balance compared to non-anxious people when viewing the different pictures.

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METHOD Participants Fifty persons were recruited to the study via wanted lists briefly describing the experiment. Participants were told not to eat, or use caffeine or nicotine within two hours before the experiment. None used any kind of medication or suffered from any disease known to affect the cardiovascular system. Eleven participants were excluded from the study: three reported changes in the masking picture when the target picture was exposed subliminally, four were excluded on account of artifacts in data sampling, one got an allergic reaction and began to sneeze, one was excluded because of problem with one of the tachistoscopes, and finally two owing to periodical double beats. Two experimental groups were formed: one receiving a threatening stimulus, and one receiving a non-threatening stimulus. After the exclusions the former consisted of two men and seventeen women aged 18-29 years (M = 24.8, SD = 2.5) and the latter of five men and thirteen women aged 20-29 years (M = 23.4, SD = 2.7). All examinations took place between 10.00 and 12.00 a.m.

ANXIETY MEASURES Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) The STAI (Spielberger, 1972) consists of a state and a trait anxiety scale. Each scale contains 20 items that assess the cognitive and affective components of anxiety. Regarding the state anxiety scale participants are told to answer the questions in relation to how one is feeling “right now”. The questions in the trait anxiety scale are answered in relation to how one is feeling in general. Stimuli and Stimuli Presentation Three pictures were used as stimuli: a threatening picture represented by a face of a grimacing ape-man (Threat); a non threatening picture represented by a flower (Non-Threat); and a picture of a boy leaning over a table was used as a masking stimulus (Mask). The stimuli were presented via

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two tachistoscopes on a half-transparent screen (35 x 35 cm). [The Mask and the Threat are both requisite of the Meta-contrast Technique (MCT; Smith, Johnson & Almgren, 1989). The MCT is a personality inventory and has for a long time been used to assess patients with psychiatric disorders (ibid). The Mask is by way of introduction presented alone and is intended to generate a conceptual frame of reference. When the motif of the Mask is correctly apprehended the Threat is gradually introduced; first at very short durations, then followed by increased exposure times until that too is correctly described. The Threat is supposed to induce an anxiety or conflict filled situation with resulting defensive or coping strategies to reduce it. Commonly participants report alterations in the Mask before the Threat has been noticed; the boy may be reported to close his eyes or lift one arm etc. Only the stimulus material is relevant for this article, not the scoring technique for the personality variables. Theoretical background is described in Smith and Westerlund (1980). Those interested in the scoring details are referred to the MCT manual (Smith et al., 1989)]. An opto-electronic switch (that contained a photo diode and a Schmitt trigger) was attached to each tachistoscope. Each exposure (Mask and Target) and its duration could therefore be recorded by the acquisition system described in next paragraph. ECG and HRV The participant was seated in an armchair and fitted with Ag-AgCl adhesive disposable electrodes (lead I configuration). He or she was told to find a comfortable seat and to sit as still as possible during the examination. ECG measurements were recorded (sampled at 1 kHz) and analyzed with a computer-based acquisition system, MP100WSW, and its software AcqKnowledge (BIOPAC System, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA, USA). 5 minutes of the ECG signal in each condition of interest was used for the analysis. Data were ocularly scrutinized. Artifact free data were used for the estimation of the R-R intervals, which were transformed to a heart rate tachogram (BPM). The R-R interval data were resampled at 1 Hz to obtain equidistant time series values. A power spectrum density (PSD, calculated as (BPM)2/Hz) was then obtained via a Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) of

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the tachogram. In connection with the FFT data were linearly detrended and filtered using a Bartlett window. The integral of the power spectrum was studied in two major frequency bands: a low frequency region (LF, 0.02-0.05 Hz), and a high frequency region (HF, 0.15-0.5 Hz). The LF and HF were expressed in relative terms. The LF/HF ratio was used as a measure of the sympathovagal balance. The spectral values for both frequency regions were transformed into natural logarithmic (ln) values to approach normally distributed data. Procedure First the state and trait scales of STAI were completed. After that the ECG registration followed during five conditions: 1, Resting condition. 10 min of ECG registration whereof the last 5 min was used as baseline. During this registration the test leader asked the participant about age, education, occupation, etcetera, in order to hold the amount of speech approximately at the same level as in the following conditions. 2, The Mask was presented in repeated exposure with increasing exposure times (the first exposure at 8 ms). After each exposure the participant gave a short verbal report of what he or she had noticed. Exposure time was increased until the participant correctly apprehended the Mask. Then the exposures proceeded, at the same exposure time until 5 min of ECG recording had been completed. 3, The targets (Threat or Non-Threat) were then introduced subliminally without the participants’ knowledge, and immediately followed by the Mask. Half the group received the Non-Threat, half the group the Threat. The duration for the target started at 8 ms and was repeatedly presented with increased exposure times; five exposures at each exposure time. This procedure was intended to take at least 5 min with the target at a subliminal level (subjective threshold). No new structures or changes reported in the Mask were permitted. For example, if a participant reported that “there is something strange happening in the window” or “the window seems to be darker”, she or he was excluded from further analysis.

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4, The targets (Threat or Non-Threat) were, together with the Mask, repeatedly presented supraliminally (i.e. targets and Mask correctly recognized and described) during 5 min. 5, Five minutes rest. After this a second state anxiety form was completed. By way of conclusion the participants were informed about the purpose of the study.

RESULTS STAI The means for the total group on the trait anxiety scale was M = 40.3 (SD = 8.0), and for the state anxiety scale assessed before the experimental conditions M = 35.1 (SD = 7.1). The means were used to split the participants into two groups with higher and lower levels of trait (M =33.7, SD = 0.9 and M = 46.6, SD = 1.2) and state anxiety (M = 29.8, SD = 0.7 and M = 41.4, SD = 41.4, SD = 1.1). The mean on the state scale measured after the test session was 32.7 (SD = 7.1), and after mean split (M = 28.2, SD = 0.8 and M = 33.3, SD = 1.4). A 2 (Stimulus) x 2 (State anxiety; before, after) repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect yielding that the difference between the state anxiety before and after the test measures was significant (F(1,35) = 4.58, p < .05). No other effects were found. Number of exposures and exposure times In order to control that the number of exposures did not differ between the groups a 2 (Target) x 2 (Trait anxiety) x 3 (Condition) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. This revealed a main effect for “Condition”: F(2, 66) = 41.5, p < .001, ∈ = 1 (the Greenhouse-Geisser procedure was used for calculating epsilon). No other differences were found; hence the number of exposures did not differ between the groups. The number of exposures for the different stimuli in the three experimental conditions can be seen in Table 9.1.

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Table 9.1. Summary of Exposure Times and Number of Exposures. Groups divided by received target (Non-Threat/Threat) and trait anxiety (Low/High) Experimental Condition Group Anxiety Mask Subliminal Supraliminal N Exposure time NonLow 78.7 (16.4) 32.9 (18.8) 168.7 (118.3) 10 Threat High 87.2 (18.2) 29.4 (16.7) 234.5 (195.9) 8 Tot 82.5 (17.2) 31.3 (17.4) 197.9 (156.0) 18 Threat Low 59.0 (0.5) 19.1 (9.0) 167.1 (108.8) 9 High 58.7 (9.7 16.8 (4.7) 158.6 (111.8) 10 Tot 58.8 (6.9) 17.8 (7.0) 162.6 (107.4) 19 Total Low 69.3 (15.4) 26.4 (16.2) 167.9 (110.7) 19 High 71.4 (20.0) 22.4 (12.9) 192.3 (154.7) 18 Tot 70.3 (17.6) 24.4 (14.6) 179.8 (132.6) 37 Number of exposures NonLow 12.5 (2.5) 14.9 (3.1) 12.4 (2.8) 10 Threat High 13.6 (2.8) 15.7 (3.1) 13.6 (2.9) 8 Tot 13.0 (2.6) 15.3 (3.0) 12.9 (2.8) 18 Threat Low 13.7 (1.7) 16.1 (1.7) 14.0 (2.5) 9 High 13.5 (2.1) 17.0 (2.0) 14.2 (3.1) 10 Tot 13.6 (1.9) 16.6 (1.9) 14.1 (2.8) 19 Total Low 13.1 (2.2) 15.5 (2.5) 13.2 (2.7) 19 High 13.6 (2.4) 16.4 (2.5) 13.9 (3.0) 18 Tot 13.3 (2.3) 15.9 (2.6) 13.5 (2.8) 37 Note. Values are means (standard deviations within brackets). Low/High = trait anxiety category. Non-Threat/Threat = received target stimulus.

The exposure times are presented in Table 1. Besides an obvious main effect for Condition (F(2, 66) = 37,2, p < .001, ∈ = .513), a 2 (Target) x 2 (Trait anxiety) x 3 (Condition) repeated measures ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between the groups. Analyses where State anxiety replaced Trait anxiety as between groups variable were also conducted. No significant results were found. Neither did the following analyses reveal any significant results for State anxiety and will therefore not be further commented.

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HR and HRV Initial Rest. HR and the LF/HF ratios are summarized in Table 9.2. A 2 (Target) x 2 (Trait anxiety) ANOVA revealed no significant results regarding HR or LF/HF. Low anxious ,8

,6

LF/HF

,4

,2

0,0

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High anxious ,8

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,2

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-,4 Mask

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Figure 9.1. LF/HF ratio as a function of experimental condition: In the first condition (Mask) the masking stimulus was presented alone; in the second condition (Subliminal) the target stimuli (Non-Threat or Threat) were backwardly masked and presented at exposure times below the subjective threshold for recognition; and in the third condition (Supraliminal) the target stimuli were presented above the subjective threshold.

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Experimental Conditions. LF/HF. Regarding the LF/HF ratios the 2 (Target) x 2 (Trait anxiety) x 3 (Condition) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect for “Target” x “Trait anxiety” x “Condition”: F(2, 66) = 3.69, p < .05, ∈ = .976 (see Figure 9.1). For this interaction, there were significant within-subjects contrasts for the “Subliminal” and the “Supraliminal” condition in relation to the condition when the Mask was presented alone (F(1, 33) = 6.36, p < .05, and F(1, 33) = 4.34, p < .05, respectively). As can be seen in Figure 1 the LF/HF ratios for the low trait anxious group are approximately the same over the three experimental conditions. It was the high trait anxious group that accounted for the interaction. Heart Rate. HR was found to vary among the three experimental conditions (see Table 9.2 for a summary of the HR). A 2 (Target) x 2 (Trait anxiety) x 3 (Condition) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for “Condition”: F(2, 66) = 14.69, p < .001 ∈ = .962. Tests of within subjects contrasts showed that HR decreased in the second experimental condition, when respective target stimuli were subliminally introduced, compared to the first experimental condition when the Mask was presented alone (F(1, 33) = 4.77, p < .05). HR was further decreased in the “Supraliminal” condition, compared to the first experimental condition, (F(1, 33) = 24.21, p < .001). Furthermore, an interaction effect was found for “Condition” x “Trait anxiety”; F(2, 66) = 4.15, p < .05, ∈ = .962. In connection to this interaction there was a significant contrast between the “Mask” and the “Subliminal” condition (F(1, 33) = 5.54, p < .05), as well as between the “Mask” and the “Supraliminal” condition (F(1, 33) = 6.25, p < .05). The HR for the high trait anxious group was decreased in each condition. For the low trait anxious group the HR was rather equal in the first two conditions, whereas it decreased in the last (see Table 9.2). Final Rest. Analyses of the rest condition after the experimental conditions did not reveal any significant results.

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DISCUSSION The results of the present study indicate that high trait anxious individuals were more affected by the target stimuli than the low trait anxious group. Low anxious individuals had rather the same LF/HF ratio during the three sessions. The two high anxious groups, however, responded differently depending on the stimulus they were exposed to. Those who received the Threat had lower LF/HF ratio compared to those that received the NonThreat. This was the case when the pictures were presented at exposure times beneath the subjective threshold for recognition as well as above. In the first experimental condition when the masking picture was presented alone the groups did not differ. Preattentive and Controlled Processing In accordance with earlier research the target stimuli appeared to be processed both at a preattentive and controlled level. As mentioned in the introduction subliminally presented emotional faces have been shown to affect participants’ liking for ideographs (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Angry faces, and threatening phobic related stimuli evoke physiological responses both when presented beneath and above levels for conscious recognition (Jönsson & Sonnby-Borgström, 2003; Öhman, Dimberg, & Esteves, 1989; Öhman & Soares, 1994). Öhman (1993) argues that the ability to respond to stimuli at an unconscious or a preattentive level has a survival value. “Effective defense must be quick; consequently, there is a premium for early detection of threat. Furthermore, threat stimuli must be detected wherever they occur in the perceptual field, independently of the momentary direction of attention” (Öhman, 1993, p. 520) LeDoux (1996) has proposed a subcortical circuit that might process emotional information not reaching conscious awareness. This circuit consists of a direct link from thalamus to amygdala. Bypassing cortex it is described as a “quick and dirty” loop that only transmits incomplete information about the stimulus. The amygdala, however, receives enough information to recognize that a significant stimulus possibly is present. Recently a neuroimaging study by Whalen and co-workers (1998) seems to confirm this. Amygdala was significantly activated when participants were exposed

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to backwardly masked fearful faces compared to when exposed to backwardly masked happy faces. In the present study, however, the target stimuli seemed only to affect high trait anxious individuals. Attention, Vigilance, and Trait Anxiety It is well documented that anxious individuals show attentional bias in favor of emotional, and in particular, threatening stimuli (for review see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). For example, in a dot-probe task study with students, high trait anxious individuals were biased toward words related to a soon coming exam (i.e. faster reactions), whereas low trait anxious individuals were slower to react to the dot-probe when it replaced words related to the exam (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). However, research applying the emotional Stroop paradigm suggests that emotional stimuli in general may cause selective processing. In a study by Mogg and Marden, (1990) high anxious normals were slower in colour-naming emotional than non-emotional words. Similarly, anxious patients demonstrated interference in colour-naming on both positive and negative words (Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991). Although, Mathews and Klug (1993) proposed it is not the emotional valence but rather the relatedness of the words to anxiety that accounts for colour-naming interferences. Whereas normal controls did not show any colour-naming latency across the different word lists, anxious patients showed more interference on anxiety-related words than anxiety-unrelated words. Confirming this Reimann and McNally (1995) found in a study using students that the words related to high negative current concern and high positive current concern produced more colour-naming interference than did low negative and low positive current concern and neutral word. Anxiety is described to represent a shift into a mode of hypervigilance (Williams et al., 1997). Thus, anxious people might be more responsive to emotional stimuli. Eysenck (1997) proposes that the “hypervigilance of high-anxious individuals involves a high rate of environmental scanning, a broadening of attention prior to the detection of a threat-related or taskrelated stimuli, and a narrowing of attention when such a stimulus is being processed”, (Eysenck, 1997, p. 13). Similarly it has been proposed that

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anxiety is biologically involved in the avoidance of potential dangers (Gray & McNaughton, 1996; Rosen & Schulkin, 1998) wherefore, as noted by Calvo and co-workers (Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 1997), it is important for high anxiety individuals to detect potential harmful events in order to facilitate avoidance strategies. In conclusion the result in the present study that the high trait anxious groups responded to the emotional pictures with changes in the autonomic balance, whereas the low trait anxiety group were rather unaffected may be explained with reference to the previous research described above. Anxious individuals may be more responsive to emotional stimuli, depending on an exaggerated excitability and vigilance, and a proneness to scan the environment for the detection of threat. Threat versus Non-Threat As mentioned in the introduction autonomic responses are dependent on context. Freely roaming animals respond to aversively conditioned tones with increased heart rate and blood pressure, but with decreased HR and blood pressure if restrained (Iwata & LeDoux, 1988). Viewing pictures in an experimental setting resembles the latter condition; like vigilant and attentive predators or freezing animals the participants have limited possibilities to move (Lang, 1995). When looking at threatening or unpleasant pictures in a situation like this the heart rate decelerates (Lang et al., 1993). On the contrary the heart rate increases if participants imagine unpleasant events (ibid.). In the present study viewing the threatening picture was followed by a lower LF/HF ratio compared to the non-threatening one. Hence if instead participants were told to imagine a fearful event an increased LF/HF ratio ought to be expected. Indeed, although not imagining a threatening situation, but another negative emotion, namely anger, participants showed an increased LF/HF ratio in comparison to a resting condition (McCraty, Atkinson, Tiller, Rein, & Watkins, 1995). Freezing and Assessment of Potential Threat Ethological studies show that offence such as aggressive attack is seldom seen outside a conspecific context (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1988). Instead some defense strategy is utilized with flight as the most frequent. However,

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if the predator is too close or in the case of a potential threat, sudden movements may result in discovery that makes escape impossible. In situations where specific defensive behaviors cannot be used until the threat is located and maybe also identified an elaborate pattern of assessment of predatory risk is initiated, e.g. freezing (ibid.). The pattern is aimed at assessing the threatening situation or stimulus while at the same time avoiding the danger. In situations where risk for discovery is impending, freezing is the only effective defensive method. This may according to Blanchard and Blanchard (1988) involve total immobility or scanning movements. Further, it is proposed that risk assessment may be “the most common and prevalent behaviour pattern for any higher animal, occurring in situations involving any considerable degree of unfamiliarity or unpredictability, in addition to danger from predation, conspecific attack, or natural hazards” (ibid, p. 48). Conclusion Hence, in a novel and unfamiliar test situation anxious individuals may be in a state resembling freezing; with an increased vigilance they are scanning the environment to detect possible threats. When exposed to threatening pictures the freezing condition is accentuated with accompanying autonomic reactions; when exposed to non-threatening stimuli the freezing condition is diminished. However, in the light of a theory by Robinson (1998), an alternative explanation regarding non-threatening stimuli may be considered. Robinson (1998) argues that fear and anxiety are the only emotions that can be generated solely by unconscious processing. He proposes two distinct modules that account for this dissociation; one module that makes preattentive judgments about valence information of a stimulus, and one module that makes preattentive judgments about the urgency of the information. The preattentive valence module serves the function of deciding whether a stimulus should receive focal attention or not. If it does, primary and secondary appraisal occurs (as described by Smith & Lazarus, 1990), and at a conscious level an emotion is experienced. However, with reference to works by Winkielman, Zajonc, and Schwarz (1997) and Bargh and associates (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992), Robinson states that the detection of valence is not (per se) sufficient to

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produce an emotion and preattentive valenced reactions do not seem to be specially sensitive to the intensity of a stimuli. Fear and anxiety can however be generated solely on the basis of unconscious processing (e.g. Öhman & Soares, 1994). This is done via a preattentive urgency module that serves to quickly identify potential threats, and to prepare the body and mind to respond quickly. Urgency of a stimulus, in contrast to the valence, is proposed to be sufficient to produce an emotion. Building on writings by Scherer (1984) and Bargh et al. (1992), Robinson argues that preattentive urgency detection is particularly sensitive to the intensity of the stimulus whereas the preattentive valence detection is not. Further, urgency, but not valence, seems to be connected to sympathetic activation (Öhman & Soares, 1994). With reference to Robinson’s model, the alternative explanation is that the threatening stimulus that is presented subliminally activates the preattentive urgency module and the vigilant condition is accentuated, with a related lower sympathovagal balance. The increase in sympathovagal balance for the group receiving the Non-Threat subliminally might instead be a time dependent issue; after a while the anxious individual concludes that nothing harmful will occur. Eventually he or she relaxes, the anxious and vigilante state diminishes and the sympathovagal balance increases. In the supraliminal condition the Non-Threat-group remains calm; the Threatgroup remains in a vigilant and anxious state, although this time dependent on a conscious processing and evaluation of the stimuli. Unfortunately respiration was not recorded and its contribution to the HRV was therefore not possible to examine. However, the findings in the present study seem to be congruent with earlier research where other physiological measurements have been adopted. Further, the stimuli material was limited and the generability of this study is fairly restricted. Studies using a wider or more complete stimulus arsenal are called for.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Ingegerd Carlsson for valuable comments.

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REFERENCES Akselrod, S. (1995). Components of heart rate variability: Basic studies. In: Heart rate variability, eds. M. Malik & A. J. Camm, Eds. Armonk, N.Y.: Futura, pp 147-163. Akselrod, S., Gordon, D., Madwed, J. B., Snidman, N. C., Shannon, D. C., & Cohen, R. J. (1985). Hemodynamic regulation: investigation by spectral analysis. Am. J. Physiol., 249: H867-H875. Akselrod, S., Gordon, D., Ubel, F. A., Shannon, D. C., Berger, A. C., & Cohen, R. J. (1981). Power spectrum analysis of heart rate fluctuation: a quantitative probe of beat-to-beat cardiovascular control. Science, 213, 220-222. Bargh, J.A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto,F. (1992). The generality of the automatic attitude activation effect [see comments]. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 62(6):893-912. Berntson, G. G., Bigger, J. T. Jr., Eckberg, D. L., Grossman, P., Kaufmann, P. G., Malik, M., Nagaraja, H. N., Porges, S. W., Saul, J. P., Stone, P. H., & van der Molen, M. W. (1997). Heart rate variability: origins, methods, and interpretive caveats. Psychophysiology, 34:623-648. Berntson, G. G., Boysen, S. T., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1993). Neurobehavioral organization and the cardinal principle of evaluative bivalence. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci., 702:75-102. Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J.T., & Quigley, K. S. (1993). Respiratory sinus arrhythmia: autonomic origins, physiological mechanisms, and psychophysiological implications. Psychophysiology, 30(2):183-196. Blanchard, D.C., & Blanchard, R.J. (1988). Ethoexperimental approaches to the biology of emotion. Ann. Rev. Psychol., 39:43-68. Bradley, M. M., Cuthbert, B. N., & Lang, P. J. (1990). Startle reflex modification: emotion or attention? Psychophysiology, 27:513-522. Cacioppo, J. T., Klein, D. J., Berntson, G. G., & Hatfield, E. (1993). In: Handbook of emotions, eds. M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland. New York: Guilford Press, pp 511-536. Calvo, M. G., Eysenck, M. W., & Castillo, M. D. (1997). Interpretation bias in test anxiety: The time course of predictive interferences. Cognit. Emot., 11(1):43-63.

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Öhman, A., & Soares, J. J. (1994). "Unconscious anxiety": phobic responses to masked stimuli. J. Abnorm. Psychol., 103:231-240. Palomba, D., Sarlo, M., Angrilli, A., Mini, A., & Stegagno, L. (2000). Cardiac responses associated with affective processing of unpleasant film stimuli. Int. J. Psychophysiol., 36(1): 45-57. Pomeranz, B., Macaulay, R. J., Caudill, M. A., Kutz, I., Adam, D., Gordon, D., Kilborn, K. M., Barger, A. C., Shannon, D. C., & Cohen, R. J. (1985). Assessment of autonomic function in humans by heart rate spectral analysis. Am. J. Physiol., 248:H151-H153. Riemann, B. C. & McNally, R. J. (1995). Cognitive processing of personally relevant information. Cognition and Emotion, 9:325-340. Robinson, M. D. (1998). Running from William James’ bear: A review of preattentive mechanisms and their contributions to emotional experience. Cognit. Emot., 12 (5):667-696. Rosen, J. B. & Schulkin, J. (1998). From normal fear to pathological anxiety. Psychol. Rev., 105:325-350. Sherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A components process approach. In: Approaches to emotion, eds. K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, pp. 293-318. Spielberger, C. D. (1972). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychlogists Press. Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1990). Emotion and adaptation. In: Handbook of personality: Theory and research, ed. L. A. Pervin. New York: Guilford Press, pp. 609-637. Smith, G. J. W., Johnson, G., & Almgren, P.-E. (1989). MCT – the metacontrast technique. Stockholm: Psykologiförlaget. Smith, G. J. W., & Westerlundh, B. (1980). Perceptgenesis: A process perspective on perception – personality. In: Review of personality and social psychology, Vol 1, ed. L. Wheeler. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 94-124. Tomkins, S. S. (1995). The quest for primary motives: Biography and autobiography of an idea. In: Exploring affect: the selected writing of Silvan S. Tomkins, ed. E. V. Demos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-63. Vrana, S. R. & Lang, P. J. (1990). Fear imagery and the startle-probe reflex. J. Abnorm. Psychol., 99:189-197

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10. PERCEPTGENETIC TECHNIQUES IN THE STUDY OF COGNITIVE STYLES AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS: FROM ASSESSMENT TOWARD PSYCHOTHERAPY Uwe Hentschel and Juris G. Draguns The goal of the present chapter is to identify perceptgenetic and other procedures that may be useful for assessing cognitive styles and defense mechanisms. Cognitive styles are enduring individual dispositions that may be partially conscious and intentional. Defense mechanisms are predominantly unconscious and unintentional. The relationship between these two constructs is explored on the basis of the accumulated findings and their implications for psychotherapy and spelled out. These leads are considered as possible stepping stones toward integrative research designed to link stylistic consistencies in human adaptation, defensive operations, and psychotherapeutic interventions. Conceptual affinities between defenses, as registered by perceptgenetic techniques and as assessed in psychotherapy, are tentatively identified. The chapter concludes with a list of eight potential topics of psychotherapy research in which perceptgenetic techniques can be employed.

COGNITIVE STYLES: DO THEY MATTER IN PSYCHOTHERAPY? Cognitive Styles as Adaptive Organizing Principles All scientific disciplines are subject to varying fads and fashions, epitomized in the recognition of what is "in" and what is "out" at a given moment. Thus, projective techniques, at one time heavily used and then virtually discarded, appear to be experiencing a degree of recrudescence. Along similar lines, Sternberg and Grigorenko (1997) asked, in the title of their article: "Are cognitive styles still in style?" Their answer was af-

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firmative for educational psychology, a field in which cognitive styles are thriving in both research and practice. Not so, however, in clinical psychology, where the concept of cognitive style originated (Klein, 1949) and where, over several decades, systematic research had been vigorously pursued. The divergence described by Sternberg and Girgorenko is anomalous and must be overcome. Both educational and clinical psychology are fundamentally concerned with learning in the broadest sense of term. Therefore, if cognitive styles are useful in prediction and explanation in one area of psychology, there is no plausible justification for their rejection a priori in another field of psychological inquiry. In clinical psychology, investigation of cognitive styles has a history of over fifty years. George S. Klein was a central figure in forging a link between cognitive styles and the major concerns of clinical psychology, assessment and, to a lesser degree, intervention. In particular, Klein (1949, 1951) articulated the terms of the complex relationship between cognitive styles and defense mechanisms, both of them considered to be important components of persons’ adaptive organization. Defense mechanisms are primarily thought to come into play in reducing anxiety and other distress; cognitive styles are conceptualized as habitual and individually characteristic coping strategies, invoked regardless of threat, stress, or conflict. On this basis, Klein and his coworkers eventually identified six distinct cognitive styles (cf. Hentschel, 1980), as follows: (1) Leveling-sharpening pertains, respectively, to a person's tendency to underestimate or overestimate the perceived differences between gradually changing stimuli (Holzman & Klein, 1950). (2) Equivalence range or conceptual differentiation (Gardner, 1953) refers to the narrow vs. broad categories characteristically used by an individual in a variety of tasks that involve grouping or sorting. (3) Focusing, later called scanning (Schlesinger, 1954) highlights the contrast between the percepts currently in the focus of perceiver's attention and his or her more peripheral experiences. Focusing can also be described as accentuation of the figure-ground distinction, as postulated in Gestalt psychology.

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(4) Constrictive-flexible ego control was proposed by Klein (1954) to encompass individual differences in interference proneness. Such disruption or distraction can be observed in tasks that require responding to divergent clues, as exemplified by the Serial Color Word Test (S-CWT), where color names do not correspond to the colors in which they are printed (cf. Stroop, 1935). (5) Field dependence-field independence is a concept introduced and systematically investigated in the course of Herman Witkin's long career (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson & Karp, 1962). As such, it stands historically apart from the other five cognitive styles, all of which were identified and investigated by George Klein and his collaborators. Conceptually, field dependence capitalizes upon intraindividual consistencies and interindividual differences in the ease and/or speed with which a stimulus that is embedded in a complex figure is identified and separated from its context. (6) Tolerance for unrealistic experience is characterized, at one extreme, by the acceptance of experimentally induced perceptual distortions or illusions and, at the other end of the continuum, by the rejection of any induced modification of familiar or accustomed reality (Klein, 1951). Presumably, this characteristic extends to embracing vs. rejecting any spontaneously occurring experiences that appear to violate expectations as to what is or is not real. Cognitive Styles: Relationship Among Them and With Defense Mechanisms. Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, and Spence (1959) conducted a major factor analytic study of indicators of the above six cognitive styles. Its pattern of results was complex and defies a simple interpretation. On the positive side, five of the six styles emerged as distinct factors. Unexpectedly, however, factorial composition varied markedly across genders. In the male sample, focusing and tolerance for unrealistic experience constituted distinct factors. Among women, three factors were found, pertaining to field-dependence, leveling-sharpening, and equivalence range, respectively. One may wonder why the perceptual world of men and women is organized so differently. This question has, as yet, not been answered nor have the operations of Gardner et al. been fully replicated.

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A major concern in Gardner et al.'s research was with the relationship between cognitive styles and defense mechanisms. Holzman (1960) stated emphatically that repression was inconceivable without leveling, a conclusion consistent with the findings by Holzman and Gardner (1959). Focusing was hypothesized to be related to isolation and projection, and this expectation received support from Benfari (1966) and others. More broadly, focusing appears to promote vigilance in the force of subjectively threatening stimuli (Hoffman, 1971; Luborsky, Blinder & Schimek, 1965). A substantial body of findings has linked field dependence with such defenses as denial, repression, and introjection that are thought to be consistent with a global and undifferentiated, and hence less mature, level of functioning (Witkin et al., 1962). At the same time, field independent persons were hypothesized to rely primarily on more cognitively differentiated patterns of defense, exemplified by isolation, projection, and externalization. Both types of prediction have received partial support. As for intolerance for unrealistic or implausible experiences, Kaplan (1952) demonstrated its relationship to rationalization, perhaps as a part of a general adaptive strategy of avoiding emotionally arousing events. Finally it should be mentioned that Gardner et al. (1959) included ratings of defense mechanisms in their factor analysis, with results that are generally consistent with the findings recapitulated above. A number of questions, however, remain unanswered. Specifically, most of the indicators of defenses were based on Rorschach test scores. As such, these measures are several steps removed from the manifestation of actual defense, apart from the more general and still unresolved problems of validity of such ratings. Moreover, the appropriateness of a non-pathological sample for the conclusive determination of the relationship between stylistic and defensive components of personality is problematic. At a subsidiary level, it was thought to be worthwhile to reopen the issue of the basis cognitive stylistic dimensions a generation later and in a different culture. Disentangling Style and Defense: Subsequent Contributions With these objectives in mind, Hentschel (1980) undertook to investigate the interplay of cognitive style and defense in two groups in Sweden, consisting of psychiatric patients and of their normal counterparts. The pa-

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tient sample was recruited from among out-patients and in-patients at the psychiatric clinics of the University of Lund in Sweden. Persons with organic or psychotic diagnoses were excluded, and the members of the sample were in psychiatric treatment for a variety of neurotic conditions, corresponding in the current official psychiatric nomenclature to anxiety, somatoform, and dissociative disorders. There were 91 participants, all of them female. Control group consisted of 63 women undergoing dental treatment at a university clinic. None of them were in any kind of psychiatric treatment nor did they carry any psychiatric diagnosis. The age range of the two groups was identical, i.e., 18 to 40 years, and their means and standard deviations were comparable. With the exception of tolerance of unrealistic experience, measures of cognitive styles used by Gardner et al. (1959) were included, along with the defense mechanisms for the patient sample, based on their clinical reports. For measuring adaptation to the interference task, Serial ColorWord Test (S-CWT) (Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001) was used, a perceptgenetic technique that allows to capture the process of adaptation and not only the level of performance at a given moment. Upon factor analysis, seven cognitive control dimensions were extracted for the patients as well as for the control group. Factorial composition in the two samples was highly similar though not identical. The seven factors extracted were as follows: field dependence-field independence; successful vs. unsuccessful adaptation to interference tasks; productivity in free association; focusing; scanning; phenomenal regression to the real object; and leveling-sharpening. This listing bears closer resemblance to the cognitive styles described by George S. Klein and his associates (e.g., Klein, 1951) than it does to Gardner et al.'s (1959) factor analytic results. Focusing and scanning, moreover, constituted separate factors. Given the differences in the perceptual processes involved in the two operations, centering attentional efforts and changes in eye movements (cf. Wachtel, 1967) respectively, this result appears to be meaningful and interpretable. On the basis of the ratings for defense mechanisms and the factor scores obtained for the cognitive style-factors, canonical correlations between the two sets of variables were computed. Proceeding from the perceptgenetic conceptualization of defenses, the following six defenses were investi-

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gated: repression, isolation, reaction formation, introjection, turning against self, and projection. The significant canonical correlations are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 10.1.

These results substantiate earlier research findings, at least in part, and are in keeping with theoretically based expectations. Particularly impressive are the correlations between isolation and adaptation to interference tasks, accompanied by a negative relationship to productivity in free association. High isolators cope successfully with the distractions from the task at hand, but they do so at the expense of restricting the scope of their associations - and possibly, the emergence of any novel ideas - to the stimuli and situations that they encounter. There is also a significant canonical correlation linking sharpening with projecting. Yet, correlational bridges between defenses and styles are not numerous and the redundancy estimate for the two sets of variables does not exceed 12 percent of common variance. These findings suggest a high degree of autonomy for these two components of persons' adaptive endeavors, although a number of indirect relationships, for example those between field dependence and the severity of symptoms, also appeared. In particular, it is worth noting that a significant relationship between leveling and repression, anticipated by the pio-

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neers in this area of investigation (e.g., Holzman, 1960), failed to materialize. Similar objectives were pursued by Rubino and Siracusano (2004) and Rubino, Grasso, and Pezzarosa (1990) in Italy who observed the unfolding of regulative styles in two perceptgenetic processes, on S-CWT and DMT, respectively. Their findings, linking complex process scores derived from the S-CWT with specific defense manifestations on the DMT, need not be recapitulated in detail at this juncture. Suffice it to say that, on the basis of a rather complex pattern of adaptation to the serial task, Rubino et al. (1990) were able to differentiate two groups of psychosomatic patients, suffering from bronchial asthma and peptic ulcers, respectively. On the DMT, bronchial asthma patients exhibited disturbance primarily at a relatively superficial level of personality. Patients diagnosed with peptic ulcers experienced disturbances affecting deeper and more fundamental layers of personality. Rubino et al. (1990) pointed to the similarity, though not identity, of these disturbances to neuroticism and psychoticism, respectively. As these leads are pursued and extended, they may improve the effectiveness of psychotherapy with psychosomatic patients, which Grawe (1992), on the basis of outcome research in Germany, subjected to severe criticism. Our last example of relationships between cognition and defense concerns depression. Hentschel, Kiessling, Teuber-Beng, and Dreier (2004) conducted a study of 30 female depressive inpatients and a matched control group. The whole sample was clustered on the basis of performance in an intelligence test, which resulted in an almost pure patient cluster, a control group cluster that was also virtually pure, and a mixed cluster of patients and controls. The performance of the patient cluster was especially affected on the fluid intelligence subtests of the test. Of particular interest are the DMT results in the three clusters of depressive patients formed on the basis of performance on the intelligence test. As shown in Figure 2, no difference among the clusters was found in the first third of the DMT series. In the second and third segments of the DMT, the two clusters characterized by greater intellectual impairment, i.e., the patient cluster and the mixed cluster, obtained substantially higher scores in isolation/reaction formation. This pattern of defense tends to be responsible for deficits in

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attention control under conditions of both information overload and underload (Hentschel, Kiessling, & Hosemann, 1991).

Figure 10.2.

Thus, for depressive patients, striving for harmony, accompanied by attempts to exclude all aggressive tendencies, exacts a high price in symptoms. Patients who participated in this research only received psychoparmacological treatment. If, however, they had been treated with psychotherapy, would this information on their intellectual functioning and on their use of defense mechanisms, have been of any help for the therapist, and if so, in what way? Fava, Rafanelli, Grandi, Canestrari and Morphy (1998) attempted to prevent recurring depression by cognitive behavioral means. Would findings on the vicissitudes of defenses across time be applicable within the perceptgenetic framework? Other indications point to the sensitivity of perceptgenetic measures of defense to suicidal ideation among depressive patients. Berglund and Smith (1988) found higher suicide rates among patients whose MCT protocols were devoid of any signs of defense. Another study by Sundbom (1993), with the DMT, indicated a higher suicide rate among patients whose DMT protocols showed drawings of a hero shrinking in size, perhaps suggesting a diminished ego. These bits of information have not yet been incorporated into psychotherapy practice. How then can the situation be changed, assuming that this kind of information is relevant to psychotherapy? Is psychotherapy a set of procedures

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that work irrespective of patients’ previous experiences, basic attitudes, personality traits, and specific symptoms? It is much more plausible to try to trace changes observed in psychotherapy to the interaction between two partners engaged in the process of social learning (cf. Hentschel, Bijleveld, & Rudolf, 1999). If so, it should be possible to utilize the structural pattern of cognitive styles and the dynamic functions of defenses as hypothetical predictors for outcome research in psychotherapy. Embedded in a general learning model, such a scheme may look somewhat like Figure 3.

Figure 10.3.

On the left side are the characteristics that patients bring to the therapy situation. It is assumed that not only do their symptoms matter, but so do their personality traits, cognitive styles, and defense mechanisms. These individual characteristics coalesce with the person's experiences and expectations in generating transference reactions. An allowance is made for additional factors, as yet unidentified, that might affect both patients’ subjective experiences and their overt conduct in psychotherapy. Similarly, the therapist’s impact upon psychotherapy is co-determined by his or her personality characteristics, the "school" of therapy espoused, and

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the experiences accumulated - along with additional factors, not yet pinpointed but potentially relevant. Between these two parties to the transaction, a therapeutic alliance is forged, attempts at problem solving are undertaken, and the process of therapy is initiated. The patient's learning ability comes into play as specific tasks to be learned are gradually identified and tackled. The basic question is: What is to be learned and how? In reference to “what” is learned, defense mechanisms are relevant: “how” they are learned is in part influenced by cognitive styles. Leads in the preceding section are potentially useful to therapists here and now. What is as yet lacking is a systematic demonstration of the contribution of cognitive styles to the therapy process, and the same can generally be said about defenses. As a start toward filling this gap, the next section of this chapter contains suggestions for a program of studies focused on defenses in psychotherapy.

DEFENSE MECHANISMS IN PERCEPTGENESIS AND IN PSYCHOTHERAPY Defense Mechanisms: From Pioneering Contributions to Present State Defense mechanisms were first identified and described in the clinical context, specifically in the course of psychoanalysis (Freud, 1894/1964; 1896/1964). In the ensuing decades, they were scrutinized under controlled and artificial laboratory conditions (cf. Cramer, 1991; DeWaele, 1961; Sears, 1943). In recent years, the focus of research has shifted somewhat. No longer are experimental analogues emphasized, and systematic objective investigation of the phenomena related to defense is vigorously pursued in more realistic settings, often in the course of social interaction (Cramer, 2000). Defense mechanisms, originally described on the basis of observations gleaned in the course of psychotherapy, are once again being investigated in the therapeutic setting, but this time with the armamentarium of current instruments, techniques, research designs, and data processing. It is our task to capture and describe this trend, and to map its possible extensions into the future. Specifically, our goal is to narrow the gap be-

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tween the two, hitherto independent and sometimes divergent, domains. This objective will be pursued by applying the results of systematic research to the psychotherapy setting as an arena of further investigation of defenses under conditions of distress. Within the last fifteen years volumes dealing exclusively or primarily with the experimental or systematic investigation of defense have proliferated (e.g., Conte & Plutchik, 1995; Cramer, 1991; Hentschel, Smith, Draguns, & Ehlers, 2004; Olff, Godaert, & Ursin, 1991; Clark 1998; Ozolins, 1989; Singer, 1990; Vaillant, 1992, 1993). The number of research studies in cognitive, developmental, social, personality, and clinical psychology and the multiplicity of the approaches utilized in these investigations (Cramer, 2000) attest to the vitality and robustness of this concept. Defense mechanisms have been described as the observable tip of the psychoanalytic iceberg (Erdelyi, 1985) and, as such, have been virtually destined to serve as the point of contact between modern, partially experimental, psychology and historic, clinically grounded, psychoanalysis (Draguns, 2004). Hailed as the core of the dynamic aspect of psychoanalytic theory (Drews & Brecht, 1975) and described as perhaps Freud’s most original contribution to human beings’ self-understanding (Vaillant, 1977), defense mechanisms, by comparison with other psychoanalytic notions, are more amenable to operationalization and less remote from observable data. Psychotherapy and DMT: Search for Similarities and Differences A major development over the last several decades has been the advent of several standardized instruments for the assessment of defenses, as exemplified by the percept-genetic Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) (Kragh, 1985). DMT is virtually unique in potentially encompassing the entire conflict-anxiety-defense sequence (Smith & Hentschel, 2004), as postulated in classical (Fenichel, 1945; A. Freud, 1946) and elaborated in more recent (e.g., Erdelyi, 1985; Sjöbäck, 1973) formulations. The distinctive characteristic of the DMT is not in providing the opportunity for inferring or interpreting defenses, as the major projective tests do (e.g., Cramer, 1999; Schafer, 1954), nor in capturing self-reported defensive operations, as exemplified by the Defense Mechanism Inventory (DMI) (Gleser & Ihilevitch, 1969). Instead, responses to DMT are plausibly expressive of

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the defense mechanisms for which the test responses are explicitly scored. Such responses emerge in encounters with emotionally arousing and/or threatening stimuli as they gradually emerge and become distinct. This operation, though compressed into a tight time frame, has affinities with the client’s experience in psychotherapy. In both cases, the person is confronted with ambiguity. The challenge is to reduce uncertainty and to impose structure. Moreover, as Erdelyi (1985) observed, defenses are applied in an uneven, saltatory, and multistage fashion. During this process, hypotheses vie and alternate. On the DMT, these hypotheses are traceable to the vague impressions and fragmentary clues gleaned during the tachistoscopic presentations and to the threats, conflicts, and anxieties triggered by them. The dual task is to come to grips with the stimulus and avoid distress and discomfort in the process. Instead of the intervention of a homunculus derided by the critics of perceptual defense (e.g., Eriksen, 1960), a sequence consisting of several stages unfolds (Erdelyi, 1974, 1985), punctuated by attempts to reduce stress that closely resemble defenses as described by psychoanalysts. What happens in psychotherapy is not very different. Here too, the objective is the discovery of truth about the complex and multiple facets of the person’s past experience and present behavior. The expectation is that the resulting insight will promote cognitive understanding, affective control, and eventually behavioral change. Moreover, insight may be selfreinforcing, perhaps as a personal equivalent of the aha-phenomenon. These observations should not, however, lead us to gloss over the difference between these two progressions. The 22 presentations of DMT, with exposure times gradually from 5 milliseconds to 2 seconds, lead inexorably to veridical recognition. In full, unimpeded view the nature of the stimulus can scarcely be denied, even if it generates discomfort. In contrast, there is a lot more spontaneity and less predictability in psychotherapy. The quest for insight may be diverted, overridden, or postponed by real-life events and developments. The client or analyzand may fortuitously or defensively switch to another area of experience or concern, or may even interrupt therapy. It is as though the client’s phenomenal field were filled with countless DMT stimuli triggering emotional arousal and competing for attention.

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Even though defense mechanisms have an undeniable traitlike, personally characteristic quality, psychoanalytic theory (e.g., Sjöbäck, 1973) does not explicitly postulate consistency of defenses across situations, problems, and time. Conceivably, isolation in response to visual threat may co-exist with, say, rationalization of real-life actions. Defenses may be shaped by a complex situation-by-person interaction, as envisaged by Mischel (1968) for personality traits. All of these considerations demand empirical resolution in determining the nature and extent of the relationship between DMT and psychotherapy, if any. To this end, advances in assessing defenses in psychotherapy must be described. Approaches for Investigating Defenses in Psychotherapy Three instruments for the assessment of defenses have been explicitly designed for application in psychotherapy. The CADM (Clinical Assessment of Defense Mechanisms; Ehlers, 2004; Ehlers & Czogalik, 1984) is a scale developed for use by psychotherapists in rating 16 defense mechanisms at the initiation of treatment and at various points up to its termination and beyond. Originally validated in a German psychotherapy clinic on a sample of 147 inpatients presenting a variety of anxiety and personality disorders, CADM has been factor analyzed, with interpretable factors emerging for superego defense, affect defense, impulse defense, consequence of affect defense, and displacement of the libido. This scale has been used, with positive results, in a number of published clinical studies (Ehlers, 2004; Ehlers & Czogalik, 1984; Küchenhoff, 2004). In Buenos Aires, Liberman and Maldavsky (1975) constructed a lexicon of defenses that can be computer scored in psychotherapy transcripts. Named the David Liberman algorithm (DLA), it has been systematically applied by Maldavsky (2003) and others to the investigation of defenses in the course of psychoanalysis. Maldavsky (2003) has provided extensive psychometric data on this novel, complex, and promising approach. DLA makes it possible to study analyzands’ productions and analysts’ interventions in an objective, systematic, and quantitative manner. It lends itself to studies of changes of defenses in psychoanalysis with an N of 1, an objective that Ehlers (2004) has also pursued, but in a very different manner.

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The Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (DMRS, Perry, 1990), developed in Montreal, constitute a standardized and highly elaborate procedure for rating 29 defense mechanisms on the basis of verbal productions in psychotherapy sessions. Thorough training and close supervision of raters has resulted in acceptable reliabilities for this instrument. DMRS have been developed specifically with psychotherapy research applications in mind, such as the investigation of the relationships between therapist’s interventions and patient’s defenses (Perry & Henry, 2004). DMRS have gone through five editions, their convergent and discriminant validity have been established, and their usefulness in both processes and outcome research has already been substantially demonstrated (cf. Perry and Henry, 2004). As many practicing psychotherapists will attest, the vicissitudes of defenses constitute one of the main threads of the therapeutic process. Such mechanisms wax and wane, expand, constrict, alternate, and are modified and transformed in the course of psychotherapy. Yet, the aggregate of research on defense mechanisms has been focused on assessment and diagnosis, i.e. stability and persistence of defenses, rather than on their change and modification that is expected to occur in psychotherapy. This impression is sustained upon taking a closer look at the English-language volumes on defense mechanisms of the last two decades. Thus, in two reviews of research on defenses (Cramer, 1991; Olff et al., 1991) psychotherapy does not even appear in the subject index, nor is it prominently featured in three of the other, somewhat more specialized, volumes that relate defense mechanisms respectively to bodily movements (Ozolins, 1989), biographical events (Vaillant, 1992), and recollection of repressed experiences (Singer, 1990). Clark’s (1998) book deals explicitly with defense mechanisms in the counseling process, but does not prominently address research issues. Hentschel, Smith, Draguns, and Ehlers (2004), however, have provided indications that, at long last, psychotherapy is emerging as a significant arena for the observation and study of defense mechanisms in action. As yet, this trend has not extended to perceptgenetic measures such as DMT and MCT. Specifically the following interfaces are proposed:

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1. Defenses as determinants or predictors of response to psychotherapy, e.g., individuals who demonstrate Level III (neurotic) defense mechanisms in Vaillant’s (1993) scheme, are expected to improve more in traditional psychodynamic therapy than those with primarily Level I (psychotic) or Level II (immature) defenses. At this point, operational definitions of defenses at these levels are not yet available for DMT, but they can be developed, explored, and eventually validated. 2. Similarly, therapies can be recommended or designed on the basis of the nature of defenses employed. Thus, spontaneity in emotional expression may be explicitly promoted for clients high in isolation on the DMT, and clients with high perceptgenetic or other scores for repression may be helped to expand their scope of self-awareness and selfunderstanding. 3. Defensive preferences can also be investigated among the effects of psychotherapy. On the basis of pre and post measures, what would be the effect of a specific type of therapy upon the decline of defenses at Vaillant’s Level II and their emergency at Level IV? What kinds of interventions increase variety of defenses, and what, if any, result in constricting their range? What therapies result in the strengthening of defenses (i.e., make a person “better defended,” but not “more defensive”) and what therapies have the opposite effect? How does the balance between defending and coping change in the course of a given therapy? 4. In this day and age of tailor-made, focused, and time-limited interventions, it is not utopian to envisage the advent of psychotherapies that are targeted upon specific defense mechanisms or groups thereof, as indexed by means of the DMT. Such developments, through a combination of cognitive techniques with a psychodynamic rationale, as exemplified by Liotti (1981) in the case of agoraphobia, might accelerate the attainment of circumscribed and concrete objectives. Clark’s (1998) objective of making the recognition and modification of defense mechanisms a key feature of the counseling process is consonant with this orientation. Eventually, protocol-driven intervention to address excesses and deficits in defense preference and usage can be envisaged. 5. DMT might also figure in the comparison of several modes of psychotherapy and the specification of their respective effects. As a provi-

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sional example, let us venture a hypothesis: Psychodynamic interpretive psychotherapy would produce greatest change upon a person’s defense mechanisms by comparison with behavioral and social learning interventions, with cognitive-behavioral techniques in an intermediate position. 6. Finally, defense mechanisms can be naturalistically, but systematically studied in the course of psychotherapy, parallel to the same kind of process-oriented, multi-indicator scrutiny of the DMT series. As yet, none of the existing tests or scales of defense mechanisms have succeeded in opening to observation the entire sequence of impulse engendering threat (often in the form of intrapsychic conflict) that, in turn, triggers anxiety and finally results in the imposition of defense. However, this entire succession is potentially observable at certain points in psychotherapy. Technical problems involved in continuous psychophysiological recording remain to be resolved and complications inherent to intermittent psychological ratings have to be overcome. Once these challenges are met, the road will be open to studying defense mechanisms. The vicissitudes of defense under these conditions could then be compared with the characteristics of the impulse-threat-anxiety-defense sequence studied perceptgenetically under experimental conditions. (Such studies have, as yet, not been fully implemented.) Once the extent of the correspondence was established, or lack thereof documented, such successive experiences of intrapsychic threat reduction could be explored in relation to psychotherapy techniques and orientation. In this manner, defense mechanisms would be incorporated into process, in addition to outcome, research in psychotherapy. 7. Operationalization of defenses within the therapy context should enable researchers to conduct objective and quantified studies with an N of 1. This has already been done by Ehlers (2004) and proposed by Perry and Henry (2004), specifically for the purpose of clarifying the functional relationship between the therapist’s interventions and the client’s defenses. Careful, predictive case studies, as conducted by Kragh (1986) with the DMT, some of them implemented in the therapy context, provide a model for this type of research. 8. Low correlations among the various formats of measures of defense mechanisms, e.g., between the DMT and DMI (Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969), may be turned to advantage by helping us obtain a more differentiated pic-

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ture of the impact of particular modes or styles of intervention upon specific defense manifestations, e.g., in relation to their access to consciousness or its ego-syntonic vs. ego-dystonic nature. Eventually, it should be possible to elucidate these putative multi-level connections. None of the studies proposed have as yet been implemented. With notable exceptions, research on defense mechanisms in psychotherapy has suffered a one-hundred year lag. This lost time should be made up by pursuing the investigation of defenses in psychotherapy with the intensity, sophistication, creativity, and rigor that this vitally important topic deserves. Perceptgenetic techniques should be an important component in this comprehensive effort.

CONCLUSIONS Perceptgenetic techniques are consonant with process-oriented approaches to personality. Smith's (1957) conception of visual perception as an event over time parallels Heiss's (1948) view of person as process. Yet, similarities between the unfolding of prolonged real life sequences, as exemplified by psychotherapy, and the microprocesses involved in perceptgenesis, have rarely been addressed. In this chapter, we have tried to take a few initial steps toward filling this gap. To this end, certain relevant and promising research findings on cognitive styles and defense mechanisms were reviewed, with emphasis upon the serial presentation of stimuli, as exemplified within the perceptgenetic framework by S-CWT and DMT. On a conceptual basis, both convergences and divergences of these procedures with psychotherapy were noted. We believe that the systematic incorporation of perceptgenetic procedures pertaining to both defense and style is a promising and fruitful pursuit, well worth undertaking for both theoretical and practical reasons.

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Berglund, M. & Smith, G. J. W. (1988), Postdiction of suicide in a group of depression patients. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 77:504-510. Clark, A. Jr. (1998), Defense Mechanisms in the Counseling Process. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers. Conte, H. R. & Plutchik, R. (Eds.) (1995), Ego Defenses: Theory and Measurement. New York: Wiley. Cramer, P. (1991), The Development of Defense Mechanisms. Theory, Research and Assessment. New York: Springer Verlag. Cramer, P. (1998), Coping and defense mechanisms: what is the difference? Journal of Personality, 66:895-918 Cramer, P. (1999), Future directions for the Thematic Aperception Test. Journal of Personality Assessment, 72:74-92. Cramer, P. (2000), Defense mechanisms in psychology today. American Psychologist, 55:637-646. DeWaele, J. P. (1961), Zur Frage der empirischen Bestätigung psychoanalytischer Grundannahmen. [On the question of empirical confirmation of basic psychoanalytic assumptions]. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 165:90-134. Draguns, J. G. (2004), Defense mechanisms in the clinic, the laboratory, and the social world: Toward closing the gaps. In: Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research and Clinical Perspectives, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 55-75. Drews, S. & Brecht, K. (1975), Psychoanalytische Ich-Psychologie [Psychoanalytic ego-psychology]. Frankfurt/Main, Germany: Suhrkamp. Ehlers, W. (2004), Clinical evaluation of structure and process of defense mechanisms before and during psycholanalytic treatment. In: Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research and Clinical Perspectives, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 353-392. Drews, S. & Czogalik, D. (1984), Dimensionen der klinischen Beurteilung von Abwehrmechanismen [Dimensions of clinical assessment of defense mechanisms]. Praxis der Psychotherapie und Psychosomatik, 29:129-138. Erdelyi, M. H. (1974), A new look at the New Look: Perceptual defense and vigilance. Psychological Review, 81:1-25.

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Erdelyi, M. H. (1985), Psychoanalysis: Freud’s Cognitive Psychology. New York: Freeman. Eriksen, C. W. (1960), Discrimination without awareness: A methodological survey and evaluation. Psychological Review, 67:279-300. Fava, G.A. (1999), Sequential treatment: a new way of integrating pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy. Psychotherapy, Psychosomatics, 68: 227-229. Fava, G. A., Rafanelli, C., Grandi, S., Canestrari, R. & Morphy, M. A. (1998), Six-year outcome for cognitive behavioral treatment of residual symptoms in major depression. American Journal of Psychiatry, 155:1443-1445. Fenichel, O. (1945), The Psychoanalytic Theory of Defense. New York: Norton. Freud, A. (1946), The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, S. (1894/1964), The neuro-psychoses of defense. The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 3. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 45-61. Freud, S. (1896/1964), Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defense. The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 3. London: Hogarth Press. Gardner, R. W. (1953), Cognitive styles in categorizing behavior. Journal of Personality, 22:214-233. Gardner, R. W., Holzman, P. S., Klein, G. S., Linton, H., Spence, D. P. (1959), Cognitive control: a study of individual consistencies in cognitive behaviour. Psychological Issues, 1, No. 4. Gleser, G. C. & Ihilevich, D. (1969), An objective instrument for measuring defense mechanisms. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33:51-60. Grawe, K. (1992), Psychotherapieforschung zu Beginn der neunziger Jahre [Psychotherapy research at the beginning of the 90s]. Psychologische Rundschau, 43:132-162. Heiss, R. (1948), Person als Prozess [Person as process]. Kongressbericht der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Psychologie, Göttingen.

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Hentschel, U. (1980). Kognitive kontrollprinzipien und neuroseformen [Cognitive styles and types of neurosis]. In: Experimentelle Persönlichkeitspsychologie [Experimental personality psychology], eds. U. Hentschel & G. Smith. Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 227-321. Hentschel, U., Bijleveld, C.J.H., & Rudolf, G. (1999), Psychodynamische Persönlichkeitsmerkmale von Psychotherapeuten in beziehung zum therapieerfolg [Psychodymanic personality characteristics of psychotherapists in relation to therapy success]. Psychother. Psychsom. Med. Psychol., 49: 55-63. Hentschel, U., Kiessling, M., Teubner-Berg, H. & Dreier, H. (2004), Intellectual performance and defense mechanisms in depression. In: Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J. G. Draguns & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 431-451. Hentschel, U., Kiessling, M., & Wiemers, M. (1998), Fragebogen zu Konfliktbewältigungsstrategien – FKBS [Conflict-Solving Strategies Inventory – FKBS]. Weinheim: Beltz. Hentschel, U., Kiessling, M. & Hosemann, A. (1991). Anxiety, defense and attention control. In: Cognitive Microgenesis: A Neuropsychological Perspective, ed. R. E. Hanlon. New York: Springer, pp. 262-285. Hentschel, U., Smith, G., Draguns, J. G., & Ehlers, W. (Eds.), (2004), Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Hoffman, H. E. (1971), Scanning, stress, and the defense profile. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27:199-202. Holzman, P. S. (1960), Repression and reality contact. In: Festschrift for Gardner Murphy, eds. J. G. Peatmann & E. L. Hartley. New York, pp 330343. Holzman, P. S. & Gardner, R. W. (1959), Leveling and repression. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59:151-155. Kaplan, J. N. (1952), Predicting memory behavior from cognitive attitudes toward instability. American Psychologist, 7:322. Klein, G. S. (1949), Adaptive properties of sensor functioning. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 13:16-23.

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Klein, G. S. (1951), The personal world through perception. In: Perception. An Approach to Personality, eds. R. R. Blake & G V. Ramsey. New York: Ronald press, pp. 328-355. Klein, G. S. (1954), Need and regulation. In: Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1953, ed. M. R. Jones. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 224-274. Kragh, U. (1985), The Defense Mechanism Test. Stockholm: Persona. Kragh, U. (1986), Life panorama under the microscope. A paradigmatic case study. In: The Roots of Perception, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, & J. G. Draguns. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 145-160. Küchenhoff, J. (2004), Defense organizations and coping in the course of chronic disease: A study of Crohn’s disease. In: Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 597-607. Liberman, D., & Maldavsky, D. (1975), Psicoanalisis y Semiotica [Psychoanalysis and Semiotics]. Buenos Aires: Paidos. Liotti, G. (1981), Un modello cognitivo-comportomantale dell’agorafobia [A cognitive-behavioral model of agoraphobia]. In: Cognitivismo e psicoterapia, eds. V.F. Guidano & M.A. Reda. Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli, pp. 149-170. Luborsky, L., Blinder, B. & Schimek, J. (1965), Looking, recalling, and GSR as a function of defense. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 70:270280. Maldavsky, D. (2003), Actualizacion del ADL: Instrumentos, Conebialidad y Validez [Development of the ADL: Instruments, Reliability, and Validity]. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Ciencias Sociales y Emresariales. Mischel, W. (1968), Personality and Assessment. New York: Wiley. Olff, M., Godaert, G. & Ursin, H. (Eds.), (1991), Quantification of Human Defense Mechanisms. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Ozolins, A. R. (1989), Defence Patterns and Non-Communicative Body Movements. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Perry, J.C., (1990), The Defense Mechanism Ratings Scales Manual. (Fifth edition). Cambridge, MA: Author. Perry, J.C. & Henry, M. (2004), Studying defense mechanisms in psychotherapy using the Defense Mechanism Rating Scales. In: Defense Mecha-

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nisms: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 165-194. Rubino, I. A. & Siracusano, A. (2004), Patterns of adaptation and perceptgenetic defenses. In: Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 415-431. Rubino, I. A., Grasso, S., & Pezzarossa, B. (1990), Microgenetic patterns of adaptation on the Stroop task by patients with bronchial asthma and duodenal peptic ulcer. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 71:19-31. Schafer, R. (1954), Psychoanalytic Interpretation in Rorschach Testing. New York: Grune & Stratton. Schlesinger, H. J. (1954), Cognitive attitudes in relation to susceptibility to interference. Journal of Personality, 22:354-374. Sears, R. R. (1943), Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts. New York: Social Science Research Council. Singer, J. L. (Eds.) (1990), Repression and Dissociation: Implications for Personality Theory, Psychopathology and Health. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sjöbäck, H. (1973), The Psychoanalytic Theory of Defensive Processes. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup. Smith, G. (1957), Visual perception - an event over time. Psychological Review, 64:306-313. Smith, G. & Hentschel, U. (2004). Percept-genetic indications of defense. In: Defense Mechanisms: Theoretical, Research, and Clinical Perspectives, eds. U. Hentschel, G. Smith, J. G. Draguns & W. Ehlers. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 129-152. Sternberg, R. J. & Grigorenko, E. L. (1997), Are cognitive styles still in style? American Psychologist, 52:700-712. Smith, G.J.W., Nyman, G.E., Hentschel, U. & Rubino, L.A. (2001). The Serial Color Word Test. Manual. Frankfurt: Swets & Zeitlinger. Vaillant, G. (1977), Adaptation to Life. Boston: Little, Brown. Vaillant, G. E. (1992), Ego Mechanisms of Defense. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.

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Vaillant, G. E. (1993), The Wisdom of the Ego. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wachtel, P. L. (1967), Conceptions of broad and narrow attention. Psychol. Bull., 68:417-429. Witkin, H. A., Dyk, R. B., Faterson, H.F., Goodenough, D. R. & Karp, S. A. (Eds.), (1962), Psychological Differentiation. New York: Wiley.

11. WHICH TYPE OF NORM FOR S-CWT RESEARCH? I. Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi, and Alberto Siracusano The Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) is one of the main paradigms of percept-genetic research. The repeated confrontation with a table of incongruent color-words (Stroop task) allows the assessment of the individual’s style of regulation, i.e., his or her pattern of adaptation to a conflict situation. In this study, four types of norms were compared (Swedish clinical, Italian nonclinical, internal, based on reading times). Two groups of women outpatients with DSM-IV principal diagnoses of Anorexia (n=29) and of Bulimia (n=28) were given the S-CWT. Only the norms based on reading times significantly discriminated between groups on Primary Types and on ITA. Inter-group differentiation was allowed by all norms on Secondary V - Types, and was not reached by any norm on Secondary R Types. Present findings suggest that norms based on reading times are to be preferred, at least with nonpsychotic samples. The Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) (Smith & Klein, 1953; German revised manual by Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001) is one of the basic paradigms in percept-genetic research and represents one of the main instruments for assessing individual differences in patterns of adaptation. According to the S-CWT, the subject is repeatedly confronted with the Stroop task, which consists in naming the printing hue of color-words printed in incongruent hues, ignoring the printed word (e.g., the word green is printed in red, and the proband must say “red”). A 100 color-word table is administered five times (each representing a subtest), and reading times are taken every 20 words. The fundamental measures are linear (R) and nonlinear (V) change, both within subtests (primary variables), and between them (secondary variables). The combination of R and V determines four patterns of adaptation to the conflict situation: (1) Stabilized (S), when both R and V are below the normative medians, (2) Cumulative (C), when R is high and V is low, (3) Dissociative (D), when R is low and V is high, (4) Cumulative-Dissociative (CD), when both R and V are above

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the medians. The most frequent pattern in the five subtests dictates the Primary Type. R and V are then calculated both on the five Rs (Secondary R-Types) and on the five Vs (Secondary V-Types). Three further adaptive variables of the Serial Color-Word Test are Initial Types A and B (ITA and ITB), and the Adaptation Index (Rad); these three variables are dichotomised into high or low (cf. the above cited manual, for further information). Summing up, each protocol yields six classifications: Primary Type, Secondary R-Type, Secondary V-Type, ITA, ITB, and Rad (e.g., D, CR, CDV, ITA +, ITB -, Rad +). The S-CWT seems to have many virtues, as it is quick (about 15 m.), doesn’t need a laboratory, is practically water-proof against any motivetional bias, does not depend on any interpretation by the researchers, has very interesting discriminant properties when applied to clinical and nonclinical samples, shows good predictive validity, is linked to a psychodynamic framework and is embedded in the percept-genetic model of perception-personality. Few other psychological instruments display so many qualities, but, in spite of this, the S-CWT is practically ignored around the world. One of the main reasons for this bizarre situation is that US research workers have not yet “discovered” it (despite the fact that the test was born in the US half a century ago and that most of the recent papers have been published in US journals, but by European authors). Another cogent reason is that it takes time for an interested reader to really understand to what the many variables of the S-CWT refer: although the S-CWT certainly explores processes of adaptation which are deeply ingrained in the individual personality, it leaves little to common sense and intuition and sounds very formalistic, mathematical and reality-far. It is indeed difficult to explain on a descriptive psychological level what’s the difference between, say, a DR or a CR pattern. Much correlational research is still needed to acquire a sufficient knowledge of the mental and behavioural counterparts of S-CWT patterns (Smith and Klein’s seminal 1953 paper is an outstanding example in this direction). As is clear from the aforementioned brief description of the S-CWT, the aim of the instrument, i.e., the pattern classification of the individual, is wholly dependent on the normative medians. Very low medians inevitably lead to a scarcity of S types, while very high medians determine a low fre-

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quency of C, D, and CD. Most studies until the beginning of the nineties employed either clinical or internal norms: the first ones had been derived from a sample of Swedish psychiatric inpatients and were stratified for sex and age (cf. manual, pp. 55-57), the second ones were constructed each new time on the specific investigated sample. In 1990 two psychosomatic groups were compared with nonclinical norms, i.e., norms derived from a rather large segment of the Italian general population, with the same stratification criteria employed for clinical norms (Rubino, Grasso, & Pezzarossa, 1990). Later on, the finding of significant positive productmoment correlations between reading times and subtests’ V scores led to the new proposal of basing the stratification not on sex and age, but on reading times, in order not to confound pattern assessment with level of performance (the latter is the traditional target of the Stroop task, in its neuropsychological usage, as distinguished from the field of personality assessment, where the S-CWT is located) (Rubino, Claps, et al., 1997). These norms on reading times comprised five strata, characterized by increasing reading times (from a min. total time of 270 sec., to a max of 930 sec.); the 889 subjects of the sample spanned from nonclinical volunteers to schizophrenic outpatients. The problem of which type of norm is best fitted for research received a first answer in a study comparing two quite different psychopathological samples, i.e., temporo-mandibular and bulimic women patients on clinical, nonclinical and reading times norms (Baggi et al., 1998). Only Primary Types were explored. Clinical norms did not differentiate significantly between the two clinical groups, nonclinical norms fared better (p=.02) and norms on reading times showed the most powerful discriminant properties (p=.0006). However, many further studies are needed before one can conclude that norms on reading times are really superior to the other ones, at least with nonpsychotic samples. The present study represents a new step toward clarifying the latter issue. Four types of norm (clinical, nonclinical, internal, or reading times) have been used with the same two clinical groups (anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa), with the aim of comparing their respective ability to discriminate between pathologies. Given the within-instrument methodological focus of

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this paper, hypotheses and interpretations about the patterns of adaptation in anorexia and bulimia will be dealt with elsewhere.

METHOD Participants Two groups, each of 30 consecutive outpatients attending a university clinic, were asked to participate in the study, with the following inclusion criteria: (1) age above 15 and below 30 years: (2) at least 8 years of schooling; (3) DSM-IV diagnosis of Anorexia Nervosa or Bulimia Nervosa (confirmed with the SCID-P interview); (4) absence of psychotic symptoms, drug dependence, alcoholism, pathology of the CNS, colour blindness. All patients signed an informed consent. The anorexic group had a mean age of 19.8 years (SD=4.6); the bulimic group had a mean age of 21.2 years (SD=3.5). There was no significant age difference between the groups. The S-CWT The S-CWT was administered following standard instructions. Testing took place during the second visit. One anorexic and two bulimic protocols had to be excluded because of more than 10 uncorrected errors during colour-words reading. Therefore, the final anorexia group comprised 29 patients, and the bulimic one 28 patients.

RESULTS The frequencies of S-CWT types were compared between groups with the Fisher’s Exact Test, two-tailed (significant findings listed in Table 11.5). On Primary Types (Table 11.1), all the norms (with the exception of the clinical ones) led to higher frequencies of the CD pattern in the anorexia group; nonclinical norms approached significance, while norms on reading times did reach it (Table 11.5). Table 11.2 displays the distribution of Secondary R-Types. The DR pattern (norms on reading times) was more frequent among anorexic patients, but the data were far from statistical significance. No statistical betweengroup difference was found concerning R-Types.

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Table 11.1. Distribution of S-CWT primary types among anorexia (n=29) and bulimia patients (n=28), according to four different norms Clinical Norms S C D CD Not Classified Anorexia 14 1 9 1 4 Bulimia 17 3 6 1 1 Nonclinical Norms S C D CD Not Classified Anorexia 4 1 11 9 4 Bulimia 6 4 13 3 2 Norms on Reading Times S C D CD Not Classified Anorexia 3 4 8 10 4 Bulimia 5 3 11 3 6 Internal Norms S C D CD Not Classified Anorexia 7 4 9 8 1 Bulimia 10 5 5 4 4 Table 11.2. Distribution of S-CWT secondary R-types among anorexia (n=29) and bulimia patients (n=28), according to four different norms Clinical Norms CR DR CDR SR Anorexia 15 2 10 2 Bulimia 13 5 9 1 Nonclinical Norms SR CR DR CDR Anorexia 8 1 13 7 Bulimia 10 3 10 5 Norms on Reading Times SR CR DR CDR Anorexia 6 2 16 5 Bulimia 9 4 11 4 Internal Norms CR DR CDR SR Anorexia 6 7 8 8 Bulimia 8 8 7 5

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With all the norms, on Secondary V-Types, the anorexia group had higher frequencies of DV and CDV patterns, and lower frequencies of CV, compared with the bulimia group (cf. Table 11.3). As usual, clinical norms did not reach significance, while, on the main comparison, i.e., CV vs DV+CDV, nonclinical, internal and reading times norms all showed strong p-levels. The same norms did even evidence a significant intergroup difference for the comparison CV vs DV (CV being linked with Bulimia, and DV with Anorexia). Everyone familiar with the obvious personality differences between the ‘pure’ anorexic and the ‘pure’ bulimic patients, knows that the former is typically rigid, ascetic, anancastic, while the latter is impulse-ridden, chaotic, hysteroid. In S-CWT terms this is translatable into the expectation that the anorexia group should show higher frequencies of the ITA + pattern. Table 11.4 shows indeed the latter imbalance of distribution, but only norms on reading times reached statistical significance. In this instance, nonclinical norms performed very poorly, almost as poorly as the clinical norms. The reason of the latter finding lays in one often forgotten fact: ITA scores are significantly higher in the general population than in clinical samples, and therefore nonclinical norms for ITA, being very high, are of little discriminant power with psychiatric and psychosomatic groups. Furthermore, a closer inspection of Table 11.4, on the section of the norms on reading times, reveals that the significant intergroup difference is attributable more to the particular paucity of ITA+ patterns among bulimic patients, than to a markedly high frequence of ITA+ among anorexic patients. Unfortunately, no between-norms comparison was possible regarding the Adaptation Index (Rad), because neither the clinical nor the nonclinical norms contain normative medians for this very interesting variable.

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Table 11.3. Distribution of S-CWT secondary V-types among anorexia (n=29) and bulimia patients (n=28), according to four different norms Clinical Norms CV DV CDV SV Anorexia 6 8 7 8 Bulimia 7 14 3 4 Nonclinical Norms SV CV DV CDV Anorexia 3 3 10 13 Bulimia 4 12 5 7 Norms on Reading Times CV DV CDV SV Anorexia 4 2 9 14 Bulimia 5 10 4 9 Internal Norms SV CV DV CDV Anorexia 5 4 11 9 Bulimia 8 12 5 3 Table 11.4. Distribution of S-CWT secondary ITA- and ITB-types among anorexia (n=29) and bulimia patients (n=28), according to four different norms Clinical Norms ITA ITB + ITB ITA + Anorexia 14 15 14 15 Bulimia 7 21 15 13 Nonclinical Norms ITA + ITA ITB + ITB Anorexia 12 17 11 18 Bulimia 7 21 11 17 Norms on Reading Times ITA + ITA ITB + ITB Anorexia 16 13 11 18 Bulimia 7 21 14 14 Internal norms ITA ITB + ITB ITA + Anorexia 17 12 13 16 Bulimia 11 17 15 13

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Table 11.5. Significant intergroup comparsions Patterns of adaptation Type of Norm (S + D) vs CD (S + C) vs CD (SV + CV) vs (DV + CDV) (SV + CV) vs (DV + CDV) (SV + CV) vs (DV + CDV) CV vs (DV + CDV) CV vs (DV + CDV) CV vs (DV + CDV) CV vs DV CV vs DV CV vs DV ITA+ vs ITA-

Reading Times Nonclinical Internal Nonclinical Reading Times Nonclinical Internal Reading Times Reading Times Nonclinical Internal Reading Times

P .045 (.054) .004 .007 .014 .005 .005 .007 .015 .025 .032 .030

DISCUSSION The doubts regarding choice of norms for S-CWT research are not dispelled by the present results. The only certain conclusion is that clinical norms (by far the most known and employed norms) are not to be employed, at least with nonpsychotic samples. If the future of clinical validation of the S-CWT should lay on clinical norms, one could easily predict a relative failure and the premature death of such a promising paradigm. Internal norms performed well enough, although missing both the Primary Types and ITA. Furthermore, internal norms are not always permitted: for instance, two diagnostic groups not exactly matched on demographic variables and sample size would give dubious results, when classification should refer to internal normative medians. Last but not least, a classification on internal norms simply tells us which of the, say, two groups is more Cumulative or Dissociative compared with the other, but doesn’t give information on how the two groups are posited in a broader context (for instance, general population or nonpsychotic psychiatric patients). Norms on reading times and nonclinical norms were the best performers; it may also be concluded that, in this study, norms on Reading Times fared better than nonclinical norms, because they were the only ones able to dis-

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criminate significantly between groups on Primary Types and on ITA. To be sure, further studies with other couples of clearly different psychopathological groups are needed before concluding for the superiority of norms on Reading Times. It must also be added that these newly proposed norms could be ameliorated by further stratification of the too wide last Reading Times stratum (which spans from 550 to 930 sec., while the other four strata cover together the time span from 270 to 549 sec.): the latter endeavour can be performed with the inclusion into the existing data-base of 2300 new psychotic protocols, which are often characterized by very long Reading Times. If norms on Reading Times seem currently the best candidates for SCWT clinical studies with the classical, typological model, it's to be remarked that research is flourishing anew, thanks to the efforts of U. Hentschel’s laboratory, on the analytic regression model (Schubö & Hentschel, 1978; cf. Manual, pp. 15-17). In view of the future comparisons between typological and analytic regression models, it seems all the more advisable to know with certainty which are the best norms for typological studies.

REFERENCES Baggi, L., Rubino, I. A., San Martino, L., Cuzzolaro, M., Pezzarossa, B., & Martignoni, M. (1998), Patterns of adaptation to conflict in Bulimia and Temporo-Mandibular Joint Disorder. Percept. & Mot. Skills, 86:979-984. Rubino, I.A., Grasso, S., & Pezzarossa, B. (1990), Microgenetic patterns of adaptation on the Stroop task by patients with Bronchial Asthma and Peptic Ulcer. Percept. & Mot. Skills, 71:19-31. Rubino, I.A., Claps, M., Zanna, V., Caramia, M. C., Pezzarossa, B., & Ciani, N. (1997), General cognitive abilities and patterns of adaptation: for Serial Color-Word Test norms based on reading times. Percept. & Mot. Skills, 85:1347-1353. Schubö, W., & Hentschel, U. (1978), Improved reliability estimates for the serial color-word test. Scand. J. Psychol., 19:91-95. Smith, G. J. W., & Klein, G. S. (1953), Cognitive controls in serial behavior patterns. J. Personal., 22:188-213.

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Smith, G. J. W., Nyman, E., Hentschel, U., & Rubino, I. A. (2001), Serieller Farb-Wort Test (S-CWT) Manual. Frankfurt a. M.: Swets & Zeitlinger.

12. PILOTS AND GROUND OFFICERS INVESTIGATED BY PROCESS TESTS OF CREATIVITY, EXTRAVERSION, AND STRESS CONTROL Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnér and Gudmund Smith In an exploratory investigation of personality patterns, Swedish air force pilots (n = 22) and ground officers (n = 14) were tested with the Creative Functioning Test, the Serial Color Word test, and the Spiral After-Effect Technique. The participants also answered open questions about their work and about creativity related items. Achievement ratings were made by their superior officers. An initial discriminant analysis separated the groups to 83.3 %. Next, cluster analyses were conducted on the test results, resulting in three pilot clusters and three ground officer clusters. The pilot clusters were interpreted as forming meaningful groups, in agreement with previous research. Thereafter the clusters were compared with the results on the open questions. The significant answering categories gave face validity support to the clusters. It was concluded that it is important to investigate personality patterns, as measured by process tests, and, in future research, to make comparisons with biological markers as well as questionnaires. Are pilots creative? This question was put to the present investigators by the head of a Swedish wing and was the origin of this investigation. However, when venturing upon our task to study air force pilots, we felt it important to include other personality dimensions as well. Earlier research has brought out the importance of personality factors for pilots (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsouka, 1970), who have been characterized by emotional stability and extraversion (Bartram, 1995; Bartram & Dale, 1982; Jessup & Jessup, 1971; Okaue, Nakamura, & Nira, 1977; Reinhardt, 1970). The creativity dimension was found to have been little studied in pilots (but cf. Bachelor & Michael, 1991). Most previous research has used

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self-report scales, however, and it has been argued that such scales are less apt to discriminate in small samples (John, 1989). Since the present study comprised a limited number of participants, we decided to try behavioral tests as alternatives to self-report scales. Thus, the stability, or cognitive control dimension, was measured “on-line” in a pressing situation, while creativity, as well as extraversion, were studied with perceptual techniques. Stress can be defined as a psychophysiological reaction to adaptive demands in new or challenging circumstances (Levi, 1981). Coping with press implies constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), and the interaction between demands and control is of importance (Karasek & Theorell, 1990). In the present study we investigated individual differences in keeping a stable control, when adapting over time to a (modified) Stroop test, namely The Serial Color Word Test (Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001). The pilots in particular were assumed to manage this test in an even and stable manner. Another basic requirement for pilots is the ability to appreciate the outside world relatively free of valuation and close to “facts”, that is extraversion (Eysenck, 1967). This dimension was investigated with an implicit perceptual technique, namely the The Spiral After Effect Technique (Andersson, 1995). A low proportion of introverted subjectivity was thus expected in the present cohort. The creative personality has been characterised by originality, independence and introversion, as well as androgyny, and an interest in complexity and elegant solutions (Barron, 1988; Carlsson, 1992; Crutchfield, 1964; Jönsson & Carlsson, 2000). In a strict organisation with minutely defined functions, any creative activity must be kept within firm frames (Amabile, 1983; Ekvall, 1991). We therefore expected to find few officers with high creativity. But since a flexible hold was considered important, a relatively large proportion of creativity in the middle range was presumed. Thus, the final test battery encompassed, besides the aforementioned tests of extraversion and stress control, also the Creative Functioning Test (Smith & Carlsson, 2000). These personality variables were furthermore compared with answers to open questions and with achievement ratings made by each participant’s superior officer. For sake of comparison, a group of ground officers was included in the investigation.

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According to Magnusson and Törestad (1993), pattern description is a first step towards an understanding of the interaction of different subsystems in the personality. Hence, this investigation could be described as an exploratory study with the aim to find out if different combinations of personality factors would form meaningful subgroups among the participants.

MATERIALS AND METHODS Participants All available pilots, and a selected group of other young officers, employed at a Swedish wing, were asked to participate by the head of the wing. No one refrained from participation. The pilot group consisted of 22 men (age 24-42 years, M = 29.9). There was one colonel, two majors, four captains, three first-, and twelve second lieutenants among the pilots. The ground officer group consisted of five women and nine men (age 2432 years, M = 28.9). There were four captains, five first- and five second lieutenants. None of the ground officers had a pilot education. They worked as fighter controllers, engineers, and instructors. The participants comprised about one tenth of the employees at the wing. Procedure An introductory letter together with a questionnaire with open questions was sent to the participants in advance. In it the participant was guaranteed of confidentiality. The questionnaire was returned to the experimenters before the testing. The testing was done at the wing. One experimenter gave the tests of creativity and extraversion, and the other one administered the stress test, checked for missing answers in the questionnaire, and did the debriefing. Achievement Rating Scale The achievement rating scale was part of the regular assessments at the wing. It consisted of eight variables (expertise, work capacity, intellectual flexibility, discrimination of judgement, psychic stability, co-operation, leadership and physical fitness), rated on a five-grade scale. Each participant was rated against next higher grade by his or her superior officer.

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Questions about Work and Creativity The questionnaire contained 22 open questions. Half of them were related to the work, for example, what was important at the work; which were positive and which were negative aspects; stressful moments; positive press; and if the person was contented with his/her present work, or wanted to do something else. The other half was related to creativity (Smith & Carlsson, 1990), for example, which were the person´s interests; which were his or her dreams, if opportunity was given; did the person consider him-/herself logical or more apt to get ideas; did he or she prefer to be alone or together with other people; and from what age he or she had childhood memories. Finally, the participant was asked to describe what he or she considered to be most important in life. Creative Functioning Test (CFT) The stimulus picture in the CFT is a still life drawn in black and white depicting a bottle and a bowl. The picture, drawn by an artist, is built up by shadings and diffuse contours making it fairly easy to see other things in it (e.g., a face, a body, or a landscape). The participant is instructed that pictures are to be shown very briefly, but not that they are one and the same picture. He or she is asked to describe after each exposure what was shown on the screen, even if they are not quite certain. The test consists of two connected exposure series, one with increasing exposure times and the next with decreasing times. In the increasing series the exposures (shown with a tachistoscope) start with .02 sec. and are slowly prolonged until the participant has described the stimulus as consisting of two objects, a bottle and a bowl. At this point the time increase is halted and reversed, to continue into the decreasing series. During this part of the test, the exposure times are successively shortened, and end when nothing at all can be discerned. Further technical and experimental specifications can be found in the manual (Smith & Carlsson, 2000). Creativity dimensions in the CFT. A first crucial dimension of relevance for creativity is the ability to form mental representations of the indistinct contours and shapes glimpsing on the screen. This ability is tried in the in-

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creasing series, in which the perceived meanings can vary considerably between individuals. The number of different interpretations in the increasing series correlated moderately with independent criteria of creativity (Smith & Carlsson, 1990). However, in this part it is difficult to distinguish between associating fluency on the one hand and the ability to shift from rational thought to more primary process oriented cognition on the other. This distinction was put to the test in the decreasing portion of the CFT: Thus, when the participant has got a hold on the visual contents in the picture, this “objective” perception supposedly exerts a considerable influence on the viewer. Relying on rational analysis, individuals would treat their own subjective picture interpretations as incorrect and in the decreasing series would comply with what seems as “the right answer”. From a more cognitivistic perspective, a formulation such as “creativity…produced by an absence of cognitive inhibition” (Eysenck, 1995, p. 253) is feasible. Thus when correct recognition has been attained, a low-creative person would inhibit, or not consciously attend to, any subjective interpretation from the increasing series during the decreasing part. On the other hand, highly creative individuals would be inclined to shift from rational (secondary) thought processes and assign priority to their subjective (imaginary) representational world. In other words, they would prefer to perceive complexity rather than the simplicity of the logical solution. Scoring. In the increasing series the number of different interpretations (for example a person or a landscape) adds up to a measure of creative fluency. Next, in the decreasing series, the ability to shift from rational thought to more holistic cognition, or creative flexibility, is put to a test. Final classification. In the manual the scale for the decreasing series consists of six steps which were in this study compressed into three levels: High (steps 4 – 6): The whole or a substantial part of the picture is eventually interpreted in a completely different way. Medium (steps 2 – 3): Only vague changes or plastic transformations of the picture. Low: No change, or at the most that the picture is perceived to get foggy or darker. Validity. Correlations have ranged from .46 to .83 with richness of ideas, expressiveness and originality, creative interests, and predictions of creative achievement. This has been judged by external raters in studies of researchers, professional artists, children and youngsters (Smith & Carlsson,

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1990), and students of architecture (Schoon, 1992). Creative flexibility has been shown to correlate with symmetrical frontal brain activity (Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000). In the present study the authors blind-scored the protocols independently of one another. In a few cases of dissension, another experienced rater made the final verdict. Serial Color-Word Test The Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) is a modification and extension of the Stroop test (Thurstone, 1944). In the S-CWT the process of adaptation is closely registered when a person tries to cope with several repetitions of the pressing task to name the printed color of the color-word, not the printed word. (For a thorough description of all statistical procedures, consult the manual, Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001). The test material consists of a pre-test with groups of colored Xs, and a main test, preceded by one proper test line used as an introduction. The main test is a sheet with 100 color-words on ten lines. Reading time is registered at every second line. Five repeated readings of the sheet are made. Thus, altogether 5 x 5 time values are recorded. Scoring, basic classification. The scoring is founded on calculations of two basic measures. One is the linear time change, i.e. decrease (improvement) or increase (impairment) in reading time. The other is degree of instability or variability over time, the variation ascribable to linear decrease or increase being excluded. Four strategies (S, C, D, CD) have been identified outgoing from the above measures. The stabilised (S) style represents an even speed with slight improvement between the five part times on a sheet. The cumulative (C) style implies that the reading times increase on the sheet. It has been related to anxiety and compulsiveness. The dissociatives (D) are unstable, i.e. vary between fast and long part times. They have proven sensitive to increasing stress, accident-prone and more frequent in psychosomatics or in psychosis. The cumulative-dissociative (CD) type has both increasing and unstable times. It is more common in psychiatric samples. It should be noted that people classified as CD from a non clinical sample usually have less extreme values than clinical samples, since reading times are shorter.

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Final classification. Three final classifications are made. First, primary type (S, C, D, CD, or unclassified), where each of the five sheets is assigned a style, and the classification is in most frequent style. Next, the secondary types (S, C, D, CD) for linear regression (R) and for variability (V) are classified on the basis of a calculation where each sheet is considered as a subtest. Third, initial types (high or low) are analyzed. The high type implies a rapid change from initial long times to much shorter times, and has been connected with compulsiveness. Validity. The diagnostic usefulness has been demonstrated in close to 60 studies (for further data and references, consult the manual, Smith et al., 2001). Reliability studies with a parallel test yielded correlations from .56 to .89. The present data were run on a computerised program with norms for age and sex. Spiral Aftereffect Technique The Spiral Aftereffect Technique (SAT) is claimed to reflect the balance between subjective and objective factors in the experience of a visual aftereffect (Andersson, 1972, 1995). Even though the visual aftereffect is of neurophysiological origin, this balance influences it. Brief aftereffect durations imply that the viewer cuts off any subjective contribution to his experience of illusory movement, that is extraversion. Very long durations on the contrary imply that the subjective world is emphasised at the cost of objectivity, that is introversion. Aftereffects of a medium length represent a balanced approach. The test material is installed in a portable apparatus. First a rotating spiral is shown during 45 seconds and immediately thereafter replaced by a non-moving circle. The participant is instructed to fixate the middle point of the rotating spiral. When the circle appears, the person reports when he considers the aftereffect to have stopped. Immediately after that a new trial follows, until ten trials have been made. A chronometer connected to the apparatus registrates the time. Scoring. Two basic measures are made. First, the stabilized level is calculated as the mean value of the two final trials. Secondly, change of the duration over the ten trials is measured, i.e., increasing (+), decreasing (-), or unchanging (0) times.

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Final classifications. Very low (LL), or low aftereffects (L-, L+) imply a reliance on extraceptive signals; medium lengths (M-, M0, M+) show a balanced hold; and high aftereffects (H-, H+) indicate that subjective signals dominate. (For details, consult Andersson, 1995). Validity. Neuroticism on the Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI (later EPI), Eysenck, 1959) has been found to coincide with long aftereffects (Andersson, 1969), which also proved typical of people with neurotic conflicts and depressive inhibition (Amnér, 1997; Andersson & Bengtsson, 1985). A medium level has correlated with warmth in contacts. Extraverts on the MPI more often had low aftereffects with minus trend (Andersson, 1969). Decreasing aftereffects (minus trend), or a low level, have coincided with a certain cool and reserved attitude (Andersson, Almgren, Englesson, Smith, Smith, & Uddenberg, 1984). University teachers with brief aftereffects more often described their organization as open (Ryhammar & Smith, 1999).

RESULTS There were no significant correlations between the three behavioural tests. Achievement Rating Scale Mean score on the achievement scale for the pilots was 31.8, and for the ground officers 28.9. This difference was significant (t (34) = 2.91; p < .01, two-tailed). None of the youngest pilots (n = 6; age 24 – 26 years) got scores above the mean (p = .02, Fisher’s exact test). Questions about Work and Creativity The answers to the open questions were coded in two or three categories for each question. The protocols were then blind-rated by the experimenters. Certain questions were re-coded and rated anew, until consensus was reached. To minimise bias, the raters did not know the results of the tests administered by the other experimenter. Moreover, the scoring was done in advance of the further analyses. The pilots and the ground officers were found to differ on two questions. The pilots emphasised flying as positive

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press (χ2corr. = 7.93, p < .01) and saw insecure employment as a negative aspect of their work (χ2corr. = 4.24, p < .05). Questions about Creativity vs the CFT The creativity questions have as an index earlier proven relevant for creativity as measured by the CFT (Smith & Carlsson, 1990a). In the present group this was not the case. Instead, certain questions sorted out answers given by the highly plus medium creative people from the low creative ones. Thus, for the creative people freedom, challenges and comradeship were important work aspects (χ2corr. = 5.12, p = .02). Positive press implied responsibility and/or self-development (χ2corr. = 4.52, p < .05). To be alone was regarded as more positive than being in company with others (p = .01, Fisher´s exact test). Finally, either one´s own self or the self of another person was regarded as most important in life, rather than viewing oneself in relationship with other people (χ2corr. = 6.02, p = .01). Discriminant Analysis A stepwise canonical discriminant analysis for pilots versus ground officers was performed (Klecka, 1980), comprising 42 variables (the test variables, sex, age, and superiors´ ratings). The prediction of group was successful for 83.3 %. Significantly contributing variables were achievement rating (r = -.61, p < .001), high after-effects (H) (r = .44, p < .01), and instability during stress (D / CD) (r = .34, p < .05). Thus, the pilots got higher ratings, and had less introversion and less unstable stress control than the ground officers. Another differentiating variable, which, for statistical reasons, did not play part in the analysis, was increasing reading times (primary C) on the stress test, found in eight pilots but none of the ground officers (p < .05, Fisher´s exact test). Cluster Analyses Since the pilots and ground officers were distinctive groups, it was deemed appropriate to look for subgroups within each. Using the above 42 variables, hierarchical cluster analyses (Ward) were performed (Everitt, 1980). Based on squared Euclidean distances, the Ward analysis provides valid estimates of the connections in four-field tables. Solutions with either two

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or three clusters were tried, and solutions with three clusters were settled on, since they yielded more significant connections with the questionnaire. Thus, after the clustering, in a second step, the questionnaire was tested for significance against the clusters. The differentiating answers are listed in the bottom part of tables 12.1 (the pilots) and 12.2 (the ground officers). Finally, the complete questionnaires were checked again, and two more differences between the clusters were then noticed that had not previously been categorized. These additional categories are added below in the text for those clusters that were concerned. Table 12.1. Overview of the Pilot Clusters

S-CWT S-CWT S-CWT S-CWT S-CWT SAT SAT SAT SAT SAT 3a. Positive aspects of work 3b. ” 5. Stressful aspects 6. Positive press

P1 P2 P3 n = 6 n = 9 n = 7 P-values Categories Primary C 0 3 5 < .05 Secondary Cv 1 3 7 < .01 Primary D or CD 2 0 0 .05 Secondary Dv or CDv 3 5 0 .05 Initial types low 0 4 0 < .05 L6 0 1 .001 L total (LL not included) 6 0 2 < .001 M0 5 0 < .01 M total. 0 8 0 .001 Minus-strategy 6 5 1 < .01 Answering categories in the questionnaire Freedom / challenge / comrade6 7 2 .01 ship Freedom, etc., and leadership Feel insufficient, get assessed

0 4

1 0

5 3

< .01 < .02

Flying / challenges / strain

6

7

2

< .02

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Table 12.2. Overview of the Ground Officer Clusters G1 G2 G3 n = 4 n = 6 n = 4 P-values Categories S-CWT Primary S 4 4 0 .01 S-CWT Secondary Sr 3 5 0 .02 S-CWT Secondary Sv 3 0 0 < .01 S-CWT Secondary Cv 0 4 0 .02 S-CWT Secondary Cr 0 0 2 .05 S-CWT Primary D 0 0 3 < .01 S-CWT Primary D or CD 0 0 4 < .001 S-CWT Initial types low 0 1 3 < .05 CFT Fluency > 2.5 themes 4 1 2 < .05 CFT Flexibility, high or medium 1 6 1 .02 SAT All L strategies 3 0 1 < .05 (LL not included) Answering categories in the questionnaire 10a. Future Satisfied with present work 4 1 1 .02 work 10b. ” More responsibility – make a 0 4 3 .05 career 13. Dreams Family, home, and the like 4 1 3 .02 14. Logical Get ideas 0 1 3 < .05 or ideas

Pilot cluster 1 (n = 6, age 25-28, M = 27 years). All were extraverted. On the questionnaire all regarded flying, freedom, and the challenge of an advanced technology as positive aspects, but most described that they sometimes felt insufficient. Further, due to the cut-off point, age did not influence the clustering, but afterwards the mean age was found to be lower than for the other pilots (p = .01). As one pilot wrote, “flying is still no everyday business for me”. Pilot cluster 2 (n = 9, age 24-42, M = 31 years). This group collected all those with a balance between extra- and introversion as well as low initial types on the stress test. On the questionnaire most stated the importance and positive press of flying, freedom, and challenges. None mentioned feeling inadequate.

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Pilot cluster 3 (n = 7, age 26-42, M = 32 years). All had increasing reading times on the stress test. On the extraversion test none was balanced. They stated in the questionnaire that leadership was important besides the challenges, freedom and comradeship. Further, afterwards was found that all but one complained about a stiff hierarchy or the many rules, in contrast to four of the other pilots (p < .02, Fisher’s exact test). Ground officer cluster 1 (3 men and 1 woman, age 25-32, M = 30 years). This group showed high stability on the stress test, and creative fluency. Most were extraverted. On the questionnaire everyone was content with his or her present work position. Their dreams centred on the family. None felt apt at getting new ideas. In addition, when we afterwards read through all protocols, they were all found to mention having an interest in technical things, in contrast to only one of the other ground officers, (p < .01, Fisher´s exact test). Ground officer cluster 2 (3 women, 3 men, age 24-30, M = 28 years). Everyone had medium creative flexibility. None had low after-effects. Most were stable on the stress test. Several expressed a need for further development, while only one was satisfied with the present position or wanted more leisure. Ground officer cluster 3 (3 men, 1 woman, age 25-32, M = 29 years). These people were unstable during strain. On the questionnaire most felt prone to get new ideas.

DISCUSSION As predicted, the pilot group had better stress control and were less introverted than the ground officers. They also got higher achievement ratings. It is probable that the thorough selection of pilots contributed to a wellfunctioning group with good control. But it seems that experience also contributed, since none of the youngest pilots got high ratings by their superiors. Stress Control It appears favourable for the wing that few participants showed instability when stressed. It is probable, that the distribution for the pilots on the Se-

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rial Color-Word Test is not the same as in the population at large. Only two, young, pilots had an unstable stress control. Good control, or executive functioning, is crucial for not becoming disorganized when dealing with rapid changes (Kyriazis, 1991). Regarding the ground officers, the stability in the first group was paradoxical, since their work appeared less pressing. Of interest is that for this group the stress test resulted in a pervading evenness on all classifications. In these technically minded people a more active inhibiting mechanism may have contributed to somewhat over controlled reactions (Gray, 1970; Pickering & Gray, 1999). As described by Clark and Watson (1999), constrained and conscientious people “plan carefully, avoid risk and danger, and are controlled more strongly by the long-term implications of their behaviour” (p. 403). Extraversion Only two pilots were introverted on the SAT, which was in line with earlier research. The other pilots showed extraversion, or a balanced hold. The youngest, “hot pilots” (Tempereau, 1956) had an extraverted reaction, which could be a strategy to compensate for their relative lack of experience. This objective hold may have had the positive effect to make them more aware of limitations in their own performance. Not realising own inadequacies has been found characteristic of pilots involved in serious accidents (Alkov, Gaynor, & Borowsky, 1985). Extraversion can be explained by a strongly activated outward-directed approach system (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). The approach system would shorten the illusory aftereffect and, analogously, allow further information processing of the outer world, including one´s own behavior. For the second pilot group, flying was experienced as a sufficient but not overpowering challenge. This seems to have been mirrored by their balance between intraceptive and extraceptive factors on the SAT. In contrast, the third group of pilots included people with either long (H+) or extremely short (LL) aftereffects. These unbalanced reactions might be interpreted as reflecting a certain press in their work, since they had responsibilities as senior officers. Their complaints about rigid rules are in line with the wording by Rothbart et al. (2000): “positive anticipa-

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tory tendencies may result in negative affect through the frustration or sadness resulting when an expectation is not met” (p. 126). It might be of interest that three pilots in this group got top rates from their superiors on both expertise and critical discernment, which no other pilot got. This difference is probably smaller than it would have been had all participants been rated against each other, and not against next higher grade. Creativity Medium creative flexibility on the Creative Functioning Test was found in more than 60 % of the present group. When compared with a sample of 132 university teachers (Ryhammar & Smith, 1999), the present participants had a significantly higher share of medium creativity (χ2 = 10.89, p < .001). This middle way implies a balance between what is realistic and what is not (Smith, 1995; cf. Ekvall, 1997). Medium creative flexibility could be described in terms of controlled imagination, which was actually described early on to distinguish a well-functioning pilot (Anderson, 1919). These creative realists (Moss Kanter, 1984) may be able to make implementations on the basis of pre-attentive cues. Similarly, contemporary aviation psychology emphasizes the necessity for good piloting to watch out even for small and oft-neglected risks (Besco, 1994). We conceive this to be affiliated with a neurophysiological orienting dimension, implying perceptual sensitivity (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). Although post-hoc, the questionnaire items relevant for the creative participants emphasized a wish for an individualistic position. This was most clearly recognized in the second ground officer cluster, having creative flexibility. This group did not focus on the family and like things, but instead described an urge to develop. These people might improve their creativity in another, less restricted context (cf. Smith & Carlsson, 1983). Validity and limitations Validity in the cluster technique naturally depends on the selection of test instruments that are important for the investigated system (Magnusson, 1999). In the present investigation the test-based cluster solutions formed meaningful patterns that agreed with previous research. Furthermore, these clusters got a face validity support from the participants´ attitudes to their

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work. For example, a majority of the pilots in the first group expressed feelings of insufficiency, and were found in a subsequent analysis to be younger than the other pilots. The more general applicability of the results depends in part on how representative the selected officers were of military staff. The pilots included practically all the flying personnel at the unit, and should therefore be regarded as more representative than the small and select group of ground officers. Probably a randomised sample of ground officers would have resulted in groups that had partly different characteristics. Also, the ground officer group was younger and not properly matched to the pilots. Thus it is necessary to under build the results in this study, found with exploratory techniques, with further, hypothesis-testing research. A final question could be raised about to what extent the clusters were the outcome of stable personality structures, or if they were influenced by the participants’ present context. Interaction effects seem probable. Quite generally, “persons qualify trait descriptions of themselves by specifying under what particular situations a general disposition is likely to influence their behavior” (McAdams, 1992, p. 347). For instance, in this study the pilots as a group had a relatively stable hold when pressed. But this did not exclude that those with leadership tasks showed signs of tension, and moreover expressed frustration at their work. Conceivably, adaptation to strain is a dynamic balance not only between systems of affective reactivity and cognitive control, but also including the external pressures that influence these internal systems (cf. Mischel & Shoda, 1999). We believe that further descriptions and validations of such interactions/personality patterns, are important in future investigations. In the future it is also of interest to complement the behavioral process tests with questionnaires construed to tap these same personality dimensions, as well as with biological markers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For statistical expertise we wish to thank Göran Linde (deceased). Tord Karlsson, head of the wing at that time, is thanked for kindly supporting the investigation. Maj Lantz is acknowledged for efficient secretarial help.

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Alf Ingesson-Thor, Olof Rydén and Bert Westerlundh are thanked for valuable advice.

REFERENCES Alkov, R. A., Gaynor, J. A., & Borowsky, M. S. (1985). Pilot error as a symptom of inadequate stress coping. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, March, 244-247. Amabile, T. (1983). The Social Psychology of Creativity. New York: Springer Verlag. Amnér, G. (1997). Fear of flying in civil airline passengers. A manifold phenomenon with various motivational roots. Doctoral dissertation, Lund University, Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur. Anderson, H. G. (1919). The psychology of aviation. In The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation, London: Oxford University Press. Andersson, A. L. (1969). Adaptive regulation of visual after-effect duration and social-emotive adjustment. Acta Psychiatrica, 29:1-34. Andersson, A. L. (1972). Personality as reflected in adaptive regulation of visual aftereffect perception: A review of concepts and empirical findings. In: Visual Aftereffects and the Individual as an Adaptive System, eds. A.L. Andersson, A. Nilsson, E. Ruuth, & G.J.W. Smith. Lund: Gleerup, pp. 159-171. Andersson, A. L. (1995). Spiral Aftereffect Technique. Department of Applied Psychology, Lund University, Sweden. Andersson, A. L., Almgren, P – E., Englesson, I., Smith, G.J.W., Smith, M., & Uddenberg, G. (1984). Personlighet och moderskap. (Personality and motherhood. Women’s emotional reactions and social context in connection with childbirth related to the personality and the children’s personality 7 – 8 years later). Research Report 3, Department of Applied Psychology, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. Andersson, A. L. & Bengtsson, M. (1985). Percept-genetic defenses against anxiety and a threatened sense of self as seen in terms of the Spiral Aftereffect Technique, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 26:123-139.

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Bachelor, P., & Michael, W.B. (1991). Higher-order factors of creativity within Guilford´s structure-of-intellect model: A re-analysis of a fifty-three variable data base. Creativity Research Journal, 4(2):157-175. Barron, F. (1988). Putting creativity to work. In: The Nature of Creativity, ed. R.J. Sternberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bartram, D. (1995). The predictive validity of the EPI and 16PF for military flying training. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 68:219-236. Bartram, D. & Dale, H. C. A. (1982). The Eysenck personality inventory as a selection test for pilots. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 55:287296. Besco, R. O. (1994). The potential contributions and scientific responsibilities of aviation psychologists. In: Aviation Psychology: Training and Selection, eds N. Johnston, R. Fuller, & N. McDonald. European Association for Aviation Psychology, Brookfield, Ver.: Ashgate Publishing Company. Brown, J. (1991). Self as Process. New York: Springer Verlag. Carlsson, I. (1992). The creative personality. Hemispheric variation and sex differences in defence mechanisms related to creativity. Doctoral dissertation, Lund University, Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur. Carlsson, I., Wendt, P. E., & Risberg, J. (2000). On the neurobiology of creativity. Differences in frontal activity between highly and low creative subjects. Neuropsychologia, 38:873-885. Cattell, R. B., Eber, H.W., & Tatsouka, M. (1970). Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF). Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, Champaign, Il. Clark, L.A., & Watson, D. (1999). Temperament: A new paradigm for trait psychology. In: Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2nd ed, eds L. A. Pervin & O.P. John, New York: The Guilford Press. Crutchfield, R. S. (1964). Conformity and creative thinking. In Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking, eds H. E Gruber, G.Terell, & M. Wertheimer. New York: Atherton Press. Ekvall, G. (1991). The organizational culture of idea-management: a creative climate for the management of ideas. In: Managing Innovation, eds J. Henry & D. Walker, Sage.

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Ekvall, G. (1997). Organizational conditions and levels of creativity. Paper presented at the Eight European Congress on Work and Organizational Psychology, Verona, Italy. Everitt, B. E. (1980). Cluster Analysis, 2nd ed. London: Heineman Educ. Books Ltd. Eysenck, H. J. (1959). Manual of the Maudsley Personality Inventory, London: University of London Press. Eysenck, H. J. (1967). The Biological Basis of Personality. Springfield, IL.: C.C. Thomas. Eysenck, H. J. (1995). Genius: The Natural History of Creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gray, J. A. (1970). The psychophysiological basis of introversionextraversion. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 8:249-266. Hanlon, R.E. (1991). Cognitive Micro-Genesis: A Neuropsychological Perspective. New York: Springer Verlag. Jessup, G., & Jessup, H. (1971). Validity of the Eysenck personality inventory in pilot selection. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 21:158-169. John, O.P. (1989). Towards a taxonomy of personality descriptors. In: Personality Psychology: Recent Trends and Emerging Directions, eds D. M. Buss & N. Cantor. New York: Springer Verlag, pp. 261-271. Jönsson, P., & Carlsson, I. (2000). Androgyny and creativity: A study of the relationship between a balanced sex-role and creative functioning. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 41:269-274. Karasek, R. A., & Theorell, T. (1990). Healthy Work, Stress, Productivity, and the Reconstruction of Working Life. New York: Basic Book. Klecka, W. R. (1980). Discriminant Analysis. University paper series on quantitative application in the social sciences. London: Sage Publications. Kragh, U., & Smith, G. J. W. (1970). Perceptgenetic Analysis. Lund, Sweden: Gleerups. Kyriazis, D.A. (1991). Personality aspects in aircraft accidents. Paper presented at the Air Forces Flight Safety Committee Europe, 112th Meeting, Athens, 16 - 18 Oct. Lazarus, R.S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, Appraisal and Coping. Springer Verlag, New York.

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Levi, L. (1981). Society, Stress and Disease – Working Life, IV, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Magnusson, D. (1999). Holistic interactionism: A perspective for research on personality development. In: Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2nd ed., eds L. A. Pervin & O.P. John. New York: The Guilford Press, pp 219-247. Magnusson, D. & Törestad, B. (1993). A holistic view of personality: A model revisited. Annual Review of Psychology, 44:427-452. McAdams, D.P. (1992). The five-factor model in personality: A critical appraisal. In: The five-factor model: Issues and applications, ed. R.R. McRae. Journal of Personality, 60, 2:329-361. Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1999). Integrating dispositions and processing dynamics within a unified theory of personality: The cognitive – affective personality system. In: Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2nd ed., eds L. A. Pervin & O.P. John. New York: The Guilford Press, pp. 197-218. Moss Kanter, R. (1984). The Change Masters. Cooperate Entrepreneurs at Work. London: George Allen & Unwin. Okaue, M., Nakamura, M., & Nira, K. (1977). Personality characteristics of pilots on EPPS, MPI and DOSEFU. Reports of Aeromedical Laboratory, 18:83-93. Pickering, A.D., & Gray, J.A. (1999). The neuroscience of personality. In: Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2nd ed., eds L. A. Pervin & O.P. John. New York: The Guilford Press, pp. 277-299. Reinhardt, R. (1970). The outstanding jet pilot. American Journal of Psychiatry, 127:732-736. Rothbart, M.K., Ahadi, S.A., & Evans, D.E. (2000). Temperament and personality: Origins and outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(1):122-135. Ryhammar, L., & Smith, G.J.W. (1999). Creative and other personality functions as defined by percept-genetic techniques and their relation to organizational conditions. Creativity Research Journal, 12(4):277-286. Schoon, I. (1992). Creative Achievement in Architecture. Leyden, Holland: DSWO Press.

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Shipley, P., & Orlans, V. (1988). Stress research: An interventionist approach. In: Occupational Stress. Issues and Developments in Research, eds J. J. Hurrell et al.New York: Taylor and Francis. Smith, G. J. W. (1995). How can middle-range creativity be useful? The Second Int. Conference on the Military Applications of Synthetic Environments and Virtual Reality. Stockholm: Försvarets Materielverk. Smith, G. J. W. & Carlsson, I. (1983). Creativity and anxiety: An experimental study. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 24:107-115. Smith, G. J. W. & Carlsson, I. (1990). The creative process: A functional model based on empirical studies from early childhood to middle age. Psychological Issues, 57, Madison, Conn. Smith, G. J. W. & Carlsson, I. (2001). CFT – a Test of Creative Functioning. Lund: Department of Psychology. Smith, G. J. W., Nyman, G. E., Hentschel, U., & Rubino, I. A. (2001). SCWT: The Serial Color Word test. Manual. Frankfurt: Swets & Zeitlinger. Tempereau, C. E. (1956). Fear of flying i Korea. American Journal of Psychiatry, 113:218 – 223. Thurstone, L. L. (1944). A Factorial Study of Perception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

13. VISION FORMING AND BRAIN STORMING: DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF CREATIVITY CAPTURED BY A PERCEPT-GENETIC MEASUREMENT AND OTHER MEASUREMENTS OF CREATIVITY Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson The relationship between a percept-genetic measurement of creativity and other tests of creativity was investigated. The participants were elementary school children. The relation between self-image and three different creativity measures was also studied. A creative fluency test, a questionnaire about creative activities and a percept-genetic creativity test were used. A self-image inventory measured skills, physical self, psychological health and relationship to others. The results showed that the creativity measures were, to some extent, significantly related, except the cognitive flexibility dimension of the percept-genetic test. One possible explanation was that the percept-genetic test measured another aspect of creativity. This was illustrated in a cluster analysis in relation to self-image. There were no self-image differences between children with high and low creativity in any of the three measurements. Few gender differences were found. The percept-genetic ideas applied to the inquiry of creativity have for a long time been a field of research at Lund University in Sweden. Both creativity theory and instruments for creativity measurement have been developed by Smith & Carlsson (1990; 2001). Their Creative Functioning Test (CFT) (2001) leans on the percept-genetic test tradition. The scoring system and validity measures were described in detail in Chapter 13. However, there has been little comparison with more traditional tests of creativity. To this end, we have executed a study in a couple of elementary

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schools where we have compared different creativity measurements with the CFT. Creativity has been studied within the context of different psychological approaches and there are accordingly a great number of different test methods (Parkhurst, 1999). We will not account for all of them in this chapter, but we will point out a couple of different kinds of tests. The constructor of the most used creativity measurement is Torrance (1965). The Torrance Test of Creative Thinking consists of different drawing and writing tasks, among others the Unusual Uses Test (Guilford’s Brick Test). He uses the four scoring dimensions that Guilford (1967) once pinpointed, that is, fluency, flexibility, elaboration and originality, from which different assessments are made of the participants’ test production. However, these dimensions have been criticized for being too limited to describe the whole phenomenon (Amabile, 1983). Amabile (1983) believes that paper-and-pencil tests are artificial, for one thing because the participants are asked to create on command. However, her collage-technique might be criticized for the same reason. What she achieves is the exclusion of drawing and writing talent in her test, since all participants get the same items with the instruction to compose a collage. But an aesthetic talent is still a dominant component in the test. A creative mathematician might not necessarily be a good (or creative) collage-maker. Other creativity tests have been constructed as self-reporting questionnaires (Khatena & Torrance, 1976; Smith & Fäldt, 2000). These could consist of sentences or just adjectives, that people are asked to identify as descriptions of themselves or not. But the problem with these tests are that people might prefer characteristics as disobedience, impulsiveness and non-conformity without them being accurate self-descriptions, especially among groups of students who are being trained to artistic professions, for example, architects or artists (Smith & Fäldt, 2000). The percept-genetic test, CFT has been compared with creativity self-reports; little connection has, however, been found (Ryhammar, 1996; Smith & Fäldt, 2000). On the other hand, Smith and Fäldt showed that if the task was shifted from selfdescription to ideal self-description, the task became projective and the desirability-bias became no longer as influential any more. To this measure there was a significant relation to CFT.

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Finally, some theorists have tried to construct more eclectic creativity models, where they confluence many different aspects of creativity (Amabile, 1983; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). In the present study we chose to use three different creativity measures, in order to at least capture a few different aspects of creativity. This allowed us to see if different individuals excelled in different measurements. In order to find other possible differences between the tests, a self-image questionnaire also was administered in this study. This would enable us to observe if the different tests resulted in different self-image profiles for the high and the low creativity groups. Self-image and Creativity Creative adults are generally depicted as individuals with a good deal of self-confidence in order to trust their own ideas and to be able to endure critical opinions (Martindale, 1989). Creative people are also described as being inventive, enthusiastic and risk-taking but also gloomy, loud, unstable, bitter, and so forth (Barron, 1963, 1981). Eysenck (1995) pointed out the fact that there is much contradiction in the descriptions of creative persons. They are described as having social presence and poise but are also said to be asocial and irritable. Furthermore they are reported to be both dominant and introvert, despite the fact that dominance generally is considered an extrovert trait. Introversion has been shown to be related to creativity by many researchers, for example Götz and Götz (1979) who studied professional artists. Artists also scored higher than non-artists on both neuroticism and psychoticism. When it comes to research about creativity and self-image in children and adolescents, there is rather contradictory evidence. On the one hand it has been shown that the most creative pupils are the best psycho-socially functioning and best performing in academic fields (Smith & Tegano, 1992; Byrnes, 1983; Workman & Stillion, 1974; Gallucci, Middleton, & Kline, 1999). According to the humanistic creativity concept, the creative individual is a healthy self-actualizing person (Maslow, 1971; Yau, 1991). The creative person has a positive self-image. Only a person with genuine selfconfidence has courage enough to dive into her/his subconscious to find

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material to inspire her/his creative functioning, according to Yau (1991). To nurture creativity in children, a true inner security must be developed which is accomplished by unambiguous parental love. On the other hand there are studies reporting that highly imaginative and creative children do not always function very well in school settings (Westby & Dawson, 1995) and that creativity is not associated with academic performance (Cramond, 1994; LaFrance, 1997; del Pilar Gonzalez Fontao, 1997; Richmond & Norton, 1973). Westby and Dawson (1995) give some reasons for why creative children might not be considered shining lights by their teachers. They do not always solve school tasks as they are told to, but in their own original way. Especially imaginative children do not always pay attention to teacher instructions, they might now and then get absorbed in their own inner world of daydream. According to Westby and Dawson (1995) these children are more individualistic, impulsive, determined and critical towards others, compared to their peers. Gender Differences in Children’s Creativity There are few reports of gender and sex differences in children’s creativity, at least that are generally agreed upon. Some results point to the advantage of girls (Rejskind, Rapagna, & Gold, 1992) and other prove boys to be superior (Tegano & Moran, 1989; Torrance, 1965). Furthermore, there are studies showing gender differences in verbal and pictorial orientation (Torrance & Allioti, 1969). Definition of Creativity for the CFT There are many different definitions of creativity. Parkhurst (1999) has summarized and criticized some of them, including the one Smith and Carlsson have presented (1990). According to Parkhurst, their definition lacked a novelty aspect, which most creativity definitions include and was therefore altered in this article to: A productive or generative novel way of experiencing reality – including the perceiver’s own self. Parkhurst also maintained that there were other problems with this definition. He argued for example that the making of Jackson Pollack’s paintings could not be included in this definition. However, as we see it, the drop paintings of

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Pollack certainly could be examples of a productive and a generative novel way of experiencing reality. A new way of making a painting is a new way of experiencing reality (the painter’s reality). The Aim of the Study We wanted to explore the relation between different tests of creativity. Is it the same creativity that a percept-genetic instrument captures, compared to a questionnaire, or to a fluency test? Our second focus was to investigate what kind of self-image creative primary school children have. Would the different test-methods give different self-image profiles? The assumption for this study was a positive relation between the different creativity measures. We also assumed that there would be self-image differences between more and less creative children in all the different measurements. No gender differences were anticipated.

METHOD Participants The participants of this study were 69 10- and 11-year-old children in six classes from three different Swedish schools, with somewhat different demographic profiles. There were 35 girls and 34 boys. The number of participants varied between 65 and 69 in the different tests because some children were absent at some testing sessions. Unusual Uses Test (UUT) In the Unusual Uses Test (Guilford, 1967) the subjects make up as many alternate uses as possible for a well-known object, for example a newspaper or a brick. In this study the Unusual Uses Test was adapted to function as a test for children. Empty milk-packages were considered to be wellknown objects for children and therefore suitable for the test. The children were asked to write down as many uses they could think of in 15 minutes. Two different scoring systems were used. Firstly, the total number of uses was counted and every suggestion rendered one point. This is regarded as a measure of fluency of ideas (Guilford, 1967). Secondly, different catego-

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ries of uses were counted (a list of these categories is presented in Appendix), measuring flexibility of ideas. Activity Questionnaire (AQ) The Activity Questionnaire (Hoff, 2000) is a measurement of involvement in creative activities and hobbies. It regards, among other things, if the children exert any creative hobbies (e g, drawing and writing stories), if the children spend a lot of time fantasizing, if they remember their dreams and if they have or have had imaginary companions. Other questions concern if the children have invented their own games or built their own toys. There are 10 questions and a maximum score of 12. The questions about creative activities and hobbies have been shown to correlate with the Creative Functioning Test (Smith & Carlsson, 1990) and the questionnaire in its present form with the Unusual Uses Test (Hoff, 2000). Creative Functioning Test (CFT) For a thorough description of the CFT (Smith & Carlsson, 2001) the reader is referred to Chapter 13. The Self-image Inventory “How I Think I am” “How I Think I Am” is a Swedish self-image inventory (OuvinenBirgerstam, 1999) consisting of five different subscales. The first subscale measures skills and abilities (school task related, e g, “I’m good at maths”, but also more in general, e g, “Other people do things better than I”). The second subscale regards questions about physical self-image, health and appearances (e g, ”I don’t care about my looks”, “I often feel clumsy”). The third subscale concerns mental well-being (e g, ”I easily get angry”, ”I’m a happy person”). The fourth subscale measures relationship with parents (e g, ”My parents trust me”, “In my family, we fight a lot”). The last subscale measures social competence or peer relationships (e g, ”I have many friends”, “I feel different from others”). There are 76 items in the inventory. Each item had four answer alternatives, from ”Agree fully”, to “disagree completely”.

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RESULTS Relations Between Creativity Measurements Positive correlations fere found between the different creativity measures in all instances but one. Half of them were significant. The Activity Questionnaire and the Unusual Uses Test were strongly related. But the CFT dimension of fluency of ideas and the Unusual Uses Test’s dimension of the same kind also showed relation. The main dimension of CFT was positively related with the other tests but only the relation with the fluency of idea dimension of the same test reach significance. Table 13.1 presents the correlations. Table 13.1. Spearman’s Rho Correlation Between Different Creativity Measurements Unusual Activity CFT Flexibility CFT Fluency Uses Test Questionnaire UUT .90** .44** .17 .26* Fluency of Idea UUT Flexibility .47** .14 .21 (p =.08) of Idea AQ Creative .10 -.10 Hobbies CFT- Cognitive .54** Flexibility Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01

Creativity and Self-image There was no self-image difference between high and low creativity groups (split at median) found with Mann Whitney U. (A detailed description can be found in Hoff and Carlsson, 2002). Gender Differences in Creativity There were few gender differences among the different creativity measures. However, on the Activity Questionnaire girls reported more creative activities (Mann Whitney U, p = .03). There was no gender difference in total self-image. However, among the subscales, a gender difference was found in the subscale regarding physical self-image, to the advantage of boys (Mann Whitney U, p = .04).

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Creativity and Self-image A cluster analysis with all the different creativity aspects and the selfimage subscales resulted in a seven-cluster solution (Ward’s method). A full representation of all clusters with mean z-scores can be found in Hoff and Carlsson, 2002. With Kruskal Wallis’ test all the measures showed significant differences between all clusters with an apha level of .01, except the scale about parental relations that only reached the .05-level. The first group of ten girls and seven boys showed mostly low creativity scores but reported fairly good self-images, except on mental well-being, where they were below average. The second group of five boys and five girls also had low creativity scores in four of five measures. These children however had generally negative self-images, but had, contrary to the first group, above average on mental well-being. The third group of four girls and thirteen boys scored somewhat above average on cognitive flexibility and fluency of ideas (CFT), but below on the other creativity measures. These children reported good self-images, but not as good on the skill and ability scale, though, still above average. The fourth group had nine girls and 3 boys, who also scored high on cognitive flexibility and fluency of ideas (CFT) but also on creative activities and hobbies. They reported somewhat below average self-images in all subscales, especially in the mental well-being subscale. The fifth group of two girls and one boy scored high on fluency of ideas and flexibility of ideas (UUT) and creative activities and hobbies (AQ). This group showed a positive self-image on all subscales. The sixth group consisted of two girls and three boys, who also scored high on the fluency of ideas and the flexibility of ideas (UUT). They reported negative selfimages, particularly on the skill and ability-scale. The seventh group included one girl and one boy who were highly creative in all creativity measurements but had extremely negative pictures of themselves. However, they were not as negative about their skills and abilities.

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DISCUSSION One main conclusion of this study was that more traditional ways of testing creativity were related to the percept-genetic creativity measurement concerning the fluency dimension, but not to the cognitive flexibility dimension (the main dimension of CFT). Probably different creativity tests elicit different aspects of creativity and that a non-relation does not necessarily mean that one is invalid as a measuring instrument. As we see it, creativity is such a complex phenomenon that many constructs are possible – and probably necessary - to be able to enfold the whole phenonomenon. Another conclusion was that there is no simple association between selfimage and creativity. We have shown that creative primary school children do not generally have positive self-images. However, we found no convincing proof of the opposite either, although the high creativity groups had non-significantly lower means in four of five self-image dimensions. There were both confident and well-adjusted creative children and insecure and socially less conforming ones. Different Aspects of Creativity We found positive associations between all but one of the creativity measures. However, only half of them were significantly related and even if significant, the covariation varied between 7 and 29 per cent in all cases but one. The measurements and their different dimensions are all maintained to tap creativity, but to some extent at least, they seem to measure different aspects of creativity. Judging from the covariation, only the two dimensions of the Unusual Uses Test really measured a similar aspect (81 per cent covariation). In his test, Torrance (1965) used four scoring dimensions, which also might represent different aspects of creativity. However, those two dimensions that were used in this study covariated largely (the two dimensions of the Unusual Uses Test). Smith and Carlsson (2001) use the term “creative functioning” for their test, which in its main dimension measures another aspect of creativity, and might more precisely be described as cognitive flexibility or the ability to move between logical and imaginary thinking styles. This had little rela-

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tion to the other tests in this study. In their research, Lubart, Jacquet, Pacteau, and Zenasni (2000) use the term “flexible thinking” as an aspect, which they show is not related to flexibility (flexibility of ideas) in Torrance’s measurement. Their “morphing technique” might lean on similar assumptions as Smith and Carlsson’s percept-genetic measurement. In Lubart et al’s morphing test a picture is shown on a computer screen and then the picture is gradually transformed to another picture. Those participants who see the new picture at an early stage are considered to have a flexible thinking style and to be creative. Perhaps CFT and the morphing test measure a similar aspect of creativity, may one call it “creative functioning” or “flexible thinking”. However, even though both tests use the perceptual process and both require flexible participants in one way or the other, there is one difference, and a reason to doubt that they measure the same aspect of creativity. CFT requires a willingness to abandon the objective picture (reality) to the advantage of, often earlier reported, subjective themes (imaginary). Cognitive flexibility between reality and imagination is defined as creativity in this percept-genetic instrument. The morphing test on the other hand, demands the participants’ readiness to observe differences in the picture (reality). This alertness or ability to notice small changes in reality is defined as creativity in the morphing test. Further testing would be required to investigate whether there is relation or not. When assessing the Unusual Uses Test, we only chose to use fluency of ideas and flexibility of ideas, but the test might also be scored in Torrance’s originality and elaboration dimensions. The other dimension of CFT, scored in the increasing series, is also a fluency dimension of creativity, and accordingly there was a relation to the Unusual Uses Test, which has also been found in earlier research (Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000). If one applied Torrance’s elaboration and originality dimensions to both the Unusual Uses Test and CFT, some more relation between the two tests would probably have been found. Engagement in creative activities and hobbies (AQ) was related to the fluency and flexibility dimensions of the UUT, a relationship also shown in earlier research (Hoff, 2000). If we, however, look upon the different creativity tests used in this study from the perspective of Sternberg and Lubart’s multidimensional model

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(1999), all the tests tend to appear rather one-dimensional, even if the four dimensions of Torrance’s had been used. Considering the six resources needed for creativity, according to Sternberg and Lubart’ Investment Theory of Creativity (1999), only some of them are measured by the tests of this study. Among the intellectual resources both CFT and the Unusual Uses Test measure “synthetic” (idea generation) ability. However what Sternberg and Lubart call “analytic” and “practical-contextual” intellectual ability is not systematically studied by any of the tests of this study. These concepts have to do with the elaboration and realization of creative ideas. The knowledge resource is difficult to measure in a creativity context and none of our tests did. CFT classifies different styles of thinking, which is the third resource of creativity. If judged by the originality dimension, the Unusual Uses Test also can be a test of styles of thinking. No test in this study has motivation, the fourth resource, as its focus, but nevertheless favorable scores in any of the tests will indicate motivated participants. The Activity Questionnaire is one type of personality measurement, where participants’ are asked about their creative every-day activities and hobbies. Personality is the fifth resource and environment is the last resource that Sternberg and Lubart’s model includes and an aspect of creativity that our tests did not measure. Nevertheless, the environment in which the tests are taken influences the results. It has for example been shown that a competitive environment might decrease creativity among some participants and increase it among others (Amabile, 1983; Baer, 1998). Some of the tests in this study were taken in a group and one (CFT) was taken individually. In fact, this difference might be another reason for the low relation between some of the tests of this study, in addition to the fact that they seem to measure different aspects. However, when it comes to measuring creativity from the environmental perspective no inventories exist, as far as we know, that are especially designed for testing children.

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Creative Types In the cluster analysis of different aspects of creativity and self-image, some different creativity types were discerned among the clusters. The seven clusters can be compressed into three larger groups owing to the creativity results – joining the groups of positive and negative self-images together. One group with low creativity results in general (two clusters) and one with especially high scores on the Creative Functioning Test (two clusters) and the last group with high creativity results on the Unusual Uses Test (three clusters). In the presentations of these groups, we try to outline some possible differences between these creative types. Most cluster groups had an equal number of boys and girls. However the two clusters of visionaries (below) had both a majority of one sex (one cluster with female dominance and one with male). As cluster analysis is an exploratory statistical tool, further hypothesis testing is needed to see how stable the clusters groups are with respect to both self-image and creativity. The Conformists There were two cluster groups of conformists with generally low creativity scores that were not especially imaginative or good at idea association. One group of 17 children reported being successful in school, having many friends but was below average when it came to mental stability. The other group of 10 children had generally negative self-image, especially about the physical appearances. However, these children reported having average psychological soundness. Visionaries There were two cluster groups of visionaries, that is, imaginative children that easily moved between subjective and objective aspects of reality. These children showed cognitive flexibility and fluency of ideas (CFT). Individuals that excell in CFT are sticking to their subjective themes in the test and perhaps in real life have an ability to trust their subjective ideas and to use them when solving problems in real life. We believe that these creative aspects are needed to be able to form imaginative pictures about the present and the future and therefore named these individuals “visionar-

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ies”. Eysenck (1995) used the concept of disinhibition for people who are creative. He meant that creative people do not inhibit, what most people would consider, irrelevant associations. They are influenced by a much larger number of subjective and objective thoughts compared to less creative individuals when engaged in a creative task. Disinhibition could be used to explain why some participants in the CFT can see for example, a person instead of the actual bottle in the decreasing series, that is after having seen the bottle properly. The ability of disinhibition may help these individuals return to subjective themes and to break free from the chains of reality. A visionary could probably also use this ability to be able to perceive less common perspectives on reality or the future. Non-creative individuals tend to consciously or unconsciously inhibit unusual thoughts and therefore have difficulties in looking at their lives from new angles. Compared to those participants that scored high on the unusual uses test (the brainstormers; see below), the CFT high-scorers might be less verbally fluent and perhaps more dependent on visual perception in their creative ability. The children in this group described themselves as having average skills and abilities. One cluster of 17 children, mostly boys, had a generally positive self-image (but only average on the skill and ability-scale). The other cluster contained 11 children with a majority of girls that reported negative self-image (but average on the skill and ability-scale). These children had also high scores on the Activity Questionnaire. They are thus often involved in creative activities. The Brainstormers The brainstormers are a collection of three small cluster groups, where all participants had an ability to quickly come up with a broad range of ideas and were engaged in creative activities and hobbies. Our idea about this group is that these creative aspects would be needed in brainstorming (associative idea generation). This creative aspect is connected to verbal fluency as it is a test where words are generated on a limited period of time, however there is no indication of a connection to language skill. A certain amount of disinhibition would probably be needed for this ability too (see the visionaries), but it would probably be under more control compared to

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the visionary creative aspect, as brainstorming often concerns a specific field of interest, for example, to come up with unusual uses for empty milk packages in fifteen minutes. These children had all high scores on both fluency and flexibility (UUT) and creative activities and hobbies (AQ). Concerning self-image these three clusters differed a great deal, they are in this respect divided into two opposite characters. One group of three children could be called “shining lights”. They reported the most positive self-images of all groups. They reported being successful in different school subjects and to easily get along with other children. They felt liked by teachers and their parents and were happy in general. They also were engaged in creative activities and hobbies to a large extent. The other two cluster groups could be called “lone wolves” as they reported negative relationships with both their parents and their peers and answered that they often felt lonely and different from others. They also described their physical self-image and mental well-being negatively. One of the groups consisted of five children who were especially negative about their learning abilities and skills. The other cluster of two children reported somewhat above average on learning abilities but was the group with the most negative self-image in the rest of the subscales. Furthermore, these two children were highly creative in the other two dimensions of creativity as well. These two children were thus both “visionaries” and “brainstormers”. Self-image of creative people In the self-image research, creative adult individuals seem to have more positive self-images in general, compared to the 10- and 11-year-old children in this study. We found just as many creative children with negative self-images as with positive ones even though earlier research often pinpoints self-confidence and trust in one’s own capability as creative characteristics. The question arises whether some of the creative children from the group with negative self-images will develop better self-images later in life. Will they recognize their special gift later in life and develop more positive self-images, when they have the possibility to lead more inde-

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pendent lives, away from regulated school life and parental restrictions? Or will they rather stop creating due to lack of self-confidence and due to lack of encouraging environments? Maybe it is simply possible to be creative and have a negative self-image. Longitudinal research is needed to study the self-image of creative individuals from a developmental perspective. Finally, there actually are a few creativity studies that have proposed different types of creative personalities (Ryhammar, 1996; Carlsson, Amner, & Smith, Chapter 13). Ryhammar (1996) for example maintained that there is one introvert and one extravert type of creative individual. These findings are more congruent with the present results. It is perhaps high time for a revision of the creativity models where only one creative personality is described. Gender differences in children’s creativity Of all the different measurements, there were only gender differences in the Activity Questionnaire. A possible alternative explanation for this difference might be that the kind of creative hobbies included in the questionnaire, is more common for girls. The questionnaire items concern solitary creative activities as writing stories or poems, making pictures or comics, making up games and creating one’s own toys. Boys are perhaps more engaged in group activities and sports at this age and there might be less room for individual creative activities. Social activities can also give opportunities for creativity but those are not detected in this questionnaire. On the other hand an earlier study that used this questionnaire did not show significant gender differences (Hoff, 2000). This makes the alternative explanation less credible. In the cluster analysis there was one group with female dominance and one with male. These groups had quite similar creativity profiles, but the girls’ pictures of themselves were negative and the boys’ positive.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Special thanks to the participating children and their teachers who have made this study possible. We also want to express our gratitude to Per Alm, Peter Jönsson and Birgitta Wanek, who have given us useful pieces

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of advice on the manuscript and to Gudmund Smith, who has co-judged the CFT-results.

REFERENCES Amabile, T. (1983). The social psychology of creativity. New York: Springer Verlag. Barron, F. (1963). Creativity and psychological health. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Barron, F. & Harrington, D. M. (1981). Creativity, intelligence and personality. Annual Review of Psychology, 32:439-476. Bird LaFrance, E. (1997). The gifted/dyslexic child: Characterizing and addressing strength and weaknesses. Annals of Dyslexia, 47:163-182. Byrnes, D. A. (1985). “Cipher” in the classroom The invisible child. Childhood Education, 62 (2):91-97 Carlsson, I., Wendt, P., & Risberg, J. (2000). On the neurobiology of creativity. Differences in frontal activity between high and low creative subjects. Neuropsychologia, 38:873-885. Cramond, B. (1994). Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and creativity – What is the connection?. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 28 (3):193210. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow. The psychology of optimal experiences. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. Eysenck, H. J. (1995). Creativity and personality. In: The creativity research handbook volume one, Ed.M. Runco. Cresskill (NJ): Hampton Press. Gallucci, N. T., Middleton, G., & Kline, A. (1999) The independence of creative potential and behavior disorders in gifted children. Gifted Child Quarterly, 43 (4):194-203. Guilford, J. P. (1967). The Nature of Human Intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. Götz, K. O., & Götz, K. (1979). Personality characteristics of professional artists. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 49:327-334. Hoff, E. V. (2000). En målares gåta - en berättelse som utgångspunkt för att studera kreativitet hos 10-åringar. (A painter’s mystery – a story as

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starting-point to study creativity in 10-year-old children) Nordisk psykologi, 52 (1):37-77. Hoff, E. V., & Carlsson I. M. (Submitted). Shining lights or lone wolves? Creativity and self-image in primary school children. Journal of Creative Behavior, 36:17-41. Lubart, T. I., Jacquet, A. Y., Pacteau, C., & Zenasni, F. (2000). Creativity in children’s drawings and links with flexible thinking. Abstracts of the XXVII international congress of psychology. International Journal of Psychology, 35 (3/4):178. Martindale, C. (1989) Personality, situation and creativity. In: Handbook of creativity, Eds. J. A.Glover , R.R Ronning, & C. R.Reynolds. New York and London: Plenum Press. Maslow, A. H. (1971) The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. New York: Penguin Books. Ouvinen-Birgerstam, P. (1999). Jag Tycker Jag Är (How I Think I Am). Stockholm: Psykologiförlaget. Parkhurst, H. B. (1999). Confusion, lack of consensus, and the definition of creativity as a construct. Journal of Creative Behavior, 33 (1):1-21. del Pilar Gonzalez Fontao, M. A. (1997). Academic performance in creative students. Psychological Reports, 80:1011-1017. Rejskind, G. F., Rapagna, S. O., & Gold, D. (1992). Gender differences in children’s divergent thinking. Creativity Research Journal, 5 (2):165-174. Richmond, B. O., & Norton, W. A. (1973) Creative production and developmental age in disadvantaged children. The Elementary School Journal: 279-284. Ryhammar, L. (1996). Kreativ Funktion, Percept-Genetisk Rekonstruktion och Organisatoriska Förutsättningar för Kreativ Verksamhet – En Studie av Högskolelärare. (Creative Function, Percept-Genetic Reconstruction and Conditions for Creativity in Organizations – A Study of University Teachers) Doctoral Dissertation, Lund: Lund University Press. Smith, G. J. W., & Carlsson, I. M. (2001). CFT. Creative Functioning Test. Lund: Department of psychology. Smith, G. J. W., & Carlsson, I. M. (1990). The creative process: A functional model based on empirical studies from early childhood to middle age. Psychological Issues, Monograph 57. Madison, Conn.: I U P Inc.

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Smith, G. J. W., & Fäldt, E. (2000). Self-description or projection: Comparison of two methods to estimate creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 12 (4):297-301. Smith, D. E., & Tegano, D. W. (1992). Relationship of scores on two personality measures: Creativity and self-image. Psychological Reports, 71:43-49. Sternberg, R. J., & Lubart, T. I. (1999). The concept of creativity: Prospects and paradigm. In: Handbook of Creativity, Ed. R. J. Sternberg. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Tegano, D. W., & Moran, J. D. (1989). Sex differences in the original thinking of preschool and elementary school children. Creativity Research Journal, 2:102-110. Torrance, E. P. (1965). Rewarding Creative Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Torrance, E. P. & Allioti, N. C. (1969). Sex differences in levels of performance and test-retest reliability on the Torrance tests of creative thinking. Journal of Creative Behavior, 3: 52-57. Westby, E. L., & Dawson, V. L. (1995). Creativity: Asset or burden in the classroom?. Creativity Research Journal, 8 (1):1-10. Workman, E. A., & Stillion, J. M. (1974). The relationship between creativity and ego development. The Journal of Psychology, 88:191-195. Yau, C. (1991). An essential interrelationship: Healthy self-esteem and productive creativity. Journal of Creative Behavior, 25 (2):154-161.

APPENDIX List of Categories for the Flexibility dimension of the Unusual Uses Test Object: Empty Milk Packages Recycling: folding or cleaning the packages Containers in general: box, package, jar, “to put things in”. Containers for special purposes: pencil-box, drawers for cooking recipes, mug, ash tray, piggy bank, jar for jam Toys: doll, animals, car, boat, aeroplane, robot Accessories for pets: bird pool, nesting box, feeding table for birds, hurdles for rabbits and hamsters, mouse house

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Experiments and inventions: With elaborated description of how the thing is put together or how it works. E g a weight-lifting tool where packages are filled with sand. Buildings: house, castle, fortress, tower, shop, parts of houses, tent and hut. Furniture and interior decoration: lantern, flower pot, lamp-shade, chair, basket, peep show (for toys), pool, stage “Artistic” decoration: Pictures, paintings, sculptures, Christmas and Eastern decorations Apparatuses: telephone, cell phone, binoculars, watch and periscope. Game or play: foot ball, badminton, throwing and catching the milk package Clothes or shoes: Plateau shoes (high-heeled shoes), hat Books and paper: Book cover, bookmark, letter-paper, drawing-paper and card. Circus performance: Do magic tricks with, balance Musical instruments: drums. Other (1 point each): Cut out recipes from the package, palette, ruler, name sign, wallet, road, pyramid, labyrinth

14. SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW, SOMETHING BORROWED, SOMETHING BLUE: MICROGENESIS IN THE 21st CENTURY Joseph Glicksohn Microgenesis refers to an unfolding of a cognitive process (e.g., perception, thinking) which occurs in developmental sequence. The microgenetic school of thinking has seen a renaissance in recent years, with researchers looking at a number of different aspects of visual perception, utilizing a microgenetic technique. An exploration of the microgenetic unfolding of cognition will inevitably lead to the study of a dedifferentiated, syncretic mode of cognition, wherein there is a fusion of thought, perception, feeling and imagination. Furthermore, both the microgenetic and the perceptgenetic research traditions are characterized by an organismicdevelopmental and holistic orientation to research and theory, wherein personality and thought, perception and feeling, and cognition and consciousness are all interrelated. In this chapter, I present a broad overview of these issues, assessing the present status of the field in relation to its past. Ponder the title of this chapter while reading this introductory section: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue. What is the relationship between the title of the chapter and its content? One usually announces at the outset what one intends to do, and then goes on to do it. The writing, as a finished product, entails a linear presentation. This volume, however, is concerned with what some authors might consider to be a nonlinear (and nonadditive) view of cognition — rather an unfolding of cognition. A more appropriate format might therefore be a hypertext, with its multiple linkages. As a compromise, given the necessity of adopting a linear exposition, I shall be referring to the elements of the title throughout the text, thus emulating somewhat the cognitive process under discussion.

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It is, indeed, something of a challenge to be able to convey to the reader of a verbal text some of the qualities of a cognitive process or of a subjective experience, not necessarily taking a linear and verbal form (Tolaas, 1986). This task, however, can be accomplished. Metaphoric and analogical thinking can be demonstrated by means of a text having a metaphoric form (Haskell, 1987). Gestalt phenomenology (e.g., Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1981) can be demonstrated by means of a textual exegesis, itself informed by a gestalt-interactionist approach (Glicksohn & Goodblatt, 1993). Meditative and other altered (or alternate) states of consciousness (e.g., Ludwig, 1966) can be conveyed to the reader by means of various cognitive-poetic techniques (Goodblatt & Glicksohn, 1989-90). So is the case regarding the microgenetic unfolding of a cognitive process and/or subjective experience, as the reader (hopefully) is continuing to follow my verbal ploy, that of pondering the title. Microgenesis refers to an unfolding of a cognitive process (e.g., perception, thinking) which occurs in developmental sequence (Werner, 1948). At each phase of microgenesis there is a corresponding level of cognitive organization (Arieti, 1962). Developmentally, one is progressing from a stage of global diffuseness to a state of “increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration” (Werner, 1957/1978, p. 109), in line with Werner’s orthogenetic principle of development and with the tenets of the organismic-developmental tradition in general (Wapner, 1964; Werner, 1948). Furthermore, one is progressing from a primary-process level to a secondary-process level of thought (Flavell & Draguns, 1957). In line with the orthogenetic principle, the reader might thus have a vague, amorphous notion of where the discussion might lead, based on the title. Dissecting the latter, "something old" obviously refers to a classic tradition in psychology, that of the microgenetic school of thinking (for an historical review, see Flavell & Draguns, 1957; for a more recent one, see Draguns, 1991). "Something new" might then be referring to some new developments and research in this and allied approaches (e.g., Hanlon, 1991; Hentschel, Smith & Draguns, 1986), or to developments in adjacent areas, which are more in the mainstream of cognitive psychology (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Greenwald, 1992). "Something borrowed" would be a bit more problematic, though could conceivably refer to the borrowing or

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employment of different methodologies in one's microgenetic research (e.g., Bachmann & Vipper, 1983; Carlsson, Wendt & Risberg, 2000). "Something blue", on the other hand, would be enigmatic. Having made such distinctions, that is to say, on achieving increasing differentiation, then the task would be to attempt to realize hierarchic integration. Perhaps the source of the saying would be helpful? After all, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue is a bridal attire rhyme (see http: //www.yzlee.com/wedold.htm; downloaded Feb. 26th, 2001), dating back to Victorian times: "Something old" refers to wearing something linking the bride to her nuclear family (e.g., a family heirloom); "something new" refers to the bride's new family life (thus, the need to buy something new); "something borrowed" refers to wearing some bridal item, previously worn at the ceremony by another happy bride (thus, bringing the new bride good luck); "something blue" represents purity. So, is the analogy being drawn to a bride (but, who is she?), or perhaps to a wedding (psychoanalysis and perceptgenesis?), or maybe to a marriage of convenience (between mainstream cognitive psychology and microgenesis?)?

THE MICROGENESIS OF COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS In order to know where you are going, you must know from where you have come. Some “modern” ideas are not quite so modern (Valsiner, 1996). The microgenetic school of thinking has seen a renaissance in recent years, with researchers looking at a number of different aspects of visual perception, utilizing a microgenetic technique (e.g., Bachmann, 1987; Nakatani, 1995; Reynolds, 1978; Schulz, 1991; Sekuler & Palmer, 1992; Uhlarik & Johnson, 1978). But in these research programs, there is an emphasis on a microgenetic procedure which is employed within the information-processing paradigm (Palmer & Kimchi, 1986), which is a dubious marriage (“something borrowed”). Now it is true that informationprocessing theorists view the microgenetic school as something of a founding parent (Haber, 1969, 1974). But, there is a clear distinction between the two: The information-processing conception is clearly mechanistic and

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atomistic (Leahey, 1992) and somewhat never-ending (cf. Neisser’s, 1976, p.17, processing — more-processing —even-more-processing caricature), while microgenesis is organismic and developmental in orientation (Werner, 1948). Furthermore, while a microgenetic approach has been enthusiastically adopted for the study of cognitive development (Kuhn, 1995; Siegler & Crowley, 1991), there is yet again a difference in orientation: The microgenetic approach is not only characterized by a high density of intrasubject observations taken during a period of transition, but also one with a process-oriented focus. In fact, there would seem to be a great divide between scholars immersed in the tradition and its sister school of Gestalt psychology (e.g., Smith, 1957) and those promoting similar ideas, without acknowledging historical forerunners (i.e., Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; see Glicksohn, 1995, for a rebuttal), or perhaps even worse, who relegate such schools to the level of the historical footnote (“something old”). While one cannot change mainstream thought in cognition, one can certainly pose a challenge. For example, one can question the notion of modularity (Fodor, 1983), which seems to be widely accepted. Given modularity, language can be studied separately from visual perception (Fodor, 1983), and emotion can be studied separately from cognition (Zajonc, 1980). But what happens when modularity breaks down, as BaronCohen, Harrison, Goldstein and Wyke (1993) have put it? What happens is that one gains an insight into more primitive phases of the microgenetic unfolding of cognition, a subject that will now be addressed. The earlier phases of microgenesis are known to be affect-laden (Kragh, 1955; Sander, 1930; Werner, 1948). They constitute a syncretic level of cognition and experience (Barten, 1983; Barten & Franklin, 1978), wherein there is a fusion of thought, perception, feeling and imagination (Glicksohn, Steinbach & Elimalach-Malmilyan, 1999). Recall that the microgenetic unfolding of a cognitive process and/or subjective experience is an experiential, process-oriented conception (cf. Brown, 1991, 1997; Smith & Westerlundh, 1980), and not a structural one. Its graphic depiction is one of a converging process (Smith, 1990, p. 190), of a restriction of focus (Galin, 1994; Spence & Holland, 1962), moving from intrapsychic reality to consensual reality (Kragh, 1955). Various analogies have been

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suggested for the process, a particular apt one being: “Developing a photographic print after the exposed photographic paper has been bathed into the developer” (Bachmann, 1998, p. 151). And as Brown (1998, p. 78) stresses, “Microgenetic theory entails that objects are recognized before they are consciously perceived, that objects are remembered into perception.” This is a far cry from standard information-processing views on the relationship between cognition and consciousness (Velmans, 1991; see Glicksohn, 1993b). And here’s another troubling thought: Modularity implies an additive-factor model (Sternberg, 1969) or ANOVA-like type of thinking (Valsiner, 1996) for information processing. But, if Gestalt psychology starts where information processing ends (Robertson, 1986, p. 182), while microgenesis (i.e., the breakdown of modularity) ends where information processing starts, then just how much theoretical worth can be wedged between the two? Recall that Werner (1948) had suggested, that less developed systems become subordinated to, and regulated by, more developed ones, but are never actually lost. Normally, these former "drafts" (to use the term suggested by Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992) are not readily accessible, unless the system is faced with a stressful situation, novel or difficult task (i.e., the microgenetic procedure). In this event, the system reverts to a more primitive mode of cognitive functioning, much as one sees in the reversion from an abstract to a concrete mode of thinking. Akin to this microgenetic theory is that of the nineteenth-century neurologist Hughlings Jackson (Taylor, 1958), who suggested that the neurocognitive manifestation of such a reversal would be the disinhibition (i.e., release) of more primitive brain functioning (e.g., that of the limbic system) due to cortical dysfunction. Both Jackson (Taylor, 1958) and Werner (1948) suggested that there are different levels of cognitive functioning (Werner, 1957/1978). But as Brown (1988) has argued, there are differences between microgenetic theory and Jacksonian concepts: A persistent release of a lower level would be construed as a regression to a more primitive mode of behavior (...) In contrast, the microgenetic idea is that preliminary stages are not released or disinhibited from above, but exhibit a form of cognition consistent with a certain level of derivation.... Early processing stages are transformed to later

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ones, but the early stages also persist, in some sense, in the structure of the ones that follow. The direction of processing is not one of control by higher centers over lower output levels but an emergent process from depth to surface. (pp. 7-8) One can also refer to an expansion of awareness, as the microgenetic process is inspected from within (Glicksohn, 2001), and perhaps thereby disrupted. This would constitute what others have termed a mindmanifesting, or psychedelic, experience, indicative of a shift to an altered (or alternate) state of consciousness (ASC) (e.g., Hunt, 1989a, 1989b). To quote Glicksohn (1998): As Hunt (1989b) has argued, altered-state cognition is readily there in the background, but is normally masked because (...) conditions favor a normal, characteristic mode of operation. However, by changing external conditions, or internal ones (...) the normal microgenetic sequence of the unfolding of perception becomes disrupted, and both perception and thought take on a more metaphoric-symbolic, dreamlike quality. I would argue that in these circumstances, perception and thought are dedifferentiated, or syncretic (...) Thus, the dreamlike quality of perception (Smith & Westerlundh, 1980), the cognitivesensory schematization of figurative language (Haskell, 1989) and the visuo-spatial, presentational form of thought (Hunt, 1989b) are all variations on a common, syncretic theme (Werner, 1948) (….) (p. ) How can one characterize the primitive phases of microgenesis, or what workers in the perceptgenetic variant term the P-phases (e.g., Kragh, 1955; Smith, 1990, 1999; Smith & Carlsson, 2000)? Following the fundamental Gestalt notion of Prägnanz, a radical change in external conditions (employment of a microgenetic procedure) will result in a qualitatively different form of perceptual experience. As stated by Koffka (1935), Prägnanz refers to the notion that "psychological organization will always be as 'good' as the prevailing conditions allow" (p. 110). Thus, what would normally be a preattentive phase of perceptual processing is made conscious, and "colours" perceptual experience. In fact, I can provide an example here, taken from some work carried quite out some time ago (Glicksohn, 1983). In that study, I employed the same microgenetic procedure as utilized by Kreitler and Kreitler (1984)

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(“something borrowed”). Briefly, each of a series of slides was projected 10 times in an increasing scale of exposure values (with presentation times ranging between 50 and 100 msec). The subject was required to report anything that he or she perceived, as fully as possible. Each of these subjects was randomly allocated to one of 6 experimental conditions, including concentrative meditation (with instructions adapted from Clark, 1972), relaxation (with instructions adapted from Benson, Kotch, Crassweller, & Greenwood, 1977) and perceptual overload (see Glicksohn, 1992, for procedural details). The microgenetic procedure therefore served the important goal of a means to elicit altered-state cognition (Glicksohn, 1993a, 1998) within the context of an ongoing, structured perceptual process. Thus, as opposed to studies wherein the perceptual response is in effect a judgment regarding the change in perception of some external object (e.g., Deikman, 1963/1972), here the change in perception could be noted without the subject himself or herself necessarily being aware of any such change — due to the ability to compare reports to the actual stimuli. Following is the report of one subject from the perceptual overload condition, with respect to an achromatic slide depicting a girl pouring liquid into a bottle. The numbers refer to the serial number (1-10 presentations) of the verbal report: 1. The picture is all dark, and at the side is a small square of light. 3. As if something black, something like a cupboard in the background. 5. A picture in the middle — a lot of things within. 6. In all of the white background — in the middle is some picture in light blue or something — a type of square. 7. We have a picture of a child — a picture in color of a child, wearing a striped shirt I think. You see him up to the level of ... the hands are holding the head. Straight hair, brown. 8. The same. A picture in colour of a child, with the head to the side, and he's holding something. Maybe he's drinking something. Similar types of report will be found in Smith and Carlsson (1987), for example. The interesting thing here is immediately evident, when it is noted that the slide presented was in black and white. In the subject's report, there is a continual reference to colour in the slide (“something blue”). It

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would seem that the psychedelic effect entailed by perceptual overload (Gottschalk, Haer, & Bates, 1972; Ludwig, 1972) extends to an enhancement of colour perception given no objective colour in the slide! An exploration of the microgenetic unfolding of cognition will inevitably lead to the study of a dedifferentiated, syncretic mode of cognition, wherein there is a fusion of thought, perception, feeling and imagination. Indeed, it can be argued that Werner (1948) was specifically concerned with what is now termed ASC phenomena (Barten & Franklin, 1978; Glicksohn, 1993a). That the microgenetic technique cannot possibly isolate perception from thought is not necessarily a liability. As Franklin (2000, p. 36) notes, “Werner and Kaplan ... argued that experience is not only cognitively ordered but given shape, realized, or fundamentally transformed through processes of symbolizing. Furthermore, the paradigmatic symbolic form or ‘vehicle’ is not ready made but is constructed from sensuous possibilities within a medium, simultaneously and interactively with the realization of meaning. I have termed this approach ‘radical interactionism.’” One can note a similar form of radical interactionism on considering the relationship between cognition and personality, within the microgenetic framework.

THE MICROGENESIS OF COGNITION AND PERSONALITY I would suggest that there are 3 different (and probably complementary) approaches to the study of personality and cognition, within a microgenetic framework. The more familiar one is that adopted by workers in the perceptgenetic tradition, beginning with the landmark research of Kragh (1955) and extending thereon over the past 50 years (Smith, 1990, 1999; Smith & Westerlundh, 1980). The basic proposition here is that the fusion of thought, perception, feeling and imagination underlying the P-phases of microgenesis is also indicative of the participant’s personality, brought into view (or, externalized) when viewing the procedure as being a projective one. The participant’s verbal report of what he or she currently perceives within the microgenetic sequence is therefore just as much an indication of perception as it is of personality. If you like, given the syncretic nature of

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the P phases, the Wittgensteinian distinction between “seeing” and “seeing as” (cf. Ricoeur, 1977) breaks down. Thus, a person’s defenses can be operationally defined in the verbal report, and a personality profile can thereby be constructed. It is perhaps an appropriate place to reflect on the validity of these verbal reports. Whether or not the verbal report is inherently unreliable (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Smith & Miller, 1978; White, 1980) depends on whether, by providing such a report, the subject is in fact altering his or her ongoing cognitive functioning. From the analysis provided by Ericsson and Simon (1980), and as implemented in protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1984), the dangers here in providing an online verbal report of a descriptive nature, as part and parcel of the microgenetic procedure, seem to be minimal. I should further note that cognitive psychologists having a Gestalt orientation will naturally propose such a research methodology, in which the subject provides a verbal report while engaged in an act of cognition (Wertheimer, 1959). Though this is particularly in line with other research techniques that are a part of Gestalt phenomenology (Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1981), "thinking aloud" is also advocated by the information-processing model of problem-solving proposed by Simon (Simon 1978; Ericsson & Simon, 1984), and in fact can serve as a bridge between the two paradigms (“something borrowed”). In addition to these issues, various other problems have been raised in the past with respect to these verbal reports. Arieti (1962, p. 462) notes: “When we talk of stages of thinking it is almost impossible to separate thinking from language, because it is almost exclusively through language or concepts expressed verbally that we acquire a ‘conceptual’ knowledge.” Similarly, Pollack and Chaplin (1962, p. 498) note that a methodological problem with experimental studies employing a microgenetic procedure is that most of these entail some form of verbal description: “The work of linguists such as Whorf suggests that the experimentalist must take note of the classifying and organizing properties of his S’s linguistic code .... It has been argued that the ready made classifications of the language in use determine (in part) as well as direct, perceptual responses. Our own linguistic code would tend, therefore, to bias responses in favor of organized

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wholes by virtue of forcing the Ss to identify the vague stimulus-pattern as a member of some class of objects.” Of course, one rebuttal of these arguments would be to suggest that individual differences in verbal report of ongoing subjective experience should be expected, as personality and cognition are necessarily entwined. Another would be to suggest employing different modalities to capture the subjective experience, or to re-represent or exteriorize the representation (Glicksohn, 1994; Siegel, 1981). Thus, in discussing the perceptgenetic technique, Smith (1990, p. 191), for example, stresses that “the subjects are asked to make schematic drawings after each presentation and to add verbal descriptions.” A second approach to the study of the personality-cognition interface, itself having a distinguished line of research over the past 50 years, is that concerned with the notion of cognitive style. Smith (1990) himself draws the historical parallel between perceptgenesis and cognitive style: Many psychologists of the fifties looked forward to the day when the soft field of personality could be fruitfully combined with the hard methods of experimental psychology to create a new science of perception-personality. Although these people might have been somewhat naive and unrealistic, the merger might have actually been possible if it was not for the resistance of psycho-phobic hardliners who did not like personality research and wanted to direct the students’ attention elsewhere. (p. 181) Just as microgenetic techniques have evolved over the years, from tachistoscopic presentation (Kragh, 1955) to computerized variants (Smith & Carlsson, 2000), so too has the assessment of cognitive style. In my lab, we have developed both a computerized version of Witkin's Embedded Figures Task (EFT), matching the figures of the original EFT (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971) in colour, shape and orientation, and a computerized version of Witkin's Rod and Frame Task (RFT). In the latter, the subject views a luminous line appearing within a luminous outlineframe on the screen (white on black background). The line is misaligned from the vertical, as is the frame, and the subject's task is to align the line with true vertical, irrespective of the orientation of the frame. This is accomplished by placing the cursor at the end of the line (using the mouse),

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clicking and dragging to the estimated vertical. This version of the RFT was modeled on a number of studies in the literature (e.g., Goodenough, Oltman, & Cox, 1987; Marendaz, Brenet, Ohlmann & Raphel, 1988). Note that computerized versions of the tests add performance measures of a nature familiar to the cognitive psychologist, thereby lending to a better understanding of individual differences in the personality-cognition interface (“something new”). That there should be an intrinsic relationship between the cognitive style of field dependence-independence (FDI) and microgenesis is a point made by Draguns (1991): In fact, close parallels are discernible between the characteristics of field dependent persons as described by Witkin et al. and the global and undifferentiated mode of responding attributed to the holistic type by Sander (...) As far as the detail-oriented or, possibly, the fieldindependent person is concerned, his features, as expressed in the course of microgenesis, were not discovered until somewhat later, when the integrative type was described (...) These persons are capable of fitting components into supraordinate stimuli and, conversely, can extract details from complex wholes. (p. 289) Earlier (Draguns, 1984), he nevertheless notes his reservations: Recent microgenetic research (...) highlights the difficulty of eliciting diffuse whole responses at the beginning of microgenesis, even by the classical techniques of tachistoscopically presenting the complete stimulus. Individual differences come into play, perhaps akin to the cognitive style of field dependence-field independence, although empirical attempts to link established measures of this variable with characteristic modes of microgenetic progression have, so far, failed to yield conclusive results .... Apart from such enduring stylistic and other personality variables, situationally determined sets, explicitly communicated through experimental instructions or implicitly assumed by the subject, undoubtedly come into play (...) Extricating these three strands of stimulus, person, and task characteristics as they steer the course of microgenesis toward the apprehension of the whole or the accumulation of detail remains an important task for future microgenetic research. (p. 6)

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In any event, in the next few years we shall be looking in earnest at the relationship between FDI and microgenesis. It is specially important to look at individual differences not only by means of paper-and-pencil tests, but also by using laboratory tasks. The third approach, which is currently being looked at in my own lab, is drawn from the following analogy: If you want to identify an extravert, then you can either use a questionnaire (e.g., Glicksohn & Abulafia, 1998), or else observe the person in action in a party situation; the extravert will be the one enjoying himself in a circle of people, while the introvert will most probably be the person sitting alone, in the corner. Thus, why not look at individual differences within the microgenetic experiment itself (“something new”). We are currently looking at the trait of impulsivity (e.g., Barratt, 1993). How would an impulsive subject perform in a microgenetic study? Take for example the Creative Functioning Test (CFT; Smith & Carlsson, 2000), looking at the forward series (i.e., standard microgenetic series of presentations). The impulsive subject will, by definition, make speedy judgments. He or she might very well lock on to a particular referent early on in the series, as a result of a hasty judgment process (“quick, what is it?”), resulting in premature perceptual closure. As such, the described percept might very well be “primitive” in the Wernerian sense. Alternatively, the impulsive subject might very well be inconsistent in report, shifting from one referent to another, with no apparent, lawful microgenetic unfolding of one referent to another. Both alternatives would be easily detected, in a number of ways: (1) in the sequential analysis of the content of the verbal reports; (2) in the length of the reports; (3) in the time taken to make the report (i.e., between end of presentation till start of report); (4) in the relation of hypothesized to actual target. We are currently investigating this promising avenue of research.

WHITHER THE FUTURE? In comparison with the study of field dependence-independence, which was once characterized (quite unfairly, to my mind) as a method with no

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theory (Zigler, 1963), microgenesis is a theory with a multitude of methods (Draguns, 1991; Smith & Westerlundh, 1980). Indeed there is an excellent match between theory and method (Draguns, 1984; Smith, 1990). But such a marriage is not one without problems. As Flavell and Draguns (1957) summarized a long time ago: (...) the abstractness, looseness of logical structure, and general semantic imprecision which characterizes (...) microgenetic theory may be in part responsible for the ease with which it seems to subsume so many diverse cognitive phenomena (...) Likewise, at the data level, it must be apparent that the findings on the basis of which microgenetic hypotheses have been constructed are by no means gilt-edged (...) Similarly, there is no absolute proof that the sequence of percepts found when the tachistoscopic method is used is a faithful reflection of the natural process of percept development. (p. 212) And as Draguns (1984) has stated more recently, The second argument has given rise to a variety of thought-provoking formulations (...) pointing to similarities and parallels between the productions of schizophrenics, aphasics, and other functionally or organically incapacitated groups on the one hand and the responses during microgenesis by psychiatrically unimpaired and normal people on the other. But similarity is often in the eye of the beholder and is, in any case, something other than identity. ( p. 13) Yes, there are issues to be resolved. But as I have tried to show, one can strive for both theoretical and research-oriented integration, by balancing the old with the new, with the borrowed and (if your experimental set-up is conducive) with the blue. To paraphrase Messick (1994, p. 133), those researchers who study cognition apart from personality do so at their own risk. The microgenetic and perceptgenetic research traditions are characterized by an organismic-developmental and holistic orientation to research and theory, wherein personality and thought, perception and feeling, and cognition and consciousness are all interrelated, as they should be. Adherence to such an orientation can both comfort and console those of us who have been looking with dismay at the way the discipline around us has been developing (or regressing) over the past 30 years.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Chanita Goodblatt for her constructive comments. Correspondence should be addressed to Joseph Glicksohn, Department of Criminology, and The Leslie and Susan Gonda (Goldschmied) Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52100, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]

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Reynolds, R. I. (1978), The microgenetic development of the Ponzo and Zöllner illusions. Percept. Psychophys., 23: 231-236. Ricoeur, P. (1977), The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Robertson, L. C. (1986), From Gestalt to Neo-Gestalt. In: Approaches to Cognition: Contrasts and Controversies, eds. T. J. Knapp & L. C. Robertson. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 159-188. Sander, F. (1930), Structure, totality of experience, and gestalt. In: Psychologies of 1930, ed. C. Murchison. Worcester, Mass: Clark University Press, pp. 188-204. Schulz, T. (1991), A microgenetic study of the Müller-Lyer illusion. Perception, 20: 501-512. Sekuler, A. B., & Palmer, S. E. (1992), Perception of partly occluded objects: A microgenetic analysis. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen., 121: 95-111. Siegel, A. W. (1981), The externalization of cognitive maps by children and adults: In search of ways to ask better questions. In: Spatial Representation and Behavior Across the Life Span: Theory and Application, eds. L. S. Liben, A. H. Patterson & N. Newcombe. New York: Academic Press, pp. 167-194. Siegler, R. S., & Crowley, K. (1991), The microgenetic method: A direct means for studying cognitive development. Am. Psychol., 46: 606-620. Simon, H. (1978). Information-processing theory of human problem solving. In: Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Processes, Vol. 5, ed. W. K. Estes. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 271-298. Smith, E. R., & Miller, F. D. (1978), Limits in perception of cognitive processes: A reply to Nisbett and Wilson. Psychol. Rev., 85: 355-362. Smith, G. (1957), Visual perception: An event over time. Psychol. Rev., 64: 306-313. Smith, G. (1990). Measuring personality as process. In: Personality Psychology in Europe, Vol. 3, eds. G. L. Van Heck, S. E. Hampson, J. Reykowski & J. Zakrzewski. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, pp. 181-201. Smith, G. (1999), Perceptgenesis. In: Encyclopedia of Creativity, Vol. 2, eds. M. A. Runco & S. R. Pritzker (Eds.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press, pp. 347-354.

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Smith, G., & Carlsson, I. (1987), A new creativity test. J. Creat. Behav., 21: 7-14. Smith, G., & Carlsson, I. (2000), CFT: The Creative Functioning Test Manual. Lund: Lund University. Smith, G., & Westerlundh, B. (1980), Perceptgenesis: A process perspective on perception-personality. Rev. Person. Soc. Psychol., 1: 94-124. Spence, D. P., & Holland, B. (1962), The restricting effects of awareness: A paradox and an explanation. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol., 64: 163-174. Sternberg, S. (1969), On the discovery of processing stages: Some extensions of Donders' method. Acta Psychol., 30: 276-315. Taylor, J. (Ed.). (1958), Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson (Vol. 2). London: Staples. Tolaas, J. (1986). Transformatory framework: Pictorial to verbal. In: Handbook of States of Consciousness, eds. B. B. Wolman & M. Ullman. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 31-67. Uhlarik, J., & Johnson, R. (1978), Development of form perception in repeated brief exposures to visual stimuli. In: Perception and Experience, eds. R. D. Walk & H. L. Pick, Jr. New York: Plenum, pp. 347-360. Valsiner, J. (1996), Development, methodology and recurrence of unsolved problems: On the modernity of ''old'' ideas. Swiss J. Psychol., 55: 119-125. Velmans, M. (1991), Is human information processing conscious? Behav. Brain Sci., 14: 651-668. Wapner, S. (1964), An organismic-developmental approach to the study of perceptual and other cognitive operations. In: Cognition: Theory, Research, Promise, ed. C. Scheerer. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 6-44. Werner, H. (1948), Comparative Psychology of Mental Development. New York: International Universities Press. Werner, H. (1978), The concept of development from a comparative and organismic point of view. In: Developmental Processes: Heinz Werner's Selected Writings, Vol. 1, eds. S. S. Barten & M. B. Franklin. New York: International Universities Press, pp. 107-130. (Originally published in 1957) Wertheimer, M. (1959), Productive Thinking (Enlarged Edition, Ed. M. Wertheimer). New York: Harper & Brothers.

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15. ACTUALIZATION AND CAUSALITY Jason Brown This paper describes an approach to character and authenticity from the standpoint of microgenetic theory. Feeling and cognition actualize through a process that originates in archaic brain formations and develops outward through layered fields of object-formation, finally to the perception of images in the world. Value is a mode of conceptual feeling that depends on the dominant phase in this transition, which is a continuous sheet of mentation from self to world. Desire is value in the intrapsychic portion, interest is partly external and object worth is the exteriorization of value as it deposits with (into) objects. The focus is on a subjective account of value, moral feeling and the nature of authenticity. I writhe in doubt over every line. I ask myself - is it right? - is it true? - do I feel it so? - do I express all my feeling? And I ask it at every sentence - I perspire in incertitude over every word. ( Joseph Conrad)

Cognitivism is but one expression of a mode of thought that over the latter half of this past century has had a profound impact on contemporary life (Brown, 2001). The assumption of timeless, repeatable or self-identical objects – exemplified by the concept of “representations” – has had a powerful influence on the way we think about the significance of intrinsic relationality and the subjectivity of mental states. What is the nature of a thing that makes it what it is, or what is the quality of difference that is decisive for the individuation of things that are ostensibly identical? We see this influence in the tension in Western culture between a relative homogeneity of thought and a striking diversity of lifestyle, as if tattoos and nose-rings could authenticate an individuality that has been threatened with absorption and loss. We see it in the triumph of immediate pleasure over sustained engagement, or in the cult of celebrities who blend into a din of uniformity, with exaggerated importance given to the superficial marks of distinctiveness. We see it, too, in aesthetics, in the debate as to what counts as an artwork, or the boundaries that divide Real Art from popular or commercial art, or found art. The emphasis on the formal properties of an artwork sac-

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rifices the latent (if any) content of the work to the drama of a momentary impression. Or, the artwork is a melange of elements that does not exist aesthetically unless it is vetted and disambiguated by experts. The puzzled observer may be asked to contribute more to the interpretation of the work than the artist, who may profess to not having any idea as to what the work is about, its meaning or reference, and claim that it is an expression of feeling, even if he is oblivious to what feeling is being expressed. In such instances, even the “feeling” of the artwork has an external or objective character. The problem of identity also appears in the distinction between a copy and an original, or in the comparison of autographic and allographic art. In an age of cloning, when human embryos can be implanted in the uterus of a cow and grandmothers can deliver the babies of their sons and daughters, we wonder what, after all, is a mother. Just as there is a rethinking of what it means to be an artwork, we ask, what does it mean to be a person. The question spills into the debates on human rights, and the rights of animals, fetuses, the aged and the ill. What does it mean to be human? Where does humanity begin, where does it end? The nature of identity bedevils neuroscience and philosophy of mind. The so-called “identity theory” reduces mind to brain by finessing the mind, discarding what is essential to personality. We have disputes over zombies and humans, computers and brains, silicon chips and carbon molecules, which for many are debates over whether consciousness and qualia are to be given privileged status in the description of mental states. These examples of uncertainty as to what a thing is, apart from its appearance and external relations, arise from the fact that objects have been drained of their intrinsic quality, their history and context. A person, an artwork, is stripped of temporality in order to isolate it as a scientific object, that is, as an objective fact. Diverse entities are conflated on the basis of similar content or output. For example, two minds having the same momentary propositional content are said to be in identical states. Or, equally incomprehensible to me, it is claimed that different mental states can accompany the same physical state (Burge, 1993). The result is an indifference to what is unique or telling about the mind/brain state: namely, the potential behind the semblance of surface form and its transition to actual-

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ity. In the field of value, this translates to the centrality of character in relation to its expression in conduct. This lost background, the real existence and the historical individuality of the object, tends to be lost in the enchantment with the external relations of an artificially isolated object, its causal role and evanescent contacts. At the same time that analytic and computational philosophy and molecular biology have led to the conceptualization of man as a repertoire of mental contents and outward behaviors, deconstructionism has had the reverse effect, diluting the autonomy of objects by nesting them in context. Objects are, finally, replaced, or defined not by their intrinsic quality, but by their contextual surround. The object itself is not conceived as relational, but rather as something embedded in a matrix of relations, still a substantive dependent on the relations around it, a point of view, an opinion. The result is that an object or a person is either a causal implementation of a set of natural or formal rules, or a virtual construction of a manifold of perspectives. On the one hand, individuals are products that can be replicated like carburetors with no value other than their utility; on the other, the individual is what others take him to be, the sum of his acts and the impressions they provoke. The upshot is that the importance and the reality of the internal relations of an object are ignored, eliminated or displaced, thus annihilating the very process that is, ultimately, the existence and reality of the object. For science, the real is what can be measured. For contextualism, the real is perspectival. We are even getting used to the idea that belief in the real is naïve and outmoded, or that there are equivalent levels or perspectives, each of which is objectively real. Causal theory saps purpose from behavior and displaces signification from individuals to actions in the world. Perspectival theory turns the self into an image for others. We are left with a nexus of causal relations or a phantom that eludes description. And we ask, still, what is an individual? All of these trends impact on the concept of the self and the nature of value and moral responsibility. The disinterest in the interior or temporal dynamic of objects and mental states has as its main symptom the loss of self. The search for the true self is, as it was for romantic idealism beginning with Fichte, the anxiety of our times. The frantic nature of this search

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is a reflection of the depth of the loss, which is also a loss of personal meaning in everyday life, a death of subjectivity, and an impoverished concept of man, one that is reinforced by a science that elevates objectivity to a kind of religious faith. For its adherents we are the products of mental software or the encodings of a fixed genome. An algorithm translates a program or genetic script to a behavioral phenotype. Individuality is the collection of entities in a functional system or network. Operations on representations in this system are conceived as actions on solid entities in the mind. The entire system is supported by a metaphysic of objects (or selves) as aggregates, with a regress to atomic units that, in the case of minds, are viewed as conceptual primitives assembled by rules into complex structures. Hartshorne (1987) noted the contrast of a Western metaphysic of atomic entities and the individualism of selves that are identical over their existence with a Buddhist metaphysic of incessant change. The result is that entities, including minds and mental objects, are little more than links in a causal chain, the effects of prior causes or the causes of future effects. What they are in and for themselves is left unanswered. The byproduct of this “progress” is a crisis of the spirit that I see as a longing for a sense of the quality and uniqueness of each individual human mind. This uniqueness is the inner soul-life of the individual, intrinsic feeling, value and satisfaction, not only for the self but for others, and for all the objects of nature. Objectivity is a disease of excessive rationality. The cure would be a psychology, not of surface contacts, but of subjectivity and interioricity, not only for the human mind, but for non-cognitive entities as well. I am not advocating a return to animism, rather, a process monism that aligns the patterns elaborating the human mind with those underlying the objects of nature [Brown, 1996]. Process monism is an antidote to the uncoupling of mind and brain, and the pluralities of current psychology. It is also a way of thinking that redirects speculation on physical and psychic causation to potentiality and actuality, a shift from causes to constraints, from outcomes to histories, from prediction to retrospection, from publicity to privacy, and from fact to feeling. This fundamental shift in thinking is essential for a theory of intrinsic value, and the redemption of authenticity as the signal mark of character.

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CAUSALITY AND ACTUALIZATION Causation is a theory that governs object interaction. Cognitive psychology seeks to be scientific, and thus postulates interaction among logical solids in the mind, or in the brain. The concept of mental representations as stable entities acted on by processes is central to this postulate. It motivates the demarcations of mental objects and the methodology that reinforces these demarcations. Cognitivists look for the relations between representations and assume that lesions are interruptions between representations, the socalled dissociability hypothesis, or the encapsulation of modular theory. Since the interactions between representations are studied independent of their physical substrates, the theory assumes psychic causation (on or between representations), with physical causation dragged in secondarily. The assumption in cognitive psychology of psychic causation from one mental object to another, e.g. the inputs and outputs of components in flow diagrams, supposes physical causation. Philosophers tend to have more confidence in the causal efficacy of neural properties than in the efficacy of intentional or other psychic properties, but if the mental is eliminated, identified with or reduced to the physical, as is generally assumed, psychic causation is non-problematic; it is identical with physical causation. If, on the other hand, the mental is caused by the physical or is distinct from the physical, it tends to be treated as an epiphenomenal dangler. Dewey wrote that the source of the duality of mind and body was the shift to explanations based on causality from those of potential and actuality. In process theory, the mind/brain state is a single complex object. Representations or symptoms are the fleeting actualities of process, not mental things that interact. Mental contents are finalities that “contain” their momentary histories, not causal objects that project on future effects. The continuum from potential to actual within a single mind/brain state is the direction of its internal relatedness. Change involves relations constituting the object, not its interaction with other objects. The c and e of causal theory are not demarcated in relational theory. Further, a causal transaction occurs over time – the time to go from c to e – while an actualization creates a whole unit of the object’s temporal existence. There is no chain of cause and effect, but a continuous wave-like

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transition. Mental events or contents in the mental state deposit and are replaced, they do not cause other events to occur. Objects are reinstated by change, in a transition from potential to actual that recurs. Whitehead’s metaphysic is constructed on this basis. The replaced state is the ground (?cause) over which the replacing state is deposited (?effect). Each state unfolds over the immediately preceding one. Is the replacement causal if the constraints of the just-prior state delimit the immediately ensuing one? Are constraints causes? Hume was uncertain. Does a chair or a particle cause itself to recur each moment? The causal persistence of objects has been largely ignored, since objects are considered to be self-identical over time. Russell [1948] noted this fact, and made a distinction between causal persistence and causal interaction. He wrote, “Owing to the fact that the persistence of things is taken for granted and regarded as involving identity of substance, this form of causation has not been recognized as what it is.” In the relational change of process theory, all change is a kind of “object persistence,” i.e. the outcome of constraints on the iterated specification of novel form. In contrast, the mental objects of cognitive psychology change by way of an interaction that conforms to the model of ordinary “billiardball” causation. A transition from potential to actual traverses subjective phases in the process leading to a perceptual object and its infrastructure in the personality. The variety of methods that have been used to probe this hidden undersurface demonstrate that the experiential content of a perceptual object is, in the ordinary sense, pre-perceptual. That is, the feeling, meaning and recognition of an object are not attached to things out there in the world after they are perceived, in a second-pass process that follows perception, but are phases ingredient in the same process through which the perception occurs. To most psychologists, this statement would appear so radical and wrong-headed as to be hardly worth refuting. Moreover, the approach undermines the realism, consensual validation and objectivity of a descriptive science of the mind. It is much simpler to interpret the “psychic contribution” to object perception as an addition to physical nature. Yet the traditional model of objects as assemblies of sensory bits linked to feeling and meaning, associated to memories for recognition and interpretation and

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then projected back into the world where we see them, though at first blush appealing to common sense, is so implausible that one is mystified by its universal acceptance. What is more astonishing is the prevailing indifference to anatomical and psychological evidence that runs counter to what has been standard theory for over a century. This evidence not only includes percept-genetic and subliminal perception research [Smith, 2001], but cytoarchitectonic findings, blindsight, masking, priming, some studies on commissurotomy cases, gestalt psychology and clinical work on microgenesis. That these studies have had a limited impact on theory and experimentation in psychology reflects the latter’s intolerance of alternative modes of explanation and the hegemonic influence of mass presuppositions in the search for scientific truth.

POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL These studies indicate a transition in the process of perception from a phase of potential to a final actuality. What more precisely is meant by these terms? Actualities are the concrete particulars that populate consciousness and the perceptual field. Everything we are aware of is already a particular, even those concepts that are vague and still-forming in our consciousness. A mood, a feeling, an inclination, are perhaps not yet particulars, but once the content is settled, even if it is unresolved, its actualization is complete. With full consciousness of, say, a disposition, the vagueness of the content points to an incompletely realized object. The potential behind this object has not fully individuated, but the fact that one is conscious of the object indicates that other domains of cognition, linguistic or perceptual, have fully specified as conveyers of that conscious state. A disparity between a fully articulated perception that generates an object world and an incompletely specified mental content is necessary for one to have awareness of the unspecified content. If that content represents or is coherent with the terminus of the entire state, there is an indefinite content but not consciousness of the indefiniteness, as in sleep, dream, psychosis and other altered states. An actuality is but one of many possible realizations of an antecedent potential. The actuality is also but one among innumerable other actualities

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that articulate the same perception. Even though it actualizes an object space, a potential can give rise to other worlds that never actualize or are never conceived, for lack of “imagination” or an absence of external constraints. Yet a potentiality does not have the potential to become anything one can conceive of, even if every conception is itself an actuality, for all possible actualities are not latent in every potential. The human mind does not have the potential to become the mind of a dog, and a given human mind can only become what character and personality permit. From the earliest stages of life, endowment and experience limit opportunity. I may think of killing someone or composing a quartet, but having those conceptions is not enough to realize the state they refer to. Whether or not there is a potential murderer lurking inside me, there is certainly no Beethoven. A potential is the immediate past of a particular that, once actualized, becomes a past actuality. I do not believe that a prior actuality constitutes a portion of the potential for an ensuing actualization, though the prior actualization – the entire process from potential to actual – serves as a ground or constraint for the next one. Actualities perish forever; they do not reappear hidden in another potential. Put differently, the actuality perishes and is not absorbed as, say, an eternal object, for the next round of actualization. The only past that matters causally is that of the just-prior state. This does not mean each state is restricted to the content of the just-prior state plus novelty in its change. The potential in the just prior state can call up other categories for actualization, whether freely created or invented, say, through metaphoric extension, or categories of knowledge or memories of distant events that are evoked by their relation to deeper unconscious constructs in the state. Nor is the “deep structure” of a potential emptied in a multiplicity of actualities, even if the routes of renewed actualization become habitual. Actualities are what they are not by virtue of having depleted their potential, nor are they unconscious copies in miniature. They arise through the shaping effects of constraints on their own actualization. The constraints are provided by intrinsic patterns of derivation, i.e. sculpting effects on endogenous process, along with the effects on this process of sensory information coming from a world in constant change. The point is, actualities are not resultants or ingredients, but segments that objectify a continuum of becoming, which extends from a core of po-

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tential to the objects of reality. We describe actualities at the expense of their becoming, even as they perish in our description, and we describe potential as what is left over after what can be specified is exhausted, but potential, because it is devoid of content, is more difficult to grasp. Potential cannot be described in terms of the definiteness that is its aim, nor the indefiniteness that is its warrant, yet because there are limits on what issues from a potential, it is neither homogeneous nor undifferentiated.

WHAT IS POTENTIAL? Consider the problem of potentiality from the standpoint of the arousal of a word or object in the mind. There is great difficulty in describing the meaning of a word prior to the attainment of a phonological shape, or in describing an object-concept prior to its individuation as an image in the mind or an object in the world. A word is specified out of a background field. What is the nature of the meaning of a word, say “chair”, before the word is conscious, that is, before the phonological structure of the word is available to specify its antecedent meaning? What is the nature of an object concept before it objectifies in a perception? Theories based on computer analogies hold that copies of the object or word are stored in memory and retrieved to consciousness. Such theories assume that the word is a compound of elements, and itself is an element in a network of related words and objects, all copies of whatever surfaces into awareness. The theory is easy to work with, because it treats the fundamental units of thought as atomic units that are identical in conscious and unconscious mentation. The shift from unconscious to conscious thought involves a re-assembly or a reconstitution of self-identical elements. These elements survive as individuals, or they are combined into representations. In psychoanalytic theory, perceptual traces are presumed to be identical to memory images. An unconscious idea or “drive-representation” is not altered in its journey to consciousness. The difference between conscious and unconscious cognition owes to drive-based mechanisms such as displacement, sublimation or repression. In my opinion, the final word or object is deposited through a qualitative transformation from depth to surface. In this transform, the anticipatory

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lexical- or object-concept is not identical to the final word or object. The pre-object fails to achieve the same degree of referential or denotational specificity. It arises out of syncretic, magical and metaphorical thought, and develops toward referential adequacy. We can infer the occurrence of preliminary or “pre-processing” phases of magical thinking from a variety of sources. However, if we examine the lexical or perceptual meaning that comes up just prior to the realization of the word or object “chair”, we find that this meaning includes other possible derivations, say other pieces of furniture, or experientially-related objects that are called up in the act of perceiving. The preliminary meaning casts a wider semantic or conceptual net. How, then, is the meaning of a pre-object to be characterized? What language can be used to describe this meaning other than by way of its phonological or perceptual features, even if, at the phase of the pre-lexical or pre-object concept, these features are not yet available? We know that antecedent configurations occur because they deposit prematurely as the symptoms of brain damage. Once the final object materializes – whatever it is, a symptom-fragment, a normal or pathological mental content or behavior – we are more or less conscious of its meaning. The objectification specifies this meaning. Without this specification, we have an object-category or an experiential field of meaning-relations without a final object. The anticipatory category or field, which in ordinary cognition is an earlier phase in the specification process, would then, even in its diffusion or overlap of categories, be the actuality that deposits. If the object category is close to the object, what is prior to the object category? What is prior to that? At least with the object or lexical category we have some idea of what the meaning is. The meaning is whatever is virtual or possible in that category once it has been delimited from still wider fields of antecedent meaning. The concept of potential refers to this fuzzy background out of which all particulars individuate. Phases in individuation can be identified by reconstructing the sequence and pattern of actualization from its pathological moments. These buried phases are not the deep representations on which operations are presumed to act. Rather, they are normally transformed to a subsequent phase. They are transitions, not states, unless they deposit as the symptoms of pathology, at which moment they become actualities.

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There are no actual representations. Symptoms (“representations”) are not elements ingredient in the final object, but fleeting signposts that indicate the direction and the pattern of the phase-transition through which the final object has passed. What deposits are eddies in a stream, mental froth, brief existents that never again recur. If the actualization is a continuous wave, as I believe it to be, an infinitude of possible “representations”, i.e. symptoms, could actualize. The nature of those “representations” would depend on the moment in the becoming that incurs the major impact of the pathology, as well as the constraints that are applied to the process over the spectrum of its change, and especially at the precise moment of pathological disruption (Brown & Pachalska 2003). The background of any particular is not to be conceived as a field from which one element is selected. The field is prior to the element, and the element does not exist until it individuates or specifies the field. The relation of figure to field is not that of a portion to a larger ground. The figure individuates the field as it resolves. In the transition from potential to actual, the past is imported to the present and made real. A central feature of the process is the re-enactment of the past as it delivers objects into the present. Every object is grounded in the actual present, which it deposits, and the immediate past, which it inherits. If the transition from potential to actual were viewed as an outcome of operations on multiple representations, the outcome would be the final construction of its antecedents, deprived of pastness, conceptuality, feeling and belongingness. This immediate legacy of potential is what makes an object authentic. The path that leads from potential to actual is not a trail of abandoned stages. The entire trajectory is ingredient in the final object as the experiential memory and conceptual feeling out of which the object materializes. The process of fact-creation from felt-meaning is the source of value, in the artist or the individual, in an artwork or in conduct. This is an agenda for a legitimate psychology of the future, one that is sensitive to the complexity and the dynamic of evolutionary brain process, and can provide an account of the temporal structure of inner and outer objects, conceptual feeling, value and the iterated becoming of the human mind.

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THE TRANSITION FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTUAL The object in perception, as well as the final action, utterance and idea, are endpoints of a phase-transition that “contains” all of the potential “choices” and their resolutions en route to that endpoint. The persistence of preliminary phases in the final object owes to the temporal unity of the traversal. By this I mean that antecedent phases in an act of cognition are not historical events in relation to occurrent ones, but are imminent in the present content. This “presentness” of the immediate past in the final actuality gives the richness of experience, the meaning and feeling to passing events at each moment. The final object in a transition of phases does not just survive a sequence of alternative paths to become what it is: at each phase, a pre-object configuration moves closer to possibility. The transition from potential to actual is continuous. Every phase except the final one, and perhaps even that, has a potential for another transformation. In this process, drive-based conceptual primitives distribute into conceptual feelings – affects, object-concepts and meaning content – which then deliver the images, acts and words of conscious experience as the process actualizes into object form, motility and lexical morphology. Acts and percepts consist of this complex layering. Sensation limits the object-development to produce a conceptual model of the physical world. Actions lack the external constraints of sensation, and therefore depend inter alia on perceptual monitoring by recurrent collaterals and configural biases at each phase to drive the action forward. These biases determine the distribution of the action in the axial and distal musculature, whether conduct will be restrained or impulsive, emotive or rational, selfish or compassionate, pragmatic or reflective. Every perception, every thought and action incorporates the world of its occasion. The individual creates an object world for his enjoyment, as the outer world of sensation and the inner world of habit limit what actions and objects are to be enjoyed. It may seem odd to say that perception is creative, in view of its repetition and stability. After all, we perceive “what is out there.” A person might vividly imagine that he is living on Mars, but unless he is psychotic or hallucinating he perceives the Earth as it is. Yet imagination is the foundation out of which the perception of “reality” develops. Within every perception there

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is a buried system of dreamwork and magical and paralogical modes of thought.

CHARACTER AND VALUE We perceive a world that seems indifferent to our perceptions. But the outer world of perception, like the inner world of imagination, is an endogenous, intrinsic creation. The individual creates the world he perceives. Thus, every person has some responsibility for the world he creates, as for his actions in that world, I mean the psychic content of his objects, not their surface form, which is sculpted by sensation to model what is physically “out there” and shared among observers. A portion of this content deposits in the subject, a portion in the object, though subject and object are continuous in the mind/brain state. We feel this continuity, for example, as a thread of valuation linking the object to the mind. The perceptual world is infused with signification, categories, realness. There are no noncognitive perceptual objects, as there are no value-free facts. Process theory attempts to describe the becoming of the world, which is the world of value. Cognitive neuroscience, as with all branches of science, concerns the world that has become, which is the world of fact. One can dismiss values as social conventions or attempt to reduce them to facts, or one can argue, as Dewey and others have, that facts are irreducible values, but the challenge to anyone who wishes to unify science and psychology is to bridge the gap between fact and value. Royce (1901) wrote that “our acknowledgement of facts is a conscious submission to an Ought” (p. 41), in that facts are other than what is consciously presented to us, and they appear foreign to our will. This links facts as exteriorized values to values that have exteriorized as oughts. The exteriorized fact is an objectified value that has been verified by consensus, has detached and become independent of the self, and seems to force itself on the person. This is the same path that is followed by the ought. The valuation in the fact is less apparent than in the ought because the fact is less prescriptive, serving as a reason or justification for a decision, not a motivation. The fact is more fully conscious and external, the ought has one limb in the unconscious, one in the world.

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The objects of thought, like the thoughts they are, also think up the self as their subjective phase. In this process of thinking and perceiving, the self and its private space are antecedent to the mind’s creation of the world. Since the world sets limits on the actualization process, the self is as much a creation of the world, i.e. the constraints of sensation, as the latter is a creation of the self, i.e. a perceptual realization. To have a self is to have objects to perceive. From pathological cases we know that the world does not survive an erosion of the self, nor does the self survive a loss of its objects. The preliminary locus of the self, and the intermediate locus of ideas and images in the course of the actualization, implies that the character and personality of the subject are at stake in every thought, gesture and object. We all see the same objects, but we see them differently; some we notice and care about, others we ignore or dislike. These are not the responses of the subject to a neutral object, but are subjective precursors in a transition from character to fact in the striving of the mind toward objectification. Every forming object conveys its subjective phase into the perception even as it exteriorizes a space that is independent of the viewer. This background of subjectivity – emphatic at antecedent phases, inapparent in the object – provides coherence and continuity to the mental life. The constructs out of which objects, thoughts and actions develop – conceptual primitives, along with “animal” beliefs and experiential memories – are what we mean by the core self, or character, which is the thematic in personality or the mean of its fluctuations. We cannot see a man’s character, but we judge it by his pattern of behavior. An examined life may determine which of the values that went into one’s character are least deserving of credit or blame, but the sum, the average or the limits of their expression, constitutes a kind of dispositional matrix of the self that reflects its value distribution. Core values are biases in the self that are the precursors of preobject-concepts and conscious valuations. Admittedly, it is far from clear how we are to describe an unconscious value in the self-concept other than as a configural bias arising in a generative set of neurons that specifies the “drive-representations” or presuppositions that will guide ensuing concepts and feelings. The actions that flow from the core self, as well as conscious valuations, are always in flux according to the conditions of life and the needs of the actor, but the values

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that drive those actions are constitutional and slow to change. Consider the dictator of Togo, who originally threw his enemies to the crocodiles, but later, in a concession to modernity, tossed them out of helicopters!

SAME CHARACTER, COMMON PURPOSE, DIFFERENT ACTIONS Character is the source of the conscious contents of our mind, but not their cause. The relation of character to action is that of potential to actual, not cause and effect. The action individuates through a qualitative sequence that is constrained by the elimination of maladaptive possibilities. Character does not cause or produce a behavior, no more than the root of a flower causes the petals, but it is ingredient as an anticipatory phase in a dynamic structure. An action is a sign of character, not its product, as a thought is not the output of a thinker but a kind of signature of his feelings and intelligence.

CREATIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY When interpreted from the standpoint of potential and actual, which is the path of self-realization, the transition from character to conduct, from the core self to its acts and objects, can be seen to correspond with the transition from the creative unconscious to an artwork, and a life can be viewed as an aesthetic object. The generation of an artwork over many attempts is a concentrated sampling in the recurrence of behavior out of personality. In behavior, as in art, the fragmentary or piecemeal does not convey authenticity and power. When an act is partial or deficient, it barely taps the potential of what might have been a greater life or a greater work. This is the difference between an ordinary and a creative personality, or a mediocre and an inspired work of art. As in morality, the creative arises as a reconciliation of self and other, as the conventions of tradition are molded by what is distinctive in personality. Over the lifespan, there is, to a varying degree, a satisfaction of the wholeness that, ideally, should have energized every act. The self-measure of a strong character is its completeness of ac-

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tualization, as ideas give rise to performance. This is a passage from depth to surface, not a comparison across multiple actualities, i.e. between two existing acts or objects, say, a comparison of two different opinions or works of art, which is a comparison between two dead fish on a plate. If behavior is the outcome of a one-way actualization from the unconscious, should the unconscious rather than the conscious self be the subject of praise and blame? Who or what agent is responsible for an action? How this question is resolved depends on a theory of (psychic) causation. Dewey wrote that “…the ordinary conception of causation as a trait belonging to some one thing is the idea of responsibility read backward.” For Dewey, the theory of object causation was reinserted in the mind as the idea of moral responsibility. A causal role is assigned to some entity – the self, reason, the imagination – and this entity is then deemed to be responsible for the ensuing effect. I have a thought and write it down; I want a sandwich, and go to the delicatessen; I imagine my sweetheart, and pick up the telephone. In such cases, the thought, the desire, the image – or the self that purportedly causes them – is presumed to cause the behavior that follows. This concept of causation presumes a number of psychic entities that interact, including the self and its mental or physical effects. The idea that some one thing is the cause of an occurrence is an extension to cognition of a theory of physical causation, and an application to the self of the idea of credit and blame. The sense of agency for many of our thoughts, and the feeling that one deliberates as one thinks, or “manipulates” an idea or thought image, makes the self feel an instigator of its own acts and mental objects. However, in the production of an artwork, the artist is viewed more as creator than agent. We say, Beethoven composed the Eroica, not that he caused it to be composed. The progression is from possibility to fact, or potential to actual, rather than from cause to effect. Creative people often feel that they are passive vehicles to their art, which seems to pass through them to the world. Creativity is not an exceptional mode of thinking but a model for everyday thought. Gudmund Smith (2001) has demonstrated that creative thinking involves an emphasis, perhaps a prolongation or a neoteny, of preliminary phases in ordinary cognition. The sense of agency is less pronounced because the creative idea calls on meaning-laden or dream-like

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images that retain features of preliminary cognition. One could say, the feeling of passivity for a creative idea is a mark of its imaginative depth. The feeling that thoughts are unsolicited, especially those with creative force, recalls the passivity of the self to the content of a dream or hallucination. Again, the sense of agency is linked to the phase of actualization of the thought, which differs for waking and dreaming, or habitual and creative thinking. The strength of the feeling of agency is a symptom of the depth of the thought, not a result of the effort applied by the subject to the thought-content, and should not be taken as psychological evidence for agent-causation. The sense of agency for thoughts and actions differs from the feeling of passivity to perceptual objects, including many forms of mental imagery. Some perceptual images have a volitional quality, such as imagination and eidetic images. The incidental quality of agentive and passive feeling, i.e. the observation that the feeling of agency which accompanies the thought points to the dominant phase in its development, is demonstrated by instances in which the subject is uncertain as to whether he is an agent or recipient of his own thought content, e.g. in trance, psychosis and other states of “altered consciousness.” In process theory, acts and agents are realized and revived. The antecedent does not cause the consequent, but is transformed into it in a qualitative series of whole-part shifts. The seed becomes the flower, it does not cause it. The child does not cause an adult but becomes one. An early segment of process becomes a later segment, not by intrinsic causal links, but through the gradual change in replications and the constraints on emergent form. The feeling of “agent causation” that underwrites responsibility is a powerful but necessary deception, explicable in terms of the microstructure of the mind/brain state. The feeling of agency probably develops when a child reaches for something. My son, Ilya, at five months old, mimicked his mother as he rotated his arms and hands during a French nursery song. In the evening, alone in bed, he would look intently at each arm and hand as he separately rotated them; then, he did the same with his feet, which were not part of learning the song. I mentioned this observation to Jerry Bruner one evening at our home and asked, had I witnessed the birth of a volition? Jerry was skeptical. Perhaps he was not conversant with, or sym-

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pathetic to, the works of Guyau, who said that the reach of a child for an object is the nucleus of the idea of the future, and of causation. I think the sense of agency is more closely related to causal persistence and replacement than object causation. The experience of object causation is not internalized as psychic causation but, rather, the process is the reverse. The feeling that the self is the present cause of bodily and other effects in the immediate future arises in the continuity over replications of successive mind/brain states. This feeling of psychic causation is then referred outward as a theory of object causation. As in the example above, the feeling of the child that he can move his limbs “at will”, or touch or seize an external object or compute the position and grasp an object in motion is the basis on which object causation and serial time develop out of the acausality and timelessness of magical thinking.

CONFLICT A variety of approaches have documented the conflictual bases of ordinary cognition. Conflict is inevitable since every entity is a contrast. The critical importance of conflict is probably the major contribution to psychology of psychoanalytic theory, but the description of conflict in terms of cathexis misses the point that conflict is not a matter of energy flow, or the interaction of ideas and feelings; rather, in the form of contrast, dialectic or individuation, it is a pervasive and intrinsic feature at all phases in the cognitive process, whether in the evolutionary struggle of pre-human organisms or in the specification of phonological features and object form in language and perception. In ordinary discourse, conflict is most prominent as guilt, stress or uncertainty when a path taken or denied is inauthentic and the self is divided. One way of interpreting such conflict is that other-centered values, which lack a proper share in the self, are rejected in favor of self-interest, with conflict arising from that unrealized sector of the self representing the rejected other. Or, other-centered values may predominate, and self-interest will be compromised. The self feels cowardly, ashamed, suppressed, the other becomes a target of anger. However, the source of the conflict is not in the actions of the other, but in the self’s own object-concepts, the affec-

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tive tonality of which is below the threshold of consciousness. We assume that in every choice the unconscious self allocates conceptual feeling so as to maximize pleasure and avoid pain, but decisions are often made that are self-destructive, or lead to personal anguish, even death, as in altruistic sacrifice. It is not simply a matter of pleasure and pain, but the disproportionate strength of opposing valuations. Once an object surfaces, in acts or in statements, unconscious conflict transforms to conscious choice, leaving behind an intrapsychic residue of stress. What exactly is conflict? Do two separate ideas collide with each other? Is stress a result of this collision, like friction? A build-up of energy? Stress and anxiety have generally been interpreted in terms of energy, cathexis and conflict. There is perhaps some truth in this idea, but it needs a more precise formulation. I think conflict involves a disparity in the degree of realization by the complex value derivations of action and object formation. All mental contents – ideas, acts, perceptual objects – individuate the self-concept, i.e. specify antecedent conceptual feelings (values). Other-centered values originate in the process of perceptual realization as conceptual feeling accompanies the object-development outward into external space. The perceptual realization generates a feeling of passivity and receptiveness that is essential to a deference to others. In contrast, self-centered values originate in the action-development and discharge in bodily space. The action development is the implementation of will, and generates a feeling of agency that is essential to self-preservation and egoistic action. In sum, perception is linked to the realization of the other, action is the mode of self-realization. Of course, these are not sharply demarcated, rather they are biases established early in life and derived from evolutionary trends in animal cognition. Yet they determine the relative locus and emphasis of other and self-directed feeling, as the selfconcept is articulated by value. Feeling that flows into objects deposits the other; feeling that flows into action remains within the body. Perception is bound up with object meaning and signification, action with flight, fight and survival. As to the phenomenon of stress itself, if we think of affect as the processual aspect of an object-concept, and if we think of the conceptual aspect of the object as a category that encloses the affect – as process and thing,

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or the quality and quantity of the same entity – conflict can be interpreted as a reflection of the degree to which a given object-concept actualizes its prefigurative potential, or as a sign of the feeling that is residual in undischarged object-concepts. The contrast of an anxious life with one that is integrated reflects the completeness with which conceptual feeling is realized, in objects and in the part-acts of behavior. Frustration, stress, guilt, are affective residues of conceptual feelings that fail to achieve adequate realization over repeated trials; they are symptoms of an incomplete resolution of the dialectic of self and other, in other words, signs of moral distress. These stresses are not necessarily undesirable. Conflict is the engine of adaptation, and to many theorists an essential factor in moral decision. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a life free of guilt or regret, though in retrospect, painful choices are often forgotten, and reason serves to justify errors of judgment, whether honest or inconsiderate, and to excuse foolish decisions, the outcomes of which could not have been foreseen. The cultural influences on this process are not insignificant. For an egocentric and forward-looking society, such as present-day America, guilt tends to be perceived as a tether on freedom and self-expression, i.e. a trauma to be overcome, not a sign of moral decay or an incitement to growth and salvation. For conflict to play a constructive role in the psychic life, it must be a topic for reflection and re-enactment, in other words, decisions need to be recalled and replayed in the imagination. If, as has been claimed, conduct is 90% of life, and morality is the life of deeds, not thoughts, the 10% that is unexposed, the world of privacy, imagination, doubt, misgivings, the world that I inhabit, is often the intenser part of many lives. The act is less alive in the world, where it dies, than in the mind, where it is rehearsed, anticipated, and then re-lived in memory after it has perished. We may admire the man of action, but contemplation, expectation and revival are often the most vivid, lived experiences of the act. Bradley wrote, “The breadth of my life is not measured by the multitudes of my pursuits, nor the space I take up amongst other men, but by the fullness of the whole life which I know as mine.” The fullness is not just the subjective complement of an act, it is an interior vision of wholeness, a unity of will and conduct, a

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“vigilant passivity to the call of the other,” a resolution of desire and obligation, of thought and its realization, and the continuation of the will of the individual into family, community and nation.

COHERENCE AND AUTHENTICITY Authenticity is bound up with coherence and a unity of feeling and purpose. We can say that coherence is anterior to and dependent on unity, but not identical to it. Coherence is related to synchronic timing or phase coupling. Individuals are not unified by an assembly or concretion of parts, but in the relation of the parts to the deeper ground from which they coherently arise. The whole is not in the parts, nor the parts in the whole. Rather, the whole is antecedent to the parts, which are not individuals until they objectify. The parts realize some portion of the whole, but they are not copies of its contents. There is a similarity to items in a category, which are mere possibilities until their individuation makes the content and direction explicit. The perfect coherence of two individualities marks their access to a common stem. Unity is not in the synchrony of one thing with another, but diachronic in the things specified. Individuality and unity are compatible, if we concede that individuality is not pure autonomy, and unity is not pure homogeneity. On this view, unity is not external to the things unified. But if the unity is strictly internal, how do separate things come into union? The difficulty is in the question, which arises from the notion of separate things, and the idea of an external unifying relation. Instead, the unity exists prior to the things unified, the things arising through qualitative transitions. A synchronic binding is a form of coherence but not a true unity, which lies in the diachronic becoming of things out of a common epicenter. Ultimately, the unity of the world is the binding of objects in consciousness, the coherence of concurrent lines of development, and the growth of the world out of the self in the momentary history of all individualities. In the relation of whole to part, the partaking of the whole is the source of its unity, while the recognition that all particulars issue from the same core overcomes the appearance of their separateness. The relation of potential to actual in a single mind is imported into the transition from character

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to conduct. Authenticity is the measure of this relation. It refers to the fullness of character that individuates a given thought or action, the consistency in the realization of one’s core beliefs and values, and the coherence of potential paths of actualization at each phase in the process. The fullness must also tap a depth of origination of the part-acts constituting the behavior, as they are expressed in each actuality, and over successive occasions, since some facet of character is revealed in every momentary act, as well as in the collective experience of an individual life. Authenticity is not an extrinsic judgment, as with right and wrong, where there is adherence to some convention, or deviance from a standard or rule. It is, for better or worse, self-realization in conduct. The coherence on which authenticity depends mirrors the sufficiency of resolution of competing tendencies at successive points in the phase transition. This begins with implicit beliefs and core values and is repeated at each phase as the action develops. A conflicted self may be inauthentic if there is a reluctant compromise, or when behavior is driven by one of a set of competing values. A failure in self-expression, or an unwillingness to defer to the needs of others, may give embarrassment, guilt, shame or the feeling of self-betrayal. These feelings are induced by an action that is not “true to oneself,” whatever the “true” self is apprehended to be. In such instances, character is incompletely realized in conduct, or conduct is dominated by a lesser (less acceptable to the subject) value. Such occasions are common and unavoidable, for example, whether to please oneself or a companion, to choose a path of safety or risk, and all the little acts of a life. There are choices where values of equal goodness come into conflict, for example, the ability to aid only one of several people, the choice of saving the life of a mother or a child, acts of apparent altruism that can be decomposed to unconscious motivations. It could be argued that every act of cognition, regardless of the degree of conflict or coherence, is authentic in that it discharges the self such as it is, “warts and all,” given the conditions that prevail, i.e. that conflict is no less authentic a depiction of character than coherence. Indeed, conflict may even be essential to moral decision, for the individual unaware of the possibility of conflict is hardly in a position to make a moral judgment. Yet the impulse in life, and the mark of an authentic person is, or should be, a

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concordance in the mix of values that drive his behavior. Such a person, we say, is “at peace” with himself. The coherence is a felt experience of comfort in decision; its danger is complacency. Conflict is the felt experience of choice; its danger is anxiety or stress. In either case, self-esteem is at stake. Self-esteem is value as worth emphatic in the self rather than in an object. The value that deposits in the self does not leave the self and then, reflexively, return to fill the self as it fills other objects; rather, the self is filled with its own value prior to the derivation of this value into ideas and external objects. Self-esteem is a state of the self, not the infusion of value into the self as a secondary phenomenon. The self is not like other objects, even in reflection. The self in reflection is superficial to the core self that drives the content of the introspective state. The generative self is unconscious. The other side of self-esteem is the denial of one’s shortcomings. Denial is so common in normal and, especially, pathological states, that it has to be considered an essential feature of the self’s own derivations, with those values retained that promote self-esteem, and those subdued that threaten the sense of integrity. As objects become worthless when their valuation is diminished, the self lacks esteem when it does not receive an adequate share of its own selfvaluation, i.e. when self- and other-centered values are discordant. Unlike the self, however, objects are not the locus of conflict. Objects realize potential, or specify options. They are endpoints in the mind/brain state, not occasions of intrinsic choice in the subject, where possibility is still alive. The manifold of potential selves within a person contrasts with the finality of his objects. We are looking at the subjective and objective segments of the mind/brain state that correspond to phases closer to potential or actuality. A weakness of will (akrasia) is not a sign of a weakness of character or fragility of will, but of a conflict in values that implodes on the will that seeks to mobilize them. The weakness is the inertia resulting from the opposition of equal and contradictory forces. When values concur, the will is forceful. A weakness of self-valuation, like a diminution of object worth, may lead the individual to feel unworthy, or to feel his objects are worthless. This reflects a prominence of values that do not serve self-interest,

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and depends on the bias to other-directed or egocentric values. What matters, finally, is the self’s own self-assessment. One asks, have I been faithful to my principles, which could mean, have I been immoral to my limits or do my values reflect a basic decency; that is, have I fulfilled my own expectations? In each act, and in all acts over a lifetime, the self attempts to exhaust its potential in such a way as to reveal its full nature. Hopefully, the self will undergo growth in valuation so as to progress to greater comprehensiveness, charity and goodness of character. Completeness and coherence may not be exhibited in every, or any act of cognition, but they are the goals toward which one should strive, and authentic goodness is their desired outcome. Goodness is desirable, and genuine goodness is a mark of authenticity, but authenticity is not a matter of good or bad; both can be equally authentic. Paton (1927) argued that coherence is a sign of wholeness or unity, that “to be good is to be coherently willed … (and that).. that self or will is coherent and good which wills the momentary action as part of an allinclusive whole of coherent willing, and in willing the part, wills the whole.” I could hardly agree more with the spirit of this statement. The whole self should be announced in every part-act, which in turn partakes of the whole from which it devolved. Yet I would not want, as Paton is prone to do, to conflate drive and volition in will, nor separate will (as drive) from feeling, and I would qualify the identification of coherence with goodness. Coherence is desirable because the whole self is expressed in conduct. This avoids conflict and so increases pleasure. Yet coherence establishes, or is a sign of, the wholeness or the authenticity of the act independent of whether it is good or bad, for the act can be pleasurable even if, as in a person who fully enjoys sadistic torture, it is authentically evil. To take up these points in further detail, microgenetic theory claims that will (as drive) develops to desire, i.e. drive is derived from the primal will, and the desires are derived from the drives, so that pleasure is ultimately derived from the satisfaction of urges that are drive-based. The satiation of instinct, the satisfaction of drive, the enjoyment of pleasure, reflect a continuum in the specification of conceptual feeling and the objects into which it distributes. From the standpoint of the individual, pleasure is a selfindulgent good. More often than not, the pleasure of one person entails

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pain or deprivation for another. If the good is more than mere enjoyment, it must be a good that is good for others. The fusion of good with pleasure substitutes a moral judgment for a drive satisfaction. When good and bad are conceived as judgments applied to conduct, either by others or by a rational self, they stand in relation to drive as truth does to reason. A coherence theory of value entails a coherence theory of truth, just as a correspondence theory of truth entails a good that appeals to an abstract standard or ideal. Paton seems to accept this distinction when he writes that reflection or critical judgment follows on the activity which creates the value. With regard to the interpretation of will as volition or agency, clinical studies have shown that the volitional feeling in an act depends on that phase in its structure which is the focus of emphasis in the normal fluctuation of consciousness, or it points to that phase in an act of cognition that receives the major brunt of a pathology. Barring coercion, and from an endogenous or subjective standpoint, whether an act appears or feels voluntary, purposeful, automatic or passive, or whether the self feels an agent or a victim, is a function of the microstructure of the act. Volition does not reflect a stronger or weaker will that is imposed on an action, or an impulse of the self that propels that action; the self does not cause a volition which then causes an action. Agency is not an output of a self that stands behind an action and urges it forward; rather, the feeling of volition is created as a kind of byproduct of act- and object- realization.

REFERENCES Brown, J.W. (1996) Time, Will and Mental Process. New York: Plenum. Brown, J.W. (2001) Microgenetic theory: reflections and prospects. Neuropsychoanalysis 3:61-74 Brown, J.W. (2002) Prospects in the study of aphasia, In: The Sciences of Aphasia; from Therapy to Theory, eds. I. Papathanasiou, & R. De Blesser. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Brown, J.W. (2005). Process and the Authentic Life. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.

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Brown, J.W. & Pachalska, M. (2003) The nature of the symptom and its relevance for neuropsychology. Acta Neuropsychologica 1:1-11. Burge, T. (1993) Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In: Mental Causation, eds. J. Heil & A. Mele. Oxford: Clarendon,. Hartshorne, C. (1987) Wisdom as Moderation. Albany: SUNY Press. Paton, H. (1927) The Good Will. London: George Allen & Unwin. Royce, J. (1901) The World and the Individual. Macmillan. Russell, B. (1948) Human Knowledge. New York: Simon and Schuster. Smith, G. (2001) The Process Approach to Personality. New York: Plenum.

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NAME INDEX Aarsse, H.R. 138, 140 Abulafia, J. 252, 256 Adam, D. 164 Ahadi, S. A. 213-14, 219 Akselrod, S. 145-46, 161 Albano, C. 80, 90 Alkov, R. A. 213, 216 Allen, S. N. 92, 94, 107, 219, 288 Allioti, N. C. 224, 238 Allodi, F. 97, 107 Almgren, P. E. 9, 21, 26, 49, 127, 129, 131, 141, 149, 164, 208, 216 Amabile, T. 202, 216, 222-23, 231, 236 Amnér, G. 5, 9, 19, 139, 141, 201, 208, 216, 298 Anderson, D. 111 Anderson, H. G. 214, 216 Anderson, P. E. D. 111 Andersson, A .L. 9, 13, 19, 202, 207-08, 21617, 255 Andrews, G. 93, 107 Angrilli, A. 164 Arieti, S. 242, 249, 254 Armelius, B-Å. 34, 49, 80, 89, 97, 109, 114, 116, 123-124 Arsenault, L. 94, 110 Atkinson, M. 158, 163 Atwood, G. E. 78, 87, 90 Bachelor, P. 201, 217 Bachmann, T. 24, 29, 40, 42, 243, 245, 254 Bäckström, M. 32, 42, 59, 61, 114, 122-23 Baggi, L. 193, 199 Barger, A. C. 164 Bargh, J. A. 159-61 Baron-Cohen, S. 244, 254 Barratt, E. S. 252, 254 Barron, F. 202, 217, 223, 236 Barten, S. S. 244, 248, 254, 260 Bartram, D. 201, 217 Bates, D. E. 248, 257 Baumeister, R. F. 128, 140 Beck, R. 30, 42, 47 Becker, D. F. 111 Benfari, R. 170, 183 Bengtsson, M. 208, 216 Benson, H. 248, 255 Berger, A. C. 161 Berglund, M. 174, 184

Bernstein Carlson, E. 96, 107 Berntson, G. G. 144-46, 161 Besco, R. O. 214, 217 Beyn, E. S. 30, 42 Bigger, J. T. Jr. 161 Bijleveld, C. J. H. 175, 186 Binzer, M. 34, 49, 79-80, 85, 90, 110, 116, 125 Bird LaFrance, E. 236 Birmes, P. 93, 104, 107 Blanchard, D. C. 158-59, 161 Blanchard, R. J. 158-59, 161 Bleger, J. 39, 42 Bleich, A. 92, 108 Blendon, R. J. 109 Blinder, B. 170, 187 Block, A. 165 Blos, P. 113, 123 Blount, J. 94, 111 Bodlund, O. 94, 110 Bollini, P 109 Bond, M. 93, 107-08 Bornstein, R. F. 242, 255 Borowsky, M. S. 213, 216 Bourassa, M. G. 138, 140 Boxer, A. M. 114, 122, 125 Boysen, S. T. 144, 161 Bradley, M. M. 143-44, 161, 163, 283 Brecht, K. 177, 184 Bremner, J. D. 92, 108 Brenet, F. 251, 258 Brett, E. 108 Brosschot, J. F. 123, 125, 138, 140 Brown, J. W. 3, 14-17, 19, 24, 29, 37, 40, 42, 188, 217, 244-45, 255, 263, 266, 273, 28788, 298 Bruner, J. S. 28, 42, 279 Bruno, R. 94, 111 Burge, T. 264, 288 Byrnes, D. A. 223, 236 Cacioppo, J. T. Callahan, S. Calvo, M. G. Canestrari, R. Caramia, M. C. Carlier, I. V. Carruthers, M. Caspi-Yavin, Y. Castillo, M. D.

144-45, 161 93, 107 158, 161 174, 185 199 92, 108 146, 162 107, 109 158, 161

290 Cattell, R. B. 201, 217 Caudill, M. A. 164 Carlsson, I 1-5, 15, 16, 19, 21, 27, 29, 32, 35, 43,49, 114, 122, 123, 127-142, 161, 201239, 243, 246, 248, 250, 252, 255, 260 Cegalis, J. A. 25, 29- 31, 37, 40, 42, 43 Chaiken, S. 159, 161 Chan, S. 109 Chaplin, M. R. 249, 258 Charlet, J-P. 93, 107 Charney, D. S. 108 Christian, J. 93, 108 Ciani, N. 59, 62, 199 Claps, M. 193, 199 Clark, A. Jr. 177, 180-81, 184 Clark, D. M. 157, 163 Clark, J. H. 247, 255 Clark, L.A. 213, 217 Clark, M. E. 108 Cohen, R. J. 161, 164 Coleman, J. C. 114, 123 Conte, H. R. 177, 184 Cooper, C. 58, 61 Cox, P. W. 251, 257 Craighead, E. W. 41, 43 Cramer, P. 31, 41, 43, 176-77, 180, 184 Cramond, B. 224, 236 Crassweller, K. D. 247, 255 Crowley, K. 244, 259 Crutchfield, R. S. 202, 217 Csikszentmihalyi, M. 223, 236 Cuthbert, B. N. 143-44, 161, 163 Cuzzolaro, M. 199 Czogalik, D. 179, 184 Dale, H. C. A. 201, 217 Danielsson, A. 33, 49 Darwin, C. 143, 162 Davidson, K. 104, 108 Davidson, M. M. 128-29, 141 Davidson, R. J. 127, 138, 141 Dawson, V. L. 224, 238 de Marneffe, D. 109 Deikman, A. 247, 255 del Pilar Gonzalez Fontao, M. A. 224, 237 Dennett, D. C. 244-45, 255 Derakshan, N. 128, 138, 140 DeWaele, J. P. 176, 184 Dimberg, U. 144, 146, 156, 162-63 Dixon, N. F. 16, 19, 55, 61 Dobbins, J. 78, 89 Dolev, A. 92, 108

Donelan, K. 109 Draguns, J. G. 4, 7, 19-21, 23, 27, 29-31, 3739, 42-50, 61, 63, 167, 177, 180, 184, 18688, 242, 251, 253, 255-58, 298 Dreier, H. 173, 186 Drews, S. 177, 184 Ducey, C. P. 94, 111 Duff, K. J. 128, 140 Dunn, V. K. 108 Dunn, W. 80, 90 Dyk, R. B. 169, 189 Eber, H. W. 201, 217 Eckberg, D. L. 161 Eckoldt, K. 146, 161 Ehlers, W. 31, 37, 43-47, 49, 177, 179-80, 182, 184, 186-88 Ekvall, G. 202, 214, 217-18 Elias, C. 109 Elimalach-Malmilyan, S. 244, 256 Elklit, A. 93, 104, 110 Emrich, H. 37, 40, 43 Englesson, I. 208, 216 Erdberg, P. 80, 89, 97, 109, 116 Erdelyi, M. H. 177-78, 184-85 Ericsson, K. A. 249, 255 Eriksen, C. W. 178, 185 Erikson, E. 113, 122, 124 Esbensen, K. 80, 90 Esteves, F. 146, 156, 163 Etcoff, N. L. 165 Evans, D. E. 213-14, 219 Evengård, B. 78-79, 89-90 Everitt, B. E. 209, 218 Eysenck, H. J. 202, 205, 208, 217, 223, 233, 236 Eysenck, M. W. 128, 138, 140, 157-58, 161-62 Fäldt, E. Faterson, H. F. Fava, G. A. Feingold, A Fenichel, O. Fine, A. D. Flavell, J. H. Foa, B. E. Fodor, J. A. Folkman, S. Fontana, A. Fouwels, A. J. Frank, G. Frankel, M.

222, 238 169, 189 174, 185 123-24 52, 61, 138, 140, 177, 185 108 29, 44, 242, 253, 256 92, 104, 108 244, 256 202, 218 108 92, 108 94, 108 109

291 Franklin, M. B. 244, 248, 254, 256, 260 Fransson, P. 5, 94, 108, 113-15, 118, 124, 298 Frasure-Smith, N. 138, 140 Frazier, T. W. 146, 162 Frensch, P.A. 17, 21 Freud, A. 13-14, 39, 44, 55, 140, 177, 185 Freud, S. 32, 44, 55, 57-58, 176-77, 185 Fribergh, H. 34, 44 Fröhlich, W. D. 45, 61, 255, 258 Frueh, B. C. 94, 108 Fukuda, K. 78, 89 Furnham, A. 137, 140 Gaillard, F. 138, 141 Galin, D. 244, 256 Gallucci, N. T. 223, 236 Gardner, R. W. 168-71, 185-86 Gardner, S. 93, 108 Gaynor, J. A. 213, 216 Gemelli, A. 25, 35, 44 Genzel, S. 165 Gershuny, B. S. 92, 108 Gersons, B. P. 92, 108 Gitzinger, I. 34, 39, 44 Glanzmann, P. G. 44 Gleser, G. C. 177, 182, 185 Glicksohn, J. 4, 44, 241-42, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252, 254, 256-57, 298 Godaert, G. 110, 123, 125, 177, 187 Gold, D. 224, 237 Goldstein, L. H. 244, 254 Goodblatt, C. 242, 254, 256-57 Goodenough, D. R. 189, 251, 257 Gordon, D. 161, 164 Gottschalk, L. A. 248, 257 Götz, K. O. 223, 236 Govender, R. 159, 161 Grandi, S. 174, 185 Grasso, S. 173, 188, 193, 199 Graumann, C. F. 29, 40, 45 Gravel, G. 138, 140 Grawe, K. 173, 185 Gray, J. A. 158, 162, 213, 218-19 Greenwald, A. G. 242, 257 Greenwald, M. K. 144, 163 Greenwood, M. M. 247, 255 Grigorenko, E. L. 167, 188 Grossman, P. 161 Guilford, J. P. 21, 89, 161, 162-64, 217, 219, 222, 225, 236 Guldberg, C. A. 123-24

Haber, R. N. 244, 257 Haer, J. L. 248, 257 Hägglöf, B. 94, 108, 114, 124 Hakim-Larson, J. 124 Hamm, A. O. 144, 163 Handler, L. 94, 110 Hanlon, R. E. 20, 37, 40, 42-43, 45, 186, 218, 242, 255, 257 Hansson, M. 162 Harrington, D. M. 236 Harrison, J. 244, 254 Hartman, W. L. 94, 104, 108 Hartshorne, C. 266, 288 Harvill, L. 94, 110 Haskell, R. E. 242, 246, 257 Hatfield, E. 144, 161 Hauff, E. 93, 106, 111 Heinemann, L. G. 37, 40, 43 Heiss, R. 183, 185 Hellberg, S. 80, 90 Hemmendinger, L. 53, 61 Henningsson, M. 5, 9, 20, 36, 45, 77, 79-81, 87, 89, 97, 106, 109, 116, 124, 298 Henry, L. 114, 123 Henry, M. 180, 182, 187 Hentschel, U. 4, 12, 20-21, 24, 28, 32-33, 35, 37, 42-50, 61, 63, 141, 167-68, 170-71, 173, 175, 177, 180, 184, 186-88, 191, 199-200, 202, 206, 220, 242, 255, 257-58, 298 Herbison, G. P. 93, 110 Herman, J. L. 111, 169 Herrmann, T. 38, 45 Hickie, I. 78, 89 Hilsenroth, M. 94, 110 Hobart, C. J. 114, 124 Hoff, E. V. 5, 221, 226-28, 230, 235-37, 298 Hoffman, H. E. 170, 186 Hofstede, G. 35, 45 Höglend, P. 123-24 Holland, B. 20-21, 43-45, 47, 219, 244, 260 Holzman, P. S. 168-69, 170, 173, 185-86 Horowitz, M. J. 91, 109 Hosemann, A. 173, 186 Hunt, H. T. 246, 257 Hyde, J. S. 114, 122, 124 Hyman, L. 111 Hyndman, B. W. 145, 162 Ianni, F. F. Ihilevich, D. Intons-Peterson, M. J. Iwata, J.

104, 110 182, 185 122, 124 145, 158, 162

292

Jacobsson, L. 9, 21, 35, 49, 82, 90, 94, 111 Jacquet, A. Y. 230, 237 Jenike, M. A. 165 Jessup, G. 201, 218 Jessup, H. 201, 218 Johanson, A. M. 9, 16, 20-21, 26, 35, 42, 49, 127, 129, 131, 141 Johansson, E. 80, 90 John, O. P. 12-13, 21, 42, 48, 202, 217-19, 260 Johnson, G. 9, 21, 26, 49, 127, 129, 131, 141, 149, 164 Johnson, R. 243, 260 Jönsson, P. 4, 143, 146-47, 156, 162, 202, 218, 235, 298 Juba, M. 111 Juneau, M. 138, 140 Kamenchenko, P. 92, 109 Kaplan, J. N. 170, 186, 248, 255 Karaminas, N. 34, 46, 52, 62 Karasek, R. A 202, 218 Karlsson, B. 107, 144, 162, 215 Karp, S. A. 169, 189, 250, 261 Kaser-Boyd, N. 94, 109 Kaufmann, P. G. 48, 161 Kazdin, A. 41, 45 Kiessling, M. 173, 186 Kilborn, K. M. 164 Kimchi, R. 243, 258 Kinder, B. N. 94, 108 Kinsbourne, M. 244-45, 255 Kitney, R. I. 145, 162 Klecka, W. R. 209, 218 Klein, D. J. 144, 161 Klein, G. S. 13, 20, 168-69, 171, 185-187, 19192, 199 Kline, A. 223, 236 Kline, P. 32, 45, 58, 61 Klug, F. 157, 163 Koffka, K. 246, 257 Kohut, H. 13, 59, 61 Komaroff, A. L. 78, 89 Koslowsky, M. 92, 108 Kotch, J. B. 247, 255 Kragh, U.4, 8, 20, 23-24, 26, 29, 31, 33-34, 3840, 46, 49, 51-52, 57-58, 61-62, 65-71, 7476, 79, 89, 94, 109, 116, 124, 177, 182, 187, 218, 244, 246, 248, 250, 258, 298 Krasniasnski, A. 92, 109 Kreitler, H. 38, 46, 246, 258 Kreitler, S. 38, 46, 246, 258

Kris, E. 138, 140 Kroon, T. 57, 62 Krueger, F. 53, 62 Krystal, H. 92-94, 103, 109 Kubovy, M. 242, 249, 259 Kucala, T. 111 Küchenhoff, J. 179, 187 Kuhn, D. 244, 258 Kullgren, G.9, 21, 34-35, 49, 79-80, 82, 85, 90, 94, 110-11, 114, 116, 125 Kutz, I. 164 Kyriazis, D. A. 32, 34, 39, 46, 52, 62, 213, 218 Labouvie-Vief, G. 114, 124 Lamberts, R. D. 92, 108 Lang, P. J. 20, 143-44, 147, 158, 161-165 Lange, V. 145, 162 Laub, D. 96, 111 Laux, L. 30, 37, 44 Lavelle, J. 109-10 Lazarus, R. S. 159, 164, 202, 218 Lazrove, S. 111 Leahey, T. H. 244, 258 LeDoux, J. E. 145, 156, 158, 162-63 Lee, M. B. 165 Lerer, B. 92, 108 Lesperance, F. 138, 140 Leverett, J. P. 94, 108 Levi, L. 202, 219 Levin, P. 94, 109 Levit, D. B. 122, 124 Liberman, D. 179, 187 Lieberman, H. J. 37, 46 Lilja, Å. 16, 20, 35, 42, 56, 62 Lin, L. 110 Lindgren, M. 16, 20 Linschoten, J. 29, 38, 46 Linton, H. 169, 185 Liotti, G. 181, 187 Lubart, T. I. 223, 230, 237-38 Ludwig, A. M. 242, 248, 258 Lundh, L-G. 139-40 Macaulay, R. J. MacGregor, M. W. MacLeod, C. Madsen, K. B. Madwed, J. B. Magnusson, D. Maldavsky, D. Malik, M. Mandel, F. S.

164 104, 108 157, 163, 165 32, 41, 46 161 203, 214, 219 179, 187 161 111

293 Manifold, V. 111 Marden, B. 157, 163 Marendaz, C. 251, 258 Marlowe, D. 128, 130, 140 Martignoni, M. 199 Martin, J. L. 93, 110 Martin, M. 157, 163 Martindale, C. 223, 237 Maslow, A. H. 223, 237 Massagli, M. P. 110 Masson, A. 138, 140 Mathews, A. 157, 163, 165 Matsumoto, D. 122, 124 McAdams, D. P. 215, 219 McCraty, R. 158, 163 McFarlane, A. 111 McGlashan, T. H. 111 McInerney, S. C. 165 McInnes, K. 110 McNally, R. J. 157, 164 McNaughton,N. 158, 162 McWilliams, N. 87, 89 Merleau-Ponty, M. 70, 76 Messick, S. 253, 258 Meyer-de-Stadelhofen, F. 141 Michael, W.B. 201, 217 Middleton, G. 223, 236 Miller, F. D. 249, 259 Miller, T. W. 92, 109 Mini, A., 164 Mischel, W. 179, 187, 215, 219 Mogg, K. 157, 163 Mollica, R. F. 92, 95-97, 107, 109-10 Monahan, J. L. 146, 163 Moran, J. D. 224, 238 Morgan, M. K. 108 Morphy, M.A. 174, 185 Morris, E. 93, 110 Moss Kanter, R. 214, 219 Munz, D. 37, 43 Murphy, E. 110 Murphy, S. T. 146, 156, 163 Nagaraja, H. N. Nakamura, M. Nakatani, K. Neisser, U. Nemeroff, C. Neuman, F. Neuman, T. Newman, L. S.

161 201, 219 243, 258 244, 258 41, 43 4, 127 34, 47 128, 140

Nilsson, A. 9, 13, 20, 34, 39, 47, 57, 62, 163, 216 Nira, K. 201, 219 Nisbett, R. E. 249, 258-59, 261 Norton, W. A. 123, 185, 224, 237 Nyman, E. 12, 21, 191, 200 Nyman, G. E. 129, 141, 171, 189, 202, 206, 220 Offer, D. 114, 122, 125 Ohlmann, T. 251, 258 Öhman, A. 146, 156, 160, 163-64 Öjehagen, A. 33, 139, 140 Okaue, M. 201, 219 Olff, M. 94, 110, 123, 125, 177, 180, 187 Oltman, P. K. 250, 257, 261 Orange, D. M. 78, 89 Orlans, V. 220 Ouvinen-Birgerstam, P. 226, 237 Ozolins, A. R. 32, 34, 42, 47, 177, 180, 187 Pachalska, M. 273, 288 Pacteau, C. 230, 237 Palmer, S. E. 243, 258-59 Palomba, D. 146, 164 Parkhurst, H. B. 222, 224, 237 Paton, H. 286-88 Pelcovitz, D. 111 Penayo, U. 9, 21, 35, 49, 82, 90, 94, 111 Perry, G. G. 104, 108 Perry, J. C. 110, 123-24, 180, 182, 187 Persson, B. 32, 42 Petrenko, V. F. 30, 38, 47 Petrides, K. V. 137, 140 Pezzarossa, B, 59, 62, 188, 193, 199 Pham, T. 109-10 Pickering, A. D. 213, 219 Plutchik, R. 177, 184 Pollack, R. H. 225, 249, 258 Pomerantz, J. R. 242, 249, 258 Pomeranz, B. 145, 164 Poole, C. 110 Porges, S. W. 161 Postman, L. 28, 42 Pratto,F. 159, 161 Prinz, W. 41, 47, 162 Quigley, K. S.

145, 161

Rafanelli, C. Rapagna, S. O. Rapaport, D. Raphel, C.

174, 185 224, 237 12, 20 251, 258

294 Raskin, E. 250, 261 Rauch, S. L. 165 Regnell, G. 34, 44 Rein, G. 158, 163 Reinhardt, R. 201, 219 Rejskind, G. F. 224, 237 Reynolds, R. I. 237, 243, 259 Richmond, B. O. 224, 237 Ricoeur, P. 249, 259 Riemann, B. C. 164 Riggs, D. S. 92, 108 Risberg, J. 16, 19-20, 206, 217, 230, 236, 243, 255 Robertson, L. C. 245, 258-59 Robinson, M. D. 159-60, 164 Romans, S. E. 93, 104, 110 Rosen, J. B. 158, 164 Rosenheck, R. 108 Rosser-Hogan, R. 96, 107 Rossier, J. 138, 141 Roth, S. 111 Rothbart, M. K. 213-14, 219 Royce, J. 275, 288 Rubino, I. A. 4, 12, 21, 33, 47, 58, 59, 62, 171, 173, 188, 191, 193, 199-200, 202, 206, 220, 298 Rudmin, F. W. 130, 140 Rudolf, G. 175, 186 Russell, B. 268, 288 Ryan, A. 109 Ryhammar, L. 13, 19-20, 208, 214, 219, 220, 222, 235, 237 Salley, R. D. 94, 110 San Martino, L. 199 Sander, F. 25, 27, 29, 35, 47, 53, 62, 244, 251, 259 Sarajlic´, I. 110 Sarajlic´, N. 110 Sarlo, M. 164 Saul, J. P. 161 Saya, A. 62 Sayers, B. M. 145, 162 Schachter, D. L. 15, 20 Schacterle, R.S. 78, 89 Schafer, R. 177, 188 Schimek, J. 170, 187 Schlesinger, H. J. 168, 188 Schmidt Pedersen, S. 93, 104, 110 Schmitt, L. 93, 107, 149 Schneider, U. 35, 45 Schoon, I. 206, 219

Schubö, W. 199 Schulkin, J. 158, 164 Schulz, T. 243, 259 Schwartz, G. E. 127, 138, 141 Schwarz, N. 159, 165 Schweiger, E. 165 Sears, R. R. 176, 188 Sekuler, A. B. 243, 259 Shannon, D. C. 161, 164 Sharpe, M. 78, 89 Sherer, K. R. 164 Shipley, P. 220 Shoda, Y. 215, 219 Siegel, A. W. 250, 259 Siegler, R. S. 244, 259 Sifneos, P. E. 139, 140 Sigal, J. J. 93, 108 Silfverskiöld, P. 16, 20 Simon, H. A. 163, 249, 256, 259, 288 Singer, J. L. 177, 180, 188 Singh, M. 93, 107 Siracusano, A. 34, 47, 133, 188, 191, 298 Sjöbäck, H. 13, 21, 31, 42, 47, 59, 62, 177, 179, 188 Sjöström, M. 80, 90 Sloan, P. 94, 110 Smith Fawsi, M. C. 97, 110 Smith, C. A. 159, 164 Smith, D. E. 223, 238 Smith, E. R. 249, 260 Smith, G. J. W. 1, 3, 5, 7-10, 12, 15-16, 19-21, 23-27, 29, 32-33, 35, 37, 39-50, 56-57, 6163, 65, 70, 76, 94, 97, 110-11, 114, 122-23, 127, 129, 131, 137-41, 149, 164-65, 171, 174, 177, 180, 183-84, 186-88, 191-92, 19902, 204-09, 214, 216, 219-22, 224, 226, 229, 235-38, 242, 244, 246, 248-50, 252-53, 255, 257-60, 269, 278, 288, 298 Smith, M. 208, 216 Snidman, N. C. 161 Soares, J. J. 146, 156, 160, 163-64 Söderberg, S. 79, 90 Sonnby-Borgström, M. 146-47, 156, 162 Southwick, S. 108 Spence, D. P. 169, 185, 245, 260 Spence, E. L 144, 165 Spencer-Bowdage, S. 137, 140 Spielberger, C. D. 130, 141, 148, 164 Stadler, M. A. 17, 21 Stegagno, L. 164 Steinbach, I. 244, 256 Steinhauer, S. R 146, 162

295 Stern, W. 29, 49 Sternberg, R. J. 48, 167, 188, 217, 223, 230, 238 Sternberg, S. 245, 260 Stillion, J. M. 223, 238 Stolorow, R. D. 78, 87, 89 Stone, P. H. 161 Straus, S. 78, 89 Strauss, M. E. 146, 162 Sundbom, E. 5, 9, 21, 34-35, 49, 77, 79, 80-82, 85, 87, 89-91, 94, 97, 108-11, 113-16, 118, 123-25, 174, 298 Svensson, B. 9, 13, 20-21, 34, 49, 59, 62 Swanson, G. S. 94, 104, 111 Sztulman, H. 93, 107 Taggart, P. Tatsouka, M. Taylor, J. Tegano, D. W. Teiling, P. A. Tempereau, C. E. Terjestam, Y. Teubner-Berg, H. Theorell, T. Thurstone, L. L. Tiller, W. A. Tolaas, J. Tomkins, S. S. Tor, S. Törestad, B. Torrance, E. P. Tozzi, F. Träskman-Bendz, L. Truong, T. Trygg, L.

146, 162 201, 217 138, 220, 245, 254, 260 223-24, 238 94, 110 213, 220 33, 50, 52, 63 186 202, 218 206, 220 158, 163 242, 260 143, 164 109, 298 203, 219 222, 224, 229-30, 238 4, 191, 298 44 109 9, 21, 34, 49, 59, 62

Ubel, F. A. Uddenberg, G. Uhlarik, J. Ursin, H.

161 208, 216 243, 260 110, 123, 125, 177, 187

Vaernes, R. J. 34, 49 Vaillant, G. E. 31, 39, 49, 129, 141, 177, 18081, 188-89 Valsiner, J. 243, 245, 260 Van der Kolk, B. A. 92, 111 van der Meer, G. 139, 141 van der Molen, M. W. 161 Varvin, S. 93, 106, 111 Vasilenko, S. V. 30, 38, 47 Velmans, M. 245, 260 Vipper, K. 243, 254

Vojvoda, D. Volkov, V. N. Vrana, S. R.

111 30, 42 144, 16465

Wachtel, P. L. 171, 189 Waehler, C. A. 114, 122, 125 Wapner, S. 242, 254, 260 Warner, B. A. 93, 107 Watkins, A. D. 158, 163 Watson, C. G. 92, 111 Watson, D. 213, 217 Watts, F. N. 157, 162, 165 Weinberger, D. A. 127-29, 138, 141 Weine, S. M. 92, 96, 111 Weiss, K. E. 123, 125 Wendt, P. E. 16, 19, 206, 217, 230, 236, 243, 255 Werner, H. 4, 25, 33, 50, 52, 63, 242, 244-46, 248, 255-56, 260 Wertheimer, M. 217, 249, 260 Westby, E. L. 224, 238 Westerlundh, B. 13, 21, 31-33, 49, 52, 56, 59, 62-63, 94, 111, 164, 216, 244, 246, 248, 253, 260 Whalen, P. J. 156, 165 White, P. 59, 249, 261 Wiemers, M. 186 Wiggins, J. S. 12, 21 Williams, J. M. 165 Williams, R. M. 157, 163 Wilson, T. D. 109, 249, 258-59, 260 Winkielman, P. 159, 165 Winsch, D. L. 108 Witkin, H. A. 169-70, 189, 250-51, 261 Wittling, W. 146, 165 Wold, S. 80, 90 Workman, E. A. 223, 238 Wyke, M. 244, 254 Yang, T. Yau, C.

109 223, 238

Zaback, T. P. 114, 122, 125 Zachrisson, A. 4, 65, 72, 74, 76, 298 Zachrisson, H. D. 72, 76 Zajonc, R. B. 38, 50, 146, 156, 159, 163, 165, 244, 261 Zanna, V. 199 Zenasni, F. 230, 237 Zhirmunskaya, E. A. 30, 42 Zigler, E. 253, 261 Zimmermann, G. 139, 142

296

SUBJECT INDEX A Activity Questionnaire 226-27, 231, 233, 235, 298 Affective responses 91, 99, 101, 103-04, 106 Akrasia 285 Altered consciousness 279 Amauroscopic 11, 13, 21, 31, 62 Anorexia nervosa 193-194 Antecedent configurations 272 Anxiety 14-16, 18, 20, 24, 26, 32-33, 44, 48, 50, 57-60, 62, 75, 86, 88, 91-92, 99, 101, 103, 127-28, 130-37, 139, 141, 143, 147-49, 151-54, 157-64, 168, 171, 177, 179, 182, 186, 206, 216, 220, 265, 281, 285 Associationism 1, 14 Authenticity 263, 266, 277, 283-84, 286 Automatization 8, 29, 48 Autonomic nervous system 145 B Biological perspective Blocking defense style 106 Borderline personalities Brainstormers Bulimia nervosa Buddhist metaphysics

15 87, 91, 99-100, 103, 34 233-34 193-194 266

Core self 276-77, 285 C-phase 72-73, 75 Creative flexibility 205-06, 212, 214 Creative fluency 137, 205, 212, 221 Creative functioning test (CFT) 5, 11, 27, 35, 56, 201-02, 204, 214, 221, 226, 232, 237, 252, 260 Creativity 5, 19, 23, 26-27, 35, 45, 48, 123, 137-41, 183, 201-39, 255, 260, 277-78 D Deconstructionism 265 Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) 8, 13, 21, 49, 61-62, 123 Defence Mechanism Inventory (DMI) 177, 182 Defence Mechanism Rating Scale (DMRS) 180 Defence Mechanism Technique, modified (DMTm) 9, 11, 13 Defence mechanisms 13, 17, 26, 28-29, 31-32, 39, 41, 43-45, 75, 93, 95, 110, 114, 117, 122-23, 127-28, 131, 137, 141, 167-88 Denial 55, 83, 88, 101, 106, 129, 170, 285 Distorting defence style 88, 99-100, 106 Dream questionnaire 130 Dreams 29, 59, 127-28, 130-31, 134, 136, 204, 211-12, 226, 257, 259

E

C Character 8-9, 34, 59, 263-66, 270, 275-77, 283-86 Chronic fatigue syndrome 5, 77-79, 80-90 Cognitive styles, 33, 45, 167-71, 175-76, 183, 186, 188 Cognitivism 17, 263 Coherence 276, 283-87 Conflict 13, 21, 37, 42, 46-47, 50, 62, 74, 138, 149, 168, 177-178, 182, 186, 191, 199, 28082, 284-86 Conformists 232 Constrictive-flexible ego control 169 Construction 7, 10, 12, 15, 21, 24, 28, 40, 48, 65, 67, 69, 72, 88, 265, 273 Continuity 18, 27, 69, 275-76, 280 Conversion disorder 34, 49, 77, 79, 81-82, 8488, 90, 110, 125

Eating disorders Evolutionary brain process External constraints Extraversion

34, 44 273 270, 274 5, 201-20

F Field dependence Field independence Free association Frustration

169-72, 251-52, 257 169, 171, 251 33, 40, 52, 171-72 56, 214-15, 282 G

Gender differences 39, 113-15, 121-24, 221, 224-25, 227, 235, 237

297 H Harvard Trauma Questionnaire 91-92, 95-96, 102, 107, 109 Heart rate 143-45, 147, 149, 154, 158, 161-64 I Identification Test (IT) 11, 27, 40, 56 Immature defense mechanisms 127 Intelligence 173, 236, 277 Introjection 100, 117, 119, 170, 172 Introversion 5, 202, 207, 209, 211, 218, 223 Isolation 33-34, 51, 57-59, 101, 117-18, 13233, 137-38, 170, 172-73, 179, 181 L Leveling-sharpening

168-69, 171 M

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 128, 130, 140 Medium Creative Flexibility 212, 214 Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT) 4, 9, 11, 21, 23, 26, 44, 49, 129, 141, 143, 149 Metaphoric thinking 242, 272 Microgenesis 2, 19-20, 24-25, 30-31, 33, 35, 37-38, 40-45, 52, 186, 241-61, 269 Multiple Chemical Sensitivity77, 79, 81, 84-89 N Negation Neoteny Neuroticism

55, 83, 101-03 278 173, 208, 223 P

Parallelistic hypothesis 52 Partial least squares (PLS) 36, 80, 97, 113, 115-116 Patterns of adaptation (in the Serial ColorWord Test) 188, 191, 206 Perceptgenetic Object Relations Test (PORT) 11, 13, 40 Personality inventories 27, 123 Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 91-93, 96-98, 102-04, 108, 111 Potential to Actual 267-68, 270, 273-74, 27778, 283 P-phases 52-53, 59-60, 66, 246, 248 Preattentive processing 146 Presentness of the immediate past 274 Process monism 266

Process-oriented methods 11 Projective tests 27-28, 114, 177 Psychic causation 266-67, 278, 280 Psychoanalysis 2-3, 7, 12-15, 17, 19, 50, 52, 54, 111, 176-77, 179, 185, 187, 243, 297 Psychosomatic diseases 92, 139 Psychotherapy 4, 61, 90, 105-06, 110-11, 125, 167, 173-83, 185, 187 Psychoticism 173, 223 R Radical interactionism 248 Reaction formation 26, 56, 83, 101-03, 119, 123, 172-73 Reconstruction 15, 19-20, 41, 54, 65, 67, 69, 218, 237 Regional Cerebral Blood Flow 37 Regression 11, 59-60, 93, 121, 132-33, 138, 171, 199, 207, 245 Repression 2, 26, 33-34, 51, 57-59, 62, 100, 127, 132-33, 135-38, 170, 172, 181, 186, 188, 271 Repressor 4, 34, 127-41 Rorschach 28, 53, 61, 94, 104, 108-11, 139, 170, 188 S Self-actualization person 269-70 Self-esteem 78, 114, 127-28, 238, 285 Self-image inventory 5, 221, 226 Sensitivity-projection 114 Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) 4, 11, 21, 169, 171, 173, 183, 191-200, 206 Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory 130, 148 Spiral Aftereffect Technique (SAT) Stress control 5, 11, 207, 210-13, 216 Stabilization 29, 31, 48 Standing wave 12, 18 Subliminal perception 16-17, 19, 37, 40, 43, 269 Suicidal ideation 174 Suicidal individuals 34 Sympathovagal balance 4, 143, 145-47, 150, 160 Syncretic mode of cognition 241, 248 T Test of Flight Phobia 26, 40 The self 28, 31-32, 55, 61, 91-93, 102-03, 209, 228, 234-35, 265-66, 275-81, 283-87

298 Torrance Test of Creative Thinking Transference

222 175

Visual afterimages

10 W

U Unusual Uses Test

Witkin's Rod-and-Frame Task

250

222, 225-27, 229-33, 238 Z V

Visionaries

Zero-phases 232-34

11

299

CONTRIBUTORS Amnér, Gunnilla, Ph.D., senior advisor, Learning and Teaching Development Centre, Lund University, Sweden Brown, Jason W., Ph. D., professor, Medical Faculty, New York University, 952 Fifth Ave, New York NY, 10021 USA. Carlsson, Ingegerd, Ph.D., professor, Dept. of Psychology, PO Box 213, SE-22100, Lund, Sweden Draguns, Juris G., Ph.D., professor, Dept of Psychology, Penn. State Universiy, 417 Bruce Moore Bld, University Park PA, 16802 USA. Fransson, Per, Ph.D., assoc. professor, Dept. of Psychology, Umeå University, 90187 Umeå, Sweden. Glicksohn, Jospeh, Ph.D., assoc. professor, Dept. of Criminology and the Multidiciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52100 Israel. Henningsson, Mikael, Ph.D., assoc. professor, Dept.of Psychology, Umeå University, 90187 Umeå, Sweden. Hentschel, Uwe, Ph.D., professor, Department of Psychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, RB2300, Leiden, The Netherlands. Hoff, Eva, Ph.D., lecturer, Malmö College, Hjälmaregatan 1, 20506 Malmö, Sweden. Jönsson, Peter, Ph.D., lecturer, Dept. of Psychology, Lund University, PO Box 213, 22100 Lund, Sweden. Kivling-Bodén, Gunilla, Ph.D., deceased Kragh, Ulf, Ph.D., deceased Neuman, Fredrik, B.A., Dept. of Psychology, Lund University, PO Box 213, 22100 Lund, Sweden. Rubino, I. Alex, Ph.D., professor, Dept of Psychiatry, Tor Vergata University, Rome, Italy. Siracusano, Alberto, M.D., Chairman, Dept. of Psychiatry, Tor Vergata Univesity, Rome, Italy Smith, Gudmund J.W., Ph.D., professor, Dept. of Psychology, PO Box 213, 22100 Lund, Sweden. Sundbom, Elisabet, Ph.D., professor, Dept. of Clinical Sciences, Umeå Univesity, 90187 Umeå, Sweden. Tozzi, Federica, Ph.D., Psychiatrist, Dept. of Psychiatry, Tor Vergata University, Rome. Italy. Zachrisson, Anders, Psychoanalyst, Professor Dals Gate, 0353 Oslo, Norway.

Process Thought Edited by Nicholas Rescher • Johanna Seibt • Michel Weber Advisory Board Mark Bickard • Jaime Nubiola • Roberto Poli Volume 1 Michel Weber (Ed.) After Whitehead Rescher on Process Metaphysics ISBN 3-937202-49-8 Hardcover, 339 pp., EUR 89,00

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