Problem Solving in a Foreign Language 9783110224467, 9783110224450

Citation preview

Problem Solving in a Foreign Language

Studies on Language Acquisition 41

Editor Peter Jordens

De Gruyter Mouton

Problem Solving in a Foreign Language by Lena Heine

De Gruyter Mouton

ISBN 978-3-11-022445-0 e-ISBN 978-3-11-022446-7 ISSN 1861-4248 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Heine, Lena. Problem solving in a foreign language / by Lena Heine. p. cm. ⫺ (Studies on language acquisition ; 41) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-3-11-022445-0 (alk. paper) 1. Second language acquisition ⫺ Study and teaching. 2. Language and languages ⫺ Study and teaching. 3. Language and culture. 4. Sociolinguistics. I. Title. P118.2H45 2010 418.0071⫺dc22 2010003181

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. 쑔 2010 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/New York Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ⬁ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

For Doris and Werner Heine who make things grow and sail the sea

Acknowledgements This book is based on my PhD thesis “Kognitive Prozesse bilingualer Lerner bei der fremdsprachlichen Verarbeitung von Fachinhalten” (2007, Osnabrück University), which was partly funded by the German Research Foundation within the project “Fachlernen und (Fremd-)Sprachlichkeit: aufgabenbasierte Kognition, Kooperation, Kommunikation”. I would like to thank H. Johannes Vollmer for all his support and for taking me ‘on board’, Debbie Coetzee-Lachmann for the many stimulating discussions and the enjoyable working hours spent together, and Verena Barbosa Duarte, Kristin Möller and Randi Troschke for their help with the coding of the think-aloud data. A special thanks goes to Alex Bergs for his support under the final stages of the project. Thanks also to the editor of the present series, Peter Jordens, especially for his valuable comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. My grateful thanks goes to the students of the Ratsgymnasium Osnabrück who allowed me intimate insights into their very thoughts. Without their help this book could never have been written.

Contents Figures Tables

x xi

Chapter 1 Introduction

1

1. 2. 3.

Bilingual education and CLIL Objectives Structure

Chapter 2 Language and thinking 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Linguistic knowledge Linguistic knowledge in multilingual speakers Language and meaning Language and the format of thought Conclusions and summary

Chapter 3 Problem solving 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

1 4 5

8 8 10 13 15 21

23

Mental processes Task solving as problem solving The appropriate level of description Processes vs. phases Focus on meaning and focus on form Summary

23 27 28 30 32 35

Chapter 4 Language-specific cognitive processes

36

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Linguistic processing Processes of text comprehension Processes of language production Models of writing tasks Summary

Chapter 5 A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving 1. 2. 3.

Task-solving as a complex problem solving activity Phases of task solving Summary

36 37 40 42 56

57 57 61 66

viii

Contents

Chapter 6 Task design and task analysis 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The importance of the research design Subjects Elicitation tasks Cognitive task analysis Linguistic task analysis Summary

Chapter 7 Think-aloud data 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Thinking aloud Thinking aloud and language of thought Individual differences in cognitive processing Thinking aloud in L2 settings Think-aloud data as protocols of problem solving activites Summary

Chapter 8 A coding scheme 1. 2. 3. 4.

68 68 68 69 73 79 81

82 82 84 89 90 94 98

99

Coding the data Change of focus between the problem spaces Different phases – different mental activities Summary

99 107 114 118

Chapter 9 Problem solving in a foreign language

119

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Language as a catalytic converter: depth of processing L1-L2 processing differences in language production Language reception Filled and unfilled pauses Mispronunciations Differences in semantic processing of text information? Critical thoughts on the process data Summary

Chapter 10 Evaluation of the think-aloud method 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Limitations of the think-aloud method Subjective interview data Reactivity Mental language switches Is thinking aloud a valid elicitation method? Summary

119 128 148 149 151 156 159 160

162 162 163 165 170 173 176

Contents

Chapter 11 Results and discussion 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Retrospective thoughts Theoretical results Methodological results Empirical results Implications for the design of learning contexts What further research is needed? Final remarks

Transcription conventions References Index

ix 177 177 177 178 183 185 187 189

191 192 214

Figures Fig. 1: Cognitive processes on a continuum of descriptive levels

26

Fig. 2: The model of text composition by Flower and Hayes (1981)

44

Fig. 3: Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1987) model of knowledge telling

46

Fig. 4: Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1987) model of knowledge transforming

48

Fig. 5: Kring’s (1996) model of L2 writing

52

Fig. 6: The model of written language production by Chenoweth and Hayes (2001)

53

Fig. 7: A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving

60

Fig. 8: Tasks 1 to 5 from the task set for the bilingual learners

71

Fig. 9: Task 6 from the task set for the bilingual learners

72

Fig. 10: Jennifer’s answer of task 6

133

Tables Table 1: Framework for the description of complex problem solving tasks Table 2: Task solving phases of the conceptual task solution

32

Table 3: Task solving phases of the linguistic-rhetorical task solution

63

Table 4: Cognitive Task Analysis of Task 2 (knowledge structures and cognitive processes)

78

Table 5: Problem solving phases in the conceptual and the linguisticrhetorical problem spaces

102

Table 6: Cases of deeper semantic processing, caused by activity in the linguistic-rhetoric problem space

129

Table 7: Deeper semantic processing of the CLIL learners, caused by activity in the linguistic problem space

147

Table 8: CLIL learners’ mispronunciations when reading

152

Table 9: Subject-specific scores in the answers of Task 6

156

Table 10: Contribution of individual data types to the study

182

61

Chapter 1 Introduction

1. Bilingual education and CLIL Language is the most elaborated semiotic system we use, and it is inextricably linked with the meaning that it conveys. In all linguistic communication, conceptual content is either constructed on the basis of linguistic structure – namely when utterances are decoded, and a mental representation of the message is constructed –, or it is merged into such a structure – in speech production or text composition. This book is about the effects of foreign language use on the cognitive processes of meaning-focused problem solving. It is an attempt to understand more clearly what happens when humans deal with non-linguistic tasks in a foreign language setting. Thus, I will try to find answers to the following two main questions: 1. 2.

Which role does language play in problem solving activities that have a focus on meaning, but not on form? Does it make a difference if a task with a focus on meaning is solved in an L2 dominated environment, compared to an L1 context?

The question whether the use of a foreign language has any effects on problem solving, is particularly relevant for contexts in which an L2 is used as a working language in educational settings, such as immersion programs or Content and Language Integrated Learning classrooms. Indeed, the main reason why I decided to undertake this research was that I wanted to acquire a better understanding of the characteristics of Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL). I will therefore provide some background information for this educational approach and the state of research in the field.

2

Introduction

In CLIL classrooms, often also called Bilingual Education, a foreign language is used as the medium of instruction and communication in a limited number of content subjects in an otherwise L1 dominated context. In Europe, it has become a very popular form of teaching, and we find it in a wide variety of formats. CLIL differs from immersion programmes, known first and foremost from Canada (Genesee 1987; Harley, Allen et al. 1990; Swain 1998; Swain and Lapkin 1995), in that the dominance of the L2 is smaller and generally only covers one to three school subjects (often science subjects such as geography, history, or biology). Still, differences in individual programmes are large, even within the same country. This makes general statements somewhat difficult, but certain aspects can be generalized (see Dalton-Puffer and Smit 2007 for a summary of the historical development of the discipline, and Garcia 2009 for an overview with an international perspective). Historically, CLIL has in many European contexts emerged as an alternative to the traditional language classrooms, in which not the linguistic structure is in the centre of the syllabus, but its communicative use in authentic learning situations. Systematic comparisons between foreign language proficiency have provided evidence that learners in CLIL classes outperform learners who only participate in the traditional language classrooms (Bredenbröker 2000; DIPF 2006; Helbig 2001; for an overview, see also Vollmer 2000; Wode 1995; Zydatiß 2005, but see Sylven 2004 and Lim Falk 2008). As a rationale for this superior effect on language acquisition, the Comprehensible Input Hypothesis by Krashen (1984; 1985) or, as an alternative approach, the Output Hypothesis (Swain 1985) have been considered. However, only general foreign language proficiency has been measured in the studies mentioned above, while the subject-specific aspects of language use was not in focus. Therefore, it is not surprising that predominantly research on language acquisition has dealt with CLIL, while its character as a subject classroom setting has largely been neglected. This stands in contrast to the fact that in CLIL curricula, linguistic structure and function is only seldom the explicit topic of instruction, in spite of the comprehensive term Content and Language Integrated Learning; language learning is assumed to take place more or less automatically, and CLIL classrooms are generally regarded by teachers and syllabus developers as subject classrooms with a focus on meaning (Long 1991, Long and Robinson 1998), not language classrooms; introducing and practising aspects of linguistic structure is generally regarded as a domain of the foreign language classrooms.

Bilingual education and CLIL

3

Mirrored in CLIL curricula and the scientific discussion is the following understanding: It is assumed that language learning and content learning are regarded as separate processes, and subject-specific content learning occurs more or less independently from language. In contrast to this, we find in any meaning-focused classroom that language plays an important role, even if it is not the centre of attention: Language serves as the dominant means of communication, and the medium in which the subject content is presented and addressed; through language conceptual relations are discussed and negotiated in classroom interactions; subject-specific knowledge is built up by reading textbook chapters, or through discussions with fellow students in group work. Furthermore, language is the predominant semiotic system used in testing learning outcome: In typical achievement tests, students are required to demonstrate learning outcome by putting their knowledge, skills and competences into words, either written or spoken. Even in testing formats, where no oral or written texts have to be produced, language has to be dealt with at least in a receptive way, namely in decoding the task prompts or test questions. Until now only few studies have focused on the aspects of content learning in CLIL settings and the role that language plays therein. So, although several studies have revealed that L2 proficiency is improved in CLIL settings even if it is not in focus, we still do not know what effects the use of the L2 as a working language has on the processing of subject content. One major reason for this is a methodological obstacle: It is much more difficult to measure levels of subject-specific competence than linguistic proficiency, because carefully validated tests for general linguistic proficiency have long been in use, but reliable tests for subject-specific competences are still lacking. Thus in the few studies we find about subject-specific knowledge and its use in typical problem solving situations (Badertscher 2004; Gajo and Serra 2002; Golay 2005; Koch 2005; Koch and Bünder 2006; Stohler 2006), no competence tests have been used up to now; instead pre-post test designs that test only a selection of more or less randomly chosen subject knowledge have been preferred. That is why they cannot claim to give an overall measure of the central subject-specific competences. Within the scope of these tests the studies show that CLIL learners achieve a similar subject-specific proficiency as the control group of learners taught in traditional monolingual environments. First attempts to measure subject-specific competence have been made by Bonnet (2004) for the field of chemistry and Vollmer (2006a; 2006b, 2007, see also Passon 2007) for geography. Vollmer uses a competence

4

Introduction

model developed by the German Geographical Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Geographie 2006). The results are difficult to compare, and Vollmer’s study has not been finalized yet, but here too it seems obvious that the CLIL learners are in their subject-specific competences on a comparable level to learners from traditional classes. These results are particularly interesting with regard to what has been addressed as the ‘CLIL paradox’ (De Florio-Hansen 2003; Thürmann 2000; Zydatiß 2002). The puzzle addressed here is that CLIL learners have to acquire a range of the categories and skills of the subject, but are at the same time lacking the linguistic competence that would allow them to infer these categories from context. So, subject learning and language learning have to take place at the same time, despite the fact that one is the precondition for the other. When we compare this paradox to the outcomes of the studies mentioned above – why are CLIL learners apparently not hindered by the use of the L2 as a working language? How do they compensate for the difficulties they should experience in the foreign language setting? This interrelationship of the two sides of CLIL learning, subject side and language side, needs to be clearly described, and the two sides put into relation to each other to form a scientific basis for the development of curricula, teaching material and suggestions for their implementation.

2. Objectives Although the focus of this book is the relationship between (foreign) language and the construction of conceptual meaning relationships, its aim is not to contribute to the discussion on linguistic relativity, e.g. how speakers of different languages conceptualise the world differently through the particular linguistic microstructures they are using. What I will focus on instead is whether it is possible to see an effect of the use of a foreign language as a working language in processes of task solving. The study thus approaches the intimate relationship between language and thought from the macro-perspective of focus. It asks how phases of problem solving in which a person’s focus is on linguistic information influence processes of meaning construction. So, not subconscious microprocesses of grammatical or lexical processing are at the centre of this study, but potentially conscious phases in a student’s attempt to find a solution to a problem.

Structure

5

It follows that the aims of this book are basically twofold, because in order to understand which role a foreign language plays in content-focused settings, two things are necessary: Firstly, we need a theoretically well-based model of how language and problem solving are interrelated in cognitive processing in general. I will suggest such a model, which integrates the socio-cultural embedding of the cognitive processes. Secondly, assumptions and statements about the effects of the foreign language on the task solving processes should be based on empirical evidence. I will therefore provide an analysis of empirical data that has been elicited, transcribed and categorized especially for this purpose. The data corpus consists of a set of three kinds of data: 1. think-aloud protocols produced by subjects solving meaning-focused tasks in a foreign language setting, 2. the written texts they composed as an answer for the elicitation tasks and 3. interview data collected after the task-solving sessions. While the think-aloud corpus can be regarded as the main data set that has been elicited in order to gain insight into the online-processing of language and conceptual content, the written answers and the interview data serve as complements that allow a methodological triangulation. The following section gives a more detailed outline of the content of the book.

3. Structure The book contains eleven main chapters. After this introductory chapter I will account for the theoretical view underlying the empirical data elicitation of the study. Chapter 2 starts with a short overview over definitions of linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge from different theoretical perspectives and the relationship between language and thought. Chapter 3 continues with a discussion on the processing of information in the context of tasks that can be defined as problems (in other words, situations in which a goal state cannot be reached automatically, but which require the application of knowledge and cognitive activity of some sort). I will discuss different degrees of abstractness in cognitive processes, and distinguish between problem solving processes with a focus on language on the one hand and with a focus on content on the other. In Chapter 4 I will give a short overview of psycholinguistic approaches in order to account for the question of what happens when linguistic infor-

6

Introduction

mation is processed. Here, I briefly discuss processes of speech production and reception, and elaborate on models of text composition and reading. Chapter 5 integrates these basic theoretical assumptions into a model of task-based content and language processing. This model accounts for the assumption that different content-based and linguistic activities can be identified during the macro-process of problem solving, and that the focus can alternate between them. In addition to the process dimension, the model also covers the aspect of learner characteristics and that of the context and the task setting, which account for macro-theoretical assumptions of the individual construction of a mental representation and the necessity of embedding any analysis of cognitive processes into their social contexts. In Chapter 6, the basic framework for the elicitation of the empirical data is provided. The elicitation tasks are firstly described and a way for analysis presented. On the one hand, the problem solving tasks show a clear focus on content in that non-verbal sources of information such as climate graphs and geographical maps had to be interpreted by the subjects. On the other hand, even linguistic information had to be processed in order to solve the tasks: Part of the information was provided in linguistic form (task assignment and information texts) that had to be decoded. Furthermore, the subjects had to formulate a written answer in which they presented their findings. One group of subjects had to work with all linguistic material in their L1 German, while another group had to process all linguistic input in their L2 English, and had to write their answers in the L2 as well. This kind of task design was chosen on the basis of the following reasoning: If interactional effects between content processing and linguistic processing are to be investigated, both kinds of processes take place when such a task is solved, and should thus be accessible in process data. After depicting how the elicitation tasks are designed in order to trigger the mental activities to be investigated, I will in Chapter 7 discuss possibilities for making these mental processes observable. What is interesting here is that most of the time language use is an automatic process that people only seldom reflect on. Normally, we do not notice the words and grammatical constructions we use, but, as it were, we immediately decode their underlying meaning structures. This point has methodological implications for this study in that it has led to the decision to use think-aloud data as the main data source. In the remainder of Chapter 7, the think-aloud method is outlined and discussed in terms of both its advantages and restrictions, and the suitability of think-aloud data as a source for investigating mental processes in problem solving activities is explained.

Structure

7

In Chapter 8, the process categories from the model introduced in Chapter 5 are exemplified, using think-aloud data examples from the study. With their help it is possible to separate the process data into contentfocused and form-focused processing activities. In order to give a reliable interpretation, a cognitive task analysis is shown to be necessary in order to identify different phases of the problem solving process. The focused instances in the data analysis are thus instances where attention on any linguistic form triggers a deeper processing of meaning relationships, especially when an L2 is used as a working language. Thus, no linguistic construction is in particular focus, although it turns out that many problem solving activities are caused by knowledge gaps on the lexical or phrasal level. The results of the data analyses are presented in Chapter 9. Here, the empirical findings are discussed and illustrated with examples from the data. This results in the formulation of a number of hypotheses concerning the role of language in problem solving activity, with a special focus on foreign language use. Owing to the fact that before and during the data elicitation, the thinkaloud method led to many questions that could not be answered by the existing literature, part of the data elicitation was conducted in order to address these problems. Chapter 10 is dedicated to the presentation of these results concerning the validity of the method. Here, evidence is provided for the individual and shifting character of mental processing and the need for psycholinguistic modelling to respond to this. By presenting the hypotheses that have been generated, Chapter 11 summarizes the findings, gives an outline of recommendations for didactic situations as well as perspectives for future research. The chapter concludes with final remarks concerning qualitative and quantitative research designs and hypothesis testing.

Chapter 2 Language and thinking

1. Linguistic knowledge The interrelation between language and non-linguistic knowledge has been of interest in a wide range of fields, ranging from logic and philosophy of language over cognitive psychology to linguistic semantics, and is of crucial interest if we want to find out about possible impacts of language on meaning-focused problem solving activities. In this chapter I will present the theoretical view underlying the design for the empirical study. Because my aim is to study the impact of an L2 on learners’ mental processes in problem solving situations, it is necessary to specify the basic assumptions about linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge. It is not the space here for any detailed accounts of theoretical views; thorough overviews can be found in specialized monographs, such as Edmondson and Burquest (1998) or Herdina and Jessner (2002) for the modelling of linguistic knowledge, or Löbner (2002) or Saeed (2003) for linguistic semantic theories, to name just a few. Instead, I will give a rough overview of how the variety of research strands conceptualise linguistic knowledge, and the relationship between language and thought in general and in problem solving situations in particular. This will form the basis for the analysis for the empirical data, presented in Chapter 9. Since the cognitive shift in the late 1950s the main task of linguistics has been to model linguistic knowledge. In the modular linguistic theories in the Chomskyan tradition that have developed to become the dominant view since then, linguistic knowledge is assumed to be based on innate, specific and independent cognitive mechanisms that differ from those of other conceptual knowledge representations. Although embedded into the general cognitive apparatus, and in principle dependent on a theory of cognition, linguistic knowledge is modelled separately from general cognition, descriptions are made module- internally. Therefore, results from psychological studies on perception and cognition are generally not integrated into linguistic model building.

Linguistic knowledge

9

The terminology used in the neurosciences or cognitive psychology, such as ‘perception’, ‘activation’, or ‘memory’, is seldom used in traditional linguistic approaches, and general cognitive structures and functions play only a subordinate role, if any (but cf. Marantz 2005, who argues that generative linguistic theories are compatible with results from the neurosciences). The same holds for sociopsychological concepts such as ‘expectations’ and ‘assumptions’, ‘affects’ or ‘context’. Rather, linguistic processing is described in its own terminology, such as ‘mental lexicon’ and ‘rules’ for the generation of grammatically correct utterances, without asking detailed questions about the cognitive-psychological reality of these abstract concepts, nor the sociocultural embedding of language use. Within these traditional theories, linguistic competence is regarded as a composite of several autonomous subsystems in which different fields of knowledge are stored, each subsystem controlling a specific level of linguistic representation. In most models, we find a separation into phonological, morphosyntactic, lexical and semantic information (for an overview, see e.g., Aitchison 2003), with varying assumptions about which entities are stored as a whole and what is generated on the basis of rule knowledge (for an overview of different models of morphosyntactic processing, see Haspelmath 2002). What is interesting for us here is the question which structures should be regarded as linguistic knowledge, and which ones have to be thought of as being part of non-linguistic modules. The answer is rather straightforward for knowledge of phonological or grammatical rules, which can clearly be counted as linguistic knowledge. Yet, a distinction becomes more difficult when it comes to the meaning part of language. Generally, linguistic knowledge is assumed to contain a semantic part in the mental lexicon, where the meaning of linguistic entities, such as words, is stored. It contains information about what is permanent of a word’s core meaning, or its sense (e.g., the general, isolated meaning of a word like ‘shoe laces’, Evans and Green 2006: 208). Semantic knowledge is contrasted with encyclopaedic, or conceptual, knowledge, which is assumed to be stored outside the linguistic module, and contains knowledge of the world (e.g., where to buy shoe laces or how to tie them, Evans and Green 2006: 208). Encyclopaedic knowledge is by traditional linguists regarded as belonging to the field of cognitive psychology, rather than linguistics, and is not integrated into the modelling of linguistic core disciplines. This traditional view has been challenged, however, as I will explain in the following section.

10

Language and thinking

2. Linguistic knowledge in multilingual speakers After this short overview of general linguistic theories, the question remains how foreign language acquisition research attempts to model the organization of linguistic knowledge. Foreign language research has suggested different approaches (for overviews, see e.g. Appel and Muysken 1987; Baker and Prys Jones 1998; Bhatia and Ritchie 2008; Herdina and Jessner 2002; Kroll and de Groot 2005). Because at least two language systems are in focus here, a bigger grain size is chosen for the theoretical view. This often leads to the unfavourable situation that models are restricted to an internal theorizing of this aspect, but fail to embed it into a larger framework. Compare for Herdina and Jessner (2002), who criticise that a large number of theories currently discussed in research on language acquisition and multilingualism lack an overall theoretical foundation.

In the following, I will only present theories that do address the issue of knowledge representation. Older theories describe multilingual knowledge as subordinate compartments of the language module, and with that tie in with modular theories of grammar. Here, the models by Weinreich (1953) and Ervin and Osgood (1954) used to have a highly influential status. A central concept in their assumptions is the differentiation between compound and coordinate bilingualism. A compound bilingual speaker has learned two languages in the same cultural context, while a coordinate bilingual learner has formed each language system in a different cultural surrounding. In the first case, it is assumed that both languages form a common mental representation, so that words from the different language systems relate to the same conceptual representation. In the second case, on the other hand, two separate representations are formed, in which each language’s lexicon is stored separately and linked to separate conceptualizations. If the proficiency for both languages is different in coordinate languages, which is the norm in foreign language acquisition, Weinreich suggests that the concepts from the language with the higher proficiency can influence the interpretation of word meaning of the other language (= influence from L1 to L2). Generally, it is assumed that is more probable that more interferences occur between compound than between coordinate language systems.

Linguistic knowledge in multilingual speakers

11

In order to test these theoretical assumptions, studies in error analysis and contrastive research designs were conducted. Their goal was to investigate on a structural and behaviourist background which stages of language development occur and which transfer and interference phenome between language systems can be found (see Edmondson and House 2000; Herdina and Jessner 2002). The theoretical assumption behind this is that the learner language develops successively from an incomplete to a native speaker status. Furthermore, an influence of the L1 on the L2 is assumed in the way that identical structures in the L2 should be easy to acquire, while different structures should be difficult, and result in linguistic structures that deviate from the target language structure. This contrastive hypothesis has met harsh critique: Learner language is typically instable and in many respects independent from the L1, so that the individual and constructive character of language learning with its embedding into learner motivations and other factors needs to be integrated in explanations. Most learners do never reach an L2 proficiency comparable to their L1, but tend to reach a standstill on certain stages (Corder 1971; Nemser 1971; Selinker 1972). Besides that, the degree of difficulty cannot be defined by the degree of difference between linguistic structures, because this value would remain constant (Edmondson and House 2000). This means that English learners of German would have the same difficulties as German learners of English, but that is obviously not the case: Any second language teacher will attest that the German verb position in subordinate clauses usually poses big problems for native speakers of English, while the corresponding syntax of English is only seldom problematic for German learners of English. Likewise, the contrastive hypothesis cannot explain why learners of the same L1 do experience idiosyncratic difficulties when learning the same L2. And finally, early research (Osgood 1949) already indicates that a lack of contrast can cause errors in the L2 system as well. So, even when there are only minor differences between L1 and L2, more problems can arise than when the differences are very obvious. Another highly influential early study for theories on L2 representations is Peal and Lambert (1962). In a large-scale investigation, it could show that bilingual Canadian children (English-French) were not only superior to a French-speaking control group in verbal tests in both languages, but even in nonverbal tests of cognitive ability. This study is highly important for the following reasons: Before it, L1 influence on the L2 was only assumed to lead to negative transfer phenomena. Now it could not only be shown

12

Language and thinking

that even the L2 had an effect back on the L1, but even on other cognitive areas. These results could be confirmed in further studies (Baker and Prys Jones 1998). These results provide evidence against the modular hypothesis, because a modular view cannot account for interactions between the linguistic module and other cognitive modules. Another theoretical model that explicitly addresses the representation of different language systems in multilinguals is suggested by Cummins (1979; 1984; 1991). In part, it can provide explanations for the Peal and Lambert study. According to Cummins, linguistic knowledge can be subdivided into different types of knowledge: Basic interpersonal communication skills (BICS) und Cognitive/Academic Language Proficiency (CALP). BICS covers linguistic elements such as pronunciation, lexicon, and grammar, which enable the speaker to communicate. CALP, on the other hand, refers to the ability to use language as a cognitive tool in order to construct and structure abtract thoughts and master metalinguistic requirements. For instance, a general text decoding ability is assumed that transfers general decoding-related strategy knowledge to new L2 knowledge. This means that a proficient L1 reader will also be a proficient L2 reader (of course this is determined by general proficiency). Likewise, abilities that have been acquired in L2 contexts are accessible for L1 usage as well. Another model is linked to this interdependence hypothesis which challenges the traditional view of multilingualism as multiple monolingualism (see Baker 1996). Within the framework of multiple monolingualism, language acquisition is regarded as a reduplicated number of processes and cognitive resources, so the abilities for each language are separate (Cummins calls this SUP for Separate Underlying Proficiency). This assumption underlies the old view that multilingualism is actually restricting cognitive capacities: The more cognitive resources are bound by one language, the less capacities are left over for the other languages. According to this logic, the optimal case is monolingualism. As a contrasting theoretical view, Cummins suggests a Common Underlying Proficiency (CUP). Multilinguals use a common pool that is underlying all their languages systems. This is conformous with the fact that increase of proficiency in one language can have even a positive effect on the other language systems. The studies by Peal and Lambert (1962), and concurrently the interdependence hypothesis by Cummins (1979; 1984; 1991) have provided im-

Language and meaning

13

portant impulses for more recent models of multilingual language knowledge. In particular, we can state that the potential for interaction between cognitive and language-specific knowledge is a well-accepted concept by now. Furthermore, the constructivist assumption that there are individual differences in how the linguistic subsystems are build up and interact with each other (cf. Riemer 1997). Language systems are highly dynamic, so that a once reached proficiency stage can be lost again. Newer models make use of system theory and chaos theory, and the basic assumptions of Cognitive Linguistics have been adapted for foreign language research (ibid., also Achad and Niemeier 2004). This has implications which lead to a renaissance of topics from earlier research under new focus: Still the question is unanswered whether multilingual speakers store knowledge in one cumulative or several separate mental lexica. In this context, the Subset model by Paradis (1987) takes an intermediate position, and might have the biggest explanatory power. It starts out from a single mental lexicon of all languages, while each linguistic code forms an internal subsystem within it, either because these elements are used in combination so often (Raupach 1994) or because of structural features such as the phonological-prosodical system. As this short overview shows, it seems not justified to assume separate cognitive modules, in which the linguistic module is subdivided further into different linguistic codes. Instead, the interlinking and interdependency of all knowledge ares has to be stressed, and conceptual meaning is not bound to single linguistic systems. 3. Language and meaning The relationship between linguistic structure and underlying conceptual representations, that has been addressed already, is the traditional field of linguistic semantics. I will therefore give a short summary over different theories here that might be relevant for the theoretical basis of the present study. Traditional linguistic semantics assumes formal, clear analytical categories. Within the formal approach of feature semantics (Katz 1972; Wierzbicka 1996), word meaning is modelled with the help of a finite number of semantic primitives (the concept BACHELOR would show the features +HUMAN, +MALE, +ADULT, -MARRIED). In order to identify these primitives, a strictly structuralist analysis is used: The semantic fields

14

Language and thinking

within the mental lexicon are structured according to lexical relations, so that the single elements of a field come to stand in semantic relationships of homonymy, antonymy, hyponymy etc. to each other. Besides that, the single element is internally structured in that it is distinguished from other elements by its distinctive features. What follows from this is that word meaning can be described as being built up of smaller entities. All other associations that are not triggered by the semantic primitives are assumed to belong to encyclopaedic world knowledge. The criticism of models of feature semantics starts out from the observation that humans do not distinguish phenomena in the world as strictly distinguishable on the basis of a number of features. Feature semantics cannot account for the fact that people often experience difficultiy in sorting phenomena into clear categories; hedging expressions like ‘this thing is a kind of X’ or ‘this thing resembles an X’ hint at this fact, as well as a range of experiments, e.g. the cups and mugs experiment by Labov (1973) and a range of experiments by Rosch (1975, 1977, 1999). This led to the formulation of prototype semantics (Rosch 1975, 1977, 1999). Prototype semantics investigates how humans construct meaning through category building, and describes this system of categories. The experimental evidence suggests that humans perceive the world as structured, which is mirrored in their cognitive categories, and not the number of necessary distinctive features determines the meaning of a phenomenon, but the features that make it to a more or less good representative of a category. Thus, a German shepherd might be a good representative of the category DOG, while a pug or a chihuahua are untypical representatives. This view integrates concepts of gradience and fuzziness (Aarts 2007). For linguistics these findings set the stage for the integration of neighbouring disciplines, particularly cognitive psychology, because they made it obvious that for linguistic structures the same basic mechanisms apply as for other forms of cognition. It is crucial here that prototypes cannot be explained without the integration of world knowledge, because what is considered to be a good or a bad member of a category is often to a high degree culture specific and grounded in personal experience; so the strict distinction between linguistic knowledge and encyclopaedic knowledge is suspended. A similar approach is taken in frame semantics (Fillmore 1975, 1977, 1982; Fillmore and Atkins 1992) and script theory (Schank and Abelson 1977), which introduce basic ideas from newer branches of Cognitive Linguistics. Here, it could be shown that humans store prototypical and sche-

Language and the format of thought

15

matic situations (frames) or typical scenarios (scripts) on the basis of their individual experiences, which guide processes of categorisation, expectations, and actions. The meaning of single words can only be understood in the context of these frames and scripts, because the connected field of experience reveals different aspects of lexeme meaning. So, the question which features of a concept become meaningful can only be answered by embedding them into larger relational schemes; denotation and connotation of a word fall into one. Evans and Green (2006: 161) illustrate this fact with the following examples: (a) The child is safe. (b) The beach is safe. (c) The shovel is safe. In these examples, the word safe shows a range of different meanings, which can only be inferred from context. Whether the subject of either example sentence is perceived as being potentially endangered, or on the contrary as a potential source of danger, depends on a language user’s world knowledge about children, beaches and shovels: [T]he conventional meaning associated with a particular word is just a ‘prompt’ for the process of meaning construction: the ‘selection’ of an appropriate interpretation against the context of the utterance. [ibid, bold face in original|

So, single lexemes trigger processes of conceptual meaning construction, but do actually contain less fixed meaning than is traditionally assumed. They are the key that opens up the path through the conceptual content that is attached to a particular concept, of which different features can be foregrounded in different contexts. 4. Language and the format of thought An important issue that needs to be taken up in the discussion of the relationship between language and conceptual processing is the actual format of thoughts. If it should turn out that thoughts are dependent on a linguistic format, then language would be insolubly interconnected with processes of thinking, and thought would not be possible without language, so that lan-

16

Language and thinking

guage might in fact be the actual cause for our thinking abilities. If, on the other hand, thought is possible without language, linguistic and conceptual knowledge can be assumed to be separable on a cognitive level, and this has consequences for the setup of the empirical study presented here. We find a range of different theories about the format of thinking and the interrelation between language and conceptual content, which I summarize in the following. 4.1. Thinking for speaking and linguistic relativity The view that language and thought are insolubly interconnected has a long tradition. Going back to von Humboldt (ca. 1919), it has been assumed that the native language is the actual format we think in, so that the language we speak is the format that codes our thoughts. Following from this is that language contains a theory of how speakers mentally represent the world, so that each natural language can be seen as a system for the conceptualisation of reality. Because certain conceptual structures are linguistically conventionalised in a given language, certain ways of mental representation are conventionalised as well. Cultural conventions are thus mirrored in linguistic structures and patterns, and their repeated use reinforces the conventions in return. As a result it has been hypothesised that speakers of different languages must think differently, because languages with different grammatical structures and semantic word boundaries serve as different classificatory systems that control a person’s perception of the world. A closely related implication to this view is known as ‘linguistic relativity’, traditionally linked to the work of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf (Sapir 1949; Whorf 1956). According to the strong version of this view, which is often called ‘linguistic determinism’, language does not only provide a framework for classification of thoughts, but actually imposes restrictions on possible ways of thinking and reasoning, so that we are only able to see reality through our linguistic filter. This view equates thought with language and has met strong criticism, mainly for two reasons: On the one hand, there is evidence of thinking without language (cf. the results obtained by Barsalou et al. 2003, see next section), on the other hand there is the fact that linguistic structure never fully comprises the semantic richness of a message (see section above).

Language and the format of thought

17

Linguistic determinism can today be said to be largely discredited, on the grounds that it is seems unlikely that linguistic categories embody the only kind of influence on our thought processes; we all share the experience that we can create both new words and new concepts. Nevertheless, the basic idea that the linguistic structure we use has an impact on the way we conceptualise has met renewed interest in Cognitive Linguistics, both under the names ‘linguistic relativity’ and ‘thinking for speaking’ (Slobin 1987; 1996; 2000; Boroditsky 2001, Li and Gleitmann 2002). Still, linguistic relativism has been criticised harshly (e.g., Pinker 1995). One of the main flaws addressed is its methodological circularity – Slobin (1987; 1996; 2000) for instance only uses linguistic data to infer results about non-linguistic thinking. What he can show is only that grammar and thought correlate (which indeed does not come as a surprise when verbal data are used as the source of information), but fails to prove that language really has an impact on cognition. Pinker parodies this reasoning in the following circular argumentation: [They] speak differently so they must think differently. How do we know that they think differently? Just listen to the way they speak! (Pinker 2007: 50)

Nevertheless, in studies that have taken regard to this methodological issue and used non-linguistic data, it could be shown that different languages embody different conceptual classifications of the world, for instance in that semantic contrasts expressed by grammar lead to differences in perspective and foregrounding of certain aspects of concepts (Lucy 1992; see also overview in Pavlenko 2005), while here too, it has to be concluded that linguistic structure is not the only factor that influences thought. 4.2. Sociocultural theory Because it also addresses the relationship between thinking and language, and has become a widely used theoretical framework, I want to mention Vygotsky’s socio-cultural theory of mind (Vygotsky 1978, 1986) in this context. It has a strong developmental focus and tries to explain how children develop their cognitive abilities. In that, it stresses the social aspect of thinking and perception, and describes the role that language as a semiotic tool plays in the internalisation of concepts and thus the conceptual and at the same time social development of humans.

18

Language and thinking

Sociocultural theory can generally be seen in the tradition of the SapirWhorf hypothesis (Vygotsky 1986: ch. 1) but puts the focus on some special concepts. One central assumption of this theory is that [e]very function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later, on the individual level: first, between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological) (Vygotsky 1978: 57)

According to this assumption, higher thinking processes are originally derived from structures and functions of social interaction; these are eventually internalised in that they manifest themselves in internal mental structures. Because of its origin in social and cultural structures, these mental structures mirror the socioculture in which the individual is raised. Special emphasis is laid upon the Zone of Proximal Development: This concept refers to the internalisation of culture (which equals with the establishment of consciousness and learning processes) by means of semiotic mediation, and assumes that the process of internalisation optimally takes place when cognitively more mature individuals interact with immature ones (e.g., in teacher – student relations). This relationship provides situations in which the expert leads the novice to insights that he or she would not have been able to reach alone. Language plays a central role in this mediation process: It is the most elaborated semiotic system that humans use, and it is a vital tool in social interaction. In that, it provides the interface that allows interaction between an individual’s mind and the outside world, it is the cause for higher order thinking, and stays indelibly interconnected with the mental structures that it helped to create. Vygotsky does not assume that language is necessary in order to think in general (e.g., he assumes a prelinguistic phase in the development of children, in which nevertheless thinking takes place), but that a close connection emerges in the run of the ontogenetic development of an individual. In his considerations about word meaning Vygotsky characterises the character of meaning as basically procedural and changing, ‘a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought. […] Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them’ (Vygotsky 1978: 57). In this context, Vygotsky uses the concept of inner speech which he defines as a kind of condensed and abbreviated speech the speaker does not utter but produces for himself in the interaction with the world. Inner

Language and the format of thought

19

speech and external speech are assumed to be two different types of language because they have different functions: External language is believed to be an externalisation of thoughts, while inner speech is a translation of words into thoughts. So, Vygotsky assumes that thought and speech unite into verbal thought (Vygotsky 1986: ch. 1), and that inner speech is closely connected to it. Sociocultural theory does not so much answer questions of how structures of thought and cognitive processes can be modelled, which I will focus on in more detail further on. Still, it can be combined with approaches from cognitive science without any greater friction (Frawley 1997). I regard this theory as a supplement to the cognitive models I will describe in the next section, and particularly appreciate the stress it lays on the social context in which the individual stands. Even when the focus is not explicitly on linguistic structure, the fact that according to this theory abstract thoughts in particular are dependent on language might have an impact on the conceptualisation of the different foci in teaching situations and shall be kept in mind here. 4.3. The format of thought The issue of the format of thinking and the role language plays therein has been the cause of a long debate in cognitive psychology, known as the ‘imagery debate’ (overview in Kosslyn 1994; Tye 1991). Generally, there have been two contradictory positions: One, dominantly represented by Fodor (1995), states that thoughts are coded in a ‘language of thought’, which he calls mentalese. Although mentalese is a language-like structure that makes use of propositional entities, it is not the same as the speaker’s mother tongue: It is an abstract format in which propositions are combined on the basis of a mental syntax. So, verbatim word order of a specific language is not encoded, but sense relationships. The English and German sentences ‘Bill ate 20 cookies’ and ‘Bill aß 20 Kekse’ are represented by the same single proposition with the following elements: Time – PAST Relation – EAT Object – COOKIES Agent – BILL

20

Language and thinking

The same proposition is contained in the sentence ‘20 cookies were eaten by Bill’ and its translation into German, French, or any other language. According to this theory, thoughts are represented in this abstract propositional code, and have to be translated into the language actually spoken by the thinking subject. This theory stresses the innateness of general cognitive principles, assumes that human thinking is based on the linking of conceptual entities and is not dependent on any natural language system in particular. Contrasting this, the dual coding theory by Paivio (1971; 1986) takes an intermediate position between the two extremes ‘thinking is possible without language’ and ‘thinking is only possible because of language’. It assumes that there are different cognitive codes for verbal and non-verbal information and gives equal weight to both kinds of processing. Paivio assumes that both subsystems process information simultaneously but have different functions: Verbal coding takes place when a person is confronted with verbal information, e.g., when reading, or listening to speech. If the input is visual, then the representation is coded in a visual-spatial representation. Contrary to the verbal coding system, the visual-spacial system is not sequential but can process different dimensions of information, such as size or colour, at the same time. Both subsystems can be activated independently, but depending on the semantic content of the input, the other system can be activated in a crosstalk-like process. So, for example, when a person reads a description of a house, the linguistic subsystem is activated, but simultaneously a mental image of a house is formed by the visualspacial subsystem. By this, dual coding of information can take place. Evidence for visual-spacial coding stems furthermore from research on mental models (Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005; Craik and Lockhart 1972; Garnham and Oakhill 1996; Gentner and Stevens 1983; JohnsonLaird 1983; Oakhill and Garnham 1996) which proves that humans build mental representations in an analogue, visual-spatial, mode. These representations structurally resemble the structure of the perceived phenomenon. Mental model theory can explain the fact that humans are able to predict features and effects of complex entities: Because we experience phenomena as systems, we can mentally simulate and modify them (e.g. by mental rotation) which in turn enables us to make predictions and hypothetical assumptions, e.g. about cause-effect relationships. Inferences and analogies play an important role here. Representations of this kind are not assumed to consist of discrete elements, as for example the language of thought hy-

Conclusions and summary

21

pothesis by Fodor would assume, but form a structural and functional entity that is holistic in nature. Recent models of enactive theories of thought activity (Barsalou 1999, 2003; Barsalou et al. 2003) follow up the basic assumptions of the mental model approach in that they model thinking in an analogue format. Enactive models move away from the theory that knowledge is stored in discrete symbolic entities and stress the constructive and procedural character of thinking. Here it is assumed that conceptual processing is based on modality-specific systems of auditory, tactile, olfactory and visual-spacial processing, so not only is a dual coding assumed, but a multitude of sensory formats. Information is not transferred into amodal symbols, but modality-specific states are stored in memory in their modal form (for empirical evidence see Barsalou et al. 2003). Although this theory is not concerned with linguistic representations whatsoever but models conceptual formats from a cognitive perspective only, the evidence supports the view that there is conceptual content that is not connected with language. 5. Conclusions and summary As this overview indicates, the relationship between language and thought has been modelled in various ways and with different purposes. As Prototype Theory suggests, the modular-linguistic approach with its distinction between objectively describable semantic knowledge and subjective encyclopaedic knowledge cannot account for a range of experimental results. It seems to make more sense to explicitly integrate the constructive character of any kind of knowledge into a model of linguistic knowledge. A range of experimental results supports the assumption that there is no general distinction between linguistic meaning and encyclopaedic meaning. It is thus not necessary to use specific criteria for describing semantic knowledge, as is indeed assumed in newer linguistic theories that integrate concepts from cognitive psychology into linguistic modelling, such as Construction Grammar or Cognitive Linguistics (Goldberg 2006; Evans and Green 2006; Geeraerts 2006). These branches do not describe linguistic knowledge as being in need of a distinct language-specific formalism. Instead, they stress that conceptual structure and processes of categorisation are sufficient to describe linguistic meaning. Furthermore, research from cognitive psychology suggests different formats for thought, but none of the dominant theories assumes natural lan-

22

Language and thinking

guage to play a nesessary role in the coding of thought. Empirical evidence makes it likely that there are a range of modes of mental representations, among them visual, auditory, and linguistic ones, the latter being connected with the linguistic language systems of which the speaker possesses knowledge (Barsalou et al. 2003; Ericsson and Simon 1993). Although the actual format of thinking seems not to be bound to language, language can be assumed to play an important role in building up abstract knowledge categories, in the ontological development into a mature social being, and although people using different languages are in principle able to think any thought, the association of thoughts with specific lexical and grammatical structures might lead to differences in conceptualisation and perspective. So, semantic concepts in the mental lexicon have their origin in individual and social experiences. Between encyclopaedic and linguistic information stored in a speaker’s mind, a close interrelation can be assumed, because linguistic concepts belong to our experience of reality and have a big impact on the ontogenesis of each individual’s system of cognitive concepts. The result is a closely intertwined relationship between cognitive and linguistic concepts. Conceptual structure does not necessarily form a part of linguistic structure; language, on the other hand, serves as a highly sophisticated semiotic tool for the encoding of meaning, thus for thinking. An immediate consequence from this is highly interesting for the investigation of how linguistic structure influences conceptual content: When we use lexical items and syntactic constructions in order to express a thought, we automatically feature the conceptual structure that the lexicon and grammar of that particular language encodes; by this, certain aspects are put in the background, while others are pushed into the focus of attention. On this basis a distinctive definition of linguistic and conceptual knowledge on pure functional grounds seems useful. I will therefore define linguistic knowledge as knowledge underlying the semiotic system of language. This is knowledge that enables humans to formulate thoughts in language and to interact with others verbally. It refers to those elements of knowledge that contain knowledge about speech sounds, lexemes and the possible ways of connecting them to phrases and sentences, but even about stylistic and rhetorical rules, about different discourse forms and metalinguistics knowledge. Contrasting to this, the definition of conceptual knowledge I will use here is the following: Conceptual knowledge refers to any kind of knowledge structure that is necessary in order to construct meaning, and which is not concerned with the semiotic system of language.

Chapter 3 Problem solving

1. Mental processes As follows from the discussion in the previous chapter, I will regard language as a tool for thinking, but not as the format we think in. What, then, is thinking? How can we grasp what happens on a mental level when we plan and focus our attention on different mental concepts? When we try to describe processes of thinking in everyday language, we can choose from an overwhelming list of vocabulary: We consider, remember, learn, plan, compare, know, recognise, imagine, calculate, translate, analyse, evaluate, solve problems – a list that can easily be continued (cf. Fortescue 2001). But which mental processes are actually described by these verbs? What is, cognitively speaking, the difference between them? Is it possible to define them distinctively at all? Some further thought reveals that not every expression seems suitable for a cognitive distinction between processes of thought. Let’s take a look at the verb ‘understand’: On the one hand, it can refer to the result of the mental act in which information already stored in memory is retrieved; formulated in a more abstract way, it refers to processes of reconstruction and activation. On the other hand, ‘understand’ can refer to processes in which new knowledge elements are added or new connections between concepts are established. A paraphrase for this process would be ‘learning’. This example suggests two notions: Firstly, that there are different levels of description that can help define what we actually mean when we speak of mental processes; secondly, when we analyse what verbs of mental processes actually depict, we evoke a theoretical framework about what cognition is and how it works. All recent theories of cognition, including theories of language acquisition (Grotjahn 1997), regard human behaviour as complex, that means as the result of a range of simpler processes (see e.g. Palmer and Kimchi 1986 and Massaro and Cowan 1993; for overviews in the area of language acquisition, see Grotjahn 1997 and Robinson 1995). Mental events are described functionally as events in which information is processed. Information, according to Massaro and Cowan (1993: 386), is the mental

24

Problem solving

representation that a person constructs, either by individual interpretation of external data, or by activating existent cognitive structures from memory. Information as this internal mental representation is to be understood within a constructivist framework, which means that it is a result of a subjective and individual interpretation process; it cannot directly be linked to any objective reality, and can differ from person to person. Thus information can be understood as a specific state of the cognitive apparatus. Within this view, every process can be regarded as a three-step module that consists of the following components (Palmer and Kimchi 1986: 40): 1. the information that forms the starting point 2. the operation that is performed on the initial information and which modifies it 3. the resulting information as a result of the processing event. Each of these three processes provides information that is necessary for the next one. This, however, does not imply that mental processing can only be modelled serially; parallel processing is also possible. Nevertheless, within each basic module, the order is logically obligatory. Starting from here any processing event can in principle be described as the sum of sub-processes which makes it possible to describe it on different levels of abstraction. In cognitive psychology, two different kinds of theoretical description of cognitive processes are usual: One uses the physiognomy, the mental ‘hardware’, as the reference point for the description; the other is concerned with the ‘software’ that runs on it, that is which functions the processes have in a computational system (Palmer and Kimchi 1986: 49f), without taking the physiological basis into account. On the level of a physical description with the highest degree of detail, cognitive processes are described as neurological activities. The mental state in question corresponds here to the interplay between different biochemical processes which consist in their most basic elements of coordinated activity or inactivity of neurons, or in Palmer and Kimchi’s (1986: 42) words: Such descriptions are ultimately reducible, at least in theory, to quantal happenings among countless quarks, or whatever the most microscopic level of physical reality happens to be.

Mental processes

25

Theories at this end of the continuum use terminology such as ‘perception’, ‘stimulus’, ‘activating’, ‘inhibiting’, ‘connecting’, ‘disconnecting’ (cf. Bruner 1966, Dörner 1999: 61; Rumelhart and Norman 1978). More dominating in cognitive science are, however, theories about the ‘cognitive software program’: There is, in addition, a ... strategy for dealing with the conditions under which to stop decomposing, and that is simply not to worry about it. Many IP [information processing, L.H.] psychologists, perhaps even most of them, are quite satisfied to work at a level that is well above any ultimate ‘primitives’ and leave theorizing at such a ‘low’ level to other theorists. (Palmer and Kimchi 1986: 49)

These theories use more complex and more functional descriptions and employ terminology that coincides with everyday language use. Mostly, terminology like ‘thinking’, ‘problem solving’, ‘language comprehension’, ‘judging’, ‘drawing conclusions’, ‘learning’ or ‘memory activation’ is used (e.g., Anderson 2000; Eysenck and Keane 2000; Solso 2005). Cognitive processes here are defined independently of their physiological basis. Because of the functional description, there is often no reason for cognitive psychologists to draw clear lines between them; therefore, terminology can overlap. From this follows that a dichotomic view of process descriptions on the material basis on the one side and functional descriptions on the other does not seem useful; rather, the information processing paradigm that I will use here suggests that both positions should be considered to be the end points on a continuum in which complexity and abstractness increase cumulatively. This view is illustrated in Figure 1. The processes indicated above the axis illustrate exemplary taxonomies, with an increasing degree of complexity from the left to the right. The processes indicated here range from biochemical descriptions on an extreme micro level of detail (to the left) to a more functional description that does not take the material basis of cognitive processes into account at all (to the right). Note that the processes to the left can be regarded as cumulative elements of the processes to their right. At the same time, even within the taxonomies there can be different degrees of cognitive complexity: So, the process of ‘comparing’ is not always cognitively the same, depending on the complexity of the objects of comparison, and how it is anchored in the knowledge store of the subject.

26

Problem solving

Neurons firing

Basic cognitive processes as neurological events

Activating Inhibiting Linking Dissolving

Comparing Concatenating Abridging Transform ...

Basic cognitive processes as functional entities

Perceive Learning Judging Problem Solving

Functional process clusters that characterise specific performance

Figure 1. Cognitive processes on a continuum of descriptive levels

As Figure 1 shows, functional and neurological standpoints can be linked smoothly if we take the theoretical view that every cognitive activity can ultimatively be described in terms of neurological microprocesses. Both are compatible with each other. Note that in such a decomposition of operations, the sub-components are not only quantitatively simpler, but show a different quality (Palmer and Kimchi 1986): In a decomposition of the process ‘search in memory’, for instance, the following range could result: a. ‘perception of external stimulus’, b. ‘comparison of perceived information with content in memory’, c. ‘decision that congruence is the case’ and d. ‘conditional control (if congruence, give out result, otherwise go on searching)’. None of these sub-components bears any resemblance with the overall process ‘search in memory’ – it is a result of the combination of them. Speaking of a ‘search’ is therefore actually only reasonable if we take a higher level of abstractness. Thinking can be defined as situation-specific activation and construction of different semantic relationships between pieces of information in memory. According to this, the solving of meaning-focused tasks can be described as a sequence of cognitive processes, which lead to the establishment of meaningful relations between knowledge structures. In order to develop the analytical tools for the present study, I now need to decide at which level of abstractness mental processes can be analysed

Task solving as problem solving

27

with enough illustrative and explanatory power. In order to do this, I will turn back to the actual processes to be investigated.

2. Task solving as problem solving On the basis of the theoretical grounds established in the above paragraphs, it is now possible to develop a clear understanding of how the mental activity can be captured. Because I want to investigate how learners mentally deal with content-focused activities while using a foreign language, I will use the concept of task to capture all activities that a learner can go through in these situations. This concept is embedded into the approach of problem solving, a well-established branch of applied cognitive psychology. Problem solving research investigates how humans solve complex tasks for which they do not have any immediate solutions, and this provides a suitable framework for the kind of activities I will focus on here. In order to classify a situation as a problem, three components are necessary: a. a beginning state that is perceived as being in some way unsatisfactory, b. a desired goal state and c. a lack of knowledge of how to immediately change a. into b. From this follows that automatised activities are not subsumed under problem solving activities, because for them, only the feature of goal directedness would suffice. On this basis, the process of problem solving can be subdivided into two macro processes, namely a process in which the problem is identified, and a search process. Before the solving activity can be started, a mental representation of the problem has to be created. This means that the starting point needs to be perceived by the individual as being unsatisfactory, and a mental representation of goal state has to be constructed. Processes of problem solving show central features that make them compatible with the information processing approach I have presented in the above: Problem solving is goal-directed, the problem is divided into subordinate goals, and operations are used that transform the actual problem state in a step-by-step manner on the way to the desired final goal state. So, in the process of being solved, a problem takes different shapes. The total of these states is called problem space. It can be characterised by the sum of all possible states and operations that can be applied in order to reach the goal state. Thus the process of problem solving can be regarded as a search in the problem space by which subordinate problems are identi-

28

Problem solving

fied, and it can be described as a sequence of processes that are carried out in order to solve these subordinate problems. In problem solving theory, there is consensus about which embedded problem solving activities can be identified. Pretz et al. (2003: 3) paraphrase them as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Recognize or identify the problem. Define and represent the problem mentally. Develop a solution strategy. Organize his or her knowledge about the problem. Allocate mental and physical resources for solving the problem. Monitor his or her progress towards the goal. Evaluate the solution for accuracy.

In spite of the numbering in Pretz et al. (2003), no sequential order should be assumed, nor the implication be made that every problem solving must contain all of these subordinate processes. Rather, they comprise the basic glossary for the description of any kind of mental activity that can occur during the solving of a problem. Nevertheless, problems of very different shape are possible (for a discussion of different problem types see Funke 2003). Crucial features in the characterisation of a problem are the amount and degree of explicitness of information provided by the context, but even characteristics of the subject who constructs his or her individual representation of the problem and makes use of individual knowledge. These two complexes, problem features and subject features, can be subdivided ad libitum (see model in Funke 2003: 34). They interact with each other and determine in turn at which point the solving process is started, which subordinate processes occur in which order and when the solving process is ended. 3. The appropriate level of description Because of its flexible macro-framework, problem solving can serve as a suitable mesotheoretical approach for the question I want to investigate here. On this basis I will now define the grain size with which I will try to observe the cognitive processes that can reveal any possible interaction between meaning-focused task solving and L2 use.

The appropriate level of description

29

If we take a look back at Figure 1 and look at the left hand side of the scale, a degree of highest resolution with a distinction between ‘neurons firing’ or not does not seem adequate for an investigation of my research question: They would not provide us with any comprehensible format for mental activities that a learner goes through while solving a task. On the other hand, it should be made sure that linguistic and content-focused processes are not described too broadly, so that a distinction between the two can be maintained. This suggests that a cognitive process description such as planning, for instance, seems too coarse for my research question, although it is implicated by the terminology of problem solving research: It is possible that an interesting interaction between language and contentfocused cognition takes place as a subordinate process just underneath this superordinate activity of planning. We need more detail that enables us to distinguish between language-specific and content-specific planning, so I will start out from the smallest common denominator above the level of neuronal activity. As already mentioned above, the result of mental activity can take different shapes: On the one hand, knowledge structures can be reactivated without being structurally changed, which could be paraphrased as memorizing. Common verbs for these processes of reconstruction are, e.g. ‘remembering’, ‘knowing something’, or ‘recognising’. This stands in contrast to a restructuring, or to the completely new creation of knowledge structures. These processes are commonly subsumed under the term learning, and are often referred to in terms of assimilation or accretion (integration of new information into already existing mental structures). This can result in a more detailed field of knowledge and is then called tuning (Bruner 1966, Norman and Rumelhart 1975, Piaget 2002, Vygotsky 1986). Furthermore, incoming information can lead to the restructuring of knowledge. This happens when it cannot be integrated into existing schemata, so that it is only interpretable when these schemata are changed. Processes of this kind are often called accommodation or restructuring (ibid). This equates with learning, because it results in knowledge that was not manifest before the mental activity started. There is a wide variety of terms to be found for these processes in everyday language: ‘recognising’ or ‘epiphany’ (= establishing new relations between already existing elements), ‘extract information’, ‘sort new information to categories’, but even ‘learning’, to name just a few.

30

Problem solving

One possible way of grasping processes of thinking is to take up this distinction and to subdivide thought activity into those processes that do not reshape previous knowledge and those that do (for a similar subdivision, see von Aufschnaiter and von Aufschnaiter 2003: 619). In the first case of the type memorizing, it should be stressed that even if knowledge structures are already existent, these processes refer to a highly active mental process. Therefore, we should not call it ‘activation’, which might mirror a passive role of the individual, but the more active term ‘reconstruction of knowledge’. In the second case, concepts and schemata are used that are made available by reconstruction, and which are then reshaped, differentiated or extended. These processes I will call ‘construction of new knowledge’. 4. Processes vs. phases Process models of problem (or task) solving do not provide analytical categories for cognitive activities that relate to memory structures, but rather for functional macrophases. Subsequent to the theoretical considerations above, I would like to suggest a differentiation of cognitive processes, which to my knowledge has not been discussed in any taxonomy for task solving processes so far. I would suggest dividing cognitive activities into more elemental cognitive processes, and different phases. As described above, the basic processes I will use here are a. reconstruction and b. construction of memory structures. Phases, on the other hand, do not represent single mental operations, but clusters of operations that can be used for different functional descriptions of problem solving. As indicated in Chapter 3 on problem solving, a basic set of functional phases can be identified with which any kind of problem can be analysed. Basic cognitive processes describe how humans operate their knowledge base, and thus refer to general categories of human information processing. Describing problem solving phases, on the other hand, means identifying what humans do in different task situations. In a description of phases, we can identify how succession and scope of certain phases result in different degrees of success for the solutions of the task (e.g., when planning or research for information is going on, when phases of evaluation are carried out etc.). So a description of when a certain kind of phase is entered, how it was triggered or interrupted by other

Processes vs. phases

31

phases or in which cases it is skipped can reveal strategic considerations of the subject. However, a close analysis of processes can shed light on why a certain sequence of phases occurs the way it does. A phase might have to be repeated because the desired goal state could not be reached (= phase dimension), and this can have its cause in the fact that certain elements of knowledge could not be retrieved from memory (= microprocess dimension). An integration of both dimension seems thus to be useful for an analysis of both task features and process data. The processing of a task with problem features can thus be pictured as in Table 1. On the vertical level in Table 1, the functional macrophases of task solving are indicated. The horizontal level, in contrast, refers to microprocesses in memory. Because memory structures can be integrated into the task in different ways, different cognitive micro-processes can be involved. Of course it would be possible to subdivide the process dimension even further, if that was required by another research question. For example, the process of knowledge construction could be subdivided into the Piagetian categories assimilation and accommodation, or according to the different sources of information, e.g., in which kind of medium information. So, procedural skills in dealing with different materials could be analysed (e.g., construction of new information from text, from pictures, from tables, …). This differentiation into processes and phases achieves two goals. Firstly, it helps to clarify the interrelations within the different stages in the process continuum. Secondly, it provides a cognitively salient contribution to the mere strategic descriptions found in problem (and task) solving research. Without the process dimension, we can only analyse what purpose a certain phase has. With it, we can even indicate what kind of individual construction activity the subject has to employ in order to reach the goal.

32

Problem solving

Table 1. Framework for the description of complex problem solving tasks Process Dimension Phases

Reconstruction

Construction

= activation of previous knowledge

= creation of new knowledge

Construction of a mental representation of a task (= ‘understanding the task’) Setting of (subordinate) goals Attempting (re-)construction of conceptual relations in order to specify goal concept (Re-)constructing conceptual relations (= ‘finding information’) Comparison between result of (re-)construction and mental representation of goal concept (= ‘evaluating task solving processes and solution’)

5. Focus on meaning and focus on form Hitherto, I have discussed the cognitive basics for the analysis of taskbased mental processes and tried to provide a theoretically coherent definition for task-based cognitive processes. I will now elaborate on a central aspect of language pedagogy: The task-based approach of focus on form. My main concern will be to distinguish between focus on form and focus on meaning, which obviously tie in very closely with my research interest. These two concepts have been discussed as part of SLA classroom teaching approaches, and can contribute to a theoretical understanding of Content and Language Integrated Learning.

Focus on meaning and focus on form

33

The approach of focus on form is based on the tradition of communicative language teaching approaches (e.g., Legutke and Thomas 1991), with a strong base in Long’s Interaction Hypothesis (Long 1983) and Schmidt’s Noticing Hypothesis (Schmidt 1990, 2001). These hypotheses claim that language acquisition takes place when a learner focuses on the production of comprehensible and meaningful input for the addressee. The interactive negotiation of meaning promotes modifications of the output and raises awareness of the meaning-carrying potential of linguistic structure, because it requires learners to talk about the data together. This talk, like talk about any other topic, involves the exchange of information and ideas and is, therefore, meaning-centred (Ellis 2003: 17).

The focus on form approach thus combines a focus on meaning and a focus on language, in that it guides the learner’s attention to structural properties of the utterance. This leads to a reflection on linguistic form, possibly followed by modifications, in order to make sure that the right message reaches the addressee. It contrasts with traditional structure-focused approaches (termed focus on forms by Long 1991 and Long and Robinson 1998: 44–45). In focus on forms classroom settings, the curriculum and thus L2 learning classroom activities are based on structural aspects of the target language (with lesson topics such as ‘present progressive’ or ‘interrogative sentences’). Here, teaching materials and classroom activities have the purpose of presenting more or less isolated linguistic features of the target language. It is analysed into single elements, such as “words and collocations, grammar rules, phonemes, intonation and stress patterns, structures, notions, or functions” (Long and Robinson 1998: 16). The learner then has to face the task of putting these pieces together for use in communication. Thus, SLA is supposed to happen in the process of “accumulating entities” (Long and Robinson 1998: 16). Focus on form, on the other hand, puts communicative activities in the centre (typical lesson topic: How to book a hotel room, how to apply for a job, etc.). In contrast to the focus on forms approach, the syllabus is not based on the linguistic structures but on the communicative requirement. The rationale behind this approach is based on empirical evidence for the fact that

34

Problem solving learners do not move from ignorance of a form to mastery of it in one step […]. Typically, when a form first appears in a learner’s IL, it is used in a non-target-like manner, and only gradually improves in accuracy of use. […] Further, attempts to teach isolated items one at a time fail unless the structure happens to be one the learner can process and so is psycholinguistically ready to acquire. […] Finally, […] there is a great difference between structural knowledge of a language, when that is achieved, and ability to use that knowledge to communicative effect. (Long 1991: 44–45)

The focus on communicatively meaningful interaction is assumed to lead automatically to the situation in which structural features of the language are registered as being capable of conveying meaning. Noticing a particular linguistic structure is believed to be a necessary precondition for the acquisition of this feature. This means that the learner has to consciously focus attention on the grammatical form of the input in order to acquire grammar. The concept of noticing (Schmidt 1995, 2001; Schmidt and Frota 1986) has by now become a solid basic assumption in SLA research (Ellis 1994; Fotos 1993; Fotos and Ellis 1991; Harley 1993; Larsen-Freeman and Long 1991; Robinson 1995). So, in contrast to a focus on forms approach, language acquisition is supposed to take place in meaningful target language use. The communicative use of language for the expression of conceptual meaning is then assumed to support L2 learning processes that lead to an improved structural correctness. Therefore, classroom activities are initiated in order to trigger communicative and meaningful communication. As initiating triggers, tasks are used which provide the occasion for verbal interaction. How to design these tasks and how to guide intended linguistic behaviour is the concern of task-based language teaching research (Eckerth and Siekmann 2008; Ellis 2003, 2005a, b; Gilabert 2007; Kuiken and Vedder 2007; Robinson 2007; Robinson and Gilabert 2007). So, Robinsons’s Cognition Hypothesis (e.g., Robinson 2001) claims that cognitively more complex tasks trigger more complex linguistic structures (but see the results in Robinson 2007). Note that focus on form still means that the attention is on linguistic structure. The content of the syllabus is linguistic, and classroom interaction is motivated only with regard to language learning. This approach is contrasted with focus on meaning (Doughty and Williams 1998; Long 1991; Long and Robinson 1998), in which attention to formal elements of language is largely excluded. Content-focused task solving can be regarded as a problem solving activity: Specific information needs to be constructed which is not yet avail-

Summary 35

able at the beginning of the task-solving process. For instance, the contentfocused geography task ‘Describe the climate in Kisangani in detail with the help of the climate graph’ (which I have used as one of my elicitation tasks, c.f. Chapter 6) can be considered a problem, because the learner needs to find out what kind of information he or she needs for an appropriate answer, plan how to obtain the information needed and then extract it from the material given, namely the climate graph. A task of the kind ‘State which country Kisangani is located in’, without any additional information provided, is generally not considered a problem, because it can be solved by simply retrieving information from memory: Either the student knows the answer, or he does not, and is thus not able to solve the task. 6. Summary In this chapter, I have accounted for the general cognitive basis of the processes that are to be investigated in the course of the empirical study, and characterized cognitive processes as complex, constructivist, and embedded into a social context. I have presented problem solving as a suitable framework for the analysis of task-based cognitive processes. Because cognitive processes can be analysed on different levels of abstraction, I have chosen a suitable starting point for my research and suggested a basic scheme for analysis that distinguishes between phases of task solving, and the microprocesses of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘construction’ of memory content. On this basis, I have addressed the task-based approach of focus on form and focus on meaning, because it assumes that a distinction between language and content focused activities is possible in task solving. The conclusions I have drawn from the overview of research in Chapter 2 suggests that a clear focus on meaning is not really possible: If language is considered to be a tool for thinking, this would mean that language is involved in most cognitive activities in task-based settings in one way or the other. Nevertheless, in the next section I will argue that it is possible to distinguish between cognitive processes with a focus on form vs. processes with a focus on meaning, which means for a distinction between languagespecific and content-specific processes.

Chapter 4 Language-specific cognitive processes

1. Linguistic processing My research questions requires that a distinction between processes with a focus on meaning and processes with a linguistic focus can be made on theoretically solid grounds; otherwise it will not be feasible to show whether there is any impact of an L2 on cognitive processing of content information. This means that processes need to be defined that are run on language-specific knowledge structures, and differentiated from nonlinguistic processes that I have discussed in the previous section. After that it needs to be decided which language-specific processes are relevant for this study. In order to do this I will give an overview of linguistic conceptualizations which reveals what language-specific cognitive processes have been assumed in linguistic theories. As already addressed in Chapter 2 above, linguistic theories make different assumptions about organisation and structure of the language processor (see, e.g., Schwarz 1996: 138ff). If a modular structure is assumed that is subdivided into phonology, morphosyntax, lexicon and semantics, separate processing of information in these sub-modules is assumed as well. So, distinct representations of phonological, morphosyntactic or semantic levels are assumed which are separate from nonlinguistic information. World knowledge and general problem solving skills are assumed to have an important impact on language processing, but do not control the modular components directly. Inspired by the findings from cognitive psychology, there are, nonetheless, alternative theories from the field of Cognitive Linguistics. They do not assume that linguistic processing is based on any special cognitive mechanism, but work according to the same basic underlying principles as other forms of cognition. What this theoretical debate shows is that it is not at all clear whether we should assume a clear structural distinction between linguistic and conceptual knowledge. We do not need to take any strict decision for or against one or the other view here; but the research from the cognitive

Processes of text comprehension

37

sciences shows that it is possible to establish a distinction between linguistic and conceptual knowledge on a function level. In this light I have defined linguistic cognitive processes as mental processes that serve the construction and transfer of meaning with the help of the semiotic system of language. These cognitive processes are generally called ‘understanding and producing language’. They form the traditional areas of applied linguistics such as psycholinguistics, discourse analysis, and text composition research, which can look back onto a long tradition of empirical research (z.B. Aitchison 1998; Dietrich 2002; Garman 1991; Pinker 1995). In the following, I will present short overviews of those basic processes of understanding and production of speech and written texts which have been modelled in these areas, and see whether they can be used here.

2. Processes of text comprehension Firstly, I will take a closer look at processes of language comprehension, which I will define as the human ability to extract information from the semiotic system of language by constructing a conceptual representation through linguistically coded symbols. The reception of language has been investigated mainly on the basis of written texts and only marginally on evidence from spoken language (but cf. Jusczyk 1997). In my empirical study, I will only make use of written language and will thus focus on the research literature on written texts. Corresponding to the information processing view that I have adapted for the processes of cognitive processing and task solving, text comprehension can generally be understood as a complex interaction of a vast range of simpler processes: From the decoding point of view, the reader is under the control of the text and must mechanically identify every letter and word in front of the eyes. But the meaningful perspective holds that what goes on behind the eyes is the critical factor. Reading is seen as a creative and constructive activity having four distinctive and fundamental characteristics – it is purposeful, selective, anticipatory, and based on comprehension, all matters where the reader must clearly exercise control. (Smith 1994)

38

Language-specific cognitive processes

Text comprehension is much more than the mere mechanical act of reading. Certainly, the intake of information starts with the act of transferring visual stimuli into linguistic symbols. But these symbols have to be linked with meaning, and have to be connected with the linguistic context to bigger entities of meaning, until a holistic understanding of the text is achieved. Hitherto, no taxonomies have been suggested that comprise the totality of processes that can be run in order to achieve a textual understanding; but there are approaches that have achieved a classical status by now. One of them is the functional approach by Halliday and Hasan (1976), who give a detailed description of a set of superordinate principles by means of which relations between linguistic structures are built: - reference - substitution - ellipsis - conjunction - lexical ties These features can be found in the linguistic surface structures of any coherent text, and an analysis can show which textual structures underlie the comprehension of text that exceeds the single-sentence level. However, information that is coded in the linguistic information alone is often not sufficient for comprehension. The linguistic surface structure shows gaps that have to be closed by the reader through inference (Christmann and Scheele 2001; Singer 1994). Text comprehension thus needs to be understood both as a bottom-up process that starts out from the data in the actual text, and a top-down process that is guided by the reader’s previous knowledge. This view results from the following empirical evidence: Psycholinguistic studies investigating eye movement data were able to show that readers visually focus text in so called saccades, and perceive only small parts of a text at a time. In order to test when readers start meaning construction, so called ‘garden path’ experiments were conduced (Just and Carpenter 1987). In these experiments readers were confronted with texts that contain ambiguous lexemes or sentence constructions, like in the following example sentence: The horse raced past the barn fell.

It could be shown that up to the penultimate word, readers assume that they are actually dealing with an intransitive active sentence. When they reach the final word ‘fell’, however, this interpretation does not make any

Processes of text comprehension

39

sense. The real meaning is first revealed when the sentence is read as a reduced relative sentence with passive participle, in which ‘fell’ is the main verb. Experiments like this show that readers do not read a whole sentence before they start to construct knowledge, but process language successively and start their interpretation activity right away when they read the first word. Further evidence for the importance of assumptions and inference comes from reaction time experiments in recognising word pairs (esp. Meyer and Schvaneveldt 1971; 1976). The results stress that the interpretation of written information is not entirely data-driven, but guided by encyclopaedic knowledge: In lexical decision tasks, measurements were taken of how fast subjects could identify the second part of a word pair as either a real or a nonexisting word. The results show that subjects were able to identify a word faster when the first word was anchored in the same semantic field (e.g., nurse – doctor), and slower when there was no direct semantic connection between the words (nurse – butter). Furthermore, several empirical investigations examined subjects’ ability to understand linguistic utterances that contain gaps in the linguistic surface. From these studies, case grammar (Fillmore 1982, 1985, Kintsch 1974, 1998) and the text comprehension model by van Dijk and Kintsch (Kintsch and van Dijk 1978; van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) were developed. Subjects were asked to retell a story they had read before. Typically, they added information that was not present in the original text, but which can be explained as logically necessary or at least plausible elements of familiar schemata. So, world knowledge schemata underlie assumptions and inference of information that is not named in the text. This revealed on the one hand that readers store verbally transferred information independently of the original wording, and on the other hand that retrieval of information from memory is highly influenced by world knowledge. So, empirical evidence suggests that our encyclopaedic world and context knowledge influences to a high degree the way in which we interpret linguistic input and which information we focus upon, and how we fill informational gaps in the linguistic structures. In comprehending language, not only the external linguistic data are an important source of information, but recipient-specific internal features such as the subject’s linguistic and world knowledge in its individual structure, scope and complexity. Processes of text comprehension are thus to be regarded as a highly active, constructive and individual process of interpretation. In this process, information is constructed bottom-up from the text base, while at the same

40

Language-specific cognitive processes

time a top-down interpretation emerges from linguistic and encyclopaedic knowledge. Disciplines that have their origin in linguistics but deal with the decoding of language above the sentence level have recognized the need for concepts from cognitive psychology, such as frames, scripts, mental models, inferences and presuppositions. The need to integrate extralinguistic knowledge structures has led to an approximation between text linguistic models and models of cognitive psychology (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981), so that no specific mental processes different from general cognitive processes have been assumed for linguistic information decoding. Particularly in the modelling of text comprehension processes, the positive effects of an integration of linguistic and cognitive science models are obvious. 3. Processes of language production While models of text comprehension try to map how linguistic structures are decoded and a mental representation of the meaning is created, models of speech production are concerned with the question of which processes are involved when conceptual content is encoded in linguistic symbols. Research on speech and text production comes from slightly different research branches: While speech production models have been built mainly in the field of psycholinguistics, text production has traditionally been dealt with from an applied linguistics and didactics angle. Because in my study, language production plays a role both in spoken and written form, I will present models from both areas. The best-known model for speech production, which is still authoritative today, has been developed by Levelt (1995). It pictures processes in monolingual speakers, and has been elaborated for speech production in multilingual speakers by de Bot (1992). The model comprises several stages, in which the mental lexicon takes a central role. The following stages are regarded as the basic processes involved in speech production: 1. Conceptualisation: In this first stage, the speaker creates a pre-linguistic representation of the conceptual proposition that he or she wants to express. Here, information is picked from encyclopaedic and context knowledge. Multilingual speakers choose the language for use at this stage.

Processes of language production

41

2. Micro-planning/formulation: In the second stage, three subordinate processes occur: a. Lexical items are chosen that are considered to be appropriate for transporting the conceptual content. In that, knowledge about the linguistic system interacts with context and world knowledge, e.g. a mental representation of the addressee; b. a syntactical structure is generated; and c. the utterance is coded phonologically and/or graphemically. The assumption that these three processes should be separated is underpinned by research on slips of the tongue (see for a review, Aitchison 1998, 2003), which suggests that there are different processing stages of conceptual, syntactic and phonological representations. 3. Articulation: Finally, the articulatory organs for speech or writing are activated, which have the task to implement the phonological/graphemical representation in an actual motor performance. The result is audible (or visual) speech or visual text production. In his multilingual adaptation of Levelt’s model, de Bot (1992) assumes that different linguistic systems need to stand in some kind of relation to each other, which makes it possible for them to interact. On the other hand, a control device needs to be integrated into the activation, otherwise the result would be uncontrolled code switching. de Bot adapts Green’s (1986) position, according to which the language systems can take different levels of activation in the mental lexicon: They can be selective, active, and dormant. So, the conceptual content to be expressed is only verbalised in the selected language. Other languages can be activated, however, although they do not reach the articulation stage. From active languages, unintended language switches can occur (e.g., Williams and Hammarberg 1998). Although a serial processing is suggested, both Levelt and de Bot assume that parallel or cascading processing is possible in which the subprocess of articulation can be started before the process of conceptual planning is finalized. Levelt’s model tries to grasp general processes of language production and tries to cover both oral and written language production. But as indicated above, there are models that deal in more detail with the specific features of written text composition. I will present the most prominent ones in more detail in the next section.

42

Language-specific cognitive processes

4. Models of writing tasks Writing is a specific activity in which language production is involved, and it is particularly important for school education. Like the term ‘reading’, which on the one hand can refer to the transfer of written symbols into a phonological code, but also to the mental construction of the meaning of the text, ‘writing’, too, can take on two different meanings. Consider the following sentences: a. In a hurry he wrote down the telephone number before he could forget it. b. She wrote a term paper on linguistic relativism.

In sentence a., what is referred to as ‘writing’ is merely the physical act of transferring phonological code into a written code in order to fixate it; there is no need for conceptual content to be processed beside the phonological representation from working memory. In b., on the other hand, writing describes a rather different activity: Here, it refers to text composition, which involves a lot more conceptual involvement (unless the term paper should happen to be plagiarized, of course!). Text composition, in contrast to mere ‘writing down’, requires that thoughts become activated in structured relations, and an adequate formulation of thought is found; in this, the task to compose a text resembles a complex and ill-defined problem. This is the reason why the most influential models on text composition (Bereiter and Scardamalia 1987; Flower and Hayes 1981) and their adaptation for L2 text composition (Chenoweth and Hayes 2001; 2003; Grabe 2001; Grabe and Kaplan 1996; Krings 1996; Portmann-Tselikas 1991) make use of the basic assumptions of problem solving research. Text composition is thus assumed to be a problem solving activity, in which the composer is involved in generating, structuring and verbalising of conceptual knowledge structures. Therefore, in models of text composition, both processes of conceptual and linguistic construction are integrated, as I will show in the following overviews of the most important models.

4.1. The Model of Text Composition by Flower and Hayes The model of text composition by Flower and Hayes (1981) can still be seen as the most influential model in writing research today. Text composi-

Models of writing tasks

43

tion is modelled here as a goal-oriented complex activity with clear reference to problem solving theory. So, the process of text composing involves the intersection of the activity into subordinate phases. The activity of writing is, like problem solving, regarded as a set of different phases that do not occur in a fixed sequence, but can be combined freely in a module-like fashion. These phases can be repeated as many times as the composer considers necessary, and even be embedded into each other. With this assumption, Flower and Hayes (1981) distance themselves from older writing models, which take a sequential order of phases as their basis (Britton et al. 1977; Rohman 1965). On the macro-level of Flower and Hayes’s model, text composition consists of the phases of planning, formulating and editing, as indicated in Figure 2. When, and in which order, each of them is initiated, is controlled by a monitor. Each of these phases can in turn be broken down into subordinate processes: Definition of goals, search for a suitable sequence of operators in order to reach these goals, and analysis and evaluation of how the solution was achieved, especially if difficulties have occurred. The basis for this activity is a complex thinking process that is controlled by a network of the writer’s goals. These goals can be set in two different ways: On the one hand by generating macro-goals that incorporate subordinate goals (of which the writer assumes that they lead to the ultimate goal state); on the other hand, by the fact that in the run of the writing activity, new macro-goals can be generated, and old goals be abolished. Therefore, planning and conceptualisation are not only initial activities that subsequently are followed by a phase of writing down thoughts, as in a printer that prints out a text after having received all the data; rather, processes of planning occur throughout the whole process of text composition and monitor the writing activity.

44

Language-specific cognitive processes

Task Environment The rhetorical problem

Text produced so far

The writer’s long-term memory Knowledge of topic, audience, and writing plans

Generating

Topic Audience Exigency

Planning

Translating

Reviewing

Organizing

Evaluating

Goal setting

Revising

Monitor

Figure 2. The model of text composition by Flower and Hayes (1981)

Still, Flowers and Hayes emphasize that the activities in the course of the composition shift from the left hand side of the model to the right hand side. So, in the beginning phase of a writing task, typically more generating and goal setting activities occur, while towards the end phase activities of revising become more principal. Besides the processes that form the actual writing activity, the model contains a monitor that controls when each phase is started and ended. Here, strategic knowledge of the writer is stored. Besides that, two more factors control which information is processed, and which goals are being set: 1.

2.

The context of the writing tasks, that is everything “outside the writer’s skin” (Flower and Hayes 1981: 369). Aspects like time constraints, the formulation of the task prompt, and the text that has already been written, play a role here; The writer’s long-term memory. It serves as a source for all sorts of relevant information about the writing topic, as well as procedural knowledge.

Models of writing tasks

45

To sum up, the different mental activities interact with each other and with the writer’s knowledge in long-term memory, as well as with external factors. Time limits, topic, addressee, and self-motivation of the writer influence which parts of knowledge are activated and how the writing process itself is shaped, e.g. in what length of text it will result. Besides, the text written so far plays a role, because it restricts the possibilities of continuing: Everything that is to be written has to be connected to what is already there; the greater the amount of text that has already been produced, the more restricted are the possibilities how to proceed. This model still has a dominant status in writing research, because it characterises writing as a problem solving process and illustrates the activities involved as dynamic, non-linear and interacting. What I want to criticise is the limited scope of writing processes that are covered by the model: It assumes that all necessary information comes from the writer’s memory. This might hold for creative writing, but gives other kinds of text composition a very weak status, especially academic writing, for which the interaction with different kinds of resources is highly important. An integral part of the writing tasks that I use in my empirical study is the extraction of information from climate graphs, tables, and maps, and should therefore be made explicit in the model I use for analysis. Furthermore, the model is strongly content-focused and does not make explicit which role linguistic knowledge plays. So, the categories planning, formulating and revising are not fine-grained enough to investigate the influence that an L2 has on content construction processes. I will therefore take a look at another model, which focuses stronger on writing tasks that resemble the ones I use in my study.

4.2. Bereiter and Scardamalia’s models Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) agree with Flower and Hayes in that they also describe text composition as a complex problem solving activity with an imprecisely defined goal. Still, they assume two very different writing activities. The first possibility is depicted in their model of knowledge telling (Figure 3).

46

Language-specific cognitive processes MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT

CONTENT KNOWLEDGE

DISCOURSE KNOWLEDGE

LOCATE TOPIC IDENTIFIERS

LOCATE GENRE IDENTIFIERS

CONSTRUCT MEMORY PROBES

RETRIEVE CONTENT FROM MEMORY USING PROBES

RUN TESTS OF APPROPRIATENESS

FAIL

PASS

WRITE (NOTES, DRAFT, ETC.)

UPDATE MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF TEXT

Figure 3. Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1987) model of knowledge telling

Models of writing tasks

47

Knowledge telling starts with a mental representation of the writing task and refers to activities in which content from the writer’s memory is written down without any structural planning. Bereiter and Scardamalia separate topic-specific content knowledge, which specifies the precision, amount and complexity of the conceptual construct that is to be presented in the text, and discourse knowledge, which controls in which structural shape this conceptual construct is presented. In knowledge telling, no processes of controlling or planning are involved in text composition. As a twelve-year-old from one of the studies referred to by Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987: 9) expresses it: I have a whole bunch of ideas and write down until my supply of ideas is exhausted. Then I might try to think of more ideas up to the point when you can’t get any more ideas that are worth putting down on paper and then I would end it.

Knowledge telling is thus rather similar to most kinds of spoken language, and very typical of untrained writers. Contrasting knowledge telling, Bereiter and Scardamalia account for a very different kind of writing activity, which they call knowledge transforming. Here, rather than just being written down, thoughts are reshaped in the process of writing. Knowledge transforming writers do not only consider whether the linguistic form is adequate for the expression of their conceptual thoughts, but reconsider also which concepts they actually want to express. Writing here serves as an opportunity for reflection: It actively triggers processes of conceptual construction and generates new knowledge. As shown in Figure 4 on the following page, knowledge transforming is modelled as a process of problem solving that simultaneously takes places in two parallel problem spaces. On the left hand side, conceptual problem solving activity is indicated: Here, too, the activity starts with the construction of a mental representation of the content. As indicated on the right hand side, the writing task is not finished before a linguistic-rhetoric form has been found that adequately expresses the content. Formulation conceptual content thus can be regarded as a subordinate problem in its own right, in which the writer has to decide on a way of expressing the thought from a vast range of potential formulations. The results of the subordinate problem solving steps of one problem space serve as input for the other problem space.

48

Language-specific cognitive processes

MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT

PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND GOAL SETTING CONTENT KNOWLEDGE

DISCOURSE KNOWLEDGE

CONTENT PROBLEM SPACE

RHETORICAL PROBLEM SPACE PROBLEM TRANSLATION

PROBLEM TRANSLATION

KNOWLEDGE TELLING PROCESS

Figure 4: Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1987) model of knowledge transforming

Linguistic processing triggers conceptual processing and vice versa, so that a constant interaction between the two is the result. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987: 11) illustrate this interaction as follows: For instance, a writer might be working in the rhetorical space on a problem of clarity and might arrive at the decision that she needs to define the concept of responsibility that she is building her argument around. This is a content problem, however, and so one might imagine a message going from the rhetorical problem space to the content problem space, saying ‘What do I really mean by responsibility?‘ Work on this problem within the content space might lead to determining that responsibility is not really the central issue after all but that the issue is, let us say, competence to judge. This de-

Models of writing tasks

49

cision, transferred to the rhetorical space, might initiate work on problems of modifying the text already written so as to accommodate the change in central issue. This work might give rise to further content problems, which might lead to further changes in the writer’s beliefs, and so on until a text is finally created that successfully embodies the writer’s last thinking on the subject. (italics in orig.)

At the end of both problem spaces, a process of knowledge telling is embedded into the model of knowledge transforming as a subordinate activity. Finally, the result is checked in a feedback loop and compared with the original problem analysis and goals. In this model, the conceptualisation of content is focused much stronger than in the model of Flower and Hayes (1981). The reason is that in their empirical studies, Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) make use of elicitation tasks that exceed the need for a mere structurizing of memory content, but require the creation of new knowledge while information has to be extracted from subject-specific sources of information; for instance, subjects had to extract typical geography-specific content from matrices (Bereiter and Scardamalia 1987: 158). For my research question the knowledge transforming model with its theoretical division into two problem spaces provides a useful ground for a model of task processing. Still, it gives very little detail if one tries to analyse problem solving activities in detail. Another shortcoming of the model is its strong cognitivist focus, so that it does not integrate characteristics of context or learner variables like motivations or individual goals. In the following, I will describe alternative models of text composition by Hayes, (1996), Grabe and Kaplan (1996), Börner (1996), Krings (1996), and Chenoweth and Hayes (2001), which in part build strongly on the models by Flower and Hayes (1981) and Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987). 4.3. Other models of text composition In a later model by Hayes (1996), the Flower and Hayes model is expanded by a range of components, such as the specific composition of the task, addressee, and goals and motivations of the writer. Hayes assumes that these factors control the problem solving activity of the writing task, because they influence the writer’s goal setting. They have an impact on the motivation, planning and evaluation of the writing result, which in turn can trigger an editing process. Furthermore, the Flower and Hayes model component ‘the

50

Language-specific cognitive processes

writer’s long-term memory’ is now specified: The concept of working memory is integrated, and the interaction between processes of writing and reading are considered. The processes that are run in working memory show similarities with Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1987) knowledge transforming model in that it is now made explicit that expansions in the writer’s knowledge base can occur. Another model of text composition, Grabe and Kaplan (1996), refers stronger than the previous models to the tradition of text linguistics (Brown and Yule 1983; de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Martin 1992). They oppose the models by Flowers and Hayes and Bereiter and Scardamalia with a component model which does not so much aim at describing cognitive processes, but tries to describe features of textuality. The single components are syntax, semantics, lexicon, cohesion, coherence, functional dimensions and non-linguistic resources. Writing activity starts, here too, with a process of planning, which comprises attitudinal and motivational factors. The actual process of writing has its source in working memory, when processes of planning and goal setting activate relevant knowledge, and generate content that can be written down. Before this, a control instance is activated that evaluates the conceptual content in relation to the original plans and goals. After that, the physical activity of writing takes places, while the emerging text adds another component to the context variable. In this approach, social aspects are highlighted, so that personality of the learner and a broad context are integrated into the model. Furthermore, Grabe and Kaplan (1996) open the view for L2-specific writing processes, although they do not integrate this point in any detailed way into their model. On the other hand, the model does not focus on actual processes of text composition and is thus not very explicit for an analysis, if one is interested in investigating processing activities. Grabe (2001) attempts to develop a specific theory of L2 specific writing. This approach and others that concentrate on writing in a foreign language I will summarise in the following section. I will start with models that follow the model of Flower and Hayes (1981) very closely.

4.4. L2-specific models of writing In his model of L2 writing, Börner (1996) keeps very close to the Flower and Hayes (1981) model and adapts it only slightly to L2 writing situations,

Models of writing tasks

51

where classroom contexts are strongly focused: He introduces a subdivision into L1, Lint (for interim language) and L2, and adds more detail to the model with regard the use of writing tasks as a learning tool in L2 classroom settings. Therefore, he gives a details description of L2 writing tasks: A differentiation is made between texts that are part of the task prompt, exercises, and the writing task itself, and didactical aids such as teacher corrections are integrated. The subordinate writing activities planning, formulating and revision from the original model, however, stay unchanged. Even if a more detailed description of the L2 writing tasks is helpful, Börner’s adaptation of the model focuses only on form-focused production tasks. For my research interest, I need a model that features content and language dimensions equally, and which integrates both production and reception of language. Krings (1996), using in turn Börner’s model as a general framework (and thus implicitly Flower and Hayes’ model), zooms in on the process of formulation in the L2, where especially L2 specific planning processes play an important role (Figure 5). In his model, Krings embeds the following L2 specific mental processes into the general activity of text production: 1. Identifying L2 problems 2. Activating L2 strategies 3. Evaluating results of L2 problem solving 4. Deciding about L2 problem solving results. What is particularly interesting here is that as specific feature of L2 writing, translation processes are focused: Plans can be realised in the L1 and then transferred into the L2. This point will be taken up in the interpretation of my empirical data. Apart from that the model contains the same problems for my research interest as Börner’s, and the original model by Flower and Hayes (1981).

52

Language-specific cognitive processes Generating global plans

Realisation of plans in L1

Identify L2 problems

Generating more specific plans

Realisation of plans in L2

Evaluating plans Activate L2 strategies

Deciding about plans

Evaluate L2 solutions

Decide about L2 problem solving results

Sequencing of plans

Writing Revise already written text (= realisation of plans)

Figure 5. Kring’s (1996) model of L2 writing, my translation

Models of writing tasks

53

Another model, which uses the model by Kaufer et al. (1986) and thus a different starting point, is presented in Chenoweth and Hayes (2001). As is depicted in Figure 6, it gives a comparatively detailed account of general cognitive and linguistic processes involved in writing, and variables that influence the processing. Is consists of three levels: 1. the level of resources 2. the level of process 3. the level of control.

Task Schema

Control Level

Translator

Internal

Proposer

Reviser Transcriber Process Level

External

Task materials

Dictionaries

Long Term Memory

Text written so far

Process of Reading

Resource Level

Working Memory

Figure 6. The model of written language production by Chenoweth and Hayes (2001)

54

Language-specific cognitive processes

The resource level comprises all sources of information, and the general processes that are of relevance in producing written text. ‘Long-term memory’ forms the basis for writing and contains all sorts of linguistic and nonlinguistic knowledge. ‘Working memory’ is obviously important in many kinds of ways, but especially when already formulated strings of language have to be kept active right before they are written down. As a third category, the authors propose ‘Processes of reading’ and separate it from the process level, because it is classified as a “general purpose process” (Chenoweth and Hayes 2001: 83) with the goal of obtaining information, but which does not form a core process of writing activity itself. The process level is subdivided into internal processes and external environment in which the single processes are embedded. The external situation contains information about the intended reader, the text written so far, as well as additional material like source texts, notes, comments, lexica, etc. As internal processes of writing, the authors propose the following, which bear a close resemblance to Levelt’s (1995) view on language production: 1. a proposer that creates pre-linguistic ideas 2. a translator that converts the proposed ideas into strings of language 3. a transcriber that converts the linguistic strings into written code 4. a reviser that evaluates and, if necessary, triggers the revision of both the proposed and transcribed versions At the beginning of each writing activity, the proposer contains a general plan of available information. This contains communicative goals, content, order of information, intended addressee and genre. Here, the ideas are generated that are to be expressed. The translator transfers the proposed ideas into strings of language by choosing lexical elements, puts them in an order and adds morphosyntactic information, such as inflections, in a way that expresses the ideas appropriately. The thoughts that have been transferred into linguistic form are handed on to the reviser, where they are checked for adequacy. If adequacy is ratified, the information enters the transcriber, where the string of words, which is held active in working memory, is coded into written signs. Finally, the reviser can become active again for evaluation of the written version. After that, the proposer produces a new idea and the whole process starts anew. All processes are assumed to interact with each other, resulting in a close network of interrelated dependencies. For instance, the authors assume that several slightly different ideas might be proposed in the pro-

Models of writing tasks

55

poser, and which one is picked might be influenced by the translator, because it would choose the one that is easiest to translate. So, no simple linear processing is underlying, but a reciprocal interaction. The external environment that interacts with the internal processes consists of the audience, the text that the writer has produced so far, and task materials such as source texts, critics’ comments, or notes. The environment may also include dictionaries, style guides, computer interfaces, spelling checkers, and so on (Chenoweth and Hayes 2001: 84)

It remains somewhat unclear why the authors chose as the three central categories ‘Task materials’, ‘Dictionaries’ and ‘Text written so far’; it seems to me that categories on different levels are mixed here, because dictionaries are clearly taxonomic sisters with e.g., style guides or spelling checkers, and not hyperonyms. I would instead suggest a subdivision of the external environment like a. intended audience, b. sources of information, and c. text written so far. What is noteworthy here, however, is that Chenoweth and Hayes do not only stress the importance of the physical environment here, but also the social setting in which the writer produces a text. Located above the other levels the control level contains a task schema and strategic knowledge that controls which processes are activated on the process level, and which sources of information are used. The task schema causes different behaviour for different forms of writing tasks, because situations might require specific micro-processes (e.g., revision is not necessary to the same extent in drafting than in the composition of an academic proposal). This model provides a rather detailed insight into the single processes and cognitive components that form part of writing activity, and integrates insights from cognitive psychology into the description. Besides that, it leaves space for the social environment in which the writing task is to be solved. Although it has been developed for the analysis of L2 writing, it is kept very general and does not include any explicit L2 processes. So, the same processes are assumed to take place in L1 and L2 writing, with special processes being subsumed under the category level depicted in the model. The last contribution I want to address in the context of L2 writing is Grabe (2001). He underlines the importance of sociocultural factors in writing, such as culture-specific demands or goal-oriented objectives, and, like Krings (1996), focuses on L2-specific features of writing. Instead of

56

Language-specific cognitive processes

developing a model, however, he provides a deficit analysis of previous models and claims that specific steps need to be taken before valid L2 writing models can be developed: [I]t is most likely the case that a distinct theory of L2 writing may need to wait until models of writing move beyond a basic descriptive stage of development. (Grabe 2001: 54)

5. Summary In this chapter I have accounted for processes of language reception and production, and presented an overview of different models. Typically, processes involved in text composition are modelled as problem solving activities, and integrate both linguistic and content focused processes, albeit to different degrees. So, although concerned with a language-specific activity, writing models show very clearly that an interaction between content-focused and language-focused activities takes place in text composition. Furthermore, the overview showed that models of L2 writing are adaptations of models of L1 text composition and do not really show any specific features. If L2-specific processes are depicted, it nevertheless is manifest that they are located on a subordinate level, so that L2 processing is embedded in general linguistic processing categories. The differences between L1 and L2 processing are thus being regarded as lying on a subordinate level, and we can deduce that general processes that are assumed for L1 processing do generally also hold for L2 processing. Specialized L2 processes, like translating, do take place, however, and will be addressed in the analysis of the empirical data in Chapter 9. In the following chapter I will integrate the theoretical basis I have presented so far in a model that provides the necessary analytical depth and scope for the research question posed in this book. This model will be the basis for the coding scheme with which the empirical data will be analysed.

Chapter 5 A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving

1. Task-solving as a complex problem solving activity In search of theories that shed light on the relationship between content and language processing, I have in the previous chapter addressed models that theorize on problem solving phases in text composition. Models of writing processes are particularly interesting for my research question, because the transfer of conceptual thoughts in linguistic form is illustrated, and thus not only linguistic knowledge, but even encyclopaedic world knowledge has to be integrated into a description. As I have already suggested, none of the models that are found in the literature is immediately adaptable for my research interest, because none of them integrates all aspects that are of importance for my study. Besides that, I need a model that covers cognitive processes a long way before the motor activity of writing actually starts. So, my model needs to include processes of reading and other processes of interaction with task material in enough detail, and it must leave open the question whether the subject’s focus is on processing a content-focused sub-problem or a linguistic subproblem. In this chapter, I will start out from the framework presented so far and develop a model that can account for both content and language-specific, task-based information processing. I will use models from writing research as a basis, and link and expand them, where necessary. The general framework of problem solving research, which has been developed for the detailed description of conceptual information processing, has already been adapted for text composition models (Flower and Hayes 1981; Bereiter and Scardamalia 1987). What is interesting here is that processes of language reception and production can be conceptualized as complex and ill-defined subordinate problems as part of the task. Therefore, they can be described in terms of problem solving as well, which is coherent with theoretical assumptions from Cognitive Linguistics.

58

A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving

Thus, the information processing model of problem solving is suitable both for conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical problem solving activities. As demonstrated by Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987), a theoretical twopartition into conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical problem space is useful, because with its help, the generating of ideas can be illustrated without having to link it with language. Such a division is necessary when the influence of the foreign working language on conceptual processing is to be investigated. Therefore, it is useful to adapt the separation into two problem spaces. The rest of their model, as indicated already, is nevertheless not detailed enough for a fine-grained observation of different task-solving processes, and does not include context factors. The task-solving model that I will present in the following is nonreductionist, and comprises aspects that will not be systematically elicited or analysed in the empirical part of the study, such as context and learner features, which could potentially exert influence on the task solution (for models of learner features, see, eg., Gardner and MacIntyre 1993; Gardner and Tremblay 1994). Rather, the model illustrates the theoretical considerations that form the basis for the empirical study. Because of its scope, the study does not attempt to falsify the model; it would be hard to imagine a practicable research design that could control and measure the interdependence of the total amount of the addressed factors. Still, since we know about the intertwined nature of factors and the important role they play in different activities, they have to form part of the theoretical considerations that form the background for the design of an empirical investigation. In order to answer the question if and how the foreign working language influences the cognitive processing of content, cognitive activities must be elicited that are typical for the content situations in question. I will come back to this point in Chapter 6, where the design of the elicitation tasks is described. These tasks show features of typical problems, because they confront the subjects with a situation that they themselves perceive as unsatisfactory (‘There is a task that needs to be solved’). By stepping through different stages in which this starting point is changed, they adapt the initial situation to a goal state. In this process, different knowledge elements have to be retrived from memory, and semantic relations established between them. In all elicitation tasks used here, a typical content-focused problem is to be solved. Therefore, it can be assumed that typical conceptual problem solving activities take place in a learner who is trying to solve the tasks. Besides that, linguistic information has to be decoded, and an answer has to

Task-solving as a complex problem solving activity

59

be written. These language-specific activities can also be described as a subordinate problem solving activity, in which a language-specific knowledge base is employed; Just like the content problem, the decoding and the coding of linguistic structure are ill-defined problems, in which a goal state has to be defined, knowledge accessed, and subordinate goals have to be reached. The model (Figure 7) on the following page depicts processes and factors of task solving activities and which require both conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical problem solving operations. The most dominant feature in this model is the separation of the task solving activity into a range of subordinate problem solving activities, which in turn can have an either encyclopaedic-conceptual or a linguisticrhetorical focus. This corresponds to the two-partition of the model into two separate problem spaces. The solving of a subject task thus needs to be theoretically subdivided, firstly into activities that lead to the solution of an encyclopaedic-conceptual task (that is the construction of a mental representation of the solution), and secondly into activities that underlie the processing of language (e.g., formulating the solution in an answer). The conceptual information processing is depicted in the left wing of the model. Here, conceptual knowledge is either reconstructed from memory, or constructed, so that changed memory structures are the result. In the linguistic-rhetoric solution processes in the right wing of the model, language-specific knowledge is activated, or added.

Time constraints

Type and scope of sources of information to be used

Explicitness of goal in task prompt

Figure 7. A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving

Motivation, interest in topic, …

Variables of personality

Knowledge of subject norms

Knowledge of non-verbal sources of information

Knowledge of addressee

World knowledge, knowledge about topic

LTM, conceptual knowledge

Task and context features

Reception of Language

Construction of a Mental Representation of the Task

Learner features

Task solving phases

Task solving phases

Text written so far

Kind of discourse

Task text, lexicon used, degree of cohesion

Wording of task prompt

Linguistic task features

Task and context features

Verbosity, extrovertness, anxiety, …

Variables about personality

Knowledge of grammar, lexicon, syntax

Knowledge of discourse form

Linguistic knowledge

Learner features

Production of Language

Linguistic-rhetorical task

Conceptual task

60 Task solving as complex problem solving activity

Phases of task solving

61

2. Phases of task solving Let us first take a look at the conceptual side of the task in the left side of the model. The box at the top, ‘Task solving phases’, contains the problem solving activity in which the subject is mentally pacing through the conceptual problem space. Here, the matrix for analysis from Table 1 (p. 33), which takes up the differentiation between knowledge reconstruction and construction, can be inserted in any degree of detail. Table 2. Task solving phases of the conceptual task solution

Encyclopaedic-conceptual problem solving phases Construction of a mental representation of a task (= ‘understanding the task’) Setting of (subordinate) conceptual goals Attempting (re-)construction of conceptual relations in order to specify goal concept (Re-)constructing conceptual relations (= ‘finding information’) Comparison between result of (re-)construction and mental representation of goal concept (= ‘evaluating task solving processes and solution’)

Process dimension Reconstruction Construction = activation of previous = creation of new knowledge knowledge

62

A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving

When a person starts solving a task the first step is to understand it, which means that a mental representation of the task has to be created (e.g. ‘I am supposed to find out where Kisangani is on the map’). After that, representations of goals are generated, mental images of a desired goal stated (‘I want to construct a mental image of Kisangani’s position on the map’). This representation guides the mental construction activity that is supposed to transform the starting point into the desired goal state. If a partial goal is reached (‘Kisangani is in Africa’), this can be evaluated according to its adequacy. If not deemed adequate, new goal setting and new construction activity can follow (‘Africa does not suffice, where exactly in Africa is it?’). Table 2 indicates these problem solving steps with a focus on a task with a conceptual focus. In the left side of the model, all mental activities are addressed that can occur theoretically without linguistic knowledge being involved. Certainly, linguistic knowledge is frequently activated automatically as soon as the focus is directed to a conceptual relation. Nevertheless, this more or less automatic activation of linguistic knowledge is not to be regarded as problem solving steps in its own right: Although such steps do occur, they are automatized and do not tie up cognitive capacities. On the right hand side of the model, the linguistic problem space is indicated, opposing the conceptual problem space diametrically. Here, the problem solving phases consist of activities in which the focus of attention is on linguistic form. As long as these do not occur automatically, these activities are describable in problem solving terminology as well. We can state the following macro phases: 1.

Reception of language, as it occurs in any kind of receptive interaction with written or spoken linguistic material, such as reading of task prompt, of written task material, or in understanding an oral instruction by a teacher.

2.

Production of language, as it occurs when conceptual thought is to be transferred in a linguistic format. It is important to stress once again that only non-automatic processes are addressed here. Prototypically, these are processes in which an appropriate formulation of a conceptual content is constructed.

Phases of task solving

63

Analogous to the conceptual problem space, the following range of processes can be found here: Table 3. Task solving phases of the linguistic-rhetorical task solution

Linguistic-rhetoric problem solving phases: Reception

Process dimension Reconstruction Construction = activation of previous = creation of new knowledge knowledge

Construction of a mental representation of a task (= ‘understanding the task’) Setting of linguistic-rhetorical (subordinate) goals Attempting (re-)construction of conceptual relations from linguistic structure Allocation of linguistic form and conceptual meaning (= ‘understanding a text’) Comparison between result of (re-)construction and mental representation of goal concept (= ‘evaluating task solving processes and solution’)

The construction of the linguistic-rhetorical subtask could for instance be: ‘Read and understand the following text’, with the goal ‘Now I want to see what this text tells me’. Attempts to construct meaning from a given text are activities in which language is decoded. Processes and goals can be subject to evaluations in a further process category. In reception, the close relationship between linguistic and conceptual meaning-making becomes very obvious (this is why text linguistic approaches are so strongly dependent on non-linguistic theories, as I have indicated in the previous chapter). However, linguistic and conceptual meaning making can be separated from each other on the basis that in linguistic decoding, language-specific knowledge is activated.

64

A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving

Even in language production, a mental representation of the linguisticrhetorical sub-task needs to be constructed. This could be ‘Write a text with the features XY’. When this goal is represented, the next step is to attempt to find an adequate way to express the conceptual content in words. If this is achieved, the result can be evaluated in its stylistic and grammatical adequacy, and checked whether it is really suitable for the transport of the conceptual content.

2.1. Learner variables Because of its constructivist and socio-cognitivist basis, the model assumes that a range of learner features exerts an influence on which problem solving steps are performed, and when this takes place. An integral element of the model is the level of the microprocesses of reconstruction and new construction of knowledge structures. Therefore, it seems natural to pinpoint which factors determine the individual activity in the interaction with the tasks. This means that we should take a closer look at how processes of reconstruction and construction of new knowledge take place. Problem solving processes and their results are highly individual and can seem very surprising and creative from the point of external observation. I subdivide the factors that can determine how a subject proceeds – e.g., which information is individually associated, how long and how hard the person works on a task or how long and detailed the answer is – in two complex elements: The first complex comprises learner features such as intelligence, previous knowledge, strategy knowledge, personality traits such as extrovertness, and many more. These features have their basis in encyclopaedic and metacognitive knowledge, and in the general disposition of the subject, and are thus not language-specific, so I integrate them into the left wing of the model. In analogy to this, language-specific factors that influence the problem solving phases are linguistic knowledge, which comprises for example the extent of lexical knowledge, but also knowledge about the kind of discourse, e.g. which linguistic form is adequate for a descriptive, which for an argumentative text and so on. We can assume that certain variables of personality exist that have an impact on the way a person chooses to verbalise. Here, features such as verbosity, extrovertness, or anxiety to express oneself verbally and to make errors can be named. This feature’s importance is even enlarged when a verbalisation in a foreign language is in focus.

Phases of task solving

65

2.1.1. Features of task and task context Also, external factors of the task-solving situation play a role. Here it is important to note that even if every task-solving situation is individual and starts out from a highly subjective construct of the problem, it can nevertheless be defined to a certain degree. External factors that can be assumed to have an impact on solving activities in the conceptual problem space are presented down to the left in the model. Here, we find non-linguistic task features and features of the task context, such as how explicit the goal state is made already in the task prompt, which and how many non-verbal sources of information are integrated, or which time constrains the subject has to keep in mind. These features interact dynamically with the learner features, because whether a goal is perceived as explicit by the subject, or whether the processing time is perceived as being too short, is to a high degree dependent on the individual’s pre-knowledge and experience. For the solution of language-specific problems, the linguistic elements of the task are important. These are the task prompt, and further text, with their length, coherence, choice of words etc. Besides that, the discourse type is relevant: For example, subjects have to deal with different challenges when the task requires re-telling of a content that has already been presented verbally, compared to when they have to verbalize their own thoughts from scratch. Besides that, the text written so far plays an important role. As soon as a subject has written down a thought, everything that comes after that has to be linked to it. So the more that is written down already, the more the possibilities for further formulation are restricted. Having described the single components, some words about the development of the model are in order. It is the result of a hermeneutical process, in which the theoretical background on cognitive processing was integrated with research results from applied and psycholinguistics. At the same time the model components were checked against the empirical data, the results of which I will describe in the next chapters. With the application of the model to each new set of data, new insights were gained and adjustments made until no new phenomena could be found that could not be grasped with the categories of the model. Still, it had to be made sure that any bottom-up adaptation stayed consistent with the theoretical view, and did not conceal relevant information. In particular, the interaction with the empirical data had to show which grain size of analysis

66

A model of conceptual-linguistic task solving

was useful for the investigation. The character of phases changes, as I have addressed in Chapter 3, depending on the size of the segment that is chosen as an element for analysis. The important role that has to be ascribed to the empirical data explains another feature of the model: I have deliberately chosen to locate it in a degree of abstractness above the level of L2 specifics, but designed it so that the linguistic part of problem solving takes equal space with the conceptual space. In this, the data produced by both bilingual learners and monolingual learners can be analysed with the same instrument for analysis. Thus, an important goal of the data analysis is to exploratively unravel patterns that become visible through the model view. I will come back to this after the specific features of the data elicitation have been presented in the following chapter.

3. Summary In this chapter, a model of conceptual and linguistic task solving has been presented. This model has emerged from a combination of theoretical considerations with findings from the data analysis. It is based on the basic assumptions of individual, dynamic and socially embedded information processing, and in particular on those of problem solving research. Here, findings from writing research are expanded, so that the focus is not only on the macroprocess of text production, but also integrates the interaction with different kinds of material, and the solving of the conceptual task. It builds on the assumption that the solving of subject-specific tasks (as which the elicitation tasks used in this study can be classified) can be regarded as the solving of complex problems. It thus consists of a range of minor sub-problems, which in turn are solved by different processes of meaning construction. The most important feature is the separation of the superordinate problem into two problem spaces: One with a conceptual focus, the other one with a linguistic-rhetorical focus. Because of its constructivist and sociocultural embedding, the model assumes several bundles of factors that influence which problem solving steps are taken in which situation, and which kind of knowledge and sources of information are used. The model is easily extendible for other research interests with specific questions. One possible field of research would for instance be the question of task difficulty, in that the interaction between task characteristics and

Summary

67

learner features is taken into focus, and which is realized in specific types and patterns of task solution. The model serves as the theoretical foundation for the analysis of the empirical data and will be discussed in the actual analysis of the performance data presented in Chapter 9. In the following chapter I will discuss ways in which an insight into mental process can be gained in which an interaction between language and conceptual thought manifests.

Chapter 6 Task design and task analysis

1. The importance of the research design In the empirical study, methodology forms the link between the theoretical construct of the conceptual-linguistic processing, which has been developed in the previous chapters, and the empirical investigation. Each decision taken in the data elicitation has an impact on the kind, and quality of the data, which in turn have an impact on the theory building that is the result of the analysis. Therefore it is necessary to be very careful in the decisions that have to be taken before the data are elicited, and to link them well with the theoretical findings that I have accounted for so far. We first have to ask ourselves how it is possible to gain insights into the cognitive processing of subject-specific content, while an L2 is used as a working language, in order to see whether there is any interaction. Which instruments elicit the operations of thought that interest us here? Before I describe the elicitation tasks, let us first turn briefly to the subjects. 2. Subjects The subjects who participated in the study came from two groups of Grade 10 (age 16) students from the same German grammar school. All students volunteered, learner features were not controlled. The first group consisting of 13 students came from a class that had received all their geography education in their L2 English; for these students interaction with English texts and material was the normal situation. This group was introduced to the think-aloud method in English, and received task material that was exclusively in English. The second group, 7 students, came from a traditional class where only the L1 German had been used as a working language in content-focused

Elicitation tasks

69

school subjects. This group solved the same tasks as group 1, with the only difference that all linguistic material was in German.

3. Elicitation tasks For my research interest, both subject-specific and L2-specific mental processes need to be elicited, the subject in our case being geography. At German grammar schools geography forms an interface between economical, ecological, historical, social and political sciences, and ethics. The central geographical concept is ‘space’ (Brunotte et al. 2002; Leser 2005). Although it typically makes use of a broad range of material (maps, diagrams, tables, photographies, caricatures, texts), that are used in other disciplines as well, e.g. history, geography looks at problems from specific angles: Where the central concept in history is ‘historical awareness’ (Gies 2004; Pandel 2005), the ‘space’ concept of geography leads to different foci and interpretation of material. Against this background the tasks in this study were designed so that a map of the world showing the natural vegetation, and a climate graph were main sources of information. This means that well-established semiotic systems that are typical for geography had to be used. To put it in simple terms we can say that persons go through subjectspecific thought processes when they deal with typical subject-specific content and problems. If one wants to elicit subject-specific cognition it seems suitable to bring subjects face to face with subject-specific, e.g. geography tasks. In order to solve them they have to interact with different sorts of typical material, and have to employ a range of different mental activities and knowledge. A potential interaction between subject-specific cognitive processes and the L2 can be achieved, if the interaction with the tasks includes the receptive and productive processing of L2 information. This can be done though the interaction with L2 text material, and the production of an answer in the foreign language. For my purposes, a set of six tasks was developed, which I present in Figure 8 and 9 on the following pages. All tasks deal with the tropical rain forest, which is a complex field that exemplifies a range of typical geography issues, e.g. climate, topography, socioeconomy, ecology and ethics in their global and systemic interactions. The holistic requirements of each task are the following:

70

Task design and task analysis

Task 1: Localization of a zone of vegetation on a map of the world by means of information from the map key Task 2: Extraction of degree information from a complex set of information in a climate graph, and localisation of the climate graph’s location on the graticule of a map of the world Task 3: Description of a place’s climate by interpretation of a climate graph Task 4: Construction of relations between geographical location and climate by deducing the climate from the geographical location Task 5: Orientation on a map of the world, recognizing and explaining the role of mountain ranges in climate Task 6: Construction of the concept of sustainability by extracting information from an informative text, and evaluation of a suggested solution for the protection of the tropical rain forest, in which only ecological goals are features and which thus does not correspond to all the principles of sustainability A second feature of the tasks is that they require the subjects to use several sources of information (map, climate graph, text) (see for a discussion regarding competences Coetzee-Lachmann 2007; Vollmer in progress). The tasks exceed the format of simple fact questions. They can be characterized as complex and knowledge-intense problems, which cannot be solved spontaneously by mere activation of memory content. Besides that, they include L2-specific requirements. They were developed to include the requirement to extract information from linguistic sources of information (tasks prompt, legend in map, information texts), so that the subjects had to go through processes of language reception in order to deal with the tasks. For the language production side, written answers had to be composed, so that productive linguistic processes were elicited in the generation of text.

Elicitation tasks

71

____________________________________________________________ DISTRIBUTION In this section, we would first like you to locate the tropical rain forests. Then, you are going to look at specific areas in the tropical rain forest in more detail. Please write down your answers on the separate answering sheets. 1. Have a look at the map of the world (Figure 1) showing the distribution of the tropical rain forest. Describe as precisely as possible where exactly in the world tropical rain forests can be found. Please, do not write on the map! 2. Study the climate graph for Kisangani (Figure 2). Describe the exact location of the Kisangani weather station by also looking at the map (Figure 1). 3. What type of climate does Kisangani have? Describe Kisangani’s climate in detail with the help of the chart. 4. Medan is a place in Indonesia and has the following coordinates: 3° N/98° E. Is the climate in Medan different from the climate in Kisangani? Motivate your answer. 5. Take a look at South America on the map of the world. Why are there no tropical rain forests in the west of South America? Fig. 2

Figure 8. Tasks 1 to 5 from the task set for the bilingual learners

72

Task design and task analysis

____________________________________________________________ 6. SUSTAINABILITY Since the world summit of Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Agenda 21) the principle of sustainability has been globally accepted. This principle means that in terms of the use of natural resources, ecological, social and economic goals should be treated as equally important. At the same time, the rights and needs of future generations should be respected, so that they are not disadvantaged in any way through the exploitation of the resources. Against the background of the aims of Agenda 21, how do you evaluate the following suggestion for a solution? Support your answer.

One possible way of protecting the tropical rain forest would be to turn the remaining forests into conservation areas or national parks. This would mean that nature would be left to itself again, untouched by mankind. Only a limited number of people would then be allowed to enter restricted areas in the parks along special trails and accompanied by a ranger.

__________________________________________________________________

Figure 9. Task 6 from the task set for the bilingual learners

Cognitive task analysis

73

For each task, an English and a German version were developed. The English task set introduces the subjects into the task in English, presents all the material in English and requires an English answer. In the German set, all corresponding linguistic information is in German, and the answer is to be written in German. Contentwise, both sets are identical. The tasks from both sets were discussed with geography experts from teacher education and schools (for more information, see CoetzeeLachmann 2007), and tested at several stages of development in pilot school classes with bilingual and traditional education in geography. This resulted in several stages of improvement. 4. Cognitive task analysis How can these tasks be used? Why are they suitable for the purpose of eliciting the cognitions that are in the centre here? According to the model presented in Chapter 5, each task can be segmented into a range of smaller sub-tasks. The structure of the model with the integration of different bundles of factors suggests that each task can be characterized in its cognitive demands. Notwithstanding the theoretical coherence of the model idea, we here are confronted with an epistemological paradox: The tasks are designed in order to trigger certain mental processes in the subjects; at the same time, we have to assume a highly subjective interpretation, which is grounded in individual experience, and the constructivist nature of perception and knowledge. The subject thus creates a situationspecific and indiosynchratic mental representation of each task, influenced by previous knowledge, personality traits, personal interest in topic, among other variables. The researcher cannot claim to be able to control these features; in a study like this the previous knowledge of the subjects cannot be controlled in detail, or constructs like motivation, anxiety, mood, and the interaction in between them investigated systematically. This means that without knowledge of the relationship between learner and task features, I want to give a valid picture of the task characteristics and anticipate the mental construction activity it will trigger in the subject – while an anticipation of this mental construction activity is not possible!

74

Task design and task analysis

How can this paradox be solved? Can the cognitive requirements of a task be identified without knowledge of the individual subject’s intellectual and emotional requisites? A solution is provided by Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA), an approach from cognitive psychology that has its roots in applied psychology, e.g. ergonomy. A CTA can provide valuable insights into expert behaviour in complex problem setting, and has been used in order to create possibilities for training and improvement in several professional settings. As in my data elicitation, in a CTA it is attempted to collect information about knowledge structures, mental processes and goals which underly observable task solving behaviour. The starting point here is the construction of an ideal case of the task solving process, which is not interrupted or biased by time constraints, tiredness or lack of motivation (overviews in Chipman, Schraagen, and Shalin 2000). The description of the task is achieved on the basis of a theory-driven analysis, which, too, is based on the framework of problem solving. A CTA is divided into the following phases: 1. Initial phase: Gaining of expertise, often achieved by collecting expert opinions. Here the researcher becomes acquainted with the task and the task context. Goal: To be able to make assumptions about how the performance of an expert differs from that of a novice. 2. Identification of necessary knowledge. Here, in a top-down procedure, the declarative and procedural knowledge structures are identified that are necessary for a sufficient solution of the task. 3. Elicitation of knowledge structures. On the basis of the problem solving paradigm, a hierarchy of intermediate goals is identified. From this it is possible to build cognitive models of the task on a systematic basis. The first two steps serve the identification of a competent performance in specific situational context (cf. Roth and Woods 1989). This step of analysis shows with what kind of subordinate problems subjects have to deal with, what previous knowledge they need to have, which knowledge structures they have to establish while solving the task and how they have

Cognitive task analysis

75

to make use of them in order to solve the task in question (Roth and Woods 1989: 246). In a second phase a performance model is built which allows a mapping of the subject performance. In this phase, real data are elicited. Also in the task analysis for this study I want to reach an overview of which cognitive achievements each task requires for an adequate solution, on a purely structural level, without anticipating individual task solving behaviour. This theoretical analysis with a description of a task’s cognitive requirements is possible with a high degree of objectivity, because it is reduced to a mere description of which information is presented in the task in what form, and how it is to be extracted and linked with external information, such as previous knowledge. But why should one make such an analysis when it is still not possible to predict individual subject performance? The answer is that a detailed characterization of the tasks is necessary for the analysis of the data. The deep understanding of the cognitive requirements a tasks imposes on a subject serves as a framework for the interpretation of the performance data. Through CTA it thus becomes possible to investigate even complex mental activities whose intermediate steps do not show any observable signs in the behaviour and thus have to be inferred. A second argument for a CTA is the following: Although it is not possible to determine exactly in advance what a subject will do while processing a task, where problems will occur, where pre-knowledge will be employed and where new knowledge structures will be established, and thus each subject will go about individually, the mental activities will not differ from each other in all details. It can be predicted on logical grounds that some processes will definitely be a part of the processing. So, we can assume with a very high degree of probability that each learner will in some way read the task prompt. Also, the range of the task solution phases can be predicted to a certain degree on logical grounds: Thus, it is not possible to find a solution of the task before a mental representation has been established, no matter how incomplete it may be. Likewise, the answer cannot be written down before processes of formulating take place.

76

Task design and task analysis

What we can determine in advance is 1.

which knowledge structures have to be present before the task processing in order to be able to find a successful solution. This is the case if task prompt and material do not contain the necessary information, so that the subject has to bridge a gap in the information structure through activation of appropriate knowledge. The more inferencing has to be done when only little information is provided, the more knowledge-intense and cognitively challenging is the task. Task features like this indicate that processes of knowledge retrieval are necessary within the task solving.

2.

which knowledge structures do not have to be there in advance and can be constructed on the basis of the provided information. Task features like this indicate that processes of knowledge construction have to take place in the task solving.

It is not possible before the analysis of the real process data to describe individual ways of solving the task in detail. In the analysis, it has to be verified whether the assumed task solving phases are suitable to describe the empirical data, or if adjustments need to be made. So, for the analysis of the tasks, necessary elements of an adequate answer had to be identified. For this, geography experts and teachers were consulted who validated the tasks in terms of appropriate answers for geography learners of Grade 10 German grammar schools. On the basis of these sample answers, an analysis of knowledge structures was made, namely those that had to be reconstructed from memory, and those that needed to be constructed as new structures by extracting information from the task material. This means that the kinds of mental processes that a task triggers are closely dependent on the wording of the task prompt, and characteristics of the task material. So, the cognitive task analysis of the elicitation tasks consists of the following steps: 1. Development of sample answers (including a validation by experts): Which content elements need to be part of an adequate solution?

Cognitive task analysis

77

2. Description of necessary task solving steps in terms of activation of previous knowledge: Which subject-specific knowledge structures do the subjects need to retrieve from previous knowledge in order to be able to solve the task? 3. Description of necessary task solving steps in terms of gain of new knowledge: Which subject-specific knowledge structures do the subjects need to construct? Which cognitive processes have to take place for this, e.g. the extraction of information from different sources? 4. Grading of possible answers according to subject-specific achievement or adequacy as a basis for the interpretation of the subjects’ texts (cf. Coetzee-Lachmann 2007, who concentrates on this step in detail) I will exemplify such an analysis on task 2 from the elicitation task set: Task prompt: 2. Study the climate graph for Kisangani (Figure 2). Describe the exact location of the Kisangani weather station by also looking at the map (Figure 1).

‘Figure 2’ refers to the climate graph depicted in Figure 8, ‘Figure 1’ is a traditional map of the world from a school atlas that indicates the vegetation zones of the earth. Here, the equator is indicated, as well as the gradation in sections of 20° each. The key of the map marks the vegetational zones in different hues end explains them in short texts. One challenge of this task is to filter the relevant information from the amount of given information. The relevant information is the coordinates ‘1°N/25°E’, indicated as part of the information in the climate graph. These coordinates then have to be transferred to the coordinate frame on the map, and by this to localize the place. Table 4 gives a systematic analysis of this task. On the left hand side the cognitive construction processes are indicated that are necessary for a successful solution. On the right hand side the concept structures are indicated that are either reconstructed or newly built by these processes.

78

Task design and task analysis

Table 4. Cognitive Task Analysis of Task 2 (knowledge structures and cognitive processes) Cognitive construction activity

Knowledge structures

Reconstruction

to be reconstructed

- triggered by task prompt: - suggested by material:

- location - coordinates (number + ° + N + E) - m (metre) - equator - tropical rain forest - graticule of a map - vegetation zones - Congo - (Central) Africa

- without help in the task: Construction - triggered by task prompt: - extract information from task prompt: - suggested by material: - extract information about location from climate graph: - extract information about height from climate graph: - transfer coordinates to the map: - relate location to topographical features: - link location with information about vegetational form in map key: - without help in the task: - link location with the topographical information about continent and country:

to be built up – - There is a place called Kisangani – - Kisangani is located at 1° N and 25° E - Kisangani is located at 460 m - Kisangani is located at 1°N und 25° E on the map - Kisangani is close to the equator - Kisangani is in the tropical rain forest –

- Kisangani is in Central Africa - Kisangani is in Congo

Linguistic task analysis

79

The processes of construction are subdivided into achievements of reconstruction, that means retrieval from memory, and building up of new knowledge, which takes place predominantly by extracting information from task prompt and material. In both reconstruction and construction, three kinds of processes are distinguished: (Re-)Construction processes that are triggered by the task prompt, (re-)construction processes that are suggested by structure and content of the task material, and (re-)construction processes that have to be achieved without any help in the task. This subdivision is important for the analysis of the subjects’ performance that I will carry out later, because the data is only interpretable with the help of the necessary procedures and knowledge content. In many cases, the analysis reveals with which material the subject is interacting at a given moment, or if he or she is retrieving information from memory. The lower part of Table 4 depicts the building up of new knowledge structures and makes explicit the procedural knowledge that is necessary for each step. It becomes clear that the construction of new knowledge is based on the reconstruction (indicated in the upper part of the table), so that procedural knowledge (knowing how to do something) is based on declarative knowledge (knowing that something is the case): Only if the subject knows what coordinates are and what they indicate would he or she be able to extract them from a climate graph and transfer them onto the graticule of the map. 5. Linguistic task analysis As described, besides the conceptual task solving, the tasks also require a range of language-specific construction activities. This can roughly be subdivided into reception and production of language. The elicitation tasks can be analysed according to the different requirements they pose on the subjects, namely to what degree they trigger the production and reception of language, and which relevance they assign texts as a source of information. Besides the task prompt, tasks 1 to 5 contain linguistic information in the texts of the map key, and in the labelling of the climate graph and the map of the world. Most of the relevant information, however, is communicated non-verbally, so that the main linguistic challenge is to transfer the conceptual representations into language in the composition of an answer. This forms a subordinate, but nevertheless complex problem. Besides that, tasks 1 to 6 require a high amount of subject-specific language, because

80

Task design and task analysis

they make use of established non-verbal sources of information. CoetzeeLachmann (2007) can show that the subjects here experience more difficulties and reach lower ratings than in other tasks that require less specific vocabulary. In Task 6, on the other hand, the main activity is on the processing of information offered in verbal forms in texts. The concept SUSTAINABILITY is presented and explained in a text, equally so the suggestion for a solution, which has to be evaluated by the subjects. So, on the basis of text information, a mental representation has to be created that in turn has to be related to the previous knowledge about the complex system TROPICAL RAIN FOREST. So, which language-specific cognitive construction activity is required for an adequate solution of the tasks? All in all, a range of different linguistic activities take place in the decoding and coding of linguistic texts, which can be subdivided into reconstruction and construction of knowledge structures as well. For example, lexical knowledge has to be reconstructed, while construction of new knowledge can be assumed to take place in the application of rule-based knowledge, that is when sentence structures are put together that are not stored as entities in the mental lexicon. How much of the linguistic processing is to be characterized as reconstruction of memory content, and how much as construction of new information is closely linked to the theoretical understanding of whether inflection and derivation are to be regarded as separate mental processes or not (see for different models, e.g. Haspelmath 2002). Depending on whether a lexicon on morpheme basis is assumed, in which all linguistic utterances are produced on the basis of rules, or a word form lexicon, in which all complex words have lexicon entries so that only little new construction activity takes place, we have to assume different micro-processes. No matter which theoretical view one might take – an analysis reaches a much higher degree of complexity than the conceptual task analysis, and it is questionable how useful a detailed analysis would be for the research question here. Besides that, a theoretical analysis of the linguistic requirements in terms of a CTA is much more difficult, because the linguistic elements of a sample answer cannot be predicted in the same detail as the conceptual elements. There are too many possible ways of formulating one propositional content. Instead of a detailed analysis of construction activity in the linguistic field, I will stay on a more abstract level. This means that I will list phases of solving activity that I have found for the linguistic part of the task solu-

Summary

81

tion model. I will not, however, make assumptions about the individual forms of reconstruction or construction of new information. Because I do not attempt to get to a linguistic-rhetoric sample answer, I will not determine in detail the linguistic features or requirements of each task. 6. Summary In this chapter, I have described under which aspects the elicitation tasks were developed: Care was taken to ensure that in solving the tasks subjects had not only to deal with conceptual construction activity, but also with the solving of linguistic-rhetorical problems. This was achieved by including the need to read information texts of different length and complexity, and to write an answer in which the solution of the content problem had to be accounted for. In the next chapter I will discuss ways of gaining access to process data of the task-solving activities and describe the think-aloud methodology used in this study.

Chapter 7 Think-aloud data

1. Thinking aloud Up to this point I have discussed why we could assume that subjectspecific and language-specific mental activities occur in the solving of the elicitation tasks. We now have to face the methodological problem to gain insight into these mental activities, which only seldom manifest in observable behaviour: In an observation of a subject who solves subject-specific tasks, all that is there to follow might be eye movements that allow to deduce which material the subject focuses on in a given moment, or when a page is turned, when the person writes or crosses out what she has written, or when she scratches his head, or sighs. We might get a rich set of observational data but they will not give us any insight into the potential influence that the use of a foreign language plays in the processing of subjectspecific information; so, for instance, we cannot infer from eye movements, writing activity, facial expression or body posture which linguistic problem a person is solving in a given moment. What we need is thus an appropriate methodology in order to map such mental task solving processes. For purposes like this learning and teaching research uses introspective elicitation method. The term ‘introspection’ is used in different senses (for a thorough discussion of the term, see Ericsson and Simon 1993; Heine 2005; Matsumoto 1994). I I will here follow the dominant use in the research literature and will thus define introspective data as a person’s statement by means of which insights can be gained into her own mental activities. So, in introspective investigations, people are asked after how they have proceeded in a given situation, and what went through their mind then. In cases where this verbalisation is mirroring range and content of thought activities, these statements are called verbal protocols (for a discussion of the term, see Heine 2005).

Thinking aloud

83

This, however, poses a theoretical problem: When persons are asked about which cognitive processes they went through in a given situation, it soon becomes clear that subjects only have limited access to their own processing. Therefore, they might speculate about what might have happened, rather than giving a reliable account. Besides, this effect tends to rise the more time lies between the performance and the account for it. On the other hand, if a person verbalises mental activities and performs the task simultaneously, the verbalisation might interfere with the performance and thus change the data (see for a discussion in L2 contexts: Anderson and Vandergift 1996; Cohen 1984, 1987a, 1987b; Cohen and Hosenfeld 1981; Cohen and Scott 1996; for a critical discussion on introspection: Deffner 1984, 1987, 1988; Dobrin 1994; Ericsson 1988; Ericsson and Simon 1980, 1987, 1993; Garner 1988; Howe 1991; Leow and Morgan-Short 2004; Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Pritchard 1990; Seliger 1983; Verplanck 1962; Watson 1930). These kinds of bias are tried to minimize by asking persons to verbalize the words that automatically come to their minds, but not to verbalize sense relations or to give explanations for their activity (Ericsson and Simon 1993). This method is called ‘thinking aloud’. I will use the think-aloud method as the main means of accessing thought processing. In spite of its deficits, thinking aloud gives a detailed account of thoughts. However a combination with other methods is highly recommendable. In the present study, the think-aloud protocols are triangulated with the written answers, and with an interview that was held with each student after the think-aloud session. The think-aloud method has become one of the standard tools in the research on mental models, as well as problem solving research (Chi and Glaser 1985; Chi 1997; Chi, Feltovich and Glaser 1981), activities that do not focus on linguistic activity. The method is also often used in writing research and foreign language acquisition research (e.g., Flower and Hayes 1981, Schramm 2001, Würffel 2006). I have already given more detailed accounts of the theoretical embedding and the criticism it has met in separate articles (Heine 2005; Heine and Schramm 2007). I will thus only present the most important basics here that are necessary for an understanding, and elaborate only in areas that I have not presented in detail so far. Here, theoretical and methodological problems in particular are to be discussed because they are directly linked to the validity of the empirical investigation (cf. Grotjahn 1987; 1993; 1999; 2003; and the extensive methodological discussion in Diskussion in Riemer 1997).

84

Think-aloud data

The theoretical considerations have a direct impact on the transcription and interpretation of the data. Good theoretical overviews of introspective methods and thinking aloud can be found in Gass and Mackey (2000); Green (1998); van Someren et al. (1994) and the standard work by Ericsson and Simon (1993). Heine and Schramm (2007) give an overview in German with practical advice for application in empirical research. 2. Thinking aloud and language of thought When verbal protocols are used in order to obtain information about the mental activities an individual goes through, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the relationship between language and thought. In Chapter 2 I have accounted for different theoretical views on this issue, and have come to the conclusion that thought and language can be assumed to be theoretically distinct phenomena; research assumes several modes of mental representation, among them a linguistic one. For the methodological discussion, the question of what is the original format of thought seems, however, not too crucial; more important is the empirical observation that, no matter what representation might be the origin, a crosstalk effect involving language is often taking place. This means that if a mental representation is evoked, automatically and without any effort, its linguistic form is activated as well: Natural language looms large in the cognitive lives of ordinary folk. Although proportions vary, many people seem to spend a good deal of their waking activity involved in ’inner speech’, with imaged natural language sentences occupying a significant proportion of the stream of their conscious mentality (Carruthers 2002).

Carruthers refers to a study by Hurlburt (1990), in which subjects wrote down over the period of a whole day what they had in mind, each time they heard a signal from a headset they were wearing. These notes were discussed in retrospective interviews. In spite of obvious interindividual differences, all subjects accounted for the experience that their thoughts over large stretches of time were accompanied by language, alongside with images and feelings (this holds for healthy subjects; the study involved scizophrenic patients also, who did not think in language as much). Between 7 and up to 80% of the cases, language was involved, with a mean value of over 50%.

Thinking aloud and language of thought

85

[M]ore than half of the total set of moments which go to make up someone’s conscious waking life occupied with inner speech – that’s well-nigh continuous!“ (Carruthers 2002).

It is this effect that is used in the think-aloud method. So in thinking aloud, it is assumed that not all, but a lot of thought is accompanied by a mental activation of its linguistic form. According to the paradigm of information processing that is taken up in problem solving research, thinking can be regarded as a range of mental states. The current state is active in working memory, and can thus be vocalized without activation of further cognitive resources. By making subjects vocalise this stream of words and phrases that goes through their minds while they are solving a particular task, a protocol of thought activity can be obtained. It makes it possible to follow the sequence of foci of attention a person goes through while pursuing a particular activity. This is the reason why a protocol of this kind cannot be expected to provide a full account of all the cognitive processes under a certain task: A think-aloud protocol of somebody looking at a picture does therefore usually not resemble a coherent story: The utterances are typically unsyntactical and telegram-like in that they reflect the way the person’s attention is taking, like enumerating the towns a route goes through on a map; the route itself is not named. The long empirical tradition of this methodology shows that not every kind of activity is suitably depicted in this way: Mere motor activity seems not to trigger verbal representations automatically, so if a person tying her shoe laces or juggling a ball is asked to vocalize what she is thinking, this prompt is likely to disturb the subject in performing the activity. The reason for that is that the verbalization becomes a task in itself that claims searching activity, which in turn alters and interrupts the thinking process of the original activity. A dominantly verbal activity, like writing, on the other hand, is (unsurprisingly) easy to vocalize, because the person has to solve a task that involves looking for linguistic forms. The think-aloud method has been used a lot in the investigation of linguistically focused tasks, such as text composition or translating (e.g., Smagorinsky 1994), and has provided valuable insights into the nature of the processes involved in such complex activities. Closely connected to this is the fact that most of the time, language use is an automatic process that people do only seldom reflect on. Normally,

86

Think-aloud data

we do not notice the words and grammatical constructions we use, but, as it were, look through them directly onto the meaning structures behind. For the empirical elicitation situation, this means that it needs to be made very clear for the subjects that these nonverbal thoughts are not to be verbalized, and that the purpose of the vocalization of thoughts is not that the researcher should be addressed, because that again would imply that the subject has to communicate comprehensibly, which might be different from silent thought. So, thinking aloud is a kind of unreflected self-talk, a mere vocalisation. The method has often been misunderstood (see the criticism mentioned above), the critics suggesting that it biases the thought activity through the metacognitive focus it provokes. The method itself is, however, very clear about that metacognitive accounts of the subjects have to be avoided, because they are indeed not valid (Ericsson and Simon 1993; auch bereits Smith and Miller 1978; White 1980). Instead, only unreflected vocalisation can be used to form a verbal protocol, and the subjects must not be encouraged to explicate their mental processes. Rather, they have to be inferred by the researcher. So, not the subject him- or herself observes and interprets what he or she is doing; this is the researcher’s task. The following example provides an illustration of a think-aloud protocol from my data basis. It illustrates well the incoherent character of the vocalization: “Study the cli- (drops her pen) [(softly) ups] the climate graph . for . . Ki- . -san- . -gani . . figure two. (1 s) Describe the eract . . exact location of . . Kisan- . -gani . weath- . . weather station by also looking at the map.” (1 s) [(whispers, unclear, German) Au.] (2 s) Erm . . four hundred sixty metres (1 s) one degree North (paper rustles, 1 s) twenty five degree . . East. Data Example 1. Henriette* 1023-1.b *All student names in this study are anonymized.

Henriette here reads the task prompt of Task 2 and starts to extract information from the climate graph. She only vocalizes the thoughts that she directs her attention to, but is not trying to make herself be understood by a listener. Note that only because certain mental states are not indicated verbally, this does not mean that they have not taken place. Now it becomes clear that the detailed understanding of the task and its material is crucial

Thinking aloud and language of thought

87

for the researcher to be able to give an interpretation of the subject’s performance. If we compare Henriette’s Data Example 2 with another protocol example, it can be illustrated that, if the method is misunderstood, a completely different kind of data can be elicited: “Study . the climate graph ca- . from . for Kin- . -sagani. Figure two” (1 s) “describe the exact location of the Kinsani weather station by also looking at the map. Figure one.” (1 s) Okay I now . . erm . . co- . . I am now concentrated on the map and I want to see what I can read about it. Data Example 2. Mona 1005-1.b)

In the end of this extract, Mona lets us know what she is doing in the given moment. Here, she interprets her own cognitions, which means that they reach a level of consciousness: The metacognitive thought “I am now concentrated on the map” [sic] is unlikely to have occurred in the situation without the task to think aloud. Probably she would just have looked at the map without evoking this action explicitly in working memory. This means that the cognitive activity we see here is probably changed compared to a silent task solving, because Mona has misunderstood the think-aloud task. By means of these examples, I want to show that very different cognitions can accompany the solving of a task. A clear conception of the differences is vital in order to elicit data that is as valid as possible. Think-aloud protocols try to extract cognitive processes of the type Henriette produces in Data Example 1. These can be described as cognitive processes that occur when a specific task is being solved. In Mona’s example (Data Example 2), on the contrary, we find metacognitive data that are typical for protocols of an activity when the focus is turned on the verbalization of the subject’s thoughts. In Data Examples 1 and 2, we find qualitatively different kinds of data. This does not necessarily mean, however, that think-aloud protocols must not contain any metacognitive content at all. Some learners make use of metacognitive thoughts as a part of their repertoire of strategies, and thereby reach a more reflected level of how they proceed in solving specific tasks. These cases can look rather similar to Mona’s example above, as can be seen in the following extract from a protocol produced by subject Joachim:

88

Think-aloud data Soo. . Jetzt . . gucken wir uns den Niederschlag an . . der ist natürlich ziemlich hoch . . genau. Tausendachthundertvier [Translation: Okay. . Now . . let’s look at the precipitation . . it is of course pretty high . . right. One thousand eight hundred and four]

Data Example 3. Joachim 1123-1.b)

The utterance “Now we are going to look at the precipitation” is a strategical instruction from the subject to himself. It is typical in protocols of Joachim, who claims that he would have thought in the same way even when he had not thought aloud: In the introductory training phase he was asked about his strategical thoughts that he revealed in the think-aloud task, because I was afraid he had misunderstood the task. He, however, was adamant in that this mirrored a typical way for him to deal with tasks, which he was sure he made use of even in silent task solving. So, this data hints at the kind of cognitive learner type (who is a comparably reflective and structured task solver), and should not be taken as a sign of reactivity of the method. This data comparison should have made clear that in the elicitation situation great care is vital. Firstly, it is crucial to explain the procedure clearly to the subjects, train them to think aloud and provide feedback before the real elicitation is started (see Heine and Schramm 2006). Secondly, these data examples show how interpretative the analysis needs to be. I will get back to this point in Chapter 8. Ericsson and Simon (1987; 1993) assume that the right use of the method might slow down thought activity, but quality and sequence of cognitions should remain the same as in a silent task processing. I do not share this positive evaluation of the method in full; even when a thorough instruction has taken place, it is possible, as Mona’s example shows, that the method might have an impact on the individual cognitions. If data like these occur, and cannot be evaluated on the basis of another data set, such as interview, they should be excluded from analysis. For a triangulation I questioned the subjects after the think-aloud session after their own perception and evaluation. The results of these interviews are presented in Chapter 10. They hint at the fact that at least in some places the vocalisation task has a reactionary effect which manifests itself in interruptions and feedback loops in thought activity, which in turn can lead to changes in intention. But not only difficulties in verbalization

Individual differences in cognitive processing

89

can have an impact on the quality of thought. Through articulation thought content becomes audible for the subjects and thereby enters the articulatory buffer in the working memory (see also Baddeley 1986; 1990; 1992; Baddeley and Hitch 1974). This can lead to an increase in reflection: The cognitive steps are potentially perceived more conscious, which in turn can lead to self-monitoring, an evaluation of one’s own processing, and increaded planning and structuring activities. Throught this, conceptual connections are established and deepened. Experiments from cognitive psychology can show that an intensified reflection about one’s own processing can lead to improved results of problem solving activities (e.g. Chi et al. 1994). This fact is a problem for the think-aloud method. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate its advantages over its disadvantages: In spite of the method’s deficits, the richness of data, as well as the possibilities it offers to gain a deep understanding of cognitive processes in general, still make thinking aloud a highly valuable tool. Nevertheless, it should be stressed once more that it should not be used naively. 3. Individual differences in cognitive processing The question of the method’s reactivity has lead to a range of investigations (see for an overview (Überblicke in Ericsson and Simon 1993; Jourdenais 2001; Knoblich and Rhenius 1995; Leow and Morgan-Short 2004; Stratman and Hamp-Lyons 1994). These studies compared the task processing behaviour of loud thinkers with that of silent thinkers, or think-aloud protocols with eye movement data or keyboard protocols. As mentioned above, Ericsson and Simon (1993) do indications for a slower processing, but none for a qualitatively changed thought activity. In the other articles, however, both positive and negative effects of thinking aloud protocols are reported, that sometimes lead to an improvement of the task solving, sometimes to an impairment. This heterogeneity of results can be explained by the wide range of different think-aloud prompts, and by the fact that small and unrepresentative subject groups were used. However, my main point of criticism is this: Although there is a general consensus that humans differ strongly, both in the way they process cognitive content, and their ability to verbalize, this assumption is not taken up in the reactivity studies mentioned above. If one assumes that there are subjects who experience greater difficulty in transforming a thought into a verbal form, it is vital to form groups of subject

90

Think-aloud data

types, before reactivity is measured. This, however, is not reflected on in any study I know. I will take up this issue in the interviews (Chapter 10).

4. Thinking aloud in L2 settings The goal of thinking aloud is to uncover the problem solving steps a person goes through in solving a specific task. When a task is solved in a foreign language context, however, another dimension comes into the picture: When there are several language systems present in the learner, the question is in which language the learner is supposed to think. Should only the L1 be used, because it can be assumed that it is rooted more deeply in cognition and automatized more easily? Or are the cognitive processes changed compared to silent thinking, when a language is prescribed – maybe learners do think in an L2? What happens if the researcher leaves it to the subject to choose a language? Do multilingual persons switch between the activated languages, even in silent thinking? Is a think-aloud protocol containing language switches valid? Although think-aloud protocols have been used a lot in foreign language research, this issue has not been discussed in detail so far. Only Ericsson and Simon (1993: 249 ff.) give a very short comment in which they assume that thinking aloud in a foreign language, depending on the individual proficiency, can merely slow the processes down. Aguado (2004) and Kormos (1998) argue against this and assume that the use of an L2 should generally be regarded as a high cognitive pressure which influences the mental processes. They recommend making subjects generally think in their L1, especially if the proficiency is not high. Similar argumentations can be found in Kern (1994) and Matsumoto (1994). Still, the verbalizations should mirror what goes on inside a learner’s head, when he or she would have thought silently in the same situation. I therefore assume that it is necessary to leave it entirely up to the learner which language to use, and to allow the learner to switch languages if she feels the need for it (see Beyer 2005; Cohen 1994; Heine and Schramm 2007). This decision, however, is no trifling matter: The researcher is forced to choose a linguistic code in order to communicate with the subject in the elicitation situation, in which thinking aloud is explained and trained. By this, a linguistic frame is created that can dominate the linguistic behaviour of the subjects (Grosjean 1998). But the question remains: Does the lan-

Thinking aloud in L2 settings

91

guage that is used by the authoritative person have an impact on the learner performance? I have tried to find an answer in two earlier pilot studies, which I have already addressed in Heine (2005). These studies were conducted before the elicitation tasks had been developed, so that different tasks from another field (high and low tides, time zones) were used with learners that did not participate in the main study. The goal of the pilot study was in the first place to test the think-aloud prompts and to gain experience of the elicitation situation. Indeed, the piloting was highly important for the validity of the main data, because it could be shown how even the smallest changes in the formulation of the task prompt and the way the material was presented had an impact on the quality of the data. The experience that could be gathered in the pilot studies lead to a standardized procedure in the main elicitation, which is summarized in Heine and Schramm (2007). The question for the verbalization language was tested in the following way: In the first case, six CLIL learners were introduced to the elicitation situation in their L1 German. Only after that were they confronted with the English task prompts and materials. The initial decision was that the initial phase was not really part of the elicitation and served mainly the goal to make the learners understand the task. However, it is important to note that it was made explicit that the learners could choose the language in which they wanted to verbalize. The think-aloud protocols of all six learners showed, however, that they consistently used German as the think-aloud language, and only switched into English when they were reading a text or composing the written version of their answers. In order to make a well-motivated decision for or against the use of German or English, I conducted a second pilot study. Here, nine learners were confronted with comparable tasks. Now, all communication between researcher and learner was conducted in the L2, so that even the thinkaloud procedure was explained in English. Here, too, it was made explicit that it was up to the learners themselves to choose the language. The results obtained here were clearly different to the first pilot study: Only few switches into the L1 occurred, and all nine learners used dominantly the L2 English for their verbalizations. These results make it seem probable that the language used by the researcher can have a strong impact on which language is chosen by the subjects, even when it is made explicit that they can chose, and the option for language switches is left open.

92

Think-aloud data

What then can be the reason for this? Do subjects think differently in L1 surroundings than in L2 surroundings? Or do we have to assume that we are witnessing an observer effect that biases the data, because the subjects try to adapt to a setting which they perceive as authoritative? These considerations have important methodological consequences, because in the L2 think-aloud data, we find instances such as the following: It’s (2 s) this is only . . erm (1 s) an extr- erm (laughs, 1 s) erm (1 s) [(German) ein Ausschnitt] [translation: an extract] . . out of . this . . big Data Example 4. Pilot Bärbel task ZZ 1

the sun moves . and . so it s- has always another dis- erm . position, and erm . at twelve o’clock, in the n- erm . . high n- (1 s) high noon . no. High (1 s) hm. In midday, it’s ermm . . it stands . . erm it has . its (1 s) highest position, and ermm (1 s) e- a- erm in the day before erm (4 s) eeermm (1 s) before it has his highest . erm position, it rises. Data Example 5. Pilot Bärbel task ZZ 2

there’s (1 s) a difference I think . . sometimes about eleven hours or . . seven hours, (1 s) because . of . the (1 s) [(German, softly) ja.] [(laughing) Of the] (2 s) [(German) Weiß die Wörter [(laughing) nicht.] [translation: Don’t know the words] (1 s) Ermm (3 s) ja. Weiß ich nicht. Kann ich [(laughing) nicht.] [translation: yes. Don’t know. I can’t (do this).] Data Example 6. Pilot Ida task ZZ 1

What we see here is the learners’ tendency to try and stay within the L2 system and to express their thoughts in a single code. In this attempt formulation problems interrupt the mental processes. In Data Example 4, the learner cannot access any suitable form in order to express the concept EXTRACT, so that she first goes through searching activity and ends up using the corresponding form in the L1. In Data Example 5, Bärbel does find a formulation for the expression of the concept she is thinking of, but she does not succeed in that without additional search processes. In the data, we can see that this is not an automatized process.

Thinking aloud in L2 settings

93

A third possibility manifests itself in Data Example 6, in that Ida does not express the concept at all but interrupts her processes altogether. Ida’s focus is on the search for an appropriate formulation, her attention swings from the conceptual side of the problem to the linguistic form, and the original stream of thoughts is interrupted. We cannot know for sure, but it seems very unlikely that a similar process of searching for a linguistic form would have occurred in a silent task processing – why should a person look for an adequate linguistic form in the same detail when she does not need it for the communication of her thoughts? The pilot data suggest that this does not happen in the same way when learners think aloud in their L1, which is more automatized. And indeed, comparable cases could not be found in the pilot data of the first generation. If an L2 English setting is dictated, the danger of reactivity effects arises. On the other hand, we have to face the problem that for advanced learners of English who are immersed into an L2 setting the L2 forms and not their native language forms might automatically become active in the working memory as soon as a mental concept is focused on. If these learners are confronted with an L1 situation this immersion is not achieved at all, and the L1 suppresses the L2 in its level of activation. If that happens, the elicitation setting influences the task processing as well, and the results are not valid. For the elicitation I was forced to make a decision within this dilemma. Because I was mostly interested in the cognitive activities in a foreign language setting in which content-focused tasks are in the centre of attention, I finally decided to use a pure L2 input for the bilingual subjects. So, not only were task prompt and task material presented in English, but also the think-aloud procedure explained. Through this, an English environment was created, although it was made very clear that the learners could switch to any language at any time, as soon as their thinking activity suggested that (which also happened – one of the learners who turned out to be Russian, solved the tasks thinking aloud in Russian. Because his profile deviated so much from the other learners, his data were not integrated in the study). The learner’s linguistic competence was clearly sufficient to follow this preparatory discourse. In the think-aloud training, anything that had remained unclear could be addressed and explained. Because the methodology here could be shown to have such an important impact on the data quality, I decided to tackle the question of how much each subject dealt cognitively with the different language systems.

94

Think-aloud data

For this, interview questions were developed that address the language of thought. The interview as a subordinate investigation will be addressed in Chapter 10, so I want to wait with any concluding assessment of thinking aloud in L2 contexts and come to a final conclusion after the interview data has been integrated. 5. Think-aloud data as protocols of problem solving activites Can we now conclude that think-aloud data are a suitable data format for the investigation of problem solving processes? A preliminary glance at protocols from my data corpus gives an answer to this question. Indeed, it can be shown that we can follow the typical steps of problem solving activities. In order to interpret the following data example, a coherent embedding into cognitive theory, a deep understanding of the cognitive demands of the task (see Chapter 6), and an integration of the written answerings text are necessary. They make it possible to infer information that I have accumulated in the right hand side column ‘External activities’, which help to clarify interpretation further. 001

002 003 004 005 006

Transcript “Study the climate graph . of . bla [(whispering) blubb blubb blubb] . describe the exact location of the . Ki- . sangani . weather station by also looking on the mmap“ s- rdshsh (turns pages, 1 s) hm? (3 s) How should I know where [(knocks on table) (1 s) this (1 s)] [(German) ach][translation: oh I see] . . one North. (1 s) [(unclear) One North is] [(whispering) dh dh dh] . xx [(German) da ist fünfundzwanzig (3 s) so ungefähr find ich es [translation: there is twenty-five – I can find it approximately]

Data Example 7. Sönke 1004-1.b)

External activities Reads task prompt

Looks at map and climate graph Looks at map and climate graph Looks at climate graph Looks at map Looks at map

Think-aloud data as protocols of problem solving activites 007 008 008 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022

okay. [(softly) So.] (1 s) (takes a deap breath, 1 s) [(whispering) bh dh dh] . erm [(writing) (2 s)] . . B (2 s) [(writing) it . is] (2 s) [(writing) (1 s) [(softly) in (1 s) the (1 s) middle (8 s)]] Mh (1 s) “in the middle of“ . . „-stani“ (1 s) [(whispering, rapidly) “exact location“] (1 s) [(German) ja super.] (1 s) [oh great! (ironically)] “Study the climate graph“ . . (hits the table) [(German) was soll ich m- jetzt machen?] [translation: what am I supposed to do now?] (1 s) [(whispering) düd] xxxx (1 s) (writing, 0,5 s) (1 s) [(whispering) dü düdüd] (4 s) kan- (whispers unclearly, 2 s) [(writing) (3 s)]

95

Writes “b)“ Writes “It is“ Probably: looks at map Writes “in the middle“ Reads his own text Re-reads task prompt

Re-reads task prompt

Re-reads his own text Writes “of“ Re-reads task prompt Writes “Africa, Rain Forest“

Data Example 7 cont.

Although task solving in this protocol is unrepresentatively short, it shows the typical steps of the problem solving: Firstly, Sönke needs to create a mental representation of the task – he needs to understand what the task is about. In order to do that he reads the task prompt (segment 001) and orientates himself in the additional task material (002–003). It becomes clear here that constructing the mental representation of the problem covers several processing steps: Firstly, we see that Sönke has constructed the overall goal state (‘localize Kisangani on the map’), but no representations of any intermediate goals that would allow him to reach the final goal state (003). In segment 004 then, he has constructed a partial goal and solves it by finding the coordinates in the climate graph. With this step, he has information at his command that allows him to take further problem solving steps. So, here we can see that subordinate goals such as ‘look for information in the climate graph that enables you to

96

Think-aloud data

localize Kisangani on the map’ are embedded into the macroproblem and have to be constructed in the same way as the superordinate goal. In 005–006, we can observe the solving process of the next partial problem, which can be paraphrased as ‘transfer the coordinates from the climate graph onto the graticule of the map’. After this has been achieved, Sönke goes on planning in 007, so we know that the mental representation of the solution of the task is constructed, which is a representation of where on the map Kisangani is. The task solving, however, is not finished yet, because it includes the composition of a written answer (which in itself is another subordinate goal). So, in 007, the phase of formulating and writing starts in which the conceptual representation is specified even further. Here, further subordinate problems are identified, the mental representation of the task is specified again (cf. difficulties in 018 and the re-reading of the task prompt), until eventually a decision for the ultimate solution is made and written down. What we see is that the learner can start with the writing process even before a full mental representation of the conceptual content is present (see 010 and following, also cf. Bereiter and Scardamalia 1987). This means that conceptual problem solving and linguistic formulation processes often occur in a parallel and intertwined manner in which they can trigger and enhance each other. This can be illustrated even more clearly in the following transcript extract: 021 022 023 024 025 026

Transcript Im Westen [translation: In the West] [(writing) (5 s) Südamerikas (4 s)] [translation: of South America] (1 s) mmh . . ja. Liegen Berge? [translation: yes. There lie mountains?] Kann man auch nicht sagen. [translation: This is not possible to say, either.] (1 s) Ermm (2 s) gibt es (1 s) viele Gebirge [translation: There are many mountain ranges

Data Example 8. Jan 1120-1.e)

External activities Writes “Im Westen Südamerikas“

Think-aloud data as protocols of problem solving activites 027

[(writing) (9 s)]

028

(1 s) welche zusammen (1 s) [translation: which together [(schreibend) (1 s)]

029 030

033

mit der Küste (1 s) [translation: with the coast] aber ich kann doch nicht sagen mit der Küste. [translation: but I can’t say “with the coast”.] Mit der (1 s) mmmh (2 s) mit der (4 s) [translation: With the – with the] Jaa. [translation: Yeess.]

034

(1 s)

035

Aber das ist eigentlich auch ein Grund. [translation: But that is actually another reason.] (1 s) Tja. (3 s) [translation: Well.]

031

032

036 037 038

039

Egal. [translation: Doesn’t matter.] M- . das . muss dann m- -chtichmit der (2 s) nahen Lage [translation: That has to do then with the close location] [(writing) (4 s) an . der (3 s) Pazifikküste (6 s) den Bewachs (5 s) durch . . Regenwald (3 s) everhindern. (3 s)] [translation: on the Pacific Coast prevents a vegetation of tropical rain forest.]

97

Writes “gibt es viele Gebirge“

Writes “welche“ [translation: which]

Writes “mit der nahen Lage an der Pazifikküste den Bewachs durch Regenwald verhindern.“ [translation: prevent the vegetation of tropical rain forest, together with the closeness to the Pacific Coast.]

Data Example 8 cont.

In this example we can observe the interlacing of different phases. After entering the macrophase of formulating and writing down his ideas, Jan continues to reflect on the conceptual solution: In 035, while formulating, he comes up with another conceptual aspect that he had not thought of before he began the writing down of his ideas.

98

Think-aloud data

So these examples show on the one hand that the problem solving phases can clearly be identified in the think-aloud protocols. On the other hand they demonstrate that the problem solving steps come in different sizes, so that problem solving steps of different quality can be embedded into each other. 6. Summary In this chapter I have presented the think-aloud method as a means of gaining insight into mental processes and discussed its advantages and limitations. I illustrated its use for the study with the help of data examples from the corpus, and demonstrated how problem solving activities can be inferred from the data. Furthermore, a preview was given on the evaluation of the interview data in Chapter 10, in which the think-aloud method is validated. In spite of its limitations the method was evaluated as a useful means of obtaining process data in order to answer the research question, because in the data both conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical problem solving activities can be observed in great detail.

Chapter 8 A coding scheme

1. Coding the data How can we now gain insight into content and language specific mental processes from the think-aloud data? Firstly, the verbal data have to be transcribed in order to be accessible for analysis (cf. key for transcription in supplement). The transcripts make it possible to follow in detail what the learners do while solving the tasks, and by that add another level of detail to the observable reality. Transcription, however, is not purely descriptive, but necessarily also the result of an interpretative process: As I have discussed, the verbalizations in the protocols are fragmentary utterances that reveal the cognitive processes only indirectly. The learners themselves have no automatic access to their own cognition and can thus not express them. In order to make statements about the mental processes, they have to be inferred through an interpretation of the utterances. For this a coding scheme is necessary that is the surrogate of a theoretical framework. It guides the interpretation and features those processes that take a central role for the research question. So, only when there is a coherent model of cognitions, think-aloud data can be interpreted at all (for a discussion see Chi 1997; Green 1998; Kasper 1998; Smagorinsky 1994). If such a theoretical basis is present and clearly formulated, an interpretation can be made with a high degree of objectivity because it is not argued on the basis of idiosyncratic assumptions, but on a reasonable construct which can be shared between raters. Each research question and data interpretation is in need of a tailor-made coding scheme (cf. Smagorinsky 1994; Witte and Cherry 1994). Because there has not been any study with the same research question and the same methodological instrumentarium, I could not transfer any model or coding scheme onto my data. Therefore, the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 5 was developed. Smagorinsky (1994 10ff.) and Yang (2003)

100

A coding scheme

describe such a procedure as a hermeneutical process. In Yang’s words (2003): There is a loop involved in the process of coding the protocols, developing the coding schemes and developing a descriptive model which suggests that the process can be subject to several cycles of interpreting, defining, and refining.

I began by describing the theoretical framework in its central elements and developed from that a rough model which was then used in the segmentation and coding of the transcript data. This deep interaction with the data led to a fine-tuning of the coding scheme. In several repeating analyses, the descriptive model of conceptual-linguistic task solving evolved in a step-by-step manner. This, in turn, extended and specified the coding scheme. After each adaptation a new run of analysis became necessary which partly revealed new phenomena. Each analysis captured the data on a deeper level (s. zu diesem Vorgehen auch Rehbein 1994; Rehbein and Mazeland 1991). This process was ended when the categories were detailed enough to capture even new data from the data corpus without further adaptation. The theoretical decision is complicated by the use of the think-aloud method: If all the main data we receive from the protocols is verbal, how then can cases of conceptual problem solving be distinguished from cases of linguistic-rhetorical problem solving – if basically all the data are verbal data, how can we then gain insight into interrelations? This means that the analytical separation between conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical problem solving processes cannot be made on the basis of the outer verbal form. And how can genuine linguistic-rhetorical processes be differentiated from searches for formulations of thought that are caused by the method itself? We need to distinguish between two different causes of verbal problem solving activities: Cases in which the (misunderstood) methodology causes problem solving activities on the one hand, or cases in which conceptual content is decoded or encoded. A separation of the two is of the utmost importance for my research interest here, because only if cases of linguistic problem solving activities can be identified that are not caused artificially by the methodology used, can assumptions be made regarding the interaction with conceptual thought activity, which can also be assumed for real situations. The protocol examples presented above reveal that different problem solving activities are identifiable in the macroprocess of task solving. In

Coding the data

101

order to make interrelations visible, a separation of problem solving activities with a conceptual focus from those with a linguistic-rhetorical focus is necessary. One way to solve this complex problem is to interpret the think-aloud data according to which phase of task solution the learner is in at a given moment. Different phases imply that the focus of attention is on different elements. Here, the model of conceptual-linguistic task solving with its two-part division into two different problem spaces makes it possible for us to observe the interlaced sequence of conceptual and linguistic-rhetoric problem solving activities separately. This allows us to identify the point at which which process is taking place. So, this view on two separated problem spaces needs to find its reflection in the coding of the data. This means that the continuous transcripts of the think-aloud protocols need to be broken down into segments for analysis. The size of each segment depends on the degree of detail in the analysis, and a new segment starts each time there is a new activity in one of the columns for analysis. The indication of different activities that can be found in each segment has evolved though different stages of development as well. In the further develpment of the model, a bi-sected coding was made which showed in detail which activities were taking place in the conceptual and which in the linguistic-rhetoric problem space. This double coding has the advantage that it can visualize the fact that there are often activities in both problem spaces at the same time. So, finally, the following decisions for analysis were made: In a separate column ‘External activity’, all events are indicated that do take place outside the learner’s head. Here, externally observable activities such as reading, writing or handling of different material are indicated. This information provides an important aid in tracking the learner’s activities. In two other columns the inferred cognitive activities are subdivided into those that belong to the conceptual problem space and those that are part of linguistic-rhetoric problem solving activity. Instead of a numerical coding that would have reduced the complexity too strongly, I decided on a basic vocabulary which is anchored in the theoretical considerations of the model. The general terminology I used as a guideline for the description of the task solving phases can be seen in Table 5. These textual building blocks (and their negations, e.g. when a sub-goal was not reached) were used in order to characterize which events in each

102

A coding scheme

problem space were taking place in each segment. Through this, a matching between coding and theoretical framework was accomplished. Table 5. Problem solving phases in the conceptual and the linguistic-rhetorical problem spaces Solving phases in the conceptual problem space

Solving phases in the linguisticrhetorical problem space

1.a) Construction of a mental representation of the conceptual task

1.b) Construction of a mental representation of the linguistic task

2.a) Goal-setting of conceptual (sub-)goals

2.b) Goal-setting of linguisticrhetorical (sub-)goals

3.a) Attempt to (re-)construct conceptual relations that specify the goal concept

Reception of language

Production of language

3.b) Attempt to construct meaning from linguistic structure

3.c) Attempt to (re-)construct an adequate linguistic form for the expression of the mental concept

4.a) Accomplished (re-)construction of specifying goal concept

4.b) Accomplished matching between meaning and linguistic form

4.c) Accomplished (re-) construction of a linguistic form

5.a) Comparison between (re-)constructed concepts and the mental representation ot the representation of the (sub-)goal

5.b) Evaluation of adequacy of matching

5.c) Evaluation of adequacy of linguistic form

I illustrate the use of this coding scheme by applying it to Sönke’s problem solving protocol (previously presented in Data Example 7). Coded in the two problem spaces, the data set looks as follows:

Coding the data

001

002

003

004

005

103

Transcript

External activity

Activity in content problem space

Activity in ling.-rhetor. problem space

“Study the climate graph . of . bla [(whispering) blubb blubb blubb] . describe the exact location of the . Ki- . -sangani . weather station by also looking on the mmap“ srdshsh (turns pages, 1 s)

Reads task prompt

Constructs mental representation of task: Goal = construction of concept KISANGANI’S LOCATION

Constructs mental representation of linguistic task: Goal = composition of a text with the features of a description

Turns pages in task booklet

hm? (3 s) How should I know where [(knocks on the table) (1 s) this (1 s)] [(German) ach] . . [translation: oh I see] one North.

Knocks on the table

Attempts to construct the concept KISANGANI’S LOCATION while interacting with the task material (Re-)construction is not successful

(1 s) [(unclear) One North is] [(whispering) dh dh dh] . xx

Looks at map

Looks at climate graph

Data Example 9. Sönke 1004-1.b

Constructs concept COORDINATES OF KISANGANI from information in climate graph Constructs mental representation of LOCATION ON LATITUDE OF KISANGANI ON THE MAP

104 006

A coding scheme [(German) da ist fünfundzwanzig (3 s) so ungefähr find ich es [translation: there is twentyyfive – I can find it approximately] okay. [(softly) So.] (1 s) (takes a deep breath, 1 s) [(whispering) bh dh dh] . erm

Looks at the map

008

[(writing) (2 s)] . .B

Writes “b)“

008

(2 s)

010

[(writing) it . is]

011

(2 s)

012

[(writing) (1 s) [(softly) in (1 s) the (1 s) middle (8 s)]]

007

Data Example 9 cont.

Constructs mental representation of LOCATION OF KISANGANI ON THE MAP

Keeps concept KISANGANI’S LOCATION active in working memory

Writes “It is“

Writes “in the middle“

Keeps concept KISANGANI’S LOCATION active in working memory Attempts to (re-)construct a specifying concept by means of the map information Keeps concept active, attempts to (re-)construct a specifying concept Attempts to (re-) construct a specifying concept by means of the map information Reconstruct specifying concept CENTRAL

Attempts to (re-)construct an adequate form to express the mental concept

Attempts to (re-)construct an adequate form to express the mental concept (Re-)constructs form

(Re-)constructs form

Coding the data 013

mh (1 s)

014

“in the middle of“

015

. . „-stani“ (1 s) [(whispering, rapidly) “exact location“] (1 s) [(German) ja super.] (1 s) [oh great! (ironically)]

Re-reads task prompt

017

“Study the climate graph“

Re-reads task prompt

018

. . (hits the table) [(German) was soll ich mjetzt machen?] [translation: What am I supposed to do now?] (1 s) [(whispering) düd] xxxx (1 s)

016

019

020

(writing, 0,5 s)

Data Example 9 cont.

Attempts reconstruction of concept for continent AFRICA, does not succeed Attempts to (re-)construct a specifying concept Reconstructs mental representation of task Attempts to (re-)construct a specifying concept, does not succeed Reconstructs mental representation of task

105

Reconstructs mental representation of formulation Reconstructs mental representation of writing task

Reconstructs mental representation of writing task

Attempts to (re-) construct a specifying concept, does not succeed

Re-reads his own text

Attempts to (re-) construct a specifying concept

Writes “of“

Reactivates specifying concept CENTRAL

Probably: reconstructs mental representation of formulation (Re-)constructs linguistic form

106 021

022

A coding scheme (1 s) [(whispering) dü düdüd] (4 s) kan- (whispers unclearly, 2 s) [(writing) (3 s)]

023

Re-reads task prompt

Attempts to reconstruct continent concept

Probably: constructs mental representation of writing task

Writes “Africa, Rain Forest“

Reconstructs concept AFRICA and TROPICAL RAIN FOREST and links them with each other

(Re-)constructs form for the expression of the concepts AFRICA and TROPICAL RAIN FOREST Evaluates answer as adequate

Evaluates task as solved as well as possible

Data Example 9 cont.

A close-reading of the coded protocol reveals that I reached the interpretation only seldom through the indicators that are found on the surface of the protocol. Phenomena that look superficially similar can have their origin in very different mental activities. So, a pause of one second can indicate the reactivation of memory content, or the search for information in the task material. The context in which the pause occurs is the only indicator for the mental process. Here, it becomes clear once again how important it is to have built up a thorough theoretical conceptualization of the task and of possible steps in the problem space, and how necessary it is to combine different data sets for interpretation. There are many gaps in the protocols so only in few cases is it possible to identify without the written answer which formulation the subject produces at the end of the search in the linguistic problem space. Likewise, without a close knowledge of the task material, it is not possible to keep track of the problem solving steps in the conceptual problem space. In order to improve the reliability of the analysis the same protocol was segmented and analysed several times. Furthermore, in a two-day workshop, three fellow researchers, Debbie Coetzee, Vreni Barbosa-Duarte and Kristin Möller, coded excerpts from the think-aloud data after having been introduced to the theoretical framework and the research question. There were hardly any discrepancies in rating, which means that we can assume

Change of focus between the problem spaces

107

that the framework led to an intersection into segments for analysis and an interpretation of the task solving processes with a high intersubjective reliability.

2. Change of focus between the problem spaces Sönke’s think-aloud data example reveals several issues: In the column ‘External activity’, activities are not indicated continuously. The mental activities of the subjects are not always accompanied by externalized behaviour. Furthermore, activities can occur in both problem spaces simultaneously. I would like to focus a little more on this point and make it clearer by means of the following example:

003

Transcript

External activity

Activity in the content problem space

Activity in the ling.-rhetor. problem space

“describe the exact location of the Kisangani . . weather station by also looking at the mac fi- figure one.“

Reads task assignment

Constructs mental representation of task assignment: Goal = construction of a mental representation of KISANGANI’S LOCATION ON THE MAP

Constructs mental representation of linguistic task assignment: Goal = formulation of an answer

Data Example 10. Lara 1006-1.b)

In reading the task prompt Lara here does two things simultaneously: She builds up a mental representation of the task, namely the goal of constructing a mental representation of the concept KISANGANI’S LOCATION ON THE MAP. Secondly, she simultaneously constructs a linguistic-rhetorical goal, namely to write an answer in which she demonstrates the conceptual concept she has constructed. As we see, in this case there is activity in both problem spaces simultaneously. In other cases, the focus can switch between the spaces, so that

108

A coding scheme

sometimes more, sometimes less attention is focused on activities each problem space, as the following protocol excerpt demonstrates:

008

009

Transcript

External activity

Activity in the content problem space

(2 s) three de- . . -grees North (4 s) [(whispering) twenty de-] (2 s) ermmm . . shsearch (1 s) [(German) zwanzig [translation: twenty](8 s) oh Gott das hab ich ewig nicht mehr gemacht [translation: oh my God, I haven’t done that in such a long time]

Looks at the map

Attempts to construct a mental representation of MEDAN’S LOCATION ON THE MAP, plans transfer of COORDINATES Reconstructs concept DIRECTIONS, but does not succeed in the spatial reconstruction of the subordinate concepts EAST and WEST Constructs the spatial position of NORTH and EAST by means of a mnemonic (“Nie Ohne Seife Waschen”) Constructs spatial position of the direction concepts NORTH and EAST

010

(quietly) ermm (2 s) ohne Seife waschen] [translation: (do not) wash without soap]

011

(4 s)

Data Example 11. Mona 1005-1.d)

Activity in the ling.-rhetor. problem space

Change of focus between the problem spaces 012

three degrees . North

Looks at the map

013

(1 s)

Looks at the map

014

ninety degree (5 s) East

Looks at the map

015

(4 s)

Looks at the map

016

o- . -kay.

109

Attempts to construct MEDAN’S POSITION AT THE LATITUDE 3°N Constructs MEDAN’S POSITION AT THE LATITURE 3°N Attempts to construct MEDAN’S POSITION AT THE LONGITUDE 90°E Constructs MEDAN’S POSITION AT THE LONGITUDE 90°E 90°E Evaluates partial solution as appropriate

Data Example 11 cont.

Here we can observe how the subject extracts the coordinates from the climate graph and attempts to transfer them onto the map of the world. In this attempt, she is confronted with a gap in her knowledge, because she cannot remember where North, East, South and West are on a map. The points of the compass she then infers by means of a mnemonic sentence (“Nie Ohne Seife Waschen” for North, East, South, West). After that, she is able to locate the place on the map. During the whole episode, her focus is on conceptual relations, not on how to decode or express them. The forms of verbalisation we can see in the transcript consist of automatised verbal forms, which do not trigger any problem solving activity but pop up automatically in working memory. For the analysis, this means that there is only activitiy in the conceptual problem space, but not in the linguistic-rhetorical problem space.

110

A coding scheme

Contrary to that, there are other cases in which the focus turns away from solving activities in the conceptual problem space. In the following example, Sönke has just identified Kisangani’s location on the map: Transcript

010

middle of . .

011

Africa (1 s)

012

[(writing) [(German) Mittel]] [translation: middle]

013

..

External activity

writes “In“

Data Example 12. Sönke 1004-1.a)

Activity in the content problem space Reconstructs concept CENTRAL Reconstructs continent concept AFRICA Keeps concept DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST active, turns focus on CENTRAL AFRICA Keeps concept DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST active, focus on CENTRAL AFRICA

Activity in the ling.-rhetor. problem space

(Re-)Constructs formulation

Reconsiders formulation: “Middle sounds funny“

Change of focus between the problem spaces 014

015

[(German, whispering) Mittel Mittel] . Mittel . . Mittel] [(whispering) s. . [(German) Mittel wie heißt das denn]] [translation: middle middle middle middle middle what is it called] [(writing) 5 s) [(whispering) Africa] (2 s)]

Crosses out “In“, writes “Middle of Africa“

111

Keeps concept DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST active, focus on CENTRAL AFRICA

Attempts to reconstruct adequate term for concept CENTRAL AFRICA

Keeps concept DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST active, focus on CENTRAL AFRICA

Reconstruction does not succeed, chooses term “Middle of Africa“

Data Example 12 cont.

Sönke here has constructed the solution for the conceptual problem already in 012: Here he knows that KISANGANI is in AFRICA, namely right in the middle of it, so the concept CENTRAL AFRICA is constructed, but no mental representation of the term. After that, the focus turns to the linguistic problem space in which a search for the adequate expression is run. All that happens in the conceptual problem space during that time is that the concept CENTRAL AFRICA is being kept active. A salient feature of the conceptual problem space is that activities are indicated here with nearly no interruption, while the linguistic-rhetorical problem space is only sometimes filled with activities. The reason for this is the semiotic function of language: The form side is only of importance when meaning is to be constructed from or to be expressed by it. However, there are exceptions. In my database there are a few cases in which subjects ponder orthographical problems:

112

A coding scheme Transcript

External activity

Activity in the content problem space

Activity in the ling.-rhetorical problem space

Reads “tropical rainforest“ in task assignment or material

Interrupts thought, turns focus on linguistic form

Constructs representation of spelling “tropical rainforest”, notices discrepancy with her own spelling

018

[(German) Mh . jetzt seh ich gerade] the tropical rain forest [(German) schreibt man klein [translation: Oh I see now that “the tropical rain forest” is to be spelled in lower case] also schreiben wir das klein] [translation: so we spell that in lower case] (writes, 1 s)

019

(2 s)

020

(writes, 1 s)

016

017

Changes “Tropical Rainforest“ to “tropical rainforest“ in answer 3

Changes “Tropical Rainforest“ to “tropical rainforest“ in answer 2

Data Example 13. Britt 1024-1.e)

Plans adaptation of her answers an actualized representation of right spelling Keeps mental representation of spelling active

Attempts to identify more instances of “Tropical rainforest“ in her texts, identifies one further case Keeps mental representation of spelling active

Change of focus between the problem spaces 021

(1 s)

Reads her own text

022

(writes, 1 s)

Changes “Rainforest” to “rainforest” in answer 2

023

(1 s)

024

[(German) und auseinander? [translation: and in separate words?] (1 s) Hm. .

025

026 027

Na egal. [translation: Well, doesn’t matter.] Ich hätt’s jetzt zusammen geschrieben. [translation: I would have spelled it in one word.]

Data Example 13 cont.

113

Attempts to identify more instances of “Tropical rainforest“ in her texts Keeps mental representation of spelling active Actualizes linguistic form “tropical rain forest” by means of extracting infromation from task prompt or other text material Constructs orthographic form “rain forest” with focus on spelling in two words Identifies discrepancy beween her own spelling, considers adapting her spelling to her knew knowledge state Decides not to do this Compares representation of the given spelling with her knowledge of English spelling, identifies discrepancy

114 028

A coding scheme (sighs, 2 s) (1 s)

Turns back to conceptual task solving: Reconstructs mental representation of task 5

Data Example 13 cont.

The reason why there is no conceptual activity here is that in the problem that is in the focus here, all attention is on form. Orthographical issues are semantically empty. 3. Different phases – different mental activities In this first look at the data we can see already that the task solving phases in the conceptual and the linguistic problem space are not linked to any point in a sequential order. Rather, they can occur at any rate and in any order during the solving process. Of course, the variability is limited, and there are tendencies in distribution: In the beginning, a mental representation of the problem has to be created, because without it, no problem would be there that could be solved. It does not mean, however, that this phase needs to be fully finalized, and a revision of the representation can take place any time during the task solving. A clear tendency is that the linguistic-rhetorical problem solving activities can be found in the beginning of the task processing, namely when the learners read the task assignment in order to create a mental representation of the task. After that the focus would typically turn more to conceptual and nonverbal content. Only when the task solving comes to its end is the centre of attention moved back to linguistic issues, namely when a formulation for the solution has to be found (s.a. Flower and Hayes 1981). So, the subjects first start to deal with formulating and writing when they have dealt with the conceptual side of the problem, and in that switch the focus from content to form. This assumption has consequences for the evaluation of validity of think-aloud protocols (see discussion in Chapter 10): When a learner halts in the verbalization of thoughts that have their focus in the conceptual problem space, we can assume with greater probability that the interrup-

Different phases – different mental activities

115

tions of the cognitive activities are a reactive effect of the think-aloud method. The following example illustrates this case: Transcript

External activity

Activity in the content problem space

Activity in the ling.-rhetorical problem space

009

I . think . the temperature . . is . . veryyy

Looks at climate graph

Attempts to (re-)construct a linguistic form for the expression of the concept STABLE, does not succeed

010

(takes a deep breath, 1 s) deerm . doesn’t . m- . var- . variable (1 s)

Looks at climate graph

Reconstructs concept TEMPERATURE, links it to KISANGANI and the feature STABLE ALL YEAR Constructs concept DOES NOT VARY

011

no.

012

Erm (1 s) (sighs, 2 s) (2 s)

013

[(researcher) Please keep talking.]

014

Mh. . I miss one word in English. (1 s)

Data Example 14. Bianca 1008 -1 b)

Focuses on STABLE ALL YEAR Keeps focus on STABLE ALL YEAR

Is interrupted in her stream of thought by the intervention of the researcher Turns focus to linguistic problem

(Re-)constructs alternative linguistic form for the expression of the concept Evaluates linguistic form as not adequate Attempts to (re-)construct a linguistic form for the expression of the concept STABLE, does not succeed

Evaluates her ability to express her thoughts in English as deficitary

116

A coding scheme

015

The temperature is not variable it’s . .

016

very constant

Turns focus back to concept TEMPERATURE DOES NOT VARY and TEMPERATURE IS CONSTANT Keeps focus on concept CONSTANT

Attempts to (re-)construct a linguistic form for the expression of the concept STABLE (Re-)constructs term “constant”

Data Example 14 cont.

Bianca here is in the phase of the first contact with the information from the climate graph, so we can assume that her intention is not on writing down any thoughts here. We see her concentrating on the curves in the diagram and construct a mental representation of their progress, and by that creating an understanding of the climatic situation. Why should she then, as in segment 010 ff, ponder over how to express the run of the climate curves? She has just begun the conceptual construction activity. If she had been thinking in silence, it seems unlikely that she would have spent time thinking about the formulation of the concepts. So it seems plausible that Bianca here has problems with the assignment of the think-aloud method, and that the method triggers unnatural cognitive activity. It is not a valid indication that bilingual learners think in any way differently because they use the L2 in content-focus situations, but is created by the think-aloud method. This is different when the learner has entered the phase of formulating and writing down: In the following example Svenja follows the goal of writing down her answer. Here it is plausible that she invests energy in the formulation of her thoughts, and that in a silent task processing, similar activities of evaluation and editing would occur like the ones we see in the protocol. From this is becomes clear that the conceptualization of qualitatively separated phases within the solving of a problem provides a helpful tool for the assessment of validity of think-aloud protocols. Once again it stresses how important a close consideration of the theoretical base and a wellgrounded knowledge about the task is in order to arrive at a plausible analysis.

Different phases – different mental activities

117

Transcript

External activity

Activity in the content problem space

Activity in the ling.-rhetorical problem space

031

[(writing) over . . the year.]

Writes “over l“

(Re-)Constructs linguistic form

032

(2 s)

033

no

034

. the whole year. . Through.

035

[(writing) (1 s)

Crosses out “over l“

036

eerm aand (1 s) the whole year (1 s) through (2 s)]

Writes “the whole year through.“

Keeps focus on TEMPERATURE CONSTANT ALL YEAR Keeps focus on TEMPERATURE CONSTANT ALL YEAR Keeps focus on TEMPERATURE CONSTANT ALL YEAR Keeps focus on TEMPERATURE CONSTANT ALL YEAR Keeps focus on TEMPERATURE CONSTANT ALL YEAR Keeps focus on TEMPERATURE CONSTANT ALL YEAR

Tries to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form to express the concept Evaluates parts of the formulation as inadequate (Re-)Constructs alternative formulation

Data Example 15. Svenja 1020-1.b)

Another important issue is that for recognizing patterns, an overview of the whole protocol of the interaction with the task is necessary. Extracts alone are often not enough to infer what is going on. Therefore, it was necessary to transcribe, segment and code complete protocols. A selective analysis, as Chi (1997) suggests, would have only been possible after a lot of experience with the coding scheme in question. Since the theoretical

118

A coding scheme

model emerged from the analysis itself, and hypotheses of bilingual learner’s cognitive processing had first to be built, not tested, selective analysis was not an option.

4. Summary In this chapter I described how the theoretical-methodological decisions led to the development of the coding scheme for the data. The segmentation of the model into conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical task solving could be demonstrated as a useful way of analysis. The data revealed that problem solving activities can take place in each problem space simultaneously, but even turn from side to side. In the following chapter, I will present cognitive patterns that manifested themselves in the think-aloud data. From this, I will try to find an answer to the question of whether differences can be found in the cognitive processing of problem solving in the L1 compared to the L2. By means of illustrating examples, I will build hypotheses concerning the role of language in general and of a foreign language in particular in content-focused task processing.

Chapter 9 Problem solving in a foreign language

1. Language as a catalytic converter: depth of processing The process data provide insight into the focus that the learners put on linguistic and content information. Partly because of methodological reasons, this study cannot produce any results about specific conceptualisations that come with different language systems in the sense of linguistic relativity, whereas it is possible to reveal interactions between linguistic and conceptual processing. I will illustrate this with the help of an example produced by Heike, a student from the L1 group. Before the sequence we see in her Data Example 16, she has identified tropical rainforest North and South of the equator by extracting information from the vegetation map of the world. In the following sequence, she tries to construct a summarizing statement about the location of the tropical rainforest.

055

Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

Activities in the ling.-rhet. problem space

[(writing) somit (1 s) befindet (1 s) er . . sich (1 s) in] [translation: therefore it is located in]

Writes “Somit befindet er sich in”

Reconstructs concept CLIMATE ZONE and connects it with DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST

(Re-)constructs linguistic form

Data Example 16. Heike 1115-1.a)

120 056

057

058

Problem solving in a foreign language wie ist das mit den Subtropen? Gemischte Zone gemäßigte Zone Tropen wie heißt das denn in den (1 s) in den (1 s) naa ind[translation: how was that again about the subtropics? Mixed zone, temperate zone, tropics – what is it called – in the – in the – ooh! in the –] “befindet er sich in” den Tropen

[(writing) (1 s)]

Data Example 16 cont.

Reads her own text

Writes “den” [translation: the]

Keeps Focus on CLIMATE ZONE, Reconstructs connected concepts VEGETATIONAL ZONE and subordinate concepts SUBTROPICS, MIXED ZONE; TROPICS

Searches for term for concept CLIMATE ZONE

Keeps concept TROPICS active, links it with DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAINFOREST Focuses on DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST in the TROPICS

Actualizes mental representation of formulation, (re-)constructs following formulation

Language as a catalytic converter: depth of processing 059

060

nee wie heißt das (1 s) faaa(1 s) ermmm (1 s) erm wie heißt das denn? Tropen? Subtropen? . . Gemischte Zone . . kalte Zone . und wie heißt das insgesamt? (1 s) [translation: noo… what is it called – faaa- – er – er – what is it called? Tropics? Subtropics? Mixed zone – cold zone – and what is the overall category called?] Vegetationszonen? [translation: vegetation zones?]

121

Turns focus on superordinate concept CLIMATE ZONES, reconstructing and linking the subordinate concepts TROPICS, SUBTROPICS, MIXED ZONE, COLD ZONE

Tries to express superordinate concept CLIMATE ZONES

Fokussiert CLIMATE ZONE

Reconstructs term “Vegetationszone“ in attempt to express CLIMATE ZONE

Data Example 16 cont.

Heike tries here to find the correct term for the superordinate concept CLIMATE ZONE. She cannot immediately access an adequate linguistic form, so she goes through search processes in the surrounding semantic field. Here, she reconstructs the subordinate concepts TROPICS and SUBTROPICS, that is she reconstructs her mental model around the concept CLIMATE ZONE in order to get access to the right denomination. Finally, she settles with “Vegetationszonen”, vegetation zones. What we see here is that the search for the adequate linguistic form triggers an elaboration of the conceptual knowledge network, because it is reconstructed in relation to its surrounding semantic field and tested in its

122

Problem solving in a foreign language

coherence. If Heike had been able to retrieve the right term for CLIMATE ZONE immediately, it would be improbable that she had dealt with the neighbouring and subordinate concepts with the same intensity. Because of the search process in the linguistic problem space, she has a reason to reconstruct her knowledge, to check it and by this to deepen it. Let us look at another example, produced by Jan:

027

028

029

030

Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

Activities in the ling.-rhet. problem space

[(writing) (1 s) die (1 s) der Regenwald] [translation: The rain forest] (2 s) ist (2 s) mh. (3 s) [translation: is erm]

Writes “Der” [translation: The]

Keeps concepts active, focuses on TROPICAL RAINFOREST

(Re-)constructs form

Keeps concepts active, focuses on DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAINFOREST Keeps concepts active, focuses on DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAINFOREST

Attempts to (re-)construct adequate form for the expression of the concepts (Re-)constructs form

Der tropische Regenwald liegt in der tropischen . [translation: The tropical rainforest is located in the tropical] [(writing) . . [(whispering) der tropische] (1 s) Regen- (2 s) -wald (2 s)] [translation: the tropical rainforest]

Writes “tropische Regenwald“ [translation: tropical rainforest]

Data Example 17. 1120 Jan-1.a)

Keeps concepts active, focuses on DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROPICAL RAINFOREST

Language as a catalytic converter: depth of processing 031

. . ermm (1 s)

032

entwickelte sich (1 s) [translation: developed]

033

[(writing) entwickelte sich (3 s) sich in (1 s) (breathes in, 1 s) in der gleichnamigen (4 s) gleichnamigen (1 s) tropischen (3 s) Klimazone (4 s) Komma welche (1 s) sich] [translation: developed in the tropical climate zone with the same name comma which] (2 s)

034

Data Example 17 cont.

Writes “entwickelte sich in der gleichnahmigen tropischen Klimazone, welche sich” [translation: developed in the tropical climate zone with the same name, which]

Re-reads his own text

Keeps concepts active, looks for coherent relationships and order of concepts Keeps concepts active, focuses on DEVELOPMENT OF THE TROPICAL RAINFOREST Keeps concepts active, focuses on DEVELOPMENT OF THE TROPICAL RAINFOREST, reconstructs and links TROPICAL CLIMATE ZONE, establishes conceptual link between TROPICAL RAIN FOREST and TROPICAL CLIMATE ZONE Probably: Keeps concepts active

123

Attempts to (re-)construct adequate form for the expression of the concepts (Re-)constructs form

Deduces from the term “tropisch” with the similar name the conceptual connection

Probably: Attempts to (re-)construct adequate form for the expression of the concepts; actualizes mental representation of formulation

124 035

Problem solving in a foreign language [(writing) im . . Äquator (2 s) quator- . . bereich (1 s) befindet. (2 s)] [translation: is located in the region around the equator.]

Writes “im äquatorberech [sic] befindet.“ [translation: is located in the region around the equator.]

Keeps concepts active, links TROPICAL RAINFOREST, TROPICAL CLIMATE ZONE and CLOSENESS TO EQUATOR

(Re-)constructs form

Data Example 17 cont.

In segment 032–033 Jan decides to write down the more specific form ‘entwickelte sich’ (‘developed’ instead of the formulation ‘befindet sich’ (‘is located’), which he had (re-)constructed in the first place. In entering the process of writing down his conceptual results and by that working on formulating his thoughts, he is motivated to optimize the concepts themselves. In that, he enriches his mental representation of the distribution of the tropical rainfores by the aspect of DEVELOPMENT, which adds both a time and a cause dimension to the conceptual relations because it implies the dependency of the vegetational zone on climatic causes. However, this new sense relation might not for the first time have occurred to him during the interaction with the task; can we then speak of a deeper processing of content also? Yes, because the act of formulating leads to a deeper establishing of knowledge, because the learner processes information by questioning its meaning and rejects one formulation as not comprising enough. Even if the conceptual knowledge is not changed qualitatively, it is deepened and linked by reconstruction. Here, we see clearly that the process of formulating is not only a simple activation of memory structures; rather, it reconstructs and changes knowledge structures by the need to explicate and specify meaning relations. In the two previous examples I have deliberately chosen protocols produced by monolingual learners, because the effect of a linguistic focus on conceptual knowledge structures can be shown not to be L2-specific. It occurs even when the learners use their L1 as the working language. Similar cases can be found in the data of the bilingual learners as well, for instance the following:

Language as a catalytic converter: depth of processing Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

Activities in the ling.-rhetorical problem space Attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form in order to express concept, plays with an option, decides against it (Re-)constructs linguistic form

093

It’s . . quite (1 s)

Links ARID with LOWEST VALUES

094

That are

095

[(writing) (2 s) the]

096

(4 s)

Keeps concept active, focus on ARID Keeps concept active, focus on ARID Keeps concept active, focus on ARID

097

[(writing) erm . the (1 s) most (1 s) [(whispering) arid] . . mmh . . months.]

Writes “That are the”

Writes “most arid months.”

Data Example 18. Katharina 6001-1.b)

125

Keeps concept active, focus on ARID

Attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form in order to express concept ARID (Re-)constructs linguistic form

126 098

099

Problem solving in a foreign language (4 s) [(whispering) Arid [(German) heißt doch (2 s) [(unclear) wenig Niederschlag und] humid (1 s) [(German) viel Niederschlag [translation: ‘arid’ sure means low precipitation and ‘humid’ high precipitation] ja.]] [translation: yes.]

Reconstructs concepts ARID and HUMID in their features and their interrelation

Assigns terminology to the concepts, checks reconstruction of the linguistic form “arid” as an adequate expression for the concept ARID

States congruence with focused concept

Evaluates reconstruction of the termini “arid” and “humid” as adequate

Data Example 18 cont.

Because Katharina is forced to formulate her thoughts in order to solve the task, she has to decide on a term that expresses the concept ARID that she has in mind. In that she alternates between “arid” and “humid”. So, the concept is present and active already, but the activity in which the concepts ARID and HUMID are reconstructed in their definitory features and by this are semantically linked with each other are triggered by the task of finding the adequate term for the concept. Here, too, the semantic relations between the concepts that are denominated by each term are reinforced and adjusted, while the learner reconstructs her conscious knowledge of aspects of the dichotomic relation. What the data can show is that a focus on linguistic form can lead to a deeper semantic processing. Since Craik and Lockhart (1972, see also Cermak and Craik 1979), is has been known that different levels of semantic processing can be identified. In contrast to the orthodox view that information is stored in different memory stores according to the amount of repetitions (which means: The more repetitions, the better an information is

Language as a catalytic converter: depth of processing

127

learned), Craik and Lockhart (1972) suggest that the degree of semantic processing determines in how much detail and stability information is stored in memory. Here, I do not assume that information passes from short-term to long-term memory in a sequential order, but that perceptual stimuli are processed on several levels simultaneously. These levels form a continuum of semantic links. The more superficially an item of information is processed, the less meaning is linked to it; the more deeply it is processed, the more processes of pattern recognition and generation of meaning are run. This conception of a series or hierarchy of processing stages is often referred to as depth of processing where greater depth implies a greater degree of semantic or cognitive analysis (Craik and Lockhart 1972: 675).

So, the stronger a meaning is linked to a focused item of information, the stronger the concept is anchored and the more likely is it that it can be recalled in the future. If we compare this concept with the results by Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) (cf. p. 46ff.), we can see that the conscious process of formulating one’s thoughts in text composition can lead to deeper processing of this kind. The effect of linguistic processing of conceptual content could be demonstrated in experiements by Chi (Chi 2000; Chi, de Leeuw et al. 1994). Here subjects who were prompted to provide explanations of meaning relations demonstrated a better grasp of the concepts than a control group. Similar assumptions have been uttered in the theoretical discussion of immersion programs, although here, language-specific rule knowledge is in focus (Swain 1998; Swain and Lapkin 1995). Also for CLIL education, similar hopes are cherished concerning the effect of the L2 use, which tie in nicely with the concept of semantic processing: Because the functional aspect of language is in the foreground in the focus-on-meaning classroom, a temporary focus on form never loses the link to the meaning that is to be conveyed. Der Umstand, daß sich die Fremdsprache dem Schüler vornehmlich als Transportmittel für das Sich-Aneignen und den Austausch von relevanten Sachinformationen darstellt, kann bzw. sollte dazu führen, daß er sich ihrer in ‚natürlicher‘ Weise bedient. Das bedeutet, daß der Sprachgebrauch nicht gekennzeichnet ist durch Überlegungen hinsichtlich der grammatischen Korrektheit, sondern bezüglich des Aussagewertes. Dies hat zur Folge, daß der funktionale Aspekt von Sprache betont wird und nicht, wie häufig im-

128

Problem solving in a foreign language

mer noch im traditionellen Fremdsprachenunterricht, der strukturelle Bereich. (Bredenbröker 2000: 17)

The first insight from my data analysis is introduced by combining the results of the examples provided above with the theoretical concept of semantic processing. It confirms results from text composition and learning research: The subjects do not go through sequential phases of planning in which a mental representation is created and eventually written down. Instead the single phases are interlaced and trigger each other. The biproduct of the linguistic search is re-adjustments, precisions, and interlinking of the conceptual content. So, from the database the following hypothesis can be formulated: The transfer of conceptual content in a linguistic form lead to a reflection about the semantic content and relationships, and through this to a deeper semantic processing of the content.

The data examples above indicate that this is the case for both groups of learners, no matter whether the written text is to be produced in the L1 or the L2. If the focus on the linguistic form leads to this effect anyway, is there a difference between L1 and L2 processing of conceptual content at all? Can we identify different types of linguistic problem solving activity in L1 and L2 processing? 2. L1-L2 processing differences in language production A first hypothesis would be that the bilingual subjects go through more search processes in the linguistic problem space than the monolingual subjects. In order to test this hypothesis the data corpus was searched for cases in which a focus on the linguistic form resulted in some form of deeper processing of content. As Table 6 on the following page shows, we see that in the protocols of the bilingual learners more cases of linguistically caused deeper processing can be found than in the protocols of the L1 users. This tendency is not homogeneous, however: The differences within each group are very big. So, Mona, Lara, Yvonne and Tamara from the bilingual group do not show any or only one single case of linguistically caused deeper processing,

L1-L2 processing differences in language production

129

while the leaders in this group, Katharina and Britt, show 10 and even 11 cases. Table 6. Cases of deeper semantic processing, caused by activity in the linguistic-rhetoric problem space CLIL learners

Number of cases

1024 Britt 6001 Katharina 1012 Karen 1019 Svenja 1011 Jennifer 1023 Henriette 1008 Bianca 1015 Roland 1004 Sönke 1022 Tamara 1025 Kim 1005 Mona 1006 Lara 1007 Yvonne

11 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 -

Monolingual learners

Number of cases

1115 Heike 1105 Max 1104 Tim 1120 Jan 1123 Joachim 1128 Isabella 1128 Isabella 1128 Isabella 1114 Marco

9 8 7 5 4 2 2 2 -

For the L1 users, the mean deviation is somewhat smaller, but even here there is a big difference between Marco (0) and Heike (9 cases). We can thus conclude that the hypothesis that bilingual learners dwell more often on linguistic sub-problems than L1 users cannot clearly be confirmed on the data basis elicited for this project. This is rather surprising, given that the L2 users generally have a lower proficiency in their L2 than in their L1. On the other hand, the case study database is so small that it is not possible to come to clear conclusions with traditional quantitative measurements. From this basis, a restricting hypothesis needs to be added to the first hypothesis:

130

Problem solving in a foreign language

The impact of the working language on the processing of conceptual content can vary strongly between subjects, no matter whether an L1 or an L2 is being used.

For these differences, too, different factors can be responsible, e.g., individual differences in the cognitive processing, motivations, minuteness, language awareness and many more. It is not possible to pinpoint the role of the L2 in this way. For a more valid statement we have to investigate whether there are special cases in the data that clearly show the impact of L2 processing, in contrast to the focussing effect of language in general, without having to take external factors into account for an explanation. Differences between L1 and L2 use that seem to be highly relevant here are indeed to be found in the verbal protocols: The most prominent, and rather trivial, difference between both groups is that in the think-aloud protocols of the monolingual group only one, while in the protocols of the bilingual group two languages play a part. Therefore the bilingual learners have to face a special kind of linguistic problem solving, namely translation (cf. L2 text composition model by Krings 1996); thus, these processes are specific for the information processing of the bilingual learners. Typical of translation phases is that a mental representation of a concept is more or less automatically expressed in the L1, and subsequently transferred into an L2. In that, additional problem solving activities become necessary. The following example illustrates this case: Transcript

070

External activities

what was [(German) Elfenbeinküste] in English again ermm . (clicks her tongue, takes a deep breath, 1 s)

Data Example 19. Karen 1012-1.a)

Activities in the conceptual problem space Reconstructs concept IVORY COAST

Activities in the ling.-rhet. problem space Reconstructs German form “Elfenbeinküste”, tries to reconstruct corresponding English term

L1-L2 processing differences in language production 071

oh no idea

072

ff- l- ermm (1 s)

073

Okay.

Keeps concept IVORY COAST active Keeps concept IVORY COAST active Turns away from concept IVORY COAST

131

Reconstruction does not succeed Tries to reconstruct corresponding English term for German “Elfenbeinküste“ Reconstruction does not succeed

Data Example 19 cont.

As we see here the concept IVORY COAST is present, and even its L1 form “Elfenbeinküste”. The search activities that follow only take place because Karen is trying to fulfill the requirement of formulating an answer in the L2; had the task not contained this requirement, or had the focus been completely on meaning, she could have stopped with the reconstructed meaning, or solved the subordinate problem by writing the German term. What does this mean for the conceptual side of the task solving? As indicated in the analysis above activity can be assumed in the conceptual problem space as well, because it is not plausible that the learner turns away from the meaning side of the concept completely and only keeps a semantically empty phonological construct active in working memory. Rather, we can assume that she attempts to recall the English term while activating episodic previous knowledge while she keeps the concept IVORY COAST active. This leads to a longer processing of the information than if the learner had been able to activate the right term immediately. Here, we can assume that semantic connections are established or strengthened. This kind of L2-specific difficulties in formulation can cause an omission of concepts that are actually mentally represented in the answer, as in the following example:

132

Problem solving in a foreign language

Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

Activities in the ling.-rhetorical problem space

030

[(writing) (2 s) it is important (6 s) to leave (2 s) the forest (2 s) to itself again (4 s)]

Writes “because it is important to leave the forest to itself again to!

(Re-)constructs linguistic form

031

(crosses out, 1 s)

Crosses out “to”

032

(2 s) so (1 s) so it can . . [(German) sich erholen (sighs, 2 s) Hm. . . [translation: to recover]

Reconstructs evaluation of the GOAL OF THE SUGGESTION FOR A SOLUTION as IMPORTANT Keeps concept active, focuses on relation IN ORDER TO Turns focus to concept RECOVER

033

Na lassen wir das einfach weg.] [translation: okay, let’s just leave that out.]

Turns away from concept RECOVER

Evaluates linguistic form as not adequate Reconstructs German form for concept RECOVER, attempts to reconstruct corresponding English term, does not succeed Stops attempts to reconstruct English term

Data Example 20. Britt 1024-6

Britt wants to express the concept TO RECOVER. Of this we can be sure because she utters it in the L1. The following search process for the English corresponding term does not lead to any result, so that she eventually stops her attempts to explicate the conceptual thought. Here, we have good reasons to assume that she would have fixated the thought in writing in German term had it not been her aim to write an English answer. This leads to another hypothesis about the special character of L2 processing of content:

L1-L2 processing differences in language production

133

The usage of an L2 as a working language can lead to the situation that less conceptual knowledge is expressed in the learners’ texts than is actually mentally present.

If, on the other hand, the learner does not interrupt the search process, limitations in L2 knowledge can lead to additional search processes. The following data example 21 produced by Jennifer illustrates this point. In it, we can follow for some time how she composes the text in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Jennifer’s answer of task 6 (here called 5.a)

At the beginning of the protocol extract in Example 21 on the next page Jennifer wants to express that the suggestion for a solution presented in the task material does not correspond in all respects to the principle of sustainability. In segments 052–056 we can keep track of her attempts to look for the adequate English term in order to express the concept CORRESPOND. In German an adequate linguistic term can be retrieved, but not in English. In 057, she decides to abandon her initial goal and starts instead to look for an alternative concept that she can express. After a longer sequence of searching (which she unfortunately does not vocalise) she evaluates the alternative formulation she has found, “would be right for”, as not adequate (“expressed clumsily”). Because she cannot come up with an alternative, she still decides to write it down. After that she is looking for the appropriate verb in order to express the mental concept, decides first on “treating”, writes it down, rejects it shortly

134

Problem solving in a foreign language

afterwards and changes the text to “saving”. This, too, is eventually evaluated as not adequate, probably under the impression of the formulation in the information text of the task. Finally, she settles for “protecting the natural resources”. Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

049

[(writing) (1 s) mh the]

Writes “The”

050

..

Keeps concept active, focus on SUGGESTION Keeps concept active, focus on SUGGESTION

051

[(writing) suggestion (3 s)]

052

(1 s) mh (2 s) ermm (1 s) [(German) entsprechen a- -m. -m- -m- -a (10 s) Aach! [expressing her annoyance] (1 s)

053 054

Writes “suggestion”

Data example 21. Jennifer 1011-6

Keeps concept active, focus on SUGGESTION Keeps concepts active, focus on CORRESPOND

Keeps concepts active, focus on CORRESPOND Keeps concepts active, focus on CORRESPOND

Activities in the ling.-rhet. problem space

Attempts to reconstruct adequate linguistic form for the expression of SUGGESTION, probably by making use of the information in the task prompt Reconstructs linguistic form “suggestion” Attempts to reconstruct adequate linguistic form for the expression of CORRESPOND Reconstruction does not succeed Attempts to reconstruct adequate linguistic form for the expression of CORRESPOND

L1-L2 processing differences in language production 055

Mann! [expressing her annoyance] (sighs, 2 s) (5 s) mh (1 s) mh .

Keeps concepts active, focus on CORRESPOND Keeps concepts active, focus on CORRESPOND

057

Dann anders [translation: then differently]

Keeps concepts active, focus on CORRESPOND

058

(1 s) mmmh (10 s)

059

wääää . . schon wieder so ungeschickt ausgedrückt [translation: oh no, so clumsily expressed again] . . na ja] [translation: well okay]

Keeps concepts active, turns focus to BE RIGHT Keeps concepts active, focus on BE RIGHT

056

060

061

(takes a deep breath, 1 s)

062

[(writing) (2 s)]

Data example 21 cont.

Keeps concepts active, focus on BE RIGHT

Writes “would”

Keeps concepts active, focus on BE RIGHT Keeps concepts active, focus on BE RIGHT

135

Reconstruction does not succeed Attempts to reconstruct adequate linguistic form for the expression of CORRESPOND; reconstruction does not succeed Plans to (re-)construct alternative linguistic form for the expression of the concept (Re-)constructs alternative linguistic form Evaluates linguistic form “be right” as not adequate

(Re-)constructio n of an alternative form does not succeed, decides to use “be right” after all Prepares for act of writing (Re-)constructs linguistic form

136

Problem solving in a foreign language

063

(1 s)

064

[(writing) (1 s) be (1 s) right (1 s) for . . ] mmmh (3 s)

writes “be right for”

066

[(writing) . . treating]

Writes “treating”

067

(2 s) ermm (6 s)

068

[(crosses out) (2 s)]

069

(1 s) for (1 s)

070

Saving

071

[(writing) (1 s)]

065

Data example 21 cont.

Keeps concepts active, focus on BE RIGHT

Writes “treating”

Writes “saving”

Keeps concepts active, focus on BE RIGHT Keeps concepts active, focus on BE RIGHT Keeps concepts active, focus on TREATING Keeps concepts active, evaluates TREATING as inadequate concept

Keeps concepts active, focus on TREATING Keeps concepts active, attempts to (re-)construct adequate concept Keeps concepts active, reconstructs concept SAVING Keeps concepts active, focus on SAVING

Attempts to reconstruct linguistic form in order to express the concepts (Re-)constructs linguistic form Attempts to reconstruct linguistic form in order to express the concepts (Re-)constructs linguistic form Attempts to reconstruct linguistic form in order to express the concepts, evaluates “treating“ as not adequate

Attempts to reconstruct linguistic form in order to express the concepts (Re-)constructs linguistic form

L1-L2 processing differences in language production 072

(3 s)

Rereads information text

073

[(writing) the natural (2 s)]

Writes “the natural”

074

(1 s)

075

(crosses out, 1 s)

076

(1 s)

077

078

[(d) nee . . anders.] [translation: no – differently] (1 s)

Keeps concepts active, evaluates SAVING as not adequate Attempts to reconstruct adequate concept

079

Protecting

Reconstructs PROTECTING

Data example 21 cont.

Crosses out “saving”

Keeps concepts active, turns focus to TROPICAL RAIN FOREST, attempts to (re-)construct specifying concept Reconstructs NATURAL RESOURCES Keeps concepts active, evaluates SAVING as not adequate Keeps concepts active, focus on SAVING Keeps concepts active

137

Searches for adequate linguistic form using the information text

(Re-)constructs linguistic form Attempts to reconstruct adequate linguistic form, evaluates “saving” as not optimal

Checks adequacy of linguistic form Evaluates “saving” again as not adequate Attempts to reconstruct adequate linguistic form to express the concepts (Re-)constructs linguistic form “protecting“

138

Problem solving in a foreign language

080

(1 s) mh mh . .

081

[(writing) resources (1 s)]

082

(3 s)

083

[(writing) re- . sources]

Turns focus to concept NATURAL RESOURCES

Writes “protecting the natural” Possibly: Rereads information text

Focuses on NATURAL RESOURCES Focuses on NATURAL RESOURCES

Writes “resources”

Focuses on NATURAL RESOURCES

Attempts to reconstruct adequate linguistic form in order to express the concept NATURAL RESOURCES, using the information in the information text (Re-)constructs linguistic form Probably: Searches for spelling in the information text (Re-)constructs linguistic form

Data example 21 cont.

So, what is Jennifer doing in her attempts to find a formulation? She relates the concepts CORRESPOND TO SOMETHING, BE GOOD FOR SOMETHING, TREATING SOMETHING IN A CERTAIN WAY, SAVING SOMETHING and PROTECTING SOMETHING to each other. Each of the attempted formulations provides individual access to the conceptual representation. In testing which concept provides the right perspective and by that searching through the semantic field, Jennifer changes her perspective of the mental concept. Here, the interrelations between the concepts are sorted out and reinforced. She is activating conceptual knowledge, because she evaluates the linguistic forms in their capacities to adequately express the concept. Underlying such a process of evaluation are processes of comparison; as Jennifer compares, she establishes relations between the neighbouring concepts that are indicated by their linguistic form. So, besides a longer focusing on the conceptual content, the whole idea that is to be expressed is processed more deeply. Still, such a search is not necessarily typical of L2 usage. But the beginning of the transcript segment shows what caused the search process in the first place: A gap in the L2 lexicon. It is highly plausible to assume that

L1-L2 processing differences in language production

139

Jennifer would not have initiated the whole search process with its necessary deeper processing had she had an English formulation at her disposal or could she have written a German text instead. On these grounds we can subdivide linguistically caused cases of deeper semantic processing in the bilingual learners into two categories: 1. Cases in which the focus on language in general causes a deeper semantic processing in the search for an adequate formulation 2. Cases in which a focus on the L2 form causes a semantically deeper processing in the search for an adequate L2 formualtion. The result of this can be formulated as the following hypothesis: An L2 as a working language has the potential to trigger L2 specific search processes and by that to increase linguistic reflection, which in turn can lead to deeper semantic processing of content.

Cases from category a) are those from which we can assume that they would have had occurred even if the learners had not used the L2; Data Example 18, in which Katharina contemplates using HUMID or ARID, is such a case: Because Katharina is looking for the right subject-specific terminology (which for this case is the same in English and German), she would have needed to go through similar search processes, had she solved the task using her L1 German. Category b), on the contrary, subsumes cases like Data Example 21 by Jennifer, in which a gap in L2-specific knowledge causes deeper processing. Problematic in a qualitative analysis of think-aloud data is that not all cases can be categorized clearly. In a number of cases it seems possible, but not definitive, that L2-specific difficulties in expressing a concept trigger search activities, although it could be very possible that a corresponding search for formulations would have been applied in the same way in L1 processing. Data Example 22 by Henriette exemplifies this case. She is writing down where Kisangani is located. While doing that she changes the formulation from “below the tropic of cancer” to “between the tropic of cancer and the equator”, and by that changes the angle from which she focuses different features of the conceptual representation.

140

Problem solving in a foreign language Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

028

(5 s) it’sssssss (2 s)

Looks at map

029

Below

030

(4 s) ermm (3 s)

Looks for place name in task prompt or climate graph

Reconstructs mental representation of KISANGANI’S LOCATION ON THE MAP, attempts to (re-)construct further concepts in order to specify the concept Constructs specifying concept: BELOW THE TROPIC OF CANCER Attempts to (re-)construct further concepts in order to specify the concept, (re-)constructio n does not succeed, turns focus to KISANGANI

031

[(writing) Ki- . . -san- (1 s) -gani]

Writes “Kisangani”

Data Example 22. Henriette 1023-1.b)

Keeps concept KISANGANI’S LOCATION active, focus on KISANGANI

Activities in the ling.-rhetorical problem space

Attempts to reconstruct place name “Kisangani”, reconstruction does not succeed, attempts to construct place name while using information from task prompt or climate graph Constructs place name “Kisangani”

L1-L2 processing differences in language production 032

(4 s) issss (1 s)

033

between (1 s)

034

[(writing) is . . be- . . -tween (1 s) the tropic of cancer (4 s) tropic . of (1 s) cancer (1 s) and . . the . . [(whispering) equator.] (3 s) -quator.] (1 s) Okay.

035

Writes “is between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator.”

141

Keeps concept active, (re-)constructs concepts TROPIC OF CANCER and EQUATOR, tries to link these to KISANGANI’S LOCATION Links KISANGANI’S LOCATION with TROPIC OF CANCER and EQUATOR Keeps concept active, focus on LOCATION BETWEEN TROPIC OF CANCER AND EQUATOR

Attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form in order to express the concepts

Evaluates solution as adequate

Evaluates texts as adequate

(Re-)constructs linguistic form

(Re-)constructs linguistic form

Data Example 22 cont.

The turn of focus from BELOW to IN BETWEEN, which actually is a specification of the location, is not L2-specific: Such a focus switch cannot be regarded as being caused by the foreign working language, and could happen while processing the L1 as well. However, we cannot be completely sure whether restricted L2 knowledge indeed has caused the search for formulation. For instance, it could be possible that Henriette is looking for the right preposition, while she mentally focuses already on the concept IN BETWEEN. Additionally, I want to show the following data example for this category, because it illustrates the point well:

142

084

085

Problem solving in a foreign language Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

Activities in the ling.-rhet. problem space

[(writing) precipitation (4 s) is very high (4 s) so (1 s) erm . . so] I can (1 s) erm . . I can . I can (1 s)

Writes “The precipitation is very high so”

Reconstructs concept HIGH PRECIPITATION IN KISANGANI Attempts to construct causal link between the subordinate concepts Attempts to construct causal link between the subordinate concepts Reconstructs relation between these concepts and VEGETATION TROPICAL RAIN FOREST Keeps concepts active, focus on KISANGANI’S LOCATION IN THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST

(Re-)constructs linguistic form

086

so I know

087

[(writing) (3 s) that (1 s) this (2 s) has . . to be (1 s) in . . tropical rain forest . reason . erm regions.]

088

(1 s) [(German) oder] [translation: or] in regions (1 s) in tropicallll (1 s) rain (1 s)

Writes “I know, that this have”, changes “have” zu “has”, writes “to be in Tropical rain forest”

Data Example 23. Svenja 1019-1.b)

Attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form (Re-)constructs linguistic form

(Re-)constructs linguistic form, evaluates form as not adequate, (re-)constructs other linguistic form Evaluates formulation as not optimal, attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form in order to express the concept

L1-L2 processing differences in language production 089

[(stressed) in] the tropical rain forest.

090

[(writing) (3 s) forest. (2 s)]

Inserts “in”, puts fullstop.

Keeps concepts active, focus on KISANGANI’S LOCATION IN THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST Keeps concepts active, focus on KISANGANI’S LOCATION IN THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST

143

(Re-)constructs linguistic form

Data Example 23 cont.

The formulation problem that starts in 084/085 and subsequently leads to a search is obviously caused by a gap in L2 knowledge. Probably the learner focuses on a concept and tries to express it (CONCLUDE or INFER would be plausible, because she starts with “I can”), but cannot access the right lexical elements. This leads to a reformulation “so I know” in 086. With this interpretation we can classify this instance as an L2-caused deeper processing of content, which ends up in a somewhat simplified conceptual relation: “So I know” expresses a less elaborate subject-specific view than “so I can conclude”, because the way of reasoning and the causal relationships are not in the focus any longer. Nevertheless, we cannot be completely sure that the L2 actually is the cause for this. It could likewise be plausible that the learner does not even focus any concepts such as CONCLUDE, and that we actually witness the initial construction of a concept, so that “so I know” is not a second alternative, but the first. If that is the case, then the search for a linguistic form is not L2-specific. Another aspect can shed more light on this methodological problem: If we assume that the bilingual learners’ L2 proficiency is incomplete, while the monolingual group has full proficiency in their L1 and thus does not experience any formulation difficulties, we could evaluate the above example as clearly L2-caused. A look at the data of the monolingual group,

144

Problem solving in a foreign language

however, reveals quickly that it is not that simple; even the L1 students struggle with language:

062

063

064

065

066

Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

Activities in the ling.-rhet- problem space

“ich begründe meine Meinung damit” [translation: I justify my opinion with the fact] (2 s) dass . . das. . . Klima- . – diagramm [translation: that the climate graph]

Rereads his own text

Keeps concept active, attempts to reconstruct his own way of concluding

Tries to (re-)construct linguistic form of the formulation up to now Attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form for the expression of the concept

[(writing) Kliiima- . . -dia- (2 s)] [translation climate gra-] Klimadiagramm . . aus. . . [translation: climate graph of]

Writes “dass das Klimadiagramm”

Reconstructs way of concluding, attempts to establish causal relation between CLIMATE and CLIMATE GRAPH Keeps concept active, focus on CLIMATE GRAPH Keeps concept CLIMATE GRAPH OF KISANGANI active

Nee. [translation: No.]

Data Example 24. Max 1105-1.d)

Keeps concept CLIMATE GRAPH OF KISANGANI active

(Re-)constructs linguistic form Attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form for the expression of the concept Evaluates (re-)constructed preposition “aus” (“of”) as not adequate

L1-L2 processing differences in language production

066 067

Von? . . Oder aus? (1 s) Von? (1 s) [translation: Of? Or from? Of?] Das Klimadiagra- [(stressed) von] (1 s) [translation: The climate graph of] [(writing) Kii- (1 s) -san- (1 s) gani (1 s)] “das Klimadiagramm von . Kisangani”

068

(4 s) deutlich eindeutlich . [translation: clearly unambiguously (form is idiosynchratic, is not part of German standard!)]

069

[(writing) ein- (1 s) -deutlich . . aus (1 s) dem (2 s) T Punkt R Punkt (1 s) stammt (3 s) und] [translation: unambiguously stems from the T.R. and]

Data Example 24 cont.

Writes “von Kisangani” Rereads his own text

Writes “eindeutlich auch [sic] dem T.R. stammt und”

Keeps concept CLIMATE GRAPH OF KISANGANI active Keeps concept CLIMATE GRAPH OF KISANGANI active Turns focus to concept KISANGANI Keeps concept CLIMATE GRAPH OF KISANGANI active Attempts to reconstruct conceptual task solving from the information from the CLIMATE GRAPH and the CLIMATE that is characterized therein Reconstructs relation between shape of the CLIMATE CURVES and the FEATURE OF CLIMATE TYPICAL OF TROPICAL RAIN FOREST

145

Attempts to (re-)construct adequate prepositional phrase Decides on preposition “von” (Re-)constructs linguistic form Attempts to (re-)construct formulation up to now Turns focus to form: Attempts to (re-)construct adequate linguistic form in order to express concept

(Re-)constructs linguistic form

146

Problem solving in a foreign language

In 065 Max is not sure which preposition he should choose, and shows in 068 and 069, that even the L1 is a learner language that contains elements that deviate from the target language. The phenomenon “eindeutlich” we see here cannot be explained as a problem of performance: Max does not produce a slip of the tongue, but obviously his lexicon contains a lexeme “eindeutlich” in the sense of “eindeutig”, because he does not only pronounce it this way, but even writes it down. This example shows that we even need to regard the L1 as a learner language with dynamic character. This issue is highly important for a distinction between L1 and L2-specific processing of content. Therefore I will formulate the following hypothesis: L1 and L2 competence are not qualitatively different competences with clear boundaries, but have to be regarded as lying on a proficiency continuum. L1 users might experience fewer difficulties in mastering their working language than L2 users, but even here, linguistic processing is not completely automatized.

The evidence in the data implies that there is no principal difference between L1 and L2 usage in meaning-focused situations; the conclusion is that we should assume rather a quantitative difference in the performance of the two groups, not a principal difference in cognitive processing. This leads to the situation that in an analysis of the data, cases have to be isolated in which a mental concept is clearly present and can with more ease be denominated in the L1, but no corresponding form in the L2 can be accessed, so that search processes follow. They have to be separated from unclear cases. The result of such an analysis is shown in Table 7. Here, again, we see big differences between the learners. Still we can conclude a clear result concerning the role of the L2, which can be maintained without having to take individual learner variables into account. In the data of the bilingual learners, we find three phenomena: Firstly, linguistically caused cases of deeper semantic processing, and they correspond to similar cases in the monolingual group. This is indicated in the left column in Table 7. Secondly, we find cases of deeper processing in which it is not possible to identify whether the cause is the L2 usage, or general linguistic reflections; these cases are listed in the middle column. But thirdly, we find cases in which search processes are directly caused by a search for an adequate L2 form, while an L1 form is already present; in this last category, it would not be plausible to assume that these cases had taken place if not the L2

L1-L2 processing differences in language production

147

had been the working language. These cases are listed in the column on the right hand side in Table 7. All these instances of semantically deeper processing, and probably several from the middle column, would not have occurred without the L2 as the working language; L2 users show more knowledge transforming instances in their data than would have been there in L1 usage. Table 7. Deeper semantic processing of the CLIL learners, caused by activity in the linguistic problem space

Britt Katharina Jennifer Karen Bianca Roland Svenja Tamara Henriette Kim Sönke Mona Lara Yvonne

Cases of deeper semantic processing: Generally languagecaused 3 4 4 2 4 1 1 -

Cases of deeper semantic processing: Unclear, whether L2caused 4 2 1 4 2 6 2 2 2 2 1 -

Cases of deeper semantic processing: Clearly L2-caused 8 6 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 -

So, we find evidence in the bilingual groups’ data that the general effect of a linguistic focus on conceptual processing can be further enhanced by using an L2 as a working language. Formulating this as a hypothesis, we can state the following: When an adequate formulation for conceptual content has to be found, the use of an L2 enhances the effect of a deeper semantic processing, because here additional instances of linguistic problem solving occur compared to the use of an L1.

148

Problem solving in a foreign language

The hypotheses I have formulated so far all have their origin in the protocol phases in which the subjects focus actively on the formulation of conceptual thoughts. In the following, I want to turn the focus to the second macrocategory of linguistic processes in order to find out whether there are L2-specific phenomena in the reception of linguistic information that effect the processing of content. 3. Language reception One of the elicitation tasks, Task 6, was specifically designed to make the subjects decode a longer stretch of informative text. As described in Chapter 6, this task requires the learners to construct the concept SUSTAINABILITY from the text, and after that to evaluate a solution that suggests how the tropical rainforest can be protected in relation to the concept SUSTAINABILITY. The solution proposes protecting the tropical rainforest by establishing national parks. By that, it only takes ecological goals into consideration, but not social or economic goals. So, in order to be able to recognize this, the subjects need to build up an understanding from the information texts. In the analysis of the think-aloud protocols it soon becomes clear that we can infer very little about comprehension processes from the process data. What we can follow is only which text parts are focused on at which point in time. A typical protocol, like the following, illustrates why an analysis is methodologically problematic:

Filled and unfilled pauses

045

149

Transcript

External activities

Activities in the conceptual problem space

Activities in the ling.-rhet. problem space

“One possible way . . of protecting t- . -pical mh forest would be . to turn (1 s) the remaining forests . . into con- (1 s) -servation areas or national parks. (1 s) This would mean that nature would be llleft to itself again . . untouched by mankind. (1 s) Only a limited number of people would then be allowed to enter restricted areas in (1 s) parks along special trails”

Reads introductory text

Attempts to construct mental representation of the facts and circumstances

Attempts to decode linguistic information

Data Example 25. Lara 1006-6

The protocol here consists mainly of the vocalization of the text. It is not possible to infer in detail the constructive processes from the data material; we can only state on which text information the learner focuses her attention at a given moment and assume that she tries to construct meaning from the linguistic form. In that, elements of problem solving have to take place; but when exactly do these activities take place, and which role does the L2 play here?

4. Filled and unfilled pauses Let us take a second look at Data Example 25 above. If the processing of the text information had no problem solving character and were merely an

150

Problem solving in a foreign language

automatized activation of meaning elements as soon as the orthographicphonological form was activated in working memory, the vocalization should be very fluent; only breathing pauses should interrupt the vocalization. The data, on the other hand, reveal a different picture: We find a lot of gaps in the vocalization. It is to be assumed that the learner in these gaps either faces difficulty in immediately constructing meaning from what she just has read, or that she is occupied with the phonological decoding of the text. Of course, other causes could be possible: Information could be processed in parallel in these gaps, or processing could take place in a nonverbal code. The latter seems less likely, because the focus is on verbal information here. But the learner could be simply distracted and wander with her thoughts to completely different areas. So, in how far a matching between orthographical-phonological form and meaning actually takes place cannot be inferred reliably. Besides unfilled pauses, we find filled pauses like “mmh”, “erm”, etc. The number of pauses is very different from one individual to another. The exact measurement of speech pauses is difficult and can only be achieved on qualitative grounds, “because a long-drawn-out word such as WE . . . ELL, IN FA . . . ACT may be substituted for a pause” (Aitchison 1998). So, an individual who generally tends to speak slowly might produce fewer pauses than a person who speaks rapidly. Thus we cannot draw conclusions about planning and search processes from the number of pauses alone. Without any systematic account I therefore only want to mention the interesting observation that in all protocols, nearly exclusively unfilled pauses occur during the decoding of language, while filled pauses seem to be a typical feature of text production phases. It would be interesting to investigate this phenomenon psycholinguistically, because these surface phenomena could have an indicator function for underlying cognitive processes. In spite of the methodological problems concomitant with measuring pauses reliably, it seems probable that pauses are indicators of cognitive effort. Because it is difficult to measure, I now want to take a closer look at yet another phenomenon which might have a stronger indicator character.

Mispronunciations

151

5. Mispronunciations Let us consider the following transcript: 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030

Transcript “Against the background (1 s) of the aim of . . Agenda twenty one . how . do you (2 s) evaluate the following sul- . . suggestion for a solution. Support your answer”. “One possible way to pr- erm of Protection (2 s) Protecting the tropical rain forest (2 s) would be to turn the remaining forests into conserv- (1 s) conseveration areas or national parks. (1 s) This would mean that the Natural would be left itself again (1 s) untiched . . and mankin. (1 s) Only a limited number of people would then be allowed to enter (4 s) restricted areas in the parks . along sp- . special trails (1 s) and accompanied by rangers”.

Data Example 26. Roland 1015-6

We see in 013, 016 and 029 interruptions that are followed by a repeated pronunciation of the text element in question. These cases may indicate mere slips of the tongue (Aitchison 1998: 240ff); because they occur so often in Roland’s protocol, it seems plausible that these mispronunciations indicate decoding problems. Roland seems to be confronted with these lexemes for the first time, and therefore needs more effort to pronounce them. Simultaneously, these cases indicate difficulties in the semantic decoding which can only be solved by a higher activation of cognitive resources. We find a slightly different case in segments 017, 021, 023 and 025. Here, the pronunciation deviates from the text (marked in the transcript by italics). The learner obviously does not notice his mispronunciation, be-

152

Problem solving in a foreign language

cause he does not correct himself (023 and 025) or does even mispronounce it in a second try (021). What impact do these cases have on the construction of meaning? The learner obviously does not process the semantic content that the text provides, because he obviously cannot access it. This becomes particularly clear in Segment 025, where he is not only confronted with an unknown word, but also does not succeed in his attempt to integrate the information syntactically. Here we can assume that Roland is not able to construct the meaning of the information text. Mona provides another example: 015 016 017

Transcript in any way. Through the explanation of resources.

Data Example 27. Mona 1005-6

Note that in the original text it is ‘exploitation of resources’. Mona obviously does not know the word ‘exploitation’, so that we can assume that she fails to succeed in the meaning construction of the concept EXPLOITATION. Mispronunciations that indicate difficulties in decoding meaning occur with the following frequency in the bilingual learners: Table 8. CLIL learners’ mispronunciations when reading 1004 Sönke 1005 Mona 1006 Lara 1007 Yvonne 1008 Bianca 1011 Jennifer 1012 Karen 1015 Roland 1019 Svenja 1022 Tamara 1023 Henriette 1024 Britt 1025 Kim 6001 Katharina

8 17 6 6 3, stops task solving after that 1 2 7 8 6 3 Reads always without vocalization 6 4

Mispronunciations

153

This contrasts sharply with the protocols of the monolingual subjects, because here we do not find any of these cases. The monolingual group only produces mispronunciations on the phonological level, as in the following example by Tim in Segment 003 or 005: 002

003 004 005 006

Transcript “Leitbild der Nachhaltigkeit. Seit dem Weltgipfel von Rio de Janeiro im Jahre neunzehnhundertzweiundneunzig (1 s) gilt das Leitbild der Nachhaltigkeit als weltweit akzeptiert. (1 s) Dieses Leitbild besagt dass bei der Nutzung von . . Ressourcen . o- . . ökologische soziale (1 s) und . ökonomische Zielsetzungen gleichrangig zu beachten sind. . . Wobei nachfolgende Rene- . . Generationen hierdurch (1 s) keinen Schaden nehmen dürfen. . . Sondern ihre Bedürfnisse und Rechte stets mitbedacht werden sollen”. [translation: see information text of Task 6; this is the German version.]

Data Example 28. Tim 1104-6

It is highly unlikely that Tim here reads the word ‘Generationen’ for the first time or does not know its meaning. Furthermore, every mispronunciation is immediately corrected. From these transcript examples, the following hypothesis can be inferred: CLIL learners experience greater difficulties in the receptive L2 processing than monolingual students when processing comparable information in their L1. In many cases, the CLIL learners do not succeed in meaning construction.

It is rather suprising, however, that instead of massive mispronunciations in some cases, one one single learner, Bianca, surrenders and interrupts the task solving. All other learners solve the task. Here, some processes in the data are somewhat surprising, as can be illustrated with the help of Mona’s example:

154 003 004 005 006 007 008 009

010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035

Problem solving in a foreign language Transcript Since the world summit of Rio de Janeiro inn (1 s) nineteen ninety two (2 s) [(g with glottal stop) Agenda] twentyone the principle of sustan- . -nábility has been globally accepted. The principle means that the (1 s) in terms of the use of natural resources [(g with glottal stop) ecologi-] gical social and economic goals should be treated (1 s) as equal important. (1 s) At the same time the rights and need of future generations should be respected to say (1 s) to that they are not disadvantages in any way. Through the explanation of resources. (4 s) Against the background of the aims of [(g with glottal stop) Agenda] twenty-one how do you evaluate the following suggestion for a so- . -lu. - ution. (1 s) Since the world summit of Rio de Janeiro nineteen twenty two the principle of sutenability has been globally accepted the principle means that in terms of the use of natural ressources ecologish- (1 s) mmmh goals should be sh- . treated and equally important. At the same time the rights and needs of future generasions should be er- respected to say . . so say . . so that they are not disadventures in any way through the explanation

Data Example 29. Mona 1005

Mispronunciations 036 037 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050 051 052 053 054 055 056 057 058 059 060 061 062 063 064 065

155

of the resources”. (1 s) Okayyy. “Against the background of the aims of [(g mit Glottalverschluss) Agenda] twenty one you d- . how do you ev- . -valuate the following suggestion for a solution support your answer. (1 s) One possibility way of protection be left to itself the tropical rain forest would . be to turn the remaining forest into conser- . . -vation areas or national parks. This would mean that . nature would (1 s) this would mmh (2 s) would be left . to . itself again untouched by many kind. . . Only a limited number of people would then be allowed to enter restricts areas . in the park . along . . special trails and accom- . -men- . . [(diphthongised i) accompanied] by . ran- . by a ranger“. . „One possibility way of protection . would be to turn the [(betont) remaining] forest” (1 s) [(German) oh Gott [translation: Oh God] das find ich gut [translation: I think that’s good]

Data Example 29 cont.

Obviously, in a number of places Mona has to deal with unknown vocabulary or is overchallenged with the syntactic processing (007, 009, 010, 012, 016, 019, 028, 033, 035, 042, 045, 047, 054, 056, 058, 061, 062; I do not count the pronunciation problems in “sustainability”, because the information text serves the introduction of this concept). Here, her problems do not become any the smaller when she reads the text in which the concept SUSTAINABILITY is explained for the second time (021 following). Once more she reads all other texts, task prompt and

156

Problem solving in a foreign language

suggestion for a solution, and after that immediately forms an evaluative statement about the suggestion in Segment 065. Obviously, she does not expend further cognitive effort in the precise construction of meaning, but is still able to form a holistic evaluation of the suggestion for a solution. 6. Differences in semantic processing of text information? Table 9. Subject-specific scores in the answers of Task 6 CLIL learners 1005 Mona

Conceptual score 6,5

Monolinguals 1128 Isabella

Conceptual score 6,5

1015 Roland

5,5

1104 Tim

5

1025 Kim

5,5

1115 Heike

4,5

1006 Lara

5

1120 Jan

4

1011 Jennifer

4,5

1123 Joachim

4

1024 Britt

4,5

1105 Max

3,5

1023 Henriette

4

1114 Marco

1,5

1012 Karen

3,5

1007 Yvonne

3

1022 Tamara

3

1004 Sönke

2,5

1019 Svenja

2,5

6001 Katharina

2,5

1008 Bianca

Interrupted, no text Ø = 4,0

Ø= 4,2

The plausible assumption that the CLIL learners have to face more difficulties in comprehending texts and to process the information semantically deeply enough is challenged by these data. In order to investigate the actual

Differences in semantic processing of text information?

157

depth of processing, the data are not optimal; a pre-post-test design would have been more appropriate here. Therefore, I have assessed the degree of subject-specific qualitiy of the answer of each learner in order to see whether there is any correspondence. For this, I used an assessment scale for subject-specific competences, developed by Coetzee-Lachmann (2007), the results of which are displayed in Table 9 above. If we consider the processing difficulties that were revealed in Roland’s and Mona’s think-aloud protocols, it is rather surprising that their results show a score of 5.5 and 6.5 and in that are even above the average of both groups. Generally, we can state that the answers show major conceptual deficits (according to an idealized sample answer that was provided by geography specialists and teachers; 6 was defined as a miminum value for grade 10 grammar school students, see Coetzee-Lachmann 2007 for detail), but they can be found in the monolingual subjects’ texts as well. Obviously, the decoding difficulties of the CLIL learners do not lead to larger problems in processing the content. What we can assume here is that they employ compensatory strategies that enable them to understand sufficiently. In the interviews after the think-aloud sessions, I asked the learners about comprehension difficulties. All learners informed me that they infer information from the context when they experience difficulties in decoding texts. In the following interview extract I am talking to Mona about her task solving of Task 6 (all interviews were conducted in German, and are presented here in translation). She reports that she experienced no problems. 087 088 089 090 091 092 093 094 095 096 097 098

... Did you think it was easy or difficult Easy to evaluate the suggestion for a solution? Easy. Mmh. Why? Mmh. Don’t know. It is nothing like, well this has all been so mathematical and this here is more like, a little like, from humanities or something Mmh. And this, all these later tasks I found easier. I mean where I could write something, and an opinion and so on The tasks where you could work with a text? Yes, exactly. Yes, do you think that is because you could work with a text or not? Yes, yes. I could work well with that.

158

Problem solving in a foreign language

099 100

Mmh. Where there other things in the tasks that you did not understand? Some words, but else, I actually understood everything.

Data Example 30. Mona 1005-Interview

154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165

Mmh. And when you have to solve a geography task in English in class or in an exam, and do not understand an important word Mmh What do you do then? Well, we do not yet use dictionaries, but then I first try to figure it out from context. Okay. And if you want to formulate something and you are lacking an important word, what do you do then? Then I try to express it in a way that is possible without that word. So you try to I mean, paraphrase Okay. Do you have the feeling, very generally, that you are restricted by the foreign language as a working language? No. Er. Not even when you say you do not understand words at times, if you read a German text? No, but I am not restricted by that.

Data Example 30 cont.

Mona’s statement in 100 about having understood everything is somewhat surprising with regard to the many mispronunciations in the thinkaloud protocol. Yet obviously, she is able to construct a coherent meaning from context and does not feel disadvantaged by the L2. Sönke, in his interview, is even more explicit: 528 529 530 531 532 533 534

Mmh. Okay ermm if you have to solve a geography task in English in class or in an exam and do not understand an important word, what do you do then? [Takes a deep breath] What I do then? An important word? Mmh. Ask. And if you cannot ask? – What should I do then? Context – it it is not pos- try to infer it from context. And if that is not possible, then it is not possible. Mmh. That was similar with “sustainability”

Critical thoughts on the process data 535 536 537

159

Yes. now, right? You say yourself, you didn’t understand, but I haven’t paid further attention to it then. I mean if I don’t really understand a certain word, then I don’t focus on it and read on, and but in the end, I understand the text anyway.

Data Example 31. Sönke 1004-Interview

This statement describes what we can assume in example 028 for Mona: Obviously she does not understand many of the words, but is not too impressed by that and instead goes on looking for a holistic understanding of the text. In this, she succeeds. So my data imply that the CLIL learners are able to construct a conceptual representation in spite of difficulties in understanding the linguistic form. I would go so far as to formulate the following hypothesis (which of course needs to be tested in more detail): CLIL learners are used to dealing with comprehension deficits when constructing a conceptual representation from linguistic input, and use context information to compensate for these. They are trained to go on focusing on a text, even if they do not understand large parts of it.

The process data from my data set do unfortunately not allow any conclusions about whether the interaction with the difficult text parts leads to a deeper or on the contrary only a more superficial semantic processing. I counted each time of reading and re-reading the texts in Task 6 in order to find out how often the information could have been processed. Here, individual differences were big, but no tendencies in difference between CLIL group and monolingual group could be seen. Because both groups achieve similar results in the degree of conceptual complexity in their answers (cf. Table 9), it is not likely that we have to assume that the L2 as a working language has a negative impact on the conceptual processing. This supports the most recent hypothesis.

7. Critical thoughts on the process data Concerning the question of whether the L2 has an impact on receptive processes of information retrieval from sources, we see that the process

160

Problem solving in a foreign language

data obtained in this study are not optimally suited. Although we can assume problems in the reception of text, we cannot infer clearly what nature they have, why they occur and which effect they have on the conceptual construction. All we can state from the interview data is that the learners obviously use context information to draw inferences. The learners dwell too shortly on these problem solving stages, so that they do not verbalize anything here besides the given text information. An analysis of strategies would therefore not seem very promising on the basis of my data. This is not a general problem of think-aloud protocols, however, as shows the strategy analysis of reading activities in Würffel (2006). It seems to be the case that in both my learner groups the elicitation tasks are only very superficially processed (see for a discussion of this Coetzee-Lachmann 2007, Vollmer in progress). This does simply not make it necessary to make use of a more elaborate set of strategies. Possibly, this is a difference to adult subjects with a higher motivation to construct information from text. The subjects in my study are easily satisfied with a superficial text comprehension and start very quickly with the formulation of an answer, which in turn is not particularly elaborated. If this way of doing things is caused by the task formats, we should bear in mind that the task were designed in close resemblance to geographytypical text book questions. Possibly, what we see here is an interaction with the typical school tasks in which the learners do not really see a reason why they should elaborate deeper. If it holds true that textbook tasks might not cause enough involvement and motivation, because they do not cause any real interaction with subject-specific problems, which needs to be investigated further, this would be an alarming result for textbook designers. 8. Summary In this chapter results from the analysis of the think-aloud data were presented. Coding the data on the basis of the model of conceptual-linguistic task processing revealed interactions between problem solving activity in the linguistic-rhetoric and conceptual problem spaces. In particular, I demonstrated how a focus on linguistic form led to a deeper semantic processing of the conceptual content, and how this effect

Summary

161

could be enhanced when an L2 was used as a working language. This led to several hypotheses about the role of an L2 as a working language. Performance features in processing the L2 receptively were discussed, and it became clear that the data obtained for this study are more informative concerning the productive use of an L2 than the receptive use.

Chapter 10 Evaluation of the think-aloud method

1. Limitations of the think-aloud method In Chapter 7, I presented the cognitive basis for the think-aloud method. Here it became clear that the method is susceptible for many distracting factors in the elicitation situation, which can lead to a very different type of data. I mentioned the reactivity of the method, which means the impact the verbalisation can have on the activity itself, so that the activity in question is changed. I concluded that according to the state of research today, it is assumed that the cognitive processes might be slowed down, but are not changed. High validity is therefore assumed. However, even in the pilot studies for the investigation it became obvious how differently learners deal with the think-aloud task, and how varied the resulting protocols are. Some learners verbalize after only some minutes of training uninterruptedly and obviously without any cognitive effort, while others need a long training phase, and never do reach a degree of fluency in their verbalizations. Furthermore, some CLIL learners stay nearly continuously in the English mode, while others verbalize mainly in German. One CLIL learner, Britt, makes it clear right at the beginning that she cannot think aloud while reading a text. She claims she would not be able to process the conceptual content then. For other learners, on the other hand, this does not seem to be a problem at all. So, obviously the cognitive processing is interindividually different. From this we have to conclude that for some learners thinking aloud is a challenging additional task, while for others it is not. This leads to the conclusion that it is not possible to state a single value for reacitivity: The cognitive processes of those learners that experience only minor difficulties with the method should be influenced very little by it, while it should have a greater impact on the cognitive processes of learners that have to activate additional cognitive capacities to verbalize.

Subjective interview data

163

2. Subjective interview data These results prompted me to collect additional data for a deeper insight into the validity of the think-aloud method. In a study that focuses on individual cognitive processes and which therefore puts the individual learner in the centre, it is helpful to find out about the learner’s individual view. A rather trivial research approach to investigating the learner’s subjective theories and motivations is to ask him or herself how he or she experienced the elicitation situation. Results of those inquiries can be termed subjective data, because the data on the subjects stem from the subjects themselves (vgl. Edmondson 1996; Kallenbach 1996), and we can assume that the learners structure their experiences in form of some kind of metacognitive theory which then can be reconstructed. The assumption that learners can provide insights into their own language processes is based on two grounds: 1. The processes reported take place on a conscious level and are used strategically. The learner controls her own behaviour and is therefore able to report about strategies, and which factors have an impact on his or her decisions. 2. The learner observes him or herself. Here, the reported processes are not consciously triggered, but the learner has noticed by selfmonitoring that certain patterns occur in his or her behaviour. In order to explain these patterns, a hypothesis is built. These subjective observations do not have any special status compared to observations from an external researcher, except that the learners have priviledged access to the data, because they are not restricted to only a short, highly selective data set. Of course, subjective data are problematic. For instance, it is not possible to infer in how far they are reliable and valid. However, subjective theories build holistic meaning relations that exceed the elicitation situation. Therefore it is not possible to state clearly whether they can be transferred to other situations, but on the other hand they can serve as an additional set of data that complements other approaches (vgl. dazu Grotjahn 1991). Although it should not be assumed that they contain highly valid data, subjective data reflect important concepts and assumptions of the learner, of which in turn we can assume that they have some impact on the learners’ behaviour.

164

Evaluation of the think-aloud method

For my data, this means the following: If verbalization of thought content from working memory is achieved without any additional cognitive efford – only this would imply a really valid method – the subjects should not report any cases where they had perceived the think-aloud method as interfering. In order to find out more about this, the learners were asked a set of questions in which it was asked how natural it felt for them to think aloud (1. u. 2.), and what they thought about possible impacts of the vocalization on the task processing (3.–5.). 1. Did it feel uncomfortable for you to think aloud? 2. Do you sometimes speak to yourself when you are alone, e.g. when you do your homework? If yes, when do you do this, and in which language? 3. Did you have the feeling that the thinking aloud restricted you in solving the tasks? 4. Did you have the feeling that the thining aloud helped you in any way in solving the task? 5. Would you have solved the tasks to the same degree of complexity had you worked on them silently? The learners were free to elaborate their answers. If suitable, further questions were posed on the developing topic. The goal was to interrupt the learners as little as possible and to let them associate freely without guiding their answers. The first result from the interviews is the following: Four learners (Mona, Lara, Britt and Isabella) report explicitly about their experience that they could only capture in fragments the complexity and parallelity of their thoughts in speech, a phenomenon which is discussed in the research literature. So, we find the following statements in the interviews: 019 020

Why do you think you did not say everything? I don’t know, because one cannot immediately speak out loud all mechanisms of thinking that one goes through in one’s head.

Data Example 32. Mona 1005-Interview 006

... Besides that, one is much slower when one speaks while doing it, because one thinks much more rapidly than one can talk.

Data Example 33. Britt 1024-Interview

Reactivity 018

165

And I cannot explicate all the interrelations as clearly when I’m speaking as when I’m thinking.

Data Example 34. Isabella 1128-Interview

These experiences in themselves do not prove any reactivity of the method, but only that in the data, not all thoughts become visible. This is an integral assumption of the think-aloud method (cf. Ericsson and Simon 1993, Heine 2005, Heine and Schramm 2007) and is supported by my data. 3. Reactivity In order to find out about a possible reactivity of the method, I asked the students questions about a possible impact of the method on thought activity. Firstly, I wanted to know how natural or unnatural the vocalizing task felt for the subjects. The interest behind this is whether the learners perceive their thought activity being accompanied by language in other circumstances also, and whether they tend to vocalise this code anyway. The answers reflect a wide range of learner experiences:

3.1. Verbal coding Several learners perceive the verbalisation of thoughts as a highly unnatural process (Roland, Britt, Kim, Tim, Joachim): 006

I would never think aloud like that. ...

Data Example 35. Britt 1024-Interview 018 019 020 021

Do you do that sometimes by yourself, that you when you do you homework or when you are alone, that you speak with yourself? Never. You never do that. No.

Data Example 36. Tim 1004-Interview

166

Evaluation of the think-aloud method

011

Yes. Erm do you do that sometimes that you speak to yourself when you do your homework or when you are alone in some way? I can’t think of any situation. No. So it is an unusual [(simultaneously) yes task] for you Mh. Yes, exactly.

012 013 014 015 016

Data Example 37. Joachim 1023-Interview

These cases suggest that the elicitation procedure poses a highly unusual cognitive task to some learners, and potentially requires additional cognitive resources. 3.2. Thinking aloud as an everyday phenomenon On the other hand, other subjects report that they are used to perceiving their thoughts in verbally coded form, even outside the elicitation situation, e.g. when they do their homework (Mona, Lara, Jennifer, Tamara, Franziska, Marco, Heike, Jan). The following interview extracts provide examples of this: 002

It was a bit unfamiliar, but honestly speaking, when I do my homework, I sometimes speak out loud everything as well.

Data Example 38. Mona 1005-Interview 009 Yes. Was it awkward for you to think aloud? 101 To think aloud? Mm no. […] I think I would do that when I am at home, really erm to think aloud. 104 Okay. 105 So somehow for myself like that. But at school: noo, not really 106 That would probably be disturbing 107 That would be disturbing if I did it there. Sometimes, I know. I do that without thinking about it. 108 When you are at home doing your homework 109 [(simultaneously) or something like that. Yes. Without thinking about it.] 110 If I don’t understand something clearly, then I try to speak it out loud for myself and then Data Example 39. Marco 1114-Interview

Reactivity 111 112 113 114

167

Yes. let’s see. So it has been a rather natural thing for you right now. Yes, not too bad.

Data Example 39 cont. 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008

Great. Thank you so much. – You think aloud as if you had never done anything else. No. I usually do that at home, when I am sitting in my room. Yes? Yes. [(simultaneously) Is that I tell] myself what I want to write down first, and things like that. Then it becomes much easier somehow. Okay. I always do that at home. That’s why.

Data Example 40. Heike 1115-Interview

For these learners it is obviously less unnatural to speak their thoughts out loud. Here, we can assume a smaller degree of reactivity. 3.2.1. Thinking aloud as a support strategy In Example 39 and 40, thinking aloud was not perceived as disturbing, but as a positive interference (see Segment 110 in Data Example 39, Marco and 006 in Data Example 40): The verbalization of thoughts is used as a strategy through which the solving of the task is facilitated, presumably because conceptual content is structured and, by entering the phonological loop in working memory, is being kept active. This is how Jennifer and Jan put it in words: 041 042 043 044

Do you sometimes speak to yourself when you do your homework, for example, or when you are alone When I am learning and I don’t understand the topic, then [(laughing) I do] that sometimes. That I try to explain it to myself. And then it becomes – clearer for you, when you speak it out loud to yourself Yes, and it sticks in my mind better, too.

Data Example 41. Jennifer 1011-Interview

168 055 056

057 058

Evaluation of the think-aloud method Okay. And did you have the feeling that the thinking aloud helped you in any way in the task solving? – Mm well. Well, I would think that I – well I could remember better what I wanted to write down. So when I had spoken out loud everything that I had thought, then it was easier for me to remember the texts that I had formulated, and then to write them down. So that was something that helped. Yes. That helped.

Data Example 42. Jan 1120-Interview

Here thinking aloud is being perceived as a support. Therefore, the method here might have had a positive effect on the task solving.

3.2.2. Thinking aloud as disturbance of thought activity But we also find a less positively perceived effect. Isabella addresses this in her interview: 016

I well I think more rapidly than I speak and when I speak more slowly, then the thoughts escape me.

Data Example 43. Isabella 1128-Interview

So, in binding the attention to the conceptual thought that is being vocalized in a given moment, the stream of thought is interrupted and potentially changed compared to silent thinking.

3.3. Vocalizing versus inner verbalizing Several learners (Sönke, Tamara, Max, Jan) recognize the phenomenon of verbally coded thinking from their everyday life, but would only verbalize internally and never vocalize loudly: 023

That I speak with myself? Well, I would say I would not speak it out loud. If I do, then like [(stressed) internally].

Data Example 44. Sönke 1004-Interview

Reactivity

169

This leads in the elicitation situation to situations like in the following description: Here, thinking aloud blocks resources and by that potentially changes the chain of thought. 43

Or generally, because I speak it out loud. Because, otherwise I would not speak it out loud. And that is then a process that requires some thought.

Data Example 45. Sönke 1004-Interview

3.4. Verbal code as a temporary modus of thinking Even if thinking in a verbal code is perceived as a common phenomenon, learners report that they do not always think in words: 30

I, because I kept telling myself ‘what should I say now?’, because I do not think anything really at that moment, and [(laughing) what should I say then?]

Data Example 46. Katharina-6001-Interview

Although it is not completely unfamiliar for Katharina to think in words, this is not the case the whole time. In the elicitation situation this puts her under pressure to find verbalizations that are not activated automatically. This is a clear indicator that cognitive activities can be interrupted and the focus be turned to verbalizable content. As we can see, the subjects report very different experiences with the think-aloud task in the elicitation situation. I therefore think that the findings found in the research literature have to be specified by the following hypotheses: Not every person processes information in cognitively the same way. The simultaneous activation of a linguistic form occurs to different degrees in different subjects. Therefore, the think-aloud method can require an activation of additional cognitive resources and cause interruptions of thought activity in some subjects, while others are not influenced.

170

Evaluation of the think-aloud method

Thinking aloud can in some cases lead to the situation that subjects reflect more on their processing than without vocalizing their thoughts. So, the method can lead to a higher degree of structuring and processing of information.

From this it follows that Thinking aloud cannot be assumed to map thought activity in a completely undisturbed way. We have to assume that the method interferes occasionally with the cognitive activity of the subjects. Thinking aloud is not per se a reactive or a non-reactive method. Besides individually different cognitive processing types, other factors play a role, which can enter and leave the focus of attention during a think-aloud session.

4. Mental language switches Another question which is closely linked to the discussion of validity is the question about the language that is chosen for the vocalization. The CLIL learners generally chose English as the most dominant language for their think-aloud protocols. In order to find out whether this choice was an effect of the elicitation situation, the learners were asked the following interview questions: 1. You mostly thought aloud in English. Sometimes, however, you switched to German. Can you tell me when you switched to German, and why? 2. Would you say that you would have switched between the languages in a similar way, had you been working on the tasks silently? 3. Do you think in your CLIL geography class rather in English or in German? 4. When do you tend to think in your CLIL class in English or when do you do your homework in English? 5. In which situations in your CLIL class or when you do your homework do you tend to think in German? Even in the answers to these questions individual differences are revealed. In general, all learners report that they are familiar with the phe-

Mental language switches

171

nomenon of switching between the languages in thought. This can be captured in the following hypothesis: Multilingual persons switch in thoughts between the different language systems.

Most learners indicate that they switch from English to German when they are confronted with a processing problem. This is in most cases a problem in the linguistic problem space, namely a lack of adequate vocabulary (Mona, Lara, Yvonne, Bianca, Karen, Roland). Besides that, Sönke, Jennifer, Karen and Roland state that they go back to the English mode when they process a subject-specific problem. As another cause for a switch, Sönke and Svenja name emotionally charged situations, e.g. when they are getting angry or when they start to get unmotivated. Karen, Roland, Tamara and Britt report their experience that the linguistic context has an impact on the language they think in. They stress the effect I have assumed in the pilot studies for the data elicitation (see Chapter 7). Here, Roland, Tamara and Britt let us know that they fall into the English mode especially when they work with English texts or have to write such a text. The think-aloud protocols generally prove this statement right. Except for Britt, all CLIL learners stay mostly in the English mode, and change only in the following cases into their L1: – When vocalizing numbers and units, such as ‘eins’ (‘one’), ‘sechsundneunzig’ (‘ninety-six’), ‘Grad Celsius’ (‘degree Celsius’) – When confronted with conceptual problems, unsuccessful attempts at reconstructing vocabulary (possible reason: reducing the cognitive load) – In metacomments about their own processing or the task ‘das ist Mist’ (‘That is bullshit’), ‘oh Gott’ (‘oh my God’) – In experiencing lexical gaps, in which the concept is expressed in the L1 and followed by L2 search activity – When communicating with the researcher (although she communcates only in English!) ‘Soll ich das aufschreiben?’ (‘Should I write that down?’), ‘Darf ich was trinken?’ (‘May I drink something?’) – As a marker indicating the end of the task processing: ‘Gut’ (‘Good’), ‘Dann weiter’ (‘On we go’). Several learners report that they tend to first think in German and then translate into English (Mona, Lara, Yvonne, Bianca, Svenja). Kim men-

172

Evaluation of the think-aloud method

tions the interesting case that she translates L2 input into German for strategic reasons: 241 242 243 244 245

... there are sometimes these subject-specific terms, when one speaks them out loud in German, then one sees the relation or one can put them into context then somehow. Mostly when I do not know exactly what it means. Mmh. Then Mmh. I look for the German word.

Data Example 47. Kim 1025-Interview

In the following example, Kim indicates that she has intentionally picked English as the language for the think-aloud session. 259 260 261 262

... Erm, would you say you would have switched in a similar way between the languages, had you processed them silently? If I had processed them silently, I think I would have predominantly thought in German. Ah yes. Okay. And why do you think you now have thought aloud in English now? Because that was the task, and when one has entered that mode, one does not switch so easily again.

Data Example 48. Kim 1025-Interview

A similar formulation can be found in Roland’s interview. Here, these two subjects report that the elicitation situation has an impact on the quality of the data. I do not want to formulate this well-known phenomenon from empirical research as a hypothesis, but stress how many factors play a role in how the results are to be interpreted. Here, the value of a combination of research methods becomes very obvious, because this issue had not been addressed had not the interviews been part of the study. Besides these two learners, I was surprised to hear that not less than half the CLIL learners explicated that they evaluated their language switches as authentic (Sönke, Mona, Lara, Jennifer, Karen, Henriette, Britt). They assume that they would switch in the same way in silent thinking. These results can be summarized in the following hypothesis:

Is thinking aloud a valid elicitation method?

173

Which language is activated as the language of thought in multilingual speakers is influenced by the context language. Furthermore, if one language has been chosen, switching to another language can be made more difficult.

5. Is thinking aloud a valid elicitation method? How should we interpret the results of this subjective investigation? For sure, we cannot assume that the interview statements are a one-to-one mapping of the actual events during the task processing. For instance, it is possible that the learners overstress difficulties in the elicitation situation because they regard their task solving as unsatisfactory and want to avoid a loss of face. Still, it remains a question whether the protocols allow valid statements about conceptual and linguistic-rhetoric problem solving activity, or whether all inferable processes are artificially generated and deviate from a silent processing under normal circumstances. If the method only has an impact on minor parts of the thought activity, we can assume a holistically high validity. This is what we find in the interviews of Mona, Bianca, Svenja, Tamara, Tim, Max, Jan and Joachim, who do not assume that their thought activity has been changed to a high degree in the session. 007 008

Was it awkward for you to think aloud? Well, at the beginning it was a bit odd, but I got used to it fairly quickly.

Data Example 49. Mona 1005-Interview 030 031

032 033

Erm did you have the feeling that the thinking aloud disturbed you in any way? No. Not really. No, not disturbed. I can’t think of why it should have. It doesn’t matter whether I do it only in my head – I mean when one speaks it out loud, then it might take longer time, but not really restricted. No, I wouldn’t say so. Okay. Erm did you have the feeling that the thinking aloud has helped you in any way in solving the tasks? Mmh. [(laughing) No.] Not either. I don’t know. Whether I am thinking aloud or silently, doesn’t matter. No.

Data Example 50. Tamara 1022-Interview

174

Evaluation of the think-aloud method

015 016

Was it awkward for you to think aloud? Well, yes, it was at the beginning, and in the end it became, it became easier and easier, and at some point you are so used to it that you do not even notice anymore that you speak out loud.

Data Example 51. Tim 1104-Interview 015 012

Was it awkward for you to think aloud? In the beginning it was awkward, because I do not say, because I didn’t know what to say. But after a while I got used to it and then I overcame this somehow.

Data Example 52. Max 1105-Interview 015 004

Was it awkward for you to think aloud? Yes, in the beginning. But now I got so used to it, in the end. At first it was a bit unfamiliar. But then at some point. Well, I think, I didn’t think 100% like I would otherwise, but rather much so.

Data Example 53. Jan 1120-Interview 030 018 019 020 021 022 023

Did you have the feeling that the thinking aloud disturbed you in any way? Yes. Whenever I had to write something down, then it sometimes was disturbing a litte. Then I had to concentrate on what to write down. But in general it didn’t disturb much. Mh. But it was mainly when you wrote something down. When writing down, yes. Mh. Otherwise it didn’t [(simultaneously) disturb. Otherwise not.]

Data Example 54. Joachim 1123-Interview

According to the learners’ own subjective statements, it seems unlikely that the think-aloud method changes the thought activity generally. Furthermore, I would not assume that subjects have a completely different problem solving behaviour at their disposal, one for silent thinking, and one for thinking aloud. So, because the research question here does not require any quantification of processes (e.g. How often do evaluation processes occur?), any exact validity measure does not possess too much relevance.

Is thinking aloud a valid elicitation method?

175

The main argument for using the method still remains that hypothesis and theory building about the L2 usage in meaning-focused contexts can only be achieved if deep insights into mental processes can be achieved. The think-aloud method can provide this basis. Still, the subects’ statements do provoke thought. Many reports do not correspond to the theoretical assumption uttered so often in the research literature, that thinking aloud can be made use of without provoking additional cognitive activities. On the basis of my data, I cannot follow these one-sided positive evaluations of the method, exemplarily represented by Ericsson and Simon (1993); rather, I think that a more differentiated picture is necessary. The interviews with the wide range of answers, which in part are contradictory, show how complex the situation is perceived by the learners. On second thoughts this is not surprising: It reflects the character of the task. So, the solving of a complex task with problem features cannot be assumed to be a linear process, but rather a multi-layered and recursive one. Mental activities can occur on different levels, and change their character in the run of the solving in a dynamic way. On the other hand, thought activity does not come in a single format. Human cognition is complex and not only language-bound. If the learners are asked for simple answers, the fact that they mirror their experience in a simplified way is not surprising. Here, again, the advantage of the think-aloud method is that the learners are not asked for their own cognitive processes; they have to be inferred on the basis of a model of cognition. In that, it is possible to recognize phases in which it is likely that problems of validity occur, which differ from phase to phase. When a subject is extracting information from a map or a climate graph, it is more likely that thought activity is accompanied by representations in non-verbal form. If problem solving activities in the linguistic problem space occur in these phases, they are probably based in the method and have to be regarded as reactive. So, an interpretation can be made on a reliable fundament if a coherent theoretical basis is present. Furthermore, the interviews show to which different degrees people use language as a tool for the structuring of their thoughts. These individual cognitive differences and dynamics should gain more weight in the theoretical and methodological discussion about cognitions.

176

Evaluation of the think-aloud method

6. Summary This chapter presented methodological results that were, so to speak, a biproduct of the proper study: In order to obtain valid results from the process data it was necessary to determine the extent to which the think-aloud method really can provide valid data. In that, new theoretical insights could be obtained which stress the individual character of cognitive processing: Subjects perceive the method as disturbing their thought processes to different degrees, which should be acknowledged in a discussion about validity. The analysis of the interview data suggested that thinking aloud can be reactive and elicits data with a shifting character. Therefore, it should not be used in research that is interested in exact quantitative measurements of process phenomena. However, for the research interest followed here, thinking aloud was evaluated as a highly useful tool that can provide indepth insights into cognitive processing.

Chapter 11 Results and discussion

1. Retrospective thoughts It was the goal of this study to investigate on an empirical basis whether the use of a foreign language as a working language leads to L2-specific cognitive processing of subject-specific content, compared to the use of the L1. In this matter, the investigation contributes to research about CLIL, but also to the theoretical discussion about any kind of information processing in which conceptual content and language play a role. I have tried to present a theoretical framework which allows us to study conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical mental activities in their interaction, and I have discussed methodological ways of doing this on empirical grounds. From that, I have generated hypotheses about the special character of the processing of meaning-focused tasks in an L2 context. I will summarize the most important results of the study, before I go on to ask how they can be implemented practically in learning contexts that deploy a foreign working language.

2. Theoretical results Due to the embedding into results from cognitive psychology, the study provides a solid basis for the theoretical discussion of the relation between content processing and language. This has largely been lacking so far in research about CLIL teaching and learning. Here it becomes obvious that a theoretical integration of theories from cognitive psychology and newer linguistic theories is useful and necessary, because psycholinguistic results about language processing and results about text composition can be integrated here. Niemeier (2000) has already discussed the fact that the theoretical framework of Cognitive Linguistics is highly suitable for the investigation of the relation between content and language interaction in classroom settings, but her work has been largely neglected in the context of CLIL research. After my theoretical considerations, I recommend strongly that any discussion about the design of

178

Results and discussion

learning situations should make use of these conceptualizations; any scientific discourse that operates on core concepts such as learning, thinking, and language, needs a stringent conceptualization of what these concepts actually mean, and which theoretical consequences they imply. Otherwise, all didactic assumptions are built on a weak foundation. Therefore, language acquisition research needs a well-established model of human cognitions in which the role of language has to be located. This requires an extensive study of linguistic theories, along with a close observation of developments in cognitive theories. One of the goals of my theoretical considerations in this study was to contribute to the link between these neighbouring disciplines that can profit strongly from each other, but have only recently started to make use of each other’s results (e.g., Achard and Niemeier 2004, Robinson and Ellis 2008). Out of these basic theoretical considerations I have developed a theoretical model of conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical task solving. This model is based on the assumptions of information processing, problem solving research, and constructivist and socio-cognitive conceptualizations, and models how the interaction with tasks that show both a content and a form side can be mapped as a string of problem solving activities with different foci. Here, conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical activities can be separated from each other, whereby I introduced the subdivision in cognitive elementary processes and task-specific solving phases. Furthermore, the model considers how problem solving activities interact with the subject’s individual prior knowledge, goals, motivations and emotions, which in turn are in interaction with context factors. The model is kept rather general and can thus be used as a basis for other research questions apart from the one followed here. With it the study contributes to the discourse in problem solving research, which hitherto has not discussed the role that language plays in problem solving. 3. Methodological results Besides the theoretical results, the study focuses to a great deal on methodological issues on process reserach, in particular on questions about the think-aloud method and its validity with special regard to L2 context. Here, it becomes obvious how essential a deep understanding of cognitive theoretical basics is to conceptualizations such as language of thought, modal and amodal representations of thought, problem solving, construc-

Methodological results

179

tion processes etc. Without them it is not really possible to consciously choose a particular method, and to interpret the data obtained with its help. Only when central concepts can be clearly distinguished from each other (that might even look identical on the data surface) is it possible to recognize them in the data, and to interpret them. These theoretical considerations were followed by the insight that a careful description of learner behaviour can only be made when the analysis of internal cognition and input features, aspects of personality and of social context are integrated. This was presented in the task analysis. Here, the theoretical implications have an impact on the methodological framework: Because in an empirical investigation of this format only a minor range of potentially important factors can be controlled. Therefore I had to restrict the data analysis on interactions that reveal themselves in the processes of the data base, without having to integrate learner features or context factors for an explanation. The analysis of the empirical data adds further facets to the general discussion about the validity of the think-aloud method. They are in coherence with the constructivist and socio-cognitive macro-framework: We find how strong the impact of individual construction processes is, e.g. in the great interindividual differences in the role language plays in thinking, or the individually perceived disturbance caused by vocalizing thought. With this, the interview data of my study support the observation that it is methodologically vital to distinguish different cognitive types in subjects. This observation has coincidentally been made in the research on the think-aloud method, but has never been underpinned systematically with empirical data before. As regards the validity of think-aloud data in L2 context, the pilot studies conducted for this investigation revealed that the language code that is being used by the researcher has a strong impact on the choice the learners make for their vocalization language. The learners’ reports in the interview data hint at the fact that thinking aloud in the L2 can be a source of bias in thought activitiy. However, maybe the most important methodological insight from the learner data is how inconsistent the character of the elicitation procedure can be. From this follows that researchers need to be aware that the validity of the method can change dramatically during a task processing session. I would therefore not recommend the method for a quantitative investigation. However, the depth of insight it can provide in cognitive processing is

180

Results and discussion

invaluable and justifies its use for the generation of hypothesis and the investigation of patterns. Finally, I want to summarize the hypotheses about the think-aloud method that were obtained from the study. Hypothesis TA1 has a theoretical motivation, while all the others build on the empirical data base. TA5, TA6 and TA7 contribute new aspects to the theoretical discussion, while the others have been addressed before, but can be supported by my data. I would once more like to stress the importance of a modelling of individual, unstable and dynamic aspects in the theoretical discussion. 3.1. The think-aloud method: Hypotheses TA1 Language is activated in parallel Human thought can be linked to different cognitive modalities, and is not necessarily dependent on language. Still, when the focus is aimed at a specific concept, in many cases its linguistic form is automatically activated in working memory.

TA2 People process differently Not every person processes information in cognitively the same way. The simultaneous activation of a linguistic form occurs to different degrees in different subjects. Therefore, the think-aloud method can require an activation of additional cognitive resources and cause interruptions of thought activity in some subjects, while others are not influenced. The impact of the working language on the processing of conceptual content can vary strongly between subjects, no matter whether an L1 or an L2 is being used.

TA3 Thinking aloud can enhance metacognitive processing Thinking aloud can in some cases lead to the situation in which subjects reflect more about their processing than without vocalizing their thoughts. So, the method can lead to a higher degree of structuring and processing of information.

Methodological results

181

TA4 Language of thought alternates Multilingual persons alternate in thoughts between the different language systems when thinking.

TA5 The context influences the choice of language of thought Which language is activated as the language of thought in multilingual speakers is influenced by the context language. Furthermore, if one language has been chosen, switching to another language can be made more difficult.

TA6 Thinking aloud has incidental reactive effects Thinking aloud cannot be assumed to map thought activity in a completely undisturbed way. We have to assume that the method interferes occasionally with the cognitive activity of the subjects.

TA7 The method’s validity is dependent on a dynamic complex of factors Thinking aloud is not per se a reactive or a non-reactive method. Besides individually differnt cognitive processing types, other factors play a role, which can enter and leave the focus of attention during a think-aloud session.

These hypotheses are the result of a triangulation of different data sets plus a thorough theoretical reflection. The interplay between the different methods allows an insight into cognitive dynamics that exceeds the potential of a single methodology by far. In the following table, I give an overview of how the individual data types have contributed to the holistic result:

182

Results and discussion

Table 10. Contribution of individual data types to the study Theoretical framework:

The L2 processing of conceptual content can be captured within the framework of information processing and problem solving theory. Problem solving activities can be subdivided into different phases and microprocesses, which in turn can be described on different levels of abstraction. It is possible to subdivide activities in the conceptual and the linguistic-rhetorical problem space.

Think-aloud protocols:

Think-aloud protocols can be segmented and interpreted in terms of phases and microprocesses. Think-aloud data indicate when a switch takes place between the problem spaces. A search in the linguistic problem space can trigger construction activities in the content problem space.

Written answers:

The written texts allow a more reliable interpretation of the think-aloud data. The answers support my hypothesis, because they give an indication of the depth of semantic processing.

Interviews:

Provide a validity check for the phenomena that have been identified in the think-aloud data. Indicate interindividual differences in processing. Show that thinking aloud is partly reactive.

Empirical results

183

The theoretical and methodological findings of this study are products of the necessary preparatory considerations before the empirical investigation could be conducted. On their basis, the empirical study was designed and the data interpreted. The results of this empirical investigation, which I summarize once more in the next section, provide answers to the initial research question. 4. Empirical results The analysis of the empirical data, with the think-aloud data as the primary source, resulted in several hypothesis, which I will summarize here once more. Some of them can be related to language reception and others to language production.

4.1. Hypotheses on language production LP1. Language as a catalytic converter The transfer of conceptual content in a linguistic form leads to a reflection about the semantic content and relationships, and through this to a deeper semantic processing of the content.

LP2. Difficulties in expression enhance the catalytic function of language If problems occur in the search for an adequate linguistic form in order to express a conceptual content, often a thorough restructuring of the semantic field follows, which leads to a deepening of conceptual meaning relations.

LP3. An L2 as a working language makes it more difficult to find an adequate expression CLIL learners experience greater difficulties in the receptive L2 processing than monolingual students when processing comparable information in their L1. In many cases, the CLIL learners do not succeed in meaning construction.

184

Results and discussion

LP4. An L2 enhances deeper semantic processing more often than an L1 When an L2 is used as a working language, two kinds of linguistically triggered deeper processing occur: Cases that are based on a general linguistic focus, but also cases in which L2-specific processing activities lead to a deeper semantic processing. So, when an adequate formulation for conceptual content has to be found, the use of an L2 enhances the effect of a deeper semantic processing, because here additional instances of linguistic problem solving occur compared to the use of an L1.

To put the results in a nutshell: Each focus on producing an adequate linguistic form in order to express conceptual content has the potential to deepen semantic relationships. Because of the more restricted ability for expression in the L2, more cases of focus on form occur in an L2 processing. So, an L2 as a working language enhances this effect. 4.2. Hypotheses on language reception From the empirical data further hypotheses could be formed about particularities in the reception of language in meaning-focused contexts. I will summarize them in the following: LR1: CLIL learners experience greater difficulties in decoding meaningfocused texts CLIL learners experience greater difficulty in decoding information from L2 information texts than monolingual learners with comparable L1 texts. The use of an L2 as a working language can lead to the situation that less conceptual knowledge is expressed in the learners’ texts than is actually mentally present.

LR2: CLIL learners compensate the decoding difficulties CLIL learners are used to dealing with comprehension deficits when constructing a conceptual representation from linguistic input, and use context information to compensate these. They are trained to go on focusing on a text, even if they do not understand large parts of it.

Final remarks

185

LR3: Differences between L1 and L2 processing are gradual L1 and L2 competence are not qualitatively different competences with clear boundaries, but have to be regarded as lying on a proficiency continuum. L1 users might experience less difficulties in mastering their working language than L2 users, but even here, linguistic processing is not completely automatized.

As the data indicate, the CLIL learners had to face more decoding difficulties with the L2 texts than the monolingual learners with the L1 texts. It is surprising that the written answer differ only little in their subject-specific quality between the two groups. We can surmise from this that the CLIL learners compensate the lack of comprehension through context knowledge. This assumption is supported by the interview data. 5. Implications for the design of learning contexts What remains is to turn to the implications these results have on concrete learning situations. Wolff (1997: 50) claims that each form of classroom, including CLIL situations, needs activities which are in coherence with an underlying theory of how learning takes place. Such a theory should contain the possibilities for a development and improvement of teaching practice. This is a just claim, although rather broad, and therefore I want to first answer rather broadly: My results support a teaching methodology which is based on constructivist and socio-cognitive, and by that in process-oriented and learnercentered approaches. The results of the study also have implications for a closer characterisation of CLIL contexts, and these might be somewhat surprising: Neither from the cognitive-theoretical basis, nor from my data can I find any features of L2 processing of content, which differ qualitatively from L1 processing. Language is nothing specific for CLIL classes. Therefore, it is not a CLIL-specific task to develop language awareness or focussing on language as a tool for thinking and for participation in discourse communities; rather, these goals have to be pursued in any kind of classroom setting. So, my claim is that linguistic awareness and language use have to be focused on in any kind of classroom.

186

Results and discussion

However, my data support the relevance of CLIL settings. They show that even when the learners experience L2-caused difficulties, they profit from them, because the additional language-specific problem solving activities cause deeper semantic processing. So, the use of an L2 as a working language can be highly useful, even if the language competence is restricted. According to the evidence in the data, it seems justified to promote the use of an L2, even when the learners are not able to produce adequate formulations that contain the whole complexity of their conceptual representation, because the deeper processing occurs nevertheless. However, it is still unclear how well-developed the L2 competence needs to be in order to avoid premature interruptions of the whole task solving process. Even in decoding L2 text, the enhanced difficulties in constructing meaning from linguistic form do not seem to lead to disadvantages in the text understanding that is eventually reached. Another issue that is suggested by the empirical data is that any form of meaning-focused learning situations profits from a focus on form, especially in language production. This, again, is not reserved for L2 usage, but holds true also for L1 classrooms. For institutionalized learning contexts this means that any kind of curriculum should integrate a focus on language, because language is a perfect tool with which to conceptualize and define conceptual concepts and meaning relations. This claim has been taken up in the discussion on “language across the curriculum” (Anson, Schwiebert et al. 1993). My empirical results give further evidence for the justification of this claim. In the presentation of the results, I have indicated that the learners who participated in the study focus rather superficially on language, and go rather sparsely through activities in the linguistic problem space. This leads in most cases to a somewhat superficial text comprehension and a very rapid text composition with little reflection. I have assumed that this could be due to the learners’ expectations vis-a-vis the task, which they perceive as typically school-like. If this assumption should be right, then the learners are not aware of the importance of conciseness in subject-specific answers. This leads to the claim that this issue has to be addressed and practised in class, because simultaneously with a focus on form, a reflection about the subject-specific statement is achieved. This issue could best be achieved in classrooms which provide space for the design of individual learning situations which take regard to a learner’s individual state of knowledge and skill.

Final remarks

187

Yet another observation is of interest for concrete suggestions how to proceed in CLIL classrooms: All CLIL learners in this investigation report that they are used to asking the CLIL teacher immediately when they experience difficulties in comprehension. Obviously, they immediately receive answers. Contrary to this practise, my results suggest that this is not necessary, and not even useful: Firstly, the learners (at least in the group that participated in this study) are perfectly capable of constructing an understanding of a text by making use of context information. Secondly, and more importantly from a learning perspective, the data show that instances of linguistic disturbance provide opportunities for a deeper semantic processing and with that to learning. Therefore, my claim would be to address linguistic questions and heighten the awareness for the relationship between language and semantic content, and provide opportunities where the learners have time to construct meaning themselves.

6. What further research is needed? This study has provided a starting point for further research in the relationship between language and conceptual problem solving. Nevertheless, this area is still highly underresearched, and several issues need to be investigated further. Firstly, we need to know more about the role of learner features in the interaction between language and conceptual information processing. Because the individual variation in cases of linguistically caused semantic deep-processing is so large, studies are necessary that shed light on correlations between occurrences of cases and certain learner features. If it should be possible to show that these features can be subject to alteration – e.g. language awareness – results like this can be used as the basis for informed recommendations for activities in the classroom (Fehling 2005). If, on the other hand, the important learner features belong to the group of static characteristics, then an awareness of relevant differences in learners can lead to adequate reactions in learning situations as well. For investigations like that a combination of methods seems necessary in which process data are combined with tests in which potentially important constructs like motivation, language awareness and expectations towards the tasks can be measured.

188

Results and discussion

One question that is closely linked to this is how the relationship between learner features and task features can be described in order to develop learning tasks. In the discussion about task-based cognitive processes in Chapter 3, I have already indicated that the degree of task difficulty cannot be determined when the individual learner’s previous knowledge is not identified. Such an investigation needs to be linked to the research on learning tasks (Eckerth and Siekmann 2008; Ellis 2003, 2005a, b, Robinson 2007), but exceed questions of language acquisition. Here, too, problem solving research can provide a suitable starting point. The hypothesis about use of strategies in order to compensate for a lack of L2 knowledge leads to the question whether CLIL learners tend to develop stronger coping skills in frustrating or overchallenging situations, because they are used to dealing with patchy information and to the necessity to infer lacking elements from other sources. Here, it would be highly interesting to gain a systematic insight into how different strategies are used. Besides performance process data, insights into strategical awareness and strategical skills would be highly informative. This study’s results concerning the gain of semantically deeper processing through the use of an L2 as a working language can only be generalized to a certain degree; it is certainly not the case that a high degree of difficulty in the input information does always lead to a more intense semantic processing. Here, we still lack knowledge about how well the language proficiency needs to be developed in order to trigger the conceptual processes, and when the learners are overchallenged to a degree that makes them stop the task processing altogether. This question is particularly interesting for the development of didactic material for different learner groups, and has to be investigated empirically as well. One further question, which can be linked to the previous one, is the question of how multilingual speakers with extended language learners’ biographies deal with CLIL situations, e.g. learners with an immigrant background. Here, it could be investigated which different roles which language system takes in different situations (see Ehlers 1998, 2003), and in particular, how the language of thought is influenced, e.g. by emotional attitudes. An interesting design would be to let learners process similar tasks in different languages, e.g. to not let them decide which language to use in thinking aloud, and to compare the results. A follow-up question would be whether CLIL learner actually develop a bilingualism in subject-specific contexts. Sönke, for instance, reports in his interview that he does not assume that he would be able to express geogra-

Final remarks

189

phy-specific content in German with the same proficiency as in English. If this was indeed the case, and would hold for a representative group of CLIL learners, then this form of subject-specific education would not hold what the pedagogical concept actually started out to achieve. Furthermore, what is not really proven yet is whether the incidental cases of deeper semantic process that I was able to identify in the thinkaloud protocols actually lead to a real learning effect, and in how far a measurable learning achievement is the result. Here, Chi’s experiements about task-based learning could be used as a model (Chi 1997, 2000; Chi, de Leeuw et al. 1994; Chi, Feltovich et al. 1981; Chi and Glaser 1985; Chi, Glaser et al. 1982; Chi and Koeske 1983). Such a design requires pre- and post-test studies, and possibilities for the mapping of knowledge structures, such as the technique of concept mapping (Koch 2005, 2007).

7. Final remarks In foreign language research, the ideal teaching method remains the holy grail of research. And in study after study, it remains difficult to give simple answers to questions about causal relationships between method and learning achievement. Maybe the question is not the right one: Although it is understandable to wish for clear answers and a guaranteed recipe for successful methods, I would assume that it is not doing justice to the highly complex field of investigation. The range of factors that can have an impact on individual performance is so vast that no research design, no matter how careful it is elaborated, can capture it all. Of course, the question remains which goals research on learning and teaching, and research in general, has to reach. For sure, learning should be optimated, learning should be initiated, learners need to be empowered to pursue their individual goals and to become self-determined members of society. The more CLIL teachers, but also foreign language teachers and subject teachers learn about the interrelation between language and conceptual learning the better they will be able to understand what is going on in their classroom, and the better they will be able to make informed and coherent decisions in novel situations. Therefore, I deem a connection between research and teaching, and between activities in the classroom and a coherent theoretical construct, as absolutely necessary – but not in the form that an obligatory teaching manual is presented, not even when the necessity of research is questioned un-

190

Results and discussion

less it produces these manuals. The goal is instead to raise awareness of the complexity of factors and the circumstances in which learning takes place. Only when such an understanding is achieved can the results of empirical research in the field be interpreted and appreciated. Part of the problem is that research should be perceived as a process in which the dynamic character of how insight is achieved is at the centre. Here it needs to be accounted for relativity of results, the vast width of factors and the problem that this complexity can only be reduced with a loss of (potentially important!) detail. Theoretical frameworks enable the researcher to find a path through the jungle; however, with its help, only part of the problem can be grasped at a time. To learn to cope with this discrepancy has to be part of any qualifying education for teachers. Results of carefully conducted empirical research form necessary corner stones, but at the same time they run the risk of being based on a too simplified view of the phenomena that occur in reality. I would therefore like to advocate that the ongoing scientific discourse with its potential of awareness raising and learning is a superior goal to the obtaining of clear results and easily digestable ‘truths’.

Transcription conventions .

Single dot surrounded by blanks: minimal pause

..

Two dots: short pause of less than a second/of x seconds

(x s)

Pause of x second(s)

[(whispering) and then]

Qualifyer in round brackets modifies utterance in square brackets

coordinaaaaaates

Reiteration of letters indicates slow and stretched-out speech

“coordinates“

Text in quotation marks is read

“coordinates “

Text in italics indicates deviating pronunciation from what is in the text

[(writing) coor- (1 s) -dinates]

Underlined text: speech accompanied by writing activity

coordinates.

Single dot after word: Falling intonation

coordinates?

Question mark: Raising intonation

xx

Utterance incomprehensible, one x per syllable

References Aarts, Bas 2007 Syntactic Gradience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Achad, Michael, and Susanne Niemeier (eds.) 2004 Cognitive Linguistics, Second Language Acquisition and Foreign Language Teaching. Berlin/ New York: de Gruyter. Aguado, Karin 2004 Introspektive Verfahren in der empirischen Fremdsprachenforschung. Methodisch-methodologische Überlegungen. Fremdsprachen und Hochschule: 24–38. Aitchison, Jean 1998 The Articulate Mammal. An Introduction to Psycholinguistics. London: Routledge. 2003 Words in the Mind. An Introduction to the Mental Lexicon. 3rd ed. Oxford/New York: Blackwell. Anderson, John R. 2000 Cognitive Psychology and its Implications. 5th ed. New York: Worth. Anderson, Neil J., and Laurens Vandergift 1996 Increasing metacognitive awareness in the L2 classroom by using think-aloud protocols and other verbal report formats. In Language Learning Strategies Around the World: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Rebecca Oxford (ed.), 3–18. Manoa: Second Language Teaching & Curriculum Center, University of Hawai’i. Annett, John 2000 Theoretical and pragmatic influences on task analysis methods. In Cognitive Task Analysis, Jan Maarten Schraagen, Susan Chipman, and Valerie Shalin (eds.), 25–37. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Anson, Chris M., John E. Schwiebert, and Michael M.Williamson 1993 Writing Across the Curriculum: An Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT/London: Greenwood. Appel, Rene, and Pieter Muysken 1987 Language contact and bilingualism. London etc.: Arnold. Baddeley, Alan D. 1986 Working Memory. New York: Oxford University Press. 1990 Human Memory. Theory and Practice. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 1992 Working memory. Science 255: 556–559.

References

193

Baddeley, Alan D., and Graham J. Hitch 1974 Working memory. In The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, Gordon H. Bower (ed.), 47–90. New York: Academic. Badertscher, Hans 2004 Wissenserwerb im Bilingualen Unterricht. Eine Empirische Studie zur Bedeutung der Sprache im Sachlernen (Schlussbericht). Bern: Pädagogische Hochschule Bern. Baker, Colin 1996 Foundations of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Baker, Colin, and Sylvia Prys Jones 1998 Encyclopedia of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Barsalou, Lawrence W. 1999 Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 577– 660. 2003 Situated simulation in the human conceptual system. Language and Cognitive Processes 18 (5/6): 513–562. Barsalou, Lawrence W., W. Kyle Simmons, Aron K. Barbey, and Christine D. Wilson 2003 Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. In Trends in Cognitive Science 7 (2): 84–92. Bereiter, Carl, and Marlene Scardamalia 1987 The Psychology of Written Composition. Hillsdale, NJ/ London: Erlbaum. Beyer, Sabine 2005 Introspektive Verfahren im fremdsprachlichen Unterricht. Deutsch als Fremdsprache 42 (1): 18–22. Bhatia, Tej, and William Ritchie (eds.) 2008 The handbook of bilingualism. 3rd ed. Malden: Blackwell. Bonnet, Andreas 2004 Chemie im Bilingualen Unterricht. Kompetenzerwerb durch Interaktion. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Boroditsky, Lera 2001 Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers conception of time. In Cognitive Psychology 43 (1): 1–22. Börner, Wolfgang 1996 Das Werkzeug ‘Textverarbeitung’ im fremdsprachlichen Schreiben: Idealkonzeption und Realisierungen. In Schreiben in der Fremdsprache: Prozeß und Text, Lehren und Lernen. 2d ed., Wolfgang Börner, and Klaus Vogel (eds.), 297–313. Bochum: AKS-Verlag.

194

References

Börner, Wolfgang, and Klaus Vogel (eds.) 1998 Texte im Fremdsprachenerwerb: Verstehen und Produzieren. Bochum: AKS-Verlag. Bredenbröker, Winfried 2000 Förderung der Fremdsprachlichen Kompetenz durch Bilingualen Unterricht. Frankfurt a.M. e.a.: Peter Lang. Breidbach, Stephan, Gerhard Bach, and Dieter Wolff (eds.) 2002 Bilingualer Sachfachunterricht. Didaktik, Lehrer-/Lernerforschung und Bildungspolitik zwischen Theorie und Empirie. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. Britton, James, Tony Burgess, Nancy Martin, Alex McLeod, and Harold Rosen 1977 The Development of Writing Abilities: 11–18. A Report from the Schools Council Project on Written Language of 11–18 Year Olds, Based at the Univ. of London Inst. of Education, 1966–71. London: Macmillan Education. Brown, Gillian, and George Yule 1983 Discourse Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bruner, Jerome S. 1966 Towards a Theory of Instruction. Cambridge, MA: Belkapp Press. Brunotte, Ernst, Hans Gebhardt, Manfred Meurer, Peter Meusberger, and Josef Nipper (eds.) 2002 Lexikon der Geographie. Heidelberg: Spektrum. Bucciarelli, Monica, and Philip N. Johnson-Laird 2005 Naive deontics: A theory of meaning, representation, and reasoning. Cognitive Psychology 50 (2), 159–193. Carruthers, Peter 2002 The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25: 657–726. Cermak, Laird S., and Fergus I. M. Craik 1979 Levels of Processing in Human Memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Chenoweth, N. Ann, and John R. Hayes 2001 Fluency in writing. Generating text in L1 and L2. Written Communication 18 (1): 80–98. 2003 The inner voice in writing. Written Communication 20 (1): 99–118. Chi, Michelene T. H. 1997 Quantifying qualitative analyses of verbal data: A practical guide. The Journal of the Learning Sciences 6 (3): 271–315. 2000 Self-explaining expository texts: The dual processes of generating inferences and repairing mental models. In Advances in Instructional Psychology, Robert Glaser (ed.), 161–238. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

References

195

Chi, Michelene T. H., and Robert Glaser 1985 Problem solving ability. In Human Abilities: An Information Processing Approach, Robert J. Sternberg (ed.), 227–257. San Francisco: Freeman. Chi, Michelene T. H., Nicholas de Leeuw, Mei-Hung Chiu, and Christian LaVancher 1994 Eliciting self-explanations improves understanding. Cognitive Science 18: 439–477. Chi, Michelene T. H., Paul J. Feltovich, and Robert Glaser 1981 Categorization and representation of physics problems by experts and novices. Cognitive Science 5: 121–125. Chi, Michelene T. H., Robert Glaser, and Ernest Rees 1982 Expertise in problem solving. In Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence (Vol. 1), Robert J. Sternberg, (ed.), 7–75. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Chi, Michelene T. H., and Randi D. Koeske 1983 Network representation of a child´s dinosaur knowledge. Developmental Psychology 19: 29–39. Chipman, Susan F., Jan Maarten Schraagen, and Valerie L. Shalin 2000 Introduction to Cognitive Task Analysis. In Cognitive Task Analysis, Jan Maarten Schraagen, Susan Chipman, and Valerie L. Shalin (eds.), 3–24. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Craik, Fergus I. M., and Robert S. Lockhart 1972 Levels of processing: A framework for memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 11: 671–684. Christmann, Ursula, and Brigitte Scheele 2001 Kognitive Konstruktivität am Beispiel von Ironie und Metapher. In Zur Programmatik einer Sozialwissenschaftlichen Psychologie. Band II: Objekttheoretische Perspektiven. 1. Halbband: Sozialität, Geschichtlichkeit, Erlebnisqualitäten, Kognitive Konstruktivität, Norbert Groeben (ed.), 261–326. Münster: Aschendorff. Coetzee-Lachmann, Debbie 2007 Assessment of subject-specific task performance of bilingual geography learners: Analysing aspects of subject-specific written discourse. Ph.D. diss., University of Osnabrück (http://elib.ub.uniosnabrueck.de/publications/diss/E-Diss864_thesis.pdf). Cohen, Andrew D. 1984 The use of mentalistic measures in determining LSP reading problems. In Reading for Professional Purposes: Studies and Practices in Native and Foreign Languages, Anthony K. Pugh, and Jan M.Ulijn (eds.), 177–189. London: Heinemann.

196

References

1987a

Studying learner strategies: How we get the information. In Learner Strategies in Language Learning, Anita Wenden, and Joan Rubin (eds.), 31–39. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1987b Using verbal reports in research on language learning. In Introspection in Second Language Research, Claus Færch and Gabriele Kasper (eds.), 82–95. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 1994 The language used to perform cognitive operations during fullimmersion maths tasks. Language Testing 11 (2): 171–196. Cohen, Andrew D., and Carol Hosenfeld 1981 Some uses of mentalistic data in second language research. Language Learning 31 (2): 285–313. Cohen, Andrew D., and Kimberley Scott 1996 A synthesis of approaches to assessing language learning strategies. In Language learning strategies around the world: Cross-cultural perspectives, Rebecca L. Oxford (ed.), 89–106, Manoa, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, National Foreign Language Center at Manoa. Corder, S. Pit 1971 Idiosyncratic dialects and error analysis. International Review of Applied Linguistics 9: 147–159. Craik, Fergus I. M., and Robert S. Lockhart 1972 Levels of processing: A framework for memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 11: 671–684. Cummins, Jim 1979 Cognitive/academic language proficiency, linguistic interdependence, the optimum age question and some other matters. Working Papers on Bilingualism 9: 121–129. 1984 Bilingualism and Special Education: Issues in Assessment and Pedagogy. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 1991 Interdependence of first- and second language proficiency. In Language Processing in Bilingual Children, Ellen Bialystok (ed.), 70– 89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dalton-Puffer, Christiane, and Ute Smit 2007 Introduction. In Empirical perspectives on CLIL classroom discourse, Christiane Dalton-Puffer and Ute Smit (eds.), 7-23, Frankfurt, Wien: Lang. de Beaugrande, Robert, and Wolfgang Dressler 1981 Introduction to Text Linguistics. London/New York: Longman. de Bot, Kees 1992 A bilingual production model: Levelt’s ’Speaking Model‘ adapted. Applied Linguistics 13: 1–24.

References

197

De Florio-Hansen, Inez 2003 Inhaltsbasiertes Fremdsprachenlernen. Bilingualer Unterricht auf dem Prüfstand. Praxis des Neusprachlichen Unterrichts 50/1: 11– 19. Deffner, Gerhard 1984 Lautes Denken – Untersuchung zur Qualität eines Datenerhebungsverfahrens. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. 1987 Lautes Denken als Methode der Datenerhebung. Qualität und Anwendungsmöglichkeiten. In Die Rolle der Psychologie in der Sprachlehrforschung, Sabine Börsch (ed.), 257–268. Tübingen: Narr. 1988 Concurrent thinking aloud: An online tool for studying representations used in text understanding. Text 8 (4): 351–367. DIPF, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Pädagogische Forschung 2006 Deutsch-Englisch Schulleistungen International (DESI). Download: http://www.dipf.de/desi/DESI_Zentrale_Befunde.pdf Deutsche Gesellschaft für Geographie, DGfG 2006 Bildungsstandards im Fach Geographie für den Mittleren Schulabschluss. Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Geographie. Dietrich, Rainer 2002 Psycholinguistik. Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler. Dobrin, David N. 1994 Whither wisdom? In Speaking about Writing: Reflections on Research Methodology, Peter Smagorinsky (ed.), 275–290. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Dörner, Dietrich 1999 Bauplan für eine Seele. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. Doughty, Catherine, and J. Williams 1998 Issues and terminology. In Focus on form in classroom SLA, Catherine Doughty, and J. Williams (eds.), 1–11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eckerth, Johannes, and Sabine Siekmann (eds.) 2008 Task-Based Language Learning and Teaching. Theoretical, Methodological, and Pedagogical Perspectives. Tübingen: Narr. Edmondson, Jerold A., and Donald A. Burquest. 1998 A survey of linguistic theories. 3rd edition. Dallas, TX: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Edmondson, Willis J. 1996 Was Lerner über ihr Fremdsprachenlernen berichten. In Wie lernt man Sprachen – wie lehrt man Sprachen?, Juliane House (ed.), 68– 82. (Arbeitsberichte 12, ZFI.) Hamburg: Universität Hamburg.

198

References

Edmondson, Willis J., and Juliane House 2000 Einführung in die Sprachlehrforschung. 2nd, revised ed. Tübingen/Basel: Francke. Ehlers, Svantje 1998 Lesetheorie und Fremdsprachliche Lesepraxis aus der Perspektive des Deutschen als Fremdsprache. Tübingen: Narr. 2003 Das Leseverständnis von Migrantenkindern und L2-Lesefähigkeit. In Deutschdidaktik und Deutschunterricht nach PISA, Ulf Abraham, Albert Bremerich-Vos, Volker Frederking, and Petra Wieler (eds.), 297–309. Freiburg: Fillibach. Ellis, Rod 2003 Task-Based Language Learning and Teaching. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ellis, Rod (ed.) 2005a Planning and Task Performance in a Second Language. 1st ed. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. 2005b Planning and task-based performance: Theory and research. In Planning and Task Performance in a Second Language, Rod Ellis (ed.), 3–34. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Ericsson, K. Anders 1988 Concurrent verbal reports on text comprehension: A review. Text 8 (4): 295–325. Ericsson, K. Anders, and Herbert A. Simon 1980 Verbal reports as data. Psychological Review 87 (3): 215–251. 1987 Verbal reports on thinking. In Introspection in Second Language Research, Claus Færch and Gabriele Kasper (eds.), 24–53. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 1993 Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data. Revised ed. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Ervin, Susan M., and Charles E. Osgood 1954 Second language learning and bilingualism. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Supplement 49: 139–146. Evans, Vyvyan, and Melanie C. Green 2006 Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Eysenck, Michael W., and Mark T. Keane 2000 Cognitive Psychology: A Student’s Handbook. 4th ed. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. Fehling, Sylvia 2005 Language Awareness und Bilingualer Unterricht: Eine komparative Studie. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang.

References

199

Fillmore, Charles 1975 An alternative to checklist theories of meaning. In Proceedings of the first annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, Charles Fillmore (ed.), 123–131. Amsterdam: North Holland. 1977 Scenes-and-frames semantics. In Linguistic Structures Processing, Antonio Zampolli (ed.), 55–82. Amsterdam: North Holland. 1982 Frame semantics. In Linguistics in the Morning Calm, Linguistic Society of Korea (ed.), 111–137. Seoul: Hanshin Publishing. 1985 Frames and the semantics of understanding. Quaderni di Semantica 6: 222–254. Fillmore, Charles, and Beryl T. Atkins 1992 Toward a frame-based lexicon: The semantics of RISK and its neighbors. In Frames, Fields and Contrasts, Adrienne Lehrer and Eva F. Kittay (eds.), 75–102. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Flower, Linda, and John R. Hayes 1981 A cognitive theory of writing. College Composition and Communication 32: 365–387. Fodor, Jerry 1995 The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Fortescue, Michael 2001 Thoughts about thought. Cognitive Linguistics 12 (1): 15–45. Fotos, Sandra S. 1993 Conscious raising and noticing through focus on form: Grammar task performance versus formal instruction. Applied Linguistics 14, 385–407. Fotos, Sandra S., and Rod Ellis 1991 Communicating about grammar: A task-based approach. TESOL Quarterly 25, 605–28. Funke, Joachim 2003 Problemlösendes Denken. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Frawley, William 1997 Vygotsky and cognitive science. Oxford: Harvard University Press. Gajo, Laurent, and Cecilia Serra 2002 Bilingual teaching: connecting language and concepts in mathematics. In Education and Society in Plurilingual Contexts, Daniel D.W. So and Gary M. Jones (eds.), 75–95. Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press. Gardner, Robert C., and Peter D. MacIntyre 1993 On the measurement of affective variables in second language learning. Language Learning 43: 157–194.

200

References

Gardner, Robert C., and Paul F. Tremblay 1994 On motivation: Measurement and conceptual considerations. The Modern Language Journal 78 (4): 524–527. Garman, Michael 1991 Psycholinguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garnham, Alan, and Jane Oakhill 1996 The mental models theory of language comprehension. Models of understanding text. Bruce K. Britton and Arthur C. (eds.), 313–339. Graesser. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Garner, Ruth 1988 Verbal-report data on cognitive and metacognitive strategies. In Learning and Study Strategies: Issues in Assessment, Instruction and Evaluation, Claire E. Weinstein, Ernest T. Goetz, and Patricia A. Alexander (eds.), 63–76. San Diego: Academic Press. Gass, Susan M., and Alison Mackey 2000 Stimulated Recall Methodology in Second Language Research. Mahwah: Erlbaum. Geeraerts, Dirk (ed.) 2006 Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Genesee, Fred 1987 Learning through two languages: studies on immersion and bilingual education. Cambridge, Mass. etc: Newbury House. Gentner, Deirdre, and Albert L. Stevens (eds.) 1983 Mental Models. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. Gilabert, Roger 2007 Effects of manipulating task complexity on self-repairs during L2 oral production. IRAL 45, 215–240 Gies, Horst 2004 Geschichtsunterricht: Ein Handbuch zur Unterrichtsplanung. With the collaboration of Michele Barricelli and Michael Toepfer. Köln: Böhlau. Golay, David 2005 Das Bilinguale Sachfach Geographie. Eine Empirische Studie Bezüglich des Progressiven Lernzuwachses im Bilingual Deutsch-Französisch Unterrichteten Sachfach Geographie auf der Sek. I. Nürnberg: Selbstverlag des Hochschulverbandes für Geographie und ihre Didaktik. Goldberg, Adele E. 2006 Constructions at work. The nature of generalization in language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

References

201

Grabe, William 2001 Notes towards a theory of second language writing. In On Second Language Writing, Tony Silva and Paul Kei Matsuda (eds.), 39–57. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Grabe, William, and Robert B. Kaplan 1996 Theory and Practice of Writing: An Applied Linguistic Perspective. London/New York: Longman. Green, Alison 1998 Verbal Protocol Analysis in Language Testing Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Green, David W. 1986 Control, activation and resource: A framework and a model for the control of speech in bilinguals. Brain and Language 27: 210–223. Grosjean, François 1998 Studying bilinguals: methodological and conceptual issues. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition 1 (2), 131–149. Grotjahn, Rüdiger 1987 On the methodological basis of introspective methods. In Introspection in Second Language Research, Claus Færch and Gabriele Kasper (eds.), 54–81. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 1991 The research programme subjective theories. A new approach in second language research. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 13: 187–214. 1993 Qualitative vs. quantitative Fremdsprachenforschung: Eine erklärungsbedürftige und unfruchtbare Dichotomie. In Kontroversen in der Fremdsprachenforschung. Dokumentation des 14. Kongresses für Fremdsprachendidaktik, Veranstaltet von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Fremdsprachenforschung (DGFF) Essen, 7.–9. Oktober 1991. Johannes-Peter Timm and Johannes Helmut Vollmer (eds.), 223–248. Bochum. 1997 Strategiewissen und Strategiegebrauch. Das Informationsverarbeitungsparadigma als Metatheorie der L2-Strategieforschung. In Strategien und Techniken beim Erwerb Fremder Sprachen. Ute Rampillon and Günther Zimmermann (eds.), 33–76. Ismaning: Huber. 1999 Thesen zur empirischen Forschungsmethodologie. Zeitschrift für Fremdsprachenforschung 10: 133–158. 2003 Konzepte für die Erforschung des Lehrens und Lernens fremder Sprachen: Forschungsmethodologischer Überblick. In Handbuch Fremdsprachenunterricht. 4th revised ed., Karl-Richard Bausch, Herbert Christ, and Hans-Jürgen Krumm (eds.), 493–499. Tübingen: Franke.

202

References

Halliday, Michael A. K., and Ruqiaya Hasan 1976 Cohesion in English. Amsterdam: Addison-Wesley Longman. Harley, Birgit, Patrick Allen, Jim Cummins, and Merril Swain (eds.) 1990 The development of second language proficiency. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Harley, Birgit 1993 Instructional strategies and SLA in early French immersion. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 15, 245–259. Haspelmath, Martin 2002 Understanding Morphology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hayes, John R. 1996 A new model of cognition and affect in writing. In The Science of Writing, C. M. Levy and S. Ransdell (eds.), 1–27. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Heine, Lena 2005 Lautes Denken als Forschungsinstrument in der Fremdsprachenforschung. Zeitschrift für Fremdsprachenforschung 16 (2): 163–185. Heine, Lena, and Karen Schramm 2007 Lautes Denken in der Fremdsprachenforschung: Eine Handreichung für die empirische Praxis. In Empirische Zugänge in der Fremdsprachenforschung: Herausforderungen und Perspektiven, Johannes Helmut Vollmer (ed.), 167–206. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang. Helbig, Beate 2001 Das Bilinguale Sachfach Geschichte: Eine Empirische Studie zur Arbeit mit Französischsprachigen (Quellen-)Texten. Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Herdina, Phillip, and Ulrike Jessner 2002 A Dynamic Model of Multilingualism: Perspectives of Change in Psycholinguistics. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Howe, Reed B. K. 1991 Introspection: A reassessment. New Ideas in Psychology 9/1: 23–44. von Humboldt, Wilhelm ca. 1919 Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium: in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung. Leipzig: Meiner. Hurlburt, Russell 1990 Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience. New York: Plenum Press. Jessner, Ulrike 2006 Linguistic Awareness in Multilinguals: English as a Third Language. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

References

203

Johnson-Laird, Philip N. 1983 Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Jourdenais, Renée 2001 Cognition, instruction and protocol analysis. In Cognition and Second Language Instruction, Peter Robinson (ed.), 354–375. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jusczyk, Peter W. 1997 The Discovery of Spoken Language. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Just, Marcel A., and Patricia A. Carpenter 1987 The Psychology of Reading and Language Comprehension. Newton, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Kallenbach, Christiane 1996 Subjektive Theorien. Tübingen: Narr. Kasper, Gabriele 1998 Analyzing verbal protocols. Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages Quarterly 32 (2): 358–362. Katz, Jerrold J. 1972 Semantic Theory. New York: Harper and Row. Kaufer, D. S., John R. Hayes, and Linda Flower 1986 Composing written sentences. Research in the Teaching of English 20: 121–140. Kern, Richard G. 1994 The role of mental translation in second language reading. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 16: 441–461. Kintsch, Walter 1974 The Representation of Meaning in Memory. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. 1998 Comprehension: A Paradigm for Cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kintsch, Walter, and Teun van Dijk 1978 Toward a model of text comprehension and production. Psychological Review 85: 363–394. Knoblich, Günther, and Detlef Rhenius 1995 Zur Reaktivität Lauten Denkens beim komplexen Problemlösen. Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie 42: 419–454. Koch, Angela 2005 Bilingualer Naturwissenschaftlicher Anfangsunterricht: Entwicklung – Erprobung – Evaluation. Ph.D. diss., University of Kiel. [www.ipn.uni-kiel.de/zfdn/pdf/004_12.pdf]

204

References

2007

Concept Mapping als Erhebungsintrument von Lernzuwächsen im bilingualen naturwissenschaftlichen Anfangsunterricht. In Synergieeffekte in der Fremdsprachenforschung. Empirische Zugänge, Probleme, Ergebnisse, Helmut Johannes Vollmer (ed.), 207–218. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. Koch, Angela, and Wolfgang Bündner 2006 Fachbezogener Wissenserwerb im bilingualen naturwissenschaftlichen Anfangsunterricht. Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Naturwissenschaften 12: 67–76. Kormos, Judith 1998 Verbal reports in L2 speech production research. Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages Quarterly 32 (2): 353–358. Kosslyn, Stephen M. 1994 Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Krashen, Stephen D. 1984 Immersion: why it works and what it has taught us. Language and Society 12: 61–64. 1985 The Input Hypothesis: Issues and Implications. London/New York: Longman. Krings, Hans-Peter 1996 Empirische Untersuchungen zu fremdsprachlichen Schreibprozessen – Ein Forschungsüberblick. 2nd ed. In Schreiben in der Fremdsprache: Prozeß und Text, Lehren und Lernen, Wolfgang Börner and Klaus Vogel (eds.), 47–77. Bochum: AKS-Verlag. Kuiken, Folkert, and Ineke Vedder 2007 Task complexity and measures of linguistic performance in L2 writing. IRAL 45, 261–284. Kroll, Judith F., and de Groot, Annette M. B. (eds.) 2005 Handbook of bilingualism: Psycholinguistic approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Labov, William 1973 The boundaries of words and their meanings. In New Ways of Analyzing Variation in English, Ch.-J. N. Bailey and R. W. Shuy (eds.), 340–373.Washington: Georgetown University. Larsen-Freeman, Diane, and Michael H. Long 1991 An introduction to second language acquisition research. London, Longman. Legutke, Michael, and Howard Thomas 1991 Process and experience in the language classroom. London, New York: Longman.

References

205

Leow, Ronald P., and Kara Morgan-Short 2004 To think aloud or not to think aloud. The issue of reactivity in SLA research methodology. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 26: 35–57. Leser, Hartmut (ed.) 2005 Wörterbuch Allgemeine Geographie. 13th, revised ed. Braunschweig/München: Westermann, Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag. Levelt, Willem J. M. 1995 Speaking: From Intention to Articulation. Cambridge, MA/London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Li, Peggy, and Lila Gleitman 2002 Turning the tables: Language and spatial reasoning. In Cognition 83: 265–294. Lim Falk, Maria 2008 Svenska i engelskspråkig skolmiljö. Ämnesrelaterat språkbruk i tå gymnasieklasser. Stockholm: Eddy. Löbner, Sebastian 2002 Understanding semantics. London: Hodder Arnold. Long, Michael H. 1983 Native speaker/non-native speaker conversation and the negotiation of comprehensible input. Applied Linguistics 4: 126–41. 1991 Focus on form: A design feature in language teaching methodology. Foreign language research in cross-cultural perspective, Kees de Bot, Ralph B. Ginsberg, and Claire Kramsch (eds.), 39–52. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Long, Michael H., and Peter Robinson 1998 Focus on form: Theory, research, and practice. In Focus on form in classroom second langauge acquisition, Catherine Doughty, and K. Williams (eds.), 15–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lucy, John A. 1992 Grammatical Categories and Cognition: A Case Study of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marantz, Alec 2005 Generative linguistics within the cognitive neuroscience of language. The Linguistic Review 22: 429–445. Martin, James R. 1992 English Texts: System and Structure. Philadelphia: Benjamins. Massaro, Dominic W., and Nelson Cowan 1993 Information processing models: Microscopes of the mind. Annual Review of Psychology 44: 383–425.

206

References

Matsumoto, Kazuko 1994 Introspection, verbal reports and second language learning strategy research. Canadian Modern Language Journal 50: 363–386. Meyer, David E., and Roger W. Schvaneveldt 1971 Facilitation in recognizing pairs of words. Evidence of a dependence between retrieval operations. Journal of Experimental Psychology 90: 227–234. 1976 Meaning, memory structure and mental processes. Science 192: 27– 33. Nemser, William 1971 Approximative systems of foreign language learners. International Review of Applied Linguistics 9: 115–123. Niemeier, Susanne 2000 Bilingualismus und ‘bilinguale’ Bildungsgänge aus kognitivlinguistischer Sicht. In Bilingualer Unterricht: Grundlagen, Methoden, Praxis, Perspektiven, Gerhard Bach and Susanne Niemeier (eds.), 27–49. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy DeCamp Wilson 1977 Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84: 231–259. Oakhill, Jane, and Alan Garnham (eds.) 1996 Mental models in cognitive science. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Osgood, Charles E. 1949 The similarity paradox in human learning: A resolution. Psychological Review 56: 132–149. Paivio, Allan 1971 Imagery and verbal processes. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1986 Mental representations: A dual coding approach. New York: Oxford University Press. Palmer, Stephen E., and Ruth Kimchi 1986 The information processing approach to cognition. In Approaches to Cognition: Contrasts and Controversies, Terry J. Knapp and Lynn C. Robertson (eds.), 37–77. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Pandel, Jürgen 2005 Geschichtsunterricht nach PISA: Kompetenzen, Bildungsstandards und Kerncurricula. Schwalbach (Taunus): Wochenschau-Verlag. Paradis, Michel 1987 The stratification of bilingualism. In Aspects of Bilingualism, Michel Paradis (ed.), 165–176. Columbia, SC: Hornbeam Press.

References

207

Passon, Peter 2007 Evaluation von Fachlernen und Sprachlichkeit im Kontext bilingualer Bildung. Unpublished thesis, University of Osnabrück. Pavlenko, Aneta 2005 Bilingualism and thought. In Handbook of bilingualism: Psycholinguistic approaches, Judith F. Kroll and Annette M. B. de Groot (eds.), 433–452. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peal, Elizabeth, and Wallace E. Lambert 1962 The relation of bilingualism to intelligence. Psychological Monographs 76: 1–23. Piaget, Jean 2001 The language and thought of the child. London etc.: Routledge. Pinker, Steven 1995 The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. New York: Harper Collins. Portmann-Tselikas, Paul 1991 Schreiben und Lernen: Grundlagen der fremdsprachlichen Schreibdidaktik. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Pretz, Jean E., Adam J. Naples, and Robert J. Sternberg 2003 Recognizing, defining, and representing problems. In The Psychology of Problem Solving, Janet E. Davidson, and Robert J. Sternberg (eds.), 3–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pritchard, Robert 1990 The evolution of introspective methodology and its implications for studying the reading process. Reading Psychology 11: 1–13. Raupach, Manfred 1994 Das mehrsprachige mentale Lexikon. In Kognitive Linguistik und Fremdsprachenerwerb: Das Mentale Lexikon,Wolfgang Börner, and Klaus Vogel (eds.), 19–37. Tübingen: Narr. Rehbein, Jochen 1994 Theorien, sprachwissenschaftlich betrachtet. In Texte und Diskurse: Methoden und Forschungsergebnisse der Funktionalen Pragmatik, Gisela Brünner and Gabriele Graefen (eds.), 25–67. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Rehbein, Jochen, and Harrie Mazeland 1991 Kodierentscheidungen: Zur Kontrolle interpretativer Prozesse bei der Kommunikationsanalyse. In Verbale Interaktion: Studien zur Empirie und Methodologie der Pragmatik, Dieter Flader (ed.), 166– 221. Stuttgart: Metzler.

208

References

Riemer, Claudia 1997 Individuelle Unterschiede im Fremdsprachenerwerb: Eine Longitudinalstudie über die Wechselwirksamkeit ausgewählter Einflussfaktoren. Hohengehren: Schneider. Robinson, Peter 2007 Task complexity, theory of mind, and intentional reasoning: Effects on L2 speech production, interaction, uptake and perceptions of task difficulty. IRAL 45, 193–213. 2001 Task complexity, difficulty and lexical variety. Applied Linguistics 22 (1), 27–57 1995 Task complexity and second language narrative discourse. Language Learning 45: 99–140. Robinson, Peter, and Nick C. Ellis 2008 Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics and Second Language Acquisition. New York: Routledge. Robinson, Peter, and Roger Gilabert 2007 Task complexity, the Cognition Hypothesis and second language learning and performance. IRAL 45, 161–176. Rohman, Gordon 1965 Pre-writing: The stage of discovery in the writing process. College Composition and Communication 16: 106–112. Rosch, Eleanor 1975 Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 104: 192–233. 1977 Human categorization. In Advances in Cross-Cultural Psychology (Vol. 1), Neill Warren (ed.), 1–49. London: Academic Press. 1999 Principles of categorization. In Concepts: Core Readings, Eric Margolis, and Stephen Laurence (eds.), 189–206. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Roth, Emily M., and David D. Woods 1989 Cognitive task analysis: An approach to knowledge acquisition for intelligent system design. In Topics in Expert System Design, Giovanni Guida and Carlo Tasso (eds.), 233–264. New York: Elsevier Publishers. Rumelhart, David E., and Donald A. Norman 1978 Accretion, tuning, and restructuring: Three modes of learning. In Semantic Factors in Cognition, John W. Cotton, and Roberta L. Klatzky (eds.), 37–53. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Saeed, John I. 2006 Semantics. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Schank, Roger C., and Robert P. Abelson 1977 Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

References

209

Sapir, Edward 1949 Language: An introdiction to the study of speech. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Schmidt, Richard W. 1990 The role of consciousness in second language learning. Applied Linguistics 11 (2), 129–158. 1995 Attention and awareness in foreign language learning. Honolulu, HI: Second Language Teaching and Curriculum Center, University of Hawai'i. 2001 Attention. In Cognition and Second Language Instruction, Peter Robinson (ed.), 3–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, Richard W., and Sylvia N. Frota 1986 Developing basic conversational ability in a second language: A case study of an adult learner of Portuguese. In Talking to learn: Conversation in second language acquisition, Richard R. Day (ed.), 237–335. Rowley, MA: Newbury House. Schramm, Karen 2001 L2-Leser in Aktion: der fremdsprachliche Leseprozess als mentales Handeln. Münster etc.: Waxmann. Schwarz, Monika 1996 Einführung in die Kognitive Linguistik. Tübingen/Basel: Francke. Seliger, Herbert W. 1983 The language learner as linguist: Of metaphors and realities. Applied Linguistics 4: 179–191. Selinker, Larry 1972 Interlanguage. International Review of Applied Linguistics 10/3: 209–231. Singer, Murray 1994 Discourse inference processes. In Handbook of Psycholinguistics, Morton Ann Gernsbacher (ed.), 479–515. San Diego e.a.: Academic Press. Slobin, Dan 1987 Thinking for speaking. In Papers from the 13th annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, J. Aske, N. Beery, L. Michaelis, and H. Filip (eds.), 435-444. Berkeley: University of California. 1996 From ‘thought to language’ to ‘thinking for speaking’. In Rethinking linguistic relativity, J. Gumperz, and Steven C. Levinson (eds.), 70– 96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000 Verbalised events. In Evidence for linguistic relativity, Susanne Niemeier, and René Dirven (eds.), 107–138. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

210

References

Smagorinsky, Peter 1994 Think-aloud protocol analysis: Beyond the black box. In Speaking About Writing: Reflections on Research Methodology, Peter Smagorinsky (ed.), 3–19. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Smith, Eliot R., and Frederick D. Miller 1978 Limits on perception of cognitive processes: A reply to Nisbett and Wilson. Psychological Review 85 (4): 355–362. Smith, Frank 1994 Understanding reading. 5th ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Solso, Robert L. 2005 Cognitive Psychology. 7th ed. Boston: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon. Stohler, Ursula 2006 The acquisition of knowledge in bilingual learning: An empirical study on the role of language in content learning. Current Research on CLIL 15 (3): 41–46. Stratman, James F., and Liz Hamp-Lyons 1994 Reactivity in concurrent think-aloud protocols: Issues for research. In Speaking About Writing: Reflections on Research Methodology, Peter Smagorinsky (ed.), 89–114. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Swain, Merril 1985 Communicative competence: Some roles of comprehensible input and comprehensible output in its development. In Input in second language acquisition, Susan Gass, and Caroly Madden (eds.), 235– 256. New York: Newbury House. 1998 Focus on form through conscious reflection. In Focus on Form in Classroom Second Language Acquisition, Catherine Doughty, and Jessica Williams (eds.), 64–81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Swain, Merril, and Sharon Lapkin 1995 Problems in output and the cognitive processes they generate: A step towards second language learning. Applied Linguistics 16: 371–391. Sylvén, Liss Kerstin 2004 Teaching in English or English teaching? On the effects of content and language integrated learning on Swedish learners’ incidental vocabulary acquisition. PhD dissertation. Göteborg University. Thürmann, Eike 2000 Eine eigenständige Methodik für den bilingualen Sachfachunterricht? In Bilingualer Unterricht: Grundlagen, Methoden, Praxis, Perspektiven, Gerhard Bach, and Susanne Niemeier (eds.), 75–93. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang.

References

211

Tye, Michael 1991 The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. van Dijk, Teun A., and Walter Kintsch 1983 Strategies of Discourse Comprehension. New York: Academic Press. van Someren, Maarten W., Yvonne F. Barnard, and Jacobijn A. C. Sandberg 1994 The Think Aloud Method: A Practical Guide to Modelling Cognitive Processes. London e.a.: Academic Press. Verplanck, William S. 1962 Unaware of where’s awareness: Some verbal operants – notates, monents, and notants. In Behavior and Awareness: A Symposium of Research and Interpretation, Charles W. Eriksen (ed.), 130–158. Durham: Duke University Press. Vollmer, Helmut J. 2000 Bilingualer Sachfachunterricht als Inhalts- und Sprachlernen. In Bilingualer Unterricht: Grundlagen, Methoden, Praxis, Perspektiven, Gerhard Bach, and Susanne Niemeier (eds.), 51–73. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. 2006a Bildungsstandards von oben – Bildungsstandards von unten. Der Fremdsprachliche Unterricht – Englisch 40(1): 12–16. 2006b Fachlichkeit und Sprachlichkeit. Zeitschrift für Fremdsprachenforschung 17 (2): 1–45. 2007 Zur Modellierung und empirischen Erfassung von Fachkompetenz am Beispiel der Geographie. In Synergieeffekte in der Fremdsprachenforschung: Empirische Zugänge, Probleme, Ergebnisse, Helmut Johannes Vollmer (ed.), 270–298. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. in progress Geographische Kompetenzen von Monolingualen und Bilingualen Lernern am Ende der Klasse 10 des Gymnasiums. Ergebnisse einer Empirischen Untersuchung. von Aufschnaiter, Claudia, and Stefan von Aufschnaiter 2003 Theoretical framework and empirical evidence on students’ cognitive processes in three dimensions of content, complexity, and time. Journal of Research in Science Teaching 40 (7): 616–648. von Humboldt, Wilhelm ca. 1919 Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium: in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung. Leipzig: Meiner. Vygotsky, Lev S. 1978 Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Translated by Michael Cole, V. John-Steiner, S. Scribner, and E. Souberman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1986 Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

212

References

Watson, John B. 1930 Behaviorism. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Weinreich, Uriel 1953 Languages in Contact. The Hague: Mouton. White, Peter 1980 Limitations on verbal reports of internal events: A refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem. Psychological Review 87: 105–112. Whorf, Benjamin Lee 1956 Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Ed. and with an introduction by John B. Carrol. Cambridge, Mass.: Technical Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Wickens, Christopher D. 2007 Attention to the second language. IRAL 45, 177–191. Wierzbicka, Anna 1996 Semantics: Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, Sarah, and Björn Hammarberg 1998 Language switches in L3 production: Implications for a polyglot speaking model. Applied Linguistics 19 (3): 295–333. Witte, Stephen P., and Roger D. Cherry 1994 Think-aloud protocols, protocol analysis, and research design: an exploration of the Influence of writing tasks on writing processes. In Speaking about Writing: Reflections on Research Methodology, Peter Smagorinsky (ed.), 20–54. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Wode, Henning 1995 Lernen in der Fremdsprache. Grundzüge von Immersion und Bilingualem Unterricht. Ismaning: Huber. Wolff, Dieter 1997 Bilingualer Sachfachunterricht: Versuch einer lernpsychologischen und fachdidaktischen Begründung. In Englisch als Arbeitssprache im Fachunterricht: Begegnungen zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Helmut J. Vollmer and Eike Thürmann (eds.), 50–62. Soest: Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung. Würffel, Nicola 2006 Strategiengebrauch bei Aufgabenbearbeitungen in Internetgestütztem Selbstlernmaterial. Tübingen: Narr. Yang, Ching S. 2003 Reconceptualizing think-aloud methodology: refining the encoding and categorizing techniques via contextualized perspectives. Computers in Human Behavior 19: 95–115.

References

213

Zydatiß, Wolfgang 2002 Konzeptuelle Grundlagen einer eigenständigen Didaktik des bilingualen Sachfachunterrichts: Forschungsstand und Forschungsprogramm. In Bilingualer Sachfachunterrich, Stephan Breidbach, Gerhard Bach, and Dieter Wolff (eds.), 31–61. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. 2005 Bildungsstandards und Kompetenzniveaus im Englischunterricht: Konzepte, Empirie, Kritik und Konsequenzen. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang.

Index

accommodation, 29, 31 accretion, 29 applied linguistics, 37, 40 assimilation, 29, 31 BICS, 12 Bilingual Education, 1, 2 CALP, 12 case grammar, 39 CLIL, 1-4, 127, 177, 185, 187, 188 paradox, 4 climate graphs, 6, 35, 45, 69, 70, 71, 77-79, 86, 87, 95, 96, 109, 116 Content and Language Integrated Learning, see CLIL coding (data), 56, 99-102, 116, 118, 160 cognition, 8, 14, 17, 23, 29, 36, 69, 73, 87, 88, 90, 99, 175, 178, 179 cognition hypothesis, 34 cognitive ability, 11 cognitive complexity, 25 Cognitive Linguistics, 13, 14, 17, 21, 36, 57, 177 cognitive processes, 1, 5, 6, 19, 24-26, 28, 30, 32, 35-37, 40, 50, 57, 69, 77, 83, 86, 89, 90, 99, 150, 162, 163, 175, 188 cognitive psychology, 8, 9, 14, 19, 21, 24, 27, 36, 40, 55, 74, 89, 177 cognitive shift, 8 cognitive task analysis, 7, 73, -75, 80 comparison (as cognitive process), 23, 25, 26, 32, 61, 63, 102, 138 compensation, 4, 157, 159, 184, 185, 188

competence tests, 3 compound and coordinate bilingualism, 10 Comprehensible Input Hypothesis, 2 concept mapping, 189 conceptual knowledge, 8, 16, 22, 36, 37, 42, 59, 121, 124, 133, 138, 184 construction (as cognitive process), 4, 6, 15, 23, 26, 29-32, 35, 37, 38, 42, 45, 47, 59, 61-64, 66, 70, 73, 74, 76-81, 102, 116, 124, 143, 152, 153, 156, 160, 178, 179, 182, 183 constructivism, 11, 13, 21, 24, 35, 37, 40, 64, 66, 73, 149, 178, 179, 185 content learning, 3 context (as source of information), 4, 6, 9, 15, 19, 28, 35, 38, 44, 49, 50, 58, 65, 74, 106, 157160, 178, 179, 181, 185, 187 continuum, 25, 26, 31, 127, 146, 185 Contrastive Hypothesis, 11 curriculum, 33, 186 deeper processing, 7, 124, 126129, 139, 143, 146, 147, 159, 160, 183, 184, 186-189 design of learning contexts, 185 dual coding, 20, 21 editing, 43, 49, 116 elicitation tasks, 5, 6, 35, 50, 58, 66, 68, 69, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83, 91, 148, 160

Index empirical, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16, 21, 22, 33, 35, 37-39, 45, 49, 51, 56, 58, 65-68, 76, 83-86, 172, 177, 179, 180, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190 enactive theories, 21 encyclopaedic knowledge, 9, 14, 21, 22, 39, 40, 57, 59, 64 evaluate (as cognitive process), 23, 28, 50, 54, 62, 64, 88, 133, 138, 148 eye movement data, 38, 82, 89 feature semantics, 13, 14 focus on form, 1, 32-35, 127, 184, 186 on forms, 33, 34 on meaning, 1, 2, 32-35 format of thought, 15, 19, 84 frame semantics, 14 functional approach, 25, 26, 30, 31, 38, 50, 127 gaps, 7, 38, 39, 106, 150, 171 garden path experiments, 38 geography, 2, 3, 35, 49, 68, 69, 73, 76, 157-159, 170, 188 goal state, 5, 28, 31, 43, 58, 59, 62, 65, 66 gradience, 14 imagery debate, 19 immersion programme, 2 individual differences, 13, 84, 89, 130, 159, 170, 179, 182 inference, 20, 38-40, 160 information (as cognitive construct), 5, 6, 20-29, 31-40, 44, 45, 49, 54, 55, 58, 61, 64, 69, 70, 73, 75-82, 86, 95, 106, 116, 119, 126, 170, 175, 180, 183, 184, 187, 188 processing, 25, 27, 30, 37, 57, 59, 66, 85, 130, 177, 178, 182, 187

215

inner speech, 18, 19, 84 Interaction Hypothesis, 33 Interdependence Hypothesis, 12 Interpretation (as cognitive process), 10, 15, 24, 38, 39, 70, 73 introspection, 82-84 keyboard protocols, 89 knowledge declarative, 79 procedural, 32, 45, 75, 80 telling, 45, 46, 47, 49 transforming, 47-49, 50, 147 L1, 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 12, 51, 56, 68, 90, 92, 93, 118, 119, 124, 128132, 139, 141, 143, 146, 147, 153, 171, 177, 180, 183-185, 187 L2 proficiency, 3, 11, 143 -specific processes, 56 language acquisition, 2, 10, 12, 23, 33, 34, 83, 178, 188 of thought, 19, 20, 84, 94, 173, 178, 181, 188 production, 40, 41, 53, 54, 64, 70, 128, 183, 186 switches, 41, 90, 91, 170, 172 learner characteristics, 6 type, 88 linguistic determinism, 16, 17 knowledge, 5, 8-14, 21, 22, 45, 54, 57, 62, 64 processing, 6, 9, 36, 48, 56, 68, 80, 127, 146 relativity, 4, 16, 17, 120

216

Index

structure, 1, 2, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 59, 63, 102 long-term memory, 44, 45, 50, 54, 127 meaning-focused problem solving, 1, 8 task, 5, 26, 28 memory, 9, 21, 23-26, 30, 31, 35, 39, 45, 47, 49, 58, 59, 70, 76, 79, 80, 106, 124, 126, 127 mental lexicon, 9, 13, 22, 40, 41, 80 model, 20, 21, 40, 83, 121 processes, 6, 7, 8, 23, 26, 30, 32, 37, 40, 51, 67, 69, 73, 74, 76, 80, 86, 90, 92, 98, 99, 106, 175 representation, 1, 6, 10, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 32, 40, 41, 47, 59, 62, 63, 73, 75, 80, 84, 95, 96, 102, 107, 111, 114, 116, 124, 128, 130 mentalese, 19 metacognition, 64, 86, 87, 163, 180 methodology, 3, 4, 6, 17, 68, 81-85, 92, 93, 99, 118, 119, 143, 148, 150, 175, 177-179, 182, 183, 185 mispronunciation, 151-153, 158 modality-specific, 21 monitor, 28, 43, 44, 89, 163 monolingualism, 12 multilingualism, 10, 12

perception, 8, 9, 16, 17, 25, 26, 73, 88 phase (of problem solving), 4, 7, 30-32, 35, 43, 44, 57, 61-66, 75, 76, 80, 96-98, 101, 102, 114, 116, 128, 130, 148, 150, 175, 178, 182 pilot study, 73, 91-93, 163, 171, 179 presupposition, 40 problem (as mental category), 4, 5, 23, 27, 30, 31, 35, 42, 47, 49, 51, 57, 58, 65, 66, 69, 70, 74, 75, 79, 81, 82, 92, 93, 95, 96, 114, 116, 129, 131, 143, 171, 175 problem solving theory, 28, 182 problem space, 27, 47-49, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 101-111, 116, 119, 124, 130, 133, 148, 161, 171, 176, 183, 187 proposition, 19, 20, 40, 80 prototype theory, 14, 21 qualitative, 7, 87, 89, 116, 124, 139, 146, 150, 185 quantitative, 7, 26, 130, 146, 176, 179

operation, 24, 26, 27, 30, 59, 68 orthography, 111, 114, 150

reactivity, 88, 89, 93, 162, 165, 167 reading, 6, 20, 37, 38, 42, 50, 57, 62, 91, 96, 101, 107, 152, 159, 162 reconstruction, 23, 29, 30, 32, 35, 61, 63, 64, 78-80, 81, 124 reliability, 106, 107 revising, 44, 45 rules, 9, 22, 33, 80, 127

parallel processing, 24, 41, 96, 150, 164, 180 pause, 106, 149-150

schema, 14, 29, 30, 39, 55 script, 14, 15, 40 semantic primitives, 13, 14

noticing hypothesis, 33, 34

Index social context, 6, 19, 35, 1179 sociocultural, 9, 55, 65 theory, 17, 19 strategy, 12, 25, 28, 31, 44, 51, 55, 64, 87, 88, 157, 160, 163, 167, 172, 188 subjective, 21, 24, 65, 73, 107, 163, 173, 174 data, 163 theories, 163 subject-specific competence, 3, 157 SUP, 12 syllabus, 2, 33, 34 task, 1, 3-5, 6, 26, 29, 30-35, 39, 42, 44, 45, 47, 55, 57-67, 69, 70-83, 85-88, 90, 91, 93-96, 102, 106, 107, 117, 124, 126, 131, 133, 134, 139, 148, 160, 162, 165, 175, 178, 185, 188 design, 6, 34, 58, 69, 73, 148, 160 teaching method, 185, 189 text composition, 1, 6, 37, 41–45, 47, 49, 50, 56, 85, 127, 128, 130, 177, 186 comprehension, 37–40, 160, 161, 186 text written so far, 45, 54, 55, 65 think-aloud data, 6, 7, 92, 94, 99, 101, 106, 107, 117, 139, 160, 179, 182, 183 thinking, 15–23, 25, 30, 35, 43, 49, 85, 92, 93, 164-169, 178, 179, 181, 185 for speaking, 16, 17 thought, see thinking transcription, 84, 99 translating, 56, 85 triangulation, 5, 83, 88, 181

217

understanding (as cognitive process), 32, 37, 38, 61-63, 75, 80, 116, 148, 159, 186, 187 validity, 7, 83, 91, 114, 116, 162163, 170, 173-176, 178-182 variables of personality, 64 verbal protocol, 82, 84, 86, 130 vocalization, 86, 149, 150, 152, 164, 170, 179 world knowledge, see encyclopedic knowledge working memory, 40, 50, 54, 85, 87, 89, 93, 109, 131, 150, 164, 167, 180 writing, 41-57, 66, 82, 85, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 116, 124, 131, 132, 139 zone of proximal development, 1