Pragmatic Nonviolence: Working toward a Better World (Value Inquiry Book) 9004445986, 9789004445987

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Pragmatic Nonviolence

Value Inquiry Book Series Founding Editor Robert Ginsberg Managing Editor J.D. Mininger

volume 360

Philosophy of Peace Editor Danielle Poe, University of Dayton

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​vibs and brill.com/pop

Pragmatic Nonviolence Working toward a Better World By

Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Image from unsplash.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Fitz-Gibbon, Andrew, 1951- author. Title: Pragmatic nonviolence : working toward a better world / by Andrew Fitz-Gibbon. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill Rodopi, [2021] | Series: Value inquiry book series, 0929-8436 ; volume 360 | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Pragmatic Nonviolence is an important contribution to the philosophy of nonviolence. By writing in a manner accessible to undergraduates and to general readers, Fitz-Gibbon broadens the audience for his argument. On multiple levels, this book successfully stimulates reflection and discussion on how pragmatic nonviolence offers a moral and an effective response to violence that advances progress toward “a better world””– Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2020046610 | ISBN 9789004445987 (hardback ; alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004445994 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Violence–Moral and ethical aspects. | Nonviolence– Philosophy. | Nonviolence–Religious aspects. | Nonviolence–Drama. Classification: LCC BJ1459.5 .F57 2021 | DDC 179.7/5–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020046610

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill.” See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 0929-​8 436 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 4598-​7 (paperback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 4599-​4 (e-​book) Copyright 2021 by Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

For William C. Gay who has made the world better

∵

Contents Foreword ix Preface xiii 1

What Would a Better World Look Like? 1 Scene 1 1 Scene 2 2 Scene 3 14 Scene 4 17 Scene 5 23

2

How Violence Spoils a Better World 34 Scene 1 34 Scene 2 34 Scene 3 45 Scene 4 51 Scene 5 54 Scene 6 63

3

Nonviolence as an Antidote to Violence 65 Scene 1 65 Scene 2 74 Scene 3 79 Scene 4 87

4

Pragmatic Nonviolence 95 Scene 1 95 Scene 2 98 Scene 3 113 Scene 4 118

Epilogue Objections and Answers 129 Scene 1 129 Bibliography 137 Index 143

Foreword How do you get college students to read, understand, and like philosophy? A gifted teacher helps. Open discussion helps. However, the issue of the text remains. Most classical and contemporary philosophical texts are steeped in careful and frequently complex arguments. Many times such texts have an elaborate systematic structure and include numerous references to classical figures and scholarly secondary sources. The use of esoteric technical terms is also very common. No wonder the average college student is put off by such texts. The effort to read these texts and then follow lectures on them (often delivered in the same style, even if the instructor does so in a somewhat diluted manner) is likewise often met with yawns, or even nods—​not of assent but of drowsiness. Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon’s Pragmatic Nonviolence is not such a text. Fitz-​Gibbon returns to the style originally used by Plato—​the dialogue. As publishers of Young Adult (ya) fiction have learned, books with a more conversational style are more likely to catch a reader’s attention; once hooked, readers may even continue reading a series of such books that build upon one another. The instructor who uses a text that has a dialogical style or narrative format can spend more time discussing ideas—​instead of defining terms or explaining the logic of arguments. Classroom presentation and discussion, instead, can be used to engage the students with the “story” and take them to deeper—​more philosophical—​levels. The “conversation” of the book can continue, strengthened by allowing students to engage in dialogue like that found in the book—​through interactions made even more relevant by sharing and examining their own experiences and views. An additional plus for the dialogue format of this particular book is that the “scholarly” trappings are not altogether eliminated. Instead, they are placed in footnotes and need not interrupt the flow of reading, engagement, and understanding. For the instructor, this feature of the book also facilitates a way to point to and discuss more technical terms and issues. By having primary and secondary sources included in footnotes, the instructor does not have to provide them by writing them on the board, projecting them on a screen, or putting them into a handout. Outside of class, the motivated student (or even instructor) can follow up by making use of the well-​chosen bibliographic citations—​some with helpful quotes or elaboration on relevant points. General readers, if they pick up a philosophical book, often face obstacles similar to those of college students—​except they frequently also lack the benefits that an instructor and class discussion can provide. For the general reader as well, the dialogical style of Pragmatic Nonviolence facilitates access, interest,

x Foreword and understanding. Persons who might never wade through a typical philosophical text can be drawn into the conversational style of this book that allows questions about its thesis and argument to be raised and addressed along the way toward its final conclusion. In these ways, this book is accessible to a broad audience and provides a very useful means to engage readers in philosophical reflection. Most significantly, this very engaging “dialogue” also addresses a vital topic. The problem of violence has plagued human beings throughout their history. In recent times, the instruments of violence—​from handguns to nuclear weapons—​have increased in number and lethality and make a response to the problem of violence even more urgent. Many argue that from individuals through governments, the way to respond to violence is with violence (though such violence is often called by different names—​from “law and order” to “counter-​violence”). The view that the response to violence needs to be more violence has been common since the time of Plato’s Republic where Thrasymachus equates justice with the interest of the stronger and provides an early version of the view that “might makes right.” From the efforts of Socrates to refute Thrasymachus through contemporary efforts to respond to Realpolitk (political realism)—​which continues to drive a sharp wedge between morality and politics—​moralists and ethicists have advanced the relevance of normative considerations at all levels. Moreover, many have also argued that nonviolence is a better response and one that advances, in the words of Fitz-​Gibbon, a “better world”—​one that seeks continually to expand justice. Advocates of nonviolence have had an especially hard time being heard—​ and being harkened. From religious figures within virtually every major religion through such icons as Gandhi and King, the moral argument for nonviolent responses to violence has been made. More recently, historical and empirical studies have provided supporting evidence that not only is nonviolence to be preferred prescriptively but also nonviolence is more effective descriptively. From a pragmatic point of view—​like the one developed by Fitz-​Gibbon—​ nonviolence more frequently and more effectively promotes and achieves successful conflict resolution. Significantly, these results are found from interpersonal through international relations. Fitz-​Gibbon draws from these sources—​sometimes mentioning them in the dialogue but regularly providing full documentation in his references. In the text, while he at times mentions Plato, Gandhi, and King, as well as historical and empirical studies that document the greater success of nonviolence strategies, he weaves such material into the fabric of the questioning and clarification characteristic of good conversation. Fitz-​Gibbon allows his own position and various supporting reasons

Foreword

xi

and evidence to emerge in interchanges that increasingly lead to the conclusion that pragmatic nonviolence “makes for a better world.” Fitz-​Gibbon is not only a good writer and a good “story teller,” he is also a leading figure in philosophy of peace, nonviolence, and social justice. Over the last quarter-​century, he has published several academic books in philosophy and in religion. He has also published many journal articles and book chapters. Many of these publications deal with issues of nonviolence and/​or re-​parenting. While his scholarly work on nonviolence is well known among philosophers, his work on re-​parenting has attracted a broad audience outside professional philosophy. (His expertise is not just academic but also personal; since 1982 he and his wife have fostered over 100 children and on the basis of this experience developed their practice of what they term “loving nonviolent re-​parenting.”) Some of this additional work on “re-​parenting” is also expressed in the current book when conversations turn to very insightful and helpful considerations of violence in everyday family situations. Not surprisingly, Fitz-​Gibbon is also involved with several professional associations, including Concerned Philosophers for Peace (cpp). cpp is the largest professional society in North America oriented to philosophical issues in peace, justice, and nonviolence, and Fitz-​Gibbon has served as the President of cpp (2012–​2013). Furthermore, he edited one of the volumes in the “Philosophy of Peace” Book Series of cpp, namely, Positive Peace: Reflections on Peace, Education, Nonviolence, and Social Change (2010). (He is himself also editor of a “Social Philosophy” book series.) In still further research, he extends his work to address not only the mind but also the body. He has done important work in “somaesthetics—​bodily practice—​and he practices and teaches techniques relating to such bodily practice. In addition, he frequently applies his thinking to contemporary issues. For example, in his book Talking to Terrorists (2016) he shows that since 9/​11 treatments of terrorism often myopically reduce it to what the scholarly literature refers to as “insurgent” or sub-​national terrorism. He exposes how this focus ignores state-​and state-​sponsored terrorism (“incumbent” terrorism) inflicted directly against its own citizens or indirectly against external groups. In this example of applied philosophy, he provides practical suggestions for addressing terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland and the Gaza Strip. Fitz-​Gibbon, who has received a variety of awards for his excellent teaching and scholarship, is well positioned to present and defend his view that the philosophy of pragmatic nonviolence “makes for a better world.” His diverse and rich background allows him to blend successfully an informed philosophical approach with the pedagogical method of dialogue. As he indicates in his “Introduction,” he returns in the present book to the dialogue format he used

xii Foreword in his Love as a Guide to Morals (2012). As he notes, this book engaged his students more directly and successfully than his straightforward academic works. In addition, by employing this format again in this book, he is able to express a variety of perspectives through the comments and questions of the academic characters that he places in dialogue with one another on this topic. The position of pragmatic nonviolence is introduced gradually through the realistic and authentic conversations among his four primary characters—​faculty members from several departments who come from varied backgrounds and perspectives. (In relation to development of his own perspective on pragmatic nonviolence, he allows these characters to express the central influences on his own thinking of religious pacifism, analytic philosophy, and Daoism.) He is able to present views that diverge from one another, challenge one another, and often come to complement one another. Along the way the reader is gradually taken to increasingly deeper and more nuanced expositions and defenses of pragmatic nonviolence. Pragmatic Nonviolence is an important contribution to the philosophy of nonviolence. By writing in a manner accessible to undergraduates and to general readers, Fitz-​Gibbon broadens the audience for his argument. On multiple levels, this book successfully stimulates reflection and discussion on how pragmatic nonviolence offers a moral and an effective response to violence that advances progress toward “a better world.” William C. Gay Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Charlotte

Preface In this book I make an argument that the philosophy of pragmatic nonviolence makes for a better world. It’s a book that has been percolating for some years, and I have addressed much of its argument tangentially in other books, book chapters, and articles. It is not a complete or definitive argument; more like a developing set of ideas. William James suggested that in order to understand a philosopher’s work, one needed to know that philosopher’s biography.1 In deference to James’ assertion, and putting my cards on the table, I have been self-​ consciously a pacifist since 1983. My early pacifism was for religious reasons. I was, and remain, a pacifist Christian, though both my pacifism and my spirituality are very different 37 years later. I began seriously studying pacifism at Newcastle University in 1985, and subsequently took three advanced degrees. In the mid-​1980s I  was a Baptist minister in the United Kingdom, diligently studying in my spare time. Currently, I am professor of philosophy and chair of a philosophy department in the United States. For the last couple of decades, my full-​time occupation has shifted from the pastorate to the academy. I remain a Christian minister, but of a different kind: it is no longer my full-​time occupation, and my theology, practice, and commitments have shifted significantly. My pacifist, spiritual, and academic journeys have been a complex meandering along varied paths leading, hopefully, toward the same destination. Of that I can’t be sure, for the destination remains, as yet, unknown. In this book, I present an argument that pragmatic nonviolence makes for a better world. I do not argue for an absolute pacifism (though in the conversations of the book the character Anna represents that position), but rather suggest that a better world is one where policies and practices are based on a bias toward nonviolence and against violence. I have previously written in dialogue format, Love as a Guide to Morals,2 and though I have written four books since, I decided to return to the dialogue format in this book. In part, my reason is that of all my books Love as a Guide received the most comments from undergraduate students in the vein of, “I can understand the argument better when people are talking to each other, rather than in a convoluted sentence.” Anything that helps students and the general public understand philosophy, and fall in love with its intricacy and beauty, is all to the good. However, my main reason for returning to a dialogue format is 1 Joan Richardson, Pragmatism and American Experience: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 14. 2 Love as A Guide to Morals (Leiden: Rodopi, 2012).

xiv Preface that the varied characters in this extended conversation express the differing, sometimes competing, and often complementary aspects of my own reasoning processes. This is fitting, as the pragmatic tradition, which represents an element of the argument of this book returns us, in William James’ words, to an “old way of thinking” in dialogue with “new ways of thinking,” or as Joan Richardson says, “pragmatism breaks our invisible train of thought, making us stop to watch our intellectual processes, and so find ourselves beside ourselves in some sense,” [italics original],3 and further “Conversation is the heart of pragmatism.”4 The chief ways of thinking in Pragmatic Nonviolence represent religious pacifism, analytical philosophy, philosophical Daoism, and pragmatic nonviolence. As I began to write the dialogue, I realized that I needed a back-​ story for each of the characters. I had to know their socio-​cultural background, their education, the troubles and high points of their lives. Some of this is revealed in the dialogue of the book. Much of it remains in my “invisible train of thought.” However, the process of creating what, I hope, are realistic characters gives the dialogue an air of authenticity. The four characters I have named Anna, Rivka, Clayton and Jack. My early pacifism was influenced by the writings of the Anabaptists of the early sixteenth century. Their approach to pacifism was a fairly literalist interpretation of the New Testament, especially the life and teaching of Jesus. In the heady days of the European Reformation, with its nascent focus on the individual, the presentation of sacred scripture in common language rather than Latin, and a developing literalistic understanding of sacred texts, the Anabaptists took Jesus at his word. “Turn the other cheek” they interpreted literally; “Love your enemies” had no exceptions; and “Repay evil with good” was to be the standard for the whole of life. The Anabaptists held to an absolute pacifism. It was never acceptable for a Christian to use violence against others. That the authorities, secular and religious, used violence was not their concern. That God, or Christ, would use violence in judging the world also did not trouble the Anabaptists. For them, obedience to the letter of the New Testament was all that was required. That this approach produced inconsistencies with regard to a philosophy of violence and nonviolence was outside their imagination. For their pacifist stance the sectarians were persecuted by both Catholic and Protestant authorities, faced execution or banishment, withdrew into closed sects, and eventually migrated to the New World. We know their progeny today as the Amish, the Hutterites, the Mennonites, and certain Baptist sects. My early

3 Pragmatism and American Experience, 9. 4 Ibid., 15.

Preface

xv

pacifism I took more or less wholesale from the radical reformation. Much later, I wrote about the inconsistencies of the Anabaptist position, though affirming its strengths, in The Fragility of Tolerant Pluralism.5 Though my pacifism today is no longer based on a literalistic reading of certain Bible texts, that early understanding still exercises a strong pull on my sensibilities. In this book, that aspect of my psyche is represented by Anna, a Mennonite scholar and assistant professor of theology. Anna is married to Kelly. The bête noire to a form of pacifism based on biblicism is that of analytical philosophy. Though not formally trained in analytical philosophy—​my training is in ethics—​I received a thorough schooling through my good friend, colleague, and analytical philosopher, the late Larry Ashley, who was my mentor for many years. (The dialogue in Love as a Guide was largely drawn from extended conversations with Larry.) From him I learned to be skeptical about truth claims based on little to no evidence, or else claims that were conclusions based on faulty reasoning. In the dialogue of this book, the analytical philosopher and skeptic in the conversations is Rivka, a retired professor of philosophy, whose parents were Holocaust survivors. She specializes in critical thinking and logic. Rivka is the second strand to my psyche. Along the way I pursued an interest in Chinese philosophy, studied the classics, became a player of taijiquan and a senior taijiquan instructor teaching several classes each week, developed a course for undergraduates in Chinese philosophy, and studied Chan (Zen) Buddhism and “took refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha.” However, I make no claims to be a Sinologist, not reading or speaking Chinese to any extent. I  have learned Chinese philosophy through a diligent comparison of the best translations, through internalizing principles in somatic practice, and by being an “indoor disciple” (lineage holder) of a qigong and taijiquan master. The Chinese triad of Confucianism, philosophical Daoism, and Buddhism, though not pacifist in a strict sense—​Buddhism more so than the other two—​leans against violence and toward a practical nonviolence. In this book, this aspect of my psyche is presented through Clayton, a Black associate professor of political philosophy, who is a philosophical Daoist, and a teacher of Chinese internal arts. The final character, Jack, a British ex-​pat, is a professor of ethics and presents a philosophical position he calls pragmatic nonviolence Jack represents my current existential self, nonviolent for pragmatic reasons, yet in dialogue with religious ideas, philosophical analysis and skepticism, and Chinese wisdom. 5 The Fragility of Tolerant Pluralism (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017).

xvi Preface In the nature of a dialogue, quotations from relevant works are included as footnotes so as not to disturb the natural flow of the dialogue. The intention is to build an argument for pragmatic nonviolence through a conversation that generally does not include the kinds of quotations and scholarly references that a standard text does. This requires a careful balancing act between simplicity and depth. For undergraduates and the general public my aim is to present the developing argument in everyday speech, necessarily missing some of the finer details. For scholars I have given sufficient references in the footnotes for those who know the field to both discern from where I take my argument and to give a sufficient basis for further work. I am grateful to many colleagues and friends who have helped shape my ideas over the years. Of note for this book are my life partner, and often co-​ author, Jane who patiently listened to endless readings of the text and was a careful proofreader; Sebastian Purcell and Joseph Rayle at Cortland who read the manuscript at an early stage and made helpful suggestions; Iris Lupu, our good friend and neighbor, an Israeli-​American who has lived most of her life in New York City and helped immensely with Rivka’s character; Maurice Olfus and Rich Robinson, both from Charleston sc, who helped give a more authentic voice to Clayton; and Karla Alwes who brings her skills as a distinguished English professor to the text; and my good friend and confidante professor emerita of philosophy Kathy Russell who always clarifies my thinking. I  am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers of the manuscript who helped me sharpen a number of the arguments. Of especial note is William C.  Gay, to whom I dedicate this book, and who was kind enough to write the foreword. Bill has been a good friend and colleague in the philosophy of peace since we met in 2004. He read the book at several stages with extraordinary care, and his many suggestions made the book far better than it might have been. He has been a leading figure in the professional organization Concerned Philosophers for Peace since its beginning in 1981, and has been its President, Executive Director, Newsletter editor and editor of its prolific Philosophy of Peace book series, of which this book is the latest volume. To my knowledge, Bill has been to, and read papers at, every one of the association’s meetings. He has been a mentor to many, and a wonderful exemplar of the kind of philosophy I argue for in this book. Besides his work in the philosophy of peace, Bill has had a prolific career in contemporary Russian philosophy. I am honored to count him a friend. Thanks are due to President Erik Bitterbaum, Provost Mark Prus, and Dean R. Bruce Mattingly of suny Cortland who supported my sabbatical leave in Spring 2019 to write this book. Finally, thanks to Danielle Poe, Bill’s successor as editor, who happily decided to include this book in the Philosophy of Peace Series.

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The final edits were completed during a stay-​at-​home order during the covid-​19 pandemic that ravaged much of the world. The index was completed as the United States and other countries around the world saw daily peaceful Black Lives Matter protests after the prime-​time execution of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis. The peaceful protests were often accompanied by excessive violence by the police, with some counter violence by protesters. The worse civic violence seen in decades was accompanied by far reaching calls for change, especially with regard to police brutality and systemic racism. As I write it is too early to see the long-​term effects of this turbulent few weeks. Is it too much to hope that after the summer of 2020 the world will emerge kinder and less violent than before? Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon Ithaca, NY Summer 2020

act 1

What Would a Better World Look Like?

Scene 1

Jack—​early-​sixties, cropped greying hair, bundled in a parka—​is a professor of ethics and chair of the Philosophy and Religion Department at a medium size state college in upstate New  York. Anna—​mid-​thirties, dark shoulder-​ length hair, in a navy woolen toggle coat—​is an assistant professor of theology. They are walking along a narrow path cut through two feet of snow across the Arts Quad. Their breath is apparent as short bursts of steam pepper the frigid New York air. They are mid-​conversation. j ack: I think it’s a great idea. It’s just that I’ve … a nna: [interrupting] It’s just that you’ve tried it before, and it didn’t work. But I’m not thinking of anything big. No great announcement. Just a trial of a few weeks, and we’ll see how it goes. You’ve nothing to lose. And not much else to do in this weather! j ack: I’ll give it a go, but only if we can find a couple of other people to join us. [Jack gestures down the path] Speaking of which, here’s Rivka. Rivka—​dressed head to toe in an oversized puffed down overcoat, only her eyes visible—​is a professor emerita of philosophy. She is walking unsteadily, and almost collides with her two colleagues. She slips on the packed snow. Anna reaches out to steady her. a nna: Hey, Rivka! Are you OK! This is really slippery; you’ve got to take care. r ivka: [blowing on her hands, even though they are gloved] Oh, dearest Anna, thanks so much! I’ve such a dread of falling, and I’m such a klutz. My mother always said so. a nna: Well, I’m glad you didn’t fall. But it’s so nice to see you! I didn’t expect you’d be out until the thaw. r ivka: I’m going stir crazy! Almost meshuga.* I  want to keep active and taking my chances. [glancing at Jack and reaching out to shake his hand] And Jack, how have you been? Busy writing, I hope. I always enjoy your stuff. What’re you working on? * Yiddish: crazy, idiotic.

© Andrew Fitz-​G ibbon, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004445994_002

2 Act 1 j ack:

I’m still chipping away at the philosophy I’m calling “pragmatic nonviolence.” It needs sharpening up a bit. a nna: In fact, Rivka, Jack and I were just chatting about it. I want to set up a little informal discussion group. The idea is Jack will present his ideas and a few friends will critique them. Would you like to be part of it? r ivka: Love to! But you know … a nna: I know. You’re skeptical about the idealism of nonviolence. And you’ll want to push Jack hard to justify his thinking, as you have me in the past. r ivka: [laughing] You know me too well. And you’ll know, too, that I’m always up for an intellectual challenge. a nna: [brushing snow off her sleeve] That’s perfect. My Mennonite nonviolence will be a nice counter-​balance to your skepticism. So, are you in? r ivka: Just let me know where and when. Who else is on board? j ack: I am thinking of asking Clayton, the new associate professor of political philosophy. You’ve not met him yet, but besides his political stuff, he’s something of a philosophical Daoist. It will make an interesting group. r ivka: [stamping her feet in the cold] Well, much as I’d love to, I can’t stand here all day. I’m freezing to death. [touching Anna’s arm] Anna, dear, text me the details. The three friends part company.

Scene 2

The Bistro on Main Street, an upscale café-​wine bar. Jack, Anna, Rivka, and sundry others are seated and standing in the crowded café. Clayton—​tall, trimmed beard, black hair pulled tight in a man bun—​approaches with a tray on which are a cup of latte, a cup of cappuccino, a small tea pot and two matching cups, four scones with clotted cream and jam. c layton:

As I’m the new kid on the block I  thought I’d start as I  mean to go on. I’ve always loved scones and clotted cream, ever since my parents took us on vacation to Cornwall, England, when my dad was stationed with the Air Force in Germany. It was such an honor. I wonder how the Bistro gets the imported cream?

What Would a Better World Look Like?

r ivka:

3

Clotted cream? I’ve heard of it, but never tried it. I’m afraid the name has always put me off. Sounds a bit medicinal, likely with too much schmaltz,* and I’m always watching my cholesterol. c layton: [smiling as he places the tray on the table] Well, at least give it a try. Earl Grey for you Anna and for Jack. [he hands the cups around and shares out the scones] j ack: Thanks Clayton! Now let’s get down to business—​though I’m still not sure what I have to say is up to much yet. c layton: [wiping a scone crumb from his neatly trimmed beard] Well, I for one am looking forward to hearing your ideas. Of course, I know you by reputation, but it’s such a treat to become a member of your department. r ivka: [looking over her pince-​nez, and leaning toward Clayton] You’ll go far, young man. It takes skill to flatter the department chair in such an artful way. [she smiles, Clayton is clearly embarrassed] a nna: As this seems to be my idea, I’ll get us started. I  think we all know that Jack is working on his ideas about pragmatic nonviolence, and how, if consistently practiced, pragmatic nonviolence would make for a better world. I’ve been intrigued by his ideas, as far as I understand them. I don’t quite share his views, but I’m willing to learn. j ack: Well, in brief I’m making an argument that nonviolence is not some pie in the sky ideal for perfect people. Rather, that pragmatic nonviolence is a practice everyone can engage in. I’m not looking for absolute theoretical or practical purity. Every one of us has engaged in violence to some degree, but we can make the world better by practicing nonviolence. If we intentionally choose to refrain from violent actions and violent language, and if we choose to act nonviolently, then we make the world that much better. When I say “nonviolence” I mean a practice that, whenever possible, seeks the well-​being of the Other by refraining from violence and acting according to lovingkindness Pragmatic nonviolence encourages human potential and flourishing. r ivka: [frowning] I assume by calling your idea “pragmatic” you mean it to be practical and not just a fine theory. [with a scoff] We’ve had too many fine theories! I must say at the outset of our discussion that I simply can’t see what you might suggest that would make our violent world less violent. * Yiddish: fat.

4 Act 1 j ack:

I won’t pretend it’s easy. But I do think it’s possible. I’m calling it pragmatic because it works. If we begin to tell a different story about violence and its true effects, if we build daily habits of nonviolence, if we expose people to understandings of nonviolence and raise their consciousness about the effects and harm of violence, then we will work toward a better world. r ivka: [coffee cup near her lips] All well and good, but before we get to the finer details of what pragmatic nonviolence might be, I need to ask a prior question. Jack, you assume that you, or we, know what a better world is. That’s a huge assumption! [pausing to take a sip of coffee] I hope you’re not just going to leave it hanging there, as if it’s obvious what a better world might be? Better for whom? Whose idea of better? Better than what? c layton: Forgive me, but as a political philosopher, isn’t it obvious? A better world is one that is better than the one we currently experience. I can easily imagine that. In fact, it is the basis of much that we do in political philosophy. Political philosophers from Plato to Thomas More, from John Locke to Karl Marx, from Mary Wollstonecraft to John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum have all imagined a better world. r ivka: Imagine away. But don’t give me some utopian vision of a world inhabited by saintly people—​a world no one could possibly live in. c layton: I wouldn’t have to go as far as a utopia. A  better world would be one, for instance, where fewer people died of starvation. Or where less people were unemployed and more people had meaningful jobs. Or where a cure was found for cancer. Where women were equal to men. Where people of color truly had equal rights. I can imagine that any or all of those changes would make for a better world. r ivka: [nodding sagely] And does it seem obvious to you that any reasonable person would want to live in such an imagined better world? c layton: I would say so, yes. r ivka: I grant you that. But my problem is that one person’s imagined better world, would be another person’s worse world. Let me give you differently imagined better worlds. For many people, a better world would be one where everyone lived according to the teachings of the same religion. And it doesn’t matter which

What Would a Better World Look Like?

5

religion—​you could choose among them. The problem is that not everyone shares those religious values. a nna: [frowning] Yet, don’t all religions have in common the value of compassion, and something like the golden rule, “do unto others as you would have them do unto you”? c layton: Or as Confucius would have it, “don’t do unto others what you do not want to happen to you.”1 r ivka: I give you those generalities. In reality, though, religions make claims that are incommensurate with competing claims. Religious conservatives, based on their values, think that a world in which gays and lesbians could marry would be a worse world than one in which they were prohibited. They would also think the world worse for allowing women the right to choose what to do with their own bodies. Yet, my lgbtq friends think the world is better now than it was before they were allowed to marry. And most of my women friends think a world that includes reproductive rights is a better world than one that restricts women, and leaves women to the mercy of men and the laws men construct. [pauses to drink] Or else, for one a better world would be one where every person received free and adequate health care as a right. Yet to another, such a world would encourage laziness, work against thrift, and create a world enabling a culture of “something for nothing.” I could multiply examples, but it’s not necessary. It strikes me that we cannot come up with a commonly accepted view of a better world. And if we cannot, then, Jack’s project falls at the first hurdle. j ack: [with a broad grin] Well, that settles it! I’ll find a new project. Thank you all for your time. [he motions as if to get up] r ivka: [laughing, as do Anna and Clayton] Come on Jack, I’m sure you’ve thought of this. What’s your answer? j ack: Don’t hold me to this—​it’s still developing. I will not take a utopian view, but … r ivka: [interrupting] Thank goodness! 1 In Confucius, “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire. In this way you will be free from ill will whether in a state or in a noble family,” (12:2) and “Tzu Kung asked ‘Is there a single word which can be a guide to conduct throughout one’s life. The Master said, ‘It is perhaps the word “shu.” Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire,” 15:24) The Analects: Lun Yü, Translated with an Introduction by D. C. Lau (London: The Folio Society, 2009).

6 Act 1 j ack:

I do think we can both imagine and measure a better world. I agree with what Clayton just said: it is quite easy to think of a better world without resort to impossible ideals. Better health care would make for a better world. r ivka: Oy vey! I’ll not let you get away so easily. It’s not obvious what better health care is. For some people the more technology in health care the better. Test after test after test. But not everyone agrees. I read recently that doctors were having second thoughts, for instance, about the frequency of mammograms. In the United Kingdom they now recommend less testing. How do you measure better in terms of health care? c layton: I’m with you Rivka. Traditional Chinese Medicine looks at health care holistically rather than allopathically. a nna: By allopathically you mean, I assume, traditional Western medicine as practiced by most in the medical profession in the United States? c layton: Yes. Health care is not just about symptoms and disease. It’s also about prevention, healthy lifestyle choices, eating, and exercise. I’ve been leery myself about the number of tests doctors suggest when I have a physical. a nna: But surely, medical care is beginning to change, and more and more doctors are looking at their patients holistically. People are more than living machines. r ivka: Even though that may be true, I’m still not sure that all agree on what better health care might be. At my age I have a lot of health issues, and I’m always seeing doctors. What’s better health care for me? j ack: I can see that I need to be more exact. How about this, a world that has eradicated smallpox and polio is a better world than one where those illnesses destroy lives. Will you allow that, Rivka? r ivka: Of course! [smiling ruefully] Carry on. I will agree on the generalities, but I need to hear you more on the specifics. j ack: [taking a long drink of his cooling tea] I will mention five major schools of philosophy that help us think about a better world, and how such a world might be measured. a nna: And your first? j ack: I think the principlism of David Ross, and its development by Beauchamp and Childress, give us at least a beginning of how to think about a better world.

What Would a Better World Look Like?

c layton: r ivka: j ack:

a nna: j ack:

a nna:

r ivka:

a nna:

7

I’ve read a little but help the brother out. All in good time. I’d like to hear what the others are before we get into specifics. The tradition of happiness that goes all the way back to Aristotle tells us that a world with more happiness would be a better world. [draining his tea] Third, I think care ethics have something important to say about a better world. Then the capability approach suggests that the more people can achieve their basic human capabilities, the better the world. And finally, human rights theory leads us to think that the more widespread and respected are human rights, then the better the world. That’s quite a list. You also said that this better world can be measured. How will you demonstrate that? Fortunately, the work has already been done. The United Nations record data from over 180 countries measuring many aspects of human life. Also, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker has impressive datasets measuring many aspects of well-​being. Much that derives from principlism, happiness, care, capability, and human rights can, in fact, be measured. We have some objective criteria how to measure in what ways the world gets better, and by inference what are those things that make the world worse. It all sounds good, but you three will remember that I’m a lowly theologian. Besides taking an introduction to philosophy as an undergraduate I’m not very well read. You will explain things as we go along, won’t you? Of course, my dear! You’ll pick it up easily. Much philosophy—​ perhaps the best philosophy—​is common sense. [turning to Jack] I’ve never really looked at principlism in any depth. Didn’t it arise in the 1930s? But before you answer, I’m going to get more drinks. [she rises a little unsteadily and walks toward the bar] Oy! My alte beiner* It gets harder every time! I’ll give you a hand

Five minutes later, the four friends are faced with new drinks.

* Yiddish: old bones.

8 Act 1 j ack: Getting back to your question, Rivka. You’re quite right. David Ross … r ivka: [interrupting] Is that the same fellow as W. D. Ross? j ack: Yes, one and the same. You’ll find his pen name as W. D. but he went by David. He was one of a very long and distinguished line of Scottish philosophers. When you read all they accomplished, you wonder where they found the time. Ross was the general editor of the Oxford complete works of Aristotle—​a monumental task running to a dozen volumes—​besides being an original moral philosopher, and ultimately Vice Chancellor of Oxford University.2 He was knighted for his work, so correctly I suppose we ought to call him Sir David. [frowning] But then, perhaps not! a nna: Just so I can follow you, can you situate Ross among other moral philosophers? Did he follow Aristotle in favoring virtue theory, or Immanuel Kant placing emphasis on universal moral duties, or Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill, and G. E. Moore who thought we ought to maximize the good for the most? If I  recall correctly, those tend to be the three major schools of ethics.3 And of course, I would add care ethics advocated by feminist philosophers from the 1980s onward.4 j ack: [sipping his tea in thought and placing the cup back on the table] Ross did not fit neatly into any of the three major schools—​and of course, care ethics was after his time. He found the major theories all helpful to a degree, but constructed his own moral theory we call for shorthand “principlism.”5 As a translator of Aristotle and editor of “the Oxford” he leaned in Aristotle’s direction in seeing ethics as rather indeterminate. By that I mean he didn’t see ethics and morality as precise as mathematics, for instance.6 2 Smith, J. A. and W. D. Ross. The Works of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908–​1952). 3 Anna is correct, though she oversimplifies the three main theories in ethics. See, James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2009) for a helpful introduction to the major theories. 4 See, Nel Noddings, Caring: a Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care:  Personal, Political, and Global (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (London: Women’s Press, 1990). 5 Ross develops his theory of principlism in The Right and the Good, Edited by Phillip Stratton-​ Lake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). 6 See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W.D. Ross (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999). Aristotle says, speaking of ethics, “We must be content, then, in speaking of such

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There is about ethics inevitably something of perception and judgment, and sometimes, perhaps often, ethical dilemmas are faced when two very good solutions present themselves and no objective criteria can be found to choose between them. It then takes a wise person to make the call.7 c layton: I like the sound of that. It reminds me of the Confucian emphasis on the junzi, the decent, humane, and wise person. Confucius was all about how to help people become like that. But let’s bring it down from the lofty heights of theory. Give me an example where two actions might be moral when no objective criteria can be found to choose between them. j ack: There’s the obvious matter of truth-​telling. It’s likely that we all agree that telling the truth is morally good. But what do you do if you tell the truth you will cause harm to someone? Here we have two moral claims: tell the truth and don’t cause harm. But how do we judge between them? a nna: Funnily, just the other day I faced that. My wife looked terrible and was going for an important job interview. She was already nervous and needed some courage. “How do I  look,” she said. I knew that if I told her the truth, “You look like shit!” [with a nervous laugh] It would have made matters worse. So, there was my dilemma: tell the truth, or not cause Kelly further harm. r ivka: [smiling] And of course you told her she never looked better, and that she was going to knock them out at the interview. a nna: Yes, I did! r ivka: Did Kelly get the job? a nna: She did! We were so pleased. j ack: But it brings up the point: how did you decide between your two options? Did you apply any objective criteria? a nna: I don’t think so. I guess I just went with my gut instinct in the moment. I know Kelly better than anyone else. She hadn’t slept well, tossing and turning all night. I  could see it in her body

subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better,” 12. 7 In Nurturing Strangers:  Strategies for Nonviolent Re-​Parenting Children in Foster Care, Jane and I suggest an ethics that is a fusion of Aristotelian virtue ethics and Ross’s principlism (New York: Routledge, 2018), 82ff.

10 Act 1

j ack:

c layton:

a nna: c layton: a nna: j ack:

8 9 10 11

movements, in her eyes. She was as nervous as hell, and it was affecting her whole demeanor. And because you are a good person, you intuited the right thing to do. And that was what Ross learned from Aristotle. Incidentally, it also crops up again in Moore’s ideal utilitarianism. Moore claimed that there was no possible reasonable basis for making moral choices. Intuition was everything.8 The good could not be spoken of, only intuited. Ross differed, and here he looked to Kant for guidance. Come on now! Wasn’t Kant an absolutist? Moral rules are universal. You found them by reason and having found them they applied in every situation, every time. Anna’s conversation with Kelly would have, for Kant, only one moral outcome:  tell the truth and be damned! That was Anna’s moral duty.9 But if Kelly had not picked herself up, she might not have secured the new job. Wouldn’t that outcome have been my fault? As far as I understand Kant, the outcome was not your moral responsibility. You had one duty in that situation, and it was to tell the truth. In that case, I’m no fan of Kant! But Jack, you said that David Ross, [smiling cheekily], Sir David, I should say, looked to Kant. Did Ross become a moral absolutist, then? No. He took Kant’s understanding of duty and softened it. Ross parted company with those like Moore who said there was no way of speaking of the good and suggested rather what he termed “prima facie duties.”10 He returned to Aristotle’s notion of common sense and argued that some things seem right to most reasonable people. But unlike Kant he didn’t make these hard, fast, and unbreakable rules. They were more like principles to live by. They were “prima facie” in that, unless other good reasons could be found for a different course of action, then these principles act as guidelines for moral actions.11

See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethics (Amherst; Prometheus Books, 1988). See Kant’s “On the Supposed Right to Lie for Philanthropic Reasons,” in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 63ff. The Right and the Good, 19. Ross was unhappy with the word “duty” in this context, but could think of no better word. Ibid., 20–​21.

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c layton: [leaning into the table] Tell me there are not dozens of these principles making them impossible for the average person to grasp? j ack: You’ll be glad that Ross had just six or seven. And they are pretty general. They are: Obligations connected to some action, which he divided into two: fidelity, where I have promised to act in a certain way; and reparation, where I have committed a wrong that needs to be made right. Obligations of gratitude, when a kind action has been taken toward me. Obligations related to the distribution of pleasure or happiness, that is, the principle of justice. Obligations of beneficence, where I can increase the pleasure of others. Obligations of self-​improvement, and, finally, the obligation of not harming others. clayton: Pump your brakes Jack! That’s quite a lot to take in. Let me see if I’ve heard you correctly. So, unless you can find really good reasons not to, you ought to keep promises you have made, and fix stuff you have broken. You should be thankful when something good happens to you. You should be fair—​at least that’s the way Rawls interprets justice. And I’m just blanking on the other two, or was it three?12 r ivka: Beneficence was in there, as well as nonmaleficence anna: [interrupting] Sorry Rivka, you mean by that doing good and not doing harm [pausing] And I  think the last one was self-​improvement. r ivka: It’s an interesting list. But to be honest, it doesn’t strike me that self-​improvement and being grateful are as obvious as not causing harm. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not against either principle, but neither seems to carry the same weight, as for instance, the principle of justice. j ack: I see what you mean, though self-​improvement has always been a virtue, or practice, favored by philosophers. You might remember that John Dewey, the great American pragmatist philosopher, said that growth was the only moral end. And by growth he meant the capacity to develop as a human being.13

12 13

Rawls: “I present the main idea of justice as fairness, a theory of justice that generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the traditional conception of the social contract,” A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 3. See Michael Bacon, Pragmatism: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), 58.

12 Act 1 c layton:

That would certainly be the case for the sages of Chinese philosophy. In Confucianism, self-​cultivation is of major importance. It is a core tenet not only of Confucius, but also of the Yijing, the Book of Changes.14 Some years ago, I realized the importance of the divinatory nature of the Yijing as a tool for self-​improvement. a nna: [with a nervous laugh] Isn’t the Yijing just another form of silly fortune-​telling—​like reading your daily horoscope? c layton: I suppose some people use it in that way. But for centuries, at least since the Confucian reinterpretation of the book, it has been understood as a great repository of ancient wisdom to help the serious reader develop character and a better sense of self.15 a nna: I’ll take your word for it, though I’m skeptical. My upbringing taught me that any kind of divination was wrong. The Bible speaks against it, we were told. [smiling] But we were told much about the Bible that I no longer think is a good interpretation. Perhaps I should be more open minded. c layton: I’d love to talk further about it. Perhaps, another time. j ack: I think, the point you are making Clayton, is that in Chinese wisdom, self-​improvement is a prima facie moral obligation. Confucius agrees with Ross. [pauses] But medical ethicists Beauchamp and Childress didn’t. They simplified the principlist approach, and reduced Ross’s six or seven principles to four. They used three of Ross’s—​nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice—​and added one Ross did not consider, autonomy.16 a nna: And by autonomy you mean having control over your own body and your own decisions. But surely that’s a pretty recent idea and very Western. Historically, and in some non-​Western

14

15 16

See chapter two, “The Philosophy of the Book of Changes,” in James M. Balkin, The Laws of Change: I Ching and the Philosophy of Life (New York: Schocken Books, 2002). Balkin states that the Yijing’s: “concern is ethics in the larger sense of ethos—​how a person should live and what kind of person one should become,” 11, and urges “self-​cultivation as a means of succeeding in the world,” 15. Balkin:  “[The Yijing] offers the reader a subtle philosophy about the inevitability of change, the proper methods of adjusting to the flow of events, and the complicated ways that character leads to destiny,” ibid., 37. See, Tom. L. Beauchamp, and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

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cultures, community commitments are valued more highly than individuality. j ack: Yes, I’ll allow that. And we might want to argue about the relative weight we give to individual choice when balanced against community commitments … a nna: You mean like balancing the individual choice of parents not to vaccinate their kids—​autonomy—​and societies requirement to vaccinate against diseases that we have all-​but eradicated? j ack: Just so. For the moment, I  think we can lay that to one side and simply accept that working in a North American context, Beauchamp and Childress rightly express that the highly valued notion of individual autonomy is a central ethical principle. In ethical principlism, Ross’s six (or seven) general principles, or Beauchamp and Childress’s four, are guidelines that helps a decent (perhaps wise) person make the right kinds of decisions. And, Anna, if you think back to your conversation with Kelly, though you said it was a gut instinct I can see at least a couple of these principles underlying your decision in the moment. a nna: Which were? c layton: Not harming Kelly and seeking her well-​being, which I think is the way I would understand doing good. a nna: But I wasn’t consciously thinking of those principles. I just acted. It was a split-​second decision. j ack: Moore would say it was purely intuition. Ross would say (with a nudge from Aristotle) that, as a good friend to Kelly and a decent person, you had internalized those principles. In other words, you had made them your own in such a way that you quite naturally acted on them. c layton: That sounds something like body memory. When you drive your car, after years of driving you don’t even realize what you are doing most of the time. You’re not consciously changing gear, or indicating left or right, or looking in the mirror. Your body has memorized the practice of driving. And that is much the same as the body memory that is a large part of the practice of taijiquan. [smiling] By the way, I’m beginning a new taijiquan class for faculty and staff every Monday at 4:30. You are all most welcome to join us. a nna: I’d love to! Where will it be held? r ivka: [with a little irritation in her voice] All well and good. You can get the details later. Let’s not lose the thread of our discussion.

14 Act 1 Jack, if I can bring you back to where we started. You said that different schools of philosophy would help you establish what a better world would look like. How does principlism help you? j ack: A better world would be one where more people experience a greater sense of well-​being, are less harmed, are treated fairly, have a greater say over decisions that affect them. r ivka: [a little sarcastically] Wunderbar! Now all we need to know is what you mean by well-​being, how we would understand harm, and in what fairness consists! j ack: All in good time. As it happens, I’ve a curriculum committee to chair and it’s the other side of campus. I’m afraid we’ll have to leave it there until next time. c layton: I’m teaching over there, too. You catching the bus? I’ll come with you.

Scene 3

On the campus bus, as it waits for more passengers, Jack and Clayton are sitting together mid-​way back, both bundled against the chill c layton: [arms folded tight under opposite armpits] Roll on the summer! Do you know I was offered a job in Florida? On days like this I wish I had taken it. j ack: You’ll get used to it. c layton: I’ve never known this type of cold. And the snow! j ack: [laughing] A minor cost for living in paradise! c layton: [after a pause] So tell me more. I like your idea of using principlism to suggest a better world. But Rivka’s right—​you’ll need to give a good account of well-​being for your ideas to be useful. d river: [shouting from the front of the bus] Next stop the Ferraro Library. j ack: I agree, and thankfully I think we are on safe ground. Much has been written about well-​being, both in its classical sense that we find in Aristotle, and in a more modern sense as psychological happiness. c layton: What’s the difference? j ack: Classically, well-​being, or in Greek eudaimonia, was used in a very full sense. It didn’t just relate to a mere feeling of [Jack makes air quotes] “being happy.” It relates more to how well the whole of your life is lived. Another Scottish philosopher, this

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time contemporary, Alasdair MacIntyre, said that well-​being is “being well in doing well,” or words to that effect.17 c layton: We covered MacIntyre at grad school in contemporary moral philosophy. If I recall, wasn’t he one of the scholars who re-​ introduced Aristotle to mainstream philosophy in the latter part of the last century? j ack: Yes, one of the triumvirate that is MacIntyre, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Phillipa Foot who all pointed toward a re-​thinking of Aristotle’s virtue ethics as the best hope for moral philosophy.18 A life of well-​being is lived by a person of virtue. And you become a person of virtue by a practice within a tradition. Your tradition suggests the virtues for a life well lived. c layton: That’s not too easy to follow. Can you dumb it down for me? j ack: [frowning slightly] I’ll try. MacIntyre rejected the idea that we can find universals. c layton: You mean like Kant’s universalizable moral rules?19 j ack: Exactly! MacIntyre thought the quest was futile. Rather he suggested that virtues—​the character traits that lead to well-​ being—​are specific to a particular tradition. So, for example, Athenian virtues—​the ones Aristotle espoused—​arose from the Greek classical tradition. c layton: You mean the four cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, justice and courage? j ack: Yes! And more besides. Aristotle included, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, proper ambition, patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, and righteous indignation.20 But according to MacIntyre, these are not universal virtues. They don’t apply to all people at all time in every place.

17

18 19 20

The exact quote: “He gives to it the name eudaimonia—​as so often there is a difficulty of translation: blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is the state of being well and doing well in being well, of a man’s being well-​favored himself and in relation to the divine,” Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1985), 148. G. E.  M. Anscombe (1919–​2001), Philippa Foot (1920–​2010), and Alasdair MacIntyre, (1929–​). Kant’s first framing of the categorical imperative:  “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,” Grounding, 30. For a list of the virtues see The Nicomachean Ethics, Translated by J.  A. K.  Thompson, (London: Penguin, 1976), 285–​286.

16 Act 1 c layton: j ack:

As Kant thought the categorical imperative did. Each tradition will develop its own telos, the goal of a good life, and that telos will suggest certain virtues necessary to live a well-​lived life, or, we might say, a life of well-​being. For example, Fitz-​Gibbon, working within the tradition of love as a basis for morality, and using a Neo-​Aristotelian framework, suggested these virtues:  goodness, no-​harm, courage, fairness, kindness with gentleness, care, faithfulness, reparation with forgiveness, respect with attentiveness, non-​ possessiveness, moderation, and thankfulness.21 He suggested that if someone lived within the tradition of love as the summum bonum—​the great good—​ of life, then these virtues, acquired through daily practice of their corresponding habits, would produce a life of well-​being, a flourishing life. c layton: I see. It sounds to me like a form of relativism. Each tradition has its own narrative, its own goals, its own virtues, and its own habits to become virtuous, and hence to live well. Aristotle’s list of virtues and Fitz-​Gibbon’s list are not too dissimilar, but I could imagine other traditions—​like say the warrior traditions of ancient Sparta—​would conflict with both Aristotle and Fitz-​ Gibbon. If we return to your original idea—​that a better world would be a world where people experienced a greater well-​being—​this suggests that we could imagine many worlds, with their own traditions, side by side each perhaps getting better. The problem is that the well-​being of the Spartan22 would conflict in significant ways with the well-​being of Aristotle’s virtuous citizen, or of Fitz-​Gibbon’s lover. [with a smile] Are you happy with that (no pun intended)? j ack: [grinning] I’m not sure my own happiness is relevant in this regard. But I think you are making too hard a claim for relativism. c layton: How so? j ack: Well, I can think of three things that soften the case for the relativism of traditions. The first is that traditions grow and change. It’s a mistake to think of traditions as something that are set in stone. Traditions are not a given. They arise over time, and

21 22

See, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, Love as A Guide to Morals (Leiden: Rodopi, 2012), 91ff. Sparta was a city state in rivalry with Athens. Spartan virtues were more warlike than Aristotle’s Athenian virtues.

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change and modify, too, over time. The second is that traditions never exist in isolation. Traditions are always in touch with other traditions, at least at the margins, and in our ever-​shrinking world, traditions increasingly intermingle. c layton: That is proving to be the case even more so since the internet and more or less global media. Every tradition on the planet now rubs shoulders with every other one, at least to some extent. I  realize that some of our students are locked into their own provincialism. Their experience of social media is like an echo chamber of their own views. It’s a long way from cosmopolitanism. But still, global awareness is closer now than at any time in human history. j ack: That’s true! And even though traditions resist other traditions, they also learn from others, and are changed in the interaction. The third thing is that, as you noted with the lists of virtues in the Aristotelian tradition and the tradition of love, that despite differences the traditions have many overlapping virtues. The lists of virtues are not too dissimilar, so claims of relativity can only be somewhat soft claims. All the traditions have within them a sense of what well-​being is. And a better world, in terms of that tradition, would be where well-​being is increased for more people. And well-​being in all the traditions is remarkably similar. d river: [shouting above the din of the bus] Next stop Johnson Administration Building. j ack: My stop. We’ll continue this later. Scene 4 Later the same day, Philosophy and Religion Department, Jack is speaking with Sue, the department secretary, when Anna and Clayton enter, mid-​conversation. a nna: [breathlessly] My goodness, that hill always gets me. How come you’re not out of breath? c layton: My obsessive fitness regime! An hour’s taijiquan in the morning and a three-​mile run after work. a nna: Every day? c layton: [with a smile] More or less.

18 Act 1 a nna: [noticing Jack and Sue] Hi, Sue. Did you get that photocopying for me? [Sue points, and Anna picks up the six-​inch-​thick package from a side table] So, Jack, Clayton was just telling me about your conversation. Sorry I missed it, but I think I’ve got the gist of it. Something about Neo-​Aristotelianism and well-​being. r ivka: [voice raised artificially, from her office, linked to the department common area, with the door open] What have I missed? I thought we were meeting at the Bistro for our conversations. c layton: Jack and I were just mulling over increased well-​being as a way of speaking about a better world. That is, from the Neo-​Aristotelian standpoint. r ivka: [entering the common area] Oh, I’m quite familiar with that school of thought. But dear Jack, I think if you are looking for the increase of well-​being, or happiness, as a way of thinking about a better world, you would do well to look at trends in positive psychology, or what we might think of as the science of happiness. j ack: Great! I’ll be looking at that. Tell me your thoughts. r ivka: [pulling up a chair from one of the computer tables in the room] Do you mind if I  sit? [she pauses to get comfortable] As far as I am aware, psychologists, and philosophers before them, have been concerned with happiness as pleasure—​what we classically have called hedonism—​and how people are satisfied with their lives, and emotionally feel well. a nna: So, are we talking really about a state of mind? What people feel about themselves? r ivka: More or less, but it’s tricky. People can be quite happy, but also quite ignorant, or quite prejudiced, or happy with injustice. Because of that I’ve never really been a great fan of happiness as a measure of the good, or in Jack’s terms, as a measure of the better. In 1930s Poland, my parents faced happy Nazis, all the happier with the extermination of Jews. c layton: [interrupting] I  certainly faced happy racists in Charleston in my youth a nna: [also interrupting forcefully] And I  have seen too many happy homophobes, even in my own church [with a frown] Though I’m not sure they were truly happy. I can’t imagine such bitterness bringing happiness. I  have sometime wondered if people are homophobic because homosexuality represents a challenge to some aspects of the culture they use to shield themselves from

What Would a Better World Look Like?

19

unconscious anxieties about their own mortality. But that’s just my musings. c layton: [turning to Anna, with concern] I sense a painful backstory, Anna. I’m sorry you faced that. a nna: It’s more of a scar now, rather than a raw wound. It was difficult for a long time. And I likely misspoke calling them homophobes. They were sincerely religious people whose religion told them that homosexuality was sinful. c layton: I know what you mean. In my boyhood church, and likely still true today—​though I long since left it behind—​many good folk, and I  mean really good folk who would give you the shirt off their back if you needed it. Yet, most of them thought homosexuality a sin. But they didn’t hate gay folk. They believed them misguided, for sure, and wanted them to change their behavior. But hate? They had no hate in them. r ivka: [eyebrows raised slightly] “You mean love the sinner and hate the sin?” I’ve always found that a strange notion. j ack: [slightly puzzled expression] I don’t know. I have people in my life who I dearly love, but some of the things they do I find hard to take. a nna: [slightly embarrassed] Religious people are often conflicted. Their religion says one thing and their love and commitments say something else. When I came out to my parents—​Kelly was with me for moral support—​Dad was silent and Mom just burst into tears. I think I had spoiled her dreams for her daughter. After a while they came around, but their church never did. The elders placed me under the ban, and they wanted my parents to shun me—​effectively cut me off. My parents refused. We moved to another church. r ivka: But I understand you are still Mennonite? I would have thought you’d have given up on that religion. a nna: I thought about it. But it runs deep [smiling] Scratch me and I bleed Mennonite blood. c layton: Even with what they did to you? a nna: Even so. Mennonites, like most religions, have many flavors. The stance affirming homosexuality caused a major split within the Mennonite Church quite recently. But Mennonites have done so much good in service to others and in anti-​war protest. Many are now quite progressive. The new church we found readily

20 Act 1 accepted Kelly and me. We married in a joy-​filled ceremony in that same affirming church. c layton: Every tradition is mixed. Still, I’m so sorry to hear that you’ve suffered so much. a nna: Thanks Clayton. [she reaches over and gently touches his arm] And emotions aside, yes, I do agree that religious people can be sincere. r ivka: [interrupting] Sincerely misguided and blinded by the preaching. a nna: But not always hateful. It’s a complicated world. r ivka: [pulling her left ear lobe, with a sigh] Oy! But bringing this back to happiness, whether hateful or misguided, or sincere, it seems you could be quite happy and yet cause much harm to others. And for those who you hurt, life is not better. Happiness, then, seems an unlikely candidate for measuring a better world. What do you say, Jack? j ack: I tend to agree. But subjective happy states can be measured, and so it’s a very tempting measure to use. You measure subjective happy states largely through self-​reporting in answer to a question such as “On a scale of one to five, how happy are you?” or “How satisfied are you with your life?” or “your job?” or “your spouse?” But as you suggest, one person’s subjectively happy state might not make for a better world if that happy state causes pain and suffering to others. r ivka: Ah, so what are we saying? Are we inserting value judgments about the merit of happiness? Presumably, if you are happy for the right reasons—​reasons that line up with some acknowledged value—​then that might make for a better world. But who is to decide the value? c layton: I’m assuming, then, Jack, that you will want to link psychological states of mind—​feeling happy—​with a more nuanced understanding of well-​being, and not just well-​being for the individual, but well-​being that is, in some sense, social. j ack: Yes. A better world cannot simply be the case when more people feel happy at the expense of others who suffer. A  better world would be one where the well-​being of more people is increased.23 23

Ursula K. Le Guin tells a delightful story that covers this very point, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” in The Wind’s Twelve Quarters (New  York:  Harper Collins, 1975), 275–​284.

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r ivka: [frowning] That has always been my disagreement with classical utilitarianism, if utilitarianism is about maximizing pleasure, even when that maximization is for the many. In a society of majority slaveholders, those slaveholders may live pleasurable lives at the expense of a minority of slaves who perform their bidding. It strikes me that pleasure at the expense of some more important value—​such as the human right not to be enslaved—​ is not something we ought to applaud. j ack: Agreed. But I think without going to those outliers, we can surmise that certain things make for a happier life than others. a nna: Such as a worthwhile job, a decent home, a family life that is supported by society and not diminished, some other sense of meaning. In my tradition that would include some kind of service to others. j ack: Exactly! And when those things are reduced, or are interrupted, then happiness is diminished. Think of a family where one breadwinner loses their job, then, other things being equal, the happiness of the family takes a hit. r ivka: Of course, you might also feel happy when you ought not to feel happy! a nna: [puzzled expression] How do you mean? r ivka: Think of the countless women who have felt happy in patriarchal marriages, where they willingly submit to their husband’s domination. Those women have a false consciousness of their circumstances. a nna: [with a knowing smile] Ah, consciousness raising. Becoming aware of your social situation and how you might make it better. Until you have a raised awareness, you live happily in less than ideal circumstances. r ivka: And in those circumstances, if one is happy, one ought not to be. c layton: That reminds me of Marx’s thoughts on religion as the opiate of the people. Religion, like a drug, masks your real situation.24 anna: [with a grin] Playing the fiddle while the Titanic sinks, I guess. clayton [laughing] I suppose so! 24

Marx: “Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people,” Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the Right, translated by Anette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), 131.

22 Act 1 j ack:

So, my suggestion is that we can think of a better world by combining the Aristotelian idea of well-​being (being well in doing well)—​and perhaps the Platonic notion of the good as the development of one’s excellence—​with the psychological and subjective state of feeling happy, modified by values about the state of happiness. a nna: And a better world would be one where more people felt happier for the right reasons—​not at the expense of someone else—​and whose lives exhibited a greater sense of all-​round well-​being. j ack: Yes. r ivka: But how would you measure that? j ack: It’s not easy! And to complicate matters, I think we also need to think about cultural bias, or group bias. a nna: [puzzled] How so? j ack: Well, for example, traditionally we Brits by upbringing tend to be less ebullient than Americans by birth. When friends ask me how I am, I tend to say something like “OK.” My American-​raised friend responds, “Only OK! What’s the matter?” If British-​raised folk tend to be less forthcoming with their feelings, then if you test them as a group you might find them less happy than Americans who self-​report happiness. a nna: I can see that. I suppose that will always be the case with self-​ reporting. But as happiness is a personal sentiment, could anyone be wrong about how happy they are? If I say I’m happy, then who’s to say I’m not happy? We’ve already talked about a false consciousness, where perhaps we [ emphasizes the next word ] ought not be happy with our lot. But are there any measures of happiness that don’t depend on self-​reporting and that which contain a measure of objectivity? j ack: There are. It usually requires that the word “happiness” is not used, but those conditions and states of life that contribute to happiness are measured. c layton: You mean conditions like having basic human needs met, levels of autonomy, quality of personal relationships, and such like. j ack: Yes, that sort of thing. And if those conditions are met then we might assume that people have a measure of well-​being, and if it increases, then we might say that such is a better world, as overall well-​being has increased. r ivka: [getting gingerly to her feet and glancing around her office door to look out the window] My goodness that snow’s coming down

What Would a Better World Look Like?

23

again. If you don’t mind, I think I’ll leave you to it. I’d rather be home now before it really sets in. a nna: [glancing around the same door] Good idea Rivka! I’ll walk you to your car. c layton: Let’s meet next Wednesday at the Bistro, weather permitting. How about “Happy Hour” rather than lunch? Let’s say at five. j ack: [looking around the small group] If that works for everyone? [turning to Sue] Can you put that on my calendar?

Scene 5

The Bistro on Main Street, the following Wednesday. More crowded than their last meeting. Rivka and Anna enter. Clayton beckons to them from a table in the far corner, close to the log fireplace. c layton: r ivka: c layton:

It’s busy tonight! This was the last table. Sorry it’s a bit tight. I think it’s rather cozy. What a beautiful fire! Jack will be here shortly. He got tied up with some administration. In the meantime, I’ll get a bottle of wine. The house red is a nice Californian Merlot. That do for everyone?

He leaves, just as Jack arrives and gently pushes through the crowd, making his excuses. A few minutes later, Clayton is pouring the wine. c layton: [to Jack] Did you manage to get the issue resolved? j ack: Yes, just fiddling with the new curriculum software. Sue has been on a course and was bringing me up to speed. Seems like there’s a new system every other week. r ivka: I’m so glad I’m retired. No doubt the technological solutions are better in the long run, but I have a certain fondness for the days of large paper spreadsheets, slotting everything in like a jigsaw puzzle, pencil and eraser in hand. Tell me it’s better now Jack. j ack: I wish I could. I suppose it’s more efficient. But it’s less humane. It feels like we have to fit in with the technology, rather than technology serving the faculty. [smiling] But don’t get me started! [lifting his wine glass] Anyway, cheers everyone! [they clink their glasses] To philosophy and friendship! r ivka: [placing her glass down] Now, where were we? If I recall, Jack, you were trying to explain how the world might be better. So far,

24 Act 1

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you have suggested that the increase in the fulfilment of basic prima facie obligations would indicate a better world. And that an increase in overall well-​being would also make for a better world. And we talked a little about how we might measure such an increase in well-​being. Great summary, Rivka! But before we consider how we might measure that better world, I want to add my third philosophical tradition. This is the newest historically and goes by the name care ethics.25 It was first mooted in Carol Gilligan’s work in the early 1980s and has been picked up by other feminist philosophers (though Gilligan is a psychologist). I’m glad you are including it, Jack. I consider it one of the most creative aspects of contemporary ethics. It is rooted in human affective response to other people and situations, rather than in reason—​in other words in feeling. That’s true, but a few other philosophers have suggested ethics is rooted in feeling rather than thinking. David Hume, for instance, said that reason ought ever only to be a slave of the passions. I take it by that he meant that before we think about moral issues, we feel them deeply. His colleague, Adam Smith, famous for being the father of economics in his 1776 book, The Wealth of Nations, agreed with him.26 I didn’t know that. But would you agree with me that such has been a minority tradition? I would. Most weight has been placed on reason, on thinking ability. What the care ethicists alerted us to is the notion of caring relationships. They have argued that historically ethics has been the province of men, and a female perspective has often been missing. Men have been concerned with objectivity, contracts, principles and justice. A female voice would be

See, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, “The Ethics of Care and Violence,” Michael Patterson Brown and Katy Gray Brown, Nonviolence:  Critiquing Assumptions, Examining Frameworks (Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2019). Smith: “How selfish soever man [sic] may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it … the greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it,” The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Dover Philosophical Classics (Minneola, N.Y.: Dover, 2006), 3.

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j ack:

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different—​likely more concerned with nurturance, care and compassion. Yes, Nel Noddings suggested an ethic of care would be rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness.27 And the archetypal relationship is the care of a mother for her child. They claim that this is the primary human relationship and acts as a model for all others. If we care, then we are less likely to choose violence as a way of solving problems. Yes, care and violence are the antithesis of each other. So, a more caring world would be a better world. A more caring world would be a less violent world. So, it is important to take care ethics seriously. [pausing for thought] But let me return to the idea of measuring a better world.28 This leads me to my next two schools of philosophy that are applicable. The first is the capability approach. It’s one of those sets of ideas that crops up in lots of different academic disciplines. You find it in the social sciences as well as in philosophy. In brief, the approach suggests that well-​being is a matter of what people are able to do and be, and not merely what they own, and hence, the kind of life they can live.29 Wasn’t it first suggested by Amartya Sen and developed, most promisingly, by Martha Nussbaum? Though I’ve heard suggestions that you can find something like a capabilities approach in Plato, where he speaks of the difference between men and women as irrelevant for the function of a ruler. He seemed to argue for the full participation of women based on their capabilities.30

Caring:  A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley, CA, and London: University of California Press, 2003). 28 Virginia Held:  “The ethics of care is not built on faulty images of peace. It can fully acknowledge that parents sometimes kill their children. But the ethics of care upholds standards of care. It understands those who use violence, even in ways usually considered justifiable, as having morally failed to appropriate ways to avoid needing to do so … What the ethics of care offers is an appreciation of the possibilities for nonviolence and of countering violence in appropriate ways,” The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 138–​39. 29 On gdp as an inadequate measure of well-​being see Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities:  The Human Development Approach(Cambridge:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 47ff. 30 Plato, in The Republic, suggests that some natural differences are irrelevant, such as a bald head or long hair for shoemakers. He argues that male or female is irrelevant for the

26 Act 1 It’s a helpful approach, but like well-​being generally it’s not an exact science and a little fuzzy around the edges.31 j ack: Tell us more, Clayton. c layton: [a little flustered] You’ve put me on the spot, but I’ll take a stab at it. [pausing to take a large gulp of wine] The capabilities approach begins by asking the basic question:  what are people actually able to do and to be?32 I have found it helpful that the approach takes a multi-​layered tack, looking at individual well-​ being, at the social arrangements that make for well-​being, and then how socially we might move toward greater capabilities. Nussbaum wrote about it first with regard to women and development. She argued that women have been treated, more often than not, as means to an end—​as reproducers for others, caregivers, sexual outlets and such—​rather than as an end in their own right.33 r ivka: [interrupting] Sounds like Kant’s categorical imperative in one of its versions.34 c layton: You’re right. And like Kant—​and likely Plato before him—​ Nussbaum claimed that human capabilities are universals and not specific to any particular culture or time. She claimed that these capabilities amounted to an “overlapping consensus” with regard to the dignity of human life.35 a nna: I don’t want to jump ahead, but what are the capabilities we are talking about? function of being a ruler. iv. 445 B–​v. 457 B, (Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Overland Park: Digireads.com, 2016), 170ff. 31 Armatya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999), and “Capability and Well-​ Being.” In Nussbaum, Martha C.  “Non-​ Relative Virtues:  An Aristotelian Approach.” In Martha C. Nussbaum, and Amartya Sen. (Editors.) The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 32 See Creating Capabilities, 18. 33 Women and Human Development:  The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2. 34 Rivka refers to the second formulation of Kant’s categorial imperative, “Acts in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in the person of any another, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end,” Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993) 36. Nussbaum admits her reliance on Kant, Creating Capabilities, 94. 35 Women and Human Development, 5. Nussbaum: “The capabilities approach is fully universal: the capabilities in question are important for every citizen, in each and every nation, and each is to be treated as an end,” 6.

What Would a Better World Look Like?

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c layton:

Nussbaum suggested ten capabilities, if memory serves, life, health, imagination and thinking, feelings, play, being in control, and a few others.36 j ack: [smiling] You mean you’ve not memorized them all! clayton: [returning Jack’s smile] Even further, capabilities can be thought of as “doings” and “beings.” Doings are such things as travelling (freely), caring (adequately for children and dependents), voting (in local and national elections without hindrance or prejudice). r ivka: [eyes crinkling into a smile] All the gerunds, then. clayton: I suppose so. But also, the “beings.” Being educated, being free from torture, and being housed decently, for example. The “doings” and the “beings” make for capabilities in a full sense. Until Sen and Nussbaum developed the capabilities approach, focus was on what people had rather than what people could be and do. The approach distinguished means, like money, from ends, like well-​being and freedom.37 Even if you have certain resources, whether you can turn those resources into capabilities depends on personal, social, and environmental factors. anna: I suppose, until very recently, like whether women in Saudi Arabia could drive cars. You could have the resources to own a Mercedes, even the personal ability to drive, but socially women were constrained. I can see the difference between what you have and a capability to fulfill your well-​being. So, well-​being is more than merely having stuff. rivka: It’s a nice theory. It reminds me somewhat of the Platonic ideal of being situated sufficiently enough to fulfill one’s functions—​that is, basic human functions, not just animal functions but functions unique to human beings. If not, then one is deprived and could be “better off.” So well-​being might be measured that way. But has it been applied in any practical way? c layton: Yes, it has. Perhaps the clearest approach is that of the United Nations’ Human Development Index. Begun in 1990, the index is based on three general criteria: life expectancy, educational 36

37

Nussbaum’s list of central human functional capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control of one’s environment, politically and materially. See, Women and Human Development, 78–​80. See also, Creating Capabilities, 33–​34. See, Stanton, The Human Development Index, 9.

28 Act 1

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achievement, and standard of living.38 There is a complicated algorithm applied to all nations, and nations are ranked. Each year the UN issue an updated document, with analysis and recommendations. Its basic approach is the one, Jack, you are suggesting, that we can think about a better world, and a better world is one where everyone has the same access to capabilities that make for a life of well-​being. The United Nations, following Sen, considers human development to be progress toward greater human well-​being.39 And behind the data collected by the United Nations are certain values about the quality of lives people live, and the justice that people are entitled to. This requires that people are treated as ends, and not as a means to an end. That people have freedom to choose; that a plurality of values ought to be respected; that we should be concerned about areas of entrenched social injustice; and that there is an urgent task for governments to address injustices. So, Clayton, it sounds like you’ve looked at the data. What do they suggest? Based on the Capabilities Approach, is the world getting better? Without wanting to sound complacent, I’d say so. Of course, there is still so much that can be done, but generally in world terms, we have never had it so good.

According to the United Nations Development Programme:  “The hdi was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The hdi can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of gni per capita can end up with different human development outcomes. These contrasts can stimulate debate about government policy priorities. The Human Development Index (hdi) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development:  a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita.” http://​hdr.undp.org/​en/​content/​human-​development-​index-​hdi. For an analysis of its early history see, The Human Development Index: A History, by Elizabeth A. Stanton, Working Paper Series Number 127, Political Economy Research Institute (Amherst, 2007). Another measure is the various indices produced by Vision of Humanity, with various indices measuring peace, terrorism and other issues relating to human well-​being. See, http://​visionofhumanity.org/​indexes/​global-​peace-​index/​.

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a nna:

That’s surprising, if you pay attention to the news media. My guess is that most people think the world is getting worse. Can you recall any examples? c layton: If memory serves, on just about every measure of human capabilities, the world has made progress.40 Longevity has increased worldwide, for instance.41 Education, too, has seen remarkable progress.42 Living longer and getting more education don’t necessary mean that the quality of life has increased, but these measures at least show some progress.43 Of course, in places torn apart by war, civil war and unrest, and natural disasters, hdi scores go down. But generally, the trends are very positive. j ack: [finishing his glass of wine and noticing that the bottle is also empty] And when I think about the obstacles to a better world, it’s often violence that is the chief culprit.44 But I don’t want to get ahead of myself. Before I get to that, I want to talk about human

40

41 42

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According to the latest Human Development Report at the time of writing: “Looking back over almost three decades, all regions and human development groups have made substantial progress. The global hdi value in 2017 was 0.728, up about 21.7 per-​cent from 0.598 in 1990. Across the world, people are living longer, are more educated and have greater livelihood opportunities. The average lifespan is seven years longer than it was in 1990, and more than 130 countries have universal enrolment in primary education,” Human Development Indices and Indicators 2018 Statistical Update (New  York:  United Nations Development Programme, 2018), 2. “Although life expectancy has increased substantially in most countries over the past three decades, the measure does not reveal whether the years lived are healthy and enjoyable,” ibid., 8. “The quantity of schooling shows impressive progress. In 1990 mean years of schooling for the global adult population was 5.8; by 2017 it had increased to 8.4 (­figure 12). And today’s school-​age children can expect to be in school for 3.4 more years than those in 1990,” ibid., 10. “Most people today live longer, are more educated and have more access to goods and services than ever before. Even in low human development countries people’s human development has improved significantly. But the quality of human development reveals large deficits. Living longer does not automatically mean more years spent enjoying life. Being in school longer does not automatically translate into equivalent capabilities and skills. So shifting the focus towards the quality of human development will be important in monitoring future progress,” ibid., 12. According to the hdr, “Violence not only threatens human security but also erodes development progress. Between 2012 and 2017, the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen contributed to these countries’ slipping down the hdi, due to significant declines in their life expectancy or economic setbacks. It will take years, if not decades for them to return to pre-​violence levels of development,” Ibid., 3.

30 Act 1 rights as a measure of a better world. [smiling] And before I do I’ll get another bottle of wine. After a few minutes Jack returns with a second bottle j ack: [pouring a glass for each of his friends] And so to human rights. I’m assuming I don’t need to say much about them. I can’t imagine anyone being seriously against human rights, so established have they become. r ivka: Easy to say so now! But remember, it was only in 1948 that the United Nations formulated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.45 And even today the United States has not ratified the treaty—​the only industrialized country not to do so. c layton: That’s not to say that the United States is opposed to basic rights. Many rights have been enacted by individual states and by the federal government. But full ratification has been a step too far, even though after the Second World War it was the United States that took the lead in producing the document. My suspicion has always been that, as a nation, we have been too compromised. How could we ratify a treaty offering rights and dignity to all people when people of color were discriminated against at home? How could we ratify a treaty that opposed torture when our government endorsed torture after 9/​11? a nna: [placing her glass on the table after a sip of wine] I tend to agree, Clayton. The work I have carried out on violence against children highlights that, as yet, the United States has not ratified the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child.46 j ack: [hands raised palms out in a universal “stop” signal] Whoa! I stand corrected, again. I need to be more careful. I was assuming that we all agreed on the fundamental morality of human rights, even if some nations, our own included, has had reservations. r ivka: I’m sure we do, but [looking over her pince-​nez] my dear Jack, I will hold you to exactitude. I simply won’t let you get away with flippant generalities.

45 46

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” https://​www.ohchr.org/​en/​Library/​Pages/​UDHR.aspx. See, Jane Hall Fitz-​Gibbon, Corporal Punishment, Religion, and United States Public Schools. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 11–​12.

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j ack:

Perhaps, I  should have said that human rights theories have much in common with the Capabilities Approach. Nussbaum’s list of capabilities overlaps significantly with the Declaration of Human Rights. Both aim for a universalizability. Both theories have been given practical expression through the United Nations. And, important for my argument, both capabilities and rights allow us to measure what a better world would look like.47 r ivka: So, we are back to measuring a better world. Do you have anything else? j ack: If I can refresh your memory. So far, I have suggested that we can look at a better world through the philosophical lenses of the principlist and eudemonic approaches a nna: [interrupting, eyebrows raised and with an upward inflection in her voice] Eudemonic? j ack: The set of philosophical ideas based on the Greek word eudaimonia—​happiness, well-​being, flourishing a nna: Thanks! j ack: And that increased well-​ being—​ what makes for a better world—​has been measured consistently since 1990 by the United Nations in its Human Development Report, and its other agencies. Nongovernmental organizations, too, such as Human Rights Watch, together with the news media, are very helpful in keeping track of human rights developments and abuses around the world.48 r ivka: [frowning] I have to say, Jack, that having looked at the work of those ngo s, and being an avid reader of the news, it all seems a bit depressing. As it happens, I had occasion to read recently the latest Human Rights Watch Annual Report.49 It seems human rights’ abuses abound. There’s not much to suggest the world is getting any better. If I recall, the lead essay in the Report began with the words, “This is a dark time for human rights.”50 I hope 47

48 49 50

Nussbaum: “The common ground between the Capabilities Approach and human rights approaches lies in the idea that all people have some core entitlements just by virtue of their humanity, and that it is a basic duty of society to respect and support those entitlements,” Creating Capabilities, 62. https://​www.hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. World Report 2019:  Events of 2018 (New  York:  Seven Stories Press, 2019). Rivka is only partially right. Kenneth Roth said, “In some ways this is a dark time for human rights. Yet while the autocrats and rights abusers may capture the headlines, the

32 Act 1 your notion of pragmatic nonviolence has some practical value. We seem to be very good at diagnosing the illness of the world, with little to suggest a cure. j ack: [with a slight grimace] And I’m afraid I will have my own diagnosis to offer before I get to the cure! [looking round at the now gloomy faces of his friends] But we can’t leave it tonight on such a glum note. Before we leave I want to end on something positive. a nna: Thank goodness! j ack: My positive note is the analysis that Steven Pinker gives in his recent work. In brief, he is an ardent defender of the progress that the world has made in the last 500 years. r ivka: [with a little laugh] I would suspect that many people would find such a claim counterintuitive! I have often pondered how those of us who think of ourselves as progressive tend to have a very dismal view of the world. For many of my progressive friends, the world seems in a worse state today than ever before. I have not completely shared that view. The world in which my parents lived during the 1920s and 1930s was for them, and for all Polish Jews, a worse world than we now live in. An early twenty-​first century woman has so much greater freedom and opportunity than an early twentieth century woman.51 Without a doubt, we have seen progress. j ack: Pinker’s Enlightenment Now, is a data-​ driven analysis that demonstrates in terms of longevity, health, food security, wealth, inequality, peace, general safety, terrorism, democracy, rights, education, and happiness the world has made remarkable progress [pausing to finish his wine] Well-​being can be measured, and overall, and taken over time, the world is getting better.52

51

52

defenders of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are also gaining strength,” “World Autocrats Face Rising Resistance,” in World Report 2019, 1. According to the World Bank: “The data show there has been great progress towards legal gender equality over the past decade. In 131 economies there have been 274 reforms to laws and regulations, leading to an increase in gender equality. This includes the 35 economies that implemented laws on workplace sexual harassment, protecting nearly two billion more women than a decade ago. But the average global score is 74.71, indicating that a typical economy only gives women three-​quarters the rights of men in the measured areas,” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank. Women, Business and the Law 2019: A Decade of Reform (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2019), 1. The United States ranks joint 62nd place, with the Bahamas, Kenya, and Malawi, ibid., 9. Enlightenment Now:  The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (New  York: Viking, 2018).

What Would a Better World Look Like?

33

a nna: [frowning, and in sarcastic tone] And how does he account for the supposed change for the better? j ack: Humanity has made progress through the application of reason, science and humanism over the last several hundred years.53 Pinker’s thesis is a corrective to what he calls “progressophobia”—​fear of progress.54 For me, although we have made progress, we have much more to do. And that is where my pragmatic nonviolence comes in. I will show that violence is the chief obstruction to well-​being and a better world. To continue to make progress we need to become more intentional about the benefits of pragmatic nonviolence. [pausing to look at his watch] And on that note, I’m afraid I need to get home. 53

Pinker concludes: “We will never have a perfect world, and it will be dangerous to seek one. But there is no limit to the betterments we can attain if we continue to apply knowledge to enhance human flourishing For it requires only the convictions that life is better than death, health is better than sickness, abundance is better than wants, freedom is better than coercion, happiness is better than suffering, and knowledge is better than superstition and ignorance,” 453. 54 Ibid., 39.

act 2

How Violence Spoils a Better World

Scene 1

The common area of the Philosophy and Religion Department. Clayton is seated speaking with a student at the conference table. Jack is chatting with Sue as they look at Sue’s computer screen. Anna enters the room rather flustered. a nna: [a little breathless] I’ve just had a terrible text from Rivka! s ue: [with a concerned expression] Oh, no! Has something bad happened? a nna: She’s had a fall on the ice and she’s at the hospital. Clayton leaves the student and gathers with the others around Sue’s workstation. j ack: c layton:

I do hope she’s OK. Me too. And I  guess that means we postpone our discussion group. Weren’t we meeting later? a nna: That can wait. I’m just concerned about Rivka [looking down at her phone] She’s sent another series of texts. j ack: What does she say? a nna: “Don’t worry about me … It’s not too bad … Sprained wrist … Keeping me in for observation … Worried about concussion … I feel OK … Just sore … emoji sad face.” Oh, thank goodness! s ue: [looking relieved] Well that certainly got my heart beating faster! a nna: Hold on, here’s another text. “Difficulty texting with one hand … emoji sad face.” [Anna laughs nervously] “Bring the discussion group here tonight … Visiting hours seven to nine … Stop me being bored … Ward two, third floor … two emoji smiley faces.”

Scene 2

At the hospital, later that evening. Anna, Jack, and Clayton have pulled up chairs close to Rivka’s bed. On the bedside table a small bunch of flowers in a crystal vase, and a small box of marzipan candies. r ivka: [smiling warmly] You are all so kind, but you needn’t have bothered with the flowers and candies. I’ll be out in the morning, all © Andrew Fitz-​G ibbon, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004445994_003

How Violence Spoils a Better World

35

being well, and I doubt I’ll be able to eat them all. So, please help yourselves. a nna: [reaches for the candies] So, what happened exactly? r ivka: Oh my God, it was pretty scary! I  was walking along, minding my own business. Rather slowly, I might add, so much ice. This group of students came from behind, with rather more speed. They pushed to get past, and before I knew what was happening I lost my footing and found myself on the ground. I went down on my left side using my hand to break the fall. Hence the sprain. When the paramedics arrived, they worried that I  had hit my head. It all happened so fast I really don’t remember. c layton: And the students? r ivka: [chuckling] They were mortified! They called campus security and stayed with me until the paramedics arrived. They couldn’t have been sweeter. I probably made them late for class. [pausing] Now, enough of that. I’m eager to continue our discussion about Jack’s project. [she looks toward Jack] Where were we? j ack: We were at the place where I  had established, I  hope to everyone’s satisfaction, that we can imagine a better world. Not a perfect world, but one where we see more beneficence and less maleficence, more fairness, with people given control over their own lives and bodies, where well-​being is increased, where more people are enabled through capabilities, and where human rights are respected. [He looks around the little group expectantly] So, no objections then? [his eyes come to rest on Rivka] r ivka: Your ideas so far are still a little woolly around the edges, and there are a number of places I would like to push you harder, but for the moment let’s agree that we can imagine a better world. j ack: [feigns relief as he mops his brow, and Rivka smiles] Good! It seems to me then, that if we can imagine a better world, we might also imagine that which militates against it. And my suggestion is a simple one. While we can think of many conditions that work against well-​being,1—​natural disasters, pandemics, for instance—​human violence is that which most works against a better world and …

1 See for example, Iris Marion Young’s now classic “The Five Faces of Oppression,” Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 39–​65. For Young

36 Act 2 r ivka: [interrupting] And you know where I am immediately going to press you? c layton and anna together: What do you mean by violence? [followed by giggles] r ivka: [looking over her pince-​ nez, matter-​ of-​factly] Oh my God, am I  that predictable? j ack: I’m not going to answer that directly. [he reaches into his bag and pulls out four sheets of letter paper] But I  did anticipate where you might go, and I thought we could have some fun. [he passes a sheet to each of his friends] I  found a number of definitions of violence that I thought we could play with. a nna: It’s like being in one of my classes! c layton: Well, I  hope we can do a little better than my students [with a laugh]. j ack: I think the best way in for us is to consider the first definition. It’s very practical and was used by the World Health Organization as a basis for its extensive study of violence worldwide in 2002. a nna: Would you like me to read it out? [looks around to general nods] OK. According to the who, violence is “The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.”2 Hmm, like many multi-​ clause definitions this needs some thinking about. violence is one face of oppression along with exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, and cultural imperialism—​all of which work against human well-​being. 2 Etienne G. Grug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi, and Rafael Lozano, eds. 2002. World Report on Violence and Health (Geneva: World Health Organization), 5.

How Violence Spoils a Better World

37

The four read and ponder for a few minutes. Rivka is the first to break the thoughtful silence. r ivka:

Let me pull out the elements of this. We have intentionality, which means you must intend to do violence for it to be considered violence. Then, violence is physical. It can be against yourself, one or more people. And its effect can be any one of a number of things—​harms both physical and psychological. [pauses to read again] I think that covers everything. c layton: Even so, I can see several things I want to take issue with. r ivka: Me too. My first is that though violence is often intentional, sometimes a violent act can happen without intention. Two children are playing a rough game. It gets out of hand and one hits the other too hard. She says, “I didn’t mean to do it.” And likely she didn’t. They were just playing. But the effect on her friend is much the same as if she meant to cause harm—​a bloody nose. Is her act, because unintentional, not, therefore violent? It is not obvious to me that unintentional actions, or we might say accidents, because they are unintended are less violent if the outcome is still harm. c layton: I think we might say, though, that an action with the intention to cause harm has more culpability than an unintentional or accidental violent action. Yet, for the victim, the effect is the same in the harm caused. a nna: My worry with the who definition is that it suggests that only physical force or power can be considered violent. In my view, violence does not have to be physical. The abusive spouse who screams at his partner and her children, though not using physical force is without a doubt acting violently. r ivka: [a puzzled frown] I  am not going to disagree with your sentiment, Anna, for I  too have seen much psychological violence. But I do want to sound a note of caution. Language can be used quite loosely, and one of the beauties of language is in its subtlety. We use language literally and we use it metaphorically. And sometimes the two are confused or run into each other. When we speak of a violent man, we are likely using language quite literally to speak of one who uses physical strength to hurt another. Yet, when we speak of a violent storm we are using language metaphorically. The storm resembles the kind of violence

38 Act 2 we see in human interactions. Great harm may be caused by the storm, but there is certainly no agency. c layton: An example from recent politics, I  think, sheds light on what you are saying, Rivka. In the 2016 election cycle, then candidate Trump spoke much about a “big beautiful wall” to be built on the US-​Mexican border. Many people heard Mr. Trump use literal language. He spoke of the dimensions of the wall, and the material needed to build the wall, of its foundations and its cornice. Yet, the meaning of [he makes air quotes] “wall” began to change in the politics of Washington. [air quotes again] “Wall” became more symbolic, more a metaphor. It took on a partly literal meaning, and partly metaphorical—​something more like the wall between church and state. That use does not suggest a physical wall, but something [emphasizes the next phrase] like a wall, something that functions to keep two entities separate. r ivka: Exactly! So, it might be the case, when we speak of psychological violence—​a form of violence that is not physical—​that we are using a more symbolic meaning. [pauses] I am not committed to this view, but I think it is worth considering. And I don’t want for a minute to suggest that the harm caused through psychological bullying is less than the harm caused by minor physical violence. The who definition does allow for psychological harmful effects of physical violence but does not allow for any form of merely psychological force. I think that is a lack, but just now, I am not sure how I would want to include it. Jack, are you addressing that in your work? j ack: I am, but if it’s OK with you, I’ll hold on to that for the time being. I want us to consider a couple of other definitions first. c layton: [looking down at his sheet of paper] OK. Here’s the second one by philosopher Barry Gan, “One does violence if and only if one acts with the intent to harm or with the intent to perform an action whose consequence is reasonably foreseeable as likely to cause harm.”3 a nna: I’ll tackle this one. Let me see. [pauses] So, Gan’s is a brief definition, and in my view all the better for it! But being brief he is restricting violence to intentional actions, much like the who definition. That raises a problem for you, Rivka, as you have 3 Barry L. Gan, Violence and Nonviolence: An Introduction (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013) 85–​86.

How Violence Spoils a Better World

39

already said that some actions do appear to be violent, even when no intention to cause harm is present. Accidents can be violent as you experienced today. Rivka, in acknowledgment, lifts her heavily bandaged arm. a nna:

I guess, for Gan, that your experience today might simply be put down as an accident, with no intention to cause harm. No violence was committed. However, if the students had maliciously decided to push you over, with the same result, then violence would have occurred. Other than intention to cause harm, Gan seems a bit vague to me. Harm could be physical, or psychological, and my guess would be that the action could be physical or psychological too. j ack: Yes, that’s partly true. But I think Gan would also say that Rivka’s falling was a result of violence if, in fact, the students were walking around her in such a way that her fall could have been reasonably foreseeable Also, someone can perform an action that intended to cause harm or could reasonably be foreseeable as causing harm (for example, shoving someone in front of a bus but the bus stops in time) but that results in no harm. That action would still be violent. Why? Not because of the consequence but because of the intention or likely outcome. I suppose one could also talk about the psychological effect on the person who was pushed. But perhaps that person shrugs it off. The act itself is still violent. a nna: I see. j ack: Let me add two things to the definition Gan gives, as I know his work. First, he wants to emphasize that violence begins in the mind, with intention. His argument is that nonviolence, too, begins in the mind. If violence is a matter of intention, then, so too is nonviolence. The solution to violence begins with intention. Second, in his book Gan explores five myths about violence and nonviolence. His first myth is that violence does not consist in physical injury, but that it consists in the intention of the perpetrator.4 4 Gan, “Violence does not consist of the physical injury done to others but in the mind of the perpetrator, in the perpetrator’s intent to harm or to act in a way that is reasonably foreseeable to cause harm, physical or otherwise,” Violence and Nonviolence, 11.

40 Act 2 r ivka: [with a little irritation in her voice] And that is the same issue I have with Kant. I simply cannot go along with the idea that, morally speaking, everything is in the intent of the moral actor. A good will—​a good intention—​is clearly important, but outcomes matter too. Violence is both in the intention and in the harmful outcome. j ack: Agreed! But what I think we can take from Gan’s definition is that intention does matter, and if we are going to find an antidote to violence, then that too will begin with intention. Later in our discussion I want to say more about intentional nonviolence, but for now I’ll simply register the importance of the idea. r ivka: Alright. Let me read the next definition you have provided for us, from Kit Christensen. “Violence is the direct or indirect infliction of injury on someone or something by some agent; and, ‘injury’ here refers to a continuum of harm, damage, or hurt to someone against his or her will or in some way contrary to the recipient’s interests, ranging from that which is immediately life threatening, through different degrees of debilitation, suffering, and loss, to a point of insignificance in the thwarting of desires.”5 [a little laugh] Ha! Almost the opposite of Gan! No mention of intention at all, and all rests on the outcome. Perhaps, a combination of the two would be better. But I do like the idea of harm or injury as a continuum. It makes violence quite a pervasive category. It broadens out what actions might be considered violent to the point of some kind of mental or emotional suffering. That is important. Violence is not only physical harm. [pausing] Which takes us nicely back to Gan. j ack: I like the notion that Christensen adds something here that’s missing in the who definition. Violence can be against persons or things. This would now include, say, the terrorist bomb that is aimed at infrastructure and designed not to take human life. In the Troubles of Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army would sometimes give a warning that a bomb had been placed in a certain building. The warning was to allow people to evacuate before the explosion. Sometimes it worked, and damage only happened to property. But too often, it didn’t work and people

5 Kit R. Christensen, Nonviolence, Peace, and Justice: A Philosophical Introduction (New York: Broadview, 2010), 31–​32.

How Violence Spoils a Better World

c layton:

j ack: a nna:

c layton: r ivka:

41

were killed or injured. Yet, even in those bombings where only property was damaged, I think we see the actions of the ira as violent. So, I’m OK including harm to things, and not just people, as an aspect of violence. In that regard, I would add looting as a form of violence too. We have seen it too often when peaceful protests degenerate into destruction of property and looting of stores. I sympathize with the frustration people experience, but I’ve often felt that destroying stuff plays into the hands of those you protest against. The authorities are quick to call looting violence, and usually in their turn hit back with often excessive violence. Thanks, Clayton. And that is one reason why nonviolence is a better tool of protest. But I don’t want to get ahead of myself. So far in all our discussion we have only spoken of harm to people and property. I think even more important than damage to property is harm and injury to other sentient beings, to other animals. The man who kicks his dog is carrying out a violent act. Don’t you agree? I certainly do. My vegetarianism, though in part from my Buddhist leanings, is philosophically because of the egregious violence we do to animals in the factory farm system.6 I’m not going to disagree, but I want to point out that not all philosophers have supported this position—​that violence can happen to property, or to animals. Our dear friend Kant, assumed that injury could only happen to persons. If I destroy your car, I have not caused harm to the car but to the owner of the car. As, until very recently and still the case for many, animals have no moral interest, the man who kicks the dog is not harming the dog, but the owner of the dog. If the dog has no owner, then no harm has been done. Though Kant does suggest that to go around kicking dogs might produce a cruel person. [to Jack] Would you pass me a candy? [pauses to pop a candy in her mouth and continues] I think Kant was wrong. Since Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in the mid-​1970s we have found good reasons to

6 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Harper Collins, 1975), 95–​157. Singer was the first to highlight the plight of animals turned into commodities in the factory farm system. See also, Tom Regan, Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 87–​106.

42 Act 2

c layton:

r ivka:

c layton:

acknowledge the interests of animals. Our animal friends suffer too much violence at human hands. I agree Rivka, and I think you ought to broaden out the notion of a better world. A better world, for me, would be one where fewer animals suffer at the hands of humans. I’ve always liked the way Peter Singer approaches animal rights from a utilitarian perspective. When we think about maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, we should take account of all the pleasure and pain in any situation, and that includes the pleasure and pain of all who can feel. It’s not, as some earlier philosophers argued, that rationality is the measure of moral interest. If that were the case then, the very young, the senile, and anyone with any kind of mental impairment could be excluded from having moral interest. Singer argued that because animals can experience pain, they ought to be given moral consideration according to their interests. No animal desires to suffer pain, and all animals clearly enjoy pleasure. A better world, then, would be one where fewer animals experience suffering at human hands.7 Of course, Singer was not the first to argue that the ability to suffer is a primary moral category. Jeremy Bentham had argued the case in the nineteenth century. You will recall his maxim was not whether animals can reason, but whether they can suffer. And that requires us to consider the well-​being of animals. Bentham, was, of course, the father of utilitarianism.8 Yes. Singer further argued that animals ought to have rights on the same basis that humans have rights—​based on their interests. I have heard people caricature animal rights as ridiculous, in that a dog would not know how to vote. But the caricature misses the point. The dog has rights in relationship to its interests. By the same token it would be foolish for males to argue for the right to an abortion. Abortion is not one of their interests. But both dogs and humans have an interest in not experiencing suffering, and therefore, a right not to suffer.

7 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Harper Collins, 1975). 8 Bentham: “The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? But Can they suffer?” The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford:  Clarendon press, 1889), 311. Jean Jacques Rouseau had said something similar before Bentham. “the other [principle] inspires in us a natural repugnance to seeing any sentient being perish or suffer,” Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 14.

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a nna:

And the converse of a right is a corresponding duty. If the dog has a right not to be kicked, I have a duty not to kick the dog. j ack: Further, to choose to give rights to animals is a moral choice, in much the same way that to treat humans equally is a moral choice. Such choices are derived from the values we hold. If we value highly [he makes air quotes] “not suffering,” we choose to value the not suffering of others too. It is a small step to expand “not suffering” to animals other than humans.9 r ivka: [frowning slightly] But surely, you won’t take account of all animal suffering. After all, nature is red in tooth and claw. Much animal suffering is caused by other animals as a fact of nature. Is the suffering humans cause animals any different than that? Humans are part of nature and not distinct from it, despite what some religious traditions tell us about humanity as in some sense godlike, and hence separate from the merely natural. j ack: Yes, I think the exceptionalism religion often gives to humanity has been mischievous. The biblical myth where God gives to humanity dominion over the animals has been taken as license to subjugate and abuse. The notion that humans have souls, whereas animals do not, has exalted the human species at the expense of all other species. If it is the soul that ultimately counts—​souls go to heaven (or hell) and bodies return to dust—​then those without a soul can be treated as any other object. At the very least this religious account comes with a great deal of hubris—​ the human conquest of nature. For me, the human continuum with nature is important. [pauses to eat a marzipan candy with evident enjoyment] These are really good! Even so, part of our nature is a developed moral sense. We understand what it is to cause pain to others. And we humans have a degree of freedom to make moral decisions. We can choose beneficence or maleficence—​in a way, so far as we know, that other animals cannot. We can choose nonviolence—​though again I don’t want to get ahead of myself! c layton: [with a grimace] Of course, it’s not just some religious traditions that have valued animals less than humans to the detriment of all animals. If I recall, Mary Midgely argued that reason in secular traditions has played much the same role that the soul has 9 Singer, “The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings,” ibid., 5.

44 Act 2

j ack:

in religious traditions.10 I would also want to add that we need not only consider animal suffering from a utilitarian standpoint. Regan points out the arbitrariness of Kant’s categorical imperative relating to humanity as the only end in itself. He takes a modified Kantian position, expanding it to include all sentient beings. Animals, too, are ends and not means.11 All animals are what Regan calls the subject-​of-​a-​life,12 and all animals have inherent value, not just the human species.13 Thanks. These are important considerations and I agree I ought to include the interests of animals in imagining a better world. And, of course, that means I need to take a long hard look at the violence that animals experience.

A nurse enters the room and looks at Rivka’s chart. Jack and Clayton move to one side as she takes Rivka’s blood pressure and pulse. n urse:

This all looks fine. Any headache? [Rivka shakes her head] Any nausea? [another shake] And any pain other than in your wrist? [another shake] I’m afraid your wrist is going to be tender for quite a while. But the doctor will give you a scrip for painkillers before you leave. r ivka: [to the nurse] I’m feeling quite well. I assume, God willing, I’ll be able to leave in the morning? n urse: That will be up to the doctor. But I’d say so. Do you have someone who can give you a ride home? r ivka: I …

10

Animals and Why They Matter (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983). Midgely writes that besides a few philosophers who argued for the moral consideration of animals (Montaigne, Paine, Voltaire, Bentham, and Mill): “Enlightenment thought in general was drawn the other way by its exaltation of reason. If animals are irrational, and value and dignity depend entirely on reason, animals cannot matter. Reason plays the same road here that the soul does in Christian thought. The extreme form of this rationalist view was that of Descartes, who identified the human soul or consciousness so completely with reason as to conclude the animals could not be conscious at all, and were in fact just automata,” 11. 11 See, Tom Regan, The Case for Animals Rights (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1983), 183ff. 12 Ibid., 245. 13 See discussion of Regan’s views in Taylor, Angus. Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate (Peterborough: Broadview, 2009), 66ff.

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a nna: [Interrupting] I’d be glad too, Rivka. I’m not teaching until the afternoon. n urse: Seems like you are well taken care of. [looking around at the three visitors] Visiting hours are over in a few minutes. Better say your goodbyes. [she bustles out of the room] r ivka: What a shame! I’ve so enjoyed our chat. j ack: Not to worry. I  can pop in to see you tomorrow night when you’re home. Just to make sure you’re OK, and to see if you need anything. r ivka: I’m sure I’ll be fine. But why don’t you all come over. We can continue our conversation. c layton: If that’s OK with you, but we wouldn’t want to be a burden. a nna: Why don’t we bring carry out and make an evening of it? j ack: Chinese, Thai, or Indian? a ll: Indian! [followed by laughter] r ivka: But not too spicy for me. My delicate stomach! j ack: Good. I’ll bring the food.

Scene 3

Rivka and Clayton are seated at Rivka’s dining table in the kitchen of her 1930s Sears and Roebuck house, the room decorated in mission style, crafted by local Amish furniture makers. Anna is busy at the sink. a nna:

I’m so glad it wasn’t worse Rivka. And glad too that you had no concussion. You can’t be too careful. [turning toward the door] Ah, here’s Jack. Good! I’m starving.

Jack enters, stamping his feet to shake off the plentiful snow, his navy Fjallraven parka dotted with large snowflakes. He is holding a bag of food from the local Indian restaurant, its subtle aroma entering with him. j ack:

I hope I’m not too late. Massive line. Apparently, nobody wants to cook at home tonight! c layton: All the better for the wait. Now what’s in here? [he helps Jack place the many small food boxes in the center of the table] j ack: It’s written on the top of each carton. c layton: [as he places the cartons] Malai kofta … vegetable vindaloo … veggie korma … basmati rice … another rice … a veggie biryani

46 Act 2 … paneer jalfrezi … this must be naan bread … and finally the relishes. [he surveys the table] A feast! r ivka: [helping herself to food, as do the others] I  am blessed to have such nice friends around. It happens all too infrequently nowadays, since Aaron passed. It’s such a treat, and to do philosophy as well! After a few minutes of general chitchat, talk of the weather, and the deliciousness of the food, they continue their conversation. c layton:

So, Jack, not wanting to spoil our wonderful dinner [grimaces slightly] but let’s get back to violence. j ack: I know what you mean. It can get you down. Nonviolence is more uplifting, but we’ve still some work to do before we get there. c layton: Have we finished looking at how we understand violence, or do you have more? j ack: [reaching for a piece of naan bread] A little more. I think we are all agreed that violence is more than intentional physical force to cause physical pain—​though that of course is central to violence and is our most literal understanding of it. a nna: We have added to that basic understanding the notion that violence can sometime be unintentional, but still be violence. And that violence can cause psychological or emotional harm. c layton: That violence, too, can be psychological and not only physical force—​perhaps the husband’s constant berating and criticizing his wife, with threats of violence, or threats to withhold money. Though not physically violent, I think we are agreed that the harm to the spouse is experienced as violence, even if the husband keeps his hands to himself. a nna: And that we wanted to broaden out the victims of violence to include sentient beings other than humans, in proportion to their ability to experience pain. clayton: We wanted, also, to include violence against property. The wanton destruction of the world’s oldest Buddhist statues by the Taliban, in Afghanistan in 2001, I take to be a violent action, though not aimed at people or animals. [pauses to enjoy a mouthful of curry] I think we have a pretty comprehensive understanding of violence with all that. rivka: [puzzled expression] Can I sound a note of caution about violence to property? I know we have talked about it, but I’ve thought some

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more. If we think of violence as a violation, then is it really possible to violate property? We can destroy property, but I wonder if we can cause harm to property. Perhaps we should at least raise a question about it. I could imagine that if one measures well-​being in terms of capacity to perform one’s function well, then blowing up a building or damaging a car affects the well-​being of not only those who own them but of the things themselves—​the building cease to perform its function. Even so, maybe we ought to leave the notion of violence as that which happens to sentient beings. But Jack, do you have anything else? j ack: Unfortunately, yes. It’s that type of harm I call systemic violence. r ivka: Ah, yes, I wondered when you would get around to this. But it’s not without controversy. If I may, I suspect by systemic violence you mean harm caused to people by impersonal systems. Some call this structural violence, and … [takes a moment to savor the jalfrezi] j ack: [interrupting] Yes, systems and structures of society like capitalism, patriarchy, and racism. a nna: Feminists have made much of structural violence. Social, economic, and political systems have all worked against women. Patriarchy, the system where males are favored and women diminished, has impoverished the lives of girls and women throughout most of human history. Measures used to demonstrate this are mortality rates and the quality of life. Where the lifespan of women is reduced and where the quality of women’s lives is less than men’s, there we find structural violence at work.14 It includes such things as the preference for sons rather than daughters, structures of food distribution, education, and work.15

14

15

See, Dyan Mazurana, and Susan McKay. “Women, Girls, and Structural Violence:  A Global Analysis. In Daniel J. Christie, Richard V. Wagner and Deborah DuNamm Winter, (Editors) Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2001), 130ff. Mazurana et al conclude: “The denial of girls’ and women’s right to food, health care, education, and life, as well as the undermining of that political, economic, and social rights are some of the most damaging and egregious forms of direct and structural patriarchal violence,” 137.

48 Act 2 c layton: [wiping his beard with a napkin] And racism. I can give so many examples from my youth. The Confederate flag still waved proudly from the South Carolina State House. White boys would drive their pickups through our neighborhood with the Confederate flag flying from the truck-​bed. Many of us took that to be an act of violence. It was surely intimidating. At the very least those actions gave legitimacy to other more direct kinds of violence.16 r ivka: I think some have called this cultural violence.17 But doesn’t it move us even further from a literal understanding of violence? Are symbols really violent? Perhaps incentives to commit violence, or to buttress violent structures? But the symbol itself? j ack: I agree, it’s a tricky area. Johan Galtung understands violence to be any avoidable insult to basic human needs.18 He analyzes needs as survival needs, well-​being needs, identity needs, and freedom needs. r ivka: And here I must part company with Galtung. I am not for a moment suggesting that all those aspects of human need are unimportant, but to call any insult to any human need as violence is to stretch language beyond breaking point. If we go down 16

17

18

Though Clayton refers to his youth, systemic racism continues to the present. In summer 2020 during the writing of the final corrections to this book, George Floyd, a black man, was executed by a white Police Officer as the officer knelt on Mr. Floyd’s neck for almost nine minutes. What was surprising about the incident was not just another black victim of systemic racism in police departments, but the blatant nature of the murder—​it was filmed and broadcast in real time—​and the public and worldwide outcry against the violence of systemic racism. Black Lives Matter protests sprang up around the world including Britain, France, Indonesia and Australia. The United States saw the most diverse protests in living memory. British Premier League soccer players on their shirts sported “Black Lives Matter” instead of their names, and “took the knee” (kneeling on one knee) before every game in solidarity against racism. Some reforms were rushed through (the banning of choke holds by police in some authorities, for example). However, at the time of writing it is too early to tell if deep and lasting changes will occur. Nonetheless, the signs are encouraging. Johan Galtung, “By cultural violence we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—​ exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—​that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 196. “I see violence in avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Threats of violence are also violence,” ibid., 197.

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that pathway, we will end up labeling anything we disapprove of, anything that is morally questionable, and anything that is socially troubling as violence. In that case, real actual violence is lost sight of. It makes the insult the same as the physical attack. “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me,” said my mother. [smiling] Of course, she was wrong. Words can emotionally hurt. Symbols can cause offense. But surely, shouldn’t we make meaningful distinctions? [looks around at her friends in turn] So Jack, how are you going to deal with all this complexity? j ack: [with a gentle laugh] It is a bit of a minefield! To try to make sense of it, I am going to make a distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary violence. Primary violence I  take to be that form of violence that is the most literal:  the use of physical or psychological force intended to cause physical and, or, psychological harm. Secondary violence is less literally violence, and would include physical or psychological force, with no intention to cause harm but which does cause physical or psychological harm. Tertiary violence I understand to be social systems, or cultural practices, that directly or indirectly cause either physical or psychological harm. With tertiary violence, often, no agency can be directly found. You likely couldn’t point the finger at any person and say, “you caused harm.” [pauses in thought] But it’s tricky. Pierre Bourdieu notes that just because you can’t find a specific agent does not mean that a system—​ such as language—​lacks agency. Language, for instance, can’t be separated from power, and power is not evenly distributed in society. Nietzsche had pointed out that words like “good” were reserved for the nobility, and “bad” for the populace. Disadvantaged groups suffer tertiary violence in this sense.19 r ivka: I see. But let me ask you a question or two for clarification. [pauses to dip naan bread in the remaining curry sauce] You seem to be clear that violence can be either using physical or psychological force. 19

For a careful analysis of Bourdieu and Nietzsche on this see, Gay, William C. “Bourdieu and the Social Conditions of Wittgensteinian Language Games,” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11, n1 (1996):  15–​21. Gay states:  “From my own study of language I have come to the conclusion that speaking is inseparable from the distribution of power in a society,” 15.

50 Act 2 j ack: r ivka:

Correct, as does Gan. And when physical or psychological force is intentionally used to cause harm, that is your primary violence. j ack: Yes, besides actual physical violence, the threat of violence can cause much psychological harm. The harm is in the emotional turmoil and expectation that physical force might be used at any time. r ivka: But I hope you are still going to make a distinction. The actual destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001 was surely more significant than the threat to do so? j ack: For sure. c layton: So, by the same token, is the threat to hurt the child by the abusive parent less than a severe paddling? j ack: I would say so. But I am still going to argue that both a threat of terrorism and the threat of an abusive parent when given with the intention to cause harm are primary violent actions. We might make a distinction as to the severity of the violence, but it is still clearly violence. c layton: Based on the two factors:  force—​ whether physical or psychological—​and the intention to cause harm? j ack: Yes. c layton: So, it seems to me that your primary violence is what Gan simply calls violence. j ack: But I add secondary and tertiary violence because it seems to me that Gan is too narrow in his understanding of violence—​ though I am aware that Gan prefers to call structural violence “structural injustice.” r ivka: And why is that? j ack: Because structural violence is not an act, and for Gan violence is always an action. c layton: And, Jack, you use the terms secondary and tertiary because they are derived from a more literal understanding of violence. r ivka: In other words, your secondary and tertiary forms of violence resemble literal violence but need to be distinguished from it. And here, you are back to my concerns about the use of language. j ack: Yes. Let’s take poverty as an example. It has become common to speak of poverty as a form of violence. Someone who wants to use language carefully might point out that while poverty is indeed a terrible condition, often no agency can be found. No one

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has the intention to cause harm, but harm occurs.20 The family in poverty experiences physical, literal pain in hunger, and psychological harm in worry for the future, in being unable to care adequately for children. Yet, no single agent might be found who intended the harm. It is likely that happenstance, luck, and a myriad of circumstances, both personal and social, contributed to the family’s poverty. Nonetheless, the family experiences great harm. It feels like violence. c layton: And some would argue that the cultural systems of capitalism, together with housing policies, class, and race all play into the family’s poverty. The system is against them. The system is a violent system. j ack: I agree. But I want to make the distinction that such violence is violence in a tertiary sense. Its effect is often the same as physical or psychological violence, but it is difficult to find an agent who intends the harm or who uses physical or psychological force. r ivka: I’m glad you make those distinctions, Jack. To some it may sound like splitting hairs, but as philosophers we need to be as precise as we can be, to bring clarification, and to avoid indistinct and ambiguous statements. a nna: [looking at her watch] I’m sorry to spoil the party, but I’m afraid I need to leave. You can carry on without me and fill me in later. j ack: I think we ought to end. [turning to Rivka] You’ve been so kind, especially so soon after your accident. [rising from the table] But before we go, we’ll tidy up [he begins gathering the used silverware]

Scene 4

A week later, lunchtime, at the Bistro on Main Street. Seated around the table are Jack, Rivka, Anna, Clayton, and a professor from the Political Science Department, Patty, an Arendt scholar. They are in the middle of a conversation.

20

Iris Marion Young: “The conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression,” “The Five Faces of Oppression,” 41.

52 Act 2 c layton: [placing his coffee cup on the table] Patty, as you know, our little group has been discussing with Jack his work on pragmatic nonviolence. I invited you for coffee because you are something of an expert in the writings of Hannah Arendt.21 I recall she had written on violence, but I think you could give a better account than me. [with a smile] patty: [returning the smile] You flatter me! But what exactly are you looking for? c layton: We have been discussing the complexity of violence r ivka: [interrupting] Making distinctions in order to bring clarity. Jack’s thesis is that besides natural disasters human violence has always been the greatest threat to a better world, and that pragmatic nonviolence is the best hope for the well-​being of people, animals and the planet. [looking at Jack] Correct me if I’m speaking out of line. j ack: Spot on so far! r ivka: But before we consider nonviolence we need clarity about what violence is, the scope of violence, and the problem of violence. patty: It sounds like a great project, and I’m assuming you want me to talk about Arendt’s little, but important, book on violence? c layton: Exactly! patty: OK. But I  think we need to be aware that her time is not our time. She wrote at the end of the 1960s, I suppose to answer the puzzle why the students, who had been largely nonviolent, and civil rights activists following Martin Luther King Jr., turned to violence. a nna: They were heady days! I’ve sometimes wondered what it must have been like to live then. [smiling dreamily] The summer of love,22 Woodstock,23 Vietnam and all. It is always reported as such a vibrant time. r ivka: [looking over her pince-​nez] Don’t believe the mineses!* I  was there at university in the midst of everything. We had sit-​ins, love-​ins and protests against Vietnam. But it was a very mixed time. We have made so much progress in civil and human rights since then. It was a time of exploration to be sure, but patriarchy, 21 22 23 *

Hannah Arendt 1906–​1975, philosopher and political theorist. Summer 1967, when approximately 100,000 hippies descended on San Francisco. Music festival in Woodstock, New York, in April 1968, when a half million people gathered. Yiddish: myths, stories.

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sexism and homophobia were rampant, even among the hippies. You’re so much better off now. But Patty take us back to Arendt, please. patty: In trying to understand why the students turned to violence—​ ironically just after the summer of love—​Arendt made careful distinctions between words that are often used loosely, and sometimes interchangeably. r ivka: Ah, precision in language! Arendt is a scholar after my own heart! patty: Arendt makes distinctions between the words power, strength, force, authority, and violence. [pauses to drink coffee] In brief, according to Arendt, power is the human ability to act in concert. a nna: So, in a real sense power belongs to the people. A president has power derived from the people who elect them. patty: Yes, and strength is inherent in an object, or person, in relation to other persons of objects. c layton: [rubbing his beard] So, a chair is strong in relation to a person sitting on it. patty: Of course. Force is the energy released by physical or social movement, as in the force of a strong wind. And, finally, authority is the recognition that obedience is called for without coercion or persuasion. c layton: I suppose, like the stop sign, or the police officer who raises a hand for vehicles to stop. But how does all this relate to violence? patty: Arendt’s argument is that too often power, strength, force, and authority are confused with violence. Violence, she argues is only ever instrumental to some other end. It is not an end in itself. a nna: If I’m understanding you, violence is not power. Yet, often we assume that the violent person is a powerful person, or the violent regime is powerful. patty: Yes, that is Arendt’s argument. And further, when violence is used to support power, then power is undermined. j ack: So, take the most common form of violence—​that of parental violence against their own children. When a parent uses the paddle, or the hand, to cause pain to make a child obedient, if Arendt is correct, then parental power is undermined. patty: Absolutely! And further, true authority is without coercion, so the use of violence by a parent does not demonstrate parental authority at all. When the father beats his child, he has already lost his authority. His violence demonstrates that he is losing

54 Act 2 power. Violence is certainly a force, but it is a force intended to cause harm or injury. Strength is a neutral idea concerning relationships. The father is most often physically stronger, and we might assume, emotionally stronger, or more mature, than his child. But that strength says nothing about violence. In other words, violence is neither strong nor weak. Strength may be used to assist violence in causing harm, but equally strength may be used in support of nonviolence. j ack: [smiling] Patty thanks for sharing that. I  will certainly bear it in mind.

Scene 5

A large lecture hall, theatre seating, in the Humanities and Social Sciences Building. A guest lecture, “India and Pakistan: Prospects for War,” has just finished. Students are heading for the doors at the back of the hall. Jack, Rivka, Clayton, and Anna are in a little huddle to one side of the right aisle. c layton:

Great lecture, but a bit depressing. [with a frown] Prospects for war seem as high now as at any time since independence for the Indians and Pakistanis. To be honest, I was unaware that over the last thirty years between 45,000 and 70,000 lives have been lost in the Kashmir conflict.24 I knew it had been bad, but not that bad. r ivka: [looking down at the handout from the lecture] In the year of the most deaths by terrorism worldwide in recent history, 2014, of the almost 45,000 deaths almost 3,000 were in India and Pakistan, the vast majority in Pakistan. Since 2007, Pakistan has seen well over 1,000 terrorist-​caused deaths each year, with almost 3,000 in 2013 alone.25 It is a terribly unstable part of the world. And more unstable now with a rise in tensions between India and Pakistan as incidents of terrorism from Pakistan on Indian soil have increased. God forbid we see another war between the two nations. In the 1971 war over 10,000 people were killed.26 24 25 26

“Modi’s Jaw-​Breaking Threats,” The Economist (February 23, 2019). Our World in Data, “Number of Fatalities in Terrorist Attacks,” accessed March 1, 2019. https://​ourworldindata.org/​terrorism. “Skirmishing Between India and Pakistan Could Escalate,” The Economist.

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a nna:

And even more frightening is the possibility of nuclear escalation. Both India and Pakistan have over 300 nuclear weapons between them. In a nuclear war, both nations would be damaged beyond belief! [she shudders involuntarily] And they also have intermediate-​range missiles! For those and other reasons, I remain an absolute pacifist. War is never acceptable. And nuclear war is unthinkable. r ivka: But Anna, my dear, don’t you see that is the heart of the problem. War is very thinkable. War has been the modus operandi of humanity for all of recorded history, and likely before that too. [turning to Jack] And I think, Jack, this is the heart of the problem for your work. Violence is endemic in the human species and is likely always to be so. We can’t get away from it. I fear your pragmatic nonviolence will be as useless in the real world as Anna’s absolute pacifism. [Anna raises her eyebrows, opens her mouth to speak, but thinks better of it] j ack: Here we have to differ, Rivka. I do not doubt the reality of violence, nor that violence has been a large part of the human experience. But in part, the telling of the story has been shaped by what Francisco Muñoz has called the “violentology perspective.”27 r ivka: [frowning] I  do so hate jargon. Pray tell, what does he mean by that? j ack: It is the notion that violence is given a greater emphasis than it warrants.28 I have fallen into the trap myself. In a course on war and terrorism, so thoroughly did I do my job that a student in her term paper began, “For every act of kindness in the world, there are thousands of atrocities.” [a little laugh] In analyzing the violence of the world, I had left no room for the myriad acts of kindness, love, and consideration that are the glue of human existence.

27 “Perspectiva violentológica,” in Fancisco A.  Muñoz, La Paz Imperfecta (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2001) par. 10. 28 William C.  Gay in analyzing Muñoz states:  “research focused on violence, even when undertaken by advocates of nonviolence, makes violence appear more pervasive than it is,” “Pacifism, Feminism, and Nonkilling Philosophy: a New Approach to Connecting Peace Studies and Gender Studies.” Jennifer Kling, Editor, Pacifism, Politics, and Feminism (Leiden, Boston: Brill Rodopi, 2019), 139.

56 Act 2 c layton:

And I hope that you said to her that for every atrocity or act of violence there are literally thousands of acts of kindness. Didn’t Gandhi say that violence is merely a ripple in the fabric of love?29 j ack: Yes I did! [with a smile] And, yes he did! Even so, the violentology perspective is pervasive. The media lead us to believe that violence is constantly on the rise, and that affects public opinion.30 To be honest, I used to share the same sense of dread about the world as many of our progressive friends do. Those of us who work in the philosophy of peace, teaching and writing about war and terrorism and suchlike, often have a very jaundiced view of the world. c layton: I’m afraid it’s also the case in political science. a nna: The violentology perspective reminds me somewhat of the myth of redemptive violence. r ivka: Redemptive violence? That sounds like a religious idea. a nna: It does come from a theologian, Walter Wink, who wrote extensively about violence and peace.31 Though it arises from a religious perspective, I think it has something important to say in general. The basis of the myth is ancient, but it has played out constantly in history and is pervasive in our own culture. r ivka: [with a smirk] It must be a grand myth to encompass so much! I am deeply skeptical of such grand narratives. anna: [with noticeable frustration] Well, at least hear me out before you make a judgment. rivka: Oy vey! My apologies. I  do sometimes jump to conclusions. Carry on. anna: The myth presupposes a primeval chaos. Out of the chaos a character arises, the villain, who oppresses the good, often with torture and violence. The reader, hearer, or observer of the myth is drawn 29 30

31

Gandhi: “History is really a record of every interruption of the even working of the force of love or of the soul,” Non-​Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (Mineola: Dover, 200), 16. According to the Pew Research Center, violent crime has fallen from 747.1 crimes per 100,000 of the population to 382.9 crimes per 100,000 from 1993–​2017. When asked if they thought crime had risen over the last year in 1993, 87 percent said yes. In 2017, still 68 percent said yes. Public perception of violence is actually higher than instances of violence. Pew Research Center. “5 Facts About Crime in the U.S.” Factank: New in the Numbers. https://​www.pewresearch.org/​fact-​tank/​2019/​01/​03/​5-​facts-​about-​crime-​in-​the-​u-​s/​. See, Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers:  Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 17–​31.

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with natural sympathy toward the oppressed, and antipathy toward the oppressor, though, in some tellings, the reader morbidly enjoys hearing of the violence of the oppressor. A hero arises who opposes the oppressor, and battle ensues. It is touch and go who will win, the hero often suffering terribly. As the hero suffers, the observer is drawn more fully toward them and against the villain. When all looks lost, the hero finds renewed strength and finally defeats the oppressor with extreme violence. The observer, who has now been fully drawn into the myth, is happy that the villain has suffered great violence. In every telling of the myth, violence wins the day and redeems the situation. The reader, or observer, is faced with the inner conflict and angst of hating the violence meted out to the hero, but loves the violence suffered by the villain. c layton: I can see that myth in many movies and tv shows. a nna: Wink suggests that the myth is foundational to American experience, at least as played out in popular culture. You see it in every war, spy, and superhero movie, and in just about any cop show. Evil has to be defeated, and the good defeats evil by violence. Such violence is not only necessary, but often unrestrained. The good uses good violence to destroy the bad violence of the evil.32 [takes out and refastens the tie in her pony tail] But Wink wasn’t the first to speak of such foundation myths and violence. Rene Girard produced monumental texts exploring primeval violence and myth and how those myths persist in our present culture.33 Girard’s perspective is from the standpoint of an anthropologist [with a grin] but I’m sure he might be relevant to you philosophers.34 r ivka: [sheepishly] I stand corrected! The myth of redemptive violence is indeed an interesting perspective.

32

33 34

Wink: “Here is how the myth of redemptive violence structures the standard comic strip or television cartoon sequence. An indestructible good guy is unalterably opposed to an irreformable and equally indestructible bad guy. Nothing can kill the good guy, though for the first three-​quarters of the strip or the show he (rarely she) suffers grievously, appearing hopelessly trapped, until somehow the hero breaks free, vanquishes the villain, and restores order until the next installment,” 17. See, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, “Perpetual Violence? Mimesis and Anamnesis,” in Rob Gildert and Dennis Rothermel, Remembrance and Reconciliation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011). For a good introduction to Girard’s work see, The Girard Reader, editor James G. Williams (New York: Herder and Herder/​Crossroad, 1996).

58 Act 2 a nna:

It is such a pervasive myth that it is common sense that the only way to resolve finally conflicts is through violence. My students [makes air quotes] “know” that violence as a last resort will always work. They have no reason to say so, other than common sense. Since they began to watch tv they have been subject to the myth. Our Mennonite witness has always been opposed to the myth of redemptive violence. For us, it is common sense that nonresistance is a better way. j ack: [turning to Anna] And how is the myth of redemptive violence similar to the violentology perspective? a nna: In that both ideas tell us that violence is more pervasive, more necessary than in reality it is. The violentology perspective argues that we hear and read more about violence than the actual violence committed. The myth of redemptive violence tells a story that in the final analysis only violence works to solve problems. j ack: That’s helpful. You recall in our earlier conversations, I  mentioned Steven Pinker and his book Enlightenment Now? That book was an update and expansion of a book he had written a few years earlier, The Better Angels of Our Nature. His subtitle is important: “Why violence has declined.” He makes a very impressive case that, in fact, far from getting worse, as the violentology perspective suggests, violence has been decreasing. When I  first read this, I  was nonplussed.35 How could he say such a thing? What about the continuing wars? What about the upsurge in violence? a nna: [with a wry smile] There always seems to be an upsurge in violence. j ack: Yet, the more I read, the more convinced I became. It came to me as a bit of a shock. On just about every measure of violence—​ based on incidences per 100,000 of the population—​violence has declined. a nna: If that is true, I am surprised. Can you share any instances where violence has declined? j ack: The homicide rate is one marker. In Europe the rate of homicides per 100,000 of the population declined from over 100, in the year 1500, to less than one today. The picture is slightly different for 35

The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011).

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the United States. While the rate has come down to European levels in the North East, in the Southern states the rate remains at around 10 per 100,000. The average across the USA is around six.36 And that is just one measure. We execute fewer people. Fewer children suffer terribly through harsh beatings that were considered acceptable not too long ago. Corporal punishment has been abolished in most areas—​though children still suffer greatly in the public-​school system.37 a nna: [deeply frowning] Given the population of the United States, that is still a lot of homicide. If we say violence is in decline, isn’t that a recipe for complacency? j ack: It might be, but not for me. That violence is in overall decline gives hope that we can further reduce violence through intentional nonviolence. But it’s still a stretch as violence remains so pervasive. r ivka: [with slight annoyance] I return to my point. With the best will in the world, you cannot deny that we live in a world shaped by violence. c layton: I’m going to add fuel to your fire, Rivka. I don’t know if you have read the book, Atrocities: The 100 Deadliest Episodes in Human History, by Matthew White?38 r ivka: [with a cynical laugh] Is it a serious book? It sounds like something the National Enquirer might say, or at the very least a children’s book. c layton: It’s deadly serious, if you’ll excuse the pun. My guess is he gave the book a playful title in order to attract attention, but also because the subject matter is so damn serious. White is a librarian by profession, and a numbers nerd. The book is a serious analysis of wars, genocides, ethnic cleansings, and despotic oppressions that have created the most damage in human history. It’s so serious that a new lexicology is required. White uses “multicides” for events that kill large numbers of people.

36 Ibid., 85ff. 37 In 2019, still 19 states in the USA allow corporal punishment in public schools. Only New Jersey and Iowa have outlawed corporal punishment in private schools. Each year around a quarter million children are legally beaten with paddles and other implements in those states that allow corporal punishment. See, Hall Fitz-​Gibbon, Corporal Punishment, 23ff. 38 Matthew White, Atrocities:  The 100 Deadliest Episodes in Human History (New  York:  W. W. Norton, 2012).

60 Act 2 r ivka: [ frowning deeply] My goodness! c layton: “Atrocitology” is the study of atrocities. r ivka: [continuing the frown] Oy! Even worse! c layton: And “megadeaths” for events that kill multiple thousands of people.39 r ivka: He surely must have his tongue firmly in cheek. c layton: I admit there is a certain playfulness to his writing. It counterbalances the sheer weight of horror he discusses. White has a serious moral purpose yet writes with a humorous touch. [pauses] I know that’s not to everyone’s taste, but he takes a quite objective view, not distinguishing one form of killing as better than another. He views all atrocities equally, whether they are the atrocities of the [makes air quotes] bad guys—​the Hitlers and Stalins—​or the [air quotes] good guys, the Churchills and Trumans.40 After analyzing the world’s worst atrocities his conclusions are interesting.41 First, wars have caused the most deaths in human history. a nna: Isn’t that obvious? c layton: Kind of [pauses] but it’s quite common to hear that oppressive government creates the most violence. Whilst oppressive governments do cause violence, their scope is overshadowed by war. a nna: And if that is true, the tradition of absolute pacifism that I belong to has something important for the betterment of the world. War is morally abhorrent.

39 40

41

Generally, “megadeath” refer to death in the millions; “gigadeath” to death in the billions. White states: “To be fair to all sides, I have carefully selected the one hundred events with the largest man-​made totals regardless of who was involved or why they did it. One of the standard ways to skew the data is to decide up front that certain kinds of killing are worse than others, so only those are counted. Gassing ethnic minorities is worse than bombing cities, which is just as bad as shooting prisoners of war, which is worse than machine-​ gunning enemy troops, which is better than plundering colonial natives, so massacres and famines are counted but not air raids and battles. Or maybe it’s the other way around. In any case my philosophy is that I wouldn’t want to die in any of those ways so I count all killings, regardless of how they happened or to whom,” ibid., xiv. White in his conclusion asks: “What can we conclude from my list of mass killings? It i that any single quality that all one hundred of them share? Aside from the horrific every day details like torture, cannibalism, assassination, rape, castration, betrayal, and severed heads, are there any larger characteristics that all of these multicides have in common? I don’t see any,” ibid., 532.

How Violence Spoils a Better World

c layton:

r ivka: c layton:

j ack:

a nna:

42 Ibid., 541. 43 Ibid., 563.

61

I will not disagree with your sentiment Anna, though I  think that in exceptional circumstances to wage war might be the lesser of two evils, if a greater war can be prevented. [looks to Jack] I’ll be interested to see how you handle that with your pragmatic nonviolence. [back to Anna] But of interest to me was White’s analysis of how many people are actually killed in war. If memory serves, in the nineteenth century around 2 percent of people were killed in war. In other words, 98  percent of people were not. That percentage rose in the twentieth century to 3.5  percent. But still, given two world wars 96.5 percent of people did not die in war. Given the world’s population, that’s still a lot of people who died. But it’s far less than the 15 percent who died in wars in tribal, pre-​state societies.42 Still, in sheer numbers the twentieth century in some ways stands alone. White even has a word for it. [looks to Rivka] Are you ready for this? [pauses] The “Hemoclysm.” Let me guess. [rubs her temple as if to avert a headache] Something to do with blood? Exactly! From the Greek for “blood flood.” White links the two world wars, which were really parts one and two, to the Russian Civil War and Stalinism, to the upheavals in China and Mao, to the Japanese invasion, the fall of Japan and the grab for power by Mao in Korea. In all, if these events are all linked in the hemoclysm, it accounted for 150 million killed.43 So, in that sense the oft-​quoted “the twentieth century was the bloodiest in human history” makes sense in terms of the sheer numbers killed. But in other ways his data suggest that humanity has not been getting worse—​the violentology perspective—​but rather that humanity has always carried out its blood-​letting. If I might refer back to Pinker’s work. I don’t think he would disagree with the raw figures in White’s analysis, but he makes adjustments based on population at the time of the atrocity, and views it in terms of an equivalent to the population in the mid-​ twentieth century. I see. So, presumably, a thousand deaths when a population was small, would be the equivalent of many more deaths in

62 Act 2 mid-​twentieth century terms. And I assume he used mid-​twentieth century as the base line because of the Second World War. j ack: That’s correct. And in those terms, the Second World War was not the worst atrocity—​based on numbers killed as a percentage of the population. I think that the Second World War’s adjusted rank was nine out of a hundred. a nna: And the worst then would be? j ack: The An Lushan Revolt in eighth century China.44 a nna: To my shame, I’ve never heard of it. I suppose that shows how limited our understanding of history is. r ivka: [a little irritated] And what else does White conclude? c layton: That terrorism, in terms of the numbers killed, is historically insignificant—​at least so in terms of atrocities. Terrorism rarely kills more than a few dozen people. War kills millions.45 r ivka: I have always thought terrorism is overplayed. c layton: And, perhaps strangely, that hereditary monarchs have not caused nearly as many deaths as those who rose up through the ranks, or who were elected to office by others.46 a nna: [looking despondent] I  have to say all this talk of atrocities, megadeath events, and millions killed is rather depressing. Even if White is correct in saying humanity has always been violent, or even if Pinker is correct, that violence has been decreasing relatively speaking for 500 years, it does not say much for the human ability to refrain from violence. I think that is why my forebears in the faith, the Anabaptists, withdrew from society into closed communities. They rather preferred a pure type of pacifist group than take part in the violence of the world. The Amish communities still exemplify that position. c layton: But is that a realistic option? The Amish can only live in their closed communities because they shelter under the protection of the rule of law in the wider society. [looks at his watch, and then around at the now empty lecture hall] My goodness, I must be going! I promised Juanita that I’d pick up the kids from hockey practice. I’ll be late. Clayton rushes toward the door and the little group breaks up. 44 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature, 195. 45 Ibid., 535. 46 Ibid., 538.

How Violence Spoils a Better World



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Scene 6

Toward the end of the day, Jack is seated in Rivka’s office, with a cup of tea. Rivka sits behind her desk, also enjoying tea before braving the icy weather. j ack: [with concern] I’m sorry that our last conversation took such a dismal turn. It’s one of the dangers of our subject. Once you begin to look into human violence, the sheer weight of it all can emotionally paralyze you. The problem is so vast, and the seeming solutions so few, that we withdraw from it and think about something else. r ivka: The ostrich with its head in the sand. j ack: And the sad thing is that when we spoke of violence, we really only looked at its largest expression, that of war. But human violence is far more pervasive. The World Health Organization’s Report on Violence and Health looked at youth violence, child abuse and neglect, violence by intimate partners, abuse of the elderly, sexual violence, and self-​directed violence, and needless to say the data in all those areas point to unacceptable levels of violence worldwide. r ivka: It is easy to see why Hobbes considered the natural human condition one of war of all against all. And why, too, he thought the only solution to human violence was a strong state with its military and police functions to restrain the inevitable violence that people naturally commit. j ack: You might be pleasantly surprised, then, to hear that Steven Pinker sees Hobbes’ Leviathan as a primary means of reducing violence.47 r ivka: Leviathan, I assume, is a monarch or state with a monopoly on force to restrain the violent actions of citizens. j ack: Of course. r ivka: To be honest, I find this to be a more convincing view of human nature than one that sees the human species as benign, if only we would allow it to be free. While I am a fan of as much human freedom as possible, it must always be within the bounds of the rule of

47

Pinker:  “By inflicting the penalties on the aggressors, the Leviathan can eliminate the incentive for aggression, in turn diffusing general anxieties about preemptive attack and obviating everyone’s need to maintain a trigger for retaliation to prove their resolve. And because the Leviathan is a disinterested third party, it is not biased by the chauvinism that makes each think its opponent has a heart of darkness while it is as pure as the driven snow. The Leviathan theory, in a nutshell, is that law is better than war,” Better Angels of Our Nature, 35.

64 Act 2 law. Remove all constraints and we have untold misery. Freedom within the bounds of decency and law has been my bible. Given all you have said about violence, I see no reason to change my view. Without the state exercising its monopoly of force, we would be in a worse mess. j ack: Even given the sometimes excessive use of force by police officers? r ivka: Even so. Without officers of the law, and the courts to enforce the law, we would be in a sorry mess with even greater violence than we see now. I do hope your pragmatic nonviolence will make room for such, and is not just wishful thinking about the goodness of human nature? [raising her eyebrows] j ack: [with a smile] I’ll have something to say about that, for sure. But for now, I simply want to say that all the forms of violence we have spoken of militate against a better world. In other words, every act of violence breaches prima facie moral principles, robs victims of their rights and capabilities, and works against well-​being and flourishing. My argument will be that the more we can reduce violence, by intentional nonviolence, the better the world will be. r ivka: I can’t wait to hear it!

act 3

Nonviolence as an Antidote to Violence

Scene 1

The Bistro on Main Street. Crowded for dinner, all barstools occupied, with people standing two and three-​deep at the bar, amid a general, congenial hubbub. At a table by the window, Jack, Rivka, Clayton and his wife Juanita, Anna and her wife Kelly are gathered for Anna’s 35th birthday. j uanita: [addressing Kelly and Anna opposite, smiling] How long have you two been together? k elly: Fifteen years. We met in sophomore year at college. It was love at first sight for me. I was an out lesbian. Anna was not. It took me several months to woo her, didn’t it babe? [leaning to kiss Anna on the cheek] j uanita: A love story! I want to hear more. k elly: It was a Friday night at the student union [looking at Anna, who is now blushing, and, feeling a kick from her under the table, thinking better of telling the story] Maybe another time Juanita. r ivka: [noticing Anna’s evident embarrassment] Delicious food as always. Did you know the chef is a local man? I taught him as an undergraduate, must be twenty years ago. He completed a philosophy degree and then went to train as a chef at Cornell’s prestigious Statler Hotel, came home and bought the Bistro when it was a run-​down diner. What a transformation! j uanita: [with a grin] Ah, so that’s what you do with a degree in philosophy! j ack: [with a laugh] Philosophy is very versatile! I make a decent pasta myself! j uanita: And very time consuming. Clayton keeps leaving me and the kids for some discussion group. [looks knowingly at Clayton] Or so he tells me! [looks around the group] You wouldn’t be covering for his secret assignations would you? [laughs] a nna: No, I swear it’s legitimate! We’re trying to help out Jack with his latest writing project.

© Andrew Fitz-​G ibbon, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004445994_004

66 Act 3 j uanita:

Well, it must be absorbing given the amount of time he’s giving to it. Is it the kind of thing we non-​philosophers might be interested in? [looking toward Jack] j ack: [taking a sip of wine] I’m happy to talk about it, but are you sure? It’s Anna’s birthday. And, maybe, we don’t want to “talk shop.” k elly: Why not! Count me in. What could be more memorable for a birthday party than talking philosophy. [she turns and winks at Anna] So, what’s the project? r ivka: If Jack is reluctant, let me tell you. Jack is hoping to offer insight on the problem of human violence. His argument is that violence is the greatest obstacle to a better world. By a better world he means one where there is more fairness for people, more well-​being than at present, where rights are respected and capabilities achieved. Violence, whether of the major kind like war and terrorism, or of more domestic like child or spousal abuse, or more systemic like patriarchy and racism … [pauses to sip wine] all those types of violence work against a better world. k elly: A great subject! Though I married into the Mennonites [a sweet look at Anna], and admire their absolute pacifism, I’ve never quite given up on the idea that sometimes violence is necessary. And as an attorney, I’ve seen my fair share of violent people who I think ought to be punished. As punishment is often a form of violence, I’ve never quite given up on its legitimacy. j ack: If we’re all on board for a discussion, why don’t we take the corporal punishment of children as an example. It’s not as large a subject as war, though we will need to think about war at some point. And my guess is that we are all agreed that violence against kids is a bad thing. k elly: Of course, but surely, violence against kids has been outlawed long since? j ack: Only in part. Nineteen states in the USA still allow the paddling of children by teachers … k elly: [interrupting] You mean paddling as with a wooden stick? j ack: Exactly! We know that around a quarter of a million individual children are paddled each year in public schools.1 Perhaps worse 1 According to the United States Department of Education (usdoe) number of students paddled (not total number of incidents) 1994, approximately 500,000; 2006–​2007, 223,190; 2009–​2010, 309358. See Jane Hall Fitz-​Gibbon, Corporal Punishment, Religion, and United States Public Schools (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 23–​36.

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still, only two states have outlawed corporal punishment in private schools. No data are collected and so we don’t know the extent of corporal punishment in those schools. r ivka: But we might assume that since many private schools are religious, and religion is often taken as a justification for punishment—​spare the rod and spoil the child, they say—​my guess would be that many thousands more children are paddled. j ack: You’re right. And in private homes how many kids are spanked? Who knows, but we do know that the majority of American adults think it’s acceptable to give all children a good spanking from time to time.2 Presumably, if parents act consistently with their beliefs, most children are spanked by their birth parents. [pauses for a drink] And my argument is that each time a child experiences that kind of violence it works against her well-​being, it diminishes her capabilities, it goes against her right not to be harmed, and against the integrity of her own body. To be pragmatically nonviolent would be to find a way of caring for the child—​even when she misbehaves—​that works toward her well-​being. c layton: Jack, early in our conversations you defined what you mean by nonviolence. Can you remind us? j ack: I’d be glad to. Nonviolence is a practice that, whenever possible, seeks the well-​being of the Other, by refusing to use violence to solve problems, and by having an intentional commitment to lovingkindness. In my writing, I capitalize Other to indicate all of those with whom we are in a relationship.3 c layton: And as we have discussed before, for you that would include all sentient beings—​humans and other animals—​as well as mother earth? j ack: That’s it. r ivka: [looking over her pince-​nez] And, dear Jack, you modify nonviolence with the word pragmatic. So, I am assuming that you are 2 Males 16–​65, 75 percent, and females 16–​75, 65 percent believe it is sometimes necessary to “give a child a good hard spanking,” down from 84 percent and 82 percent, respectively, in 1986. Child Trends Databank. Attitudes Toward Spanking, November, 2015. “About 94 percent of parents of children ages three to four in the United States report having spanked their children in the previous year,” 2. 3 For a summary of the history of peace in philosophy see, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, “Peace,” The Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy, Andrew Fiala (editor) (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

68 Act 3 thinking of something quite reasonable and practical, rather than merely theoretic. j ack: If we are seeking to maximize well-​being, then nonviolence is more practical than violence. I  have often pondered Michael Nagler’s differentiation between what works and [he makes air quotes] “what works.” What works is what works in the long run to achieve your goals. [air quotes again] “What works” might immediately get something done, but in the long run fails. a nna: [with a puzzled frown] I suppose, if you go back to spanking children, the frustrated mother who can’t get the child to behave might lash out with her hand. She causes the child pain, and, if she’s lucky the child stops the misbehavior. In that sense it works, but she teaches the child that the way to solve problems is by causing someone else pain. If the child internalizes that, she will likely go on to cause others pain. She will also learn that patience is a bad thing, that parents are not safe, and probably other issues adverse to long-​term well-​being. In that sense, the violent spanking does not work. j ack: Exactly! So, for Nagler, nonviolence sometimes [air quotes] “works,” but always works. Whereas violence sometimes [air quotes] “works” but never works.4 I have taken Nagler’s idea and looked at it further in the light of the American pragmatic tradition. We will talk about it later, but practical outcomes for the good are a large part of the pragmatic tradition in philosophy. r ivka: That’s novel, Jack, as my impression of pacifism generally is that it is irrelevant to the real world. In a violent world, nonviolence too easily gives in to the bullies and the bullies reign supreme. I’ll take some convincing. [with a gentle laugh] But I’m here for the ride. Two servers begin clearing the dishes and silverware from the entrees. A third arrives with a cake and a single candle. The three servers begin to sing “Happy Birthday to You,” and all join in the joyful, but shambolic, refrain. As the last note dies uncertainly away, the friends and waitstaff laugh amid congratulations to Anna, who blushes profusely. The cake is cut, handed around, and their conversation continues.

4 Michael N. Nagler, The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our Families, and Our World (Maui: Inner Ocean Publishing, 2004), 106.

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k elly:

I’m intrigued to hear your take on the Mennonite understanding of absolute pacifism. It sounds to me, Jack, that your perspective differs. I’d like to know in what way. j ack: I’d be glad to explain the difference. But perhaps Anna could give us a summary of absolute pacifism, as it is her tradition. a nna: [with a little smile] It’s a long and distinguished tradition, so I’m not sure I’ll do it justice, but I’ll have a try. [pausing to gather her thoughts, as her friends lean in intently amid the noise of the café] Mennonites have always seen their tradition as the original Christian standpoint that was lost for almost a thousand years, and was reinvigorated in the early sixteenth century. Since then, there has been an unbroken peace witness. By that I  mean a Christian stance against war. The Mennonites have always tried to take the New Testament, especially the Gospels seriously. In the Gospels, Jesus was against violence, taught love for enemies, turning the other cheek, and not resisting evil. They understood Jesus as bringing something new to the world—​a different way of living. It was a way of love, and a way of suffering injustice at the hands of violent people.5 In this tradition, you make love your aim. In doing so you will often include justice. But in making justice your aim, you may end up doing something unloving. r ivka: [with a slight frown] But I would hope that an adequate theory of justice, whether it stems from a religious root or not, would not allow power, position, or wealth to trump love, nonviolence, or some similar value. [ pauses in thought] So the Mennonites would rather face suffering than use violence to defend themselves or others? a nna: Yes. I think pacifism, as opposition to war, was a function of a deeper idea, that of nonresistance.6 The Anabaptists took the

5 The Mennonite position is summarized by Guy Franklin Hershberger in War, Peace and Nonresistance:  A Classic Statement of a Mennonite Peace Position in Faith and Practice (Scottdale: Herald, 1981). He says: “Jesus says to Christians: do not resist him; do not pay back to him in kind; deal with him in the spirit of love and so fulfill the fundamental law of God the New Testament way is to aim at love, not at justice. In aiming at justice the result is frequently a selfish struggle for power, position, or wealth. In aiming at love, however, the result is often justice as well as love. But even if this result does not follow, the Christian must continue to love anyway, for according to the teaching of Christ his disciples should be willing to suffer injustice rather than to forsake the way of love,” 51, 53. 6 See, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, “Rehabilitating Nonresistance,” The Acorn: Journal of the Gandhi-​ King Society, 2010.

70 Act 3 command of Jesus not to resist evil as far-​reaching. Nonresistance was the whole of life. As self-​defense is a form of resistance, the Anabaptists did not believe one ought to defend oneself. And as war was a violent resisting of the enemy, war was forbidden.7 Hence, absolute pacifism. r ivka: [still frowning] My God! Even if the enemy was an aggressor? Even if self-​defense would be considered by most a reasonable response? a nna: Yes. Christians, for roughly the first 300 years after Christ, were pacifist and against violence. However, when the Roman Empire was Christianized under Constantine in the fourth century, and Christianity became the religion of Empire, its character changed, and the faith was compromised. Empires always wage war, and Christianity became the religious wing of Empire. Christian theologians began to justify wars.8 [pausing as if to remember something] I recall that Gandhi took a similar position on suffering. Is that right Jack? j ack: Somewhat similar. Suffering was, for him, not part of a political goal. It was an acknowledgement that to harm others was to diminish the truth that the others might possess. Thus, if one believed one was correct in one’s view, one ought not to cause others to suffer for it but to persist in one’s own view of truth, come what may. If others harmed oneself in the process, they were diminishing truth. But Gandhi considered suffering in the context of nonviolent political action. He believed that nonviolent protest required as much courage as a soldier going to war. His satyagrahis—​his nonviolent followers—​were to resist oppressive sanctions by nonviolent means. It would often mean putting oneself in harm’s way. When that happened, the satyagraha was to absorb the violence of the oppressor in his own person. In time the oppressor would cease violence, having had their fill 7 Andrew Fiala defines wars as: “[H]‌uman activities in which groups of people are killed by other groups of people; and this killing has some political meaning, that is, it is about a struggle for power, legitimacy, and/​or ideology,” The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 4. 8 Duane Cady comments: “From the early church to the Middle Ages, Christian values on war had moved from extreme pacifism and nonparticipation in war, through reluctant participation in just war, to eager and hearty participation in the Crusades,” From Warism to Pacifism:  A Moral Continuum, 2nd Edition, (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 2010), 7–​8.

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of it. Gandhi called it the law of self-​sacrifice, or else the law of suffering.9 anna: I see. So, whilst the Anabaptists and Gandhi both embraced suffering, the radical sectarians did it as an act of obedience to Christ, whereas Gandhi also saw suffering as part of a political strategy. j ack: That’s a fair summary. k elly: Anna, my love, some time ago when we were chatting about your tradition, you characterized the adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire as the fall of the church, mirroring the Genesis story of the fall of humanity. a nna: Yes, the Mennonites consider the temptation of wielding power as the church’s fall. r ivka: I’m assuming you are only talking about the history of the Western world. I understand that, in the East, ancient Buddhism was pacifist, and largely remains so today. Jainism, too, was, and remains a pacifist religion. c layton: Not to mention philosophical Daoism. Though not absolutely pacifist, Daoism leans toward nonviolence.10 r ivka: [to Anna] Leaving aside the Eastern traditions, are you saying that there were no pacifists in the West for over a thousand years? I find that hard to believe.11 a nna: Traditionally, Mennonites had assumed so. But I think it is fair to say that Mennonites scholarship post-​World War Two began to recognize kindred spirits in a couple of earlier movements. John Howard Yoder, who was perhaps the most influential Mennonite peace scholar after the war, recognized that there were clear currents of pacifism in the medieval period—​people like St. Francis of Assisi,12 for example, movements like Rabbinic 9 10

11 12

M. K. Gandhi, Non-​Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (Mineola: Dover, 2001), 3. In the Daodejing, 31, it says: “Weapons are the tools of violence /​all decent men detest them. /​Weapons are the tools of fear; /​a decent man will avoid them /​except in the direst necessity /​and, if compelled, will use them /​only with the utmost restraint. Peace is his highest value. /​If the peace has been shattered, /​how can he be content? /​His enemies are not demons, but human beings like himself. /​He doesn’t wish them personal harm,” Mitchell, Stephen, Tao De Ching (New York: Harper Collins, 1989). For an analysis of peace historically see, Gerado Zampaglione, The Idea of Peace in Antiquity, Translated by Richard Dunn (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1973). Zampaglione covers issues of peace in Greek, Roman, Jewish and Christian thinking. Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution, Theodore J.  Koontz and Andy Alexis-​ Baker, Editors, (Grand Rapids: Brazos Books, 2009), 130–​136.

72 Act 3 Judaism,13 and later in the Czech reformation of the fifteenth century.14 But even recognizing those other pacifists, the Mennonites always looked to the New Testament and the teaching of Jesus as canonical. You might even say that they viewed Jesus’ life and teaching as a canon within the canon of scripture. rivka: [with raised eyebrows, questioning] In other words, everything else was to be tested, so to speak, by the teaching of Jesus? anna: If anything seemed to contradict Jesus, like the commands of Yahweh to destroy whole villages in the book of Joshua, then Jesus took precedence. The Mennonites, and others of the radical reformation in the sixteenth century, were, I suppose, the first biblical literalists. They tried to live exactly as the New Testament said. r ivka: That makes sense, I suppose, as the Bible had not been in the hands of the common people until the sixteenth century, after the introduction of the printing press.15 a nna: That in a nutshell is why the Mennonites became absolute pacifists. It was purely for religious reasons. c layton: It’s a good story. But are you sure that Jesus was an absolute pacifist? a nna: It is the Mennonite story. But as a theologian, I’m not so sure, for a number of reasons. Textually, it’s quite difficult. It is hard to get to the real Jesus. All we have about him comes through the writings of others. And, like all editors, they bring their own biases. Given that, scholars have found it difficult to agree on what Jesus was really like. Some have him as a pacifist, like the Mennonites, but others have Jesus as a first century revolutionary. While much of Jesus’ teaching seems to be against violence, some stories have Jesus acting aggressively—​chasing out moneychangers from the temple with a whip, for instance—​and suggesting to Peter that one sword was sufficient as a weapon. But I would agree that the tenor of the stories about Jesus is anti-​violence. And it is certainly true that in the early Christian church the church fathers were anti-​violence.16 [pauses to finish her last mouthful of birthday 13 14 15 16

Ibid., 137–​143. Ibid., 144–​160. See, Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York: Routledge, 2015), for an analysis of the orality of language and written modes of expression. See Peter Brock, The Roots of War Resistance:  Pacifism from the Early Church to Tolstoy (Nyack: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1981), 10–​11. Also, Yoder, Christian Attitudes to War,

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cake] But it doesn’t diminish the tradition. Mennonites, with few others since the very early church, have maintained a consistent absolute pacifist perspective. The tradition stands on its own, regardless of the historicity of Jesus. j ack: Thanks Anna. I think that is a pretty good summary. I greatly respect your tradition. In fact, it was reading Mennonite literature that gave me my first inroads into understanding pacifism. But I do have my differences. a nna: I thought you might, but I’d be glad to know what they are. j ack: My differences are in three general areas. First, are the reasons for embracing nonviolence. The Mennonite position seems to be that we ought to embrace nonviolence because Jesus said so. I don’t mean to oversimplify, but is that the case, more or less? a nna: Yes, I would say so. j ack: For me, that is inadequate. It is an appeal to an authority—​in this case Jesus—​and with such an appeal, there can be no argument. The authority announces what the truth is but gives us no reason as to why it may be true. In other words, no argument is given that leads to such a conclusion, nor are justifications given for the position. c layton: So, Jesus says, “Turn the other cheek,” and “Love your enemies,” but gives no explanation why? j ack: Exactly! a nna: What kind of argument would you advance for nonviolence, then, Jack? j ack: Our earlier discussion about a better world will help us. If, for example, a better world is one where people’s beings and doings are enhanced … r ivka: [interrupting] The capability approach. j ack: It is clear that violence works against those capabilities. Hence, nonviolence is more suitable to a capabilities approach than violence. c layton: I can see that to be true using just two of Martha Nussbaum’s universal capabilities: bodily health and bodily integrity. If you Peace, and Revolution, 48–​50. Yoder states: “In the pre-​Constantinian age, for the first time theologians are addressing our subject. Tertullian, Origen, and Cyprian, the three major voices from this period, all said the same thing with regard to war and military service They were all pacifists. They all put that pacifism within a global rejection of the system, which they experienced as diabolical.”

74 Act 3 use violence against me it is unlikely that it will contribute to my bodily health. k elly: [with a cynical laugh] In fact, the reverse! Violence takes away from bodily health! c layton: And when you do violence to me, you violate my bodily integrity. After all, the word violence derives from the Latin vialationem, an injury. You cause me harm with your violence. j ack: [excitedly] Exactly! All of those issues we discussed that would make for a better life—​the principles of not harming, doing good, fairness, being responsible for what happens to you, and self-​cultivation—​together with well-​being, care, capabilities and rights [pauses to catch his breath] all point toward nonviolence rather than violence. Violence always works against them. r ivka: Let me reflect back to you, Jack, to ensure I am hearing you correctly. Your argument is that as the principlist, rights, care, and capability approaches point to a life of well-​being, and as to prefer to maximize a life of well-​being is more reasonable than not, and that as violence, more than any other factor, militates against such a life of well-​being, then we have a prima facie reason to choose nonviolence. If so, then your argument for embracing nonviolence over violence is a better one than a mere appeal to authority. Lost in their conversation, the friends had neglected to realize that they were the only ones still seated in the café. The last few customers at the bar are finishing their drinks, while the remaining waitstaff are clearing the last dishes from tables. r ivka: [looking round at the near empty café] And on that note I think we ought to call it a night. Your other reasons why you differ from the Mennonites, Jack, will have to wait for another day.

Scene 2

A few days later. In the Arts and Sciences conference room. A long, and tedious, department meeting is coming toward the end. Faculty members anxious to end the meeting are gathering papers together, holding side conversations, and

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a couple are leaving the large oval table. Jack motions to Anna who is seated at the far end of the table. j ack: [squeezing past a faculty member to talk to Anna] I hope you didn’t think I was too dismissive of the Mennonite tradition the other night. a nna: [smiling] Not at all! As you know I’ve had my own issues with my tradition. I still have something of a love-​hate relationship. Kelly’s very much on the fringe. But for the time being I still own up to being Mennonite. [smiling broadly] Perhaps not a very good one. I’m intrigued by someone who values nonviolence, but not from a religious perspective. I have not really looked at that before. j ack: Historically, it has been quite rare, but my sense now is that quite a few political activists have taken to nonviolent direct action as a useful means of changing the political landscape. a nna: Even though the originators of nonviolent direct action like Gandhi and King based their nonviolence on religious ideas? j ack: Yes. Much direct action has become a kind of secularized version of the vision of Gandhi and King. I don’t want to address this further here, but later in our conversation I’d like to talk more about the work of Gene Sharp, who has done more than anyone else to bring our attention to the political effectiveness of nonviolent direct action.17 a nna: [after a pause] The other evening, when you said you differed from the traditional Mennonite understanding of pacifism, you told us that the first reason was because it was based in an appeal to authority. I’m assuming that you had other reasons, as you said that was the first. j ack: Yes, we simply ran out of time. But I  hope you enjoyed the birthday party. a nna: [smiling broadly] Immensely! Thanks so much for organizing it. Kelly really loved getting to know people better. It was the first time she had met Clayton and Juanita. j ack: The second reason why I depart from the Mennonite understanding of pacifism is its scope. In some ways, this is linked to my first reason. a nna: [puzzled] How so? 17

For a contrary view see Ward Churchill, Pacifism as Pathology: Reflections on the Role of Armed Struggle in North America (Edinburgh: A.K. Press, 2007). Churchill argues that pacifism is counter-​revolutionary and supportive of the status quo.

76 Act 3 j ack:

a nna:

In linking pacifism solely to the New Testament, and doing so in a quite literal way, where the New Testament is silent, then pacifism derived from it is silent too. And as the New Testament gives conflicting signals, a pacifism derived from it seems in part contradictory. I don’t want to interrupt your train of thought, but I’m teaching in a few minutes. I don’t suppose you’d mind walking down to my office while I grab a few things?

The two colleagues leave the conference room to make their way through the crowded corridors, students spilling into the hallway at the end of class. a nna: j ack:

You were saying? In terms of the New Testament being silent on some issues, take the human relationship to animals, for example. a nna: That’s dear to my heart. j ack: Quite simply, the New Testament is silent on the rights of animals. And because of its silence, religious versions of pacifism usually have nothing to say about animal suffering. a nna: I suppose I’ve always inferred that because we ought to be kind to each other, then we ought to be kind to animals. j ack: And that’s quite reasonable. But let me suggest that you are reading back into the text something that was likely not there, and which reflects your current sensibilities rather than any prescriptions from the Bible. If you had not been socialized in our current climate [with a laugh] where you can’t open social media without seeing cute pics and videos of kittens and puppies you might read the ancient text differently. a nna: I see. j ack: My guess is that the Amish and more traditional Mennonites have a very different view of animals than you or me. a nna: [with a frown] Ah, the Amish puppy mill exposé! Though subject to much nonsense on social media, I think there is truth in the Amish seeing dogs in the same way they see other farm animals. j ack: Dogs are livestock, kept in cages, produce puppies time after time until they can no longer breed. Puppies are sold to pet stores, and adult dogs are bought and sold at auction, just like other livestock. For breeding bitches, life is miserable. a nna: I have always had my suspicion about our little min pin Alfie. j ack: Why’s that then?

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a nna:

Kelly and I really wanted a little dog. We decided not to go to a pet store because we’d heard the horror stories of puppy mills, and how the puppies were produced. We looked instead on Craig’s List and after several months found what we were looking for. We called the number and got the address. j ack: Don’t tell me it was a puppy mill? a nna: No, they said it was a private house and there were four puppies in the litter. So, we headed way upstate. As it happens, it was an Amish farm. The father greeted us. Very friendly. He asked the kids to fetch the puppies out to the front lawn. [eyes lighting up in remembrance] They were gorgeous! We were both smitten and played with the little things for half an hour before we chose Alfie. [laughing] Or more like he chose us! But we forgot one essential thing j ack: Which was? a nna: In our excitement we didn’t ask to see the little mother. We only realized later that the mother was likely not at the house. The litter came from a puppy farm. Of course, it didn’t stop us loving Alfie. But we couldn’t help thinking about his little mom, confined to a cage her whole life j ack: [with feeling] I’m so sorry. The two arrive at the department offices. Anna picks up graded papers from her desk, and the two continue down the hallway toward her classroom. j ack:

My point was to highlight that because the Amish based their view of pacifism solely on the Bible, aspects of nonviolence, like violence we do to animals, is missing from their understanding. The Mennonite understanding of nonviolence is not as comprehensive as I  would like to see. And I  have a third critique. [he looks at Anna juggling her pile of papers, and two bags] Do you want me to help with those? a nna: [with a grimace as she nearly drops the papers] Just grab the top pile of papers. Thanks! [back on an even keel] So, what is your third critique? j ack: The Mennonite viewpoint is inconsistent. a nna: How so? I’ve always considered our absolute nonviolence to be quite clear. You can disagree with it, but within its own narrative it makes sense. j ack: The inconsistency I see is that, while the Anabaptists rejected violence, that rejection was limited to the Anabaptists themselves.

78 Act 3 a nna:

Yes. They viewed the radical church as the [awkwardly makes air quotes] “perfection of Christ.” Those who were baptized in the correct way, having made their own choice to follow Christ, were within the perfection of Christ. Everyone else was outside. The commandment to refrain from violence—​in their terms wielding the sword—​ was only for the truly baptized. j ack: And that is my point. The magistrate, the state authorities, could wield the sword quite happily. In fact, according to the New Testament, God has positioned the magistrate to do exactly that—​to restrain the ungodly.18 a nna: And why is that inconsistent? j ack: It’s inconsistent because what at first glance appears to be opposition to violence generally, is in fact a very selective nonviolence. It is limited only to the baptized in the Anabaptist communities. The sectarians did not have a general understanding of why violence might be morally problematic. That stance was amplified by the Anabaptists’ understanding of the eschaton—​the end of the world. a nna: They believed that Christ would return to judge the world, separating the sheep from the goats. j ack: [with an ironic smile] And the poor old goats, presumably the ungodly, those outside the Anabaptist communities, would be cast into hell where they would endure eternal punishment. And that is perhaps the ultimate violence! a nna: It’s a view I have rejected, but to be honest it is a core traditional belief of most Christian churches, not just the Mennonites and Amish. j ack: But doesn’t it seem strange that a religion that is so strong on a belief in pacifism, can also embrace the idea of hideous suffering for the great majority of humanity? a nna: I suppose it does. But my guess is that many Christians, if not most, don’t really believe in God as an eternal punisher. The idea of hell is in the background, but not taken seriously. j ack: You’re probably right. Even so, the fact that those who formed the doctrine of absolute pacifism did so quite happily alongside a doctrine of acceptable pain and punishment at the hands of the state and God. [pauses as they arrive at Anna’s classroom, a few minutes before class is due to start, and students are beginning to take their seats] And I  have another example, which I’m afraid touches you 18

On Anabaptist and the use of violence by state authorities, see Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, The Fragility of Tolerant Pluralism (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 52–​64.

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quite personally. It’s the Mennonite issue of shunning those in the community it considers as sinners.19 a nna: [looking serious] I wondered when you would get around to this. j ack: The Anabaptist communities have historically been very close. They tended not to have large congregations. Everyone knew everyone else, and everyone else’s business. a nna: That was certainly my experience. j ack: So, when a member of the church faced the ban, being unable to be part of the community, with even their family rejecting them … a nna: [interrupting] The idea was to shun only until the sinner repented and confessed their sins before the community. It wasn’t an absolute rejection. j ack: Even given that, in such a very tight and introverted community, the psychological pain inflicted on an erring member could be severe in the extreme. I dare say that such emotional pain would be felt far worse than a punch in the nose. And the long-​term traumatic effects could be quite devastating. I would go so far as to say it is a form of bullying. [noticing Anna’s cast down expression] I’m sorry Anna, I didn’t mean to make this personal. a nna: No, please don’t apologize. Though I have made my peace with the way I  was treated, it still deeply saddens me. I  have not been the only one to face the ban, and doubtless I won’t be the last. And you are right. Such psychological trauma is felt as violence. You do feel violated by the community that you love and trust. [pauses] And yes, I agree that such psychological violence is inconsistent with an avowed absolute pacifism. I’m aware, too, physical violence is often preceded by, and often sustained by, abusive language, which is itself a form of psychological violence. Anna takes the papers from Jack, smiles in acknowledgment and enters the classroom to teach.

Scene 3

A few weeks later. The Rensselaer Auditorium. All available faculty members in the Arts and Sciences are attending a special meeting to discuss possible 19

See Fitz-​Gibbon, ibid., 45–​48.

80 Act 3 cuts to the adjunct faculty of the college. The Dean has explained that due to shrinking student numbers across the state, the college might have to merge smaller departments, and drop under-​enrolled majors. Fewer classes will be taught, and hence fewer instructors needed. The mood is tense. The Dean is nearing the end of her prepared remarks. t he dean: [in the middle of her closing sentence] I expect, therefore, that we will all pull together. I will be available to meet with department chairs to discuss which courses you propose to lose over the next two semesters. We will be leaner, but more efficient. Thank you. j ack: [leaning over the theatre style seats to chat with his colleagues Clayton, Rivka, and Anna] Well at least the tenured faculty are safe for the moment. And as we merged philosophy and religion during the last round of cuts, I don’t expect we will be affected as a department. a nna: But still, losing a hundred sections of teaching a year across the college is a major disruption. That means we are likely to have to tell about twenty-​five part-​time faculty members that they no longer have a job. I’m glad I’m not a department chair. I don’t envy you, Jack, having to make those decisions. j ack: It’s not yet finalized, and I’m sure the union will have something to say. We’ll have to wait and see. [looking at his watch] Look at the time! No wonder I could do with a cup of strong tea. [to his colleagues] Anyone want to join me? To general nods of assent, the four make their way across the Arts and Sciences quad to the Lion’s Lair refectory in the Müller Building. It is the first spring-​like day of the semester, multi-​colored crocuses, and daffodils adorn the flowerbeds, and the friends are able to walk without overcoats. c layton:

r ivka:

This is more like it! My sister told me spring arrived at home more than a month ago. [taking a deep draught of air] See, it doesn’t hurt when you breathe in! [turning to Rivka, as they walk along] I thought you retired a couple years ago, Rivka. If you don’t mind me asking, why do you still come to these meetings? Force of habit I  suppose. When you’ve been doing something for forty years, you just continue. I  was never going to be the kind of retiree who took off for the beaches in Florida.

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j ack: r ivka: j ack:

c layton: j ack:

20

21 22

81

Me, snow bird! Oy vey! [with a laugh] I’d be bored out of my mind! So, I generally come in most days. It keeps me busy. And when I don’t want to come in, I simply stay home. My retirement keeps me well fed and in books, so I have the best of all worlds. [pauses to admire the flower beds] But enough of that. [turning to Jack] Anna tells me you were chatting further about Mennonite absolute pacifism, rooted in their understanding of nonresistance. Yes, that’s about it. I always thought it interesting to me that religion has played a large part in pacifist movements. But I understand that your pragmatic nonviolence is not a religious idea. That’s true. But it’s not opposed to religious ideas. A  Mennonite, Quaker, Buddhist, or Jain could also be a pragmatic nonviolentist. In many respects, I take Gandhi to have been a pragmatic nonviolentist. He used nonviolent direct action as a force toward Indian independence from the British Empire. That was quite pragmatic. But isn’t it true, besides his use of a nonviolent strategy for political change, that Gandhi was himself committed to a more religious understanding of nonviolence? I think so. His religious understanding was rooted in the Hindu notion of ahimsa: nonviolence as a way of life, more like an end in itself than as a means to some other end. Gandhi understood ahimsa as love.20 It was one reason why he urged his followers to use spinning as a form of deep meditation, as well as spiritual disciplines such as fasting. Nonviolence was for him much more than merely a political tool. He went so far as to say that a belief in God was essential to be a Satyagrahi.21 One could be a passive resister, and even use nonviolence as a political tool, but not a Satyagrahi.22 However, Gandhi was somewhat vague

Gandhi:  “The true rendering of the word [ahimsa] in English is love or charity. And does not the Bible say; ‘Love worketh no harm to his neighbor, /​Believeth all things, /​ Hopeth all things, /​Never faileth,’ ” Non-​Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (Mineola: Dover, 2001), 221. When asked if socialists or communists could be Satyagrahis, Gandhi responded: “I am afraid not. For a Satyagrahi has no stay other than God, and he who has any other stay or depends on any other help cannot be a Satyagrahi,” ibid., 364. Gandhi initially used the term “passive resistance.” He changed the phrase to Satyagraha. Gandhi:  “Truth (Satya) implies love, and Firmness (Agraha) engenders and therefore

82 Act 3

r ivka:

j ack:

by what he meant by “God.”23 I think he meant a commitment to some ultimate principle—​something like Truth is God, God is Truth. Nonetheless, whatever he meant by God, ahimsa involved a deeply spiritual connectedness. Coming back to my question. Putting to one side religious versions of pacifism, based in some religious text or tradition, have philosophers made a case for pacifism, based on reasoning and argument rather than religion? They have, though it is quite complex! Let’s order the drinks first.

The four friends arrive at the refectory and join the line for service. Rivka and Clayton order espresso and Jack and Anna order tea. They find a table in the corner. j ack:

I have to say that the tea on campus is disappointing. Just generic black tea or green tea, and both leave much to be desired. a nna: I’ve already written a couple of emails to the campus food and catering management office. They said they’ll look into offering more variety. It wouldn’t harm if you also sent a note. j ack: [writing on his iPhone] I’ve made a note. Consider it done!   As I was saying, pacifism can be found in the philosophy canon, but you have to ferret around a little. In part, that’s because there is no standard understanding of pacifism. [pauses to sip his tea] For some pacifism is an absolute opposition to war. For others, pacifism is more like a leaning toward opposition to war, but with war allowed in exceptional circumstances a nna: [interrupting] Like the just war tradition? j ack: Yes. In its stricter versions, the just war position is as close to pacifism as you can get. I think a most helpful way to look at pacifism was suggested by Duane Cady.24 He suggests continuums for pacifism and warism (a phrase he coined). All

23

24

serves as a synonym for force that is to say, the Force that is born of Truth and Love or Non-​ Violence,” in Louis Fischer, (Editor), The Essential Gandhi: An Anthology of His Writings on Life, Work, and Ideas (New York: Vintage, 1962), 77. Gandhi: “But far be it from me to suggest that you should believe in the God that I believe in. Maybe your definition is different from mine, but your belief in that God must be your ultimate mainstay. It may be some Supreme Power or some Being even indefinable, but belief in it is indispensable,” ibid., 364. Duane. L.  Cady, From Warism to Pacifism:  A Moral Continuum (Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 2010).

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philosophies relating to war and peace are somewhere on these continuums—​in terms of pacifism, from an absolutism to more nuanced pacifisms, and war from war realism to versions of the just war. r ivka: [frowning] And warism according to Cady is what? j ack: That the moral justifiability of war is taken for granted.25 r ivka: And pacifism? j ack: That war is never morally justifiable.26 c layton: And just to be clear, by war realism, if you are using it in the way we normally do in political philosophy, would be to say that war is an inevitable aspect of human interaction and that when nations engage in war, the gloves are off, so to speak. Nations will use any and all means to win, and morality does not come into the equation.27 In other words, the war realist position is one of total war until the enemy is defeated. a nna: [with a grimace] All is fair in love and war.28 j ack: As the saying goes. But at least since St. Augustine in the fourth century, moral philosophers have rejected the notion.29 Morality demands that the utter destruction of war must be restrained. On the continuum from warism to pacifism, the just war tradition sits somewhere in between. Exactly where in between depends on how strict the tradition is adhered to. c layton: And my guess is that such war realism has been a majority position in human history. War just is. Period.

25 26 27

28

29

Cady: “Warism is the view that war is both morally justifiable in principle and often morally justified in fact,” ibid., 17. Cady: “Pacifism, of the other hand, is the view that war by its nature is morally wrong and that humans should work for peaceful resolution of conflict,” ibid., 17. For a careful analysis of the war realism position, with examples, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 3–​20. Walzer quoting Clausewitz, who wrote a standard defense of war in the nineteenth century, states: “War is an act of force which theoretically can have no limits,” 23. Cady on war realism: “This is the view that war brings with it a suspension of moral judgment; that war happens outside the moral order,” ibid., 31. “The war realist believes that war is outside of morality, that war is amoral. Consequently, the war realist is committed to total war whenever war happens, because there is no moral restraint to war. To the war realist, wars undertaken must be won at any cost. The just-​warist, in contrast, believes that war must be justified morally,” ibid., 39. See, Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), ­chapter 4, “St. Augustine and the Justification of War,” 114–​145.

84 Act 3 j ack: [pursing his lips] Only somewhat. While since at least the ancient Greeks war has been understood as something natural and inevitable,30 voices have always been raised with regard to moral restraint in war. [pausing to drink] Socrates, for example … r ivka: [interrupting] Ah, the old gadfly! [with a smile] If anyone disrupted the accepted wisdom it would be Socrates. Let me guess, perhaps in the Crito, as Socrates awaited his execution. Doesn’t he say that we ought never to return evil for evil—​effectively saying that retaliation is always morally wrong?31 a nna: [with a little laugh] He sounds like a Mennonite! j ack: Exactly that, Rivka. Socrates’ non-​retaliation position would lean toward the pacifist. r ivka: [rubbing her chin] I do like the idea of a continuum of ideas. I  can quite see that someone would lean toward the pacifist position—​as I do myself—​but could not countenance an absolute renunciation of war. I can imagine a situation when war becomes an inevitable choice between two evils. a nna: [frowning] We Mennonites have never found one. Can you give an example? r ivka: I suppose there have been few such moral choices. In most cases, I think war could have been avoided. I am thinking of recent wars, such as the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003. Both seemed to me to be knee-​jerk reactions to the horror of 9/​11. With hindsight, the response could have been handled so much better. It would be difficult morally to justify those wars. But the Second World War, I  think was different. After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the threatening stance of the Japanese navy to the west coast of the United States, [sighs] I could see no alternative. And that is leaving aside what the Nazis were doing in Europe. In the light of the Shoah, what other than war could have worked? c layton: In other words, Rivka, you lean toward pacifism rather than war, but you are not absolutist. 30 Ibid., 2. 31 Plato: “… it is never right to commit injustice by retaliation,” Crito, 49d, The Last Days of Socrates, Translated by Hugh Treddenick and Harold Tarrant (London: Penguin, 1993), 85. Cady comments: “Socrates’ rejection of retaliation undermines all the justifications for violence and war offered throughout history,” ibid., 5.

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r ivka: j ack:

That’s about it. I think that is a reasonable position, Rivka, and is one expression of the just war tradition. It also expresses what has become the consensus in international relations. No serious ethicist would today hold to the war realist position. c layton: As a political scientist, I’m afraid I have to disagree Jack. Our military academies are full of scholars who are also service folk who take that exact position. For them the moral imperative is to finish wars quickly, by any means available. I would say, including nuclear war, if that becomes expedient. I take them to be serious ethicists, don’t you? j ack: [with some reticence] I stand corrected. It shows how cloistered we can be. I was thinking of colleagues who are ethicists, and I don’t know any who would be war realists. Of course, there are ethicists outside university philosophy departments. [pausing] But let me bring us back to Cady’s work. Though I like Cady’s analysis very much, in my work I suggest something different. Rather than a pacifist continuum and a warist continuum, I’m working with a continuum whose poles are unrestrained violence and absolute nonviolence.32 a nna: I see you keep the continuum idea, but it sounds like you have expanded it. You are not merely speaking of war and anti-​war, but violence and anti-​violence in every aspect of life. j ack: [excitedly] Yes. Some people are anti-​war, but think personal violence is fine. Some are anti-​war but think state-​sanctioned violence is sometimes acceptable in the form of police violence. And still others, that personal violence is morally unacceptable but state violence, in the form of war or police action is acceptable. c layton: The latter sounds to me the conventional wisdom of the social contract. a nna: [with a wry smile] Remember, Clayton, I’m only a theologian! c layton: Sorry Anna! By that I mean the set of ideas that became common currency in political philosophy after Thomas Hobbes , John Locke, and Jean-​Jacques Rousseau who expressed in different ways that people in society are bound by an implicit

32

Something like this continuum is presented in Gan’s Violence and Nonviolence:  An Introduction, pp. 68–​71.

86 Act 3 social contract. In the state of nature, they surmised, people had every right to defend themselves. For Hobbes, for instance, as nature is a war of all against all, you would be justified in using whatever violence is necessary to protect yourself or your family. In the social contract we trade off that right to use violence—​effectively freedom to do as we choose—​with the security of giving to the state the only legitimate use of violence in the form of law courts, a police force, and a military. It’s a trade-​off we still face—​we trade certain freedoms for the security the state provides. j ack: [with a smile] Thanks Clayton! And you’re right. That social contract position would be on the continuum from unrestrained violence—​which I  guess would be Hobbes state of nature—​to absolute nonviolence. Of course, it would not be close to absolute nonviolence, because social contract theory of every kind leaves room for violence. It gives violence to the state and removes it from the hands of the citizen. Even so, in most versions, the citizen is allowed to use limited forms of violence in self-​defense, so long as such violence is proportional. r ivka: On your continuum Jack, what other positions have you identified? j ack: Moving from the pole of absolute nonviolence here are several positions. First, that violence is never morally acceptable in any form, in any circumstance. Second, that while violence is never morally acceptable, in some situations mitigating circumstances allow for the use of limited violence, but never to the point of war. Third, that while violence may be permitted by individuals or sub-​state groups, war is never permitted. Fourth, that while violence is morally prohibited for individuals, or sub-​state groups, against each other, in certain circumstances, a war may be fought as the lesser of two evils, under certain strict conditions. Fifth, that violence is permitted between individuals or sub-​state groups, but such violence has to meet certain criteria, and wars are permitted under certain circumstances. Sixth, that while conventional war might be justified, a nuclear war, or other war involving weapons of mass destruction—​chemical and biological warfare—​would never be permitted. Finally, that any kind of violence is permitted by individuals, groups or between nations.

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r ivka: j ack:



87

What interests me about all those positions, Jack, is that bar the last one—​the war realist position—​each one places some limit on violence. What does that tell us? It tells us that when people have seriously considered violence, what it is, what are its effects, how we should think about it, they almost always want to limit it. It tells us that violence is a problem and needs to be addressed. [looks at his watch] And as always, just as we are getting into interesting territory, duty calls. I have a class. [he gets up to leave] Scene 4

A few days later, an hour before first class. Jack enters the Philosophy and Religion Department common area. Clayton and Anna are in conversation at the center table. Sue is busily typing. Rivka’s door is ajar and she is sitting in her comfy chair reading. j ack: [with a laugh] My goodness, we are early birds today! I thought I’d come in before classes to get some administration done. You’ve all beat me to it! r ivka: [shouting from her room] It’s springtime, Jack. This warmer weather makes you want to get on with the day. c layton: Good morning Jack! I have put my kettle on for hot water. Anna and I are just going to have a cup of tea. Would you like to join us? j ack: I’ve already had a couple of cups of tea, but why not. Thanks! r ivka: [shouts again] Did I  hear a cup of tea? Count me in! What’s brewing? c layton: I have a very nice Oolong. Juanita brought it back from her trip to Beijing, along with a rather nice tea pot and cups. Clayton disappears to his office and returns a few minutes later with a simple but decorative China tea pot and four matching handle-​less cups. Rivka joins the other three around the table. r ivka:

Oh my, these are rather nice. [with a wink to Anna] You’re very domesticated, Clayton. Juanita has trained you well! c layton: [with a smile] I try my best.

88 Act 3 r ivka:

I know you said you need to do some administration Jack, but I’d love to chat about your project. At least while we have a cup of tea. j ack: Well, that’s as good an excuse as any not to do my least favorite job. Are we all in? a nna: Of course! c layton: As I recall, you had given us a continuum from unrestrained violence to absolute nonviolence. And between the two you gave us five or six other positions with various commitments to nonviolence and restraints on violence. And my guess would be that there are even more positions on the continuum. j ack: You’d be right. It seems to me that any understanding that sits between the poles of absolute nonviolence and unrestrained violence would be relevant. But I want to emphasize again, from my understanding, that nonviolence is a practice and not merely a theory. That is the pragmatic aspect, and I’ll come to that in due course. Before that, I would like us to mull over the tradition that claims pride of place between the extremes. r ivka: [with a wry smile] And that would be the just war tradition. My own position. j ack: Exactly! And I’m glad you called it a tradition. Sometimes people speak of the just war doctrine. But it’s not as fixed as that. It’s a more fluid set of ideas that have grown and changed over time. It is rooted in the notion that though wars might be inevitable and even necessary, some wars that have been fought have been unjust, and some things that happen in all wars are immoral, that there is such a thing as war crimes. c layton: The very idea of a war crime seems to indicate that some happenings in war are not considered criminal and some are. Different actions in war are given a different moral status.33 j ack: That’s true. The same can be said for the idea of the rules of war. Some things in war follow the rules and some do not. a nna: Like the rule that if a soldier surrenders, then they ought to be taken prisoner and not killed. r ivka: Or that, generally speaking, civilians who are not soldiers in arms or wearing uniforms should also not be killed or mistreated.

33

For an analysis of the crime of war, see Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21–​33.

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j ack:

89

Yes. And all those rules about what is acceptable, and not, in war are part of the just war tradition. The tradition is what Andrew Fiala has called a critical theory, in the sense that the tradition calls us to be critical of war.34

The four friends lapse into a thoughtful silence, each sipping their tea, and ruminating on what a critique of war might look like. r ivka: [emerging first from her reverie] As I  recall, the just war tradition sets requirements for what might be considered a just war. Requirements such as a just cause. j ack: That’s true. But the list of requirements differs in the various narratives of the just war. Some are rather simple, and others complex. The differing accounts all have in common that a set of criteria are used against which any particular war, or proposed war, can be measured.35 a nna: Do you have a list of the criteria? It would be helpful for me, and for my students when we look at issues of war and peace in theology. j ack: I have several lists, but I have one that might be apropos to your religion classes. It’s a statement on the just war by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. a nna: That would be very helpful. j ack: I use it as a handout; the ideas and comments are from Robert Holmes. I think I have a few copies in my filing cabinet. Give me a minute Jack moves quickly to his office. After looking in several filing drawers, he finds what he is looking for and returns to the table and hands a copy to each of his friends. j ack:

34 35

There you go. As you can see, it’s quite a set of criteria. [he reads from the paper]

The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), ix. John Howard Yoder states: “There is no official position to which all have subscribed. The tradition, however, is at work wherever: a set of criteria is named whereby one can measure political situations, with a respectable level of accuracy and objectivity, in order to support the case that the evil of a given war, which one ‘justifies,’ will be less than the evil of the other war which one prevents,” When War is Unjust, 2.

90 Act 3 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

Just Cause; “war is permissible only to confront ‘a real and certain danger,’ i.e. to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence, and to secure basic human rights.” Competent Authority: “[W]‌ar must be declared by those with responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals.” Comparative Justice: In recognition of the fact that there may be some justice on each side, “[e]‌very party to a conflict should acknowledge the limits of its ‘just cause’ and the consequent requirement to use only limited means in pursuit of objectives.” Right Intention: “[W]‌ar can be legitimately intended only for the reasons set forth above as a just cause.” Last Resort:  “For resort to war to be justified, all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted.” Probability of Success:  “This criterion is not precisely stated, but the bishops affirm that its purpose is to prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance when the outcome will clearly be disproportionate or futile.” Proportionality: “[T]‌he damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms This principle of proportionality applies throughout the conduct of the war as well as to the decision to begin warfare.” Two principles, finally govern the conduct of war even when justifiably resorted to: Proportionality: as above. Discrimination: “[T]‌he lives of innocent persons may never be taken directly, regardless of the purpose alleged for doing so. Just response to aggression must be directed against unjust aggressors, not against innocent people caught up in a war not of their making.”36

r ivka: [looking at the paper] That’s a good account of the tradition. It’s why I am a fan. It makes the criteria for a war to be just to be very rigorous. A war is not merely just because you want land or possessions, or you have a disagreement of policy or ideology. j ack: That’s true. Michael Walzer, who wrote perhaps the standard text on the just war, suggests that war is really ever only justified in self-​defense against an aggressor. And even then, what

36 Holmes, On War and Morality, 164.

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you can do in a war is bounded by a strong moral understanding about its limits and who may be involved. a nna: John Yoder, writing admittedly from a Mennonite perspective, goes even further. Having explained the just war position, he claims that if a nation was utterly serious about the criteria, it would never enter a war.37 In other words, to take the just war tradition seriously is theoretically to admit that a war may be justified, but in practice all the known wars that have been fought have been fought unjustly. r ivka: [with a frown] I admit that is the case. Though I said earlier that in my view the Second World War was entered into by the Allies justly—​they had a just cause, that of aggression—​in the prosecution of the war unjust measures were taken. c layton: Clearly the bombing of cities with the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians would be a case of unjust prosecution of the war, as would the dropping of nuclear weapons on Japan. r ivka: And that is beside the myriad breaches of the moral rules by ordinary soldiers in every theater of battle. As General Sherman said in the burning of Atlanta during the civil war, “War is hell.” By that he meant that once a war is justly entered into, anything is acceptable by the defensive side. The blame for the burning of Atlanta was not his own, but the Confederacy who brought the war upon themselves.38 c layton: By the same token, those who justify the fire-​bombing, and atomic bombing of Japan in 1945 might argue that Japan brought the destruction upon themselves by their aggression. j ack: [with a frown] And they do. But in doing so both Sherman and those who use his [makes air quotes] “war is hell” argument place themselves outside the just war tradition. Clayton reaches for the tea pot to refresh their cups, but realizes that they have already finished the pot. He repairs quickly to his room to add more hot water and returns a few minutes later. c layton: [pouring tea into the delicate China cups] So, Jack, do you see any point to the just war tradition. It seems that nations who go to

37 38

When War is Unjust, 79–​80. On Sherman, see, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 32–​33.

92 Act 3 war have more often than not ignored the criteria, or have merely paid lip-​service to it. But once war is begun it seems restraint is often laid to one side. r ivka: [placing her cup back on the table after a delicious sip] Before you answer that Jack, [turning to address Clayton] this tea is extraordinary. Do you know anywhere near by where I might purchase some for myself? c layton: Not immediately near-​by. But Ithaca has a wonderful tea shop where they import specialty teas. I’d try there. It’s a bit of a drive, but well worth it. When we run out that’s where we’ll try first. And if not, I’m sure there are importers on the Web who supply direct. j ack: Returning to your question, Clayton. Though the just war tradition is not always followed, it has produced an important effect. It stands as something of a critique of the actions of nations. And since the mid-​nineteenth century, the nations of the world have entered into agreements regarding the conduct of war. We generally term them the Geneva Conventions, after the first Red Cross Convention in Geneva in 1864. That Convention spoke of the treatment of the wounded in war. Other Conventions followed, such as the 1874 Brussels Declaration, signed by twenty-​ seven nations and related to administration of occupied populations, forbidden weapons, the humane treatment of prisoners of war, and such like.39 Collectively, these have become loosely considered the laws of war. Though not every combatant country has signed the declarations, and those that have sometimes ignore them, still the laws of war have had the effect of limiting violence. a nna: I suppose it is on the basis of these laws and conventions that war trials are held. I’m thinking of the Nuremberg trials after the Second World War. I have a dim memory, too, of a war trial after the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s. r ivka: Ah, yes! The trial of Slobodan Milošević, Yugoslavia’s one-​time dictator. He was tried at the Hague for crimes against humanity, in the International Court of Justice, under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. As I recall, he was most uncooperative and

39

See, Yoder When War is Unjust, 142–​146, for a summary of the major Conventions from 1856–​1981.

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did not accept the legitimacy of the court. The trial dragged on for years and he died before the court could return a verdict. And even more recently Radovan Karadžić was sentenced to life in prison by the same court for crimes against humanity in Bosnia during the same unrest.40 j ack: Even so, the war conventions and the fact that the world has such a court, suggests that limitations on the violence of war has become a normative idea, at least for many nations of the world. a nna: [with a cynical laugh] My absolute pacifist tradition still has major problems with it. I find it abhorrent that we can talk about war and the utter devastation it brings and suggest that some forms of killing in war are more acceptable than others. It’s as if the bombing of British cities by the Nazis in 1940 was somehow less acceptable than the fire-​bombing of Hamburg and Dresden in 1944. Thousands of civilians were killed in both instances. Neither passed the just war criteria against the killing of civilians. For me, the just war tradition fails utterly. j ack: It fails for me too. But the tradition has value in that, at least theoretically, it places limitations on violence.41 It at least gives pause for thought before the massive destruction of war is engaged in. Clayton fills up the tea cups for the final time, draining the last drop from the pot. It is sufficient for just half a cup each.

jack:



rivka:

40 41

Before we get on with the day, I just need to ask about our spring department retreat. It will be upon us in a few weeks’ time. I’ve booked the college retreat center for an overnight stay. We’ll have some department task to complete—​annual assessment, new course planning and such, but I’ve scheduled late morning and afternoon for something collegial. We’ll have to leave by four in the afternoon. Something philosophical. I  did enjoy last year’s conversation about anti-​semitism in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. What’s on the agenda this year?

See, “Radovan Karadžić war crimes sentence increased to life in prison,” The Guardian, March 3, 2019. Fiala in The Just War Myth states:  “The just war ideal should remind us of our guilt and responsibility,” xi, and “The just war theory gives us an ideal toward which we can aspire,” 26.

94 Act 3 j ack: c layton:

That’s for us to decide. Any ideas? We could look at philosophy in the age of Trump? Or the latest developments in ethics? [after a pause for thought] Or, we could just have a longer session looking at your project Jack. j ack: I don’t want to monopolize things. r ivka: [Looking over her pince-​nez] Don’t be silly! We’ve so enjoyed our chats this semester. I think we should continue. a nna: Agreed! Jack might, at last, get his project finished and to his publisher. [with a laugh] And we can get on with the rest of our lives!

act 4

Pragmatic Nonviolence

Scene 1

The parking lot of The Johnson House, the college’s residential retreat center on the shore of Seneca Lake in upstate New York. The house is an Edwardian former hunting and fishing lodge, one-​time summer home to the Johnson family. The Johnsons bequeathed the lodge to the college and it was transformed into a twenty-​bedroom facility, with meeting rooms, a dining room, a library, and a well-​stocked bar. It is late afternoon, and Clayton is pulling bags from the back of his yellow Jeep Wrangler Unlimited. Jack, Anna, and Rivka are standing close by. r ivka:

That’s very kind of you Clayton. I’m afraid my wrist is still not right, and so difficult to schlep* these bags. The doctor says it might take up to a year before I’m back to my old self. [frowning] He even suggested that, at my age, it might never return to normal functioning. But such is life. c layton: [adding the final bag to the pile he had created on the loose-​stone driveway] Life is change. According to the Dao, the secret of life is managing the inevitability of change. We would all do well to learn how to go with the flow of life, and not against it. Rivka reaches for her battered L. L. Bean duffle bag, and Jack steps in j ack: r ivka:

I’ve got that. I suppose going with the flow is learning your limitations and working with them. c layton: Exactly! It also means learning how to cooperate with others, and not think that you have to do everything yourself. r ivka: [smiling] Point taken! I’ll go with the flow. Let’s find out which rooms we are in. And after we’ve checked in let’s meet in the conservatory for coffee and tea. I’m desperate for a drink.

* Yiddish, carry or haul.

© Andrew Fitz-​G ibbon, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004445994_005

96 Act 4 The four colleagues walk to the house reception desk, and discover that Anna and Rivka are sharing, as are Jack and Clayton. After leaving their bags in their rooms, the four gather again, with their drinks in the airy conservatory, with a panoramic view over the lake. a nna:

I’ve never felt quite comfortable in old hunting lodges. [she is facing a large buck’s head, mounted to the wall over the large fireplace at one end of the conservatory] c layton: [grimacing] I know what you mean. r ivka: [with raised eyebrows] I  didn’t know you were squeamish, Clayton. c layton: I’m not really. I just can’t get it out of my head the violence the poor deer suffered at its end. And then to display it? To make it a trophy, as if the hunter had accomplished something worthwhile? I don’t get it. r ivka: Then there is much about upstate living that you will not get. It will be a learning experience for you, and you’ll be all the better for it. But the thought of animal violence leads us nicely into the subject of our retreat. Where are we going with the project Jack? j ack: So far, we have considered what a better world might look like. I have suggested that one of the major factors preventing that better world is violence. And that to work toward a better life we would be well served to try to limit violence as far as we can. I  thought we might now consider another philosophical tradition—​ American pragmatism, especially the work of William James—​and how in my work I  am linking that to nonviolence. c layton: I hope you will also consider the pragmatism of the East in Confucius and Laozi? j ack: Of course! r ivka: Excellent! We only have a few minutes before dinner, but let’s make a start. a nna: Can I make my repeated plea. As the only non-​philosopher here, you might have to slow things down. [smiling] A little remedial work please! I’m assuming that pragmatism has something to do with the way we normally use the word “pragmatic”; that is to think about things realistically and practically, rather than idealistically. j ack: Yes, that’s a large part of the pragmatic tradition. And you can probably see immediately that when I  speak of pragmatic

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nonviolence I am speaking of something that is realistic, practical, and not merely idealistic. I  make a distinction between nonviolence that is utopian, nonviolence that is dogmatic, and nonviolence that is pragmatic. r ivka: I assume that dogmatic nonviolence would equate to an absolute nonviolence, that is given to us by an authority, with no room for discussion, deviation, or compromise? j ack: Yes. a nna: And that sounds like my Mennonite absolute pacifist tradition, yet I  have not before considered it dogmatic, [pauses in thought] though I  suppose it is, given the way you explain dogmatism, Rivka. r ivka: And utopian nonviolence is a merely theoretical ideal. [pausing to find the right words] One with little practical value in the real world? j ack: That’s it. And when I think of nonviolence, I am not thinking of either of those two positions. [savoring a slow drink] If you recall from our earlier conversations, we have been pondering how to make the world better, and that is a very practical affair. If someone’s well-​being is compromised by violence, my suggestion is that to find a nonviolent way, a nonviolent method, would likely make the situation better. [taking another sip] And further I’ll suggest that a nonviolent method is only likely to be followed by someone who has internalized the principles of nonviolence, developed the character traits of nonviolence, and hence has become a nonviolent person. [pausing and noticing Rivka’s frown] OK! Here’s an example:  We’ve all been in those committee meetings where two sides oppose each other. A shouting match ensues, with not a little bullying. Hurtful words are said, and the well-​being of all suffers. It does not get physically violent, but harsh words and emotional blackmail cause harm. You will know there are a couple of departments in the college where such a heated argument happened years ago, and folk are still nursing their wounds. c layton: Though I’m new around here, I could replicate your stories from my last institution. j ack: Unfortunately, it’s everywhere. So, in the context of our working lives, my suggestion is that if we can find a method of speaking to one another, and making decisions together, being community together, that is intentionally nonviolent—​a nonviolent

98 Act 4 practice—​then the well-​being of our colleagues, and the campus climate, would be enhanced. It’s what Bill Gay has termed linguistic nonviolence.1 r ivka: It sounds reasonable so far, but as you know the American pragmatic tradition is very diverse. Will you demonstrate in your work how diverse the pragmatic tradition has been? j ack: I will and [he is interrupted by the sound of a large gong announcing that dinner is served] I do so like the way we are summoned to dinner! [with a gentle laugh] It makes me feel that we might almost still be in the Edwardian age. a nna: Well, I for one am glad we’re not! Imagine having to change your clothes at least three times a day. Dress for the morning, dress for the afternoon, and then dress for dinner! No thanks. c layton: [standing] The complexity of pragmatism will have to wait until later. [beckoning toward the door from the conservatory to the dining room] Shall we?

Scene 2

After dinner, the Philosophy and Religion Department faculty members repair to the library where coffee and tea are served. Several groups gather from the department and other guests in the facility. Jack, Rivka, Anna, and Clayton arrive at the front of the line to be served. c layton: [as he stirs sugar in his cup of coffee and disposes of the paper sachet in the garbage, and turning to Jack] I have to say that the vegetarian food I’ve had so far on campus, and here at the Johnson, is above average. My last institution was a nightmare! I actually had a colleague tell me, at a formal college lunch where there were no vegetarian options, that I could pick the bacon off the salad, and take an extra helping of chips! a nna: [raising her eyebrows] In all seriousness? c layton: That’s the truth. We had an administration that was keen on diversity but managed to overlook food diversity. They said it was a matter of cost.

1 William C. Gay, “The Practice of Linguistic Nonviolence.” Peace Review, 10, 1998, 545–​547, n4.

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The four friends walk toward a low table with four over-​stuffed leather chairs. The table is peppered with journals, but with just enough room to place a few cups. j ack:

Let’s grab those chairs before someone else does. [turning back toward Clayton] To be honest we had to fight pretty hard to get where we are. Our more vocal vegan colleagues, helped by a growing minority of vegetarian students, bothered the administration after every event. I don’t think it was ill will on the part of the college, just a lack of awareness.

They each settle into the comfy chairs, and drink silently, looking around at the oak-​paneled library, taking in its ambience. After a few minutes Rivka continues their conversation. r ivka:

As I said, Jack, I’m interested in how you will deal with the complexities of the pragmatist tradition. Will you favor any one of the traditional pragmatists over the others? j ack: I tend to lean toward William James’ understanding, [observing Anna’s puzzled expression] but for Anna’s sake let me just say a little about four of the great thinkers who we tend to think of as the foundation of pragmatism. c layton: [adding helpfully] That would be James, Charles Peirce, John Dewey and who else?2 j ack: Jane Addams! She’s often missed out.3 r ivka: As women generally have been. j ack: I’m afraid so, and it’s important to revise the traditional canon to include such important women thinkers. Each of the four in their own way tried to address some of the traditional questions that philosophers have asked relating to metaphysics r ivka: [interrupting] That is, questions of being: What is the case? j ack: And epistemology

2 Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–​1914), William James (1842–​1910), John Dewey (1859–​1952). For a helpful analysis of these philosophers and more contemporary pragmatists see, Michael Bacon, Pragmatism: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). 3 See commentary on Addams in Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Jane Addams Reader (Basic Books: New York 2002).

100 Act 4 r ivka: [interrupting again] Questions related to knowing. How we know what we think we know. j ack: And ethics. r ivka: [interrupting a third time] Questions relating to behavior. How we ought to live. j ack: And ethics I  take in a very broad span. For me ethical issues are all those issues relating to human behavior, what a good life might be, and how we interact with one another and our surroundings. clayton: [lifting both hands, palms outward, in a universal stop sign] Slow down! Feels like you are moving in on my turf. [with a feigned annoyance] We political philosophers get testy when someone muscles in! j ack: [laughing] Apologies! It’s just that the traditional subject of ethics—​how we should live—​is also the subject of social and political philosophy. We separate the disciplines only for analysis. [more seriously] Don’t you agree? c layton: I’ll reserve judgment for now. Getting back to your point. You say that the pragmatists tried to answer the same questions philosophers have always worked with. j ack: But as an ethicist, I’m most interested in how they answered the central ethical questions about life—​how we get on with each other, why some ways of getting on are better than other ways, and what would make the world a better place in which to live. c layton: And, of course, those are the central questions of political philosophy. [with a broad grin] We are on the same page. r ivka: [folding her arms tight with a shiver] You know even though the days are warm, it still gets chilly at night. I wish I’d brought my Pashmina to dinner. a nna: [getting to her feet] I’ll get it for you. r ivka: Thank you, my dear! You do look after me well. It’s in the top of my bag. a nna: I’ll be right back. Don’t say anything important. Anna returns with Rivka’s paisley Pashmina, and Rivka gratefully wraps it around her shoulders a nna: r ivka:

That is so beautiful! My birthday present from my son Benny last year. It’s just right for these chilly spring evenings. [pausing] That’s much better! You were saying Jack?

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j ack:

That the pragmatists considered the traditional questions of philosophy but looked at them more practically. They were uninterested in arguments for argument’s sake. They wanted to know what difference a philosophical idea has in the real world, what difference it might have for human behavior. In fact, if an idea did not have a practical effect in the world in which we live, the pragmatists were not interested in the idea.4 r ivka: I can see why such ideas might draw you toward pragmatism, as your project is concerned with how to make the world better. But I have to say, that beyond that basic impulse, I have never found the pragmatists to share much in common with each other. It is a very vague and woolly tradition. [pulling her Pashmina tighter] It is not exact enough for my taste. j ack: [with a rueful smile] It won’t surprise you Rivka, that is why I am drawn to the tradition. Like the pragmatists, I  don’t think we have an authority to give fixed, certain, and final answers. Descartes’ quest for certainty before we can make a claim to knowledge is not practically helpful. c layton: You mean Descartes’ notion that we must doubt everything until we can find something beyond doubt on which to build knowledge? j ack: Yes. His famous cogito ergo sum. I think therefore I am. The only thing that Descartes could not doubt was that here he was thinking about certainty and doubt. [pausing to drink tea] But the pragmatists rejected that approach. For them, you only doubt things when you have good reasons to. You begin with experience in the world, with your relationship with the people and things around you. You don’t need to doubt your everyday experiences and interactions. You don’t need to look for a foundation for knowledge, or an authority to give you certainty. Philosophy worth its salt is a philosophy that works.

4 William James: “The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?—​fated or free?—​ material or spiritual?—​here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than the other notion is true?” Pragmatism, in Writings 1902–​1910, editor Bruce Kuklick (New York: The Library of America, 1987), 506.

102 Act 4 c layton: j ack:

Isn’t that what James called philosophy’s “cash-​value”? Yes, it is. For James the “cash-​value” of anything is its practical meaning. In his book Varieties of Religious Experience, in a passage dealing with the material world, he argues that what matters about matter, [grinning] excuse the pun! is the way we experience the material world. It is irrelevant whether matter is temporal or eternal, is one or is many, is epiphenomenal of spirit, or vice versa. James said that the cash-​value of matter is our physical sensations, how we experience material things.5 a nna: [with a puzzled frown] Does that mean, Jack, that pragmatists reject any kind of theology, any talk of God, any understanding of mystery, or awe? j ack: Not necessarily. But as they say about relationships, [smiling] it’s complicated! r ivka: At last! Talking about cash-​value and being practical is all well and good. But being merely practical assigns much philosophy to the garbage dump of history. If I recall correctly, James said that any books that didn’t deal with practical meaning may be “committed to the flames.”6 And, of course, James was merely following Hume.7 It has always seemed too drastic to me, too reductionistic. It reduces everything to my small experience. And the burning of books to me is shande*—​it’s tragic! a nna: I agree! There is more to the world than my mere, and limited, experience of it. [animatedly] Surely, there is so much more to the world that I could possibly understand, not to say everything we study in theology! 5 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, in Writings 1902–​1910, 398. “For what seriousness can possibly remain in debating philosophic propositions that will never make an appreciable difference to us in action? And what could it matter, if all propositions were practically indifferent, which of them we could agree to call true or which false? (399). And in Pragmatism: “But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such word [“God,” “Matter,” “Reason,” the Absolute,” “Energy,” and so on] as closing your quest. You must bring out of each word its practical cash-​value, set it at work within the stream of your experience,” ibid., 509. 6 Varieties of Religious Experience, ibid., 398. 7 David Hume, “If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, ‘Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?’ No. ‘Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?’ No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion,” Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, (Whithorn, Anodus Books, 2017), 95. * Yiddish, repulsive.

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The group of colleagues at the next table look over in unison as Anna raises her voice. Anna colors with embarrassment. a nna: [shrinking in her chair a little] I’m so sorry! I didn’t know I felt so strongly about this. j ack: Please don’t apologize. I’m glad you have convictions. But my reading of the pragmatists is not as dreadful for your position as you fear. Let me try and explain more clearly. [looking at the empty cups on the table] Something else to drink? r ivka: I think we should get a bottle of wine. My treat. Jack see if they have a decent Malbec in my price range. [she hands Jack two twenty-​ dollar bills] And while you’re away I’ll try and help Anna with the pragmatists. [Jack leaves and Rivka smiles at Anna] Most philosophy can be distilled to its main tenets, and it’s not really that complicated. I’ve found that the same ideas circle round every generation or so, and though I’m not doubting the creativity of my fellow philosophers, as Alfred Whitehead said, everything after Plato is a footnote. a nna: Thanks Rivka. Sometimes I feel I’m in over my head. r ivka: Though we talk about the American pragmatic tradition, the ideas are much older. Even James subtitled his book Pragmatism, as “a new name for some old ways of thinking.” It was James who first gave Peirce the moniker “pragmatist.”8 It’s a strange phenomenon, but many pragmatists have been reluctant to call themselves such, William James being the exception. a nna: I suppose because in general use, pragmatic is often perceived as something negative. Someone is pragmatic who is unprincipled. Or the pragmatic person is willing to compromise anything for a result. I don’t suppose many philosophers would want to be labeled as such. r ivka: That is largely true. But though I, too, do not call myself a pragmatist, the philosophical tradition is more robust than pragmatism in the popular imagination. For Peirce, a central idea is that knowledge is arrived at by collective inquiry.9 In other words, knowledge is not arrived at by a direct intuition in the mind. We understand by being in conversation with others as we interact in the world. We can never be absolutely sure that we have arrived at truth. [pausing] We 8 James said that pragmatism: “was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled’ How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ in the ‘Popular Science Monthly for January of that year,” Pragmatism, in Writings 1902–​1910, 506. 9 Bacon, Pragmatism, 20.

104 Act 4 call that fallibilism. But we test our beliefs in conversation with others, and we are willing to change when we find a belief that makes better sense of our experience of the world. And what we believe is equal to the effects of that belief in our experience.10 That was Peirce’s way of speaking of James’ “cash-​value.” a nna: Let me see if I’m understanding this so far. r ivka: Go ahead! a nna: It sounds to me that the pragmatists didn’t think much of ideas that had no practical effect. Such ideas were irrelevant to them. So, I’m assuming that many ideas we deal with in theology have no cash-​ value. Christian theologians, in the fourth century, argued interminably about whether God was one, or three-​in-​one, and if three-​ in-​one then what was the relationship between the three. Were they three separate persons? Was one prior to the other two? And in what sense were they equal? I’m guessing that the pragmatists would say that such speculation had no cash-​value, no effect in the real world, and so was irrelevant. r ivka: And not just irrelevant, but also nonsensical. It literally makes no sense. Whether one holds God to be one or three-​in-​one, and in what way, has no cash-​value. [with a grin] At least we Jews were spared the silliness of it all! James was accustomed to ask students in his classes in what way the world would be different if this alternative, or that alternative, was true.11 Jack returns with the wine and four glasses, pours each of them a glass and retakes his seat. j ack: r ivka:

10

11

Did I miss anything? I was just explaining a little about Peirce and his view of the effects of a concept being the whole of the meaning of the concept.

Peirce:  “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our concept to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object,” cited in Bacon, Pragmatism, 25. James on Peirce:  “Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought’s meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance,” Pragmatism in Writings 1902–​1910, 506. Pragmatism in Writings 1902–​1910, 507.

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a nna:

And therefore, how ideas that have no practical effect were, for the pragmatists, not claims to truth. [with a double fist pump] I think I got it! But it saddens me that for the pragmatists much of my career, my degrees in theology, my forthcoming book on early Mennonite pacifism as a religio-​political phenomenon—​ all of it would be worthless … c layton: [interrupting with a broad grin] You finished your book! When will it be published? a nna: I haven’t heard yet. The peer reviews were positive and helpful, and I submitted my changes last week. [with evident delight] I’m so excited! It might sound silly, but I can’t wait to see the cover. [with a look of defeat] But the pragmatists would say my work is not any kind of truth claim. Perhaps, for them, it’s just a game with words. j ack: Not necessarily. The pragmatists had different views about how you worked out the practical effects of an idea. I tend to think of the tradition as a family of philosophies. Each shares a family resemblance, but each have their own personality. The resemblance is in the emphasis on practicality, but beyond that each philosopher works out pragmatism differently r ivka: [interrupting] Which is why I  do not call myself a pragmatist. [laughing a little cynically] It seems pragmatism can mean anything you want it to! j ack: For Peirce, practical effects would be empirically verifiable. As a trained natural scientist, he leaned heavily toward the claim that to be counted as knowledge, an idea must be subject to testing, results found, and re-​tested to achieve the same result.12 In other words, practical consequences must be observable and testable. r ivka: Peirce sounds like the later logical positivists of the twentieth century who denied that any kind of religious or moral statements—​any value statements at all—​because not empirically testable, were meaningless. In other words, because moral or religious statements could not be tested, they were discarded as irrelevant. And I think James differed.

12

Bacon states, “Peirce’s version of the pragmatic maxim anticipates the logical positivist’s principle of verificationism, according to which meaningful statements are those (and only those) for which we can establish whether or not such statements are true,” Pragmatism, 27.

106 Act 4 jack:

He did. For James, though he agreed with Peirce that concepts had to have practical effects to be meaningful, for James practical effects included any kind of effect. As a psychologist he suggested that a psychological effect was as important as an observable and testable effect. So, whereas for Peirce any kind of religious idea was meaningless, James made room for religion. Religious ideas can have a profound effect in people’s lives. [pausing and looking to Anna and smiling] And that’s why you need not despair of pragmatism, Anna.13 anna: An example might be, if I understand you correctly, the religious believer whose belief in a caring God leads her to care for the poor in a life of service, perhaps? jack: A perfect example. And I  think here we would have to include Jane Addams. Though there is some dispute among scholars as to how much religious ideals played a part in shaping her practical social work, I think it is fair to say that for Addams religious ideas must have practical value. Theological speculation is quite worthless. c layton: Perhaps I  could give an example of the practical effect—​and therefore worth—​of religious ideas. I’m thinking of those Buddhists who believe in inter-​being. r ivka: Meaning? c layton: That everything is intimately connected through an unseen web of life. Simplistically, a plant grows and is nourished by earth, water and sun, I harvest the plant and make it my food. I in turn am nourished by the food, water, air and sunlight. Through oxygen breathed out by the trees I  live a healthy life. The trees in turn use the carbon dioxide I exhale. In time I die and return to the ground. My body nourishes the plants. Everything coheres in everything else.14 [pauses] And I  assume, Jack, that for Peirce the concept of inter-​being could not be tested. [looks to Jack who nods 13

14

James: “If theological ideas prove to have a value from concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged,” Pragmatism in Writings 1902–​1910, 507, italics original. Buddhist inter-​being is one of many monist views of the universe. The phrase was coined by Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh. It seems to mean the interconnectedness of all things that exist. For an extensive discussion of the philosophical problem of the one and the many, and a pragmatic understanding of it, see James’ chapter “the One and the Many,” in Pragmatism in Writings 1902–​1910, 541–​557.

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in agreement] The Buddhist’s belief leads her to the practical effect of vegetarianism and, and as the Zen statement has it [makes air quotes] “saving all sentient beings.”15 j ack: Exactly! James wanted to hold in tension the notion that science explains the empirical world, but religion offers certain psychological benefits to people. A religious idea such as inter-​being, for James, would also have, emotionally considered, a high pragmatic value.16 In other words, it has cash-​value. It makes you feel better about yourself and your place in the world, and affects the way you treat other people, animals and the earth itself. c layton: So, the difference between Peirce and James seems to be that for Peirce concepts such as inter-​being remain meaningless, because you can’t empirically prove them, whereas for James such concepts do have practical effects in the world, if it changes someone’s behavior, and is thereby meaningful.17 j ack: That’s about it. For Peirce pragmatism exposes metaphysical or ethical questions to be meaningless, whereas, for James, pragmatism looks at metaphysical and ethical questions in terms of their practical effects. r ivka: For Peirce, then, philosophy is reduced to the natural sciences. For James, philosophy looks at every kind of practical effect. a nna: [with a puzzled frown] Perhaps I  am missing something, but James’ view could work quite negatively. I can see how the positive effects of Clayton’s Buddhist caring for animals because of his belief in inter-​being, but what of the white supremacist’s belief that the culture of white civilization is superior to all other cultures. Such a belief is untestable, and for Peirce is meaningless. But for James, if such a belief has practical effect, which it does 15

16 17

Thich Nhat Hanh has popularized the notion of inter-​being, and his many writings are suffused with the idea. Here is one example: “If you are a good organic gardener and you have the eyes of a bodhisattva, looking at a rose you can see the garbage, and looking at the garbage you can see a rose. Roses and garbage inter-​are. Without a rose we cannot have garbage; and without garbage we cannot have a rose. They need each other very much. The rose and the garbage are equal. The garbage is just as precious as the rose,” The Heart of Understanding:  Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita (Berkeley:  Parallax, 1988), 31–​32. James: “We all have an ear for this monistic music: it elevates and reassures,” Ibid., 553. Bacon: “James urges that philosophy must address lived experience by combining respect for the facts discovered by natural science with space for moral conviction and religious belief,” Pragmatism, 29.

108 Act 4 through racist and prejudicial actions against people of color, then the white supremacist’s belief is a meaningful belief. That doesn’t seem right. [a more puzzled expression] And I think I prefer Peirce’s conclusion. But that doesn’t feel right either. j ack: Yes, it is tricky. James in his book, The Will to Believe, makes an argument that everyone has a right to believe what they want. But he is clear, and here he agrees with Peirce, that truth—​or better justifiable beliefs—​are arrived at through conversation, through dialogue, through argument, and through coming to consensus. So, James is not saying that any belief that has practical consequences is equal in importance or truthfulness to any other belief. Beliefs that are able to be tested empirically ought to be tested. r ivka: Like the white supremacist claim that to be white is genetically superior. Such is an empirical claim that proves false when tested. j ack: Yes! But ideas are also tested through dialogue, argument, and conversation. Reasons for beliefs must be given, and those reasons tested too. And ideas are tested by ideas which we already hold to be true. r ivka: So, if we hold the belief that all people are to be treated equally because we all share a common humanity, then the idea of the white supremacist is tested in dialogue with the truth of the equality of all people. j ack: Exactly! But even more important for James is the practical effects. And here I want to add effects. [emphasizing the next two words] for good. James subsumes that which is true under that which is good.18 He really advocates a principled pragmatism. Effects may be good or bad. The effect of the Buddhist’s belief in inter-​being in caring for all sentient beings is consonant with the principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, and respect. The effects of the white supremacist’s belief are not. We are justified, then, in rejecting the white supremacist’s ideas. c layton: And politically in opposing them, through every available means. j ack: Of course. Let me give you one example of the way James’ thought practically about the extreme violence of war from his 1910 essay “the Moral Equivalent of War.”19 18 James: “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons,” Pragmatism in Writings 1902–​1910, 520, italics original. 19 In Writings 1902–​1910, 1281–​1293.

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r ivka: [with a knowing smile] Ah, I  wondered when you would get around to this! j ack: In this important document, James makes it very clear that he is a pacifist, admitting “pacifist tho’ I am.”20 He recognizes, though, that most people are not pacifists and he marvels that people so often chose war over peace. He speaks of war as the glory of the past that holds a fascination for the present and admits that war “was the gory nurse that trained societies to cohesiveness.”21 a nna: So, he sees some value in the wars of the past? j ack: In a way. But he also believed that a peaceful socialist future awaited humanity.22 He suggests that humanity has grown beyond pure looting and mastery of others, and that wars in his day (and ironically he was writing just before the First World War) nations needed to find some other pretext for going to war. Even so, he suggests that war and the military mind that prepares for war has a certain benefit. And that benefit is to train certain “manly” virtues—​such as hardihood—​in young men that are absent save for some form of disciplined social engagement. It is the disciplinary function of the military mindset that James sees as important and which works in help create a disciplined and stable society. a nna: A pacifist who values military life? Isn’t that a contradiction? j ack: At first glance it is. But remember, James is a pragmatist and so he is on the lookout for that which works. War as destruction does not work, but the disciplined life of the military does work in making young men into responsible citizens who do not merely think of themselves. c layton: Does he propose anything positive? j ack: He does. James wants to preserve the good aspects of military discipline for young men and proposes a form of national service—​ conscription to a number of years working in industry, social work and national infrastructure building. This he suggests would

20 Ibid, 1284. 21 Ibid, 1283. 22 James: “I devoutly believe in the reign of peace and in the gradual advent of some sort of socialist equilibrium. The fatalistic view of the war-​function is to me nonsense, for I know that war-​making is due to definite motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, just like any other form of enterprise,” ibid 1289.

110 Act 4 work both in service to the nation and in shaping the character of young men as they enter adulthood. r ivka: That sound not dissimilar to the programs Roosevelt initiated during and after the Great Depression—​the Civilian Conservation Corps among them. Those schemes were highly successful and are the basis for modern America’s infrastructure. j ack: Exactly! James’ pacifism was not merely theoretical but had practical effect. a nna: But was he really as sexist as he sounds? All about young men? Any mention of young women? j ack: Alas, the only mention of women is as wives who will benefit by the disciplined young men in becoming better husbands. Unfortunately, too, he speaks of the moral equivalent of war as a war on Nature, which sits uncomfortably with our current understandings of the environment. He was after all a child of his day. r ivka: [with a humph] And so we excuse the partially enlightened, well-​ meaning, but sadly misguided males again! The four friends sit in for a few minutes, as each ponders the import of their conversation. Eventually, Clayton breaks the silence. c layton: Jack you mentioned the four great philosophers of pragmatism. You have not yet said anything about Dewey and little about Addams. j ack: [sipping his wine, then laughing nervously] I doubt that I can do justice to Dewey’s body of work, and I am by no means a Dewey scholar. He touched on just about everything. But here’s what I think is important for my purposes. He was very clear that philosophers ought to address problems that confront people in particular times and places.23 Like Peirce, he was not interested in speculative theories. Dewey too was rooted in the natural sciences. He too thought that our beliefs—​he preferred the phrase “warranted assertibility” to “belief”24—​are always provisional, that we arrive at them socially through interaction with others and conversation, and that we should be willing to change as we 23

Dewey: “philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men,” cited in Bacon, Pragmatism, 49. 24 Bacon, Pragmatism, 53.

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gain deeper understanding. Dewey also thought that individuals can only develop when certain social conditions are present.25 [pausing to look around at his friends] And you can see where I am going with this? r ivka: [looking over her pince-​nez] That the social conditions required for human development and growth are those of nonviolence, perhaps? j ack: [laughing] You can write the book for me! In fact, Dewey was a pacifist, though not often acknowledged as such. At least, we can infer that from his reasons for opposition to American involvement in the First World War.26 r ivka: And wasn’t Jane Addams also a pacifist? You have not said much about her. j ack: Yes, that’s true. She had a remarkable career in opposing violence. Her pacifism was most clearly demonstrated in her opposition to the First World War. In fact, she suffered much public ridicule during the war years, but was rehabilitated in the public mind in the 1920s. In 1931 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.27 a nna: My only knowledge of Addams comes from a course on religion and social change I took as an undergraduate. I recall reading her autobiography about amazing social work she did in Chicago.28 It was an inspiring story, but I did not know she was counted as a philosopher. If I remember correctly her social work was based on her religious ideas—​what was then called the social gospel.29 25 Bacon, Pragmatism, 60. 26 See, William C.  Gay, “Dewey’s Political Ethics as Applied Philosophy that Advances International Peace.” in Critiquing Assumptions, Examining Frameworks, editors Michael Brown and Katy Gray Brown (Leiden: Rodopi, Brill, 2019), 159–​170. 27 Elshtain on Addams’ pacifism:  “Her activities before, during, and in the aftermath of World War I are remarkable. She struggled to prevent American entry into the war, not on behalf of the narrow isolationism embraced by many of those who spoke out against American participation but in the name of a new internationalism. Pacifism was for her not withdrawal but engagement: One was obliged to try to put one’s ethical convictions into action to create international institutions that would generate and sustain alternative ways of dealing with enmity, hostility, and open conflict between nations,” The Jane Addams Reader, 249. 28 Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House (Mineola: Dover, 2012). 29 Elshtain on Addams’ work: “Hull-​House was an experiment in urban sociology. Its activities were shaped by Jane Addam’s dream of improving the quality of life for immigrants by offering them art, drama, and music as well as public baths, baby care, job training, and classes in English and citizenship,” The Jane Addams Reader, xxiv.

112 Act 4 j ack:

I think that is partly true, though her version of Christianity was much more about practical work among the poor than it was about a set of religious ideas. I suppose in some ways it was a form of secularized Christianity. r ivka: [frowning] Is that even possible? j ack: Oh, I think so. You take some of the ethical ideas of Christianity—​ loving neighbors and enemies, compassion and kindness, and work them out in the seaculum, the world, rather than in the confines of the church. And Addams did just that. But of interest in terms of pragmatism is that both James and Dewey associated with Addams and counted her as one of their own. She was not in any sense a systematic philosopher working out a grand scheme … r ivka: [interrupting] But then neither was James … j ack: Her favorite medium was the essay. Remarkably she published over 500 in her lifetime. And I include her among the pragmatists because for Addams everything has to be rooted in the concrete, everyday experience of ordinary people. Theories have to be worked out in practice. And what worked for Addams was peace rather than war. In this she was what we would likely term today a difference feminist.30 It was largely male violence that caused the major issues of history. A  female voice would bring something different. She called the First World War “an old man’s war,” believing that many of the young men who fought and died were indifferent or antagonistic to the war.31 I think it is safe to say that a pragmatic approach to war and violence—​James’ cash-​ value—​for Addams as well as for James was that violence and war do not work. c layton: I can see where you’re going with all this Jack. [stretching and yawning] And I know where I’m going. I’m off to bed. It’s been a long day. j ack: Me too. Let’s continue this tomorrow after we’ve finished our department business.

30

31

Addams: “I have become conscious of an unalterable cleavage between Militarism and Feminism … It would be absurd for women even to suggest equal rights in a world governed solely by physical force, and Feminism must necessarily assert the ultimate supremacy of moral agencies. Inevitably the two are in eternal opposition,” The Jane Addams Reader, 347. In “Personal Reactions to the War,” The Jane Addams Reader, 318, and “Address of Miss Addams at Carnegie Hall,” ibid., 332.

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Scene 3

The following day. The ten Philosophy and Religion Department faculty members are gathered in one of the few seminar rooms in the Johnson House. Rivka, Anna, and Clayton are seated in rustic hickory chairs near each other. A large white board on one wall is covered in scrawled writing and rough thought charts, interconnecting boxes with ideas and actions. Jack is standing by the white board. j ack:

I hope the Dean will buy this. [pointing to a thought chart titled “Curriculum Review”] There’s no reason why she shouldn’t. We’ve thought through the possible ramifications. [replacing the red cap of the dry marker he was using and sitting down] We might lose a few students by narrowing our focus, but we’ll likely pick up others through the new general education offerings. [looking around the group] Are we all on board? [to nods of agreement] Great! I’ll get it written up and arrange a meeting.

As if on cue one of the Johnson staff members wheels in coffee, tea, and cookies on a serving cart, and the meeting breaks up as people begin their mid-​ morning refreshments. a nna:

Thanks for all that Jack. It makes me feel more a part of things now that I have the bigger picture. [taking a chocolate covered cookie] I really shouldn’t, but we are on retreat. [bites into it with a pleasurable shrug] I was quite fascinated by your explanation of pragmatism Jack. But I seem to recall that Clayton had said there was something similar in Chinese philosophy. c layton: [joining Jack and Anna, cup of tea in hand] Did I hear my name mentioned? a nna: I was just saying that you had mentioned something similar to American pragmatism in Chinese philosophy. c layton: That’s true. It’s of a different kind, but I think some of the emphases are very similar. Take the Yijing, the Book of Changes, for example.32

32

Yijing is a transliteration of the Chinese character according to the current and preferred pinyin system. Another, older, way of transliteration reads in English i Ching, according to the Wade-​Giles system.

114 Act 4 r ivka:

I’m just coming in the middle of a conversation, but did I hear you say the Yijing. Isn’t that a book of fortune telling? Don’t you randomly construct a six-​line hexagram and read your fortune in the corresponding text related to the hexagram?33 c layton: [with raised eyebrows] That is a popular view of it, but philosophers have always considered it much more. It did have origins as a tool of divination, but most scholars see its origins as pre-​ historical, so it’s not easy to say. But it’s true that a popular use of the Yijing was to ask a question and get an answer. However, in time, the original Chinese ideograms were interpreted, and re-​interpreted, by serious scholars and it became a repository of Chinese wisdom. The Yijing became foundational for philosophical Daoism, as well as Confucianism. I suppose, it might still be considered a method of divination, but scholars such as the psychologist Carl Jung saw in it a way of engaging your own questions arising out of your unconscious with the ancient wisdom of the Chinese sages. In other words, no magic is involved, but rather natural psychological processes as you answer your own question in dialogue with the ideas found in the Yijing. It’s a different and helpful way of thinking about the complex issues we all face, [rubbing his beard] at least I’ve found it to be such. r ivka: [with furrowed brows] I’ll take your word for it, but I’m leery of anything that smacks of bubbe maises.* We see too much flakiness nowadays for my liking. c layton: I assure you, Rivka, that there is nothing of flakiness about the ancient Chinese wisdom. In fact, quite the reverse. But as it is not written like a normal book, it takes time to mine its treasures. r ivka: [frowning doubtfully] Can you give us a summary of its treasures? c layton: From philosophical Daoism, the Yijing focuses on the interdependence of opposites, the inter-​relatedness of all things, and an emphasis for behavior of living simply and naturally, moving with the flow of events and not against them. From Confucianism, the Yijing emphasizes the virtues of modesty, sincerity,

33

*

The Yijing contains sixty-​four hexagrams, six-​line figures, each line either solid or broken, together with meanings and commentaries on the hexagrams. For a scholarly introduction see, James M. Balkin, The Laws of Change: I Ching and the Philosophy of Life (New York: Schocken Books, 2002). Yiddish: grandmother’s stories.

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devotion, co-​operation, and self-​improvement.34 In other words, you could say that the Yijing is about what a person should do and what a person should become. a nna: If I recall, that seems to echo the doings and beings of the capability approach, though I doubt the ancient Chinese thought of it in those terms. c layton: Yes, there are clear similarities. The emphasis of the Yijing, as its name implies, is how to manage the myriad changes of life. In other words, it is very much practically oriented. j ack: Can you be more specific? c layton: You could say that the ancient wisdom suggests a successful life … j ack: [interrupting] One that works, or has cash-​value, thinking of James’ pragmatism … c layton: is one where we learn the nature of things, where we develop inner balance and strength, and where we are proactive rather than passive.35 Self-​cultivation, or personal growth [pausing in thought, and rubbing his beard] And Jack, didn’t you say that for Dewey personal growth is the moral purpose of life? [Jack nods his assent] Self-​cultivation for the ancient Chinese was the means to succeeding in the world. It is a form of principled pragmatism.36 j ack: And from my limited understanding, isn’t Confucianism, too, very practically oriented? I seem to remember that Confucius is not really interested in metaphysical questions. c layton: That’s true. Confucius is very practical. The sayings in the Analects, like the wisdom of the Yijing, are aimed at a practical, decent life. Doing one’s best in practical and humane ways was at the heart of Confucius’ teaching.37 He also favored the very practical wisdom of not imposing on others what you yourself do not desire.38

34 Balkin, The Laws of Change, 10. 35 Balkin, The Laws of Change, 12. 36 Balkin comments that the philosophy of the Yijing encourages, “motivating strength of character and learning how to adjust to changing events without betraying one’s values or surrendering one’s larger goals. It is principled pragmatism,” The Laws of Change, 20. 37 “Tseng Tzu said, “The way of the Master consists in doing one’s best and in using oneself as a measure to gauge others. That is all,” Confucius, The Analects: Lun Yü, translated with an Introduction by D. C. Lau (London: The Folio Society, 2009), iv:15, 61. 38 The Analects, xii:2, 111, and xv:24, 141.

116 Act 4 r ivka: c layton:

r ivka: c layton:

j ack: c layton:

39 40

And how does Confucius lead us toward this humane life? Through what, in Chinese, are the li. Most often this has been translated as the rituals. But from my reading and understanding I tend to think of the li more as the habits of life. If you seek self-​cultivation, then you need to engage in habits that will produce a humane life. Confucius spoke of practicing respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness in speaking, and generosity.39 And these practices were embodied in the way one behaved toward others, the way one dressed, what one did with one’s body, and much else besides. But you surely don’t mean to suggest that we embrace the particular conservatism and mores of traditional Chinese culture? No. I  don’t think it is possible to transfer wholesale the Confucian li to our present times, even if we wanted to. [pauses searching for the right words] Our culture and mores are too far removed from traditional Chinese society. But if we take the principles, the notion that we become a certain kind of person by engaging in certain kinds of practice, then I think you can see why I suggested that Chinese philosophy is quite pragmatic. Michael Puett and Christine Gross-​Loh have produced some very creative work applying Confucian ideas to our contemporary lives.40 Their approach is to contrast our rote habits, which harden over time with repeated use, and are often unhelpful, with the practice of li—​the intentional habits that make for a humane life. Like American pragmatism, Confucius has no ethical framework that transcends the everyday complexities of life. The rituals are all we have to guide us through the messiness of our ever-​changing lives.41 Your explanation of Confucius makes him sound almost Aristotelian, that his ethics are a form of virtue ethics. That’s right, and a number of scholars have made that very comparison.42 Though their contexts were different, both Aristotle

The Analects, xvii:6, 152. Michael Puett, and Christine Gross-​Loh, The Path: What Chinese Philosophers Can Teach Us About the Good Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016). 41 Puett and Gross-​Loh, The Path, 53. 42 See, for example, May Sim, Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and Jiyuan Yu, The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue (New York: Routledge, 2007). Yu comments: “Aristotle’s ethics centers on the character and virtue that a person must have in order to live happily or

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and Confucius focused on the practical way to become a certain kind of person; that is, by habituation that produced character. And people with character are most likely to make the best kinds of life choices. And the best kinds of life choices make for a flourishing life. r ivka: [smiling mischievously] With a bit of mazel, a bit of luck, of course! c layton: [returning her smile] Always with a bit of luck! j ack: I like this idea Clayton. If Confucius is an ancient pragmatist, and he shares a family resemblance with Aristotle, then that makes Aristotle a pragmatist too. And that returns us nicely to William James who said that pragmatism is a new name for some old ways of thinking. James does, of course, count Aristotle among his pragmatist forebears, but not Confucius, or the philosophical Daoists, though I tend to think he would, had he benefited from the century of scholarship since his time that has—​for those of us in the West—​given such insights into Asian philosophies. c layton: I like to think so too! a nna: So, Jack, can you pull this all together for me. I’m trying to hold on to all the threads of our conversation. But it’s not easy! Your starting point was how to make a better world, with the answer that a better world would be serviced by nonviolence. And now we have had an interesting discussion about philosophical pragmatism. But what’s the connection? j ack: If we take the pragmatist case seriously—​that ideas have to be tested by their practical outcomes—​then we must put my suggestions about nonviolence to that test. Would all I have suggested about nonviolence have any real effect in the world? Or is talk of nonviolence merely idealistic? r ivka: And you are going to argue that nonviolence is indeed practical, that its effects, when consistently practiced, are for the good. That is nonviolence, practically, makes for a better world. j ack: [smiling] Got it in one! Faculty members begin to disperse, to get ready for the second business session of the morning. to flourish. The value of an action can only be judged in relation to the character of the agent. It is not difficult to see that these two features of Aristotle’s ethics characterize the ethics of Confucius,” 2.

118 Act 4

Scene 4

Three hours later. The business meeting was followed by a light lunch of soup and a sandwich. Guests are gathered in the sunshine outside the Johnson on the lawn that gently slopes to the lake. A few people have already donned life jackets and are carrying kayaks to the dock. r ivka: [in the middle of a conversation with Anna] I don’t mind in the least if you want to go with the younger folk out on the lake. I’ll be fine. There’s a lovely little pagoda a short walk in the woods near a delightful pond. It’s one of my happy places. a nna: I don’t want to abandon you! Besides, I think all the kayaks are already taken. I can go out later before we head for home. I’d really like to finish the conversation we started earlier with Jack and Clayton speaking of which … Clayton and Jack amble over to them, Clayton rolling up the sleeves of his plaid hiking shirt. c layton:

What a beautiful day! [looking around as if seeing the surroundings for the first time] I hadn’t realized being indoors all morning. r ivka: [shielding her eyes in the bright sunlight] I was just saying to Anna that I wouldn’t mind if you all wanted to do something outdoors. I’m going to wander over to the pagoda. There’s a heron rookery by the pond, just a short walk farther on. I’d be glad to show you. c layton: I’ve never seen one of those! If it’s no trouble I’d like to tag along. j ack: Me too! a nna: That’s settled then! The pagoda and rookery it is. The four friends walk in single file along a narrow and winding pathway the fifty yards to the subtly hidden pagoda. c layton:

I’m surprised we are not seeing more mosquitos. Don’t you have them up here? a nna: Oh yes! Mosquitos aplenty in the summer months. This is just a little early. Mind you, watch out for the ticks. The last few years we’ve seen a larger infestation than usual. I’m forever pulling ticks off the dog when she’s been out in the woods. r ivka: [taking her seat in the pagoda] In August, it would be nigh on impossible to sit and enjoy the woods as we are able to now. Today is perfect!

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c layton: Perfect too to continue our discussion. j ack: [taking off his light fleece pullover] As I was saying, in my work I  link the philosophy of nonviolence with something like the pragmatism of William James to suggest a better world. r ivka: [taking a thin booklet from her bag and fanning herself lightly] OK, Jack. Let’s hear the cash-​value of your theory, if you’re going the Jamesian route. j ack: Well, I really need to take you back to our initial conversations. I hope that I adequately demonstrated that we can both imagine a better world, and having imagined it, we can measure it in different ways. a nna: Just so I am on the same page. [pulling her hair back into a pony tail with a rainbow band] A  better world would be one where we would see the effects of basic ethical theories of caring, non-​ harming, doing good for each other, greater fairness, and respect for everyone’s autonomy, as people pursue self-​cultivation in whatever way they desire. It would also be a world where people were free to develop their capabilities without hindrance, and where their civil and human rights were respected. In other words, it would be a world in which we would see an increase in human flourishing and happiness. Such a better world could actually be measured through instruments such as the United Nations Human Development Index, and through various studies of human well-​being. j ack: [smiling] I couldn’t have put it better myself! c layton: And, I  think, Jack you demonstrated that violence in all its forms—​physical, psychological, and systemic—​is one of the greatest obstacles, if not the greatest obstacle, to achieving that better world. j ack: Yes. And that intentional nonviolence would be one way of working toward that better world. r ivka: Remind us Jack how you understand nonviolence. j ack: Nonviolence is a practice that, whenever possible, seeks the well-​being of the Other by refraining from violence and acting according to lovingkindness. I  might add that refraining from violence includes thinking, speaking, and acting.43 43

See, William C. Gay, “The Practice of Peace: Thinking, Speaking and Acting,” in Critiquing Assumptions, Examining Frameworks, ed. Michael Brown and Katy Gray Brown (Leiden: Rodpi, Brill) 2019, 11–​18.

120 Act 4 r ivka:

It’s a simple enough definition, and quite tight, I  have to say, and I  commend you for it. But I’d like to hear now in what way your intentional nonviolence meets the criteria of James’ pragmatism. j ack: For it to work, intentional nonviolence would need to meet James’ understanding that it must have practical consequences, and those practical consequences are for the good. In other words, in what way would the world be different if what I have said about nonviolence were true? r ivka: And I hope you have an answer to James’ question. j ack: I’ll begin by looking at violence in the domestic sphere. c layton: Didn’t Michael Walzer do the same with his analysis of the just war tradition? j ack: Yes, he suggested that, just as in the domestic sphere we consider self-​defense against an aggressor justifiable, so when nations are attacked by an aggressor, they may use force in self-​defense.44 r ivka: I think he called it the domestic analogy. j ack: To be honest, I don’t think it quite works to jump from the domestic to the international. There are too many complications, too many uncertainties and possibilities for escalation when nations face each other in conflict, [slightly frowning] but I don’t want to lose my thread. c layton: Sorry! j ack: Not to worry! I think we can see quite clearly that when someone who carries out violent acts in the domestic sphere the effects of the action are deleterious. r ivka: Be specific! j ack: OK. Domestic violence. The man who berates his partner, and whose verbal onslaught too often becomes physical violence. His partner’s well-​being is greatly affected to say the least. Her rights are overridden. She is unable to reach her capabilities. She does not flourish. a nna: And I  would say that, for the abuser, too, though in different ways. He does not flourish. He does not reach his potential. Not to say what happens to any children in the home who also suffer from the abuser’s violence, and who watch their mom suffer.

44 See Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 58–​59.

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The violence perpetuates itself, often generationally, and all suffer from the violence. j ack: But paint a different scenario, where both partners internalize the values of intentional nonviolence. I’m not saying that these folk have to be perfect. Everyone gets angry from time to time. None of us live up to one’s better angels. But a commitment to intentional nonviolence—​refraining from violent speech and deeds and acting according to loving kindness always produces a very different effect. Intentional nonviolence becomes the rich soil that encourages human flourishing and potential. r ivka: [frowning] I don’t wish to pour scorn on your theory, but how do you get from A to B? How does the person, or the family, who are mired in violence through long tradition and habit become nonviolent to achieve the effect you say will happen? j ack: I’m not saying such is easy. But it is possible. It happens through a steady reversing of what made for the violence. You mention tradition and habit, and that is exactly how intentional nonviolence works. The tradition that exults in violence is intentionally replaced by a new tradition of nonviolence.45 r ivka: [interrupting] And how does that happen? j ack: By education. By exposure to understandings of nonviolence. By consciousness raising regarding the effects and harm of violence. It is not a quick fix, but rather a gradual growing in understanding. [pauses, feeling both his pant pockets in search of something] I left my phone in my room! [turning to Anna] May I borrow yours for a moment? Anna passes her new iPhone xr to Jack, who caresses the sleek yellow casing j ack:

45

46

Nice! I’ve not seen one of these before. [he silently taps on the screen to bring up documents from the cloud] This diagram will likely help46 [he turns the screen so the others can see] Nonviolence, practically speaking, requires the interaction of three

Current neuroscience adds weight to the possibility of change through habituation. See discussion in, Irene Mingol Comins, and Sonia Paris Albert. “Nonkilling Philosophy.” Joám Evans Pim, Editor. Toward a Nonkilling Paradigm (Honolulu: Center for Global Nonkilling, 2009), 271–​286. Jane Hall Fitz-​Gibbon and Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon. Welcoming Strangers: Loving Nonviolent Re-​parenting of Children in Foster Care (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2016), 92.

122 Act 4 important parts of the psyche, the affective (feelings), the reflective (thinking), and the elective (choosing). In other words, Rivka, to get from A to B, means engaging feeling, thinking and choosing as we are conscientized about violence and its harm, as we internalize the values of nonviolence and its effects, and as we intentionalize and make an active and intentional choice to pursue nonviolence. a nna: [with a puzzled expression] And I assume that without the active engagement of all three—​feeling, thinking and choosing—​that the practice of nonviolence is incomplete? j ack: Yes. One can have strong feelings about the harm of violence, but feelings need to be supplemented with careful thought, and both are inadequate unless they lead to practical choices [he passes the phone around so his friends can look more closely] And even then, this is just the beginning. Much depends on the practical choices. Nonviolent practice

Conscientize Affective

Internalize Reflective

c layton: j ack:

Intentionalize Elective

I’m thinking this is where we meet Confucius and Aristotle again. The practical choices, in this case, are the small steps of refusing to be violent and choosing love and kindness. Exactly! Baby steps of not responding violently. Baby steps of seeking the best for the Other. Baby steps of acting kindly. Though at first this is very difficult. Remember, according to Puett and Gross-​Loh, we are entrenched in unthinking habits that are difficult to break. But in time, the new habits of loving nonviolence become more prominent. You respond

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initially [makes air quotes] “as if” you are a nonviolent person, and through intentional habituation you become increasingly loving and nonviolent. The effect of this process is good for you, and good for the Other with whom you are in relationship. r ivka: You have spoken of this in terms of the domestic relationship. But would it be the same in other relationships? j ack: I see no reason why not. The same process would work in extended family and friendship networks, in the work environment, in fact in any set or relationships where violence threatens well-​ being. Intentional nonviolence works. Its effects are always for the good. [pauses and looks at the woodland surroundings] Rivka, didn’t you say we would do well to take the walk to the heron rookery? a nna: [animatedly] Yes, let’s go! I’ve not seen it yet. The four colleagues meander down an almost hidden, overgrown pathway. After a few minutes the pathway leads out onto a wooden deck extending over the pond and beaver constructed wetland. Two rustic wooden benches adorn the viewing area. r ivka:

If we’re lucky we’ll see a few birds. The first ones come back mid-​ March and by now most have returned. They’ll likely be sitting on the nest. We may see a few hatched young birds. They stay around the nest for a couple of months and then head off on their own. c layton: [looking around in wonder at the several large nests, high in the trees some fifty yards away] I’ve never seen anything like it! [pointing] Look, three nests from the left. That’s a young one! a nna: Yes! How cute is that! r ivka: Marvelous! j ack: I’ve only been here in the late fall when it was a rookery devoid of birds. Thanks for thinking of it, Rivka. r ivka: [with a contented smile] Truly my pleasure! The four friends consider in silence for ten minutes or so r ivka:

And as we watch the birds, Jack, return to your theme. You say the practice, or the process, of nonviolence would work for the good in domestic and other relationships. And you have provided us with a useful understanding of the process of becoming

124 Act 4 nonviolent that involves the psychological complexity of feeling, thinking and choosing, as well as a practical Neo-​Confucian, or Neo-​Aristotelian, way of habituation, [with a gentle smile] baby steps, I think you said. [and now a sigh] Which is all well and good. But I  cannot see it working in political terms. The world of politics, the harsh social realities of realpolitik, the ill will that often prevails. Even if your nonviolence is practical in personal life, in families, between friends, and possibly in the workplace, it surely becomes impractical in the world of politics and government? c layton: Good question Rivka. That has been an issue I’ve been pondering too. You have given voice to my worry with Jack’s idea: nonviolence is not practical beyond the personal realm. j ack: [with a broad smile] I have to say that is the most common objection I get from students when I introduce them to the practice of nonviolence. Nonviolence seems counterintuitive. As we live in a violent world, and as the world so far as we know has always been violent, it seems common sense to think that violence is the fallback position because nonviolence could not possibly work. a nna: In my tradition, we always knew that nonviolence works in small communities of the faithful. But we also assumed that the world would always be violent. That was why my forebears withdrew from the world to form small nonviolent communities, with their own rules for behavior. It was a version of what the Reformer Martin Luther called the two kingdoms—​the kingdom of this world, and the kingdom of God. He assumed that a Christian could live in both kingdoms. My Anabaptist ancestors differed. You had to choose one kingdom or the other. They chose the kingdom of God where non-​resistance was the norm. They believed that such a choice would always be only for a minority. Most people would choose the kingdom of this world, with all its concomitant strife and violence.47 c layton: In that case, using Jack’s framework of pragmatism and what works or has effect, your tradition would say that pragmatic

47

For an analysis of the difference between Luther’s and the Anabaptist understanding see, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, The Fragility of Tolerant Pluralism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 87–​93.

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a nna: j ack:

c layton: j ack:

a nna: j ack:

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nonviolence has cash-​value in small religious communities, but has no cash-​value in wider society? I guess so, though I have never thought of it in terms of cash-​value before. Here’s the interesting thing, [pauses as his friends give him their attention] Gandhi took a different view. He believed that nonviolence did have cash-​value as a social strategy. Societies could be changed through nonviolent direct action. And I  guess he demonstrated its truth by bringing the British Empire to its knees. Yes, Gandhi demonstrated that nonviolence has social and political cash-​value. Simply put it works. And Gandhi, of course, inspired Martin Luther King Jr. and his use of nonviolent protest to help achieve civil rights for African Americans. After reading Gandhi’s work, King traveled to India in 1959. In his 1960 speech “Pilgrimage to Nonviolence,” he says as much.48 He equated Gandhi’s ideas with the Christian doctrine of love. [turning to Anna] It’s a different take on nonviolence than the Anabaptist tradition. King did think that the nonviolence he saw in the teaching of Jesus applied to wider society, and not just to a select few in small religious communities. Yes, I see that. And I have to say that many contemporary Mennonites have moved beyond that original Anabaptist understanding and now gladly embrace nonviolent civil resistance. After King, the idea of nonviolent social protest expanded. Most notably, Gene Sharp wrote a trilogy about nonviolent action in 1973.49 He gives both a theoretical analysis of nonviolence as a social movement, and also very practical ways to engage in nonviolent direct action. If memory serves in the second part of his trilogy he gives almost two hundred different methods, ranging from protest and persuasion, to economic and political noncooperation. He’s very specific, and very practical. Sharp’s books have been translated into many languages and have been used as a basis for social change in many nations.

King: “I came to see for the first time that the Christian doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method of nonviolence was one of the most potent weapons available to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom.” The Politics of Nonviolent Action Part One:  Power and Struggle (Porter Sargent:  Boston, 1973), The Politics of Nonviolent Action Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action (Porter

126 Act 4 a nna: [excitedly] Truly amazing! [as she follows the flight of two enormous blue herons as they take off not ten yards from where they sit] I  didn’t even know they were there. Hidden in the reeds! [realizing she had interrupted Jack’s train of thought] Sorry Jack! That was just so unexpected. I really was listening to you! j ack: No need to apologize. That was truly spectacular! [continues to watch the birds as they circle, then disappear over the trees] As I was saying, besides Gene Sharp’s impressive work, Ackerman and Duvall demonstrated the effectiveness of nonviolent social change in their book A Force More Powerful.50 They looked at movements in the twentieth century from Russia in 1905, to the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s, to South Africa and the struggle against apartheid, and many more social and political movements besides. In each movement they showed how nonviolence was a practical methodology to initiate social change.51 r ivka: But I’m going to be skeptical again. Wouldn’t you say that for every nonviolent social movement that worked, there were likely many more violent movements that brought effective change? j ack: [with a wry smile] You’d think! But it is not in fact true! r ivka: Well, I am surprised. Do you have any evidence for your claim. j ack: I do. A study was published, in 2011, by Chenoweth and Stephan that provided all the evidence you might need.52 Their work analyzed resistance movements in the twentieth century, characterized them as either violent or nonviolent, and looked at the success rates in each decade. For example, in the decade of the 1990s nonviolent campaigns succeeded over fifty-​percent

50 51

52

Sargent:  Boston, 1973), The Politics of Nonviolent Action Part Three:  The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action (Porter Sargent: Boston, 1973). Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall. A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000). For a thorough philosophical analysis of nonviolence as a means of political change, see Todd May, Nonviolent Resistance: A Philosophical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2015). May comments: “We have isolated nonviolence as a particular way to conduct political, social, and/​or economic resistance. It seeks to change arrangements that are considered by its participants—​and often by nonparticipants—​as unjust, oppressive, unfair, or deleterious. What distinguishes nonviolence from violent forms of political change does not lie necessarily in its ultimate goals, but in its means,” 162. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

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of the time, whereas violent campaigns succeeded only nearly thirty-​percent of the time. On the contrary, violence fails over sixty-​percent of the time, and nonviolence fails just over twenty-​ percent of the time.53 c layton: And I  assume that partial success accounts for the remaining percentage? j ack: That’s right. Their analysis is more complex than my simple representation of it, but the conclusion is very clear. Violence sometimes works, in that it achieves its goal. But so too does nonviolence. And the amazing fact is that nonviolence succeeds in far more cases than violence. r ivka: That is surprising, and I  stand corrected. It is clearly a study I need to become familiar with. j ack: If I can take you back to your original question about whether nonviolence is effective in situations other than the domestic sphere, the answer is an unequivocal yes. Nonviolence is very practical, hence my argument for nonviolence as a means toward a better world. r ivka: [looking at her watch] My! How the time has flown! I think we ought to be heading back, or we’ll miss afternoon snacks, and I’m ready for a coffee. The four make their way in single file way along the narrow path back to the Johnson. j ack: [who from the front turns around awkwardly to speak to the others] I do want to say one last thing about nonviolence as a political strategy. Pragmatically, I think it’s clear that nonviolence does work—​it has the effect that activists are looking for. That is, at least most of the time. Nonviolence also fails politically, at least some of the time. c layton: [raising his voice form the back of the single file] And I guess in those circumstances, protesters turn to violence? I think it was largely the lack of progress toward the end of the 1960s that sparked students to turn to violence here in the States and in Europe.

53

Ibid., 8–​9.

128 Act 4 j ack:

They did. My sense of that is that frustrated by nonviolence seemingly failing, they resorted to the old, commonsense assumption that violence will in the end work if nothing else has. a nna: [with a little smirk] The myth of redemptive violence again. j ack: In my understanding, that is largely because, if we only see nonviolence as a political strategy and not more fundamentally as a moral way of life, we can change the strategy—​perhaps to a violent one—​to achieve some other end. It is a difference Gan makes between merely strategic nonviolence and comprehensive nonviolence. Gan’s critique is that Sharp too readily dismisses a moral or religious foundation for nonviolence.54 It strikes me that for both Gandhi and King, it was a prior commitment to loving nonviolence in the whole of life that led to nonviolence as a political strategy. For them loving nonviolence was both a means and an end.55 For King, nonviolent social change would lead to the Beloved Community—​a community itself characterized by lovingkindness and nonviolence.56 Nonviolence merely as a political strategy has no such end in view. Its end could be any kind of political change. r ivka: In other words, your argument for pragmatic nonviolence is a form of principled pragmatism. Both the means and the ends, the practice and its effects, are based on your understanding of nonviolence as a refusal to use violence, and through lovingkindness working toward the well-​being of the other, whenever possible. j ack: That’s about it! [smiling] I’m ready for that cup of tea! 54 55 56

Gan on Sharp: “Sharp is anxious that nonviolence of the strong not be ‘equated with belief in nonviolence as an ethical or religious principle,’ ” 97. See, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, “Spiritual Practice as a Foundation for Peacemaking,” in Danielle Poe and Eddy Souffrant, Parceling the Globe: Philosophical Exploration in Globalization, Global Behavior, and Peace (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008). See, Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, “The Beloved Community: A Neo-​Aristotelian Perspective,” in Andrew Fiala, The Nature of Peace and the Peace of Nature (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

Epilogue

Objections and Answers

Scene 1

Mid fall semester. Jack is drawing to a close a presentation on his new book in a medium size auditorium at the college. The lecture hall is two thirds full, mostly students, with a smattering of faculty. Jack is wearing a dark suit, lightly checked Oxford button down shirt, and the blue, green, and white striped tie of his alma mater, the Victoria University of Manchester. j ack: [addressing the audience and smiling] So, that’s about it. If more people, organizations small and great, and governments, too, adopted pragmatic nonviolence as an intentionally normative way, we would likely see greater human and non-​human flourishing. More people would have their rights respected, and be enabled to achieve their capabilities. In sum, the world would be a better place. [pauses] Thank you all for coming, especially as the warmth and fall colors invite us to be outside. I’d be glad to answer any questions, so I’ll hand back to Anna. a nna: [still applauding with the audience, and looking around as several hands are raised] Jack, thank you so much for a very stimulating talk. I can see a number of people want to respond. I wonder, would you mind fielding your own questions? I think it’s easier that way. I will walk around the audience with a wireless mic so everyone can hear the questions. She moves toward the first questioner, mic in hand, as Jack steps back up to the podium. a nna: s tudent:

Can you say your name and department before asking the question? Hi, my name’s Keisha, and I’m studying anthropology. Professor, I enjoyed your talk very much. It’s only my second year, so I might get this wrong. I think I heard you say that we can imagine a better world. But doesn’t that assume some kind of universal understanding of what better is? In class, I’ve been taught that it was just such a view that the European imperialists held

© Andrew Fitz-​G ibbon, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004445994_006

130 Epilogue when they pretty much decimated indigenous societies. Didn’t they assume that European society was better and then impose it on others? j ack: Thanks Keisha for such an important question. I’d be glad to clarify. I  do agree with you, at least to some extent. Western nations do have a legacy of imposing ideas and practices on those who differ. And yes, it did a great deal of damage. I  am not suggesting the imposition of an imagined better world. But I  do think we can find more or less universal principles that help us make judgements about what would be better and what would be worse. [pauses to take a drink from the water bottle on the podium] Let me give you just one. It would be the principle of respect for people. That seems to me to be a pretty universal and very basic value. In philosophy, we look for counter examples that might prove an idea false. So, Keisha, from your studies so far, can you think of a culture that values the disrespect of people? k eisha: [taking the mic back from Anna] I  can think of a ton! [laughs from the audience] Gangster culture values disrespecting other gang members. Europeans disrespected other cultures. Nazi culture disrespected Jews and gays. And white supremacist culture disrespects people of color. So, respect is not a universal value. j ack: [smiling broadly] Wow! Your anthropology teachers have done a great job! I don’t want to poach, but have you tried taking philosophy? [laughter from the audience] You could double major! [more laughs] I acknowledge that respect for people is not universally practiced. But that does not mean that respect is not a universal value. [noticing Keisha’s puzzled frown] I can see you’re not convinced. Let me try this. [pauses] Would you agree with me that taking another human life is, on the whole, not a good thing? We can, perhaps, find justifications that on occasion to take a life might be required in self-​defense, or that justice may require it (though I’m skeptical of that), or that your country requires you to take life if you are in the armed services. But even in those circumstances, there is some pause, some reluctance, for killing is largely considered wrong. It does not lead toward a better world. But people do still commit homicide. Humans kill one another. And you could say, then, that the prohibition against killing is not universal. Murderers, I think we might assume, generally do not hold the value that taking life is wrong.

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But because they do not says nothing about the universal value that taking human life is [emphasizes the next phrase] actually wrong. Taking life causes harm, does not work toward human flourishing, robs those killed of their capabilities, and ignores their basic human right to life. In the same way, that some people, cultures and subcultures do not respect others says nothing about the universal value that to respect other people creates more human flourishing, and hence makes for a better world. Let me remind you that pragmatic nonviolence is the practice that, whenever possible, seeks the well-​being of the Other by refraining from violence, and acting according to loving kindness. Anna moves to another questioner on the far side of the auditorium s tudent:

j ack:

Thanks Professor. My name is Andy, and I’m a senior political science student. I want to ask you something different. I have always assumed that the world is a more violent place than ever before … wars, terrorism, homicides, mass school shootings … But did I hear you say that violence is decreasing? Good question Andy. Let me answer this way. In absolute terms it’s likely that more violence of certain kinds takes place in the world than ever before. Remember that the world population did not reach one billion until 1800, and today it stands at almost eight billion. And at current rates we increase by a billion every dozen years or so. So, with more people in the world it’s not surprising that in raw numbers more violence takes place. But some violence is less now than at other periods in human history. In the wars of the early part of the twentieth century we saw some 150 million people killed in war. Though we still have wars, we have not seen human destruction on that scale since the end of the Second World War. That’s not to dismiss the awful numbers still killed in war, but it is to say that even in raw numbers we have been worse. In comparative numbers, given the size of the world’s population, even the wars of the twentieth century were not the most violent. [pauses as he sees puzzled faces in the audience] By that I mean numbers killed per 100,000 of the population. So, you see, it’s tricky to say we have more or less violence. It depends on how you measure it. But we have certainly seen a shift in types of violence that are common. For instance, it was common for husbands to beat their

132 Epilogue

a ndy:

j ack: a ndy:

j ack:

a ndy: j ack:

wives, and such was acceptable in society. We no longer think so. Similarly, the violence of slavery has been abolished in most parts of the world, as have public tortures and executions. Children have less violence enacted upon them. Yet, we have seen a rise in the number of mass shootings in schools in the United States. And without diminishing the horror of such events, that amount of violence is far less than humanity did to itself in previous centuries. I can see that, for instance, in Stalin’s purges, or Hitler’s death camps. But just look at television and movies. We’ve never seen so much violence. I happen to be a Game of Thrones fan [cheers from a few students] and a bit of a numbers nerd. Did you know that the show is watched by 30 million people every episode? That’s a lot of people! But I have to confess, I’ve never seen an episode. I’m too cheap to afford hbo! [laughs from the audience] But my point is that Game of Thrones is a very violent show. Estimates suggest that if you’ve watched every show in all eight seasons you will have watched over a quarter million people killed. And of the main characters, you will have seen 185 die in often gruesome circumstances. If you say violence has declined overall, how do you account for our fascination with violence in popular culture? I have often wondered about that, Andy. And I  don’t think I have a satisfactory answer. I think I’ll leave it to my psychology colleagues. But I  do have a thought. I  have wondered whether as real violence is getting less, that we work out our violence vicariously on the screen. In a sense, we watch violence enacted—​perhaps with both a morbid fascination and a genuine revulsion—​and then we don’t have to do it ourselves. It’s not only Game of Thrones, but just about every crime show ever made, war movie, horror movie, and “who done it.” It seems that the human fascination with violence has increased at the same time that actual human violence has declined. OK Professor. But don’t you think if you announce far and wide that violence is in decline that we will get complacent and violence will increase? Good point Andy, and I wouldn’t want anyone to get complacent about the amount of violence in the world—​every rape, every murder, every act of terrorism, every war, and every child hurt by adults who ought to know better is one too many. We still have so much to do—​hence my book on pragmatic nonviolence—​but

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the data tell us that humanity has made progress in so many areas. I want to affirm that. Anna takes back the mic and passes it to a professor seated near the back of the auditorium p rofessor ( jen): Thanks Jack. Great and provocative presentation as always, but—​Oh, I’m Dr.  Lewis, chair of the English Department—​You and I  have had many a discussion on this very topic over the years, and I am still stuck. Do I have to buy the whole package? Must I become an absolute nonviolentist? It seems to me that in personal life we might sometimes need to defend ourselves, and as a nation we must be prepared to defend ourselves against aggressors. Both might well involve violence to greater or lesser degrees, and both would be justifiable. Not to act with violence might well involve even worse violence. In those cases, violence might well be the lesser of two evils. Please tell me that I  can keep the pepper spray in my purse in case of danger, and that I can enjoy the occasional delicious filet mignon? [to laughs from the audience] j ack: [laughing too] Thanks Jen. I wouldn’t want to deprive you of your pepper spray. I know you would only use it in dire circumstances. As to your steak, I’ll leave that to your conscience and the poor animal that suffered much for your brief enjoyment. j en: [she visibly winces] Ouch! [to further laughter] j ack: But again in my understanding of pragmatic nonviolence, it’s a practice that [emphasizes the next phrase] wherever possible seeks the well-​being of the Other by refraining from violence and acting according to lovingkindness. Wherever possible is a key element. I am not an absolutist. I  think at times a violent response might prevent further violence. But two things:  First, those times are far fewer than we have believed. We resort to violence as a go-​to response in so many situations. It is not [makes air quotes] “violence as a last resort.” It’s rather violence in order to save a life, your own or someone else’s. Violence as a last resort too often assumes that violence will work if nothing else will. In my book I demonstrate that violence does not

134 Epilogue

j en: j ack:

work in the long run or in any truly helpful way. At least I hope I do. Without meaning to be personal, my guess would be that should you—​God forbid—​ever be attacked and you used your spray, or some other violent way to defend yourself, that the memory would haunt you. Both the attack and your violent defense of the attack. Violence is never a free ride. It always wounds, always scars, and some of those scars remain for years, and sometimes for a whole life. You might be able to justify the violence, but it still takes a heavy price. You mean something like ptsd? That and more beside. But let me return to your main point. Do you have to buy the whole package? No. Any reduction of violence in our lives contributes to the overall sum of well-​being in the world. Do what you can. Build up habits of refraining from violent responses, build up habits of acting with lovingkindness.

A student anxiously waves his hand toward Anna, who crosses the room and hands him the mic s tudent: [excitedly] Come on Professor! It’s a fairy tale! a nna: [to the student] Can you say who you are and which department you are with. s tudent: Matt. Biology. It’s a fairy tale because it’s just not realistic. Not realistic in biological terms. We’re just animals, and like all animals selfish, and that means we are violent in self-​ preservation. Professor, you can’t work against nature! And it’s just not realistic between nations. Nations have always gone to war and always will. Nonviolence? Fairy story for kindergarten! [he hands the mic back to Anna roughly] j ack: OK, Matt. On your first point, I think there is some very useful work on human nature as cooperative and empathic, besides our aggressive tendencies. The selfish gene has been overplayed. My reading of the literature is that we are not deterministically either selfish or empathic, but rather that we humans have the potential for both.1 We have choice. We 1 See Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon, “Becoming Nonviolent: Sociobiological, Psychological and Spiritual Perspectives.” The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence, Andrew Fiala (Editor) (New York: Routledge, 2018).

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can choose to be nonviolent, and the more we habituate nonviolence and lovingkindness, the more likely we are to act in those ways when faced with a difficult situation. In other words, far from being a fairy story, nonviolence is eminently practical. Nonviolence is a practice. Nonviolence works. It creates far more well-​being than aggression and violence do. And not just in personal life. One of the best elements of foreign policy between nations is diplomacy, and at its heart diplomacy is a nonviolent way of solving disputes. Numerous wars have been avoided through the skillful work of diplomats. In other words, even given the number of wars we have seen, we would have seen many more if not for nonviolent diplomacy working for the well-​being of all. And despite often justified criticism with regard to police brutality and systemic racism, law enforcement often acts without overt violence, as does the justice system as a whole. I am not suggesting by any means that it is perfect. Do I wish that the various police services were reformed? Of course! Is it time for deep and lasting changes to police procedures regarding racial bias? Most certainly! The work of calling our systems to account, and to move them from violence toward nonviolence is very important work. But insofar as they are nonviolent we ought to applaud them. [a few claps from the audience] Our systems work best when they exhibit nonviolence and care, and they are at their worst when they use violence to solve problems. a nna: Well, on that note I think we need to draw things to a close. Thanks everyone for coming. Remember to buy Pragmatic Nonviolence, when it is released in the new year. [turning to Jack] I assume you’ll be using it in your philosophies of nonviolence class? [Jack nods] And before we close, Jack, if there is one thing you would like the audience to remember from tonight, what would it be? j ack: [scratching his head] I suppose it would be to say that though the world is less than we would want it to be, it can be made better. And every one of us in this lecture hall can be a part of that. On a daily basis, choose compassion, choose lovingkindness, and don’t return violence with violence. You’ll feel better and the world will be a better place. Thank you! [final applause from the audience]

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138 Bibliography Eames, S.  Morris. Pragmatic Naturalism; An Introduction. Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University Press, 1977. Economist, The. “Modi’s Jaw-​Breaking Threats.” February 23, 2019. Economist, The. “Skirmishing Between India and Pakistan Could Escalate.” February 28, 2019. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. The Jane Addams Reader. Basic Books: New York 2002. Fiala, Andrew. Practical Pacifism. New York: Algora, 2004. Fiala, Andrew. The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. Fischer, Louis (Editor). The Essential Gandhi: An Anthology of His Writings on Life, Work, and Ideas. New York: Vintage, 1962. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. “Spiritual Practice as a Foundation for Peacemaking.” In Danielle Poe and Eddy Souffrant. Parceling the Globe: Philosophical Exploration in Globalization, Global Behavior, and Peace. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. “Rehabilitating Nonresistance.” The Acorn: Journal of the Gandhi-​ King Society, 2010. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. “Perpetual Violence? Mimesis and Anamnesis.” In Rob Gildert and Dennis Rothermel. Remembrance and Reconciliation. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. Love as A Guide to Morals. Leiden: Rodopi, 2012. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. “The Beloved Community:  A Neo-​Aristotelian Perspective.” In Andrew Fiala, The Nature of Peace and the Peace of Nature. Leiden: Brill, 2012. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. “Peace.” The Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy. In Andrew Fiala (Editor). London: Bloomsbury, 2015. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. The Fragility of Tolerant Pluralism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. “Becoming Nonviolent: Sociobiological, Psychological and Spiritual Perspectives.” The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence. Andrew Fiala (Editor). New York: Routledge, 2018. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew. “The Ethics of Care and Violence.” In Michael Patterson Brown and Katy Gray Brown. Nonviolence: Critiquing Assumptions, Examining Frameworks. Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2019. Fitz-​Gibbon, Andrew and Jane Hall Fitz-​Gibbon. Nurturing Strangers:  Strategies for Nonviolent Re-​Parenting Children in Foster Care. New York: Routledge, 2018. Fitz-​Gibbon, Jane Hall. Corporal Punishment, Religion, and United States Public Schools. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017. Fitz-​Gibbon, Jane Hall and Andrew Fitz-​Gibbon. Welcoming Strangers: Loving Nonviolent Re-​parenting of Children in Foster Care. New Brunswick: Transaction, 2016. Fox, Michael Allen. Understanding peace:  A Comprehensive Introduction. New  York: Routledge, 2014.

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Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. London: Sage Publications, 1996. Gan, Barry L. Violence and Nonviolence:  An Introduction. Lanham:  Rowman and Littlefield, 2013. Gandhi, M. K. Non-​Violent Resistance (Satyagraha). Mineola: Dover, 2001. Gay, William C. “Bourdieu and the Social Conditions of Wittgensteinian Language Games.” In The International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11, n1, 1996: 15–​21. Gay, William C. “The Practice of Linguistic Nonviolence.” Peace Review, 10, 1998, 545–​547. Gay, William C. “The Practice of Peace: Thinking, Speaking, Acting.” In Michael Patterson Brown and Katy Gray Brown, eds. Nonviolence: Critiquing Assumptions, Examining Frameworks. Leiden: Brill, 2019. Gay, William C. “Dewey’s Political Ethics as Applied Philosophy that Advances International Peace.” In Michael Patterson Brown and Katy Gray Brown, eds. Non­ violence: Critiquing Assumptions, Examining Frameworks. Leiden: Brill, 2019. Gay, William C. “Pacifism, Feminism, and Nonkilling Philosophy: A New Approach to Connecting Peace Studies and Gender Studies.” In Jennifer Kling, ed. Pacifism, Politics and Feminism. Leiden: Brill, 2019. Girard, Rene. The Girard Reader. Ed. James G. Williams. New York: Herder and Herder/​ Crossroad, 1996. Guardian, The. “Radovan Karadžić war crimes sentence increased to life in prison,” The Guardian, March 3, 2019. Grossman, Dave. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. New York: Back Bay Books, 2009. Grug, Etienne G., Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi, and Rafael Lozano, eds. 2002. World Report on Violence and Health. Geneva:  World Health Organization. Hanh, Thich Nhat. The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita. Berkeley: Parallax, 1988. Hedges, Chris. War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: Anchor, 2002. Held, Virginia. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Hershberger, Guy Franklin. War, Peace and Nonresistance: A Classic Statement of a Mennonite Peace Position in Faith and Practice. Scottdale: Herald, 1981. Holmes, Robert L. On War and Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Holmes, Robert L. and Barry L Gan. Nonviolence in Theory and Practice. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2005. Human Rights Watch. World Report 2019:  Events of 2018. New  York:  Seven Stories Press, 2019.

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Index 9/​11 84 A Force More Powerful 126 abortion 42 absolute pacifism 70 Addams, Jane 111 affective, the 122 ahimsa 81 American pragmatic tradition  diverse nature of 98 Amish 62 Anabaptism  the world and 124 Analects, the 115 animal rights 42, 76 puppy mills and 76 Anscombe, Elizabeth 15 anti-​semitism 93 apartheid 126 appeal to an authority 73 Arendt, Hannah 53 Aristotle 7–​17, 122 Confucius and 116 atrocitology 60 autonomy 12 ban, the 79 belief  warranted assertibility as 110 beneficence 11, 43 Bentham, Jeremy 8, 42 Bible, the 12 pacifism and 76 biblical literalism 72 body memory 13 Book of Changes 12, 12n14, 113 British Empire, the  nonviolence and 125 bullying 79 Cady, Duane 82 capability approach 7, 25, 73, 115 capitalism 51 cardinal virtues 15

care ethics 24 cash-value 102, 104, 115, 125 categorical imperative 26, 44 Chinese philosophy  American pragmatism and 113 Christensen, Kit 40 civil resistance 125 cogito ergo sum 101 concepts  meaning and 104 Confucianism xv, 12, 114 Confucius 5, 9, 96, 122 Aristotle and 116 consciousness raising 21, 121 corporal punishment 59, 66 Crito, the 84 Descartes, Renee 44n10, 101 Dewey, John 11 dogmatic nonviolence 97 domestic analogy  the 120 domestic violence 120 elective, the 122 empiricism 105 epistemology 99 ethics 100 eudaimonia 14 fallibilism 104 Fiala, Andrew 89 Foot, Phillipa 15 Francis of Assisi 71 Galtung, Johan 48 Gan, Barry 38 Gandhi, M. K. x, 56, 56n29, 69n6, 70, 71, 71n9, 75, 81, 81n20, 81n21, 81n22, 82n23, 125, 128 Geneva Conventions, the 92 Girard, Rene 57 golden rule, the 5 Golden Rule, the 115 good life, the 16, 100

144 Index habituation 116, 121, 124 happiness 7, 11, 14, 15n17, 20, 21, 22, 24n26, 31, 32, 32, 33n53 health care 6 hedonism 18 hemoclysm 61 Hobbes, Thomas 63, 85 Holmes, Robert 89 homicide 58 homosexuality. See LGBTQ Human Development Index 27, 27n37, 28n38, 119 human rights 21, 30 Human Rights Watch 31 Hume, David 24 India 54 intentionality 37 inter-​being 106 James, William xiii, 96 Jesus 70 Jung, Carl 114 just war tradition 82, 83, 88, 91, 120 criteria 89 justice 12, 69 justifiable beliefs 108 Kant, Immanuel 8, 10, 40 Karadžić, Radovan 93 King, Martin Luther, Jr. x, 52, 69n6, 75, 125, 125n48, 128 Laozi 96 Leviathan 63 LGBTQ 5, 19 li 116 logical positivism 105 Luther, Martin 124 MacIntyre, Alasdair 15 megadeaths 60 Mennonites 19, 69 metaphysics 99 Midgely, Mary 43 Mill, J. S. 8 Milošević, Slobodan 92 Moore, G. E. 8, 10 moral absolutism 10 Moral Equivalent of War, the 108

multicides 59 Muñoz, Francisco A. 55 myth of redemptive violence 56, 57, 57n32, 58, 128 Nagler, Michael 68 National Conference of Catholic Bishops 89 Neo-​Aristotelianism 124 Neo-​Confucianism 124 Noddings, Nel 25 nonmaleficence 11 nonviolence  apartheid and 126 as counterintuitive 124 as political strategy 128 biblical literalism and 72 character traits, and 97 civil resistance and 125 definition of 67, 119 does it work? 127 effectiveness of 126 human flourishing and 121 internalization of 97, 122 Jesus and 70, 125 realpolitik and 124 the Bible and 69 Nonviolence  the British Empire and 125 the Civil Rights movement and 125 Northern Ireland 40 Nuremberg trials, the 92 Nussbaum, Martha 26 pacifism 68 absolute 66 Mennonites and 75 pacifism, Mennonite 97 paddling in schools 66 Pakistan 54 parental violence 53 patriarchy 21, 47 personal growth 115 philosophical Daoism xiv, xv, 71, 114 summary of 114 philosophy  pacifism and 82 Pinker, Steven 33, 58 Plato 26, 103 poverty 50

145

Index practice  nonviolent 98 pragmatism  negativity, and 103 principled 108 prima facie moral obligations 10, 64 principled pragmatism 108, 128 principlism 6, 8 real world philosophy 101 realpolitik  nonviolence and 124 Realpolitk x reductionism 102 reflective, the 122 relativism 16 religion  pacifism and 81 religious language  meaning and 105 rituals.  See li Roman Empire 70 Ross, W. D. 8 Ross, W.D. 6 satyagraha 70 Satyagraha 81 Second World War 62 Self-​cultivation 115 Sen, Amartya 25 Sharp, Gene 125 Singer, Peter 42 slavery 21 Smith, Adam 24 social media 17 Solidarity movement, the 126 spanking 67 suffering  animal 43 summum bonum 16 terrorism 55 the just war tradition 82 thinking, feeling, choosing 122 tradition 16 Traditional Chinese Medicine 6 two kingdoms, the 124

United Nations 7, 28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 30 universals 15 utilitarianism 10, 21, 42 utopian nonviolence 97 Varieties of Religious Experience 102 vegetarianism 41 violence  against property 46 as common sense 124 as metaphor 38 as punishment 66 bodily integrity and 74 capitalism 51 does it work? 126 domestic 120 intentionality and 37 necessity of 66 oppressive governments and 60 physical 37 poverty and 50 power and 53 primary, secondary and tertiary 49 psychological 37, 46 racism and 48 restraint of 85 strength and 53 structural 47 systemic 47 violentology perspective 55 virtue ethics 9n7, 15, 116 Walzer, Michael 90, 120 war  civilians and 88 warism 82 warranted assertibility 110 well-​being 18, 22, See happiness white supremacy 108 Whitehead, Alfred 103 Wink, Walter 56 World Health Organization 36, 63 Yijing 12, 12n14, 12n15, 113, 113n32, 114n33, 115, 115n36 Yoder, John 91