Power!: Black workers, their unions and the struggle for freedom in South Africa 0896082458, 9780896082458

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POWER!

POWER! Black workers, their unions

a n d t h e struggle f o r f r e e d o m i n S o u t h Africa Denis MacShane, Martin Plaut, David Ward

S o u t h E n d Press

Copyright © 1984 Dennis MacShane, Martin Plaut, David Ward

Copyrights a r e still required for b o o k production i n t h e

United States. However, in our case itis a disliked necessity. Thus, a n y properly footnoted quotation of u p to 500 squential w o r d s m a y b e u s e d without permission, s o l o n g a s t h e total n u m b e r of w o r d s q u o t e d d o e s n o t exceed 2000. F o r longer quotations o r for a greater n u m b e r of total words, authors s h o u l d write for permission from t h e publisher. ISBN: 0-89608-244-x paper ISBN: 0-89608-246-8 cloth P r i n t e d i n G r e a t Britain

Cover design: Dave King

South E n d P r e s s / 3 0 2 Columbus A v e / B o s t o n M A 02116

Contents Foreword Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Durban 1984, Durban 1973

The history

of black

workers a n d their

unions

Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter § Chapter 6

Unions in South Africa in the 1980s Sheltering the flame: the growth o f unions after 1973 Organisation and structure Workers’ health and safety becomes an issue

Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter

7 8 9 10 11 12

11 14

Women workers assert their rights Industries and unions Black unions and the search for unity Unions, politics a n d liberation movements International solidarity Conclusion

Appendices 1 The workers’ struggle — where does F O S A T U stand? Address b y Joe Foster to the 1982 F O S A T U Congress 2 The General Workers’ Union o n the United Democratic Front The Municipal and General Workers Union o n the United Democratic Front The United Democratic Front o n the unions CUSA o n political organisations Labour movement relations with South African trade unions. statement b y the National Executive Committee o f the British Labour Party International Policy Statement adopted b y F O S A T U Central Committee, April 1984 Making contact with black unions in South Africa

24 34 48 64

75 83 91 110 118 130 140

142 157 167 175 180

181 186 190

Notes 1. Terminology a. South Africa’s apartheid system divides the country’s peoples i n t o so-called population groups. A 1950 law assigns every person t o one o f the three groups: white, coloured and black. The coloured group is further divided i n t o Indian and Asian groups. A s is well k n o w n the Africans were the original inhabitants o f South Africa; the whites arrived i n t w o waves mainly from the Netherlands and Great Britain from the 17th century onwards though they have been augmented since 1945 b y white immigration from continental Europe and from the rest o f Africa. The coloureds are the descendants o f mixed marriages and African-white relationships while the Asian population, mainly Indian, are descendants o f those brought t o South Africa as cheap labour b y the British i n the 19th century. For the purposes o f this b o o k we follow the usage o f the workers i n South Africa which is t o refer i n general terms t o all workers who are not i n the white population group as black. So when you read o f ‘“‘black’’ workers this often includes African, coloured and Asian workers. When it is necessary t o draw a finer distinction the report refers t o ‘ ‘ A f r i c a n ’ ’ t o mean the descendants o f the original inhabitants o f South Africa, ‘‘coloured’’ i n accordance with the definition above and ‘ ‘ I n d i a n ’ ’ o r ‘ ‘ A s i a n ’ ’ , as appropriate. b . The apartheid system has also created a set o f so-called ““homelands’’ o r ‘‘national states’’ o r ‘independent republics’’ which the Pretoria régime claims are the territorial entities t o which many Africans belong. So, for example, the so-called Republic o f Transkei was set u p under the Status o f Transkei Act which declares that all those b o r n i n Transkei o r directly descended from Transkeians o r who have linguistic o r cultural ties t o the Xhosa o r Sotho groups i n the Transkei shall n o longer be South African citizens. The four so-called ‘independent republics’’ are Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda. The ‘‘national states’’ are KwaZulu, Gazankulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa, Ndebele, and KaNgwane. I n the o l d usage these were always referred t o as ‘‘bantustans’’ and i t is h o w most workers i n South Africa refer t o them n o w as few people outside government circles accept the claim that these areas are countries, nations, o r states i n any accepted sense o f the word. Therefore, unless there is a specific need t o draw a specific distinction this b o o k w i l l refer t o the above ten areas as ‘“‘bantustans’’.

8

POWER!

2. Population The population is divided as follows: White African 4.5 million 20.8 million

Coloured 2.6 million

Asian 820,000

3. Government The ruling Nationalist Party has been i n power since 1948. I t currently enjoys a large majority i n parliament. There is strong criticism o f apartheid in the English language press. 4. Trade U n i o n Federations and independent o r emerging unions Chapter 3 provides more details but before then you will come across references t o TUCSA, FOSATU and C U S A . TUCSA, the Trade U n i o n Council o f South Africa, was established in the 1950s and is white dominated though i t has many black members. FOSATU, the

Federation of South Africa Trade Unions was founded in 1979. I t is non-racial. C U S A , the Council o f South African Unions, was launched

in 1980. Its philosophy is close to black consciousness. Other unions are not affiliated t o any centre. Generally all the black-led non-TUCSA unions are labelled as independent o r emerging.

5. Currency Most figures are quoted i n Rand. I n April 1984, R 1 equalled £0.55 o r US$0.80. The minimum wage in the metal industry in April 1984 was

R1.53 an hour, ie: a monthly salary of R269 or £148 or $215. Prices i n the shops for food, clothes, leisure were about the same as Western Europe o r North America.

Abbreviations South African Trade Union Federations, and their affiliates mentioned in this book. C U S A : Council o f U n i o n s o f S o u t h A f r i c a N U M : N a t i o n a l U n i o n o f Mineworkers F O S A T U : Federation o f S o u t h A f r i c a n T r a d e U n i o n s

M A W U : Metal and Allied Workers Union N A A W U : N a t i o n a l U n i o n o f A u t o m o b i l e a n d A l l i e d Workers Union

N U T W : National U n i o n o f Textile Workers S A C O L : South African Confederation o f Labour T U C S A : T r a d e U n i o n Council o f S o u t h A f r i c a

Historic Unions a n d Federations

C N E T U : Council o f Non-European Trade Unions FOFATUSA: Federation o f Free Trade Unions o f South Africa I C U : Industrial and Commercial Workers U n i o n P T U : Progressive Trade U n i o n Group S A C T U : South African Congress o f Trade Unions

Unaffiliated black unions C T M W A : Cape Town Municipal Workers Association F C W U : Food and Canning Workers U n i o n G A W U : General and Allied Workers U n i o n G W U : General Workers U n i o n C C A W U S A : Commercial Catering and Allied Workers U n i o n o f South Africa B M W U : Black Municipal Workers U n i o n M A C W U S A : M o t o r Assembly and Component Workers U n i o n o f South Africa S A A W U : South African Allied Workers U n i o n O V G W U : Orange Vaal General Workers U n i o n Political Organisations A N C : African National Congress P A C : Pan Africanist Congress N F C : National F o r u m Committee U D F : United Democratic Front International Trade Union Federations a n d Secretariats

I C F T U : I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f Free T r a d e U n i o n s W F T U : World Federation o f T r a d e U n i o n s I M F : International Metalworkers Federation

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Fore word This short book is t o explain t o people outside South Africa the immense growth i n trade unions organising black workers i n that country. There are now more than 550,000 blacks organised i n trade unions. O n average there has been a strike a day i n South Africa over the past three years. The apartheid state and the employers have had t o come t o terms with the growth o f an organised working class. Clearly this has important implications for the struggle for democracy, political freedom and economic and social justice i n South Africa. Workers and unions i n countries outside South Africa can now play crucial roles i n building solidarity with their brothers and sisters i n South Africa. I n this book we t r y t o describe the growth o f this black trade union movement, its fight against repression, its successes and its problems. We have not attempted t o describe the full horror o f the daily existence o f 80 per cent o f the South African population which is not white. The Carnegie Foundation has recently sponsored a major study i n t o poverty i n South Africa. Four hundred researchers from 20 South African universities have been at work since 1982. Their first findings which emerged i n 1984 showed that one third o f all black children under the age o f 14 d i d n o t get enough food t o eat and were stunted i n their growth. I n Cape Town, a nuclear power station came o n stream i n 1984, yet for most blacks the only heating source i n one o f the bantustans (‘homelands’) is firewood the people have t o spend 150-million man-hours a year collecting. The pass laws and group areas Acts, w h i c h c o n t r o l where blacks l i v e , w o r k a n d travel are s t i l l i n force.

Since 1948, 12.5 million people have been arrested or prosecuted u n d e r t h e pass l a w s . I n 1983, 140,000 v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e v a r i o u s c o n t r o l s o n m o v e m e n t o r h a b i t a t i o n were r e c o r d e d , a n average o f

nearly 400 a day. Since 1960, three-and-a-half million people have been forcibly evicted from their homes and a further two million are threatened. The activities o f the security police have been responsible for the deaths i n custody o f Steve B i k o , Neil Aggett and many others. N e l s o n M a n d e l a a n d o t h e r b l a c k leaders r e m a i n i n p r i s o n .

Discrimination is still visible i n segregated transport, housing, beaches and lavatories. The wealth o f the whites contrasts with the

12

POWER!

poverty o f the blacks. T w o i m p o r t a n t categories o f workers —

agricultural labourers and domestic servants, are n o t permitted t o organise i n a trade union. There is n o evidence that the ruling white minority w i l l give u p o r even lessen its control without a determined struggle. We have n o t dwelt at length o n these problems. They are well covered i n reports, articles and books elsewhere. The excellent range o f publications produced b y the International Defence and A i d Fund o r by the anti-apartheid movement provide fully documented evidence o f the cruel and inhuman consequences o f apartheid for the people o f South Africa. N o r have we written about the important and interesting political developments inside South Africa including the arrival o f the United Democratic F r o n t , the National Forum Committee, nor indeed about the activities o f the African National Congress, n o r about the political dynamic o f Southern Africa as a whole including the Namibia conflict, the signing o f a treaty with socialist Mozambique o r the problems facing the Zimbabwe and Angola governments. The debate around what form o f capitalist relationships exist i n South Africa is a profound one which space does not permit us t o enter. N o r t o judge the value o f the ideas o f the black consciousness movement as opposed t o those who argue for a class-based approach t o the liberation o f South Africa. I t may seem strange t o list what a book does n o t cover b u t it is better at the outset t o make clear that this book concentrates o n the black working class and their unions. Although a great deal o f material is available i n South Africa o n this subject very little has been published at length outside South Africa, and what does exist is often written from a narrow viewpoint aimed to boost the position o f particular exiled organisations o r specific political perspectives o r party analyses. Readers o f the South African Labour Bulletin w i l l see the immense debt we owe t o its editors and contributors and we are grateful t o its editors for permission t o quote from its many articles. The South African Labour Bulletin is a model for a rigorous, yet accessible review o f a country’s trade union and labour movement scene. Anyone interested i n what is happening t o black workers and their organisations i n South Africa should subscribe ( S A L B , 4 Melle House, 31 Melle Street, 2001 Braamfontein, South Africa). We have also drawn o n the journals, bulletins and publications o f the South African trade union movement and from personal interviews conducted i n South African workplaces and townships i n M a r c h 1984. Finally, one should note the contribution o f some o f South Africa’s journalists who report labour news. Their coverage is first-rate and any

Foreword

13

student o f the black trade union movement i n South Africa will find plenty o f material i n the R a n d Daily Mail, the Financial Mail, the Star, the Argus, the Sowetan and City Press. The Trade U n i o n International Research and Education Group at Ruskin College, Oxford has produced a video called ‘The Workers Struggle i n South A f r i c a ’ . They showed i t t o a group o f shop stewards i n Manchester. One o f the shop stewards said afterwards: ‘ ‘ I t wasn’t the level o f repression i n South Africa shown i n the programme that surprised me. I felt I knew about that already. I t was the level o f organisation among black workers, that I just didn’t know was there. I didn’t realise that such union organisation was possible there, much o f i t is fighting against British companies like our o w n . ’ This book is written for people like h i m . I t is dedicated, however, t o the workers o f South Africa. They are engaged i n a struggle whose outcome is far from certain. B u t i n fighting for working class rights and building independent democratic workers’ controlled unions they are setting an example t o the world. Denis MacShane, Martin Plaut, David Ward July 1984

14

Chapter 1

Durban 1984, Durban 1973 Slowly, the workers came over the hill. From the township i n Clermont where they lived t o the industrial areas around Durban where they worked was a distance o f 15 kilometers. I t had meant getting u p much earlier i n the morning; i t would mean not arriving home u n t i l well past nightfall. They walked cheerfully, singing songs and from time t o time shouting out ‘Amandla’ — Power! — and punching the air with their fists. Every few minutes an empty bus would be driven quickly past the walking workers. Troops o f police drove u p and down the line, occasionally lobbing a tear gas grenade. I t was 14 March 1984 and this was another episode i n the long struggle for workers’ rights i n South Africa. The dispute between 200 bus drivers and the Durban Transport Management Board w i l l perhaps n o t even be mentioned when the future historians o f the South Africa labour movement begin their work. I t was over i n a matter o f days. There was little media interest. I n any democratic country i t would never have happened. Yet the Durban bus drivers’ strike i n March 1984 brought i n t o play the following elements: a workplace occupation, mass dismissals, the hiring o f strike-breakers, police charges and tear-gas attacks o n innocent bystanders, a community boycott, the threat o f a general strike i n Durban, the winding u p o f a hated management controlled liaison committee, a n d a clear v i c t o r y for w o r k e r s , t h e community

and their union. The issue was simple enough. The 200 black drivers employed b y the Durban Transport Management Board wanted their union, the

Transport and General Workers U n i o n , t o be recognised as representing their rights and interests. They wanted t o elect shop stewards and they wanted the management t o talk with them rather than through a management-workers liaison committee whose composition was heavily weighted i n favour o f the Transport Board. As public employees they had n o legal right t o strike. They knew that many o f their fellow trade unionists had achieved recognition i n the textile and industrial plants i n Durban. But municipal and state bodies, particularly those responsible for transportation had resisted efforts b y the independent black unions t o w i n recognition agreements. T w o years previously, further down the coast i n Port Elizabeth,

Durban 1984, Durban 1973

15

800 workers employed b y SATS, the state transportation company had gone o n strike to w i n recognition for their union, the General W o r k e r s U n i o n . T h e strike h a d been c r u s h e d , t h e w o r k e r s

dismissed and those who were migrants were forced back t o their bantustans. Every municipal employee i n South A f r i c a was aware o f the cruelty used against Johannesburg city council workers i n 1980. So the Durban bus drivers were taking a risk when they decided t o go o n strike t o press for union recognition. The strike began on a Friday when the workers occupied the bus depot at Clermont. Over the weekend the management told them over loudspeakers that they should return t o work and that they all faced dismissal. The management showered the workers with leaflets saying they could be charged under the Riotous Assemblies A c t . I n addition t o its police, Durban has a specially trained municipal ‘‘combat group’’. Heavily armed with shotguns, they backed their vehicles i n t o the yard where the workers were meeting and began swinging their batons i n an attempt t o intimidate the strikers. O n Monday, the workers were told that they had been formally dismissed. Police arrived t o evict them from the depot but the workers left peacefully. The Transport Board began hiring replacement drivers and also t o l d inspectors t o drive the buses. The workers took the struggle i n t o the community. U n i o n activists i n other unions spread the word that no-one should use the buses t o go t o or from work. The police patrolled the columns o f workers. Near the bus depot and a shopping centre the police suddenly ran amok, driving their L a n d Rovers straight at groups o f passers-by and firing hundreds o f tear gas grenades. O n Wednesday, there was a general meeting o f shop stewards from the unions i n Durban i n the FOSATU federation, t o which the Transport and General Workers U n i o n belonged and which is the most important o f the independent, black-led union federations which has emerged i n South Africa. The shop stewards decided t o send a delegation t o the mayor o f Durban. They also debated whether i n addition t o the bus boycott they would consider a protest stoppage i n the Pinetown industrial area. The concept o f ‘‘pressure’’ is one much bandied about i n discussion o f industrial disputes. Sometimes pressure can be directly measured i n terms o f production halted o r revenue lost. Sometimes the desire t o avoid a major confrontation o n the part o f employers, uncertain as t o what its outcome might be, is a form o f pressure that produces a settlement i n favour o f workers at an early stage. Employers i n Durban must have asked themselves why o n earth should they have t o face the possibility o f industrial action, not t o mention the irritation o f the bus boycott making workers t i r e d o n a r r i v a l a t w o r k yet a t t h e same t i m e e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d

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POWER!

with the solidarity action they were engaged i n , when the issue — that o f union recognition and the election o f shop stewards was one they had already conceded i n their own factories? Similar points were made i n a debate i n the Durban City Council and b y Thursday, six days after the strike had begun the Durban Transportation Management Board was negotiating with the union about recognition. B y Thursday evening all the dismissed bus drivers were reinstated, the liaison committee had been removed, and i n a written agreement the Board had accepted the election o f six shop stewards who would ‘‘have the right t o represent members i n disciplinary and grievance hearings and w i l l be afforded the traditional facilities o f such representatives.’ The management also granted access t o the bus depots for full-time union officials and agreed t o deduct union subscriptions at source i f an employee decided t o j o i n the union and forward the cash t o the Transport and General Workers Union. Power in the workplace For b o t h the workers and their union i t was an important victory. Unions may have charismatic leaders o r may figure large i n the media, but what counts for workers is t o know that they are n o longer powerless i n the workplace. A shop steward at Alusaf, one o f South Africa’s aluminium companies put i t this way: ‘‘Some people used t o bow when they see the white people saying ‘Baas, baas’. But we have changed that attitude now and everybody, i f he’s a man, he’s a man . . . They don’t feel victims o f another nation n o w . Although they know that these people have got the money, and are wealthy, the workers have managed t o erase the slave from themselves b y n o t bowing t o anybody.”’ Page 2225 o f the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary tells us that a Trade U n i o n is: ‘ A n association o f workers . . . for the protection and furtherance o f their interests i n regard t o wages, hours and conditions o f labour . . .”” Yet the Durban bus drivers were n o t s t r i k i n g f o r m o r e m o n e y , s h o r t e r h o u r s o r b e t t e r facilities i n t h e d e p o t ; n o , t h e i r struggle h a d a w i d e r political a n d social

significance. As with workers everywhere the act o f forming a trade union and having t o overcome the hostility o f the employers and their agents, having t o face o f f the threats o f the police and ignore the dismissal orders, having t o learn t o talk with each other and take decisions collectively and democratically, all this added u p t o a sense o f regaining some control over their lives, a sense o f control that i n South Africa had been doubly denied them as workers and as blacks. I t was i n Durban, 11 years previously that the first great wave o f

Durban 1984, Durban 1973

17

strikes began t o h i t South African industry giving b i r t h t o what is now a strongly-based, militant, democratic and still growing trade union movement composed almost entirely o f black workers. I n 1969, there w e r e 13 a f r i c a n u n i o n s w i t h 16,000 members. I n 1973,

about 40,000 black workers were organised i n unions. N o w 550,000 black workers are organised i n industrial and general unions. The emerging unions have full-time organisers, offices i n different regions o f the country, employ specialist experts as health and safety officers, legal advisers, educationists a n d editors.

The independent trade unions have emerged as amongst the most coherent, best organised opponents o f apartheid because they are slowly gaining the power t o h u r t the regime economically. Employers and pro-management academics have been desperately organising seminars o n how t o deal w i t h black unions and launching appeals for unions t o restrict themselves t o economic issues and avoid political questions. This has been brushed aside b y the black unions who have continually called for the introduction o f political democracy, have denounced the apartheid infrastructure such as influx control and the Groups Areas Act, and have campaigned strongly against the 1983 constitution referendum which proposed t o white voters the setting u p o f ‘“‘parliaments’’ for coloureds and Indians while leaving africans disenfranchised. The black National U n i o n o f Mineworkers, which since its founding b y the Council o f Unions o f South Africa i n 1982 has shot t o a membership o f 70,000, has a subtle, clever b u t cautious

leadership. Whoever threatens the gold mines i n South Africa, threatens not just the very foundation o f South African wealth but menaces a key segment o f white South Africa’s sense o f history and enduring control. The greatest strikes i n 20th century South African h i s t o r y , i n v o l v i n g b o t h b l a c k a n d w h i t e workers, i n v o l v e d

the gold mines. Political upheavals leading t o key changes i n government followed the great mining strikes that came after b o t h world wars. N o single group o f workers has seen so many o f its leaders victimised. 95 per cent o f the 600,000 black miners are migrant workers. Dismissal from the mine means a return t o a bantustan. T h e president o f t h e N U M , James Motlatsi, is a m i g r a n t w o r k e r

from Lesotho. So for h i m and his colleagues the need t o tread carefully i n building u p their union is paramount. A n all-out strike b y his members would be unlikely t o end i n a negotiated settlement, with one side winning o r losing, gracefully or otherwise, and the strikers suffering privation for the duration o f the dispute: i n South Africa, a serious, completely engaged miners’ strike at the present l e v e l o f o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d b a l a n c e o f forces w o u l d a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y

18

POWER!

involve repression, bloodshed and mass dismissals. Motlasi recalls a spontaneous strike i n the Western Deep Levels mine i n 1973. Anger over meagre wages exploded when managers told the black miners that they were unskilled men fit only t o hack at the rockface with their picks. The workers decided t o go o n strike and went back t o the hostels t o urge their colleagues n o t t o report for the next shift. Security forces moved i n and the sight o f fixed bayonets made the massing workers more angry. Someone threw a stone at the troops and others followed suit. The troops opened fire and 12 miners were killed. Motlasi was 22 at the time but the memory stays inside h i m . W i t h i t is anger, b u t also an eye t o maintain and extend organisation and t o increase worker education before letting emotion spill over i n t o a confrontation out o f which the miners are unlikely t o emerge as winners. Politics comes in

Yet such a perspective does not make the N U M mealy mouthed or hesitant i n its political analysis. Here is how the N U M uses simple and direct language i n its handbook for shaft stewards: “Employer 1. H e has money;

2. H e is white and enjoys the support o f government; 3. H i s main aim is t o make a big profit out o f the Worker; 4. H e usually knows more about the j o b than the worker; 5. H e has the power t o employ and dismiss; 6. H e is well educated and crafty; 7. H e can pick and choose his workers

Worker H e has n o money that is w h y he needs a j o b ; H e is Black and the government discriminates against h i m ; H i s major aim is t o make a living o u t o f wages. H e must w o r k o r his family will starve; M a y not fully k n o w the j o b and h o w the company operates; H e has n o powers o r say i n the workplace; H e has had n o schooling; Because o f unemployment, he cannot choose employer.

From the above factors we therefore see that the worker is i n a terribly weak position. H i s weak position will stay that way from the day he is hired t o the day he is fired unless he does something about i t . T o get o u t o f that position o f weakness, workers need t o form their o w n organisation so that they can t u r n their weakness i n t o strength. When workers form a brotherhood they outweigh the might o f the employer, they deal w i t h h i m from a position o f strength a n d n o t weakness.”’

A meeting held i n M a r c h 1984 o f metal unions i n Johannesburg,

Durban 1984, Durban 1973

19

which included major affiliates o f b o t h F O S A T U and C U S A , adopted a resolution, i n which the delegates noted ‘‘that the voice o f the majority o f the working people has been suppressed, their organisatons crushed and that their political rights are still being denied’’ and resolved ‘ ‘ t o continue t o fight for the total liberation o f workers and the development o f majority trade unions as a vehicle for change.” T h e r e i s a n i m p o r t a n t debate (see C h a p t e r 10) g o i n g o n i n t h e

emerging unions about what should be their precise relationship with political bodies i n South Africa such as the United Democratic F r o n t , the National Forum Committee, AZAPO (the Azanian

Peoples’ Organisation) o r even Inkatha, the KwaZulu based political organisation set u p b y Chief Buthelezi. Never officially mentioned is the clear support amongst many black workers for the African National Congress and especially for the imprisoned Nelson Mandela. As one P o r t Elizabeth shop steward put i t : “ W e long for the day when there is majority rule government i n South Africa and Nelson Mandela is our Prime Minister. B u t when that day comes we must have an independent trade union organisation t o make sure the black workers don’t get kicked around simply because our people are i n power.’’ The building u p o f those unions has taken a decade o f constant work since the Durban strikes i n 1973. I t has been a hard slog, punctuated b y fierce internal debate about the nature and role o f trades unionism, the relationship o f the black working class t o capital and the apartheid state, and, i n particular, important and difficult strategic and tactical decisions t o be taken about such issues as the role o f whites i n the emerging unions, the ratio o f r e c r u i t m e n t t o education a n d organisation, t h e use o f l a b o u r l a w ,

the acceptance or refusal o f government registration and whether t o j o i n the employer dominated Industrial Council system. There have been divisions between unions following the black consciousness line and those that argue that non-racialism should be a guiding principle. Inevitably, there have been personality clashes and differences o f opinion about whether forceful leadership offered by an individual encourages workers’ confidence or whether a personality cult and over-dominance o f a union results. The balance between the power o f full-time officials and that o f the rank and file membership o f an executive committee remains a problem. Organising unions o n a national basis has been difficult. South Africa is five times the size o f Great Britain. Cape T o w n is 1,000 miles from Pretoria. The economy, racial composition, and political and industrial history o f the Western Cape is very different from Transvaal. Unions have grown u p based o n different industrial areas and there is considerable

POWER!

20

autonomy, n o t t o say rivalry, between branches o f unions covering different provinces. As we shall see later there have been major steps taken towards a greater degree o f trade union unity. The differentiation i n u n i o n development and outlook has naturally been a source o f weakness. But i t has also permitted the emerging unions t o develop at their o w n pace and t o seek out members and confront employers i n a wide variety o f ways. A monolithic aproach t o organisation, negotiation and confrontation would have presented employers and the state with a single target, readily identified and hence more easily dealt with. The 1973 strikes in Durban

A l l these problems were far from the minds o f the strikers i n Durban i n 1973. I n the 10 years leading u p t o those strikes there had been little industrial activity b y black workers. The repression o f the South African Congress o f Trade Unions (SACTU) i n the early 1960s and the indifference o f the Trade U n i o n Council o f S o u t h Africa (TUCSA) t o the needs o f black workers meant that there was n o leadership o r trade union expression given t o the rising tide o f black industrial discontent. The following table shows the number o f strikes b y black workers 1962-1972. Strikes b y black workers: 1962-72 Black

No. Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

of

Disputes 56 61 99 84 98 76 56 78 76 69 71

workers o n strike 2,155 3,101 4,369 3,540 3,253 2,874 1,705 4,232 3,303 4,196 8,814

During this period o f labour quiescence, the South African economy was expanding at a rate matched only b y that o f Japan. Between 1960 and 1970 i t grew b y 56 per cent. Foreign investment increased from R1819 million t o R3943 million. But black workers, who b y 1970 formed 78 per cent o f the workforce i n the manufacturing and construction sector, and.90 per cent i n the mining sector, were n o t sharing i n this bonanza o f rapidly

Durban 1984, Durban 1973

21

increasing industrial development, nor i n the sharp upturn i n South Africa’s national income following the increase i n the price o f gold after President Nixon suspended dollar convertibility i n 1971. A devaluation o f the rand b y 8 per cent i n 1971 combined with an increase i n world food prices meant that between 1971 and 1973 there was an increase o f 40 per cent i n the poverty datum line — the minimum subsistence level. Bus fares increased b y 16 per cent. There was also mounting unemployment. Between 1961 and 1979 unemployment went u p b y 4,000 a month; between 1971 and 1975, the rate o f increase i n joblessness was 11,000 a month. I n 1973, a survey showed that 80 per cent o f the African employees i n British and South African controlled firms were paid below the Poverty Datum Line. These problems were accutely felt i n Durban, where 165,000 African workers constituted one o f the largest group o f industrial workers i n South Africa. The major industries are garment, textile, general engineering, food processing and tyres (Dunlop). The factories are generally small, single storey affairs. I n January 1973, a strike began i n a brickworks. 2,000 workers went o n strike for higher wages. They marched down the streets, chanting: ‘ ‘ M a n is dead, but his spirit still lives.”” They won a wage increase. The strikes spread t o factories belonging t o the Frame group, South Africa’s largest textile employer and notorious for low wages and poor conditions. Before the end o f January, some 6,000 Frame employees were o n strike. They obtained relatively modest wage increases. B u t the strikes moved o n like a wave. As one factory won a wage increase and returned t o work, another group o f workers would come out o n strike. The Durban press gave the strikes considerable publicity and word spread quickly i n the townships. According t o one observer: ‘Typically, the stoppages seem t o have followed spontaneous mass meetings at the workplace; wage demands were n o t normally specified at the outset, b u t once formulated these involved ambitious increases. Serious bargaining d i d not occur, for n o worker representatives were prepared t o come forward and risk victimisation. Commonly the employers offered increases o f u p t o £2 a week which, though usually rejected initially at mass meetings, were normally accepted when i t was clear that n o further improvements were forthcoming.”’

Help from ‘‘outsiders’’ B y the end o f 1973, about 100,000 workers i n Durban had gone o n strike. Strikes also h i t other industrial centres elsewhere i n South Africa, but Durban was the focal point for the 1973 strike wave. Employers and the government were aghast. The strike wave appeared t o have come from nowhere. Its spontaneity was

22

POWER!

undeniable but effective. But widespread industrial action still requires some organisation and leadership. The year before, 1972, there had been a successful strike b y bus drivers i n Johannesburg. 300 had been arrested after a sit-in b u t their services were needed for the daily transport o f 120,000 black workers. I n the end they won wage increases o f 35 per cent. I n addition, white students and post-graduate researchers who had been active in the radical students union offered their services as advisers t o black workers. The great era o f student and young intellectuals’ political radicalisation associated with the events o f 1968 i n France, with the anti-Vietnam war campaign i n the United States, the Prague spring i n Czechoslovakia, the university demonstrations in Warsaw, the

student revolts i n Britain, the h o t summer (1969) i n Italy, also had its effect i n South Africa where young white, usually English speaking would-be political activists could n o t help b u t be influenced b y this worldwide movement o f ideas. Outright leftwing activity o f a political party nature was impossible i n South A f r i c a : h o w e v e r , o n e o f t h e m a i n ideas t o emerge f r o m t h e 1968

movement was that o f the industrial working class as the major agent o f political progress and dynamic change. I n Natal, the National U n i o n o f South African Students had formed a ‘Wages Commission’’ which exposed the poor living standards o f african workers. Young whites associated with the “Wages Commission’’ were active i n helping strikers i n Durban i n 1973. The exclusively black South African Students Organisation had been founded i n 1969; t h e B l a c k P e o p l e ’ s C o n v e n t i o n was l a u n c h e d i n 1972 together

with a general workers’ union, the Black Allied Workers Union. What became known as the black consciousness movement was beginning t o be active at the time o f the Durban strikes. Finally, there was the behind-the-scenes involvement o f older generations o f workers who had been activists i n the war-time and post-war period o f industrial action under the Council for Non-European Trade Unions or later i n the 1950s with S A C T U . Although many key activists were arrested, imprisoned or forced into exile, there were also hundreds, possibly thousands, who had a living experience o f union organisation and agitation which would once again be put t o use. Veteran trade union leaders like Oskar Mpetha and Morris Kagan who had managed, just, t o keep legally functioning as trade union officers were t o be a source o f advice and encouragement t o the emerging unions. The Durban strikes also gave an impetus t o the handful o f coloured and Indian trade union officials who worked for T U C S A but resented TUCSA'’s indifference t o African workers. Some o f them left t o form a carworkers’ union which i n due course would become one o f the bestr u n and most militant o f the FOSATU unions.

Durban 1984, Durban 1973

23

The wage levels against which the Durban strikers were protesting were extremely l o w , often less than R15 a week. Employers found that they could offer increases without much dent being made i n their profits. The strikes were also embarrassing for foreign companies. American and European firms were suddenly and publicly exposed as paying wages which t o public opinion i n their own countries might seem little better than slave rates. The successful sporting boycott o f South Africa had increased the country’s sense o f isolation and its need t o cultivate its image as part o f the Western community. Partly b y skilful tactics involving staying inside workplaces for meetings, b y not having any identifiable leaders, and avoiding major public demonstrations and partly by the short, sharp nature o f the strikes the 1973 strikers avoided brutal police repression. Only 0.2 per cent o f the strikers were prosecuted. I n short, b o t h the employers and the state looked u p at the end o f the 1973 strikes and could see that i t appeared that i t was possible t o live with black working class pressure, go through strikes, grant wage increases and yet survive. The power o f the state, the authority o f the employers, the strength o f the economy appeared unscathed. R e f o r m , r e v o l u t i o n , o r repression are t h e three ‘ ‘ r ’ s ’ ’ t h a t 2 0 t h

century capitalism has responded with when confronted with pressure from an organised working class. They are n o t necessarily three separate alternatives; as often as not repression has been found accompanying both reform and revolution. I n South Africa, workers and their unions are still more aware o f repression than reform. Yet after the Durban strikes the state and many employers opted, under growing and sustained pressure from black workers, for changes that amounted t o a massive reform o f labour law and employer-employee relations. The object o f those trying t o implement reform from o n high was clear — i n return for being granted a handful o f rights that were supposed t o approximate those achieved b y unions i n advanced capitalist countries the black w o r k e r s w o u l d b e g r a t e f u l , c o n t e n t even. I n s t e a d t h e b l a c k w o r k i n g

class has watched as the door has been opened inch b y inch and each time kicked i t a good deal further ajar. The process is far from over. But t o understand the relationship between the strikes o f 1973 i n Durban and the 1984 strike for recognition b y the Transport and General Workers U n i o n i n the same city we should first look i n more detail at the South African economy, its system o f industrial relations and collective bargaining, the changes i n labour legislation following the 1973 strikes, and the history o f black workers’ struggles t o form their own unions and negotiate with employers and the state.

24

Chapter 2

The History of Black Workers and their Unions Black workers i n South Africa have a long history o f organising t o improve their standard o f living and t o gain elementary trade union rights. Their history is a story o f both bravery and a fierce determination t o fight for ‘ ‘ a better tomorrow’’, as one worker put i t recently. B u t i t is also the story o f tragic reverses. F o r black workers have had t o fight n o t only against a management that was as determined as any i n the world t o resist their demands, b u t also against a state uniquely organised along racist lines t o deny blacks any say over their o w n lives. For this reason the democratic channels that played an important part for the working class i n much o f the developed world i n its historical development, played little role i n the emergence o f forms o f organisation amongst black workers i n South Africa. Indeed, the entire weight o f the state was at crucial moments utilised t o break their trade unions and the political parties that sought at different junctures t o assist the unions i n their development. B u t there is also one further strand that cannot be ignored i n any attempt t o explain the emergence o f unionisation i n South Africa, and that is the disunity and fragmentation that has plagued the organisation o f workers down the years. Sometimes o n political grounds, and at others o n racial grounds, black workers have for decades been weakened b y the d i v i s i o n s i n t h e i r o w n r a n k s . These t h r e e factors — d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,

oppression and division, are central t o the emergence o f organisation amongst black workers. They are the central themes that dominate the story o f the period. For i n the last 60 years there have been at least four waves o f unionisation that have washed over South Africa. Each has broken, or been broken, except the last. Each has left its mark and contributed t o the struggles that have succeeded i t , for although much is lost when a union is destroyed, lessons have been learned, and many workers recall their pasts with exceptional clarity. Perhaps the bitterness o f the disputes brands these experiences o n their memories. T w o other factors should be borne i n m i n d i n considering the growth o f unionisation over this period. I n the last 100 years South Africa has experienced massive industrial development. Since the discovery o f gold and diamonds i n the last quarter o f the 19th century, the country’s industrial wealth has been generated o n a

History o f Black Workers

25

scale unknown elsewhere i n Africa. I n the period after the First W o r l d War much o f this wealth was diverted by government action i n t o the industrialisation o f South Africa, t o free i t from its dependence o n foreign manufacture. The giant I r o n and Steel Corporation was only one o f many state owned companies established i n this period. Between the end o f the First W o r l d War and the beginning o f the Second, manufacturing grew from 10 per cent o f National Income t o 18 per cent. The Second W o r l d War saw a further increase i n manufacturing and this trend was t o be continued i n the post-war years, and especially during the boom o f the 1960s. Thus i n 100 years South Africa has developed from being an agricultural colony o f little importance o n the world stage, through a massive development programme based o n the mineral wealth o f the country, t o its current position as the most advanced industrial power o n the African continent, with a diversified economy which boasts b o t h a mining and a manufacturing sector that has placed the country amongst the ranks o f the second order economic powers o f the world. Clearly, this dramatic development has n o t simply been responsible for moulding the black worker, but has brought black workers t o the centre o f the country’s development. For without their skills and sweat South Africa could n o t have developed i n the way i n which i t has. I t has also created a dual dependence o f workers o n management, b u t also o f management o n their workforce. One o f the key reasons for the growth and success o f the current trade union movement has been the increasing importance o f black workers, b o t h skilled and u n s k i l l e d , t o every sector o f the economy.

A n d this brings us t o the second area that, although crucial, will only be referred t o i n passing. That is the role o f white workers and their political organisations. For as blacks have become increasingly important t o the economy, white workers have declined i n importance. Today the vast majority o f whites are i n highly skilled positions, o r else in management. There are very few whites who today d o not exercise some supervisory function over blacks. The last 100 years has been marked b y the struggles o f white workers t o resist their gradual replacement b y blacks, and the development o f b o t h white unionisation and the political parties that have represented white workers, leading t o the victory o f the Nationalist Party i n 1948, can at least i n part be traced t o this defensive role.

The 1920s a n d the I C U

The first recorded instance o f a strike b y black workers occurred i n

26

POWER!

Cape T o w n as early as 1854, when the dockers struck for an improvement i n their wages. But i t was really i n the aftermath o f the First W o r l d War that organisation amongst blacks began. Strikes broke out amongst dockers and municipal workers, and i n 1920 a massive strike b y 71,000 b l a c k m i n e w o r k e r s t o o k place. I t

was against this background o f militancy that the first attempt at unionisation took place with the formation i n 1919 o f the Industrial and Commercial Workers U n i o n — the I C U . The I C U , founded b y the Malawian (then Nyasaland) schoolteacher, C l e m e n t s K a d a l i e , g r e w r a p i d l y as a result o f a

successful strike o n the Cape T o w n docks. I n an atmosphere i n which blacks felt themselves t o be b o t h powerless and oppressed, the I C U appeared as a beacon o f hope. As the L o n d o n Times put i t : “ T h e genuine grievances o f the South African Natives provided the hotbed i n which the I C U flourished. Rack rented Natives i n the urban locations, underpaid Natives i n Government employ, badly treated Natives o n European farms, flocked t o j o i n the movement.’’ As the report indicates, the I C U , which rapidly spread from its base i n Cape T o w n t o the Cape ports o f East London and P o r t E l i z a b e t h , t h e n t o t h e O r a n g e Free State a n d t h e Transvaal,

became a focus for a wide range o f grievances, and soon took o n the character o f a mass movement rather than a trade union. The I C U ’ s chief weakness was also one o f its strengths — Kadalie h i m s e l f . W h i l e K a d a l i e was b o t h a charismatic a n d flamboyant

figure, he was a poor administrator and organiser. The result was that the organisation grew with extraordinary speed, but lacked any coherent structure. This was exemplified b y the area o f the I C U ’ s greatest expansion — r u r a l N a t a l a n d t h e eastern Transvaal. Here,

blacks deprived o f land b y the notorious 1913 Land Act were being squeezed o f f the land o n which they squatted b y white farmers keen t o transform their holdings into modern farms. I n their desperation they joined the I C U i n their thousands. B u t although the I C U expanded with enormous rapidity, reaching a peak o f 100,000 members i n 1927, i t was a highly unstable organisation, and rapidly c r u m b l e d . T h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e I C U was hastened b y fierce

disputes within the organisation about the role o f the South African Communist Party, which was formed i n 1921, and tried t o gain influence i n the I C U . The Communist Party had supported the white miners’ strike i n 1922 and coined the slogan: ‘““Workers o f the W o r l d Unite and Fight for a White South A f r i c a ’ ’ . The difficulties were exacerbated when i n June 1927 Kadalie left o n a triumphal tour o f Europe that lasted u n t i l November, leaving the organisation without leadership i n a crucial period. O n his return, Kadalie attempted t o introduce long overdue organisational reforms, but the union was beset by

History o f Black Workers

27

splits and workers drifted away from the organisation. The I C U ran i n t o financial difficulties and i n 1928 a number o f branches broke away from the organisation. B y the following year the I C U had t o all intents and purposes ceased t o exist. The 1930s a n d the Second World W a r

The collapse o f the I C U did n o t spell the end o f black unionisation. Its decline was i n part responsible for a growth i n the small, b u t important industrial unions that had sprung u p , especially on the Witwatersrand. Their existence had come about because o f the conflicts inside the I C U over the role o f the Communist Party, which after December 1926 decided that ‘ ‘ n o officer o f the I C U shall be a member o f the Communist Party’’. Denied the opportunity o f organising within the I C U , the Communists set u p independent industrial unions. I n 1928 five black unions with a combined membership o f about 10,000 drawn from furniture and clothing factories, bakeries, laundries and garages founded the South African Federation o f Non-European Trade Unions under a leadership consisting o f Communist Party members. The foundation o f the Federation could not have taken place at a more difficult time. N o t only was the country i n the depression that was affecting the industrialised world, b u t i t was faced with a government that was determined t o break the power o f black workers. The government saw this as being essential i f i t was t o secure its objective — the replacement o f black workers b y whites as a way o f eliminating unemployment amongst whites. The ‘ p o o r white problem’’, as i t was termed, had meant that one-fifth o f all whites — some 400,000 people — were living i n dire poverty. I n order t o remedy this situation the government turned o n blacks. T h e n o t o r i o u s M i n i s t e r o f Justice, O s w a l d P i r o w , t o l d white

workers that i t was u p t o them t o ensure that ‘‘public opinion declare i t t o be a disgrace t o employ a native where a white man could be employed’’. Accordingly, a number o f repressive laws were enacted, a n d t h e p o l i c e were i n s t r u c t e d t o c r a c k d o w n u p o n

the black unions with all the power at their command. Meetings were broken u p and the premises o f the unions attacked. Despite this campaign, the unions d i d have their successes. F o r example, i n 1929 they were able t o claim a ‘‘real breakthrough’’ when i n the laundry trade a white union was persuaded t o form a joint committee with a black union i n an attempt t o win better conditions for their members. But despite these isolated successes, the union movement was unable t o sustain its position. Only the economic upturn that occurred just prior t o the war brought a real increase i n the power o f black workers.

28

POWER!

The end o f the depression saw workers returning t o the factories. The number employed i n manufacturing alone rose b y 58 per cent between 1932-33 and 1935-36. W i t h the outbreak o f war this trend increased sharply, and was further enhanced for black workers when a large number o f whites enlisted i n the armed forces, and created a shortage o f labour. Between 1939 and the end o f the war i n 1945 the number o f black workers i n factories rose from 143,000 t o 249,000. This increase i n the demand for labour gave black workers the bargaining power that they had previously lacked, and their p o s i t i o n was strengthened w h e n , i n N o v e m b e r 1941, t h e small

black unions came together t o form the Council o f Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). The first president was Gana Makabeni, previously expelled from the Communist Party, but i n 1945 he was t o be succeeded b y J.B. Marks, the chairman o f the African Mineworkers U n i o n , and a member o f both the Communist Party and the African National Congress. Most strongly organised o n the Witwatersrand, the Council had real strength i n P o r t Elizabeth, P r e t o r i a , E a s t L o n d o n , C a p e T o w n , B l o e m f o n t e i n a n d Kimberley.

B y the end o f the war i t was able t o claim 119 unions as affiliates and a membership o f 158,000. The strength o f the unions was built not only o n the needs o f the factories for labour, b u t also o n the militancy o f its members. I n December 1942 a series o f strikes broke out i n Johannesburg, with 8,000 workers i n the meat, dairy and brick industries going o n strike. I n Natal 400 coal miners walked out complaining about assaults from white foremen, insufficient food and long hours. Although the police reacted with their accustomed ferocity and 14 blacks were killed and 111 injured i n Johannesburg, many o f the strikes were successful. The Government, afraid that production badly needed for the war effort, would be affected, responded b y allowing the Wage Boards, which were empowered t o set wages across industries, t o raise wage levels i n a way unheard o f before t h e war.

But perhaps the most significant advance was recorded i n the m i n e s w h e r e , for t h e f i r s t t i m e , b l a c k w o r k e r s were a b l e t o f o r m

unions. Again the stimuli were strikes that broke out i n 1942 and 1943. The government established a commission o f inquiry which recommended that since mineworkers had not had an increase i n real terms for over 50 years, that their wages should be increased by a third. This was rejected b y the mine owners, who only granted a small increase. Although most miners saw even this small increase as a victory, they were angered b y the failure t o implement the commission’s findings. But despite the obvious power that black workers could exercise, their union leaders failed t o build o n the gains that they had been

History o f Black Workers

29

able t o make. I n part this was the result o f the political perspective o f the Communist Party which, after the entry o f the Soviet U n i o n i n t o t h e w a r , was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t n o a c t i o n s h o u l d b e t a k e n t h a t

would undermine the war effort. This position struck a chord with many i n the movement, since black workers were only too keenly aware that the most reactionary elements i n white society were backing a victory for fascism. Nonetheless, i t meant that the early militancy o f the workers was resisted b y the union leadership, and workers were encouraged instead t o take their cases t o the Wage Boards set u p b y the government. This trend was opposed by some union members, and i n 1944 the disagreements led t o the formation within the C N E T U o f what was called the Progressive Trade U n i o n G r o u p . The P T U , led b y Daniel Koza, argued that the workers h a d

nothing t o gain from assisting the government t o w i n the war. Instead they called o n workers t o fight for better working conditions and greater worker control. F o r them the struggle was for socialism, n o t simply better working conditions. B y 1945 they had been expelled from the C N E T U and soon collapsed as a movement. These divisions, together with repressive measures that the government took as part o f emergency war powers undermined the Council and meant that the unions emerged at the end o f the war i n a weakened position. Despite its difficulties the C N E T U was t o lead one further major s t r i k e before i t , t o o , was t o collapse. T h i s was t h e mineworkers s t r i k e o f 1946. A s was m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r , t h e m i n e w o r k e r s h a d n o t

been satisfied b y the results o f the government commission. B y 1944 the African Mineworkers U n i o n had grown i n influence, and claimed 25,000 members. I n the following year post-war food shortages led t o a deterioration i n the standard o f the food being provided i n the mines, and at one mine i n Johannesburg the miners went o n a hungerstrike. A t the union’s annual conference i n 1946 the union decided t o ask for a m i n i m u m wage o f 10 shillings a day, and other improvements i n their conditions o f employment. Its demands received only the briefest o f replies from the Chamber o f Mines, with a post-card informing the union that their demands were receiving attention. A wildcat strike broke out, and o n 4 August the union held a special conference, at which the delegates passed a resolution warning the Chamber that i f their intransigent attitude continued, a strike would be called from 12 August. I n adopting this position J.B. Marks warned the workers t o expect violence, since, as he put i t , ‘ Y o u are challenging the basis o f the cheap labour system and must be ready t o sacrifice i n the struggle for the right t o live as human beings.’ A n o l d miner shouted out i n reply: ‘““We o n the mines are dead men already’’. A n d so the strike began. O n the morning o f 12 August between

30

POWER!

60,000 and 70,000 miners stopped work i n at least 12 mines. O n the following day C N E T U called a general strike i n support, b u t the state confirmed Marks as correct and were determined t o use any means t o crush the dispute. Although the strike lasted a week, i t was doomed. The police surrounded the compounds i n which the miners lived, cutting them o f f from the outside world. Raids o n the union’s offices and arrests o f the leadership limited the possibility o f spreading the strike. Miners who attempted t o resist b y staging an underground sit-down strike were driven t o the surface with b r u t a l i t y . Twelve were killed a n d 1,200 w o u n d e d . C N E T U ’ s attempts t o provide support were b r o k e n b y a massive police

presence i n the townships. B y the 16th the strike was broken. The result was not only catastrophic for the Mineworkers Union, which collapsed, but i t fatally weakened the C N E T U . I n 1947, 22 o f its affiliates seceded from the Council, citing as their reason the influence o f communists i n the leadership and the use o f the strike weapon. Although C N E T U struggled on, i t was further undermined when, i n 1950 the Communist Party was banned, and i n 1953 the Council finally split up.

Unions against apartheid: the ’50s and ’60s I f the unions o f the 1940s grew out o f the war and the opportunities that i t brought t o black workers, then the unions o f the ’50s and ’60s grew out o f the increasing polarisation o f South African society. For the period saw the triumph o f Afrikaner nationalism i n 1948, and its consolidation i n the years that followed together with the unfolding o f its policies o f apartheid. F o r although racism had been central t o white politics before, its institutionalisation i n the post-war period with the election o f the Nationalist Party o n an overtly racist platform transformed the country’s politics. A direct clash with the organisations representing blacks was inevitable. I n such a climate workers became embroiled n o t only i n clashes with m a n a g e m e n t a n d t h e state, as t h e y h a d i n t h e years b e f o r e , b u t

became part o f the pattern o f resistance t o apartheid. I n later years commentators have chastised the u n i o n movement f o r subordinating the trade union struggle t o the political battles o f the day. I n the prevailing climate there was little option, for blacks were i n reality fighting for their political lives. Amongst the legislation enacted b y the Nationalist government was the Suppression o f Communism Act o f 1950. N o t only d i d i t b a n t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , w h i c h d i s b a n d e d i t s e l f , b u t i t also

removed a number o f communists from the leadership o f the union m o v e m e n t . I n 1954 t h e government published a f u r t h e r b i l l — t h e

Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act — which aimed at splitting

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31

the union movement along racial lines. I t decreed that recogniton would not be granted t o any union that had a multi-racial constitution, and required mixed unions t o either split i n t o unir a c i a l u n i o n s o r else t o set u p separate r a c i a l branches, each w i t h a

white controlled executive. The move threw the movement i n t o turmoil. The largest union body, the South African Trades and Labour Council (the predecessor t o the present T U C S A ) was deeply divided, since its affiliates had among its members Indians, coloureds and some Africans. A t the same time i t also organised white artisans, who were i n favour o f the new legislation. I n October 1954 i t arrived at what i t hoped was a suitable compromise. Africans would be excluded from direct membership, and would instead become members o f unions that would be represented o n a liaison committee. Registered white unions i n the same industry would then negotiate o n their behalf. Nineteen unions refused t o go along with this strategy, known as ‘“‘parallelism’’. These included the F o o d and Canning Workers U n i o n and the Textile Workers Industrial U n i o n . Finally 14 unions broke away from the Trades and Labour Council and together with a r u m p o f the C N E T U unions formed the South African Congress o f T r a d e U n i o n s — S A C T U . I n M a r c h 1955 S A C T U was b o r n ,

with 19 affiliates and a membership o f around 20,000. S A C T U was, from the first, not only non-racial (some 400 members o f the laundry union were white) b u t political. The inclusion o f the word ‘‘Congress’’ i n its title signified its identification with the Congress opposition, o f which the African National Congress was the most significant element. Its political character was reaffirmed at its first conference held i n Cape T o w n i n 1956. I t then adopted the following declaration: ‘“‘SACTU is conscious o f the fact that the organising o f the mass o f workers for higher wages, better conditions o f life and labour is inextricably b o u n d u p w i t h a d e t e r m i n e d struggle for political

rights and

liberation from all oppressive laws and practices. I t follows that a mere struggle for economic rights o f all the workers without participation i n the general struggle for political emancipation would condemn the trade union movement t o uselessness and t o a b e t r a y a l o f t h e interest o f t h e w o r k e r s . ” ’

But although S A C T U took a militant stand politically, and joined i n the activities o f the Congress alliance, o f which i t was a member from late 1955, i t was first and foremost a trade union organisation. Its main strength lay i n its local committees, which acted as a core, providing most o f the financial and administrative support for its unions. A t its inception SACTU’s main support came from the Witwatersrand, with 15,000 o f its members coming from this area. But as i t grew its strength diversified. Its main fields

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o f activity lay i n manufacturing, food processing and services, b u t this left many areas untouched. Agriculture, transport and metals, as well as mining, which after the end o f the African Mineworkers U n i o n was almost unorganisable because o f the strict security, were amongst the areas o f the economy that were n o t successfully organised. Nonetheless the unions grew, despite much government hostility. B y 1961 i t had 35 unions and 53,000 members, o f whom 38,791 were Africans. Most o f this growth came as the result o f campaigns t o improve the workers’ conditions o f employment, and some unions were hastily brought together i n response t o strikes b y workers i n particular locations. I n its first two years o f operation SACTU concentrated o n building industrial unions, b u t after the Alexandra bus fare protests o f 1957 i n which workers resisted the increases i n fares b y walking t o work en masse, the organisation switched its strategy t o more broadly based campaigns. Early i n 1957, 300 workers attended a ‘‘National Workers Conference’’ and resolved t o press for a £1 a day minimum wage. The aim was not only t o increase wages, b u t also t o broaden the base o f the movement t o reach a wider audience. £1 a day committees were formed i n all the major towns and won the support o f the Congress alliance. O n 26 June 1957, a stay at home — effectively a one-day general strike — was called as part o f the Defiance Campaign being waged b y the Congress Alliance against the laws being introduced b y the Nationalist Government. The day drew support from many workers i n P o r t Elizabeth and Johannesburg. The following year a further stay away from work was planned o n the slogans ‘ ‘ £ 1 a d a y ’ and ‘‘the Nats must g o ’ ’ . Called t o coincide with the white elections, the campaign opened o n 14 April 1958. This time i t won only minority support, and was called o f f b y the A N C national working committee after one day. A further three-day strike call was made i n 1961, but again failed t o draw the k i n d o f response that the organisers had hoped, and was once again called off. Again the unions were plagued b y the k i n d o f splits that had appeared i n the past. I n 1959, five unions formed the Federation o f Free Trade Unions o f South Africa, aligned t o the Pan Africanist Congress, a movement which had grown out o f the African National Congress and was the result o f Africanists hostility t o the influence o f whites within the movement and, i n particular with the role o f the Communist Party. Although supported b y the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f Free T r a d e U n i o n s a n d T U C S A ,

FOFATUSA had little impact o n the union scene beyond its main affiliate, the Garment Workers U n i o n , led b y Lucy Mvubelo, once an executive member o f the SACTU.

History of Black Workers

33

B u t the main difficulty confronting S A C T U was again the state. W i t h the Sharpeville massacre o f 1960, the government cracked down o n all forms o f opposition with unprecendented ferocity. The African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congresses were banned, and under the wide ranging provisions o f the 1962 Sabotage Act 160 members and leaders o f S A C T U were arrested between 1960 and 1966. B y the middle o f the decade SACTU had been effectively destroyed, despite the fact that i t was never actually banned inside South Africa. Although one o f its unions — the Food and Canning Workers — survived, and survives t o this day, SACTU lost its presence i n South Africa and followed the other members o f the Congress movement into exile. I t has maintained itself i n exile ever since, functioning i n close liaison with the A N C . The exiled SACTU developed strong links w i t h British and Canadian trade unions. The ruthless effectiveness o f the security police i n South Africa combined with penetration o f many South African exile organisations has limited its capability t o intervene industrially or organisationally amongst South African workers. Furthermore, SACTU is closely identified with the USSR dominated W o r l d Federation o f Trade Unions ( S A C T U is still a W F T U affiliate) at a time when the most interesting and authentic working class drives for independent trade union organisation such as the metalworkers i n Brazil, the copper workers i n Chile or the Solidarity trade union i n Poland were based o n theories o f workers’ control at odds with the W F T U model which places the union firmly under the control o f the state and its ruling party. The new generation o f black workers’ leaders and activists i n South Africa have inevitably become more remote from the exiled S A C T U organisation, though all acknowledged its historic role i n the 1950s and the courage o f its militants who had tried t o keep the S A C T U and hence the black trade unionists’ flame alive i n the 1960s.

34

Chapter 3

Unions in South Africa in the 1980s The growth o f black unions i n the late 1970s and early 1980s has created a diverse and fluid labour movement i n South Africa. The development o f these independent unions has quickly created a new structure o f trade union organisations and has placed heavy burdens o n the old white-dominated labour movement. Today the black independent unions inside South Africa are organised i n two national confederations, the Federation o f South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and the Council o f Unions o f South Africa (CUSA). I n addition there are a number o f large, unaffiliated black unions, such as the South African Allied Workers U n i o n and the General Workers’ U n i o n . Collectively these national centres and individual unions are frequently termed the ‘‘independent’’, ‘‘black’’, ‘‘non-racial’’, o r ‘‘emerging’’ unions. They must be sharply distinguished from the ‘‘white’’ o r ‘‘multiracial’’ unions.' The latter are organised i n the remaining major trade union federations, the South African Confederation o f Labour (whites only) and the Trade U n i o n Council o f South Africa (multi-racial). SACOL

The South African Confederation o f Labour (SACOL) is openly racist and exclusively composed o f white unions. Recently S A C O L has come i n t o conflict with the South African government over its labour ‘‘reforms’’ and the decision t o include black trade unions i n the industrial relations system. I n response t o the Wiehahn Report o f 1979, the Confederation’s General Secretary warned the Minister o f Manpower n o t t o promote the erosion o f the right o f ‘““our white labour organisations’’. The most hardline o f SACOL’s affiliates is the M i n e Workers’ U n i o n led b y its General Secretary, Arrie Paulus. The M W U launched an unsuccessful strike against the Weihahn proposals i n 1. I n the South African context a distinction is drawn between non-racial and multiracial organisations. The former demand a complete absence o f any racial discrimination, whereas the latter implies a union that accepts all races b u t organises them separately.

Unions in S . A . in 1980s

35

1979 and has encouraged S A C O L t o adopt the role o f defending the privileged position o f white workers against the emerging independent and non-racial unions. The M W U has sought an alliance w i t h the ultra-right-wing Herstigte (Purified) National Party ( H N P ) and Arrie Paulus has called o n ‘ a l l whites t o j o i n one u n i o n ’ ’ t o protect their jobs from black labour. The major changes occurring i n the South African labour movement are causing severe problems for S A C O L . The confederation’s hardline anti-reform posture has generated splits among affiliated unions. As a result S A C O L has suffered a dramatic loss o f membership from 240,000 members i n 1980 t o 120,000 i n 1984. Most o f the disaffiliated unions have departed from SACOL’s ranks following changes i n their constitutions t o admit non-whites. F o r the future, S A C O L is deepening its defensive strategy by launching a membership drive t o draw i n all unaffiliated unions with an exclusively white membership. U n i o n membership 1983 Africans Whites Coloureds and Asians

545,000 (1981 — 360,000) 488,000 (1981 — 468,000) 343,000 (1981 — 327,000)

Trade U n i o n Federations i n S o u t h Africa

Independent black and non-racial Federation o f South African Unions (FOSATU) Council o f Unions o f South Africa (CUSA)

106,000 148,000

Multi-racial Trade U n i o n Confederation o f South Africa (TUCSA)

446,000

Whites only South African Confederation o f Labour (SACOL)

126,000

Unaffiliated unions (various racial composition)

550,000

(Source: 1 L O Report o n South Africa 1984)

TUCSA The Trade U n i o n Council o f South Africa (TUCSA) is a multiracial — as opposed t o a non-racial — national centre. I t was set u p i n 1954 and has long held an ambivalent attitude t o organising black workers. T U C S A has at times expelled its black members so as t o conform t o government legislation, only t o re-admit them later. This shifting policy changed i n the 1970s when T U C S A allowed blacks t o affiliate but only i f organised i n exclusively black

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POWER!

unions, i n parallel t o the orginal unions which effectively ‘“‘sponsor’’ them. The so-called ‘‘parallel’’ unions are highly dependent o n their parent unions for finance and administration. M a n y general secretaries o f the parallel black unions are also the secretaries o f the parent unions. Frequently they are introduced i n t o a firm with the co-operation o f the management i n an attempt t o head o f f the establishment o f an independent union. F o r example parallel unions have been offered the use o f company facilities denied t o the independent unions. The T U C S A General Secretary, A r t h u r Grobbelaar (who died i n August 1984), has said that ‘‘the administration ( o f parallels) should continue t o be subject t o the overall supervision o f the registered (white) u n i o n ’ ’ . Yet black workers have complained that subscriptions are deducted from their wages for a union they have never joined, which has n o shop stewards and never holds meetings. T U C S A affiliates have generally welcomed the legislation introduced post-Weihahn and have experienced little trouble i n registering its parallel unions. I n the long term T U C S A seems t o be i n trouble. The independent unions like F O S A T U and S A A W U etc., have gained shop floor credibility i n contrast t o the black parallels which are regarded w i t h suspicion. A t TUCSA’s 27th annual conference i n September 1981 delegates expressed deep fears about competition from the independent unions. ‘ ‘ I t cannot be denied’’, said a delegate, ‘‘that there is a terrific battle o n the shopfloor, which extends t o the townships, for the hearts and minds o f South African workers’’. Revealingly conference delegates spoke bitterly about ‘‘so many people i n responsible positions’’, including some government officials who describe T U C S A affiliates as ‘‘sweetheart unions’’. Serving t o highlight TUCSA’s generally meek and subservient relationship with b o t h industry and government has been the union’s reliance o n closed shop agreements t o exclude recognition and deter membership o f the independent unions. A classic example is i n the textile industry where the T U C S A affiliated Garment Workers Industrial U n i o n ( G W I U ) has enjoyed a dominant role courtesy o f closed shop arrangements. The F O S A T U affiliated National U n i o n o f Textile Workers (NUTW) has challenged the G W I U ’ s monopoly and is taking legal action t o defend its recognition claim. The N U T W gained recognition at the Pinetown clothing firm o f James N o r t h following a ballot o f the workforce. The clothing Industrial Council, however, refused t o allow the workers t o resign from the T U C S A union and rejected the N U T W ’ s claim t o introduce the check-off system (whereby

Unions in S . A . in 1980s

37

union dues are deducted automatically from pay). The Industrial Council ruled that the N U T W was not represented sufficiently widely i n the industry as a whole and the dispute between the unions w i l l now be resolved i n an industrial court. F u r t h e r evidence o f T U C S A ’ s i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n the Government’s labour relations strategy has been graphically shown i n a survey (published i n early 1984) o f the wage levels o f artisans (skilled workers) over the last 10 years. The study shows that artisans, who were largely represented b y T U C S A unions for the period under review, suffered a real wage decline i n negotiations conducted i n the industrial council system. Gordon Young, one o f the researchers involved i n the report commented that the results would have a ‘‘disastrous’’ impact o n the credibility o f the unions involved. ‘‘Unions should be negotiating agreements which protect their members at all times rather than agreeing t o wage levels which suit employers. The fact that artisans’ wages have gone down speaks for itself. These people have had unions to represent them i n the Industrial Councils and yet they have got p o o r e r ’ , he said. Another issue which threatens T U C S A is the sharp decline i n support from international labour organisations i n favour o f the independents. These developments are encouraging splits within T U C S A itself. I n June 1982, t w o u n i o n s w i t h a combined membership o f 11,000

workers i n the catering and distributive trade withdrew from T U C S A as a result o f dissatisfaction with the Council’s policies. The splinter unions were concerned with TUCSA’s distancing itself from the wave o f protests from the independent unions following the death i n detention i n February 1982 o f the union organiser D r N e i l Aggett. The crisis o f credibility facing T U C S A deepened i n 1983. I n October at the union’s annual conference a major dispute broke out between affiliates arguing over the Council’s increasingly hardline posture against the independent and non-racial unions. TUCSA'’s leadership urged the government t o increase action t o prevent illegal strikes and t o ban the unregistered unions. I n protest at the ‘‘selfish’’ and ‘‘imbecillic’’ attitude o f the T U C S A l e a d e r s h i p , t h e S o u t h African

Boilermakers Society

withdrew from the union soon after the annual conference. The 54,000 strong mixed race union, led by I k e Van der Watt, argues that T U C S A has lost credibility and its sense o f direction. The failure t o adapt the union at a time o f rapid change i n South Africa’s labour relations scene has meant that T U C S A ‘is unable t o satisfy the needs o f a large number o f workers now able t o j o i n the union movement’’, says Van der Watt. The Boilermakers departure further alienates T U C S A from the

POWER!

38

organisations o f the international trade union movement. As the largest South African affiliate o f the International Metalworkers’ Federation, the Boilermakers have strong international links and participates i n the I M F ’ s South Africa Coordinating Council along w i t h unions affiliated t o C U S A and F O S A T U . Indeed, i n March

1984, Van Der Watt was elected President o f the Coordinating Council which brings together South Africa’s ten largest metal unions, representing 200,000 workers. I n 1984, a further eight unions withdrew from TUCSA. FOSATU The best organised o f the independent union federations is the Federation o f South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). I t was established i n 1979 and i n November 1983 boasted a membership o f 106,000 workers organised i n approximately 490 factories. A further indication o f FOSATU’s increasing strength are the number o f companies which recognise the federation’s shop stewards and negotiating rights. T o date FOSATU have obtained, or are negotiating, over 285 company recognition agreements. A t its bi-annual congress i n A p r i l 1979, F O S A T U adopted a programme o f objectives which indicate the union’s basic policy positions. F O S A T U has attempted t o achieve: ® a strong democratic factory floor organisation; ® a u n i t e d l a b o u r m o v e m e n t , i n d e p e n d e n t o f r a c e , c o l o u r , creed

or sex; ® n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l unions;

® a n ongoing worker education programme; ® Social justice, decent standards o f living and fair conditions o f work for affiliates and for the working class as a whole. (Source: Introduction t o F O S A T U Annual Report 1981).

FOSATU'’s nine affiliated unions are particularly strong i n the heavy industrial sector, organising car workers, metal workers, food workers, transport workers, and textile workers among others. The membership is predominantly black although the union is committed t o a non-racial policy. F O S A T U has assumed a key role i n the emerging structure o f the independent South African labour movement. The federation has continued t o grow despite consistent state harassment. I n 1980, for example, the South African government prohibited ‘‘the collection o f contributions by or for or o n behalf o f Federation o f South African Trade Unions (FOSATU)’’. The ban n o t only prevents F O S A T U from obtaining funds inside South Africa, but seeks t o

Unions in S.A. in 1980s

39

block funds going t o the Federation from the international labour movement, a development condemned b y the International Confederation o f Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as ‘‘contrary t o accepted international labour standards’. The F O S A T U unions have also had t o contend with the drive b y the T U C S A ‘parallel’ union t o recruit black workers. I n response FOSATU has fiercely attacked the parallels as being organised i n connivance with management, as condoning the state structure o f racially exclusive unions, and o f seriously assisting black workers only i n the face o f competition from the independent unions. Following the legislation introduced as a result o f the Wiehahn Commission, the F O S A T U unions opted t o apply for registration. F O S A T U believes that advantages can be gained that would compensate for the controls that the government imposes o n registered unions. They argued that company recognition would offer some protection from state repression, and provide unions the benefit o f subscriptions checkoff. However, F O S A T U has insisted o n seeking registration o n a non-racial basis. As a consequence o f this commitment F O S A T U unions have faced difficulties i n registering. I n 1980, for example, the F O S A T U affiliated Metal and Allied Worker U n i o n applied for registration stressing their wish t o organise o n a non-racial basis. The Government responded b y providing M A W U with a registration certificate but only t o represent African workers. The union rejected this offer and successfully appealed t o the Natal Supreme Court which upheld M A W U ’ s protest and thus overturned the tradition o f racial registration. Another controversial issue for F O S A T U is the system o f Industrial Councils which are at the centre o f South Africa’s labour relations structure. The Councils have traditionally been viewed as a device to separate negotiations from the shop floor favouring the interests o f the minority o f workers at the expense o f the black majority. I n addition the Council’s lengthy disputes procedures inhibit the legal right t o strike. FOSATU have campaigned t o remove the existing Industrial Council system i n favour o f one catering for plant-level bargaining. M e a n w h i l e F O S A T U , after a l o n g i n t e r n a l debate, has a l l o w e d

affiliates t o j o i n Industrial Councils i f the unions wish and provided that plant based bargaining and recognition rights were n o t lost. One dramatic aspect o f the independent trade unions is the quality and range o f black working class leadership i t has produced. Chris Dlamini is senior shop steward at Kellogs i n Springs and president o f F O S A T U . H e is a natural leader as much at home i n the corridors o f an international conference as talking t o

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POWER!

a handful o f shop stewards. H e has always fought for workers’ rights. ‘ ‘ I remember once when the company introduced a canteen system, where you could get a quarter o f a l o a f o f bread for free. The o l d lady who was running the canteen used t o supply us with stale bread and people used t o grumble but they never d i d anything. Well, one day I had had enough o f this stale bread so I went back t o her. Look, I said, the company decided t o give us bread but i t never said you should give us stale bread. She started swearing at me, so I threw the bread i n t o a basket next t o the counter. Well, she phoned the general manager who came i n and dragged me b y m y dustcoat t o the top manager’s office. H e t o l d me I should be dismissed for such an action but I asked for a chance t o defend myself. I stated m y reasons why I rejected the bread and even brought the stale bread t o h i m . Well, he said t o me, don’t you think you should have adopted a different attitude when you spoke t o the white woman. I replied that I don’t know. I f one is angry i t doesn’t matter i f the person is white or black as far as I am concerned. I n spite o f everybody expecting me t o be fired, I wasn’t,”’ Dlamini recalls. H e was elected t o the liaison committee at Rank Xerox, where Dlamini worked before Kellogs, but said that the liaison committees were powerless t o act for workers. “ W o r k e r s would give us a mandate t o make demands but when we arrived at the meeting i t was dominated b y management and some supervisors. Immediately the chairman, who is always one o f the management, wants t o close the matter, he just closes i t . A n d i f y o u are dissatisfied you are t o l d that

you can find a job somewhere else. A t times we managed t o air grievances and the bosses would say they would investigate the matter a n d come back t o us — b u t n o t h i n g ever happened. Because

o f our powerlessness we were forced t o talk about whether the forks and knives were nice, whether the lawn was O K or whether we had enough equipment for sports.’’ Dlamini said that before the arrival o f the independent unions ‘‘what was really aggravating was that workers could be dismissed without any notice and for n o apparent reason. A n d as a result o f this dismissal, a w o r k e r w o u l d lose h i s house, c h i l d r e n w o u l d b e

forced t o leave school and that would mean a dead end for that family’s future.”” H e felt that the presence o f the union at Kellogs certainly eliminated some o f these malpractices as workers could elect representatives o f their own choice who would fight for them. ““The presence o f the union means that a balance o f power has emerged between management and the workers. I f workers are well organised, the bosses are forced t o realise that we are n o t just people who produce things i n their factory but real human beings with rights. I n Kellogs, through the union we have blocked retrenchments, we have fought for a living wage and i n 1983 we

Unions in S . A . in 1980s

41

achieved R 2 an hour. Workers deserve a fair share o f what they have produced and this can be achieved b y a workers organisation. B u t i t must be worker controlled and that is why FOSATU sees workers control as crucial for the building o f an organisation which w i l l help the working class,’”’ Dlamini declared. I n A p r i l 1982 FOSATU held a second Congress t o review the achievements since the inauguration i n 1979. The Congress was held at Hamanskrall, near Pretoria, and resulted i n an important statement o f FOSATU’s policies and objectives. I n an address t o t h e Congress, F O S A T U ’ s General Secretary, Joe Foster, spoke o f

the need t o b u i l d an independent workers movement which would ensure that workers ‘‘control their o w n destiny’’. Describing past popular struggles i n South Africa, Foster explained that u n t i l now the creation o f a workers’ movement had been impossible. ““Progressive and militant unions were continually the subject o f state harassment . . . Whilst the unions were often prominent they were always small and weakly organised b o t h nationally and i n the factories’’. Foster believes that the environment today is different. Changes i n the economy and i n black workers’ levels o f skill and education allow the creation o f a powerful workers’ movement. Under these conditions Foster says that F O S A T U must concentrate o n building factory floor support i n the major industries. Although praising the role o f the liberation movements and the African National Congress i n particular, F O S A T U will remain independent from any political organisations. F O S A T U does not regard itself as apolitical, b u t rather that the establishment o f a worker movement is i n itself a political task. According t o Joe Foster ‘‘workers must strive t o build their own powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are part o f a wider popular struggle’’ (see Appendix 1). A t the conclusion o f the Hammanskral Congress a resolution was adopted calling for one-man-one-vote and deploring the bantustan policy ‘‘whereby South African citizens are stripped o f their birthright and declared foreigners i n the country o f their b i r t h ’ ’ . The resolution stated that FOSATU will engage i n struggles ‘ t o secure a better standard o f living, social justice, social security and the political emancipation o f workers i n the community where members o f its affiliates live’’. F O S A T U also added that ‘ ‘ a n essential prerequisite’’ for change is t o develop at the factory level an ‘‘unshakeable unity based o n effective organisation’. T h e emphasis o n

factory

organisation, h o w e v e r , has not

inhibited the Federation’s involvement i n wider issues. The union has engaged i n a series o f unity talks with the other emerging unions and has tackled the Government’s constitutional proposals which extend certain democractic rights t o Asians and coloureds,

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b u t not t o blacks. FOSATU has clearly stated its opposition t o the Government’s reform plans arguing that they are ‘undemocratic, racist and anti-worker’’. T o back u p its protest FOSATU mounted a major educational programme among workers and a wider campaign against the Government’s referendum held i n November 1983. FOSATU has not joined either o f the two main organisations campaigning against the constitutional reforms, ie; the United Democratic Front and the National F o r u m Committee. Rather F O S A T U has been concerned t o maintain its distinct working class identity and simply express support for the aims o f the two organisations whilst organising its own, union based, campaigns. The F O S A T U unions are usually affiliated t o appropriate international Trade Secretariats and have engaged i n highly effective international solidarity work. CUSA The second trade union centre o f independent unions is the Council o f South African Unions (CUSA). I t was created i n September 1980 after the failure o f its unions t o resolve differences with the FOSATU national centre. The principle difference between the two is cver the question o f race i n the short and medium term. Both unions share the goal o f the creation i n the long term o f a non-racial labour movement. FOSATYU believes that this can only come about b y pursuing a nonracial policy from the outset. CUSA is closer t o what is commonly termed the ‘black consciousness’ philosophy which encourages a positive effort t o construct an exclusively black leadership. Both federations are open t o unions o f all races, but CUSA’s affiliates are only black unions. C U S A consists o f ten unions with approximately 148,000 members and is mainly based i n the Transvaal area. Unlike FOSATU’s tightly disciplined unions, C U S A is a loose federation which seeks only t o co-ordinate affiliates o n certain principal issues. C U S A has not advocated registration o r non-registration t o its affiliates. Rather i t has pointed out the advantages and

disadavantages o f both actions. Currently t w o CUSA affiliates have been permitted t o register. C U S A has established strong links w i t h the international labour movement, particularly via the International Confederation o f Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), t o which i t is affiliated. The most important o f CUSA’s affiliates is the National U n i o n o f Mineworkers (NUM) led b y Secretary General C y r i l Ramaphosa

Unions in S . A . in 1980s

43

(who previously worked i n CUSA’s legal department). The N U M was created i n 1982 and has already gained a membership o f 70,000 o f whom 70 per cent work i n the gold mines and 25 per cent i n coal mines. The union is recognised b y 14 companies and is also recognised b y the Chamber o f Mines for negotiating purposes. Despite the problems o f organising the high percentage o f migrant workers that are employed i n the mining industry, the N U M has become an impressive force i n the South African labour movement. The union demanded a 30 per cent wage rise i n negotiations with the Chamber o f Mines i n 1983 and has fought hard t o raise health and safety issues which are obviously crucial i n the industry. Other Unions Apart from t h e t w o national federations, FOSATU and CUSA,

described above, there are a group o f significant independent, individual unions. These unions include the African Food and Canning Workers’ U n i o n , the Black Media Workers’ Association, the General Workers’ U n i o n , the Black Municipal Workers’ U n i o n , t h e M o t o r Assemblies a n d C o m p o n e n t W o r k e r s ’ U n i o n

and the South African Allied Workers’ U n i o n (SAAWU). F r o m this group the most important are S A A W U and the Cape Town area unions — the General Workers’ U n i o n and the African F o o d and Canning Workers’ Union. SAAWU

The most overtly political o f the independent trade unions is the South African Allied Workers’ U n i o n (SAAWU). Based i n the East L o n d o n area, S A A W U was established i n March 1979 following a split i n the black consciousness-inspired Black Allied Workers’ U n i o n . The breakaway group established S A A W U and committed t h e u n i o n t o a p o l i c y o f n o n racialism. T h e u n i o n ’ s President,

Thozamile Ggwetha, explains that ‘‘we believe the country has a non-racial future and therefore we must be totally non-racial.”’ S A A W U claims a membership o f 50,000 and has been described as ‘ ‘ a s m u c h a mass m o v e m e n t as a u n i o n ’ ’ , b u t o n e researcher suggests t h a t a m e m b e r s h i p o f 2 0 , 0 0 0 i s a m o r e realistic estimate.

Committed t o a policy o f mass participatory democracy, S A A W U has sought t o establish a strong relationship with the black community. A union spokesman explains that “ S A A W U is a trade union dealing with workers who are part and parcel o f the community. Transport, rents t o be paid, are also worker issues. The problems o f the workplace go outside the workplace’. As a result S A A W U has become heavily involved i n political

44

POWER!

issues beyond conventional factory disputes. S A A W U says that ‘ t h e r e can be n o normal unionism i n an abnormal society’’. The union has challenged the South African’s homelands policy and, i n particular, opposed the so-called ‘independence’ o f the Ciskei bantustan i n which many o f SAAWU’s members live. The Ciskei gained ‘independence’ from South Africa i n December 1981 and S A A W U ’ s activities have seriously challenged its legitimacy. I n contrast t o the FOSATU unions, S A A W U has totally rejected registration with the government and ignores the official bargaining system. S A A W U has stated that i t will not register unless the basis o f the apartheid system is removed; that is the abolition o f such racial legislation as the pass laws and the Group Areas Act. Despite SAAWU’s militant posture, the union has been able t o gain a number o f company recognition agreements. Notable recognitions have been obtained from South African Chlorides, Johnson and Johnson, and K S M Milling. Such agreements were reached after representative elections showed that S A A W U had majority support o n the shop floor. The personnel director o f Chlorides, Theo Heffer, believes that ‘ ‘ t o refuse t o deal with a representative union, even i f i t is not registered, would, t o m y m i n d , fly i n the face o f reality. We are concerned with representation not registration. I f a union reflects the true representation o f the workers, then one is courting disaster t o refuse t o deal with that u n i o n ” . Such a liberal approach b y management was notably absent i n the South African subsidiary o f Rowntrees-Mackintosh. I n February 1981, 500 black workers and S A A W U members were sacked from the Wilson-Rowntree factory i n East L o n d o n after a strike over unfair dismissals. The management refused t o recognise S A A W U and maintains its long-standing relationship with the docile T U C S A affiliated Sweet Workers’ U n i o n . S A A W U have responded b y launching a boycott o f Wilson-Rowntrees products. Leaflets printed with the slogan ‘Spit out that fruit gum chum’ were circulated b y Boycott Support Committees causing an estimated 25 per cent loss o f business for the company. However, more than any other independent union S A A W U has been subject t o severe state harassment. The union’s participatory and community orientated political stand has antagonised the South African government and the authorities o f the Ciskei. Scores o f S A A W U members were detained by the Ciskei police i n 1981 and the South Africans have assisted the homeland administration i n union busting techniques. Leaders o f S A A W U have been subject t o long periods o f detention during which at least one o f them had t o have hospital treatment. Thozamile Gqweta, S A A W U ’ s 30 year o l d president, has been

Unions in S . A . in 1980s

45

described as South Africa’s most harassed black trade union leader. Since the founding o f S A A W U Gqweta has been detained nine times and was held i n the notorious John Vorster Square prison where N e i l Aggett died. During his fifth period o f detention, i n February 1982, Gqweta was transferred t o the psychiatric ward o f Johannesburg hospital. After a visit b y relatives i t was reported that he was suffering from a severe headache, depression and anxiety, difficulty i n speaking, partial memory loss, as well as a dramatic loss i n weight. I n March 1981 Ggweta narrowly escaped assassination when his house was destroyed b y arsonists. H e survived b y climbing through a window as the door had been wired u p t o prevent his escape. I n November the same year, his mother and uncle were burnt t o death when their house was similarly burnt down. A t their funeral a few days later there were clashes between the Ciskei homeland police and the 3,000 mourners. During the violence, Gqgweta’s 20 year o l d girlfriend Deliswa Roxiso was shot dead. I n December 1981, T h o z a m i l e G g w e t a as asked i f h e was a f r a i d

o f the police repression. H e replied: ‘‘Police tactics are t o make you scared, b u t they won’t succeed. I f anything they have made me more determined. But these latest incidents have changed me. I used t o laugh a l o t . N o w there is great anger inside me’’. The onslaught against Ggweta and S A A W U represent an attempt b y the South African and Ciskei authorities t o destry the u n i o n . S A A W U has been adamantly opposed t o the ‘independence’ o f the Ciskei, granted b y South Africa i n December 1981. The Ciskei’s ‘President’, Lennox Sebe, is committed t o crushing S A A W U i n the belief that independent unions are unnecessary since the ‘‘Ciskei itself is a trade union looking after workers’ intersts’’. T h e b a n t u s t a n ’ s security p o l i c e , t h e C i s k e i C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e

Service (CCIS) were responsible for the largest mass arrest o f trade unionists when they detained some 200 peole after a meeting at Mdantsane i n East L o n d o n i n October 1982. The workers were accused o f having sung freedom songs and anti-Ciskei government slogans. They were detained for ten days before being charged with violations under the Riotous Assemblies Act. Co-operation i n union busting between Ciskei and the South African security has been explicit. A document written by an officer i n the Security Branch o f the South African Police on how t o b r e a k t h e p o w e r o f S A A W U was circulated t o companies i n t h e

area. I t proposed the encouragement o f T U C S A unions and i n the creation o f lists o f unemployed workers t o be used t o recruit labour for replacing dismissed S A A W U members. I n October 1980, the Minister o f Manpower Fanie Botha held a meeting behind

46

POWER!

closed doors with East L o n d o n employers urging them t o h o l d out against SAAWU. Equally the Ciskei police have publicly acknowledged their relationship with the South Africans. The problem facing S A A W U is whether i t can retain its militant posture, and inevitably endure further repression, without losing its membership. Resistance b y employers also weakens S A A W U ’ s support since repeated strike action defeated b y scab labour leaves many o f the union’s members unemployed. T o t r y t o counteract this trend S A A W U established an unemployed workers branch, b u t met with little success. Adding t o SAAWU'’s difficulties is a major split i n the union’s leadership which occured i n early 1984. Three senior officials including the General Secretary Sam Kikine were expelled from the union. Announcing the expulsions SAAWU’s President Thozamile Gqgweta refused t o provide reasons for the action b u t i t appears that personality tensions within the leadership are primarily responsible. Kikine is based i n Durban whilst Gqweta and the new General Secretary Sisa Njikelana operate from East London. The rival leaders have adopted markedly different styles o f organisation with Gqweta being credited with a more professional approach t o unionism. I t remains t o be seen i f the split generates a major change o f policy within SAAWU, particularly over the issue o f trade union unity. As yet S A A W U has been reluctant t o shed its ‘communityunion’ image and fully co-operate with the unity talks being held b y the other major independent unions. Following the expulsions Gqgweta reiterated S A A W U ’ s traditional policy approach and it appears the union w i l l maintain i t cautious attitude t o the unity INOVeS.

Cape Unions The Cape Unions share a common commitment rather than a formal organisation. The African F o o d and Canning Workers’ U n i o n and the F & C W U were two o f the few unions t o survive the repression o f the 1960’s. Both were affiliates o f the exiled South African Congress o f Trade Unions (SACTU). The General Workers U n i o n was founded i n 1978 as the Western Province General Workers U n i o n , which i n turn, owes its birth t o a workers’ advice centre set u p i n 1973. The three unions share a commitment t o non-racialism b u t have a predominantly African membership. The General Workers U n i o n established itself as a ‘general’ union rather than an industrial union due t o the small percentage o f A f r i c a n s i n t h e w o r k f o r c e o f t h e area. I n C a p e T o w n , t h e state

designated the region as a ‘Coloured Preference Area’ which

Unions in S . A . in 1980s

47

requires employers t o hire Africans only when n o ‘coloureds’ are available. As a result the coloured workers dominate the skilled j o b sector with Africans concentrated i n the low paid and unskilled jobs. The General Workers Union’s 12,000 members cover most o f the stevedores employed i n South Africa’s four major ports and it is steadily increasing its recruitment o f engineering industry workers. T o find the G W U ’ s national chairman you have t o drive due west o f Cape T o w n through the coloured areas, skirt the notorious African shanty town Crossroads township until you come t o a men’s hostel at Nyango East. The r o o m i n which Johnson Mpukumpa, a migrant worker who works i n a small metal factory, lives is about 4 metres b y 3 metres. H e has shared i t for sixteen years with another migrant worker. H e sees his wife and four children who live i n Transkei at Easter and Christmas and sends most o f the R80 a week he earns t o them. “ E v e r y worker would like t o stay with his family, but many cannot. So i t is the duty o f the union t o take u p issues like influx control,”’ said Mpukumpa. The general secretary o f the G W U , David Lewis, is white. Says Mpukumpa, ‘ I f we say we are democratic we can allow n o hint o f racism. Colour is not the question. The question is whether a union represents its members o r n o t . ’ The relationship o f white union organisers with black workers is discussed elsewhere. For Mpukumpa i t is a question o f developing leadership from within the working class and not relying passively o n key union figures. ‘ W o r k e r s j o i n the union t o have a channel t o express their grievances. Without the union the workers are voiceless. But the union must be r u n b y the workers themselves. They must take the decisions. I t is not good for a leader t o r u n alone and leave the workers behind. Workers and leaders must a l l g r o w u p t o g e t h e r , ’ ’ h e stated.

CCAWUSA The Commercial Catering and Allied Workers U n i o n o f South Africa is a driving force i n the food and retail industry. Originally aligned with C U S A i t is now unaffiliated. I n 1984 i t had a membership o f 40,000 and has won recognition agreements with several important employers. I t has also participated i n the unity talks t o try and bring F O S A T U , C U S A and unaffiliated unions i n t o one federation.

48

Chapter 4

Sheltering the Flame: the Growth Unions after 1973

of

The b o l d steps taken b y black workers i n the ‘Durban’ strikes o f 1973 may, i n retrospect, seem t o have been destined t o succeed. A t the time that was certainly not the view. M a n y thought that they were more likely t o fail. N o t only d i d the strike wave gradually subside, reaching a l o w point i n 1977 when strikes were only a quarter o f the level that they reached i n 1973, b u t the union movement had been h i t b y two attacks from the state. I n 1974 and 1976 trade union organisers i n key unions were banned and prevented from taking any further part i n the union movement for the next five years. Some felt so helpless i n the wake o f their being banned that they left the country, determined t o continue the struggle from exile, much i n the way i n which S A C T U militants had done i n the 1960s. As Steve Friedman, the labour correspondent o f the R a n d Daily Mail, the country’s most liberal newspaper, and one o f the most respected labour analysts was t o write later: ‘ ‘ T h e initial wave o f organisation was t o prove as ephemeral as its predecessors. The banning o f union leaders — all white intellectuals — began a decline which was t o see paid-up union membership i n the Durban area slump t o something i n the region o f 2,000 b y the mid-1970s. I n retrospect, i t seemed that the brief wave o f unionism i n the early Seventies was t o be yet another chapter i n the catalogue o f the African union movement’s failures.”’ But this pessimistic prognosis proved mistaken. The unions have succeeded, t h e y h a v e g r o w n , a n d t h e y h a v e b e c o m e a p o w e r f u l

force o n the South African political scene. There are distinct, b u t i n t e r r e l a t e d , reasons f o r t h e i r success.

1. Who joined the unions?

The first reason for the union’s success has been the courage and determination o f black workers. B u t , having said that, i t is important not t o fetishise this, for the eternally optimistic, allseeing worker militant is a myth. I n reality, workers are as much prone t o depression and despair as any other class. The question t h a t needs t o b e answered is w h i c h w o r k e r s j o i n e d t h e u n i o n s , a n d w h i c h w o r k e r s r e f u s e d . T h e answer i s b y n o m e a n s c l e a r , b u t o n e

Sheltering the Flame

49

study conducted i n Durban towards the end o f 1975 gives some clues. The survey was conducted amongst the membership o f the three most powerful unions i n the Durban area — the Chemical Workers Industrial U n i o n , the Metal and Allied Workers U n i o n a n d t h e N a t i o n a l U n i o n o f Textile W o r k e r s . A l l were, i n t i m e , t o

become members o f F O S A T U . A t that time they had between them just under 14,000 workers signed u p , b u t the real strength o f their base is revealed from the number that were paid u p members: C W I U — 900, M A W U — 1,000, N U T W — 2,000. Between them the unions had 14 paid officials some o f whom were part-time. The majority o f workers that joined the unions could be described i n the following terms. They were unskilled o r had l o w grade, semi-skilled employment They were young — most were under 50, and over half were under 40. Nearly three-quarters had been i n their current employment for over t w o years, and 5 per cent had been i n their jobs over 15 years. Just over half had been b o r n i n t h e r u r a l areas, a n d a t h i r d were b o r n i n D u r b a n . F o r t h e vast

majority their union was the first that they had joined, b u t a significant number (11 per cent) had been members o f S A C T U i n the 1960s — a factor that explained the continued popularity o f Moses Mabheda, a SACTU leader o f the 60s, who was mentioned b y 8 per cent o f the union members, when asked which leader could best improve their lot. Arbitrary management action and victimisation was put as equally important as l o w wages b y the workers, and nearly 60 per cent o f the workers p u t defending workers rights as the most important reason for joining a union. But when asked whether the union was helping t o overcome their problems less than half (49 per cent) were able t o answer i n the affirmative. 45 per cent felt that the union’s performance could n o t be judged because i t was n o t recognised and its members were too vulnerable t o victimisation. As one worker put i t : “This is very difficult because most o f the things need an open challenge, yet we can’t do i t because we can then be exposing ourselves t o victimisation b y police and management.’’ N o t surprisingly fear o f victimisation was seen as the most important issue dissuading workers from joining unions, with pessimism put as the second most potent factor. The academics who conducted the survey concluded: ‘ W e have shown that members i n this sample are relatively stable i n their jobs and j o i n unions t o try collectively t o improve their wages and work c o n d i t i o n s . These a r e t h e necessary c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e s u f f i c i e n t

conditions for effective trade unions involve the readiness o f both management a n d the state t o allow t h e emergence o f collective

organisation i n the work-place and a willingness t o recognise and negotiate with its leadership o n a permanent basis.”’

50

POWER!

2. Economic contradictions and the role of management L i k e the economies o f most other capitalist states, the South African economy has i n the past t w o decades witnessed increasing monopolisation. As South Africa followed other countries down the monetarist paths o f the 1980s the rate o f concentration increased. One company, the Anglo-American Corporation, holds 50 per cent o f all the shares listed o n the Johannesburg stock exchange. According t o the Financial Mail, the South African business and finance weekly, five general corporations and three insurance companies now control the bulk o f South Africa’s private-sector infrastructure. Apart from the mining industry — gold and coal — the b i g corporations now exercise effective control over,

amongst

others,

the

food

sector,

alcohol,

tobacco,

packaging, chemicals, insurance, motors and the Press. The public sector controls 58 per cent o f South Africa’s fixed capital stock and contributes 26 per cent t o the country’s G D P . One i n three workers i n South Africa is a state employee. The South-African I r o n and Steel Industrial Corporation (ISCOR), the Industrial Development Corporation ( I D C ) , the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) and the South African Coal, O i l and Gas Corporation (SASOL) are among the major ‘parastatal’ companies which are effectively government controlled. G o l d is the major South African export and its price rose rapidly after President Nixon took the United States o f f the gold standard i n 1971 ( i n 1971, the price o f gold was US$35 per ounce; i n 1984 it is US$380 an ounce, with surges u p t o $800 an ounce i n between). I n 1980 net gold output exceeded the value o f all other exports combined. Coal exports are also increasing i n importance. Between 1973 and 1980, coal production more than doubled and a quarter o f the coal produced is exported, which makes coal South Africa’s second biggest source o f foreign exchange earnings after gold. Overall, South Africa is an exporter o f raw materials and agricultural produce and an importer o f manufactured goods. Nonetheless,

despite

low

productivity,

the

South

African

manufacturing economy is relatively advanced and corresponds m o r e t o t h a t o f a n a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l i s e d state, n o t dissimilar i n

profile t o that o f Australia, rather than a developing o r newly industrialised economy. L o w wages combined with the ability o f the monopolies t o set prices relatively free o f market price competition pressure has helped ensure high profit levels: i n 1982, South African firms earned profits o f 24.8 per cent, compared w i t h 6.5 per cent i n the United K i n g d o m , 4 . 1 per cent in West Germany

and 5.9 per cent i n Switzerland.

51

Sheltering the Flame

Despite its cushion o f gold and other exports South Africa has n o t escaped the effects o f the world recession. Since 1981 there has been a fall o f 4.2 per cent i n Gross Domestic Product and manufacturing output i n 1983 was down 9.1 per cent from 1981. Inflation i n 1983 was 11 per cent. Market Research Africa estimates that average household income for Africans rose less than 10 per cent i n 1983, while the incomes o f other population groups generally kept pace with inflation. A l t h o u g h A f r i c a n workers i n certain sectors, notably manufacturing, have achieved money wage increases i n the past decade, these have generally only just kept pace w i t h inflation.

Average money earnings of Africans as a percentage of those of whites, 1972 and 1982 Sector Mining Manufacturing Electricity Construction Trade Transport and communications

1972

1982

5.47 17.12 21.72 16.05 21.72 16.61

17.79 31.60 26.76 18.35 24.94 25.96

I n M a y 1984, the Financial Mail noted: ‘‘Monopolies, ologopolies and cartels have become entrenched features o f South Africa’s economic l i f e ’ ’ . Yet i t is i n just these sectors that the black unions have made the most substantial gains since 1973. This is not accidental. During the 1973 strikes management had found itself at factory after factory facing a workforce that had simply walked o f f the j o b . Time and again managers found themselves faced with an angry crowd o f workers who refused t o elect leaders or engage i n any k i n d o f dialogue. A s one worker insisted: “ W e don’t need a committee. We need R30.00 a week’’. The reason for this reluctance t o elect a leadership was clear — fear o f victimisation b y management o r the police. But as the manager o f Coronation Brick C o . , the company at which the strikes began, s a i d , h e was n e i t h e r willing n o r a b l e ‘ ‘ t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h 1,500 w o r k e r s o n a football f i e l d ’ ’ . I t was a dilemma t h a t m a n a g e m e n t

was t o come across time and again during the dispute. A n d for the more thoughtful managers i t held a clear message — i f you want t o be able t o conduct reasonable negotiations with workers i n the f u t u r e , y o u h a d b e t t e r c o m e t o t e r m s w i t h t h e leaders t h a t t h e y

throw u p from the factory floor. Simple repression is not going t o solve the problem. A n d one o f the results o f the increasing monopolisation outlined above, was that these considerations

52

POWER!

spread rapidly through major sectors o f the economy. Senior management realised that i t could n o t achieve its goals o f increased profits and a larger market share i f i t allowed local managers t o simply remove any leader that stepped forward from amongst the workforce. This sophisticated analysis d i d n o t come easily, b u t it was assisted b y two factors — the intense shortage o f skilled labour and the international context within which many firms operated. The shortage o f skilled labour was probably the more important factor. According t o a 1981 survey, the South African private sector had a skill shortage o f 8 per cent i n terms o f craftsmen and apprentices and 12.1 per cent i n terms o f scientists, engineers and technicians. I n 1982 there were 5,517 white apprentices under training i n the metal engineering and 390 Africans. There were 807 coloured and 426 Asian apprentices i n the same year. Although this was still not enough t o provide the skills required b y industry, i t was a considerable advance from the situation i n 1979, when n o African apprentices were under training. W i t h the white population static the employers had n o alternative but t o begin t o train blacks for skilled positions. Management was clearly aware o f this problem. I n a private study commissioned for the major multinationals and published i n 1980, Business International pointed t o the serious bottlenecks that had emerged i n the economy as a result o f the shortage o f skilled labour, and concluded that the only solution was for management t o train black workers t o fill the places previously occupied b y whites. They quoted w i t h approval the progress made b y the G e r m a n firm Siemens. T h e Siemens c h i e f executive, Wilfried

Wentges said: ‘ ‘ I n 1966, we had only 10 blacks i n skilled and semiskilled wage-earning jobs. N o w the number is 1,391, a most impressive result o f untiring training. I n 1966, only 2.4 per cent o f our African wage earners could be classified as skilled o r semiskilled, but now the proportion is 26 per cent’’. Clearly n o rational manager would be prepared t o throw away the results o f this ‘untiring training’, and this gave black workers a bargaining strength that they had previously lacked. The international investment i n the South African economy is central t o the country’s development. According t o the Business I n t e r n a t i o n a l survey c i t e d a b o v e , t h e r e a r e b e t w e e n 2 , 0 0 0 a n d 2 , 5 0 0

foreign owned firms operating i n South Africa. B y far and away the largest number are British (1,200) followed b y German (350) and U S (340) concerns. Total foreign investment is i n the region o f $30 billion. About 20 per cent o f all industry i n South Africa is accounted for b y foreign investment. Countries such as Japan are increasing their involvement but are doing so, for example i n the auto industry, b y setting u p wholly

Sheltering the Flame

53

owned South African firms so that the fiction o f non-Japanese involvement i n the apartheid system is maintained. I n fact South Africa exports more t o Japan (15.6 per cent) than t o either the United States (12.3 per cent) or Great Britain (13.7 per cent). Taiwan has become an important export market, overtaking Canada i n 1982. European and American firms have been there for a long time. Swedish companies such as SKF, Alfa Laval and Electrolux established subsidiaries i n South Africa i n the 1920s. M a n y British companies go back still further. But the crucial point is that international companies are susceptible t o international pressure i n a way i n which local companies are n o t . The Business International report recognised this point: ‘ W o r l d antagonism t o apartheid has increased i n the last 20 years, although the growth i n pressure against South Africa has been slow and steady rather than dramatic. The most significant development i n the late 1970s has been the imposition by certain Western countries o f economic embargoes t o back up what has until now been largely a rhetorical campaign . . . Multinationals, b y taking affirmative action t o improve the working conditions o f black employees, may be able t o retard the introduction o f stricter measures against South Africa and indeed against themselves.”’ So although the campaign for sanctions against South Africa may have failed t o achieve its ultimate objective, namely economic sanctions, i t has helped t o create a climate i n which international companies are aware o f the spotlight that is focussed upon their activities. I t was not accidental that the first company t o recognise a black union i n the 1970s was Smith and Nephew — a British subsidiary.

3. Unions a n d the state: confusion, concessions and confrontations Discussing the South African state is never easy, for i t takes so many forms. A t the one level there is the South African P a r l i a m e n t , w h i c h , u n t i l September 1984, o p e r a t e d u n d e r t h e

Westminster model. W i t h one grave exception — i t only represented whites, for only they had the vote. But its flawed nature was further undermined by the fact that there is i n reality n o serious opposition. I n September 1984 a new constitution gave coloureds and Asians representation i n segregated Houses o f Parliament, but whites still have the whip hand i n governing the country. Since 1948 there has only been one party i n power — the Nationalist Party. Since the government operates without an

54

POWER!

opposition i t must respond t o the pressures upon i t as i f i t was the opposition itself, for there is n o prospect o f a future government o f a different political complexion undoing the legislation that i t enacts. Thus the laws that i t brings i n are quite frequently withdrawn o r amended as a result o f pressure from outside Parliament. The abandonment o f legislation o n pensions (described below), after an outcry from the black unions and a wave o f strikes, is a case i n point. But this is a somewhat isolated example. The more normal course o f events is for the executive arm o f the state to alter the law administratively without formally going through the motions o f having the law amended. So one often finds that a particular piece o f legislation is simply n o longer enforced. But, since the law still stands, most trade unionists i n South Africa go about their business from day t o day knowing that what they do more often than not contravenes some law, b u t hoping that the law w i l l not be enforced. The degree o f enforcement often varies widely from area t o area, so that something that might be generally accepted i n Cape T o w n or Johannesburg, would result i n instant arrest i n any small t o w n i n the Orange Free State — the heart o f

Afrikanerdom. The state is further complicated b y the bantustans — which are today referred t o as ‘homelands’. F o r although they are regarded b y most o f the world as part o f South Africa and under the South African state, they are seen as independent b y Pretoria. A n d some o f the most fearsome repression meted out t o trade unionists has come from the bantustans. The Ciskel, i n particular, has become notorious for its overt hostility t o any form o f unionisation. B u t despite these obstacles, i t is difficult t o discern a clear strategy t h a t the state has attempted t o e m p l o y i n S o u t h Africa.

The most obvious has been repression, and no-one should be under any illusion about the dangers under which the unions operate i n the country. U n i o n leaders and activists have been banned, jailed and even killed. A n d as the following table indicates, this is a trend that has not diminished over time. Number o f occasions police called: a. t o a labour dispute b . t o a work stoppage c. t o a strike Number o f black workers arrested for striking illegally

1974 38 14 51

1980 52 20 94

1983 65 22 99

214

294

525

T o this chilling list could be added the death i n detention o f the trade union official, Neil Aggett i n early 1982, and the detention

55

Sheltering the Flame

and harassment o f Thozamile Ggweta, the President o f the South African Allied Workers U n i o n . N o t only were his mother and uncle b u r n t t o d e a t h w h e n t h e d o o r o f his house was w i r e d s h u t , a n d t h e

place then set ablaze, b u t his g i r l friend was shot and he was taken i n t o prison and so brutally treated that he became severely depressed and lost his memory. B u t i f this was the only response that the state had found t o the unions they would, i n all likelihood, have ceased t o exist. I n the wake o f the 1973 strikes the state embarked upon an alternative approach. This change i n emphasis was signalled by the introduction o f the Bantu Labour Relations Regulations Amendment A c t o f 1973. The Ac t established two types o f infactory committees which were meant t o be available as means o f communication between black workers and white management. The committees — ‘works’ and ‘liaison’ committees — were a deliberate attempt t o forestall the development o f trade unions, and were denounced as such. They were generally passive instruments o f management, and workers became dissatisfied with this poor substitute for genuine representation. Nonetheless, they did provide workers with the first taste o f bargaining — a novel experience for many. B y 1979 there were 312 works committees and 2,683 liaison committees i n operation. But a far more significant step was taken with the appointment i n 1977 o f a Commission o f Inquiry i n t o Labour Legislation led by Nicholaas Wichahn. The Commission, which was set u p i n the wake o f the 1976 Soweto uprising, reflected the government’s c o n c e r n t h a t t h e union m o v e m e n t was c o n s o l i d a t i n g i t s pcsition,

and that i t was doing so entirely outside the parameters o f government control. I n particular the government was worried about the politicisation o f industrial relations as the ‘class o f ’76’ (young blacks politicised b y the Soweto uprising) began t o enter the workforce. I n what was described by Steve Friedman as ‘ ‘ a bizarre piece o f symbolism’’ the Wiehahn Commission released its report o n M a y D a y 1979. T h e C o m m i s s i o n recommended a n u m b e r o f measures,

but perhaps the most important was the recognition that blacks could form their own unions. Although such unions had n o t been illegal, they now received official recognition. This change ended 60 years o f government policy aimed at forcing black unions out o f existence, and driving all Africans into the bantustans. I n addition t o this central proposal (which was accepted by the government)

there

were a n u m b e r

of

other

steps t h a t

the

Commission recommended. These included the establishment o f a new industrial court which was t o attempt to resolve labour

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disputes, and a National Manpower Commission that was t o provide surveillance over union activities. But the fundamental strategy was one o f control. The Commission hoped t o bring the black unions under the official industrial relations system that had previously only been available t o white unions. These were the Industrial Councils. These Councils govern the terms and conditions o f particular industries, setting wages, hours and standards o f employment. Previously only white o r coloured and Asian union members were represented directly o n the Industrial Councils. African unions — or those offering membership t o all groups — were prevented from registering with the Councils, and thus securing a place at the negotiations. Instead government officials had been appointed t o act o n behalf o f Africans — with the predictable result that African wages were only a fraction o f those paid t o whites. N o w for the first time Africans would be allowed a place at the Industrial Council sessions. But only i f they registered. This was something that the black unions rejected. F o r they saw the Industrial Councils as being remote from the real struggles that were taking place o n the shop floor, and an attempt t o remove the negotiations from the factories i n which the unions had their real strength. The unions were as yet n o t strong enough t o cope with negotiations o n a national level. For although some o f the unions were beginning t o pick u p strength i n particular industries i n certain areas, none were strong enough t o feel really representative at a national level. I n addition some union officials felt that any form o f registration was u n d e s i r a b l e , since i t i n v o l v e d c o n t a c t w i t h t h e a p a r t h e i d state,

which they believed would eventually bring them under state control. These fears were expressed at the first union unity conference, held i n Cape Town i n August 1981. A statement adopted at that meeting stated: ‘‘Industrial Councils: the meeting rejected the present Industrial Council system as an acceptable means o f collective bargaining. The meeting recommended that unions that are not members o f Industrial Councils should not enter any Industrial Council and requested that participating unions refer this back t o their respective unions for endorsement. The unions agreed t o support each other i n the event o f any union resisting participation i n the Industrial Council.’ The issue o f Industrial Councils was t o be a major bone o f contention between the black unions as time went b y , for as the resolution implied, some were already members o f the Councils, and as the unions felt their strength grow, some began t o believe that their best interests lay i n having a presence at a national level, without giving u p their

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commitment t o shop-floor bargaining. This position was adopted b y the Metal and Allied Workers U n i o n i n 1983. The decision was defended b y Andrew Z u l u , then president o f M A W U i n an interview: ““Question: What prompted M A W U t o apply for membership? ( o f the Industrial Council). “ A n s w e r : D u r i n g the 1981 and 1982 strikes o n the East Rand we were negotiating with individual companies only and so while we won increases i n some companies, employers were able t o crush strikes i n others. I f we had been able t o negotiate nationally, we could have at least won something everywhere — perhaps R2 an hour. Also we expanded after the strikes and are now organising i n over 200 factories. We do n o t have time t o have lengthy negotiations at each plant. Negotiations take six t o twelve months. I t would be easier t o face employers nationally — and the only forum is the Industrial Council.” Other unions rejected this approach entirely, arguing that all the unions should follow the line agreed at Cape Town, and that t o have any truck with the Councils was t o arrive at an accommodation with the apartheid state. I n practice both approaches have been followed, with varying degrees o f success. Strikes

I f the response o f the unions t o the Wiehahn proposals was at best cool, the response from management was just the opposite. M a n y managers saw the Commission’s recommendations as official endorsement o f black unions, and the number o f recognition agreements that were entered i n t o b y companies after Wiehahn snowballed. This process was accelerated b y a rise i n confidence o n the part o f workers, and a spate o f bitter, but generally successful strikes that won nationwide coverage i n the press. A strike at one o f S o u t h A f r i c a ’ s best k n o w n food f i r m s , F a t t i s a n d Monis, i n t h e i r

pasta factory i n Cape T o w n i n A p r i l 1979 was won after workers held out for seven months. After a community-wide boycott o f the companies’ products, and substantial sums o f money had been donated by the public, the strikers won, and the union was recognised b y the company. H o t o n the heels o f the settlement came a strike amongst stevedores o n the Cape T o w n docks, and after a few days the employers there also gave i n , and the docks were unionised. N o t that the workers d i d n o t suffer reverses. A strike b y meat workers collapsed, despite a four-month-long community boycott o f all meat products. B u t the strike brought such a wave o f bad publicity for the employers that many managers began t o feel that i t was not worth the poor image that was now associated with disregarding the unions.

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As the following table indicates the confidence and combativity o f b l a c k w o r k e r s soared after t h e l o w t h a t i t h a d reached i n 1977.

Strikes b y black workers 1973-1983

No. Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

of

Disputes 370 384 276 248 90 106 101 207 342 394 336

Black Workers o n Strike 98,029 58,975 23,295 26,931 15,091 14,088 17,323 56,286 84,705 141,517 64,469

I n their fight for elementary rights and better wages i i has been this upsurge o f militancy that has not only won workers a better deal, but led to the phenomenal growth i n the strength o f the unions. I t should not be forgotten that when i t was formed i n 1979 F O S A T U had only 35,000 members, many o f whom were not paid up. Today F O S A T U has over 106,000 members. I n 1982, F O S A T U affiliated u n i o n s were i n v o l v e d i n 145 strikes

with 90,000 workers taking part. This compares with C U S A where 10,000 workers took part i n 13 strikes or S A A W U which organised 6 strikes involving 2,600 workers. Yet the use o f the strike weapon i n South Africa has t o be handied with care. For a start, most strikes are illegal; i n fact there has been only one legal strike b y a black union since 1981. T o go o n strike legally requires that a union first goes through a lengthy procedure designea t o wear down union determination and t o try and p u t as much time between the cause o f the dispute and any industrial action undertaken t o resolve i t . Once o n strike, unions have t o face further problems. Picketing is forbidden, though some unions have been gingerly organising poster campaigns outside strike-hit workplaces. Strike pay is illegal. Under both the Internal Security Act and the Riotous Assembly A c t the police can arrest strikers or unions’ officials for organising workers’ meetings. Companies are legally entitled t o dismiss workers during a strike. Inter-union rivalry has led t o management successfully using others unions t o help break strikes. During the Johannesburg municipal workers’ strike, white citizens

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undertook what t o them was the remarkable and unprecedented labour o f rubbish disposal i n order t o undermine the strikers. W h y d o workers go o n strike? A breakdown o f the reasons for strikes i n 1982 i n three key industrial sectors is shown i n the table o n the following page. Most strikes are o f short duration. I n the auto industry i n 1982 the average length was 5 days and i n the metal industry 2 2 days. Some last longer. I n September 1982, 260 workers at the B&S Engineering factory i n Brits (Transvaal) were dismissed after lodging a pay demand. The company tried t o hire back workers selectively b u t this was rejected. The workers met every day i n a church hall. The dispute lasted just over a year. Their union, M A W U , took the company t o court accusing i t o f unfair labour practices and claimed R850,000 i n back pay, the biggest such claim ever made. Finally, the company gave way and i n September 1983 re-hired all the workers and agreed t o establish a ‘satisfactory’ relationship with the union. Often companies refuse t o recognise unions and when a strike takes place insist that they w i l l only talk t o the workers directly and not t o an ‘outside party’, i.e. the union. I n M a y 1983, Progress Knitting i n Natal, dismissed two workers for alleged low production and then, following a short protest stoppage by 28 o f the sacked workers’ colleagues, they fired another six for being ‘trouble-makers’. This led, i n turn, t o a strike by the 1,500-strong workforce. Officials o f the workers’ union, the National U n i o n o f Textile Workers, offered t o negotiate with the management who replied that they would talk only with the workers. The strikers refused, insisting the union represent them. Management attempts t o split the workers by dismissing some o f them failed as all those o n strike refused en bloc t o accept their wages. The strike dragged o n for seven days u n t i l finally the Department o f Manpower intervened; govern.nent officials produced a face-saving formula which allowed the company t o go back o n its previous position and agree t o meet the union. Following this the union was fully recognised at Progress and shop stewards were elected. I n M a y 1981 a dispute occurred between the FOSATU affiliated Chemical Workers Industrial U n i o n (CWIU) and the management o f a Colgate-Palmolive plant i n Boksburg. The dispute, which lasted about 14 months, began over a recognition agreement. Colgate-Palmolive refused t o recognise the C W I U o n the grounds that i t was unregistered, despite the fact that the union had the support o f the majority o f the workforce. Eventually Colgate gave i n t o the C W I U ’ s demand for recognition b u t o n condition that the union should negotiate o n wages and conditions at an Industrial Council.

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Without hesitation the C W I U refused t o accept this condition and launched a two-pronged attack o n the company. Firstly the union launched a consumer boycott o f Colgate products and then began the process t o declare a ‘legal’ strike. The C W I U had t o apply t o a Conciliation Board which found i t could n o t resolve the dispute. After the Board, the union had t o observe a 30-day ‘cooling-off’ period after which a strike could be legally declared i f a ballot o f the workers agreed — which they did, voting 93 per cent i n favour o f a strike. Meanwhile the FOSATU-organised boycott o f Colgate products gained momentum. W i t h i n two weeks thousands o f workers were going t o work with boycott stickers o n their overalls and posters supporting the C W I U appeared i n workers hostels. Traders i n East Rand and elsewhere agreed t o remove Colgate products from their shelves and whole communities became mobilised behind the boycott call. Other employers began t o fear that a wave o f sympathy strikes would occur. ‘“What is clear’’, remarked the R a n d Daily Mail, ‘‘is that workers i n other East Rand factories as well as black community organisations were rallying behind the boycott’’. Under such extreme pressure and just t w o days before the strike was due Colgate-Palmolive relented and agreed t o negotiate with the C W I U outside o f the Industrial Council. Colgate said that i t had t o ‘‘recognise the reality o f the situation’’, and F O S A T U hailed the settlement as an important victory. I n its Annual Report F O S A T U commented that ‘‘the Colgate-Palmolive dispute was a turning point i n South Africa’s industrial relations. I t punched a great hole i n the collective solidarity o f employers . . . ’ ’ . The dispute also clearly indicated the power o f boycott actions. ‘ I t was’’, says F O S A T U , ‘ ‘ a planned boycott and not one organised after a defeat had already taken p l a c e ’ . Proposed state legislation designed t o control company pension schemes may appear an unlikely candidate for a major cause o f strikes, yet i n 1981 the government proposals sparked o f f a wave o f strikes that rippled o n i n t o 1982. A t the height o f the controversy a total o f 62 strikes occurred relating t o the Pensions B i l l i n Natal alone, and b y the end o f 1981 the government had been forced t o drop the Bill altogether. The state had proposed t o introduce the ‘Preservation o f Pensions B i l l ’ . This seemingly innocuous legislation was t o have ensured that companies continued t o administer the pensions o f their employees after they had left their employment — effectively locking i n the pensions u n t i l the workers retired at 65. Black workers’ hostility t o the proposal arose from a very real fear that once they left a company they would never see their

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62

contributions again. Given workers’ experience o f the almost insuperable difficulties o f claiming money from the government’s unemployment insurance fund (to which they also contribute) this is hardly surprising. There was also a belief that b y ‘preserving’ pensions the state would shed its obligation t o pay even the below subsistence pension that i t pays at present t o black workers. Most o f all there was the fact that most workers see their pension contributions as a form o f savings t o be used when they lose their jobs. I t is about the only form o f security that they possess. Certainly black workers were incensed that the state should be tampering with their finances without even bothering t o consult them. The Pension Gap: M o n t h l y pensions 1980 White

Coloured and Asian

African

R109 (£55)

R62 (£32)

R33 (17)

T h e i r response was n o t o n l y t o s t r i k e , b u t t o d e m a n d t h e

immediate payout o f their contributions. Company after company was f o r c e d t o c o m p l y , w i t h a devastating effect o n finances, w h i c h

had relied i n part o n the pensions t o fund company operations. Transvaal clothing workers alone were reported t o have withdrawn over £500,000 o f their pension contributions. Management suggested that the whole matter was a ‘misunderstanding’ and said that i f only the B i l l was explained t o workers i t would be accepted. This was refuted b y a F O S A T U spokesman, saying ‘‘They understand the B i l l . . . and they don’t accept i t . Workers have got pretty good reasons for not liking the B i l l ’ . Such was the opposition that o n 6 November 1981 the Director General o f Manpower was forced t o announce that the B i l l was t o be withdrawn for consultation, and thereafter i t was abandoned. Despite the government climb-down, workers’ interest i n the control o f their pensions has been awakened, and the first six months o f 1982 saw a further 27 strikes o n this issue i n Natal. I n July this came t o a head with 3,000 workers o n strike i n Richards Bay. Workers are simply n o longer willing t o allow companies t o use their money for whatever they like, and are demanding a say i n i t s a l l o c a t i o n . A F O S A T U organiser said ‘ ‘ P e n s i o n f u n d trustees,

who have negotiated o n several issues, seem t o be missing the main point — that is that the people here i n Natal don’t seem t o want a pension fund. They would rather have the money now and use it for the education o f their c h i l d r e n ’ .

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The industrial c o u r t

Another element i n the Wiehahn proposals has proved t o be a surprisingly effective weapon i n the union’s arsenal — the Industrial Court. Many unions now find the Court a useful adjunct t o their industrial muscle. A number o f recognition agreements have been forced upon companies and workers’ confidence has been enhanced b y the knowledge that wholesale sackings are made more difficult b y the rulings o f the Court. N o t that the Court has made unions less combative. FOSATU unions have been i n the forefront o f the movement t o use the Court i n certain circumstances, and yet according t o a recent survey FOSATU unions were involved i n more strikes i n 1983 than all other unions combined. Just how the state will finally relate t o the growing challenge that the union movement represents remains t o be seen. Already there are signs that the power o f the Industrial Court is t o be curbed, and there are reports that the government intends t o bring i n new legislation t o t r y t o force all unions t o register. But the gains o f the last decade w i l l not be easy t o wipe away, and the power o f the black unions looks like remaining a permanent factor i n the South African politicai economy.

Chapter 5

Organisation and Structure John Gomomo is the burly chairman o f the shop steward’s committee at the Volkswagen factory i n Uitenhage, near P o r t Elizabeth. As he walks quickly down the lines where the Golf motor cars are assembled, most o f the workers l o o k u p and grin. H e stops for a word with some o f them. The union notice board is covered with announcements and appeals from his union, the National Automobile and Allied Workers U n i o n — N A A W U . H e proudly points t o three little offices that the company was building for shop stewards inside the plant. Outside, workers come u p t o discuss minor personal problems. Gomomo led two major strikes which h i t Volkswagen i n 1980 and 1982. Although the union had already been recognised b y Volkswagen, an important advance after those strikes was the recognition o f full-time shop stewards. Gomo also serves o n N A A W U ’ s executive council and is a member o f FOSATU’s National Executive. H e is a type o f trade union activist recognisable all over the world, sitting o n a myriad o f committees and taking decisions i n which information gained through daily shop floor contacts informs his attitude when deciding upon a national FOSATU issue, just as his participation i n national union leadership helps when deciding what strategy and tactics t o adopt i n plant level relations with Volkswagen management. Unions’ structures are affected b y their sense o f history and the relationship the workers feel they have with each other, with the employer and the state. South Africa is n o different. The re-birth o f South Africa trade unionism for black workers after 1973 was based firmly o n democratic control b y the membership and the establishment o f strong workplace organisation. This was partly i n reaction against the white-controlled trade unions with their emphasis o n professional trade union officials working i n close proximity with employers i n the industrial councils. Perhaps even more important was the memory o f how the previous waves o f black trade unionisation had been more like general mass movements o f workers, without strong roots i n the workplace. The older generation o f trade union activists shared with the young white intellectuals, w h o staffed w o r k e r advice centres i n t h e early

1970s, the view that organisation i n the factory or the warehouse

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65

should be central. Instead o f going once every few months to hear a charismatic union leader deliver a rousing oration at a mass meeting, workers would elect local leaders and collectively discuss their problems. Employers too would have t o confront and learn t o negotiate with representatives o f workers who came from their o w n workforces. N o t all unions followed this strategy. I n particular, the newer community unions recruited at general meetings i n the townships and handed out leaflets i n the street inviting people t o join. Anyone who signed was entered as a union member even i f he o r she paid n o further subscriptions and d i d not proclaim union membership while at w o r k . Other unions were meticulous i n refusing t o recruit beyond what they perceived t o be their organisational capacities even i f that resulted i n the union having only a small membership. Key role

of shop stewards

Great emphasis is placed o n company-by-company, workplace-byworkplace organisation. B y 1983, four unions affiliated t o F O S A T U covering the metal, textile, transport and chemical industries had organised 321 factories and negotiated recognition agreements i n 226 o f these. FOSATU has published a 72-page booklet entitled ‘The Shop Steward’. H a l f o f i t is an historical account o f the British shop steward movement w i t h upbeat accounts o f the strength o f shop stewards during the First W o r l d War o r at Ford plants i n Britain i n the 1960s. The booklet goes o n t o say that what FOSATU unions want from employers should be: RECOGNISED Shop Steward Committees. Shop Stewards represent an ORGANISATION that is PERMANENT and does n o t depend o n individuals o r management. This is because they are: ® clected b y their fellow workers as representatives; ® elected in such a way that all workers either in a section, department o r shift have a representative that they can contact; ® governed b y constitutional rules t h a t allow members t o replace

them i f they d o n o t perform their duties; ® supported b y the U n i o n who can train them, give them advice and assistance and support them i n dealing with grievances o r negotiations; ® l i n k e d t o their fellow w o r k e r s i n other factories t h r o u g h their

Union and through their federation o f Unions. Shop Stewards are: ® representatives o f workers; ® clected department b y department;

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POWER!

® clected according t o the union constitution; t o perform their duties b y the union; ® linked t o other worker leadership through their union and their federation o f unions.

@® trained

(Source: The Shop Steward, FOSATU).

T h e N a t i o n a l U n i o n o f M i n e w o r k e r s , a C U S A affiliate, has

produced a 130-page training manual for its shaft stewards and tells them: ‘““The Shaft Steward will succeed i n uniting members i f he acts i n a respectful way with all members and does not try t o be their boss. H e must remember that the members elected him t o represent them because they had confidence i n h i m . H e must also remember that i f he does n o t serve them satisfactorily they can always remove h i m from his position. The Shaft Steward is the leader o f the workers i n the work place. Members will always l o o k t o h i m for leadership in every situation that confronts them. The Shaft Steward must be prepared for this. H e must be well-informed and be interested i n all the things happening i n his section o r department. H e must be willing t o be trained b y the union t o increase his knowledge so that he can impart his knowledge t o other workers.’’

Finding effective shopfloor leaders is a problem as Joe Foster, responsible during the 1970s for organising workers at the Leyland factory i n Cape T o w n , noted: ‘ ‘ Y o u call for elections and no-one puts his name down, so you go and ask someone and he says n o , and you try t o persuade h i m and so on. A n d then when you get a new shop steward you have t o train h i m . A t the moment we have a whole l o t o f new shop stewards b u t we don’t just tell them about the workers’ rights and legislation. We also educate them about the capitalist system and imperialism and what we are struggling for i n South Africa...

W o r k e r s ’ c o n t r o l i s a l o n g a n d d i f f i c u l t process,

you can’t just walk i n and have everyone participating. B u t that’s what the struggle is all about.”’ I n the Hendred Fruehof factory which makes lorry trailers near Johannesburg, 95 per cent o f the 400 workers belong t o the Metal and Allied Workers Unions, M A W U . Each department — paints h o p , t a n k - s h o p , stores etc — elects o n e s h o p s t e w a r d a n d a n

alternate. There are n o full-time shop stewards. The chairman o f the shop stewards is John Nonjeka, a 43-year-old welder. The stewards meet every Wednesday and h o l d a general meeting once a fortnight t o which all members may come. Branches a n d locals

This relentless participatory democracy continues o n u p through the M A W U structure. L i k e most South African unions w i t h a

Organisation and Structure

67

membership extending beyond one geographical area M A W U has branches corresponding more o r less t o the major regions i n the country. So there are four M A W U branches for Transvaal, South and N o r t h Natal and the Eastern Cape. Branches are further subdivided into locals, offices from which full-time organisers work. The M A W U office at Katlehong i n the East Rand, t o which the Hendred Fruehof factory is attached, is a shabby, brick hall behind a garage. Rows o f benches provide the seating and there are two desks, one with a telephone and typewriter, the other pushed against a wall t o make way for a meeting. These local offices are where shop stewards’ councils meet. These a d hoc bodies have helped organise workers b y launching recruitment drives. A t the beginning o f 1981, i n the area around the Katlehong local, there were only t w o factories i n which FOSATU unions were organised. B y the end o f 1981, shop stewards from 23 factories representing 7,000 workers were attending shop stewards’ council meetings. Unions affiliated t o FOSATU help each other with office facilities o r , as i n P o r t Elizabeth, have a k i n d o f general suite o f offices and meeting rooms which all F O S A T U affiliates may use. The same is true o f C U S A unions and the head offices o f the main C U S A unions are situated i n the same office building i n Johannesburg. Each factory elects one delegate and an alternate t o the branch executive committee o f M A W U . S o w i t h 7 7 factories i n Transvaal,

the branch executive is 150 strong. I n turn, each branch elects four delegates and t w o alternates t o provide a 24-strong National Executive Committee for the unions. Each branch holds an annual general meeting. Four thousand attended the 1983 Transvaal M A W U annual meeting which was held i n a stadium. F o r the National U n i o n o f Mineworkers, the organisational structure is similar, though based o n shafts and mines, with each mine constituting a branch and a group o f mines coming together t o form regional shaft stewards’ councils and regional committees. Regional loyalties are important and sometimes there can be fierce divisions between different region-based branches o f the same u n i o n . I n 1984, M W A S A , t h e m e d i a w o r k e r s ’ u n i o n , effectively

split when the Western Cape branch affiliated t o the United Democratic Front against the wishes o f the Transvaal and Natal branches. The differences between S A A W U branches i n East L o n d o n and i n Durban contributed t o that union’s grave internal problems i n 1984. Distances are so great and local political, industrial relations and leadership customs and history so different that detailed national control can sometimes be difficult. Full-time officials

A t all levels i n the emerging trade unions the emphasis o n elected

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shopfloor workers forming local, branch and national committees is stressed. But very few unions have negotiated agreements for full-time shop stewards. The need exists for full-time organisers paid for b y the union. I n most unions the general (or national) secretary is appointed by the national executive council. Organisers are also appointed either b y the national executive council o r , for example, in M A W U ’ s case, they may be appointed b y the branch executive committee. The pay o f organisers varies from union t o u n i o n . I n M A W U ’ s case t h e i r 23 organisers e a r n R 5 0 0 a month,

about the same as a semi-skilled metalworker. I n N A A W U , where the pay rates are the highest for black workers, organisers earn around R800 a month, while i n the General Workers’ U n i o n which organises poorly paid dock and general workers the rate for an organiser is R400 a month. The National U n i o n o f Mineworkers’ 17 full-time officials receive between R320 t o R450 a m o n t h compared with the average pay o f a miner o f R264 a month. As i n m o s t u n i o n s t h e full-time

organisers s t a r t as u n i o n activists,

become elected office-bearers and apply t o be full-time organisers. Most are young, under 40, and have been through a variety o f strikes, dismissals and successful negotiation i n the changing labour scene since 1973. Titus McKenna was a shop steward i n Leyland who became a full-time organiser for F O S A T U i n 1981. H e was attached t o the textile workers union i n organising drives and has now been sent t o help the paperworkers’ union. David Sebabi was b o r n i n 1952 and was employed by Toyota as a clerical worker. H e became a fulltime organiser with M A W U i n 1979, and was appointed general secretary i n 1981. Three years later he left that post and became an organiser again. I n fact, there is quite a turnover in many F O S A T U unions i n the post o f general secretary. I n part this may be selfpreservation. Some emerging unions whose general secretaries have adopted high public profiles have become the object o f state repression. I n addition, changes i n the composition o f the executive committee can result i n a general secretary being ousted following a shift i n the balance o f power. I n some o f the labour writings i n South Africa there are warnings about entrenched union bureaucracies emerging that gradually win control o f a union and then cease t o be accountable t o workers.

White organisers A n important difference between the FOSATU and C U S A unions is over the role o f white organisers. The N U M ’ s handbook for shaft stewards says that one o f the fundamental principles o f the the union is ‘‘black worker leadership’’. I n contrast a brochure

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69

published b y the National U n i o n o f Textile Workers states: ‘ ‘ W e hire organisers according t o their ability and not according t o their r a c e ’ . Some o f the more dynamic black unions such as the General Workers U n i o n and the Food and Canning Workers’ U n i o n have long had white general secretaries, David Lewis and Jan Theron respectively. John Copelyn has been general secretary o f the National U n i o n o f Textile Workers since his appointment b y the executive council i n 1982. While a student at university i n Johannesburg he became involved i n the union movement during the strike wave o f 1973. H e worked as a union organiser u n t i l 1976 when he was banned. H e qualified as a lawyer during his three-and-a-half years o f being banned and once that was lifted came straight back t o work for the union. ‘ U n t i l 1983, I was the only white. N o w we have appointed t w o more, an organiser and our health and safety officer’’, Copelyn explained. Standing beside the union president, Gain Ngqgawana, a full-time shop steward at Industrex, a Belgian-owned fabric plant i n P o r t Elizabeth, Copelyn said that he d i d n o t have that direct a rapport w i t h the membership. ‘ I ’ m stuck i n head office preparing legal papers and educational material with a l o t o f administration and financial work for the branches. We have computerised membership and financial records for our 19,000 members a t t h e h e a d o f f i c e i n D u r b a n ’ ’ , h e said.

Some white general secretaries have tried t o avoid having too outspoken a role in their unions. Others, like David Lewis, have

written extensively about the theory and history o f black trade unions. Neil Aggett’s death underlined the influential role played b y whites i n the development o f the emerging unions since 1973. The contemptuous term ‘white academic’ is t o be found o n the lips o f b o t h employers and old-style union leaders as they denounce what they see as manipulation b y outsiders. I t is a point raised with rather more seriousness b y those who argue that workers’ organisations s h o u l d have w o r k e r s h o l d i n g a l l the posts, especially

an important one like that o f general secretary which, however one down-plays it, is a key union position. Calvin Nkbabinde, general secretary o f a small blacks-only engineering union based i n Johannesburg, said: ‘“The black man is pushed according t o his needs, the white sympathiser according t o his ideology. The black man has been so used t o deferring t o the white. A white union organiser tends t o be more and more relied o n . ’ ’ I n contrast, David M a d u t e l a , a n executive c o u n c i l m e m b e r o f M A W U , w h i c h has

three white organisers claimed: ‘‘The white intellectuals should be used. W e can learn from t h e m . B u t we must take that learning and

p u t i t i n t o use ourselves. I f we make mistakes so be i t . I n the factories shop stewards have t o learn t o stand o n their o w n feet.

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Workers still ask the whites to come and do the negotiating.’’ His point was echoed b y Andrew Z u l u , vice-president o f F O S A T U , who said: ‘‘The whites are there as advisers. That’s where they should stay. We have t o provide the leadership. Sometimes the white intellectuals go too far i n offering leadership and then there is the possibility o f a clash.” Recruitment

Whites only play a limited personal role i n recruitment. One o f the organisers’ key tasks is recruiting. Often one o f the African languages is needed, especially amongst migrant workers. Volkswagen’s John Gomomo, for example, can speak English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa and can understand Tswana (in passing, one might ask how many union movements i n the world throw u p worker leaders fluent i n four languages) and i t is normal for union meetings t o be conducted i n more than one language. The normal method o f recruitment is t o meet small groups o f workers and persuade them t o j o i n the union and recruit their fellow workers. Sometimes the unions are awash with membership applications. More than 7,000 workers i n different factories applied t o j o i n M A W U i n Natal during the rolling wave o f engineering factory disputes. M A W U was identified as standing out against the Industrial Council wage offer and demanding a much higher minimum wage. Once a union has recruited more than 40 per cent o f the workers i n a factory i t can apply for recognition. Msoks Qotole, an organiser with the General Workers U n i o n , described the problems they had at a Cape Town factory, once the union arrived with sufficient signed forms to begin negotiation over recognition. ‘‘The management interviews each worker and asks h i m i f he is sure he knows what k i n d o f form he has signed t o j o i n the union. The personnel officer, who also referred t o the workers as ‘‘the boys’’ clearly didn’t believe they could write. The word i n Xhosa for subscription is ‘ I r h a f u ’ which can also mean payment o r tax. So when a worker was asked i f he knew he had paid ‘ I r h a f u ’ the white personnel m a n who speaks Xhosa says, ‘ A h , ha. So you pay tax. What’s that got t o do with the union?’’ The workers just replied patiently, ‘“‘Yes, it’s ‘ I r h a f u ’ for the union.”’

H o w unions are financed U n i o n subscriptions also vary from union t o union, and amount o n average t o about 0.75 per cent o f the weekly wage. The National U n i o n o f Mineworkers’ subscription is R 1 a month, that o f the Metal and Allied Workers’ U n i o n , R 2 per month. I n the N U M ’ s case the money is collected b y shaft stewards and after being

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divided between local and national use is sent o n t o the head office. Many o f the industrial unions have negotiated check-off or stoporder systems so that the union subscription is automatically deducted from the members’ wages and forwarded b y the employer t o the union. The money is used t o pay salaries, r u n offices, pay benefits, publish education material and leaflets and even t o help organisers with car driving lessons. The National Automobile and Allied Workers’ U n i o n arranges for each o f its officials t o have a car through a complicated leasing system. B u t M A W A ’ s 23 organisers only have four union cars between them so valuable time is lost as one organiser chauffeurs another t o a meeting. Workers are also compensated for lost pay when they have t o take working days off t o attend meetings. Those attending a 2-day meeting o f the Chemical Workers Industrial U n i o n National Executive Committee held at Wilgespruit i n Transvaal i n February 1984 found themselves discussing issues such as who t o employ as an organiser, an allegation that the vice-president was n o t performing his duties satisfactorily, a rise i n subscription rates, cooperation w i t h a rival union, a report from the FOSATU executive committee and reports from the general secretary and from the branches. As always the dry recorded minutes o f such meetings conceal as much as they disclose, b u t any trade union activist or official from Britain, the rest o f Europe or N o r t h America would find plenty o f common ground i n the work and organisation o f the South African unions. I n Britain, much heat is generated over the closed shop, which British unions correctly see, i n the British economic and political context, as an essential collective defence against the power o f employers. I n South Africa, the closed shops granted t o the white dominated unions have been used t o perpetuate control over black workers who were barred from forming their o w n unions. Management came t o agreements w i t h such unions and workers even find themselves having subscriptions deducted without their consent. So the rivalries between unions over organisation and jurisdiction rights has been marked. I t is not just between white and black unions, o r between T U C S A and F O S A T U and C U S A unions but the rivalry extended t o unions with broadly the same political outlook under black leadership. I t also exists between the so-called industrial and so-called community unions, b e t w e e n those t h a t h a v e registered a n d those t h a t refuse t o register,

between those o n industrial councils and those outside the industrial council system. Bearing i n m i n d that the vast majority o f black industrial workers remain t o be organised, the charges o f simply recruiting members from one union into another are serious.

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One European metalworkers leader with more than 40 years’ experience o f organising returned from a visit t o South Africa i n 1984 and said: ‘‘Sometimes I get the impression they are shuffling the same members around. As much time is spent complaining about each others raiding activities as getting out and organising new members.” M o s t Western union movements have agreed procedures t o prevent that k i n d o f futile inter-union rivalry. I n South Africa, the frustrations and lack o f trust stemming from t w o decades o f organisational difficulties combine w i t h deep-rooted differences over ideology t o make united organisation drives impossible. Perhaps the most important union activity is the meeting. Yet even t o hold meetings presents problems. I n theory, whites need permission t o go i n t o black townships. M a n y township union meetings are held out o f doors. Yet, any gathering o f more than 10 people i n public should have prior permission from the authorities. Transport problems for migrant workers means it is difficult t o attend meetings held any distance from their hostels. The remarkable thing about the level o f organisation and the structures that have evolved is n o t that here and there they have their faults, but that given the difficulties against which the emerging unions have t o operate they have nonetheless developed forms that blend the requirement for leadership, and full-time organisation and yet stay close t o the needs o f the members and the principle o f democratic control and accountability.

Communications

I n a large, slightly chaotic office i n a Durban suburb, I a n Bissell sat one Saturday morning trying t o work out what he could spike for the next issue o f Fosatu Workers’ News. L i k e all trade union editors he had t o juggle between the demands o f industrial news, longer articles, theoretical pieces and interviews with union activists. Bissell is a young Durban journalist appointed i n 1983 as full-time editor o f the FOSATU newspaper. I t is tabloid size, with a pacy layout and a sophisticated use o f headlines and photographs. Fifty thousand copies are printed every five weeks. The five-week rhythm is t o circumvent a law which requires the registration o f any journal appearing 12 times or more a year. Registration means the payment o f a R20,000 deposit which is forfeited i f the publication is banned. T h e M a y 1984 issue had 12 pages, had articles o n the metal industry national wage negotiations, M a y Day appeals, an appeal t o workers n o t t o vote i n the elections t o coloured and Indian parliaments, an account o f women workers’ problems, the sixth part o f a history o f the South African working class, reports o f i n d i v i d u a l u n i o n successes i n f o o d , t r a n s p o r t , t i m b e r , textile,

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tyre and sugar industries, and an extract from a story about a workers’ life written b y Alfred Qabula, a Dunlop worker. Fosatu Workers News also appears i n Zulu. C U S A publishes a smaller j o u r n a l , Izwilethu, w h i c h is A 4 size

w i t h a 20,000 print r u n . The Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ U n i o n publishes Ccawusa News which is a four-page t a b l o i d w h i l e t h e General W o r k e r s ’ U n i o n publishes, i r r e g u l a r l y ,

Phambili Basebenzi. The Metal and Allied Workers’ U n i o n published an A 4 size newsletter Umbiko we M A W U . I n addition t o newspapers many o f the emerging unions produce leaflets, brochures and longer booklets. C U S A publishes an occasional newsletter, Know Your Rights which deals with labour legislation. FOSATU’s publications include such titles as A Guide to Wage Bargaining, Why Your Union Needs Shop Stewards, Reform o r Control: the N e w South African Labour Dispensation, Fighting

Retrenchment,

International

Trade

Unionism,

Unemployment Insurance Fund and Workmen’s Compensation. Academics and writers sympathetic t o the black unions have also helped produce short booklets o n aspects o f South Africa trade union history. These are written i n clear, direct language. I n Cape T o w n , a trade union library for workers has been opened. The need t o improve direct union communication with members and the communities i n which they live is important as the media i n South Africa, as elsewhere, is biased against the workers and their unions. Most South African companies employ public relations consultants, usually former journalists w i t h good contacts i n the press, t o p u t over t h e i r case. D u r i n g t h e L e y l a n d s t r i k e i n 1981, t h e

company inserted large advertisements i n the newspapers thanking strike-breakers for coming t o work. I n the strike at B M W near Pretoria i n January 1984, the West German-owned company hired an helicopter t o shower the township with leaflets inviting workers a n d t h e i r families t o a v i d e o s h o w i n g and free d r i n k s , t o p u t over

the company’s arguments. Against this, the unions are increasing their contacts w i t h the press. A l l are becoming proficient i n using press releases at a national level, though a traditional union-media distrust still exists. A major problem is that the South African television and radio networks are firmly under government control and the activities o r views o f the black workers are simply n o t heard.

Training and education Increasing emphasis is now being placed o n training and education for workers and those holding elected office. The National U n i o n o f Mineworkers has produced a 180-page training manual for its

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shaft stewards. The union has also appointed a full-time education officer. A 1979 FOSATU booklet, Factory Research, states: ‘“‘Research is not something special which can only be done b y intellectuals or people with degrees. Every organiser and every worker can help with research.’’ I n 1983, FOSATU appointed a full-time education secretary, Alex E r w i n , who has organised a series o f labour studies courses, lasting for one or two weeks. A two-week-long education workshop was held i n and around Johannesburg i n July 1983. Lectures i n c l u d e d such subjects as ‘ W o r k e r s a n d D e m o c r a c y ’ , ‘ W o r k e r s a n d

the Community’ and ‘Women Workers’. M o r e than 300 workers attended these courses. I n d i v i d u a l u n i o n s organise courses for shop stewards, l o c a l a n d

branch officers. The subjects cover subjects from the mundane, i f important, such as basic bookkeeping and office administration, t o public speaking, wage bargaining, labour law and political economy. I n 1983, i n Natal, FOSATU and its affiliates organised 32 education courses attended b y 842 workers; i n Transvaal, 23 courses were attended b y 1,636 participants. The Federation has begun using video cassettes t o teach workers about grievance procedures. W i t h a legal studies centre, the union has jointly produced a series o f short plays which show how ill-informed shop stewards can mess u p the handling o f a workers’ grievance and then how t o do i t properly. T o attend a black workers’ meeting i n South Africa is t o hear songs and chants interspersed w i t h the serious union business. A t all important regional and national meetings, workers’ choirs compete w i t h each other i n front o f the crowd. Workers also stage plays about factory life. One o f them staged b y Dunlop workers has this line from a worker who is allowed t o be an austronaut for the day: ‘ Y o u k n o w , I ’ m sure i f I came t o live o n the moon, Dunlop would start a factory just t o torment me. A n d Vorster would come u p just t o make sure I carry a pass.”

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Workers Health and Safety Becomes an Issue O n Monday 12 September 1983 the morning shift at the stateowned Hlobane colliery i n Natal got ready t o go underground. D o w n i n the shaft, miners shuffled t o their various work posts, each reluctantly adjusting t o the week’s work that lay ahead. Various machines used underground were switched on. One o f them, a scoop that drags the coal along t o dumper trucks, seemed t o be short-circuiting. I t was a normal enough sight and the miners had almost got used t o the electric flashes from the poorly maintained equipment. What no-one knew that morning was that over the weekend a large quantity o f methane gas had seeped i n t o the area where the men were beginning the day’s shift. O f all the dangers coalminers face methane is perhaps the greatest. I t is odourless and colourless. A n uncomplicated hydrocarbon, the simplest member o f the paraffin series, methane hugs the ceiling o f mine shafts. Going i n t o a mine full o f methane is like walking i n t o a sealed room a metre deep i n paraffin. When a spark or an electrical flash touches i t , the effect is instant incineration. That’s what happened at Hlobane when the electric sparks from the scoop ignited the methane gas. Sixty-four miners were burnt alive. Four more died after days o f agony i n hospital and several were seriously injured. A build-up o f methane gas is a normal, indeed predictable mining danger. I t is avoided b y adequate ventilation and b y checks before work begins t o ensure that the area is methane free. I n addition, according t o South African government regulations, underground machinery is meant t o be flame-proof. None o f these conditions were met at Hlobane. A few days before the explosion there had been major holing operations which had not been properly sealed o f f , which meant that the mine’s ventilation system d i d n o t clear away the methane. One miner had reported the presence o f methane but the mine management decided he was lying t o cover u p a poor production record. Only four out o f the required ten flame safety lamps were i n operation i n the area o f the blast. O f those, only one had a probe attachment necessary t o test for methane o n the mine ceiling. O f 29 machines i n the blast area, 14 were not flame p r o o f and could have caused the explosion. A detailed enquiry i n t o the Hlobane tragedy revealed other

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examples o f management indifference and the lack o f effective regulation, inspection and enforcement o f safety procedures. B u t one fact emerged above all from the events surrounding the blast: that the miners themselves had n o say i n safety procedures and that their union had n o legal o r contractual right t o intervene o n their behalf. The responsibility for the health and safety o f the worker i n South Africa rests entirely with the employer. The way employers have discharged this responsibility can be measured by South Africa’s workplace accidents which are amongst the highest i n the world. I n the 1980s, according t o the governments’ Workmens’ Compensation Commission, there were a n average 300,000 accidents a t w o r k each y e a r , w i t h 2 , 0 0 0 deaths

and 30,000 workers left permanently disabled. There is little safety training and much unsafe machinery. M o r e than 90 per cent o f the accidents i n coal mines were officially blamed o n ‘acts o f God’, whereas management and workers are blamed for fewer than 2 per cent. I n 1983, a total o f 831 miners died i n accidents, three quarters o f t h e m i n g o l d mines, S o u t h A f r i c a ’ s m a i n source o f w e a l t h . Between 1972 a n d 1982, 8,209 m i n e r s were k i l l e d i n g o l d , c o a l a n d o t h e r

mines. Even these statistics were challenged as being too modest. According t o D r Herbert Eisner, the former head o f the explosives and flame laboratory o f the British Health and Safety Executive, the methods used b y the South African government i n gathering statistics o n mining accidents are n o longer considered reliable b y other important mining countries. The mining death rate i n South Africa was six times that o f the United Kingdom, he said. The

NUM steps in

The issue o f miners’ safety has become a priority for the black National U n i o n o f Mineworkers (NUM), according t o its president, C y r i l Ramophosa. Several resolutions o n safety were passed at the N U M ’ s second annual conference held i n December 1983. The union has demanded that its safety stewards be fully recognised by the Chamber o f Mines. Six months before the Hlobane disaster the N U M had applied t o j o i n the official Mines Safety Committee, but their application was turned down b y the Government M i n i n g Engineer who said the union was ‘unrepresentative’. The N U M has 70,000 members and many miners n o t yet i n the union followed its call for a 30 minutes stoppage i n protest at the Hlobane tragedy. The N U M is now insisting o n being legally represented at all enquiries i n t o mining disasters. I t also won an important legal case when the Industrial Court backed 17 N U M members who refused t o work i n an area they thought unsafe i n a West Driefontein mine.

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Management o f G o l d Fields, the company which owns the mine, fired the workers b u t the court ordered that they be reinstated. After the case the N U M said i t would advise its members that they had the right t o refuse t o go i n t o areas they thought unsafe and the union called o n mine owners t o conclude safety agreements with i t i n order t o avoid court actions. The N U M has also flown i n safety experts from other countries t o advise i n improvements i n mine safety procedures. Accidents are n o t the only hazard workers have t o face. Canceror disease-inducing substances and chemicals are in common use i n many production processes. Workers are also exposed t o dangers such as h i g h n o i s e levels, f u m e s , d u s t , m i n e r a l f i b r e s , solvents,

sprays, paints and other toxins. The West German government, for example, recognises 280 high risk substances workers should avoid exposure t o : i n the United States the figure is also 280. Even Czechoslovakia lists 70. The latest number o f high risk substances recognised b y South Africa is just 49. Shift w o r k , unless properly controlled b y a union-management agreement, can also harm a worker’s overall health. A survey o f cleaners working at night i n Johannesburg offices showed that 64 per cent had only two t o four hours sleep a day. This was caused partly b y the nature o f the shift work, partly b y the vibration o f the cleaning machines, which meant they found i f difficult t o sleep easily when at home. Four out o f five women complained o f sore eyes and headaches and nearly half were diagnosed as suffering from high blood pressure. None o f the workers was i n a union. 50,000 workers at risk from asbestos Barry Castleman is one o f the United States’ best known experts o n workplace health and safety. H e has advised the U S Congress, the International Labour Organisation and numerous N o r t h American unions o n the issue. Castleman toured South African factories and mines i n 1983 t o look i n t o safety conditions. H e described the experience as ‘‘like going back i n a time m a c h i n e ’ . H e saw welders using blow torches without face shields, miners pouring molten gold without safety glasses and workers i n dangerously high noise areas without ear protection. Castleman was especially scathing about the protection given the workers handling asbestos. Ten thousand workers are employed i n South African asbestos mines a n d a f u r t h e r 40,000 w o r k e r s h a n d l e asbestos d i r e c t l y as p a r t o f

their daily job. Everite is South Africa’s largest manufacturer o f fibre-cement and other products containing a mixture o f blue and white asbestos fibre and cement. The company is a subsidiary o f the Swiss Eternit

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group. I n South Africa, Everite employs 24,200 workers i n four plants. Only i n the last few years has the company started t o organise health checks for its employees. I n 1983, as a result o f these a n d subsequent u n i o n pressure, 23 w o r k e r s at o n e o f Everite’s

plants i n Cape T o w n were retired early o n full pay after i t was diagnosed that they suffered from asbestosis, a serious — often fatal — lung disease caused b y exposure t o asbestos. A t the time o f the men’s retirement, the workers’ union, the General Workers’ U n i o n , was still i n the middle o f trying t o get the company t o agree t o a recognition agreement. G W U general secretary, David Lewis, had asked the company at least t o cooperate with the union over health matters b u t Everite had refused t o agree t o this. The union had plenty o f points t o raise. The 23 men had n o t been moved to lower exposure areas after being certified as having asbestosis. A n inspection o f the plant showed that workers handling raw asbestos mixed with water and cement were doing so without masks. Workers were t o be seen cutting asbestos sheets without masks. D r Jonathan Myers, o f the University o f Cape Town’s industrial health research unit, has taken a particular interest i n the dangers o f asbestos and i n the Everite case. Everite claims that over 37 years only 71 workers out o f 24,200 have been diagnosed as having asbestosis, an average o f 0.29 per cent. O f those only 15 have died from asbestos-related diseases. D r Myers finds i t difficult t o accept these figures: ‘‘According t o international studies o f workers i n asbestos product plants i n other parts o f the world, there is nowhere where the fatalities are so l o w . ’ ’ These studies, carried out according t o International Labour Organisation specifications, show the lowest rate o f asbestosis t o be 8.5 per cent at a fibre cement factory i n Barcelona, where workers were exposed t o the fibres for an average o f seven years. D r Myers was also concerned about the level o f asbestos fibres Everite permitted t o be i n the air. Tiny asbestos fibres, difficult t o see under the microscope, are believed t o cause lung cancer and mesothelioma, a rare and extremely unpleasant cancer o f the lining o f the lung. Sweden and Norway have completely banned the production o r handling o f asbestos because o f its known dangers. I n Britain, the maximum legal level is 0.2 fibres per m l o f air, though many unions and health experts believe that any exposure t o any level o f asbestos fibres is dangerous. Everite’s management said their workers were exposed t o 1 fibre per m l o f air — five times the British level. One o f the men obliged t o take early retirement is Christian Mattee who had worked at the factory for 30 years. For eight years he loaded raw asbestos dust from a train. Then he became a tractor

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driver which also involved loading asbestos. ‘ ‘ I n 1977, they told me I had something i n m y lungs. I carried o n working as a tractor driver u n t i l November 1983, when I was transferred.”’ The workers’ fears about the daily danger they face has undoubtedly helped the union’s organisation drive. L i k e unions facing the asbestos problem i n other countries G W U ’ s Lewis has had t o adopt a twin-track policy o f calling for research o n substitute products which would eliminate the need for asbestos while also pressing the company for ‘‘short-term solutions: constant monitoring and very early identification o f the disease, protective clothing and a monitoring o f the production’’. Campaigning against ‘Brown L u n g ’ Another union that has taken u p the question o f workers’ health with great effect is the National U n i o n o f Textile Workers ( N U T W ) . I n 1981, the union began testing textile workers for ‘ b r o w n lung’ disease (known medically as byssinosis). This is a well-known disease caused b y cotton dust. I t first came t o prominence as a major industrial disease i n the United States i n the 1970s after union campaigns secured compensation for several hundred workers affected b y ‘brown lung’. I n S o u t h A f r i c a , t h e N U T W h a d tested t h o u s a n d s o f workers

and produced pamphlets, leaflets and posters alerting their

members to the dangers of cotton dust exposure. I n 1983, one union member, John Hlela became the first black worker t o be awarded a l u m p sum and a pension o f R109 after the Bureau o f Occupational Diseases had accepted that his disability was caused b y cotton dust induced ‘brown lung’. I n 1984, three more workers won payments and were awarded pensions. The fight t o secure financial compensation for workers whose future lives are probably shortened, certainly blighted, b y having contracted industrial diseases is more than retrospective action o n the part o f the union. The examples serve t o encourage other workers t o be alert t o the dangers and t o insist they are taken u p w i t h management. I n 1983 the N U T W appointed a full-time health and safety officer, a physician, D r Neil White, and has started t o keep medical records o f their members. N U T W general secretary, John Copelyn, said i t was important ‘ ‘ t o build up medical records o f our members even i f they have clear lungs when first tested, so that i f five years later the worker finds he has lung disease, the union will have p r o o f that i t was caused b y the f a c t o r y . ” The question o f dust levels, he said, had always been considered the ‘‘unchallenged prerogative o f management’’ b u t now plant union committees were taking u p this issue. They had also

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demanded extra hazard payments for having t o work i n dusty areas and insisted the workers should be transferred t o dust-free working environments i f they felt unwell. The F o o d and Canning Workers U n i o n (FCWU) has also taken u p the question o f its members health. I n 1982, workers at a fruit drying factory i n Montagu, near Cape T o w n were worried about one o f the chemicals used. This was sodium metabisulphate which is mixed w i t h the fresh fruit and helps t o preserve its colour during the drying process. However as the fruit goes through a quick drying tunnel the chemical dissolves giving o f f sulphur dioxide gas which can cause a variety o f physical, mainly respiratory complaints as well as nausea and dizziness. The union carried out tests o n its members which showed a high level o f problems connected w i t h working near the drying tunnels giving o f f these fumes. I n 1983, the F C W U approached the management simply, at that stage, t o discuss the problem. The management response was t o announce that i t was going t o scale down the operation and that henceforth fruit would be dried i n the traditional way, that is outside i n the sun. B u t this meant that the factory’s designation was changed t o that o f a farm. Workers were laid o f f and although the union’s health and safety worries were obliquely met, the need for strong union organisation i n the first place was underlined. Anger over company medical schemes I n the propaganda they offer t o the outside world many South African companies boast about health schemes they have set u p and also claim t o provide free or cheap medical services for their workers. One such is the D e Beers diamond company i n Kimberley. I t says that the company doctor provides free medical advice; there is a hospital paid for by D e Beers and a cheap medical scheme t o which workers can belong t o provide a wide range o f medical services for themselves and their families. Shop stewards belonging to the mining union organising at D e Beers tell a very different story. They say that a black worker who felt unwell first had t o get permission from the foreman, who made a prior examination before he was allowed t o go t o the company hospital. Then he sees a nursing sister who decides whether he can see the doctor. Even i f admitted i n t o the hospital there is pressure t o report back for work. The company doctor, who was also a director o f D e Beers, urged workers t o j o i n the company medical scheme which cost R30 per month. H e refused t o refer workers t o their own, black doctors. A n attempt b y four black doctors t o set u p i n practice was thwarted b y the town council (over which D e Beers has i m m e n s e influence as Kimberley for t h e l a s t c e n t u r y has,

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more or less, been a company town) which refused the black doctors permission t o open surgeries i n the town centre. One union activist described how several years ago he called u p the De Beers company doctor because his baby son was sick. H e made the call at 7.30am after the baby had been u p all night. The doctor eventually arrived at 9.30 i n the evening. H e gave a prescription but the dispensary was shut until the following morning. D u r i n g the night the little boy died. Other workers complain that they could not afford the R30 a month t o j o i n the company medical scheme. O f all the issues discussed at a general union meeting o f D e Beers’ shop stewards i n M a r c h 1984 t h e p r o b l e m s o f medical t r e a t m e n t , a n d o f

workers n o t being made t o work when they felt unwell, took u p most o f time. The stewards were angry i n their condemnation o f the company. N e w safety legislation under fire All the independent unions are united i n their criticism o f the 1983 Machinery and Occupational Safety A c t . A t first sight i t looks progressive. B u t as with other recent South African workplace legislation i t flatters t o deceive. Employers are obliged t o set u p Health and Safety Committees i n their factories and appoint Safety Representatives. But the decision o n who should be a Safety Representative is entirely for management and the committees are under management control. The new A c t lays down that the employer w i l l appoint worker representatives t o the health and safety committee and w i l l draw u p its agenda and chair its meetings. Managements are encouraged b y the government t o appoint supervisory personnel as Safety Representatives, and they will have n o special training, n o right t o information and n o powers t o enforce decisions made b y the Health and Safety Committees. The new law does not list hazardous materials t o which workers should not be exposed. Factory inspectors have t o make several inspection visits before they can take action, thus leaving employers plenty o f time t o cover their tracks. Unlike the n o r m i n most Western countries, which makes the employer liable t o prosecution for failing t o enforce safety precautions, there is even a provision i n the A c t permitting employers t o dismiss workers who do not wear protective clothing. I n response t o t h e n e w A c t , u n i o n s i n F O S A T U s a i d t h e y w o u l d

nominate their o w n shop stewards t o sit o n Health and Safety Councils and strongly oppose employers who try t o nominate their o w n Safety Representatives. As the 1983 F O S A T U annual report noted: ‘‘the experience was that bargaining over health and safety was very difficult i n an environment that still required a struggle

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for basic recognition r i g h t s . ” However FOSATU and other independent unions have successfully begun t o give health and safety i n the workplace a much higher profile. Doctors and research institutes are now paying more attention t o workers’ health problems and unions from Europe and North America have been sending industrial health and safety officials t o help South African unions with training courses and expert advice. But i t is workers themselves who will be the force t o secure safer workplace environments. One o f the pamphlets p u t out i n South Africa as part o f the ‘ b r o w n lung’ campaign sums i t u p thus: ““Most workers see illness as a personal problem. They see illness as something that can be cured b y a doctor. A n d , i f they are badly affected they think they can get compensation. But this is not the solution. Doctors cannot cure o r prevent this illness. Compensation does n o t make factories safer. I t is only through organisation that workers can learn about this illness and begin the struggle t o make the factories safer and prevent this

illness. Prevention is better than cure.”

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Chapter 7

Women Workers Assert Their Rights The problems facing black women workers i n South Africa, like those faced b y their counterparts i n Europe, America and Asia, go beyond the workplace difficulties arising from the struggle between labour and capital, go beyond even the nature o f racial repression inherent i n South Africa and touch u p o n the life that women have t o live subordinate t o men, within the family and society itself. As Gloria Barry, a General Motors worker i n P o r t Elizabeth for 10 years before she began work full-time for the union, said: ‘ I believe that very few males ever accepted that women are i n equal partnership with them as the creator o f m a n and, as such, o f labour power that ensures that the planet Earth continues t o develop i n the hands o f the male species.”’ The widespread practice o f ‘lobola’, a payment made b y a would-be husband t o the family o f the woman he wishes t o marry, confers an almost chattel status o n the wife. Unions holding meetings for w o m e n w o r k e r s h a v e h a d t o write t o husbands, a s k i n g

politely for permission for the wife t o attend the meeting and assuring the husband that his wife would be participating i n serious union business. I n Soweto, six out o f 10 children d o n o t have married parents and the single working mother is a common phenomenon. I n S o w e t o , t h e r e a r e 90,000 p r e - s c h o o l c h i l d r e n , b u t o n l y o n e c e n t r e for those u n d e r t h e age o f t w o . F o r m o s t w o r k i n g w o m e n , there i s a n e x h a u s t i n g r o u t i n e — ‘ t h e dual s h i f t ’ — o f h o u s e w o r k , c o o k i n g ,

childcare and sexual provision t o be added t o a day’s work. Yet, at the same time the changing nature o f women’s participation i n manufacturing and service industries and their increasing activity i n the trade union movement mean that women are challenging the daily oppression they have t o live with.

More women enter workforce The shift from agricultural labour and domestic service i n t o waged employment has been quite marked, though i t needs t o be set i n context — a c c o r d i n g t o t h e 1980 census nearly f o u r o u t o f five A f r i c a n w o m e n were s a i d t o b e ‘ n o t e c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e ’ , a n d 57

per cent live i n the bantustans where waged employment is rare for

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b o t h women and men. Nonetheless, that leaves 1.7 million African women workers. I n 1946 African women constituted only 1.8 per cent o f a l l p r o d u c t i o n w o r k e r s i n S o u t h Africa; b y 1982 12.8 per

cent o f African women were employed i n production work. They work mainly i n semi-skilled o r unskilled jobs and are a concentration i n the textile and food industries. I n 1981, women constituted 46.8 per cent o f workers i n the textile industry, and o f those 64.9 per cent were African women. Percentage increase o f women i n the black work-force b y sector, 1973-1981

Sector/Industry Shoe Commerce Electrical machinery Textile Clothing Non-metal mineral Food Furniture Chemical Wood

Percentage increase 23.9 15.2 15.0 12.1 7.2 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.0 2.9

(Source: National Manpower Surveys)

Female wages are l o w . Although the government has repealed legislation permitting wage discrimination, employers still pay women less than men. I n the Transvaal clothing industry i n 1982, a female sewing machinist earned 50 per cent less (R33) than a male sewing machinist (R49.50). There has been a steady shift o f women i n t o wage labour i n the service sector. I n 1946, 93.1 per cent o f all women service workers were domestic servants. B y 1980, only one t h i r d o f African women i n paid employment were i n service work. I n a sense, the externally employed service work does n o t differ that much from domestic service — i t still consists o f cleaning, laundry, cooking and waitress work. B u t this expanding sector (from 62,468 i n 1973 t o 112,024 i n 1981) has helped increase the possibility o f union organisation and the raising o f women workers’ consciousness through their o w n agitation and industrial activity.

Fighting for maternity rights That such union organisation is badly needed can be seen by looking at how South African capital and the state respond t o what

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t o them is perhaps the most important function o f women relative t o the l a b o u r force — t h a t o f reproducing i t . ‘ ‘ I f y o u get pregnant,

that’s i t , they fire y o u . ’ ’ That’s how a Transvaal woman shop steward summed u p one o f the main problems facing women workers. I n a chemical f i r m , women workers had t o sign a document stating: ‘ ‘ I , the undersigned, hereby declare that I am n o t pregnant. I furthermore agree that should I fall pregnant i n the n e x t 12 m o n t h s , m y services s h o u l d b e t e r m i n a t e d i m m e d i a t e l y . ” ’

A l l forms o f contraception are used, including the controversial Depo Provera drug, which is injected i n employer-run clinics. Back street abortions are frequent. A n industrial relations officer at Kellogs said: ‘ ‘ I n a place where I worked before, a woman who was pregnant wrapped her stomach tightly so that no-one would know she was pregant because she was afraid o f losing her j o b . This made her a b o r t . ” Another women said she wore outsize dustcoats at work i n order t o disguise her pregnancy. During pregnancy, retail workers reported that they were moved away from shop counters, as management d i d n o t want them t o have contact with the public. A Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ U n i o n organiser said that a pregnant shop assistant may be moved i n t o warehouse work which is often arduous and involves carrying crates or climbing ladders, precisely the k i n d o f activity a pregnant woman should avoid. Even i n those companies which permit their women employees leave t o have babies, the financial pressure t o return t o work is strong. For even i f a woman worker has paid for three years i n t o the state Unemployment Insurance F u n d she can claim only about one-third o f her wages for 18 weeks before and eight weeks after confinement. South African labour law provides little protection for women. I n d e e d , t h e 1983 Basic C o n d i t i o n o f E m p l o y m e n t A c t a c t u a l l y

removed certain protections that women had i n respect o f overtime and nightwork. B y contrast, the law obliges companies t o give white male workers generous time o f f for military training and their jobs and fringe benefits are protected during such absences. The conflict between the needs o f capital and the requirements o f the apartheid state emerged i n the recommendations o f the Wiehahn Commission. Under advanced capitalist organisation female labour is needed t o fill unskilled and low-pay jobs, and women are increasingly incorporated i n t o the labour market. Under pressure from women organised i n unions, b u t also i n response t o the need t o protect and keep women workers (relatively) quiescent i n terms o f their family and reproductive roles, most states have passed legislation aimed at protecting women’s maternity rights and preventing unfair discrimination i n

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employment or workplace practices. Wiehahn, i n trying t o develop Western norms o f labour legislation, was obliged t o include certain recommendations i n favour o f women. These included equal unemployment benefits for women, a prohibition o n being dismissed because o f pregnancy, pre-confinement leave t o be raised t o six weeks, pregnancy leave earnings t o go u p t o 60 per cent, light duties for pregnant women t o be legally obligatory. The government rejected all these recommendations. T o wait then for the state t o grant improvements i n the conditions women face at work was pointless. Instead, women workers began organising, demanding and successfully negotiating maternity and other relevant agreements, combating sexual harassment and forcing their male colleagues t o discuss, albeit hesitantly, problems o f sexism and patriarchy which are intertwined w i t h apartheid and the employers’ dominant position i n South Africa.

W o m e n u n i o n activists

Lydia ‘ M a m a ’ Kompe is the Transvaal organiser o f the Transport and General Workers’ U n i o n . She joined the Metal and Allied Workers’ U n i o n i n 1974 when she worked for Heinemann Electric. “ T h e r e were 606 workers i n Heinemann, mostly women. I n three months we managed t o organise almost the entire plant. I was elected a shop steward’’, she said. B u t although the majority o f the workers were women, i t was men who played a commanding role i n the union organisation. ‘ A t Heinemann we had six women shop stewards out o f 12. This was because we were insisting and our organiser, Khubeka, was encouraging us. B u t our chairman was a man. During meetings we tried t o fight the undermining o f women’s suggestions. They thought we were n o t saying strategic things. B u t we managed t o fight that. I f a woman stands u p and puts a motion o r a suggestion, i t should be taken i n t o consideration. We succeeded i n Heinemann because women outnumbered men. We weren’t scared even when the police were trying t o thrash us and scare us with dogs. I think that was when women realised that women can be determined’’, said ‘ M a m a ’ Kompe. Several women have been chosen as general secretaries. Tembi Nabe was elected b y the executive council o f M A W U t o the post i n M a y , 1984. June-Rose Nala was also general secretary o f M A W U before going t o Ruskin College, Oxford o n a trade union scholarship. Other women who have held a general secretary position recently are Refilo Nzuta o f the Paper, W o o d and Allied Workers U n i o n ;

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Maggie Magubane o f the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers’ U n i o n and Emma Mashinini, who was detained for five months while general secretary o f the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ U n i o n . Others are full-time organisers like A n i n k a Claassens o f the Paper, W o o d and Allied Workers’ U n i o n and R i t a Ndzanga, organising secretary i n the General and Allied Workers’ U n i o n . I n classical trade union nomenclature, the term general secretary has an authoritative ring and often describes the union’s chief officer who occupies the post after a fiercely contested election or long service as an official. I n the emerging unions, w i t h their strong emphasis o n almost day-to-day control b y an executive committee elected from rank and file workers, the role o f the general secretary is far less authoritative a n d , i n F O S A T U unions, for example, there

has been a fair turnover o f general secretaries. As ‘ M a m a ’ Kompe noted, the crucial power-broking leadership positions are still dominated b y men: ‘ N o union has yet elected a branch chairlady. Offhand, I don’t know even o f a chairlady o f a shop stewards committee. Perhaps a female treasurer, since people think a woman is more responsible and w i l l be more careful with money. Even the women feel it’s important t o elect men. I don’t know why. Even i n textiles, w h e r e there’s mostly w o m e n , I ’ v e never h e a r d o f a

chairlady o f the branch or a president.”’ A t a conference organised b y FOSATU t o discuss problems arising from organising women workers, the question o f the extra burden o f housework and child-rearing was raised b y several women shop stewards. M A W U general secretary Tambi Nebe described the unequal division o f labour i n the home thus: ‘“‘Both man and wife have t o get u p i n the morning t o work. B u t the woman has t o get u p first; make tea for her husband, prepare w a t e r t o w a s h , m a k e the b e d w h i l e t h e m a n i s w a s h i n g ; w a s h t h e

baby and take i t t o the nurse lady who looks after i t . Then she comes home and prepares herself t o go t o work. ‘“‘But remember the woman works as a domestic, harassed by the madam the rest o f the day. O r she works i n a factory. L o n g hours. H a r d work. She finishes work at 5.30pm and then she has t o travel from work t o home. The earliest she can get home is 7.30pm. ‘““The husband also finishes work at about 5.30pm. When he gets home he doesn’t make fire t o make the house warm; he will just p u t o n the heater and sit next t o i t , and read the paper, watch T V , or play horses. H e doesn’t fetch the baby. H e doesn’t l o o k after it. Y o u k n o w , h e makes i t a p o i n t t h a t every time w h e n h e comes b a c k

from work, there’s this ‘little darling’ next t o h i m , which is a bottle o f whisky o r brandy! ‘““On the way home from work the woman will fetch the child.

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When she gets home she makes the fire, starts preparing the evening meal, then washes the child, and feeds i t , and then prepares the bed for the husband. The woman must do everything — see t o i t that tomorrow morning she doesn’t have too much work t o d o because she must carry the baby and prepare everything. Most women d o their ironing during the night. ‘ A n d when i t comes t o bed time, the husband becomes impatient i f the woman does n o t come t o bed when he calls her. When she does go t o bed — there starts the overtime. But i f she is tired and refuses h i m , that is the beginning o f another problem. H e becomes a cheeky somebody; he will go out. A n d sometimes because o f this ‘darling’ which was o n the table, i t gives h i m powers and makes h i m think o f battering you. O r he will go out and find another woman. A n d that is where divorce begins.’’ Sexual harassment

Sexual harassment, b y b o t h white and black men i n positions o f workplace authority over women, is an issue that South African unions are being forced t o take u p b y their female members. Cleaners working during the night at Anglo American offices i n Johannesburg have complained about sexual abuse, especially from ‘idunas’, their black supervisors. A woman organiser recruiting workers i n a food factory reported that a worker complained that she had n o t been given a wage increase b y a white supervisor because she had refused t o ‘love’ h i m . A t Dunlop, members o f the Chemical Workers Industrial U n i o n fought back against such sexual harassment. I n a leaflet, Dunlop shop stewards explained what they did. ‘ ‘ A t Dunlop, we realised that the training officer sold jobs for sex. We planned t o catch h i m i n action with workers who could be around the offices and watch h i m . H e employed one lady o n a Friday, and b y Tuesday the following week at about 1 o’clock he called the lady t o his office. One o f our union members rushed t o the door a few minutes later t o test i f the door was locked o r n o t and found i t locked. H e phoned another member, who phoned one o f the managers. The training officer was caught ‘taking his payment’ and fired o n the spot. The woman d i d n o t get fired.”’ The shop stewards concluded b y noting that handing the case this way ‘‘was far better than allowing workers t o assault h i m as they wished. We just refused, and promised them we would solve the problem. A n d now they are all happy.’’ A t the Unilever factory there was an even stronger reaction i n A p r i l 1984 when more than 1,000 w o r k e r s , m e m b e r s o f t h e F o o d Beverage W o r k e r s Union,

went o n strike i n protest against a white manager who was found having sex w i t h a black female employee.

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Maternity agreements Unions have also been successful i n securing some enhanced protection for women i n the form o f maternity agreements negotiated with employers. The Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers U n i o n has a large female membership. The union has stipulated that maternity agreements must be signed at the same time as recognition agreements. I n an agreement with one o f South Africa’s biggest retailing chains, O K Bazaars, C C A W U S A won the right for pregnant women t o have 12 months o f f , without pay, before and after birth. I n contrast, the Sweet Food and Allied Workers’ U n i o n has negotiated an agreement w i t h Kellogs which provides for three months’ pay while women are absent o n pregnancy leave b u t does n o t guarantee them their jobs back. I n M a y 1984, the National Automobile and Allied Workers U n i o n secured the first ever maternity agreement i n the motor industry when i t negotiated 12 weeks’ maternity leave at the Pretoria-based Sigma automobile manufacturer. FOSATU unions i n Transvaal have formed a maternity rights group t o keep the issue alive as an important trade union demand. The struggle t o secure fair play for women i n the workplace can sometimes backfire. A t the SA Fabrics textile factory i n Durban, members o f the National U n i o n o f Textile Workers, i n addition t o a demand for a 15 per cent wage increase, p u t forward a claim that the gap between male and female wages should be closed. They backed their claim with a three-day strike i n February 1981. The company chose t o go t o arbitration, b u t the judge awarded a 1 2 2 per cent increase and ordered the company t o close the male-female wage gap. B u t the company started t o lay o f f workers and ensured that women were the first t o go. B y 1983, only two women workers were left. The organisation o f women workers i n South Africa is likely t o face fresh problems with the arrival o f new technology which may offer cost advantages to employers, especially i n the textile industry, even despite the l o w wages paid. As with their sisters i n trade unions i n countries whose labour movements pride themselves o n their democratic liberties, maturity and sophistication, the women workers o f South Africa are finding that i n raising their natural and very necessary demands they are opening u p a hitherto sealed box o f prejudices that concern far more than plain economic relationships. B u t an essential element i n the richness o f the contemporary trade union scene i n South Africa is precisely that women, as workers, are seeking t o establish their o w n rights, needs, and priorities independently o f , though n o t necessarily wholly separately f r o m , men. ‘ M a m a ’ Kompe puts i t

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eloquently: ‘“Why can’t we be equal? What d o men see us as lacking? I f they could tell us what we are lacking t o achieve the same rights i n the union or the family, then I ’ d understand. B u t they don’t give us proper reasons. Just that a woman is a woman. We pay subs equally, we work the same shifts, we work the same jobs, we participate i n the same way i n the unions. So I don’t see why we can’t have an equal say and equal rights! ““I think it’s time for women t o come together and see this as a major problem for us. I t ’ s a problem that w i l l go ahead from one generation t o another i f we don’t actually work o n i t . I would n o t like m y child t o grow the same as I was, as I am n o w . I would like m y grandchildren t o actually feel free, i n organisations, at home, everywhere. They should have the same say, the same rights.”’

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Chapter 8

Industries and Unions Automobile

Ford opened South African’s first automobile factory i n P o r t Elizabeth i n 1924. T w o years later, General Motors followed suit. N o w the automobile and motor components industry is one o f South Africa’s largest, employing i n 1981, 115,800 workers, o f whom 71 per cent were black. The key union is the National Automobile and Allied Workers U n i o n which organises 40 per cent o f the industry’s black workforce. The union was launched i n the P o r t Elizabeth and Uitenhage area where Ford, General Motors and Volkswagen have plants. Through mergers with other unions and the opening u p o f branch offices i n Durban (Toyota) and Transvaal ( B M W ,

A l f a - R o m e o ) i t has n o w c o n s o l i d a t e d its

position throughout South Africa. N A A W U has 19,000 members. One factor that has helped N A A W U is that the managements o f most o f the companies they deal with have t o report t o a headquarters located overseas. So N A A W U has carefully developed its relationships with the unions organising autoworkers i n West Europe and N o r t h America. As long ago as 1973, N A A W U general secretary, Fred Sauls, was visiting Detroit as the guest o f the United Autoworkers o f America and telling the managements o f Ford and General Motors that his union existed and they should tell their South African subsidiaries t o negotiate w i t h h i m . The shop stewards at Volkswagen have also established a telex l i n k with local unionists at the Volkswagen factory i n Wolfsburg who are members o f the 2.5 million-strong West German metalworkers’ union, I G Metall. But important as these international contacts have been, the union has found itself often involved i n major strikes i n order t o achieve its aims. I n 1980, there was a prolonged stoppage involving V W workers and i n 1982, 10,000 P o r t E l i z a b e t h a u t o w o r k e r s w e n t o n s t r i k e . T h e r e were also

strikes at the Leyland factory i n Cape Town i n 1981, during which the intervention b y the British Transport and General Workers U n i o n and the Amalgamated U n i o n o f Engineering Workers helped N A A W U ’ s battle for recognition and better pay. The advances m a d e b y t h e u n i o n are i l l u s t r a t e d b y t h e h i s t o r y o f

organising the Leyland factory i n Elandsfontein i n Transvaal. This

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factory was originally organised b y the Metal and Allied Workers U n i o n i n 1976, but the weakness o f the union i n those days meant that the management could brush i t aside and instead come t o an agreement with a T U C S A union t o recruit members. After the Cape T o w n Leyland strike i n 1981, the Transvaal workers got i n touch with N A A W U and the union, i n agreement with M A W U , began recruiting. Police broke u p recruiting meetings and arrested a N A A W U organiser, b u t within a few months more than 50 per cent o f the workers had joined the union and Leyland had agreed t o deduct union subscriptions and h o l d talks for a recognition agreement. But N A A W U is n o t the only union i n the industry. The United A f r i c a n M o t o r a n d A l l i e d W o r k e r s U n i o n , a C U S A affiliate, w o n

an important legal victory i n 1983, when i t made Nissan reinstate 102 workers the company had made redundant. Nissan also agreed t o pay the workers for the earnings they had lost while retrenched. Another union organising black autoworkers is the M o t o r Assembly Components Workers U n i o n based i n P o r t Elizabeth. I t has about 700 members i n a Ford Cortina plant. Its former president, Thozamile Botha, was fired by the company after his involvement i n a community protest boycott i n P o r t Elizabeth. H e later w e n t i n t o exile, b u t t h e tensions between M A C W U S A a n d N A A W U , a r i s i n g f r o m t h a t i n c i d e n t , based as t h e y were o n t h e

conflicting priorities t o be given b y unions t o industrial as opposed t o the community struggle, have continued t o this d a y . D u r i n g the

N A A W U members’ strike at F o r d i n 1982, the Cortina plant kept working, leading t o accusations o f strike-breaking. There have been tentative contacts between N A A W U , the United African M o t o r and Allied Workers U n i o n and a T U C S A union, the M o t o r Industry Combined Workers U n i o n * , which organises mainly coloured workers, about the possibility o f forming a united autoworkers’ union, b u t n o concrete proposals have emerged. N A A W U is steadily increasing its organisation i n the motor c o m p o n e n t s i n d u s t r y . I n September 1983, i t p u l l e d o f f t h e first ever

strike i n South Africa i n which workers employed b y the same company b u t i n widely differing locations — Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and Cape T o w n — went o n strike at the same time over the same demands. One thousand workers employed b y Autoplastics went o n strike simultaneously and won a wage increase. Building and Construction The main union for construction workers is CUSA’s, Building, Construction and Allied Workers U n i o n (BCAWU) which has *The Motor Industry Combined Workers Union left T U C S A i n July, 1984.

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12,000 members. Founded i n 1977, i t has five regional organisers as well as a national organiser, Aaron Nthinya. I n addition t o the building and civil engineering industries, B C A W U , is seeking t o organise i n the cement, clay and ceramics factories. I t has secured recognition agreements with firms such as Armitage Shanks and Johnson Tiles. Organising building workers is always extremely d i f f i c u l t because o f the casual n a t u r e o f t h e w o r k , t h e remoteness

and constantly changing location o f work-sites and the willingness o f employers t o victimise any worker who tries t o organise a union. The union has moved slowly, consolidating its membership wherever its recruiting campaigns are successful. There have been bitter struggles at Olifantsfontein, near Pretoria. Attempts t o organise i n an important cermaics plant, Cullinan Industrial Porcelain, were resisted b y the management. The plant was shut down for three weeks b y a strike i n October 1983 and when it reopened the workers were selectively rehired, with the leaders o f the strike being left unemployed. Marches and demonstrations were met b y police action. The workers’ hotel was raided and 100 were arrested o n pass offences. Other BCAWU-organised factories i n the area protested t o the Cullinan management and as the R a n d Daily Mail commented at the time: ‘‘The incidents show a cohesive B C A W U presence i n the area.’”’ The union was back i n action early i n 1984 i n the same area, when a brickworks fired 16 shop stewards. This time B C A W U threatened court action o n an unfair labour practices charge t o get the unionists re-hired. Other unions are also trying t o organise building and construction workers, including SAAWU, the Black Allied M i n i n g and Construction Workers U n i o n which is linked t o the black consciousness m o v e m e n t a n d , i n t h e W e s t e r n C a p e , t h e General

Workers U n i o n . A n important future area o f organisation will be the civil engineering workforce where less than 1 per cent o f the black workforce is unionised. Chemical

South Africa’s chemical industry dates back t o the last century when the British firm I C I set u p its subsidiary — African Explosives and Chemical Industries ( A E C I ) , and opened the first explosives factories t o cater for the mining industry. Today, the A E C I explosives plant is the world’s largest. 103,000 people are employed i n the chemical industry, two-thirds black, one-third white. The most aggressive o f the black unions organising i n this industry is the Chemical Workers Industrial U n i o n (CWIU) a FOSATU affiliate. Its merger with the Glass and Allied Worker

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U n i o n has given i t an important foothold i n the glass industry. The C U S A affiliated South African Chemical Workers U n i o n has also been active b u t i t would appear to have lost ground t o the C W I U . The C W I U has been particularly militant i n defence o f its shop stewards. When Morgan Mathebula, chairman o f the shop stewards at the Cheeseborough Ponds factory, proposed a work stoppage i n 1983 t o commemorate the anniversary o f the 1976 Soweto uprising, he was dismissed b y management. Workers immediately stopped work i n protest and, following further intervention b y the C W I U , Mathebula was reinstated. Another attempt at a fertiliser factory i n Richards Bay t o dismiss two senior shop stewards was foiled b y the union. I n this case the management tried t o manipulate disciplinary procedures t o sack the t w o stewards b u t the workers made clear their willingness t o strike i n order t o defend the t w o men and, i n the end, they were reinstated. The C W I U has also forced companies t o open their books so that union auditors could check the financial health o f a company. This happened at the G & W Industrial Minerals factory i n Wadeville when 250 workers staged a two-day strike i n A p r i l 1983. When the company claimed they could n o t afford a wage increase the workers refused t o return t o work u n t i l the management agreed t o let union auditors inspect their books. This inspection showed that G & W had large financial reserves. The workers organised an overtime ban and this produced a substantial wage increase, with the promise o f fresh wage negotiations six months later. Overtime bans and a boycott o f company-run canteens were a tactic used b y C W I U members i n t w o Duropenta factories, one i n Natal and one i n Transvaal. Although the company had conceded a recognition agreement w h i c h gave the u n i o n p l a n t level bargaining rights, there

was pressure from the employers federation n o t t o give wages rises above the Industrial Council minimum. The overtime ban and boycott were launched b y the union t o try and secure a plant level wage increase. O v e r t i m e also became a n issue a t t h e S h a t t e r p r u f e Safety Glass

factory i n Pretoria. There production schedules were so badly organised that one department was working short-time while others were being ordered t o work extra hours. There was a factory-wide stoppage, lasting six hours, u n t i l talks between the union and management resulted i n an evening out o f production targets. I n another Shatterprufe factory, i n Port Elizabeth, workers left the T U C S A Glass Workers U n i o n and won recognition for the C W I U with the recognition o f shop stewards and the implementation o f stop orders. After the signing o f the recognition agreement 100 workers joined the union. According t o shop steward Eddie Scholtz the arrival o f the C W I U changed the atmosphere i n the factory.

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“ W o r k e r s for the first time now have a say i n their o w n working conditions’’, he said. ‘“‘One o f the union’s first tasks would be t o introduce a pension scheme’’, he added. As noted elsewhere, a key area o f organisation for the emerging unions are the state-owned companies. A n important breakthrough has been made at SASOL, the government o i l corporation which has the task o f trying t o reduce South Africa’s dependence o n imported c i l b y developing a way o f extracting o i l products from coal. I n February 1984, the C W I U said i t had recruited 4,000 workers at the SASOL plants i n Secunda. Management had agreed t o grant a stop order and discussions were continuing over a recognition agreement. I f the union is successful at SASOL i t will be an important breach i n the general policy b y ‘parastatals’ against t h e b l a c k u n i o n s . I n a m i n o r b u t s i g n i f i c a n t v i c t o r y , t h e

C W I U managed t o w i n the reinstatement o f 36 workers dismissed b y SASOL i n October 1983 after they had stopped work i n protest against the dismissal o f a colleague. Instead o f talking with the workers, the management sent i n armed security police who escorted them back t o their hostels. From there they were taken t o different railway stations and given a one-way ticket back t o their bantustans. Nearly all SASOL’s African employees are migrant workers. The C W I U took u p the case and took legal action against the company. The union stated: ‘‘Workers were being treated like criminals when they were only trying t o resolve a legitimate industrial grievance.’”’ The workers meanwhile had been scattered t o different areas and the union had t o track them down i n East L o n d o n , Transkei, Pongola and other places t o get them t o make statements. So thorough were the C W I U ’ s preparations that i n the end SASOL preferred t o avoid a court case and agreed t o reinstate 36 workers. The C W I U has also won recognition agreements from the African Explosives and Chemical Industries at one o f its vinyl factories a t P i n e t o w n , n e a r D u r b a n . W o r k e r s staged a 2 4 - h o u r

stoppage i n protest at a low wage offer i n February 1984. Although the emerging trade union movement is dominated b y affiliates o f t h e m a j o r f e d e r a t i o n s , F O S A T U a n d C U S A , as

well as

the big unaffiliated and community unions, there is also a degree o f spontaneous union organisation as workers hear about unions and decide t o form one themselves i n their factory. Hence the Black Health and Allied Workers U n i o n (BHAWUSA) which organised the Johannesburg plant o f a pharmaceutical company. B H A W U S A has n o full-time office bearers and is n o t affiliated t o any federation. Nevertheless i t has extended its operation t o laboratories served by the pharmaceutical plant and i n March 1984

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signed the first ever trade union recognition agreement with a Johannesburg pathologists’ laboratory. Again, this came after seven months’ negotiation and the threat o f industrial action. Docks

The Cape Town-based General Workers U n i o n ( G W U ) has been the main union organising dockworkers. Starting w i t h Cape T o w n stevedores, the union has gradually extended its jurisdiction u p the coast and now covers South Africa’s four main ports — Cape T o w n , P o r t Elizabeth, East L o n d o n and Durban. The G W U has won recognition agreements from the t w o main stevedoring companies, South Stevedores Services and Grindrod Cotts Stevedoring and for the stevedores — the men who load and unload the ships — labour relations are reasonably harmonious. T h e d o m i n a n t force as a d o c k w o r k e r s ’ e m p l o y e r , however, i s t h e

state-owned South African Transport Services (SATS) which is violently anti-union. SATS is South African’s largest employer, with 150,000 African workers o n its payroll. I t has relationships with all-white unions and other docile workers’ bodies and SATS has resisted strong efforts b y the independent unions t o organise and represent workers. I n the early 1980s, the General Workers U n i o n steadily recruited members amongst SATS employees — mainly railway dockers who handled goods o n and off trains and lorries — i n P o r t Elizabeth and East London. B y the middle o f 1982 the union had 850 members i n P o r t Elizabeth and 350 i n East London. Despite repeated requests, the company refused all requests for a meeting and d i d n o t even acknowledge the signed u p lists o f membership the G W U provided. Instead their reaction was one o f harassment and intimidation. SATS dismissed Jeremiah Tolwana with 24 hours’ notice saying that he was only a casual worker. I n f a c t , h e h a d w o r k e d for S A T S for 13 years. T o l w a n a was c h a i r m a n

o f the union committee i n P o r t Elizabeth. Railway police detained and interrogated other union activists, two union organisers were arrested, workers’ homes were raided and searched. Public concern about the volatile state o f labour relations i n the Port Elizabeth docks was expressed b y local industrialists, including Ford’s labour relations director. Attempts b y the government Manpower Department and the International Transport Workers Federation t o intervene were brushed aside b y SATS. Finally, the P o r t Elizabeth workers staged a go-slow after

continuing refusal o f SATS management to meet them. After first dismissing the action as having n o impact, SATS suddenly changed its attitude and decided, early i n September 1982, t o break the

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GWU'’s organisation o f SATS employees. Four hundred workers were surrounded i n their hostels and ordered t o return t o their bantustans. Attempts t o organise sympathy strikes petered out as SATS refused t o listen t o pleas from anyone t o reinstate the workers. Having crushed, at least for the time being, efforts t o organise SATS dockers, the company and the government moved t o consolidate the exclusion o f the G W U b y passing a law i n 1983 which permitted only staff associations approved b y the Minister o f Transport Affairs and registered as trade unions t o participate i n SATS conciliation machinery. SATS has set u p a managementcontrolled Black Staff Association which is the only workers’ channel for African employees. The white unions went along with this arrangement. A 1984 I L O report said this amounted t o ‘ c o l l u s i o n between the established unions, the management o f SATS and the government i n bringing about a controlled, racially based and a officially managed system o f staff representation.’’ Food

South Africa’s food and drinks industry employs 134,500 people, 85 per cent black and 15 per cent white. 60 per cent o f the country’s food crops are exported and many o f the workers are considered as agricultural labourers and beyond the scope o f legal union organisation. A n important union i n the Western Cape is the Food and Canning Workers U n i o n which is a former SACTU affiliate. I t survived during the 1970s and has developed strongly after the 1973 D u r b a n strikes a n d n o w has 20,000 A f r i c a n a n d c o l o u r e d members.

I t is one o f the unaffiliated unions involved i n the unity talks. F O S A T U has t w o affiliated u n i o n s , t h e Sweet, F o o d a n d Allied

Workers U n i o n (SFAWU) with 10,000 members and i n 1983 it accepted i n t o membership the Natal Sugar Industry Employees U n i o n w h i c h was f o u n d e d i n 1937 a n d h a s 1,000 m e m b e r s . Chris

Dlamini, a Kellogs worker and S F A W U member is also president of FOSATU. C U S A has a major affiliate, its Food, Beverage Workers U n i o n w i t h 10,000 members and many o f the general and community unions also have pockets o f workers i n the multitude o f plants and companies operating i n the industry. The organisational fight has been uphill. ‘Skates’ Sikhakane, general secretary o f the Food, Beverage Workers U n i o n was arrested under the Internal Security Act early i n 1984 when he went t o a factory near Johannesburg t o t r y t o settle a dispute. The police also came t o the homes o f other union members who worked i n the factory i n order t o question them.

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Workers employed b y the Natal dairy industry have also been victimised for trying t o organise a union. A t the Carmel Chocolate and Sweet Industries plant a union organiser was ordered o f f the premises and a worker was approached and asked i f he belonged t o the ‘fucking shit o f a union’. Another was offered a R30 increase i f she resigned from the union. After the Christmas closure i n 1983, management selectively rehired and refused t o take back 25 workers who were S F A W U members. However at a Natal hide and skin factory the S F A W U secured the reinstatement o f workers who had gone o n strike when five leading union members were fired. As so often i n these reinstatement battles the case was o n the point o f being heard i n court when the company agreed t o a settlement and t o take back the workers. Another organising success was when the F O S A T U affiliate won recognition at the Congella Brewery i n Durban. This brewery is owned b y the Port Natal Administration Board. This may open the way t o union recognition i n other publicly-owned enterprises r u n by Administration Boards. I n addition t o securing the right t o elect shop stewards and stop orders, the union won time o f f for union training. The massive drought that has h i t South Africa since 1981 has sent drink sales soaring and union organisation i n drinks factories with i t . I n early 1984, 2,000 Coca Cola workers went o n strike for higher wages and for access t o details o f the company pension fund. A t the Suncrush bottling plant i n Richards Bay, S F A W U members negotiated a wage increase o f 18 per cent after an initial company offer o f 10 per cent. Insurance a n d Clerical

W i t h South Africa’s insurance companies now amongst the giant financial a n d commercial c o r p o r a t i o n s o f t h e c o u n t r y , t h e need for

effective unionisation amongst the black clerical and administrative workers is long over-due. But i t w i l l be hard. The major dispute that developed i n 1983 at Liberty L i f e , when the Insurance and Assurance Workers U n i o n o f South Africa (IAWUSA) tried t o obtain recognition, shows the lengths t o which the insurance companies w i l l go t o keep at bay unions for their black employees. The union requested talks over recognition b u t were t o l d that as i t organised only African workers — I A W U S A is close t o the black consciousness movement — the company, which claimed t o follow a ‘non-racial’ policy would n o t agree t o meaningful talks. IAWUSA'’s president, Joe Seoka, replied that Liberty Life’s employment policy was far from ‘non-racial’. The starting salary for a qualified African clerical worker was R320 a month while a

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white with the same qualifications started o n R650 a month. Support for the union inside the company was shown when 100 workers came out o n strike i n support o f higher wages. During the three-day strike, the strikers organised poster demonstratons outside the company head offices. A second strike was called after the management still refused t o talk t o the union as the representatives o f the workers. This time Liberty Life fired 93 workers and selectively re-hired. The union’s response was t o call upon Africans t o withdraw their savings from Liberty Life companies. The heartland o f South African business and commerce — the Johannesburg headquarters o f Anglo-American — was h i t b y a short strike b y clerical workers i n September 1983. This followed the dismissal o f a photocopier operator, Walter Mnguno, who had 28 years service with Anglo-American. H i s offence was that he d i d n o t smile at some white staff! M o r e than 100 members o f the General

and

Allied

Workers

Union

staged

a

strike,

and

demonstrated outside Anglo-American, u n t i l the management agreed t o lift the dismissal notice. They decided t o try and organise a formal G A W U branch at Anglo-American. G A W U is one o f the community-based unions. M a n y clerical workers are organised i n the industrally based unions o f FOSATU and C U S A as well as i n general unions, but t h e office employees o f banks, insurance companies and finance houses, (often a major source o f white-collar union membership i n other countries) remain, at least i n terms o f black clerical workers, t o be organised i n South Africa. Metal a n d engineering

The metal manufacturing sector o f South Africa is perhaps the key area for development for the emerging trade union movement. O f i t s 426,000 w o r k e r s , 311,500 are b l a c k . T h e y w o r k i n a l a r g e

number o f firms. The major metal union, the Metal and Allied W o r k e r s U n i o n , M A W U , has 180 factories organised a n d has

signed 122 recognition agreements. Organisation problems are immense. Seventy per cent o f South Africa’s manufacturing establishment have 50 or fewer employees. Although there have been r o l l i n g waves o f r e c r u i t m e n t , such as i n the East R a n d i n 1982,

the follow-up problems o f organisation, developing shop steward structures and maintaining the union as a going concern i n each local plant is difficult. M A W U ’ s membership i n 1983 was 36,000 yet i t estimated that during the union’s 10 years’ existence i t has probably recruited about 80,000 metalworkers. Finding the organisational capacity t o keep each o f those i n continuing

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membership has been beyond the union’s capabilities. Yet i n comparison w i t h some o f the other black unions, M A W U is better organised, uses its 23 full-time officials more effectively and has an excellent record i n negotiation and dispute handling. O t h e r i m p o r t a n t u n i o n s are t h e 2 4 , 0 0 0 - s t r o n g Steel, E n g i n e e r i n g

and Allied Workers U n i o n (SEAWU) and a smaller union, the Engineering and Allied Workers U n i o n which broke away from the former. The general secretary o f the SEAWU, Jane Hlongwane, is one o f the longest serving black metal union leaders. H e r union is affiliated to C U S A . The General and Allied Workers U n i o n has been active recruiting steel and engineering workers i n Transvaal and the General Workers U n i o n also has a growing engineering worker membership i n the Western Cape. The metal unions face a determined opponent i n South Africa’s best organised employer’s federation, the Steel, Engineering Industry Federation o f South Africa (SEIFSA). SEIFSA has consistently resisted the advance o f unions. Its tactics i n the past have included refusing t o negotiate with unregistered unions, insisting that all negotiations take place within the framework o f the Industrial Council and advising companies n o t t o sign plant level agreements. SEIFSA dominates the metal industry Industrial Council. This is a national council and sets wage rates for the entire industry. Since MAWU'’s entry i n t o the Industrial Council the negotiations have taken a much harder direction. Yet union action at the base has repeatedly overturned efforts b y SEIFSA t o control the metal unions. Scaw Metals is one o f AngloAmerican’s most profitable companies; its 1983 profits were R66 million. I n 1981, t h e r e was a s t r i k e b y 3 , 0 0 0 w o r k e r s a t Scaws for

higher wages. The chairman said he was a ‘pillar o f SEIFSA’ and that he would not break SEIFSA’s policy o f n o t negotiating at plant level. The strike was broken when management called i n the police t o force workers back t o the bantustans. The union kept organising, however, and b y 1984 i t had won the re-engagement o f all the workers fired i n the 1981 strike. M A W U shop stewards had also won consultation rights over the company’s recruitment policy. A major event i n the metal industry was the rolling wave o f strikes that h i t the East Rand i n 1982. M A W U rejected a low wage settlement offered b y the Industrial Council. Workers turned t o the union as i t appeared t o be the only organisation willing t o fight back. I n 1983, M A W U decided t o j o i n the Industrial Council providing i t did not give u p plant based bargaining as well. The economic recession meant that retrenchment became a major issue i n 1983 and 1984. Companies have also used the excuse o f economic problems and the need t o slim down workforces t o get r i d

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o f union militants. A t the B and S Engineering factory at Brits i n Transvaal, 900 workers were fired i n September 1983 as the management sacked the entire workforce i n order t o remove the union’s presence. Three hundred o f the workers stayed together and held meetings every day as M A W U tried t o get them reinstated; eventually they were successful and all 300 were taken back. A t a carborundum factory i n P o r t Elizabeth, M A W U went o n strike t o protect the jobs o f seven workers. They were the firm’s security guards whom the company wanted t o replace with outside contractors. As a result o f the strike the company agreed t o keep the men o n the payroll as production workers; the strike also revealed that the security guards had been consistently underpaid and they won R$5,000 i n back pay. A n important step forward was taken b y the emerging unions when they won seats o n the metal industries’ pension fund. This has funds o f more than R500 million and all black workers must belong. W i t h the decision o f the South African Boilermakers (which, despite its name, is a general metal union) t o withdraw from T U C S A , the possibility o f greater co-operation between metal unions is now o n the cards. Another development was the setting o f a South African co-ordinating council for metal unions under the auspices o f the International Metalworkers Federation. I t s f u l l - t i m e secretary, B r i a n Fredericks is a former official o f t h e

FOSATU auto union, N A A W U . I n the early rounds o f negotiations for the 1984 metal industry agreement, the white-run Boilermakers joined with M A W U and S E A W U i n rejecting the SEIFSA offer — the first time there had been that k i n d o f interunion agreement o n bargaining strategy.

Mining South African’s gold, metal, and coal mining industry lies at the centre o f the country’s wealth. After agriculture, mining is the most important source o f employment. There are 550,000 black mine workers. Ninety-five per cent o f these are migrants. They live i n c o m p o u n d s , i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e t o w n s h i p s a n d o t h e r industrial

workers. The great mining strikes o f 1922 and 1946 form an important and well-known part o f South African history. Mineworkers were not organised i n the 1950s and although there were strikes during the 1970s there was little effective organisation o f black miners. Strikers were simply shunted back t o the bantustans. There is a tightly supervised system o f recruitment and i t is easy b o t h t o blacklist k n o w n union activists and t o engage strike-breakers from the many unemployed Africans. B y 1982, mineworkers had had enough. There was a strike by

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70,000 i n 13 gold mines. I n one mine 120 workers sealed themselves i n a tunnel. The main grievance was l o w wages and the poor living conditions i n the compound. As Chapter 6 o n health and safety s h o w s , t h e dangerous w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e m i n e s are also

a major concern. The 1982 strike was suppressed, leaving 10 dead and scores wounded and the usual expulsions t o the bantustans. I n response t o the strike several o f the emerging unions tried t o increase direct organisation o f black mineworkers. The Council o f Unions o f South Africa sent one o f the young experts from its legal department t o begin an organising drive. H i s name is Cyril Ramophosa and i n two years (1982-1984) the National U n i o n o f Mineworkers has become South Africa’s biggest black union w i t h 70,000 members. Born i n 1952, Ramophosa was detained twice while a student. H e was held for 11 months after his involvement i n a rally i n support o f the Mozambique liberation movement, FRELIMO, i n 1974 and then for six months i n 1976 during the Soweto uprising. Ramophosa was questioned for four months during one o f his detentions but says: ‘ ‘ I feel sorry for the people who d i d that t o me. They won’t ever stop the tide o f black people fighting for their r i g h t s . ” As noted i n the chapters o n structure and organisation, and health and safety, t h e N a t i o n a l U n i o n o f M i n e w o r k e r s has

concentrated o n building u p its shaft steward system and o n increasing pressure o n employers t o improve safety standards. I n 1982, the N U M was recognised b y the Chamber o f Mines. After the b i t t e r strike o f t h a t year t h e Chamber, i n t h e w o r d s o f o n e o f i t s

officials, found i t ‘‘easier t o deal with recognised leaders o f organised unions than t o confront an angry m o b ’ ’ . Ramophosa’s calm, well-spoken manner belies a solid union organising ability. The N U M ’ s 180-page shaft stewards’ manual, which he was largely responsible for drafting, is an impressive document. The call for a protest stoppage over the Hlobane mining disaster, i n which 68 miners were killed i n September 1983, was widely followed. I n the h a n d f u l o f m i n e s t h a t a r e n o t m e m b e r s o f t h e C h a m b e r o f Mines,

the N U M has fought hard for recognition. Seven hundred mineworkers went o n strike at an open-cast coalmine near Witbank. The mine’s management wanted shop stewards t o be elected according t o procedures laid down b y the company. The strike changed their m i n d and they agreed t o recognise the N U M ’ s shop steward committee. Other unions are also trying t o organise black mineworkers i n various parts o f the country. M A W U has one organiser working o n recruiting miners and there is also the Black Allied Miners Construction Workers U n i o n which is closely linked t o AZAPO, the Azania People’s Organisation. I n Kimberley, at the D e Beers

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diamond mines, the Federated M i n i n g U n i o n , which is an offshoot o f the South African Boilermakers Society is successfully organising black workers. There is also a very powerful, all-white union i n the industry — the M i n e Workers U n i o n . This union went o n strike i n 1979 t o protect jobs reserved for whites only. The strike was crushed b u t the union has allied itself w i t h extreme, right-wing break-away elements i n the Nationalist Party, unhappy at what they consider t o be too many concessions made t o blacks b y the government. The mining industry still has the last legal j o b reservation and n o black can obtain the ‘blaster’s certificate’ which permits promotion i n t o the ranks o f skilled mineworkers. The white M W U has said i t w i l l take any action t o defend its members’ privileged position.

Municipal workers Organising black municipal workers has proved extremely difficult. This section o f workers has suffered t w o major blows i n the 1980s. Firstly, the crushing o f the 1980 Johannesburg municipal workers’ strike. T h e n i n 1982, t h e d e a t h i n a c a r accident o f Joseph Mavi,

president o f the Black Municipal Workers U n i o n , removed one o f the most effective black union leaders i n South Africa. The 1980 strike was over a recognition and a claim b y electricians for an increase i n the minimum wage o f R33 per week. I t spread quickly and within days 15,000 workers were o n strike. Streets were n o t cleaned and garbage left uncollected. The strike was broken b y the police. They asked workers at gunpoint i f they would return t o work or i f they wanted t o be expelled t o the bantustans. One thousand four hundred workers were dismissed and t o l d t o pack their beiongings and return t o their bantustans. M a v i , who had earlier organised his fellow bus drivers and won better wages for t h e m , h a d f o r m e d t h e B l a c k M u n i c i p a l W o r k e r s U n i o n o n l y a short

time before the strike. The Johannesburg City Council refused t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h h i m ; i n s t e a d h e was arrested a n d k e p t i n s o l i t a r y

confinement. Ater his release i n 1981, Mavi tried t o get the union o f f the ground again, but he was detained for t w o months i n the middle o f 1981 after speaking at a meeting. H i s death i n an accident i n June 1982 was a c r u e l b l o w t o the Johannesburg municipal

workers. The South African Black Municipal and Allied Workers U n i o n ( S A B M A W U ) i s affiliated t o C U S A a n d h a s 20,000 members. I t

has patiently tried t o expand its organisation, adopting a more concilatory approach than the M a v i tradition. Attempts t o get recognition agreements with the Rand Water Board have been brushed aside. The F O S A T U affiliated Transport and General

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Workers U n i o n staged a march though the centre o f a Durban suburb and a sit-down i n front o f the civic centre b y 200 municipal workers calling for higher pay and union recognition. The t o w n clerk agreed t o call a meeting o f the council t o discuss an interim recognition agreement. This public, peaceful protest surprised white shoppers. L i k e other public employees, municipal workers face different, perhaps greater difficulties than private sector workers b u t the drive for organisation is there. A t the 1983 annual congress o f the Municipal and General Workers U n i o n o f South Africa ( M G W U S A ) workers presented a long list o f complaints, including the newly introduced practice o f giving two weeks’ unpaid leave, which means that a migrant worker cannot b u i l d u p consecutive employment time i n order t o qualify as a permanent resident i n Johannesburg. Workers also called for a wage increase and condemned the city council for its support o f a management controlled union for black workers. They decided t o elect a shop stewards’ committee t o press these demands. I n Cape T o w n , the Cape T o w n Municipal Workers Association has become more active and participated with other Cape unions i n the talks around forming a united federation o f independent unions. Print and paper The main black union for print workers is the Media Workers Association o f South Africa (MWASA). O f its 2,000 members, about 1,800 work i n newspapers as drivers, clerks and i n typographical departments, while the remaining 200 are journalists. Most o f South Africa’s best-known black journalists, like Joe Tholoe and Zwelakhe Sisulu, son o f the imprisoned A N C leader, Walter Sisulu, are M W A S A members. Indeed, journalists occupy nearly all the leadership positions i n the Transvaal, Western Cape and Natal branches. M W A S A began life as the Writers Association o f South Africa which was set u p i n 1977 after the U n i o n o f Black Journalists was banned. The decision t o open u p the union t o all media workers has increased its membership but brought new problems. Although MW ASA was able t o develop solidarity action b y its Johannesburg members i n 1980 i n support o f striking Cape Town Argus workers, a strike b y M W A S A printers o n the Johannesburg Star i n 1982 was crushed and 209 printers lost their jobs. Most MW ASA journalists work o n black newspapers like the Sowetan o r the City Press or for the black supplements o f the English language newspapers and their capacity for effective solidarity action with printers is limited. The founders o f M W A S A were closely linked t o the black consciousness movement. There is a white journalists’ union, the

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South African Society o f Journalists (SASJ) which from the middle 1970s onwards has taken a radical and, b y South African standards, a brave stand, i n attacking the effects o f apartheid o n journalism and i n criticising the limited career opportunities open t o black journalists. The S A S ] de-registered itself i n order to open its ranks t o black journalists, the only white union t o have thus acted. The black journalists however felt that as a minority i n the S A S J they w o u l d have n o influence a n d , f o l l o w i n g t h e b l a c k

consciousness line, argued that the differences between whites and blacks were so great that t o come together i n a trade union dealing with workplace matters was pointless. The problems o f a blacks only policy, and the dominant role o f journalists in M W A S A , came t o a head late i n 1983 and b y the middle o f 1984, the union had split i n two. The r o w started when the Cape T o w n M W A S A members decided t o affiliate t o the United Democratic Front. They also proposed t o change the union’s constitution t o make i t non-racial. This would have had little practical effect as M W A S A ’ s only possible area o f expansion is among black workers. However the Transvaal leaders o f MW ASA reacted strongly against b o t h proposals. Here one enters difficult areas o f speculation about motives, as the Johannesburg black journalists contain b o t h strong black consciousness oriented people, as well as those linked t o the A N C non-racial traditions. I n Cape T o w n M W A S A has a higher proportion o f non-journalists i n its membership b y comparison with Johannesburg. A stormy congress failed t o resolve these problems and though attempts at conciliation were made during the first months o f 1984 these came t o nothing. A continually expanding union can take this k i n d o f problem i n its stride b u t M W A S A ’ s main obstacle t o growth i n the newspaper i n d u s t r y has been t h e p o w e r f u l T U C S A u n i o n , t h e 43,000-strong

South African Typographical U n i o n (SATU). This is a long established, white-run craft union that has the well-policed and enforced closed shop often found i n print industries. I t thus automatically pulls into membership black workers and its medical, insurance and retirement schemes provide attractive benefits that M W A S A could n o t hope t o match. I n the paper and packaging industry, o n the other hand, the F O S A T U affiliated Paper, W o o d and Allied Workers U n i o n ( P W A W U ) has made considerable progress. I n several firms ballots o f all the workers have shown massive majorities for P W A W U . A t Kohler Corrugated, for example, a ballot o f 288 workers i n July 1983 had 273 voting t o be represented b y P W A W U . Firms are being forced t o grant partial exemptions t o SATU’s closed shop i n the face o f workers’ determination t o be

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represented b y a union o f their o w n choice. The union has also taken strike action t o secure recognition. Three hundred and fifty workers went o n strike for a week at the Premier Paper Mill after management only gave wage increases t o a selected 48 workers. The company also cancelled the recognition agreement b u t the resulting strike made them change their minds and come t o terms with the union. There are about 29,000 black workers i n the South African paper industry and many o f them work i n small companies with fewer than 100 employees. A dispute at the Johannesburg plastic bag manufacturer, Transpoly, i n March 1984, which employed only 85 workers, showed P W A W U ’ s determination t o organise smaller firms, where working conditions — including an alleged working week o f 84 hours at Transpoly — are often extremely bad. Workers went o n strike and all o f them were dismissed. The company called i n the police who arrested a P W A W U organiser. The union’s response was t o contact workers i n firms that use Transpoly’s products and ask them t o black them. This tactic plus the threat o f legal action changed the company’s m i n d and they reinstated h a l f the fired workers and paid the other R35,000 as compensation. P W A W U said i t hoped the case would serve ‘‘as a warning t o other companies w i t h similar abysmal labour practices’’. Retail

The only union operating with real effect i n organising retail workers is the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers U n i o n o f South Africa (CCAWUSA). I t has won recognition agreements with m a j o r South African chain stores including O K Bazaars, Pick’n Pay and Woolworths. Founded i n 1975, i t was lucky t o have as an advisor M o r r i s Kagan, a veteran socialist from Latvia and one o f the best-known trade union organisers i n South Africa. H e was a former president o f the National U n i o n o f Distributive Workers and worked with SACTU’s African Commercial Workers’ U n i o n until i t was crushed i n the repression o f the early 1960s. CCAWUSA'’s energetic general secretary, Emma Mashinini, has also used a wide range o f tactics t o spread the union’s strength. The U n i o n is regularly involved i n strikes and is spreading its organisation into hotels. Strikes b y hotel workers have h i t the giant Southern Sun chain and Johannesburg’s top hotel, the Carlton. One o f the most interesting aspects o f CCAWUSA’s work is the variety o f mechanisms the union deploys t o achieve its ends. During the 1983 wage negotiations with O K Bazaars, the union used the Conciliation Board machinery laid down i n the Labour Relations A c t . A company offer o f a R20 a month was pushed u p t o R35 a month after three conciliation board hearings. The union

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also broke new ground i n using outside arbitrators t o settle a case over a sacked worker. H e was fired b y the wholesalers M a k r o after allegations o f assault and insubordination. The union went through the disputes procedure laid down i n the agreement b u t failed t o w i n the worker’s reinstatement. T w o strikes also failed t o move the company. Finally, the union suggested appointing two outside arbitrators — one t o be chosen b y CCAWUSA, the other by M a k r o — and they would make a binding decision. As i t happened their decision was i n favour o f the worker, but this was the first time that a union had succeeded i n persuading a company t o allow such outside arbitration. C C A W U S A has been one o f the pioneering unions i n getting maternity agreements with companies. I t is also one o f the few nonracial unions which has seen common action undertaken by black and white workers. I n October 1983, management at one o f the Germiston branches o f Checkers demoted a woman worker. There was also a general discontent about the store manager’s attitude t o the workforce. Workers went o n strike and secured the woman’s reinstatement and extracted an apology from the store manager. What was interesting was that the demoted woman was white and b o t h black and white workers went o n strike. The union has also used threats o f boycotts against stores, though with limited success. Textile and clothing 240,000 black workers are employed i n this sector, and the clothing industry alone is South Africa’s fifth largest employer. There is a rich history o f militant trade union organisation and the Garment Workers U n i o n led b y Solly Sachs, a communist, was one o f the most successful unions i n the 1930s and 1940s. Textile workers also spearheaded the 1973 Durban strikes. There are four textile and garment unions affiliated t o T U C S A and the history o f organisation i n the industry is one o f great inter-union rivalry with companies actively supporting T U C S A unions against the claims o f FOSATU’s National U n i o n o f Textile Workers (NUTW) and CUSA'’s Transvaal Textile Workers’ Union. Outside the metal industry, this sector has seen the highest level o f strike activity b y the emerging trade union movement. February 1984, for example, saw three major strikes over pay i n Pinetown, near Durban. Four hundred workers went o n strike for 10 days at SA Fabrics, a subsidiary o f the British Courtaulds group. The company had offered an increase o f 4 per cent, against the workers’ claim for 10 per cent. I n a secret ballot 91 per cent o f the workers voted t o go o n strike. A t Smith and Nephew, 600 workers went o n strike for higher wages, while at the Ninian and Lester factory 80

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shift. workers struck t o have an unpopular shift system abolished. When the company fired them the entire workforce came out i n support. T h e shift system was scrapped. T h e u n i o n a l l these

workers belonged t o , the National U n i o n o f Textile Workers, broke new ground the year before when i t organised the first ever legal strike b y black workers i n South Africa. The union patiently worked its way through the lengthy procedures o f the Labour Relations A c t , which are usually ignored as workers respond quickly t o a sense o f grievance b y taking immediate strike action. The more than 400 workers were willing t o wait and follow the union’s strategy o f seeking t o go o n strike legally. I t was worth i t because after the nine-day strike the Natal Thread Company n o t only came u p w i t h a 15 per cent an hour wage increase (plus back pay), they also agreed t o a clause i n the settlement agreement which stated that i n the event o f future strikes they would either dismiss all strikers or none o f them. This was an important development i n South African collective bargaining as the selective re-hiring o f strikers is a commonly used weapon enabling managements t o weed out strike leaders and union activists. Although the N U T W has only 18,000 members its support is growing. The main obstacle is the set o f closed shop agreements covering black workers which companies have signed with T U C S A unions i n order t o keep the N U T W at bay. I t was this problem that led the N U T W t o reverse its policy o f non-recognition o f Industrial Councils, and seek instead, t o j o i n them i n order t o gain access t o workers covered b y Industrial Council closed shop agreements. The N U T W joined the Transvaal knitting industry Industrial Council while preserving its right t o continue plant level bargaining where it deemed i t necessary. T w o important steps i n breaking the T U C S A domination o f the Natal garment industry were taken early i n 1984. A t the multinationally owned James N o r t h Africa factory, the management agreed t o a ballot o f workers t o see which union they wished t o represent them. Eighty-one point four per cent voted i n favour o f the N U T W . Another step forward was when the union secured a court judgement permitting i t t o take the Frame Group o f companies t o the Industrial Court over the Frame Group’s persistent refusal t o recognise or negotiate with the N U T W . The Frame Group is South Africa’s largest textile employer, with over 4,000 employees at one Durban plant alone. Although the N U T W has signed u p many Frame workers, the company has refused t o permit ballots to see which union workers preferred. Instead i t has always supported the different T U C S A textile unions. One o f the T U C S A u n i o n s , t h e T e x t i l e W o r k e r s I n d u s t r i a l U n i o n , has t u r n e d

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t o violence t o stop the N U T W recruiting Frame workers. A n N U T W organiser, Jabulani Gwala and two women N U T W members were attacked b y T W I U members while they were leafleting outside a Frame factory near Durban. I n February 1984, another worker had his arm broken while trying t o recruit for the NUTW.

Transport

The major transport employer i n South Africa, the South African Transport Services (SATS), which has 150,000 african employees is off-limits t o the emerging trade unions. As noted i n the section o n d o c k workers, a t t e m p t s t o organise h a v e b e e n c r u s h e d . I n 1983, t h e

government passed the Conditions o f Employment (South African Services Act) which legaly entrenched SATS’s refusal t o deal with the independent unions. The act allows only staff associations recognised b y the Minister o f Transport t o function with the conciliation machinery which is controlled, i n any case, b y SATS. Employees are forbidden from initiating o r taking part i n strike action. The A c t also reverts t o forms o f disguised j o b reservation. A l l workers who are not citizens o f South Africa are t o be denied permanent o r temporary appointments and instead will be treated as ‘casual’ w o r k e r s . T h i s will affect a b o u t 50,000 S A T S workers

who come from bantustans and thus considered as ‘foreigners’ b y the South African government. I t will severely l i m i t promotion and training possibilities though these are the least advanced o f any South African industry i n any case. I n 1982, South African Railways indentured 1,647 apprentices. Only seven were black. I f SATS is, for the time being, a no-go area, the emerging unions are making headway organising i n the private transport undertakings and with some municipal bus companies. The t w o main unions are FOSATU’s Transport and General Workers U n i o n ( T G W U ) which has 9,000 members and CUSA’s Transport and Allied Workers U n i o n (TAWU), also with 9,000 members. Some headway has been made with P U T C O , South Africa’s biggest private bus company. Bus companies are defined i n legislation as ‘essential services’ so unions have t o go through mediation and arbitration procedures. The T G W U has recently made P U T C O go t o arbitration following unsatisfactory negotiations. There has been more success with municipal bus companies. As noted at the beginning o f this book a strike b y Durban bus drivers i n M a r c h 1984, won union recognition for the T G W U . I n fact, nearly all the bus companies i n the Natal region have been organised. The T G W U has also been moving i n t o the private freight transport area. A recognition agreement signed w i t h

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Freight A i r and Freight Services Forwarding i n August 1983 was the first agreement b y an independent union and a goods transport company.

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Chapter 9

Black Unions and the Search for Unity Although the growth o f the independent unions has been swift and substantial, many obstacles confront them. None is potentially more dangerous than the divisions that have plagued the unions since their emergence. A t first these divisions had little impact o n the day-to-day functioning o f the unions. As we have seen, each pursued its o w n path separated from the others b y b o t h space and a sea o f unorganised labour. Unions that emerged i n Cape T o w n had little need t o consult labour organisers i n Johannesburg, nearly 1,000 miles away. Each union centre developed its o w n character and form o f organisation reflecting the political and geographic environment i n which they found themselves. Even when unions organised subsidiaries o f the same firm, they seldom felt constrained t o co-operate with unions at such distances. I n addition the political divisions that exist i n the black working class were reflected i n the unions. Thus i n Natal the Zulu-based organisation Inkatha was a factor t o be reckoned with. I n the Eastern Cape the strong A N C tradition helped shape the unions along non-racial lines. A n d i n the Witwatersrand black consciousness had a major influence i n the early 1970s. Yet as the unions developed, the need t o co-operate became ever more apparent. Firstly there were cases i n which union solidarity amongst unions organising the same firm i n different areas would be obviously beneficial. Then, as the unions expanded their membership, the ocean o f unorganised labour was gradually reduced, and the potential for inter-union rivalry grew. Although t h e r e were s t i l l vast numbers o f u n o r g a n i s e d w o r k e r s , m a n y were i n

sectors o f the economy that were exceedingly difficult t o organise — such as agriculture o r mining. Finally there was the impetus provided b y the state. I n a negative way the state gave the unions the greatest rationale for unity. O n the one hand the government issued a series o f reports — Wiehahn and Riekerts — that were designed t o govern the behaviour o f unions. A response t o these had t o be given, and a unified response would be so much more powerful than a disparate series o f stands. O n the other hand, the state’s repeated crackdowns o n union leaders and members tended t o weld the union movement together, despite their differences. I n reality the death o f Neil Aggett and the wave o f repression

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launched b y the Ciskei authorities probably d i d more than anything else t o bring the unions together. First unity summit

Although preliminary discussions about unity had been going o n since l a t e 1979, t h e first u n i t y summit was h e l d o n 8 A u g u s t 1981.

O n that day over 100 representatives o f 29 independent unions met at Langa i n Cape T o w n . All the major unions were represented, including F O S A T U , C U S A , S A A W U and the Cape Unions. The meeting’s primary purpose was t o formulate a united response t o the government’s labour legislation. However, resolutions o n several other issues were discussed and agreed. The resolutions covered the boycotting o f Industrial Councils; union harassment b y the Ciskel authorities; detentions and solidarity action. The unions agreed t o co-operate with each other i n resisting the state, and decided t o establish ad hoc solidarity committees t o encourage inter-union co-operation i n each region. I t was agreed that the committees would ‘ ‘ . . . discuss and initiate solidarity action arising out o f our co-operation’’. Sadly, the promise o f the first historic meeting i n Langa gave way t o a series o f ever more divided meetings, i n which the fractious tendencies within the union movement were given full reign. The second meeting was scheduled t o take place in November 1981, b u t finally got under way over the weekend o f 24 and 25 A p r i l 1982. The setting was Wilgespruit i n the Transvaal. The meeting took place against a background o f detentions — that hit G A W U , S A A W U and F C W U i n particular — and the very limited success achieved b y the solidarity committees. Although the meeting was felt t o make some progress, with a spirit o f unity at the gathering, i t also saw the k i n d o f behaviour that was t o dog future meetings. M A C W U S A argued that i t would have n o truck with any union that registered with, or was a member o f , the Industrial Councils, a n d w a l k e d o u t o f t h e meeting, c a l l i n g o n o t h e r

unregistered unions t o d o likewise. The meeting concluded that more detailed discussions o n unity were needed. The third unity meeting took place i n P o r t Elizabeth o n 3, 4 July that year. The meeting was the most divisive t o date, with the emergence o f the factions that still divide the movement today. The only real point o f agreement was o n the broad principle o f workers’ control over the unions. Even this general commitment t o democracy was qualified b y the insistence o f C U S A that workers’ control should mean black workers control. Even this highly qualified unity would i n all probability have dissolved i f its practical consequences had been examined.

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The meeting was divided i n t o broadly t w o camps. O n the one side were the hardliners, which included S A A W U , B M W U , G A W U , O V G W U , M A C W U S A , G W U S A . These unions took their stand o n what they felt were non-negotiable principles. These principles should form the basis o f a new federation and were: nonregistration with the state’s Industrial Councils; federation policies binding o n affiliates; non-racialism; workers’ control; participation i n community issues; rejection o f reactionary bodies nationally and internationally. They insisted that the resolutions adopted at the first meeting i n Langa should form the basis o f any discussions concerning unity. Disagreement over registration Ranged against the hardliners were a more disparate grouping o f more pragmatic unions, including F O S A T U , C U S A , G W U and F C W U . All b u t the G W U had unions that were members o f the Industrial Councils and/or were registered. Certainly these unions, which had b y far the largest membership, were n o t prepared t o be lectured t o b y the seven and were n o t going t o be t o l d that certain demands were non-negotiable. Nonetheless, the pragmatists d i d have their differences. FOSATU called for a disciplined unity, i n which all member organisations would be bound b y the decisions o f the proposed federation — something that already took place i n F O S A T U . The G W U and C U S A , again reflecting their o w n experiences, argued for a loose federation, with a high degree o f autonomy for component unions. I n the event the arguments were academic, since the meeting collapsed w i t h many bitter recriminations. A series o f highly critical articles appeared i n the unions’ respective newspapers attacking the positions adopted by the contesting parties. I n December 1982 the General Workers U n i o n published an attack o n the hardliners which accused one o f its members — M A C W U S A — o f scabbing during a recent industrial dispute. I t went o n t o argue that the Langa resolutions could n o t be binding o n future action, and could n o t be a precondition t o unity. The article concluded b y calling for the formation o f a loose federation i n which the views o f each affiliate would be respected, and no-one would have the ability t o dictate policy t o anyone else. This was followed b y t w o articles that appeared i n March 1983, arguing from t w o very different perspectives. The Orange Vaal General Workers U n i o n argued, i n a document that they prepared i n anticipation o f the unity meeting scheduled for April that year, that the basis for unity was amongst the workers themselves. As one o f their headings suggested — who has been divided, workers o r leadership? They returned t o the agreement reached i n Langa,

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which had made provision for the establishment o f solidarity action committees, which would bring together workers i n a given location irrespective o f the union t o which they belonged. They said that the reason for the failure o f such committees was that they had not been seriously implemented. They refused t o believe that workers i n any location were n o t interested i n forging such links, and pointed t o a number o f instances which they believed showed that workers were already i n practice giving each other this k i n d o f support. Local meetings should be convened at which solidarity action committees would be elected at mass meetings. The committees would, i n effect take over the functions previously undertaken b y the unions, since they would be capable o f binding all workers represented at the meetings, t o a particular course o f action. N o t surprisingly this formula received little support from those workers and unions that had spent many hard years building their union structures as effective forms o f organisation. The second proposal came i n the form o f an editorial i n F O S A T U Workers’ News. The March issue set out t o explain t o workers the basis u p o n which the Federation would participate i n the A p r i l meeting. FOSATU argued that what was required for a successful meeting was a ‘ ‘ u n i t y o f purpose and political direction’’, since without a common perspective there would be wide differences which would prevent ‘‘common worker a c t i o n ’ . The other prerequisite for a successful meeting was pragmatism. The Federation professed itself t o be ready t o debate and compromise o n all its positions, except this commitment t o workers’ control o f union affairs and non-racialism. The Editorial concluded b y warning that ‘ ‘ a l l talk and n o action is a dangerous game’’. I n the event the warning went unheeded. Although the meeting o n 9, 10 A p r i l 1983 d i d agree t o set u p a steering committee representing 14 o f the 29 unions that attended the meeting, charged with finding the most appropriate structure for a new federation ( t h e r e m a i n d e r agreed t o t h e i d e a o f a f e d e r a t i o n , b u . felt

constrained t o seck a mandate before joining the steering committee), little else was forthcoming. The meeting was deeply split o n the best way forward. The split took place along familiar

lines. On the one side SAAWU, OVGWU, G A W U and M A C W U S A — o n this issue joined b y C U S A — argued that the way forward was b y means o f solidarity action committees. O n the other hand were the FCWU, G W U and F O S A T U , which argued that the committees had been tried and had failed. They said that the problem was that the committees were mainly attended b y officials and had generally been characterised b y rivalry and disagreement. Together with CCAWUSA, these unions declared i n

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favour o f a federation. The C T M WA supported their position, but argued that a federation should be supplemented b y solidarity action committees. During the course o f the first day the S A A W U came round t o agreeing that a federation might be desirable, and the second day was then spent discussing existing union structures. Essentially the reason why the committees were attractive t o the regional or general unions was because i t would allow them t o expand beyond their regional bases, and secondly, because i t would allow them t o continue without being fractured i n t o their industrial components, ultimately t o be absorbed i n t o the larger, existing i n d u s t r i a l u n i o n s . T h e industrial u n i o n s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e r e

n o t prepared t o lose their national status, a status which had allowed them t o unionise different plants i n the same company. When the steering committee met i n Cape T o w n o n 2, 3 July 1983 some o f the unions that had expressed their reservations about the steering committee were present, evidently having been given a mandate b y their membership t o attend. A n d the meeting proved t o be one o f the most fruitful that the movement had held since i t had begun seeking unity t w o years earlier. The two opposing blocs o f unions were n o t i n evidence, and unions voted for and against points according t o their convictions. M o s t o f the time was devoted t o discussing the future structure o f the federation, with some unions arguing for a complex structure, while others felt that the federation should be kept simple. Divisions did emerge over t w o issues, namely o n t h e future r o l e a n d p o w e r s o f u n i o n officials, a n d

external funding. Some o f the unions felt that officials should have voting rights where they had a clear mandate, while others felt that voting should only be b y worker delegates. O n funding some felt that the federation should be wholely dependent upon the resources that its membership could provide, while others argued that outside assistance was essential t o the viability o f the organisation. Divisions c o n t i n u e

But i f the April meeting was productive, the next meeting which was held i n Johannesburg o n 8, 9 October 1983 was as divisive as ever. For the July meeting had agreed that all unions would submit information o n the areas i n which they were organising and their proposals for the new federation. However the hardline unions failed t o live u p t o their commitment. This soured the meeting and the atmosphere degenerated further when a number o f unions insisted that demarcation should be discussed as a matter o f urgency. There then followed a bitter argument between G W U and C C A W U S A o n the one hand and S A A W U o n the other with the two accusing S A A W U o f poaching their members and disrupting

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organising activities. Arising from the discussions, FOSATU proposed that all unions should accept a commitment t o the principle o f ‘one union, one industry’, b u t failed t o w i n acceptance at the meeting. Agreement was hindered by the fact that the hardliners had failed t o provide adequate i n f o r m a t i o n concerning their operations, and they came under pressure from the rest o f the meeting t o provide the information b y the following day, or withdraw from the meeting. O n the ninth the hardliners gave some general information about the sectors and areas i n which they were organising, b u t the unevenness o f the i n f o r m a t i o n made comparisons difficult. As a result little practical was achieved. I t was agreed that a co-ordinating committee should be formed comprising t w o delegates from each union t o discuss the problem o f demarcation. I n reality there was little hope o f an accord, since for the general unions t o agree t o clear lines o f demarcation would be t o submit t o their o w n dismemberment b y the industrial unions. Only general unions like the G W U , which had previously begun t o specialise i n t o areas such as the docks, could hope t o survive once genuine demarcation took place. M a n y o f the unions found the October meeting deeply depressing, for i t had become evident that there was n o t likely t o be the possibility o f a federation that included all the unions that had been involved i n the discussions from the start. I n October the F O S A T U Central Committee, for example, decided that bilateral negotiations should begin w i t h like-minded unions, and a delegation was selected, instructed t o meet w i t h the other more p r a g m a t i c u n i o n s , s u c h as F C W U , C U S A , C T M W A , G W U a n d

C C A W U S A . All o f these unions agreed that there appeared little hope o f unity with the hardliners, b u t one last meeting should be held t o t r y t o resolve the differences. The meeting was held i n Johannesburg o n 3, 4 March 1984. I t opened w i t h a proposal b y the F C W U that the meeting could only proceed i f there could be clarity o n who was ready t o j o i n a federation. The union proposed that i n order for a union t o be ready for unity i t would have t o satisfy the following three conditions: 1. The union must have taken a clear decision with n o conditions that i t is prepared t o j o i n a new federation. 2. Federations must have decided t o disband i n order t o form a new federation. 3. General unions must be i n the process o f forming industrially demarcated unions o r o f confining their activities t o certain clearly defined industries. Those unions that were not able t o meet the criteria should be offered observer status i n the talks

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u n t i l such time as they could meet the criteria, at which time they would rejoin the talks as full participants. This position was accepted b y C C A W U S A , C T M W A , C U S A , F O S A T U and G W U . The hardliners, namely S A A W U , G A W U and M C W U S A all raised objections. S A A W U asked for a p o s t p o n e m e n t , a n d after t h e l u n c h b r e a k t h e t h r e e u n i o n s w e r e

informed that they should either accept observer status or leave the meeting. Under protest the unions left, leaving those unions that had already achieved a great deal o f unity t o l o o k at the details o f the federation that they were now determined t o set up. Since that decisive meeting there has been rapid progress towards the formation o f a federation that will encompass the vast majority o f all the non-racial unions i n the country.

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Chapter 10

Unions, Politics and the Liberation Movement The repression o f the early ’60s removed the South African Congress o f Trade Unions’s (SACTU) leadership from South Africa. Although never officially banned, its leadership was decimated b y arrests, detentions and bannings (see Chapter 2). Five SACTU activists died i n detention. Those that survived either decided t o lay l o w , or went i n t o exile. The capacity to organise workers i n unions inside South Africa had been destroyed. I n the years that followed, the SACTU leadership, i n conjunction with the rest o f the Congress movement, used the international arena t o expose the suppression o f trade union rights i n South Africa as part o f its condemnation o f apartheid. SACTU claimed t o have an underground network inside South Africa, but one can only speculate about its role. B y any analysis the years between 1964 and 1973 were ones o f industrial quietude. I t was the ‘Durban’ strikes and the events that preceded them i n 1972/73 that sparked o f f a renewal o f trade union activity amongst black workers. Some o f the activists o f the 70s had been active a decade earlier, a n d m e m o r y o f S A C T U ’ s w o r k remained. O n e

former SACTU union was still i n existence — the F o o d and Canning Workers U n i o n — but i t was a ghost o f its former self, and t o all intents and purposes had t o be built anew. So for the majority o f workers drawn i n t o the unions i n the ’70s the organisations were a new phenomenon. As the unions grew i n membership and organisational competence i n the ’70s and early ’80s S A C T U was faced with something o f a dilemma. I n their literature and public statements the organisation had portrayed the apartheid state as fascist. A n y form o f genuine trade union activity would be inimicable t o such a state. The idea that unionisation could take h o l d i n such arid soil seemed t o be little more than wishful thinking. SACTU’s analysis Y e t t a k e h o l d i t d i d . G r a d u a l l y , a n d despite intense repression,

black union membership grew t o its present level o f around 500,000. F i r m l y rooted i n the militancy o f the black working class, the movement has carved an increasingly significant place for itself

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i n the South African political economy. Yet despite this impressive performance. SACTU has remained essentially unconvinced that anything b u t sham unionisation could take place. I n a paper published i n June 1977 John Gaetsewe, General Secretary o f SACTU p u t the case with considerable clarity. ‘““What then is the role o f open, legal trade unions for African workers? “‘Organisation o n all possible levels is vital in the development o f the fighting strength o f the workers, t o meet the great challenges which lie ahead. I n the day-to-day battles for the higher wages, better working conditions and trade union rights, the organisation and consciousness o f the workers has advanced. For this reason, it has always been the policy o f the South African Congress o f Trade Unions (SACTU) t o encourage and further the struggle for open trade unions i n South Africa, and for trade union recognition. ‘ A t the same time, S A C T U recognises that there are ultimately only t w o options open t o legal African trade unions: either t o advance, taking u p political as well as economic questions, and eventually being crushed o r driven underground; o r for the leadership t o become co-opted and the unions emasculated — tools in the hands o f the employers and registered unions . . . Repression o f trade union activity means that i n the long term, meaningful advances can only be made o n an underground basis.”’ While such a n a t t i t u d e m a y h a v e been c o r r e c t i n t h e e a r l y ’70s,

the continued growth and vitality o f the movement increasingly brought i t i n t o question. Yet as late as 1982 a similar position was being adopted. I n a major restatement o f its position i n June 1982, entitled ‘SACTU’s Present Role’, the organisation spoke o n the one hand o f the ‘‘open trade union movement becoming a powerful force’’. A n d o n the other hand i t reiterated the line that repression would i n the end win out. ““SACTU was forced underground. A n d there is nothing t o suggest that the apartheid regime will ever tolerate a strong, progressive and open trade

union movement for very long. I t would be a mistake to act on this basis.”’ I n the statement S A C T U was portrayed as fulfilling three functions. First i t claimed t o be active i n those sectors closed t o the ‘ o p e n ’ u n i o n s , such as t h e mines, t h e f a r m s a n d t h e bantustans. T h e c l a i m t o b e active o n t h e m i n e s was m o r e t h a n a l i t t l e i r o n i c ,

given SACTU’s conspicuous failure t o make any headway o n the mines during its period o f open trade union activity i n the 1950s. The second claim was that i t ‘‘sows the seeds for open trade unions t o emerge, also creating a second level o f leadership and continuously drawing new people into the trade union movement’’. Finally i t acted at an international level t o win support f o r , and channel funds t o , the open unions i n their struggle for survival.

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A real tension permeates this analysis. I f i t is a mistake t o act i n the belief that the unions could play an effective role i n the long r u n , why seek t o succour, protect and strengthen the very organisations that are doomed t o be crushed? Is i t simply that workers must pass through unionisation as a step t o some higher plane? Was n o t the organisation misleading workers i n channelling them into unions that are pre-ordained t o fail? The statement is u n c l e a r o n a l l these questions, b a l a n c i n g a strange fatalism w i t h a

desire t o encourage and assist. I n a sense these contradictions arise from the portrayal o f the South African state as ‘fascist’. While no-one is under any illusion about the repressive and authoritarian nature o f the apartheid r e g i m e g i v e n t h e l o n g l i s t o f deaths i n d e t e n t i o n , banishments,

bannings and forced removals, i t is simply misleading t o label i t fascist. I t could be argued that those who employ such terminology do so as a form o f abuse, or perhaps t o convey t o a European audience the severity o f conditions under which the mass o f the people i n South Africa have t o live. But such arguments are undermined b y the analysis that SACTU employs. For i t is from the analysis that South Africa is a fascist state that the belief arises that ‘there is nothing t o suggest that the apartheid regime will ever tolerate a strong, progressive and open trade union movement for very long’. The emphasis o f the statement is clear: the state is portrayed as all powerful and the opposition as essentially weak and reactive. I n this analysis only the underground struggle stands any chance o f success. I t is an analysis that serves a real function — t o warn o f f the international labour movement from links with the unions, since these are at best temporary phenomena. Its real purpose is t o attempt t o suggest that SACTU remains the only legitimate focus for workers’ struggles i n South Africa. The hope is that b y maintaining this illusion all assistance t o the unions i n South Africa will be channelled via S A C T U , and that SACTU will thereby maintain a h o l d over the open unions inside South Africa. I t is i n the end a strategy aimed at controlling the movement that its purports t o assist. The problems that S A C T U faced were not lessened by the establishment i n 1979 o f the Federation o f South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and the Council o f Unions o f South Africa (CUSA) i n 1980. For the first time since the 1960s there existed i n South Africa trade union centres that could legitimately speak o n behalf o f the workers o f South Africa. Unlike the Trade U n i o n Council o f South Africa (TUCSA), FOSATU and C U S A could not be dismissed as tools o f the South African state. Yet their existence raised implicitly questions about the future o f S A C T U .

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Independent unions develop links abroad This uneasy relationship was not assisted when the independent unions began t o extend their influence abroad. Hitherto the international scene had been the exclusive preserve o f S A C T U , and the organisation reacted sharply when this monopoly was challenged. The British Trade Union-SACTU liaison group stated i n 1977 that the apartheid regime was resorting t o sending abroad moderate trade unionists t o ‘explain’ the position. ‘They are easily distinguished b y the fact that they h o l d South African passports, a commodity which under Apartheid rules is not available t o any South African citizen who wishes t o travel abroad t o promote the interests o f oppressed workers.’ Such an accusation could be applied with considerable justification t o some o f the emissaries sent abroad b y organisations such as T U C S A , whose chief purpose was t o denounce SACTU. Unfortunately the statement was bandied about without distinction, and a number o f representatives o f the independent, non-racial unions found themselves regarded with less than fraternal friendship. Although S A C T U never formally attacked the independent unions, dark hints about their ‘true’ role were dropped o n more than one occasion. F O S A T U , for i t s p a r t , was b o t h t a k e n aback a n d m o r e t h a n a

little disturbed b y the hostility that i t encountered. The concern was heightened when i t became clear that the tensions between SACTU and the independent unions was being used as a vehicle for leftright battles within the international trade union movement. FOSATU was n o t prepared t o be used as a vehicle t o attack S A C T U , which some o n the right o f the international trade union movement saw as a communist front. A t this time two further disputes complicated the scene. The first was a dispute within SACTU London headquarters concerning its policy and direction. The second was a conflict within the British Anti-Apartheid Movement over relations with the independent unions.

Divisions inside S A C T U

The dispute within S A C T U , which had been simmering for some time, erupted i n July 1979 with the dismissal o f the editor o f S A C T U ’ s p a p e r , Workers’ Unity, a n d t h e members o f t h e L o n d o n -

based Technical Sub-Committee after a period i n which the work o f Workers’ Unity became ‘bogged down i n conflict which reflected serious political differences o n what the role and tasks o f S A C T U were’ as the dismissed editor p u t i t . The differences were

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summarised i n 1979 b y the dismissed members o f SACTU as follows: ® That the lack o f urgency and commitment t o the tasks o f building SACTU at home (and with i t , developing the paper) was a result o f a lack o f political clarity within the organisation and among the leadership o f the character and tasks of the South African revolution. ® That the cornerstone o f S A C T U ’ s approach to the revolution must be the recognition that neither economic gains, nor national liberation, nor democracy can be secured for the black workers o n the basis o f capitalism, b u t only through an uninterrupted struggle t o overthrow capitalism and begin the building o f socialism. ® That the black working class is the only social force capable of leading this revolutionary struggle in the interests o f all the oppressed, and, t o undertake this task, must be organised first and foremost as workers. ® That t h e w o r k e r s m u s t b e mobilised w i t h t h e a i m , a t t h e decisive point,

o f defeating the armed force o f the state with the revolutionary armed force o f the mass movement. ® That the path t o this geal lies i n giving clear priority t o building organs o f mass struggle, so that at every point the politics o f the mass struggle exercise command over the gun and the b o m b . ’

N o t surprisingly, the S A C T U leadership reacted angrily t o this criticism. I n particular they were stung b y the charge o f inactivity i n South Africa and what the dissidents referred t o as ‘isolation from the workers’ movement i n South A f r i c a ’ . The criticism was seen as an attack o n the strategy adopted b y the Congress Alliance over a number o f years, including the theory o f a two-stage revolution (first bourgeois democratic and then socialist) and the consequent need t o build the broadest coalition o f forces t o oppose the apartheid state. The criticism drew a sharp reply from an anonymous ‘reader’ i n African Communist, the theoretical journal o f the South African Communist Party, i n its third quarter issue o f 1980. The strategy o f the dissidents was attacked as b o t h economistic and workerist. I t was incorrect because i t saw the liberation struggle solely i n terms o f the working class, ignoring the role o f other layers or classes o f the oppressed. As the author p u t i t , such an analysis results i n ‘ ‘ . . . the total collapse o f the entire political and armed struggle o f the popular masses i n t o the trade union movement and the abandonment o f any conception o f an alliance i n the revolutionary struggle between the working class and the ‘rural p o o r ’ together, under the appropriate conditions, with the petty bourgeoisie. Worse still, such an analysis poses a threat t o the Congress Alliance itself, for i t elevates the trade union movement t o a general political and revolutionary role. This is t o seek t o usurp the place and

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function o f the A N C and its allies: i t leads . . . t o the substitution o f SACTU for other political organisations.”’ Whatever the merits o f the respective positions the editor o f the paper remained dismissed and the technical Committee remained disbanded. Together with a group o f like-minded people they went o f f t o form the South African Labour Education Project, publishing Inqaba Ya Basebenzi, which they referred t o as the Journal o f the Marxist Workers’ Tendency of the African National Congress. Close t o the Trotskyist Militant Tendency within the British Labour Party, the dissidents build links with the British labour movement, while also engaging i n educational activities i n Germany and the Netherlands. Anti-apartheid a n d fraternal visits

The debate within the British Anti-Apartheid Movement concerned relations between the union movement i n Britain and the independent u n i o n s i n S o u t h A f r i c a . T h e debate, w h i c h l e d t o

heated exchanges at the Anti-Apartheid A G M s i n 1981 and 1982, centred o n whether relations with the independent unions should be direct or via SACTU. The issues at stake were summarised i n a resolution t o the 1981 A G M which called for support for the independent unions i n addition t o the traditional policy o f supporting S A C T U . I t went o n t o argue that the movement should ‘‘encourage the formation o f direct fraternal links between all independent non-racial trade unions i n South Africa and unions i n Britain at all levels o f union organisation’’. I t called o n Anti-Apartheid t o encourage exchange visits with the independent unions. The Anti-Apartheid executive successfully opposed this proposal, confirming instead a previous policy document issued b y the movement. Existing policy was t o ‘‘establish fraternal links between South African and British workers through the South African Congress o f Trade Unions’’, something that should be ‘continued and strengthened’’. Exchange visits were specifically rejected, since the movement believed that because unions i n South Africa organise i n what i t termed °‘‘semi-legal o r clandestine conditions’’, direct links could ‘‘provoke harassment and i n other ways jeopardise these trade unionists’ w o r k ’ . S A C T U entered the debate with an article i n the A p r i l 1982 issue o f Workers’ Unity entitled ‘Direct Links Stink!” — claiming that visits t o South Africa by unions were objectionable since ‘‘they do us n o good and p u t our organisation i n jeopardy’’. Similarly visits f r o m S o u t h A f r i c a n u n i o n s t o t h e U K o r U S A w e r e unnecessary

since the independent unions ‘ ‘ . . . don’t need lessons i n class

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collaboration’’. Most tellingly the article attacked direct links as an attempt t o by-pass what i t termed ‘‘the peoples’ revolutionary organisations, the A N C ( S A ) and S A C T U ” . The argument was soon overtaken b y events. Over the past eight years the independent unions had developed extensive links w i t h the international labour movement. The Council o f Unions o f South Africa is now a full affiliate o f the ICFTU. M a n y unions are affiliates o f their appropriate International Trade Secretariat. The Metal and Allied Workers U n i o n , for example, a member o f F O S A T U , is now an active participant i n the work o f the International Metalworkers Federation, successfully using this forum t o secure the expulsion o f certain racist South African unions from the ranks o f the International. I n the U K these exchanges were given the blessing o f the Labour Party i n a guideline that was issued i n 1982 (see Appendix 6). After consultation with a wide range o f bodies, including the I C F T U , S A C T U a n d A N C , C U S A a n d F O S A T U , t h e P a r t y endorsed

exchanges between the union movements o n condition that a distinction is drawn between the independent unions and unions such as TUCSA. Visits should only take place at the request o f and according t o a schedule drawn u p i n co-operation between British unions and the independent unions i n South Africa. A rather different aspect o f the debate emerged from the South African unions themselves. After considerable discussion FOSATU sought t o define its relations with other movements, and the liberation movements i n particular. The speech b y FOSATU General Secretary, Joe Foster, t o t h e Federation’s 1982 conference,

crystallised the arguments (see Appendix 1). While acknowledging the crucial role that the A N C played i n organising the South African oppressed, irrespective o f tribe, class or indeed race, Foster goes o n t o argue that there is a danger that the movement may, because o f the broad class alliance that it represents, ultimately t u r n against the very workers that form the bulk o f its support. Foster puts i t i n these terms: ‘ A l l the great and successful popular movements have had as their aim the overthrow o f oppressive — most often colonial — regimes. B u t these movements cannot and have not i n themselves been able t o deal with the particular and fundamental problems o f workers. Their task 1s t o remove regimes that are regarded as illegitimate and unacceptable by the majority. I t is, therefore, essential that workers must strive t o build their o w n powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are part o f the wider popular struggle. This organisation is necessary t o protect and further worker interests and t o ensure that the popular movement is not hijacked b y elements who will i n the end have n o option b u t t o t u r n

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against their worker supporters’’. A similar b u t less elaborate point was made b y F O S A T U President, Chris Dlamini. Following a visit t o Zimbabwe he remarked that although some people i n Zimbabwe were liberated, workers were n o t . This he p u t down t o the absence o f a strong workers’ movement. ‘Worker liberation can only be achieved b y a strong, well organised worker movement’’. Precisely what is meant b y such a movement is a m o o t point. T o what extent can unions fulfill what are essentially political roles? I n a situation like South A f r i c a , where the main political organisations o f the oppressed are banned, what role can trade unions play? Clearly these are b o t h complex and highly pertinent questions. One answer t o these questions was posed b y a further article i n African Communist. Deeply critical o f the F O S A T U position — which i t labelled syndicalist — it reiterated the familiar arguments against regarding the working class as the sole force opposing the apartheid state. I t went o n t o charge F O S A T U w i t h ignoring o r even distorting history i n failing t o mention the role o f the South African Communist Party. Far from there n o t being an organisation o f the working class, the author charges that the unions are attempting t o substitute themselves for the Communist Party which is ‘ “ . . . a political party o f the working class’’. The analysis goes o n : ‘‘Dare F O S A T U ignore this? A n d dare i t ignore the confusion and division i t w i l l sow i n the ranks o f the working class i f i t sets u p a new ‘workers movement’ i n competition with o r alongside the still living Communist Party?’’ (African Communist, No.83, second quarter 1983). I t is unclear whether these views represent official thinking o n this subject. There appears t o be some distance between such sentiments and recent statements o f the A N C . A n article i n the A N C journal Mayibuya spelled out a clear call for unity amongst the trade unions — irrespective o f their ideological concerns. There was a distinct absence o f criticism o f unions that sought t o register with the state or have joined Industrial Councils. The statement called for ‘flexibility’ o n the part o f all concerned, i n order t o achieve a united movement. Differences o f tactics o n these issues ‘ “ . . . must not be used as an issue t o militate against u n i t y ’ ’ . I n a recent interview, A N C president Oliver Tambo made i t plain that his analysis was one i n which the workers’ movement was given equal importance with the armed confrontation with the state. While power ‘ ‘ w o u l d n o t be achieved without armed struggle . . i t would be equally disastrous t o say the armed struggle has n o need o f any other form o f struggle. Organisation o f the workers is most important’’, he declared. This is a perspective that w i l l have, i f anything, been

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strengthened b y the new geopolitics o f the region. The Nkomati a c c o r d between S o u t h A f r i c a a n d M o z a m b i q u e , t h e accommodation with Angola and the continued pressure o n the other states bordering o n South Africa must mean that the armed struggle w i l l become increasingly difficult over the next few years. Although it is unlikely t o invalidate this approach, i t is likely t o mean that the A N C will place increasing emphasis o n other forms o f struggle, including building the trade union movement. I f , as now seems likely, a genuinely national trade union centre emerged, then the A N C will have n o alternative b u t t o come t o some understanding with the union centre. Political role

of black unions

I t would, however, be a mistake t o see this as simply a debate conducted between F O S A T U and the A N C . A number o f other u n i o n s h a v e j o i n e d t h e debate, a n d t h e subject h a s b e e n b r o a d e n e d

out t o cover the whole question o f the political role o f the union movement. O n one issue all the unions agree: that they have a political role. The question is how best t o exercise this role. The F O S A T U position, that the workers must first establish their o w n perspective and organisational capacity, was echoed by a number o f other major unions, including the Food and Canning Workers and the General Workers U n i o n . I n particular both rejected calls t o j o i n the newly established political groupings which have emerged i n South Africa. These groupings — the United Democratic Front (which follows a non-racial approach and is broadly sympathetic t o the viewpoint o f the A N C ) and the National F o r u m Committee (which is i n the black consciousness tradition, insisting o n black leadership o f the struggle against apartheid) — were formed t o unite the opposition t o apartheid. B o t h are amorphous bodies bringing together hundreds o f small community and other organsations, from church groups and sports clubs t o political parties and trade unions. I t is the heterogeneous nature o f the groupings that has been at least i n part the cause o f the mistrust that has arisen between them and some o f the most important unions. I n essence their calls for the unions t o affiliate to them has met with three distinct responses. The most established o f the unions have rejected the call — those adopting this position include F O S A T U , F C W U and G W U . F r o m C U S A both groupings, the U D F and the N F C , have won acceptance. A n d the more community orientated unions such as S A A W U , Municipal and General Workers U n i o n and the General and Allied Workers U n i o n have joined only the U D F . But what d o each o f these stands mean?

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The first position was elaborated b y Dave Lewis, general secretarty o f G W U i n an extensive interview that he gave (see Appendix 2). H e argued that the union was b y n o means saying that i t rejected politics, and even that i t encouraged its members t o become involved i n organisations that were affiliated t o bodies such as the U D F . But he ruled out affiliation b y the union for two distinct reasons. Firstly he pointed out that as a union leader he had t o represent his members i n a very strong sense. H e had t o ensure that he always acted o n a mandate from them. A n d this was simply not the case for most o f the organisations that were affiliates o f the U D F . This made co-operation with them difficult, since i t was n o t possible t o always get a mandate from his membership before being involved i n a particular decision taken b y such bodies such as the UDF. This was made more difficult because within the G W U were members who supported different political positions, and Lewis was not prepared t o alienate one section o f the union b y affiliating t o a body o f which they d i d n o t approve. The second objection was because o f the multi-class nature o f the U D F . H e argued that because o f this i t was very difficult for workers t o become involved. W o r k e r s were s i m p l y n o t used t o t h e k i n d o f structures, o r

sufficiently educated t o fully participate i n the life o f political bodies such as the U D F . F o r example, most o f the discussions were i n English, a language that many workers d i d not understand. F o r this reason their participation would o f necessity be limited. “‘Given the above, there is a feeling o n the part o f the workers that they will n o t be able t o participate fully i n the decisions that lead t o a programme o f action, and this is a n anathema t o a n organised worker. They are not going t o be drawn into an organisation i n which they feel that they will have t o take action blindly, without having participated i n the decision making. Those are really the key aspects o f the class composition o f the organisations: firstly, that we draw our membership from a very wide and diverse range o f political views, unlike most o f the other organisations participating i n the U D F , and secondly, that our members are working class people, and as working class they come from a culture that is very distinct from that o f other more privileged classes i n society’’.

A t the same time Lewis stressed that the union was prepared t o participate i n campaigns w i t h the U D F , and said that he did n o t rule out the possibility o f a national trade union centre affiliating t o such a body. The position o f CUSA was rather different (see Appendix 5). I t too was approached by the U D F and the N F C early i n 1983, with requests for affiliation. After discussion o f the issues involved b y their executive committee the following resolution was adopted o n 30 April 1983:

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‘“‘Having examined the proposals o f the regime o n the constitution; Having further examined the basis o f the call b y various organisations regarding the constitutional proposals; Noting that the Nationalist Party is presently i n disarray and that these proposals may therefore be changed t o impose White rule under different guise even through a referendum; Knowing that the White opposition forces and parties are themselves divided and without any effect;

The Council o f Unions o f South Arica n o w therefore: ® wishes t o place o n record its complete and total rejection o f t h e proposal;

® pledges itself t o participate i n every forum to work towards the achievement o f a just and democratic society; ® calls u p o n its members t o lend their individual support to all efforts o f community organisations t o end this foolish plan; ® pledges itself t o all forces and all efforts t o work towards a common citizenship i n an undivided democratic and just society.”’

C U S A went o n t o state that: ‘‘Following the response o f various unions and the nature o f press reports together with intransigent positions adopted b y some sections o f the community C U S A is involved currently o n an ongoing examination o f its attitude and role i n the U D C and N F C ” ’ . Quite what this intransigence was, o r the n a t u r e o f the examination conducted b y C U S A , is n o t stated.

But the general thrust o f their position is clear. They would support any organisation that opposed the new constitutional proposals, and would work with them for the achievement o f a just and democratic society. The t h i r d position, o f affiliation t o the U D F only, was defended by the Municipal and General Workers U n i o n o f South Africa, amongst others (see Appendix 3). They pointed out that a trade union is not a political party, and as such is limited i n the range o f questions that i t is capable o f tackling. They also said that n o political party could be exclusively composed o f working class members, and that even i f i t were there was n o guarantee that it would act i n the interests o f workers. I n addition there was the problem o f the rural areas, areas i n which the unions could n o t function, and for this reason a body like the U D F was vital i f a broadly based opposition t o apartheid was t o be created. A similar argument was put foward by the General and Allied Workers U n i o n , whose general secretary, Sydney Mufamadi, stated: ‘‘Some want t o perceive the working class as only found o n the factory floor. Our view is that even those people who are n o t behind machines o n the factory floor can be said t o be waging a working class struggle i f the issues which they take u p i n their various sites o f struggle, and the way i n which they take those issues u p , serve t o undermine the class relations upon which the present

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society is built . . . Ideologically speaking, we are saying that we are involved i n a national democratic struggle wherein we p u t special emphasis o n the leadership role which has t o be played b y the working class. I f you l o o k at the U D F declaration, there is nothing there which negates the interests o f the working class. We feel that we as a trade union have got r o o m i n the U D F as much as any other organisation, be i t operating i n the community, at a student level o r i n the women’s front.”’ Just as the FOSATU position leaves questions unanswered, so do the positions outlined above. For they fail t o take u p the points made b y the G W U . I n particular they do n o t deal with the problems faced b y workers participating i n multi-class organisations, even i f they are formally open to workers. Nor does i t meet the point about the k i n d o f mandate that union leaders have from their members. I t would appear, therefore, that all o f the unions still have major problems t o overcome before the trade unions can fulfil their true potential within the South African political economy. I t is unlikely that these difficulties will be resolved i n theory. Rather, i t will be i n facing the real issues o f the day that the unions, and the political movements that seek their support, will unpack these problems. I t may be that once a national union centre comes into being that the unions will have the confidence that they need to move from their c u r r e n t positions. Perhaps i n t h e e n d i t will take a n event, such as

the tragic death o f Niel Aggett, to bring the movement together o n a political front. B u t when they do, then the enormous strength that is now being forged will, for the first time, be seen i n action.

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Chapter 11

International Solidarity The importance o f international solidarity with black workers i n South Africa can never be underestimated; n o r should i t be overplayed. South Africa’s white-dominated economy and political culture seeks integration with and acceptance b y Western capitalism. The regime does respond t o international pressure. Particularly effective have been the sporting boycotts and the expulsion o f South Africa from most world bodies. Another factor that has had t o be constantly taken into account b y the authorities and big business is the haphazard disinvestment campaign i n some countries, notably i n Scandanavia and i n a few American companies where shareholders with what could be described as a conscience have been subject t o moral and church originated pressure. The collapse o f the Portuguese colonies o f Mozambique and Angola b y 1975, and the disappearance o f the white settler regime i n Zimbabwe b y 1980 added t o a sense o f international isolation. No-one disputed (or disputes) the overwhelming economic and military domination that South Africa enjoys i n the southern h a l f o f the continent b u t the solidarity o f most African countries i n denying South Africa economic, o r even transport, links (except obviously i n the cases o f the front line states where these were o f a lifeblood necessity) also added pressure o n the South African state. The clear identification o f the Carter administration i n the United States between 1976 and 1980 and especially Carter’s U N ambassador, Andrew Young, w i t h the politics o f human rights a n d , t o a m o r e hesitant e x t e n t , those o f b l a c k l i b e r a t i o n l e f t S o u t h

Africa uncertain about the attitude o f the most important capitalist power, i n the key years during which Pretoria was elaborating its response t o the challenge posed b y the growth o f an organised black working class after 1973. The important role o f foreign capital i n South Africa also opened the way t o solidarity pressure o f all sorts i n the countries where the headquarters o f banks and multinationals with subsidiaries i n South Africa were based. I t was against this background that the emerging black trade union movement worked out its strategy o f international links and solidarity i n the 1970s and 1980s. B y the middle o f the 1980s they had had a decade o f experience o f international contacts and were

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able t o judge those that would be o f direct use. A t the same time unions i n Europe and North America and their international organisations were able to go beyond angry denunciations o f apartheid i n national and world forums and instead looked t o concrete ways o f helping the black workers i n South Africa. Solidarity during disputes Car workers at the Volkswagen plant i n Uitenhage, for example, had established good links with the 2.5 million-strong West German metalworkers’ union, I G Metall. These proved o f value i n J u n e 1980, w h e n b l a c k w o r k e r s l a u n c h e d a three-week s t r i k e a t t h e

V W plants. Organised b y unions affiliated t o FOSATU, the strike centred o n wage demands and shop steward rights. A t its height the dispute involved 7,500 workers i n 11 factories and a mass march was broken b y riot police firing shotguns and teargas. I n Germany, I G Metall applied pressure o n the parent company. I n this, they were helped b y the German industrial democracy system which placed the president o f the union o n the supervisory board o f Volkswagen; he thus had direct access t o the highest level o f V W management. The union also informed V W workers about what the company was doing. The International Metalworkers Federation, t o which the South African and German unions are affiliated raised funds for the strike and £38,000 was transferred t o South Africa. A n assistant general secretary o f the federation flew from its headquarters i n Geneva t o provide what help he could. I n fact, as one o f the international labour movement’s most experienced economists he was able t o advise the unions during the negotiations and i n preparing their claim for a living wage index t o replace the previously applied minimum standard o f living index. As an outcome o f the strike the workers gained a wage increase o f u p t o 40 per cent and Volkswagen and the other automobile companies i n the Eastern Cape agreed t o continue talks o n the union’s proposals for a new living wage index. The number o f wage categories was reduced and F o r d and General Motors agreed t o the same scales. F o r the American multinationals there was the knowledge that the workers i n Port Elizabeth had established close contacts with the United A u t o Workers union i n Detroit. M a r c S t e p p , t h e b l a c k U A W Vice-President, v i s i t e d t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n

auto union i n December 1981. Another important result concerned trade union rights at plant level which led t o the recognition o f paid shop stewards and i n plant training for an increased number o f African workers. Subsequently three full-time shop stewards were elected, becoming full-time worker representatives while still being o n the company

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payroll. The elections were the first o f their k i n d i n South Africa. The Volkswagen shop stewards have now established a telex l i n k with their opposite numbers i n Wolfsburg, the West German centre o f V W production. Britain, Sweden, Italy

I n 1981, support was gained by workers i n British Leyland’s South African subsidiary. A n attempt to dismiss 2,000 workers at Leyland’s plants i n Cape Town resulted i n the intervention b y British trade union officials. A t a meeting with the parent company i n Britain, Alex Kitson, Deputy General Secretary o f the Transport & General Workers’ Union and Terry Duffy, President o f the Amalgamated U n i o n o f Engineering Workers protested t o the management about the behaviour o f the South African subsidiary. The intervention was successful and subsequently many o f the dismissed workers were re-employed. I n 1982, action i n support o f the South African Allied Workers’ U n i o n claim for recognition with the South African Rowntree’s Mackintosh subsidiary occurred at all levels o f the British labour movement, w i t h statements b y T U C General Secretary, L e n M u r r a y , and local action with shop-stewards at Rowntree’s headquarters i n Y o r k . The International U n i o n o f Foodworkers (IUF) mobilised its 183 affiliated unions around a threatened boycott o f Coca Cola after a Port Elizabeth firm holding the local Coca Cola franchise dismissed workers belonging t o the General Workers Union after they had gone o n strike for higher wages and union recognition. The I U F pressure worked with the firm taking back some o f the fired workers and permitting union activities i n the plant. I n 1975, t h e Swedish n a t i o n a l trade u n i o n c e n t r e , L O , p u b l i s h e d

a lengthy report o n Swedish companies’ involvement i n South Africa. The influential Swedish trade union movement has quietly, but effectively, put pressure o n firms such as SKF and Electrolux t o recognise and deal fairly with the emerging unions operating i n their South African subsidiaries. In

1983,

the

powerful

Italian

metalworkers’

union,

the

800,000-strong Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici ( F L M ) played a decisive role i n successfully helping black car workers w h e n t h e i r u n i o n , t h e N a t i o n a l A u t o m o b i l e a n d A l l i e d Workers

U n i o n (NAAWU) was i n dispute with the South African subsidiary o f Alfa Romeo. The South African management had refused t o recognise t h e u n i o n . U n l i k e t h e P o r t E l i z a b e t h f a c t o r i e s , t h e

automobile multinationals with plants i n Transvaal were strongly resisting union recognition. N A A W U contacted the F L M i n Italy and a N A A W U official flew t o Rome for the meeting between the

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Alfa R o m e o m a n a g e m e n t , t h e F L M a n d , t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Metal-

workers Federation, t o which both unions belong. As a result o f this meeting, the union was recognised at two o f the Alfa Romeo plants i n South Africa and was given facilities and access t o the third for organising purposes. The 1984 report b y the ILO’s Director General hailed this as ‘ ‘ a unique agreement . . . the first t o be achieved outside the country. I t occurred i n Rome and illustrated the effectiveness o f international support. The significance o f this development lies i n the speed and unanimity with which the trade union groups involved were able t o act i n support o f the South African u n i o n ’ . Clearly i n each o f the above cases i t was the determination o f the black workers themselves that achieved positive results. But the action o f trade unionists outside South Africa is a legitimate, useful contribution i n defence o f the demands o f South Africa’s independent unions. The value o f solidarity action has long been understood by the trade union movement, b o t h nationally and internationally. A t all levels o f the labour movement strategies for assistance and support o f the rights o f trade unionists throughout the world have been discussed and policies outlined. South Africa is n o exception and rarely does a conference o f trade union members occur i n which condemnation o f the apartheid system is n o t high o n the agenda o f international issues. Bodies such as the International Labour Office ( I L O ) and the International Confederation o f Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) have formulated comprehensive programmes t o encourage international action i n support o f black workers’ rights. A t a conference i n November 1980 held i n the T U C ’ s headquarters i n London, the I C F T U proposed a plan o f ‘‘internationally co-ordinated action to

prevent

the

South

African

union movement

from

strangulation’’. The programme offers assistance t o black trade u n i o n s i n t h e forms o f ‘‘financial, technical, legal a n d r e l i e f a i d , as

well as political s u p p o r t ’ . The ICFTU urged the international trade secretariats, individual unions and shop floor workers t o support the struggle o f black workers t o gain recognition agreements for their unions, and during labour disputes i n South Africa ‘ ‘ b y appropriate solidarity action e.g. intervention w i t h headquarters management, boycotts, etc.”’ I n January 1984, the I C F T U held a second conference (at the Dusseldorf head office o f the German Trade U n i o n Confederation (DGB) ) , t o evaluate and update the programme o f action i n support o f the emerging independent and non-racial unions. The conference was attended b y union leaders around the world and included representatives from the South African unions (both

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C U S A and F O S A T U ) . Warning that as the independent movement grows, so South Africa’s repression o f the unions will intensify, the conference reiterated the urgent need t o offer financial, legal and technical a i d , c o m b i n e d w i t h increased s o l i d a r i t y i n defence o f t h e

rights o f South Africa’s workers. International Labour Organisation As the major international agency dealing with labour matters the I L O is another important forum i n which the rights o f the independent union movement can be defended. A tripartite United Nations body bringing together representatives from government, employers and labour organisations, the I L O adopted a Declaration o n Apartheid i n 1964. Periodically updated the Declaration calls for action t o increase I L O educational and technical assistance t o black workers and their independent unions. The I L O regularly condemns the apartheid regime and intervenes i n specific cases protesting at violation o f basic human and trade union rights. I n addition the I L O publishes an annual ‘Special Report’ o n South Africa which is a valuable source o f information about labour relations i n the Republic covering a wide range o f issues; u n i o n s t r u c t u r e , i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s l e g i s l a t i o n , strikes a n d

repressive measures. The I L O has also served indirectly t o bring home t o South African employers the anger i n the world community over the effect o f apartheid o n labour practices. I n the late 1970s, the South African Association o f Chambers o f Commerce (ASSOCOM) were able to attend the I L O ’ s tripartitie Committee o n Apartheid as observers with the employer’s group. They had t o listen t o ferocious attacks from b o t h workers and government representatives. As a result o f this meeting the Association sent out a circular i n 1980 urging the National Manpower Commission t o ‘‘examine ways and means whereby registration o f Trade Unions can be made more attractive and whereby the existing stigma and suggestion that government wishes t o ‘control’ the unions can be removed’’. The Association also said that freedom o f association was an absolute right and that a union’s racial composition should be entirely a matter for the union and not the government. The submission went o n t o state there should be ‘ ‘ n o right o f veto with regard t o the membership o f the Industrial Councils. This is a subject which has caused considerable criticism both within and without the Republic and it is difficult t o defend.”” As D r Christopher Hill, director o f the Centre o f Southern African Studies at the University o f Y o r k noted: ‘ ‘ A l l these points had been made forcefully at the I L O meeting. The fact t h a t A S S O C O M ’ s Secretary chose t o repeat t h e m i n a c i r c u l a r t o

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members suggests that his attendance at Geneva had not been fruitless’’. Material assistance and help with education Material assistance is equally important t o the independent trade unions. Financial assistance is made all the more important by the South African government’s attempts t o curb the flow o f external funds t o the independent unions. The ICFTU and the International Trade Secretariats have managed t o give some cash t o the emerging unions. C U S A , as an I C F T U affiliate has received direct help. FOSATU has n o t formally affiliated t o any international federation but its affiliates are members o f International Trade Secretariats and receive financial support — often i n the form o f travel and organisation costs — indirectly through them. Money from overseas is a sensitive subject as with i t comes the suggestion o f control and ideological alignment. I n one instance the offer o f a handsome sum o f money from one source was refused b y all the emerging unions because, as one spokesman put i t : ‘ ‘ I t was crude and obvious that the national centre concerned would want t o proclaim t o the world that the black unions were ‘their boys’.”’ I n fact, cash assistance has come from left-wing unions i n Scandinavia, Italy and France, as well as those whose political outlook is not conceptually hostile t o capitalism as i n the United States. Material assistance can mean more than mere cash. The highly developed trade union education programmes available i n the industrialised countries can offer the independent unions o f South Africa a valuable resource. Officials from the emerging unions have been sent o n courses at Ruskin College, Oxford and union education schools i n West Europe and the United States where they can learn the basics o f bargaining skills and trade union organisation. Unions have also been able t o send education specialists t o South Africa t o help with shop steward courses, especially i n the area o f health and safety.

Codes o f conduct The use o f codes o f conduct has been urged as an effective means t o defend trade union rights i n South Africa. The operation o f the codes, established b y the European Economic Community and the United States (the so-called Sullivan code named after the Rev. Leon Sullivan who proposed i t ) have proved t o be a disappointment. None o f the independent o r non-racial unions have expressed any confidence i n either o f the Codes o r believe that they have helped unions establish their presence or improve wages

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o r conditions. The main fault with the Codes is that i t is difficult t o monitor them and their application is voluntary and moral, rather than obligatory and legal. I n 1983, the British government reported that i t has received replies from 130 British companies under the E E C Code o f Conduct. N o company b y company details were provided, only a generalised summary. However the Observer newspaper obtained details o f certain company reports which showed that i n 1981 important British metal companies such as British Electric Traction, Guest Keen and Nettlefold, Turner and Newall were paying workers below what was considered t o be the minimum poverty line. The 1982 Sullivan Code report noted that 142 United States companies operating i n South Africa were n o t even signatories t o the Code and o f 93 signatory companies 29 did n o t bother t o report. Although the reporting companies said they had desegregated workplace facilities and many said they supported the right o f their workers to j o i n a union, others indicated that they did not approve o f trade unions i n general, considering them t o be unnecessary. I t is widely agreed within the trade union movement and indeed b y their chief advocates like the Rev. Sullivan that without legal enforcement the codes will remain largely ineffectual. A t the Dusseldorf conference the ICFTU confirmed that the results o f the Codes remained totally inadequate and urged that legal enforcement be implemented t o ensure ‘‘that companies that breach the codes are penalised’’. A t its most basic level solidarity action is the abhorence o f the cruel tactics employed b y the South African state i n defence o f white suprematism. Every year communications appealing t o the United Nations, o r protesting t o the Republic’s Prime Minister, P . W . Botha, are sent from the trade union movement, internationally, nationally and locally. With tragic regularity pickets are held outside the South African embassy i n Trafalgar Square, London. I n 1982 further need for such solidarity occurred; the death o f Neil Aggett and the detention o f S A A W U ’ s leadership are examples o f a wave o f repression i n the 1980s. Protests b y telegram may seem futile but t o a detainee they are a source o f invaluable encouragement and continue t o embarrass the Pretoria regime. A useful example o f solidarity support has been the longrunning campaign b y the British technicians and draughtsmen’s union, AUEU-TASS for the release o f their member, Dave Kitson. Kitson, who had dual British-South African nationality was sentenced t o 20 years’ imprisonment i n 1964 because o f his involvement with SACTU and the A N C . H e was released shortly

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before the full term expired i n M a y 1984. H e said that b y the end o f his term he was receiving so many solidarity Christmas cards sent b y trade unionists from overseas that the prison governor complained about the effect i t was having o n the prison postal service! Contact established through international solidarity can also provide unexpected benefits t o the independent unions i n South Africa. A t an international conference i n Washington i n M a y 1981 delegates from black metal unions i n South Africa held a meeting with shop floor representatives o f the Polish Solidarity union. After Solidarity was suppressed following General Jaruzelski’s coup i n December 1981, many Polish workers fled as refugees t o Austria. There, recruiters from South African firms sought immigrants with specific, needed skills. The black unions i n South Africa contacted the underground leadership o f Solidarity and together with Lech Walesa they appealed t o Polish workers i n West Europe n o t t o emigrate t o South Africa and stressing the common struggle o f workers i n South Africa and Poland for human and trade u n i o n rights. Union visits

The question o f visits t o and from South Africa b y trade unionists has often excited controversy. Ill-informed trade union officials from Europe o r North America who spent more time with old-style white u n i o n leaders o r w i t h employer and government representatives rather than with black workers caused harm and confusion. Visits b y certain blacks with trade union posts who seemed t o support some o f the government’s policies also created problems for unions overseas who were uncertain as t o the exact shape o f the policies and solidarity needs o f the emerging trade unions. As noted i n Chapter 10, the problem was further complicated b y statements from organisations falsely claiming that only government stooges were allowed out o f South Africa o r trying t o assert that they should be the sole conduit o f help t o the black workers. As usual the best judge o f the usefulness o f visits are the independent unions themselves. I n the automobile industry the major black unions issued this formal statement i n 1981: “ W e strongly favour fraternal contact between workers i n South Africa and workers i n other countries, at all levels, provided this is guided b y the interests and requirements o f workers. The aims o f these visits should be t o strengthen fraternal ties between organised workers i n different countries and t o carry forward the struggle i n South Africa t o win the same rights as have been won b y workers i n other countries’’.

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POWER!

Partly i n response t o the debate about the viability o f direct contact and visits t o South Africa i n 1982 the British Labour Party’s National Executive issued a set o f guidelines (in the form o f an ‘advice note’ t o affiliated organisations). The guidelines endorsed direct contacts and visits provided that they occurred as a result o f requests from bona fide independent o r non-racial unions. The statement followed a detailed examination o f the issues b y the Labour Party’s Africa Committee which received submissions from many trade union sources including key South African unions such as C U S A and FOSATU (see Appendix 6). The largest o f the International Trade Secretariats, the International Metalworkers Federation urged, i n 1984, its 170 affiliates: ‘ ‘ t o extend solidarity with South African workers b y encouraging the development o f appropriate company-to-company workplace links and organising visits t o and from South Africa b y plant-level union leaders. Visits t o South Africa should be carefully prepared i n full consultation with the unions i n South A f r i c a ’ . I n the meantime, black workers were taking advantage o f their international links t o go overseas. FOSATU’s president, Chris Dlamini, for example, was a guest o f the French socialist union confederation C F D T at their congress i n 1982. James Motlatsi, president o f the N a t i o n a l U n i o n o f M i n e w o r k e r s , m a d e u s e f u l

contacts at the congress o f the Miners International Federation, held i n Luxembourg i n M a y 1984. British unions, including the Transport and General Workers U n i o n , the Association o f Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs and the General Municipal and Boilermakers U n i o n as well as the T U C hosted a visit b y Maxwell Z u l u , Moses Mayekiso and Geoff Schreiner, Transvaal and Natal branch officers o f the Metal and Allied Workers U n i o n i n M a r c h 1984. As well as taking part i n union education courses, they established contact with shop stewards from many companies that their union was organising i n South Africa, including Metal Box, D u n l o p , Lucas, G E C and Chloride. Black trade unionists have made similar visits t o West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United States and Canada. A t the best o f time effective solidarity is n o t easy t o achieve and i t is not only the South African government that wishes t o obstruct the links being established between the independent unions and the international trade union movement. I n many Western countries trade union solidarity for workers abroad is shackled by legislation designed t o destroy the power o f organised labour. I n Britain, the 1982 Employment A c t prevents British workers taking action i n sympathy with trade unionists engaged i n disputes overseas. The Act makes i t unlawful for workers i n Britain t o take action unless the British workers are ‘likely t o be affected’ b y the outcome o f the

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dispute abroad. Thus a union i n Britain wanting t o take action i n support o f black workers i n South Africa working for the same multinational company will be blocked. The courts would have t o decide whether the outcome o f the South African dispute would be likely t o affect the British workers’ terms and conditions o f employment. I f the case is lost there can be n o legal trade dispute and n o immunity i f the company takes court action against the union involved. I n p r o t e s t a t t h e E m p l o y m e n t A c t , T U C G e n e r a l Secretary, L e n

M u r r a y wrote t o the Prime Minister, M r s Margaret Thatcher and urged the Government t o withdraw its legislation. Stressing the international dimension he complained that i t will be illegal for trade unionists ‘ ‘ t o take action i n support o f fellow trade unionists i n other countries — such as Poland o r South Africa — i n their struggle for freedom and dignity’’. Despite such obstacles solidarity has succeeded i n advancing the workers’ struggle i n South Africa. The instances o f solidarity action described above during the disputes at Volkswagen, Coca Cola, Alfa Romeo and Rowntree are amongst just a few examples and have been chosen largely because they represent a degree o f success. Doubtless i t is easy t o list the failures, the disappointments and the unfulfilled expectations. However, the call for assistance i n defence o f trade union rights and the urgency for response is ever present. As the trade union movement worldwide struggles t o maintain its strength, the need t o gain confidence from success is paramount. I n South Africa, the independent unions are growing and challenging apartheid’s denial o f their democratic rights. Opponents o f that ‘crime against humanity’ must offer their commitment and support t o the independent unions. The battle they are engaged i n , as Joe Foster, General Secretary o f F O S A T U , comments ‘ ‘ i s p a r t o f t h e w i d e r struggle’’. I n S o u t h Africa, as

elsewhere, an independent and democratic trade union movement and a repressive state are fundamentally incompatible.

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Chapter 12

Conclusion M a y day 1984 saw the first mass celebrations o f the international workers’ day i n South Africa for nearly 30 years. I n Cape Town, 3,000 workers were packed into a crowded hall for a meeting organised b y different unions. I n Natal, thousands wore M a y Day stickers and distributed leaflets t o workers explaining the historic importance o f M a y Day. As usual, very little o f this activity was reported b y the South African media and n o foreign correspondent deemed such workers’ celebrations worth a line. B y contrast, the coverage o f the visit made b y the South African premier, P . W . Botha, to some West European capitals a month later suggested that an event o f almost world importance has taken place. Yet Botha, despite having shaken hands with M r s Thatcher, Herr Kohl and the Pope, flew back to a South Africa where a black working class was growing stronger i n terms o f its organisation, its self-development and the confidence that comes from successful struggle, as well as the experience that comes from problems and setbacks. As we have tried t o show, the range and depth o f activities o f the independent trade unions i n South Africa is remarkable. The black working class has forced the South African state and capital t o grant concessions which mark a significant, enduring increase i n black power i n the country. Each effort t o co-opt the emerging trade union movement has been swept aside. Black workers have displayed an impressive maturity i n judging how t o handle state initiatives o r how and when to use state industrial relations machinery. Commentators predicted that the recession and consequent unemployment o f the 1980s would weaken union strength and reduce worker militancy. The reverse appears t o have happened with strikes over pay, as well as j o b security, being as high i n the first months o f 1984 as they were i n the preceding three years. The potential for growth is enormous. I n the manufacturing, mining, and distribution sectors four o f five workers are still n o t union members. When and i f a united federation o f unions is set u p and is seen t o be functioning o n a continuing basis, its strength will speed u p union organisation. M a n y black workers currently i n T U C S A unions, and held there because o f closed shop provisions, are likely t o transfer t o an independent federation.

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I f the independent unions have been successful i n organisation and negotiation they have n o t been able t o prevent the government continuing t o implement, and i n many cases, worsen the effects o f the apartheid system. I f you talk to most black workers and ask what is the outstanding event o f the recent past they invariably answer: ‘Soweto’. The 1976 revolt left 700 dead and a generation o f young blacks permanently alienated. That anger is there, deep, rarely visible b u t i t constitutes a hatred o f apartheid and a burning desire t o see i t d o n e away w i t h , v i o l e n t l y i f need b e ; t h a t hatred i s a

factor that transcends the objects o f traditional trade unionism. I t is a factor o f which the white rulers o f South Africa are perfectly well aware. Today’s impressive level o f black trade union organisation i n South Africa has a precarious fragility and given the country’s history it would be foolish to dismiss the possibility o f outright suppression. I n this context the need for labour movement organisations i n the democratic countries t o develop their links and solidarity with the black trade unions i n South Africa becomes ever more urgent. Yet violent suppression is not inevitably written into the future scripts. The Afrikaans mentality has been that o f the laager, the self-protective ring against external pressure. I n the early 19th century Afrikaners and blacks fought, sometimes side b y side, against the encroachment o f imperial Britain. The Boer War is hailed as an example o f sturdy independence against a foreign master. The Nationalist victory o f 1948 was the triumph o f Afrikanerdom — o f the white tribe o f Southern Africa — over the power o f the English speakers, whose loyalty was divided between England and South Africa. Since 196(), South Africa has devised an image for internal consumption which sees itself defending Western values against a communist wave from the northern liberated black African states. South African newspapers still use the word ‘red’ o r ‘reds’ i n headlines when referring t o the Soviet U n i o n . N o w all this appears meaningless. The border states seem powerless, indeed are obliged t o sign humiliating agreements with South Africa. The only threat t o Afrikanerdom comes from within. Internal pressure is harder t o deal with than a commonly perceived external menace. I f change is t o come t o South Africa i t will d o so as a result o f what happens inside the country. I n that process, the organised black working class is likely t o play a decisive role.

142

Appendix 1 The Workers’ Struggle — Where Does FOSATU Stand? The following document is the full text o f the keynote address, given b y the FOSATU General Secretary, Joe Foster, at the FOSATU Congress i n April 1982, and endorsed b y Congress as FOSATU policy. Introduction

Three years ago — almost t o the day — we met in this very same place t o form FOSATU. Today we have set as our theme — the Workers’ Struggle — in a serious attempt to further clarify where we as worker representatives see FOSATU t o stand in this great struggle. That we are discussing this theme today and resolutions that relate t o i t is a justification o f our original decision t o form FOSATU and shows h o w seriously we take the new challenges that face us three years after that decision. Clearly any such discussion raises many very important issues and the purpose o f this paper is t o try and bring together these issues i n ways that will help guide our discussions. I t is the task o f this Congress t o give a clear policy direction t o our actions between n o w and the next Congress — we believe that the issues raised i n this paper are crucial t o a political understanding o f our policies and what we hope t o achieve b y them. W e also believe that i t is the task o f Congress t o add and modify the views expressed through open and serious debate. F O S A T U — a n Assessment

I n the three years that FOSATU has existed there is little doubt that we have achieved a lot i n terms o f growth and gains made for our members. However, I believe that our greatest achievement is the fact that at this Congress we are determined t o re-evaluate our policies. W e are determined t o respond t o new challenges and set new directions i f this is necessary. W e could have made this Congress a great occasion open t o all t o parade our successes and hide our failures, however, we have chosen otherwise. We have chosen t o keep i t closed and t o once again self-critically examine our position. I believe that this shows our determination t o take the great militancy o f our members and use this t o build a just and fair society controlled b y workers. We have n o intention o f becoming self-satisfied trade unionists incapable o f giving political direction t o the workers struggle. Yet we would only be dreaming o f change i f we d o n o t strengthen and build our unions into large and effective organisations. A t our Inaugural Congress we stressed certain policies and set ourselves the task o f establishing a tight federation o f non-racial, national, industrial

Appendix 1

143

unions, based o n shop floor strength. We set ourselves the task o f sharing resources between affiliates and o f building u p a n educational programme. W e further stressed our independence in regard t o party political organisations and from international trade union organisations. N o w i t is not m y task t o assess every success and failure o f FOSATU. There are reports tabled that will allow delegates t o draw their o w n conclusions. However, it is important t o make certain assessments i n order to go further and identify why we need t o clarify our position and set new clearer directions. I believe that we have t o ask ourselves two crucial questions: — have we established a n effective organisation based o n shop floor strength and national non-racial industrial unions? — has our organisational activity developed worker leadership that can give guidance and direction t o all workers? I n answer t o both questions it would be wrong t o expect a positive answer after only three years. However, we should be able t o assess i f we are going i n the right direction. Clearly in regard t o the first question we made progress — i t could even be said to be considerable progress — with N A A W U , N U T W and M A W U beginning t o be a significant presence i n what are major industries. However, there is a long way t o go both in these cases and more so i n those o f the other affiliates. I t is, however, the second question that poses more problems. A s the unions grow and are faced with new challenges it becomes crucial that the leadership knows what direction i t is going i n . What are the organisational strategies that are necessary as the unions become larger and more effective. What dangers t o worker militancy lie i n recognition and stability? A s these unions grow then the question is what role d o they play i n the wider political arena. There has been a great upsurge i n political activities over the last few years and many different political groups are looking t o the union movement t o state its position. We must be sure our organisation and our leadership can confidently state its position and continue t o organise i n the way that w i l l strengthen and n o t weaken that position. The purpose o f this paper is t o set out the issues we should debate i f we are t o meet the challenges. |

Working Class Movement

A s a trade union federation we are clearly concerned with workers and their aspirations. I f we were t o think i n terms o f our members only, we would have a very limited political role. I f , however, we are thinking more widely o f the working class then we have t o examine very much more carefuly what our political role is. I n particular we need t o look at this role i n the South African context. I f we l o o k at the advanced industrial countries then we see what can be called working class movements. There are a number o f different organisations — trade unions, co-operatives, political parties and newspapers — that all see themselves as linked t o the working class and furthering its interests. These working class movements are, therefore,

powerful social forces in those societies.

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I n the capitalist economies these working class movements have power and organisation yet politically the working class is still subject t o policies

and practices that are clearly against their interests as the activities o f Thatcher and Reagan show. This is increasingly leading t o intense political and organisational activity t o give the working class and the union movement a clearer direction so as t o gather together the working class movement into a force that will more definitely put workers i n control o f their o w n destiny. I n the Socialist countries similar battles are being fought. Whilst social, political and economic relations i n these countries have been greatly altered and there have been great achievements t o the benefit o f workers, there is still the need for workers themselves t o control their o w n destiny. So Solidarity was not struggling t o restore capitalism i n Poland, its struggle was t o establish more democratic worker control over their socialist society. N o w m y purpose i n briefly looking at the working class movement in the advanced industrial countries was twofold: Firstly, so that we can be clear that worker activities such as strikes and protests d o n o t i n themselves mean that a working class movement o r working class politics exist. These latter are more than that — they are large-scale organisations with a clear social and political identity as the working class. Secondly, I wished t o show that the pure size o f working class organisation is itself n o guarantee that workers will control their o w n destiny. I n fact as the struggle o f Solidarity shows, even the fact that a country is said t o be socialist does not guarantee that workers control their o w n destiny. I n short it could be said that workers must build a powerful and effective movement i f they are t o succeed in advancing their interests against some very hostile forces, b u t they must also ensure that this movement is able to take a clear political direction. The experience o f the great working class movements in the advanced industrial countries is a very important guide and lesson t o us. However, it cannot provide all our answers. Firstly, i n South Africa w e cannot talk o f a

working class movement as we have defined it above. Secondly, whilst there is undoubtedly a large and growing working class its power is only a potential power since as yet i t has n o definite social identity o f itself as working class. The questions we should, therefore, address ourselves t o , are: — W h y has n o working class movement emerged? — What are the prospects for such a movement emerging? — What role can FOSATU play i n such a process?

Political History and Workers I t is not possible i n a paper such as this to deal fully with all the developments in South Africa’s history that have led to the non-existence o f workers’ movement in South Africa. South Africa’s history has been characterised b y great repression and the major political and ideological instrument for this repression has been

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racism. Yet the major effect o f this repression has been t o very rapidly establish a large capitalist economy. Racism and the violence and injustices associated with it is a very stark and clear form o f repression. Alongside this only about 5-10 per cent o f the population has ever had the franchise. Clearly, therefore, there is a very identifiable oppressive force and the major political task o f the oppressed people has always been to attack that oppressive and racist regime. So what has developed i n South Africa is a very powerful tradition o f popular o r populist politics. The role o f the great political movements such as the A N C and the Congress Alliance has been to mobilise the masses against the repressive minority regime. I n such a situation mass mobilisation is essential so as t o challenge the legitimacy o f the state both internally and internationally. Where virtually all the population is voteless and oppressed b y a racial minority then a great alliance o f all classes is both necessary and a clear political strategy. Furthermore, building such a n alliance was a great task. The A N C had t o overcome racial division so as t o rise above the divisive racism o f the oppressors. They had t o deal with opportunistic tribal leadership, t o organise thousands upon thousands o f people and they had t o d o all this i n t h e face o f harsh repression b y t h e state. I n achieving this

there is little wonder that the A N C rose t o be one o f the great liberation movements i n Africa. I n this context i t is also easier t o see and understand why the trade-union movement acted in a particular way. The racial divisions in the working class, linked as they were t o other objective factors, made it possible for capital t o quite quickly suppress any serious challenge t o their supremacy. I t was possible t o create the conditions that led t o a politically tame union movement and thereby forced more militant and progressive unions t o bear the brunt o f state action, which in t u r n affected the politics o f these unions. Furthermore, at all times there were occasions when workers resisted b y strike action, protest and organisation. Yet this b y itself cannot constitute a working class movement. Whilst the unions were often prominent they were always small and weakly organised both nationally and i n the factories. They could not provide an organisational base for a working class movement as we have defined it above. Progressive and militant unions were continually the subject o f state harassment, b u t , never managed to seriously challenge capital nationally o r o n a sustained basis. As a result the effective political role o f progressive unions and o f worker activity was t o provide a crucial part o f any popular struggle and that was t o give it its ‘Worker Voice’. N o mass popular movement can be effective o r be seen to be effective i f i t does not have some worker involvement o r representation. B y the 1950s with the growth o f South Africa’s industry and the size o f the working class the need t o include workers became essential and as a result S A C T U became a n important element o f the Congress Alliance. I n these circumstances the progressive trade unions became part o f the popular struggle against oppression. They did not and probably could not have provided the base for working class organisation. There is o f course n o doubt that their activities have been very, very important i n creating the

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conditions that led t o the emergence in the last 10 t o 15 years o f the present progressive trade unions. However, these unions are operating i n a different environment.

Workers and their struggle became very much part o f the wider popular struggle. A n important effect o f this development was that capital could hide behind the curtains o f apartheid and racism. The political energies o f the oppressed masses and o f international critics were focused o n the apartheid regime and its abhorrent racism. The government and Afrikanerd o m became the focus o f attack. I n fact the position was such that learned liberal academics saw i n capital the great hope for change despite the fact that capital and its lackeys were undoubtedly the major beneficiaries o f apartheid. Capital did its very best t o keep i n the political background and as a result this helped prevent the creation o f capital’s logical political opposite which is a working class political movement. However, o f crucial significance was that capital was growing rapidly and changing its very nature i n t o a more monopolistic, technologically advanced and concentrated form. I t s links internationally were also growing as was its importance for international capital. We find, therefore, that behind the scenes o f the great battle between apartheid regime and its popular opponents that the capitalist economy has flourished and capital emerges n o w as a powerful and different force. I t — 1s highly concentrated i n truly gigantic corporations; — has access t o international information o n h o w t o deal with working class challenges; — has access t o the state’s security information; — 1s able t o rapidly share and assess information; — is able t o use the objective circumstances i n its favour such as unemployment and influx control t o weaken worker organisations; — is n o w a n important part o f international capital and cannot therefore, be lightly discarded b y international capital; — is able to hide behind politics and as a result can hide its sophisticated attacks o n labour because no-one is paying any attention. Yet as the upsurge o f popular political activity emerged again i n the 1970s some o f its new forms such as Black Consciousness also place little emphasis o n capital. So there is a growing gap between popular politics and the power o f capital and as a result the potential power o f workers. I t is i n this context we should l o o k at the likelihood o f a working class politics emerging.

Need for a Working Class Movement The growing size o f the economy and the dramatic changes taking place i n capital have created important new conditions i n the economy. We also have t o take i n t o account the speed and manner i n which the economy has developed. I n discussing the working class movements i n the advanced industrial economies, we have t o bear i n mind that i n most cases they t o o k about 100 years o r more t o fully develop. Industry started first b y building larger and larger factories and bringing people together i n these factories. The new capitalists had t o struggle politically with the older ruling classes

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over labour, land, taxation policy, tariff protection, political rights and political power. The mechanisation became more important and there was a definite change in production processes. A s this happened the skilled workers who had usually given leadership t o the craft unions found themselves in a very difficult position. A s a result leadership problems in the organisation o f trade unions and the political environment, developed in a complex and relatively slow way. I n South Africa this has been condensed into 60-70 years and from the outset large scale capitalist enterprises dominated. The birth o f capitalism here was brutal and quick. The industrial proletariat was ripped from its land in the space o f a few decades. A t present capitalist production massively dominates all other production. There are n o great landlords o n their agricultural estates and there is n o significant peasantry o r collective agriculture. Virtually everyone depends for all o r part o f their income o n industry or capitalist agriculture. The working class have experienced a birth o f fire i n South Africa and they constitute the major objective political force opposed t o the state and capital. There is n o significant petty bourgeoisie o r landed class with a n economic base in our society. I n the economy capital and labour are the major forces, yet politically the struggle is being fought elsewhere. The existence o f this industrial proletariat and the rapid transformation o f capital are very powerful reasons why a working class movement could rapidly develop i n South Africa. There are a number o f factors that will assist i n the organisation o f workers: — the great concentration o f capital has also meant a greater concentration o f workers. These workers generally have a higher level o f basic

education and skills than before and their links with the past are all but broken so that more and more a worker identity is emerging:

— this is reinforced by the sophisticated strategies that are designed to ‘de-

— —

—

—

racialise’ industry and some other areas o f society. The effect o f this is t o divide off certain privileged members o f Black society leaving workers at the bottom o f the privilege pile; the concentration o f workers i n industry has also concentrated them i n the great urban townships; the particular structure o f the South African economy with its high degree o f state involvement, price controls and heavy dependence o n international markets has made i t a very sensitive economy. A s a consequence attempts t o ‘ b u y off’ the major part o f the working class will fail. I t is more likely that as some readjustments o f privilege are attempted that it will have t o be workers that suffer through inflation and lack o f basic commodities; the above factors and South Africa’s international economic importance are likely t o force capital into the political open and as a consequence develop a worker response; although capital can at present hide behind apartheid it is also the case that i f workers organise widely enough they can get great support from the international labour movement. Also international public opinion

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has to be very carefully watched b y capital because both international and South African capital are dependent o n their links with the rest o f the world. These then are some o f the important factors that are favourable to the development o f a working class movement in South Africa. However, this does not mean that this will automatically happen. T o understand this, we need to look at the present political environment more carefully to see both the present political tendencies and t o establish why some active leadership role should be played b y the unions and FOSATU in particular. Workers need their o w n organisation t o counter the growing power o f capital and t o further protect their o w n interests in the wider society. However, it is only workers w h o can build this organisation and in doing this they have t o be clear o n what they are doing. A s the numbers and importance o f workers grows then all political movements have t o try and win the loyalty o f workers because they are such a n important part o f society. However, i n relation t o the particular requirements o f worker organisation, mass parties and popular political organisations have definite limitations which have t o be clearly understood b y us. W e should distinguish between the international position and internal political activity. Internationally, it is clear that the A N C is the major force with sufficient presence and stature t o be a serious challenge to the South African state and to secure the international condemnation o f the present regime. T o carry out this struggle is a difficult task because South Africa has many friends who are anxious to ensure that they can continue t o benefit from her wealth. The fact that the A N C is also widely accepted internally also strengthens its credibility internationally. However, this international presence o f the A N C which is essential t o a popular challenge t o the present regime places certain strategic limitations o n the A N C , namely: — t o reinforce its international position it has to claim credit for all forms o f resistance, n o matter what the political nature o f such resistance. There is, therefore, a tendency t o encourage undirected opportunistic political activity; — it has t o locate itself between the major international interests. T o the major Western powers it has t o appear as anti-racism but not as anticapitalist. For the socialist East it has t o be least neutral i n the superpower struggle and certainly it could not appear t o offer a serious socialist alternative t o that o f those countries as the response t o Solidarity illustrates. These factors must seriously affect its relationship t o workers; — accordingly, the A N C retains its tradition o f the 1950s and 1960s when because there was n o serious alternative political path i t rose to be a great populist liberation movement. T o retain its very important international position it has t o retain its political position as a popular mass movement. This clearly has implications for its important military activities. Internally we also have t o carefully examine what is happening politically. A s a result o f the state’s complete inability t o effect reform and

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the collapse o f their Bantustan policy, they are again resorting t o open repression. Since 1976 in particular this has given new life to popular resistance and once again the drive for unity against a repressive state has reaffirmed the political tradition o f populism i n South Africa. Various political and economic interests gather together in the popular front in the tradition o f the A N C and the Congress Alliance. I n the present context all political activity, provided it is anti-state, is o f equal status. I n the overall resistance t o this regime, this is not necessarily incorrect. I n fact without such unity and widespread resistance it would not be possible b y means o f popular mass movements t o seriously challenge the legitimacy o f the present regime. However, the really essential question is h o w worker organisation relates to this wider political struggle. I have argued above that the objective political and economic conditions facing workers is n o w markedly different t o that o f 20 years ago. Yet there does not seem t o be clarity o n this within the present union movement. There are good reasons for this lack o f clarity. A s a result o f repression most worker leadership is relatively inexperienced and this is made worse b y the fact that their unions are weak and unstable organisationally. The union struggles fought against capital have mostly been against isolated companies so that the wider struggle against capital at a n industry o r national level have not been experienced. This also means that workers and their leadership have not experienced the strength o f large-scale worker organisation nor the amount o f effort required t o build and democratise such large-scale organisation. Again state repression and the wider political activity reinforce previous experience where the major function o f workers was to reinforce and contribute t o the popular struggle. Politically, therefore, most unions and their leadership lack confidence as a worker leadership, they see their role as part o f wider struggle b u t are unclear o n what is required for the worker struggle. Generally, the question o f building a n effective worker organisation is not dealt with and political energy is spend in establishing unity across a wide front. However, such a position is clearly a great strategic error that will weaken i f not destroy worker organisation both now and in the future. All the great and successful popular movements have had as their aim the overthrow o f oppressive — most often colonial — regimes. But these movements cannot and have not in themselves been able t o deal with the particular and fundamental problem o f workers. Their task is t o remove regimes that are regarded as illegitimate and unacceptable b y the majority. It is, therefore, essential that workers must strive to build their o w n powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are part o f the wider popular struggle. This organisation is necessary t o protect and further worker interests and to ensure that the popular movement is not hijacked b y elements who will i n the end have n o option but to turn against their worker supporters. Broad and complicated matters have been covered and it is difficult t o summarise them even further. However, I shall attempt t o d o so in order for us t o try and examine the role that FOSATU can play in this struggle.

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1. That worker resistance such as strike action helps build worker organisation b u t b y itself it does not mean that there is a working class movement. 2. There has n o t been and is not a working class movement in South Africa. 3. The dominant political tradition in South Africa is that o f the popular struggle against an oppressive, racist minority regime. 4. That this tradition is reasserting itself i n the present upsurge o f political activity. 5. However, the nature o f economic development i n South Africa has brutally and rapidly created a large industrial proletriat. 6. That the size and development o f this working class is only matched b y its mirror image which is the dramatic growth and transformation o f industrial capital. 7. That before it is too late workers must strive t o form their own powerful and effective organisation within the wider popular struggle. FOSATU’s objective From what has been said we believe that FOSATU must set itself the task o f giving leadership and direction t o the building o f a working class movement. Our efforts so far have equipped us t o d o this. O u r organisation is nationally based, located in the major industries and the militancy o f our members has generally developed a politically aware and self-critical leadership. FOSATU as a trade union federation will clearly n o t constitute the working class movement nor would this place FOSATU i n opposition t o the wider political struggle or its major liberation movement. FOSATU’s task will be t o build the effective organisational base for workers t o play a major political role as workers. O u r task will be t o create an identity, confidence and political presence for worker organisation. The conditions are favourable for this task and its necessity is absolute. We need have n o fear o f critics — our task will contribute to the wider liberation struggle and will also ensure that the worker majority is able t o protect and further its interests. Ours is a fundamental political task and those who ask o f workers their political support without allowing them the right t o build their o w n organisation must answer for their real motives. As was said above, capital has transformed itself and has a greater capacity t o tolerate worker organisation because i t is n o w more powerful and better able t o deal with a worker challenge. Also because o f its absolutely central position i t will have the full support o f the state i n its actions and i n the bitter struggles that are t o come. This requires a very much greater effort t o establish worker organisation and requires thorough organisational work and ceaseless mobilisation o f our members. The growth and transformation o f capital has created the very preconditions for large-scale worker organisation. Our concrete tasks and challenges

I f we set the above as our general direction then we must deal with concrete tasks and challenges.

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Organisation

What is crucial in organisation is the quality o f the organisation — the quality that gives it its overall political direction and capability. As is clear from the experience o f the advanced industrial countries that we looked at earlier, organisational size alone is not enough, yet without size there can be n o effective counter t o capital. Broadly one can distinguish three factors that affect the quality o f worker organisation — the structure o f organisational strength and decision making; the location o f organisational strength and the political qualities o f its leadership structures. Structure

The structure o f an organisation should be such that i t correctly locates worker strength and makes best use o f that strength. FOSATU’s experience i n this has been very important. Our organisation is built u p from the factory floor. A s a result, the base o f the organisation is located where workers have most power and authority and that i t where production takes place. This also has the effect o f democratising our structures since worker representatives always participate from a position o f strength and authority i n the organisation. B y stressing factory bargaining we involve our Shop Stewards i n central activities and through this they gain experience as worker leadership. I t should be said that they d o battle every day. These factory-based structures are the key t o transforming pure quantity o f members i n t o a flexible and effective quality. Capital’s hostility t o factory organisation forces members and Shop Stewards t o struggle continuously o r else t o have their organisation crushed. A t the u n i o n level FOSATU has attempted t o build broad industrial unions o n a national basis. We, in effect, have a position o f one affiliate per industry. W e have chosen industrial unions because o f the organisational advantages we gain i n our struggle against capital. However, FOSATU’s role is t o link these industrial unions i n t o a tight federation that is based o n common policy and a sharing o f resources. O u r aim is t o keep a unity o f purpose among affiliates at all levels o f their organisation. Our task i n the three years t o come must be t o consolidate and develop factory organisation, a national presence for our unions and t o reassert unity o f purpose among affiliates. The structures we are developing are a n essential basis for effective and democratic organisation and are the basis for greater worker participation i n and control over production. Location

The question o f location is closely related t o structure. Without correct structures then the location o f one’s organisational strength is n o t as important. W e must accept that i t will take many years t o organise all workers and at present that should not be our aim. Our present aim must be t o locate our organisation strategically. We need to l o o k at the location o f our

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organisational strength in relation t o the industry, geographic area and the points at which we can most effectively carry out collective bargaining. Our major affiliates should be located in the major industries. Within those industries we must become a substantial presence b y carefully building our organisation i n major factories, companies and areas. Geographically we must clearly aim t o be a national presence both as FOSATU and as the affiliates. Our organisation should be able t o dominate major industrial areas. B y doing this we create the major means whereby worker organisation can play a significant i f not dominant role i n the communities that surround these industrial areas. Successful collective bargaining requires that the organisation is capable o f mobilising its members behind demands. Thus far our unions have only really been able t o mobilise at the plant level. However, the experience o f N A A W U which is exceptional in FOSATU has shown what can be gained b y mobilising across companies. We have flexible structures and we must use them i f we are t o serve our members. W e must be able t o mobilise across factories and i n local areas across industries. W e must see industry bargaining o r regional bargaining n o t as something t o be feared but as the logical extension o f our present structures and practices. Worker leadership

Here we must be immediately clear that we are not talking about leadership in the sense that it is usually discussed — which is in terms o f individuals and ‘great men’. This view o f leadership is not what is important for a worker organisation. What we are interested i n is the elected representatives o f workers and the officials they appoint to work within the organisation. We are interested in h o w the leadership is elected o r appointed; who i t is answerable t o and h o w this accountability is achieved; h o w experienced leadership is and h o w i t gains this experience and h o w they develop means o f training and educating leadership so that it remains self-critical and politically active. The challanges facing worker leadership are undoubtedly different t o other leadership groups. For worker leadership in a capitalist society, your everyday struggle is related t o your j o b and therefore your wage and therefore your very ability t o survive. The most appropriate comparison is w i t h that o f the guerrilla fighter who has t o develop the strength t o resist daily, the knowledge o f his terrain that will give him every tactical advantage and the support o f those for whom he is struggling. Probably most important because both the worker leader and the guerrilla are fighting a powerful enemy, is the development o f a sense o f when t o advance and when t o retreat. These skills are not easily learnt and not easily replaced. So worker leadership cannot be wasted b y opportunistic and overly adventuristic actions. W e are also concerned with worker leadership i n a wider arena than only that o f the union struggle. Giving leadership t o the working class requires a n organisational base. Without this base, then the poverty and the lack o f education, information and time that workers are struggling against will be

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the very factors which will force workers t o surrender leadership o f the community t o other strata i n society. Our aim is to use the strength o f factory-based organisation to allow workers t o play a n effective role in the community. Worker leadership will have: — gained invaluable political experience from their factory struggles; — organisation and resources behind them; — organisational structures and location that will give them localised strength; — the ability to speak with a clear and democratically established worker mandate. The points made here should be our guide for action and we have a long way t o go in building a larger leadership structure that has the political qualities o f clarity, determination, discipline and the ability t o be selfcritical. Working class identity The task o f organisation outlined above and more important, the quality o f that organisation will absorb most o f our energies i n the next three years, and is, therefore, our major priority. Yet to give leadership in the building o f a working class movement we must start t o build a greater identity for worker organisation. I n a very important way the building o f effective trade unions does create a worker identity. However, there is the danger that the unions become preoccupied with their members and ignore workers generally. B y establishing a clear political direction we can avoid this. One answer that is often proposed is t o be involved in community activities. That FOSATU should be involved in community activities is correct since our members form the major part o f those communities. However, as we have argued above we must d o so from a n organisational base i f we are truly to be a n effective worker presence. Without this base, it is more likely that we will destroy a clear worker identity since workers will be entirely swamped b y the powerful tradition o f popular politics that we examined earlier. I t is also the case that there has emerged into our political debate a n empty and misleading political category called ‘the community’. All communities are composed o f different interest groups and for a worker organisation to ally itself with every community group o r action would be suicide for worker organisation. Under the surface o f unity community politics is partisan and divided. FOSATU cannot possibly ally itself to all the political groups that are contesting this arena. Neither can it ally itself with particular groups. Both paths will destroy the unity o f its o w n worker organisation. This simple political fact is the reason for one o f our founding resolutions. It has nothing t o d o with not wanting t o be involved i n politics.

Our whole existence is political and we welcome that. Our concern is with the very essence o f politics and that is the relation between the major classes i n South Africa being capital and labour. We need t o state this more clearly and understand i t ourselves more

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clearly. There is also n o doubt that we must take our o w n newspaper very much more seriously as it can be a major instrument in building a worker identity. A t the level o f organisation we have a sound base o n which t o w o r k . Probably our main problem has been that we did n o t clearly state why we had chosen certain structures and what could be achieved b y them. A s our political clarity and confidence grows, so we must state our position more clearly in our meetings, among our members and through our own newspaper. Unity in the Labour Movement Our first step must be t o address ourselves t o unity i n the labour movement. I f we are t o create a working class movement then trade union unity has t o be dealt with very early o n in our struggle. Because we take working class politics seriously we must take trade union unity seriously. A t present there is a very great momentum t o unity i n the labour movement and we have to carefully consider and analyse what is happening. The first point to understand is that all the unions involved in the talks are relatively weak in relation t o their potential — some appallingly so. Many are too easily fooled b y their o w n propaganda and the great interest shown b y everyone into believing that they are n o w a strong force. Furthermore, with a few exceptions (mostly i n FOSATU), these unions are not yet a national o r a n industrial presence. Their strengths lie i n isolated factories and very few have any real geographic concentration. A s a result, both the leadership o f these unions and their membership have n o clear conception o f the organised power o f capital nor for that matter o f its weakness. There is n o real experience o f the difficulties o f large-scale worker organisation nor o f the difficulties in building democratic worker structures. The b u l k o f the present leadership has n o clear conception o f

the needs of worker struggle or of a worker dominated society. There is all t o o often a contradiction between the political position and organisational practice. Radical political positions are adopted b u t the organisational

practice makes little headway into the power o f capital nor is it effectively democratic. A number o f factors result from this — often capital is attacked i n the ‘abstract’ b y making i t all powerful and accordingly seeing an attack o n the state as the only answer, o r political energies are spend i n widespread campaigns. Actual worker organisation and advance is left weak and based o n sporadic upsurges rather than o n organisational strength. As a consequence o f these factors it is not possible for people t o draw any distinction between worker struggle and popular struggle let alone understand the relation between the t w o i n South Africa. The unity talks are therefore conceived o f as being within the wider popular struggle and as another area where anti-state unity can be achieved. A formal unity rather than a working unity against capital is therefore seen as the prime object. There are broadly speaking three forms o f unity t o the union movement at present and we should l o o k at each fairly carefully: A d hoc unity: this is what has occurred at present where unity is issue-

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located and there are attempts t o take a common stand. A t present this unity is significant i n that it creates unity out o f apparent disunity. However, its significance will rapidly decline. Such a d hoc unity can only achieve anything o n specific issues and i t is inevitably forced t o take more and more concerted and concrete actions unless i t merely wants t o be the source o f endless press statements. Such further actions require a more permanent organisational l i n k . United front unity: here the organisations remain autonomous but they set u p a permanent platform o f contact. Some people seem t o see the solidarity committees as such as platform. However, although this provides a more definite organisational l i n k , considerable new problems are posed. Again the movement is towards more and more significant gestures o f protest and the problem n o w posed is h o w are decisions to be taken and o n what mandate. Does each organisation have an equal vote o r is voting b y size? I f decisions are o n a consensus basis — then o n what mandate? Should each organisation get a formal mandate o n each issue and i f they d o n ’ t , h o w representative o f rank and file membership is each decision? I s there not a greater than usual danger o f decisions being taken b y a few officials who have easy access t o the meetings? A permanent organisational l i n k requires a process for making decisions that is democratic and equitable. Furthermore, i f solidarity actions are t o be successful they require organisational co-ordination — this i n turn requires the power t o sanction. H o w can this be done i f participants are entirely autonomous? A further step i n this type o f unity can be a ‘loose federation’ such as TUCSA, where the unions are n o w all i n the same federal organisation and the symbolism o f unity is far greater. However, such a federal body — n o t being based o n any clear principles — is unlikely t o generate working unity as i t would contend with numerous problems o f jurisdiction between unions and i t is unlikely that organisational rationalisation could take place without firm policies and particular structures. I n fact ‘United front u n i t y ’ , with o r without a loose federation, can destroy the hope o f greater unity b y creating unresolved differences and n o acceptable way o f resolving these. Disciplined unity: this requires common political purpose, binding policy o n affiliates and close working links based o n specific organisational structures.

I f such a federation is based on industrial unions then FOSATU is the closest t o being an example o f such ‘undisciplined unity’ — i n the present circumstances. I f the federation were not based o n a n industrial structure but o n a regional one, then i t is more difficult t o set out its working structures since there is n o clear experience o f h o w this would w o r k . However, there is n o doubt that some allowance would have t o be made for industrial considerations and the industrial organisation o f capital. I n FOSATU we have argued that industrial unions i n a ‘tight federation’ allow for maximum flexibility and efficacy. I t is clear from this that unity means little unless these factors are taken i n t o account. T o talk lightly o f unity is t o keep it within the framework o f

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a d hoc o r united front unity. The effectiveness o f such unity would rapidly disappear. So i f that is what is meant b y unity we have t o imply certain possible motives o f its proponents: — inexperience and lack o f thought o n the matter; — political expediency whereby this unity is for specific limited ends o f embarrassing certain organisiations; — a preoccupation with popular politics and a lack o f commitment t o the building o f a working class political position. However, i f we i n FOSATU are t o take our objective seriously and that objective is the building o f a working class movement then we have t o take unity very seriously. Clearly b y unity we should strive for ‘disciplined unity’ since it is only such unity that can possibly meet our objective. We must ourselves work out a programme for unity and o n the basis o f that programme we should not hesitate t o attack those who are impeding the development o f a working class movement. Conclusion

The issues that have been covered in this paper are important and complicated — they are the basis for a n understanding o f the true nature o f the workers struggle i n South Africa and the political role our organisation must play in that struggle. We believe that in FOSATU we have a firm base o n which t o build organisationally. Our task in the three years t o come is t o firmly commit ourselves t o a working class political position. With this greater political understanding we must: — consolidate our organisational structures; — give guidance and leadership i n the building o f a larger working class movement i n South Africa; — seek out comrades and allies who will j o i n us i n this struggle; — and in this way make our fundamental contribution t o the liberation o f the oppressed people o f South Africa. I n doing this we must all be clear that we shall never be so petty as t o insist o n our organisation’s name as the only one in the trade union movement which can carry out this task. I t is what the organisation does that is important — not what it is called. Yet equally, we shall never be so politically foolish as to abandon the worker struggle.

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Appendix 2 The General Workers’ Union o n the United Democratic Front I n November 1983, the South African Labour Bulletin (SALB) published a series o f interviews and statements about the relationship o f the emerging trade unions with the black political groupings in South Africa, in particular, the United Democratic Front (UDF). T o begin with S A L B interviewed the General Workers’ Union o n its attitude t o the United Democratic Front. The following preamble from the G W U explains the context i n which it felt it necessary t o clarify its views publicly. The preamble is followed b y the interview. Amidst the controversy surrounding the position o f many unions with regard t o the U D F , the G W U feels that it is important that our position and views o n this issue are clear. I n addition, we believe that debate o f this nature is healthy within and between progressive organisations. This controversy has involved much criticism. W e d o n o t see criticism as necessarily negative. Some criticism may be based o n a detailed understanding of, and disagreement with, our reasons for not affiliating t o the U D F . This merely reflects the fact that, quite predictably, different outlooks o n political issues d o exist within the democratic movement. Some criticism has, however, been based o n a distortion o f our position. Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that there has not been enough detailed publication o f our reasons for not affiliating t o the UDF. W e take issue with claims and resulting criticisms that we d o not support the U D F o r that we are ‘ n o t interested i n politics’. The interview with our General Secretary answers these allegations in detail. W e stress again what we have repeatedly and publicly stated: that we support any organisation opposing the new constitution and other laws which deny the majority o f South Africans democracy. Our support obviously extends t o the U D F . W e have stated our willingness t o participate jointly i n campaigns and give our general support i n a variety o f ways. Neither d o we say ‘we will never j o i n the UDF’, a view attributed t o us i n some reports. W e d o have real difficulties, however, and explain these, in affiliating as a single workers’ organisation to the U D F . One possible scenario for the future mentioned i n the interview is that o f a national union federation affiliating t o a national political body. I t must be emphasised once again however, that we are a n organisation which acts o n mandates from our membership. A s such, this kind o f unity would have t o be one called for b y the rank-and-file members. A s stated i n the interview, a national union federation may provide workers with the necessary support t o participate in a multi-class organisation. Participation o f workers o n the ground rather than through a n alliance merely ‘at the t o p ’ would still be imperative.

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We put our views forward in the hope o f clarifying the present misunderstanding and encouraging discussion. Why has the General Workers Union decided n o t to affiliate to the United Democratic Front?

The first p o i n t , which we’ve stated repeatedly, is that we are committed t o supporting any organisation which opposes the constitutional proposals and the Koornhof Bills, and the U D F would obviously be primary amongst those organisations. W e are also committed to the idea o f joint campaigns with the U D F i n opposing the Bills and the constitution. But we d o n ’ t see our way clear t o affiliating t o the U D F . Our difficulties there relate t o two broad areas, two broad issues. The first concerns the structure o f many o f the other organisations that are affiliated t o the U D F , relative t o the structure o f a trade union. These structures are very distinct and critically different. Our second major area o f difficulty relates t o the essentially single class nature, working class nature o f trade unions, relative to the multi-class nature o f the U D F , and o f many o f the organisations affiliated t o the UDF. What d o you see as the essential differences in General Workers Union and other trade unions, many o f the organisations affiliated to the UDF, those differences present obstacles to affiliation to

structure between the o n the one hand, and and why d o you think the same organisation?

The answer t o that question is long and complicated. I t ’ s relatively simple, difficult as that has proved t o be i n practice, for one union t o affiliate t o another union, because trade unions t o all intents and purposes have identical structures. They all have factory structures, branch structures, and national structures, so that one union can fairly easily lock into another union at all levels o f both organisations. This is simply not the case with a great many o f the U D F . T o take two concrete examples from the Western Cape: the Ecumenical Action Group called T E A M , and the Detainees Parents Support Committee. The former is a grouping o f progressive priests, and the latter is a grouping o f individuals dedicated t o opposing detention, and providing support for those i n detention. Let me be clear from the outset that both o f these are laudable and necessary ventures, b u t neither bear any similarity whatsoever t o the structure o f a union. The same can be said i n varying degrees o f a great number o f other organisations affiliated t o the UDF, all the youth and student bodies, for example. The critical feature that all these organisations have i n common, as far as we can see, is that they are primarily organisations o f activists. T o say they are organsations o f activists is n o t intended as a slight i n any way, and we believe that there is a great need for this type o f organisation i n South Africa. But we still insist that they bear n o similarity i n their structure o r organisational practice t o a trade union. This problem has been recognised b y the UDF, i n the Western Cape, where some organisations, referred t o as mass-based organisations, have been given a certain number o f delegates. Other organisations, those that we would primarily refer t o as activist organisations, have been given a smaller number o f delegates. While this recognises that differences d o exist, we believe that i t is a n

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inadequate recognition. The difference between an activist organisation and a mass-based organisation is not one o f size, and therefore o f the number o f delegates t o a central b o d y , but rather o f the entire structure and functioning o f the organisation. A s we see i t , a n activist organisation is essentially a grouping o f likeminded individuals, who are brought together b y a common political goal. Their activity consists in propagating their ideas amongst a constituency which they themselves define. Activists grouped together in this way, i n an organisation o f this sort, have a great deal o f freedom o f manoeuvre i n the extremely flexible parameters i n which they operate. They d o n ’ t represent members in a strong sense. They propagate ideas amongst a certain constituency, o r in a certain area, and as such play a very important political role. Unions, o n the other hand, are not organisations o f activists, and union leaders are not activists in the same sense at all, because they are representatives i n the strongest sense. Union leaders d o n ’ t claim t o represent the views o f the working class. They represent the views o f their members. Church o r student activists, can claim t o represent the broader social aspirations o f church congregations o r student bodies and it doesn’t really matter whether they are actually mandated b y the broad mass o f students o r churchgoers, o r whether they are n o t . B y propagating their

ideas or their line they attempt to make students or churchgoers aware of their broader interests and their social role. A union leader, o n the other hand, can’t go t o a factory and claim t o speak for the working class. H e has t o be mandated b y workers i n a factory, and he has t o be reasonably sure that the particular workers who have mandated h i m back u p his mandate. I n a union situation there is n o alternative t o working that way. The critical upshot o f this is that a union representative has t o go through a long and very arduous process o f receiving mandates and constantly ensuring that the mandates are backed. Union leaders d o n ’ t derive their position from discussing ideas from amongst a small group o f comrades, and then propagating these ideas widely. They derive their position from the members whom they’ve organised, and w h o send them forward with a specific mandate. Unquestionably union leaders can influence the mandate that is given b y discussing issues with the rank and file, b u t ultimately they are very tightly bound t o the specific decisions o f members. This is, as far as we see, what a mass-based organisation means. I t ’ s got nothing t o d o with the size o f the organisation, its got t o d o with the difference between organisational politics and activist politics. The structure o f a union derives from the relationship between the shop steward committee and the members i n a particular factory. I t is undoubtedly at that level where the mandated relationship is the strongest, b u t i t works i n that way all the way u p t o the top o f the organisation, all the way u p t o the national conference, and we cannot, change our hats t o suit different occasions, and still retain our character as representative organisations. We have t o go through the process o f getting these mandates, we have t o k n o w that our members are willing t o back the mandates and what they are willing t o d o . I f we don’t d o that our participation is either meaningless, o r even worse than that, our participation could be construed b y our members as being i n violation o f the most basic trade u n i o n principle, namely the

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principle o f representivity. Those considerations simply d o n ’ t apply t o a large number o f the organisations affiliated to the U D F . Most o f the organisations affiliated t o the U D F have as their legitimate political task, t o appeal to the masses ‘ o u t there’. We have as our task the representation o f the workers inside our organisation, and the painstaking process o f drawing more and more members into the formal and disciplined structure o f a trade union. This is a major reason why we’ve found i t difficult t o envisage fitting into the structure o f the U D F . We’ve experienced huge difficulty in explaining t o our members h o w we would fit into the U D F as a union, yet conversely we have found it very easy t o explain to our members h o w we would fit into a trade union federation. The difficulties that we have d o n ’ t arise from the issues which the U D F has been set u p t o tackle. These have been discussed in the union, and they are very broadly appreciated. But affiliation has aroused very little interest. There’s one additional point that I want to emphasise. We’ve stated repeatedly that we’ll encourage our members to j o i n the U D F . Well, given the federation structure o f the U D F , that’s impossible, but we’ll encourage our members t o j o i n organisations that are affiliated to the U D F . Should one o fo u r members rise t o become even a leader o f the U D F , we would not view that as inconsistent with union policy i n the slightest. I n fact i t would probably be a source o f great pride t o the union, just as i t ’ s a source o f great pride t o us whenever any o f our members become leaders i n their progressive community organisations. But we d o not see our way clear to representing our members as a union in the U D F . Your referred earlier to problems in the relationship between the union as a single class organisation, and other organisations affiliated to the U D F which are multi-class organisations. Could y o u elaborate o n that? I t ’ s not even primarily a question that the union is a single-class organisation, but that the union is a working class organisation, and a working class organisation only. A union b y definition is open t o workers only. This is not t o say that there are never divisions in a trade union. There obviously are. There are a group o f people in a trade union who are not workers, namely all the full-time officials, and their interests have always t o be subordinated t o the interests o f the members. There are also divisions within a union o n the basis o f the skill categorisation o f workers in a factory. I n South Africa there are also the inevitable racial differences and potential divisions between section 10 people and contract people. I t ’ s these divisions which the constitution and the Koornhof Bills have been set u p t o widen. They are divisions that we always have t o work o n , that we always have t o work at overcoming. But notwithstanding these divisions, all our members are working class. They are all factory members, and they are all members o f the broader society. This means that they identify, quite correctly, as their source o f oppression, the bosses and the state. That has bearing o n the question o f our affiliation t o the U D F . For one thing, we will inevitably be an organisation that incorporates a great diversity o f political views and affiliations. W e ’ l l have within our ranks members with militant political views, and we’ll have in our ranks members with fairly conservative political views. W e ’ l l also have within our ranks a great many

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members who have few political views at all, people who have joined the organisation purely to fight their bosses. With a certain degree o f tension n o w and again, those diverse views can all be contained within an organisation, because they are all held b y workers. T o a certain extent this could also be said o f any other mass-based organisation. I t could be said o f student organsations where these are massbased, it could be said o f womens’ organisations where they are massbased, it could be said even o f a community organisation. I t is conceivable that a woman joins a womens’ organisation t o fight womens’ issues. Such a n organisation should be able t o contain within i t a fair diversity o f general political views as well. But there are two key differences. The first is that student and community organisations, and, although not necessarily correctly, women’s organisations, tend to identify the state as their source o f oppression. This means that they are inevitably more clearly politically defined, and their membership is more clearly a politically based membership. They d o n ’ t have the bosses t o intercede in the struggle in the same way that workers in a trade union d o . Secondly, the fact o f the matter is that in South Africa, most non-trade union progressive organisations, tend t o identify themselves quite strongly with one o r another political tendency. This o f course involves particular problems in Cape T o w n . I don’t know i f these problems are the same everywhere else. But here the community organisations are divided quite clearly into two groups. There was a

possibility that affiliation could jeopardise the unity of, i f not directly our union in Cape Town, certainly o f some other unions in Cape T o w n . This is also especially sensitive when we’ve identified as a priority the formation o f a trade union federation, with the even greater diversity o f views that are contained therein. Just as we wouldn’t want t o d o anything that would jeopardise the unity o f the whole trade union movement. I ’ m aware that opens us u p t o what has become a currently fashionable charge, namely that we are economistic. Although it’s not always clear from those levelling the accusation, I take this t o mean that we concentrate our activities exclusively o n wages and working conditions, that we’re not concerned with political struggle, that the only basis o f our unity is the struggle i n the factory. I t ’ s as such, a unity that makes little positive contribution t o the national democratic struggle. There are two answers to this: the first is that a union must inevitably carry within it the tendency towards economism. A factory-based organisation b y definition sets itself certain limits, and the General Workers Union has never made any claim t o mystically transcend these limits. The second answer to the question is that the accusation reflects a very narrow, formalistic notion o f what politics is, and that’s what really brings us t o a point pertinent to the question o f the class composition o f the union. I t has to be acknowledged that workers are a very special group i n the society. They are the class, unfashionable that term might be, that produces the wealth o f the country. As such they are the most exploited and oppressed members o f society. This special place o f the workers in society is currently recognised i n a very peculiar and inverse way b y other groups in society. The way i n which i t ’ s recognised i n South Africa is b y frantic attempts b y other groupings t o eliminate the

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differences between themselves and the working class. What you have ranges from the laughable assertion made some years ago t o the effect that all blacks are workers, t o more serious assertions made b y community leaders and very often trade union leaders today, t o the effect that the community are the workers and the workers are the community, o r student activists who are the workers o f tomorrow, o r women’s organisations w h o are the wives and daughters o f the workers. All these assertions have a kernel o f t r u t h , b u t t o be a worker o f tomorrow is not t o be a worker o f today. More pertinently i t doesn’t go any way towards transforming a student organisation i n t o a workers’ organisation. T o say that workers constitute the majority o f any black community i n South Africa is obviously true, b u t i t doesn’t mean that workers constitute the majority o f community organisation, o f organised community organisation, o f organised community members. I n fact, it’s lamentable, but nonetheless true, that community organisations have had relatively little insertion i n t o the ranks o f contract workers, for example. I n those rare cases where the majority o f a particular community organisation are i n fact working class people, its possible that these working class members will have little influence at the t o p o f the organisation i n the decision m a k i n g structures o f t h e

organisation. I want t o be clear about one thing: when we say that workers are the most oppressed and exploited members o f society, that means, at the general level, that workers d o n o t have access t o the means o f production, and that, t o be workers, they have t o be deprived o f the possibility o f turning themselves i n t o bosses. This, even at that general level, is n o t necessarily true o f other groups i n society. I t ’ s not for example necessarily true o f students. But what i t means at a more specific level, a level more specific t o our problems with affiliation t o the U D F , t o a multi-class organisation, is that workers as a class are necessarily denied access t o skills and education, other than those that are directly required b y the bosses i n production. They are denied the skills o f articulation and language, o f literacy, numeracy, i n fact o f the whole culture and short hand which a smoothly functioning organisation seems t o require. This is n o t t o mention the fact that workers also have very little time at their disposal, o r at any rate the time at the disposal o f the workers is very rigidly controlled. I t is i n fact control that is key-defining element o f what i t means t o be a member o f the working class. Every minute o f a worker’s time is controlled, he’s t o l d when and how and where he’ll w o r k , he’s t o l d when and where and how he’ll sleep, he has n o control over whether he is employed one day and unemployed the next day. A l l workers have, i n a sense, is their unity. This is why workers tend so naturally t o take and implement decisions en masse, and conversely why other groupings i n society are so comfortable w i t h taking decisions individually o r i n small groups, even, which is very characteristic o f student organisations, t o break u p large gatherings i n t o small groups t o facilitate decision making and discussion. The point o f this digression isn’t t o say that workers should never cooperate, never work together with organisations o f non-workers, o r organisations i n which non-workers are also members. W e would expect

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this o f our members. But we wouldn’t be surprised, and nobody else should be surprised, i f when our members d o work i n this way, they insist o n carrying into these organisations the culture and demands o f the working class, and the culture and demands o f a working class organisation. Because, and this is where I really d o want t o answer the charge o f economism t o some extent, unquestionably the democratic u n i o n movement i n South Africa has w o n substantial economic gains, and t o be sure we’ve spent a major part o f our time and energy i n making these economic gains. But i n the democratic unions, the workers have also i n addition won a new pride and dignity, a self-confidence i n their ability t o take and implement decisions. This is really the key aspect o f unions’ political w o r k . The acquisition b y our members o f an awareness o f their o w n power, an awareness o f their ability t o participate i n their o w n way i n the most complex and difficult decisions. We don’t claim for one minute that this should o r does represent the totality o f our political work. N o r d o we make the claim that this is sufficient t o democratise South Africa. B u t we are absolutely certain that the level o f organisation o f workers i n South Africa has reached a stage where they simply w o n ’ t settle for any less than the right t o participate fully i n any political o r community organisations that they form, o r that they j o i n . This is especially so i f they j o i n these organisations i n their capacities as union members. They won’t be satisfied with formal symbols o f power, nor will they be satisfied w i t h power where the ability t o exercise that power resides with the more skilled and educated union bureaucrats, where they become i n a sense silent b u t nevertheless muscular participants in the whole process.

We don’t here want to get into a detailed critique of the U D F as such. B u t the U D F has t o ask itself whether its style and tone, whether the language spoken, whether the pace at which it’s developed, whether its programme, facilitate the fullest participation b y working class people. O u r members simply d o not feel that way. They’ve never, for example, appreciated the need for the sophisticated structures which the U D F have introduced. This is not because they are backward o r stupid, b u t because they are advanced leaders o f their own organisation, an organisation which has been i n existence for 10 years. We’ve never i n the 10 years o f our existence found the need t o set u p single sub-committees, let along a highly sophisticated and complex structure. The workers have not felt that they’ve had the time t o participate i n the endless debate surrounding the setting u p o f the U D F . This is not because they are uninterested i n politics, b u t because they d o arduous full-time jobs and they believe, unlike activists generally, that meetings are only necessary when the meetings have a very clear and defined objective, and when there’s the possibility o f that objective being fulfilled at the meeting. We encouraged, for example, our members t o attend the launching o f the U D F . A fair number attended, but the vast majority o f those who attended didn’t understand the meeting, because i t was i n English.

Principally the workers don’t understand what programme of action is envisaged b y the U D F , and this is obviously very critical. Given the above, there is a feeling o n the part o f the workers that they w i l l not be able t o participate fully i n the decisions that lead t o a programme o f action, and

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this is anathema t o an organised worker. They are not going t o be drawn into an organisation in which they feel that they will have t o take action blindly, without having participated in the decision making. Those are really the key aspects o f the class composition o f the organisations: firstly, that we draw in our membership from a very wide and diverse range o f political views, unlike most o f the other organisations participating in the UDF, and secondly, that our members are working class people, and as working class they come from a culture that is very distinct from that o f other more privileged members o f society. There has been a lot o f talk about the importance o f working class leadership in national political organisation. Are you saying that working class leadership does n o t amount to the presence of individual members of the working class within national politically oriented organisations, but rather that the working class should have a leading status, within national political organisations?

I think that I mean b o t h . I t is essential that working class individuals occupy leading positions i n national political organisations, inside the country. I t ’ s important because I believe the second t o be true as well, that workers must have a special status in multi-class organisations. Workers m u s t have t h e opportunity t o lead the pace and style and t o n e and language

— i n fact the whole discourse — o f the organisation. The reason why it’s important, and the reason why I think that it’s important t o examine the questions raised with respect t o the UDF, is that democracy in this country is inconceivable without the fullest struggle. This is not merely because the working class is the largest and most muscular group i n society. Simply put, they are the only social grouping with a class interest in democracy. Other social classes o r social groupings might have a n interest i n relative o r partial democratisation o f society; other individuals might have a moral interest i n a thorough going democratisation o f society. But the working class which has every aspect o f i t ’ s life — its economic life and its political life, very rigidly controlled, is the one class in society that has a n interest i n a thorough going democratisation o f the economy and the polity. Working class organisation in South Africa has developed to the stage where workers insist o n the right to participate fully, in the structures o f any organisation o f which they are members.

The participation o f Western Cape trade unions in the Disorderly Bills Action Committee (DBAC) last year, seemed to be a n unsatisfactory experience, n o t only for the trade unions, b u t for the other organisations participating in the DBAC. Very little was achieved after a long series of meetings. To what extent d o you think this has discouraged workers and trade unions in the Western Cape from participating in the UDF, which is seen as some bigger form o f the DBAC. I n the initial stages o f the formation o f the UDF, our experience o f the D B A C definitely did influence our feelings about participating in the UDF. The experiences o n the D B A C were uniformly negative, i n the sense that we found ourselves i n the middle o f extraordinary squabbles. Sometimes they seemed t o be squabbles based o n straight power plays, straight questions o f

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dominance between the t w o factions o f the community organisation i n Cape T o w n . The upshot o f that was nothing got done, with respect t o the Koornhof Bills. I recall a laughable situation o n one occasion — I myself wasn’t present there, but our representatives reported — where in the same week that the Koornhof Bills were withdrawn, the D B A C met. They sat through an entire three- o r four-hour meeting without once mentioning the Koornhof Bills. The D B A C seemed t o be set u p for some other purpose altogether. The purpose seemed t o be one grouping i n the community t o achieve domination over another grouping i n the community. This did

colour our participation in the UDF at first, but it doesn’t any more. We, like I imagine other groups who were equally disappointed with their experience o f the D B A C , have shaken off the ill effect o f that experience. Where it does still colour our decision is that particularly some unions draw their membership from one o f these groupings in the community, and there are sometimes members o f other community groupings in the union. W e would not wish these differences in the community t o intercede in the unity o f a trade union, both o f the grouping o f trade unions in the Western Cape, and also o f particular individual trade unions. You talked earlier about thefact that the General Workers’ Union supports the development o f other progressive organisations in the community, and that it encourages participation o f General Workers’ Union members in those organisations. I n what concrete ways has the General Workers’ Union supported the development of these organisations, and h o w does it aim to d o so in future? The primary way, i n which we attempt t o facilitate the development o f broader community organisations is b y taking u p broader issues i n our union. This we’ve always done, and we continue t o d o . The issue o f the Koornhof Bills and the constitution has been very substantially discussed i n the union right from the beginning, before many o f the organisations that have been specifically set u p t o oppose the Bills were even conceived of. This is really the primary way in which we support other organisations. W e would also support them, and we’ve said this repeatedly, b y encouraging our members t o j o i n these organisations. We’ve fairly consistently been asked t o give our members to other organisations. Well, our answer t o that is that our members are not locked in concentration camps, our members are in the community, i n the townships. They must be organised, and we would certainly encourage them t o j o i n these organisations.

What is the union’s current relationship with the UnitedDemocratic Front, and what possible future developments d o you see? O n the question o f our current relationship to the U D F , we definitely see a role for ourselves as a union relative to the U D F . We’ve said repeatedly that we are prepared t o engage i n j o i n t campaigns with the U D F , and that we are prepared t o support U D F campaigns. W e hope t o be informed o f U D F activities, o f U D F meetings, t o enable us t o encourage our members t o go t o these meetings. Both o f a local o r regional nature. W e hope that we will receive U D F newsletters and information sheets and that we will be

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able t o hand these out t o our members. For example, i n the very near future in Cape Town the U D F are holding a meeting t o discuss what is going o n i n the Ciskei. W e see what is going o n in the Ciskel as critically important t o us, obviously. We also see i t as a critically important exposé o f the constitutional proposals, and therefore legitimately within the UDEF’s ambit. W e would certainly support them i n that campaign. As t o the future, that’s a little b i t hypothetical at the moment, I can’t ever envisage the General Workers U n i o n affiliating t o the U D F . Although obviously I can’t speak for any other union, I can envisage a situation where a f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p develops between a n a t i o n a l / political/community centre like the U D F , and a national trade union centre. I should say o n that score that there is a precedent for this i n South Africa, for a relationship between a national explicitly political based centre and a national trade union centre. I t ’ s often been said b y the unions that their priority is the formation o f a federation, and that is the case. The reason why it’s a priority, or the reason why that priority influences our decision w i t h respect t o the UDF, is not that we are spending so much time i n forming a federation that we d o n ’ t have time t o devote any resources t o affiliating t o the U D F . Rather we see that as part o f a national trade union centre, the workers would have the necessary support, the necessary base, from which t o participate i n a multiclass organisation. That is a possible development. Obviously i t would be a highly complex development, and one that would require a broad agreement i n the trade u n i o n movement. But certainly it’s a possibility, it has been done before, I d o n ’ t see why i t shouldn’t be done again.

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Append ix 3 The Municipal and General Workers’ Union o n the United Democratic Front The Municipal and General Workers’ U n i o n o f South Africa’s response t o this issue must begin b y outlining h o w we see the present political situation. This is because our decision t o j o i n the U D F was made as part o f our response t o certain political events. These events directly affected us b o t h as a trade union, and as people who identify ourselves with the struggle for a free and just South Africa. There are four main political issues that effect workers today. These four are: a. The increasing push towards Bantustan independence for all the homelands — and therefore the forcing o f Bantustan citizenship o n all Black people. b . The attempt t o push through new Pass Laws that will tighten u p the control o f all workers. The lives o f all workers, b u t more especially contract workers, will become very difficult i f this new law is passed. c¢. The Community Council elections that will be held later o n this month. This issue is linked t o the problem o f high rents, high electricity bills and high transport costs. d . The ‘New Deal’ being pushed b y the government i n the forthcoming constitution. This issue must be seen as a part o f the issues spoken o f above. A l l four o f these issues are linked. They are all part o f the attempt t o ensure that the Apartheid capitalist system can continue t o exploit workers b y continuing t o oppress all black people. We will explain what we mean b y this i n more detail below. First we will l o o k at why these four issues are so important t o black workers.

Bantustan independence All black workers are faced with the fact that they and their children are being forced t o become citizens o f one o r other homeland. As these homelands become independent — the situation o f the workers from that homeland deteriorates. They are n o longer seen as citizens o f South Africa but as foreigners coming i n t o South Africa t o get a j o b . The government has made i t clear that i t hopes t o eventually have n o more black citizens o f South Africa. All black people will be foreigners who can come i n t o South Africa t o work i f there are jobs for them. I f there are n o jobs then they will be sent t o the homelands t o starve. The Bantustans are governed b y people who are junior partners i n the oppression o f the black people o f South Africa. These governments are there t o make sure that the large numbers o f unemployed and hungry people i n the homelands are kept under control. These governments survive only because they are given money and guns b y the Botha government.

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They exist only t o oppress the people, and t o keep them from rising u p against their oppression.

All black workers are faced with the threat of being sent off to rot in a homeland. All black workers must unite t o say N O to these Bantustans. The new pass laws

The pass laws have always been the way in which the government o f South Africa has made it easy for the bosses to exploit black workers. The pass laws control the movements o f black workers. These are the laws which make it possible for the government t o get rid o f any workers who are not needed in the urban areas. These are the laws that have made i t possible for the government and the bosses t o force black workers into jobs they would never choose t o d o — o n the mines o r the farms. But the problem is that the very high numbers o f unemployed people and the starvation in the homelands has resulted in people defying the control o f the pass laws and coming t o town illegally t o look for jobs. So the government has decided t o tighten u p the pass laws in order t o make sure that people d o not come t o the urban areas unless they are needed b y the bosses. The government has also decided that the best way o f doing this is t o try and divide the workers. The people who have jobs and houses in the urban areas will be givena little more freedom — and all others will be booted out into the homelands. N o rural people will be registered for jobs i f there is a n urban person w h o does not have w o r k . Anyone who tries t o defy these laws b y coming t o town illegally will face a large fine and/or a long period in jail. Anyone who gives accommodation to a n illegal worker will also face a large fine/or a long period in jail. A n y employer who hired a n illegal worker (because he can pay the worker less money) will be fined R500,000. (This is because the government feels that the problem o f control over all black workers is more important than the extra profit that a few bosses can make b y employing ‘illegals’). Even though the urban workers with housing will be given a bit more freedom, their situation is also uncertain. This is because they could lose their position as permanent urban workers and end u p in a homeland. The only way forward is t o resist the government’s attempts t o divide workers and unite against these new pass laws. All black workers are oppressed and controlled b y the pass laws. All black workers will be affected b y these new pass laws. This is why we must all unite to say N O t o the ‘Orderly Movement and Settlement o f Black Persons Bill’.

The Community Council Elections The Community councils are another attempt t o confuse people about who the enemy is. This is done b y putting stooges into power in the community councils and then oppressing the people through these stooges. When the Bantu Administration Boards were the people i n charge, it was clear who the oppressor was. The UBCs had so little power that it was clear t o everyone that they were the dummy bodies. The government then decided t o give them a b i t more power, change their name, and try t o fool the people in this way. B u t the real power still lies in the hands o f the

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government through the BAABs (Bantu Affairs Administration Boards). This means that a whole l o t o f extra money is spent without any benefits for the people. These community councillors have t o be paid high salaries, they need buildings t o meet i n , cars t o ride around in — all i n order t o carry out the government’s dirty w o r k . The workers who live i n the townships have t o pay for all this. The government n o t only puts u p stooges to d o its dirty work for it — but i t also tells the people that n o w that they control their o w n affairs — they will also have pay for it all b y themselves — n o more money from the government. This means that higher rents, higher electricity bills, dog tax and all sorts o f other expenses will be forced upon the workers. I f the people complain, then the reply is that they are n o w in control o f their own townships. They must complain t o the people they elected. The government is also moving towards giving these councillors the power t o oppress the urban people i f they resist too much. Community guards — a type o f police under the control o f the community council — are being spoken about. All black workers must unite t o prevent the situation i n the townships becoming like a mini-homeland. We must all unite t o say N O t o the community council elections.

The new constitution — n o more apartheid? Botha’s ‘New Deal’ is being spoken about as a move away from Apartheid. The idea is that n o w Indian and Coloured people are being ‘included’, and that this is a step i n the right direction. But i f we l o o k at this from the position o f the black workers, we can see that this ‘new deal’ is just the same old apartheid — the same old oppression. The government is speaking o f a new non-racial democracy coming about with this ‘new deal’. This can only make sense i f we first d o away with all black people i n South Africa. I f there are n o black South Africans (only Transkeians, Vendas, etc) then suddenly the whites are i n the majority. Suddenly it becomes possible to include Coloureds and Indians i n the government. So this ‘socalled’ move away from Apartheid is only possible thanks t o the ultimate result o f Apartheid — the banishing o f all black South Africans t o the Bantustans. I n this way we can see h o w this ‘New Deal’ is very closely linked t o the other issues spoken o f above: the ‘Independence’ o f the Bantustans — the tightening u p o f the pass laws — and the new self-government o f the townships. The government is hoping t o win over the Coloured and Indian people i n order t o tighten u p the oppression o f the black people — and most especially — the black workers. The ‘New Deal’ is trying t o divide the oppressed people. This ‘New Deal’ is trying to make sure that the black workers remain under the control o f the government. This ‘New Deal’ will make sure that the black workers are still at the mercy o f the bosses. All black workers and other oppressed people must unite t o say N O t o the whole package — the Constitution and the Koornhof Bills.

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Who else is affected? W e have spoken o f the way i n which black workers are affected b y this ‘package deal’. We can see that the Apartheid capitalist system i n our country is fighting t o survive. The people are resisting and all sorts o f problems are surfacing. This ‘New Deal’ — and the Koornhof Bills — are attempts b y the government t o face the challenges made b y the people’s resistance. We have seen h o w this tightening u p o f Apartheid laws will make i t easier for the bosses t o continue the exploitation o f black workers. The government is passing these laws i n order t o make sure that the black working class is tightly controlled i n the urban areas — and kicked out t o the homelands when workers are n o longer needed. B u t these laws are also part o f the Apartheid system that oppresses many people from other classes and other communities. All black people — and Indian and Coloured people — are oppressed b y these laws. The black workers are the largest and most oppressed group. This is why black workers will usually be the most dedicated and hardworking people i n the struggle. B u t black workers are not the only oppressed people. We must stand together with all people willing t o fight for a free and just South Africa. W e must unite t o oppose this ‘New Deal’ and the K o o r n h o f Bills. Only in this way can we mobilise the widest possible grouping o f people t o reject continued oppression. We must recognise that within this broad unity o f people — there will be differences o f approach — different levels o f understanding — different ideas about the kind o f society we are fighting for. This does n o t matter. W e are united i n our opposition t o Apartheid and its effects o n all black people. The black workers will put all their might behind a thrust t o d o away with Apartheid and the injustices and inequalities that i t has resulted in.

We believe that this cannot be done without a total change in the type o f society that has been created b y the Apartheid capitalist system i n South Africa.

Trade Unions and the struggle Our stand o n these issues is clear — b u t h o w can we oppose them effectively? Trade Unions are not political parties. Trade Unions are organisations o f workers — uniting t o fight for the rights o f workers and t o defend these rights o n the shop floor. O u r Trade Unions are also committed t o fighting for a society i n which all workers are free. But we cannot pretend that all our members are politically-conscious people w h o would wholeheartedly get involved i n the struggle. Our strength lies i n our ability t o unite i n the workplaces w i t h the possibility o f stopping production. This happens mainly around some o f the immediate problems facing workers i n that workplace. The structures o f our unions exist t o enable workers t o deal with problems i n the workplace as they arise. Because u n i o n structures bring workers together t o discuss problems — i t becomes possible for political issues t o be discussed. However, i t is very difficult for a trade u n i o n t o launch and control political campaigns — as well as function effectively as the first line o f defence o f the workers. This is why i t is very difficult for us — as trade unions — t o respond effectively

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t o political issues. While admitting all this, we must say at the same time that i t is our duty as trade unionists in South Africa t o be part o f the struggle for freedom and justice. Our problem is therefore t o find the most effective way o f doing this — despite the limitations o f our organisations. This brings us t o the need for alliances with other organisations. Alliances

I n South Africa, the main political organisations are banned. W e are thus faced with finding ways o f responding — together with other groupings o f oppressed — t o the main political struggles occurring inside our country. Many other organisations — like student groupings o r community organsations — have a similar problem. They are formed t o fight some o f the basic problems that occur amongst people they are organising. They are not political parties. I f they spent all their time functioning as political groupings — they would lose touch with their base. Ordinary people have t o be drawn into the process o f struggle — they d o not come rushing i n b y themselves. Ordinary people need t o learn — through the process o f struggling t o change some o f the immediate problems around them — h o w and why these immediate problems (like high rents, bad teaching, etc.) are part o f broader political problems. I n this sense, the difficulties these groups have in responding effectively t o political issues are similar t o those faced b y the unions. This is why we have all responded so eagerly t o the formation o f the UDF. The U D F and the crisis

Everybody today seems t o be talking about the crisis. Well, the reality is that the present system o f domination and exploitation is not working t o o well. So the government has a crisis o n its hands. The ‘New Deal’ and the Koornhof Bills are the government’s attempt t o resolve this crisis b y bringing in a shiny new model. This new model is supposed t o make sure that the crisis becomes a thing o f the past and that domination and exploitation live o n . . . happily ever after. I t ’ s u p t o us t o make sure that this does not happen. This means that the present political situation demands a far greater and more united response than we have managed for a very long time. B y ourselves — whether we are unions, community organisations, students o r whatever — we will achieve very little. The present situation calls for the kind o f united response that can bring together the strengths and talents o f as many different groupings o f people as possible. Churches, unions, community organisations, students, youth groups, women’s groups and groups o f activists — committees o f all kinds — all o f these should unite t o resist this new ‘package deal’. The problem then becomes h o w t o bring all these different types o f organisations together. Herein lies the strength o f an organisation like the UDF. I n the real sense o f the word — the U D F is not an organisation at all. I t ’ s a rallying point. I t ’ s the focus o f a range o f different types o f energies. I t represents the pooling o f resources; the co-operation o f a range o f very different, autonomous organisations. I t is a form o f unity i n action — b u t not i n structure/form or detailed policy. I t is a n attempt t o create the

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broadest possible unity i n opposition t o this specific political situation. I t serves as a means o f bringing people together. I t serves as a forum t o sort through the differences that may arise between the groupings — but only those differences that may serve as a stumbling block t o this united opposition. All other differences are irrelevant t o the project o f the UDF. The U D F also serves as a symbol o f our determination t o oppose oppression t o the end. The election o f presidents and patrons should be understood for their symbolic value — rather than as a set o f very complicated structures. The individuals involved were chosen because they are symbols o f our struggle — symbols o f determination: o f courage and o f the history o f our struggle. I t is i n all these ways that the U D F is a United Front o f a broad range o f organisations and n o t a unitary (or even a federal) structure. A s far as the operation o f the U D F is concerned this means that the programmes o f the U D F must be carried out primarily through the organisations that identify themselves with the U D F . The shared planning process, the pooling o f resources and the employment o f a number o f fulltime personnel b y the U D F : all these things ensure that member organisations o f the U D F receive a l o t o f support i n the process o f carrying out these programmes. The most interesting result o f the excitement and activity generated b y the U D F so far, has been the emergence o f a whole range o f new organisations that then j o i n the U D F . A number o f youth organisations and civic organisations have emerged throughout the country t o take u p the U D F banner. These organisations exist as autonomous entities — although they have emerged as a result o f the existence o f the U D F . They will n o w be able t o grow, consolidate their base, foster new leadership and continue t o function long after the U D F ceases t o exist. B u t what about unions? What k i n d o f role should they play in the U D F ? Unions a n d the U D F

Unions are working class organisations. They exist b o t h as a means t o fight for the rights o f workers — and as a training ground which enables workers t o develop skills i n organisation and leadership. The development o f these skills — as well as the growing confidence that this generates amongst workers — are essential elements i n the development o f the working class struggle. The main limitation o f all unions is that their structure and way o f operating tends t o push them towards focusing only o n economic issues — t o the exclusion o f political issues. This can only be overcome b y associating ourselves — as a trade u n i o n — with the political struggles going o n around us. I n this way we can achieve t w o goals at the same time: a. we can oppose the tendency towards economism b y clearly stating our commitment — as trade unionists — t o the broader struggle for freedom. This challenges all the workers that we organise t o also examine their role i n these terms; and

b. by actively participating i n these struggles, we can influence their direction and goals. Worker leaders, emerging from the training ground o f the unions, can take their places amongst the leadership o f the

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political struggle. Workers — organised through the unions — can participate actively i n the process o f struggle. I f this active participation occurs — the large number o f workers involved w i l l be a tremendous boost t o the political struggle and will help t o ensure that the aims o f the struggle are controlled b y the workers. What alternatives d o we have i f we reject bodies like the U D F ? Some would argue that unions are working class bodies and i n the interests o f working class autonomy we must ‘go i t alone’. The unions should be part o f an independent initiative against the ‘new deal’. This independent opposition group should consist only o f unions. Even i f we felt this t o be a good idea (which we don’t) we would oppose it o n the grounds that we spoke o f above: a union is n o t a political organisation and for as long as it continues t o function as a u n i o n — i t cannot effectively fulfill the role o f a political organisation. The other alternative would be for the unions t o support/encourage the setting u p o f a ‘Worker’s Party’ that will lead the workers i n the struggle against the ‘new deal’. This type o f political grouping — it is argued — would ensure that the political goals o f the working class are promoted. We disagree with this position for the following reasons: a. N o ‘working class party’ is ever composed only o f workers. Anyone who is prepared t o fight for the k i n d o f fundamental changes that would enable workers t o be free would be welcome i n any working class party. This also points t o the mistake o f assuming that all workers are somehow automatically committed t o the struggle for fundamental change. I t is true that a progressive political direction can most naturally take root amongst the working class — it is not true that a political

leadership composed of workers is automatically progressive. Nor is it true that a political leadership composed o f workers will guarantee that the interests o f the workers are promoted b y that leadership. We believe that a truly fundamental change i n this society can only occur i f the workers are actively involved i n the process o f struggle. This is because the workers are one o f the most down-trodden and oppressed classes in our society — as well as having a very important role i n the functioning o f our Apartheid capitalist society. This gives workers the kind o f power that other oppressed classes — like the rural people (peasants) — d o not have. The question then arises — I n what way should workers be involved i n the struggle? This leads us t o the second objection that we have t o the idea o f a workers’ party ‘going i t alone’. b . W e mentioned — i n the first part o f our discussion — the fact that it is the black workers o f South Africa who have suffered most under the various parts o f the Apartheid capitalist system. This is because this system functions in such a way as t o enable the bosses t o make the highest possible profits — at the expense o f the workers. Many other people have also suffered terribly at the hands o f this system — the rural poor people for example. I t is because we believe that the oppression o f black workers is at the r o o f o f the broader oppression o f all black people i n South Africa — that we advocate the widest possible unity o f all oppressed people t o fight this system.

Some w h o will unite with us will not be prepared t o go as far as we will

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o n the road t o freedom — but because i t is the same road — we can unite and work together. Some believe that we will be betrayed b y those w h o

would get rid of racial discrimination but are not too keen to shake things u p any further. Our reply t o this is quite simple. We believe that it is impossible t o separate off Apartheid from the capitalist system it has fed. A truly committed opposition t o Apartheid (and its consequences) will lay the foundations for a fundamental change i n the entire system i n South Africa. Our present struggle does not have t o be based o n some abstract ‘ideal society’ o f the future. A struggle which aims t o get rid o f Apartheid — t o get rid o f t h e homelands — t o get rid o f t h e

inequality bred b y Apartheid, inequalities o f wealth, land, education, etc. This kind o f struggle — i f taken t o its logical conclusion — will undermine the foundations o f Apartheid capitalism. The rest is u p t o us. The importance o f this k i n d o f struggle is its ability t o unite the widest possible range o f oppressed people. The path o f the struggle is the same for all o f us — h o w far down the path we go will depend o n our efforts. I t ’ s u p t o the unions and all other progressives t o ensure that the organised workers are fully involved i n the process o f struggle — that worker leaders emerge and take u p positions amongst the political leadership — that progressives unite t o ensure a struggle for truly fundamental change i n South Africa. These are reasons for joining the U D F , we encourage all other progressives t o d o the same.

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Appendix 4 The U D F o n the Unions The S A L B (South African Labour Bulletin) interviewed M r Mosiuoa Lekota, publicity secretary o f the United Democratic F r o n t , at Khotso House, Johannesburg o n 13 December 1983.

What is a united democratic front? I t is an alliance o f a wide spectrum o f organisations: workers’, youth, church, sporting organisations and so o n . The U D F is an alliance specifically in opposition t o the constitutional proposals and the Koornhof Bills. I t is an umbrella body seeking t o co-ordinate organisations previously acting independently. Does this involve a n alliance o f different classes? A n alliance o f classes is built into the United Democratic Front. For example workers’ organisations and professional organisations contain different classes. But the United Democratic Front is essentially an alliance o f organisations.

H o w was the U D Fformed? A t the time when the Presidents’ Council proposals and the Koornhof Bills were put forward opposition t o them was coming from small, uncoordinated organisations. A t the anti-SAIC (Anti-South African Indian Council) meeting in Johannesburg i n January D r Boesak suggested that a united democratic front should be formed. The call was well received and organisations represented at the meeting such as the Natal Indian Congress, the Joint Rent Action Committee and individuals who were members o f the Cape Housing Action Committee contacted their members i n other regions. The idea was passed o n and mobilisation took place especially in Natal, the Transvaal and the Western Cape. I n these areas U D F regions were being formed at meetings i n April, M a y and June. Further consultation led t o the decision t o launch the U D F nationally, even though not all the regions had been formed, because o f the urgency o f the situation. A t the time o f the national launch, o n 20 August, the only fully structured regions were the Transvaal, Natal and the Cape. The other regions did their best but were not properly constituted. N o w we are organising i n the North Western Cape, the Eastern Cape and Border region and the Free State. Apart from meetings being banned we are continuing t o make strides i n gaining support.

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The U D F took nine months to form itself whereas the union movement has taken ten years to reach its present position. H o w d o you account for this difference? The U D F has organised organisations, it has not had t o organise individuals i n the same way as a trade union, which is more difficult and takes much longer. The strength o f the U D F depends o n the strength o f the organisations which constitute it. To what extent have you gained support amongst workers? We are not satisfied that we have achieved as much trade union support as we had hoped for. But we see the participation o f workers i n the U D F as important. The more workers come i n the closer we are to gaining a truly national character. South Africa is still under colonial conditions and the struggle against imperialism is a struggle against capitalism. For this reason the working class must provide the backbone o f the struggle. The question o f sizes o f organisations must be considered. For example professional organisations tend t o be smaller than trade unions. I n this regard organisations must receive representation proportionate t o their strength i n numbers. What d o you mean b y ‘a truly national character’? W e mean b y this that we are non-racial, which means we embrace all races, and that we bring together all classes. The presence o f workers and the middle classes i n the U D F is well discernable, but a significant section o f the working class i n some major independent unions still remains outside our fold. D o you feel, then, that whites have a contribution to make in the struggle?

Yes, for example students who were members o f NUSAS (the National U n i o n o f South African Students) became stalwarts o f the union movement. Does your term ‘national’ also include all regions in South Africa?

Yes, b y ‘national’ we mean all classes, all regions and all races. To what extent does the U D F have a presence in the Bantustans? We need a presence i n these areas, b u t there the repression is worst. W e have a strong presence in the Ciskei, but support for the U D F there is heavily suppressed.

Is your support in the Ciskei mainly through S A A W U (South African Allied Workers’ Union)?

Yes, mainly through S A A W U b u t we have other support, as was shown b y the numbers at the launching o f the U D F in that region. The Transkei is very different. Our supporters there can’t express their support because they fear the consequences. I n Zululand Gatcha (Buthelezi) claims that everyone belongs t o Inkatha. I t is difficult for

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anyone t o show support for the U D F . B u t as support grows for the U D F i n the urban areas amongst contract workers our message will be carried back to these areas.

What are the structures o f the UDF? The Transvaal region, for example, has a president, t w o secretaries, a treasurer and other executive members. Each region is affiliated t o the national executive. The three regional presidents are also national presidents, b u t this is not a requirement, they just happen t o have been elected t o b o t h positions. I f a n issue arises one o f the two regional secretaries will call a regional general council. This is made u p o f delegates from the organisations affiliated t o the U D F . The regional executive committee is elected b y the regional general council. I t does not include representatives from each affiliated organisation as this would make i t t o o unwieldy. The executive committee runs the day-to-day affairs o f the U D F . I n a few cases there are organisations which are national. Clause 5 o f the U D F Working Principles provides for these organisations t o affiliate nationally. The terms o f their membership is decided b y the national executive in consultation with the regional councils. When an organisation has affiliated t o the U D F it retains its independence. I t cedes its independence only i n regard t o opposition t o the constitutional proposals and the K o o r n h o f Bills. Could you briefly explain the UDF’s programme o f action?

We have set broad objectives, some activities may be possible i n the Western Cape and others in the Transvaal. I n the Transvaal, area committees are being established. There are t o be workshops, door-to-door campaigns and mass meetings. The mass meetings give people a feeling o f belonging together, but the door-to-door visits are the most important because people can ask questions. We are planning a peoples’ weekend at the end o f October at which there will be vigils focusing o n the legislation. This will be part o f the build-up t o regional o r provincal rallies o n the eve o f 2 November. H o w d o you see the role o f the U D F differing from that o f other organisations, particularly the unions? The unions mainly handle the problems o f working class people at the factory floor level. Some people have criticised unions for not taking u p political issues, but the unions are not well equipped t o handle political issues. The members o f trade unions can also participate i n other organisations which take u p other issues, for example the pass laws, bus fares, rents. Such issues require a different type o f organisation.

Some unions, such as SAAWU, the Food and Canning Workers’ Union, G W U (General Workers’ Union) and others have taken u p such issues in the past. With the emergence o f the U D F d o you see the role o f these unions changing?

These unions were i n the past expected to take the lead. Workers turned to

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the unions, but this could have jeopardised the unions. N o w they can encourage workers t o j o i n other organisations which take u p these issues. Some unions have done this. T o l i n k to the community organisations is not t o sell out. The U D F can be used to fight issues that unions cannot directly fight. The criticism has been made b y some of the independent unions that the U D F is dominated b y middle class people and that workers find it difficult to participate. The language used is English and workers can’t compete with the debating skills of the middle classes.

I t is true that the middle class tends to take over leadership and dominate community based organisations. The question is whether the working class can win genuine allies from the middle classes, for example intellectuals. Workers must j o i n not only t o give the U D F numbers b u t also direction; t o make their voice heard. Where possibie workers must also assume positions o f leadership. The challenge for the U D F is whether i t can evolve effective democratic processes t o enable every constituent organisation t o participate i n the running o f all the affairs o f the front. The criticism is also made that decisions are taken and then p u t to meetings for ratification, n o t for discussion.

Whilst i t is true that we are not without shortcomings, some o f the criticisms come out o f ignorance. People who d o not take part i n the U D F cannot k n o w who took the decisions because they were not at the meetings. I f workers are not there the decisions will be taken b y those who are present. But once they j o i n they will decide. Where the democratic processes are n o t followed the workers will ask, ‘ ‘ w h o t o o k that decision?’ I f the unions came i n t o the U D F they could take u p the programme o f action and participate i n the way they want t o , b u t for the time being those i n t h e U D F will decide issues. A t the national launching o f the U D F some unions affiliated and others decided n o t to affiliate b u t nevertheless gave their support. This suggests that the support for the U D F is very wide amongst the independent unions, b u t that there are differences over the best way of giving support. Why d o you feel that the unions should formally affiliate to the UDF? Resistance t o the constitutional proposals and the K o o r n h o f Bills should n o t be restricted t o one class. I t is n o t merely workers w h o are affected b u t a combination o f people; o f classes. I f the U D F creates a wider u n i t y then the unions should join.

Some unions have said that joining the U D F may have devisive effects within their organisations because their members have differing political affiliations. It is also argued that the fact that some unions have joined and others have n o t is making union unity more difficult. We have not made any u n i o n j o i n . Every union will consider whether o r n o t t o j o i n a n d t h e democratic processes w i t h i n the u n i o n s w i l l take their

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The disunity amongst the unions is disappointing. We sent a letter t o the feasibility committee giving our solidarity t o the unions i n their search for unity. We also stated that workers must be organised beyond the factory

and need to form an alliance with other classes and that the UDF is the best forum for this. It seems then that there are a number o f possible ways in which workers could join the UDF: they could join as individuals o r through their unions joining o r through a federation o f unions joining. Why in fact does the U D F see it as necessary for unions to become members? The problem with a loose affiliation is that i t is not easy t o co-ordinate and t o mobilise people. The situation would be greatly improved i f unity o n the factory floor and unity i n the communities could be achieved. Combining unity at both these levels would greatly enhance the struggle. I t would be easier t o take decisions and t o take action i f the trade unions had already formed themselves i n t o a single federation.

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Appendix 5 CUSA o n Political Organisations The General Secretary o f The Council o f Unions o f South Africa sent this resolution t o the S A L B (South African Labour Bulletin) i n response t o a request for a statement o n its position in relation to political organisations. During March and August this year the C U S A office had received a request from the National Forum Committee (NFC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) and one other agency for its views and commitment o n the Constitutional Proposals. The three requests were put t o the National Executive Committee during April. I t was agreed that the matter be discussed at the Joint Executive Council (JEC) o f C U S A o n 30 April 1983. The requests together w i t h a draft resolution was prepared for the J E C meeting. A lengthy debate t o o k place o n various aspects. Amongst other issues discussed were the following: 1. the nature and philosophy o f the organisations requesting the commitment; 2. the content o f the C U S A response in the resolution; 3. the commitment C U S A was able t o provide, and 4. the nature and content o f the Constitutional Proposals. The following resolution was then unanimously adopted: ‘“‘Having examined the proposals o f the regime o n the constitution; Having further examined the basis o f the call b y various organisations regarding the constitutional proposals; Noting that the Nationalist Party is presently i n disarray and that these proposals may therefore be changed t o impose white rule under different guise even through a referendum; Knowing that the white opposition forces and parties are themselves divided and without any effect. The Council o f Unions o f South Africa n o w therefore: ® wishes t o place o n record its complete and total rejection t o the proposal; ® pledges itself t o participate i n every forum t o work towards the achievement o f a just and democratic society; @ calls u p o n its members t o lend their individual support t o all efforts o f community organisations t o end this foolish plan; @® pledges itself t o all forces and all efforts t o work towards a common citizenship i n an undivided democratic and just society.’’ Following the response o f various unions and the nature o f press reports together w i t h intransigent positions adopted b y some sections o f the communty C U S A is involved currently o n an ongoing examination o f its attitude and role i n the U D F and the NFC.

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Appendix 6 Labour Movement Relations with South African Trade Unions Statement b y the National Executive Committee o f the British Labour Party, February 1983

The 1970s saw a major change i n the South African political economy. The decade witnessed the development o f a rapidly expanding, well organised non-racial (but predominantly African) trade union movement. The movement, although viewed w i t h considerable suspicion and o n occasions viciously attacked, now appears t o have established itself as a permanent feature o f the South African scene. A t the 1981 Labour Party Conference a resolution was unanimously adopted calling ‘ “ . . . for the Labour Party, working with our trade union colleagues, t o provide assistance and training t o the independent, non-racial trade union movement in South Africa’’. We must w o r k towards finding the most appropriate way o f implementing this resolution. The first task is t o distinguish those trade unions that can genuinely be considered to be ‘independent and non-racial’ from those that are n o t . The unions affiliated to the South African Confederation o f Labour, organising white workers i n openly racist unions, clearly fails t o meet these criteria. Unions affiliated t o the Trade U n i o n Council o f South Africa, although organising some 170,000 Asian and Coloured workers as well as over 20,000 African workers, also cannot be accepted. Since its foundation i n 1954 T U C S A has vacillated over the organisation o f African workers. T U C S A first excluded African workers, then admitted them (1963), then finally expelled them (1969). I n 1974, with the growth o f African trade unions, T U C S A allowed Africans t o affiliate, b u t generally organised them i n exclusively African trade unions, i n parallel t o existing T U C S A unions. TUCSA'’s changing stance should be seen as the result o f the growth and militancy o f the independent non-racial trade unions, which threatened TUCSA'’s credibility as a major trade union federation. T U C S A ’ s A f r i c a n u n i o n s are h i g h l y b u r e a u c r a t i c , r e l y i n g organisationally o n their parent unions for finance and administration. Many general secretaries o f the parallel unions are also the general secretaries o f the registered parent trade unions. For these reasons, T U C S A unions cannot be considered t o be ‘independent’. I n addition i t must be noted that they are frequently brought i n t o a firm with the co-operation o f

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management t o head off a recruitment drive b y one o f the independent non-racial trade unions. The attitude o f the parent unions t o the

unionisation of African workers is one of paternalism and their commitment t o workers’ education and shop-floor democracy is nonexistent. The remaining unions can generally be described as non-racial, since they organise all workers i n an industry. T o date this has generally meant that they unionise African, Coloured and Asian workers, but their constitutions are non-racial, and once white workers are willing t o j o i n the unions they will be welcomed into membership. One union affiliated t o the Federation o f South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) recently made something o f a breakthrough i n recruiting some white workers into membership at a car plant, but clearly there is a long way t o go before this becomes a significant trend. The non-racial unions are also characterised b y a commitment t o participatory democracy so that the membership have a direct say i n the policies and practises o f their union. I n addition, most have built considerable links with other community based organisations, co-operating o n issues such as rents and bus fares, while i n return receiving support for their industrial action from the community. Perhaps most importantly, these unions are increasingly taking united action. During the protests that followed the death i n detention o f the trade unionist Neil Aggett, the unions co-operated t o bring out 100,000 workers i n a protest stoppage. I n August 1981 and April 1982 the unions met at a ‘summit’ t o thrash out a common policy for the non-racial u n i o n movement — a process which is continuing. There are a rapidly growing number o f trade unions, b u t the best known and most representative are those groups around FOSATU, C U S A (the Council o f Unions o f South Africa) and unaffiliated unions such as the General Workers U n i o n , the South African Allied Workers Union and the

Food and Canning Workers Union. I f there is any doubt over the status o f a union there should be consultations with the ICFTU, o r the appropriate International Trade Secretariat. These bodies are i n constant contact with the non-racial unions

and well able t o advise on the policies and problems of the unions. I f these are the unions that we can support (and the list is n o t exhaustive) and the criteria b y which we can judge them (non-racial, independent), what k i n d o f solidarity can we have with them? Forms o f Solidarity 1. Solidarity Action in Britain

The British Labour movement has a long history o f campaigning against the repression and racism that characterises apartheid. The Labour movement supports United Nations sanctions against South Africa and unilateral steps t o reduce the economic links between Britain and South Africa, as well as the development o f a strong non-racial trade u n i o n movement i n South Africa. British unions can and d o play a valuable role i n assisting the non-racial unions i n their struggles with South African management and the state.

Appendix 6

183

i . South African trade unionists not infrequently fall foul o f the regime’s repressive laws. There are a wide range o f measures — including pickets, publicity, messages o f support etc — that can be taken i n order t o bring pressure t o bear o n the South African authorities t o secure the unionists’ release. i i . The hand o f workers i n disputes in South African subsidiaries o f British companies can be substantially strengthened i f British unions take action o n their behalf. I n the last few years, several examples o f such action have taken place. For instance, i n 1981, at the request o f the ICFTU and after shop-floor meetings at the British Leyland plant at Cowley, Alex Kitson and Terry Duffy o f T G W U and A U E W respectively met senior B L management i n order t o p u t pressure o n the company during a strike at the B L plant i n Cape T o w n . The intervention was successful, and subsequently many o f the Cape Town workers were re-employed at the plant. 2 . Material Assistance

Financial and material assistance have been supplied t o the non-racial trade unions b y the ICTFU, the T U C and a number o f International Trade Secretariats for a number o f years. The form that such assistance should take can best be determined i n consultation with the independent and nonracial unions, b u t the following forms o f assistance may be appropriate: a. financial assistance for trade union education i n South Africa; b . scholarships for South African trade unionists; c. collections for workers o n strike and for the families o f jailed o r victimised workers; d . subsidies for salaries o f organisers and for office and transport equipment. The ban o n FOSATU receiving such funds has caused some difficulties, b u t these have not generally proved t o be insuperable, with the international Labour movement supporting a wide range o f educational and organisational projects i n South Africa. 3 . Visits t o Britain

A n increasing number o f non-racial union representatives are visiting Britain t o attend meetings w i t h their trade union colleagues i n this country. While contacts with racist trade unionists must o f course be discouraged, contacts w i t h representatives o f the non-racial trade union movement assist i n the establishment o f a real rapport between unions. These contacts have proved invaluable during disputes when solidarity must be based o n an in-depth knowledge o f the organisations and personalities involved. 4. Visits to South Africa A s the independent and non-racial unions have grown i n strength they have come increasingly t o value their links with the international Labour movement. Many union representatives n o w travel overseas and a number o f British unions have received invitations from their South African

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counterparts. I n particular, non-racial unions i n disputes have at times felt that a visit b y members o f the international Labour movement would assist

their cause. A t the same time it must be recognised that the South African government would, o n occasion, welcome such visits, since they could be portrayed as breaking the policy o f boycotting South Africa. Certainly the regime will be at pains t o extract any propaganda value that it can from

such visits. I t is therefore essential that any visit should only take place after consultations with the appropriate non-racial trade union, the T U C and the appropriate International Trade Secretariat. Some guidance has been provided b y those FOSATU unions affiliated t o the International Metalworkers Federation. They suggested the following:

‘““We strongly favour fraternal contact between workers i n South Africa and workers i n other countries, at all levels, provided this is guided b y the interests and requirements o f workers. Visits t o South Africa and visits overseas should be based o n the concrete needs o f workers. Visits should involve not only top officials, but also plant-based worker representatives. ‘““The aim o f these visits should be t o strengthen fraternal ties between organised workers i n different countries and t o carry forward the struggle for workers i n South Africa t o win the same rights as have been w o n b y workers in other countries. ‘‘Several visits t o and from our unions have already taken place with shop stewards and union officials from Europe visiting unions and factories i n South Africa and shop stewards and officials from our unions travelling t o the U S A and Europe. This contact has been valuable and will be encouraged i n the future, provided i t takes place in accordance with the above principles and guidelines’’ (Press Release, 22 October 1981).

These guidelines can be elaborated u p o n b y suggesting that: i . visits should only take place at the request o f and according to a schedule drawn u p i n co-operation between British unions and the independent and non-racial trade unions in South Africa; ii. emphasis should be given t o company-based contacts, i.e. the exchange o f visits b y trade union representatives working for the same parent company in Britain and South Africa; i i i . British unions should specifically refrain from going o n visits t o South Africa organised b y the South African government (or its front line organisations) or b y companies w i t h interests i n South Africa; i v . great care should be taken i n making any statement t o the media concerning the visit. I f these guidelines are followed, visits t o South Africa can be undertaken and the solidarity so vital t o the international Labour movement can be strengthened.

Note: I n drawing u p this document consultations were held w i t h the following organisations: I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f Free Trade U n i o n s

Trades U n i o n Congress

Appendix 6

International Metalworkers Federation International Transport Workers Federation International Union o f Food and Allied Workers Associations South African Congress o f Trade Unions African National Congress Anti-Apartheid Movement Council o f Unions o f South Africa Federation o f South African Trade Unions

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186

Appendix 7 International Policy Statement adopted b y F O S A T U

Central Committee, April 1984 FOSATU believes i n international worker contact i n order t o pursue the following goals: 1. T o build international worker solidarity i n the struggle against the economic, social and political oppression o f workers. 2. T o build effective worker organisation t o counter and reduce the power o f the multinational corporations (MNCs). 3. T o support workers’ struggles i n other countries i n whatever way FOSATU can. T o ensure that the institutions o f the international trade u n i o n movement are not being used b y anti-worker forces t o create divisions a n da loss o f independence within the South African worker movement. T o assist i n increasing the international condemnation o f and pressure o n the present racist regime i n South Africa. FOSATU realises that the pursuit o f these general goals requires the carrying out o f a wide range o f activities. These activities are not without their difficulties and problems. FOSATU accordingly sets out the following guidelines o n activities related t o each o f the four goals. 1. International Worker Solidarity: FOSATU understands b y this fraternal support t o generally strengthen independent worker organisation i n all countries. I n particular at present the focus is o n the following in the South African situation. 1.1 Financial assistance — t o build independent worker organisation i n South Africa has required and will continue t o require financial assistance from the international trade u n i o n movement. FOSATU sees three stages through which our organisation will go i n the receipt o f such financial assistance. The first was financial assistance i n the general operating expenses o f both affiliates and the federation. The second is one where affiliates are self-sufficient i n regard t o general running expenses whilst the federation receives assistance t o build structures and facilities o f benefit t o affiliates. The t h i r d stage is where b o t h affiliates and the federation are self-sufficient i n regard t o general running expenses and financial assistance will be for extraordinary projects t o further develop the worker movement. FOSATU believes that financial assistance is fundamental t o international worker solidarity. However, i t can be a double-edged sword that can b u i l d o r destroy. Financial assistance must not be used t o creat dependency and division within the South African worker movement.

Appendix 7

187

1.2 International travel — where and when this is possible there is n o doubt that i t is important for building fraternal links. The chance t o meet and talk t o fraternal unionists outside South Africa will educate our leadership i n the common problems o f the working class. FOSATU believes that such travel should be seen as part o f a systematic programme o f study, research and working activity. Those going must be appropriately briefed o n the nature o f their visit and must submit written reports upon their return. FOSATU should wherever appropropriate finance its o w n independent travel t o build fraternal links. However, it must not be forgotten that overseas support cannot replace organisation at home. FOSATU’s purpose is t o educate its leadership and t o establish effective worker solidarity. Fraternal visits t o South Africa b y worker leadership from abroad, arranged within the framework o f FOSATU policy o n such visits, can also be o f great value, especially since it can involve larger number o f workers than the limited number who will get the opportunity t o travel abroad themselves. 1.3 Expertise and Information — the worker struggle i n South Africa can benefit greatly from the hard lessons learnt overseas. I n many areas, such as Health and Safety, great expertise has been developed. Here i n South Africa we must make use o f this rather than try and learn i t all again. FOSATU believes that such knowledge must be exchanged b o t h b y visits overseas and more particularly b y people coming to South Africa where they can have greater contact with shop stewards and officials. However, FOSATU is fully aware o f the fact that we have t o develop skills here that will allow us t o effectively use such information in our circumstances. 1.4 Publications — FOSATU should actively circulate its publications so as t o inform people what is happening here. Likewise we must obtain foreign publications so as t o get more information o n worker problems elsewhere i n the world. This is necessary because o f the anti-worker propaganda that the press, radio and T V call news here i n South Africa. . Multinational Corporations (MNC): FOSATU believes that the M N C s have excessive power which is used t o the detriment o f workers b o t h i n South Africa and i n the home countries o f these M N C s . W e believe i t is i n the common interest o f all workers that organisation is strong i n all places where the M N C s operate. F O S A T U ’ s experience has shown that as a m i n i m u m , strong factory-based organisation around a Shop Steward movement and active membership is needed t o counter the power o f capital and the M N C s i n particular. 2.1 FOSATU accordingly believes that effective worker solidarity i n the struggle against the M N C s depends o n contact at all levels —

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membership, Shop Stewards, the union and the I T S . Worker solidarity will not be built o n the basis o f contact at one o r t w o o f these levels only. 2.2 FOSATU will initiate and j o i n any positive attempt t o build international organisation within each multinational. FOSATU

believes that the bringing together of Shop Stewards (or their equivalent) is the key element to such organising efforts and i n this way the whole union can be fully integrated into this bitter struggle. FOSATU believes that such organisation can build u p a n active exchange o f information and can work toward common demands o n wages and working conditions. 2.3 FOSATU believes that it should begin t o establish greater direct contact with workers in M N C s i n so-called Third World countries which share many similar problems t o those experienced here. . Vigilance Against Division and Loss of Independence FOSATU believes that the institutions o f the international trade union movement are still bedevilled b y the politics o f international power and the ‘ C o l d War’ and that this is t o the lasting detriment o f workers. FOSATU’s o w n experience makes i t wary o f the dangers o f division and organisational collapse that arise out o f many o f the practices o f these institutions. FOSATU believes that we have t o guard against being caught i n the web o f international politics rather than building effective worker solidarity. 3.1 FOSATU accordingly believes that there must be clear control over and policies towards the access o f international financial assistance. The dangers o f such finance have already been seen i n South Africa — i t props u p non-existent unions, creates disunity and can be used for particular political purposes rather than t o assist i n the development o f trade unions. FOSATU believes that the unco-ordinated and unchecked access b y affiliates t o financial assistance will create a decline i n organisation and potential division. FOSATU favours assistance through co-ordinated channels and within a clear programme t o move the three stages outlined i n point 1.1 above. 3.2 Likewise we believe i n a co-ordinated approach o n the side o f the donor organisations. This will have t w o important practical effects for us i n South Africa. Firstly, differences o f opinion and interest between them will have t o be solved overseas i n meetings instead o f creating problems here i n South Africa. Secondly, FOSATU (and other S . A . unions) w i l l be able t o more effectively deal w i t h one multilateral effort rather than waste energy and resources o n dealing w i t h a number o f different efforts. 3.3 This multilateral effort should deal with the requirements o f

general solidarity as dealt with in 1.1 above. Within this, affiliates can and should — i n consultation with FOSATU — establish relationships with unions overseas for the purposes o f more specific and detailed solidarity projects and the funding o f these.

Appendix 7

189

3.4 FOSATU accepts the principle o f co-ordinating councils i n South Africa o f the affiliates o f a particular I T S . Such co-ordinating councils should n o t be a vehicle for propping u p splinter unions and giving credibility t o the anti-worker and racist practises o f certain trade unions i n South Africa. 3.5 FOSATU believes that because o f their particular political interests governments should not interfere in the affairs o f the international trade union movement and accordingly would prefer t o conduct its affairs directly with trade union and labour organisations. 3.6 FOSATU is o f the view that affiliation t o the ICFTU, W C L o r W F T U would not be o f significant advantage t o FOSATU membership and workers i n S . A . at present. The particular position i n South Africa would make any such affiliation politically complicated and prevent a full and active participation i n all activities o f these organisations. FOSATU accordingly believes that only one unified national centre should affiliate t o such international organisations. . International Pressure o n South Africa: FOSATU has continually stated its implacable opposition t o South Africa’s racist regime and, therefore, fully supports international pressure o n South Africa t o bring about social justice and a truly democratic society. 4.1 Because o f the specific problems o f the South African situation FOSATU believes that visits b y trade unionists t o South Africa should only be made o n the specific request o r arrangement o f the independent non-racial trade unions i n South Africa. FOSATU believes that other visits are used b y the South African government t o gain credibility for its actions b o t h within and outside the country. 4.2 For similar reasons FOSATU is opposed t o the stationing o f permanent representatives o f the international trade union movement and related organisations inside South Africa. 4.3 FOSATU as a trade union organisation concerned with the jobs and livelihood o f its members has t o give careful consideration t o the question o f disinvestment. However, i t is F O S A T U ’ s considered view that the pressure for disinvestment has had a positive effect and should therefore n o t be lessened. FOSATU is definitely opposed t o foreign investment that accepts the conditions o f oppression maintained b y this regime. FOSATU is, however, also clear that its o w n focus o f attention must be the building o f a strong worker movement i n South Africa that can set the terms o f foreign investment and ultimately ensure that the factories, machines and buildings presently i n South Africa will be retained i n South Africa t o the ultimate benefit o f all.

Appendix 8 Making Contact with Black Unions in South Africa I t is easy t o write or telephone t o unions i n South Africa. Some even have a telex operation. All welcome messages o f support and solidarity. Postal censorship exists in South Africa but most letters d o not get opened. I n the following list o f addresses you should be able t o find h o w t o contact all the major South African unions. Remember that few have a centralised head office and that branch offices and locals play a more important role. The head office o f the FOSATU federation, for example, is a small office i n a Cape Town suburb. I f you wanted t o find out information about FOSATU

it would be better to contact their publishing centre situated in their regional office i n Durban.

FOSATU F O S A T U Head Office 2 Goodhope Street 7530 Bellville South

Tel: 021-951412

FOSATU Affiliates Head Offices: Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) Suite 3, Central Court 61 H i m e Street 4052 JACOBS

Tel: 031-67401/482633

National Sugar Industry Employees Union (NSIEU) 216 Goodhope Centre 92 Queen Street 4001 D U R B A N Tel: 031-65563 National Union o f Textile Workers (NUTW) 5 Central Court 125 Gale Street 4001 D U R B A N Tel: 031-65250 Metal and Allied Workers Union ( M A WU) 14 Fines Building Voortrekker Street 1500 BENONI Tel: 011-543388

Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (PWAWU) 2 Palladium Building 1560 SPRINGS Tel: 011-567925

Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU) 3 Central Court 125 Gale Street 4001 D U R B A N Tel: 031-337350

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Appendix 8

Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) First Floor Harrister House 65 Harrison Street J O H A N N E S B U R G 2001 Tel: 011-8364463 Jewellers and Goldsmiths Unions (JGU) 201/4 City Centre 18 Corporation Street 8001 C A P E T O W N Tel: 021-468086

National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU) 102 Lotus Building Cottrell Street P O R T E L I Z A B E T H 6001 Tel: 041-46010/9

REGIONAL OFFICES OF FOSATU A N D AFFILIATES EASTERN PROVINCE 9 Lotus Building Cottrell Street P O R T ELIZABETH 6001

Tel: 041-414026

NATAL Shop 12 12 Webbers Centre H A M M A R S D A L E 3700

Tel: 0325-61665

NORTHERN N A T A L 1 Waste C e n t r e

37 Morris Street E M P A N G E N I R A I L 3910

Tel: 0351-21673

TRANSVAAL 30 World Centre 48 Railway Street 1401 G E R M I S T O N

Tel: 011-8256222 011-518818

WESTERN PROVINCE 2 Goodhope Street B E L L V I L L E S O U T H 7530

Tel: 021-951412

FOSATU L O C A L S NATAL

DURBAN

Tel: T G W U — 031-319511 — 031-312565

2 / 3 / 5 Central Court

MAWU

125 Gale Street 4001 D U R B A N

S F A W U — 031-337350 N U T W — 031-65250

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HAMMARSDALE Shop 12 Webbers Shopping Centre

3700 HAMMARSDALE

Tel: NUTW — (0325-61665

ISIPINGO 6 Jadwat Building 148 Old Main Road 4110 I S I P I N G O Tel: M A W U / C W I U — 031-923780

Shop 8 Isipingo Mall 100 Old Main Road 4110 I S I P I N G O Tel: N A A W U — 031-924190

JACOBS Suite 3, 61 Hime Street 4052 JACOBS

Tel: C W I U — 031-486648 MAWU/PWAWU 031-482633

PIETERMARITZBURG Suite 106 518 Church Street P I E T E R M A R I T Z B U R G 3201

Tel: 0331-26121 (SFAWU) -24596 (FOSATU)

PINETOWN 9 Imperial Lane 3600 P I N E T O W N

Tel: 031-729766 (FOSATU) -711663 (NUTW) -725424 (MAWU)

NORTHERN N A T A L 1 Waste Centre Building 37 Morris Street E M P A N G E N I R A I L 3910

Tel: 0351-21994 (CWIU) -24381 (MAWU) -25823 (PWAWU) -23500 (TGWU)

TRANSVAAL BENONI 7 Fines Building Voortrekker Street 1500 B E N O N I

Tel: 011-540337 -548013 -543663

GERMISTON 30 World Centre 48 Railway Street 1401 G E R M I S T O N

Tel: 011-8251916 (MAWU) -8256826 (CWIU) -518818 (NUTW)

JOHANNESBURG First Floor Harrister H o u s e

65 Harrison Street 2001 J O H A N N E S B U R G

Tel: 011-8364736

KATLEHONG Morena Store Black Reef Road 1832 K A T L E H O N G

Tel: 011-8653500

KEMPTON PARK Shop 11 Westblou 48 West Street 1628 K E M P T O N P A R K

Tel: 011-9755876

Appendix 8

PRETORIA N O R T H 10/11 Penor Building C n r . Gerrit Maritz & West Streets PRETORIA N O R T H 0166 SPRINGS 1 / 2 / 1 8 Palladium Building Third Avenue 1560 SPRINGS VEREENIGING 39 Beaconsfield Ave. VEREENIGING 1930

Tel: 012-551650/552328 P . O . Box 154 1563 K w a Thema Tel: 011-566215 (SFAWU) -566826

P.O. Box 865 VEREENIGING 1930 Tel: 016-224362

CUSA CUSA Head Office 7th Floor L e k t o n House 5 Wanderers Street JOHANNESBURG 2001

Tel: 011-298031

CUSA Affiliates Building, Construction and Allied Workers Union Head Office Branches P . O . Box 10928 DURBAN JOHANNESBURG Tel: 031-31-9707 2000 PIETERMARITZBURG Tel: 011-23-8302 Tel: 0331-5-4642 PORT ELIZABETH T e l : 041-41-3403

PRETORIA Tel: 012-26-6242 Food Beverage Workers Union P . O . Box 25271 FERREIRASDORP 2048

T e l : 011-23-8357

Hotel Liquor and Catering Trade Employees Union P . O . Box 1409 Tel: 011-836-4738 J O H A N N E S B U R G 2000

National Union

of Mineworkers

P.O. Box 10928 JOHANNESBURG 2000

Tel: 011-29-4561

S . A . Chemical Workers Union

P . O . Box 4990 J O H A N N E S B U R G 2000

T e l : 011-29-8920

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South African Laundry, D r y Cleaning and Dyeing Workers Union P . O . Box 25271 Tel: 011-23-9058 FERRAIRASDORP 2000 Steel Engineering and Allied Workers U n i o n o f S . A . P . O . Box 61289 Tel: 011-834-4771 M A R S H A L L T O W N 2017 S.A. Black Municipality and Allied Workers P . O . Box 23027 Tel: 011-29-8507 Joubert Park 2044 Textile Workers Union — Transvaal

P . O . Box 10488 J O H A N N E S B U R G 2000

Tel. 011-37-6591

Transport and Allied Workers Union Branches P . O . Box 4469 DURBAN J O H A N N E S B U R G 2000 Tel: 031-6-0464 Tel: 011-29-4784 PORT ELIZABETH Tel: 041-4-5448

United African Motor Workers Union Branch: 514 Willie Theron Building DURBAN Bosman Street, Tel: 031-6-1105 P R E T O R I A 0002 Tel: 012-323-0838

UNAFFILIATED U N I O N S Black Allied Workers Union P . O . Box 2691 D U R B A N 4000

Tel: 031-311516

Black Allied Mining and Construction Workers Abbey House 51 Commissioner Street J O H A N N E S B U R G 2001 Tel: 011 834 6681/2 Black Municipal Workers Union P . O . Box 23027 Joubert Park 2044

Tel: 011-239017

Cape Town Municipal Workers Association P . O . Box 49 A T H L O N E 770 Tel: 021-678140 Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of S . A . P . O . Box 7135 J O H A N N E S B U R G 2000 Tel: 011-23-6127/8/9 Food and Canning Workers Union P . O . Box 2678 C A P E T O W N 8000

Tel: 021-46-6066/7

Appendix 8

General and Allied Workers Union P . O . Box 6914 JOHANNESBURG 2000

Tel: 011-838-2377

General Workers Union Benbow Building 3 Beverley Street A T H L O N E 7764

Tel: 021-670870

Media Workers Association P . O . Box 11136 JOHANNESBURG 2000

of S . A . Tel: 011-29-8005

Motor Assembly Components Workers Union P . O . Box 2924 P O R T ELIZABETH 6000 Tel: 041-54-4245 Municipal and General Workers Union 2nd Floor Chancellor House 2 5 F o x Street

JOHANNESBURG 2001

Tel: 011-836-6025

Orange-Vaal General Workers Union 308 Trevor Building Voortrekker Street VEREENIGING 1930 Tel: 016-224743

South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) East London Office 94 Tasmin Centre 122 Victoria Street P O Box 7002 D U R B A N 4001 T e l : 031-69217

E a s t L o n d o n 5200 T e l : 0431-26-899

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The b l a c k trade unions i n South Africa constitute the most effective challenge t o the apartheid state. I n 1 9 6 9 , there were j u s t 1 5 , 0 0 0 a f r i c a n workers i n trade u n i o n s . Now more t h a n h a l f a million blacks are organised. I n t h e three years l e a d i n g t o 1 9 8 4 there has b e e n , o n average, a strike a d a y i n South Africa. Despite repression, arrests, e x i l e , torture a n d deaths the b l a c k w o r k i n g c l a s s i n South Africa h a s continued successfully t o organise a n d t o struggle. This i s the first book t h a t e x a m i n e s the emerging b l a c k trade u n i o n movement a n d where i t h a d got t o b y the m i d 1 9 8 0 ' s . Based o n research a n d interviews with workers a n d u n i o n leaders i n South Africa, it e x a m i n e s a n d analyses the history o f the b l a c k w o r k i n g c l a s s struggle, its achievements, its internal differences, its p o l i t i c s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l links. The authors describe the d a i l y w o r k o f the unions t o w i n better wages, w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , shop steward rights a n d w o r k p l a c e safety standards. The c o n t i n u i n g f i g h t w i t h the apartheid regime, its security police a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l companies i s reported i n detail. Hundreds o f British a n d American companies operate i n South Africa. The role o f British a n d American workers i n b u i l d i n g solidarity l i n k s with the b l a c k trade u n i o n movement will b e c r u c i a l I n the fight t o overthrow apartheid. T h i s book describes u n i o n activities i n fifteen industries and lists addresses o f b l a c k unions s o that contact can be established with them.

T h e authors:

ISBN 0 89608 2 4 4X

D e n i s M a c S h a n e i s a former B B C p r o d u c e r a n d

$8.00

president o f t h e N a t i o n a l Union o f Journalists. H i s p r e v i o u s books i n c l u d e a study o f S o l i d a r i t y , the Polish union and a political biography of France's P r e s i d e n t M i t t e r r a n d . H e i s n o w a n o f f i c i a l o f the International Metalworkers Federation. M a r t i n P l a u t w a s e d u c a t e d a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Cape Town. U n t i l r e c e n t l y h e w o r k e d i n t h e Labour P a r t y ’ s i n t e r n a t i o n a l Department i n charge o f its Africa desk. H e i s n o w a broadcaster w i t h the B B C ' s Africa Service. David Ward works for the World Development Movement. H e i s co-author of the 1 9 8 2 Spokesman pamphlet ‘‘Black Trade Unions in South Africa’’. He has travelled extensively in Southern Africa.