Post-Independence Development in Africa: Decolonisation and Transformation Prospects (Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development) 303130540X, 9783031305405

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Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development

David Mhlanga Emmanuel Ndhlovu   Editors

Post-Independence Development in Africa Decolonisation and Transformation Prospects

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development Series Editors Diery Seck, CREPOL - Center for Research on Political Economy Dakar, Senegal Juliet U. Elu, Morehouse College Atlanta, GA, USA Yaw Nyarko, New York University New York, NY, USA

Africa is emerging as a rapidly growing region, still facing major challenges, but with a potential for significant progress – a transformation that necessitates vigorous efforts in research and policy thinking. This book series focuses on three intricately related key aspects of modern-day Africa: economic, social and political development. Making use of recent theoretical and empirical advances, the series aims to provide fresh answers to Africa’s development challenges. All the socio-­ political dimensions of today’s Africa are incorporated as they unfold and new policy options are presented. The series aims to provide a broad and interactive forum of science at work for policymaking and to bring together African and international researchers and experts. The series welcomes monographs and contributed volumes for an academic and professional audience, as well as tightly edited conference proceedings. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, economic policy and trade, regional integration, labor market policies, demographic development, social issues, political economy and political systems, and environmental and energy issues. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed. The book series is indexed in SCOPUS.

David Mhlanga  •  Emmanuel Ndhlovu Editors

Post-Independence Development in Africa Decolonisation and Transformation Prospects

Editors David Mhlanga The University of Johannesburg College of Business and Economics Johannesburg, South Africa

Emmanuel Ndhlovu The University of Johannesburg School of Business and Economics Johannesburg, South Africa

ISSN 2198-7262     ISSN 2198-7270 (electronic) Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development ISBN 978-3-031-30540-5    ISBN 978-3-031-30541-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book is the result of the collaborative efforts put in by its editors as well as its contributors. The editors are grateful for the dedication of all the contributors to this volume, and as a result, they would like to take this opportunity to offer their sincere gratitude to each of them. Most importantly, we want to express our gratitude to the Springer editors, Lorraine Klimowich and Ruth Milewski, and Kirthika Selvaraju, the Project Coordinator.

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About the Book

The book Post-Independence Development in Africa: Decolonisation and Transformation Prospects revisits the development debates and development realities in Africa. This is achieved by offering theoretical comments about post-­ independence development in Africa and by providing historical details pertaining to the development approaches adopted in Africa immediately after independence in the 1960s and mid-1970s. Sitting at the intersection of two sets of scholarly literature, namely literature on development and literature on development discourses and practices in Africa, the book comprises of a dirty mixture of beautiful and detailed sector-specific accounts of the status of development on the continent. The chapters in the book also contribute to clarifying how the two strands of literature intersect using several case studies across Africa. The book has 21 chapters, including the introductory chapter which theorises development in post-independence Africa. The other 20 empirical chapters appear in five parts: Development Historicisation and Theorisations; Development Politics and Practice in Africa; Development as a Painful Process; The Future of Development in Africa; and Conclusion and Recommendations. The first part, comprised of four chapters, covers the post-independence development theories and discourses in Africa with a particularly focus on the development theories or approaches that were developed and implemented by the first generation of African political leaders immediately after gaining independence in the 1960s and 1970s. The second part comprises three chapters which mainly focus on the implications of the adopted development approaches for both formal and informal socio-economic activities. The third part comprises six chapter which flag how the development process has been a painful process across sectors, including the human settlement, health, tourism, and agriculture. In the fourth part, the book offers chapters which focus on future trajectory of African development. This part comprises six chapters which basically focus on a combination of inward- and outward-looking development strategies and legal frameworks as well as the implications which have been generated by this particularly for the vulnerable categories of the African population. The last part comprises a single chapter which explores possibilities of development in Africa.

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Contents

 1 Introduction:  Theorizing Development in Post-independence Africa��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 David Mhlanga and Emmanuel Ndhlovu Part I Development Historicization and Theorizations  2 Unearthing  the Nexus Between Development Theories and Underdevelopment in the Post-­independence Africa��������������������   17 Aaram Gwiza, Moira Tambaoga, and Vain D. B. Jarbandhan  3 Post-Independence  Sustainable Development in Africa and Policy Proposals to Meet the Sustainable Development Goals������������������������   37 David Mhlanga and Farai Mlambo  4 Decolonization  of Development in Early Post-independence Africa��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   63 Emmanuel Ndhlovu and David Mhlanga  5 Navigating  a Tight Rope Between African Philosophy and Economics: Will the African Union Sustain the Spirit of Ujamaa in the Advent of COVID-19?������������������������������������������������   83 Michael Takudzwa Pasara Part II Development Politics and Practice in Africa  6 Impact  of Regional Trade Agreements on Economic Growth: An Econometric Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������  103 Michael Takudzwa Pasara and Steven Henry Dunga  7 Livelihood  Activities in Post-Independent Africa: A Closer Look at the Impact of Chikorokoza Illegal Mining on the Education System in Zimbabwe��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  117 Respect Jongwe and David Mhlanga ix

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 8 Institutional  Capacity Challenges for Policy Research Analysis (PRA) in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study of State and Non-state Policy Institutions������������������������������������������������������������  133 Moira Tambaoga, Aaram Gwiza, Vain D. B. Jarbandhan, and Promise Machingo Hlungwani Part III Development as a Painful Process  9 Development-Induced  Displacement: A Call for Ethical Considerations in Africa��������������������������������������������������������������������������  157 Robson Mandishekwa 10 Health  and Healthcare Delivery in Zimbabwe: Past and Present������  171 Tamisai Chipunza and Senia Nhamo 11 Contested  Landscapes: Politics of Space and Belonging in Land-Use Planning in Bvumba Forest Along the Zimbabwe-­Mozambican Border������������������������������������������������������  195 Joseline W. Chitotombe, David Mhlanga, and Emmanuel Ndhlovu 12 Post-independence  Reforms and Policies in Zimbabwe ����������������������  213 Clainos Chidoko 13 Tourism  Receipts, Education, and Income Inequality in Selected South African Provinces��������������������������������������������������������������������������  227 Rufaro Garidzirai 14 Dam  Projects, Modernity, and Forced Displacement: An Analysis of the Role of Local Institutions in Surviving Marginalization Among the Tokwe Mukosi Displacees in Zimbabwe ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  239 Lloyd Nhodo and Vivian Besem Ojong Part IV The Future of Development in Africa 15 Public  Spending and Private Sector Investment in Nigeria: An Investigation of the Crowding-in (or Crowding-out) Effect Amidst Deteriorating Fiscal Balance������������������������������������������������������������������  263 Nargiza Alymkulova, Paul Terhemba Iorember, and Oreoluwatoni Omotesho 16 The  Impact of Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals on Women Leaders Within South African Schools ������������������������������  279 Musa Grace Zitha 17 Implications  of Sino-African Partnerships for Peasant Natural Resource Access, Ownership, and Utilization in Africa ����������������������  301 Emmanuel Ndhlovu and David Mhlanga

Contents

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18 A  South African Perspective on the Solidification of Auditor’s Competence in the Areas of Testing for the Presence of Fraud and Corruption����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  321 Kgabo Freddy Masehela and David Mhlanga 19 Post-COVID-19  in South Africa: The Pandemic and Public Finances toward Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals ����������  345 David Mhlanga 20 The  Politicization of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Zimbabwe and Implications on the Attainment of the SDGs ��������������������������������  365 Emmanuel Ndhlovu and David Mhlanga Part V Conclusions and Recommendations 21 Conclusion:  Toward Development in Postindependence Africa����������  389 David Mhlanga and Emmanuel Ndhlovu Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  399

About the Editors

David Mhlanga  is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. His research includes financial inclusion, poverty studies, and Industry 4.0. Subject areas include Development Economics, Economics of Artificial Intelligence, Health, and Education Economics. Emmanuel  Ndhlovu  is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Vaal University of Technology, South Africa. He holds a PhD in Development Studies from the University of South Africa. He conducts research on land and agrarian change in Africa, peasant livelihoods, food security, migration, and political economy of development.

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About the Contributors

Nargiza Alymkulova  is currently a Professor (Associate) at the Department of Economics, Nile University of Nigeria. She holds a PhD in Monetary Economics. Her research interests include monetary economics, public finance, and development finance. Clainos  Chidoko  is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Economics, Great Zimbabwe University. He conducts research in trade policy, industrialisation, and emerging issues. Subject areas include Development and Agricultural Economics. Tamisai Chipunza  is a Lecturer at the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. He teaches microeconomics and investment analysis modules. He recently earned a PhD in Economics with the University of South Africa. His research interests are in development economics, focusing on health economics. Joseline  Wadzanai  Chitotombe  is a Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Great Zimbabwe University. Her research interests are environmental policing and natural resource governance. She joined the University in 2009 and has published a number of publications in refereed journals in the research area of natural resource management. She is a holder of a BSc honours degree in Sociology and MSc in Social Ecology from the University of Zimbabwe. She is currently a PhD student in Environmental Management at UNISA. Rufaro Garidzirai  is a skilled and experienced university educator with a solid background in Economics lecturing. His research interests are in sectorial economics, macroeconomics, and development economics. Aaram  Gwiza  is a Lecturer at the Department of Development Sciences, Marondera University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology. He holds a PhD in Public Management and Governance from the University of Johannesburg; Master of Public Administration (UZ); and the BSc Hons in Administration (UZ).

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About the Contributors

Paul Terhemba Iorember  is currently a Lecturer at the Department of Economics, Nile University of Nigeria. He is also a PhD scholar at the Department of Economics, University of Jos. His research interests include development finance, public sector economics, energy finance, macroeconomic modelling, climate change economics, and environmental and resource economics. Respect Jongwe  is an emerging researcher with research interests in development issues with a focus on developing countries. He is a District Registrar in the Civil Registry Department Zimbabwe. He is currently pursuing his PhD. Robson  Mandishekwa  is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Economic Sciences, Midlands State University. He has 15  years of university services. His research interests are in internal displacement, poverty, and economics of happiness. He holds a Doctorate degree in Economics from Midlands State University. Kgabo Freddy Masehela  is a Lecturer at the University of Johannesburg (RSA). He is currently lecturing taxation for the third-year Diploma Students at the Department of Commercial Accounting. His research interests are in the following fields: Taxation, Accounting, and Auditing. Farai  Mlambo  is a full-time academic within the School of Statistics and Actuarial Science at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg South Africa. Before joining Wits, Farai was employed as a Statistical Analyst, Institutional Researcher, and Lecturer at Fever-Tree Finance, Office of the Vice-Chancellor, and Department of Statistics at Nelson Mandela University, respectively. Farai holds a PhD (Mathematical Statistics), MCom Statistics (Cum-Laude), BCom Hons Mathematical Statistics (Cum-Laude) and BCom Economics and Statistics (CumLaude) from Nelson Mandela University where he also received about 10 academic awards. Moira  Tambaoga  is a Lecturer at the Development Sciences Department, Marondera University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology. She possesses Master of Public Administration degree (UZ) and the BSc Honours in Administration (UZ). Senia Nhamo  is a Senior Lecturer and Professor of Economics at the University of South Africa. She teaches econometrics, environmental economics, and microeconomics. Her research interests are on the economic empowerment of women in fragile states, green growth indicators, and Agenda 2063 for Africa. Lloyd  Nhodo  is a Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Great Zimbabwe University. He holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Areas of specialisation include Forced displacements, Rural and Urban Livelihoods and Human Security.

About the Contributors

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Oreoluwatoni Omotesho  is a graduate student of the Department of Economics, Nile University of Nigeria. Her research interests include public sector economics and development economics. Michael Takudzwa Pasara  is an economist with interests in macroeconomics, international economics (trade and finance), and sustainable development using mathematical, simulations, and econometric applications. He is mainly interested in research, consultancy, and policy advocacy. Vain D. B. Jarbandhan  is an Associate Professor and Director at the Centre for Public Management and Governance, School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg. Musa Grace Zitha  is a PhD student at the University of South Africa. She currently works for the Gauteng Department of Education as a Principal of a primary school. Ms. Zitha worked as an Accounting and Business Studies teacher, a Departmental Head for Commercial subjects, and a Deputy Principal and a Principal in different secondary schools. Her research interests are in female leadership.

Chapter 1

Introduction: Theorizing Development in Post-independence Africa David Mhlanga

and Emmanuel Ndhlovu

Abstract  This chapter introduces the book Post-Independence Development in Africa: Decolonisation and Transformation Prospects. It achieves this by offering theoretical comments about post-independence development in Africa and by providing historical details about the development approaches adopted in Africa immediately after independence in the 1960s and mid-1970s. As the chapter shows, the book sits at the intersection of two sets of scholarly literature, namely, literature on development and literature on development discourses and practices in Africa. This book contributes to clarifying how the two strands of literature intersect using several case studies across Africa. Keywords  Africa · Colonialism · Post-independence development · Poverty · Welfare

1.1 Introduction This chapter introduces the book Post-Independence Development in Africa: Decolonisation and Transformation Prospects. This is achieved by offering general theoretical comments about development since the 1960s and 1970s when most of the countries on the continent began to attain independence from the colonial rule of European countries that had subjugated them for over a century. The success of colonial rule in Africa was based on the disenfranchisement of Africans from resources that could enable them either to challenge White supremacy or to pursue D. Mhlanga The University of Johannesburg, College of Business and Economics, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] E. Ndhlovu (*) Vaal University of Technology, Vanderbijlpark, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_1

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independent socioeconomic activities. In addition to resource access denial, colonial administrations across the continent also instituted racially based policies such as hut and livestock tax to force Africans to serve Whites (Moyana, 1975; Palmer, 1977). The result was the generation of abject poverty for Africans. With the attainment of independence, therefore, the first generation of African nationalist leaders committed to swiftly tackling the poverty problem – one of the tickets upon which they had ascended to power. Almost seven decades since independence, however, poverty remains one of the key challenges which Africa faces. The realization of inclusive development promised during the liberation struggle remains a forfeit ambition, while the achievement of democracy, as Gumede (2022: vi) observes, “remains a work in progress, and often, democratic reversals have become a common phenomenon.” At the global level, the continent of Africa remains “running while others walk” (Mkandawire, 2011). So far, the future remains bleak as nothing seems to be working. In addition to poor leadership, corruption, and misinformed policies, among others, there are also unjust trade agreements, conditional aid, and biased debt structures by which former colonizers continue to regulate African development. This continues to present insurmountable problems for African countries to chart their sovereign development path. This book, therefore, offers insights into the various explanations behind Africa’s underdevelopment and the challenges it faces in several sectors ranging from agriculture, economy, and health to education and mining. Africa’s development impasse, therefore, should be understood in the context of the aborted national project at independence. The contributors in this book explore Africa’s challenges using several case studies, thereby making the book an empirical-based valuable and interesting read. Development was at the center of the African nation-building agenda. Early nationalist political leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Modibo Keita, Sekou Touré, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kenneth Kaunda, and Seretse Khama, among others, first placed the concepts of development and national project on the arena. Their views were widely supported by development experts of the time, including the likes of Samir Amin, Archie Mafeje, Claude Ake, and many others. The national project promoted by the leaders was focused on the primacy of nation-building and national development, the complete dismantling of the institutional colonialism legacies, and achieving inclusive social and economic growth for the people. The national project was defined by Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (2011: 70) as a vital aspect of state-building which involves the formation of new institutions, defining new culture, developing new citizenship, designing new policies, adopting and implementing new political and economic programs which are meant address people’s demands, and institutionalizing the notion of state or national sovereignty. At the heart of the African national project has been the thirst for development. The close link between the national project and development was observed by Rivkin (1969: 156) who wrote: “Nation-building and economic development … are twin goals and intimately related tasks, sharing many of the same problems, confronting many of the same challenges; and interrelating at many levels of public policy and practice.” African leaders in these early years of independence vigorously pursued

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this national project and also founded networks such as the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) and several other subregional networks through which they shared ideas and coordinated development efforts. As a result of their vigorous efforts and commitments, African economies managed to grow impressively particularly in the 1960s and early 1970s. Improvement was most notable in areas of physical infrastructure development, particularly in the areas of health, education, and communications. However, with the arrival of the mid-1970s, African countries slowly plunged back into poverty as neoliberal policies sneaked back. Today, seven decades later, evidence shows that not much has changed since then (Ndhlovu, 2021). Most Africans across the continent still rely on vulnerable subsistence activities for survival, while others rely on illicit and illegal activities such as mineral panning as highlighted by Jongwe and Mhlanga (Chap. 7, this volume) while others on communal rangelands as described by Chitotombe, Mhlanga, and Ndhlovu (Chap. 11, this volume). This chapter provides some summaries of the key concepts that hold this book together. The book could be important for development policymakers who could draw from the empirical evidence provided in the chapters to inform decisions. The multidisciplinary nature of the chapters in this book makes it also important for academics who could use it as reading material for students of all levels. The next section provides a discussion on post-independence Africa’s interrupted development trajectory. This is followed by a summary of the definitional debates on the concept of development in Africa and a discussion of the development status of the continent since the mid-1970s. Thereafter, the chapter presents the book outline.

1.2 Interrupted Development Although African economies experience significant growth in the first decades of independence, from the mid-1970s, a slow plunge back began to be experienced as neoliberal policies sneaked in to interrupt the growth of these young economies. Several socioeconomic realities contributed to the challenges which faced the African national project. At the national level is poor leadership. Committed to swiftly achieving development, most post-independence African governments exercised top-down development approaches. Unfortunately, these approaches ended up stifling the productivity of citizens who could not contribute to any programs since the development projects were envisaged, designed, and implemented from above. As observed by Mkandawire (2011), policies came to be influenced mainly by concern with the means instead of the conditions for development. For Gumede (2022), this reality gave rise to an obsession with structures, leading to centralization and a top-down approach to the management of public affairs. Thus, by the mid-1970s, the national project had started to fall apart, and the gap between the state and its citizens widened significantly in the process. This worsened in the early 1980s when the Euro-North American-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF)

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forced African countries to implement punitive economic structural adjustment programs to service their outstanding debts to continue gaining access to development finance from donor institutions. African countries were forced to open their markets; undo many African state aspects, including the existence of social safety nets; and institute some “democratic procedures” that allowed the proper functioning of the market. Thus, the development welfarism of the 1960s, which undergirds the national project, was shattered by the neoliberal development package (Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021a; Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021b; Ndhlovu, 2022). By so doing, policy and decision-making, a key aspect of sovereignty, was wrenched from the African state. There was also another challenge. The development agenda pursued by African leaders was misplaced. It involved “catching up with the world of former colonizers, while at the same time rectifying the colonially created economic and social problems” (Mkandawire, 2011, 10–12). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) argues that due to this “catch-up” drive, the postcolonial states attempted to accomplish numerous national tasks as quickly as possible and at once. These tasks, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 12) argues, “began with the drive toward nation-building and state-­ consolidation involving uniting different races and ethnicities into one national identity as well as entrenchment of African political power in terms of building institutions, monopolizing violence and forging hegemony.” Olukoshi and Laakso (1996) opine that the postcolonial state pledged to stamp out colonial dictatorship and authoritarianism to build accountability, legitimacy, and transparency and guarantee popular participation in governance. The national projects would be accompanied by the elimination of poverty, ignorance, and disease (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021c) and the campaign for economic growth to improve the living standards of people. Radical postcolonial such as Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, among others, also promised to reverse the colonial dispossession through the redistribution of national resources, particularly land. However, as demonstrated by the contributions in this book, the African national project seems to have not succeeded in realizing its core objectives. The next section details what could have happened to Africa’s national project.

1.3 Conceptual and Theoretical Debates on Development Widespread debates exist concerning what development entails, particularly in the African context. The major problem, however, is that existing conceptualizations and theorizations are steeped in or are influenced by European thinking and, therefore, offer no cultural nor contextual relevance in Africa. For instance, in Europe, the concept of development emerged as “part of the philosophical assumptions of the European Enlightenment” (Prah, 2006: 175). The Enlightenment period was “a pedagogical movement led by the philosophers to build a new scientifically ordered discourse of nature, authority, social existence and virtually everything in the universe” (Lushaba, 2006: 6).

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In the West, just like in Europe, the concept of development is linked to modernity. Development is viewed in the West as “an evolutionary process through which the western societies evolved and through which third world countries were still in the process of evolving” (Ndhlovu, 2020: 84). This conceptualization, which was initiated by W.W.  Rostov, an adviser in both the John F Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson eras of the United States, was based on the idea that the development of the non-Euro-West could be realized if developing countries could copy and paste Western capital, technology, and social organization and values. The Western conceptualization of development is also associated with modernity – a process that is characterized by transformation from a traditional, rural agrarian society to a secular, industrial, and urban culture. This is based on the characterization of non-­ Western countries as primitive and custom-condemned. The Euro-Western conceptualization of “development” is associated with the notion of modernity and, therefore, is rejected by many African development experts who argue that “Africa cannot possibly develop by modernizing or becoming like the modern west” (Lushaba, 2006: 3) and that modernity is not a suitable form of development for Africa (Ndhlovu, 2020; Mhlanga, 2022). Latouche (1993: 460) dismisses the current conceptualization of development arguing that it “has been and still is the westernization of the world.” Ziai (2009: 198) labels it as “…an empty signifier [emerging from the West] that can be filled with almost any content.” African scholars prefer that development be conceptualized as referring to a “liberatory human aspiration to attain freedom from political, economic, ideological, epistemological, and social domination…” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 2). Gumede (2019: 51) defines development as “…improvements in wellbeing, involving socio-­ economic progress.” Brobbey (2010:1) defines development as “the capacity of a state to achieve the higher outcome of production for the satisfaction of citizens and empower them to make demands.” This chapter adopts the definition by Gumede (2019) which emphasizes the need for improved well-being and socioeconomic progress. However, whatever the debates, one fact, as demonstrated by the various contributions in this book, is that poverty remains on the African continent.

1.4 Debating the Development Status in Africa Since the mid-1970s, empirical evidence has been showing that African economies are either stagnant or moving backward. From 1980 to 2015, for instance, the sub-­ Saharan Africa (SSA) Human Development Index (HDI) was the lowest in comparison to other global regions (Gumede, 2016). The HDI levels for East Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific were also making better progress when compared to SSA. Although the HDI for some regions, such as the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Central Asia, and the Arab States, had not shown any significant growth in the 2011–2015 period, the HDI levels of those regions were still better than for SSA. Coupled with the underperformance of countries have been issues of massive corruption across countries but mostly in countries such as Angola, Malawi, Mali,

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and Zimbabwe; state captures in South Africa, Uganda, and Central Africa; cadre deployment to critical government offices across countries; coups mostly in West Africa, but also Zimbabwe; vote rigging which attracts economic sanctions and international isolation in Zimbabwe and armed conflicts in Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sudan; and violent protests in the Arab states of North Africa, but also in South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho, Nigeria, Ghana, and Gambia. The former colonial countries have also played no small part in the development challenges on the continent. In addition to economic sanctions on radical countries that refuse to tour the neoliberal line, there has been a massive sponsorship of coups to dispose of Pan-Africanist and pro-poor leaders. There has also been a massive provision of funding to disruptive opposition political activities. Amin (2014) added that Africa is also in the weird grip of dependency where every piece of advice by former oppressors is embraced uncritically. As argued by Ndhlovu and Mhlanga (Chap. 4, this volume), it would be contradictory for the former oppressors to genuinely commit to helping their former subjects (who disrupted their accumulation trajectory), out of poverty and underdevelopment so that they can be of equal status with the former oppressor. Former colonial agents posited that Africa failed to develop because of its narrow resources and productive base; overvalued local currencies; the presence of large and incompetent public sector bureaucracies that interfere in “purely economic matters” (Erunke, 2009: 8); and the upkeep of subsidies in certain economic communities which in the end overstrain the state. It was also argued that Africa failed to develop because the economies of its countries are not well integrated into the global financial system which could benefit them. This view is dismissed by many African development experts who view no merit in the claim. Amin (2014: 28) posits that: In 1990 the ratio of extra-regional trade to GDP was for Africa 45.6 percent while it was only 12.8 percent for Europe; 13.2 percent for North America; 23.7 percent for Latin America and 15.2 percent for Asia. These ratios were not significantly different throughout the twentieth century. The average for the world was 14.9 percent in 1928 and 16.1 percent in 1990.

Amin (2014: 29) further argues that the above statistics indicate that “all the regions of the world (including Africa) are equally integrated with the global system, [only that] they are integrated into it in different ways. The concept of marginalization is a false concept that tends to becloud the real question, which is not to which degree the various regions are integrated” but “in which way they are integrated.” What, therefore, explains the difference in the development status of regions is the imperialistic tendencies of regions. Other regions are better placed to manipulate the global system for their benefit while pushing the less powerful and less resourceful ones into increased poverty. With the ascendency of neoliberal leaders across Africa, development priorities have been distorted. The agrarian fabric of African society is now viewed as the problem and not the solution. African farmers who, for centuries, have been the pillars of the realization of African food sufficiency were now viewed as unproductive and, thus, had to be replaced by large-scale capitalist farming activities. The results

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had been landing grabs either by the African state or by monopoly-finance capital from the peasantry. Considering that most African countries were poor at independence and that they did not have funds to pursue their development agenda in other sectors, except agriculture, the disruption of the agricultural sector represented the biggest error by African leaders and a well-calculated move by former colonizers to thwart the nationalist project and to disrupt whatever efforts toward development in Africa. Ake (1996) also believes that the neglect of the agriculture sector undergirds the problems of the development agenda. Ake (1996) avers that development was never realized due to the neglect of the agrarian revolution, which itself is a vital stage for growth for an agrarian continent like Africa.

1.5 Volume Outline The book has 21 chapters, including this introductory chapter which theorizes development in post-independence Africa. The following 20 empirical chapters appear in five parts: Development Historicisation and Theorisations; Development Politics and Practice in Africa; Development as a Painful Process; The Future of Development in Africa; and Conclusion and Recommendations. The first part covers the post-independence development theories and discourses in Africa. The chapters revisit the development theories or approaches developed and implemented by the first generation of political leaders immediately after gaining independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Chapter 2 by Aaram Gwiza, Moira Tambaoga, and Vain Jarbandhan interrogates the development theories and development nexus with a particular reference to Africa’s post-independence era. The prime objective of the study is to discuss the reasons why development theories are failing to project and bring real development in post-independence Africa. The chapter utilizes documentary search as the data collection instrument. The data is analyzed qualitatively using the content analysis method. The study argues that the deep-rooted poverty cases are linked to the failures of the contemporary theories of development in shaping the pace and direction of development efforts in the African continent. To this end, the research seeks to synthesize the key components and role of the three major theories of development, namely, dependency, modernization, and globalization, in understanding Africa’s post-independence development. Observed loopholes of the above development theories are, indeed, a compelling case for this chapter to suggest the Africa Renaissance theory as a panacea for a holistic appreciation of the depth and breadth of various development strides in post-independence Africa. In Chap. 3, David Mhlanga and Farai Mlambo present the prospects for the realization of post-independence sustainable development in Africa. The chapter also commented on the ideas that the African states might follow to accomplish the Sustainable Development Goals. The systematic literature review was used for this chapter’s focus. The chapter provides a range of development indicators for Africa,

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and it wraps up with an in-depth examination of the numerous policy options that could help Africa achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Chapter 4 by Emmanuel Ndhlovu and David Mhlanga examines Africa’s socioeconomic development with a focus on the first two decades of political independence, i.e., 1960–1980. The chapter is a broad assessment of the colonially disrupted socioeconomic social reality in Africa to highlight the development status of the continent. Utilizing secondary empirical and qualitative evidence obtainable in both academic and gray literature, the chapter shows that given the slow rate with which the Human Development Index often grows, the performance of early post-­ independence African countries (combined) was not as dismal as is often claimed. Africa’s economic growth performed well above the global average just like Asia and the Americas during the 1970–1980 period despite the oil price shock as well as the structural adjustment programs of the 1970s. While Africa produced mixed development results, the chapter avers that the success of post-independence Africa can be attributed to the impressive groundwork of first-generation African leaders who experimented with different kinds of developmental systems, both home-­ grown and adapted. In Chap. 5, Michael Takudzwa Pasara takes a critical analysis of the Ujamaa philosophy, its past successes and weaknesses, and how it has fared in different times especially in the wake of two very contrasting developments in March 2018 and December 2019, respectively. Firstly, the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) seeks to revive and promote the spirit of Ujamaa through economic gains from intra-African trade. Secondly, the challenges associated with COVID-19 which were largely promoting isolation resulted in the closing of borders leading to countries operating as silos against a common enemy of such magnitude as the pandemic. The chapter also analyzes how the European Union has, in practice, applied the spirit of Ujamaa in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the position of the approach in Africa despite the rhetoric on the subject. The chapter concludes that the original models upon which Ujamaa was anchored were largely meant to attain political freedoms in the 1960s to 1980s. These priorities changed when countries became independent leading to less stimulus for continued commitments to regional bodies such as the African Union. The chapter recommends that commitment to the African Ujamaa can be sustained in the long run when arrangements such as the AfCFTA are operational and when member countries derive pragmatic gains with priorities moving from political to economic freedoms. Part II consists of three chapters. Michael Takudzwa Pasara and Steven Henry Dunga (Chap. 6) investigate whether the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) could lead to any significant welfare gains in Africa. Using the augmented gravity model, the chapter seeks to answer this and related questions by focusing on three regional economic communities (RECs), namely, the East African Community (EAC), Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The gravity model was preferred not only for its ability to identify significant factors which influence bilateral trade but also for its ability to reflect the level of trade creation and

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diversion and key components in welfare distribution. The results indicate that economic size (positive) and distance (negative) are significant in influencing bilateral trade, but population size was not showing that it is income that carries more weight in trade volume. Country idiosyncratic factors of the shared border and landlocked or coastal were also significant but the presence of a common language was not. The chapter recommends not only the removal of trade barriers but also the introduction of one-stop border posts, the adoption of a common language, and the development of soft and hard infrastructure and other non-trade barriers (NTBs). In Chap. 7, Respect Jongwe and David Mhlanga determine the actual experiences that stakeholders have had concerning how artisanal miners make their living in Zimbabwe. Personal interviews were conducted in person and included the use of both structured and semi-structured questionnaires. These types of questions were posed to respondents. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was utilized to carry out the statistical analysis. Content analysis was utilized to conduct the study of qualitative data. The findings of the study pointed to rampant violence among artisanal miners, who are also known as “maShurugwi,” as well as an increase in school dropouts, teenage pregnancies, teachers boycotting lessons in pursuit of gold panning activities, and the proliferation of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) (STIs). The findings of this study indicate that “chikorokoza” has had a detrimental effect on the educational progress made in the Kwekwe district. According to the findings of the study, the Zimbabwean government should take severe action to put a stop to chikorokoza in the country. Moira Tambaoga, Aaram Gwiza, Vain D.B. Jarbandhan, and Promise Machingo Hlungwani in Chap. 8 investigate the institutional capacity for PRA in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Policy, with a specific focus on state and non-state policy institutions. The thesis of the chapter is that institutional incapacity undermines effective policy research and analysis. A qualitative research methodology was applied to gain more insight into the research topic. Land and agrarian institutions, the Ruzivo Trust, Women and Land in Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, the 2003 Presidential Land Review Commission (PLRC), and relevant academics and experts on land governance were consulted for case evidence. In this study, data collection tools included in-depth interviews and documentary searches. The researchers used content and thematic analysis approaches for data presentation and analysis. Research findings highlight that the institutional capacity for PRA in Zimbabwe is relatively weak and fragmented. The main challenges noted include overstressed human resources due to understaffing and limited financial resources exacerbated by leakages through corruption. The study, therefore, recommends that the Land Commission appoints qualified and non-partisan staff. Furthermore, policy researchers and analysts should be given access to critical policy documents. Part III focuses on development as a painful, but necessary process. Thus, in Chap. 9, Robson Mandishekwa problematizes development-initiated displacements and argues that development projects often lead to displacement. This chapter builds on the trolley problem as an ethical decision-making tool for displacement. It argues that despite the trolley problem having been identified about six decades ago, its application in decisions about development projects that lead to displacement is

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rare, especially in Africa. That is to say, the ethical considerations, especially using the trolley problem, about displacing people have been under-researched. The study, therefore, puts forward the argument that despite the benefits derived from development projects, ethical considerations still need to be emphasized. This research, therefore, used the trolley problem as one sacrificial dilemma model for ethical decision-making. The findings indicate that utilitarian approaches suggest that displacing the minority is acceptable based on the fact that the majority is going to benefit. Deontologically, this displacement is not morally justifiable because the government has a moral obligation to protect every citizen against arbitrary displacement. If approached for assistance, courts may not need to intervene because, from the trolley problem view, they will be perceived as allowing the killing of innocent civilians, if they rule in favor of the government or development partners. Again, the government must improve the welfare of the citizens, who include both the displaced and the non-displaced, but by instituting the project, the displaced may be worse off than before. Faced with this dilemma, the government normally uses its power of eminent domain to attain supposedly utilitarian results. In Chap. 10, Tamisai Chipunza and Senia Nhamo explore the key issues impacting Zimbabwe’s path toward ensuring healthy living and well-being (SDG3). It shed light on the state of health and healthcare delivery in Zimbabwe since independence. This was achieved through a review and synthesis of literature and statistics on selected health-related indicators drawn from the United Nation (UN) tier classification of SDGs. The review showed that inadequate healthcare financing, more spending on salaries than on service delivery, the bias of public healthcare spending toward urban-based higher-level health facilities, and lack of community participation in health matters are among the challenges impacting efficient healthcare delivery in Zimbabwe. To improve health and healthcare delivery in the country, there is a need to enhance community participation in health issues, adequately equip lower-­ level health facilities, adopt strategies to retain health personnel, and raise additional resources for healthcare delivery. Joseline W Chitotombe, David Mhlanga, and Emmanuel Ndhlovu (Chap. 11) explore the re-emerging landscapes in the Bvumba forest, in Zimbabwe, analyze the contestations surrounding the landscape changes, and evaluate the solutions that have been pleaded for to deal with the overarching difficulties. The research was conducted using a qualitative research methodology called content analysis, and it took an interpretive approach to data presentation. The findings showed that the Bvumba forest had been made into a political space through the use of speech, which is what made it a site of conflict. This has consequently resulted in a redefining of the emerging social relations, which has now resulted in the local inhabitants becoming estranged from their customary forest rights. According to the study, policymakers should engage stakeholders to initiate inclusive governance in the Bvumba forest. This is followed by Clainos Chidoko (Chap. 12) who explores the various development strategies adopted in Zimbabwe since independence. He observes that since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has implemented more than ten economic development strategies. These policies ranged from the inward-looking, interventionist

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strategy to the outward-oriented market-driven focus. All these policies endeavored to create employment in the country among many other objectives and to jostle the economy into an industrial activity. Most of the objectives including the employment objective have not been achieved fully with unemployment going up instead. The interventionist strategies targeted mainly the agricultural, mining, financial, and manufacturing sectors and to some extent construction and tourism. Zimbabwe inherited a fairly performing economy at independence, and as such the main task of the government was to maintain and improve the economy’s performance. A lot of resources were to be committed to continuing on the right track. On that note, Zimbabwe received a lot of support from the international community in terms of funding, training, and human personnel. However, despite the final support from the international community, the economy did not improve to the expectation of the Zimbabweans. It is recommended that the government should implement the policies wholeheartedly. In Chap. 13, Rufaro Garidzirai investigates the influence of education and tourism on income inequality in South African provinces. In achieving this a pooled mean group (PMG) was employed. The results show that tourism arrival and economic growth negatively influence income inequality in the South African provinces, while tourism arrival was insignificant in explaining income inequality. Contrarily, tourism receipts and education positively influence income inequality in South African provinces. Thus, an improvement in the tourism sector is crucial since it is one of the fastest-growing sectors in South Africa. It is envisaged to create employment and reduce poverty and income inequality. Chapter 14 by Lloyd Nhodo and Vivian Bassem Ojong shows how the Tokwe-­ Mukosi people are falling back on the existing local institutions for protection, simultaneously portraying how they create new local institutions to build resilience with very limited state support. The findings reveal the interplay between local institutions and social capital in understanding the efficacy of informal and community-­ based institutions in dealing with vulnerability and marginalization. The chapter interfaces social capital theory and strategic essentialism to understand the collective response of the displacements in the quest to survive marginalization. Methodologically, unstructured interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and secondary sources of data were used to collect data within this ethnographic study. Part IV is an assessment of the future of development in Africa. Paul Terhemba Iorember, Nargiza Alymkulova, and Oreoluwatoni Omotesho (Chap. 15) investigate the effects of public spending on private sector investment amid rising fiscal deficit, with the view of establishing the crowding effects of such spending. Employing the autoregressive distributed lag model on quarterly data from 2011Q1 to 2020Q2, the study found that despite the rising level of fiscal deficit in Nigeria, public spending (recurrent and capital expenditure) and public borrowing are the strong determinants of private sector investment. The results show that public expenditure has a significant effect on private investment in Nigeria. However, the recurrent expenditure which constitutes the largest percentage of the total public spending, moves in the opposite direction, and has a negative significant effect on private investment.

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This suggests that fewer resources are made available for capital expenditure. The study, therefore, recommends the need for the government to reduce recurrent expenditure and increase spending on capital items. This involves the concentration of efforts on the provision and expansion of the existing infrastructure. Musa Grace Zitha, in Chap. 16, provides a report on how South African women leaders in schools were impacted by the MDGs and SDGs. It uses the qualitative review of secondary literature wherein document analysis is deployed. The study shows that the government of South Africa and the DBE embraced the MDGs and SDGs to make its NDP a success by promoting women to leadership positions. The chapter reveals that although the MDGs and SGDs had a positive impact on women leaders of South African schools, there are still many challenges that hinder the achievement of SDG goals by 2030. The study recommends the empowerment of individuals responsible for empowering women and the implementation of systems and projects that can help improve the situation of women leaders in schools. In Chap. 17, Emmanuel Ndhlovu and David Mhlanga explore the implications of Chinese investments on African peasant access to, utilization of, and ownership of natural resources and propose solutions to asymmetrical power relations in economic partnerships. The chapter undertakes a critical document analysis of secondary literature obtained in both scholarly and gray literature which were selected using key terms such as Africa, China-Africa relations/partnerships, natural resources, and land. In Chap. 18, Kgabo Freddy Masehela and David Mhlanga examined the South African perspective on the strengthening of auditors’ expertise in detecting fraud and corruption. The findings suggest that audit firms in South Africa and other nations should focus more on promoting integrity and ethical values and invest more in antifraud measures like whistle-blower lines, which encourage auditors to report fraud and misconduct without worrying about facing retaliation from their employers. This may contribute to a decrease in corrupt practices, which will benefit the South African economy’s expansion and development. Chapter 19 of David Mhlanga’s book examined the pandemic and public finances in relation to achieving the sustainable development objectives. The post-COVID-19 pandemic worldwide economic depression had a negative impact on both public and private businesses, as well as national and international budgets. According to the analysis, South Africa’s government finances were significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the report advises that the government should encourage investment and growth while putting a focus on the quality of governance by increasing transparency, implementing efficient compliance procedures and technologies, and opening the economy to citizen engagement. This chapter also covered strategies that can be used to carry out the Sustainable Development Goals. Emmanuel Ndhlovu and David Mhlanga examined the politicization of the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe and its effects on the achievement of the SDGs in Chap. 20. The chapter concluded that the ruling party’s response to the COVID-19 epidemic is, thus, a very clear example of how biological and health issues may quickly be

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converted into political issues, which can have very bad consequences for the achievement of sustainable development goals. Part V concludes the book and makes some recommendations. Chapter 21 by David Mhlanga and Emmanuel Ndhlovu concludes the book. The chapter provides an overview of the entire book Post-Independence Development in Africa: Decolonisation and Transformation Prospects. The purpose of this book was to encourage both the dissemination of information and the cultivation of hope by providing a comprehensive and chronological account of the debates and facts surrounding post-independence development discourses and practices in Africa and to present this account in a comprehensive order. The book offered a complete and chronological summary of the discussions and facts surrounding post-­ independence growth.

References Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and development in Africa. Brookings. Amin, S. (2014). Understanding the Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. Africa Development, 69(1), 15–36. Brobbey, P. (2010). Theories of social development. University of Ghana: Department of Sociology. Erunke C. E. (2009). Evolving an alternative theoretical construct for African development: an indigenous approach. Nasarawa State University, Keffi: Nigeria – West Africa. Gumede, V. (2016). Towards a better socio-economic development approach for Africa’s renewal. Africa Insight, 46(1), 89–105. Gumede, V. (2019). ‘Rethinking and reclaiming development in Africa’. Ndlovu Gatsheni & Mpofu, B. Rethinking and unthinking development: Perspectives on inequality and poverty in South Africa and Zimbabwe. : Berghahn books. Gumede, V. (2022). Editorial. Rethinking African development in the 21st century (Special edition in honour of Thandika Mkandawire). Journal of African Transformation, 7(1). Latouche, S. (1993). In the wake of the affluent society: An exploration of post-development. Zed Books. Lumumba-Kasongo, T. (2011). The National Project as a public administration concept: The problematic of state building in the search for new development paradigms in Africa. Africa Development, 16(2), 63–96. Lushaba, L.  S. (2006). Development as modernity, modernity as development (African Studies Centre Working Paper 69/2006). ASC. Mhlanga, D. (2022). Stakeholder capitalism, the fourth industrial revolution (4IR), and sustainable development: Issues to be resolved. Sustainability, 14(7), 3902. Mhlanga, D., & Ndhlovu, E. (2021a). Financialised agrarian primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe. African Renaissance, 18(3), 185. Mhlanga, D., & Ndhlovu, E. (2021b). Socio-economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe and the development implications for southern Africa. Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 8(2), 75. Mhlanga, D., & Ndhlovu, E. (2021c). Surrogate currency and its impact on the livelihoods of smallholder farmers: A Zimbabwean case. African Journal of Development Studies, 11(4), 93. Mkandawire, T. (2011). Running while others walk: Knowledge and the challenge of Africa’s development. Africa Development, 36(2), 1–36. Moyana, H. V. (1975). The political economy of land in Zimbabwe. Mambo Press. Ndhlovu, E. (2020). Decolonization of development: Samir Amin and the struggle for an alternative development approach in Africa. The Saharan Journal, 1(1), 87–111.

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Ndhlovu, E. (2021). Land, agrarian change discourse and practice in Zimbabwe: Examining the contribution of Sam Moyo [PhD thesis]. University of South Africa: Pretoria. Ndhlovu, E. (2022). Neoliberalism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the public healthcare crisis in Africa. Journal of African Transformation, 7(1), 80–94. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2012). Coloniality of power in development studies and the impact of global Imperial designs on Africa. Inaugural Professorial Lecture, University of South Africa, 16, October. Olukoshi, A., & Laakso, L. (Eds.). (1996). Challenges to the nation-state in Africa (pp. 7–12). Nordic Africa Institute. Palmer, R. (1977). Land and racial domination in Rhodesia. Heinemann. Prah, K. K. (2006). The African nation: The state of the nation. CASAS. Rivkin, A. (1969). Nation-building in Africa. Rutgers University Press. Ziai, A. (2009). Development: Projects, power, and a poststructuralist perspective. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 34(2), 183–201.

Part I

Development Historicization and Theorizations

Chapter 2

Unearthing the Nexus Between Development Theories and Underdevelopment in the Post-­independence Africa Aaram Gwiza

, Moira Tambaoga

, and Vain D. B. Jarbandhan

Abstract Africa is endowed with plentiful social and economic resources. Ironically, the continent is still deeply entrenched in extreme poverty that, regrettably, defines the lives of many people. Drought and famine, pandemics, high rates of unemployment and crime, and natural disasters point to a discouraging bleak future. This study interrogates the development theories and development nexus with a particular reference to Africa’s post-independence era. The prime objective of the study is to discuss the reasons why development theories are failing to project and bring real development in post-independence Africa. The chapter utilizes documentary search as the data collection instrument. The data is analyzed qualitatively using the content analysis method. The study argues that the deep-rooted poverty cases are linked to the failures of the contemporary theories of development in shaping the pace and direction of development efforts in the African continent. To this end, the research seeks to synthesize the key components and role of the three major theories of development, namely, dependency, modernization, and globalization, in understanding Africa’s post-independence development. Observed loopholes of the above development theories are, indeed, a compelling case for this chapter to suggest the Africa Renaissance theory as a panacea for a holistic appreciation of the depth and breadth of various development strides in post-independence Africa. Keywords  Development · Underdevelopment · Development theory · Poverty · Post-independence

A. Gwiza (*) · M. Tambaoga Marondera University of Agricultural Sciences, Marondera, Zimbabwe V. D. B. Jarbandhan University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_2

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2.1 Introduction Arguably, specialized literature covering the development concept has unequivocally burgeoned over the past years, very much apparent in extant governance literature. Development specialists have a squarely critical task to establish the nexus between development theories and development. Particularly in the African continent, appreciation of this relationship is compelling because there is a growing inverse proportion between resource endowments and development. Ukwandu (2015:17) utilizes David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage to dramatize Africa’s neocolonialism. His analysis resonates with the observation that Africa is rich in natural and human resources and is one of the most naturally endowed continents in the world. Despite this, it is currently one of the poorest continents in the world (Ayittey, 2005:46). Africa has rich soils that are suitable for agricultural cultivation, yet millions of people on the continent go hungry (Abubakar cited in Ukwandu, 2015:18). The continent is further argued to have abundant water resources for irrigation, transportation, and hydroelectric power generation but still uses less energy than almost any of the major cities in the developed world (Acemoglu and Robinson cited in Ukwandu, 2015:18). In this limelight, development theories lay the necessary conceptual and theoretical insights against which government and other relevant stakeholders utilize for devising the most appropriate interventions to address Africa’s underdevelopment. Accordingly, the volume of literature interrogating these two variables is considerably increasing. The whole mark of these frantic efforts is to suggest lasting solutions to Africa’s long-term poverty. The main objective of this study is to discuss the centrality of existing theories of development in informing the development realities of the African continent. A prior interrogation of the previous works would give us the platform to picket alternative theoretical and conceptual explanations for people-oriented development in Africa. In realizing the study’s objective, a narrative literature review was used as a research methodology. This qualitative research method allowed the review of the most critical aspects of the current knowledge of the topic in terms of competing theories and related concepts as well as previous research on the nexus between development theories and development regarding Africa. Researchers reviewed relevant information from various secondary data sources like academic journals to familiarize themselves with the ongoing work on the study topic. Equivalently, researchers were able to identify existing patterns and trends in extant development literature to understand the fundamental knowledge chasms in the study area. These knowledge gaps were important to put the study into proper perspectives and sufficiently justify the imperative to undertake the research. The content analysis method was utilized to analyze secondary data. This study begins with an introduction that presents an overview of the study and the methodology that was used. The next section presents a conceptual analysis of development in the African context. What follows is a systematic discussion of the various theories of development with a particular focus on their contribution to

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shaping the development trajectory of the African continent. The book chapter provides a candid theoretical interrogation of how the African continent can consider itself on the appropriate path toward its type of development. The last section presents the conclusions and policy implications of the study.

2.2 Development in the African Context: A Conceptual Analysis Over the past decades, and specifically, since the early 1960s when the African region was at the peak of reconfiguring its political architecture, the concept of “development” became, undoubtedly, a buzzword across the continent (Ndhlovu, 2020:79). The source of this fashionable terminology can be traced from the great and gluttonous 1884 Berlin plunder (Ndhlovu, 2020:79). Unsurprisingly, the hegemony of the colonial rule on the region became a source of motivation for several scholars (Samir Amin included) to study and conscientious African nations to prioritize inclusive development initiatives as part of the concerted efforts aimed at decolonizing the entire continent and also guaranteeing that a people-oriented development roadmap was followed. From this period, scholarly interrogations on development in Africa have dominated, with some scholars positing that in the postcolonial reality, “development” has been subordinated to personal gain by neocolonial leaders (Cheru, 2009; Rodney, 1972), while others maintain that the adoption of inept development models has frustrated progress on the continent (Ayittey cited in Ndhlovu, 2020:79). This section briefly discusses the various definitional perspectives of development in the African continent. The idea of development and its usage in the African continent is virtually as ancient as civilization. Its widespread application in extant governance literature serves as a general construct that describes the most diverse facets associated with humanity’s well-being. The concept’s widespread application also allows it to draw near to that of a doctrine that is used to judge the depth and breadth of social, economic, and political prosperity of African people. Debates on what constitutes development have dominated various scholarly forums. However, governance literature has tended to link the definition to the orientation of the developed world. As argued by Tandon (2015: 145), the biggest problem associated with most theoreticians of both the global south and the segregated peoples and sub-nationalists of the north is to present a definition of “development” outside the cages of the Euro-West. Even the current appreciation of the development concept falls under the westernization of the world (Latouche, 1993:460) or simply “…an empty signifier [emanating from the West] that can be filled with almost any content” (Ziai cited in Ndhlovu, 2020:84). In the view of Gumede (2019: 51), development relates to “…improvements in wellbeing, involving socio-economic progress.” Brobbey (2010:1) defines development as “the capacity of a state to achieve the higher outcome of production for the satisfaction of citizens and empower them to make demands” (Ndhlovu, 2020:84).

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Of all the definitions, Rostov is widely considered a conventional theoretician who provided the most controversial interpretation of the development concept. His definition generally points to an evolutionary process through which the western societies evolved and through which third-world countries were still in the process of evolving (Ndhlovu, 2020:84). This definition clearly shows the basic assumption that all development efforts of the third world should be informed by the Western capital, technology, and social organization and values. This view considers the development of Africa as merely the adoption of modernization. This is a process entailing the transformation from traditional means of production to modern technologies in the agrarian sector. Modernity is a Western construct whereby nonEuro-­ Western countries that are considered primitive and custom-bound are mobilized to embrace Western-based lifestyle choices, tastes, etc. (Ndhlovu, 2020:84). It also entails a gradual social transformation in the processes of agricultural sciences and technology. Thus, in the African context, the above definition has received widespread criticism from several scholars, whose argument is that: “Africa cannot possibly develop by modernising or becoming like the modern west” (Lushaba, 2006:3). Further, Gumede (2019:51) argues that “modernity is not an appropriate form of development that Africa needs.” Regarding postdevelopment, Ziai cited in Ndhlovu (2020:84) argues that the Euro-Western notion of development faces rejection largely for its romanticization of local communities and “legitimi[s]ing oppressive traditions, and for being just as paternalistic as the chastised development experts.” It is, thus, widely agreed that the form of development espoused by the West is not the kind of growth that Africa needs (Ndhlovu, 2020:84). At the same time, it is argued that the structure of development that Africa needs promotes reliance on resources available in various contexts of culture and situations; it is also argued that development, for Africa, should not exhibit a yearning for the primitive past (Mugo, 1992). Ndlovu-Gatheni (2012:2) considers development as a “liberatory human aspiration to attain freedom from political, economic, ideological, epistemological, and social domination….” The final analysis of the above definitions indicates that development is usually considered as any action that is undertaken by one group (like a development agency) to the other (like rural farmers in any given society). The above definitions also bring to the limelight that development is, inherently, a political process simply because it raises the most critical questions of the source of power to determine who should do what when and how and with what consequences to any given polity. In Africa, the idea of development would entail the source of political power to effectively distribute scarce resources and values within diverse public preferences. In effect, African leaders must implement their development values and principles to enable the region to gain control of its economic policies. At this stage, it is being mainly controlled externally, a situation that must be addressed as soon as possible.

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2.3 The Status of Development Theory In this section, a synopsis of the theoretical and model approaches to the study is presented. In doing this, the presentation starts with a short description of the criticality of a theory in research intending to provide the basis for interrogating the various theories of development that will be applied in this study. Wacker cited in Udo-Akang (2012:89) argues that there are “three reasons why theory is important for any type of study: (a) it provides a framework for analysis, (b) it provides an efficient method for field development and (c) it provides a clear explanation for the pragmatic world.” Several attempts have been made in the literature to classify the various typologies and present the meaning and role of a theory in the research field. These descriptions are context-specific (in terms of purpose, functions, boundaries, and goals). For instance, Gelso (2006:12) defines theory in line with the following eight constructs: “(a) descriptive ability, (b) explanatory power, (c) heuristic value, (d) testability, (e) integration, (f) parsimony, (g) clarity, (h) comprehensiveness, and (i) delimitation.” Further, Sunday (2013:12) views a theory as “a set of interrelated concepts, definitions, and propositions that explains or predicts events or situations by specifying relations among variables.” Importantly, “theory shapes the process of decision making; having cognitive implications in both knowledge and practice” (Nel, 2013:14). The afore-given definitions seem to suggest that a theory brings about research which in turn develops and refines theory (Gelso, 2006:18). According to Harlow (2009:8), a theory considers the competing research paradigms, suggesting a determining law, or system of laws, as in the natural sciences, or a construct or set of constructs for ordering and understanding phenomena. The essence of a theory is to criticize, amend, and combine past experiences and knowledge to generalize different opinions and perceptions as frameworks for explaining the existential world (Nederveen, 2009). With the above interpretations, it is instructive to briefly define the term “development theory” because this concept will be frequently applied in subsequent discussions. Several development challenges are resolved using various theories, models, and approaches that provide the basis for marrying theory and practice in human lives. As such, development theory presents the larger descriptive and/or explanatory frames of reference to the existential world. Additionally, development theory normally points to leading and contending models and approaches as knowledgeable concepts of development from the humanitarian perspective (Nhema & Zinyama, 2016). These theories seek to explain the causal relationship between various human activities, natural events, and poverty alleviation (Nederveen, 2009:2; Nhema & Zinyama, 2016; Evans & Jakupec, 2021). In humanities, it is now globally believed that development realities are politically, economically, socially, and technologically constructed. In other words, the way people view human life realities is overtly or covertly determined by the interpretations of the various political, social, and economic perspectives characterizing a particular community.

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A cursory review of practice will potentially create a new theory, and theory or theoretical praxis can inspire new practice. Development models are inherently context-specific. Even though these models respond to other models and normally underscore diversities instead of synergies, the challenges met in practice are such that we normally require numerous analytics together. From a historical standpoint, there is evidence of the ascension and declining line of development models and their proponents’ explanations of the various problems being experienced by developing countries (Evans & Jakupec, 2021). Ensuing sections discuss the various main theories of development, indicating their criticality in shaping development in Africa’s post-independence.

2.3.1 The Modernization Theory The emergency of the modernization theory is usually linked to the Age of Enlightenment and became progressively predominant after the Bretton Woods Conference which was held in 1944 (Evans & Jakupec, 2021:477). It assumed prominence and was widely accepted by several development practitioners immediately after the adoption of the Marshall Plan around the late 1940s (Evans & Jakupec, 2021:478). Since then, this theory was firmly adopted and, of late, it is related to developments of industrialization, urbanization, and, also importantly, the expansion of education (Evans & Jakupec, 2021:478). Popularized in the 1950s and 1960s, the modernization movement is, indeed, an economic theory that is deeply entrenched in capitalism (Matunhu, 2011:65, Mutongi et al., 2020:444). It, essentially, presents the whole range of the radical change that a traditional society needs to experience in its quest for modernization (Hussain & Tribe, 1981; Lenin, 1964). Squarely, the modernization theory provides a model which Africa must follow just like what Europe typically did to achieve development (Matunhu, 2011:65). Proponents of the modernization theory argue that policies designed to improve the quality of living for African people usually comprise disseminating knowledge as well critical information concerning the various effective and efficient approaches of boosting the means of production. Considering agriculture as its economic backbone, the modernization theory aims to promote African farmers to grow new crops and adopt new modern farming technologies and advanced marketing knowledge and opportunities (Mutongi et al., 2020:448). This modernization theory is partly a theoretical explanation for the various developmental initiatives in the agricultural sector of many African countries like the introduction of crop and animal hybrids, adoption of greenhouse technologies, genetically modified (GMO) food, application of artificial fertilizers and insecticides, and the use of tractors and other scientific knowledge in substitution of the traditional agricultural systems and praxes (Matunhu, 2011:65; Muongi et  al. 2020:448). The modernization theory further resulted in a positive transformation in Africa’s social and economic landscape. Transportation of goods and people from one point to the other is now easy because of imported technology and

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infrastructure from the developed world. Simultaneously, the advent of the Internet service enabled a virtual platform that allows the world to do e-business regardless of geographical boundaries. The new information and communication technologies changed the lifestyle of Africans as they can now undertake business with partners who are within and outside the world without necessarily traveling (Mutongi et al., 2020:448). In support of the above, Smith argues that modernization is simply an exchange of archaic development systems and practices with new ones (Smith, 1973: 61). Impliedly, the agriculture sector of any given polity is deemed modern only if it reflects the above development features. These characteristics become a clear testimony to the level of modernity that country would have attained. The features are presented concisely by Coetzee et al. (2007: 31) inter alia: (i) Preparedness to adopt new ways of life arising from environmental changes (ii) Constant expansion of life skills and experiences as well as adaptability to new knowledge (iii) Constant environmental scanning and adoption of new experiences (iv) Probability of action as well as the aptitude to apply effective control (v) High capacity in the use of technical skills and appreciation of the principles of production (vi) Changing minds to kinship, family functions, family size, and the function of religion (vii) Transforming consumer preferences as well as the receptiveness of the social classification (Matunhu, 2011:65) Positively, the various modernization approaches apply to both the pre- and postcolonial states in Africa (Matunhu, 2011:66). Historically, when the colonial masters arrived in Africa, they took the role of modernizing the continent. It is a little wonder why Africa was labeled a “dark continent” by the, hitherto, colonial masters. This pointed to the imperative for the continent’s enlightenment. The idea of enlightenment propelled Cecil John Rhodes and his followers to settle in Africa. The entourage comprised missionaries, engineers, as well as farmers, among them. Similarly, Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSAC) came up with a mission to construct the road network from Cape of Good Hope in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt (Matunhu, 2011:66). The nature, breadth, and depth of Africa’s development have since been transforming in line with the transformations in technological as well as ideological perspectives of the developed world. The then USA president’s (Harry Truman) January 20, 1949, presidential inaugural address captured these sentiments: We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism- exploitation for foreign profit- has no place in our plans . . . (Allen and Thomas, 1992: 06) cited in (Matunhu, 2011:66)

Presumably, the fundamental role of developing Africa is in the hands of the White settlers. This strong belief implied that development in sub-Saharan Africa was,

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regrettably, remaining behind compared to other parts of the world. This was largely due to the inherent inferiority complex among blacks to sufficiently grasp the socioeconomic as well as the IT architecture which was critical in modifying their social and economic life experiences. Unfortunately, the above claim mirrors a wrong picture of Africa’s development trajectory. Rodney (1972) in his book How Europe underdeveloped Africa aptly postulates somewhat uniquely that in the fifteenth century (the period of the first encounter between Europeans and Africans), the region had already created empires in the East, Central, and West as well as the South of the region (Matunhu, 2011:66). The coming of the Portuguese to the African continent around 1444 had a strong impact on the development of the African continent (Matunhu, 2011:66). Over time, the arrival of the West on the same continent brought a different philosophy that Africa was expected to follow to develop. In effect, the West’s anticipation was to see Africa transforming its development path in its favor. Guided by the “enlightenment” view, the West society took the role of developing Africa using a new path. This model outlined specific stages which Africa had to follow in its development course. Rostow came up with five phases of social change as he tries to justify the sequential order of the development process. These stages are traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, the drive to maturity, and, finally, the period of high massive consumption (So, 2010; Matunhu, 2011:66; Tagarirofa, 2017:4). Based on these successive stages, the modernization theory allows us to present African countries on the linear development course. However, this theory is too romantic. Several African economies are diverse. Some invest in agriculture while others focus on manufacturing, mining, and tourism among others. Therefore, it will be rather difficult, if not impossible, to categorize varying economies into clearly specified stages as proposed by Rostow. Rostowian thesis is widely supported because of its unique thesis that the country’s path to development is associated with marked improvement in the contemporary values of production. Proponents of modernization maintain that countries move toward modernity at various episodes depending largely on their level of flexibility as well as adaptability (Matunhu, 2011:66). This study is tempted to agree with the above assumption. Notwithstanding, there is a need to take a holistic view of other possible inhibitive factors toward development. According to Matunhu (2011:66), cases of civil wars, conflicts, natural disasters, and pandemics may trigger poor countries to move back and forth on their way to development. Case evidence might include the distressing political rivals in Zimbabwe and the topical ethnic wars in Libya, Sudan, and Mozambique that have compromised the countries’ development gains. The home takeaway message is that the route to development is, evidently rugby, with many challenges. Possibly, therefore, the model is associated with contemptuous condemnation from Le Roux and Graff (2010: 54) who argue that “Rostow forces the rich and diverse histories of many countries into a single stage of growth model.” Proponents of the modernization theory, misguidedly, considered the development theory as a paradigm that has a clear starting and ending points in terms of development

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achievement. Contextually, Africa’s development is a product of assistance from the developed world. Sachs (1992:1) supports the above idea, stating that: Like a towering lighthouse guiding sailors towards the coast, development stood as the idea which oriented emerging nations in their journey through post-war history . . . the countries of the south proclaimed modernization as their primary aspiration after they had been freed from colonial domination.

The above claim illustrates an exploitative role of the modernization theory with a narrow sense of transforming Africa’s cultural values, norms, and attitudes to develop the Western community. According to Matunhu (2011:67), the modernization of a person needs to provide motivation, to go along with the changing social and economic situation. It entails the total rejection of Africa’s diverse culture and honors that of former colonial masters. In other words, Africa’s development comes with regrettable cultural erosion among African nations. Critics further disregard the modernization theory for its naivety. It fails to recognize poor people as the central linchpin of all efforts aimed at addressing abject poverty in Africa. This oversight on the importance of the bottom-up approach, the coined recipe for Africa’s development, rings hollow. Community engagement and participation remain a precursor for the success of all development efforts in Africa. This notion is supported by Brohman cited in Tagarirofa (2017:2) that the African perspective on development entails a strong emphasis on various poverty alleviation mechanisms premised on the old democratic culture of African communalistic societies. This African development perspective has resulted in the institutionalization of the top-bottom approach to development which considers the local people as core participants in the development drive to transform their welfare (Tagarirofa & Chazovachii, 2014); Tafarirofa 2017:2). Without input from Africans, all foreign development initiatives will face massive resistance and will serve no purpose in providing lasting solutions to the continent’s problems. A case in point is the widespread denunciation of development interventions like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) by the West which was externally developed and packaged for Africa (Matunhu, 2011:67). The major source of condemnation was because of its elitist flavor, with no input from Africans. Relatedly, Africa suffered most from the ripple effects of the failed IMF-induced economic structural adjustment program (ESAP) introduced in the early 1990s (Matunhu, 2011:67; Mutongi et al., 2020:446). The dismal failure of the ESAP project is ascribed to, erroneously, the West’s rejection of the cultural, social, political, as well as archaic cultural values of Africa. ESAP proved to be a clear “Eurocentric” test that did not pass at all, and all efforts to address issues of underdevelopment in the continent went in vain (Mutongi et al., 2020:446). The West continues to drive its oppressive agenda toward Africa, drawing its theoretical standing from the modernization theory. Africa remains in the jaws of poverty, especially with the dawn of the East taking its opportunity to drain all the continent’s resources. For instance, the Look East policy in Zimbabwe is a clear testimony of the established exploitative relationship in which Zimbabwe’s natural resources like oil and minerals are siphoned by Eastern countries like China and

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some Asiatic countries. Again, this manipulative relationship remains a product of the modernization theory, paying little or no attention to devising new indigenous theories for Africa’s development. Indeed, this paper calls for new theoretical insights for Africa to pave a new corridor to the continent’s development. Finally, the dramatic imbalances in terms of economic growth and democratization that dominate the modern world pose a serious threat to modernization theory. Only a limited number of countries have experienced the development path proposed by the modernization theory. This movement has been experienced only for the past two centuries. What has been widely noted is that the human condition has remained stagnant despite various development interventions adopted in most developing countries. The study notes the following shortfalls of the modernization theory: • There is an industrial revolution that failed to result from the various technological transformations and expansions of other critical factors of production more than a thousand years ago. • There is a traceable loss of some technological innovations previously gained, especially in developing countries. • The world is also characterized by uneven growth, particularly since the beginning of the industrial revolution. There is no theoretical justification for why the industrial revolution (which is the heart of economic transformation) began only at a particular period and in a particular area. • Empirical evidence to support the relationship between the level of per capita income and democracy is required. However, the failure to show how growth is not affected by this relationship presents the great lacunae of the modernization model.

2.3.2 The Dependency Theory Dependency theory evolved in the 1950s in contrast to the modernization theory of development (Evans & Jakupec, 2021:478). The major source of disgruntlement against the former was its narrow focus and its attachment to the conventional Darwinian evolutionary philosophy. Thus, dependency theory forms the crux of the recent topical discussions including understanding historical issues that affect development initiatives in third-world countries (Evans & Jakupec, 2021:478). The development discourse remains vigorous and intellectually challenging to avert Africa’s problems. As succinctly put by Brown (1985), “…there is no single coherent body of thought that can be described as ‘dependency’” theory. Instead, diverse theorists are of the view that most countries are conditioned in their development path through heavy reliance on other countries (or economies) (Agbebi and Virtaneni 2017:430). Further interrogating Brown’s opinion three decades later, it is beyond a reasonable doubt to suggest that, regardless of the rich intellectual thoughts, discussions, and propositions from dependency theorists, a single codified theory of

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dependency is still missing. Liberalism proponents consider it as one of the competing theoretical perspectives, which was popularized in the 1950s as a counter to classic models of economic development which were popularized in the aftermath of World War II (Matunhu, 2011:68; Herath, 2008:820). Andre Gunder Frank in his study of the post-colonial regime has argued that conventional development models like modernity do not reflect a true picture of the existing exact link between the developed and the poor regions of the world (Matunhu, 2011:68). In fact, modernization proponents were condemned for distorting the reality concerning the intention of the West on its former colonies. Equivalently, the Brandt Commission (1980) noted that any form of development premised on modernity is moribund. As such, Reid (1995:47–48) notes: The hope that faster economic growth ‘modernization’ in developing countries by itself would benefit the broad masses of poor people has not been fulfilled, and no concept of development can be accepted which continues to condemn hundreds of millions of people to starvation and despair.

As argued by Sunkel (1969:23), the dependency theory unpacks the prevalent economic development of a state arising from external influences. These outside forces classified into political, economic, as well as cultural have a strong bearing on the national development strategies of that state. Dos Santos sheds light on the criticality of the historical dimension of the dependency theory which must equally be considered to understand the original meaning and essence of this theory. The definition is succinctly presented as follows: [Dependency is] ... a historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected. (Dos Santos cited in Sanchez, 2003:33)

As argued by Farny (2016:1), the dependency theory attempts to generate practical answers to address the most distressing scenario of the “development of the metropolis and the underdevelopment of the satellite” and the “structure of dependence” (Dos Santos, 1970). For instance, some scholars seconded the idea of establishing more global parity in a socialist revolution fueled by Marxism. Others suggest reforms anchored on the global economic system (Herath cited in Farny, 2016:1). Dependency theorists normally suggest a link between the function of the capitalist arrangement and the subsequent underdevelopment of the periphery (Farny, 2016:1). The common argument among development theory is that the world is split into two distinct portions, the center-industrialized countries and the periphery/underdeveloped countries (Agbebi and Virtaneni 2017:430; Farny, 2016:2). This stratified construct epitomizes the existential exploitative linkages between the developed and developing states. Guided by the world-system theory, scholars like Arno Tausch suggest a link to the dependency theory, and the common conclusion is that the ubiquity of poverty and backwardness in the periphery and semi-periphery is a result of the very peripheral or quasi-peripheral setup created by these regions in the international division of labor since the dawn of the world system in 1492 (Tausch

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cited in Farny, 2016:2). Thus, the dependency theory presents a solid theoretical foundation for explaining global inequalities (Farny, 2016:2). Mhango (2018) in his book titled How Africa Developed Europe cements that the current phenomenon of siphoning unquantifiable wealth from Africa to Europe can be seen in the ongoing unequal trade between the duos (Mhango, 2018:13). It is from the oddities of looting Africa that Europe was able to fill its vaults with diamonds and gold it is now boosting of having while Africa was left poor (Iliffe cited in Mhango, 2018:13). With the above theoretical orientation, it then sounds unequivocally logical to a bunch of countries with relatively similar experiences of colonization as well as an economic dependency into one single category to explain extant regional variations. Regrettably, countries of the periphery remain entirely dependent on the core countries as argued by Dos Santos: The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development. (Dos Santos, 1970:231)

Overall, previous research has considered the dependency paradigm as largely sarcastic and utopian. From a macro-perspective, the fulcrum of the structural dependency theory is the impossibility of appreciating different processes and challenges of Africa independent of the wider sociohistorical context of Western European growth and the colonization of these countries by Western societies. As argued by Rodney (1972), colonialism was not just a way of Africa’s exploitation. Rather, it was a well-calculated move with a clear motive to repatriate the profits made in the continent to the West. The key message here is that the expatriation of profits signals organized exportation of excess values generated by African labor using African resources (Matunhu, 2011:68). Therefore, the development pronouncement in Europe is partly tied to similar dialectical activities that underdeveloped the African continent. Put differently, the unjustified hegemony of Europe in Africa was a cost to the continent in terms of socioeconomic development. Over the past decades, Europe’s energy was to encounter the African continent. The above scenario is concisely espoused by Rodney (1972:149) whose evaluation of the context and nature of the link between Europe and Africa is that during the colonial era, the West organized itself, amassed capital acquired from its former African colonies, and insightfully invested the excesses in the productive economy, persistently broadening national wealth as well as the riches for its people. Africa was and remains under the influence of Western centers of power politically, socially, and economically. According to Matunhu (2011:68), the most observable scenario is the economic, political, and cultural dependence of the continent upon America and Europe. The dependence is also localized between rural and urban settings. Commenting on this precarious condition in Southern Africa, Samir et al. (1987:2) argued:

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Imperialists partitioned the countries in Africa and then forced the African peasantry into reserves, deliberately planned to be inadequate for ensuring the failure of subsistence in earlier traditional forms. The discovery of the mineral riches of Southern Africa (such as gold and diamonds in South Africa, copper in Katanga in Zambia) just when capitalism was entering a new stage of monopolistic expansion inspired a particular form of colonization of the economy of the reserves.

The above quote is a self-say that as Africa was and continues to be exploited by the West, the same also happens at the national level where urban people are, squarely, busy exploiting their rural counterparts. Within the same rural context, rich individuals take opportunities to exploit the poorer; and this ruthless order keeps on going. In this case, the dependency theory is, arguably, a linear and multistaged experience seeking to benefit the dominant part. The socioeconomic progression of rural communities comes from the deliberate creation of metropolitan-satellite relationships at various strata of the economy in Africa. This linkage is hinged on the regional control of the economy as well as political resources among the different sectors of the economy and diverse social groupings (Nyerere, 1973; Gabriel, 1991). This is quite disturbing and may explain the resultant underdevelopment of some rural parts of African countries. For instance, Lower Gweru, Manicaland, Chibi, Mhondoro, Marange, Chipinge, Chirumanzu, and several other rural areas in Zimbabwe remain underdeveloped due to this exploitation (Matunhu, 2011:68). Similarly, the Amathole District in South Africa is squarely an indication of this exploitation (Matunhu, 2011:68). As has been argued before, the exploitation chain extends to the employer-employee relationship in which the latter remains deprived of all avenues of development and growth. The former has stronger economic muscles to sustain this exploitative relationship to the detriment of the latter. This typifies the sustained exploitative relations in Africa’s various levels of political, social, and economic groupings (internal colonialism), hence, abject poverty. The convincing message about the dependency theory is that the unmatched development of the metropolis emanated from the active underdevelopment of the non-metropolis communities (Matunhu, 2011:68). While the dependency theory served as a breakthrough for understanding the underdevelopment of the periphery, it also received an equal share of criticisms. The biggest challenge of the dependency theory in showing existing global inequalities is that it can result in too many generalizations without necessarily taking into account the critical historical and development perspectives of individual states. This has been always the major loophole of modernization theory, which made to receive heavy criticism from recent dependency theorists. After a critical deciphering, one is tempted to conclude that the modernization and dependency theories operate in parallel, yet because of advocating these categorizations (i.e., the “core-­ periphery” or “North-South”), the dependency theory failed to dissociate itself from other conventional development models. Emerging challenges from these regional groupings are that these conventional theories are inertly ethnocentric since the “Periphery” or the “South” is characterized by socioeconomic and political backwardness, measured against Western values and principles; and this should not be taken for granted (Farny, 2016:4).

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Also, there is a need to address the most fundamental question of whether differentiating the world through these clear-cut classifications or not is important for understanding global imbalances. As succinctly espoused by Dos Santos, the key feature that countries of the periphery have in common is a high reliance on the core countries (Dos Santos, 1970:231). In this case, the distinction between the periphery and the core sounds rational to improve the position of developing nations in the international economic setup and to minimize their heavy reliance on the developed world. This will also help in addressing issues of global inequality. For developing nations, the proposal for regional integration will generate a strong economic policy setup and assist in a grip of more power and authority in interregional or trade dialogues. According to Krapohl & Fink, 2009:2), regional integration may assist in getting and sustaining “better access to other regions’ markets.” The same arrangement may also become a useful tool for attracting the necessary foreign direct investment (FDI), even though it is highly questionable the extent to which developing nations are benefiting from FDI (Sekhri, 2009:250). Based on the dependency model proposition, this study upholds the relevance of bunching countries that have a common experience of colonization and economic dependence into one similar category to better appreciate global inequalities and devise practically sound ways of addressing them. The new setup would seek to dismiss the long-standing view of the dependency theory that local individuals lack the necessary expertise and capacity to remove themselves from the jaws of poverty. This view is rejected by Max-Neef (1991:38) who argues that: Development geared to the satisfaction of fundamental human needs cannot, by definition, be structured from the top downwards. It cannot be imposed either by law or decree. It can only emanate directly from the actions, expectations, and creative and critical awareness of the protagonists themselves. Instead of being the traditional objects of development, people must take a leading role in development. (Max-Neef cited in Matunhu, 2011:68)

Even at national levels of development planning, one can discover that several national policies like those in the agricultural sector appear to have insignificant practical linkage with their perceived purpose of alleviating poverty. This is buttressed by Magaloni et al. (2005:8): …Programs normally supposed to reduce poverty, for example, turn out to be unrelated to poverty. Lack of prioritization on development imperatives remains the source of the deepening abject poverty.

In the final analysis of this theory, this chapter argues that Africa’s poverty is, erroneously, a product of poor service delivery and the ill advice from the West. Rodney cited in Matunhu (2011:68) that, from the previous years of the nineteenth century until the 1960s, the African region acted as the key producer of underpriced raw materials to Europe and, contrary, the most purchaser of overpriced finished goods from the West (Matunhu, 2011:68). This theory is condemned for its failure to appreciate the practicality of externally induced development strategies. Crucially, Shenton and Cowen (1996) maintain that the approach is nothing else but “system maintaining.” This study advances the argument that a local-based arrangement to

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the expanding political economy of the African underdevelopment is imperative to address most of the previous challenges of deciphering development at the macro-­ level. Now the fundamental question is to figure out the most fitting theory for developing Africa. The current discussion holds that the African Renaissance is the “final nail to the coffin” of all development chasms in the African region.

2.3.3 The African Renaissance Theory Extensive criticisms of the conventional theories of development gave an impetus for the evolving African renaissance theory. This paradigm is premised on African values, attitudes, and norms which form the backbone of the lives of people in this continent. This theory has gained wide support largely because it leaves room for all development initiatives to adapt to changes and innovations on the condition that their sources are within the social and value orientations of the African continent. Ayittey (2005) in his book Africa Unchained suggested the various ways through which the African continent can reconfigure to improve on its home-grown institutions. As he argues, Africa must be removed from the obnoxious economic structures which are foreign to the continent and hold on to its ancient tradition of free trade (Ayittey, 2005). Thus, dreaming about a true African life is as good as thinking of prosperity, harmony, collectivism, and a common cause (Matunhu, 2011:71). Put differently, a discourse of development that is not decolonized presents paradigms and theories which may be a hindrance to the development of the continent (Ukwandu, 2015:20). The centrality of the theory of decoloniality is premised on the fact that since Africa is still mired in socioeconomic doldrums, there is a need to decolonize, indigenous, and Africanize many of the theories that shape the discourse and direction of development on the continent (Ndlovu-Getsheni, 2012:73). The unfolding sorry scenario is that colonial governance has been dismantled throughout Africa, but in actual sense, coloniality is still regrettably ubiquitous across the continent (Ukwandu, 2015:20). The African renaissance theory presupposes that all interventions set for Africa’s development need to be informed and accustomed to African cultural values. For instance, South Africa’s cultural value is “Ubuntu,” Zimbabwe is “Humwe,” Kenya is “Harambee,” and Tanzania is “Ujamaa” (Matunhu, 2011:71). The theory disregards the conventional modernization and dependency theories because their philosophical underpinnings aggravate poverty, with no fervent appeal to the African cultural system. As a radical departure from the mainstream arguments, the model suggests the need for a social system that rejects the conventional models of development because they lack Africa’s values and cultural orientations. Equivalently, Claude Ake (1939–1996), one of Africa’s most prominent political and social scientists and democrats of the twentieth century, presents his life-long concerns about democracy and the future of the African continent (Ake, 2005). His study focused largely on what he referred to as “the most pernicious form of imperialism”

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implying “scientific knowledge.” His central thesis was to contextualize the Western social sciences, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to impose capitalist imperatives on developing nations to achieve imperialist aspirations (Ake, 2005). Ake suggests the theory of political development/“Westernization,” unpacking its ideological values and castigating “Western development studies as worse than useless” (Ake, 2005). This theoretical exposition provided him with the foundation to advocate alternatives that potentially assist in addressing the decades-long underdevelopment in third-world countries. Equally, Ake advances the imperative for adopting a newer model of social sciences that is socialist-orientated as a way of disregarding Western models (Ake, 2005). The African renaissance model provides the necessary conceptual and theoretical framework for Africa to focus on locally based strategies for poverty alleviation in the world which is largely controlled by the metropolitan states. From a Zimbabwean perspective, the theory underlines the use of the indigenous knowledge system (IKS) to solve its socioeconomic issues. IKS has been a rallying point in Zimbabwe, and particularly, in the higher education sector, there has been a comprehensive review of the curriculum to integrate the heritage-based education system with which IKS is regarded as the chief enabler for transforming the country’s socioeconomic fortunes. To date, research in IKS is growing exponentially in education, health, and other critical sectors of the economy. The key message from the Africa renaissance theory is that African problems must be solved by African solutions (including traditional medical practices, conflict resolutions, environmental sustainability, and addressing issues of food security). In most African countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique, traditional food has been reconsidered as a critical ingredient in the fight against malnutrition and other health-related challenges. Equally, zero tillage farming (pfumvudza in Zimbabwe) has recently regained momentum at a national scale to improve agricultural production, hence food security in the country. All these renewed focuses seek to bury the long existed conventional theories of development which compelled African people to remain uninterested in their potential, skills, as well as competencies. Unfortunately, Africans have lost their identity and development lane because of these misguided conventional theories about the continent’s development. The African renaissance model for development emphasizes the criticality of social integration which has a key role to unite people for the articulation of problems like social injustice, inequality, as well as sustainability using collective strategies. It is, principally, oriented toward redefining the African culture and values and utilizing them for reshaping Africa’s property. The African renaissance theory, different from its forerunners, calls for indigenous strategies, diversity, community-­ based participation, and utilization of local resources. Accordingly, the most fundamental issue here is a real positive change for the upcoming generation which is hinged on the transformation of institutions, the use of appropriate technology, and respecting cultural values that resonate with Africa’s ecology.

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2.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications All development efforts in Africa have, to a larger extent, appeared to be covertly or overtly influenced by the various models and theories of development. Development strategies and initiatives informed by the modernization paradigm are largely top-­ down. The metropolitan states take the sole responsibility for defining the path for Africa’s development. As such, the whole package of the development strategies is sent to Africa by the West for adoption and implementation. Consequently, this imposition of development support renders recipients grossly alienated. The dependency theory advocates extreme poverty in Africa because of the constant looting of the satellite’s human as well as nonhuman resources by the metropolis. A similar scenario is noticeable between the town and the rural settings where the former develops through the exploitation of the resources of the latter. The foregoing established with great concern that the principal source of Africa’s underdevelopment is, indeed, the cultural collision between the two distinct camps (i.e., the West and Africa). The former took advantage of its strategic as well as technological prowess to erode the culture as well as the value system of Africa. Upon doing this, Africa lost its obligation to suggest its route to development. The study concluded that the fight for Africa’s real freedom requires total disconnection with the North in terms of political as well as economic approaches especially those that collide with the former’s culture and value system. Admittedly, the journey is bumpy and thorn. It calls for Africa’s reunification and now battle for a collective purpose. The most radical method to end Africa’s underdevelopment is the African renaissance theory which views African people as being part of the development challenges and also becoming part of the answers to the region’s underdevelopment. If properly utilized, the Africa renaissance theory may go a long way in fragmenting the West’s sophistication in its ambition to sustain Africa’s underdevelopment.

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Samir, A., Chitala, D., & Mandaza, I. (1987). SADCC prospectus for disengagement and development in southern Africa: Studies in African political economy-United Nations University. ZED Books Ltd. Sanchez, O. (2003). The rise and fall of the dependency movement: Does it inform underdevelopment today? E.I.A.L., 14(2). Sekhri, S. (2009). Dependency approach: Chances of survival in the 21st century. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 3(5), 242–252. Shenton, R. W., & Cowen, M. P. (1996). Doctrines of development. Routledge. Smith, A. D. (1973). The concept of social change. Routledge and Kjegab Paul. So, A. (2010). The modernization perspective (pp. 17–59). Social Change and Development. Sunkel, O. (1969). National development policy and external dependence in Latin America. The Journal of Development Studies, 6(1), 23. Tagarirofa. (2017). Modernization theory and ‘third world’ development: An exegesis of theoretical sarcasm. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, 8(2), 1–8. Tagarirofa, J., & Chazovachii, B. (2014). Exploring the politics of local participation in rural development projects: Small dam rehabilitation in Zimbabwe. Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, 2(14), 74–88. Tandon, Y. (2015). Development is resistance. Africa Development XL, 3, 139–159. Udo-Akang, D. (2012). Theoretical constructs, concepts, and applications. American International Journal of Contemporary Research, 2(9), 89–97. Ukwandu, D. (2015). David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage and its implication for development in sub-Saharan Africa: A decolonial view. African Journal of Public Affairs, 8(3), 17–33.

Chapter 3

Post-Independence Sustainable Development in Africa and Policy Proposals to Meet the Sustainable Development Goals David Mhlanga

and Farai Mlambo

Abstract  The most powerful instrument available for achieving sustainable development is economic expansion. The reduction of poverty and the enhancement of living standards are both attainable goals for nations in the process of economic development. Research that encompasses multiple countries, and case studies conducted inside individual countries demonstrate that quick and sustained economic growth is necessary if we are to make faster headway toward achieving our objectives, particularly sustainable development goals. The chapter concentrated on the post-independence sustainable development measures in Africa using facts and data. The chapter also commented on the ideas that the African states might follow to accomplish Sustainable Development Goals. The systematic literature review was used for this chapter’s focus. The chapter was successful in providing a range of development indicators for Africa, and it wrapped up with an in-depth examination of the numerous policy options that could help Africa achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Keywords  Africa · Data analysis · Post-independence · Sustainable development

D. Mhlanga (*) The University of Johannesburg, College of Business and Economics, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] F. Mlambo University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, School of Statistics and Actuarial Science, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_3

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3.1 Introduction The most potent tool for sustainable development is economic growth. Developing countries can reduce poverty and improve their quality of life through economic growth. To make faster progress toward our goals, both cross-country research and country case studies show that rapid and sustained growth is essential (Jobs, 2008; McBride et al., 2018; Kimbu & Tichaawa, 2018). If there is strong economic growth and job prospects, parents will be more likely to put money into their children’s schooling, which might lead to an increasing number of entrepreneurs who would put pressure on the government to do a better job of governing (Jobs, 2008; Tikly, 2019; Addaney & Cobbinah, 2019). Human progress is furthered because of rapid economic expansion, which in turn encourages further economic development. Growth rates can have a profound impact on poverty levels, employment opportunities for the underprivileged, and a wide range of human development measures, depending on a variety of factors. For poverty reduction and sustainable development, the rate and pattern of growth are crucial factors (Jobs, 2008; Marques et al., 2018; Addaney & Cobbinah, 2019; Pasara, 2021; Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021). According to Khalid Anser et  al. (2021), Africa’s numerous accomplishments and dynamism have captivated the attention of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa has seen more rapid growth than any other region since 2000, growing by 1.68 percent from 2000 to 2010 and by 0.94 percent from 2010 to 2014, according to Mukherjee et al. (2019). Using the Human Development Index (HDI) as a measure of development, Sub-Saharan Africa has grown faster than any other region since 2000. Many countries have shown impressive growth, but Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Mozambique stand out. It is true, according to Anser et  al. (2020), that Africa has made great strides, but despite this, the continent continues to be plagued by serious issues such as social isolation and food insecurity. According to Das and Espinoza (2020), although poverty in Africa has declined substantially since the 1990s, the absolute number of people living in poverty has increased dramatically at the same time. When comparing 1990 to 2015, Africa’s population was down from 57 percent to 41 percent, while the number of poor people went from 278 million to over 413 million, according to Das and Espinoza (2020). The performance of African countries varies significantly; however, due to a variety of factors, the most notable of which are the fragility, violence, and abundance of natural resources in the continent. As has been the case in all other regions of the world, Mukherjee et al. (2019) believe that progress has been inconsistent between countries and socioeconomic categories and that substantial human deprivation endures. In addition to a lack of access to financial and nonfinancial resources, some groups, according to Mukherjee et al. (2019), also lack access to education and other necessities. As a result, establishing equitable access to opportunities and services for women and girls across Sub-Saharan Africa will have a major beneficial impact on human development advancement in the region, according to the report. On the other hand, according to Lall et al. (2017), the social geography of Africa is fast shifting. There are currently 472 million Africans who live in cities and towns; this figure is predicted to rise to 800 million in the next two decades. However, Das and Espinoza (2020) found that

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while most people in North and South Africa presently live in cities, West Africa is expected to become a majority urban population by 2020. According to Das and Espinoza (2020), however, urbanization rates in East Africa remain below 20%. Nigeria, along with India and China, is expected to contribute 35 percent of the anticipated expansion in the global urban population from 2018 to 2050, resulting in an additional 189 million urban residents. Africa has the world’s highest population increase, even though fertility is down in nearly every country. The region’s half-population is under the age of 25, and by 2050, Africa will have 362 million young people aged 15 to 24 (Khalid Anser et al., 2021). The over-60 population in Africa is anticipated to more than triple from 69 million in 2017 to 226 million by 2050 (Das & Espinoza, 2020), at the same time as several African countries experience population ageing. The body of scholarly literature on African development is growing, but most studies look at only one or a few characteristics, such as economic growth or development, without providing a comprehensive view of the continent. When it came to social media and human development in 49 African countries in 2012, Asongu and Odhiambo (2021) researched the topic. Quantile regressions demonstrate that Facebook penetration is linked to inclusive human development, and they show that this positive linkage is even stronger in the above-average subsample, where it is statistically significant at a statistically significant level. The impact of internet use and innovation on human development was explored by Ejemeyovwi et al. (2019) in 15 ECOWAS nations. Ejemeyovwi et al. (2019) found that Internet use, innovation, and their interaction have a substantial and positive association with human development using the fixed and random effect panel data approaches. Once again, Acquah and Ibrahim (2020) use annual panel data from 45 African nations spanning 1980–2016 to evaluate the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI), economic growth, and the development of the banking sector. For the most part, increased FDI is related to higher economic growth, according to the results of the two-system generalized technique of moments. Considering this, the following chapter aims to showcase post-independence development in Africa using data from several measures of sustainable development. The chapter will focus on the postindependence sustainable development measures in Africa using facts and data, and it will then remark on the ideas that the African states might follow to accomplish the Sustainable Development Goals. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.

3.2 Review of Important Literature 3.2.1 The Concept of Growth, Development, and Sustainable Development An economy’s growth can be described as a rise in the market value of the goods and services it produces over time. The traditional metric used by statisticians to gauge economic progress is the real gross domestic product growth rate (Acemoglu,

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2012; Kuznets, 2013). Increased production and consumption of economic products and services, according to other academics, is what it is defined as. However, while the idea of economic growth is easy, measuring it is highly complicated; growth is sometimes defined as a rise in household income or GDP adjusted for inflation. Economic growth, according to Acemoglu (2012), is defined as a change in material production over a short period. In economics, economic growth is defined as an annual rise in the value of material production expressed in terms of GDP (or national income) or GDP per capita. While economic growth is possible, it can also be challenging to maintain the economy’s growth trajectory. There are many more socioeconomic processes and developments that are influenced by both economic and noneconomic elements that contribute to economic development (Acemoglu, 2012). Since economic growth is the process of increasing the size of national economies, macroeconomic indicators, especially GDP per capita in an ascending but not linear direction, with positive effects on the economic and social sectors, we can conclude that development shows us how growth impacts the society by increasing the standard of living. 3.2.1.1 Economic Development A process that results in growth, advancement, or good change, as well as the inclusion of new elements that are physical, economic, environmental, social, or demographic, is referred to as development. According to Ivi and Van den Berg (2016), the goal of development is to improve both the standard of living and the quality of life of a population, as well as to generate or increase opportunities for regional or local employment and sources of income, all while minimizing adverse effects on the natural resources of the surrounding area. Changes in quality are a part of development, as is the establishment of conditions that will allow such changes to persist in the future. Development may not take place instantly, but it is observable and beneficial. According to Acemoglu (2012), economic development is best understood when seen over a longer time, and the economic development of a country is made up of several different structural shifts. Encouraging the participation of the processing capabilities of industrial production will be necessary for the country to achieve its goal of economic development; however, the tertiary sector of the economy, which is responsible for more advanced economic activity, is becoming increasingly dominant at higher levels (Acemoglu, 2012). 3.2.1.2 Sustainable Development An organizing principle for reaching human growth goals while preserving the ability of natural systems to deliver essential resources for the economy and society is sustainable development (SDGs). The end goal is a society in which human needs are met without compromising the integrity or stability of the natural system through the efficient use of available resources and living conditions (Brundtland, 1987;

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Parris & Kates, 2003; Rogers et al., 2012). Sustainable development, according to Rogers et al. (2012), is the belief that human civilizations must survive and meet their needs without harming the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The Brundtland Report in 1987 was the first time that the term “sustainable development” was formally defined (Brundtland, 1987; Rogers et al., 2012). In the words of Brundtland (1987), “sustainable development” is not a static state of equilibrium, but a dynamic process in which resources are exploited, investments are made, technological advancements are aimed at, and institutional changes are implemented in line with current and future needs. 3.2.1.3 Sustainable Development Goals The Open Working Group, which was established by the UN General Assembly, presented a set of worldwide SDGs at the United Nations headquarters in New York City (Hák et al., 2016). The SDGs consist of 17 goals and 169 targets. In addition to that, an initial group of 330 indicators was presented to the public in March 2015. Some of the Sustainable Development Goals expand upon the Millennium Development Goals that came before them, while others introduce brand-new concepts (Hák et al., 2016). According to the research of several different academics, including Mhlanga (2021), Mhlanga (2022), Umbrello et al. (2021), Holzinger et al. (2021), and Saetra (2021), the 17 sustainable development goals have been outlined as follows: To begin, poverty in all its forms and every region of the world must be eradicated. The second objective is to put an end to world hunger, guarantee food security, improve nutrition, and support the growth of agriculture that is more environmentally friendly. The third objective is to encourage and support healthy lifestyles across the board for people of all ages and demographics. A high-quality education that is both inclusive and equitable should be accessible to all people, and people should be encouraged to continue their education throughout their entire lives. This is the fourth objective of the mission. Bring about gender parity and provide all women and girls with the ability to make their own decisions (goal 5). Goal 6 is to make sure that everyone has access to clean water and sanitation, as well as to ensure that these resources are managed sustainably. The seventh goal is to make sure that everyone has access to energy that is not only cheap but also dependable, environmentally friendly, and up-to-date. Goal 8 aims to encourage economic growth that is persistent, equitable, and sustainable, as well as full and productive employment for everyone. This goal is part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Goal 9 is to encourage innovative thinking, the construction of infrastructure that is both robust and sustainable, and the promotion of industrialization that is inclusive and equitable. As part of Goal 10, bring about a reduction in the inequality that exists within nations as well as between them. To accomplish Goal 11, it is necessary to make sure that cities and other human settlements are not only secure but also environmentally friendly, accessible, and resilient. Goal 12 ensures sustainable consumption and production patterns. Take prompt action to combat the detrimental effects

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of climate change, which is Goal 13 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Protecting the oceans, seas, and marine resources while making appropriate use of them for the benefit of sustainable development is the target of Goal 14 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 15 of the Sustainable Development Goals aims to protect, restore, and encourage the sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, and put an end to the loss of biodiversity. Ensuring that everyone has access to justice and building institutions at all levels that are effective, responsible, and inclusive is the target of Goal 16, which aims to foster peaceful and inclusive societies for the sake of sustainable development. The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development needs to be revitalized, and the means through which it will be implemented need to be improved, to accomplish Goal 17. 3.2.1.4 Africa Union’s Agenda 2063 and SDGs The United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want are both examples of contemporary macro-­ development frameworks that were finalized in 2015. Both documents are important instruments to guide Africa in pursuing its developmental agenda (Mahlatsi, 2021). Both socioeconomic and environmental concerns are addressed by both devices, which complement one another. However, the 2030 Agenda covers the entire world and has a 15-year plan (Ani, 2016; Mahlatsi, 2021) and the time horizon for Agenda 2063 is set at 50 years and is tailored specifically to the continent of Africa. Both the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Africa’s Agenda 2063 include several goals, targets, and indicators that incorporate the economic, social, and environmental aspects of sustainability into national planning frameworks. These three dimensions of sustainability are referred to as “dimensions of sustainability.” In contrast to the MDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 were developed through a collaborative process, starting from the bottom up rather than the top down (DeGhetto et al., 2016; Ndizera & Muzee, 2018).

3.3 Empirical Literature Review The scientific literature on development in Africa is rising, although most of the research focuses more on analyzing single or multiple variables on components such as economic growth and development for single or multiple states without offering a comprehensive view of the situation. For instance, Ahenkan and Osei-­ Kojo (2014) examined the level of success in achieving sustainable development in Africa by employing the qualitative research approach. To collect data, Ahenkan and Osei-Kojo (2014) used the desktop instrument. They did this by doing in-depth

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literature research on topics such as the achievements, obstacles, and future opportunities of sustainable development in Africa. According to the research conducted by Ahenkan and Osei-Kojo (2014), the progress of sustainable development across metrics in Africa is inconsistent. Ahenkan and Osei-Kojo (2014) discovered that most African countries have made significant progress over the past decade in terms of building strong economies, strengthening democratic institutions, improving agriculture, and reducing poverty. However, pressing and holding difficulties such as climatic change, growing populations, and insufficient job opportunities continue to undermine efforts toward sustainable development. In their conclusion, Ahenkan and Osei-Kojo (2014) recommended that African governments should strengthen their commitment to formulating and delivering innovative policies to improve agriculture, combat climate change, and increase the number of jobs available on the continent to ensure sustainable development. In a different piece of research, Bugaje (2006) suggested that the utilization of renewable energy sources in Africa has been examined, with the countries of South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, and Mali serving as case studies. The many separate regional environmental policies of these countries were evaluated by Bugaje (2006), and the areas that need attention to attain sustainability were highlighted in his findings. According to the findings of Bugaje (2006), the key to achieving sustainable development in Africa is to solve the continent’s looming energy crisis. The overconsumption of fuel wood is already causing significant environmental concerns, particularly in the Sahel. In addition, Bugaje (2006) discovered that Africa possesses all the potential to solve its energy problems if the appropriate infrastructure support can be provided for the harnessing of the abundant renewable resources on the continent and if skills are pooled together and experiences are shared in the process of addressing the primary issues. According to Tikly (2019), education is frequently seen in policy agendas as playing a transformative role in the achievement of sustainable development and the SDGs on the African continent. He argues that this perception is warranted. As one facet of the postcolonial predicament, Tikly (2019) offered a critical analysis of the relationship between education policy and sustainable development in Africa. This was done in the context of the African continent. Tikly (2019) concluded that if education is to play a social transformation role in environmental sustainability, then education reform needs to be profoundly reoriented and channeled to wider processes of economic, cultural, and political transformation in the interest of social and environmental justice. If this is to occur, then education reform needs to be profoundly reoriented and fully utilized for wider aspects of economic, cultural, and political transformation. According to Ogwu (2019), sustainable development represents a paradigm change from the traditional pursuit of economic expansion, which is traditionally predicated on the exhaustion of resources and the deterioration of the environment. Ogwu (2019) investigated the implications that urbanization and climate change have had on Africa’s capacity for sustainable development. Ogwu (2019) concluded that because of Africa’s agrarian-based economy, climate change presents a substantial and one-of-a-kind obstacle to the continent’s efforts toward sustainable development. Ogwu (2019) concluded that for Africa to achieve SD, it needs to increase the capacity of its existing infrastructures, construct robust

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public institutions, fight poverty, create new industrial and agro-based technologies, increase employment opportunities through diversification, make use of renewable energies, and engage in climate-smart agriculture. According to Ogwu (2019), the formulation of an effective policy is required to address the consequences of increasing urban populations and changing climates on the progress of sustainable development in Africa. Ouedraogo (2019) conducted a literature study on papers that discussed the circumstances of deploying renewable energy resources in Africa. The purpose of this review was to have a better understanding of the most recent research trends, questions, and issues about this subject. According to the findings of Ouedraogo (2019), the success of renewable energy in the African region has been limited by a combination of factors. These factors include a poor institutional framework and infrastructure, high initial capital costs, weak dissemination strategies, a lack of skilled manpower, poor baseline information, and weak maintenance service. Amankwah-­ Amoah (2019) investigated the quiet technological revolution taking place in sub-­ Saharan Africa with a particular emphasis on newly emerging problems and difficulties. Amankwah-Amoah (2019) argued that from the perspective of the central importance of technology transfer in cultivating local innovative ideas and institutional development in the world, it is surprising that our comprehension of the challenges in scaling-up innovations remains limited. Amankwah-Amoah said this because it is surprising that our comprehension of the risks and problems in the ability to scale technologies remains limited. According to Amankwah-Amoah (2019), there are a variety of issues that operate as barriers to development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of these reasons include inadequate regulatory enforcement mechanisms and a lack of accessible financial credit. Machine learning strategies were utilized by Ofori et al. (2021) to determine the primary factors that contribute to the advancement of the banking sector in Africa. According to the findings of Ofori et al. (2021), the expansion of the financial industry in Africa is dependent on several factors, including economic globalization, cell phones, the efficiency of African institutions, and literacy rates. Beeckmans (2018) stated further that after achieving independence in the early 1960s, newly established nations in sub-Saharan Africa began a lengthy and frequently confusing process of nation-building. Beeckmans (2018) also argued that this process of nation-building was also literally a process of building, as the newly independent states initiated large-scale building projects through which they aspired to represent their power in the urban space, as well as break with the material legacies of the colonial past. These projects included the construction of monuments, government buildings, and other structures. According to Beeckmans (2018), even though the new regimes strived for new norms and forms to express their identity as new and independent African states, due to the lack of expertise and funds, they primarily commissioned foreign architects within the framework of development programs, clearly mirroring colonial practices. This is even though the new regimes strived for new norms and forms to express their identity as new and independent African states.

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3.4 Post-Independence Development Measures in Africa: Facts and Figures 3.4.1 Human Development in Africa According to Roser (2014), the Human Growth Index is a measurement tool that evaluates the most important components of human development (HDI). The three most important variables are as follows: a long and healthy life expectancy; access to education which is measured by the average number of years that adults have spent in school and the expected number of years that children will have completed by the time they start school; and a reasonable standard of living that is commensurate with the country’s gross national income per capita after considering the average cost of living in the nation. The Human Development Index for Africa is depicted in Table 3.1. The bulk of the African states has HDI indices between 0.4 and 0.6. Table 3.1  Human Development Indices for Africa HD indices 0.3–0.4 HD indices 0.4–0.5 Niger (0.35) Chad (0.4) Central African Burkina Faso (0.42) Republic (0.37) South Sudan (0.39) Sierra Leone (0.42)

HD indices 0.5–0.6 Sudan (0.5) Comoros (0.5) Togo (0.5)

Burundi (0.42)

Senegal (0.51)

Mali (0.43) Eritrea (0.44) Mozambique (0.44)

Benin (0.52) Lesotho (0.52) Mauritania (0.52) Madagascar (0.52) Uganda (0.52)

Democratic Republic of Congo (0.46) Guinea (0.46) Guinea-Bissau (0.46) Ethiopia (0.46) Djibouti (0.48) Cote d’Ivoire (0.49)

Source: author’s analysis

Nigeria (0.53) Zimbabwe (0.54) Tanzania (0.54) Cameroon (0.56) Angola (0.58) Zambia (0.59) Eswatini (0.59) Kenya (0.59) Ghana (0.59)

HD indices HD indices 0.6–0.7 0.7–0.8 Congo (0.61) South Africa (0.7) Namibia Egypt (0.7) (0.65) Cape Verde Gabon (0.7) (0.65) Morocco Botswana (0.67) (0.72) Tunisia (0.73) Tunisia (0.73) Libya (0.71) Tunisia (0.73) Seychelles (0.8)

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The Human Development Index for Africa is depicted in the table above and the bulk of the African states has HDI indices between 0.4 and 0.6. The Human Development Index for Africa and the rest of the world is depicted as a heat map in Fig. 3.1. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the Human Development Index for the world in a heat map is shown. As can be seen in the figure, the Human Development Index in Africa is lower than that of the rest of the world. The bulk of the African states has HDI indices between 0.4 and 0.6. Most countries have HDI indices that fall between 0.4 and 0.6, with only a few countries having indices that fall between 0.7 and 0.8, as indicated by the data presented above in Fig. 3.1, which was noted earlier on. This information is also laid down understandably in Fig. 3.1. The interpretation of the HDI index states that the higher a country’s level of human development, the higher its HDI value. Since this is the case, it indicates that many African nations still have a long way to go before they reach their potential in terms of human development. Azuh et al. (2020), who focused their research on West Africa, suggest that increased research and development (innovation) be carried out with adequate funding for research and development as well as partnerships between universities and various industries to solve the issues that are associated with human development. The findings of Ahenkan and Osei-Kojo (2014), who discovered that the progress of sustainable development in Africa is mixed across indicators, are supported by the information that pertains to the HDI indices for various African nations. This information is in line with the findings of those researchers. Ahenkan and Osei-Kojo (2014) found that some African countries have made significant progress over the past decade in building

Fig. 3.1  Human Development Index data for Africa and the world. (Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2020-Our World in Data (2019a))

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strong economies, strengthening democratic institutions, improving agriculture, and reducing poverty. Nevertheless, pressing challenges such as climate change, population growth, and inadequate employment opportunities continue to undermine efforts toward sustainable development. To achieve sustainable development, Ahenkan and Osei-Kojo (2014) proposed that African governments should strengthen their commitment to devising and executing creative policies to create jobs, combat climate change, and enhance agriculture. Korankye et al. (2020) also argued that without profound human development as synergies in elevating the continent’s policy perspective, it will be extremely difficult to achieve the strategic goals of transformative economic growth and regional integration, empowering the populace, and consolidating peace and society in 2030 and 2063. These goals are outlined by Korankye et al. (2020). According to Korankye et al. (2020), the successful implementation of this vision can be aided by placing a significant emphasis on empowering the general population through the use of domestic finance.

3.4.2 Poverty Facts and Figures in Africa After experiencing certain phases of economic improvement, Africa still faces a significant challenge in the form of widespread poverty. An investigation that was conducted by the World Bank and by Beegle et al. (2016) found that there has not been a constant growth in inequality in Africa, and the level of poverty may be lower than the current data suggested. The survey also found that there are still important challenges that need to be conquered, such as the fact that more people are living in poverty now than there were in 1990 and that the rate of violent crime is on the rise. The importance of expanding access to data on poverty and inequality in Africa, as well as improving their comparability and quality, cannot be overstated. The statistics on poverty in Africa are presented here.

3.4.3 Poverty Data in the World and Africa The World Bank considers someone to be living in extreme poverty if they have a daily income of fewer than 1.90 dollars (Roser, 2013). Establishing a poverty line and then counting the number of people whose incomes or consumption levels are below that line, often known as the poverty headcount ratio, is the easiest way to measure poverty. This is the simplest technique for assessing poverty. The headcount ratio gives information that is easy to understand because it tells us the percentage of the population whose consumption (or incomes) are below a specific minimum level; as a result, it offers useful information. According to the World Bank, someone who survives on less than 1.90 dollars a day is living in extreme poverty. According to the data presented in Fig. 3.2,

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Fig. 3.2  World’s share of population in extreme poverty. (Source: author’s analysis)

the global level of poverty has been on a steady downward trajectory since 1985. This information is presented in Fig. 3.2. However, Das and Espinoza (2020) argued that although the proportion of the world population living in poverty has consistently declined, questions about whether the same has been the case for Africa have been investigated, and the results show that the opposite has been happening. This is illustrated in Fig.  3.2, which shows a decline in the proportion of people living in poverty. According to the research conducted by Beegle et al. (2016) for the World Bank, the percentage of people living in poverty in Africa has decreased from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012; however, even though the overall rate of poverty in Africa has decreased, the total number of people living in poverty has increased. One can observe that central Africa continues to be a region with a high concentration of people living in extreme poverty by comparing it to the rest of the world, as depicted in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4. In contrast to the rest of the world, where the number of people living in extreme poverty has generally seen significant reductions, this number has increased in Africa. This is because many African countries have not been able to lift themselves out of the continent’s cycle of poverty. Azzarri and Signorelli (2020) state that even though Africa has had two decades of unparalleled economic growth and a fall in the proportion of its population that lives in extreme poverty, the continent’s overall population has continued to increase at a rapid rate. As a direct consequence of this, the number of individuals surviving in conditions of extreme poverty rose by more than 100 million. Even though the percentage of the African population that lives in poverty has decreased from 57 percent to 41 percent, Das and Espinoza (2020) report that the absolute number of people living in poverty has increased from around 278 million to over 413 million. This is regardless of the number of people living in poverty has increased. However, due to a wide range of factors, the most important

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Fig. 3.3  World’s share of population in extreme poverty. (Source: World Bank PovcalNet-Our World in Data (2019b))

Fig. 3.4  Share of population in extreme poverty in Africa

of which are the fragility, violence, and availability of natural resources in the continent, the performance of African countries varies significantly. Estimates of the headcount ratio of people living in extreme poverty are shown on the map in Fig. 3.3, broken down by nation.

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As shown in Fig. 3.3, Africa is the home to people who are living in extreme poverty compared to the rest of the world. In the map above, poverty has been declining in the rest of the world, but Africa still dominates in the number of people living in extreme poverty. This information is truly supported by the arguments of Khalid Anser et  al. (2021) who argued that irrespective of these attainments, the continent has also drawn global attention for its considerable problems such as social exclusion, food insecurity, poverty, inequality, and unemployment, among others. Concerning individual countries, Madagascar, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan are the nations with the highest levels of extreme poverty. Most of these nations are nations marred with fragility and violence. Data from Our World in Data (2019b) indicated that countries in the 50–100% range were Madagascar (76.55%), Mozambique (62.29%), Malawi (67.55%), Zambia (58.52%), Angola (51.4%), Democratic Republic of Congo (70.99%), Central African Republic (70.76%), Congo (55.65%), Mozambique (62.29%), Somalia (68.66%), Burundi (79.53%), South Sudan (80.71%), and Guinea-Bissau (62.65%). This information is clearly shown in the line graph in Fig. 3.4. Figure 3.4 is showing that in Africa in general poverty is rising compared with the rest of the world. Countries like South Sudan, Burundi, Madagascar, and Democratic Republic of Congo among others have high and rising poverty levels of poverty when compared with the rest of the world where poverty is declining. Only a handful of African nations like Mauritius, Algeria, and Tunisia among others show declining poverty levels. As highlighted by Das and Espinoza (2020), the performance of African countries varies significantly; however, due to a variety of factors, the most notable of which are the fragility, violence, and abundance of natural resources in the continent. 3.4.3.1 Demographic Indicators of Sustainable Development in Africa Africa, like many other regions of the world, is experiencing a rapid increase in the proportion of its elderly population; however, in contrast to this trend, most African countries continue to have extremely high fertility rates, rapid rates of population growth, and very young populations. To achieve a “modern” demographic regime with low mortality and low fertility, the countries of Africa will need to address the doubling or possibly tripling of their working-age population by the year 2050 and make better preparations for the future of their upcoming young generations. By doing so, they will increase their chances of achieving a “modern” demographic regime. The nations of Africa would be in a better position to accomplish inclusive growth, cut poverty rates, and establish economic convergence if they were to put such a system into place. Additionally, they would be in a better position to benefit from the demographic dividend. Changes in demographic characteristics can play a role in triggering socioeconomic progress, but this is not a completely automatic process. Changes in the population are a natural consequence of both social and economic progress (Guengant & May, 2013).

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3.4.3.2 Population Growth Figure 3.5 depicts the population of Africa in comparison to that of the world. Figure 3.5 illustrates that the population growth in Africa has traditionally occurred at an accelerating rate; hence, forecasts suggest that this rate will continue to quicken well into the future, even beyond the year 2100. A closer look reveals that the rise in population across Africa has not been all that noteworthy. The population of Africa is shown in comparison to the population of the rest of the globe in Fig. 3.5. Even though the historical population of Asia has grown between the years 1950 and the present, as seen in Fig. 3.5, this expansion has occurred in a slower and slower rate ever since 1950. This growth is illustrated by the fact that the rate of growth is getting smaller and smaller. The population of Asia is expected to continue to expand until about 1950, at which point it will begin a slow drop that is expected to continue up to 2100. These forecasts are based on data collected from countries across Asia. Instead, population increase in Africa has historically occurred at a rate that is accelerating; hence, estimates suggest that this rate will continue to quicken well into the future, even after 2100 has passed. According to The Economist, Africa’s population will double by 2050, 1 in 4 people on Earth will be African, and the report expects Africa to be the only region that will continue to grow after 2050. It is possible to make the point, at least on the surface, that the high population growth rates that are forecast for African nations that are included in this group of underdeveloped and with limited agricultural resources

Fig. 3.5  Population growth. (Source: author’s analysis)

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may not be sustainable with the development potential given by such resources. The United Nations also reported that this demographic dividend for Africa presents an opportunity for the continent, which can be capitalized on by making investments in high-quality education, teacher training, cutting-edge technology, and innovative ideas. These investments would result in increased productivity, the creation of new jobs, and the promotion of inclusive growth and prosperity. 3.4.3.3 Infant Mortality in Africa Even though the average infant mortality rates in the rest of the world are lower than the averages for Africa, the infant mortality rate in Africa has been steadily decreasing. Figure 3.6 provides a visual representation of the infant mortality rates for the world, as well as the rates for Eastern and Southern Africa, Western and Central Africa, and the rest of Africa. The infant mortality rates for the world, as well as the rates for Eastern and Southern Africa, Western and Central Africa, and the remainder of Africa, are presented graphically in Fig. 3.6. The infant mortality rate in Africa has been progressively falling over the past few decades, even though the average infant mortality rates of the rest of the world are lower than the averages for Africa. 3.4.3.4 Life Expectancy in Africa and the Rest of the World As can be seen in Fig. 3.7, the average life expectancy of people living in Africa is significantly lower than the average life expectancy of people living anywhere else in the world. In addition, the average life expectancy of Africans remained the same from the years 1990 to 2000, and a revival has been visible after the year 2000. When taking into consideration the heat map presented in Fig. 3.7, it is possible to see that the average life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa is substantially shorter than that of the rest of the globe. The average life expectancy of people living in

Fig. 3.6  Average infant mortality – Africa vs the world. (Source: author’s analysis)

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Fig. 3.7  Infant mortality: Africa vs the world

Africa is much lower, as can be seen in Fig. 3.7, in comparison to the average life expectancy of individuals living anyplace else on the globe. In addition, the average life expectancy of Africans did not change between 1990 and 2000, and following the year 2000, there was clear evidence of a comeback in this statistic.

3.5 Policy Proposals for Africa to Attain the SDGs If one were to give the information presented above their complete attention, it would most surely portray a gloomy image of what is ahead for Africa in the future. Muswere (2020) argued that Africa has carried out many development initiatives; however, due to several systemic problems and challenges such as “poverty, instability, natural disasters, and climate change, no positive results are yet available that guarantee Africa will meet the Sustainable Development Goals within the decade of programming that spans from 2020 to 2030. Muswere’s argument was since Africa has carried out many development initiatives.” According to Muswere (2020), these difficulties have had a negative impact on Africa to the point where it is now possible to predict that Africa’s developmental route will be decimated once more if stringent structural, social, economic, political, and industrial reforms are not carried out immediately. Muswere forecasts that Africa’s path toward growth will deteriorate further if these reforms are not implemented quickly. Each of these challenges must receive the utmost attention because Africa has not been spared from the destruction produced by pandemics like HIV/AIDS, COVID-19, and malaria, among others. In addition to this, Adeola (2020) said that despite global advancements, a major gender gap still exists in the social, political, and economic life of Africa. This was stated even though worldwide improvements have been made. Listed below are a few of the policy suggestions that, if implemented, could assist Africa in accomplishing its goals for sustainable development.

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Policy Proposals for Africa to Attain the SDGs

Fig. 3.8  Policy proposals for Africa to attain the SDGs

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Africa Should Deal with Corruption

Africa Should also Deal with Violence and Conflict Africa Should Also Consider Developments of The Fourth Industrial Revolution Seriously Prioritizing Agriculture is Critical for Africa Prioritizing Agriculture is Critical for Africa

Factors listed in Fig. 3.8 above are a few of the policy suggestions that, if implemented, could assist Africa in accomplishing its goals for sustainable development.

3.5.1 Africa Should Deal with Corruption According to Mahlatsi (2021), the implementation of Agenda 2063 and the SDGs faces significant challenges because of the disparity between norm-setting and norm implementation by African governments. Mahlatsi (2021) also maintains that corruption is extremely high and endemic in Africa and that it has been connected to serious economic hemorrhages. If there is not a significant effort made to combat corruption, it is considered that the goal of ending the world’s worst forms of poverty and ensuring that no one is left behind by 2030 will be difficult to achieve (Chitonge et al., 2020; Mahlatsi, 2021; Weigel & Demissie, 2021). Using the indicators for reaching Target 16.5 of the sustainable development goals, Hope Sr (2021) evaluated Africa’s performance in terms of significantly cutting down on all types of corruption and bribery on the continent by 2030 (SDGs). According to Hope Sr (2021), corruption and bribery influence all SDG-related sectors, which undermines development results and significantly compromises attempts to meet the SDGs in Africa. Because of this, Hope Sr (2021) believes that making the elimination of corruption a priority, which includes the prevention of money laundering, bribery, and other illegal activities, is an essential prerequisite for achieving sustainable development, good governance, and the establishment of institutions that are both effective

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and inclusive, as is required by SDG 16, as well as funding the accomplishment of the Sustainable Development Goals. Corruption was found to have a negative association with socioeconomic growth across the Asian, African, and Caribbean subpanels by Murshed and Mredula (2018). Additionally, corruption had a detrimental impact on the environmental development of the Asian and African subpanels.

3.5.2 Africa Should Also Deal with Violence and Conflict Insurgencies, terrorism, political upheavals, instability, a burgeoning population, and a dwindling economy are just a few of the problems the African continent faces, according to Mahlatsi (2021). To achieve the SDGs in Africa, we must address these concerns in a context that is distinctive to Africa. The African continent, according to Ani (2016), has remained a hotbed of war, with a variety of crises disrupting the domestic and international tranquility of the countries that make up the continent and the areas within it over time. These conflicts, according to Ani (2016), have impacted prior MDG dynamics, and Ani (2016) asserted that terrorism, slavery, political struggle, civil war, and military coups are eroding the foundations for African countries to implement Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). African countries’ performance varies substantially, however, due to factors such as instability, violence, and richness of natural resources, which Das and Espinoza (2020) noted. Many countries in Africa that have been scarred by violence are included in the Human Development Index that was provided before. Furthermore, Mahlatsi (2021) noted that while South Africa and Uganda attained their MDGs for water in 2010, Zambia failed to meet this objective by 2015. Increased populations, particularly in unplanned communities where people often live in subhuman conditions, along with the impact of global warming on freshwater supplies, present further concerns. Politicians’ and officials’ lack of commitment has been cited as a factor in the failure to meet the Millennium Development Goals, according to the authors. Low budgetary allocations to vital ministries like health and education are an indication of a lack of SDG commitment.

3.5.3 Africa Should Also Consider Developments of the Fourth Industrial Revolution Seriously Global society and workplaces are on the verge of a radical shift due to the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is impacting all aspects of human existence, including schooling, according to Yingi et al. (2022). Artificial Intelligence, robotics, biotechnology, and quantum computing, among others, are just some of the technologies that are influencing the revolution. This comes at a time when the United Nations has formulated the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under

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Agenda 2030, which aims to improve the lives of people around the world. It is impossible to overstate the importance of the SDGs and 4IR in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. For SDG 4, the use of 4IR technologies like AI, learning analytics, and the Internet of Things (IoT) helps to ensure that all students have access to a high-quality education. Because of the significance of the 4IR, African governments must ensure that they take this revolution seriously and begin investing in technology via educational initiatives and policies that enable businesses to make investments. Digital technologies like “artificial intelligence, machine learning, the Internet of Things, Big Data, Blockchain, Robotics, 3D technologies, and many more” have become the means and solutions to many of the world’s problems as we approach the Fourth Industrial Revolution, according to Hoosain et al. (2020). The COVID-19 epidemic and other societal issues were recently helped by this technology. The 4IR developments have taught us that, despite the disruptions and the rise in the number of unintended consequences of technology, the role that artificial intelligence and machine learning play motivates us to “conclude that governments must build trust in these technologies, to address health problems going forward, to ensure that the sustainable development goals related to these technologies are met.”

3.5.4 Prioritizing Agriculture Is Critical for Africa to Attain the SDGs and Achieve Sustainable Development Increased attention to agriculture is based on Jaiyesimi’s (2016) argument that growth in agriculture has a greater impact on reducing poverty than growth in other parts of the economy. It was pointed out by Jaiyesimi (2016) that the agricultural sector is intimately linked to any strategy aimed at combating extreme poverty and, as such, has enormous potential for both sustainable growth and contributing to the reduction of poverty and inequality. A more revolutionary approach is needed where agricultural goods are processed on the continent and the sector’s productivity rises, rather than huge traditional agricultural systems with low capital investment and productivity, according to Jaiyesimi (2016). If Africa wants to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it will require a greater understanding of how to change the agriculture sector. Agriculture is likely the most significant starting point for tackling hunger and extreme poverty, as well as reducing income disparity between the rich and poor, rural, and urban and between men and women (Orimoloye et  al., 2021). African inequality is mostly based on this, according to Orimoloye et al. (2021), who stated that research reveals that most of the disadvantaged are either directly or indirectly engaged in agriculture as a source of income. It’s not just about providing food security for the poor; it’s about assuring more substantial agro-based industrialization, which will increase Africa’s economic growth and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainability. Many African nations will be able to reduce their reliance on natural resources by diversifying their economies, which will help protect them from volatile and often unpredictable

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commodity price shocks, such as those associated with oil (Nhemachena et  al., 2018; Orimoloye et al., 2021). It was also stated that prioritizing agriculture is congruent with the 2014 Malabo proclamation on African agriculture transformation for shared prosperity by Orimoloye et al. (2021). Ending hunger; doubling intra-­ African agricultural goods and services trade; strengthening agricultural livelihoods and production systems; and ensuring that agriculture contributes significantly to poverty reduction were some of the goals set out in this declaration by the African Union, governments, and heads of state. It’s also widely accepted that major challenges must be overcome such as mechanization and improving the use of modern agro-inputs like fertilizers or pesticides through improved science and technology, upgrading agricultural value chains, access to financing, access to markets, as well as gender inclusion to succeed in such a transformation (Karlsson, 2014; Newell et al., 2019; Nhemachena et al., 2020; Orimoloye et al., 2021).

3.6 Prioritizing Infrastructure Development in Africa Jaiyesimi (2016) argues that the new SDGs emphasize the necessity of infrastructure development for the sustainability of growth and that infrastructure development has long been recognized as a significant determinant of growth. Because of competing social investment needs, most African countries are unable to fund large-­ scale infrastructure projects. Scholars say that the extended payback term and, in some circumstances, investors’ perceptions of political instability have hindered private sector engagement in infrastructure finance (Ajakaiye & Ncube, 2010; Adeola & Evans, 2020). There has been a lack of investment in the continent’s infrastructure sectors such as energy (including renewables), transportation, telecommunication, and water and sanitation (Jaiyesimi, 2016; Orimoloye et al., 2021). In many of these four subsectors, Africa has fallen behind the rest of the globe. In comparison to other developing regions, infrastructure in Africa is the weakest (Kannan et  al., 2020). Over two-thirds of the world’s population does not have access to grid energy in sub-Saharan Africa, where nearly 600 million people reside. Despite tremendous progress in closing this gap, Africa still trails behind, for example, India connected 100 million people to power in 2018, whereas only 20 million individuals in Africa achieved this feat (Kannan et  al., 2020). A continent’s economic progress, its people’s well-being, and its business sector’s expansion depend heavily on reducing this infrastructural gap, according to Kannan et al. (2020). In contrast to other regions, however, since the turn of the new millennium, the continent has progressed in infrastructure expansion. For the past 15 years, infrastructure investment in Africa has consistently increased, according to Kannan et al. (2020), and international investors have both a strong desire and money to spend much more on the continent. African infrastructure projects, on the other hand, have a terrible track record of going from feasibility and business plans to financial close: 80 percent of infrastructure projects fail. In Africa, there is a paradox of infrastructure

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funding: there is a great need, and funds are readily available, as well as a vast pipeline of potential projects, but not enough money is being spent.

3.7 Conclusion and Policy Recommendation The expansion of the economy is the single most effective tool at our disposal for attaining sustainable development. Both the alleviation of poverty and an improvement in people’s standard of life are feasible objectives for nations whose economies are undergoing the process of economic growth. Case studies undertaken within nations as well as research that includes numerous countries demonstrate that rapid and sustained economic growth are vital if we are to make faster ground toward reaching our goals. This chapter focused on the post-independence sustainable development initiatives that were implemented in Africa by employing facts and statistics. In addition to this, the chapter included some commentary on potential courses of action for the African states to take to achieve Sustainable Development Goals. The focus of this chapter is going to be on the systematic review of the previous research. The chapter was successful in offering a variety of development indicators for Africa, and it finished up with a comprehensive discussion of the different policy alternatives that could assist Africa in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Prioritizing Infrastructure Development in Africa, Prioritizing Agriculture is Critical for Africa to Attain the SDGs and Achieve Sustainable Development, Africa Should Also Consider Developments of the Fourth Industrial Revolution Seriously, and Africa Should also Deal with Violence and Conflict are some of the proposals that have been made. Other proposals include Africa Should Deal with Corruption, Prioritizing Infrastructure Development in Africa, and Prioritizing Agriculture is Critical for Africa to Attain the SDGs and Achieve Sustainable Development.

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Chapter 4

Decolonization of Development in Early Post-independence Africa Emmanuel Ndhlovu

and David Mhlanga

Abstract  This chapter examines Africa’s socioeconomic development with a focus on the first two decades of political independence, i.e., 1960–1980. The chapter is a broad assessment of the colonially disrupted socioeconomic social reality in Africa to highlight the development status of the continent. Utilizing secondary empirical and qualitative evidence obtainable in both academic and gray literature, the chapter shows that given the slow rate with which the Human Development Index often grows, the performance of early post-independence African countries (combined) was not as dismal as is often claimed. Africa’s economic growth performed well above the global average just like Asia and the Americas during the 1970–1980 period despite the oil price shock as well as the structural adjustment programs of the 1970s. While Africa produced mixed development results, the chapter avers that the success of post-independence Africa can be attributed to the impressive groundwork of first-generation African leaders who experimented with different kinds of developmental systems, both home-grown and adapted. Keywords  Africa · Development · Post-independence · Socioeconomic development

4.1 Introduction The efforts to decolonize development and to mobilize Africa and its people toward the revival of its socioeconomic past which was disrupted and distorted by the continent’s colonial encounter with Europe became more pronounced since the 1960s E. Ndhlovu (*) Vaal University of Technology, Vanderbijlpark, South Africa D. Mhlanga The University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_4

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when most countries attained their political independence. One of the key pressing concerns by the first-generation post-independence Africans has been to restore the continent’s indigenous principles and values with the view to reconnecting the people with their past in which imagination was possible and where socioeconomic development was a possibility. This chapter is a broad assessment of the disrupted socioeconomic social and economic reality in Africa to highlight the development approaches, theories, and trends that emerged in the post-independence period. The focus is placed on the period 1960 and 1980 for two important reasons. Firstly, this period represents the height of the political transformation in Africa. Secondly, the development efforts of the first-generation African leaders also started showing in this period. In addition, for most of the countries that had gained independence, the results of development efforts had begun to show in this period. The chapter is premised on the observation that existing debates on development in post-­independence Africa have some blind spots in relation to the socioeconomic realities that emerged. While the literature on the development theories, trends, and debates abounds, such literature emphasizes the importance of the restoration of indigenous principles and values while equally important issues such as livelihoods, human welfare, and economic inclusion are treated as add-ons. Utilizing secondary sources obtainable in both academic and gray literature, the chapter takes issue with this tragic reality. The chapter, however, acknowledges that for context- and cultural-specific development to be realized, there is the need to revisit the disrupted past to learn what needs to be done in the present and future. The next section summarizes available definitions of development as a concept. This is followed by a detailed discussion of selected development theories that were adopted in Africa in the first two decades of political independence, that is, between 1960 and 1980. Thereafter, the chapter presents facts and figures of socioeconomic development in the same period. A discussion on the integration efforts by African countries is also made to demonstrate how socioeconomic development challenges have also been approached as a collective on the continent. Lastly, conclusions are made.

4.2 Rethinking Development in Africa Socioeconomic development emerges as one of the key collective pursuits of African countries. In its Agenda 2063, the African Union (AU) envisions an African future of socioeconomic development and positive social change branded by Pan-­ African unity, integration, prosperity, and peace (African Union, 2013; Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021a). The AU seeks to ensure that Africa and its people are free from poverty, diseases, and, in general, from a lack of development that characterizes the continent. However, debates on what constitutes the concept of development persist. Scholars and policymakers are at loggerheads regarding how the concept should be defined. The concept has had diverse definitions from scholars depending on one’s angle of approach. The key features in the available definitions include, among

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others, the view of development as economic growth, human development, a modernization process, the abolition of dependency, improvements in human welfare, dialectical transformation, and development as history (Brobbey, 2010; Gumede, 2019; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Tandon, 2015; Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021b). More precisely, Brobbey (2010:1) views development as “the capacity of a state to achieve the higher outcome of production for the satisfaction of citizens and empower them to make demands.” Sen (1999) views development as the existence of freedom arguing that the level and quality of freedom that people have determines their level of development. Gumede (2019:51) posits that development should be viewed as “…improvements in well-being, involving socioeconomic progress.” For Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:2), development should be understood as a “liberatory human aspiration to attain freedom from political, economic, ideological, epistemological, and social domination….” Rodney (1972) avers that the term “development” is used mostly in an exclusive economic sense. He argues that the economy is itself an index of other social features – socioeconomic, environmental, cultural, and political, among others. This implies that all features of development have, in one way or the other, an affinity with the economy. Drawing on this notion, Rodney (1972) argued that a society develops economically when its members increase jointly their capacity for dealing with the environment, socioeconomic, and politics. This capability for dealing with the environment depends on the extent to which the people understand the laws of nature (science), the degree to which they deploy their understanding into practice by devising tools (technology), and on how work is organized. Thus, the crux of development is the realization of the socioeconomic and political needs of the people in a manner that enables them to live their own fulfilling lives. Development, therefore, is a context-specific concept with its meaning closely tied to contexts of culture and contexts of situations. This view is supported by Lushaba (2006:3) who argues that “Africa cannot possibly develop by modernizing or becoming like the modern West.” If “modernity” constitutes development, then such a form of development could work in the West and is not suitable in the African context. To Gumede (2019:51), “modernity is not an appropriate form of development that Africa needs.” Modernity is a Western construct whereby non-Euro-Western countries are considered primitive and custom-­bound and thus urged to embrace Western-based lifestyle choices, and tastes, among others. This modernity involves a social change in the elements of science and technology. All these views on development are rejected by Amin and other scholars in Africa and the broader South. Tandon (2015:145) observed that the “major challenge for the theoreticians of not only the global south but also of the marginalized peoples and sub-nationalists of the north is to provide a…. definition of development” outside Euro-West cages. Latouche (1993:460) mentions that what is conceived as development in Africa “has been and still is the westernization of the world.” Ziai (2009:198) rubbishes the entire concept as “…an empty signifier [emerging from the West] that can be filled with almost any content.” This rejection of development is steeped in the definition first coined by W.W.  Rostov of the United States, an adviser in both the John F Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson administrations, who defined it as primarily an

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evolutionary process through which the Western society evolved and through which the Third World was still in the process of evolving. This thinking was based on the belief that non-Western societies could achieve development if they could simply copy and paste Western capital, technology, and social organization and values. This understanding of development is rejected widely in Africa. Amin (1974) drew attention to the holism of the historical process and the polarizing inclinations of accumulation on a world scale in staking out what development for Africa should constitute. Discarding the proposals for global forms of social democracy, Amin (1991) contended that even a softer and less extractive form of inclusion within a global capitalist system still depends on value flows from the periphery to the center, thereby compromising the chances of the periphery to realize development. In line with Amin’s argument, as shown in the next, African nationalist leaders in the post-independence period adopted development theories and political stances which they believed could work for their economies and peoples.

4.3 Post-independence Politics and Development Theories The political transformation of the 1960s and 1970s in Africa ushered in new energies and hope for the continent which would, once again, be able to take charge of its affairs and decide its future. The countries that gained independence between 1960 and 1980 embarked upon policies and efforts which they believed could steer socioeconomic development for their vulnerable populace. This section summarizes some of the theories that gained attention in Africa. The theories often overlap, and it is not surprising to observe how they were adapted by different African leaders.

4.3.1 The Socialist Thought The socialist thought involved included state-controlled economic development policies which often entailed strict central planning and a large public sector (Minogue & Molloy, 1974). With indigenous principles and values at the center, most post-independence African leaders and thinkers believed communitarianism and economic solidarity constituted the crux of African traditional life. Thus, many nationalist leaders embarked upon missions of setting up government systems that were based on this communitarian, solidarity, or socialism which they considered “a deep attitude of the mind” (Ikechukwu, 2016:14). Notwithstanding the diverse forms and varieties of the socialist thought adopted by countries across the continent, the common denominator was the call for a return to the African traditional life structure. Amilcar Cabral (1973) viewed this as the “return to the source.” The “Ujamaa” in Tanzania is a perfect example of this returning to the source.

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In analyzing “Ujamaa” or “family-hood” as the heart of African socialism, Nyerere argued that like democracy, socialism was an attitude of the mind, a disposition of considering wealth only in terms of its use for the service of other fellowmen (Nyerere, 1969). However, since African socialism concerns itself with the attitude of the mind, it can also be argued that it has nothing to do with the actual possession and ownership of wealth. Nyerere himself posited that a wealthy man could be a socialist if his thinking was for the general welfare of the society while the peasant could possess capitalistic tendencies by thinking about how to deploy wealth for domination. Nyerere (1969:512–513) argued that African socialism calls for the return to African values and traditions and that in a socialist society, it is the socialist attitude of mind, not the unbending devotion to a standard political pattern which is required to ensure that people care for each other’s welfare. Thus, for Nyerere, in Africa where life has always been traditionally socialist, it is only socialism that has the potential to transform lives and steer development since it has been an integral part of their tradition. It is opposed to capitalism which aspires to build a joyful society based on the exploitation of man by man. Several African leaders adopted “African socialism” as a realistic means through which economic, social, and political development of the newly independent countries could be achieved. The most popular feature in the African version of socialism is what has been described as “reconstructed traditionalism.” African socialism places stress on the return to a definite mentality and method (Damachi, 1976). This type of socialism is the community, and democratic, and is founded on the primacy of law. As a result, it was more appealing to most African nationalist leaders. Immediately after gaining their respective independence, Ghana (1957), Tanzania (1963), Zambia (1964), Angola (1975), Mozambique (1975), and later Ethiopia (which was never colonized) embraced the socialist ideology and embarked on the centrally planned socialist development and political strategy. The appeal of the socialist thought and its associated central planning model emerged, for Kumssa and Jones (2015), from the acknowledgment that the public sector is a key instrument that the state can utilize to achieve socioeconomic development for the people. In addition, the first generation of African nationalist leaders, namely, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and others, embraced a state-controlled development strategy because it enabled them to control and monitor the activities of private and foreign firms which they considered as agents of Euro-North American exploitation and domination (Kumssa & Jones, 2015). The focus was on the development of national economies to speed up the decolonization process. As a result, in the first two decades of independence, most African countries emphasized and dedicated their meager resources toward economic and social development. Some home-grown strategies were devised for dealing with the colonial policy of exclusion and separate development (Ndhlovu, 2020). In all these efforts, African countries pursued a communitarian approach to national planning. Nationhood was conceived in terms of a type of growth that could enable countries to ascend to a socioeconomic level that other modern states enjoyed with social

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service systems for education, welfare, and health, along with income maintenance for the poor and needy (Mkandawire, 2005). In embracing the socialist approach, African countries distanced and detached themselves from whatever Euro-North American models, and for many African governments such as Tanzania and Mozambique, the preferred models were the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Influential post-independence fathers, particularly Nkrumah and Nyerere, were particularly vocal in mobilizing the newly independent African countries to embrace the socialist approach and to take lessons from the East which had models that closely spoke to the continent’s needs. Likewise, when they achieved their independence in 1975, Angola and Mozambique also embraced a socialist development strategy with the collectivization of agriculture and partial nationalization of industry, except for the oil industry in the case of Angola (Kumssa & Jones, 2015). Mozambique went on to adopt a plan that involved the nationalization of assets in the land (through state farms), banking, industry, healthcare, education, and housing. In all the countries that adopted the socialist approach, much focus was placed on improving the socioeconomic base for the people, particularly the poor who made up the majority. Agriculture also received special interest from the newly independent states which would largely depend on agriculture to develop themselves. This was demonstrated by the wide interest in agricultural-based development economics. In both Angola and Mozambique, broad-based access and utilization of land were improved with the view to improving lives and livelihoods. Most households in these countries, and large Southern Africa, depended on agriculture for domestic livelihood, food production, employment creation, generation of household income, and reduction of poverty  – a situation that has not significantly changed even today (Ndhlovu, 2021). Agriculture even remained a major human economic practice in terms of contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) of most countries in the region (Kanyenze, 2006). As a result of the great potential of agriculture as a livelihood tool in SSA, it became at the center of social policy efforts. It is for this reason that most socioeconomic development measures of the majority post-liberation and post-colonial SSA economies would therefore focus mainly on the sector to improve the lives of much of the populace in the region. Agriculture received increased post-independence development ahead of the other economic sectors. One of the contributing factors promoting the focus of the post-independence government on agricultural development than the rest of the economic sectors had to do with affordability in terms of capital availability and sectoral expertise in agriculture (Ndhlovu, 2020; Mhlanga et al., 2021). Most of the post-independence governments were resource-poor and therefore opted to begin their socialist development agenda on agriculture mainly because already the general populace in the region would have had existing indigenous skills in agriculture and not in the other economic sectors.

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4.3.2 Philosophical Consciencism While Nyerere pursued African socialism, Nkrumah decided to express his vision for development in the theory of consciencism. Consciencism manifested his socialist ideal. After Nkrumah’s development and passionate adoption of revolutionary Pan-Africanism and his brilliant analysis of neocolonialism, Nkrumah developed his theoretical treatise, consciencism, which, according to him, was the map of the disposition of forces that would enable the African society to shun the dictates of former colonizers and to pursue a form of development that fits into the African personality. In the last chapter of consciencism, Kwame Nkrumah maps out the course of action which he believed was required for a colonial territory to be liberated to attain genuine independence and, thus, maintain the independence of the country. According to Nkrumah, African societies were faced with the challenges of colonialism, imperialism, neocolonialism, disunity, and lack of development. Thus, the aim of philosophical consciencism in its political manifestation was to chart a course of action to overthrow colonialism and imperialism; second, to expose the whims and caprices of neocolonialism so that the defeat of colonialism does not become pointless; third, to mobilize all the countless forces and groups in a territory toward a national (or continental) unity; and finally, to articulate a (philosophical) ideology suitable for national reconstruction and development. For Nkrumah, the conscience of the African society is beleaguered by three components of influences which have to compete and conflicting ideologies. African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment that represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa, using colonialism and neo-colonialism as its primary vehicles. (Nkrumah, 1964: 68)

When these three segments with their conflicting ideologies are allowed to coexist, the African society “will be racked by the most malignant schizophrenia” (Nkrumah, 1964: 79). Thus, an African personality is defined by the collection of humanist principles which underlie that the traditional African society was crucial (Nkrumah, 1964). There is, therefore, the need to either accommodate the other two fragments into the experiences of the African traditional way of life or seek harmony among the three segments. For Nkrumah, the harmony to be forged is the accommodation of the Islamic and Euro-Christian influences in the traditional African way of life. The harmony is to be pursued in such a way that the combined presence of all three influences “is in tune with the original humanist principles underlying African society” (Nkrumah, 1964: 70). Nkrumah’s philosophical consciencism was viewed by many as the answer to the problem of the three Africas (the traditional indigenous identity and the two “others” which were imposed from without – the Islamic and Euro-Christian identities) by way of philosophical synthesis (Ikechukwu, 2016; Kosack, 2012). The fundamental mission of Nkrumah in this vision was to stimulate the philosophical conscience of every African to the understanding that philosophical consciencism

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which accepts matter as primary reality is the key to total African freedom, unity, and development. From 1961 to 1966, Nkrumah’s government in Ghana adopted consciencism infused with elements of the socialist strategy in which the state-owned industry and land. Philosophical consciencism was designed to translate or transform the opposed tripartite features of the African conscience into a uniformed “personality” whose central principle or ideology is socialism. The shape and form of the harmony that is forged out of the three segments of African society is socialism (Egbunu, 2014). Nkrumah strongly dismissed capitalism which shares the same principles and ideologies as slavery, feudalism, colonialism, imperialism, idealism, and individualism, but he preferred socialism and its kindred terms – communalism, humanism, materialism, and egalitarianism due to its human-centeredness. Nkrumah (1964: 73) argued that: Whereas capitalism is a development by refinement from slavery and feudalism, socialism is not a development from capitalism. So that socialism should be a development from capitalism, it needs to share a fundamental principle, that of exploitation, with capitalism. Socialism most avowedly has no share in this principle. Hence socialism cannot develop from capitalism. Rather it stands for the negation of that very principle wherein capitalism has its being, lives, and thrives, that principle which unites capitalism with slavery and feudalism. If one seeks the social-political ancestor of socialism, one must go to communalism. Socialism stands for communalism and capitalism stands for slavery. In socialism, the principles underlying communalism are given expression in modern circumstances... Socialism, therefore, can be and is the defense of the principles of communalism in the modern setting. Socialism is a form of social organization which, guided by the principles underlying communism, adopts procedures and measures made necessary by demographical and technological developments.

Grounded on a centralized economy based on his philosophical consciencism development approach, Nkrumah’s government offered free primary, secondary and tertiary education, as well as other subsidized social services. Education was viewed as one key factor that could see the majority quickly improve their socioeconomic conditions and hence realize development and economic inclusion. Thus, the Nkrumah government increased primary education enrolment fivefold from 234,000 to 1.13 million under the Accelerated Development Plan for Education (ADPE) (Kosack, 2012). By the time Nkrumah was eliminated in a coup, over 8000 new primary schools had been built in Ghana.

4.3.3 African Humanism In Zambia, from 1964 to 1982, the country adopted a semisocialist economy based on an African humanism philosophy. This type of economy was based on centralized planning with capital-intensive import substitution industries. African Humanism was developed by Kenneth Kaunda who argued that “humanism” was a means to an end, which pure socialism.

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African humanism is a philosophy that commends not only the good of humanity but also the good of the African person as the purpose of all actions. It involves an active concern for human welfare as the central object of development policy. It is a philosophy that encourages “the best in the evolution of society and the treatment of mankind, and in the exploitation or use of his natural environment” (Igwe, 2002: 189). Igwe (2002: 189) defines humanism as involving “the creation of the conditions that are favorable to the practical exercise of man’s fundamental rights, and the treatment of his pains and tribulations as a direct concern of the collectivity.” At the center of human are issues of justice and human rights as well as dignity. It deals with the “challenges, contexts, history, experience and culture of Africa” (Azenabor, 2010: 121) and the social, cultural, political, economic, and physical welfare of Africans. It is a philosophy that is aimed at finding purpose and meaning in the life and existence of the people (Egbunu, 2014). According to Damachi (1976:7), “Humanism is supposed to be derived from the traditional African culture…, the African society was progressive and human, and the present generation of Zambians must bear this in mind in all its political, economic, social, and cultural activities.” Kaunda did not only view man as being at the center of social reality but also viewed man as the essence of everything. Kaunda’s understanding of humanism is based on egalitarianism. The equality of man should be at the center of everything regardless of all unintentional inequalities that abound in society. For him, all people have a moral right to equal opportunities. Kaunda thus deployed the humanism approach in Zambia to reduce poverty and vulnerability among the people, particularly the poor who were in the countryside and urban slums. Recognizing that vulnerability and lack of resilience exacerbated and reinforced poverty, the government upscaled its efforts on social protection programs as part of the broader social policy.

4.3.4 Kagisano The Kagisano developmental ideology was developed by Seretse Khama of Botswana to teach people the value of the four major social virtues, namely, unity, peace, harmony, and a sense of community (Ikechukwu, 2016). For these to be realized, Khama was of the understanding that definite intrinsic concepts in Botswana history had to be fulfilled. Such concepts included democracy, selfreliance, and development. Khama argued that if the people could only embrace these, then socioeconomic and political development could be achieved. The major channel toward the realization of the virtues of Kagisano is absolutely hard work both on the individual and general levels. Khama believed that the success of Botswana as a country depended on the hard contribution of all its people. Thus, Kagisano as an ideology is that of hard work both physical and mental and for the general good.

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4.3.5 Free Market Economy The developmental theory was adopted by Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Unlike other theories discussed above which sought to place Africa and Africans at the center of development and how it can be achieved, this theory was based on any African principles or African values. Houphouet-Boigny was a very wealthy man, and he owned some cocoa plantations before and after the Ivorian independence. His thinking thus largely focused on how to amass more material wealth. Houphouet-­ Boigny’s idea was not that the accumulated wealth be available for all but that all people should go all out to gather as much as possible for themselves. Houphouet-­ Boigny detested the newly independent nations of Africa because of their poor economies, and he believed that nothing economically likable could come out of them except their increasing poverty. Houphouet-Boigny’s intentions, therefore, seemed to be focused on making Ivory Coast an extension of the capitalist Western nations (Ikechukwu, 2016). He strongly refused to Africanize the Ivorian economy and insisted that decolonizing the structure of the economy would be disruptive and therefore undesirable for the nation and its pursuit of development. He mobilized his countrymen to utterly reject the calls by other African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, of emphasizing political independence. Instead, he mobilized his people to pursue a life-sustaining kingdom that was based on coffee and cocoa production arguing that these would fetch them a good price and improve their socioeconomic conditions.

4.4 Socioeconomic Development Realities in Africa Having observed all the theories of development described above by some selected African leaders immediately after independence, the major question is whether the theories were effective in the realization of socioeconomic development for the people of Africa. Facts and figures reveal that Africa has continued to face deep-­ seated problems in its development crusade. It is, therefore, vital to explore what could have gone wrong and what could be done as part of collective and continuous efforts toward the building of a better socioeconomic future for all. It is also important to note that African countries have had no uniform results regarding socioeconomic conditions. While some countries seemed to have performed better (for instance, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Sudan), others languished (for instance, Chad, Ivory Coast, and Eritrea). African countries pursued tendencies that served to constrain the growth of their economies and the improvement of socioeconomic conditions for the people. These tendencies included stringent government control of the economy (restrictions on trade, direct control of production, high level of government purchases relative to GDP, direct control of financial transactions, lack of market and competition); unsanctionable macroeconomic policies which caused high inflation and unstable

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output and employment; lack of financial markets that allowed the transfer of funds from savers to borrowers; weak enforcement of economic laws and regulations (weak enforcement of property rights makes investors less willing to engage in investment activities); a large underground economy relative to GDP and a large amount of corruption; a lack of transparency and information; and low measures of literacy and numeracy and other measures of education and training; low levels of human capital that makes workers productive and, in addition, many countries borrow extensively from foreign countries (Amin, 1991; Gumede, 2019; Kumssa & Jones, 2015). All these characteristics contributed to a vicious circle of poverty on the continent. However, during colonialism, the economy was mainly one-sided, and it only supported the welfare of Whites than Africans. Thus, it is not surprising that even though African economies somehow underperformed in the post-­ independence period, the little improvement they achieved was able to be felt in terms of improved socioeconomic conditions of the people. This explains the slight improvement of the Human Development Index in the post-independence period especially in Sub-Saharan Africa as indicated in Table 4.1. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the HDI changed from 0.081 in 1950 to 0.173 in 1980. Given the slow rate with which HDI often grows, this was a relatively substantial improvement. The improvement in the HDI between 1950 and 1980 was a result of improvements in life expectancy and educational attainment which both increased from 0.076 to 0.161 and 0.030 to 0.030, respectively. Improvement in education could have resulted in improved access to health facilities and healthy food, hence leading to an improved life expectancy. Most colonial governments in Africa imposed restrictive conditions that left Africans unable to access education. As a result, huge sections of indigenous populations were not educated or were only allowed inferior education which would not empower them to achieve anything. At independence, the increasing number of people accessing education facilities, though small since most of the people who had been denied an education by colonialism were now old to attend school, was still significant enough to slightly alter the socioeconomic condition of countries. Although the growth has not been consistent, both GDP and GDP per capita (GDP/C) also improved between 1960 and 1980. This could have been the result of the mass mobilization of the indigenous populations and other interested investors to participate in the economy unrestricted by the racial-based biases of the colonial era. This could also be linked to the pursuit of some home-grown development Table 4.1  Sub-Saharan African development indicators Year HDI GDP GDP/capita Life expectancy Education

1950 0.081 – – 0.076 0.030

Source: Prados de la Escosura (2015)

1960 0108 255,6131 1124 0.098 0.049

1970 0.139 402,2042 1384 0.123 0.072

1980 0.173 581,0636 1516 0.146 0.117

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10 8 6 4

2 -2

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

0 -4 GDP per capita growth (annual %)

GDP growth (annual %)

Fig. 4.1  GDP growth and GDP/C rate (1960–1980). (Source: Authors’ plot based on the World Development Index dataset) Table 4.2  Annual average GDP growth by world regions World Developing economies Economies in transition Developed economies Developing economies in Africa Developing economies in the United States Developing economies in Asia

1970– 1980 3.8 5.8 4.9 3.4 4.5 5.8 6.2

Source: Gumede (2013:487)

approaches by some African countries at independence. It was only in the 1970s when African leaders embraced structural adjustment policies that economic performance and the standards of living of the general people began to underperform again as shown in Fig. 4.1. A study of economic growth by world regions also shows that Africa positively performed well above the global average just like Asia and the Americas during 1970–1980 as shown in Table 4.2. This was despite the impact of the oil price shock of the 1970s as well as the creeping structural adjustment programs that most leaders now began to flirt with. The oil price crisis of the 1970s had been caused by the Yom Kippur War of 1973 as well as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 which disrupted oil supplies from the region. This created difficulties for the countries, including the African continent, which relied on oil from this region. Despite the shocks of the period, all developing economies combined managed to perform above the global average for the 1970–1980 period. The crucial point shown by this data is that the economic performance of African countries (combined) was not as dismal in the immediate post-independence period as often claimed. It was better “than that of the world average and better than that of South Asia and even of the wealthiest among First World regions (North America)”

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(Hirsch & Lopes, 2020: 36). Atardi and Saia-i-Martin (2003) also observed that in the period between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s, African growth was strong with per capita growth between 1960 and 1975, at 1.5–2% annually. This was like or better than most other global regions. Overall, many African countries grew remarkably in terms of their economy, especially considering their situations at the time of the transition. It is argued that social welfare also improved as “physical infrastructures were greatly improved, particularly in the areas of health, education, and communication. New universities, agricultural research centres, national transport networks, and local government structures were established to facilitate the national development project” (Cheru, 2009: 1271). It is, however, important to understand that there were similar results for countries. For instance, while most countries gained independence in the early 1960s and 1970s and, thus, began to pursue development policies that would improve the conditions of their people, in Southern Africa, countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa (settler colonies) together with Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde continued under colonial control. Liberation activities were, thus, ongoing in these countries. In the independent countries, the results were also not uniform since diverse approaches to development were pursued as detailed above. Countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Guinea, and Ghana implemented closely similar policies generally known as African socialism in which state ownership of resources and larger organizations is the main feature. The idea was to improve economic access by most indigenous populations that were denied access and participation in the economy by the colonial state. In contrast, countries such as Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire adopted policies that supported market-driven economic development. These countries were in what Mkandawire (2010) identified as the cash crop economy. In this economy, countries were coerced into the world economy merely as a producer of primary tropical cash crops needed in European factories. The producers were small-scale indigenous producers from whom, initially, the colonial systems used forced labor to extract their products but later relied on favorable economic and noneconomic forces to extract these cash crops from Africans. The presence of middlemen directly collecting produce from small-scale producers for foreign, and mostly colonial buyers, resulted in the emergence of domestic capitalists but also “spawned a whole range of economic activities dominated by Africans  — small repair workshops, retail shops, transport companies, etc. that were the predecessors of the modern-day informal sector” (Mkandawire, 1986: 73). This somehow improved the socioeconomic conditions of the people as compared to the labor reserve and concession economies. Hirsch and Lopes (2020: 36) aver that both Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire were the number one “regional centres of the colonial era, and both continued to outpace their neighbours in economic growth terms.” Both countries had comparatively diversified economies when compared to their regional neighbors, and both, for diverse reasons, had sizeable domestic farming classes and moderately sizeable urban middle classes. In contrast, in the countries where African socialism was dominant, and particularly in the settler colonies of Southern Africa, the indigenous middle class was relatively small (Sylwester, 2005), while the farming class was also insignificant due to

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massive land expropriation and the pursuit of separate development by the colonial regime (Ndhlovu, 2021). In the labor reserve economy of Southern Africa where the Europeans needed to settle, the colonial state was restrictive and punitive. The labor reserve economy did not allow any opportunity for self-improvement by the indigenous people and did not condone any form of informal economic activity that would improve the socioeconomic conditions of Africans (Mkandawire, 2016). In the labor reserve economy region of Southern Africa, mining and large-scale capital activities, including farming, required the collection of labor. Thus, the colonial state made sure that African labor was always readily available whenever needed by Whites. Mkandawire (2016: 5) quotes Richard Wolff (1973) who observed that in the labor reserve economy, the imperative of producing cheap wage labor by the colonial state could not condone Africans the occasion to work outside the white settler economy, compelling them “to adopt a way of life in which they derived an increasing portion of their sustenance from land and equipment owned legally by others.” Draconian laws and rules were adopted to force Blacks to participate in wage employment in the mines and settler farms. These included the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which wrenched lands from Blacks in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. Native reserves for labor were also established to make sure that whenever African labor would be required, Whites knew where to find them. The prohibitive pattern of urbanization promoted in the labor reserve economies resulted in much more methodical forms of labor commodification that were calculated to promote dependence on formal employment and not informal activities (Mkandawire, 1986). Thus, according to Mkandawire (2005), the result was lower levels of informalization and high dependence on formal sector employment, which, at the same time, did not have adequate job opportunities for job seekers. This ensured the low levels of socioeconomic welfare for the people in these economies. Some countries did not fit into the two paths described above. One such country was the Congo which had been colonized by the brutal King Leopold II of Belgium. The Congo was in the concession economy where the colonial state gave private companies concessions on vast tracks of land, for the production of crops on large plantations or mineral extraction. The Congo, according to Hirsch and Lopes (2020: 37), emerged from colonial subjugation with “almost no indigenous middle class, and virtually no social or economic infrastructure except those built to funnel human and natural resource riches out of the country.” With the collapse of colonialism, political power fell to the kleptocratic Mobutu Sese Seko following a coup sponsored by the CIA (Prados, 2006). The ascendency of Mobutu to power in Congo did not result in any significant economic or social development despite the ubiquity of mineral wealth. The years between 1975 and 1980 saw most of Africa’s per capita income becoming stagnant or even slightly negative. However, Africa still managed to produce some hopeful results despite some arguing that the period 1975 to 1980 represented Africa’s lost decade. The lack of economic growth in this period was not solely an African challenge since the rest of the world also struggled because of the oil crisis of 1973, stagflation, and low commodity prices. The average annual per capita growth rate of the rest of the world in this period was only around 2% (Hirsch

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& Lopes, 2020). In Africa, there were several reasons which made the crisis more pronounced in the late 1970s. Several commodity-exporting states were trapped in resource-dependent patterns. Other countries also over-borrowed in anticipation of future commodity sales which did not turn out. Some simply failed to construct a diversified economy due to overvalued currencies and relatively poor human and physical capital. However, it would be erroneous to assume that the stagnation and decline of the period were universal. Mauritius, for example, managed to use a social pact to build a development coalition that could break path dependency (Brautigam, 1997). From 1973, the socialist prime minister of Mauritius convinced businesses and labor to shift toward sustainable growth on an employment-generating route. From dependence on agricultural commodity exports, Mauritius diversified into labor-­ intensive manufacturing and later services (Hirsch & Lopes, 2020). Several tripartite treaties in the 1970s aided the country “to adjust more rapidly than other African countries to external shocks and high levels of debt while keeping coalitions together through judicious use of side payments to the most vocal losers” (Brautigam, 1997: 56). Compulsory negotiation of wages, the building of trust by the prime minister and business “through symbolic public gestures as signals of commitment to co-­ operation, and the construction of dense clusters of consultation between business (united in one peak organisation) and government resulted in a co-ordinated form of capitalism that delivered both sustained investment and pro-poor outcomes” (Hirsch & Lopes, 2020: 38). Another country that rowed against the tide in the era of Africa’s “lost decades” was Botswana under the leadership of the thoughtful and pragmatic Seretse Khama and his Kagisano development approach. As in the Mauritian case, Seretse Khama built a stable and trusting relationship with the private sector, which provided reliable growth and improved development outcomes. The state assumed 50% ownership of the very rich diamond mines in 1969 and followed similar policies with its other minerals and allowed them to be well managed in jointly owned companies. Robinson, Acemoglu, and Johnson (2003) posit that Botswana epitomizes the only case in Africa where great mineral wealth has been well managed with an effective balance of public and private interests.

4.5 Towards Working Together to Achieve Development The first-generation African leaders also made significant steps toward uniting a continent divided by colonial administrators in Berlin in 1884–1885 to rule. However, just like in the adoption of development theories, the approaches to and reasons for African integration also differed in regions and among countries. The most common reason, however, was related to market integration. Some scholars have referred to this as the market integration approach (Egbunu, 2014; Igwe, 2002). Regional market integration involved reducing and removing trade barriers among countries in a region or subregion. Market integration starts with a free trade area,

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then a customs union, followed by a common market, and finally a monetary union (Gumede, 2019). As a theory, market integration advocates for the liberalization of trade globally as a means of integrating the regional economy. Another view which promoted integration in post-independence Africa was the regional economic geography theory “which propounds that smaller or weaker countries should integrate with bigger or stronger countries to reap the benefits of international trade” (Gumede, 2019: 101). This theory examines the socioeconomic conditions of regions or countries with a focus on economic regionalization as well as local economic development. The theory is premised on the view that location and climate wield large effects on income levels and income growth through their effects on transport costs, agricultural productivity, and disease burdens, among other channels. The recognition of geography and climate factors enables the theory to consider factors that directly impact specific contexts and hence propose solutions that are context specific. Lastly, the other explanation of integration is the developmental cooperation approach. This approach encourages developmental cooperation between or among countries through the protection of emerging industries, applying import substitution interventions, and industrialization (Egbunu, 2014). The theory is about reaping the traditional benefits of regional integration, ensuring that such benefits flow to all member countries while seeking to enhance the integration of member countries into world markets as a means of fostering sustainable development. It is also about encouraging formerly colonized countries to rather rely on each other than rely on their former colonizers. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) were some of the initial steps toward integration by African countries in the post-­ independence period. The failure to properly implement the LPA did not stop economic and political integration efforts on the African continent. Flowing from this, the African heads of state decided to give another try at integration and revived the 1980 LPA through the adoption of the Abuja treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). The African Economic Community avers that the integration agenda should be more than a trading arrangement or a mechanism for promoting cooperation in production based on the creation of a common market. The idea has been to integrate national markets and cooperation in production. The signatories of the agreement undertook to cooperate in certain functional areas, for example, social, political, and economic matters. The central feature of this common agenda is the improvement of the lives of African citizens. African countries have also tried integrating based on linguistic, cultural, ideologies, and other types of backgrounds as part of an attempt to build relationships that would quickly produce development results for their vulnerable populace. The Casablanca group, for instance (i.e., Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco), drew from Pan-Africanism as its “driving force” in building a “postcolonial” united African state in the early 1960s (Olaosebikan, 2011). Prominent leaders in this group included Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, and King Mohammed V.

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There was also the Brazzaville group. This group comprised mainly former French colonies (i.e., Central African Republic, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Republic of Congo, Dahomey, Mauritania, Gabon, Upper Volta, Senegal, Niger, Chad, and Madagascar). The group advocated for a gradualist approach to integration. The integration would start with regional economic and cultural cooperation and then proceed to other regions when initial member countries are ready enough. The Monrovia group (i.e., Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey, Madagascar, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, People’s Republic of Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Tunisia) brought together the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups although it was closely aligned to the Brazzaville group. It also paved the way for the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 in the presence of dignitaries of the likes of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; Modibo Keita of Mali; Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt; Sékou Touré of Guinea; Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; Ben Bella of Algeria; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; William Tubman of Liberia; Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria; Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya; and others (Olaosebikan, 2011). Through the OAU, African countries collectively condemned domination, suppression, enslavement, and imperialism which had held them divided and broken down as a society for centuries. The OAU gave birth to the emergence of terminologies such as Africa’s rebirth, political liberation and sovereignty, regeneration, reconstruction, revitalization, and reengineering. Steeped in the Pan-Africanism ideology, all these terms were coined by African leaders as part of the continuous attempts to regain Africa’s values and identity to speed its socioeconomic development. Pan-­ Africanism was used to mobilize African countries to stand up and reconstruct themselves and initiate their development, after a century of dehumanization by imperialistic Europe.

4.6 Conclusion This chapter has examined socioeconomic development in post-independence Africa focusing on the two decades immediately after many countries gained political independence in Africa. Focus has been placed on the various socioeconomic development and political approaches which first-generation nationalist African leaders adopted to try and improve the lives of the majority of their people in the shortest period that was possible. The development approaches in the chapter include Nkrumah’s philosophical consciencism, Kaunda’s humanism, Khama’s Kagisano, and Houphouet-Boigny’s free market economy. These approaches produced different development results for the countries in which they were implemented. While first-generation nationalist African leaders should be applauded for their initial groundwork, it is also important to note that there were no uniform development results across the continent. The chapter concludes that considering the Africans were just emerging from colonialism where separate development was promoted toward the welfare of Whites, the socioeconomic positive data of the early

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years of post-independence, though small, represents an improvement that Africans themselves felt as the move in the right direction. While some countries performed better, some continued to languish in poverty despite political liberation. In recognition of this challenge, there have also been concerted efforts toward continental integration as part of the collective effort to speed up development across the continent. While integration remains problematic, the groundwork of the 1960s, however, provided an opportunity for African politicians, academics, and activists to reflect on the divisive nature of colonialism and how the residue of the imperial project can be dismantled. Contemporary African leaders, therefore, have a point of reference that they can use to steer development on the continent. Unfortunately, often, the groundwork efforts of early African leaders have been abandoned by leaders who speciously think that socioeconomic development will come to Africa through external social formations with their former colonizers. There is a need to develop and pursue context-specific approaches rather than import them. Examples that have managed to improve the conditions of their people using home-grown approaches are available. North Korea and Albania, for instance, were considered underdeveloped in the 1950s but today are in the first-world ranking through the pursuit of home-grown development policies. Contemporary African leaders, therefore, need to look inward rather than depend on external support in dealing with the African socioeconomic challenge.

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Chapter 5

Navigating a Tight Rope Between African Philosophy and Economics: Will the African Union Sustain the Spirit of Ujamaa in the Advent of COVID-19? Michael Takudzwa Pasara Abstract  Ujamaa is a highly popularised African spirit and philosophy of socialism and family or brotherhood. This chapter takes a critical analysis of the Ujamaa philosophy, its past successes and weaknesses, and how it has fared in different times especially in the wake of two very contrasting developments in March 2018 and December 2019, respectively. Firstly, the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) seeks to revive and promote the spirit of Ujamaa through economic gains from intra-African trade. Secondly, the challenges associated with COVID-19 which were largely promoting isolation resulted in the closing of borders leading to countries operating as silos against a common enemy of such magnitude as the pandemic. The chapter also analyses how the European Union has, in practice, applied the spirit of Ujamaa in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the position of the approach in Africa despite the rhetoric on the subject. The chapter concludes that the original models upon which Ujamaa was anchored were largely meant to attain political freedoms in the 1960s to 1980s. These priorities changed when countries became independent leading to less stimulus for continued commitments to regional bodies such as the African Union. The chapter recommends that commitment to the African Ujamaa can be sustained in the long run when arrangements such as the AfCFTA are operational and when member countries derive pragmatic gains with priorities moving from political to economic freedoms. Keywords  Africa · COVID-19 · Development theories · Economic theory · Ujamaa

M. T. Pasara (*) TRADE Entity, FEMS, North-West University, Vanderbjilpark, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_5

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5.1 Introduction Economic theory is premised on the principle of rationality which asserts that agents make choices based on rationality and optimisation. Private citizens make consumption decisions based on utility maximisation, and firms make investment decisions based on profit maximisation, whilst governments seek to maximise economic welfare. However, other scholars contend that economic decisions are not always based on economic rationality but can be potentially and significantly influenced by relational values as they relate to harmony, wholeness, and community (Hämäläinen & Wang, 2022; Huang et al., 2022). For instance, the socio-political and economic African philosophy lends credence to the fact that indigenous knowledge cannot be disconnected from the social, cultural, spiritual, political, and economic realities of indigenous people (Masoga & Kaya, 2012; Kincheloe, 2006; World Bank, 2004). In the same vein, other scholars such as Oparinde and Govender (2019), Chawane (2016), and Owusu-Ansa and Mji (2013) opine that situations in Africa must be analysed from an African viewpoint as opposed to the Eurocentric ideologies and methodologies which largely misconstrues the continental realities due to the predicated assumptions. As Oparinde and Govender (2019) allude, what is critical is to instil within the African (researcher) a proclivity for renaissance to succeed in Africa as well as impart Afrocentric inclinations. This will allow for effective comprehension of profound intellectual research which lays a foundation for the Africans to actively answer relevant questions using African models such as indigenous knowledge. Jones (2015, 114) denotes that “of all the continents of the world, Africa is conceivably the most subjected to analyses, diagnoses and prescriptions which purport to provide solutions to its internal socioeconomic and political ills”. A plausible explanation could be that African people were, for decades, exposed to ideological construction at the hands of European scholarship such that most African studies continue to contribute (in some way or the other) to European intellectual space. It is within these broad concepts and ideals that this chapter seeks to revisit the “indigenous” African philosophy of Ujamaa considering the recent economic integration arrangement under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCTTA). Drawing from the assertions of Nyerere (1967) who perceived Ujamaa (familyhood or brotherhood) and viewed negritude, that is, the African traditional worldview, values, and civilisation as the foundation of socialism, one could argue that it was upon these Afrocentric philosophies that African institutions were established. The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (1963) and later African Union (AU) (2000) was envisioned under the spirit of Ujamaa, a notion which transcended kingship ties and extended its membership to encompass the whole continent. This spirit was carried over for decades until it culminated in the formation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in March 2018. When some countries attained independence (which was the main aim of the OAU although it had other plans like promoting human rights and raising living standards, differing views and methodologies on how the unity of African countries

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could be attained were already emerging in the early years of the OAU. This threatened the spirit of Ujamaa which was in its infancy. Two main groups emerged, the Casablanca bloc led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana supported by Morocco, Egypt, Mali and Libya and the Monrovian bloc led by Senghor of Senegal and Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Tanzania who opined that unity should be gradually achieved through economic cooperation as opposed to a political federation. Over the decades between 1963 when it was formed and 1999 when it was renamed, the organisation would face various challenges and criticisms which threatened not only its continued existence but also the spirit of brotherhood with which it was established. For instance, it was widely described as a “talking shop” which did little to address human rights violations in Uganda under Idi Amin in the 1970s and civil wars in Nigeria and Angola which were unabated for years. Instead of being identified by the Ujamaa spirit, others described the OAU as a “Dictators Club”. However, others such as the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the organisation as a success which brought Africans together. Given the prevailing context at the time, total unity was difficult due to some underlying idiosyncrasies from basics such as Anglo- and Francophone to more complex matters such as varying proposed methodologies towards a common vision of unity. The renamed and recalibrating from the OAU to the African Union (AU) was aimed at addressing some of the identified constraints in the spirit of reinvigorating the spirit of Ujamaa towards an economically and politically integrated Africa. As a result, progress was made over the years which resulted in the gradual deepening of integration levels of some regional economic communities (RECs) and the expansion of regional trade blocs. Firstly, the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) consisted of 26 African countries (COMESA, EAC and SADC) proposed in 2012 and signed in 2015 in Egypt. This then culminated in the AfCFTA, a continent-wide agreement for the first time. The AfCFTA somehow managed to bring to reality some notions which were envisioned by the founding fathers in 1963, an integrated Africa which could work (trade) and develop together. Nevertheless, like the challenges at the beginning of the OAU, the AFCFTA also face methodological challenges in terms of the most effective or mutually beneficial trade instruments. However, before the AfCFTA celebrations could even reach their climax, the novel coronavirus presented a major shock and threatened to disrupt and re-orient African scholarship and indigenous knowledge such as Ujamaa. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) “is an infectious disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 virus. Coronaviruses are a family of diseases which include cold and SARS-CoV-2, which then caused the pandemic” (WHO, 2020). The virus caused respiratory illness leading to difficulty in breathing or shortness of breath, loss of speech, mobility or confusion, and chest pain and is highly transmittable by contact or air in short distances. Consequently, nations across the globe (including Africa) had to enter forced hard lockdowns which implied that movements had to be minimal, and, among others, borders had to be closed. This introduced a new complexity. For instance, whilst the AfCFTA implies the opening of borders and stimulating unity and free trade among Africans, COVID-19 forced most nations to abandon their commitments to regionalism and globalisation by closing their borders to

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contain the spread of the virus. Thus, working in isolation was practised, contrary to both the Afrocentric Ujamaa spirit and regionalisation theories supported by Western theories. In fact, when the coronavirus pandemic broke out, there was a disintegrated approach such that other countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana closed their borders, whilst other countries like Zambia and Tanzania remained open (Pasara, 2021). Ejike et al. (2018) argues that prevalent socio-political and economic circumstances in a particular era (like the coronavirus pandemic) determine whether a society tilts towards communalism or individualism. Does this uncoordinated approach in the face of a global pandemic of the magnitude of COVID-19 signify a disintegration of the brotherhood spirit which held the continent for so long? The chapter proposes to reflect on two themes with the potential for significant convergence: first, the role of philosophical studies in the critical scholarship of African institutions as it relates to Ujamaa and trade and second, the various ways in which global incidences like the coronavirus pandemic threaten the existence of the spirit of Ujamaa in African institutions, more specifically the AU. The AU is of interest to this study because of its role in stimulating integration and brotherhood as an apex institution. The AU has been criticised, for instance, for failure to ensure that continental visions such as Agenda 2063 and SDGs (2015–2030) are aligned to national programs and limited role in promoting peace and good governance in conflict zones, among others. Others support its existence due to its role in promoting unity and solidarity (Ujamaa) and providing overall structure and direction. This chapter is structured as follows: the subsequent subsection unpacks the origins of Ujamaa. This is followed by a contextualisation of the Ujamaa spirit and African institutions. Moreover, this is followed by an analysis of some selected theoretical postulations which relate to the study. It should be noted that this section is not meant to be exhaustive but rather shed some light onerous aspects which might stimulate discussions and debates on the subject. The theoretical section is then followed by an analysis of Ujamaa in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Conclusions and recommendations are proffered.

5.2 Unpacking the Origins of the African Spirit of Ujamaa Ujamaa is a philosophical ideology which has its roots in Tanzania. It is a philosophical belief or spirit of familyhood, extended family, or brotherhood. Brothers may have small fights against each other but never to the extent of desiring evil on the other. In generic terms, Ujamaa reflects the ideals of cooperative economics in which local people work together to build or maintain sources of livelihood and profits. The overall feeling will always be that of love and togetherness. In the face of an existential external threat, the family is always ready to set aside their differences and fight the common enemy together. Their fights will never spiral to the extent of desiring to eliminate one another, whereas the same cannot be said in the case of an external threat.

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Contrary to mainstream economic models usually adopted in the Global North where rationality and optimality (maximisation) are fundamental (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817; Keynes, 1936; Solow, 1956), Julius Nyerere used the Ujamaa philosophy as his basis for economic development. In the 1967 Arusha Declaration, Nyerere argued for the need to develop an African developmental model well suited to African lifestyles. Other African proponents were sharing related sentiments and convictions as well. These included but were not limited to Kenneth Kaunda’s (KK) humanism ideology and philosophy which was anchored on a blend of traditional African values, with Western socialist and Christian values (Schler, 2018; Ikechukwu, 2014). Seretse Khama’s conventional liberal democracy and Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi’s Islam-based economic approach were also instrumental in liberating, empowering, transforming and shaping the philosophies of their respective economies of Botswana and Libya, respectively. As Ujamaa asserts that a person becomes a person through the people or community, Nyerere argued that the spirit of “others” was fundamental in fostering cohesion, service, and love among people and nations. As a result, Ujamaa was first and extensively employed in Tanzania where the Tanganyika African National Union became a leader of the one-party system as proponents alleged the need to solidify the cohesion of a newly independent Tanzania. Other developmental changes included abolishing the discriminatory practices based on ascribed status; the institutionalisation of economic, social, and political equality; and the nationalisation of key sectors within the Tanzanian economy (Crawford & Rosberg Jr, 1964). Production in villages was collectivised and self-reliance was fostered through transformative economic and cultural attitudes. People began to be taught to work both for groups and themselves for their economic emancipation whilst they learnt to free themselves from the culture of European dependence. Education became free and compulsory, whilst tribal identities were diluted by making use of common languages such as Swahili. The resultant effect was that Nyerere gained international recognition due to his consistent application of ethical principles as a foundation for pragmatic policies. Ujamaa-based policies resulted in significant improvements in social development indicators: life expectancy increased to 52 in 1984 from 37 in 1960 and adult literacy rate rose from 17% (1960) to 63% (1975), among others. However, there were also doubts with regard to sustainability due to decreased production which in turn decreased economic growth. Such international recognition would become critical in the participation of Nyerere, among other African leaders, in setting the tone of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Several models were proposed by the founding fathers of the OAU which will be discussed in the subsequent subsections. Ujamaa was also fundamental in altering gender roles in Tanzania since the project supported the idea of a nuclear family. This was, however, without its forms of resistance since people were not willing to change the way society assigned gender roles, especially in a predominantly patriarchal system. The nuclear family within the villagisation which later ensued centralised its focus on household instead of brotherhood, and this became a cause for tensions and a struggle for power between

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socialist ideas (Crawford & Rosberg Jr, 1964). However, there were effective structures within the TANU party and the government which represented the rights of women through a department known as Umoja wa Tanganyika (UWT). Although the UWT would later become central in integrating women into a socialist society, some critics argue that most of the officials were wives of important TANU officials, thereby promoting the very patriarchal structure that it was attempting to address. Most of the educational content of the UWT remained largely in the context of home economics. Eventually, the Ujamaa developmental program declined due to several factors such as the 1970s oil crisis. The oil crisis was emanating from several factors including the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the Iranian Revolution (1979). Peasant farmers in Tanzania resisted moving back to the communal land from their farms as they cited a lack of capital (Sakata et al., 2021). Nyerere reacted by forcing people into Ujamaa villages, and this resulted in a lack of acceptance leading to less-than-­ optimal agricultural yields. Ujamaa also created friction as there were mixed feelings on the importance of self-reliance, especially in the era of neoliberal international economics policies. Neoliberal international economics which was mainly promulgated by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was premised on repurposing a different world order which diffused neoliberal policies aimed at promoting free markets, new modes of global-level institutional changes, renegotiated treaties, and the emergence of multi-national corporations (MNCs), among others. In general, the neoliberal era represented an intense break in the basic assumptions of economic policy, especially on the role of the state. It opined that government failure was a more pressing matter and economic liberalisation was the solution (Kentikelenis & Babb, 2019; Evans & Sewell, 2013). The policies made it difficult for new democracies such as Tanzania to grow with the philosophy of self-propagated economic production.

5.3 Ujamaa and African Institutions Freedom of Africa from colonial powers was a culmination of various ideologies and philosophies which include but are not limited to the African Renaissance, Marxism, and Ujamaa. The African Renaissance was largely based on the notion of African people overcoming continental challenges to attain a cultural, economic, and scientific renewal which recognised the African identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2019; Sitas, 2006; Vale & Maseko, 2002; Ntuli, 1998). Developed by Karl Marx in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Marxism ideology was mainly concerned with the challenges between the working class and the owners of production factors. Marxism was skewed towards communism and socialism over capitalism. Extrapolating from some of these earlier ideologies and subsequently building its momentum, Ujamaa also played its role in uniting Africans in their fight against colonial powers. This was complemented by other philosophies and ideologies such as consciencism premised by Kwame Nkrumah. Consciencism drew from three

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main strands, namely, Euro-Christian, Islamic, and African tradition, thereby infusing moral responsibility into Pan-African revolution methodologies (Nkrumah, 1965). When one country attained its independence, it would not see itself as independent until its neighbours were also free. Thus, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Modibo Keita of Mali, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Sekou Toure of Guinea were among the major architects of African socialism (Crawford & Rosberg Jr, 1964). Since the founding fathers were largely driven by the African philosophy of socialism which included humanism by Kaunda, consciencism by Nkrumah, and Ujamaa by Nyerere and some notions of earlier philosophies like Marxism and the African Renaissance, it then shaped the political economy of the continent and its key institutions such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (1963). Guiding principles included social development which endeavoured to retain the African identity and one in which the public sector would play a critical role, thereby ensuring that there is avoidance of social classes within the society (Hechter et  al. 2018; Sitas, 2006). In other words, they held the view that socialism was the pragmatic way of attaining inequality as opposed to basic economic models where the invisible hand would ensure that the market would efficiently allocate economic resources and ensure optimisation (Nyerere, 1967; Nkrumah, 1965; Keynes, 1936). Since African socialism was anchored on the belief of sharing economic resources using traditional African models, most countries committed their resources and hosted military bases for most revolutionary movements to ensure the freedom of their neighbours. For instance, Zimbabwe benefited from the earlier independence attained by Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s. When Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda and Mozambique under Samora Machel got their independence in 1964 and 1975, respectively, they also joined in supporting the liberation movements in SADC. Thus, the rationale behind the formation of the OAU was to formalise the spirit of Ujamaa to coordinate efforts to liberalise other countries in a structured manner. The generic sentiment was that capitalism was rejected by most leaders in favour of Afrocentric economic models. They viewed capitalism as exploitative and cancerous to the African spirit of familyhood and would not only compound poverty but also create divisions, something which would not play in their favour both politically (as some were still fighting colonisation) and economically (Crawford & Rosberg Jr, 1964). They argued that they needed to establish self-reliant economies which would be able to defend themselves from exploitative international markets largely anchored on capitalism. The long-term effects of such philosophies are still felt in present-day African economies and institutions. For instance, the ideology of self-reliance implied that there was a need for massive government spending to stimulate employment and production. The positive effects were felt in the short run as Ujamaa villages in Tanzania blossomed. However, as noted earlier this model was not sustainable. It should be noted, however, that the introduction of neoliberal economics led by the IMF began to dilute the convictions of some of the Afrocentric ideologies as new democracies needed liquidity injections to accelerate economic growth.

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Consequently, most democracies began to adopt divergent models. For instance, Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980, and by 1990, it had already adopted the IMF-led Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Hadebe, 2022; Matamanda et  al., 2021; Chattopadhyay, 2000). The pressure to move from the Afrocentric approach and synchronise with the global economic community through trade liberalisation played a role in the departure. However, as shall be discussed in the subsequent subsections, some analysts also argue that the need for political liberation upon which the OAU was established had lost its savour as countries gained independence. There was a new need, an economic one, which could not be satisfied by the old methods and was perhaps also instrumental in this departure from Afrocentrism.

5.4 Theoretical Postulations 5.4.1 Convergence The ideals of Afrocentric economic models viewed international trade and the need for integration with international markets as an enemy as opposed to a complement to African economic development. Thus, Africa remained largely disintegrated from significant international trade models (Pasara, 2020; Pasara & Dunga, 2019). However, the convergence models, as cited by Mundell (1961, 1973), posit that economic integration is a key developmental model. This notion was later promulgated by Lucas (1988) in his analysis of the mechanics of economic development. In Robert Mundell’s two theories, namely, the ex ante and ex post models, he argues that it is through economic convergence that less developed economies can easily benefit from technological innovations, adaptations, and imitations (Rasiah, 2011; Romer, 1986, 1990; Nelson & Phelps, 1966). One could argue that Africa has always lagged in technological advancements due to its lack of proper integration with international markets (Solow, 2007; Buthe and Milner, 2008). The chapter indicated earlier that the Monrovian bloc argued for a gradual approach to political and economic integration. Consequently, eight regional economic communities (RECs) were established under the OAU. As of July 2022, the recognised RECs were, as of February 2017, the recognised eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the African Union, namely, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern African Development Community (SADC). In the context of convergence arguments, the various RECs proposed and established various macroeconomic convergence criteria as a prelude to deeper levels of economic integration, improved intra-African trade, and inclusive development (AfDB, 2014).

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Despite the founding fathers having established regional economic communities (RECs) which were supposed to be the basis for economic integration, econometric and statistical evidence shows that there has been very little intra-African trade throughout its history (Pasara, 2021; Pasara & Dunga, 2019). Africa has the lowest level of intra-trade which is estimated to be oscillating between 15% and 18%, whereas it is estimated to be around 61% for the European Union (EU) and 67% for the ASEAN community (Mold & Mukwaya, 2017). Thus, economic empirical evidence contrasts the perceived gains of African socialism which are largely anchored on Ujamaa-based ideologies and development. It is possibly why such models did not sustain only in Tanzania but also in the continent as a whole. On the other hand, one could also argue that the founding Ujamaa principles were largely anchored on attaining political freedom in the continent since a significant number of countries were still under colonial rule. As these priorities changed, there was also needed to adjust the models to suit current needs although they would still be largely driven by the same brotherhood spirit. Perhaps there was a sense of this when the OAU was rebranded to the AU in 2000. However, this did not translate into much economic gain leading to low commitment levels. The introduction of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (2015) which culminated in the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (2018) provided a major signal of the revival of the true African spirit of Ujamaa. This is perhaps because, for the first time in decades, the new generation saw the pragmatic potential economic benefits of economic convergence and/or integration which were set to be gained once the new trade agreement becomes operational.

5.4.2 Intergovernmentalism Ujamaa philosophy sought to attain equality which is predicated on a classless society. This is extremely challenging to attain in practice. For instance, the establishment of the OAU in 1963 implied that there was now a high authority which was supposed to provide the overall direction and tone of the continent (Rosamond, 2000a, b). As history notes, this tone was largely influenced by Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah with the former arguing for the formation of regional economic communities whilst the latter proposing the United States of Africa in which presidents would become state governors. As Edmond Haas, the founder of the neo-functionalist view, would argue, the existence of a high authority such as the OAU (1963) and later the African Union (AU) (2000) is usually anchored on varying groups with varying interests which are better satisfied through partnerships (Hoffmann, 1966, 1982; Ujupan, 2005; Alesina et al., 2000). In the case of the OAU and later the AU, the underlying notion has been that these institutions are composed of leaders and followers. Countries such as South Africa in SADC, Kenya and Tanzania in the EAC, Ghana and Nigeria in the West, and Egypt in the north have always had some hegemonic influence on the direction of continental institutions. These include even sporting institutions such as

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the Confederations of African Football (CAF) where past and current past presidents have been from these influential countries including the incumbent president Patrice Motsepe of South Africa. Neofunctionalism subscribes to the notion that affiliates to the higher authority such as the OAU and AU will be effective only if there is some willingness to “give up some sovereignty”. This has not been the case with African leaders. Controversy usually arises on the magnitude of sovereignty which should be transferred to make the parent institution truly functional (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Krapohl et al., 2014). The power should neither be too much nor too little to create a balance between the high authority having enforcement power and affiliate universities and institutions of higher learning not being crippled so that they can independently make internal strategic decisions (Chechi et al., 2016; Aguilera & Grøgaard, 2019). Africans have failed to strike this balance resulting in, as some argue, great white elephants such as the AU (Pasara, 2020). It is quite interesting that although Nyerere himself had spearheaded the establishment of a one-party state in Tanzania under the spirit of Ujamaa, he was not willing to give up such sovereignty at the continental level. There was always an extent to which one was willing to “give up power to the higher authority”. This was the very fear of Nkrumah who argued that once leaders become comfortable in their own spaces, they may be unwilling to then give up sovereignty to achieve the true spirit of oneness which the Ujamaa spirit is all about. One could argue that it is perhaps the Europeans who embraced the true spirit of Ujamaa when dealing with macro-policies. The European Union (EU) has a credible track record of adopting common economic models for the benefit of the whole region (Candau & Dienesch, 2015). Even when countries like Greece slid into an economic depression, there were measures taken to ensure that not only are there limited negative spillovers but also that the Grecian economy recovered (IMF, 2019). Collaboration has been difficult in Africa for various reasons, but largely political instability and inconsistent economic policies (AfDB, 2014; Johnston & Trebilcock, 2013). The consequence has been irregular outcomes.

5.4.3 Neoliberalism Drawing wisdom from the intergovernmentalism school of thought, which is anchored on binary currents of neoliberalism and neorealism, it is understandable that countries in common institutions like the AU do not carry the same power base. Those institutions with greater weight and power bases (economic or political) are likely to pursue the majority of their objectives (Bacharach and Lawler, 1998; Napoleoni, 1975; Putnam, 1998). Perhaps, the challenge in Africa has been that those with greater weight did not comprehend the underlying principles of the principal-agent theory in which there is a need to influence preferences and priorities whilst simultaneously considering the preferences of other countries to avoid loss of position.

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Consequently, like how small-scale farmers began to renege on their commitments to the TANU-led Tanzanian government; smaller African economies have tended to be more loyal to regional and sub-regional economic communities such as the South African Customs Union (SACU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and East African Community (EAC). Instead of adopting common goals such as convergence macroeconomic objectives which were agreed upon at the REC level, countries have largely operated as silos with independent economic policies which in many ways are divergent from each other. Thus, despite Africans promoting the spirit of brotherhood in which “all people of all communities are considered equal”, the narrative on the ground has been the contrary. As Pasara (2020) argues, this has perhaps led to the lack of trust capital in the spirit of African socialism by some countries leading to less cooperation than would be needed to ensure that the true Ujamaa spirit prevails.

5.5 Ujamaa and the COVID-19 Context On one hand, the spirit of Ujamaa underscores togetherness, oneness, and a unified approach to tackling individual and continental challenges. We already established that it was in this spirit that the OAU and later AU and other continental and sub-­ regional bodies were formed and operated. It was in the same spirit of Ujamaa that these continental bodies have always resolved challenges. For instance, South Africa represented by Thabo Mbeki was assigned as a neighbour (brother) in resolving the domestic political crisis between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe in 2008 leading to the Global Political Agreement in 2009. Similar cases can be cited for other countries, in which neighbouring countries are usually assigned to mediate negotiations to promote the spirit of oneness. The emergence of the coronavirus pandemic came and challenged the African models in a significant way. The spirit of brotherhood which seems to have been preached for so many decades was truly tested. At its peak, African countries and leaders showed that they were largely driven by self-interest as opposed to their professed socialism. There were hardly any coordinated efforts to combat the virus throughout the continent. This was reflected by a lack of synchronisation in closing borders as one country would have its borders opened whilst its neighbours were closed. Until recently (January 2022), South Africa only approved the Moderna and AstraZeneca and did not approve the Sinopharm vaccine, whereas Zimbabwe did approve the latter. This reflects the lack of convergence and standardisation which should be natural if Ujamaa was prevailing. At the continental level, the AU was heavily criticised for the lack of leadership and taking decisive action towards ensuring that there was equitable access to procurement of necessary equipment and medication. Similar criticisms had been raised before when the continent was faced with previous political and health crises such as malaria, cholera, and Ebola outbreaks. Thus, it was only natural that

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countries acted individually in self-interest the same way those Tanzanian villagers did when they resisted being moved back from their farms. To make matters worse, the coronavirus pandemic broke out at a strategic time when, for the first time, Africans had signed a single cross-cutting continental trade agreement, namely, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in Kigali Rwanda in March 2018. The idea behind the AfCFTA was to revive the very same African Ujamaa spirit. However, unlike the OAU which was largely stimulated by political freedoms and the emancipation of Africans, the AfCFTA was largely stimulated by the potential economic gains which could be derived through dynamic effects of trade if Africans were to trade with each another. The momentum was high with almost all 54/55 countries committed to the cause. However, before the AfCFTA could see the light of day, COVID-19 broke out forcing the very same countries into isolation and an “each man for himself” stance. Thus, there is a need to revive the Ujamaa spirit through the AfCFTA and ensure that the founding principles upon which the continent was established linger longer.

5.6 A Case Study: Russia-Ukraine Conflict The Russian-Ukraine conflict is one recent event with the potential for significant global implications. Whilst this paper does not intend to investigate the details behind such an event due to the complexity of the historical and geopolitical configurations of the regions which are beyond the scope of this paper, it is critical to acknowledge the international implications considering the context of this discussion. The way European countries and/or institutions reacted and will continue to react has global significance in the context of brotherhood or familyhood. In the very early phases of the conflict, the immediate reaction was a cancellation of major sporting events such as the Formula One Grand Prix which was set to take place in Russia whilst the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) also indicated its intention to ban Russia from participating in the forthcoming World Cup in Qatar. Major corporations such as KPMG, Ernst and Young, and Deloitte have pulled out their operations from the Russian Federation. The United States and the European Union (EU) have also responded by imposing several economic sanctions on Russia. At the time of the writing of this paper, the EU is establishing new energy arrangements with the Middle East, a key leverage which Russia had on the continent as a key supplier. These actions and sanctions have a significant impact on the level of both economic integration and trade between the Russian Federation and the rest of the European continent. What this implies is that Russia must establish new trade channels with the rest of the world (RoW) to, in a way, compensate for the intra-trade losses from the EU and the Americas. The European Community and other economic communities have taken a clear stance against the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. This kind of reaction by the EU demonstrates the “true spirit of Ujamaa”, standing with a brother during times of trouble.

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One might be prompted to think what the reaction of other African countries could have been had a fellow African Union member state attacked the other. Looking in hindsight, the AU has not done much to instil the level of confidence which is needed by member states for them to confidently affirm that the spirit of Ujamaa prevails in the continent. Unlike in the EU, the African approach to issues of sovereignty appears to be taken a bit to the extreme to such an extent that the ideals of regional integration and “Ujamaa” are not fully embraced despite the high rhetoric. As highlighted earlier, the continent is marred with wars, civil unrest, a gross violation of human rights, and a lack of decisiveness in dealing with troublesome member states the way the EU is approaching the recent case between Russia and Ukraine. Some analysts have cited on several occasions that intervening countries have almost always opted to either support the ruling party or remain neutral in the name of political correctness. This kind of reaction has, over the years, killed the true Ujamaa spirit as “little brothers” felt hard done or exploited by “bigger brothers” as is the case between Russia and Ukraine.

5.7 Towards a Resolution The chapter revealed that the case of Africa is characterised by complexity. This complexity emanates, in part, from various and sometimes contrasting ideologies which range from the African Renaissance, Marxism, humanism, consciencism, socialism, and Ujamaa among others. These ideologies and philosophies have contributed to varying outcomes which range from exhibition of the true spirit of brotherhood as demonstrated by the establishment and survival of continent-wide institutions such as the OAU to cases of acrimony which resulted in some members withdrawing their membership from the apex institution and sometimes war. Within this complex cobweb lies a rich history upon which wisdom can be drawn. As wisdom denotes, “experience is the best teacher, the author argues that there is enough historical experience to inform policymakers (provided there is a sufficient political will) on what works and what does not”. Looking forward, the recommendation is that Africans must learn to “fight and work together as brothers or suffer and perish as individuals”. Extrapolating from the old wisdom, “A kingdom divided shall never stand” (Mark 3:24). There is an urgent need for the continent to see beyond the individual country’s idiosyncrasies and work together towards common goals. Recent blueprints such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015–2030) whose aim is to “leave no one behind” and the African Union Agenda 2063 provide enabling platforms to work together again as “brothers or sisters”.

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5.8 Conclusion This paper argues that the African Ujamaa spirit and Afrocentric socialism were the basis for the establishment of continental organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It was through this spirit that the process of accelerating the independence of colonised states was realised as independent countries put their domestic resources at the disposal of those who were seeking independence. Consequently, Ujamaa led to significant political success in the early decades of its implementation. However, as countries became independent, priorities changed from seeking political independence to economic freedom, social equality, peace, and security. Thus, the older models of attaining these macro-objectives could no longer suffice. Although there was an attempt in 2000 to rebrand the OAU into the AU, the outcomes were not significantly different. As a result, trust capital among affiliate countries of the AU began to dwindle as countries preferred smaller sub-­ regional groups as opposed to continent-wide development. This led to most countries operating in silos, a contrary philosophy to Ujamaa. The introduction of the AfCFTA was meant to revive the spirit of brotherhood whose foundations are deeply entrenched in the 1963 establishment whilst at the same time addressing the current economic needs of the continent by stimulating trade. The pandemic then threatened this new revival as countries were then forced to operate in silos under the “survival instinct mode”. The paper posits that it is through intra-trade (trade integration) arrangements like the AfCFTA, as some may argue, that trust may be easily established. This will then perhaps, as some may argue, lead to political integration. When this is attained, then the true spirit of Ujamaa will truly live on.

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Part II

Development Politics and Practice in Africa

Chapter 6

Impact of Regional Trade Agreements on Economic Growth: An Econometric Analysis Michael Takudzwa Pasara

and Steven Henry Dunga

Abstract  While general trade theory points towards the stylised hypothesis of a positive correlation between trade openness and economic growth, theorists such as Jacob Viner questioned this hypothesis due to the presence of trade creation and diversion effects. Africa has been historically engaged in various regional trade agreements (RTAs) whose economic gains are sometimes skewed leading to polarisation of gains (or losses) and uneven development. Will the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) lead to any significant welfare gains? Using the augmented gravity model, this chapter seeks to answer this and related questions by focusing on three regional economic communities (RECs), namely, the East African Community (EAC), Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The gravity model was preferred not only for its ability to identify significant factors which influence bilateral trade but also for its ability to reflect the level of trade creation and diversion and key components in welfare distribution. The results indicate that economic size (positive) and distance (negative) are significant in influencing bilateral trade, but population size was not showing that it is income which carries more weight in trade volume. Country idiosyncratic factors of the shared border and landlocked or coastal were also significant, but the presence of a common language was not. The chapter recommends not only the removal of trade barriers but also the introduction of one-­ stop border posts, the adoption of a common language, and the development of soft and hard infrastructure and other non-trade barriers (NTBs). Keywords  Economic growth · Regional trade agreements (RTAs) · Regional economic communities (RECs) · Trade · Economic integration

M. T. Pasara (*) TRADE Entity, FEMS, North-West University, Vanderbjilpark, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] S. H. Dunga Economic Sciences, North-West University, Vanderbjilpark, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_6

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6.1 Introduction A combination of the increasingly unavoidable incidence of globalisation, the need to establish sustainable paths to address the global challenges of poverty and inequality, and very low levels of intra-regional trade in Africa was among the key rationale behind the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Prior to the signing of the AfCFTA, intra-regional levels generally oscillated between 15% and 18% (AEO, 2016; AfDB, 2014), whereas other economic zones such as the European Union (EU) and the ASEAN community approximated 62% and 67%, respectively (IMF, 2017). This implies that Africa was failing to tap into and retain its value which could have compounded economic growth through multiplier effects. In retrospect, the subject of regional integration has been in discussion since the formative years of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (1963) later renamed the African Union (AU) (2002). Consequently, regional blocs called eight regional economic communities were formed to stimulate political (such as assisting those fighting for independence) and economic (boosting intra-­ trade) integration. Thus, over the years, discussions of economic integration in Africa have always oscillated, gaining momentum in some periods and losing in others. Various factors have contributed to this phenomenon: lack of political will by some leaders in certain eras, political instability (wars and civil unrest) in some regions of the continent, and lack of sufficient economic stimuli as some policymakers did not perceive the economic gains which could be potentially gained (evidenced by some countries joining and exiting RECs) among other factors (Obasaju et al., 2019; Pasara, 2020; Ismail, 2017; Mold & Mukwaya, 2016). In some cases, some countries have found it more beneficial to be loyal to smaller regional blocs even though they were not officially recognised by the African Union at the time. For instance, members of the South African Customs Union (SACU) have been committed to deeper levels of economic integration and macroeconomic convergence criteria as compared to the SADC commitments (Sunde et al. 2009; Ujupan, 2005). Many reasons justify this rationale, some of which point toward a lack of trust in the African Union itself as the apex institution in spearheading continental change. Taking into account all the vicissitudes which occurred over the years, the 54 member states of the African Union (AU) finally agreed that a continent-wide trade agreement is established to optimise the gains of globalisation and intra-trade. The rationale was simple; economic integration was viewed as a better, faster, and more effective unifier of the continent compared to other alternatives such as diplomacy and political integration. Moreover, some economic gains (and losses) could be easily quantified which would make negotiations of trade instruments easier compared to other normative aspects of regional negotiations. The AfCFTA is another form of moving towards trade liberation or trade openness. Various methodologies and arguments were employed to demonstrate the potential gains and costs of trade liberalisation. For instance, authors such as Makochekanwa (2012), Pasara and Dunga (2019), and Mold and Mukwaya (2016)

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employed various econometric techniques, simulation models, and general equilibrium models to assess the effects of various trade agreements. The key takeaway from all the arguments raised by these authors is that while it is generally true that trade openness is always beneficial, it is not always true (Salvatore, 2013; Krugman et al. 2010). As such, it is critical to avoid generalisations. For instance, as early as 1950, Jacob Viner was already arguing using the trade creation and diversion theory that it is possible for certain countries and/or economic sectors to be worse off even though the overall gains are positive. This would then lead to the polarization of benefits which may disadvantage certain strategic sectors in certain countries in the case of the AfCFTA. Labour distribution may become skewed, and income of factors of production may become distorted leading to significant structural changes which may distort the economy. Thus, the general notion which was put forward by Viner and his proponents was that every trade agreement must be analysed within that specific context without generalising it to economic theory, which is usually the tendency in macroeconomic policy formulation. As a result, this chapter seeks to assess the potential effects of bilateral trade in the context of free trade agreements. The basic assumption is that free trade agreements are the most basic forms of trade liberalisation. Thus, any results which are demonstrated in this study are, at least, very minimal and are subject to increase as countries move towards deeper levels of integration such as customs unions and common markets. This chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 covers the theoretical and empirical literature review which will be followed by the discussion of the augmented gravity model methodology in Sect. 6.3 and finally the discussion of results in Section of 6.4. In Sect. 6.4, results are first presented and discussed, and then conclusions and recommendations are drawn thereafter.

6.2 Literature Review The chapter takes cognisance of trade theories such as the Stolper-Samuelson model which emphasizes the importance of relative factor rewards and prices especially real wages and return on capital (Samuelson, 1949). It generally asserts that changes (increase/decrease) in relative prices will influence the return to those factors which were employed towards their production while simultaneously (decreasing/increasing) return to other factors (Solow, 1999). This implies that inexpert labour in high-­ income countries will become worse off post-trade liberalisation. In retrospect, discussions around the rationale for trade and specialisation were pioneered around the 1800s and early 1900s as nations transitioned from the feudal to the industrial revolution era. Classicalists such as Smith (1776), Ricardo (1817), Mill (1920), and Ricardo (1817) were generally skewed towards the notion of gains of free trade due to comparative advantage emanating from production efficiency and also increased consumer surplus due to lower prices and increased choices [Beyene 2014a, Ujupan, 2005]. Consequently, theorists such as Allan Abbott Young, Karl Marx, Adam

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Smith, and Hirschman advocated for economies to integrate as early as the industrial phase. Thus, despite the renewed vigour under the AfCFTA, the rationale for free trade or trade liberalisation is as old as the formalisation of economic theory itself. Various viewpoints were raised in support of this outcome, for instance, Smith (1776) in his famous ‘Wealth of Nations’ inquiry shed some light on how the division of labour and later specialisation (Ricardo, 1817) would lead to absolute and comparative advantages, respectively. Though later extended by other theorists such as Napoleoni (1975), these fundamental arguments still hold in this age. Napoleoni highlighted that division of labour can be divided into ‘between’ corporations and ‘within’ corporations, the former being harmonised markets and the latter by entrepreneurs. Thus, there is a need for workers to enter exchange relationships (social integration) to realise transitions. The general arguments posited by these theorists were that increased productivity by multiple partners leads to economic growth due to multiplier effects. Drawing from these notions, African AfCFTA could become beneficial if the industrial sector is well-coordinated and developed. When complex processes are simplified and specialised whether using division of labour or specialised machinery, large-scale operations become feasible through a process called industrial integration (Young, 1928). Thus, technological developments which can be inventions, innovations, or transfers (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Romer, 1986), should become a significant part of the AfCFTA integration process (Pasara & Dunga, 2019). Sai-Wing Ho (2016) and Ietto-Gillies (2002) placed emphasis on integration within firms whose focus is on production operations subject to the scope of the firm and posited that a complete analysis of economic integration processes accounts for both trade within and between economic agents. These sentiments were later shared by Thanh et al. (2016), Hwang and Lee (2015), and Giroud and Mirza (2006). Other authors were concerned about how these models could be effectively replicated in less developed economies (Hirschman, 1968; Hufbauer, 1970; Kim, 2007; Gray & Singer, 1988). Hirschman, in particular, was concerned about sustainable changes as opposed to one-time changes. Krugman (1990) in the theory of new economic geography later expounded on this view and argued that it is through linkages that technologies can be transferred from developed to developing countries. This is possible through a process of backward and forward integration to satellite industrial locations. Though satellite industries might appear smaller in size, they are likely to cause significant growth due to dynamic effects (Pasara & Dunga, 2019; Sai-Wing Ho, 2016). For instance, cheap raw materials and labour from Africa, on the one hand, and a significant market for manufactured products, on the other hand, continue to significantly contribute to linkages with Europe (ECDPM, 2013; Van der Loo & Van Elsuwege, 2012). The African continent itself is characterised by significant disparities with countries such as Egypt, Mauritius, Kenya, and South Africa becoming largely skewed towards emerging economies, while countries like Swaziland, Malawi, and Zimbabwe are still largely developing. Consequently, integration between such economies has resulted in the supply of cheap labour and unprocessed raw materials from the latter and a market for the former (Pasara & Dunga, 2020; Pasara, 2021).

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The role of South Africa in the expansion of regional trade, and investment was acknowledged by the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2014). The regional bank, however, highlighted that the constraint was that South African policymakers were still heavily guarding their economy, that is, it was not yet liberalised. This is something that the AfCFTA hopefully intends to address or, at least, minimise by stimulating trade liberalisation not only among leading African economies but also across the board to provide some level of policy consistency across the continent. The challenge which has occurred in the past was that some countries have responded by pursuing protectionist policies citing an uneven trading platform. For instance, of the 3287 countries per product classification in Southern Africa, South Africa accounts for more than 50% (Stevens & Kennan, 2013), while 90% of imports originate from South Africa for approximately 1000 product combinations. The uneven gains (or losses) emanating from such result in the polarization of gains (Mold & Mukwaya, 2016; Sai-Wing Ho, 2016). These welfare disparities are sometimes both exploited and exacerbated by the presence of transnational companies (TNCs) which generally seek to influence regional economic integration to influence flows of both production factors and consumer behaviours (Pasara, 2020). Hwang and Lee (2015) posited that the complexities emanating from the influence of TNCs result in a ‘different form of enclave development’. At the same time, attempts to regulate these TNCs generally result in reactions of influencing trade negotiations which again result in uneven development. Thus, economic integration between countries at different levels of development will likely, ceteris paribus, put the unskilled worker in a worse-off position as cheap labour will be able to freely move from lowto high-income countries (Sai-Wing Ho, 2016; Dobrusin, 2015; McGrattan & Schmitz, 1999). This is, among other factors, the fear of South Africa as the country is already experiencing an influx of cheap labour from neighbouring Zimbabwe even before the implementation of the AfCFTA (Pasara, 2021). While one might argue that free trade agreements do not involve the movement of production factors, empirical evidence points towards this proclivity. Perhaps more interesting to the discussion was Viner’s (1950) argument on trade liberalisation. Using a partial equilibrium model, he argued that trade liberalisation is not always welfare-enhancing due to trade creation and diversion effects. Viner reasoned that size matters in international trade and benefits are likely to be skewed towards bigger economies when trade liberalisation such as the AfCFTA is being implemented largely due to scale economies. The argument on the significance of economic size was later expounded by Tinbergen (1962) in his theory of gravitational pull. According to Tinbergen, the size of the economy was proportional to the gravitational pull of the magnet, and smaller economies were likely to be pulled towards trading with larger economies in such a scenario which would advantage the bigger economies. Viner (1950) reasoned that positive gains occur when trade creation outweighs trade diversion, but this is not always the case as assumed by most theorists (Pasara, 2020; Makochekanwa, 2012). Consequently, this paper seeks to narrow down its analysis of the potential effects of the AfCFTA by not only investigating factors which influence bilateral trade but also if there exists trade creation or diversion and to what extent.

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6.3 Methodology Several authors econometrically tested the gravity model (Karambakuwa et  al., 2015; Shujiro & Misa, 2010; Warin et al., 2009; Jayasinghe & Sarker, 2007; Rojid, 2006). In general, the majority of authors concur with the basic model which posits that trade volume is a function of aggregate output (GDP) and economic distance between the trading centres. Differences largely exist in the augmenting variables. In this context, Ghosh and Yamarik attempted to aggregate the variables and came up with 48 dependent variables which he argued will depend on the subject being investigated. Others such as Jayasinghe and Sarker (2007) indicated that regional trade agreements have distinct components of trade creation and trade diversion and should be included sometimes as dummies. Extrapolating from various literatures, the model is estimated as follows: ln  trade ijat   A  1 ln GDPit   2 ln GDPjt   3 ln  distance ij    4 ln Pit   5 ln Pjt   6 COMESAij   7 COMESA0ij  8 EACij   9 EAC0ij

 10 SADC Cij  11SADC0ij  12 lan ij  13 borderij   ij .

(6.1)

and i = 1, 2, 3; j = 1, …, n. where: COMESAij = 1 if j is a member of COMESA, 0 otherwise COMESA0ij = 1 for net importer outside COMESA, 0 otherwise EACij = 1 if j denotes EAC member, 0 otherwise EAC0ij = 1 denotes importer outside EAC, 0 otherwise SADCij = 1if j denotes SADC member, 0 otherwise SADC0ij = 1 denotes importer outside SADC, 0 otherwise Trade variable tradeijat represents the total bilateral trade dollar (USD) value between i and j, at the time, t. GDP is the current value while Pit and Pjt denotes the respective country populations; lanij denotes the language while borderij and distanceij reflects the shared border and weighted distance, respectively. The latter account for the city-level geographic distribution of the population. Regional bloc and trade openness are also represented by similar notations such as COMESAij which implies the presence of RTA between two trade economies. Similarly, SADC0ij represents the degree of openness of imports to SADC countries. Thus, the two categories of dummies reveal that it is feasible to separate scenarios where a regional bloc (SADC in this case) is only trading creating a scenario where intra-regional trade increase is derived via trade diversion. Taking into account the double-logarithmic specified nature of the estimated function, it is optimal to interpret estimates on GDPi, GDPj, Pi, Pj, and distance variables as elasticities. Nevertheless, it is not feasible to express β6 and β7 in logarithmic form. Consequently, Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Giles (2011) proposed  that dummy variables be calculated as: trade ijat 1  tradeijat  0  ) / trade ijat  0   e 6  1 . In this instance, the SADC dummyvariable coefficient estimate, β6, would reflect

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two SADC member countries marginally trading an extra  exp 6 1  100  relative  





 1 trade amount by non-­SADCeconomies. Thus,  exp 6  100  is the component which reflects the additional mean to SADC countries trading with each other instead of the rest of the world. However, other analysts such as Makochekanwa (2012) and Pasara and Dunga (2019) are of the view that trade with non-member countries should be interpreted as the benchmark to reflect the positive gains of the RTA. Using a similar analysis, it then follows that β7 becomes negative for aggregate trade for a given product where a SADC member state is a net importer given a non-SADC trade partner is  exp 7 1  100  below its net exports to non-RTA member countries.





6.4 Discussion of Results While the paper acknowledges that the AfCFTA covers all eight regional economic communities, the results discussed in this section will only take into account factors which influence bilateral trade within the three respective regional blocs under consideration. Pre- and post-estimation tests are also discussed in this subsection to ensure that the model is reliable and results are not spurious. These include a test for multicollinearity reflected in the correlation matrix table below. Results indicate that no condition of |Cm| > 0.8 is fulfilled, where Cm is the correlation value between two variables. Thus, there are no multicollinearity concerns. Table 6.1 shows the stationarity results. The study employed two methods to test for stationarity, that is, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) test and the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Fisher type) test. Two tests were used to ensure consistency and robustness. The results concur in the majority of variables at a 1% significance level except for GDP and population. In such scenarios, results of the first differenced variable would be considered since at this point results would converge. Except for the trade variable which is stationary in levels, all other variables were consistent when first differenced. Given the null hypothesis of zero variance across entities (no panel effect), the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for random effects was applied to decide between a random effects regression and a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The LM function was stated as:

LNBiTrade  pairid,t   Xb  u  pairid   e  pairid,t 



 1  8475.57



Prob   2  0.0000

2





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Table 6.1  Unit root tests for gravity model variables

LNBiTrade LnExp DLNExp LNIMP DLNIMP LNGDP(i) DLNGDP(i) LNGDP(j) DLNGDP(j) LNPop(i) DLNPop(i) LNPop(j) DLNPop(j)

Fisher-type (H0: All panels contain unit root) (H1: At least one panel is stationary) 951.91*** 674.60 3122.94*** 673.39 1408.92*** 321.01 2469.88*** 529.37 2152.22*** 2570.80*** 2701.61***

Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) (H0: All panels contain unit roots) (H1: Some panels are stationary) −7.59*** −1.72** −4.78*** 12.61 −23.73*** 13.25 −19.10*** 9.27 −59.40*** 3.26 −63.34***

Source: author’s computations ** significant at 5% level

Thus, given the LM results, the null hypothesis was rejected implying the presence of a panel effect which points towards the application of a random effects model. These results were also confirmed by the Hausman test which fundamentally checks if there are any correlations between regressors and any presence of unique errors:

 1  2 1   b  B  Vb  VB    b  B   0.26  



Prob   2  0.5986



where, Vb  VB   positive definite



2 The results show that  calculatted  0.26 and p − value is 0.5986. Thus, the random effects model is preferred since the null hypothesis was not rejected. It implies that country idiosyncratic factors, for instance, whether or not a country is landlocked have a significant bearing on trade levels. These variables could have been dropped had the results favoured a fixed effects model which essentially eliminates time-­ invariant factors (Sarker, 2007; Greene, 2008; 2010).

6.4.1 Presentation of Results of the Augmented Gravity Model The results presented below are of various scenarios (models) which were generated using random effects panel autoregressive distributive lag. The first model presents the basic gravity model where bilateral trade is a function of economic mass and

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distance between the trading centres which took into account population. The second model extended model 1 by adding country idiosyncratic factors, namely, landlocked or coastal, shared border, and common language. Idiosyncratic factors give the respective economies certain comparative advantages when trading with certain countries. The third model adds the free trade area (FTA) variable to the subsequent model as a proxy for economic integration or the degree of trade openness. This is important because some countries are part of regional blocs, COMESA, EAC, or SADC but not necessarily in free trade areas within those blocs. Model 4 seeks to establish if there was trade creation or trade diversion (Table 6.2).

6.4.2 Post-estimation Test Serial correlation tests the relationship between a variable and its lag. However, Du (2017) and Weber (2017) highlighted that panel data may not necessarily eliminate serial correlation but rather utilise within and between the variation of variables. The former shows cross-sectional variation, while the latter shows longitudinal variation. Using the D-W statistic test on residuals, the following results are presented:

F test that all ui = 0 F  316,3162   7.29

Prob  F  0.0000





modified Bharghava et al.Durbin  Watson  1.86972



Baltagi  WuLBI  1.63030



The D-W test results range from 0 to 4 with 1.5 to 2.5 being considered reasonably normal. Thus, the value of 1.87 is not a cause for concern. This study also argues that cross-dependence tests are not necessary since robust random effects models account for time-invariant factors.

6.5 Discussion of Results of the Regression Models 1–4 In general, most variables have expected signs. Using model 1 results, income (GDP) significantly influences bilateral trade levels. Notably, the income of the importing country bears more weight [GDP(j) at 1% l.o.s] than that of the exporting country [GDP(i) at 10%] which is weakly significant. The population was, however, not significant implying that it is economic mass, not population size, which is important. Karambakuwa et  al. (2015) observed similar results, but Shujiro and Misa (2010) and Jayasinghe and Sarker (2007) found the variable to be significant. As

Eqn. 2 LNBiTrade 1.69* (2.38) 2.09*** (4.23) 7.46 (1.12) 11.72 (1.92) −1.09*** (−3.40) 0.160 (0.48) 3.49*** (6.14) −1.997*** (−6.06)

21.71*** (8.21) 3742 0.0096 0.2596 0.2251

Equation 1 LNBiTrade 1.71* (2.40) 2.11*** (4.23) 2.90 (0.39) 12.81* (2.08) −1.84*** (−6.55)

27.11*** (13.02) 3742 0.0091 0.1143 0.0710

Source: author ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance

Dependent variables DLNGDP(i) DLNGDP(j) DLNPOP(i) DLNPOP(j) LNDISTANCEW Language Border Landlocked FTA COMESA EAC SADC EAC0 SADC0 COMESA0 Constant N R2: Within  : Between  : Overall

Table 6.2  Gravity model regression results

19.67*** (7.29) 3742 0.0083 0.2861 0.3411

Eqn. 3 LNBiTrade 1.80* (2.49) 2.08*** (4.20) 7.81 (1.09) 11.19 (1.93) −1.01** (−3.24) 0.251 (0.75) 3.55*** (6.31) −1.753*** (−5.24) 1.470*** (3.56)

Eqn. 4 LNBiTrade 2.00* (2.79) 2.12*** (4.17) 8.93 (1.31) 11.00 (1.84) −1.14*** (−3.95) 0.51 (1.69) 3.31*** (6.63) −0.702* (−2.23) 1.88*** (4.70) 0.024 (0.04) −3.25*** (−4.74) 4.42*** (5.01) 3.44*** (5.09) −5.32*** (−7.42) −0.225 (0.28) 20.21*** (7.77) 3742 0.0079 0.4570 0.5840

112 M. T. Pasara and S. H. Dunga

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postulated by the gravity model, the weighted distance was observed to be negative and significant at a 1% level. The implication is that despite the AfCFTA opening up trade across the continent, economic centres further away from each other (e.g. Harare and Tripoli) may still find it constraining to trade with each other. Regarding country idiosyncratic factors, the common language was not significant. One could argue that the globalisation incidence and easily accessible translators have minimised the effect of this barrier. However, the shared border was highly significant at 1% implying that those with shared borders are likely to trade more by an approximate factor of 3.5. Similarly, the landlocked variable was found to be negative and highly significant by an approximate factor of 2 reflecting inherent disadvantages. The inclusion of the FTA variable in model 3 reflects its positive influence at 1% level and by an approximate factor of 1.5. Thus, the removal of trade barriers such as is proposed by the AfCFTA is likely to positively influence intra-trade levels which is a positive rationale for economic integration. In the fourth model, we should note that while a positive and statistically significant coefficient implies trade creation, a negative and statistically significant coefficient does not necessarily imply trade diversion but only that member countries of the respective regional blocs traded less with each other compared to rest of the world (RoW). Results show that the COMESA dummy is insignificant implying that being a COMESA member does not significantly increase trade creation levels. This could be partially explained by the dual membership argument and also by the distance argument. For EAC countries, the coefficient is negative and highly significant at 1%. This is rational taking into account that the EAC members are already at a deeper integration level than AfCFTA levels and thus would not gain much being members of a free trade agreement. SADC has a positive and statistically significant dummy at a 1% level implying trade creation. This reflects that SADC members traded more with each other, which could be mainly because of the strategic positioning of South Africa in the bloc. South Africa exports approximately 64% of its products to its top 15 countries where 6 of which are from SADC countries. Moreover, the South African Customs Union (SACU) is not only the oldest bloc but also well-functioning. The results for trade diversion effects show that EAC0 was positively and statistically significant at 1% level, negative and significant for SADC0, and positive but insignificant for COMESA0. This implies that imports from non-EAC members were higher compared to the rest of the world (RoW) and trade diversion outweighs trade creation within the SADC bloc implying SADC countries are less efficient at producing traded commodities. However, it is difficult to determine the net welfare effects for the EAC.

6.6 Conclusion and Recommendations The study results reveal that while regional trade agreements play a significant role in stimulating the level of bilateral trade between countries, several other factors are significant towards this end. These include country idiosyncrasies which can give

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other countries natural advantages such as being coastal as opposed to landlocked. Thus, there is a need to ensure that these regional trade agreements (RTAs) are structured in a manner which addresses or corrects some of these inherent advantages or disadvantages; otherwise, history reveals that countries may not be as forthcoming during the implementation phases. Weighted distance may be addressed by not only developing hard infrastructure such as roads and one-stop border shops but also soft infrastructure especially integrated information technological structures to ensure that transactions are quickened. Thus, there is a need for stronger and converging fourth-industrial (4IR) policies. Moreover, the establishment of new or special economic zones (such as smart cities) which are structured in ways which complement bilateral and intra-African trade can also help minimise the negative effect of weighted distance which was observed in the results. In terms of trade creation (and diversion), the study recommends not only the implementation of the AfCFTA but its further integration over time towards deeper levels such as customs unions and common markets. This is because some of the already existing regional economic communities such as COMESA and EAC are already integrated in this dimension. Thus, the AfCFTA is essentially benefiting little from this arrangement which explains why significant trade creation results were largely observed in SADC. Overall, the AfCFTA is a significant step towards continent-wide integration which, if implemented well, will likely lead to positive intra-trade and welfare gains.

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Chapter 7

Livelihood Activities in Post-Independent Africa: A Closer Look at the Impact of Chikorokoza Illegal Mining on the Education System in Zimbabwe Respect Jongwe

and David Mhlanga

Abstract  After the country gained its freedom, one of the most prominent methods of making a living in Zimbabwe was a practice known as chikorokoza, which is an indigenous term for gold panning. The purpose of the study was to evaluate how chikorokoza has an impact on the educational system in the mining town of Kwekwe. In the current body of research, a pragmatic approach that triangulated data gathering and analysis was chosen as the method of choice. The purpose of this was to determine the actual experiences that stakeholders have had concerning how artisanal miners make their living. Personal interviews were carried out in person and included the use of both structured and semi-structured questionnaires. These types of questions were posed to respondents. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was utilized to carry out the statistical analysis. Content analysis was utilized to conduct the study of qualitative data. The findings of the study pointed to rampant violence among artisanal miners, who are also known as maShurugwi, as well as an increase in school dropouts, teenage pregnancies, teachers boycotting lessons in pursuit of gold-panning activities, and the proliferation of sexually transmitted infections (STIs). The findings of this study indicate that chikorokoza has had a detrimental effect on the educational progress made in the Kwekwe district. According to the findings of the study, the Zimbabwean government should take severe action to put a stop to chikorokoza in the country. Keywords  Gold panning · Livelihood · Dropouts · Violence · Zimbabwe

R. Jongwe (*) Department of Home Affairs, Harare, Zimbabwe D. Mhlanga The University of Johannesburg, College of Business and Economics, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_7

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7.1 Introduction The formal or informal mining enterprises that have largely simplified forms of exploration, extraction, processing, and transportation are what the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) refers to as artisanal mining. This trade includes both men and women working on an individual basis as well as those working in family groups, in partnership or as members of cooperatives or other types of legal associations and enterprises involving hundreds or even thousands of miners. Artisanal mining is typically characterized by a low capital intensity and a high labour intensity (OECD, 2016). According to a survey published by the Zimbabwe Mines Federation (ZMF) in 2016, there were an estimated four million small-scale gold miners, also known as “makorokoza.” However, only 25,000 of these miners were registered following the Mines and Minerals Regulation Act (Chipangura, 2018). The emergence of small-scale artisanal mining as a key livelihood activity in postcolonial Africa has presented both positive and negative impacts on society, a phenomenon which is largely reflected in the scholarly debate on the “resource-curse” hypothesis. These impacts can be broken down into two categories: those that are beneficial and those that are detrimental (Mancini & Sala, 2018). According to the opinions of Mikesell (1997), Anderson (1998), Sachs and Warner (2001), and Cai and Newth (2013) mentioned in a study by Mancini and Sala (2018), the resource-curse phenomenon is observed at a national level in the sense that resource-rich countries tend to develop more slowly than resource-poor countries. This concept is also evident at a local level, where resource-rich areas are faced with a myriad of developmental challenges associated with the extraction of minerals. Artisanal mining, or chikorokoza, as it is more often called, has been praised for its role as a source of economic stimulation in local economies, leading to an increase in population income and chances for business in other fields (Mancini & Sala, 2018). Lahiri-Dutt (2011) and Chipangura (2018) argue against the idea that small-scale artisanal mining has been responsible for the maintenance of millions of livelihoods in poor mineral-rich countries. According to PACT (2015), as cited by Mkodzongi and Spiegel (2019), small-scale artisanal mining has helped provide a living for more than one million individuals in Zimbabwe. This chapter acknowledges the prominence of small-scale artisanal mining as a livelihood strategy in postcolonial Zimbabwe. However, it sought to highlight how artisanal mining has negatively impacted the education system in the mining town of Kwekwe in Zimbabwe, which is in the country of Zimbabwe.

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7.2 Review of Important Literature 7.2.1 The Mining Sector of Zimbabwe The mining industries of Zimbabwe contribute huge amounts to the economic growth of the country and gross national product, even though both countries are currently experiencing significant economic difficulties. The economic system of Zimbabwe has continued to decline, with a downturn of over 8% in 2019, high inflation, and a marked collapse in social conditions. As a result, as of the end of 2019, approximately 90% of Zimbabweans were living in poverty, and 60% were food insecure. This places Zimbabwe’s food insecurity at the fourth highest level in the world (London School of Economics, 2021; Maronga et  al., 2021; Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021a, b, c). This trend persisted into 2020, prompting South Africa to voice its concerns that its neighbor is in a state of crisis (Muchaendepi et al., 2019; Maronga et al., 2021). It is estimated that the sale of minerals accounts for approximately sixty percent of Zimbabwe’s total export revenues, while the contribution of the mining industry to the country’s gross domestic product is approximately sixteen percent. The production figures for the primary minerals and gemstones produced in Zimbabwe are presented in Table 7.1. These numbers cover the first half of the year 2020. Gold, platinum, chrome, coal, diamonds, and lithium are among the most important minerals extracted in Zimbabwe, as Table 7.1 demonstrates. The production of all minerals reached its all-time low in July. This could be because of the widespread COVID-19 outbreak and lockdowns.

7.3 Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining of Gold in Zimbabwe It is approximated that up to 1.5 million individuals in Zimbabwe might be engaged in the gold supply chain, and artisanal and small-scale mining produces about 63 percent of Zimbabwe’s captured gold production. Gold is currently Zimbabwe’s primary export, and according to official data, the bulk of the gold is extracted by artisanal and small-scale miners (London School of Economics, 2021; Zhou, 2022). The attributes of the ore deposits, which are limited and often not convenient for industrial mineral extraction; the poor investment climate in Zimbabwe, which does not motivate large-scale and long-term investments; and the political meddling that takes place in the gold mining sector are some of the reasons why the artisanal and small-scale mining sector dominates Zimbabwe’s gold mining industry. Other reasons include the qualities of the ore deposits, which are small and often not convenient for industrial mining (London School of Economics, 2021; Zhou, 2022). As a direct result of the formalization that has taken place in the economy of Zimbabwe, the ASME industry has been able to draw people from a wide variety of different backgrounds. Some women work in the mining sector or, more frequently, run

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Table 7.1  Production of minerals in Zimbabwe each month in 2020, beginning in January and ending in July Mineral January February March Gold (kgs) 2702.43 1549.41 1899.83 Platinum 1273.42 1203.68 1066.64 (kgs) Palladium 1055.71 1010.79 890.46 (kgs) Rhodium 113.04 109.66 94.00 (kgs) Iridium 81.94 71.61 62.25 (kgs) Ruthenium 71.01 69.88 64.12 (kgs) Diamonds 147,935.58 197,188.68 195,815.47 (cts) Chrome 99,322.72 88,004.38 105,345.42 (MT) Nickel 1461.84 1363.20 1110.95 (MT) Copper 761.70 691.64 665.38 (MT) Cobalt 30.65 268.89 22.30 (MT) Coal (MT) 153,595.20 2567.48 8926.00

April May June July 1600.16 2199.59 1608.33 1441 1087.38 1489.41 1884.14 267 908.27

1259.84

1611.51 225

97.01

136.21

165.85 35

72.96

93.90

131.74 25

53.67

82.79

87.65 25

229,349.63 405,256.24 4,781,625.50 – 179,243.28

39,661.84

748.60

1040.49

2029.24 876

591.92

862.55

1063.28 224

16.33

19.95

35.52 21

330,769.50 326,567.00

117,571.64 85,027

313,147.00 306,750

Source: author’s analysis, Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines statistics

small-scale mining enterprises, some of which are highly successful. Most artisanal and small-scale miners are men; however, some women do work in the mining industry. Usually, artisanal and small-scale miners work closely together with the more organized section of the same group of miners. Those who work in artisanal and small-scale mines are claimed to come from a variety of backgrounds, including the farming business. It is believed that these folks labor in the mines during the dry season when no farming activity must be done so that they can generate money to pay for their education. During this time, there are no farming operations that need to be done. Students have the option of working in the mines on a part-time basis to contribute to the costs of their education. The other issue that has been brought up is that there is a high rate of gang violence close to gold mining sites because there is a low rule of law and there are regular arguments over who controls the mining sites. This has been brought up as a reason why there is a high rate of gang violence close to gold mining sites. This is one of the factors that contribute to the alarmingly high percentage of gang-related violence. In addition, the police frequently do not intervene when there are invasions of mining sites or violence related to mining, particularly in situations where gangs or artisanal miners are politically connected. This is especially true in situations where there is a high likelihood that the police will not

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intervene. This is especially important to keep in mind in settings where there has been a history of violence connected to mining.

7.4 The Rise of Chikorokoza as a Livelihood Activity Chikorokoza is considered to have “begun” in Zimbabwe when significant mining corporations were forced to shut down, as this was the point at which the phenomenon became more noticeable. According to Chipangura (2018), artisanal small-­ scale mining has a long history that dates to the twelfth century, when local populations found and began mining in the Penhalonga gold belt in Eastern Zimbabwe. This belt is in the country of Zimbabwe. People are being pushed into artisanal mining as a source of livelihood for a variety of reasons, including some climatic patterns that became apparent during the postcolonial era, such as climate change’s disruptive effect on productivity in the agricultural sector (Hunter et al. 2021). Hlungwani et al. (2021) make a passing reference to the significance of artisanal mining in maintaining livelihoods and fostering rural development. Despite this, the authors point out that the industry is still confronted with a slew of difficulties, as stated by Hlungwani et al. (2021) in a study by Hlungwani et al. (2021). This is primarily because it has remained unregulated and disorderly due to political and economic reasons. It has been argued that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme has allowed newly resettled peasant farmers access to natural resources that were previously enclosed and enjoyed by a minority of white farmers. Some academics believe that the FTLRP is responsible for the rise of small-scale artisanal mining as a strategy for making a living in postcolonial Zimbabwe. This view is shared by others who believe that the FTLRP is an outcome of the program (Scoones, 2015; Mushongah & Scoones, 2012; Rutherford, 2016; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2008, 2010 in Mkodzongi and Spiegel, 2019). Mining has traditionally been seen as an important source of income, as shown by the fact that the discovery of gold in a region leads to an increase in the number of people moving there in the hopes of finding work, which in turn leads to the establishment of numerous new small businesses, including those dealing in food, clothing, alcohol, and prostitution in mineral-rich areas (Bhebhe et  al., 2013). According to Moyo (2011:501), the rise of monopolistic large-scale commercial farms has resulted in the concealment of resources, which has led to the expansion of artisanal mining (Mkodzongi & Spiegel, 2019). Around the world, SSAM is responsible for around “10 to 15 million miners, including 4.5 million women and 600,000 children.” This is particularly true in the gold industry (OECD, 2016  in Hlungwani et  al., 2021). The prevalence of gold-panning activities, particularly among school-aged children, has also been seen to have been heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic. During this time, children were forced to pursue gold panning to put food on the table because their parents’ income streams had all been destroyed by the pandemic. Consequently, the prevalence of gold-panning activities among school-aged children has increased (Chingono, 2020).

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7.5 Empirical Literature Review To acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the notion of gold panning, the research analyzed secondary material written by other academics and focused on chikorokoza or gold panning. Therefore, a search was undertaken through both regularly used web research engines such as Google Scholar and Jstor, as well as online media articles, to acquire an understanding of the purported effects that artisanal mining has had on educational opportunities. Among the many keywords that were utilized included “artisanal mining,” “Chikorokoza,” “gold panning,” “school dropouts,” and “violence.” Newspaper articles, primarily from the Herald and Chronicle, were also combed through on a more regular basis to glean information on developing trends regarding gold-panning operations in Zimbabwe. Illegal small-scale artisanal mining activities are also evident in South America, as is the case with the Yanomami and Yekuana indigenous people who live in Brazil and Venezuela. This practice has also been identified as a cause of the destruction of more than 500,000 square meters of primary rainforest in the Peruvian Amazon (Graça, 2019). According to Burns (2020), gold panning in Venezuela is characterized by violence and corruption, both of which are prevalent characteristics of gold panning in many countries. Illegal mining in Venezuela is similarly characterized by violence and corruption. In West Africa, artisanal mining has emerged as a major source of income for low-income families; however, its sociological effects are visible and include things like human and drug trafficking, prostitution, crime, a breakdown in societal cohesion, and a decreased respect for the culture and traditional rights (Takyi et al., 2021). According to a report published by Interpol in 2021 on illegal mining in Central Africa, the presence of crime and corruption in connection with artisanal mining is a common characteristic of the activity in many countries, including Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome. This is a characteristic of the livelihood activity in these countries. Chingono (2020) believes that the occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 significantly contributed to the involvement of children in gold-­ panning activities in the Mutare Odzi area. According to Chingono, children were spending their school time at the river panning for gold to find food to eat because their parents’ economic opportunities had all been closed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Other scholars whose works were consulted by this researcher include Thondhlana et al. (2021), who associate the concept of gold panning with an ideology of African indigenous churches where sustainable development should come using one’s hands as a source of livelihood, citing the works of Musoni (2013) and Maposa. This researcher also consulted the works of Musoni (2013) and Maposa (2014). However, its impact on the education sector in low-income societies is what this study has sought to address. The emergence and spread of artisanal mining as a livelihood activity in post-independence Africa have gained a lot of scholarly attention. Mancini and Sala (2018) added voice that mining provides inputs for other

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industrial sectors that are vital for maintaining population well-being and the functioning of global economies. The authors Mancini and Sala (2018) recognize the dual role of mining, which includes both an increase in wealth for mining towns and the social disadvantages it brings. As a result, the resource-curse hypothesis has become the predominant theory in academic discussion. It is a gateway opportunity for poor and unemployed men and women, which is why it is seen as a livelihood activity in present-day Africa as it is in other developing countries that are not in Africa. This is true of groups that engage in artisanal mining across the world. Muchaendepi et  al. (2019) argued that sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) is the integration of environmental consequences into the interorganizational exercises of supply chain management and that the implementation of SSCM in the mining sector has been a slow process. Sustainable supply chain management is the integration of environmental consequences into the interorganizational exercises of supply chain management. The integration of environmental considerations into the activities of interorganizational supply chain management is what is known as sustainable supply chain management (SSCM). Muchaendepi et  al. (2019) researched to discover the constraints that prevent the mining industry in Zimbabwe from implementing sustainable supply chain management in a practical setting. The mining industry served as the focus of the case study that Muchaendepi et al. (2019) conducted. They based their investigation on descriptive data research as a method of investigation. Their target population was comprised of one thousand different businesses, and to acquire data for their sample, they employed Slovin’s equation and approached 91 of those different businesses. Muchaendepi et al. (2019) discovered that there is not currently any structural or organizational change that would facilitate the implementation of sustainable supply chain management. This was shown to be the case. They recommend that organizations and various stakeholders should ensure that there is a structural and organizational change to support the improvement of legal and regulatory framework on the environment, reduction of cost associated with green products, and distribution of resources vital for effective implementation of sustainable supply chain management. They say this because they believe these things are necessary for the effective implementation of sustainable supply chain management. It was argued by Maronga et  al. (2021) that the drought that struck Zimbabwe in 2020 caused damage to the country’s primary hydro-power station, which in turn made the country’s electricity supply less secure and reliable. These difficulties led to load-shedding, which is something that mining firms want to avoid as much as possible because their activities require continuous and stable power. Mining businesses seek to prevent load-shedding as much as possible. Maronga et al. (2021) conducted a techno-economic analysis to examine the possibilities of integrating concentrated solar power with thermal storage and photovoltaics with battery storage to supply power to a typical mine in Zimbabwe. This was done to determine whether or not such an integration would be possible. The country of Zimbabwe served as the location for this study. Maronga et al. (2021) ran simulations based on two distinct cases: the first one was a fundamental situation in which there were no exports to the grid, and the second one allowed exports to take

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place. Both cases were analyzed using the same methodology. The models were evaluated using criteria such as the amount of renewable energy generated that was able to offset the demand from the mine, the amount of energy that was exported, the contribution that was made to the grid, the levelized cost of power, and the net present value. In addition, the models were evaluated using the amount of energy that was exported. According to the findings that were presented by Maronga et al. (2021), the addition of a battery storage system to PV systems results in an almost twofold increase in both the percentage of the load that is offset by the renewable system and the amount of energy that is generated by the renewable system. This was found to be the case when PV systems were equipped with battery storage systems. Gochero and Boopen (2020) used an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) method to investigate the effect that foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mining sector has had on the economy of Zimbabwe while simultaneously accounting for the effect that non-mining FDI, as well as domestic investment, has had on the economy. This was done to investigate the impact that FDI in the mining sector has had on the economy of Zimbabwe. According to the findings of this study, which was conducted by Gochero and Boopen (2020) using data spanning the years 1988–2018, in the long run, foreign direct investment in the mining industry has a strong positive association with the gross domestic product of the country. This was determined by looking at the correlation between the two variables. It has been shown that foreign direct investment in mining has significantly higher effects when compared to domestic investment and foreign direct investment in non-mining industries. This is the case even when comparing the effects of foreign direct investment in mining to domestic investment. According to the findings of the short-run analysis that was conducted by Gochero and Boopen (2020), domestic investment, foreign direct investment in mining, and investments in non-mining sectors all continue to have positive and significant effects on economic growth, albeit to a lesser degree. This is the case even though domestic investment accounts for a greater share of total investment. According to Mkodzongi (2020), during the last 3 months of 2019, there was a notable increase in the amount of machete gang violence that occurred in artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) communities in Zimbabwe. This trend was observed in the country’s artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) communities. According to Mkodzongi (2020), the gangs are commonly known as “Mashurugwi,” which refers to individuals from the relatively small village of Shurugwi in the Midlands province of Zimbabwe, who were reportedly terrorizing mining communities and robbing people of cash, gold, and ore. This information was obtained from a report written by Mkodzongi. It seemed like there was almost every day that went by without the need for a story to be published in the media about Mashurugwi robbing miners or businesses. According to Mkodzongi (2020), the extremely violent nature of the robberies and the lack of police intervention, particularly in the earlier period, led to many assertions being made in the mainstream press about who the violent gangs were and their connection with party leaders in Zimbabwe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU

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PF) political party. These assertions were based on the fact that there was no police intervention during the earlier period. In addition, because of these reasons, an overly simplistic discussion of barbaric bandits marauding over the countryside robbing and killing people became popular. According to Mkodzongi (2020), however, the beginnings of the machete gangs and the underlying reasons for the violence that were linked with them did not receive a great deal of attention when it came to the investigation of this topic. This article is an ambitious attempt to study the origins of the Mashurugwi as well as the underlying causes of the machete violence that has happened throughout Zimbabwe’s ASGM districts. This investigation may shed light on both topics. The research that was conducted by Nyikahadzoi et al. (2022) focuses on the application of concepts of corporate social responsibility to the management of human resources in the gold mining industry in Zimbabwe. Nyikahadzoi et  al. (2022) researched the socially responsible management of human resources that is practiced within the gold mining industry in Zimbabwe. The study also determined which of the five distinct types of governance systems, namely, local private, government-owned, listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, multinational not listed, and listed on overseas stock exchanges, is the most successful in this regard. Gold mining businesses engage in socially responsible human resource management, as indicated by the findings of Nyikahadzoi et al. (2022). In addition, gold mining firms that are listed on foreign stock exchanges have the highest index, which indicates the best performance. This is followed by gold mining companies that are owned by the government.

7.6 Research Methodology To investigate the influence that gold panning has had on the educational system in Zimbabwe, the research took a pragmatic approach. In this study, a case study design was utilized, and the Kwekwe district served as the sole instance. Two focus group discussions, each consisting of 15 gold panners aged around 18 years and below 15 AGYW (adult girls and young women), were carried out. The purpose of these discussions was to gain an understanding of the perceptions of both makorokoza and young women and adult girls regarding how gold panning has impacted the appetite and access to school in school-going-age children as well as how it affected them. The participants were initially chosen through the process of observation in conjunction with snowball sampling and purposive sampling. In addition, nine in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders on the question of education, child protection, and health in the Kwekwe district. These stakeholders include the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, the victim-friendly unit of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, clinics in the mining communities, traditional leadership, and nongovernmental organizations. These stakeholders were selected using both purposive and convenience sampling. In addition to that, there were three more in-depth interviews with educators who were involved in gold mining. In addition, the research incorporated a survey of secondary

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literature to acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of gold panning in Zimbabwe. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS) was utilized for the analysis of quantitative data, while content analysis was utilized for the study of qualitative data.

7.7 Findings 7.7.1 Chikorokoza Versus Education 7.7.1.1 School Dropouts Children in the area drop out of school, with most boys doing so to enter the mining industry and the majority of girls doing so either to enter the industry themselves or to marry small-scale miners. However, official figures to support this claim were not to be obtained from the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education because the officials who were interviewed believed that doing so would put the nation at risk. Further interviews with representatives from nongovernmental organizations, such as PLAN International and CAMFED, established that a reasonable number of children drop out of school every term due to chikorokoza, primarily in regions where there are mines around the schools. This was determined by the findings of the previous interviews. The problem of students not attending school because of the presence of gold mines is not exclusive to the district of Kwekwe in Zimbabwe; it is also visible in the district of Gwanda (Jordaan, 2013). After the failure of the farming season, some children of school age in the Odzi area of the Mutare district in Zimbabwe are forced to engage in artisanal mining because they must “shoulder the burden of providing for their families.” This was reported by Chingono in the Guardian on November 13, 2020. Similar incidents of dropouts are also apparent in the Buchwa area of the Mberengwa district, where a 16-year-old boy brags about having to purchase beer for graduates. This demonstrates that education cannot be equated to gold panning in terms of the economic rewards it provides (Gono, 2022). In addition, Mancini and Sala (2018) recognize the possibility that panning for gold may encourage adolescent males and girls to forego their education in favor of a career in the industry. 7.7.1.2 Teenage Pregnancies In areas where gold is mined, adolescent pregnancy has developed into an increasingly widespread problem. An official from the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education who was interviewed by this researcher indicated that several reports are received all the time of girls who drop out of school because they have fallen pregnant after being lured by cash-full gold panners commonly known as makorokoza or magweja in the district. This scholar found this information from an official at the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. According to Great Dyke News 24

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(2020), during the lockdown caused by COVID-19, six junior councilors in Kwekwe were pregnant because of gold panners. Most of these junior councilors were younger than 15 years old. Kwekwe is not the only district in which teenage pregnancy is a problem; it has been reported in other districts as well. For instance, in the Shurugwi district, which is another mining town in the Midlands province, 23 girls at Chironde Secondary School in Ward 9 dropped out of school after being impregnated by artisanal miners. The problem of teenage pregnancy is not limited to Kwekwe alone (Chitumba, 2021). According to a report published by the National Aids Council (NAC), one of the primary causes of the 4475 adolescent pregnancies recorded for girls aged between 15 and 19 years in Mashonaland central province between March 2020 and February 2021 was the practice of gold panning (Lupande, 2021). The district officer in charge of ZACH (Zimbabwe Association of Church-­ Related Hospitals) OSC (one-stop center), who was interviewed by this scholar, highlighted that the OSC “has attended to school-going victims of SGBV most of which are Section 70 and rape cases perpetrated by artisanal miners, some of these cases lead to child pregnancies and victims dropping out of school to get married or stay at home.” 7.7.1.3 Violence The trade of small-scale artisanal mining (SSAM), also known as chikorokoza, is characterized by violence (Mkodzongi, 2020). The machete-wielding artisanal miners are commonly referred to as mashurugwi. It was first used about gangs that robbed, raped, and killed people in Marange during the diamond rush from 2005 to 2008. According to Maguwu et  al. (2020), the term mashurugwi is a codename describing a group of young and middle-aged men wreaking havoc in gold mining communities. These men range in age from 14 to 42. This scholar discovered that incidences of violence were reported at a school known as St. Jude’s in the Zhombe area. As a result, some children in that school dropped out of school because of the trauma caused by makorokoza, also known as mashurugwi in some contexts. This information emerged during interviews with a PLAN International representative as well as during a focus group discussion that was held at Joel Business Centre in Zhombe area under Kwekwe district with a group of school-aged gold miners who were selected using snowball sampling. The group of gold miners was in the Kwekwe district. The use of machetes and other weapons to intimidate victims of sexual assault is another example of the violence that is committed by gold-panning gangs. During the discussion with a representative from PLAN Kwekwe, she brought up the fact that stories of dropouts have been heard of students who quit school because of the direct violence, or the trauma caused by mashurugwi. She went on to talk about an incident that took place at Mutimutema Secondary School, where she claimed, “We heard of a situation at Mutimutema when a mashurugwi comes to choose a girlfriend at school and instructors had to let the child leave because they feared for their safety.” Therefore, violence is a regular feature of gold panning in the post-independence era, which has had a severe impact on the education sector’s ability to function without disruption in the Kwekwe district.

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7.7.1.4 Teachers Joining Chikorokoza During the data collection procedure, it was discovered that some teachers had abandoned their positions to pursue careers as gold-panning workers. This researcher spoke with three educators who are known to be involved in illegal gold mining. All three of them admitted that they had skipped a significant number of classes to pursue the valuable mineral. According to Bulawayo24 News (2020), a mathematics teacher from Zvishavane passed dead after sliding down a mine shaft while lowering a colleague who had skipped work to engage in illicit mining. The colleague had left work to engage in illegal activity. A primary school teacher named Mr. Chitiyo, who was interviewed by this scholar, did not mince his words about how gold panning has improved his life more than he could ever have achieved with the salary he receives for teaching. “I have managed to build 2 shops in Rutendo suburb, Redcliff using the money I get through korokoza, a thing I had never imagined in my lifetime,” Chitiyo said. “I have managed to build 2 shops in Rutendo suburb, despite the country’s severe economic problems and widespread poverty,” and he has been able to maintain his standard of living by gold panning. Because instructors in the district of Kwekwe have been absent from their lessons to pursue gold mining, the district’s education system has suffered as a direct result. 7.7.1.5 Sexually Transmitted Infections According to Chipangura (2018:203), who cites the ideas of Gratz (2006; 2004) and Cuvelier (2011), “makorokozas tend to have a uniform habit of spending large portions of their earnings on alcohol, drugs, gambling, clothes, phones, women, and entertainment,” as is the case with the artisanal miners in the Katanga province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This demonstrates that the societal repercussions of gold panning, such as the necessitation of the spread of sexually transmitted illnesses, are not exclusive to the Kwekwe district alone; rather, it is a common phenomenon that is seen throughout the wider parts of postcolonial Africa. During the focus group discussion that was composed of AGYW, it came to light that the cash-loaded makorokoza in some instances do not use protection when they engage in sexual activities, thereby exposing women to the risk of STIs. Two women confirmed that they had been infected by their korokoza lover. The same sentiments were also echoed by nurses from both the Zibagwe Rural District Council clinic (located in Kwekwe CBD) and the Donjani clinic (located in the Donjani mining area of Kwekwe rural), who both confirmed during the two interviews that it has become a norm that daily they treat gold panners for STIs. Both clinics are in Kwekwe rural. The transmission of sexually transmitted infections caused by the practice of gold panning is not limited to just the Kwekwe district; evidence of it has also been found in the Gwanda district, where women from Mbalabala engage in activities such as prostitution, the sale of food and alcohol, and the trade of clothes. This is a situation that has led to an increase in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Bhebhe et al., 2013), and it is made even worse by the fact that male miners will utilise the

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influence of money to get women to engange in sexual activities without using protection sometimes.

7.8 Conclusion and Recommendations The study established that gold panning has become an important technique for sustaining one’s living in post-independence Zimbabwe, notably in the Kwekwe district. In the Kwekwe district, the rise in popularity of gold panning coincided with the FTLRP. This activity offered an alternative to the failing commercial farming business as well as the ailing industrial sector, and as a result, it evolved into a means of sustaining one’s livelihood in the years following Zimbabwe’s independence. However, it is abundantly clear that the pursuit of gold has been both a blessing and a burden at the same time, particularly in the education sector in the Kwekwe district. Violence, school dropouts, teenage pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections, and teachers missing class to engage in gold panning operations are just some of the ways that artisanal mining has hurt the education sector. Other factors include STIs. When it comes to the field of education, SSAM in the Kwekwe district is a good example of the so-called resource curse. According to the findings of the study, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education should establish greater sexual abuse awareness programs in schools connected to gold panning and should also give IEC material in schools to educate learners on SGBV concerning gold panning. These campaigns of awareness should be expanded into communities on gender-­ based violence about gold panning to reach out to those who are staying at home even if they are of an age when they should be attending school. This study recommends that artisanal mining be regularized, that artisanal miners be registered and affiliated with the Ministry of Mines so that their operations and conduct can be made accountable to the Ministry of Mines and Minerals development to control the behavior of artisanal miners, and that artisanal mines be affiliated with the Ministry of Mines.

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Chapter 8

Institutional Capacity Challenges for Policy Research Analysis (PRA) in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study of State and Non-state Policy Institutions Moira Tambaoga , Aaram Gwiza and Promise Machingo Hlungwani

, Vain D. B. Jarbandhan

,

Abstract  Institutional capacity forms the core of sound policy research and analysis (PRA). Studies of institutional capacity focusing on PRA are increasingly gaining momentum in the contemporary world. Specifically, researchers focus on how governments can design and adopt policy decisions to fundamentally address societal needs and realise sustainable development. This chapter investigates the institutional capacity for PRA in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Policy, with a specific focus on state and non-state policy institutions. The thesis of the chapter is that institutional incapacity undermines effective policy research and analysis. A qualitative research methodology was applied to gain more insight into the research topic. Land and agrarian institutions, the Ruzivo Trust, Women and Land Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, the 2003 Presidential Land Review Commission (PLRC), and relevant academics and experts on land governance were consulted for case evidence. In this study, data collection tools included in-depth interviews and documentary searches. The researchers used content and thematic analysis approaches for data presentation and analysis. Research findings highlight that the institutional capacity for PRA in Zimbabwe is relatively weak and fragmented. The main challenges noted include overstressed human resources due to understaffing and limited financial resources exacerbated by leakages through corruption. The study, therefore, recommends that the Land Commission appoints qualified and non-partisan staff. Furthermore, policy researchers and analysts should be given access to critical policy documents.

M. Tambaoga (*) · A. Gwiza · P. M. Hlungwani Marondera UniversityPlease of Agricultural Sciences, Marondera, Zimbabwe V. D. B. Jarbandhan University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_8

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Keywords  Institutional capacity · Institutional theory · Policy analysis · Public policy · Policy research

8.1 Introduction Over the past decades, Zimbabwe has shown commitment to strengthening its policy-­ making, implementation and evaluation systems and practices (Zhou, 2014:13). Such concerted efforts focused on addressing a range of policy issues such as food security, political violence, corruption, human rights, governance, land reforms, climate change, child abuse and electoral malpractices. Despite specific policy and research analysis (PRA) units that focus on Zimbabwe’s land reform policy, such as the Ruzivo Trust, the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), the Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU), the Institute of Environmental Studies (IES), state universities and land commissions, their impact on policy-making and implementation has not yielded the expected results. According to Babu and Sengupta (2006:2), this has brought about serious institutional capacity constraints and subsequent widening gaps between policy pronouncement and policy enforcement that hamper optimal PRA. These challenges are a product of factors such as a lack of political will and a deteriorating political environment due to a shortage of critical and independent policy analysis caused by skills gaps and almost no reliable data sources from relevant government ministries and departments. Furthermore, economic instability associated with fiscal imbalances, poor public service delivery and brain drain adds to the policy analysis problem in Zimbabwe (Kanyenze et al., 2017). For the past decades, empirical evidence on the land reform programme has been characterised by an underperforming agricultural sector. Notably, this key sector’s contribution to the economy fell from 17% in 1997 to 13.1% in 2009 (Kapuya et al., 2012:27). Extended periods of food insecurity have ruined Zimbabwe’s reputation as the ‘breadbasket of southern Africa’. Currently, the country often depends on international aid to fill the food deficits (Kapuya et  al., 2012:27). Newsday (19 September 2013) reported that from 2000 to 2013, maize production declined by 79%. In 2003, the then Agriculture Minister, Joseph Made, said that Zimbabwe had 400,000 tonnes of maize stocks, against 2.2 million tonnes needed to feed the nation annually (Newsday, 19 September 2013). Furthermore, the World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that, in 2013, at least two million people needed food assistance countrywide (Newsday, 19 September 2013). A high unemployment rate has also been recorded after the implementation of the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The employment rate declined from 68% in 1998 to 80% in 2002 (Kapuya et  al., 2012:30), and, according to the WFP figures, 85% of the population was unemployed as of 2013 (Newsday, 19 September 2013). The above scenario typifies the implications of compromised policy research and analysis in Zimbabwe’s land reform programme with negative implications on the performance of the agricultural sector.

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It is against this background that this chapter analyses institutional capacity challenges for PRA on land reform in Zimbabwe. Particular attention is paid to both state and non-state institutions involved in this profession. The study’s main objective is to establish the various factors that affect PRA in the context of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. Specific objectives of the study are to conceptualise institutional capacity means and its relationship with PRA; to identify and discuss the various key players in PRA in Zimbabwe’s land reform policy; to assess the institutional capacity challenges associated with PRA in Zimbabwe’s land reform policy; and to suggest alternative interventions to address the institutional capacity constraints in Zimbabwe’s land reform policy. This chapter used a case study approach as the research design. Benbasat et al. (cited in Ololube et al., 2010:48) define a case study as a research approach that studies subject matter within its real-life situation, using different strategies to gather and analyse data. The case study research design enabled the researchers to appreciate the nature and dynamics of PRA in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Policy as they unfold in the real-life context. The researchers were able to consult different sources of qualitative data like in-depth interviews, documentary searches and non-­ participant observations. Two case studies were used, namely, the state and non-­ state policy institutions that are involved in land policy issues in Zimbabwe. These institutions include the Ruzivo Trust, Women and Land (WLZ), the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MoLRR), selected state universities and the 2003 Presidential Land Review Commission. The MoLRR is a government ministry that is responsible for land reform in Zimbabwe. As such, key informants were selected from this department. One institution insisted on remaining anonymous, and researchers referred to it as Institute A for this study. Respondents were purposefully selected based on their knowledge and vast experiences to help identify units that could provide detailed and accurate information about the study. These respondents for in-depth interviews include the Commissioner who formed part of the Utete Commission of 2003, a key informant from Institute A, three officials from the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, three academics from the University of Zimbabwe (UZ), one academic from Great Zimbabwe University, one Finance and Administration Manager from Ruzivo Trust and three officials from Women and Land Zimbabwe. Qualitative data collected through documentary search was analysed using content analysis. Thematic analysis was used to analyse data gathered from in-depth interviews. The outline of this chapter includes an introduction section that presents an overview of the study as well as the research methodology outlining the method utilised to undertake the study. The next section defines and briefly discusses the key concepts frequently used in the study for familiarisation. What follows then is a detailed discussion of the research findings generated in line with thematic areas developed from the study’s objectives. This section provides a candid empirical picture of weak and fragmented PRA in Zimbabwe to pave way for the next section to proffer the recommendations aimed at improving the status quo. The last section presents the conclusions and policy implications of the study.

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8.2 Conceptual Orientation This section briefly highlights the main concepts of this chapter.

8.2.1 Institutional Capacity The term “institutional capacity” has two constituent elements: institution and capacity. Capacity is “the adequacy of staff, skills and competency, financial and physical resources and management systems and structures in place for an organisation to function well” (Ragasa et al. cited in Zhou & Zinyama, 2016:5). Zhou and Zinyama (2016:5) further define capacity from an organisational, financial, labour and technological perspective and link institutional capacity to the availability of financial, technological, organisational and manpower resources. According to Bhagavan and Virgin (2004:3), institutional capacity includes the functions (tasks) that institutions can (ability) perform, as well as the resources (human, technical and financial) and structures they need. Based on the above definitions, it can be observed that PRA institutions are specialised bodies which are aimed at undertaking policy research and analysis. As a result, institutions should focus on introducing and sustaining the ideals of good PRA (Zhou, 2014:14). Notably, there are specific behavioural patterns (best practices) that should be evident where PRA is institutionalised. To optimise PRA, related units should have adequate financial resources, professionals from multidisciplinary backgrounds, information technology (IT) resources, a certain level of institutionalisation, stakeholder commitment, collaborative capacity, institutional functional autonomy and research freedom, as well as direct access to top-level decision-makers (Dror cited in Ojagbohunmi, 1990; Bryan, 2011:70; Jones, 2006:8; Eisinger, 2002:125; USAID, 2011:5). This concept helped the researchers with forming the basis to investigate PRA-associated institutional capacity challenges.

8.2.2 Policy Research According to Hovland (2007:1), policy research is undertaken to inform and influence public policy. This definition resonates well with Mead (2004:3), who defines policy research as an inquiry into the nature and origins of problems that public policy aims to solve. The above definitions highlight that policy implementation without appropriate policy research is problematic. This is fundamental because the government is informed of the nature and context of public problems through policy research so that it can devise appropriate strategies to address these challenges. Similarly, Matheson et al. (1996) argue that when under stress, centralised authorities fail to cope with the entrenched features of public administration, such as

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value-related conflict, ambiguity and uncertainty over cause and effect, asymmetries of information about performance and the likely consequences of decisions. Based on the aforementioned, Etzioni (1978:1) believes that policy research helps solve fundamental problems and advance major programmes. As such, policy research helps ensure that government devises effective policies, projects and programmes that address the actual problems faced by the public.

8.2.3 Policy Analysis Quade (cited in Eneanya, 2010:21) defines policy analysis as “any type of analysis that generates and presents information in such a way as to improve the basis for policy-makers to exercise their judgments”. In a similar vein, Chandler and Plano (cited in Eneanya, 2010:21) argue that policy analysis involves a “systematic and data-based alternative to intuitive judgments about the effects of policy or policy options”. Ikelegbe (cited in Eneanya, 2010:21) defines the term as the study of the causes, processes, formation, implementation and consequences of public policy. Based on the above definitions, it can be observed that policy analysis is a tactful process of interrogating intended and actual public-centred government plans to address the negative implications associated with them. The hallmark of policy analysis is to ensure that public policy addresses citizens’ needs and wants. This is done through a “systematic, disciplined, analytical, scholarly and whose primary motivation is to produce well-supported recommendations for action in dealing with concrete political problems” (Zhou, 2014:14).

8.3 Theoretical Framework In this section, the researcher briefly discusses the main theory guiding this chapter.

8.3.1 Institutional Theory Institutional theory or institutionalism focuses on institutions’ role in constraining or empowering human behaviour. The institutional capacity evaluation of PRA in Zimbabwe is challenging without considering institutional theory as the study’s theoretical basis. Richard (2004):408) defines the institutional theory as a model or approach that focuses on the degree and more resilient facet of social structures, as well as the process whereby these structures, including schemes, rules, norms and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. As used in politics and the public administration discipline, the institutional theory

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advances two different forms of institutional arrangements in terms of their influence on policy and political action. Amenta et al. (2010):18) add that institutions restrict certain forms of action and facilitate others to realise the overall organisational goals. The institutional theory provides the necessary conceptual and theoretical basis to earmark and assess modern government institutions, particularly regarding the design, adoption and implementation of public policy. It also focuses on institutions and their specific role in policy-making. Within this context, the most broad-based way of explaining how institutions affect policy output is by determining how they empower and constrain policy-making actors. Thus, for purpose of this study, the institutional theory provides broader insights into the nature and basic conditions for PRA in Zimbabwe. The theory helps to explore specific political, economic, socio-cultural and technological factors that inhibit the implementation of PRA in Zimbabwe.

8.4 Research Findings and Discussion This section discusses the research findings gathered during the study.

8.4.1 Key Stakeholders in PRA in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Policy Literature confirms that sound PRA is enhanced through synergies arising from vibrant multi-stakeholder participation. In effect, government interacts with various actors to complement its various activities in terms of expertise, material resources and funding among other necessities in PRA. This section briefly outlines some of the institutions that play a critical role and are actively involved in PRA, particularly with regard to the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. Prior appreciation of these institutions is equally important to understand the context and nature of institutional capacity challenges associated with PRA in Zimbabwe.

8.4.2 Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MoLRR) The Ministry implements land policies, programmes, plans, recommendations and findings from research institutes and commissions of inquiry. During the interviews, the Director and the two Deputy Directors revealed that although the Ministry is in dire need of a research unit, it does not have a separate PRA unit. All the key informants from the Ministry noted that a request has been made to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). However, the request has not been met due to the fiscal

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challenges that the government faces. In particular, one respondent indicated that “…as a Ministry, we have tended to use the personnel we have to conduct the research though some of them are not experienced enough to carry out policy research as a result of the brain drain that characterised Zimbabwe during the 2000 era”. The informant further stated that “…concerted efforts to send some of the officials locally and internationally to learn and be trained on land management in countries like Germany, Kenya, Brazil, and Namibia have been made”. All these efforts by the Ministry can be seen as a way to strengthen PRA in the Ministry so that informed decisions regarding land can be made. Government ministries and departments cannot solve public problems alone. As such, they normally engage local and international stakeholders when dealing with policy matters. To this end, the study found that, when dealing with land policy issues, the MoLRR worked with other relevant government ministries like Agriculture, Environment, Mines, and Women’s Affairs; Portfolio Committees of the respective Ministries; local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Institute A and WLZ; and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) like the European Union (EU), the Food Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). For instance, one senior ministry official revealed that “…during the formulation of the Wildlife Based Land Reform in 2006, we, as a Ministry engaged the Ministry of Environment so that there are no inconsistencies and no overriding powers of one Ministry over the other”. Equally important, the Ministry usually receives funding from international development agencies such as the FAO, UNDP and EU to complement its consultancy work on land issues. The informant further pointed out that “…a good component of funding is being injected by EU through [the] UNDP”. For instance, in an interview, the respondent revealed that “…during the National Land Policy Review, the Ministry received financial assistance from INGOs such as FAO and UNDP”.

8.4.3 Policy Research Analysis Non-Governmental Organisations/Civil Society Organisations, and Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Policy Institute A Institute A was formed in 2003 to influence land and agrarian reform policies through multidisciplinary social science research, policy dialogues, training, networking and information dissemination (Institute A website). The Trust interacts with different institutions as well as countries to facilitate its capacity development for policy formulation and research. Institute A supports policy dialogue among governments, academics, civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs regarding land and agrarian issues. In an interview, the Executive Director (Informant A) acknowledged that Institute A has staffed with a sufficient number of quality human resources thanks to a network they spearheaded in 2012 with the support of the

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Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Essentially, the network collaborates with key actors to enhance the development and implementation of equitable agrarian policies and promotes sustainable land use through information exchange, policy analysis, capacity development and dialogue.

8.4.4 Women and Land Zimbabwe (WLZ) The WLZ was founded by a group of women activists to address the marginalisation of women in land acquisition. Evidence gathered from the documentary search supported the above issue of marginalisation of women in accessing and controlling land. According to Chingarande (2003:10): ...compared to previous land resettlement programmes soon after independence, it seems there is a reduction in the number of female beneficiaries of land when it was estimated that 25% of beneficiaries were women, and now after the Fast-Track Land Review Programme (FTLRP), it is estimated that female beneficiaries are close to 20%.

The study also revealed that women’s land rights are marginalised in both the1A1 and2A2 models. For instance, statistics indicate that, countrywide, only a small percentage of females received land under the FTLRP. According to Utete (2003:25), “Women-headed households who benefitted under A1 model constituted 18%, while women beneficiaries under model A2 constituted 12%”. Chingarande (2003:11) adds that, “...the majority of beneficiaries under the government public leasing programmes were males accounting for 76%, while females as sole owners were just fewer than 6%”. Thus, there were far more male beneficiaries in land acquisition than women. This reinforces the fact that women have always been marginalised and this trend will continue without deliberate policy to that effect. One respondent in the organisation noted that, “...we do a lot of advocacy work at local and national levels. We create awareness, sensitise, and facilitate the participation of women at the grass-­ root levels in land issues”. The WLZ has interfaced with policy-makers on several occasions. Also, they have had dialogues with the Ministries of Lands, Agriculture, Women Affairs, and Environment and their respective portfolio committees. Another key respondent shared a similar view that “...we also participate at regional level (SADC) where Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in a bid to safeguard women’s rights”.

 A1 model is focused on smallholder production with an average size of 37 hectares including crop and grazing land. 2  A2 model is a commercial settlement scheme, at a slightly larger scale with an average size of 318 hectares. 1

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Since 2000, when the government officially launched the FTLRP, the WLZ has played an active role in ensuring gender parity in land access, control and ownership. For instance, one respondent revealed that: ...we as WLZ lobbied for the 20% quota in 2000. This meant that whenever farms are subdivided, 20% should be allocated to women. Further, in 2014 we also lobbied for the enactment of Statutory Instrument Number 153 of 2014 (SI153 of 2014) whereby we wanted land to be owned 50-50 by both spouses whenever it was acquired in a household.

While the issue has not been officially recognised by the government, it can be noted that WLZ lobbied for these issues due to inequality in land ownership. WLZ revealed that they also formed the Women and Land Lobby Group (WLLG) to help address land ownership imbalances. According to Goebel (2005:145): ...the WLLG has also focused primarily on evaluating and responding to government policy documents and hosting public forums on the land question in a bid to make sure that the government include women’s interests in the design of land reform in Zimbabwe.

All these efforts reveal WLZ’s key role in eliminating all sorts of discrimination against women in the FTLRP to ensure sustainable poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe.

8.4.5 Ruzivo Trust This organisation carries out “action-based research on land, livelihoods, food security, climate change, bio-fuels and a variety of other subjects relating to development” (Matondi, 2012: iii). One interviewee also revealed that: ...Ruzivo Trust has high-quality staff specialised in diverse areas which enhances the quality of our research and analysis. For instance, I hold an Accounting Degree; the Executive Director, Dr Matondi holds a PhD in Rural Development; two Programme Officers, Mudzindiko and Murimba hold Degrees in Wildlife and Safari Management, and Agronomy respectively among other staff members.

In line with this, Matondi (2012:iii) argues that “the multidisciplinary composition of the teams that run its programmes allows for an in-depth understanding of socio-­ economic and policy processes in different contexts”. The Ruzivo Trust collaborates with communities on livelihood practices and widely shares its knowledge (Matondi, 2012:iii) of sustainable community development and poverty alleviation. The Finance and Administration Manager at Ruzivo Trust indicated that: ...Ruzivo Trust started with individuals like Dr Prosper Matondi who carried out research on land reform programmes and were funded by the Oxfam International, an international aid and charity organisation. As time went on, it became an organisation under the name Ruzivo Trust with Oxfam International as its donor.

The interviews generally revealed that the Trust was forced to stop its research on Zimbabwe’s land reform programme following the economic-political challenges that emerged in 2008. As the ruling party showed extensive interest in the Trust, some donors like Oxfam International withdrew their funding. As a result, the Trust

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deviated from its central focus and started to research livelihoods and renewable energy, among others. Nonetheless, the Trust continued to receive wide recognition from the government, and its director was nominated to sit on the Land Commission which advises the President on land issues.

8.4.6 State Universities Various state university departments undertake research in a bid to inform and influence public policy. An in-depth interview with one academic at the University of Zimbabwe pointed out that, “…at the University of Zimbabwe, Faculties like Agriculture, Engineering, Environmental Sciences and Social Sciences among others have been at the forefront in carrying out land research”. In a similar vein, Zhou and Zinyama (2016:23) state that “universities have been involved in several ways in PRA.  These include teaching, as they facilitate policy knowledge and skills through teaching courses like public policy analysis and policy formulation and analysis”. Zhou and Zinyama (2016:23) add that, at the University of Zimbabwe, departments such as Political and Administrative Studies, Sociology, and Psychology run short-term courses in various areas that include gender policy analysis, policy monitoring and evaluation and pre- and post-budget analysis. These short courses are designed to equip trainees with the needed investigative skills to probe policy issues in their areas of specialisation. Furthermore, university lecturers conduct research and publish policy briefs that have a strong impact on policy analysis. Moreover, university lecturers share their knowledge at government-organised training workshops. Universities are home to seasoned policy analysts who provide policy advice to various sectors of government. They served as specialists during the constitution-making process, land reform policy and Zim-ASSET, among others (Zhou & Zinyama, 2016:23). State universities involved in PRA in land reform policy include the Midlands State University, the Chinhoyi University of Technology, the Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE), the Great Zimbabwe University (GZU) and the Marondera University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology (MUAST).

8.4.7 The 2003 Presidential Land Review Commission The respective Land Commissions of Inquiry in Zimbabwe were set up to advise the government on land policy and monitor programme implementation. During the interviews, a senior academic in the Department of Sociology who formed part of the Commission noted that “…the 2003 Presidential Land Review Commission was set up to go on a fact-finding mission. We were more concerned with the situational analysis of the ground whereby we were trying to find what the situation on the ground was”. In a similar vein, one respondent stated, “…we wanted to find out

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from the people on the ground how many women had benefitted, how many A1 and A2 farmers were there, and also to review what has been done in terms of giving out the land”. The key respondent added that “…we achieved the set objectives in undertaking the Utete Commission and we followed the Terms of References (ToR) as was directed by the Parliament”. For instance, the Commission investigated and made recommendations regarding challenges being faced by the newly resettled farmers, and the recommendations were made thereof. However, this point has been criticised by an academic from the University of Zimbabwe’s Political and Administrative Studies Department (POLAD) who stated that “…when the commissioners are contracted by the government they can be manipulated. It is the government that formulates the ToR, as a result, the independence and analysis might also be compromised as some individuals would want to appear ‘politically correct”. When asked about the degree of independence of the Utete Commissioners, one senior academic at Midlands State University (MSU) argued that “…there is no way we could have been independent when the ToR were set for us by the President”. Thus, it is evident that the degree of independence is compromised when specific instructions that must be followed affect the analysis of the findings and the subsequent formulation of effective policies.

8.4.8 International NGOs (INGOs) The interviews highlighted that many international organisations were involved in Zimbabwe’s land issues. In particular, one interviewee at the Great Zimbabwe University pointed out that: ...INGOs that work in collaboration with the Ministry of Lands include UNDP, FAO, EU, World Bank, and IMF.  The INGOs help where the Ministry seems to be lacking. For instance, they bring in expertise and funding. Also, another important thing to note is that the UNDP has a project office in the Ministry of Lands.

Respondents at the University of Zimbabwe added that “...a good component of funding is coming from EU through UNDP. FAO also possesses a strong research base in the Ministry through providing experts to help carry out policy research”. They have also been providing financial and technical resources to research institutions. In this regard, the project coordinator of the Norwegian People’s Aid stated that “...there are two organisations that focus on land that we assist financially; these are Institute A and WLZ”. Another respondent added that “…organisations like the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have provided aeroplanes for aerial topography to the Ministry, whereas the UN has also provided plotters for the printing of the aerial maps”. Furthermore, an official from MoLRR revealed that “…UNDP and EU have been assisting the Ministry in buying computers since 2010 so that working can be made easier”. All these efforts illustrate that INGOs strengthen policy research and analysis to ensure sustainable development outcomes.

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8.5 Institutional Capacity Challenges for Policy Research Analysis in Zimbabwe’s Land Policy: Empirical Evidence This section presents and discusses the experiences, challenges and lessons in Zimbabwe regarding institutional capacity for PRA. The discussion focuses on the state and non-state institutions involved in land PRA to inform and influence policy-­ making in Zimbabwe.

8.5.1 Relationship Between Institutional Capacity and Policy Research Analysis in Zimbabwe It emerged from this study that there is a link between institutional capacity and effective PRA as variables to enhance good policy governance. Primary data point to the importance of reinforcing and sustaining institutional capacity to devise and apply more integrated PRA for sustainable development. To ensure this, policy researchers and analysts must have sufficient institutional resources to conduct effective research and analysis work. Failure to capacitate institutions in PRA hampers sound public policy-making. The level of capacity demonstrated by an institution in PRA determines the extent to which government can mitigate practical societal challenges. Importantly, funding creates PRA-related capacity to devise well-informed policy recommendations regarding public issues. Notably, a respondent mentioned that senior academics like professors produce higher-quality research than undergraduate students. Thus, research competencies in terms of professional qualifications and research experience play a significant role in determining the output and outcome of the PRA processes and systems in the country. This position is in sync with Bryan (2011:64) who says, “acquiring sufficient personnel who are specialised and have the skills to achieve the work of the organisation is, arguably, an organisation’s most critical resource”. One Director confirmed that “…an institution should hire the relevant experts when it comes to PRA, for example, academics in the relevant policy field (who can train others), skilled researchers and analysts”. A case in point was Institute A, where the key informant A confirmed that “…since 2009, we run a Summer School every year, offer capacity building training programmes for the civil society as well and offering internship programmes to students who are into PRA”. The respondent further mentioned that an institution will find it easy to sustain and maintain quality policy governance if its system is functional.

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8.6 Challenges with Institutional Capacity in Policy Research Analysis in Zimbabwe The research pointed to considerable institutional capacity challenges that have an adverse impact on PRA in Zimbabwe. Certain challenges are common to government-­related and non-governmental PRA institutions, while some are specific. The challenges range from political, economic and legal to human resource constraints. These challenges are discussed below.

8.6.1 Political Factors Political factors, such as censorship, political apathy, an intolerant political culture or a lack of public support for education and research, can constrain the impact of policy research (Stone et al., 2001:20). It should be noted that the land reform policy in Zimbabwe has historically been a political issue. The research gathered that NGOs, in particular, are prone to considerable political challenges that hamper their capacity to effectively undertake PRA. On the other hand, the government strategically denies non-state actors the opportunity for effective PRA, while it also deliberately masks the controversies associated with the highly political land policy field.

8.6.2 State-Civil Society (NGOs) Mistrust and Policy Research Analysis NGOs should provide professional advice and information and exert pressure and persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations. However, mistrust between the state and civil society (NGOs) in Zimbabwe has limited the capacity of the latter to meaningfully undertake PRA that could benefit the former. The ZANU-PF government which has been dominant since independence views NGOs with suspicion and distrust. This is reflected in the aftermath of the controversial, highly political FTLRP that the Zimbabwe government has pursued since 2000. In-depth interviews with senior officials in the Ministry of Lands confirmed this when they stated that the “…government is very suspicious about NGO operations, especially those that are confrontational and seeking to illegally overthrow a constitutionally elected government”. This suspicion is reflected in late ZANU-PF national chairman, John Nkomo, statement that “Western countries are using NGOs to foment political instability and to pursue a regime change agenda in Zimbabwe and have no real purpose or reason to be in the country”. He went on to say that NGOs received funding from Britain and the United States to create political disturbances in the country (The Herald, 2007:2 cited in Chakawarika, 2011:10–11).

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The above statements confirm that the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) does not feel comfortable with NGOs, especially organisations that meddle in the country’s political affairs. Several key informants in non-state PRA institutions revealed a growing mutual mistrust between the state and civil society. Undeniably, this has curtailed civil society’s PRA capacity. In effect, the utilisation of policy research findings by the governments depended on who carried out the study. One academic stated that “…no matter how good the findings of NGOs are, they are ignored as long as these findings are viewed as anti-government”. He used the late Prof John Makumbe, a well-known critic of the government, as an example. Even when they were objective, Makumbe’s findings were never incorporated into government decision-making.

8.6.3 Undue Political Interference in the Selection of the Members of Commissions of Inquiry There has been undue political interference in the choice of members to undertake the land audit in Zimbabwe. For instance, Dore (in The Financial Gazette, 17 September 2015) states that: …gone are the provisions that Parliament would be responsible for appointing members to the land commission. Instead, it is the President once again who makes the appointments. Nor does Parliament provide policy guidelines. Instead, it is the Minister of Lands who gives policy directives to the land commission. Any regulations too, are subject to Ministerial approval. Subsections 5 and 6 (a) try to give the Commission a veneer of independence and impartiality. The Commission may make recommendations on a host of issues, including land tenure and compensation, but it lacks any real powers of implementation or teeth for enforcement.

Interviewees from the academia indicated that the president and the ministers’ roles in the Land Commission militated against transparency in the audit and concealed corruption in the land reform programme. Moreover, partisan appointments compromise the independence of the Commissions. According to Etzioni (1978:1), policy research is best conducted by organisational units that specialise in such research, as well as units that are close to policy-makers yet sufficiently independent to allow critical analysis. While the Commissions often meet the first two conditions, they fail the independence test as the Office of the Minister might tamper with the findings before they are referred to the Parliament.

8.6.4 Corruption Misuse of state resources for political expediency has also undermined PRA organisations’ capacity. Policy-makers have tended to divert resources for political gains set aside for policy research and analysis. One interviewee cited an example where

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international agencies (UNDP and FAO) allocated resources to the Ministry of Agriculture for an audit, yet they were misappropriated and instead used for purchasing vehicles for political campaigns. Similarly, Nyoni (2011:35) states that: …Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, revealed that during his term in office, his government set aside funds for Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. However, the plans to fund the controversial land reform exercise failed to take off amid fears that Mugabe's administration would misappropriate the funds and would not be used for the purposes for which it was directed.

Such diversion of funds militates against the capacity of organisations to engage in effective PRA as resources are misappropriated to further the interest of the politicians.

8.6.5 Funding Gaps The lack of funding also emerged as one of the stumbling blocks for PRA capacity development (Sawyerr, 2004:226). The above scholar argues that, in many African countries, PRA is largely funded by donor grants. Regarding the land policy, the above observation is in line with the views of academics who were interviewed. Most key informants agreed that PRA institutions have faced challenges to receive funding, as donors have become reluctant to fund land issues in Zimbabwe. More specifically, some European-based organisations have become less inclined to fund projects relating to land advocacy in Zimbabwe. During an interview with a Ruzivo Trust official, the key informant in question stated that “…when the political situation in Zimbabwe worsened in 2008, and our organisation, researching land issues, was investigated, Oxfam withdrew its assistance”. The key informant indicated that since then, the Trust has been doing consultancy research as a fundraising endeavour. All these revelations gave the general impression that without adequate and reliable funding, sound PRA remained a nightmare. In line with this, Zhou and Zinyama (2016:16) assert that “it is a truism that effective public policy research and analysis without funding is a nullity”. Funding challenges have affected both NGOs and government institutions. Notably, these challenges have limited the mobility of researchers who are involved in PRA institutions’ field operations. For instance, Zhou and Zinyama (2016:38) state that, “In the Ministry of Agriculture, only supervisors have motorbikes while their subordinates have bicycles which are not appropriate for their job. In the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), the mobility of researchers is constrained by the lack of trucks”. The same challenge was noted at the Ministry of Lands and Institute A. In particular, Informant A said that “…we do not have adequate vehicles to enable our team to go into the research field thereby compromising the organisation’s concerted efforts to reach all target research areas”.

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8.6.6 Inaccessibility of Government Documents The study found that information on land policy, projects and programmes within government institutions is, in most cases, inaccessible. The government has implemented institutional and legislative frameworks that prohibit interested parties  – especially non-state actors – to access relevant information. The situation is worse when these institutions are perceived to be antagonistic towards government imperatives. In particular, one interviewee at the University of Zimbabwe said that “…the Official Secrecy Act is very prohibitive as it does not allow access to government documents for individuals”. In line with the above, it would seem that only specific role-players were granted access to the aforementioned information. For instance, government-related PRA institutions could more readily access information than NGOs. This was revealed during an interview with a senior academic at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of Sociology and a member of the Utete Land Commission. The key informants confirmed that they mostly consulted government documents, which they accessed through government offices like the then Ministry of Agriculture and Land and the Civil Service Commission (CSC). This scenario, as backed by the above theoretical framework, highlights the critical role institutional frameworks play in promoting PRA activities. Role players outside the government did not have equal access to state information or documents. Almost all the academics from the selected state universities and key informants from NGOs concurred that accessing government information was problematic. For instance, one academic at Midlands State University noted that once lecturers disclosed their positions, they were viewed as critics of the government and were therefore not given access to government documents. An NGO key informant said that the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) was denied access to statistical government documents, as it was labelled a “government critic”. In a similar vein, Informant F mentioned that “…it is a struggle to get information from the government. Sometimes you get it, sometimes you do not”. For him, the difficulties were linked to the government’s view that NGOs were trying to discredit the government on land reform.

8.6.7 Human Resource Constraints The quantity and quality of human resources dealing with PRA in Zimbabwe’s land policy have significantly dwindled. In particular, Zhou and Zinyama (2016:38) argue that “the Ministry of Agriculture is yet to recover from the brain drain that was induced by the post-2000 socio-economic meltdown in which it lost specialised and experienced staff across all departments”. University departments are staffed by young lecturers who lack the experience and expertise to analyse policies. Interviews with key informants at the Ministry of Lands revealed that, even within the Ministry, there is inadequate expertise owing to inadequate training with only two employees in the Ministry of Lands trained in Land Management in Germany.

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8.6.8 Information Technology Constraints Sound information and communication technology (ICT) plays a fundamental role in strengthening PRA in the agricultural sector. However, the economic environment in Zimbabwe does not support the implementation of the information technology (IT) structures that are necessary to strengthen the capacity of PRA in land policy. Indeed, IT constraints remain one of the major challenges in strengthening PRA in land policy (Tsokota & Solms, 2013:3). This is compounded by the weak budgetary allocation for the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology. Interviews with key informants confirmed IT-related challenges in the country. Respondent S, a project coordinator from NPA, revealed that “…technology is a problem in Zimbabwe as a nation. There is no new technology for monitoring things. There is only the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS)”. Similar revelations were made by MoLRR officials who have relied on INGOs for the provision of technological equipment. For instance, one official revealed that “…organisations like UN and JICA have provided aeroplanes for aerial topography, whereas the UN has also provided plotters for the printing of the aerial maps”. Another interviewee from the MoLRR pointed out that “…the UNDP and EU have been assisting the Ministry in buying computers for them since 2010 so that working can be made easier”. These are all IT-focused efforts by INGOs to tackle developmental problems. However, NGOs like WLZ and Institute A stated that they do not have technological challenges. Instead, they revealed that they had to access to the required technological resources such as telephones, computers, and laptops.

8.7 Ways of Improving Institutional Capacity for Policy Research Analysis in Zimbabwe Based on the evidence conclusions presented above, the authors make the following recommendations to address some of the PRA deficiencies afore-discussed.

8.7.1 Prioritising Research-Related Funding There is an urgent need to prioritise funding for land research and analysis in state and non-state institutions. As such, there should be a budget allocation for research in state institutions. To support research initiatives, ministries should be provided with a fleet of vehicles to conduct site visits. Universities should also be well-funded to recruit and retain senior academic staff such as professors and PhD holders, provide staff development programmes, offer infrastructural development funding cadetship programmes, and facilitate contact visits by lecturers (Zhou & Zinyama, 2016:53–54). Furthermore, non-state actors should engage international organisations to provide the needed funding.

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8.7.2 Building Policy Capacity Through Training and Education There is a need to prioritise capacity building through training and education. Most research institutions have suffered the loss of experienced staff in various specialised departments. Out of necessity, research institutions and departments are staffed by inexperienced staff, which compromises the quality of research outputs. Therefore, there is a need for capacity building by providing training and education opportunities to ensure objective policy research and analysis. For instance, Zhou and Zinyama (2016:52) argue that new learning opportunities in the form of formal courses and informal events (e.g., annual conferences, periodic luncheons and leadership) should be provided to strengthen capacity.

8.7.3 Establishing Policy Research Analysis Departments in Relevant Ministries Government should modify the existing organisational structures and create specialised units or departments for PRA to create a strong policy focus, provide expertise and create capacity to address policy problems. Government ministries should focus on improving the delivery of key development priorities and move to an outcomes-­based approach to public service delivery. As part of this change, the government should review policy capacity as part of periodic departmental capacity reviews. The initiative should also include the development of an annual ministry-­ wide research plan to address issues of key importance.

8.7.4 Strengthening of Interactions Between Policy Research Analysis Institutions and Government There is a need to build a working relationship between state and non-state policy institutions. Zhou and Zinyama (2016:53) argue that academics and government departments should periodically join forces to design short-term training programmes that directly address the input and research needs of the government sector. Non-state policy institutions should invite government officials to workshops, conferences, research presentations and seminars. This will introduce practical experience in non-state institutes’ policy debates. It will further address the problem of the government’s limited utilisation of research institutes’ expertise and research outputs. The interaction between non-state actors and state actors will also help eradicate the perceived mutual mistrust.

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8.7.5 Enhancing Government-Private Sector Partnerships for Policy Research Analysis Government partnerships with academic institutions, not-for-profit organisations and foundations can create centres of expertise. This increases the flow of information and ideas, thereby improving the government’s policy capacity. The cooperation between the government and private sector will also help determine which policy direction to take, as well as which policies to enact and promote. Indeed, the partnership should be based on mutual respect, trust and demand among policy institutions.

8.7.6 Accessibility of Relevant Government Documents To ensure objective PRA, government documents should be readily accessible to independent research organisations such as research institutes and universities. To improve public policy, the government should be tolerant and make its structures accessible for research and evaluation. This will also solve the challenge of hypothetical research as real and accurate data will be accessed.

8.7.7 Involving of Parliament in Appointments and Reporting Procedures of the Land Commission The president, in consultation with Parliament, should select the Land Commission team. Zhou and Zinyama (2016:57) state that “…the new Zimbabwean Constitution requires Parliament to play an active role in the appointment of the commissioners for various commissions such as Human Rights, and Zimbabwe Electoral Commission”. As a result, this should be replicated in the appointment of the Land Commissioners. Furthermore, there is a need to reconsider the Land Commission’s reporting frameworks. Currently, the Land Commission reports directly to the Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement, who then presents the report to the Parliament. Such reporting procedures may generate problems where the Land Commission comes up with a negative report and the Minister tampers with the findings before the report is submitted to the Parliament. Thus, the Land Commission should report directly to Parliament.

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8.8 Conclusion This chapter demonstrated that the establishment of PRA institutions in Zimbabwe, both state and non-state, centred on the improvement of decision-making based on objective findings, to achieve sustainable development in the country. The evidence gathered on the ground, however, reveals a more complicated scenario in which non-state policy institutions are seen as agents of the imperialist government. In addition, the study found that insufficient resources, undue political interference, difficulties with human resources, problems with information technology and corruption have a negative impact on the effectiveness of policy research and analysis. It is imperative that the government places a high priority on PRA initiatives in order to guarantee that decisions regarding sustainability are made with full knowledge.

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Kapuya, T., Anseeuw, W., & Saruchera, D. (2012). Zimbabwe’s agricultural reconstruction: Present state, ongoing projects and prospects for reinvestment. Working Paper Series Number 32. Development Bank of Southern Africa: Development Planning Division. Matondi, P. B. (2012). Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform. Zed Books. Mead, L. M. (2004). Policy research: The field dimension. Policy Studies Journal, 33(1), 535–557. Ojagbohunmi, G. A. (1990). Institutionalisation of policy analysis in developing countries with special reference to Nigeria. Working Paper Series No. 83. International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS). Ololube, N. P., Onyekwere, L. A., & Kpolovie, P. J. (2010). Human security and educational development in The Niger Delta region. Journal of Human Security, 8(1), 47–67. Richard, S. W. (2004). Institutional theory. SAGE Publications. Sawyerr, A. (2004). African universities and the challenge of research capacity development: Boston College and Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. JHEA/ RESA, 2(1), 211–240. Stone, D., Maxwell, M., & Keating, M. (2001). Bridging research and policy. An International Workshop Funded by Development for International Development (DFID), Warwick University. Available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/ csgr/research/keytopic/other/bridging.pdf. Accessed on 12 Dec 2020. Tsokota, T., & Solms, R. (2013). ICT and the turning-around of the Zimbabwean economy. A Paper Presented At The International Conference on ICT for Africa, February 20–23. Harare. USAID. (2011). Performance monitoring and evaluation: Measuring institutional capacity. TIPS Report Number 15. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadw115.pdf. Accessed on 19 Sept 2020. Utete, C. (2003). Report on the presidential land review committee on the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme, 2000–2002. Presidential Land Review Committee. Zhou, G. (2014). Institutionalising and mainstreaming policy analysis culture in African environments. International Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 1(1), 12–25. Zhou, G., & Zinyama, T. (2016). Strengthening institutional capacity for policy analysis, management and governance in Zimbabwe. University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Part III

Development as a Painful Process

Chapter 9

Development-Induced Displacement: A Call for Ethical Considerations in Africa Robson Mandishekwa

Abstract  Development projects often lead to displacement. This chapter builds on the trolley problem as an ethical decision-making tool for displacement. It argues that despite the trolley problem having been identified about six decades ago, its application in decisions about development projects that lead to displacement is rare, especially in Africa. That is the ethical considerations, especially using the trolley problem, about displacing people have been under-researched. The study, therefore, puts forward the argument that despite the benefits derived from development projects, ethical considerations still need to be emphasised. This research, therefore, used the trolley problem as one sacrificial dilemma model for ethical decision-making. The findings indicate that utilitarian approaches suggest that displacing the minority is acceptable based on the fact that the majority are going to benefit. Deontologically, this displacement is not morally justifiable because the government has a moral obligation to protect every citizen against arbitrary displacement. If approached for assistance, courts may not need to intervene because, from the trolley problem view, they will be perceived as allowing the killing of innocent civilians, if they rule in favour of the government or development partners. Again, the government must improve the welfare of the citizens, who include both the displaced and the non-displaced, but by instituting the project, the displaced may be worse off than before. Faced with this dilemma, the government normally uses its power of eminent domain to attain supposedly utilitarian results. Keywords  Trolley problem · Utilitarianism · Deontology · Pareto efficiency · Development-induced displacement

R. Mandishekwa (*) Department of Economic Sciences, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_9

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9.1 Introduction While utility maximisation is very important in economic decisions, it need not necessarily overshadow the concern for the individual. Thus, while utility maximisation is central to economics, it should not supersede the concern for individual survival. The key philosophical and ethical question asked in this study is: Is it morally permissible to displace people to enable development projects which have national interests? This question has various connotations from which it may be viewed. For instance, Downing and Carmen Garcia (2006, p.1) once said “[d]evelopment that impoverishes is not development”. This may be taken to mean that as long as some people are impoverished, there is no development to talk about because development must be inclusive. In this same line of reasoning, Penz et al. (2011) said that development must be worthwhile for it to be considered development; otherwise, it becomes maldevelopment. Another perspective from which the statement by Downing and Carmen Garcia (2006) may be analysed is the capability approach. Along this line of thought, one may think that by displacing households, the capabilities and functionings of households and individuals are negatively affected. According to Sen (1999), capability deprivation is poverty. In this same vein, because development-induced displacement leads to capability deprivation, we argue that development projects that displace communities impoverish the displaced persons. On the contrary, Sen views development as capability expansion and freedom. Another moral dilemma question that may be asked is: Does it matter whether a person migrates on his or her own or was forced to migrate because of a development project? This study argues that the morality of the development project’s effects on inhabitants is necessary for the attainment of sustainable growth with equity. To attain the above objectives, two ethical theories, utilitarianism and deontology, are employed along the trolley problem as a sacrificial dilemma. Findings indicate that ethical considerations in development-induced displacements are necessary for inclusive development. Deontologically, it is important to do unto others what one would like others to do unto him. Therefore, one is advised not to intentionally cause harm to innocent persons. As such, governments and lawmakers need to minimise displacements because they lead to capability deprivations and at times to human rights abuses among other consequences. The chapter is organised as follows: First, the literature is reviewed including that on the trolley problem and development-induced displacement. Secondly, development-induced displacement and its association with the trolley problem are outlined. Finally, a conclusion is made to show that development-induced displacement needs to be analysed in the context of sacrificial dilemmas such as the trolley problem.

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9.2 Literature Review Conway and Gawronski (2013) state that the judgements for moral dilemmas are usually guided by two theories: deontology and utilitarianism. On the one hand, Conway and Gawronski (2013, p.216) state that “…deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences)”. Therefore, deontology does not put much emphasis on the consequences of an action but on its intrinsic nature. Biblically, deontology is associated with some of the ten commandments (Hausman & McPherson, 2006). Thus, Hausman and McPherson (2006) argue that as stated in the fifth commandment, one is not allowed to kill. From this statement, one can find that it does not say to minimise killing. On the other hand, “…the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people)” (Conway & Gawronski, 2013, p.216). Thus, according to consequentialism, whose variant is utilitarianism (Roby, 2018; Kay, 2020), the consequences are very important in making a decision. The good outcomes must outweigh the bad for an action to be justified (Roby, 2018). Possibly implied in this argument is the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion which argues that if winners can theoretically pay losers, then the action must be done. Hausman and McPherson (2006) thus say deontological theories conflict with consequentialism theories and rationality. Using utilitarianism and deontological theories, this study analyses the applicability of the trolley problem to decisions of instituting development projects such as mining and hydropower projects that lead to most population internal displacement in Africa. By internal displacement, it is meant displacement within borders which, when then referring to internally displaced persons (IDPs), Opukri and Ibaba (2008) termed aliens in their communities. The argument posed here is similar to the ones posed by Downing and Carmen Garcia (2006) and Goulet (2006), although the current study focuses on the trolley problem as a tool of analysis. Downing and Carmen Garcia (2006, p.1) said “[d]evelopment that impoverishes is not development”. Again, Goulet (2006, p.4) had this to say “[i]f the world is to succeed in its development efforts, it needs to discover, to promote, and to propose an ethics which takes full account of the requirements of authentic development. Otherwise, universal prosperity and fraternity will remain an unrealizable dream and become a new opium of the people”. From Goulet (2006), it is revealed that ethical considerations are very important in the development agenda. Thus, if a country is to institute a development project, it has also to consider the ethical issues instead of just economic progress resulting from the project. In addition, Downing and Carmen Garcia (2006) may be taken to imply that development that is not inclusive cannot be considered to be development possibly because of capability deprivations associated with development projects. That is if some people are affected in a bid to improve welfare for others that need not be considered as development at all. This is again in line with the sentiments echoed by Penz et  al. (2011) when they spoke about maldevelopment. All in all, economic

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development from projects that lead to displacement needs to be inclusive. This can be attained by making sure that at least no one is made worse off by the project as proposed by the Pareto principle. However, greater harm may be permitted by not undertaking the development projects and by not industrializing (Penz et al., 2011) but “…development is a worthy social goal if, and only if, it satisfies several values, including human well-being, equity, empowerment, cultural freedom, human rights, environmental sustainability and integrity regarding corruption” (Penz et  al., 2011, p.11). Current work on development-induced displacement has concentrated on risks associated with these projects. For instance, Cernea (1997) has given rise to the impoverishment risks and reconstruction model. In the model, Cernea gave eight risks associated with displacement. The analysis by Cernea in most of his studies is from a social anthropology perspective. From an economics perspective, Mandishekwa and Mutenheri (2020) studied these risks of displacements in Arda Transau, Zimbabwe, and found the majority of these risks to exist. Also, a similar study was done by Agbley (2019) in Ghana, using biofuel-induced displacements. Thus, ethical considerations have been generally relegated to development-induced displacement studies. In contrast to most existing arguments for development projects, where development projects may be approved based on efficiency, expected returns and/or cost-­ benefit analysis, this study aims to show that ethical considerations need to be included at the onset. Therefore, by outlining the ethical considerations in development projects, the article contents that development-induced displacement’s consequences need to include ethical considerations. This study is rightfully placed because most economic decisions, especially on development-induced displacements in Africa, have rarely involved ethical considerations. Economists have generally been involved in debates about efficiency at the expense of the morality of the action, yet efficient utilisation of resources needs to be done ethically. The maximisation of utility must be morally justified. Thus, by invoking ethics, economic decisions for development projects will be better placed. To put this into context, this study uses the trolley problem as an ethical decision-making tool. The choice of the trolley problem is informed by the fact that it has become increasingly used in moral decision-making as argued by Kahane et al. (2017). In this study, the trolley problem is applied to development-induced displacement since the projects that lead to displacement are meant as development engines but usually turn out to make other people worse off. By so doing, the attainment of several Sustainable Development Goals, for example, goal number one (SDG 1) on reducing poverty and goal number eight (SDG 8) on promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable growth, is stalled. This may, possibly, be the first study to use the trolley problem to study development projects that lead to displacement in Africa. Thus, the study places a practical problem in the simplest abstract scenario suggested by Foot (1967). Of note is that no solution, especially to the trolley problem, is without controversy (Graham, 2017; Kahane et al., 2017). de Wet (2015) also noted that ethical dilemmas have no clear solutions.

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While several authors, such as Drydyk (2007), Penz et  al. (2011) and de Wet (2015), have written on ethics of development, little is currently known about the application of ethical dilemmas in development projects. As such the application of the trolley problem is a move in the right direction because it provides the foundation for use of this approach to development-induced displacement analysis.

9.3 The Trolley Problem Foot (1967) is credited for noting well the trolley problem. There are, however, several illustrations of the trolley problem (Foot, 1967; Edmonds, 2014). Following Foot (1967), Thomson has written widely on this topic, for example, Thomson (1976, 1978, 1985). In all these attempts, Thomson was trying to offer solutions and critiques to the various versions of the trolley problem. In short, the trolley problem has been around for more than three decades now. However, its application to development-­induced displacement is rare. Reamer (2021) stated that the trolley problem, sometimes called trolleyology, has become a staple in moral philosophy. The authors go on to say, “[t]he Trolley Problem provides educators, students, and practitioners with complex ethics scenarios that require careful analysis, particularly for their implications for practical decision making” (Reamer, 2021, p.43). To illustrate the trolley problem, let us use the following cases. Suppose there is a loose trolley coming in a rail track. Five rail workers are trapped by the rail who will be killed if the trolley continues on its path. However, there is a switch in front of a bystander which if hit will turn the trolley to a side track. On that side track is also a worker trapped. Another situation is that the trolley is not loose but has a driver. The driver upon realising the five trapped workers can turn the train (or not) thereby either saving the five men or killing one man. Then the question is: Is it morally ethical to hit the switch (the bystander case) or turn the train (the driver case) so that five workers will be saved but one worker will be killed? That is: Is it ethical to kill one to save five? If it is acceptable to kill one person to save five, then we will be said to be adhering to the utilitarianism principle while accepting not killing any person(s) is analogous to the deontological response. According to Conway and Gawronski (2013), in traditional settings, accepting utilitarianism is similar to rejecting the deontological principle. This concurs with Hausman and McPherson (2006) who noted that deontology and consequentialism conflict. Thus, the “thou shall not kill” commandment is upheld when deontology is accepted. Hedner and Hansson (1988) also noted that, according to the utilitarian principle, an intervention is justified based on the number of beneficiaries against the affected. If the number affected is greater than those to benefit, the intervention is not justified (Hedner & Hansson, 1988). Thus, the greatest happiness principle must hold for any intervention to take place. In the scenarios above then, turning the trolley by the bystander or the driver is justified according to utilitarianism because only one man is likely to die while five will be saved. Therefore, more will benefit from the action.

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The moral duty of not killing, as in the trolley problem argues that killing is not permissible, whether it is killing one or all the five workers in the cases above. Thus, as humans, we are morally responsible for saving a life, not destroying them. In line with this, Duncan (2015) argues that it is more objectionable to harm than to allow it to happen. This means, in the context of this study, that allowing development to take place without displacing certain people is allowed, but to allow development through a displacement is not justified. However, given this dilemma what then can one, say the government, do? One way maybe is not to intervene, that is, to let the trolley proceed on its track without anyone being held responsible for diverting it. In terms of development then, can the economy develop without these development projects being approved by the government? This is, however, mostly unattainable. Let us again turn to the bystander case, where the bystander can turn the trolley. Let us assume the bystander can turn the trolley to kill one workman or to kill himself. If the act is done in such a way that the doer (bystander) pays the cost (kills himself), then it is permissible according to Graham (2017). If he does not pay the price, then it remains not permissible morally. Therefore, in line with this line of thinking, the government must pay the cost of development-induced displacement for the displacement to be somehow acceptable. If the government is not prepared to pay the price, then there is no justification for displacement. There are several ways the government can pay this price, for example, compensation and or restitution for assets lost. And yet another illustrative example given by Thomson (1985) is whereby five patients in a hospital need some transplants, for example, heart, kidney and lung, for them to survive. Suddenly a fit man, ceteris paribus, peaches up into the hospital, and the qualified surgeon pleads for the donation of these parts from the fit man. The young man refuses. Then the question is: Is it morally justified for the surgeon to let the five die by not killing the fit young man to transplant the parts for the five to survive? Thomson (1985) argued that letting the five dies is permissible as compared to killing the young man. Thus, the principle of letting the five dies versus killing one justifies the saving of the young man because saving the five requires killing one. The simplest rule is that if saving some person(s) involves killing another, then it is not morally justified. This conclusion is derived from deontology. In terms of development-induced displacement, developing an economy through sacrificing other people by displacing them will not be morally acceptable. From the above illustrations, one can preliminarily conclude that killing is not permissible. The number killed is not necessarily important, but as long as the killing is involved, it is not ethical. The following section looks at the trolley problem from the perspective of development projects that lead to displacement.

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9.4 Development-Induced Displacement in Zimbabwe Zimbabwe’s government has embarked on several development projects which led to displacement. One well-documented project is the Kariba dam project which displaced 57,000 people both in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Cernea, 1997). Recently, the Chiadzwa diamond and Chisumbanje green fuel cases have raised concerns over the human rights abuses caused by these projects. Gukurume and Nhodo (2020) stated that the government of Zimbabwe in 2009 targeted to displace 4700 villagers to allow for diamond mining. As of 2017, 930 households had been displaced (Mandishekwa & Mutenheri, 2019). In line with the expectations of utilitarianism, the government acted in the interest of the majority which happen to the people of Zimbabwe who were expected to gain from the mining ventures. It was expected that the proceeds from mining will trickle down to everyone in the country. Thus, it acted on the basis that aggregate utility is more important than individual utilities. In that way, it played the role of turning the trolley to save five people, thereby killing one person. In this case, the five people here are analogous to the majority of the Zimbabweans, while the ones killed are the displaced persons. As if the above is not enough, the government and the mining companies did not go through the required processes. Gukurume and Nhodo (2020) noted that there was no environmental impact assessment done as required by the Environmental Management Act (Chapter 20:27). Also, no consultations were done as required by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Gukurume & Nhodo, 2020). This exacerbated the situation. In a bid to adhere to some deontological principles, particularly the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the government somehow tried to compensate the Chiadzwa villagers by giving each household one hectare of arable land. While this could be taken as a welcome development, the land size is small relative to the one the villagers lost. It seems that these arbitrary displacements are likely to continue in Zimbabwe. For example, Zimbabwe intends to displace about 12,000 households in the Chilonga area of the Chiredzi district through Statutory Instrument 51 of 2021 as also stated in Statutory Instrument 63A of 2021. The area stretches for about 12,940 hectares of land. The main reason for displacing households is the establishment of an irrigation scheme. However, like in the case of Chiadzwa and Chisumbanje, no consultations have been done. For Chisumbanje, what started as internal displacement ended up being external displacement with some villagers relocating to Mozambique. The externally displaced persons may, however, not be recognised as refugees and hence will remain as externally displaced persons. Instead of allowing displaced persons to equitably gain from the development projects, the Zimbabwean government has been victimising them.

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9.5 Development-Induced Displacement and the Trolley Problem In the development project case, this can be illustrated as follows. A development project is aimed at making more people better off than those to be displaced. Projects of this nature include mining, hydropower projects and national parks. For these projects to be done, there may be a need to displace or forcibly relocate people. The benefits of these projects usually extend beyond those displaced and the current generation. However, the costs also do the same for those displaced. If the project is imminent, is it morally permissible to displace these few people to allow the nation to benefit? The few to be displaced, in this case, act as the one worker in the trolley problem, while the nation at large represents the five workers. Again, the few to be sacrificed may act as the fit young man, while the nation may be considered to be the five patients in the hospital. The bystander, in this case, may represent the courts of law, while the driver is the government which may use its power of eminent domain or even the development partners who have an agenda to transform the nation through the development project. The courts have the power to intervene, using the law at their disposal to allow or not to allow the project to continue, thereby allowing or disallowing displacement. However, this is possible if they are approached by the victims of development-induced displacement. Therefore, is it moral for the courts not to intervene and save the majority or intervene to save the few people to be displaced? Again, is it morally justifiable for the government to disapprove or not to engage in the project to protect the few to be saved from displacement while rendering development not possible? This is analogous to the driver not turning the trolley but allowing the killing of five workers. Again, is it morally permissible for the courts to allow the displacement of the few or otherwise? This is similar to the bystander case where the bystander can turn the switch. From the consequentialism theory, especially the utilitarian perspective, it is allowed that the majority be saved because their total utility outweighs that of the minority. Thus, using the argument that utility is additive (Wesseling, 2000), the utility derived from saving five workers is more than that of saving one. Analogously, the utility derived from the proposed development project by allowing the project to affect a few people is more than that derived by saving the few from displacement. Thus, the greatest happiness principle by Bentham (1781) will argue that it is better to allow the project to proceed. The underlying assumption here is possible that utilities derived from the project have equal weights among the people displaced and those to benefit. If not, as we will find later, a different solution may come out. The motives of the agent are, however, ignored in the utilitarianism theory (Kay, 2020). For instance, the ruling party’s motive for gaining popular votes in the next election, by developing an underdeveloped area, is not of essence but the outcome counts more. That is to say, people who are displaced may count more than the need for elections. Also, that a few people are affected may not be as justifiable as the fact that the majority will benefit. Contrastingly, utilitarianism seems to accord equal weighting to losses and gains. But if non-equal weighting was to be used, it may be

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possible that on aggregate, the nation may be worse off as a whole than without the project. That is to say, assuming utility is still additive, weights may give displaced persons an upper hand by according them more weight thereby outweighing the benefits of the project. This is because Smith (2002, p.53) said “…our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, … naturally felt by the person principally concerned”. This means that if weights are to be accorded to gains and losses, losers will accord more weight to losses than to gains. Again, a spectator is likely to accord more weight to losses than gains because he or she is expected to sympathise with losers more than winners. Therefore, if the courts of law, as spectators, are to use this moral understanding, they may afford displaced person relief by not allowing displacement because the courts will sympathise with the displaced people. A practical example of a situation whereby the losses to the few transcended to the majority is the fast-track land reform in Zimbabwe. While the commercial farmers were considered losers, the nation finally lost because it shifted from being a breadbasket to being a bread beggar of the regional bloc. Thus, if weighting were to be applied, the nation will be a net loser. However, even if weighting is not applied, the Zimbabwean example illustrates that the move made all worse off. From an efficiency perspective, Pareto efficiency argues that an action is efficient if it, at least, leads to no one being made worse off than before the intervention (Debreu, 1954; Beckerman, 2017). On the one hand, from the Pareto efficiency criterion, the development project, such as a hydropower project, will only be permissible if it does not lead anyone to be worse off than before the project. Thus, if this displacement does not make displaced persons worse off than before, then it is assumed to be Pareto efficient and therefore allowed. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion (Beckerman, 2017), on the other hand, states that in such scenarios, it is only efficient and therefore permissible if the winners are theoretically able and willing to compensate the losers. Thus, in the trolley problem, the bystander (courts of law in this case) will only hit the switch if the five workers are willing to compensate the single worker who will die in that event. Analogously, if the development project is to continue, the nation at large must be theoretically willing to pay the displaced persons. The practicality of this is, however, not likely to occur unless some form of compensation like benefits-sharing is employed. Again, from the perspective of trickle-down economics, it is permissible to allow people to be displaced because they will benefit from the project. Thus, benefits from the project will theoretically trickle down to the affected individuals. If this were practically possible, this may be a better alternative just like the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. However, trickle-down effects are not always possible. In fact, on the one hand, there may be an increase in inequality, in one or all of its various forms, including wealth, health, opportunities etc., because of these projects, with displaced persons being discriminated against. If, on the other hand, the equity principle was to hold, these displaced persons were supposed to get more benefits from the project because they are the most in need since they will have lost out more to allow the project to take place. Perhaps this is why Cernea (1997) called these displaced persons “investors of equity”.

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The Kaldor-Hicks criterion and trickle-down economics seem to approve displacement on certain grounds and both may be viewed to be utilitarian. The Kaldor-­ Hicks criterion is aligned with utilitarianism in that if compensation can be obtained, then the intervention is approved. One can make a compensation payment only if he or she can get net benefits after making the payments. That is to say, the utility derived by the payer must outweigh the costs to the payee. Again, benefits can only trickle down to others if the one directly benefitting has got enough for himself or herself; otherwise, nothing trickles down. From another perspective aligned with utilitarianism, if the doer (bystander) is prepared to pay the cost for his or her actions, the act is permissible (Graham, 2017). For instance, Mandishekwa (2020) argues that if a government discovers that it has, say by mistake, built a state house worth several billions of US dollars on top of a mineral deposit, will the house be demolished to pave way for mining? If so, then according to this ethical argument, the removal of a state house is morally justified because the government is the loser, that is, it is willing to pay the cost of its action. However, if not, then there is no basis, ethically, to displace people to pave way for mining while saving the statehouse under which there are mineral deposits as well. This argument is again in line with the golden principle which says “do unto others what you would want them to do unto you”. Analogously, if the government is willing to displace itself to pave way for development projects, then it may as well be willing to be displaced by other people to allow projects of that nature to take place. From the deontological principle, development projects that cause displacement must not kick off. This is so because it leaves some people worse off and therefore contradicts the fifth commandment that says “thou shall not kill”. The same argument could also be derived from the golden rule as stated above. The fifth commandment is corroborated by the sentiments of Smith (2002) that the concern for the individual must not be sacrificed in the name of utility maximisation. In deontological principles, whether the affected number is high or not does matter. What matters is that at least someone is not made worse off by any intervention. Thus, as long as development projects lead to displacement, they may not be approved on ethical grounds. Therefore, the deontological perspective may be considered alongside the Pareto efficiency criterion. Possibly the difference may be that Pareto considered efficiency in his arguments while deontologists invoked moral principles. Analogous to the deontological argument, Downing and Carmen Garcia (2006:1) said “[d]evelopment that impoverishes is not development”. This, possibly, means that irrespective of the number to benefit or lose, as long as some are impoverished, there is no development at all. This is very important because in most cases the justification for development-induced displacement is premised on neoliberal arguments based on utilitarianism which argues that as long as the majority will benefit, the project is justified. This justification is contrary to Adam Smith’s (2002) concern about the individual versus the total community utility. It also contradicts the proclamation “thou shall not kill”. The commandment “thou shall not kill” does not mention the number to be killed to be anything above zero. The number killed must be zero for one to obey the commandment. Thus, deontologically, an intervention must not negatively affect anyone for it to be morally ethical.

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In the development projects above, the courts of law, if approached, will be held accountable in one way or the other. For instance, by not allowing the development projects, the courts will have violated other residents’ positive rights through the omission of an act that may have improved their (residents’) lives. However, by allowing the project to continue, they will have violated the displaced persons’ negative rights. Along with this argument, Duncan (2015) noted that positive rights are violated when the bystander does nothing to the trolley, while negative ones are violated when the bystander turns the trolley thereby killing one person. However, doing and allowing an act is different. If the courts of law do not intervene, they are not allowing or doing. They are just omitting an act, that is, the courts are simply acting like a bystander who does not turn the switch. However, in the case of the driver, the act involves the driver. Therefore, the driver will be considered to have done an act, that is, killing. The development actors are recommended to find other means of development without necessarily displacing some people. This is because displacement is more like harming the people displaced, analogous to capability deprivation. Since harming is more objectionable (Duncan, 2015), it is not morally permissible. Thus, if development means displacing others, it is not morally justified in line with the letting five dies versus killing one principle. This, again, corroborates the Pareto efficiency criterion which states that an intervention is not Pareto efficient if it leads to at least a person being made worse off than before the intervention. Since displacement leaves at least someone being made worse off, it then may not be justified. With this, it means moral ethics and Pareto efficiency may be considered to have found each other at least as shown in this study. If governments want to engage in development projects with the potential to displace people, it may be permissible for them to do it in areas in which the governments are currently doing their economic activities. That is to say, if the government is prepared to pay the cost, it may engage in such activities; if not, then it is encouraged not to undertake those projects. As noted by Drydyk (2007), compliance plan must be put in place. Failure to have a compliance plan fails to comply with agreements made before group displacements. This is the case with the displaced persons in Arda Transau, Zimbabwe. Before displacement, certain agreements were made, such as providing food hampers, but after displacement, the companies responsible for displacements reneged on their promises leaving households on their own. The place of ethics in development projects is very important for it shows that despite the quest for tapping growth from underneath the ground, in the case of extractive industries, there is a need for ethical considerations. If that is done, national welfare may equally improve. The study, therefore, again recommends that if these projects are to be instituted, governments may consider taking cognisance of these ethical arguments where possible.

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9.6 Conclusion Despite the usual acceptance of development projects, they lead to the displacement of people. However, it has been established that these displacements need ethical considerations. If such invocations are put in place, then even human rights will not be violated in the name of development projects because rights override utility (Graham, 2017). Again, Duncan (2015) concludes that even the driver is not allowed to turn the trolley. Therefore, in line with Duncan (2015), the government, as a driver of the economic development train, may not be allowed to displace people to pave way for development projects. Contrary to this, Graham (2017) and Thomson (1985, p.1395) concur when Thompson said “[r]ights trump utilities”. That is to say, utilities derived from these development projects do not justify the loss of rights to those displaced. Conclusively, the two authors imply that displacement may not be justified because it violates people’s rights. However, beneficiaries of the development projects will also have their rights trumped if the project is not undertaken (Drydyk, 2007). Given that one’s rights must not violate another’s, it becomes very difficult to give a clear conclusion. But adhering to the rule – do unto others what you would like them to do unto you – may solve the dilemma in that no one will love to be displaced.

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Chapter 10

Health and Healthcare Delivery in Zimbabwe: Past and Present Tamisai Chipunza

and Senia Nhamo

Abstract Zimbabwe did not achieve the health-related 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and unless bold measures to improve the situation are taken, the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) health targets could be missed too. Understanding the healthcare challenges in Zimbabwe is key in proposing suggestions for positioning the country’s healthcare delivery system along the path of the 2030 SDGs. This chapter aimed to explore the key issues impacting Zimbabwe’s path toward ensuring healthy living and well-being (SDG3). It sheds light on the state of health and healthcare delivery in Zimbabwe since independence. This was achieved through a review and synthesis of literature and statistics on selected health-related indicators drawn from the United Nations (UN) tier classification of SDGs. The review showed that inadequate healthcare financing, more spending on salaries than on service delivery, the bias of public healthcare spending toward urban-based higher-level health facilities, and lack of community participation in health matters are among the challenges impacting efficient healthcare delivery in Zimbabwe. To improve health and healthcare delivery in the country, there is a need to enhance community participation in health issues, adequately equip lower-­ level health facilities, adopt strategies to retain health personnel, and raise additional resources for healthcare delivery. Keywords  Challenges · Development · Health · Healthcare · Zimbabwe

T. Chipunza (*) Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] S. Nhamo University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_10

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10.1 Introduction The government of Zimbabwe has, since independence in 1980, adopted strategies aimed at improving the health of the nation through health sector reforms. These involved the decentralization of healthcare, abolition of user fees (1980 to the early 1990s), and eventually user fee exemptions at public health institutions only for selected groups such as pregnant women, children under 5 years old, and the elderly. The government has also encouraged community participation in health and forged partnerships with the private sector and donor agencies on health-related matters. However, challenges in  health and healthcare delivery have continued to be witnessed, including inequalities in access to healthcare, high rates of child and maternal mortality, inadequate human resources for healthcare, and insufficient fiscal allocations to health. An appreciation of the nature and magnitude of these challenges is important in proffering possible measures to improve the country’s healthcare situation. Based on a review of literature and statistics on key health indicators, the chapter reflects on Zimbabwe’s healthcare situation since independence in 1980. Document content analysis was conducted by reviewing journal articles and government/organisational reports, without restrictions on publication dates. The chapter is organised as follows: first, the structure of the country’s health delivery system is presented. This is followed by a discussion of trends in selected health and health delivery indicators, as well as the healthcare financing situation in Zimbabwe. Strategies that can be adopted to improve health and healthcare delivery in the country are then proposed. A conclusion is provided in the last section.

10.2 Healthcare Delivery in Zimbabwe Healthcare delivery in Zimbabwe has been premised on the primary health care (PHC) approach (Osika et al., 2010; Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC), 2016; Ray & Masuka, 2017; Kidia, 2018). The PHC approach, articulated in the Alma-Ata (1978) declaration, emphasizes community participation (decision-­ making) on health issues/policies (World Health Organization, WHO, 1978). In 2018, national governments reaffirmed their commitment to the Alma-Ata Declaration at a conference in Kazakhstan, the Declaration of Astana on PHC (WHO/United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF, 2018). A major step that was taken by the government of Zimbabwe to operationalize the PHC approach has been the decentralization of healthcare. The process saw the country moving from an urban-based, white minority-oriented system to one which also catered for the majority black population that was predominantly rural (Woelk, 1994; Chirwa et al., 2016). Moreover, the move was aimed at having a health system covering promotion and prevention rather than just curative services (Woelk, 1994; Fundira & Shelley, 2020).

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Through the Prime Minister’s 1984/1985 Directive on Decentralisation, Zimbabwe created structures for public/community participation in development, including healthcare delivery (Stewart et al., 1994). The process entailed the creation of representative bodies at various levels, namely, the village, ward, district, provincial, and national levels. Decentralization saw the formation of Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), District Development Committees (DIDCOs), and Provincial Development Committees. From the ward level upward, each development committee has a committee on health issues. Community health workers are viewed as the key link between communities and local health services (Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, MoHCW, 2010). They are composed of village health workers (VHWs) (who are most common and are normally found in rural areas), health promoters (the urban counterparts of VHWs), and community-based distributors (whose major duty is to promote family planning services). For their services, community health workers receive variable monetary and material incentives – they are not full-time MoHCW employees. In 2016, more than 60% of villages were receiving the services of a VHW (MoHCC, 2016), and recent estimates place the coverage rate at 77% (Fundira & Shelley, 2020). The ministry anticipates engaging more VHWs and at the same time extending the program to cover resettlement areas. Although Zimbabwe’s health delivery system emphasizes community participation (base of the structure), the bias of the healthcare budget toward curative care at higher-level hospitals and payment of salaries continues to compromise the effectiveness of PHC in the country (Ray & Masuka, 2017; Shamu et al., 2017). Besides MoHCC facilities, PHC services are also provided by councils (58 rural and 28 urban), which use revenue collected from rates, licenses, levies, and grants from the central government to provide health services (MoHCC, 2017). However, it has been observed that the local authorities spend very little of the money on service delivery; the bulk of the funds, including those from the donor community, have been going to salaries (Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit, ZEPARU, 2019). The decentralized structure of Zimbabwe’s health system described above dovetails into the four levels at which healthcare is provided in the country. These are the primary, secondary (first referral), tertiary (second referral), and quaternary (third referral) levels.1 The primary level is the first port of call and is composed of rural and urban clinics that mainly offer preventive and curative care as well as maternity services. Depending on the complexity of the illness, patients are then referred to the next level of care (the secondary level), which is made up of district, mission, and rural hospitals. The tertiary level comprises the provincial hospitals in each of the country’s provinces, excluding the cities (Harare and Bulawayo) and Matabeleland North province where the construction of a provincial hospital is on course. At the quaternary level, there are six central hospitals (Chitungwiza, Harare,

 In 2020, a fifth level (the research and development hospital) was added (Chingwere, 2020; MoHCC, 2020). 1

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Ingutsheni, Mpilo, Parirenyatwa, and United Bulawayo hospitals) as well as infectious disease hospitals such as Beatrice Road and Wilkins. Central hospitals receive patients with difficult conditions from provincial hospitals, and they offer specialist services using advanced equipment and highly trained staff. According to the structure that existed during the first four decades of independence, central hospitals are the country’s highest level of care (Osika et al., 2010; MoHCC, 2017; Maboreke et al., 2019; Busumani & Mundagowa, 2021).

10.3 Trends in Selected Health and Health Delivery Indicators for Zimbabwe This section presents some trends in key health and health delivery indicators. These include indicators on maternal health (antenatal care visits, deliveries attended by a trained health professional), child health (under-5 mortality), major causes of morbidity and mortality in the country, and health worker density. Most of the indicators were drawn from the tier classification for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2020) and were traced to show how Zimbabwe has performed in terms of ensuring healthy living and well-being (SDG3).

10.3.1 Maternal Health Maternal health is a key health indicator of the 2030 SDGs and has remained a priority for most governments for many years. There exist huge gaps in maternal mortality between the rich and the poor, in rural and urban settings, as well as between developing and developed nations. For instance, in 2017, the risk of women in developing countries dying due to maternal-related causes was 130 times higher than that of their counterparts in developed countries, and about 99% of maternal deaths in the world occur in developing countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia (WHO, 2019a). The sad story was that such deaths could have easily been prevented and have largely arisen because of inequitable access to quality maternal health services. Wealth inequalities have been one of the key factors causing disparities in maternal mortality within and across countries (ibid). Makate and Makate (2017) found that wealth status has also been the main contributor to differences in healthcare utilization in Zimbabwe. At the same time, it has been observed that despite a general improvement in access to antenatal care services in Zimbabwe, maternal deaths in the country have remained high (Busumani & Mundagowa, 2021). This highlights the need to improve not only the access to maternal care services but also the quality of care offered (Maboreke et al., 2019; Busumani & Mundagowa, 2021; Haruzivishe et al., 2021).

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The Government of Zimbabwe, through the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency  (ZimStat), has consistently conducted Demographic and Health Survey data collection exercises every 5/6 years since 1988. Thus, maternal indicators such as prenatal/antenatal care visits by pregnant women and deliveries attended by a trained health professional have been followed up and published at regular intervals  – Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS) 1988, 1994, 1999, 2005/2006, 2010/11, and 2015.2 As of May 2022, the 2015 ZDHS was the latest publication available. Maternal statistics 2016 reported in this chapter were available from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) (ZimStat/UNICEF, 2019). Figure 10.1 shows the percentage of women who visited a health professional during pregnancy in the 5 years before the 1988 survey until 2019. During the 5 years preceding the 1988 ZDHS survey, the proportion of urban and rural women who made at least one antenatal care visit to a qualified health professional was 96.2 and 87.1%, respectively. This trend has generally been maintained throughout the period, with at least 90% of pregnant women in both rural and urban areas seeking antenatal care services and the variance in visits based on residence being less than 5% after 1988. However, the proportion of women satisfying the then-WHO-recommended minimum of four visits have been much lower – between 2000 and 2015, it averaged 73.1% and 69.0% for urban and rural mothers, respectively. The WHO has since revised the recommended minimum to eight visits (WHO, 2016b), and thus the need to establish and address bottlenecks in access to antenatal care cannot be overemphasized. Delivery at a health facility is another key indicator of access to maternal services. It provides room for the service to be attended by qualified health personnel,

96.2

95.4 92.3

87.1

94.6 92.3

96.1 93.2

Percentage

75.8 68.9

1988

1994 Urban

1999 Rural

2005/06

89.9 89.7

96 92

95.7 92.1

77.4 74.9

73 68

66 64.3

2010/11

At least 4 visits (urban)

2015

Year 2019

At least 4 visits (rural)

Fig. 10.1  Antenatal care visits by pregnant women (1988–2019). (Source: author, based on the Central Statistical Office, CSO (various issues); ZimStat (2012, 2016); and ZimStat/ UNICEF (2019))  For each survey, information collected covered some 3–5 years preceding the survey.

2

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Percentage

using equipment and facilities that meet some acceptable minimum standards of quality and hygiene. This, in turn, reduces the risk of infections and deaths during delivery. Figure  10.2 illustrates trends in the proportion of deliveries at a health facility from 5 years before the 1988 survey up to 2019. Throughout the period indicated in Fig. 10.2, on average 91.3% of urban women delivered in the presence of a trained health professional. However, this has been much lower for rural women – only about 66.4% had deliveries attended by trained health professionals during the period. Thus, compared to rural areas, deliveries attended by trained health professionals were, on average, 26% higher for women in urban areas. As indicated in the ZDHS reports, most of the women who were not assisted by a trained health professional had their deliveries at home and were assisted by traditional birth attendants, or relatives, or were not assisted by anyone. This generally puts the life of the mother and the baby at risk. Using ZDHS 2015 data, Mupwanyiwa et al. (2020) investigated the factors associated with the uptake of maternal healthcare in Zimbabwe based on three indicators of maternal health, namely, prenatal care visits, postnatal care visits, and delivery at a health facility. The study found that residing in an urban area, health insurance ownership, household income, and education positively impacted maternal healthcare uptake. Religion (being apostolic) and age were negative predictors of maternal health uptake. An earlier study by Makate and Makate (2017) pointed at inequalities in the utilization of maternal care services in Zimbabwe based on education, religion, wealth, and access to information (radio, television, newspapers). A cross-­ sectional study on the relationship between health expenditure and maternal healthcare utilization in 42 developing countries (including Zimbabwe) revealed that more government health spending was positively related to delivery attended by skilled health personnel and utilization of cesarean section (Kruk et  al., 2007). Manyika et al. (2019) found a statistically significant negative association between

92.1

91.1 70.1

1988

93.8

89.4 61.5

1994

64.2

1999

94

92.9

86 58.2

57.8

2005/06

2010/11

71.3

2015

82

2019 Year

Urban

Rural

Fig. 10.2  Deliveries attended by trained health professional (1988–2019). (Source: author, based on CSO (various issues); ZimStat (2012, 2016) and ZimStat/UNICEF (2019))

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maternal mortality and government expenditure on health in Zimbabwe, underscoring the importance of adequate healthcare financing in improving this SDG3 health indicator. Increased public health spending on health has also been recommended to avoid a rise in maternal deaths in Zimbabwe to more than 1200 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2025 (Nyoni, 2019).

10.3.2 Child Health In 1982, the government of Zimbabwe initiated the Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI) (CSO, 1989). The program has remained active throughout the years and has aimed to protect children from the six child-killer diseases namely, tuberculosis (TB), diphtheria, tetanus, measles, polio, and pertussis/whooping cough. According to the ZDHS reports, a child should receive all six vaccinations, as prescribed by the MoHCC. Based on ZDHS 2015 data, Chigwenah (2020) found that socioeconomic inequalities in child immunization existed in Zimbabwe. Despite the service being freely provided in Zimbabwe, the wealthy had more coverage compared to the poor. This phenomenon is not unique to Zimbabwe. Ameyaw et al. (2021) found wealth status to be an important determinant of a child being fully immunized among 23 SSA countries, including Zimbabwe. Moreover, children from urban settings were more likely to be fully immunized than those from rural areas. The funding gap has been cited to be a potential bottleneck to the full immunization of all Zimbabwean children – there is an overreliance on donor financing for the program (Ameyaw et  al., 2021). A review of immunization programs in East and Southern Africa revealed that funding for immunization was inadequate in 50% of the countries (Shibeshi et al., 2020). Immunization programs were hampered by vaccine stockouts, shortage of fuel, and human resource gaps. Dadari et al. (2021) highlight various strategies that Gavi-supported countries implemented in the drive to narrow inequities in immunization across populations and achieve universal immunization coverage. These include extending opening hours, giving nonfinancial incentives to health workers, and improving communication through advocacy groups and social media. In terms of under-5 mortality, Zimbabwe failed to move closer to the MDG target of 34 deaths per 1000 live births. Under-5 mortality is the probability of death between birth and exactly 5 years of age. It encompasses infant mortality (probability of dying between birth and exactly 1 year of age) and childhood mortality (probability of dying between 1  year of age and exactly 5  years of age). ZDHS data reveals that nationally, under-5 mortality in Zimbabwe has stayed above 68 deaths per 1000 live births since independence (CSO, 1989, 1995, 2000, 2007; ZimStat, 2012, 2016). The country missed the MDG target of 34 deaths per 1000 live births by the year 2015. The new challenge is of moving toward the SDG target of not more than 25 deaths per 1000 live births by the year 2030. Figure  10.3 depicts trends in under-5 mortality for the 10 years preceding each ZDHS survey until 2019.

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99.7

Deaths per 1000 live births

98.6

91 80.3 63

69

72 64

78 77

77

78 62

54.9

34

34 25

1988

1994

1999 Urban

2005/06 Rural

2010/11

2015

2019

25

2030 Year

MDG/SDG target

Fig. 10.3  Under-5 mortality in Zimbabwe (1988–2019). (Source: author, based on CSO (various issues); ZimStat (2012, 2016); and ZimStat/UNICEF (2019))

Figure 10.3 shows that throughout the period, rural households have generally experienced high rates of under-5 mortality than urban areas. The difference in the number of deaths per 1000 live births was as high as 43.7 and 30 during the 10 years before the 1988 and 1999 surveys, respectively. A positive development has been that such differences have significantly narrowed since the 2005/2006 survey, possibly reflecting more equal access to child healthcare between rural and urban areas. Available statistics also show disparities in under-5 mortality based on wealth status. Results of the 2019 MICS show that under-5 mortality per 1000 live births was higher among those in the poorest wealth quintile (91) compared to the richest category (51) (ZimStat/UNICEF, 2019). Overall, access to maternal and child health services in Zimbabwe seems to be skewed in favor of urban populations. Despite the decentralization of health delivery, the urban population continued to experience better health access than those in rural areas. Possible reasons for this include distance to a health facility, presence of suitably trained health personnel per population, and accessibility of drugs. For instance, in urban areas travel time to the nearest health facility tend to be shorter owing to the proximity to many facilities and more efficient transport networks. At the same time, health personnel have a preference to work in urban areas where there is better access to amenities such as clean water and electricity and better accommodation. Moreover, the presence of many health facilities and pharmacies makes it easier for patients in urban areas to access medicines. Additionally, a large proportion of rural households predominantly rely on subsistence farming and may not afford to buy medicines.

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10.3.3 Major Causes of Morbidity and Mortality in Zimbabwe Morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe have been a result of both communicable and noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) (MoHCC, 2016). The communicable/contagious diseases that are prevalent are TB, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. The burden of communicable diseases is highest in SSA, and the Global Fund spends more than 60% of its resources in these countries (Ithibu & Amendah, 2019). In 2014, TB and HIV/AIDS were among the top ten leading causes of death in Zimbabwe (MoHCC/ ZimStat, 2014). Recent literature reports that most deaths and disabilities in Zimbabwe are due to HIV/AIDS (World Bank (WB), 2019). NCDs such as cancer, diabetes (high sugar levels), and hypertension (high blood pressure) have also contributed to high rates of mortality. Mortality due to NCDs in Zimbabwe was estimated to be 31% in 2012 (MoHCC, 2016), while at the global level it causes about 71% of all deaths annually (WHO, 2018). Some of the NCDs can be easily controlled by paying attention to diet and exercise – alcohol abuse, tobacco smoking, obesity, and inadequate physical exercise create fertile ground for the emergency of such diseases (Lee et al., 2012; MoHCC, 2016). The lack of funding has negatively impacted Zimbabwe’s fight against communicable and noncommunicable diseases. A study on the responsiveness to NCDs in Gweru district, Zimbabwe, highlighted various challenges encountered, among them, transport for health staff, shortage of medicines, and lack of equipment and community engagement (Muzvondiwa & Batterman, 2022). In cases where screening and diagnosis were done, either the medicines were scarce, or most patients could not afford them (ibid). Funding challenges have also been reported in dealing with communicable diseases. The WB (2019) recommends sustained financing of HIV/AIDS for the continued decline in HIV incidence in Zimbabwe. The Government of Zimbabwe has been commended for the efficient allocation of HIV/ AIDS funds and its commitment to fighting the pandemic (ibid). Ithibu and Amendah (2019) underscore the need for increased domestic financing to fight TB, HIV/ AIDS, and malaria in SSA, especially given that donor resources have been dwindling. Levels of morbidity and mortality in a country have a direct bearing on life expectancy, that is, the average number of years that an individual expects to live. As can be seen from Fig. 10.4, the period 1989–2004 saw a continuous decline in life expectancy in Zimbabwe. Before 1989, an individual was expected to live for 60.5 years, and by 2000–2004, life expectancy reached a record low of 43.7 years. The decline in life expectancy could be largely associated with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. According to the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, 2020), AIDS-related deaths were highest during the period 2001–2004, averaging 110,000 deaths per year compared to about 23,667 deaths per year between 1989 and 1992. After 2004, the number of AIDS-related deaths gradually decreased, and it averaged 21,666 deaths annually between 2017 and 2019 (UNAIDS, 2020). There were gains in life expectancy from 43.7 years in 2000–2004 to 61.6 years in 2019–2020

180

55.2 43.7

45.4

2000-04

2005-09

1995-99

1990-94

Years of life

1985-89

61.6

54.8 47.8

1980-84

60.5

2019-20

60.5

2010-14

60.6

2015-18

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Period

Fig. 10.4  Life expectancy at birth in Zimbabwe (1980–2020). (Source: author, based on WB (2022))

(WB, 2022). There have also been significant reductions in the incidence of HIV (the number of new people acquiring the infection) and HIV prevalence (the proportion of people living with HIV). HIV prevalence, which peaked at 27.2% in 1998 (National Aids Council (NAC), 2011), has followed a downward trend to 12.8% in 2019 (UNAIDS, 2020). Similarly, HIV incidence per 1000 people among the 15–49-year age group was highest at 50.39 in 1993 but has continuously declined thereafter, reaching 4.87 in 2019 (ibid). Smit et al. (2018) argue that the decline in HIV incidence and the success of antiretroviral therapy (ART) have led to improvements in life expectancy in Zimbabwe. Behavior change has been cited as a contributor to the decline in HIV incidence; young people have increasingly shunned casual or multiple sexual partners, and there has been an increasing use of protection when nonregular partners are involved (UN, 2015). Such behavior change came largely because of vigorous educational health campaigns by the MoHCC and its partners (ibid).

10.3.4 Health Worker Density A sound healthcare system hinges on the presence of a trained and skilled health workforce. Human resource density (number of physicians, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 population) is an important determinant of maternal, infant, and under-5 mortality  – the higher the health workforce density, the lower the mortality (MoCHW, 2009). To improve health outcomes in the low-resource countries in SSA and Asia, part of donor financing has been targeted at human resources for health (Micah et al., 2018). The support came in the form of top-ups on salaries and related incentives, and this has helped address staffing challenges in some of the countries.

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During the MDGs era (2000–2015), the WHO recommended a health worker density3 of at least 23 core health workers per 10,000 population for adequate PHC interventions key to the attainment of the MDGs (MoHCC, 2015). The threshold has since been revised upward to 44.5 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 population following the pronouncement of the 2030 SDGs (WHO, 2016a). Available statistics show that over the years, Zimbabwe has not been able to satisfy the minimum WHO-recommended core health worker density. Figure 10.5 shows the doctor-patient ratio per 10,000 people and the overall health worker density (physicians and nurses per 10,000 population) in Zimbabwe for selected years.4 As shown in Fig. 10.5, the physician density in Zimbabwe has generally stayed below 1.5 doctors per 10,000 people before 2015 and peaked toward 2 doctors per 10,000 population between 2015 and 2020. During the MDGs era, the overall health worker density has averaged 14.06 against the recommended minimum of 23 personnel per 10,000 population, meaning that the country missed the target. The SDGs health worker density threshold has been pegged at 44.5 personnel per 10,000 population, and Zimbabwe needs to work toward the new target. Some SSA countries with health worker densities surpassing the SDGs threshold of 44.5 health personnel per 10,000 population are South Africa, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Botswana (WHO, 2022). There have generally been striking differences between low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and high-income countries. For

Number per 10000 population

44.5

44.5

44.5

44.5

27.83 23 15.81 16.69

14.02

10.7

9.56

12.66

14.85

23

21.45

23.38

16.61 15.65 15.79

1.27

1.43

1.21

1.27

0.82

0.81

0.83

1.24

1.82

1.79

1.86

2.1

1.99

1990

1995

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2020 Year

Physician

Overall density

MDG/ SDG recommendaon

Fig. 10.5  Health worker density in Zimbabwe per 10,000 population (1990–2020). (Source: author, based on WHO (2022))  While the core health workers considered in this WHO statistic comprise doctors, nurses, and midwives only, the critical roles played by other health cadres such as pharmacists, dentists, laboratory, and environmental health workers continue to be recognized. 4  The nurse category is composed of primary care, state-certified, and registered general nurses as well as midwives. 3

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high-­income countries, health worker densities have exceeded 100 core health workers per 10,000 population. This has been the case in Germany (185.60), Australia (169.89), Canada (138.17), and the United Kingdom (115.00) in 2019 (ibid). Poor economic and working conditions, especially during the 2000s, are partly to blame for the low number of medical personnel in Zimbabwe; there has generally been massive outmigration of health workers. For instance, the period 2000–2008 was characterized by hyperinflation and general economic decline. Zimbabwe experienced high rates of inflation, which turned into hyperinflation in March 2007 (monthly inflation exceeding 50%); annual inflation rose to 231 million percent by July 2008 when official inflation figures during that period were last announced (Hanke & Kwok, 2009).5 Salaries of workers (including medical personnel) reached trillions of Zimbabwean dollars that were worthless. For instance, in November 2008, a physician working in the government earned a gross monthly salary that was less than US$1 (Kabonga, 2020). Although the economic situation improved during the greater part of the multiple currency period (February 2009 to February 2019), another wave of economic instability resurfaced after the introduction of a quasi-local currency, the Bond Note, in November 2016. Monetary expansion has been identified to be a key driver of price instability in Zimbabwe (Makochekanwa, 2007; Topal, 2013; Kavila & Le Roux, 2016; Kavila & Le Roux, 2017). Annual inflation, which had stayed below 4% between 2009 and 2017 and was in the negative territory for some 3 years (2014, 2015, and 2016), began to surge toward the end of 2018 (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, RBZ, 2019). It reached 837.5% by July 2020 (RBZ, 2020), causing a deterioration in real wages. In 2020, doctors and nurses working in the government earned less than US$150 and US$75 per month, respectively (Dzinamarira & Masuka, 2021). Due to the dire economic situation in Zimbabwe, brain drain has been persistent in the country’s health sector. Over the years, vacancy rates for medical personnel have remained high, exceeding 80% for some specializations (MoHCC, 2016; Dzinamarira et al., 2020; Dzinamarira & Masuka, 2021). According to Chimbari et al. (2008), South Africa has been the most preferred destination for Zimbabwean health personnel considering emigration. After South Africa, other most preferred destinations have been Australia, Botswana, the United Kingdom, and Namibia, respectively. Chikanda (2007) notes that in 2002 alone, the United Kingdom issued 2346 work permits to nurses migrating from Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe ranked fourth as a major supplier of overseas nurses to the United Kingdom, with the top three providers being the Philippines, India, and South Africa. The recent move by the United Kingdom government to allow the immigration of health professionals to help cope with the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) situation in that region has been predicted to worsen Zimbabwe’s healthcare situation as many health workers are likely to leave (Dzinamarira & Masuka, 2021).  Hyperinflation continued to haunt the country until the introduction of the multiple currency system in February 2009. 5

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10.4 A Snapshot of Healthcare Financing in Zimbabwe Since the attainment of independence in 1980, government taxes have continued to play a pivotal role in financing healthcare services in Zimbabwe. There was a massive expansion of the health sector during the first decade of independence. Public healthcare expenditure increased by around 80% (which translated to approximately 2.3% of GDP), and several health facilities were constructed, resulting in at least 85% of Zimbabweans traveling less than 8 km to the nearest health facility (Sanders, 1990; Munyuki & Jasi, 2009). However, in some areas, people still travel up to 50 kilometers to get to the closest health facility (Mangundu et al., 2020), especially in areas where people resettled during the early 2000s. A policy of free healthcare to those earning a monthly income lower than some threshold was launched in 1980 (Sanders, 1990).6 The policy continued until in the early 1990s; the government implemented the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which led to significant cuts in government health expenditure and saw the introduction of user fees at public health facilities (Loewenson, 1993; Gaidzanwa, 1999; Munyuki & Jasi, 2009). However, the user fee exemption policy at public health facilities has been maintained for specific groups which include pregnant women, children under 5 years old, the elderly (above 65 years), and HIV/ AIDS, TB, and mental patients (MoHCC, 2017). UNICEF (2018) provides evidence that despite the government’s directive, some public healthcare providers have continued to charge user fees to these groups. The introduction of user fees and cuts in government health expenditure meant that the proportion of the country’s population that could not access healthcare due to the inability to pay increased. The economic crisis that was experienced in the country during the period from 2000 to 2008 exacerbated the situation. Fiscal allocations to health in real terms continuously dwindled because of hyperinflation, culminating in a “near collapse” of the country’s healthcare delivery system (MoHCC, 2016). Figure 10.6 shows government health expenditure (as a proportion of general government expenditure and GDP) in Zimbabwe since the year 2010. As shown in Fig. 10.6, between the period 2010 and 2021, fiscal allocations to health, as a proportion of the national budget, averaged 10.19%. The highest values of 15.22% and 14.84% were attained in 2010 and 2021, respectively. Throughout the period, the health sector has generally been underfunded. This has also been the case for most African countries. For instance, during the period 2013–2015, Swaziland was the only country in East and Southern Africa to reach the Abuja threshold, followed by South Africa, Namibia, and Madagascar, all at around 13.5% (Piatti-Fünfkirchen et al., 2018). The rest of the countries in the region allocated less than 10% of their national budgets to health during that period. In 2012, Liberia,

 In September 1980, the user fee exemption policy applied to those who were earning less than Zw$150 per month (Sanders, 1990). At the official exchange rate of that year, this was approximately US$234 (Gaidzanwa, 1999; WB, 2004). 6

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15.22 15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15 14.84

13.36 Percentage

11.25 9.12

2.75

2010

9.8

9.65

2.12

2

2.02

2011

2012

2013

2.73

2014

8.73

7.57

7.56

1.55

1.79

1.79

2015

2016

2017

8.73

6.44 2.78 1.36 2018

Gvt health expenditure (% of general gvt expenditure) gvt health expenditure (% of GDP)

2019

2020

2021

Year

Abuja target (% of general gvt expenditure)

Fig. 10.6  Government health expenditure as a proportion of general government expenditure and GDP. (Source: author, based on WB (2022); MoFED budget estimates (2020–2021))

Malawi, and Rwanda allocated more than 17% of their national budgets to health (Kalisa et al., 2015; Kutzin et al., 2016). Due to inadequate tax financing of the health sector, Zimbabweans have experienced high out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenses. Although OOP health expenses among Zimbabweans have been declining since the introduction of the multiple currency system in 2009, they have remained above the SDGs recommended threshold of 10% of total household spending (Ray & Masuka, 2017; Zeng et al., 2018; Witter et  al., 2020; Kabaniha et  al., 2021). High levels of OOP health payments militate against the UN agenda of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) (UN, 2015). Studies have used different health expenditure thresholds to describe health spending as catastrophic. The popular thresholds that have been used are health spending of more than 10% of total household consumption expenditure, health spending of more than 25% of household non-food consumption expenditure, and health expenditure of more than 40% of household expenditure (excluding food) (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011; Zeng et al., 2018; Koch & Setschegetso, 2020). In the SDGs framework, catastrophic health spending is described as OOP health expenditure exceeding 10% of total household spending (WHO/WB, 2020; Kabaniha et al., 2021; WHO/WB, 2021). Such health spending thresholds usually force households to reduce spending on necessities, deplete their savings, sell their assets, or borrow, hence catastrophic health spending. Thus, with OOP health payments of over 25% of total health spending, healthcare expenses in Zimbabwe have been catastrophic or impoverishing (Buzuzi et al., 2016; WHO, 2016b; MoHCC, 2017; Ray & Masuka, 2017; Zeng et al., 2018; Witter et al., 2020). It is argued that among the Southern African countries, Zimbabwe has experienced the highest cost of healthcare, with most patients meeting these expenses OOP (Nhapi, 2019). In response to the WHO call for governments to come up with innovative healthcare financing mechanisms (Stenberg et al., 2010), the government of Zimbabwe (in

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the 2017 national budget) announced the introduction of the Health Levy (MoFED, 2017). It aimed to mobilize additional resources for healthcare since the high levels of informality in the economy were hampering efforts to collect adequate revenue. The levy was set at 5% of mobile data and airtime purchases and has been earmarked for the procurement of medical drugs and equipment for public hospitals. During the first 8 months of its introduction (February to September 2017), the fund generated about US$18 million (MoHCC, 2017). The money has helped immensely in the procurement of drugs for public hospitals as well as offering blood and renal dialysis services at public hospitals free of charge (MoHCC, 2018).7 Earlier, another earmarked health tax (the AIDS Levy) had been introduced in 1999, and the money was dedicated to fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic under the administration of the National Aids Council (NAC). It has been pegged at 3% of the income of employees, employers, and trusts, and since its inception, annual revenue from the fund has been rising, reaching US$38 million in 2014 (Bhat et al., 2016; MoHCC, 2017). Besides the Abuja Declaration and recommending a maximum of 10% OOP payments for the avoidance of catastrophic expenditure, other literature suggest government healthcare spending at least 5% of GDP (McIntyre et al., 2017). It has been argued that this level of health expenditure helps to reduce catastrophic health spending and move closer to the achievement of UHC.  As shown in Fig.  10.6, Zimbabwe is well below this threshold, with the highest achieved being 2.75% and 2.73% of GDP in 2010 and 2014, respectively. The WHO also stipulates some minimum per capita public health spending to enable the delivery of essential/basic healthcare interventions for attaining the MDGs in low-income countries. This has been pegged at US$60 (2005 prices) or US$86 (2012 prices), and many low-income countries have not managed to reach the stipulated threshold (Jowett et al., 2016). Stenberg et al. (2017) predict that for low-income nations to attain the SDGs, an additional US$76 in per capita public health expenditure is required, giving a new target of US$162 per person. Per capita, public healthcare spending in Zimbabwe averaged US$29.34 between 2010 and 2018, with a low of US$22.41 in 2015 and a high of US$39.25 in 2018 (WB, 2021). The per capita public health expenditure has been lower than the minimum of US$93 per annum (about US$7.75 per capita per month) required to meet the population’s basic healthcare needs (MoHCC, 2017).

10.5 Strategies to Improve Health and Healthcare Delivery in Zimbabwe The foregoing sections highlighted various challenges working against Zimbabwe’s achievement of SDG3. The problems include health staff exodus, limited community participation in health, and bias of government health spending toward salaries

 Before the use of the Health Levy to subsidise the availability of blood at public hospitals, a pint of blood used to cost about US$135 (Chipunza, 2018). 7

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and higher-level health facilities. At the core of these problems is limited public health financing. To mitigate the problem of health staff attrition, Zimbabwe needs to adopt human resource retention strategies. This may involve improving the salaries and working conditions of health staff, improving health infrastructure, availing medical equipment and medicines, relaxing health staff deployment policies, and giving health staff opportunities for skills development (Chirwa et al., 2016; Kidia, 2018; Micah et  al., 2018; Mashange et  al., 2019; Kanyumba & Msosa, 2020; Dzinamarira & Masuka, 2021). It is noteworthy to mention that the problem of brain drain in Zimbabwe has not been witnessed in the health sector alone. The education sector too experienced a staff exodus of similar magnitude as teachers migrated for greener pastures or joined Zimbabwe’s growing informal sector (Chagonda, 2012; Kabonga, 2020). Madebwe and Madebwe (2017) observe that emigration from Zimbabwe was not only a result of a deteriorating economy – political and social instability contributed to the phenomenon too. Neither was the phenomenon limited to a particular group – men and women migrated in roughly equal proportions, and skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers crossed the country’s borders and so were unaccompanied children (ibid). To realize the maximum benefits from the PHC approach, there is a need to empower communities to contribute to healthcare delivery in their areas. The coming in of a new government in 2017 has seen renewed thrust on decentralization in Zimbabwe. Zinyama (2021) perceives the decentralization drive of the new government as being significantly different from the earlier efforts in that, as of 2021, serious government commitment to the process had been manifested. Economic devolution is currently being implemented in Zimbabwe, and this is expected to see provinces and districts becoming economic hubs making decisions on attracting investment, formulating and executing budgets, and setting development priorities in their jurisdictions (ZEPARU, 2019). Concerning healthcare, for example, communities can make use of voluntary labor and resources donated by locals to construct health facilities in their areas, thus operationalizing the PHC approach by allowing maximum community participation. Equally important is increased government expenditure on PHC – currently, there is a bias of public health spending on higher-level facilities. Increased public spending on PHC enables access to basic health services for many people, thus enhancing health expenditure efficiency. Above all, Zimbabwe should explore avenues for raising more funds for healthcare, and NHI is a potential candidate. Escobar et al. (2010) underscore the need for economists to explore the potential of health insurance in building sustainable health financing systems in LMICs. Not only does health insurance enable financial protection during sickness – it impacts health status or health outcomes too (ibid). Thus, social protection systems such as NHI can accelerate progress toward attaining UHC (Babajanian et  al., 2014; Van Hees et  al., 2019; Afriyie et  al., 2021; International Labour Organization, ILO, 2021). Zimbabwe’s academia must complement the government’s vision of NHI by conducting research in the area. Such research may focus on Willingness to Pay (WTP) for NHI or national Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI). Through NHI and national CBHI, Ghana and

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Rwanda have made significant strides in moving toward attaining the MDGs and the SDGs (ILO, 2016; Nnamuchi et al., 2019; WHO, 2019b; Nyandekwe et al., 2020). It should be noted that efforts to implement NHI in Zimbabwe have faced resistance from labor organizations, employers, and Parliament (Share, 2016; Phiri, 2017). The move has been perceived to worsen the plight of Zimbabwean workers whose salaries have been low and subjected to high taxes. In 2016, the NHI scheme principles were approved by Cabinet (Muperi, n.d.; Share, 2016; Phiri, 2017), thus paving way for the drafting of the NHI bill that would be further deliberated in Parliament. Nevertheless, according to MoHCC (2017), whether an NHI scheme was to be implemented would be decided after assessing the results of CBHI pilot schemes. In the country’s 5-year economic blueprint, the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1), the government envisages the introduction of NHI during the period 2021–2025 as one of the measures to improve domestic healthcare financing (Government of Zimbabwe, 2020). Meanwhile, the responsibility of reflecting on the proposed NHI scheme has since been transferred from the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) to the MoHCC.

10.6 Conclusion The chapter sought to reflect on the state of health and healthcare delivery in Zimbabwe since independence. It also aimed to propose measures to position the country along the path of achieving SDG3. A review of the literature and statistics on health and healthcare indicators drawn from the UN tier classification of SDGs was conducted. The review highlighted various challenges in meeting SDG3, among them, limited community participation in health matters, inadequate human resources for health, and public health spending biased toward higher-level health facilities and salaries. Healthcare financing remains key in resolving most of the healthcare delivery challenges highlighted in the chapter. The current tax-based financing model has been characterized by persistent financing deficits and high OOP health payments and has thus been socially exclusive to some sections of the population. One option to improve the healthcare financing situation, and in turn healthcare delivery and health outcomes, is the introduction of a contributory NHI scheme in which premiums depend on members’ ability to pay. Lessons can be drawn from the relatively successful health insurance schemes of Ghana and Rwanda.

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Chapter 11

Contested Landscapes: Politics of Space and Belonging in Land-Use Planning in Bvumba Forest Along the Zimbabwe-­Mozambican Border Joseline W. Chitotombe

, David Mhlanga

, and Emmanuel Ndhlovu

Abstract  The Bvumba Forest in Manicaland has become a very contentious environment as a direct result of the reconfiguration of the landscape, which has led to a redefinition of the political areas. The purpose of this study is to identify the reemerging landscapes in the Bvumba Forest, analyze the contestations surrounding the landscape changes, and evaluate the solutions that have been pleaded for to deal with the overarching difficulties. This research was conducted using a qualitative research methodology called content analysis, and it took an interpretive approach to data presentation. The findings showed that the Bvumba Forest had been made into a political space through the use of speech, which is what made it a site of conflict. This has consequently resulted in a redefining of the emerging social relations, which has now resulted in the local inhabitants becoming estranged from their customary forest rights. According to the study, policymakers should engage stakeholders to initiate inclusive governance in the Bvumba Forest. Keywords  Political space · Environmental insecurities · Belonging · Conservation · Actors · Struggles

J. W. Chitotombe (*) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] D. Mhlanga The University of Johannesburg, College of Business and Economics, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] E. Ndhlovu Vaal University of Technology, Vanderbijlpark, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_11

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11.1 Introduction Protected areas (PAs) are regarded as cornerstones of biodiversity conservation across the world (Muller, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2011). They have also created meanings of place and belongingness (Gleiss, 2017). However, with the protection of these areas, conflicts have emerged as such protection overrides the rights of local communities who depend on such areas for their socioeconomic, environmental, educational, and political activities (Ndhlovu, 2022). Kachena and Spiegel (2019) insinuate that protected areas have been heavily characterized by conflicts given the multiple land-use reconfigurations in such landscapes. Bvumba Forest has emerged to be one such area which has been transformed into multiple land uses due to climate change which has created exigencies for land. This has been also worsened by the economic and political climate which has compounded insecurities. Contrary to studies that have balanced the trade-offs of conservation with local livelihoods (Kachena & Spiegel, 2019; Timberlake et al., 2020), the scenario in Bvumba is not apologetic to locals and is typical of fortress conservation which wants “people” as a conservation imperative. A volition of actors has emerged under the guise of conservation, tourism promotion, commercialization of timber, and agriculture (agropastoralism and farming). There are emerging conflicts of interest and controversies in Bvumba Forest in planning and use of space. The vast transfiguration of the landscape has shaped innumerable narratives over an emergent middle shared space creating contradictory and competing claims over use and access to the forest, thereby reframing issues of belonging and political space. However, studies which explore this conflict and that problematize the protection of areas without broad stakeholder consultation and involvement are either scant or nonexistent. This chapter seeks to close this research gap and highlight how future research can intervene. This study could serve as the basis for policy formulation and research on protected areas. In addition, the study could highlight the methodologies required for the involvement and participation of local communities in the identification of PAs. This will ensure that, as a rural development strategy, PAs will not disrupt, distort, and even shatter the livelihoods of communities in their proximity. In the next section, the background of the chapter is presented under numerous subsections. This is followed by a review of related literature, a discussion of findings, and, lastly, the conclusion.

11.2 Contextual Background The background will be focused on the following issues, the location and topography, geology and climate, vegetation, historical land use, and politics of space and belonging as discourses as shown in Fig. 11.1. As shown in Fig. 11.1, the background will be focused on the following issues, the location and topography, geology and climate, vegetation, historical land use,

11  Contested Landscapes: Politics of Space and Belonging in Land-Use Planning… Fig. 11.1 Contextual background

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Contextual Background

Location and

Topography

Geology and climate

Vegetation Historical Land Use Politics and belonging as discourses

and politics of space and belonging as discourses. These issues are discussed in detail below.

11.2.1 Location and Topography Bvumba is in the Eastern Highlands, 20 kilometers southeast of the border of Mutare City, and it straddles the international border between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In the north, this region is separated from the Banti-Himalaya-­ Tsetsera massif by the Muneni River, which also serves as the Forbes Machipanda Border. In the south, this region is split from the Banti-Himalaya-Tsetsera massif by the Burma Valley, which runs along the Nyamataka River. The Mozambican lowlands and midlands, as well as Chicamba Real dam, make up the eastern boundary, while the valley of the Odzi River serves as the western boundary (Timberlake et al., 2020). The highest points of the upland massif in the study area are Castle Beacon (1911 m) and Chinyakwaremba (1714 m). The main rivers are the Nyamataka River in the south, which drains into Rio Vanduzi through the Chicamba Real dam and flows into the Rio Buzi, the Zonwe River in the center, and the Ndonwe River in the north, both of which drain into Rio Vanduzi. The primary river in the western direction is the Nyachowa, which eventually empties into the Odzi and then the Save River (Timberlake et  al., 2020). According to Muller (2006), rainforests may be found on the leeward slopes of mountains that are located along the eastern border with Mozambique and range in elevation from 350 to 2100 m. These mountains can be found at a height of between 350 and 2100 m. The primary factor that determines

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the distribution of species and the makeup of different forest types, as well as the amount of water that is available (especially during the dry season), is an area’s altitude. The amount of water that is available is also, to a lesser extent, influenced by the type of soil, the aspect of the land, and the topography. According to Katsvanga et  al. (2006), the region has an average daily temperature of approximately 15 °C during the winter and 21 °C during the summer. The average annual rainfall variation is 1200  mm, with most of the precipitation occurring from November through April.

11.2.2 Geology and Climate The geology is made up of igneous rocks, most of which are of plutonic origin and have been exposed to erosion (Katsvanga et al., 2006). Granite domes, according to the further opinion of Timberlake et al. (2020), have the propensity to suffer from soil erosion, which is necessary to produce extremely acidic soils that are appropriate for plantation forestry (Katsvanga et al., 2006). According to the further explanation provided by Timberlake et al. (2020), these soils are typically very deep and have been through a lot of weathering, which is one of the reasons they are regarded as fertile. The region receives an average annual precipitation of about 1800 mm, with the rainy season lasting from November until about the middle of March and the dry season, which is generally colder, lasting from June through August. In addition to this, frosts are uncommon. The region is known as “Mountains of the Mist,” which is a brand name that originates from a Shona symbolic word called Bvumba. In the Shona dialect, the term “guti” refers to the mist that appears early in the morning and then dissipates in the middle of the morning. Bvumba has played an important role in signaling the appearance of this mist. These mists have played a significant role in lowering the level of physiological stress caused by the dry spell for a variety of plant species, which has allowed for the expansion of the forest (Timberlake et al., 2020).

11.2.3 Vegetation The Bvumba region is home to a diverse array of plant life, including (i) montane grassland, (ii) Afromontane evergreen forest, (iii) high rainfall miombo woodland, and (iv) secondary scrub savanna (Timberlake et al., 2020). Bvumba is characterized by regenerating montane forests that are in various states of recovery. Dominant species including Macaranga mellifera, Maesa lanceolata, and Schefflera umbellifera are frequently codominant in these forests (Muller, 2006). The region is characterized by extensive plantations of exotic timber trees as well as agricultural land that is either cultivated or left fallow. As a result of the persistent mists, Bvumba has the most diverse and abundant fern vegetation of any location in Southern Africa.

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Secondary scrub savanna is a habitat for invasive alien species and shrubs. It can be found on soils that are infertile or gravel-based, in degraded forests, or on land that was formerly used for agriculture (Timberlake et al., 2020).

11.2.4 Historical Land Use On the Mozambican side of the border, the region has been inhabited for at least a thousand years and maybe for much longer. On the side of Mozambique that runs along the Nzombe Valley, the Chirara Dynasty was already establishing permanent settlements there before the arrival of Europeans. In Zimbabwe, the first European settlement was established in the city of Ernest in the year 1890. In 1898, the British South African Company awarded Gloudland farm, which is now a private nature reserve, the prestigious concession that made the farm famous. In 1917, a road leading from Mutare to Bunga woodland was mapped out, and by 1921, it had already been extended to Burma Valley (Timberlake et  al., 2020; Mhlanga & Ndhlovu, 2021a, b). The Bvumba region of Zimbabwe is privately owned by a variety of small agricultural holdings and plantations. Additionally, the Bvumba region is maintained for conservation purposes through tourist efforts such as the well-known Leopard Rock Hotel and golf course. The roads are easily navigable because of an extensive road network, and the region is home to many properties that are used as vacation homes by people who advocate for the preservation of native plant and animal species. Dairy farming, protea flower cultivation, coffee growing, and even some wattle and eucalyptus plantations are all examples of commercial agriculture in the region. The Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority oversees the formal conservation areas, which include the Bvumba National Park and Botanic Gardens, which cover a total area of 201 hectares (ha), as well as the extended Bunga Forest Botanical Reserve, which covers 1560 hectares (ha). According to the information provided by GIS, Mozambique does not have any officially protected areas. The vegetation cover of Serra Vumba looks to be undisturbed, which may be a consequence of the observations of the cultural traditions (Ibid, 2020). Considering these circumstances, the Bvumba Forest was categorized as a protected area to put into action several nature preservation plans. Bvumba has been classified as a protected conservation area for indigenous woods because of its extensive vegetation and favorable climatic conditions; as a result, it has been shortlisted for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage List. However, this has resulted in the establishment and enforcement of protected areas, which has proven to be highly controversial because it has contributed to the loss of livelihoods for indigenous communities while at the same time creating spaces of indigenous knowledge that are inaccessible to western scientific knowledge (Kachena & Spiegel, 2019).

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11.2.5 Politics of Space and Belonging as Discourse The political space is in constant flux, and actors could redefine their own political space by rearticulating the discourses on the variables that compose the political space (Nicola, 2012). It has been viewed as a discourse, in which it is recast as a discursive space that shapes chances for, and constraints on, civic fights. The literal and metaphorical connotations of the term “political space” are interdependent and mutually formative. According to Yuval Davis (2011), the concept of “belonging” is fluid and cannot be reduced to a reified fixedness. This is like a political space. Some conflicts are intertwined with the preservation and reproduction of limits that have been shaped by hegemonic power relations both inside and outside of the communities and how these boundaries are also subject to resistance by other political agents.

11.3 Review of Important Literature With the existence of many different contested landscapes that have lately emerged in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa, planning is a vital component of the development practice that is carried out there. The transformation of landscapes into enormous areas with a variety of uses has far-reaching repercussions, as numerous meanings of places within the landscape, including specific locations within the landscape, are evoked and constructed in narratives as a result of the transformation (Masterson et al., 2019). The conflict that arises as a consequence of the alterations is particularly visible in circumstances in which the preservation of the natural environment is given a higher priority than the maintenance of the local population’s standard of living. Best et al. (2021) discovered that tropical forest landscapes are characterized by an endless number of interacting groups and people who have competing land-use interests. This was one of the findings that they uncovered. It is common for the traditional people to be dispossessed of their land as part of the process that involves the expropriation of their land and the expulsion of traditional communities that are viewed as incompatible with conservation goals. According to the findings of the research conducted by Kachena and Spiegel (2019) on the Chimanimani Transfrontier, regions that are designated for borderland conservation are usually characterized by diverse land uses including agriculture, tourism, conservation, and other activities. This is something that is brought up multiple times throughout their research. It has come to light that protected areas are symptomatic of the expropriation of community lands, and as a result, they have become a hotspot for confrontation between conservation agencies, organizations, and traditional people. This is because protected areas are symptomatic of the expropriation of community lands (Gleiss, 2017; Ndhlovu, 2020). Anecdotal evidence from Tanzania’s Kilombero Nature Reserve was used in a study by Matejcek and Verne (2021) that reflected on how the valley has developed

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into a scene of profound change as a result of the expansion of agricultural land and an increase in the number of cattle farms at the expense of the region’s forested areas. The study was a reflection on how the valley has developed into a scene of profound change as a result of the expansion of agricultural land and due to widespread illegal deforestation, fires, expansion of agricultural land, and poaching, which has led to the extinction of a sizeable number of the native animal species. This has resulted in the eradication of a substantial portion of the native animal species. According to Mara (2013), the frequent collision of conflicting interests and values, which has ramifications for territorial planning, might cause the administration of space to turn into a very contentious issue. Masterson et al. (2019) give data on the case of the Wild Coast in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, which turned out to be beneficial to the concept of conservation and resulted in ecotourism branding being a preserve of white visitors of middle- and upper-income levels in South Africa. The apartheid government of South Africa established the Transkei region as a homeland for South Africa’s indigenous people based on the region’s high level of racial homogeneity. This homeland was a component of the Bantustan Region at one point in time. They make an effort to gain the support of the residents, which raises conflict due to the historical rationale that led to the inhabitants’ exclusion and dispossession from their land, as well as the stigmatization of their customary resource use as illegal poaching. These disagreements and disputes over place claims arose as a direct result of the present conservation policy, which was the primary factor in the creation of these conflicts and difficulties. It has come to light that many different sorts of institutions, including official and informal ones, public and commercial organizations, and local players, all pursue competing interests in places. This is something that has come to light (Best et al., 2021). These contested landscapes are frequently the settings of the complex challenges that include stakeholders from both the local community and further beyond. These problems can range in scope from simple to extremely complex. Most of the time, local communities are marginalized because they have very little control, no formal land tenure rights, and inadequate legal protection, all of which are factors that contribute to the issue. Their capacity to participate, contribute their knowledge, and express their worries is being taken away from them, and as a direct consequence, their voices are being muffled. Complex challenges involving stakeholders occur within the same contested landscapes, making it necessary to strike a compromise between their various interests. This calls for creative problem-solving (Best & Heckman, 2012). Rihoy and Maguranyanga (2010) found that political clashes over resource rights and advantages have taken place across the country’s landscapes in Botswana, where they carried out their research. These wars have been fought between the populace of the area and the governing leaders of the region. The struggles are evident in the processes of resource accumulation, particularly land and livestock, and privatization among the country’s elites, as well as the contested wildlife as a local vs. national resource and a resurgent protectionist wildlife paradigm championed by

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Kez political figures. All of these factors contribute to the fact that the struggles are evident. These individuals contend that localizing the benefits derived from wildlife is in direct conflict with the Constitution, which is founded on the principle that all natural resources belong to the nation as a whole. They also contend that localizing the benefits of wildlife runs counter to a growing trend toward protection. According to Kachena and Spiegel (2019), the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion in the process of accessing extractive resources are related to conservation discourses invoked by a variety of actors as well as discursive framings by environmental officials and other organizations. This is the case even though exclusion and inclusion are related to accessing the same resources. Kachena and Spiegel both point out that there is a connection between these processes and conservation discourses. According to Robbins (2012), producer groups have lost control of resources and landscapes as a direct result of conservation expeditions. As a direct consequence of this loss of control, local officials have been able to disable the production of local livelihoods and the sociopolitical organization of the area. The fact that authorities were present on these missions serves as the foundation for Robbins’ argument. The Nussir and Biedjovággi initiatives in northern Norway are both potential mining operations in Sámi reindeer pastures. Johnsen (2016) analyzed and compared the decision-making processes for both of these projects. Johnsen (2016) investigated the actors’ claims to land and the rationales that were employed in political decision-making. His research was based on interviews, records from the government, discussions in the media, and observations of meetings between the actors. Johnsen (2016) discovered that the actor groups justified their land claims using analogous lines of thinking. The mining corporations contended that their industry was a response to local, national, and global aims and opportunities for coexistence that were beneficial to all parties involved. Johnsen (2016) discovered additional evidence that the pastoralists viewed their traditional rights to pastures as well as mining as potential dangers to their means of subsistence. Johnsen (2016) concluded that the politics of belonging played a role in determining whether or not the public acknowledged the pastoralists’ claim to the land. Furthermore, Best et al. (2021) noted that modern tropical forest landscapes are frequently characterized by a plethora of interacting institutions and players with competing land-use interests. They stated that this is a common occurrence in tropical forest landscapes. Further, Best et al. (2021) argued that in these kinds of contexts, indigenous and tribal populations are frequently disenfranchised in the decision-making process about the level of the terrain. However, Best et al. (2021) stated that inclusive landscape governance organically integrates multiple knowledge systems, including those of indigenous and tribal people. According to Best et  al. (2021), geo-information tools are increasingly being recognized as proper tools to integrate varied preferences and legalize the voices, values, and understanding of indigenous and tribal societies in landscape governance. In their study, Best et al. (2021) presented the contribution of the incorporated application of three public participation geo-information tools to inclusive landscape governance in the Upper Suriname River Basin in Suriname. These participatory geo-information

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tools included the “Participatory 3-Dimensional Modelling,” the Trade-off! game, and participatory scenario planning. The findings presented by Best et al. (2021) highlight the significance of systematically taking into account tool attributes and key factors, such as facilitation, to ensure that participatory geo-information tools are used effectively and are a good fit for the contexts in which they are used. Again, Best et al. (2021) found that combining the tools helped to build momentum and led to diverse yet complementary insights, which demonstrates the benefits of integrating multiple tools to address inclusive landscape governance issues. In addition, the researchers found that combining the tools led to diverse yet complementary insights. Kramp et al. (2022) demonstrated how farmers in a northern Lao village converted their customary land rights into a territorial strategy to safeguard their land tenure in response to inconsistent and overlapping official territorialization measures. Kramp et al. (2022) demonstrated that to stake a claim to land that was only recently zoned for upland rice cultivation (and conservation) as part of a state-led land-use planning initiative, some villagers have engaged in a crop boom by planting rubber. The land in question had previously been used for other purposes. Internal resettlement, ethnic division, and the influx of commercial agriculture in the Lao uplands were shown to intersect in a novel land-use planning process by Kramp et al. (2022)’s study. This study also showed how the plan’s actual significance is predetermined by the plan’s actual significance. In a different piece of research, Nwankwo and Ayadiuno (2022) suggested that the memories of landscapes that people carry with them might help keep histories and customs alive in rural regions, that they are intertwined with everyday lives, and that they have multiple meanings. Nwankwo and Ayadiuno (2022) investigated the recollections that people in two neighboring villages in the Nsukka area of Enugu State, located in Southeastern Nigeria, have regarding plateaus. These villages are Alor-Uno and Edem-Ani. It was discovered by Nwankwo and Ayadiuno (2022) that the plateaus that separate Alor-Uno and Edem-Ani are landscapes of political memory of the ancient wars that took place between the two communities, as well as more contemporary disputes regarding the territorial extent of the communities and the use of the land behind the plateaus if you are in Alor-Uno. According to the findings by Nwankwo and Ayadiuno (2022), Alor-Uno claims that wars fought against it by several kingdoms displaced the community, allowing parts of the community’s land to be occupied, and now they want to reclaim it from Edem-Ani. They say this happened because the community was forced to move because of the wars. According to Nwankwo and Ayadiuno (2022), however, extant narratives frequently recognize the disputed area as being a part of Edem-Ani. This is because colonial administrators used the plateaus as a boundary, and the presence of the plateaus helps the people recollect the memories of these ancient wars. They use it to seek legitimation of their claim over the land. According to Nwankwo and Ayadiuno (2022), the memory of previous land-use bolsters the legitimacy of existing land tenure configurations, shapes sensitivity to territoriality that can lead to

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exclusion, and can maintain group identities across generations, which can serve as a breeding ground for conflict in the future. It is a request for more attention to be paid to the nonhuman agency and in connection to the political memory of landscapes, which speaks to the post-human thought that is prevalent in contemporary human geography. According to Nwankwo and Ayadiuno (2022), when analyzing resource conflicts, it is important to take into consideration the social meanings, memories, and identities that are connected to the physical landscape. This is because these things contain ideological and symbolic elements that foreground conflict environments. Despite the widespread reliance on landfills for the management of urban waste in Ghana, their operation tends to ignite land-use conflicts at different scales. Kansanga et al. (2020) also argued that the siting of landfills in peri-urban spaces is seen as both a remedy to land scarcity in inner cities and a development opportunity for rural hinterlands. Furthermore, the siting of landfills in peri-urban spaces is seen as both a solution to land. Drawing on a longstanding landfill conflict in northern Ghana, the work by Kansanga et al. (2020) shows how the land question in peri-urban spaces is contested under the guise of landfills. According to Kansanga et  al. (2020), existing research on the drivers of these struggles has mostly failed to situate local resistance within the broader political economy of land control. Even though at first glance, the struggle over landfill space appears to be fueled by the associated poor environmental conditions and health risks of waste from the inner city, our findings reveal the role of a variety of diverse incongruities. These include “the crafty tactics deployed by state institutions in land acquisition for ‘public interest,’ payment of unrealistic consideration, and diversion of designated public lands to undeclared uses.” During these debates, the concept of territorial belonging held by peri-urban communities frequently conflicts with the statutory ordering of the government, which typically seizes properties that were formerly privately owned for the sake of the “public interest.” Kansanga et al. (2020) suggested that powerful local players such as chiefs hide behind community agitations to control land if such contestations come to fruition (Table 11.1).

11.4 Reframing Alternative Discourse Over Resource Struggles According to Gleiss (2017), the literal sense of the word “space” defines political space as the location where the action is taken from the bottom up. The figurative expression “political space” refers to the opportunities and constraints that are placed on bottom-up action. Some examples of political space include the political environment and the political climate. This is clear to see in Bvumba, which has been designated as a pristine region that is appropriate for tourism activities due to the expansive greenery and picturesque views that can be found in that area. To

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Table 11.1  Other selected studies on contested landscapes: politics of space and belonging in land use Study Zavar and Schumann (2020)

Focus Post-disaster communalism: land use, ownership, and the shifting “publicness” of urban space in recovery

Methodology Using discourse analysis and grounded theory, they investigated how occupants of these quasi-public urban areas perceive their access to these spaces as well as their sense of belonging in them

Simko et al. (2022)

Contesting commemorative landscapes: Confederate monuments and trajectories of change

Goalwin (2021)

Bandits, militants, and martyrs: Substate Violence as claim to Authority in Late Antique North Africa

Building on models of memory as an iterative and path-­ dependent process, authors track recontextualization efforts in three communities: St. Louis, Missouri; Oxford, Mississippi; and Austin, Texas. They document how each mode alters the meaning of contested symbols. St. Louis, Missouri; Oxford, Mississippi; and Austin, Texas The author argues, with support from borderland theory and studies on non-state violence, that these acts were not the consequence of madness but rather of purposeful efforts to solidify religious and political authority. He does this by pointing out that such crimes were the outcome of such efforts

Source: Author’s computation

Findings The findings demonstrate how distinct policy tools, such as public buyouts and changes in insurance rate structures, contribute to land uses and perceptions of access that are comparable In this article, the authors outline five major factors that jointly promote communalism in our study sites. This article builds on earlier research in human geography In conclusion, they examine the conflicting implications of post-disaster communalism for the promotion of both principles of public space and community resilience to future calamities This research provided a framework for recognizing distinct “modes of recontextualization,” which are anchored in the relocation and/or modification of commemorative items

In this respect, Donatism and the sectarian violence that accompanied it provide valuable insights into how banditry and peasant rebellions can support alternate sources of social and political power. These are avenues through which heterodox movements challenge the power state as well as religious hierarchies alike

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make room for environmentally friendly tourism, the natives in the area have been marginalized, which has made life difficult for them. In light of the shifting circumstances, in which the nation has been hit by a recession and erratic rainfall as a result of climate change, there has been a rise in the number of so-called imagined communities that are attempting to justify their existence by arguing that it is more important than that of wildlife. The region is extremely wealthy and fertile, and it contains a great amount of vegetation, both of which make it favorable for the fictitious villages to engage in agricultural production despite the imperatives of conservation. On the one hand, Mozambique has been going through some economic and political upheavals recently, which has led to some people leaving the country. Illegal settlers have been engaging in subtle forms of conflict because of the replication of meaning over the construction of belonging that has occurred on the sense of belonging. The use of discourse contributes to the conceptualization of meaning as being political and as a location of conflict between various discourses. The practice of politics involves contests between many discourses to pin down the significance of a certain symbol (Gleiss, 2017). Illegal migrants in Bvumba have established alternative structures to the local governance structure by electing their chief who is responsible for dividing up the land. These structures are in place alongside the local governance structure. This is an indication of how residents establish ownership as a measure of regaining land use, and it demonstrates how this process works. They have also trespassed on estates that are owned by Leopard Rock Hotel and Wattle Company without obtaining permission from either the relevant government agency or the estates in question. They have occasionally encroached onto those estates to clear the way for agriculture, which requires them to resort to slash-and-­ burn practices, which causes veldt fires that are highly destructive and harmful to the estates that are being discussed here. Alternative interpretations are silenced (Gleiss, 2017) when illegal settlers believe that they are reclaiming land in the pursuit of livelihood security, which is their fundamental right to food, rather than setting aside those areas for wildlife, which is commercialized through tourism initiatives. This is because the illegal settlers believe that they are reclaiming land in the quest for livelihood security, which is their fundamental right to food. As a result, the political space has been discursive and has been created through a variety of discourses, as Gleiss (2017) points out accurately; the discourses themselves provide meaning to the actors that are involved in the process. As a result, political space may be recreated from both above and below as actors use alternative techniques to express discourses in new ways. This is possible because political space can be remade from both above and below. This is made abundantly clear by the fact that the proprietor of Leopard Rock and Wattle Company properties has tried to foster positive relationships with the community members. At one time, Leopard Rock was forced to negotiate with the illegal settlers to get them to leave their property once they had gathered their produce, which the illegal occupants had disregarded with disdain. As a result of the articulation of various alternative discourses, the political space has been reshaped and renegotiated. Articulations never take place in isolation but rather are in constant

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relation to prior articulations and discourse, which can result in the repetition or modification of meaning (Gleiss, 2017). Because of this, the estates and the illegal settlers have been forced to negotiate and find a middle ground, particularly when the locals resort to slash-and-burn practices and the estate owners are forced to wait on the delineated lines to prevent fire outbreaks. The transformations that have taken place in these protected regions are evidence of the fact that political space can have a finite amount of time, which can result in a scenario in which these pristine zones gradually become shared spaces in the middle. Locals, illegal settlers, conservation agencies, and the commercial imperatives associated with the tourist and exploitative industries have presented several obstacles in the path of the reconfiguration and construction of specific “heritage landscapes” through conservation imperatives. These obstacles have been met with a variety of challenges. As a result, these configurations have witnessed the shifting patterns of space and the social ties that exist inside it. When efforts to preserve the environment are seen as a threat to people’s ability to make a living, some people will occupy estates to get their hands on agricultural land. This is a demonstration of the competition for limited resources. The result of this is that most illegal immigrants have settled on the land illegally, without the permission of the property’s owner or the blessing of the government. This has resulted in conflicts between estate owners and the locals, with the former arguing that the settlers were deliberately destroying the trees for the sake of making a quick buck due to the high demand for charcoal in Mozambique and tobacco farmers insisting that their rights are more important than those of animals. Both sides have argued that this is because there is a high demand for charcoal in Mozambique. Because of this, the pure ecosystem is in danger because mature trees, which take an average of 30 years to reach their full potential, are being cut down. In addition to this, there has been confusion regarding the definition and function of natural protected areas because of this phenomenon (Bianchi, 2002). To put it more bluntly, whenever there is a “politics of belonging,” there are also dynamics surrounding claims to ownership of the landscape based on grounds of origin, culture, and citizenship. This implies that conservation discourses involving numerous participants have defined the validity of land ownership as leading to resource difficulties because of the conflict (Kachena & Sipegel, 2019). This is demonstrated by the fact that illegal settlers have been “illegally grabbing” more land so that they can divide it up and give it to their family members. It was also discovered that the squatters had purposefully disguised their motive as that of subsistence farmers, but their motive was to burn trees for charcoal, which is a product that is highly profitable on the market. Nicola et  al. (2012) state that questions regarding space and location provide clues regarding who can be where and what they can do. The politics of space are mixed up with the politics of the world. Because of this, politics determine the environments in which we live. Being on the margins or in the periphery might spark a resistance movement that gives birth to new conceptions of space that allow for the space to be reclaimed to question or fight dominance. Illegal settlers have occupied the land in Bvumba, claiming that the region is suitable for agriculture, which they

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engage in throughout the year by employing techniques such as crop rotation and no-till farming. These settlers have taken over the area. They also suggested that the region is exceptionally wealthy and fruitful and that it has no need for any additional fertilizers. One of the respondents reiterated the fact that they can produce up to 200 tons of maize. Some farmers come to the area for the season. This is a caveat to the idea put forth by Nicola et al. (2012), which states that a sense of belonging can be formed through shifting socioeconomic and cultural expectations. Those on the margins can reorganize themselves, which will result in the birth of new ideas, to regain their territory. Oracles crafted by illegal settlers are emblematic of the reorganization of space based on spatial configurations, which is done under the guise of belonging for the settlers to justify their continued existence and claim the right to a means of subsistence. Since the Executive at Leopard Rock Hotel has gone on to implement stringent measures against stray animals, which include a fine of US$20 per day for each animal, the illegal squatters have demonstrated opposition by pretending that they are unaware of the new regulations. The transformation of the scenery can be attributed in large part to the region’s rising population. Nicola and colleagues (2012) argue that spatial manifestations are symbolical of inequalities and that those in power are increasingly barricading themselves from being disenfranchised by sealing themselves in enclaves of advantages while generating zones of exclusions. The concept of privatizing estates and private property is like the unequal power-­ brokering that is taking place against illegal settlers who also claim their right to a means of subsistence. Illegal settlers are resisting and challenging the powers that have appropriated the resources, which has resulted in the marginalization of the illegal settlers. The struggles that are manifesting in the so-called protected areas are exemplary of “imagined worlds” or cultural landscapes and boundaries. Wattle Company, for example, has gone to the extent of establishing boundaries for settlers that have encroached on their estate, and they have also deliberately contrived with them to alert them when they use fire for clearing land. This has been done to prevent further damage to Wattle Company’s property. According to Bianch (2003), tourism brings attention to transitory spaces that are present within cultural practices. The fights that have taken place between the many parties concerned over the management of resources have been conditioned by the economic and political situations. This has resulted in the appropriation of space and the transformation of landscapes that were before recognized as protected and unspoiled. In addition, this offers evidence that the processes of tourism development are, in and of themselves, questioned and appropriated at various levels by overlapping networks of social activity in which individuals use strategic orientations. It would be a mistake to disregard the political process because both natural and historical factors have contributed to the formation of space. As it has developed, it has come to wear the imprints of a variety of social behaviors and distinct notions that are connected to a specific period. The population growth that has been observed in the area, considering the climatic conditions that are characteristic of the region, is suggestive of the place being productive, as was inferred by the majority of the settlers, which enables them to realize rich harvests.

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This is undermined when tourism programs inspired by conservation principles meet with the ordinary lived-in places of “imagined” communities, transforming those spaces into a battlefield for conflict and competition. In addition, there was evidence that suggested the illegal settlers were making claims that they had been given land as part of the accelerated land reform scheme. The conservation imperative has been called into question as a result of this, even though the Forestry Commission has stayed neutral about the matter. The declaration of particular landscapes to which inhabitants have an attachment can also develop into conflict, particularly in situations in which places imply symbolic and cultural capital. In the past, individuals with more power have been able to turn space into a commodity, which has pushed others with less power to the margins. The appropriation of land for agricultural purposes has been the only type of peasant resistance that has been utilized by illegal settlers as a daily form of peasant resistance. According to Bianchi (2002), the spatial configurations of tourism are an embodiment of a conflict over the meaning and values of space, and this conflict is conditioned by the dominant forms of accumulation and systems of power. Bianchi’s argument may be found in the following sentence: The protected areas, to promote tourism initiatives, conceptualize the spaces as production and consumption driven. This, in turn, reflects the competition over the meaning and appropriate use to which these places should be devoted, which in turn gives rise to distinctive structures of production and consumption in various localities.

11.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations The objective of the project was to study the politics of space as well as how disagreements over meanings and attachments manifest themselves in freshly renovated spaces. There have recently been opposing claims made over the use of space that is founded on the idea of belonging. Belonging bestows rights on how space will be utilized in the future. These claims have been made in recent years. Utilizing qualitative research methodologies, we were able to compile the testimonies of those involved in a dispute over land rights. The transformation of a Bvumba Forest has resulted in protracted confrontations between the parties concerned regarding who should have access to the resources and how they should use them. Illegal settlers, often known as “imagined communities,” have degraded the land and appropriated it for agricultural use, which runs counter to the objectives of conservation efforts. Because of this, there are multiple stakeholder groups with competing claims to the land, including illegal squatters, estates, an ecotourism business, and individual houses. The Forestry Commission has also been ineffective in its efforts to bring control to the issue, which is growing more politically charged as a direct result of the government’s land redistribution policies. Illegal actors are also competing for space to rectify the wrongs of the past and seize pieces of property to validate their claims to the security of tenure. Both of these goals conflict with one another. In Bvumba, the presence of subtle struggles demonstrates the inability to

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participate in dialog to break the impasse between conservation and livelihood to maintain food security. This impasse can be broken by engaging in discourse to break the deadlock between conservation and livelihood. The many different actors operating within the Bvumba Forest need to be brought together and given equal opportunities to participate in the management of the forest.

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Muller, T. (2006). The distribution, classification and conservation of rainforests in Eastern Zimbabwe. Occasional Publications in Biodiversity, No. 19. Ndhlovu, E. (2020). Land acquisitions and relocations of the Shangane in Zimbabwe: Disintegratory or transformative? Africa Insight, 49(4), 55–71. Ndhlovu, E. (2022). Political economy of Chisa Livelihoods in Rural Zimbabwe. In K. Helliker, J. Matanzima, & P. Chadambuka (Eds.), Livelihoods of ethnic minorities in Rural Zimbabwe (pp. 123–139). Springer International Publishing. Nicolas, A. (2012). Structures of ophiolites and dynamics of oceanic lithosphere (Vol. 4). Springer Science & Business Media. Nicolas, P., Mäder, U., Dervyn, E., Rochat, T., Leduc, A., Pigeonneau, N., ... & Noirot, P. (2012). Condition-dependent transcriptome reveals high-level regulatory architecture in Bacillus subtilis. Science, 335(6072), 1103–1106. Nwankwo, C. F., & Ayadiuno, R. U. (2022). Landscape memories of land struggles in plateaus of two Nsukka villages in Nigeria. Human Geography, 15(2), 176–189. Rihoy, L., & Maguranyanga, B. (2010). The politics of community-based natural resource management in Botswana. In F. Nelson (Ed.), Community rights, conservation and contested land the politics of natural resource governance in Africa. Earthscan. Robbins, P. (2012). Political ecology: A critical introduction (2nd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell. Simko, C., Cunningham, D., & Fox, N. (2022). Contesting commemorative landscapes: Confederate monuments and trajectories of change. Social Problems, 69(3), 591–611. Timberlake, J., Balling, P., Vidal, J.  D., Jr., Wursten, B., Hyde, M., Mapaura, A., Childes, S., Palgrave, M. C., & Clark, V. R. (2020). Mountains of the mist: A first plant checklist for the Bvumba Mountains, Manica, Highlands (Zimbabwe-Mozambique). Phytokeys, 145, 93–129. Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). Power, intersectionality and politics of belonging, FREIA working paper series, No.75, Research gate. Zavar, E.  M., & Schumann, R.  L., III. (2020). Post-disaster communalism: Land use, ownership, and the shifting ‘publicness’ of urban space in recovery. Environmental Hazards, 19(4), 398–416.

Chapter 12

Post-independence Reforms and Policies in Zimbabwe Clainos Chidoko

Abstract  Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has implemented more than ten economic development strategies. These policies ranged from the inward-looking, interventionist strategy to the outward-oriented market-driven focus. All these policies endeavored to create employment in the country among many other objectives and to jostle the economy into an industrial activity. Most of the objectives including the employment objective have not been achieved fully with unemployment going up instead. The interventionist strategies targeted mainly the agricultural, mining, financial, and manufacturing sectors and to some extent construction and tourism. Zimbabwe inherited a fairly performing economy at independence, and as such, the main task of the government was to maintain and improve the economy’s performance. A lot of resources were to be committed so as to continue on the right track. On that note, Zimbabwe received a lot of support from the international community in terms of funding, training, and human personnel. However, despite the final support from the international community, the economy did not improve to the expectation of the Zimbabweans. It is recommended that the government should implement the policies wholeheartedly. Keywords  Economy · Economic structural adjustment · Post-independence · Zimbabwe

12.1 Introduction This chapter is an analysis of reforms and policies that the Zimbabwean government has embarked on since 1980 when it attained independence. The country has implemented more than ten economic development policies to date. These are Growth C. Chidoko (*) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_12

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with Equity (GWE) (1981), Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) (1982–1985), First Five Year National Dev Plan (FFYNDP) (1985–1990), Economic Structural Development Programme (ESAP) (1991–1995), Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) (1996–2000), Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) (2001–2002), National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) (2003–2004), National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP) (2006–2008), Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) (2009–2013), Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP I) (2009), Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP II) (2010–2012), Medium Term Plan (MTP) (2011–2015), Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-­ Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) (2013–2018), the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (October 2018–December 2020), the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) (2021–2025) and, its anticipated successor, NDS2 (2026–2030) (Sibanda & Makwata, 2017; GoZ, 2021). Most of these policies had almost similar objectives of reviving the economy into a full manufacturing giant and employment creation in the country, among many other objectives. Most of these objectives have not been achieved, mainly due to poor implementation procedures and due to political will success. Instead, poverty levels increased. This chapter looks at the nature of the reforms and policies and their implementation, shortcomings, strengths, and achievements among other issues. The whole idea is to review the policies and establish the impact and the extent of that impact and then give recommendations for future policymaking. It starts by reviewing the early postindependence intervention strategies, goes on to deal with the reform era, and then looks at the stabilization programs and development strategies. It rounds off by looking at recommendations and a conclusion.

12.2 Post-independence Intervention Strategies The interventionist strategies targeted mainly the agricultural, mining, financial, and manufacturing sectors and to some extent construction and tourism (Chitsike, 2003). The government’s main task was to maintain and improve the performance of these economic sectors. A lot of resources were to be committed to continuing on the right track. On that note, Zimbabwe received a lot of support from the international community in terms of funding, training, and human personnel (Maiyaki, 2010; Sibanda & Makwata, 2017) toward improving its economic performance. The government of Zimbabwe from March 23 to 27, 1981, held the Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD). The ZIMCORD resources were mostly targeted at the reconstruction of the infrastructure that was damaged during the war of liberation. New structures were constructed under the Public Sector Investment Programme, while the private sector used borrowed resources to enhance their production capacities (GoZ, 1990). Insurance companies and other financial institutions invested in high-rise buildings. Rural roads were reconstructed through the District Development Fund (DDF). The National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ)

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embarked on partial electrification of the railway line to increase the movement of goods within and across borders for both imports and exports. The National Parks and the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority did their best to rehabilitate infrastructure to attract tourists to the country (Pasipanodya et al., 2000). Sibanda and Makwata (2017) assert that the main development activities revolved around the following: mobilizing human and material resources to develop and establish a socialist society. This was the development philosophy that guided the economy of the newly independent Zimbabwe. There was also the issue of economic transformation to recognize equity and equality for all people of Zimbabwe. This was also in line with the socialist development path of the country, then. The government also worked on the reconciliation of different classes of people to achieve peaceful coexistence, economic empowerment of the majority of Zimbabweans, land redistribution in favor of the black majority, and enhancement of socialist values as recognized through education for all up to Grade 7 and health for all by the year 2000, among others (Kanyongo, 2005). The aim of all these was to include every Zimbabwean in the development agenda and redress the past ills of the colonial regime. The change of government from colonial minority rule to independent majority rule could only be bridged by a transitional plan. Implementing a new development plan backed by no historical experience became a big task. At any rate, a transitional plan became the obvious choice because previous development plans had been designed to serve the interests of a privileged white minority at the expense of the interests of the black majority. In that case, the guiding policy framework was put in place, that is, the Transitional National Development Plan (1982/1983–1984/1985) where the major objectives of the plan were to create a foundation on which Zimbabweans could claim their history and to rehabilitate the economy (Mutiwanyuka, 2000). To this end, the challenge lay in building upon and developing what was inherited from the colonial setting by modifying, expanding, and, as appropriate, changing structures and institutions to maximize the benefits of economic growth and development to all Zimbabweans.

12.3 The Reform Era The reform era began in the 1990s starting with Zimbabwe’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) between 1990 and 1995. The main aim was to transform Zimbabwe’s tightly controlled economic system into a more open, market-­driven one. This was an International Monetary Fund (IMF)/Word Bank (WB) sponsored economic program that was supposed to be instrumental in stabilizing the economy. According to Madise (2009), ESAP sought to transform Zimbabwe’s tightly controlled economic system into a more open, market-driven economy. The restructuring sought to promote higher growth and reduce poverty and unemployment. ESAP had several fundamental objectives according to which they were shaped, i.e., reducing fiscal and parastatal deficits and instituting prudent

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monetary policy, liberalizing trade policies and foreign exchange systems, carrying out domestic deregulation, establishing social safety nets and training programs for vulnerable groups, promoting the free movement of capital, the opening of the national markets to international competition, privatization of public services and companies, deregulations of labor relations, and improving competitiveness. The structural reforms brought some improvements to some extent (Kanyenze, 2014). The manufacturing sector in 1994 achieved some positive growth, and its exports increased. Agriculture showed some signs of recovery. Availability and quality of transport to towns is said to have improved. Under the fiscal reforms, the government managed to reduce the size of the civil service and subsidies to parastatals. On the social dimension front, the social dimensions of adjustment (SDA) were to address the transitional hardships brought on by the civil service downsizing, the removal of maize meal subsidy to poor urban consumers, and the reinforcement or introduction of health and education fees. The fund centered around two issues of social safety, which provided support for food expenses and school examination and health fees and an employment and training program for those affected by the downsizing. On the other hand, ESAP brought a lot of hardships. It undermined the country’s industrial base and the urban sector was particularly affected. Manufacturing’s share of GDP declined from about 20% to 16% during the first phase of ESAP. Some observers blame this on the use of inappropriate policy instruments and sequencing during ESAP and tariffs imposed on intermediate inputs to manufacturing. Manufacturing sector liberalization led to a decline in both real wages and employment and an increase in capital intensity (Mumvuma et al., 2006). ESAP had detrimental effects on the quality of life of the Zimbabwean people. The reform also effectively reversed most of the gains made in the first decade of independence concerning the provision of, and the majority’s access to, educational and health services. The failure of ESAP in Zimbabwe was the result of the inability of the government to adequately restrain and cut back public expenditure, thereby crowding out private investment and generating inflation (Mumvuma et al., 2006). ESAP implementation problems suggested that the country’s adjustment process did not work according to the government’s expectations. The fact that the government decided to extend the tenure of economic reforms to well beyond the year 2000, against the spelled out target of 1995, suggests that the government realized that there was little evidence in 1995 of the rapid economic growth promised under ESAP (Zhou & Zvoushe, 2012). Zimbabwe moved on to implement other programs. ESAP was succeeded by the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST). ZIMPREST (1996–2000) was aimed at creating a stable macroeconomic environment to support increased savings and investment to achieve higher growth and improvement in the standard of living for all Zimbabweans. Dumbu and Mahachi (2016) assert that the ZIMPREST (1996–2000) was aimed at creating a stable macroeconomic environment to support increased savings and investment to achieve higher growth and improvement in the standard of living for all Zimbabweans. Unlike the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme launched in 1991 when the

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country’s economy was still robust and inflation below 20%, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation came at a time when the country’s economy was on the brink of collapse. ZIMPREST had several objectives. The major policy objectives were an increase in the economic growth rate of the nation. The target as of then was an average of 6% per annum; the government also aimed to run a primary budget surplus and grow out of the looming debt trap; the government also pledged through its various wings to invest in human capital. That resources would be channeled toward investing in people and the promotion of Zimbabwe as a destination for investment and facilitation of investment by domestic and foreign investors, with particular emphasis on foreign currency generating projects which enhance competitiveness for other enterprises. ZIMPREST to a certain extent brought the desired benefits to the intended Zimbabwean beneficiaries. There was a marked improvement in Zimbabwe’s fiscal performance. This improvement in fiscal performance was due to improved revenue collection and enhanced expenditure management which was the major focus of the ZIMPREST. The strong fiscal position laid the groundwork for a stable macroeconomic environment which was achievable once the balance of payments position improved. On the one hand, the reform was affected by poor economic management. Land invasions and bad rainfall patterns also affected agriculture, which is the mainstay of the Zimbabwean economy. Further, the lack of policy credibility, particularly macroeconomic policy inconsistency and reversals, undermined efforts at turning around the economy (Munoz, 2007). ZIMPREST was succeeded by the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP). This was a homegrown government policy with a broad group of stakeholders (government, business, and labor) involved in its formulation. The program emphasized consolidating the gains from the first reforms, improving the institutional capacity of the implementing agencies, further liberalizing external trade, deregulating public transport, and pursuing fiscal consolidation (Nyikadzino & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022). MERP failed to have any meaningful impact on any of the main sectors of the economy and was short-lived. Then came the National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) which was launched in 2003 as a 12-month plan. Zwizwai (2007) asserts that NERP had focused on the following key challenges that faced the economy: inflation reduction, support for agriculture, reversal of deindustrialization, support for the productive sector, increased mining production, and development of tourism, among many other economic concerns. It was launched amid high hopes that the program would turn the country’s fortunes and bring about increased exports and bring the needed foreign currency that was expected to improve the economy by increasing productivity and improving capacity utilization by manufacturers. Mapuva (2017) says that NERP failed to achieve macroeconomic stability mainly due to its failure to control inflation. Inflation was mainly fuelled by the unstable local currency which was overvalued at Z$800 to US$1. The overvaluation of the Zimbabwean local currency led to the emergence of the foreign exchange black market which had a more realistic and higher rate. Zimbabwe being a small open economy could not significantly affect the world money stock and price level

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or interest rates. This meant that further deterioration of the Zimbabwean local currency meant higher domestic prices of the imported products. There was also the emergence of a vibrant black foreign exchange market; this meant most of the foreign currency that was circulating in the market went through the informal market and this worsened the production constraint in the economy as most businesses failed to access the foreign currency to acquire raw materials. Most of the productive industries in the economy were thus operating below full capacity leading to shortages of basic commodities further fuelling inflation (Tamukamoyo, 2009). NERP also failed to increase exports and bring the much needed foreign currency and reduce the yawning BOP deficit due to a lack of investment. This was acknowledged by the Central Bank in the December 2003 Monetary Policy where it sought to achieve a Zimbabwe which upheld property rights and welcomed investment from across the globe for the betterment of its people as one of its objectives. The landmark takeover of land occupied by white farmers had already created scepticism on Zimbabwe’s invitation to both local and foreign investors (Tamukamoyo, 2009). The continuation of the downturn of the country worsened, and by 2004, a new Industrial Development Policy was formulated which covered 6 years. The timing of the policy following the macro environmental analysis made to assess the achievements of economic goals previously set and the failures. The main purpose of the Zimbabwe Industrial Development Policy (IDP) included reducing poverty, increasing economic growth, and creating employment at high skills level, among many others. Mazarura (2008) asserts that the IDP was a sound move and a well-­ crafted endeavor. However, the policy did not achieve much as anticipated. Although it is expected that the process is still going on, nothing is happening on the industrialization side of the economy. The effort is being hampered by a lack of adequate or meaningful funding, coupled with the poor performance of the biggest feeder sector, that is, agriculture. Another program that came into effect from 2006 to 2007 is the National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP) (GoZ, 2012). NEDPP was a concept that comprised economic growth, economic development, and development strategies. It also had several variables which included management strategy, development strategy, planning strategy, research strategy, and sustainable growth strategy. The economic development priority program of Zimbabwe was meant to address issues of education, health, commerce, and agriculture as engines of the country’s growth and development attainment by the year 2020. The program devised strategies that would include access to financial services by the poor, investment in technology to stimulate rural or communal economies, and facilitation of access to income through factory-based daycare. Hence, strategies were put in place that would address income redistribution from the rich to the poor and maintenance or sustenance of a stable general price level in an economy. At face value, NEDPP was ideal and appeared to be a framework that could see the economy grow toward the attainment of its set goals and macroeconomic parameters. However, the 2007/2008 economic meltdown was enough testimony that the

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policy had failed. Nothing of significance was achieved by this program (Seguino, 2019). The real causes included corruption and gross macroeconomic mismanagement. This seriously affected industries in manufacturing, commerce, transport, construction, finance, and contributions to export earnings and import substitution. The Zimbabwean economy experienced a severe economic recession between 2002 and 2009. Economic growth declined continuously over the period until 2008. The sustained negative economic growth rates were caused by consecutive declines in manufacturing, agriculture, and mining. The government went on to introduce the Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) (2009–2013). ZEDS was a short-lived economic policy that was introduced in 2009 and was supposed to run up to 2013 (ZEPARU, 2012). It was nothing new except being a repackaging of previous policies. It focuses more on poverty reduction. This policy was never fully implemented as it came on the onset of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (2009–2013) when the policy was at its formative stages. The GNU instead focused on another policy strategy to arrest the continued deterioration of the economy. Prices had soared beyond the reach of many people for the few available goods as the manufacturing sector was equally affected. The industry had ground to a halt. Then came the GNU at the beginning of 2009. The government brought in yet another policy, that is the Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP) in 2009. This was a 9-monthly program focusing on political and governance issues, social protection programs, supply-side reforms, and macroeconomic reforms. After stabilizing the economy, STERP was then followed by STERP II which ran from 2010 to 2012. This was meant to consolidate the gains of STERP I by focusing more on economic growth. The objectives of STERP II according to Sibanda and Makwata (2017) included sustaining macroeconomic stabilization and consolidating STERP, supporting economic growth and employment creation, ensuring food security, restoring basic services, encouraging public and private investment, promoting regional integration, restoring basic freedoms, restoring international relations, turning around agricultural sector, attaining growth rates in agriculture of up to 20%, increasing capacity utilization in manufacturing, improving the mining sector, and rehabilitating both urban and rural network in the transport sector. According to Nyavaya and Mtomba (2016), the introduction of STERP enabled the country to contain inflation. The levels of inflation fell to levels consistent with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) targets. Inflation declined from nine-digit levels to single-digit levels. Another positive achievement of STERP was the achievement of positive economic growth. Restoring basic social services including the reopening of hospitals and schools was one of the main aims of STERP. Significant progress was made in this direction since the introduction of STERP. The program also impacted positively on the prices of goods, the financial sector, and general investment. The positive progress was realized also as a result of the use of the US dollar as the main transactional currency among another basket of foreign currencies. Despite the notable successes of STERP, the country faced some challenges during the same period. There was the challenge of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority that failed to supply adequate power to the industry that was

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reawakening. Local authorities failed to supply adequate facilities as they faced challenges in acquiring enough chemicals for water treatment. The National Railways of Zimbabwe was also failing to adequately move goods as required by industry, among many other challenges (Nyavaya & Mtomba, 2016). The main reason for the failure of STERP to adequately attain its goals was the issue of political disagreements among the political principals who were in the Government of National Unity arrangement. After STERP, the government of Zimbabwe moved on and implemented the Medium Term Plan (MTP) (2011 to 2015). This was a homegrown plan that was meant to set out the national priorities and investment programs (GoZ, 2019). The overall goal of the MTP was to transform the economy, reduce poverty, create jobs, maintain macroeconomic stability, and restore the economy’s capacity to produce goods and services competitively, building upon the gains achieved since the launch of STERP in 2009. MTP needed huge funding and this affected its implementation. Sources of funding were investment-led recovery, leveraging government assets and position, and donations. The Plan was quickly discarded when the 2013 elections ushered in a new government. The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET 2013–2018) was the development program that followed later. It focused on empowering the State to function like a profit-driven corporate. Matutu (2014) asserts that ZIMASSET was developed after Zimbabwe experienced a deteriorating economic and social environment since the year 2000 which resulted in a deep economic and social crisis characterized by a hyperinflationary environment and low industrial capacity utilization that led to the overall decline in gross domestic product (GDP) by 50% in 2008. Zimbabwe’s immediate happiness was to come through the full implementation of ZIMASSET. It was so fascinating, idealistic, and pregnant with vision and wisdom. ZIMASSET was a two-pronged approach: the quick fix (2013–2015) and the long term dealing with the woes confronting the economy (Marazanye, 2016). Its execution was guided by the following mission: “to provide an enabling environment for sustainable economic empowerment and social transformation to the people of Zimbabwe” with the vision of the Plan being “toward an empowered society and a growing economy.” The Plan was guided by the following 13 strategies that were aligned to cluster priorities in order to achieve economic growth and development: (i) Investing in sustainable and robust solutions in order to address the challenges of food insecurity and undernourishment. (ii) Implementing the Presidential Agricultural Input Support Scheme. (iii) Providing social services encompassing construction of housing, schools, hospitals, and other social amenities particularly in the new resettlement areas. (iv) Availing and increasing economic opportunities for women, youths, and the physically challenged in communities in conformity with the indigenization, empowerment, and employment creation thrust.

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(v) Expanding the accessibility and utilization of ICTs to improve service delivery and accelerate economic growth. (vi) Building and rehabilitating infrastructure and utilities as enablers for economic growth and prosperity. (vii) Establishing special economic zones. (viii) Improving production and export of goods and services through value addition and beneficiation. (ix) Implementing an import substitution program (particularly to address machinery, equipment, fuels, chemicals, and consumer products). (x) Fostering strategic linkages and formalization among SMEs and cooperatives across all sectors of the economy. (xi) Recapitalizing and capacitating the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Infrastructural Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ), AgriBank, Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO), the Minerals Exploration Company, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) to grow the economy and create employment. (xii) Reinventing the business of government through the Integrated Results Based Management (IRBM) system. (xiii) Accelerating the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to fund economic revival and infrastructure development. The program turned out later to be more on the political side than having bankable projects that could turn around the economy. It failed to produce any meaningful results just like many of its predecessors, according to ITA (2021). First, the government immediately required significant foreign direct investment to “quick fix” the economy as envisaged in ZIMASSET.  That did not happen in the short-medium term and derailed the “quick victory” targets. This already cast doubt on the viability of the plans and reduced the policy to just another plan for the shelves. It is also argued that the government did not fully engage stakeholders in drafting the document. It excluded key strategic shareholders such as the private sector and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It became difficult to get that buy-in from such stakeholders, making the document defective at birth. The poverty levels continued to deteriorate, and the government through the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and other ministries stepped up various social welfare programs. It did very well in the area of the social protection of its citizens. The protection mechanisms that are offered to the citizens are both cash transfers and noncash transfers. These include pensions, public assistance, war victims’ compensation, drought relief/public works program, rural livelihoods programs, and Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM). These are done to cushion the citizens from the effects of poverty as various policies failed to achieve their intended goals but instead aided the growth of abject poverty in the country. The government also redressed the injustices in agriculture that were created by the colonial regime by impacting the land reform program (Chitsike, 2003). Most research and literature on the land reform program in Zimbabwe was carried out

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between 1999 and 2003 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). The conclusions reached then indicated that the program had not been able to meet its objectives. Despite this conclusion, the program managed to address the issues of landlessness and resettlement, plus the challenges of overcrowding in communal areas. The program cannot be relegated to the failure bin just like that. There are significant results that were and are being realized at the moment. Fast forward to 2022, we can witness significant progress toward high production by a significant number of new farmers. Few are still struggling although there is a significant change from the early days of land acquisitions. The country also witnessed a period of reforms in the financial sector driven by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). The turnaround process began at a time when Zimbabwe was facing a host of challenges without precedence in its short history. The main objectives of the quasi-fiscal policy were to attain a healthy economy with stable inflation and exchange rate stability, reengage the international community, and promote local industries by providing low-cost finance and a stable, internationally sound financial sector (RBZ, 2012). The financial reforms managed to achieve the intended goals to some extent although the country lost its currency in the process. The government of Zimbabwe has been working tirelessly trying to revive the economy that has been in the doldrums for decades now since 2000. The core sectors of the economy are the anchors of Vision 2030 where the country envisages achieving upper-middle-income class status. The new government of Zimbabwe is on a transformative journey aimed at rebuilding the economy. This initiative is in line with continental and intercontinental commitments toward the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals and the AU Agenda 2063. The aim is to improve the livelihoods of most Zimbabweans through improved access to basic services and higher income (GoZ, 2020).

12.4 Transitional Stabilisation Programme and Vision 2030 The Transitional Stabilisation Programme (October 2018–December 2020) is the policy implementation program for Vision 2030. The government had a roadmap to ensure the attainment of the people’s aspirations under this Vision. The roadmap involved a staged approach with the first phase being the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) that was implemented until 2020. The second and third stages involve the formulation and implementation of two 5-year national development strategies, which are the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) (2021–2025) and the NDS2 (2026–2030). The step-by-step approach allows for the prioritization of policies and interventions necessary for setting the foundations for a long term sustainable growth over the Vision 2030 horizon. The core sectors of the economy, as being main pillars in the drive to achieve Vision 2030, are full of investment opportunities. They remain the mainstay of the Zimbabwean economy, accounting for over 70.5% of the GDP in 2017 and

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employing 50–60% of the workforce (GoZ, 2020). The government of Zimbabwe launched the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) in 2018, and it ended in December 2020. It is believed the major success of the TSP was the introduction of the Zimbabwe dollar, which now gives the country a chance to grow its economy. The country was facing quite several challenges in making sure that the foreign exchange supply was adequate because of the multicurrency system. The government of Zimbabwe managed to balance the fiscal budget and attributed the obtaining fiscal surpluses to the TSP. The program was also lauded for reducing the civil service wage bill as a percentage of the budget and thus freeing up funds to channel toward capital expenditure. It also surpassed its revenue targets in the 6  months starting in January 2020. However, the authorities have failed to reveal that this increased inflow of tax revenue was driven by inflation and not improved economic performance. The TSP has failed to stimulate economic growth, and in 2019, against a growth target of 9%, the economy contracted by −6.5% due to climatic shocks. It is also believed that despite the reported successes on the fiscal front, the binding constraints to economic growth in Zimbabwe are its institutions of governance. The failure of the TSP to address the binding constraints to economic growth has sowed the seeds for its failure. TSP was succeeded by the National Development Strategy (NDS1) that will run from 2021 to 2025. Thereafter, NDS2 will take over where we intend to achieve Vision 2030 of being an upper-middle-income country. The objectives of the Strategy include the following: (i) Strengthening macroeconomic stability, characterized by low and stable inflation, as well as exchange rate stability. (ii) Achieving and sustaining inclusive and equitable real GDP growth. (iii) Promoting new enterprise development, employment, and job creation. (iv) Strengthening social infrastructure and social safety nets. (v) Ensuring sustainable environmental protection and resilience. (vi) Promoting good governance and corporate social investment. (vii) Modernizing the economy through the use of ICT and digital technology. Vision 2030 is anchored on the following pillars: governance, macroeconomic stability and financial reengagement, inclusive growth, infrastructure utilities, and social development. Before implementing national development strategies, the government had to stabilize the economy first, hence the TSP that was launched in 2018. The economy stabilized to some extent then. The current developments that have been taking place and have been experienced in the economy including the continued deterioration of the Zimbabwean currency are a result of fiscal indiscipline on the part of the government and policy inconsistencies. The willingness to succeed is also questionable as there seems to be no commitment to policy implementation and containment of corrupt activities by elements that are bent on destroying efforts to succeed.

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12.5 Conclusion and Recommendations Zimbabwe is in its current state because of the effects of all the reforms and policies that were implemented from 1980 to the current period. Successes and failures have been realized in all cases. The major challenge was and is still the implementation process and lack of adequate funding for government projects. ZIMASSET comes to the light on this one. Without adequate funding, it was difficult to move on. Currently, there are a lot of projects underway such as road rehabilitations, dam constructions, and new parliament construction, among many projects. These are either funded by local resources or in partnership with foreign funders. The government cannot be blamed for everything. All citizens must take part and do that positively. The country is still hoping that 1 day the economy will finally turn around and ultimately manage to industrialize and realize a better Zimbabwe. To succeed, the country should contain corruption and implement policies wholeheartedly. These have been the country’s major challenges. The impact of corruption is remarkably substantial. What is of great concern about the Zimbabwean situation is that there has been a lack of political will to fight corruption on the part of government officials. It renders policies ineffective as this may affect funding. This is coupled with the political will to succeed. In many cases, officials do not have the zeal to implement government policies as they lack the will to succeed. Sibanda and Makwata (2017) also highlight this issue of corruption and noncommitment when they say that there is a lot of talk about zero tolerance to corruption, but the government has to do more than talk by actually stamping hard on offenders notwithstanding their standing in society or politics. Corruption is rampant in both government and private sectors. The government should not tolerate corruption of all forms and levels. Merely acknowledging its presence without taking an active role in stamping it out will not help the situation. Corrupt members of society should be brought to the book as a deterrent measure to would-be new corrupt members. The government of Zimbabwe also needs to devise a project funding model that works, like the public-private partnership (PPP) model. There is also a need for a build-operate-transfer (BOT) model for major infrastructure development. The current model of printing money to finance capital expenditure has seen prices going up which fuels inflation in the economy. Also, the projects cannot be financed directly from national budgets. If the PPP or BOT models are adopted, these will relieve financial pressure from the treasury for other recurrent expenditures. Using own resources is not bad, but at times, these may fall short of the requirements and period to achieve the goal. Fiscal discipline is one area that the government of Zimbabwe has to take care of; otherwise, the country may not go anywhere. The government needs to contain expenditures and channel its efforts to projects that benefit the nation in the long run. There is also a need to strengthen monetary policy measures to contain runaway inflation episodes.

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References Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail. Crown Business. Chitsike, F. (2003). A critical Analysisof land reform Programme in Zimbabwe. 2nd FIG regional conference. Morocco. Dumbu, E., & Mahachi, I. (2016). Chapter 10: Evaluation of the industrial development policy (idc)- (2004–2010). In Economic reforms and policies in Zimbabwe: A concise analysis. Mambo Press. ISBN: 978 0 86922 888 3. International Trade Administration (ITA). (2021). Zimbabwe  – Country Commercial Guide. https://www.trade.gov/country-­commercial-­guides/zimbabwe-­market-­challenges Kanyenze, G. (2014). The Zimbabwean economy. Ledriz Crisis Coalition, Harare, Zimbabwe. Kanyongo, G. Y. (2005). Zimbabwe’s public education system reforms: Successes and challenges. International Education Journal, 6(1), 65–74. Madise, K. M. (2009). An appraisal of Zimbabwe’s economic performance: Issues, problems and prospects. [Online] Available from: http://marshalmadise.blogspot.com/2009/11/appraisal-­of-­ zimbabwes-­economic.html Maiyaki, A.  A. (2010). Zimbabwe agricultural industry, a review. African Journal of Business Management, 4(19), 4159–4166. Mapuva, J. (2017). Zimbabwe’s Economic Interventionist Policies: Critical Issues and Perspectives. The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs, 44(2), 29–49. Marazanye, K. (2016). An analysis of indigenisation and economic empowerment in Zimbabwe. Master’s in Public Administration Thesis. Stellenbosch University, RSA. Matutu, V. (2014). Zimbabwe agenda for sustainable socio-economic transformation (ZIMASSET 2013-2018) a pipeline dream or reality. A reflective analysis of the prospects of the economic blue print. Research Journal of Public Policy, 1(1), 1–10. Mazarura, O. L. (2008). Exploring the dynamics of informal foreign currency trading: The case of Harare’s black market traders. Master of Development Studies Thesis. University of KwaZulu-Natal. Mumvuma, T., Mujajati, C., & Mufute, B. (2006). Understanding economic reforms: The case of Zimbabwe. In J. Mensah (Ed.), Understanding economic reforms in Africa: A tale of seven nations (pp. 237–268). Palgrave. Munoz, S. (2007). Central Bank quasi-fiscal losses and high inflation in Zimbabwe: A note. IMF working paper, WP/07/98. Mutiwanyuka, C. M. A. (2000). A critical investigation of the impact of debt management policies and strategies in context of money market’s ability to generate investment resources. (unpublished MBA dissertation). Nyavaya, K., & Mtomba, V. (2016). Cash crisis bond notes trigger panic withdrawals. The Standard [online] available from: http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2016/05/11/ cash-­crisis-­bond-­notes-­trigger-­panic-­withdrawals/ Nyikadzino, T., & Vyas-Doorgapersad, S. (2022). Zimbabwe’s transition to a devolved system of government: Critical factors for success. Africa’s Public Service Delivery & Performance Review, 10(1), 604. Pasipanodya, D., et al. (2000). Fiscal decentralisation and subnational government finance in relation to infrastructure and service provision in Zimbabwe. Final report: A collaborative study between the National Association of Local Authorities in Denmark (NALAD), people & systems inclusive, management cousultants, Zimbabwe. Directed by the World Bank Financed by United States Agency for International Development with support from Danida, Denmark. Seguino, S. (2019). Engendering macroeconomic theory and policy. Feminist Economics, 26(2), 27–61. Sibanda, V., & Makwata, R. (2017). Zimbabwe post Independence economic policies: A critical review. Lambert Academic Publishing.

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Tamukamoyo, H. (2009). Survival in a collapsing economy: A case study of informal trading at a Zimbabwean flea market. Doctoral Thesis, University of Johannesburg. ZEPAU. (2012). Strengthening the Zimbabwe National Policy Making Process. Harare. Zimbabwe. Zhou, G., & Zvoushe, H. (2012). Public policy making in Zimbabwe: A three decade perspective. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2(8), 212–222. Zimbabwe, Government of. (GoZ). (1990). Zimbabwe-a framework for economic reforms (1991–1995). Government Printers. Zimbabwe, Government of. (GoZ). (2012). Government of Zimbabwe industrial development policy 2012–2016 policy. Government Printers. Zimbabwe, Government of. (GoZ). (2019). Harare. Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, Government of. (GoZ). (2020). Harare. Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, Government of. (GoZ). (2021). Harare. Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, Reserve Bank of. (RBZ). Monetary Policy Review Statements (2003-2012). Harare, Zimbabwe. Zwizwai, B. (2007). Deepening integration in SADC regional integration in southern Africa – Vol. 10. A study conducted for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. IDS Zimbabwe – Missing SADC Macroeconomic Targets.

Chapter 13

Tourism Receipts, Education, and Income Inequality in Selected South African Provinces Rufaro Garidzirai

Abstract  South Africa is one of the most unequal countries worldwide. This is illustrated by a high inequality since 1994. The government has endeavored to develop programs to assuage this challenge such as developing a social grant system and internship programs. However, regardless of these developments, the inequality challenge persists. Deplorably, the provinces are the source of South Africa’s inequality. Despite the income inequality challenge, tourism receipts and education are envisioned to solve this challenge. Thus, this study investigates the influence of education and tourism on income inequality in South African provinces. In achieving this, a pooled mean group (PMG) was employed. The results show that tourism arrival and economic growth negatively influence income inequality in the South African provinces, while tourism arrival was insignificant in explaining income inequality. Contrarily, tourism receipts and education positively influence income inequality in South African provinces. Thus, an improvement in the tourism sector is crucial since it is one of the fastest-growing sectors in South Africa. It is envisaged to create employment and reduce poverty and income inequality. Keywords  Education · Income · Income inequality · Tourism · Zimbabwe

13.1 Introduction The abstraction that income inequality is common in South Africa has become precise and incontestable. This is demonstrated by a big gap between the rich and poor currently recorded at more than 0.65 (Global economy, 2022). This is a substantial increase in inequality since South Africa gained its independence in 1994. In 1994 the income inequality was recorded at about 0.43 (World Bank, 2022). Several R. Garidzirai (*) Walter Sisulu University, Butterworth, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_13

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scholars have highlighted that high-income inequality has been caused by the apartheid economic policies that exonerated the majority to participate in economic activities (Marriott & Fourie, 2014; Garidzirai & Meyer, 2020). The government has endeavored to develop programs to assuage this challenge such as developing a social grant system and internship programs. However, regardless of these developments, the inequality challenge persists. Thus, South Africa’s provinces cannot be exempted from this income inequality challenge. Deplorably, the provinces are the source of South Africa’s inequality. If inequality is not addressed, it proliferates income and socioeconomic challenges such as crime, corruption, drug abuse, etc. Despite the income inequality challenge, tourism receipts and education are envisioned to solve this challenge. For instance, the tourism sector is one of the fastest-growing sectors globally, especially in South Africa. South Africa is one of the most beautiful countries globally, and it attracts tourists from as far as Asia and Europe (Statistics South Africa, 2019). Therefore, the increase in tourists increases tourism receipts which tends to reduce income inequality. Moreover, education is supposed to increase individual income to close the gap between the rich and the poor. To put this theoretical perspective into practice, this study investigates the contribution of tourism receipts and education on inequality in South Africa’s provinces. This study emanates from the fact that inequality in South Africa is greater than in the past decades and it continues to rise. Secondly, fewer studies have investigated the link between tourism, education, and income inequality (Alam & Paramati, 2016; Yang & Qiu, 2016). The abovementioned studies are national studies, and from the literature gathered, no study has examined this link on a provincial level. Since provinces feed inequality to the nation at large, it is imperative to have a look at this nexus on a provincial level. Thus, the study considered six provinces, namely, Gauteng, Free State, Eastern Cape, Kwazulu Natal, Limpopo, and Mpumalanga. These provinces were chosen because of the high inequality rates in their provinces. Moreover, these studies have not reached any consensus on whether tourism receipts reduce or increase the income inequality gap. Thus, this study also contributes to the existing scant literature on tourism receipts and inequality. The following chapter is organized as follows: Section 13.2.1 discusses some stylized facts on inequality, education, and tourism in the selected provinces, while Sect. 13.2 provides a theory that supports the study and the related empirical literature. Section 13.3 provides the methodology used in this chapter, while Sect. 13.4 provides the empirical results. Section 13.5 provides a summary of the study and its conclusion and some recommendations for the study.

13.2 Literature Review This study is underpinned by structural change theory. The theory was developed by Lewis in 1954. The theory posits that for development to take place in an economy, the structure of the economy should change (Lewis, 1954). Thus, all the factors of production should be shifted from traditional sectors to modern sectors such as

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tourism and education (Ghose, 2021). The reason for this change is that modern sectors have high productivity. For instance, investing in the education sector has higher productivity as it provides income to households which tends to reduce the gap between the poor and the rich. Furthermore, South Africa is one of the countries that attract tourists worldwide, and if the resources are channeled to improve the sector, it will yield more revenue that will promote employment and increase income which has an inverse relationship with income inequality. Alam and Paramati (2016) investigated the impact of tourism on income inequality in developing countries. The study focused on 49 developing countries around the world using panel data analysis from 1991 to 2012. The results of the study show that tourism increases income inequality. The results further highlight that tourism revenue is linked to the Kuznets hypothesis confirming that tourism revenue will eventually reduce income inequality in the long run. Zhang (2021) investigated the impact of tourism on income inequality using a meta-analysis of econometric studies. The scholar used the Gini coefficient to measure income inequality and found the econometric studies from Scopus and Web of Science databases. The results of these studies point out the fact that tourism increases income inequality. However, it was found that trade openness and economic growth positively influence income inequality. Nguyen et  al. (2021) examined the relationship between tourism and income inequality looking at 97 countries. These countries were put into three categories, namely, low-middle-income, upper-middle-income, and high-income countries. The study employed a panel and found that international tourism inversely influences income inequality and at the same time local tourism should be supported by institutional adjustment in both the low-middle- and upper-middle-income countries. Tan and Morimoto (2019) investigated the link between tourism activities and income inequality in developing countries. Scholars employed a panel dynamic fixed-effects model and found that tourism has a significant impact on income inequality. Fauzel (2019) investigated the impact of tourism on income inequality in Mauritius over a period from 1983 to 2016. The study employed a dynamic vector error correction model and found that tourism growth reduces income inequality. The study further found that unemployment and inflation have a negative impact on income inequality. Fang et al. (2020) used fixed effects and fully modified ordinary least squares to examine the relationship between tourism indicators and income inequality in 31 developed and 71 developing countries. The results of the study show that tourism indicators inversely impact income inequality in developing countries. The results further highlight that tourism indicators do not impact income inequality in developed countries. Tsaurai (2022) examined the influence of tourism on income inequality in transitional economies from 1999 to 2019. The scholar utilized fixed effects and fully modified ordinary least squares and generalized methods of moments. The study found that tourism reduces income inequality in transitional economies together with other variables such as foreign direct investment, human capital development, and employment.

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Nabassaga et al. (2020) examined the effects of education and income inequality in 37 African countries. The study used a survey from 1987 to 2016 looking closely into the bottom 40 percentile and upper 40 percentile. The results of the study reveal that education only improves social mobility and does increase income inequality in these countries. Yang and Qiu (2016) also found that education does not reduce income inequality but rather early investment in education reduces income inequality. Topuz (2022) examined whether economic growth reduces income inequality in 143 countries. The study made use of panel data techniques from 1980 to 2017. The results of the study reveal that economic growth reduces income inequality in these countries. A further study done by Delbianco et al. (2014) examined the relationship between economic growth and income inequality in 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries using panel data analysis. The results of the study reveal a negative relationship between these two variables. A recent study by Moyo et al. (2022) in the Eastern Cape province, South Africa, examined the relationship between human capital development, poverty, and income inequality. The study made use of pooled mean group and found that human capital increases income inequality in the Eastern Cape. This shows that there are unequal opportunities in the education system. This study is in sync with the findings by Lee and Lee (2018) who found that rich people are the only individual who affords to go to school, thereby increasing the gap between the rich and the poor. However, in Brazil, Menezes and Kirschbaum (2019) found that secondary education is inversely related to income inequality. Thus, secondary education reduces income inequality.

13.2.1 Stylized Facts on Inequality and Tourism in the Selected Provinces This section provides the trends in the form of a chance to explain the income inequality, tourism, and education in selected South African provinces. The South African provinces are seen as important geographical areas that contribute largely to the macroeconomic objectives of the country. Therefore, its education and tourism revenue is considered as the main vehicle in reducing income inequality. To give a better perspective of income inequality, Fig. 13.1 provides the average income inequality (1995–2021) of the selected provinces in South Africa. Figure 13.1 shows that the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, and Gauteng provinces are the most unequal provinces in South Africa. This is illustrated by a Gini coefficient of Eastern Cape province (0.651), Limpopo (0.650), and Gauteng (0.643), respectively. Several scholars have posited that income inequality is significantly high in these provinces because of the exclusion of black people in economic activities, lack of proper skills, high poverty rates, and high unemployment in the provinces (Garidzirai et  al., 2019; Moyo et  al., 2022). On the other hand, Kwazulu Natal, Mpumalanga, and Free State Gini coefficients were recorded at 0.638, 0.620, and 0.612 respectively. Although these provinces are the lowest in this study, income

13  Tourism Receipts, Education, and Income Inequality in Selected South African… Fig. 13.1  Average income inequality in selected provinces. (Source: Own Compilation)

0.638

231

0.65 Gauteng limpopo

0.643

0.651

Free state Mpumal Eastern C kzn

0.612

0.62

Table 13.1  Post-education attainment in selected provinces Province Gauteng Eastern Cape Limpopo Kwazulu Natal Mpumalanga Free State

Secondary 4,963,820 1,712,201 1,455,120 3,063,328 1,268,051 882,593

Post-education 1,144,955 251,528 240,915 482,577 179,934 133,159

Total 6,108,775 1,963,729 1,696,035 3,545,905 1,447,985 1,015,752

Source: Statistics South Africa (2016)

inequality is significantly high. In line with the National Development Plan (2030), South Africa’s government plans to reduce income inequality. Among other variables that are envisioned to reduce income inequality are better education and the promotion of modern sectors such as tourism. Table 13.1 provides the number of people that have secondary and postsecondary education in selected provinces. Table 13.1 shows that Gauteng has the highest number of people with secondary education and postsecondary qualification. In total, Gauteng province has more than six million people with at least secondary education. This accounts for more than double the selected provinces because these provinces feed Gauteng province since other people migrate to Gauteng in search of greener pastures. Kwazulu is the second highest in both secondary and postsecondary attainment. The total number of educated accounts for 3,545,905 people. Contrary, Mpumalanga (1,447,985) and Free State (1,015,752) are the least educated provinces in this study. This is a sign of low-quality education which also has a positive relationship with poverty and unemployment. Table 13.2 illustrates the tourism provincial contribution to GDP within their geographical areas. Table 13.2 results report that Mpumalanga and Limpopo are the highest contributing provinces to their GDP. Thus, tourism activities in the region in the form of revenue contribute about 6.5% and 6.3% in Mpumalanga and Limpopo,

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Table 13.2  Average tourism performance

Province Gauteng Mpumalanga Limpopo Free State Eastern Cape Kwazulu Natal

Tourism contribution to GDP 4.7% 6.5% 6.3% 4.5% 5.4% 6%

Source: Global Insight (2021)

Table 13.3  Description of variables Variable Gini coefficient Tourism Tourism Education GDP growth

Description The statistic that quantifies the amount of income inequality that exists in a population Tourism receipts from international tourists in current US dollars Tourist arrivals Number of people in a province that attained tertiary education The growth rate of gross domestic product

Acronym Gini TOUR TOUR2 EDU GDP

Source: Own Compilation

respectively. On the other hand, Gauteng and Eastern Cape are the least contributing provinces to GDP about tourism revenue.

13.3 Methodology 13.3.1 Data Description This section provides a data description and the methodology used in this study. The data was sourced from the IHS Global Insight, and the data ranges from 1995 to 2021. The data pertains to Gauteng, Free State, Eastern Cape, Kwazulu Natal, Limpopo, and Mpumalanga. This sample size was chosen due to the availability of data. The study used variables such as the Gini coefficient, tourism receipts, tourists’ arrival, education, and GDP growth. The Gini coefficient was used to measure income inequality, and this proxy has been used by Nguyen et al. (2021), Tsaurai (2022), and Fauzel (2019). A summary of the variables is given in Table 13.3.

13.3.2 Panel Unit Root Test Panel unit root tests are the preliminary tests used to determine the appropriate technique to use. To check for this, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) (2003) and Lin, Levin, and Chu (LLC) (2002) were used. These tests set the null hypothesis at the unit root

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test, and if the p-value is less than 10%, then the variable is stationary. The econometric literature prescribes that if the variables are integrated at I(0) then an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) can be estimated. Furthermore, if the variables are integrated at I(0) and I(1), then a PMG is deemed fit. If the variables are integrated at I(1), a VECM and VAR are deemed fit. Table 13.4 shows a panel unit root test. The results illustrate that the variables under study are a combination of orders 0 and 1. This thus means that the study will employ a PMG.

13.3.3 Estimation Technique The study adopted a quantitative approach to investigating the link between tourism receipts, education, and income inequality in South African provinces. The study could employ various panel techniques such as generalized methods of moments, pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and random effects. Noteworthy is that the techniques may produce spurious results and provide serial correlation, endogeneity, and heteroscedasticity problems (Moyo & Roux, 2020). To provide a better perspective, models such as generalized methods of moments are appropriate when the time series is smaller than the number of cross-sectional units. Having laid this background, then pooled mean group (PMG), mean group (MG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) can be employed. Literature posits that the PMG estimator was developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). The PMG considers both the long-run and short-run relationship. The developer of the estimator argues that short-run and long-run coefficients are different and are assumed to be the same for every cross-sectional unit under the study. The other advantage of using PMG is that it is based on cointegration among the variables and assumes the absence of serial correlation (Roodman, 2009). Although the PMG has a built-in cointegration, the study will use Kao (1999) to confirm the cointegration among the variables. The study will make use of the Hausman test to determine the appropriate method to use. The Hausman test sets the null hypothesis of homogenous long-run coefficients and a failure to reject this null which means that PMG is the most robust method to use. Below is the PMG estimator: Table 13.4  Panel unit root test Variable GINI TOUR TOUR2 EDU GDP

IPS Levels 0.73*** 3.90 5.42 6.46*** −5.09***

First difference 0.32*** −2.10*** −4.91*** 7.60*** −11.19***

Source: Own Compilation Note: ...represents 1% level of significance

LLC Levels 0.53** 2.64 4.38 5.20*** −4.19***

Conclusion First difference 0.51*** −3.19*** −2.31*** 6.17*** −9.35***

I(0) I(1) I(1) 1(0) 1(0)

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R. Garidzirai j 1

j 0

p

q

Yit    iYi ,t  j   Xi ,t  j ij  i  it , t  1, 2,, T , i  1, 2,, N



(13.1)

where Yit is the dependent variable, μi is the fixed effects, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, and δij and αij are vectors of parameters. The short-run or error correction form of Eq. 13.1 is



j 1

j 0

p 1

q 1

Yit  iYi ,t 1  Xit i    ij Yi ,t 1   Xi ,t  j  ij  i it



(13.2)

j 0  j 1  Where Yit  Yit  Yi ,t 1 and i    1    ij  and  i    ij p q  

Because of the small-time series units, the ARDL (1,1) is specified as follows: log  GINI 2 it  i   i log  GINI 2 i ,t 1   10 i log  TOUR it  20 i log  EDU it  10 i   30 i log  GROWTH it

(13.3)

 40 i log  TOUR 2 it   20 i log  TOUR i ,t 1

 21i log  EDU i ,t 1   22 i log  GROWTH i ,t 1  it



The error correction form of Eq. 13.3 is specified as follows:



 log  GINI 2   10 i log  TOUR   i , t 1 i , t 1    log  GINI 2 it   i  11i log  EDU i ,t 1  12 i log  GROWTH i ,t 1    (13.4)  13i log  TOUR   i , t 1    20  log  EDU it   21  log  GROWTH it  i   it

where ∆ is the first difference operator. Furthermore, αi = −(1 − βi) is the error correction term which should be negative and significant to indicate a long-run relationship between the variables.

13.4 Empirical Results This section discusses the cointegration and short-run relationship among the variables. The cointegration test was estimated using Kao (1999), and the results are shown in Table  13.5. The cointegration results show that there is cointegration among the variables.

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Augmented Dependent variable DF statistic Conclusion Cointegration GINI −5.12a Source: Own compilation Note: arepresents 1% level of significance

Table 13.5 shows the empirical results of the long run and short run. The Hausman test results reveal that PMG is the most appropriate technique to use. The PMG results reveal that tourism receipts are positively related to income inequality. Thus, a 1% increase in tourism revenue increases income inequality by 0.60%. This positive coefficient is also consistent with the MG and DFE model. The result is positive because the income received from tourism activities is channeled to owners of businesses that are already rich. This tends to increase the income gap between the rich and the poor. The result is in sync with other studies done in developing countries such as Fang et al. (2020), Tan and Morimoto (2019), Alam and Paramati (2016), and Zhang (2021). These studies were in the developing economies context. Tourism arrival was found to be negative and insignificant. This means that tourism arrival reduces income inequality but is insignificant. The result is like the study done in developed countries that found that tourism arrival has no relationship with income gap reduction (Fang et al., 2020). A study done by Tsaurai (2022) rather argued that other factors influence income inequality other than tourism. The author mentioned some of the factors such as FDI, economic growth, and education. Thus, the study also investigated these in the South African province’s context. For instance, education was found to be positively related to income inequality. Hence, a 1% increase in attainment of tertiary education increases income inequality by 1.1%. This implies that the attainment of tertiary education increases the income gap between the rich and the poor. The notion is that few people attain tertiary education within a population and these few will only have access to income compared to the majority without income. The results are in line with the studies done by Nabassaga et al. (2020) and Zhao et al. (2021). These studies found that education widens the income inequality. Another study done by Moyo et al. (2022) argued that tertiary education is afforded by rich people and poor people cannot afford tertiary education, thus a huge gap between the rich and the poor. An inverse relationship between economic growth and income inequality in the South African provinces. The relationship was expected, and it is significant. Thus, 1% increase in economic growth reduces income inequality by 0.66%. If the economic growth increases, the earnings of the poor will rise faster which covers the gap between the rich and poor. The findings are in line with the studies done by Mdingi and Ho (2021), Topuz (2022), and Delbianco et al. (2014). These authors found that sustained economic growth reduces income inequality. The short-run relationship is confirmed to be relevant and significant by the error correction term. It was found to be significant at 5% and negative. This confirms that the model will converge in the long run. Thus, all disequilibrium in the model will move back to equilibrium over a specific period (Table 13.6).

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Table 13.6  Empirical results Variable Long run Log(TOUR) Log(TOUR2) Log(EDU) Log(GROWTH) Short run ECM

PMG

MG

DFE

0.60... (0.128) −0.18 (0.90) 1.10... (0.900) −0.66... (0.139)

0.10 (0.246) −1.13... (1.706) −0.70.. (1.82) −0.50... (1.148)

0.50.. (1.158) 0.21 (0.1152) 0.20 (0.231) 0.15... (0.260)

−0.39... (0.137)

−0.52... (0.409)

−0.21... (0.059)

Source: Research Own computation Note: ... and .. are 1% and 5%, respectively

13.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations The study attempted to answer one fundamental question: Can tourism receipts and education reduce income inequality in the selected six provinces in South Africa? Thus, the study aimed to examine the nexus between tourism receipts, tertiary education, and income inequality. To achieve this aim, the study employed the panel data technique  – pooled mean group with data spanning from 1995 to 2021  – although other models were used for comparison purposes. The study found that tourism revenue widens the income inequality gap while tourism arrival was insignificant. This implies that tourism arrival does not influence income inequality. An interesting result is that tertiary education further widens the income inequality gap. Noteworthy is that these results are important since the literature on inequality and tourism receipts is scant. The results contribute to the economics of the tourism body of knowledge and assist other emerging researchers to further their studies. Furthermore, the impact of education and tourism receipts has a crucial role to play in formulating redistributive and tourism policies. Thus, an improvement in the tourism sector is crucial since it is one of the fastest-growing sectors in South Africa. It is envisaged to create employment, reduce poverty, increase economic growth, and reduce income inequality. For future studies, the study will look into the relationships between poverty, employment, and tourism in all the South African provinces.

References Alam, S., & Paramati, S. R. (2016). The impact of tourism on income inequality in developing economies: Does Kuznets curve hypothesis exist? Annals of Tourism Research, 61, 111–126. Delbianco, F., Dabús, C., & Caraballo, M. Á. (2014). Income inequality and economic growth: New evidence from Latin America. Cuadernos de Economía, 33(63), 381–398. https://doi. org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v33n63.45338

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Fang, J., Gozgor, G., Paramati, S. R., & Wu, W. (2020). The impact of tourism growth on income inequality: Evidence from developing and developed economies. Tourism Economics. Copyright © 2020 © SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354816620934908 Fauzel, S. (2019). Tourism and income inequality in Mauritius. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/ chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351025102-9/tourism-income-inequality-mauritiussheereen-fauzel. Garidzirai, R. , Meyer, D. F. & Muzindutsi, P. F. (2019). THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SECTORS ON LOCALECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (LED): THE CASE OF THE CAPRICORN REGION, LIMPOPO PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA . International Journal of Economics and Finance Studies, 11(2), 20–35 . https://doi.org/10.1080/34109/ijefs.201911202 Ghose, A. K. (2021). Structural Change and Development in India. Indian Journal of Human Development, 15(1), 7–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/09737030211005496. Garidzirai, R., & Meyer, D. (2020 The contribution of key economic). The contribution of key economic sectors on poverty alleviation in the Capricorn District municipality : A panel ardl model. African Journal of Business and Economic Research, 15(2), 159–172. Global Economy (2022). Economic Indicators. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/indicators_ list.php. Kao, C. (1999) Spurious Regression and Residual-Based Tests for Cointegration in Panel Data. Journal of Econometrics, 90, 1–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00023-2. Lee, J. W., & Lee, H. (2018). Human capital and income inequality. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 23(4), 554–583. https://doi.org/10.1080/13547860.2018.1515002 Mariotti, M., & Fourie, J. (2014). The economics of apartheid: An introduction. Economic History of Developing Regions, 29(2), 113–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/20780389.2014.958298 Mdingi, K., & Ho, S. Y. (2021, May 28). Literature review on income inequality and economic growth. MethodsX, 8, 101402. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mex.2021.101402. PMID: 34430298; PMCID: PMC8374511. Menezes Filho, N., & Kirschbaum, C. (2019). Education and inequality in Brazil. In M.  Arretche (Ed.), Paths of inequality in Brazil (pp.  69–88). Springer. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-­3-­319-­78184-­6 Moyo, C & Pierre Le Roux, (2020). “Financial liberalisation, financial development and financial crises in SADC countries,” Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 12(4), 477–494. Moyo, C., Mishi, S., & Ncwadi, R. (2022). Human capital development, poverty and income inequality in the Eastern Cape province. Development Studies Research, 9(1), 36–47. https:// doi.org/10.1080/21665095.2022.2032236 Nabassaga, T., Chuku, C., Mukasa, A., & Amusa, H. (2020). How does educational inequality affect income inequality in Africa?, Working Paper Series N° 343, African Development Bank, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Nguyen, C.  P., Schinckus, C., Su, T.  D., & Chong, F.  H. L. (2021). The influence of tourism on income inequality. Journal of Travel Research, 60(7), 1426–1444. https://doi. org/10.1177/0047287520954538 Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y. and Smith, R.P. (1999) Pooled Mean Group Estimation of Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94, 621–634. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1999.10474156. Roodman, D. (2009). How to do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata. The Stata Journal, 9(1), 86–136. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0900900106. Tan, D., & Morimoto, R. (2019). Tourism as a mechanism in reducing income inequality in developing economies, Working Papers 230, Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London, UK. Topuz, S. G. (2022). The relationship between income inequality and economic growth: Are transmission channels effective? Social Indicators Research, 2022, 1177. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11205-­022-­02882-­0 Tsaurai, K 2022. “Influence of Tourism on Income Inequality in Transitional Economies: Does Foreign Direct Investment Matter?,” EuroEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, 1(41), 76–89.

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World Bank. (2022). New World Bank Report Assesses Sources of Inequality in Five Countries in Southern Africa. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/09/ new-world-bank-report-assesses-sources-ofinequality-in-five-countries-in-southern-africa. Yang, J., & Qiu, M. (2016). The impact of education on income inequality and intergenerational mobility. China Economic Review, 37, 110–125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2015.12.009 Zhang, J. (2021). The effects of tourism on income inequality: A meta-analysis of econometrics studies. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Management, 48, 312–321. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jhtm.2021.07.009 Zhao, Yn., Fan, J., Wang, Yf. et al. (2021). Income inequality and growth from functional orientation and spatial policy: Case study of Tibet, China. J. Mt. Sci. 18, 178–193. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11629-019-5541-5.

Chapter 14

Dam Projects, Modernity, and Forced Displacement: An Analysis of the Role of Local Institutions in Surviving Marginalization Among the Tokwe Mukosi Displacees in Zimbabwe Lloyd Nhodo

and Vivian Besem Ojong

Abstract  This chapter is a product of the broader qualitative and ethnographic study carried out among the Tokwe Mukosi internally displaced persons (IDPs) at Chingwizi. This followed the construction of the largest inland dam project in Zimbabwe. It acknowledges that owing to the social, political, and economic impediments afflicting Zimbabwe, the state has reneged on the international imperatives for the protection of IDPs. These include but are not limited to the United Nations Guidelines on IDPs and the Kampala Convention on the Protection of IDPs. The disregard for these obligations is also an outcome of the spirited desire for modernity, rationality, and quantitative development. This has unintentionally led to the unintended consequence of “development eluding people". This chapter shows how the Tokwe Mukosi people are falling back on the existing local institutions for protection, simultaneously portraying how they create new local institutions to build resilience with very limited state support. The findings reveal the interplay between local institutions and social capital in understanding the efficacy of informal and community-based institutions in dealing with vulnerability and marginalization. This chapter interfaces social capital theory and strategic essentialism to understand the collective response of the displacements in the quest to survive marginalization. Methodologically, unstructured interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and secondary sources of data were used to collect data within this ethnographic study. Keywords  Dam project · Forced displacement · Local institution · Social capital

L. Nhodo (*) · V. B. Ojong University of KwaZulu-Natal Harwad College, School of Social Sciences, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_14

239

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L. Nhodo and V. B. Ojong

14.1 Introduction and Background to the Study Traditionally, research on migration has mainly focused on the trifurcated areas, specifically international migration, xenophobia, and the refugee problem (Landau, 2005; Crush & Tevera, 2010; Maphosa, 2012; Makandwa & Vearey, 2017; Rukuni et al., 2020; Nyamwanza & Dzingirai, 2020). This has had the unintended consequence of pushing internally displaced persons (IDPs) to the margins of social research in migration studies. Nevertheless, in recent times, there has been a refreshing interest in the need to consider the plight of IDPs within the subfield of forced migration (see Gukurume & Nhodo, 2020; Gukurume & Tombindo, 2021; Basure et al., 2021). Much as we acknowledge that there has been an increasing board of literature on IDPs and more specifically on development-induced displacement, the fallacy is that research has tended to be confined to the disaster period (see Gumindoga et al., 2014; Hove, 2016; Chazireni & Chigonda, 2018; Zikhali, 2018; Mucherera & Spiegel, 2021). Thus, the “victims” have inadvertently become invisible in post-disaster situations. What it means, therefore, is that there is a dearth of literature on the experiences of the displacements in post-disaster environments like the Tokwe Mukosi experience. This, therefore, becomes the gap that this study seeks to fill in academic research. To contextualize the aforementioned experience, in the Zimbabwean context, there is a voluminous literature on the worrying conditions of the Tokwe Mukosi people in the aftermath of the flooding and the ensuing displacement (see Hove, 2016; Ndimande & Moyo, 2018; Zikhali, 2018; Chazireni & Chigonda, 2018; Benhura & Naidu, 2018). To this end, the general trend is that there is a lack of academic scholarship on the positive post-disaster experiences of displaced persons. To this end, the displacements have been evaluated as passive victims of their condition. The humanitarian community has further compounded the situation by making such situations a development industry (Powel & Seddon, 2007). To buttress this position, the invisibility and perpetual push of the Tokwe Mukosi people to the margins is reflected in the state’s approach to development. Of note is the recent development where the state is seized with the implementation of the proposed master plan for the Tokwe Mukosi dam, pointing to the thriving of quantitative development over qualitative development. Academic research has also shifted in the same direction. Thus, academic institutions have been tasked to come up with contributions to the master plan, albeit with no reference to the displaced. In the end, these displacements have now fallen under the category of invisible displaced persons, both in the state’s policies and academic research (IDMC, 2008). As stated elsewhere in this chapter, it is also worrying that academic research on the Tokwe Mukosi dam project and displacement has almost entirely focused on the displaced as passive “victims” of their social situation. This study however moves away from this “black hole” by dissecting the stratagems adopted by the people in question to paradoxically move from the “victims” status to survivors. This is in the backdrop of 6 years after their dislocation from their ancestral land and the associated livelihoods. Thus, the study focuses on how the displaced deploy agency in

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their encounters with the state, quasi-state, and local institutions. It looks at how they are falling back on formal and informal institutions simultaneously creating new local institutions in the quest for survival. The study also focuses on the interplay between social capital, social networks, and local institutions in dealing with marginalization with very little support from the state. It is however important to start by situating the Tokwe Mukosi dam project, displacement, and the subsequent marginalization within the postcolonial intricacies in Zimbabwe. This is because when it comes to displacements and violence, in Zimbabwe, the state continues to dance around the same spot (Helliker, 2010).

14.2 Forced Displacement in Zimbabwe: A Postcolonial Overview From the outset, it should be underscored that the colonial institutionalized violence ironically continues to inform the relocation programs in postindependent Zimbabwe. Following the said approach in the year 2000, there were massive displacements of white farm owners and farm workers orchestrated by the war veterans and ruling party ZANU PF supporters under the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP). These violent displacements were legitimized by the party’s proclamation for radical land reform and the long-standing promise for land rationalization. It was believed that this would help to achieve the bifurcated goal of decolonization and socioeconomic development. Notwithstanding the moral, economic, and political necessities, these forced displacements led to the loss of production, livelihoods, and food security in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 2006). Between the years 2005 and 2006, the government embarked on the infamous and highly militarized Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order). Officially, the operation was aimed at purging illegal structures, vendors, criminal elements, small business owners, and tuckshop owners, as well as removing filth in major cities and towns. Many of these elements were grossly blamed for stealing foreign currency from the state, creating health hazards and operating illegally (Hammar, 2008). Notwithstanding the official discourse, the move was a highly political one as it appeared to target the urban electorate for voting against the ruling ZANU PF party in the preceding plebiscite (see Tibaijuka Report, 2005; Sachikonye, 2006). The operation is estimated to have cost over 700,000 residents their homes and livelihoods, drifting the nation into a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. In response, a significant number of affected urbanites migrated to rural areas as part of the many survival gambits adopted by the vulnerable people in the absence of state assistance. What is apparent is that like the preceding displacement programs, the government took a technical approach to relocation albeit with a lack of resources and proper planning, as well as significant participation of the affected populations.

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The violent relations between the state and victims of forced displacements have also been documented succinctly by Hove et al. (2014). They noted that in 2007, the government embarked on yet another atrocious operation known as operation Chikorokoza Chapera (Operation No to Panning), which aimed at flushing out elicit trade in minerals such as gold and diamonds. This operation negatively impacted the livelihoods of many informal miners in Zimbabwe who were falling back on informal mining in the absence of formal employment. In the year 2011, the state followed this with yet another involuntary displacement of the Chiadzwa people from the Marange diamond fields in Manicaland province to pave way for the efficient and formal diamond mining. In this relocation program, approximately 4300 Marange families were relocated to ARDA Transau in Odzi. This culminated in yet another humanitarian crisis, which was epitomized by the use of institutionalized violence through the repressive state apparatus. What is evident is that the crisis was a manufactured problem because the government took a top-down approach to the relocation exercise, thereby glossing over the fundamental sociocultural questions affecting the locals. These include the impact of the relocations on social institutions, social networks, and livelihoods in general. These sociocultural fundamentals nevertheless form the foundation of this study. Between the years 2012 and 2013, there was yet another developmental program, which led to massive displacements of people in the Chisumbanje area in Manicaland and the Nuanetsi Range in Mwenezi. These displacements were marshaled by the government working in cahoots with large conglomerates that were investing in biofuels and crocodile farming, respectively. From a technical and quantitative dimension, the program was comprehensive as it was expected to foster the much needed investment, generation of foreign currency, and job creation for the said villagers. As has always been the case, the relocations lacked proper planning, and the villagers were ruthlessly given only a month to vacate the areas. These displacements led to a serious impairment of the villagers’ livelihoods in those two areas. Responding to the use of violence in these relocations, Mutopo et al. (2013) argue that the major problem when it comes to displacements is that the government’s response is affected by political expedient imperatives that are regarded as more significant than the actual issues confronting the autochthonous people. For Madihlare (2013), these displacements led to the loss of livelihoods as well as the sociocultural and economic status of the affected villagers. Based on this case, it is evident that social inequalities between development beneficiaries and those expected to bear the brunt of development costs are not addressed in Zimbabwe (see Flood, 1998). The involuntary displacement at Tokwe Mukosi dam is the latest in a series of displacements carried out by the Government of Zimbabwe. Of note is the fact that the construction of the dam which is the precursor to said relocations has been ongoing since 1998, and the idea dates back to the colonial era. The Tokwe Mukosi dam is situated in the Chivi district in Masvingo province, just below the Runde catchment area. Upon its completion, the dam, from the government’s perspective, would ultimately become the biggest domestic dam in Zimbabwe, taking over from Lake Mutirikwi. The construction of the dam aimed to ensure that there was

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sufficient and reliable generation and supply of electricity while simultaneously facilitating irrigation for the local communities and sugarcane estates in the southern parts of Zimbabwe. As has been the tradition, the government from the beginning did not consider the sociocultural dynamics involved in the relocation since it focused more on the technical matters including compensation for the affected villagers in financial terms. It conceptualized the affected villagers as passive entities, thereby ignoring the fundamental internal aspects. These include the possible impact of the relocations on local institutions, social networks, and livelihoods, as well as how the affected residents respond to such developments as rational, knowledgeable, and strategic actors. This, therefore, becomes the major focus of the study in an attempt to illuminate a complete picture of the displacements in Tokwe Mukosi. To give the reader a nuanced appreciation of the role of local institutions at Tokwe Mukosi, we begin with a brief but general conceptualization of local institutions before unraveling how these local institutions have been an important resource to survive marginalization.

14.3 Conceptualizing Local Institutions Local institutions have in recent times become an important asset that shapes how rural populations respond to vulnerability and in the same process build resilience in communities facing adversities (Agrawal, 2008). Considering the realization that adaptation at Tokwe Mukosi is almost entirely local, importance should be attached to how the local institutions inform adaptation and improve the capacity of the displacements to survive social exclusion. While our emphasis is mainly on the many informal institutions at Tokwe Mukosi, it ought to be pointed out that local institutions fall into three broad categories. These are public, private, and civic institutions (Agrawal, 2008). • Public institutions relate to various government departments, ministries, ZANU PF organs, opposition parties, and central and local government at Tokwe Mukosi. • Private institutions include nongovernmental organizations, charity organizations, and private businesses. • Civic institutions include cooperatives, internal savings schemes, and burial societies inter alia (Agrawal, 2008). The first two local institutions are formal and are based outside the community, and they have a symbiosis with linking social capital. On the contrary, the last one is highly informal and inward-driven. It should also be underscored that civic institutions, particularly in rural communities, appear in a traditional form. They are also based on the mobilization of bonding and bridging social capital. On the whole, local institutions foster a coterie of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital (Dahal & Adikari, 2017). While commenting on community-based natural resources management, Mukamuri (2009) posits that institutions present perhaps the best

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condition for sustainable management of resources in many rural communities that have been marginalized from mainstream developmental programs.

14.4 Methodology and Methods This chapter is derived from a qualitative ethnographic study carried out among the displaced Tokwe Mukosi residents at Chingwizi. Within this paradigm, participant observation was used as the main data-soliciting technique. This method was indispensable as the researchers were able to observe and record the behaviors of the researchers in an environment that is close to their everyday experiences. It also enabled the researchers to immerse themselves in the peculiarities and everyday realities of the people. This became useful given the marginalized status and the politics surrounding their dislocation from their ancestral land. Participation was made easier by the fact that the lead researcher belongs to the original displacement area (matongo), which made him a resident researcher and an insider. This was critical in the establishment of rapport with the researched community. Nevertheless reflexivity became critical in balancing the insider-outsider roles in research. More importantly, such politics of belonging and identity helped to gain entry into such a volatile area, which is often difficult to access in academic research. Unstructured interviews were also used to complement participant observation, and many of the interviews were conversational. Key informant interviews (KII) were also done with officials from both the public and private institutions, and they helped to determine the official position on the dynamics at Chingwizi. Focus group discussions (FGDs) done at Chingwizi were necessary in overcoming the politics of interviewing that comes with one on one interviews. Thus, they were able to foster multi-vocality as many respondents were encouraged by the situation to speak up (see Madriz, 1998). Secondary sources of data such as reports and memos from state institutions were critical in augmenting the data that we gathered using the orthodox research methods.

14.5 Results and Discussion of Findings 14.5.1 From “Victims” to Survivors: The Role of Local Institutions in Evading Social Marginality at Tokwe Mukosi In literature, on the significance of the abovementioned types of local institutions, there has been a fallacy in looking at the positive interrelationship between those types of local institutions (see Agrawal, 2008). What makes the Tokwe Mukosi situation unique is the fact that overreliance on informal institutions is a product of the

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ineptness of the private and public institutions to provide local protection. The political and economic environment in Zimbabwe has also posed a huge strain on private institutions like NGOs, and this has exacerbated the vulnerability of the Tokwe Mukosi people. Again given the volatile relations between the state and civil society in Zimbabwe, many NGOs operating in Chingwizi have been evaluated as anti-­ governmental organizations (also Masunungure, 2014). It should be stressed that the sensitivity of the Tokwe Mukosi displacements has also led to an ambivalent relationship between the state and the NGOs. What this means, therefore, is that for the NGOs to operate in this area, they have to go through a cumbersome accreditation process. Thus, many of the NGOs operating in this area are hamstrung by the obtaining environment. Consequently, this has a knock-on effect on the Tokwe Mukosi people’s aptitude to effectively mobilize linking social capital which comes with formal institutions for survival. With regard to a public institution, the irony is that for the Tokwe Mukosi people, this precarious situation they confront is perceived to be a product of the same institutions. This has led to the relations of ambivalence between the state institutions and the locals. Interestingly, this ambivalence was reflected each time we tried to introduce ourselves to some respondents who did not know us. As part of the ethical considerations, we had to produce a letter of authority to do research which had the government logo and stamp. Some respondents would then show discomfort each time they saw the letter. We would then go on to explain that we do not work for the government but are academic researchers. One of the respondents in this study confronted us at first when we produced the same letter. He responded angrily by saying: You people from the state, you are at it again. Will you ever stop bothering us? When shall we ever have peace?

After explaining the purpose of our visit and pointing out that we are researching for academic purposes, he then accepted our invitation to be interviewed. After the interview, we then realized that the nature of his survival strategy had an impact on his initial response. It bordered on criminality, hence the fear of anything associated with the state. The lack of trust between the locals and public institutions has been documented by Muzvidziwa (2004), who links this to colonial relations, wherein trust in public institutions was linked to traitors of the armed struggle for independence. The state as a local institution has furthermore worsened the commonly accepted belief among many Tokwe Mukosi residents that it is the architect of all the misery they face. This is because it is insisting on a bag of maize per household as food relief. The size of the family does not matter, and for some residents with bigger families, this arrangement was an insult. In addition, the residents were required to pay US$2 per family for the transportation of the same and an additional US$0.50 for the packaging of the maize. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional food relief programs by NGOs which they were accustomed to, before their displacement. In their areas of origin, the quantity of food was relatively satisfactory, and it corresponded to the number of children in the family. Moreover, the donating organizations would meet all the transportation and operating expenses.

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At the primary school at Chingwizi, the state as a local institution facilitated a feeding scheme for the learners. This was a noble idea given the situation at hand, but it unintentionally became another source of conflict between this public institution and the Chingwizi villagers. Just like in the food relief program, parents or guardians were required to pay US$1 per child every month to cover the operating expenses. Little as it might appear from an etic perspective, this amount of money is beyond the capacity of a significant number of residents. To this end, one respondent complained: This is not fair, how do they expect us to raise that money? I have five grandchildren orphaned by HIV and AIDS so where can I get $5 every month? What surprises me is that the same state is forgetting that we are in this situation because it displaced us from our homes.

The decision to redirect the operating expenses to the villagers in the two respective programs would attract bitterness from the villagers. This is also partly because it has always been their expectation that government programs should be accessed for free, a position that has been further buttressed by their displacement status (we will pursue this position in the proceeding section as part of strategic essentialism). In addition, they believe that state institutions should always fulfill the psychological and social contract between the state and the Tokwe Mukosi people, considering their victim status. Despite the inadequacies of food relief, some respondents also lamented the way it was distributed. The distribution also added to the politics of inclusion and exclusion, based on political affiliation. Thus, those with strong political capital benefitted at the expense of opposition members. This feeds into what Machingura (2012) terms The Messianic Feeding of the Masses. This is a situation whereby the state and/or the ruling party creates social problems for the displacements and then comes back as a caring state in the quest for political capital (also Salafia, 2014). Given the abovementioned relationship between the locals and public institutions, the locals were rationally falling back on civic and informal institutions as rational, calculative, and strategic actors (see Giddens, 1984). The social relations, networks, and social capital were largely mobilized in a horizontal form of relations. Kinship relations were of utmost importance among many respondents that were interviewed. They cherished many kinship ties both within and beyond the Chingwizi area. Outside the Chingwizi area, the matongo institution (denoting the area of origin) was a prime institution which they used as a resource for dealing with marginalization. In the realm of education, we observed that the standard and facilities in education provided by the state at Tokwe Mukosi were comparatively very poor. In response to this unfortunate predicament, some respondents rationally sent their children back to the matongo, where they stayed with relatives who survived displacement. This way the Tokwe Mukosi people are utilizing existing kinship ties and family relations to survive social exclusion. It was reported that in this arrangement the children would only come back to Chingwizi during the school holidays and sometimes the parents would visit them in the matongo area. A case in point is that of a respondent whose four children were staying with his in-laws in the

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Nemauzhe area in Chivi. It cannot be disputed that this kind of arrangement has negative implications on the performance of the children in question but most of the parents view it as a better arrangement compared to the vagaries of the Tokwe Mukosi area. While our interest was not in the impact of displacement on education, many of our respondents kept on referring to this highly sensitive issue. They reported a disturbing rate of school dropouts, which also had a gendered dimension. While both boys and girls were affected, girls suffered more compared to boy child. It was therefore revealed that many young girls who dropped out of school ventured into prostitution in surrounding towns and growth points. Popular areas included Triangle, Chiredzi, Jerera, Ngundu, Mhukahuru, and Chivi. These young girls are popular with older men, particularly truck drivers; and they are popularly known as Zvichingwizi. When loosely translated, it means small Chingwizis. This situation has made the vulnerable young girls part of the key populations in the spread of sexually transited diseases (see). Further research would therefore be imperative to unearth the challenges and overall consequences on the educational performance of children in this displaced community. Kinship ties, relations of trust, and mutual support were also relevant for a section of the Tokwe Mukosi people who wished to maintain the much needed livestock. Given their abrupt displacement coupled with inadequate pastures, some residents rationally left their livestock in the custody of the same relatives. Some of the residents who brought their livestock to Chingwizi devised many ways of returning their livestock to their places of origin. A popular strategy was to sell their cattle at Chingwizi and buy others in the matongo area pointing to the significance of cattle in the rural economies. Another section of the Tokwe Mukosi people has also become nomadic in the quest to maintain this valuable property. They are moving back to the vacated area taking advantage of the abundant but neglected areas for pastures. Adaptation to life in this area is nonetheless easy, and they reported that they are getting all forms of support from their kinsmen. In addition, there is another strategy pursued by the calculative residents known as kuronzera mombe (loaning out cattle). Here some Chingwizi residents based on social networks go into an arrangement where they loan their cattle to poor households in the matongo area. The poor households would then befitting from draught power, milk, manure, and other related benefits. This, therefore, makes it a win-win social arrangement. In addition to sustaining livelihoods for the vulnerable Tokwe Mukosi people, the Matongo institution became very important as a place of refuge during the protracted conflict with the public institutions. These public institutions included the police and the Department of Wild Life. In an earlier study, we interrogated the violent clashes between the locals and the police following the decision by the state to forcibly move the agitated residents to the 1-hectare plots. The Matongo area went on to harbor many residents, particularly fugitive men who were running away from the life-threatening situation. In this way, they moved on to stay with relatives, thereby mobilizing existing social ties in their ancestral land. It should be underscored that the Chingwizi area which housed the Tokwe Mukosi people was previously a game reserve. Given their vulnerability and threatened livelihoods, poaching has also become a valuable livelihood strategy.

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Mobilizing social networks, some resourceful residents are forming poaching teams which are known as Vakwashiri (the hunters). These poaching teams are capitalizing on what they consider natural capital in their survival matrix. Mostly, they go for smaller animals but when need be they go for bigger ones such as buffalos. At times, these poaching teams encroach into the Billy Rautenbach farm, and this is also another source of conflict between the locals and this businessman. While this strategy is important, it also attracts the wrath of the police and game rangers. Based on the culture of violence at the macro level, these officers often use violence as a policing mechanism. In response, many residents flee the area and hibernate in the Matongo area. Another significant local institution at the disposal of some of the Tokwe Mukosi residents is the Village Savings and Loans (VSLs) scheme. It is popularly known as Fushai in Zimbabwe, denoting investing for the future. This is a microfinance scheme that is also internally driven. It is the brainchild of CARE International whose aim is to move away from the orthodox top-down approach to development. It is conceived as a people-centered approach to development whose goal is to build capacity by mobilizing local resources for sustainable development in rural communities. It is also a cost-effective rural financing strategy (Hugh, 2006). Here, the villagers group themselves into either larger or smaller groups based on their internal networks and relations of trust. Members then pool monetary resources which they compulsorily loan to group members with an interest every month. At the end of the year, they would then share the proceeds. At Chingwizi, the interests ranged between 15% and 20% per group depending on the size of the group. It is different from the traditional merry-go-round strategy in that this is more organized but they both share the informal component and social capital is the backbone of these two strategies. The VSL philosophy however did not originate at Chingwizi. It was indicated that most of the villagers in this scheme were trained by CARE International prior to their relocation from Chivi. This was part of the broader capacity-building program in the Matongo in the Chivi area. In an interview with an official from CARE International, it was revealed that the organization is only there to render technical guidance for the villagers in this program and everything is done by the villagers. At Chingwizi, there were both larger and smaller VSLs. The smaller ones were highly informal and mostly composed of people with personal relationships. The larger ones during the time of research were moving toward the formalization of their operations. One of the groups had a formal constitution and an organizational structure composed of the chairperson, treasurer, secretary, and security detail. In October 2018, we attended a meeting convened by the most pronounced VSL group at the Bongo business center. Therein there were strong indications to make the program viable. Thus, they insisted that in the December meeting when they share the proceeds it was mandatory to move away from the consumptive to more sustainable income-generating programs. The envisioned programs include but are not limited to market gardening, piggery, and poultry projects. As we interacted with the respondents in this meeting, there were indicators of the gendered nature of the envisioned income-generating projects and the composition of this local institution.

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Out of the 20 members, only 2 were men and the rest were women. Culturally in the Chingwizi area, these income-generating projects are regarded as feminine. This position has been further reinforced by the patriarch which is deeply rooted in the culture at Chingwizi in particular and among the Shona people in general. Whereas the philosophy behind VSL institution emanated from the Matongo area, there is a clear interface between linking social capital and bonding social capital. CARE International is bringing in linking social capital by simply mobilizing and at the same time strengthening the already existing bonding social capital. Bonding social is expressed in the personal relations created before and after resettlement at Chingwizi. These personal relations are therefore the mainstay of this institution. This has been corroborated by the Chairlady of the biggest institutions at Chingwizi, who said: The advantage that we have here at Chingwizi is that most of the people are related and we know each other very well. We know all the mischievous people in financial terms, so we just close the door for them.

In the final analysis, the Village Savings and Loans were particularly important for the Tokwe Mukosi people. Their marginalized position meant that access to loans and conventional savings was highly compromised. In its prognosis, this program would help to push the members out of the vicious cycle of poverty because it worked in the past in other villages in Zimbabwe. The future of this institution notwithstanding its merits remains bleak considering the unpredictability of the Zimbabwean political economy. The hyperinflationary environment is negatively impacting the savings of this local institution. To remain afloat, the members will need to devise new strategies. In this regard, toward the end of November, there were strong indications of the migration to the US dollar and/or the South African rand. BACOSSI is also one of the novel informal institutions at Tokwe Mukosi. The philosophy was borrowed from a very popular strategy adopted by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe during the highly inflationary years to ensure the availability of cheap and affordable basic commodities for poor households. At Chingwizi, it is a highly organized, sophisticated, and mobile marketing strategy conducted every month. It is an outcome of the convolution of both private and civic institutions as well as individuals to market their products. To this end, local business persons, villagers, and big companies outside Chingwizi throng the Chingwizi area during BACCOSSI events. The purpose is to either market their products or to buy the products at cheaper prices. During the fieldwork, we participated in and observed events at two BACCOSSI gatherings, where we also got the opportunity to buy roadrunner chickens and millet. Here we also observed that N. Richards, one of the biggest retail companies in Zimbabwe, participates at these monthly events. Residents believe that at BACOSSI, all the products are available and affordable, leading to the popularity of such local institutions. The participation of different villages and private companies at BACOSSI is just but a convergence of different types of social capital and local institutions in this struggle for survival. Same-level relations between individuals were maintained as

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a marketing strategy, signifying the importance of bonding social capital. Many villagers ranging from Masangula, Nyuni, Mukosi, and even Triangle cane cutters participated at BACOSSI, and this is evidence of the existing bridging social capital. The participation of private companies also points to the aptitude of the locals to use linking social capital, which unlike the other two forms of social capital comes in the vertical direction.

14.5.2 Strategic Essentialism, Local Institutions, and the Struggle to Become There is a bourgeoning interest in strategic essentialism and how it has been part of the many strategies adopted by marginalized groups in society. The term was coined by Spivak (2008) in the quest for understanding the strategies deployed by women to fight social exclusion. It has subsequently been applied by in the analysis of the relations between journalists and ethnic minorities. Unpacks it in the context of the feminist agenda in religion. Overall, it is a strategy that nationalities, groups, and other marginalized citizens like the Tokwe Mukosi residents present themselves. It occurs whenever there are relations of domination and subordination. Identity categories become the rallying point for collective representation by minority groups to settle political ends. Reflecting on our Tokwe Mukosi experience, strategic essentialism becomes a political strategy deployed by the “victims” who are also acting based on the displacement status in the interest of unity, recognition, and the struggle to become real citizens. While there is a huge body of literature on strategic essentialism, there is a paucity of literature on strategic essentialism as a strategy used by the IDPs like the Tokwe Mukosi residents. As argued elsewhere in this study, the dearth of literature on the capacity of the displacements to deploy agency and strategic essentialism can be largely attributed to the fallacy of always portraying them as passive victims of the situation. Thus, scholars such as Hove (2016) and Zikhali (2018) have fallen into the same trap in academic research. In the mission for collective representation, it emerged that the Tokwe Mukosi people are mobilizing strategic essentialism which mostly manifests itself through local institutions that have been discussed in the preceding section. It is quite evident that just like in feminist and racial studies, the displacement at Tokwe Mukosi has hitherto created binaries of inferiority and superiority. These binaries are clear in the relations between the Tokwe Mukosi people and the state. They are also present in the high political relations with the Triangle estate and the Shangani people. This has resulted in what can be called the Tokwe Mukosi “essence” (Eide, 2006). This kind of situation helps them to demand special treatment from the other actors in resource allocation. Drawing from Spivak (2008), their work can be read as strategic use of positive essentialism. The clear explanation of the Tokwe Mukosi people’s encounters with other actors is imbued in

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strategic actions which may also be understood as being pragmatic in this highly political environment (Eide, 2006). Collectively strategic essentialism has pushed the residents to downplay their differences in the interim in the interest of the common purpose. The purpose is to deal with the social marginality that came with the dislocation from their ancestral land and livelihoods. The observation at Chingwizi given the situation is different from the observations made by Fontein (2015) among the displaced persons in and around Lake Mutirikwi in the same province. These displaced people unlike the Tokwe Mukosi displaced persons were accorded proper compensation and support structures that met the minimum standards before displacement. The collective nature of the resistance and conflict between the Tokwe Mukosi people and the state speaks to the utility of modulating personal differences for the common purpose. In many cases, it is assisting the locals to push for their rights given their marginalization. The systematic manner in which the guerrilla kind of resistance was orchestrated in the aftermath of the relocation becomes the ideal type of strategic essentialism. It was revealed in this study that villagers at Chingwizi violently resisted relocation from the transit camp to the proposed temporary 1-­hectare plots in what emerged as one of the strongest forms of resistance from below in the postcolony. While their actions were labeled as acts of banditry by the state, these residents were able to draw sympathy from both local and international institutions. Their marginalized and subordinate status became the moral justification for those actions. Such rational and strategic actions also helped to strengthen linking social capital among the contesting displaces. Internationally the residents who were arbitrarily arrested following the violent protests were able to harness legal support from the Lawyers for Human Rights. Their case is one of the standout cases where residents were able to successfully sue the state and receive compensation in the history of postcolonial Zimbabwe. Locally, linking social capital based on strategic essentialism was apparent in the minimal support that these residents amassed from various NGOs working at Chingwizi. This kind of support was however curtailed by an avalanche of factors, chief among them corruption, gerrymandering, and the electioneering gimmick by the state. Consequently, the support was politicized and highly skewed toward food aid which was also palliative in nature. Outside political relations, strategic essentialism and agency are also deployed to good effect in many collective strategies for survival at Chingwizi. Ordinarily, such cases as illegal electricity connections for small businesses and entrepreneurship at Chingwizi attract heavy sanctions from the police and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). It is worth noting that in as much as this act has not escaped the attention of the responsible authorities, it has been normalized under the pretext of the dire situation that the Tokwe Mukosi people find themselves in. The same can also be said regarding the rampant poaching in- and outside the Chingwizi area. Here the displacement status rationalizes and sanctifies such illegal strategies. Of note is the fact that up to the time we finished my fieldwork, there were no recorded cases of prosecution despite the proliferation of poaching at Chingwizi and beyond.

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The history and current predicament of the Tokwe Mukosi people have also been used to lay claims to scarce resources at Chingwizi. These resources include but are not limited to water, pastures, and food aid. Based on the political and acrimonious relations between the residents and Billy Rautenbach, the latter went on to fence off his pastures and water sources from the Tokwe Mukosi people. The state was then put in an intercalary position considering the links it has with the businessman in question. The obtaining situation then forced the state to side with the residents. According to that, it successfully lobbied the business mogul to avail the contested resources in the interim toward the end of 2018. A closer analysis shows that this became one of the exceptional cases where the Tokwe Mukosi people mobilized the state as a social institution to provide protection. Above all, this was some form of linking social capital that was also coming in a vertical way to gain access to resources. In addition to that, the Tokwe Mukosi case goes down as a rare case where the state is at least able to provide food relief to its citizen given the dire financial constraints that the country is going through. Nevertheless, as we noted earlier on, the residents complained about the inadequacy of food relief that they are getting from the state. In addition, serious concerns were raised about the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the access to this important staple diet. Politically, the displacement status is of utmost importance in the relationship between the locals and the ZANU PF party at Chingwizi. It is undeniable that the relations between the state and ZANU PF were characterized by gerrymandering and electioneering. In such processes, the objective of such institutions was to amass political capital. While this is true, it should be emphasized that the Tokwe Mukosi displacements are far from being rendered passive victims of the ZANU PF’s shenanigans. On the contrary, they exhibited the tenacity to use an agency in a dialectical way. Thus, claiming allegiance to ZANU PF and its structures at Chingwizi became a strategic move used to lay claims to valuable resources needed for survival. Toward the end of the fieldwork, it was indicated that a group of youths in Nyuni engaged the ZANU PF Youth League for it to also induce the ZANU PF Politburo to expedite their allocation of land. The Politburo is the supreme decision-­ making organ of the ruling ZANU PF party and is chaired by the president. Their case is strengthened by the fact that only their parents were allocated land in the aftermath of the forced displacement. The paradox is that 6  years after displacement, most of these youths have started their own families. Such a precarious situation has heightened the need for land in this context. In a list of their request, they also included a request for priority in the allocation of irrigable land. In the same vein, a group of villagers approached the ZANU PF chairperson because of getting fishing permits at Tokwe Mukosi dam. In these requests, the overall justification is that they are the ones who suffered the most from the dam construction. Given this background, rationally, they should be accorded an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of modernity, which is believed to be the fulcrum of the Tokwe Mukosi dam construction. At the microlevel, allegiance to ZANU PF is also a ticket to acquiring limited resources such as food aid. While the relations between the locals and ZANU PF were distasteful, the ZANU PF chairperson and other organs like the ZANU PF

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Youth and Women’s leagues became key institutions for determining who gets access to food aid. Political affiliation is also used in the politics of inclusion and exclusion to the much cherished land for small enterprise businesses. At both Bongo and Nyuni business centers, it was revealed that one had to be politically correct to get access to land for business purposes. Additionally, it also became a viable strategy which the entrepreneurs mustered to remain operational. In tandem with this, a female business person at Nyuni remarked: If you are in business like us you ought to dance along. If you dissociate yourself from ZANU PF your life becomes difficult. So even if you do not like ZANU PF you have to pretend.

The tenacity to use the abovementioned local institution for survival was also observed by Nhodo (2014). He observed that many of the respondents in the newly formalized Chimusana market in Masvingo had to be ZANU PF during the day and MDC (the main opposition party) at night. Such a strategy was indispensable for retaining trading places and wares. Similar findings were observed by in his study of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Harare where allegiance to ZANU PF was turned into social and economic capital for the youths. As we observed in the previous section, donating to the ZANU PF cause was also a viable strategy used to remain in business for small shop owners at Chingwizi. It should be noted that the patron-client relationship between the Chingwizi villagers and ZANU PF is not peculiar to this context. ZANU PF is just using this commercial space to amass or generate the much need political mileage (Gukurume, 2018). This has always been part of the party’s culture and mobilization strategy to gain political capital (Kamete, 2017). What is new however is the capacity of the displacements to also use ZANU PF to strengthen linking social capital for survival in the alien context.

14.5.3 Identity Markers, Local Institutions, and Survival Among the Displaces During our stay at Chingwizi, we witnessed an intersection of social identity and local institutions as part of the survival gambits deployed by the inhabitants. As stated elsewhere, two major communities were displaced from their original places to form the Tokwe Mukosi community at Chingwizi. These are Tokwe Mukosi and Nyuni. There was a spirited effort by the state as part of legibility to maintain the same living arrangement by correspondingly naming the two major communities at Chingwizi. An attempt was also made to maintain the same villages and their names and leadership under those two communities. These villages include but are not limited to Mudzungudzi, Madzivire, Maheya, Muzvimwe, Tsikisai, Chekai, and Jawa. While most of the villagers were coerced to move into those villages, there were covert measures in place that ensured that the villagers moved into the plots that corresponded with the names of their original villages in the matongo area. Much as this arrangement was a noble idea aimed at uniting the fragmented

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communities, it nonetheless became a serious source of conflict between the Tokwe Mukosi people, other local institutions, and the established leadership of chief Chitanga in Mwenezi. Notwithstanding the political undertones, in the long run, the aforesaid living arrangement helped to strengthen bonding social capital which proved to be the hallmark of survival in the alien territories. Commenting on the indispensability of bonding social capital that was reinforced by the strategic living arrangements in the 1-hectare plots, a female respondent (39) who identified herself as VaChivi had this to say: Although the displacements were painful, we are happy with the current living arrangement. Here in Nyuni there are very few aliens and this puts us in a position to assist each other with the little that we have in times of trouble.

Much as there were a few aliens at Nyuni and Tokwe Mukosi, there was also a deliberate effort to ensure social inclusion by using totemism as a rallying point. This helped to instill a sense of belongingness and solidarity in the hitherto marginalized community. Over and above this, the said living arrangement facilitated the maintenance of the networks and local institutions that were important in the matongo area. Based on social networks, reciprocity was cited as the commonly used survival option in the many villages at Chingwizi. Coincidentally, as we interviewed VaChivi, a middle-aged man arrived at her homestead with a small packet of fish. In the middle of the interview, the respondent was forced to stop and welcomed the visitor in line with the cultural expectations in this community. In a welcoming voice, she said, Titambirezve Mirambwi yangu, matiunzireiko nhasi (Welcome Murambwi (totem), what did you bring for us today?). The man responded with a smile, Ndakabva kudhamu nezuro kunoredza saka ndati ndiunzire VaChivi vangu svimuto (I came from the dam yesterday for fishing so I thought I should bring VaChivi (totem) some relish). After the expected introductions, the interviewee asked to be excused for a while, and they went on to have a private conversation. We waited patiently for about 30 minutes, and when they came out of the hut, the man said goodbyes but VaChivi stopped him and said, Mirai Murambwi ndikubatisei tunzungu utu munopa muroora wangu aite dovi ndoziva munorida (Wait Murambwi (totem) I have these ground nuts for my in-law to make peanut butter for you, I know you love it). After the man’s departure, the interviewee went on to chronicle what had transpired, emphasizing the significance of social exchange and reciprocity in the new territory. This, therefore, points to the importance of bonding social capital among the displaced Tokwe Mukosi villagers. Voluntary organizations at Chingwizi were also a manifestation of the centrality of bonding social capital. Of importance are the burial societies in the sampled villages. Although they came in an informal way, many respondents highlighted their indispensability in times of bereavement. These burial societies were anchored on relations of trust as they were composed of members with personal ties and relations. While they are informal, their structure resembles formal organizations. To this end, they had the chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary, and treasurer. During our stay at Chingwizi, we had the opportunity to attend and participate in a

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burial of a villager near Bongo business center. Based on the class, the funeral might fall short of an elaborate funeral, but the local burial society was at least able to meet some of the basic requirements of a funeral. Consequently, it was able to provide food, transport, and the much cherished coffin for the deceased. As with many local institutions operating at Chingwizi, the ability of this local institution to provide the requisite services for its members has however been compromised by the dire macroeconomic environment in Zimbabwe. The inflationary environment means that most of the savings by such informal organizations are eroded leading to incapacitation. Moreover, toward the end of 2018, the prices for most of the basic commodities and services more than doubled, thereby putting such organizations in a dire situation. In as much as the burial societies were popular institutions, one cannot gloss over the class differences. These class differences had a bearing on the membership and nonmembership to these local institutions. As a result of this, we observed a complicated class matrix characterized by three distinct classes. The first is comprised of extremely marginalized residents who cannot afford the subscriptions necessary for membership. The second class is relatively better off, and people in this class are managing the required subscriptions to become full members of these burial societies. Lastly, there is a category that is considered to be above the other two classes. This class based on the ability to mobilize various forms of capital for survival is also able to mobilize and outsource linking social capital in the form of funeral service providers. We observed that such residents rely mostly on the Nyaradzo funeral service which is popularly known as Sahwira Mukuru (reliable friend) in Zimbabwe. As we interacted with the respondents during the aforesaid funeral, we observed that this event reinvigorates a sense of community and social identity among the villages identified in this study. Villagers from the other village thronged the Bongo area to pay condolences to the bereaved family. This gesture and cultural practice is known as kubata maoko at Chingwizi. This way they were able to provide moral support to the members of their community in their time of need. They were also able to provide material support to the bereaved families popularly known as chema. What is apparent is that these processes capacitated the displaced persons to mobilize bridging social capital from the other villages. Of note is the fact that linking social capital was also important considering that relatives from the Matongo also attend such events, at the same time providing the same support that the locals provided. It was also indicated that reciprocally the villagers from these villages visit the Matongo during such occasions to provide the same support. Although such events are unfortunate, they indirectly help to maintain kinship ties and identity with relatives in the Matongo area for many of the Tokwe Mukosi residents. The unity and solidarity for the Tokwe Mukosi residents in times of adversity were captured by the family representative who gave the closing remarks and thanked people who had contributed toward the success of the burial at the said funeral. He said:

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Firstly, I would like to thank members from the burial society here present for their role. Secondly, I wish to thank our in-laws, sons and daughters for the work done from illness up until we buried our mother. I also want to thank our neighbours for their love, particularly Amai Rhozi, may you please standup so that they can see you. Let’s clap hands for her. Let me finish by thanking our friends and relatives from Matongo, surrounding villages, Mufula and Masangula. Your love and support should be maintained, let’s also clap hands for them. Once more, I thank you all.

Solidarity and collectivism are the linchpin of the local culture both at Chingwizi and in the Matongo area. These very important attributes of African culture were also maintained through the humwe or nhimbe concept among the displaced persons. While the ultimate objective was to instill a sense of solidarity, this element had a bifurcated objective in that it also helped to provide the much needed labor for some members who did not have adequate labor. This then made it a survival strategy in the final analysis. Humwe is a social arrangement where an individual invites close relatives and friends to provide labor as a team to complete a specific task. Reciprocally, the hosts brew beer and provide food, all to be consumed in a celebratory way after completing the task at hand. This idea, unlike some of the social institutions discussed above, was inherited from the traditional Chivi and Mushawasha areas. The utility of humwe as a survival strategy is however compromised by the politics of space for agricultural purposes. It is therefore mostly utilized by resourceful residents like Mai Lucy who managed to acquire additional space for agriculture. It is also used for the construction of the pool and dagga huts and toilets in most of the villages sampled for this study. What is clear is that this local institution is very successful based on the mobilization of bonding social capital. In a dialectical manner, we also observed that it helps to further reinforce the same bonding social capital as it is utilized by people with the same level of relationship. Thus, unlike linking social capital, it comes in a horizontal form.

14.6 Conclusion This ethnographic study focused on the efficacy of local institutions in providing local protection for the displacements at Chingwizi. Emphasis was on how they mobilize existing local institutions at the same time looking at how they create new local institutions for survival. These local institutions include public, private, and civic institutions. It however contends that the inaptness coupled with the ambivalent relationship between the public and private institutions on one hand and the Chingwizi residents, on the other hand, has pushed the villagers to fall back on local and informal institutions. In as much as the public institutions at Chingwizi are interested in using the residents to gain political capital, the same residents are also using such institutions to survive marginalization in a dialectic and strategic way. It also emphasized the inextricable relationship between local institutions, social networks, and social capital in the Tokwe Mukosi people’s survival strategies web. It shows that while some villagers were uncouth in this survival matrix, the

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displacement status became the flagship and moral justification for such survival strategies. This kind of conduct falls within strategic essentialism, a strategy used mostly by poor and marginalized citizens. Added to the survival strategies are issues of identity and collectivism which were also used as the rallying point to survive social marginalization. Without generalizing the findings, this study opens novel dimensions in terms of future research. Thus, it is prudent to look at the gendered nature of forced displacement and the various responses to displacement. In the same vein, it becomes important to look at the impact of forced displacement on people facing multifaceted vulnerabilities like persons living with disabilities (PLWDs), children, and the youths. Added to the novel challenges is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the said marginalized citizens, whose experiences are different from the more visible citizens. In terms of policy implications, the study points to the need to strike a balance between economic policy and social policy to ensure the goals of transformative social policy to facilitate social justice, social cohesion, and unity among the hitherto fragmented communities. It is also imperative to strengthen public and private local institutions and social capital for sustainable development. Equally important is the need to ensure equal participation of individuals in community development, notwithstanding the diversity of the displaced.

References Agrawal, A. (2008). Local institutions and climate change adaptation. In Social Development Notes, No 113. Basure, S. H., Nhodo, L., Dube, C., & Kanyemba, R. (2021). Death and the sociocultural dimensions of forced relocations: experiences from the Tugwi-Mukosi displacement in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe. Anthropology Southern Africa, 44(2), 80–93. Benhura, A.  R., & Naidu, M. (2018). Humanitarianism in praxis? Probing power dyanamics around key actors in Zimbabwe’s forced migration. Journal of International Migration and Integration, Springer Nature B V, 20(3), 735–749. Chazireni, E., & Chigonda, T. (2018). The socio-economic impacts of dam construction: A case of Tokwe Mukosi, in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe. European Journal of Social Sciences Studies, 3(2). Crush, J., & Tevera, D. (2010). Zimbabwe’s exodus, crisis and survival. SAMP. Dahal, G. R., & Adikari, K. P. (2017). Bridging, linking and bonding social capital in collective action (Working Paper No 79). CAPRI Collective Action and Property Rights. Eide, E. (2006). Strategic essentialism. In N. A. Naple (Ed.), The Blackwell encyclopedia of gender and sexuality studies. Wiley and Sons Ltd. Flood, L.  U. (1998). Sarder Sarovar dam: A case study of development induced environmental displacement. Refuge, 16(3), 12–17. Fontein. (2015). Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape, water and belonging in Southern Zimbabwe. James Currey. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Polity Press. Gukurume, S and Nhodo, L, (2020). Forced Displacements in Mining Communities, Politics at Chiadzwa Diamond Area, Zimbabwe, Journal of Contemporary African Studies,Volume 38 No1

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Gukurume, S., & Tombindo, F. (2021). Post-displacement livelihoods in mining communities: The politics of precarity and everyday uncertainty in Marange, Zimbabwe. The Extractive Industries and Society, 8(4), 100992. Gumindoga, W., Chikodzi, D., Rwasoka, D., Mutowo, G., Togarepi, S., & Dube, T. (2014). The spatio-temporal variation of the 2014 Tokwe-Mukosi floods: A GIS and remote sensing based approach. Zimbabwe Institution of Engineers, 1–11. Hammar, A, (2008), In the Name of Sovereignty, Displacement and State-making in Postindependence Zimbabwe, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26 No 4. Helliker, K. (2010). Dancing around the same spot? Land reform and NGOS, in Zimbabwe A case study of SOS children’s villages. African Sociological Review, 13(2). Hove, M. (2016). When flood victims become state victims, Tokwe-Mukosi Zimbabwe. Democracy and Security, 12(3), 135–161. Hove M, Nyamunda, T and Mukwambo, P, (2014), Violent State Operations at Chiadzwa (Zimbabwe) Diamond Fields (2006-2009), in Conflict and Peace Research Vol 6 No 1. Hugh, A. (2006). Village and loans association, sustainable and cost-effective rural financing. Small Enterprise Development, 17, 61. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2008). The many faces of displacement, IDPs in Zimbabwe. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Kamete, A.  Y. (2017). Pernicious assimilation, reframing the integration of the urban informal economy in Southern Africa. Urban Geography, 39(2), 167. Landau, B. (2005). Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2005. ISSN 0305-8298, 34(2), 325–348. Madriz E.  I. (1998). Using focus groups with lower socioeconomic status Latina women, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol; 4, 114–28. Muzvidziwa, V, N, (2004), Reflections on Ethical Issues, A Study of How Women, Deal with Impoverishment, Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol 13 No 3 Machingura, F. (2012). Messianic Feeding of the masses, An Analysis of John 6 in the Context of Messianic Leadership in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, PhD Thesis, University Bamberg. Makandwa, T., & Vearey, J. (2017). Giving birth in a foreign land: Exploring the maternal health experiences of Zimbabwean migrant women living in Johannesburg, South Africa. Urban Forum, 28(1), 75. Mandihlare, C. N. (2013). Large scale land acquisition and its implication on rural livelihoods: The Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant Case, Zimbabwe, Master’s Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hagues. Maphosa, F. (2012). Irregular migration and vulnerability to HIV&AIDS: Some observations from Zimbabwe. Africa Development, XXXVII(2), 119. Masunungure, E.  V. (2014). The changing role of civil Society in Zimbabwe’s democratic processes: 2014 and beyond. Bibliothek der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Mucherera, B., & Spiegel, S. (2021). Forced displacement: Critical lessons in the protracted aftermath of a flood disaster. GeoJournal, 87, 3855. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-­021-­10471-­w Mukamuri, B. B. (2009). Rural institutions, challenges and prospects for their active participation in natural resources governance in Zimbabwe. In Mukamuri et al. (Eds.), Byond proprietorship, Murphees’s Laws on community based natural resources management in Southern Africa. Weaver Press. Mutopo, P., Chiweshe, C., & Mubaya, C. (2013). Large scale land acquisition, livelihoods and gender reconfiguration in Zimbabwe. In E. Osabuohein (Ed.), Handbook of research in country determinants, USA. IGI Global. Ndimande, J., & Moyo, G. (2018). The state, betterment schemes and displacement: Ras Caleb’s public pedagogy in Zim-dancehall. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, 1X(9), 2. Nhodo, L. (2014). Innovation and the exercise of agency in an informalising economy: The lived realities of entrepreneurs at Chimusana market in Masvingo urban. Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology, 11(2), 78.

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Part IV

The Future of Development in Africa

Chapter 15

Public Spending and Private Sector Investment in Nigeria: An Investigation of the Crowding-in (or Crowding-out) Effect Amidst Deteriorating Fiscal Balance Nargiza Alymkulova , Paul Terhemba Iorember and Oreoluwatoni Omotesho

,

Abstract  The renewed interest in the role of the private sector as a powerhouse for enhancing economic development provides the impetus for this study. Specifically, this study investigates the effects of public spending on private sector investment amidst rising fiscal deficit, with the view of establishing the crowding effects of such spending. Employing the autoregressive distributed lag model on quarterly data from 2011Q1 to 2020Q2, this study found that despite the rising level of fiscal deficit in Nigeria, public spending (recurrent and capital expenditure) and public borrowing are the strong determinants of private sector investment. The results show that public expenditure has a significant effect on private investment in Nigeria. However, the recurrent expenditure which constitutes the largest percentage of the total public spending moves in the opposite direction and has a negative significant effect on private investment. This suggests that fewer resources are made available for capital expenditure. The study, therefore, recommends the need for the government to reduce recurrent expenditure and increase spending on capital items. This involves the concentration of efforts on the provision and expansion of the existing infrastructure. Keywords  Public spending · Private sector investment · Crowding-in and Crowding-out effects

N. Alymkulova Department of Business Administration, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania P. T. Iorember (*) · O. Omotesho Department of Economics, Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Mhlanga, E. Ndhlovu (eds.), Post-Independence Development in Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_15

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15.1 Introduction Since the great depression of 1930 and the Keynes’s intervention, the role of the government in an economy can never be overemphasized. In the Keynesian view, the government could turn the tides against economic downturns by increasing its expenditure, through several sources of income including borrowings. High levels of government consumption are likely to increase employment, profitability, and investment via the multiplier effects on aggregate demand. This would have some implications for private sector investment. The extant literature has divergent positions regarding how changes in government expenditure would impact private sector investment (Iorember & Jelilov, 2018; Gbaka et al., 2021). To some, an increase in government spending can be an effective tool to stimulate aggregate demand for a stagnant economy and to bring about crowding-in effects (when higher government spending leads to an increase in private sector investment) to the private sector (Chude & Chude, 2013). Meanwhile, other researchers established a crowding-out effect of public spending (when higher government spending drives down private sector investment) to the private sector. In Nigeria, despite the attention given to the private investment, relevant economic indicators show that the sector performance is less than optimum (Ekpo, 2019). The share of private investment in GDP, which was 14.6% in 1973, gradually fell to 5.9% in 1980 and 2.0% in 1985. During the structural adjustment period (SAP) from 1986 to 1992, there was minimal improvement. In 1994, the share of private investment in GDP reduced to less than 0.5%. The advent of civilian administration in Nigeria in 1999 caused a rise in private investment contribution to GDP. In 1990, it rose to 13.0% and even further to 16.2% in 2002; however, there has been a steady decline to 12.0% in 2005 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2005. Fast forward to 2015, the contribution of private investment to GDP increased by 300 bps to 15.0% due to the normalization of monetary policy in the country which spurred both long-term and portfolio investments in the country amidst an increase in government capital expenditure. In 2016, the country slid into an economic recession, and that affected the contribution of private investment to GDP which declined marginally to 14.6% (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2019). With the renewed interest in the private sector’s role as a powerhouse for economic growth, the study of this relationship is given a further incentive. The idea of private sector-led economic growth in Nigeria is traceable to the observed success of the major industrialized countries, which is attributed to their organized private sector’s resilience (Omitogun, 2018). As an offshoot of the poor performance of the economy over the period in which the government was at the forefront of leading the economy, there is a call for a change in the government’s expected role. To this end, market-oriented structural reform programs such as privatization and deregulation are being adopted to reduce the government’s role in the economy. In this reevaluated role of the government, the guiding principle was that government should concentrate its resources in areas that complement rather than crowd out

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private sector investment, thereby creating an enabling environment for private sector investment (Naser et al., 2009). Without prejudicing the importance attached to the mobilization of resources, current circumstances obliged the proper allocation, and efficient government expenditure utilization as the reward is more generous. Similarly, the fine for bad policy in this respect is more significant than ever before in the realm of globalization. In a nutshell, government expenditure could negatively affect domestic private investment if its allocation and utilization are not adequately addressed. However, there is also a lack of unanimity in the empirical findings regarding the crowding-in/ crowding-out effects of government spending on private investment. Research results often conflict with each other on the issue. However, Kim and Nguyen (2020) noted that the specific effect of government spending on private investment could vary based on the type of government expenditure being considered. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no adequate literature on studies carried out, particularly in Nigeria, on the impact of specific categories of government expenditure in crowding in/out private investment. Amidst the prevailing contradicting research results, it is unquestionable to carry out an empirical study to determine the effects of government expenditures on private investment (Kim & Nguyen, 2020). Coincident with the above fact, this study is unique in that it tries to investigate the effects of disaggregated government expenditures on private investment in Nigeria, which is expected to bridge the existing gap in the study area. The study aims at examining the effect of government expenditure and fiscal balance on private sector investment in Nigeria. The rest of the study is organized as follows: Sect. 15.2 focuses on the theoretical and empirical review. Section 15.3 deals with the material and methods employed in the analysis of data. Section 15.4 presents the results and discussions, and Sect. 15.5 concludes the study and makes policy recommendations.

15.2 Theoretical and Empirical Review 15.2.1 Theoretical Standpoint This study is anchored on the views of Keynes, the neoclassical and the Ricardians. The Keynesian view asserts that increased government expenditure crowds in private sector investment through improved infrastructure, health, and education stimulating private investment (Hussain et  al., 2009). The government sector, through the use of fiscal tools can afford large-scale investments and projects requiring a long time to become profitable that the private sector cannot  (Goshit and Iorember, 2020). The spillover effects of such investments in the public sector may be beneficial for the private sector, such as reducing transportation costs by developing infrastructure in roads and railways (Atukeren, 2005). In this context, government expenditures may stimulate private investment. On the other hand, the

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neoclassical believe that a rise in government spending would result in the crowding out of the private investment. They argue that government budget deficits expand the level of consumption in the economy. This is because individuals assume that the existing deficits would be financed by the taxes obtained from future generations. Further, the neoclassical postulate that government spending is less productive than private investment. The increased output resulting from the debt-financed government spending does not fully offset the negative effect of the crowding out of private investment on output, resulting in reduced GDP (Alauddin, 2007). Departing from the two opposing views or theories of public spending, the Ricardian equivalence theorem postulates that private investment results in neither crowding-in nor crowding-out effect, and as such, private investment and government spending are considered to behave independently from each other. The premise for this view is that an increase in government spending is anticipated to be succeeded by a hike in taxes in the future, if not today (Arestis, 2011). So government spending financed by the issue of public bonds is expected to be repaid by revenue generated through taxes levied in the future. Therefore, interest rates and private investment remain unchanged as economic agents realize that their income would be taxed in the future. Hence, they do not alter their current savings and consumption level.

15.2.2 Empirical Review The extant literature is rich which studies of the nexus between public expenditure and private investment, and the argument concerning this issue is still ongoing, especially since several related studies have reported mixed findings. For instance, Nguyen and Trinh (2018) in a study on the impact of public investment on private investment in Vietnam used the approach of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model on data from 1990 to 2016, to evaluate the effects of public spending on private investment. The results indicate that public spending positively impacts private investment. Thilanka and Ranjith (2018) also confirm that public spending crowds-in private investment. Similarly, Njuru et al. (2014) in a study on the impact of government expenditure on private investment in Kenya using the VAR technique using time data for the period 1963–2012 establish that both recurrent and development expenditures have a positive impact on private investment in Kenya. On the other hand, Yovo (2017), in a study on public expenditure, private investment, and economic growth in Togo, examines the link between public spending and private investment in Togo using the two-stage least squares on annual data covering the period 1980–2013. The results show that increasing public spending results in a crowding-out effect on private investment. Similarly, Atabaev et  al. (2018) use quarterly time-series data from 2004 to 2018 to analyze the impact of government expenditure and domestic borrowing on credit to the private sector in Kyrgyzstan. The findings show that government spending and local borrowing crowd out lending to the private sector by raising the lending rate in the long run.

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The study recommends a reduction in specific deficit spending by the Kyrgyz government. In this line, Shah et  al. (2021) employed autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) to study the impact of public infrastructure investment on private infrastructure investment in Pakistan by using annual data. The results show that government infrastructure investment negatively affects private infrastructure capital formation in the long run and short run, indicating that government infrastructure investment crowds out private infrastructure investment. Furthermore, Borsha and Hossain (2021) by using ARDL found an inverse relationship between GDP and public investment in the long run indicating the prevalence of the crowding-out effect in Bangladesh. It is consistent with Pamba (2022). Pamba (2022) attempted to determine whether FDI crowds in or crowds out in South Africa by employing the autoregressive distributed lag-error correction model (ARDL-ECM). The result implies that FDI crowds out domestic investment. In China, the study of Xu and Yan (2014) shows that government investment in public goods crowds in private investment significantly, while government investment in private goods mainly crowds out private investment. Similarly, Bahal et al. (2015) relying on time-series and cross-country regression analysis observe mixed predictions on the relationship between private investment and public capital accumulation. Hussain et al. (2009) look into the long-run relationship between private investment and government expenditure in Pakistan between 1975 and 2008, using a VECM method. The findings show that current expenditures such as debt servicing and defense crowd out private investment, whereas development expenditures like infrastructure, health, and education crowd in private investment. Kollamparambil and Nicolaou (2011) analyzed the nature of and relationship between public and private investment in South Africa, through a VAR model using quarterly data from 1960 to 2005. Their results indicated that even though the public investment was not “crowding in/out” private investment, it indirectly impacted private investment via the accelerator effect. Thus, any increase in government expenditure on infrastructure and social sectors would most likely boost private investment in that economy. Also, Ferris and Voia (2015) stated that government spending between 1870 and 2011 showed an inverted U-shaped relationship with private output in the Canadian economy. The results show that although government size aids the growth of Canadian private investment at the early stages, recent experience tilts more toward the hypothesis that expansion in government size decreased private per capita output. In the Japanese economy, Fujii et al. (2013) conclude that public investment confers different effects qualitatively and quantitatively, in individual sectors. This infers that public investment produces different benefits in different sectors and that it can bring then an unfavorable impact of resource misappropriation in other sectors. In this light, Askandarou et  al. (2021) using a sample of 40 countries over 1980–2017 and pooled mean group (PMG), mean group (MG), and dynamic full effects (DFE) methods studied the effect of foreign direct investment and domestic private investment in sub-Saharan African countries. They found that FDI has little effect on private investment in the short run but significant crowding-in effects in the long run. The results also show that FDI interacts with public domestic investment to boost these positive effects. On other hand, Merga (2022) examined the

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effect of public investment on private investment and their relative effects on Ethiopia’s economic growth by using ARDL. The study revealed that public investment has a crowding-out effect on private investment. Andonova (2022) explored the crowding effect of disaggregated public expenditure on private investment in Malaysia from 1980 to 2016 via the vector error correction model. Empirical findings show that private investment significantly crowds in education and defense of government expenditures while significantly crowding out health and transportation expenditures in the long term. In Nigeria, Dada (2013) observes that government expenditure triggers private consumption and output in the long run. Government spending on healthcare, education, and social security crowded in private consumption, while other components such as government spending on administration, construction, agriculture, transport, and communication crowded out private consumption. The short-run result showed that the variables tested do not return to equilibrium after a short-run deviation in the private consumption equation. Similarly, Nwosa et al. (2013) show that recurrent expenditure and government final consumption expenditure crowd in private investment, while capital expenditure had a crowding-out effect on private investment. Akamobi and Unachukwu (2021) probed the effect of the budget deficit on private investment and public investment in Nigeria by employing ARDL and annual timeseries data covering 37 years from 1981 to 2019. The study revealed that the government budget deficit has no crowding-out effect on investment in Nigeria. Eke and Akujuobi (2021) empirically investigated the effect of public debt on economic growth in Nigeria, covering the period 1981–2018. Employing a cointegration approach, the results showed a significant short-run relationship between public debt and economic growth. Also, the study further showed that whereas both the domestic debt and the external debt variables were statistically significant, only the latter failed the a priori expectation test and, thus, exert a negative contribution to economic growth in Nigeria. Akomolafe et al. (2015) investigated the effect of public borrowing on private investment in Nigeria. Applying the Johansen cointegration test and vector error correction models (VECM), results indicated that domestic debt crowds out domestic investment in both the short run and long run. However, the result suggested that external debt crowds in domestic investment in the long run. In another study, Mabula and Mutasa (2019) explore the effect of public debt on private investment in Tanzania using annual time series from 1970 to 2016. Applying the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bound test to cointegration and the Granger causality, the results suggest significant evidence of a nonlinear long-run and short-run relationship between external debt and private investment. However, the Granger causality test suggests that the relationship is rather a co-movement than causal. Observable from the above review of literature is that none of the studies to the best of our knowledge jointly account for the effects of fiscal balance and public debt stock in analyzing the effects of public spending on private sector investment. This study, therefore, makes an important contribution by incorporating the moderating effect of fiscal balance and debt stock given their importance in the crowdingin (or crowding-out) analysis.

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15.3 Material and Methods 15.3.1 Data The data requirements for this study include gross fixed capital formation, recurrent expenditure, capital expenditure, and fiscal balance covering the period 2011Q1 to 2020Q2. Gross fixed capital formation refers to the net acquisition of assets that are intended for use in the production of other goods and services for more than 1 year. In this context, it is used as a proxy for investment. Recurrent expenditures are the sum of money spent on the day-to-day running of the economy as well as on the payment of salaries during a fiscal or financial year. Capital expenditure refers to government spending that lasts more than a year and can be on building, construction of roads, land, and housing among others. Fiscal balance is simply the difference between government revenue and total expenditure for a particular period. If revenue is greater than expenditure, then the fiscal balance will be in surplus; otherwise, it is called a deficit fiscal balance (see Table 15.1 for details about the data).

15.3.2 Model Specification The model for this study follows closely the works of Gitahi et  al. (2013) and Omojolaibi et al. (2016) with moderation via the introduction of a fiscal balance variable given its relevance in Nigeria’s fiscal policy space. The stochastic logarithmic form of the relationship is expressed as

ln GFCF   0  1 ln REXP   2 ln CEXP   3 FISBL   4 DEST   (15.1)

where the log of gross fixed capital formation (lnGFCF) is the proxy for domestic investment and the dependent variable and the log of recurrent expenditure (lnREXP), log of capital expenditure (lnCEXP), fiscal balance (FISBL), and log of Table 15.1  Sources of data and unit of measurement Variable notation GFCF

FISBL

Definition Gross fixed capital formation Capital expenditure Recurrent expenditure Fiscal balance

DEST

Debt stock

CEXP REXP

Measurement Gross fixed capital formation (constant LCU) Federal government capital expenditure in billion naira Federal government recurrent expenditure in billion naira Federal government fiscal balance in billion naira Total debt stock in billion naira

Source National Bureau of Statistics (2020) Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2020) Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2020) Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2020) Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2020)

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debt stock (DEST) are the independent variables. α0 is the intercept term, α1 − α4 is the parameter estimates, and μt is the stochastic error term. The model is expressed in the semilogarithmic form to correct for the large variances in the measurement of the variables and to express the coefficients as elasticities (see Dabwor et al., 2020; Iorember et al., 2021a; Usman et al., 2019).

15.3.3 Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model Specification To obtain the long-run and short-run estimates of the model in Eq.  15.1, we re-­ specify Eq. 15.1 into an ARDL form in Eq. 15.2, following the framework of the Pesaran et al. (2001) unrestricted error correction model also employed by Iorember et al. (2021b, 2022a, b), Musa et al. (2021), and Usman et al. (2019).  ln GFCFt   0  1 ln GFCFt 1   2 ln REXPt 1   3 ln CEXPt 1  4 FISBL t 1   5 ln DESTt 1 p

q

q

  6  ln GFCFt 1   7  ln REXPt 1  8  ln CEXPt 1 i 0



i 1

i 1

r

s

i 1

i 1

  9  FISBL t 1  10  ln DESTt 1   ECTt 1   t

(15.2)

where Δ is the first difference operator and ln is the natural log of the variables. The log is applied to all the variables to stabilize the variances and also enable the interpretation of the coefficients as percentage changes or elasticities. γ is the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) which measures the speed of adjustment from the short-run disequilibrium to the long-run equilibrium level in the event of a short-run shock in government spending. This is because the explained variable (GFCF) may not immediately adjust to the long-term equilibrium level during shocks in the explanatory variables; hence, the error correction term is introduced to correct for the disequilibrium. 15.3.3.1 A Priori Expectations Theoretically, it is expected that recurrent and capital expenditure will have a positive impact on domestic investment, thereby crowding in investment. On the other hand, the fiscal balance is expected to have a negative impact on domestic investment and consequently crowds out private investment.

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15.4 Results and Discussions 15.4.1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix The summary of the descriptive statistics on the variables used in the study is presented in Table 15.2. The results show that the log of gross fixed capital formation has the highest mean score, followed by the log of recurrent expenditure, capital expenditure, and then fiscal balance, respectively. The result also shows that aside from the standard deviation scores for fiscal balance, the standard deviation scores for the other variables are within zero range, implying less volatility in the variables. Furthermore, the results in Table  15.2 indicate that gross capital formation and recurrent expenditure are positively skewed, while capital expenditure and fiscal balance and depth stock reflect positive skewness. Furthermore, the results reveal the case of platykurtic (with kurtosis value