Post-Colonial Statecraft in South East Asia: Sovereignty, State building and the Chinese in the Philippines 9780755619689, 9781848858978

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Picture 1 Tuguegarao city’s Chinese cemetery. 2  Picture 2 A Chinese temple in Aparri, Cagayan province. 6  Picture 3 Itawes-Chinese Ke Chin School, Tuao. 8  Picture 4 In Cagayan Valley, sacks of milled rice are loaded onto trucks heading to Manila. 41  Picture 5 Leoncio Tan and his rice mill in Luna, Isabela province. 54  Picture 6 Hotel Delfino was once the headquarters of the Minister of Defense and the military in the 1980s. 83  Picture 7 Delfin and Teresita Ting with four of their children in Tuguegarao. 88  Picture 8 The author, his goddaughter and the Ramirez family at Metropolitan Cathedral of Tuguegarao, Cagayan Valley. 100  Picture 9 Aeta/Negrito tribesmen in Gatarran East, Cagayan province. 139  Picture 10 Rodolfo Aguinaldo campaigned for Cagayan governorship in Tuguegarao, 1987. 143  Picture 11 Delfin Ting in the mayoral inauguration ceremony, Tuguegarao, Cagayan province, February 2, 1988. 147  Picture 12 Seat of government: Cagayan Provincial Capitol. 150  Picture 13 Speech by Congressman Manuel Mamba while inaugurating the annual ceremony for the Movement for Self-Reliant Tuao, August 2004. 170  Picture 14 Winners of the annual beauty contest in Tuao. 171  Picture 15 Congressman Dr. Manuel Mamba inaugurated family members as the local government officials of Tuao in 2004. 174  Picture 16 Flyer of the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Tuguegarao, 2004. 184 

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Picture 17 Tuguegarao city mayor Delfin Ting and Tuguegarao Archbishop Sergio Utleg during the Archbishop’s installation ceremony, 2011. 186  Picture 18 Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile inaugurated the Tuguegarao Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1984. 198  Picture 19 Electoral campaign motorcade for presidential candidate Gloria M. Arroyo in Tuguegarao, 2004. 215  Picture 20 Presidential candidate Gloria M. Arroyo met with local political leaders in Hotel Roma, Tuguegarao city. 217  Picture 21 Diosdado Macapagal Avenue construction: Arroyo-funded project for Tuguegarao city government in 2004 electoral year. 219  Picture 22 Mayor William Mamba of Tuao, 2004. 221  Picture 23 Rodolfo Aguinaldo, PMA class of 1972. 230  Picture 24 The tomb of Lt. Col. Rodolfo Aguinaldo in Tuguegarao reads: ‘The Lord Hears the Cry of the Poor’. 234  Picture 25 The late Atty. Leonardo Mamba, former mayor of Tuao. 241 

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4 Map 5 Map 6

The Philippines Cagayan province Southeast Asia Northern Philippines Kokang, Myanmar Chico River area

3  4  14  56  61  156 

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 A comparison of annual gross domestic product (GDP) in all Southeast Asian and selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1960–2005 (selected years). 20  Table 1.2 A comparison of life expectancy in all Southeast Asian and selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1960–2005 (selected years). 21  Table 2.1 Total number and percentage of Chinese-surnamed elected officials at the municipal, city, provincial and congressional levels, 1992–2007. 38  Table 2.2 Positive, weak and strengthening linear relationships between annual rice production and the numbers of Chinese-surnamed elected officials in the provinces, 1992–2007. 38  Table 2.3 Annual events of the residents of Barangay Agguirit, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines. 47  Table 2.4 The perceived largest Tuguegarao grain-traders and their suki coverage in the third congressional district, Cagayan province, the Philippines. 48  Table 2.5 Electoral office won by the Pua–Tio–Uy grain-trading-milling network in the Cauayan–Luna–Cabatuan cluster, Isabela province, the Philippines, 1992–2010. 53  Table 3.1 A comparison between the theorizations of agency and policy implications for statecraft between Bourdieu and Foucault. 65  Table 3.2 A preliminary profile of the four SRs in the Golden Triangle, northeastern Burma, 1989–2009. 76  Table 3.3 Number and percentage of votes gained by the Tings for the mayoral position of Tuguegarao and other positions in Cagayan province, the Philippines, 1988–2010. 86  Table 3.4 Tuguegarao municipal/city government annual revenue surplus and cumulative total capital and liabilities (1988–2006). 90  Table 3.5 The constitution of the state in Burma and the Philippines. 94 

LIST OF TABLES Table 3.6 Comparison of post-colonial statecraft in the Burmese and Philippine frontiers. Table 4.1 Considered equivalent ritual kinship terms by the Cagayanos. Table 4.2 Cagayano renditions of the Tagalog ethics of utang na loób (Part I). Table 4.3 Cagayano renditions of the Tagalog ethics of utang na loób (Part II). Table 4.4 Jargon of betting rates and hand signals in a Cagayano cockpit. Table 4.5 Awakening: Cagayano art of governing the self and others. Table 5.1 Total number of state-based armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, 1948–2008 (selected years). Table 5.2 A comparison of Human Development Index (HDI) in all Southeast Asian and randomly selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1990–2010 (selected years). Table 6.1 The Mambas of Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines (1926–2010). Table 6.2 The perceived major Tuao grain-traders and their suki coverage in the Itawes areas in Cagayan, Apayao and Kalinga provinces. Table 6.3 Firearms used and number of security aides employed. Table 6.4 Estimated annual governmental funds received by the congressman, the governments of Tuguegarao city, Tuao municipality and Cagayan province, the Philippines. Table 6.5 Estimated numbers of visitors and food consumption at birthday parties for Mayor Randolph Ting and Congressman Manuel Mamba (2003–4). Table 7.1 Presidents of the Philippines since the 1986 People Power revolution. Table 8.1 Equivalent terms of compassion and forgiveness in Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines.

xiii 94  101  112  113  118  122  126  128  158  164  173  175  176  216  251 

LIST OF FIGURES AND BOXES

Figures Figure 1.1 A flowchart of the political business cycles in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, 1960s–2000s. 17  Figure 2.1 Top four Philippine rice-producing regions, 1970–2002. 33  Figure 2.2 Percentages of total rice production in the top two rice-producing regions, 1970–2002. 33  Figure 2.3 Production of the top three corn-producing regions, 1980–2002. 34  Figure 2.4 Percentages of total corn production in the top three corn-producing regions, 1980–2002. 34  Figure 2.5 Top five rice-producing provinces in the Philippines, 1990–2006. 39  Figure 2.6 Top ten corn-producing provinces in the Philippines, 1990–2006. 39  Figure 2.6 cont. Top ten corn-producing provinces in the Philippines, 1990–2006. 40  Figure 2.7 Comparison of NFA annual rice procurement and national rice production 51  Figure 2.8 Annual percentage of NFA-procured rice out of the total national production. 51  Figure 3.1 An illustration of Bourdieu’s major sociological concepts and logics. 63  Figure 4.1 A possible model of the Cagayano cultural continuum 98  Figure 7.1 Delfin Telan Ting’s legally testified genealogy, as of May 16, 1991. 202  Figure 8.1 The structural compatibility of modern science and African witchcraft. 237  Figure 8.2 The ‘spiral of vendettas’ as a causative science. 239  Figure 8.3 What is discursive resistance? 252

LIST OF FIGURES AND BOXES

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Briefing Boxes Briefing Box 8.1 The killing of Rodolfo Aguinaldo. Briefing Box 8.2 The killing of Leonardo Mamba. Briefing Box 8.3 The killing of Roberto Guimbuayan.

231  242  246 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFP ASEAN CCP CDF COMELEC CPB CPP CSU GMA IRA KAMPI KIA KKY KMT KNDIA LAKAS MNDAA NAMFREL

Armed Forces of the Philippines Association of Southeast Asian Nations Chinese Communist Party Country Development Fund, an annual fund allotted to Philippine congressmen Commission on Elections (Philippines) Communist Party of Burma Communist Party of the Philippines Constabulary Security Unit (Philippines) Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (Philippines) Internal Revenue Allotment, an annual fund distributed by the Philippine national government to local government units Kamalikat ng Malayang Pilipino; Partner of the Free Filipino, name of a Philippine political party Kachin Independence Army (Burma/Myanmar) Kwa Ka Ye; Home Guard Units (Burma/Myanmar) Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) Kachin New Democratic Independence Army (Burma/Myanmar) Lakas ng Bansa; Strength of the Nation, name of a Philippine political party Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections, name of an election watchdog organized by the Philippine Catholic Church

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS NDAA NDF NPA PDAF PPCRV RAM SLORC SOCCSKSARGEN

SR SSA TEPCO UWSA YOU

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National Democratic Alliance Army (Burma/Myanmar) National Democratic Front (Philippines) New People’s Army (Philippines) Priority Development Assistance Fund, an annual fund allotted to Philippine congressmen Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting, name of an electoral education organization of the Philippine Catholic Church Reform the Armed Forces Movement (Philippines) State Law and Order Restoration Council (Burma/Myanmar) Known as Region XII in the Philippines. This administrative region consists of four provinces and two cities: South Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Sarangani, and General Santos City and Cotabato City. Special Region (Burma/Myanmar) Shan State Army (Burma/Myanmar) Tuguegarao Electric Plant Company (Philippines) United Wa State Army (Burma/Myanmar) Young Officers’ Union (Philippines)

GLOSSARY

Etymological sources Ar. Arabic Ch. Chinese (Mandarin) Eng. English Fil. Filipino Fr. French Hok. Hokkien Ib. Ibanag alcade mayor amor propio angkan anting-anting; ating-ating balimbing barangay barangay captain barangay kagawad barkada barrio bayabat bayan bibingka bihon bodong Bombay bumibili ng boto

Il. Isn. It. Kal. Sp. Tag. Vis.

Ilocano Isneg Itawes Kalinga Spanish Tagalog Visayan

Spanish provincial governor (Sp.) Self-esteem (Sp.) Clan, kin group, kindred (Tag.) Amulet that confers spiritual power or protection (Tag.) Turncoat (Fil.), star-fruit (Il.) Boatload of kin and dependents led by a datu; a 30-to-100 household settlement; village or city district (Tag.) Village council chairperson (Fil.) Village councillor (Fil.) Gang-friend (Tag.) Village (Sp.) Guava (It.) Nation, country, people (Tag.) Rice cake (Tag.) Rice vermicelli (Hok.) Peace pact (Kal.) Indian migrants from South Asia (Fil.) Vote-buying (Tag.)

GLOSSARY butaka butengo cabecilla cabeza de barangay cacique calle commercio carabao caudillo christo compadrazgo datu discarde, diskarte disiplina Diyos el demonio de las comparaciones galang ganti gatu na nono gobernadorcillo

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A long chair made of narra wood (Tag.) Tyrant (Il.) Ringleader, boss (Sp.) Barangay chief, usually a former datu (Sp.) Local political boss (Sp. of Latin American origin) Central business street (Sp.) Water buffalo (Vis.) Field supervisor (Sp.) Middleman in charge of cockfights (Sp.) Ritual kinship (Sp.) Title for a leader of a small settlement; headman, big man. Stratagem (Sp.) Discipline (Sp.) God (Sp.) Specter of comparison (Sp.)

Respect (Tag.) Reciprocate, avenge (Tag.) Debt of gratitude (Ib.) ‘Petty governor’; indio official above the cabeza de barangay (Sp.) guanxi Human relationship (Ch.) hacendero/hacendado Big land owner (Sp.) hacienda Landed estate (Sp.) hiya Shame (Tag.) Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Army of National Liberation (Fil.) Bayan Huks; Hukbalahap People’s Anti-Japanese Force (Tag.) ina-anak Godchildren (Tag.) indio Native (Sp.) intsik Chinese (Hok., Tag.) jueteng An illegal lottery (Hok., Fil.) kalagom Bravery (It.) kalayaan Freedom (Tag.) Kalinga Headhunting, enemy (Ib., It.) kamay na bakal Iron fist; iron hand (Tag.) kapangyarihan Power, authority, the powerful person, strongman (Tag.) kapatid Sibling (Tag.) karangalang Dignity (Tag.)

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karma kasinsin katarungan katut kan nonot kia-pai-hia-ti ko-yi kuan-yim-a kudeta kumare kumpadre kuripot lagay-lagay lakan lakay lanzadera la suerte lider lin-qing litson longsilog mabait madrino maengel magaling na lalaki magandang loòb mahirap ng buhay mahjong maingel mainit ang ulo mais makakarma malakas na lalaki mambabatas manang mangiyegu manong mare mata sa mata, ngipin sa ngipin

Spirit, fate (Il.) Cousin (Tag.) Justice (Tag.) Debt of gratitude (It.) Ritual brothers (Hok.) Good; kind; well-behaved (Hok.) A Chinese goddess (Hok.) Mutiny (Fr.) Co-mother (Sp.) Co-father (Sp.) Stingy; frugal (Tag.) Bribery (Tag.) Headman (Tag.) Old man; headman, elected by an informal council of brave elders (Ib., Il., It.) Shuttle (Sp.) Luck (Sp.) Leader of a clan; leader of a group of followers (Eng., Sp.) Human obligation; human feeling (Hok.) Roasted suckling pig (Fil.) A breakfast dish with eggs, Filipino sausage and rice (Fil.) Kind; good; well-behaved (Tag.) Matron; female sponsor (Sp.) Brave individuals (Ib.) Real man (Tag.) Kind-hearted; generous (Tag.) Life is difficult (Tag.) A Chinese gambling game (Ch.) Brave individuals (Kal., Isn.) Hot-headed (Tag.) Corn (Sp.) To be visited by a spirit of the dead (Il.) Tough man (Tag.) Law maker (Tag.) Elder sister (Il.) Protector, caretaker, strongman (Ib.) Elder brother (Il.) Co-mother (Sp.) An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth (Tag.)

GLOSSARY matapang na lalaki mattalaw mengal mestizos mga negosyante intsik min-zi misua mongo Moro mukha naimbag a nakem nakarit narra; nara ninang ninong nipa pacquio padrino pag-asa pagmamalasakit pagsasarili pagta pakikipagkapwa pakikiramay pakikisama palay pancit panciteria pandanggo pangat Pangulo ng Pilipinas pantay-pantay pare patawad patul pekyu poblacion principales puri

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Brave man (Tag.) Fear (It.) Brave individuals (It.) Offspring of Chinese and indio, or Spanish and indio (Sp.) Chinese traders (Tag.) Face, shame (Hok.) Flour vermicelli (Hok.) Green bean (Tag.) Moslems in the southern Philippines (Sp.) Face (Tag.) Good will (Il.) Aggressive; competitive (Tag.) Furniture wood; a kind of tree (Tag.) Godmother (Tag.) Godfather (Tag.) Palm (Tag.) Daily wage (Tag.) Patron, male sponsor (Sp.) Hope (Tag.) Sympathetic concern (Tag.) Self-reliance (Tag.) Provisions (Kal.) Treating others as equals (Tag.) Compassion (Tag.) Sympathetic cooperation; giving in (Tag.) Unhusked rice (Tag.) Noodle dish (Hok.) Noodle eatery (Fil.) A Filipino oil-lamp dance (Tag.) Chieftain (Kal.) President of the Philippines (Tag.) Equality (Tag.) Co-father (Sp.) Forgiveness (Tag.) A kind of king (Ib., It.) Poker game (Hok.) Town center (Sp.) Local elite under Spanish rule which comprises current and past officials, ex-datus, and wealthy Chinese mestizos (Sp.) Honor (Tag.)

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renqing Sandigan Bayan sangley Sanguniang Kapataan sari-sari shabu shuating

Human obligation; human feeling (Ch.) Philippine Anti-Graft Court (Tag.) Chinese merchant (Hok.) Young People’s Council (Fil.) Grocery store (Tag.) An addictive soft drug; amphetamine (Fil.) Mountain top; Luzon localities outside Manila (Hok.) suki Patronage; customer (Il.) sultan Islamic title for ruler (Ar.) swapang Greedy (Tag.) takot Fear (Tag.) tao-lang Headman (Hok.) tapang Bravery (Tag.) tattadday tam nga familia We are one family (Ib.) tinapay Ilocano bread (Il.) tis-mis; chiz-miz Gossip (Tag., Il.) tiwala Trust (Tag.) tong Extortion money (Hok.) touren Headman (Ch.) towkay Owner of a business; boss of a company (Hok.) trapo Dishrag (Tag.); traditional politician (Fil.) tunay na lalaki True man (Tag.) utang Debt (Tag., Il.) utang na loòb Debt of gratitude (Tag.) utang nga naimbag a Debt of gratitude, debt of good will (Il.) nakem vendetta Blood feud (Sp.) venganza Vengeance (Sp.) videoke A karaoke lounge, probably with female guest-relations officers (Fil.) wako Japanese pirates (Hok.) walang Without, lacking (Tag.) walang hiya Shameless (Tag.) walang utang na loòb Ungrateful, without debt of gratitude (Tag.) Wha-chi The Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force (Hok.) Y daga mas nakannag ta Blood is thicker than water (Ib.) danum yama Father (Ib.) Yena Tam Ngamin Our Mother; Our Lady of Piat (Ib.)

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND CURRENCY

This study mainly involves four ethno-linguistic groups in the Philippines; Ibanag, Ilocano and Itawes, as well as Tagalog. These are Austronesian languages. The first three are Ibanag/Ybanag, Ilocano/Ilokano/Iloko/ Yloko and Itawes/Itawis/Itawit/Itavi/Itavit/Tawid/Tawish/Ytabes/ Ytawes, which are members of the Cordilleran language family (Rubino 2000: xi). While Ibanag and Itawes are closely related to the Ibanagic sub-group of the Northern Cordillera linguistic branch (Davis et al. 1998: 1), in the principal field-site – Tuguegarao city (Cagayan Valley), where there have been decades of Ilocano migration, these three languages share similar syntactic rules and an overlapping vocabulary pool. An Ibanag or Itawes speaker can more or less understand an Ilocano speaker. In Tuguegarao, a regional center of education, religion, business and administration as well as land and air transportation, migration has brought an increasing foreign population from other places in the Philippines. Apart from a significant number of Tagalog speakers, a growing Muslim entrepreneur population from Mindanao has demonstrated how Tuguegarao has become a multi-ethnic and multicultural urban complex. As a result of cultural complexities, language creolization has taken place among these ethno-linguistic groups with the penetration of Tagalog-based Filipino (or Pilipino) as the national language and English as the official language used in local schools, and widely used in government, commercial and religious sectors in the past decades. In daily communication, elements from several different languages are usually found in speech. Although Filipino is more widely

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used by the inhabitants than English, Ibanag is predominantly spoken in Tuguegarao because it is positioned as ‘the premier Ibanag City in the Philippines’ by the Tuguegarao city government. Although the Tings, the first family of Tuguegarao, have Chinese, Ibanag and Ilocano backgrounds, they usually use Ibanag as the language of choice within the family. In another frequented field-site, the Municipality of Tuao, the Itawes language is spoken as the lingua franca, although it is often mixed with Ilocano words because of the constant influx of Ilocano migrants. In Tuao, one would therefore expect the mother tongue of the leading Mamba family to be Itawes. The Tuguegarao Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimated that there is a small population of 300 to 330 ethnic Intsik (Chinese), according to its membership record. Chamber members have to be Filipino citizens. These Chinese-Filipinos taught themselves Hokkien and Mandarin Chinese/Putonghua through the only Chinese school in Tuguegarao, the Ke Bing School (啟明學校 Qiming xuexiao). The school is administratively under the Department of Education, Republic of the Philippines, where non-Chinese students are also admitted. Following state education regulation and the introduction of an authorized curriculum, the Filipino, English and Chinese languages are taught together. Decades of business transactions, daily intermingling and intermarriage have meant that apart from Filipino, most Chinese-Filipinos in Tuguegarao speak at least one of the three major local languages, mostly Ibanag and Ilocano. Although the Hokkien Chinese dialect has been the lingua franca of the Chinese-Filipino community in the Philippines, it does not have a standardized romanization system. Therefore, because of the growing popularity of Hanyu Pinyin 漢語拼音 as the official romanization style for Mandarin Chinese/Putonghua, I have adopted this romanization system for the Hokkien dialect. Instead of the simplified Chinese characters used in the People’s Republic of China, I have used traditional Chinese characters, which are featured in the majority of Chinese publications in the Republic of the Philippines. In most cases, the sequence of romanization and transliteration that I have followed is: 1. romanization of Hokkien, 2. original/closest Chinese characters, 3. romanization of Mandarin Chinese/Putonghua, and 4. English translation. For example, Shēng-lī, 生意 Shengyi, business. For Filipino/Tagalog, I have adopted the transliteration style of the following two dictionaries:

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND CURRENCY 

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English, Leo James. 2001. Tagalog–English Dictionary. Mandaluyong City, the Philippines: National Book Store.  English, Leo James. 1997. English–Tagalog Dictionary. Mandaluyong City, the Philippines: National Book Store. There is very little ethnographic knowledge on the Itawes language, and there are more publications on Ilocano than Ibanag. The following were used in the course of the research and writing of this book:  Afenir, Juan O., Reynaldo de Dios, and Felix M. Manalili. 1998. Combined English–Tagalog IlocanoVocabulary. Quezon City: R. Manalili Gen. MDSE.  Davis, Philip W., John W. Baker, Walter L. Spitz, and Mihyun Baek 1998. The Grammar of Yogad. Munchen Newcastle: Lincom Europa.  Komisyon sa Wikang Filipino. 2003. Bokabularyong Traylinggwal (Ilokano–Filipino–English). Maynila: Komisyon sa Wikang Filipino.  Ibarbia, Zorayda Beltran. 1969. An Ibanag-English Dictionary.Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Language, Literature and Linguistics, Texas A and M University.  Rubino, Carl Ralph Galvez. 2000. Ilocano Dictionary and Grammar: Ilocano–English, English–Ilocano. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. During the years of field research, the exchange rate for British pounds sterling to Filipino pesos was an average of £1 to P90. The exchange rate for the American dollar to Filipino pesos was an average of $1 to P50.

ABOUT THE BOOK

In September 1972, a shipment of foreign arms was intercepted by the Philippine armed forces in the Pacific coastal town of Palanan in the Cagayan Valley, northeastern Philippines. The arms were reported to have originated from the People’s Republic of China to support the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Confronted by decades of social upheavals, the 1972 Palanan incident formally pushed President Ferdinand Marcos into declaring martial law. However, despite a widely-perceived status as a ‘weak state’, the Philippine state has managed to avoid a full-blown bloody revolution and kept itself intact. How has it done that? This historical ethnography aims to account for centralizing measures by the state and the resistance that it encounters when pacifying the frontiers. The author has conducted a decade of field research in collaboration with a range of actors, including state officials, the judiciary, police force, Catholic Church, military, Chinese business community, and inarticulate ruled majority. By focusing on the governance techniques of three frontier strongmen of the Cagayan Valley – the late Lieutenant Colonel Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Dr. Manuel Mamba of Tuao, and Mr. Delfin Ting of Tuguegarao City – the book argues that the gist of the Philippine post-colonial statecraft hinges on the co-optation specifics of the frontier strongmen into the state’s ruling instruments. State sovereignty is delegated and localized through the strongmen. Instead of portraying the strongmen as a threat to state rule, this book details how the strongmen have been successfully contained and therefore caught in the centralizing state’s governmental technologies and the ruled majority’s countergovernmental technologies. It holds that the theorization and maintenance

ABOUT THE BOOK

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of the state as a sprawling field of diverse tug-of-war processes and multiple arenas of contestations is of policy relevance for governance and security practitioners.

PREFACE

In an attempt to reclaim the territories lost to the invincible Manchurian troops, the dismissed Yuan Chonghuan (袁崇煥) (1584-1630) was recalled by the rapidly deteriorating Ming Dynasty to defend the northeast Chinese frontier of Liao. In view of the treacherous politics of the Ming court, Yuan was urged not to take up the assignment by his families and friends in the Guangdong province in south China. But after contemplating his destiny which entailed an array of possible outcomes, he decided to do what he considered as necessary. Based on his past victory over the formidable Aisin Gioro Nurhaci – the founder of the Manchu state, he went and proposed several strategies to Emperor Chongzhen in Peking to reclaim the Liao frontier:  Let the Liao people defend the Liao soil, use the Liao soil to feed the Liao people (以遼人守遼土，以遼土養遼人).  Defence is the core tactic, only sudden attacks on enemies, peace-making is the supplementary tactic (守為正著，戰為奇著，和 為旁著).  Implementation method of the above two strategies must be gradual and not drastic; it must be also based on solid grounds, not surrealism (法在漸不在驟，在實不在虛). Instead of relying on the regular but incapable Ming troops who were not from Liao, Yuan organized the Liao people into farming, governing and defending their own land. With the gradual expansion of the agrarian economy, Yuan was able to build new military forts, thus pushing the defence line forward. Coupled with sudden attacks and intermittent peace talks, Yuan was able to utilize the Liao economy and society, and reclaimed a substantial portion of the territories. In view of Yuan’s success and resilience, a Manchurian intrigue was skillfully deployed into Peking’s

PREFACE

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inter-factional squabble. Because of the internal power struggle, Yuan was charged with treason and tragically sentenced to death by Chongzhen. It was, however, within Yuan’s self-knowledge and in private anticipation of his own fate. In light of Yuan’s acts and self-knowledge that transcended life and death, this book details my own soul-searching process for a substantially revised reply to my former academic supervisor at Oxford, Frank Pieke, and my Ilocano friend, Manong Katigid (Brother Left), whom I serendipitously met in northern Luzon. While Frank unfailingly asked for my embedding which I interpreted as self-knowledge, over the years, Manong Katigid has engaged with me in two debates. First is the method for governing the egoistic self. For me to effectively liberate from various secular bondages, Manong Katigid instructively provided a parable with regards to the essence of intellectual freedom. A traditional Malay monkey trap places the decoy inside a coconut shell. Whenever a monkey is tempted to grasp the decoy, its enlarged fist will be caught by the shell and immediately alert the hunter. To escape from the trap, one must release the decoy, which warrants an awakened renunciation of the tempting decoy and the illusion that one could get away with it. Second is the question of why the Communist Party of the Philippines did not succeed in taking over the entire Philippines. This book will detail my views. I would like to thank David Gellner, Frank Pieke, Temario Rivera and an anonymous reviewer who provided recommendations for revisions. The Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (RGC Ref. No. 456610), Chinese University of Hong Kong (grant nos. 2020962 and 4440393) and City University of Hong Kong (grant nos. 7200096 and 9610084) provided the research funding. Chung-ho Lam, Chi-kin Chan, Kenneth Fung, Cliff Lam, Nikkiter Chan, Siu-man Tam, Wing-tai Leung, Raymond Chan, Tai-lok Lui, Ranhilio Aquino, Joel Migdal, Alfredo Robles Jr., Sergio Utleg, Diosdado Talamayan, Wong Siu-lun, Ben Kerkvliet, Patricio Abinales, Aileen Baviera, Ho Luen, and Ada Yuen offered their suggestions. Wilfredo Villacorta and Trinidad Osteria at Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University extended their incomparable help. The following institutions are acknowledged for the permits, support and assistance: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Asian Center of the University of the Philippines, Bayan Muna, Catholic Church of the Philippines (Archdiocese of Tuguegarao and Diocese of Ilagan), Department of Applied Social Studies of City University of Hong Kong,

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Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (including Centre of Asian Studies) of University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of Chinese University of Hong Kong, Institute of Philippine Culture of Ateneo de Manila University, Institute of Thai Studies of Chulalongkorn University, Philippine Congress and Senate, Philippine National Police, Philippine Information Office, Philippine Military Academy, and the local government units in the Cagayan and Isabela provinces. Research and technical assistances were provided by the following individuals in various stages: Christian Berrey, Benjie de Yro, Edison Cheng, Chris Estolas, Daisy Gacias, Huang Jinyang, Hung Wing-lok, W.L.Ma (Canada Editing), Jet Olfato, Santino Regilme Jr., Chris and Joyce Vea, Wang Jian, Kitty Wong and Paulina Wong. The following journals kindly granted permission to draw on previously published material:  Wong, Pak Nung (2010). ‘State of Aporia: Violence, Forgiveness and Non-self-asserting Agency in Christian Philippine Society’. International Political Anthropology. 3(1): 79–102,  Wong, Pak Nung (2010). ‘The Art of Governing the Self and Others in the Christian Philippines’. Journal of International and Global Studies. 1(2): 110–146,  Wong, Pak Nung (2011). ‘Following the Grain: State Formation and the Rise of a Trans-local Grain-trading Network in the Philippines, 1970s–2000s’. Journal of Contemporary Asia (www.tandtfonline.com). 41(4): 584–609. Due to space limitations, I apologize for not being able to acknowledge all individuals and institutions involved. Lastly, I would like to dedicate this book to the Filipinos who helped and protected me. The following Chinese poem is dedicated to my family, friends and godchildren:【無常脫塵鞅，自管意滅諦，空明趨無我， 聖域頃刻見。】[Impermanence derails secular bondages. Self-governance entails disillusionment. Detachment from worldly desires leads to self-renunciation. For a brief moment, I have seen the Holy Land.] WONG, Pak Nung Hong Kong

1 Introduction: Toward an Approach of Post-colonial Statecraft in Southeast Asia

1.1 A serendipitous entry On January 24, 2000, while I was conducting field research in Shishi city of the Chinese province of Fujian, a Chinese New Year celebration by a transnational clan association brought me to a Hokkien-speaking clan leader, the 77-year-old Mr. Tang (Dong, 董).1 Shishi is well-known for the extensive genealogical connections of its inhabitants with the overseas communities in Hong Kong, North America and Southeast Asia, who donated school buildings and invested in Fujian. Since Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy turned the neighboring city of Xiamen into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), from the 1980s, transnational clan associations in coastal Fujian have been revived for channeling overseas capital to the development of their ancestral homes (Ong 2006: chapter 4; Wong 2002). The celebration was expectedly well-attended not just by the clansmen and their overseas relatives, but also by the Chinese state officials. Tang later revealed that his recently deceased father had actually lived in a Philippine locality which he pronounced as shua-ting (shanding, 山頂), and literally means ‘mountain top’, where his half-Chinese-half-Filipino sisters may be found.2 After the sudden death of his Chinese wife in the

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Picture 1 Tuguegarao city’s Chinese cemetery. Chinese cemeteries are widely found in the Philippine provinces. Source of image: Author’s collection.

1930s, Tang’s father, Valentine, had had to feed three children. Driven by the civil war, famine and poverty, Valentine decided to try his luck in Luzon, where his clansmen had ventured much earlier. He went on a boat with three or four other people. They landed in Aparri, Cagayan province, a port town on the northern edge of Luzon. He then sailed upstream along the Cagayan River and set up a roadside grocery (sari-sari) store, operating a grain-trading business in Barangay Concepcion, Municipality of Amulung. While he brought considerable profit back to his family in China, he also courted and re-married to an Ilocano-Filipina named Basilia Sera, a daughter and widow of two landed political clans in Amulung–the Seras and Callos. Due to his alien status, their two daughters were named after their mother, i.e. Teresita and Corazon Sera. I asked why Cagayan was called ‘mountain top’. He crudely explained that this place was so far away from ‘the center of civilization’ that deep in the mountains, headhunting tribesmen still wore G-strings. One of his two half-sisters was married to a Philippine political figure of Chinese ancestry, known as tao-lang (touren), which refers to the headman in Chinese. The last name is Ting. He then gave me his nephew’s contact in the Philippines, a Chinese-Filipino businessman who operated trading

Map 1 The Philippines

Map 2 Cagayan province

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businesses in Manila and Cagayan Valley. Later on, in a genealogical research of the inhabitants of Shishi city, I found the late Valentine’s official record of going abroad: Thirteen generation. Chundeng [Valentine Tang], son of Huanhui. Born in Qing dynasty, Emperor Guangshui, Year of Renyin, the fifteen of August [of Imperial calendar], i.e. 1902 [of Western calendar]. Married to Qiu Juanzi. Qiu died. Re-married to Filipina, Caihong [Basilia Sera]. Further information unavailable. (My translation from Chinese, Zhuang, Zheng, and Li 1994) In July 2002, I succeeded in identifying the Tuguegarao city of Cagayan Valley as the ‘mountain top’ and Mayor Delfin Telan Ting as the ‘headman Ting’.3 In Fujian and Manila, the Chinese commonly call the provincial Luzon ‘mountain top’, which ideographically denotes remote, harsh and undeveloped tribal frontiers. Located at the northeastern tip of the Philippines, the geographical proximity of Cagayan Valley to East Asia has historical strategic importance. It was already known to the Spanish colonists as a ‘frontier of China’ when they discovered a Japanese ‘pirate’ (wako) fort at the Cagayan River mouth in 1581 (de Jesus 2001[1982]: 24). The Spaniards defeated the Japanese, destroyed their infrastructure and continued upstream until they reached the Municipality of Lal-lo, where they established the Archdiocese of Nueva Segovia. With a focus on the China–Mexico galleon trade, the Spaniards were more interested in Cagayan as a gateway to silk-rich China, than bothering about this untamed territory. A regular garrison was then dispatched to guard this frontier from Japanese re-invasions, and prepared for entering the realm of China. Due to a prolonged fiscal crisis on the part of the colonial government which caused the abolition of the tobacco monopoly in the late 1800s, ethnic Chinese traders started to gain inroads from the 1870s into tobacco trading and money lending businesses (de Jesus 2001[1982]: 31). Since then, this frontier has become the place for the offspring of these Chinese traders to dwell and prosper as Chinese mestizos, who later replaced the political status of the Spanish mestizos as the local elite (principales) (de Jesus 1980). The principales were entitled to run for political offices as village chiefs (cabezas de barangay) and petty governors (gobernadorcillos), under the supervision and control of the Spanish provincial governor (alcalde mayor) and the parish priests. In governance, the Spanish and American colonial states relied on the local

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Picture 2 A Chinese temple in Aparri, Cagayan province. Chinese temples are administered by the local Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Source of image: Author’s collection.

elite as the brokers, who followed the pre-Hispanic clientelistic system of big-man chieftainship (datu) (Abinales 2000; Wong 2006). By borrowing from the seminal work of Leach (2004[1959]) on political systems in the highland Burma–China frontier, where the cultural categories of aristocratic (gumsa) and democratic (gumlao) were interchangeably used by the organizationally gumlao-based Kachin highlanders to communicate with the valley people, especially the gumsa-based Shans, I then anticipated that the headman of Cagayan Valley, Delfin, would possess a similar multicultural capacity of thinking, speaking and acting differently in order to concomitantly stand as the frontier tribal chieftain, translocal Chinese business community leader and Philippine state official. Leach (2000: chapter 3.3) stated that the idea of state–frontier relations was already developed in China during the Han Dynasty in the first millennium BC, a few centuries earlier than the conceptual emergence of the Roman imperium. Without fixed borders and permanent administrative staff, the state expanded and gradually incorporated the frontiers. The ‘arbitrary whim of local war-lords’ of the frontiers was confronted and co-opted by the military force, tributary taxation systems, education system, judiciary and bureaucracy of the

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centralizing state, which ensured the continuity and penetration of state rule (Leach 2000: 230). By following Leach, case studies of the frontier powers of the Cagayan Valley may well illustrate how a contemporary Southeast Asian state manages to rule over the frontiers.

1.2 Encountering the strongman Through the contacts of former director Wilfrido Villacorta at the Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University (DLSU) in Manila, I met an alumnus at the Local Government Leadership Award (LGLA) ceremony for the ‘Most Outstanding Mayor of the Philippines’ co-organized by Philippine academia and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) (Brillantes 2003). He was the former city mayor of Tuguegarao, Randolph S. Ting. His father, Delfin, had also been the mayor. He invited me to visit Tuguegarao. I then took a 14-hour overnight journey on his Deltra Bus Transit from La Loma, Manila to Cagayan Valley and subsequently checked into Hotel Delfino and met Delfin. In contrast to the ungrounded and flexible character of contemporary Chinese transnationalism (e.g. Ong and Nonini 1997), my one-week stay in Tuguegarao portrayed a far more complex picture. The Chinese-Ibanag mixed-blood Delfin is locally addressed as Lakay Ting or Lakay Delfin. By using the native Ibanag/Ilocano/Itawes term, lakay (literally meaning old man or headman), to address a political personage, this denoted him as the patriarch of a political clan and the godfather or patron (padrino) of the political scene in the town, as well as the elected chief of an informal council of brave elders. The institution of lakay is widely found in political organizations of ethno-linguistic groups in northern Luzon, e.g. the Ilongots (Rosaldo 1980). Around 1900, the term was already being used by the neighboring head-hunting warrior societies to describe a village headman, who ‘was typically elected by a group of prominent men who were themselves maingel (braves)’; ‘men who have won a reputation for ferocity in battle – or, more accurately, for the number of lives they have taken in battle or elsewhere’ (Scott 1979: 143). The use of the term maingel is similar – the Isneg word mengal literally means ‘brave’, and was a prestige accolade primarily achieved by headtaking (Madale 1973: 228–43; Reynolds 1973: 55). Lakay enshrines the incomparable fearlessness of a leader. Other tribal societies in northern Luzon also have a similar social control mechanism. Among the Tinguians, assisted by an informal council of old and brave men, the lakay decides and settles cases of offences and disputes according to their informal customary laws (Eggan 1941). Among the Ibanag tribes in Cagayan, a

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Picture 3 Itawes-Chinese Ke Chin School, Tuao. Patrons are the active members of the Tuao-Piat Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Source of image: Author’s collection.

council of braves (maengel) elect a ‘strong man’ (mangiyegu), or a king (patul), whose sovereign power cannot be questioned (Gatan 1981: 28; Scott 1994: 268). Lakay is also similar to the lakan position found in the Tagalog datu system, which embodies the ancient Tagalog concept of kapangyarihan, which indexes sovereignty and authority (Scott 1994: 220). In the southern Philippines, a compatible social control mechanism is also found (Junker 2000; McKenna 1998). Cagayan Valley is the birthplace and political base of Juan Ponce Enrile. He had been the Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Justice, and Secretary/ Minister of National Defense during the Marcos authoritarian regime (1965–86). In the post-Marcos democratic era (1986–present), Enrile had been elected as a congressman and senator, and currently, is the Senate President. As a major granary of the Philippines, Cagayan Valley houses a substantial population of peasantry. Its relative remoteness and the presence of an extensive cave system moreover made it an ideal shelter for Maoist revolutionaries. As a result of prolonged social unrest and insurgency in Cagayan and the country as a whole since the Huk rebellion in the 1950s (Kerkvliet 1986a, 1990[1977]), Enrile co-founded a militarist organization, Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), in the early 1980s (McCoy 1999). Cagayan has been insurgent-infested and known as a

INTRODUCTION

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redoubt of right-wing militias, which is featured in international headlines.4 In particular, on March 4, 1990, the Cagayan provincial governor, Lieutenant Colonel Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, who was a core RAM leader and major counter-insurgent during Marcos’ martial law regime, and a total of 300 defected soldiers and Negrito paramilitary, and 3000 supporters stormed Cagayan’s regional center and provincial capital, Tuguegarao, in reaction to a suspension order from President Corazon Aquino. The order came as a result of his alleged involvements in a series of mutinies in Manila from 1986 to 1990. Some 150 forced into the Hotel Delfino, where Delfin, a patriarch of a trans-Luzon grain-trading and business conglomerate, resided. They kept Aquino’s negotiators hostage, and subsequently declared Cagayan’s independence from the Republic. As the 10,000-strong Manila-hailed troops pushed into Tuguegarao, a gun battle between the mutineers and Delfin’s security aides caused the death of the primary negotiator, General Oscar Florendo. With a shoot-to-death warrant on his forehead, Aguinaldo retreated to the mountains for guerrilla resistance with 200 armed men. After 100 days of hiding, he surrendered in front of a thousand-man chanting crowd outside the provincial government building. While facing pending charges for rebellion and murder, he ran for election again and won as the provincial governor in May 1992. After winning another governorship in 1995 and the congressional race in 1998, he was defeated by a bitter rival, Dr. Manuel Mamba of Tuao in the 2001 election, who had formed a tactical alliance with Delfin. One month after his electoral defeat on June 12, 2001, Aguinaldo was assassinated by communist assailants in Tuguegarao. The leading negotiator of the Communist Party of the Philippines New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) community, Saturnino Ocampo, admitted that killing Aguinaldo was a belated revenge against this martial law torturer and warlord-despot. Despite enjoying a Robin Hood persona in Cagayan, Aguinaldo’s murder did not win nationwide sympathy because of his controversial track record as a secessionist-rebel. In many ways, Cagayan Valley seems to fit into Leach’s frontier analogy as warlords, mutineers, insurgents, outlaws, illegal rings and killers-for-hire are featured in the life histories that I have collected. Nevertheless, as Leach (2000: 230) has also reminded us, the state’s governance specificities in co-opting frontier powers to counteract the ‘arbitrary whim of local war-lords’ will tell us how the post-colonial state-building project operates on the ground level. My encounters with the Tings will illustrate how the

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state’s co-optation may be manifested in the everyday life of the frontier powers. In the 2001 election, Randolph was re-elected as the mayor, but Delfin lost the governorship. Randolph’s cousin, Boy Sera, was traumatically murdered during the campaign. The case was unresolved and some family members suspected Ting’s political adversaries. Delfin and Randolph consoled the clan and insisted on leaving the final justice to God (Diyos) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). My brief visit was also marked with the potential for violence during the fourth day of my stay in Hotel Delfino. During breakfast, I learned that an unidentified male had sneaked into the hotel, carrying an alleged bomb at around three o’clock in the morning. Delfin’s police aides were able to apprehend him. When I expressed my concern, Delfin assured my safety and explained, ‘This one came for me. They know I am still holding the flag. Don’t worry. I assure your safety here in our territory!’5 Then, he left with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver, guarded by three policemen armed with M-16 armalite rifles and .45 caliber semiautomatic pistols. Sometime later, Delfin asked for my explanation of China’s rapid economic development since the late 1970s. After listening to my summarized briefing of the ‘China miracle’ thesis (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996), he questioned the reason for the inexpensive, but poor-quality Chinese-made products that were flooding the public markets of Tuguegarao, which suggested that an unequal China–Philippines trading relationship had emerged. Similar exchanges and dissonance convinced me that my original research topic on Chinese transnationalism did not suit the primary concerns of my host.6 While I gradually realized that the hosting Ting family is actually the Philippine state’s agent-delegate on the ‘mountain top’, these encounters also attested the reach of the Philippine state, which has been seen as weak.

1.3 State-building in the post-colonial Philippines We’ve got to have rules and obey them. Sir William Golding (1962[1954]: 55) Who are you that I should obey you? Clifford Geertz (1977: 251)

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[W]hile conceptual models of society are necessarily models of equilibrium systems, real societies can never be in equilibrium. Sir Edmund R. Leach (2004[1959]: 4) Golding, Geertz and Leach commonly explicated an observation; while different societies create and enforce rules in state-building, no rule is forever stable. As an archipelagic geographical complex consisting of more than seven thousand islands and numerous ethnic groups with substantial experience of Spanish and American colonial rule, maintaining the state in the post-colonial Philippines poses a challenging question for public administrators of interior security and students of statecraft: how would 7,107 islands be kept under the sovereign state? Migdal (1988: chapters 3 and 4) suggested that the states and the strongmen are engaged in struggles for social control. Whereas a weak or failing state like Sierra Leone traces the fragmentation of social control to the hands of the local strongmen during British colonial rule, a strong or robust Israeli state is able to centralize social control because Jewish society acts as an agent of the British interests in the Middle East. The qualification of being a strong state therefore hinges on the state’s capacity in winning over the strongmen for furthering and strengthening its rule in society. In the midst of insurgency, counterinsurgency, mutiny, extrajudicial violence, secessionism, terrorism, corruption scandals, reports of electoral frauds and vote-buying, the Philippine state since Marcos has been seen as weak. The twenty-year Marcos era lasted from 1965 to 1986. At first, Marcos was democratically elected as the president. He then declared martial law in September 1972, suspending most elections and disbanding congress and other electoral bodies. The martial law regime was overthrown by a series of events commonly known as the People Power Revolution, which took place in Metro Manila, including: the rapid deterioration of the authoritarian government, increasingly intensive opposition to the government, a snap presidential election campaign (December 1985 to February 1986), a mutiny, a People Power Uprising on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Metro Manila, the exile of Marcos to Hawaii, the Catholic Church’s intervention, and Aquino’s assumption of the presidency. Despite the resumption of countrywide democratic elections, the Philippine state has been struggling to stabilize its rule. Scholars generally attribute the weak Philippine state to clan-based oligarchic patronage politics, in which politicians do not hesitate to use guns, goons and gold to rig elections, coerce and terrorize people, and

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

eliminate rivals for perpetuating self-interests (Eaton 2003; McCoy 2002; Sidel 1998). The state is conceived to be tarnished by an elite minority, composed of caciques (landed bosses) and capitalistic cronies (Anderson 1988; Hutchcroft 1991; Lacaba 1995; Sidel 1999). In line with Migdal’s (1988) state-vs.-strongman analogy, scholars tend to portray the Philippine state on the losing side, justifying its weak state status and the derogatory image of the strongman. In reaction to the widely-received ‘weak state’ status (Rivera 1996; Villacorta 1994), former President Gloria Arroyo (2002) called for a ‘Strong Republic’ in terms of two essential features: The first is independence from class and sectoral interests so that it stands for the interests of the people rather than of a powerful minority. The second is the capacity, represented through strong institutions and a strong bureaucracy, to execute good policy and deliver essential services – the things that only governments can do. (Arroyo 2002: 102) As she belongs to two strongman families of the Pampanga province in central Luzon – that is, the Arroyo and Macapagal clans – Arroyo shares a similarity with past presidents and most elected officials. Instead of hailing from Manila, most have political bases in the provinces. Her remark about state capacity suggests that the strong/weak state typology has become a part of the local political discourse. Moreover, upon my return to the Philippines in 2003, Randolph invited me to attend the ceremony for the Local Government Leadership Award (LGLA), held in the Philippine Senate on October 13 because he had again won an award. The night before the ceremony, we had an exchange. He asked about my research topic so I told him in a straightforward manner by asking him whether the Philippines were a ‘weak state’. He replied, ‘We [Filipinos] still live with traditional values of utang na loób [debt of gratitude], pakikisama [sympathetic cooperation/giving-in], pagmamalasakit [sympathetic concern] […] The country is being run not so far away from these values is still finding a way to escape from poverty, inequality, graft and corruption’.7 Although he diplomatically deflected the question with Catholicized Filipino values that he had learned in school, it seemed clear that Philippine state and society have been aware of the ‘weak state’ discourse. Kerkvliet (1998) nonetheless admitted that the scholarly community has not yet come up with a set of parameters to determine what constitutes a weak state and a strong state. As Migdal (1988) conceived the state and the strongman at two ends of a tug-of-war, it would be over-simplified to

INTRODUCTION

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reduce the processes of state formation into the binary categories of either a strong or weak state. In order to capture the complex dynamics of post-colonial state-building, I therefore adopt Migdal’s (2001) processoriented ‘state-in-society’ approach to develop a suitable approach for Southeast Asia. In light of the literature which argues for the policy option that the strongmen are possible instruments of state rule in Southeast Asia (Nishizaki 2008; Wong 2008), I will illustrate how the strongmen may be contained and utilized for the post-colonial state-building project.

1.4 Toward an approach of post-colonial statecraft in Southeast Asia In order to illustrate an approach of post-colonial statecraft, an existing approach in Southeast Asian political economy is selected for examination, namely, the political business theory. In the first place, the proponents of the political business theory conceive that democratization, political decentralization and capitalistic economic development contribute to the bourgeois state formation in various states after World War II, when the Chinese immigrants and their descendants started to play increasingly significant roles first in the economic realm, then in the political realm (Gomez 2002). Political business refers to: the close ties between politicians and businessmen [that] have influenced the form of economic development, and following the [1997] financial crisis, have been a factor that has contributed to political upheaval [e.g. coup in Thailand and anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia]. […] Political funding by business has contributed to a significant rise in the phenomenon of ‘money politics’, that is the use of money in the political arena to secure control over the state in order to influence the distribution of state-generated economic rents. […] politicians holding office in government use their power to distribute to party members or select business associates state-created rents in the form of licenses, contracts, subsidies, and privatized projects. (Gomez 2002: 2–3) Interchanges of authoritarian and democratic regimes in these Southeast Asian states are the consequences of the political business linkages of the ethnic Chinese businessmen and the politicians (Eklöf 2002; Gomez 1999; Wingfield 2002). Amidst the fluxes of economic globalization, reoccurrences of political upheavals and social conflicts are results of the

Map 3 Southeast Asia

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state-capitalist domination which the political elite and the Chinese business elite co-constituted. This led to widening economic disparity and political turbulences as well as regime changes (Figure 1.1) (Bello, Cunningham, and Li 1998; Bello et al. 2004). Since then, the ethnic Chinese have controlled a substantial portion of the national economies and secured privileged connections with state office-holders. The political business theory has made three significant contributions. First, although the Southeast Asian Chinese have historically encountered discrimination and policy constraints imposed by the hosting society and state, the ethnic Chinese effectively linked up with state officials and politicians as they are the major economic stake-holders. With such political business linkages, apart from protecting their business interests, they indirectly influence state policies. In Indonesia, after the Fujian-hailed Sudono Salim (Liem Sioe Liong) first did business with the military of the Sukarno regime (1945–67), he established a 31-year alliance with President Suharto (1967–98) (Dieleman 2006). Troubled by prolonged poverty and disparity, the domestic economic downturns resultant of the 1997 Asian financial crisis escalated the grievances of the Muslim majority into widespread anti-Chinese riots and pogroms in 1998. As the ethnic Chinese fled and adversely affected the national economy, Indonesia asked for their return. Upon their return, political business linkages re-emerged (Dieleman and Sachs 2008). In the Philippines, the Fujian-hailed Lucio Tan became a major crony of Marcos’ martial law regime and managed to shift his allegiance to the democratically elected President Joseph Estrada (1998–2001). Tan not only flexibly adapted to authoritarian and democratic regimes, but his political influences also seemed to have grown in recent years. For instance, Tan controls formerly state-owned enterprises, such as the Philippine Airlines and Philippine National Bank (Wong 2009: chapter 4.4). Second, the political business theory illuminates the possible exchange of economic capital for political power which enables the ethnic Chinese to participate in state and security affairs. Emerging evidence even shows that the ethnic Chinese have effectively combined economic capital with political power, and self-granted extraordinary access to state power. In the Philippines, a contemporary example would be the Chinese-Filipino Cojuangco clan of the Tarlac province, where former President Aquino and incumbent president Benigno Cojuangco Aquino III originate from. By marrying into the Aquinos, a major landed political clan, the

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Cojuangco family has effectively combined land ownership with economic capital, which grants them extraordinary access to political power and state hierarchy (Anderson 1988). In Thailand, given their penetrating business networks in the rural areas, the Sino-Thais were witnessed to play an indispensable role in collaborating with the militarist regime to counter communist insurgency during the authoritarian era (Anderson 1990). Later, democratization measures neither hindered their attempts for elected offices nor inhibited their access to state power. The Sino-Thai local businessman-politicians in the grain-rich Ayutthaya province of central Thailand are an example. Known as jao pho (local powers), the rural Sino-Thai merchants started to gain inroads into local electoral scenes through a mixture of performance-based politics, public service, vote-buying, intimidation and violence (Arghiros 2001). Electoral offices provided the monetary means and administrative authority to maintain and expand one’s political machineries that connected from the village up to the provincial and national levels (Chantornvong 2000; Ockey 2000). In northern and northeastern Thailand where the peasant majority dwells, the recent rise of the populist Sino-Thai former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-6) would illustrate how a rural Sino-Thai family transformed from a local business family to a national political business conglomerate. They trace their ancestry to a Hakka-Chinese immigrant who settled in the Chiang Mai province. After World War II, the Shinawatra family gradually extended their business coverage from northern Thailand to the entire country and overseas. In the early 1970s, Thaksin joined the Royal Thai Police and was sent to the USA for postgraduate studies in criminology. From the 1960s to 1980s, rural Thailand was generally troubled by communist insurgency (Saiyud 1986). Thaksin therefore earned the tacit knowledge of left-wing politics and mobilization strategies during those years as an in-field policeman. Combining his privy connections in the police, military and government along with his family’s extensive business networks, Thaksin founded the populist Thai Rak Thai Party in 1998 and was elected the prime minister (PM) in 2001.8 Third, the political business theory insightfully contextualizes the reoccurrences of domestic upheavals and violent conflicts in Southeast Asia against the international backdrop whereby the core metropolitan states have effectively extended the global capitalistic economy and incorporated the peripheral states in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan

Figure 1.1 A flowchart of the political business cycles in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, 1960s–2000s.

The Philippines Leftist insurgency started in the 60s  China-sponsored insurgency spreads  Marcos declared

martial law in 1972  ethnic Chinese naturalized by Marcos as Filipino citizens in the 70s  Chinese-Filipinos supported Marcos  US sponsored land reform implemented to counter insurgency  military authoritarianism rule  Marcos dictatorship deteriorated in early 1980s  Marcos overthrown in 1986  Corazon Aquino established democratic regime  Aquino sought support from Chinese-Filipino business community  communist insurgency thrived  Chinese business–military link returned  General Fidel Ramos resumed presidency in 1992  insurgency faltered  Estrada resumed presidency in 1998  Asian financial crisis caused economy decline  Chinese-Filipino Lucio Tan allied with Estrada  insurgency returned  Estrada overthrown in 2001  Arroyo resumed presidency  insurgency continued  coups in 2003, 2006 and 2007  Arroyo conceded to the military  extrajudicial killings of the left continued Thailand China-sponsored leftist insurgency affected Thailand in the 60s  popular uprising in 1973  US-backed land reform and counterinsurgency implemented  1976 massacre  military rule in 1970s  limited democratization experimented in 1980s  1991 coup  democratization facilitated Sino-Thais to run for state offices in the 90s  1997 constitutional change  Chiangmai-hailed Sino-Thai Thaksin Shinawatra elected Prime Minister (PM) (2001–6)  constitutional change proposed by Thaksin party  monarchy, landed and some Sino-Thai elites threatened  2006 coup  Thaksin fled  militarist rule resumed  King allowed Generals Surayud and Chulanont to serve as caretaker PMs  election resumed  Thaksin-backed Samak elected PM  uprising continued  Samak forced to step down  Thaksin’s brother-in-law Somchai resumed PM  military factions threatened to overthrow Somchai by force  Somchai declared state of emergency  Somchai stepped down after a court rule  military and Bangkok Sino-Thai businesses picked Thaksin-unrelated Abhisit as PM in 2008  pro-Thaksin ‘red shirts’ and ‘yellow shirts’ clashes continued Indonesia Chinese-Indonesian businesses were tapped by Sukarno (1945–67) regime for financing the army  Chinese-Indonesian businesses linked with the military  communist groups and left-wing factions within the military were countered by Suharto-led troops  Suharto resumed militarist authoritarianism (1967–75)  political business linkage reinforced  Suharto (1975–98) strengthened ties with some Chinese-Indonesian businesses  Chinese-Indonesian political-economic domination  grievances among Muslim majority  1997 Asian financial crisis  economy collapsed  escalated grievances of the Muslim majority  anti-Chinese pogroms and riots  Chinese businesses fled  Indonesian economy affected  fled Chinese-Indonesian businesses were asked to return  military authoritarianism resumed  militarist regime received foreign pressure  democratic politics resumed  military-backed General Susilo resumed elected president in 2004 & 2009  political business linkages returned

18

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Africa since World War II (Amin 1974; Wallerstein 1983).To understand the intricate nexus between the development of the post-WWII global economy and the building of the Southeast Asian state, a contrastive discussion with the African state should be instructive. There is consent among pan-African scholars that the African state has neither protected the welfare of its citizens, nor delivered what was expected to its people. Rather, as a ‘neo-colonial’ construct at the peripheries of the global capitalistic economy (Kieh 2006: 47; 2008: 171; Lumumba-Kasongo 1994: 51), the post-colonial African state has been a collaborative predatory instrument for the metropolitan capitalists and the African ruling elite minority to ‘siphon off the continent’s resources to Europe for European development, while leaving Africans and their economies poor and underdeveloped’ (Agbese and Kieh 2007: 8; Lumumba-Kasongo 2002: 80). Violent conflicts, such as civil wars, putsches, genocide and secessionism, are resultant of neo-colonial underdevelopment in post-colonial Africa. Post-colonial African rulers and state agents are generally caught in a circulatory loop of politics of survival which often short-circuits domestic politics and foreign relations. On the one hand, the country’s foreign relations are structured by the global capitalistic system in which core metropolitan states are tied with African peripheral states for economic exploitation of their rich natural and human resources. On the other hand, the domestic politics of the post-colonial state is often characterized by intense ethnic, regional and factional divisions and rivalries, which are often underpinned by the struggle for the control of the country’s rich resources. To obtain international recognition of sovereignty and exchange for foreign financial and military aids for economic development and pacifying internal conflicts, African rulers usually become collaborative agents with the metropolitan states, mainly for plundering the rich state resources and exploiting their own people. Such vicious short-circuiting of domestic politics and foreign relations renders the African countries vulnerable to underdevelopment and violent conflicts. In contrastive reference to the African post-colonial governance imbroglio and underdevelopment (Tables 1.1 and 1.2), the relative success of state-building and developmental achievement in Southeast Asia since World War II may be resultant of the containment efforts that encircled Mao Zedong’s communist China (1949–76) and Deng Xiaoping’s socialist China (1978–present) (Bowie and Unger 1997: 28-9). This ‘China factor’ appears to be critical in explaining the social, economic and political developmental differences between Southeast Asia and Africa. The

INTRODUCTION

19

African political economy has been featured by a number of domestic and transnational players since pre-colonial times. However, since the early 18th century, the metropolitan capitalists and their collaborative local agents started to enjoy determining powers on both the causes and outcomes of African state affairs (Kieh 1992; Lumumba-Kasongo 1999; Nzongola- Ntalaja 2002). In contrast, Southeast Asia has been historically connected to China even before the arrival of the Europeans. The coming of metropolitan capitalism was both an enrichment and complication to Southeast Asia where the ethnic Chinese had been present in the economic and political realms. Troubled by the China-sponsored but then localized communist movements, Southeast Asian states accepted economic, military and policy aids from Western powers from the 1960s to 1980s (Lansdale 1972; Muscat 1990). Since then, while various Southeast Asian states are incorporated into the global capitalistic system, their governments are generally caught in a two-sided predicament. On the one hand, they have attempted to attract foreign investments and absorb technologies to develop their national economies and upgrade domestic industries. On the other hand, they need to channel internal economic pressures, facilitate social structural transformation and pacify internal unrest resultant of the liberalization measures. However, as there are constant fluxes in the growth of the global capitalistic economy, it is not unusual to see cases which are caught in conflict cycles. For example, during the 6-year Thaksin administration (2001–6) in Thailand, the government attempted to install policies to liberalize the domestic market, international trade and land ownership for foreign investments. In rural areas, the administration gave financial assistance to the farmers. Such a populist and liberal economic policy agenda, however, touched on the nerves of the traditional sakdina (Thai: power of the land) landed class and attracted disagreements from the urban elite and middle classes (Murphy 2009). The tensions between the two camps escalated into a conflict cycle which spiraled across the 2000s up to the early 2010s. A military coup in 2006 therefore ousted Thaksin from power. Amidst the silence of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, two military generals served as the interim caretaker PMs. Although a nationwide election was held in 2007, Thaksin-backed Samak Sundaravej regrouped the Thai Rak Thai Party into the People’s Power Party and won the nationwide election as PM. However, Samak was forced to step down in 2008 due to pressure from the opposition. Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat, was then appointed as the caretaker PM. However, amidst the domestic economic

… 637 … … 2441 … 6684 650 2761 … 1960 … 619 3427 … 191 … 119 322 7342 423 699 1053

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Sub-Saharan Africa Angola Cameroon Congo D. R. Ethiopia Liberia Mali Rwanda Sierra Leone South Africa Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

1965

114 869 … … 3188 … 5784 966 4389 … 1965 … 814 4044 … 249 … 149 359 10971 885 1061 1311

Source: Data from World Bank (2010).

1960

Southeast Asia 179 718 9657 … 4277 … 6687 1896 7087 … 1970 … 1160 4878 … 349 360 220 434 17854 1260 1789 1884

1970 1168 … 32148 … 9890 … 14894 5671 14883 … 1975 … 2753 10237 … 620 831 568 679 36948 2360 2442 4371

1975 4929 … 78013 … 24937 … 32450 11730 32354 … 1980 … 6741 14395 … 954 1787 1163 1101 80710 1245 3884 6679

1980 3524 … 87339 2367 31772 … 30734 17743 38901 14095 1985 6804 8148 7195 9409 935 1314 1715 857 67066 3520 2252 5637

1985 3521 … 114427 866 44024 … 44312 36842 85343 6472 1990 10260 11152 9350 12083 384 2421 2584 650 1120139 4304 3288 8784

1990 4734 3441 202132 1764 88832 … 741198 84291 168019 20736 1995 5040 8733 5643 7606 135 2466 1293 871 151113 5756 3478 7111

1995 6001 3654 165021 1735 93790 … 75913 92717 122725 31173 2000 9129 10075 4306 8180 561 2422 1735 636 132878 6193 3238 6607

2000

9531 6286 285869 2723 137848 … 98824 125418 176352 52931 2005 30632 16588 7104 12286 530 5305 2581 1239 247064 9000 7157 5583

2005

Table 1.1 A comparison of annual gross domestic product (GDP) in all Southeast Asian and selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1960–2005 (selected years).

62 42 41 44 54 44 53 64 54 44 1960 33 42 41 38 40 36 42 33 49 44 45 51

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar/Burma Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Sub-Saharan Africa Angola Cameroon D. R. Congo Ethiopia Liberia Mali Rwanda Sierra Leone South Africa Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

Source: Data from World Bank (2010).

1960

Southeast Asia

64 45 44 45 58 47 56 66 57 47 1965 35 44 42 41 42 37 44 34 51 47 47 55

1965 67 44 48 46 61 51 57 68 59 49 1970 37 46 44 43 44 38 44 36 53 50 49 53

1970 69 34 51 47 64 55 59 70 62 53 1975 39 48 45 44 47 39 45 39 55 51 51 57

1975 71 40 54 49 64 57 61 71 66 57 1980 41 51 46 44 48 40 46 42 57 50 52 59

1980 73 53 58 51 69 59 63 73 69 61 1985 41 54 48 44 47 42 47 42 60 50 52 61

1985 74 55 62 54 70 59 65 74 69 65 1990 42 55 48 47 49 43 33 40 61 48 51 61

1990 75 56 64 58 71 59 68 76 68 69 1995 43 54 46 49 51 44 29 38 60 45 47 53

1995 76 57 67 61 73 60 69 78 68 72 2000 44 51 46 51 54 46 43 42 56 46 42 43

2000 77 59 70 64 74 61 71 80 68 74 2005 46 51 48 54 57 47 48 46 52 50 43 41

2005

Table 1.2 A comparison of life expectancy in all Southeast Asian and selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1960–2005 (selected years).

22

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

problems caused by the 2008 global economic crisis and confronted by fierce pressure from the opposition, Somchai was forced to step down and replaced by the opposition leader of the Democratic Party, Abhisit Vejiajiva. The years after 2008, however, saw violent clashes between proThaksin ‘red shirts’ protestors and royalist ‘yellow shirts’ protestors who put Thailand into bitter divisions. Although Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was elected in 2011 as the PM with a landslide victory, it remains unclear whether she will be able to disentangle the complexes that caused the fall of Thaksin, Samak and Somchai. Nonetheless, from a locally hailed Sino-Thai business family to an influential national political business family, the Shinawatra party has clearly stood as an exemplar, showing how a combination of economic capital, business networks and political connections could grant the Southeast Asian Chinese extraordinary access to state power. Geopolitically, the Southeast Asian states and their capital-rich ethnic Chinese populations are located between an array of competing transnational entities, especially the Greater China region and the core metropolitan states in Europe and North America. Whereas the latter established their regional hegemony from the early 18th century when the British Empire first defeated China’s Qing Dynasty in the Opium Wars (1839–42), the former has been undergoing rapid economic development since the late 1970s. From the 18th century, the following decades witnessed how metropolitan capitalism has sunk its roots in Southeast Asia whereas China has gradually conceded in traditional political strongholds. In contemporary China where economic development has been featured as a strategy for legitimacy engineering and nation-building of the Chinese communist single-party state, the capital-rich Chinese in Southeast Asia have become a most sought after population for the East and Southeast Asian sovereign states, metropolitan capitals and other transnational institutions to vie for their ideological, political and economic allegiances. The Southeast Asian Chinese are therefore being conceptualized as one of the most wanted frontiers of these states and transnational forces, especially by their hosting states which naturally have more direct impacts on their lives with serious stakes. Henceforth, Southeast Asian state power may be seen as continuously contested by a plurality of competing forces who struggle for domination with the aim to seize the state’s coercive and ideological apparatuses. In order to comprehend the complex dynamics of state-building, the authoritative quest of the state in the monopolization of physical force

INTRODUCTION

23

and symbolic violence vis-à-vis a multiplicity of competing forces should therefore be engaged, examined and clarified. The state is methodologically approached with symbolic construction, which is first discursively constructed by the actors, but has consequential bureaucratic, coercive and physical manifestations (Gupta 1995; Weber 1948). These discursive constructions reveal perceptions that inform social practices for the actors to act upon and compete against each other (de Certeau 1984), whose networks stretch across the interpenetrating realms of state and society. By empirically studying how networked actors struggle for hegemony in selected arenas, the ‘state-in-society’ approach by Migdal (2001) aims to show how states, societies and transnational forces dynamically transform and constitute one another. The state is defined as: a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts. (Migdal 2001: 16, italics original) I have been effectively guided by this definition of the state in engaging with multiple forces and examining the results of state–society interaction where the images and practices of the state could be empirically identified in terms of the following: counterinsurgency, land reform, the graintrading economy, local government, election and legal justice. This research strategy has policy relevance for public administrators of interior and regional security because it promises to depict the sovereignty-making strategies of the Southeast Asian state in its two most wanted frontiers: territorial borders and human subjectivity (Humphrey 2004).

1.5 The comparative argument: frontier governmentality Gradually incorporated into the global capitalistic system with its vibrant economic development, China’s approach towards Southeast Asia has entered a new era since the end of the millennium (Harvey 2006; Ong 2006). During the Mao era, China exported various types of support to the peasant insurgency and communist movements in the Philippines and Southeast Asia in general (Appleton 1959; Lansdale 1972; Macmillan 2007). In the 1980s and 1990s, with Deng’s ‘open door policy’, China aimed to absorb Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Southeast Asian Chinese capitals to facilitate its economic development and rescue its devastated domestic economy (Wong 2002). Overseas Chinese large businesses were

24

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

particularly encouraged to conduct foreign direct investment in their ancestral provinces where SEZs were deliberately set up in southern China (Howell 2000; Wang 2001). In the 2000s, however, after the signing of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement 2002, recent trends show that China has been engaging in bilateral trade with ASEAN countries to fuel its industrialization and modernization programs. According to ASEAN statistics, China has been consistently among the top four largest trading partners from 2000 to 2008.9 In 2009, China was even the largest trading partner with ASEAN.10 In the post-millennial era, China’s outreaching interactions with ASEAN countries are expected to flourish (Yeung 2006). In short, the greater China region has gradually become a major foreign direct investor in Southeast Asia in its own right. Do the transnational reaches of the greater China region undermine Southeast Asian state sovereignty? On the one hand, various scholars have argued that intensifying global capital flows, the advancement of mass communication technology, and the proliferation of transnational movements of migrants and commodities have made territorial boundaries of nation-states more transparent and porous (Ohmae 1999; Sklair 2001). Conceivably, state sovereignty is weakened by transnational forces. Apart from blurring territorial borders, the state’s legal and policy measures and body politic have been compromised and altered by transnational forces. On the other hand, it is argued that the nation-states have been successfully re-affirming their sovereignty when confronted by the competing arrays of globalization processes, not just by defending their territorial intactness, but also re-asserting political legitimacy and control over their economies and societies (Ong 2005; Sassen 1996). Instead of seeing the states being weakened or strengthened by transnational forces, various scholars have pointed out that there are regional variations and local culture-specific practices by which the states can adapt to complex global changes without compromising their sovereignty (Agnew 2009: 212–6; Taylor and Flint 2000: 288–309; Yeung 2000: 11–12). In short, globalization involves complex processes in which transnational networks may constitute ethnicity-based transnational circuits for a new global division of labor. Various scholars have therefore suggested that Southeast Asia may be perceived as a transnational field where the transnational Chinese circuits meet the sovereign states (Castells 1996: 106–115; Mittelman 2000: 49–54). An effective and informed response to this debate would not be possible without conducting contextualized and comparative research in the Southeast Asian states.

INTRODUCTION

25

By putting this globalization-vs.-sovereignty debate in the context of the post-colonial Philippines, this book will examine whether Philippine state sovereignty on its frontier territories and populations has been compromised by China. In the following chapters, however, I will illustrate how China’s transnational politics does not undermine Philippine state sovereignty. The reach of the Philippine state in its frontiers has even been reinforced. The key questions are: what makes the 7,107-island archipelago-state stay together as a whole? How has the Philippine state kept itself intact? How has the Philippine state established and maintained sovereignty in its frontiers? What strategies does the Philippine state use in order to keep the frontiers under its control? How do the elite and the ruled majority conceive their own state affairs? I will argue that pre-colonial chieftainship and colonial arts of governance are relevant for post-colonial state-building where the frontier strongmen may well be included as instruments of state rule. By comparing how the selected strongmen operate at the ground level, frontier governmentality aims to identify, in Foucault’s (1988) words, the ‘political technologies’ of domination and resistance of the strongmen and the ruled majority (Scott 1990). Studies of counter-governmentality have opened up a promising line of inquiry by asking: how do individuals resist and privatize the disciplinary and subjecting measures of the state (Ong 1987; Ong and Zhang 2008)? These technologies are elaborated in terms of governance techniques, institutionalized practices and creative strategies for local political actors to privatize, conflate, compromise, reinterpret, deflect or even reject the interests and rationalities of the Philippine state and other competing forces. As state-building involves the hegemonic processes of monopolizing physical force and symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1998; Gramsci 1971; Weber 1948), the frontier strongman is argued to be the agent-delegate of the state’s sovereign authority for implementing these two measures in exchange for political legitimacy. My objective is to show the ways that the Philippine state naturalizes its existence among the frontier inhabitants. I will argue that the gist of the post-colonial Philippine state may well be metaphorically conceived as a perpetually-expanding pinball machine which has its own autonomy, interests and rationalities as well as technologies to confine its inhabitants. At first, the state was a mere imagination of the national hero-martyr in the late 19th century, Dr. Jose Rizal. In line with Foucault’s (1995) carceral society analogy and since the formal establishment and subsequent revisions of the constitution of the

26

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Philippine Republic in 1946, this image and its reified state bureaucracy and institutions have been striving to include the ever-shifting allegiance and volatile collusion of the strongmen, whose continuous reinvention of self-interest and ever-bouncing competition in turn have energized the state and even made it prosper! By using case studies of strongmen, I will show that the Philippine state is capable of pacifying and including frontiers through a complex set of governance strategies; this is what I call ‘frontier governmentality’. Frontier governmentality is the selective recycling of the Spanish and American colonial rule in the Philippine context so that the post-colonial centralizing state includes strongmen as instruments of state-building, and contains them in the expanding state hierarchy. It entails the creation and maintenance of a trans-archipelago field of diverse tug-of-war processes and multiple arenas of contestation, which the sovereign state will use to monitor, intervene and conclude about domestic affairs in the 7,107-island archipelago. As state-building is an authoritative quest of the monopolization of physical and symbolic violence, the Philippine state has been decentralizing its sovereign authority to the strongmen to generate internal revenue, pacify unrest and resolve dispute/conflict through enacting and implementing state laws, such as those of counterinsurgency, land reform, education, election and local government code (Philippines 1991). In other words, the sovereign state has been able to restrain/unleash or constrain/enable the strongmen to meet its purposive ends. Frontier governmental technologies are elaborated in terms of legality and exceptionalism. In terms of legality, the state delegates craft and implement laws to regulate its domestic affairs of trade, local government, citizenship, elections, and other major spheres. Strategies that the state uses to impose its rule in the frontiers include the establishment of local governments, nationwide democratization of local government offices and henceforth regularly held elections, implementation of land reform programs, and regulation of grain-trading networks. In terms of exceptionalism, the Philippine state closely monitors its domestic affairs and finds intervention points to assert its sovereignty into the frontiers mainly through incidents of ‘juridical indeterminacy’ (Scheuerman 1999), by which the state enjoys the freedom to act outside the usual legal realm (Agamben 2005). In situations of rebellion, secessionism and securityrelated disputes, the state has the absolute discretion to settle a conflict by imposing a conclusive legal decision and deploying brute force to defend the injunction. Imposition of the martial law by Marcos in 1972 and

INTRODUCTION

27

declaration of a state of emergency by Arroyo in 2006 are two examples of contemporary Philippine exceptionalism. More localized forms of exceptionalism are also found in the strongmen’s operations of counterinsurgency, land reform, local elections and trans-local grain trade. In the midst of symbolic contestations and violent conflicts, the strongman politics paradoxically provide the Philippine state with continued inroads to reassert its sovereignty in the frontiers. Comparative studies mostly depict strongmen as the ‘sovereigns beyond the state’ who kill and punish with impunity, act outside the state’s juridical realm and, therefore, undermine state-building (Hansen 2005; Hansen and Stepputat 2006). This portrayal economically reinforces the ‘weak state’ imagery, which was not the original intention of Migdal’s (1988) theoretical scheme. The imagery neglects the qualitatively different, culture-specific symbolic orders that have been keeping the post-colonial states intact (Migdal 2001: chapter 5). It also rules out a viable policy option in interior security as the strongman may well be co-opted as the agent of state rule and contained within the state hierarchy. The state is not only an actor of relative autonomy competing against the social forces for domination (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1985), but also a sprawling field of processes and arenas where practices and identities may be re-shaped (Migdal 2004). By studying how the frontier strongmen operate under the radars, I aim to show the context-specific ways in which the Philippine state has gained significant inroads into and governed two frontiers: territorial borders and the intersubjective landscapes of the inhabitants. To supplement the general impression that the local strongman is antagonistic to state rule, I will argue that the post-colonial Philippine state has succeeded in containing and utilizing them to securitize the frontiers.

2 Landscape of the Rhizomes: Cagayan Valley, 1972–2009

The New People’s Army is determined to bring further successes to its nationalist-democratic revolution by fighting against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism. Under the theoretical guidance of […] Mao Zedong thought and […] the Communist Party of the Philippines, the New People’s Army will advance the revolutionary project. The People’s Daily, Beijing, March 5, 197211 [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines […] is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines […] for the purpose of establishing […] a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control. […] [It] constitutes a […] danger to the security of the Philippines. President Ferdinand Marcos, Manila, September 21, 197212 The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare. Thomas Hobbes (1985[1651]: 224)

30

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

2.1 Fighting the enemy: soft-power measures Approximately two months before Marcos formally declared martial law on September 21, 1972, a Philippine-registered vessel named Karagatan (meaning ‘ocean’ in the Tagalog-Filipino language) which carried massive unlicensed foreign armaments was intercepted by the Philippine armed forces outside the Pacific sea-waters of the Digoyo Point of Palanan, a remote coastal municipality of the Isabela province, eastern Cagayan Valley. Crewmen of Chinese nationality were allegedly identified onboard. The arms were reportedly to have originated from the People’s Republic of China for supporting the NPA, the armed wing of the CPP. In the midst of public controversies, Marcos asserted that the nation was threatened by a foreign power. This justified the imposition of martial law, granting the military discretionary powers to detain and interrogate individuals who were suspected to be associated with the global communist movement as the enemy of the Philippine state.13 As the martial law regime granted the military with discretionary authority to use force, reports of alleged extrajudicial killing, arbitrary detention, abuse of authority, liquidation and disappearance of civilian subjects were found (Amnesty International 1982). Why did the revolutionaries choose the Cagayan Valley in the first place? In the late 1960s, the communist ideologues of the Huk rebellion (1940s to 1960s) had decided to go beyond the ‘Huklandia’ of the central Luzon plain to reach the southern and northern Philippine frontiers due to a few strategic considerations (Armed Forces of the Philippines 2008; Kerkvliet 1986a, 1990[1977]; Lava 2002; Pomeroy 1994[1963]). First, given the vast alluvial river plains in northern Luzon and Mindanao, these frontiers have been the major staple food production regions in the Philippines. Agricultural statistics suggested that the Cagayan Valley has historically been a major rice granary of the Philippines. Burley (1973: 48–57 & 171) reported that in the 1960s, Cagayan Valley ranked second in rice production. In 1970, it contributed 11% to the nation’s total corn production. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicate that the Cagayan Valley consistently ranked among the top three rice-producing regions from 1970 to 2002. From 1980 to 2002, it ranked among the top four corn-producing regions (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Consequently, the Cagayan Valley was strategically selected as a base for the revolutionary cause. Secondly, the Cagayan Valley houses a considerable population of peasantry. The presence of an aggrieved peasant majority served as an ideal base for mass mobilization beyond the reach of the Manila state (Pomeroy 1968; Putzel

LANDSCAPE OF THE RHIZOMES

31

1995), which fitted into the site selection criteria and the ‘encircling cities from the countryside’ tactic that Mao (1971[1967]: 176–9; 2002[1968]: 12–24) originally proposed. Thirdly, the Cagayan Valley is surrounded by two major mountain ranges, the Sierra Madre Mountains on the elevated eastern coast and the rugged Cordillera Mountains to the west. These trans-Luzon mountain ranges house extensive caving systems which served as the natural shelters for guerrilla warfare. This was also the base selection criteria for Mao, who chose the mountainous Yan’an of the Shaanxi Province in northwestern China after the 12-month ‘Long March’, where the Red Army successfully evaded the pursuit of the Kuomintang (KMT) (Mao 1971[1967]; Nemenzo 1984). Apart from using military combat strategies, the martial law regime also took advice from leading US advocates to launch the land reform (Putzel 1992: 128). With the land reform (Presidential Decree 27, October 21, 1972), I argue that the Chinese mass naturalization (Letter of Instructions 270, April 11, 1975) was a combined effort to pacify the aggrieving peasantry in order to undermine communist infiltration and mobilization,14 which led to two unintended consequences; the consolidation of rhizome-like trans-local grain-trading networks and access to electoral offices by the rural Chinese capitalists in the post-Marcos era.

2.2 Rise of the rhizomes Rhizome is a continuously growing horizontal underground stem with lateral shoots and adventitious roots at intervals. The Concise Oxford Dictionary A rhizomatic political economy denotes an active and non-visible form of everyday human networking and its social control mechanisms constituted by the state officials, landlords, capitalists and peasants in accommodating, maneuvering and localizing state measures in order to unevenly protect and further local interests. Presidential Decree 27 unambiguously stipulates that tenants of rice and corn lands should be given a family-size farm of 5 hectares on non-irrigated land or 3 hectares on irrigated land. The implementation of the land reform has nevertheless been locally compromised,15 illustrated by the following ethnography. Upon receiving their Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in 1972 from the Department of Land Reform at their Manila office, the tenants Antonio Rustico and his two brothers were called for a special meeting by the mayor, Francisco Mamba Sr., to meet with their landlords, Chong-ho

32

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

and Lionera Tan, and discuss the land reform arrangement in Barangay Naruangan, Tuao.16 Chong-ho actually hailed from the Chinese province of Fujian. He sailed to Aparri in the 1960s and joined his half-brother, Patricio, who operated a grain-trading business in Tuao. When Chong-ho arrived at Tuao, Patricio was already ill. Patricio’s Filipina wife, Lionera inherited a considerable portion of a major landed estate from her parents. By marrying Lionera, Patricio was entitled to the land properties and henceforth managed the tenants. Patricio’s health, however, continued to deteriorate and he passed away. A consented decision ruled that Lionera should re-marry to Chong-ho so that the landed estate and businesses of the two families would not be seriously disrupted. While Antonio expected to meet Patricio and Lionera in the mayor’s meeting, Chong-ho presented himself as the representative of Tan’s properties. Antonio and his brothers told Chong-ho and the mayor that under the land reform, each was entitled to own at least 3 hectares of lands. Mediated by the mayor, Chong-ho suggested that their CLTs should be checked and endorsed in the provincial and regional offices and therefore took their documents. Several years later, Chong-ho had not returned the CLTs. In the mid-1970s, Antonio and his brothers decided to visit the same Department of Agrarian Reform to inquire about the matter. He, however, found out that the lands have been re-named after another Tuao person, a grandchild of a former big-time landlord. 17 Antonio insisted that the official record was a hoax which was fixed by those who wanted to show that the land had been transferred under the land reform. In the late 1970s, following several failed attempts to file a lawsuit and running out of money, Antonio and his brothers eventually gave up. From 1949 to 1975, the Philippines chose to establish a diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China in Taipei, but not with the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. From the 1950s to 1970s, it was known that Beijing gave various types of support to the communist movements in East and Southeast Asia, including the Philippines (Macmillan 2007; van der Kroef 1967). When Marcos finally declared martial law in 1972, he undertook measures to ensure Philippine Chinese support. In the early 1970s, the majority of the Chinese in the Philippines held Republic of China citizenship. In an attempt to correct a perceived pro-KMT stance, Marcos decided to adopt the ‘one China policy’ abouttwo months before signing a Joint Communiqué with the People’s Republic of China to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing on June 9, 1975,

Production (Thousand metric tons)

2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 1970

1974

1978

1982

1986 Year

1990

1994

Cagayan Valley

Central Luzon

Southern Luzon

Western Visayas

1998

2002

Figure 2.1 Top four Philippine rice-producing regions, 1970–2002. Sources: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and Department of Agriculture, the Philippines, 2007.

25

Percentage

20 15 10 5 0 1970

1974

1978

1982

Cagayan Valley Percentage

1986 Year

1990

1994

1998

2002

Central Luzon Percentage

Figure 2.2 Percentages of total rice production in the top two rice-producing regions, 1970–2002. Sources: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and Department of Agriculture, the Philippines, 2007.

Production (Thousand metric tons)

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0 1980

1982

1984

1986

Cagayan Valley

1988

1990 1992 Year

1994

Northern Mindanao

1996

1998

2000

2002

SOCCSKSARGEN

Figure 2.3 Production of the top three corn-producing regions, 1980–2002. Sources: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and Department of Agriculture, the Philippines, 2007.

40 35

Percentage

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1980

1982

1984

Cagayan Valley

1986

1988

1990 1992 Year

Northern Mindanao

1994

1996

1998

2000

SOCCSKSARGEN

Figure 2.4 Percentages of total corn production in the top three corn-producing regions, 1980–2002. Sources: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and Department of Agriculture, the Philippines, 2007.

2002

LANDSCAPE OF THE RHIZOMES

35

and mandated that all Chinese who wished to stay in the Philippines must apply for Filipino citizenship (Carino 1998: 55–6).18 In this historical juncture, Chong-ho decided to be naturalized. Years later, a Philippinesborn son of Chong-ho and Lionera, Joaquin, continued to operate the family business and finance Antonio’s farming activities. In the prior two decades, Antonio had been sharing 25% of his annual harvests with Joaquin. In the 1992 election, Joaquin was invited by Mamba Sr. to run for municipal councilor and campaign for his son, Manuel, for mayor; they were both elected. In the following elections, Joaquin was known as a loyal supporter of Manuel and a protected grain-trader of the area. The above ethnography vividly illustrates that since the launching of the land reform and Chinese mass naturalization programs, the dominance of the traditional landlords over the peasantry gradually gave way to the emerging patron–client relationships forged between the tenants and the Chinese capitalists, who then gained access to electoral office in the post-Marcos era. During the Cold War, aside from deploying hard-power military strategies to counter communism in the Asia-Pacific region, soft-power programs of land reform and Chinese mass naturalization were also introduced (Hayes, Zarsky, and Bello 1987[1986]; Kerkvliet 1979; Lansdale 1972; McCoy 1971). At the behest of the martial law regime, the land reform was intended to hinder peasant identity formation by creating divided interests of an aggrieved class (Ledesma 1982; Lynch 1972). By appropriating and dismantling the vast landed estates, the peasants were entitled to possess and till farmlands for generating private income. In 1975, Marcos granted the Chinese an opportunity to be naturalized as Filipino citizens. The Chinese have historically been a major source of capital in the Philippine economy (Wickberg 2000[1965]; Wong 1999). During the American colonial era, it was believed that the Chinese controlled a significant portion of the retail trade and internal commerce. To counter Chinese economic dominance, discriminatory laws were introduced in 1921, which mandated the use of non-Chinese languages in business accounting. Similar laws were passed in the 1930s, which required Chinese business accounts to include the translation of one official language (English, Spanish or Tagalog) in addition to Chinese (Appleton 1960: 155). After Philippine independence in 1946, the Chinese reportedly controlled approximately 40% of import trade and an equal share of the retail trade (Wurfel 1988: 58). Starting from 1954, there were a series of retail trade nationalization bills which prohibited non-Filipino citizens

36

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

from starting new retail business and therefore would prevent many Chinese who already owned such businesses from transferring them to their heirs (Appleton 1959: 156). On August 2, 1960, the Rice and Corn Industry Nationalization Act (Republic Act No. 3018) was signed by President Carlos Garcia, which mandated that ‘[n]o person who is not a citizen of the Philippines […] shall directly or indirectly engage in the rice and/or corn industry’ (Angliongto 1975: 70). Facing budgetary constraints and the reality that the Chinese had controlled a consideration portion of the country’s grain industry (Grossholtz 1964: 60–1), the Chinese mass naturalization policy was intended to naturalize the Chinese into Filipino citizens, absorb their substantial capital and make use of their moneylending system for pacifying peasant unrest. Coupled with the land reform, the Chinese mass naturalization program was, moreover, argued to cause a major socio-political change in the rural areas. As counterinsurgency measures, although they facilitated an internal stratification process within the peasantry (Kerkvliet 2002), the shaken patron–client bondage between landlord and tenants gave inroads for an emerging rural capitalist class, especially the trans-archipelago networks of Chinese grain-traders and moneylenders (Hayami 2001). This allowed them to acquire economic and political powers. In the Cagayan Valley, most farmers generally lacked capital to finance farming. They tended to borrow money from the Chinese merchants and were obliged to sell their harvests to the indebted traders. Patron–client relationships between traders and farmers enabled the capitalists to run for public office. Countrywide electoral results in the past two decades show an increasing trend for the Chinese to occupy electoral office at various levels (Table 2.1). A regression analysis further indicates a positive correlation between provincial annual rice production and the number of Chinese elected officials (Table 2.2); in provinces where there is higher annual rice productivity, there are more Chinese elected local government officials. Although the correlations are weak, they show a strengthening tendency from 1998 to 2007. A methodological limitation must, however, be considered. As many Chinese-Filipinos do not carry their original Chinese surnames and many Filipinos have Chinese ancestry, the data used for the statistical analyses conducted in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 may not reflect the complexity of the reality. Nonetheless, the depicted structural trend does fall in line with the observations of my farmer-informants: since 1986, more and more Chinese have been elected into public offices. In order to

LANDSCAPE OF THE RHIZOMES

37

understand how the political economy of the grain trade operates, I will ethnographically detail how a major rice-trading route trans-locally operates and how an alleged national rice-trading cartel was formed during the martial law regime, but slapped by President Fidel Ramos in 1995.

2.3 Tracking down the rhizomes; following the grain After spending a hard and hot day working in the paddy-field, my host family in Western Amulung offered me a local product, wag-wag rice, for dinner.19 Wag-wag is a high-end rice category highly demanded by the affluent class in Metro Manila. The reason why wag-wag is relatively expensive is because of its mildly sticky texture and lightly refreshing fragrance resultant of traditional techniques which guarantee that no chemical fertilizers and pesticides are added in the farming process. Wag-wag moreover has a special political glamour: this organic rice is known to be harvested once a year and can only be grown in the remote, non-irrigated paddies and hilly terraces the NPA frequented.20 A major trader is the Magno Y. Lim Corporation of Tuguegarao city, who then sold the harvests to the rice mills in the Isabela and Bulacan provinces. From 1990 onward, the Cagayan and Isabela provinces have consistently ranked among the largest rice-producing and corn-producing provinces (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). To track down a possible route of how each grain of wag-wag travelled from the farm-gates to the consumers and the socio-political changes involved, I interviewed a convenient sample of forty farmer-families in Western Amulung. 21 With frequent NPA interferences, the land reform broke down some of the landed estates (hacienda) and challenged the dominance of the traditional landlords. The farmers commonly suggested that the land reform implementation was full of compromises and negotiations because it was not in the interest of the landlords to distribute the land to them. As a general practice, the landlords further divided the land and distributed to their heirs and relatives as well as friends. Western Amulung has been a major gateway between the nearby NPA bases in the Cordilleran Mountains in the west and the Sierra Madre Mountains in the east.22 Regarded as a withdrawal area, the NPA had been temporarily accommodated in Western Amulung, especially during military–rebel encounters in the nearby mountain ranges. To increase their bargaining power so that the land reform could be enforced in actuality, at times, the tenants solicited support from the NPA. The NPA would then either directly or indirectly contact the landlords. Threats were occasion

Table 2.1 Total number and percentage of Chinese-surnamed elected officials at the municipal, city, provincial and congressional levels, 1992–2007.

Electoral year

Number of Chinese-surnamed elected officials

1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007

Percentage of Chinese-surnamed elected officials

39 57 67 67 70 82

3.45% 5.04% 5.92% 5.92% 6.18% 7.24%

Source: Commission on Elections, the Philippines, 2007.

Table 2.2 Positive, weak and strengthening linear relationships between annual rice production and the numbers of Chinese-surnamed elected officials in the provinces, 1992–2007.

Electoral year

Pearson’s r

r²

a

b

N

1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007

+0.165 +0.148 +0.124 +0.184 +0.233 +0.247

0.027 0.022 0.015 0.034 0.054 0.061

8.211 8.237 8.355 7.899 8.317 8.936

+8.01 +8.11 +8.46 +8.58 +9.23 +8.58

72 76 76 76 78 78

Key: Independent variable (X) = rice production per province Dependent variable (Y) = number of Chinese-surnamed elected officials per province Pearson’s r = correlation coefficient; r² = coefficient of determination a = Y-intercept; b = slope; N = population number of all provinces

Sources: Commission on Elections, Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and Department of Agriculture, the Philippines, 2007.

Production (Thousand metric tons)

1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998 Year

Nueva Ecija

Isabela

Iloilo

Cagayan

2000

2002

2004

2006

Pangasinan

Production (Thousand metric tons)

Figure 2.5 Top five rice-producing provinces in the Philippines, 1990–2006.

1,000 800 600 400 200 0 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998 Year

2000

Isabela

Bukidnon

Maguindanao

North Cotabato

2002

2004

2006

South Cotabato

Figure 2.6 Top ten corn-producing provinces in the Philippines, 1990–2006.

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Production (Thousand metric tons)

40

500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998 Year

2000

Lanao Sur

Cagayan

Lanao Norte

Sultan Kudarat

2002

2004

2006

Pangasinan

Figure 2.6 cont. Top ten corn-producing provinces in the Philippines, 1990–2006. Sources (Figures 2.5 and 2.6): Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and Department of Agriculture, the Philippines, 2007.

occasionally issued. As this practice proved to be effective, the farmers had therefore regular social exchanges with the NPA, forming complex and interpenetrating reciprocal networks. The land reform program subsequently intensified the internal stratification process in Western Amulung, opening up upward mobility opportunities for which the Ilocano entrepreneurial practice, salda (mortgage), became the gist. There are generally two types of salda. First, salda gating (mortgage buy) rules that the owner would lease the land to the mortgagee who pays an agreed amount to the owner in advance. The mortgagee will till the land and possess the harvests. To claim back the land title, the owner must pay the mortgage and interest within a certain period. The mortgagee will take the land if the owner is not be able to clear the debt and accumulated interest. Second, salda patay (mortgage till death) rules that the mortgagee must pay an annual amount of money to the landowner for a period of years. The mortgagee will take the land when the period expires. These are illustrated by the career of a farmer as follows.23 As a migrant from the Ilocos region, Rufino was able to make a living in Western Amulung because of the willingness of the Hawkins family to accommodate him. Hawkins promised Rufino that his heirs will inherit his tenancy. Upon Rufino’s death in the late 1960s, his four sons continued to

LANDSCAPE OF THE RHIZOMES

41

Picture 4 In Cagayan Valley, sacks of milled rice are loaded onto trucks heading to Manila. Source of image: Author’s collection.

till on the 3.5-hectare farmland. However, one of them, Edgardo, told his three brothers that their father’s debt of gratitude (Ilocano: utang nga naimbag a nakem) to the Hawkins family should not be passed to all of them because the land was not enough for all the brothers. They went to ask the Hawkins for additional farmland to till. The Hawkins assigned them 4-hectares of rain-fed (non-irrigated) barren land, which was actually located on the hilly areas. They were demanded to share 20% of the annual harvests generated. Struggling to make a better living for their children, within two years and with some credit from the late father of Magno Lim who operated a grain-trading business in central Amulung, Edgardo and his brothers worked hard and succeeded in harvesting wag-wag rice and corn. Apart from sharing the harvests with Hawkins, Edgardo kept some for household use and sold the remaining to Lim. About three years after the land reform was announced, the brothers received formal notifications from the Department of Agrarian Reform that the land they used to till would be re-entitled to them. Rumors had it that the Hawkins estate did not want the land titles to be leased to the tenants. In connection with the rumors, armed estate owners (hacenderos) were allegedly roaming around, asking the tenants to surrender the land reform documents. Shortly after receiving the notifications, Edgardo and

42

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

his brothers immediately informed a trusted barangay official who was also believed to be a local contact of the NPA. They then borrowed money from Lim to fence the entitled land lots, signifying their territorial boundary. A month later, the barangay official told them that the Hawkins family would like them to consider their late father’s debt of gratitude by continuing to share 20% of the annual harvests. Edgardo promised to observe the agreement for an initial period of ten years. In the following ten years, he raised several heads of pig and water buffalo and some poultry to build a zinc-roofed house and send one of his children to a college in Tuguegarao, who was then employed as an elementary school teacher. Roughly in the mid-1980s, Edgardo decided to stop sharing his harvests with Hawkins. He explained that the land was salda to another person because his daughter needed money to work abroad as a domestic helper and his children needed to study in college. Hawkins subsequently demanded financial compensation, but reasoned out that according to the initial agreement, his debts of gratitude to Hawkins were already cleared in the past ten years. The matter was left hanging in the air when a military patrol-jeep was ambushed adjacent to the farmhouse of Edgardo’s brother, and costed several soldiers lost their lives. To avoid being further caught between the military and the NPA, Edgardo immediately evacuated his brother’s family. Rumors quickly circulated that ‘si Edgardo ay malakas ni NPA (Edgardo had strong connections with the NPA)’, which caused Hawkins to hesitate with taking further action on Edgardo’s land. In actuality, Edgardo mortgaged a hectare of land to a cousin who had newly migrated from the Ilocos region to find greener pasture in Cagayan. After some years, Edgardo managed to claim back the mortgaged land from his cousin. In the 1990s, working together with his brothers, children and relatives, Edgardo started to mortgage the farmlands of others to produce extra harvests. Encouraged by the lucrative results, he succeeded in negotiating a substantial amount of credit at a discounted interest rate from Magno to mortgage more farmlands in neighboring barangays in the 2000s. Nowadays, as a former beneficiary of the land reform, Edgardo is admired as a well-to-do farmer in the Western Amulung plains. In his entire career, the presence of a financier-patron is consistent; that is, the Lim grain-trader family. Western Amulung is presently regarded as ‘Magno Lim country’. Table 2.3 shows that among the farmers in Barangay Agguirit, transactions with Chinese traders (mga negosyante intsik) such as ‘selling to Chinese traders’,

LANDSCAPE OF THE RHIZOMES

43

‘paying credit to Chinese traders’ and ‘borrowing credit from Chinese traders’ are regarded as a must among the farmers during the course of their year. Harvesting is done at the same time as paying credit through selling to the traders. Most of them were suki of the largest Tuguegarao grain-traders. A farmer, on the one hand, was critical and aware about the problem of the ‘Chinese credit system’: The Chinese credit system leaves the farmers [open] to poverty. We are bound by the credits that we are never able to pay back … because of frequent calamities. When typhoon comes, you don’t have choice but to borrow more from them. If not, how could you afford to buy seedlings? Typhoons come to us every year. We all became the labour of the Chinese. They come from the same family and they dictate the price of our harvest; they took our documents of land as deposit. These people are very powerful. I heard some of them farmers were harassed by the military before. When we failed to repay the debt, they even took their carabao and equipment. A lot of us now have to sell lands in order to pay the debts. That makes us poorer and poorer. And for the Chinese, they become richer and richer.24 To resist the conceivably exploitative Chinese credit system, this farmer would under-report the harvest (Fegan 1986). On the other hand, he was morally bound by his debt of gratitude to one of the grain-traders, especially during election time: You know, [former] mayor [Randolph] Ting [of Tuguegarao] was very good to the farmers. He pitied us. He is also a grain-trader but whenever we need money and assistance, he would help us. He is a good man. I remembered last time after the typhoon, my dealer did not give me [any] credit [but] he [Randolph] gave me 10,000 pesos credit. He even did not ask me whom did I used to transact with. That’s why I voted for his father [Delfin] in this [2004] election [for congressman].25 Manong Katigid suggested that this farmer’s contradictory attitudes towards Magno and Randolph should be seen as a consequence of the ‘sili at asukal (chili and sugar)’ strategy used by the Lim–Ting alliance to maintain their dominance.26

44

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Lim family originally hailed from Amulung. During the martial law, the family’s businesses were ransacked; members were harmed and forced to leave Amulung, resultant of political rivalry with strongman Rodolfo Morales (mayor: 1955–71; 1971–8). Through Chinese connections, they managed to resettle in Tuguegarao.27 In the 1980s, while big-time graintrader Delfin was aspiring to be a political strongman, a major decision was made between the Lims and the Tings: Magno married Rosemarie Castañada, Delfin’s niece. The Lim–Ting intermarriage facilitated a formidable business-cum-political angkan 28 -network in the region, handling the majority of grain trade in Tuguegarao (Table 2.4). Manong alleged that this business conglomerate gradually became a major subsidiary of the nationwide grain cartel: a formal association or informal coalition of local grain-traders formed to maintain high profits and restrict competition as well as promote mutual interests.29 He indicated that the core members may include the businesses of Eduardo Cojuangco (Parreno 2003), Lucio Tan, Henry Sy Sr. and the banks located in Binondo, Manila. Although Magno sold 70% of his corn to B-Meg feed mills, which are owned by Eduardo Cojuangco’s San Miguel Corporation, like other local traders and millers, he rejected the cartel argument by reasoning that on the one hand, there were big competitors in the market, who made big profit-margins but few daily transactions. On the other hand, there were emerging and small community-based feed mills that made small profitmargins but many daily transactions.30 From 1988 and onward, the idea of Metro Tuguegarao was developed to foster mutually beneficial developments between Tuguegarao city and the surrounding municipalities under the two-decade administration of the Tings in the Tuguegarao city government. In addition to Tuguegarao, these municipalities together form a larger territory which covers most of the third congressional district, Cagayan province, where its fertile farmland produces rice and corn as the major harvests. Despite that the Lims abruptly left Amulung, their suki (Ilocano: customer) coverage has remained in Amulung and expanded into other municipalities. How is this possible? We must look into the Ilocano cultural concept of suki, which involves patronage. This transactional system entails two properties (Jocano 1982: 66). First, the customers patronize a particular seller who is believed to be more friendly, trustful and understanding than others. The relationship encourages more future transactions. Secondly, because of the frequent transactions, the seller gives privileges in the suki relationship, and particularly when a suki customer does not have ready cash to transact,

LANDSCAPE OF THE RHIZOMES

45

the seller allows credit. In appreciation of this, the suki customer recommends other affiliates to patronize the same seller with the hope that credit will also be extended to them in due course. Table 2.3 illustrates a distinctive feature of the regional grain-trading complexes: the Tuguegarao grain-traders were less active in Tuao. Although the interviewed Tuguegarao traders did not want their suki coverage to be disclosed, they commonly stated that they could not directly operate in Tuao because Tuao has its own grain-traders. The Tuao traders also operate outside Tuao, competing with the Tuguegarao traders. As a result, Tuao traders were usually said by Tuguegarao traders to be ‘aggressive/competitive’ (nakarit). Therefore, it is not surprising that the Municipality of Tuao was not included in the Metro Tuguegarao development plan. The first reason is the business rivalry between the Tuguegarao and Tuao grain-trading networks. Secondly, Tuao’s political strongman, the Mambas, have been a major political rival of the Tings since 1992 when they competed for the position of congressman. There is conceivably a political consideration for the Mambas to prevent outside grain-traders from encroaching into Tuao; the relationship between a grain-trader and a suki is interdependent, perpetuated by the practice of patronage. Wolters (1989) revealed that grain-trading has been a business characterized by its ‘rent capitalistic’ nature; instead of paying a fixed wage to the labor, it is a production system based on the production relationship between a rent capitalist (RC) and a dependent petty entrepreneur (DPE). The RC owns all the means of production and capital, and provides seedlings, fertilizers and equipment as well as fuel to the DPE on a credit basis. The DPE becomes the sole bearer of the risks and pays interest to the RC before sharing the fruits of their labor as income. In Western Amulung, the farmers had to gradually rely on the credit borrowed from the Tuguegarao grain-traders, which rendered them debt-dependent on the grain dealers with a range of monthly interest rates from three to ten percent. Every suki is expected to stay with their trader-patron. If a ‘flying suki’ was identified, the grain- trader association, an informal communication network of Tuguegarao grain-traders led by Magno, would blacklist him/her. This was to prevent farmers from borrowing money from more than one dealer. The dealers believe that the farmers will therefore be unable to repay their cumulative debts. Moreover, this practice might cause losses for the traders, because the suki can compare selling prices between different traders and choose the one they want to make further transactions with, leaving previous debts unpaid.

46

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The RC–DPE relationship is actually reminiscent of the ringleader– agent (cabecilla–ahente) relationships originally found among the Chinese from the time of the Hispanic Philippines to contemporary Iloilo and the present day, in Cagayan Valley (Omohundro 1981; Wickberg 2000 [1965]).31 These patronage relationships form a bond between a superior patron and an inferior client, yet the relationship is still represented being on equal terms by addressing each other as pare or mare. In the case of the Tuguegarao Chinese, a cabecilla may form ritual kin relations with his agents (ahente) as kiat-pai-hia-ti (結拜兄弟 jiebai xiongdi, ritual brothers). According to a major Chinese-Filipino grain-trader in Tuguegarao, [t]he farmers all owe us money. So they have to sell their harvests to us. To stabilize the market price during harvest time, we [the grain traders] would sit down together and decide a range of prices that we are going to buy their harvests. Then, I shall wait for good prices and sell and transport them to the millers or buyers […]. We have to respect these farmers. They are our suki. We have to take care of their personal needs. For example, this morning a farmer came to me for financial assistance because his son is sick and hospitalized. […] Sometimes I also serve as ninong and kumpadre, sponsoring their weddings and baptisms.32 Manong therefore argued for the existence of a national rice cartel in which the localized grain-trading networks play a crucial role. 33 Accordingly, these local grain-traders are the subsidiary-agents financed by the higher levels of cabecilla, may it be in the forms of trader, miller, banker, retailer or business enterprise. In contrast to the portrayal of the alleged rice cartel as Manila-dictated pyramidal-complexes that stretch to the locales, seemingly acting outside the realm of the state, I will show how the state rules by monitoring, mobilizing and co-opting the translocal grain-trading networks against competitors. By following the travel of the wag-wag grain from the Western Amulung plains to Tuguegarao’s warehouses, I will continue to trace its route to the rice mills in the Isabela province. There, an alleged nationwide rice cartel was reportedly consolidated during the martial law regime, but slapped by President Ramos in 1995.

@

Feb

The month that the event(s) took place.

@

Jan

Mar @

@

Apr

@ @

Jun @

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

The months that the event(s) took place

May

Source: fieldwork with Father Noel Malana in Barangay Agguirit, Western Amulung, July 2004.

Key:

Events Land preparation, ploughing Land cleaning, welding Spraying insecticide, herbicides & fertilizers Sowing & covering with soil Harvesting Selling to Chinese traders Paying credit to Chinese traders Borrowing credit from Chinese traders School enrolment Migrating to look for jobs Celebrations Home preparations Improving or rebuilding new houses

Months

@

Nov @

Table 2.3 Annual events of the residents of Barangay Agguirit, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines.

@

Dec

Table 2.4 The perceived largest Tuguegarao grain-traders and their suki coverage in the third congressional district, Cagayan province, the Philippines. Tuguegarao grain-traders

Clan (angkan) affiliations

Chinese ancestry

Less active area (√) TUG A E I

Deltra Cereals Corporation ¶ Randy Ting Cereals Trading * Rosendo A. Que Trading Magno Y. Lim Corporation § Hilario Y. Lim Corporation $ Digno Y. Lim Corporation Krystal White Grain Trading Michael Lim Yap Cereals Trading R. B. Chua Trading Meynard’s Corporation # New Life Commercial Ibanag Grain Trading

Ting

√

√

Ting

√

√

Que, Sera & Ting Lim & Ting

√

√

√

√

Lim

√

√

Lim

√

√

Catral & Lim

√

√

Yap & Lim

√

√

Chua Carag

√ √

√ √

Go Ang & De Guzman

√ √

√ √

PE S TUA

Key: TUG-Tuguegarao; A-Amulung; E-Enrile; I-Iguig; PE-Peñablanca; S-Solana; TUA-Tuao ¶ Owner (Delfin Ting): Tuguegarao municipal/city mayor (1988–98; 2007–10; 2010–13) * Owner (Randolph Ting): Tuguegarao municipal/city mayor (1998–2007); congressman (2010–13) § Owner (Magno Lim): The president of Tuguegarao grain-trading association $ Owner (Larry Lim): Provincial boarder member (1992–95) # Owner (Jojo Carag): Solana municipal vice-mayor (2004-2007) and mayor (2007–10; 2010–13)

Sources: (1) Interviews with grain-traders and farmers in the third congressional district, Cagayan province, the Philippines, 2003–9. (2) Commission on Elections, the Philippines, 2010.

LANDSCAPE OF THE RHIZOMES

49

2.4 Governing the rhizomes: rhizome vs. rhizome To govern a state will thus mean the application of economy, the establishment of an economy, at the level of the state as a whole, that is to say, having supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth, and the conduct of all and each, as attentive as that of a father’s over his household and goods. Michel Foucault (2007: 95) Since 1970, the private sector has been handling more than 90% of the country’s total rice production (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). Whenever the rice price abruptly surged, the public would attribute the increase to the alleged existence of a Chinese-controlled rice cartel. Food policy specialists, however, remark that under trade liberalization which started from the 1990s, unrestricted entry to the rice industry and unregulated proliferation of rice mills must also be seen as the factors that explain why an increasing number of middlemen are able to make excessive profits (Dawe et al. 2008: 461). I moreover add that in actual governance, a plurality of trans-local grain-trading networks must be conceived. The handling of the 1995 rice crisis by President Ramos is instructive to food security policy-makers and practitioners: by constantly monitoring and interacting with an array of trans-local grain-trading networks, state actors monitor selectively co-opted and mobilized selected alleged rice cartel(s) against their competitors. This is in order to maintain the state’s sovereignty over national food security and prevent total private monopolization. In 1989 and 1990, the rice price in Manila skyrocketed, which caused the price increase of general daily necessities.34 Confronted by a series of public controversies that questioned the executive capability of the newly formed democratic regime, the Aquino administration was pressured to investigate the cause and bring down prices. The Senate assigned the Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct investigative hearings. It hypothesized that the root cause was an alleged existence of a nationwide rice cartel known as the ‘Big Seven’, mainly composed of seven Manila Chinese rice traders who were making high-margins profits at the expense of national food security.35 It postulated that the rice cartel was histori- cally formed, but further consolidated during the Marcos regime when the ‘Big Seven’ successfully colluded with related governmental departments to depress the farm-gate prices, limiting NFA procurement, and restricting rice

50

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

importation.36 Mainly based on rice price surveys conducted in Manila markets and a series of public hearings, the final report neither empirically confirmed nor rejected the alleged existence of a nationwide rice cartel. Rather, it proposed to conduct tax fraud investigations of the seven rice-traders, filing criminal charges for violation of tax laws and giving suspected false testimonies and documents.37 From 1989 to 1992, the Aquino administration was entangled by turbulences caused by continued communist insurgency and frequent militarist mutinies. The issue was not followed up. The public hearings nevertheless rendered a discursive image of the existence of an alleged rice cartel. In 1992, General Fidel Ramos was elected as the president. In 1993, when the secretary of the Department of Agriculture announced on television that the rice price would soon increase by three pesos per kilogram due to an anticipated production shortfall, a series of senate resolutions were passed which urged actions be taken against the alleged ‘Big Seven’ and involved state officials pressurized again by public opinion.38 Ramos postponed intervening until 1995 when there was again a substantial hike of rice price, which caused wider public concerns. By attributing the price hike to an alleged rice cartel, the seven Chinese rice-trading companies were ordered to be closed under the investigation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 39 Through the referral of the Tuguegarao grain-trading network and with the assistance of the Cauayan city government, I visited Leoncio Tan and Janet Tio of Leoneco Merchandising, one of the ‘Big Seven’ in the Isabela province.40 After 1995, they moved the entire business to the Cauayan–Luna– Cabatuan cluster, the Isabela province where Janet’s family originates. Based in Barangay Dapdap, the rice mill was registered as Golden Seasons Grain Centers, Inc. (豐年米業公司). Known as probably one of the largest rice mills in the country, Golden Seasons is part of the Pua–Tio– Uy grain-trading-cum-milling angkan-network whose members have won electoral office (Table 2.5). The network has business branches in the Bulacan, Batangas and Mindoro provinces where relatives and associates take charge.41 Leoncio was born in the Philippines to Chinese parents, who were naturalized during the Marcos regime. After finishing his schooling in Hong Kong, Leoncio engaged in the grain-trading business upon returning to Manila. He became a small retailer in the 1970s and a wholesaler in the 1980s. In the late 1970s, he was once responsible for a trade deal negotiation with

Production (Thousand metric tons)

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

2006

Year National Production

NFA Procurement

Figure 2.7 Comparison of NFA annual rice procurement and national rice production Source: National Food Authority, the Philippines, 2007.

12.00%

Percentage

10.00% 8.00% 6.00% 4.00% 2.00% 0.00% 1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Year NFA Percentage

Figure 2.8 Annual percentage of NFA-procured rice out of the total national production. Source: National Food Authority, the Philippines, 2007.

2005

52

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

the Hong Kong government in exporting rice to the British colony. After the business was suspended in 1995, he decided to retreat to his wife’s birthplace in the Isabela province, where the Tio family has been operating grain-trading businesses.42 Looking back at the troublesome years from 1989 to 1995, he attributed the price surges and alleged food shortages to the following factors. 1. Despite that rice productivity increased annually, it failed to match the population growth. 2. Since the late 1980s, total rice production has fallen short 10% to 15%. The government did not import enough rice. 3. The number of middleman-traders has greatly increased since the early 1990s. The additional transaction costs created by these middlemen were shouldered by the consumers. 4. There was panic-buying in the market. 5. There were traders who did not release the harvests on time because they wanted to make higher-margin profits. With regard to the alleged existence of a rice cartel, he stated that even the richest businessmen and bankers in Manila who might have the highest volume of capital, would find it difficult to control all the market prices and mobilize more than 10,000 rice mills in the entire country. In Cagayan Valley, grain-trading businesses fall into different operational domains of the local political economy. As shown in the Tuguegaraovs.-Tuao grain-trade rivalry, there is competition among the grain-traders who have linked up with different strongmen, rice mills and financiers. With reference to the grain-trading route from Metro Tuguegarao to the Cauayan–Luna–Cabatuan cluster, this trans-local operational domain overlaps with a number of grain-producing locales from Cagayan Valley down to Manila where the Ting–Lim and Pua–Tio–Uy trans-local graintrading networks established their connections with the rice-milling and storage businesses in the Bulacan province and local government officials along the way. Yet there are other grain-trading routes in the country that are being consolidated by other trans-local grain-trading networks. Since these locales are under the jurisdictions of different local government units, to increase internal revenue and protect sectoral interests, local government officials take various positions. For instance, in Cagayan Valley, it was not unusual for the mayor to refuse or deter grain-trading business permit applications. To counter the monopolization tendency of local grain-traders, Isabela provincial governor Grace Padaca recently enforced a policy to subsidize two additional pesos per kilogram for rice

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53

Table 2.5 Electoral office won by the Pua–Tio–Uy grain-trading-milling network in the Cauayan–Luna–Cabatuan cluster, Isabela province, the Philippines, 1992–2010. Electoral Year

Name of elected official(s)

Position in Luna

Name of elected official(s)

Position in Cauayan city

1992 1995 1998

Panchito Pua Panchito Pua Panchito Pua Manuel Tio Panchito Pua Manuel Tio Manuel Tio Benjamin Pua

Vice-mayor Mayor Mayor Councilor Mayor Councilor Mayor Councilor

None None Councilor

Manuel Tio Manuel Tio

Mayor Mayor

Josienar Pua

Councilor

None None Alejandro Uy III Alejandro Uy III Alejandro Uy III Reynaldo Uy Reynaldo Uy Alejandro Uy III

2001 2004

2007 2010

Adrian Pua Tio

Councilor

Councilor Councilor Councilor Councilor Councilor Councilor

Reynaldo Uy

Source: Commission on Elections, the Philippines, 2010.

and three additional pesos per kilogram for corn whenever farmers chose to sell their harvests to the NFA. With intelligence provided by the local governments, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) also conducted irregular security investigations and raids against alleged illegal businesses operated by non-Filipino citizens. The Philippine state has therefore had knowledge of the trans-local grain-trading networks. In this regard, Leoncio recalled that in 1995, while the businesses of the ‘Big Seven’ were all suspended in Manila, he was aware that the Ramos administration (1) accepted policy advice from another group of traders, millers and bankers to import rice from Thailand and Vietnam, and (2) formed another core rice-provision group to monitor and stabilize the rice price.43 In 2007, Leoncio was invited by the Arroyo administration as a food security consultant for the Department of Agriculture. It is evident that at both local and national levels, the state has been actively monitoring and interacting with an array of competing grain-trading networks.

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Picture 5 Leoncio Tan and his rice mill in Luna, Isabela province. Source of image: Author’s collection.

2.5 Conclusion In the 1960s, the Chinese were already reported to have gained control of the grain industry in the Philippines: The Chinese gained control of the rice and corn business by many of the same methods that made them dominant in the retail trade: easy credit, hard work, and attention to the business. In the rice areas, the Chinese provided rice on credit during the growing season when tenants and small owners could not meet their domestic needs since the price was high when rice was scarce. At harvest time, the Chinese would collect two sacks for each one loaned. (Grossholtz 1964: 60–1) Combined with the land reform, the Chinese mass naturalization policy in the 1970s was intended to make use of the Chinese grain-trading system and their substantial capital to pacify peasant unrest and fight communist insurgency. These soft-power measures, however, gradually led to the rise of a rhizomatic political economy; the formation of trans-local grain-trading complexes constituted by peasants, grain-traders, millers, landlords, state officials, bankers and retailers. After the downfall of Marcos, a plurality of competing grain-trading networks was further

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consolidated through the access of rural Chinese capitalists to electoral offices in the locales. Following the abrupt rice price surges and food shortages which caused public outrages from 1989 to 1995, the Ramos administration displayed its sovereign might by dismantling an alleged rice cartel. To bring down the rice price and ensure enough supply, the Ramos regime immediately formed its own rice-provision group by selectively co-opting existing trans-local grain-trading networks. The tug-of-war between the state and the emerging rhizomatic strongmen would nevertheless continue to attest to state strength. In comparing with the state–frontier relations in Burma/Myanmar, I will show how the Philippine state has successfully contained Delfin, a Chinese-Ibanag frontier strongman.

Map 4 Northern Philippines

3 Localizing Sovereignty: Contours of a Reflexive Sociology of Post-colonial Statecraft in Southeast Asia

Botero writes: ‘The state is a firm domination over peoples.’ Raison d’État [Reason of the state] ‘is the knowledge of the appropriate means for founding, preserving, and expanding such a domination’. That is to say, he makes raison d’État the type of rationality that will allow the maintenance and preservation of the state once it has been founded, in its daily functioning, in its everyday management. […] Chemnitz says: What is raison d’État? It is a ‘certain political consideration that is necessary in all public matters, councils and plans, which must strive solely for the preservation, expansion, and felicity of the state, and for which we must employ the most ready and swift means’. Michel Foucault (2007: 237–8)

3.1 Introduction: two trajectories of state–strongman struggle In 1988 and 1989, two less renowned yet significant events took place in the China-neighbored frontiers of two apparent ‘weak states’ in Southeast Asia, which attested to their growing strength. In February 1988, Chinese-

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Ibanag rhizomatic strongman, Lakay Delfin Telan Ting (丁羅敏), was proclaimed as the mayor of Tuguegarao, the administrative center of the once communist insurgent-infested northeastern Philippines in the Cagayan Valley (Region 2). Delfin gathered and celebrated with his Chinese, Ibanag and Ilocano kinsmen, close friends, associates and followers in his Hotel Delfino for winning public office in the Philippine state hierarchy. Approximately twelve months after Delfin proclaimed his electoral victory, the Shan-Chinese strongman Pheung Kya-shin (彭家聲) of the troublesome Golden Triangle region celebrated a victorious mutiny against the Beijing-sponsored Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in March 1989. His relatives, armed followers, Shan insurgents, Kachin and Wa allies in Laogai, Kokang, Shan state, northeastern Burma44 were with him. As a core member of the CPB and a major chieftain (saophao/sawbwa) of Kokang, Pheung covertly collaborated with the Burmese armed forces (tamadaw), swiftly overthrew CPB rule and led a ceasefire agreement. He turned Kokang and the neighboring Mong La, Wa and Kachin areas into Special Regions (SRs) under the state of Myanmar. Although Delfin and Pheung attained political victory through different means, the successful co-optation and containment of the two frontier strongmen as instruments of the state vividly affirm to the gradual and solid localization of the common raison d’État (reason of the state) or governmental rationality in their geopolitical frontiers (Foucault 2007: 237–8), i.e., to extend the reach of the state and establish sovereignty over the national territory. How do the Burmese and Philippine states specifically localize their sovereignties in the frontiers? Which frontier powers were included in their state-building project? What measures were designed and deployed? How did they deal with local resistance? What similarities and differences do they share in post-colonial statecraft? These comparative historical-sociological questions set the terrain of this section. Before moving forward to illustrate the two different trajectories of state– strongman struggle in Burma and the Philippines, it is necessary to delineate a trend in Southeast Asian comparative politics. Then, I will delineate a better historical sociology to answer these questions. Influenced by (post)-structuralist thoughts, recent literature on Southeast Asian comparative politics has seen an anti-humanist tendency, mainly characterized by the decentering of human subjects which overemphasizes structural constraints and discursive properties over human agency. In response, this section will trace anti-humanist influences to the works of Bourdieu. By following a critique of Bourdieu’s theorization of

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agency, I will argue that reflexive historical sociology should not only bring agency back into the analysis, in light of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’, it also highlights that a more policy-oriented historical sociology of postcolonial statecraft should conceive the localization of state sovereignty in terms of the conceptual trio of discourse, practice and creative strategy. By recognizing that human beings are naturally discourse-articulating, practical actors and creative strategists, reflexive historical sociology of post-colonial statecraft should be able to inform policymakers about interior security and sovereignty-making. In comparing the Burmese and Philippine state-building processes along the China-neighbored geopolitical frontiers, the answers to these questions would largely hinge on three governance techniques with regards to the frontier strongmen; co-optation, containment and transformation. Together with a methodological outline of a historical ethnography of the practice of state sovereignty, this governance trilogy would constitute what I mean by a reflexive historical sociology of post-colonial statecraft in Southeast Asia.

3.2 A critique of Bourdieu’s theorization of agency Recent literature on Southeast Asian comparative politics depicts an antihumanist face, mainly characterized by the decentering of human subjects in favor of structural and discursive properties that shape actions. In light of Bourdieu’s (1990) (post)-structuralism, Sidel (2004) formulated the ‘bossism’ approach to capture the complex roles of local strongmen in Southeast Asian state formation. By drawing case studies from Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, the ‘bosses’ are defined as the: local brokers who enjoy an enduring monopolistic position over coercive and economic resources within their respective bailiwicks: long-term mayors and governors who built up political machines and business empires that spanned entire districts or provinces. (Sidel 2004: 56) Although it remains unclear whether Sidel’s (1999) earlier structuralist formulations of the Philippine and Thai state were informed by Bourdieu, it is obvious that Sidel’s (2006) later post-structuralist formulations of religious violence in Indonesia were influenced by Bourdieu. It was moreover clearly stated by the editors in the 2004 contributed volume that Bourdieu’s concepts, such as ‘habitus’, were employed to conceptualize ‘both the structural balance of power and the practices of actors’ and explain the actions of people in terms of:

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA their strategies, derive from their dispositions and their positions (implying access to different forms and combinations of capital) in the social field, and their perceptions of it. ‘Practice’, over time, may bring about change in both the constitution of the field and in habitus. (Harriss, Stokke, and Tornquist 2004: 16)

At odds with Migdal’s (1988) argument which has suggested that local strongmen flourish in a web-like society, whose personalistic networks and clientelist social control mechanisms tarnish national political-economic development and inhibit formal state rule, Sidel turned Migdal’s scheme against itself by arguing that local strongmen are shaped by the web-like ‘structure of the state which creates the conditions for the emergence, survival, and success of local strongmen’ (Sidel 2004: 53, italics original). Instead of conceiving the local strongman as an obstruction to state-building, mostly characterized by the prevalent use of private violence and corruption, their entrenchment in the local/national political economy actually facilitates and benefits from the expansion of the capitalistic encroachment into their bailiwicks, ‘thanks to enabling state structures and institutions, and as active promoters of capital accumulation and industrial growth’ (Sidel 2004: 57). To better understand the theoretical presuppositions of this strand of historical sociology, Bourdieu’s scheme will be elucidated. Although Bourdieu produced a voluminous corpus of studies, he consistently defended a particular theoretical position which was intended to transcend analytic dualism in the social sciences: the subject–object divide (Mouzelis 1995: 112–3). On the one hand, subjectivist sociologies propose to examine how norms and social practices are first shaped and objectified in the minds and interactions of actors, and how these (inter)-subjective constructions are further institutionalized into macro-structural properties (Goffman 1997). On the other hand, objectivist sociologies propose to study how objective-macro structures shape actions, values and personality (Parsons 1964). As subjectivist sociologies conceive actions as conscious and voluntaristic, criticisms usually point to their inability to account for how structural constraints inhibit or confine the planning and deployment of actions. As objectivist sociologies conceive that structural properties have more determining effects upon actions, criticisms are raised against their reluctance to engage in interactive contexts where actors often find room to maneuver

Map 5 Kokang, Myanmar

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structural constraints. The two sociologies moreover carry very different implications for praxis. To Bourdieu, the subject–object divide could nevertheless be bridged through the notion of ‘habitus’, which refers to: the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus. (Bourdieu 1977: 78, italics added) Habitus refers to the socialized outcomes of the subjective internalization of objectified structures that encompass perception, instituted practice and creative strategy (Figure 3.1). What qualifies as a good strategy? ‘The most profitable strategies are usually those produced, without any calculation, and in the illusion of the most absolute “sincerity”, by a habitus objectively fitted to the objective structures’ (Bourdieu 1990: 292, italics added). Although an actor may eventually improve the structural position in the hierarchical field, the habitus of the perception of the rules of the game and the strategies would be automatically reproduced: The idea of strategy, like the orientation of practice, is not conscious or calculated nor it is mechanically determined. It is the intuitive product of ‘knowing’ the rules of the game. (Harker, Mahar, and Wilkes 1990: 17) There are, however, two criticisms of habitus. First, despite the fact that the concept manages to bridge the subject–object divide, Bourdieu appears to fall into the same trap of the objectivist sociologies which he originally intended to escape: over-determination of the subject. By stressing the cyclical pattern of social reproduction and the nearly nonvoluntaristic deployment of pre-determined strategies, little room is left for explaining why changes may occur in the hierarchical field and new strategies may be innovated (Figure 3.1). As the field entails a set of interrelated objective relations (of production) and structural positions, habitus of perception and practices/strategies are deterministic in that the ‘field  habitus  practice nexus portrays human beings just as passively as’ would most objectivist sociologies (Mouzelis 1995: 111). It is hence-

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forth criticized that Bourdieu’s scheme tells little about how interactive situations may impact and alter habitus and structures (Mouzelis 1995: 114). To escape from the ‘field  structure  habitus  practice’ cul-de-sac is to take the voluntaristic dimension of subjectivist sociologies more seriously. This will be elaborated in the second criticism with regard to Bourdieu’s rather monolithic conceptualization of agency. When confronted by an array of circumstances which limit life chances, agency refers to the desire and capacity to deploy creative strategies and exercise power in the midst of impinging structural constraints to achieve a designated goal. Anderson (1980: 19–20) identified three forms of agency: (1) self-serving, (2) communal-serving, and (3) global-serving. Social & mental structures

Habitus (dispositions)

Practice & strategy

Perception (rules of game)

Capitals Specific historical circumstances Key Subjectification/internalization of structures Direction of causative determination Objectification/reproduction of structures Circumstantial influence/perceptual change Figure 3.1 An illustration of Bourdieu’s major sociological concepts and logics. Source: Mouzelis (1995: 194–5, with modifications).

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In contrast to Anderson’s heterogeneous conceptualizations, Bourdieu’s agency remains monolithically self-serving. His conceptualization of agency appears to be as egoistically competitive as simply to compete and perpetuate one’s dominance in the field as Swingewood (1998: 105, italics added) had suggested: ‘[c]learly there are determining elements involved in the workings of a field: structured around the distribution of capital, the internal logic of fields is linked with the type and volume of capitals possessed by individuals and groups as they formulate strategies for advancing their positions’. By privileging the structural and discursive pro- perties, this deterministic portrayal of agency constitutes the ontological foundation of Sidel’s formulations of Southeast Asian politics. To correct this problem, an outline of reflexive historical sociology needs to be in place.

3.3 Contours of a reflexive historical sociology of post-colonial statecraft in Southeast Asia Regarded as a core proponent of contemporary (post)-structuralist movements, similar to Bourdieu, Foucault was also criticized for decentering the subject in his allegedly ‘anti-humanist’ analysis (Layder 1994: 106–113). It might have been true in his earlier ‘archaeological’ works in the 1960s (e.g. Foucault 1989). However, Paras (2006: 121 & 149) suggested that ‘the Foucault of 1980 had found room for interpretation, agency, and subjectivity’ which allowed him to swing along the subject– object pendulum, where he seriously attended to individuals. Also similar to Bourdieu, Foucault attempted ‘to resolve the sociological dualism of subject and object into a unified theory of human agency’ (Smart 1985: 71). There are nonetheless differences between Bourdieu and Foucault (Table 3.1). Whereas Bourdieu’s agency is largely determined by capital, Foucault held that agency is both constitutive and constituting. On the one hand, subjectivity is constituted by the state’s ‘power/knowledge’ mechanisms, mostly in terms of state-endorsed discourses and instituted practices (Foucault 1980). On the other hand, individuals could freely deploy inventive strategies to re-constitute their subjectivity (Foucault 1988). Whereas Bourdieu used the habitus concept to address the reproducing circulation between the structures, and the perceptions and practices of subjects, Foucault suggested that one can never be sure whether the rationalities and apparatuses of the state will be able to finalize human subjectivities. To resist the state’s total subjection, actors are capable of finding innovative room to articulate alternative discourses, selectively internalizing, deflecting and even rejecting the state’s

Table 3.1 A comparison between the theorizations of agency and policy implications for statecraft between Bourdieu and Foucault.

Social theorist Nature of agency and motivation Key concept How does the key concept bridge the subject–object divide?

Nature of creative strategy

Nature of social action

Policy implications for post-colonial statecraft in regard to the local strongmen

Bourdieu

Foucault

Largely determined by capital and motivated by self-interest Habitus Reproduces social and mental structures in instituted practices and creative strategies within a social field where the state institutes its hierarchy Pre-determined, unconscious and largely dependent on habitus and structures Relatively stable and predictable; accumulates forms of capital and therefore, self-serving. Inherently competitive and predatory The local strongmen are incompatible with the state-building project. They obstruct and impede state rule.

Unsettled because it may be motivated by multiple interests Governmentality Bridges through uncertain contact zones where the state’s subjecting mechanisms and the freedom-seeking selves meet Relatively conscious and may be invented

Relatively unstable and unpredictable; may serve private, communal and global ends in an action The local strongmen may be compatible with the state-building project. They can be the instruments of state rule.

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sovereignty-making measures for their private, communal and/or global purposes (Wong 2010). Whereas Bourdieu conceived the state as a competitive and hierarchical social field constantly reproduced by capitalistic pursuits of the agents, Foucault conceived the state as a set of unsettled and contested discursive constructions and practices, in which its future remains unknown. Foucault’s core concept, ‘governmentality’, entails uncertain contact zones ‘between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self ’ (Foucault 1988: 19). Without totally being dominated by the state’s sprawling subjecting mechanisms, human subjects could actively deploy creative strategies to re-interpret the state’s discourses, reconstitute their subjectivity and even re-constitute the state. In contrast to Bourdieu’s capital-determines-action formulation of agency, Foucault held that as the agent’s primary concern is freedom, which ‘is not a state for which we strive’ but ‘a condition of our striving’ (O'Leary 2002: 159–60), his/her relatively unstable and productive characteristics of human actions reject any form of causative determinism, thus opening room for capturing the often Janus-faced and always-in-flux characteristics of actions. Foucault’s formulation of unsettled agency lays the ontological foundation for a reflexive historical sociology which effectively stretches the monolithic conceptualization of Bourdieu/Sidel of the self-serving and predatory bossist agency into the Janus-faced and innovative local strongman of contradictory personas, competing concerns and multiple interests. In a nutshell, governmentality may refer to the always-emerging and uncertain contact zones of concomitant arenas of contestations and diverse tug-of-war processes between (a) the sovereignty-making nationalizing state which aims to lodge its discursive imprints and territorial signposts into the people’s inter-subjective landscape and the disputed borderlands as its most-desired frontiers; and (b) various forms of maneuvering, reception, deflection and rejection of the state’s subjecting mechanisms by the frontier populations. Situated in a volatile spatial field between the two ends of the state’s sovereignty-making measures and the frontier actors, post-colonial statecraft in Southeast Asia entails a complex of diachronic arrays of arenas of state–frontier interactions for which the sovereign state co-opts and contains the frontier strongmen into its bureaucratic hierarchy to localize state sovereignty. By exercising fragmentary yet tightening state control, the frontier strongmen are gradually transformed into agents of the state and vanguards of its sovereignty along the intersubjective and territorial frontiers. The cooptation–containment–

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transformation governance trilogy would constitute what I mean by post-colonial statecraft in Southeast Asia. The question is: how can this form of unsettled agency be brought back in? The following ethnographic snapshot from sub-Saharan Africa would help to achieve this goal. In a forgotten town of Cameroon where Bayart (1993[1989]) conducted research, the informant Djoda found out that he had to pay double the rent. Due to a lack of money, he pretended to be the personal representative of the Cameroonian President and visited a frontier tribe. The tribal chief received him with the highest hospitality, and gave him a piece of land with a nice house. Encouraged, Djoda went to see the President in Yaoundé, which is the capital city, and informed him that he was the personal representative of the tribal chief. Djoda then returned to the tribal chief with a story that his family members were nominated as mayors and regional administrators of a leading political party. Djoda proceeded to ask for a contribution of one million Cameroon francs, which he received, and moreover, the tribal chief even gave him gifts of a fast car and new wife before he was eventually found to be a liar. Bayart used this scenario to illustrate his definition of an African state: a shared, deep-seated repertoire of discourses and practices for the actors to opportunistically take advantage from joining politics. In light of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991), Bayart (1993[1989]) delineated that the African state entails localized sets of discourses, practices and strategies that actors utilize to satisfy everyday private desires. For example, the Cameroonians say la politique du ventre (the politics of the belly), which means ‘the goat eats where it is tethered’; those in power all intend to eat up the state resources for their own bellies. As a discourse, the African state mainly serves the practical purpose of eating, neither for the service of the people nor the improvement of the welfare of its population. As a practice, the state of Africa encompasses a widely-received political repertoire whereby African individuals mainly engage with the government to extract state resources for private gains. Given the presence of various morbid symptoms in the Southeast Asian states, it may be tempting to simply extend Bayart’s ‘politics of the belly’ empirical argument. However, his governmentality-informed theoretical formulation of the state is worth a second look, which is in parallel with Migdal’s definition of the state: a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a

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Echoing Foucault and Bayart who conceive the state in terms of discourse, practice and strategy, Migdal (2001: 18–9) clarified that governance practice and strategy often go against and batter the discursive image of a coherent controlling state, and therefore allows for room to reconstitute the state. Whereas Bayart conceived that the discourse and practice/strategy of ‘politics of the belly’ are largely reproduced by the actors thus implying a static vision of state–frontier relations, Migdal privileged practice/strategy over discourse, thus promising a more reflexive historical sociology to explain changes and dynamics. As sovereignty-making hinges on the successful instillation of insider knowledge that exclusively links the state and its subjects, mostly in the cultural forms of identities and practices (Bartelson 1995: 188–9), the local strongman’s realization and grasp of the hidden practical rules of the game is critical for positioning themselves along the volatile interface between a centralizing state and the frontier. In line with the above explicated theoretical and methodological edifices, a reflexive historical sociology of post-colonial statecraft in Southeast Asia would consist of the following features.  Generally maintain the sovereignty-making state as a set of discourses and practices, which are embodied in the subjective and objective structures of citizens. Inventive discourses and strategies may facilitate state reformation.  Extend a bureaucratic hierarchy with attainable electoral positions and political careers which induce local powers to aspire for and compete to obtain.  Adopt Foucault’s agency because it allows room to deflect from total subjection and induce local powers to invent creative strategies for resolving state–frontier dilemmas.  Methodologically, to understand how the strongman’s agency operates on the ground, a reflexive historical sociology of post-colonial statecraft is also an actor-oriented historical ethnography. Apart from collecting historical data from secondary sources, primary ethnographic data should be collected through field surveys, interviews and participation–observation for which agency–structure interplays would be clarified.

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As a policy agenda, inform the operational specifics with regards to the ways that the reaches of the state meet local powers. Inform policy-makers about the possible ways to co-opt, contain and transform local powers for state-building. Two existing studies on post-colonial state–frontier relations in Southeast Asia are relevant: Callahan’s (2003) study of war and state-building in Burma; and Abinales’ (2000) study of the state formation in the southern Philippines. While Callahan pointed to the fact that the British colonial practice of ‘divide and rule’ was recycled by Burma to drive away foreign intruders, Abinales illuminated the centrality of the strongman’s brokerage practice in the Philippine frontier statecraft (Abinales 2000: chapters 7 & 8). The divide-and-rule and brokerage practices in post–colonial Burma and the Philippines can be traced to their respective state–frontier relations during the colonial period (Abinales 2000; Callahan 2003: chapter 1). Day (2002: 155) rightfully suggested that Southeast Asian state formations have long developed mechanisms that can accommodate colonialism without losing their own ‘regimes of truth’: ‘[c]olonial regimes of truth, which assumed monolithic, bureaucratized form by way of thousands of petty stratagems and conflicts, were no less universalizing than the state cosmologies in Southeast Asia that preceded and then overlapped with them.’ A more comprehensive understanding of post–colonial Southeast Asian state formation would therefore not be possible without looking at how these resilient ‘regimes of truth’ in terms of discourse and practice are recycled in the contemporary context. The following comparative case studies have two objectives. First, they aim to make an argument. While I will illustrate how the Burmese junta recycles the British colonial divide et impera (divide and rule) practice to maintain control over the Golden Triangle frontier (Callahan 2003: 33–5), the rise of Delfin as a frontier strongman and his indispensable role in local and regional development will illustrate how the post-colonial Philippine state recycles the electoral system from American colonial administration. This system engages frontier strongmen with a state-building project, where the state establishes its sovereignty through mandating the operations of elections and local government. This is how the Philippine state keeps itself intact, and even prospers as a sovereign whole. The second is a methodological point. As reflexive historical sociology aims to clarify how the local strongman’s agency may facilitate state-

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building, the collection and use of primary ethnographic data through participation-observation and interviews are of utmost importance. Whereas secondary/documentary data would provide a skeletal framework where embedded structures and instituted practices would be identified, first-hand ethnographic data help to identify creative strategies that agents deploy and invent in contexts. While the Burmese case study solely relies on secondary sources, the Philippine case study employs both primary and secondary data. Such a methodological distinction would naturally lead to different findings: whereas the colonial ‘divide and rule’ practice has been largely reproduced in post-colonial Burma, more room for creative maneuvering by the local strongman as the Janus-faced agent-broker has been found in the Philippine case. This would just illustrate that ethnography is a better tool to capture the inventive strategies of the agents than pure documentary research. To begin, the instituted practice that keeps the post-colonial Burmese frontier intact will be unfolded.

3.4 The divide and rule practice in the Burmese Golden Triangle, 1950s–2000s 3.4.1 1950–89: driving away the KMT and containing Shan separatism In maintaining a string of colonies that stretches across South and Southeast Asia, the British Empire wanted to maintain political legitimacy with the least cost, which is similar to other colonial powers who were primarily concerned about extracting natural resources and extending commodity markets. Hence, instead of building a centralized state, the British Empire opted to establish indirect rule in colonial Burma. There are two major characteristics. First, Burma was administratively operated under the larger jurisdiction of British East India. Militias were directly recruited locally from South Asia and dispatched to Burma, serving as the official armed forces. Second, confronted by a terrain of multiple ethnic groups whose cultures and identities remained plural and discretely segregated (Furnivall 1991), the colonial administration actively sought informal, collaborative ties with these ethnic chiefs. In the Golden Triangle where the Shans dwelled (Colquhoun 1970), the local chieftain is generally known as saophao/sawbwa, who was co-opted by the colonial administration. As the local strongman, the saophao must possess exceptional organizational capabilities and military skills to protect and expand bailiwicks in order to meet the needs of his growing population.

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An informal brokerage relationship was formed between the colonial regime and these local strongmen. In exchange for the exclusive rights of excavation of resources and commodity trade, the colonial administration gave exclusive authority to the collaborating chieftains to govern inside their bailiwicks, privileged discretions to take whatever share of the financial and material rewards, and weapons for defense and warfare. After World War II, leading Burmese nationalists were determined to build a unified state. For instance, Prime Minister General Ne Win clearly stated in 1969: ‘Our Union is just one homogeneous whole. […] Everyone can take part in any of the affairs, whether political, economic, administrative of judicial…We will not need to have separate governments within the Union’ (quoted in Silverstein 1981: 56). State-builders, however, encountered two immediate governance problems. First, state authority was scattered in the hands of ethnic chieftains who possessed arms, thus posing a serious hindrance to the implantation of a Rangoon-hailed civil bureaucracy for locals. Second, the reliance of the colonial regime on Indian militias for coercion left them with a security problem: Burma did not have a well-equipped army that should have included representatives from non-Burman groups. The assessment that the ethnic relations in post-colonial Burma have been far from satisfactory is evidenced by the territorial separation and cultural segregation between ethnic Burmans and non-Burmans, which on the one hand, fueled the fear of Burmanization among the ethnic minorities, and on the other hand, caused prolonged ethnic insurgencies (Silverstein 1977: 11 & 31; Smith 1991; Taylor 1982). Even worse, the civil war in China between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), further brought complications to the newly established Burmese state. In 1949, Mao defeated Chiang Kai-shek and established the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. While the majority of KMT forces retreated to Taiwan, with the covert assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States in 1950, KMT General Li Mi’s army went down to the China-bordered Golden Triangle region in Burma’s Shan state (Cockburn and St. Clair 1999: 215–6). They quickly took control of more than 80 percent of the opium production and trade by forging an alliance with the opium-warlords and recruiting young and aspiring Shan saophao-strongmen for daily operations, in preparation for re-invasion into China (McCoy 1991: 370). As there was no formal diplomatic ties with Beijing, Rangoon feared that if the uninvited KMT troops continued to stay inside their

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territory, Beijing would invade Burma and join forces with the Burmese communist insurgents to annex the entire country (Callahan 2003: 156). To defend national sovereignty, Rangoon immediately listed the KMT as an enemy of the state. As the Burmese armed forces were not sufficient to defeat the relatively well-equipped KMT forces, Rangoon re-launched the British ‘divide and rule’ practice against the KMT regime in northeastern Burma to break down the collaboration between the KMT and local strongmen, in the face of budgetary constraints and that the KMT troops had failed several attempts to re-invade China from the 1950s to 1960s. For example, a rising Chinese-Shan mixed-blood strongman named Chang Chi-fu (張啓福), alias Khun Sa, had established fame as a rising warlord by storming a KMT outpost and seizing some 30 firearms when he was 16 years old (McCoy 1999). His rise caused Rangoon to make a strategic move and co-opt him in 1962 as a war instrument. 45 This further led to Rangoon’s reach into the complex dynamics of the Golden Triangle, where the ruling Yang family was later replaced by two other Rangoon-co-opted Shan strongmen; Lo Hsing-han (羅星漢) and Pheung Kya-shin of Kokang. In the late 1950s, while the KMT troops received covert assistance from the CIA and Kokang was still out of the reach of Burma, Lo and Pheung attended KMT’s local military training programs.46 They then served as the division leaders in the Kokang Army, which was commanded by Olive Yang Jinxiu (楊金秀), who forged a decade-long alliance with the KMT troops (Lintner 1999: chapter 5). In the early 1960s, when the Burmese military intelligence reached Kokang, they encouraged Lo to form his own Kokang Self-defense Army (果敢自衛隊) as a measure to undermine the KMT-Yang dominance.47 On the one hand, to further demilitarize all of the saophaos in Kokang after Burma successfully captured Yang in 1963, Lo set up the Kokang Youth Progressive Commission (果敢青年前進委員會) and his Kokang Self-defense Army under the blessings of Rangoon, which successfully absorbed most of Yang’s militias within three months.48 On the other hand, to continue to paralyze the remnant capabilities of the KMT, Lo and Khun Sa were delegated as the Home Guard Units (Kwa Ka Ye, KKY) and stationed in the Shan state, which granted them extra firepower to challenge the KMT monopoly over the opium trade (Lintner 1990: 85). It is therefore safe to conclude that Rangoon astutely used them as KKY to successfully undermine the KMT rule from 1963 to 1967.

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It was rumored in 1969 that Khun Sa was sympathetic to the Shan separatist movement. Therefore, Rangoon would pull its support in favor of Lo. Khun Sa then negotiated with the secessionist Shan State Army (SSA) to join forces. Although Rangoon immediately captured and jailed him in Mandalay, his forces continued to stay with the Shan rebels. From the late 1960s to early 1970s, by utilizing his capability as a KKY chief, Lo became ‘the kingpin of the heroin trade’ and extended his opium trade to Thailand, Vietnam and Hong Kong through his Chinese connections while Khun Sa was imprisoned. 49 Henceforth, while the Shan rebels fought for their national cause, they also went against the Rangoon/Lo complicit alliance in the regional drug trade (Brown 1999: 247; Elliot 1993: 14–5). At this juncture, however, Rangoon was equally concerned about the threats posed by the Beijing-sponsored thrust of the CPB into the Golden Triangle frontier. In 1968, the junta drove the CPB away from the Burma proper after the assassination of the CPB leader Thakin Than Tun (Steinberg 1981: 38). CPB remnants retreated to the China-bordered Shan mountains. They quickly localized by collaborating with the saophaostrongmen, including Pheung of Kokang and Pao Yuchang (鮑有祥) of Wa. The CPB then became involved in the opium trade to finance the revolution (Lintner 1990: 266). In targeting the China-backed CPB as an enemy of the state reminiscent of the KMT invaders, the junta was determined to remove CPB rule. By utilizing Lo’s old-boy networks with major strongmen and CPB recruits, Rangoon succeeded in temporarily dividing the alliance forged between the CPB forces and the Shan saophao-strongmen for the ceasefire deals in the early 1970s (Lintner 1998: 169–70; Snyder 2006: 961). In 1973, Rangoon disbanded all the KKY units under international pressure to improve its drug interdiction. Lo changed sides to the SSA rebels. He further proposed a deal to the American government in which he would sell his narcotics, a third of the world’s heroin supply, at the bargain price of US$12 million for burning if Washington would pressure Rangoon to ease up on the Shan independence movement.50 In July of that year, Thai authorities arrested and deported him to Burma ‘where he was eventually sentenced to life imprisonment for “rebellion against the state” in 1976’.51 Shortly after Lo’s imprisonment, Khun Sa escaped from prison, rejoined his troops in northern Thailand and regained his foothold in the regional heroin trade.52 However, just when Khun Sa appeared to replace Lo’s dominance in the drug trade, Lo befriended the Burmese military intelligence head in prison, who later became a major political

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figure in the junta. Lo kept in contact with him after he was released by national amnesty in 1980.53 In the 1980s, Lo returned to the Shan state and became a local entrepreneur (Lintner 1998: 169–70), but also took significant steps to demilitarize the Golden Triangle frontier, which was instrumental to the Burmese state-building project. First, he succeeded in persuading his brother Lo Hsing-ming (羅新明), the commander of the Shan State New Revolutionary Army ( 撣 邦 新 革 命 軍 ) to surrender (Boucaud and Boucaud 1988: 38; Lintner 1999: 401). Second, as a native of Kokang, Lo was well placed to serve as a go-between for General Ne Win’s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the Shan strongmen who were under CPB rule. In aiming to dismantle the CPB, it was therefore unsurprising to see why the junta-supported Lo convinced Pheung to implement ethnic self-governance in the CPB-controlled Kokang in 1982.54 These moves also confirmed suspicions that there had long been a junta–Lo tie (Brown 1999: 247), and paved the way for a mutiny against the CPB in Kokang in 1989.

3.4.2 1989–2009: dismantling the CPB and weakening the strongmen Two years after Mao died, Deng took charge in 1978 and rectified China’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. By concentrating on improving the domestic economy, Deng withdrew tangible support from the communist movements in the region. This policy change immediately upset the financial sustainability of the CPB. Troubled by monetary shortage, the CPB powerbase in the Golden Triangle started to lose legitimacy and local support. The junta saw this as a golden opportunity to further weaken the CPB. On March 11, 1989, as a core CPB member, major Kokang chieftain and opium-warlord, Pheung covertly collaborated with the junta and with some tactical assistance from Lo, overthrew the CPB rule. By setting up his Kokang Alliance Army (果敢同盟軍), Pheung restored Kokang’s independence. On April 11, Pheung’s contemporary, Wa saophao-strongman Pao, successfully annexed the remaining CPB forces into his United Wa State Army (UWSA) with the help of a CPB remnant, Chao Ngilai (趙 尼來).55 The CPB rule in the Golden Triangle was dismantled and its leadership retreated to the Yunnan province in China (Lintner 1990: 45–6). Pao, Pheung, Pheung’s son-in-law (Lin Mingxian (林明賢) of Mong La), and Pheung’s former CPB colleague, Sakhone Ting Ying (丁英) of Kachin, were given the political authority to self-administer four

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autonomous SRs and command over their own armies (Table 3.2). Led by Lo and Pheung, a ceasefire agreement was then signed between the four SRs and the junta in 1989. While the junta was guaranteed cooperation from the SRs to mobilize against other anti-government rebels, it was only anticipated that these autonomous regions would be fully integrated into the state of Myanmar after some time. From 1989 to 2009, the junta continued to tighten its control over the Golden Triangle frontier with the collaboration of the SRs. The changes were evident by tracing the career development of Khun Sa, Lo and Pheung. In December 1993, Khun Sa agreed to lead the Shan State National Congress’s fight for independence. Shan’s decision directly upset the regional order. It also made Khun Sa a clear target for Rangoon’s relentless hunt which gained support from Bangkok, Beijing and Washington D.C., who conceived Shan as defying ‘the world order’ (McCoy 1999: 143)56. In January 1996, after many bloody battles, negotiations and a decision made by the Shan State National Congress to denounce Khun Sa as a Chinese and pick another leader, Khun Sa surrendered in front of the Burmese troops, who joined forces with the UWSA.57 Although Rangoon later permitted Khun Sa to regain control in part of the drug trade and command some of his best soldiers,58 his commitment to Shan nationalism had caused irreversible mistrust between him and Burma until he died in October 2007.59 On the contrary, Lo’s track record in acting as Rangoon’s go-between to lead the ceasefire agreements with the CPB in the early 1970s, and Kokang and Wa strongmen in 1989, qualified him as the junta’s preferred bet in the eyes of the military junta. By serving as an advisor on ethnic affairs to the junta’s chief, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, the 1990s and 2000s saw Lo’s business empire extend to Rangoon and overseas.60 For example, his Asia World Co. and subsidiaries expanded from a local trading house and bus company into a conglomerate of supermarket chains, hotel industries, real estate, transportation and freight service franchises, and construction companies with privileged access to Rangoon’s major port development plans and a US$33 million toll Burma–China highway construction contract.61 In the mid-1990s, his American-educated son, Steven, married a Singaporean, Cecilia Ng, who later ran three branches of Asia World Co. in Singapore. A Singaporean government official reportedly attended their wedding. This transnational marriage served as Singapore’s investment entry-point into the Burmese market and provided the junta–Lo alliance with inroads into Singapore’s financial market, in which Lo was suspected

Mong La (猛拉), Mong La region, eastern Shan state

Mainly Han and Kachin

Shan (50%), with Akha, Buliang. Lahu and Han minorities

Special Region No. 3 Total area/population Information unavailable No. of soldiers 4,000–5,000 Military base: Deguo (得窩) Special Region No. 4

Panghsang (邦康), Wa region, northeastern Shan state

Army Composition

President: Lin Mingxian

President and financial secretary: Pao Yuchang General Secretary of the United Wa State Party: Chao Ngilai (趙 尼來) Vice-General Secretary: Xiao Mingliang (肖明亮) President: Sahkone Ting Ying

National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)/Eastern Shan State Army (撣邦東部民族民主同盟軍) Commander: Lin Mingxian Chief of staff: Luo Changbao (羅長保)

Kachin New Democratic Independence Army (NDA) (克 欽新民主獨立軍) Commander: Sahkone Ting Ying Commander of the Myitkyina stream: Mathu Naw

UWSA (佤邦聯合軍) Chief Commander and General Secretary: Bao Yuchang

Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) President: Pheung Kya-shin Vice-presidents: 1. Wang Guozheng (王 (緬甸民族民主同盟軍), also known as ‘Kokang Alliance 國政) 2. Kokang mayor Yang Zhongwei Army’ (楊忠衛) 3. Kokang SR government secretary Liu Guoxi (劉國璽)

Administrative Leadership

September 13, 2009 and September 20, 2009. (3) ‘Inside Burma’s War’. Time. September 21, 2009.

Sources: Callahan (2007: 25–30, 42–5), Lintner (1999: appendixes 2 & 3), Zhao and Ge (2003: chapters 8, 10 & 11). Also: (1) ‘Regional Affairs: Narcotics 1 and 2’. Far Eastern Economic Review. March 28, 1991. (2) Reports and articles on the Burma–Kokang conflict (in Chinese). Yazhou Zhoukan 亞洲週刊.

Total area 4,925 km² Total population 74,000 No. of soldiers 1,200–1,500 Military base: Mong La

Bhamo (坂瓦) and Myitkyina, northeastern Kachin state

Wa (70%)

Special Region No. 2 Total area 33,000 km² Total population 600,000 No. of soldiers 25,000–30,000 Military base: Kunma Xiaolanzhai ( 捆馬小蘭寨)

Laogai (老街), Kokang region, northeastern Shan state

Kokang (Han) (90%), with Burman, Lisu, Miao, Palaung, Shan and Wa minorities

Special Region No. 1 Total area 2,700 km² Total population 180,000 No. of soldiers 1,500–3,000 Military base: Laogai

Admin. Center(s) & Jurisdiction

Ethnic Composition

Special Region (特區)

Table 3.2 A preliminary profile of the four SRs in the Golden Triangle, northeastern Burma, 1989–2009.

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of laundering the Golden Triangle’s drug money.62 At the behest of the junta, the allegation did not inhibit Lo’s further links with the Malaysian-born Hong Kong tycoon, Robert Kuok. From the late 1990s, Burma imported Kuok’s cooking oils while Asia World Co. subcontracted the construction of Kuok’s Shangri-La Hotel in Rangoon.63 Lo’s fortune would continue to hinge on his willingness to assist the junta’s reach into the Golden Triangle. This was evidenced by a surprising coup against the junta’s next ‘divide and rule’ target in 2009: Pheung Kya-shin. Due to international pressure and Burma’s efforts to improve its image in foreign relations, opium production in the Golden Triangle significantly declined from the early 1990s to 2000s, causing Afghanistan to replace Burma as the world’s largest heroin producer (ALTSEAN- Burma 2004: 23, table 1.5).64 The apparent success of the junta in the war on drugs, however, would not be comprehensively accounted without examining the changes in the world drug market and the political dynamics in the Golden Triangle after Khun Sa surrendered in 1996. According to the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) (UNODC 2006), high demand, easy use and simple production of new emerging soft drugs contributed to the shrinking of the global heroin market. In the Golden Triangle, Khun Sa allegedly shifted to the amphetamine business in 1997 after surrendering his poppy fields in 1996.65 In the Kokang, Kachin, Mong La and Wa areas, Pheung and Pao established a favorable political climate by collaborating with the junta in not just defeating Khun Sa and containing the Shan rebels, but also reducing opium production. However, in order to rejuvenate the once opium-dependent frontier subsistence economy, the strongmen were left to a convenient option: attract Yunnan-Chinese capital for cross-border economic development. As a former communist and an ethnic Chinese, Pheung established a close relationship with various Chinese government officials and private businesses who poured substantial investment capital and entrepreneurial skills into the Golden Triangle. In the 2000s, Kokang, Mong La and Wa SRs witnessed the Chinese renminbi gradually replace the Burmese kyat as the currency of daily transactions. Businesses of Yunnan origin flooded into the Golden Triangle. These Chinese capital and transnational networks also caused a new wave of soft-drug problems for the entire region. A number of illegal Chinese immigrants were identified to be the traffickers allegedly under the protection of some SR officials (Lintner and Black 2009: chapter 4). Despite efforts between the Chinese government and the SRs to launch cross-border campaigns against the

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new drug problem,66 the junta would have regarded these stage-shows as the Shan strongmen’s politics against Burmese sovereignty rather than genuine efforts to curb the drug problem and integrate into mainstream Burmese society because they perceived that Burma’s international trade and domestic economy were dominated by China and the ethnic Chinese (Steinberg 2005: 113, n.13). Two decades after the March 1989 CPB mutiny when the four SRs were established, the junta proposed to them in March 2009 that the administration of their armies was due to be under Burma’s ‘Border Guard Force’ unit. The proposal was rejected. In August 2009, after 5 months of failed negotiations, the junta re-enacted the ‘divide and rule’ practice against Pheung. Upon receiving insider information on Lo, the Burmese military intelligence officer and commander of the northeastern region, Major General Aung Than Htut, secretly contacted Pheung’s aggrieved right-hand, deputy commander, Bai Souqian. After the Burmese troops failed to raid Pheung’s residence in Laogai for illegal drugs with Aung’s maximum firepower from outside, Bai’s faction suddenly sparked a mutiny from within against his commander, Pheung.67 By using Kokang civilians as a hostage-shield,68 the Burmese troops dispersed Pheung’s 800-strong army and seized control of Kokang. Thousands of Kokang Chinese flooded into China as refugees and immediately strained the Burma–China diplomatic relationship.69 While the Pheungs disappeared into hiding, Bai reigned in Kokang under the auspice of the state of Myanmar.70 In the past 60 years, Burma has been gradually localizing its sovereignty in the Golden Triangle frontier under ‘divide and rule’ which enabled the junta to neutralize and eliminate its enemies one by one. Callahan (2003: 161) observed that the definition of the enemy in the early phase of the post-colonial Burmese state-building project served an essential purpose.The enemies were not the Indians and Thais, but ‘the Chinese’ in and out of nation. The above case studies from the Golden Triangle not only confirm, but also extend Callahan’s argument to the recent 2009 Kokang crisis: the junta has been relentlessly getting rid of the Burmese state’s enemy, who are ‘the Chinese’ among the KMT, CBP and the Shan secessionists and strongmen. Along the arduous path of building a sovereign nation-state out of a vast terrain of multiple armed ethnic groups, although Burma ‘incorporates the experiences of both democratic and authoritarian governments’, neither ‘has been able to solve the nation’s fundamental problems’, i.e., ethnic minorities (Silverstein 1977: 197). It is therefore unsurprising to find the continuance of the colonial

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‘divide and rule’ practice in explaining state violence against the insurgents in the Golden Triangle. In comparison, the post-colonial Philippine frontier statecraft complexly involves the institutionalization of electoral democracy and local government.

3.5 The brokerage practice in the Philippine Cagayan Valley, 1950s–2000s In February 1988, Delfin Ting spoke forcibly to fulfill his electoral promises to source external funds in order to build a public hospital, some school buildings and concrete roads within the first term after he was publicly declared as the mayor-elect of Tuguegarao. In the following privy celebration held exclusively for his kinsmen, followers and supporters inside his Hotel Delfino, he unreservedly told everyone while opening his arms wide, ‘from now on, Tuguegarao is ours’ in his welcoming speech. These two self-contradictory statements again confirm the balimbing (turncoat) persona which usually typifies Filipino politicians. However, is it sufficient to understand Delfin’s contradictory statements? Why did he appear to be public-minded in one circumstance and self-serving in another? What are the implications for his two-faced politics in postcolonial state-building? From 1901 to 1907, the American colonial regime in the Philippines extended the electoral system from the municipality, province to the national legislature. Paredes (1988a: 6), however, suggested that it actually ‘forced Filipino politicians into a complex of clientelist relations with American officials that reached from the provinces through Malacanang Palace to Washington D.C.’. Colonial democracy is an imperial measure for the colonizing power to establish its sovereignty without granting its subjects the authority to restrain the colonial state’s power. Colonial sovereignty has two characteristics: it is external to the colonized territory, and it is the control of ‘patronage and exclusive use of force’ (Paredes 1988b: 44 & 65). By co-opting the local chieftain-strongmen and their rhizomatic patron–client networks into the state hierarchy, the American empire exercised control over the archipelago mainly through patronage and coercion. In the post-colonial period, colonial democracy was modified for state-building although America continued to influence Philippine state affairs. Abinales (2000: 176 & 186) held that the consolidation of a centralized state authority which is out of the hands of the frontier strongmen can be enabled by allowing them to gain access ‘to positions in the modern state and learned the art of doing politics: from competing

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over resources and allocations to fashioning laws and forming political factions’. In contrast to colonial democracy, the post-colonial electoral system may serve as both a gateway of state formation and governance strategy in the frontiers where the strongman’s brokerage practice is utilized for state-building. A successful strongman must concomitantly strive to have his foothold in the two spheres of national and local politics. While they continue to engage in patronage and coercion, they are also bound to make sacrifices and facilitate state formation as elected officials to remain in position. Both Paredes (1988b: 42, 50–1) and Abinales (2000: 188) highlighted the presence of a ‘double-faced’ or ‘Janus-faced’ characteristic of Filipino politicians, whose identity-switching brokerage practice encompasses the moral codes of reciprocity and conflict avoidance (Abinales 1998). While a compatible traditional political system and practice are found in the Cagayan Valley, the modern state institutions of the electoral system and local government have also pushed the strongman to work ‘within the law because they included in their political ambition the exercise of state power’ (Abinales 2000: 182).

3.5.1 1950s–1980s: instituting state laws through the strongmen’s struggles In the Cagayan Valley which the Ibanag, Ilocano and Itawes ethnic groups have inhabited for centuries, the Ibanag personage mangiyegu is the sovereign; ‘[n]o one can question his sovereign power’ as the ‘strong man’, indexing the supreme status of being the patron, provider, protector and caretaker (Gatan 1981: 28). Similar to the lakan position found in the Tagalog chieftaincy, the Cagayano political institution of lakay refers to the sovereign power-holder; a kind of king called patul, the all-mighty sovereign who is elected by a council of life-taking braves, the maingel, (Reynolds 1973: 55; Scott 1979: 143; 1994: 220 & 268). With prowess, linguistic dexterity, charisma, military skills, wealth, resourcefulness and extensive connections, a qualified lakay should be able to manage, protect and advance the crystallized interests of the local society. The Cagayano lakay is identified as the key instrument for the post-colonial state–frontier integration project. While state laws are often used by the strongmen as the censuring means for political contestations, the supremacy of the sovereign state to conclude upon their disputes would be affirmed through these processes. Delfin is locally known as Lakay Delfin or Lakay Ting in the Cagayan Valley. He was born to a Chinese merchant-father and Ibanag mother in San Pablo, Isabela province, in 1937. Although it is believed that his father

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was killed by Japanese troops in 1945 after joining the Mao-sponsored ‘Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force’ (Yung 1996), it is, however, perceived that Delfin inherited his father’s connections with the Chinese business ring, transnational communist circle and tribal chiefs. After 1946 when the Philippines gained independence, he was sent by his mother to the Chinese Ke Bing School (啟明學校) in a neighboring town, Tuguegarao. Delfin dropped out in grade six due to poverty. He then worked as a salesman in a Chinese-owned garment business in Divisoria, Manila. After accumulating capital, he returned to Tuguegarao to start up his first business in 1955, The Modern Store. Representing his Manila Chinese boss (towkay) and credit-lending cabecilla (patron), Delfin started as a broker-agent (ahente) who sold Manila-sourced garments in Tuguegarao. From the 1960s to 1980s, he diversified into confectionery, ice-plant, construction, transportation, grain-trading and milling, and hotel and catering businesses in the provinces and Manila. By using his two-way connections, he marketed Manila-hailed commodities to the rural hinterlands and traded Cagayan’s agricultural products to Manila.71 In the early 1980s, Delfin chaired an informal association of the grain-merchants in the Cagayan Valley with major traders and millers in the Cagayan and Isabela provinces. This brought him further to the presidency of the Tuguegarao Chinese-Filipino Chamber of Commerce in the 1990s. 72 Nowadays, the Ting party still occupies core positions in these organizations.73 His rise as a regional broker must be ascribed to his early realization of the tacit knowledge that business could not prosper without the proper political connections. 74 Starting from the 1950s, he networked as an ambitious entrepreneur with other local businessmen and politicians, such as the Chinese mestizo Gosiengfiao family of Tuguegarao. In 1955, he henceforth campaigned for Francisco Gosiengfiao’s mayorship. Gosiengfiao won. Delfin’s business prospered under Gosiengfiao’s protection, but also met his arch-rival, Santiago Tang. In the late 1950s, led by Gosiengfiao, the Tuguegarao Electric Plant Company (TEPCO) was set up to provide electricity service to the Tuguegarao inhabitants. While Gosiengfiao was the major stakeholder, he invited Delfin and Santiago to join the venture and formed the core management of TEPCO. TEPCO went bankrupt in the early 1970s because its customers failed to pay dues and as a result of an alleged financial anomaly that concerned Santiago. Whereas money was paid to Santiago’s fuel provision company, fuel was reportedly not supplied. Delfin filed a legal charge against Santiago, who

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filed a libel case against Delfin. A fire broke out in Santiago’s store and affected other stores and buildings along the central business street. Delfin sued Santiago for arson. Due to lack of evidence, these cases were dismissed by the legal courts.75 President Marcos imposed martial law in 1972 and the electoral system was suspended for more than a decade. As state power was concentrated in the hands of the Marcos faction, aspiring provincial strongmen would have to tie up with the regime. For instance, in the mid-1970s, a dispute over the construction of the Hotel Delfino in the town center not only escalated the Delfin–Santiago rivalry at the local level, but also pushed Delfin to reach out to the martial law regime at the national center. A new municipal ordinance was passed in November 1975 by Mayor Florentino Fermin and the municipal council where Santiago Tang was the vice-mayor. In marked contrast to the October 1974 ordinance, the 1975 ordinance ruled that no construction of hotels was permitted within the town center.76 This immediately disrupted Delfin’s plan to build the Hotel Delfino, which he had just started. A banner was then found outside the construction site, stating ‘Delfin No Hotel’. Delfin perceived the ordinance was the opposition’s move to harass his businesses. As complaints to the local government were in vain, Delfin forced his way into the municipal council, armed with a gun and threatened to use force. He then went directly to Manila where he sought help from the right-hand of Marcos and Cagayan’s political godfather, Enrile, the martial law Defense Minister. Delfin filed a case to nullify the municipal ordinance in the Supreme Court and won. In late 1977, the Hotel Delfino was registered as a legitimate business in Tuguegarao after receiving permission from the Supreme Court. Based on the rise of Delfin, the Philippine state succeeded in the localization of its sovereignty by litigating and concluding upon the local strongmen’s struggles during the martial law period.

3.5.2 1970s–1990s: enabling the strongman to perform in counterinsurgency, elections and local government At the height of counterinsurgency in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, the entire third floor of Hotel Delfino housed the Cagayan Valley military operations of Defense Minister Enrile.77 Through the Chinese connections of Delfin, Enrile and the military were able to solicit financial, intelligence and logistical support from the penetrating grain-trading and logging business networks in the far-flung areas of the valley Chinese. For instance, an illegal lottery (jueteng) syndicate founded by the Tuguegarao-

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Chinese merchant Ang-chung Ben de Guzman forged a tactical collaboration with Enrile’s right-hand man, the leading counterinsurgent, Lieutenant Colonel Aguinaldo.78 While Aguinaldo protected the jueteng operation, de Guzman contributed to Aguinaldo’s counterinsurgency program in terms of finance, intelligence and logistics. Apart from contributing to the monetary costs of counterinsurgency, de Guzman’s extensive grain-trading and jueteng networks which stretched from Tuguegarao to the insurgent-infested rural areas, conveniently served two counterinsurgency purposes. First, they were the prevalent eyes and ears for which detailed surveillance reports were relayed. Second, these networks provided room for military–civilian collaboration in the rural areas where the civilians were mobilized to fight insurgency as vigilantes (May 1992). Partly through Enrile’s connections in the bureaucracy, Delfin gained inroads into the construction contracts of the national government and extended his political networks in Manila, which were essential for his controversial victory in the 1987–8 mayoral election and thereafter, performance in the first 4-year term. In his electoral campaign, apart from promising to build a free-of-charge emergency hospital and other infrastructures, an anti-jueteng statement was consistently defended. His antijueteng statement won the immediate support from the professional and

Picture 6 Hotel Delfino was once the headquarters of the Minister of Defense and the military in the 1980s. Source of image: Hotel Delfino.

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educated elite in civic associations. In particular, there was a group of legal practitioners who had strong connections with the legal sector in Manila. They saw Delfin as a possible instrument to strengthen the rule of law in a frontier where illegal gambling was rampant.79 As Delfin was the only candidate who stood against the illegal gambling activities, he quickly gained their support and affirmation. This further contributed to Delfin’s electoral victory in 1988 against the opposition led by Fermin and Santiago. Delfin lost in the first counting. Due to alleged cheating and a slim ballot margin, a re-counting result was declared in his favor. Shortly after he was proclaimed as the mayor, the opposition filed a case which charged that Delfin is not a Filipino citizen, but an illegal Chinese immigrant. In response, Delfin presented witnesses and testimonies to explain that his Ibanag-Filipina mother was not legally married to his Chinese father, so he was not recognized as a natural born Filipino citizen until 1965 when the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation in Manila cancelled his alien registry and recognized him as a citizen by birth. The legal court then confirmed his Filipino citizenry.80 His electoral victory was also defended. Public elections compelled the strongman to perform and meet complex expectations sprung from Manila and local society. To satisfy the quest of the Manila legal elite for the rule of law, Delfin’s anti-gambling campaign, however, was ostensibly more violent than the voters expected, which dragged him into a series of public controversies and legal charges. Although these issues had certain constraining effects on him as the operations of jueteng were already embedded in a complex web of economic interests and violence, the coercive dimension of Delfin’s governance style did not immediately go away. When his son, Randolph, was elected as mayor in 1998, he attempted to distinguish himself from his father’s heavy-handed approach on social order. Nonetheless, the relatively soft-spoken, approachable Randolph and the heavy-handed, stiff Lakay Delfin proved to be complementary, not just in retaining the existing votes, but also gained additional support from youths, professionals and Catholic groups. In other words, they forged an intimidation-cumconsolation-style type of patrimonial governance. This proved to be more effective in campaigning against jueteng when the civic sectors defended the anti-gambling public opinion together with the local government. Since the deaths of Aguinaldo and de Guzman in 2001 and 2002, respectively, organized illegal gambling has been minimized in Tuguegarao.

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From 1988 to 1992, Delfin solicited substantial private donations from the Federation of the Chinese-Filipino Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Binondo, Manila to fulfill his electoral promises to put up public utilities in Tuguegarao. 81 Donors were believed to be major Chinese banker-financiers and retailer-capitalists who desired to extend trading and business activities into the relatively unexploited Cagayan Valley and Cordillera. Tuguegarao is geographically well-connected with these places. Delfin then used their donations to build a free-of-charge emergency hospital and some school buildings in Tuguegarao within the first term. In return, from 1988 to the present, the Tings have been ensuring the accessibility of Tuguegarao as a regional hub where outside capital could easily find local collaborators in the valley. This is being evidenced by the increasing number of hotel-buildings where meetings and conferences could be held. Hotels in the town center also consistently record high occupancy at 60–70%.82 To facilitate business transactions, the Tuguegarao local government will charge a minimal amount of litigation fee for endorsing signed commercial contracts.83 Under the 1991 Local Government Code, regularly held local elections serve as both arenas and processes for the voters to identify issues, exchange views and form consensus. The elected chief executive and the legislators are conceived to be the crystallized representatives of the combined interests of the sovereign state and local society (Brillantes 2003). Under the auspice of the Philippine state-building agenda, electoral democracy is installed to facilitate political-economic transformations so that existing groups and emerging sectors are given the opportunities to express, defend and develop interests through public campaigns and open debates. Elections are a centralizing measure of the state in which local competing interest groups are given the chance to aspire to public office and authorized to take charge of local governmental power. The elected officials are expected to craft and implement context-sensitive policies that are pertinent to the specific needs of the local society in accordance with state laws. If the elected officials fail to meet the complex demands of the national state and diverse local interests, elections will enable power transfer. To concomitantly remain in position as the agent of the centralizing state and the local society, the Cagayano strongman must be a multiple-faced broker who: (1) connects with the Manila capital and the agrarian majority, and (2) makes use of the local government as an instrument to pacify grievances and reshuffle interests. As evidenced by their track record in the local government (Table 3.3), Delfin and

Table 3.3 Number and percentage of votes gained by the Tings for the mayoral position of Tuguegarao and other positions in Cagayan province, the Philippines, 1988–2010. Years in

Elected

terms

Tuguegarao

Number of votes Percentage gained

Attempted

Candidate

position

elected

of votes (%)

mayoral candidate

gained

(candidate)

(party affiliation) 1988–

Delfin Ting

1992

(Independent)

1992–

Delfin Ting

1995

(Independent)

6,779 17,065

18.56 n.a.

n.a.

50.71 Congressman

Francisco

(Randolph

Mamba Sr.

Ting) 1995–

Delfin Ting

1998

(Independent)

1998–

Randolph Ting

2001

(Liberal Party)

2001–

Randolph Ting

2004

(LAKAS-

16,474

48.24 Congressman (Raphael Ting)

15,125

34.50 Governor (Delfin Ting)

30,899

77.57 Governor

Manuel Mamba Florencio Vargas Edgar Lara

(Delfin Ting)

UNDP) 2004–

Randolph Ting

2007

(Independent)

42,275

88.16 Congressman

Manuel

(Delfin Ting)

Mamba

City Councilor

Michael Ting

2007–

Delfin Ting

2010

(LAKAS-

(Randolph

Christian Muslim

Ting)

Democrats)

City Councilor

26,502

52.65 Congressman

Manuel Mamba Michael Ting Hilario Ting

2010–

Delfin Ting

2013

(LAKAS-

(Randolph

KAMPI)

Ting)

33,495

57.31 Congressman

City Councilor

Randolph Ting Michael Ting Hilario Ting

Source: Commission on Elections, the Philippines, 2010.

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Randolph appear as fitting for these two complex tasks for three reasons. First is the cultural affinity. They possess the necessary linguistic dexterity and cultural skills to connect with the rural peasant majority and the urban business elite. They are socialized in the mainstream Roman Catholic society without losing the Chinese culture. While continuously serving as sponsors in baptism and wedding ceremonies which nourish social and political ties, annual worshipping of Chinese ancestors and gods was held at homes, temples and funerals to maintain ethnic and communal solidarity.84 Second is the extensive connection with the frontier society and Manila. The fact that Delfin and his Chinese-Ilocana wife, Teresita Sera, hail from the agrarian locales of San Pablo (Isabela province) and Amulung (Cagayan province), grant them unrestricted access to the rural areas and the trans-local Chinese business networks which reach the major bankerfinanciers and retailers in Luzon and Manila. This not only serves their businesses well, but the patron–client networks that cover the grainproducing locales also keep them abreast of the developments in the rural areas and possible causes of unrest. For example, since the implementation of the land reform in 1972, a usual source of rural conflict is land ownership. Whereas the landlords want to retain their landholdings, the tenants want to take their entitled land-share. As the land conflicts usually provide convenient intervention-points for the NPA for mobilization purposes, local state and societal actors tend to avoid filing court cases, but adopt a third-party conflict-resolution approach, which for the most part involves the grain-traders. For example, Delfin’s nephew-in-law, Magno, is known as an astute go-between-style grain-trader in Amulung where the Ting-Lim graintrading conglomerate has established a stronghold. In Amulung, the land title would not be usually transferred immediately upon receiving formal notification. As the landlord often perceives the land transfer as a violation of the tenancy agreement and the particularistic landlord–tenant relationship, the landlord would normally ask for a substantial financial compensation before releasing the landholding. Lacking finances to be totally independent from the landlord, the tenant may agree to a cropsharing period as compensation. The landlord will consider releasing the land title to the tenant later. In many cases, the landlord and/or tenant would approach a trusted grain-trader who would agree to serve as a middleman-guarantor and offer loans of lower interest rates than the banks. The grain-trader would agree to finance the farming activities of

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Picture 7 Delfin and Teresita Ting with four of their children in Tuguegarao (from right to left): Michael, Raphael, Randolph and Raul. Source of image: Hotel Delfino

the tenant until she has completely compensated the landlord. Or, the grain-trader would immediately pay the landlord the requested compensation on behalf of the tenant. In either case, the farmer would have to share his/her future cropping and repay the loan to the graintrader. Based on the agreement, the grain-trader would estimate the annual crop procurement and apply for additional loans from trusted financiers in Luzon and Manila. The grain-trader then uses these loans to again engage with other tenants and landlords for the same purpose. Year after year, the grain-trading coverage would enlarge as more farmers become indebted to the grain-trader. With decades of mediating landlord–tenant conflicts since the land reform first reached Cagayan in the early 1970s, the Tuguegarao grain-traders have gradually emerged as the new masters in the Amulung plains. Third is Delfin’s vision and strategy for local and regional economic development. Since 1975, when Tuguegarao was chosen as the regional administrative center, its commercial development has been continuous.

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Its daytime population has risen to 170,000–195,000, of which 50,000– 75,000 people are transients. It has approximately thirty banks. Business establishments have grown at an average of 7.83 percent a year or about 142 additional business establishments. From 1988 to 1998, the local government took advantage of commercial development. It increased its total revenues from P7.39 million in 1987 to P65.64 million in 1996. Of these amounts, locally generated revenues increased from P6.45 million to P40.06 million, a 521.09 percent increase in ten years, averaging 22.50 per annum. Based on these substantial revenue increases, Tuguegarao was upgraded from a third-class to a first-class municipality, as assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Manila. In 1999, Tuguegarao was upgraded from a first-class municipality to a component city, which granted it more financial support from the national government through the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), and administrative autonomy to generate its own revenue through local taxation. In 2000 and 2001, locally generated revenue increased to P63.85 million and P69.88 million, respectively. As a result, apart from being a regional administrative center, the recent emergence of Tuguegarao as a regional commercial center has been well reflected by its consistent track record of locally generated revenue accumulated in the public coffer (Table 3.4). Outstanding financial management earned Randolph two national awards as ‘the Most Outstanding City Mayor of the Philippines’ in 2002 and 2003 (Secretariat 2003). To solely attribute financial performance to well-documented development plans and management skills of the local government is insufficient.85 The accumulated fiscal surplus was also the result of a particular context-sensitive development agenda and governance techniques with regards to how the local political economy and regional development have been envisioned and operated. As the general perception is that the Manila Chinese have dominated the Philippine economy, the local government has become an important political tool for developing the local economy without being eaten up by the tycoons. For example, in Dagupan city, Pangasinan province, over half of the business outlets in the business district are occupied by Chinese entrepreneurs (Dannhaeuser 2000: 157). These outlets contribute to over 90 per cent of the district annual sales, which give the local Chinese business community remarkable influence on local government development plans and policies.

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Table 3.4 Tuguegarao municipal/city government annual revenue surplus and cumulative total capital and liabilities (1988–2006). Year

Annual Revenue Surplus (pesos)

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

1,072,240.12 Unavailable 474,742.36 731,069.92 177,658.96 3,442,089.28 5,877,927.86 2,351,156.39 2,193,556.34 2,778,728.73 7,844,536.43 11,987,854.08 72,862,989.10 78,742,348.07 116,920,492.47 100,752,970.11 79,467,748.43 90,185,672.44 101,970,715.32

Cumulative Total Capital & Liabilities (pesos) 11,332,856.03 Unavailable 16,766,236.45 21,067,519.99 120,952,159.53 142,670,034.09 165,857,710.10 187,947,097.52 205,268,279.62 239,074,628.25 243,344,450.03 271,984,908.29 Unavailable 547,545,392.97 631,443,684.00 688,812,042.41 708,509,450.47 753,298,679.84 737,164,464.36

Source: Budget Office and Accounting Office, Tuguegarao City Government, the Philippines, 2009.

In a similar vein, Delfin has been fulfilling his electoral promise to accommodate Manila-Chinese capital into the Cagayan Valley. By doing this, the Tuguegarao local government wants to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it wants the Manila capitalists to position Tuguegarao as an investment entry-point in this predominantly agrarian frontier, which would open up new opportunities for local entrepreneurs to serve as agent-brokers of Manila investors and siphon their substantial capital to extend Tuguegarao’s business network coverage into more remote areas. On the other hand, Tuguegarao aims to facilitate its own entrepreneurial culture and nourish a strong cohort of local businesses in order to avoid over-dependency on Manila. Given the geographical

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proximity of Cagayan to major East Asian economies, this critical cohort of local entrepreneurs will hopefully be able to broker foreign investments in the foreseeable future. In this regard, the city government has been self-positioned as the ‘key to the Philippine gateway to Central East Asia’ and ‘the premier Ibanag city’ in recent years. Although the development vision and strategy of the local government may have achieved some results as reflected by its impressive finances, two issues of relative concern have nonetheless recurred in past elections: (1) the fear that the local businesses would be out-competed by Manila tycoons, and (2) the fear that the local economy would be monopolized by local Chinese businesses. The local business elite share the first fear whereas the general public, the second fear. The first fear escalated into a series of conflicts in the 1990s when a Chinese business group covertly supported Ting’s opposition in two elections. According to them, their businesses had been adversely affected since 1988 due to high taxation rates and growing business competition. The Ting party was able to identify with this particular Chinese group, but failed to reconcile. The group’s businesses were investigated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and police and fire service departments for various issues that ranged from tax evasion to the violation of building safety. The Chinese group regarded these investigations and charges as harassment with the knowledge and permission of the local government officials.86 In the early 1990s, Delfin may have been to afford the loss in support from the local Chinese because he was more preoccupied with a wider concern that the local economy would be monopolized by the Chinese-Filipino businesses. This public fear had been pushing the Ting party to address related issues, especially in elections. Public concerns of nepotism were also raised during the procurement of contracts by the local government. 87 As the Chinese-Filipino businesses which usually have larger capital volumes could afford to bid lower prices, the administration adopted a few patrimonial techniques when contracting out governmental projects to protect smaller and newly established businesses in the late 1990s: bid-winners were usually allowed to bid again with restricted terms. They were asked not to bid again within a given period of time after a successful bidding. The bid winners were instructed to procure materials from designated businesses, who usually charged more than the regional retailers and the wholesalers in Manila. Annual governmental procurement and construction projects have become like a cake where competing business groups negotiate for a slice or more.88

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

These businesses also contribute to taxes in the local government’s revenue coffer, which fund new economic initiatives and grassroots’ entrepreneurial ventures. In the 2000s, fear that the local economy would be threatened by Manila tycoons and dominated by local Chinese businesses continued to linger in Tuguegarao. In the early 2000s when Henry Sy Sr.’s Shoe-Mart Corporation and John Gokongwei Jr.’s Universal Robina Corporation proposed to put up shopping malls in Tuguegarao, the local business community fiercely campaigned against the proposals. Caught in the Manila–Cagayan contradiction, the Ting party mediated with both sides and achieved a win–win resolution: the local businesses had to put up their malls before the tycoons. In 2007, Gokongwei gained formal approval to establish a shopping mall in the outskirts of Tuguegarao, which was shortly after several local businesses put up the first batch of malls inside the city proper. It is evident that local entrepreneurs and trans-local business groups made use of local and national elections to ask for concessions and lobby for their interests.89 To remain in position, the Ting party has been the Janus-faced broker who coordinates between Manila’s reach into the frontiers and Tuguegarao’s competing interest groups.

3.5 Conclusion: same reason, different practices From the 1950s to the present, state-building trajectories in the northeastern frontiers of Burma and the Philippines have shared the same reasoning as the state: to extend the reach of the sovereign state into the territorial borders where the frontier populations are induced to submit to national sovereignty. Both states have inherited certain culture-specific practices from the preceding colonial regimes. Whereas Burma, to a large extent, reproduces the British colonial divide and rule practice in driving away foreign intruders and eliminating internal rival forces in the Golden Triangle, the Philippines modify and redeploy the American colonial practice of an electoral system as a way to include the frontier strongmen into the state hierarchy and turn them into state-building instruments. Case studies of the Shan strongmen suggest that although they have been utilized by Burma to drive away the KMT troops, contain separatist movements, dismantle communist rule and eliminate other strongmen, the Golden Triangle and the larger Burmese society continue to be troubled by ongoing civil wars due to the repeated use of the ‘divide and rule’ tactic and the subsequent political mistrust created. As the military has evolved from a state institution to leading state-builder, Burmese statecraft in the

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Golden Triangle has been mainly marked by coercion throughout the decades, whereas civic state institutions, such as the judiciaries and the bureaucracy remain underdeveloped. Even the case studies vividly suggest that the Shan-Chinese strongman Lo has been co-opted by the junta as an entrusted business client-tycoon, instrument of economic development and confidential political advisor of frontier affairs. However, Lo has also served as a tool to undermine and divide his own contemporaries, where political mistrust thrives. In marked contrast to the Burmese top-down militarist stratagem, the Philippine frontier statecraft practice is significantly, complexly different, which permits the frontier subjects to exercise restraining power on their strongmen as elected state officials. In the post-colonial Philippine Cagayan Valley, the 50s and 60s witnessed aspiring Chinese mestizo strongmen who competed by the astute use of the electoral system and government–business linkages to broker governmental contracts and business opportunities from local political bosses and Manila business patrons. Although the 1972 martial law regime disbanded nationwide elections for more than a decade, case studies further suggest that local-level political-economic monopolization actually pushed aspiring strongman Delfin to directly engage with the Marcos regime, who later utilized his rhizomatic networks for counterinsurgency purposes. Through intervention and litigation into the strongmen’s local political struggles, the judiciary, as the centralizing state institution, gradually reaches and meddles with the political affairs of the frontiers. These established trans-local business, political and legal connections then paved the way for Delfin to gain votes as the Tuguegarao mayor and serve as the state–frontier nexus when nationwide elections were reinstalled in 1987 and the Local Government Code came into effect in 1991. To conclude, a reflexive historical sociology of post-colonial statecraft in Southeast Asia conceives the state in trio terms of discourse, instituted practice and creative strategy. In targeting local strongmen as possible state-building instruments, I have delineated the governance trilogy of co-optation, containment and transformation for the considera- tion of policy-makers. These conceptual tools and governance techniques have been elucidated in the comparative studies of state–frontier relations in Burma and the Philippines (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). As the Burmese case study solely relies on secondary data, we have not been able to identify the creative strategy, nor capable of assessing whether local strongmen and frontier populations have ever been transformed by the Burmese

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

state-building project in the absence of direct field research. In contrast, the Philippine case study has been able to identify the creative strategies and transformation techniques involved in the state-building project informed by a range of primary and secondary sources. By hinging on the rhizomatic brokerage practice of the strongman, the electoral system has combined with the local government as two statebuilding measures for the centralizing state to institute its regulations and presence into the Philippine frontiers. They push the rhizomatic strongman into a pinball machine-like complex of diverse tug-of-war processes and multiple arenas of negotiations between the centralizing state and diverse local powers. To stand as an agent of the centralizing state, the strongman must be able to broker diverse interests and resolve contradictions by performing a Janus-faced and identity-switching persona, usually known as a balimbing (star-fruit). How can one be a popular, votewinning balimbing? What are the major symbiotic codes and strategies that a successful balimbing must observe and deploy? The next chapter will provide the answers. Table 3.5 The constitution of the state in Burma and the Philippines. State of the nation Dominant discourse Instituted practice Creative strategy Targeted local strongman

Burma Republic of the Union of Myanmar Divide and rule Unknown Ethnic chieftain

The Philippines Republic of the Philippines Patronage-brokerage Star-fruit (balimbing) politics Tribal chieftain

Table 3.6 Comparison of post-colonial statecraft in the Burmese and Philippine frontiers. Governance trilogy

Burma

1. Co-optation techniques

Counter–insurgency/war

2. Containment techniques

Delegated armed forces, administrative autonomy

3. Transformation techniques

Unknown

The Philippines Counter–insurgency, electoral democracy, local government State bureaucracy, judiciary and electoral politics State laws, local government code, annual fiscal review

4 Capillaries of the State: The Padrino (Power/Knowledge) System

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body. Michel Foucault (1980: 119)

4.1 Introduction Negotiating for research access in the Cagayan Valley was more complicated than anticipated. It was impossible to gain social acceptance without learning the local etiquette. After a brief stay in Tuguegarao in 2002, I was informally guaranteed access into the region. In September 2003, I returned as a graduate student to ask how the Philippine state governed its frontiers. To better understand the post-colonial statebuilding project, a political biography of frontier strongmen was designated as a task. Initial attempts to ask for Delfin’s collaboration were unsuccessful. I had originally expected to see him at 7 a.m., but he did not appear. The second appointment was at 6 a.m. Again, he was not there. The third time was at 5 a.m. and he did not show up. I then changed my strategy to a more personalized style, which would convey my personal interest in him.

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I decided on an ‘ambush interview’ at 4 a.m., which was more successful and allowed me to conduct a series of informative interviews which were typed, checked and sometimes rectified with him. We gradually established a personal relationship. He posited me as a young man vis-à-vis him as the old man who often told me the ways of doing things by determining what constituted as ‘true/false’ and ‘correct/wrong’. For instance, in November 2003, I was invited for the first time to serve as a baptismal sponsor, i.e. ninong (godfather) by a market vendor.90 I declined due to my unfamiliarity with the Catholic practice and the family. Delfin’s wife, Teresita, suggested that I should have agreed so that I would not be mistaken as walang pakikisama (Tagalog: without sympathetic companionship). 91 In January 2004, I accepted an invitation to be a baptismal sponsor for Teresita’s grandson.92 I then continued to receive similar invitations and accepted all of them. In the process, I gradually immersed into rhizomatic webs of social relationships and their discursive mechanism, which is locally known as ‘the padrino system’. Sovereignty-making hinges on the successful instillation of an insider knowledge system that exclusively links the nationalizing state and the subjects, which mostly manifests in the subjectivity-ingrained power/ knowledge system in the forms of personal identities, moral virtues and tacit rules of everyday exchange. Hence, the strongman’s realization and grasp of this wisdom is critical to conducting the often Janus-faced, balimbing politics along the interface between the nationalizing state and the frontiers (see Chapter 3). This Filipino power/knowledge system is elaborated in terms of symbiotic codes and social practices which govern the ways that inhabitants conceive the person, imagine the self, practice social skills that connect with each other, and make sense of social reality. What are the codes and practices of the padrino system? How does it contribute to the imaginings of the Filipino person, self, others and social reality? How would this system enable one to govern the self and others? How would it contribute to the production of truth? This chapter will provide the answers. First, I will discuss how the co- existence of various ethno-linguistic groups constitutes a cultural continuum in Cagayan.

4.2 The Cagayano cultural continuum Ang pagtanaw ng utang na loób ay may lalakip na pananagutan. Tama o mali? [Acknowledging a debt of gratitude has a corresponding responsibility. True or false?] Test question used in Philippine elementary schools93

CAPILLARIES OF THE STATE

97

An Ibanag elementary school teacher, Roxanne, was approached by an Ilocano parent, Eloisa, who was accompanied by Roxanne’s niece. Roxanne’s niece is the godchild of Eloisa. Roxanne saw that Eloisa was presenting herself as her relative. Knowing that her son needed a passing grade for admittance into high school, Eloisa pleaded with Roxanne for special consideration in grading her son’s examination paper. The encounter constituted a predicament to Roxanne. While she is expected to be impartial in marking, it becomes hard to refuse Eloisa’s request because she may be accused of awan tu pavvurulum (Ibanag: without sympathetic companionship) by her brother. 94 What are the symbiotic roots of Roxanne’s predicament? The Manila state resonates with the frontier populations by matching and hybridizing with local cultural codes and practices. Within daily language, it is prevalent to have bits and pieces of Ibanag, Ilocano, Itawes, English, Chinese, Spanish and Tagalog coexist together to form an intelligible sentence. Due to this multi-ethnic context, actors are living within a ‘cultural continuum’ where different cultures intermingle and creolize (Drummond 1980; Hannerz 1992) (Figure 4.1). Although the homogenizing national culture had been institutionalized for years through mass education, local government, electoral politics and media penetration, the Ibanag, Ilocano and Itawes still retain their indigenous cultures. Often, this cultural continuum serves as cultures-in-reserve: a pool of symbols for an individual actor to purposefully retrieve and make practical use of in certain situations. A cultural continuum is an intersystem where different cultural manifestations are acquired by a person through learning and socialization. Although there are boundaries between these seemingly independent cultural systems, they also overlap into aspects of social life, e.g. linguistic creolization (Amyot 1973; Ang See and Go 1990; Manuel 1948; Skinner 2001[1996]). The creolization process is significant in that it enables us to understand the padrino system: actors could interpret, create and renew meanings from establishing patron– client relationship with others. Since the Spanish times, Christianization has taken place in the Cagayan Valley. As commonly perceived by local inhabitants, the culture of patronage and its associated institution of ritual kinship (compadrazgo) were originally introduced by Spanish missionaries. However, in northern Luzon, contemporary Filipino patronage already had pre-colonial roots as the indigenous institution of lakay entails a reciprocal network of a big-man and his followers. By mixing indigenous chieftainship and Catholic ritual kinship, contemporary patronage found

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Ibanag–Ilocano–Itawes–Tagalog–English–Chinese –Spanish–Isneg–Kalinga–Malaueg–India

Figure 4.1 A possible model of the Cagayano cultural continuum

in the region is regarded as a creolized cultural system, or the padrino system. Informants point out that the padrino is a system, which characterizes its historical and institutional characteristics. The Spanish word padrino refers to the personage – the patron. The word system refers to an interpersonal interaction pattern which reconstitutes a larger moral order. It is systemic because it encompasses a constellation of complementary moral values which guide how reciprocities should be organized. There are two major complementary pillars in the padrino system. They are the notions of gratitude and revenge. A debt of gratitude (utang na loòb) is the cornerstone of interpersonal ‘trust’ (tiwala), which compels one to return a gift or a favor after receipt. In other words, not appreciating an exchange party’s debt of gratitude is also considered immoral. The notion of gratitude serves as the moral basis for long-term relationship development. What would happen if the principle of debt of gratitude was violated? The notion of revenge (ganti) would sanction behavior that is considered ungrateful (walang utang na loòb). For instance, in a case of negative reciprocity (Sahlins 1972: 195), the padrino system also provides moral guidelines to sanction impersonal exchanges. Chicanery is severely sanctioned by the act of revenge. Use of violence and the sabotage of one’s reputation through gossip (tis-mis), intrigue (intriga) and slander are not uncommon. Without changing the originality of this indigenous phrase, my additional understanding of the padrino system is to regard it as ‘a kind of rationality which was intrinsic to the art of government’ that ‘constitute(s) the specific reality of the state’ (Foucault 1991: 89 & 97). Patronage is conceived as a cultural pattern, sustained by compatible moral principles that govern reciprocity and social hierarchy (Blok 1969; Silverman 1965). In the Cagayan Valley, patronage is seen to be a moral practice which informs how one should behave properly as a ‘good person’ (tao ng mabait) – a reciprocal person with compassion, honor, dignity and mutual help. Further investigation has shown that compatible ideas also exist in the Ibanag, Ilocano and Itawes cultures.

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99

4.3 Compadrazgo: the art of producing a good person (tao ng mabait) 4.3.1 Codes and practices If I have studied ‘practices’, […] it was in order to study this interplay between a ‘code’ that governs ways of doing things and a production of true discourses that served to found, justify, and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things. To put the matter clearly: my problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth. Michel Foucault (2002: 230) I am going to elaborate on the discursive specifics which guide dyadic transactions that the frontier strongman relies on for political organization. It entails the art of creating and cultivating loyalty from other existing actors in the network of social relations across a particular geographical territory. Maintaining loyalty does not solely mean controlling followers. Although it involves inculcating debt of gratitude that the receiver is compelled to reciprocate, it allows freedom for one to decide when, what and how to reciprocate. As a personhood system (Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes 1985), the padrino system enables the transacting parties to evaluate the involved persons with a key assessment criteria: is s/he tao ng mabait? Patron–client models of Philippine politics have portrayed a more or less pyramidal hierarchical structure of the state, leaving little room for individual agency – the reflexive manipulation and versatile interpretation of the padrino system to improve one’s life chance within a situation of constraining conditions. As an alternative, I propose a ‘ripple’95 model of social relations to portray the frontier organization as an intersubjective system of meanings, which allows different interpretations of meanings by the actors based on the padrino system. In Foucault’s (1980: 89 & 97) sense, the padrino system entails the art of governing the self and others which becomes ‘a kind of rationality which was intrinsic to the art of [Philippine] government’ that ‘constitute(s) the specific reality of the [Philippine] state’. The padrino system thus contains the dominant value system of Filipino society, where actors who are either playing the role of the patron/client are interlocked by a potentially expanding social network. Among the Ibanag, the bilateral kinship system is headed by the father (yama), who is expected to be a protector (mangiyegu):

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[A] strong man, able to protect his family and his home against any aggression […] he is called patul – a king, in his own domain. No one can question his sovereign power. In the absence of the father, the mother is expected to take over. (Gatan 1981: 28) Compared to the Ibanag phrase Y daga mas nakannag ta danum (blood is thicker than water), invoking Tattadday tam nga familia (we are one family) has more far-reaching moral implications to both kin and non-kin.96 In merging with the traditional tribal chieftainship, the padrino system has become a creolized technology of the strongman in the reproduction of political legitimacy. In the Philippines, like other Catholic countries where the Christian compadrazgo is practised (Hart 1977), the Spanish term padrino is equivalent to the Tagalog terms ninong (god-father/male sponsor) and kumpadre (co-father), respectively. Madrino, padrina, ninang (as to the godchildren) and kumadre (as to the parent of the godchildren) mean the female sponsor/patron/godmother and the co-mother, respectively (Lynch and Himes 2004[1984]:158–9 & Figure 6). It is important first to clarify the equivalent ritual kinship categories adopted by various ethno-linguistic groups who have absorbed the padrino system into their ritual kinship system (Table 4.1). As Drummond (1978: 35) said, ‘[c]reole contains not one grammar, […] but several’. Hence,

Picture 8 The author, his goddaughter and the Ramirez family at Metropolitan Cathedral of Tuguegarao, Cagayan Valley. Source of image: Author’s collection.

Table 4.1 Considered equivalent ritual kinship terms by the Cagayanos. Tagalog kumpadre/ pare kumadre/mare Ninong Ninang Ina-anak kinakapatid Tagalog

Spanish

Mandarin

compadre

kiat-pai-hia-ti

comadre padrino madrino ahijado/a# ¶

kiat-pai-tsi-mei jiebai zimei kueh-bei qifu kueh-mu qimu kueh-gin-a qiernü kueh-hia-ti-tsi- qixiongdi mei zimei Ilocano Itawes

Ibanag

kumpadre/ Kumpari pare kumadre/mare kumari Ninong nangana/ namallao@ / ninung Ninang nangana/ namallao@ / ninang Ina-anak ina-anak/ naballao/ inana ta kristiyano kinakapatid

Hokkien

compadre$

jiebai xiongdi

Chinese Characters

English Translations

結拜兄弟

co-father

結拜姊妹 契父 契母 契兒女* 契兄弟姊妹

co-mother godfather godmother godchildren god-sibling

kumpari

English Translations co-father

comadre$ kumari ama ti buniag/ kanganak ninung

co-mother godfather

nanang ti kanganak buniag/ ninang inanak barok ti buniag (male) balasangko ti buniag (female) wahi kang manong/ wawagi ta simban santa Iglesia/ manang/adik/ wagi ta ating+ / kristyano kabsat ti bunyag / kabagis

godmother godchildren

god-sibling

Key: # Rarely used. Gender differentiation: ahijado (godson); ahijada (goddaughter). * Gender differentiation: kueh-ga; qier 契兒 (godson); kueh-tsa-mo-a; qinü; 契女 (goddaughter). ¶ Not used at all. @ Naganan/namallao is used to address the sponsors during the actual ceremony. The godchildren address their godfather as tiyu (uncle) and godmother as tiya (auntie). Other equivalent terms for godparents are ulitag and pakiaman. $ Usage extends to siblings of co-sponsors and their spouses (Jocano 1982: 117). + Manong and manang are used to address older male and female god-siblings. Adik/ating is for younger god-siblings regardless of gender.

Source: Author’s field research on kinship terms (2003–9).

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creolization of these ritual kinship categories constitutes that a ‘grammatical continuum be adapted to form a conception of a cultural continuum’ of ritual kinship categories that embrace contradictory (or, seemingly incompatible), but semiotically related, units of ritual kinsman (Drummond 1978: 35, italics original). These ethno-linguistic groups do not separately operate within their own symbiotic realm of patronage. None are completely independent. While I aim to delineate the perceived cultural compatibility between these ethno-linguistic groups, I will illustrate how creolization enables individual actors to create cultural realities by re-interpreting meanings from a ‘cultural continuum’ of discourses of patronage. Through the ritual kinship ceremony endorsed by the Catholic Church, social relations are renewed and the subsequent role expectation redefined. The padrino has a higher symbolic status than the sponsored (client) in ritual exchanges (Arce 1973). Compadrazgo ‘is so often assimilated into patron-client relations’ and commonly found in other non-Catholic societies as an ideological practice to legitimize social inclusion and exclusion for community building (Bloch and Guggenheim 1981: 377 & 385 n.2). In Cagayan, businessmen and politicians commonly address and greet their counterparts as pare or mare to denote a sense of ‘we-ness’ – this is a creative (ab)use of compadrazgo for establishing social networks and suiting individual needs (Parkin 1980). The following ethnography substantiates this observation.

4.3.2 Reinventing a good man (mabait na lalaki): a Chinese-Filipino case A vibrant culture of entrepreneurship cannot develop without ‘economic personalism’ as an entrepreneur not only has an economic role, but is also an agent-broker who represents, maximizes and creates gains for his or her connections or networks (Anderson 1969). In Tuguegarao, Alejandro Chua and Noynoy Ty97 have enjoyed friendship and a close business partnership in the past six years, since Alejandro has been the sole supplier of pancit (egg noodles), bihon (米粉 mifen, rice vermicelli) and misua (米線 mixian, flour vermicelli) to Noynoy’s new business venture, a restaurant with a panciteria section (a local eatery which specializes in Tuguegaraostyle fried noodle dishes98) on Tuguegarao’s busiest street. Alejandro is an elected leader of the local chamber of commerce. He is also well known for his industriousness, generosity and benevolence. Noynoy is a migrant entrepreneur newly arrived in Cagayan. After working for his Chinese

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father’s restaurant in Manila for many years, he wanted to establish his own business in a new environment. His distant relative in Cagayan referred him to Alejandro for help. Based on trust and endorsement from the referee, Alejandro used his connections and influence to help Noynoy to secure his business license. Moreover, he often offered him ‘friendship price’ and low-interest credit. In return, Noynoy patronizes the grocery store of Alejandro’s son, Juan. The store is the sole supplier of cooking oils and seasonings as well as other ingredients for Noynoy’s restaurant. The businesses have progressed and Noynoy is doing very well. Alejandro also helps his children’s businesses and his wife’s newly established meat-processing business. As the workload is heavy, Alejandro employed one of his nieces to be in charge of the routine deliveries to Noynoy’s restaurant and panciteria, thinking that the new staff would find it easy to adapt to the already routinized dealings with Noynoy’s business. However, things began to go wrong from this point. Noynoy started to realize that he had to pay increasing amounts of money for Alejandro’s deliveries. As Noynoy valued the friendship and previous help offered by Alejandro, he kept silent through several months of transactions. On Alejandro’s side, he noticed that Noynoy had not paid for his deliveries, but demanded more and more supplies, which he interpreted as kuripot (stingy); doing very well yet refusing to pay debts. Both started to suspect that the other was taking advantage of the shared friendship and trust. In a telephone conversation, Noynoy asked for a price reduction when Alejandro asked him to clear the debts. The discussion did not go well because both sides felt insulted when Alejandro commented on Noynoy’s stinginess and Noynoy asked why Alejandro had become greedy (swapang). Both sides failed to come up with a proper solution to resolve their problems. The situation worsened when Alejandro was encouraged by a good lawyer friend to sue Noynoy. Caught in the conflict between his father and one of his closest business partners, Juan went to investigate. Juan eventually found out that it was Alejandro’s newly employed staff member who had created the anomalies in the accounts and deliveries by lining her own pockets. Alejandro and Noynoy then cleared up the misunderstanding, but because of the charges filed by Alejandro against Noynoy, Noynoy was ‘extremely hurt inside’ (masakit na masakit ang loób) and refused to talk to Alejandro. He felt insulted because of Alejandro’s decision to sue him, which implied that Noynoy did not want to pay his debts. To Noynoy, Alejandro was ungrateful (walang utang na loób) because although Alejandro substantially

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helped Noynoy, Noynoy had been patronizing his son’s business since his arrival in Tuguegarao. Alejandro felt that it was unnecessary to apologize to Noynoy because of min-zi (面子 mianzi, face, or in Tagalog, hiya or mukha99), and since he had already withdrawn the case, he would continue to give good offers to Noynoy. However, bitterness on the part of Noynoy drove him to look for other foodstuff suppliers. Juan was sensitive about the change in the relationship between the two families. He also learned from his business friends that Noynoy was looking for alternative suppliers. After consulting with his mother, and considering the relationship between the two families, Juan decided to nominate Noynoy and his wife as his wedding’s kueh-bei-kueh-mu (契父契 母 qifu qimu, sponsors) 100 or in Tagalog, ninong and ninang. He told Noynoy that it was the Chua family’s sincere invitation to start a new phase in their relationship with the Ty family. Seeing it as an honor – a token of reconciliation from Alejandro, Noynoy was pleased to accept the invitation. At the wedding ceremony, inside the largest cathedral in Tuguegarao, Alejandro and Noynoy came together and shared the fact that they were now as close as brothers because they were kumpadre or in Hokkien, kiatpai-hia-ti ( 結 拜 兄 弟 jiebai xiongdi, ritual brothers). Noynoy praised Alejandro for having a son who is mabait and magandang loob (humane, kind and generous in Tagalog) and ko-yi (good, well-behaved and kind in Hokkien). The sponsors were mostly Alejandro’s close family members and friends, including a few notable figures in Tuguegarao, such as the mayor. As a non-family member, Noynoy was still seated with the Chua family at the dinner reception. The ceremonial event helped to sweep away the bad feelings between Alejandro and Noynoy. In this particular episode, Juan acted as a go-between, mending the relationship between his father and his closest business partner by practically using the padrino system as an honor system – nominating the Ty couple to be one of the wedding sponsors. Originally, Noynoy was a good friend to Alejandro and a business partner to Juan, but the wedding ceremony pulled him closer to the circular orbited network center of the Chuas by recognizing and honoring him as a ritual kinsman, and now positioned within the inner circle of the social universe of the Chua family. Against the backdrop of previous misunderstandings between Alejandro and Noynoy, the Chua family’s decision to nominate Noynoy as Juan’s wedding sponsor was re-interpreted as a token of reconciliation from Alejandro to Noynoy. This would not have been possible without

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Alejandro’s ceremonial endorsement of the godfather–godson relationship between Noynoy and Juan. Through ritualizing the patron– client relationship between Noynoy and Juan, Noynoy and his wife were given an equal symbolic status as the co-parents of Alejandro and his wife. However, at that moment, Noynoy himself knew well that the nomination mainly served as a token of reconciliation by granting him a seemingly equal status with Alejandro. In reality, the nomination was intended to mend the patron–client relationship between Alejandro and Noynoy. Alejandro’s superiority as the common patron of Noynoy, and his son, Juan, was affirmed at Juan’s wedding ceremony. From this case, I want to highlight the creolized nature of the discourse of patronage: the interpretation of the meanings behind the nomination of the wedding patron as a creative enterprise. In order to make a meaningful interpretation of the nomination act, one should delve into the specificities of the life histories. Based on the situational necessities of the involved parties, the nomination successfully rescued a faltering patron–client bond. In this case, Filipino patronage provides a timely platform to create a new phase in the relationship between the Chua and the Ty families. Thus, the above ethnography informs an archetype of, in Parkin’s (1980) terms, ‘creative abuse’ of the padrino system found in the Cagayan Valley. I selected a Chinese-Filipino case with the intention to display the creolized nature of this power/knowledge system in contemporary Filipino society. Three features of the padrino system are worthy of further attention. First, the padrino system is an interest-coordinating system. With its hierarchical structure between the patrons and clients, both parties seek their own interests. Secondly, it is an honor system based on frequency and depth of interactions (Bourdieu 1966: 197–8). The closer an individual is cognitively located to the designated ego-self within the circular orbited network, the more prestige/honor would be enjoyed by this individual. If the ego-self is a renowned individual, the amount of prestige/honor would therefore increase. In short, the padrino system is an honor system in which the interacting actors within the social network enjoy a collective self-esteem, amor propio – ‘an emotional high-tension wire that girds the individual’s dearest self, protecting from disparagement or question the qualities he most jealously guards as his own best claim to others’ respect and esteem’ (Lynch 1970: 16). It is the sensitivity to the norms of good behavior that preserves one’s acceptability among others, and the sensitivity to personal affront by preventing embarrassment or

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shame (hiya). Thirdly, the symbolic ingredients of the padrino system inform the specific yet delicate logics that actors have to tactfully manipulate in order to maintain the Filipino ideal type of social acceptance: smooth–interpersonal–elations (SIR). Accordingly, SIR is constituted by (1) pakikisama, meaning ‘sympathetic companionship’, ‘concessions’ or ‘giving in’ with the aim to yield ‘to the will of the leader or majority so as to make the group decision unanimous’ (Lynch 1970: 11), (2) the practice of using euphemisms in language marks a Filipino trait of cushioning the feelings of the person affected, and (3) use of go-betweens as a way of preserving and restoring smooth interpersonal relations by avoiding hiya and remedying an existing state of conflict and tension by sensitively replacing shame, embarrassment, affront and uncomfortable feelings with honor (puri) (Lynch 1970: 15-17). Undoubtedly, Juan played a successful role as the go-between and won the praise of Noynoy as someone who is mabait, magandang loób and in Hokkien, ko-yi, which are all regarded as the virtues of being a good person (Kerkvliet 2002: 177). Cutting across kinship, ritual kinship, friendship, patron-client relationship and other social relations, the padrino system actually means more than compadrazgo. Its essence remains the practical rules of interaction between the political elite and the masses. The padrino system thus entails the reciprocal exchanges between actors whose give, take and return are governed by a complex set of codes and practices, which specifically define roles, statuses and expectations of the actors differentially positioned in each other’s subjective imagination (Lynch and Himes 2004 [1984]). Perceptually, the strongman manages to occupy the most superior status in a constellation of criss-crossing social networks that he engages – the ultimate padrino. While he is continuously glorified by honor as the padrino in numerous life-events, and communal ceremonies and rituals, he is obliged to reward his followers and sometimes sacrifice himself in exchange for their loyalties. The padrino system is a set of moral codes which govern exchange and interdependency that provide individuals with roles and expectations to negotiate for qualitatively different objects. Gifts, favors, services and financial rewards are given out in exchange for political support. Every three years since 1988, elections have been a routine event where one’s political influences as the padrino can be attested and proclaimed. Through elections, fiestas, municipal beauty contests and other similar ceremonies and life-event rituals, the symbolic structure of the padrino system has been reproduced and perpetuated.

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To pictorially illustrate the padrino system, imagine that a stone is thrown into a pool of calm water. From the center point where the stone reaches the water, layers of ripples radiate outward to the peripheries. As a ripple goes further, it becomes weaker. As a ripple gets closer to the center point, its velocity becomes stronger. By using this pictorial metaphor to depict the social relation pattern in rural China, Fei (1992: 60) coined the phrase, ‘the differential mode of associations’. Social relations are outward radiating orbits that circle around the ego-self, prioritizing associations according to the differential proximities to the center, and forming a circular onion-like network of connected individuals who play a range of different social roles – the ego-self ’s ‘social universe’. In applying this typology to the Philippine context, bilateral family members and kinsmen are located at the most inner circle,101 next are the ritual kinsmen, and then neighbors and friends. Although the positioning of personal associations is believed to be orderly patterned spatially, in actual situations, individuals are said to be moving sometimes closer and sometimes further from the ego. Involved and observing parties create different interpretations with regard to the individuals and their movements. Although the padrino system resembles the features subscribed by ‘the differential mode of association’, it is, in addition, a power/knowledge system. The padrino system involves a range of structural roles, a pool of moral codes and options of social practices, which enable actors to negotiate and reinvent meanings in lived situations. The padrino system allows individuals who occupy different structural positions in the circular orbits to cut across the social universe of others, and move along the proximity to the ego-self. In other words, Filipino kinship, ritual kinship and friendship are social practices which generate (multiple) symbolic meanings. These constitute the moral force that governs reciprocal exchange that radiates throughout a constellation of multi-ego-centered criss-crossing social networks. In Cagayan, the padrino system works both inside the family and between non-kinsmen. The family head enjoys a superior status to other clansmen in political, economic and social affairs. Although debates and disagreements are allowed within the family, the final say of the family head is still respected. The family head controls most of the resources, thus ensuring that they are the most influential of the clan, enabling them to serve as the sponsor and patron of most lifeevent ceremonies and rituals of their kinsmen. Yet the padrino system goes beyond the boundary of the kin group (angkan). Its capacity is also applicable to non-kinsmen.

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Among different ethno-linguistic groups, one’s cousin (kasinsin) and kumadre/kumpadre are often called ‘brother/sister’ (kapatid). Within the hierarchical social structure, a set of symbiotic codes and social practices governs the reciprocal interactions between the ego-self and the connected actors differentially positioned in the ego’s onion-like social networks. These codes and practices serve as the shared internal system of meanings to signify and decode interactions and exchanges between different positions in the social structure. It is therefore the mortar that cements the ego-self and other actors together which forms the entire constellation of criss-crossing circular orbits of social relations that connect across the strongman’s bailiwick. The third congressional district of the Cagayan province has six municipalities (Amulung, Enrile, Iguig, Peñablanca, Solana and Tuao) and one component city – Tuguegarao. The strongmen occupy official positions such as that of mayor, which gives him/her the governmental authority to implement law, maneuver funds, administer the local police force, and execute policies and projects in the designated jurisdictions. Imagine seven stones being thrown together into the same pool of calm water. One sees seven political centers of outward radiating force collide and coalesce, forming the contours of their bailiwicks. This depicts a discursive field of power contest and mutual encroachment as well as juxtaposition of interpretations and meanings. Add in the daily interactions and routine exchanges of ordinary inhabitants, the splashes of ripples with lower velocity criss-cross the ripples of the strongmen. Hence, the existence of competing strongmen means that measures such as surveillance and coercion, as well as intimidation have to be also ensured in order to maintain effective control. On the one hand, the padrino system entails a benevolent dimension of the strongman as the all-providing patron who controls and distributes the most substantial amount of resources in the bailiwick. On the other hand, it also enables the strongman to penetrate into the coercive state apparatus, e.g. police aides as personal bodyguards, even including them in his circular layered personal social network. This enables him to exercise physical force as a potential threat to weaken the capacity of adversaries by instilling fear to elicit subordination. The padrino therefore has a coercive face. This often Janus-faced, balimbing-style of strongman politics entails the maintenance of reciprocal circulations as the art of governing the self and others, which commonly hinge on the Tagalog ideas of utang na loób.

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4.4 Utang na loób: the art of governing the self and others On a tranquil evening in the 1990s, a major grain-trader and rice miller, Feliciano Cu,102 was driving on an overnight trip from the retail headquarters in downtown Manila to his residence-cum-rice-mill in the Cagayan Valley. As usual, Feliciano had to first borrow money from the banks to order to buy grains from his indebted traders and farmers. Then, he sold the milled rice and corn to the countrywide markets and feed-mills through his Manila retail-outlet. As it was harvest season, Feliciano had to commute at least three times a week to coordinate his trucks along the meandering Cagayan–Manila national highway. Upon his early morning arrival, he was urged to call his wife, Rosita, stationed in Manila. Bad news followed: shortly after Feliciano left Manila, their daughter was witnessed to be forcibly pushed into a van by several armed men outside the office. Overwhelmed, Feliciano returned to his Manila office to join Rosita. In anticipation, the kidnapper-gang phoned his office. They asked for a considerable ransom. Feliciano immediately agreed and pleaded for his daughter’s safety, which was ensured only if he promised not to alert the police. However, the news circulated quickly and Feliciano was soon approached by his business counterpart, a grain-trader and elected government official of Cagayano and Chinese mixed ancestries. He introduced Feliciano to a ‘super-cop’ personality of a senior policecum-military rank in Manila who promised Feliciano that his daughter would be rescued and asked for absolute cooperation in a plot to track down and prosecute the notorious criminals. With extraordinary access into the state security facilities, the super-cop was able to track down the whereabouts of the kidnappers in a neighboring province of Metro Manila by tracing telephone lines and inquiring through intelligence outposts. The super-cop initiated a plot to set up the kidnapper-gang: when Feliciano proceeded to surrender the requested ransom of some 20 million pesos in an agreed venue, the police would raid their nest for a rescue. Several suspects were shot dead on the spot whereas others were arrested. When the super-cop returned the confiscated ransom to Feliciano, he felt indebted and was compelled to share a portion of it. However, the super-cop refused, but appreciated Feliciano’s utang na loób, 103 and suggested that Feliciano might consider giving some ten thousand pesos to the involved policemen for tea-time snacks (merienda). As the kidnapper-gang had long been pursued by the state authorities, Feliciano was asked to be patient with the trial process. Some months later,

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however, while waiting to serve as a witness, Feliciano was discreetly told that his family would never be disturbed by the criminals because they were all killed. Since then, Feliciano became a supporter of this super-cop, who subsequently ran and occupied senior governmental offices. The ethics of utang na loób entails the ways that the self and the selves of others may be imagined, related and ordered. There are two kinds of indebtedness involved in the above ethnography to make this order possible: (1) Feliciano’s financial debts to the Manila banks, and, (2) his utang na loób to the bankers and the officials whom he asked for credit and sought protection. The latter is particularly important because it informs the possibilities that Feliciano could conceive and take. Is it unique to the Philippines? No, as Kaut clarified: [t]he principles and mechanics of this system [utang na loób] are by no means unique to Tagalogs but are found as well among other ethno-linguistic groups in the Philippines and seem to be variations on a structural theme implicit in value organizations from Tikopia to Japan, to Vancouver Island, to Classical Greece – and not unheard of in Washington, D.C. (Kaut 1961: 256) For instance, in Cagayan, the Tagalog ethics of utang na loób share four similar features with the Chinese ethics of lin-qing. The first similarity is that both symbolize a system of reciprocal obligations. Secondly, utang na loób is commonly translated as ‘debt of gratitude’ or ‘debt of prime obligation’ for utang means ‘debt’ and loób means ‘inside of something’. Lin-qing is translated as ‘human sentiment’, ‘human feeling’ and ‘human obligation’. All refer to a subjective emotion/feeling of obligation and indebtedness internally created within another person through an unsolicited presentation of services, gifts, favors, honors and other considerations. Thus, utang na loób and lin-qing compel the recipient to return the favor after receipt because of the internal indebtedness. Thirdly, both refer to a set of norms and moral obligations which govern practices of exchange. These norms and moral obligations require the involved parties to keep in contact and continue to participate in future exchanges. Lastly, as an extended usage, both can be regarded as a kind of resource, in the forms of favors and gifts as well as honors, used in the medium of social exchange to establish social networks (Yan 1996: 122). In this spirit, utang na loób is essential in establishing pakikisama and SIR as well as ‘building public relations (PR) in politics.’ In the same manner, lin-qing is

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essential to establishing guanxi (關係 social relationship/connections) for the Cagayanos (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). The ethics of debt of gratitude allows people of different cultures to relate to each other despite their different ways of elaborating the idea in their own cultural terms. Being a good person is regarded, as in Goffman’s (1983) words, as ‘the interaction order’ with the objective to live up to the expectation of being a grateful person. It is an indispensable moral guideline for building and cultivating personal relationships for the Filipinos. As reciprocal exchange is featured in all human interaction, before giving a gift or offering a service, one should consider the receiver’s particular need. To be a good person is to be sensitive to what is inside the other person’s mind and his/her feelings. Someone would be usually complimented as considerate, kind and compassionate (mabait, magandang loòb, mabuting loòb). There is a subtle structural difference between utang na loòb and pagmamalasakit in actual usage. In the context of a superiorinferior relationship, especially in patronage, utang na loób refers to the debt of gratitude embodied by the client after receiving help, whereas pagmamalasakit is the moral obligation of a patron to show compassionate support. A patron who is willing to make a sacrifice for his or her followers is highly regarded as displaying a moral virtue that would render the client indebted forever. In addition to the utilitarian and instrumental dimensions of reciprocity, its moral nature should be emphasized. To be grateful is to remember the gifts, services and favors which have been received. The receiver is obliged to reciprocate (ganti) or ‘get ready’ when the giver is in need. The need may either arise urgently, or emerge in the planned or unexpected future. On that account, the reciprocal relationship should be based on trust (tiwala), an invisible tie that binds the two parties together, which faithfully stretches across a time-span. Without trust, long-term relationship development would not be possible and mutual benefits would not be maintained. Reciprocating parties should not be forced to return a service or favor on a specific situation, but largely based on personal ‘good will’. In Ilocano, a ‘debt of good will/gratitude’ (utang nga naimbag a nakem) is equivalent to the Tagalog idea of debt of gratitude (utang na loòb). Both refer to a sacred sense of remembered indebtedness that has a long-term effect on the reciprocating parties. Forgetting one’s human obligation is regarded as a violation of the ethics of the debt of gratitude. It is immoral, and therefore attracts sanctions. The Tagalog word ganti is the sanctioning

Table 4.2 Cagayano renditions of the Tagalog ethics of utang na loób (Part I). Tagalog

Hokkien#

Mandarin

pakikisama

kuan-hei, wu-lai-ki, guanxi, cup-lang-ying-siu youlaiwang, yuren yingchou

walang pakikisama amor propio

wu-kuai-piat, mui-a-ying-siu min-kam, zi-chuan-sim

hiya

kian-siao, minzi

walang hiya

mo-kian-siao, mo-pai-say, mo-min-zi min-zi mia-sia, min-zi

mukha puri

Chinese characters

sympathetic companionship/ relationship, relationshipbuilding. youguaipi, 有怪癖, 不懂交際 weird, anti-social, budong jiaoji unable to socialize mingan, zizunxin 敏感, 自尊心 sensitivity, self-esteem/ respect lianchi, mianzi shame, face, self廉恥, 面子 esteem buzhi lianchi, mei 不知廉恥, 沒面子 shameless, losing mianzi face 關係, 有來往, 與人應酬

面子 名聲, 面子

kaloob/ saloobin Sim

mianzi mingsheng, mianzi xin

tiwala utang na loób

Xin lin-qing, lang-qing, kiam-lang-lin-qing mo-leong-sim, mo-lin-qing

xinren, xinyong renqing

信任, 信用 人情

meiliangxin, meirenqing

沒良心, 沒人情

pagmamalasakit

wu-wao-lang, wu-kam-qing

ganqing

感情

walang pagmamalasakit

mo-wao-lang, mo-kam-qing

meiganqing

沒感情

pagkakaisa

dong-qing

tongqing

同情

ganti ganti mabait, magandang loób, mabuting loób

bo-in bo-siu ko-yi, zhui-lang-ya-suwe, e-yao-zhui-lang

baoen baochou zuoren henmei, dongde zuoren

報恩 報仇 做人很美, 懂得做人

walang utang na loòb

English

心

Key: * With assistance from the Chinese-Filipino communities in Tuguegarao and Tuao. # Some colloquial terms do not exist in Mandarin and Chinese characters.

face reputation, face, honor heart, innermost state of mind trust, credibility debt of gratitude, human obligation without good conscience, without human sentiment, inhumane. sympathetic concern/support, compassion without sympathetic concern/support, compassion having same feeling return a favor avenge considerate, generous, kind, compassionate, good (describing a person)

Table 4.3 Cagayano renditions of the Tagalog ethics of utang na loób (Part II). Tagalog utang na loób

Ibanag

gatu ta nono, makagain avi na ammu y mappabalo, tappao walang utang na awan tu gatu ta loòb nono

Ilocano utang nga naimbag a nakem

Itawes katut kan nonot

English debt of gratitude

awan ti utang na awan nga katut kan without debt of nga naimbag nonot gratitude nga nakem kaloob/saloobin nono nakem agal; nonot innermost state of mind hiya pasiran bain mappasiran shame walang hiya awan tu pasiran awan ti bain awan nga shameless mappasiran pakikisama anaddu y aggao*, kaarruba, akkikuvvulum togetherness, pavvurulum pakakaisa sympathetic companionship pagmamalasakit pangitaki pangisakit aggideddut, personal concern angnguffun tiwala confiansa / panagtalek pangurung trust pangurung pagkakaisa pattaradday panagkaykaysa (nakasta nga) having the same attaradday feeling barkada kakofun gagayyem kakkavulum friend mabait masippo nasingpet nasimpat considerate, generous, kind, compassionate, good (describing a person) magandang masippo; napiya napintas nga nakasta yo considerate, loòb, mabuting nga nono nakem unuunag generous, kind, loòb compassionate, good (describing a person) ganti (1) balo; itoli agsinnulit, bales balat; mangitoli return a favor; kang ayat reciprocate ganti (2) balo; balyan bales, agibales balat/ibalak avenge mukha muka rupa muyung face puri dayaw dayaw dayaw honor bahala na komforme ngana makammu ditan conforme ngin God will take care Key: # With assistance from the inhabitants of Tuguegarao and Tuao, Cagayan province. * Literally means ‘the day is long’ which implicates that even though one may seem to not need help from others, the wheel of fortune will turn and s/he will need help in the future (Gatan 1981: 41).

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mechanism, which entails two meanings: (1) to return a favor, and (2) to avenge. Revenge is manifested in various forms, such as refusal, confrontation, threats, and sabotage of reputation as well as the use of violence. Usually, the violator would be accused of being ‘without good conscience’ (walang utang na loòb) or sometimes more seriously, shameless (walang hiya). Fox (1959: 430) suggested that hiya (self-esteem) is ‘similar in some respects to Chinese “face”’. Despite the various yet similar usages of the concepts, they both serve as a social sanctioning system that attaches the sentiments of reputation, prestige, pride and honor to the ego, thus inhibiting the violation of moral codes. A violation of moral obligations and social expectation would cause an emotional tension of ‘losing face’ through feelings of shyness, embarrassment, shame and timidity (Bulatao 1964; Hu 1944). Nevertheless, the interchangeable use of these cultural concepts is quite unique in a creolized context like Cagayan. It is important to see that these specific ideas are not identical, but compatible. In contrast to the Mediterranean notions of ‘honor’ and ‘shame’ that emphasize the cultural logics of prestige-in-relations with its specific symbolic expression of honor in challenge–riposte contests and warfare (Peristiany 1965; Herzfeld 1985), the Tagalog ethics of debt of gratitude is largely a moral code which governs reciprocal exchange. It proves itself to be better adopted by the ethnic Chinese, Ibanag, Ilocano and Itawes, who also hold compatible principles of reciprocity. In other words, Mediterranean notions of honor and shame are more likely to operate outside the realm of reciprocity, whereas this is less likely in the Filipino case. As my previous case studies have shown, the discourse of patronage involves a carefully calculated balance sheet of business transactions, favors, credits and services. In China, the discourse of reciprocity is regarded as ‘an extremely versatile interactive resource’ and could be used in a variety of situations (Pieke 1995: 502). Delfin also observed a similar phenomenon: People say these things [(ethics of debt of gratitude)] in situations for their own purposes […] It is more a common language that [mandates] you as the recipient of the request to cooperate. This one comes for pakikisama (sympathetic companionship), that one comes to ask for pagmamalasakit (personal concern), you just cannot accommodate all of them […] Otherwise, you destroy your government. If you cannot give them what they want, they like to accuse you [of being] walang utang na loób [(ungrateful)], walang pakikisama [(anti-social)], walang pagmamalasakit [(without personal

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concern)], even walang hiya [(shameless)]. You cannot care that much. We have work to do […] and we […] consider […] according to situations.104 Delfin turned the tables around by showing the situational use of these moral symbols by the actors. This is reminiscent of ‘everyday politics’ (Kerkvliet 2002: chapter 8), which suggest that people make different claims and disagree with each other based on a set of common values and beliefs. People value social justice and equality, and expect to be treated accordingly. Due to differences in interpreting these values, conflict emerges. Many traditional Filipino values are envisaged to facilitate social justice and equality. However, these often become the arena of meaning contestations and means for self-justification in disagreements and conflicts of interests because of their ambivalence and contextual variations of usage (Gorospe 1994; Quito 1994). Paradoxically, disagreements and conflicts further reinforce the utilization of the padrino system for two reasons. First, individuals are competing for social connections and networks to suit one’s own interest – one often leaves the old padrino and shifts to a new relation without leaving the padrino system. Bishop Ricardo Baccay perceptively pointed out the social control property of the padrino system: The moral system of utang na loób is a circulatory system that binds the patron and client together into dependency. These moral sayings are also the means used by the politicians to control the people, making them further dependent on the debt bondage. […] But sometimes I see the clients also use these sayings to control their padrino, especially in elections. Every three years, you can see the sudden increase of invitation of sponsorship to politicians in baptisms and weddings. Many of them would even invite candidates of opposition camps and see who would come with their gifts. For those politicians who do not afford losing their votes would come […] vote-buying is a modern form of Filipino padrino system. […] Both patron and client gain something out of the relationship, often they ‘jump ships.’ But the padrino is still there.105 This observation partially echoes what Agpalo (1969: 6) asserted as the sophistication of the political elite as the padrino: the ‘political elite, however, are also compelled to behave like pandanggo dancers [a Filipino oil-lamp dance displaying good balancing technique]. To remain in power,

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POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

they must manipulate the people by tempting them with jobs or threatening them with loss of employment. They are also forced to distribute jobs to persons and towns where the payoff will be greatest in terms of votes’. Secondly, in the Tuguegarao city government, disagreements seemed to be limited because collective decisions had to be made. Whoever controls the legitimate use of physical force still determines the local government’s highest authority. In relation to this, I asked Delfin to clarify what he meant by ‘pakikisama according to the situation’? When I ran as the mayor, I promised to stop jueteng [illegal lottery]. […] When I was elected, they [the jueteng operators] offered me almost 300,000 pesos a month for my pakikisama, I told them you know me well. I have my legitimate businesses. Why should I join you?106 The situational use of traditional Filipino values can also work for conflict resolution. In the Chua–Ty incident described earlier, I have shown how Juan made creative use of the padrino system to mend the relationship between his father and his closest business partner. The padrino system may also be creatively used to resolve interpersonal conflicts, which is illustrated by the following cockfight.

4.5 Awakening play: notes from a Cagayano cockfight One Sunday afternoon, Manong Katigid invited me to observe a cockfight in his town.107 Upon arrival, one of his nephews took me inside where we sat with Manong’s clansmen and friends while he was preparing his cock for the fight outside the cockpit arena. The cockpit arena resembled a stadium, although smaller in scale. The audience members were either standing or sitting on the steps, all looking down onto the cockpit. I knew that this fight appeared to be an intra-clan affair – a fight between Manong’s cockerel and his cousin’s cockerel. It seemed that this fight had attracted a big crowd of male–only supporters and spectators from both sides of the same clan. Manong suddenly approached me, and said that he had been waiting for this fight for a long time. He lost last time, but had confidence that he could win this time. He invited me to bet on his bird. Although I honestly told him that I was not supposed to gamble as a researcher, he insisted. Full of confidence, Manong went down to the cockpit. At the center of the arena, the two cocks were being positioned opposite each other. Manong’s cock was on the Meron side, whereas his

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cousin’s cock was opposite on the Wala side.108 Around the cockpit, I came to learn some of the names of his relatives and friends from his town. The way the crowd acted seemed to indicate that Manong could be a lider (leader) of his clan, yet the cockfight arrangement symbolized an intra-clan split. According to the cockpit rules, the Meron side had the larger amount of bets, which symbolically suggests that the cock had more supporters. The Wala side, literally meaning ‘nothing’ or ‘none’, had fewer bets. The christo (the middleman in charge of the fight) announced his invitation for extra bets from the audience to close the gap. However, nobody responded. Many spectators suddenly stood up and shouted either in a long noninterrupted high pitch: ‘Wa…la…wa…la…’ or continuously in a firm and forceful tone: ‘Meron! Meron!’ The shouting signaled a position of being open to take bets and also the soliciting of private bets from each other. Although there was an official betting counter, almost everyone was allowed to solicit private bets. After shouting for a few minutes, they started to shout their betting rates: ‘Loges! Loges! Loges!’. The amount of bets would then be negotiated by hand signals (Table 4.4). The talk, heat, sweat, laughter and moving bodies reminded me that I was not the only one waiting for the fight in this little, yet lively, arena. Quietness and concentration suddenly prevailed. The fight was quick. I attest it was the quickest I had seen. After staring at Wala for a few seconds, Meron jumped and kicked its feet onto Wala’s head. Less than a second, Wala’s head was being dragged down onto the dirt ground. Applause, laughter and despair came from the crowd – wherever Meron went, Wala’s head followed. Meron proved itself so strong that it dragged Wala for three rounds until they were separated by the christo. A vivid path of blood circled the cockpit – Meron’s spur had gone through the neck of Wala, becoming stuck inside the neck of Wala. I estimated that the fight was finished within one minute. All of a sudden, folded peso notes were thrown from one corner to another; across the cockpit, above the audience. All of them remembered their bets; they paid and took their winnings, with trust and without dispute. Manong won 30,000 pesos from his opponent, who is his second-degree cousin or the grandson of his maternal grandfather’s brother. In the highest spirits ever, he went around and gave peso notes to the christo, entrance guards of the cockpit, his clansmen and friends. In an ethnography of Balinese cockfighting, Geertz (1993[1973]: 417) maintained that ‘[f]or it is only apparently cocks that are fighting there.

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Table 4.4 Jargon of betting rates and hand signals in a Cagayano cockpit. Betting Rates

Descriptions

Loges

5/4: 100 pesos bet, 180 pesos return if win

Kuarto-tres

4/3: 100 pesos bet, 175 pesos return if win

Singko-tres

5/3: 100 pesos bet, 160 pesos return if win

Siete-diyes

7/10: 700 pesos bet, 1700 pesos return if win

Tres-dos

3/2: 300 pesos bet, 500 pesos return if win

Hati

2/1: 100 pesos bet, 150 pesos return if win Hand Signals

Descriptions

Pointing fingers up

Multiplier of ten pesos

Pointing fingers horizontally Pointing fingers down

Multiplier of one hundred pesos Multiplier of one thousand pesos

Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2004.

Actually, it is men’. Indeed, after leaving the leftist movement, Manong rejoined his family and has been a lider of his clan. He first ran as a barangay captain (village council chairman) with his second-degree cousin, who ran as a barangay kagawad (village councilman). The unitary clan had dominated the political scene of the barangay until their split – when their sons ran against each other for the Katipunan ng Kabataan, the chair position of the barangay’s Sangguniang Kabataan (Young People’s Council).109 The winner would have a further opportunity to become an ex-officio member of the municipal council. Without any clear evidence, he suspected that the opposition gave 100 pesos for each vote, which ensured his son’s loss. Since then, the clan has split into two factions. In the 2001 election, Manong supported the opposition candidates against his cousin. In August 2003, Manong’s son challenged his cousin to a cockfight. Yet he lost again. Insults and jeers had been exchanged between the two young men, which affected the relationship between the two families. I came to know that this recent cockfight held by their fathers is a continuation of the symbolic vendetta (blood feud) between the two young men. However, Manong explained to me that it was actually a Cagayano

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way of peace-making – cocks spilled blood on behalf of their masters, in hope that the involved parties would be awakened. The above cockfight supplements a missing dimension in Lynch’s theorization of Filipino society – the place of conflict resolution. Lynch asserted that SIR consists of the highest values of the Filipinos who are patterned to avoid conflict and ease tension within a social grouping that already shares a bonding of positive emotional fulfillment. However, relationships are not always smooth. Jocano (1966) questioned the basis of the generalization of SIR and its inability to explain the existence of prevalent in-group conflicts which he observed in a Manila slum: The internal structure of these groups is, in fact, tinged with conflict – anxiety, jealousy, exploitation, suspicion and so on – in spite of its apparent unity. Members join the leader or other members in various mischiefs, gang-wars, and other serious criminal acts less of a desire for social acceptance or pakikisama than out of fear over their own safety and that of their families even if they should refuse to toe the line of gang norms. (Jocano 1966: 287, italics original) Jocano may portray an extreme. As the above scene illustrates, in the midst of factional conflicts, actors have the creative capacity to make practical use of events and ceremonies such as cockfights to soothe interpersonal tensions and tentatively resolve conflicts. Drawing from the above ethnography, vengeance (venganza) appears to be related to a structure of social relations of interpersonal conflicts. It can be viewed as a form of (negative) bonding which enables two parties to become involved in prolonged tension and exchange of violence (Jamous 1992). There seems to be a moral code that governs conflict. Although Evans-Pritchard (1940: 152) revealed that the blood feud is an essential tribal institution for the survival of the Nuer, I maintain that the Filipino padrino system is mainly a contractual system of ‘generalized reciprocity’ – ‘transactions that are putatively altruistic’ (Sahlins 1972: 193). Violence is likely to occur when there is a situation of ‘negative reciprocity’ which ‘is an attempt to get something for nothing with impunity’ (Sahlins 1972: 195). Situations of assault, deceit, chicanery and theft are as prone to violence as simply being ungrateful – taking advantage from a reciprocal relationship or even going into bitter rivalry against a patron. The padrino system mostly performs violence in two related ways. First is a display of extraordinary capacity to seem powerful enough to offer

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protection and display generosity; that is, being benevolent. Secondly, when revenge is taken against someone who sabotages his own sense of puri or that of his grouping, self-esteem (amor propio) as well as face (mukha), the padrino is therefore obliged to avenge in order to neutralize hiya and restore his face from the perceived symbolic assault. There is a common saying in Tagalog, mata sa mata; ngipin sa ngipin (an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth). Violence is conceived as a social exchange conveyed by the term ‘blood-debt’, that one’s honor is meticulously weighed like a balance-sheet – a moral imperative which motivates an individual to reciprocate (ganti) physical harm or symbolic damage in order to ‘get even’ from the debt. Venganza therefore is an emotional tension, a feeling of distress created internally after one’s physical and symbolic well-being are damaged by another antagonistic party. Vendetta means more than inter-family blood feud, but has symbolic value to individual and collective honor (Bourdieu 1966). The vengeful aspect of human societies has been globally covered by different ethnographies (Black-Michaud 1975; Blok 2001; ter Haar 2000). In northern Luzon, for example, Barton (1949; 1969) described the legal institutions and procedures among the Kalingas and Ifugaos to punish wrongdoings to curtail personal revenge. However, without a state-endorsed judicial system to settle blood feuds, killing in revenge would only lead to further killing in counter-revenge (Schlegel 1970: 52). A Cagayano theologian and legal scholar brought out its relations with justice and made the following instructive remark: One of the roles of the state and its justice system is to serve as a third party to mediate vengeance and curtail revenge by imposing an objective verdict. By no means can justice be fully objective, but there should be rigorous procedures to assure a fair and just judicial process. It is a natural tendency for a human being to take revenge as an act to exercise justice [against wrongdoers]. What is justice is to punish those who commit wrongdoings. When the justice system does not live up to the expectation of the victims, there is a tendency for them to exercise justice by themselves. This is one of the problems of the Filipino legal system.110 With regards to this predicament, Manong suggested that in the short-run, it is extremely difficult to expect the poor Cagayanos to only look up to the state judicial system.111 At the village level, for example, there is the ‘people’s court’ (lupong tagayambayaba) which invites villagers to serve as juries. Instead of immediately resorting to state-endorsed legal

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procedures, disputing parties would try to resolve a conflict in front of a patron. If the matter cannot be resolved, the complainant many decide to forward the matter to a higher level. Most people still seek assistance from higher patronal figures to settle a dispute, those who are regarded as the sovereign persons because of his/her political supremacy over the disputing parties.112 Although taking revenge is as central as reciprocating a favor in the padrino system, Cagayanos also consider the techniques of awakening (Tagalog: natauhan) for enlightening anyone who is regarded as selfish (Table 4.5). These power/knowledge systems allow the communities to govern anyone who ostensibly maximizes their self-interests. Whether a person would step back and reflect upon the self or not may depend on the tactical deployment of at least five options listed in Stage 2. These options may be selectively and concomitantly deployed by the community in order to make their governing elite reconsider and rethink his/her course of actions as justifiable or not, as determined by the ideal Filipino personhood, i.e. tao ng mabait.

4.6 Conclusion This chapter has delineated the symbiotic contents and ethnographic illustrations of the historically constituted power/knowledge system that the Philippine state resonates with its frontier populations in the Cagayan Valley – the padrino system. Elaborated in a creolized pool of codes and practices, the creative use of ritual kinship and ethics of debt of gratitude in circumstances allows interests to be coordinated and broken relationships mended, although the individuals are expected to live up to the ideal Filipino personhood. The padrino system therefore entails the culture-specific art of governing the self and others. Reality is conceived in terms of a social universe that stretches across a spatial territory of connected individuals through a range of social relations. Its complexity of moral values serves as the symbiotic force that pulls individuals together, which circles around the strongman as their patron. The padrino system, on the one hand, is constituted by benevolence, in which chains of debts of gratitude flow in circulation, making a community possible. Being a patron entails a moral obligation to offer generous giving and protection to followers in exchange for support and respect. On the other hand, the padrino system may also draw the involved parties into fear, intrigue, conflicts and exchange of violence. Vengeance compels one to ‘get even’ as a way to pursue justice. As the state judicial

Table 4.5 Awakening: Cagayano art of governing the self and others.113 Ibanag

Ilocano

Itawes

English interpretation

Stage 1: To advise someone who ostensibly maximizes his/her self and interests.

Yppisipisan y aggaw (Do not take all the days for not all the days are yours)

Ippisipisan ya akaw (Do not take all the days for not all the days are yours)

Don’t maximize yourself when you are in power. We all need to have qualms.

Stage 2: Five options to restrain someone who maximizes his/her self and interests.

Ybbita (avoid, flee) Contra (oppose) Maki-tadday da contra na ira (join force with his/her enemies) Lumanban (fight) Ymammoc (make peace, reconcile)

Awan ti bagyo nga saan nga agbales/agsu bli (Typhoons do sometimes swirl back) Pumanaw (flee, leave) Kumontra (oppose) Maki-kadua ek iti kabusor (to join force with his/her enemies) Pumanaw (fight to the death) Maki-kapia ak (make peace, reconcile)

Stage 3:

Napanono (realize from inside), nariparra (being reflective)

Panaw (flee, leave) Contra (oppose) Maki-tadda y kan contra nga ira (to join force with his/her enemies) Panaw (fight to the death) Imammok, maki-kapia (make peace, reconcile) Napanonot (realize from inside), nariparra (being reflective)

To avoid and flee from the person’s sphere of influence To oppose the person To join his/her enemies to oppose the person To use violence to stop the person To make peace with the person so to advise constructively To realize from within, to reflect upon and then restrain the self

Awakening and self-correction.

Panagpanun -ot (realize from inside, being reflective)

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system is still sinking its roots into the frontiers where the culture of legal pluralism is prevalent, several ethnographic illustrations have been provided to show the creative use of the already-existing institutions, religious rituals and folklore ceremonial activities. To effectively govern the self and others, Cagayanos rely on the cultural logics of awakening. Communities may deploy a range of strategic options in order to compel a person to step back and reflect upon the self and one’s course of actions, as a way to govern their governing elite.

5 Sovereignty Re-enacted: Philippine Art for Governing African Coups

What is the coup d’État? […] It is the self-manifestation of the state itself. It is the assertion of raison d’État, of [the raison d’État] that asserts that the state must be saved, whatever forms may be employed to enable one to save it. […] For the nature of coup d’État is to be violent. […] This means that it is obliged to sacrifice, to sever, cause harm, and it is led to be unjust and murderous. Michel Foucault (2007: 261–3)

5.1 In search of an East Asian solution to an African problem Since the Second World War, sub-Saharan Africa has produced the highest number of coups. Out of a total of 540 coups and attempted coups in the world, the majority (44%) occurred in sub-Saharan Africa whereas only 8% took place in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania from 1946 to 2006 (Human Security Report Project 2008: figures 3.7 & 3.9). Moreover, if we look at the trends of state-based armed conflicts by region from 1946 to 2008, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania recorded the highest numbers in the world from the 1950s to 1970s. However, there was a significant decline from the 1980s to 2000s when the figures in sub-Saharan Africa took over as the highest in the world (Human Security Report Project

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2010: figure 10.3) (Table 5.1). In view of this relative success in containing coups and violent conflicts by the states in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, this chapter will illustrate how a once conflict-ridden Southeast Asian country managed to pacify and contain coups, and would serve as an East Asian solution to the sub-Saharan African problem. The Philippines will be an instructive case of comparative reference for a few reasons. First, in terms of the indicator of ‘conflict years’,114 the Philippines ranked second to Burma in East and Southeast Asia from 1946 to 2008 (Human Security Report Project 2010: figure 3.1). Recent evidence shows that violent conflicts in the Philippines, and East and Southeast Asia in general have been contained in comparison with sub-Saharan Africa. Due to violent conflicts, the infant mortality rates in sub-Saharan Africa remained the highest worldwide (Human Security Report Project 2010: figure 6.2). Second, despite the fact that the Philippines has been historically troubled by armed conflicts (Santos et al. 2010), recent evidence shows that the Philippine state has been able to pacify unrest and generate Table 5.1 Total number of state-based armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, 1948–2008 (selected years). Year

Sub-Saharan Africa

East & Southeast Asia & Oceania

1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008

0 1 2 3 9 7 14 15 10 10 15 8 11

9 11 8 10 12 10 13 10 11 5 5 5 5

Source: Human Security Report Project (2010: figure 10.3 & dataset).

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economic income at the local level through political decentralization (Capuno 2011; Wong 2006). It was also suggested that economic growth (in terms of GDP per capita) is strongly correlated with the ‘remarkable decline in political violence in Northeast and Southeast Asia’ (Human Security Report Project 2010: chapter 3 & figure 3.7). As I have argued in the previous chapters and will continue to do so in the next chapter, the Philippine national economic balance sheets may not look outstanding when compared with the developed economies. However, a more comprehensive assessment of the Philippine national economy should take the fiscal performance of the local government units more seriously (Hill 2007). Third, African scholar Lumumba-Kasongo (1991: 59) observed that democratic decentralization remained symbolic in Mobutu’s Zaire (1971–97). In the 2000s, we still know little about African decentralization (Olowu and Wunsch 2004). In contrast, institutionalization of nationwide democratic decentralization and local government in the Philippines started in the late 1980s (Hutchcroft 2003). The Philippine economy has also been closely connected with other rapid-growing economies in East Asia (Hill, Balisacan, and Piza 2007). Recent evidence show that the East Asian regional economic environment has been relatively conducive for implementing decentralization which has facilitated local economic development in the Philippines (Tecson 2007). 115 In the 2000s, Lumumba-Kasongo (2002) pointed out that the African state has not performed as the ‘leading agent of development’ (Table 5.2) in comparison with the developmental experiences of the East Asian states. Instead, frequent coups and violent conflicts continue to tarnish economic recovery and human development in Africa (Lumumba-Kasongo 2004). As a result, in order to make a relevant policy recommendation for the African problem, there is a need to identify the taproots of the African coups. Then, by using the Philippine state as an example, I will illustrate the essential techniques that may have referential values for governing the African coups. This chapter will answer the following questions: what are the taproots of the coups and violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa? What possible measures have been proposed by the scholarly community? What could the post-colonial Philippine state-building experience contribute to govern African coups?

Table 5.2 A comparison of Human Development Index (HDI) in all Southeast Asian and randomly selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1990–2010 (selected years). Southeast Asia

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Brunei

0.773

0.787

0.792

0.801

0.805

Cambodia

0.186

0.385

0.412

0.466

0.494

Indonesia

0.458

0.508

0.500

0.561

0.600

Laos

0.354

0.388

0.425

0.460

0.497

Malaysia

0.616

0.659

0.691

0.726

0.744

Myanmar/Burma

0.390

0.481

0.552

0.406

0.451

Philippines

0.552

0.569

0.597

0.619

0.638

Singapore

0.899

0.896

0.885

0.826

0.846

Thailand

0.546

0.581

0.600

0.631

0.654

Vietnam

0.407

0.457

0.505

0.540

0.572

Sub-Saharan Africa Angola

0.143

0.344

0.349

0.376

0.403

Cameroon

0.418

0.408

0.415

0.437

0.460

D. R. Congo

0.261

0.226

0.201

0.223

0.239

Ethiopia

0.172

0.252

0.250

0.287

0.328

Liberia

0.222

…

0.294

0.264

0.300

Mali

0.187

0.212

0.245

0.279

0.309

Rwanda

0.215

0.192

0.277

0.334

0.385

Sierra Leone

0.230

0.226

0.236

0.292

0.317

South Africa

0.601

0.634

0.695

0.587

0.597

Uganda

0.281

0.312

0.350

0.380

0.422

Zambia

0.423

0.371

0.345

0.360

0.395

Zimbabwe

0.284

0.262

0.232

0.159

0.140

Note: Combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income, the human development index (HDI) is a composite statistic. It shows where each country stands, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. The higher it ranks, the more human development the society has, and vice versa. Source: United Nations Development Program, 2011.

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5.2 Neo-colonialism: taproots of sub-Saharan African coups There is consent among pan-African scholars that the state in Africa has neither protected the welfare of its citizens, nor delivered what was expected to its people. Rather, as a ‘neo-colonial’ construct at the peripheries of the global capitalistic economy (Kieh 2006: 47; 2008: 171; Lumumba-Kasongo 1992; 1994: 51), the post-colonial African state has been a collaborative predatory instrument for metropolitan capitalists and the African ruling elite minority to ‘siphon off the continent’s resources to Europe for European development, while leaving Africans and their economies poor and underdeveloped’ (Agbese and Kieh 2007: 8; Lumumba-Kasongo 2002: 80). Coups, putsches, civil wars, ethnic violence, secessionism and rampant corruption are resultant of underdevelopment in post-colonial Africa. Such complexities constitute a post-colonial governance imbroglio for the African states. Western Africa has the largest number of coups. From 1952 to 2000, forty-two successful coups took place out of a total of eighty-five in the entire continent (Kieh 2004: 45, table 3.3). Therefore, the Sierra Leonean civil wars will be used to identify the taproots of African coups – neo-colonialism.

5.3 Trajectories of the Sierra Leonean civil wars 5.3.1 Politics of British colonial absorption in Sierra Leone, 1808–1961 Long before Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961, its port-capital Freetown was already made a British Crown Colony in 1808. Sierra Leone was used to a major source of Black labor from the trans-Atlantic slave trade before it was outlawed by the British parliament in 1833 (Hirsch 2001: 113). In 1896, the British annexed the interior region occupied by ethnic tribes as its protectorate. In 1914, given its exceptionally rich deposits of diamond minerals, the British colonial regime built railways that connected coastal ports with the tribal interiors. In 1934, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a subsidiary of the De Beers group – a South Africa-based business conglomerate, was granted a 99-year diamond trade monopoly (Keen 2005: 12). To efficiently operate the international resource-extraction and diamond trade, the colonial administration granted the paramount tribal chiefs control over local affairs. The chiefs became the main collaborators of the British colonial regime and the diamond traders. Given the political power of the chiefs, some then engaged in wars with the colonial regime. After a few decades

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of tug-of-war between the colonial state and the chiefs, the chiefs were formally absorbed into the Sierra Leonean state bureaucracy in 1953, which promoted a wider diffusion of political power to the local chiefs (Keen 2005: 9-10; Hirsch 2001: 27–8). The diffusion of colonial state power rendered the ethnic chiefs as important players in the colonial state.

5.3.2 Coups and regime changes in post-colonial Sierra Leone, 1961–1990 Nonetheless, when Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961, the post-colonial state witnessed a series of military juntas who seized power through coups. Kieh (2005: 165) suggested that ‘the [post–colonial] state was inherited from British colonialism [and] was not democratically reconstituted’. Although conservative Prime Minister Milton Margai attempted to establish a liberal democratic regime, he ‘failed to promote the process of changing the nature, mission, character, practices and values of the Sierra Leonean State’. Following the death of Margai in 1964, the ruling Sierra Leonean People’s Party (SLPP) chose Albert Margai (the brother of Milton Margai) as the new party leader and PM. Instead of pushing for multi-party liberal democracy, Albert instituted authoritarian rule and suppressed the opposition and dissidents. The SLPP also became increasingly unpopular because of corruption (Cox 1976: 94–8). In 1967, the SLPP tried to hold onto power after it was electorally defeated by the All People’s Congress (APC) led by Siaka Stevens. Albert’s supporter, General David Lansana, staged a military coup, but was shortly ousted by another coup led by Colonel Andrew Juxon-Smith. In 1968, Juxon-Smith was deposed by a coup led by a group of soldiers who brought Stevens and the APC to power. Stevens ruled Sierra Leone for seventeen years and appointed his handpicked successor, General Joseph Momoh, as the president in 1985 (Kieh 2005: 165). However, the Momoh regime was overthrown by a military coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser in 1992. In 1996, Strasser was toppled by another military coup staged by General Julius Bio. Although the 1996 election brought Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP to national presidency, a coup led by Major Johnny Koroma and anti-governmental rebels ousted the Kabbah regime. Although the Kabbah regime was restored in 1998, civil war continued until 2002 (Kieh 2005: 166). The troublesome 1990s and 2000s witnessed the end of the Cold War and significant decrease of international aid; Sierra Leone faced economic and political crises. Economically, Sierra Leone experienced an apparent exhaustion of its most precious mineral for the world market – diamonds,

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due to the world recession of prices for raw materials. Through the De Beers-related diamond-trading network which connects Sierra Leonean tributors to South African buyers, diamonds constituted a large portion of the Sierra Leonean national income. After the Cold War ended, international aid from the Western bloc significantly shrank in the early 1990s as it was seen that there was no further need to maintain the Soviet–West fault-line, and consequently, a large number of African neo-colonial state rulers faced fiscal crises in maintaining their political legitimacy. Instead of facilitating the formation of solid state institutions, the rich mineral resources in Sierra Leone were used for international trade to perpetuate personal rule and patrimonial plunder. After the 1990s, the Sierra Leonean government started to find itself caught by continuous insurgency within its territory as a result of a severe fiscal crisis and intense resource competition.

5.3.3 Fragmented Sierra Leone: post-1990 civil wars In attempts to rescue the faltering economy by negotiating for international aid, Sierra Leone state rulers sided with the USA and served as a military base for them. The political alliance automatically earned Sierra Leone the ire of a US enemy, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya. In retaliation, Gaddafi supported a military rebel group along the Sierra Leone–Liberia border named the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which invaded the diamond-rich Gola Forest (Kieh 2006: 47). Led by Foday Sankoh and supported by Charles Taylor in Liberia (who both received support from Gaddafi), RUF received arms from Libya and arms traders in Burkina Faso (Keen 2005: 38). The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) originally served as government troops of the one-party Sierra Leonean state, headed by the SLPP. The RSLMF troops quickly found themselves caught in bitter guerrilla warfare in the insurgent-infested Gola Forest. As a result of the continued fiscal inability of the state to maintain the daily operation of the counterinsurgency programs in the early 1990s, these RSLMF troops dispersed when they found new fortunes in the Gola Forest. With guns and ammunitions that were received from the state, these military-turn-rebel groups started to operate as diamond dealers by using mixed tactics of forging patron– client bonds with villagers, and coercion and terrorism. There were reports of looting, human rights violations, mutilation and torture by these armed groups to coerce local villagers to work for their diamond mines. These opportunists are known as ‘sobels’ (soldier-rebels, or ‘soldier by day, rebel by night’) (Richards 1996: 7). By utilizing the underground

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smuggling networks of the South Africa-based diamond trade, these scattered ‘sobel’ groups managed to make lucrative profits out of unexploited mineral resources in the impenetrable Gola Forest. Within this context, schools shut down and the formal education system rapidly deteriorated due to continual state failures. Many young Sierra Leoneans roamed around with nothing to do. Targeted as a source of manpower for mining and guerrilla warfare, they were voluntarily or involuntarily recruited by various factions of the ‘sobel’. Caught in this perpetual civil war, some of the youth organized themselves into defensive-turned-predatory guerrilla groups to establish, protect and expand their own territories of diamond mining, as a counter-strategy against the oppressive ‘sobel’ militia. This largely explains why most insurgent-infested areas in Sierra Leone and Liberia are alluvial diamond areas (Keen 1998: 27, map 2; Richards 1996: 39, map 2.1), where young and small-scale distributors and non-industrial methods of mining are found. With the initial incomes generated from the first diamond harvests, these young guerrillas bought an abundant supply of Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifles smuggled from neighboring Liberia and Guinea, and turned themselves into the next generation of ‘sobel’ militias, which seemed to repeat the pattern of their oppressors. Richards coined the widespread ‘sobel’ phenomenon into the phrase ‘fighting for the rain forest’, which refers to a specific Sierra Leonean political reality – numerous young warlords who have ruled the fragmented country through perpetual war since the 1990s: [t]he problem is that the cat is out of the bag. Any opportunist with a few boxes of guns, fighting in forested country, willing to make a virtue of isolation and poor communications, can hold a weak state like Sierra Leone to ransom. (Richards 1996: 154) In summary, the end of the Cold War in the 1990s witnessed the expansion of the global capitalistic economy and the reinforcement of metropolitan interests through institutional vehicles, such as the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in Africa. Decades of civil wars, violent conflicts and humanitarian crises experienced by the three post-colonial states are not only resultant of the inherited colonial state architecture and underdevelopment, but also ‘flowed from the multidimensional crises of the neo-colonial Sierra Leone state’ (Kieh 2006: 59).

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5.4 Philippine techniques of constitutional and democratic control Based on the above studies of coups and violent conflicts in Sierra Leone, two features could define the ‘post-colonial governance imbroglio’ that the sub-Saharan African peoples are struggling to disentangle. First, the post-colonial state architecture does not substantially distinguish itself from its colonial predecessor. As a neo-colonial state, its core nature, characteristics, values and practices continue to fashion the perception of the African state as a powerful instrument of economic self-enrichment and political oppression, instead of aiming to protect and enhance the welfare and humanitarian needs of its citizens. Second, post-colonial African rulers and state agents are generally caught in a circulatory loop of politics of survival which often shortcircuits domestic politics and foreign relations. On the one hand, the country’s foreign relations are structured by the global capitalistic system in which core metropolitan states are tied with African peripheral states for economic exploitation of their rich natural and human resources. On the other hand, the domestic politics of the post-colonial state is often characterized by intense ethnic, regional and factional divisions and rivalries, which are often underpinned by the struggle for the control of the country’s rich resources. To obtain international recognition of sovereignty and foreign financial and military aids for economic development and pacifying internal conflicts, African rulers usually become collaborative agents with the metropolitan states, mainly for plundering the rich state resources and exploiting their own people. This renders the African countries vulnerable to underdevelopment and violent conflicts. To rescue the African state from the aforementioned vicious short-circuiting, the pan-African scholarly circle recently called for the need to re-constitute the state in Africa by developing two pertinent forms of social control mechanisms that should be imposed upon their state rulers and military agents: democratic and constitutional control (Kieh and Agbese 2004). Thousands of miles away from Africa, the post-colonial Philippines has also been troubled by coups. In particular, the late Aguinaldo of RAM whose career as a martial law soldier and leader of a right-wing militarist organization reveals a resilient paradox in post-colonial Philippine state-building; that is, the existence of military counterinsurgents as the state’s power-brokers is instrumentalized for the consolidation of

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Philippine post-colonial state-building in its frontiers. How did the Philippine state maintain constitutional and democratic control over the military? How did the Philippine state dissolve Aguinaldo’s coups? How was this soldier-rebel re-contained by the state? To answer these questions, the Philippine art of governing the military rebellions must be explicated. The historical ethnography of Aguinaldo will be used to elaborate the theoretical expositions and techniques of the Philippine art of governing coups. In a nutshell, its expositions entail the following. It is an ethnographic-historical practice to posit the subjecting post-colonial state and the soldier-rebels as reflexive agents at two ends of the state–military relations analytical dualism. It conceives military rebellion in terms of uncertain contact zones where the subjecting mechanism of the state and the reflective selves of soldiers meet. While it informs the field research practice of how state–military relations may be documented by conducting research in the national capital and the pacifying frontiers, it holds that the soldiers are Janus-faced power-brokers who juggle across the conflicting interests of the centralizing state and diverse frontier powers. These contradictions may often expose them to predicaments and disillusions, which tempt them to resort to rebellion. On the one hand, the agency of a soldier-rebel may well be molded by the meritocratic subjecting mechanisms of the state. On the other hand, upon dispatching to the field, they may also be disillusioned and awakened by the discrepancies between the clashing images of the state that are concomitantly perpetuated by the sovereign state and deflected by the frontier powers. Interactions between the state and contending powers reflect the core constitutional and democratic control mechanisms. Constitutional control refers to the institutionalization and internalization of the state laws such as the constitution among and by the governed inhabitants as the supreme instruments of contestation and mediation. As the constitution is the collective will of the citizens, constitutional control also refers to the maintenance of a coherent national identity through generating, denouncing and censuring the negated (internal or foreign) others through legal acts, criminalization and violence. Democratic control refers to the institutionalization and internalization of democratic values and institutions among and by the governed inhabitants as the supreme instruments of assigning and recognizing state authority to individuals as elected office-holders. Regular elections are held

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to regulate and monitor the performance of public office-holders. Electoral politics award and denounce individuals in accordance with the state laws. By diachronically pursuing the soldier-rebels along their criss- crossing life histories that bisect a range of communities and actors in the translocal/national space, Philippine art of governing the coup may include three techniques of constitutional and democratic control: (1) the production of martial law, (2) brokering counterinsurgency, (3) law/force indistinction and re-containment through electoral democracy. The following sections will provide more in detail.

5.4.1 Producing the martial law: the making of an anti-communist legend Aguinaldo was not just a product of the Philippine state, but also a creation of the Cold War circumstances in the Asia-Pacific region where transnational forces of communism and anti-communism collided. Approximately two months before Marcos formally declared martial law in September 1972, a Philippine-registered vessel named Karagatan (‘ocean’ in the Tagalog-Filipino language) carrying unlicensed foreign armaments was intercepted by the Philippine armed forces outside the sea-waters of Palanan, a remote coastal municipality of the Isabela province, eastern Cagayan Valley. Crewmen of Chinese nationality were allegedly identified onboard. The arms were reportedly to have originated from the People’s Republic of China for supporting the NPA, the armed wing of the CPP. In the midst of public controversies, Marcos insisted that the nation was threatened by a foreign power. This justified the imposition of the martial law, granting the military with discretionary powers to detain and interrogate individuals who were suspected to be associated with the global communist movement as the enemy of the Philippine state.116 The alleged existence of the communist threat was a pre-requisite of the declaration of the martial law, thus lending it legitimacy as a national security measure of the Philippine state. Securitizing the state involves re-asserting state sovereignty. State sovereignty is the dispersion of exclusive insider knowledge that links the state and its subjects such as the constitution as the collective will of the governed population ‘to express their unity and cover the problematic character of this unity’ (Bartelson 1995: 189). As ‘[s]ecurity must be defined in terms of fear, friendship in terms of enmity’ (Bartelson 1995: 164), constructing and maintaining a coherently contrastive identity vis-à-vis Chinese communism is central to these endeavors. The

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imposition of martial law entailed securitization measures to (1) identify its enemy, which was communism, and (2) direct and mobilize the entire population to fight against it. The intellectual origin of the martial law nonetheless is traced back to the theory of the state of exception. Schmitt’s (2005: 5, emphasis added) definition of sovereignty will serve as a useful entry: the ‘[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception’. In exceptional situations such as foreign invasion and rebellion, the sovereign state usually adopts two kinds of dictatorship. While commissarial dictatorship appears when the state delegates suspend laws and deploy force to defend the constitution, sovereign dictatorship consists of a series of moments which the state delegates continuously suspend state laws and use war as a strategy to claim superiority over state affairs (Schmitt 1921). Agamben (2005: 36) pointed out that despite their apparent differences, the two dictatorial forms hinge on the use of exception, in which the state power wielders act outside/over the usual legal order. Being the wielder of state power possesses the absolute freedom/power to move freely into and out of the juridical realm. By acting upon the ‘state of exception’ through, for example, declaring martial law, the wielder of state power has become the ultimate parameter in determining state affair outcomes, especially on issues of national security and public order. As a result, given the nationwide unrest, protests and armed insurgency, it was not surprising for Marcos to make use of the July 1972 Palanan incident to impose dictatorial rule across the entire country. It would nonetheless be difficult to neatly categorize Marcos’ declaration of the martial law within Schmitt’s (1921) ‘commissarial dictatorship vs. sovereign dictatorship’ dualistic taxonomy. As reminded by Agamben (2005: 36), the commonality of these two dictatorial forms allows the state delegates to claim sovereignty. This is implemented by freely doing whatever is conceived as the interests of the state through the use of the law/force indistinction: ‘the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence’ (Agamben 1998: 32). In martial law, sovereign power is claimed when law and physical force are conflated into one entity, which privileges state intactness over other social control mechanisms. For example, in the late 1960s, the communist ideologues of the Huk rebellion (1940s to 1960s) had decided to go beyond the ‘Huklandia’ of the central Luzon plain to reach the southern and northern Philippine frontiers due to a few strategic considerations (Kerkvliet 1986a,

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1990[1977]; Pomeroy 1994[1963]).117 During the Cold War, soft-power programs were also introduced into various Southeast Asia states aside from using military combat to counter communism (Bowie 1997; Lansdale 1972). In the Philippine Cagayan Valley, there were two legitimate forms of civilian counterinsurgency that the local powers could perform: the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) which were active from the 1970s to 1986, and the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) which were active in the post-1986 era. Despite their differences, the organizational gist is the same: to delegate extra commands of firearms and financial resources to local strongmen in order to mobilize the entire civilian population against communism. Unsurprisingly, civilian counterinsurgency also gave rise to vigilante groups and their acts of exercising extrajudicial violence (Amnesty International 1988; Hedman 2000). A leading example would be the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM), a rightwing militarist organization whose core members were mostly top-gun graduates of the PMA, mainly recruited by the architect of the martial law regime, the Cagayan-born Enrile (Yabes 1991). Graduating with a top-notch ranking of number two out of a 102-strong PMA class in 1972 (Academy Scribe 2008 [1984]: 96), a young Ilocano man, Rodolfo Espejo Aguinaldo, was handpicked by the Ministry of National Defense to join the secretive Constabulary Security Unit (CSU) as an intelligence officer to counter communism. After almost a decade of marking a distinguished record in capturing key figures of the Philippine communist movement, Aguinaldo was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and assigned a special mission to pacify prolonged insurgency in Enrile’s stronghold, the Cagayan Valley. Stationed in the regional seat, Tuguegarao, Aguinaldo served as the chief of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). In the early 1980s, Aguinaldo commanded the provincial police force with irregular financial support from a deteriorating martial law regime. Realizing that the military was increasingly factionalized by competing political groups, Aguinaldo and his PMA classmates became disillusioned and formed the RAM under the aegis of Enrile. Identifying communism as the enemy of the Philippine state, RAM forcibly upheld the doctrine that the military should remain internally intact and refrain from any external political influence. When taking necessary security measures, the military as the determined vanguard of the state should be emancipated from any forms of political and social control in order to defend the collective welfare of the Filipinos. While the singular end justifies all

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possible means, state intactness is prioritized over core social values, moral and civic virtues in exceptional situations of civil war, foreign invasion and states of emergency. The theory and practice were nonetheless interrogated and modified by Aguinaldo when he was assigned to Cagayan Valley. Approximately in 1979, Aguinaldo was dispatched to Cagayan as a covert intelligence officer to infiltrate the insurgent-infested settlements along the foothills of the Sierra Madre Mountains. He was provided with substantial assistance by the residents in the Municipality of Gattaran. It was there that he later married an Ilocana named Lerma Dumaguit of Barangay Calaogan Dackel, where Aguinaldo established a counterinsurgency base: Camp David Corpuz, named after his close field guide, an Aeta/Negrito tribesman who died in an encounter with the NPA guerrillas. Prior to joining Aguinaldo’s mission, Corpuz was among the peasant-insurgents who were captured by Aguinaldo and surrendered. Instead of merely deploying coercive measures, Aguinaldo had a discussion with them about their common concern: impoverishment. By immediately meeting their tangible needs, he was able to convince some of them to lay down their guns and join his Task Force Kappia (meaning peace in Ilocano) to counter communist insurgency.118 In the early and mid-1970s, Manila-dispatched counterinsurgency troops in Gattaran mainly relied on ruthless suppression and terrorism against the revolting peasantry. Therefore, the counterinsurgency program was not locally well received. In the late 1970s, Aguinaldo was once assigned by the Ministry of National Defense to take up special training in a US-sponsored military base in Taiwan, where he specialized in Maoist guerrilla warfare to prepare for the special mission.119 When he was assigned to Cagayan, he modified the costly US-originated combatoriented model into localized tactics due to a reduced budget and usually late and irregular financial delivery (Central Intelligence Agency 1963). These tactics were then recognized and incorporated into the recent PMA curriculum of ‘Internal Security Operation (ISO)’.120 Nowadays, the ISO puts more emphasis on localization practices in two respects. First, officers should consider local knowledge in terms of culture, institutions, networks and contexts as useful resources for restoring law and order. Secondly, counterinsurgency would not be successful without the willing cooperation of the frontier societies.

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Picture 9 Aeta/Negrito tribesmen in Gatarran East, Cagayan province. Many of them were keen supporters of the late governor and congressman Lt. Col. Rodolfo Aguinaldo. Source of image: Author’s collection.

Operators are expected to be the broker-agents in collaborating with local government units, private sectors, business and civic associations to formulate and implement community-based initiatives (Aguirre and Villareal 1990[1987]). Instead of merely antagonizing the local inhabitants through coercive measures, Aguinaldo immersed into the local communities. He gained social acceptance from a range of local powers and made use of Janus-faced brokerage politics to co-opt the peasant-insurgents into his privately-funded army of vigilantes. Aguinaldo’s force of irregulars was estimated to be 1000-strong, composed of rebel returnees, Aeta/Negrito tribesmen and local civilian volunteers.121 They would patrol public order and fight against the Maoist guerrillas. Since some were marginalized Aeta/Negrito tribesmen in the Philippine state-building project, this private army was then legendarily named in their honor as the ‘Black Army’. Aguinaldo successfully turned himself from a high-profile PMA graduate and military officer into a local tribal chieftain by performing as a Cagayano strongman. This allowed the frontier populations to identify with him. Often casually dressed in short pants and slippers, he was popularly addressed as Agi nac Cagayan (Agi of Cagayan). This was a Robin

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Hood persona, someone that the poor peasants could turn to and seek tangible help. However, confronted by the fiscal constraints resultant of a deteriorating Marcos administration in the early 1980s, Aguinaldo needed to look for additional financial sources to maintain the counterinsurgency program. His way of fighting insurgency was well described by a journalist: Col. Aguinaldo […] a man determined to fight his own battles by his own rules on his own terrain. Though he continues to side with the military rebels, his main preoccupation is to fight the NPA guerrillas […] Aguinaldo’s force is an unruly but fierce collection of local constabulary, paramilitary civilian defense forces, Negrito tribesmen and even NPA deserters.122 This conveniently explains why Aguinaldo forged a tactical alliance with the illegal business networks in the Cagayan Valley (Coronel 1993), especially the jueteng, who were the gambling lords of the Philippine illegal lottery.

5.4.2 Brokering counterinsurgency: fighting insurgency through jueteng According to a former senior staff of the CSU, Aguinaldo’s determination and leadership capability were exceptional.123 He could accomplish tasks in unfavorable environments with limited resources because of his creativity and boldness to pursue unconventional measures. While all possible means justify one singular end, Aguinaldo’s involvement in jueteng helps to illustrate this point.124 Jueteng was originally imported into Luzon from China’s Fujian province by Chinese migrant-traders. In the Hokkien language, jueteng means flower den (花檔), a mobile stall put up by the Chinese peddlers to sell flowers and confectioneries in the streets. These dens usually became popular gathering places of street-corner fortune-telling and petty gambling. As lotteries are easily comprehended and participated in by different walks of life, jueteng quickly became a popular gambling game among the Filipino masses. In the Cagayan Valley, jueteng operations were already active in the 1960s through an ethnic Chinese merchant named Ang Chung. As one of Ang’s businesses was grain-trading, his local and trans-Luzon connections enabled him to effectively network with the peasants, government officials,125 businessmen, police,126 and communist guerrillas.127 After

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Ang’s death in the 1970s, his son-in-law Ben De Guzman took over his businesses, including jueteng. De Guzman then inherited his father-in-law’s name: ‘Ang Chung’, signifying the continuity of jueteng operations in the region. Given Ben ‘Ang Chung’ De Guzman’s hands-on access and knowledge of the Cagayano political economy, it was therefore not surprising for Aguinaldo to establish a tactical alliance with him. Aguinaldo needed a ready-made organizational infrastructure to finance and conduct the counterinsurgency program.128 Ang needed Aguinaldo to protect and further his legal and illicit businesses. The two therefore found each other useful in achieving their very different goals. Since jueteng consists of a pyramidal complex network which connects a range of localized actors who cut across different social classes and status groups as well as geographical territories, it conveniently served as a web of surveillance, intelligence, wealth redistribution and coercion. Aguinaldo would recycle such for counterinsurgency purposes. In Cagayan, for instance, from the 1960s and onward, jueteng operations were organized through a patron–client network of the following roles: banca, cabo, kubrador and acha-dor. Ang Chung was the banca, the major operator who was assisted by a number of cabo. As jueteng was based in Tuguegarao, the cabo did the legwork in traveling to other municipalities to monitor the operation and collect bets through the local contact persons, known as kubrador. A kubrador should be able to protect the operation in the assigned jurisdiction. As a result, it was not surprising to find a kubrador occupying public office. Under a kubrador, a group of acha-dor was assigned into smaller bailiwicks for daily operations. Village officials, vigilante groups and random members of the police outposts were reported to perform the duty of the acha-dor. Bet collections were conducted in a bottom-up fashion from the rural villages up to Ang Chung’s grain-storehouse (bodega) in Tuguegarao. An incentive-based counter-checking system among the acha-dor, kubrador and cabo ensured that the original sum of bet money would reach the banca intact. After the winning numbers were released from Tuguegarao, money would be siphoned down from the banca through the cabo, kubrador and acha-dor. These individuals were allowed to take away a certain agreed percentage of commission before passing the money down to the next contact(s). In case of monetary dispute, for example, an acha-dor could bypass the kubrador and directly appeal to the cabo or banca, who would mediate. Although there were occasional internal squabbles, all these individuals discreetly knew well that the winning numbers were maneuvered by the

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banca and confidantes after calculating which numbers would bring the cabo, kubrador and acha-dor the most considerable monetary returns.129 Knowing well the ways that jueteng operated and connected all walks of life in Cagayan, Aguinaldo joined and utilized jueteng for his own purposes. By using the considerable monthly protection fee given by Ang Chung, Aguinaldo financed his counterinsurgency programs. By keeping a low profile and simple life-style, Aguinaldo allowed the ordinary and poor masses to visit his office to ask for services and assistance. He identified himself with the poor by openly criticizing the landlords and businessmen as well as politicians for exploitation and corruption. Notes of pesos were immediately fetched from the desk drawers and passed to those in need, quickly giving him a popular image of being the ‘Robin Hood’ of Cagayan. This persona would not be complete without projecting violence and displaying coercive capabilities. When Aguinaldo ran for provincial governor of the Cagayan province against the long-reigning political giants and the archrival of Enrile, Teresita and Tito Dupaya in the 1987–8 election,130 he campaigned in an armored carrier followed by a convoy of A-150 tanks and military trucks, and expressed a wish to help the poor with ruthless determination in front of massive crowds who were chanting his nickname ‘Agi! Agi!’: Throughout my adult life, I have always been fighting a bloody and senseless war. Filipinos killing brother Filipinos. What for? […] The time has come to bring peace to our poor and weary people. (quoted in McCoy 1999: 305) Aguinaldo openly stated his support to a military coup against the newly installed Aquino regime in August 1987. The coup was led by his RAM-mate, Col. Gregorio Honasan, which cost over fifty civilian lives.131 The coup plotters including Aguinaldo were filed with charges of rebellion and hiding.132 While the Philippine government was trying to summon the soldier-rebels involved, Aguinaldo ran and won as provincial governor in the 1987/88 election in Cagayan.133 During the electoral campaign, knowing that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had asked the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to remove him for alleged electoral fraud and terrorism from the 11 May 1987 election,134 Aguinaldo warned the COMELEC in front of journalists and foreign correspondents:

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Picture 10 Rodolfo Aguinaldo campaigned for Cagayan governorship in Tuguegarao, 1987. Source of image: Hotel Delfino.

They [COMELEC] just start trying to disarm my men and I hit their houses and I wipe them out. […] If a COMELEC man does something foolish, he will be the first to leave the earth. […] We have 300 firearms right here in Tuguegarao […] At a given signal, we chop off the heads of anybody who is foolish. We will send them straight to hell, from the grandfather to the grandson. If I am cheated of victory and the people say nothing, then I leave the country. But if the people want a bloody revolution, who am I to refuse them?135 Aguinaldo’s creation of this Robin Hood persona should be distinguished from the ‘noble robber’ whom Hobsbawm (1985: 49–56) qualified to be a ‘social bandit’. Whereas a social bandit insists that as an outlaw, ‘morally positive actions such as robbing the rich and not killing too much’ are protests against oppression and injustice, as a Maniladispatched counterinsurgency agent, Aguinaldo astutely utilized the Robin Hood heroism in order to pacify the aggrieved peasantry. He did so by making himself the live embodiment of hope to the poor. As Aguinaldo’s Robin Hood image could not possibly be maintained without substantial financing to support his charitable and violent acts in being the ‘strongman’ (Tagalog: kapangyarihan; Ibanag: mangiyegu) of the Cagayano

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masses, the jueteng provided him with the patron–client machinery and substantial finances to engage with the political economy of the frontier society. To counter communist insurgency, the jueteng served as both a surprisingly creative wealth-redistribution and ideological system, offering monetary assistance to the deprived and sustaining the poor people’s hope that they may become rich one day. Towards the end of the martial law regime, the operation of the jueteng was solidly forged by Ang Chung, Aguinaldo and a lawyer-cum-businessman named Atty. Victor ‘Bing’ Padilla, under a company named the Blue Pearl Corporation. Although Blue Pearl was able to secure a license from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to operate Small Town Lottery (STL),136 PCSO testified that Blue Pearl did not pay its dues.137 Following the downfall of the martial law regime and exile of Marcos to Hawaii in 1986, the regional jueteng operations were challenged by an emerging ChineseIbanag strongman in Tuguegarao, Delfin Ting.

5.4.3 Re-enacting state sovereignty: law/force indistinction and re-containment through electoral democracy A state refers to a human community which claims the legitimate monopolization of violence (Weber 1948: 78). In state-building, the monopolization of physical and symbolic violence cannot be achieved without siding with ‘friends’ and excluding ‘enemies’. To build a robust state would inevitably entail waging wars against the identified enemies. Hence, apart from drafting and legislating laws, a state relies on its capacity to en-force laws in order to defend its territorial intactness, as prescribed by the constitution (Schmitt 2008). Although the state is governed by a legal framework, the rule of law may not be ensured without using violence in the state of exception. The state of exception refers to the borderline, volatile and controversial situation where the ‘state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-preservation’ (Schmitt 2005: 12). In situations such as rebellion and secessionism, the merging of force and law is said to be critical (Giddens 1987). The combining of the use of physical and non-physical force constitutes a complementary art of Philippines-specific governance to dissolve internal threats and re-contain the state’s challengers. Aguinaldo’s 1990 secessionist rebellion and his subsequent re-access into the Philippine electoral democracy would illustrate this art of government. After the martial law regime was overthrown by the People Power Revolution in 1986, the newly installed President Aquino stood for nationwide democratization, in stark contrast to Marcos’s dictatorial rule.

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This turned the Philippines into an electoral democracy. Nationwide local elections were scheduled in 1987 and 1988 to elect local government officials and members of the national assembly. As the head of a transLuzon business conglomerate which connected the Cagayan Valley and Manila, Delfin ran as an independent candidate for the Tuguegarao mayorship in 1988, after several years of harassment inflicted by political rivals who were supported by competing business groups of both legal and illicit nature. Delfin presented himself as a self-made liberal-capitalist of humble background and an alternative to candidates of traditional landed elite backgrounds. According to the Tuguegarao and Manila legal elite, Delfin promised to eradicate jueteng, an ill of society and obstacle for economic progress and productivity. As no candidate had ever made such an unambiguous statement against jueteng, he gained support from local professional bodies. Recalled by Father Ranhilio Aquino of the Philippine Judicial Academy (Manila Supreme Court) and Cagayan provincial secretary Atty. Ven Del Rosario Jr., a few Manila legal elite saw Delfin as a possible instrument to institute law and order in a frontier where insurgents, militias, outlaws, vigilantes and the local warlords were regarded as the obstacles of state rule.138 The newly installed Aquino regime, moreover, saw Delfin as a possible entry-point to gain access into Cagayan, the traditional stronghold of Enrile and Marcos. By identifying with Aquino’s Chinese ancestry, Delfin campaigned as a ‘Chinese’ alternative, promising to bring change and progress. By using his extensive connections in Manila, Delfin successfully received a recount in favor of his candidacy by a small margin. The opposition then filed a lawsuit against his eligibility as a Filipino government official by denouncing him as a Chinese national. This immediately constituted a Schmittian exception: a situation of legal indeterminacy (Scheuerman 1999; Schmitt 2005: 5), which the Philippine state found points of intervention into the frontier society and imposed its sovereign verdicts. The Manila Supreme Court required Delfin to testify his genealogy as a ‘natural born Filipino citizen’. By mobilizing associates from the Cagayan and Isabela provinces, Delfin re-constructed his genealogy and proved himself the legitimate child of a Chinese national and an indigenous Ibanag woman in legal court.139 Testified to be a locally raised Chinese-Ibanag mixed-blood, the Supreme Court ruled that Delfin was a ‘natural born Filipino citizen’. He quickly assumed the mayoral office in 1988.

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On the first day of public office, Delfin immediately raided Ang Chung’s bodega to request him to stop the jueteng operations. Agamben referred to an exception to an indeterminate situation where state delegates have to exert their sovereign authority to make a finalizing act. He defined sovereignty in terms of a law/force indistinction: ‘the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence’ (Agamben 1998: 32). Delfin’s campaign against the jueteng is the art of merging law and force, in which the Cagayano notion of Ibanag parenthood informs patrimonial logics and coercive practices (Gatan 1981: 29–30). Nowadays, a Cagayano mayor is expected to be ‘a father of the town’ who can use physical measures to protect the constituents who are his ‘children’. As the Cagayan Valley is inhabited by the Ibanag people, political leaders at village and municipal/city levels are known to punish petty criminals by the practice of slapping. Considerable physical force is used against serious crimes. However, in order to eradicate the jueteng, Delfin conflated indigenous parenting knowledge into practical frontier governance under the aegis of the legal courts (Scott 1998: chapter 9). He formulated an ‘iron hand’ policy, known as kamay na bakal in the Tagalog-Filipino language, in which he was known to kick, box and slap the banca, cabo, kubrador, and acha-dor. Due to the support of Aguinaldo and resistance from the jueteng network and some members of the Tuguegarao municipal police, the anti-jueteng campaign then escalated into more confrontational and terrorizing measures, such as burning motorcycles. 140 Apart from filing charges against the police chief and intimidating the jueteng operators, a major commotion emerged in the Cagayan provincial government in late 1989. Accompanied by some thirty Tuguegarao municipal policemen, Mayor Delfin gun-pointed at Governor Aguinaldo and forced him to surrender. Following the downfall of Marcos in 1986 and in parallel with a series of RAM-related mutinies in Manila from 1986–90, this Ting–Aguinaldo commotion then led to the Hotel Delfino Uprising, a state of exception on March 4, 1990. It was there that the Philippine state had to show its sovereign might to dissolve Aguinaldo’s secessionist cause. Secessionism entails a serious challenge against the state boundary by disregarding the moral and political supremacy of the constitution. Secessionists are therefore identified and excluded as an enemy of the state, who are legally subject to the state’s cultural and violent censures (Sumner 1997). As a leading state agent who spent most of his adult life

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Picture 11 Delfin Ting in the mayoral inauguration ceremony, Tuguegarao, Cagayan province, February 2, 1988. Source of image: Hotel Delfino.

fighting the communist insurgency for the Philippine state, Wood’s (2003) seminal work is useful in understanding why Aguinaldo had to declare the independence of Cagayan on March 4, 1990. In contrast to the political economy argument (Popkin 1979), Wood (2003) suggested that rebel behaviors are not always driven by material interests, but moral and emotional factors, especially the emotive satisfaction gained from rebelling against injustice. From 1986 to 1989, while a new constitution was being drafted and debated, the Enrile-associated RAM faction initiated several mutinies in Manila. They attempted to overthrow the Aquino administration.141 As the Cagayan province was identified by the new regime as the solid base of Enrile, RAM and the remnants of Marcos, President Aquino attempted to suspend Aguinaldo’s governorship as a counterstrategy to undermine his stronghold. 142 Continuously caught in the struggles between the Enrile faction and Aquino administration, Aguinaldo decided to keep a distance from Enrile by refusing to be his candidate for the governorship in the 1987 election.143 With informed training in Marxist thought and years of grassroots counterinsurgency work, Aguinaldo was not only confident enough to run as an independent candidate, he also formulated

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a populist view on the root cause of the country’s prolonged insurgency problem: impoverishment resultant of corruption and kleptocracy perpetuated by a minority of forged landed-cum-capitalist elite (see: Corpus 1989: 51), especially of Chinese ancestry. The Aquino-Cojuangco family of the Tarlac province neatly falls into this elite category (Anderson 1988). When Aguinaldo resumed the governorship of the Cagayan province, he openly lambasted politicians, especially Delfin, for allegedly using public positions to protect and advance their own sectoral interests. These acts reinforced his Robin Hood persona, rendering him a folklore outlaw-hero of the Cagayano masses. Aquino delivered a suspension order to remove Aguinaldo from office after dissolving a mutiny in Manila in December 1989. In view of the increasing concerns on corruption over the Aquino administration,144 the disillusioned Aguinaldo defied the order and fielded hundreds of supporters into Tuguegarao with a stern warning to the Aquino administration: ‘Kung may masaktan sa isa sa aking supporters, diyan lalabas ang mga armado (If any of my supporters get hurt, we will have to use arms)’.145 Human barricades were formed, preventing the central government and military officials from going into the provincial government.146 After several failed talks, the AFP troops were dispatched into Tuguegarao while President Aquino assigned Aguinaldo’s PMA classmate, General Oscar Florendo, as the mediator to negotiate for Aguinaldo’s surrender. Florendo was accommodated in Delfin’s Hotel Delfino. Frustrated by Florendo’s insistence for his unconditional surrender, Aguinaldo and his defected soldiers kept Florendo hostage inside the hotel lobby. Delfin and his fully armed security aides were also banned from leaving the hotel. The mutineers cut off the electricity supply and telephone wires connected to the hotel. However, they missed one telephone line. Delfin called and ordered his two sons to immediately approach the AFP headquarters, indicating an emergency situation in Tuguegarao and urging for armed assistance. Upon receiving information that the AFP troops were quickly encroaching into Tuguegarao, Aguinaldo went to the Provincial Capitol and turned the Philippine national flag upside down, signifying that the state was at war with him. He gathered one thousand armed and civilian supporters in front of the hotel. Armed with an M-14 Armalite rifle, Aguinaldo opened fire into the sky and formally declared the independence of Cagayan. With about fifteen casualties in the rebel group, AFP helicopters, tanks and infantries eventually pushed into Tuguegarao

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and took control of the town. The rebel group splintered and retreated into hiding. Outside the Hotel Delfino, about two hundred military fatigues and firearms were left by the rebels. Inside the hotel lobby, gunfire occurred between the rebels, AFP officers and Delfin’s armed security personnel. Subsequently, the defected Seventeenth Infantry Battalion Scout Ranger Captain Feliciano Sabite suffered serious gunshot wounds, whereas leading central governmental negotiator Florendo was shot dead. According to the Criminal Investigation Service and an autopsy report, Florendo’s death was due to an Armalite-type bullet, probably fired from higher ground within a ten-meter radius. Two rebel soldiers, AFP deputy chief of staff Colonel Emiliano Templo and his Philippine marine escorts, and finally, Oscar Dumagan, a security aide for Delfin were identified as possible sources of this single fatal gunshot.147 Among the suspects, Dumagan seemed to be the only one holding an Armalite-type rifle, which was owned by Delfin. Although Dumagan admitted that he had opened fire four times in the downstairs direction, Delfin testified at a Philippine Senate hearing session that Dumagan only fired in retaliation to that made by the companion of Sabite.148 The questions surrounding the death of Florendo still remain to this day. In the Manila AFP headquarters, National Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos vowed to get Aguinaldo at all costs after learning about the death of Florendo. In addition to thousands of fully armed AFP soldiers and well-equipped armaments stationed in Tuguegarao, Ramos dispatched two specialized battalions of battle-tested Philippine marines to Cagayan Valley with a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy in pursuit of the rebels.149 With a price on his head as the rebel leader who had Florendo killed, Aguinaldo tactically evaded subsequent AFP hunts. His former followers confided that Aguinaldo had been hiding in a rural village inside Tuguegarao while letters were sent by his province–wide supporters to fake addresses. Ramos subsequently admitted that the AFP had lost track of Aguinaldo.150 On June 12, 1990, Aguinaldo eventually surrendered to the AFP at the Cagayan Provincial Capitol in front of crowds of local supporters.151 Although the following Senate hearings could not determine if Aguinaldo had killed Florendo,152 the Hotel Delfino Uprising declaration of the Cagayano nationalist cause rendered Aguinaldo an unforgettable enemy of the Philippine state. Implicated as the mastermind of several unsuccessful coup attempts, the Aquino-reappointed National Defense Minister Enrile decided to leave the presidential cabinet, return to his birthplace and

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political base – Cagayan Valley, and run for congressman in the May 1992 election. At this conjuncture, rebel leader Aguinaldo was released on bail. He subsequently ran for re-election as the provincial governor in the election, against Enrile’s favorite. At the behest of Enrile, COMELEC attempted to bar Aguinaldo’s candidacy by citing pending rebellion charges (McCoy 1999: 306). Aguinaldo filed a legal case back against COMELEC in the Manila Supreme Court, arguing that ‘when a public official is charged with wrong-doing, his re-election constitutes a condonation of the administrative charge provided that the case against him is not decided before he is re-elected’.153 There were apparently two legal justifications for Aguinaldo to run for provincial governor, despite the fact that his candidacy was questioned by COMELEC. First, since the decision of the Supreme Court was only made after his re-election in 1992, it was lawful for him to retain his candidacy. Secondly, there was a change in the legal framework between 1990 and 1992 – the passing of the Local Government Code in 1991. Under the Local Government Code, a candidate who is dismissed from office because of an administrative lawsuit should be disqualified from electoral candidacy. However, Aguinaldo was suspended in January 1990. Hence, although the legal framework changed in 1991, the new Local Government Code did not apply to him. As a result, despite facing major charges, continued massive local support enabled Aguinaldo to run for the

Picture 12 Seat of government: Cagayan Provincial Capitol. Source of image: Author’s collection

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Cagayan governorship in the election, which temporarily affirmed its sovereignty in this once-uncertain frontier. In the election, Aguinaldo won again by a landslide, and gained a total of 170,382 votes against Enrile’s candidate, who only got 54,412 votes. In consideration of the over– whelming support, the Supreme Court confirmed his electoral victory and his rebellion charges were then dismissed by a lower court (McCoy 1999: 306). Since then, Aguinaldo proved himself to be a legend in the eyes of many supporters, turning him into a heroic figure featured in the popular movie: Agi nac Cagayan (Aguinaldo: The True-to-Life Story of Gov. Aguinaldo of Cagayan) – one of the most popular contemporary productions in the Filipino cinematic industry.154 Consistent with his counterinsurgency career, Aguinaldo went on to implement peace-building initiatives by cooperating with the national government.155 In his ten-year public service as the governor, he marked several distinguished records in fiscal management and social welfare delivery. For instance, when he finished his three terms as the provincial governor, in 1998, the provincial public coffer was left with an unprecedented surplus of eighty-seven million pesos. 156 These track records partially brought him to a congressional seat in 1998, when he defeated his rival, Manuel Mamba of Tuao.157 After re-containing Aguinaldo within the Philippine electoral democracy through the 1995 and 1998 elections in which he won as the provincial governor and congressman, his electoral defeat to the tactical alliances between (1) the Mambas of Tuao and the Tings of Tuguegarao, and (2) the Mambas of Tuao and left-wing political party, Bayan Muna in 2001, gave an opportunity for the communist insurgents to avenge against Aguinaldo’s life-long counterinsurgency career by killing him in Tuguegarao on June 12, 2001.158 About six months later, the Aguinaldoassociated Cagayano jueteng-lord Ben ‘Ang Chung’ De Guzman was also murdered in Tuguegarao.159 The two cases remain unsolved.160 The indeterminate conditions of these two legal cases have again left the Philippine state with various options to consider in exercising its sovereignty over the frontiers. What are these political options? There are no definite and fixed answers. The question will again, largely depend on the extent to which the frontier strongmen are willing to continue to collaborate with the state for its state-building project. As well, it also depends on the extent to which they are willing to submit themselves to the constitution of the Philippine Republic and its national defense.

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5.5 Conclusion By comparing coups in Sierra Leone and the Philippines, this chapter has outlined an inter-regional comparative framework for studying state– military relations. Moreover, it has also elaborated the expositions and techniques of the Philippine art of governing coups by diachronically studying how the state may re-contain mutineers and re-enact its sovereignty. Given the social and economic developmental differences between sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, in contrast to the neo-colonial underdevelopment that has entangled most African countries, it is suggested that the East Asian regional economic environment has been conducive for Philippine social and economic development. This positive regional background has set the prerequisites for effectively dissolving coups and governing military rebellions. Through a historical-ethnographic study of Aguinaldo, a Philippine mutineer and frontier strongman, the Philippine art of governing coups entails three specific techniques that the state has deployed to instrumentalize soldier-rebels for state-building purposes. They are: (1) producing the martial law, (2) brokering counterinsurgency, and (3) law/force indistinction and re-containment through electoral democracy. When the Philippine state produced soldiers to assert its sovereignty over the territories, the soldiers became the agents of coercion for which the state’s constitution was defended by fighting communism during martial law. When the soldiers were disillusioned by the state affairs and turned themselves into mutineers, the Philippine state was able to dissolve rebellions through law/force indistinction and re-contain them into the state hierarchy of electoral offices as its ruling instruments. Although there is no doubt that the post-colonial Philippine state was able to impose constitutional and democratic control over its military, one should not overlook the importance of its capability to discipline and carry out surveillance, which was already developed in pre-colonial times. These techniques will be detailed in the next chapter.

6 Sovereignty Policed: Disciplinary and Surveillance Techniques in the Itawes Philippines

In politics, then, there are indispensible techniques which lie at the root of statesmanship considered as the art of governing people. Michel Foucault (2001: 112)

6.1 Introduction Arsenio Bauit is among the peasant insurgents who surrendered in the government’s Balik Baril (return of firearms) program in 1988. As a resident of a remote village near the Cagayan–Apayao border in Tuao, Bauit admitted to a private cause for joining the NPA: It may be my form of rebellion against my father for not allowing me to enter college. […] I believe in what they [the NPAs] were fighting for and I thought: I could help my family and community if I did. (Itawes: Narrebelde nak la siguru kani amak kattu marinak pinagiliammu kan kolehiyo. Ne ammuk kalohonan nga pallawanan. Kattun, manguruggak kan ilablaban da. Kungku, moffunangku familian entre kabarangay kun u kuangku.)161

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Confronted by poverty in the 1970s, Bauit was ordered by his tenant-father to give up his study and work. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the NPA’s Grupong Tagapamahayag (propaganda unit) succeeded in infiltrating into his neighborhood. The guerrillas organized seminars in the remote villages along the Tuao–Conner and Tuao–Pinukpuk borders for recruitment. Given their local knowledge and cultural affinities with the neighboring ethnic groups, the young recruits were usually assigned to advance the revolutionary front in the Gran Cordillera and Cagayan Valley. For instance, Bauit was once assigned to the Apayao province. However, Bauit’s involvement in the movement also brought the military to his home town. The municipal leadership became seriously concerned about internal security and worried about the possibility of jeopardizing the safety and livelihood of its inhabitants by the conflicts caused by the guerrillas and the military. Mayor Leonardo Mamba and his brothersuccessor, Manuel, therefore conducted penetrating surveillance measures and secretive patrols along the town borders in order to monitor the affected communities. The Mamba brothers did not hesitate to ask suspects affiliated with communist guerrillas to leave town. For instance, upon receiving the intelligence report that Bauit had joined the NPA, the neighborhood was unexpectedly visited by the armed mayor during late night. Fearful of the mayor’s wrath, the village council was deeply concerned. Bauit’s father was compelled to temporarily relocate his family. In the past few decades, the majority of Tuao chose not to side with the communist movement resultant of the municipal leadership’s intensive groundwork. Although checkpoints are presently established where its inhabitants are subjected to search by the municipal authority and the military, an official insisted that there is no insurgency in Tuao as ‘the checkpoints were established to monitor the rebel movements in the municipalities of Rizal [in Cagayan], Conner [in Apayao] and Pinukpuk in Kalinga, (Itawes: Nepataddag ya checkpoints se magardian yo guyu rebelde ira kan ili Rizal [kan Cagayan], Conner [kan Apayao] entre Pinukpuk kan Kalinga).162 Field investigations also confirm that the communist insurgency was mainly confined along the Tuao–Conner and Tuao–Pinukpuk borders.163 How did Tuao manage to keep an arm’s length from the insurgency? What are the indigenous disciplinary and surveillance technologies in which the Mambas employed to police among themselves and for the Philippine sovereign state? To answer these questions, this chapter will illustrate how the Itawes technologies in Tuao have resiliently morphed from the precolonial period to the present. Foucault (2003: 242) defined these

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technologies in terms of the systems of ‘surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, bookkeeping, and reports’. By using the 90-year governance of the Mambas as a case study, I will contrastively delineate these Itawes technologies with those found in Tuguegarao. First, in order to identify the pre-colonial archetype of these Itawes technologies, the historical and context specifics which contribute to the making of Tuao as a postcolonial redoubt of the pre-colonial Itawes mengal (braves) must be discussed.

6.2 Tuao and the making of the Itawes Philippines in historical perspective Let us preserve our solidarity […] continue to cherish it. But as Khalil Gibran stated ‘stand together yet not too near together; for the pillars of the temple stand apart; and the Oak tree and the Cypress grow out in each other’s shadow’. Let us continue and sustain constructive efforts in the building of Tuao […] let us have pride in our efforts to develop a community conducive to decent and clean-living; a community where youth will be valued for its promise and age will be honored for fulfillment. Failure has no excuse. I say this with high expectations of our capabilities and potentials and in acknowledgement of our fortitude which sustains us through the years. The Late Atty. Leonardo N. Mamba164 In Tuao, there is unity! In Tuao, there is cohesion! In Tuao, there are votes [to] be delivered! […] Tuao can proudly pronounce itself as a true community – a community of unity, cohesion and of love. Now, everyone is proud to be a Tuaoeño or Tuaoeña. Dr. Manuel N. Mamba165 Located downstream of the Chico River, Tuao is positioned at Cagayan’s southwestern lowland corner, bordering the elevated Kalinga and Apayao provinces, the two neighboring sub-provinces of the mountainous Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). Tuao’s Itawes strongman, Manuel Mamba (Table 6.1), considers Tuao as a ‘pocket town’, mainly because there is only one highway which connects to Tuao in Cagayan. Although the Mambas used to hold a huge landed estate, their landholdings had been reduced to one hundred hectares because a significant portion of their rice and corn farmlands was claimed by the land reform program.166 However, as the land reform program did not

Map 6 Chico River area Source of map: Keesing (1962: 222)

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affect sugarcane plantations, Manuel’s first-degree cousin, Leonides Fausto,167 holds an estimated 500 hectares of sugarcane plantation. The plantation regularly provides sugarcanes to a refinery plant along the Piat–Tuao–Solana highway, which is owned by John Gokongwei Jr.’s Cagayan Robina Sugar Milling Company (CARSUMCO).168 Along two sides of the Piat–Tuao–Solana highway, fields of sugarcane grow high like a tunnel leading to the Chico River Bridge, the only bridge to the Tuao poblacion (town center). Although there are routes which connect Tuao to the major Kalinga–Apayao towns of Pinukpuk and Conner, the roads are less well-maintained. In rainy seasons, travelling on those routes is often inhibited by floods and landslides. Tuao nonetheless serves as a major trading center between the Cagayano lowlanders and the Cordilleran highlanders in Kalinga and Apayao. As an educational and commercial center of the Cagayan Valley, Tuguegarao city attracts substantial transient and immigrant populations from the Kalinga and Apayao provinces. In the past decades, there have been more people and agricultural products flowing from Kalinga and Apayao to Cagayan than the other way around. However, as a result of the growing financial capability and commercial interests of the Cagayano business sector, there are also increasing capital and commodities flowing from Cagayan to Kalinga–Apayao. As the connecting nexus between Kalinga–Apayao and Cagayan, Tuao and its Itawes population have historically played the role of a go-between intermediary between the highlanders and the lowlanders. In the present, it is estimated that 60-80% and 50% of the agricultural produces in Conner and Pinukpuk, respectively, are handled by Tuao businesses.169 According to the 1948 census, there were 6,762 Itawes, 3,273 Ibanags, 6,035 Ilocanos and 92 Kalingas out of a total population of 16,365 in Tuao (Keesing 1962: 236). In the 1960s, Keesing (1962: 221) noticed an influx of Ilocano migrants, which suggested that the Itawes ‘have been joined by many Ibanag speakers, and are outnumbered today by Ilocanos’. According to the 2001 municipal census, Ibanag speakers were absorbed into the Itawes group, which constituted 44 percent of the total population out of a total population of 53,497. The majority is Ilocano (53 percent), with a small population of Tagalog (2.13 percent). The 2007 census suggested that Tuao’s total population had gradually increased to 57,154.170

Table 6.1 The Mambas of Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines (1926–2010). Years in terms 1926– 1929 1941– 1946 1946– 1949 1960– 1971 1978– 1987

Tuao Mayor (Relation to Manuel Mamba) Laureano Mamba (Grandfather) Vice-mayor Ospido Mamba# (Uncle)

Number of votes gained

Percentage of votes gained

Other position (candidate)

Candidate elected

~

~

N/A

N/A

~

~

N/A

N/A

Francisco Mamba Sr. ~ (Father) Atty. Leonardo Mamba ~ (Elder brother)

~

N/A

N/A

~

Francisco Mamba Sr. (1987)

1987– 1988

~

~

~

1988– 1992 1992– 1995 1995– 1998 1998– 2001 2001– 2004 2004– 2007

Manuel Mamba (Self)

8,304

48.24%

Manuel Mamba

13,983

79.03%

Francisco Mamba Jr. (Younger brother) Francisco Mamba Jr.

17,470

91.46%

19,772

90.39%

Francisco Mamba Jr.

19,832

92.92%

William Mamba (Youngest brother)

22,215

90.26%

Appointive Governor-in-Charge (Francisco Mamba Sr.) Appointive Governor & Provincial Board Member Congressman¥ (Leonardo Mamba) Congressman (Leonardo Mamba)* Congressman (Manuel Mamba) Congressman (Manuel Mamba) Congressman (Manuel Mamba) Congressman (Manuel Mamba)

Francisco Mamba Sr. & Manuel Mamba Tito Dupaya Francisco Mamba Sr. Manuel Mamba Rodolfo Aguinaldo Manuel Mamba Manuel Mamba

2007– 2010

William Mamba

20,936

79.54%

Congressman (Manuel Mamba)

Manuel Mamba

2010– 2013

William Mamba

16,825

68.74%

Governor (Manuel Mamba)

Alvaro Antonio

Congressman Randolph (Francisco Mamba, Ting Jr.) Key: # In 1941–6, he was appointed by the Japanese government. In 1946–9, he was elected. ¥ Elder brother Boyet Mamba was shot dead during the congressional campaign on April 25, 1987 by a bodyguard of appointed office-in-charge mayor of Tuao, Rogelio Garcia, who was supported by the opposition, incumbent congressman Tito Dupaya. * Alleged communist rebels shot Leonardo Mamba dead during the election on April 25, 1992. His father, Francisco Mamba Sr., took over the candidacy and won the position of congressman.

Sources: Tuao Municipal Government and the Commission on Elections, the Philippines, 2003–10.

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The establishment of Tuao as a municipality, and its historical trajectory, contribute to the establishment of the Itawes171 identity that can be traced to pre-Hispanic times when tribes in the lowlands and highlands were once unified by the legendary Patul Wamba (Scott 1994: 268). Shortly before the Spaniards arrived at Cagayan, a supreme mengel named Guiab had risen up over the others with a raiding company of 300 men, making himself to be a ferocious warrior and benevolent lord (Scott 1994: 268–70). Tuao and the surrounding Itawes locales in the Chico River Basin are believed to be the communities where the ancestors of the present-day Gaddang, Ibanag, Isneg (Malaueg) and Kalinga ethnic groups originated (Castillet 1960: 308; Dozier 1966: 30; Scott 1998[1974]: 74, Map D). Itawes rebellions against the Spaniards in Cagayan usually broke out in the form of headhunting raids against the colonial troops and the missionaries (Keesing 1962: 233; Salgado 2002b: 992–5). Tuao therefore earned a reputation as the ‘home of the brave’ and ‘land of the free’ because of the Itawes resistance against Spanish colonists, in which their valor and warrior-spirit were highly regarded. Based on Hispanic missionary records dated 1604, Itawes tribesmen were described as ‘so free’ and ‘hostile’ that they were regarded as exceptionally brave by the Spaniards (Keesing 1962: 224–5). Nonetheless, through missionary efforts, they changed from being ‘bloodthirsty wolves to gentle sheep’ (Keesing 1962: 225). Military forts and garrisons were then built to contain these Itawes mengal (braves) in Tuao, and defend against frequent raids from Kalinga and Isneg tribesmen (Barton 1949; Dozier 1967; Fiagoy 1987; Reynolds and Grant 1973; Salgado 2002a: 284). Since Christianization first took place in the lowlands, the evangelized Itawes and Ibanag had abolished the practice of headhunting much earlier than the pagan highlanders, who practiced until its official ban at the time of the martial law regime in 1972 (Rosaldo 1980: 44). Although many highland inhabitants in the Cordillera have converted to Catholicism after many decades of missionary efforts, nowadays, the Cagayano lowlanders still consider the highlanders as culturally different, i.e. more ‘untamed/wild’. Situated in this Christian–pagan and highland–lowland uncertain contact zone, Tuao stands as a frontier that connects the Cagayano Christians to the Cordilleran pagans, where the Itawes act as the Christian-cum-pagan go-betweens and tamed-cum-fearless Janus-faced brokers. In post-colonial times, Tuao continues to enjoy a reputation of bravery. During the Second World War, it was a key center of guerrilla movements

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against the Japanese forces (Caballero 2004: 141). In the 1970s and 1980s, the land reform and communist insurgency affected Tuao and caused significant challenges to municipal governance. The land reform started in the early 1970s, and distributed farmland to individual tenants, therefore reducing the landholding of the landed elite. This brought forward considerable political uncertainties, since the landlord- tenant patronage relationship had been a core practice in the rural political economy (Guggenheim 1984). However, farmers still suffered from financial incapability and the reforms failed to provide supporting programs to them, which meant that many turned back to the old patrons (i.e. landlords) and forged new dependencies with the emerging rural rent capitalists (i.e. agro-businesses). Although farmland was distributed to the farmers, prolonged social disparity forged another phase of patron–client interdependency through the grain-trading system.172 Frequent calamities and inability to pay cumulative loans forced farmers to sell their farmland to buyers (particularly, the grain-traders) who offered a higher price than the landlord to whom the farmers owed financial and moral debts. Secondly, the 1970s and 1980s marked the height of the Cordilleran self-determination resistance movement, and communist insurgency and vigilante counterinsurgency.173 Since the proclamation of the martial law, the Kalinga province has been characterized by continuous tribal warfare and armed struggle for political autonomy. For instance, the World Bank-funded Chico River Basin hydroelectric dam projects were met with severe resistance from the Kalinga tribes (Castro 2000). On the evening of April 24, 1980, the Fourth Infantry Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, led by Lieutenant Leodegario Adalem, opened fire at two houses in Bugnay, Tinglayan, Kalinga province. Macli-ing Dulag, the pangat (chieftain) of the Butbut tribe, died from multiple gunshot wounds, while Pedro Dungoc survived (Doyo 2000). Dungoc later joined the NPA and died as a communist insurgent.174 It is not unusual to learn that figures in the Cordilleran self-determination movement turned to the NPA. 175 Tribal warfare was entangled with the Cordilleran self-determination movement, communist insurgency and counterinsurgency. Each conflict was therefore triggered by mixed motives and ideologies. The intraCordilleran Betwagan–Bugnay–Butbut tribal warfare is an example. Although multilateral bodong (peace pacts) were settled, ambushes and killings took place under the names of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the CAFGU in Tinglayan and Sadanga of the Kalinga and Mountain provinces, respectively. 176 During the fieldwork period,

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hold-ups by bandits were frequently reported along the Cagayan–Kalinga highway.177 From the early 1980s, armed elements who entered from the Kalinga and Apayao provinces were reported to have killed village officials and villagers, rustled cattle, and looted and occupied farmland in Tuao. These armed people were from upstream Chico River Basin Kalinga tribes. The Tuao municipal leadership had difficulties in negotiations with them for two reasons. First, the Kalinga conducted a different judicial system, known as bodong (peace pact). Second, it was suspected that these people were actually the communist guerrillas who used fictitious migrant identities to conceal subversives for infiltration purposes (Marighella 2002). As a result, along the neighboring mountainous Sinundungan River Valley, a major NPA base was pacified by the military in 2002. From the 1980s to 1990s, the Mambas saw an urgency to tighten political control by intensifying the interactions between the local government and the masses. How did the Tuao police the land reform and communist insurgency? What disciplinary and surveillance technologies did Tuao employ to enhance Itawes self-governance? In the following sections, I will ethnographically illustrate four major Itawes governance techniques:    

Policing the land reform Implanting networks of eyes and ears The symbolism of ‘guns, goons and gold’ Instilling fear through enshrining bravery.

6.3 Policing the land reform Angeles Balunsat, the granddaughter of landlord Gerardo Ranjo, suggested that the land reform program ‘is the very reason for the early death of [her] mother’ as ‘she felt great agony for not having a chance to question the government, she got sick and eventually died.’178 When the land reform was proclaimed in 1972, Angeles’ mother was asked to comply with the law as the representative of the Ranjo estate, and reduce the inherited 300-hectare estate into a 5-hectare personal handholding. With the aim to keep the estate for the family and heirs, a plan to sub-divide the vast landholdings within the family was formulated. Due to the limited number of close relatives, the plan failed to keep the Ranjo estate intact. From the 1970s to the present, while the landlords in Tuao gradually complied by permitting portions of their land to be administered by the land reform program, they also constantly applied for

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land retention.179 The land of Tuao is therefore said to be in transition, for which the leading landed elite, the Mambas, have been playing an indispensable brokerage role. Policing the land reform in Tuao is mainly done through two strategies: (1) the issuance of leasehold contracts, and (2) the political co-optation of the grain-trading system. These will be ethnographically illustrated. First is the issuance of the leasehold contract. A leasehold contract is a multilateral legal agreement signed by the landlord, tenant, municipal agrarian reform officer, municipal treasurer and a lawyer. What is usually stipulated in a leasehold contract? According to farmer Roberto, It is clearly stated that we will forever cultivate the said land as long as we abide with the rules stated in the contract. […] we are directed to give three hundred and ten kilograms of rice to the landlord every after harvest.180 In 1993, shortly after Roberto received a CLT and an accompanying letter signed by Miriam Santiago (as the head of the Department of Agrarian Reform) (Lande 1996: 17),181 he was invited by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Tuao to attend an ‘agrarian relations’ meeting with the landlord. 182 The meeting denounced the Manila-hailed documents and requested Roberto to surrender the CLT. He initially resisted. However, after finding out that most of his co-tenants had already surrendered their CLTs and signed leasehold contracts, he conceded by only signing a leasehold contract. Out of the total interviewed forty-two farmer-beneficiaries of the land reform program in Tuao, eleven claimed that their CLTs were bawian (retracted) by either the municipal or regional office of the Department of Agrarian Reform. As the land reform program caused considerable conflicts between the landlords and the tenants, the leasehold contract has been used at the local level to exempt landholdings from the land reform program. According to an agrarian reform official, If the landowner has no other landholding except that area covered under the program, necessarily the right of retention will always be approved. […] After filing the land retention application, if the landowner was properly verified to have more or other landholdings aside from the area of retention, their application for the right of retention will be denied or disapproved.183

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Despite tremendous mediating efforts by the local officials, the land reform program destabilized traditional landlord–tenant interdependency simply because the land ownership rights claimed by the tenants often violated the financial and moral agreements that they had established with the landlords. In particular, the violation of the Itawes ethics of katut kan nonot (debt of gratitude) created irreversible damages to cacique–peasantry relations in Tuao. This not only pushed the tenants to look for alternative political and financial patrons, but also compelled the municipal leadership to find urgent initiatives to re-consolidate the faltering inter-class relations. In order to blockade the mobilization inroads for the communist guerrillas along the Tuao-Conner and Tuao-Pinukpuk borders, the second strategy to police the land reform was the political co-optation of the grain-trading system, which has been predominantly operated by the descendents of Chinese immigrants (Table 6.2). The Chinese started to conduct commercial activities in the Gran Cordillera and Cagayan Valley before the Spaniards arrived (Malumbres 1918: 232; 1918: 370). Nowadays, the Chinese community in Tuao called themselves the ‘Itawes-Chinese’.184 How was the Itawes-Chinese grain-trading system co-opted by the Mambas to soothe the inter-class tension in Tuao? The following ethnography will provide the answer. Domingo Abella is a former tenant of the Ranjo estate. He used to rely on the Ranjo family to finance his farming. In 1987, the land reform program enabled him to purchase five hectares of land with the mediation of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office. Since then, he has become a loyal suki-customer of Biya’s Grain Trading, which is operated by Linda Tiu. While Biya continues to give credits to finance his farming, for the past twenty years, Domingo has sold his harvests to Biya. In the mid-1990s, Domingo managed to clear all the monetary debts that he owed to Ranjo, but still needed to pay back the Land Bank. However, in 1998, a significant portion of his farmland along the Chico River was suddenly eroded by a flashflood resultant of a typhoon, which not only took away his harvests, but also ruined the farmland.185 He immediately approached Biya to explain why he could not give the repayments.186 Based on Domingo’s track record, Biya did not ask Domingo to clear the debt immediately. She was impressed that Domingo ‘continued to visit us and inform us about the exact scenario’ and regarded him as ‘one of those whom we consider as our valued customer’ because ‘he knows how to value the trust and confidence we entrusted to him.’187

Table 6.2 The perceived major Tuao grain-traders and their suki coverage in the Itawes areas in Cagayan, Apayao and Kalinga provinces. Tuao grain-traders

Clan (angkan) Ancestral & affiliation ethnic TUA identifi-

Less active area (√) Inactive area (X) PI PIN C R SA A SO TUG

cation Ankab Warehouse ¶@ Biya’s Grain Trading ¶@ Eastern Grain Trading *§ Emerson General Merchandise ¶@ Eric Chua Grain Trading ¶@ Fenix Grain Trading ¶@

Uy

Genoveza General Merchandise ¶$@

Genoveza

Tiu Mabborang Liu Chua Fenix

Henry Yap General Yap Merchandise ¶@ Lucky V General Sy / Yap Merchandise ¶#@ Mila’s Buying Station * Mila Martin Grain Trading ¶ Tayde Enterprise * Teo Tan Grain Trading ¶

Dilig Martin Tayde Tan

ItawesChinese ItawesChinese Ilocano & Itawes ItawesChinese ItawesChinese ItawesChinese & Ilocano ItawesChinese & Ilocano ItawesChinese ItawesChinese & Ilocano Ilocano Ilocano & Itawes Ilocano ItawesChinese & Ilocano

√

√

√

√

√

√

X

√

√

√

X

√

X

√ √

√

√

X

√

√

√

X

√

√

√

X

√

√

√

X

√

√

√

X

√

√

√

X

√

X

√ √

√

√

X

√

√

√ √

X X

√

Key: Municipalities in the Cagayan province: TUA-Tuao; PI-Piat; R-Rizal(Malaueg); SA-Santo Niño(Faire); A-Amulung West; SO-Solana; TUG-Tuguegarao city Municipalities in the Apayao and Kalinga provinces: C-Conner; PIN-Pinukpuk ¶ Business location: across the Chico River in central and western Tuao which connects the Tuao–Rizal–Conner–Pinukpuk highway junctions * Business location: eastern Tuao which connects the Amulung–Piat–Tuao–Santo Niño–Solana–Tuguegarao highway junctions § Operator (Loreto C. Mabborang): Tuao municipal councilor (1992–5; 1995–8; 1998–2001) $ Operator (Calixto U. Genoveza): Tuao municipal councilor (1992–5; 1995–8; 1998–2001) # Operator (Peter Sy / Nestor Yap): Tuao municipal councilor (1992–5; 1995–8; 1998–2001) @ Former/active members of the Tuao-Piat Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines

Sources: Interviews with farmers, grain-traders and local government officials in Tuao and other municipalities of the Cagayan, Apayao and Kalinga provinces, 2003–9.

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Fortunately, Domingo’s land reclaim application was properly heard by the Department of Agrarian Reform and therefore the Land Bank temporarily discontinued the collection of amortization.188 Since the late 1980s, Biya’s Grain Trading has gradually replaced Ranjo as the financierpatron of Domingo. The rise of the Tuao grain-trading system would nonetheless not be possible without the facilitation of the Mambas. From the 1960s to 1970s, the local government paid little attention to the Tuao grain-trading system. However, starting from 1978 when Leonardo became the mayor, he recycled the historic strategic position of Tuao in the Itawes lowland–highland trading nexus with the aim to create a self-reliant economy. By actively collaborating with the business community, Leonardo gradually established Tuao as an agro-business center which connected the Gran Cordillera and Cagayan Valley from 1978 to 1987. When Manuel succeeded Leonardo in 1988, he advanced his elder brother’s policy in 1992 by endorsing three agro-businessmen to run for the position of municipal councilor in Tuao, i.e. Loreto Mabborang, Calixto Genoveza and Peter Sy (Nestor Yap). In the 1995 and 1998 municipal elections, the three agro-businessmen were all successfully re-elected. The efforts to make Tuao a self-reliant economy have recently borne fruit. From 2005 to 2007, Tuao’s average annual income consistently surpassed the benchmark of fifty-five million pesos, which qualifies Tuao to be upgraded as a first–class municipality.189 From the 1980s to the 2000s, the Tuao grain-trading system gradually emerged as an independent realm of the Tuguegarao grain-trading system in two respects. First, Tuao grain-traders did not need to rely on Tuguegarao capital. In other words, Tuao is able to directly transact with Manila. Second, Tuao grain-traders compete against the Tuguegarao grain-traders. In order to retain harvests within the realm of Tuao, it is a general practice for Tuao grain-traders to constantly monitor and compete with the grain-buying prices in Tuguegarao. In recent years, Tuguegarao grain-traders have succeeded in extending beyond the boundaries of Tuao. To protect Tuao’s grain industry, the municipal government forged an informal consensus with the business community to enforce exceptional measures in exceptional times. For example, during the 2008 rice shortage, rice-buying prices in Tuguegarao were higher than those in Tuao. To ensure Tuao had enough rice reserve, the municipal government worked closely with some of the grain-traders and civic organizations. Checkpoints were set to enforce the ‘rice export ban’ and ‘truck ban’ policies in Tuao. The former mandated that no rice

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could be traded out of Tuao. The latter prohibited any non-Tuao–registered agro-business and truck from entering into and leaving Tuao without official permission. 190 All these measures were implemented through networks of eyes and ears.

6.4 Implanting the networks of eyes and ears Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them. Michel Foucault (2003: 29) In particular, the state’s enemies and rivals must not know the real resources available in terms of men, wealth, and so on, hence the need for secrecy. Michel Foucault (2007: 275) The present narrative poses an objection to two existing expositions. First, at odds with the argument that the Philippine post-colonial state’s surveillance and coercive capacities were already perfected in its colonial past (McCoy 2009), Itawes disciplinary and surveillance technologies were well formed in the pre-colonial period. Second, at odds with Foucault’s earlier exposition that human networks only serve as the passive conduits of power, the Itawes implant their disciplinary and surveillance networks on reflexive human agency. Reflexive human agency refers to the capability of observing, analyzing, gathering and relaying emerging circumstances from multiple sources not just to pursue one’s private interests, but also to regulate the self and others for the communal purpose of social control. This technology is also found among the non-colonized Ilongots in the upper Cagayan River Basin. Gossip, whispered reports and rumored stories have been crucial for the Ilongot tribesmen to conduct communal discipline and surveillance (Rosaldo 1980: 15). The Itawes incorporate similar techniques into modern state-building. These techniques stem from the idea of fatherhood. A mayor is usually addressed as ‘the father of the town’. What does it mean to be the father of the town in the Itawes Philippines? Local governance could be conceived as a form of sublimated parenthood – the elected chief executive is expected to give moral guidance and exercise

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subsequent disciplinary measures and punishments on the constituents as their parents. As the Ibanag and Itawes are closely related culturally, the following ethnographic description of Ibanag parenthood is instructive to understanding the Itawes art of instilling fear: The Ibanag parents [punish] their children for a misdeed more than the[y] praise them for a good deed. […] Children are forced to conform to parents’ expectation by intimidation. […] The Ibanag parents are authoritarian. Their favorite tools are punishments and scoldings. […] Although Ibanag parents may not be generous in showing their affection towards their children, deep down there is a soft spot in their hearts. Children […] are expected to be grateful to their parents. […] show their gratitude by being respectful and by supporting their parents in their old age. (Gatan 1981: 29–30) It is not unusual to learn that an Ibanag/Itawes mayor would slap in order to apprehend delinquents and petty criminals. Whereas Delfin Ting was known as the ‘slapping mayor’ and ‘boxing mayor’,191 Manuel Mamba also slapped with his own bare hands when he served as the mayor of Tuao.192 The fearsome effect produced from physical coercion may be called ‘discipline’ (Ibanag/Itawes: disiplina). It is a governance technique ‘to structure the possible field of action of others’ – a strategy to designate ‘the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed’ (Foucault 1984: 428; Wolf 1990: 586–7). The Ibanag/Itawes disciplinary technology consists of two sets of strategies in the maintenance of social order: non-discursive and discursive strategies. Non-discursively, discipline means direct infliction of physical pain is placed onto inhabitant bodies so as to correct wrongdoings, which resembles a father who uses his bare hands to discipline his children. Discursively, discipline produces and circulates discourses of coercion to construct an imaginary archetype about the strongman in order to instill fear and display political supremacy, as ‘the father of the town’, who symbolizes power and status, and has the right to act as ‘the Law’ (Kiefer 1972: 94). The disciplinary capacity of the strongman encompasses capillary ripple-like patronage networks that monitor the flow of information and sanction undesirable behaviors. The specifics of this governmental technology do not necessarily negotiate legitimacy from the formal legal system. It stems from the political symbolism that the strongman has the

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sole legitimacy to deploy physical force within organized networks of eyes and ears. As Blok (1981: 432 & 434) maintained, ‘the concept of honor is bound up with notions of virility and physical strength’, and ‘reputation can only be made and maintained on the basis of physical force and courage’. The Ibanag/Itawes strongman, as a physical person, addresses the motivation of using physical force, which is actually symbolic; that is, to claim political supremacy through displaying the highest honor. It is therefore not surprising to encounter coercive elements in Ibanag/Itawes governance. By using this symbolic yet physical surveillance mechanism, the strongman is enabled to trace sources of information through social networks of eyes and ears whose gossips and intelligence reports could be intercepted. The late patriarch of the Mambas, Francisco Mamba Sr., was the chief of the municipal police before he became the mayor of Tuao (1960–71). From the 1970s to 1990s, the municipal government received support from the police force and the military to confine communist insurgency, and self-organized a civilian-based vigilante counterinsurgency group. This paramilitary group was later known as the CAFGU of Tuao in 1987. Peak membership was estimated to be 1000-strong. Firearms were distributed to village officials for self-defense purposes. The municipal leadership held regular secret meetings to gather intelligence reports about the identities of newcomers at the village level. Constantly mobilized against the alleged Cordilleran and communist insurgents, a close-knit political network of eyes and ears centered on municipal leadership was developed. This commonly shared threat partially explains why Tuao is cohesively organized by the Mambas – political loyalty has been cultivated in the midst of imagined daily threats from the insurgents. In the 2000s, it is estimated that the municipal government maintained a 300-strong CAFGU. In 2004, its members wore distinctive uniform when on duty. Firearms were not assigned to everyone, but only to leaders, and only when necessary. Counterinsurgency in Tuao has not been without cost. It led to the killing of former mayor Leonardo in 1992. During the martial law period, Leonardo was close to Defense Minister Enrile. Enrile advocated all-out counterinsurgency movement in the country. Although the nationwide counterinsurgency movement officially started a month before the People Power Revolution in 1986, vigilante counterinsurgency operations had been conducted in Cagayan in the 1970s. Since the 1970s, Cagayan has been a heavily militarized and insurgent-infested region. In this respect,

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being close to Enrile, Leonardo had actively participated in the counterinsurgency scheme. The downfall of Marcos and the subsequent People Power Revolution in 1986 caused turbulences and uncertainties to Enrile’s political machinery and the Marcos loyalists. Leonardo was therefore abruptly turned out of office by the appointed mayor, Rogelio Garcia, in January 1987. In northern Luzon, a number of the identified Marcos loyalists were framed as alleged ‘warlords’ by the revolutionary government.193 This term might be used to demonize the overthrown Marcos regime and legitimate the Aquino-led revolutionary government. Although the NPA declared that they had killed Leonardo in 1992, the Mamba believed that their political rivals were behind the killings as it actually happened during election time. When it took place, the killers were looking for Manuel and read out a list of ‘crimes’ that they accused the Mambas of committing in Tuao.194 The death of Leonardo remains unresolved. Since then, the Mambas have, for a long time, remained self-reliant and kept other political figures in Cagayan at arm’s length. The Mambas recognize that it is most important to govern Tuao well. In the 2000s, after attending congress sessions in Manila for two or three days a week, Manuel would immediately go back to Tuao. At his residence in the weekend, people from all walks of life came for all sorts of help and assistance. Incidents may be reported and emergent assistance may be sought through a 24-hour cell-phone service, which was maintained by Mayor William Mamba. In 1991, the ‘Movement for Self-Reliant Tuao’ (MSRT) was officially founded by Manuel. Manuel initiated a self-governance movement to strengthen cooperation and communication between the municipal leadership and the village population. MSRT recruited volunteers to serve as contacts and intelligence outposts. MSRT annually recruited and renewed its volunteers. During the annual municipal festival in September 2004, Manuel conducted an oath-taking ceremony with some four hundred volunteers under a questioning statement: ‘It takes only one to destroy what we have built. Do you want to be that one?’ printed on the high wall of the Atty. Leonardo ‘Nards’ N. Mamba Memorial Gymnasium. Each oath-taker declared that: I, ____________, of ____________, Tuao, Cagayan, having been elected as _____________, of the Movement for Self-Reliant Tuao (MSRT) – Purok ___, Barangay of ____________, Tuao, province of Cagayan, DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY swear that I will well and faithfully discharge to the best of my ability the duties of my

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present position and of all others I may hereafter hold under the Constitution and by laws of the MSRT; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose the obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. SO HELP ME GOD.195 The MSRT network of volunteers became a parallel functionary to the elected village council. Apart from its role as a check-and-balance,196 the MSRT volunteers also assisted village councils to facilitate participation in a series of annual events in Tuao. For example, assisted by MSRT volunteers, the village council would be asked to raise funds, pull in resources and organize the locals to participate in annual municipal events, such as the Miss Tuao Beauty Contest. The annual contest serves as an important symbolic event. These beauty contests are not only competitions of young beauties, but are actually competitions between villages to build up solidarity among them. Each village unit nominates one contestant and provides her with the necessary resources. Each contestant not only represents her own family, but her performance also demonstrates the organization of the village as a whole – whether villagers can be effectively mobilized. Through beauty contests, villagers internalize their respective village identity, while a common Tuao identity is renewed and reinforced.197 In connection with the MSRT movement,

Picture 13 Speech by Congressman Manuel Mamba while inaugurating the annual ceremony for the Movement for Self-Reliant Tuao, August 2004. Source of image: Author’s collection.

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the Tuao Convention regularly holds decision-making events attended by Tuao municipal and village officials. Before each election starts, the convention attempts to agree on who will run for each position. It has proven to be an effective tool for the Mambas to keep the Tuao government stable, and facilitates communication between municipal leadership and village population, making Tuao a solid vote-bloc during election time when the Mambas enjoy a reputation of being fearsome. Why and how do the Mambas produce such a fearsome reputation? By drawing a comparison between the Tings of Tuguegarao and the Mambas of Tuao, the symbolism of ‘guns, goons and gold’ will be argued as an essential art to instill fear.

6.5 The symbolism of guns, goons and gold I have argued that frontier state-building involves a discursive strategy to instill fear and discipline in order to maintain social order. The Ibanag and Itawes terms for ‘fear’ are anasing and mattalaw, respectively, which may mean ‘terror’. The strongman is no believer of anarchic optimism. The issue of political control has been central to the question of statecraft – how is social order instituted and maintained? This entails a hegemonic project that Geertz (1977: 250–1) maintained should be built on a theory of political legitimacy, whereby internal ‘authority rests on a cultural congeneracy of ruler and ruled’ by which the ruled would ask their ruler:

Picture 14 Winners of the annual beauty contest in Tuao. Source of image: Author’s collection.

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‘Who are you that I should obey you?’ This ‘cultural congeneracy’ refers to the core discursive-symbolic force in which regimes are produced (Geertz 1977: 260). In Cagayan, fear constitutes the social control mechanism that successfully induces political submission. The instilling of fear requires the maintenance of discipline and surveillance of everyday life to which the subjects subsume and feel, which causes apprehension and cautiousness, and makes them think at least twice before defying normative codes. However, the fear produced also constrains the producing agents. Wherever Manuel goes, a convoy of vehicles carrying at least twenty fully armed security personnel accompanies him. To confuse possible assailants, Manuel often changed his choice of ride. In Tuguegarao, although the Tings instilled fear in others to maintain social order, threats against their lives and continual harassment are often inflicted upon them. If fear is an organizing force used in local governance, officials also internalize it and presume its potential threat. This can be shown by the types of firearms and number of security aides employed, especially during election time (Table 6.3). Political violence pervades political life less as an actual happening, but more as a potential threat which constitutes a culture of terror. Whereas the Itawes strongman projects an image of the strong-appearing ruling person, adversaries may sabotage their hegemonic images by making threats against their lives, inflicting harm or even taking lives. For the Nuer, who have been caught in years of civil wars, it is a common shaming strategy to kill family members to imply that the family head was not able to protect them – ‘real men [do] not stand by and [do] nothing’ (Hutchinson 1996: 134). The Itawes mengel has to carry arms not just to protect himself, but to ensure that his followers know their leader – the real man who can protect them. While the symbolism of ‘guns, goons and gold’ displays their political and economic powers over others, it has a discursive effect in that an Itawes mengel internalizes the moral obligation vis-à-vis their followers; to live up to a culture of bravery/fear – a double-edged sword serving both defensive and offensive purposes to defend and protect family members, clansmen, friends, clients and followers and their interests. Among the Itawes, it is considered to be a shaming strategy to kill the enemy’s protectorates in order to expose the enemy’s weakness and lack of capacity to protect and take care of his followers. As shown in Table 6.3, Manuel stands out as having the largest number of security personnel. If the discussion so far makes sense, one would

Table 6.3 Firearms used and number of security aides employed. Personality #

Manuel Mamba

Delfin T. Ting

Randolph S. Ting

Estimated 1.83 m/90 kg 1.78 m/70 kg height/ weight Personal firearm Magnum revolver¥ .38 Calibre Smith & Wesson revolver¥ Additional M-16 Baby Armalite None firearm used in rifle, with infra-red election night vision* No. of security 50 men 2–3 men personnel No. of security 50 men 6 men personnel (election time) Security Police, marine, Police and personnel military and civilian civilian composition Major types of M-16 Armalite rifles M-16 armalite firearms used by Uzi sub-machine rifles security guns .45 calibre personnel FAL shotguns semiautomatic .45 calibre pistols semiautomatic 9mm pistols semiautomatic 9mm semiautomatic pistols pistols

1.70 m/65 kg

Edgar Lara@ 1.70 m/65 kg

9mm .45 Calibre Semiautomatic Semiautomatic pistol§ pistol§ None

None

6 men

6–10 men

10 men

10–16 men

Police and civilian

Police and civilian

M-16 armalite rifles Uzi sub-machine guns .45 calibre semiautomatic pistols 9mm semiautomatic pistols Jericho 941F semiautomatic pistols

M-16 armalite rifles .45 calibre semiautomatic pistols 9mm semiautomatic pistols

Keys: # Generally, the choice of firearm depends on personal consideration and user’s weight and height. ¥ Although a revolver carries six bullets, the advantage of revolvers over pistols is that they do not jam. In the case of failure to fire, the revolver will continue to revolve until a bullet is successfully fired. § The advantages of pistols over revolvers are that they have automatic triggers and their magazines are fast-shooting and fast-loading. * This is a powerful firearm normally used exclusively by senior-ranking police officer. With a similar shooting range (460–550 meters) as its mother model (M-16 armalite rifle), the M-16 baby armalite rifle is half a size smaller and lighter. With a shoulder strap, it is a highly mobile and easy-to-carry firearm. @ Edgar R. Lara served as 2nd district congressman of Cagayan province (1992–5, 1995–8, 1998–2001) and provincial governor (2001–4, 2004–7).

Source: Fieldwork and interviews with firearm users and suppliers, 2004.

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expect that he has the most to fear. While terror intimidates and fear scares, fear/terror also implicates one’s exceptional bravery and capacity to protect followers. The Mamba charisma is characterized by the fear that they instill in others, giving followers a sense of security. The Mambas are therefore expected to instill the most fear yet display exceptional bravery in regime transitions (see Chapter 7). It is perceived that a congressman enjoys higher prestige than a local government official. A congressman’s primary task is to draft, debate and endorse national laws for the betterment of the country. The congressman also has more opportunities and exposure to national politics and a wider network. Although a congressman does not control more governmental funds than local officials (Table 6.4), s/he still enjoys an equally benevolent image. This is well illustrated by the displayed lavishness of annual birthday celebrations (Table 6.5). Loyal followers would give litson (roasted suckling pigs) to the birthday celebrants. Litson is a Filipino national delicacy, which costs around 3,500 pesos in Cagayan. The number of received litson reflects the political influence and status of the celebrant. Manuel also received game, such as deer and wild boar, from village headmen. To prepare for the feast, catering staff normally start cooking forty-eight hours before the celebration. This also applies to the Tings and other big-time politicians in Cagayan.

Picture 15 Congressman Dr. Manuel Mamba inaugurated family members as the local government officials of Tuao in 2004. Source of image: Author’s collection.

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Table 6.4 Estimated annual governmental funds received by the congressman, the governments of Tuguegarao city, Tuao municipality and Cagayan province, the Philippines.198 Tuguegarao City IRA* Local Revenue* CDF* PDAF* Chief Executive

P194 million P91 million N/A N/A Mayor

Tuao

P55 million P10 million N/A N/A Mayor

Congressman (3rd District) N/A N/A 55 million 15 million Congressman

Cagayan Provincial Government P505 million P68 million N/A N/A Governor

* Key: IRA – Internal Revenue Allotment is an annual fund distributed by the national government to local government units. Local Revenue – Locally generated revenue by the local government units. CDF – Country Development Fund is an annual fund allotted to every congressman/woman. PDAF – Priority Development Assistance Fund is an annual fund allotted to every congressman/woman. CDF and PDAF are usually combined and called ‘pork barrel funds’. Sources: The governments of Tuguegarao city, Tuao municipality and the Cagayan province, the Philippines, 2007.

Every year in Tuguegarao city, the Tings are obliged to organize birthday feasts that are open to visitors. Birthday feasts prior to elections would attract more visitors than in non-election years. Certainly it is a personal honor to receive an invitation, but in fact, anyone is allowed to join the lunch feast. Abundant provisions of local delicacies attract huge numbers of visitors to ensure that these occasions are big annual events. On February 3, 2004, starting at midnight, groups of visitors gathered at the mayor’s residence to congratulate him by singing birthday songs and presenting gifts and celebration banners. The mayor served them coffee and bibingka (local rice cakes). This continued until midday when rice, pancit (noodles), meat dishes and alcoholic drinks would be served. One could see crowds of people milling outside and inside the mayor’s residence, eating and drinking. More important guests were separately served. Visitors could freely take away food items. Cleaning the party venue meant the heaviest workload of the year for the catering staff of

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Table 6.5 Estimated numbers of visitors and food consumption at birthday parties for Mayor Randolph Ting and Congressman Manuel Mamba (2003–4). Birthday Party Celebrants Mayor Randolph Ting Congressman Manuel Mamba Dates of celebration February February 4, 4, 2003 2004 (prior to 2004 election) Number of Visitors 2,000 4,000 Food Consumption Water Buffalo 0 1 Cow 3 3 Domestic pig 5 5 Roasted suckling pig 19 26 (litson)# Wild Boar 0 0 Deer 0 0 Goat 3 3 Chicken 100 120 Duck 0 0 Dog 0 0 Rice 0.5 ton 0.5 ton Noodles (pancit) Plenty Plenty Alcoholic Consumption Brandy/Whisky/Gin 250 300 (bottle) Estimated Expenses 200,000 200,000 pesos pesos

August 18, 2003 August 18, 2004 (prior to 2004 election) 3,000 2,000 2 2 16 48

2 2 10 39

1 6 10 100 17 4 1 ton Plenty

0 0 7 50 5 3 0.8 ton Plenty

360

200

Unavailable

Unavailable

Source: fieldwork interviews with catering staff of Hotel Delfino, Tuguegarao city and congressman’s residence, Tuao East, Cagayan province, the Philippines, 2003–4.

Hotel Delfino. Cleaning normally took another one to two days. On February 4, 2004, an exceptionally large number of visitors turned up for the mayor’s birthday party, because of its proximity to the May 2004. After three hours of feasting, the celebrant had to officially halt the feast.A similar event is also held in Tuao every year. On August 18–19, 2004, during Manuel’s birthday party, security measures were taken at the entrance to monitor and control the flow of visitors. Visitors were asked

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to queue for food and drinks. The catering staff distributed food items to the visitors. Armed security personnel were responsible for maintaining order at the party venue. Cigarettes and alcoholic drinks were provided on request. Manuel sang songs together with the guests. One by one, guests openly presented their birthday wishes through microphones. More important guests were separately received with pulutan (appetizers). Rice and meat dishes were then served. Groups of visitors would then be cleared until the next group was admitted for another round of feasting. The Mambas and the Tings are both aware that that they have to annually observe this traditional custom in order to display their concern to the poor masses who work daily for a hand–to–mouth existence. The ability to organize annual feasting is already a prerequisite for becoming a local government official. As confided by core family members of the celebrants, annual feasting seriously affects the family financial situation because it involves huge expenses. In particular, for the past few years, business at Hotel Delfino has been partially dwindling because of the frequent presence of some voters who come for a range of monetary and non-monetary assistance. As told by several participants at the feast who happened to be tricycle drivers in Tuguegarao city, if politicians fail to organize a feast, the people may become angry with them. In fact, attending this kind of activity is a display of a political gesture, showing one’s support to the celebrant. Attending personal life-event celebrations also signifies a confirmation of the established personal ties with the celebrant, and one’s admitted difference in status to the celebrant. On the one hand, to eat someone’s food is to recognize the superiority of the food provider; on the other hand, organizing feasts is to realize the importance of the feasters. Through feasting as a ceremony, the followers negotiate ‘equality’ with the strongman, despite an admitted status difference. Negotiating for equality also involves gift-presentation to the celebrant. To present a gift item is to ask for recognition of one’s status among the followers. There are underlying rules of gift presentation. As Bailey (1971) remarked, a gift can also be poison. Presenting the wrong gift or at the wrong moment may ruin the relationship. During birthday feasts, only ‘qualified’ persons are expected to present a valued gift. These ‘qualified’ persons are normally close relatives, clansmen, ritual kinsmen, friend and working partners and confidantes who have achieved a certain high status within the hierarchy of the strongman’s followers. This person must be regarded as so by the celebrant and other followers to enjoy such status. Although these qualified individuals recognize the superior status of the

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celebrant, presenting a gift may also signify one’s personal financial capacity or his/her political influence to gather such an amount of money from one’s own followers. This is regarded to be a subtle message to the celebrant and the other feasters – the gift presenter enjoys a different status from other feasters – s/he may be so close and important to the celebrant that s/he wants to be recognized as such. For those who just come and feast, the event would simply mean that they are only capable of celebrating without asking to be recognized. In other words, the presented gifts pose a request of symbolic exchange on the part of the giver to the celebrant. If the celebrant does not recognize the giver, the giver may be offended. The strongman would also feel that he is being challenged when a giver prematurely presents what he considers to be an overly valuable gift for his status. When to give and when not to give; what to give and what not to give, all require sensitivity with respect to the relationship and situation. However, the general rule of thumb is to not sabotage the symbolic superiority of the celebrant in relation to the feasters as the benevolent caretaker. Of course, presenting a gift would inevitably attract attention, comparison and competition from other followers who are also seeking attention and recognition as being ‘important’ and ‘close’ to him. Intrigue and gossip would naturally follow. As the above has shown, there are various underlying reasons on the part of the Itawes mengel although ‘guns, goons and gold’ are the prerequisites for entering the political arena. Manuel earns the highest reputation for bravery. This is partly because of the history of Tuao as a historical frontier town fought over by the non-Itawes – the Spanish colonists, Kalinga, Japanese and communist insurgents. Another reason is that after the murder of Leonardo in 1992, gossip spread which speculated why he was killed by the NPA, and this generated a fearsome reputation for the Mambas. Since then, the Mambas have fully turned their attention to Tuao and succeeded in organizing Tuao as a solid voting-bloc through intensifying communication between the leadership and local villagers. But why are there no attempts by the Mambas to change their image? Why is their discourse of fear being perpetuated?

6.6 Instilling fear through enshrining bravery Sovereignty is, therefore, constituted on the basis of a radical form of will […]. That will is bound up with fear, and sovereignty is never shaped from above, or in other words, on the basis of a decision

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taken by the strong, the victor or the parents. Sovereignty is always shaped from below, and by those who are afraid. Michel Foucault (2003: 96) As Foucault insightfully pointed out, sovereignty may well be made through circulating a particular fear – the fear of death. To surveillance, sovereignty must therefore constantly evoke this fear and instill it into the masses by privileging the right to live over the right to die (Foucault 2003: 240). The following ethnography will illustrate this point. Lourdes is a Tuaoeña who dares to speak out against the electoral terror in Tuao which was known as ‘Operation Zero’. Previously a schoolteacher in Tuao, she was responsible for counting and validating votes in the 1986 snap elections. She confided that some teachers were so afraid that they would lose their jobs that they simply ignored the names of the opposition candidates that appeared on the ballots. This practice continued to deliver zero votes for the opposition candidates.199 Later, Lourdes disclosed her family’s reason for leaving Tuao. When she was a teenager, her family used to run a store that sold wine. One day, she witnessed a group of armed men who came into the store and assaulted her father as well as ransacked the store. The family then left Tuao. Lourdes believes these were Mamba’s men. Lourdes’ parents were already dead and I was unable to form a complete picture of what really happened during the time. Nor did Lourdes know, as her parents had subsequently never talked about the incident again. Yet through Lourdes’ experience, I realized that terror and fear may simply spread from stories told and retold – terror and fear may simply grow from terror and fear. Within the bulk of the life histories of internal migrants that I have collected, many families moved from town to town for political reasons. After his store in Amulung was ransacked by a group of armed men, businessman Doy immediately left for Tuguegarao with his family to start a new life. He was severely beaten up by the armed men, whom he believes were sent by the former mayor of Amulung, Rodolfo Morales.200 Morales used to command a private army during the peak of the communist insurgency. After listening to Doy’s grievances, I paid a visit to the ex-mayor to learn his side of the story.201 Surprisingly, although he declared that he had no knowledge of the incident, he honestly suggested that some of his followers abused his authority when he was the mayor. He frankly stated that being a leader meant that shouldering his followers’ wrongdoings was part of the job. Otherwise, one cannot win the loyalty of his followers. Manong Katigid pointed that within the politics of

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patronage, clients are often tempted to misuse and abuse the name of their patrons. By doing that, the clients would simply lay the blame on the most powerful person, making the victims more hesitant to make complaints, so the crime’s perpetrators could easily get away with the committed crime. Local wisdom suggests, ‘a fly rests on the head of a carabao (water buffalo), it starts to think it is also a carabao’. 202 The patron–client relationship is not static; the clients can often turn the tables around. Abusive clients are not uncommon. In Tuao, the Mambas are fully aware of their fearsome image. Yet in certain ways, it works well for their governance. Given the volatile political situation of this frontier town, the Mambas find it necessary to maintain an image of fear. In Tuao, to be feared is to be respected. Without fear, peace and order cannot be maintained. Marcita Mamba Perez, an elder sister and chief-of-staff of Manuel when he was congressman, was the first person who gave me a warm friendly welcome within the family by stating that ‘we are dangerous’ while smiling. Her sense of humor was evident when she asked me to check the Concise Oxford Dictionary to see that the word ‘Mamba’ actually refers to ‘a large, agile, highly venomous African snake’ – that is why the Mambas have earned a reputation of fear and astuteness.203 The Mambas later revealed how they were entangled in regional politics. Although Aguinaldo, Enrile, Alfonso Reyno Jr., Delfin Ting and Leonardo Mamba worked together in the 1980s, individual political ambitions split them apart. In 1992, while Enrile was running for First District Congressman of the Cagayan province, he and governor candidate Aguinaldo supported Alfonso Reyno Jr., who ran against Leonardo for congressman of the Third District, Cagayan province. Recalled by Cristina, the widow of Leonardo, frequent life-threatening phone calls were made by anonymous individuals during the 1992 campaign period. The callers also threatened any children in the house. To the Mambas, the 1992 election was perhaps the closest encounter with terror that they had ever personally experienced. Unsurprisingly, the opposition candidates were all suspected after Leonardo was murdered during the electoral campaign. The death of Leonardo not only signified a loss to the family, but also signaled a change in the political players. Francisco Mamba Sr. picked up the candidacy and won massive sympathetic votes in Cagayan. Being the eldest son in the family, Manuel started to take over the leadership role in Tuao. Mentored by his father, who decided to retreat to the sidelines,

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Manuel continued to serve as the mayor for a second term, and reposition his governance to attend to the needs of the people, gradually turning Tuao into a solid base for the Mambas. In 1995, while his younger brother Francisco Mamba Jr. took over as mayor, Manuel ran for congressman and successfully took the seat from his father. In the same electoral campaign, supported by Congressman (then Senator-elect in 1995) Enrile and Governor Aguinaldo, a charismatic leader of the right-wing RAM, Colonel Gregorio Honasan campaigned in Cagayan province to become a senator. As a 1971 graduate of the PMA, Honasan had also enjoyed a charismatic reputation of violence vested with romantic power and extra-masculine projection – he used to entertain special guests with a jar of dried ears slashed from the corpses of Muslim rebels in Mindanao (McCoy 1999: 218). One of his famous personal statements plastered on his former office door next to the Cultural Centre of the Philippines along Manila Bay was: ‘My Wife Yes, My Dog Maybe, But My Gun Never’ (McCoy 1999: 218). In the 1995 election, Honasan came to Tuao to campaign without notifying the Mambas. Manuel went with his armed men and forcibly drove them out of Tuao.204 Politics is like the weather in Cagayan. In the 1998 election, Aguinaldo who was a long-time resident of Gattaran in the 1st district of Cagayan, chose not to run against Senator Enrile’s son Juan Ponce Enrile Jr. for congressman (1st district, Cagayan province) in exchange for campaign funds from Enrile when he finished his three-term governorship. Instead, Aguinaldo ran against Manuel for congressman (3rd district, Cagayan province), citing evidence of residence in Tuguegarao.205 Instrumental to Delfin’s aspiration to be the provincial governor, Aguinaldo sided with the Tings and won massive support in Tuguegarao.206 This was Manuel’s first one-on-one encounter with Aguinaldo, a widely claimed expert in psychological warfare and combat strategy. Seeing that Manuel had gained endorsement from most mayors, Aguinaldo aimed to break down Manuel’s political machine by targeting the only link between the mayors and the local villagers – the village officials. Aguinaldo’s group campaigned (except in Tuao) with armed personnel to spread a rumor that Manuel had bought their votes through the mayors. He asked every villager if they had received money. The talks led to suspicion on the part of the village officials and successfully sabotaged the trust of local villagers in their mayors. After breaking down the political machine of his opponents by creating a vacuum of trust between the ruling elite and the masses, Aguinaldo again projected himself as a Robin Hood. In the meantime, his

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camp deployed tactics of terrorism to intimidate the Mambas and their followers. The Mamba house in Tuao received death threats by telephone. Registered voters in Tuguegarao also recalled that Aguinaldo used to campaign house-to-house with six to seven fully armed militiamen.207 Surprised by his ability to know residents by name, many were intimidated, and afraid that he would get back at them after the election. Aguinaldo defeated Manuel in 1998 by a margin of 6,551 votes. In the following three years, Manuel continually reflected on the lessons to be learned from his defeat. First, he recognized that endorsement from the mayors was not as useful as direct support from the village officials, who are most in touch with the ordinary populace. Secondly, he also recognized that Aguinaldo’s military background gave him the extra support which Manuel lacked. In 2001, Manuel ran for congressman again against Aguinaldo in an attempt to regain his seat in the congress. However, in this election, Manuel had a new strategy. First, he won the support from the leftist political party, Bayan Muna, led by Saturnino Ocampo, an NPA spokesperson-negotiator and allegedly a tortured victim of Aguinaldo. This move also implied necessary support from the NPA given to Manuel that neutralized Aguinaldo’s military capacity. In the 2001 electoral campaign, fully recycling Tuao’s counterinsurgency machinery and surveillance networks for the purposes of electoral mobilization and electioneering, Manuel went around with heavily armed security guards to project the fearsome Itawes mengel archetype. Tactically, he disregarded the mayor endorsements, but spent three full years establishing a solid network which directly connected him to the village councils in each municipality. Equally important, instrumental to Delfin’s attempt to gain support from Tuao’s solid vote bloc in his second attempt at becoming provincial governor, Manuel sided with the Tings and won substantial support in Tuguegarao city. This time, life-threatening phone calls were again received. However, the Mambas were ready and bravely answered: ‘Show yourself!’ and ‘Come to Tuao! We will ambush you along the sugarcane field!’208 Manuel eventually defeated Aguinaldo in 2001 by a margin of 6,768 votes. Over a month later, Aguinaldo was assassinated in Tuguegarao city, allegedly by the NPA. Back at congress, Manuel suddenly found himself a feared figure, for he managed to defeat ‘the legend of Cagayan’ – the late Aguinaldo.

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6.7 Conclusion In the May 2007 election, the Catholic Church’s National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) announced the official result in favor of Randolph’s candidacy for congressman despite the fact that the final count declared Manuel’s victory over him. Led by Tuao’s parish priest, Father Gerardo Perez, the clergy of the Archdiocese of Tuguegarao, continued to express concerns in public and social occasions in regard to the alleged practices of electoral intimidation and vote-padding in Tuao.209 After a short period of silence, in the presence of the parish priest, Congressman Manuel forcibly reminded the audience what it really meant to be an Itawes mengel: I am a creation of circumstances. Circumstances create me. […] In Tuao, do not teach us to be good, we are already good! Do not teach us to be bad, we can be the worst! To fight against the kind of corrupt politics prevailing in this country, the Itawes are ready to go back where we were!210 Bravery is the twin of fear. Without fear, there is no bravery. Although the Mambas and the Tings share similarities under the local taxonomy of ‘guns, goons and gold’, Manuel’s bravery and fear enjoyed an exceptional reputation. This can be traced back to the turbulent history of Tuao, where the Itawes have been safeguarded by their unique disciplinary and surveillance technologies. Known as a war-like and cohesive community, the Itawes have been fighting to defend their territory from outside intruders. The Mambas are an archetype of this distinctive culture of bravery. By savoring the bitter taste of terror, mortality, grief and defeat, they manage to live with such and transformed them into bravery. The supreme Itawes mengel for the state-building project constantly needs to coordinate two clashing personalities. On the one hand, one has to perform bravely and present benevolently in order to win the support of the valiant Itawes. On the other hand, as Tuao is situated on a transitional frontier of the sprawling state and vulnerable to the state–frontier dilemma, mortality has been part of political life. In this chapter, I have illustrated that even though the Mambas have been reusing the pre-colonial Itawes technologies of discipline and surveillance, they also entail agency which strives to create an orderly and progressive community in Tuao. Although they have changed their political sides and established various tactical alliances in past decades, these have given them opportunities to acquire and combine new ideas, strategies and tactics for

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state building. Since a local CPP-NPA leader has already shown ‘potential for lower-class, reformist, political organization that may build on former NPA networks – including links with urban intellectuals and other members of the provincial middle class – possibly under the aegis of a populist reformist party’ (Rutten 2000: 460), the Mambas seem to possess this potential. This potentiality was illustrated when Manuel campaigned for the post of congressman in the 2004 and 2007 elections. This will be detailed in the next chapter.

Picture 16 Flyer of the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Tuguegarao, 2004. Source of image: Author’s collection.

7 Exceptional Democracy: Conceiving Philippine Elections as a Sovereignty-making Pinball Machine

7.1 Introduction In continuation of past elections, the Tings of Tuguegarao city and the Mambas of Tuao re-enacted their rivalry in competing for the position of congressman (3rd district, Cagayan province) in the 2007 election. Issues of electoral fraud, vote-buying, electoral violence and terrorism continued to be major public concerns. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Tuguegarao took the initiative to invite all of the electoral candidates in the Cagayan province to declare their willingness to observe the following conducts of election by signing a ‘covenant’ and a ‘candidate’s manifesto’:211  

To comply with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and all COMELEC Resolutions that govern the conduct of the national and local elections. To set an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding for each other and resolve any political difference among us peacefully and in accordance with law.

186   

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA To avoid foul or fraudulent means like mudslinging and character assassination to ensure victory. To desist from employing acts or threats of violence against persons involved in the electoral processes, political leaders, and voters. To afford civilian protection by ensuring our respective political followers to faithfully abide by, observe the essence of this Memorandum of Agreement.

In front of the countersigning witnesses (the Archbishop, the provincial election supervisor and the regional police commander), Randolph and a representative of Manuel signed the documents. In Tuao, the parish priest Father Gerard Perez implemented a voter education program by utilizing the penetrating ecclesial-communal networks at the village level (Picardal 1995), in parallel with the implanted networks of eyes and ears by the Mambas.212 This parallel functionary was designed to address the alleged presence of fraudulent electoral practices.213 The congressional race between the incumbent Manuel and the challenger-candidate Randolph consistently showed a neck-to-neck tie.214 The Catholic Church’s Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting

Picture 17 Tuguegarao city mayor Delfin Ting and Tuguegarao Archbishop Sergio Utleg during the Archbishop’s installation ceremony, 2011. Source of image: Author’s collection.

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(PPCRV) and National Citizens’ Movement for Free Election (NAMFREL) concluded Randolph’s victory with an 870-vote margin over Manuel, i.e. 68,330 votes to 67,460 votes.215 Shortly after polling day, however, an additional 3,000 voters in Tuao were reportedly mobilized to cast their belated votes in favor of Manuel’s candidacy.216 Afterwards, Romeo Cu, a cousin of Randolph, was assaulted by followers of Manuel for being suspected of conducting electoral fraud outside the counting hall of the Tuguegarao city government. 217 Public protests against electoral terrorism and vote-padding were then gathered outside the office of the Archdiocese of Tuguegarao.218 The following weeks witnessed a series of legal hearings in Tuguegarao and Manila, and re-canvassing conducted in the Provincial Board of Canvassing, Kamaranan Hall, Cagayan provincial government. Around 1,000 individuals from Tuao were found gathering outside the Cagayan provincial government and drumming up their support for Manuel.219 In the midst of lawsuits and debates, 220 privy informants 221 from the two political camps and the Catholic Church as well as the legal sector commonly concluded that it was Senator Enrile – the Cagayan-hailed supreme sovereign – who finally intervened and endorsed the final COMELEC official count, which was in favor of his party-mate Manuel’s candidacy.222 This occurred despite the fact that the Mambas and the Tings actively lobbied from a range of state agencies in favor of their different versions of the electoral result. How can we make sense of these episodes? Two relevant strands of Southeast Asian state-society relations may be relevant. Informed by Migdal’s (1988) ‘weak state’ theorization, the proponents of the first approach conceive that post–colonial states have been resiliently tarnished by a top-down structural complex of elite rule formed during the colonial eras. This elite rule is mainly composed of oligarchic families, rent-seeking cronies and local bosses, which is maintained by exclusive ties of kinship, patron–client relationships and friendships (Hutchcroft 1991; McCoy 2002). By resorting to unlawful practices, such as vote-buying and violence, these entrenched oligarchies occupy electoral offices in order to perpetuate and advance their private interests at the expense of public welfare (Anderson 1988; McVey 2000). For instance, despite the fact that nationwide democratization grants citizens the civil right to elect state officials, elections were still reportedly tainted by coercion and fraud (Ockey 2000; Sidel 2004). According to this line of thought, it seems that democratic elections are not only improperly

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implemented at the local levels, but also used by the elite to perpetuate their political and economic powers. In contrast to the top-down conceptualization of the first approach, the second strand proposes a bottom-up perspective. Informed by the resistance school (Colburn 1989; Scott 1985), it approaches state–society relations from the viewpoint of the ruled majority. Apart from using armed insurgency (Goodwin 2001), value-based non-violent practices are found in which the grassroots actors negotiate for policy changes (Franco 2000; Kerkvliet 2005). For instance, although there are law-violating electoral practices, ordinary villagers, informed teachers, media practitioners and members of the civil society are not hesitant in exposing and contesting fraudulent electoral practices (Bowie 2008; Kerkvliet 1996). Electoral democracy not only has normative effects over the actors who generate a range of diverse meanings (Institute of Philippine Culture 2005), but is also locally defended. These two theoretical strands portray quite different pictures about how electoral democracy may be conceived. On the one hand, elections are the instrument for the political elite to legitimize their claims to hold public office and gain access to state resources. On the other hand, elections allow issues and concerns to be raised and addressed by actors who are genuinely concerned about public affairs, which also brings about social transformation (Eaton 2003; Quimpo 2005). Nonetheless, in the light of governmentality-informed and cultural perspectives of state formation (Dean 1999; Migdal 2001; Steinmetz 1999), the two strands seem to downplay the aspect that elections function as an instrument for the state to encroach into the intersubjective landscape of the population and re-affirm its sovereignty. This chapter aims to fill a knowledge gap where there is the need to re-conceive and substantiate elections as a sovereignty-making instrument for the post-colonial state.

7.2 Conceiving elections as a sovereignty-making pinball machine If one understands by democracy the effective exercise of power by a population which is neither divided nor hierarchically ordered in classes, it is quite clear that we are very far from democracy. Michel Foucault (quoted in Chomsky and Foucault 2006: 39) [I]t cannot be denied that, in many respects, fascism and Stalinism simply extended a whole series of mechanisms that already existed

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in the social and political systems of the West. After all, the organization of great parties, the development of political apparatuses, and the existence of techniques of repression such as labor camps, all that is quite clearly the heritage of liberal Western societies, and all Stalinism and fascism had to do was to stoop down and pick it up. Michel Foucault (quoted in Fontana and Bertani 2003: 276) Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. Carl Schmitt (2005: 5) While Foucault spoke of the inherently problematic sovereignty-making technologies in both ‘totalitarian’ and ‘democratic’ states (Fontana and Bertani 2003: 275), Schmitt (2005: 12) traced the decisionist and non-rational characteristics of liberal democracy to the recurring situations of ‘exception’ or ‘legal indeterminacy’ (Scheuerman 1999). This is where state delegates dictatorially suspend the established legal order and impose arbitrary conclusions onto the ruled population in order to preserve political unity (Schmitt 1921). Both Foucault and Schmitt concluded that there is a tendency for the state to keep itself intact at the expense of the human subjects and their rights. State-building therefore represents a form of ‘internal colonization’ which may be found in Western and non-Western settings. While Habermas (1987) identified the ‘colonization of the life world’ in which state imperatives penetrate and distort everyday social life in Western capitalistic societies, Scott (2009) found ‘internal colonialism’ in the relatively stateless highland Southeast Asia where frontier inhabitants developed astute ways to evade the subjugating mechanisms of the state. The ‘internal colonization’ argument may be pertinent in explaining the persistent recurrence of human-induced sufferings. Nonetheless, there are other innovative ways for a nationalizing state to include the frontier populations without creating a zero-sum state–frontier dichotomy. One such way is to conceive state–frontier relations in terms of murky and uncertain contact zones where the forces of the nationalizing state and the frontier societies imbricate and synergize with each other through electoral democracy. Democratization refers to the design, institutionalization and actual operations of regularly held national and local elections mainly for the centralizing state to create and localize discursive order into the society. The frontier refers to the population’s inter-subjective landscape where the state strives to meddle with and

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attempts to assert its superiority. In state-building, the state aims to lodge its imprints into the most wanted frontiers, which are individual subjectivity and communal inter-subjectivity. This means that the frontier population will either voluntarily or otherwise comply with rationalities and formal rules, observe national interests, and act in line with the state’s ambition to create an orderly society through re-shaping identities and reforming practices (Huntington 1968; Migdal 2004). In other words, state-builders must bear ambition and determination to establish a total state (stato totalitario); a de facto perfect society (societas perfecta) (Schmitt 1999: 22). Such a society can discriminate those who are the ‘enemies’; the ‘negated otherness’, which contrastively justifies the existence of ‘friends’ (Schmitt 2007: 28 & 63). Nevertheless, to correct Schmitt’s over-stress on politics for enmity, Derrida (1997) reminded us that politics for friendship is equally significant in this endeavor. The above exposition has a few implications for understanding electoral democracy in the post-colonial Philippines. First, election is a state-building strategy which involves both the elite and the masses. In other words, the institutionalization and practice of nationwide electoral democracy would be untenable without the larger objective of building a unifying state. Since the idea of democracy was first received in the colonial Philippines, it has been localized and morphed into a different set of discourses and practices. Therefore, the idea of democracy has been equivalent to the practice of electoral politics in contemporary Philippines. In definition, Philippine electoral politics involve the arenas and processes for the state and societal actors to engage and meet each other on issues. The state then uses these issues to continuously find inroads to exercise its sovereignty by meddling in local disputes and make finalizing claims. Metaphorically, Philippine electoral politics may operate like a pinball machine game. The electoral aspirant-candidates are the pinballs which are ‘shot’ (formally endorsed) by the responsible state agency. Candidates must be qualified state subjects. The state and non-state actors serve as the bumpers, targets, saucers, slingshots, spinners and rollovers as well as ramps which together shape and reshape the bouncing tracks and points (i.e. the number of votes) of pinball-candidates so that each of them would have something to gain. To win an election, the pinball- candidates are expected to work hard to ‘hit’ (contact) the voter-targets and have their conducts ‘bounced’ (checked, regulated and redirected) by the law, state agencies and societal actors as well as their electoral rivals. While this pinball machine game is supposed to work smoothly, electoral anomalies

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and disputes provide the necessary inroads for the sovereign state to take on and make the finalizing conclusions. In summary, exceptional democracy refers to the governing techniques of Philippine elections as a pinball machine for which the issues of citizenship, vote-buying, electoral terrorism and electoral fraud constitute the major entry-points for the sovereign state to meddle in local disputes and conclude upon their state of affairs. Although these issues may sometimes appear to be unpalatable, they provide the necessary venues for the sovereign state to re-affirm its sovereignty in the frontiers. In the forthcoming pages, I will substantiate this argument by illustrating how these issues affirm Philippine state sovereignty.

7.3 Contextualizing elections in the Philippine state–frontier nexus Elections are regarded as ‘perhaps the most important ritual of legitimization found in modern nations’ (Kertzer 1988: 49). Given the contesting nature of Philippine elections, its ceremonial nature is both productive and reproductive. On the one hand, an election disperses a national culture across the archipelago and enables it to take root in local societies by turning the voting population into ‘Filipino citizens’, the legitimate subjects of the Philippine state. Therefore, Philippine elections are more than ritualistic actions – they are ceremonial agents of transformation. In particular, four historically resilient issues seem to stand out in elections: citizenship, vote-buying, electoral terrorism and electoral fraud (Hau 2004; Kerkvliet 1996; Paguio 1969; Tutay 1969). In the foregoing chapters, I have demonstrated how the frontier strongmen are formed within the contextual specificities of local society and the larger backdrop of state formation. The strongmen are raised within this state–frontier nexus while they strive to act upon the constraints imposed upon them. Their life histories show criss-crossing networks that connect local societies and the central state. Political life that involves the central state has been mainly manifested in routinized events which surround electoral politics and local government. Participation in these events can be seen as submission of the local powers to a larger overarching order that regularly draws the boundaries where local powers compete against each other and the winner is determined through elections. The winner occupies political offices as congress(wo)man, governor, mayor, councilor, village official, and so on. The authority attached to the position defines one’s jurisdiction. Although the practice of patronage connects local powers with central state actors, the idea of the ‘Republic of the Philippines’ continues to have a discursive role,

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maintaining an imagined ‘exemplary center’ where the local powers can clearly identify where they stand within the instituted state hierarchy and territories (Geertz 1985). Without the imagination of a state ‘center’, its ‘frontier’ population could not have existed. Here, an ‘imagined’ national community is territorialized by a mythical yet charismatic ‘center’, reconstituting the state through regularly held ‘theatrical’ ceremonial events (Anderson 1991; Geertz 1980). Philippine statecraft certainly has many substantial distinctions from Balinese statecraft, but it does not mean that the two do not have a common ‘theatrical’ character. In the Philippines, elections have been conducted in recourse to the symbol of ‘democracy’ since Spanish times, and were fully instituted by the American regime. Since the Spanish colonial era, local elections have been a regularly held political event in the Philippines. 223 In Cagayan Valley, where the Spaniards aimed to maintain a tobacco monopoly and political control, local elections were largely used to legitimate the local datu-elites (principales) and Spanish colonial supremacy. Elections allowed the principales to run for public office as cabezas de barangays (village chiefs) and gobernadorcillos (petty governors), civil servants under the supervision and control of the Spanish alcalde mayor (the Governor General), and substantial influence from the parish priests. Therefore, local elections have already been regarded as an integral part of Cagayano political life: The indigenous principales seemed to have taken the electoral process as seriously as the Spanish authorities. The proposition that the local elite shunned the office of gobernadorcillo, if true in the provinces of Central Luzon, did not hold for Cagayan in the second half of the nineteenth century. The office was desirable and desired, an object, in fact, of keen competition, perhaps because with it came the concurrent appointment as caudillo [field supervisor] of the tobacco monopoly. The power and prestige that went with the office invited attempts at manipulating the elections to keep the post under the control of one individual or family. (de Jesus 1978: 154) At that time, candidates gave out favors in exchange for votes, and in some cases, used threats against opposition voters. Although in principle the candidate who received the highest number of votes should get the post, it was not uncommon for Spanish officials and parish priests to disregard the ballot results at their own discretion (de Jesus 1978: 156).

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This historical depiction has value for reference, but whether elections nowadays would still only formalize a foregone political decision will require more careful examination. Ethnographic observations in the Cagayan province in the 2004 elections indicated that: (1) elections are a transformational state-building ceremony, and (2) elections involve a contesting state-building process that in turn consolidates state sovereignty. The first observation suggests that state subjects internalize a Filipino national identity through election participation. The second observation maintains that elections enable participation of the state and society actors in the state-building process which surrounds an imagined sovereign center – the head of the State, that is, the President (Pangulo) of the Republic of the Philippines (Agpalo 1999). Before evidence is provided in the following sections, some working definitions will be given here. State-building in the electoral context entails processes of discussion, debate, expression of opinions, lobbying and decision-making as well as compliance which contribute to the crafting and implementation of central state and local government policies, and eventually affect the collective welfare of the constituents. As a regularly conducted state ritual, elections could transform and renew the voters’ sense of togetherness in relation to a national imagery (Anderson 1991), constituting a Filipino identity. In his classic study of nineteenth-century Balinese politics, Geertz (1980) determined that the sacred Balinese concept of negara (state) was expressed and renewed between two opposing forces through the reenactment of regularly held mass rituals and ostentatious ceremonial events: the centripetal one of exemplary state ritual and the centrifugal one of state structure. On the one hand there was the unifying effect of mass ceremonial under the leadership of this or that lord. On the other there was the intrinsically dispersive, segmental character of the polity considered as a concrete social institution or, if you will, as a power system composed as it was of dozens of independent, semi-independent, and quarter-independent rulers. (Geertz 1980: 18–9) Applying this Balinese analogy to post-colonial Philippine polity means that these two opposing forces have discursively constructed an imagined community where its state actors submit to and re-enact the subscribed theatrical roles as well as the embodied sacred belief of a state hierarchy

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occupied by democratically elected officials. 224 As a unifying force, elections have carried out nation-state notions of citizenship, representative government and civil rights which reach all corners of the archipelago. In terms of centrifugal force, modern Philippine elections have been ‘recycled’ in the sense that the principales have been continuously elected into public offices at local and national levels (Siu 1989), which can be regarded as a continuation of Spanish-instituted local electoralism and American-introduced national suffrage. However, at present, electoral processes are never pre-determined, but constantly negotiated, contested and renewed. According to Kerkvliet (1996: 163), elections provide an arena of democratic struggle for state and societal actors to discuss, debate and clarify issues, platforms and agendas. Electoral struggles have been conducted under a master narrative of liberal democracy in which state sovereignty is affirmed. Although there is a hegemonic national culture to be internalized by the voting population, voters are seen to be free to produce alternative meanings attached to these symbols (Institute of Philippine Culture 2005). In other words, elections not only affirm state sovereignty, they can also transform and diversify the meanings of sovereignty. To better grasp the contesting propensity and transformational capacity of Philippine elections, it would be empirically viable to select issues as ‘arenas’ for investigation (Kerkvliet 2001: 238). Three arenas are selected. All of them illuminate the significant role of the media in the discursive formation of the state. First, I will discuss how the disqualification case of congressional candidate Delfin in 2004 represents an electoral issue that in turn reinforces the ‘legal identity’ of the modern Philippine state as being exclusively limited to the Filipino citizenry (Scott, Tehranian, and Mathias 2002). Secondly, the discourses and practices of vote-buying will be examined. I will argue that the contested issue of vote-buying reveals an archipelago-wide ripple-like patronage network that centers on the head of the state – President Arroyo, who charismatically performs as the imagined maternal center of a web of patriarchal strongmen as her equally-treated children. This center–frontier image of the Philippine state was activated during the 2004 election when Arroyo won the support of both the Tings of Tuguegarao city and the Mambas of Tuao, who had competed for the single position of congressman. Although vote-buying is regarded as illegal, it is morally embedded, because it is not merely an economic exchange, but also entails symbolic actions for people to generate multiple

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meanings. Although competing cultural values of compassion, dignity, pity, rule of law, social justice and civil rights are the symbols used for negotiations (Cannell 1999; Kerkvliet 2002; Pinches 1991; Schaffer 2001), benevolence and fear still mediate between the elite and the masses. This points to the third issue: electoral violence and terrorism. Although electoral violence and terrorism are illegal, they are subtly celebrated culturally, as candidates have to display virtues of bravery, toughness and political will when necessary. The display of one’s bravery in locally acceptable forms requires creative efforts. In the 2004 Mamba– Ting contest, Manuel first mobilized his congressional funds to finance development projects, a few days before the official campaigns started. At the end of the campaign, accompanied by a local media group, and in front of the cameras, Manuel grasped the opportunity to display his bravery and toughness in an incident against the Cagayan Philippine National Police (PNP) third provincial mobile unit, led by Colonel Delfin Bravo. Bravo was originally dispatched by Director Rodrigo de Gracia, the Cagayan provincial commander of the PNP. In brief, confronted by the threats posed by his political opponents who reportedly assaulted his followers in a national COMELEC ‘hot spot’, the municipality of Enrile, Manuel went to rescue them with his armed police group. However, the provincial police received an executive order from the provincial governor (Atty. Edgar Lara, who was from the opposition camp) to disarm alleged armed goons who failed to comply with the gun-ban law. Manuel’s group was identified and disarmed. Guarded by an eight-strong squad of Tuao police aides, Manuel personally resisted and wrestled Bravo’s M-16 Armalite rifle from him. As the Philippine state coercive agents, the police, on the one hand, aim to maintain law and order with the frontier strongmen. On the other hand, this scenario again proves that the strongman has differentially absorbed the police force for electioneering. Copies of the Bravo–Mamba incident were made on videotape and video-CD, and freely circulated. These three issues constitute arenas of state–society interaction, which enable us to identify the ways that the Philippine state localizes its sovereignty. These arenas are both public and private. They are public issues because the governing elites are being drawn into a pinball machine-like arena where they have to engage, perform and negotiate for legitimacy. Alongside the mélange of the padrino system and modern symbolic ideals, these arenas also appear as a source of private dilemmas and public tensions that the frontier strongmen have to face and resolve,

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which forces one to generate a creative and coherent narrative when aspiring to be a Philippine government official.225

7.4 Exceptional Filipino: citizenship of genealogy In the Philippines, local elections are held every three years, while national elections are held every six years. In the May 2004 election, both local and national elections took place in Cagayan Valley. There are certain requirements for candidates. One clear criterion is that any aspirant must be a Filipino citizen. In the third district of the Cagayan province, aspiring mayoral candidates supported by Manuel ran against the incumbent mayors of Tuguegarao city, Enrile, Iguig Peñablanca, Solana and Amulung, except for the political base of the Mambas – Tuao. With the original intention to run for provincial governor, Delfin was persuaded instead to run for congressman by these mayors.226 Delfin and Manuel were tactical allies in 2001 when they ran against the late former governor and congressman Aguinaldo (Chapter 5). Historically, the Mambas and the Tings have been political rivals since 1992, when Randolph first ran against Leonardo for congressman. Since Leonardo was murdered during the campaign period, opposition factions were suspected. In 1995, Raphael Ting ran against Manuel and lost. In the same year, Manuel refused to sponsor a congressional bill to convert Tuguegarao from a first–class municipality into a component city.227 In 1998, Manuel lost the congressional seat to Aguinaldo. Tuguegarao cityhood was on Aguinaldo’s electoral agenda. After Aguinaldo won, he subsequently authored a congressional bill – Tuguegarao successfully became a component city in 1999.228 In 2004, the Mamba–Ting contest was a continuation of the theatrical drama of the strongmen in the eyes of local informants.229 Yet the first contested issue still deserves our attention because it reminded the inhabitants of Cagayan Valley that democratic elections in the Philippines are exclusively for the Filipinos. According to Article VI Section 6 of the Philippine Constitution, members of the Congress must be a ‘natural born Filipino citizen’ (Republic of the Philippines 1987). A ‘natural born Filipino citizen’ is different from a ‘naturalized Filipino’. The former requires the individual to be born to at least one Filipino citizen by blood. A foreigner can be ‘naturalized’ as a Filipino citizen through a legal process, but s/he is not a ‘natural born Filipino citizen’. One’s genealogy naturally becomes the basis for making citizenship claims in the Philippines. In general, to assign a ‘permanent family surname’ to an individual is regarded as a production of ‘legal identities proper to states’ (Scott, Tehranian, and Mathias 2002).

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Naming is seen not just as a legitimating practice, but also a territorializing strategy for the state to include its population through genealogizing individuals as proper citizens, who enjoy exclusive civil rights within the territory of the state. In an ethnographic study of genealogies in rural China, while maintaining that Chinese genealogies are considered part of national history and therefore the Chinese state encourages a genealogically informed nationalism, Pieke (2003) also revealed that: [g]enealogies are thus never complete and never exist in total isolation. As a material object and a repository of knowledge they are both an instrument and a metonym of the people whom they connect over space and time. […] Locally, a genealogy evidences the perpetual bond between members of a descent group, pouring blood into the vessel of co-residence. However, as part of an ever-proliferating corpus of genealogies elsewhere, a genealogy potentially connects each and every individual, family and local descent group with people far and wide and, more importantly, with the history of their origin, migration and growth. (Pieke 2003: 110). Although the above findings are generated from the context of contemporary China, it has equal value with reference to Southeast Asian nation-states where blood-ties play an indispensable role in the creation of citizenship. Moreover, genealogy can also serve as a powerful tool to transcend ethnic boundaries through intermarriage. Legally testified genealogy, therefore, can be seen as an identity-making process conducted by the Philippine judicial state apparatus in local societies. In the Philippines, the changing definitions of what it means to be ‘Chinese’ have been parallel to the Philippine state-building process since the Spanish times. Wickberg (1997: 176–7) stated that although in certain periods, ‘even some unmodified Chinese surnames, such as Tan and Lim, became accepted as proper Filipino surnames’, the Philippine Chinese’s ‘long-standing association of interest in Chinese culture with loyalty to China will not be dissipated overnight’. Certainly Wickberg’s observation has its validity, but it is also undeniable that there are Chinese-Filipinos who attach their political loyalty only to the Republic of the Philippines. As a modern consciousness, the Filipino national identity stems from a creolized cultural continuum that encompasses a range of intermingling ethno-linguistic groups230 who inhabit the archipelago. This creolization process partially explains why the ethnic category of ‘Chinese’ in the

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Picture 18 Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile inaugurated the Tuguegarao Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1984. Source of image: Hotel Delfino.

Philippines is still resilient. The Tings of Tuguegarao city trace their genealogy to Chinese, Ibanag and Ilocano ancestries. However, their continuous involvement in the trans-local Chinese-Filipino circle and their leadership positions in the Tuguegarao Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc. have given them opportunities to link up with the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc. (the Federation) in Binondo, Manila. The Federation’s exclusively ethnic Chinese membership consists of some prominent graintraders and rice millers, as well as the richest businessmen in the country. Being a ‘Chinese’ in Tuguegarao may also mean privileged access to this secretive ethnic business network.231 As there is a practical reason to be ‘Chinese’, the status of ‘Chinese-Filipino’ seems to be a term more proper to the Philippine state, as leading Tuguegarao Chinese-Filipinos especially the Tings who constantly reminded me that they are politically loyal only to the Republic of the Philippines and its head of the state – the president of the Philippines (Pangulo ng Pilipinas). Historically, the political loyalty of Tuguegarao Chinese-Filipinos was first crystallized by a legal dispute filed by former mayor Dr. Florentino Fermin against Delfin. In the 1987–8 electoral campaigns, Delfin presented himself as a ‘Chinese’ alternative to other ‘non-Chinese’ mayoral candidates as a campaign strategy. Regarded as an ‘industrious’ and ‘hard-working’

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‘Chinese’ self-made businessman, his platform emphasized social, economic and infrastructure development, which aimed to bring ‘progress’ and ‘economic development’ to Tuguegarao. 232 In the Philippines, many Chinese-Filipinos keep Chinese names that may be different from their Filipino names. For example, an individual may call himself Rotilio Martinez in the Filipino language, but ‘Tan Chih 陳志’ (surname underlined) in Chinese.233 In this case, a Filipino name can be acquired by taking the family name of one’s Filipino godfather. Another common way to acquire a Filipino surname is to claim that one is the child of a relative who already enjoys Filipino citizenship. For instance, an individual may be named as Gabriel Chan after his Chinese-Filipino relative, whereas his original Chinese name remains ‘Dy Shua Dai 李山 台’ (surname underlined).234 Both ways would need to go through a legal process to be verified and endorsed by relevant governmental agencies, especially the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, where corruption is believed to be present. Although the Chinese have gained Filipino citizenship, they are still regarded as ‘those not among us’235 – the implicit meaning carried by the Filipino word Intsik.236 Shortly after Delfin took office as the mayor of Tuguegarao in 1988, the opposition leader who gained the second highest number of votes, former mayor Florentino Fermin, filed a civil case which aimed to disqualify Delfin’s declaration of victory, based on one major charge: Delfin ‘is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese national’.237 Fermin stated that there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that Delfin was the legitimate son of Clarita ‘Clara’ Telan (an Ibanag-Filipina) and Tao Ting (a Chinese national). Fermin presented an ‘alien identification certificate’ which stated that Ting’s original name was ‘Delfin Gollayan’, plus a petition document which recorded the cancellation of his alien registry and a new ‘identification certificate’ that renamed him as ‘Delfin Telan Ting’, a ‘Filipino citizen by election’. All the documents were dated February 10, 1965, and obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Manila. The Regional Trial Court in Tuguegarao accepted the case, and a subsequent trial was held to resolve the two following contentious issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent [Delfin Ting] lacks the citizenship requirement as provided by law. (2) Assuming that the above is in the affirmative, whether or not the petitioner [Florentino

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Fermin] is entitled to be declared as the duly elected mayor of Tuguegarao.238 In response to these issues, Delfin presented five witnesses. In their testimonies, the respondent’s genealogy was presented to the court for evaluation (Figure 7.1). Delfin explained that because his Filipino mother was not legally married to his Chinese father, he was not recognized as a ‘natural born Filipino citizen’ until February 10, 1965, when the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation in Manila cancelled his alien registry and recognized him as a ‘natural born Filipino citizen’ ‘by birth’ in the new ‘certificate of identification’. Delfin also further testified that his father left them at a young age when he was eight years old, so his mother renamed him as ‘Delfin Gollayan’ to honor his foster-father, Roman Gollayan. He restored to his original name on the same date. The court ruled that as a legitimate son of a Filipina and a Chinese national, Delfin ‘is a Filipino at birth’. Based on the faith that the testimonies given by the witnesses were reliable, the judge concluded: [T]he fact remains that it was sufficiently established by the evidence adduced that the respondent [Delfin Ting] is a natural child of Clara Telan, a Filipina, and as such, she falls within the purview of Article 3 – Citizenship, Sec. 3 of the Constitution as earlier adverted to. A ruling in point again in the case IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE, respondent, (supra) is quoted hereunder: ‘mother is a Filipino citizen – Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship. Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled’. (capitalized and underlined in the original)239 Further investigations suggested that due to the political sensitivity of the case, this legal verdict would not be finalized without the prior knowledge of Cagayan’s supreme sovereign during the time, Enrile, with whom Delfin had long established ties.240 As a result, despite the fact that there were areas of doubt in the case, Delfin was arbitrarily ruled as a ‘natural born Filipino citizen’ legally – a typical Schmittian exception. Notwithstanding the legal verdict, Delfin’s citizenship issue was again revived in the May 2004 election for a similar reason – he was not a ‘natural born Filipino’ so he was not qualified for the position of

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congressman. 241 On a hot morning on March 26, 2004, the first ‘breaking–news’ of the electoral campaign hit Tuguegarao’s radio and television stations, and local news agencies – the disqualification of Delfin, filed by petitioner Mayotino R. Fernandez, a village chairman from the Municipality of Tuao. According to the COMELEC, a disqualification of candidacy would only be investigated if the petitioner could personally present the documents to the concerned candidate. As a result, three Tuao municipal government employees, accompanied by a Tuao policeman, went to Hotel Delfino to personally present the petition documents to Delfin. The case itself was not crucial at that point, but it became so when these individuals reportedly threatened to bomb Hotel Delfino at around six o’clock on the evening of March 25, 2005, after the hotel’s desk reception refused to accept the petition documents on behalf of Delfin, who was not in the premises at the time.242 These individuals were reportedly ‘detained’ in the Hotel Delfino. According to them, they were ‘verbally threatened’ and ‘physically assaulted’ by an armed group led by Hilario Ting (the fifth son of Delfin).243 Tuguegarao mayor Randolph arrived at Hotel Delfino and called the Tuguegarao city police to settle the incident. Everyone involved in this incident had to go to the police station for investigation. Thereafter, the opposition candidate for provincial governor, Leonides Fausto, a first-degree cousin of Manuel, also went to the police station to mediate the dispute. Outside the police station, Fausto and his armed police group accidentally met Mayor Randolph’s armed police group. Having been informed by reports that the opposition camp had maltreated his three Tuao town-mates, the atmosphere suddenly turned tense when Fausto pointed his M-16 Armalite rifle at Randolph and verbally challenged him. The Tuguegarao city chief of police intervened and settled the situation immediately by inviting the two for a peace talk inside his office. Cases of ‘illegal detention’, ‘grave threats’, ‘slight physical injuries’ and ‘unlawful arrest’ were also filed by the three Tuao individuals against the two Ting brothers and former policeman Paquing Banan, a candidate for city councilor who accompanied Randolph to the Hotel Delfino. Newspapers then reported the incident, highlighting the fact that Randolph and his brother were facing criminal charges.244 While a few incidents of alleged ‘harassment’ and ‘terrorism’ were reported to the media,245 Hilario denied the charges in a radio program and stated that his father, Delfin, was qualified to run as a congressman as he was a natural–

= ?

= ?

Domingo Telan

= Roman Golayan

Hilaria Golayan%

Regina Telan

=

=

Hanga Ting¥

? (In China)

Tao Ting§

Sebastian Golayan

Delfin Ting

Edwina Ting

Clara Telan$

Dattwin Domingo

Cenon Domingo*

Rey Domingo

Key: (Male); (Female); = (Married to); ? – Unknown name. ¥ – Hanga Ting was also named as ‘He Ting’. § – Tao Ting, a Chinese national who had a wife in China, was then the first husband of Clara Telan, daughter of an Ibanag couple who resided in Barangay Lattu (now Barangay San Jose), San Pablo, Isabela Province, the Philippines. Tao met Clara as a helper of his sister, Hanga. Tao and Clara lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of the sacrament. Tao had been missing since his guerrilla involvement against the Japanese occupation of Luzon in 1944/5 and the family believed the Japanese forces took him. $ – Clara was also known as ‘Clarita Telan’ and ‘Itay Telan’. She died on April 7, 1984 in Lattu (now San Jose), San Pablo, Isabela province, the Philippines. * – Cenon Domingo was a soldier who met Clara after Tao was listed missing. They also lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of the sacrament. % – The family name ‘Golayan’ can also be spelled as ‘Gollayan’.

Source: Civil Case No. 3813 (May 16, 1991). Florentino M. Fermin, Petitioner, Versus Delfin T. Ting, Respondent. Tuguegarao: Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Second Judicial Court, Branch IV.

Figure 7.1 Delfin Telan Ting’s legally testified genealogy, as of May 16, 1991.

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born Filipino citizen.246 The Hotel Delfino incident actually involved two issues. The first issue was the disqualification petition against Delfin’s congressional candidacy. The second issue was the accusations and legal charges filed against Randolph, Hilario, and Paquing Banan. Oddly, the immediate media reports were not able to separately clarify the two issues, but were inclined to highlight the elements of alleged terrorism and electoral violence in the incident. I discussed this incident with local media practitioners, and with the Mambas and the Tings. Based on their accounts, I have made two observations. First, the Philippine media has a tendency to report on explosive situations in order to attract public concern to how elections are being conducted. The media has come out against public issues in Cagayan Valley, which are electoral violence and terrorism. Secondly, in my encounters with the Mambas and the Tings, they commonly pointed out that reports on the incident were exaggerated in various ways. During the campaign period, voters whom I interviewed in Tuguegarao city commonly asked a similar question: if Delfin is not a Filipino, how could he have been the mayor of Tuguegarao since 1988?247 To suggest that Delfin was not a ‘natural born Filipino’ is literally a denial of their previous votes for him in those elections. Some also questioned why the political opposition did not file the case long ago before the May 2004 election. Thus, Delfin’s citizenship issue was regarded as ‘election-related’.248 Alongside the public discussions, Delfin’s citizenship quickly sprawled into another issue in the campaign – economic disparity and social injustice. Perhaps one of the most severe critics of the issue was the former vice-mayor of Tuguegarao, Victor Perez, a prominent Cagayano educationist, the president of the Cagayan Colleges of Tuguegarao (CCT). Perez joined Manuel’s team and ran as an official LAKAS (Lakas ng Bansa; Strength of the Nation) party candidate for provincial board member. In his campaign speeches, Perez specifically addressed the issue of economic disparity and social injustice in Tuguegarao city and Cagayan Valley in general – that Chinese-Filipinos have controlled economic life and are attempting to control the political life of the people. From his ten-year service in the government, Perez informed the voters about the political economy of the businesses of the Chinese-Filipinos and their political participation. To escalate the issue, Perez boldly appealed to the residents of Barangay Tagga (a rural Ibanagspeaking village east of Tuguegarao city) in his campaign speeches with regards to the ‘inequality’ and ‘injustice’ that existed in the Philippines:

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We are Filipinos! […] Look at these Chinese – they have controlled the business, the economy, and now they want to control our politics. Shame on Tuguegarao! I tell you the truth - they make business from our government. How many bags of cement do they supply? How much hardware do they supply? […] Did Delfin Ting ever kick a Chinese? Did he ever slap a Chinese? They are underestimating us – my brothers and sisters. I tell you what: we are not going to be ruled by the Chinese!249 The Chinese-Filipino business community in Tuguegarao city showed its concern about the escalation of the issue and was afraid that the issue might turn into an ethnic conflict.250 This could partially explain why the Chinese-Filipino community in Tuguegarao city consistently emphasized to me that they are not merely ‘Chinese’ but ‘Chinese-Filipinos’ and the fact that many of them have ‘Filipino blood’. Being a leader of the Chinese-Filipino community, Delfin went on several local radio and television programs starting from mid-April, to speak about this issue: My personal identity is an open card. I am Delfin Telan Ting – no question on that. If they are questioning my citizenship, who is this petitioner? Based on this legal document, he is Mayonito Fernandez. He is a Barangay Captain of Tuao. That’s why – this only shows that they are hiding behind this Barangay Captain, the official whose real intention is to hinder my candidacy. […] When there was a hearing in 1989 about this case filed by former mayor Fermin who attempted to disqualify me, first and foremost, they also went to the Bureau of Immigration. This was the same case used by my political rival in 1988. Their basis for disqualifying me was their belief that I am a Chinese national. Now, in this disqualification case that they again filed against me, they did not read the decision of the court on the 16 May 1991 given at Tuguegarao, Cagayan. I am now going to give each and everyone of you a copy so that you will be able to judge whether I am a Filipino or not. I will give you a copy of this legal verdict. I don’t think about this very much now because in my heart, I am a Filipino.251 Although the disqualification case was dismissed, the issues of economic disparity and social injustice remained so important that the political elites have been obliged to address them during election time through ordinary and extraordinary means.

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7.5 Embracing the maternal center: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Vote-buying has been a historical and global phenomenon, and does not exclude the Western liberal democracies (Schaffer 2007). In the Philippines, the resilience and pervasiveness of this phenomenon can trace its moral roots to the ethics of utang na loòb. Political modernization does not necessarily sweep away vote–buying. As noted by a Filipino observer, vote buying may operate in indirect forms: Once a candidate has sworn in a registered voter as a partisan poll watcher, he or she can expect that the latter will vote for him or her. Our Filipino trait of utang na loòb is evident on this case. Once a person has granted us something, a favor, we would do everything to pay that favor back to him or her. […] We tend to view persons who did us some good things as benefactors, and we view ourselves as beneficiaries who can please them by doing the same for them. (Bava 1998, quoted in: Schaffer and Schedler 2005: 9) In Mexico, vote-buying is differentiated between ‘authoritarian and semiclientelist’ (Fox 1994: 158). The former requires the coercive capacity to acquire proof of compliance in exchange for money, whereas the latter relies on the notion of trust especially through ballot secrecy, although voters also accept money beforehand. Hence, Mexican semiclientelist vote-buying throws valid doubts upon the straightforward economic exchange model of vote-buying behavior – instead of seeing voting in direct correlation with monetary gains, we need to recognize that there is a moral system that governs how one votes. In the Philippines, it is often held that vote-buying (bumibili ng boto) stems from the politics of patronage in which moral values of the padrino system are (re)-interpreted and negotiated between the elites and the masses (Chapter 4). On top of that, I also conceive vote-buying in terms of the practical use of benevolence, compassion, pity and fear which garner votes and consolidate legitimacy. Beyond its legalistic connotation, vote-buying is seen within the broader moral context of Filipino patronage, which effectively connects the central state and local powers in the Philippines. Giving out favors in exchange for votes not only exists between local elite and the masses, but also exists trans-locally between national political icons and local powers. However, because Philippine state laws regard vote-buying as an illegal act, condemning it would naturally demean Filipino morality. As a result, vote-buying is situated in a

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dilemma found in Philippine state-building, where traditional morality competes and collides with modern ideals of democracy and rule of law. In elections, aspirant-candidates would have to face and disentangle this tradition–modernity dilemma by conducting a series of exchange acts with local voters and national political icons. Through these exchanges, the tradition–modernity dilemma is re-enacted, and forms the integrative forces that glue the imagined state center principally represented by the head of state, together with its peripheral voting populations represented by the strongmen at election time. Although vote-buying is often regarded as undesirable in elections, it paradoxically reinforces the idea of a Philippine state among the voting population. In Cagayan Valley, vote-buying as a practice first appeared in Spanish times (de Jesus 1978). After Philippine independence, the term ‘vote-buying’ first appeared as a legal and political discourse in Tuguegarao in the 1960s.252 At that time, the Tuguegarao voting population was small. Electoral campaigning and polling procedures as well as canvassing ballots were not as organized and systematic as they are nowadays. Voters simply gathered together in the polling places. Before they voted, the candidates distributed food, clothes, money and other material in ‘good will’ (Ilocano: naimbag a nakem), especially to the poor – meaning that they did not openly ask the voters to vote for them, but only ‘to share’ and ‘to help’. In fact, it is considered to be morally unacceptable to blatantly give and receive money in exchange for votes. This is because some voters, especially the poor, consider the money given as a token of the moral obligation that the political elite have to fulfill as their patron – for taking money for nothing is considered a damage of respect (galang) and dignity (karangalang): From the standpoint of ordinary people, however, elections are the times when equality and justice are temporarily achieved as their patrons fulfill their financial obligations to support them in times of need. Those who do not comply with these expectations are simply not voted [for], as in the case of our activist who did not even shake hands with the electorate. (Ibana 1996: 130–1) In delivering in-campaign services, the moral obligation of the debt of gratitude on the part of the voters was further cultivated to compel them to vote for the one who gave the favor as the patron (Pinches 1991). As an underlying message, the inability to give (on the part of the patron) and

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return (on the part of the client) this favor is regarded as ungrateful or shameless. Through this cycle of symbolic exchange, a constellation of trans-local patron–client networks is renewed by elections. In the 1960s, voters would simply raise their hands to cast their votes in Tuguegarao. Anonymity was not observed. However, since the 1970s, Marcos’ benevolent politics of patronage poured massive funds into developing the road network and infrastructure in Cagayan Valley. Hence, elections and plebiscites were monitored and therefore conducted in a more sophisticated manner in order to ensure that his international legitimacy was comparable to Western standards – anonymity was guaranteed, and openly giving money in exchange for votes was considered unlawful. Since then, money, favors and services have been requested and delivered in other indirect, creative and subtle ways during elections and other times in exchange for political support. Gradually, in parallel with the practical reality of vote-buying, a state-endorsed discourse also emerged which interpreted ‘vote-buying’ and ‘vote-selling’ as illegal acts. In the 1970s, the former mayor of Amulung, Rodolfo Morales, was known as an exemplary hardliner who defended (and utilized) the anti-vote-buying law. Commanding a 200 paramilitary unit, his bold anti-vote buying scheme was to give a shoot-to-kill ultimatum to opposition candidates who were suspected of vote-buying activities.253 The political opposition then interpreted his anti-vote buying scheme as ‘electoral terrorism’. In the May 2004 election, the incumbent congressman Manuel firmly advocated for ‘No to Vote Buying’.254 He vowed to the people of Tuao that any vote-buyers and vote-sellers in Tuao would not be forgiven. 255 During the election, individuals and groups were reported to be warned by armed men because they were suspected to be involved in vote-buying activities. These media reports simultaneously constitute the discursive effect of fear which created a powerful sign to the voting population by transmitting the message that vote-buying was not only illegal, but also evil and punishable. Historically, the practice of vote-buying has been accompanied by fear in order to ensure vote delivery. Common perceptions suggest that vote-buying began in Spanish times when elections were first introduced. In Cagayan Valley, creative tactics of intimidation have been adopted in different ways. The most common way was that before or after distributing money to the voters, the candidate would campaign, sometimes house-to-house, with heavily armed men. During polling day, candidates would stand outside the polling station with heavily armed men

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as a gesture to remind the voters who received their money and material largesse. In every village, money for vote-buying would rarely be entirely delivered to the voters directly. A middleman, widely known as the lider who represented her/his clan or political followers would receive money from the candidate who intended to pay the voters within the leader’s sphere of influence. This leader would also be the coercive agent to make sure that votes were delivered to the right candidates. Voters were asked to record their ballots onto carbon paper while filling in the ballot at the polling station. After casting the vote into the ballot box, s/he would return the carbon copy to the leader as proof. In the 1980s, it was once common practice to give a voter a pre-filled-in ballot before entering the polling station. The voter cast the pre-filled-in ballot, and gave the blank official ballot that s/he received in the polling station to the next voter who was waiting outside the polling place. The next voter would then fill out the blank official ballot according to instructions and bring out another blank ballot for the next voter. This is called lanzadera (Spanish for shuttle).256 These practices have been severely contested by NAMFREL and are now more effectively sanctioned in Cagayan Valley.257 However, because of the perceived rampancy of vote-buying that began in the 1990s, it is not uncommon to encounter a leader who tends to receive money from opposing candidates. 258 To understand the cause of the perceived rampancy of this practice, two angles would be useful. First, vote-buying is a product of collision between the patronage tradition and modern ideas of democratic practice and civil rights. Vote-buying is the official term appropriated by a centralizing state that attempts to disperse a judicial system and regulate local political actions. In local societies where historically patronage has played a pivotal role, it is therefore not surprising that local informants are reinterpreting and utilizing vote-buying in different ways. In my own fieldwork, it was difficult to identify a common meaning of vote-buying because there are competing meanings. Similarly, in a comparative study of vote-buying behaviors in Benin, Taiwan, Japan, Portugal and the Philippines (Schaffer and Schedler 2005: 17), payments given during election time are perceived in transactional perspectives: an advance payment, a wage and a gift; and are interpreted in symbolic meanings: a reparation, an affront, a threat, a sign of virtue, a sign of vice and a sign of strength. An electoral payment always embodies multiple meanings, both to the giver and receiver(s). Often, these meanings contest against each other, leaving the givers and the receivers with dilemmas and uneasiness.

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For example, the members of a rural family with nine legitimate voters once concomitantly received money from three opposing candidates who were running for provincial governor some time in the 1990s. The family head told me that because the family was so desperate for money – harvests had been destroyed by typhoons – the election provided an opportunity to ask for money from politicians.259 Members of the family were subsequently apprehensive that politicians might take revenge against them. Eventually, they decided to equally divide the family’s votes into three groups, casting three votes for each candidate. To the family head, the family had done its part in repaying his utang na loòb. Although he knew that the politicians could monitor the actual turnouts of voters at the village level through their surveillance networks of eyes and ears, none of the politicians came back to them in the end. However, he said that he hoped that he would never have to do that again due to two reasons. First, it is ‘shameful’. He felt ashamed partly because as the family head, he failed to deliver a full number of votes to the politicians, and partly because it was illegal. Nowadays, it is almost impossible to investigate and prosecute vote-buying because it is conducted in illicit ways and nobody would dare draw attention to the buying and selling in a tight-knit surveillance network society. Secondly, it is risky because the aforementioned head of the family later learned that there was an occasion when a politician had asked a leader to reimburse the money after knowing that his opponent had received more votes than him in this village. At the end of the interview, although he stated that he will not sell votes again, he could not promise that the family would refuse money in future elections, because like other ordinary Filipino families, they are still poor in comparison to the elite.260 Ordinary people expect money from politicians as their patrons, who they look up to. Although they know that vote-buying is illegal, they will still take money from anyone who is handing it out. Taking money does not mean selling votes. They would decide who to vote for based on a complex set of factors, such as educational background, platform, charisma, etc., and the individual that the lider asks them to support. The leading anti-vote-buying campaign relies on the theory that if politicians buy votes, they will get the money back once they are in office. Hence, vote-buying is the root of ‘graft and corruption’.261 However, despite its illegality and intellectualized counter-discourses proposed by the educated and civic groups, vote-buying has been resilient. If we are going to understand this phenomenon more comprehensively, we should

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view it as a socially interdependent phenomenon. Although vote-buying is considered illegal, it is still regarded as a moral practice. To understand this illegal yet moral practice, a reconstruction of a native ‘model’ of Filipino society serves as the starting point. Informed by a journalism-trained Cagayano businesswoman and triangulated by other learned informants in the locale, modern Filipino society is divided into five strata: A, B, C, D and E classes.262 This native model also coincides with a similar model found in a piece of literature on Philippine politics (Laquian and Laquian 2002: chapter 8). Accordingly, people of Class A are considered to be the ‘super-rich’. They are big businessmen and politicians. They live luxuriously in big houses with gardens and swimming pools, as well as other amenities maintained by employed helpers. To the majority of Cagayanos, Class A people are unreachable and far away from their real lives. Estimated to be 5 percent of the population, Class B people are successful entrepreneurs and local politicians who manage to luxuriously live in air-conditioned houses, catered by domestic staff and enjoy well-prepared food. Most of them have their own cars, probably more than one. Class C is the middle class, occupying roughly 10 percent of the population. They are mostly farm owners and educated professionals. Although their lives are not as luxurious as those of Classes A and B, they still enjoy comfortable lives with a stable income, and perhaps some additional sources, from running small businesses which enables them to maintain a family house, own a car and send their children to good local private/state universities. Classes D and E constitute the majority of the population in Cagayan. Class D is the lower class. They may have a radio, television, refrigerator, and perhaps washing machine, but they live a hand-to-mouth existence. Class D consists of clerical staff in governmental agencies, farmers, and small stall owners in public markets. They live in simply furnished hollowblock houses covered by zinc roofs. Although some of them may own farmland, they still have to borrow credit from grain–traders to buy seeds and rent equipment for farming. During harvest time, they need to repay this credit by sharing their harvests. There has been a continuing trend for Class D people to work overseas. They remit money back and manage to build better housing for their families and so improve living standards. Class D people are estimated be about 50-60 percent of the population. The remaining 25-35 percent of the population is usually Class E people.

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Class E faces daily difficulties in meeting their basic needs. They have to work daily and live hand-to-mouth, working as low-paid employees in stores and warehouses, as well as in local business enterprises as sales staff or physical laborers. These people are the warehouse keepers, farmland hands, store employees, and those who continue to look for temporary jobs based on a daily wage (pacquio). Although Classes D and E are usually stereotyped as ‘lazy’ and ‘depressing’ (roughly means ‘apathetic’), the political elite often express sympathy, pity and respect for these less fortunate groups.263 Anti-vote-buying campaigns have been mainly supported by some of the educated individuals and professional societies who uphold the modern ideal of democracy and rule of law. They would anticipate that politicians distribute material considerations during election time to show their sympathy and concern for the less fortunate poor while appealing to modern ideals of equality and justice.264 Classes D and E people resist the use of the derogatory term of vote-buying because they believe politicians should know that they are poor and ought to help them.265 Government officials are obligated to be compassionate and sympathetic, and should take good care of the poor and less fortunate. In fact, although the poor insist that they have ‘hard lives’ (‘mahirap ng buhay’), ‘Hindi mo ako mabibili!’ (You can’t buy me!), they have self-respect.266 Although they may ask for favors from the politicians, they still have to consider the better candidate. Classes D and E may consider that favors delivered by politicians as their patrons during election time demonstrate their benevolence and sympathetic concern. In other words, a patron does not indiscriminately give out favors. Favors would only be given to voters who are Classes D and E people. Moreover, in the politics of patronage, services would only be given to those who show relative loyalty. It would not be advisable to pay opposition loyalists since their cultivated ‘debt of gratitude’ to their respective leaders would be insurmountable to cover. In short, the logic is that they will not sell votes, but only expect ‘considerations’ as a symbolic token of pagmamalasakit (sympathetic concern). To some, they would decide whom to vote for by taking into consideration the most sympathetic candidate who is willing to help the poor masses out of deprivation and poverty, according to a face-to-face assessment. Candidates therefore all have to campaign hard in order to get in touch with each voter to express their genuine concern. Politicians frankly told me that they have been taken hostage by this type of voter, who utilizes elections for non-democratic purposes.

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Several media reports covered the fact that a few days before the electoral campaign which began on March 25, 2004, Manuel had distributed cheques of 50,000 pesos from his congressional fund through the Tuao municipal government to every village council-chairperson (barangay captain) in the third congressional district of the Cagayan province.267 According to my fieldwork in selected villages in the district, the report appeared to be true.268 In my personal encounters with Manuel, I sensed that there were private constraints through his personal reflection as a Filipino politician: as a player in the patron–client network, one could not act with absolute freedom because, as the leader, he has to attend to the needs of his followers. Similar to the United States (Ferejohn 1974), ‘pork barrel politics’ or allocating congressional funds to one’s own electoral district, this has been widely practiced in the Philippines (Coronel 1998). In a subsequent inquiry, Manuel defended himself on two counts. 269 First, giving out public funds for ‘village development purposes’ before an electoral campaign was regarded as legal and subject to his own discretion as a congressman. Nevertheless, to the ordinary villagers in the far-flung villages of Western Amulung, the money did not necessarily fall into their hands because the village chairpersons (barangay captains) did not report to them how the funds were used.270 The second reason is a tactical consideration. Since Manuel had foreseen the ‘rampancy of vote-buying’ in the election, the 50,000-peso checks were intended to pre-neutralize the anticipated vote-buying effects. However, the opposition and the public immediately protested that the checks were an alleged act of vote-buying.271 There were considerable media reports and public discussions with regard to the issue of vote-buying in the May 2004 election, especially by local civic groups and the Catholic Church.272 Caught in a moral-legal dilemma, the electoral candidates also knew the cultural logic of the poor masses well.273 They needed to show their compassionate support and sympathetic concern for the poor people, and then hope that they would vote for them. As I have stated, this is not simply vote-buying as in the eyes of the poor masses, this is about compassion and dignity. Apart from courting the votes of the masses by giving out favors, the use of fear was also reported. Compared to the Mambas, the Tings were less capable of deploying fear because of their business involvements, which inhibited them because the voters are also their customers. To the Mambas, bravery and fear had long been celebrated and utilized in Tuao’s governance (Chapter 6). Manuel gained the support of the PNP regional commander

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of Region 2, General Jefferson Soriano, who granted him more police support specifically for the maintenance of necessary law and order against vote-buying. Armed groups were dispatched to roam around the whole district in order to prosecute vote buyers and vote sellers.274 Pulling in support from the COMELEC and the NBI, Manuel was able to maintain close surveillance and prevent the whole area from being involved in vote-buying activities.275 Philippine electoral regulations limit electoral expenses. After an election, candidates have to provide accounts of expenses. Due to the perceived rampancy of vote-buying, many think that these accounts of expenses are underestimated.276 Candidates have to source considerable funds from private donations, party support and, even worse, ‘kick-backs’ from governmental projects.277 A dominant local discourse suggests that politicians could get this money back from the government when they are in position.278 Whether this is true still needs further verification. In my own observations and encounters with these government officials, this suggestion disregards the central–local monitoring and accounting mechanisms imposed on the use of local governmental funds (Brillantes 2003; Williams 1981). Local government officials of accounting and auditing departments commonly remark that the rising financial surplus of the Tuguegarao city government revenue reserve since 1988 may be enough evidence to suggest that Tuguegarao governance may be an exception from fiscal mismanagement. In the case of Manuel, he drove me around to show me the development and infrastructure projects in other municipalities279, which was to contrast the comments that he had used congressional funds only for Tuao. Hence, it would be fair to suggest that Manuel allocated the funds to other towns in the congressional district, and perhaps for election-related purposes. These ongoing contested issues of ‘graft and corruption’ seem to be a healthy exercise for a more transparent and honest government in the Cagayan province. Due to the need to source considerable campaign funds, locating vote-buying within the larger framework of Filipino national politics where patronage connects the centralizing state and local power could help to reveal another aspect of reality. Patronage is conducted within the symbolic framework of traditional Filipino values and modern ideas of democracy, the rule of law, justice, equality and so on. To illuminate this archipelago-wide patronage network, the arrival of President Arroyo in Tuguegarao city was an important ceremonial event to the people of Cagayan Valley in 2004.

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Manuel and Randolph belonged to the same political party as Arroyo – LAKAS-Christian and Muslim Democrats. As a core member of LAKAS, which was originally founded by former president Ramos, Arroyo also founded her own ‘back-up’ party to consolidate her own party – KAMPI (Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino; Partner of the Free Filipino) which was incorporated into LAKAS during the May 2004 election.280 Although she literally belonged to two parties, she was the sole candidate for LAKAS in this election. The multiparty system of the Philippines has prospered since the fall of Marcos. Party membership entitles one with access to the necessary political machinery and financial support in elections. The multiparty system appears to be well suited to the politics of patronage because the local powers can flexibly negotiate for support based on their bargaining powers, to the extent that they could garner votes from their bailiwicks. Since the Mambas and the Tings have been known as frequent players in Cagayano politics, any political party and national politicians would come to Tuguegarao city and Tuao to drum up support, given the relatively large voting population of Tuguegarao city and the solid votingbloc of Tuao. Delfin himself has remained neutral, although Randolph joined KAMPI in 2001. In May 2004, Delfin remained an independent candidate, yet he openly supported Arroyo, which entitled him to become the official candidate of KAMPI alongside Manuel as the official candidate of LAKAS. This awkward but creative positioning worked well to the advantage of all three. Arroyo gained the assurance of support from the local elite of Tuguegarao city and Tuao. Manuel and Randolph both received support from Arroyo and her parties. Both subsequently campaigned for Arroyo. In a LAKAS official motorcade, a Filipina fictitiously named Manang Leleng (Sister Leleng) accompanied me.281 As a former journalist, Leleng was an Arroyo supporter in this election. In our conversation, I insistently posed critical questions about Arroyo’s political ambivalence in that she actually supported both Randolph and Manuel for the same position of congressman. I asserted that because Arroyo only had a slim chance of winning in the Cagayan province and the country as a whole, she could not afford to lose votes from both the Mambas and the Tings. As a loyal supporter of Arroyo, Leleng defended her in front of this critical foreigner. She intellectualized Arroyo’s matronly charisma by emphasizing the maternal role that Arroyo has been playing in Filipino politics. Leleng’s analytical angle was interesting as she attempted to justify Arroyo’s ‘equal treatment’ to the Mambas and the Tings who were seen as her children in

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Picture 19 Electoral campaign motorcade for presidential candidate Gloria M. Arroyo in Tuguegarao, 2004. Source of image: Author’s collection.

terms of her conceived maternal charisma. In order to convince me that Arroyo would win the 2004 Philippine presidential race, she first attempted to explain why, since the 1986 People Power Revolution, female presidents were widely accepted in the Philippines despite the fact that the presidents before 1986 were all males (Table 7.1). To Leleng, the Filipino mother behaves differently from the Filipino father. In a fragmenting yet prospering multiparty system and a state characterized by local powers in which patronage is almost the rule of the game, the head of the state’s matronly character may lever and mediate the intense competition between players in male-dominated local politics. As kinship terminologies and association have been frequently invoked in Filipino politics, the maternal character of Arroyo would resemble the role of a Filipino mother, who is expected to treat her children equally.282 Perhaps Leleng’s analysis has some validity. On February 10, 2004, the president confirmed her visit to Tuguegarao city. That day was also the eve of the official opening of the national (presidential and senatorial) campaign period set by the COMELEC.283 Tuguegarao city was chosen to be the starting point for Arroyo’s archipelago-wide presidential campaign. The main roads and streets that led from the Tuguegarao city airport to the city center were blocked and cleared by the police in preparation for

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Table 7.1 Presidents of the Philippines since the 1986 People Power revolution. Name Corazon C. Aquino Fidel V. Ramos Joseph E. Estrada Gloria M. Arroyo Gloria M. Arroyo Benigno C. Aquino III

Presidency of the Republic Eleventh Twelfth Thirteenth Thirteenth Fourteenth Fifteenth

Years of Service 1986#–92 1992–98 1998–2001* 2001–4* 2004–10 2010–6

Gender Female Male Male Female Female Male

# The 1986 People Power Revolution was a chain of events that stretched across the fall of the Marcos regime to the arduous stabilization of the Aquino regime: the snap presidential election from December 1985 to February 1986, a military mutiny and a People Power Uprising in Manila, the flight of the Marcos and the assumption of Corazon Aquino to the Presidency, as well as the February 1987 constitutional plebiscite that followed, the May 1987 congressional election and the January 1988 election (Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991). * On January 20, 2001, President Joseph E. Estrada was ousted by the second People Power Revolution for his alleged abuse of power, graft and corruption, and lavish lifestyle. Vice-President Gloria M. Arroyo then acted as Philippine President until the May 2004 election (Doronila 2001).

her arrival. The choice of meeting venue reflected a uniquely ambivalent mixture of neutrality and inclination – the Hotel Roma, which is situated in the center of Tuguegarao city. Although hotel owners Rosemarie and Magno Lim are the niece and nephew-in-law of congressman candidate Delfin, they also had business ventures with the Mambas in recent years. Hotel Roma seemed to be a neutral venue to meet with Manuel and Randolph. Magno’s apparently pure business orientation made his newly built Hotel Roma a politically neutral venue for the president to reside and meet the Cagayano elite. While the local elite organized a fifty-table reception in Michelle’s Restaurant on the first floor of the Hotel Roma to welcome the arrival of the president, the schedule was delayed for security reasons. In a hotel room, Manuel and his brother, Francisco Jr., awaited the arrival of the president. The reception was supposed to start at 6.30 p.m., but the

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Picture 20 Presidential candidate Gloria M. Arroyo met with local political leaders in Hotel Roma, Tuguegarao city. Source of image: Author’s collection.

president arrived three hours later. Upon her arrival, she went straight to her hotel room and started meeting the mayors, provincial governor, congressmen and congresswoman.284 After meeting all local leaders and representatives in her hotel room, the president went to Michelle’s Restaurant to meet all the other local leaders and representatives at around 10.00 p.m. who had delayed their dinner for one reason – to meet President Arroyo.285 As insightfully revealed by Geertz (1985: 14), the ‘exemplary center’ has nothing to do with geometry and little to do with geography, but possesses the most salient symbolic values that connect the peripheries – charisma. Charisma entails a series of serious acts, which manifest the highest concentration of society’s leading ideas, an opened arena of celebrated institutions that make the members of a society believe in its indispensable vitality. Charisma is incomprehensible outside morality (Shils 1975). The ‘exemplary center’ possesses the moral order of the society – the inherent sacredness of sovereign power – the state. In this spirit, the journey of Arroyo to Tuguegarao city on February 10, 2004 as her starting point to tour the 7106-island archipelago was reminiscent of how Queen Elizabeth (Tudor) I constantly toured around England from January 14, 1559, the day before her coronation, to 1602, the year before she died (Geertz 1985: 16–9). Queen Elizabeth I first toured the city of London in

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1559. Then, from London in 1565, she went to Coventry; in 1566 from London to Oxford; in 1572 a long journey through the provinces into Warwick; and in Sandwich, she was ‘greeted with gilt dragons and lions, a cup of gold, and a Greek Testament’ (Geertz 1985: 18). She did not stop touring England until she died. Through these tours, a political imagining of the British Empire’s capital center, London, was formed and consolidated. In the post-colonial Philippines, Arroyo first flew from Manila to Tuguegarao city, the northeastern station of the Philippines, and then toured down to the south until reaching Mindanao. From Mindanao, she turned back to the capital, making Manila as much the capital of the Philippines’ political imagination as it was of its government. Embodying the imagination of the two respective countries’ political centers – the capitals of Manila and London, the tour de force of President Arroyo and Queen Elizabeth I ‘fashioned for [them] out of the popular symbolisms of virtue, faith, and authority they carried’ (Geertz 1985: 19). In the evening reception held on February 10, 2004, I recorded my ethnographic encounter at length: After singing the Filipino national anthem, President Arroyo moved around the reception venue from table to table, shook hands with every individual and talked to them about her plan for the country in the next six years for a ‘Strong Republic’ – economic development, anti-poverty program, regional collaboration with neighboring nations, regional efforts against global terrorism, and programs to eradicate graft and corruption. She took pictures with each table and showed her sympathetic concern to every issue the attendants raised. […] After she finished her go-around tour, Mayor Randolph Ting, congressman candidate Delfin Ting and Governor Lara were sitting at the foremost and first table accompanying the president while I was sitting in the diagonal table. The president asked the patriarch of Tuguegarao city, Lakay Delfin Ting, straightforwardly in a soft confrontational tone, ‘Ting, why do you run against Mamba?’ Lakay Ting replied immediately addressing her in [seemingly] kinship term, ‘Mum, because Mamba put up Terry Collado [to run] against my son Randy’.286 President Arroyo kept silent. Lakay Ting then also fell into silence. After a few minutes, the President left. Yet, many attendants remained behind, sharing this unique encounter with the President of the Republic of the Philippines.287

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Like Queen Elizabeth I, Arroyo not only accepted the transformation of herself into a moral ideal, she also cooperated with it. They are both the ‘centers of the centers’ – the charismatic iconoclasts of peace, wisdom, bravery and compassion. This Arroyo–Elizabeth analogy has indicated again what Geertz (1985: 30) convincingly argued: ‘The extraordinary has not gone out of modern politics’. Arroyo’s matron-center image was further absorbed and elaborated during the electoral campaign after she left Tuguegarao city. Before the local electoral campaign that commenced on March 25, 2004, an unverified report circulated which said that Delfin and Randolph also supported Arroyo’s electoral rival, Fernando Poe Jr., at the same time.288 To avow his loyalty to Arroyo, Randolph went around Tuguegarao city day and night, openly campaigning for Arroyo: Tonight […] I am begging you to help the president we get along with. Why did we go with President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo? Why must we help her? Yes, because President GMA had directed us so much assistance here in Tuguegarao City. What kind of help? In my entire life, I haven’t heard any President of the Republic of the Philippines to give money into Tuguegarao. […] It is because she gave us fund which we used for making the Diversion Road in the eastern side of Tuguegarao. Second is that she gave us a bridge that

Picture 21 Diosdado Macapagal Avenue construction: Arroyo-funded project for Tuguegarao city government in 2004 electoral year. Source of image: Author’s collection.

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we are presently using in Annafunan East. There are many other projects that she brought to us just like the Technological Livelihood Development Center. […] That’s why I am asking you here in Tuguegarao, we people from Tuguegarao, let us vote for President so thatwe can pay her a favor that we owe Arroyo. That’s Filipino culture. We know how to thank and return a favor. Let us vote for President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo [GMA]. If we vote anyway for GMA, perhaps we can vote also for her partner, her vice-president, no other than Noli de Castro. It is very important that if we vote, our votes must coincide so that our officials will get along together and lead to good government.289 It was reported in a province-wide survey that Arroyo was losing to Fernando Poe Jr. Regarding this as an urgent matter, Randolph identified and confronted some of Fernando Poe Jr.’s supporters in public.290 This was also the first time that the people of Tuguegarao had witnessed the anger of their popular mayor. Near the end of the campaign, the Tuguegarao city government received a fifteen-million-peso check from a presidential source to continue to finance an ongoing road project in Tuguegarao city under the name of Arroyo’s former president father – Diosdado Macapagal Avenue. Delfin also made a phone call to the Malacañang Palace in Manila where President Arroyo resided.291 Delfin again reiterated his unreserved support. Several days before polling day, seeing Delfin’s absence in campaign activities, observers (including those from the opposition) suspected that he had actually pulled out of the congressional race for unknown reasons.292 The election results were accurately predicted by local surveys, Arroyo lost to Fernando Poe Jr. throughout the Cagayan province by a relatively small margin of about 23,556 votes (142,653 votes to 166,209 votes), except in Tuao, where she won by a landslide. To thank the people of Tuao, the president then guaranteed that they would not need to worry about anything in the coming six years.293 Tuao would receive abundant provisions and continue to be self-reliant. The May 2004 election proved Tuao to be solid ‘GMA Country’.294 The incumbent congressman Manuel defeated Delfin by 14,693 votes (77,102 to 62,409). His youngest brother, William, won by a landslide over the opposition candidate Estrella Dayag to become the new Tuao mayor (22,215 to 42 votes). Former Tuao mayor Francisco Mamba Jr. was later promoted to be the undersecretary of constitutional affairs within the central administration in the coming six years in Manila. In addition, on January 14, 2005, President Arroyo swore

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Picture 22 Mayor William Mamba of Tuao, 2004. Source of image: Author’s collection.

in Francisco Mamba Jr. as presidential assistant for Region 2 of the Office of External Affairs (OEA). 295 Although Randolph defeated LAKAS candidate Lucio Collado in Tuguegarao city, (42,275 to 5,565 votes), the people of that city were reluctant to give their full support to Arroyo. 296 Yet as the supreme sovereign, the president still promised continuous pro- visions to the people of Tuguegarao city in the future. Caught in an archipelago-wide patronage network of intense competition, it seems that the president wanted to show her willingness to indiscriminately radiate benevolence equally to the Filipinos. In the midst of this maternal warmth, in the Cagayan province, public attention was suddenly drawn to an electoral crisis in the town of Enrile, which turned the atmosphere tense.

7.6 Theater of the strong: a national hot spot The May 2004 election in the municipality of Enrile, Cagayan province, was said to be in crisis. COMELEC identified a total of 541 election ‘hot spots’ to alert local subsidiaries of the PNP to the possibility of electoral violence.297 These ‘hot spots’ had a track record of poll and election-

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related violence. Enrile was identified to be one of 541 ‘areas of concern (EAC)’ in the Philippines where violence was most likely to break out during the election.298 According to the same news report, records of political violence in Enrile since 1987 have to do with insurgency violence and intense intra-clan rivalry as well as inter-factional retaliation. The May 2004 armed commotion incident between the Cagayan provincial police and congressman candidate Manuel’s armed group in Enrile tells us much about the intricate role that the Philippine police played during the election. To implement law and order on behalf of the central state, the PNP would have to gain cooperation from the local strongmen. Compliance and compromise on the parts of the two parties contributed to the political ramifications that emerged during the election, where local powers openly contested for political supremacy. In other words, although the state coercive apparatus has been somehow absorbed by and embedded within local powers, it paradoxically worked well for the localization of the central state in the frontier. Due to the competition of local powers for influence and internal differentiation within the police force, the police force does not necessarily operate as a unitary whole. Nevertheless, policing in statecraft not only serves a coercive function, it also serves a discursive function by constantly reminding its population who is in final charge of the scene. Granting supervisory power of police subsidiaries to local government officials does not mean that the police force is submissive to local power-holders. To supervise a police force also means that the strongmen are being monitored and constrained by a nationwide police hierarchy, rendering them subjects to acts of compliance. In Cagayan Valley, the presence of PNP subsidiaries reminds local inhabitants that they are all Filipino citizens who are protected by the Republic of the Philippines. The choice of Tuguegarao city as the venue to set up the PNP Region 02 Command (RECOM02) has strategic importance. Although RECOM02 commands police forces of five provinces from the north to the south of northeastern Luzon, the fact that the site for the regional command headquarters was chosen in the further north of Tuguegarao city discursively reminded the frontier population that the government of the Republic of the Philippines is in charge.299 In case of armed conflict, PNP is still symbolically functioning as the sole state coercive agent of the modern Philippine state, which has the final authority to endorse and operate coercion through its subsidiaries or local government officials as the intermediaries. According to the RECOM2 commander, PNP’s nationwide presence and participation in

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local elections can be regarded as strategically necessary in law and order maintenance. In Enrile, two leading factions competed for the mayoral position in May 2004. The first was led by former mayor Robert Turingan. Turingan was supported by congressman candidate Delfin and incumbent provincial governor Edgar Lara. Mayoral candidate Melinda Arao led the second faction (the Arao faction) with her husband (Cagayan provincial prosecutor – Fiscal Armador Arao), who was backed by Manuel. During the campaign, both sides had acquired extra high-caliber firearms and security personnel. Genealogically, Turingan and Arao are related as first-degree cousins. Turingan was first elected as mayor of Enrile in 1992. He had gained continuous support from the people of Enrile and was re-elected for a total of three terms until 2001. According to the Arao faction, it had been previously agreed that they would gain support from the Turingans for mayoral aspiration in the 2001 election. However, the Turingans decided to put up the wife of Turingan for the mayoral position, and she defeated Arao. In 2004, Turingan took over the mayoral candidacy from his wife, with the aim to return to service.300 A brief summary of alleged election-related violence in Enrile would help to understand why it was categorized by the COMELEC as a national hot spot. In 1969, the father of Turingan (who was then the mayor) ran for re-election for a second term, against the Palatao group. During the campaign period, a sister and brother-in-law of Turingan were ambushed and killed. Days later, a follower of the Palatao group was killed. A brother of Turingan was suspected. He was then sentenced to a prison term. In 1992, Turingan ran for mayor against the former mayor, Dennis Guzman, who used to employ Turingan as a personal security aide. After Turingan won, Guzman filed a protest against the election result. Before the result of the protest was even released, he was shot dead inside his residence. Around the time of the 1995 election, when former vice-mayor Pacito Guya was killed, a rumor spread that Guya had masterminded the killing of Turingan’s sister and brother-in-law in 1969, implying that the new killing was a vendetta. 301 People outside and inside Enrile drew imaginative reasons that linked these killings in their daily gossip. Thoughts that this was a revenge killing and suspicions of intrigues and false friendships kept the victims’ families alert and restless especially during election times.302 Many Enrile residents were not optimistic about the political development of the town. Although they would cast their votes in elections, they urged their leaders to simply concentrate on

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government affairs without dwelling too much on the past. Enrile is also situated along the Cagayan–Kalinga–Isabela provincial borders, where the NPA has been reported to ambush individuals, the military and police force. 303 These so-called ‘vendettas’ and ‘intrigues’ might have some validity, but were largely made up of gossip and unfounded allegations. Yet the specter of vendettas could not be washed away overnight. On April 12, 2004, the house of Claro Arao (a supporter of Melinda Arao) was hailed with bullets. His warehouse was also set alight in an alleged arson attack three days later. Then, Turingan’s gasoline station was also reportedly shot. Approaching polling day, three motorcycle-riding Turingan supporters were ambushed and killed in Barangay Liwan Norte, Enrile, a village near the border between the Cagayan and Kalinga provinces. A team of policemen was immediately dispatched to the area, where they found twenty-four bullet shells fired from M-16 Armalite rifles. Cagayan Provincial Commander declared that the provincial police had to intensify its monitoring of the COMELEC gun-ban law throughout the province mainly by setting up checkpoints. Special attention was ordered to monitor the political development in Enrile. 304 The gun-ban law restricts the use of firearms during the election period. Only individuals who hold COMELEC licenses are exempted. Moreover, police and marine security aides of politicians must wear uniforms when conducting their duties. Civilian security aides of politicians must be able to show COMELEC-issued firearm licenses. The PNP Cagayan Provincial Command saw the full implementation of the gun-ban law as a priority. However, on polling day, Manuel’s police aides violated the gun-ban law in Enrile because of an emergency. At around 5 a.m. on May 10, 2004, two Arao followers were reportedly assaulted by Turingan’s police aides in Barangay Villa Maria, literally at the town center of Enrile. Fiscal Arao immediately informed Manuel and asked for support. Obliged to protect his followers, Manuel gave his immediate support and hurriedly went to the site of the incident with an armed police group from Tuao. Since Manuel had assigned all his police aides to his party members, he brought with him a total of eight Tuao municipal policemen to Enrile. All were armed with high-caliber firearms. Whereas six of them wore civilian attire, only two wore police uniforms. Tuao Mayor Francisco Mamba Jr. called RECOM02 Commander General Jefferson Soriano and asked for assistance. At 6.30 a.m., upon his group’s arrival at Arao’s compound which was only one hundred meters away from Turingan’s residence and fifty meters away from the town hall, Turingan’s group noticed the

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presence of alleged ‘armed goons’ and immediately reported this to congressman candidate Delfin and governor candidate Lara. To avoid potential armed conflict, both Soriano and Lara made an executive order to the PNP Cagayan Provincial Commander Director Rodrigo de Gracia to disarm these alleged ‘armed goons’, regardless of their party affiliation. Thus, Cagayan PNP Third Provincial Mobile Group Director Superintendent Colonel Delfin Bravo and a squad of seventeen policemen were therefore immediately dispatched from Camp Tirso H. Gador, Tuguegarao city to Enrile. They were ordered to check, arrest and disarm these ‘armed goons’ if found. 305 Without knowing about the presence of Manuel inside Arao’s residential compound, at 8.30 a.m., Bravo identified two armed civilians standing outside the compound. Their M-16 Armalite rifles were confiscated immediately by Bravo’s police group. Their identities were revealed later as members of the Tuao municipal police force. While Bravo was investigating the two Tuao policemen, the incident immediately caught the attention of Manuel, who was inside Arao’s compound. Guarded by the Tuao police aides, Manuel approached Bravo and inquired the reason for disarming his security personnel. Bravo answered, I am not disarming your security sir, but I am here to check, arrest and disarm the reported armed goons roaming around the Municipality of Enrile, and the persons that were disarmed are PNP members who are in civilian clothes.306 At this juncture, Manuel in a loud and angry voice demanded that Bravo return the confiscated firearms on the suspicion that Bravo might have received money from the opposition party. Two of Manuel’s police security aides then approached Bravo and pointed their Uzi sub-machine guns at him while Manuel forcibly grabbed Bravo’s M-16 Armalite rifle away with his own bare hands. Simultaneously, the 17 Cagayan PNP policemen spread out and formed a crescent-like squad with their guns trained at Manuel and his police group from a range of some 15 meters.307 Noticing that the situation could spin into a police-on-police shooting incident, Fiscal Arao consoled Manuel and immediately called PNP RECOM02 Commander Soriano on his cell phone.308 After conversing with Soriano, Manuel handed the cell phone to Bravo. Soriano ordered Bravo to return the confiscated firearms to Manuel’s police aides. PNP Cagayan Provincial Commander Director de Gracia subsequently arrived

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and talked to Manuel, explaining that the order was only aimed at implementing the COMELEC gun-ban law in Enrile. He further questioned why Manuel’s police aides were not in police uniform. Manuel counter-questioned by asking for the reason that the PNP Provincial Command only picked on his group, mentioning that Turingan’s group had first assaulted Arao’s followers. To avoid further argument and conflict with Manuel, de Gracia ordered a proper investigation into the assault incident, and subsequently temporarily reassigned the two Enrile policemen who were suspected in the assault incident to undergo internal investigation.309 Although Soriano had considered filing cases against the Tuao police force for failing to comply with the COMELEC gun-ban law and illegally intruding into Enrile from their original area of jurisdiction – Tuao, he decided not to escalate the issue into another round of prolonged legal battle, but chose to personally offer Manuel advice for future reference.310 A local media group who usually accompanied Manuel managed to videotape the Bravo–Mamba incident from nearby.311 The video was then made into free VHS and video-CD copies. In the Cagayan province, various societal sectors pointed out that politicians should not exert interference on police affairs and policemen should not meddle with political matters after learning of the commotion incident in Enrile. Lawyers and parish priests as well as ordinary individuals protested that Manuel’s behavior was unlawful and ‘prone to violence’.312 However, the commotion also earned Manuel a reputation as ‘the most powerful person in Cagayan’.313 In a follow-up interview, Bravo admitted that although he sympathized with Manuel’s good intentions (in protecting his followers), he also reflected that the incident exposed a common dilemma that the Philippine police force has been facing in other provinces. While the police force has to collaborate with local government officials on matters of law and order, assigned police aides are sometimes turned into politician’s personal bodyguards314 in the midst of insurgency terror and intense intra-elite rivalry. In the state-building process in which internal pacification has been constantly exercised, resolving this PNP predicament is difficult, especially in a polity where multiple centers of powers are struggling for domination. As the central state coercive apparatus, PNP subsidiaries have gradually penetrated into the multi-front local society. In discouraging the use of privately recruited goons, the assignment of a politically neutral police force as the local power’s security aides could be seen as a

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conceivable strategy of law and order maintenance. In the midst of insurgency violence and intense intra-elite rivalry, the sovereign state’s struggle for monopolization of coercive power is, in Geertz’s (1985: 26) words, ‘not necessarily violent or even usually so, but it [will be] unending’.

7.7 Conclusion The recent elections in the Cagayan province could therefore be seen to be taking place in a conflict zone. As remarked by one local journalist, ‘I have been living in this place for many years, experiencing many elections. Every time players may be different, but [the] issues are the same.’315 However, Philippine elections are more than that. As this chapter illustrates, Philippine elections operate like a sovereignty-making pinball machine game. By throwing the candidate-aspirants into concomitant sites of contestations and diverse tug-of-war processes, the essential intersubjective notions of Philippine state sovereignty have been affirmed in society. Along this volatile state–frontier nexus, a political imagining of ‘the Republic of the Philippines’, which is centered in Manila with a head of the state, is legitimized. Although the above ethnographic episodes replay some ‘theatrical’ elements of the Philippine state, the Cagayanos have demonstrated a relatively high voting rate of over 80 percent since 1988.316 Elections have been instrumentalized by the state to reach the intersubjective landscape of the subjects and turn them into Filipino citizens. Alongside the debates and disputes which address public concerns of citizenship, law and order, graft and corruption, electoral violence and terrorism, vote-buying, vote padding, Cagayanos appeal to the social and political ideals of democracy, social justice, the rule of law and honest elections as well as honest government in diverse interpretations. Despite their diverse opinions, the inhabitants of the Cagayan province have gradually contributed to the state-building process of the Republic of the Philippines through voting and recognizing electoral results. Although the interviewed journalist was not entirely satisfied with how the election was carried out, he said that he would continue to monitor future elections. On his own personal level, he will continue to cast his vote and encourage everyone to stand for honest elections. As far as the electoral concerns of Cagayanos extend in the future, their genuine democratic struggles will coincide with the many meanings of electoral issues that will continue to be generated, debated and contested for possible social and political changes.

8 Sovereignty Deflected: Discursive Resistance to State Justice

‘Resistance [refers to] counter-conduct in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others, which is why I prefer it to “misconduct (inconduite)”; […] not conducting oneself properly.’ Michel Foucault (2007: 191 & 201)

8.1 Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to ethnographically illustrate the ways that the frontier population reacted to an essential feature of modern state-building; the monopolization of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1998). One way to monopolize symbolic violence would be the hegemonic quest of the centralizing state to establish legal, and more fundamentally, epistemological supremacy over the traditional legal and scientific worldview of the frontier through introducing the notion of the rule of law and its positivistic postulates. In the Philippines, investigation of criminal cases must undergo a designated judicial procedure conducted by relevant institutions, qualified professionals and state agents. I will discuss the ways that the local elite and inarticulate grassroots react to this state-introduced justice through an emerging art of resistance, dubbed ‘discursive resistance’ (c.f. Kerkvliet 1986; Scott 1990). Borrowing from the discursive analytical approach (e.g. Anderson 2003), discursive

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resistance to justice refers to the discursive acts of inarticulate people in generating and disseminating alternative, counter-hegemonic, quasiscientific, evidence-based, logically complex truth-claiming discoursenarratives, mostly in the cognitive forms of partial acceptance, deflection, rejection, refashioning, reinterpretation and reconstruction of the concluding statements and finalizing claims issued by the state delegates. Discursive resistance to justice tends to thrive where the culture of legal pluralism emerges resultant of post-colonial state-building. To achieve the said objective, I will start with the assassination of former Cagayan provincial governor and Congressman Rodolfo Aguinaldo in 2001, as a discursive field for the state delegates and local population to express their truth-claims about this violent incident. Then, I will discuss the historical context to understand the ways that these claims may be conceived within the cultural complex of legal pluralism, i.e. resultant of four decades of state-building, communist insurgency and counterinsurgency in this Philippine frontier. This Cagayan-specific legal pluralism roughly consists of three dominant forms of justice: traditional feuding, communist revolutionary and state-introduced, constituting an overlapping pool of legal codes, symbols and knowledge for the local elite and inarticulate majority to discursively re-connect Aguinaldo’s killing with three preceding killings, together known locally as ‘the spiral of vendettas’.

Picture 23 Rodolfo Aguinaldo, PMA class of 1972. Source of image: Courtesy of Philippine Military Academy

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‘The spiral of vendettas’ represents the discursive resistance of the inarticulate Cagayanos to the justice and its positivistic epistemology that are subsumed by the centralizing state and communist revolutionaries. ‘The spiral of vendettas’ is also an indigenous science in which four killings are explained in terms of the traditional legal code of vengeance (Ibanag/Ilocano/Itawes/Tagalog-Pilipino: venganza): ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth (Tagalog-Pilipino: mata sa mata; ngipin sa ngipin)’. Consequently, after more than a decade of grappling with ‘the spiral of vendettas’ for the autonomous truth behind her husband’s killing, Leonardo’s widow decided to deflect from the three dominant justices, and discursively pursue an alternative justice which she calls ‘karma justice’, for the purpose of leaving the irresolvable past behind and moving her life forward.

8.2 Who killed Lt. Col. Rodolfo Aguinaldo? Location:

Context: Date & time: Victims: Responsibility claimant: Weapons: Mobilization:

Status of the case:

Outside the compound gate of the victim’s personal residence at No. 13, Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley Victim on his way home to attend his wife Lerma’s birthday party June 12, 2001, 7.00 p.m. Former governor and congressman, Aguinaldo, and his police aide, Joey Garro The New People’s Army (NPA) At least three .45 calibre semi-automatic pistols. Three assassins waited for the victim outside his residential compound. A total of seven gunshots were fired into the victim’s back from a distance of two to three metres, causing five fatal gunshot wounds on the head and neck Unresolved

Briefing Box 8.1 The killing of Rodolfo Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo was disturbed by the electoral terrorism and fraud allegedly committed by the NPA who had supported the left-wing political party Bayan Muna in the May 2001 election. The support was a major factor

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that caused his congressional defeat to Manuel Mamba.317 On June 12, 2001, Aguinaldo was returning from a visit to his parents’ farm-residence to Tuguegarao city. In the afternoon, he stopped by his farm in Barangay Libag Sur (eastern Tuguegarao) to plant bananas before proceeding to his wife Lerma’s birthday party in their rented apartment, located at the center of the town. At around six o’clock, Aguinaldo and his police aide, Joey Garro, came out of their vehicle and walked towards the main gate of his residence compound. Suddenly, three individuals opened fire at his back from their hand-gun pistols, leaving Aguinaldo and Garro lying in blood. Four fatal gunshots hit Aguinaldo’s head, disfiguring his face. In the Cagayano and Cordilleran legal traditions, gunshots into the head can be traced back to the ancient custom of head-hunting (Barton 1949; Barton 1969; Dozier 1966, 1967; Keesing 1934, 1962; Rosaldo 1980; Salgado 2002a, 2002b). In this local perspective, gunshots into the head signified that the killing is a vendetta. Aguinaldo’s apartment was about fifty meters away from the city police headquarters. Despite the proximity, a mobile unit from the PNP’s Cagayan provincial command was dispatched to the scene almost thirty minutes after the killing took place.318 However, due to lack of evidence and the police force’s temporary inability to identify and pursue the alleged NPA assassins, Aguinaldo’s killing is still classified as ‘unresolved’ by the legal courts.319 In Manila, President Arroyo was caught in a series of arduous talks with representatives from the CPP–NDF–NPA community. The NPA has led the longest communist revolution in the contemporary world. A defected Roman Catholic clergyman, Father Luis Jaladoni, then a negotiator of the CPP–NDF community, suddenly congratulated the NPA’s success in killing Aguinaldo as a martial law torturer and an unforgivable enemy of the Philippine left. 320 On June 14, 2001, a three-page statement from the NPA’s Fortunato Camus Command in Cagayan Valley stated that ‘Colonel Aguinaldo had expected this fate. His death is long past the appropriate time’ – he ‘deserved to die’ because of ‘his long list of heinous crimes against the people’.321 Arroyo, caught in between the prolonged violent struggles between the left-wing radicals and right-wing militarist adventurists, sought a peaceful resolution by stating that Aguinaldo’s death was ‘a police matter, not an insurgency’, indicating that the killing should be investigated in accordance with the proper legal procedure.322 In response to Arroyo’s indeterminate position, Suzette Dichoso of Cagayan, a stern supporter of Aguinaldo, openly

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criticized the Arroyo administration for compromising Aguinaldo’s life for the NPA’s ceasefire.323 On June 17, 2001, a burial procession was held in Tuguegarao city. Aguinaldo’s followers and sympathizers openly condemned the killing by displaying streamers. One of the streamers read in the Ilocano language: ‘Awan ammoyu no di pumatay! [you know nothing but to kill!]’.324 Noticing that Aguinaldo’s death had directly upset the peace talk process, Bayan Muna’s Congressman Saturnino Ocampo, a spokesperson of the Philippine left’s ‘parliamentary struggle’ movement,325 then issued a public explanation claiming that the killing was ‘revolutionary justice’: That’s the only way the NPA can carry out their ‘revolutionary justice’. Walang prison yan [there is no prison]; they cannot just capture him. […] Aguinaldo was a target since the late 70s. […] From 1992, the insurgency weakened and recovered in 1997. It’s ironic that when the unit in Cagayan developed the capacity to carry out the penalty, it was the time of elections. […] I got dragged in because we (Bayan Muna) had a tactical alliance with his political rival Rep. Manuel Mamba. We campaigned in Cagayan […] he lost. That’s why he (said in a privilege speech) […] that we got the votes through terrorism by making use of the NPA […] He said […] he couldn’t participate because he had lost his seat but […] his classmates in PMA class ’72 would not take this sitting down. […] When he was killed, his classmate Gen. Galang said we would avenge his death. The YOU [the Young Officers’ Union] also issued a statement saying the leaders of the NDF were digging their graves. So there’s a threat. That’s why I have (indicates bodyguards) […]326 Parallel with Ocampo’s statement, Manuel who was Bayan Muna’s tactical ally in the May 2001 election issued the following statement to claim the truth of Aguinaldo’s killing: The truth is the NPA tried to contact me to assassinate Aguinaldo […] I told them I would not join […] I do not kill my political opponents […] only defeat them in election. Nobody would respect me if I kill my political opponents. So after I won over him, I told the people you tell [Aguinaldo] to keep quiet as the NPA is going to gun him down. […] That’s how I treat my political opponent. I believe if I want to kill my opponents, let’s go to war, not election. But you see (indicating his security aides) … I have to defend myself also.327

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In an Ibanag-Ilocano village in Cagayan, Manang (Ibanag/Ilocano/ Itawes: elder sister) Euling, a farmer-beneficiary of the martial law regime’s land reform program, then a road-side sari-sari store operator, and a former follower of the late Aguinaldo, reacted strongly after reading Ocampo’s claim of ‘revolutionary justice’328: [In Ibanag-Ilocano pidgins] Saan ammo ni Satur Ocampo ti ibagbaga na! Ari pinatay na NPA si Aguinaldo … Kayat da laeng nga alaen ti responsibilidad para iti bagbagi da. […] Idiay tabon ni Agui, kinagi na kofun na nga NPA ni Lerma, saan da pinatay ni Agui ... Author’s English translation: Satur Ocampo does not know what he is talking about! Aguinaldo was not killed by the NPA … They just wanted to claim his death for promoting their own image. […] In Agui’s burial, friends from the NPA told Lerma that they didn’t kill him …329 When asked to give her opinion of Aguinaldo’s killer, Euling paused for a second, refrained from articulating on the sensitive topic, and murmured, ‘NPA kanu mabba …seguro NPA … [They said NPA … perhaps NPA …]’.330 In my field encounters, Euling was just one among many

Picture 24 The tomb of Lt. Col. Rodolfo Aguinaldo in Tuguegarao reads: ‘The Lord Hears the Cry of the Poor’. Source of image: Author’s collection.

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grassroots who chose to partially accept, deflect and even reject the concluding claims of political killings issued by the state delegates. When confidentiality is guaranteed, an inarticulate individual might open up and articulate their own perspectives and construct narratives to retell how the killings took place. Therefore, the question ‘Who killed Rodolfo Aguinaldo?’ actually poses as an invitation to the inarticulate population to discursively construct state affairs from their own particular points of view. Being inarticulate does not mean being ignorant or docile. On the contrary, it entails a resistance act against the state’s concluding claims about its domestic affairs. Instead of uncritically submitting to the state, being inarticulate also entails everyday counter-governmental resistance to selectively receive and critically deflect the state’s sprawling encroachment into one’s subjective spheres in order to reclaim human freedom from the state’s governmental technologies (Foucault 1991).

8.3 Resisting the state’s symbolic monopoly through a frontier science To articulate the inarticulate points of view would demand an appreciation of the indeterminate nature of scientific knowledge that the state and its traditional intellectuals arduously produce and defend in order to achieve the ‘monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 1991: 239): If the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought. By realizing itself in social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the instituted institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts of institution (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearances of the natural. (Bourdieu 1998: 40, italics original) Modern science is an accumulating, self-refuting and self-renewing corpus of instituted knowledge (Kuhn 1996; Popper 1989), generated from the ‘world of particular perspectives, of individual agents who, on the basis of their particular point of view, their particular position, […] that are particular and self-interested […] to gain recognition for the point of view that they are seeking to impose’ (Bourdieu 1991: 239, italics added). In the scientific community, a scholar’s particular perspective cannot be

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imposed without involvement in the instituted, often competitive, processes seeking recognition of his/her work (Bourdieu 1988). The scientific knowledge production process is also observed to be embedded in networked fields which may render the knowledge production process symbolically and ontologically violent (Bourdieu 1993, 2004; Lyotard 1999[1979/1984]; Milbank 1993: chapter 10): some perspectives are arbitrarily dismissed and suppressed whereas others are recognized and enshrined as being more, if not the most, ‘objective’. Having explicated some of my theoretical embeddings that shape the writing of this chapter, I must stress that my aim is to neither denounce modern science nor propose ways to remove this predicament, but invite the scientific community to consider recognizing the inarticulate grassroots and usually neglected remote frontiers as intellectuals, for Gramsci (1971: 9) instructively reminded us, ‘one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist’. In short, humans are born to be intellectuals. Non-Western societies have long developed their own scientific worldviews to comprehend the complex empirical world. For example, while reading Evans-Pritchard’s (1976) seminal ethnography of Azande witchcraft, Levi-Strauss (1996: 13) suggested that Western science and African witchcraft have two compatible modes of acquiring knowledge: causation and truth-finding. To Evans-Pritchard (1976), witchcraft is a way of explaining unfortunate events. As a knowledge system, witchcraft involves a standardized epistemological procedure for explaining incidents by identifying, testifying and vindicating the sole cause, i.e. bewitched or not. Among the Azande tribesmen, it is not uncommon to find a person who suspects him/herself to be bewitched after meeting misfortune. Evans-Pritchard found it strange, and therefore, usually got himself into arguments with the local people. Soon, he recognized that sufferers tend to seek witches among their enemies through the judicial institution of ‘poison oracle’ that informs whether one was bewitched or not. To Levi-Strauss, Azande witchcraft was a natural philosophy, revealing a theory of causation, which is also found in modern science. Whereas Evans-Pritchard revealed that Azande witchcraft can be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy, Levi-Strauss went further to assert that the structures of the ‘savage mind’ in the Azande poison oracle and the ‘modern mind’ in positivistic science are essentially the same (Figure 8.1).

SOVEREIGNTY DEFLECTED Modern Wheel of Science

Azande Poison Oracle

Theory

Empirical Generalizations

Observations

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Misfortune

Hypotheses

Verdict

Bewitched by enemy?

Poison Oracle (fowl tests)

Figure 8.1 The structural compatibility of modern science and African witchcraft.

Following Levi-Strauss’ provocative stance, one will find that any standard textbook on research methodology will contain Walter Wallace’s ‘the wheel of science’. ‘The wheel of science’ instructs on the ways that modern scientific knowledge should be generated through standardized steps: (1) identifying a theory to be examined; (2) generating hypotheses to be tested; (3) operationalizing variables into testable concepts for empirical observations; (4) based on the observations, draw generalizations; and (5) these generalizations are examined to either reject, renew or confirm the theory tested. Levi-Strauss asserted that in African witchcraft, the Azande poison oracle judicial institution shares the same operational properties of ‘the wheel of science’, where faith is indispensable in sustaining the two (Evans-Pritchard 1976: chapter 8). In other words, while African witchcraft is a science, modern science may also be seen as a kind of witchcraft. As witchcraft recently recognized by the South African state and society as a science (Ashforth 2005), policy makers should also be aware of the potential policy implications of alternative scientific worldviews. These worldviews are shared by the grassroots: non-traditional intellectuals that could expand the horizons and enrich the content of social science through their discursive resistance against the post-colonial state’s monopolization of symbolic violence. Appreciating discursive resistance is

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not equivalent with being anarchic. On the contrary, the capability to appreciate discursive resistance would instruct policy makers to see the state’s political legitimacy in more comprehensive and democratic terms of concomitant arenas of negotiation and diverse tug-of-war processes. The state delegates should not complacently expect their legitimacy to be fixated once and then forever, but be ready to ceaselessly engage with a plurality of emerging forces, juxtaposing voices and morphing worldviews.

8.4 The ‘spiral of vendettas’ is a science too Most anthropological literature on traditional law tends to portray a singularly monolithic and uncontested legal culture in which family honor is defended and inter-clan conflicts are resolved by exchanging vendetta (e.g. Barton 1969; Boehm 1984; Black-Michaud 1975; Blok 2001; Chagnon 1988; Evans-Pritchard 1940; Ginat 1997; Hasluck 1954; Kiefer 1972; Miller 1990; Otterbein 2000). Despite an emerging number of exceptions (e.g. Lazarus-Black 1994; Snyder 2005), little has been dedicated to the ethnographic study of legal pluralism (Merry 1988; Goodale 2005) in Southeast Asia,331 particularly with emphasis on the ways that competing legal codes may serve as a shared stock of knowledge for social actors to construct and articulate their own quasi-scientific truth-claims either in competition or juxtaposition with the objectifying statements issued by the state (Greenhouse 1988; Hirsch 1998; Merry 1990). The people whom these ethnographies represent are not fully recognized as representatives of alternative sciences. This chapter will show the ways that the inarticulate Cagayanos and their discourses may also be uttered in counter-hegemonic juxtaposition (Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994). Wood’s (2003) ‘pleasure of agency’ argument instructively suggests that people join resistance because it is emotively satisfying to rebel against injustice. This chapter will add that there is also resistance against justice, as justice is an idea that both the state and its challengers use to subject the population and dominate their worldviews. Foucault observes, it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it. (Foucault quoted in Chomsky and Foucault 2006: 54–5)

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Since 2002, local informants have repeatedly suggested that the killing of Aguinaldo is complexly embedded in the local and national political histories. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, none were able and/or willing to delineate in detail until I was referred to Manong Yfun.332 Although never formally involved in politics, he is observant, critical, and perceptive about the happenings of the local and national political arenas. By seeing ‘the spiral of vendettas’ in quasi-scientific causative logics (Figure 8.2), Manong Yfun qualifies as an intellectual. After Manong Yfun revealed the details of ‘the spiral of vendettas’, I validated it by conducting field research in the exact murder sites and compared it with other informant narratives. My ethnographic strategies are not new. I integrated my life with my informants. Their narratives, although varied, are resultant of years of clarification and triangulation. Nonetheless, I want to stress that by no means is the ‘the spiral of vendettas’ able to determine the positivistic truth about these killings. In place are the truth-effects created by the discursive resistance of the inarticulate peasants against the symbolic hegemony that the state has attempted to establish. In ‘the spiral of vendettas’, the objective of a vendetta is to conduct Gestapo justice: to get even by creating the same emotional torture experienced by the victim’s family for the family of the alleged perpetrator of the previous killing. Vengeance (venganza) and blood-debt differ

Killing Incident

Decision (Revenge or not?)

Suspicion (Murdered by enemy? Who?)

Observations and information gathering k f d Figure 8.2 The ‘spiral of vendettas’ as a causative science.

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qualitatively from utang na loòb. The former represents a negative cohesive force between two parties who constantly exchange symbolic violence and physical harm, whereas the latter allows two parties to positively exchange favors and grace (Peters 1975). Both positive and negative elements of the Filipino ethical value of ‘debt’ (utang) are embodied in the local representation of murders in Cagayan. Despite the NPA’s claim of sole responsibility, according to (1) Dalin, a tricycle mechanic; (2) Zuk, a market vendor; (3) Leleng, a road-side eatery waitress; and (4) Juno, a grain-buying-station worker, Aguinaldo’s killing would not be possible without the collaboration of local actors.333 Accordingly, the assassins rented an apartment in a nearby building, owned by a landlord who hailed from the solid bailiwick of Aguinaldo’s long-time political rival, the Mambas of Tuao. This information was then confirmed by a news report which stated that the Tuaoeña apartment-owner had already seen the cartons of firearms inside the rooms of the allegedly insurgent-assailants before the killing took place.334 The assailants might not be capable of such without the knowledge, and perhaps referral of Manuel, the strongman of Tuao. However, why did the inarticulate suggest that Manuel had a part in killing Aguinaldo? In accordance to ‘the spiral of vendettas’, the decade-long political rivalry between Aguinaldo and Manuel might have compelled Manuel to consider eliminating his rival. More importantly, Aguinaldo had killed Manuel’s elder brother, Leonardo, in 1992. Aguinaldo’s death was Manuel’s long-awaited revenge. The Cagayano conventional wisdom suggests that a blood-debt should not be paid immediately: Ibanag: Y Pagibaloc ay mabbalin nga namic sonu mallammin; Ilocano: Agbalin a nasamit ti panagibales inton bumaaw; Itawes: Mas namit ya pagibalat nu nallaminnin; Tagalog-Pilipino: Masarap gumanti pagtapos na; English: Vengeance will turn sweet when it is cold.335 To identify the discursive connection between the killings of Aguinaldo and Leonardo, I conducted field research in the Mambas’ powerbase, Tuao, through the cooperation of the local parishes of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Tuguegarao. Afterwards, I visited the murder site where Leonardo was killed.

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Picture 25 The late Atty. Leonardo Mamba, former mayor of Tuao. Source of image: Courtesy of the Mamba family.

8.5 Who killed Leonardo Mamba? Before I conducted a field visit to the murder site, permission was first sought from Leonardo’s widow, Cristina Mamba-Lavio.336 I also interviewed several informed individuals; most of them had witnessed the incident.337 Due to its relative remoteness, the Western Amulung plain is a major guerrilla gateway that connects the rebel bases in the Sierra Madre and Gran Cordillera mountain ranges. Whenever there was an encounter between the military and guerrillas in the two mountain ranges, the guerrillas would withdraw or retreat to the accommodating villages in Western Amulung. According to the former and current parish priests, it is not uncommon for the rebels to knock on the convent door late at night to seek medicine and dressing for their gunshot wounds. 338 Due to frequent presence of rebels in the area, some remote villages were once controlled by the NPA. Nowadays, these villages are formally pacified and under governmental control. Military check-points are often found at the entry-junctions between the Tuao–Tuguegarao highway and the rough roads leading to Western Amulung. Caught in decades of low intensity conflicts, the legal culture in Western Amulung may be elaborated in three juxtaposing forms of justice: traditional feuding, communist revolutionary and state-introduced. For example, after a local public school’s armed security guard was gunned

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down in May 2007, the local villagers circulated three different explanations about his death.339 First, the guard was killed because he refused to collaborate with the local bandits to gain access into the school during an evening. Since the bandits fled without any witnesses, the case remained unresolved. This narrative is a depiction of state-introduced justice. A second explanation attributed the death to an extramarital affair. He was either killed by the woman’s family or his in-laws as vendetta because he sabotaged their family honor. This narrative depicts traditional feuding justice. Thirdly, the security guard had previously worked for the military as a covert intelligence agent which was eventually discovered by the NPA and motivated them to kill him. This narrative depicts communist revolutionary justice. Concluded by the principal of a local school, Dr. Romeo Ramirez, whenever there were killings in the area, these court cases were difficult to resolve due to the prolonged low– intensity conflict.340 In comparing the accounts of these killings, these three justices may co-exist in different combinations in each case, pointing to an array of possibilities. This culture of legal pluralism is also present in my field investigation on the killing of Leonardo.341 Location:

Hillside bamboo grove, Barangay Bayabat, Amulung, Cagayan Province Context: In-campaign wedding reception Date & time: April 25, 1992, 5:00 p.m. Victim: Atty. Leonardo ‘Nards’ N. Mamba (the former mayor of Tuao and congressional candidate of the Third District, Cagayan Province) Responsibility claimant: NPA Weapons: M-14/16 Armalite rifles, marked with ‘CPP-NPA’ characters and tied with red ribbons Mobilization: The remote village of Bayabat saw an estimated one hundred unidentified armed men arrive in the village at least three days before the attack. Victim died of point-blank bullet wounds on the face and neck. Status of the case: Unresolved

Briefing Box 8.2 The killing of Leonardo Mamba.

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During the martial law, Leonardo had closely worked for Enrile in Cagayan. In the May 1992 election, Leonardo decided to leave Enrile’s political party and run for congressman with another political party, LAKAS, because Enrile supported Alfonso Reyno Jr. in running for congressman.342 Through his fraternity contacts in the University of the Philippines alumni networks, Leonardo established an agreement with the CPP–NDF–NPA community for campaigning in Cagayan.343 Although Leonardo’s key contact in Western Amulung, the former mayor Lakay Rodolfo Morales, warned him about groups of unidentified armed men roaming in the area, he decided to proceed without a security aide.344 He was invited to sponsor a wedding and attend a reception in Barangay Bayabat. Receiving a sponsorship invitation during the campaign period meant that the families in the wedding and local community were supportive of his candidacy. Leonardo went with his wife and party-mates as part of their electoral campaign activities. The wedding ceremony had started at eight o’clock in the morning in a parish church in Barangay Cordova, and finished as early as nine o’clock. Upon their later arrival in the area, the campaigner convoy directly proceeded to the celebrant residence, about a 45-minute drive north from the church through rough roads that bordered the municipalities of Alcala and Piat. At approximately eleven o’clock in the morning, two to five armed individuals suddenly appeared with more than seventy others, surrounding the venue and preventing anyone from leaving. In fluent English, they approached the campaign manager, Lakay Rodolfo Morales, asking if they could talk with Leonardo and governor candidate, Florencio Vargas. When Leonardo and Vargas appeared and presented themselves to the armed men, one of them approached Leonardo and asked, ‘Nasaan si Manny Mamba? [Tagalog: Where is Manny Mamba?]’ Leonardo presented himself as the elder brother of Manuel or ‘Manny’, who was in Tuao. Then the armed men took Leonardo and Vargas away for questioning. With guns pointed at their backs, they walked fifty meters away from the wedding salon to a nearby nipa-hut, whose owner had fled in terror. According to the collected eyewitness accounts, these armed individuals were mostly between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. They carried long firearms imprinted with ‘CPP-NPA’ characters and tied with red ribbons. Wearing military fatigues with rubber shoes, some had military watches and well-manicured fingernails. Some smoked up-market cigarettes. Although most were male, a few were female. They spoke Tagalog, Ibanag and Ilocano. They were believed to originate from the

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‘Amazons’ of local and neighboring provinces, another colloquial term for the NPA who used to hide themselves inside the thick jungles of nearby mountains. The armed men quickly spread out and confiscated the seventy-man LAKAS campaign convoy’s handheld radios and cutting their outside contact. The leader questioned Leonardo and Vargas. As Vargas remembers, they were first asked for their opinions on the future of Philippine communism and their ideas on Marxism. Vargas and Leonardo frankly responded that after 1989, Eastern Europe had chosen democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a response which offended the leader. The questioning and discussion continued, and they were then given a seminar on Philippine communism and Marxism. Leonardo was subsequently asked how the Mambas gained full control of Tuao and how they ruled the people of Tuao. The armed men read out a list of ‘injustices’ committed by the Mambas. At around one o’clock in the afternoon, the Mambas were ordered to pay a ransom of 30,000 pesos. Vargas was then sent back while Leonardo was detained. Cristina decided to drive back to Tuao immediately to get the ransom. At around four o’clock, Cristina successfully raised the funds and presented the money to the armed group. However, they did not release Leonardo. A few minutes past five o’clock, an order was given through radio to kill Leonardo, who was then dragged violently uphill to a nearby bamboo grove. Sounds of gunshots followed. Cristina rushed to the bamboo grove and found her husband in a pool of blood with fatal gunshot wounds on his face and neck. The armed men quickly dispersed and rapidly disappeared into the forest. Cristina carried the body of Leonardo back to the car and immediately returned to Tuao. In Tuguegarao, there was an electricity brownout starting from midday to five o’clock in the afternoon. Upon the resumption of electricity, the radio immediately reported Leonardo’s death. Many Cagayanos mourned him. Within days, funeral proceedings were conducted in the largest cathedral in the Archdiocese of Tuguegarao, St. Peter’s Cathedral, which received thousands of mourners from across the region, including representatives sent by the opposition parties. As the closest working partner of Leonardo, Manuel was extremely upset and angry. At the funeral, he declared retaliation against the mastermind behind the murder. This statement quickly spread among the public. In Manila, an NPA written statement was broadcast through the DZRH radio station proclaiming responsibility for the killing.

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Manong Yfun’s ‘spiral of vendettas’ suggested that the killing of Leonardo was a collaborative endeavor that involved various parties. First, there was the NPA, who conducted ‘revolutionary justice’ against decades of counterinsurgency efforts by the Mambas. Local villagers in Western Amulung supported this view. In line with ‘the spiral of vendettas’, they moreover suggested that the NPA (or pseudo-NPA) killed Leonardo to avenge the assassination of the former vice-mayor of Tuao, Roberto Guimbuayan, who was believed to have been killed by Manuel, the specific name invoked by the armed men. Guimbuayan was actually related to the newlyweds in Barangay Bayabat. The newlyweds nevertheless informed me that they were only distant relatives. Thus, ‘the spiral of vendettas’ suggested that the murder of Leonardo was a vendetta which addressed the killing of Guimbuayan, as Leonardo died on the same date as his half– brother, Boyet. In line with ‘the spiral of vendetta’, the villagers also held that this avenging act allegedly involved Guimbuayan’s patron, Aguinaldo. As a counterinsurgent in Cagayan, Aguinaldo used to co-opt the peasantinsurgents into his paramilitary. Aguinaldo had solid contacts with the communist rebels and was able to collaborate with some of them. On the day that Leonardo was killed, Aguinaldo was originally campaigning in Barangay Sampaguita, Solana, starting in the morning. Sampaguita is around a one-hour drive from Barangay Bayabat. He stayed at Sampaguita until five o’clock in the afternoon, and was suspected of coordinating the operation in the area through his military-type high-frequency radio, connected to his campaign headquarters in Tuguegarao. This type of high-frequency radio is locally known only to be supported by A/C current. Since Tuguegarao experienced a brownout, nobody else was able to give the order to the armed men. Therefore, these armed men needed to buy time and sent Cristina back to Tuao to collect a ransom. This also explains why, upon the receipt of money, they still kept Leonardo until five o’clock and then killed him. It also partially explains why the armed men came into possession of the military goods, and accounted for their mannerism and appearance. Manong Yfun therefore argued that the blood of Leonardo paid for the killing of Guimbuayan in 1989.

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8.6 Who killed Roberto Guimbuayan? Location: Context: Date & time: Victims:

News-reported claimant: Weapons: Mobilization:

Status of the case:

Tuao–Solana–Tuguegarao highway, Cagayan province On vehicle Daytime, December 16, 1989 Tuao office-in-charge (i.e. acting) mayor Roberto Guimbuayan and his seven security aides NPA Around one hundred long firearms, probably M-14/16 Armalite rifles Ambushers opened fire excessively onto targeted vehicle from roadside sugarcane fields Unresolved

Briefing Box 8.3 The killing of Roberto Guimbuayan.345

In 1989, as the provincial governor, Aguinaldo issued a ‘preventive suspension’ order to temporarily suspend Manuel, based on controversial charges of illegal possession of firearms.346 This suspended the mayor from power for 59 days for investigation, and automatically reassigned the vice-mayor as the office-in-charge. According to the local cultural code of strongman politics, ‘preventive suspension’ is not merely an administrative order, but acts as a severe insult by abruptly denying leadership status. Guimbuayan was assigned as the acting mayor. Yet, to comprehensively portray the picture, a question must be asked: when and how did Guimbuayan become involved in the Aguinaldo–Manuel struggle? Guimbuayan was originally a sanitary officer in the regional office of the Department of Health, Tuguegarao. He used to be a friend of Manuel’s father. In the 1988 election, Manuel ran for mayor of Tuao for the first time with his vice-mayor candidate, Baligod. Rumor had it that Baligod was ‘bought out’ by the opposition to run for provincial board member before the election. Manuel ran alone for mayor, but his father then appointed Guimbuayan as Manuel’s candidate for vice-mayor. Both won the election. In 1989, Guimbuayan was suspected of receiving support from Aguinaldo to hinder the Mambas in Tuao. Aguinaldo had

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assigned some of his closest armed security aides to Guimbuayan. Suspecting that Manuel possessed illegal firearms inside his residence, Aguinaldo raided Manuel’s residence. A 59-day ‘preventive suspension’ was then issued to Manuel, taking effect on October 16, 1989. Guimbuayan was automatically assigned as the acting mayor. On November 6, 1989, Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Internal and Local Government in Manila wrote to Aguinaldo with a request to lift the suspension order within five days, but Aguinaldo failed to act. When Manuel attempted to resume office, Guimbuayan ordered the closure of the main gate of the compound.347 On December 16, 1989, while in his vehicle, Guimbuayan was ambushed by an estimated one hundred alleged communist guerrillas on his way home. He and his seven security aides were killed in this ambush by high-powered firearms.348 According to Manong Yfun’s ‘spiral of vendettas’, Manuel masterminded the ambush of Guimbuayan. The impression that ‘Mamba killed Guimbuayan’ gained currency among the inarticulate majority in the Western Amulung plain. In the eyes of the peasants, Guimbuayan was perceived as ungrateful to the Mambas. Manuel therefore decided to avenge against him. Although the inarticulate knew that the NPA declared responsibility, they refused to believe the claim. According to Manong Yfun, the fact that Leonardo was killed on the same date as his brother on April 25 is a clear sign of vendetta. In the May 1987 congressional election, Leonardo ran as an independent candidate for congressman against the long-reigning regional strongman Congressman Tito Dupaya.349 Shortly after the People Power Revolution, a delicate decision made by the Malacañang Palace suddenly altered the electoral dynamics in Tuao. As a strategic move, President Aquino reappointed Teresa Dupaya as the office-in-charge, (i.e., acting) governor of the Cagayan province in March 1987 to counter-balance the growing influence of the powerful Enrile, who was regarded a formidable rival to Aquino. Being instrumental to Aquino, the administration reappointed Rogelio Garcia, a close ally of Tito, as the acting mayor until the 1987/88 election results were proclaimed. This move directly upset the Mambas and was subsequently interpreted as an election-related tactic to disrupt Leonardo’s congressional aspirations. Seeing that the reappointment could not be reversed and the congressional race had started, the Mambas continued the campaigns in Tuao and region apart from filing protests in the Congress. Rogelio campaigned for Tito’s re-election.

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The electoral campaign was a hot day on April 25, 1987. At noon, Rogelio was campaigning inside Tuao Centro with his fully armed bodyguards, who were believed to be assigned by Tito. While he was delivering his campaign speech, nineteen–year–old Boyet Mamba, the half-brother of Leonardo, arrived on a motorcycle. A loyal Mamba supporter, Boyet became agitated by Rogelio’s campaign speech, in which he was lambasting the Mambas. In protest, Boyet revved his engine, thereby catching the attention of Rogelio’s security guards. One of Rogelio’s bodyguards, Musli, approached Boyet and fired his pistol at Boyet’s head. The Mambas filed criminal charges against Musli and Rogelio. Musli was identified, trialed and sentenced. Due to lack of evidence, Rogelio was not convicted.350 Subsequently, the manner and day of Boyet’s killing was recalled by Manong Yfun and the inarticulate in terms of blood revenge with Leonardo’s killing.

8.7 Forgiving discursively: Cristina’s karma justice After more than a decade of repeatedly asking, ‘who killed my husband?’, the question was no longer important to the widow of Leonardo. Cristina later became a municipal councilor of Tua (2004–7; 2007–10), remarried Dr. Greg Lavio of the Ilocos Norte province in May 2009 and re-settled outside Tuao. She decided to deflect from the pursuit of the three dominant forms of secular justices by pursuing an alternative form of justice so that she could leave the irresolvable past behind her and move forward (Das 2007: chapter 10). Cristina calls it ‘karma justice’. In Indian Hinduism, the karma doctrine ‘transformed the world into a strictly rational, ethically-determined cosmos’ that ‘man was bound in an endless sequence of ever new lives and deaths and he determines his own fate solely by his deeds’ (Weber 1968[1958]: 120 & 122). The karma doctrine entails the rationalization process in which Weber attempted to explain why and how Hinduism did not lead Indian society to the capitalistic development found in European Protestant societies. While Weber aimed to establish causative relationships between the religious and social forms, he did not emphasize the ways that social agents utilized these forms in their everyday endeavors. As India has a long history of interaction with the people in the Philippines (Francisco 1965), the karma doctrine has been found in northern Luzon. To understand the local adoption of the karma doctrine, the notion of human agency is adopted for analysis. Filipinos in northern Luzon generally approach Roman Catholicism from a view-point of practicality, instead of pure religious commitment.

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The notion of agency is useful for capturing everyday maneuvering of religiosity for enhancing one’s survival. Agency can be defined as ‘the capacity of socially embedded actors to appropriate, reproduce, and potentially, to innovate upon received cultural categories and conditions of action in accordance with their personal and collective ideals, interests, and commitments’ (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1442–3). To Archer (2003), the interplay between the self and received cultural categories can be found in the ‘internal conversation’ of the agent’s private imagining. In the political killing of Leonardo, the victim’s agency would refer to the actor’s creativity to mobilize and conflate seemingly incompatible notions to construct a coherent narrative where the agent convinces the self to accept a conclusion of a life event. This would explain the unfortunate event through the private imagining of reciprocity (Cannell 1999). In Cagayan, forgiveness entails the imagination of reciprocity in the form of causality of life events sustained by the Indian-Ilocano notion of karma (spirit, fate), which originated from the Sanskrit word dharma (the underlying order in life and nature) (Francisco 1965: 36). Unsure of who had killed her husband and despite suspicions of political rivals in the electoral arena, Cristina left it to karma, which is, I think is what you have done […] you might now have paid it today but you will pay in the future directly or indirectly. That is what I can picture [might] have happened in their [the political rivals’] families and their living, in their businesses, [though] I am satisfied. Then I forgive them because of their problems and sufferings.351 Karma is a syncretized idea adopted by Cristina as a self-help skill to transcend trauma by temporarily suspending the desire to avenge. Within the privately syncretized version of the Roman Catholic faith, the Indian notion of karma is used as a means to negotiate for forgiveness. Karma means the soul and the spirit in the Ilocano language of northern Luzon (Rubino 2000). Its verb, makarkarma, refers to ‘being visited by a spirit of the dead’, implying that any life event could result from a previously committed action. In this sense, karma also entails one’s fate, which can be a result of or correlated with one’s actions in the earlier days of the present life. Before God’s final judgment day that will come to earth, there is neither beginning nor end within vengeance justice. Once it starts, it will be sustained by karma, syncretizing with Christian monotheism in which Diyos (God) is constituted by the Trinitarian notion of the Holy Father, Holy Son and Holy Spirit which together represent the most

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compassionate and the final justice of peace in the world. In other words, karma encompasses the sum of one’s actions in this worldly existence, viewed as affecting his or her future fate in this world and the other world, which is being regulated by God. God commands when the truth will be revealed and justice done. Thus, one’s misfortune can be interpreted as a ‘karmic reaction’ of previous actions or events; that is, everyone has his or her payback time. Karma justice embodies a plurality of crisscrossing cause–effect web-like chains, connecting an unknown cause towards an infinite yet common wish and destiny of the Christian-Filipinos, where justice and peace will be eternally celebrated. The more that conversations which concern the killing are circulated, the more the ‘culprits’ and ‘masterminds’ are implicated, and the more self-restraint will need to be exercised by the victims. Their self-restraint arises from the notion of ‘hope’ (Tagalog: pag-asa; Ibanag: idanama; Ilocano: namnama; Itawes: iddanaman): wishing that one day, the state judiciary will give them a proper trial and verdict prior to the coming of God’s ‘final judgment day’. In other words, due to the civil strife, the hegemonic claim of the Philippine state for final justice is almost impossible. To transcend this predicament, according to Cristina, it becomes vital to identify the notions of compassion and forgiveness (Table 8.1). The syncretized notion of karma gives her strength to hold on to faith in God. She states that eventually, the Heavenly God will give the victim’s family the final justice.352 Due to this faith, she has learned to view the suspects involved in the killing of her husband as victims of a here-and-now political system of which political violence has complicated and confused.353 Hence, she sympathizes with the sufferings of the suspects and personal circumstances of political enemies. The related Tagalog saying is ‘ang pakikiramay sa kasawian ng iba ay isang pagkakawanggawa’ which means: ‘compassion for another’s misfortune is an act of charity’. Its equivalent in Ilocano and Itawes in Tuao are ‘maysa a nadiosan nga ayat ti panangtulong kadagiti marigrigat’ and ‘ya angngoffun kan ira ya mariíta nga tolay e angngipasita kan angngayat kan i afu’ respectively. Cristina’s representation of compassion and forgiveness may offer a viable way for the Filipinos to keep justice and order together. To her, before God’s final judgment and justice come, karma temporarily mediates justice. With karma, the victims would be able to temporarily suspend private vengeance into forgiveness and compassion. It is henceforth fair to suggest that karma and its associated discourse of Christian forgiveness are the cultural logics resultant of the Philippine state’s non-conclusiveness on unresolved cases of political killings.

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Table 8.1 Equivalent terms of compassion and forgiveness in Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines. Tagalog

Ibanag

Ilocano

Itawes

English

pakikiramay patawad

simpatia pakoma

asi pakawanen

allak pakoma

compassion forgiveness

8.8 Conclusion Discursive resistance is an emerging form of knowledge politics against the quest of the post-colonial state for establishing legal and epistemological hegemony over the traditional laws and scientific worldviews of frontiers. It is also the art of bottom-up resistance deployed by the inarticulate majority, who qualify as the intellectualrepresentative of frontier science vis-à-vis state-endorsed science. Discursive resistance mostly thrives in cultures of legal pluralism, resultant of post-colonial state-building. Discursive resistance refers to the creative acceptance, deflection, rejection, reinterpretation and reconstruction of other truth-claims into authentic, quasi-scientific, evidence-based and counter-hegemonic discourses in juxtaposition with the state-endorsed discourses (Figure 8.3). In the foregoing pages, I have attempted to illustrate the ways that the indigenous science of ‘the spiral of vendettas’ is held as counter-governmental resistance against the post-colonial state’s monopolization of symbolic violence through the rule of law and its positivistic postulates. This chapter stems from the field data gathered in the Cagayan Valley where I conducted my fieldwork from 2002 to 2009. As common practice, I regularly sent hard copies of my writing to my informants for their feedback. In parallel with this chapter’s purpose, the main aim of my projects, so far, is to show in various discursive ways, how the centralizing Philippine state and its state-building measures are received by the local elite and inarticulate majority. In August 2006, I returned to obtain their feedback. On this trip, I was asked by various individuals, including Manong Yfun, whether the ‘spiral of vendettas’ is true.354 I have indeed argued that it is an alternative science and that Manong Yfun is a respected intellectual, in juxtaposition with the hegemonic, truth-claiming statements issued by the state delegates. However, I am neither concerned about whether ‘the spiral of vendettas’ is true in the positivistic sense, nor want to claim that it is the true science. In the culture of legal pluralism

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resultant of state-building and insurgency, political legitimacy is not something that the state delegates can fix once and forever. It also entails concomitant, reflexive and ad-hoc processes that the state delegates have to serendipitously interact, negotiate and co-construct with the seemingly weak, inarticulate grassroots majority and counter-hegemonic forces. State actors must, therefore, include the discursive resistance of the inarticulate into the policy– and agenda–making process, if they are sincere in building a strong state.

Internal (subjective) structures (E.g. legal beliefs)

Array of discursive resistance

Total acceptance/ reproduction

Array of discursive resistance

External (objective) discourses/institutions/structures (E.g. state laws, judicial hearings, verdicts, legal courts)

Key: The state’s channels of total subjection Array of discursive resistance in the forms of partial acceptance, deflection, rejection, reinterpretation and reconstruction

Figure 8.3 What is discursive resistance?

9 Conclusion: The Frontiers Revisited

9.1 Summary of the argument What is the central argument of this book? Since the 1972 Palanan incident, the post-colonial Philippine state has been able to keep itself intact by deploying various state-building initiatives despite being beleaguered by continued social upheavals and political turbulence. What is the gist of all these initiatives? In order to build a robust state, the post-colonial Philippine statecraft aims to make use of local powers, such as the frontier strongmen, as key instruments for two state-building purposes. First, it strives to contain the strongmen so that they may be both constrained and enabled by the state’s capillary power/knowledge system and its decentralizing apparatuses for enhancing state rule. Second, it is to instrumentalize local strongmen to energize and maintain the state as a dynamic field of diverse tug-of-war processes and multiple arenas of contestations. These processes and arenas would provide uncertain contact zones for the Philippine sovereign state to meddle in its interior affairs and re-assert its sovereignty into the state’s two most-wanted frontiers: (1) the intersubjective landscape of the inhabitants where the state strives to lodge its imprints, and (2) the geopolitical frontiers of the territorial state where challengers are subdued and exceptions are exercised to reaffirm sovereignty. The political technologies that are involved in these always-in-flux processes and unstable arenas constitute what I mean by frontier govermentality.

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Frontier governmentality entails two competing constellations of governance techniques that constitute the unfinalizability of post-colonial body politics. It refers to the uncertain contact zones where the governmental technologies of the sovereign state meet the political technologies of the human subjects. On the one hand, it refers to the reliance of the centralizing state on various subjecting mechanisms and subjugating practices to localize and consolidate its sovereignty in the geopolitical and intersubjective frontiers. On the other hand, it consists of freedom-seeking and self-inventing technologies deployed by the human self and the selves of others. In order to cope with the predicaments and conflicts that have emerged in the state-building project, the governing elite and governed majorities have been actively discerning, participating and reconstituting state affairs. The foregoing chapters provide evidence with regard to various aspects that are involved in post-colonial state-building. By using the case studies of the Tings of Tuguegarao city, the late Aguinaldo, and the Mambas of Tuao, I have substantiated the following arguments: I. The 1972 Palanan incident pushed the Marcos regime to impose authoritarian rule as it was threatened by continued communist-led peasant insurgency and social unrest. Alongside hard-power measures, soft-power measures were introduced for internal pacification. A good number of the ethnic Chinese population was naturalized in the 1970s. In Cagayan Valley, the capital-rich agro-businesses (mainly of Chinese descent) not only gradually challenged the political-economic supremacy of the traditional landlords, but their newly forged patron–client interdependency with farmers also gave them the inroads to state power. Nonetheless, the Philippine state has been able to instrumentalize this emerging cohort of local strongman for food and interior security. II. The Philippine state has consistently relied on a non-zero-sum ‘brokerage’ practice of local strongmen for including and pacifying the Cagayan Valley multi-ethnic frontier, where Beijing-supported communist insurgency was once found in the postwar era. This is in contrast to the ‘divide and rule’ sovereignty-making technique that the Burmese/ Myanmar state has used to subdue the frontier strongmen and drive away Beijing-backed communist insurgents and KMT troops in the Chinabordered Golden Triangle frontier. Localizing sovereignty in the Philippines is moreover, complexly characterized by the concomitant institutionalization of the rule of law, counterinsurgency, local government system and electoral politics.

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III. The Philippine state has been able to recycle the colonial and religious legacies to institute an encompassing, hybridized power/knowledge system that strengthens political unity and promotes cultural diversity. This over-arching padrino power/knowledge system connects the Manila state and the intersubjective landscape of the Chinese, Ibanag, Ilocano and Itawes communities in Cagayan Valley. At odds with the top-down structuralist and static view of the patron–client model, actors are free and versatile to re-interpret and generate alternative meanings from the patron–client relationship. As the art of governing the self and others, the padrino system has been facilitating the actors to build communities, resolve conflicts and restrain self- aggrandizements. IV. In contrast to the neo-colonial and predatory characters of the African state, studying coups and state-military relations in the Philippines would provide an East Asian solution to the African problem. By using the life history of the late Aguinaldo, I have identified three techniques of constitutional and democratic control that the Philippine state has used to instrumentalize the military to further the state-building project: (1) the making of an anti-communist legend, (2) brokering counterinsurgency, and (3) law/force indistinction and re-containment through electoral democracy. V. The 90-year dominance of the Mambas in local and regional politics largely hinges on the disciplinary and surveillance technologies of the Itawes people. In contrast to the proposition that Philippine surveillance technologies were perfected in the colonial past, I have argued that policing techniques in the Itawes Philippines can be traced back to the pre-colonial era. Based on a historical ethnography of the governance of the Mambas, several of these indigenous techniques have been elaborated: (1) policing the land reform, (2) implanting networks of eyes and ears, (3) the symbolism of ‘guns, goons and gold’, and (4) instilling fear through enshrining bravery. VI. Regularly held elections in the post-1986 Philippines serve two state-building purposes. First, they provide the necessary avenues for the state and societal actors to express, clarify and discuss issues pertinent to the ideals of social justice, equality, and law and order. Second, electoral disputes of electoral fraud, electoral terrorism and violence, vote-buying and citizenship serve as the necessary inroads for the sovereign state to meddle in local affairs and affirm its sovereignty. By conceiving the electoral process as a pinball machine game, Philippine elections not merely serve as the means of political legitimation, power reshuffling and

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resource redistribution, but also as a necessary instrument for the sovereign state to shape the identities of voters and aspirant-candidates, reform local practices and consolidate state sovereignty. VII. Situated in a complex culture of legal pluralism, the emerging forms of discursive resistance against sovereignty-making suggest that the killings of political figures actually provide a series of discursive arenas for the local interlocutors to partially accept, deflect, reject and re-interpret the finalizing claims of justice issued by the state delegates and the judiciary. Instead of repressing and eliminating these competing notions of justice, I have suggested that locally hailed, alternative scientific and legal worldviews and practices should be taken more seriously and considered to be absorbed by the state-building project. Since the 1950s, the Philippine state has been able to encroach into the frontiers and consolidate its sovereignty. Starting from the early 2000s, a few regional developments and field encounters, however, have pointed to the changing roles and impacts that resource-seeking foreign countries and local strongmen may seek to play and generate in the postmillennial era.

9.2 The frontiers revisited: an ethnography Shortly after President Arroyo endorsed two Executive Orders in 2004 to revitalize nationwide mining which would develop the national economy,355 state actors and business investors from East Asian countries held various bilateral talks with the Philippine government ‘on areas of mutual interests’ such as ‘mining promotion’. 356 In particular, from December 2 to 17, 2007, the Consulate of the People’s Republic of China led a diplomatic delegation and first visited the Cagayan provincial government and Tuguegarao city government to ‘explore and promote the prospects for bilateral exchange and cooperation in terms of agriculture, mining industry and etc.’357 Afterwards, he proceeded to other provinces in northern Luzon including the grain-rich Isabela province where Governor Grace Padaca ‘introduced the vantage of rice and corn producing’ to the Chinese diplomatic delegation. 358 In the following months, while criticisms were expressed by various civic groups and the Catholic Church against the president’s agenda to revitalize collaborative mining were raised on the concerns that mining would destroy the natural environment and the local people’s livelihood,359 the news continued to report that foreign mining firms and diplomatic missions traveled to other mineral-rich destinations in the Philippines.360 In 2007–9, despite the ability of the foreign mining firms that were operating in the coastal

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municipalities of Cagayan to secure formal permission from local government units, they encountered resistance from various competing forces. I will argue that these complex processes will continue to give avenues to the sovereign state in not merely in containment of the strongmen, but also transnational resource-led ventures. In Cagayan Valley, the Regional Development Council of Region 02 (RDC-02) held a ‘mining forum’ in Tuguegarao city in September 2005 on the emerging development and public concerns. 361 An estimated 120 representatives were invited to exchange views. The forum concluded that it was necessary for state authorities to carefully study how to ‘address the environmental threats of mining’ and prepare to respond to the ‘impact of mining on affected communities’ before fully engaging local communities into collaborative mining.362 In contrast to the President’s resource-led economic development agenda, local public opinion expressed considerable reservation. The following years witnessed a series of anti-mining protests and local resistance. In September 2008, Cagayan provincial governor Alvaro Antonio granted the Chinese mining company San You Philippines Mining Trade Limited an official permit to operate in the town of Lallo. However, the regional office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) against the mining activity on the basis that dredging in the covered area was considered illegal. In the coastal town of Buguey, for instance, opposition mayor Ignacio Taruc mobilized some 1,500 farmers and fishermen, and launched an anti-mining protest rally against the mining operations endorsed by the provincial government. In response to Antonio’s accusation that Taruc was a ‘“bogus” anti-mining advocate’, Taruc replied in seemingly left-wing rhetoric that ‘Project plans and propositions from foreign capitalists were not even entertained by me’.363 Taruc further gained the support of the Environment Secretary Lito Atienza to suspend mining operations in Buguey. Shortly after Antonio issued a suspension order against Taruc, Taruc retaliated by filing a ‘graft and corruption’ lawsuit against Antonio and openly accusing Antonio’s patron, the Senate President Enrile for ‘having a hand in his suspension’.364 With the Catholic Church’s advocacy, similar anti-mining protests quickly spread to other towns in Cagayan.365 In 2009, East Asian mining firms in the coastal municipalities were caught in complex local political dynamics, and had either temporarily deferred operations or decided to venture into other provinces along the Cagayan River.366

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To further understand China’s strategy on this aspect, I interviewed a Chinese mining delegation in Tuguegarao city.367 Accordingly, instead of solely relying on its state-owned enterprises, the Chinese state has been flexibly leasing procurement orders to non-state enterprises which simultaneously enabled them to venture overseas to meet the increasingly complex demands of minerals and natural resources for, in the former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s (2000) own words, China’s ‘all-out’ national development and comprehensive modernization programs. However, the Chinese state has its own ways to regulate the decentralization of resource-led diplomacy. It is, for instance, not unusual for relatives of Chinese state officials and their associated business enterprises to act as agent-brokers to generate capital from markets, and simultaneously negotiate with the Chinese state bureaucracy and collaborate with foreign actors. The interviewed director of the Chinese mining firm was actually a Chinese lady in her early twenties who had established the head office in Manila’s main business district and managed several mining operations in the Philippine provinces with a Chinese- trained English-speaking lawyer as her deputy. In response to the encountered problems on the mining operations in Cagayan, she said that they were still seeking legal and political/diplomatic resolutions. Later, a Chinese-Filipino source suggested that the interviewed lady is actually the heir of a senior-ranking government official from a Chinese coastal province.368 With its vibrant economic development, China’s approach towards Southeast Asia has entered a new era since the end of the millennium (Harvey 2006; Ong 2006). During the Mao era, China exported various types of support to the peasant insurgency and communist movements in the Philippines and Southeast Asia in general (Appleton 1959; Lansdale 1972; Macmillan 2007). In the 1980s and 1990s, China aimed to absorb Southeast Asian Chinese capitals to fuel its own economic development (Wong 2002). Overseas Chinese large businesses were particularly encouraged to conduct foreign direct investment in their ancestral provinces in China where SEZs were deliberately set up (Howell 2000; Wang 2001). In the 2000s, however, following the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement which was signed in 2002, evidence shows that China has been engaging in bilateral trade with ASEAN countries. According to ASEAN statistics, China had been consistently among the top four largest trading partners from 2000 to 2008.369 In 2009, China was even the largest trading partner with ASEAN.370 In the post-millennial era, China’s outreaching interactions with ASEAN countries are indeed intensifying.

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Against this backdrop of regional economic development, the above ethnographic episodes from the Philippines further confirm that China has indeed started to export capital and invest in Southeast Asia for a new phase of development; the procurement of natural resources, and the purchase of fertile farmlands for extra food production. With comparative reference to China-related conflicts in Africa, such as Darfur of Sudan (CQ Researchers 2010: chapter 11; Srinivasan 2008; Taylor 2009), although there are legitimate worries that China’s post-millennial resource-led diplomacy may invoke new forms of transnational conflicts for the African strongmen who are colluding with China to extract rich resources and perpetuate violence,371 informed researchers have made two instructive observations. First, it is undeniable that China has launched a resource-led global diplomacy and encroached into resource- rich areas in the developing world (Acharya 2008; Downs 2007; Gill, Huang, and Morrison 2007; Li 2007). Second, the Darfur conflict has caught China into multiple arenas and complex processes where China is pushed to perform an intriguing form of ‘diplomatic maneuvering’ (Holslag 2008: 71). What is this diplomatic maneuvering? While Deng Xiaoping’s infamous pragmatic motto ‘groping for stones to cross the river’ continues to guide China’s interior governance, Holslag (2008) convincingly argued that China has also applied this saying to foreign relations. In the Darfur conflict, for instance, moral influences were arduously sought by China to find a feasible consensus for acceptance by international public opinion, human rights groups, the Sudanese political elite and the United Nations. The foregoing chapters actually point to a rather similar Southeast Asian empirical reality: the post-colonial Philippine state is not only able to contain its frontier strongmen and challenging forces, it has also been able to contain China’s resource-led transnational ventures through its complex dynamics where collaborative mining ventures have collided and coalesced with a range of state and non-state actors. Finally, I would like to suggest that policy-makers and the global civil society take extra precautions on a few latent issues. Transnational resource-led ventures have already seeped into the arenas of local politics and state-building processes which may be utilized by local strongmen for private ambitions. In turn, the colluding strongmen would compromise state sovereignty for support from the transnational powers. As a result, center–local check-and-balance mechanisms within the sovereign states should be regularly reviewed and enforced.

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In light of the foregoing chapters and the Darfur conflict, containing a resource-led outreaching China should not be seen as a Cold War tactic to defeat/eliminate a communist threat. As China is still ‘groping for stones to cross the river’ through a hybridized form of market socialism (Pieke 2009), containing China should be seen as an endeavor for the international community to collectively shape neo-socialist China into a morally responsible global player and facilitate the emergence of a future generation of globally engaged Chinese citizens. Global civil society actors such as the Catholic Church, human rights watchdogs and civic/professional associations are of utmost importance in these endeavors. However, a shadowy side of the state-building project is the inevitable production and monopolization of symbolic and physical violence. Policy-makers and global civil society actors should prepare contingency plans to remedy increasingly contentious politics in the future.

NOTES

1 Introduction: Toward an Approach of Post-colonial Statecraft in Southeast Asia 1 Field notes, Shishi city, Fujian province, China, January 24, 2000. 2 Interview with Mr. Tang, residence, Shishi city, Fujian province, China, January 25, 2000. 3 Interview with Mr. Tang’s nephew, shop, Divisoria, Manila, the Philippines, July 26, 2002. 4 For example, see: ‘Renegade Officer Seeks Philippine Governorship.’ The New York Times. Monday January 18, 1988. 5 Field notes, Hotel Delfino, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 2, 2002. 6 Ibid. 7 Field notes, Manila, the Philippines, October 13, 2003. 8 Interviews and field notes with the Sino-Thai communities in Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Nan, Thailand, December 14, 20 & 21–8, 2009. 9 Table V14, pp. 82–3, The ASEAN Secretariat (2009). ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008. Jarkarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 10 Tables 19–21, The ASEAN Secretariat (2010). External Trade Statistics. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat (http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm). 2 Landscape of the Rhizomes: Cagayan Valley, 1972–2009 11 My English translation from: 「菲共领导的新人民军去年获巨大胜利。 武装斗争规模迅速扩展，游击根据地和游击区不断巩固和发展。农村 广大地区人民政权机关继续发展壮大。[Last year, led by the Communist Party of the Philippines, the NPA achieved significant victory. The scale of the armed struggle expanded rapidly. Guerrilla bases and zones were consolidated and developed. The local people’s political bureaus continued to

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14 15 16

17

18

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be developed and expanded in peasant areas.]」人民日报˙The People’s Daily (Beijing, China), March 5, 1972. Marcos, Ferdinand E. 1972. Proclamation No. 1081 September 21, 1972: Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines. Manila: The Office of the President. Sources from Manila Bulletin: (1) ‘PC Patrol on Ship Rescued under Fire.’ July 8, 1972. (2) ‘More Troops to Isabela.’ July 9, 1972. (3) ‘AFP Unleashes “Might” against 1000 NPA Men.’ July 10, 1972. (4) ‘PAF Jets Can’t Bomb NPA.’ July 11, 1972. (5) ‘Mitra Ridicules NPA “Ship” Story.’ July 11, 1972. (6) ‘NPA Arms Cache Seized.’ July 12, 1972. (7) ‘Mysterious Palanan.’ July 12, 1972. (8) ‘Hidden War.’ July 13, 1972. (9) ‘NPA Kills 4 Soldiers; Ship Had 2 Sino Seamen.’ July 13, 1972. (10) ‘6 Army Soldiers Slain in Isabela Ambuscade.’ September 3, 1972. (11) ‘New Raps Poised on “Karagatan”.’ September 9, 1972. (12) ‘Troopers Raid Chinatown Area.’ September 10, 1972. (13) ‘Intercept Rockets, Arms.’ September 14, 1972. (14) ‘Chinese Vessel Fired at off Isabela Waters, Crewman Hurt.’ September 17, 1972. (15) ‘Ferdinand Marcos Tells of LP-NPA Huddle.’ September 17, 1972. (16) ‘NPA Raids Army Post, Troopers Die.’ September 21, 1972. (17) ‘PC Commander Ambushed – NPA.’ September 22, 1972. For more details on the national and international dynamics behind these two programs, see Putzel (1992: chapter 4) and Wong (2009: chapter 4). Interview with Virgilio Acasili, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, Cagayan Provincial Office, Department of Agrarian Reform, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 4, 2007. (1) Interview with Antonio Rustico (fictitious identity), residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, March 22, 2007. (2) Interview with Father Rusty Aggabao, parish convent, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, March 22, 2007. (3) Interviews with Joaquin Tan, residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 5, 2004, March 27–30, 2007 & April 24, 2009. Department of Agrarian Reform (2007). Master List of Emancipation Pattern by Survey Number of Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan Province, Region II (Jan 1, 1972 – March 31, 2007). Manila: Department of Agrarian Reform. The Republic of China Embassy was renamed the Pacific Economic and Cultural Center. In the headquarters and local branches of the Federation of the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, pictures of KMT were stripped and only the Philippine flag was flown and the Philippine anthem sung. Field notes in the residence of Dr. Romeo Ramirez, Barangay Bayabat, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, March 26, 2007. Interview with Ernesto Subia, Golden Harvests Grains Center, Barangay Aranay, Cabatuan, Isabela province, the Philippines, July 20, 2008. Subia carries the original Chinese surname Uy. He has been a major miller and nationwide distributor of the wag-wag rice of the Cagayan Valley to the countrywide SM ShoeMart supermarkets, which are owned by Henry Sy Sr.

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21 As I was warned by various reliable sources that Western Amulung has been an insurgent-infested area, for security reasons, I relied on the Catholic Church’s referral for me to stay with a trusted host family. Through the family’s social network, I visited and conducted the necessary interviews. The visited barangays include: Agguirit, Annafatan, Bacring, Bayabat, Cordova, La Suerte, Masical, Nabbialan and Nangalasauan. 22 Interview with Father Frank Taeza, Parish Convent, Barangay Cordova, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 13, 2007. 23 (1) Interviews with Edgardo’s family, farmhouses and residences, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, March 26, 2007, March 29, 2007, May 14, 2007, May 24, 2007 & April 9, 2009. (2) Interview with an anonymous former barangay official, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 14, 2007. (3) Farmers’ survey dataset on land reform and grain-trading, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 13–7, 2007. (4) Department of Agrarian Reform (2007). Master List of Emancipation Pattern by Survey Number of Municipality of Amulung, Cagayan Province, Region II (Jan 1, 1972 – March 31, 2007). Manila: Department of Agrarian Reform. 24 Interview with an anonymous farmer, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 29, 2004. 25 Ibid. 26 Interview with Manong Katigid, paddy-field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24, 2007. The ‘chili and sugar’ strategy may be translated as an ‘intimidation and consolation’ strategy. Note: Manong Katigid (Ilocano: Elder Brother Left) is a consented pseudonym of a significant farmer informant in Cagayan (Wong 2009). 27 Interview with Rodolfo Morales, residence, Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 1, 2007. 28 The term angkan actually means more than ‘clan’. Angkan is an objectified imagination of genealogical affiliations embodied and told by the actor (Kikuchi 1991). It is similar to kinship. Although Filipino kinship is basically bilateral in theory, in practice, one’s angkan may entail a more extensive genealogical network causing a multilateral corporate group under a matriarch/patriarch. The Lim–Ting angkan-conglomerate of Tuguegarao is a multilateral corporate group under city mayor Delfin Ting, the patriarch in the political sense. 29 Interview with Manong Katigid, paddy–field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 24, 2009. 30 Interview with Magno Lim, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, December 8, 2007. 31 The Chinese have practiced similar patronage since the Spanish times, known as the cabecilla-ahente system (Wickberg 2000[1965]; Omohundro 1981). The Spanish words cabecilla and ahente mean ringleader and agent, respectively. Cabecilla is roughly translated into ‘employer’, ‘head of a firm’ or in Hokkien, towkay (owner of a business, boss) (Wickberg 2000[1965]: 72). The cabecilla–

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ahente system refers to a secret credit system between a patron and his clients who work as sale agents in the cabecilla’s wholesale business. The agents are dispatched to sell the products provided by the cabecilla with full autonomy, i.e. in the case of business failure, the agent bears full responsibility. In the 1970s Iloilo, the cabecilla–ahente system was practiced in Chinese family businesses. Business owners recruited either junior family members or teenage relatives from China and dispatched them as their sale agents in the credit line (Omohundro 1981). The cabecilla as a benefactor/patron offered many services, such as emergency help and credit, as well as political and legal support. Field notes, grain-buying station, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 7, 2003. Interviews with Manong Katigid, paddy field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24, 2007 & April 24, 2009. Sources from Manila Chronicle: (1) ‘Exposé Stirred Decades-old System of Rice Trading.’ January 1, 1990. (2) ‘Probe on Cartel Slows Rice Trading in Metro.’ February 14, 1990. Sources from the plenary session of the eighth congress, third regular session, records and archives division, the Philippine congress: (1) Senate Resolution No. 676 (introduced by Senator Ernesto Maceda, November 16, 1989). (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Wigberto Tañada: Krisis sa Bigas: Krisis sa Pananaw at Patakaran [Rice Crisis: Crisis in Views and Policies] (January 25, 1990). (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr.: Break the Rice Cartel (January 30, 1990). Source from the plenary session of the eighth congress, fifth regular session, records and archives division, the Philippine congress: Senate Resolution No. 1302 (introduced by Senator Ernesto Maceda, November 18, 1991). Senate, Republic of the Philippines (August 2, 1990). Blue Ribbon Committee Report No. 1075. Quezon City: Records and Archives Division, the Philippine Congress. Sources from the plenary session of the ninth congress, second regular session, records and archives division, the Philippine congress: (1) Senate Resolution No. 546 (introduced by Senators Anna Coseteng and Ernesto Maceda, August 2, 1993). (2) Senate Resolution No. 558 (introduced by Senator Ernesto Maceda, August 6, 1993). (3) Senate Resolution No. 559 (introduced by Senator Ramon Revilla, August 6, 1993). (4) Senate Resolution No. 575 (introduced by Senator Santanina Rasul, August 12, 1993). For example, see: ‘An Antidote to Rice Trading Monopolies.’ Business Daily. September 20, 1995. (1) Interview with Magno Lim, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, December 8, 2007. (2) Communication with mayor Delfin Ting, Hotel Delfino, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, December 8, 2007. (3) Interview with mayor Caesar Dy, Cauayan city, Isabela province, the Philippines, December 12, 2007. (4) Interviews and fieldwork with Rufino Arcega, city agriculturist, Cauayan city government, Isabela province, the Philippines, December 10–14, 2007 & July 18–22, 2008.

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41 Field notes and interviews with grain-traders and millers in the Cauayan–Luna–Cabatuan cluster, Isabela province, the Philippines, December 10–14, 2007 & July 18–22, 2008. 42 Interviews with Juanito Tio, Family Choice Rice Mill, Cabatuan, Isabela province, the Philippines, December 10–14, 2007 & July 18–22, 2008. 43 (1) Interviews with Leoncio Tan, Golden Seasons Grains Center Inc., Luna, Isabela province, December 13, 2007 & July 20, 2008. (2) Interview with Janet Tio, office, Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, July 25, 2008. 3 Localizing Sovereignty: Contours of a Reflexive Sociology of Post-colonial Statecraft in Southeast Asia 44 The term ‘Burma’ instead of ‘Myanmar’, is used for the sake of consistency with the widely-used term of ‘Burmese’, which may either serve as an adjective or the general name of the inhabitants of the state of Myanmar. 45 ‘Exploring Beyond the Drug-warlords’ Gates in the “Golden Triangle 探秘 「金三角」的毒梟門 (In Chinese)’, Xinan Wanbao (China) 新安晚報, March 11, 2002. 46 ‘Documentary Reports Episode No. 23: The Rise and Fall of Three Generations of Chinese Drug-warlords [紀實連載第 23:中國三代毒梟興 衰 史 ] (In Chinese by Chen Beidi 陳 貝 帝 )’. Fazhi Wanbao (China) 法制晚報, March 30, 2006. 47 ‘Exploring Beyond the Drug-warlords’ Gates in the “Golden Triangle 探秘 「金三角」的毒梟門 (In Chinese)’, Xinan Wanbao (China) 新安晚報, March 11, 2002. 48 ‘Golden Triangle from Zero Distance: Episode No. 3’, Phoenix TV, June 24, 2004. (http://big5.phoenixtv.com:82/gate/big5/www.phoenixtv.com/home/ zhuanti/fhxd/mao/200406/24/279755.html accessed on August 16, 2009). 49 (1) ‘A Border Lined with Gold’. The Economist. April 6, 1991. (2) ‘Thailand: Drug Trafficking in Golden Triangle “Ongoing Business”, Analysis by Alan Dawson: “Profitable Trade is Habit-forming”’. Bangkok Post. March 25, 2005. 50 ‘Sustenance and Bane of a Region’. The New York Times. May 20, 1997. 51 ‘Victory over Opium’. Time. July 30, 1973. 52 ‘Canada’s Wal-Mart Deals with Burmese Drug Lord (by Bruce Hawke)’. The Nation. July 13, 2000. 53 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) online, ‘Frontline: “The Opium Kings: Interviews: Adrian Cowell”’, Winter 1997. (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/heroin/interviews/cowell.htm, accessed on August 16, 2009). 54 ‘Golden Triangle Special 2: Listen to the King of Opium, Lo Hsing-han’s life Stories’. Xinhua News, June 23, 2005. (http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/ news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-06/23/content_3124719.htm, accessed on August 15, 2009).

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55 ‘Golden Triangle Special 2: Listen to the King of Opium, Lo Hsing-han’s life Stories’. Xinhua News, June 23, 2005. (http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/ news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-06/23/content_3124719.htm, accessed on August 15, 2009). 56 (1) ‘Cover Story: Opium War’; ‘Pusher with a Cause’; ‘Turf War in the Triangle’. Far Eastern Economic Review. January 20, 1994. (2) ‘Slow Strangle: Khun Sa Remains Defiant of Rangoon’s Squeeze’. Far Eastern Economic Review. April 14, 1994. (3) ‘The King of the Shan: A Drug Lord Strives for an Independent State’. Asiaweek. June 15, 1994. 57 (1) ‘Burma Smashes the Rebels, with Thai and Chinese Help’. International Herald Tribune. February 3, 1995. (2) ‘Rangoon Forces Keep Attacking Khun Sa Base’. Bangkok Post. March 16, 1995. (3) ‘Khun Sa Forces Launch Pre-dawn Raid on Town’. Bangkok Post. March 21, 1995. (4) ‘Wa Rebels To Join Rangoon Troops’. Bangkok Post. August 13, 1995. (5) ‘Burma – The Noose Tightens: Khun Sa Faces a Day of Reckoning’. Far Eastern Economic Review. October 19, 1995. (6) ‘Shan State’s CEC Claims Control of Drug Warlord’s Mong Tai Army’. Bangkok Post. August 25, 1995. (7) ‘Khun Sa – Let Me Retire in Peace and There will be No Drug Problems’. Bangkok Post. August 23, 1995. (8) ‘Southeast Asia Drug Lord Plans to Retire (Before U.S. Gets Him)’. The New York Times. November 24, 1995. (9) ‘Rangoon Troops Occupying Khun Sa Headquarters’. Agence France Presse. January 3, 1996. (10) ‘Shan State – Surrender of Khun Sa Has Lasting Impact’. Bangkok Post. January 13, 1997. (11) ‘Burmese Heroin Trafficker Surrenders But is Negotiating with Junta’. The New York Times. January 18, 1996. (12) ‘Drug Triangle Handshake: Khun Sa Surrenders, But on His Own Terms’. Far Eastern Economic Review. January 25, 1996. (13) ‘Burmese Refuse to Extradite Drug Lord’. The New York Times. February 11, 1996. 58 (1) ‘Heroin Output Stable Despite Khun Sa Exit’. Bangkok Post. March 5, 1996. (2) ‘Death Merchants are Back in Full Swing’. Bangkok Post. November 3, 1996. (3) ‘Inside Politics: Where is Khun Sa?’ Bangkok Post. January 23, 1997. (4) ‘Illicit Drug Trade: Business as Usual for Drug Barons’. Bangkok Post. March 23, 1997. (5) ‘Khun Sa’s Treasure – Giant Stone up for Sale’. Bangkok Post. July 11, 1997. (6) ‘An Unlikely Host for Key Talks’. Bangkok Post. May 1, 2001. 59 ‘Golden Triangle Drug-warlord Khun Sa Passed Away (In Chinese) [金三角 大 毒 梟 坤 沙 逝 世 ]’ Hong Kong Economic Journal (Hong Kong) 信 報 . October 31, 2007. 60 ‘Opposition Leader Interviewed’. Bangkok Post. November 24, 1996. 61 (1) ‘Burma: Rangoon’s Rubicon: Infrastructure Aid Tightens Peking’s Control’. Far Eastern Economic Review. February 11, 1993. (2) ‘People of the Opiate: Burma’s Dictatorship of Drugs’. The Nation. December 16, 1996. (3) ‘Business is Booming: Is Myanmar Asia’s First Narco-state? Compelling Evidence Points to That Dubious Distinction’. Asiaweek. January 23, 1997. (4) ‘Thailand: Thai Daily Urges Burma to End Ties with Top Drug Dealers’. Bangkok Post. January 31, 1999. (5) ‘Tycoon Turf ’. The Irrawaddy Online Edition.

NOTES

62

63 64 65 66

67

68

69

267

September 2005. (6) ‘Who’s Financing the Project?’ The Irrawaddy Online Edition. December 2005. (1) ‘Traders Hotel Struck from Airline Deal’. The Irrawaddy. August 1, 1997. (2) ‘Road to Riches Starts in the Golden Triangle’. The New York Times. May 11, 1998. (3) ‘Singapore Shrug’. The Irrawaddy. August 1, 2002. (4) ‘Yangon’s Anti-drug Spin’. Asia Times. August 15, 2002. (5) ‘Thai Daily Urges Govt to Reconsider Policy of Protecting Top Drug Suspects’ Names’. Bangkok Post. September 1, 2003. (6) ‘Today’s Burma Funded by Drugs’. Bangkok Post. January 31, 2005. (7) ‘Singaporean Leader Supports Nguyen’s Case’. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. November 21, 2005. (8) ‘Singapore’s Hand in the Golden Triangle’. The Australians (Wednesday All-round Country Edition). November 23, 2005. (9) ‘Burma the Focus of Drugs Row Between Australia and Singapore’. The Irrawaddy. November 24, 2005. ‘Burmese Tycoons Part 1’. The Irrawaddy. June 1, 2000. ‘Poppy Fields “Poison” Youth of Afghanistan’. Financial Times. November 29, 2007. ‘Illicit Drug Trade – Amphetamine Output Thriving along Thai-Burmese Border’. Bangkok Post. March 23, 1997. ‘Above the Rule of Law: The Flowers Died in the “Golden Triangle” (In Chinese) [法治線上] 花謝“金三角”’. China Central Television 中國中央電 視台.June 23, 2006. (In www.cctv.com accessed on March 23, 2007). (1) ‘Kokang Thwart Burma Army Drug Raid’. The Irrawaddy. August 10, 2009. (2) ‘China Tough with Junta on Kokang’. Shan Herald Agency for News. August 13, 2009. (3) ‘Junta’s Ply: Push Kokang to Shoot First’. Shan Herald Agency for News. August 14, 2009. (4) ‘Kokang Returns to “Normal”’. Shan Herald Agency for News. August 17, 2009. (5) ‘Kokang Returns to Uneasy Peace’. Shan Herald Agency for News. August 18, 2009. (6) ‘Fighting in Kokang Continues’. Shan Herald Agency for News. August 29, 2009. (7). ‘Conflict Flare up in the Triangle’. The Nation. August 31, 2009. (1) ‘Pheung Kya-shin: Kokang Army was Dispersed (In Chinese) [彭家聲: 果敢軍被打散了]’. Chongqing Chenbao (China) 重慶晨報. August 30, 2009. (2) ‘Kokang Soldier: Didn’t Shoot Because Burmese Army Used Civilians as Hostage-Shield (In Chinese) 果敢士兵: 因緬甸軍押民眾當人質不敢開 槍’. Singtao Daily (Hong Kong) 星島日報. September 3, 2009. (1) ‘Thousands flee Burma into China’. Reuters. August 26, 2009. (2) ‘Refugees “Flood” China’. Radio Free Asia. August, 27, 2009. (3) ‘Myanmar Clashes Leave 1 Dead, Dozens Injuried’. The China Post. August 30, 2009. (4) ‘China Urges Myanmar to End Border Conflict’. The China Post. August 29, 2009. (5) ‘Clashes in Burma Anger China’. The Financial Times. August 31, 2009. (6) ‘Myanmar Conflict Subsiding’. The People’s Daily (English and Online Edition). August 31, 2009.

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70 (1) ‘Burma’s Chinese Flood to Yunnan. (In Chinese) 緬甸萬華人湧雲南避 難’. Singtao Daily (Hong Kong) 星島日報. August 28, 2009. (2) ‘Situation in Myanmar’s Kokang Region Remains’. China Daily. August 29, 2009. 71 (1) Interviews with Delfin Ting, Hotel Delfino, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 3, 5 & 7, 2003. (2) ‘Time-out in Tuguegarao’. The Northern Forum. March 15–21, 1998. (3) Interview with Maria Agu-Villania, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 12, 2003. (4) Interview with Rufo Baculi, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24, 2004. 72 (1) Interviews with Delfin Ting, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 7, 2003 & November 30, 2003. (2) Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (1994: 149). 73 Directory (2003) of the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Tuguegarao, Inc., Tuguegarao, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, collected in November 2003. 74 Report for fieldwork in Tuguegarao, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 8, 2002. 75 (1) Interview with Delfin Ting, Hotel Delfino, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 30, 2003. (2) Interview with Santiago Tang, shop, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, January 19, 2004. (3) Interview with Mildred Valenzuela, niece of Francisco Gosiengfiao, shop, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 27, 2004. (4). Interview with Narciso Chan, shop, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 2, 2004. (5) Interview with Antonio Co, shop, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 11, 2004. 76 (1) Inquiries to the record keeping office, Tuguegarao city council, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 2003. (2) Interview with Manuel Fermin, son of Florentino Fermin, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 2, 2004. 77 (1) Interview with Rene Cebeda, journalist, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 2, 2004. (2) Interview with Benjie de Yro, journalist, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 12, 2009. (3) ‘“No!” Organized against Jueteng, Drug Trade’. Cagayan Star. September 9–15, 2001. (4) ‘Adda Latta Hueteng [Still There’s Jueteng]’. Cagayan Star. September 9–15, 2001. (5) ‘Jueteng in Cagayan Causes Clash among Officials’. Cagayan Star. January 20–26, 2002. (6) ‘Alleged Jueteng Lord in Cagayan Liquidated?’ Cagayan Star. January 20–26, 2002. 78 (1) Interview with Victorita de Guzman, widow of Ben de Guzman, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 17, 2004. (2) Interview with Rodolfo Morales, residence, Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 19, 2004. 79 (1) Interview with Atty. Ven del Rosario, Jr., office of the secretary, Cagayan provincial board, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 24, 2004. (2) Interview with Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, parish convent, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 20, 2004.

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80 Civil Case No. 3813 (May 16, 1991). Florentino M. Fermin, Petitioner, v. Delfin T. Ting, Respondent. Tuguegarao: Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Second Judicial Court, Branch IV. 81 Interview with Delfin Ting, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 19, 2003. 82 Interviews with hotel operators in Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, 2006–9. 83 Interview with the Cagayan Valley Regional Development Council, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 23, 2004. 84 Interview with Catalino Tan, vice-president of Tuguegarao Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 16, 2004. 85 (1) ‘Introduction to Tuguegarao city, “the Premier Ibanag City”’, Tuguegarao city government, document collected in 2004. (2) City Planning and Development Coordinating Office (2000). City Comprehensive Development Plan/Comprehensive Land Use Plan: CY 2001-2005. Two Volumes Tuguegarao city, Philippines: Tuguegarao City Government. (3) City Development Council (2003). Annual Development Plan. Tuguegarao city, Philippines: Tuguegarao City Government. (4) City Development Council (2004). Annual Development Plan. Tuguegarao city, the Philippines: Tuguegarao City Government. 86 Interviews with 3 anonymous Chinese-Filipino businessmen, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 2, May 1 & May 11, 2004. 87 (1) Interview with Manuel Mamba, congressman, Tuao, March 16, 2004. (2) Interview with Victor Perez, president of the Cagayan Colleges Tuguegarao, Tuguegarao city, March 24, 2004. (3) Interview with Terry Collado, Tugegarao city, March 30, 2004. (4) Interviews with 7 anonymous business-owners, Tuguegarao city, March – April, 2004. (5) Interviews with 5 anonymous journalists, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March–May, 2004. 88 (1) Interviews with 5 employees of the Tuguegarao city government, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 2004. (2) Interview with Jaime Tabbu, businessman, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 12, 2004. (3) Interview with 4 anonymous businessmen, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 2004. 89 (1) Interview with Rufo Ong, owner of Brixton Mall, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines April 1, 2004. (2) Interview with an anonymous mall owner, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 3, 2004. 4 Capillaries of the State: The Padrino (Power/Knowledge) System 90 Field notes, Tuguegarao November 3, 2003.

city,

Cagayan

Valley,

the

Philippines,

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91 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 7, 2003. 92 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, January 5, 2004. 93 The model answer should be ‘tama (true)’. Source: the first periodical test for Grade V, Department of Education, collected in Manila and confirmed in Tuguegarao city, the Philippines, July 15 and August 5, 2009. 94 Interview, Roxanne (teacher), Tuguegarao Central School, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 7, 2009. 95 The use of ‘ripples’ as an analogy to illustrate the egocentric networks of social relations is not my original idea; see Bailey (1971: 8) and Fei (1992: 60). Moreover, the Tausug political system of the southern Philippines is described as ‘a series of concentric circles of decreasing power radiating from various points and blending with each other at the edges’ (Kiefer 1972: 94). 96 Ilocano: Magmaysa tay a familia. Tagalog: Iisa tayong pamilya. Hokkien: Lang-si-tsik-ke-lang. 97 For obvious reasons, informant identities have been changed. However, it is worthwhile to mention their cross-ethnic genealogies. Alejandro Chua was born to a Chinese father and Ilocano mother in the Cagayan province. He married a Tagalog woman and she gave birth to Juan. Noynoy Ty was born to a Chinese father and Ibanag mother in the Isabela province before they moved to Manila. Interviews and travelling notes, Cagayan Valley, central Luzon and the Cordillera, December 20 to 29, 2003. 98 Pancit originated from Fujian, China (probably Xiamen) brought by the Chinese migrants into the Philippines. The Filipino term pancit is a localized version of the Chinese word bianshi (便食) which means ‘ready to eat – fast-food’. In the old days, pancit was made ready and sold by Chinese peddlers. Nowadays in Tuguegarao, pancit has become a reasonably priced special local delicacy known as batil batong, provided by numerous panciteria and restaurants. A dish of pancit consists of fried noodles with meat, liver, egg and vegetables as well as a bowl of soup which cost less than 50 pesos. Based on relatively small capital, a panciteria business is probably the most accessible option for small entrepreneurs. Every year, during the Tuguegarao city fiesta in mid-August, the city government organizes pancit contests to encourage consumption of pancit – one of the development projects initiated by former mayor Randolph Ting to foster the spirit of business entrepreneurship of the Tuguegaraoeños in order to decrease poverty. 99 Translation of hiya and mukha into the Chinese word min-zi (face) is by the informants. 100 According to the translation by my Chinese-Filipino informants, this Chinese term is said to be equivalent to the Tagalog terms of padrino/madrino, ninong/ninang and kumpadre/kumadre. 101 There may be further differentiations within kin (Pertierra 1988: chapter 4). 102 Interviews with Feliciano Cu, rice mill, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 18–22, 2008.

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103 (人情 renqing, human obligation) There are two Hokkien pronunciations in the Philippines: (1) lin-qing (2) lang-qing. Both mean the same – ‘human feeling’ (Yan 1996: 122) or ‘human obligation’ (King 1994: 109). 104 Interview with Delfin Ting, Hotel Delfino, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, December 13, 2003. 105 Interview with Bishop Ricardo Baccay, Archbishop’s residence, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, January 13, 2004. 106 Interview with Delfin Ting, Hotel Delfino, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, January 13, 2004. 107 Field notes, cockpit, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 30, 2004. 108 In the cockpit, meron literally means ‘sufficient’ whereas wala means ‘nothing’ or ‘none’. 109 According to Local Government Code (1991), members of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be under 21 years old. They have the power and authority to initiate and implement all youth-related activities and programmes that are coordinated with national, provincial, municipal and barangay-level officials. 110 Interview and field notes, parish convent of Father Ranhilio Aquino, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 24, 2004. 111 Interviews, Manong Katigid, paddy–field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24 & 25, 2007. 112 Interviews and field notes, 5 barangays in Tuguegarao city and 2 barangays in Tuao, Cagayan province, April 11, 13 & 15, 2009. 113 Interviews with Manong Katigid, paddy–field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24 & 25, 2007. 5 Sovereignty Re-enacted: Philippine Art for Governing African Coups 114 As an indicator of political stability, ‘conflict years’ are calculated by counting the number of state-based armed conflicts that a country experienced between 1946 and 2008, and then summing the number of years each conflict was active. For example, if a country experienced one conflict that lasted 15 years, and another that lasted for 1 year, the country would have experienced 16 conflict years. The result is the same regardless of whether the conflicts occurred in the same or different years (Human Security Report Project 2010: figure 3.1). 115 The ASEAN Secretariat. (2010). ‘Table 20: Top Ten ASEAN Trade Partner Countries/Regions, 2009.’ (http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table20.pdf). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 116 Sources from The Manila Bulletin: (1) ‘PC Patrol on Ship Rescued under Fire.’ July 8, 1972. (2) ‘More Troops to Isabela.’ 9 July 1972. (3) ‘AFP Unleashes ‘Might’ against 1000 NPA Men.’ July 10, 1972. (4) ‘PAF Jets Can’t Bomb NPA.’ July 11, 1972. (5) ‘Mitra Ridicules NPA “Ship” Story.’ July 11, 1972. (6) ‘NPA Arms Cache Seized.’ July 12, 1972. (7) ‘Mysterious Palanan.’ July 12, 1972. (8) ‘Hidden War.’ July 13, 1972. (9) ‘NPA Kills 4 Soldiers; Ship Had 2

272

117

118 119

120 121 122 123 124 125

126 127 128

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Sino Seamen.’ July 13, 1972. (10) ‘6 Army Soldiers Slain in Isabela Ambuscade.’ 3 September 1972. (11) ‘New Raps Poised on “Karagatan”.’ September 9, 1972. (12) ‘Troopers Raid Chinatown Area.’ September 10, 1972. (13) ‘Intercept Rockets, Arms.’ September 14, 1972. (14) ‘Chinese Vessel Fired at off Isabela Waters, Crewman Hurt.’ September 17, 1972. (15) ‘Ferdinand Marcos Tells of LP-NPA Huddle.’ September 17, 1972. (16) ‘NPA Raids Army Post, Troopers Die.’ September 21, 1972. (17) ‘PC Commander Ambushed – NPA.’ September 22, 1972. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (2008). Special Briefing Paper on the History of Communist Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Cagayan Valley (Region 2) from the 1960s to the Present. (Date of Briefing: July 14, 2008; Date of Receipt of the Paper: October 16, 2008). Gamu, Isabela Province, the Philippines: Fifth Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Field notes and dataset, Gattaran, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 1–14, 2007. During the martial law, there was a diplomatic agreement between the Philippines, Republic of China (Taiwan) and United States to counter communism in the Asia-Pacific region. China was suspected to support the communist movements in Southeast Asian countries. As a result, Philippine military officers were sent to military bases in Taiwan for special counterinsurgency training. (1) Interview, Retired General Pedro Sistoza, residence, Manila, the Philippines, December 15, 2007. (2) Interview, Senator Greogorio B. Honasan II, office, Philippine Senate, Manila, the Philippines, April 27, 2009. Field notes and dataset, Philippine Military Academy, Baguio city, the Philippines, July 7, 2008. (1) ‘In the “Killing Fields”: Red Rebels Escalate Attacks in Cagayan.’ California Manila Times. June 18, 1986. (2) ‘Irregular Force Trains to Fight Rebels.’ The Manila Times. November 18, 1988. ‘Aguinaldo Confirms Break with AFP to Fight Rebels.’ News Today. September 18, 1987. Interview with Retired General Pedro Sistoza, residence, Manila, the Philippines, December 15, 2007. ‘Lotto Makes Suspended Governor a Folk Hero.’ TM Weekly Herald. February 9 –15, 1990. (1) ‘Mindanao Governor Leads List of Gambling Operators.’ Malaya. May 25, 1988. (2) ‘House to Probe Solons Named in Gambling Mess.’ The Manila Times. May 26, 1988. (3) ‘Names of Solons Linked to Vice Sought.’ Philippine Daily Globe. May 26, 1988. ‘Police in Gambling.’ The Sunday Chronicle. October 31, 1993. (1) ‘Senate Opens Probe on Gambling, Vices: 28 Vice Lords Snub Hearing.’ Manila Bulletin. March 16, 1988. (2) ‘Red Doing Better in Anti-gambling Drive – Montaño.’ Manila Standard. March 17, 1988. ‘Aguinaldo “Payroll” Includes Top Officials.’ The Manila Chronicle. March 22, 1990.

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129 Author’s investigative research report on jueteng in Cagayan province, 1960s – present (Unpublished manuscript, June–August, 2008). 130 During martial law, President Ferdinand Marcos practiced the tactic of ‘divide and rule’ in Cagayan Province. The longest-reigning, sixteen-year governor of Cagayan Province, Teresa ‘Tessing’ Dupaya and her husband, Congressman Tito Dupaya had enjoyed continuous support from Marcos to balance their bitter rival in Cagayan – National Defense Minister Enrile, who was also one of the closest men to Marcos. (1) ‘Dupaya-Enrile War a Political Feud.’ The Manila Chronicle. Saturday, July 15, 1972. (2) ‘What Private Armies is Secretary Enrile Talking About?’ Examiner. July 22 July – August 15, 1972. (3) ‘Enrile Country Contends with the Forces of Dupaya.’ Mr. & Mrs. February 10, 1984. (4) ‘Enrile Country Sizzles with Family Feuds and Political Warlords.’ Mr. & Mrs. April 6, 1984. (5) ‘Enrile-Dupaya Showdown Looms in Cagayan.’ Manila Bulletin. July 5, 1987. 131 (1) ‘Aquino in the Corner: She May Have to Bend to Prevent a Final Fragmentation of the Mutinous Philippine Military.’ Newsweek. September 14, 1987. (2) ‘The Coup That Failed: Aquino Survives the Fifth – and Bloodiest – Attempt on Her Rule.’ Time. September 7, 1987. 132 ‘Inside the Rebel Camp.’ Newsweek. September 21, 1987. 133 (1) ‘The “Defeat”of the Rightists.’ Manila Times. January 29, 1988. (2) ‘A Tale of Two Colonels.’ The Philippine Star. February 3, 1988. (3) ‘We, the People: No Mantle of State Power.’ Manila Times. February 3, 1988. (4) ‘Comelec Proclamation of Aguinaldo.’ Philippine Daily Globe. March 16, 1988. (5) ‘Scorched Earth Politicians.’ Katipunan: Monthly Newsmagazine of the Filipino Community. Vol. 1, No. 5, March 1988. 134 ‘Cagayan Mayors Seek Relief of Provincial PC Commander.’ Malaya. Thursday June 4, 1987 135 (1) ‘Renegade Officer Seeks Philippine Governorship.’ The New York Times. January 18, 1988. (2) ‘Tough-talking Colonel Challenges Cagayan’s Political Giants.’ The Manila Chronicle. January 18, 1988. (3) ‘Should We Reward Violence?’ Manila Times. Feburary 3, 1988. 136 In view of the rampancy of jueteng, the Philippine government attempted legalization through the Small Town Lottery (STL) mainly for generating additional inland revenues. However, it was reported that STL operators followed the same modus operandi by continuing to pay portions of the incomes to the provincial governors, municipal mayors and provincial commanders of the police force. P.1, Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusement, House of the Representatives, Quezon City, October 5, 1987. 137 P. 5, Minute of Regular Session of the Committee on Games and Amusement, Senate, Congress of the Philippines, Manila, 9:55 A.M., February 12, 1990. 138 (1) Interview with Delfin Ting, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 30, 2003. (2) Interview with Atty. Ven del Rosario, Jr., Secretary of Cagayan Provincial Board, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the

274

139 140 141

142

143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Philippines, February 24, 2004. (3) Interview with Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, Parish Convent, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 20, 2004. Civil Case No. 3813 (May 16, 1991). Florentino M. Fermin, Petitioner, v. Delfin T. Ting, Respondent. Tuguegarao: Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Second Judicial Court, Branch IV. Criminal Case No. 25203. People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Mayor Delfin Ting Telan, Accused. Quezon City: Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division. (No date). Take Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel V. Ramos as examples. In 1986, it was estimated that the martial law National Defense Minister Enrile held 25 percent of the military power when he was reappointed as Secretary of Defense by President Aquino with Ramos as AFP Chief of Staff who held 35 percent of the military. The remaining 40 percent showed no specific loyalty to either. Led by Enrile, the rightist RAM members sparked several unsuccessful coups between 1986 and 1990. RAM’s unsuccessful coup attempts could attribute to the fact that General Ramos decided to side with the Aquino regime to keep the country’s unity. In 1992, favored by Aquino, Ramos served as the President of the Republic until 1998 (Porter 1987: chapter 4) (1) ‘Poll Win Didn’t Clear Plotters.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. January 29, 1988. (2) ‘Aquino Stands Part on 2 Poll Winners.’ Manila Bulletin. February 15, 1988. (3) ‘Enrile Arrested in December Coup Bid.’ Los Angeles Times. Wednesday February 28, 1990. ‘Renegade Officer Seeks Philippine Governorship.’ The New York Times. January 18, 1988. ‘The Philippines: Cory, Coups and Corruption: Allegations of Graft Fuel Resentment against Aquino.’ Time. January 15, 1990. (1) ‘Aguinaldo Hangs on, Has New Legal Tactic.’ The Manila Chronicles. January 19, 1990. (2) ‘Cory Gov’t Out to Prove It’s Not That Impotent on Cagayan Controversy.’ TM Weekly Herald. January 19–25, 1990. ‘Officials Fail Anew to Remove Aguinaldo.’ The Manila Chronicle. January 20, 1990. ‘Mayor’s Bodyguard Killed Florendo – CIS.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. March 22, 1990. Committee on National Defence and Security, Senate, Congress of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines (1990). Third Regular Session, March 23, 1990. Jarencio II-2. p.3 (1) ‘Troops Given Shoot-to-kill Order on Agi.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. Tuesday March 6, 1990. (2) ‘Agui “Owns” Slay.’ Philippine Sun. March 16, 1990. ‘Ramos: Gov’t Troops Having Difficult Time Finding Agi.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. Thursday March 15, 1990. ‘Aguinaldo Surrenders in Cagayan.’ The Manila Chronicle. Wednesday, June 13, 1990.

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152 Committee on National Defence and Security, Senate, Congress of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines (1990). Third Regular Session, March 23, 1990. Jarencio II-2, p.3. 153 (1) Civil Case En Banc G.R. No. 94115 (21 August 1992). Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, Petitioner v. Luis Santos, as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, and Melvin Vargas, as Acting Governor of Cagayan, Respondents. Manila: Supreme Court. (2) Civil Case Docket No. 212 SCRA 768 (1992). Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, Petitioner v.. Commission of Election, Respondent. Manila: Supreme Court. (3) Personal communication with Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, Chairman of Academic Affairs, The Manila Supreme Court, Manila, the Philippines, July 13, 2005. 154 (1) Aguinaldo: Ang Agila ng Cagayan. (1993). San Bruno, CA: Regal Home Entertainment. (2) ‘Spectacular Action Scenes in Aguinaldo’s Film Bio.’ Manila Bulletin. Monday August 16, 1993. For a succinct commentary on the film, see McCoy (1999: 308–12). 155 (1) ‘Cagayan Land Program.’ Manila Bulletin. Saturday December 26, 1992. (2) ‘Special Feature: Cagayan.’ Manila Standard. Monday March 29, 1993. 156 Sources: (1) Interview, Professor Leticia Aquino, former Budget Officer of the Cagayan provincial government, office, Dean of School of Law, Cagayan State University, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 13, 2008. (2) Interview, Edna Junio, Director of Department of Social Welfare, Cagayan provincial government, Tueguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 7, 2009. (3) Interview, Dr. Mildred Abella, provincial agriculturist, Cagayan provincial government, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 7, 2009. (4) Anonymous RAM member, policeman, Cagayan Valley, April 7, 2009. (5) Interview, Emy Garan, former Cagayan provincial government administrator, residence, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 10, 2009. (6) Interview, Sally Vitug, former assistant of the Provincial Planning and Development Office, Cagayan provincial government, residence, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 10, 2009. (7) Interview, Jeanna Garma, provincial accountant, office, Cagayan provincial government, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 10, 2009. (8) ‘Aguinaldo Shares Tips for Successful Governance.’ Northern Post. Vol. XVIII, No. 6, March 21, 1998. (9) ‘For 10 Years: Aguinaldo Bows Out as Cagayan’s Governor.’ Northern Post. Vol. XVIII, No. 7, March 28, 1998. 157 (1) ‘Cagayan’s Governor and Congressman-elect Vow End to 10 Percenters in Gov’t Projects.’ Northern Post. Vol. XVII, No. 15, May 23, 1998. (2) ‘Aguinaldo Vows Institutional-building in Congress.’ Northern Post. Vol. XVII, No. 15, May 23, 1998. 158 ‘Cagayan Solon Slain in Ambush.’ Philippine Star. June 13, 2001. ‘NPA: Aguinaldo Deserved to Die.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. June 14, 2001. ‘The Peace Talks, Aguinaldo’s Killing.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. September 10, 2001. 159 ‘Suspected Drug Lord Shot Dead.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. January 16, 2002.

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160 As the political rivals of Aguinaldo, the Tings and the Mambas were suspected of involvement in the deaths of Aguinaldo and Ben De Guzman. While Delfin denied these verbal accusations, he said that he would answer to any legal charges filed against him. The assassination of Aguinaldo will be detailed in Chapter 8. 6 Sovereignty Policed: Disciplinary and Surveillance Techniques in the Itawes Philippines 161 Interviews with Arsenio Bauit (fictitious identity) and his neighborhood, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, February 25, 2009. 162 Interview with an anonymous official, municipal government, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, February 25, 2009. 163 Field-trips with Congressman Manuel Mamba, Tuao, Cagayan province, Philippines. March 16, 2004 and April 7, 2004. 164 Printed on the wall of the Atty. Leonardo ‘Nards’ N. Mamba Memorial Gymnasium, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, collected on September 28, 2004. 165 Congressman Manuel Mamba’s inauguration speech, municipal festival, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, September 28, 2004. 166 (1) Field-trips with Manuel Mamba, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, March 16, 2004 and April 7, 2004. (2) Interview with Mayor William Mamba, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, August 28, 2004. 167 Leonides Fausto was elected as the board member (2004–7) and the vice-governor (2007–10) of the Cagayan provincial government. 168 Interview with an anonymous official, Cagayan provincial government, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 21, 2009. 169 (1) Interview with Teresita Espinosa, Municipal Agriculturist, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 22, 2009. (2) Interview with Henry Yap General Merchandise, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 24, 2009. (3) Interview with Lucky V General Merchandise, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 24, 2009. (4) Interview with Magno Lim, Tuguegarao city, the Philippines, April 24, 2009. (5) Interview with Mayor Paul Delwasen, residence, Conner, Apayao province, the Philippines, April 20, 2009. (6) Interview with William Ambona, Pinukpuk municipal government, Kalinga province, the Philippines, April 22, 2009. (7) Interview with Christine Espita, Universal Grain Center, Tabuk, Kalinga province, the Philippines, April 22, 2009. Note: Nowadays, it is estimated that 20–40% of Conner harvests are handled by Tuguegarao grain-traders and 50% of Pinukpuk harvests are handled by the Tabuk (Kalinga) grain-traders. 170 National Statistics Office (2007). 2007 Census of Population of Cagayan Province. Manila: National Statistics Office. 171 Itawes is the official term used by the Cagayan provincial government to name this ethno-linguistic group. Previously used terms include Ytabes, Tawish, Itavi, Itawit, Itaves and Itabes. No ethnographic study of them is extant as of

NOTES

172 173

174 175 176

177 178 179

180

181 182

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the fieldwork period. At present, apart from Tuao, Itawes communities may be found in the municipalities of Amulung, Enrile, Piat, Solana and Rizal, and Tuguegarao city. See Chapter 2 for more details. Although the 1990 plebiscite failed to approve the ruling of the Cordillera Administrative Region into the Cordillera Autonomous Region, its executive board is now moving towards an ‘autonomous government’ similar to the one recently established in the southern Philippines (Finin 1998: 37). ‘A Historical Treatment to the Resolute Cordillera Peoples’ Struggle.’ Bulatlat. Vol. IV. No. 12. April 25–May 1, 2004. Macli-ing Dulag is still considered a martyr today, and his death is mourned annually in Kalinga. ‘Pedro Dungoc: Kalinga Warrior, People’s Martyr.’ Bulatlat. Vol. III. No. 45. December 14–20, 2003. See also: Finin (2005: chapter 9). (1) ‘Elders Call for End to Tribal Wars.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. May 12, 2003. (2) Cordillera Day Marked Amid Dam Threats, Tribal Wars.’ Bulatlat. Vol. IV. No 13. May 2–8, 2004. (3) ‘Cops Move to Avert Tribal War in Mountain Province.’ The Manila Times. Monday, November 8, 2004. (4). ‘Being a Peace Pact Holder.’ Nordis Weekly. June 5, 2005. For example, see: ‘Robbers Kill Five Passengers in Kalinga.’ The Manila Times. April 9, 2005. (1) Interview with Angeles Balunsat, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, January 2, 2008. (2) Certification, Office of the Municipal Assessor, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, January 14, 1992. Interviews, five landlords, forty-two farmer-beneficiaries of the land reform program, fifteen grain-traders, two officials of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Tuao, Cagayan province, Philippines, 2007–9. The farmerbeneficiaries were randomly selected from the following two documents: (1) Department of Agrarian Reform (2007). Master List of Emancipation Pattern by Survey Number of Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan Province, Region II (January 1, 1972 – March 31, 2007). Manila: Department of Agrarian Reform. (2) Department of Agrarian Reform (2007). List of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) Generation/Registration Accomplishment of Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan Province, Region II (January 1, 1972 – March 31, 2007). Manila: Department of Agrarian Reform. (1) Interview with Roberto Rojo (fictitious identity), farmer-beneficiary of the land reform, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, September 4, 2007. (2) Agricultural Leasehold Contract, acknowledged by Atty. Romeo Calubaquib, Notary Public, Tuguegarao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, date of acknowledgement: November 29, 1993. Transfer Certificate of Title, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, Department of Justice, Manila, Republic of the Philippines, date of endorsement: April 6, 1989. Two letters of correspondence, Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, date of signature: November 3, 1993.

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183 Interview with Elpidio Urbanoso, Chief, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Officer for Operation, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, December 20, 2007. 184 Interviews with three anonymous patrons of the Tuao Itawes Chinese Ke Chin School (株后華僑啟真小學), August 16, 17 & 18, 2004. 185 From the mid-1990s to the fieldwork period, increasing incidents of flashfloods were reported due to the deforestation in the upper Chico River Basin. Interview with Manuel Mamba, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, August 24, 2004. 186 Interviews with Domingo Abella (fictitious identity), residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 23, 2007 & January 2, 2008. 187 Interview with Evelyn Tiu, Biya’s Grain Trading, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, January 2, 2008. 188 Interview with Elpidio Urbanoso, Chief, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Officer for Operation, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan province, the Philippines, December 20, 2007. 189 Statements of income and expenditure, 2001–7, Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan province, Manila: Bureau of Local Government Finance. 190 (1) Interview with Wilma Malana, President, Rice Vendors Association, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, October 15, 2008. (2) Interview with Remedio Ramirez, rice vendor, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, October 15, 2008. (3) Interview with Anastacia Caronan, rice vendor, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, October 15, 2008. (4) Interview with Nicolasa Baccay, rice vendor, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, October 15, 2008. (5) Interview with Sharon Melad, rice vendor, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, October 15, 2008. (6) Interview with Ernesto Cenabre, municipal councilor, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, November 9, 2008. (7) Ronald Lizardo, Price Market Inspector, Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, November 9, 2008. 191 (1) ‘Cagayan “Boxing Mayor” Strikes Again.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. October 20, 1994. (2) Tuguegarao Mayor Loses Cop Powers.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. April 17, 1995. 192 Interview with Manuel Mamba, residence, Barangay Naruagan, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, March 16, 2004. 193 (1) ‘25 North Luzon Warlords Listed.’ Malaya. September 11, 1986. (2) ‘MLG Sacks “Warlord” KBL Mayor in Cagayan.’ Malaya. January 20, 1987. 194 The NPA used to ‘execute’ government officials who committed the crime of land grabbing. However, the issue of land grabbing has been exploited for NPA recruitment purposes and mass-based organizing. (Porter 1987: 17). 195 Oath of Office, Movement for Self-Reliant Tuao (MSRT), Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, September 29, 2004. 196 An objective is to sanction village-level corruption. 197 Field notes, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, August 18-19, 2004.

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198 SIE Databank, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Manila, the Philippines, run date: April 30, 2009. 199 Interview with Lourdes (fictitious identity), Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 1, 2004. 200 Interviews with Doy (fictitious identity), Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 13, 2004. 201 Interview with Rodolfo Morales, residence, Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 19, 2004. 202 Interview with Manong Katigid, paddy–field shelter, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 17, 2004. 203 Field notes, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 17, 2004. 204 Interview with Manuel Mamba and field notes, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 25, 2005. 205 On May 10, 1998, Marcita Mamba Perez filed a case against the Commission of Election and Aguinaldo in an attempt to disqualify Aguinaldo from the congressional race on the basis that Aguinaldo was not a resident of the 3rd district of the Cagayan province, and thus ineligible to run for congressman. However, based on solid evidence in favor of Aguinaldo, the petition was dismissed. Civil Case En Banc G.R. No. 133944. (October 28, 1999). Marcita Mamba Perez, Petitioner, v. Commission of Election and Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, Respondents. Manila, the Philippines: Supreme Court. 206 Aguinaldo won in Tuguegarao because he promised the people that he would sponsor a congressional bill to designate Tuguegarao as a component city. Tuguegarao became a component city in 2000. In 1995, Delfin had already sought support from Manuel for sponsorship of the bill, but had failed. 207 Interviews with seven anonymous voters, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 12, May 18, May 20, July 4 & August 2, 2004. 208 Field notes, Tuao, Cagayan Province, the Philippines, June 26, 2004. 209 (1) Interview with Father Gerardo Perez, Parish Convent, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 22, 2007. (2) ‘Catholic Priest Educates Voters in Cagayan.’ The Philippine Star. Vol. XXI, No. 285, Friday, May 11, 2007. (3) ‘Protests Mark Poll End in North Luzon Areas.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. Vol. 22, No. 163, Tuesday, May 22, 2007. 210 Field notes, Manuel Mamba’s inauguration speech, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, June 30, 2007.

7 Exceptional Democracy: Conceiving Philippine Elections as a Sovereignty-making Pinball Machine 211 (1) Covenant, Archdiocese of Tuguegarao, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, collected on May 2, 2007. (2) Candidate’s manifesto, Archdiocese of Tuguegarao, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, collected on May 2, 2007.

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212 (1) ‘Catholic Priest Educates Voters in Cagayan’. The Philippine Star. Vol. XXI, No. 285, Friday May 11, 2007. (2) Interviews, Father Gerard Perez and Father Rusty Aggabao, parish convent, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 22, 2007. 213 Investigative reports on Cagayano electoral practices, September 5, November 1 & November 13, 2008. 214 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 25 & April 4, 2007. 215 (1) Statement of the Archbishop of Tuguegarao on problems relative to the election of May 14, collected on May 15, 2007. (2) Statement of NAMFREL Cagayan on the on-going canvass of electoral returns, collected on May 15, 2007. (3) Statement of electoral returns on the May 14, 2007 election, third district of Cagayan, Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) and National Citizens’ Movement for Free Election (NAMFREL), May 20, 2007. 216 ‘Protests Mark Poll End in North Luzon Areas.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. Tuesday, May 22, 2007. 217 (1) ‘Protests Mark Poll End in North Luzon Areas.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. Tuesday, May 22, 2007. (2) ‘Violence Mars Counting of Votes in Cagayan.’ Cagayan Star. May 27 – June 2, 2007. 218 ‘Protests Mark Poll End in North Luzon Areas.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. Tuesday, May 22, 2007. 219 ‘Violence Mars Counting of Votes in Cagayan.’ Cagayan Star. May 27 – June 2, 2007. 220 (1) Petition to Annul Proclamation Case No. SPC 07-108 (May 23, 2007), Randolph S. Ting, petitioner, v. Manuel Mamba, Municipal Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Tuao and Provincial Board of Canvassers of the Province of Cagayan, respondents, Manila: Commission of Election. (2) Appeal Memorandum Case No. SPC 07-167 (May 25, 2007), Randolph S. Ting, appellant, v. Manuel Mamba, Municipal Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Tuao and Provincial Board of Canvassers of the Province of Cagayan, appelles, Manila: Commission of Election. (3) Resolution No. 8164 (June 12, 2007), Manila: Commission of Election. (4) Minutes of the Provincial Board of Canvassing, proceeding of the May 2007 election, Provincial Board of Canvassers of Cagayan province, the Philippines, certified true Xerox copy dated September 3, 2007. 221 (1) Field notes, Cagayan province, the Philippines, June 21–4, June 28 & June 30, 2007. (2) Field notes, Manila, the Philippines, July 14, 2007. 222 (1) ‘Veteran Lawmaker Makes a Comeback.’ The Manila Times. Monday May 28, 2007. (2) ‘Cagayan Canvass Deferred.’ Philippine Star. July 9, 2007. (3) ‘Enrile’s Bet Proclaimed Cagayan Governor.’ Philippine Star. July 10, 2007. 223 Nationwide elections were then introduced in 1907 by the American colonial government (Anderson 1996: 20). 224 Correspondingly, Anderson (1996) observed that Philippine elections have both a positive and a shadowy face. Philippine elections transform their

NOTES

225

226

227

228 229 230 231 232

281

multicultural subjects into ‘Filipinos’ and have the population internalize a national culture through a sequence of institutionalized events: the filing of candidacy, campaign sorties, miting de advance (the meeting held ahead of schedule), polling, canvassing ballots, announcement of electoral results and official inauguration of public offices. Election connects local opinions and voices of the socially disadvantaged to the central state legislature. For each law passed and enforced, elected representatives debate, endorse and implement policies for the best interests of their constituents. In this spirit, a nationwide election affirms statehood – it unifies the voting population into a self-definition of the nation-state. The shadowy side of contemporary elections is not far from the Spanish electoral scene described above (de Jesus 1978): vote–buying, electoral terrorism, violence and electoral fraud. These contradictory aspects point to the contesting dimension of Philippine elections. This resembles the process that Levi-Strauss describes as bricolage (LeviStrauss 1996: 17–20), a creative action pulling symbols of linguistic and material forms, yet always subject to disagreements, contestation and (re)-appropriation. (1) Interview with Mayor Washington Taguinod, Peñablanca municipal government, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 28, 2004. (2) Interview with Mayor Robert Turingan, Enrile municipal government, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 29, 2004. (3) Interview with Mayor Juditas Trinidad of Amulung, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 29, 2004. (4) Interview with Mayor Rudy de Asis, Solana municipal government, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 3, 2004. The upgrade to city status and substantial increase in Internal Revenue Allotment from the central state to Tuguegarao city appeared to be a threat to the Tings’ keen political rivals. As upcoming political figures in the Cagayan province, the Tings were able to enjoy symbolic superiority, because, in comparison to other municipalities, the Tuguegarao city government now commanded the largest amount of governmental funds. There is a perception that Tuguegarao’s financial supremacy would enable the Tings to have a better financial capacity to compete for other political offices. Interview with Miguel Lim, city administrator’s office, city hall, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, January 24, 2004. Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 21–2, 2004. In the Cagayan province, these ethno-linguistic groups are mainly Ibanag, Ilocano, Itawes and Tagalog, with minorities of Chinese, Kalinga and Isneg/Malaueg. See Chapter 4 for more details. Interviews with six anonymous voters, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 21–2, 2004. Interview with Maria Agu-Villania, director, City Planning and Development Office, city hall, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 12, 2003.

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233 These names are fictitious. 234 These names are fictitious. 235 Interview with Father Ranhilio Aquino, parish convent, Barangay Annafunan West, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 24, 2004. 236 In-tsiuk refers to ‘his/her uncle’ in the Hokkien language. According to the Chinese-Filipinos in the northernmost coastal municipality of Aparri (Cagayan province), the origin of this creolized Filipino word traces to an early (probably pre-Hispanic) encounter between a Chinese sojourn-trader and a native local somewhere along the northern Luzon coast. One day, a native local saw some Chinese take off from a boat and land. He asked his Chinese companion about these foreigners. The Chinese finger-pointed at another Chinese and said Intsik, which denoted they were relatives. In the Hispanic Philippines, the Chinese were also called Sangley by the Spaniards, which means ‘business’ in Hokkien, which suggests that the Chinese mainly came to do business. After getting rich, they would leave for good (Horsley 1950). Interviews with the president and three active members of the Aparri Chinese-Filipino Chamber of Commerce, Aparri, the Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 22-23, 2004. 237 Civil Case No. 3813 (May 16, 1991). Florentino M. Fermin, Petitioner, v. Delfin T. Ting, Respondent. Tuguegarao: Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Second Judicial Court, Branch IV. 238 P.3, Civil Case No. 3813 (May 16, 1991). Florentino M. Fermin, Petitioner, v. Delfin T. Ting, Respondent. Tuguegarao: Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Second Judicial Court, Branch IV. 239 P.23, Civil Case No. 3813 (May 16, 1991). Florentino M. Fermin, Petitioner, v. Delfin T. Ting, Respondent. Tuguegarao: Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Second Judicial Court, Branch IV. 240 (1) Interview with Rene Cebeda, journalist, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 2, 2004. (2) Interview with Benjie de Yro, journalist, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 12, 2009. 241 Case for Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (March 24, 2004). Mayotino R. Fernandez, Petitioner v. Delfin T. Ting, Respondent. Tuguegarao City: COMELEC Provincial Office, the Commission of Election, Cagayan Province, the Philippines. 242 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 26, 2004. 243 Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation (March 29, 2004). Jaime M. Ventura, Marlyn B. Tayag, Gilda Fe P. Ortelano, Complainants, v. Randolph S. Ting, Hilario S. Ting, Pacquing Banan, Respondents. Tuguegarao City: City Prosecution Office, Department of Justice, City Hall. 244 (1) ‘Duelo sa Unang Araw ng Kampanya: Ting Vs Fausto (The First Fight During the First Day of Campaign).’ Alam ng Cagayan Valley. April 1–7, 2004. (2) ‘Tuguegarao City Mayor Ting Sinampahan ng Kasong Kriminal (Tuguegarao City Mayor Ting was Filed Criminal Cases)’. Alam ng Cagayan Valley. April 1–7, 2004. (3) ‘Cagayan Mayor Faces Maul Raps’. The Manila Times. March 31, 2004.

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245 The Tings reported two incidents to the police during the election. The first was a shooting incident in Solana, a town adjacent to Tuguegarao city. An assigned police aide of congressional candidate Delfin Ting was shot in his right thigh when he was off duty at home. After an investigation, it was reported that the policeman had accidentally opened fire and hurt himself. The second incident was a shooting of a van at a location about one hundred meters away from Mayor Randolph Ting’s residence along the Buntun Highway, Tuguegarao city. The front screen of the reported van was reportedly hit by a gunshot. Because neither a single bullet nor a shell was found in the area and the vehicle was actually not owned and used by any political group, the case was not categorized as serious. Nevertheless, together with the March 25, 2004 Incident at the Hotel Delfino, media reports discursively constructed an atmosphere of electoral terrorism and violence in the Cagayan province, which did nothing to ease the worries and concern of the public. 246 Radio program, Bombo Radyo, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 15, 2004. 247 Field notes during the 2004 election, third congressional district, Cagayan province, the Philippines, March – June, 2004. 248 Ibid. For obvious reasons, the informants did not want their identities to be revealed. 249 Field notes, Barangay Tagga, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 30, 2004. 250 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 1, 2004. 251 ‘Problems of Cagayan’, DZYT Radio Programme, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 14, 2004. 252 (1) Interview with Grace Gosiengfiao, a granddaughter of former mayor Francisco Gosiengfiao, residence, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, February 23, 2004. (2) Interview with Vincente Limqueco Sr., a contemporary and municipal councilor of former mayor Francisco Gosiengfiao, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 24, 2004. (3) Interview with Mildred Valenzuela, a niece of former mayor Francisco Gosiengfiao, shop, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, February, 27, 2004. 253 Interview with Rodolfo Morales, residence, Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 2, 2004. 254 Interview with Manuel Mamba and participant-observant field notes on his electoral campaign, third district of Cagayan province, the Philippines, March 31, 2004. 255 Interview with Manuel Mamba and participant-observant field notes on his electoral campaign, third district of Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 7, 2004. 256 (1) Interview with Manong Katigid, paddy–field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, May 17, 2004. (2) Interviews with Lucio Collado, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 30 & June 21, 2004.

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257 Interview with Father Ranhilio Aquino, parish convent, Barangay Annafunan West, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 27, 2004. 258 (1) Interview with Victor Perez, residence, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24, 2004. (2) Interview with Manong Katigid, paddy–field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, May 17, 2004. (3) Interview with Calixto Melad, residence, Barangay Cataggaman Pardo, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 22, 2004. (4) Interview with Wino Abraham, farmhouse, Barangay Larion Alto, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 22, 2004. 259 Interviews with an anonymous village official, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 12 & March 25, 2004. 260 Interviews with an anonymous village official, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 25 & April 24, 2004. 261 Interviews with Congressman Manuel Mamba, residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, February 11 & March 16, 2004. 262 Interviews and travelling notes in Cagayan, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur provinces, the Philippines, April 14–8, 2004. 263 I received these two impressions from various exchanges with the colleagues and individuals in Manila and the Cagayan Valley over the past 8 years. 264 Field notes on the exchanges with the members of the Rotary Club, Zonta Club and YMCA, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24, June 16, 24 & 27, August 4 & 13, 2004. 265 Interview with an anonymous informant, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 12, 2004. 266 Interview with an anonymous informant, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 12, 2004. 267 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 23, 25 & 28, 2004. 268 Apart from those barangays inside Tuguegarao city, I met officials from four far-flung villages to verify if the report was entirely true. Three officials were from Amulung and one was from Peñablanca. Later, Manuel also personally validated the report as true. (1) Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 28, 2004. (2) Field notes and interviews, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 26–9, 2004. 269 Personal communication with Congressman Manuel Mamba, telephone call, the Philippines, March 31, 2004. 270 Field notes and interviews, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 26–29, 2004. 271 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 27, 2004. 272 (1) Interview with Archbishop Diosdado Talamayan, Archbishop’s residence, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 24, 2004. (2) Interview with Father Rusty Aggabao, parish convent, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 6, 2004. (3) Interview with Manong Katigid, paddy–field-side shelter, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 15, 2004.

NOTES

285

273 (1) Interview with Mimi Dayag, electoral candidate, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 11, 2004. (2) Interview with Rey Ramirez, electoral candidate, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 12, 2004. (3) Interview with Wino Abraham, electoral candidate, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 19, 2004. (4) Interview with Supremo Bautista, electoral candidate, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 20, 2004. (5) Interview with Efren Taguiam, electoral candidate, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 22, 2004. (6) Interview with Dominador Soriano, electoral candidate, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 22, 2004. 274 Participant-observant field notes on the campaign of Congressman Manuel Mamba, third congressional district, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 7, 2004. 275 To an anonymous journalist, the strategy by the Mambas was interpreted as a ‘negative vote buying strategy’. It aimed to prevent the opposition’s successful delivery of favors to their followers during the campaign, which may induce people not to vote. However, the eventual high voting rate did not affirm this observation. Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 15, 2004. 276 (1) Interview with Lucio Collado, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 21, 2004. (2) Interview with Congressman Manuel Mamba, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, June 26, 2004. 277 Interview with Lucio Collado, office, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 30, 2004. 278 Interviews and field notes on the 2004 election, third congressional district, Cagayan province, the Philippines, January – June, 2004. 279 Participant-observant field notes on the campaign of Manuel Mamba, third congressional district, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 7, 2004. 280 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 6, 2004. 281 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 26, 2004. 282 In the Philippines, it is generally held that the mother performs the more direct role of breeding and moral teaching to her children to be respectful and obedient to elders and older siblings as well as to parents, while the Filipino father acts as provider and disciplinarian, with a rather limited role in childrearing (Medina 2001: 223). The mother is usually blamed when a child gets into trouble. Thus, socialization is primarily the mother’s role. The mother is considered to be closer to the children. In the politics of patronage, a matron might bring out a different cognitive-emotive effect than a patron. 283 Local (provincial, municipal, city and congressional) campaign period started on March 25, 2004. 284 Although Enrile supported Fernando Poe Jr., his son was supporting Arroyo for the presidency. ‘Enrile’s Son Supports Arroyo’, The Philippine Star, April 26, 2004. 285 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 9 & 10, 2004.

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286 Delfin Ting and an anonymous insider provided the quoted conversation after the reception. The intention of addressing Arroyo as ‘mum’ was ambiguous. As the actual word might also sound ‘mom’ or ‘ma’am.’ The latter would refer to ‘madame’. As a result, the address is only seemingly a kinship-related term. Nevertheless, ambiguity often enables interlocutors to re-interpret words into new and different meanings. 287 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, February 10, 2004. 288 ‘Cagayan is “GMA Country”, Says Gov’. The Manila Times. Wednesday, February 11, 2004. 289 Campaign speech of Randolph Ting (emphasis added), Barangay Caggay, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 24, 2004. 290 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 22, 23, 24 & 25, 2004. 291 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 25, 2004. 292 Local electoral surveys consistently showed that the Mamba–Ting congressional race had been one of the tightest contests. With regards to Delfin’s absence near polling day, I was not able to find a logical reason, since he had always been an unpredictable politician. However, the triangular matron–client relationships between Arroyo, the Mambas and the Tings may have been a factor. 293 Field notes, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, June 26, 2004. 294 ‘Cagayan is “GMA Country”, Says Gov’. The Manila Times. Wednesday, February 11, 2004. 295 ‘Former Mayor Named Presidential Assistant.’ Office of the Press Secretary, Republic of the Philippines. January 14, 2005. 296 Arroyo lost to Fernando Poe Jr. in Tuguegarao City by a margin of 8,672 votes (12,562 to 21,234 votes). 297 ‘PNP Fears Bloody Polls’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2004. 298 ‘Comele Vows Peaceful, Orderly Elections in Cagayan Valley’, The Northern Forum. May 9–15, 2004. Vol XXIII No. 71. 299 Being the provincial capital and a religious center, Tuguegarao was chosen to be the administrative center of Region 02 during the early martial law period, circa 1975. The PNP Regional Command was then established in Tuguegarao. It is widely perceived that because of the National Defense Minister Enrile’s proximity to Marcos, Tuguegarao was given an important role in the administration of northeastern Luzon. 300 (1) Interview with Mayor Robert Turingan, Enrile municipal government, Enrile, Cagayan province, the Philippines, April 29, 2004. (2) Interview with Fiscal Amandor Arao, office, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 2, 2004. 301 Interview with an anonymous informant, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 2, 2004. 302 Ibid.

NOTES

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303 Since the Regional Command (RECOM) is mainly responsible for coordination, each province is assigned a provincial command to take charge of all intra-provincial law and order matters. Strategically, the NPA tends to roam along provincial borders because it is easier for them to escape from the PNP Provincial Command’s chases. 304 (1) ‘3 Motorcycle-Riding Men Killed in Cagayan Town.’ The Northern Forum. 9-15 May 9–15, 2004. Vol. XXIII No. 71. (2) ‘3 Men of Enrile Mayoral Candidate Shot Dead.’ The Cagayan Star May 9–15, 2004. Vol. XXX No. 19. 305 Cagayan PNP Incident Report (Colonel Delfin Bravo), May 11, 2004, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines. 306 Cagayan PNP Incident Report (Colonel Delfin Bravo), May 11, 2004, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines. 307 Enrile election incident VCD and transcription, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 10, 2004. 308 Interview with Fiscal Amandor Arao, office, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 2, 2004. 309 Interview with Director Rodrigo de Gracia, office, Provincial Command Headquarters of the Philippine National Police, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, July 19, 2004. 310 Interview with General Jefferson Soriano, office, Regional Command Headquarters of the Philippine National Police, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, August 24, 2004. 311 Enrile election incident Video-CD and transcription, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 10, 2004. 312 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 24, 2004. 313 Ibid. May 14, 2004. 314 Interview with Colonel Delfin Bravo, office, headquarters of the provincial command of Philippine National Police, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 4, 2004. 315 Interview with an anonymous journalist, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 15, 2004. 316 Datasets on the voting rates and results of the electoral years of 1987/1988, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007, Commission of Election, Tuguegarao city and Manila, the Philippines. 8 Sovereignty Deflected: Discursive Resistance to State Justice 317 Question of Privilege, Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, Eleventh Congress Transcript of Plenary Proceedings of the Sixth Special Session No. 4, the Philippine Congress, Thursday, May 31, 2001. 318 Interview with Lerma Aguinaldo, residence, Barangay Libag Sur, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines. August 22, 2004.

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319 (1) Interview with Lerma Aguinaldo, personal residence, Barangay Libag Sur, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan Valley, Philippines. August 22, 2004. (2) Inquiries to the Tuguegarao Regional Trial Courts and Manila Supreme Court, Philippines. May 20, 2004 (Manila), July 2, 2004 (Tuguegarao), March 11, 2009 (Manila). The courts suggested that they do not release public documents on pending and unresolved cases. 320 ‘The Peace Talks, Aguinaldo’s Killing.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. September 10, 2001. 321 (1) ‘NPA: Aguinaldo Deserved to Die.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. June 14, 2001. (2) Alcantara, Tirso ‘Ka Bart’ (2001). Press Release: Lubos na Makatarungan ang Pagparusa sa Pasista at Berdugong si Col. Rodolfo Aguinaldo (A Wholly Justified Retribution to Fascist and Executioner Col. Rodolfo Aguinaldo). June 14, 2001. The Philippines: Melito Glor Command, NPA, Southern Tagalog. 322 ‘NPA: Aguinaldo Deserved to Die.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. June 14, 2001. 323 ‘Death Proves Cagayanos Undying Love for Agui.’ Manila Times. June 18, 2001. 324 Ibid. 325 In the early 1990s, an internal debate within the Philippine left emerged between two major ideological positions. One insisted on the continual use of armed revolution and the other camp proposed non-armed strategies by joining electoral politics, known as the ‘parliamentary struggle’ stream (see: Abinales 1996). 326 (1) ‘The Peace Talks, Aguinaldo’s Killing.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. September 10, 2001. (2) Interview with Saturnino Ocampo, Bayan Muna headquarters, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, July 8, 2004. 327 Interview with Manuel Mamba, personal residence, Barangay Naruagan, Tuao, Cagayan province, Philippines, March 16, 2004. 328 In interviews, I showed interviewees related news clippings and public documents as props. 329 Interview with Manang Euling (fictitious identity), road-side sari-sari store, Cagayan Valley, Philippines, August 22, 2004. 330 Ibid. 331 A work on Indonesia by Bowen (2003) and a key research note on southern Philippines by Abinales (2004) are among the exceptions. 332 Interviews with Manong Yfun, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 12, 18 and 20, and July 4, 2004. 333 (1) Interview with Dalin (fictitious identity), street-corner gathering, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, August 3, 2002. (2) Interview with Zuk (fictitious identity), Don Domingo market, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, November 22, 2003. (3) Interview with Leleng (fictitious identity), panciteria (noodle café), Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, December 8, 2003. (4) Interview with Juno, street-side basketball court, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines. March 22, 2004.

NOTES

289

334 ‘NPA: Aguinaldo Deserved to Die.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. June 14, 2001. 335 Interview with Manong Yfun, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, May 18, 2004. In general situations, this phrase was used to pacify an angry person who desired to avenge immediately. However, in Manong Yfun’s point of view, this phrase could also be interpreted as: it is better to avenge later, especially when the people will not remember. 336 Interviews with Cristina Mamba, residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, June 29, July 5 & July 20, 2004. Since Cristina Mamba remarried to Dr. Greg Lavio in 2009, she changed her name to Cristina Mamba-Lavio. 337 (1) Interview with Dr. Pura Liban, Cagayan Colleges Tuguegarao, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, June 16, 2004. (2) Interview with Congressman Florencio Vargas, Vargas College, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 16, 2004. (3) Interview with former mayor Rodolfo Morales, residence, Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 19, 2004. (4) Interview with Larry Lim, residence, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 20, 2004. (5) Interview with Father Othello Bartolome, Parish Convent, Lasam, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 21, 2004. (6) Interview with Manuel Mamba, Cassily Lake Resort, Barangay Naruagan, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 25, 2004. (7) Interview with Bishop Sergio Utleg, Bishop’s residence, Ilagan, Isabela province, the Philippines, July 30, 2004. 338 (1) Interview with Father Othello Bartolome, Parish Convent, Lasam, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 21, 2004. (2) Interview with Father Frank Taeza, Parish Convent, Barangay Cordova, Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, May 13, 2007. 339 Author’s fieldwork in Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, field notes, May 13–7, 2007. In this fieldwork, I interviewed forty farmer families to understand the agrarian economy and change of the Western Amulung plain. In this field trip, the killing incident of the security guard was circulated among the farmer-parishioners with whom I had the most interaction. The guard was killed about one week before my arrival. 340 Interviews with Dr. Romeo Ramirez, residence, Barangay Bayabat, Western Amulung, Philippines, May 15 & 16, 2007. 341 Author’s fieldwork (with substantial help of the parish priest, Father Noel Malana), Western Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 26–9, 2004. In this fieldwork, I interviewed two focus-groups of farmers in Barangay Bayabat to document what had happened on April 25, 1992. The first group consisted of seven persons and the second group consisted of five individuals. These farmers witnessed the incident. I also conducted informal interviews with around ten parishioner-farmers in Western Amulung. The identities of these Interviewees, for obvious reasons, will not be disclosed. 342 (1) Interview with Cristina Mamba, residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 5, 2004. (2) ‘Lakas Congressional Bet in Cagayan Assassinated.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. April 26, 1992.

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343 Interview with Manuel Mamba, Cassily Lake Resort, Barangay Naruagan, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 25, 2004. 344 Interview with former mayor Lakay Rodolfo Morales, residence, Amulung, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 19, 2004. 345 ‘Mayor, 7 Aides Slain in Ambush.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. December 17, 1989. 346 ‘Last Ditch Tough Stand: Tuao OIC Mayor Stops Mamba to Resume Post.’ Cagayan Star. Vol. 15 No. 98. November 26 – December 2, 1989. 347 ‘Last Ditch Tough Stand: Tuao OIC Mayor Stops Mamba to Resume Post.’ Cagayan Star. Vol. 15 No.98. November 26 – December 2, 1989. 348 ‘Mayor, 7 Aides Slain in Ambush.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. December 17, 1989. 349 In 1987–8, the congressional election was conducted separately from local elections for mayors and governors. The date for result proclamation for congressman was May 16, 1987 and for mayors and governors, January 22, 1988 and January 24, 1988, respectively. 350 Interview with the late Boyet Mamba’s former girlfriend, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, March 13, 2009. 351 Interview with Cristina Mamba, residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, the Philippines, July 5, 2004. 352 Interview with Cristina Mamba, personal residence, Tuao, Cagayan province, Philippines, July 5, 2004. 353 See, for example, Hedman (2000). 354 Fieldnotes, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, July 26 – August 6, 2006. 9 Conclusion: The Frontiers Revisited 355 (1) Executive Order No. 270, January 16, 2004, ‘National Policy Agenda on Revitalizing Mining in the Philippines.’ Manila: Office of the President. (2) Executive Order No. 270-A, April 20, 2004, ‘Amending Executive Order No. 270.’ Manila: Office of the President. 356 (1) ‘RP, China Concludes 24th Trade Meeting, Productive Talks on Areas of Mutual Interests Take Place.’ Department of Trade and Industry Review. Vol. 2, No. 14, Series of 2005, June 22, 2005. (2) ‘RP Mining Promotion Shifts to Japan.’ Department of Trade and Industry Review. Vol. 2, No. 14, Series of 2005, June 22, 2005. 357 ‘Chen Laiping Visited the Province of Cagayan.’ News Release of Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag. December 5, 2007. 358 (1) ‘Chen Laiping Visited Province of Isabela.’ News Release of Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag, December 5, 2007. (2) Chen Laiping Visited the Province of Pangasinan.’ News Release of Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag, December 18, 2007. (3) ‘Chen Laiping Visited the Province of La Union.’ News Release of Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag, December 18, 2007. (4) ‘Chen

NOTES

359

360

361

362

363 364

365

291

Laiping Inspected PNP Force of Region One.’ News Release of Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag, December 18, 2007. (1) ‘Arroyo Risking Social Upheavals for Mining Policy.’ Bulatlat. Vol. IV, No. 51, January 23–9, 2005. (2) Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment Defend Patrimony! Alliance (2008). Intensified Imperialist Mining, Growing People’s Resistance. 2008 Mining Situation and Struggle in the Philippines. Quezon City: Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment. (3) ‘Bishop Slams Government’s Mining Policy.’ Community Struggle. December 30, 2008. (4) ‘Cordillera: Tribes Fight to Keep Out Mining Corporation.’ News Release of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. June 8, 2009. (5) ‘Pacman’s Help Sought by Anti-mining Groups.’ GMAnews.TV, November 20, 2009. (1) ‘Roadshow in Beijing, Mining Conference in Manila.’ Department of Trade and Industry News Release. January 14, 2005. (2) ‘Mining Strides in Past Six Months.’ Philippine News Agency. May 11, 2005. (3) ‘Philippines Sees Boom in Mining Sector in 2008.’ Reuters. January 25, 2007. (4) ‘Philippines’ Atlas to Raise Output at Copper Mine.’ Reuters. August 5, 2009. (5) ‘China’s Mining Companies are Planning a Giant Mining Exploration Targets.’ Mining Exploration News. August, 24, 2009. (6) ‘Chinese Firms Eye Investments in RP’s Agriculture, Mining, Tourism Sectors.’ The Philippine Star. September 17, 2009. (7) ‘China Eyes Mining Deals.’ Business Mirror. September 17, 2009. (8) ‘Chinese Mining Firm to Invest $1 Billion in the Philippines.’ Xinhua News Agency. October 15, 2009. (9) ‘2 Chinese Mining Firms to Invest in RP.’ Philippine News Agency. October 15, 2009. (10) ‘China Interests RP’s Mining, Energy.’ Sun.Star Davao Newspaper. November 17, 2009. (11) ‘MGB Grants British Firm Ownership of Gold-copper Project in Nueva Vizcaya.’ Business Mirror. November 17, 2009. (12) ‘Mining Equipment Firms Betting Rebound Next Year Will Drive Sales.’ GMAnews.TV. November 18, 2009. (13) ‘Chinese B u s in e s s m e n L o o k f o r M in in g I nves t m e n t s.’ B u s i n e s s Wo r l d . December 29, 2009. The Secretariat of Regional Development Council 02 (2005). A Report on the Mining Forum Held on September 20, 2005 at the NEDA Conference Hall, Carig, Tuguegarao City. Tuguegarao City, Cagayan Valley: Regional Development Council 02. P. 3, The Secretariat of Regional Development Council 02 (2005). A Report on the Mining Forum Held on September 20, 2005 at the NEDA Conference Hall, Carig, Tuguegarao City. Tuguegarao City, Cagayan Valley: Regional Development Council 02. ‘Mining Rift in Cagayan Intensifies.’ GMANews.TV. February 14, 2009. (1) ‘Anti-mining Cagayan Mayor Suspended Again.’ Northern Philippine Times. May 24, 2009. (2) ‘Anti-mining Cagayan Mayor Suspended.’ ABS-CBN News.com. June 3. 2009. (3)‘Cagayan Governor Faces Graft Raps Over Mining.’ GUMIL-Ayab News. July 5, 2009. (1) ‘“Stop Mining!” Cagayan Clergy Urges Recall of Mining Permits.’ The Northern Forum. Vol. XXIX, No. 12, March 22–8, 2009. (2) ‘Magnetite Mining Blamed for Floods.’ Inquirer Northern Luzon. October 26, 2009.

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366 (1) Interview with Benjie de Yro, journalist, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 9, 2009. (2) Interview with Atty. Ricardo Angobong, former Tumauini mayor and former provincial administrator, residence, Tumauini, Isabela province, the Philippines, April 26, 2009. 367 Field notes, Tuguegarao city, Cagayan Valley, the Philippines, April 21, 2009. 368 Ibid. 369 Table V14, pp. 82–3, The ASEAN Secretariat (2009). ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008. Jarkarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 370 Tables 19–21, The ASEAN Secretariat (2010). External Trade Statistics. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat (http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm). 371 (1) ‘China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry. Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers.’ Washington Post Foreign Service. December 23, 2004. (2) ‘China and Sudan, Blood and Oil.’ The New York Times. April 23, 2006. (3) ‘The Chinese Century.’ Time. January 11, 2007.

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INDEX

Abella, Domingo, 163 Abinales, Patricio N., 6, 69, 79–80 Adalem, Leodegario, 160 Aeta, 138–40 Afghanistan, 77 Africa, 18, 67, 127, 129, 132–34 Agamben, Giorgio, 26, 136, 146 agency, 58, 59, 63, 65–67, 68–70, 99, 183, 190, 238, 248 Agpalo, Remigio, E., 115, 193 Aguinaldo, 133 Aguinaldo, Lerma, 138, 232 Aguinaldo, Rodolfo E., 9–10, 84, 135, 137–52, 158, 180–82, 196, 230–35, 238–41, 245–47, 254–55 Alcala, 243 All People’s Congress (APC), 130 American, 5, 11, 26, 35, 69, 73, 79, 92, 192, 194, See United States Amulung, 2, 37, 41–47, 48, 87–88, 108, 164, 179, 196, 207, 212, 241–43, 245, 247 Anderson, Benedict R., 12, 16, 148, 187, 192, 193 Anderson, Niels A., 229 Ang Chung, 140–42, 144, 146, 151 Annafunan, 220 Antonio, Alvaro, 158, 257 Aparri, 2, 6, 32 Apayao, 157, 161, 164 Aquino, Benigno III, 15, 216

Aquino, Corazon, 9, 11, 15, 50, 142, 144, 147, 149, 169, 216, 247 Aquino, Father Ranhilio C., 145 Arao, Claro, 224 Arao, Fiscal Armador, 223 Arao, Melinda, 223–24 Archer, Margaret S., 249 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), 30, 142, 148–50, 160 Arroyo, Gloria, 12, 27, 53, 194, 205, 213–21, 232, 256 ASEAN, 24, 258 Asia World Company, 75 Asia-Pacific region, 35, 135 Atienza, Lito, 257 Aung Than Htut, 78 Ayutthaya, 16 Azande, 237 Baccay, Bishop Ricardo, 115 Bai Souqian, 78 Bailey, F. G.., 177 Baligod, Vice Mayor, 246 Balik Baril, 153 Balinese, 117, 192, 193 Balunsat, Angeles, 161 Banan, Paquing, 203 Bangkok, 75 Barangay Agguirit, 47 Barangay Bayabat, 243–45 Barangay Calaogan Dackel, 138 Barangay Concepcion, 2

318

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Barangay Cordova, 243 Barangay Dapdap, 50 Barangay Libag Sur, 232 Barangay Liwan Norte, 224 Barangay Naruangan, 32 Barangay Sampaguita, 245 Barangay Tagga, 203 Barangay Villa Maria, 224 Barton, R.F., 232, 238 Batangas, 50 Bauit, Arsenio, 153–54 Bayan Muna, 151, 182, 231, 233 Bayart, Jean François, 67–68 Beijing, 32, 58, 71–73, 75, 254 Benin, 208 Berlin Wall, 244 Betwagan, 160 Bhumibol Adulyadej, 19 Big Seven, 49, 53 Binondo, 44, 85, 198 Bio, General Julius, 130 Biya’s Grain Trading, 163, 164 Black Army, 139 Blue Pearl Corporation, 144 Blue Ribbon Committee, 49 B-Meg, 44 Border Guard Force, 78 bossism, 59 Bourdieu, Pierre, 25, 58, 66, 105, 120, 229, 235 Bravo, Colonel Delfin, 195, 225–27 British East India, 70 British Empire, 22, 70, 218 Bugnay, 160–61 Buguey, 257 Bulacan, 37, 50 Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, 84, 198–200 Bureau of Internal Revenue, 50, 89, 91 Burkina Baso, 131 Burley, T. M., 30 Burma, 6, 21, 55, 58, 69–74, 76–79, 92–94, 126, 128, See Myanmar Burmans, 71

Burmese, 58, 59, 69–74, 77–78, 92–94, 254 Cagayan, 2, 4–9, 29–31, 36, 41, 44, 42–47, 52, 58, 79, 80–82, 84–87, 88, 90–93, 95–98, 100, 102, 105, 107–11, 114, 121, 135–42, 144–51, 153–55, 157–59, 161, 163–65, 166, 168–70, 172, 175–76, 180–83, 185, 187, 192, 195–96, 200, 203–4, 206–8, 210–12, 213–15, 221–27, 230–33, 240, 243, 230–33, 251, 254–58 Cagayan Colleges of Tuguegarao (CCT), 203 Cagayan River, 2, 5, 257 Cagayan Robina Sugar Milling Company, 157 Cagayan Valley, 4–7, 8–10, 29–31, 41, 46, 52, 80–82, 85, 90, 93, 95, 97–98, 100, 109, 135–38, 140–41, 145, 146, 149–50, 154, 157, 163, 165, 192, 196, 203, 206–8, 213, 222, 232, 254, 255, 257 Cagayano, 80, 96–98, 101, 109–11, 112–13, 116, 118–23, 139–41, 143, 147–48, 149–51, 157, 159, 192, 203, 210, 214, 216, 227, 231–32, 238, 240, 244 Callahan, 78 Callahan, Mary P., 69, 72, 76 Callo clan, 2 Cameroon, 20, 21, 67, 128 Camp David Corpuz, 138 Camp Tirso H. Gador, 225 capitalism, 22, 29 carceral society, 25 Castañada, Rosemarie, 44 Catholic Church, 11, 102, 183, 186–88, 212, 256–57, 260 Cauayan-Luna-Cabatuan cluster, 50, 52, 53 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 71, 72, 138

INDEX certificates of land transfer (CLT), 31–32, 162 Chang Chi-fu, 72 Chao Ngilai, 74–76 charisma, 80, 174, 209, 214, 217 Chiang Kai-shek, 71 Chiang Mai, 16 Chico River, 156, 163, 164 Chico River Basin, 159–61 chieftainship, 6, 25, 97, 100 China, 2, 5–7, 10, 22–25, 30–31, 32, 57, 59, 71, 73–75, 77–79, 107, 114, 135, 140, 196–97, 258–60 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 71 Chua Family, 104–5 Chua, Alejandro, 102–5 Chua, Juan, 102–6, 116 civil war, 2, 18, 71, 92, 129–32, 138, 172 Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), 137, 160, 168 Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF), 137 cockfight, 116–19 Cojuangco clan, 15, 148 Cojuangco, Eduardo, 44 Cold War, 35, 130, 131, 132, 135–37, 260 Collado, Lucio, 221 Collado, Terry, 218 colonial democracy, 79 colonization, 189 Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 142–43, 149–51, 185, 187, 195, 201, 213, 215, 221, 223–26 communism, 35, 135–38, 152, 244 communist insurgency, 16, 50, 54, 138, 144, 147, 154, 168, 179, 230, 254 Communist Party of Burma (CPB), 58 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP-NPA), 29, 261

319 Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), 9 compadrazgo, 97, 106 conflict resolution, 116, 119 Congo, 20–21, 128 Conner, 154, 157, 164 Constabulary Security Unit (CSU), 137, 140 containment, 18, 58, 59, 66, 93, 94, 135, 257 co-optation, 10, 58, 59, 93–94, 162, 163 Cordillera, 31, 85, 154, 159, 163, 241 Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), 155 Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), 160 Cordilleran, 37, 157, 168, 232 counterinsurgency, 11, 23, 26–27, 36, 82, 83, 93, 131, 135, 136–38, 139–42, 143, 147, 151–52, 168–69, 182, 230, 245, 254–55 coups, 125–27, 129–30, 133–34, 152, 255 Coventry, 218 creative abuse, 105 creolization, 97, 197 creolized, 98, 100, 105, 114, 121, 197 criminalization, 134 Cu, Feliciano, 109–10 Cu, Romeo, 187 Cu, Rosita, 109 cultural continuum, 96–98, 102, 197 Dagupan city, 89 Darfur, 259 Day, Tony, 69 Dayag, Estrella, 220 De Beers, 129–31 de Castro, Noli, 220 de Gracia, Rodrigo, 225–26 de Guzman, Ang-chung Ben, 48, 83, 84, See Ang-chung De Guzman, Ben, 141

320

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

De La Salle University, 7 debt of gratitude, 12, 41–42, 43, 96, 98–99, 110–15, 121, 163, 206, 211 Del Rosario, Attorney Ven Jr, 145 democracy, 78–80, 94, 130, 144–45, 151–52, 188–91, 192, 194, 206, 211, 213, 227, 244, 255 Democratic Party, 22 Deng Xiaoping, 1, 18, 23, 74, 259 Department of Agrarian Reform, 32, 41, 162, 165 Department of Agriculture, 50, 53 dependent petty entrepreneur, 45 Derrida, Jacques, 190 diamond, 129–32 Dichoso, Suzette, 232 Digoyo Point, 30 discursive resistance, 229–31, 237, 239, 251–52, 256 divide and rule, 69–72, 77–79, 92–93, 254 Divisoria, 81 Djoda, 67 Doy, Mr., 179 Drummond, Lee, 97, 100, 102 Dulag, Macli-ing, 160 Dumagan, Oscar, 149 Dumaguit, Lerma, 138 Dungoc, Pedro, 160 Dupaya, Teresa, 247 Dupaya, Teresita, 142 Dupaya, Tito, 142, 158, 247 DZRH radio station, 244 East Asia, 5, 127 Edgardo, 41–43 ego-self, 105–8 electoral democracy, 79, 94, 135, 144, 152, 188–91, 255 electoral violence, 185, 195, 203, 221, 227 Elizabeth I, Queen, 219 England, 217 Enrile, 48, 108, 195, 221–26 Enrile, Juan Ponce, 8, 82, 137, 142, 147, 149, 151, 168, 180–82, 187

Enrile, Juan Ponce, continued 198, 200, 243, 247, 257 Enrile, Juan Ponce Jr., 181 Estrada, Joseph, 15 Euling, Manang, 234 Europe, 18, 22 Evans-Pritchard, Edward E., 119, 237–38 exceptional democracy, 185, 191 exceptionalism, 27 family honor, 238, 242 fascism, 188 Fausto, Leonides, 157, 201 fear, 71, 91–92, 108, 121, 161, 167, 171–72, 174, 178–80, 183, 195, 205, 207, 212, 255 Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc., 198 Federation of the Chinese-Filipino Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 85 Fei, Xiaotong, 107 Fermin, Florentino, 82, 84, 198–200, 204 Fernandez, Mayotino R., 201, 204 feudalism, 29 Florendo, General Oscar, 9, 148–49 food security, 51, 53 Foucault, Michel, 57–59, 64–68, 95, 98–99, 125, 154, 166–67, 179, 188–89, 235 Fox, Jonathan, 205 Fox, Robert B., 114 Free Trade Agreement, 24, 258 Freetown, 129 frontier governmentality, 23, 25–26, 254 Fujian, 1, 5, 15, 32, 140 Gaddafi, Colonel Muammar al-, 131 Gaddang, 159 galleon trade, 5 Garcia, Carlos, 36 Garcia, Rogelio, 158, 169, 247 Garro, Joey, 232

INDEX Gatan, Marino, 8, 80, 100, 146, 167 Gattaran, 138, 181 Geertz, Clifford, 10, 11, 117, 171, 192, 193, 217–19, 227 genealogy, 145, 196–97, 200, 202 Genoveza, Calixto, 164, 165 Gibran, Khalil, 155 globalization, 13, 24–25 Goffman, Erving, 60, 111 Gokongwei, John Jr., 92, 157 Gola Forest, 131 Golden Seasons, 50 Golden Triangle, 58, 70–79, 92, 254 Golding, William, 10 Gollayan, Delfin, 199 Gosiengfiao, Francisco, 81 gossip, 98, 166–68, 178, 223 governmentality, 59, 65–67, 188 Gramsci, Antonio, 25, 236 Gran Cordillera, 154, 163, 165, 241 gratitude, 98, 167 Greater China, 22, 24 Guiab, 159 Guimbuayan, Roberto, 245–47 Guinea, 132 guns, goons and gold, 11, 161, 171–72, 178, 183, 255 Guya, Pacito, 223 Guzman, Dennis, 223 Habermas, Jürgen, 189 habitus, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65 Hakka, 16 Han Dynasty, 6 Hawaii, 11, 144 Hawkins family, 41–42 Hinduism, 248 Hobbes, Thomas, 29 Hokkien, 1, 104, 106, 112, 140 Holslag, Jonathan, 259 Honasan, Gregorio, 142, 180–81 Hong Kong, 1, 23, 50, 73, 77 honor, 98, 104, 105, 112, 113–14, 120, 139, 168, 175, 200 Hotel Delfino, 7, 9–10, 58, 79, 82–83, 88, 143, 147, 148–50, 176–78, 198, 201

321 Hotel Roma, 216 Huk rebellion, 30, 136 Huklandia, 30, 136 human rights, 131, 259–60 Ibanag, 7, 55, 57–58, 80, 84, 91, 97–100, 114, 144, 145, 146, 157, 167, 171, 199, 203, 231, 234, 240, 250, 255 Ifugaos, 120 Iguig, 48, 108, 196 Ilocano, 2, 7, 41, 44, 58, 80, 97, 111, 114, 137, 138, 157, 198, 206, 231, 232–34, 240, 243, 249, 255 Ilocos, 40, 42, 248 Iloilo, 46 Ilongots, 7, 166 imperialism, 29 Indian, 71, 78, 248–50 indirect rule, 70 Indonesia, 15–17, 20–21, 59, 128 insurgency, 8, 11, 17, 23, 83, 131, 136–37, 139–40, 148, 154, 222, 226, 232–33, 252, 254, 258 internal colonialism, 189 Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), xv, 89, 175 Internal Security Operation (ISO), 138 Isabela, 30, 37, 46, 50, 53–57, 80–81, 87, 135, 145, 224, 256 Isneg, 7, 159 Itawes, 7, 8, 80, 101, 113, 114, 122, 153–55, 157, 172, 178, 182–84, 231, 234, 240, 255 Jaladoni, Father Luis, 232 Japanese, 5, 81, 158, 160, 178 Jocano, F. Landa, 44, 101, 119 jueteng, 84, 116, 140–42, 143–45, 146, 151 Juxon-Smith, Colonel Andrew, 130 Kabbah, Ahmed Tejan, 130 Kachin, 6, 58, 74–76, 77 Kalinga, 120, 154–55, 157, 159–61, 164, 178, 224

322

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Kamaranan Hall, 187 Karagatan, 30 karma, 248–51 karma justice, 231, 248, 250 Katigid, Manong, 43, 116, 179 Kaut, Charles, 110 Ke Bing School, 81 Kerkvliet, 8 Kerkvliet, Benedict, 12, 35, 36, 106, 115, 136, 188, 191, 194–95, 216, 229 Khin Nyunt, Lt. Gen., 75 Khun Sa, 72–74, 77 Kieh, George Klay Jr., 18, 19, 129–34 Kokang, 58, 72–73, 74–79 Kokang Alliance Army, 74–76 Kokang Youth Progressive Commission, 72 Koroma, Major Johnny, 130 Kuok, Robert, 77 Kuomintang (KMT), 31, 32, 70–73, 78, 92, 254 Kwa Ka Ye (KKY), 72 La Loma, 7 Lallo, 257 Lal-lo, 5 Land Bank, 163 land reform, 23, 26–27, 35–36, 41–42, 54, 87–89, 155, 160 Lansana, David, 130 Laogai, 58, 76, 78 Lara, Edgar, 86, 173, 195, 218, 223, 225 Lavio, Greg, 248 Leach, Edmund R., 6, 7, 9, 11 legality, 26 Leleng, Manang, 214, 215 Leninism, 29 Leoneco Merchandising, 50 Levi-Strauss, Claude, 238 Li Mi, General, 71 liberal democracy, 130, 189, 194 Liberia, 20–21, 128, 131–32 Libya, 131 Lim family, 44

Lim, Magno Y., 37, 41–42, 44, 45, 48, 216 Lin Mingxian, 74–76 Lo Hsing-han, 72–75, 75, 78, 93 Lo Hsing-ming, 74 local elections, 27, 145, 185, 189, 192, 196, 223 Local Government Code, 93, 150 London, 217–18 Lourdes, 179 Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi, 18, 19, 127, 129 Luzon, 2, 5, 7–9, 12, 30–31, 87, 88, 97, 120, 136, 140, 145, 169, 192, 222, 248–50, 256 Lynch, Frank, 35, 105, 119 Mabborang, Loreto, 164, 165 Macapagal family, 12 Malacañang Palace, 220, 247 Malaueg, 159 Malaysia, 20–21, 128 Mamba Perez, Marcita, 180 Mamba, Boyet, 245, 248 Mamba, Cristina, 180, 241, 244, 245 Mamba, Francisco Jr, 158, 181, 216, 220, 224 Mamba, Francisco Sr, 31, 86, 180 Mamba, Leonardo, 154–55, 158, 165, 168–69, 178, 180, 196, 240–49 Mamba, Manuel, 9, 35, 86, 151, 154–55, 158, 165, 167, 169, 170, 172, 173, 176–77, 178, 180–84, 186–87, 195–97, 203, 207, 212–15, 216, 221–23, 224–27, 231–33, 240, 243–44, 246 Mambas, 45, 151, 154–55, 161–63, 165, 168–69, 171, 174, 177–78, 180–87, 194–97, 203, 212, 214, 216, 240, 244, 246–48, 254–55 Mandalay, 73 Manila, 5, 7, 9, 11–12, 31, 37, 41, 44, 50, 84–85, 87, 89, 90–93, 97, 103, 109–10, 119, 138, 143–45, 147–50, 162, 165, 169, 187, 198,

INDEX Manila, continued 200, 218, 220, 227, 232, 244, 247, 255 Mao Zedong, 18, 29, 31, 71, 74, 81 Marcos, Ferdinand, 8, 11, 15, 26, 30, 32, 35, 54, 82, 93, 135–36, 144–45, 147–48, 169, 207, 214, 254 Margai, Albert, 130 Margai, Milton, 130 martial law, 9–10, 11, 26, 30, 35, 37, 44, 46, 82, 93, 133, 135–38, 144–45, 152, 159–60, 168, 232, 234, 243 Marxism, 29, 244 Middle East, 11 Migdal, Joel S., 11–13, 23, 27, 60, 67–68, 187–88, 190 millers, 44, 46, 56–57, 81, 198 Mindanao, xxiii, 30, 181, 218 Mindoro, 50 Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), 257 mining, 64, 132, 256–59 Mobutu, President, 127 Momoh, Joseph, 130 money lending, 5 Mong La, 58, 74, 76, 77 Morales, Rodolfo, 44, 179, 207, 243 Movement for Self-Reliant Tuao (MSRT), 169 Myanmar, 20, 21, 55, 58, 61, 78, 94, 254 National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), 10, 53 National Food Authority (NFA), 49, 53 National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), 183 naturalization policy, 36 Ne Win, General, 71, 74 Negrito, 9, 138, 139 neo-colonialism, 129 New People’s Army (NPA), 9, 29, 30, 37, 41–42, 87, 135, 138, 140, 153–54, 160, 169, 182, 184, 224

323 New People’s Army (NPA), continued 231–34, 241–43, 243–47 Ng, Cecilia, 75 North America, 1, 22 Nuer, 119, 172 Nueva Segovia, 5 Ocampo, Saturnino, 9, 182, 233–34 Oceania, 125–26 Office of External Affairs, 221 opium, 22, 71–75, 77 Padaca, Grace, 53, 256 padrino system, 96–100, 104–8, 115–16, 119–21, 121, 195, 205, 255 Palanan, 30, 135–36, 253–54 Palatao group, 223 Pampanga, 12 Pangasinan, 89 Pao Yuchang, 73, 76 Paras, Eric, 64 Paredes, Ruby R., 79, 80 Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), 186 Partner of the Free Filipino, 214 patronage, 11, 44, 45, 79, 80, 94, 97–98, 102, 105, 111, 114, 160, 167, 180, 191, 194, 205–8, 211, 213–14, 215, 221 patron–client relationships, 35–36, 79, 87, 97, 99, 102, 104–6, 141, 144, 160, 180, 187, 207, 212, 254–55 peasant, 16, 23, 30, 31, 35–36, 54, 87, 138–40, 140, 153, 239, 245–47, 258 Peñablanca, 108, 196 People Power Revolution, 11, 144, 168, 215–16, 247 People’s Power Party, 19 People’s Republic of China, 30, 32, 71, 135, 256 Perez, Father Gerardo, 183 Pheung Kya-fu, 72–74, 77

324

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Pheung, Kya-shin, 58 Philippine Constabulary, 137 Philippine Judicial Academy, 145 Philippine Military Academy (PMA), 137, 138, 139, 148, 181, 233 Philippine National Police (PNP), 195, 212, 221–23, 224–27, 232 Piat, 8, 157, 164, 243 Pieke, Frank N., 114 Pinukpuk, 154, 157, 163, 164 Poe, Fernando Jr, 219, 220 Portugal, 208 Provincial Board of Canvassing, 187 Pua-Tio-Uy, 50, 52 Qing Dynasty, 5, 22 raison d’État, 57–58, 125 Ramirez, Romeo Dr., 242 Ramos, Fidel, 37, 46, 50, 149, 214, 216 Rangoon, 71–74, 75 Ranjo, Gerardo, 161, 163 reciprocity, 80, 98, 114, 119 RECOM02, 222, 224, 225 Red Army, 31 Reformed Armed Forces Movement (RAM), 8, 133, 137, 142, 147–48, 181 rent capitalist, 45, 160 Republic of China, 32 Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF), 131 revenge, 9, 98, 120, 209, 223, 240, 248 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 131 Reyno, Alfonso Jr, 180, 243 rhizomatic political economy, 31, 54 rhizome, 31 Rice and Corn Industry Nationalization Act, 36 rice cartel, 46, 49, 52, 55 Richards, Paul, 131 ritual kinship, 97–98, 100, 101

ritual kinship, continued 106–7, 121 Rizal (municipality), 154, 164 Rizal, Jose, 25 Robin Hood persona, 9, 140, 143, 148 Roman Catholic, 87, 184, 185, 232, 240, 249 Rufino, 40 Rustico, Antonio, 31 Sabite, Captain Feliciano, 149 Sadanga, 160 Sakhone Ting Ying, 74 Salim, Sudono, 15 San Miguel Corporation, 44 San Pablo, 80, 87 San You Philippines Mining Trade Ltd, 257 Sankoh, Foday, 131 Santiago, Miriam, 162 Santos, Luis T., 247 Schmitt, Carl, 135–36, 144–45, 189–90 Scott, James C., 188, 229 Scott, William Henry, 7, 80, 159 Second World War, 13, 18, 71, 125, 159 Sera, Basilia, 2 Sera, Boy, 10 Sera, Teresita, 87, 96 Shaanxi, 31 Shan, 6, 58, 76–79, 92 Shan State Army (SSA), 73, 76 Shan State National Congress, 75 Shan State New Revolutionary Army, 74 Shinawatra, Yingluck, 22 Shishi city, 1, 5 Shoe-Mart Corporation, 92 Sidel, John T., 12, 60, 64, 66, 187 Sierra Leone, 11, 20–21, 128–33, 152 Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), 129

INDEX Sierra Leonean People’s Party (SLPP), 130, 131 Sierra Madre, 31, 37, 138, 241 Silverstein, Josef, 71, 78 Singapore, 20–21, 75, 128 Sino-Thai, 16, 22 Sinundungan River, 161 slapping, 146, 167 sobel, 131 Solana, 48, 108, 157, 196, 245 Somchai Wongsawat, 19 South Africa, 20–21, 128, 132 South Asia, 70 Southeast Asia, 1, 12–15, 16, 20–25, 32, 57–58, 59, 64, 66–70, 74, 93, 125–27, 128, 137, 152, 189, 238, 258–59 sovereignty, 8, 18, 23–25, 27, 49, 58, 59, 66, 68–69, 72, 77–79, 82, 92, 96, 133, 135–36, 146, 151, 178–79, 188–91, 193, 194–96, 253–54, 255, 259 Spaniards, 5, 159, 163, 192 Special Economic Zone (SEZ), 1, 24, 258 spiral of vendettas, 230, 231, 238–40, 245, 247, 251 Stalinism, 188 State Law and Order Restoration, 74 state of exception, 135–36, 144, 146 Stevens, Siaka, 130 Strasser, Captain Valentine, 130 strongmen, 11–13, 25–27, 52, 55, 58, 60, 65–67, 69–74, 77–80, 82, 92–95, 108, 137, 151, 191, 194–96, 206, 222–23, 253–54, 256–57, 259 sub-Saharan Africa, 18, 20–21, 67, 125–29, 152 Sudan, 259 Suharto, President, 15 Sundaravej, Samak, 19 Swingewood, Alan, 64 Sy, Henry Sr, 92 Sy, Peter, 165

325 symbolic violence, 23, 25, 144, 229, 235, 237, 240, 251 Tagalog, 8, 35, 80, 96–97, 100, 101, 104, 108–10, 112, 113–14, 120–21, 135, 143, 146, 157, 231, 243, 250 Taipei, 32 Taiwan, 71, 138, 208 Talamayan, Diosdado, xxix Tan, Chong-ho, 35 Tan, Joaquin, 35 Tan, Leoncio, 50 Tan, Lionera, 35 Tan, Lucio, 15, 44 Tan, Patricio, 31–32 Tang, Santiago, 81–82, 84 Tang, Valentine, 2, 5 Tarlac, 15, 148 Taruc, Ignacio, 257 Taylor, Charles, 131 Taylor, Ian, 259 Taylor, Robert H., 71 Telan, Clarita "Clara", 199 Templo, Colonel Emiliano, 149 terrorism, 11, 131, 138, 142, 182, 185, 187, 191–92, 195, 201, 207, 218, 227, 231, 233, 255 Thai Rak Thai Party, 16, 19 Thailand, 13, 16, 17, 20–22, 53, 59, 73–74, 128 Thakin Than Tun, 73 Thaksin Shinawatra, 16 Tikopia, 110 Ting family, 10 Ting, Delfin, 5, 7, 9–10, 44, 55, 57–58, 69, 79, 80–89, 90–91, 95, 96, 114–16, 144–49, 167, 173, 180–82, 186, 194–96, 198–204, 214, 217–25 Ting, Hilario, 86, 203 Ting, Michael, 86, 88 Ting, Randolph, 7, 10, 12, 43, 84, 86–88, 89, 158, 173, 176, 183, 196, 203, 214, 217–21 Ting, Raphael, 86, 88, 196 Ting, Raul, 88

326

POST-COLONIAL STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Ting, Tao, 199 Tinglayan, 160 Tings, 9, 46, 85, 86, 151, 171, 172, 175, 177, 181, 183, 185, 187, 194, 196, 198, 203, 212, 214–15, 254 Tio family, 52 Tio, Janet, 50 Tio, Manuel, 53 Tiu, Linda, 163 tobacco, 5, 192 transformation, 19, 59, 67, 93, 188, 219 transnational networks, 24 Tuao, 31–32, 45, 52, 108, 151, 153–55, 157–71, 175–77, 178–83, 185–87, 185–87, 201, 207, 195–96, 221, 224–26, 240–48, 250 Tuao Centro, 248 Tuao Convention, 171 Tuguegarao, 5, 7, 9, 10, 37, 42, 48, 50, 52, 79, 84–86, 88–93, 95, 102–4, 108, 116, 137, 141, 143–45, 147–49, 151, 155, 175–77, 179, 181–83, 185, 187, 196–204, 206–7, 213–14, 217–18, 219–23, 225, 231–33, 240, 244–47, 254, 256 Tuguegarao Electric Plant Company, 81 Turingan, Robert, 223–26 Ty, Noynoy, 102–6 United Nations, 77, 259 United States, 71, 212 United Wa State Army (UWSA), 74, 75 Universal Robina Corporation, 92 Utleg, Sergio, 186 Uy, Alejandro III, 53

Uy, Reynaldo, 53 Vargas, Florencio, 86, 243–44 Vejiajiva, Abhisit, 22 vengeance, 119–20, 121, 231, 239–40 Vietnam, 20–21, 53, 73, 128 Villacorta, Wilfrido, 7, 12 vote buying, 11, 16, 115, 185, 187, 190–92, 194, 205, 207, 205–13, 227, 255 vote padding, 183, 187, 227 Wa, 58, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77 Wallace, Walter, 237 Washington, 73, 75, 79, 110 Weber, Max, 23, 25, 144, 248 Wickberg, Edgar, 35, 46, 197 witchcraft, 237 Wolters, Willem G., 45 Wong, Kwok-Chu, 35 Wong, Pak Nung, 1, 6, 13, 23, 66, 127, 258 Wood, Elisabeth Jean, 147, 238 World Bank, 160 Xiamen, 1 Yan’an, 31 Yang family, 72 Yang, Jinxiu Olive, 72 Yaoundé, 67 Yfun, Manong, 239, 245, 247–48, 251 Yuchengco Center, De la Salle University, 7 Yunnan, 74 Zaire, 127 Zhu Rongji, 258