Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue (Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice) 3030705196, 9783030705190

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INTERRELIGIOUS STUDIES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue

Michael H. Mitias

Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice

Palgrave’s series, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, seeks to capture the best of the diverse contributions to the rapidly expanding field of interreligious and interfaith studies. While the series includes a diverse set of titles, they are all united by a common vision: Each volume advocates— explicitly or implicitly—for interreligious engagement, even if this involves a critique of the limits of this work as it is currently defined or embodied. Each volume provides models and resources—textual, theological, pedagogic, or practical—for interreligious dialogue, study, or action. The series models a commitment to religious pluralism by including books that begin from diverse religious perspectives. This does not preclude the publication of books dedicated to a specific religion, but the overall series reflects a balance of various faiths and perspectives. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14838

Michael H. Mitias

Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue

Michael H. Mitias Jackson, MS, USA

Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice ISBN 978-3-030-70519-0    ISBN 978-3-030-70520-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Credit: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 General Framework of Analysis  7 3 Mutual Respect as a Condition of Interreligious Dialogue 37 4 Mutual Understanding as Condition and Aim of Interreligious Dialogue 65 5 Mysticism as a Basis of Interreligious Dialogue: God-­Centeredness 95 6 Does Religious Self-Understanding Impede Interreligious Dialogue?117 References137 Index141

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Two central problems are the focus of discussion in this book: (1) What is the aim of interreligious dialogue, and under what conditions is this kind of dialogue possible? And (2), exploration of the first, I shall elucidate and defend the two propositions: (a) the immediate end of interreligious dialogue is mutual understanding, and (b) the conditions of its possibility are tolerance, empathy, modesty, God-centeredness, mutual respect, and truth-­mindedness. I begin the discussion with a brief analysis of the structural and formal conditions in general and then devote my attention to a detailed analysis of mutual respect, mutual understanding, God-­ centeredness, and religious self-understanding. I have chosen these four conditions primarily because they are the most contentious, most debated, and most essential to an adequate understanding of interreligious dialogue as a concept and as a possible event. In my analysis of these concepts, I restrict myself to the logic that underlies the possibility of interreligious dialogue: What are the logical requirements that need to be met in order to articulate an adequate conception of these conditions? What kind of analysis would inform and enable a meaningful conversation among the various religions of the world? In my endeavor to answer these and related questions, I acted as a logical analyst, as a metaphysician, and as a philosopher of religion. I have kept a steady eye on the following questions: First, what is the ontic basis of religion? How does an understanding of this

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. H. Mitias, Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6_1

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basis shed a light of understanding on the viability of interreligious dialogue? Second, what are the commonalities and differences among the various religions of the world? To what extent do these differences constitute an obstacle that stands in the way of interreligious dialogue? Third, what is the most effective method for analyzing the main conditions of interreligious dialogue? Or, how can we arrive at an understanding of these conditions that may gain the approval of the different theologians, philosophers, and leaders of the different religions? Given the uniqueness, tensions, hostilities, alienation, fear, ignorance, violence, and amazingly complex institutional structures of the major religions of the world, no inquirer into the nature of interreligious dialogue should ignore the following recalcitrant, stubbornly challenging questions: Is it really possible to design a conceptual framework within which the various theologians, philosophers, and leaders of these religions can sit around a table and converse about their beliefs, values, and practices; try to solve the problems they have with each other; and discover ways to cooperate on meeting the growing economic, political, and cultural dangers that seem to constrict and sometimes threaten their role as spiritual forces in contemporary society? Religions are not only major social institutions; they are also spiritual languages. These languages are different from each other. How can religions communicate or discuss the questions and problems they face as religions? How can two religions that are vast, spiritually complex, and culturally diverse, and that exist as disparate worlds of faithful be represented in a rational conversation? I am not unaware of the recalcitrance of these questions, to mention just a few. Should we shrink from any worthwhile project because it is daunting or hard to achieve? Did the Western European societies shrink from pursuing the democratic form of government during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? Did the founders of the major religions shrink from pursuing the ideals of their religions during the early centuries of their growth and development? Did the early founders of the American system of education shrink from building a university system that was open to all citizens? The pursuit of interreligious dialogue may or may not be accomplished in our lifetime or by any one individual. It must be viewed as a collaborative project espoused by the different religions and must be treated as a project of continual development and attainment. Although it cannot be accomplished in the near future by any one religion but rather collectively, nevertheless it is our duty as individuals and as a religious community of scholars to make a contribution toward its development

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and realization. The clearer we are about it, the more rational it gets, the more realizable it becomes, and the more adherents it will attract, primarily because it is a worthwhile project and because it is an essential demand of reason and moral sense. Religion has always existed; it is a response to an essential demand of human nature. Human beings are social, rational, political, and creative by nature, but they are equally religious by nature. As an institution, and especially as a spiritual phenomenon, religion cannot afford to remain silent or unresponsive to the unprecedented, stunning advances in science, technology, art, politics, economics, and education, and particularly to the radical changes they are producing in the sphere of economic and political behavior and interindividual relations. Religion’s ideals and its mission should remain active, creative, and a constant spring of giving, of meeting the spiritual needs of the people in the midst of a web of materialistic values that seem to dominate contemporary culture. But how can it remain alive and influential if it is vitiated by internal division and conflict rather than unity and concord? One way of creating an atmosphere of unity and concord is an active network of interreligious dialogue among the various religious communities in the different parts of the world. I hope that this book will be a modest contribution to the increasing spread of this network. I am quite aware of the extensive research being done in the area of Comparative Theology and Scriptural Reasoning and their substantial, indispensable, and critical contribution to our understanding not only of the question of interreligious dialogue and the means of implementing it on the ground of reality but also of revaluating the subject and aim of theological reflection and study: If the transcendent—God, Allah, Jehovah, the ultimate, or Dharma—is revealed equally to the different cultures of the world, if each revelation is equally unique and genuine, can any theology afford to neglect or ignore the doctrines, that is, beliefs, values, and ways of life of the other religions? Does interreligious dialogue not become a religious as well as a moral imperative? But again, if we grant that the major religions of the world are equally unique and genuine, it would necessarily follow that mystical experience moves to the center of theological analysis because the central focus of the theologian is not only one’s particular doctrine but also the transcendent and how this transcendent is revealed to a certain people. This change of focus widens and deepens our faith in God, Allah, or Jehovah, expands our appreciation and understanding of the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of God, and guarantees our respect of the religiously different other. I cannot explore

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these questions in this book only because my primary aim is to shed as much light as possible on the logical structure of interreligious dialogue and the conditions under which it can be realized (see Clooney, Ochs, Schmidt-Leukel, Lochhead). In what follows, I shall present a brief summary of the chapters that make up the structure of this book. The purpose of this presentation is to give the reader a general idea of what to expect from it. These chapters can be read singly or as an integral whole. Chapter 2 explores the formal and structural conditions of the possibility of interreligious dialogue. It is intended as a conceptual framework within which the main concepts of this book are discussed. The proposition I defend is that to be transformative of attitudes or feelings, the dialogue should be God-centered, objective, and empathetic, and it should be founded in the values of respect, tolerance, and equality. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss the following question: What are the structural elements of dialogue between (a) individuals and (b) religious communities? In the second part, I discuss the conditions under which interreligious dialogue can change attitudes and views of how a religious person thinks and feels about the religiously different other. What does it take to discern the truth of a religion that makes claims similar to ours? We may construct a strategy or an agenda for a rational dialogue between two religions, but still the question remains: How can a community that tends to believe that its version of the revealed word of God is true, unquestionably true, change their attitude or view of the other religion? In Chap. 3, I discuss in some detail the concept of mutual respect in interreligious dialogue. I argue that the subject of the conversation in this kind of dialogue is a collective subject composed of three elements: the revealed truth, the interpreters of the truth, and the religious community. Toward the realization of this purpose, I advance a concept of respect in general and respect for human beings in particular. The basis of respect is possession of human value. The kind and significance of respect is commensurate with the kind and significance of the value it embodies. Humanity is absolute valuable; therefore, human beings should be respected as ends in themselves even when they are used as means to ends. I conclude this discussion with an analysis of the following question: Why is humanity absolute valuable? I argue that human beings should be respected always as ends in themselves not only because they are capable of self-determination, as many philosophers have argued, but primarily

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because humanity is sacred, and it is sacred because it emanates from the divine essence. The focus of my critical attention in Chap. 4 is on the concept of mutual understanding: First, what does it mean to understand an object? Second, what does it mean for a religion to understand another religion? Under what conditions is this kind of understanding possible? Under what conditions can understanding be a transformative power? This chapter is composed of two parts. First, I present a concept of understanding; second, I present an analysis of the view that religious self-­understanding impedes the possibility of interreligious dialogue; and third, I critically evaluate this view. The proposition I defend is that religious self-understanding does not in principle impede the possibility of interreligious dialogue. The focus of my attention in Chap. 5 is God-centeredness. Some theologians and philosophers have argued that this orientation cannot be a condition of interreligious dialogue for at least four reasons. First, it is a given fact that religions view their beliefs and values as unquestionably true. Second, all religions are embedded in radically different cultural contexts. Third, grounding all religions in a transcendent reality relativizes their beliefs and values. Moreover, people worship their God, not a neutral reality. Fourth, it is difficult to ground all religions in a transcendent reality anyway. In this chapter, I evaluate these arguments and defend the belief that the mystical experience provides a justifiable basis for the claim that the transcendent is a wealth of being and that the same transcendent is revealed in the mystical experience that underlies all religions. The transcendent is the common ground on which all religions stand in interreligious dialogue. In Chap. 6, I first respond to my critic’s query whether it is logically possible to say that mutual understanding is the primary aim of interreligious dialogue and at the same time one of its conditions. The proposition I shall defend is that it is logically possible to hold that it can be both at the same time. Second, I shall critically evaluate the argument that a religion’s belief is that its revelation is a true revelation of the word of God. This evaluation will consist of two parts. In the first, I shall present an analysis of the main components of this argument, and in the second, I shall critically evaluate them. The proposition I shall defend is that a religion’s self-understanding is not an obstacle in the way of interreligious dialogue.

CHAPTER 2

General Framework of Analysis

Conditions of Interreligious Dialogue This chapter is devoted to an exploration of the general conditions under which interreligious dialogue can be a transformative process, one in which what changes is not only the interlocutors’ understanding of the beliefs and values of the religiously different other but also their attitude toward each other—the way they view, act, and interact with each other, regardless of whether the other is a person, a community, or a religion. The proposition I shall defend is that to be transformative, the dialogue should be God-centered, objective, and empathetic; it should, moreover, proceed in the spirit of respect, toleration, and equality. I shall first discuss the structural conditions of interreligious dialogue: What do we mean when we speak of dialogue in general and interreligious dialogue in particular? I raise this question because interreligious dialogue takes place, as I shall explain in detail, at two levels. The first is discursive and its datum is concept, and the second is practical and its datum is action. The first

I would like to thank Professor Malgorzata Czarnocka, editor of Dialogue and Universalism, for permitting me to make use of parts of my essay, “Possibility of Inter-religious Dialogue: Structural and Formal Conditions” (29:2, 2016), in Chap. 2, and including “Mysticism as a Basis of Inter-religious Dialogue,” in Chap. 5, (29:2, 2019). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. H. Mitias, Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6_2

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takes place between theologians, religious leaders, and philosophers, and the second takes place between religious communities. It is one thing for two scholars to dialogue on a concept or a question and another for two communities to “dialogue,” or to communicate, at the level of action. I here assume that interreligious dialogue cannot and should not stop at the level of theory between theologians and philosophers, for we can ask, What is the “cash value,” to borrow a term from William James, of such dialogue if its fruits are not translated into modes of behavior in the sphere of action, where diverse religious communities live and interact as neighbors, religious groups, politicians, businesspersons, teachers, and organizations? Second, I shall discuss the formal conditions under which interreligious dialogue can be a transformative process: What does it take a person who has grown up in a certain religion, who understands herself and in fact lives from the standpoint of that religion, to discern the religious truth proclaimed by another religion, comprehend it, appreciate it, and hopefully assent to it as a divine truth and then incorporate it into her mind or worldview? What is the use of a dialogue, or even the ritual of going through one, if we are not willing or ready to embrace a new truth, we may discover both theoretically and practically? We may construct a formidable strategy, one that wins the blessing of reason, but still the question remains: How can a religious community that tends to be exclusivist in its religious orientation change its attitude or understanding of God and the meaning of human life and destiny, and especially treat the truth of other religions as equal or as a revelation of the transcendent? This change is, I submit, a necessary condition for the possibility of mutual understanding, appreciation, respect, and cooperation among the different religions of the world. I shall refer to Christianity and Islam as examples in defending my thesis and when necessary I shall refer to Hinduism, Judaism, and Buddhism. But a critic might point out that there are two major families of religions, theistic and dharmic. The first includes Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and the second includes Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. The first group is God-centered; the second is Dharma-centered. In what sense is God-centeredness a condition of interreligious dialogue, for example, between Christianity and Hinduism? First, all the major religions are founded in a transcendent reality or principle that underlies the universe. Religion is not only a set of beliefs, values, and modes of behavior, nor is it only an established institution, it is also a nature, that is, an essential aspect or dimension of human nature.

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We can characterize human nature as political, rational, social, or creative (homo creator), but we can also characterize it as religious: The human being is religious by nature. One of the basic impulses in human nature is the impulse to respond to and to know the power that underlies the existence of nature and humanity. This power is the ontic basis of religion. The human response to its existence, nature, and relation to human beings has always been concrete—cultural, historical, communal. But although communal, any knowledge claimed of it is based on contemplation of the design of the universe. This contemplation is the royal road that leads to any type of knowledge of this power. The thrust of this contemplation has always been a thrust at the being of the transcendent, that is, the source and ground of the universe. Knowledge of this ground is the key to our understanding of the mystery that permeates the totality of existence, the purpose of human life, and the best way to live in this vast, strange, and sometimes hostile nature. Generally speaking, the kind of contemplation that is the source and foundation of all the religions; it is the locus of what is generally called “mystical experience.” It is mystical because its object, namely the transcendent, is experienced as infinite and indescribable. It is uniquely different from the universe and surpasses it in every conceivable way; we also experience our universe, including the human mind, as dependent on it. But although it is transcendent, it is real, indeed more real than the reality of the nature we inhabit. Again, although it is indescribable, it is knowable, and the knowledge the mystic has of it transcends in richness, meaning, depth, and dignity, the kind of knowledge we have of natural objects. To borrow a term from Plato, the kind of knowledge we have of it is noetic in nature. Finally, although it is indescribable, it is not irrelevant to our knowledge of the order of nature and the meaning of our lives because this kind of knowledge illuminates the laws that govern the realms of nature and human nature. The fundamental values and beliefs of religion originate from the mystic’s contemplative vision of this transcendent reality. The mystic is the kind of mind that stands on The Edge, the edge of the universe, and contemplates what lies beyond it from the standpoint of its experience and knowledge of the universe. The assumption that underlies the thesis of this book is that all the religions are founded in this kind of contemplation. The contemplative vision I have just characterized, albeit very briefly, is not merely an act of observation or voyeurism; no, it is an existential encounter with the transcendent. This encounter is the locus of revelation. The way the religious

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founders of the various religions—Mohammad, Jesus, or Buddha—articulated their knowledge or understanding of the transcendent differs from one culture to another. What matters in the present discussion is that all the religions are, directly or indirectly, founded in a vision or mystical experience of the transcendent. We encounter religious differences not only between the major religions but also between the different denominations within them. Being a religion is one thing and the way the religion interprets its understanding of the transcendent is something else. My primary concern in this study is the basis of religion as such. This concern is explored recently systematically, insightfully, critically, and cogently by Perry Schmidt-Leukel in Religious Pluralism and Interreligious Dialogue (2017). Thus, when I propose that God-centeredness is a necessary condition for interreligious dialogue I mean transcendent-centeredness. I use “God-­ centeredness” in this book for the following reasons. In my analysis of the possibility of interreligious dialogue I use Christianity and Islam as examples. For them, God is the transcendent. Accordingly, both religions are God-centered. Nevertheless, even in this context God-centeredness essentially signifies “transcendent-centeredness.” But we encounter this kind of centeredness in the dharmic religions. “Dhari,” the root word of the concept of “Dharma,” is hard to define, and “Dharma” is understood differently in theory and practice in the different dharmic religions. But although “Dharma” has different significations, interpretations, and applications, it refers to the ultimate that underlies the cosmos. Generally, “dhari” means “fixed decree, law, duty,” “to support, hold, or bear”; it also signifies a universal, abiding, and changeless principle that steers the cosmic process without being a part of it. In the sphere of practical life this principle is the path to the good or the right way of living (see Brereton 2004; Rosen 2006). As I shall emphasize in my analysis the mystical experience in Chap. 5, we should always keep a steady eye on the transcendent as the foundation of religion, not on its name, on the way it is understood and interpreted by the different religions. The general purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework within which I shall analyze in some detail four central conditions for the possibility of interreligious dialogic: mutual respect, mutual understanding, subject, and God-centeredness. I choose these conditions for discussion in detail for three reasons. First, they are the most recalcitrant, most important, and the most contentious of all the conditions heretofore

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considered by theologians and philosophers who discussed the question of the possibility of interreligious dialogue. Accordingly, a cogent analysis of these conditions is a necessary condition for an adequate analysis of the possibility of this kind of dialogue. Second, these conditions logically imply that a religion is a subject that can assume an attitude of respect, tolerance, or empathy with another religion. But can a religion be a subject the way a human individual can? If it can, in what sense can it be a subject that can assume an attitude or undergo an experience such understanding or cooperation with another religion? Third, as my argument in the following chapters will show, if religions recognize that they are genuine revelations of the word of God, and they are, if they can assume an attitude of respect toward each other, and they can, and if they understand each other as genuine revelations of the word of God, and they can, conditions such as empathy, modesty, equality, or tolerance will not be hard to realize. But, what if religions can, and what if they actually do, converse with each other under the conditions of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and God-centeredness, and what should the ultimate purpose of this dialogue be? Is it merely to find a way to mitigate the hatred, alienation, and hostility that plagued interreligious relations for almost 1500 years and to cooperate on worthwhile projects that serve their individual interests? No. These two goals are very important and in urgent need of serious attention, but I tend to think that this is not enough: the real purpose of interreligious dialogue should be to establish a bond of friendship between them. Only when they exist and thrive in this kind of relation can they, first, cooperate on worthwhile projects and face the challenges posed by the economic, political, and technological forces that seem to weaken the moral and cultural role they play, and can play, in the human society and, second, realize their nature as revelations of God’s word.

Concept of Interreligious Dialogue It is, I think, reasonable to begin my discussion with a brief elucidatory analysis of the concept of dialogue as such because it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to theorize on the elements that make up the structure of interreligious dialogue, its outcome, and the conditions that make it a transformative process if we do not proceed in this discussion from a clear understanding of dialogue as such, that is, of the kind of ingredients or structure without which an encounter between human beings cannot be

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characterized as a dialogue. We may view this structure as the ontological locus within which the encounter evolves into a kind of dialogue. “Religious” in “interreligious dialogue” qualifies “dialogue” as a subject. Accordingly, we understand the sense in which a dialogue is religious inasmuch as we understand the factor, or aspect, that makes it religious. We can say that it is religious because the interlocutors are religious people or members of a religious establishment, or because the ideas discussed in the dialogue are religious in nature. For example, a philosopher may not be a religious person; does it necessarily follow that she cannot participate in a religious dialogue? It would seem that at the level of individuals, what makes a dialogue religious is not the religious identity of the interlocutors or their institutional status but rather the subject matter of the dialogue. Thus, a dialogue is philosophical inasmuch as the ideas discussed in it are philosophical, it is scientific inasmuch as the ideas discussed in it are scientific, it is political inasmuch as the ideas discussed in it are political, and so forth. But is the religious nature of the subject matter of interreligious dialogue the only factor that makes it religious? An answer to this question should, I think, start with a focus on “inter” in “interreligious dialogue.” In a philosophical dialogue as it is embodied in the Platonic model of dialogue, the interlocutors are individual human beings. But first, what are they in interreligious dialogue? Second, how are they related in this kind of event, or how do they dialogue with each other? The interlocutors in interreligious dialogue cannot be only individuals. This is why when we speak of interreligious dialogue, we should mean the kind that takes place between, or inter, two religious communities. But if they are communities, the question necessarily arises: In what sense can they dialogue with each other? Moreover, unlike the dialogue that takes place between individuals, what makes interreligious dialogue religious is not only the fact that its subject matter is religious ideas but also the fact that the participants in it are religious communities and converse as religious communities, as embodiments of the revealed word of God. Thus, the signification “religious” in interreligious dialogue is not restricted to the religious character of the subject matter but includes the religious identity of the participants in the dialogue. We readily understand someone when she speaks of a dialogue between two individuals, but can we readily understand her when she speaks of dialogue between two communities? This question is warranted because there is a radical difference between an individual and a community, for we can ask, Can a community think, feel, and speak with one voice? In the

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Platonic model of dialogue, the aim is, generally speaking, clear: to grow in understanding or to establish the truth or validity of an idea or a hypothesis. But is this the only aim of interreligious dialogue? We may say, as I shall discuss, that in addition to understanding or discerning the truth of an idea, interreligious dialogue aims at changing one’s attitude and hopefully one’s behavior toward the members of the other community. If this is the case, and I think it is, as I shall argue, we should grant that interreligious dialogue is made up of two basic components; the first is theoretical or conceptual, and the second is practical. In interreligious dialogue, we aim at understanding the other religious community and hopefully the way we interact with its members in the domain of praxis. This essential yet peculiar feature of interreligious dialogue sheds new light on the significance of the question I raised earlier: In what sense is interreligious dialogue a dialogue? In my response to this question, I shall (a) discuss the general idea of dialogue, (b) explain the sense in which two communities can dialogue with each other, and (c) analyze the conditions under which it can be a transformative power in the attitudes and action of the dialoguing communities.

Idea of Dialogue “Dialogue” is a translation of the Greek word dialogos, which derives from dialogesthai, which in turn derives from dia (between) and legein (talk); that is, dialogue is a discourse—talk or discussion—between two or more persons. Again, the word legein is the source of the word “logic,” namely the science of correct reasoning—of correct thinking or talking. This is why we can characterize dialogue as a rational conversation, one governed by the principles of reason (logos). We usually distinguish between idle talk and meaningful talk. Idle talk is pointless; therefore, it is worthless. Dialogue is meaningful talk; it is the kind of conversation that aims at something good or significant. When people engage in meaningful talk, they usually analyze, reason, criticize, and evaluate important ideas: beliefs, questions, propositions, hypotheses, values, or points of view. The discussion is guided by an aim, and the aim is to discover or ascertain the truth, falsity, or meaning of a claim or belief. Regardless of whether it is philosophical, scientific, or theological, dialogue is a rational conversation in which concepts are interchanged and discussed. By “discussion” I do not merely mean the exchange of ideas or points of view, or merely their presentation, but especially their analysis,

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criticism, and evaluation and the attempt to discern the truth inherent in them. The instrument, or power, by which this activity takes place is reason. This is why, once more, dialogue is justifiably called “rational conversation,” that is, as a conversation conducted in the light of logos. Rational conversation is the formal structure within which ideas are presented and discussed. It may take place by means of questions and answers, arguments, conceptual or logical analysis, or the expansion of the abilities of the intellect into higher levels of understanding. The interlocutors are “dialecticians” inasmuch as they submit to the voice of reason (Plato, Republic, chapters V and VII). A distinctive feature of dialogue is that it is a purposeful encounter. Two or more people meet in order to establish the truth or falsity of an idea, theory, or claim, or in order to understand it. This activity involves, as I have just pointed out, clarification, definition, analysis, evaluation, argumentation, and systematization of the ideas under consideration. Accordingly, a clear formulation of the purpose of the dialogue is critically important so that all the participants proceed into the discussion with a clear understanding of the question they seek to explore. Failure to clarify the purpose will certainly undermine the focus of the participants on the subject matter of the dialogue and consequently on the character of the encounter, or meeting, qua dialogue. Moreover, when the interlocutors do not address the same idea or adhere to the purpose of the meeting— that is, to converse rationally on a particular subject matter—the dialogue will necessarily be reduced to a monologue or idle talk. A second distinctive feature of dialogue is that the truth the interlocutors seek emerges in the course of the conversation as a kind of disclosure. They “see” or “discern” it as a luminous presence. It emerges as a result of the analytical, critical, and reasoned interchange of the ideas under consideration, as a result of the logical movement of thought that develops in the dialogue; in fact, it emerges in and through this movement. It may appear at its end as an intuition that can be articulated into a concept or in the process of the conversation as a shining presence of the truth, the kind that retransforms the intuition into knowledge. This is why, as I shall argue, a necessary condition for interreligious dialogue is that the interlocutors bracket their personal biases, emotions, and desires before and during the dialogue. A third distinctive feature of dialogue is that it is not always a smooth or direct development toward a certain end (viz., the truth or the understanding the interlocutors seek), but is frequently rough, nebulous,

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or unpredictable because there is frequently a need to clarify vague or ambiguous concepts, to consider hidden assumptions, to broach neglected questions or ideas, or to unravel certain complex propositions. The dialectical process is always expansive in its ideas, insights, and possibilities of understanding. An excursus from the main course of the conversation now and then is not uncommon in the major philosophical, scientific, and theological dialogues. A fourth distinctive feature of dialogue is that, although the model I use is essentially Platonic, I take into serious consideration the basic insight of the Buberian model of dialogue in my analysis of the conditions of interreligious dialogue. Conducting a dialogue within the framework of this model is not merely an activity of discovering or communicating the truth of an aspect or element of this or that religion the way a scientist discovers and communicates her knowledge of an aspect or element of nature, it is also a human encounter in which the representatives of the dialoguing religions do not stand before each other as “others” or as “they” or as strangers, but as human others, or, to use Buber’s well-known term, as “Thou,” as realities with whom we share our humanity—the human essence—and before whom we stand as “human subjects.” The truth the interlocutors seek does not pre-exist but is disclosed in the course of the conversation. Indeed, the dialogue cannot be transformative in character, as I shall argue, if it does not happen as a human encounter. This kind of dialogue originates from two human cores. The disclosure of the truth is a collaborative effort. This is a main reason why we can characterize it as an adventure in mutual cooperation and understanding qua different revelations. If the rational activity is the spoken dimension of the dialogue, the dialogue-as-encounter is the medium in which the rational activity takes place. We should always remember that religious dialogue is supposed to be one of the highest forms of spiritual activities! (See Lochhead 1988; Buber 1980, 2002.)

Idea of Interreligious Dialogue Now, in what sense can two communities engage in a religious dialogue? If they can, what may the structure of such a dialogue be? In the Platonic model of dialogue, or any dialogue that takes place between individuals, the conversation consists of a clearly defined purpose: a commitment to the principles of reason in the activity of analysis, criticism, and evaluation, a focus on the logic implicit in the ideas or issues under consideration

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without allowing one’s idiosyncrasies to interfere in the discussion; and a commitment to the truth that emerges in the course of the dialogue. The emphasis in this statement is on “consists”—on the structure within which a dialogue between two communities can take place, mainly because a community (a) does not in fact think, feel, know, and speak in one voice; (b) may not even be interested in the dialogue since it might believe that it is already in possession of the truth; and (c) may not be skilled in the art of rational conversation. A quick investigative look at the abundant research done in the area of interreligious dialogue will show that most writers on this subject have adopted the Platonic model in their theorizing on this type of dialogue, and indeed most of the conferences held on this subject during the past five decades have taken place between theologians and philosophers and sometimes political leaders. But as Hendrik Vroom has correctly pointed out, “Academic dialogical studies may end up in books, and nobody knows where the spirit of dialogue leaves its traces” (Vroom, in Cornille 2010, p.  214). But interreligious dialogue is not only an academic question; it is also, and more urgently, an existential concern that, first, expresses an essential aspiration of the religious dimension of human nature and, second, does not merely aim at the understanding the philosopher or theologian seeks but also at using this understanding to create a particular atmosphere in which the different religious communities can live and thrive together as human beings. Moreover, the call for interreligious dialogue did not, and should not, issue from philosophical, theological, or political curiosity. Even philosophers such as Hegel, who argued that the Absolute manifests itself differently in the different cultures of the world, did not broach the question of interreligious dialogue but, on the contrary, viewed Christianity as the highest revelation of God’s will on earth. The call for interreligious dialogue should issue from the encounter with the religiously different other—the other whose religious beliefs and way of worshipping God are different from ours. This encounter—which seems to be growing in depth, breadth, and urgency as a positive consequence of globalization in the fields of economics, politics, science and technology, education, information, transportation, and telecommunication, and of the continual fusion of the different types of human relationships in these very fields—is the raison d’être of interreligious dialogue. Hardly any country in the world is immune to cultural, religious, political, and economic diversity. Boundaries—which used to separate different countries, religions, cultures,

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and economies, as well as societies—are now opaque, porous. The separate other, whether it is he, she, or they, is now as close to us as one’s TV screen, computer, airplane, or smartphone, and is someone with whom we can personally interact, play, marry, work, or collaborate on scientific or business projects and with whom we struggle for more justice, freedom, and prosperity. In short, the separate other is now my neighbor—“my brother-and-sister-in-humanity.” But how can the communal other be our neighbor if we cannot live harmoniously under the conditions of equality, freedom, respect, peace, justice, and mutual aid, that is, if we cannot coexist as human beings? Yes, the question that glares at us in the face at the present is not merely how we can get along economically, politically, socially, and even culturally, although these goals are intrinsically desirable, but how we can live together as human beings. The impulse to this type of living is what morally justifies interreligious dialogue. Founding it in this impulse will certainly pave the way not only to a successful dialogue but also to a more peaceful and progressive world. This impulse should also be the basis on which one can explore the conditions under which diverse religious communities can interact and cooperate on the development of a more human society (see Nowak 2001). One of the thorniest factors that underlies the tension we frequently witness among the various cultures of the world and necessarily challenges the possibility of interreligious dialogue is “religious exclusivity,” the quiet but firm claim that one’s religion is the true religion, in the sense that it is in possession and the custodian of God’s word on earth, and that, consequently, it is the true way to salvation and eternal happiness. It also underlies, at least to some extent, the religious wars that have punctuated the history of societies in the East and the West in the ancient, medieval, and modern periods. Finally, it underlies the spread of religious missions throughout the Eastern and Western worlds, whose supreme aim has been to convert “the religiously different other” to the “true religion.” An exclusive claim to the divine truth necessarily generates a feeling of superiority socially, morally, and culturally in relation to the different other. The other is viewed as “underdeveloped” as a human being. But is “religious exclusivism” a valid religious orientation or point of view, in the sense that a certain religion can have an absolute claim to the divine truth? (See Hick 1974, 1989, 1992; Badham 1998.) Although it darts at the heart of the question of the possibility of interreligious dialogue, I shall discuss this question in some detail in the following chapters, but I think it will be helpful to the development of the

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thesis of this book to make a distinction between what I shall call “hard” and “soft” exclusivism. A hard exclusivist claims that her religion is the “true” religion and that all other religions are either false, incomplete, or misguided. Accordingly, its way is the true way to salvation and happiness. A soft exclusivist claims that her religion is not necessarily the true religion but that it is a true and adequate basis for her own salvation and happiness, and that other religions are, or can be, true revelations of the divine will and therefore adequate bases for the salvation and happiness of the other peoples of the world. The soft exclusivist grounds her claim in the metaphysical assumption that God is a transcendent being, that the human mind cannot comprehend his essence in the fullness of its being, and that God reveals his will differently in the different cultures of the world in the course of history. She would concede, in defense of her claim, that since God is a transcendent being, he is infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness, that he is the creator of the universe, and therefore it is reasonable to hold that he reveals his will differently in the different cultures of the world. The soft exclusivist focuses her attention more on understanding the meaning of human life and destiny; on the spiritual dimension of human nature; on how the message of a religion is translated into moral, religious, and social values; and on the fact that human nature is universal and that it is a divine spark than on whether the theological questions of her religion are the final word of God. Soft exclusivists, sometimes referred to as “inclusivists” or “pluralists,” tend to believe that the diversity of religions is a testimony to God’s infinite wisdom and creativity. This aspect was emphasized by philosophers such as Whitehead (1929), Hartshorne (1941, 1967), and Cobb (p. 82). Who said that the transcendent speaks only one “language,” that he expresses himself in only one way, or that the way he speaks or the way he expresses himself can in any way be anthropomorphized? The very fact of the mosaic of the different religions is a vivid indication of his infinite wisdom, greatness, and love. Two comments are in order. First, soft exclusivism is assumed when any theologian, philosopher, or community engages in an interreligious dialogue, for by its nature, hard exclusivism rules out the possibility of such dialogue, mainly because if someone seriously believes that her religion is the “true” religion, she would not, ipso facto, need to discuss any aspect of the other religion; she has nothing new to learn, and she has much to give. She may talk out of curiosity with the religiously different other in order to know what she believes, how she lives, how to become happy, or how to secure her eternal

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life, and she may inform the other of her beliefs and values, but this kind of talk remains at the level of theory in the way it happens in scientific or philosophical research, and it may be used by some leaders in the implementation of some social or political policy, that is, as an instrument of control, but this is not what is intended in interreligious dialogue. Moreover, can an exclusivist in principle dialogue with the religious other? Second, soft exclusivism provides a solid basis for the possibility of interreligious dialogue because the interlocutors proceed into it, as I shall explain in some detail, with a tolerant, empathetic, and open mind, with a mind that is willing to see the new truth and embrace it or acknowledge it, because she discerns it as a truth. Religious difference, which is the basis of religious particularity, is also what justifies getting together to seek mutual understanding.

Ingredients of Interreligious Dialogue In the analysis of the structure of interreligious dialogue, it is not enough to say that it is a rational conversation and that it is rational in character; it is equally important to identify the participants who design and realize its aim, its subject matter, and the conditions under which it takes place. Well, the participants in this kind of dialogue are not only theologians and philosophers, although their work is a necessary condition for its realization, but primarily religious communities. But as I pointed out earlier, it is extremely difficult for the members of a community to think, feel, reason, and think in one voice. Let us not lose sight of the fact that the ultimate purpose of interreligious dialogue is not merely “to understand” the beliefs and values of the religious other but also to comprehend the divine truth implicit in her religion and hopefully to change one’s attitude toward it. But the comprehension of a new truth entails accepting it and acting on it; otherwise, the act of understanding becomes an instance of what I would call “cognitive voyeurism.” In contrast, this is not the aim of interreligious dialogue; its aim, as I shall expound, is to enhance our understanding, respect, appreciation, and human living with the religious other—to demolish a wall that separates us from each other as human beings, and ironically as God’s creation, as a creation that reflects God’s image; to experience the divine in our lives; and to cooperate on creating a more human society. Now, in what way can a religious community rise to the level of dialogue, or how can it exist in the mode of dialogue, since it in fact exists

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discretely and thrives in large areas, cities or even countries, so that the basic conditions of the human kind of dialogue can be fulfilled? Or what does it take for a religious community to understand, appreciate, and respect not only the truth implicit in the other religion but also the members who espouse it? I raise these questions because dialogue in the form of conferences, symposia, or meetings among religious thinkers is not enough. The result of their dialogue should be transmuted into the minds and hearts of the members of the dialoguing community, and it should win their assent—hopefully by rational explanation and argument, not by conditioning, manipulation, or brainwashing. Only when this happens can we say that a dialogue between two religious communities takes place. Accordingly, we should ask, What is the vehicle, or channels, through which this transmutation can take place? A quest for these channels is, I think, a step toward identifying the interlocutors of interreligious dialogue. First, Interpreters of Religious Truth The first, and we should say basal, constitutive ingredient of the formal structure of interreligious dialogue is authoritative religious leaders, philosophers, and theologians. I say “basal” because their analysis, evaluation, articulation, and especially their interpretation of the basic beliefs and values of a religion are a sine qua non, and we can add the first logical condition, for the possibility of dialogue, because without a clearly defined interpretation of these beliefs and values, there would not be anything clear or substantial to converse about. These beliefs and values underlie not only the worldview of a community but also its religious culture, because the symbols, rites, celebrations, norms, practices, rituals, and the way its members understand and practice their religion are concrete embodiments or expressions of these beliefs and values. If we take them away, the religion collapses. The author of a philosophy may perish, but his or her philosophy itself may survive. The ancient Greek, Roman, and Medieval philosophers perished but not their philosophies. A religion is a way of life; its foundation is a set of beliefs and values. These exist in the minds and hearts of the faithful and become actual in the way the faithful act or behave religiously. When the religious community perishes, its religion as a way of life perishes. Where are the ancient Greek, Roman, and Egyptian religions? I do not exaggerate in saying that the doorway to our understanding of a religion is its basic beliefs and values.

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We cannot comprehend how the members of a community fast, pray, perform rites such as marriage, baptism, or death; or understand the meaning of human life and destiny without a genuine understanding of these beliefs and values. For example, we understand why the Muslim prays the way he does in the mosque, at home, in public, and in nature only if we understand the creed “There is no god but God, and Mohammad is his messenger” and his conception of the afterlife. Similarly, we understand why a Catholic or an Orthodox Christian prays in church, at home, or in public the way he does only if we understand the belief that Jesus is the Son of God and the Christian conception of God the Father. The prayer in these two cases embodies the meaning of the creed or the belief. The Muslim or the Christian lives, enacts, this belief in the event of praying. The prayer is an occasion for the faithful to experience the divine in their lives. The point that calls for special attention here is that the fruits and spirit of the dialogical event—understanding, respect, and appreciating and accepting the religiously different other—should be transmuted into the minds and hearts of the religious community; otherwise, interreligious dialogue would remain abstract and therefore irrelevant to the lives of its members. Toward the achievement of this goal, the theologians and philosophers should in some way devote themselves to a serious interpretation of the beliefs and values they represent. The interpretation should include a discussion of the major differences and commonalities between the dialoguing communities. This comparative discussion will enhance one’s understanding of one’s religion as well as the religion of the other. It will also help the mind of the faithful to see that difference does not have to be a source of alienation or hostility but can expand their understanding and appreciation of the presence of the divine in their lives. The selection of the basic beliefs and values whose interpretation is essential for the mutual understanding of a religion in the medium of dialogue is a painstaking task, for it frequently involves translation of technical, abstract, and recalcitrant concepts and questions into communicable language, one that can be understood by the “lay” person; identification of the differences and commonalities between the religions; and explanation of some of the metaphysical, theological, and cultural assumptions whose elucidation is a requisite for interpreting and, consequently, for understanding the beliefs and values under consideration.

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Second, the Religious Establishment If I were to follow Aristotle’s analysis of causation (or creation), I would say that (a) the interpretation of the beliefs and values the theologians and philosophers provide would be the material cause (or condition), (b) the interlocutors would be the efficient cause, (c) the subject matter interchanged would be the formal cause, and (d) the mutual understanding of the truth would be the final cause. Now, in and of itself, the interpretation of the beliefs and values cannot move into the minds and hearts of the religious community; an agent should initiate and undertake this movement, of course in view of her vision of the final cause. In addition to the religious thinkers who interpret the beliefs and values, the second logical condition for this task is, in my judgment, the religious establishment, or the clergy—that is, the leaders who are in charge of administering, teaching, justifying, and guarding a religion as an institution and as a way of life: popes, imams, priests, pastors, sheikhs, rabbis, holy men and women, muftis, bishops. These function as mediators between the revealed truth and the faithful not only in their role as models but also in the way they teach the revealed truth. At the existential level, they are the most direct, and consequently most effective, point of contact between the beliefs and values, on the one hand, and the members of the community on the other. They are in a position to influence the attitude of the member of their congregation toward the religiously different other. This is why it is urgently important for the religious leaders who occupy the highest seat of authority to initiate the development of a program that aims at orienting their clergy in the basic beliefs and values of the other religion and promoting the values of toleration and respect for the religiously different other as such. These leaders can play a decisive role in creating a spiritual environment in which genuine interreligious dialogue can happen. I would not be very mistaken if I said that the active involvement of these leaders not only legitimizes but also inspires the dialogue at the communal level. Let me illustrate this point by an example: the recent meeting at the Vatican between Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayeb, the highestranking religious authority in Sunni Islam at Al-Azhar. The two leaders embraced! This is a highly symbolic but profoundly meaningful gesture. Though the meeting was short, they discussed “the common challenges faced by the authorities and the faithful of the major religions of the world” (Assafir, May 23, 2016). The message of the meeting, it was announced, was the meeting itself. There is no need to analyze what the

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pope and the sheikh discussed, but it is important to emphasize that it was cordial and constructive, and it promised future cooperation between the two religions. In Sheikh Al-Tayeb’s words, “We need to take a joint stance, hand-in-hand, to bring happiness to humanity, not to cause them hardship” (Ibid.). The phrase “hand-in-hand” should be spotlighted, for this image offers a firm basis for dialogue between Christianity and Islam and hopefully between other religions. It suggests amiability, trust, cooperation, and goodwill. I only hope that this meeting does not remain just a meeting—a symbolic gesture. The point is to initiate concrete steps that translate the meaning it embodies into modes of behavior. But this is not the first meeting between the pope and an Al-Azhar sheikh—similar meetings were held in the past—nor is it the only meeting between Christian and Muslim thinkers and leaders, or even between Christian and Muslim communities. Indeed, such meetings have been flourishing in Europe, Canada, the United States, and some parts of the Middle East during the past decades. Although they are intrinsically desirable and an essential condition for the possibility of interreligious dialogue, they are in need of systematization so that the various Muslim and Christian denominations can arrive at a statement of the general teachings of Islam and Christianity. Such a statement is needed to chart a strategy for initiating and moving the dialogue from the sphere of theory to that of praxis. For example, emphasis on values such as toleration, justice, peace, cooperation on worthwhile projects, love, and freedom of belief, not to mention institutions such as Sunday school, Bible school, or madrassa in the educational system and the family, is a most desirable first step. This step can be supplemented by interreligious encounters and visitations. For example, when I was an undergraduate student at Union College, a Methodist institution, in 1963, my anthropology teacher, Professor Gormley, extended an invitation to the class to attend a religious service at the Baptist church where he served as an elder. He wanted to know how many of us would attend the service so he could reserve seats for his students. The class, about twenty students, received the invitation with painful silence. The professor was surprised, in fact embarrassed. “The purpose of the invitation,” he added with trembling lips, “is not to convert you to the Baptist religion but to be acquainted with the Baptist religion.” Well, ten students raised their hands. I was one of them. At the end of the service, Professor Gormley introduced us to the congregation with a feeling of pride. Many of the worshippers approached us and welcomed us to the church and asked many questions about Union and

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Barbourville. On our way back to the dormitory, one student remarked, “The Baptists are not very much different from us!” Another, a Presbyterian, retorted, “Basically, the Baptists are similar to the Presbyterians.” A third, a Congregational, interjected, “All of us are Christians!” There is no need to recount the details of the conversation. The point that deserves special attention here is that that interdenominational visit initiated an interreligious dialogue among the students; it also shattered the social and psychological distance among the students and, along with it, the element of “fear of the unknown” that is usually stirred in us when we meet the different other. What if Christian students were to visit a mosque on Friday or a synagogue on Saturday or a Buddhist temple and witness the way they worship the transcendent, the creator of the universe? What if they discern that all of them worship the same transcendent being? Third, the Educational Establishment In addition to religious thinkers and the religious establishment, the educational system, qua efficient cause, plays a vital role in transmuting the mutual understanding achieved by theologians and philosophers and which is articulated in their interpretation of the basic beliefs and values of the dialoguing religions. First, by “educational” I mean the process in which the character of the young as well as adults grows and develops. The domain of this process is not exclusive to the academy—school, college, institute, and university—but extends to (a) the family and (b) the extensive and expansive network of communication (internet, TV, magazines, books, newspapers, radio, smartphones, movies). I here assume that (a) education is a lifelong process, and (b) regardless of its kind, any factor that plays an effective role in the growth and development of the human being is essentially educative in nature. We do not stop learning or growing when we graduate from high school or university. The greatest merit of the academy is that it equips our mind with the intellectual skills we need to grow as human individuals. Educational channels, or forces, constitute, in different ways and degrees, a direct point of contact for the members of the religious community. Our attitude toward the religiously different other is to some extent shaped by the immediate social environment: parents, teachers, peers, books, movies, and public opinion. One of the most constructive steps a society should take, directly or indirectly, is to prohibit, or at least

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discourage, stereotyping, discrimination, dissemination of false information, racism, ethnocentrism, bigotry, and prejudice. Next, it is vitally important to implement religious enrichment programs at the high school and college levels that inform the students about the basic beliefs and values practiced by the religious other in society. This kind of program is a quiet instigator of interreligious dialogue at the level of praxis. I have read this morning, as I was working on writing this chapter, that the head of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Germany, Bavarian bishop Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, has declared in the Heilbronner Stimme newspaper (Friday, May 27, 2016) that Islam should be taught critically and scientifically in all German schools, that the Islamic communities should establish a kind of “Friday school” (madrassa) where young people can be informed about their religion, and that the universities should establish Islamic theology faculties, for he thinks that the Islamic tradition should “be approached critically and on scientific criteria.” He added that “tolerance, religious freedom and freedom of consciousness must apply to all confessions. These rules can best be implemented when you have religion as a part of public education.” Bishop Bedford-Strohm thinks that this part of the student’s education can be a factor in immunizing pupils from radical leanings. I strongly endorse the bishop’s proposal not only because it helps in warding off religious radicalism but especially because it expands our own understanding of ourselves as human beings, because it reveals a new dimension of the divine presence in our lives and because it is intrinsically valuable to our knowledge of the religiously different other. I really think that the values of toleration, freedom of conscience, justice, respect for humanity, and cooperation should be promoted as a matter of scientific, religious, and political policy not merely as a means to an end, where the end is warding off extremism, or promoting peace or some political policy, but as an end in itself, primarily because these values are essential conditions of our humanity; they express essential needs of human nature.

Some Basic Conditions of Interreligious Dialogue If interreligious dialogue is not restricted to a rational encounter between religious thinkers or leaders, if it should also engage the members of the dialoguing communities, if its aim is not merely to understand the truth implicit in the other religion but also to assent and translate this understanding into concrete modes of behavior, that is, to change one’s

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attitude toward the other, then the question necessarily arises, under what conditions is this type of dialogue possible? Or under what conditions can it be a transformative power in the lives of religious communities so that their members assume an attitude of respect for, toleration of, appreciation of, and cooperation with the religiously different other? Notice that although this question is cast within the parameters of religious discourse, it can, and in fact does, have both political and social ramifications, for a harmonious and cooperative relation among diverse religious groups in a society promotes the material and spiritual dimensions of human life. Let us not forget that social order, stability, and solidarity are necessary conditions for social progress. I underscore this point only to stress that respect for the religious other should not be sought or practiced only as a means to an end, for if this were to happen, it would cease when the end ceases, but especially as an end in itself, mainly because it is an intrinsically valuable end, and it is so valuable because it is an imperative of our humanity. First, Mutual Understanding The material condition, without which interreligious dialogue cannot begin, is, as I argued in the preceding pages, a clear statement of the basic beliefs and values of the two religions. Only when the interlocutors analyze, explain, critically evaluate, systematically interpret, and grasp the truth implicit in these beliefs and values can we say that understanding has taken place. This implies that the interlocutors cannot proceed into the dialogue without a clear knowledge of their own beliefs and values. This requirement is, to a reasonable extent, fulfilled at the level of theoretical discourse by theologians and philosophers, but it is not fulfilled, at least not adequately, at the level of the community, which is the main target of the dialogue. One may be a devout Muslim, Christian, Jew, or Hindu without having adequate knowledge of the theology that explains and justifies her religious way of life. We do not choose where and when we are born: we do not choose our parents, society, or culture. We simply discover, when we pass through our adolescence, that we are religious in a certain way. But possessing a certain religious identity is generically different from knowing the source, texture, or justification of this identity. This is a main reason that the major religions have educational programs (e.g., madrassa or Sunday school) whose purpose is to enlighten the faithful about the fundaments of their religion. In addition to the pulpit,

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such programs can be used as loci to which the fruits of the theoretical dialogue can be extended. Many a church, mosque, and synagogue in North America and Europe have already initiated such programs. The program developed by the cooperative effort of the Church and Mosque in Ireland—A Journey Together: Muslims, Christians in Ireland, Building Mutual Respect, Understanding and Cooperation—can be cited as an example (Forde 2013). The establishment of such programs in religiously pluralistic societies will not only serve peace and order but will also further human growth and development. Implicit in the implementation of this comprehensive approach to interreligious dialogue are (a) a quiet rejection of hard exclusivism and (b) a practical acceptance of the belief that insofar as he is the Absolute, God has revealed himself differently to different cultures of the world. How can I engage in a dialogue with the religiously different other, one that aims at mutual understanding, respect, appreciation, and cooperation, if the truth she embraces is not expressive of the divine? I raise this question because I am anxious to spotlight the conditions under which a member of one religious community can comprehend a constitutive truth of the other religion not only from the standpoint of that religion but also as a divine truth, as a truth that flows from the same source that gives rise to her own religious truth. This statement refers specifically to the kind of understanding that conduces to a change of attitude—of respect, appreciation, and equality of humanity. Two conditions should be fulfilled in order for this type of understanding to take place. The first is a plea for objectivity in the analysis and evaluation of the basic beliefs and values under consideration. What does it take to assume an objective attitude, one in which the interlocutors bracket out their desires, biases, prejudices, and hidden assumptions—in short, their idiosyncrasies— and focus their attention on the meaning, truth, and falsity of these beliefs and values? The participants assume this attitude when they submit in principle to the logic implicit in the beliefs and values without the intervention of any factor or authority external to it; that is, the course of the dialogue cannot be dictated by any authority external to this logic. The participants undertake the activity of analysis and evaluation, yes, but they do not dictate its course. Moreover, they pursue the line of reasoning that evolves in the discourse to the end, and they make judgments, although they cannot be judgmental. Truth, as it is baptized by the hand of reason, is for them the ultimate court of appeal in both theoretical and practical matters. In their role as participants, they function as logical

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midwives. They cannot determine either the direction or the outcome of the discourse; they make it possible. They enable the logic of the discourse to take its course. Emphasis on this condition was one of Plato’s lasting legacies to the possibility of philosophical and scientific inquiry. Let me spotlight this point by brief example. Suppose the interlocutors arrive at a mutually acceptable definition, or characterization, of “God,” “Son of God,” or “There is no god but God, and Mohammad is his messenger.” What can we infer from the logic of any one of these definitions with respect to our understanding of the revealed truth in the monotheistic religions? Second, in order for the dialogue to be conducive to mutual understanding, it should be God-centered, not religion-centered. This condition, which was elaborated and defended by John Hick (Hick 1974, 1989, 1992; Badham 1998), and which I shall discuss in detail in Chap. 5, requires that the interlocutors view and treat each other’s beliefs and values not from the standpoint of their own particular religions but from the standpoint of God, from the assumption that all the major religions are divine revelations. This means that they cannot interpret the beliefs and values of the other religion in terms of their own religion. Doing this will certainly expose them to the charge of the “religio-centric” predicament. When I am stuck in this predicament, that is, when I see with the eyes of my religion or when I hear with the ears of my religion, I cannot understand the religion of the other as the other understands it but as I understand it. Assuming this kind of dialogical posture entails a kind of religious imperialism. One may object that since every religion is God-centered, it is easy to slip into the religio-centric predicament—thus, can we be God-centered except from the standpoint of our conception of God? Or can we transcend the religio-centric predicament? Yes, the supreme purpose of the dialogue is to transcend this kind of predicament, and this in and through the process of analysis, criticism, and evaluation, or, in Plato’s language, through the dialectic process generated by the discussion. The point is to penetrate, through logical and linguistic analysis, into the meaning of the divine truth inherent in the other religion. This penetration is possible if one abandons the dogma that ours is the only true divine revelation and if we proceed into it with open minds and hearts. This is exactly why the dialogue cannot stop at the level of conceptual analysis but should be transmuted into modes of existential dialogue in which we not only think but also see and feel the divine truth insofar as it is embodied in the other

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religion. This is why the dialogue should not, as I argued earlier, stop at the level of intellectual understanding but should extend to the sphere of praxis, where members of the religious communities are expected to practice the values of respect, toleration, equality, freedom, and appreciation of the other. It is critically important to emphasize that assuming a God-centered attitude does not in any way undermine the cognitive authority of a religion, nor does it undermine the authority of the religion in the life of the community, because the religions in dialogue are divine revelations; they derive their authority from that revelation and from nowhere else. They are equal in relation to God. Moreover, “difference” does not logically imply opposition or contradiction, nor does it necessarily imply “better” or “worse.” This aspect has not escaped the attention of the theologians who have been engaged in interreligious dialogue during the past forty years. For example, Mustafa Abu-Sway argues that “the Islamic worldview presents humanity as a family united through the same parents, rich with commonalities, and yet has many differences. Though many of these differences are postrevelational constructs created by human beings, The Qur’an recognizes that some of these differences are positively created by God, and, therefore, they command a pluralistic paradigm” (Abu-Sway in Cornille, p.  134). This argument is based on a Qur’anic text: “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that you may know one another. Lo! The noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct/piety. Lo! Allah is Knower! Aware!” (Qur’an, 49:13). The recognition that no one religion has a monopoly on the divine truth was endorsed by the World Council of Churches meeting in 1985, at which the members stated, “The conviction that God as creator of all is present and active in the plurality of religions makes it inconceivable to us that God’s saving activity could be confined to any one continent, cultural type, or group of peoples” (quoted in Pratt, p. 15). Accordingly, the religiously different other should not be viewed as a threat or as a source of fear. On the contrary, difference should stir interest, curiosity. The differentia, by virtue of which the other is an “other,” is always the basis of new knowledge. I am inclined to think that the interlocutors should pay special attention to the similarities—for example, on the universality of human nature, human values, and the infinite wisdom of God; on the need to cooperate on valuable social projects; and on charting the road to a more peaceful world order. Friendship fosters the possibility of mutual understanding. Direct,

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constructive cooperation is conducive to friendship, and friendship is a basic moral value in all the major religions. And yet understanding the differences cannot, and should not, be neglected, especially those that underlie the claim to exclusivity. We fear what we do not know, and we cannot respect, appreciate, or tolerate what we fear and what we do not know. Thus, knowledge of similarities as well as differences will not only remove the source of fear, and so of alienation among different religious communities, but will also deepen mutual understanding in the sphere of praxis. I shall discuss the concept of mutual understanding in more detail in Chap. 4. Second, Equality If we grant that all the major religions are ways in which the transcendent God reveals himself to human beings differently in the different parts of the world, if the truth they embody is sacred in the sense that it acts as an absolute source of respect and reverence in the life of the faithful, next, if the interlocutors mutually recognize the validity of this claim, it would be reasonable to say that they should not proceed into the dialogue from an attitude or position of superiority because assuming this position would transform the dialogue into a session of dictation, a show of sophistry, an attempt at delicate manipulation, or an occasion of rivalry or competition. In fact, it would trivialize the claim of the other that his truth is a divine revelation. However, let me at once state that by “equality” I do not mean the equal size of the religious communities, for one of them may be a minority, nor do I mean the size of the theological literature within which a divine truth is articulated or interpreted, but rather I mean equality in terms of the ontological presence of divine revelation. No one revealed truth is more or less important than another; each one is infinitely valuable and therefore equal because it is a divine revelation: I treat the religiously different other as my equal because I discern the divine presence in his or her way of life. This discernment is the foundation of equality among religions; it is also the basis of (a) respect and (b) toleration. First, what does it mean to respect the religiously different other? Broadly speaking, it means that I uphold the being of the other; that is, I esteem and honor her for her own sake, for what she stands for, for the beliefs and values that constitute her religious identity. Moreover, I respect the other when I show concern for her well-being spiritually and materially, when I promote, so far as I can, the integrity of her way of life; otherwise,

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respect becomes a ritual of social mannerism. In the course of the dialogue, I show respect to my interlocutor when in my questions, criticism, and proposals for new ways of analysis, I aim at the truth, at understanding what the other has to offer, when in seeking the truth I submit to the authority of reason. I respect the other when I strive for the enactment and implementation of the laws that guarantee freedom of conscience; when I take a firm and active stand against discrimination bigotry, prejudice, injustice, and oppression; and when I create the conditions for her to grow as a human being. Second, I do not exaggerate if I say that “toleration” derives its meaning from the concept of respect. A large number of people understand “toleration” as “putting up with,” “letting alone,” “bearing,” or “suffering silently,” but these and similar definitions strip off the moral content of the concept. If I simply put up with a group of people, I assume a passive attitude toward them; I distance myself from them. I extricate myself from any moral responsibility toward them. Accordingly, I become indifferent to them; I take a hands-off attitude toward them. This attitude can be articulated by expressions such as “What is he to me? Why should I care?” Unfortunately, this attitude is prevalent in contemporary society. It is, as Hegel would say, characteristic of “civil society,” not of “the state” or “the human community.” But if we trace “toleration” to its etymological source, tollere, we discover that it means “to lift up.” When a person falls, I do not assume an indifferent but a different attitude toward her. I care for her; I lift her up. Implied in the concept of toleration is an attitude of concern. But “to be concerned” implies to be interested, and “to be interested” implies that the object of interest is important, valuable. Recognition of this value is the basis of concern. When I notice, on a hike in the forest on a dreary autumn day, a leaf falling from a tree, I do not assume an attitude of concern toward the leaf, although I may clearly discern that change is the supreme law of nature and sadly realize that perishing is a fact I cannot escape. But when I notice an old villager who is returning from his field falling under the weight of a heavy sack of wheat he is carrying, I rush to him and lift him up! Unlike the leaf, the villager is a human being, a valuable being. Now, what does it mean to tolerate another human being, one who is different from me culturally, politically, or ideologically? It means first to allow her to live or act according to her beliefs and values, that is, to refrain from interfering in her way of life or action. For example, a tolerant parent

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is one who allows her daughter to pursue a mode of behavior that may be different from the parent’s own or from the social or cultural norm; this implies that the parent does not interfere with her daughter. Second, “to tolerate” means “to recognize and respect.” This second dimension of the meaning reveals the active, responsive character of toleration. A tolerant parent does not only allow her daughter to perform a certain action, but she responsively respects the daughter’s right to do what she chooses to do. The parent does not merely refrain from interfering; she also supports her daughter in what she plans to do. She moreover recognizes her daughter’s right to make her own choices. From a pedagogical point of view, she assists her daughter in developing her character from within. Toleration is essentially a moral concept, mainly because it entails the imperative to assume an active, caring attitude toward the different other as a human being. In the contemporary state, even in the most advanced democracies, most of the time toleration stops at the boundary of the law. The state cannot impose any type of moral rule or modes of behavior beyond the statement of the established law. But this is not the case in a religious community. Here the ground of toleration is not an established law but humanity and ultimately the word of God. In this kind of community, the members are related to each other as human beings, not merely as legal entities, before the eyes of God. Respect for the other, which entails caring for her, is not a matter of choice but of moral obligation. This is why in order for interreligious dialogue to foster mutual understanding, the interlocutors should be tolerant of the beliefs and values of each other. At the level of conceptual interchange, one is tolerant when she recognizes what the other says, when she allows the other to present and explicate her position or interpretation freely, and when she makes a serious effort to comprehend the truth disclosed in the course of the discourse. But the importance of toleration as a condition of dialogue is urgently needed at the level of praxis. It is somewhat easy to change one’s belief about a state of affairs in science or philosophy under the light of reason, but it is not easy to change one’s attitude toward another human being, God, or the world even when one discovers a new truth about any of these. Many a human being and many a society live today by the truths of yesterday, not by the newly developed truths of today. And yet, especially among the younger generation, assuming a tolerant attitude is conducive to interreligious dialogue, primarily because it is effective in penetrating, if not shattering, the barrier that segregates one religious community from another, and it

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is effective mainly because in assuming it, we view the different other as a human being from the standpoint of God. When we know or recognize the other as a human being, that she worships the same God, that her way of worship is simply different from ours, why should we refrain from understanding her religious way, not only by reading her religious book but also by interacting with her and seeing how she worships and shows her reverence to the same God? This mode of existential dialogue promotes mutual understanding, yes, but it also deepens our appreciation of the mystery, wisdom, and divine creativity in the universe. The visit of the anthropology class to the Barbourville Baptist Church that I described earlier should throw some light on the possibility of this kind of dialogue. Third, Empathy I emphasized earlier that a necessary condition for the possibility of interreligious dialogue is that the interlocutors, whether at the level of theory or praxis, should aim at the mutual understanding of the beliefs and values from the standpoint of the religious other—the way she understands and practices them. Now I shall zero in on the structure of the event, or process, of understanding itself: What does it take for someone to understand her beliefs and values from her point of view? This question requests an explanation of how, for example, I can leave the point of view in terms of how I understand the transcendent being and things and events around me from my point of view and then stand within another’s point of view. More concretely, how can I understand the world the way she understands it? The point in spotlighting this question is not to abandon my religious point of view or to become a convert, but to understand the other’s understanding of the world or her point of view. Here two comments are in order. First, mutual understanding is not possible unless we assume the religious point of view of the other; second, we cannot assume an attitude of toleration, respect, and appreciation unless we understand the beliefs and values of the other from her religious point of view. We usually think, analyze, evaluate, and make judgments in terms of the kinds of beliefs, desires, emotions, level of intelligence, sense of value, and dispositions that make up the structure of our minds. The “I,” or self, with which we identify ourselves is inconceivable apart from this content. Accordingly, it is impossible for my real self, ontologically speaking, to enter the interior of another self or to see what she sees or how she feels, thinks, or understands. But it is, I submit, possible for us to understand

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and feel what it means for another human being to think, feel, or understand something in a certain way. This requires a special act or turn of mind in which the imagination can “think into” the mind of another person. This type of mental act is usually called “empathy,” einfuhlung—to feel into. This term, which was first used by Lutze and Fischer, comes from the Greek term empatheia. Most psychologists use it affectively in the sense that we can feel what it is like for someone to feel sad, dejected, or happy even though we do not feel or experience her feeling of sadness, dejection, or happiness. But in this context, I use “empathy” in its cognitive sense, according to which we can understand what someone means when she says that she understands a certain state of affairs in a certain way. In this type of mental activity, we “think into” the mind of the other person. I place my mind by an “imaginative leap,” so to say, into her mind and discern what it is like for her to believe in God, how she understands some essential aspects of his nature, what she understands by the immortality of the soul, or how she conceives the universality of human nature. Although intellectual in character, cognitive empathy is not a purely conceptual act; it is also affective. It is, as Hegel and the phenomenologists after him have argued, a “feeling act”: We do not and cannot only feel into the feeling of the other; we can also think into the belief of the other. By the way, the act of believing is affective and dynamic in character because it involves an act of will—of perception, of grasp, of articulation, of assent, of assuming an attitude toward the object of belief. I cannot comprehend how or what a religious other understands regarding a certain belief or value if I do not comprehend this belief or value in the fullness of its being. In interreligious dialogue, I do not stand or converse with a “stranger”; I stand and converse with a human being. In this encounter I do not merely seek to understand what she believes; I also seek to understand her in and through what she believes. The medium of this understanding is listening. By “listening” I do not simply mean hearing what she says. This is what frequently happens in social talk, classrooms, and business meetings. In these and similar situations ideas are spoken, they are received, and they are stored in some drawer of the human mind. It does not matter whether the ideas are understood or misunderstood; what matters is that they are transmitted from one mind to another. Although this kind of communication takes place in interreligious dialogue, and indeed it is indispensable to it, it is richer and more complex in its structure and content. First, interreligious dialogue is, as I have just stated, an act of will. The student finds herself in the classroom, people are thrown into social

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visits, and employees are required to attend meetings organized by their superiors; but participants in interreligious dialogues choose to converse with the religiously different other. Second, their conversation is not a spontaneous but a deliberate encounter; its content and the way it proceeds revolve around a purpose. In fact, the conversation is structured around the purpose. This cannot happen if the interlocutors do not give the ideas being interchanged their full attention. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that interreligious dialogue is an active, responsive, purposeful event. In it the interlocutors attend to each other as minds and as human beings. This last feature—“to attend”—brings into relief another aspect of interreligious dialogue: care. As a listener, I care for what the other says. I focus my attention on what is said from a feeling of interest, and I am interested in it because I deem it important. But how do I exercise this care? By making a special effort to comprehend the beliefs and values she is presenting and explicating in terms of their assumptions, structural elements, implications, and affective content—as living wholes. The words I hear in the conversation are carriers of meaning. My first task is to chart the territory of this meaning, to discern its levels, shades, and implicit and explicit associations, that is, to open up the door of the domain of meaning of the words I hear. This activity requires linguistic as well as theological or philosophical skill and knowledge. The meaning we comprehend when we read or hear a sentence is not merely a kind of abstract reality that passively enters the mind; no, it is a creatively structured reality and as such living content. Accordingly, the act of comprehension or understanding, regardless of whether it is achieved by means of reading or hearing a text, is essentially a dialogical event. It is a generally recognized fact that merely reading or hearing certain ideas does not necessarily entail understanding them. The mind has to receive the ideas, actively penetrate the domain of the meaning inherent in them, recognize them for what they are, and then embrace them in order for the act of understanding to take place; and we cannot say that they are “understood” until they are incorporated in the structure of the mind that understands them. As we can see, understanding takes place in the mind of the one who undertakes the act of understanding. This is exactly why this kind of understanding can be a moment of human growth and development; and this is why, as I shall explain a little later, we can say it is a transformative activity, one in which we see, feel, and act in a new way; and this is why we can view the other in a new light—in the light of the divine.

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References Badham, Roger A., ed. 1998. Christian Theology. Louisville: John Knox Press. Brereton, Joel P. 2004. Dharma in the Rveda. Journal of Indian Philosophy 32 (5–6): 449–489. Buber, Martin. 1980. I and Thou. Edited By P. R. Mendes -Flohr. San Francisco: Harper and Row. ———. 2002. Between Man and Man. New York: Routledge Classics. Cornille, Catherine. 2010. Interreligious Hermeneutics. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. Forde, Gerard, ed. 2013. A Journey Together. Cork, Ireland: Cois Time. Hartshorne, Charles. 1941. Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism. New York: Macmillan & Co. ———. 1967. A Natural Theology for Our Time. New York: Macmillan & Co. Hick, John. 1974. Truth and Dialogue in World Religions. Philadelphia: Westminster. ———. 1989. An Interpretation of Religion. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Hick, John., with Paul Knitter. 1992. The Myth of Christian Uniqueness. New York: Orbis Books. Lochhead, David. 1988. The Dialogical Imperative. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. Nowak, Marek. 2001. Fundamental Dialogue. Dialogue and Universalism 11 (1–2): 69. Rosen, Steven. 2006. Essential Hinduism, 32ff. Praeger. Whitehead, A.N. 1929. Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan & Co.

CHAPTER 3

Mutual Respect as a Condition of Interreligious Dialogue

Introduction The majority of philosophers and theologians who have discussed the question of the possibility of interreligious dialogue in books, articles, and international conferences would, I think, agree that mutual respect is a necessary condition for the possibility of this kind of dialogue (see Mitias 2020; Barnes 1989; Dupuis 1997; Hick 1974). They would also agree that the essential aim of the dialogue is mutual understanding. Accordingly, if the participants in the dialogue do not proceed into it with an attitude of mutual respect, the conversation as an event in which they seek mutual religious understanding, not merely philosophically or theologically, would not occur. They may meet and go through the motions of conversation, but the event of understanding, of comprehending the meaning of the beliefs, values, symbols, and doctrines of each other’s religion, would remain a far-fetched goal. On the contrary, they may remain philosophically, theologically, and behaviorally alien to, indeed ignorant of, each other. I have emphasized “hopefully change” the way religions view and react to each other because regardless of its kind, a vision of the truth, genuine respect for it, and commitment to it are transformative in nature. We can never remain the same after we discover a new truth, that is, after we see it, comprehend it, and incorporate it as an integral element in the structure of our minds or after it becomes active, formative in the way we think, feel, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. H. Mitias, Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6_3

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believe, and make decisions. The desire to know the truth is inherent to human nature. Do we not seek the company of honest, caring, and courageous people, while avoiding the company of dishonest, selfish, and cowardly people? Do we not desire to know the cause of the universe and humanity? What has been the quest of the philosopher, the scientist, and the artist during the past five millennia but a quest for the truth of nature, human nature, the meaning of human life, and the course of human civilization? Moreover, do we not change our attitude toward people we used to fear, doubt, or mistrust when we discover that they are honest and honorable? Contrarily, do we not change our attitude toward people we used to trust when we discover that they are not trustworthy? Do we not change our attitude toward physically and psychologically sick people when we discover the causes and dynamics of their sickness? Do we not change the way we farm the fields when we discover more sophisticated, more efficient tillers and reapers? There is no need for me to lengthen this list of examples to highlight the claim that comprehension of the truth is a transformative power. Some people discover, during the course of reading, a scientific, philosophical, literary, theological, or professional treatise, a truth about an important aspect of their individual or social life, but dismiss it, while many others treat it the way voyeurs treat items in store windows. Do all students or all educated people who read serious books in science, philosophy, literature, or history take them seriously? They react to them with expressions such as “interesting,” “provocative,” “great book,” “challenging,” or “enlightening,” but they forget about the truth communicated in the book sooner than they return it to the bookshelf. Do all the people who are constantly exposed to scientific, aesthetic, religious, or practical truths take them seriously? Do all the people who are challenged, provoked, and entreated by their religious leaders, parents, or academic teachers to live by the truths they communicate take them seriously? Also, do all the teachers, religious leaders, and academic teachers who transmit different types of truths to their students or audience take the truths they transmit seriously? And, with a streak of polite cynicism, a critic might wonder: Thousands of books, articles, symposia, and conferences have been held during the past few decades on the nature, possibility, desirability, and urgent need of interreligious dialogue—have they been effective in promoting existential dialogue, mutual coexistence, peace, and cooperation among the faithful of the various religions of the world?

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I am not unaware of the marginalization of the truth in the different areas of human life, and I can even add that changing one’s attitude, feelings, way of thinking, and living according to newly discovered truths is not easy and frequently hard to achieve. Is it easy for older people to change their way of thinking and living? Is it easy for the young to accept the wisdom of their elders? Is it easy for a society to accept the discovered truths of the scientist, the philosopher, or the artist? Nevertheless, it seems to me that we need to make a distinction between genuine desire to discover the truth and live according to it and using it as an intellectual, economic, or social commodity. Again, are all students who go to university interested in intellectual enlightenment, moral understanding, or human growth and development, or do they go to university simply to get a degree that qualifies them for social status, a job, or parental approval? Are all the people who read the different types of books seekers of the truth? Do all the teachers who transmit knowledge to their students believe in what they teach? Unfortunately, the truth has been treated in the different institutions of society more as a commodity than as an essential need for human perfection. But regardless of how it is treated in itself as a spiritual phenomenon, truth is a spark of power. How many a human being has changed his or her way of life, how many a great theory has been placed in the wastebasket of history, how many an institution has collapsed, how many a human relationship has splintered into nothing when people discovered a new truth about themselves, the social institutions, or the other? I acknowledge the centrality of truth in our lives as individuals, communities, and nations; I also acknowledge the obstacles and challenges that stand in the way of its realization. However, these difficulties and challenges should not deter us from trying to deepen our understanding of its nature and explore the conditions that promote mutual understanding, coexistence, and cooperation between the different religious communities. Is the improvement of the human condition, of fostering peace, justice, freedom, respect for the human other, and prosperity, not one of the most important tasks of all religions? The wheels of goodness in all its dimensions—justice, love, generosity, freedom, courage, and honesty— turn slowly, very slowly, during the course of history. We cannot shrink from keeping them turning! The task of keeping them turning is a moral, religious, and rational obligation from which we cannot extricate ourselves with impunity. A betrayal of this obligation is a betrayal of our humanity, of the fundamental values and beliefs that underlie the major religions of

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the world. Is it not more important to cooperate on the realization of this purpose than to live in a world vitiated by bigotry, ignorance, hate, animosity, violence, fear, misery, and destruction? And yet the history of civilization is densely punctuated by interreligious hostility, alienation, and wars. One wonders why! Is this hostility justifiable? Is it consistent with the beliefs and values of the various religions of the world? Does it form part of the divine message they hold dear, preach, and pretend to defend? Should different religions be hostile? If we rationally and critically examine the foundation of these religions, we discover that none of them approves hostility and hate toward other religions. On the contrary, they teach reverence for the creator and respect for the human being. Love is the central moral doctrine of Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, Taoism, and Sikhism. How and why do religions, and I should say religious leaders, either condone, directly or indirectly, or permit any kind of hostility, alienation, or disrespect toward human beings, regardless of their religious affiliation? What is especially sad is that this kind of hostility, alienation, and disregard has succeeded during the past two millennia at building formidable walls of ignorance around themselves. In time these walls became fixtures to the extent that the faithful viewed and continue to view them as an integral part of their divine revelation. The building blocks of these walls are attitudes, emotions, modes of conduct, practices, a certain understanding of the meaning of human life and destiny, values, and beliefs about one’s religion on the one hand and the other religions on the other. These walls have become the basis of what is generally known in theology and philosophy as religious exclusivism, the belief that one’s religion is the only true religion and that it is the royal road to heaven, immortality, salvation, and eternal happiness. However, what if every other religious community insists that theirs is the true religion and that their religion is the only path to heaven, immortality, salvation, and eternal happiness? Would this general realization not create an atmosphere of rivalry, fear, alienation, conflict, and hate among them, even war, or a feeling of self-righteousness and religious arrogance? Broadly speaking, some people hate a Muslim, a Christian, or a Hindu simply because he or she is a Muslim, a Christian, or a Hindu. How many a leader, and sometimes a religious community, has oppressed, discriminated against, disenfranchised, and even killed a religious other simply because he or she is a Muslim, a Jew, or a Christian? Does the belief that one’s religion is the only true religion and that the other religions are false not underlie the entire phenomenon of religious missions among some religions?

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Nonetheless, the different religions, as they have existed during the past several centuries, justify this hostile, self-righteous, and to my mind destructive attitude in the name of God, the same God they recognize and worship since all the religions acknowledge the existence of one supreme being as the creator of the universe and humanity. What an irony! Here it is crucial to distinguish between religion and the religious establishment. The foundation of religion is the revealed truth, word, or will of God, while the religious establishment is founded in the authority of the interpreters and leaders of specific religions. The establishment may or may not be genuine representatives of the revealed truth, and even if they are genuine, they may not be adequate or competent representatives. They are frequently influenced by political, economic, social, ideological, and idiosyncratic forces. The revealed truth is a direct emanation from the mind of God. It is the basis for any interpretation or understanding of the nature and will of God. One of Socrates’s lasting legacies is that ignorance is the source of evil: hate, animosity, bigotry, racism, oppression, envy, greed, violence, and arrogance. It is also the source of evil associated with or attributed to nature: disease, earthquakes, drought, floods, and volcanoes. For example, we solve marital problems by analyzing the causes of the problems, namely the desires, fears, intellectual and moral endowments, beliefs, and values of the spouses in a particular family context. We resolve labor conflicts in industries by understanding the causes of the conflict via the medium of negotiation and then arbitration. We solve conflicts between nations by analyzing and evaluating the conflicting claims in an international court of justice. We decrease, and in some cases avoid, catastrophic events of nature or at least reduce them by understanding their causes. We cure mental and physical diseases by understanding their causes. In short, understanding is the most effective way of addressing the problems that arise throughout human life. The purpose of this short list of examples is only to emphasize that understanding the causes of interreligious problems, regardless of their nature, is the most effective way of solving human problems. The power by which we understand any problem, human or natural, is reason, which denotes the same power the philosopher, the scientist, the theologian, the person of practical wisdom, and the artist employ to explore human and natural problems. First, if Socrates’s dictum that ignorance is the source of evil is correct; second, if evil is one of the most difficult problems that human beings face throughout their theoretical and practical lives; third, if hate, violence, and

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killing innocent people are forms of human evil; fourth, if the major religions indulge in this sort of evil; and fifth, if refraining from this evil is both a moral and a religious obligation, then it should follow that the best strategy for solving this problem is establishing understanding among the religions, and the best method of achieving this understanding is dialogue: rational conversation. I say “dialogue” because, as I have just indicated, rational conversation is the most effective means of solving human problems. The alternative to reason is violence, but violence breeds violence, not peace, not love, and certainly not mutual coexistence. Moreover, violence is an evil we have been trying to eradicate from social life for many a century now. It is one of the major obstacles that stand in the way of economic, political, and cultural progress. When I speak of violence in this context, I mean all types of violence—physical, mental, legal, social, religious, and cultural violence. Reason aims at truth, love, prosperity, harmony, and moral progress. Accordingly, if understanding, as we shall see in the following chapter, is the aim of dialogue between religions and if reason is how we achieve this aim, under what conditions can we achieve this aim? I have discussed rather briefly the structural and formal conditions of the possibility of interreligious dialogue in the preceding chapter. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall discuss in some detail the concept of respect as a necessary condition for the possibility of interreligious dialogue. What does “respect” mean? What is its basis? What does it mean for two religions to assume an attitude of respect toward each other? We generally understand people when they speak of respect for a human being, an animal, the law, or the natural environment, but what does it mean for two institutions to assume an attitude of respect toward each other? In what follows I shall first advance a concept of respect; second, I shall discuss the concept of interreligious dialogue; third, I shall advance a concept of respect as a condition for interreligious dialogue; and finally, I shall defend the proposition that human beings are entitled to unconditional respect because humanity is sacred, and it is sacred because it is a divine emanation.

A General Concept of Respect First, what kind of reality is respect? We can say that “respect” denotes an attitude, a feeling, or an action toward a human being, an artifact, a natural object, or a class of objects. For example, we respect our parents, teachers,

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and religious leaders. We respect laws, traditions, and national symbols. We respect scientists, heroes, and artists, as well as the natural environment in all its dimensions. We respect human beings regardless of whether they are family, neighbors, or strangers, and regardless of their color, sex, race, or social, economic, and educational status. What is respect? Let me first point out that respect is a relational concept; that is, it is a relationship between a person who respects and an object that deserves respect. We cannot assume an attitude or a feeling of respect in general. The attitude, or feeling, is aroused by a particular object, for example, a human being or a particular symbol. Again, no object deserves or demands respect unless there is a person who can respect the object. But since there are different types of objects that deserve respect, there must be various ways of showing respect. Next, we respect some objects (a) voluntarily, because the object meets our personal sense of value, for example, a monument or a teacher; (b) imperatively, because a legitimate authority requires it, for example, a particular law or judge; (c) expediently, because the object serves a particular end, for example, a particular secretary; (d) customarily, because tradition or custom demands it; and (e) intrinsically, because something in the object elicits an attitude of respect, for example, a work of art or a human being. The way we show respect for objects in one class differs from the way we show the same attitude toward objects in other classes, which differs from one object to another even within the same class. How we show respect to our parents is different from how we show respect to our neighbor, and how we show respect to this neighbor is different from the way we show it to another neighbor. How we show respect to one teacher is different from how we show the same attitude toward other teachers. To generalize, the way people show respect to different types of human and natural objects, and the objects within them, differs from one individual to another, from one class to another, from one society to another, and from one historical period to another. Second, as a concept, “respect” is composed of two basic ingredients, attitude and feeling. First, by “attitude” I mean a disposition inherent in the character of a human being. As such, it is intentional in nature because a disposition of respect, in general, does not exist; it is always aimed at an object or a class of objects. Next, a disposition is an orientation, a tendency to respond to an object in a certain way. I may be disposed to respect teachers, judges, imams, rabbis, or priests. The disposition of respect exists in me, that is, in my character, as a potentiality that is realized concretely

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when I meet a teacher, a judge, an imam, or a priest. The concretization of this feeling differs from one teacher, judge, imam, or priest to another. The presence in my experience of the teacher, for example, creates an existential situation that arouses a particular feeling of respect toward that particular teacher. This feeling, however, is not abstract or general but concrete because it is directed at this teacher. The kind of feeling I experience depends on my view of this person on the one hand and the situation I am in on the other. The point that merits special attention here is that the attitude of respect for a class of objects, which exists in our minds as a potentiality, is transformed into a feeling during my encounter with the teacher. The feeling of respect does not occur suddenly or spontaneously because it does not exist in our minds as a ready-made reality. I may feel excited, flustered, shy, or confused when I meet the teacher. This kind of feeling may differ from one situation to another. Again, when I meet a person for the first time, I may treat him or her as an ordinary human being. However, when I discover in the course of the conversation that he or she is a teacher, the attitude of respect, which exists in me as a potentially, surges into my mind as a feeling of respect I typically have for teachers! This assumes that the attitude as well as the feeling of respect is, as I shall presently explain, value-laden. An encounter with the teacher activates in me the attitude of respect I have for the class of teachers. I do not see the teacher merely as a human being, one who embodies certain values; I also see him or her as a special kind of human being. We ordinarily acquire, during the process of social growth, different types of attitudes toward different types of objects: parents, teachers, and judges.

Ontic Basis of Respect Value is the ontic basis of respect: An object deserves or obligates respect inasmuch as it is valuable. The kind of respect we have for an object is commensurate with the kind and significance of the value the object embodies. For example, we respect a forest because it is a part of nature, and we respect nature because it is our home, but our respect for this forest increases or surpasses our respect for other forests because it is more beautiful or because it is more useful to the integrity of the ecosystem. We respect a teacher because he or she is a teacher, but we respect this teacher more than another teacher since he or she is more competent, more dedicated, and more caring. Again, we respect human beings regardless of

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their physical, social, educational, or professional status by virtue of their humanity. But the kind and degree of respect we show to one human being may be more than the kind and degree we show to another human being because he or she may be more productive, more honest, or more cooperative. We respect soldiers because they are willing to defend their nation, but a soldier who sacrifices his or her life to save a comrade in a fierce battle deserves our respect more than one who simply follows the rules obediently or is a coward. What distinguishes an attitude or a feeling of respect for a certain object? I raise this question because we generally assume that different types of attitudes and experiences appropriate feelings of respect toward certain objects throughout daily life. For example, we assume an aesthetic attitude toward artworks, a religious attitude toward holy places, a professional attitude toward our employers, and a moral attitude toward sick people. These types of attitudes generate different types of feelings of respect toward these objects. The kind of attitude the object arouses in us depends on the kind of value the object embodies. Again, the higher the value we attribute to the object, the greater the respect we feel toward it. The question of who determines the degree, significance, or amount of value of the object or how it is determined need not arise in the context of this chapter. Suffice it to say that philosophers have over the past few centuries been developing criteria for the evaluation of moral, aesthetic, intellectual, political, and other types of qualities of the objects we deem important or valuable in our lives. Broadly speaking, criteria such as enlightenment, delight, human perfection, happiness, human dignity, inner peace, and human growth and development have been proposed, analyzed, and defended as bases for assessing the value merit of natural and human objects. They range from mediocre to good to excellent. What matters in this context is that the depth of our respect for the object is commensurate with the depth of the value the object embodies. The assertion that value is the ontic basis of respect cannot be restricted to the object of respect but should include the attitude we assume toward the object. They are correlated; the one is the reason for the being of the other. As I have mentioned earlier, both the object of respect and the attitude we assume toward it is value-laden. We cannot assume a general attitude toward certain objects or class of objects because such an attitude does not exist. For example, we assume an aesthetic attitude toward artworks or a religious attitude toward religious objects. The attitude we assume toward these and other types of objects is a cultivated disposition.

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We develop it in the medium of experiencing types of objects that either deserve or command our respect. What we develop is a kind of sense internalized in the structure of our mind the way we internalize moral sense, common sense, and other forms of “sense.” As a disposition, attitude is not a passive but an active, responsive tendency. I cannot stand idle or apathetic when I stand before Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa; I respond to it as art, as a radiance of human meaning. In this response, I assume an aesthetic attitude. The aesthetic qualities that exist in the painting as a potentiality come to life during the event of allowing my imagination to delve into its artistic depth. I do not remain idle or apathetic when I stand before a mother who is crying over her dead or dying child! The moral attitude that exists in my mind as a potentiality transmutes into a feeling of compassion: I sympathize and, if possible, empathize with her as a mother. I feel a strong desire to share her agony even though I cannot do this! The aesthetic or moral attitude I assume toward the painting or the scene of the crying mother emerges as a feeling in the process of experiencing it. It is impossible for an attitude, in general, to allow the particular values inherent in the form of the painting and the crying scene to come to life when I experience them; otherwise, the entire institution of art appreciation or moral education would be superfluous. Similarly, when I enter a doctor’s waiting room and encounter a patient who is a stranger to me sitting in a chair and having droopy eyes and a confused expression, I do not merely encounter a statue or a lump of flesh covered with clothes; I encounter a human being. Every part and every gesture of the person’s body radiates humanity. I see the body with my eyes, but I feel his humanity with my mind and heart. I feel the depth of his humanity the more I listen to the language his body speaks—his eyes, lips, and face, and the way he carries his head on his shoulders—and I respond to him accordingly. Can I remain indifferent to this patient? I have not seen him before, yet I respond to him as a human being. How can I recognize him as a human being if I do not possess a human sense, a certain kind of attitude, by which I can feel his humanity? What if I greet him and strike up a conversation with him? Does the human world that pulsates in his heart and mind not reveal itself in the medium of the conversation? During this conversation, albeit silent, I know him as the particular individual he may be, but I also know him as a human being. His humanity is the ontic basis of my respect for him. Feeling exists in the mind as a general capacity. As such, it is a schema that can be the source and basis of different types of mental states or

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events. It enables us to respond to and experience an object in a certain way. For example, we possess the capacity to sense, think, perceive, judge, wonder, relate, or be conscious, even self-conscious. Similarly, what we feel is different from what we think, will, or wonder, although these capacities are sometimes involved in certain experiential situations.

Feeling of Respect We can experience a diversity of feelings in the spheres of practical and theoretical life: hate, loneliness, hostility, elation, enthusiasm, boredom, and hope. The type of feeling we experience is to a large extent determined by a certain object regardless of how simple or complex it may be—a social, natural, religious, artistic, or intellectual object. A feeling of loneliness surges into my mind when I lose my beloved, of hate when I see the man who killed my parents, of envy when I meet the person who received the award I should have received, or of dejection when my dearest friend is struck down by a critical illness. What kind of feeling does the object of respect arouse in our minds? Or what are the differentiae of the feeling of respect? Regardless of their type, depth, or significance, feelings of respect share a fundamental feature: esteem, honor, regard, or special admiration. We usually hold the object of respect in honor, regard, or esteem. We do not interact with it nonchalantly, coolly, or indifferently but differently, with special interest, and we react to it accordingly. We acknowledge it for the value or values it embodies or expresses. It occupies a special or prominent place in the scale of our estimation, and the kind of place it occupies is always commensurate with the significance of the value it embodies or expresses. The object may be a lion, a mountain, a sunset, a teacher, a doctor, or a secretary. The respect we accord to any one of these objects is proportional to the kind of value it embodies or expresses. For example, the respect I show to the president of the country when he visits one of my classes is different from the respect I show to the landscape, different from the respect I show to my grandmother, and still different from the respect I show to a stranger, but it is always infused with a feeling of esteem, regard, or special interest. But although esteem, regard, or honor signifies the differentiae of the attitude or feeling of respect, this feeling is not and can never be general or abstract: It is always concrete, that is, a particular, definable feeling. For example, when I enter a religious place, the attitude of respect I assume toward this building changes into a feeling of humility, piety, awe, or

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reverence. During this specific experience, I become a religious person even if I happen to be an atheist. The degree or magnitude of my feeling of respect is commensurate with the kind of value I feel in the building. When I listen to a lecturer discussing the problem of evil passionately, creatively, honestly, and lucidly; when the ideas she is trying to communicate stream into my mind and illuminate it with rays of understanding so that I feel an inner pulse of intellectual and moral growth within my heart and mind; the attitude I assume toward the lecturer changes into a feeling of respect for her—of appreciation, gratitude, admiration, even mystical communion with her. Why shouldn’t I have this kind of feeling if a part of her mind, of her being, flows into mine and becomes a part of my mind, my being? We respect the types of objects that deserve our respect differently. For example, we show respect to scientists, teachers, parents, holy places, and political leaders in different ways. The way we respect them differs from one class of objects to another, from one individual to another, and from one culture to another. Moreover, the kind of respect we accord to an object depends on its general nature, whether it is an animal, a plant, a human being, or a class of human beings, for example, a teacher or a parent, and the extent to which we esteem it or the kind and depth of value it embodies.

Respect Between Religions Introduction It is now appropriate to raise more directly the central question of this chapter: If respect is a necessary condition for the possibility of dialogue between religions, what does it mean for a religion to assume an attitude of respect toward another religion in the medium of dialogue? How can a religion respect or show respect to another religion? We readily understand someone when he or she speaks of respect toward an object, for example, a parent, a priest, or a certain stretch of the environment, because the object in these and similar cases is describable, definable. We can identify this human being as a priest by his dress, headpiece, white collar, or generally recognized symbol, and we can assume an attitude of respect when we encounter him. In this kind of encounter, we know what it means to respect this kind of person. The feeling of respect that is aroused by the appearance of the priest in my presence points to this individual priest and

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no one else. But how can a religion show respect to another religion? This may seem a strange question because we should first ask, How can a religion have a dialogue with another religion? Or, what do we mean when we speak of a dialogue between two religions? The priest is an object I encounter directly. He exists in a definite place and I exist in a definite place, and both of us face each other in a certain way. But what kind of object is a religion? Where does this object exist? Dialogue is a rational discourse that takes place between two individuals. Is a religion an individual? Is it describable and identifiable as an object? And yet philosophers, theologians, religious leaders, political thinkers, and of course ordinary people have been speaking of religious dialogue for several decades now. They have been holding conferences, and they have been writing books and articles about interreligious dialogue and the conditions under which this kind of dialogue takes place. One cannot but wonder about the extent to which these conferences, books, and articles are based on a clear, generally recognized conception or understanding of religion or what it means for a religion to engage in dialogue about a question or problem. It would therefore be important to proceed into an analysis of the concept of mutual respect between religions from a clear and reasonably acceptable notion of the kind of object religion is and the method of conducting dialogue between religions. Toward this goal, I shall approach religion as a phenomenon of human experience regardless of whether it is given to us directly as a sensuous object, the way most scientists typically treat their objects of investigation. In my attempt to explain its ontic basis and structure, I shall examine it insofar as it is given to our consciousness in the fullness of its being. In this examination, the totality of my analytical and apprehending faculty will focus on it. That is, I shall undertake the examination according to the basal experiencing power of the human mind, not merely by its sensing or intellective capacities but by its capacity of experiencing as such—sensing, feeling, conceptualizing, analyzing, imagining, and understanding. Religion as a Multidimensional Object Let me at once state that unlike the objects of ordinary perception such as chairs or animals, religion is a multidimensional object. Its basis is composed of three ontic dimensions: The first dimension is the revealed truth, word, or will of God; the second dimension is the interpretation of this truth,

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word, or will of God; and the third dimension is the community of the faithful. The first dimension is a document; the second is the minds of the interpreters and teachers in which the truth, word, or will of God as a conceptual system of beliefs, values, principles, norms, and practices, in short as a doctrine, exists; and the third is the minds and hearts of the faithful. The revealed truth comes to life in their minds, hearts, and actions. The first and second dimensions are theoretical and conceptual in nature, while the second is practical in nature. The first two dimensions exist for the sake of the third, namely the faithful; it provides the fundaments of a way of life. The three dimensions are organically interrelated. None of them exists without the other two, and we cannot understand one without understanding the other two. For example, we cannot understand the word of God without interpreting it, and we cannot understand the interpretation adequately outside the sphere of action or religious life of the faithful. Otherwise, the interpretation will remain a theoretical document. Again, we cannot understand the action or the religious behavior of the faithful if we do not understand the beliefs, values, and principles that underlie the action or way of life of the faithful. Finally, both the revealed word of God and the actions or way of life of the faithful are the reasons for being of the revealed truth and its interpretation. However, although the three dimensions that comprise the ontic structure of religion constitute an organic unity, this unity does not exist in the world simply as an object for three main reasons. First, the number of interpreters and teachers of the word of God in the major religions of the world constitutes a huge multitude of people. Moreover, the writers of the doctrines of the different religions are dead. Sometimes their interpretations need interpretation! This raises the question of who the true interpreters and therefore representatives of the religion are. But the number of the faithful is higher than the number of interpreters and teachers, and they are not unified in their understanding or practice of their religion. Second, both the interpreters and the faithful thrive in different, and sometimes distant, places. Third, the interpreters and teachers of the doctrines of the major religions do not always agree on the meaning of some of their fundamental beliefs and values. Even the faithful do not understand the meaning of the doctrines in the same way. Although very briefly, I highlighted the multidimensional reality of religion only to focus attention on the possibility of religion as a subject of respect in interreligious dialogue. Can a multidimensional institution such as a religion engage in a dialogue with another religion? It can in principle

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only if the interlocutors in the dialogue are genuine representatives of the spirit, or Geist, of their religion in the dialogue so that they think, explain, and speak from the core of this spirit not as the individual interpreters and teachers they are in society; so that the beliefs, values, and principles they present and explain are founded in the revealed truth, word, or will of God; so that they express the living reality of this spirit as it thrives in the minds and hearts of the faithful and exists as a living potentiality in the revealed truth; and so that, although those who conduct the dialogue are few, they are at the same time many—the many that make up the community of the faithful. This condition may seem esoteric and perhaps stringent, but I think it is indispensable for the possibility of interreligious dialogue because without it, mutual respect is inconceivable. How can a religion assume an attitude of respect toward another religion if the subjects of the dialoguing religions are not identifiable, locatable, or definable? However, a critic would ask, first, the dialogue aims at mutual understanding—how can the faithful in each religion that exists as a diversity and as a multitude, as an intricate web of individuals, organizations, institutions, that is, as an agglomeration, grow in mutual understanding? Second, in what sense is the dialogue between the religions conducted under the conditions of respect? I shall discuss the first question in detail in the following chapter. Mutual understanding is achieved in two steps. First, the theologians and philosophers who participate in the dialogue stand in this event as representatives not only of the revealed truth, word, or will of God but also of the faithful. The point we should accentuate is that the spirit of the religion—its beliefs, values, principles, and traditions—comes to life in the dialogue. Theologians and philosophers are more qualified than any other types of thinkers to comprehend the spirit of their religion and bring it to life in a rational conversation than anyone else, and they are also more qualified to comprehend and receive the truth of the other religion in this kind of conversation more efficiently, adequately, and competently than anyone else. Also, the mutual understanding achieved during the dialogue can be communicated to the faithful in a spirit of tolerance, understanding, and compassion in the different educational institutions of each religion. Schools, parents, and religious leaders can play a significantly effective role in shaping the attitude and enhancing the knowledge of the faithful about the other religion. Second, a religion can assume an attitude of respect toward another religion under the following conditions. The philosophers and theologians

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should not participate in the dialogue as particular individuals, faithful members of their religion, or even as scholars, although they are these, but as agents of the living spirit of the religion they represent, so that although they are few, they are also many; although they are many, they are one; and although they are an agglomeration, they are also a whole. The “I” that converses in interreligious dialogue or teaches in a religion class ceases to be the “I” of a particular individual and becomes the universal “I” of the spirit of the religion. Do we not exist as concrete instantiations of the universal moral law when we act according to it? Although we are individuals, do we not become one with the moral law when we live according to it? Does the conductor of a symphony orchestra not seek to capture the spirit of the musical piece created by the composer and make it shine, emanate from the multiple sounds of the different musical instruments that comprise the orchestra? Again, is a group of people not a community, a unity, by virtue of the unity of the beliefs and values according to which they live? Are these beliefs and values not the unifying spirit of the group? I shall illustrate this important point via an actual personal experience. In an evaluation of her History of Philosophy class, one student wrote, “I feel amazed, stunned, by the magic of ‘this’ professor. He was a Plato when he lectured on Plato, Aristotle, when he lectured on Aristotle, Epictetus, when he lectured on Epictetus, and he did the same when he lectured on the majority of the philosophers of the ancient period. Every time he lectured on a philosopher, he was believable, and I believed his philosophy. I changed my mind every time he lectured on a new philosopher. At the end of the semester, I was honestly befuddled. I did not know who or what to believe! I confronted the professor.” It is important to point out at this point in my discussion that understanding another religion is not forthcoming if both teachers and learners do not proceed into the dialogue from a tolerant and modest religious mind, a religious heart, and an attitude of respect for the human being as such. Will students who do not trust, respect, or like their teachers, who are not open-minded, who are not tolerant of beliefs that are different from or antithetical to theirs be willing to take their teachers seriously, to entertain new ways of thinking, or to seek the truth of various aspects of experience or the world? We should always remember that the event or activity of understanding during interreligious dialogue, or any serious dialogue, cannot happen in a vacuum but should always be pursued under the conditions of patience, open-mindedness, intellectual modesty, a desire to learn, a respect for humanity, and freedom.

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Unfortunately, many philosophers, theologians, and leaders who participate in conferences devoted to interreligious dialogue, which I have frequently attended during the past few decades in North America, Europe, and the Middle East, proceeded into the conversation with a defensive or combative attitude, strategy, discussion, or argument. They try to defend the ultimacy of the truth of their religion or to show that the other religions fall short of this ultimacy. This kind of attitude puts the cart before the horse because the interlocutors enter the dialogue with a self-­ gratifying or self-justifying attitude, not with a desire-to-understand attitude. This desire must issue from two basic needs; the first is utilitarian, and the second is intrinsic. First, the history of human civilization is profusely dotted with silent and active tensions, disputes, conflicts, and fears, even wars, among the different religions of the world. I cannot discuss the causes and dynamics of these events in this chapter, but I can state with a reasonable measure of confidence that they were not desirable, rationally justifiable, or religiously acceptable. If, as I emphasized earlier, killing or harming innocent human beings is a form of evil, it stands to reason that understanding among religions would decline and hopefully gradually eliminate it as a problem in human life. Does ignorance of the other in family life, in the workplace, in academic institutions, and in social life not underlie the majority of the disputes, hate, conflict, and hostility in society? What is strange, and in fact baffling, is that the highest aim of the major religions is the ennoblement, the improvement, and the salvation of human beings from the ridicule of the world. Are love, compassion, justice, mercy, respect for humanity, friendship, cooperation, and modesty not some of the major values of these religions? I make this short remark only to underscore the importance of mutual understanding as the primary, and I should say only, aim of interreligious dialogue. The second factor that underlies the need to understand other religions is implicit in the generally recognized dictum that human beings by nature desire to know. Broadly speaking, people seek to uncover the natural phenomena they do not know, for example, time, the cause of the universe, the cause of different diseases, the mystery that permeates nature, the best method to achieve social justice, the nature of happiness, and, ironically, much of the time the other human being. However, unlike trees, rocks, or lions, humans—in addition to their bodies, minds, and subjectivity—have an inner world of thoughts, feelings of loneliness, anxiety, joy, emotions, desires, ideas, images, dreams, hopes, and memories, to mention a few

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examples of some of the phenomena that make up the structure of the human world. However, this world is hidden, private; it can be known, at least partly, only if the individual reveals it by will, force, or accident. As I have emphasized earlier, religion does not exist merely in books or documents, or in the minds of theologians and religious leaders, but also, and more prominently, in the minds and hearts of the faithful, in their inner world, which is the spring of their action and life projects. Accordingly, if interreligious dialogue aims at mutual understanding, as it should, and if the existential reality of religion exists in the hearts and minds of the faithful, of the world that constitutes their spiritual being, then it is imperative that the dialogue aims at this world, not only at the religious documents and authority of the theologians and philosophers. But the realization of this aim is an obligation of the desire to know in general and the human other in particular. Suppose that the different religions of the world exist in harmony but are ignorant of each other; is it not their obligation to understand each other? Religion is a world, a spiritual world. If every religion acknowledges, and they should, that an infinitely wise, good, and powerful being is the designer and creator of the universe and human destiny, is it not reasonable, and also desirable, to understand how the other religions understand this infinite being? Should they not be curious to know how they came into existence; how they formed their religious beliefs in this infinitely wise, good, and powerful being; how they respond to this being; or the extent to which they share some of their fundamental beliefs, values, and principles? Why should we not be curious to uncover the dynamics of natural or mental phenomena, the purpose of the universe, in short, the mystery that engulfs everything that exists? I would not be too much amiss if I submit that needing to know other religions is an obligation of reason. The ontic basis of this understanding is the religions’ beliefs, values, symbols, traditions, practices, rites, customs, and ways of responding to the infinite being. What if the major religions of the world actually expand their understanding of other religions? What if they discover that they worship the same infinite being but in different ways? What then? Would this understanding not enhance their appreciation of the God they worship and deepen their faith in the greatness and wisdom of God? Would this understanding not enrich their feeling of friendship, cooperation, and respect for one another? The time is now ripe to answer the second question of my critic: In what sense is interreligious dialogue possible under the condition of respect?

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How can a multitude—one that is huge and diverse and exists in different places—assume an attitude, much less an attitude of respect, toward another religion? If the dialogue at the level of theologians and philosophers is conducted under the conditions of respect, which I shall discuss momentarily; if the interlocutors embody the spirit of their religions; if the dialogue aims at mutual understanding and has no other purpose; and if rational conversation is the most effective means of communication at the level of the educational establishment of each religious community; then the dialogue will generate an attitude of respect. The generation of this kind of attitude will not happen immediately or even in the near future but will take place gradually and will grow in strength, range, and momentum as it did in several parts of Europe and North America. This attitude will generate a feeling of respect not only for the other religion as an institution but also for its members, which is the ultimate purpose of the dialogue. Let me elucidate and defend this proposition in some detail. If assuming an attitude of respect by the interlocutors in interreligious dialogue is a necessary condition for mutual understanding, and if this attitude changes into a feeling of respect, then we should grant that the real subject of the dialogue is not an ordinary subject but a collective subject, a subject that is composed of a multitude of individuals but united in its religious spirit—in its commitment to a way of life founded in the revealed word of God. This spirit manifests itself in the way the faithful worship God, design their life projects, raise their children in the family, socialize with other people, solve their practical problems, and establish friendships. Do we not recognize a Christian, a Jew, a Muslim, and a Hindu by the way they conduct themselves in society, the way they celebrate their religious events, worship God, or even in the way they speak? Do we not feel some kind of kinship with a person we recognize as a member of our religious community? Do we not feel as if we know this very person? It may seem strange to introduce the idea of collective subject into the present discourse, but it is both reasonable and realistic because we exist in the world and interact with each other and the environment around us not only as living human bodies but also as human beings, that is, as spiritual beings. Although we exist as a diversity of societies, political systems, cultures, and ethnic groups, we are united in one essence: the human essence. This essence is centered in the body as a spark that gives rise to the spiritual activities we perform daily—intellectual, moral, social, political, artistic, and religious activities.

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Moreover, speaking of a collective subject should not seem unrealistic or unreasonable because the interlocutors at the existential level, namely leaders, teachers, parents, philosophers, and theologians, are not expected to converse as particular individuals but as agents, as embodiments of the beliefs, values, and doctrines of their religions. The understanding achieved during this type of event is destined to reach the hearts and minds of the faithful. Even the process in which this goal is accomplished consists of religious subjects. These subjects, whether they are receivers or transmitters of knowledge, are integral parts of the spiritual being of the religious community. But as I have explained earlier, the community does not exist as an agglomeration but as a spiritual unity. This unity forms the basis of the idea of collective subjects. Accordingly, the attitude of respect the interlocutors should assume in this event is the kind accorded to human beings. In making this assertion, I neither neglect nor underestimate respect for religious texts, symbols, practices, rites, customs, or places as essential ingredients of the concept of “the collective subject of the dialogue.” On the contrary, they form an integral part of it because the interlocutors are embodiments of the spirit of their religion—of their beliefs, values, doctrines, traditions, and holy places, all of which are founded in the revealed truth, word, or will of God. The interlocutors derive their authority to represent their religions not from the religious establishment or any other human establishment but from this spirit, which they embody and exemplify in their conversation and the way they conduct it with the representatives of other religions. A religion is not only a set of beliefs, values, or doctrines; it is also practice, praxis, a way of acting in the world, or responding to the creator. The dialogue would not be a genuine conversation, one that leads to existential mutual understanding, if it is merely philosophical or conceptual. Unfortunately, the type of interreligious conversation that dominates most of the conferences that have been held in the past few decades has been more philosophical or conceptual in nature than existential. To be meaningful and effective, interreligious dialogue should, at any level of education, exemplify the living spirit of religion. We think, understand, and learn not only with our minds but also with our hearts. In this kind of discussion, I am always reminded by Pascal’s dictum that “the heart has reasons of which the reason knows nothing. We know the truth not only by reason but also by the heart.”

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Basis of Respect in Interreligious Dialogue If the collective subject is the efficient means of conducting a dialogue between religions, if this subject is the unity of human beings as a community, if the aim of the dialogue is mutual understanding between religious communities, then the question that should provoke our interest is, “What does it mean to respect a human being?” How can one assume an attitude of respect toward a multitude, a multitude the interlocutors do not and cannot directly meet and know? In short, how can one assume an attitude of respect toward a collective subject? I shall begin my answer to this question with a brief analysis of the concept of respect for individual human beings: What does it mean to respect a human being? Broadly speaking, value is, as we have seen, the basis of any object of respect, human or natural. A valueless object is an object that does not arouse our interest and, consequently, an attitude of respect toward it. We usually assume an attitude of indifference or apathy toward such an object. We can use it as a means to an individual or social end. But as we saw in the first part of this paper, there are two types of value, extrinsic and intrinsic. We value certain objects merely as means to an end, and we respect them because they are useful. Again, the measure of our respect of them is commensurate with the value we place on them: the higher the value, the higher the respect. Here, the value of the object is extrinsic to it. We human beings bestow the value and determine its estimate on it. But we value other types of objects intrinsically because their value inheres in them. We value them because they are valuable in themselves. For example, we value works of art because their value inheres in them. We do not need to use them as a means to an end, although we can. They are valuable even if we do not experience them now and then or if most of the people in the world do not experience their value. Many a person listens to Brahms’s Fourth Symphony without feeling or appreciating its aesthetic value. Again, knowledge is valuable in itself; its goodness inheres in it regardless of whether we experience it or not. However, saying that certain objects are intrinsically valuable does not necessarily imply that they cannot be extrinsically valuable. For example, although knowledge is intrinsically valuable, we can use it as a means to an end, and although works of art are intrinsically valuable, we can use them as means to an end. Peculiar to our respect for intrinsically valuable objects in the various spheres of practical life is that we can choose to respect or refrain from respecting them with impunity. People do not punish me if I do not appreciate works of art or

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if I refuse to grow in knowledge or appreciate it, although they may frown upon me or think that I am a poorly educated person. But we are expected to respect human beings. We value the environment because it is conducive to human survival. We value artifacts such as cars because they are effective means of transportation, and we value works of art because they are a special source of pleasure and human enlightenment. But why do we value human beings, and more importantly, why are we morally obliged to respect them? The obvious and generally recognized answer to this question is that we are obliged to respect them because they are human beings, that is, because in addition to being bodies, they are also human: Humanity is valuable; therefore, human beings are valuable by virtue of their humanity. Humanity does not exist external to them, that is, extrinsically, but inheres in them. And like the majority of intrinsically valuable objects, they can also be used as means to an end. We may respect a worker in a factory, a teacher in a school, and a soldier in an army for the work they do, and the amount of respect we accord to them is proportional to the value of the work they do. The degree of this proportion is determined by an established set of criteria. But in general, our respect for these objects is proportionate to the value we place on their work. This view, which has been recognized, at least implicitly, and frequently taken for granted by the majority of thinkers in the theory of values until the middle of the eighteenth century, was articulated systematically and defended by Immanuel Kant. He used it as a basis of moral action and as a principle on the basis of which we justify obedience to the moral law. He argued in some detail in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that humanity is an absolutely valuable reality; it exists as an end in itself. This does not mean that we cannot use human beings as ends but that even when we use them as means, we ought to use them as ends in themselves. They should be treated as ends under any condition whatsoever! Kant likened humanity to a jewel that shines from within, that is, to a jewel that is the source of its own sheen. Thus, regardless of their economic, social, educational, or professional status; regardless of their color, sex, gender, race, or ethnic background; and regardless of their religious, ideological, or political leanings, people should at all times be respected as ends in themselves. But my critic might ask, Why should humanity be respected as an end in itself? We can answer this question by saying, as I pointed out a moment ago, that humanity is absolutely valuable. But why is it absolutely valuable?

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By what principle or authority can this assertion be justified? Saying that humanity is absolutely valuable is one thing, and justifying this assertion is quite something else! We may argue that unlike any other creature, human beings are endowed with a mind, with the ability to think, feel, make decisions, and determine the course of their lives. This is based on the assumption that human beings are self-conscious beings; they not only exist and they are not only conscious of their environment, but they are also conscious that they exist and that they are conscious of this consciousness. Again, unlike animals and plants that exist in time and drift in its course, human beings are conscious that they exist in time, that time is irreversible, and that that they will sooner or later be buried in its belly. They can do this through their ability to imagine the past, the present, and the future and especially the essential logic and fabric of time. They can transcend the past into the future and the future into the present. This ability, which underlies their capacity for thinking, feeling, and making decisions, and enables them to be authors of their lives, is what transforms them from being mere objects to being subjects to being agents who can preside over the activities of their minds during ordinary life. We may further characterize this point by saying that unlike any other creature, human beings are capable of autonomy, that is, freedom. Although briefly stated, my critic would object that my answer is descriptive. It sheds light on what it means to be a human being and perhaps on why we should treat one as absolutely a valuable object, but it is not an explanation of why it is justifiable to claim that we ought to respect human beings as ends by virtue of their humanity. This objection may seem unfair because if value forms the basis of respect, if respect is proportional to its value, and if the value is absolute, then the respect should also be absolute. But still, why should we respect humanity absolutely? The assertion that we should respect humanity absolutely is a descriptive, anthropocentric statement. It is tantamount to saying that we human beings are the most valuable type of beings in the universe because we are more advanced than other types of beings; therefore, we are absolutely valuable. But what if there are more advanced beings in other parts of the universe? What if they possess qualities more admirable, more valuable, than the capacity of self-determination or to author one’s life? Can we rely only on human reason to justify the claim that human beings are absolutely valuable because they are more advanced than any other being on earth? Is possession of the capacity of self-determination or to author one’s life a

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necessary and sufficient condition that justifies the claim that human beings are absolutely valuable, and, therefore, they deserve to be respected absolutely? No. Why? Two reasons. First, humanity is given; it is not a self-creation. I am not the source of my being. On the contrary, I discover myself in the world in a particular place, a particular time in history, a particular society, a particular family, and a particular culture or religion. I discover myself as a human being in contrast to the other types of beings around me; that is, I discover, of course gradually, what it means to be a human being and how to exist in the world as a human being. In short, I discover that my unique endowments, both mental and physical, are superior to those of other types of beings. Does this discovery, and consequently this realization, justify the claim that I am entitled to absolute respect? The fact either overlooked or consciously avoided by philosophers—for idiosyncratic, ideological, or philosophical reasons—in their attempt to justify the claim that humanity exists as an end in itself and, therefore, is entitled to absolute respect is that if we are not the source of our being, then who is its source? More importantly, do human beings have the right to exist? Is their existence necessary? If we cast a critical, investigative look at this amazing universe, if we focus our attention on the reality of change, on the passage of time, we can say with a reasonable measure of confidence that the universe and the objects that comprise its fabric, including human beings, are contingent. Human beings exist, but they do not have to exist. Why do I exist rather than not? This question has occupied the attention of philosophers over the past century. What makes this question more perplexing and more dramatic is that I have not chosen my existence, nor do I have to exist, yet I exist. Why? My existence is not essentially significant to the existence of the universe since I am a negligible speck in it, and yet my existence is not abstract or ephemeral. It is substantial; it is important, essentially important. I am a life, and I am the most significant life on the face of this earth. It is, I think, appropriate to characterize my existence as a kind of invitation to participate in the most important banquet ever arranged so far as I know—a cosmic banquet. The theme of this banquet is human living, the kind that celebrates the joy implicit in the realization of the values of goodness, wisdom, and beauty, in standing in the light of a divine presence, in being the spark of creativity that emanates from this presence, in discovering that the infinite exists in us and we exist in the finite.

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However, this kind of invitation is not an ordinary one. It is a gift. Yes, my life and the life of every human being is a gift. “How? By whom?” my critic would now ask. First, it is a gift in the sense that I am not its author. Moreover, I exist even though I do not have to exist. Second, it is valuable, intrinsically valuable, and I can add that it is the most unique and valuable kind of existence in the universe. Third, I am allowed to be a guest at the most meaningful, most magnificent, most joyful banquet the human mind can imagine. At this banquet, I participate in the ritual of the most magnificent and most mysterious feature of the cosmic process: creativity. I do not only create artistic, intellectual, or physical objects, I create myself as the individual I am in and through the creation of these objects. The kind of delight I enjoy during this process of creation is not restricted to the delight I enjoy in the realm of ordinary living but surpasses this realm into the realm that underlies it and the whole universe in depth and dignity. Second, if my life is a gift, the most precious gift I can conceive, would it be an exaggeration to say that it is sacred? Again, if humanity is an intrinsically valuable phenomenon on the face of the earth, is it possible to say that its existence is an accident? No. This point calls for special emphasis because I wish to underline the assertion that the mere ability of human beings to author their lives does not adequately justify the claim that humanity exists as an end in itself. I aver that human beings are capable of self-determination; consequently, they can be the authors of their individual lives but not necessarily as human beings, although many of them lead the life of sheep. I also aver that they are intrinsically valuable. Self-determination is an essential feature of humanity. I tend to think that humanity exists as an end in itself and that it is our obligation to respect humanity absolutely because it is sacred. Sacredness is what makes humanity an end in itself and also what justifies absolute respect for it. If my critic wonders why it is sacred, I can say that the sacredness of humanity derives from the fact it is a ray of the divine essence. Have some religions not acknowledged that human beings were created in the image of God? What is this image but our humanity? How do we show our respect for objects in general and human beings in particular? How do we transform an attitude of respect into a feeling of respect? I shall begin my answer to this question with a reiteration of two ideas discussed in the first part of this chapter: (a) value is the basis for respect, and (b) the degree and kind of respect we bestow upon a valuable object are proportional to the value we place on the object. Broadly

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speaking, “respect” implies an attitude, and consequently a feeling, of esteem, honor, or high regard. We treat such an object with special interest or deference. We cannot treat it apathetically or uninterestedly. We respect the natural environment because its integrity is important to the stability and continuance of the ecosystem, which is, in turn, essential for the integrity and continuance of human life. But we respect parts of the environment more than others. We accord respect to a part that contains arable land or is more beautiful than a part that is arid or lacking in beauty. We respect cars because they are a means of transportation, but we respect more beautiful or more efficient cars than less beautiful and less efficient cars. In the case of the environment, we show respect to the landscape by safeguarding its integrity, by cultivating it, by making sure that it is not destroyed by adverse natural factors or events. We show respect for the car by placing a monetary value on it and by repairing it when necessary. But how do we show respect to human beings? Human beings are not only objects, but they are also subjects by virtue of their humanity. Accordingly, we should respect them as subjects. Therefore, we cannot use them merely as a means to selfish ends, although this occurs quite frequently. We respect them as subjects by safeguarding their integrity as subjects, that is, as human individuals, by safeguarding their ability to function or live as subjects, as self-determining individuals, as individuals who can author their actions and who can design and implement their life projects. Any infringement or restriction of this capacity is an expression of disrespect. Accordingly, the more we create the conditions that foster their growth and development as individual human beings, the more we show respect for them. Ignorance, sickness, oppression, violence, bigotry, disenfranchisement, and racism are conditions that constrict their growth as subjects or as human individuals. We show more respect to people the more we transform these adverse conditions into more constructive, more life-enhancing conditions. Regardless of its kind, genuine respect is not exclusive of and should not stop at the level of attitude or feeling. This feeling should be translated into action. Moreover, our respect for human beings is commensurate with their achievements. People who promote goodness in any of its dimensions, in the lives of other human beings, command more respect than people who are indolent, unproductive, or selfish. Respect for the individual human being is always direct because it is aimed at a particular person, for example, respect of a child toward her father or mother. Here the respect issues from a feeling in the child toward

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the parent. But respect for a collective subject is indirect because those who respect and those who are respected exist as a multiplicity and in different places. In the case of mutual respect between religions, it is promoted through a complex network of communication—family, religion school, books, the internet, mediums, and political leaders. It begins with the theologians and philosophers who meet directly and establish a basis of mutual respect and mutual understanding through extensive dialogue, after which it is transmitted, through the different educational channels to the faithful who are its ultimate objects. Understanding is, as I pointed out earlier, a transformative power, and the point of the dialogue is to achieve this goal. I am inclined to think that the promotion of mutual understanding is the key to a peaceful, respectful, and cooperative attitude among the different religions of the world, primarily because any other type of relation contradicts the letter and spirit of the teaching of these religions. I cannot help but imagine my critic wondering, Is this goal realistic, achievable? The answer to this question is in principle, yes. But are the different religious communities of the world willing and ready to cooperate sincerely on its realization? The major obstacles do not lie only in the religions themselves but also in factors external to them—historical, educational, economic, political, and cultural factors. A detailed discussion of this question should be the subject of a separate study.

References Barnes, Michael. 1989. Religions in Conversation: Christian Identity and Religious Pluralism. London, England: SPCK. Dupuis, Jacques. 1997. Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism. New York: Orbis Books. Hick, John. 1974. Truth and Dialogue in World Religions. Philadelphia: Westminster. Mitias, Michael. 2020. The Philosopher Converses with God. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock.

CHAPTER 4

Mutual Understanding as Condition and Aim of Interreligious Dialogue

Introduction If mutual respect is a necessary condition for the possibility of interreligious dialogue, if the dialogue aims at mutual understanding, we should ask, What is mutual understanding? Although I discussed this question rather briefly in Chap. 2, I raise it again because it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assume an attitude of respect toward the religiously different other if we do not know, at least to some extent, the object of our respect. How can I respect my mother or my teacher if I do not know what it means for someone to be a mother or a teacher and if I do not know that a mother or a teacher is the kind of person who requires, obligates, or deserves respect? How can I respect a person as a human being if I do not know what it means for a person to be a human reality? We assume an attitude of respect toward different types of objects, for example, a leader, a hero, or a law, for different reasons, but regardless of the type of reason that inclines us to respect the object or whether the reasons are justifiable we cannot assume an attitude of respect toward it if we do not know that the object is worthy of our respect. But as we saw in Chap. 3, the object of understanding in interreligious dialogue is not merely complex but also multidimensional in character, composed of three main elements: (a) word of God, (b) interpretation of this word, and (c) minds and hearts of the faithful. Formally, these elements © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. H. Mitias, Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6_4

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are the collective subject of the dialogue. The articulation of this concept is based on the assumption that if the dialogue is between religions, if religion is a multidimensional reality, it should follow that the subject in this type of dialogue is a collective subject. We would commit a grave mistake if the dialogue stopped at the level of conversation between the representatives of the dialoguing religions because this kind of conversation would necessarily be theological or philosophical but not religious as the revealed word and its interpretation or articulation into doctrine comes to life in the minds and hearts of the faithful, including political leaders and theologians. Thus, although formally those who conduct the first moment of the dialogue are representatives of the dialoguing religions, the event of mutual understanding does not existentially take place merely in their minds and hearts but also in the minds and hearts of the faithful because the representatives in the event of the conversation act as agents of their religions, that is, because they embody the spirit of their religion. The understanding achieved in this event is transmuted into the religious community through the religious teachers and leaders in their lessons, sermons, and actions. This may seem a Herculean task. I readily aver that it is not an easy undertaking, for it requires careful planning, commitment, genuine faith, love of humanity, and especially religious will, all of which conditions seem far-fetched at the present. But it is crucially important to recognize that if the mutual understanding that is achieved between the representatives of the dialoguing religions does not reach the minds and hearts of the religious community, if it does not act as a transformative power in the way they see themselves and the religiously different other, the other that has so far stood before them as an alien, as a source of fear, and as a threat to their way of life, the dialogue will remain ink on paper or empty words. This is a main reason why in their conversation, the interlocutors should adopt a practical attitude, that is, converse from the standpoint of praxis, not from the standpoint of this or that theological or philosophical point of view. This point calls for special emphasis because a religion is not merely a doctrine or a set of beliefs and values; it is a way of life—a way of responding existentially to the will of God, of translating this will into action. The will of God is revealed to a people in order to live in a certain way. It contains answers to some of the most important questions of human existence: How should we live as human beings? How should we die as human beings? The scheme of nature stands before our eyes, ears, and hearts as a riddle, as a bewildering mystery: Why does it exist? Why does it

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exist the way it does? Who is its author? Could he have created a better world? But alas, why do I, the person who is asking these and many related questions, exist? What kind of purpose underlies the cosmic process? Is it steered by some kind of wisdom? Religion does not exist as a response to some whimsical wish or an itch of curiosity in the human mind, nor does it exist as an instrument constructed by some politician, philosopher, or artist, but as an existential response to an urgent demand in human nature, to a cry for life. It reveals one of the deepest longings inherent in human nature—a longing to know its source and the source of this amazing universe and hopefully to stand in its presence. How can it know it if does not stand in its presence or in some way feel it? Religion is a ray of light that illuminates the mystery that permeates our existence and the existence of the world, that empowers people to live the way they should live, and that enables them to live in the radiance of this light. A religious way of life is a translation of the revealed word of God into praxis. This translation may or may not be perfect, and it may or may not be perfectly applied. But the way of life that is lived by a religious community is the high road to an understanding of its religion. However, a critic might wonder, What about the articulated doctrine, which is supposed to be founded in the revealed word of God, the theologians, the philosophers, and political leaders? These are immensely important questions; an answer to them is indispensable not only for (a) structuring and administering the life of the religious community but also for (b) perfecting it. First, the revealed word of God is the foundation of a religion. Neither the philosophers and theologians nor the religious community would exist without it. But as I pointed out, in itself it is absolutely lifeless; as such, it cannot constitute a religion. And yet it is the ontic, formative part of a religion only when it is endowed with life. The agents who endow it with life are the religious leaders and theologians. Would the major religions of the world exist without the work of founders such as Buddha, Moses, Muhammad, or Jesus, their followers, and the armies of theologians who sought to explain, systematize, and justify the validity of the doctrines they proclaimed? As they have always done, religions have tended to be insulated, and they frequently behave as if the other religions do not exist or do not share with them basic beliefs and values, aspirations, and a certain understanding of the human condition, the meaning of human life and destiny, as if they are not founded in a belief in the same God they worship, as if the other

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religions are false, as if they exist as hostile or dangerous rivals to one’s own religion’s existence. Regardless of whether this kind of tendency is good, prudent, or justifiable, it is, I think, crucially important that they change this tendency to a more open, more flexible, more constructive one. The different religious communities are made of human beings after all! In numerous cases, they interact and cooperate socially, economically, educationally, artistically, and politically, and sometimes they intermarry. Why should they be alienated from each other as religions? Why should we treat religion as a kind of taboo, especially in this age of reason, in this age of technology? The religious books of all the religions can be read by any educated human being. Religious service in all the religions is practically a public event. Religions are the subject of study in all the private and public universities. Why should they keep their distance from each other? I have raised these rhetorical questions for two reasons: First, in principle, there is no justifiable reason for the different religions to be insulated; and second, there is an urgent need at the present to promote mutual understanding, mutual respect, friendship, tolerance, and cooperation among them. Given the ongoing progress of technologizing the means of living, the growing dominance of economic and political powers in the areas of state governance, and the imperceptible yet gradual erosion of spiritual life, it would be very helpful for the different religions to cooperate on the promotion of the fundamental values that are central to all of them. Meeting this need requires a change of attitude, of transforming the current attitude of insulation and sometimes of hatred, animosity, and destructive violence into an attitude of openness, friendship, mutual understanding, cooperation, and readiness to respond effectively to the challenges that seem to constrict the religions’ role and consequently their significance in the development of a more humane society and a more God-centered culture rather than money, power, and pleasure-­ centered culture. This kind of transformation entails the need to look within and without—within into the essential meaning of the truth implicit in the revealed word of God in view of the newly emerging conditions of life and in the hope of finding the best possible way to adapt to these conditions, and without into those conditions in view of the truth implicit in the revealed word of God. I spotlight this formal condition because I assume that the truth implicit in the revealed truth in any religion is not frozen or carved in stone. Regardless of whether it is scientific, philosophical, artistic, or religious, truth is always dynamic. Have the major religions not been interpreting and reinterpreting this or that part

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of their doctrine in view of the scientific, technological, and artistic discoveries during the past 2500 years? But these discoveries are rising steadily. Their frequency is amazing and sometimes unsettling. Should the religions not be informed of their nature and their impact on the lives of their communities, and not be willing and ready to meet the challenges they pose to them? As we can see, interreligious dialogue is a pressing need not only to find a way to minimize and hopefully to eliminate the silent but rampant hostilities among religions, not only to enhance their appreciation of the greatness of God and deepen their faith in him, but also to cooperate on facing the overpowering forces that threaten to diminish their roles in social progress. The question is not whether religions exist or will continue to exist, for they can exist as historical relics or fixtures, but whether they can be active, creative, vibrant forces in social progress. Theologians, philosophers, and religious leaders have discussed tolerance, open-­ mindedness, empathy, modesty, and mutual respect as conditions of interreligious dialogue, but they have treated them singly, as if they are unrelated to each other, as if they are not implied by each other, as if they are not significant concepts worthy of philosophical analysis. This way of looking at these conditions is, I think, mistaken; on the contrary, they are organically interrelated. Is it possible for someone to be tolerant if he or she is not open-minded, modest, empathetic, and respectful of the other? Is it possible to treat the other as an equal if we do not respect them and assume an attitude of tolerance toward them? But, alas, how can we respect them, treat them as an equal, or be empathetic toward them if we do not understand them? It seems that mutual understanding is a necessary condition for fulfilling these and related conditions for the possibility of interreligious dialogue. This is a main reason why I emphasized earlier that mutual understanding should be the central aim of interreligious dialogue. This kind of understanding is not and cannot be achieved in one act or conversation but should be an ongoing encounter, one that becomes an integral part of the educational activities of the dialoguing religions. It should begin with the religious leaders, theologians, and philosophers who initiate it and slowly transmit their mutual understanding into the religious community. We should always recognize that the event of dialogue cannot begin as a genuine conversation if it does not proceed from the admission that the other is a religion. This admission implies that the other is a God-centered participant in the conversation and therefore worthy of understanding and respect.

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But the question of the possibility of mutual understanding among the religions has been the thorniest and most recalcitrant question in the analysis of the concept of the possibility of interreligious dialogue during the past several decades for a number of reasons. The most challenging reason is what is generally known among philosophers, theologians, and religious leaders as religious self-understanding, the fact that each religion understands itself as the beneficiary of the unquestionably true revelation of God’s word. Why should I converse with you about this or that aspect of my or your religion if I am convinced without a shred of doubt that I am in possession of the truth God willed for the human race? What can I gain from such a conversation? But does the belief that one’s version of the word of God is indubitably or finally true necessarily negate or imply that the version of the other religion is not also indubitably or finally true? What if someone argues that even if religions believe that they are in possession of the true word of God and that no other religion is a true religion, still, a dialogue among them would be useful because they can cooperate on dangers that face all of them, negotiate the possibility of discovering a way to mitigate some violence that has been rocking their peace as well as their budgets, or promote some humanitarian or social project? This is quite desirable! But can their conversation or cooperation be characterized as religious or religiously justifiable? That is, can it be between two religions if they do not proceed into the dialogue with the recognition that the other is a genuine religion? Again, how can a religion recognize the other as a religion if it does not also recognize that it possesses a genuine revelation of the word of God? I tend to think that a necessary condition for the possibility of interreligious dialogue is that the participants should engage in it with the mutual acknowledgment that their religions are equally founded in the revealed word of God, not with the silent belief that the other is not a true religion. The truth of a religion’s claim that it possesses the true revelation of God’s word is not logically exclusive of similar claims by the other major religions, and it is consistent with the belief upheld by all religions that God is an infinite being and therefore infinitely creative. Accordingly, “true” in “the true revelation of God’s word” should be changed to “a true” revelation of God’s word. Thus, no religion is more or less true than, better or worse than, or superior or inferior to other religions. Put differently, the claim that the truth of the revelation of one religion is not mutually exclusive does not slight, undermine, constrict the uniqueness of, or in any way lessen the believability or dignity of the other religion.

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Accordingly, although they are different versions of the word of God, they can dialogue, and they can aim at mutual understanding in this kind of dialogue. I may be told that my line of reasoning is unrealistic, if not contradictory, because it is not logically possible for two different revelations to be equally and finally true. The different religions provide quite different explanations, instructions, and guidance about the nature of God, the meaning of human life and destiny, and the purpose of the universe, to mention a few of the basic concerns of humanity. Moreover, the critic might add, if the revealed word of God proclaimed by one religion is believed as ultimate and final, that is, as absolutely true, then it would follow that it is impossible for any other religion to make a similar claim! The preceding line of reasoning may seem a logical, cogent, and compelling objection to the view I have been expounding and defending, but it is not, because the logic that governs the activities of the human mind and ordinary life is different from the logic that governs God’s activities or action. The logic of the finite mind is different from the logic of the infinite mind that created it. How can the human mind understand by means of its logical powers why God created the world? How can it understand that God has revealed himself to this or that people in this or that way? How can the infinite mind think finitely? Again, has God not revealed himself to the different peoples of the world directly, immediately, and privately? Who was witnessing or listening to the mind of God when he revealed himself to Moses or Jesus? Who was witnessing or listening to the mind of Mohammad when the angel Gabriel delivered the Qur’an to him? We can raise many other similar and equally difficult questions. Suffice it to say that a patient, comprehensive meditation on the nature of the universe and human life, on the dynamics of the cosmic process, on the mystery that oozes out of this process will support the claim that the human mind cannot comprehend, not fully, the logic that governs the meaning and direction of the cosmic process, and that a higher logic or logical mind is needed to have a modest and to a great extent mystical perception of this higher logic. It will, I think, show that human logic is not the only logic that governs this process; on the contrary, there is a higher logic. We may be able to know that it exists, but we are not able to comprehend the intricacy, depth, and richness of its thinking or ways, creative vision, or ideals. The master metaphysical minds of the Western and Eastern traditions, not to mention the mystics who dotted their histories, or Western

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metaphysicians such as Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, or Whitehead have directly or indirectly acknowledged the existence of this higher logic. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall first advance a concept of understanding; second, I shall present a brief analysis of the view that religious self-understanding impedes the possibility of interreligious dialogue; and third, I shall evaluate this view. The proposition I shall defend is that religious self-understanding does not in principle impede the possibility of interreligious dialogue.

A Concise Conception of Understanding What does it mean for one religion to understand another religion? An adequate answer to this question should begin with answers to two more specific questions: (a) What kind of object is religion? (b) How do we know this object? Or what is the structure of the cognitive act in which we understand a religion as a phenomenon? An adequate analysis of this types of understanding is a necessary condition for a reasonable explanation of the possibility of interreligious dialogue. Broadly speaking, the act of understanding an object is an act of “apprehending”—grasping, intuiting, seizing—the essential features that constitute its identity. This type of apprehension results in what is generally known as the idea, and sometimes concept, of the object. Regardless of its kind, an idea is always tethered to a word; it is an idea of an object or a type of object. An idea that does not refer to an object, mental or physical, is vacuous and as such sense-less. A word is a linguistic unit; it derives its identity, or meaning, from the identity, or essential features, of the object to which it refers. Objects may or may not be sensuous. The lamp that sits at my desk is a sensuous object. I know it by perceiving its essential features by one or a combination of the five senses. Although the different perceptions of the object enter the mind through the different senses, they are unified into an idea by a creative act of the mind. But objects of knowledge do not have to be sensuous, for example, mathematical numbers and relations, aesthetic objects in the different arts, and metaphysical intuitions that are not derived from directly perceiving certain features of the universe, for example, infinity. The mystic’s idea of God emerges from the experience of the cosmos in a certain way. The aesthetic object emerges from the experience of a painting, a novel, a dance, or a poem. The idea of number emerges from the experience of the phenomena of plurality and unity in the scheme of nature. No matter their

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kind, ideas are derived from experiencing one or more objects or aspects of the world or from ideas derived from our experience of the world. But the object always exists as “an other” to the human mind. For example, although the ontological locus of the aesthetic object is the mind, and although it is constructed by the mind, it exists to the mind as an object, as an other. Similarly, although numbers are not physical objects and exist in the mind, they exist as object to the mind that perceives them. Even the self that undergoes an experience of self-consciousness exists as an object to itself. We know and discourse about objects through the ideas we have of them. Ideas do not float in the mind as nameless, indistinguishable, or unidentifiable mental states. They are couched in words. Words are identifiable linguistic identities. An idea is what it means. Meaning is what we grasp when we grasp the idea of an object. A word is composed of two elements, form and content. Idea is the content of a word; this is what we comprehend when we hear or read a word. Form is a kind of shell to which the ideas is tethered or in which it exists. There are two types of shell, verbal and written. The first is made of organized sounds, and the second is made of organized written symbols. (The possibilities of symbolic formation and signification are infinite.) These two modes of symbolic organization are the handiwork of convention, cultural and linguistic. But regardless of whether they are written or spoken, the shells to which the ideas are tethered are kinds of symbols primarily because they are human constructions created as means of communication. Every society has its own way of creating its system of symbolic forms of expression and communication. But the ideas, or meanings, the words communicate are determined by the nature of the objects of experience and knowledge. All the peoples of the world experience the trees, the rivers, the sun, and the animals; they all experience emotions of hate, love, and loneliness; they all raise the fundamental questions that are essential for human life; and they all seek inner peace, inner growth, and happiness similarly. This is why a text or a speech in one language can be translated into other languages, though of course according to established rules and conventions of translation. Words are the building blocks of language: sentences, paragraphs, phrases, texts, and many other symbolic forms of expression. The kind and nature of these symbolic forms vary from one type of knowledge to another. But words are not the only loci of meaning, or ideas. A sentence can be the locus of meaning. The same applies to a complex of sentences, to images, and to other forms of symbolic expression. However, we

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recognize a word and the idea it signifies by practice when we begin to learn how to speak and write, and we continue this process when we explore the different types of knowledge and different types of creation and expression in the sphere of ordinary and theoretical life. Although words are the building blocks of language, although they are vehicles of ideas, in and by themselves, that is, as linguistic units, they do not usually communicate the meaning of the objects we experience by means of words, or simply by writing or uttering words, unless the words we say or utter are communicated in a recognized philosophical, scientific, or ordinary discourse. For example, at a social event, if I spontaneously utter a word such as “rock” with a blank look at my face and without a bodily gesture, as if the word flew from my mouth the way a straw flies in a soft breeze, and then adhere to a deadly silence, my friends would wonder, “So?”, “What do you mean?”, or “So what?” They know the meaning of the word “rock,” but they do not know what I wish to say or what they should think about a specific rock or about rocks in general. Next, although words are unitary symbols, they are multivalent and sometimes multidimensional in their structure. They contain simple ideas— for example, the color “white” I now see when I cast a perceptive look at the sheet of paper that sits at my desk or the number “one”—but they also communicate a complexity of meaning. For example, “chair” may signify an object on which we sit to rest, but it also signifies a professional position, for example, the chair of a department or committee. Poets and novelists are gifted at loading words and images with a multiplicity or strata of meanings. But regardless of whether a word or a vehicle of ideas communicates one or more meanings, the idea or the multiplicity of ideas it communicates are, generally speaking, complex primarily because the objects of our experience are usually complex: the complexity of the idea reflects the complexity of the object it signifies. This complexity is molecular in character; its elements are interrelated. This character results from the fact the elements that make up the structure of the objects of experience vary in the functions they perform or the role they play in the context of which they are integral parts. No two elements in any object are exactly the same. This is why we may characterize the objects of experience as multivalent. Accordingly, just as the structure of the object is multivalent, and sometimes multidimensional, so the meaning structure of the word or word structures that denote the object are also multivalent and sometimes multidimensional. The complexity of the objects of experience increases in

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magnitude as we move from the simplest subatomic particles to the most complex objects we can conceive, namely God or the universe. This is why some thinkers characterize artworks, religions, philosophies, civilizations, novels, individuals, and certain historical periods as “worlds.” The objects that make up the structure of the universe, including human achievements, are rich, and their richness sometimes baffles the human mind. For example, the depth of being we experience when we let our imagination penetrate the aesthetic dimension of works such as Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, or Melville’s Moby Dick, or works such as the anatomy of the different types of animals, the solar system, the galaxies and mega-galaxies, or the wealth of the achievements of the human mind—yes, the depth of these and the numberless objects that populate the universe are worlds of meaning. Although very briefly expounded, the purpose of the preceding remark about meaning is to provide a basis for the act of understanding in general. This basis should reveal the logical structure of this act. It consists of intuiting, apprehending, or grasping the meaning inherent in a linguistic formation: a sentence, a paragraph, or a text. Here I use “intuiting,” “apprehending,” and “grasping” interchangeably only to emphasize that intuition, as I shall presently discuss, is not a passive but an active, creative, and constructive act or activity; it is cognitive par excellence. The outcome of this act is insight, concept, or vision of an object or aspect of reality. To know an object or an aspect of the world is to capture its nature by an act of the intellect; it is, moreover, to recognize the identity of this nature in contradistinction to any other identity. This type of act or activity is the essence of “understanding.” Thus, when someone asks, “Do you understand what I have just said?” and I answer, “Yes!”, the act that constitutes my understanding in this interchange is the intuition of the meaning of what was said. This is based on the assumption that meaning is the unity of the essential features that are summed up in the idea of the object or the subject of the conversation, which may be simple or complex. Put differently, genuine understanding is the intuition of the idea or ideas that are couched in a certain linguistic structure in the fullness of their essence, assumptions, and implications. An idea exists as a sensuous feature or features in the physical, perceptual object; it is transformed into meaning in the mind and by the mind. These features impress the mind in a certain way; the outcome is the formation of the meaning content that exists in the word as a linguistic symbol or structure.

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I have italicized “genuine” because it is possible to treat words as labels, as general concepts, as lexical definitions. College teachers, precollege teachers, and observers of social conversations are quite familiar with this use of words. Frequently students receive words from their teachers or from books and retain them in the bank of their memory qua lexical definitions, raise questions about them in class, and even write papers about them without grasping the full content of the meaning that exists in the text they read or the lecture they heard. This kind of understanding happens in many social, family, and professional conversations. Let me shed more light on this point by an example derived from my personal experience. A young man whose mind was filled with snippets of information about many concepts in the various areas of knowledge and values that have occupied the attention of philosophers, scientists, and artists for centuries, but who did not have time to explore their elements and implications inquired about the subject of my last book project. “God!” I said. He hesitated a little, hummed a little, and then asked: “What is God?” “What is God? Whose God?” I returned. “The God of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, or Judaism?” “No, God in himself!” “You should read the book!” “Oh, no, tell me in a few words!” “I cannot!” “But you wrote the book! You must be able to say what God is in a few words.”

This young student wanted a lexical definition of “God.” He was reluctant to delve deep into the world of meaning entailed by the concept of God in himself. But philosophers, artists, and scientists frown upon this use of words or concepts. They probe deep into the multivalent and multidimensional dimensions of the meaning implicit in the texts they study or seek to understand. For instance, most people define “world” as “everything that exists.” But a philosopher or a scientist asks, “What is this ‘everything that exists’?” What is the true signification of “the world”? They may analyze it into God, nature, and humanity. But each one of these is a world. This applies to their multivalent and multidimensional realms of meaning. The point that merits special emphasis here is that the

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act of understanding is one in which we seek to capture the wealth of meaning inherent in the linguistic structures we hear or read.

Understanding as a Transformative Power When I speak of understanding in this chapter, I mean genuine understanding, the kind that captures the world of meaning inherent in the concept of the object. The proposition I shall now elucidate is that this kind of understanding is a transformative power or event. By “transformative power” I mean the kind of power that changes the way the subject of understanding thinks, feels, and acts toward the object of understanding in a significant way. She sees and interacts with the object from the standpoint of the understanding she has acquired about it. This is based on the general assumption that truth is a transformative power, in the sense that when we comprehend the truth of an object, we cannot remain the same people, at least toward the object. How many a time in the course of our theoretical and practical lives do we hear that truth is a liberating power or that truth shall make you free? Did Oedipus the king remain the same after he discovered the truth of the innocent crimes he committed against his father, mother, and society? Do we remain the same after we discover that our friend, wife, husband, or child has betrayed us? If the understanding revolves around the goodness of an object, the change produces an attitude of appreciation. If it revolves around a neutral object such as a natural, metaphysical, or scientific object, the understanding produces an enlightened, clear vision of perception or an enhanced skill in the art of making sound judgment. If it revolves around works of art, it enlivens our sense of value and appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime. But if it revolves around the badness of an object, it produces an attitude of aversion. This characterization is supported by the assumption that the good promotes human well-being and the bad hinders it. The kind of change the recipient of the understanding undergoes is proportional to the extent and value of the meaning he or she comprehends in the act of comprehending it. The greater the dimension and value of the meaning apprehended, the greater the change. If I discover the benefits of vitamin D and if I fully comprehend the justification of these benefits, I will be inclined to take this vitamin according to the prescription of the doctor or pharmacist. Although this change of behavior is minor, it is nevertheless a change of attitude toward this vitamin. If upon a recommendation by my philosophy professor that

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I study Stoicism in the fullness of its vision of the world and the meaning of human life, I follow his advice, and if I discover in the course of my inquiry, which may take a few years, that this philosophy is a reasonable guide to a good life, I will be inclined to change my way of life and gradually adopt a stoic attitude toward myself, human beings, and the world. In this case, the change is major, indeed huge! Whether in the comprehension of the idea of vitamin D or Stoicism, the amount of change is proportional to the extent and significance of the meaning I apprehend in the event of understanding the two objects. The objects that stir, and sometimes provoke, our desire to understand are different in kind and value. The objects may be material or spiritual. They may affect us individually or as members of families, communities, cultures, or nations. But regardless of their significance in themselves or in relation to others, the attempt to understand an object must originate from a sincere desire to understand. To be meaningful, to be effective, the understanding must be sought from a will to understand; otherwise, it will not make a dent in our mind, which is the way it happens in so many social, academic, or religious conversations. How many a student listens to analyses of the most valuable ideas in their lives, ideas that dart directly or indirectly at their growth and developments as human beings and as professionals, without taking them into serious consideration, but, on the contrary, having memorized them, returns them to the professor at the end of the semester, earning an A grade for her brilliant act of memory and soon afterward places their notes in a wastebasket? Merely listening to a speech or reading a text, no matter the genius of the speaker or author, is not a guarantee that genuine understanding is acquired by the person who hears the speech or reads the text. A will to understand, to grow in knowledge, is a necessary condition for inner change, the kind that makes a difference in one’s life. Is it an accident that some wise people have argued that a measure of curiosity is a necessary condition of learning? I here assume that learning is an activity of emotional, intellectual, and social discovery. Now, what are the cognitive dynamics that underlie the transformative act of understanding? Or, what makes this kind of act transformative? The act of understanding is by its very nature assimilative and expansive in character. The elements of this act are the powers of the intellect that understand the nature of a particular object. What are these powers? We may say that they are sensuous and nonsensuous perception, conception, judgment, evaluation, feeling, recollection, comprehension, imagination,

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creation, deduction, inference, and other related powers. These powers are the hands or the agents that participate in the formative activities of the cognitive act. Metaphorically speaking, if we view mind as an artisan, we can say that these powers are instruments the intellect uses in the construction of the cognitive act. Moreover, these powers underlie the basic functions of the mind, for example, imagination, consciousness, creation, appreciation, enjoyment, relation, expectation, aspiration, and desire, to mention several. Understanding is an act in which we comprehend the identity of an object and, more concretely, what it means for an object to be the kind of identity it is. Thus, when I say that understanding is assimilative and expansive in nature, I mean that it is additive, enhancing, or enlarging in character primarily because (a) a new idea, insight, or dimension of meaning is added to the fund of its knowledge and capacity of assimilating new meanings to its existing fund of meaning, and (b) because the powers of comprehension are intensified. Addition and intensification are not added to the mind ab extra, that is, from the outside, but incorporated in its very structure so that the mind grows from within, not from without. This incorporation is exactly what enhances and intensifies the basic capacities of thinking, feeling, and choosing, for it enables the mind to think more logically, feel more deeply, and will the rational choice. Can a person who undergoes this kind of change remain the same not only toward the object of understanding but also in general? Do we not change our attitudes and ways of interaction with ourselves, others, and the environment when we grow in our understanding of them?

Understanding Between Religions We can now ask, What does it mean for a religion to understand another religion? What is the structure of the act or activity in which a religion attains an understanding of another religion? In what sense is this act a transformative power? I raise these questions not only because interreligious dialogue is intrinsically valuable, not only because this kind of dialogue is an obligation of reason, but more importantly because it is practically useful, if not urgently needed. Interreligious dialogue is the most effective means of promoting mutual understanding among the religions, and mutual understanding is in turn the most effective means of creating an atmosphere of coexistence, mutual trust, tolerance, respect, and cooperation rather than an atmosphere of fear, hatred, animosity, rivalry,

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and violence among them. Animosity, hostility, or hate between individuals is manageable because the conditions of dialogue between them can easily be identified and articulated, but dialogue between institutions that exist as agglomerations of culturally, socially, and geographically diverse individuals does not seem to be easily manageable. How can this kind of institution dialogue with another institution? I shall begin the discussion of this question with a reiteration of a point I emphasized more than once in the preceding pages, namely a religion is not merely a complex phenomenon but a multivalent and multidimensional spiritual and empirical reality. Its foundation is first the revealed word of God, which is a compendium of beliefs and values concerning the nature of God and his will for human beings; second, interpreters of this word; third, leaders, which includes clergy, theologians, and teachers; and fourth, the community of believers. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to speak of religion if “religion” does not denote this complex structure. We can refer to it as a multitude, and in fact it is viewed and treated as such by social scientists and ordinary people. But if it is a multitude, the question necessarily arises: How can a multitude dialogue with another multitude? We should not overlook the fact that it is an agglomeration, not a conglomeration. No two individuals in the same religion, in the same community, in the same place, and sometimes in the same family have or can have exactly the same understanding of the beliefs and values and the ways these beliefs and values should be translated into action. Can you imagine how difficult it would be for two multitudes qua agglomerations to dialogue with each other? However, although it is a multitude and an agglomeration, and although it is mosaic of individuals who frequently live in geographically isolated areas, it is possible for a religion qua institution to dialogue with another religion if the aim of the dialogue is mutual understanding. The point is to enable the faithful to know that the other religion is a religion, that their way of life is founded in the word of God, that both of them recognize and worship the same God but differently, that it is impossible for them to worship another God since the existence of more than one God is inconceivable and so impossible, and that, contrary to what they may think or believe, they share many beliefs and values and none of them condones hate, violence, or bigotry, or disrespect for other human beings, regardless of their social, economic, cultural, religious, or ideological affiliation. But a critic might wonder, How can this type of mutual understanding be achieved? In what sense is interreligious dialogue the

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most effective means of achieving this aim? But first, how is dialogue between multitudes possible? First, dialogue is a rational conversation. The aim of this type of conversation is knowledge of the truth of an object or aspect of reality, human and natural. Apprehending the truth of an object is tantamount to understanding its identity, that is, its essence or nature. The most effective instruments of understanding are direct experience, logical and conceptual analysis, argument, demonstration, analogy, and critical evaluation. The object of understanding in interreligious dialogue are the beliefs, values, and way of life (praxis) of a religion. Accordingly, the activity of understanding a religion is composed of two basic steps: (a) analysis of its beliefs and values, and (b) experience of their way of life by observing its practices and, if possible, participating in some of its rituals. We cannot inject understanding into the mind of an individual or a community the way we inject a medication or some kind of liquid into the body of a human being intravenously, and we cannot force it into somebody’s mind by a decree, a whip, or even by brainwashing, for the mere presence of an idea in the mind does not necessarily entail belief or understanding. On the contrary, the mind should voluntarily desire to know or open its door to engage in a conversation that aims at the truth of an idea or an object; that is, it should be willing and ready to evaluate the elements of the object or the validity of a certain claim or belief. But understanding a truth can be attained directly or indirectly— directly when the individual participates in a conversation with one or more individuals, which frequently happens in social, professional, family, and academic settings. In this kind of setting, the understanding of a truth is directly attained in a conversation. But understanding the meaning of an idea or an object can also be attained through intermediaries, for example, when a scientist, a philosopher, an artist, or a theologian discovers a truth and then communicates it to others by means of logical and conceptual analysis, illustration, or an appropriate means of communication that reveals the nature of the new truth. Although in this kind of communication the audience acts as a recipient, nevertheless, they are active participants in the communication because they actively and willingly follow the development of the ideas communicated in the conversation. I here assume that following a line of reasoning or the development of an idea is an active, creative activity. Do we not follow the presentations of speakers or teachers when they deliver a lecture or lead a certain discussion? Do we not ask questions or criticize them when they finish the presentation? Do

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we not critically evaluate a book after we read it? Is the activity of reading a book or watching a drama unfold on the stage seriously dialogical in nature? How can it be otherwise if the mind is one with what it reads or sees? Suppose I read a book or a text by a dead author such as Plato, Voltaire, or Dewey. Suppose that my reading is serious, inquisitive, and critical, in which I seek an understanding of a certain question, problem, or type of human experience. Do I not have a conversation with the author of the book or text? I would not exaggerate, and I would not be too much amiss, if I state that in following the author in his analysis or development of a question, problem, or type of human experience, the activity of reading the book or text is dialectical par excellence. The arrival at a truth is a dialectical process in which the mind rises from the comprehension of the particulars to that of the essence that underlies the particulars. No matter its kind, truth does not jump into the mind; it is always the fruit of a critical, analytical, and evaluative activity. What is the point of participating in a dialogue in which the aim of the participants is to seek the truth if I am not willing to listen to the voice of reason, which implies putting aside all my idiosyncrasies, desires, and preconceptions about the subject under discussion? We may hide, ignore, veil, or in some way stray away from the truth, but we cannot destroy or annihilate it. The only hand that reveals it is the hand of reason, the only means of reaching or recognizing it is the light of reason, the only power by which we can apprehend it is the power of reason, and the only method by which reason can apprehend it is the method of logical and conceptual analysis, argument, and critical evaluation, the power that can tease it out of the particulars in which it is immanent. Accordingly, regardless of whether it is an agglomeration and regardless of whether it is a group, community, or institution, it is possible for two religions to dialogue on the basis, meaning, and application of their beliefs, values, and ways of life through intermediaries. Is it really possible, my critic might wonder, for two megainstitutions such as religions to dialogue about their unusually complex web of beliefs, values, and practices? Is this possibility realistic or feasible? Can it really produce the intended objective? But first, who are the intermediaries? How can an understanding that happens in the minds of a few individuals be transmitted intact to the culturally diverse and disparate community of the faithful? How can a will to understand be generated in their hearts and minds? These are fair questions! They spotlight the question of the possibility of interreligious dialogue, for if the event of mutual

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understanding does not find its way into the hearts and minds of the faithful, the dialogue would be restricted to the few theologians, political leaders, and philosophers who conduct it. If this happens, the dialogue would be a misfortune. Let me at once state that dialogue is the most appropriate medium in which mutual understanding can be achieved primarily because the aim of the dialogue is not merely to realize a practical need or interest, which may be the factor that instigates it, but also mutual understanding. It is urgently needed because mutual misunderstanding exists between most if not all religions. There is no viable alternative to the method of reason, and in the case of dialogue between two megainstitutions, there is no viable alternative to intermediaries as the agents by whom it can be conducted. Even in small communities such as parliaments, business or academic committees, boards, or councils, the conversation is usually conducted by a few persons and sometimes by one person who comes up with a proposal or a solution to a problem or an answer to a difficult and problematic question. Such persons are selected as representatives or as intermediaries primarily because they can articulate the spirit or the interests of the community or group. But such representation is urgently needed especially in interreligious dialogue because unlike business, political, economic, and academic types of conversations, dialogue between religions is extremely intricate and intellectually demanding. The interpretation of the word of God, the way it is translated into doctrine, and the way doctrine is translated into a way of life are complex, intricate, and deep in their meanings and ramifications. The word of God’s adequate interpretation, which should be an ongoing process, necessarily requires the cooperation of a large number of specialists. Is it an accident that ever since their rise and gradual development, the major religions have been surrounded by a multitude of theologians, philosophers, historians, administrators, and different types of linguistic and cultural experts whose function is to explain, clarify, and preserve the true meaning of the word of God and to promote it in the life of the believers by means of a large network of educators and religious scholars? But from the fact that interreligious dialogue is not conducted directly between two religious communities as groups and that it is conducted through representative intermediaries, it does not necessarily follow that it is not a genuine interreligious dialogue, that is, a dialogue between religions, for two reasons. First, the subject of the dialogue is not what the members of the religious communities believe but the word of God. Since,

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as I have just indicated, this word is not easily understandable or communicable, it stands to reason that only those who know and can discourse about it are qualified to converse about it or communicate it. In this context, what matters is not the number of the participants but the comprehensive and correct knowledge and communication of the meaning of the beliefs and values of the religions. Truth and falsity cannot be decided by a vote no matter the magnitude or generality of that vote. With the exception of a few cardinals, the church establishment stood against Galileo on the question of whether the earth rotates around the sun or the sun around the earth. Again, a majority vote condemned an innocent man such as Socrates, although he was right and the majority was wrong! But neither Galileo nor Socrates, nor a myriad of similar others in the different societies of the world, was wrong! Should we not always listen to the voice of truth, and should truth not always prevail? Is it an accident that we expect our leaders in all the institutions of our society to be truthful, wise, and prudent? Do we not feel cheated and sometimes angry when we discover that our leaders are not elected on the basis of wisdom and professional competence? Second, and a corollary to the preceding point, only those who can penetrate the depth of the word of God, those who can feel the presence of God in his revealed word, and those who can capture its essence can be its agents, explain it, and communicate it to others in the fullness of its connotation. Accordingly, if the interlocutors in interreligious dialogue are genuine embodiments of the spirit of their religions, it would be reasonable to say that such a dialogue can take place under the conditions of genuine conversation between two religions. My critic would now ask, “Let us grant, for the sake of discussion, that interreligious dialogue through intermediaries is or can be a genuine occasion for religious dialogue; second, let us grant that it takes place under the conditions of tolerance, modesty, respect, will to understand, and the recognition that the religion of the other is founded in a genuine divine revelation; and, third, let us grant that the interlocutors have arrived at mutual understanding. How can this understanding reach the minds and hearts of the faithful with the hope that they will at least gradually change their attitude toward the other religion? The ignorance, animosity, violence, and hate that vitiated interreligious relations during the past centuries in the East and the West exist in the minds and hearts of the faithful, not in the minds and hearts of the interlocutors. Moreover, we should not view mutual understanding merely as an intellectual exercise but as a means to transforming the attitudes of the members of the

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religious communities so that the conditions of the dialogue can be translated into action.” The fundamental premise that guided me in the preceding discussion in its entirety is that the best, and I think only, method for mitigating and hopefully eliminating the enmity and conflict among the various religions is the method of reason, not that of violence. Accordingly, if reason is the power by which we understand the factors that underlie this animosity and conflict, if rational conversation is the language of reason, it should follow that education should be the means of promoting mutual understanding as well as the conditions under which it can take place. This claim is based on the assumption that the language of education is the language of reason, that is, analysis, explanation, elucidation, argument, and demonstration. The basic thrust of education is a thrust for the truth; its immediate goal is the illumination of the nature of reality and human nature in all their dimensions, aspects, and activities. Only when this type of illumination happens not only in the minds of the intermediaries but especially in those of the faithful is genuine understanding possible, and only when this type of understanding is achieved can the apprehension of truth be a transformative power. Can the apprehension of the truth be a transformative power that changes our attitude toward the religiously different other? But how can the light of this illumination, of the truth that is revealed by it, find its way to the minds and hearts of the religious community? How can it open the minds that have been petrified in their ways of thinking, feeling, and acting toward people they have viewed as dangerous, misguided, and hateful for centuries? How can it open their hearts and allow the fountains of compassion, understanding, and cooperation to flow again toward those people? In short, can it really change their negative attitude toward the religiously different other? I aver that the achievement of this goal is a hard and formidable hope, and it may seem an impossible challenge not only because those hearts, minds, and attitudes have been firmly set and have become as hard as steel but also because in addition to the faithful, a large number of religious leaders and sometimes theologians tend to view the religiously different other with the same heart, mind, and attitude. Nonetheless, from the fact that it is not easy to achieve this goal, it does not necessarily follow that it is not worthy of pursuit or that it is not achievable. First, regardless of whether it is difficult or easy to pursue this goal, it is our moral, and I can add religious, obligation to pursue it. Thus, if the pursuit of love, peace,

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cooperation, and friendship is good; if interreligious dialogue aims at the realization of these values; if the pursuit of the good is always worthy of pursuit; then it is our obligation to promote interreligious dialogue. Was the good at the individual, social, national, and international levels in any sphere of human experience ever easy? Were the great achievements in science, technology, art, philosophy, politics, and economics during the past 2500 years easy? Was the rise and development of any of the major religions easy? What if, by a strike of irony, some of the leaders and theologians discover that the gospel of love, peace, and cooperation is not only their gospel but also the gospel of the same religions they hate, fear, and view as dangerous? What if they suddenly recognize that the faithful of the other religions are human beings just as they are, and that they worship the same God they worship just as they do? How many a missionary, researcher, or teacher discovered in their work that those who are religiously different share many of their moral, social, and metaphysical values and beliefs? Although we should not expect or hope for miracles in the pursuit of worthwhile goals, although some achievements in different periods of human history have been more miraculous than the miracles some ordinary people wished for, I hold tenaciously to the belief that no matter the difficulty of realizing it, the pursuit of a worthwhile goal that meets an essential demand of human nature is an obligation from which we cannot extricate ourselves with moral impunity. The obligation to pursue mutual understanding among the various religions as a necessary step for the realization of peace, cooperation, and mutual respect among them is such an obligation. But if it is an obligation, and if we commit ourselves to its realization, the recalcitrant question my critic raised and remains glaring us in the face is how? Is it feasible? This question is a request for a plan of action and an articulation of the conditions under which it can be realized. The elucidation of this twofold request is the task of the philosopher. I underscore this point because no goal we seek in any sphere of our life, individual or communal, is realizable if it is not clearly conceived, if it is not justifiable, and if it is not in principle realizable. Accordingly, we cannot answer the critic’s question unless we first examine the plan and the conditions under which it is feasible. It would be a grave mistake to reject a goal worthy of pursuit if we do not first know the elements of the plan and how the plan will be realized; otherwise, our rejection would be based on prejudice, fear, some idiosyncrasy, or lack of resources. Three basic conditions are required for the realization of a worthwhile goal: (a)

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purpose, or vision; (b) design, or plan of action; and (c) will, or passionate desire.

First, Purpose of Interreligious Dialogue: Mutual Understanding The first condition required for pursuing mutual understanding among the major religions of the world is a system of education whose main aim is religious enlightenment. The sort of education intended by this concept is not academic in nature; its purpose is to throw a light of understanding on the foundation and basic structure of the dialoguing religions. This purpose implies a recognition that God is the creator of the universe and everything that exists or happens in it, an interpretation of the nature of revelation and the way it is understood by the religions, the doctrines that disclose the essential meaning of the revelation, how this doctrine is related to the religious practice of the community of faithful, and how they understand God’s will for them, for example, immortality, last judgment, salvation, happiness, or reward and punishment. It is crucially important to emphasize that the dialoguing religions recognize that they are with a religion founded in a genuine divine revelation; otherwise, the dialogue would be superfluous and would not promote mutual understating. This is why I stated in Chap. 2 that equality is a necessary condition of interreligious dialogue. The concept of religious enlightenment consists of two elements: self-­ understanding, or understanding of the nature of one’s religion, and understanding of the religion of the religiously different other. It is, I think, painfully sad, as I pointed out earlier, that the majority of the faithful in the various religions are ignorant of the foundation and structure of their own religion as well as the foundation and structure of other religions. We are born with a particular religious identity; we do not choose this identity just as we do not choose the time, the place, the family, or the culture in which we are born. We receive it the way we receive our language and our intellectual, emotional, and social skills—by practice, by habitual enculturation. This reception, which is a gradual process, takes place within a complex web of religious practice: prayer, fasting, festive days, birth, burial, marriage rites, alms giving, and a multitude of modes of symbolic behaviors. We do not acquire our religious identity by going to school, listening to the arguments of theologians or philosophers, or

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reading some books, nor do we receive it as a gift by some authority by a magical act. We discover that we have a particular religious identity when we begin to mature rationally, emotionally, and socially. What if someone asks me, “Why are you a Christian, a Jew, a Muslim, a Hindu, or a Buddhist?” if I happen to be one of them? “Why do you go to church? Why do you draw the sign of the cross when you start eating your meal or when you enter a church? Why do you fast or pray the way you do?” How can I rationally answer any of these and other questions? The best logical answer I can give is that “I am a Christian because I am a Christian. This is how I was brought up by my family.” Believing that God is the creator of the universe, that he is three persons in one—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—that Jesus is his son, that the life and teaching of Jesus constitute the word of God, that the human soul is immortal, that there will be a last judgment day, that the disciples of Christ are the founders of the church, that this church is founded in the word of God—in short, living according to this word is what it means to be a Christian. As a Christian, I embody in my religious character this very meaning. Thus, I know what it means to be a Christian, and I am willing to converse with you or anyone on the nature and significance of Christianity from the standpoint of my experience as a Christian. Fine. What does it mean to be religious? It means to be a Christian! For me, “the Christian” defines “the religious.” But what if your neighbor is a Muslim or a Hindu? What if she too claims or asserts the way you do that she lives according to the way God revealed himself to her, and what if she claims that her religion is the true religion and that, therefore, she understands the religious from the standpoint of her religious practice? The point that merits special attention here is that the Christian, Muslim, and Hindu live in closed religious domains. They cannot leave their domain, not because they do not desire to leave it, not because they are intellectually incapable of leaving it, and not because they happen to be close-minded, but because epistemologically they cannot do it; they do not know how to leave the circle of their religious domain and examine it as objective observers, compare it to the domains of other religions, and then evaluate their understanding comparatively with the understanding of the other religions. But we do not need a religiously different other to reflect on or inquire into the foundation of our religion or the way we live in it without wondering why we live in it or because we happen to suffer from a bout of doubt. This kind of examination or inquiry is an imperative of reason, and

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it is such an imperative because self-examination is a moral and human imperative. The unexamined life, Socrates never tired of pleading to the Athenians, is not worth living! The need to respect this imperative is magnified not merely because the religiously different other lives next to my house or works with me in the office or the factory, but also because he has, for some political, economic, social, educational, or cultural reasons, been engaged in hateful and violent action toward the religiously different other. It does not harm any religious community in any of the different religions to know about the way their religion came into being, how they received the word of God, how they developed this word into a complex institution, why they interpret the meaning of human life and destiny the way they do, how they justify their interpretation of the revealed truth, or whether there is a reason or a justification for the existence of other religions. As I have emphasized more than once, the desire for knowledge is inherent in human nature. Knowledge is a power we can use to promote human well-being. But the desire to understand the dynamics that underlie the rise and development of one’s religion should extend to the other religions of the world because the world is becoming smaller and smaller, and also because it is becoming increasingly interactive and, in some cases, interdependent educationally, scientifically, technologically, and economically. This understanding should begin, as I argued earlier, with the recognition that the other religions are religions. Without this recognition, interreligious dialogue and, along with it, the conditions of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and the other conditions are not possible. Accordingly, the participants in the dialogue should proceed into it with a reasonably clear conception, at least understanding, that God is the source and ground on which all religions stand. But how can we acquire this understanding if we do not step out of the circle of our religious domains, if we do not view them from the standpoint of God rather than the standpoint of this or that religion, this or that theologian or philosopher? If we remain standing within the circle of our religious domain, we shall view God from its standpoint, not from the standpoint of God as the creator of the universe. But again, can we step out of it, and are we ready to step out of the domain of our religion? Under what theoretical and practical conditions can we do this? The only power that enables us to step out of the domain of our religion is the power of reason; it is creative par excellence! It is the seat of cognition, self-consciousness, moral sense, willing, and envisioning the

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future in all its modes of being and possibilities. It is, moreover, the power by which we transcend the present into the future and the past by which we recognize our personal identity or the identity of any event or idea in the immediate or distant past. Neither thinking nor planning is possible without this power. How can we examine ourselves if we cannot transcend ourselves? How many a time are we reminded or cautioned by our parents, friends, teachers, and elders to look in the mirror and see where we are, where we are going, or even what we should be? There is no need for more examples to underscore the fact that in addition to being a cognitive power, reason is a power of transcendence. We can step out of the circle of our religion, examine it, and understand its genesis, structure, and purpose by this power. But my critic might wonder, Can we empty ourselves of our own religion and examine it objectively? We cannot empty ourselves of our own religion, but we may bracket it by stepping out of its domain, which is an act of transcendence, and viewing it as an object. Do we not frequently catch ourselves performing the wrong action or walking on the wrong road of social existence? Do we not find ourselves standing before ourselves in moments of crisis, profound love, or exhilarating joy? How can we have such experiences but with the capacity of reason to transcend the present moment? Moreover, bracketing our religious beliefs, values, or feelings does not mean silencing, denying, or marginalizing them; on the contrary, we employ them as general concepts, as conceptual equipment, in the examination of the beliefs and values of the other religion. Is this not the method used by philosophers of comparative religion, comparative culture, and comparative philosophy, and is it not the method used by scientists in their quest of the nature of the world? Moreover, this power enables us to see an object as it is in itself and as it is related to other objects. It seems to me that if we approach the occasion of interreligious dialogue with God-mindedness, that is, with the recognition that there is one God and that he has revealed himself differently to the different cultures of the world differently; that if this revelation is the foundation of all the religions, then the dialogue will be an occasion for mutual understanding, the kind that enhances faith in God and also appreciation of the mystery and infinity of his creative powers. I shall explore this point in greater detail in the following chapter.

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Second, Religious Enlightenment: Plan of Action We may envision a lofty, attractive, idealistic, or even rational project in any area of human experience as a response to a critical or urgent need, but if the method of realizing the project cannot be translated into a workable system, that is, if it cannot be translated into action, the vision will remain ink on paper or an idea in the mind. It is not enough to have a lofty vision of religious education whose primary aim is religious enlightenment of one’s religion and other religions; it is equally important to design a system, at least a general plan, that can be translated into a living reality. What may the basic elements of such a plan be? No matter its kind or scope, the system must be a direct response, that is, tailored, to the kind and scope of the kind of enlightenment needed in a given social and cultural context; it cannot be borrowed or imposed on a religious community in need of religious enlightenment. But although the needs of the various religious communities are frequently variant, nevertheless, the basic design of the system in and through which it is implemented should rest on three elements of religion in general: school, family, and clergy or leadership. These three elements should be engaged in the educational program primarily because they are in a position to directly influence the attitude of the young and the adult alike. The kind of influence these elements exercise in their speech and action should be consistent with the central ideas and spirit of the educational establishment. The source and nature of the enlightenment to be promoted are the theologians and the interpreters of the religious doctrine. I emphasize this group because they, or some of them, will be participants in the conversations with the religiously different other and because they can embody the spirit of their religions more adequately than others. We should not lose sight of the fact that the religious education intended here is not academic in character. Although it is not academic in character, this religious education is nonetheless a program; as such, it is in need of an administrative structure led by a board of governors, a plan of religious enlightenment, and people who implement this plan. We cannot view or treat this kind of program as a traditional Sunday school, as a madrassa, or as a kind of social occasion, which is rather informal, voluntary, and scantily attended. On the contrary, the religious establishment must treat the program as a religious requirement for being a member of the community of the faithful or as an integral part of being a member of the religious community. The goal of

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the traditional Sunday school or similar schools can be incorporated in this program. The establishment of this kind of program, which is more serious, comprehensive, and substantial than the existing educational programs, is not a new idea but a revival of one of the three fundamental, original functions of the church, the Jaamei, and the synagogue, namely enlightenment, community, and worship. There is no need for me to discuss the material aspect of the implementation of such a program or how it should be implemented. Suffice it to say that a religious education program whose aim is religious enlightenment should be established by the dialoguing religions. The type of understanding that occupies the attention of the leaders of the programs should be the one that results from the conversations that take place between the theologians and leaders in the first moment of the dialogue between them. Only when this understanding finds its way into the minds and hearts of the members of the religious communities can tolerance, friendship, peace, respect, and cooperation prevail among them, and only in this way can the different religions be influential in the moral and spiritual development of human society. I should immediately add that the kind of understanding implied in this discussion is not an event that may take place during a stretch of time but is an ongoing process, a lifelong process. The religious way of being in the world is always understanding, always caring, always compassionate, always cooperative, always communal, always progressive!

Third, Will, or Passionate Desire The will intended in this discussion is religious will. Regardless of whether it is small or big, individual or communal, or national or international in nature, no worthwhile project is achievable without will or, as Aristotle would say, “efficient cause.” Ordinarily, will is associated with individuals; it is frequently the will of this or that human being. As a phenomenon, its ontic locus is the human individual, or the human subject. Accordingly, the questions we confronted and discussed in the preceding chapters confront us again: In what sense does the concept of will apply in this context? Whose will may qualify as the religious will of a religious community? Put differently, in what sense can a religious community have a religious will? The kind of will that can act as an efficient cause in the realization of the education program of a religious institution is a collective will in the same way a religious subject that represents the religious community in intrareligious

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dialogue is a collective subject. The ground of this will is the spirit, Geist, of a religion or religious community. Accordingly, the religious will that can act as the moving force in the erection of an education program that promotes religious enlightenment in general and interreligious dialogue in particular is a collective will, one shared by persons who are God-­ centered, who are truly committed to mutual understanding, mutual respect, friendship, and cooperation with the religiously different other, and who are willing to serve as the agents of the spirit of their religious community. How can such a will initiate or be effective in the design and implementation of such a serious program in an age that does not seem to place high value on the spiritual, much less on the religious? Can it? We can, as I pointed out earlier, construct lofty and noble visions of the betterment of human life in the different domain of human experience, but they will be useless if they are not transformed into a concrete, living reality. I never tire of emphasizing this contingency. This is why I have characterized will in this chapter as “passionate desire,” only because I view passion as a spark, as a flame. This kind of fire underlies the conception and development of human achievements at the individual and collective levels. Could the major religions have risen and progressed without the passionate will of their founders? Could the major empires have been established without the passionate will of their leaders? Could the major scientific and later technological revaluations have happened without the passionate will of the scientists and engineers who punctuate the history of human civilization from the early days of Thales and Archimedes to Galileo to Newton to Darwin? Could democracy have been established in many Western societies as a political way of life if it were not for the sacrifices of millions of freedom lovers? Hegel was not, I think, mistaken when he remarked that passion is the moving force of history. But when passion is desire for the good, it is glorious. Yes, passionate will, whether it springs from the mind of one or more than one person, is a kind of fire that creates worthwhile projects from the bosom of human potential. Was this kind of will the source of Martin Luther’s courage to stand in defiance of the church establishment? There is no need for me to cite more examples to substantiate the reasonableness of my claim because the history of civilization offers plenty of them. I tend to think that this fire exists potentially, and it is aflame quietly, in the hearts, minds, and wills of many religious people and anyone interested in the progress of humanity. The good is always attractive, always desirable.

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The only power that kindles this fire is the power of love, the only power that embraces this kind of love ontically is the power of reason, and the only power that enlivens the eyes and arms of love is education. It is, I think, the task of the religious elite to create an awareness, and hopefully a kind of consciousness, of the need to promote mutual understanding, mutual respect, and cooperation among the different religions not as a public relations project but as a religious obligation and as an integral part of the aims of religion as an institution.

CHAPTER 5

Mysticism as a Basis of Interreligious Dialogue: God-Centeredness

God-Centeredness as a Condition of Interreligious Dialogue Of all the conditions that are necessary for the possibility of interreligious dialogue, God-centeredness is the essential requisite, without which this kind of dialogue is not possible, much less practicable, first, because it is indispensable for the fulfillment of the formal conditions of the dialogue, namely respect, equality, objectivity, empathy, toleration, and especially mutual understanding (see Smock 2002; Pratt 2014; Cornille 2008; Schmidt-Leukel 2017), and second, if it is not met, it would be difficult to begin or even justify the dialogue. God-centeredness is an ontological orientation grounded in the belief that the major religions are founded in the transcendent: God. It is a concretization of this belief into a way of viewing the world—of thinking, feeling, and acting from its standpoint. It implies that a superior, transcendent reality exists and that we and the whole universe is dependent on it. It also implies that the design of the I would like to thank Professor Malgorzata Czarnocka, editor of Dialogue and Universalism, for permitting me to make use of parts of my essay, “Possibility of Inter-religious Dialogue: Structural and Formal Conditions” (29:2, 2016), in Chap. 2, and including “Mysticism as a Basis of Inter-religious Dialogue,” in Chap. 5, (29:2, 2019). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. H. Mitias, Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6_5

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universe, on the one hand and of human nature on the other derive their being from this reality. Is it an accident that Dharma is a cosmic principle that administers cosmic change without being a part of it? A God-centered person experiences and interprets the scheme of nature and human life from the standpoint of God, that is sub species divinitas. Inasmuch as it is ontological, this orientation is the ground on which the interlocutors stand prior to and during the dialogue. Sidestepping this ground is a negation or repudiation of the possibility of interreligious dialogue; affirming it paves the way for the fulfillment of the formal conditions, for, as I shall be arguing in the following pages, standing on this ground is standing on a common sacred space. But although it is the essential condition, God-centeredness alone is not a sufficient condition for the possibility of interreligious dialogue. The fulfillment of the formal conditions is necessary for the dialogue’s realization. The point we need to underline here is that although the formal conditions are necessary, they are dependent on, and we can say derived from, God-centeredness as the essential condition. In what follows, I shall first elaborate this claim, and then I shall explain the sense in which God-centeredness is the essential condition. First, when I say that God-centeredness is the essential condition of the possibility of interreligious dialogue, I mean that conditions such as toleration, respect, objectivity, empathy, equality, or mutual understanding cannot be fulfilled if the interlocutors in it do not proceed from a God-­ centered orientation. If we deny that the beliefs and values of the religious other are grounded in divine revelation, or if we proceed into it with a religion-centered orientation, namely that ours is the only true revelation, it would be impossible for us to tolerate, respect, treat the other as our equal, or assume a disinterested attitude, primarily because we believe that their beliefs and values fall short of the divine truth. This assertion is based on the principle that we ought to respect and tolerate the true (and the good) and frown upon the untrue (and the bad). Broadly speaking, we can treat other people as our equals in virtue of our shared humanity, but we cannot treat the religiously different others as our equals if they are not our equals religiously or if we do not stand on the same religious ground, namely the transcendent. On the contrary, if we think that the religious beliefs and values they live by are not grounded in the transcendent, we are bound to feel superior to them; we would also feel inclined to enlighten them about the Truth and feel justified in converting them. Moreover, proceeding into the dialogue from the conviction that our religion is the

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true religion would undermine the possibility of objectivity, which is a basic condition of rational conversation in general, because we will necessarily be caught in the religion-centered predicament, in which we will converse with the other from the standpoint of our religious beliefs and values. In this state, we are impelled to hear what the other says in terms of our own categories of thinking, feeling, and valuing. But the more serious difficulty is that, in contradistinction to God-­ centeredness, religion-centeredness undercuts the possibility of mutual understanding, which is an aim and a condition of interreligious dialogue; that is, mutual understanding is not only an end but also a means to the end. We aim at mutual understanding because it is a condition for creating harmony among the different religious communities and hopefully for cooperating on projects that matter to us as human individuals and societies. I here assume that interreligious dialogue is not merely a conversation between theologians and philosophers, which is a theoretical activity, but also a conversation between two religious communities. Now, since it is a rational conversation, interreligious dialogue aims at the truth, in this context at the truth implicit in the beliefs and values of the religiously different other. But if we proceed into it with a religion-­ centered attitude, that is, from the belief that ours are the true beliefs and values, it would be impossible to understand the religiously other’s beliefs and values the way they understand them; on the contrary, we would understand them from the standpoint of our own beliefs and values. But the point of the dialogue is to understand them the way they understand their beliefs and values. Lack of mutual understanding is due to the fact that each party stands on a different religious ground, on the belief that they have an exclusive possession of the truth. Standing on two different religious grounds will necessarily undermine the possibility of mutual understanding. We here assume that the subject of the dialogue relates to the beliefs and values—and along with them the rites, norms, rituals, customs, symbols, myths, and traditions that embody these beliefs and values—of the interlocutors. This implies that insofar as it is a rational conversation, the purpose of the dialogue is mutual understanding. It is possible for two religions to dialogue about political, social, philosophical, or scientific issues and to consider ways of dealing with them. This type of conversation cannot be characterized as “religious” but as political, social, philosophical, or scientific. These issues fall outside their domains as religions, although they may be vitally important for the realization of certain goals. A dialogue

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derives its identity from the distinctive character of its subject. For example, a dialogue is scientific inasmuch as the ideas discussed in it are scientific, philosophical inasmuch as the ideas discussed in it are philosophical, and artistic inasmuch as the ideas discussed in it are artistic. Moreover, it is possible for the religious interlocutors to discuss the religious beliefs and values of another religion. In this case, although the subject of the dialogue is religious ideas, the distinctive character of their conversation is not, strictly speaking, religious but philosophical or theological. This assertion does not, however, imply that the conversation in interreligious dialogue is not philosophical or theological; on the contrary, it is both, for it includes both critical and logical analysis of religious texts and because it is the kind of conversation that takes place between two religions qua religions. I emphasize “qua religions” only to accentuate the fact that the interlocutors in it know and recognize that they are not merely conversing about beliefs and values that are external to their religions but about their own beliefs and values. Their aim is not to teach, preach, compete, or exploit the other but to achieve mutual understanding. They know and recognize that the ground on which they stand is sacred and that it is the source and foundation of their being qua religions. It would be difficult, in fact impossible, for two religions to engage in a dialogue qua religions if they stood on different ontological grounds, because if they did, the beliefs and values that make up the structure of their religions would then derive their meaning and justification from different sources. Refusal to acknowledge the same ontological source insulates religions and sets them apart from each other and consequently undercuts any possible line of communication between them, mainly because they are committed to the belief that the religious truth they live by is exclusively revealed to them, and because it is exclusive, it can be understood only from the standpoint of their religious texts and the way they interpret them. The theologians of a religion may converse with the theologian of other religions about their beliefs and values; in this case, their conversation will, as we saw, be theological or philosophical, not about their religions qua religions. The wall that separates them from each other is impenetrable by other religions. Accordingly, they would in principle be reluctant to engage in interreligious dialogue. Now, interlocutors who are religion-centered cannot theoretically participate in interreligious dialogue. They are generally called exclusivists. Those who acknowledge, directly or indirectly, that the major religions are revelations of the transcendent are called pluralists. But there is a third

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group of scholars who have taken a middle ground, namely the inclusivists. They have argued that although their religion is unique, and some would say exclusive, interreligious dialogue is possible. Many arguments have been advanced for and against these positions (see, e.g., Badham 1998). There is no need for me to participate in this debate because my main concern is to explore the feasibility of God-centeredness as the essential condition of interreligious dialogue: Is the claim that the major religions are founded in the transcendent justifiable? Many theologians and philosophers have argued, as I shall presently explain in detail, that it is not justifiable. They think that positing a transcendent as the basis of interreligious dialogue, a “being” we cannot describe or directly experience, is not a justifiable position. If this is the case, the pursuit of interreligious dialogue would be a vain undertaking. But I shall argue that it is not a vain undertaking. In what follows, I shall first present a brief analysis of the main arguments against the possibility of mysticism as an ontological basis of interreligious dialogue and, second, critically evaluate these arguments. The proposition I shall defend is that mysticism is a reasonable and therefore justifiable basis of God-centeredness as the essential condition of interreligious dialogue. This defense rests on two main claims: (a) positing the existence of a transcendent as the source and foundation of the major religions is an ontological necessity in the sense that it is difficult to explain the world as it is without positing a transcendent as its source or ground, and (b) by its very nature, religion points to, indeed presupposes, a transcendent as its ontological source or foundation. We should hasten to add that positing the existence of a transcendent that is unknowable, one that is not relevant to human life, is untenable on philosophical and religious grounds. The relevance of the transcendent is disclosed in the medium of the mystical experience, which has been the aim of the metaphysician from Plato and Plotinus to Whitehead and Bergson, and the aim of the mystic from the rise of Hinduism, Taoism, and Buddhism in the East to the rise of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the Middle East. As I shall explain in the following pages, any discourse about mysticism presupposes the existence of the transcendent, and any discourse about the transcendent presupposes the existence of mystical experience; otherwise, talk about the transcendent or the mystical experience would not be meaningful.

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Arguments Against Mysticism as a Basis of Interreligious Dialogue The most recent, comprehensive, lucid, yet critical statement of the main arguments against the possibility of mysticism as a basis of interreligious dialogue, and consequently of God-centeredness, is presented in Catherine Cornille’s The Im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue (2008). Although my focus will be on this statement, I shall keep a vigilant eye on her analysis of the formal conditions of interreligious dialogue. First, the formidable, stubborn obstacle that stands in the way of any attempt to justify the possibility of mysticism as a basis of interreligious dialogue, Cornille (2008) argues, is the existential fact of religious self-­ understanding: “Every religion tends to regard itself as unique, self-­ contained, and in no way comparable to the other religions of the world” (p. 95). Acknowledging this fact is tantamount to a denial of a ground on which religions can stand in their attempt to dialogue qua religions. Self-­ containment, or singularity, precludes the recognition of a transcendent as the religions’ source or common denominator. In Cornille’s words, it “severely limits the impulse for dialogue since all religious teachings are regarded as but finite expressions of an incommunicable experience or reality” (Ibid.). In defending this assertion, Cornille focuses on two major approaches in the domain of mysticism. The first approach appeals to the unity of the mystical experience in the different religious traditions. Its adherents argue that although they are different in their cultural contexts, methods, and ways of talking about the transcendent, the mystical experiences in all these traditions share a common core. This core is the ground in which they are founded and on which they stand before each other qua religions. But the existence of such a ground, Cornille argues, has been questioned by many theologians and philosophers such as Gavin D’Costa (2000), Steven Katz (1983), Robert M. Gimello (1983), Hans H.  Penner (1983), John Cobb (1982), and Denys Turner (2012), to mention a few. For example, Katz says that the mystical experience is not a pure experience that stands on its own apart from the religious context in which it takes place but one that belongs to that context; it is quite different from the mystical experience that takes place in a different religious context. “The Hindu mystic,” he writes, “does not have an experience of X which he describes in the, to him, familiar language and symbols of Hinduism, but rather he has a Hindu experience; his experience is not an unmediated experience of X but is itself the at least partially preformed

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anticipated Hindu experience of Brahman” (Katz 1983). But if the mystical experience of the Hindu is radically different from that of the Muslim, the Buddhist, and the Taoist, it would necessarily follow that their experiences would not have a common denominator; consequently, it would be difficult if not impossible to speak of “unity of all mystical experiences” among the different religions. Cornille (2008) thinks that the arguments advanced by those generally known as constructivists, in contradistinction to those known as essentialists, who uphold the unity of the different mystical experiences, have “succeeded in removing the self-­ evidence with which some have come to assume the idea of the unity of all mystical experiences.” Absence of this unity renders the possibility of interreligious dialogue futile. Moreover, if we posit the existence of an ineffable being as the principle of the unity of all mystical experiences, the beliefs and values of the different religions would be relativized. The Truth does not anymore lie in the religions but in the ineffable transcendent. The implication for interreligious dialogue is clear: if the different religious teachings and practices of a religion are not “constitutive” of “the mystical experiences which take place in them, or if they are not different from the mystical experiences in other religions, it is no longer clear that engagement with any other religious teaching is necessary except for the general acquisition of facts” (Ibid., p. 120). Cornille’s rejection of the unity of all mystical experiences does not stop with her endorsement of the constructivist position, for she considers “the actual experience of dialogue between spiritual masters and monks from different religious traditions” (2008, pp. 114–15) as a kind of empirical evidence that corroborates the claim that all mystical experiences have a common denominator. But this kind of dialogue cannot be properly characterized as interreligious for two reasons: first, because it takes place between a small group of individuals, and second, because these individuals admit that their experiences are also different from each other. A Christian monk may, for example, engage in a dialogue with a Buddhist monk about some aspects of the universe or human life. They may in the course of their conversation reflect on the mystery that permeates the scheme of nature and necessarily plunge into its foundation; yes, they may together focus their intellectual eyes on the cause that underlies all causes; and yes, they may fall silent in the presence of what their eyes witness. In a moment like this, they do not communicate; they commune. Can we not subsume this type of experience under the category of “unity of all mystical experiences”? No. Even though it points to

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the unity of their experiences, “it must also be pointed out,” Cornille writes, “that a number of individuals immersed in this dialogue continue to emphasize the difference between mystical experiences” (p. 118). This difference is a roadblock that stands in the way of interreligious dialogue. Second, if the unity of mystical experiences cannot be a basis of interreligious dialogue, can the position of a transcendent reality be a justifiable basis? Although the focus of this chapter is primarily on mystical experience, it is, I think, important to consider this alternative because, as I indicated earlier, the concept of a transcendent being is both logically and ontologically inseparable from the concept of mystical experience. Cornille is aware of this relation for she considers the possibility of the transcendent as possible basis of interreligious dialogue immediately after her discussion of the concept of mystical experience. Those who hold that the major religions derive their being and the substance of their beliefs and values from a transcendent reality view this reality as the ground on which they stand as a common denominator in the medium of interreligious dialogue. Even though they are different, they are nevertheless expressions, or revelations, of this reality. Their differences, which reflect different cultural languages, gradually fade away or recede as they move closer in the mystical experience to their source. The religious experiences of the faithful or mystics in the different religions may seem different since they are embedded in different cultural contexts, but in essence they are not because they embody the same ultimate truth. Accordingly, no religion can in principle be said to be superior to any other religion, and no religious truth enunciated by one religion can be charged with relativism since no one of them is religion-centered but God-centered. In her critical reaction to this position Cornille (2008) directs her attention to the most influential advocate of the view that the transcendent is the basis of interreligious dialogue, namely John Hick: “it seems more probable,” she quotes from his The Philosophy of Religion, “that they undergo characteristically different unitive experiences (even though with important common features), the differences being due to the conceptual frameworks and meditational disciplines supplied by the religious traditions in which they participate” (p.  123). Thus, if all the religions are revelations of the same transcendent, if the truths that are communicated in and through their religious texts are derived from that reality, then it should follow that that reality is a reasonable basis for interreligious dialogue. This line of reasoning may at first seem sound, but it is not for three reasons. First, how do we determine that a truth

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enunciated by a certain religion is authentic? This question asks for a valid criterion by which we can verify the veracity of such enunciation. Where can it come from—inside or outside the religion? According to Hick, a religious truth is genuine inasmuch as it promotes “the transformation of human experience from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness” (Cornille, 2008, p. 124). But this criterion, Cornille objects, is plausible and may function as a common denominator among the religions only as far as it “can be derived from within the normative teachings of their particular religions” (Ibid.). But this criterion resists application to other religions, for what counts as growth or movement toward the transcendent reality in one religion may not so count elsewhere. Besides, religions are not inclined, Cornille adds, “to subordinate their own religious criteria to any other religious denominator. Not only would this contradict religious self-understanding, but it would almost certainly impoverish dialogue, which ideally includes the creative and constructive engagement of one’s own highest criteria of truth with those of the other” (Ibid.). Second, founding religions in a transcendent reality would “diminish the importance of distinctive teachings and ritual practices, and thus the very occasion of dialogue” (Cornille 2008, p.  124). But does it? For Cornille, even though Hick recognizes “the informational input of the different religious conceptions of ultimate reality (p. 125), still, founding all religions in the same transcendent reality tends to “minimize the existence and importance of claims to truth, and indeed the fact that religious teachings claim ultimacy” (Ibid.). Third, for Hick, the transcendent is viewed as a neutral reality because it is ineffable. But following critics such as Masao Abe (1995), D’Costa (2000), and Cobb (1982), Cornille (2008) points out that a transcendent reality that is neutral cannot be relevant to interreligious dialogue. “After all,” she adds, “believers worship not the Real, but a particular conception of ultimate reality that thus retains all the meaning and the power proper to the religions” (p. 127). This line of reasoning was, moreover, articulated with a sharp focus by Denys Turner in a recent study, “Christians, Muslims and the name of God: Who owns it, and how would we know?” Here Turner argues that positing a transcendent reality as a common denominator among the different religions does not only relativize their beliefs and values by stripping them of their absolute claim to the truth of these beliefs and values, but also because the transcendent will be referred to by terms “that are neutral between them all and owned by none, and that is no basis for any sort of dialogue between them” (in Volf 2012,

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p. 23). And if a dialogue is conducted between them on its basis, it will be a bastard dialogue because the transcendent will be a tertium quid—“a sui generis discourse of dialogue standing on its own and additional to the discourses proper to and natural within the faith traditions themselves” (Ibid.).

Critical Evaluation First Critical Response. An analysis of the concept of ineffability will, I think, shed ample light on the relation between the mystical experience and its cultural context, its relation to other mystical experiences, and its relation to the transcendent, and pave the way for a critical evaluation of Cornille’s arguments. If I can show that the different mystical experiences are unified in virtue of their being founded in the transcendent, it would be reasonable to claim that the mystical experience can be a basis of interreligious dialogue; otherwise, such a claim would be unreasonable. “Ineffable” does not denote a simple quality that we can perceive and point to the way we perceive the white color of snow, nor does it denote a “quality” that can be captured, defined, or subsumed under a logical category or pure concept. Therefore, it does not signify an essence in virtue of which all the different mystical experiences are or can be unified. “Affability” comes from the Latin ad (do) and fori (to speak)—to be able to speak—which gives rise to “ineffable,” which in turn comes from the Latin in (no) and affabilis (utterable)—unable to speak. Thus “ineffable,” which means “too overwhelming to be expressed or described in words” (WNCD), is a capacity term; it denotes the inability of the mind to conceptualize an object, an event, or a relation. This implies that the mind does not possess the capacity to “comprehend” the wealth of the content it encounters in the mystical experience. This is why when mystics try to communicate their experiences of the transcendent, they speak negatively— via negativa—or in superlative terms, which clearly acknowledges their inability to describe their experiences. It is, we think, quite appropriate to say that “ineffability” is a linguistic guidepost, a symbolic expression that points to something beyond itself, namely the transcendent. When the Hindu mystic, for example, says that Brahman is neti, neti, he means that it is not this, not that, and not any other object, event, relation, quality, or anything that can be conceptualized by the mind or communicated by language. But although language fails to communicate the essential nature of the transcendent, it does not necessarily fail to lead the mind to it.

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Moreover, when the mystic says neti, neti, she implies that it is something that exists, that she experiences, and that it cannot be described. The same applies to the arguments she uses to show that the transcendent is something other than any object we experience in the realm of nature. This point is clearly illustrated by an anecdote in which a master was lecturing to his students about the Truth—the transcendent. Toward the end of the lecture, one of the students asked, “Master, but what is the Truth? You have said what it is not, but not what it is.” The master looked at him without uttering a word, and he remained speechless for a long time. The class also was speechless during this time. The student lost his patience and asked again: “Master, would you please tell us what the Truth is?” The master kindly looked at the student and said, “Can’t you see, foolish one, that the Truth is Silence?” Via negativa is not merely a linguistic exercise but especially an ontological activity whose aim is to direct the mind to the sufficient reason that underlies the existence of the world as an ordered whole. The student in the anecdote was looking for a ready-made answer—for a conceptual account of the Truth, thinking that it could be expressed in a few sentences or in a definition, but he did not understand that the purpose of the lecture in which the master employed the via negativa method to explain what it means to say that the truth is ineffable was to initiate the class in the art of rising from the experience of the particulars, human and natural, that make up the structure of the universe to that which underlies it. Talking about beauty is one thing; experiencing it is something else. Similarly, talking about the transcendent is one thing; experiencing it is something else. And the master was, in his way, trying to show the way that leads to the Truth. He simply could not experience it for them. The quest for the transcendent is a personal undertaking. This point calls for two remarks. First, mystics are quite aware that attributing any quality, or “existence,” to the transcendent is either redundant or self-contradictory. While a proposition such as “God exists” is redundant, because we cannot attribute existence to God if we do not assume that he exists, a proposition such as “God is ineffable” is self-contradictory, because it asserts what it denies. Thus “God is ineffable” is not a proposition in which we assert the ineffability of God the same way we assert the whiteness of a flake of snow, but a directive that points the way to God. It is a request to experience him and then see what it means to say that he is ineffable. Second, inasmuch as God is understood as a transcendent being and inasmuch as any claim about him is the result of a direct encounter with

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him, the mystical experience cannot be a fortuitous or sui generis experience but is a quest and, more concretely, a process of reflection, and it frequently involves a regimen of exercises and practices, which begins with a provocative, problematic, or intriguing aspect of nature or human life and culminates in a mystical encounter with God. Regardless of how it begins or of the cultural background of the seeker, it takes place in a cultural-religious context, primarily because humanity is a second nature and because this nature steps into actuality in the sphere of culture. Outside this sphere, humanity remains in the womb of potentiality. Accordingly, the mystical experience takes place in terms of the beliefs and values—rites, customs, symbols, myths, practices, celebrations, social norms—of a specific culture. Second Critical Response. Inasmuch as the mystical experience is a quest, the transcendent is its aim. This aim is the raison d’être of the mystical experience. If this is the case, and it is, the mystical experience presupposes the existence of the transcendent, and without this presupposition, any discourse about the mystical experience would be idle talk. This assertion is made on the assumption that “experience” is a relational or intentional concept; it is always the experience of an X, where X is an object of some kind. One cannot have a pure experience or an experience of not-X or of “nothing.” And it would be equally idle talk to say that the transcendent can be experienced as something “unknowable” or “unknown,” for it is not an object. And we cannot experience it as an object, one to which we can refer. We can say that it is “unknowable” the way Locke and Kant did, but on the basis of inference, not direct experience. Thus, the mystics’ claim that they undergo an experience of the transcendent implies that it is cognitive, and if it is not cognitive, they cannot make any claim about it; they would not even be able to say neti, neti in reference to it. Indeed, they would not be mystics without this kind of experience. However, it is not cognitive in a conceptual but in an intuitive sense. This is why the mystics characterize their experience of the transcendent as “noetic.” Even metaphorically, we cannot say that the transcendent is ineffable if we do not imply that we know it to be so. Therefore, it would be reasonable to say that the mystical experience is (a) inconceivable apart from the transcendent that is the subject of the experience and (b) inconceivable if it is not cognitive. It should follow from the preceding line of reasoning that, regardless of the fact that mystical experiences are embedded in different religious contexts and regardless of how radical these contexts may be, they must be

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of the same transcendent; otherwise, we would be compelled to posit more than one transcendent, which is inadmissible both logically and ontologically. But our critic would ask, “How can we know that the transcendent is revealed or appears differently to mystics in the different religions, and how do we know that all of them are experiences of the transcendent?” First, since the transcendent is an infinite wealth of being, as I have already explained, it is not unreasonable to hold that it can be experienced differently by different mystics. Moreover, it is a generally recognized fact that people experience the same object differently, mainly because individual experience is generally enmeshed in an unusually complex system of values, beliefs, past experiences, interests, levels of intelligence, desires, tastes, and genetic dispositions—and one can say in a different worldview. But from the fact that the mystical experience is enmeshed in a specific religious context, it does not necessarily follow that it cannot be interpreted or translated into a different religious or cultural language. Second, the transcendent does not reveal itself the way artists reveal themselves in their works or the way human beings reveal themselves in their actions. As far as we know, the transcendent is not an object and certainly it is not anthropomorphic in nature. It does not, in short, have a mind, a heart, and a will; therefore, it does not act the way people do. It simply is, and it is itself. How can the infinite undergo any kind of change, no matter its magnitude? It would be contradictory to say, as Descartes and Spinoza cogently argued, that it does not undergo any kind of change! It is we human beings who seek it and respond to it in a certain way, and it is we who desire to know it. But then do we seek it because we need to know why we are here, why the universe exists, or how we should live? The transcendent exists for us, as Aristotle said, as an object of love and desire, and from the standpoint of the mystics, as an object worthy of seeking, knowing, being with, and in some cases revering. Only in this sense does the transcendent reveal itself. If we choose to use the term “reveal,” we can say that it reveals itself inasmuch as its reality consists in self-­ disclosure, and I say “self-disclosure” because since it is what it is, that is, since it does not undergo any change, it is absolute presence. Was it an accident that Plato, Plotinus, and many mystics referred to it metaphorically as the Sun—the Light? This dual feature, that the transcendent is essentially self-disclosure on the one hand and that it is an infinite wealth of being on the other, is what justifies the claim that it is noetic and ineffable. Before the sublime, dazzling sight of this infinite wealth of being,

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the mind of the mystic bows in silence—not the silence of absence but the silence that speaks. Third Critical Response. Cornille’s claim that the major religions are radically different from each other and that, consequently, this difference stands in the way of interreligious dialogue is an exaggeration to the extent that it distorts their existential teachings and practices. This criticism betrays a leaning toward a strict exclusivist position both religiously and culturally. The exclusivity of a religion is correlated with, and we can say derived from, the exclusivity of the culture in which it is embedded. It assumes that because religions are embedded in different cultures, because cultures are radically different ways of life, and because they reflect different worldviews, they therefore cannot communicate with each other. But this line of reasoning is indefensible. I aver that religions are rooted in different cultural contexts and that the meaning of their beliefs and values is expressed, interpreted, and understood according to the rules and conventions of their cultural languages. But from the fact that they are embedded in different cultural contexts, it does not necessarily follow that they do not share structural features or a common denominator, as I have already argued. Meaning transcends the symbolic expression in which it is communicated, be it philosophical, artistic, or religious. Is it logically permissible to say that radically different religions cannot communicate with each other if we do not assume knowledge of their beliefs and values? Again, can we say that they are radically different if we do not know their beliefs and values? It is noteworthy that religion-centeredness is to a large extent actuated by psychological, political, social, economic, and educational factors, not so much by religious beliefs and values. The history of religious conflict, much of which is fostered by an exclusivist orientation, in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa, now and in the past, lends credibility to this assertion. Any statement we make about similarities and differences among religions should be based on religious reasons, on philosophical or metareligious criteria, not on criteria proposed by the particular religions themselves. It is not my purpose here to undertake any detailed analysis of this issue, but a remark is in order. In any attempt to make a comparative statement about the different religions, we should, as it is the case in any kind of comparative study, stand outside the spheres of the religions under consideration and, focusing our attention on the meaning of their beliefs and values, see the extent to which we can discern certain similarities or differences. In this respect, Cornille cites Hick’s criterion for the evaluation

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of the ultimate claims of a religion, namely religious growth: “the transmutation of human experience from self-centeredness to Reality-­ centeredness” (2008, p.  124). But this criterion is not enough because one can be Reality-centered but fanatic, narrow-minded, intolerant, or religiously arrogant. How many a genuine religious leader approved the torture, and in some cases the death, of the religiously different other? How many a genuine human being has been shunned because her religious beliefs and values are different? How many a society was persecuted in the name of religion? Moral goodness should be added as a second criterion. Moral values constitute the second essential constituent, and we can say pillar, of any religion (Dinoia 1992; Whitehead 1926). It is difficult for the truly religious person, regardless of the religious tradition to which she belongs, to be a religious bigot or fanatic, not only because all religions are founded in the belief that God is an infinite wealth of being and so can appear differently to different peoples under different cultural circumstances, but especially because it is impermissible for any human being to denigrate or impede the growth and development of humanity. Humanity exists as an end in itself, as Kant insisted; it is a jewel that shines from within. It is a primary, if not the primary, value of all the religions. An investigative look into the mosaic of the different religions will, as I shall presently explain, show that the similarities among them surpass their differences and that these differences are mostly due to cultural, not essential factors. This explanation is based on the proposition that all religions are founded in the transcendent. First and foremost, all religions share the belief that they are founded in a transcendent being—in a being that is greater than the world, that this being is the foundation of the universe, that this being is the author of human life and destiny, and that neither the world nor human life can be explained without it (Smith 1991; Prothero 2010; Hick 1989). Whether it is called God, Brahman, Allah, Yahweh, Tao, or Emptiness, it is the ultimate, the transcendent, because we cannot assume the existence of a plurality of transcendent that perform the same explanatory function and because the religions themselves hold that they are founded in the transcendent. Second, the beliefs and values that constitute the structure of the various religions are believed to be derived from, inspired by, or in some way attributed to the transcendent (Ibid.). This derivation, inspiration, or attribution is exactly what bestows finality or absoluteness upon the beliefs and values proclaimed by the different religions. The faithful are expected

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to accept that these beliefs and values are divine, absolute, and that the moral and religious prescriptions that follow from them are absolutely binding, and they are binding because they come from the transcendent. The transcendent is, after all, the absolute being than which nothing greater can be conceived. His word, or the truth that emanates from the infinity of his being, justifies but cannot be justified. Third, contrary to Cornille’s claim, the mystical experience is not merely an experience of a simple, pure, or neutral reality but of an infinite wealth of being. In addition to testimonies by most if not all mystics, this claim is corroborated by philosophical mystics such as Plotinus, Spinoza, and more recently Whitehead, who interpreted the concept of God in terms of (a) a primordial and (b) a consequent nature. While the first consists of an infinite wealth of potentiality, the second consists of the realm of actuality. The first is an object of God’s vision and the basis of his creative act; the second is the realization of this act. In spite of their differences, mystical experiences, which underlie all religions, show that the transcendent is believed to be infinite in power, wisdom, goodness, and creativity (Whitehead 1929; Smith 1991). A critical examination of these four concepts will show that they are explanatory in their function. They are intended to answer basic questions about the meaning of human life and destiny on the one hand and the existence of the universe on the other. Fourth, the understanding that emerged from the pioneers of the major mystical experiences of the major religions and that was later endorsed by many mystics in the East and the West is that the transcendent is intimately relevant to human life and that it is worthy of worship, reverence, and obedience (Smith 1991). This intimacy derives, first, from the fact that the kind of knowledge gleaned from or intuited in the mystical experience provides answers to the fundamental questions that matter to human beings, for example, how should we live? Who created the universe? Why are we created on this earth? Is human life worth living? Second, all mystics express a feeling of awe, of wonder, of amazement, of confusion, of elation, of self-loss, of fear in the presence of the transcendent to the extent that not only the mind but also the body of the mystic trembles and quakes before the overpowering effect of this presence. Could it be that this sort of experience is what justifies the tendency of most religions to view the transcendent in personal terms? Fifth, all religions express their understanding of the transcendent and respond to it similarly, that is, in terms of a system of beliefs and

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values—which are embodied in a set of rites, prayers, customs, celebrations, symbols, social norms, traditions, myths, and ways of realizing their happiness—and a conception of the world and human life. For example, worshipping the transcendent (or God) is an essential ingredient of all the religions, but it is performed differently. This difference is to a large extent due to cultural factors. The task of interreligious dialogue is to translate the cultural language of one religion into another. We may accompany a Christian and observe how he prays in church on a Sunday morning; then on Friday noon we may accompany a Muslim and observe how he prays in the mosque. Not only is the architecture of the buildings in which they pray different, which reflects the art of the culture in which they are embedded, but also the content of the prayer is different. Both pray to God but differently. Do the different Christian denominations not pray to God differently? Is it not possible to explain why they pray differently? But if we cast a comparative look at the religious values that underlie all religions, we discover that they are basically similar—piety, faith, compassion, humility, mutual aid, grace. Does this similarity shed further light on the claim that the human response to the transcendent, which finds its highest concretization in the mystical experience, is universal? Sixth, and a corollary to the preceding point, in all religions, the transcendent is understood and believed in as the author of human life and destiny. This belief is expressed in two types of value. The first is moral, whose function is the organization of individual and social conduct by definite rules and sanctions, and the second is, as we have just seen, religious, whose function is the organization of spiritual life, also by means of certain rules and sanctions. The unity of these values as dispositions constitutes the fabric of religious character. We know a Muslim or any other religious faithful by the way she acts both religiously and morally. Religion is not only a set of beliefs, values, and doctrines but is especially a way of life—of responding to the concrete problems of daily living, of making decisions about matters of personal and social concern, of choosing the appropriate road to happiness, of interacting with other human beings, of responding to the perennial questions people have asked since the dawn of civilization. I do not exaggerate in saying that the fundamental intuition of a religion, that which sums up its significance as a religion, is its conception of these values and the extent to which they are formative forces in the human growth and development of the religious community. If you bracket out these values from a religion, it becomes a skeleton; in fact, it

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collapses as the lighthouse of the spiritual life. But if we cast a general yet critical look at the moral values we prize as human beings—justice, friendship, courage, honesty, truth-telling, respect for human life, love, loyalty, promise-keeping, compassion, and humility, to mention some of the basic values—we discover that they are essentially similar in all religions. I say “essentially” because we recognize that in some cases they are interpreted or applied differently. But this difference can be attributed to economic, political, social, historical, and a host of related factors. We encounter this kind of difference not only between religions but within the same religion that embraces more than one culture. Let me illustrate this point by a personal experience. At one of the annual conferences of the American Philosophical Association in Boston, Massachusetts, USA, in the early 1980s, I chaired a session devoted to problems in aesthetics. One of the speakers was a Hindu. He gave a paper on the ontology of the icon in Hinduism. At the end of the session, when everyone left, I found myself alone with this Hindu speaker. Our eyes met. We conversed for a few minutes about the papers that were presented at that session, and then before parting, both of us almost simultaneously wondered whether we could dine together. The answer was yes, gladly. Our dinner lasted a little more than three hours, during which we discussed many social and academic issues. Just when we were about to say goodbye to each other, he said, “Michael, you are a Christian and I am a Hindu. We met for the first time, but let me tell you that I feel at home with you. You are not a stranger to me. We share the same spirit! Your way of thinking and seeing life and the world is like mine.” Where did this spirit, which flowed from his heart into mine and from his mind into mine, come from, and how? I cite this example, which I feel is commonplace, only to indicate that the moral as well as religious values that define the essential nature of the different religions are more universal than many people tend to think. Let us remember that regardless of whether we are Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, or Christians, we are first human beings, that we are human in virtue of one nature, human nature, that we seek God or the transcendent because we are human, that humanity is a bundle of potentialities, that these potentialities are always realized differently in different cultural contexts. Fourth Critical Response. My critic would at this point of my discussion interject, What do people worship, the transcendent or the God they worship in their religion? Is it reasonable to say that the Christian, for example, who worships God on Sunday morning is in fact worshipping the

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transcendent, or that he is worshipping the same God the Muslim worships on Friday noon? What if we tell this Christian faithful that she is not worshipping God the Father she knows but the transcendent, the infinitely ineffable transcendent? How would she respond? Although this question is important and seems to dart at the core of this chapter for it directs our attention to the relation between the transcendent and the different religions, it unfortunately puts the cart before the horse because, first, one of the main purposes of interreligious dialogue, which at first takes place between theologians and philosophers, is to explain to their communities how the different religions are founded in the transcendent or the sense in which the transcendent reveals itself in the mystical experience to the different religions. Second, it is a gross mistake to think that it is not reasonable to say that worshipping God is not worshipping the transcendent because all religions acknowledge that they are founded in the transcendent. They worship the transcendent in the medium of their vision of its nature. For example, in Islam, God is the Greatest; he is the creator of the universe but transcends it. He delivered the Qur’an directly to Muhammad through a messenger. The human mind cannot even attempt to comprehend the infinity of its being. Again, consider another example—Christianity. The Logos is not only embodied in Jesus but is one with him. How many a time did Jesus contradistinguish himself from his Father in Heaven? It is a generally endorsed belief by all Christian philosophers and theologians that God is absolute in wisdom, power, and goodness. An investigative look into the different religions will readily show that there is continuity between the transcendent as it is in itself and its revelations in the different religions. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that insofar as the beliefs and values of a religion are derived from a genuine mystical experience of the transcendent, and insofar as its understanding is articulated in a cultural language, the worshippers in that religion in fact worship the transcendent. Third, without assuming the existence of the transcendent as the foundation of all the religions, we would necessarily be driven into a strange kind of polytheism since the God of every religion would be absolute. But it is logically permissible to say that the transcendent can be experienced differently by different people or that it appears differently to different peoples. Even in ordinary life, people experience the same reality differently. The eyes that see and the minds that experience are always cultural eyes and minds; they are conditioned by genetic, social, educational, and material factors. Finally, founding the different religions in the transcendent does not undermine their

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uniqueness or the claim that their beliefs and values are derived from the transcendent; on the contrary, the recognition that these beliefs and values are derived from the transcendent will enhance their commitment to them for it will expand their understanding of what it means for the transcendent to be an inexhaustible wealth of being. Again, positing the existence of a transcendent that underlies the existence of all religions does not undercut the absoluteness of their cognitive claims because they are based on a direct vision of the Absolute. The religious beliefs and values of a religion are absolute inasmuch as they are derived from the absolute being of the transcendent. But then if all religions are expressions of the same transcendent, do we need interreligious dialogue? Yes, because these religions understand and interpret their vision of the transcendent differently and because without this supposition, the dialogue is impossible. In fact, knowing how other peoples respond to the transcendent can deepen and enrich our understanding of our own religion. Furthermore, is human fellowship not the ideal aim of all religions? Interreligious dialogue is a significant factor in promoting the realization of this ideal aim. Fifth Critical Response. My critic would now advance perhaps the most difficult objection to the possibility of interreligious dialogue, one that may resist a final response: “Suppose interreligious dialogue is logically or philosophically justifiable; is it realizable? How can the multitude of different peoples who walk in the different streets of human culture; people who have given their unwavering allegiance to God, Brahman, Allah, Yahweh, or Tao; whose religious psyche is deeply rooted in a certain worldview; and who feel comfortable in worshipping their ‘God’ be willing to change or abandon their firm commitment to their absolute God and be willing to stand on the same religious ground with the religiously different other as an equal? Perhaps the educated elite, regardless of their intellectual orientation, may understand and assent to interreligious dialogue, but would the multitude of ordinary people who accept the doctrines of their religions on faith be able and willing to do the same? Besides, some would argue that a strong streak of fundamentalism lurks at the bottom of every religion. How can you loosen the ‘ionic bonds’ of this streak?” Let me at once state that this is not a philosophical but a practical question. The task of the philosopher is to explain the formal and structural conditions under which interreligious dialogue is possible (Mitias 2012, 2020; Hick 1989; Pratt 2014; Cornille 2009). This chapter has addressed

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this question from the standpoint of God-centeredness. However, this objection merits the following remarks. First, regardless of the extent to which it is possible, interreligious dialogue is a basic human need for two reasons. (a) Human societies are not anymore insulated within societal, physical, and political borders; they are becoming increasingly interconnected economically, politically, educationally, technologically, artistically, and scientifically. The borders that used to separate them are now transparent, permeable. (b) Whether it is cultural, political, economic, or ethnic, religious plurality is a basic feature of contemporary society. The different other does not anymore live far away or on the other side of the border; she lives next door, works with me, collaborates with me on worthwhile projects, sits next me in the classroom, marries my brother, attends movies with me, and worships her God in a temple next to mine. Who is this religiously different other? This question does not spring merely from curiosity but also from an urgent need. The religiously different other can be a source of fear, of threat, of hostility, one that can make mutual existence difficult, complicated, and in some cases dangerous. The unknown frequently arouses a feeling of mystery, of threat, of resistance. Mutual understanding is a necessary condition for a harmonious, amiable, cooperative relation between differently religious others. It can remove the veil of mystery that envelops the others and paves the way for exploring constructive ways of reacting to and dealing with them. The path that leads to this understanding is dialogue. Many phenomena in the domains of economics, science, technology, art, entertainment, and philosophy have been under the influence of globalization or some aspects of it, but not religion. This human institution has so far resisted this kind of influence, primarily because it is grounded in the belief that its truths are ultimate and therefore permanent. But in an age in which human individuals and societies are becoming increasingly members of a larger society, the different religions cannot afford to remain insular. No matter its kind, understanding is productive of goodness (and sometimes of evil) and, in the sphere of human life, of discovering new ways to live better, always better, as human beings. Second, I am aware that the realization of interreligious dialogue at the communal level is extraordinarily hard and that it will be a long, arduous, and daunting challenge, but I am also aware that noble ideals have never been easy to realize. The wheels of reason grind slowly, ever so slowly in the march of history. Consider for a moment the ideal of democracy (or

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freedom). This idea was first conceived by Locke in the second half of the seventeenth century and later systematized by Rousseau in the eighteenth century. It took more than one century for democracy to become accepted as a basic human need, another century to find its way into the political institutions of European countries, and another century to move into other parts of the world. And despite the remarkable progress it has made, democracy remains an ideal. But from the fact that it is still an ideal, it does not necessarily follow that we should not continue to pursue it, to refine it, to reinvent it, and to try to create the appropriate conditions for its realization in the different countries of the world. A necessary requisite for progress is will. Perhaps what is needed at the present is religious will. The locus of this will is the religious intelligentsia—religious leaders, intellectuals, and educated people in general. I hope that the eyes of reason direct their attention to this dimension of human progress.

References Badham, Roger A., ed. 1998. Christian Theology. Louisville: John Knox Press. Cobb, John. 1982. Beyond Dialogue. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. Cornille, Catherine. 2008. The Im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company. ———. 2009. Criteria of Discernment: Interreligious Dialogue. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. Dinoia, O.P. 1992. The Diversity of Religions. The Catholic University Press. Hick, John. 1989. An Interpretation of Religion. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Katz, Steven. 1983. Mysticism and the Religious Traditions. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Mitias, 2020. The Philosopher Converses with God (Wipf & Stock, 2020). Pratt, Douglass. 2014. Being Open, Being Faithful. Geneva, Switzerland: World Council of Churches. Prothero, Stephen. 2010. God is not One, Harper One. Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. 2017. Religious Pluralism and Interreligious Dialogue. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. Smith, Houston. 1991. The World’s Religions. Harper One. Smock, David R., ed. 2002. Interfaith Dialogue and Peace Building. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Volf, Miroslav. 2012. Do We Worship the Same God? Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. Eerdmans. Whitehead, A.N. 1926. Religion in the Making. New York: Macmillan & Co. ———. 1929. Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan & Co.

CHAPTER 6

Does Religious Self-Understanding Impede Interreligious Dialogue?

Introduction My critic, who has been following my line of reasoning in the preceding discussion, would now ask with a somber intellectual mood, “You seem to think that mutual understanding, which is the aim of interreligious dialogue, can at the same time be a condition of its possibility. First, how can mutual understanding be an aim and a condition at the same time? Second, is your thinking grounded in a rational, objective comprehension of the reality of the different religions, that is, of how they understand themselves and other religions? Have you taken into serious consideration the existential, indeed stubborn, belief, one supported by theological and philosophical arguments, that religious self-understanding is a formidable obstacle in the way of mutual understanding, mutual respect, and consequently interreligious dialogue? Although you valiantly argued that mystical experience—which is a union with God, the same God the metaphysician, the ascetic, and ordinary religious people claim to experience in all the cultures of the world—is a viable basis of the possibility of interreligious dialogue, still, a large number of philosophers, theologians, and religious leaders have argued that the essential reality of any one of the major religions is summed up in its doctrine. The actual life of a religious community is founded in its religious doctrine. Right or wrong, this claim is justified by the general claim that doctrine is unquestionably authoritative © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. H. Mitias, Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6_6

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and that it derives its authority from the revealed word of God, to the extent that it reflects the truth inherent in this very word. The founders of the different religions are witnesses to this intimate relation between the doctrine of a religion and the revealed word of God. Broadly speaking, these founders are the main architects of the doctrines of the different religions. This is why at the practical level, doctrine is treated by many of the faithful, even by their religious leaders, as a version of the revealed truth; therefore, it is unquestionable. In fact, the religious self-­ understanding of the faithful is a translation of the doctrine of their religion. Muslims, Jews, and Christians, for example, read the Qur’an, the Torah, and the Bible, but they understand what they read from the standpoint of the existential practice of their religion, which is in turn founded in its doctrine. Their religious way of life is the lens through which they comprehend the text they read. In short, their life and their religious self-­ understanding are founded in the doctrine of their religion. The spiritual domain of this doctrine is the domain of their faith. “But this kind of understanding,” my critic would go on, “is not exclusive of this or that religion but common to all religions: each religion believes that its version of the word of God is the true version. Accordingly, if religion is a spiritual domain, if the religious thinking and life of the religious community thrives in this domain, how can that community see, much less admit, that the revealed word of God of other so-called religions is true? How can the other be a religion if it is not in possession of the true word of God? But if they are not a true religion, how can a religion converse with them as a religion? Can they converse with them as a religion? Again, how can they respect the so-called religiously different other and treat them as an equal?” This line of questioning is based on the assumption that the different religions of the world are circles of closed religious domains. This is why to a large extent the possibility of interreligious dialogue seems bleak, if not impossible. “Let us consider two persons,” my critic would press on, “a Christian and a Muslim. The Christian grows up with the firm belief that Jesus is the Son of God, that he is an embodiment of the Word (Logos), that he is the truth, the way, and the light. The Muslim grows up with the firm belief that the Qur’an is the word of God, that it was communicated to Mohammad in Arabic by his angel Gabriel, and that Mohammad is his messenger. How can these two persons converse about the truth of the religiously different other? How can they step out of the circles of their faith and think and feel from the standpoint of the religiously different other? One of them must be correct,

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and each one thinks he is correct. A is A. If it is A, it cannot be B. It is impossible for A to be A and B at the same time. Since one believes that God revealed himself to them and that this revelation is unquestionably true, it follows that the claim of the other cannot be true.” And in fact, this logic is the ground on which the various religions have stood during the past three millennia. When a belief thrives in theory and practice in the minds and hearts of a community for such a long time, its members tend to treat it as natural, as absolutely true. The mere attempt to introduce to them the notion that other religions exist, that the religiously other’s revelations of the word of God are true, or that all of them worship the same God, they would view this attempt as an insult, as a blasphemy, as a travesty of the truth, and as a threat or unwelcome intrusion into the sanctity of their religion.

The preceding thread of reasoning has, according to some philosophers and theologians, been the most recalcitrant challenge to the possibility of interreligious dialogue. It is therefore crucially important to analyze its claims and assumptions and see the extent to which it is valid. I think that even if it is not valid, it merits serious critical analysis because a number of scholars have used it to express implicitly or explicitly their objection to the possibility of interreligious dialogue. In this chapter, I shall first respond to my critic’s query whether it is logically possible to say that mutual understanding is the primary aim of interreligious dialogue and at the same time one of its conditions. The proposition I shall defend is that it is logically possible to hold that it can be both at the same time. Second, I shall critically evaluate the argument that a religion’s belief is that its revelation of the word of God is a true revelation or that it is the only true revelation. This evaluation will consist of two parts. In the first, I shall present an analysis of the main components of this argument, and in the second I shall evaluate them. The proposition I shall defend is that a religion’s self-understanding is not an obstacle in the way of interreligious dialogue. (a) Mutual Understanding as the Aim of Interreligious Dialogue. If ignorance is the source of evil, if hatred, animosity, violence, and alienation among the major religions of the world are forms of evil, it would be reasonable to assert that aiming at mutual understanding among

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them would mitigate and hopefully eliminate these evils in the distant if not in the near future. This assertion is based on the assumption that there is no morally, rationally, even religiously justifiable reason for these evils to exist in practice or in interreligion relations. I do not know of any religion that condones hatred, violence, or any form of hostility toward other human beings regardless of their cultural, religious, or ideological orientation; on the contrary, love, compassion, mercy, justice, and respect for humanity are the supreme values of all religions. The argument that a religion’s self-understanding stands as an irremovable obstacle in the way of mutual understanding among the major religions, which I shall discuss in some detail presently, is not valid. As I shall explain, the claim that all religions worship the same God, albeit differently, provides a justifiable basis for the possibility of one in which mutual understanding can be achieved. Could it be that the real factor that stands in the way of mutual understanding and that underlies the alienation, hatred, animosity, and violence that has existed among religions in the past and present is not merely religious self-understanding but a multiplicity of factors, primarily political, economic, cultural, and educational factors? How many a king, emperor, or general waged war against another nation in the name of God or religion? Can we explain the great schism within Christianity, which was initiated in the fifth century and became actual in the eleventh century, and can we explain the various divisions, conflicts, and wars between the different churches apart from political, economic, ideological, and idiosyncratic factors? Can we explain the schism within Islam into Sunni and Shia in the seventh century apart from political, economic, cultural, and idiosyncratic factors? We can ask similar questions about the divisions and conflicts within Hinduism and Buddhism. I do not mean to reduce the conflicts and animosities between the different religions to external factors; it may well be the case that internal religious differences played, and still play, a major role in the hostile relations between them. I simply wish to spotlight a fact overlooked by many writers on the interreligious dialogue that, even if religious self-understanding stands as an obstacle in the way of dialogue between the religions, it is not in their nature to encourage or practice hatred, hostility, or violence against any religion or human community. Moreover, even if two or more religions are irrevocably committed to the belief that they are unique, that God has revealed himself to them and to no one else, and that every other religion is false or misguided, yes, even if all the religions make a similar commitment, nevertheless it is in

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principle both possible and intrinsically desirable to engage in a dialogue that promotes mutual understanding between them. Knowledge does not harm, although some people use it for harmful purposes; on the contrary, it is useful, constructive, and frequently a healing power. It underlies everything good we achieve in our practical and theoretical lives. But as an aim of interreligious dialogue, mutual understanding is urgently needed. In spite of the uniqueness of religions’ doctrines and ways of life, and in spite of the differences they seem to take seriously into consideration, an investigative look into the moral and religious values, the characterization of God, and the way they respond to him in their ways of worship and action, we discover that the different religions share much in common. This commonality can be treated as a further basis of interreligious dialogue. More than any other time in history, all religions face serious challenges from the growing yet overpowering technological, economic, and political values that tend to constrict, if not threaten, the vital role they play in human life. Let us not forget that one of the greatest gifts of the major religions to the world has been the spiritual values that are essential to the growth and development of human nature. Accordingly, it would be beneficial, if not imperative, that the major religions put their conflicts, hatred, and animosities aside and cooperate on the construction and implementation of worthwhile projects that foster their integrity, relevance, and productive role in the advancement of human civilization. Mutual understanding is a necessary condition for the realization of these projects. (b) Mutual Understanding as a Condition of Interreligious Dialogue. How can mutual understanding be an aim and a condition of the attainment of that aim? It would seem that this claim is contradictory primarily because if it is an aim to be achieved by the dialogue, it cannot function or even exist as one of its conditions since it does not yet exist, and if it already exists as a condition, there is therefore no need for it to be an aim since it already exists as a condition. We usually aim at what does not exist, not at what exists. In the context of this discussion, I use the term “mutual understanding” equivocally, (a) theoretically as an aim and (b) practically as a condition. Let me explain this equivocation. First, theoretically. When I say mutual understanding is the aim of interreligious dialogue, I mean that in this kind of dialogue, the interlocutors aim to understand each other; they seek this aim by conceptually and

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logically analyzing the values, beliefs, symbols, principles, and customs as well as the practices of their religions: What is the basis, or source, of these values, beliefs, symbols, principles, customs, and practices? How does a religion justify the belief that its version of the revealed word of God is unquestionably true? Reason? Faith? To what extent is either reason or faith a reliable instrument of justification? In addition to this important topic, the interlocutors should explore the essential similarities and differences between them. I say “essential” because so many of the differences may not be real differences mainly because they are obscured by cultural, metaphorical, and linguistic shades of meaning. The concept of God should be the central focus of the conversation because if all religions are founded in one being called God as the creator of the universe, humanity, and human destiny; if this being is the ultimate object of love, desire, worship, reverence, and honor; and if all religions uniformly acknowledge that he is the alpha and omega of the totality of existence and what happens in it, it should follow that a mutual understanding of the concept of God in the way he revealed himself to them, although differently, should be the starting point of the dialogue. This concept can be used as a point of reference in the analysis and explanation of the web of beliefs, values, principles, symbols, and practices that make up the fabric of their religious ways of life. We should make a distinction between the concept of God as he is in himself and as he is revealed to the different religions. The first is infinite and transcends description; the second is a human construction fashioned by the human mind. The faithful acknowledge, understand, and worship God insofar as he is revealed in their doctrine. This revelation is the source of their knowledge of God. This is a main reason that the subject of conversation in interreligious dialogue should be the beliefs and values that make up the structure of God’s will for the people. The different revelations are not self-revelations; they are divine (God’s) revelation. In other words, they are not metaphysical propositions about the nature of God. They cannot be such propositions not only because by his very essence God is infinite and therefore indescribable, but also because there is no rationally justifiable reason for such a being to reveal himself or to reveal himself this or that way to finite minds that would not understand this kind of revelation even if he were to make it. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that the different revelations that underlie the mosaic of world religions are revelations for certain people in certain cultural and historical periods. We may make some inferences about God’s nature from a general

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examination of these revelations, but these inferences remain provisional and limited, indeed very limited. The different religions may claim exclusive privilege to their revelation, but knowledge of God as the creator of the universe is not the monopoly of any religion, philosopher, or mystic, not only because God is infinite and transcends the subject of revelation but also because the infinity of God’s being transcends the cognitive powers of the human mind. Have the major metaphysicians of the Eastern and Western worlds not explored the foundation of the universe? Have they, as well as the mystics in the world, not reported direct experience of God as an infinite being but not as he is in himself? Have artists not probed the nature of the transcendent and communicated their meditations by means of images and a multitude of symbolic forms? Has the mind of the ordinary person not soared into the mystery of the universe in moments of wonder about the mystery that permeates people’s own existence and the existence of the universe, and then stood on the edge, the edge that overlooks the being of the infinite? I tend to think that human beings in general and especially philosophers, scientists, and theologians would agree with me that the yearning to know what lies beyond the boundary of the universe, the boundary that extends before the human mind as an infinite vista of being, is inherent in human nature. No one person, religion, philosopher, scientist, artist, or ordinary human being can claim a privileged desire to know God or to seek him! It is, I think, reasonable to say that some of the essential aspects of God are recognized by all the major religions: for example, creativity, power, wisdom, transcendence, infinity, ineffability, goodness. They also recognize that only one God as creator of the universe exists. And yet despite his infinity, transcendence, and ineffability, he revealed himself to them. How this infinite, transcendent, and ineffable being reveals himself to finite human minds defies any logical grasp or explanation. The only way this incomprehensible claim is either accepted or justified is faith. This is why the subject of conversation in interreligious dialogue cannot be whether the revealed word of God is true or false, justifiable or unjustifiable, but must be the content of the revealed word of God: its meaning and how this meaning is translated into a way of life. But if different religions acknowledge that they worship the same God, that is, as a number of distinguished philosophers and theologians have done, then it would be reasonable to say that the focus in interreligious dialogue should be on the dynamics that underlie their revelation, how

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they understand faith, how they interpret the revealed word into doctrine, and how this doctrine is translated into a way of life. The point of this kind of conversation is, as I have emphasized repeatedly, mutual understanding of the beliefs and values the religions uphold. Once this understanding is articulated into a text, that is, into a statement that sheds light on the meaning of the different doctrines and the way it comes to life in the behavior of the faithful, it can be used as a pedagogic document whose main purpose is to promote mutual understanding between religious communities. If I am to express this whole point by an analogy, I can say that the text that sums up the conceptual structure of the mutual understanding reached by the interlocutors is a kind of “sun” that radiates knowledge; the teacher, clergy, and theologian are the rays that transmit the light of understanding that emanate from the sun to the members of the religious communities. We may view the conversation between the theologians, philosophers, and religious leaders that represent the dialoguing religions as the first moment, or dimension, of interreligious dialogue because it is a first and an indispensable step, or happening, of the dialogue. So far, the interreligious dialogue that has taken place during the past four decades has to a large extent stopped at this level. But only when the dialogue takes place within the religions and between them at the level of the religious communities can we say that interreligious dialogue is real and should be taken seriously. Second, practically. When I say that, in addition to being its aim, mutual understanding is a condition of interreligious dialogue, I mean that the dialoguing religions cannot begin or even proceed into the dialogue if they do not recognize, implicitly or explicitly, that the other is a religion. This recognition implies that, as I have just discussed, there is one God and that this God has revealed himself differently to other peoples of the word. Recognizing the other as a religion does not necessarily entail an understanding of the meaning of the revealed word of God, how this word is translated into doctrine, and how this doctrine is transmuted into a system of behavior. How can a dialogue with the religiously different other take place if the interlocutors do not acknowledge that the other is a religion? If it does not make this acknowledgment honestly and seriously to itself as well as to the other, can it be said to be dialoguing with the other as a religion and can we say that their dialogue is genuine? I underscore this acknowledgment because without it, the dialogue, which should be devoted to an understanding of conceptual and axiological structures

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of the religions, will not be serious. It will not be a conversation between two religions as religions. This kind of dialogue is bound to be competitive, defensive, or contentious. I have witnessed some interreligious dialogues that ended up in shameful quarrels! But then, my critic might wonder, what prompts a religion to recognize another religion as an equal if it believes it is in possession of the sole, true revelation of God’s word? Two factors—the first is a matter of principle, and the second is a matter of method. The first factor, and I would add condition, is religious and intellectual modesty. A modest person is not a proud person, in the sense of hubris; he is not close-hearted but open-­ hearted. Again, he is not close-minded but open-minded. He is willing to welcome others into his presence regardless of their philosophical, religious, or ideological orientation. Is this other not a human being? Should we not listen to what she has to say? Are we not supposed to respect the other as a human being? Can we take humanity lightly or indifferently? A modest person is not a presumptuous person. The belief that I or my religion is in possession of the true word of God does not logically entail that the religiously different other, who also claims that she is in possession of the true word of God, is mistaken. I say “logically” because the law of contradiction, which is the foundation of human logic, does not and cannot apply to God’s thinking or action. If God is infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness, he can logically reveal himself to any people in any way he chooses; indeed, he can reveal himself to infinitely different beings in any way he chooses. The human categories of good, beauty, justice, creation, judgment, and truth do not apply to God. The second factor that we may view as a condition of interreligious dialogue is reliance on the phenomenological method of thinking or inquiry. In any type of rational conversation—scientific, philosophical, political, moral, artistic, or social—we should assume a disinterested attitude. When we assume this kind of attitude, we suspend our personal beliefs or any religious idiosyncrasy about God—what he is, how he revealed himself to my religious community, his will for humanity, or the meaning of human life and destiny. This suspension does not necessarily imply that our belief, which we accept on faith, is wrong or that we doubt the validity of our faith. It implies only that we are willing to take into serious consideration the religiously other’s claim that their religion is founded in the word of God, that this word is revealed to them, and that they believe it to be unquestionably true. Their claim may or may not be reasonable, and our claim may or may not be reasonable. This is not the

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point. What matters is that we try to understand the logic and meaningfulness of what the other claims. But can we do this if we do not assume that the other is a religion? “You must be an inveterate optimist!” my critic would now intervene. “Inveterate optimist? Are you sure?” “Yes, I am now convinced that you are one!” “Can you explain the reason for this characterization, perhaps accusation?”

“You tend to think that the recognition of one God as the creator of the universe and humanity can be a justifiable basis for interreligious dialogue. The substance of your arguments, which you advanced lucidly and passionately in the preceding pages and which follow an established tradition of theologians and philosophers who share your bent of mind, is that if different religions acknowledge the existence of one God as the creator of the universe, if they admit that this God is the foundation of their religion, and if each one also admits that the same God revealed his will to them but differently, it would follow that they worship the same God, and if they worship the same God, it should follow that they can have a conversation about their differences and similarities, respect each other as religions, reach some kind of mutual understanding, and cooperate on worthwhile projects rather than hating each other or conflicting or fighting with each other. You have also emphasized that the revealed word of God is the basis of their doctrine and religious institutions and organizations they weaved around it and that this doctrine is translated into a way of life. But since they translate the revealed word into doctrine and the doctrine into a way of life, they in effect become not only the interpreters of the essential meaning of the word of God but also its guardian. In the sphere of practice, a necessary outcome of this process is that the doctrine and the way of life become the source of their knowledge of God, his will for them—for how they should live and what they can expect in the future, either a life of eternal happiness or eternal extinction. What you seem to overlook is that this document and along with it their way of life have in time petrified and stood as a solid wall between God the infinite being and the minds and hearts of the faithful so that any reference and any discourse about God is for them a reference and a discourse about the God they know in and through their religion. God is the foundation of their faith, and their faith is grounded in their doctrine; the domain of their doctrine as they know is

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the domain of faith. The faithful as well as the clergy are enclosed within this domain. They understand God, their religion, and the meaning of their lives from the standpoint of this domain. Whether for historical, cultural, or some other reasons, doctrine becomes, as it has been for centuries, ultimate. Its ultimacy seems to defy even the virtues of tolerance, modesty, respect, and openness they uphold. Now, if this is the case, and it is, how can the faithful in any of the religions step out of their domain of faith and acknowledge the religiously different other? What is harder to see is that epistemologically they cannot comprehend how the other religion can be a genuine religion. This is how the different religions in fact understand themselves. But this kind of understanding is not exclusive of the faithful; it includes the clergy, the leaders of the religion, even some of the philosophers and theologians. Do you have some kind of religious or philosophical hammer by which you can create a window or a door in that wall that allows the clergy, philosophers, and theologians as well as the faithful to see, to understand, or to know that all the religions stand on the same metaphysical ground and that this ground is none other than the God they worship? But if you do not have such a hammer, then do you know of a metaphysical Pied Piper who can lure those theologians, philosophers, and religious leaders out of their circle of faith, endow them with divine eyes, and then invite them to see that there is a fountain from which not only the scheme of nature and humanity but also the different religions of the world flow, exactly the way a river flows from its spring?” You have attended many conferences on the possibility of interreligious dialogue, and you have read many articles on this subject. Do you not think that the main obstacle that stands in the way of this possibility is this very self-understanding of the major religions of the world? Is this obstacle removable?

Response It is removable, and the only way we can remove it is the way of reason. I aver that this is a serious challenge for the reasons you, my critic, have stated. But although it is a challenge, we cannot shrink from meeting it, and we can meet it only if we understand the factors that make it a challenge and the kind of logical and practical demands implicit in it. But meeting it is not only a theoretical but also a practical undertaking. We

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may construct a design or a plan for meeting it, but the design or plan will be useless if we cannot implement it. In what follows, I shall focus my critical attention on this challenge. Although it has been treated by some philosophers, theologians, and religious leaders as an obstacle in the way of a meaningful interreligious dialogue, and although many of them have viewed it as a stubborn, irremovable obstacle, religious self-understanding is not, at least in principle, insurmountable. As I explained earlier, the achievement of any serious goal or project requires aim, method of achievement, and will. Our task as philosophers is to articulate a reasonably clear explanation of these three requirements. What is at issue in the present discourse is the articulation of a clear, cogent, and realizable aim, namely mutual understanding among the religions: Is mutual understanding as an aim of interreligious dialogue possible? Those who argue against this possibility think that it is not possible because religious self-understanding stands as an obstacle in its way. As we have seen, religious self-understanding is grounded in doctrine, but doctrine is a firmly closed circle that does not allow for the possibility of conversing, much less understanding, the religiously different other who might be equally enclosed in a similar circle. But does the fact that a theologian, philosopher, or ordinary person who truly believes that her religion is the recipient of the true word of God, who sees herself and the world from the standpoint of her doctrine, who derives her inner satisfaction from her way of life—yes, does this kind of ontological and practical orientation stand in the way of conversing and understanding the religiously different other? Could it be that an answer to this question should proceed from an analysis, at least a clarification, of the meaning of “mutual understanding” and its significance in interreligious dialogue? The idea of religious self-understanding has already received ample attention, and I have already discussed it in some detail, but the idea of mutual understanding has not received equally adequate attention. I think that an investigative look at this idea will shed ample light on whether religious self-understanding is a serious obstacle to interreligious dialogue. This is based on the assumption that an inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of interreligious dialogue should begin with a clear and reasonable conception of its aim. We cannot travel to any place if we do not know where we are going, and we cannot choose the means of travel if we are not clear about our destination (aim). It seems to me that clarity and reasonableness of the aim we seek in interreligious dialogue is indispensable to the conditions under which it can be conceived. But the pursuit of any

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aim in general and the aim of interreligious dialogue in particular never happens in a vacuum, spontaneously, or whimsically. The aim usually originates from an existential, problematic situation that gives rise to it. Now we can raise our question but with a new focus: Why would two religions aim to understand each other? What prompts them to pursue this aim? That is, what kind of need, problem, interest, or concern necessitates or makes the pursuit of this aim desirable? Curiosity? Violence between their religious communities? Dangers that threaten their role in society? A quiet urge, perhaps some kind of zeal, ambition, or practical need to convert the other into their faith? I raise these questions only to underscore the fact that religious self-understanding cannot be reasonably or legitimately viewed as an obstacle to interreligious dialogue if we are not clear about its aim. Let me explain the significance of this point by discussing two scenarios in which it may be possible for two religions to engage in interreligious dialogue. The first is prompted by curiosity, and the second is prompted by the need to mitigate violence between them. First, curiosity. Although it is usual for some individuals to be curious about and to desire to know or understand one or more of the world religions, for example, students, coworkers, neighbors, world travelers, and mystics, it is not usual for two religions to be curious about each other, and yet, they should be because they exist as religions. How can a religion assume an attitude of complete indifference to another religion that exists, as it does, in the same society? Practically speaking, no religion can afford to ignore the existence of other religions in the different parts of the world. Their existence is a given fact. Should a religion not be curious about the religiously different other the way we are curious about natural phenomena, other cultures, neighbors, or the mystery of human existence? We should always remember that institutions are not simply abstract or formal organizations but are made up of human beings. Accordingly, they have a mind and a heart. Those in charge of the administration of the different social institutions—political, educational, economic, or technological—are their minds and hearts. Now, suppose a dialogue between two religions is prompted by curiosity to understand the religiously different other—their conception of God, divine revelation, beliefs and values, the meaning of human life and destiny, and the way their doctrine is translated into a way of life. There is no reason to raise the question of the conditions under which this dialogue takes place primarily because they proceed into it by mutual desire to understand each other. In this case, the following questions are uppermost

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on their minds: What are the basic beliefs and values of the other religion? What is their basis? How are they translated into principles and rules of conduct? The interlocutors who conduct the conversation assume an intellectual attitude in which they stand to each other as objects of knowledge. We usually conduct this kind of conversation in the different spheres of human knowledge as well as in ordinary life. For example, I may be a staunch idealist and desire to understand Marxism, pragmatism, vitalism, or existentialism as philosophies. I may achieve this purpose indirectly by reading the books of the representatives of these philosophies or directly by conversing with a Marxist, pragmatist, vitalist, or process philosopher. Let us here ask, Is it possible for me as a staunch, committed idealist to converse with any of these philosophers in the hope of acquiring an understanding of the philosophically different other? As an idealist, I think about the human and natural worlds in terms of the idealist categories of my mind or through my idealist lenses of vision. Can I transcend my idealist way of thinking and seeing myself and the world, or can I remove my idealist lenses from my intellectual eyes and understand the philosophically different other? I tend to think that the answer to this question is yes. The essential structure of the activity of thinking and understanding consists of the powers of logical and conceptual thinking and analysis, argument, demonstration, analogy, and evaluation. This type of activity is philosophically colorless; it is incapable of allegiance to any philosophy, ideology, or way of looking at and understanding the world, nor is it capable of any form of psychological, cultural, or idiosyncratic tendencies, although it can be used as an instrument in the analysis or justification of these tendencies. Its aim is the discovery or determination of truth and falsity. Espousing, endorsing, or adopting a view of the general nature of reality or an aspect of it requires another kind of intellectual activity, one of seeing, believing, comprehending, in short, of understanding the essential nature of reality or any aspect of it. This does not imply that some people do not hold onto their philosophy, ideology, religion, or worldview uncritically or expediently. It implies only that the human intellect can, by means of its capacities of seeing, reasoning, analyzing, relating, judging, and believing, transcend its own domain of thought—feeling, desiring, or understanding the nature of reality. Let us not forget that we use this cognitive faculty in our scientific, philosophical, and artistic effort to understand the nature of the world and human life. The point I am anxious to spotlight is that my commitment to a philosophical way of thinking or viewing the world and human life does not necessarily impede my attempt to

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understand the philosophically different other. I may or may not learn something from them, and I may or may not change my attitude toward them. This is not what matters. What matters is my ability or inability to understand the philosophically different other despite the fact that that I am a staunch idealist. I can, and I do. Second, violence. Most philosophers, theologians, and religious leaders would, I think, agree that one of the main reasons, and some would say the main reason, that has provoked the need for interreligious dialogue between the different religions in the West and the East during the past four decades is violence. Fear, ignorance, rivalry, or competition has most of the time been the kind of spark that has started this violence. But some religious, even political, leaders have realized that the destruction that has resulted from this kind of violence should not be condoned not only because it is inconsistent with their moral and religious teachings but also because it is offensive to common sense and the general well-being of society. These leaders have recognized the fact, a fact well known to philosophers, social reformers, religious leaders, and scientists, that violence breeds violence and that destruction creates the conditions for more destruction. Let us suppose that two conflicting religions have decided to dialogue with each other in the hope of finding a way to stop this violence and mitigate its causes, namely fear, hatred, ignorance, and alienation between them. Let us also suppose that they arrange for a meeting between two teams of representatives from their religions to find a mutually satisfactory solution to this problem. Let us finally suppose that they proceed into this meeting with the mutual acknowledgment that the violence that has devastated their religious communities stems from a mutual misunderstanding primarily because neither of the conflicting religions in principle condones violence and that the only way to resolve the conflict between them is to arrive at a mutual understanding of themselves as religions. This agreement is based on the assumption that mutual understanding would in time mitigate and hopefully eliminate the animosity and hatred that has existed between them. Both religions acknowledge that this mutual understanding cannot be restricted to their representatives but should extend to the members of the religious communities because the fear, animosity, hatred, and ignorance that have caused the violence exist in the hearts and minds of the members even though the violence is sometimes instigated by the religious leaders. In a situation like this one, the philosophers, theologians, and religious leaders who represent the two

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religions will prepare an agenda that lists the ideas, principles, values, and questions that constitute the fundamental structure of the religions. Before I proceed any further in my discussion, it is crucially important to ask, Should the fact that the dialogue was instigated by a practical goal, namely mitigation of violence, affect or in any way change the substance of the conversation between the dialoguing religions? I can even dramatize this kind of encounter by allowing the possibility that some of the interlocutors may indeed feel a measure of hatred, superiority, or animosity toward the other religion; and let me dramatize still more by imaging the possibility that the interlocutors are microcosms of their religious communities—would, or should, this negative attitude influence the direction of or direct the conversation away from its intended aim, namely mutual understanding? Is it not possible for these representatives to bracket their feelings of hatred, animosity, superiority, or anger in the process of the conversation? If the interlocutors do not assume a disinterested attitude, that is, bracket their feelings, desires, and personal ideas and put them aside, then they do not proceed into the dialogue in good faith or heart, and if they proceed into it as microcosms of their feuding religious communities, then they have put the cart before the horse. They would not reach the goal of mutual understanding. In either case, the dialogue as an event in which they seek to achieve mutual understanding would not and cannot happen. It might be a session of negotiation, of bargaining, of public relations, or a kind of appeasement. But if the interlocutors are convinced that the key to a peaceful coexistence is under the conditions of their religious and moral values, and if they are sincere in their endeavor to achieve their goal, I would think that they would harness their idiosyncrasies, religious presumptions, and established attitudes toward each other, and rely on their intellects and its method of logical and conceptual analysis, argument, and demonstration in seeking mutual understanding. One or more of the interlocutors may proceed into the dialogue with the preconceived notion that the other religion is not genuine, false, or inferior, and this knowledge may float in the sky of the conversation; nevertheless, should the conversation not reveal the truth or falsity of these preconceived notions? The point I am trying to underline is that we should make a distinction between conversation as a process of rational activity, which is the privilege of the intellect, and conversation as a process of negotiation, bargaining, and public relations. Understanding is a function

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of the intellect, the power by which we conceive, comprehend, reason, and know. It is, at least in principle, possible for this faculty to steer away from their idiosyncrasies regardless of their nature or strength in its effort to seek the truth or an understanding of the nature of this or that aspect of reality. We can cite mathematics as an example, but the history of science and philosophy, as well as the quest for the conditions that underlie human progress, lends credibility to this claim. Can we solve the major problems we face at the individual or social level without the authority of this faculty? Its autonomous functioning is indispensable for the design and realization of any meaningful project we undertake in our life. Accordingly, when one argues that religious self-understanding stands as a block in the way of interreligious dialogue, we should spotlight the phenomenon of “religious self-understanding,” namely the firm belief that one’s religion is the true or ultimate revelation of the word of God. Let us suppose that the different religions of the world implicitly or explicitly uphold this belief; would this belief stand in the way of the possibility of seeking mutual understanding? Would it block the eyes of their minds from seeing the truth or the essential nature of the other religion? Is it not possible for each religion to put aside their religious self-understanding and focus their attention on the elements of the other religion as religion? It would be strange, puzzling, indeed bewildering if the answer to this question is yes mainly because, as I have just argued, the same intellect that saw the need for the dialogue, that arranged it, can logically analyze and evaluate the basic elements of the other religion. This analysis and evaluation should reveal the extent to which they are true, false, genuine, or incomplete religions. They may discover that certain elements of the other religion are true, more profound, or quite different from theirs. This is not the question! The question is to understand the other. What if, in addition to the general belief held by all religions that God is the creator of the universe and humanity and that this God is infinitely wise, good, and powerful, they discover that the religious and moral values they all live by are similar and that this similarity stems from the same belief that God is infinitely good, wise, and powerful? This is based on the assumption that if a community recognizes that God is infinitely good, wise, and powerful, it would logically follow that the faithful would worship him in accordance with this conception or understanding of God. What if the two religions discover that in spite of their cultural and religious differences, they are all human beings and as such united by the same logic of responding to an infinitely good, wise, and powerful being?

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What if they also discover that their destiny and the destiny of the universe are charted by the same God the other worships? In short, what if they discover that, although they are different, they are both religions? But I may be reminded by my critic that there are also differences between the religions, and the major difference is that the meaning they seek and the expectation of salvation, eternal peace, or happiness that are dearest to their hearts are embedded in the conceptual and axiological structure of their religion, in their way of life: Theirs is the surest way to the realization of this expectation. Yes, I acknowledge this difference, but this is not the crux of the problem we face when we raise the question of the possibility of mutual understanding. The fact that the other religion is different in its doctrine and ways of life does not, as I argued, logically imply that, that it is not or cannot be viewed as a religion. Do people in the different cultures of the world not seek and realize the meaning of their lives differently? Do individuals in the same culture, in the same town, even in the same family not seek and realize the meaning of their lives differently? Are they less human or more misguided if their ways of life are different? Besides, is it not a strike of prejudice to think, or even entertain the thought, that the infinitely wise, good, and powerful creator cannot or may not reveal himself to human beings in different parts, or even in the same part, of the world differently? Why should this creator not reveal himself to the Chinese, the Indians, the Persians, the Arabs, the Hebrews, or the Mongolians differently? (See Schmidt-Leukel 2017a; Mitias 2020.) Let me now sum up the preceding line of reasoning. No matter how firm our belief that our version of the revealed word of God is unquestionably true, that he revealed himself to us and to no one else, this belief does not necessarily imply that God has not revealed himself to other peoples or that he cannot reveal himself to an infinite number of peoples differently. Difference does not logically cancel, negate, or trivialize the other. As I have argued more than once, modesty and tolerance need to be observed in any kind of interreligious dialogue. Truly modest people acknowledge to themselves that they are deficient in their knowledge of themselves, the history of civilization, and the universe. They moreover acknowledge that God’s essence is infinite and cannot be described by human categories. First, even though we may be absolutely certain about the ultimacy of the truth of our revelation, we cannot presume that God has revealed himself only to us. Other revelations and in different ways are logically possible, indeed realistic. The presence of the mosaic of religions

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and the rich tapestry of mystical experiences in the different parts of the world confirms rather than disconfirms the meaningfulness and truth of this claim. Second, if we believe that God is the creator of the universe, we should feel inclined to appreciate the way he reveals himself not only in the world but also in the way he reveals himself to humanity. But the sole purpose of interreligious dialogue, regardless of the reasons that prompt us to have it, is mutual understanding. I here assume that achieving this purpose will foster the possibility of not only peaceful existence and friendship but also of cooperation on worthwhile projects, projects that promote their well-being but also the well-being of society.

Concluding Remark “What about the alienation, the animosity, the hatred, and fear that seem to be rooted in the religious attitude of the different religious communities toward each other? Is this kind of rootedness not a major factor that underlies the hostilities among these communities?” my critic might now wonder. An ideal observer, one who comes from a planet inhabited by purely rational beings and who suddenly pays our Earth a visit, would, I think, be amazed, and perhaps more startled than amazed, to notice that the different religions that claim to be founded in the word of the infinitely wise, good, and powerful God interact more as strangers, as sources of fear and frequently threat, as rivals, more as enemies than as friends, as different rays of the light that emanates from the being of God. Have the different religions qua institutions drifted away from the purpose for which they exist? I would not be surprised if our interplanetary visitor, having examined the sad state of the interreligion relations on our Earth, mumbled the following words: myopic vision, prejudice, supremacy, hubris, power, jealousy, cultural chauvinism, ignorance, and similar words. My aim in the preceding chapters has been to examine the conditions under which interreligious dialogue is possible and to create a conceptual framework within which the possibility of friendship between religions is possible, which I shall discuss in a separate study. I am convinced that this type of dialogue is the most realistic method for promoting friendship and cooperation between religions. This is based on the assumption that ignorance is the source of evil and that understanding is a transformative power; it can not only transform the way we view ourselves and the world around us but also our attitudes toward each other as human beings.

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But the task of using this power to change the existing interreligion relations and especially religions’ attitudes toward each other is a practical task, one that should be administered by social scientists. Sociologists, psychologists, and historians should assume responsibility for the realization of this task. This proposal is made on two basic assumptions. First, the factors that underlie the animosity, fear, hatred, and alienation among different religions are not exclusively internal to them; they are also external, that is, political, economic, cultural, and historical in nature. How many a political, economic, and ideological leader has used religion as a means to an expedient end? How many a social, natural, or economic catastrophe have forced religious communities to be havens of economic or cultural survival? Is it an accident that the budgets of some of the religious establishment are richer than the budgets of most states in the world? Second, social scientists can, unlike theologians and philosophers, be behavioral engineers. This recommendation is consistent with the principle that any worthwhile project requires three conditions: aim, method of implementing the aim, and will.

Reference Mitias, Michael. 2020. The Philosopher Converses with God. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. 2017a. Religious Pluralism and Interreligious Dialogue. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.

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Assafir. A Vatican-Al-Azhar Summit Calls for the Renunciation of Terrorism. https:/assafir.com/Article/1/495726 Badham, Roger A., ed. 1998. Christian Theology. Louisville: John Knox Press. Barnes, Michael. 1989. Religions in Conversation: Christian Identity and Religious Pluralism. London, England: SPCK. Brereton, Joel P. 2004. Dharma in the Rveda. Journal of Indian Philosophy 32 (5–6): 449–489. Buber, Martin. 1980. I and Thou. Edited By P. R. Mendes -Flohr. San Francisco: Harper and Row. ———. 2002. Between Man and Man. New York: Routledge Classics. Clooney, Francis X. 2010. Comparative Theology: Deep Learning across Religious Borders. Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2018. Learning Intensely: In the Text, in the World. Fortress Press. Cobb, John. 1982. Beyond Dialogue. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. Cornille, Catherine. 2008. The Im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company. ———. 2009. Criteria of Discernment: Interreligious Dialogue. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. ———. 2010. Interreligious Hermeneutics. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. ———. 2013. The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Interreligious Dialogue. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. Dinoia, O.P. 1992. The Diversity of Religions. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America.

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Dupuis, Jacques. 1997. Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism. New York: Orbis Books. Fitzgerald, Michael L., and John Borelli. 2006. Interfaith Dialogue: A Catholic View. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis. Forde, Gerard, ed. 2013. A Journey Together. Cork, Ireland: Cois Time. Gioia, F., ed. 1997. Irreligious Dialogue: The Official Teaching of the Catholic Church. Boston: Pauline Books. Hartman, David. 2010. Controversies in Interreligious Dialogue and the Theology of Religions. London: SCM Press. Hartshorne, Charles. 1941. Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism. New York: Macmillan & Co. ———. 1967. A Natural Theology for Our Time. New York: Macmillan & Co. Hegel, George W. F. 1956a. The Philosophy of History. Translated by John Sibree. New York: Dover. ———. 1956b. The Science of Logic. Translated by George di Giovanni. New York: Cambridge University Press. Heinze, Bradford, and Irfan A. Omar, eds. 2005. Heirs of Abraham: The Future of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian Relations. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. Hick, John. 1974. Truth and Dialogue in World Religions. Philadelphia: Westminster. ———. 1977. God and the Universe of Faiths. London, England: Collins. ———. 1989. An Interpretation of Religion. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. ———, with Paul Knitter. 1992. The Myth of Christian Uniqueness. New  York: Orbis Books. Horsch, Paul. 2004. From Creation Myth to World Law: The Early History of Dharma. Journal of Indian Philosophy 32 (5–6): 423–448. James, William. 1902. The Varieties of Religious Experience, 210. Vantage Books Hartman, Savid. Katz, Steven. 1983. Mysticism and the Religious Traditions. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Kessler, Diane, ed. 1999. Together on the Way: Official Report of the Eighth Assembly of the World Council of Churches. Geneva, Switzerland: WCC Publications. Lochhead, David. 1988. The Dialogical Imperative. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. McIntosh, Mark, and Edward Howell. 2020. The Oxford Handbook of Mystical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitias, Michael. 2012a. Friendship: A Central Moral Value. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Rodopi. ———. 2012b. Seeking God. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. ———. 2020. The Philosopher Converses with God. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock. Nowak, Marek. 2001. Fundamental Dialogue. Dialogue and Universalism 11 (1–2): 69.

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Ochs, Peter. 2003. The Jewish-Christian Schism. London: Eerdmans. ———. 2011. Another Reformation: Postliberal Christianity and the Jews. Group: Baker Publishing. Plato. 1961. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Bollingen Series LXXI. Pantheon Books. Pratt, Douglass. 2014. Being Open, Being Faithful. Geneva, Switzerland: World Council of Churches. Prothero, Stephen. 2010. God is not One, Harper One. Qureshi, Nabeel. 2016. No God but God. Zondervan. Race, Alan. 1983. Christian and Religious Pluralism. London, England: SCM. Rosen, Steven. 2006. Essential Hinduism, 32ff. Praeger. Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. 2017a. Religious Pluralism and Interreligious Dialogue. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. ———. 2017b. God Beyond Boundaries: A Christian and Pluralistic Theology of Religions. Munster: Waxman. Shah-Kazemi, Reza. 2006. The Other in the Light of the One; The Universality of the Qur’an and Interfaith Dialogue. Cambridge: Islamic Test Society. Smith, Houston. 1991. The World’s Religions. Harper One. Smock, David R., ed. 2002. Interfaith Dialogue and Peace Building. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Tracy, David. 1990. Dialogue with the Other. Leuven, Belgium: Peeters Press. Volf, Miroslav. 2012. Do We Worship the Same God? Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. Eerdmans. Whitehead, A.N. 1926. Religion in the Making. New York: Macmillan & Co. ———. 1929. Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan & Co.

Index

A Abe, Masao, 103 Affability, 104 Aristotle, 22, 52, 92, 107

Cornille, Catherine, 16, 29, 95, 100–104, 108, 110, 114 Curiosity, 16, 18, 29, 67, 78, 115, 129

B Bedford-Strohm, Bishop, 25 Bergson, Henri, 99 Buber, Martin, 15 Buddhism, 8, 40, 99, 120

D D’Costa, Gavin, 100, 103 Dewey, John, 82 Dhari, 10 Dharma, 3, 8, 10, 96 Dharmic religions, 10 Dialogue Buberian model, 15 conditions, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13–15, 19, 20, 23, 25–26, 37–63, 65–117, 119, 121–129, 135 idea of, 13–19 meaning, 8, 82, 128 Platonic model, 12, 13, 15, 16 religious, 3–5, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 49, 52, 55, 57, 83–85, 98, 100, 101

C Christianity, 8, 10, 16, 23, 40, 88, 99, 113, 120 Cobb, John, 18, 100, 103 Conversation, 1, 2, 4, 13–16, 19, 24, 35, 37, 42, 44, 46, 51, 53, 55, 56, 66, 69, 70, 75, 76, 78, 81–85, 91, 92, 97, 98, 101, 122–126, 130, 132

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. H. Mitias, Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70520-6

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INDEX

Disinterested attitude, 96, 125, 132 Divine truth, 8, 17, 19, 27–30, 96 Doctrine, 3, 37, 40, 50, 56, 66, 67, 69, 83, 87, 91, 111, 114, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 126–129, 134 E Education, 2, 3, 16, 24, 25, 46, 56, 85, 87, 91–94 educational establishment, 24–25, 55, 91 Empathy, 1, 11, 33–35, 69, 95, 96 Equality, 4, 7, 11, 17, 27, 29–33, 87, 95, 96 Exclusivism, 18, 19, 27 religious exclusivism, 17, 40 F Faith, 3, 54, 66, 69, 90, 104, 111, 114, 118, 122–127, 129, 132 faithful, 2, 20–22, 26, 30, 38, 40, 50–52, 54–56, 63, 65, 66, 80, 82–87, 91, 102, 109, 111, 113, 118, 122, 124, 126, 127, 133 Francis, Pope, 22 G Geist, 51, 93 God as basis of religion, 1, 9, 10 as creator, 18, 29, 41, 56, 87–89, 113, 122, 123, 126, 133, 135 God-centeredness, 1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 95–100, 115

H Hartshorne, Charles, 18 Hegel, George W. F., 16, 31, 34, 72, 93 Hick, John, 17, 28, 37, 102, 103, 108, 109, 114 Hinduism, 8, 40, 99, 100, 112, 120 Human encounter, 15 Humanity, 4, 5, 9, 15, 23, 25–27, 29, 32, 38, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 52, 53, 58–62, 66, 71, 76, 93, 96, 106, 109, 112, 120, 122, 125–127, 133, 135 Human nature, 3, 8, 9, 16, 18, 25, 29, 34, 38, 67, 85, 86, 89, 96, 112, 121, 123 as religious, 3, 9, 16, 18, 89, 112 I Ineffability, 104, 105, 123 Islam, 8, 10, 23, 25, 40, 99, 113, 120 J Jainism, 8 James, William, 8 Jesus, 10, 21, 67, 71, 88, 113, 118 Judaism, 8, 40, 99 K Kant, Immanuel, 58, 106, 109 Katz, Steven, 100, 101 M Modesty, 1, 11, 52, 53, 69, 84, 125, 127, 134 Mohammad, 10, 21, 28, 71, 118 Moses, 67, 71

 INDEX 

Mystical experience, 3, 5, 9, 10, 99–102, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 117, 135 Mysticism, 95–116 O Objectivity, 95–97 P Plato, 9, 14, 28, 52, 72, 82, 99, 107 Pluralism religious, 10 Praxis, 13, 23, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 56, 66, 67, 81 Q Qur’an, 29, 71, 113, 118 R Reason, 3, 5, 8, 10, 13–15, 19, 26, 27, 31, 32, 41, 42, 45, 50, 53, 54, 56, 59, 60, 65, 66, 68–70, 79, 82–85, 88–90, 94, 101, 102, 105, 108, 115, 116, 120, 122, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135 Religion-centeredness, 97, 108 predicament, 28, 97 Religious community, 2, 4, 8, 13, 19–22, 24, 27, 32, 40, 55, 56, 66, 67, 69, 85, 89, 91–93, 111, 117, 118, 125 establishment, 12, 22–24, 41, 56, 91, 136 self-understanding, 1, 5, 70, 72, 100, 103, 117–136

143

truth, 8, 20–21, 27, 68, 98, 102, 103 will, 66, 92, 93, 116 Revelation, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 18, 28–30, 40, 70, 71, 84, 87, 90, 96, 98, 102, 113, 119, 122, 123, 125, 129, 133, 134 religious, 3, 8, 87, 96, 102 S Socrates, 41, 84, 89 Spinoza, 72, 107, 110 Spirit, 7, 16, 21, 51, 52, 55, 56, 63, 83, 84, 91, 93, 112 Subject, 3, 4, 10–12, 14, 16, 19, 22, 50, 51, 55–57, 59, 62, 63, 66, 68, 75–77, 82, 83, 92, 97, 98, 106, 122, 123, 127 collective subject, 4, 55–57, 63, 66, 93 T Al-Tayeb, Sheikh Ahmad, 22, 23 Theology, comparative, 3 Toleration, 7, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29–33, 95, 96 Transcendent, 3, 5, 8–10, 18, 24, 30, 33, 95, 96, 98–100, 102–107, 109–114, 123 Turner, Denys, 100, 103 U Understanding, 1–3, 5, 7–11, 13–16, 18–21, 25–31, 33–35, 37, 39–42, 48–50, 52–54, 56, 63, 65–94, 110, 113–115, 118, 124, 127, 128, 130, 133, 135

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INDEX

Understanding (cont.) mutual, 1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26–30, 32, 33, 37, 39, 51, 53–57, 63, 65–98, 115, 117, 119–128, 131–135 V Values, 2–5, 7–9, 13, 18–35, 37, 39–41, 43–48, 50–54, 56–62, 67, 68, 76–78, 80–82, 84, 86, 90,

93, 96–98, 101–103, 106–114, 120–122, 124, 129, 130, 132, 133 Violence, 2, 40–42, 62, 68, 70, 80, 84, 85, 119, 120, 129, 131, 132 W Whitehead, Alfred, 18, 72, 99, 109, 110