Ports, Crime and Security: Governing and Policing Seaports in a Changing World 9781529217735

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PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

Governing and Policing Seaports in a Changing World

ANNA SERGI, ALEXANDRIA REID, LUCA STORTI AND MARLEEN EASTON

ANNA SERGI, ALEXANDRIA REID, LUCA STORTI AND MARLEEN EASTON

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY Governing and Policing Seaports in a Changing World

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2021 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-5292-1771-1 hardcover ISBN 978-1-5292-1772-8 ePub ISBN 978-1-5292-1773-5 ePdf The right of Anna Sergi, Alexandria Reid, Luca Storti and Marleen Easton to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the authors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Dave Worth Front cover image: shutterstock_​131488238 By Oleksiy Mark Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Anna Sergi wishes to dedicate this book to all the beautiful containers she has seen and their cheerful colours. Alexandria Reid wishes to thank Louis Skelton, Jo Leverett and Ankur Shah for their patience. Luca Storti dedicates this book to all the travels yet to come. Marleen Easton dedicates this book to those who contributed to her insights behind the scenes.

Contents List of Tables and Figures About the Authors Acknowledgements

vi vii ix

Introduction one Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society two Policing Complex Criminality in and through Major Seaports three Governance of Security in Ports four The Future of Port Security Conclusion

1 17 49 78 111 134

Notes References Index

143 148 177

v

List of Tables and Figures Tables I.1 2.1

Dimensions and spatial configurations of ports Complex crime in the ambivalent dimensions of ports

5 76

Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4a 1.4b 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8

Ports: global and local economic circuits Container port traffic (2018, million TEU) Three types of port Top 20 world container ports (volume 2018, million TEU) Hypothetical distribution of ports according to their interconnections Changing ports: main dynamics Ideal-​typical structure of a port innovative network Port environments: elements and actors A multilevel model for economic behaviour between formal and informal rules

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19 20 24 27 28 30 31 36 44

About the Authors Marleen Easton is Professor and chair of the research group ‘Governing and Policing Security’ (GaPS, www.gaps-u ​ gent.be) at the Department of Public Governance and Management at Ghent University. Her research group generates research on public management and governance in the policy field of safety and security. GaPS is currently focusing on four research lines: (1) Governance of flows; (2) Innovation, technology and security; (3) Knowledge exchange; and (4) Safety in local communities. Since 2017, Easton is Associate Professor at the Criminology Institute at Griffith University in Australia. Besides her academic career, Easton has been presiding the Innovation Network for Security (www.iungos.be) since 2014. Alexandria Reid is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), where she specializes in environmental security, transnational organized crime, illicit trade and related illicit financial flows. Anna Sergi holds a PhD in Sociology (2014), with specialization in Criminology, from the University of Essex, where she currently is a Senior Lecturer in courses on organized crime, security and globalization. She specializes in mafia studies, cross border policing of organized crime and, more recently, drug importations through seaports. She has published extensively in renowned journals and authored four books.

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Luca Storti (PhD) is an Associate Professor of Economic Sociology at the University of Torino and Research Fellow of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies in the Graduate Center at The City University of New York. His main research interests and publications involve the topic of international organized crime groups at boundaries between legal and illegal markets, and the relationships between Institutions and the Economy.

viii

Acknowledgements The authors wish to extend a collective thanks to the countless experts and port security professionals who contributed to the numerous research projects and events underlying this book. In particular, Dr Sergi and Dr Storti wish to thank all the institutions they met throughout their research on ports and organized crime, namely the Secur.Port Project in Genoa, Liverpool, Montreal, Melbourne, New York and recently Gioia Tauro. Thanks are due to the British Academy for funding the Secur.Port project and workshop under the ‘Tackling the UK’s International Challenges’ call of 2018. Prof Easton wishes to acknowledge the funding provided by the Flanders Research Foundation (FWO) for the project ‘Ports of Call: understanding transnational security networks’ (2016–​ 2020). Additional thanks are due to that project’s research team, namely PhD student Eva Dinchel, Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning. Prof Easton’s work for this book also draws on workshops in Ghent (June 2017), Brisbane (April 2019) and London (May 2020). The first two workshops were facilitated by the research group ‘Governing and Policing Security’ at Ghent University in Belgium and funded by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). The workshop ‘Governance of flows: security provision in ports’ in Brisbane (2019) was held between 30th of April and 1st of May 2019 in collaboration with the ‘Evolving Securities Initiative’, located at

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the Criminology Institute, Griffith University Brisbane. The London (2020) workshop is the one where this book project saw the light. The authors collectively want to thank the team of editors at Bristol University Press for their support and their enthusiasm about this book project.

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Introduction

Background The idea for this book emerged from a workshop organized by the four authors of this book in May 2020. The workshop brought together 16 practitioners and nine researchers with expertise in the field of port policing, port security, organized crime and border control. Funded by the British Academy, the ‘Secur.Port’ workshop was organized by the University of Essex and Strategic Hub for Organised Crime Research (SHOC) at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), with the support of Ghent University and Research Foundation Flanders. The event featured contributors from seaports including Melbourne (Australia); Antwerp (Belgium); Rotterdam (The Netherlands); Genoa (Italy); Montreal (Canada); New York and New Jersey (US) and Liverpool (UK). Two EU-​funded projects also contributed to the overall discussion, namely the PASSAnT project (for new port security technologies), led by the Belgian Innovation Network for Security, Iungos, the Belgian Vias Institute and the Dutch Institute of Technology, and the European Union (EU) funded project ‘Improving Port Security in Western and Central Africa’, led by Expertise France.

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Practitioners were asked to present on the two enforcement or security issues they deemed most relevant in their port of reference. A Q&A followed presentations and researchers acted as thematic discussants, contextualizing and analyzing the emerging themes from each session. These themes are presented in what follows as an informal introduction to the key material and debates covered in this book, which draws on projects the four authors have worked on separately and together in relation to crime, security and ports over the past five to ten years. In addition to the Secur.Port project, the authors wish to credit Research Foundation Flanders for funding the ‘Ports of Call’ research project, including workshops in Ghent (2019) and Brisbane (2019). This book should, therefore, be considered a product of the aforementioned research and knowledge exchanges, as well as a stepping stone for future research. The main debates in the Secur.Port workshop –​ and consequently in this book –​revolve around the following question: Why do ports embody such multifaceted security issues and what does this entail in practice for curbing crimes and governing the port space? Naturally, the centre of all the discussions and key debates preceding and informing this book is the port itself, as an object of research and an analytical gateway through which social, economic, criminal phenomena can be examined. Before proceeding to describe the content of this book, it is therefore necessary to reflect on the nature of the space of ports from a sociological perspective. The space of the port and the port as space Ports play a crucial role in the licit and illicit global economy. They are the ‘beating’ heart of legal and illegal flows of people, goods, information and money. They are places and spaces that matter across several levels of analysis and are therefore used by criminal networks to set up illegal practices and ‘surf ’ along legal ‘waves’.

2

Introduction

Essentially, ports are multivalent spaces –​that is, they have many purposes, interpretations and values. They can be seen as having multivalent access points; multivalent meanings given to the physical territory of the waterfront; multivalent behaviours as to what constitutes the social territory of the waterfront; and, of course, they are plural economic settings. Even morphologically, they are in constant flux: places of arrival, transit and departure all at once. The multivalent quality of the port space and function is crucial to understanding why trading, governing, securing and policing the waterfront is such a complex task. Ports’ multivalent nature can, in the first instance, be reduced to the port spaces having two dimensions: the local and the global, combining to make them glocal (Sergi and Storti, 2020). In particular, when looking at the local dimension of ports and at the configuration of access, ports are gates for entry into the city, as much as they provide an exit door to the sea. In this sense, they are both gates and barriers as much as they are doors of entry or exit (Stenning and Easton, 2021). From a global economic perspective, conversely, ports can be understood as a space of exchange between actors of all forms, principally used for delivery and departure of goods of all forms. The physical territory of the port can also be conceptualized differently from a local or a global perspective. The territory of the port represents a border; from a local point of view, this border is inward looking, delimiting the so-​called ‘port-​city’ interface. From a global perspective, meanwhile, the physical territory of the port represents an outward-​looking boundary, or the start of the port-​sea interface. In this way, ports are quintessentially ‘liminal’ spaces that are ‘neither purely sea nor purely land’ (Steinberg, 2013: 163; Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). Likewise, ports are multivalent spaces in as much as their social and economic nature constantly swings between the global and the local. Indeed, from a local perspective, the social territory of the port is the space for different forms of

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relationships across public and private actors, such as terminals and dock workers, law enforcement and border agents, and shipping companies and freight forwarders (Easton, 2020). From a global perspective, the scenario is the same but reversed: the port is a space for international governance. As a consequence, the global maritime industry must meet both local and global expectations, standards and regulations. Big players in the port economy establish and maintain relationships across borders. This includes multinational terminal operators or shipping companies that operate in different ports and across different shipping lines, perhaps two of the best examples of the complex social relationships that can be forged in ports at the global level. Finally, from a local economic perspective, the port represents an opportunity for investment and employment in the city or state of reference, while from a global perspective, the port is one of the many hubs integral to global maritime trade and national prosperity, a node of the global shipping industry. The complex interaction between these global and local dimensions generates governance challenges in ports around the world. Table I.1 summarizes the multivalent nature of the port space, demonstrating how one can look at ports in different ways from local and global perspectives. This reflection on the nature of the space of ports forms the preliminary framework of this book and provides a structure that enables us to address the most pressing port security issues from a political economy perspective. Emerging themes from the Secur.Port workshop Obviously, then, there are several endogenous reasons why the governance of security in ports is intrinsically puzzling, not least the presence of multi-​sectoral actors and users, their divergent priorities, and the problematic overlapping authority, jurisdiction and competences they share. As demonstrated, large ports have always been, and still are, both inward-​and outward-​looking, which is one of the primary reasons why

4

Introduction

Table I.1: Dimensions and spatial configurations of ports Spatial configurations

Local

Global

Access

Port as gate, door and barrier

Port as shipping hub (delivery and departure)

Physical territory Port-​city interface (inward border)

Port-​sea interface (outward border)

Social territory

Port as space of relationships across private and public sectors

Port as space of international governance

Economic settings

Port as space of investment and employment

Port as hub/​node in global trade

such complexity exists in the first place. This introduction now turns to the most pressing practical and analytical challenges created by this complexity, as identified through a thematic analysis of practitioner presentations at the Secur.Port workshop in May 2020 and in light of previous research conducted by the authors during other projects and workshops. Complex governance structure and cooperation

The primary issue when it comes to ports, security and crime control is in the nature of port governance, which is a sub-​product of port economics. Most large ports are landlord ports –​with private companies leasing the land from the state for a few decades, in order to build their (competitive) business (Huybrechts et al, 2002). The complex governance structures of many large ports therefore necessitates cooperation between public agencies –​including law enforcement and state authorities (ie, the port authority, if that is a public body) –​and private companies. Usually, the facilities’ owners –​the private companies with the lease –​act as tenants, and their clients are admissible ‘guests’ on the terminal premises.

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One of the biggest challenges for ports and port authorities in these complex governance structures relates specifically to the difficulty of information sharing across several platforms and actors. As mutual ‘outsiders’, some law enforcement agencies and other public authorities struggle to establish consistent channels of communication with private companies and their security forces, and vice versa (Sergi, 2020a). Three main reasons for this challenge appear to be: • Cooperation problems: different and competing priorities for agencies and institutions active in policing and securing the waterfront, often working in siloed manners. • Coordination problems: overlapping jurisdictions, mandates and duplication of effort in approaching certain investigations/​ security issues. • Privacy concerns: inconsistent or incompatible confidentiality protocols, data sharing cultures and requirements. In order to improve coordination, communication and information sharing, authorities often organize Information Sharing Centres or other bespoke groupings to address security matters (De Boeck et al, 2014; Dinchel and Easton, 2020; Easton, 2020). Notwithstanding many steps in the right direction, the biggest issues –​those of data sharing and privacy concerns –​ when mixed with clashes across different occupational cultures of each authority, often lead to coordination remaining residual. For example, it might seem relatively easy to cooperate when intelligence-​led investigations need ad hoc support or access to port facilities and/or other institutions, but this cooperation is not necessarily ongoing. Ad hoc approaches tend to be unsustainable or ineffective in the long term: intelligence-​led policing and risk-​based enforcement strategies rely on consistent data sharing to detect systematic abuse and improve port governance more broadly. Last but not least, a lack of public-​private engagement can limit law enforcement’s oversight of trusted insiders

6

Introduction

and corrupt practices. This occurs for a number of reasons, including the difficulty of accessing personnel data belonging to the private sector; fragmented regulatory oversight of companies and businesses by port-​facing law enforcement; and limited knowledge of private sector processes and systems. Assessments of supply chain vulnerabilities are usually undertaken by border forces or by intermediaries who can bridge the public-​private divide (at times, but not always, within port authorities). However, without law enforcement’s broader knowledge of complex criminality, these assessments primarily focus on breaches of border security alone. Security versus trade

The aforementioned can be compounded by competing public sector priorities and limited resources that result in the treatment of port security as a border security issue, predominantly focussed on maintaining order and not in curbing crime or corruption. Due to limited resources, many institutions, including port authorities and border forces are increasingly hybrid in their roles (Eski, 2020), performing security, policing and custom roles concurrently. Even when a good relationship is established between public authorities and private companies, law enforcement can struggle to execute routine or advanced investigations. There are a number of reasons for this, including the difficulties of accessing port (private) premises without interrupting business, and the divergent priorities and targets of the businesses that employ private security teams, who may wish to be more cooperative with law enforcement, but face explicit and implicit institutional incentives to prioritize continuity of business (Eski, 2020). This speaks to the inherent tension between trade facilitation and security. From a management perspective, this is linked to the privatization of the port economy, which prioritizes

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privacy and smooth business transactions. To view security as an ‘added value’ essentially requires ‘added’ costs (Sergi, 2020a). Nonetheless, there is growing awareness that security issues can also have economic consequences for the port and companies therein –​particularly as regards reputation. This has influenced the priorities of at least a part of the private sector (principally terminals) active in the port area. From a law enforcement perspective, trade and security are mutually reinforcing objectives. However, most port security regimes are historically and legally geared towards the protection of critical infrastructure from violence and physical threat by state and more recently non-​state terrorist actors (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Eski, 2016). This is ill suited to law enforcement’s focus on other security threats, including organized crime, illicit trafficking and corruption. The trade versus security tension is also expressed through working conditions in the port. Many ports rely on low-​ skilled and labour-​intensive workforces. These sectors tend to be exposed to informal regulation and conflicts between workers and employers (Cowen, 2007). As explored in Chapter 1, in the past, industry-​workforce tensions have sometimes led to parallel forms of extra-​legal governance, which have also facilitated organized crime (Jacobs, 2006; Sergi and Storti, 2020). This relationship is often overlooked, despite its importance in port governance. Workers’ rights and conditions appear to affect the extent and form of unionization (Cowen, 2007), as well as the degree of deregulation and related opportunities for corruption or infiltration. For example, research suggests that in contexts characterized by non-​coordinated market economies, organized crime groups have tried to infiltrate unions within ports in order to extort money from employees through intimidation, infiltrate legal businesses by collecting bribes and influence the support that unions might give to local politics (Jacobs and Peters, 2003; Sergi and Storti, 2020).

8

Introduction

Technology and cybersecurity

The field of technology and innovation is particularly relevant in the port space, including security. Technological advancement is considered a cornerstone of enhanced security in port terminals, notwithstanding the fact that there appears to be scarce communication across ports on these issues, according to the participants of the Secur.Port workshop. All major port facilities constantly update the ways in which trade data is tracked and stored, a process which often reduces –​though does not eliminate –​the traditionally paper-​based nature of port business. Infrastructures are constantly subjected to reviews of technological progress and efficiency. For example, technological advancement in the form of biometric equipment and scanning machinery significantly affects patterns of detection, enforcement and mobility in port facilities (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019a). While technological advancements might be seen as decreasing the opportunities for illicit trade by fragmenting chains of permissions and by creating shared information repositories, it also poses new challenges and displaces certain risks (Sergi, 2020b). For one, by making technologies more secure, people who have access to these technologies might themselves become targets. As it is difficult for most traffickers to access computer-​based systems remotely, this may lead to the attempted corruption of ‘back office’ staff rather than port workers on terminal grounds (Easton, 2020). This, in turn, may also reduce the number of people approached by organized crime overall. Corruption, therefore, is not only curbed by reducing physical opportunities; it is also a matter of reducing incentives (Sequera and Djankov, 2014). Beyond these technology-​e nabled insider threats and corruption, increased reliance on technology in port governance and control also creates new systemic vulnerabilities that can be exploited by different organized crime networks.

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For example, hackers may seek to gain access remotely to information about cargo or shipments, or blackmail or extort port operators. Several incidents demonstrate that hackers can successfully manipulate IT systems to release or introduce illicit cargo. Businesses using port facilities also need adequate cybersecurity protections to protect against unforeseen cyber threats. Cybersecurity therefore extends to the integrity and maintenance of IT systems and IT-​enabled assets, including those of private users in the port. Chapter 4 in this book proposes that cybersecurity needs to be part of a holistic approach to port security, with law enforcement and relevant regulators trained to investigate cyber-​enabled incidents. Yet most cyber-​enabled crimes increasingly need to be investigated by specialist law enforcement agencies residing outside the port, adding another layer of governance to the complex port space. Blind zones: corruption

As hinted earlier, curbing both individual and institutional corruption on the waterfront remains a priority for border and national security, yet there is relatively little consensus on effective approaches adopted by security providers in ports (Jancsics, 2019). It is often the case that that organized crime investigations in the port space eventually uncover a problem with integrity and corruption, either concerning private employees or law enforcement agents (Sergi, 2020b). In the past –​and in some respects to this day in some ports –​ corruption on the waterfront was mostly confined to certain types of workers, usually unionized and entrusting one another (Sergi and Storti, 2020). The less hierarchical, more complex and distributed in nature the port economy becomes, including the changes brought it by IT enhancements, the more organized crime networks’ interests in human capital increases (Sergi, 2020c; Roks, Bisschop and Staring, 2020). Indeed, individuals with access to key knowledge and information

10

Introduction

about how processes work in the port, including high-​ranking employees, are in positions that may not have existed 15 years ago. Vulnerable positions and practices are dynamic, changing and adapting to security protocols and trends in the illicit market. While tackling individual instances of corruption uncovered in the course of an investigation is important, many authorities lack the resources needed to detect and deter systemic corruption. Anti-​c orruption policies and procedures need to be monitored and strengthened in practice, not just be a mere box-​ticking exercise. It should be considered crucial to understand not only how, but also why, law-​abiding workers are recruited and become involved in organized crime networks. The question of why different individuals, in different ranking positions in the port management, economy, security and policing realms, become approachable or are otherwise co-​ opted into criminal activities remains key (Zaitch, 2002a). This also extends to actors in the broader supply chain, who facilitate or enable crime within the port. Of course, rational choice theories of crime, together with routine activities and situational crime prevention techniques (Kirby and Penna, 2010), are embedded as standard into security protocols in ports to reduce incentives, increase the risks, reduce the benefits and harden the targets. Yet while profit remains perhaps the most important incentive, arguably, the social and cultural enablers of corrupt activity cannot be tackled through hard security measures alone. Indeed, the issue is not only one of reducing incentives and benefits of criminal involvement but also one of providing different, highly localized responses to corruption. In addition to introducing risk assessments to evaluate transparency and anti-​corruption –​ and enforcing best practices in hiring procedures to identify any problematic relationship before joining the port –​there is a need to dig deeper. This includes understanding the underlying dynamics of discontent, individual perceptions of fairness and the collective approach to industry relations. Once again,

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this calls for localized and contextualized approaches applied through comparative lenses. The port-​city interface and the port-​sea interface

One of the underlying issues that unites many of the themes mentioned earlier is the necessity to look at ports from both sea and city perspectives, treating them as both inward and outward looking. The criminal shadow economy of the area surrounding port cities and regions is intimately linked to port culture and dynamics (Sergi, 2020a). To understand drug trafficking, for example, one must consider not just the immediate consequences of drug consumption and violence surrounding the port, but the impact of criminal groups in the city on the national and global drug supply chain, as well as criminal investment and money laundering through local legal vehicles (Easton, 2020). Crime through ports is naturally linked to secondary local phenomena such as money laundering, violence, and the social acceptability of corrupt practices or illicit goods. This creates a challenge in drawing coherent boundaries around security and policing policies, and activities aimed to counter crime in and around ports. The port-​city interface is often poorly addressed in current security regimes. International regulations such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code –​ which this book considers in Chapter 3 and 4 –​are primarily focussed on the port-​sea interface and largely aimed at counter-​ terrorism scenarios (Eski and Carpenter, 2013). Criminal activities on the waterfront go far beyond these narrow boundaries. Many companies see the ISPS Code as something that needs to be fulfilled administratively on paper –​a box-​ticking ­exercise –​rather than something that can actually help in the daily job against crime and illicit trafficking in ports (Wilkes in Safety4Sea, 2019). The adaptation of the ISPS Code and/or the potential introduction of other tools or international codes of conduct

12

Introduction

to better represent the reality and modus operandi of crime in ports was considered an important area of enquiry by the participants of the Secur.Port workshop. The tools and languages of maritime security do not always provide the right mandate to allow law enforcement to investigate and prosecute criminality at sea or in ports (McNicholas, 2008; Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016). Similarly, the tools and priorities of institutions countering organized crime do not always consider the importance or challenges of policing hybrid areas like the city-​sea interface or the port. Overall, maritime security is about ports as much as port security is about the cities’ and host territory’s fight against serious, complex and organized crime. Book structure This book draws on these themes when answering the question set out at the beginning of this chapter, concerning the multifaceted security issues raised by the modern port space. In doing so, the book attempts to bridge the divide between theory and practice, providing an overview of different standpoints in disciplines such as economic sociology, criminology, network studies and political economy, as well as a look at the current state of affairs, recent data and even more recent debates. This book is a combined effort; however, each of the authors curated one chapter specifically, whose topics mostly relate to their specialist expertise. Chapter 1 was primarily curated by Dr Luca Storti, thanks to research and fieldwork conducted during the Secur.Port project funded by the British Academy. This chapter functions as a theoretical framework that explores the relationship between the port economy and society to establish the foundations of this book’s ‘political economy of port security’ approach. Ports are involved in trading activities and engaged in attempts undertaken by institutions to regulate complex economic processes. Accordingly, the book assumes the concept of political economy in a broad interdisciplinary sense to define

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how governmental bodies, institutional frameworks, collective actors, an economic system (ie, the maritime economy in which large ports are rooted), and the social environment affect and influence each other, both at the local and the global level. This approach has long been present in this field of study, but in a rather implicit way. It is, therefore, useful to frame it more clearly. With this aim, Chapter 1 places ports against the background of broad socio-​economic scenarios. Ports are shaped by local, national and international factors that operate not just in isolation but affect one another. To disentangle the combination of these factors, the first part of the chapter observes how ports are embedded in global trade networks and shaped by the national and local institutional frameworks. It then reconstructs the economic processes that actually happen in ports and outlines the individual and collective actors operating in the port economy. Last, Chapter 1 lays out the endogenous mechanisms that generate an environment in ports in which informal, illegal actions and multifaceted criminal activities tend to emerge. Chapter 2 was primarily curated by Dr Anna Sergi, also thanks to research and fieldwork conducted during the Secur. Port project funded by the British Academy. This chapter provides a framework for analyzing large-​scale, organized and complex criminality through and within major seaports and the challenges of policing these activities. The chapter’s main aim is to analyze how organized crime, organizational crime and forms of collusion and/​or corruption on the waterfront and in/​through seaports should be understood as complex crimes, in as much as they involve different types of activities, more or less serious or harmful in nature and more or less local in reach. Drawing on data collected in the ports of Genoa, New York/​New Jersey, Montreal, Melbourne, Liverpool and Gioia Tauro, the chapter reflects on practical challenges and the practices of policing the port space. In doing so, the chapter establishes that the policing of complex crimes on the

14

Introduction

waterfront and in/​through seaports is a form of hybrid policing between high and low control mechanisms. It concludes with an analysis of the consequences this has for local partnerships and long-​lasting interventions. Chapter 3 was primarily curated by Professor Marleen Easton. The chapter begins by exploring some of the main vocabulary used in the governance of security literature, defining key concepts such as flows, nodes, plural policing, nodal governance, polycentric systems, partnerships, networks, assemblages, regulation, hybridity and accountability. The chapter uses this vocabulary to illustrate some of the main findings of research on security governance in ports. Without being exhaustive, it explores the importance of ports as hubs in a multitude of flows, ports as hybrid spaces, illustrations of plural policing and nodal mapping and the nature of relations between security providers in port spaces. The importance of regulation and accountability are illustrated throughout. The text is underpinned by the testimonials of port professionals around the world, reflecting upon the dynamics of security governance in practice, as well as empirical research by the authors and other colleagues in the field. In this way, the chapter hopes to contribute to the conversation between academics and practitioners in the field of port security, one of the main goals of this book. This dialogue reveals that much work is left to be done to disentangle the complexities of security governance in ports. Chapter 4 was primarily curated by Alexandria Reid, built on research and fieldwork conducted while at RUSI. The chapter departs by considering how ports are dynamic spaces where both licit and illicit operators and users must capitalize on social, political, economic and technological change to remain competitive. It aims to demonstrate that the political economy approach proposed in this book provides a useful lens for exploring and evaluating how these forces will continue to shape port security in the future. It begins by discussing the ‘long shadow’ of the ISPS Code and its treatment –​or lack

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thereof –​of organized crime as a port security priority. Here, it engages with critiques of the politicization of the international regime, its failure to address local priorities and what this means for maritime-​focussed capacity building initiatives moving forward. It then turns to technology, digitization and automation as a challenge and opportunity for port security, including cybersecurity as an emergent threat, the changing nature of corruption vulnerabilities and the displacement of organized crime activities into the wider logistics supply chain and port-​city hinterland area.

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1

Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society

Territories, flows, networks As demonstrated in the introduction, ports are the liminal boundary between (global) flows and territories (Ng et al, 2014), as well as hubs of global trade networks. In this way, they are pillars of both the licit and illicit economy, as well as social spaces that are continuously transformed through multi-​actor exchanges and interactions at the internal, local, national and international level (Ben-​Yehoyada, 2017). It is against this background that this chapter sketches some important economic processes related to ports, mainly large cargo ones. It adopts an economic sociology approach (Granovetter, 2017), as opposed to a more conventional perspective on the so-​called port economy, which mainly aims to present an atlas of the concrete economic activities taking place in ports and in the maritime world (see Talley, 2017). In this vein, the chapter pays attention to the multiple intersections emerging in port areas among economy, society and institutions. These intersections

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raise, for their part, several puzzles pertaining to micro coordination and regulation matters. Briefly speaking, the economy can be traced back to three main dimensions: producing goods and services, trading such goods, and governing or regulating the markets where the goods are traded and exchanged (Varese, 2011; Shortland and Varese, 2016: 811). The concepts of governing and regulating are meant here both in a strict economic perspective –​as the emergence from below of market exchange practices –​and in a broad sociological perspective –​as external institutions defining the rules of economic processes. By definition, ports are involved in trading and thus in attempts undertaken by institutions to regulate complex economic processes. Accordingly, this chapter deals with these two dimensions, which are also foundational dimensions of a ‘political economy of port security’ approach. Here the concept of political economy is assumed in a broad sense as an interdisciplinary approach to define how governmental bodies, institutional frameworks, collective actors, an economic system (ie, the maritime economy embedded in large ports) and the social environment affect and influence each other, both at the local and the global scale. This approach has long been present in this field of study, but in a rather implicit way. It is, therefore, useful to frame it more clearly. The chapter explores first ports from a global supply chain perspective, demonstrating that intense intra-​and inter-​port competition shapes the international and national dynamics of port governance and transformation. It then turns to four major trends in the governance of ports and the port-​city interface, namely, innovation, regeneration, planning and governance. Lastly, it observes the multi-​actor relationships within the port itself and the regulation of port security, and the endogenous mechanisms that underlie demand for protection, and informal and illegal actions occurring in ports worldwide.

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Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society

Placing ports in the world economy: analytical toolkits This section begins by interrogating the social and economic processes that shape ports, and asking how ports, for their part, affect these social and economic processes. It presents a multilevel and dynamic scheme referred to as ‘ports within global and local economic circuits’ (see Figure 1.1) to answer these questions. The scheme is rather descriptive in character and explained by following a typical U process (Goldthorpe, 2007). First, the section moves through a top-​down path, starting from the macro and international tendencies. Second, it follows a bottom-​up path to position the port within global trade networks. It is clear that from the crises of the old Fordist institutional configuration onwards that there has been a growing tendency towards the interdependence of the world’s economy. Globalization has fostered the connectedness of nations, and increased the exchange of goods, services and capital all over the world. Hence, maritime international trade has also grown accordingly (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2012; Córdova and Pahl, 2019). An estimated 80 per cent of global trade by volume and 70 per cent of global trade by value is carried by sea, the

Figure 1.1: Ports: global and local economic circuits Global value chain

Global trading network

Global production network

Globalized economic tendencies Path dependency; models of capitalism

Ports

Dry ports Logistic activities

Cluster of production

Territorial and national institutional framework

Authors’ own elaboration

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majority of which is handled by large, containerized ports worldwide (UNCTAD, 2018). In 2018, major dry bulk commodities –​iron ore, grain and coal –​accounted for more than 40 per cent of total dry cargo shipments, while containerized trade and minor bulks accounted for 24 per cent and 25.8 per cent of shipping, respectively (UNCTAD, 2019). It is no coincidence that a number of scholars have tried to shed better light on the evolution of containerization, which allows the transport of different goods in containers with standardized dimensions (Hlali and Hammani, 2019: 1). The volume of world maritime trade has grown by about 2.7 per cent or 3.0 per cent over the last 40 years, hitting 4.1 per cent in 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018; 2019; see Figure 1.2). Yet despite this growth, world maritime trade lost momentum in 2018, and deceleration turned into a decrease in 2019–​2020 as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. By applying Trade Network Analysis and Artificial Neural Networks, Vidya and Prabheesh (2020: 2408) show that there has been a drastic Figure 1.2: Container port traffic (2018, million TEU) 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Authors’ own elaboration from the World Bank Data (data.worldbank.org)

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2020

Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society

reduction in trade interconnectedness, connectivity and density among countries since the coronavirus pandemic’s outbreak in 2020. This decline in trade is likely to last until December 2021 for most economies, with the future beyond that appearing uncertain as well. Given these common and transnational tendencies, there are also relevant differences at a more circumscribed territorial level, that is, between different regions, trading blocks and countries (Dwarakish and Salim, 2015; Liu, Wang and Zang, 2018). Although it is not possible to go into all relevant patterns here, there are several useful tools for looking at these constellations. According to a political economy perspective, the globalized trends pushing the growth of maritime trade are filtered by different institution frameworks, which give rise to different models of capitalism and path-​dependent orientations, or established ways of developing and consolidating maritime trade. Hall and Soskice (2001) set out two types of market economy within capitalism: liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the US, UK, Canada and Australia, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany, Japan and Sweden. In LMEs, firms primarily rely upon market mechanisms. In CMEs, the political regulation of the economy has more space and firms accordingly rely more heavily on non-​market forms of interaction and coordination. This somewhat simplistic dual scheme still maintains essential validity, although recent studies have tried to refine the typology, identifying economic subtypes. Among others, Schneider (2009; see also Bresser-​Pereira, 2012) has provided a deeper account of resource allocation processes, which can be conceived as the founding criteria of more specific models of capitalism. The main mechanisms of resource allocation are the market, negotiation, networks and hierarchy. According to how these are combined, other types of capitalism emerge. Here it is useful to recall the hierarchical CME model, to which many Asian capitalisms, ie, the Chinese system, are traced back.

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This typology system provides a ‘rule of thumb’: the more a country or an economic region belongs to the LME model, the more maritime trade tends to be deregulated and ports tend to be included in a special economic zone (SEZ) with weak levels of regulation and taxation. By contrast, the more a country or an economic region belongs to the CME model, the more maritime trade and port areas tend to be part of a broader regulation frame. The hybrid model of dirigiste and hierarchical capitalism, which can be conceived as a sub-​type of CME (see previously mentioned), adheres to this rule of thumb. One of the most relevant cases of this model is the socialist market economy, the economic system employed in the People’s Republic of China. Market-​opening reforms implemented by Deng Xiao Ping in 1978 have seen several SEZs created in the country, some of which are located in coastal areas (Storti, 2020). These SEZs are equipped with large ports with a strong import/​export vocation around which large infrastructural investments have been made. The legacy of that process persists and has made China one of the world’s leading countries in terms of maritime trade and the availability of port capacity (van der Putten, 2019). In the Chinese case and similar others, large ports have been created ad hoc by central political institutions through expansive political choices in order to penetrate international trade. Needless to say, formal institutions are not just involved in defining different models of capitalism in which ports might assume specific configurations. Formal institutions are also required to allocate resources in order to strengthen the effectiveness of ports. To this end, we must once again place our point of view at the crossroads between global dynamics and local responses. The container shipping industry is one of the backbones of global trade, thus it is no wonder that ‘despite heavy investments in container terminal capacity, larger ships and larger flows of containers severely strain seaport operations’ (Roso, Woxenius and Lumsden, 2009: 338). Ports’ capacity can be increased by: i)

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physically expanding; ii) changing the organization of labour; iii) innovating technologies and information systems; and iv) linking port activities with an efficient hinterland organization (Roso, Woxenius and Lumsden, 2009: 338). The first two ways of increasing ports’ capacity may lead to a successful low-​road path emphasizing labour cost-​cutting (Bottalico, 2019), while the latter two support a successful path that takes the high-​road by increasing productivity growth, and encouraging innovation based on cooperative relations. Enhancing cooperative relations is the pre-​condition to establishing dry ports, defined in Leveque and Roso (2002, in Roso, Woxenius, Lumsden and 2009: 341) as ‘an inland intermodal terminal directly connected to seaport(s) with high-​capacity transport mean(s), where customers can leave/​ pick up their standardized units as if directly to a seaport’. Dry ports primarily offer services such as storage, depot-​storage, maintenance and repair of containers, a logistic platform, and intermodal transport infrastructure for cargo on trucks, freight trains and ships (Khaslavskaya and Roso, 2020). Dry ports assume different configurations with respect to the characteristics of the landscape, the level of accessibility of the main highway networks, main railway infrastructure, large airports and, above all, in conjunction with the main features of the local production system in which the port is territorially embedded (Ibrahimi, 2017). Based on these factors, three types of ports can be identified: isolated, connected and integrated. They differ depending on the degree of alignment between economy, territory and society. Integrated ports are deeply embedded in social structures and economic dynamics, and are relevant in shaping places where they are located. Connected ports are more superficially embedded in the socio-​economic context, while by contrast, isolated ports do not have –​or have lost –​socio-​economic connectivity and are ‘foreign objects’ in the social environments in which they are present (see Figure 1.3).

23

newgenrtpdf

Figure 1.3: Three types of port

A - Isolated

C - Integrated

B - Connected

= Dry Port = Rail

= Production cluster = Road

= Industrial district

= Intermodal terminal = City

Authors’ own re-​elaboration from Roso, Woxsenion, Lumsden, 2009: 343. The more a port tends to the integrated model, the more interconnected it is with a dry port and local production systems (ie, production clusters, industrial districts). In the cases in this figure, ports are connected with local production systems through railways. A port can also be located within a local production system. Levels of connectivity have a significant impact on the port economy, its relation with local communities and, in turn, crime, policing and security.

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

24 = Port

Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society

With regard to dry ports, we can postulate a general tendency law: the more a port is connected with a dry port structure and integrated into a type of local production system (ie, industrial district or cluster), the more a port can rely upon infrastructure helping it to act in an innovative way. This configuration makes it easier for ports to control transport flows and to manage them without resorting to the intensification of work rhythms and over-​consumption of spaces (Bottalico, 2019; 2020). Overall, these last aspects assure that the operations taking place in the port chain are inspectable and transparent and make it more likely for security, control and policing measures to be implemented, not least by using information technology and communication systems (Roso, Woxenius and Lumsden, 2009; see Chapter 4). This enables us to complete the analytical circuit by concentrating on ports as relevant hubs of international trade networks. It has already been noted that globalization has increased the volume of commercial exchanges worldwide; it is useful to address how competition between ports to gain access to this potentially vast amount of commerce take shape. There is a high level of concentration in global maritime trade. The ten leading traders in 2018 represented more than half of world trade, with the top five accounting for around 37 per cent of global transactions (UNCTAD, 2019). This concentration is also found at a geographic level. As for global container port traffic by region, 64 per cent gravitates around Asia, 16 per cent involves Europe, ‘only’ 8 per cent North America, 7 per cent South America, and 2 per cent Oceania (UNCTAD, 2019). More precisely, Asia deals with 61 per cent of all the international maritime unloaded trade, 19 per cent is found in Europe, 14 per cent in the Americas, 5 per cent in Africa, and 1 per cent in Oceania. Similarly, Asia is affected by 41 per cent of the whole loaded trade, the Americas 22 per cent, Europe 16 per cent, Oceania 14 per cent and Africa 7 per cent (UNCTAD, 2019).

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PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

Consequently, the configuration of the global system with regard to the maritime shipping routes used for commercial circulation is relatively simple (Notteboom, Pallis and Rodrigue, 2021). The main layout is a circum-​equatorial path linking North America, Europe and Pacific Asia through the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca and the Panama Canal (Notteboom, Pallis and Rodrigue, 2021). Notteboom, Pallis, and Rodrigue (2021) state that as a result of geography, geopolitics and trade flows, specific locations play a strategic role in the global maritime network (2021).1 These are labelled as chokepoints and can be classified into two main categories: i) primary chokepoints, which are key locations in the global trade of goods (ie, the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca); and ii) secondary chokepoints, which support maritime routes that have alternatives (ie, the Magellan Passage, the Dover Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Taiwan Strait). While it is clear that geographic points of passage and constraints shape maritime routes, maritime routes are also socially, politically and economically constructed; political borders, historical habits inherited by the imperial age, fuel and oil economic pressures and international relations tensions have also shaped these routes. This combination of the substantial overall level of maritime trade and the high degree of its concentration in relatively few routes gives rise to an intense inter-​port competition to access and/​or build global trade networks (van Klink, 1997; Notteboom and Yim Yap, 2012). Large ports aim to become hubs of such networks. However, ports are unequal in terms of geographical locations; some of them are placed in strategic spots, helping them enter into these networks. Inter-​port competition therefore also refers to the need to assume an integrated configuration that can partly compensate for territorial gaps or poor location (see Figure 1.3). Moreover, there are other historical, relational and ‘path-​ dependent’ factors concentrating cargo ships into a few

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Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society

Figure 1.4a: Top 20 world container ports (volume 2018, million TEU) 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

N

Sh an

gh ai ,C h in S gb he Sin ina G o n ua -Z zh gap ng ho en or zh u s , C e ou ha h H Bu Ha n, ina on s C g an rbo hin K o , S r, Je a be n g ou Ch lA , S th ina li, .A K o D Q .R re ub in g d , Ch a ai a in R ,U ni Ti o, C a ot t te a rd ed nji hin am Ar n, a , T ab Ch Po he Em ina rt Ne ira Kl th te Ka s a e oh An ng, rla si tw M nd u n e al s g, rp, ay Ta B sia i w el g Xi an, ium am C e hin Ta a D n, n j L o a l Ch un s ia i g An n, C na Pe g e hi l H epa les na am s , U bu , M SA Lo rg, ala n g G ysi Be erm a ac an h, y U SA

0

Authors’ elaboration from World Shipping Council (worldshipping.org)

routes and large ports. Erikson and Samila (2015: 151) have shown that ‘In the early modern period […], social networks encouraged trade at port cities with already high rates of traffic.’ Much has changed since then, though, and we cannot assume their thesis in a perspective of historical determinism. Yet it is clear that a multi-​causal process is still leading to a growing concentration of the cargo ships in a few routes and ports (see Figure 1.4a). This concentration process is similar to the 80–​ 20 rule: roughly 80 per cent of global maritime trade passes through 20 per cent of the largest ports (see Figure 1.4b).2 A minority of large ports that are highly interconnected tend to gain new interconnections according to the overall ‘the rich get richer tendency’ (Erikson and Samila, 2015). A final aspect concerning inter-​port competition pertains to the fact that global trade supply chains are also vertically integrated according to the international labour divide

27

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

Number of connections

Figure 1.4b: Hypothetical distribution of ports according to their interconnections

= ports = connection(s)

Number of ports

The graph represents a quasi-​power law distribution: very few large ports are highly interconnected, and a vast number of ports have a few global interconnections. Authors’ own elaboration.

(Robinson, 2002; Baldwin and Lopez-​Gonzalez, 2015). Because of the nexuses with the systems of production at the national level and the growing trades, economic activities worldwide have been undergoing a spatial division. Accordingly, a functional diversification has arisen between nodes within global production networks. This means some nodes are mainly devoted to high-​added-​value activities and are primarily located in the richest areas of the world, while others are characterized by the cheaper activities of manufacturing and assembling row components, predominantly located in poor countries. Large port networks act as ‘relational infrastructures’, facilitating the circulation of goods and products at different production stages (ie, raw materials, intermediate products). In so doing, port networks shape this international labour divide.

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Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society

Territories in which ports are located may compete with each other not only to gain access to these networks but also to stabilize their presence in the more profitable phases of the (international) chain of production (Wang, 2020). The intense competition dynamics are one factor that may encourage informalities to emerge in the lower labour activities of import/​ export. Even integrated ports that can rely upon dry ports and dense connections with local production systems often need to cut costs and increase the rhythms of primary activities (such as loading and unloading goods and stowage). This can reduce labour safety and taxation compliance and incentivize corruption between shipping companies and economic actors in the port, an issue to which Chapter 2 pays attention. Governing and regulating ports This section now turns to the political economy of the regulation of activities taking place in and around ports, areas interchangeably referred to throughout this book as the ‘port-​city interface’ or the ‘hinterland’ of the port. It can be argued that the growing automation, securitization and privatization of the port economy has increasingly closed off the port to many traditional stakeholders (Eski, 2011). It is against this backdrop that modern ports must be understood. Hence, this section examines four main trends that are changing the configuration of ports and how they can be conceived within contemporary economic and geopolitical processes: innovation, regeneration, planning and governance (see Figure 1.5). First, it will be shown that innovation lies at the heart of the balance between inter-​port cooperation and competition. Then, port regeneration will be observed in terms of impacts on landscapes, economic renewal, society and local communities. Against this background, it will be established that ports have become crucial within wider strategic territorial planning frameworks and, consequently, require and nourish sophisticated governance structures.

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PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

Figure 1.5: Changing ports: main dynamics Innovation Supranational Regeneration Ports

National Planning Local Governance

Authors’ own elaboration

Beginning with innovation, Wahyuni (2019: 187) has noted that the port of Rotterdam –​consistently ranked among the top ports of the world over the past 20 years –​has been overtaken in trade volume by several Chinese ports, largely because of ‘high speed foreign direct investment (FDI), quick development of Shenzhen as a special economic zone, and close coopetition between all stakeholders: academy, business, government and community’. According to his analysis, this competitiveness relies on ‘coopetition’, that is a combination of cooperation and competition between actors, and successful efforts to establish functional relationships across different types of actors, including local and national political actors, business groups, civil society, representatives of small and medium enterprises, and universities. Thus, innovation in ports is more likely to emerge if heterogeneous resources and actors are present and combined with each other. In order to find new ways of developing, ports need hard infrastructure (see previous section), as much as soft infrastructure like research, education and training, maritime culture and heritage (Wahyuni, 2019: 188). By assuming a social network theory perspective, it can be argued that large ports tend to reach a propitious environment which promotes innovation whether they are embedded in

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Figure 1.6: Ideal-​typical structure of a port innovative network Strongties Weakties Ports Intermodal terminals Dry ports Universities Research centers Shipbuilding centers Grassroots Legal services

Stakeholders Maritime regulators

Authors’ own elaboration

‘weak ties and weak network structures on the one hand, and strong ties and closed network structures on the other’ (Michelfelder and Kratzer, 2013: 1159). These heterogeneous relational resources and structures can indeed have ‘a mutually reinforcing effect on innovation outcomes if combined’ rather than if they are separated (Michelfelder and Kratzer, 2013: 1159; Ramella, 2015). Networks combining both weak and strong ties are more likely to give rise to belonging-​groups that reinforce the local community and to capture stimuli and information coming from the outside world, such as at the international level. Hence, relying on these kinds of networks may offer resources for both solidarity and reciprocity, consolidate traditional routines and increase receptivity to new market opportunities or new ways to do business. From a concrete point of view, ports can be strongly interconnected with other ports, shipping companies and formal institutions (see Figure 1.6). They can also be weakly linked to research centres, consulting systems, ICT and

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different types of stakeholders. Ports embedded in such networks can quite easily get in touch with actors all over the world: stakeholders and research centres need not be located close to the port. This type of model facilitates the port’s interconnections with multiple actors and with all maritime activities. The reticular structure we have now described may support the fulfilment of this model. While we have assumed the idea of innovation exclusively with regard to economic spheres, we can look at some broader regeneration dynamics that large ports have undergone in more recent years. Port regeneration is nestled within broader phenomena such as urban and landscape renewal, and growing attention to environmental issues (Timur, 2013). Quite apart from the specific regeneration programmes found in several port cities, port regeneration is meant to be a general transformation of port social representation. Ports have long been conceived as a ‘black hole’ or a disturbing factor in big cities’ aesthetic harmony (Jacobs, Ducruet and De Langen, 2010). Moreover, ports have always been spatially isolated, giving rise to segregated communities (ie, immigrants, port workers, fishers). A short report by the European Parliament explains that: Port-​related waterfront development transforms former industrial port sites into urban places. Successful projects have achieved a mix of functions that make the waterfront economically vibrant. This typically includes port functions, recreational and cultural activities, as well as food markets or restaurants. They rely on a master plan agreed by the different actors involved, which should provide public access to –​and enjoyment of –​water, as well as solutions for transport and water and land use. (Pape, 2016: 4; see also Giovinazzi and Moretti, 2010; Timur, 2013) Needless to say, the diversification of the waterfront also reflects the diversification of megacities. The old Fordistic model of a ‘one-​company town’ has transformed into mixed-​functions

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‘global’ cities (Sassen, 2010; 2001). Therefore, port cities have tried to reduce their dependence on the port through economic diversification. For example, in Antwerp, the fashion business has grown; in Hamburg, a local media industry has emerged; Rotterdam has become an architecture centre; Genoa has renewed its cultural and museum area (Pape, 2016: 4); and Hong Kong has become ‘a knowledge-​based global supply chain management center’ (Wang and Cheng, 2010: 104). Ports being regenerated through these initiatives often give rise to new ways of planning. Ports are no longer just a relevant component of local economic development. They are also conceived as a part of territories as a whole, from a local, national and global perspective. Accordingly, the way ports should develop over time has become increasingly relevant within the ‘strategic territorial planning’ frame, which is an integrated decision-​making process encompassing: all residents and economic activity, including informality. [This type of planning] should address social, cultural, environmental and economic challenges comprehensively […, and] respond to the major development challenges across the region: natural resource management; climate change; disaster risk reduction; and socioeconomic inequalities. (UN-​Escap, 2019) Several types of actors are presumed to take part in strategic territorial planning actions: local authorities and the national government, grassroots organizations emerging from civil society, sectoral service providers (ie, education, health care), associations of planning professionals and economic stakeholders (Hersperger et al, 2018; UN-E ​ scap, 2019). This is a purely theoretical concept, not a normative viewpoint (ie, we are not making any claims about what ought to be). Whether concrete cases of territorial planning work this way –​and if not, how they do work –​is an empirical question. Strategic planning aims to be participatory and horizontal, but in fact,

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the different actors taking part in it have unequal interests and power resources. For analytical purposes, it is relevant to underscore that according to the ‘strategic territorial planning’ narrative, ports and actors gravitating towards them must be crucial in this type of decision-​making process. Complementary to this frame is the idea that strategic planning and transformation dynamics should increasingly involve ports in multilevel governance processes. This type of governance requires high levels of coordination among several government levels and across quasi-​g overnment and non-​governmental organizations and actors (see also Chapter 3). Multi-​lateral governance is therefore a dynamic concept blurring the boundaries between centre-​periphery and state-​society (Piattoni, 2009: 163). Again, we are briefly teasing out the main characteristics of this concept in relation to ports for descriptive and analytical purposes and not for normative ones. Territories face several economic challenges. To deal with these challenges, political decision-​makers are required to encourage more dynamic and representative ways of making relevant decisions. There is no doubt that strategic port actors are meant to take part in multi-​lateral governance processes and, vice versa, multi-​lateral governance is considered an excellent way to govern large ports. To sum up, current trends regarding ports in light of the four dimensions mentioned earlier (innovation, regeneration, planning, governance) suggests that ports increasingly assume a multi-​dimensional identity, at least in terms of their representation. Ports are thus places to make economic innovation emerge across local, national and global levels. They are integral to regeneration, and they have acquired a central role in complex planning and governance processes. Making ports: environment and actors It is now time to take a closer look at what is going on within ports. This section continues to pay attention mainly

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to the economic sphere, but it also aims to reconstruct ports’ endogenous environment (see Figure 1.7). The concept of environment can be assumed according to the new-​institutionalist perspective. An environment is thus a ‘specific field’ of society with a consistent set of rules –​formal and informal –​and requirements defining how actors should act in order to receive social legitimacy and recognition (Scott, Meyer and associates, 1994). In recent years, it has been suggested that the informal rules underpinning social (and economic) action can be synthesized under the umbrella notion of conventions (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Conventions correspond to collective representations and shared references that solve problems of coordination in uncertain conditions. Among others, ‘civic and environmental’ conventions push economic action towards the support of activities aimed at pursuing the collective well-​being and not just self-​interests. When influenced by ‘opinion’ conventions, production and consumption choices are driven by the fame and reputation assigned to the product or the activity. By contrast, ‘market’ and ‘industrial’ conventions affect economic choices in relation to which prices and technical efficiency are estimated to be the main indicators of quality. Finally, ‘inspiration’ conventions orient economic choices in favour of new and creative activities. Although conventions have been mainly conceived as a tool to analyze micro-​regulation in economic transactions involving individual actors, they can also be applied to the port context. As already shown, ports have long been traced back almost exclusively to industrial and market conventions. More recently, large ports have been increasingly affected by civic and environmental conventions (ie, the idea that ports should be consistent with sustainable development objectives and protect the workers’ well-​being), and by inspirational conventions (ie, that ports should introduce economic, institutional and social changes to meet progressive objectives). These dynamics have given rise to new conflictual relationships among port

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newgenrtpdf

Figure 1.7: Port environments: elements and actors Conventions–Informal rules Port administration models • Landlord or fully privatized • Ownership of port structures (ship-toshore handling equipment, sheds, warehouses) • Dock labour conditions

Governing and controlling bodies • Port authority • Port security agencies

36

Ports environment Conventions– Informal rules Authors’ own elaboration

Ports private actors • Stevedoring firms • Cargo handling companies • Shipping companies

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

Territorial setting • Urban context • Peri-urban areas • External areas

Ports: Economy, Institutions and Society

stakeholders. A renewed old clash has emerged. Port workers’ unions have found new motivation in their fight for better working conditions and civil society organizations have put pressure on ports to strive for an environmental-​friendly maritime economy. For their part, shipping companies require ports to efficiently organize unload-​upload functions and logistic activities. These general elements (ie, specific combination of different conventions) are thus an overarching frame made up of soft variables establishing a ‘social atmosphere’ that is a relevant part of the port environment. Given what has been already discussed in previous sections, it is enough here to recall that context matters; how ports are conceived and how they are ‘socially and economically’ legitimatized is influenced by the territorial setting. Territories surrounding ports offer opportunities of various kinds: spaces to expand and develop infrastructure, interconnection possibilities with productive clusters, but also pre-​existing economic conventions that can be adopted by the actors who are active in the ports and transferred to that context. Broadly speaking, it seems that ports being recently built around peri-​urban contexts or external areas will be affected by narratives about the necessity to activate and sustain economic development. On the other hand, urban ports are more likely to be affected by the dynamics and the public debate about the transformation and regeneration of the economic model, hence referring mainly to civic conventions. This framework enables us to investigate actors and concrete relationships that constitute port environments. According to a number of factors concerning historical matters, institutional and path-​dependent tendencies and the prevalent capitalist type, ports appear to assume different administration models and formal configurations: i) public service ports; ii) the tool port; iii) the landlord port; and iv) the fully privatized port or private service port (World Bank, 2016: 81; see also National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 2019).

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Service ports are public in character, with a central public authority offering ‘all the services required for the functioning of the port’ (World Bank, 2016: 82). The main functions of this type of port are cargo-​handling activities. The tool port is characterized by ‘split operational responsibilities. Whereas the port authority owns and operates the cargo handling equipment, the private cargo handling firm usually signs the cargo handling contract with the shipowner or cargo owner’ (World Bank, 2016: 82). The landlord port ‘represents the most common management model where infrastructure, particularly terminals, are leased to private operating companies with the port authority retaining ownership of the land’ (Rodrigue, 2020; Notteboom, Pallis and Rodrigue, 2021). Fully privatized ports are few in number and can be found mainly in the UK and New Zealand. It’s not surprising that we see this type of port in countries close to the LME model. Fully privatized ports suggest that: the state no longer has any meaningful involvement or public policy interest in the port sector. In fully privatized ports, port land is privately owned, unlike the situation in other port management models. This requires the transfer of ownership of such land from the public to the private sector. In addition, along with the sale of port land to private interests, some governments may simultaneously transfer the regulatory functions to private successor companies. (World Bank, 2016: 83) The existence of different port models also affects working conditions. Following Talley, it appears that dockworkers ‘are workers who are involved in the movement of cargo to and from vessels’ (2017: 156). As a result of technological and organizational changes (ie, port privatization), ‘[t]‌he number of dockworkers worldwide has been declining’ (Talley, 2017: 156). The growing reliance on technology in the port has also changed employment typologies on the docks. For example,

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checkers –​those who run data verifications on cargo –​are now also a type of dockworker in some cases. Consequently, in recent years conflictual working relationships within ports have arisen. Dockworkers’ unions have expressed their frustrations with port working conditions using a combination of traditional strikes, short-​term and cyclical work stoppages, and work slowdowns. Moreover, as claimed a few lines earlier, the influence of civic and environmental conventions within ports have legitimated new reasons for labour disputes. Regardless of their outcome, these initiatives have a high impact on ports: they ‘can be costly to port users (eg, from ship delays) and to the ports themselves (eg, from port revenues foregone)’ (Talley, 2017: 156). Moreover, national dockworker unions are often affiliated with international organizations, for instance, the International Dockworkers Council (IDC). International coordination across port unions is not accidental. While it is true that local and national institutional arrangements (eg, models of capitalism) count for a lot, mitigating or accentuating the trend towards privatization or subcontract work (Lillie, 2005), common international trends are also pushing towards progressive deregulation and have increased competition between ports. Even in the European Union, for example, guidelines have been discussed ‘to promote competition among EU ports… [where a] self-​handling provision would allow ship owners to use their seafarers as opposed to dockworkers for the loading and unloading of cargo on its ships’ (Talley, 2017: 156). Such global market pressures cause the interests of employers and those of employees within port contexts to further diverge (Bottalico, 2019; 2020). Another relevant type of actor populating port environments are governing and controlling bodies such as the port authority and security agencies. The port authority is often a multifaceted institution embodying several smaller organizations within it, but ‘administering only one port area’ (World Bank, 2016: 83). The port authority and its sub-​units take care of

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the port management and administration and, occasionally, security, as we will briefly mention in the next chapters with reference to the New York/​New Jersey Port Authority. ‘The most common form is a local port authority, an authority administering only one port area’ (World Bank, 2016: 83). More concretely, the port authority often deals with keeping internal costs under control in each single port, establishing a regular cash flow by also attracting international investments, and disciplining competition according to market rules (World Bank, 2016: 83). Security and safety are also major issues for the port authority. However, large ports have many actors who are in charge of security and safety. This is explored in depth in Chapter 3, which documents the broad range of public and private sector actors that must apply the rules set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) under the ISPS Code. The ISPS Code is designed to provide a global and standardized collective risk assessment framework, with common risk mitigation strategies across the public and private sector. Bichou (2004) describes this as the art of perceiving and managing ‘security threats through integrating local/​domestic threat-​levels into a global awareness-​level’. The ISPS Code has had broad consequences for port security, not least the emergence of a complex and increasingly privatized port security economy (Eski, 2011; 2020; Lee and Yoo, 2014). Security actors expected to cooperate in policing the port include private security service companies hired by public authorities, private sector security companies hired by economic actors in the port, as well as local police, specialized law enforcement agencies of the police dedicated to ports, specialized law enforcement agencies against organized crime, national police units and counter-​terror policing units. As Chapter 4 will argue, this complex situation has seen conflicts emerge in the port economy both horizontally –​regarding jurisdiction and authority –​and vertically, relating to power and recognition.

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In sum, the coordination costs of safety and security activities within ports are high. This is mainly for two reasons: i) the manifold threat of risks, insecurity and informality may emerge within ports (ie, terrorism, sinking of a container ship in the port’s harbour, dock incidents, illegal trafficking); and ii) the organizational hypertrophy of ports has led to the emergence of several police-​corps responsible for security (ie, ordinary police, specialized law enforcement agencies of the police dedicated to ports, private security services, local police, specialized law enforcement agencies against organized crime and international trafficking). Chapter 3 further develops these intricate interconnections between collective actors dealing with ports’ safety and security, and their ‘different mindsets’. Economic actors operating in ports are also plural and heterogeneous. For our analytical purposes, it is enough to distinguish briefly among the main categories: stevedoring firms specialized in loading and unloading of cargoes of vessels and in coordinating dock activities; container shipping companies that own the vessels carrying all of the goods in truck-​size intermodal containers, according to the so-​called technique of containerization (World Bank, 2016); and cargo handling companies whose activities include the management of cargoes between container ships, trucks and trains, to optimize the passage of goods through customs and to minimize the waiting time of ships inside the port. From a functional point of view, they are usually the connecting link between ports and dry ports. These companies, their compositions, their relationships (business as well as political) are of interest for a criminological scrutiny of complex criminality in and around ports, as Chapter 2 will highlight further. In conclusion, it is evident from the data that large ports tend to adopt a partly standard structure as a result of a mimetic isomorphism:3 ports imitate each other because they have to deal with similar international economic pressures and because of the belief that imitating the structure of a successful port is

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beneficial. Furthermore, a normative isomorphism is also present; industrial, market, civic-​environmental, and inspiration conventions exert pressure on ports that lead to the emergence of some shared and legitimated ways of doing things. Yet, each large port retains some specific features because of the formal norms and idiosyncratic factors of the context in which they are embedded. Port environments are often characterized by a redundancy of individual and collective actors of different kinds having conflictual interests. For this reason, inside ports, power equilibria are often unstable, and conflictual relationships tend to emerge. Licit and illicit as endogenous dynamic Governance dilemmas are emergent factors within the port environment that cannot be explained simply by recalling the idea of weak institutions. Maritime economy and port activities are, in fact, quite regulated and several durable institutions exist in port contexts at the local, national and international levels. Enforcement of the rules is not per se low, as it is impacted by a number of security and safety actors. Furthermore, the intrinsic complexity of port activities has multiplied the number of existing organizations and has facilitated multiple conflicts to emerge (see Chapter 3). Such a situation tends to produce instability and uncertainty, giving rise to coordination issues. Uncertainty and conflicts –​which are also exacerbated by competitive pressures –​can decrease rules-​based compliance. The aim of this last section of the first chapter is thus to lay out a plausible combination of mechanisms through which informality, illegality and the demand for control tend to consolidate inside the port environment. It can be argued that informal ways of doing business and regulating transactions within ports take shape at an endogenous level, given some favourable conditions concerning the economic activities happening in ports and the institutional arrangements. To address this issue, it is relevant to follow an

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analytical model that has been suggested by Nee and Hopper (2012) to analyze institutional change. Although the model was not developed for port-​related enquiries, it can be applied, with some changes, to the topic. It is, in fact, useful to look at ‘the relationship between norms embedded in informal social processes and the formal rules mandated and enforced by the state’ (Nee and Hopper, 2012: 18–​19). In other words, it helps to observe how social norms, legal norms (ie, ‘governing social relationships within which actors pursue and fix the limits of legitimate interests’, Nee and Hopper, 2012: 18), beliefs, conventions and actual organizations generate a regularity of economic behaviour, which can contravene formal provisions. More precisely, Nee and Hopper argue that: In a generalized multilevel causal model, top-​down processes allow higher-​level and more encompassing structures to shape –​both constrain and empower –​the structures and actions at lower levels. But ‘simultaneously, counterprocesses are at work by which lower-​level actors and structures shape –​reproduce and change –​the contexts within which they operate.’ Top-​down and bottom-​up processes interweave ‘as they combine to influence institutional phenomena’. Causal mechanisms operate in both directions, from macro to micro and micro to macro levels. Thus, state institutions not only impose formal rules on corporate and individual actors but also respond to accommodate interests mobilized from the bottom up. (Nee and Hopper, 2012: 18–​19) As Figure 1.8 shows, the arrow pointing from right to left indicates opportunity and constraints through formal rules and the specific systems that enforce them (ie, maritime trades regulations, port labour working contracts, taxation of marine and port activities, security and control practices). The arrow pointing from left to right indicates how social action and interaction affect macro arrangements (ie, economic actors

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Figure 1.8: A multilevel model for economic behaviour between formal and informal rules Enforcement accommodation

Individual and collective actors

Informal rules

Cooperation Competition

Ports environment

Structuring the organizational field

Formal rules

Collective action

State and local institutions – formal regulation

Compliance decoupling

Authors’ own adaptation from Nee and Hopper, 2012: 20.

within ports may mobilize and act as a lobby to negotiate some changes in formal rules). On top of that, powerful economic actors within ports may informally push to obtain a certain noncompliance level. If individual interests and the structures of incentives are aligned, ‘they reinforce compliance with formal rules through self-​monitoring and mutual enforcement’ (Nee and Hopper, 2012: 19). Otherwise, the economic interests of various individual and collective groups may give rise to decoupling from institutionalized routines. This is more likely to happen in such a context as ports where different interests are present, and synthesis between these interests is hard to achieve. Thus, the port environment has been conceived as a highly complex ‘organizational field’ with heterogeneous actors. The more decoupling from institutional routines is widespread, the more informal practices and rules gain importance. Once a critical mass is reached, formal institutions may be forced to change the rules or –​as is even more likely –​to find a way to adapt, thus giving rise to an interpenetration between formal and informal rules (Sciarrone and Storti, 2019). Drawing on this multilevel model, it can be observed how formal rules may lose their grip on social groups, and how institutions might accommodate adverse overlapping between licit and illicit spheres. This overlapping may incentivize extra-​ legal governance and raise security problems. One example of

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this can be found in the New York and New Jersey port and the International Longshoremen Association (ILA), the primary dockworkers’ union on the east coast of the US (Sergi and Storti, 2020). More in-​depth analyses about corruption and infiltration of organized crime groups into the ILA follow in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, it is useful to frame the pre-​conditions facilitating the decoupling of some branches and executives of the ILA from formal rules, and the infiltration by organized crime groups. As reminded by Jacobs and Peters (2003: 264), a US Congress report in 1984 noted that: ‘Much of the corruption on the waterfront stemmed from the control organized crime exercises over the ILA, a condition that has existed for at least 30 years.’ Italian American mafia families in New York City, continue the authors, were also found to have great influence on the operation of many shipping companies. In other terms, ILA had to learn how to work within an environment, such as the port, where mafia families ruled over contracts, bids and hiring processes. Organized criminals were able to take advantage of a combination of processes related to the dynamism of local settings in which were present a flourishing port economy, as well as migration flows. Immigrant workers often matched the growing job opportunities in the more marginal labour sectors within the port economy, while mafias often tried to gain a grip on these workers (Sciarrone, 2008; Varese, 2011; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014; Lupo, 2015). This last assumption is strictly connected with the settlement process of organized crime groups on the east coast of the US and of North America as a whole. With respect to the US, from the post-​WWII on, Jacobs pointed out: Labour racketeering is an important example of American exceptionalism. No other country has a history of significant organised crime infiltration of its labour movement, and no other country has an organised crime syndicate with a power base in labour unions […] Labour

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racketeering has been an important source of organised crime’s power, prestige, and wealth. (2006: xi) By ‘labour racketeering’, the author meant the exploitation of unions and union power by organized crime (Jacobs and Peter, 2003; Jacobs, 2006). Leaving aside the emphasis on ‘American exceptionalism’ –​indeed organized crime groups try to control recruitment in low-​skilled jobs elsewhere as well (eg, the case of caporalato4 with respect to Italian mafia groups in some areas of southern Italy) –​this interpretation is acceptable. Thus, it can be postulated that organized crime groups were partly able to exploit unions within ports, by privileging those specific ‘social spaces’ more than others, in order to build up their economic wealth, power and prestige. Further examples of this follow in Chapter 2. To understand this case study, it is useful to interrogate the basic aspects of workers’ unions in North America, which help us to understand why organized crime groups were interested in establishing their power within labour unions. To this aim, it is relevant to recall that both the US and Canada are archetypical LMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In these countries, workers are less organized than in the CME countries, and wage negotiations take place at the company and local levels. Unions are fragmented by skill and economic sector; thus, bargaining is equally fragmented. In this scenario, even during the golden age of industrial capitalism, labour unions have faced economic hostility at the central level, as they have been often considered conspiracies against free trade (Streeck, 2001: 8215; 2005). At the same time, labour unions in LMEs have been able to gain –​in some respects –​high material relevance. Given the absence of public health and pension systems in the US, a number of labour unions became a vehicle between workers on one side and insurance companies and pension funds on the other side. This meant that they were involved in the allocation of substantial amounts of

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money. It is therefore not surprising that controlling unions became valuable for organized crime groups. By controlling or influencing unions, organized crime groups could pursue three main goals/​activities: i) steal from the union coffers and extort money from employees through intimidation and patronage (Jacobs and Peter, 2003: 5); ii) infiltrate some legal businesses by collecting bribes; and iii) influence the support that unions might give to local politicians and local political party machines (Jacobs and Peter, 2003: 5). In sum, controlling unions has been a way for organized crime groups to embed themselves both in the upper world and in the underworld of certain economic sectors, to gain profit, to affect the micro-​regulation of the labour market and to build connections between different social spheres, mostly in finance and politics. In so doing, some sectors of the ILA –​as collective actors –​accommodated a ‘compliance decoupling’ which spread throughout the NYC/​NJ port, thus giving rise to perverse cooperation with organized crime groups (see Figure 1.8). Conclusions This chapter shows that a dynamic and multilevel perspective is needed to analyze the governance, regulation and security of large cargo ports. Ports are indeed hubs within global trade networks, but they are also shaped by conventions, and national and local institutional arrangements (Pallis, Vitsounis and De Langen, 2010). Furthermore, it has been shown that ports are characterized by several endogenous factors that can cause illegal activities to emerge, generate a systemic interconnection between licit and illicit processes and create a demand for extra-​legal protection and governing actors. Among these factors, we can recall the hypertrophic presence of institutional, economic and law enforcement actors of different kinds, opposing economic interests that are not easily aligned, and the multifaceted level of formal regulation.

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From this political economy perspective, it is possible to identify two events that may accelerate and further exacerbate the trends explored in this chapter: the medium-​and long-​term consequences of the coronavirus pandemic and the US-​China trade dispute. As outlined earlier, the pandemic has reduced the scale of global interconnections. While trade worldwide has been –​at least temporarily –​decreasing, competition between large ports and between shipping companies may increase, and further concentrating economic power within the maritime economy. Assuming this will not be adequately regulated, the new phases could put more pressure on port workers and port activities, thus giving rise to new safety and corruption risks. With regard to the US-​China trade dispute, there has already been a ‘6.5% reduction in Chinese exports to U.S. ports […] Even though China remained the largest origin country for U.S. containerized imports.’5 This is a geopolitical and economic factor that might have effects consistent with those addressed earlier: unexpected and radical transformation in global trade dynamics. The disproportionate global impact of the US-​China trade dispute hints at the extent to which world trade continues to be highly concentrated among certain actors. No matter what, such an unstable world is surely also bringing new challenges for ports and unfolding promising avenues for further research touched upon in the subsequent chapters and conclusion.

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2

Policing Complex Criminality in and through Major Seaports

Introduction Ports are multivalent, liminal spaces. On the one hand, they are gates into the city, and on the other, they provide an exit door to the sea. Moreover, we can argue that they are multivalent spaces in as much as their nature is hybrid. As shown in the previous chapter, their activities constantly swing between the global and the local; global trade meets local workforce; global maritime industry meets local regulations. The multivalent and hybrid nature of the ports’ territory and purpose is crucial to understanding why policing the waterfront is such a complex task. This chapter provides a framework for analyzing large-​scale, organized and complex criminality through and within major seaports and the challenges of policing these activities. It analyzes organized crime, organizational crime and forms of collusion and/​or corruption on the waterfront and in/​through seaports by focussing on the challenges of countering them from a policing perspective. Drawing from data collected for completed research projects, especially in the ports of Genoa, New York/​New Jersey, Montreal, Melbourne, Liverpool and

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Gioia Tauro, this chapter reflects on practical challenges and the practices of policing the port space. In doing so, we start from two main standpoints and arguments. First, crime on the waterfront and in/​through seaports manifest as ‘complex crimes’, in as much as they involve different types of activities, more or less serious or harmful in nature and more or less local in reach. The chapter will address forms and manifestations of organized crime, including organizational crimes and corruption, as complex criminality. Accordingly, the chapter focusses on crime over harm, which is certainly relevant in this context (Bisschop, 2015), but not necessarily addressed in this chapter. Second, the policing of these complex crimes emerges as a form of hybrid policing, between high and low control mechanisms. This chapter therefore looks at the challenges of policing complex crimes through the lenses of high policing or hybrid policing approaches and the consequences this has for local partnerships and long-​lasting interventions. Organized crime and complex criminality in and through ports In criminological literature, ports are virtually always mentioned as key entry points for drugs and other illegal goods, as well as areas of influence of more sophisticated groups, who aim at governing spaces and not just profiting from them, such as mafia-​type groups (Zaitch, 2002a; Eski, 2016; Sergi, 2020a; Sergi, 2020c; Sergi and Storti, 2020; Roks, Bisschop and Staring, 2020). Literature that looks at the way organized crime groups need and use ports for their activities focuses largely on large-​scale drug trafficking and importation (Zaitch, 2002a; Zaitch, 2002b; Sergi, 2020c) as much as other forms of illegal smuggling and contraband, such as weapons or tobacco (Thachuk, 2007; Van Dijck, 2009; Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010; Smith, 2017).

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In organized crime studies, deviance and crime in ports range from the occasional corruption of port workers to the employment of longshoremen on the criminal network’s payroll for the purposes of continuous drug trade; port criminality might also involve the control of longshoremen’s trade unions and associations and corruption of large companies involved in port administration (Jacobs, 2014). Transport systems in general have also been studied in connection to illicit trade (Nordstrom, 2007), as well as illicit governance, systemic corruption and the infiltration of the port economy and management, that is, infiltration of labour unions of port workers (Jacobs et al, 1994; Jacobs and Peters, 2003; Demeri, 2012; see Chapter 1). Organized crime research is extremely wide and generally involves reflections on both illicit activities and illicit structures (Sergi, 2017). Organized criminals are invested in both illicit trading and in the provision of extra-​legal governance (Varese, 2011; Campana and Varese, 2018), which makes their portfolio of activities very rich. If we consider the port economy to be one of many potential economic opportunities that organized crime groups exploit, then we can look at studies on organized crime and infiltration in different legal sectors and industries (Caneppele et al, 2013; Savona et al, 2016), research on money laundering and organizational crimes (Leong, 2007; Moiseienko, Reid and Chase, 2020), and even political and public sector corruption (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2012) and investment (Van Duyne and Van der Vorm, 2015). All of these studies are applicable to the port environment in light of the complexity of relationships between security networks and private sector actors that characterize major seaports (Dinchel and Easton, 2020). Criminality in ports is indeed complex. Recent primary research (Sergi, 2020b) has investigated how in virtually all major seaports, organized crime activities range from illicit trafficking of drugs to other forms of illicit trade, both inbound and outbound, involving criminal groups that are mono or

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poly-​criminal, and local or transnational, depending on the type of trade. While the detection and disruption of illicit trade seems to be the most frequent activity performed by law enforcement units on the waterfront, other behaviours of an illegal nature also appear in the plethora of criminal activities committed in ports. Serious criminality, such as money laundering and/​or infiltration in the legal economy, are equally important in understanding port security. This book therefore turns to the concept of complex crimes, defined as those forms of criminality that come in packages of activities, some of which more serious, some of which less serious, but all of which must be accounted for to understand the overall nature of the offending (Sergi, 2017). Criminal activities in port settings are complex because crimes such as trafficking rely on the infiltration of the legal economy by criminal groups, who in turn rely upon crimes committed by white-​collar and corporate actors who exploit the opaque organizational culture of the port environment. By framing the issue as one of ‘complex crime’, therefore, one can account for various forms of serious and/​or organized crime, including organizational crimes such as white-​collar crimes and corporate crimes, as well as crimes committed within organizational settings, facilitated by unethical and corrupt behaviours (Shover and Hochstetler, 2002). All of these behaviours happen in the port space. This is consistent with the multilevel model provided in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.8), which shows how informality emerges in ports environments, enabling actors to contravene formal provisions in many different ways. Crucially, ports are also inseparably linked to urban development and urban lives, which shapes how criminal activities manifest on the waterfront (Sergi, 2020a). Port cities are sites where some of the most internationally recognizable historic and modern organized crime groups have formed and grown (Blakey and Goldstock, 1980; Brewer, 2014; Madsen, 2018), as the maritime industry and economy represent a lucrative business to launder and invest proceeds of crime. With a few

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exceptions, an urban perspective on crime on the waterfront has thus far not been a central focus of scholarly work (Jacobs et al, 1994; Sergi, 2020a). As Chapter 1 presents, the port economy cannot be understood without reference to the spatial and functional relationships between the port and its city or hinterland (Kanellopoulos, 2018). In other words, the city and the port develop in tandem, each affecting one another and presenting challenges and opportunities to their respective development. There is no linear relationship between organized crime groups operating within and surrounding the port (Sergi, 2020b), but this urban perspective necessitates an understanding of the extent to which the city and the port share the same manifestations and evolution of organized crime activities and groups. High policing, security and ports In order to understand the challenges of policing complex crimes in ports it is necessary to understand that everything starts and ends with the way complex crimes manifest in the multivalent space of the port. We can also argue that the policing of complex crimes in the port environment has been influenced by the peculiar ‘duplex’ nature of ports and port spaces, in between the local and the global (Sergi and Storti, 2020: 10). The policing of various forms of complex crimes has been subject to several inquiries in the recent years and the notion of ‘plural policing’ has emerged to describe the current concurrence among different agencies besides the actual police engaging in policing behaviour and objectives (Brodeur, 2010). These agencies might be public or private, but they all take on policing tasks from crime prevention to harm reduction (Loader, 2000; Bull, 2010; Easton et al, 2010). Indeed, the next chapter presents the applicability of the concept of plural policing to the securitization of ports more specifically. This chapter, instead, looks at the policing of complex crime as hybrid policing: not as the sum of many agencies, but rather the co-​existence of many aims and the

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constant tension between port security as a matter of national security and somewhat mundane, low-​level territorial control. Here, what characterizes the policing of complex crime is that it is a form of high policing or, at the very least, a hybrid between high and low policing. As reminded by Atkinson (2019) the concept of high policing was first introduced in 1983 by the Canadian criminologist Jean-​Paul Brodeur. Brodeur (1983; 2007), in fact, distinguished between high and low policing. High policing is characterized by four features (Brodeur, 2007: 27): the wide scope and strategic use of intelligence; the conflation of separate state powers; the protection of national security; and the use of human sources and undercover operatives. By comparison, low policing refers to the maintenance of order and the general suppression of crime (Atkinson, 2019), that is usually street-​based and simpler crime. Unsurprisingly, high policing has been equated with counterterrorism since 9/​11 (Bayley and Weisburd, 2011). Additionally, in the past two-​to-​three decades, processes of securitization have invested different forms of criminality and attracted them to the wide label of national security (Sperling and Webber, 2019). This has happened for terrorism, of course (Kaunert and Léonard, 2019), organized crime (Edward and Gill, 2002; Harfield, 2008; Carrapico, 2014; Tilley, 2016), cybercrime (Lavorgna and Sergi, 2016), complex urban violence and safety (Devroe, Edwards and Ponsaers, 2017; Cozens, Greive and Rogers, 2019) and even corruption (Stoian, 2020). The concept of high policing, therefore, has come to intersect, practically, with the results of successful securitization. The more certain crimes have been assigned to the realm of national security, the more the remit of high policing has expanded to include those crimes. The process of securitization of societal problems leads to defining these areas as subjects of high policing as they reflect the four features as defined by Brodeur. Regardless of high and low policing, there is a process of privatization and pluralization in ports that has consequences for both high and low policing, as the next chapter will further detail. In both,

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we see the involvement of more actors, greater diversity and more conflict as well. From an operational point of view, this means a broader application of those policing powers usually associated with high policing strategies, particularly the use of intelligence for strategic purposes. The policing of complex crimes can therefore be characterized as high level or hybrid policing. Indeed, port policing has been securitized by the international regime itself (see Eski and Carpenter, 2013, and Chapter 4 for a discussion on the ISPS Code). With securitization investing more and more areas of port economy and governance, heavier investments of high-​policing techniques have developed. The reasons and the implications of this are explained as follows and will be evidenced in the rest of this chapter. The first consideration relates to the nature of the space of the port. If we look at ports as border zones (Sergi and Storti, 2020), we see that their protection and the policing of their areas fall into the category of national security interest, as in the case of many other border zones. The characterization of policing activities in seaports within the mandates of national security also mirrors in the securitization of the threat of organized crime that has been ongoing since the 1990s and even more so after 9/​11, which is today central to any western state’s political agenda (Carrapico, 2014; Mann, 2020; Sergi, 2016, 2017). The study of security networks in ports has been of interest to various researchers (Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016; De Pauw and Easton, 2017): often, the spaces of security and that of policing, in fact, overlap (Eski, 2016; Sergi and Storti, 2020). High level policing matches the border dimension of ports because of its securitization. Conversely, if we look at ports as synecdoche of the urban infrastructure, deeply embedded in the urban economy and social space (Sergi, 2020a), we can see that they are also subjected to low-​level forms of policing, primarily through the maintenance of order in and around the port space. This is particularly clear in harbours that, next to their business

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areas, also include a residential or retail zone such as the port of Antwerp. As Chapter 1 outlines, the introduction of recreational facilities is often integral to regeneration plans for port adjacent spaces. From a second perspective, we can consider how, in/​ through/​around ports there are different types of interests that yield various criminal opportunities. Ports, as border zones, are entry/​exit points for goods and trade into a city or, at times, a state (Sergi and Storti, 2020) and this brings opportunities for large-​scale cross-​border criminality that is the realm of high policing (Sergi, 2020c). Conversely, as ports are intertwined with the city’s economy and its social spaces, this can bring opportunities for corruption, infiltration in public or private contracts in and around the port and occasions to divert the good governance of port administration (Sergi, 2020a; also see Chapter 1). Policing these criminal activities can be either low or high policing, depending on the actual activity. For example, extortion might be low policing, while corporate corruption might be high policing, as we will see later in this chapter. As the next chapter will further explore, countering different forms of complex criminality in the port means understanding flows and networks around the waterfront (Castells, 2000). It demands an interrogation of who has the capacity, the resources and the intent to enter the port territory and economy for different types of illicit activities and from different locations and access points. The port requires specialist and diversified policing approaches, from policy-​focussed security partnerships to operational task forces. It also requires cooperation across institutions within the port itself, and at the municipal, national and international level. Policing complex crimes: between local and global dimensions of ports It has been argued elsewhere that an integrated approach that looks at the countering of organized crime activities in the

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port as tightly linked with an understanding (and therefore countering) of the criminal landscape in the city might bring interesting insights (Sergi, 2020a). This is in consideration of the symbiotic relationship between the city and the port when it comes to shape the local dimension of the port identity and nature. As noted by Ducruet (2007: 168), ‘the closer ports are to the heartland, the less their port-​city equilibrium will be realized, given the concentration of flows and the indirect dependence on inland markets’, although the integrated port model can partly reconcile different territorial interests (see Chapter 1). The local-​global nature of port activities is complicated by the port-​city interface when it comes to crime. Therefore, the policing of complex crime in ports needs to face this complication straight away. As said, the port requires specialist and diversified policing approaches, from different institutions across the municipal, national and international level, including law enforcement and police forces. These institutions have to liaise with authorities in the city in a strategic and specialist cross-​trajectory approach (Sergi, 2020a). Everyone who is assigned policing roles and duties on the waterfront has to interact with security networks active in and around the ports. The space between policing and security, as we will see also later on in this book, tends to overlap; high policing, in fact, includes security-​led responses both at the local and at the global level. We can therefore look at some of the challenges and the practices in policing the different forms of complex criminality of ports and waterfront, keeping in mind three main considerations stemming from what has been said so far: • The global/​local dimension of ports will call for different global and local policing responses; low policing can be predominant in maintaining order in and around the port space. • The different manifestations of complex criminality –​illicit trafficking, organizational crimes and infiltration, extra-​legal

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governance –​can be affected by the pre-​existing criminal scenarios of the cities behind the port. • Policing responses can be complicated by the ambivalent nature of the port space, as much as by the port-​city interface when it comes to crime. The following sections will present short case studies drawing from data collected in the ports of Genoa, Gioia Tauro, Montreal, Melbourne, New York/​New Jersey and Liverpool from a research project whose full findings have been shared elsewhere (Sergi, 2020b). The data collected in these locations highlights some of the significant practices and challenges in policing different manifestations of complex criminality in ports. Policing illicit trafficking Case no. 1

Operation Artabaz in Genoa, Italy, in 2018, is a representative example of the work done by port authorities in coordination with others, in their attempt to curb both heroin and cocaine trafficking.1 The seizure of around 270 kg of heroin on the ship Artabaz in November 2018 marked one of the largest heroin seizures in the past 20 years, worth over 10 million euros. The ship had left the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, headed towards Turkey, calling at Hamburg, Valencia and Genoa, where 31 containers were offloaded in Terminal Spinelli. Three containers on board contained the heroin, camouflaged among bags of bentonite (materials for construction). Around 2 kg of the drug were left to proceed by truck, in a controlled shipment that was meant to lead to the arrests of whoever was behind it. In practice, the investigation started in Belgium the summer before –​the drugs seized in Genoa were the second shipment that traffickers could not send to Antwerp due to additional controls there. Authorities did not know the final destination

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of the drugs, but the Belgian police sent authorities in Genoa all the necessary information to intercept the containers and agreed to a controlled shipment strategy under a European Investigative Order. The buyer linked to the containers –​in this case a man associated with a company based in Czech Republic –​had to contact the shipping agent (in Austria) with further details on how to deliver the shipment. The final address was in Rosendhal, in the Netherlands, close to Antwerp, where two arrests were finally made. Neither the shipping agent nor the truck driver knew anything about the drugs in the container. Case no. 2

Operation Afloat in Australia in June 2017 led to the arrest of seven men in Melbourne who were trying to import around 92 kg of cocaine in three black duffle bags hidden in a cargo container from Panama.2 The network in question had run various shipments for months, as observed by investigators in Victoria police’s Trident Taskforce, composed of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Australian Federal Police, Australian Border Force, Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and the Australian Taxation Office. The Trident Taskforce was formed in 2013 as a Commonwealth-​funded initiative aimed at detecting and disrupting organized crime at the state’s waterfront.3 The network also had a mentor in a businessman in Melbourne who helped different people in the criminal network to buy properties and assets, reinvesting their proceeds of crime in shares and companies’ names too. Among those arrested were Canadian, Australian and British men, as the network relied mostly on Canadian and Vietnamese connections in Colombia. The Australia-​Canada-​Vietnam connection is not new to Australia, as courts have heard in different cases over the past ten years.4 For example, in a case in 2012,5 a shipment of foot spas and pedicure chairs arrived in Melbourne from

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Canada concealing cocaine, methamphetamine and MDMA. One of the defendants, Tang, a Canadian citizen, was present when the drugs departed Canada, as his role was to confirm the same quantity arrived in Australia. The other defendant, Pham, also Vietnamese-​Canadian, acted as a point of liaison between the importers of the drugs and the freight forwarding company (by paying their fees), facilitating delivery of the container to the warehouse and unpacking the contents to deliver them to the purchaser. Both played a material role in the movement of drugs from Melbourne after their arrival into Australia. Pham was also involved in another case in New South Wales in 2020,6 also involving the importation of foot spas carrying cocaine and methamphetamine from Canada, together with their cousin Nguyen. Nguyen had set up a business, registered two business names and leased a commercial warehouse in Victoria, also renting a storage space in Sydney. He was present to take delivery, deconstructed the foot spas to remove the packages of drugs and attended meetings with Pham to hand over the packages to the purchaser. Nguyen was born in Vietnam but migrated to Australia in 1982. Both of these cases, selected among many others of this nature, embody some commonalities in the policing of illicit trade, with the focus mainly on drugs, but obviously in relation to other commodities as well. Among shared trends, as data has already suggested (Sergi, 2020b), the following emerges as significant: • The variety of shipment methods –​from printers to foot spas, from coffee beans to stereo speakers, from the use of large cargo ships to the use of smaller vessels –​is a sign of the variety of maritime routes and trade. Illicit drugs do not necessarily arrive in ports in the same way, with every country experiencing a plurality of routes and the need to develop red flags and knowledge based on its own routes and its own commodities.

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• As it is increasingly difficult to open containers in the terminals –​due to the displacement effect of increased security controls –​ it is more likely for the drugs or other illicit goods to leave the port with the container. Investigations therefore increasingly involve the transport system across the whole supply chain and, eventually, various infiltration and corruption mechanisms that enable the movement of the container with the illicit goods out of the port. Another option is to move to another, smaller, port to extract goods directly. • Criminal networks often copy companies’ names and addresses to import as legitimate suppliers. They exploit the reputation of companies with ‘good names’ to avoid extra checks (sometimes referred to as using a ‘green line’). This enables the illegitimate importer to abuse or overcome ‘trusted importer’ registers and schemes, where companies are checked against several criteria, such as place of origin, destination of their business, tax status and even frequency of trade to confirm the veracity of their activity. • There are people in each port that are considered as being ‘available’ for a variety of criminal activities, irrespective of ethnic origin or social status. This is also helped by technological advancements, as discussed in Chapter 4. These individuals usually hold positions in the port, such as port workers or terminal employees, and usually remain ‘available’ for a certain period until arrested. After monitoring the ‘available’ persons for a while, authorities often identify subjects who act as trait-​d’union with the importing network/​organization. • Criminal organizations often become visible to the authorities when the drugs leave the port. This often happens when the port is the final destination for the shipment and the shipment is on the radar of authorities because it also involves known local criminal groups. Police teams are usually aware that when the drugs or other goods are intercepted in a port –​but

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that port was not the intended final destination –​importers are usually less visible and connected within the territory. This likely means that communications between parties and the management of the shipment is handled remotely. These trends are visible across different port sites and represent challenges for virtually all policing teams involved in countering illicit trade and trafficking. First and foremost, the policing of trafficking through ports challenges the limits and capabilities of sovereign police forces. The illicit drug trade, like most other illicit maritime trade, is truly global, and therefore usually pursued thanks to concerted intelligence-​led, cross-​border efforts. Two types of policing activity can be seen in operation against trafficking through ports. On the one hand, policing trafficking –​especially when cross borders –​requires special skills and dedicated teams. Border forces, special port enforcement teams in federal or national police forces are often deputed to the task. In essence, this requires a focus on local expertise and an investment in specialist task forces, usually multi-​agency. On the other hand, policing trafficking through ports is almost never about one port only. Investigations span across different countries, different ports, and face a series of choices differentiating between the common trafficking tactics. Policing trafficking through seaports therefore includes a series of high-​policing strategies, mainly based on intelligence-​led and intelligence sharing across jurisdictions. Although there is no ‘usual’ way to structure a trafficking job, there are indeed various ways of disrupting opportunities and increasing the risk of detection. Indeed, the policing of trafficking is based on risk modelling, which remains national in remit, but tends to be harmonized across countries. Different countries tailor their risk models and strategies within their own threat assessment models, often taking into considerations geographical location of the port, commodities sought and arriving in the port, shipping routes available and, last but not least, the criminal scenario –​the ‘underworld’ –​of the city

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and the area surrounding the port. Notwithstanding situational differences, these models also tend to be based on the same type of trends and tendencies common to all ports, such as the ones mentioned earlier. Policing trafficking is, therefore, a form of high policing based on intelligence and on risk modelling that necessarily accounts for cross-​border trends and experiences over the qualification of threats. Policing infiltration and organizational crimes Case no. 3

In the United States of America, New York State, in 2013, American Stevedoring Inc. (ASI) filed a civil RICO7 lawsuit accusing the ILA, the ILA’s president and several others of forcing the company to sell its operations at the port of New York and New Jersey.8 The case was before the court for two years, until in 2015, the parties executed a settlement agreement after they went into mediation.9 Nonetheless, the claim forms an example of conduct among big players in the port environment. The defendants were presented together as an enterprise, including the ILA, the executive members of the ILA, the individual members of the ILA local unions (‘Locals’) and other ILA subordinate labour organizations, the trustees of the New York Shipping Association (NYSA)-​ILA Pension Trust Fund, the Port Police and Guards Union (PPGU), the executive members of the PPGU, the individual members of PPGU Locals and other PPGU subordinate labour organizations, the trustees of the NYSA-​PPGU Fund and a few other individuals. The dispute related to ASI’s reluctant agreement in 2011 to sell its operations at the Red Hook terminal in Brooklyn and Port Newark. American’s operations were sold in September 2011 to Red Hook Container Terminal LLC. American claimed the ILA wanted to oust the company because it was unwilling to participate in ‘illegal and corrupt activities’ including no-​show jobs, loan-​sharking and bogus insurance claims.10

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ASI claimed that the defendants acted in a pattern of racketeering activities including, among other things, the establishment of a syndicate linked to organized crime (the ‘Waterfront Group’). This case was ultimately about the recovery of damages as a result of a particular scheme directed at ASI by the Waterfront Group, to oust ASI from its business conducted at the New York and New Jersey Ports. However, the claimant also affirmed that the Waterfront Group had first attempted to coerce ASI to participate in racketeering activities, and then eventually retaliated against them when they refused to do so. The claim proceeded by listing and connecting all the dots among the individuals and structures of the Waterfront Group, their indictments or convictions for crimes and their association with organized crime and illicit activities, including illegal gambling, loan-​sharking, extortion, labour racketeering, witness retaliation, mail fraud and wire fraud, among others.11 One of the main arguments in this claim is that notwithstanding the many convictions and investigations, and despite evidence of association with organized crime and racketeering activity, various high-​ranking members of the ILA had been re-​ elected. In particular, ASI’s claim focussed on the chief role of the President of the ILA Harold Daggett in the scheme of the extortion and pressure on ASI to sign an agreement with the port authority, by which they would be ejected from the terminals, with control to be taken over by Red Hook Container Terminal LLC, a company favoured by the Waterfront Group over ASI. Using the mechanism of a port-​wide strike, the ILA planned to coerce the signature of the agreement and eventually succeeded. Case no. 4

In 2015–​2016 a corruption scandal in Rome, Italy, implicated contracts at the port of Genoa too. The events relate to the construction works of the new container terminal (now, in 2020, operational) in Calata Bettolo, a strip of land in between Terminal SECH, Spinelli Terminal and Terminal Rinfuse in

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the old port area of the city. One of the companies that won the contract, in mid-​2000, was Tecnis S.p.A., based in Catania, Sicily, one of the largest companies in the south of Italy. The works of Calata Bettolo underwent a series of delays until, in 2014, the port authority, through an ‘amicable settlement’, added 46 million euros to the initial 140-​million-​euro budget. The Public Prosecutor Office in Rome, under Operation Dama Nera (parts 1 and 2),12 started investigating cases of systemic corruption, self-​laundering, trafficking of favours and bid rigging within ANAS s.p.a from 2015 onwards.13 Many involved bribes (called ‘cherries’) that were used to feed maxi variants rises of costs during construction masked by amicable agreements –​like the one of Calata Bettolo. In 2016, Tecnis was the leader of a consortium of 24 companies that were subjected to judiciary administration –​seizure –​by order of the tribunal in Catania, following Operation Dama Nera in Rome. The consortium leaders, through direct decisions by their administrators –​charged with corruption –​were said to have contributed to mafia businesses, linked to the clan Santapaola of Cosa Nostra. In addition, and de relato, the chief engineer who managed the works for the port authority, was sentenced to two years of imprisonment for the crime of abuse of office (under Article 323 of the Italian Penal Code). As technical manager of the Port Authority of Genoa, in 2010, he provided an unjust capital advantage to companies by fragmenting a large contract into smaller contracts to the threshold triggering the proper tender procedure.14 Both of these cases, selected among others of this nature, have features common to the policing of organizational crime and/​ or infiltration in the legal economy. When it comes to this area of complex crime, different states tend to experience their own peculiar cases, in part because different economic, social and political systems present unique barriers and opportunities in the port economy and the surrounding environment.

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Nonetheless, there are some trends and approaches that law enforcement appear to experience and share across ports in different locations: • Organizational crimes and infiltration in the port economy involve border corruption and allegations/​expectations of connivance in criminal activities of border agents and government officials. From a policing perspective, this is linked to control of access to port premises, usually for purposes of completion of illicit trade or other criminal activity. • Port authorities struggle with establishing a system of recognition of trusted insiders within various supply chains active inside the port. Corruption in the maritime supply chain and/​or infiltration of criminal funds and actors in the provision of services at the port is problematic to counter, police and control in as much as it often involves abuses of trust, which is notoriously difficult to detect, curb and prove. • Corruption and collusion in contracts relating to construction, development, infrastructures and services in and around the port are considered a high-​r isk phenomenon in most port locations. The port economy’s opaque and highly specialized nature often results in lack of oversight over contracts and an assumption that the pool of competition is naturally small to start with (see Chapter 1). Both organized crime groups, as well as white-​collar offenders, trade access to insider data and information related to the port economy in order to benefit certain sub-​contractors over others and to use influence to gain a contract in the first place. These trends are visible across different port sites and represent challenges for all the policing teams involved in countering complex criminality at the port, particularly in the form of organizational crimes and infiltration into the legal economy. Policing units at the port are usually hybrids of security teams, local and national police forces and high-​policing intelligence-​ led taskforces, creating a conflation and intersection of various

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powers (Brodeur, 2007). This represents the high policing and, to a lesser extent, low policing, involved in countering these kinds of crimes. Most investigations remain based on threat assessments and risk modelling, both those on trafficking and those on corruption, infiltration and other organizational crimes. On the one hand, threats are fast evolving, and risks are partially dependant on both the port and maritime economies beyond the local environment, making it particularly difficult for authorities to investigate this type of criminality. On the other hand, it appears that what precedes organizational crimes and corruption/​infiltration in the port economy is connected to power networks already present in the city –​made up of entrepreneurs, politicians and administrators. This might lead to law enforcement witnessing ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ that evolve into collusion and private (unlawful) agreements, bribery, forgery of public documents, intimidating practices against competitors based on corruption and retaliation. Generally, networks of power around the waterfront are difficult to disentangle, are often worrisome for conflicts of interest between policy, politics and economic interests and, often, develop and exploit a great deal of discretionary power. Repression and/​or disruptions are complicated by these entanglements and even well evidenced cases can be hard to follow. Eventually, what characterizes policing of these behaviours is a form of high policing that needs to apply discretion and needs flexibility in investigating different forms of mala futura (future crimes). These mala futura might stem from the mere co-​existence and proximity of different actors in what is a small pond after all, that of the port economy at the local level. Indeed, these networks of power require an approach beyond that of policing alone, intended as the maintenance of law and order, beyond security and beyond mere ‘control’; they require organizational and cultural understanding of social dynamics of power. It might be indeed difficult for high policing agencies

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and teams to exercise discretion in their investigative duties (Lowe, 2011), to follow what appear as very fluid and often hidden networks involved in complex offending. Policing extra-​legal governance Case no. 5

In 2011, the case of the United States of America v. Michael Coppola provided evidence of the Genovese family’s criminal control over the Manhattan and New Jersey waterfronts generally, and over ILA Local 1235, in particular.15 Genovese family member George Barone, Genovese associate Michael D’Urso, Gambino family member Primo Cassarino and Lucchese family member Thomas Ricciardi testified that mafia ‘control’ over the metropolitan area waterfront dated back to the 1950s, with an understanding that the Genoveses would influence and control unions and businesses operating on the Manhattan and New Jersey docks, while the Gambinos would influence and control unions and businesses operating in Brooklyn and Staten Island. When Barone was asked how such control was exercised, he replied, through ‘intimidation, fear, whatever’ –​the mafia method. The evidence corroborated that intimidation and fear was the common method used by the Genovese family to secure and maintain waterfront control. In the Manhattan-​based ILA Local 1804-​1, control was eventually exercised by Coppola and his one-​time Genovese captain, Tino Fiumara, who was respected and feared in the community –​as testified by Local 1804-​1 vice-​president Thomas Buzzanca during the case. The Genovese family used its influence of unions to dictate what businesses worked on the waterfront, by including and excluding any ‘ordinary guy wanted to go into the trucking business on the docks, or wanted to open up something on the docks’, as testified by D’Urso.

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Coppola was convicted on a two-​count indictment charging him with substantive and conspiratorial racketeering in connection with his activities over three decades as an associate, soldier and ultimately captain of the Genovese family. The pattern of racketeering through which Coppola was alleged to have conducted and participated in the affairs of the Genovese family was charged in three predicate acts. Racketeering Act One is particularly interesting as it alleged conspiracy to extort, extortion and wire fraud in connection with the Genovese family’s control of ILA Local 1235. As for the extortion, between January 1974 and March 2007, Coppola and others obtained or conspired to obtain the property of Local 1235 members in the tangible form of: ‘Local 1235 labour union positions, money paid as wages and employee benefits and other economic benefits that such Local 1235 union members would have obtained but for the defendant and his co-​conspirators’ corrupt influence over such union’ and in the intangible form of ‘the right of Local 1235 members to have the officers, agents, delegates, employees and other representatives of their labour organisation manage the money, property and financial affairs of the organisation’. The property was allegedly obtained with the consent of union officials ‘induced by wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence or fear’. As for the wire fraud, between January 1974 and March 2007, Coppola and others devised a scheme to defraud Local 1235 union members of i) the same tangible property charged in the extortion scheme and ii) intangible property in the form of ‘the right of the honest services of the Local 1235 Presidents’. In a typical mafia behaviour, the Genovese family provided ‘through contacts … labour peace on the waterfronts where trucks were picking up containers’. In exchange for this peace, tribute payments were demanded from both waterfront businesses and unions, based on the earnings that the company and the union made. In addition to monthly tribute payments,

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the Genovese family demanded ‘Christmases’, special year-​end payments. Finally, the tributes paid by businesses were often channelled to the criminal enterprise through the union. Case no. 6

The trial related to Operation Porto started in October 1998 and ended with a sentence in May 200016 in the Tribunal of Palmi, in Calabria, southern Italy. The accusation against the defendants was that, since 1995, they tried to extort Medcenter Container Terminal (MCT) at the port of Gioia Tauro. MCT managed the activity of transhipment in the port when affiliates of the ‘ndrina (a family of the ‘ndrangheta mafia group) began to extort US$1.50 for every container moved on the territory of the port. The clan ‘Piromalli-​Molè’ from Gioia Tauro and the clan ‘Pesce’ from the nearby village of Rosarno were behind the extortion. The prosecution characterized the case as ‘the mother of all extortion’ involving a multinational company, one of the most important investments of the Italian state, and the European community at large. The Piromalli-​Molè group has maintained a sort of order over time in the city of Gioia Tauro, having full control of the activities of extortion. In addition to the victimization of businesses in the area, this group also worked consistently in the entrepreneurial field of procurement and in particular, subcontracting to companies headed by obvious nominees, family and friends. It emerged that the use of subcontracts was needless for contracting companies as much as it was widespread –​this is how the extortion matrix became evident. It became clear the clans have an interest in the whole territory, from public works to the ‘Port affair’, which the boss Giuseppe Piromalli invested in since the beginning of its works in the early 1990s. The Piromalli-​Molè, Pesce and the Bellocco clans are not just any mafia families; they are first class ones, recognized for their connections with other families, and with cocaine traffickers

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and importers who operate through the port of Gioia Tauro. Although some years have passed since Operation Porto, the economic area around the port of Gioia Tauro remains influenced by the power of the ‘ndrina. Their affairs in the port and around the port remain active 20 years after Operation Porto. In 2020, Operation Waterfront17 investigated the interests of these mafia families in investments over buildings and infrastructures around the port, a sign that the territory around the waterfront remains not just profitable but also part of the power quest of the clans. Both of these cases, again selected from others of this nature, enable us to identify some commonalities in the policing of complex criminality that takes the form of extra-​legal governance. Extra-​legal governance includes mafia-​type organized criminality and broader criminality that is involved in a series of activities aimed at both governing and trading on a territory, mainly through power-​oriented and profit-​driven activities (Varese, 2011; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014; Sergi, 2017). These cases in particular enable us to observe the relationship between the port and the city playing at the level of territory control, for both political and economic power as much as for trading opportunities. There are fewer common trends to identify here, mostly due to the diversity of data available across borders. One thing that can be learned from these cases is that (illegally) controlling a large industry is at times only a matter of controlling an essential service required by that industry, providing an opportunity to extract significant monopoly profit. This can happen, for example, by exercising some form of control over the workforce, slowing it down or speeding it up, influencing contracts and conditions of work through the unions and swaying relations with the employers. As discussed at the end of Chapter 1, this has long been considered a way to control the port (Jacobs, 2003). Even though practices have evolved, and the waterfront economy is now more complex, this ‘mentality’ has been flagged as still enduring in many port locations. Even with all its complexity, in fact,

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there are very few moving parts in the port economy –​parts that do not depend on one another. While the trades are indeed global, the relationships and the workforce remain a local business and as such can be object and subject of abuse and manipulations and become pawns for mafia-​type groups seeking power establishment. Generally speaking, cases of this nature are complex to police because they involve both illicit behaviours –​in the form of serious or less serious crimes –​as well as behaviours that are not apparently illegal per se –​such as trading in influence through the provision of contacts that mafia groups can offer. Differently from the policing of complex criminality in the form of organizational crimes and corruption/​infiltration in the legal economy, these cases are about running the extra-​ legal governance of the port as a territory, not just individuals colluding to get a slice of the cake. Instead, they are systematically instituting control systems within the territory. These cases challenge the skills, resources and capacity of traditional investigative approaches. The policing of extra-​legal governance is naturally quite local, even though it is often characterized by high-​policing strategies. In fact, the knowledge of territory is fundamental in the quest for power of any mafia-​type group (Sergi, 2017), and that needs to be mirrored in the way policing forces approach these investigations. Additionally, however, investigations into such cases tend to be high-​profile in as much as they involve serious cases of corruption, widespread fraud, undue influence into political and economic worlds, as well as associated intimidation and even threats. Most of the time these investigations are as much about territorial governance as they are about understanding networks of grey zones and instrumental friendships that organized crime groups develop through various professions and politics (Sciarrone and Storti, 2016). These cases are often characterized by the need for confidentiality if not secrecy, as well as special tactics and the application of new technological advancements for surveillance and/​or

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data collection. Sometimes, high-​level policing institutions are involved in the investigations, at other times, the investigations stem from local authorities instead. In any case, the profile and scope of such cases often escalates beyond the port and into the city/​territory of reference. This, in turn, makes it even more challenging to maintain the focus on the peculiarity of the port economy and space. Discussion and conclusion As portrayed throughout this book, ports are ambivalent spaces. Their nature requires a duplex perspective on a series of space configurations. Indeed, if spaces can be intended as social and cultural configurations (Löw, 2016), port spaces can be intended as having an ambivalent nature. As outlined in the introduction to this book, by looking at Table I.1 and the various dimensions of space configurations of the port, one can begin to understand how criminality in ports manifest differently because of the ambivalent nature of port space, between the local and the global and with different declinations of space configurations, access, territory and economy. Looking, for example, at different manifestations of organized crime –​illicit trafficking, infiltration, corruption, organizational crime and other forms of extra-​legal governance –​it can be argued that opportunities and possibilities are different if one considers the local or the global dimensions, or both (Sergi and Storti, 2020). When one considers illicit trafficking at the local level, it appears obvious that the need for criminal groups to look for doors –​to actually get inside the port –​is the main need (Sergi, 2020c; Roks, Bisschop and Staring, 2020). This often leads criminal groups to engage with the port workforce and the corruption of border force or other key actor in law enforcement. From the local perspective, policing on the ground might still catch some elements of the bigger scenario that is trafficking, through targeted low-​level policing of the port

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space and social relationships at the port. From a global perspective, however, the capacities of organized crime investing in illicit trade are frustrated, or facilitated, by pre-​existing shipping opportunities. As it has been noted elsewhere (Sergi, 2020c) there is no illicit route that does exploit a licit one. From a global perspective, therefore, illicit trafficking can only be approached through strategic intelligence-​led policing, where different state powers, such as border control, revenue and customs, anti-​fraud offices, organized crime agencies and others, will conflate and act jointly with similar agencies in other states. Illicit trafficking therefore is hybrid, where high policing at the borders also needs low policing on the ground; high confidentiality and high secrecy cross borders also are a peculiarity of such investigations and might actually hinder cooperation. When it comes to infiltration in the legal economy of the port, the port-​city interface plays an indispensable role at the local level. This is valid both for criminal groups seeking to ‘corrupt’ the legal economy and for white-​collar and corporate criminality, that is organizational crime. When cartels of entrepreneurs and organized crime groups converge in their interests and grip over public contracts, for example, there might be more systemic forms of corruption. Where organized crime groups are interested in a specific area of the port economy, these groups tend to be local, thus already present in the city behind the port. Additionally, there are also examples of criminal agreements in economies around ports that, even when they do not originate from existing groups in the city, nevertheless spill over into the city (as has been reported in the port of Antwerp, discussed in Chapter 3). Conversely, the port-​sea interface plays a role for organized crime and the infiltration in the port economy; indeed, these would be the case (very few detected, incidentally) of organized crime groups gaining undue influence over shipping companies, or the cases in which trusted insiders of the maritime economy, who respond to global trade relationships more than local ones, collude for personal gain and interest. Given

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this tapestry of actors, it is unsurprising that hybrid forms of policing have emerged. Nonetheless, there is also a clear tendency towards high policing; even if low-​level policing might capture some of the liaisons dangereuses around the port economy, it is very likely that investigations into organizational crimes of this kind could be carried out without intelligence-​ led approaches and national security outlooks, in pursuit of the protection of ‘critical national infrastructure’ and national economic well-​being (Sergi, 2017). When it comes to organized crime as extra-​legal governance, one sees the influence of organized crime groups, mafia-​type ones invested in profit as much as power seeking ventures, over labour unions at the port. As stated earlier in the book, the influence over labour unions, particularly in LMEs, has been a constant in many large ports historically (Sergi and Storti, 2020). The illegal or unethical activities of people in power, for example involved in the administration of the port or in the board of the port authorities, also fall into this category. The port represents a centre of power, around which various political and financial interests can converge. These interests could be manipulated for political and financial gain of various actors in the city or state behind the port, as it is often the case in key sectors of the economy (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2012). Curiously, it is very difficult to imagine any manifestations of extra-​legal governance in global settings for the ports, in as much as this type of activity, for organized crime groups, tends to be aimed at maintaining a grip over territories at the local level. From this perspective, therefore, we could imagine that low-​level forms of policing, when there is mafia-​type infiltration and extra-​legal governance thanks to a series of relationships within industry-​specifics groups (ie, labour unions), could be more appropriate to tackle these issues. However, realistically, most of the investigations of mafia-​type criminality and power-​driven organized crime in the form of extra-​legal governance are run in many states through forms

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of hybrid policing, as these activities are considered complex and high profile in nature, thus raising the bar of risk. Table 2.1 summarizes the arguments made so far on the manifestations of complex criminality in ports. This taxonomy identifies the variations in policing approaches that complex crimes call for. In conclusion, the manifestations of organized criminality, organizational crimes, infiltration and corruption on the waterfront and in/​through the port can be characterized as complex crimes. Accordingly, their policing can also be characterized as hybrid policing, where the national security framework appears to be increasingly influential. Indeed, port policing has been securitized, and with securitization has come heavier investments of high-​policing techniques. The conflation between policing and port/​maritime security, which was

Table 2.1: Complex crime in the ambivalent dimensions of ports Complex crime

Local

Global

Organized crime –​illicit trafficking

Access/​entry/​exit Looking for doors (incl. individual corruption) Hybrid policing (leaning low)

Transport and shipping opportunities Hybrid policing (leaning high)

Organizational crime –​ infiltration in the legal economy

Cartels of entrepreneurs, private actors and Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) (incl. systemic corruption), or OCGs’ initiatives –​ port-​city interface Hybrid policing

Port economy opportunities and global trade relationships –​port-​ sea interface Hybrid policing (leaning high)

Organized crime –​extra-​ legal governance

Influence over labour N/​A unions, port administration and other power brokers for financial or political gain Hybrid policing

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noted by various observers of the port space (Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016; Sergi, 2020a) is certainly one of the effects of the securitization of port policing. This operates across several levels of analysis. The port itself is necessarily glocal, thereby demanding a hybrid form of policing, also glocal. Taking these findings into account, the next chapter takes a closer look at the complexities of security governance in ports. Confronted with complex criminality in and through seaports, all actors involved in security governance are challenged by the ambivalence of the port.

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3

Governance of Security in Ports

Introduction There has always been an acknowledgement of the central position of ports within the development of our societies throughout the ages (Darwin, 2020; Stenning and Easton, 2021). So far in this book, ports have been explored through the lens of economic sociology and attention has been paid to the complex crimes that take place through and within the port. These accounts have presented ports as logistics hubs that take up an important glocal strategic position in cities, countries, continents and seas. During a workshop organized for academics and practitioners working on port security, Julie Berg defined ports as: … a lens by which we can explore a number of new (and old) developments in the world. They represent a microcosm of the governance opportunities and challenges we face in the 21st Century. Ports are the sites by which evolving harmscapes and evolving securities play out. They are the litmus test of humanity’s resilience. Ports –​ as with other sites of critical infrastructure –​need to

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be resilient and adaptable as they identify and face new global harmscapes.1 By harmscapes, she refers to the technological, environmental and other risks (such as terrorism, for example) that share common features of radical uncertainty and unpredictability, defining our age in accordance with what Beck (1992) called a risk society (Holley et al, 2020). Indeed, ports play a crucial role in the global economy, acting as the ‘beating’ heart of both legal and illegal flows of people, goods, information and money. They are places and spaces few will ever visit, silently relied upon by society, where criminals may abuse the sheer volume of trade and activity to ‘surf ’ undetected along the legal ‘waves’ of global commerce. This makes ports a true ‘hell’ in terms of providing security. With so many practices and processes connected to one another, and a multitude of actors operating within internationally linked ports, it is challenging to untangle the concept and reality of security governance in ports. To say there is a lot going on in ports is an understatement. That a lot of things can go wrong in ports is an even bigger understatement. In general, security in ports roughly incorporates four different security phenomena: i) port-​related crime, ii) threats, iii) emergency situations and iv) events and incidents. Port security encompasses all the complex crimes explored in Chapter 2, from smuggling, scams with vehicles, hacking of supply chains and waste, and international drug trafficking, as well as the protection of the port against economic and human threats such as terror or state-​led attacks. Furthermore, port security involves preventing and managing emergency situations. Finally, it includes the planning and organization of events and incidents (De Boeck et al, 2014). Related to the multifaceted nature of port security is the considerable number of ‘actors’ that can be identified as security ‘providers’ in ports, some of which are briefly recalled in Chapter 1. These can also be roughly classified into four broad categories (De Boeck et al, 2014). The first includes

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governmental bodies such as mayors’ offices, port authorities and ministries of home affairs, environment, planning and justice, who have people in different departments who may deal with security. The second category includes those responsible for security from a justice and policing perspective such as police forces, judicial authorities and intelligence and security services. Those responsible from an inspection and rescue viewpoint such as customs, the environmental inspection and fire brigades can be considered a third category. Finally, the large number of private companies in the port serve as a fourth separate category. Though the title of the actors differs across countries and contexts, the classification shown previously is effectively enshrined in the ISPS Code, the main international port security regulation, which gives the owners and crew of ships and operators of port facilities a defined set of international risk management responsibilities and procedures (Eski and Carpenter, 2013). With this complex situation in mind, this chapter begins by exploring some of the main vocabulary used in the governance of security literature, defining key concepts such as flows, nodes, plural policing, nodal governance, polycentric systems, partnerships, networks, assemblages, regulation, hybridity and accountability. This vocabulary is then used to illustrate some of the main findings of research on security governance in ports. Without being exhaustive, it takes the same approach as the chapters that proceed it by exploring the importance of ports as hubs in a multitude of flows, ports as hybrid spaces, illustrations of plural policing and nodal mapping, the nature of relations between security providers and ports and the importance of regulation and accountability are illustrated. The findings discussed are mainly based on the case studies developed by the authors of this book, supplemented by the findings of other empirical research done by colleagues in the field. The text is underpinned by the testimonials of port professionals around the world, reflecting upon the dynamics of security governance in practice. In this way, the chapter

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hopes to contribute to the conversation between academics and practitioners in the field of port security, one of the main goals of this book. This dialogue reveals much work is left to be done to disentangle the complexities of security governance in ports. Vocabulary to address security governance This section looks at the main perspectives and concepts that have been used in research to get a grip on security governance in general. The governance of security is about providing, distributing and regulating. Regulation is perceived here as a subset of governance that is about steering the flow of events and behaviour as opposed to providing and distributing. Of course, when regulators regulate, they often steer the provision and distribution that regulated actors undertake as well (Braithwaite et al, 2007: 3). The vocabulary to address security governance includes concepts such as flows, nodes, plural policing, nodal governance, polycentric systems, partnerships, networks, assemblages, regulation, hybridity and accountability.2 The term flow has become a transdisciplinary way to refer to things in motion, those not staying in their places, to mobility and expansion of many kinds, and to globalization along many dimensions. Late 20th century societies are characterized by flows of capital, labour, commodities, information and images, and so economists, sociologists, demographers, media researchers, geographers and others can engage with flows (Hannerz, 2002: 4). In 1989, leading urban sociologist Manuel Castells coined the notion of a ‘space of flows’, referring to the handling of information within and between dispersed organizations (Castells, 1989). In his publication on the network society, Castells (1996) further elaborated on processes of globalization and the rise of technology that has fundamentally changed social structures. As it is now possible to access information from almost anywhere,

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at any time, location has become less important, and gaining access to and navigating a flow of information has become all the more vital. Castells also noted the importance of flows of people, goods, and money in our society, and the nodes have emerged at the intersections of all those flows. The connection between all of these flows creates a network society. Multiple flows converge at hubs such as ports, also called critical national infrastructures. In terms of security provision, it is clear that security in our societies is not only provided by government. Nowadays, privatization and pluralization have radically transformed the field of policy and practice. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, a notion of plural policing has developed to account for the fact that many agencies besides the public police are involved in policing (Brodeur, 2010). An increasing number of public and private actors, as well as civil and military actors, now take on policing tasks (Loader, 2000; Bull, 2010; Easton et al, 2010). Changing ideas and practices from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ have thrown up new questions about what the role is of private companies, the public sector and citizens in the provision of security (Jones and Newburn, 2006; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012). Government is meant to indicate a form of governing in which the government assumes the key role. ‘Governance’, in turn, is a more fragmented form of governing and policymaking, in which both public and private actors but also military and civil actors play a role at a sub-​national, national and international level (Krahmann, 2003). These various actors can organize themselves in different ways into traditional hierarchical relationships and can form networks together. Whelan and Dupont (2017) point out that there is very little research into the internal functioning of security networks in the fields of criminology and policing. In the existing literature, they identify two dominant lines of thought. The first one uses the security network as a metaphor to explain and map the pluralization of and changes in governance of security. The

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second one focuses on identifying the relationships between actors within security networks, typically working with social network analysis. The authors indicate the need to pay more attention to study networks as an organizational form in itself and pay more attention to how a network is directed and managed. In this context, Shearing and Wood (2003) refer to an evolution from ‘state-​centric’ government to nodal governance. Nodal governance is based on the non-​monopolistic production of security by a network of interrelated entities/​ actors, called nodes. These nodes interact in formal or informal organizations, which can be public or private, and constitute a web (Brodeur, 2010). Nodes can be defined as sites of governance exhibiting four characteristics: i) mentalities (how actors think), ii) technologies (methods to exert influence), iii) resources (to support the operations of the node) and iv) institutions (a structure that enables the mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time). As covered by Burris et al (2005: 37–​38), these nodes need ‘not be a formally constituted or legally recognized entity, but it must have sufficient stability and structure to enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time’. Consequently, organized crime groups or gangs can be considered nodes too and may take up a significant role in the governing (dis)order that emerges in different parts of our society. To test whether the security domain is evolving to ‘nodal governance’ requires ‘nodal network analysis’ (Shearing and Johnston, 2010). This analysis consists of a nodal mapping describing the mentalities, technologies, resources and institutions of the nodes. Observing the presence of a variety of nodes need not automatically imply the existence of a network; an additional network analysis needs to be done to get an idea of the relationships between the nodes and to see if and how they relate to each other in terms of cooperation and/​or competition. This is an empirical challenge.

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Ostrom defines these security configurations as polycentric systems where a diversity of independent and autonomous rule-​enforcing auspices/​authorities are taking up a role. These ‘rulers’ differ in size, degree of specialization, operating scales or levels, and thereby working in overlapping jurisdictions. Crucial is the existence of a number of policing or security nodes that are independent from each other but have relationships that can be either cooperative, conflictual or anything between (Ostrom in Berg, 2015). Partnerships are built through this process of connecting and engaging between security auspices and providers. Given their diversity and impact on the way society experiences security, some scholars have mapped out different kinds of these plural policing networks or security assemblages (Crawford et al, 2005; Dupont, 2006; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Quéro and Dupont, 2019). In the port context, many security ‘assemblages’ are plural. This adds to the discussion in Chapter 2, which presents port policing as a ‘hybrid’ of high and low policing techniques (Brodeur, 2007). This changing landscape has given rise to discussion about the evolution of the nature of the security providers involved. Colona and Jaffe (2006) define hybrid governance arrangements as arrangements in which private actors take over roles that are typically prescribed to public actors. By doing so, a range of governance actors become co-​rulers and share control while ultimately becoming intertwined with each other to such a degree that a differentiation between public and private actor is hard to make. An important point of debate is whether the public-​private divide is still relevant, and voices are raised that there is a middle ground of hybridity rising in policing where everything and everyone is becoming hybrid (Schuilenberg, 2015).3 With this middle ground of hybridity, Schuilenberg is referring to the growing similarity and even sameness between private and public actors. It is related to the issue of blurring boundaries that has always been on the academic agenda (Easton et al, 2010).

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Hybridity is also an interesting notion with regard to the space in which these security configurations are evolving, particularly where the blurring of ‘privateness’ and ‘publicness’ of space can be observed. Private space is increasingly used as public space, for example in football stadiums; while public spaces like train stations are modernized into shopping centres and policed by private actors. Since the 1980s, spaces such as cinemas, shopping centres and leisure parks have been called ‘mass private properties’ (Shearing and Stenning, 1981; 1983). These spaces combine private ownership with collective access. Private or public ownership itself cannot adequately explain the notion of private and public space. Rather, factors such as the scope of public or private authority within these spaces as well as who is accessing and using the space needs to be considered (Marcuse, 2003). This gives rise to the idea of hybrid space. The presence of so many actors and duties in this changing policing landscape has led to a search for how developing security configurations can be made accountable (Krahmann, 2003; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012). Stenning (2009) called for more research to engage with the effects of the blurring of private and public policing on issues of accountability and governance, and more recently Berg and Shearing (2020) pointed out the neglected area of research on how private sector providers are accountable within security assemblages. Here, it is also important to keep Crawford’s (2004) deliberation on the problem of ‘many hands’ in mind. Indeed, if so many people contribute that no single contribution can be identified, no one needs to behave responsibly as no one person or institution can be held accountable either. This area of security governance is a rich and evolving field of scholarship, full of discussions and complexities yet to be disentangled. In the following sections we consider what this conceptual framework –​including the notions of flows, nodes, plural policing, nodal governance, polycentric systems, partnerships, networks, assemblages, regulation, hybridity and

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accountability –​has delivered in terms of insights on security governance in ports. Lessons learned on security governance in ports Although the vocabulary outlined in the previous section has been applied in many different contexts, ranging from occupational culture within security networks in Australia (Whelan, 2015), to local security networks in France (Quéro and Dupont, 2019), empirical research on governance of security in ports is rather scarce. Nevertheless, during the two last decades the work of Lieselot Bisschop, Hans Boutellier, Russell Brewer, Charlotte Colman, Marc Cools, John Darwin, Arne De Boeck, Margo De Koster, Eva Dinchel, Marleen Easton, Yarin Eski, Cyrille Fijnaut, Fien Gilleir, Alex Gould, Bob Hoogenboom, Pieter Leloup, Peter Marks, Martin Nøkleberg, Paul Ponsaers, Alexandria Reid, Genserik Reniers, Robby Roks, Anna Sergi, Clifford Shearing, Arie Sluis, Richard Staring, Philip Stenning, Luca Storti, Evelien Van den Herrewegen and others, have all added to our knowledge on port security by shedding light on different topics related to security governance, including policing and policy against crime. This section relies on their work and workshops with practitioners over the past four years to generate some lessons learned on the interaction between theory and practice when it comes to the governance of security in ports. Importance of flows and ports as hybrid spaces

There has always been an interest in ports as sites of geopolitical (in)security (Fijnaut, 2019; Darwin, 2020; Stenning and Easton, 2021). The historically conservative and realist study of sea power has meant that port security has often been studied for its influence on the distribution of hard naval power and military competition, particularly during wartime, seizes and blockades (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Stenning and Easton,

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2021). Ports are naturally embedded in strategically relevant geopolitical positions, which naturally affects discourses around security and insecurity. A notable illustration is the reaction to Chinese global investment in foreign maritime infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI investment projects are estimated to add over US$1 trillion of outward funding for foreign infrastructure between 2017–​2027 (OECD, 2018), with much of this allocated to the ‘Maritime Silk Road’, which is focussed on port infrastructure. Some analysts have raised concerns that China will use this involvement to generate political influence in individual member states, which could also affect security and its governance (Huang, 2018; Stenning and Easton, 2020). The BRI has, in some ways, revived interest in broader aspects of port security. Ports are no longer seen as solely geographical places, dots on a world map, but rather as hybrid spaces that include sea-​port and port-​city interfaces. This has been proven to be true for the approach to cocaine trafficking in the port of Antwerp. The interwovenness of international drug trafficking and organized crime, which has settled in the city and its environs, has been a major source of concern for security actors and policy makers in Antwerp for several years now. The import and transit of cocaine via the port of Antwerp is increasing, as are associated safety problems in and around the city (Easton, 2020). It can be argued that ports are indeed doors –​playing on the etymology of the word port in Latin (Sergi, 2020a); they act as breakwaters to flows coming from the sea, including illicit trade and all forms of global commerce. The challenges in countering illicit trade through ports not only have an effect on institutions in and around ports, they also affect criminal networks already existing outside the ports (Sergi, 2020b). In the port of Genoa, for example, the existence of mafia-​type groups linked to the ‘ndrangheta (Calabrian mafia groups) in the city impacts, on the one hand, on the amount of cocaine these groups manage to move through the port and, on the

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other hand, on the level of infiltration they can exercise over the port economy as well. Likewise, drug-​dealing organized crime groups operating in the cities of Genoa, Vancouver and New York City do not necessarily rely on their local ports, but often choose other ‘doors in’ depending on a number of different factors (Sergi, 2020c). The criminal landscape of the port and city may be more or less decoupled; as one city police force officer observes ‘criminal equilibrium in the port is more static [than the city]’, perhaps because it is a ‘gated territory in its own right’ (Sergi, 2020c: 11). Furthermore, ports are clearly hybrid spaces in so far as they allow citizens to access the space while at the same time being highly secured. This aspect of port security is increasingly important, given the regeneration approaches discussed in Chapter 1. Traffic flows in and out of ports are often monitored through CCTV and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) technology. They are comparable with gated communities, physically set apart from the public space by fences, gates or walls to limit access and provide security and order (Low, 2006; Stenning and Easton, 2021). This means that ports have a reduced accessibility and usability. Nevertheless, ports differ in the extent to which they are freely accessible. The waterfront is an area relatively few of us will ever visit, yet the social phenomena that unfolds there is somehow part of a shared, iconographic knowledge. Some ports are surrounded by a gate (such as the port of Ostend, Montreal or Liverpool) and other ports also have a residential function where citizens can move freely using the central roads through the port and are only denied access to certain private spaces such as terminals of private companies located in the port (as is the case in the port of Antwerp). In practice, ports differ with regard to their degree of hybridity. For example, the port of Antwerp (at the side of the City of Antwerp)4 is a landlord port, owned by the municipality of Antwerp but managed and controlled by a corporate entity. The Board of Directors of the Port Authority represents

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both the public and private sector. Political parties elected in the city exercise their influence by occupying half of the Board of Directors seats in the port. The other half is taken up by industry representatives. The chair of the board is the vice-​mayor of the city, responsible for the port. Representing public and private interests, the port authority is therefore a hybrid actor. By comparison, the Port of Brisbane in Australia is a privatized port governed corporately under lease from the Queensland government. Consequently, governmental influence is reduced to a regulatory role, while the port authority is responsible for the security of the general port area and all common user facilities, which are rented to private businesses. In short, alongside being hybrid spaces in respect to their accessibility, ports can also be considered as hybrid regarding the involvement of a range of private and public actors that take part in security provision in the port. The impact of the nature of port authorities, namely whether they are public, private or hybrid, on the governance of security must be evaluated empirically. Hybridity is not a development that can be simply assumed. It demands a close empirical examination of everyday practices and collaborative efforts and relationships (Nøkleberg, 2020: 604). Whether hybridity is most commonly the case in ports is an empirical question. On the basis of his analysis of the collaborative landscape of aviation and maritime policing in Norway, Nøkleberg concludes that policing agencies continue to use the vocabulary of public and private to make sense of their practices and relations. He cautions that this might be different in another context and urges researchers to take up the ‘empirical glove’ to address these issues, further encouraging the spirit of cross-​disciplinary dialogue promoted in this book. Another interesting empirical question is how the multivalent, complex nature of the port space in different countries affects the structure and nature of policing arrangements. In her ongoing research, Eva Dinchel aims to contribute to a

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better understanding of the powers that private sector security providers have in the port of Antwerp and Brisbane. Today, there is limited knowledge about the roles they hold and perform in these hybrid spaces and what kind of power they are ‘tapping into’ within the existing networks of multiple security providers in both ports (Dinchel and Easton, 2021). Practitioners indicate that they are overwhelmed by the number of actors who play a role in security provision in the port environment, making it hard to get a grip on the number of potential partners. This sea of actors can make it challenging to attain an overview of who is doing what. Moreover, some practitioners note that their individual and institutional competences in dealing with and grasping this complexity differs. As one 2019 workshop participant noted: ‘In Ports there are a sh*t load of actors. And what this ‘sh*t load of actors do, has to be ordered and coordinated if port security is to be established and maintained.’5 Against this backdrop, practitioners in several interviews and workshops voiced that viewing the port as a critical infrastructure and a hub in a multitude of flows in a globalized world is an interesting but not always practical approach. Many of them testified to the limitations of this conceptual understanding of hyperconnectivity and flows, for all of them are regularly confronted with a lack of competence or legal powers to generate an impact on certain flows that generate security problems in their ports of reference. For example, Stanny De Vlieger, who initiated the Stroomplan as Director of the Belgian Federal Judicial Police in the province of Antwerp,6 shared his frustration in applying a flow perspective to the issue, saying: The more we invest in security within the port and the more efficient we are in combating it; the more vulnerability to crime shifts to related adjacent sectors. It seems endless and we must continue to pay attention to it in the future and take actions on both fronts.

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Yet, practitioners also indicate that the perspective of the port as a hub in a multitude of flows makes them aware of the need to cooperate with partners at local, national and international level to be able to generate a real impact on crime phenomena. Some of them have travelled the world to build relations with partners in countries of origin of flows of illegal goods, such as cocaine or heroin, for example. De Vlieger himself invested in a mission to explore future collaborative actions with public partners in cocaine exporting countries of origin in South America. He was nevertheless confronted with the fact that this collaboration depends on people, goodwill and trust due to a lack of structure, legislation and means to generate an impact on globalized flows being discussed. Plural policing and nodal mapping

Conditions, trust and goodwill all apply to domestic collaboration too. None of the studies revisited in this chapter deny the pluralization of policing, and from a historical perspective, port security has always been the remit of a variety of actors (Leloup and De Koster, 2017). This throws up several challenges, particularly because the actors involved operate according to different mindsets (economic/​trade, social, security, risk), which often conflict and undermine an integrated approach to a phenomenon. For example, Sergi (2020b: 11) coins what she calls the ‘tenant mindset’ in Genoa port. She cites the words of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) that show this mentality when talking about police forces (as opposed to his security teams): Until 1994 authorities could enter and circulate in the port as they pleased and this is still the way they behave; at all times and the question remains, who is in charge here? [. . .] You enter my house, you have to have a reason or an authorisation, otherwise you shouldn’t enter right? In theory this is my house, I pay the rent, right? But obviously they always have a reason to enter.

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This mindset is likely to produce difficulties achieving cooperation between public and private institutions, as it creates a space where ‘tenants’ –​that is, the companies leasing the terminal facilities –​preserve their rights against other institutions seen as ‘intruders’. This ‘tenant mentality’ also enables them to subordinate security to trade facilitation by decoupling the threat from where the harm is realized (Moiseienko, Reid and Chase, 2020). This applies to various crime and security issues. One exploration of the governance of transmigration in the port of Ostend and Zeebruges (Easton and Gilleir, 2013) finds that the maritime police had a security mindset that primarily focussed on the safety risks generated by transmigrants for the transport sector and the risks posed to the physical integrity of the port and border security writ large. This differs greatly from the economic mindset of port businesses, which define transmigration as a problem that can disrupt the flow of goods, entailing an economic risk for them. This, in turn, differs from the welfare mindset that governs the actions of the social services sector in the cities where the ports are situated. Social workers are confronted with illegal immigrants whose human rights are violated, and their role is to offer them basic assistance and support regardless of the setting. Finally, this conflicts with the political mindset of the municipal authorities, whose primary objective is to represent the interests of the local population, and to protect the touristic value of the neighbouring cities. The following interview quotes illustrate some of these different mindsets: Illegal migration is a security problem: people die during the crossing. We had 58 dead Chinese here in 2000, then we had the Wexford drama. This is a security problem, and we are the authority responsible for security in the port. (Interview with an officer of the Waterway Police)

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It is extremely important that you have a fairly safe port, as this better attracts customers. Everything that goes on in Ostend with these illegals who try and get onto ships is very damaging for customers. These transit migrants try and get into containers, and don’t care whether there are goods inside them or not, or whether the cargo is perishable or not. What it boils down to is that a great deal of material damage is caused to goods. They also have to relieve themselves in that container, don’t they? That causes a great deal of material damage and is no good to anyone. So, the reputation of your port is closely linked to the security of your port. (Interview with a harbourmaster) We do what we have to do, from our social mission … In the organic law of the Centre for Social Welfare, this right is also enshrined in the first article, which stipulates that anyone is entitled to a human existence. It comes down to actually enforcing those rights. (Interview with the Director of the local Centre for Social Welfare) These different mindsets generate different attitudes and approaches to dealing with crime and security issues in the port, as further evidenced by divergent positions on how to deal with drug trafficking in the port of Antwerp (Easton, 2020). Interviews with the main security providers (including corrupt dockworkers)7 show that business leaders located in the port are mostly worried about infiltration within their organizations because it smears the image of the sector and threatens service delivery. For this reason, they expend time and money on self-​regulation and internal practices to screen for possible vulnerabilities or corrupt actors. Furthermore, they explicitly ask for more support from the government and call for a strengthening of the law enforcement sector. Interesting to note here is that the coronavirus pandemic and

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its general financial implications may make personnel (not only dockworkers but also IT specialists) working in the port more vulnerable to engaging in illegal practices. In a reaction to an animated film distributed by Cepa,8 the common trade union in the port, warned employees of the devastating consequences of being involved in illegal practices.9 This is mentioned here because the mentalities of the dockworkers are equally important, since they are important nodes/​actors in the provision of security in the port. Likewise, in her case study on illegal transport of e-​waste, Lieselot Bisschop (2012; 2015; 2016) suggests that actors across the supply chain have diverging motivations and opportunities. The typical flow of waste from developed to lesser-​developed economies sees different push and pull factors for being involved in the illegal trade. Bisschop’s (2012) study shows that the involvement of legal and criminal actors, and the nature of their relationships, differ depending on which part of the flow is under consideration. Differences pop up for example when looking at the collection of e-​waste in contrast to the transportation of it. She concludes that legality and illegality is not clearly depicted when talking about the actors involved along the flow in the transport of e-​waste. Zooming in on relations between security providers in ports

With regard to international port-​related research, most studies use the two dominant lines of thought described by Whelan and Dupont (2017) in the previous section. They either use the security network as a metaphor to explain and map the pluralization of and changes in security governance in ports, or/​and use social network analysis to identify the relationships between actors within security networks. Using social network analysis, Russell Brewer (2014; 2015; 2017) suggests that network connections of trust and social capital are the necessary building blocks for effective inter-​agency collaboration to address crime on the waterfront.

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Social capital refers to the investment of actors in social relations or associations with the expectation of generating access to and return in resources (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 1999). Brewer’s research in the ports of Long Island in California and Melbourne in Australia found that the Americans have been more successful in creating and utilizing social capital than the Australians. In doing so, it acknowledges that policing the waterfront is challenging and resources from multiple agencies have to be harnessed to obtain a maximum gain. Brewer gives us insight into how actors use their resources to position themselves in relation to others, including private sector actors too. Eski (2016), meanwhile, opted for a qualitative ethnographic study and observed various public and private actors in the ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg, searching for the cultural dynamics resulting from the mutual cooperation that followed after the introduction of new legislation such as the ISPS Code (discussed later). In their research on security governance in the port of Antwerp, Dinchel and Easton (2021) found that representatives of organizations including port authority, public police agencies, customs, terminal operators, private security companies and other private actors reported to regularly participate in over 30 different security configurations that deal with security aspects linked to the port or maritime security in a broader scope. These configurations could be divided into roughly three categories. The first category includes transnational, national, regional and local security fora such as a local security committee based on the ISPS Code, a meeting of PFSOs, a forum on cybersecurity, a task force on cocaine trafficking, meetings of the National Authority of Maritime Security, and the International Committee of Maritime Security (MARSEC). The second category includes virtual information exchange and reporting mechanisms such as the Port Information Network (PIN), an email reporting system for PFSOs and BENTAR, a public and private early warning system for vessels. Finally, associations and federations such

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as the Confederation of European Security Services, a private forum for security providers on a European level, are considered important by some of the respondents. Ad hoc fora such as irregular or one-​time conferences, seminars, exercises and information sessions were not included since they are simply too plentiful to capture. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that they may also play a role in shaping relationships between security providers in ports. Furthermore, this research highlighted the fact that security concerns in ports are often very local, and security providers participate more in local and national security configurations than transnational security networks. This is contrary to what might be expected from a security community operating in a highly interconnected environment such as a port. Practitioners participating in our workshops on port security confirmed this contradiction. Although transnational relations and networks are considered crucial to improving security provision in ports worldwide, professionals indicate that high workloads and a lack of time inhibits them from building relationships or contacts within their counterparts in other ports around the world. In many cases, it is also a challenge to find the right counterparts, actors in other countries with whom it is possible to cooperate, because competences of the same type of organizations such as police and customs, for example, may vary from one country to another. When zooming in on the main configurations mentioned earlier, it becomes clear that only a thorough empirical analysis can uncover the complex relationships between security providers. In the battle against drug trafficking in the port of Antwerp for example, a policy plan, called the Stroomplan, has generated four working groups of which three consisted of public services only (Colman, 2018; Easton, 2020). Only the working group on port employment has members of the private sector on their list of participants. The Stroomplan demonstrates that any potential cooperation involves a large number of partners in different domains, ranging from

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local police, federal police, the public prosecutor, customs, inspections services, private businesses and the port authority. The plan has stimulated networking between different sectors involved, uniting them operationally in what can be considered a goal-​oriented network (Provan and Kenis, 2008). In the port of New York and New Jersey, as well, security networks are a mix of private and public interests. For example, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey –​which is also responsible for the region’s airport and other real estate (such as the World Trade Centre) –​is a peculiar body established in 1921. It is a joint venture between the states of New York and New Jersey, but it is financially independent from both. It relies almost entirely on revenues generated by facility users, tolls, fees and rents, making the corporate interests around it enormous. The port authority has its own police force and an Office of the Inspector General. The port police –​overseen by the Office of the Inspector General –​are responsible for daily security at New York Harbour, while each terminal implements their own security protocols in line with the ones of the port authority. The port authority’s inputs are particularly noticeable around anti-corruption. Other agencies, such as the US Coast Guard, the Waterfront Commission, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), regulate access of goods and people, while the New York Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigations and Drug Enforcement Administration all have to usually negotiate ad hoc access with CBP to the terminals when needed during their policing operations. In particular, US CBP is tasked with the integration of security into the commercial operations of the port (Sergi and Storti, 2020). The overall picture of these security networks is therefore still quite chaotic, but nevertheless seems to work in practice. As outlined in the Introduction, the Achilles’ heel of sustainable relations between security providers in ports is often the sharing of information. Although both countries are

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differently organized, studies of cocaine trafficking through ports in Belgium and the Netherlands (Easton, 2020; Eski et al, 2021) reach comparable conclusions surrounding concerns and frustrations in relation to information sharing. The exchange of information, even between government agencies, is often considered impossible due to privacy legislation. Furthermore, there is a lack of decisiveness and leadership related to a lack of knowledge and skills. Eski and his colleagues see a solution in a centralized, neutral, independent leader to make it possible to act as ‘One Government’ in dealing with subversion in the port of Rotterdam (Eski et al, 2021). In Belgium, information sharing is even more complicated due to the complex administrative organization of the country (including the police) and the knock-​on effects in the port area in particular (Easton, 2020). The port area covers different municipalities, different judicial districts and challenges the collaboration between the federal component of the Integrated Police (including the Waterway Police, competent for the port area) and the local police zones (which are not responsible for the port area). This administrative ‘swamp’ was referenced by the mayor of the city of Antwerp in an interview on the persistent security problems in the city related to drug trafficking through the port of Antwerp. In 2020, he said: “As mayor, I am the owner of the port authority, which is solely responsible for the operation of the port. Security issues such as drugs are not part of this.”10 Undoubtedly, this has consequences for the management of the port-​city interface in terms of security and affects the information sharing between all security providers involved. Overcoming practical information sharing difficulties has been the focus of many technological innovation projects and processes in ports. Ports rely on a myriad of technologies that are more or less relevant to crime and policing. Heilig and Voss (2017) identify three distinct generations of port technology based on their impact on digital transformation, namely by enabling paperless, automated and smart procedures.

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In their taxonomy, the digitization began with the necessary development of universal electronic data interchange (EDI) systems at the inter-​and intra-​port level. Paperless EDI systems were developed to swiftly facilitate information exchange across a growing range and volume of stakeholders involved in the port economy from the advent of containerization in the 1960s to1980s. This was followed by second-​generation technologies such as automatic identification systems (AIS), global position systems (GPS), ANPR and radio-​frequency identification (RFID), enabling increased procedural and physical automation within the port from the 1990s onwards. Finally, a new generation of ‘smart’ technologies including the internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence and big data are set to revolutionize the quality, quantity and transfer of data, although most of these technologies are yet to be implemented. Aspiring ‘smart ports’ aim to achieve an integrated, fully digitized and completely traceable end-​to-​end supply chain both in the port and its hinterland. The development and integration of new technologies has given rise to several interesting examples of cross-​sector collaboration and innovation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, ports need soft infrastructure like technology, research, education and training, maritime culture and heritage, as well as hard infrastructure, to develop and survive. An example is the EU-​funded ‘PASSAnT project’11 in Flanders and the Netherlands, coordinated by the Innovation Network for Security in Belgium. The project shows that intensive collaboration between private companies, government and knowledge institutions can generate high tech solutions for phenomena such as smuggling of humans, drugs and explosives. The development of intrusion-​resistant tarpaulins, smart camera software and interactive fencing underpinned by analytics and integrated in control rooms has the potential to generate an impact on the functioning of professionals in the field and enhance the security provision in ports. A combination of means, not least knowledge, money, and technology creates

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a win-​win here for all public and private partners involved in the project (Easton, 2019). Finally, it should be mentioned that besides the relations between security providers in ports, researchers have increasingly focussed on illegal nodes and their networks as well. Bright and Brewer (2020) take this approach in their description of Australia’s dark networks and Bright, Koskinen and Malm (2019) pay explicit attention to the formation and evolution of a drug trafficking network. The latter comes to the conclusion that actors/​nodes in these networks do not seek to create an efficient network that is highly centralized at the expense of security. These actors’ interactions appear to be based on primarily enhancing security and trust, protecting themselves and actors in close proximity through the use of brokers that offer access to the rest of the network. Although the illicit nature of their activities and threat of detection or incapacitation plays a role in their formation and evolution, they still exhibit several similarities to licit networks in terms of the importance of trust and brokerage as indirect connections. This is an approach taken throughout Sergi’s research (2020b) on how complex crime (as defined in Chapter 2) manifests in ports around the world. As said, illicit groups can be considered nodes too and may play a significant role in governing (dis)order in ports. For example, the role of port employees as enablers of organized crime has been indicated as a key factor of the ability of certain criminal organizations to do business in ports (Sergi and Storti, 2020). Clearly, the intertwining of illicit and licit networks in ports requires careful scrutiny. Also important is the insight this offers to law enforcement and policy makers. For example, Bright and his colleagues (2019) suggest that intelligence and law enforcement agencies should use social network analysis to facilitate intelligence collection and guide their prevention and intervention strategies. They point out that targeting key connections in drug trafficking networks such as brokers (indirect connections), is likely to disrupt and potentially even dismantle the network.

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Furthermore, they suggest law enforcement should better use informants to undermine trust within such networks. During our roundtables, practitioners acknowledged the usefulness of these suggestions but at the same time stressed their lack of means in terms of time, people, knowledge and technology to apply them in optimal conditions, often described as ‘an unequal game between the good and the bad guys’. The following testimonies illustrate some of the other concerns of practitioners in the public sector of security provision in the port of Antwerp on some of the issues mentioned earlier. Technology is an enabler, but port security ultimately still relies on human decision-​making. At a 2019 workshop in Brisbane, Kathy Dua,12 then Head of the Port Security Department at the Antwerp Port Authority reflected upon ‘the New Human’:13 We have a new relationship with our technology, also in the professional field. Technology is constantly changing, and it now takes us from an evolution to a transformation of ourselves: we all have a digital “me”. Technology is a facilitator, that also makes life easier for us in the security-​transportation sector. The smartphone, as the 24/​7 indispensable personal assistant, opens a new path in safety and security efficiency. Each app is a key to another gate of personal or professional needs. There are apps to show the way, report security breaches, emergency notifications, employer information or it could be your access badge. But we also have become dependent on it and have to be careful not to lose the connection with the real environment. Technology must support us, not lead us. We have to maintain human trust networks, human responsibility and human awareness in unknown situations. This input led many practitioners in other ports to reflect on the importance of technology in setting up sustainable relations

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with diverse partners. Stanny De Vlieger14 reflected upon The New Digital Age15 as: Police practitioners are becoming increasingly aware that technological innovation expands security issues to a global scale. Being active on the strategic level in the domain of reducing different phenomena of international organised crimes makes it clear that non-​legal actors, high-​end criminal organisations, are taking full advantage of new technologies. Public actors are some steps behind their illegal opponents, whilst thinking too much within the boundaries of what is not possible due to jurisdictions, the lack of budget or not running innovation projects towards their working processes. Only multi-​agency approaches of public-​private actors, with insights from the academic world, will be effective in responding to these new kinds of challenges. Finally, one should take into account that illegal actors are able to shift very fast, they don’t have to respect any boundary. His reflection makes it clear that awareness about the strength of illegal nodes and networks and its impact on the need for better partnerships between security providers is huge. At the same time, his colleagues around the table added that this awareness is not enough to overcome the boundaries that these professionals are confronted with on a daily basis. Indeed, it is often underestimated how much energy and time it takes not only to set up but also to maintain relationships between different security providers. Most security professionals admit that making a plan and bringing people around the table is the easiest part of initiating relationships. Maintaining relations, coordinating, communicating and building trust is the continuous challenge that practitioners are confronted with in striving to be successful in their daily work. They are quite often confronted with a lack of means, in terms of time, money, engagement, technological tools, to sustain

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relationships with other security providers. Staff turnover, both in the private and public sector, also contributes to this. Finally, new challenges on the ground also call into question the structure of organizations that are usually traditionally and bureaucratically organized and cannot be changed in the short term. This prevents practitioners from working in a problem-​ or team-​oriented way on solutions that transcend existing silos. Practitioners consider some of their relationships with other security providers as potential vulnerabilities in themselves, particularly cross-​sectoral relationships. Some private companies, in their efforts to avoid reputational damage and economic loss, prefer to avoid communication with the authorities and the press about security issues altogether. The importance of regulation and accountability

The regulation of security, as a part of the governance system, clearly has an impact on how crime develops and is handled in ports. The importance of regulation cannot be underestimated and affects the actions of actors active in both legal and illegal activities taking place in the port and at sea. Regulations set the boundaries for the possible exchange of information between law enforcement agencies and private companies. Equally, regulation is crucial for the development of the illicit side of activities within and beyond the port as regulation influences the possible modus operandi of illicit groups or people. The international port security regulatory regime as we know it is heavily influenced by 9/​11 and, to a lesser extent, al-​Qaeda’s small-​scale attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and French oil tanker the Limburg in 2002 (Szyliowicz, 2014). These events demonstrated the potentially devastating economic impact and threat to life posed by so-​called ‘maritime terrorism’, leading the IMO to propose major revisions to Chapter XI of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention of 1974, launching the ISPS Code in 2002. Often seen as the most comprehensive effort to date to ‘institutionalize a global

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culture of maritime security’ (Kraska and Pedrozo, 2013: 379; see also Chapter 1 and Chapter 4), the ISPS Code fundamentally transformed the public order of seaports by producing a mandatory legal regime designed to protect critical infrastructure from physical threat by terrorist non-​state actors. Crucially, it delegated formal responsibilities across the public and private sector, forming the baseline for port security and much cooperative activity in ports. The ISPS Code applies to all 165 SOLAS members, covering all cargo vessels over 500 gross tonnes, mobile oil rigs, passenger ships and the port facilities that service them, thereby accounting for over 99 per cent of world shipping tonnage (Sergi, 2020a). It entered into force on 1 July 2004 and is formed of two sections: Part A details mandatory procedural requirements that governments, port authorities, and shipping companies must adhere to in order to be assessed ‘ISPS Code compliant’; Part B is recommendatory and contains guidelines about how to implement these requirements. The measures proposed are lengthy and extremely detailed, distributing a wide range of individual and collective responsibilities, including the designation of specific personnel with common procedural duties. At a minimum, for example, shipping companies must designate nominated security personnel including a Company Security Officer (CSO) and a Ship Security Officer (SSO) to assess threat levels and devise security plans, and train crew and personnel in the identification and mitigation of security threats, among other measures (see Kraska and Pedrozo, 2013, for greater detail). Likewise, contracting governments and port authorities should nominate a PFSO, develop a Port Facility Security Plan covering physical, infrastructural and procedural risks and train staff to identify and mitigate security threats, among other measures (see Eski and Carpenter, 2013, for greater detail). Crucially, all obligated ships and ports must consistently monitor, update and publish a security level around level 1 (normal risk), level 2 (heightened risk) and level 3 (imminent

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risk) based on the likelihood of attack. In many cases, vessels that have called at a non-​compliant port within their last 5–​10 calls must declare this downstream, and increase their security level to at least level 2, thereby creating a commercial incentive to avoid them altogether. Despite concerns it would prove too costly for some governments and private sector actors to implement (Bichou, 2004), the majority of international ports have adopted Part A’s measures. Many have gone further and adopted sections of Part B by law (EC 725/​2004). Nonetheless, in 2020, the Port Security Advisory of the US Coast Guard judged at least one port in 22 countries to be non-​compliant with anti-​terrorism measures stipulated in the ISPS Code (‘Port Security Advisory’, 2020). The ISPS Code’s securitization of the port perimeter has had a direct impact on the modus operandi of drug traffickers using the port of Antwerp as a hub for illicit trade. For example, the ISPS Code has resulted in a tightly organized security system that makes it difficult to reach the transported cocaine without the intervention of official personnel, who act as mediators tasked with transporting the right cargo from the port to the right destination in the right way. This role is a way to establish a status in this illicit economy and in the urban environment within which it is expanding (Easton, 2020), as further explored in Chapter 4. This effect is also visible in the port of Genoa, in the terminal PSA Genova-​Prà, also known as Voltri. Voltri receives over 60 per cent of the volume of cargo in Genoa, and holds most of intercontinental routes, leaving it particularly exposed to illicit trafficking. Voltri is part of PSA but its security protocols and regulations therefore tend to differ in practice, despite being under similar umbrella frameworks by the port authority. The most obvious result of such differences is that Voltri has experienced a certain degree of crime displacement, whereby it is very unlikely that drugs are found on the port grounds, which instead does not seem to happen in the other terminals to the same extent (Sergi, 2020b).

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Regulation of glocal phenomena making use of flows is extremely difficult from a policy and operational perspective (Roks, Bisschop and Staring, 2020). Lieselot Bisschop (2015; 2016) looks at regulation of flows by paying attention to the origin, transit and destination context. She finds interesting insights on how this regulatory context influences the flow of e-​waste, as it tends to search for the least resistance along the way. It is no coincidence that e-​waste finds its way to African countries with a lack of regulatory power and resources (Okafor-​Yarwood and Adewumni, 2020). Furthermore, Bisschop (2012: 244) points out that the various actors involved in e-​waste flows and their diverging motivations and opportunities require a governance framework that is equally diverse and flexible: The Initiatives to heighten awareness about e-​waste throughout the flows –​ from production and over consumption to collection, transport and recycling –​ combined with national and international governmental control and self-​regulation are necessary ingredients of this governance mix. Given the global dimensions of transnational environmental crime, limiting this to national policy is to no avail. However, the local impact should not be neglected either because illegal transports of e-​waste may result in harm to environmental and human health, but they might also have positive effects locally (secure livelihood, bridge digital divide). This implies that policy needs to take both the global and the local into account. Future studies should look at the exact implications of these characteristics for the governance framework of transnational environmental crime. In addition, some research has focussed on private actors’ role in maritime security provision, not so much in the port but at sea. Gould (2020) for example shows that weak and shifting lines of regulatory authority in international waters transfers

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authority and autonomy towards the private sector. It seems that states and their governments provide little oversight of private security at sea. Indeed, public policing does not exist at sea, as it does on land. Regulations means nothing if they are not adhered to, however. As elaborated by Clifford Shearing at a workshop in 2019:16 Standards and codes enable ports to operate as nodes in a global marine network. In ports, security rests in a triangular foundation. At the top of the triangle are partnerships, and at the bottom of the triangle are codes and audit systems to ensure compliance. The Achilles’ heel of port security is complacency. Port security breaks down when the triangle is not strong, and this happens when people become complacent. This quote indicates the importance of regulation and accountability in the context of security provision in ports. Several practitioners have noted the triangle becomes weak where there is complacency among some security providers in ports (Eski, 2016). Chapter 4 discusses the importance of future research on regulation and accountability in the evolving security configurations in ports worldwide. Conclusion and reflections As addressed in the previous chapters, there are several endogenous reasons why the governance of security in ports is intrinsically puzzling, not least the presence of multi-​sectoral actors and users, their divergent priorities and the problematic overlapping authority, jurisdiction and competences. This chapter applied some of the main vocabulary and concepts in security governance to capture some insights into port security in practice. It is clear that security and policing activities in the port involve many different actors, all of them being equipped

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with different technologies, mentalities, resources and institutional structures and each of them taking a role in delivering security in the port environment. The idea that ports are hubs connecting a multitude of flows has broadened perspectives to address security governance issues. As explored in Chapter 1, ports are no longer seen as geographical places, dots on a world map, but rather as hybrid spaces that include sea-​port and port-​city interfaces. Acknowledging this brings the expectation for security providers that they will deal with glocal crime and security issues (Easton, 2020). Many practitioners embrace this viewpoint but stress the difficulty of dealing with the boundaries of their competences and legal frameworks in addressing these phenomena in a problem-​oriented way. Needless to say, those who want to do more are confronted with inhibiting factors of different nature such as lack of time, people, skills, knowledge, technological tools and legal support. Further, some are inevitably confronted with colleagues who have lost the motivation to pick up this ‘glove’ or who prefer to ‘hide’ within the boundaries of formal compliance. Beyond dealing with less complex crimes, some see the restraining logics of coordinating so many actors and incentives as insurmountable. Nonetheless, the growing pluralization and hybridity of port policing cannot be denied. The literature and case studies explored here discuss an almost overwhelming number of actors or nodes who play some kind of role in investigating complex crime or security provision in ports. Both legal and illegal actors play a role in security governance. From a practical perspective, this makes it challenging to delimit the actors to take into account when doing research on security provision in ports. It is simply not possible to include everyone, particularly when it comes to the global supply chain. Researchers have solved this problem by either zooming in on the space of the port as a geographical hub (Ramos, 2010; Ng et al, 2014), focusing on certain phenomena, using crime-​scripts, reconstructing traffic lines or conceptualizing flows in ports (Bisschop, 2016;

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Dinchel and Easton, 2020, 2021). These artificial solutions resonate in the way practitioners deal with the same challenge of defining the scope of their work terrain. This chapter also illustrated how different visions, resources, and technology used by each of the involved actors, or ‘nodes’, make it difficult to achieve coherent and uniform policy implementation. Seemingly incompatible economic, social, and security-​related mindsets can generate ‘islands’ that jeopardize cooperation, as in the example of the ‘tenant’ mentality illustrated earlier. This is consistent with the existence of different conventions discussed in Chapter 1 and the way they drive and shape the logic of action of the myriad of (security) actors operating in port environments. Furthermore, all actors develop practices that are resistant to change. After all, it is not easy to reconcile economic, security, welfare and financial mindsets across such a variety of actors/​nodes. If a formal framework for cooperation is lacking, success depends on voluntary, informal relations in which trust is a crucial element to nourish in practice. In this vein, a diversity of formal/​informal, local/​national/​ international, private-​private, public-​private, public-​public relations have been set up to suit different contexts. The increased interest by public and private actors in aligning potentially opposing goals has created a variety of permanent and temporary, inter-​organizational and cross-​sectoral security configurations in ports worldwide. As already stated, security configurations can be conceived as a kind of ‘organizational field’, in which several actors attract, conflict, compete and cooperate based on formal and informal rules, local institutional frameworks and contingent socio-​economic factors. While some of these configurations form regulatory bodies that are anchored in national and international legislation, others have emerged in the form of associations, formal and informal security fora or virtual information exchange mechanisms (Dinchel and Easton, 2021). Sometimes regulation is the source of this dynamic, but bottom-​up initiatives are also triggered by

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often urgent or operational problems as in the case of tactical or operational taskforces for example. Over the years, both public and private actors have become increasingly convinced of the added value they can bring to each other. This positive momentum is a key driver of hybridity. Recognizing and taking into account each other’s logics, especially the delicate balance between security and economy, is a prerequisite for building trust and giving cooperation a chance. “The possibility of being able to pick up phone and talk to the right person” is considered vital.17 Both the public and private sector testify to the importance of personal relationships. This sense of urgency is an important context for the future development and improvement of the relations between security providers in ports (Dinchel and Easton, 2021). This chapter did not seek to provide an exhaustive overview of research findings in relation to security governance in ports. This is not possible for two main reasons. The first is that studies on security governance in ports use different concepts and definitions, have different units of analysis (comparing ports, sectors within ports, different legal or illegal networks, for example) and use different combinations of research methods. The second reason is that the field of research on security governance in ports is evolving, with many research gaps to be addressed in the future. Some of the main concepts in security governance are still developing or have yet to be applied to ports. This generates a patchy, sometimes incoherent, but overall exciting field. A lot of work remains. Many future research avenues in this field are addressed in the overall conclusion of this book.

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Introduction It is clear from the previous chapters that ports are dynamic spaces where both licit and illicit operators and users must capitalize on social, political, economic and technological change to remain competitive. This chapter looks to demonstrate that the political economy approach proposed in this book provides a useful lens for exploring and evaluating how these forces will continue to shape port security in the future. It begins by discussing the ‘long shadow’ of the ISPS Code and its treatment –​or lack thereof –​of organized crime as a port security priority. Here, it engages with critiques of the politicization of the international regime, its failure to address local priorities and what this means for maritime-​focussed capacity building initiatives moving forward. It then turns to technology, digitization and automation as a challenge and opportunity for port security, including cybersecurity as an emergent threat, the changing nature of corruption vulnerabilities and the displacement of organized crime activities into the wider logistics supply chain and port-​city hinterland area. New areas of inquiry for the port security research agenda are identified throughout.

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The ‘long shadow’ of the ISPS Code The politics of the ISPS Code

While the ISPS Code1 is widely credited with establishing a shared understanding of baseline port security standards (Kraska and Pedrozzo, 2013), it is not without criticism. This includes the extent to which the current regime reflects local priorities (Hönke and Cuesta-​Fernandez, 2018; Chalfin and Dahou, 2020) and whether the Code’s narrow focus on terrorism neglects the more insidious and common threat of non-​ violent security issues such as organized crime and corruption (Greenberg et al, 2006; Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010; Grillot, Cruise and D’erman, 2010; Eski and Carpenter, 2013). As Greenberg et al (2006) note, there is a profound difference in the motivations of (organized) criminal and terrorist actors targeting the port space, not least that the former relies upon continuity and hides conspicuously in global trade, while the latter seeks to disrupt it. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 3, it is difficult to quantify the ISPS Code’s tangible impact on ship and port security. Its most obvious contribution to tackling crime lies in situational prevention through the restriction of access and movement within the port itself (Easton, 2020). This is principally achieved through the mandatory designation of controlled areas, adoption of formal access procedures, and use of perimeter and surveillance technology to monitor the port, thereby reducing the opportunity for theft, rip-​on and rip-​off schemes, stowaways and low-​level bribery of staff on site (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Sergi, 2020b). This level of impact is reflected in a recent study of Nigeria’s seaports, which concludes that the adoption of the ISPS Code has curtailed ‘the most common misdemeanours’ such as cargo theft and petty corruption, but left ‘the high-​profile, classes of white-​collar port crimes which thrive under elite protection yet to be fully addressed’ (Chilaka, 2019: 95). Likewise, Sergi’s (2020a) study of Genoa finds a displacement effect between terminals that are

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deemed less compliant with the physical measures proscribed in the ISPS Code. On this basis, one senior shipping consultant describes the ISPS Code as a ‘paper tiger’, a ‘massively expensive, bureaucratic exercise in “issue signalling” ’ that secures the port perimeter but fails to achieve any real impact on security (Wilkes in Safety4Sea, 2019). In a similar vein, Eski (2011; 2016; 2020) finds it to be an exercise in securitization, encouraging the consumption of new technologies and private security services to demonstrate compliance but regardless of whether crime or insecurity actually decreases. The prioritization of process over outcome, Eski (2016) argues, contributes to the meaninglessness and routinization of security procedures, thereby reinforcing the cooperation challenges and incompatible security logics or mindsets. The extent to which the ISPS Code delivers value within and especially beyond the perimeter of the port itself therefore remains in dispute. At an international level, the narrow ambition of paper-​based compliance with the international regime is seen by some to encourage a cynical ‘transit culture’ (Moiseienko, Reid and Chase, 2020) where port authorities face little incentive to police outbound vessels or cargo. Barring duties arising from United Nations sanctions and export controls (Whang, 2019), exported cargo or goods in transit are seldom inspected due to inadequate resources and competing national priorities. A recent study of the ports of Montreal, Liverpool and Genoa finds that outbound illicit trafficking is not a priority, with very little intelligence-​led profiling of outgoing cargo (Sergi, 2020a; 2020b). The downside of this so-​called ‘transit culture’ is epitomized by the illegal export of vast quantities of toxic industrial, electronic, agricultural, medical and other waste from advanced economies in North America and Europe to port states across South East Asia and Africa (Bisschop, 2012; Baldé et al, 2020; UNEP, 2018). Drawing on evidence from Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana, Okafor-​Yarwood and Adewumi (2020) argue that the systematic export of toxic waste

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to the Gulf of Guinea amounts to ‘environmental racism’, noting that compliance with the ISPS Code in ports of origin does little to address this type of security threat. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is another port-​dependent transnational organized crime untouched by the ISPS Code, which does not regulate fishing vessels. IUU fishing accounts for an estimated 15 per cent of the world’s total capture fisheries production, generating an estimated $10–​23.5 billion in criminal income per year (FAO, 2016). The well-​ established links between IUU fishing practices and money laundering, corruption, forced labour and drug trafficking have led to the emergence of a broad ‘fisheries crime’ concept to capture these convergences (De Conning and Witbooi, 2015). Fisheries support the livelihoods of an estimated 660 to 880 million people worldwide (FAO, 2017), making fisheries crime a significant threat to human and national security (Haenlein, 2017). Introduced in 2009, the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (commonly known as the ‘PSMA’) responds to the fact that IUU fishing operators systematically target ports with weak governance and high levels of corruption to land and sell illegal catch, as well as pass undetected for other fisheries crimes (FAO, 2016; de Rivaz, Haenlein, Reid and Nouwens, 2019). The PSMA targets the port as a key node in these criminal schemes by establishing a port state duty to inspect vessels for fisheries crime offences; designate specific national ports for foreign-​flagged vessels; commit to international information sharing; and deny entry to vessels suspected of IUU fishing, even if they are solely refuelling and not landing catch. It is rightly considered a landmark treaty that complements the ISPS Code, however, the fact it only reached the required ratification threshold in 2016 demonstrates the challenge of achieving reciprocity and global coverage within a fragmented and crime-​specific international legal regime (Becker, 2005; Klein, 2011). Further evidence of this fragmentation is found in the

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IMO’s 2020 agreement to develop guidelines for the prevention and suppression of wildlife trafficking on ships and in port (Traffic, 2020). In line with other critical scholars, Eski (2011: 421) finds the ISPS Code makes few substantive contributions to combating crimes such as waste trafficking and IUU fishing because it is ‘not an internationalization but rather an Americanization of port regulation’. His ethnographic study of over 80 port security actors in Rotterdam and Hamburg concludes that ‘frustration lies in how at its inception, the War on Terror-​ inspired ISPS Code led to all types of illogical security practices at the docks that did not support global commerce at a local level’, with one security officer exclaiming that ‘When that ISPS [Code] was designed, it was shoved down the companies throats! [Sic]’ Hönke and Cuesta-​Fernandez’s (2018: 252) profile of the ports of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Tema in Ghana further questions the ‘hegemonic aspirations of transnational governance technologies’, finding that the ISPS Code transforms foreign ports into ‘outposts of [US] homeland security’. Indeed, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) actively states ‘We have made our Nation’s borders not our first line of defence, but one of many’ (DHS, 2020). Critiques of the disproportionate representation of US interests and influence on port security standards worldwide have grown in recent years (Brew, 2003; Sergi, 2020b), reinforced by the US Container Security Initiative –​which requires 100 per cent of all incoming cargo to be scanned –​and the Coast Guard’s unilaterally conducted evaluations of foreign port compliance with counter-​terrorism measures proscribed in the ISPS Code (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Szyliowicz, 2014; Sergi, 2020b). These critiques serve to remind that the current regime is politicized and suits neoliberal, capitalist and Western-​dominated interests, a fact that is sometimes disguised behind the seemingly benign sociotechnical banner of ‘global logistics’ (Gregson et al, 2016: 382). Ideological engagements with port security governance and regulations

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will therefore surely persist in the future, particularly as global politics becomes more pluralistic and ‘maritime security’ capacity building initiatives grow in demand, as discussed in the next section of this chapter. Placing ports within maritime capacity building initiatives

The past ten to 15 years has also seen a range of new capacity building and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives devoted to improving lesser developed countries’ responses to maritime security threats (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe, 2020), many of which were launched in response to a significant increase in piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia from 2008 to 2009 onwards (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Since then, several international organizations with varying levels of policing and security experience have become major SSR providers in the maritime security field, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol, World Customs Organization, UN Office on Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank. Other SSR initiatives include bilateral projects run or funded by countries including the US, UK, Norway and the European Union (see, for example, CRIMSON EU Maritime Security Programming, 2018). These programmes are often impressive in their scope, the broad range of actors they target, and their approach to the interconnected nature of maritime security threats across land and sea (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). Several programmes that began as anti-​piracy and anti-​armed robbery actions have evolved to focus on a broader suite of ‘maritime crimes’. One such example is the Djbouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), which was established in 2009 as a cross-​regional anti-​piracy platform, but in 2017 expanded its mandate through the so-​called ‘Jeddah Amendment’ to address IUU fishing and ‘transnational organized crime in the maritime domain’, including trafficking in arms, wildlife, narcotics,

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oil bunkering, human trafficking and illegal dumping of toxic waste, among other priority areas (DCoC Jeddah Amendment, 2017). Likewise, established in 2010, UNODC’s Counter Piracy Programme has since evolved into the Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), which operates across 20 countries and applies a holistic criminal justice approach to maritime crimes, focussed on investigation, detention and prosecution. For example, the GMCP convenes the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime (IOFMC), which operates a prosecutors’ network focussed on cooperative strategies for prosecuting piracy cases and illicit trafficking in drugs, people and wildlife, as well as the ‘Southern Route Partnership’, which focusses on cross-​border data sharing across national drug enforcement agencies to tackle opioid trafficking from Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa (UNODC, 2018). As the ‘gateway’ to the ocean and ‘door’ to the land (Sergi, 2020b), several of these initiatives have focussed on seaports. Since 2004, the UNODC has run the ‘Container Control Program’ (CCP), which delivers trainings on effective cargo risk profiling and provides an information sharing platform called ContainerComm to assist states in fighting illegal cross-​border trafficking. Today, the CCP operates in over 50 countries and has established over 115 multi-​agency Port and Air Cargo Control Units staffed by domestic law enforcement agencies (UNODC, 2019). In 2019, meanwhile, the EU Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) Programme launched the €8.5 million euro project Improving Port Security in West and Central Africa (WECAPs), which focusses on raising ISPS Code compliance and crisis management in ports in the Gulf of Guinea, several of which are key nodes in the global cocaine and illegal wildlife trade (Ingram et al, 2019; World Drug Report, 2019). Similarly, the EU’s Seaport Cooperation Project (SEACOP) works under the Cocaine Route Programme to counter illicit trafficking by supporting the establishment and functions of Joint Maritime Control Units and Maritime Intelligence Units in seaports across West Africa, Latin America

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and the Caribbean, a further example of the diffusion of European port security cultures and practices abroad (European Commission, 2013). Several global trends are likely to increase the demand for this style of maritime capacity building in the future, not least the rise of the Blue Economy development concept, which features prominently in the African Union’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy and the European Union’s ‘Blue Growth’ Strategy (African Union, 2012; EU, 2012). Although there is no agreed definition of the ‘Blue Economy’ (Silver et al, 2015), the concept is predicated on the idea that marine industries such as oil and gas, fisheries, aquaculture and tourism are currently underexploited compared to their full potential and should be sustainably developed to increase state revenue, reduce coastal poverty and contribute to development (Voyer et al, 2018). The Blue Economy concept has achieved significant buy-​in; at least 18,000 delegates including heads of state and 84 ministers from 184 countries attended a flagship Blue Economy conference held in Nairobi in 2018 (Juma in Reid and Jones, 2019). The current global economic value of coastal and oceanic environment is estimated to be $2.5 trillion a year, with the ocean itself worth ten times that amount due to the ecosystem services it provides (Hoegh-​Guldberg, 2015). The EU alone estimates that its Blue Economy industries turned over €750 billion in 2018, directly supporting over five million jobs (European Commission, 2020). The promise of similarly lucrative windfalls has seen many governments worldwide abandon their ‘sea blindness’ (Redford, 2014) and adopt a more proactive approach to the management of their maritime domains (Reid and Jones, 2019). This is particularly true of African states, where an improved maritime security situation is seen as a necessary prerequisite for a thriving Blue Economy (Voyer et al, 2018). In this vein, the AIM Strategy promotes the need to improve maritime governance and port infrastructure (Reva, 2020), particularly where dwell times

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are disproportionately high compared to the rest of the world (Raballand, Refas and Isik, 2018). Notwithstanding recent research by Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe (2020), maritime capacity building programmes remain understudied compared to land-​based SSR initiatives. Although they paint a sympathetic picture more broadly, Bueger and Edmunds (2017: 1308) rightly acknowledge that the types of projects listed here should be ‘recognized as an explicitly normative endeavour’ that ‘institutionalize[s]‌externally derived notions of best practice in security governance’ by encouraging local actors to manage security in a particular manner and within a preferred model of political organization. Indeed, although often garbed in a language of ‘neutral technocracy’, capacity building is an inherently political activity (Denney, Mallett and Benson, 2017), not least because technical assistance programmes inevitably privilege certain political elites, national institutions and individual personnel over others. Two decades of arguably lacklustre development aid results have created a growing appreciation of the influence of local politics on the outcomes of such capacity building programmes (World Bank, 2005; Unsworth and Williams, 2011; Leitch, 2018). The failure to achieve transformational change through externally imposed solutions has seen the emergence of a new paradigm coined as ‘Thinking and Working Politically’ (Menocal, 2014; Price, 2019), which understands ‘institutional failures in terms of power and politics, rather than capacity gaps’ (Cox and Norrington Davies, 2019: 3). In practice, this entails approaching an issue such as poor port performance with a political economy analysis of the problem, not a fixed solution, and empowering local actors to make programmatic choices that aim for achievable and incremental improvements in existing capacity (Cox and Norrington Davies, 2019). This offers an important lens for designing and evaluating the impact of port security assistance moving forward, particularly because such SSR programmes may recreate or entrench the structural conditions that perpetuate the

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organizational and extra-​legal governance crimes explored in Chapter 2. It could be hypothesized, for example, that port security initiatives in particular will need to look beyond procedural solutions to understand the vested interests of corrupt actors and criminals involved in complex crimes across the port-​city and port-​sea interface. This is an area where further research can make a significant contribution. Beyond the achievement of the baseline ISPS Code standards, it seems that port security interventions capable of improving port governance and security lie in a more holistic understanding of glocal priorities and incentives (Szyliowicz 2014; Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe 2020; Moiseineko, Reid and Chase, 2020). In this vein, Eski (2011: 427) argues that greater criminological research can account for the ‘socio-​cultural and ethico-​political status quo of port security to theorize what is possible, rather than what is (utopian) ideally wished for in the current security society’. Without this, it may be difficult to manage and construct ‘sensible port security’ objectives and procedures that go beyond tick-​box compliance or deliver genuine benefits to national and local communities. At the same time, local ownership is one of the core principles of successful SSR programmes (Gordon, Welch and Roos, 2015; Price, 2019). However, the extent to which local buy-​in has been achieved in practice varies significantly and has at times jeopardized maritime capacity building actions (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). Recent research across the Western Indian Ocean finds that the most successful capacity building programmes in the region have focussed on ‘shared problems, open participation and practically orientated working groups’ that target a broad range of actors, including government agencies as well as private and community interests such as shippers and fishers (Bueger, Edmunds and McCabe, 2020: 241). This nuanced and flexible approach may lead to the emergence of new security communities, networks and solutions that could be studied and applied elsewhere.

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This further reinforces the importance of avoiding a simple narrative of a one-​size fits all or Western-​centric approach to port security. It also calls for greater scrutiny of the conflation between port security and maritime security more broadly. Situating small or informal ports and waterways

Finally, in part as a consequence of the ISPS Code, the global research and policy agenda remains heavily skewed towards an analysis of crime prevention in ‘large’ containerized ports and vessels over 500 gross tonnes. As explored in Chapter 1, many nations classify and regulate their ports according to size and integration with local production systems, particularly where trade is concentrated in one or a few key sites (Brooks, Pallis and Cullinane, 2017). Yet barring explorations of artisanal IUU fishing, oil bunkering and migrant smuggling (Kraska and Pedroza, 2013; Hanlon, 2018; Kadfak, 2020; Chapson, Koning and Noortmann, 2019; Song and Scholtens, 2020), there is relatively little research on how security is managed and governed in small and informal ports in either advanced or lesser developed economies. It is unclear, for example, how much weight small ports hold in states’ view of maritime and national security. The securitization of national borders means that even small ports with no permanent security personnel appear to experience hybrid policing. In 2014, for example, the UK launched ‘Project Kraken’, a multi-​agency national security initiative run by Border Force, the National Crime Agency and local police forces to counter-terrorism and organized crime in the UK’s ‘generally unpoliced’ and ‘unwatched’ waterways such as marinas, estuaries, boat yards and small ports (Pells, 2016). Kraken is executed through posters and online advertisements that ask citizens who ‘live, work and relax’ in these areas to report any behaviour they consider to be ‘suspicious in the context of the location they are in’ (Essex Police). Yet with the exception of Weaver (2020), there is little analysis, public

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scrutiny or evidence regarding the success of Project Kraken, which explicitly frames itself as a national security initiative and resembles other citizen surveillance policies that emerged following 9/​11. The relevance of small and informal ports for the study of security and organized crime is further reinforced by the fact that illegal drug trafficking shipments often travel the ‘final mile’ via smaller, ad hoc ports serviced by smaller vessels, boats, submarines and yachts, a phenomenon described as the diffusion, dilution and fragmentation of maritime drug trafficking (Hanlon, 2018; Sergi, 2020c). In line with our frameworks in Chapters 1–​2, small and informal ports should therefore be understood in their local and global economic setting, avoiding the trap of assuming all facilities seek to develop from a ‘primitive harbour to a global hub’ (Kanellopoulos, 2018: 14). Further, there is more work to be done to differentiate the local and global impact of crimes such as drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, whose harms are often perceived through a global lens, despite the fact these crimes can have a disproportionate effect on coastal communities (World Drug Report, 2010; Chen et al, 2020). A size does not matter agenda for port security studies is also necessitated by the pursuit of maritime domain awareness (MDA) in many contemporary maritime security strategies (Bueger, 2017). MDA seeks to achieve ‘as far as possible, perfect information about the maritime environment’ in order to understand, deter and suppress threats at sea (Kraska and Pedrozo, 2013: 399). The US, for example, aims for nothing less than ‘the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States’ (US National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2005: Annex A). MDA’s ‘perfect picture’ is meant to be achieved through cooperative information sharing, analysis and data fusion from sources across the public, private and third sector (Voyer et al, 2018).

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The DCoC, for example, has attempted to improve MDA by establishing three information sharing centres stationed across Kenya, Yemen (currently defunct) and the United Republic of Tanzania respectively. Other regionalized examples include the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) operated by the Singaporean Navy and the Information Sharing Centre of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which brings together over 20 contracting government parties across Asia and Europe. MDA’s all-​encompassing securitization of marine spaces therefore inevitably broadens the scope of security to encompass small and informal ports, and territorial waters more broadly. This shared understanding of the maritime environment also distinguishes MDA from an epistemic point of view, raising several unexplored areas regarding how security is governed in this context. Technology, digitization and automation The value of focussing on ‘large’ ports is further reduced by the growing use of technology in ports of all sizes. This section of the chapter now turns to the impact of technology on port security. The past two decades have ushered in a now ‘near total dependence’ of day-​to-​day port and ship operations on information technologies (IT), operational technologies (OT) and internet-​enabled information systems (IS) (Heilig and Voss, 2017). As referenced in Chapter 1, the adoption of new technologies to deliver more efficient and/​or unique services is an essential component of remaining a competitive port (Roso, Woxenius, Lumsden, 2009; Kanellopoulos, 2018). New technologies help achieve this by maximizing the spatially limited port territory, reducing procedural error through automation, improving the transfer of information across disparate actors and reducing the need for costly human labour. This section of the chapter analyses the growing reliance on these port technologies from a crime and policing perspective,

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including the diffusion of responsibility for cybersecurity and technology’s impact on organized crime and corruption in the port supply chain. Cybersecurity

It is commonly accepted that seaports’ increasing reliance on technology gives rise to new security risks in the form of cybersecurity vulnerabilities across the logistics supply chain (Fitton, Germond and Lacy, 2015; IMO, 2017; Meyer-​Larsen and Müler, 2018). A number of malicious actors may be interested in launching cyberattacks against ship and port facilities, including organized crime groups, terrorists and foreign state actors. According to one reputable cybersecurity company, there were at least 310 reported cyberattacks on ships and ports in 2019, up from an estimated 120 attacks in 2018 and 50 attacks in 2017 (Naval Dome, 2020). The actual number of cyberattacks is likely to be much higher, however, as many companies are unwilling to declare that they have been a victim due to reputation and rising insurance premiums (Morris, 2016). Several studies conclude that ports are unprepared for the growing scale of the cybersecurity threat. One 2013 analysis of six commercial ports in the US found a relatively low level of cybersecurity awareness, with only one conducting a cyber vulnerability assessment and none with a cyber incident response plan (Kramek, 2013). Empirical evidence from multiple ports in the Baltic Sea region also indicates a lack of cyber threat preparedness (Ahokas et al, 2017). Further, a 2011 study by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA, 2011: 1) concludes ‘[T]‌he awareness on cyber security needs and challenges in the maritime sector is currently low to non-​existent.’ Past cases demonstrate that criminals may abuse cybersecurity vulnerabilities to monitor ships or cargo of interest, infiltrate companies in the legitimate supply chain, identify and exploit physical security vulnerabilities, use ransomware to extort

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actors in the port economy and avoid enforcement action by abandoning cargo under suspicion, among other advantages (Meyer-​Larsen and Müller, 2018; Reva, 2020). In 2012, for example, the Australian CBP IT system was accessed by an organized crime group who used the information to monitor containers and abandon those under suspicion by the authorities. Access was facilitated through a software loophole detected as early as 2008 (Baker and McKenzie, 2012). In 2017, meanwhile, global shipping line Maersk Group experienced a NotPetya ransomware attack that affected operations in multiple container terminals worldwide, creating a conservatively estimated loss of US$250–​300 million (Greenberg, 2018). One criminal operation that ran for two years between 2011 and 2013 saw an organized crime group recruit hackers to launch a phishing attack that successfully infiltrated the computer networks of two companies in the port of Antwerp, providing them with access to information about the location and security details of containers within the port (Bateman, 2013). This data enabled them to import using the legitimate companies’ names, then sending in truck drivers to extract the containers before they were processed or transferred to the listed importer. The scheme was noticed when port workers questioned why containers belonging to the same companies were regularly disappearing in the port. Access to the port’s IT system clearly provided significant value, because when the breach was noticed and remote access was cut off, the group subsequently broke into the port premises and installed key-​logging devices to capture passwords and usernames. Rob Wainwright, then Executive Director of Europol, described this as a ‘new business model’ for traffickers that would undoubtedly become more significant in the future (Bateman, 2013). These criminal schemes take advantage of a combination of human, infrastructural and procedural vulnerabilities (Senarak, 2020). On the human side, low-​levels of cyber awareness or a lack of ‘cyberdiscipline’ (IMO, 2017) can pose a major threat where employees are targeted to facilitate access to

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internet-​enabled systems. Several techniques are used to target individuals and businesses across the logistics supply chain, including malware transferred by email (‘phishing’), links to websites or materials that infect the device (a ‘watering hole attack’) and the use of social engineering techniques to manipulate a user into providing sensitive information (DHS, 2016). Infrastructurally, meanwhile, many ports use the same commercial off-​the-​shelf software, meaning multiple facilities share identical vulnerabilities (DHS, 2016). Infrastructural risks are often introduced when new and old IT/​OT systems are combined (UK Maritime Security Strategy, 2014), particularly because many shipping systems are significantly older than their portside counterparts and were designed before cybersecurity was a commonplace consideration (DHS, 2016). Human error and infrastructural weaknesses can then be compounded by unclear procedural guidelines or practices that result in an inadequate response or a lack of resilience to an attack (Senarak, 2020). The sheer variety of global seaports means that these vulnerabilities differ significantly in practice, not least because certain ports attract different users or rely on technology to different extents. For example, one study of African ports finds digital transformation to be markedly slow, with many systems remaining insecure by design, threatening widespread economic consequences in the event of a cyberattack (Reva, 2020). While some ports are still run on paper documents and EDI systems from the 1990s, others are already integrating ‘SmartPort’ technologies such as blockchain, the IoT and big data analysis (Heilig and Voss, 2017). Risks are therefore unevenly spread, which can be the cause of deviance and/​or displacement, as seen in other examples in this book. Achieving resilience to an attack is also complicated by the sheer volume and variety of actors with access to the port supply chain, including large companies with fully integrated supply chains and secure IT systems down to small enterprises with limited control or oversight of their users, customers and suppliers

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(Bichou, 2004). As an illustration, some companies in small-​ to-​medium size Mediterranean ports have been shown to struggle to refine internal processes or fund new IT systems that integrate with a more secure port community information system (Zerbino et al, 2018). Multiple international guidelines have been introduced to deal with cybersecurity in the shipping industry, but cyber-​ related port regulation has lagged behind (Ahokas et al, 2017; Cook, 2020). In January 2016, a coalition of shipping industry associations published the The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (BIMCO, 2016), complemented a year later by the IMO’s introduction of Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management and Resolution MSC.428(90) on ‘Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems’ in 2017. Notably, the IMO guidelines find that the technology used by the industry varies too widely and changes too quickly to justify the proscription of specific technical standards, while the latter resolution imposes a mandatory requirement on flag states to ‘ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems’ no later than 1 January 2021 as part of their International Safety Management obligations under SOLAS (IMO, 2017). Port cybersecurity management, by contrast, is devolved to the national or regional level, through instruments such as the UK’s ‘Good Practice Guide [for] Cyber Security for Ports and Port Systems’ and the 2019 ‘Good practices for cybersecurity in the maritime sector’, issued by ENISA. Some countries also subsume ports under their broader ‘critical infrastructure’ cybersecurity policies, creating a ‘kaleidoscopic’ regulatory framework and vulnerabilities ripe for criminal exploitation according to some analysts (Ahokas et al, 2017; Cook, 2020: 53). When they do occur, cyber-​enabled crimes also raise multiple investigative and enforcement challenges, drawing further attention to the need for the complex crimes approach discussed earlier in this book. Such incidents require specialized and technical investigative skills that may only be available at

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the federal or national level (Leppänen and Kankaanranta, 2017), and some cyberattacks may appear to be human error or mechanical failure, meaning they may never be attributed to a cyber vulnerability. Cyber-​enabled crimes have also grown in sophistication, evidencing an active online marketplace offering ‘cybercrime-​as-​a-​service’, where criminal groups with traditional interests in the port can purchase malware or other services on a commercial basis from other criminals (Boyes, Isbell and Luck, 2020; Europol, 2020). The complexity of this marketplace further complicates the attribution of an attack to an individual, state actor or criminal group, confounding the traditional territorial limits of port policing (Brewer, 2014). In addition, the investigation of port-​target cyberattacks faces the same challenges as any transnational cybercrime investigation, including disparate national legal frameworks, the absence of standard international evidentiary requirements, and barriers to the timely collection, preservation and sharing of digital evidence between countries due to slow mutual legal assistance (UNODC, 2019). Finally, the public and private sectors face similar barriers to cooperation in achieving improved cybersecurity as they do in securing the physical port space. As observed in the physical policing of the port of Rotterdam, ‘indistinctness regarding the competences and responsibilities [of different actors] may lead to tensions … in turn leading to inefficient tackling of crime and security problems’ (De Boeck et al, 2014: 41). Moving forward, an effective port cybersecurity regime will require a shared understanding of the threat and baseline solutions to reach minimum standards (ENISA, 2019). Here too, there is a silo between private technology providers, policymakers and academics that must be bridged to produce open-​access knowledge on best cybersecurity practices and solutions for multiple types of port (Heilig and Voss, 2017; Reva, 2020). This speaks to the importance of innovation, as discussed in Chapter 1.

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Technology and corruption

As discussed here and in Chapter 2, another area of interest when discussing complex crimes is corruption. Port corruption is not static or homogenous, so we can expect different manifestations of corruption dependent on factors unique to different port environments. As with the rest of the port economy, corruption vulnerabilities emerge and perhaps fade away in response to economic, political, social and technological changes. Technology is a particularly significant driver in this respect because automation, digitization and surveillance have significantly reduced the ability of single individuals to exert significant control over events and processes within the port (Sergi, 2020b, 2020c). Simply put, common security system features such as digital ID cards, ANPR, CCTV surveillance and e-​tagged containers make it much harder for corrupt insiders or criminals to move around the port or guarantee certain actions can be executed. Digital record keeping, meanwhile, makes it harder to conduct certain actions without being monitored or leaving a trace. These technological checks and balances mean corrupt actors are increasingly sought out for their knowledge or intelligence about the intricacies of the port economy, as opposed to their ability to exert direct control within the port (Sergi and Storti, 2020; Sergi, 2020b, 2020c; Roks, Bisschop and Staring, 2020). One analysis of the port of Genoa in Italy concludes that today, ‘the challenge is not that port workers might steal or might facilitate drug importation in person and within port premises, but the opposite; the fear is that whoever works at the port knows the system enough to circumvent it’ (Sergi, 2020c: 13). This elevates the importance of understanding which tasks or processes, as opposed to job roles, titles or occupations, are most vulnerable to infiltration or abuse and suggests that organized crime groups may be increasingly likely to seek out office staff or previously irrelevant individuals for knowledge or oversight of how processes work in the port (Sergi, 2020c; Roks, Bisschop and Staring,

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2020). The value of this insider knowledge is increased through the outwardly obscure nature and constant transformation of the social, technological and procedural systems that govern the port (Easton, 2020). To an extent, the securitization of the port space discussed here has also displaced crime from the port itself. The same analysis of the port of Genoa finds that 24/​7 surveillance and increased automation has displaced organized crime from port facilities into the hinterland logistics chain, incentivizing traffickers to control, infiltrate, set up or exploit transport companies operating within and around the port to extract and access containers of interest (Sergi, 2020b). The same analysis finds that the port of Montreal’s fully automated container terminal has displaced criminal activity into the hinterland (Sergi, 2020b). Greater investigation into how criminal groups infiltrate the port supply chain is therefore essential to policing complex crime (Easton, 2020; Sergi and Storti, 2020). This is supported by the case studies discussed in Chapter 2, which demonstrate how an understanding of complex crime requires the analyst to look beyond individual acts of corruption inside the port to the infiltration of the port economy and the relationship between organized crime groups operating in the surrounding area. While the need for this broader approach is by no means entirely driven by the technological displacement of organized crime, technology does play a significant role. The transition to so-​called ‘smart ports’ that aim to achieve a fully digitized and completely traceable end-​to-​end supply chain is likely to exacerbate this displacement (Molavi, Lim and Race, 2019). These changing trends call for a more nuanced understanding of port corruption, particularly because many security actors remain heavily influenced by cultural depictions of mid-​century North American ports, where corruption was confined to certain types of workers, usually unionized and socially entrusting of one another (Sergi and Storti, 2020; Sergi, 2020c). Although it remains true that specific forms of

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corruption can have a symbiotic relationship with the organization of the port economy, the relationship between the system of representation of workers’ interests and the likelihood of infiltration by organized crime should not be assumed a priori (Sergi and Storti, 2020). Contemporary research instead suggests the issue of corruption should be approached as an understanding of ‘how several factors combine with each other to support infiltration by organized crime groups in specific local settings’ (Sergi and Storti, 2020: 9). Again, with some tasks more prone to automation or digital transformation than others, greater attention is required in the future to understand how changes in the labour market impact upon port security and ‘insider threats’ in practice (Jacobs, 2006; Easton, 2020; Eski, 2020). A more holistic approach to corruption in the port economy must also widen the net to include a broader range of downstream intermediaries such as financial institutions and other actors regulated under the global anti-​money laundering (AML) regime, including Designated Non-​Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) who provide services relied upon by the licit and illicit port economy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the financial aspects of organizational crimes and extra-​legal governance in port environments have received relatively little policy and academic attention compared to trafficking in physical goods, despite their essential role in port and border corruption (Moiseienko, Reid and Chase, 2020). It remains unclear, for example, how organized crime groups seek to use the services of DNFBPs, such as lawyers, accountants and auditors to infiltrate and reinvest criminal profits in the broader legal economy in and around the port (Sergi, 2020c), or why these actors cooperate with illegal demands (Lord, Wingerde and Campbell, 2018). As explored in Chapter 3, Easton’s (2020: 123) study of the holistic Stroomplan to combat cocaine trafficking through the port of Antwerp includes a financial disruption component, however, she describes the broader literature on this topic as an academic ‘wasteland’.

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Finally, as with cybersecurity, financial crime raises unresolved tensions in the extent to which the policing of port security is site-​specific activity and where responsibility lies for the investigation of the organizational crimes and extra-​legal governance activities presented in Chapter 2. Much like their cybercrime counterparts, qualified financial investigators are often in short supply at the local or regional level. Moreover, in many cases, the fear of ‘following the money’ and encountering high-​level corruption is a significant barrier to launching financial investigations at all. How to overcome these barriers remains an important avenue of policy-​focussed research in the future. Conclusion This chapter discussed emergent trends in port security and reinforced that the political economy approach proposed in this book provides a useful lens for exploring and evaluating how these forces will continue to shape port security in the future. It began by discussing the ‘long shadow’ of the ISPS Code and its treatment –​or lack thereof –​of organized crime as a port security priority, engaging with critiques of the politicization of the international regime and its failure to address local priorities. The ‘transit culture’ and ‘tenant mentality’ discussed in Chapter 3 means that some port security actors are far more preoccupied with formal, paper-​based compliance with the ISPS Code over actual results. This ideological engagement with the ISPS Code and regulatory regime may have a number of lessons for the emergent field of maritime-​ focussed capacity building initiatives moving forward, some of which appear to be surprisingly flexible in the way they approach security governance. The second half of the chapter discussed technology, digitization and automation as a challenge and opportunity for port security, including cybersecurity as an emergent threat, the changing nature of corruption vulnerabilities and the

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displacement of organized crime activities into the wider logistics supply chain and port-​city hinterland area. Infiltration of the legal economy cannot be achieved without reliance on a number of professional intermediaries outside the port, a relatively understudied aspect of port security. As with cybersecurity, financial crime brings into question unresolved tensions over the extent to which port security is site-​specific activity and where responsibility lies for tackling the organizational crimes and extra-​legal governance activities presented in Chapter 2. This speaks to the practical value of conceptual vocabulary and analytical tools such as ‘hybridity’ and ‘plural policing’ presented in Chapters 2 and 3. This aspect of port policing is likely to become increasingly relevant, especially where automation results in the ‘de-​peopling’ of the port environment by reducing demand for physical labour. Further exploration of the enforcement implications of these trends is a fruitful area for further interdisciplinary research across criminology, strategic studies, geography, sociology and anthropology. More targeted areas for future research are discussed in the conclusion to this book.

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One of the most fascinating things about researching ports and studying financial, social and human relations in and around port spaces is that ports are places on the edge (Weaver, 2020): the edge of the sea; the edge of the city; the edge of the coast; the edge of borders. As outlined in the introduction, ports sit at the intersection of the port-​city and land-​sea divide, occupying a quintessentially ‘liminal’ space where security issues cannot be understood and addressed as problems of the marine or hinterland environment alone (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Weaver, 2020). Sergi and Storti capture this sentiment in their concept of the port as a ‘duplex’ space, at once a ‘border space’ a ‘gate’, as well as a ‘space for global trade’ (Sergi and Storti, 2020). In this book, we refer to ports as ‘multivalent’ spaces to highlight how many different dimensions they occupy. The study of port security is the study of global economic opportunism, as much as it is the study of border controls and policing. Together, the themes discussed in this book bring into question the extent to which port security is a site-​specific, municipal, federal, national and even international security objective, a tension felt by the actors responsible for governing and policing them. Much of the research referenced in this

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book has been carried out in close collaboration with security professionals and law enforcement active in ports; the Secur. Port workshop, interviews with practitioners and all the other knowledge exchange events that the authors have organized and participated in are embedded in its findings and perspectives. In order to unpack all that this entails, each chapter in this book looked at various aspects of life, politics and economy in the port space. The book has taken a practical look at some of these junctures and the relationships that port spaces produce, blend and enrich across the port-​sea and port-​city interface. The result is a panacea of interdisciplinary discussions that all paint a complex –​and therefore fittingly non-​final –​picture. At the core of the analysis is global/​local tensions, which –​it has been argued throughout this book –​are forced together in port environments. As the nature of the port space and environment is necessarily glocal, each chapter has used different lenses to look at this glocal character of ports. Emerging themes from the book Chapter 1 applied several frameworks taken from economic sociology to explore the intersections between economy, society and institutions in port spaces. This broad analytical lens provided an interdisciplinary perspective on how informality and illegality emerges within ports. It argued that ports do not develop and mutate in a merely functionalist way, adapting to socio-​economic environments. Ports are instead just one of the factors shaping the environment in which they are located, on one side, and the ‘result’ of complex mixes of micro-​mechanisms, such as the logic of action of port actors of all kinds, and meso and macro factors, such as institutional frameworks, local and global economic trends, on the other hand. The glocal nature of ports lies at the intersection of these factors. Chapter 2 took this understanding of the complex mix of micro/​meso/​macro-​mechanisms and offered some reflections

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on the challenges of policing crime in the port space. It suggested that organized criminality, organizational crimes, infiltration and corruption on the waterfront and in/​through the port can be best understood as ‘complex crimes’, in as much as they involve different types of activities, more or less serious or harmful in nature and more or less local in reach. Complex criminality in and through ports follows the rules of the market, exploits the regulations of the port space and the relationships across different actors in that space. It is clear from the case studies examined in Chapter 2 that ports necessitate a hybrid form of policing, also glocal. The policing of complex crime is hybrid because it mixes low and high policing, with an increasing focus of national security and border control. The securitization of ports has brought heavier investments in high-​policing techniques. The conflation between policing and port/​maritime security is certainly one of the most significant effects of the securitization of (port) policing (Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016; Sergi, 2020a). Yet as this book makes clear, policing complex crime is not just a matter of intelligence-​led investigations, nor only a disruption exercise; it requires ad hoc and highly localized approaches to policing highly complex types of crimes. Such types of policing strategies might clash with –​and have to adapt to –​the highly localized nature of security networks. As presented in Chapter 3, port security requires cooperation across a considerable number of actors that can be identified as security ‘providers’. This presents several challenges, particularly because the actors involved operate according to different mindsets (economic/​trade, social, security, risk), which often conflict and undermine an integrated approach to a phenomenon. Port security actors must therefore differentiate and at the same time merge policing, trading and security efforts. If security happens mostly on the berths, policing happens around them, and trading must continue, all three have to work together, while still remaining clear on objectives and even more so on accountability.

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Chapter 3 therefore focussed on security actors themselves and various ‘assemblages’, fora and institutions that constitute security networks in different ports (Dinchel and Easton, 2021). These security networks are naturally local and contextualized, as they have to be in an attempt to be effective in the specific locations where they emerge and exist. Chapters 2 and 3 ultimately conclude that port policing requires several levels of analysis to understand complex enforcement responses across high and low policing. The port demands an appreciation of localized criminal markets in areas immediately surrounding the port, as well as the impact of political changes on opportunities to infiltrate the legal port economy (Sergi 2020b), and how each of these factors influence port-​specific vulnerabilities. For a successful glocal approach to port policing, a contextualized security approach needs to meet a global intelligence-​led approach to complex criminality (Easton, 2020). Although there is no linear relationship between complex crime groups operating within and surrounding the port (Sergi, 2020b), this book has drawn attention to the need to explore how the port shapes complex crime in the city and vice versa (Sergi, 2020b). For example, drug-importing organized crime groups operating in the cities of Genoa, Vancouver and New York City do not necessarily rely on their local ports, but often choose other ‘doors in’ depending on a number of different factors (Sergi, 2020b). The criminal landscape of the port and city may be more or less decoupled depending on the situation; as one city police force officer observes ‘criminal equilibrium in the port is more static [than the city]’, perhaps because it is a ‘gated territory in its own right’ (Sergi, 2020b: 11). As Chapter 4 outlined, the future of effective port security interventions that genuinely raise governance standards therefore appear to lie in an understanding of local not just global priorities (Moiseineko, Reid and Chase, 2020). Without this, it may be difficult to manage and construct ‘sensible port security’ objectives and procedures that go beyond tick-​box

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compliance (Eski, 2011: 427). This viewpoint is particularly relevant to growing ideological engagements with the international port security regime and the implications of a more critical approach for the emergent field of maritime capacity building. The chapter draws attention to the fact we should understand ports in their local and global economic setting and not fall into the trap of assuming all ports seek to develop from a primitive harbour to a global hub (Kanellopoulos, 2018). Scholars of port security have much to gain from embracing a ‘size does not matter’ approach, as discussed in the next section. Going forward: change and continuity No two ports are the same; they are the product of different economic, spatial, political, social, technological, cultural and military influences (Bichou, 2004). Ebbs and flows in these forces are reflected in the rise and fall of various ports since the ancient era. As a consequence, there is no universal experience of the dockworker, security professional or law enforcement agent assigned to the port. Greater emphasis on the diversity of individual settings does not, however, prohibit the development of lessons learned and best practices to guide effective security cooperation in the port space. For example, the multilevel and dynamic political economy approach used in this book can be useful to investigate ports against the backdrop of seismic contemporary shocks and events, not least the coronavirus pandemic, the trade dispute between the US and China and the aftermath of the UK’s exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’). These events have pushed ports to the forefront of public security debates. The coronavirus pandemic is a concrete case par excellence of shocking events. As noted in Chapter 1, the pandemic has reduced, at least in the short term, the volume of shipping trade and raised the uncertainty thresholds about the future. For social scientists, a virus is more than just a virus: its consequences are mediated by social and territorial variables.

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It is unclear what effect the coronavirus pandemic will have on the maritime economy. Some predict, for example, that an acceleration of the ‘Matthew effect’ will occur: large ports will become larger, while small and medium ports may scale down, thereby further concentrating policing and security activities in large ports. As a result, small and local ports may become more attractive for medium-​range illegal trades. Outside the port economy, it will also be interesting to observe how global networks trading in illegal goods change as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. New scholarship increasingly views these networks as polycentric and unstable relational structures, lacking in central direction (McCarthy-​Jones, Doyle and Turner, 2020). For drug trafficking, for example, it might be expected that local relational cliques emerge stronger, in which local dealers and sellers are connected through ‘strong ties’ and gravitate around smaller ports. This won’t necessarily sever other ‘weak ties’ with global producers, as local sellers might use other international routes of illegal goods. Second, the US and China trade dispute that began in 2018 can be seen as a case of geo-​economic conflict affecting –​and being affected by –​large cargo ports. Trade between the two superpowers considerably dropped from 46 per cent in 2018 to 42 per cent in 2019–​2020 (UNCTAD, 2019). Here the question is once again about what economic changes will follow. So far, global shippers and their employees have displayed agility and responsiveness to changes in global supply chains.1 It remains unclear, however, if the China-​US impasse will open space for new trade routes, an inclusive reorganization of maritime exchanges, regeneration, innovation, and innovative ways to (re)organize ports, or if the low road will prevail and working conditions, safety, and security will be ‘driven to the bottom’. Fortunately, science is not the land of hope; empirical research will provide answers to these questions. Third, a glocal approach to policing complex criminality in ports will be tested in the aftermath of ‘Brexit’ since 1 January 2021. Brexit affects not only trade and customs regulations,

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but also industries’, networks’ and individuals’ behaviours. A certain level of informality might be expected post-​Brexit, as many seek to rely on the existing practices, relations and contacts that they used before, albeit informally. Loopholes in regulations, as well as abrupt changes in customs requirements and opportunities, will affect everything from supply chains, to shipping and freight forwarding, and this in turn will undoubtedly affect illicit trade and criminality behind/​around ports. While it is too early to identify how Brexit will unfold, there are four key areas in demand of further scrutiny in relation to ports and crime. First, the creation of new borders at sea will expand the remit of policing criminality in ports perhaps also to include maritime crimes and other ‘blue’ crimes as well, such as IUU fishing and waste dumping (Bueger and Edmunds, 2020). Second, one might expect security performance gaps between larger commercial ports and other/​smaller ones in the UK, as small ports will be tasked with further security requirements more than ever before. On the one end, this might lead to greater and more diverse opportunities for illicit trade (inbound and outbound), smuggling and corruption; on the other end, if this leads to more policing and security efforts in large ports, small ports might become more attractive for illicit trade (as mentioned previously). Third, and perhaps the best anticipated of these threats, the different customs regimes between Northern Ireland’s ports and other UK ports might lead to displacement of criminal activities –​and more criminal opportunities –​on the Irish border and in Irish ports as well. Finally, the introduction of liberally regulated freeports, and the private nature of most ports in the UK, represent a significant obstacle to the effectiveness of multi-​agency strategies when countering complex criminality in the port space after Brexit. Yet despite these shifting sands, many of the issues examined in this book will remain the same and further research has much to offer to academics and practitioners alike. Many research gaps are ripe for investigation, not least i) broader perspectives on flows and their impact on port security by research in countries

140

Conclusion

of origin, transit and destination; ii) the impact of violence and crime related to the port space from a port-​city interface perspective; iii) new security networks yet to be subjected to social network or other analysis; iv) investigations of how accountability can be achieved in multi-​nodal security assemblages; v) comparative research on the links between hybridity of port space and the security governance arrangements in these ports; and vi) the need to determine if networking between public and private security providers has an impact on displacement of crime between ports worldwide. Clearly, security governance in ports is a rich and evolving field, full of discussions and complexities yet to be disentangled. In particular, the port-​city interface has been identified as a crucial –​but underexplored –​element of port governance. As Chapter 4 suggests, future research should also focus on a wider range of downstream intermediaries in the city that have an impact on port economy and management as well. This includes financial institutions and other actors regulated under the global AML regime, particularly those who provide professional services relied upon by the licit and illicit port economy. As raised throughout this book, the financial aspects of organizational crimes and extra-​legal governance in port environments have received relatively little policy and academic attention compared to trafficking in physical goods (Moiseienko, Reid and Chase, 2020). It also extends to understanding the possible role of neglected nodes such as insurance companies or companies outside of the port that have a direct impact on security governance. Finally, a fruitful perspective on this for any future research in this field can be picked up from the Evolving Securities Initiative (ESI –​ https://​evolvingsecuritiesinitiative.com). This initiative, led by Professor Clifford Shearing, triggers us to think about three new lenses: the New Planet, due to climate change and its implications worldwide; the New Human, related to new interfaces between humans and technologies; and the Digital World, inspired by developments such as big data,

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algorithms and artificial intelligence. These changes present new harmscapes, challenging traditional sources of resilience developed at the individual, community, government and corporate level. Ultimately, critical infrastructure is important because it is interlinked with the protection of vital flows such as water, electricity, gas, goods, people, money and information in our societies. Ports, after all, are just one example of a hub in a multitude of flows. No doubt, port security will continue to rise in importance from a scholarly perspective.

142

Notes Chapter 1  1

2

3

4

5

See Main Maritime Shipping Routes [online]. Available from: https:// ​ p orteconomicsmanagement.org/​ ? page_​ i d=325 [Accessed December 2020]. The 80/​20 rule or Pareto principle states that 20 per cent of a specific universe controls roughly 80 per cent of all resources. Several social phenomena have shown to be characterized by a similar uneven distribution. For instance, the richest 20 per cent of the world population produce and own 80 per cent of the whole wealth. Isomorphism is the process through which organizations operating in the same economic sector become increasingly similar over time (Farquharson, 2018). There are three types of isomorphism: i) mimetic, which is about the tendency of organizations to model themselves on others; ii) normative, which is the tendency for organizations to become similar according to the pressure of social norms that legitimate some ways of doing business and not others; and iii) coercive, which relates to the tendency of organizations to be similar in response to formal requirements delivered by the law (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983). Caporalato is an illegal form of job placement in which a broker (caporale) helps someone find a job –​usually an underpaid and temporary job –​ asking in exchange to obtain part of the salary. How the U.S.-​China Trade Dispute Has Affected U.S. Containerized Imports in 2019, by Orku Gonen [online]. Available from: https://​www. morethanshipping.com/h ​ ow-t​ he-u ​ -s​ -c​ hina-t​ rade-d​ ispute-​has-​affected-​ u-​s-​containerized-​imports-​in-​2019/​ [Accessed January 2021].

Chapter 2  1

Manotti, F. (2019) ‘Artabaz Investigation’, 6th Intersessional meeting of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) [online].

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2

3

4 5 6 7 8

9

10

11

12

13

Available from: https://​www.unodc.org/​documents/​hlr//​follow-​up-​ process/2​ 019-t​ hematic-​discussions/​16-​October/​panellists/A ​ RTABAZ_​ INVESTIGATION_​ by_​ F ederico_​ M ANOTTI.pdf [Accessed 6 January 2021]. Australian Border Force (2017) ‘International Drug Syndicate Disrupted by Seven Arrests in Melbourne’, 30 June [online]. Available from: https://​ newsroom.abf.gov.au/​releases/​international-​drug-​syndicate-​disrupted-​ by-​seven-​arrests-​in-​melbourne [Accessed 7 January 2021]. Originally, waterfront task forces were set up in Brisbane (Jericho), Sydney (Polaris) and Melbourne (Trident). Only Trident still exists, with funding extended in 2016 (without the Australian Federal Police). See Australian Border Force (2016) ‘Trident Task Force Funding Extended’, 16 February [online]. Available from: https://​newsroom.abf.gov.au/​ releases/t​ rident-t​ ask-f​ orce-f​ unding-e​ xtended [Accessed 7 January 2021]. DPP (Cth) v. Brown [2017] VSCA 162; The Queen v. McCraw [2011] NSWCCA 162. The Queen v. Pham [2015] HCA 39; The Queen v. Tang [2012] VSCA 101. R v. Nguyen; R v. Pham [2010] NSWCCA 238; (2010) 205 A Crim R 106. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. American Stevedoring, Inc., Plaintiff V. –​International Longshoremen’s Association [2013] Case 1:13-​cv-​00918-​UA, United States District Court Southern District Of New York. American Stevedoring, Inc., Plaintiff V. –​International Longshoremen’s Association [2015], Order of Discontinuance [online]. Available from: https://​ w ww.cour tlistener.com/ ​ r ecap/​ g ov.uscour ts. nysd.407617.105.0.pdf [Accessed 7 January 2021]. American Stevedoring, Inc., Plaintiff V. –​International Longshoremen’s Association [2013] Case 1:13-​cv-​00918-​UA, United States District Court Southern District Of New York. United States of America v. ISA, Case 1:13-​cv-​00918-​KPF, ‘Exhibit 2’ [online]. Available from: https://​www.courtlistener.com/​recap/​gov. uscourts.nysd.407617.1.2.pdf [Accessed 6 January 2021]. Guardia di Finanza, ‘Operazione Dama Nera 2–​1 9 arrestati tra imprenditori, professionisti, dirigenti e funzionari di Anas S.p.A.’, 11 March [online]. Available from: http://​www.gdf.gov.it/​stampa/​ultime-​ notizie/​anno-​2016/​marzo/​operazione-​dama-​nera-​2-​19-​arrestati-​tra-​ imprenditori-p​ rofessionisti-d​ irigenti-e​ -f​ unzionari-d​ i-a​ nas-​s.p.a [Accessed 7 January 2021]. Formerly an acronym for Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade (National Autonomous Roads Corporation), ANAS is an Italian

144

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14

15

16

17

government-​owned company deputed to the construction and maintenance of Italian motorways. Preve, M. (2020) ‘Appalti in porto assolti due ex dirigenti di palazzo San Giorgio’, la Repubblica Corte di Appello di Genova, sentenza Andrea Pieracci 28.02.2017. United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael Coppola, Defendant-​ Appellant [2011], Docket No. 10-​0065-​Cr. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Tribunale di Palmi, Proc. Penn. N. 290/​98 + N. 35/​96 + 84/​97 R.G.N.R. D.D.A + 239/​99 R.G.Trib. Sentence no.436/​2000 on the 23.05.2000, Operation Porto. Guardia di Finanza, ‘Operazione “Waterfront” –​Appalti pilotati per agevolare la ‘Ndrangheta’, 28 May 2020 [online]. Available from: http://​ www.gdf.gov.it/s​ tampa/​ultime-​notizie/​anno-​2020/​maggio/o ​ perazione-​ waterfront-​appalti-​pilotati-​per-​agevolare-​la-​ndrangheta [Accessed 7 January 2021]. Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Reggio Calabria Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia. Proc. n. 1120/​2017 R.G.N.R. DDA Richiesta per l’applicazione di Misure Cautelari Personali + Richiesta di Sequestro Preventivo per Equivalente, Operation Waterfront.

Chapter 3  1

2 3 4

5

6

Ghent University and Evolving Securities Initiative Workshop, ‘Governance of Flows: Security Provision in Ports’, 30 April 2019 [online]. Available from: https:// ​ evolvingsecuritiesinitiative.files. wordpress.com/​2019/​08/​how-​do-​things-​flow-​esi-​highlights-​3.pdf [Accessed 12 January 2021]. Dr Julie Berg is a senior lecturer in criminology at the School of Social and Political Sciences, and Associate Director of the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR) at the University of Glasgow. As the area of security governance is brimming with discussion, we adopt a pragmatic approach here in delimiting the field. This is different to the concept of hybridity discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter focusses on the Port of Antwerp facing the city of Antwerp, not the Waasland port, another part of the Port of Antwerp, which is differently organized. ‘Summary Remarks from Governance of Flow workshop’, 30 April –​1 May 2019 [online]. Available from: https://​evolvingsecuritiesinitiative. com/ ​ 2 019/ ​ 0 7/ ​ 2 4/​ s ummary-​ remarks-​ f rom-​ g overnance-​ o f-​ f low-​ workshop-​esibne-​30-​apr-​01-​may-​2019/​ [Accessed 14 January 2021]. The ‘Stroomplan’ is a multi-​agency initiative launched in 2018 to provide a policy and operational response to the increasing problem of cocaine

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7

8 9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

smuggling and trafficking through the port of Antwerp. See Easton (2020) and the following for further analysis. See Easton (2020) and the 2019–​2020 ‘De Cokelijnen’, series published by newspaper De Tijd [online]. Available from: https://​www.tijd.be/​ dossiers/​de-​cokelijnen.html [Accessed 14 January 2021]. Cepa is the private employers’ organization of the cargo handlers and dockworkers of the port of Antwerp. This was done via Alfaport Voka, the platform for companies and professional associations from the port of Antwerp within Voka, Chamber of Commerce Antwerp-​Waasland. DePuydt, P. and Bové L. (2020) ‘Ik ben de hypocrisie over cocaïne kotsbeu’, interview with Mayor of the City of Antwerp Bart De Wever, 11 December [online]. Available from: https://​www.tijd.be/​dossiers/​ de-​cokelijnen.html [Accessed 14 January 2021]. ‘About PASSAnT’ [online]. Available from: https://​www.passant.info/​ en/​[Accessed 14 January 2021]. Kathy Dua supervised the proper implementation of the ISPS-​Code at terminals in the port of Antwerp. Her team carries out inspections, plays an active role in security exercises, stimulates the flow of incident reporting and creates security awareness. In addition, she also manages and maintains the general Port Security Plan and coordinates the Port Information Network. The New Human as defined by the Evolving Securities Initiative refers to ‘Our third transformation is all about the new emerging Human Capacities, focusing on humans and their assemblages with other earthlings, what we refer to as techno-​humans, whereby we physically converge with technologies and explore the new harmscapes brought about by this convergence.’ See https://​evolvingsecuritiesinitiative.com/​ new-​worlds/​. See what preceded. Stanny De Vlieger was the initiator of the Stroomplan dealing with the trafficking of cocaine through the Port of Antwerp (Easton, 2020). The New Digital Age as defined by the Evolving Securities Initiative refers to ‘Data streams that run through the digital networks, and the algorithms that analyse these masses of data, now constitute the information armature indispensable for the functioning of complex societies. The economic and social benefits of the Digital Revolution are accompanied by new harmscapes, new forms of delinquency and attacks against critical infrastructure.’ See https://​evolvingsecuritiesinitiative.com/​new-​worlds/​. Clifford Shearing is the initiator of the Evolving Securities Initiative located at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia.

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Notes 17

‘Summary Remarks from Governance of Flow workshop’, 30 April to 1 May 2019 [online]. Available from: https://e​ volvingsecuritiesinitiative. com/ ​ 2 019/ ​ 0 7/ ​ 2 4/​ s ummary-​ remarks-​ f rom-​ g overnance-​ o f-​ f low-​ workshop-​esibne-​30-​apr-​01-​may-​2019/​ [Accessed 14 January 2021].

Chapter 4  1

See Chapter 3 for a summary of the ISPS Code.

Conclusion 1

See Orku Gonen ‘How the U.S.-​China Trade Dispute Has Affected U.S. Containerized Imports in 2019’ [online]. Available from: https://​www. morethanshipping.com/h ​ ow-t​ he-u ​ -s​ -c​ hina-t​ rade-d​ ispute-​has-​affected-​ u-​s-​containerized-​imports-​in-​2019 [Accessed 6 January 2021].

147

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175

Index automation  29, 123–​32 ‘available’ workers  61

A abuse of office  65 accountability  85, 103–​7, 136 Adewumni, I. J.  106, 113 administration models  36, 37–​8 Africa  25, 106, 113, 117, 118, 126 African Union’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy  118 algorithms  142 American Stevedoring Inc. (ASI)  63–​4 Americanization  115 ‘amicable settlements’  65 ANPR (automatic number plate recognition) technology  88, 129 anti-​money laundering (AML)  131, 141 Antonopoulos, C.  50, 112 Antwerp, Belgium cybersecurity  125 drug trafficking  58, 74, 87, 88–​9, 93, 96–​7, 105 growth of city around port  33, 56 private security  90 security governance  95–​6 Stroomplan  90, 96, 131 technology  101 artificial intelligence  142 Artificial Neural Networks  20 Asia  25, 48, 113, 117 see also China Atkinson, C.  54 Australia  59–​60, 89, 100, 125

B back office workers  9, 94, 129 barriers, ports as  3 Bateman, T.  125 Beck, U.  79 Belgian Innovation Network for Security, Iungos  1 Belgian Vias Institute  1 belonging-​g roups  31 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China  87 BENTAR  95 Ben-​Yehoyada, N.  17 Berg, J.  78–​9, 84, 85 Bichou, K.  40, 105, 127, 138 big data  126, 141 BIMCO (Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships)  127 biometrics  9 Bisschop, L.  10, 50, 73, 86, 94, 106, 108, 113, 129 blackmail  10 see also extortion blockchain  126 Blue Economy  118 Blue Growth Strategy (EU)  118 Boltanski, L.  35 border agents  66 border forces  7, 73 see also policing border security, port security reduced to  7

177

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border zones, ports as  3, 55, 56, 134 borders at sea  140 Bottalico, A.  23, 25, 39 Bourdieu, P.  95 Boutellier, H.  86 box-​ticking exercises  11, 12, 120, 137 Braithwaite, J.  81 Brewer, R.  13, 55, 77, 86, 94–​5, 100, 128, 136 Brexit  139–​40 bribery  8, 47, 65, 67, 112 Bright, D.  100 Brisbane, Port of, Australia  89 Brodeur, J. P.  53, 54, 67, 82, 83, 84 Bueger, C.  3, 86, 116, 119, 120, 122, 134, 140 Bull, M.  53, 82 bureaucracy  103, 113 Burris, S.  83

Cocaine Route Programme  117 cocaine trafficking  58–​60, 70, 87, 91, 98, 117 codes of conduct  12–​13 collusion  66, 67 Colman, C.  86, 96 Colona, F.  84 competition, inter-​port  26–​9, 30, 39, 42, 48 complex criminality  50–​73, 100, 130, 136, 137, 140 complex governance structures  5–​7 compliance  43–​4, 47, 107–​8, 113–​15, 117, 120 concentration in global maritime trade  25, 26, 27, 48 Confederation of European Security Services  96 confidentiality  6, 72, 74 conflicts of interest  67 connected ports  23–​4, 27–​8, 31 consortia  65 Container Control Program (CCP)  117 Container Security Initiative  115 ContainerComm  117 containerized trade container shipping companies  41 cybersecurity  124–​5 drug trafficking  61 human trafficking  92–​3 statistics on quantity of sea trade  20, 25 strains on  22–​3 technique of containerization  41 top ten container ports  27 continuity of business  7 contraband goods  50 contracts  65, 66, 70, 74 controlled areas  112 see also fences/​walls; surveillance conventions  35 Cools, M.  86 cooperation  5–​7, 23, 30, 74, 96–​7, 110, 113, 116–​17, 122–​3, 128 coopetition  30

C Calata Bettolo, Genoa  64–​5 Canada  46, 59, 60 Caneppele, S.  51 capacity, increasing port  22–​3 capacity building initiatives 116–​21, 138 capitalism  21, 22, 37, 39, 46, 115 Carpenter, A.  8, 12, 55, 80, 104, 112, 115 Castells, M.  56, 81, 82 CCTV  88, 129 chains of production  28–​9 checkers  39 Cheng, M. C.  33 Chilaka, E.  112 China  22, 30, 48, 87, 139 chokepoints  26 city-​port interface see port-​city interface city-​sea interface  13 civic conventions  35, 37, 39 civil society  33, 37

178

INDEX

coordinated market economies (CMEs)  21–​2, 46 coronavirus pandemic  20–​1, 48, 93–​4, 138–​9 corporate crimes  52, 56, 74 see also organizational crimes; white-​collar crime corruption anti-​corruption policies and procedures  11 back office workers  9, 94, 129 blind zones  10–​12 complex criminality  52 cybersecurity  9, 124–​8 deterring systemic  11 financial investigators  132 ‘fisheries crime’  114 high policing  56 integrated ports  29 and the ISPS Code  112 of law enforcement officers  73 local social acceptability of  12 policing mindsets  93 port workers  9, 48, 51, 61, 100, 129 public sector priorities  7 in supply chains  66 systemic  74 and technology  129–​32 and workforce tensions  8 Counter Piracy Programme  117 counter-​terrorism  54, 121 Cowen, D.  8 Cox, M.  119 Crawford, A.  85 crime prevention  53, 112 CRIMSON EU Maritime Security Programming  116 critical infrastructure  8, 90, 127, 142 Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) Programme  116 cross-​border policing  62, 117 Cuesta-​Fernandez, I.  115 customs  41, 140 cybersecurity  9–​10, 124–​8

D Daggett, Harold  64 Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania  115 dark networks  100 Darwin, J.  78, 86 data sharing  6 see also information sharing De Boeck, A.  6, 79, 86, 128 De Conning, E.  114 De Koster, M.  86, 91 De Pauw, E.  55 De Vlieger, Stanny  90, 91, 102 Della Porta, D.  51, 75 Demeri, M. J.  51 Denney, L.  119 deregulation  8, 22, 39 Designated Non-​Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)  131 development aid  119 digitization  98–​9, 101, 123–​32 Dinchel, E.  6, 51, 86, 89–​90, 95, 109, 110, 137 displacement of crime from port itself  130 Djankov, S.  9 Djbouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)  116, 123 dockworkers  38–​9, 45, 93–​4 doors, ports as  3, 5, 49, 87, 117 Dover Strait  26 drug trafficking Antwerp  58, 74, 87, 88–​9, 93, 96–​7, 105 cocaine trafficking  58–​60, 70, 87, 91, 98, 117 complex criminality  50, 58–​63, 137 ‘fisheries crime’  114 Genoa  105 hybrid space  87–​8 information sharing  98 mindsets  93 networks  100 plural policing  91 port-​city interface  12

179

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

regulation  105 security sector reform (SSR)  116–​17 small and informal ports  122 technological solutions  99 technology and corruption  129 dry cargo  20 dry ports  23, 25, 29, 41 Dua, Kathy  101 Ducruet, C.  57 Dupont, B.  82, 94 Dutch Institute of Technology  1

explosives  99 extortion  8, 10, 47, 56, 64, 69, 70 extra-​legal governance  8, 44–​5, 51, 68–​73, 75, 131, 141

F FAO (UN Office on Food and Agriculture Organization)  114, 116 fences/​walls  88, 99 Fijnaut, C.  86 financial crimes  141 financial investigators  132 financial professions  131 ‘fisheries crime’  114 fishing  114, 140 flows  15, 17–​18, 26, 57, 81–​2, 86–​91, 138, 142 forced labour  114 foreign direct investment (FDI)  30 fraud  64, 69 freeports  140

E Easton, M.  3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 51, 53, 55, 78, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 95, 98, 100, 105, 108, 109, 110, 112, 130, 131, 137 economic diversification  33 economic sociology  17–​18, 19–​29 EDI (electronic data interchange)  99 Edmunds, T.  3, 86, 116, 120, 134, 140 emergency situations  79 ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity)  124, 127, 128 entry and exit, ports offer both  2–​3 environment of ports  34–​42 environmental conventions  35, 39 environmental racism  114 Erikson, E.  27 ESI (Evolving Securities Initiative)  141–​2 Eski, Y.  7, 8, 12, 13, 29, 40, 50, 55, 77, 80, 86, 95, 98, 104, 107, 112, 113, 115, 120, 136, 138 e-​tagging  129 EU (European Union)  1, 39, 116, 117, 118 European Commission  118 European Investigative Orders  59 European Parliament  32 e-​waste  94, 106 Expertise France  1

G gates, ports as  3, 117, 134 Genoa, Italy  33, 58–​9, 64–​5, 87–​8, 105, 112–​13, 129, 137 ‘gentleman’s agreements’  67 Ghana  113, 115 Ghent University  1 Gilleir, F.  86, 92 Gioia Tauro  70 global cities  33 global concerns  3–​4, 5 global logistics  115 globalization  19, 21, 25, 48, 81 glocalism  3–​4, 5, 49, 53, 77–​8, 108, 120, 135–​40 GMCP (Global Maritime Crime Programme)  117 Goldthorpe, J.  19 Gould, A.  86, 106–​7 governance bodies  36 complex governance structures  5–​7

180

INDEX

conclusions on  140–​1 extra-​legal governance  8, 44–​5, 51, 68–​73, 75, 131, 141 local-​global interface  137–​8 multi-​lateral governance  34 multi-​level governance  34, 52 networks  82 nodal governance  83, 91–​4, 108, 109 political economy of port security  29–​34 security  78–​110 see also regulation government (definition of term)  82 Granovetter, M.  17 ‘green lines’  61 Greenberg, A.  125 Greenberg, M. D.  112 Gregson, N.  115 ‘guests’  5 Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships (BIMCO)  127 Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management and Resolution (MSC)  127 Gulf of Guinea  117

Holley, C.  79 Hong Kong  33 Hönke, J.  115 Hoogenboom, B.  86 Hopper, S.  43, 44 Huang, K.  87 hubs, ports as  17, 25, 26, 108, 142 human rights  92 human trafficking  92–​3, 99, 116–​17, 122 Huybrechts, M.  5 hybrid governance  84–​5 hybrid policing  7, 53–​6, 74–​6, 84, 121, 133, 136 hybrid roles  49 hybrid space  85, 86–​91 hyperconnectivity  90

I Ibrahimi, K.  23 IDC (International Dockworkers Council)  39 ILA (International Longshoremen Association)  45, 47, 63, 64, 68 illegal immigrants  92 see also human trafficking illegal nodes  100, 102 immigrant workers  45 IMO (International Maritime Organization)  40, 103, 115, 125, 127 Improving Port Security in West and Central Africa (WECAPs)  1, 117 incentives to crime, reducing  11 industrial conventions  35 infiltration and deregulation  8 financial professions  131 organized crime  45, 47, 51, 52, 63–​8, 74, 93 and technology  124, 129, 131 informal ports  121–​3 informality  42–​8 informants  101 Information Fusion Centre (IFC)  123

H hackers  10, 125 Haenlein, C.  114 Hall, P. A.  21, 46 Hamburg, Germany  33, 95, 115 Hammani, S.  20 Hanlon, J.  121, 122 harm reduction  53 harmscapes  78–​9 health insurance  46 Heilig, L.  98–​9, 123, 126, 128 high policing  53–​6, 62–​3, 72, 73, 75, 76, 136 hinterland organization  23 see also port-​city interface hiring procedures  11 Hlali, A.  20 Hochstetler, A.  52

181

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

information sharing  6, 9, 62–​3, 74, 95, 97–​8, 117, 122–​3 Information Sharing Centre of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)  123 Information Sharing Centres  6, 123 infrastructure development  87, 118, 126 inland ports  23 innovation  29–​31, 98, 128, 139–​40 insider knowledge  66, 130 insider threats  9–​10, 131 inspiration conventions  35 institutional change  43 integrated ports  23–​4, 27–​8 intelligence-​led policing  6, 62, 66–​7, 74, 100, 136, 137 interconnections  21, 27–​8, 31–​2, 37, 48, 96, 116 interdependency  19 International Committee of Maritime Security (MARSEC)  95 international labour divide  27–​8 International Safety Management  127 international waters  106–​7 international worker coordination  39 internet of things (IoT)  99, 126 Interpol  116 intimidation  68 investigations, difficulties in  7, 10, 72, 74, 127–​8 investments  40, 51, 59, 131 IOFMC (Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime)  117 isolated ports  23–​4 ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility Security) Code  12, 40–​1, 80, 95, 103–​5, 112–​23 IT systems  124–​8 see also cybersecurity

IT workers  94 IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing  114, 116, 140

J Jacobs, J. B.  8, 32, 45–​6, 47, 51, 53, 71, 131 Jaffe, R.  84 Jancsics, D.  10 ‘Jeddah Amendment  116 Joint Maritime Control Units  117 Jones, M.  118 jurisdictional overlap  6, 40–​1

K Kanellopoulos, J.  53, 122, 138 Kenis, P.  97 Khaslavskaya, A.  23 Kirby, S.  11 Kostakos, P. A.  50, 112 Kraska, J.  104, 112, 121, 122 Kratzer, J.  31

L labour disputes  39 labour racketeering  45–​6, 64 labour-​intensive working conditions  8 landlord ports  5, 37–​8, 88–​9 law enforcement agencies information sharing  6, 7 international regulation  13 specialist cyber crime agencies  10 specialist organized crime agencies  40–​1 see also policing leases  5, 38 Leloup, P.  86, 91 Leong, A.  51 liberal market economies (LMEs)  21–​2, 38, 46, 75 Lillie, N.  39 liminality  3, 17, 49, 134

182

INDEX

Liverpool, UK  88, 113 Loader, I.  53, 82 loan-​sharking  63, 64 local ownership  120 local port authorities  40 local production systems, connection to  23–​5, 29 local-​global interface  57–​73, 122, 137–​8 see also glocalism logistics  37, 115, 124, 126, 130 Long Island, USA  95 Lord, N.  131 Löw, M.  73 Low, S.  88 low policing  54–​5, 73–​4, 75, 76, 136 Lowe, D.  68 low-​skilled workforces  8 Lupo, S.  45

migration  45, 92–​3, 122 mindsets  91–​3, 113 Moiseienko, A.  51, 92, 113, 120, 131, 137, 141 Molavi, A.  130 money laundering  12, 51, 52, 59, 114, 131 monopoly profits  71 Montreal, Canada  88, 113, 130 movement restrictions  112 Müller, R.  124, 125 multi-​actor relationships  17–​18 multi-​lateral governance  34 multi-​level governance  34, 52 multinationals  4 multivalent spaces, ports as  3–​4, 5, 49, 89, 134

N National Geospatial Intelligence Agency  37–​8 national security interests  55 Nee, V.  43, 44 neoliberalism  115 network analysis  27, 30–​1, 83, 94–​5, 100–​1 New York/​New Jersey Port Authority  40, 45, 47, 63, 68, 88, 97, 137 new-​institutionalist perspectives  35 Ng, A. K.  17 NGOs (non-​governmental organizations)  34 Nigeria  112, 113 nodal governance  83, 91–​4, 108, 109 nodes in global production networks  28 Nøkleberg, M.  86, 89 Nordstrom, C.  51 Norrington-​Davies, G.  119 Northern Ireland  140 Notteboom, T.  26, 38

M mafia  45, 46, 65, 68, 70–​3, 75–​6, 87–​8 Magellan Passage  26 mala futura  67 Marcuse, P.  85 Maritime Silk Road  87 market conventions  35 market economies typology 21–​2, 46 Marks, P.  86 MARSEC (International Committee of Maritime Security)  95 mass private properties  85 McCarthy-​Jones, A.  139 McNicholas, M.  13 MDA (maritime domain awareness)  122–​3 Medcenter Container Terminal (MCT)  70 megacities  32–​3 Melbourne, Australia  59–​60, 95 Meyer-​Larsen, N.  124, 125 Michelfelder, I.  31 micro-​regulation  35

O Oceania  25

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office workers  9, 94, 129 Okafor-​Yarwood, I.  106, 113 Operation Afloat  59–​60 Operation Artabaz  58 Operation Dama Nera  65 Operation Porto  70–​1 Operation Waterfront  71 opinion conventions  35 organizational crimes  51, 52, 63–​8, 74, 131, 141 organized crime complex criminality  50–​3 cybersecurity  9–​10, 124–​8 drug trafficking  58–​63 extra-​legal governance  51 and human capital  10 infiltration  45, 47, 51, 52, 63–​8, 74, 93 and the ISPS Code  112 mafia  45, 46, 65, 68, 70–​3, 75–​6, 87–​8 policing between local and global  56–​73 and politics  47 port workers  9, 48, 51, 61, 100, 129 securitization  55 security sector reform (SSR)  116 small and informal ports  121–​2 technology and corruption  129–​32 and trade unions  8, 10, 45–​7, 51, 68–​9, 71, 75, 94 trade versus security  8 vulnerability of certain employees  11 Ostend, Belgium  88, 92–​3 outbound trafficking  113

PASSAnT project  1, 99 path dependency  21, 26–​7, 37 patronage  47 Pedrozo, R.  104, 112, 121, 122 Penna, S.  11 pension funds  46 perimeters  105, 112–​13 see also fences/​walls peri-​urban territorial settings  37 personnel data  7 Peters, E.  8, 45, 46, 47 phishing  125, 126 piracy  116, 117 planning  33–​4 plural policing  53, 82, 91–​4, 133 pluralization  82, 94, 108 policing complex criminality  49–​77 conclusions on  135–​6 counter-​terrorism  54 extra-​legal governance  68–​73 high policing  53–​6, 62–​3, 72, 73, 75, 76, 136 hybrid policing  7, 53–​6, 74–​6, 84, 89, 121, 133, 136 infiltration  63–​8 intelligence-​led policing  6, 62, 66–​7, 74, 100, 136, 137 investigations  7, 10, 72, 74, 127–​8 between local and global dimensions  56–​73 low policing  54–​5, 73–​4, 75, 76, 136 mindsets  91–​3 outbound vessels  113 plural policing  53, 82, 91–​4, 133 security actors  40–​1, 80 security sector reform (SSR)  117 social capital  95 specialist organized crime agencies  57, 62 political economy of port security  18, 19–​21, 29–​34, 111, 119, 138 polycentric systems  84, 139 Ponsaers, P.  54, 86

P Pallis, A.  47 Panama Canal  26 pandemic  20–​1, 48, 93–​4, 138–​9 Pape, M.  32, 33 paperless systems  98–​9 partnerships  84

184

INDEX

Port and Air Cargo Control Units  117 port authorities  5, 7, 38, 39–​40 port economics  5, 17 Port Information Network (PIN)  95 port-​city interface capacity building initiatives  120 complex criminality  137 governance  29–​34, 87, 134, 141 liminality  3 policing  52–​3, 56, 57, 71, 74 poorly addressed in security regimes  12–​13 relations between security providers in ports  98, 108 unexplored element of governance  134, 141 ports within global and local economic circuits  19–​29 port-​sea interface  3, 12–​13, 74, 87, 108, 120, 134 power networks  67, 86, 90 Prabheesh, K. P.  20 privacy  6, 98 private actors  36 private companies  5–​7, 80 private security  7, 89–​90 private service port  37–​8 private spaces with public access  85 privatization  7–​8, 29, 37–​8, 54, 82 Project Kraken  121–​2 Provan, K. G.  97 PSMA (Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing)  114 public service ports  37–​8 public/​private relationship  4, 6–​7, 84–​5, 96–​7, 99–​100, 102

R racketeering  45–​6, 64, 69 railway infrastructure  23 ransomware  124–​5 rational choice  11 ReCAAP (Information Sharing Centre of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia)  123 reciprocity  31, 114 recreational facilities  56 regeneration  32–​3, 56 regulation and the coronavirus pandemic  48 cybersecurity  127 definition  81 freeports  140 importance of  103–​7, 109–​10 international regulation  12 and the ISPS Code  112–​23 micro-​regulation  35 political economy of port security  29–​34 regulatory oversight  7 types of market economies  21 Reid, A.  51, 86, 118 relational infrastructures  28 Reniers, G.  86 reputation  8 Research Foundation Flanders  1 residential zones  56, 88 resource allocation  22 retail zones  56 Reva, D.  118, 125, 126, 128 rip-​off schemes  112 rip-​on schemes  112 risk assessments  11, 40–​1, 62–​3, 117 risk management  80 risk mitigation  40 Rodrigue, J. P.  38 Roks, R.  10, 50, 73, 86, 106, 129

Q quasi-​government organizations  34

185

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

Roso, V.  22, 23, 24, 25, 123 Rotterdam, Netherlands  30, 33, 95, 98, 115, 128 RUSI (Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies)  1

Senarak, C.  125, 126 Sequeira, S.  9 Sergi, A.  3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 86, 87, 88, 91, 97, 100, 104, 105, 112, 113, 115, 117, 122, 129, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137 service ports  37–​8 Shearing, C.  83, 85, 86, 107, 141 Shenzhen  30 SHOC (Strategic Hub for Organised Crime Research)  1 Shortland, A.  18 Shover, N.  52 Silver, J.  118 situational crime prevention  11, 112 Sluis, A.  86 small and informal ports  121–​3, 138, 139, 140 smart procedures  98–​9, 126, 130 Smith, A.  50 smuggling  50 social capital  95 social engineering attacks  126 social network theory  27, 30–​1, 94–​5, 100–​1 socialist market economies  22 sociology of ports  2–​4 soft infrastructures  99 SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) Convention  103–​4, 127 solidarity  31 Somalia  116 Soskice, D.  21, 46 South America  25 Southern Route Partnership  117 space of flows  81 space of the port  2–​4, 134 spatial isolation  32 special economic zones (SEZ)  22, 30 stakeholder connections  31–​2 Staring, R.  10, 50, 73, 86

S Safety4Sea  12, 113 Samila, S.  27 Sassen, S.  33 Savona, E.  51 Schneider, B. R.  21 Schuilenberg, M.  84 Sciarrone, R.  44, 45, 71, 72 sea borders  140 sea-​city interface  13 SEACOP (Seaport Cooperation Project)  117 sea-​port interface  3, 12–​13, 74, 87, 108, 120, 134 secondary chokepoints  26 securitization  29, 53, 54–​5, 113, 121, 136 security extra-​legal governance  44–​5 governance  78–​110 ISPS Code  12, 40 mindsets  92 overlaps with policing  57 policing  40–​1 port authorities  40 privatized  40 relations between security providers in ports  94–​103 security assemblages  84, 85, 137, 141 security configurations  95, 96 security networks  51, 55, 57, 82–​3, 86, 94–​103, 137, 141 see also policing security sector reform (SSR)  116–​21 Secur.Port workshop  1, 2, 4–​13, 135 self-​handling ports  39

186

INDEX

Steinberg, P.  3 Stenning, P.  3, 85, 86, 87, 88 stevedoring  41 Storti, L.  3, 8, 10, 22, 44, 45, 50, 53, 55, 56, 71, 72, 73, 75, 86, 97, 100, 129, 130, 134 stowaways  112 Strait of Hormuz  26 Strait of Malacca  26 strategic locations  26 strategic territorial planning  33–​4 Streeck, W.  46 strikes  39, 64 Stroomplan  90, 96, 131 subcontracting  39, 70 Suez Canal  26 Sunda Strait  26 supply chains anti-​corruption policies and procedures  11 cybersecurity  124, 126 drug trafficking  12 technology  99 technology and corruption  130 trusted insiders  66 US–​China trade dispute  48, 139 vertical integration  27–​8 vulnerabilities  7 surveillance  88, 112, 129 sustainable development  35 syndicates  64 Szyliowicz, J.  103, 120

smart procedures  98–​9, 126, 130 traffic surveillance  88 virtual information sharing  95 Tema, Ghana  115 tenancy arrangements  5 tenant mindset  91–​2, 132 tender procedures  65 territorial knowledge  72 territorial settings  36, 37 terrorism  8, 54, 79, 103, 112, 115, 121 Thachuk, K. L.  50 Thévenot, L.  35 ‘Thinking and Working Politically’  119 tick-​box compliance  11, 12, 120, 137 Timur, U. P.  32 tobacco smuggling  50 tool ports  37–​8 toxic waste  113, 117 trade concentration in global maritime trade  25–​7, 48 and the coronavirus pandemic  138–​9 disruption of trade versus hiding in trade  112 maritime routes  26 versus security  7–​8 statistics on quantity of sea trade  19–​20, 25 trade data  9 Trade Network Analysis  20 trade unions  8, 10, 37, 39, 45–​7, 51, 63, 68 traffic surveillance  88 ‘transit culture’  113, 132 transmigration  92–​3 transparency  11 transport systems  51 tribute payments  69–​70 trust  10, 66, 91, 94, 100 ‘trusted importer’ registers  61 trusted insiders  6–​7, 66, 74

T Taiwan Strait  26 Talley, W. K.  17, 38, 39 technology and corruption  129–​32 cybersecurity  9–​10, 124–​8 drug trafficking  61 future of port security  123–​32 impact on dockworkers  38–​9 information sharing  98–​9 as means to increase capacity  23 port security  98–​102

187

PORTS, CRIME AND SECURITY

U

W

UN Office on Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)  114, 116 UNCTAD  20, 25, 139 UN-​Escap  33 unions  8, 10, 37, 39, 45–​7, 51, 63, 68 United States of America v. Michael Coppola  68 University of Essex  1 unload-​upload functions  37, 41 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)  9, 116, 117, 128 urban ports  37 US  45–​6 US–​China trade dispute  48, 139

Wahyuni, S.  30 Wainwright, R.  125 Wang, J. J.  33 waste transport  94, 106, 113, 140 waterfront development  32 weak institutions  42 weak network ties  31, 139 weapons smuggling  50 Weaver, D.  121–​2, 134 WECAPs (Improving Port Security in West and Central Africa)  1, 117 welfare mindsets  92 Whelan, C.  82, 94 white-​collar crime  52, 66, 74, 112, 131–​2, 141 wildlife trafficking  115, 117 wire fraud  64, 69 Witbooi, E.  114 witness retaliation  64 Wood, J.  83 work stoppages  39 workers’ rights  8, 37, 39 workers’ well-​being  35 workforce tampering  71 workforce tensions  8 working conditions  8, 38–​9 World Bank  20, 37–​8, 39, 40, 41, 116, 119 World Customs Organization  116

V Van den Herrewegen, E.  86 van der Putten, F. P.  22 Van der Vorm, B.  51 Van Dijck, M.  50 Van Duyne, P. C.  51 Vancouver, Canada  88, 137 Vannucci, A.  51, 75 Varese, F.  18, 45, 51, 71 vertical integration  27–​8 Vidya, C. T.  20 Vietnam  59, 60 violence  12 see also terrorism Voss, S.  98–​9, 123, 126, 128 Voyer, M.  118, 122

Z Zaitch, D.  11, 50

188

“Written in straightforward language, the authors critically reveal how local seaports struggle with ongoing transnational crime and security. Their spot-on work is timely and riding the wave of a rising maritime criminology.” Yarin Eski, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

“This insightful, timely and multidisciplinary book enables practitioners and academics to have essential discussions about the multi-faceted security issues connected to ports and international trade flows.” Lieselot Bisschop, Erasmus University Rotterdam

The COVID-19 pandemic, Brexit and the US–China trade dispute have heightened interest in the geopolitics and security of modern ports. Ports are where contemporary societal dilemmas converge: the (de)regulation of international flows; the (in)visible impact of globalization; the perennial tension between trade and security; and the thin line between legitimate, illicit and illegal. Applying a multidisciplinary lens to the political economy of port security, this book presents a unique outlook on the social, economic and political factors that shape organized crime and governance. Advancing the research agenda, this text bridges the divide between global and local, and theory and practice.

Anna Sergi is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex, UK. Alexandria Reid is a Research Fellow in the Organised Crime and Policing team at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), UK. Luca Storti is an Associate Professor in Economic Sociology at the University of Torino, Italy and Research Fellow at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies in the the Graduate Center at The City University of New York, USA. Marleen Easton is Professor and chair of the research group ‘Governing and Policing Security ‘(GaPS) at the Department of Public Governance and Management at Ghent University, Belgium and Associate Professor at the Griffith Criminology Institute, Griffith University, Australia. ISBN 978-1-5292-1771-1

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