Polycentric World Order in the Making 9811953740, 9789811953743

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Polycentric World Order in the Making Edited by Andrey Baykov · Tatiana Shakleina

Polycentric World Order in the Making

Andrey Baykov · Tatiana Shakleina Editors

Polycentric World Order in the Making

Editors Andrey Baykov MGIMO University Moscow, Russia

Tatiana Shakleina MGIMO University Moscow, Russia

ISBN 978-981-19-5374-3 ISBN 978-981-19-5375-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

Part I Features of the Global World 1

2

3

4

Megatrends and Global Issues: Constants and Innovations in the Subject Area Andrey Baykov, Alexey Bogaturov, and Tatiana Shakleina

3

The Global Order in the Twenty-First Century: Consolidating Polycentricity Tatiana Shakleina

13

Global Governance of the Polycentric World: Actors, Architecture, Hierarchy of Issue Areas Alexandra Khudaykoulova

41

Evolution of the International Security Landscape in the Midst of Great Power Rivalry Igor Istomin

77

5

The Phenomenology of Globalization Alexey Kuznetsov

103

6

International Scientific and Technological Relations Alexey Biryukov and Andrey Krutskikh

125

7

The Political Economy of Global Development Stanislav Tkachenko

155

v

vi

CONTENTS

Part II Key International and Political Issues and Processes 8

International Integration in Theoretical Discourse Andrey Baykov

181

9

Contemporary Conflicts: Typology and Characteristics Andrey Sushentsov

203

10

The Emergence of a Global Labor Market and Its International and Political Implications Vera Gnevasheva

231

11

Digital Transformation of National Economies Lilia Revenko and Nikolay Revenko

251

12

Nuclear Deterrence in Contemporary World Politics Alexey Fenenko

279

13

Digital Revolution and New Digital Markets: Competing Technology Platforms Ivan Danilin

14

Global Energy Trends Igor Tomberg

15

Global Environmental Norms and Their Russian Implementation Anne Crowley-Vigneau and Andrey Baykov

16

Political Implications of Global Higher Education Sector: The Russian Case Andrey Baykov, Anne Crowley-Vigneau, and Yelena Kalyuzhnova

317 335

365

387

Part III Great Powers and the Structuring of Regional Spaces 17

Reconfiguring Global Space: Great Powers and Their Regional Subsystems Tatiana Shakleina

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CONTENTS

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19

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The Institutionalization of Regional Centers in Europe and the Asia–Pacific Andrey Baykov

445

Leading Centers of Power and Regional Dynamics in East Asia Ekaterina Koldunova

469

The Evolution of the Latin American Subsystem in International Relations Boris Martynov

501

21

Features of Statehood in the Middle East Irina Zvyagelskaya

22

The Role of Global and Regional Powers in the Regulation of Regional Crises Mariya Khodynskaya-Golenischeva

23

International Relations in the Post-Soviet Space Andrey Baykov and Irina Bolgova

24

Communication Spaces in the System of Interstate Conflicts Alexey Fenenko

525

547 573

601

Bibliography

645

Index

657

Notes on Contributors

Baykov Andrey holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, is Vice-Rector for Science Policy and International Cooperation, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Editor-in-Chief of the International Trends journal. Biryukov Alexey has done Ph.D. in History, is Associate Professor, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for International Information Security, Science and Technology Policy at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Bogaturov Alexey is Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Distinguished Scholar of the Russian Federation, President of the Academic Forum on International Relations, recipient of the Russian Government Prize in Education, and winner of the Tarle Prize of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Bolgova Irina holds a Ph.D. in History, Vice-Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Associate Professor, the Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and assistant editor of the International Trends journal.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Crowley-Vigneau Anne has done Ph.D. in Political Science, Ph.D. (United Kingdom), is Associate Professor, MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Danilin Ivan has done Ph.D. in Political Science, Head of the Department of Science and Innovation at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fenenko Alexey is Doctor of Political Science, Associate Professor, Faculty of World Politics at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Gnevasheva Vera has completed Ph.D. in Economics, Professor, Department of Demographic and Migration Policy at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Head of the Department of the Reproduction of Labor Resources and the Employment of the Population at the Institute for Demographic Research of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Istomin Igor holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, is Associate Professor, Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and First Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the International Trends journal. Kalyuzhnova Yelena is Director of the Centre for Euro-Asian Studies and Head of Leadership, Organisations and Behaviour at Henley Business School. She is also a Principal Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (PFHEA). Khodynskaya-Golenischeva Mariya is Doctor of History, Professor, Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Chief Advisor at the Department of Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Khudaykoulova Alexandra has done Ph.D. in Political Science, and is Associate Professor, Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Koldunova Ekaterina has done Ph.D. in Political Science, is Associate Professor, Department of Oriental Studies at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Director of the ASEAN Centre at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Comparative Politics journal. Krutskikh Andrey is Doctor of History, Professor, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in the Field of Information Security, Director of the Centre for International Information Security, Science and Technology Policy MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Director of the Department of International Information Security at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Kuznetsov Alexey is Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Economics, Director of the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Editor-in-Chief of the Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law journal. Martynov Boris is Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Head of the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Revenko Lilia is Doctor of Economics, Professor, Department of International Economic Relations and Foreign Economic Affairs at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Revenko Nikolay holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, and is Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Research of International Economic Relations at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. Shakleina Tatiana is Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Head of the Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and winner of the Tarle Prize of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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Sushentsov Andrey has completed Ph.D. in Political Science, and is Director of the Institute for International Studies at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Associate Professor, Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Tkachenko Stanislav is Doctor of Economics, Professor, Department of European Studies, St. Petersburg State University. Tomberg Igor is Doctor of Economics, Professor, Department of Applied International Analysis at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Director of the Center for Energy and Transport Research at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Zvyagelskaya Irina is Doctor of History, Professor, Department of Oriental Studies at MGIMO University under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Head of the Center for the Middle East Studies at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Research Fellow at the Center of Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 14.1

Fig. 14.2

Military spending of selected countries in 1995–2019 (Source Compiled by the author based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [see: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. URL: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex]) Number of UN Security Council Resolutions in 1990–2019 (Source Compiled by the author based on UN data [see: UN Security Council Resolution Database, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ru/con tent/resolutions]) Treaty mechanisms for arms control in 1990–2010 (Source Compiled by the author) Technological paradigms periodization Global technological partnership structure in a multipolar world order Changes in the structure of global primary energy consumption by fuel type since the second half of the nineteenth century (Sources Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Skolkovo Energy Centre, New Stage of the Fourth Energy Transition, https://www.eprussia.ru/epr/374/9335671. htm) Changes in oil prices (Source All About Oil, https://vse onefti.ru/etc/risksi-v-neftyanoi-otrasli.html)

84

85 87 129 149

338 340

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 14.3

Growth of gas demand in China (Source Gavin Thompson, “China Unveils the Extent of its Gas Ambitions,” Wood Mackenzie [August 5, 2020], https://www.woodmac.com/news/opinion/china-unv eils-the-extent-of-its-gas-ambitions/)

357

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1

Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table Table Table Table

9.1 10.1 11.1 12.1

Changes to the quotas of BRICS countries in the IMF and the World Bank, % Casualties from various types of organized violence in 1990–2019 (only combat fatalities are counted for conflicts), persons Military spending to GDP ratio of select states in 1995–2019, % Military spending of US and China in 1995–2019 Use of the veto right by the permanent members of the UN Security Council Nuclear Arsenal by state Official development assistance from OECD member states (in USD millions) Extreme poverty in developing countries in 1990, 2005 and 2019 Typology of conflict behavior in International Relations Decent work indicators Digital development strategies by region (2012–2017) Evolution of the nuclear deterrence concept

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80 83 83 86 89 168 173 209 246 257 285

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PART I

Features of the Global World

CHAPTER 1

Megatrends and Global Issues: Constants and Innovations in the Subject Area In lieu of Introduction

Andrey Baykov, Alexey Bogaturov, and Tatiana Shakleina

In his seminal book Megatrends, John Naisbitt wrote about a time of the parenthesis in global transformation, a time when the world had transitioned from one era to another, a new era. And although periods of transformation always contain some elements of uncertainty, Naisbitt noted that much depends on whether we are able to correctly assess the

A. Baykov (B) · A. Bogaturov · T. Shakleina MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] A. Bogaturov e-mail: [email protected] T. Shakleina e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_1

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emerging challenges, answer the new questions, and make use of all the opportunities available to us. He wrote that “if we can learn to make uncertainty our friend, we can achieve much more than in stable eras”.1 The current world order is becoming polycentric. If the there is one princal megatrend shaping all the other megatrends, it is the increasing polycentricity of the world takes as its subject matter and grapples with the most following questions in (1) what megatrends shape emerging world order? (2) how the changing world order shapes megatrends? (3) in what way the regulation and self-regulation of changing world order and megatrends are achieved? The most important characteristic of the modern era is that individuals, and indeed entire peoples, are becoming increasingly aware of their being part of humanity as a whole. The juxtaposition of this trend and increasing polycentricity of world order is the subject of the present monograph. The monograph focuses on the actions of the world’s leading states (great powers) and processes in regional structuring (regional subsystems), as long as they matter from the point of view of the general state of the global system. Equally important are the dynamics of changes in the overall proportion of the potentials of leading states; the eternal questions of international political, economic, and military competition; inter-country and global security, including human security; the state of the environment; resource potential and resource limitations in global development; and the global social area (problems of poverty, gender equality—equality of social genders—ethnic and cultural differences, and ethnic and political psychology). What is urgently needed in this regard is an understanding of the instrumental principles of regulating the global system: the management of human reflections on global existence; the philosophy and anthropology of international relations; and the problems in the global governance institutions and developing a set of tools for a formalized and informal regulation of international relations. Traditional paradigms of international relations knowledge commonly link the question of ordering global development, of regulating it, either with voluntary constructive cooperation between the world’s leading states (ideally, between all states), or with the hegemony of a single super-strong power capable of imposing its will on weaker actors or of convincing them to accept that power’s terms for international development without using force, but without ruling out the use of force, either. Such is the logic of political realists. It forms the foundation of the actions of the United

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States following the end of the bipolar order. Since the mid-2000s, this concept has guided the establishment of an expanded group of leading states. It was increasingly obvious that these states were determining the dynamics of development in individual states, regions, and the world as a whole. The liberal tradition links international institutions (both formal and informal) with the idea of the positive regulation of the international system. In this view, regulation is taken to mean exercising rational (conscious and thought-out) and directed influence on global development with a view to preventing crises and wars, even if the stability of the world as a whole is achieved at the expense of security interests of a specific state or group of states. Other concepts propose somewhat different hypotheses of mechanisms that underlie the emergence of a world order. Various theories of selforganization, for instance, interpret a world order as only partially being the result of the deliberate efforts of individual states and the competition between them. To a large extent, this order appears to be a product of internal fluctuations inherent in the global system. Consequently, understanding the nature, amplitude, and “trend” of these fluctuations is crucial for correctly assessing order-shaping trends. On the one hand, classical views state that the dynamics of the global political system are produced by the original strivings of countries, peoples, groups, and individuals towards as full a realization of their interests as possible, or the realization of what they understand to be their interests. These strivings clash and generate conflicts. In order to avoid wars or to restrict them, global political actors engage in talks and diplomatic relations aimed at mutual adaptation, working out the terms of coexistence or even the terms of an intensive rapprochement based on identified common interests. On the other hand, we can claim that such interactions are typical primarily for the pre-global level of the international system’s evolution. Today, we can confidently state that there are contradictions between the interests of global stability and development on the one hand and the interests of states (and their alliances) and non-state actors on the other. There is the need to constantly update our understanding of the contents of those interests and to reconcile them, if possible. In the meantime, the resources for this crucial function of aligning interests and accommodating new types of actors are objectively in the hands of the strongest

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states, the most influential corporations, and certain non-governmental organizations. This book is based on the hypothesis that the dynamics and contents of the processes of the transformation of the world order are determined primarily by the interactions of all the actors in international communication on finding a resolution to global problems while taking the national interests of the key states into account. In this sense, global politics (as an environment of inter-country and public and private relations) and global policies (as ways to resolve a special class of global and cross-border problems) are superimposed on the traditional international competition between states over leadership, and access to a privileged geopolitical standing and the most favourable positions in the global division of labour, mutually constructing each other both ideologically and at the level of resource potential distribution. As regards the interests of world peace, the primary value of any world order is the ability of the most powerful states for self-restriction (restraint) and the ability of global civil society to restrict the actions of those international actors (state or non-state) whose conduct hurts the interests of overall international security. Self-restriction and restrictions are the key functions of maintaining order, and various types of international actors attempting to discharge these functions on behalf of the entire global community range from the United Nations to the most powerful and responsible states at various levels. For instance, the United States did this in the 1990s, while in the 2000s and 2010s, both the traditional (old) great powers (G8 members), and the “ascendant” powers (China, Brazil, and India) actively joined the world regulation process, and many regional leaders from G20 joined the process with regard to sectoral issues. Individual transnational networked structures and private organizations also strive to gain their own world-regulating role. At the same time, it is essential to understand that it is precisely states and the competition between them that primarily determine the mode of being of the global system and the activities of global institutions for regulating relations in the sphere of solving global problems. States set the tune of the activities of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. New group regulators of the global economy and global politics (G7 and G20) are also comprised of representatives of states. Finally, NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), or the most successful integration alliances

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in Europe and Asia, including the Eurasian Economic Union, are also purposefully moving towards becoming bodies that will aggregate and articulate the will of their constituent states and peoples, towards the ordered governance of the global military, political, trade, and economic spheres. And they all are alliances of states and are the products of their sovereign prerogatives. No single state has a monopoly on resolving global issues. In addition to states, various non-state actors, such as transnational corporations (TNCs), international political, environmental, and other movements and groups, various networked communities (including criminal networks), and similar entities, also have significant influence. It is apparent, however, that, compared to states, this type of actor is far less restricted in its activities by rules and official international communication mechanisms operating at the global, regional, and state levels. Non-state actors rather perform the important role of “communication agents”, intermediaries of sorts between levels of interaction typical for states. In order for the planet to have order, there first and foremost needs to be: . a clear hierarchy of capabilities between the leading powers, a hierarchy that is acknowledged by all, or the apparent majority of, international relations actors; . a totality of principles and rules for the international conduct of all global actors; . a system for making decisions on key international issues—a system that could guarantee that the interests of the lower rungs of the hierarchy are represented in the decision-making at its top rungs; . a set of morally acceptable sanctions for violations, and enforcement mechanisms; . forms, methods, and procedures for implementing decisions made, i.e. a regime for keeping order. Let us also specify that the issue of a global hierarchy has traditionally been linked with the concept of polarity in the global system, although today it is with increasing frequency discussed in terms of centricity, which does not entail a rigid ideological confrontation and mandatory and comprehensive commensurability of potentials of the powers that constitute its centres.

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In addition to the structure of the international system, the authors of this monograph suggest an expansive interpretation of today’s global trends that contains all issues pertaining not only to the above-described global cross-section of inter-country communication (traditional matters of security and power balance), but also new international communication “dossiers”. This is why the military-political, energy, financial, economic, political, and ideological aspects of humanity’s development occupy us as much as environmental and social and humanitarian aspects do. We should indicate here that two global trends have become the focus of attention in the 2020s. The first is the world’s increasing homogeneity, and the second is its growing complexity and even variegation produced through heterogeneous components of the common global space being mixed by intensified migration flows. On the one hand, a block of problems common to all humanity has emerged and is expanding. Relations that people engaged in to resolve these common problems form an external outline of transnational globalization that is pulling humanity into a single whole. Yet, on the other hand, hotbeds of homogeneity under this outline are shrinking. Many countries, including Russia, the United States, Canada, Australia, the leading EU states, and even Japan, manifest a growing trend for the increase of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. The direction of the flows of incoming ethnic groups is determined by movement from poorer states to more prosperous ones and is linked with the emergence of a global labour and human resources market. Increasing heterogeneity in different regions is the result of large-scale migrations that have spanned the entire world. This wave of migration has become a consequence of globalization. Paradoxically, along with the trend for homogeneous economic paradigms in individual states and among certain peoples, and along with the spread of common standards of consumption, doing business, accessing information, and ultimately, common standards for human rights and political activity, globalization serves equally as a breeding ground for the growth of a “mixed”, diverse, heterogenous, and ultimately enclaved world, and the domestic political propensity for conflict. In this sense, globalization emerges as a network of relations “weaving” itself over the “surface” of countries and peoples, while relations that continue to develop within individual states and ethnic groups are frequently and significantly different and sometimes opposite to those to which globalization is conducive. Both types of relations are

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capable of coexisting and forming conglomerates of diverse paradigms and behavioural models within a single international community that is united in its external outline by the presence of global problems whose solutions require that all participants in international relations put their effort into the task.2 Therefore, since the early 2020s, the world has exhibited two simultaneous and related megatrends. First, the increased importance of global trends and problems, and the growing understanding that cooperation is needed to resolve them; consequently, single rules, standards, and practices emerge that follow the logic of cooperation for the sake of the stable development of the entire planetary system. Second, this “framework” exhibits within itself a growing complexity and diversity of social, economic, and political relations inside individual states and between them. Of course, global trends should not be overemphasized. But it is not sufficient to see what is happening in the world solely through the lens of the needs of one’s own country. The Russian Federation is part of the global whole. We need to know what Russia’s national interests are, yet it is no less important to recognize that Russia’s foreign policy is shaped and implemented within a global context that is a true reality, within a global political and economic environment. This environment can produce new opportunities and chances to pursue Russia’s interests, but it also imposes certain restrictions on its actions, as it does on the actions of any other state. A diplomat’s craft and skill lie precisely in the ability to find a mechanism for ensuring the optimal integration of a country (in our case, Russia) into real global development processes, contributing to them in some instances and resisting them in others. It is also important to avoid a head-on confrontation with objectively developing global trends, i.e. those tendencies that emerge and develop due to new objective conditions of the global system, the acquisition by the system of new qualities and needs, and the increasingly complex nature of the competitive environment. Otherwise, there is a threat of the country “overexerting” itself, of setting clearly non-feasible foreign political tasks that are not backed by existing resources. As a consequence, there is a threat of undermining Russia’s international positions.3 This book analyses the principal trends in today’s global development, and its driving forces, and consider options for the further development of

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the international political situation, with due account of the interpretations offered for these issues in the latest works of Russian, American, and European international relations experts. The book is not only about what transpires but about how reality is described and interpreted in the expert and academic community. The book’s authors—leading Russian international relations experts— place special emphasis on the important aspects of new areas in international relations emerging in connection with the environmental, migration, demographic, leadership and world order problems, and on analysing interactions between Western and non-Western components in today’s international relations system through the lens of Russia’s interests and perceptions. The book places a special focus on identifying a new “agenda” in the study of the problems in the transformation of the international system and international security, and in regulating world politics. Needless to say, not every issue area is covered exhaustively. Moreover, the trends and megatrends outlined here need to be studied further. John Naisbitt’s book Megatrends was published nearly 40 years ago, and yet debates on the issues he raised have only become particularly urgent today, when a new world order is indeed taking shape. This is, clearly, an ongoing longitudinal study that reflects the theoretical understanding of the subject matter as of the dawn of the third decade of the twenty-first century. As opposed to more pertinent and on-point studies, here robust, impartial evidence, and strategic aloofness, which can only be obtained with the passage of time, will be needed to provide an adequate assessment of more recent developments and astute interpretation of how the world will continue to evolve moving forward.

Notes 1. John Naisbitt’s book Megatrends was published in 1982 and immediately became a national bestseller, prompting extensive discussions in academic and political circles both in the United States and beyond. Analysing the situation in America and predicting its future—specifically, the transition from an industrial economy to an informational and service economy, Naisbitt laid the foundations for a new understanding of what was happening both in the United States and in the world at large, and of what other states should expect. His book was called “A Roadmap into the 21st Century”. See: John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (New York: Warner Books Edition, 1984), xxii, 283.

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2. For more details, see: A.D. Bogaturov, ed., Today’s World Politics: Applied Analysis (Moscow, 2009), Chapter 2. 3. M.A. Khrustalev, Analysis of International Situations and Political Expertise: Essays on Theory and Methodology (Moscow: Academic Educational Forum On International Relations, 2008), Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

The Global Order in the Twenty-First Century: Consolidating Polycentricity Tatiana Shakleina

The shaping of the new world order following the end of the bipolar order can be seen as the principal megatrend of the twenty-first century. It can be defined as a mega-process at the highest level since the contents of global development will hinge on who determines the foundations of the new world order, its base institutions, the structuring of relations within the new world order, and who plays the decisive role in that order thereby influencing the politics of other actors. By 2022, individual outcomes of the actions undertaken by some leading global powers with the aim of laying down the foundations of the new order had clearly manifested themselves. We should take a critical look at the order-shaping process that has been unfolding for the last three decades, and at the discussions concerning the successes and failures of individual states. We should also ponder the effect this process has had on the current state of international relations and individual

T. Shakleina (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_2

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states. It is important to objectively assess the efforts the United States (and the collective West) has been undertaking since the end of the global bipolar system to shape a liberal world order. We need to recognize that there is no alternative to the polycentricity of today’s world that has emerged and to work toward achieving a consensus between the creative/leading powers on the new world structure and on the new “rules of the game” applicable in resolving crucial global problems. Otherwise, ensuring the predictable development of the world, individual regions, and states will be difficult, instability will mount, and, consequently, the problem of overcoming transitoriness in shaping the world order will remain unresolved.

The Global Order as a Process Although order entails some certainty concerning the reliance on its functional foundations—be they different official and unofficial institutions or principal actors involved in maintaining order—order is also an ongoing process whose dynamics are primarily dictated by the actions of the principal actors, changes in the group of great powers and in the relations between them (including values), the power dynamics that reflect the distribution of power between them, capabilities of purposefully acting, also affecting the outcomes of the actions of others. Changes are also taking place in the international environment, producing new forces and factors affecting the process of the world order formation. The tremendous globalization process has so enriched and complicated the activities of states still defining the foundations of global development that their politics and interactions (cooperative and competitive, and especially regarding leading global powers, or great powers) have a global, universal, and planetary geographical dimension. Therefore, we are specifically talking about world order here.

Important

Russian and American researchers use two terms: “international order” and “world order.” Although the term “international order” is used with lesser and lesser frequency, some scholars still stress that world order and an international order are two different things.

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We do not believe it to be the case since activities of states have long become comprehensive, they are woven into the network of all types of relations at all levels, and they determine their nature and scale. The prominent Russian political scientist Yuri Davydov justly noted that “it is wrong to distinguish ‘international’ and ‘world’ orders. International relations are very complex and no longer onedimensional, state and non-state actors are closely intertwined, and therefore we need to speak of a world order.”1

We believe that similar adjustments should be made to distinguishing the concepts of “international relations” and “world politics.” Very often, international relations are reduced solely to relations between states, but it was not correct even in the twentieth century. International relations are a comprehensive area of existence and interactions of actors of different status, different jurisdictions and areas of activity. By studying the state as an actor in global processes, we are studying all of its manifestations and forms of activity, and also the activities of other actors that emerge as a result of the political will of states. It means that the subject field of international relations spans all areas and all actors in the world process with nation states being the focus of research as the sole polyfunctional public institution that prioritizes public good across the entire range of goalsetting in life over gaining private good in specific areas of the activities of people and society. The subject field and range of actors in international relations are no smaller than the subject field of world politics. On the contrary, the latter can be incorporated into IR subject field as its part is.

Important

International relations is a multifarious and multilevel academic field with a comprehensive subject matter, since in studying the state we are necessarily studying all aspects of its activities in various areas and realms. States establish international (global and regional) institutions of different formats, ensure their vitality, create

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legal frameworks for their functioning, and control their operations. Reducing international relations solely to relations between nation states is not correct.2

The conceptualizing efforts of Russian international relations experts have been aimed at explaining the processes stemming from the dissolution of the USSR: the disappearance of the second superpower/pole and the two crucial institutions—the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the weakening of Russia’s activities compared to the role the USSR played in the CSCE (subsequently OSCE), and in international relations. The 1990s were spent conceptualizing the events. This was particularly true for Russian scholars, as there was the need to offer a conceptual explanation for global and structural changes, for the new role and prospects of the Russian Federation (as an actor different from the USSR) in influencing the order-shaping processes. The dominant idea was that of a multipolar structure, although that structure did not become fully formed in the 1990s. Some political scientists leaned toward proclaiming the emergence and further evolution of the unipolar model. Most, however, believed that a multipolar structure had begun to emerge and would inevitably affect the contents of other constituent elements of the twenty-first-century order, particularly its institutional and regulatory dimensions. American political scientists considered a unipolar model and a three-polar model as basic options. A multipolar/polycentric structure was not the subject of serious discussion, since old great powers, with the exception of the United States, were not actively participating in world order formation and were generally content with the unipolar model. New centers of power were only entering the era of their international ascendance.3 The international situation was essentially equidistant from both the classical unipolar model and a multipolar one, which made it possible to speak of a time of transition to a new order. Three influential political scientists captured the situation that existed at the time in the emergence of a new world order in the 1990s. The American political scientist William C. Wohlforth was categorical in his definition of the late 1990s as a period of long-term unipolar stability since the United States had demonstrated and entrenched its

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privileged position. In his opinion, the danger lay in the United States undermining the existing stability by being insufficiently active.4 Other opinions concerning that period were proposed by the American scholar Samuel Huntington and by the Russian scholar Alexey Bogaturov. S. Huntington wrote that the international relations system of the time was a hybrid of unipolarity and multipolarity; it had a superpower and several leading powers with macro-regional or even global ambitions. In Huntington’s view, this hybrid character of international system manifested itself in the fact that the United States as the superpower, was capable of single-handedly blocking the actions of one or several regional powers; yet on its own, without support from other leading world powers, the United States could not resolve key international problems.5 At that time, his words were not duly appreciated, since the rise of new leading (non-Western) powers had only begun to really manifest itself, but in the 2010s, when Huntington’s view proved to be absolutely right. Alexey Bogaturov proposed an original concept of pluralistic unipolarity. In his opinion, the term “multipolar” did not adequately describe the emerging world order after the collapse of the USSR, and although one pillar of bipolarity as it existed from 1945 to 1991 had been destroyed, this was not an indication of the outlines of the future world structure. The only thing for sure was that it marked a radical shift in the previous world order. A. Bogaturov pointed out that destroying the Cold War order did not automatically mean going back to multipolarity. He defined the structure of international relations after the collapse of the bipolar system as a hybrid mono-polycentric structure where a superpower does not act alone but among a circle of an aligned concert of ideologically proximate military and political allies. The United States will not have the ability to keep a tight hold on events in every corner of the world, although it will have a hard-to-contest determining influence on the dynamics of these events relying, among other things, on the system of alliances that had emerged.6 The principal issue that in some way was discussed during these debates was that of structure, i.e., of centers/poles exhibiting creativity, ambitions, potential, and the will to build a new world order, as well as of the number of such centers and the balance of their potentials. The Russian scholar Eduard Batalov noted that “pole” and “power center” are not identical categories, although they are used as synonyms in most works produced in Russia and abroad.

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E. Batalov wrote that there must be two poles, and they can only exist in interaction (mutually attracting and mutually repelling each other). Therefore, when one pole, the USSR, lost its “pole” status, so did the other superpower, the United States. Defining the world of the time as a “nonpolarity,” Batalov wrote that poles were “powerful contrary global sub-systems that form the extreme points of an axis on which the world system hinges (revolves). The poles represent different civilizations and different social, political, and economic systems. They embody different, possibly mutually exclusive, ideational and value paradigms. Poles are symmetrical and commensurate in their strength and operating potentials, which allows them to balance each other out, acting both as guarantors of the world order and as lawmakers in the political game, setting the rules that all—or nearly all—actors on the global political stage are forced to follow. The relations between the poles are based on mutual attraction and mutual repellence. They need each other to maintain their internal and external status quo and they strive to eliminate each other as rivals. However, when one pole is eliminated, the other vanishes automatically as well, and the entire world order disappears along with them, which is precisely what happened in the late 1980s–early 1990s.”7 Later, the idea of a “nonpolar” world was reiterated by the American political scientist Richard Haass, who suggested that US leadership should recognize the fact that there are many centers of power and should try to put the existing situation to the advantage of the superpower. He defined this situation as a “concerted nonpolarity,”8 which is aligned with the idea of a functioning core that should include all the principal global powers. This idea of the functional core was previously proposed by the American expert Thomas Barnett.9

Important

An important outcome of the discussions of the 1990s about the world order was, among other things, the realization that a monocentric world did not exist and that we were essentially dealing with an order-shaping megatrend whose outcome would depend on the actions of the leading world players (powers). The popular claim of the 1990s was that nation-states were dying out and losing their decisive influence on the shaping of the world order. This claim was

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not borne out, however. It was thus crucial to decide on the composition of the new group of leading powers and see whether it was possible to work out the rules for their interaction in the process of shaping new institutions and modifying old ones, resolving global problems, and determining the nature of international relations (the problem of accommodating the “ascendant” powers).

To properly assess the situation on the eve of the 2000s and analyze the development prospects of the megatrend for building a new world order, we need clear conceptual landmarks, namely, a definition of what an “order” is. American scholars of the time were not particularly concerned with this problem since they mostly shared the dominant ideas that (1) unipolarity was solid; (2) the status of the United States as a superpower was undeniable and long-lasting; (3) the concept of building a liberal world order with western-centric values had no viable alternatives. For Russian scholars, however, this issue became the primary focus of their attention. For them, the “return” of the great powers to the global political stage was a fait accompli, and the polycentric nature of the system of international relations was evidently growing stronger, which required theoretical conceptualization. Russian political scientists proposed three definitions of a world order. In the early 1990s, Alexey Bogaturov proposed a Russian take on the world order problem and formulated a definition of “world order” based primarily on the structural realist approach, with certain constructivist elements. This definition, in our opinion, remains the only complete one that allows for a comprehensive analysis of the modern processes that are creating a new world order: A world order is a system that includes: 1) inter-country relations regulated by a totality of principles of conduct in foreign policy; 2) a set of specific institutions based on these relations; 3) a set of sanctions for violations of these relations that are deemed moral and permissible; 4) the potential for authorized countries or institutions to apply these sanctions; and 5) the political will of member states to use this potential.10

One of Bogaturov’s most important arguments concerns the “leader and space (backdrop, environment)” antimony, since in the 2000s–2010s,

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crucial issues in shaping the foundations of the world order were determined precisely by a solution to the global leadership problem (does the world need a single global leader? How many leading powers are there in the twenty-first century? What are the relationships between them?) and by changes in the international environment. A. Bogaturov wrote that “the difference between a leader and an outsider is determined by the proportion of ‘backdrop’ and ‘creative’ elements in each other’s foreign policy. To the degree that the latter dominates, a state can be provisionally called a leader. Following the same logic, many disparate outsiders form a milieu that should preferably be called space, ‘backdrop,’ or ‘environment.’”11 In the twenty-first century, major changes occurred both at the leadership level of international relations and in the international environment, where individual “backdrop” actors (countries) have begun to demonstrate their desire for regional leadership or assume the role of secondary (auxiliary) leaders siding with the global hegemon and assisting it in conducting its policies, including policies for building a new world order.12 The overall state of the international relations has become more complex, which is hardly conducive to ordering the relations between leading powers on the basis of new agreements. Instead, it bolstered competition potential at all levels of interaction within the global community. Russian political scientist Yuri Davydov offered the following definition of a world order: “A world order is a state of the international relations system that is appropriately programmed for its security, stability, and development and regulated on the basis of criteria primarily responsible for the needs of the most influential actors of a given global community.” A world order is the foundation of the structure and functioning of international relations at a specific stage of humanity’s development, foundations that are shared universally (whether voluntarily or under duress) or by the most influential part of the global community. He also noted that established rules could have the status of international law, moral norm, common or established practice, or they could be merely operational rules or “rules of the game” worked out and adopted without a formal agreement, and in some cases even without an oral consent. Despite the mutual dependence of great powers increasing because of globalization, and despite their growing international responsibility, each has its own view of the outside world and its place in it. And each, no matter how closely tied to others by common cares and concerns, strives, to the best of its abilities, to have such a world regulation system,

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such an order, as would allow it to obtain profit and advantages primarily for itself.13 Eduard Batalov offered his own definition of world order: “A world order is a structure of correlative ties between actors in the global political process. Such actors are states, inter-state and non-state organizations, and also individual citizens and citizen groups that do not have the status of an organization but, due to various capabilities, influence the global process. We are talking global ties that are more or less well-structured and stable, but at the same time sufficiently dynamic. Crucially, they accord with a certain behavioral and institutional pattern. They are intended to ensure the functioning and development of the global political system in accordance with the dominant (at the current historical development stage) goals and values. Order manifests itself as ‘rules,’ ‘principles,’ and ‘institutions’ that can be legally enshrined, thereby becoming international law, or can be sufficiently stable without legal formalization. A world order is viable if it is voluntarily adopted by the greater part of global actors, or else it is imposed on the global community by those actors who are currently masters of the world.”14 Russian definitions of world order are comprehensive and account not only for states but also for other actors and note the importance of institutions and the ability of states first and foremost to oversee their functioning. All these definitions are functional, but Bogaturov’s appears to be the most precise for the purposes of analyzing today’s order-shaping megatrend and its prospects. Russian scholars preferred the structural realist explanation of the genesis of a polycentric world order because it had become obvious by the 2000s that the American concept of a liberal world order had its implementation limits. E. Batalov stated that, “the coming order will be nonpolar, while the global system will be polycentric. The world order in the twenty-first century will not rest on a socioeconomic foundation similar to the post-classical capitalism of the late twentieth century. The world order that accords with the imperatives of the new century cannot be founded on the system of liberal (neoliberal) values that dominated the West until the end of the twentieth century. The United States will not be able to act as humanity’s political and moral leader, it will not be able to single-handedly shape a new world order and govern it rationally.”

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Important

In Eduard Batalov’s opinion, “liberalism has no prospect of spatial growth since it now has nowhere to go […] Any attempts to install it artificially will prove to have little effect: the liberal idea will not work.” “A new world order,” he wrote, “can be born only out of a joint creative effort of members of the global community. In this case, the United States will be among the principal creative forces and principal governance centers. The operative word here is ‘among,’ not ‘the only.’”15

The 2000s was a period of the emergence of a polycentric structure, of Russia, China, Brazil, India, and several other mid-level powers stepping up their role. Polycentricity was being comprehended/set up. Simultaneously, the role of the United States in shaping a new order was undergoing a major conceptualization, the leadership/hegemonic strategy used by the United States was correlated with the interests and policies of other leading global powers left outside the framework of NATO and the European Union and asserting alternative concepts of a future world order. Concepts proposed for explaining the superpower’s role include the “functional collective core” that could span countries of North America, Europe (old and new), Russia, Japan, China, India, Australia, and New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, whose populations combined total approximately four billion people out of the Earth’s population of six billion.16 The idea that the world needs to form a new world-regulating core required observance of the accommodation principle, an agreement between the powers forming the new extended core, including the United States. This idea would find its practical application in the establishment of the G20, spearheaded by the United States, which was eager to retain its position as the leader of the group determining all the decision-making. At the same time, the principal condition of this core functioning more or less successfully or effectively was not met, since the United States did not abandon its hegemonic role and did not exhibit any desire to account for the interests of other actors.

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Describing the international relations situation in the mid-2000s, Samuel Huntington wrote that America demanded that other countries made the “sacrifice” of limiting their national sovereignty and changing their economic system and culture, but did not exhibit its own willingness to do the same, which makes its actions look like dictates (hegemony) and prompts resistance from many states.17 As the United States assumed the role of a “systemic perturbator,” it did not concern itself with mobilizing on new foundations an expanded governance core. The United States proclaimed its intention to promote a stable and democratic global development, but in practice, it showed that it was more interested in preserving its special standing, and the methods of affirming liberal democracy were the old ones, based on coercion and military power, which was hard to align with the ideology of humanity’s survival. Despite significant structural changes to international relations, the United States remained firmly convinced of a superpower’s ability to keep its global dominance, which will not have any alternative. Richard Haass wrote that, in the new order, all the leading states—including Russia, China, and India—should recognize that they had to comply with the new rules of conduct, including the legitimacy of foreign intervention in a particular country for the purpose of protecting its population from genocide or in order to effect a regime change if necessary.18 The neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote that global development would be based either on “paper” or on “power,” i.e., international relations would either be handled through international law (which does not rule out using force) or solely through force. He believed that the threat to unipolarity—to the unique situation and global mission of the United States—did not lie in any specific country; rather, it lay in the choices made by the country’s foreign political establishment. Krauthammer suggested that the United States was an empire that should be kept.19 In 2008, a “second world” concept emerged (although the term was not a new one) constructed along the lines of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “chess board” idea and along the lines of his thesis of an empire of a new type, which confirmed ideological continuity in the American foreign political thought.20 Many American politicians did not reject the image of the United States as an empire, but it still was not conducive to bolstering a positive image of America as a liberal transforming center or a “global government.”21

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Important

Russian scholars pointed out that an “empire of a new type,” or “a benign hegemonic structure” demonstrated not only “the impunity of arbitrary rule,” but also changes in the way some states influenced others for the purpose of achieving certain goals, and it applied not only to relations between the leading powers and other states, but also to relations between states at different development levels: “A shift in the forms of exercising leadership apparently happened in the second half of the last century and lay in transitioning from the desire to destroy a rival’s potential first to achieving the ability to artificially limit, slow down its development, and then to the skill of ‘purposefully developing’ a potential rival and manipulating its development in the leader’s interests.”22

Even though the United States did not abandon the liberal monocentric model in the emergent order either ideologically or strategically, real processes were with increasing clarity adjusting the processes that were taking place. Even if illusions concerning the United States’ ability to continue to build a liberal world order unobstructed remained, they had finally dissipated by 2007–2008. At that time, Russia made a harsh statement to the effect that the monocentric model of the United States that ignored the interests of other countries was unacceptable. It also condemned the intervention of the United States and NATO in the affairs of sovereign states, violating their territorial integrity (Kosovo). The global financial and economic crisis of 2008 demonstrated the ability of “ascendant” powers to survive it, while China did not stop its powerful economic growth, putting a question mark over the status of the United States as a superpower. The 2008 crisis in the Caucasus (Georgia-South Ossetia conflict) also showed that other states, not only the United States, could and would defend their interests and protect their citizens using all means available. America’s military campaign in Iraq showed what American-style democratization was and the results it could produce. These events had a major influence on the real assessment of the events of the time, especially when it was a matter of old and new norms of conduct for international relations actors.

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Important

Setting the precedent of violating national (state) sovereignty pursuant to the decision of a single state (the United States) or a group of states (NATO), including without the UN’s approval, became an important landmark in the emergence of a world order following the disappearance of the bipolar regulatory structure. As the United States and its allies set the precedent of a humanitarian intervention through military force, they did not think this precedent could become a rule for other state and non-state actors that would use to protect their interests. And such precedent-setting actions may produce major conflicts.

Reality dictated a new approach to world regulation since powerful states (albeit with different levels of power) wanted to see a new order based on the solid foundation of a community of the most influential powers, with each capable of dominating in its region ensuring regional stability. They would like to “tame,” mitigate American power, to convince the United States to interact within a certain status quo adopted by the majority of developed states (“a new core”) and accepted, willingly or under duress, by other states.23 One of the most persistent American neoconservatives, Robert Kagan, called realizing and recognizing a polycentric world order “the return of history,” a resumption of the competition for power, influence, and status, and the confrontation between liberalism and autocracy, modernity and tradition. In his opinion, the twenty-first-century world order will be determined by the strongest: “The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. Its leaders will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow and Washington.” This, according to Kagan, does not make the United State’ role in constructing the world order and controlling the principal trends in global development any smaller, but makes it significantly more difficult to play.24

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Important

Recognizing the polycentricity of the global system did not shake the determination of the United States to implement its global plans of building an Amerocentric world. While officially recognizing polycentricity and non-polarity, the United States, or, more precisely, the US leadership and experts affiliated with the US government, continued to act within the former framework in accordance with the basic principles of the existence of the United States. After the bipolar order era ended, two main concepts of a new world order emerged: the unipolar concept promoted by the United States and Europe-Euro-American order, and the multipolar (polycentric) concept promoted by Russia and China. Neither concept has a fully coordinated approach or understanding of what the new order should be like, but they have a general commitment to certain values as their foundations.

By the end of the 2000s, the United States had not succeeded in implementing its plans for building and entrenching a liberal order. However, other countries, primarily Russia and China, had not obtained the share of influence in world regulation they needed to balance out that of the United States. In the meantime, a final recognition of the fact that only nation-states are the leading actors in the emerging world order became an important fact of the order-shaping process. The policies of Russia, China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and other states were developing within the realist paradigm. The predictions that smaller countries and non-state actors would acquire greater influence did not come true; the information revolution not only failed to help small states, but on the contrary, it bolstered the power of the large ones. Joseph Nye Jr. admitted that even though the information revolution was producing a diffusion of power and influence, the largest states—the world’s leading powers—retain traditionally large parameters and organizational resources compared to smaller states and non-state actors.25

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Important

The structure of the emerging world order could be said to be polycentric, the hierarchy among state actors did not have its former rigidity, but a superpower and great powers of different qualities remained, and the role and number of non-state actors continued to increase. The institutional foundation also remained fragmented.

The Results of Shaping the World Order: The Early 2020s In the early 2010s, the United States, Russia, and China remained the leading actors in shaping the world order, although they supported different models. In 2011, the United States conducted a military operation in Libya to change the regime there, thus affirming its intention to build an order based on Western norms and values, although the militantminded Republicans in the White House had been replaced by liberal Democrats. The allies of the United States in NATO supported America’s actions. Moreover, officially, they were at the frontlines of the operation, demonstrating once again the situational policies of many mid-level states (the so-called environment), which was not conducive to stabilizing the international situation and pivoting toward a more humane order. NATO’s actions in Libya caused more instability and a general imbalance in the region and produced an upsurge in terrorist activities. These developments prompted the emergence of the “Responsibility While Protecting” concept proposed by Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff at the UN General Assembly in September 2011. This concept (norm) was a response to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine that had essentially enshrined the American “humanitarian intervention” concept that the United States had already tried out in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the 1990s–2000s.26 This initiative was prompted by a lack of adequate limits for operations to protect, which, as conducted by the United States and NATO, were military campaigns with large civilian casualties.27 The concept of a “centrical” world system was debated more heatedly in the 2010s. Liberals, however, continued to stubbornly adhere to the idea of the primacy of institutions over nation-states, bemoaned

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the “return of realism” to foreign political strategies of “ascendant” states, and rejected virtually everything that the followers of the realist school had been writing about throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. The concept of a liberal world order based on Western institutions and values (as interpreted and understood by the American liberal elite in power) still dominated both the expert community and the political circles and structures. Conservative politicians and analysts that had essentially demonstrated quite pragmatic and aggressively realist views stubbornly declared their desire for a liberal order based primarily on everything American and on America’s omnipower status. The neoconservative ideology constituted a combination of the ideas of aggressive liberalism (a crusade) and realism (a global empire), which should not be identified with structural realism on the offensive. During this decade, despite the stubbornness of the ruling elite in Washington, the idea of polycentricity was already perceived as established. Since both American and Russian political scientists realized this, they engaged in explaining the new stage in the formation of the world order, primarily the problem of structuring relations and the distribution of the governing influence between the world’s leading powers. The increased activity of the G20 starting in 2008 against the backdrop of the global financial crisis was a response to the manifestation of the polycentric nature of international relations and the impossibility of resolving global problems through the efforts of the superpower and the G7. However, this institution failed to achieve its full potential because the growing power and activity of China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey prevented the United States from seizing total control of this institution and making it benefit primarily from American interests. A liberal world order as interpreted by American theorists and strategists entailed creating the most favorable conditions for the existence and activities of the United States, therefore the work of all international institutions had to benefit solely the interests of the United States and let it dominate all global processes.28 Institutional liberals developed and detailed a concept of global development and a new world order back in the 1990s and participated in its implementation. They did not propose anything radically different from the concepts that were current at the time (or they failed to propose anything at all, confining themselves to the criticisms of neoconservatives), and consequently, it was now possible to talk about the exhaustibility of the liberal idea in the American interpretation. With the

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actions of the United States and proponents of the liberal world order running more and more contrary to the real processes and the interests of leading country actors, which, without denying the role and importance of different institutions, still wanted to reform the existing organizations in their own way, offered their own interpretations of the so-called universal values, and did not wish to see the United States as the only controlling and hegemonic force. There was an emerging recognition of hegemony being unacceptable as a method for handling world affairs, which Russia and China repeatedly stated. Hegemony also prompted doubts among those American political scientists who not only wanted to have US strategy aligned with the real state of affairs, but also wanted to take international relations to a structurally formalized level that was favorable both for the global community as a whole and for the United States, where grave domestic political problems were mounting. The principal concepts used to paint the prospect of a new world order emerging focused on proposals for achieving a particular form of consensus between the leading centers of power, the world’s leading powers—primarily the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union. Here, American experts were particularly active since they also tried to build a great power consensus in the American mold, and to delineate the number and roles of the leading actors/centers that would be allowed to determine the course of the order-shaping process. The most frequently proposed variant featured a three-polar world (United States–European Union–China), which could lead one to suppose a desire to conceptually “program for” this variant by outlining the capabilities and limitations of the order-shaping power aspirations of the European Union and China by conceptually enshrining the special position of the United States. All variants of American-style polycentricity focus on the superpower status of the United States and its position as a global leader that needs to be combined/coordinated with other powers without impinging on US interests and ambitions, while also outlining the area of its activities within an Amerocentric structure.29 The tripolar US–EU–China order option featured the following distribution of the three global functions.

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1. The United States is ready to transfer the function of setting the global agenda, legitimizing and implementing it to the European Union (agenda setting). In this setup, any EU member, a mid-level country, can raise a particular issue or problem. Most of these states follow US policies, accept the liberal world order and are willing to establish it by helping the United States and neutralizing any opponents. Such is the conduct of the United Kingdom (both when it was a part of the European Union and after Brexit), Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic, while other states engage in this conduct to a lesser extent. China and Russia will hardly be satisfied with an agenda featuring, instead of really urgent global development matters, issues that interest the United States and its allies—issues that might have little significance for ensuring the stable and peaceful development of international relations. For instance, Europe’s support for US policy in several post-Soviet states and in the Arab states, and America’s uncompromisingly belligerent policy against Russia (in the form of an informational and economic war) have not been conducive to building a new world order. On the contrary, it has slowed down the process by increasing instability and the prospect of the European Union itself growing weaker. 2. The function of the keeper of the foundations of the global market economy is assigned to China (custodianship). This status is given to China not so much because it is the world’s secondfastest-growing economy with the world’s second-largest GDP, but because China actually limits the economic capabilities of the United States by preventing it from remaining a global economic superpower. This “assignment” is manifested in the acceptance of the claim that the United States “let China slip through its fingers” without having properly controlled investment and without factoring in China’s great power ambitions and its ability to mobilize society to make the “Chinese dream” come true into its calculations.30 This thought does not fit into the framework of American policies, yet one could suppose that, in the foreseeable future, the common interests of the United States and China in terms of preserving and maintaining the foundations of the market economy laid down by the United States and somewhat amended by China will prevail over the contradictions between

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the two countries. US and Chinese egoism and egocentrism will ensure that these two “dreams” will coexist. Russia, India, and Brazil should scrutinize this option very closely, as should the countries of Europe and the Asia Pacific. 3. The United States wants to retain the right to be the “sponsor” (sponsorship), which ensures the introduction of and compliance with rules, norms, and agreements. It also influences decisionmaking on issues in global politics and ensures global security, including supporting trade and finance. Such sponsorship entails, among other things, using (and threatening to use) brute force, which is a skill the United States has honed quite well, as it has the world’s greatest military power. What does the proposed “three-center” scenario promise Russia? The European Union has largely lost its appeal and credibility as the bearer and driver of liberal values and a paragon to be imitated, since most European institutions that claimed to be macro-regional, global, progressive, etc., demonstrated their bias, their highly ideological nature, and their inability to resolve truly important issues of Europe and of other states (if we agree that the European Union is a global power center). Neither the OSCE, nor the ICC, nor the European Court of Human Rights, nor the Council of Europe proved their impartiality. Nor have they exhibited real concerns for the problems of stabilizing global development, of which Europe’s further development is a part. The global community hardly needs such a center—one which also stakes claims to set the global agenda. The areas and results of the sponsorship of the United States can be judged by evaluating the state of affairs in international and regional security that had taken shape by 2020, the powerful arms race launched by the United States, military interventions in the affairs of other countries, and aggressive actions in politics and economies that produced a major economic crisis in the world and in individual states. The coronavirus pandemic that started in 2020 showed that the issues the United States and NATO member countries are putting on the global agenda are far from being those that need to be handled collectively and through the efforts of all the leading states. In its desire to build a liberal world order, to arrive at “America’s golden age,” the United States put the

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world on the brink of a confrontation. The global economy and the economies of entire regions and countries found themselves in a state of a crisis. Extremism and terrorism are on the rise in different countries, and many states are actively building up their military arsenals and bolstering their security.

Important

American, European and Chinese politicians and experts should seriously consider the exhaustibility of the American liberal model. An alternative model is in high demand. Theoretically, a Russian– Chinese world order model is possible, but doubtful, given China’s visible ambition to achieve the status of the second pole and to engage in global governance together with the United States. The possibility of a Russian–European world order also became vague, practically impossible by 2022.

The liberal institutional and realist approaches continued to compete in the debates on the emerging world order through the 2010s, with the latter becoming significantly more influential due, among other things, to Russia, China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and many other countries thinking in these categories. Despite individual differences, the liberals and realists, Democrats and Republicans, are noticeably close conceptually. This has been pointed out by John Mearsheimer, who stated that “the particular international order that obtains at any time is mainly a by-product of the self-interested behavior of the system’s great powers.” This explanation might not be appealing, but it sheds some light on why, after the Cold War, when the USSR voluntarily abolished further confrontation and was disbanded, the United States did not start implementing a peaceful policy, toward Russia among other states, and started strengthening and expanding NATO, destabilizing individual regions and states in Eurasia, particularly those in the proximity to Russia’s borders, and brought the relations to a new confrontation. J. Mearsheimer believes that great powers, as a rule, are incapable of shaping a peaceful world order for two reasons: (1) states are unlikely to agree on a general formula for ensuring peace; and (2) states cannot

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agree on enshrining a world order institutionally. Ultimately, all collective security projects intended to ensure global peace end in failure.31 The course of events after the Cold War convincingly confirms this idea. Every single Russian proposal for creating a collective security system in Europe is rejected by Western states, and attempts to create a truly effective anti-terrorist coalition fail. The United States is not ready to engage in collective action for achieving global peace unless it can dictate its terms unconditionally.

Important

A new world order can be – and is – shaped through the decisive role of state actors, primarily the leading global powers. The 2020 situation showed even more clearly that without a consensus between the leading powers, global problems in the economy, finance, energy, healthcare, migration, environmental pollution, etc., cannot be resolved. The problem of transitioning to a more constructive path of shaping the foundations of global order with a view to ensuring a stable and peaceful global development has become vital. It is counter-productive to focus on building up arms and exaggerating non-existing threats (“the Russian threat”) while not paying enough attention to real threats (terrorism, transnational crime, uncontrolled migration, military technologies in space, information security, etc.).

The fact that there was no desire within the political and academic community in the United States to re-evaluate the actions taken to build a peaceful world order, and those taken toward the leading powers, forced many countries—primarily China, Russia, Turkey, France, and several mid-level states—to become more active in handling the world order problem and in planning their actions in a way that would put them in better stead in the world. Additionally, the domestic crisis in the United States that gradually developed in the 2000s–2010s did not allow the country to continue its policy of shaping the liberal world order at the scale it wanted.32 The years 2016–2020 could be described as a slowdown, a “pause” in the active order-shaping activities of the United States, which, in the opinion of Democrats who came to power in 2021, caused

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grave damage to the prestige and interests of the United States. The claim that America is irreplaceable, that “retrenchment” and “scaling down” its international activities is undesirable and pernicious made a comeback in the rhetoric and actions of the US administration. However, the United States will have a hard time combining its ambitions and the lack of options in its stance on shaping the foundations of global order with real global development trends. It will also have a hard time continuing to implement its special principle of “licensing, selectivity, and pulverizing” in regard to the rest of the world, and to other powers.33 ∗ ∗ ∗ The situation that had emerged by the 2020s could be described as a “pause,” since the United States and its allies wanted but could not continue building the liberal world order in the same way they had done in the past because the concept is exhaustible, and because the outcome of the domestic political crisis that was mounting in the United States remains uncertain, both for the United States itself and for other states. In 2021 the United States initiated a new stage to establish liberal world order under its governance using economic, military and ideological instruments and heavily relying on the support of NATO and EU member states. However the polycentricity of the global system and the existence of leading global centers cannot be ignored or suppressed. Today’s world can be characterized by state and institutional policentricity. The current crisis demonstrates an urgent need to create a regulatory core that involves the United States, China, Russia, Turkey, India, France, and some other major actors capable of making a great and stabilizing contribution to achieving the consensus required to resolve important global problems. Situation at the beginning of the 2020s can end either in a complete imbalance in international relations with an increased rivalry between powers (which is what the United States appears to want and be ready for) or in the start of a new stage in shaping a world order on foundations other than those proposed and promoted by the United States and NATO member states. The future of individual states and the format (cooperative or unpredictably confrontational) of the development of global politics will depend on the degree to which this two-level polycentricity is taken into account in applied foreign political analysis in each state center.34

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As regards a global order and the emergence of a global regulating center, there are several possible options:

1. A liberal-repressive order with the United States and NATO as the governing center. 2. A hybrid order with the United States and China as the governing center. 3. A tripolar order with the United States, Russia, and China as the governing center. 4. A polycentric order with the United States, Russia, China, India, Turkey, France, and Germany (the new “seven”) coexisting and governing pursuant to a compromise-based consensus. 5. An order with the Russian–Chinese (Eurasian) center acting on par with the US or US led center of power .35 The coming decades will be a period of decisive structural transformation in great power relations, radical changes of global and regional institutions. Attention will continue to be focused on the actions of the United States, Russia, and China, which will continue their order formation activities, drawing mid-level and small states into their orbits.

Keywords World order, international relations, order-shaping megatrend, liberal world order, the United States, Russia, China, great powers, international environment. Self-Test 1. What definitions of a “world order” you know? 2. Why does the term “international order” not align with the current state of global development and the nature of interactions between actors? 3. What is meant by the exhaustibility of the liberal concept of world development proposed by the United States?

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4. How can you describe the principal stages in the emergence of the world order after the end of the bipolar period? 5. What are the prospects of order-shaping centers emerging? 6. What is the correlation between the Russian and American concepts of world order?

Notes 1. See: Y.P. Davydov, Norms vs. Power: The Problem of Global Regulation (Moscow: Nauka Press, 2002), 35. 2. See: T.A. Shakleina (ed.), Russia and the US in the 21st Century: Relations of Discontent (Moscow: Aspect Press, 2020), 15–19. 3. For more detail on the debates of the 1980s–1990s about the world order, see: T.A. Shakleina, Russia and the US in a New World Order. Debates in the Political and Academic Communities in Russia and the US (1991– 2002) (Moscow: Institute for US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2002), 21–92. For an analysis of Western theories and concepts in some ways connected with the world order problem, see: A.D. Bogaturov, Great Powers in the Pacific: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia After World War II (1945–1995) (Moscow: Konvert Press, 1997), 13–69. 4. William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (summer 1999): 5–41. 5. Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 35–49. 6. A.D. Bogaturov, “Pluralistic Unipolarity and Russia’s Interests,” Svobodnaya mysl’ (Free Thought ) 2 (1996): 26–36. A similar idea was proposed by A.V. Torkunov, who wrote that the 1990s order would be properly described as “uni-multipolarity” or, more precisely, as “asymmetric multipolarity,” which is understood as a sort of a transitional period in global development. See A.V. Torkunov, “International Relations after the Kosovo Crisis,” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (The International Affairs ) 12 (1999): 45–52. 7. E.Y. Batalov, “A New Era – A New World,” Svobodnaya Mysl’ (Free Thought ), no. 1 (2001): 4–13. 8. Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2008), www.foreignaffairs.org/200 80501faessay87304. 9. Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the TwentyFirst Century (New York, 2004).

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10. See: A.D. Bogaturov, Great Powers in the Pacific: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia after the Second World War. 1945– 1995 (Moscow: Konvert-MONF, 1997), 40. 11. Ibid., 59. 12. Poland, for instance, while not being a leading global or European regional power, is one of the United States’ main allies in advancing the Amerocentric liberal world order. Poland claims the status of an influential actor in European and global politics and supports the actions of the United States that are not conducive to stabilizing international relations and resolving the problem of ordering the process of working out the rules of the game. 13. Y.P. Davydov, Norms vs. Power, 39–41, 229. 14. E.Y. Batalov, World Development and World Order (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 100. 15. E.Y. Batalov, “‘New World Order’: Towards Analysis Methodology,” Polis 2003. 16. Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the TwentyFirst Century (New York, 2004). 17. Samuel Huntington, “Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite,” The National Interest 75 (spring 2004): 5–18. 18. Richard Haass, “The Case for ‘Integration,’” The National Interest, no. 81 (Fall 2005): 26–27. The events in Yugoslavia in the 1990s–2000s and South Ossetia in 2008 showed that, according to Haass, only NATO member states enjoyed the right to humanitarian intervention against genocide and enforce peace enforcement. 19. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest (winter 2002/2003): 12–13, 17. 20. In accordance with the “second world” concept, the world has three naturally evolved empires: the United States, China, and the European Union, and each is strong enough to expand. According to his view, global development would be determined by inter-imperial relations, and not by inter-country or inter-civilization relations. This concept claimed that the fate of other states defined as the “second world” (or the colonial field for the three empires) depended on the policies of the three superpowers that were already locked in a race for domination and possession. Expert pointed out that the United States, China, and the European Union, which concentrated nearly all the global power in their hands, would strive to prevent any large “second world” power from closing the power gap between them. The superpower that is best able to pull more countries to its understanding of “success” will be the one to rise and become a super superpower. See: Parag Khanna, The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century (New York, 2009), xiv–xv.

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21. The influential American political scientist Michael Mandelbaum wrote that the United States essentially acted alone, in place of an entire global government, as it provided services to the global community, protected it, advanced the development of trade, finance, economy, etc. Acting beyond its borders in economy, controlling financial and trade flows, ensuring the security of many states via NATO membership and through other means, conducting military operations abroad to combat tyrannies and to democratize countries, the United States, in Mandelbaum’s opinion, acted in the same manner as governments within states do when they protect their citizens and ensure the successful economic development of their states. Many other liberal American political scientists believe that the United States has done so much for the global community it deserves recognition as the prime minister of a global government or the speaker of a global parliament. See: Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath. How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 21st Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 7–15. 22. A.D. Bogaturov, “Leadership and Decentralization in the International System,” Mezhdunarodnye protsessy (International Trends ) 4, no. 3 (September–December 2006): 5–15. Available at: www.intertrends.ru. 23. Stephen M. Walt, “Taming American Power,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 105–120; David C. Hendrickson, and Robert W. Tucker, “The Freedom Crusade,” The National Interest, no. 81 (fall 2005): 12–21. 24. Robert Kagan, “The Return of History,” The Los Angeles Times (August 5, 2007), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications; C. Kupchan, “Autonomous Governance,” Russia in Global Affairs 3 (May–June 2009), Available at: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/38/11947. html. 25. Joseph Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 117–118. 26. NATO members Canada and Norway spearheaded the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm in 2001. According to the principle: (1) states should protect their populations; (2) if states cannot provide this protection, the international community should, through the UN Security Council, respond and help protect the population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 2005. Available at: http://www.un.org/ru/docume nts/decl_conv/declarations/outcome2005.shtml. 27. Summary of the Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), World Federalist Movement—Institute for Global Policy, 2, http://www.respon sibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/learn-about-rtop#annan. For more on the UN’s activities, see: A.V. Khudaikulova, “The UN in Today’s

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29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

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World: Adapting to International Realities,” Situatsionnye analizy (Situational analyses ), Issue 5: International Institutions in Today’s Global Politics; T.A. Shakleina (ed) (Moscow: MGIMO University Press, 2016). American political scientists, primarily conservative Republicans and Democrats, such as Robert Dole, Charles Krauthammer, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, called G7/8 an “anachronism” believing that the United States should be acting independently. Opponents of the superpower being excessively dependent on other actors believed that the United States had enough resources to govern globally on its own and it fulfil its historic mission as a reformer regardless. See: E.Y. Batalov, Person, World, Politics (Moscow: Academic Educational Forum, 2008); Y.P. Davydov, Laws Against Force: The Problem of Global Regulation (Moscow: Nauka Press, 2002). Simon Reich, and Richard Ned Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System (Princeton, 2014); Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2014); Thazha Varkey Paul (ed.), Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future (Cambridge, 2016); Stephen G. Brooks, and William Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Richard Haass, A World in Disarray (New York: Penguin Press, 2017); John Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, 2018). A.D. Voskressensky, “Implementing the ‘Chinese Dream’ in the ‘Xi Jinping Era.’ What Russia Should Expect”, World Economy and International Relations 63, no. 10 (2019): 5–16. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, 2015), 49–51. T.A. Shakleina (ed.), Russia and the US in the 21st Century: Relations of Discontent (Moscow: Aspect Press, 2020). A.D. Bogaturov, “Pulverizing Strategy,” in International Relations and in the Foreign Policy of the United States (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2004), www.obraforum.ru. See: T.A. Shakleina (ed.), Situational Analyses. Issue 5. International Institutions in Today’s Global Politics (Moscow: MGIMO University Press, 2017). As Alexey Bogaturov has noted, we have entered the third stage in international politics, a “three-centres run order” in which matters of wars or peace are now decided by the members of the “five” nuclear powers. He offered the following description of the new stage: “The third period started in January 2014 with the crisis and coup d’état in Kyiv that resulted in Ukraine losing some of its territories in its south and east, and in President Petro Poroshenko coming to power. The United States and the countries of the united Europe provided active support. Crimea went to Russia following a

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referendum. A moment of truth came in 2014, when Russia had to affirm its foreign policy in a new structure of world governance that had become a three-centre structure following the Ukraine–Russia dispute. Russia and China moved to the foreground, as they demanded that contested matters be handled through a coalition. Now the future would be determined by the United States’ dialogue with Russia and China, while the United Kingdom and France kept a nervous eye on these discussions. The circumstances of developing and making decisions in the UN Security Council changed once again. Other states drew their own conclusions. European countries froze deep in thought on when and how it would be best to start rebuilding relations with Russia to the level that was achieved in 1991–2013.” See: A.D. Bogaturov (ed.), A Systemic History of International Relations: A World Re-Divided. 1980–2018: A Textbook (Moscow: Urait, 2019), 291–327.

Recommended Reading Batalov, E.Y. World Development and World Order. Moscow, 2005. Bogaturov, A.D. Great Powers in the Pacific: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia after the Second World War. 1945–1995. Moscow, 1997. Bogaturov, A.D. (ed.). A Systemic History of International Relations: A World Re-Divided. 1980–2018: A Textbook. Moscow: Urait, 2019. Davydov, Y.P. Norms vs. Power: The Problem of Global Regulation. Moscow: Nauka Press, 2002. Mearsheimer J.J. The Great Delusion. Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Haven, 2018. Shakleina, T.A. (ed.). Russia and the US in the 21st Century. Relations of Discontent. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2020. Shakleina T.A. Russia and the US in Contemporary International Relations. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2022. Shakleina, T.A. (ed.). Situational Analyses. Issue 5: International Institutions in Today’s Global Politics. Moscow: MGIMO University Press, 2017. Torkunov, A., Noonan, N., and Shakleina, T. (eds.). Russia and the United States in the Evolving World Order. Moscow: MGIMO University, 2018.

CHAPTER 3

Global Governance of the Polycentric World: Actors, Architecture, Hierarchy of Issue Areas Alexandra Khudaykoulova

As a consequence of globalization, global governance is one of the most controversial terms and contested concepts today. Especially now when we are witnessing the “sunset” of globalization in its initial form. The need for global governance is greatly increased when global systemic crises arise, as they did in 2008 and 2020. In the current climate of uncertainty and deglobalization, the importance of global governance is greater than ever before. Even though many segments of world politics have continued to exist in a disordered state, the global governance imperative still retains its importance.

A. Khudaykoulova (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_3

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The Conceptual Framework of Global Governance Despite the booming idea of global governance at the stage of “late” globalization, neither the concept itself nor the formats for its implementation are fundamentally new. The discourse surrounding global governance problems is a little over three decades old. However, there is still no consensus on a single common understanding of the concept. Global governance is far from being a normative term capable of providing an objective and qualitative assessment of it process. For the most part, the concept of global governance is reactive and responsive to emerging changes. In the most general outline, the global governance discourse focuses on the following issues: What is global governance? What should global governance be? What actors and mechanisms are most suitable for regulating global processes? Who controls the process of formulating rules and norms? In the most general terms, global governance means regulating individual transnational issues and processes through the achievement of specific agreements using common rules to contain undesirable phenomena, counteract crises, and resolve related tasks.

Historically, the term “global governance” appeared in the Western inter-disciplinary discourse and was positioned as a product of the Western civilization. The global governance agenda was formed under the dominant influence of the neoliberal ideology and globalization, which to a certain extent, provided it with a Western vector and subsequently generated some criticism from the emerging powers. As a practice and field of study, global governance began to develop after the end of the Cold War, although the first manifestations of regulation in the international sphere date back to the period of detente. The concept of global governance initially boiled down to the futurological idea of a global government analogous to national ones. James Rosenau, one of the first global governance theorists, pointed out the diminishing role of nation-states and the increasing influence of non-state actors.1 Consequently, he defined global governance as a sum total of efforts taken by disjointed actors that supplement the activities of states or push states out of the international governance system altogether.2 Aware of the utopian nature of former notions concerning the possibility of establishing a single regulating center and a codified system of norms, we should recognize that

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the main principle of global governance, “governing without a government,” remains the same. The American political scientist Thomas Weiss describes global governance from the point of view of “collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve; it reflects the capacity of the international system at any moment in time to provide government-like services in the absence of world government.”3 In 1995, the UN Commission on Global Governance published the “Our Global Neighborhood” report to advance solutions to humanity’s global problems. The report did not meet with general approval, although it constituted an attempt to present a comprehensive analysis of the concept that was generally understood as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken, and includes formal institutions and regimes that have been given the power to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.”4 Discussions concerning the outlines and contents of global governance peaked in the late 1990s. Neoliberal institutionalism and globalism were particularly focused on issues of regulating the world amid new emerging threats and worldwide problems, although neither the former nor the latter were, strictly speaking, global governance theories as such. However, they proceeded from the common premise that purposeful regulation of global processes is preferable to a spontaneous and fragmented state of affairs similar to the Hobbesian “war of all against all.” Having refuted the hierarchical “top-down” principle of power structuring, many scholars began to promote the concept of global governance as the multilevel sum total of actions, rules, and mechanisms (official and unofficial, public, hybrid, private) connected with transnational regulation.5 Accordingly, the new global governance model (which constitutes networked interactions between international regimes, organizations, and institutions with different spans and features) is characterized by a de-centralizing type of functioning. Theories popular in the 1990s included a limited number of states and institutions as global governance actors. Paradoxically, even the United Nations (UN) was excluded from the list of global governance actors. This was accompanied by “outdated” and “insufficient” norms enshrined in the UN Charter being replaced with the wholesale introduction of new

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moral imperatives regarding interference in the internal affairs of states. This chapter uses an expanded interpretation of global governance that, on the contrary, emphasizes the UN’s special role despite all the possible problems and imperfections. The proposed expanded interpretation of global governance proceeds from a comprehensive understanding of (a) the actors that make up the global governance structure, which includes “club” diplomacy and related institutions (G20) and monetary regulators (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), as well as the entire multilevel and ramified network, including the UN, regional organizations, and non-governmental institutions; and (b) the global governance agenda that, in addition to economic, monetary, and trade regulations, includes problems of strategic stability. Global governance should be seen as a “working” expert-analytical concept for structuring and evaluating large-scale global transformations, mainly in terms of institutional dynamics. Global governance is not uniform and static and cannot fall under a simplistic evaluation formula in terms of bad or good. It requires careful, thoughtful, and measured use.

The Evolution of Global Governance Practice Despite the clearly fragmented nature of the theoretical foundations of global governance (its ambiguous definition, divergent interpretations, etc.), there is still a demand for practical global governance, and it is perhaps even growing. The practice of regulating multilateral intergovernmental and transnational processes was improving as the international system evolved. Events and processes of the post-War period (the first stage) had a decisive influence on its genesis. The bipolar model of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was characterized by confrontational governability, particularly during the détente period, when the international system began to grow progressively more governable. Issues of strategic stability were moved to the global level of regulation and treaties and these issues were handled at the level of the Big Two, the USSR and the United States. Bipolar discipline also affected the economic agenda, whose items were arranged along bloc lines and concentrated within the appropriate organizations: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). For instance, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee coordinated development assistance for capitalist countries,

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while the socialist bloc had its own mechanisms for coordinating assistance within Comecon. To regulate and liberalize trade, the Western bloc relied on the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while the socialist bloc promoted another model: the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), linking trade issues with matters of development assistance. Capitalist states influenced global financial management via the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), thereby single-handedly setting the rules of the game. Despite being ideologically affiliated with the opposite bloc, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were members of the IMF at various times. For instance, Czechoslovakia was an IMF member from 1945–1954, Yugoslavia was a member in 1945–1992, and Poland was a member in 1946–1950. In the 1970s, a realization of the importance of global governance came against the backdrop of an easing of international tensions, alongside an awareness of the importance of global problems. Consequently, individual non-systemic attempts were made to regulate various areas of interactions between states. International organizations came to play an active part in regulating international processes, and their number was growing steadily amid increasing economic internationalization. According to the Union of International Associations, from 1910–1914, the world had a total of 20 international intergovernmental organizations (IIGO), and by the late twentieth century, their number exceeded 50,000 with over 43,000 being international non-governmental organizations (INGO). The Yearbook of International Organizations for 2020 contains information on over 72,500 international organizations, extant and defunct, intergovernmental and non-governmental, and 41,000 of them are currently operational.6 Regulating roles were assigned to the UN (primarily its Security Council) in the military-political sphere; the IMF and the WB in the financial sphere; GATT in global trade; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in culture and education; UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in agriculture and food provision; and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in labor relations. The role of international organizations in the global governance practice during the Cold War was traditionally high because the USSR, as a power center to be negotiated with, preferred the UN as a talks venue. In addition to the creation of IIGOs and INGOs, the 1970s saw the foundations of para-organizations laid down. These organizations would, in two or three decades, become just as important and influential as the

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traditional institutional regulators. In 1975, the Group of Six (G6) held its first meeting in France, attended by heads of state and government of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Japan. The parties adopted the Declaration of Rambouillet, a joint declaration on the economic agenda that also called for non-aggression in trade and for abandoning the practice of erecting new discriminatory barriers. Starting in 1977, meetings of the Group of Seven (following Canada’s accession) were held annually. In addition to efforts to regulate issues in the economy, trade, and energy, the superpowers paid close attention to military and political relations, which were regulated through a system of treaties. They succeeded in reaching an agreement on containing and regulating (pre)strategic weapons. In 1972, they signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). Important steps were made in restricting strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet–American treaties on strategic arms limitation signed in 1972 (SALT I) and 1979 (SALT II) to some degree “disciplined” the arms race, yet at the same time failed to significantly reduce strategic weapons. In 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) was signed, marking the start of true disarmament. The second phase in the development of global governance practice started in the early 1990s and was directly connected with the changing structure of the world order and the redistribution of power. The unipolar model based on the dominance of the United States as the only superpower was never implemented since stable and universally acceptable rules of interactions had never been formulated. In the 1990s, the reduced rivalry between the leading world powers was conducive to relative “unanimity” in the UN Security Council’s votes. For instance, while the Council rejected 162 draft resolutions during the Cold War (1946–1989), only nine draft resolutions were vetoed from 1990–1999.7 At the start of the new millennium, the differences between the five permanent members of the Security Council exacerbated again, and the number of vetoes reached 35 as of late 2019.8 The 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis brought to light unexpected trends that affected the global governance practice. Amid rapidly developing globalization processes and the growing cross-dependence of states, the role of international institutions was decreasing, while the liberal model of economic (self-)regulation ran into a series of fundamental limitations. These circumstances starkly demonstrated the need to reform the global economic order and create a new governance model for the global

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economy. It was back then, in 1999, that the G20 was formed, although it only began to make full use of its potential a decade later. The 2008 financial and economic crisis and its consequences (such as the global recession of the next five years and states actively interfering in issues of economic regulation) spurred on the processes linked to implementing global governance ideas. At the level of global actors, the G20 sharply ramped up its activities. The Financial Stability Board replaced the Financial Stability Forum and was given an extended mandate. An agreement on banking supervision and capital requirements for major banks was also adopted (Basel III, 2009). The third phase (which started around 2007–2010 and continues until this day) coincided with another spiral in the evolution of the world order toward greater polycentricity, with “ascendant” states gaining more prominent roles and influence, the decline of the dominant positions of neoliberalism and start of the post-globalization. The rise of some alternative centers of power and the relative decline of the so-called collective West has indeed become a challenge and, at the same time, a new reality of global governance in its current version. Symbolically, this stage started with the speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference, lasting one hour and 14 minutes, which produced a tremendous effect. For the most part, this period is characterized by the redistribution of the influence/power of states, which paved the way for minor changes in the activities of the IMF and the WB.9 Nevertheless, international discourse and standards continue to be dominated by Bretton Wood structures and Western donors, albeit with much less influence. Voting shares are still unevenly distributed among developing and developed countries. A revision of quotas remains an extremely painful process for developed countries. The lack of consensus on many global issues has led to a decline in the effectiveness of the “big three” global regulators—IMF, WB, and WTO. At the same time, the importance of the UN, which has great potential but real limited opportunities, has also declined. While the G7 members continue to strengthen their power in many indicators, the cumulative potential of the largest “ascendant” counties, particularly China, is growing just as fast. The alignment of qualitative indicators in economy and trade brought political influence to the “ascendant” states and provided them with new capabilities to shape the agenda and impact the global process. Against the background of the consolidation of countries that can conditionally be attributed to the collective non-West, a different spatial-geographical

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structure of global governance is taking shape with the strengthening of rising regional powers, such as in the Asia Pacific Region and Greater Eurasia. As material indicators grow and the structural power of the latter develops, the largest developing countries actively challenge the unilateral leadership of the collective West. New centers of power began to claim the role of regulators, which paved the way for the emergence of multipolarity in many areas. The changed balance of power between developed and developing countries has increased their competition, which, as current events show, is taking the form of a rather harsh confrontation. In 2020, the world witnessed a severe aggravation of relations between the world’s two largest economies, the United States and the People’s Republic of China, which found themselves in a state of a trade war. After the start of Russia’s special military operation in February 2022, Moscow was recognized as the primary threat to the United States and its allies. In this regard, we cannot but mention “decoupling,” which refers to the deliberate severing of trade and economic ties between the United States and its allies with China, which served as a springboard to accelerate the division of the world community into two blocs—the collective Weat and the collective non-West. Although the initial trigger for decoupling was the anti-Russian sanctions adopted in 2014, five years later, it affected China. Russia’s military operation in Donbas finally formalized decoupling in trade and economic, and political spheres. The new crisis dynamics of the international system demonstrates two relatively equidistant trends. On the one hand, the withdrawal of states from multilateral coordination to solve global problems in the short term. On the other hand, the preservation in the long term of the potential of multilateral cooperation and global governance. It is not without reason that today’s global governance practice is shaped, among other things, out of blocs, alliances, and unions of the largest states, so-called flexible situational coalitions. The current international crisis will likely affect the model, nature, and formats of global governance in the future.

Global Governance Architecture The question of architecture of global governance remains important. On the one hand, objectively, there is no single global governance center. On the other hand, the current global governance architecture looks highly

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representative as it rests on (1) the leading states; (2) international organizations; (3) regional and sub-regional organizations; (4) informal bodies and clubs; (5) non-governmental organizations. The global governance system is marked by its comprehensive nature and also by an expanding network of alternative interaction platforms. In the absence of a homogeneous institutional environment, each segment has different systems/types of international regulation with different sets of actors, and different degrees of coordination and control, and the measures implemented have had varying degrees of success. The choice of a particular mechanism is historically determined by the agenda (the scale and urgency of problems), and by the readiness of the various actors to cooperate with one another. To a certain extent, the actors engaged in the global governance practice have formed a “power” hierarchy. Traditionally, global governance is mostly a prerogative of states. Although most current problems are global in nature and require coordinated inter-country efforts. Solutions for many issues are sent down to the national level, as was demonstrated in 2020 in the fight against COVID-19. States in their interactions: (1) set and impose the rules for regulating global processes; (2) make joint decisions; and (3) delineate responsibility. To some degree, global governance draws its legitimacy from that of the leading global powers, which constantly compete for the right to impose norms. Consequently, they use international organizations and other recognized platforms to advance their own approaches to the global or regional architecture. We can agree that “the current set-up of global governance appears to amplify these proclivities of countries rather than establish constraints on the excesses of national self-interest.”15 At the same time, cooperation between the leading powers in ensuring global governance is weakening. The West hardly accepts the accommodation of new centers of power. The parties have moved from a phase of rivalry to confrontation. However, their interaction is not always confrontational. It sometimes gravitates toward a balance of competition and, on specific issues, interdependence. Today, the tasks of global governance have to be mainly solved in the context of the redistribution of power between the US, Russia, and China, which largely proceed from the current interests and focus on situational crises. The nature of the relationship between them and their approaches to world order and global governance characterize the full range of complex contradictions between the Western coalition of traditional powers and the new poles of influence.

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The current US strategy in terms of global governance is characterized by an extremely pragmatic approach, which boils down to maintaining two key formats: preserving traditional coalition diplomacy based on NATO and other organizations, where the United States holds the leading positions and majority support, and, should the need arise, switching multilateral interactions into a unilateral or bilateral format to block unfavorable trends. Washington’s loyalty to the international institutions, which were established with its decisive participation, has always extended to the extent that it does not conflict with its national interests. The US policy concerning the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) is quite telling. Having boycotted the Council in the early 2000s, Washington returned in 2009, although it had not given up protesting Cuban and Iran’s membership there. In 2018, the United States once again withdrew from the HRC in disagreement with the collegiate decision-making method. Conceptually, the United States will continue to rely on the most important global institutions, tactically adjusting its goals and interests to their agenda and functioning. Since the United States still leads in terms of funding for major international organizations. The United States is moving away from long-term commitments, relying mostly on short-term situational arrangements. For the foreseeable future, Washington will rely on systemic confrontation, a strategy of containment, and quite selective cooperation with new centers of power. However, no matter how harsh its rhetoric and threats, Washington does not dare cross the “red lines” and destroy the framework of the international system, without slowing down the pace of the struggle for global leadership. While in the twentieth century, China was actually on the periphery of the world system, today it is increasingly involved in global governance. And its role in global governance is progressively expanding. Unlike the three previous industrial revolutions led by the West, the current one is undoubtedly driven by China., which offers an alternative model of development, based on state capitalism, political conservatism, and its own financial system. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Beijing had significantly strengthened its position in key international organizations, which allowed it to take a leading position in the institutional framework of global governance, which is now significantly supported by transregional economic projects. China’s foreign political strategy relies on an entire array of Confucian paradigms in ideas and values including “community of common destiny for mankind” and a “harmonious world,”

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preaching a course for a stable, peace-loving, fair world and mutually beneficial cooperation. To a certain degree, transition from peaceful coexistence to a harmonious world can be interpreted as China’s version of global governance and a counterbalance to the Western discourse. In this context, China declares its readiness to make greater global commitments and move closer to Russia for a more equitable and rational global governance. Being closely integrated into global production, commercial, and financial chains and providing one-third of the global economy’s growth, China concentrates its global governance agenda primarily on financial and economic matters. Beijing is not happy with the current contours of the global economic governance system, in particular, with the small role that the yuan plays as a reserve currency, China’s weak influence on decision-making in Bretton Woods Institutions, and US trade protectionism. On the one hand, China is interested in strengthening a number of existing global regulation mechanisms (like G20), although with a certain shift in their functioning in its favor. China is paying special attention to the regional structures, particularly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. On the other hand, Beijing is promoting alternative structures, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Similar to China, Russia has adopted a flexible approach to global governance that is largely determined by the emerging power balance. In the 1990s, Russia saw global governance as a Western concept that suited the interests of traditional power centers, thus protecting the status quo. In the new millennium, however, Russia’s foreign policy exhibits pragmatism that relies on multipolarity—a “concert” of nations, regional organizations, and informal structures. At the same time, Russia recognizes that forming a multipolar world will take a long time. In addition, the current period of Russian foreign policy is also characterized by “assertiveness” and rationalism. Russia positions itself as one of the centers of power of global importance in the non-Western world. It is integration into the political structures, and the global market on the terms of “secondary” could not be sustainable because it did not provide not only for consideration of Russia’s national interests in key areas but even an equal and mutually respectful dialogue. Russian diplomacy actively promotes its foreign political strategy at such venues as BRICS, the G20, the SCO, the OIC, etc. Russia views the UN as a universal venue for

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achieving a consensus on the entire set of global problems, and consequently, Moscow considers the organization to be its main resource and multilateral mechanism. The Russian leadership and its political establishment describe the UN as a “center for regulating international relations and coordinating global policy,” a “universal venue for crisis resolution,” and a “guarantor of multilateralism.” Russia is traditionally diplomatically active within the UN, calling for its global role to be preserved and even expanded. This approach is reflected, without exception, in all of Russia’s foreign political concepts,16 which substantiate the need to boost the UN’s role in ensuring stability, predictability, and multipolarity. However, Russia has repeatedly pointed out that many sound principles of the UN Charter have been perverted, especially the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-interference in sovereign affairs. Obviously, in current circumstances, Russia will promote its vision of the system of global governance that will best suit its geostrategic interests and the solution of relevant problems. To be sure, specific historical configurations of global governance depend on the balance of power on the international stage. Currently, three powers in some way pin their hopes on preserving and/or restoring and/or acquiring global leadership. The United States and Russia are approximately equal in their military power, China is approaching the United States in terms of its total economic power. Objectively, the parties have different national interests and priorities, which determines the competitive nature of their interactions. In the clash of interests of global actors, an important role is played not only by the resource (material) component, by also by the values that will determine the sustainability of emerging alliances. Clearly, the states do not have a clear understanding of their long-term strategic interactions. And each of them is still engaged in subtle diplomatic maneuvering intended to contain each other in the spirit of Henry Kissinger. The architecture of global governance and its regulating mechanisms are becoming more complex and dense and is not limited to interactions between states, which extend their competition to controlling key international institutions whose role and significance are increasingly contested. In the postwar period a multilevel system with a decentralized network of organizations has emerged, where each organization has its own reach and features that extend to the dominant number of areas of international and transnational interactions. Such regulation is implemented

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either directly (top-down leadership) or indirectly following the principle of “anything that works is acceptable” (self-governance). Within this logic, the established term “global governance” is semantically similar to “global governability.” Different theories offer different assessments of the role and influence of international organizations. For instance, realist schools view intergovernmental organizations as tools in the hands of great powers and believe them to have only partial and qualified independence: in this interpretation, international organizations, including the UN, can only produce results with support from dominant powers. Neoliberal institutionalism, with its belief in the independence and autonomy of international organizations, treats them as an effective mechanism for setting up inter-country cooperation and reducing the transactional costs involved in aligning interests. In this respect, the UN is gradually being transformed into one of the principal global governance institutions. In the constructivist opinion, international organizations shape the interests and, consequently, conduct, of states. Most theoretical approaches present international organizations as tools for resolving the “dilemmas” of collective action and for working out common rules of the game. The largest of them act as full-fledged economic and political actors and, to a certain extent, could be qualified as actors of global governance. At the same time, the legal personality of international organizations is secondary and stems from the legal personality of states. Given that the largest chunk of the financial and resource base of these organizations is shaped by the leading states, international organizations are forced to reckon with their “donors” and in some cases have to “play along” with them. The United Nations is usually called the kernel of global governance. Its mission is to ensure a coordinated political balance of the overall international relations system. At the same time, despite its global reach and the universal span of its areas of activity, the UN has never exactly been a global governance forum. First, the UN is an egalitarian organization that embodies the principle of equality of all its member states. The UN’s unique legitimacy is based on universal membership (193 states today), which makes collective decisions all the more difficult to achieve. In the meantime, global governance is, to a greater degree, an exclusive function of “the few,” and to some extent a result of subjective decisions. The global governance functionality in the UN system largely lies with the Security Council, which,

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however, bears sectoral responsibility: it is mostly military and political subjects that come under its purview. Second, one stark factor stands out among the many factors that affect the efficient functioning of the UN system: the never-ending disagreements between the permanent members of the Security Council. During the Cold War, the UN had no real leverage to mitigate the inter-bloc confrontation. At that time, it mostly served as a stage for, and an observer of, the superpowers’ “high” politics. Although the few instances of its willingness to advance cooperation did produce tangible results in crisis resolution. Despite the post-bipolar changes to the global power balance, the line-up of the permanent members of the UN Security Council remains the same. Calls to change the Security Council are regularly voiced by countries that are actively involved in the UN’s activities (a project proposed by the G4: Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil) and by an extensive coalition of medium-sized/small and developing states (the Uniting for Consensus project). In turn, the Security Council’s traditional “five” holds a very cautious stance on the issue and is not willing to expand the number of permanent members. Russia’s stance boils down to the need to account for the interests of all states while preserving the Security Council’s role as the key link in the global governance system, which involves keeping the veto power of its permanent members.17 Russia calls for not deviating from the UN Charter. Third, the UN has enshrined its status as a universal organization with global responsibility, its activities are large-scale and comprehensive. At the same time, the organization is not a cure-all for world disasters and cataclysms, as shown by its inefficiency and the failure of several of its initiatives, operations, and projects.

Important

The UN remains the only operational venue for discussing, coordinating, and adopting crucial decisions at the global level, despite the inevitable costs and the system’s imperfections. There is simply no other equally representative multilateral alternative. Many of the UN’s achievements are taken for granted, overshadowed by rising crisis phenomena in the international system, and this situation is

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made worse by “undermining” the United Nations systems, which is exacerbated by the position of the United States.

At its 65th session in 2010, the UN General Assembly debated the matters of global governance. One of the results of these debates was the establishment of an informal platform for interactions between the UN General Assembly and the G20. Soon after, the UN General Assembly adopted its resolution “The United Nations in Global Governance,”19 which sets forth the need to apply inclusive, transparent, and effective multilateral approaches to address global challenges and reaffirming the central role of the United Nations in ongoing efforts to find solutions to such challenges. The resolution places special emphasis on the agenda in global economic management and development. Today, the UN objectively needs a carefully considered and coordinated reform to strengthen the advantages it enjoys, advance global initiatives, and promote a long-term strategy for ensuring international security and sustainable development. The success of this reform depends both on improving the efficiency of the implementation of a range of areas, and on the introduction of positive changes to the structure and methods of the UN’s main bodies. In this sense, the reform is two-pronged: it is both structural and functional. Many initiatives for reforming both tracks are implemented slowly, gradually, and successfully. For example, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was established and started its work, a special working group was launched to intensify the activities of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Fund was set up, and a revision of ineffective programs that duplicate each other was undertaken, etc. At the same time, many reform projects, including changes to the UN Security Council, are far from being finalized. UN reform is a comprehensive and sensitive process. Remarkably, calls for modernizing the UN are particularly loud during international crises. Therefore, it is difficult to overcome the political bias of many reform initiatives and proposals owing to the differently oriented intentions of the coalitions of states involved. Many experts are convinced that “the most acceptable option for rebuilding the world order would be to strengthen the UN Security Council as the ‘world government’ with a mandate to decide on the questions of peace and war that are essential for the survival of states.”20 Some

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proposals on expanding the format of the UN Security Council’s activities without changing the composition of its permanent members appear balanced and could serve as a foundation for starting a careful reform process. We are talking about engaging regional structures and representatives of regions/continents in the work of the Security Council via the establishment of an advisory board of regional/inter-regional alliances. Instead of a subjective balance of powers, geography would be the determining factor here. Such a board would be vested with powers to regulate issues of civil (non-military) international security, including cybersecurity, energy, the environment, pandemics, etc.21 In the context of the deglobalization processes that had emerged against the backdrop of deepening US–China trade and economic contradictions and were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and amid the waning effectiveness of international organizations, rational regionalization appears to be the optimal form for developing multilateral cooperation between states. There is an increasing demand for such regionalization as a format for promoting trade and economic partnerships and for states interacting within the strategic military and political alliances. Creating a regional stratum in the global governance system, achieving a higher degree of consolidation of regional treaties and coopting them into global institutions, including “club-based” ones, would ensure a balance between national interests and incentives for international development.22 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) should be given special mention among regional organizations. These two alliances have gained a megaregional reach and have partially assumed the functions of global governance in the trans-regional spaces that accord with their areas of responsibility. Since the late 1990s, some of the UN’s functions have been taken over by NATO in an authoritarian manner (following the “might makes right” principle), as happened, in particular, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, since NATO today is acting as the most powerful regional militarypolitical alliance of ideologically proximate states, even if the interests of its members are progressively diverging. After the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has been working hard on shaping a new development paradigm, moving away from a regional collective defense strategy to a globalist model of universal collective security. NATO banked on expanding its interests from the area of its operational responsibility in

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the North Atlantic to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. The expansion of NATO’s geographical reach and its presence in the main conflicts of our time in the strategically important regions addresses the main political task of the West: transforming the Alliance into a planet-wide institution that ensures international security in the interests of the “collective West” under US leadership. The experience of the 1990s–2010s leads to the conclusion that a global NATO-centric policy has no inclination toward cooperating with institutional structures that are outside the orbit of the Western world. For example, NATO preferred to handle the Afghanistan problem without cooperating with the CSTO.

Important

NATO’s 2010 strategic concept, entitled ”Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” sets forth its long-term development goals, which include making the Alliance more flexible and efficient and stepping up its engagement in crisis settlement operations. The key tasks here are “active engagement” (consistently strengthening the bloc as a key global actor), “strategic defense” (the Alliance’s intention to make full use of its new status as the guarantor and tool of enforcing a world order), and “crisis regulation” (justifying any NATO involvement in crises and conflicts flaring up beyond the borders of the North Atlantic Alliance at any stage of their development).

In the interests of promoting NATO’s “global” dimension, steps are taken to develop a many-planed system of partnerships and advisory engagements with other states and organizations in the Euro-Atlantic region, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf. In other words, the plan entails using NATO as a global venue for uniting the forces of regional security organizations, including NATO–SCO, NATO and individual CSTO members, and NATO’s direct ties with Japan, India, and Australia. The SCO is an important intergovernmental regional organization whose functions extend, among other areas, to issues of military and political regulation. The SCO is not a military bloc or a military alliance in the literal sense (unlike NATO), or an open security conference (unlike

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the ASEAN Regional Forum). It acts as a kind of intermediary. The SCO has been developing as a security organization, counteracting new challenges and threats. In addition to security issues, the SCO’s security agenda features economic and humanitarian cooperation, which, taken together, constitute an important factor in ensuring Eurasian stability. The economic component of the SCO’s operations is influenced by China and driven by the concerns of other parties regarding China’s expansion. The SCO positions itself as an organization based on openness, mutual trust, and extensive consultations. It is flexible in shaping its agenda. Originally, the SCO grew out of treaties on mutual border security agreements, including the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions (1996) and the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Area (1997), which are intended to improve trust among the five founding members, establish cooperation between border agencies, install mutual control over the border regions, and inform each other of the border situation. Subsequently, the SCO has been developing as a security organization counteracting new challenges and threats. SCO members also signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism (2001), and the Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (2004); established the Regional AntiTerrorist Structure (RATS), the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, and a three-level mechanism for cooperation between anti-drug agencies; and set up contacts with the UNDP, the UN Security Council, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, the OSCE, and the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center. The resolution adopted at the 65th session of the UN General Assembly in 2010 entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” qualifies the latter as a crucial regional organization that deals with issues in all aspects of regional security.23 Since the late 1990s, the system for making decisions and developing long-term strategies has been increasingly moving to the level of “club-based” and informal trans-regional and macroregional organizations, known as para-organisations. The G7 and G20, due to their major experience in strategic planning and political, financial, and economic governance are the leaders of such structures. The G20 was established in 1999 at the G7 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Berlin to engage in a dialogue with developing states and in response

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to the Asian financial crisis. The largest developing and developed states— the leaders of their respective continents—joined the new club: Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Tellingly, G7 was expanded at the time, too, as Russia joined first its political and then its financial and economic agendas.25

Important

The G8 was reformatted 15 years later after Russia’s membership was suspended. The club (or “concert”) once again united solely Western powers of the Atlantic civilization (four European countries: France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom; two North American countries: Canada and the United States; and the island country of Japan). “Going back to the roots” can be seen as restoring a format that was relevant at the end of the last century (a sort of a world oligarchy), and as diminishing the club’s potential for possible global influence. The G7’s political ambitions are clear: preserving both the status quo and its own standing as the only power center, which nullifies the prospects of expanding the club’s membership.

The range of issues discussed at the club frequently coincides with the UN’s agenda, which is a positive signal and an opportunity to strengthen the multilateral foundation for solving urgent problems (as in assisting international development). On the whole, however, rather than being a collective response to a threat, the activities of the club are largely a call to the international community for action in a particular area. The G20 appears to be more balanced and effective as regards global economic and financial governance. It involves the 20 largest national economies in the world, which together account for 90% of global GDP, 80% of global trade, and two-thirds of the global population. The club’s activities are based on parity representation of states with divergent interests and on a decision-making mechanism that is fairer toward developing states.

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Important

The G20 was founded to solve the following problems: to coordinate the policies of member states with a view to achieving global economic stability and sustainable growth; to promote financial regulation that would reduce risks and prevent future financial crises; and to create a new international financial architecture. The G20 succeeded in becoming a key node in the global governance mechanism, but it cannot so far replace the entire governance network. As an economic and financial crisis manager, it is too limited in its mandate and tasks to settle comprehensive crises and solve multifaceted problems. Additionally, the G20 failed to avoid politicizing its operations, as was shown by the course it followed at its 2014 summit for isolating Russia. In the systemic crisis of 2020, the G20’s efforts have been less than progressive, but the club is still expected to produce results.

Another informal international alliance that makes a significant contribution to global governance is BRICS , which, alongside the SCO, advances non-Western multilateralism. The BRIC abbreviation was coined in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, an expert with the US investment bank Goldman Sachs. O’Neill applied the term to the four developing countries with the highest rates of development—Brazil, R ussia, India, and China. The 2003 report “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050” describes the four as countries with the most promising economic development. Officially, BRIC was formed in 2009 as a dialogue format (a discussion venue). In 2011, BRIC was transformed into BRICS following the accession of South Africa. The BRICS states have a total population of approximately three billion (42.1% of the global population), 39.7 million square kilometers of territory (29.8% of the global territory), a combined GDP of $16.8 trillion (22.3% of the global GDP), and 20% of global manufacturing. In addition to a broad range of issues in intra-regional cooperation intended to stimulate trade, economic, and investment relations, coordinate infrastructure projects, and agree on joint positions regarding environmental safety and matters of humanitarian, education, scientific, and technological cooperation, the BRICS’ agenda features “outward”

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cooperation, intended to show solidarity and a unified stance on international issues. At the same time, the foreign political positioning of BRICS member states runs into internal problems in bilateral relations (although to a lesser degree than in preceding periods), and their divergent approaches to building interactions with China and the United States.

Important

Two initiatives were proposed at the 2014 BRICS Summit in Fortaleza (Brazil): (1) the founding of the New Development Bank to finance infrastructure projects and other development projects; and (2) the establishment of a currency pool of BRICS member states as a collective mechanism for countering financial risks and ensuring that the national currencies of the member states played a more significant role in the global economy.

One of the key breakthrough ideas of the BRICS project is the BRICS+ initiative proposed by China at the 9th BRICS summit in Xiamen in 2017, which entails including out-of-region actors in the organization—inviting states from other regions to interact with BRICS. China invited the leaders of Egypt, Guinea, Mexico, Tajikistan, and Thailand to cooperate. Clearly, it would be impractical to expand membership in BRICS, and the issue is hardly likely to appear on its agenda in the near future. At the same time, it is in the organization’s best interests to set up extended cooperation mechanisms, primarily with the non-Western G20 members (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, and Argentina), as well as with Malaysia, Singapore, and Iran. In addition to involving individual states, the BRICS+ initiative is geared toward engaging with the regional integration alliances of the Global South. Neither option rules out the possibility of establishing various regional, inter-regional, and bilateral alliances. This innovation is intended to ensure the transcontinental and trans-regional scale of cooperation with developing states, thereby increasing BRICS’ influence. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have quite deservedly found their niche in the agenda and practice of global governance, although their role has been somewhat exaggerated at the current stage in the

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development of international relations. Non-governmental organizations actively push for countries to be accorded secondary roles in global politics and even stake a claim to their moral superiority, yet they are highly decentralized and geared toward solving specific problems. NGOs mostly advance a social agenda, they have a rather high level of expertise and expect to strengthen their control over many issues of global governance. At the same time, NGOs have no voting or veto rights at intergovernmental forums and, therefore, are virtually pushed out of the decision-making process. The notorious matter of NGO financing (besides financing that comes from private individuals, state contracts, international governmental organizations, and funds), difficulties in interacting with state bureaucracy, and other “sore spots” limit the effectiveness of NGOs. Nevertheless, they are rather active in integrating themselves into the current global governance system.

The Key Functional “Dossiers” in Global Governance A holistic global governance system with a comprehensive agenda and broad functional coverage has not been formed. Instead, we are talking about separate functional “dossiers” with different degrees of coordination and depths of agreement. Security, trade, and the monetary and financial market are traditionally seen as key areas in regulating global processes. Separate governance outlines are emerging in the technological field, and in matters pertaining to so-called low politics: migration, the environment, etc. In its most general form, global governance in the politico-military form includes nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and conflict resolution. At the end of the Cold War, amidst active securitization, a full range of new threats and challenges was included in global security, from transnational crime and terrorism to epidemics, poverty, environment, etc. At present, the problem of global rivalry and the aggravation of tensions between states is returning to the international security agenda, which directly affects the reshaping of the global and regional balance of power. Arms control and military transparency regimes have not been sufficiently effective and are going through a period of unprecedented pressure now. This leads many to say that global governance is becoming a shadow of local in the military-political area. States are placing their domestic policy interests above international ones, as demonstrated by

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the abandonment of the INF Treaty or the transition from strategic to tactical stability. An alarming situation has emerged in strategic stability. The problem is that practically all the existing agreements on strategic stability were concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the Yalta–Potsdam order and without the involvement of China and other states that were not among the world’s leading countries at the time—a situation that, according to the United States, is unacceptable in the twenty-first century. The United States is building its global strategy on avoiding rigid strategic stability commitments. Washington unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002s, the INF Treaty in 2019, and the Treaty on Open Skies (TOS) in 2020. With the signing of the START Treaty in January 2021, it seemed that the course toward regime strengthening was renewed. However, the general context of the international political situation and the underlying crisis in the Russian–US bilateral relations do not inspire optimism for starting a new stage of strategic dialogue, let alone make this process sustainable. Overall, security regimes have not kept pace with the framing of responses to current problems and threats, which predetermines the need for progressive adaptation of regimes to the new realities to prevent their complete erosion. The global economic, financial, and trade governance regime needs to be more balanced and representative. The global economy is becoming heavily politicized and, thus, fragmented, as countries and regions are losing their ties in trade, economy, and transportation. It develops in the context of trade wars, sanctions, protectionism, and populism, which are replacing the foundations of free economic competition. Global demand is dropping. As a consequence, the interdependence of states is falling, and trade and foreign investment indicators are following suit. Most problems of the world economy do not have simple and ready-made solutions, but this does not mean that these processes cannot be managed. In one way or another, they are linked to global economic governance. The governance deficit might be partially met by the reorganization of the leading economic organizations and the creation of new parallel governance structures, as, for example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established in its time. The recommendation to ensure oversight and broad economic coordination among the various actors of the world economy remains relevant. To restore confidence and stability in national and global markets, the world economy needs internationally

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coordinated measures, standards, and synchronized actions by regulators and major economies, without leading to excessive and overly strict regulation. A paradoxical situation has emerged in global trade: the world’s leading economies, the United States and China, have essentially swapped places. China is acting as the principal protector of the WTO’s rules and the liberalization of international trade (it is protecting the achievements of globalization). In this sense, China may be seen as the new leader of globalization. At the same time, the United States has abandoned many of the principles of open trade and is breaking down the multilateral liberal regimes that had emerged within the WTO.28 The systemic difficulties of the multilateral trade regime stem from a number of problems that take on a chronic character: stagnation in the advancement of the Doha Round negotiations, developing countries’ discontent with the failure to implement the promises set out in the Uruguay Round agreements, the crisis of the concept of special and differential treatment and differentiation of developing countries, the general crisis of the WTO, which leads to an increase in protectionist measures. In these circumstances, the WTO can only provide a relative level of liberalization of world trade, trying to form and control the boundaries of permissible protectionism.

Important

The transformation of GATT into the WTO 25 years ago was intended to spearhead the process of liberalizing international trade and regulating the international exchange of commodities, services, and intellectual property. One of its biggest achievements was the increase in cross-border business activity, which was made possible by mandatory norms and rules of global trade. The dollar value of global trade virtually quadrupled, and the volume of real trade grew, too (about 2.7 times). Another positive development was the reduction in tariffs from 10.5 to 6.4%. The composition of the WTO was steadily expanding: not a single member has left its ranks, and 23 states are in line to join it. Yet the WTO’s potential turned out to have its limits. The organization did not prevent the introduction of trade restrictions that affected the greater part of global trade

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and proved incapable of effectively counteracting growing protectionism and achieving a consensus on reforming and improving the mechanisms for resolving trade disputes, in particular, the Appellate Body. There are no interactions between the WTO and the principal regional integration blocs, which explains why the WTO is powerless in the face of new regional blocs continuously emerging and their growing influence.29 The most important thing is that the neoliberal agenda is not advancing the development of the poorest states, even though China and several East Asian states had successfully taken advantage of it.

The WTO is not so much an international trade venue as it is a regulator of international trade relations and a supervisory body that monitors compliance with the code of conduct in trade policies.30 Exacerbated trade disputes and trade wars and mounting protectionism policies will inevitably reduce the WTO’s authority compared to bilateral regional commercial and economic alliances, arrangements, and blocs. Subsequently, the regionalization of global trade regimes is taking place. Thus, a new ambitious trend of mega-regional trade agreements was set up. Recent examples include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, signed on November 15, 2020, which brings together a dozen ASEAn and five regional countries, including China, as well as the closest allies of the United States in the Pacific—Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. RCEP is positioned as a breakthrough mega-project, designed to provide further qualitative growth of regional integration through strengthening interconnectivity and developing infrastructure capacity. The activation of such mega-regional trade agreements, in one way or another, creates conditions for the fragmentation of existing trade rules and the emergence of new ones outside the WTO. Due to the increased fragmentation and politicization of the world economy, traditional regulatory structures (IMF, WB, WTO) are under additional strain and unable to cope with the changed set of challenges. The IMF, as the crucial supra-national monetary institution whose principal task is to ensure the stability of the global monetary system, demonstrates relatively little ability to influence the world economy. On the one hand, the IMF is an international organization that supervises financial markets and tracks potential risks. On the other hand, it is a

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financial institution that acts as a commercial organization (a bank) issuing loans to states that experience problems with their balance of payments. The IMF requires that borrowers comply with certain terms, including implementing political reforms. The recommendations the IMF issues to its recipient states (developing states and countries with transitional economies) are in most cases directly opposite to the anti-crisis policies implemented by developed states, which have no qualms about using the fund as a tool for achieving their goals. The main drawback of the IMF is the unequal distribution of votes between developed and developing states in the Fund’s decision-making. The weighted mechanism of the IMF’s voting means that the number of votes accorded to countries is directly proportional to the amount they contribute to the IMF’s registered capital. Accordingly, the possibility of influencing the vote depends on the contribution amount. It is primarily developed states that have the right to influence the decisions, as they have over 50% of the votes. Consequently, they can block any decision adopted by a simple majority vote, and the IMF is frequently used as a tool for achieving specific political goals. Only in December 2015, the United States Congress ratified the quota reform (the so-called 14th General Review of Quotas) and the IMF’s managing system approved by the Fund’s Board of Governors in 2010. The IMF’s functions and activities have changed in the twenty-first century, and are now concentrated on handling local anti-crisis tasks. The Fund can hardly cope with the operative regulation of financial markets in post-crisis periods, let alone with preventing crises. Even today, however, the developing world sees the IMF as a tool for developed states to pursue their agendas. The terms for extending loans prompt developing states to react not merely with skepticism, but sometimes with downright resentment. For instance, the terms for issuing a loan to Ecuador in 2019 caused mass protests that paralyzed the country for several weeks. . Like the IMF, the World Bank also issues loans. This is essentially a group of multilateral establishments that includes several financial institutions with close ties: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). However, the main purpose of the World Bank is development assistance, not crisis assistance. Both the IMF

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and the WB issue loans that require recipient states to carry out structural transformations, including political reforms. The World Bank lags behind the China Development Bank in terms of lending.

Important

The key bodies in monetary governance are not in themselves global governance actors, their decisions are derived from the positions of states that hold key positions in them. Consequently, the need to reform the Bretton Woods financial institutions has been discussed for decades; reform boils down to the need to change membership, quotas, and resource provision, and increase oversight activities. An important demand concerns the governance system and promoting representatives of developing states to governing offices in international financial and trade institutions.

Attempts at reform, particularly the IMF and the World Bank have not been fully successful, although they have managed to make cosmetic changes and partially improve the management structure. The unofficial practice of appointing a US representative to the office of the President of the World Bank, while appointing a European representative to that of IMF Managing Director remains in force. In this context, the nomination by the BRICS countries of a single candidate to the office of the head of the WTO in 2013 and that candidate’s subsequent election may be seen as a breakthrough in this area. Another important event was the election of Bulgarian Kristalina Georgieva as IMF Managing Director in 2019. This was the first time in the history of the IMF that a candidate from a country with a developing economy had been elected to this office (although she was still a representative of the European Union). By the late 2010s, BRICS had a total of 14.8% of votes in the IMF compared to 11.5% before, and 13.1% of votes in the World Bank compared to 11.22% before (see Table 3.1). The unfair representation of developing states and the inability of formalized organizations to prevent global economic and financial crises influenced both the emergence of para-organizations and their increasing importance. Gradually, the new global financial regulation system came to rely on the repeatedly mentioned G20, which should be credited with

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creating an organizational framework for financial supervision, the multiplication of “rainy day funds” intended to prevent negative consequences of new crises, the reform of international financial institutions, and the closer monitoring of global financial markets. The Financial Stability Forum (currently the Financial Stability Board) was established involving representatives of finance ministries, central banks, and financial regulators of 24 states. New power centers located primarily in Eurasia and Asia are shaping their own multilateral initiatives and bodies with different degrees of formalization. Such organizations as the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) as an alternative to the World Bank Group, the BRICS Provisional Monetary Reserves Pool as an alternative to the IMF, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as an alternative to the Asian Development Bank that is part of the World Bank Group, are all elements of an alternative financial system. Despite such obvious advantages as China’s participation, the extensive opportunities they afford, and their appeal to new member states (Turkey and Argentina), the new bodies still manifest differences in the interests of their member states and the unequal distribution of votes. What is more, China’s growing role is seen in different lights, and the loan portfolio is rather narrow ($13 bn.). Therefore, it is too early to say that new institutions will succeed in effectively replacing the established global financial regulatory system. New mechanisms, however, are becoming progressively more appealing Table 3.1 Changes to the quotas of BRICS countries in the IMF and the World Bank, % Country

China India Russia Brazil South Africa

After the 2015 IMF reform

After the 2010 World Bank reform

Quota

Change

Quota

Change

6.394 2.749 2.706 2.315 0.640

+2.396 +0.308 +0.212 +0.533 −0.144

4.42 2.91 2.77 2.24 0.76

+1.64 +0.14 0 +0.18 −0.08

Source IMF Quota and Governance Reform—Elements of an Agreement, www.imf.org/extemal/np/ pp/eng/2010/103110.pdf; World Bank Group Voice Reform: Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in 2010 and Beyond, http://siteresourc-es.worldbank.org/ DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/22553921/DC2010-006(E)Voice.pdf

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to various countries, both developing and developed, as is evidenced, for instance, by many OECD member states that participate in the AIIB. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021 and the formation of a new biomedical reality, the development priorities of a number of sectors have been adjusted. The development of medicine, environmental, and climate regulation, and ICT came to the fore. Although agendas in these areas were formulated a long time ago, over the past few years, they have undergone revolutionary changes that require rethinking. In a number of cases, it is not a question of changing certain norms but instead of “resetting” the entire regulatory complex. The regulation in these new spheres has not kept up with the rapid development of modern technologies. The new international regimes formed within them are determined by a relatively narrow group of states that have the most groundwork in using new technologies. The initiative in the climate, technology, and other agendas has passed into the hands of individual states and alliances, which in principle, indicates the politicized nature of many processes. The “rule-makers” in global ICT governance include the US, Russia, China, and the EU. This is due to their leadership in controlling global supply chains, the growing monopolization of digital space dominated by the platforms of the US (GAFAM) and China (BATX), offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and impact in setting international regimes. Russia’s key positions are due, among other things, to the development of international information security principles based on sovereign equality within BRICS and the SCO, as well as the establishment of the UN Group of Governmental Experts and the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT for the period 2021-2015. ∗ ∗ ∗ Today’s global governance practice remains fragmented and specialized. In that sense, our world is still far from global governance as such. However, claims to the effect that the global governance system is in a deep crisis are not borne out by the real state of affairs. A deficit of governance is not the same as a collapse of governance, especially since global governance by definition does not entail eliminating inequalities between states and regions. The effectiveness of global governance depends on many factors and conditions (for example, scale, consistency, and powers), and its assessment may be based on the degree of orderliness/stability of the international system

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at a given point in its development. Since the Second World War, the international system has not encountered a comparable shock that could bring about its breakdown or collapse, which still does not eliminate the tasks of reforming the regulatory and institutional foundations of governance. Regardless of how we assess the current global governance architecture, one thing is clear: global governance is being transformed in tandem with the rebuilding of the international relations system. The legacy of the Yalta–Potsdam system in the shape of an entire framework of organizations, international regimes, rules, and procedures continues to work today with the goal of preventing destabilization in international affairs. However, the new reality of international relations requires a new global governance model shaped most by deglobalizing and alter globalizing trends. Global governance tasks have to be handled amid the redistribution of influence between leading states, which largely proceed from their current interests and are guided by situational crises and processes. The political and diplomatic dialogue on the global governance agenda has intensified tangibly, but its results mostly boil down to achieving “urgent” arrangements. The global governance regime in the economy, finance, and trade needs a more representative system that is economically and politically balanced, accords with modern realities, and is capable of efficiently responding to current challenges. Until the process of shaping the new world order is complete, the importance of established global governance institutions, including the UN system, will remain limited. The lack of a consensus on many key items on the global agenda has resulted in the reduced efficiency of the “Big Three” global regulators (the IMF, the WB, and the WTO). Despite the weakening of centralized international institutions, the existing bodies allow the system to overcome emerging crises, albeit with varying degrees of effectiveness. In the context of a fairly rapidly changing international situation, the agenda and its objectives also change. Both formalized intergovernmental organizations and dialogue-focused “clubs” could face a recalibration in the future. Prompt responses to systemic and structural changes will become the crucial objective of a global governance system for the entire array of actors that are capable of effective governance. This task determines the need to reform the traditionally entrenched global governance institutions, which appears to be harder to do than actually establishing such institutions, and it will take a long time. Previous attempts produced only superficial results, without really changing the balance of power. Even though the indicators of the largest developing states are growing, and even though reform of the Bretton Woods institutions has been set into motion, global governance mechanisms still reflect

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the interests and ambitions of the Western community of states. Contradictions between the world’s leading powers and the “ascendant” powers are manifested in both military-political and economic areas. The competition extends, among other things, to control over the institutional design of international organizations. Ascendant centers lack proper representation within existing institutions and, consequently, promote trans-regional (BRICS institution system) and macroregional (“Belt and Road”) initiatives. As BRICS, the SCO, and other similar bodies (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS Development Bank, etc.) are institutionalized, the potential of the “periphery” will increase, which will ensure a more balanced world order. It appears that in the medium term, two rival world regulating blocs (the “global NATO” and the “SCO+”) will dominate the forefront of global governance. One would like to believe that the scenario of a convergence of approaches of global governance developed within the framework of traditional Western regionalism and non-Western alliances is not excluded.

Keywords Global governance, deglobalization, “ascending” powers, leading states, UN, IMF, WB, WTO, SCO, G20, collective non-West, security, trade, economy. Self-Test 1. How effective is global governance in overcoming today’s global crises (using a specific area as an example)? 2. What are the development premises and global governance principles in the post-bipolar era? 3. Who shapes the actor line-up of global governance? Are interactions between various decision-making levels possible? 4. What part does the state as an institution play in the evolution of the global governance system? 5. What are the specific features of the approaches of leading Western and “ascendant” states to global governance? 6. What roles do various types of international organizations play in global governance?

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Notes 1. James N. Rosenau, and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5. 2. James N. Rosenau, Toward an Ontology for Global Governance: Approaches to the Theory of Global Governance (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 294. 3. Thomas G. Weiss, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government?” International Studies Quarterly 2, no. 53 (2009): 257. 4. Report of the Commission on Global Government Our Global Neighbourhood, 1995, https://humanbeingsfirst.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/cac heof-pdf-our-global-neighborhood-from-sovereignty-net.pdf. 5. Margaret P. Karns, Karen A. Mingst, and Kendall W. Stiles, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015). 6. The Yearbook of International Organizations. Union of International Associations, https://uia.org/ybio/. 7. UN Security Council. Veto. Documents, https://www.un.org/securityc ouncil/ru/content/veto-90-present. 8. Ibid. 9. In 2015, the US–France Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee published its Bretton Woods: The Next 70 Years report, which, in addition to analysing the practices and achievements of the financial system, called for reforming the global financial architecture. 10. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy” (February 10, 2007, Munich), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/transcripts/24034. 11. See: A.V. Kortunov, “The World Order Crisis and the Future of Globalization,” RIAC Report (August 27, 2020), https://russiancouncil.ru/ en/activity/publications/the-world-order-crisis-and-the-future-of-global ization/. 12. The dynamics to the changes of gross domestic product (GDP) in absolute figures calculated by purchasing power parity (PPP) is quite telling in this respect. In 2014, China moved to 1st place (up from 6th in 1991) “pushing” the United States into second. As of 2019, their global shares were 19.25 and 15.11%, respectively. In 2011, India moved from 10th to 3rd (7.98%), pushing Japan into 4th place (4.05%). The indicators of Western states are falling. For example, in 2012, Italy lost its place in the top ten. Germany is 5th (3.13%), the United Kingdom 9th (2.21%), and France 10th (2.16%). Russia went down from 3rd in 1991 to 10th place in 1999– 2000 before rebounding to 6th in 2003 (3.07%). The 7th and 8th places

3

13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

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are held by the largest representatives of the developing world: Indonesia (2.64%) and Brazil (2.44%). Therefore, BRICS states today account for 34.23% of global GDP, while the G7’s share has fallen to 29.62%. For the balance of power in the relations of the demographic, economic, financial, infrastructural, scientific, technological, military, political, diplomatic, and “soft power” potentials, see: D.A. Degterev, Assessing Todays’ Balance of Power on the International Stage and the Emergence of a Multipolar World (Moscow: Rusains, 2020), 50–51. The initiative known as G8+5 was initially launched in Gleneagles in 2005. Concluding Report of the Heiligendamm Process (July 9, 2009), http:// en.kremlin.ru/supplement/10. See: Y. Lissovolik, “A Different Global Governance: Taming the Excesses of Realpolitik,” Valdai International Discussion Club (March 12, 2019), https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/inoy-podkhod/?sph rase_id=262447. For more details, see: The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 1993; The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000, http://www.ng.ru/world/2000-07-11/1_concept.html; The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008, http://kremlin.ru/ acts/news/785; The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_ publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186; The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_p olicy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248. “75th Session of the UN General Assembly,” http://en.kremlin.ru/eve nts/president/news/64074. Ibid. Resolution of the UN General Assembly A/RES/65/94 of December 8, 2010. [Electronic resource]. Available at: https://daccess-ods.un.org/ tmp/1013538.98644447.html. See: O. Barabanov, T. Bordachev, Y. Lissovolik, F. Lukyanov, A. Sushentsov, and I. Timofeev, “Staying Sane in a Crumbling World,” Valdai International Discussion Club Report (May 2020), https://ru.valdaiclub. com/files/33222/, 11. See: Y. Lissovolik, “Global Value Shift: Adjusting the Institutional Structure?” Valdai International Discussion Club (June 10, 2020), https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-global-value-shift-adjust ing-the-institutional/. See: Y. Lissovolik, “Regionalism in Global Governance: Exploring New Pathways,” Valdai International Discussion Club report (June 2019), https://valdaiclub.com/files/24670/, 16.

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23. Resolution of the UN General Assembly A/RES/64/183 of December 18, 2009, https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/8257943.39179993.html. 24. Alan Alexandroff , Challenges in Global Governance: Opportunities for G-X Leadership, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief (March 2010), http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/Alexandro ffPAB310.pdf. 25. Russia joined the club’s presidency rotation in 2006, receiving the right to host the leaders’ summit. 26. A.A. Dynkin, and V.G. Baranovsky (project leaders), Russia and the World: 2020. Economy and Foreign Policy. Annual Prognosis (Moscow: IMEMO RAS Press, 2019), 11; World Trade Organization. Press Release 855. Trade Set to Plunge as COVID-19 Pandemic Upends Global Economy, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm. 27. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Euijin Jung, “Why Has Trade Stopped Growing? Not Much Liberalization and Lots of Micro-Protection,” Peterson Institute for International Economics (March 23, 2016), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/why-hastrade-stopped-growing-not-much-liberalization-and-lots. 28. The American political scientists Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow wrote about transferring to China the role of the keeper of market economy foundations, as they proposed a world order with three centers, the United States, China, and the European Union. See: Simon Reich, and Richard Ned Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). 29. See: Y. Lissovolik, “Regionalism in Global Governance: Exploring New Pathways,” Valdai International Discussion Club report (June 2019), https://valdaiclub.com/files/24670/, 5. 30. Hongyul Han, “Global Economy: Uncertainty and Global Governance,” Valdai Proceedings, no. 60 (January 2017): 10, https://ru.valdaiclub. com/files/22132/.

Recommended Reading Afontsev, S.A. “Global Crisis and Global Finance Regulation.” International Trends 7, no. 19 (2009): 17–31. Baranovsky, V.G., and Ivanova, N.I., eds. Global Governance: Opportunities and Risks. Moscow: IMEMO RAN Press, 2015. Batalov E. “New Institutionalization of Global Politics.” International Trends 14, no. 1 (44) (2016): 6–25. Borisova A.R., Voytolovsky F.G., and Zhuravleva V.Y. “The Approaches of Russia and the United States to Global Governance Problems and UN Reform.” Pathways to Peace and Security 50, no.1 (2016): 7–23.

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Degterev, D.A. Assessing Todays’ Balance of Power on the International Stage and the Emergence of a Multipolar World. Moscow: Rusains, 2020. Kharkevich, M.V. “The Critical Experience of Russia in Global Governance.” Russian Politics & Law 54, no. 5–6 (2016): 461–476. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10611940.2016.1296307 Larionova, M.V. “Assessing the Effectiveness of Interactions between International Institutions in the Global Governance Process.” International Organisations Research Journal 11, no. 1 (2016) 126–152. Lukyanov, V.Y., and Heifets, V.L. International Organizations in the 20th—Early 21st Centuries: Principal Development Trends and Prospects. St. Petersburg: GUAP, 2016. Panova, V.V. “On the Use of ‘Club Mechanisms’: The ‘G7’ and BRICS in a Comparative Outlook.” // International Trends 10, no. 2 (29) (2012): 102– 111.

CHAPTER 4

Evolution of the International Security Landscape in the Midst of Great Power Rivalry Igor Istomin

The evolution of the global system in the 2010s had a profound effect on the hierarchy of items on the international security agenda and on the perception of that agenda. The relative weakening of the United States and other Western states amid the continuing rise of China and India, as well as Russia’s re-energized foreign policy logically resulted in intensified great power rivalry. This chapter describes how the current restructuring of international system impacts the parameters of global stability, understood as the absence of sources for conflicts to emerge and grow (or be in a state that is under control) between the leading powers, and on the periphery as less intense conflicts that mediate the rivalry between great powers . Previously, the international security agenda focused on counteracting the instability

I. Istomin (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_4

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overflowing across borders from areas with weakened statehood. Now, as this chapter states, there has been a shift to risks of latent or full-fledged rivalry between the leading powers. The latter development stimulates an upsurge in local conflict propensity, affects the nature of military activities, and also changes the nature and mode of institutions in the security domain. Meanwhile, rising social inequality fuels suspicions among the political elites of countries about possible attempts by their opponents to undermine their competitive edge in the international arena by interfering in their domestic affairs. This chapter elucidates the connection between the trends for power redistribution within the international system on the one hand and destabilization risks on the other. It provides a general assessment of the current international situation, considers the trends in military rivalry, the degradation of institutions intended to ensure international security, and the evolution of mechanisms of non-violent coercion. Additionally, this chapter will also offer an assessment of the consequences that increasing global socioeconomic inequality has on relations between the leading global actors and international security in general.

Structural Trends and Instability Dynamics The changing balance of power and redistribution of influence between states has, as a rule, been historically accompanied by large-scale cataclysms. Such periods saw increased uncertainty that undermined the foundations of military and strategic stability. The quicker and the more radical the shifts in the balance of power, the graver the risks for peace and security.1 Past record demonstrates that the shrinking gap between the dominant power and its rivals habitually forced the former to look for ways of keeping its privileged standing, including the use of force. In their turn, rapidly growing states frequently attempted to accelerate the transformation of the world order and align the level of their recognition and influence with their increased material capabilities. Such clashing intentions more often than not translated into international frictions. Back in the times of classical antiquity, the Greek historian Thucydides explained the origins of the Peloponnesian War as a consequence of Sparta’s concerns over the rise of Athens. Later, similar behavioral dynamics were reproduced in other episodes in inter-power relations. Transposing this explanation onto international relations in the twenty-first century,

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today’s analysts dwell on the possibility of a clash between the leading global powers caught in the “Thucydides Trap.”2 Meanwhile, just recently, the challenges posed by cross-border instability overflowing from weak states have topped the global problem “ratings.” Now they are sidelined by growing competition between states. The 1990s–2000s saw an inflation of threats when the increasing welfare and security of the population in developed societies made them less tolerant of the risks and inconveniences that they had previously been prepared to bear.3 At the same time, security strategies adopted by the leading states foregrounded challenges generated by radical extremist groups, illegal migration, and organized crime. These problems subsisted and in some instances exacerbated in the 2010s. Terrorism, extremism, and separatism still regularly take human lives, including the lives of people in the most successful and rich states. Cross-border flows of weapons, drugs, and extremist ideas continue to swell. Intra-state conflicts and other forms of organized violence still cause significant civilian casualties that are greater than those stemming from armed hostilities between states. Nevertheless, these challenges rarely threaten the existence of states (at least those states that did not originally suffer from a lack of legitimacy, weak political institutions, and economic difficulties), therefore, they dropped on the list of priorities of national governments compared to the 2000s (Table 4.1).4

Important

The level of tensions in relations between the largest states has increased relative to the previous two decades. The challenges inherent in the cross-border flows of instability were not entirely eliminated but were certainly pushed into the background.

The response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 is a tell-tale piece of evidence showing that rivalry between states has priority over other challenges. Although the disease delivered a painful blow to many states, claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, national egoism clearly stood in the way of the international community rallying in the face of the problem. Moreover, in some cases, the pandemic prompted political accusations and set off an escalatory spiral of rivalry.5

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Table 4.1 Casualties from various types of organized violence in 1990–2019 (only combat fatalities are counted for conflicts), persons 1990–1994 1995–1999 Conflicts between states Internationalized conflicts (internal conflicts involving foreign states) Intra-state conflicts Other types of conflicts (neither side involves national governments)

2000–2004

2005–2009

2010–2014 2015–2019

22,992

49,338

59,362

35

439

666

19,991

42,823

18,703

47,088

90,848

320,725

213,741

124,138

81,665

66,997

218,662

35,529

33,980

20,807

24,864

18,316

40,092

90,208

Source Compiled by the author based on information from the Uppsala Conflict Database (see: T. Pettersson, and M. Öberg, “Organized violence, 1989–2019,” Journal of Peace Research 57, no. 4 [2020]: 597–613)

Despite the signs of increasing great power competition, the leading states still seek to avoid a direct military conflict. In such a situation, confrontation is frequently moved to other areas, primarily into economic and information pressure. The military capabilities primarily serve as an instrument used to signal political concerns. The growing social risks prompted by rising inequality within individual communities overlap with the rivalry between states. This trend undermines the internal foundations of the international competitive edge of countries and reduces their resilience in the face of non-conventional means of external influence. This trend also builds up concerns over attempts by opponents to exploit the fault lines that already exist in societies in order to delegitimize national governments. We need to assess the impact that the trends outlined above have on today’s global environment. We take as our conceptual basis the interpretation of international security proposed by the Russian researcher Vladimir Kulagin. He defines it as the “sum total of threats and means of counteracting them through the use, or through the likelihood of the use of armed violence; this sum total pertains mostly to relationships between

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parties involved in global interactions, primarily to states, and to similar internal processes that in their scale and impact go beyond the borders of nation states and are capable of affecting the security of other countries.”6 The principal trend in the current international security landscape consists in shifting emphases toward the first part of this definition, i.e., in stressing the challenges linked with interactions between states. At the same time, the impact that internal processes have on the international community is fundamentally changing. It is increasingly instrumentalized by national governments amid the growing great power rivalry. Domestic challenges are now being positioned as a consequence of external interference.

The Growing Significance of Armed Forces in Political Signaling Mounting contradictions between major powers have resulted in military deterrence assuming a greater role in their relations. Several researchers have drawn analogies between the current situation and examples of largescale clashes in the past (primarily with the events that took place on the eve of the First World War).7 Other experts, on the contrary, dwell on the differences between future wars and the well-known historical examples. They conclude that potential conflicts will be unlike the all-out clashes of the twentieth century. They are expected to become low-intensity wars of attrition, or, on the contrary, limited-scale blitzkriegs. At the same time, speculation of this kind does not answer the question of what could prevent states from escalating confrontation, up to and including scenarios that entail large-scale use of nuclear weapons.8 Throughout the 2010s, contradictions between leading states already resulted in increased military activities. These activities were mostly localized within certain problem-plagued areas, such as Eastern Europe (where the interests of Russia and the West clashed), and the South China Sea and the East China Sea (where China opposed the United States and its allies, primarily Japan). China–India disagreements manifested in the Himalayas, while disagreements between New Delhi and Islamabad periodically flared up in Kashmir. The situation in the Middle East combined the continued US military presence (albeit smaller than before), Russia’s increasing activity, and the clashing policies of ambitious regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey). In all those regions, the armed forces of major powers came into close contact that on several occasions translated into dangerous incidents. For

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instance, in 2015, the Turkish Air Force downed a Russian Su-24 aircraft prompting an acute crisis in bilateral relations. Such incidents generate concerns that a conflict could escalate uncontrollably up to a direct military clash.9 Overall, countries appeared to be more willing to openly use military instruments to signal their stance in the 2010s compared to preceding decades. This was manifested in the mounting incidence and greater scale of military exercises, public demonstrations of breakthrough weapons, and building up military presence close to the borders of potential rivals. As in the Cold War, rivalry between major powers also manifests itself in support of proxies in local conflicts. Such proxy confrontations played important roles in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Ukraine, bringing about further exacerbation of local problems, protracting them, and transforming them into chronic conflicts. Changes in the priorities of major powers in terms of developing their military capabilities also manifest their reassessment of national security threats. This trend was starkly demonstrated by the United States reorienting its military from coercing weak states (as it had done in the preceding decades) to develop the means for opposing nearpeers.10 Another important aspect of the competition is modernizing nuclear forces and making qualitative changes while developing radically new types of weapons (hypersonic vehicles, anti-missile, and anti-satellite capabilities, autonomous lethal systems, directed energy weapons, and military AI). The development of new means of waging armed hostilities introduced an additional element of uncertainty into assessments of the prospects for international stability.11 Despite states engaging in belligerent rhetoric and military power displays, the data on defense spending did not indicate that they are preparing for a large-scale clash in the foreseeable future until 2022. The military expenditures of most large powers in the late 2010s generally were on par with preceding decades, and even a little lower (Table 4.2). These expenditures are still significantly lower than during the Cold War. There is little evidence to suggest that the majority of countries prioritize defense spending in their budget planning over internal consumption, while preceding research indicates that, historically, large-scale conflicts were preceded by major arms races.12

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Table 4.2 Military spending to GDP ratio of select states in 1995–2019, % State UK Germany India China Russia Saudi Arabia US France Japan

1995–1999

2000–2004

2005–2009

2010–2014

2015–2019

2.3 1.5 2.7 1.7 3.5 10.9 3.4 2.3 0.9

2.2 1.3 2.8 2.1 3.5 9.7 3.5 2.1 0.9

2.2 1.3 2.6 2.0 3.4 8.2 4.3 2.0 0.9

2.2 1.2 2.6 1.9 3.7 8.6 4.4 1.9 1.0

1.8 1.2 2.4 1.9 4.4 10.2 3.4 1.9 0.9

Source Compiled by the author based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (see: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. URL: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex)

Table 4.3 Military spending of US and China in 1995–2019 Total spending over five years, billion dollars, in 2018 fixed prices US China (Source Compiled by the author based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [see: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. URL: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex])

In absolute figures, the United States is still far ahead of most states in terms of military spending. At the same time, China’s economic rise has stimulated major military investment and shrunk the qualitative gap between Chinese and US weapons (Table 4.3). Defense spending of the leading European states and Japan has remained essentially the same since the 1990s, while non-Western actors (not only China) gradually increased their military spending in monetary terms (Fig. 4.1). Until recently, the build-up of Russia’s military budget followed the same trend after major underfunding in the 1990s. It should be stressed that military spending data is a highly unreliable criterion for assessing the potential of states. Thus, according to the influential Military Strength Ranking, Russia is in second place in terms of its military capabilities, behind the United States, but ahead of China, even though China has recently invested over three times more into its military.13 On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, which is periodically ranked in

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Fig. 4.1 Military spending of selected countries in 1995–2019 (Source Compiled by the author based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [see: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. URL: https:// www.sipri.org/databases/milex])

the Top 3 in terms of military spending, has relatively low military capabilities. Nevertheless, if we engage in cross-historical comparisons instead of drawing comparisons between states, we see that states are not currently getting ready for a large-scale military conflict.14 In such a situation, military instruments are used primarily as a tool for applying political pressure. States wish to test the readiness and determination of the opposite party while avoiding a direct conflict. Expanding military activities even in this particular capacity once again posits the question of instruments for managing conflict propensity. Traditionally, international institutions and treaty mechanisms have been used to reduce the risks of unintentional escalation between rivals. However, the 2010s saw a deterioration of previously established regimes for maintaining strategic and regional stability.

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Number of resolutions

4

Fig. 4.2 Number of UN Security Council Resolutions in 1990–2019 (Source Compiled by the author based on UN data [see: UN Security Council Resolution Database, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ru/content/resolutions])

Challenges to Mechanisms for Maintaining International Security In search for the sources of deterioration that have befallen the system of institutions intended to maintain international security, we should look into the 1990s–2000s, before the resumption of rivalry between major powers. It was the result of growing complacency with the low-risk potential for an international conflict after the end of the Cold War and with the attempts of the United States and its allies to usurp the functions of the guarantors of global order. Such policies weakened inclusive institutions intended to align interests such as the UN Security Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The indivisible security principle proposed as the foundation of the order following the conclusion of the bipolar confrontation has fallen victim to ambitions.15 Collective decision-making bodies, both global and regional, have become venues for information campaigns run by rival states. Although the number of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council has remained rather stable since the end of the Cold War, the states have failed to find compromise decisions on the most urgent situations, such as the operation in Yugoslavia (1999), the invasion of Iraq (2003), and the situation in Syria (since 2011) (Fig. 4.2). The inability of major powers to arrive at agreements on international security problems, including within specially designed institutions, was reflected in the UN Security Council’s permanent members using

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their veto power with increasing frequency from 2000–2010 (Table 4.4). A similar picture was seen at the regional level, primarily in Europe, which had evolved the largest range of institutional mechanisms for maintaining collective security. In 2018, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger regretfully acknowledged that “genuine dialogue has become a rare commodity in the OSCE’s formal bodies. Mutual accusations and stock statements have replaced constructive criticism and a genuine search for common ground.”16 Since the Cold War era, weapons control mechanisms, as well as measures for building confidence and cooperation in the military area, have held an important place within the system of institutions designed to maintain international security. These mechanisms had started to erode as early as the 2000s, but the contradictions only exacerbated in the 2010s. Previously achieved arrangements for maintaining strategic and regional stability were thus transformed into another area of disagreement (Fig. 4.3). The United States took the first step toward dismantling the weapons control system back in 2002 when it withdrew from the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) with Russia. At the same time, Russia and NATO member states failed to agree on implementing an Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In the late 2010s, the deterioration of the arms control system accelerated. The US–Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) was terminated in 2019, and in 2020, the United States withdrew from the Treaty on Open Skies, which had ensured increased transparency Table 4.4 Use of the veto right by the permanent members of the UN Security Council State

1990–1994

1995–1999

2000–2004

2005–2009

2010–2014

2015–2019

UK China Russia US France Total

– – 2 2 – 4

– 2 – 3 – 5

– – 1 8 – 9

– 2 3 2 – 7

– 4 5 1 – 10

– 5 14 2 – 21

Source Compiled by the author based on UN data (see: Security Council—Veto List. Dag Hammarskjold Library. URL: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto)

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Fig. 4.3 Treaty mechanisms for arms control in 1990–2010 (Source Compiled by the author)

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of military activities. Moscow and Washington engaged in serious discussions concerning extending the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that had been concluded in 2010.17 The abandonment of such treaties on arms restriction does not always result in potentials being dangerously ramped up, yet it does produce dips in mutual confidence and deepens suspicions over the other party’s intentions to gain asymmetric advantages. It also results in reduced predictability and in rivalry and, consequently, makes the international situation less manageable. Such circumstances take a particularly dangerous turn when one of the rival parties starts hoping it has a shot at gaining supremacy. As early as the 2000s, Western expert circles were increasingly speculating about the ability of the United States to achieve strategic invulnerability. Russia’s demonstration of its projects in breakthrough hypersonic weapons undermined such expectations but did not nix them. At the same time, China and India were developing hypersonic potential of their own, which resulted in more heated discussions on the prospects of the beginning of a nuclear multipolarity, wherein traditional approaches to maintaining strategic stability will not apply.18 While acknowledging the build-up of these countries’ nuclear forces, we should not forget that Russia and the United States still account for over 90% of the world’s nuclear arsenals (Table 4.5). The deterioration of traditional treaty mechanisms for maintaining international stability has resulted in states actively using more flexible, yet less reliable, instruments for ensuring mutual transparency, such as establishing “hotlines” to resolve crisis situations, holding regular consultations between chiefs of staff, and exchanging information on upcoming military exercises. In other words, we cannot say that the militaries of the rival powers have completely cut off their dialogue, yet their levels of interaction have generally dipped compared to the preceding period.

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Table 4.5 Nuclear Arsenal by state State

Total number of warheads

Deployed warheads

Non-deployed warheads

UK Israel India China North Korea Pakistan Russia US France Total global number (maximum) Share of Russia and the US share in the global arsenal, %

215 90 150 320 30–40 160 6375 5800 290 13,440

120 – – – – – 1570 1750 280 3720

95 90 150 320 30–40 160 4805 4050 10 9720

90.6

89.2

91.1

Source Compiled by the author based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SN. Kile, and H.M. Kristensen H.M. World Nuclear Forces. SIPRI Yearbook 2020, 326, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB20%2010%20WNF.pdf)

Important

The origins of the deterioration of the system of institutions for maintaining international security can be found long before the resumption of rivalry between major powers. At the same time, the exacerbation of contradictions in the 2010s transformed previously established instruments for maintaining strategic and regional stability into an object of disagreement. Abolishing institutional treaty mechanisms does not always result in a dangerous build-up of potential, but it does mean that the rivalry is becoming less predictable.

Non-proliferation risks emerge as a result of regress in arms control and the lack of further steps by nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals. At review conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, developing countries expressed their discontent with the refusal of certain key nuclear states (in particular, the United States

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and China) to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and with the unrealized promises to create a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.19 In 2017, a large group of states signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Unlike the NPT, it does not allow for exemptions for individual states allowing them to own such potentials.20 Nuclear powers formed a unified front against this treaty, claiming it undermines previous efforts intended to gradually move toward universal disarmament. Nevertheless, proponents of this initiative hope that support from the greater part of the global community will put political pressure on the states that refused to sign it.21 Such a strategy was previously used as part of the so-called humanitarian arms control mechanisms that had been developing since the 1990s, which included the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, and the Arms Trade Treaty. Many of these instruments were never signed or ratified by the leading military powers and military equipment manufacturers.22 The growing contradictions around the prohibition of chemical weapons also manifested the weakening of treaty mechanisms for maintaining security that was happening amid mounting rivalry between states. In particular, Russia sharply condemned the West’s attempts to vest the relevant international body (the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) with the right to independently determine the parties guilty of violating existing restrictions and prohibitions.23 The disagreements over a broad range of disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms limitation regimes suggest that states continue to view military power as an instrument for advancing their political interests. Such views contradict and undermine the efforts of transnational movements and groups fighting to reduce the role of military power and to help the world move toward greater humaneness.24

Non-Forcible Coercion in Great Power Rivalry Given the limited use the leading powers make of military instruments in their rivalry, the key role has gone to non-forcible coercion. They are applied with increasing frequency owing to the mounting dependency of states on global commercial and financial flows, transportation and communications infrastructure, and international political institutions for regulating the global economy.

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The instruments of political, economic, and informational pressure that had been directed against “rogue states” in the past have found new applications in great power competition. The diverse arsenal of sanctions, trade, and technological restrictions that the United States had used against Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, has come to be used against Russia and China.25 Economic means of strangling opponents have become the backbone of rivalry tools since the leading powers do not expect to either get rid of their rivals quickly or to transform them into their allies. Sanctions are used to undermine a rival’s long-term competitive edge and undercut its potential without a direct clash. Important resources in implementing such policies are accessible to one’s own market and control over financial transactions between states. Given the US dollar’s central role in global finances and the scale of the American economy, the United States has the greatest capabilities to apply such pressure. As early as the 1990s, the United States started to develop a set of tools for imposing targeted sanctions. They entail identifying the restrictive measures that would be particularly painful for an opponent and purposefully applying them with minimal risks of indirect losses for the initiator of sanctions.26 Nevertheless, sanctions are rarely effective and rarely force states to abandon a political course they are steering (one of the few exceptions is Iran’s consent to roll back its nuclear program and to place it under international control in 2013–2015). In most cases, the role of sanctions is to make it more difficult for the opponent to take further action, and to put pressure on third states. The telling development here is the expanding role of secondary sanctions applied to companies working with the target of the initial restrictions.27 In this case, the United States acts as a conduit of new approaches to applying sanctions pressure. It traces transactions at the level of individual companies and forces both American and foreign businesses in order to ensure compliance with the restrictions imposed. It is becoming increasingly important for rivals to regulate technological transfer and manage access to their advanced technologies. US restrictions imposed on the Chinese company Huawei or Russia’s Kaspersky Lab are cases in point. In such instances, the strategic motives of states frequently clash with the intentions of economic agents. Political considerations here outweigh the influence of economic interdependence. The active use of sanctions weakens the United States’ long-term structural advantages in the global economy. This policy prompts other states to reduce their dependence on American financial and institutional

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mechanisms, replacing them with alternatives. In the late 2010s, countries under sanctions had achieved limited success. Nevertheless, in the course of time, they may reduce or neutralize the central role that dollarnominated instruments play in international transactions. Countries and companies hit by US sanctions are becoming increasingly savvy when it comes to offsetting the effects the American restrictions have on the most important sectors of their economies.28

Important

The economic means of strangling an opponent have been transformed into the backbone of rivalry between the leading powers. Here, political considerations outweigh the influence of economic interdependence.

The emergence of cyberspace has shaped a new area of confrontation that does not have clearly articulated rules of the game. Given the increasing dependence societies on information and communication technologies, there has been far more intense development of instruments for gathering intelligence, manipulating public opinion, and using the internet to cause material damage.29 The question of operations conducted in cyberspace possibly escalating into armed hostilities involving conventional means of violent coercion is an important source of uncertainty.30 Expanding the arsenal of leverage used in inter-power rivalry ensures alternatives to armed hostilities and is conducive to transforming confrontation into other forms that are less dangerous to international stability. At the same time, when it comes to relations between states, such means of coercion remain largely fruitless as they rarely induce opponents to retreat or pursue a different course. As a result, mutual dissatisfaction continues to accumulate, which stimulates greater rivalry. This, in turn, negatively affects the long-term prospects of international stability.

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International Security and Domestic Destabilization In the 2010s, security discussions mostly focused on the growing rivalry between major powers, while far less attention was paid to challenges stemming from the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the leading states. Such challenges, however, can destabilize the international environment in a big way by, among other things, provoking a search for external sources of domestic problems. Historical record demonstrates that attempts to externalize the lack of legitimacy among national elites have frequently served as an important driver of conflict on the global arena. In the decades since the 1980s social inequality has been steadily increasing both in developed and developing states. Originally, its growth followed transfer of manufacturing jobs to poor states in order to cut manufacturing costs.31 State deregulation and trade liberalization policies advocated by key world economic institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization) encouraged such transfer. The rise of global supply chains preceded financialization of the global economy which resulted in massive profits for a small group of investors and professionals engaged in financial services.32 Finally, since the late 2000s, automation in the production of an ever greater number of goods and services has come to play an increasingly important role. Rising technological levels in manufacturing helped developed states implement partial re-industrialization, but this process was not accompanied by a significant upsurge in employment or by rising wages for unskilled workers.33 These trends resulted in a lower share of labor costs in the end product value, a relative shrinking of the middle class, reduced social mobility between generations, and economic wealth being increasingly concentrated in the hands of the rich. Growing class divides affected most regions of the world, including wealthy states.34 In the United States, for instance, the income gap between the richest and the poorest in the early 2010s approached the levels of the late 1920s (the eve of the Great Depression).35 Traditional means of overcoming social stratification (such as state regulation, progressive taxation, and developing a social support system) turned out to be ineffective in the context of the widespread freedom of movement of capital, as was evidenced by the crisis of the socially oriented

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economies in Europe. Attempts to increase the tax burden of large corporations and the wealthiest social groups result in assets being transferred to more favorable jurisdictions. A major chunk of proposed solutions is concentrated on traditional means of direct redistribution (for instance, introducing universal basic income).36 States strive to close the existing loopholes that help avoid taxation, for example, by intensifying the pressure they put on the offshores the rich use to free their finances from state control. However, the desire to toughen corporate regulation runs into the ability of corporations to mount a lobbyist defense. Growing inequality and the fact that the young generations have little prospects of improving or even preserving their wealth became the key sources of exacerbating political struggle in societies. At the turn of the 2010s, the countries of North Africa and the Middle East saw these trends generate a wave of protests and unrest that brought about changes or weakening of political regimes (the so-called Arab Spring).37 In Western countries, growing social stratification put a question mark over many of the previous achievements in shaping welfare states. This resulted in the majority of the population becoming disappointed in the traditional elites, and this disappointment produced a greater search for alternatives to the political mainstream. Nationalistic, protectionist, anti-immigrant, and Islamophobic sentiments became widespread. They owe their popularity to tying domestic problems to the external influence. Liberal circles attempt to stigmatize political groups and organizations advocating such ideas as “populist,” but their efforts have in many cases proved to be ineffective.38

Important

Growing social inequality has become the key source of exacerbated political struggle in today’s societies. The growing anxiety of political elites regarding their status and authority prompts them to engage into a more confrontational foreign policy intended to mobilize domestic support.

The aggravation of the domestic political situation was projected onto international security, which contributed to the mounting confrontation propensity in the foreign policies of various states. Some political forces

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began to directly link social difficulties to the policies of third states that have stolen jobs or stimulated uncontrollable migration. Others began to accuse external actors of attempting to manipulate domestic policies through, among other things, meddling in elections. In both cases, instability within states negatively impacts international security. The problem of foreign interference in domestic affairs is a particularly important source of tensions given its direct impact on the interests of the ruling elites. On the one hand, their unstable position could indeed tempt external actors to try and influence intra-state processes. By doing that, they could hope to obtain a more pliable partner in the form of a new government. On the other hand, the ruling elites of states have incentives to use the subject of possible interference to mobilize the public support they lack. They could hope that the “sieged fortress” mentality would rally people behind them. The low verifiability of charges leveled against intelligence services as well as organizations and activists that are not directly affiliated with states creates conditions for incorrect perceptions, miscalculations, and mutual suspicions. In this regard, both real and alleged interference in domestic affairs is conducive to destabilizing relations between states. Alongside the increased use of instruments of economic pressure, the growth of mutual accusations in this area in the 2010s is a noticeable trend that is shattering international security. ∗ ∗ ∗ The evolution of the international security landscape since the end of the Cold War has gone full circle: from optimistic expectations of overcoming conflict propensity through the inflation of threats and exploiting concerns over the risks of instability crossing borders, to the comeback of great power rivalry, which is additionally fueled by the challenges of domestic instability. Such dynamics do not align with the concepts of unchangeable threats, or with hopes that the international politics would steadily evolve into some qualitatively new state, suggested by Realist and Liberal theories respectively. The variety of potential challenges to international security leads to different types of threats, frequently in unique combinations, being foregrounded in different periods. This allows us, on the one hand, to turn to historical record to assess the current situation and the prospects for it changing. Yet, on the other hand, it requires caution in drawing parallels between the current and past states of affairs in society. The trend toward great power rivalry affects the international security agenda in a variety of ways. Even though the likelihood of a direct

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large-scale military clash remains debatable, the trend itself manifests in the dynamics of local conflicts that become sites of proxy confrontations, as well as in increasing military activities and the changing priorities of building up the capabilities of the armed forces. The exacerbated rivalry between the leading global actors has accelerated the erosion of institutionalized mechanisms for maintaining international stability. Their collapse increases the level of uncertainty in the unfolding confrontation. Apart from competing in the military domain, major powers translate their rivalry into attempts to undermine the long-term foundations of their opponents’ national strength. Economic strangulation becomes particularly relevant leading to the proliferation of sanctions, trade wars, and technological barriers. States do not shy away from using traditional forms of information war, adapting them to the new communicative environment created by the internet and social networks. Growing intra-state social contradictions that affect even the richest and most highly developed states increase the demand for such subversive instruments. A combination of competition between states on the one hand, and their internal weakness on the other is not something radically new. History knows similar examples. Moreover, in some historical periods, domestic problems would become so acute as to force states to abandon active confrontation with each other (the “European Concert” of the first half of the nineteenth century is one such example). These situations created prerequisites for bolstering peace and international security. Such instances, however, usually happened at times when different states had homogeneous notions of the proper political, economic, and social system. Put simply, the ideological proximity of states helped them maintain solidarity between their governments in their struggle against domestic threats to their legitimacy,39 shaping a sort of an “Establishment Internationale.” Fundamental differences between the dominant national ideologies in individual power centers overlap with the many problems described above. Such a situation makes it more difficult to overcome tensions between states and even increases the likelihood of these tensions being used in domestic political struggles. In such situations, opposition inside states comes to be seen as an agent of external opponents, while ideologically proximate forces in other states turn out to be allies, whether they know it or not. The trend toward such ideologization of relations was largely provoked by the forceful liberal messianism of the United States and other Western states, but it is now encroaching not the actions of other states. As a result, the mutual intertwining and mutual bolstering external and internal threats undermine international stability and make it harder to ensure the national security of leading states.

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Keywords International security, inter-power rivalry, non-conventional challenge and threats, military power, arms control, economic coercion, interference in internal affairs Self-Test 1. What are the principal international security challenges as of the early 2020s? 2. What are the consequences of redistributing power within the international system with a view to maintaining stability? 3. What role does military power play in today’s international relations? 4. What explains the degradation of institutionalized mechanisms of ensuring international security? 5. How do the non-forcible coercion means in international politics evolve? 6. What are the international and political consequences of growing socioeconomic inequality in today’s world?

Notes 1. See: R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); A.F.K. Organski, and J. Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); G. Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Springer, 1987); D.C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 2. Z. Brzezinski, “Can China Avoid the Thucydides Trap?,” New Perspectives Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2014): 31–33; G. Allison, Destined Forward: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 3. Stein A.A., “Power Politics and the Powerless,” in M. Finnemore, and J. Goldstein, eds., Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 219–248. 4. The starkest example is the National Security Strategy of the United States. (The White House. December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/20r7/12/NSS-Final-12-18-20r7-0905-2.pdf.) 5. Revealing here are the US claims that China was to blame for the pandemic, or the accusations levelled by Western politicians and media that Russia was intentionally spreading disinformation about the coronavirus.

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6. V.M. Kulagin, International Security (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2007), 12. 7. R.N. Rosecrance, and S.E. Miller, eds. The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of US–China Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014). 8. M. Kofman, and A. Sushentsov, “Growing Complacent Too Early,” Russia in Global Affairs 14, no. 4 (2016): 8–21; A.V. Fenenko, “What Wars of the Future Will be Like?” Russian International Affairs Council (July 19, 2017), https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/ analytics/kakimi-budut-voyny-budushchego/; M. Suchkov, and S. Tek, “The Future of War: Valdai Discussion Club Report,” https://valdaiclub. com/files/26032/; L. Kulesa, “Envisioning a Russia–NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” European Leadership Network (February 2018), https://www.europeanleadershipnet-work.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2018/02/180213-Envisioning-a-Russia-NATO-Conflict. pdf; V. Rauta, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict: Take Two,” The RUSI Journal (2020): 1–10. 9. T. Frear, L. Kulesa, and I. Kearns, “Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014,” European Leadership Network (November 2014), https://www.europeanleadership network.orgy/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dangerous-Brinkmanship. pdf. 10. A.A. Kokoshin, V.I. Bartenev, and V.A. Veselov, “Preparing a Revolution in Military Science with Budgetary Restrictions: New Initiatives of the US Department of Defensem,” The US and Canada: Economy, Politics, Culture, no. 11 (2015): 3–22; V.I. Bartenev, “The US in Search of New Technological Foundations of Military Supremacy: ‘Third Compensatory Strategy’ Dilemmas,” MGIMO University Bulletin 48, no. 3 (2016): 30– 42. 11. R.H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017); M.T. Klare, “The Challenges of Emerging Technologies,” Arms Control Today 48, no. 10 (2018): 10–16; M.C. Horowitz, “When Speed Kills: Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence and Stability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 6 (2019): 764–788. 12. Michael D. Wallace, “Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 1 (1979): 3–16; Susan G. Sample, “Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate,” Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 1 (1997): 7–22; Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison, “Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 2 (2005): 131–147.

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13. 2020 Military Strength Ranking. Global Firepower Index, https://www. globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php. The index does not account for the contribution of nuclear forces to military potential, although here too, Russia and the United States remain the unquestionable leaders as they control over 90% of all warheads (see: H.M. Kristensen, and M. Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear Arsenals of the World,” https://the bulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/). 14. See, for instance: The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (amended December 19, 2014), http://kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/47334. 15. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe. OSCE (1990), https://www. osce.org/files/f/documents/0/6/39516.pdf. 16. Address by OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger at Oxford University. October 22, 2018, https://www.osce.org/files/f/docume nts/0/9/403424.pdf. 17. For an overview of the collapse of weapons control mechanisms, see: Alexey Arbatov, “An Unnoticed Crisis: The End of History for Nuclear Arms Control?” Carnegie Moscow Center (June 16, 2015), https://carnegie.ru/2015/06/16/unnoticed-crisis-end-of-his tory-for-nuclear-arms-control-pub-60408; I.S. Istomin, “The Military and Political Balancing of Russia and the West: Evolution and Prospects,” in T.A. Shakleina, ed., Russia and the United States in the 21st Century. Relations of Discontent (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2020), 111–139. 18. Keir A. Lieber, and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no.4 (2006) 7– 44; Keir A. Lieber, and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 9–49; Austin Long, and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, nos. 1–2 (2015): 38–73; S.A. Karaganov, and D.V. Suslov, A New Understanding and Ways for Bolstering Strategic Stability: A Report (Moscow: HSE Publishing House, 2019). For criticism of statements concerning the emergence of a nuclear bipolarity, see: A.G. Arbatov, “Multilateral Disarmament Requires Sacrifices,” Nezavisimaya gazeta (August 12, 2019), www.ng.ru/s/ideas/2019-08-12/7_7647_control.html. 19. D.A. Selezneva, “Problems Maintaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” World Economy and International Relations 64, no. 3 (2020): 29–35. 20. Under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the states that had tested nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 1967 undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to

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cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, June 12, 1968, https://www.un.org/ru/documents/ decl_conv/conventions/npt.shtml). At the same time, the timeframe for implementing these commitments, as well as specific compliance criteria, were not enshrined in an international treaty. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons expressed the dissatisfaction of non-nuclear states with the lack of progress towards universal nuclear disarmament. Under the Treaty, “each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, June 7, 2017, https://undocs.org/ru/ AZCONF.229/2017/8). Originally, 122 states supported this treaty; as of late 2020, it had been ratified by 50 states and, consequently, will enter into force in 2021. Commitments under this treaty, as well as under other treaties, do not extend to the states that refused to sign it (which includes all the nuclear powers, NATO member states, and Japan). Tom Sauer, and Mathias Reveraert, “The Potential Stigmatizing Effect of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25, nos. 5–6 (2018): 437–455; Harald Müller, and Carmen Wunderlich, “Nuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States: The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty,” Dedalus 149, no. 2 (2020): 171–189. Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 613– 644; Ramesh Thakur, and William Maley, “The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 5, no. 3 (1999): 273–302; M. Patrick Cottrell. “Legitimacy and Institutional Replacement: The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Emergence of the Mine Ban Treaty,” International Organization 63, no. 2 (2009): 217–248; Denise Garcia, “Global Norms on Arms: The Significance of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Security in World Politics,” Global Policy 5, no. 4 (2014): 425–432. S.A. Ryabkov, “Russia Does Not Recognize the OPCW’s Right to Determine Who is Guilty of Using Chemical Weapons,” Russian International Affairs Council (June 28, 2018), https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-andcomments/comments/rossiya-ne-priznaet-prava-ozkho-opredelyat-vinovn ykh-v-primenenii-khimoruzhii/. See, for instance, Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (London: Penguin, 2012).

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25. Henry Farrell, and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79. 26. Daniel W. Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011): 96–108. 27. I.N. Timofeev, “Why are Secondary Sanctions Effective? The Experience of US Authorities’ Coercive Measures Against American and Foreign Business,” International Trends 17, no. 3 (2019): 21–35. 28. Daniel P. Ahn, and Rodney D. Ludema, “The Sword and the Shield: The Economics of Targeted Sanctions,” European Economic Review 130, issue C (2020). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103587. 29. Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon and International Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). 30. “Krutskikh: Russia–US Cybersecurity Dialogue Has Never Been Interrupted, It’s An Ongoing Process,” TASS (April 5, 2018), https://tass. ru/politika/5097736. 31. William Milberg, and Deborah Winkler, Outsourcing Economics: Global Value Chains in Capitalist Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 32. Natascha van der Zwan, “Making Sense of Financialization,” SocioEconomic Review 12, no. 1 (2014): 99–129; Gerald F. Davis and Suntae Kim, “Financialization of the Economy,” Annual Review of Sociology 41 (2015): 203–221. 33. Astrid Krenz, Klaus Prettner, and Holger Strulik, “Robots, Reshoring, and the Lot of Low-Skilled Workers,” Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research (CEGE), no. 351 (2018). 34. Thomas Piketty, and Gabriel Zucman, “Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700–2010,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 3 (2014): 1255–1310; Gabriel Zucman, “Global Wealth Inequality,” Annual Review of Economics 11 (2019): 109–138. Latin America has become an exception to this general trend, but this region has from the outset had extremely high inequality (see: Nora Lustig, Luis F. Lopez-Calva, and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez. Declining Inequality in Latin America in the 2000s: The Cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The World Bank, 2012). 35. Emmanuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman, “Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131, no. 2 (2016): 519–578. 36. Y.S. Gontmakher, “Basic (Universal) Income: The Political Economic Aspect,” Economic Policy 14, no. 3 (2019): 70–79.

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37. L.L. Fituni, “The ‘Arab Spring’: Political Paradigm Transformation and International Relations,” World Economy and International Relations, no. 1 (2012): 3–14. 38. A. A. Gromyko, “‘New Populism’ and the Genesis of a Post-Bipolar World Order,” Contemporary Europe 72, no. 6 (2016); A.V. Glukhova, “Populism as A Political Phenomenon,” Polis. Political Studies, no. 4 (2017): 49–68. 39. Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Recommended Reading Allison, G. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. Braumoeller, B.F. Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Drezner, D.W. “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011): 96–108. Farrell, H., and Newman A.L. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79. Kello, L. The Virtual Weapon and International Order. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. Klare, M.T. “The Challenges of Emerging Technologies,” Arms Control Today 48, no. 10 (2018): 10–16. Kofman, M., and Sushentsov, A. “Growing Complacent Too Early,” Russia in Global Politics 14, no. 4 (2016): 8–21. Kokoshin, A.A., Bartenev, V.I., and Veselov, V.A. “Preparing a Revolution in the Military Science amid Budgetary Restrictions: New Initiatives of the US Department of Defense,” The US and Canada: Economy, Politics, Culture, no. 11 (2015): 3–22. Kulagin, V.M. International Security. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2007. Pinker, S. The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. NY: Penguin, 2012.

CHAPTER 5

The Phenomenology of Globalization Alexey Kuznetsov

The concept of economic globalization only emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century, yet already in the early twenty-first century, it came to be one of the most frequently used terms in discussing global economic development and characterizing individual forms of international economic relations. Initially, researchers studied this phenomenon in connection with market globalization and the exacerbation of global human problems, yet, over the span of two or three decades, globalization has come to be associated with a whole range of trends in public life that frequently went far beyond the economic realm. As examples, we can list the problems in gradually shaping a global governance system or issues connected with the development of anti-globalist movements. Expanding the discussion beyond pure economics allowed the academic community to identify the contradictory nature of globalization processes.

A. Kuznetsov (B) Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_5

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The global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 and the subsequent transformations within the global economy confirmed that even economic globalization has non-linear dynamics. At the same time, by the late 2010s, it had become clear that despite certain reverse trends, economic globalization is not going away: this is the reality we will have to live with for the foreseeable future. At the same time, the latest largescale economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will apparently add to the sum total of our knowledge about the many facets of the globalization phenomenon.

Waves of Internationalization Before the term “globalization” appeared, the terms “internationalization” and “mundialization” were quite popular in the academic community. The sharp increase in the importance of foreign economic ties in the life of most states and the greater “density” of the global space as a result of the evolution of new means of communication in the 1980s–1990s were not utterly new phenomena. Researchers were quick to remind the public about similar explosive interconnectedness trends as early as the days leading up to the First World War. Consequently, following several years of purely academic and public discussions, the term “economic globalization” came to be used to describe the current stage of global economic internationalization. Experts differed mostly in their opinions on whether the current stage of internationalization could be considered unique due to many new features, including the emergence of a truly unified global economy (that did not exist even in the 1980s amid a fairly isolated system of socialist states).1 Another popular opinion claimed that globalization was merely another wave of economic internationalization, a trend whose history is centuries long, even if it was interrupted periodically due to the overall cyclical nature of economic (and political) development. The previous wave of internationalization started in the second half of the nineteenth century. For the people of that time and for their economic activities, the telegraph, railways, and steamers were a greater revolution than the introduction of the internet and a mass trans-continental air connectivity in the late twentieth century.2

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There are even claims that the Age of Exploration already gave the world its first wave of internationalization since it created the grounds for engaging the entire world in foreign economic connections. However, we need to keep in mind that while the greater part of the planet was involved in foreign trade in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, it was mostly under the “colonial power and colonies” model. Moreover, cross-border contacts existed only within small economic hotbeds, while the greater part of national economies in the most developed states was locked within the domestic market, and the economically backward regions of Africa and Latin America exhibited no signs of internationalization. The wave of internationalization reached its peak before the outbreak of the First World War against the start of the hostilities in Europe in 1914, followed by the post-war chaos of revolutions and the Spanish flu pandemic. The 1920s concluded with the Great Depression, and in 1939 another crushing blow came when the Second World War started. Consequently, many quantitative indicators of internationalization that existed at the turn of the twentieth century were only achieved again in the 1970s–1990s. New landmarks have certainly been achieved in the current century. Moreover, we are talking not only and not so much quantitative indicators, and this development fits perfectly with the conclusions of philosophers that significant quantitative changes frequently produce qualitative shifts. Experts usually identify the following parameters as the quantitative marks of globalization (and preceding waves of internationalization): • Foreign trade to economy size ratio (the most frequent comparison indicators are GDP and exports, less frequently the turnover of foreign trade in goods or in goods and services, although it is a more proper procedure to consider the added value of goods and services sold, not their gross value, since GDP is calculated based on added value only). • The level of protectionism can be seen as an additional parameter here. It is calculated on the basis of various indicators that characterize the volume of customs duties and non-tariff barriers corrected to a comparable base of non-tariff barriers (which is particularly important for foreign trade in services, the role of which today has significantly).

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• Indicators of cross-border population movements: the share of the population traveling abroad on business or as tourists (calculated annually or over a given period) and also indicators of cross-border labor migration as an example of the global movement of a crucial manufacturing factor (primarily the share of foreign labor force in countries that are net importers of labor resources). • Other indicators used in this connection are the “Passport Index” (the number of countries a particular country’s national can visit without a visa, at least for short trips) and labor migration parameters for countries that are net labor exporters (the share of the population that has left their home country in the last five or ten years, or the share of wire transfers by migrants in the balance of payment of countries). • A group of indicators characterizing the cross-border movement of loan capital and enterprise capital, another crucial manufacturing factor, with particular emphasis placed on the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) as the key sign of manufacturing internationalization (this can be FDI stocks to GDP ratio, the share of foreign investment in the annual investment into core assets, the contribution of assets controlled by foreign investors to the GDP, etc.). • Communication connection parameters that ensure a high degree of coordination in cross-border manufacturing that is typical of today’s globalization: foreign trade and population migration have taken place on a large scale since ancient times, and in some periods during the Middle Ages, they were comparable in scale to what we are witnessing today, while full-fledged foreign companies (even if they were not the multinational corporations of today) had already appeared during the Age of Exploration. In 1970, for instance, the global exports of goods and services to the global GDP ratio was 13.6%, rising to 18.9% in 1980, 19.3% in 1990, 26% in 2000, 28.9% in 2010, and 30.5% in 2019 (the growth, however, was uneven, it peaked at 30.7% in 2008, before plunging to 26.5% during the crisis).3 The outstripping growth rate of global trade, foreign direct investment, and other indicators describing foreign economic indicators compared to the GDP dynamics is often cited as proof of economic internationalization and the arrival of what we know as globalization today. In particular,

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in the 1980s, global exports of commodities grew by over 70%, yet FDI stocks over the same period is estimated to have tripled or quadrupled, and global GDP grew by 86%. In the 1990s, commodities exports grew by 85%, FDI grew nearly 3.3 times, and GDP by only 45%. During the 2000s, global commodities exports grew 2.4 times, the increase in FDI stocks slowed down, yet still grew nearly 2.7 times, and global GDP grew by a little under 2 times.4 Qualitative changes in modern globalization linked to the rapid growth of qualitative indicators are observed in all the areas mentioned: foreign trade, cross-border population movements, foreign investment, and international information connections. Below, I will consider the transformation of foreign trade in the context of globalization in more detail. In order to give a brief description of foreign trade today, it must be stressed that the first ever global system for regulating trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO), had only just been set up by the 2000s, while trade rules that apply to everyone (with a few specified exceptions) also partially extend to related areas, including FDI. At the same time, the global system for regulating foreign trade that had been developing steadily for over 50 years found itself in a major crisis by the early 2010s. Two years after the Second World War, a system based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. The process launched by 23 countries in 1947 that involved numerous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations ultimately made it possible to transform the GATT-based system into a full-fledged organization, the WTO, on January 1, 1995. The organization was established following the (Uruguay) Round of talks at the agreement of 125 states, whereby GATT was supplemented by the General Agreement on Trade in Services and several other instruments. Although there were many disagreements between the states, the WTO had 164 members as of late 2016, including China (which acceded in 2001), Saudi Arabia (2005), Vietnam (2007), and Russia (2012) (the European Union has been acting as a consolidated member since the foundation of the WTO). Another 23 states (the largest among them being Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Ethiopia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Serbia) announced their intention to accede to the WTO, with most launching the relevant talks. However, another round of talks, the so-called Doha Development Round—launched in 2001 to eliminate certain items in the agreements made during the Uruguay Round that benefited developed states—essentially failed.

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Important

The twenty-first century saw the start of an alternative process of concluding mega-regional trade agreements that was only temporarily slowed down by the United States during the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency. Currently, the most successful project is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an agreement concluded in 2020 as a “free trade area plus.” It includes 10 ASEAN members, as well as Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. The European Union remains another globalization pole with a ramified system of free trade agreements and other forms of close economic cooperation with many states throughout the world. But there are cooperation models that have radically different formats, for instance, China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Qualitative changes in cross-border population movements stem from intensified intercultural contacts. This trend did not result in a triumph of multiculturalism even where the “unity in diversity” policy was to some extent proclaimed (primarily in the United States and the European Union, but also in the USSR until its collapse in 1991). At the same time, economic conduct models were clearly globalized, professional education standards were to some degree aligned, English spread rapidly as the language of international communication, etc. A similar number of qualitative changes occurred in the international movement of capital. Much has been written about the radical transformation of financial markets over the last decades, when the revolution in communication technologies made it possible to essentially engage in a permanent global trade in financial instruments on exchange markets located throughout the world. The explosive growth of financial derivatives cemented the split of the real economic sector from the financial sector. This does not at all mean that they will no longer influence each other. On the contrary, economic “financialization” has finally manifested itself in full, and economies have become more volatile due to the increased role of financial market speculations. At the same time, as in the case of trade with its somewhat stronger protectionism, the role of international regulation in the financial sector, of counteracting offshores, etc.,

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has grown following the most recent global economic crisis. Special attention should be paid to the evolution of transnational corporations (TNCs) discussed below.

Important

What is the digitization of public life that is taking place before our very eyes? Is it not the unique feature of today’s globalization? Is it not a means to be used against autarchies (until now, North Korea and “failed states” in Africa and Asia are still almost entirely isolated from the global economy)? At the same time, we need to keep in mind that any revolutionary innovations must be “digested” by society, while culture and social practices do not evolve the required premises immediately. This is why virtually universal access to excessive information about reality does not only simplify global economic ties, but also produces negative consequences, such as “fake news,” state propaganda, manipulations of people’s minds for marketing purposes, etc.

Moving Away from the Dichotomy of “Developed and Developing Countries” in the Polycentric World Globalization has largely been stimulated by the liberal foreign economic policy of developed states, especially as TNCs based in those countries wanted to expand into developing states, including former colonies (as they were becoming increasingly involved in the global economy) in order to expand their markets, reduce manufacturing costs (particularly labor costs), and gain access to new resources (especially since the raw material reserves of the leading states were becoming rapidly depleted). At the same time, economic globalization created new opportunities for backward countries to catch up in terms of their development, and the arrival of foreign investors ensured the transfer of technologies and state-of-the-art managerial solutions, while gradual integration into the global division of labor and the expansion of information contacts with the outside world

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were conducive to modernizing economies and societies in the countries of the so-called Global South. Naturally, not every developing country unequivocally benefited from globalization. Many influential experts stressed in heated discussions that only a very limited circle of countries actually felt the benefits of this phenomenon.5 Large-scale cross-border and particularly transcontinental human flows should be interpreted as having highly ambivalent consequences for both those countries that were losing their most active and capable workforce, and for those where the influx of migrants from different cultures exacerbates social problems. Moreover, even in developed states, some population groups have not benefited from globalization. It is no accident that “new populists” are boosting their standing both in Europe and in the United States,6 and that calls for re-industrialization are becoming louder (up to returning manufacturing from the most successful developing countries, even as many countries of the Global South are facing de-industrialization).7

Important

Even unequal development in the context of globalization has allowed some states on the global periphery to burst into the ranks of states with mid-level economic development. Essentially, the “developed—developing states” dichotomy used to describe states disappeared by the 2010s, although some researchers had said several decades ago that it was necessary to create a more detailed typology of developing states.8

Some developing countries were able to win competitive positions, and not only in small niches. Just look at South Korea and the island of Taiwan, which have not merely long joined the ranks of developed states (although several international organizations have not yet put them on this list), but are among the leaders in R&D spending. This figure usually indicates the prospects of a country’s success in future technological races. The OECD reports that, in 2018, South Korea earmarked 4.53% of its GDP for R&D, while Taiwan allocated 3.46%, compared to 2.83% in the United States, 3.28% in Japan, 3.13% in Germany, 3.32% in Sweden, 4.94% in Israel, and just 0.98% in Russia. In absolute figures,

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R&D spending in 2015 fixed prices calculated by purchasing power parity of currencies in 2018, South Korea outstripped Russia by 2.6 times, the United Kingdom by 1.9 times, and France by 1.5 times.9 Europe is also no stranger to the phenomenon of moderately developed countries, including through examples of the successful postsocialist transformation of some current EU member states. This does not mean, however, that they have merely swelled the ranks of globalization leaders. On the contrary, countries with mid-level economic development offered the world new models of engaging in foreign economic relations. In particular, many TNCs based in those countries started internationalizing their business not because they wanted to make use of the advantages they had (like classical TNCs in the United States and the “old members” of the European Union), but to overcome their drawbacks (for instance, by purchasing Western companies developing state-of-the-art technologies that are hard to create in immature national innovation systems).

Important

A more important premise that determined the movement toward a polycentric world was the achievement of a sort of a critical mass in the level of economic development of super-large states when, even with a relatively low per capita GDP, but with large populations, they can concentrate resources on key areas, including science-intensive ones. This—and not the transformation into the “world’s global workshop” thanks to an influx of Western FDI— is what explains China’s explosive economic growth. It is also the reason why Brazil, India, and Russia (for the latter, particularly in the Soviet period with its achievements in hi-tech industries) developed competitive advantages in some areas.

Consequently, many states throughout the world can significantly influence global development. This was reflected in the transformation of the principal mechanisms for creating elements of global economic regulation. In the twenty-first century, the G7, alongside the G20 and BRICS, are playing an increasingly important role in coordinating the efforts of various countries, while leading developing states are using international organizations (including the United Nations) to push for a revision of

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the balance of power in favor of a more fair representation of the Global South. Particular attention should still be paid to the special and largely systemically important role the United States plays in international economic relations, the role assigned to it following the end of the Second World War when Washington led the group of states of the so-called capitalist bloc.10 In terms of the components of this role over the past several years, it is important to note that the US dollar is still key in monetary relations throughout the world. Even the euro failed to radically undermine the dollar’s standing.11 The US economy remains the world’s leading national economy in terms of its synergetic power. It has a uniquely creative and innovation potential, and its stable dynamic development generally rests on raw materials, capital, and labor resources that are replenished in many respects via migration (including qualified personnel still attracted by the “American dream”). An additional factor here is the military might of the United States as a nuclear superpower that actively uses its military power and economic sanctions throughout the world (just look at the ex-territoriality of US legislation). In addition, as regards military spending (which partially stimulates scientific and technological progress), the United States spent more than the next nine countries combined (including China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the five most active OECD member states) in 2019.12 At the same time, as globalization develops, the nature and phenomenological attributes of the global economy are changing rapidly, and they have little in common with the end of the bipolar era. The rapid economic growth in many developing countries brings with it the imminent threat of resource depletion if the present economic models are retained. Consequently, in 2000, the United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals, which were replaced with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in 2015. The 17 goals of international cooperation adopted by the global community until 2030 increasingly penetrate various initiatives proposed by different international organizations, and they are incorporated into the development strategies of TNCs and individual nation-states. In the twenty-first century, many states, developed countries, in particular, banked on their accelerated transition to renewable energy sources and introducing other energy-saving means, and expected a greater focus to be placed on environmental protection and social equality. While most countries in Asia and Africa focus on achieving such basic goals as “no

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poverty” (SDG 1), “zero hunger” (SDG 2), and “clean water and sanitation” (SDG 6), highly developed states are aiming for a broader range of these goals. At its initial stages, such a strategy inevitably results in slower quantitative GDP growth rates. Countries that lag behind can, however, in one or two decades, face even greater challenges as such concepts as environmental and social dumping are incorporated into the global economic regulation vocabulary. Essentially, at some point, one of the principal competitive advantages of many developing states—the gap in manufacturing costs in their country and in the states most successful in the globalization era—will be eliminated by introducing payments for such dumping. Intensified cooperation along the “South–South” line is a separate important feature of economic globalization. This is a set of relations between developing states, and these relations differ greatly in the level of economic interactions: relations between the largest states (primarily within BRICS and the IBSA—India, Brazil, South Africa—group); relations between the largest states and other developing states (the most well-known cooperation is within China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the efforts of Arab donors and other “new donors” to provide official development assistance); intensive contacts between the countries of the Global South emerging due to the objective neighborhood effect (the best-known integration groups are ASEAN in Southeast Asia and MERCOSUR in Latin America); and cross-border relations between small developing states that are far removed from each other.13 Although the countries of the Global North still dominate international economic relations, and although the South–South cooperation cannot be an alternative to other global economic connections, it is part of a fundamental transformation of the current West-centric world order. Essentially, the emerging polycentric world is the only possible way to true globalization in the context of the current world order.

Foreign Trade Transformation and Regulation: Globalization Versus Regionalization Economic globalization is developing not only through faster and cheaper transportation of commodities previously involved in foreign trade (including easier management of cross-border manufacturing and sales chains). Scientific and technological progress has ensured the expansion of a number of “tradable” commodities and services being, while the

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FDI boom brought on by the liberalization of investments—particularly in infrastructural sectors (that had previously been controlled solely by states throughout the world)—has even ensured the internationalization of those economic sectors where manufacturing and selling service are linked territorially. The electric energy sector (through developing unified power grids), phone communications (through introducing mobile technologies), and many other sectors only became actively involved in international economic relations in the 1990s. Many new economic agents that are “peripheral” in a variety of ways (from the remotest regions of the backward countries of the Global South, where state-of-the-art transportation routes have been built, to regular citizens of highly developed states that are becoming more involved in cross-border online trading) are getting involved in foreign trade. We need to keep in mind that a significant chunk of foreign trade is controlled by TNCs. At the same time, in-house relations within TNCs, even when state borders are crossed, are radically different from the free market relations that served as basis for the most famous foreign trade theories proposed in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Given the growing popularity of long-term contractual relations between independent market participants, the strategic alliances of TNCs without equity participation and other forms of interactions between companies, a continuum of highly diverse forms of cross-border trade relations emerged in the context of globalization—from something similar to competition (in the case of some forms of exchange trading) to rigid intra-corporate hierarchical supply schemes. Taken together, these developments prompt researchers to revise traditional explanations of international trade and prompt politicians to think about improving the methods of regulating cross-border flows of goods and services (against the backdrop of the overall liberalization of foreign trade). Non-economic factors continue to influence the development of international trade in goods and services. The political base plays a special role in the development of regional integration projects and in a phenomenon that is new to global economy, namely, mega-regional trade and economic agreements. Researchers have started to discuss the emergence of “globalizing networked regionalism” that started in the early 2000s. This is qualitatively different from twentieth-century regionalism. First, in addition to the rapid and ubiquitous increase in the number of regional trade agreements taking place in all the regions and sub-regions of the world,

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their agenda is also expanding and deepening beyond the WTO’s commitments and mandate. A rapid increase in the number of inter-regional trade agreements (some of which include trade blocs) can be observed. Second, in the 2010s, the largest countries came to be actively involved in regional trade agreements, thus launching mega-regional trade agreements with an ambitious pro-integration agenda. However, unlike the European Union, they propose an alternative model for building a common economic space without supra-national elements.14 Russia is facing the increasingly urgent task of where to position itself in today’s global economy. Russia’s ability to oppose mega-regional trade agreements is heavily restricted by its raw-material specialization within the global division of labor, its late accession to cross-border capital flows, and its objectively narrow domestic market, even on the scale of the five EAEU states. At the same time, Russia was late to join the talks on the RCEP and does not fit into the EU models or China’s Belt and Road Initiative, where it is assigned only the subordinate position of one of the many participants from the economic periphery. The fact that the trade ties of small countries are closely tied to certain leader states or their trade blocs usually entails intensified FDI flows between them, and this, in turn, puts additional competitive pressure on Russian companies that operate in these markets. This trend manifested itself starkly in the former Soviet countries, the Balkans, and among Russia’s traditional partners in Asia during the 2010s. In 2013, Russia accounted for 30% of imports to Ukraine (it is a traditional source of imports to the country in this respect), which was far ahead of any single country, but behind the EU-28 when taken together (the share of the 13 biggest EU countries was already larger than that of Russia).15 Relations with Mongolia are another example: in 2013, Russia fell behind China in terms of exports to Mongolia, and is currently second to China by less than 1 /5 —yet, Russia’s share in Mongolia’s commodities imports is only 28%. Even more important, however, is that Mongolia exports almost nothing to Russia (Russia accounts for less than 1% of Mongolia’s exports, while China accounts for 89%). Another tell-tale example is Uzbekistan; in 2019, Russia accounted for 18.2% of Uzbekistan’s commodities imports and 14.4% of its commodities exports, just 1 /9 behind China’s trade turnover with that country.16

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The possible signing of several mega-regional agreements at once makes the following scenario feasible: regionalization, the flip side of the globalization coin, will dominate, even if temporarily, for one or two decades, the development of the global economy.

Important

It is a mistake to see regionalization as the antithesis to globalization, since the integration efforts of states ultimately ensure intensified international economic relations. Moreover, the movement toward meta-regional agreements was a response to the collapse of most regional initiatives in those countries of the Global South that, for objective reasons, failed to repeat the (albeit relative) success of the European Union.17 Against this backdrop, Russia’s attempts to implement the “Greater Eurasia” project appear fairly problematic, primarily because the Russian economy is not sufficiently attractive as an integration core. The principal causes here are not foreign political miscalculations, but the erroneous approach of the Russian public administration system to innovative development (suffice it to mention, along with stagnating R&D expenses, the fact that the number of researchers in Russia dropped by 12% between 2005 and 2017, while the figures for China and the OECD grew by 56% and 37%, respectively, in that period).18 Russia’s key economic problem in the twenty-first century is its neglect of the R&D sector and the instruments for introducing technological achievements into the real economy that commonly serve as a channel for increasing the overall competitive edge of Russia’s national companies and its economic complex.

Another feature of today’s foreign trade is the transition to cross-border paradigms of establishing value chains (EVC). The ability of national companies to integrate into the most profitable links of these chains is a key component of success. Compared to its competitors from the leading countries, Russia has a weaker-developed entrepreneurial initiative required to shape “second echelon” TNCs from medium and mediumlarge firms, and also lower professionalism among the management of many state-controlled companies and the largest industrial corporations

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created during privatization. Nevertheless, Russia’s insignificant share in the global division of labor cannot be considered predetermined. As the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated, the 2020s will see major transformations of the current EVC through their reconfiguration and making them more spatially compact, which creates new opportunities for developing national economies.19 Developing the EVC greatly increases the importance of TNCs as the leading globalization actors.

New Features of Transnational Corporations as the Leading Actors of Globalization An important feature of the current stage of globalization is the visible geographical diversification of foreign direct investment, including major changes to the list of the leading TNCs. According to UNCTAD, the share of the EU-28’s in the inward FDI stock (including mutual capital investment within the integration group) fell from 40.5% in late 1990 to 30.4% in late 2019 (and 29.0% in current FDI net-inflows in 2019). On the contrary, the share of developing countries (including South Korea, Singapore, etc., which are qualified as such) and the post-socialist states grew from 23.1 to 33.4% (and to 48.1% in current FDI net-inflows in 2019).20 In 2020, this group of states already accounted for 72% of the current FDI net influx.21 The geographical structure of FDI exports demonstrates an even starker increase in the role played by developing states. In late 1990, the United States accounted for 32.5% of the global outward FDI stock. However, in late 2019, this figure dropped to 22.3%, with the United States’ share in the current FDI net-outflows during 2019 totaling just 9.5%. Over the same period, the share of the EU-28 (including mutual FDI within the integration group) fell from 43.3 to 36.4% (this figure includes the United Kingdom, which has since left the European Union, whose share fell from 10.2 to 5.6%), and the contribution to the European Union’s FDI net-outflows was even smaller (34.6%). Accordingly, the share of states UNCTAD qualifies as developing and post-socialist grew between 1990 and late 2019, from 6.2 to 24.1% of the global outward FDI stock, and totaled 30.2% in FDI net-outflows during 2019. The most visible contributions to the uptick in these indicators were made by China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Mexico.22

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Among the world’s 100 non-financial TNCs with the largest foreign assets, 18 were based in the United States (thus assuring the continued leadership of the United States in this area), although the largest American TNC, Chevron Corporation, was only 11th. To compare, 25 years ago, the United States had five companies in the Top 10, and 32 TNCs in the TOP 100.23 As regards the number of the largest TNCs, China is already in sixth place. A number of significant TNCs are based in other East Asian countries, and TNCs from Latin America, Russia, and India also bolstered their standings. We should also note the increasingly non-national nature of the largest TNCs here. Most leading TNCs from western states have so-called “dispersed” capital stock, so it is not an infrequent occurrence that foreign portfolio investors (particularly in small states) own over 50% of shares. For example, the Swiss own a little over 35% of Switzerland’s Nestle, one of the world’s 30 largest TNCs. With increasing frequency, the top management of the leading investor companies features independent foreign directors. That said, there are still state-controlled TNCs, and their numbers are particularly high in developing countries. In recent decades, the institutional makeup of direct investors abroad has expanded. In particular, sovereign funds began to play a significant role, and many of them now operate with direct investments in addition to portfolio investments only. At the same time, sovereign funds as direct investors are very different from even state-controlled TNCs because their motivation to invest and their legal status are different, which determines the renewed interest of a number of countries in stepping up protectionism in regard to foreign capital. A general trend can be observed towards blurring the line between direct and portfolio investment, with increased volatility in the flows of direct investments that are traditionally rather stable. Initially, this development was prompted by the increased role of mergers and acquisitions as compared to “greenfield” investment. Characteristically, as stock markets develop, FDI increasingly takes the form of exchanging stock between companies. As a result, different direct investment funds strive to establish control over foreign companies in order to subsequently resolve and restructure them. Therefore, these funds operate as direct investors in managing the acquired assets, and their purpose is to re-sell the firm they have purchased a few years (usually three to five) down the line. In other words, the ultimate goal of such FDI appears to be the same as that of many portfolio investors: to profit from re-selling an asset.

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Private individuals are investing large amounts of money into foreign real estate, to the extent that this can be called a separate phenomenon in direct cross-border investment. It is no accident that, since 2008, the OECD has included purchasing a summer home abroad as just such an investment in its FDI accounting methodology. This kind of FDI plays a particularly important role in Russia’s capital exports, which, along with the large share of round-tripping FDI (i.e., investing in Cyprus, Caribbean offshores, and similar jurisdictions with a view to controlling enterprises located in Russia), explains why the list of the world’s leading TNCs does not even include Russia’s three leading oil and gas TNCs (Lukoil, Gazprom, and Rosneft), even though Russia is regularly listed as one of the 25 key FDI exporting countries.24 Indeed, Lukoil, Gazprom, and Rosneft are only in the TOP 100 non-financial TNCs of the developing and post-socialist countries, lagging far behind the leading international investors even in their own sector. Finally, the emergence of many “born global” firms has become a mark of today’s globalization in the FDI sector. Broadly understood, this description includes companies that engage in active foreign economic activities if not immediately, then within a few years of being incorporated.25 Due to the explosive growth of possibilities for prompt remote access to virtually any information required, the need to internationalize a business step-by-step because of the time required to master new, more complex forms of foreign economic activities has shrunk sharply. Additionally, in the 1970s, the top management of an international business or firm generally had to have gone through an in-house training system. This is not the case today, as former employees of TNCs and graduates of the leading international business schools can launch global projects of their own virtually from scratch, especially in the service industry (for example, in information technologies). We should stress that, thus far, most of the more than 100,000 TNCs (as defined broadly by UNCTAD, i.e., companies that have subsidiaries in at least two countries) are regional TNCs that provide FDI in a single macro-region only. Truly global TNCs (that are with increasing frequency termed MNCs, or multinational corporations/companies) are few and far between. Even many world-renowned companies provided FDI only in two or three macro-regions, while the “domestic market” (in which entrepreneurs in their corporate reporting mean their home country and

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several neighboring states) frequently accounts for over 50% of a given company’s sales. This naturally enhances the regionalization of foreign trade we mentioned above. ∗ ∗ ∗ The global economy has changed significantly over the past 30–40 years, and we can confidently say that economic globalization is a new and objectively established phenomenon. The increasing interdependency of economic complexes is accompanied by the emergence of truly cross-border, supranational economic trends in which virtually all economic agents are gradually becoming engaged, either directly or indirectly. Single countries or groups of countries are no longer capable of guiding these trends in a direction that benefits them alone. At the same time, the principal features of globalization will continue to undergo major transformations for a long time to come. The events of the last few years demonstrate that even the trends that most experts had deemed stable are not so.

Keywords Economic globalization; waves of internationalization; global regulation of foreign trade; mega-regional trade agreements; polycentric world; transnational corporations; foreign direct investment; cross-border value chains. Self-Test 1. What indicators clearly illustrate economic internationalization? 2. What new economic features are connected with the current “edition” of globalization”? 3. What were the prerequisites of the transition to polycentricity in global economy? 4. What is the cause of foreign trade regionalization in the context of globalization? 5. What principal transformations are happening with foreign direct investment today? 6. What, in your opinion, are Russia’s strengths and weaknesses in international economic ties?

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Notes 1. Y. Shishkov, “Globalization: A New Era in Human History,” in L.M. Sintserov, ed., Global Development Geography. Issue 3: Collected Articles (Moscow: Tovarishchestvo nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2010), 7–21. 2. L.M. Sintserov, “Revolution in Transportation, Communications, and a Global Economy Emerging at the Turn of the 20th Century” in L.M. Sintserov, ed., Global Development Geography. Issue 3: Collected Articles (Moscow: Tovarishchestvo nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2010), 126–142. 3. Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP). World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts Data Files, https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?view=chart. 4. UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2015 (New York: United Nations, 2015), 2, 312–313, 340. 5. A.Y. Elyanov, “Economic Differentiation of the World,” Obshchestvo i ekonomika (Society and Economy), no. 6 (2013): 25–46. 6. A.A. Gromyko, “‘New Populism’ and the Emergence of a Post-Bipolar World Order,” Contemporary Europe, no. 6 (2016): 5–12; A.G. Volodin, “The ‘New Populism’ Phenomenon: The American Dimension,” Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law 13, no. 4 (2020): 253– 277. 7. V.B. Kondratiev, “Re-Shoring as a Form of Re-Industrialization,” World Economy and International Relations 61, no. 9 (2017): 5465; V.A. Krasilshchikov, “De-industrialization, Re-industrialization, and Development,” World Economy and International Relations 60, no. 8 (2016): 34–43. 8. V.V. Volsky, ed., Socioeconomic Geography of the World Abroad (Moscow: Kron-Press, 1998). 9. Table 2. Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a Percentage of GDP; Table 3. Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) at 2015 Prices and PPP, Main Science and Technology Indicators: Vol. 2020/1 (Paris: OECD, 2020). 10. G. Andreev, The Dollar’s Expansion (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1961). This book, authored by long-standing Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and economist Andrey A. Gromyko (under the pseudonym G. Andreev) is available at the online library of the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences at: http://inion.ru/ru/library/resursy/book-collection/ekspan siia-dollara/. 11. A.I. Bazhan, ed., The Role of Money in Global Governance (Moscow: Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences Press, 2017). 12. Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2018) US$ m., 1988– 2019 (SIPRI, 2020. URL: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex).

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13. A.V. Kuznetsov, “Concepts of Economic Interactions Along the SouthSouth Line,” Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law 12, no. 3 (2019): 30–46. 14. A.N. Spartak, “Regionalization Metamorphoses: From Regional Trade Agreements to Mega-Regional Projects,” Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law 10, no. 4 (2017): 13–37. 15. “List of Supplying Markets for a Product Imported by Ukraine,” https:// www.trademap.org. Russia lost its leader position among exporters to Ukraine only in 2019, but in 2018, its share in Ukrainian imports was only 14%, before falling to less than 9% in 2020. 16. “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Mongolia”; “List of Supplying Markets for a Product Imported by Mongolia”; “List of Importing Markets for a Product Exported by Uzbekistan”; “List of Supplying Markets for a Product Imported by Uzbekistan,” https://www. trademap.org. 17. Y.V. Shishkov, “Globalization and Regionalization in Global Economy: Two Sides of the Same Coin,” The World of Transformations, no. 1 (2005): 148–163. 18. Table 7. Total Researchers in Full-Time Equivalent, Main Science and Technology Indicators: Volume 2020/1 (Paris: OECD, 2020). 19. For more detail see: N.V. Smorodinskaia, and D.D. Katukov, “The Impact of Global Value Chains on National Economic Systems and Challenges to Russia’s Economic Policy,” Social Sciences and Contemporary World, no. 4 (2017): 27–33; N.V. Smorodinskaia, and D.D. Katukov, “Global Value Chains: Raising Sudden Shock Resilience,” Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law 13, no. 6 (2020): 30–50. 20. World Investment Report 2020. Annex tables 1, 3, https://www.unc tad.org. 21. UNCTAD. Investment Trend Monitor, no. 38 (January 2021): 2. 22. Calculated by the author based on: World Investment Report 2020. Annex tables 2, 4, https://www.unctad.org. 23. World Investment Report 2020. Annex Table 20, https://www.unctad.org; World Investment Report 1995 (New York, Geneva: United Nations, 1995), 20–23. 24. A.V. Kuznetsov, “Methods for Assessing Russia’s Foreign Direct Investment,” Economics of Contemporary Russia, no. 4 (2018): 37–50. 25. For more details see, for instance: Gary A. Knight, and S. Tamar Cavusgil, “Innovation, Organizational Capabilities, and the Born-Global Firm,” Journal of International Business Studies 35, no. 2 (2004): 124–141.

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Recommended Reading Bulatov, A.S., ed. Global Economy and International Economic Relations: A Complete Course. Moscow: KNORUS, 2021. Bulatov, A.S., ed. Prospects of Economic Globalization. Moscow: KNORUS, 2019. Bulatov, A.S., ed. Russia in the International Capital Flow in 2019–Early 2020. Moscow: MGIMO University Press, 2020. Dioumoulen, I.I. International Trade: Economy, Politics, Practice. Moscow: VAVT, 2015. Dynkin, A.A., and Ivanova, N.I., eds. Global “Perestroika”. Moscow: Ves Mir Press, 2014. Kolosov, V.A., and Sluka, N.A. eds. Global Economic Geography: Traditions, Modernity, Prospects. Moscow; Smolensk: Oikumena, 2016. Kuznetsov, A.V., ed. The Trump Phenomenon. Moscow: INION RAN Press, 2020. Sintserov, L.M., ed. Global Development Geography. Issue 3: Collected Articles. Moscow: Tovarishchestvo nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2016, http://www.igras. ru/sites/default/files/w_d_geography.pdf. Tulder, R. van et al., ed. The Challenge of BRIC Multinationals. Emerald Group, 2017 (Progress in International Business Research, Vol. 11).

CHAPTER 6

International Scientific and Technological Relations Alexey Biryukov and Andrey Krutskikh

International relations in science and technology (IRST) constitute a complex sum total of phenomena and processes that serves as a foundation for a new system of international and transnational interactions. As scientific and technological progress increasingly impacts international relations, IRST becomes a new backbone of international relations. To fully understand this phenomenon, we need to contextualize it theoretically, historically, and, crucially, within the global trends of the twenty-first century. The question of the genesis of scientific and technological progress (STP) and its evolution to the status of a crucial element in international relations deserves detailed consideration. The concept of STP only came to be used in the twentieth century to mean a combination of scientific

A. Biryukov (B) · A. Krutskikh Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] A. Krutskikh e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_6

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achievements and their implementation in the development of equipment and technologies, with the latter being introduced in manufacturing to improve its efficiency. STP also included training the relevant labor force. Today’s social development concepts employ the term “innovations” to denote the commercial use of scientific achievements in the economy and manufacturing.

Historical Examples of Innovative Transitions Innovative symbiosis became systemic against the backdrop of the Industrial Revolution. Previously, production was predominantly agrarian or manufacturing-based, with the occasional use of innovations. The Industrial Revolution as such received its crucial impetus when machine manufacturing and machine tools used in factories started to push out both manual labor and the primitive methods of increasing its productivity. Originally, these were common-sense innovations, but later, as industrial processes developed, achievements in the natural sciences, as well as new equipment and means of labor came to be in greater demand. The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth–twentieth centuries was a landmark in humanity’s development and came on the back of industrialization and machine manufacturing. Capitalist production came to dominate. It is characterized by production based on a combination of private ownership and hired labor. The market foundations of the economy create mass production and sales of goods on the domestic market and later on to the markets of neighboring states and beyond—regionally or even globally. Today’s researchers have different opinions on the development of the Industrial Revolution in connection with scientific and technological progress. In 1985, Russian experts Dmitry Lvov and Sergey Glazyev coined the term “technological paradigm,” making it the basis of their concept of economic and technological development.1 They interpret this concept as the total of connected production facilities that have the same technological level and develop synchronously. Every technological paradigm has three development stages: the embryonic stage, the growth stage, and the maturity stage. The succession of dominant technological paradigms within an economy determines the uneven progression of scientific and technological progress. The dynamics of the evolution of technological paradigms is explained through the theory of “long waves,” or “Kondratiev waves,” named

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after Nikolai Kondratiev (1892–1938), who explained the new type of long-term cyclical economic fluctuations. Each wave lasted for over half a century and included an expansion stage and a stagnation stage. Kondratiev explained their genesis as the need to renew the core assets. This renewal is accompanied by an upsurge in technological inventions before the start and at the very start of the expansion stage. Being fully cognizant of the fact that it is impossible to account for the influence of all the endogenous and exogenous factors in a global economic development model, Kondratiev stressed the relative precision in the correlation between empirically observed trends in a particular country and global development megatrends.2 Essentially, Kondratiev waves coincide in their timeframes with technological paradigms, with the insufficient temporal differences between them explained by the practical economic implementation of technologies. The famous Austrian-American economist Joseph Schumpeter pointed out that technological innovations were generators of Kondratiev waves. In Schumpeter’s opinion, such innovations should be termed “basic innovations” as they create true clusters of new economic development. From the point of view of technological waves, the cycle itself can be divided into two temporal components: a medium-term innovation component and a long-term imitation component when novelties that make slight improvements to basic innovations fill economic niches. These ideas were set down in his two-volume work Business Cycles published in 1939.3 In the 1970s, the German researcher Gerhard Mensch further developed the “Kondratiev waves” theory by adding a third temporal component to the cycle, namely, a technological stalemate that constitutes the “introduction of pseudo-innovations.”4 In the opinion of the concept’s authors, transitioning to a new technological paradigm is accompanied by revolutionary transformations, since capital involved in outdated technological manufacturing is massively devalued as this manufacturing shrinks, the economic situation deteriorates, and contradictions in foreign trade exacerbate, and social and political tensions mount. Taken together, these developments generate a profound crisis that, in turn, generates new knowledge and technologies and converts them into manufacturing radically new equipment and technologies. Nevertheless, the negative effects are protracted and accompanied by a drop in multifactor productivity, the instability of new economic sectors, social turbulence, political costs, and other undesirable phenomena.

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Important

New economic growth opportunities open up during every structural global economic crisis, which is accompanied by the replacement of dominant technological paradigms. The leading countries of the preceding period face the devaluation of their accumulated capital and qualifications. Each time, a change in dominant technological paradigms entails major shifts in the global division of labor and produces a renewed line-up of the most prosperous corporations and states.5

The concept of technological paradigms/economic waves gained many proponents and supporters in Russia. Western social scientists, in the meantime, prefer to use different terms since they view economic and technological transformations as stages in industrial revolutions (which they number as first, second, and third). This periodization, however, was also affected by the Kondratiev waves theory. Western economists (Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez) introduced the concept of a techno-economic paradigm that they use to consider the interconnection of technological, economic, and social changes. Their work is based on Schumpeter’s business cycle theory. Carlota Perez offered a description of changes in techno-economic paradigms. In her opinion, such changes provide a powerful development impetus in all areas and do not only affect innovative and technological changes, but also impact the financial, economic, socio-political, and organizational and managerial aspects of social movement in the long term. Perez substantiates the periodization of the paradigm shift by identifying, in particular, the emergence period, which is subdivided into “introduction” and “aggression”—when, having crossed the “valley of death,” new technologies become the object of venture business and become widespread due to their high profitability. Since this is the period when old institutions and regulations form the environment for introducing changes, the process of the new pushing out the old goes on with particular vigor. Then comes the expansion period with its “synergy” and “maturity” stages, when all development components are in harmony with each other and, despite certain difficulties, prosperity is achieved, at

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least until another comprehensive period of turbulence created by new basic innovations.6

Technological Macro-Innovations and International Relations We will use the concept developed by Sergey Glazyev in our analysis of the history of international relations via STP. In this perspective, the Industrial Revolution has gone through five paradigms during its 300-year history (Fig. 6.1). The first paradigm came from new technologies in the textile industry and from using water power. The second wave was marked by the accelerated development of transportation and the mechanization of the steam engine, which permeated manufacturing across all sectors. The second paradigm also produced economic expansion accompanied by explosive growth in trade, transportation infrastructure construction, and military, political and diplomatic support. The nineteenth century saw bourgeois revolutions, the collapse of empires, the replacement of monarchies with republics, the emergence of new military and political blocs and the fight for a re-partitioning of the world. It also saw the consolidation of Russophobia, as the immense Russian Empire was rapidly, and for the most part

Fig. 6.1 Technological paradigms periodization

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successfully, developing on the traditional eastern boundaries of Europe and was coming to play an increasingly important role in European affairs. Still further to the east lay the Chinese Empire, whose huge population made it an attractive market for selling capitalist-made products. In the Western hemisphere, the United States became a powerful regional state and proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, Europe remained the global center, striving to preserve its monopoly. Capitalist modernization allowed capitals to break through into the vast spaces of the global consumer market. They did not shun the means and ways of gaining profits they chose, including the multiple “achievements” of colonialism, such as the “opium wars.” International organizations began to appear during the second half of the nineteenth century. These included the International Union for Earth Arc Measurement, the Universal Postal Union, the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, the International Telegraph Union, the International Red Cross, the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, and the International Union of Railway Freight Carriage.7 Some of these organizations are no longer relevant, others, on the contrary, continue to gain international influence. Tellingly, as early as the nineteenth century, the world was concerned with protecting intellectual property, although the problem of technology transfer as it stands today was not yet formulated. The third wave of the Industrial Revolution which started approximately in 1880 was connected with the use of electric power in industrial manufacturing, the establishment of rolled steel production, the development of the heavy engineering industry, and the introduction of radio and telegraph communications, and car manufacturing. These technological changes spurred the emergence of large cartels, syndicates, and trusts. Monopolies were gaining dominance. The United States became a powerful economic and technological center as it was spreading its own influence into the markets of Latin America, Europe, and Asia. It took advantage of its distance from the European continent, where dramatic events were taking place and where contradictions between states eventually led to the First World War and domestic unrest in Russia would lead to a socialist revolution. These developments had a tremendous impact on international relations in terms of the synergetic power and competitive edge of states, cooperation and competition among them,

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and international security. Radically new phenomena such as arms trading and industrial espionage emerged. At this time, scientific and technological progress became an important development factor, but it was not yet seen as a fundamental basic element of national power. The power of STP was not yet fully recognized, even though its significance was producing fast-growing results in the public mind. Back then, it was mostly science fiction writers who were discussing the prospects of science and technologies affecting social life. Nevertheless, as we gained a deeper understanding of the laws of nature and society, scientific achievements were increasingly penetrating into the economy and other spheres of life. Even the socialist Soviet Union was dominated by the “conquest of nature” philosophy, and scientific and technological progress was the decisive factor in its practical implementation. Before the Second World War, the subject of science and technology started to occupy a prominent place in the minds of national elites building today’s economies. Assembly line mass production dominated plants and factories. Investment in manufacturing was growing, and investment banks were cropping up all over the place. Governments created a suitable environment for national business to implement policies aimed at protecting it from outside competition. National intelligence services were increasingly set tasks connected with military-industrial and scientific-technological matters. The War accelerated the process of militarizing scientific and technological progress. Research laboratories were set up and equipped accordingly, and stateof-the-art factories for manufacturing military and civilian products with high added value were built. Internationally, the building of such assets determined the transfer of capital, knowledge, and technologies. The fourth technological paradigm involved further developments in the energy sector, based this time on the use of oil and gas, as well as state-of-the-art means of communication and new synthetic materials. The fourth paradigm emerged due to the mass production of vehicles and consumer goods. The emergence of this paradigm essentially coincided with the Second World War, which radically changed the contents of global politics. Soon after the War, the international relations system underwent a massive transformation, as the socialist bloc emerged and the world became bipolar. The two systems—the capitalist world led by the United States and the socialist world led by the Soviet Union—became locked in a confrontation that, despite all the exacerbations and crises, was based on

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peaceful coexistence in the nuclear era. Nuclear war was ruled out as part of the arsenal of politicians due to the inevitable annihilating potential of retaliation. The Cold War, however, became a reality and gave a powerful additional impetus to the arms race. The nuclear project became the ultimate expression of understanding of the role of scientific and technological progress in international confrontation. The fact that the Soviet Union, following in the footsteps of the United States, developed and tested an A-bomb at an accelerated pace (through the combination of the political determination of the country’s leadership, the people’s dedicated labor, the talents of Soviet scientists, and the courage and managerial genius of the intelligence services) had a radical impact on international security and international relations.8 Then we started to explore outer space. The Earth’s first artificial satellite was launched in 1957. Here, the rivalry was between the USSR and the United States. The Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space, and American astronaut Neil Armstrong was the first to set foot on the moon.9 In 1975, the American Apollo spaceship docked at the Soviet space station Soyuz, although this project did not herald the beginning of multifaceted and in-depth cooperation in outer space between the two superpowers. It was during the Cold War that the parties began to focus particular attention on building up their national military and technological power and international interactions in weapons and technologies. After the Second World War, the United States launched an extensive program to provide military assistance to states at the frontlines of confrontation with the USSR, including France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwan. Some estimates put the US military aid at approximately $70 bn. In 1961, Washington started to abandon the free transfer of weapons as a form of assistance and moved on to large-scale weapons sales, making it a profitable business.10 Mechanisms for overcoming export control were established, yet this control was continuously toughened for the USSR and other socialist states. The NATO-affiliated Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was established and rigidly controlled access to military and dual-purpose technologies for Warsaw Pact member countries.11 Such restrictions had an important consequence, as they spurred the development of endogenous technologies that had the same quality as the “generally accepted technological solutions” that dominated the

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Western world. At the same time, scientific and technological intelligence became progressively more important as it tried to gain access to the opposite party’s achievements. However, “governmental industrial espionage,” as the West likes to call it, was not practiced only by the USSR. The United States and its NATO allies had no qualms about using nefarious tactics to discover the opposite party’s technological secrets. Despite the increasing influence of science and technology, they were not yet seen as an independent area of interactions between states within the international relations system. Treaties regulating various aspects of international economic relations started to use the term “scientific and technological relations” to reflect the growing trade in high added value goods and subsequent intellectual and technological support for products supplied. International cooperation for training the labor force demanded by national development constituted a somewhat different aspect.

Important

The fourth technological paradigm saw the diversification of international economic relations, with transnational business and multinational companies appearing. Oligopolistic competition on the global market remained high.12 International trade in goods was given major lending support. Trade and lending were supplemented by large-scale foreign direct investment—the first time this had happened within the community of the advanced states that led the trend, which then began to expand into the Third World. These trends were accompanied by providing services, training personnel, and transferring technologies. The degree, direction, and areas of such relations changed depending on historical conditions, including the confrontation between the capitalist and socialist systems that extended to developing states, many of which had proSoviet leanings thanks in part to the fact that members of their national elites had been educated in the USSR.

The 1960s saw the ultimate collapse of colonialism and the subsequent appearance of many sovereign states that remained significantly dependent economically on their former colonial powers. This was when neo-colonialism took its final shape as a system of exploiting former

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dependent territories and keeping them from breaking out of the vicious circles of poverty, backwardness, and political instability. Developed states cut short any attempts to create domestic development factors or attract outside factors that would advance optimal development. Developed states responded in a very telling manner to the initiative proposed at the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD suggested establishing a new international economic world order, one that could adjust trade in raw materials by creating prerequisites for industrializing the Third World, eliminate comprador approaches, stimulate the emergence of the national capital and a trained labor force, and assist in the technological transfer to backward states by expanding the boundaries of the technological realm. The idea of a new international economic order was discussed for many years until the adoption of the UN Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in 1974, which was subsequently amended and adjusted as well.13 It was only when developed states found new niches on the global market and new technological platforms and mechanisms for regulating international economic relations, when they had gone all-in on postindustrialism, that they started to move their own manufacturing assets, primarily environmentally dangerous ones, into developing states. Neocolonialism changed its image. Nevertheless, this trend has become an important outside factor in industrializing developing states. Legally, the assets transferred mostly continued to be owned by TNCs, yet for the transfer to be a commercial success, managerial experience needed to be passed on, too, while national banking and education systems and the system of technology transfer needed to be improved. The concept of “levelling out the playing field” proposed by Word Bank experts was being implemented.14 It touched upon the problem of improving the economic and political competitiveness of countries. Gradually, the matter of training qualified personnel also became part of the process, since a qualified labor force is an integral part of national assets. At the same time, developed states strove to preserve their undisputed leadership in the technological, patent, and educational space. International arms trade picked up the pace, “stoking” conflicts between states. In business, industrial espionage took on the guise of competitive intelligence.15

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Nations were increasingly aware of the fact that STP is incapable of righting the damage done to the Earth’s biosphere by human activities and technologies. Nikita Moiseyev, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was particularly energetic in promoting this idea. He was the one who coined the term “environmental imperative.”16 Over a short period of time, a new approach came to be cultivated that promoted being in harmony with nature instead of conquering it. The concept of “sustainable development” became widespread, leading to the establishment of many government departments working on preserving the environment.17 “Green technologies” were born that would not harm biospheric homeostasis.

The Fifth Technological Transition and Globalization Dynamics The main feature of the fifth technological wave is that its timeframe coincided with humanity’s entrance into economic globalization and public informatization produced by the global information revolution. The fifth paradigm is geared towards achievements in microelectronics, informatics, biotechnologies, and genetic engineering. It also involved mastering new types of energy and materials, outer space, and satellite communications. At the same time, there is a transition from disjointed firms to a unified network of large and small companies connected by the internet and closely interacting in technologies, product quality control, and innovation planning.

Important

The fifth wave is moving beyond the Industrial Revolution since it is connected with the global information revolution. In the scale of its impact on humanity’s development, both phenomena have earth-shaking significance. Unlike its predecessor, the information revolution is moving along at breakneck speed, and McKinsey Global Institute estimates that by the 2020s, its achievements will already be comparable to the outcomes of the industrial revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries.18

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The emergence of the fifth technological paradigm has a complicated and contradictory effect on international relations, mostly due to the US hegemony during this period. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a sharp increase in the influence of the United States as the only superpower. In this capacity, the United States—most notably at the end of the twentieth century and, with some reservations, up to the latter half of the 2010s—demonstrated a preponderance of force, seeking to impose its will on other countries thanks to its cumulative power, its global competitive edge, and its international regulation mechanisms established with the participation of transnational capital. Even amid increasing competition from Asian and European states, the US economy accounted for a third of the global GDP. The United States manufactured the world’s largest volumes of industrial products with high added value. This meant that even though the United States had moved many of its industrial assets abroad, it retained a mature industrial potential that allowed it to provide national manufacturing. At the same time, the United States created a fairly powerful innovative basis for its national security that allowed it to remain on the cutting edge of scientific and technological progress. Nevertheless, the United States mostly profited from its financial dominance, which was ensured by the dollar retaining its position as the global reserve currency. The profit rate of “this kind of business” is mindblowing. The estimates peg the profitability of rent derived from the entire world using the dollar at 250,000%.19 Along with its financial and economic power, the United States was rapidly building up its military power, which relied on a super-wide network of military bases abroad and a super-powerful navy, which gave the country the capacity to wage a modern war in any corner of the planet and deliver a prompt global strike. The defense potential of the United States is managed via the so-called global information grid. Network warfare was put at the heart of its military strategy. At the same time, the United States consolidated the national intelligence community, including its space and cyber capabilities.20 Consequently, the US military potential and intelligence authority were recognized by both its NATO allies and other states. It would be incorrect, however, to reduce the political influence of the United States to the dominance of its military and intelligence complex, which allows it to talk to other states from a position of strength. The world’s only remaining superpower also remains the world’s foremost

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center of technologies, education, and science, and America’s influence on public opinion extends beyond its borders. The 30 years have shown us exactly what a unipolar world has to offer, with the United States, riding the global information revolution as the world’s only superpower, extending its jurisdiction into international affairs. In several cases, the United States and its allies implement the “controlled chaos” strategy in various regions and “export democracy” via revolutions without accounting for historical and cultural traditions of the countries that are affected. This often involves ignoring universally accepted morals, while its hegemonic behavior is justified through onesided interpretations of international rules and historical circumstances. Such behavior cannot but worry the increasing numbers of responsible politicians in many states. In the 2000s, the United States was transitioning to a “soft leadership” policy, while the European Union was building up its economic power, which resulted in globalization shrinking its American focus, although it did retain its liberal leanings. The new liberal stage was specifically characterized by subjectively understood global priorities, where the interests of humanity were essentially equated with those of the United States and other developed states. In reality, this meant subordinating the national interests other and seeing other states as objects of exploitation. Western states, led by the United States, are actively eliminating sovereignty-related obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, capital, technologies, and people. For example, they are trying to minimize the importance of state borders, customs barriers, and other procedures that affect such movement. At the same time, they proceed from their own interests and are therefore very selective in eliminating such obstacles. They also erect other barriers to filter flows and blame others for breaching the rules of technological exchanges, intellectual piracy, industrial espionage, and illegal weapons trading. Moreover, these states are ready to sacrifice the WTO’s rules by establishing regional regimes and imposing economic sanctions on individual states.

Important

At the same time, in accordance with the law of uneven development, the global playing field is continuously levelled. Many states

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are trying to catch up, relying on the achievements of advanced countries and their own competitive advantages. They have successfully adapted to the global information revolution, technology transfer, and transfer of industrial assets, and are creating successful national development models with heavy localization. It would be wrong to gloss over the consequences of neo-colonialism, which has exacerbated the dependence of many developing states on their former colonial powers, and is taking on a “digital hue.”

This negative phenomenon is further compounded by the destabilization trends that unfolded during the US hegemony and swept an entire range of states that are rich in natural resources and have a long history of statehood, as well as a fascinating material and spiritual culture recognized by UNESCO. The current turbulence stems from the “chaos” that frequently has domestic socioeconomic roots but is largely created from abroad, particularly since informatization has increased the capabilities for exercising a cross-border influence on the domestic situation in specific states manyfold. The information revolution has boosted the standing of non-state actors in international relations. We are talking primarily transnational capital here. In terms of economic power, Google has caught up with the world’s leading economies. MIT estimates that, by 2020, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft will be ahead of Russia, Brazil, and Mexico in terms of their annual GDP.21 At the same time, TNCs are becoming powerful information and technology platforms and centers of attraction for small and medium-sized businesses from different countries.

On the Way to a Global Information Society An important newly emerged reality of international relations today is the international information space that has begun to appear due to the extensive spread of information and communication technologies and the internet that originated in the United States.

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Important

Information and cyber space creates a virtual world that is merging with the real world fairly quickly. Taken together, the achievements of globalization and informatization constitute the difference between today’s international relations and the eras of the “concert of great powers” or the Cold War. There are now new ways of building interactions and partnerships that have a positive effect on the atmosphere of trust that is much in demand among the people of the world. Consequently, internal and external development aspects that demand dialogue and cooperation have become intertwined into a single whole like never before. At the same time, the opportunities for stirring confrontations, creating threats to international security, and cultivating enmity and hatred between states have also grown greatly.

Information and cyber space has contributed to qualitative changes taking place within international relations due to the emergence of a global information order (GIO). Officially, it has been implemented since the early 2000s following the adoption of a G8 charter at Okinawa (Japan) and the World Summit on the Information Society that started in Geneva (2003) and concluded in Tunisia (2005). The main positive aspect of discussions at these international forums was that all countries became aware of the importance of building up their information potential, which is the pivot not only of capital turnover and an economy’s integration into the global division of labor but also of a country’s political leadership properly responding to the emerging international situation and national socioeconomic circumstances. The authors of major international reports by the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the World Economic Forum believe that the successful development of states today in the context of the emergence of the GIO largely hinges on whether they have made use of the fruits of the information revolution. This means that a country has to have created basic conditions for developing an information society: the

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computerization of its citizens’ lives, the elimination of computer illiteracy, and providing access to the internet.22 Other important conditions are the internet’s infrastructure, free access to the market of information and telecommunication technologies and services, and protection of intellectual property and inviolability of personal information stored in electronic form. Those who take the consequences of the global information revolution into account and march in step with the times are capable of avoiding the “digital gap” and of ensuring their steady development. Since the start of the global information revolution, scientific and technological progress has increasingly affected the entire system of international relations. As a knowledge, technologies, and STP innovations have accumulated, the trends they generated have moved to the forefront of the international agenda. This was only possible amid large-scale information changes that create a continuity, a striving into the future, and openness—that is, those values that are in particularly high demand in international scientific and technological relations. Public informatization, combined with economic globalization, created a veritable avalanche of global processes that increasingly reveal the deeper contents of IRST. The global innovation process and transnational innovation infrastructure are currently under development. Most states are affected by the global academic and technological revolutions. The digital dimension is becoming more and more important in industry, the energy sector, and transportation, which results in the expansion of the “critical information infrastructure.” Cyberspace is being cultivated. The merging of all these processes into a single flow is intensifying. Oddly, however, the importance of sovereignty and national interests is increasing, and even though they are experiencing major “digital influence,” they are not dissolving in the global information revolution, contrary to various predictions.

Important

The political meaning of the global innovative process consists in the synergetic power and global competitive edge resting primarily on the intellect incentivized by innovative development involving the state, business, science, and education. This international trend is becoming the object of interactions between states, while a

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symbiosis of the components listed attracts the attention of international organizations, business circles, and the academic community.

State policies intended to advance the innovative development of society are crucial here. Well-thought-out steps taken by governmental bodies create a favorable environment where all members of the innovative process have an opportunity to make full use of their creative potential. Societies evolve an atmosphere where due recognition is accorded to the value of research and discovery, and knowledge is valued as such. Innovation-focused companies play a special role here since innovations are the main source of profit. These companies do not need to be large— sometimes they are medium-sized or even small. But they are networked, i.e., they use information technologies and software that allow them to successfully interact with transnational corporations. Business becomes the central element in the innovative process since it is the main consumer of innovations, a driver of sorts for innovative development. As a principal supplier of innovations, science becomes a real productive force, enjoying public and private support, and becoming the backbone of innovative development. Finally, this symbiosis includes education geared towards producing specialists in the innovative process. The Education for Innovative Societies in the twenty-first-century document adopted by the G8 in St. Petersburg in 2006 directly stated the need to “generate new knowledge and nurture innovation to sustain long-term economic growth.”23 Several experts interpret global innovative development as the extensive spreading of a networked economy of knowledge, which is unthinkable without collective global creative efforts, the transfer and use of high technologies, close interactions between business, science, and education, and without manufacturing unique science-intensive products.24 It is within the innovative process that the global technological resource is being developed, ensuring a combination of convergent and cloud technologies, and cutting-edge scientific knowledge of the functioning of economies, “big data” on economic and technological development, corporate governance methods, automated reporting, and in-depth understanding of the cognition process.25

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A New Technological Paradigm and Its Political Consequences Whether we are talking about a “technological paradigm” or a “technological and economic paradigm,” the contents of a global technological revolution depend on the level of global cooperation. The achievements of countries should rest on fundamental and applied sciences, and major national R&D and engineering work needs to be done. This revolution stimulates the intellect to actively participate in manufacturing processes, it spans economic and financial activities, and the humanitarian area. Today, the pace of technological transformation is accelerating rapidly and technological cycles are shrinking. Before, it would take years to upgrade equipment, while today, it is upgraded within a year or less at the cutting edge of STP. Many types of intellectual activity that significantly contribute to GDP growth need no special equipment at all (only progressively more advanced computers). Global technology transfer is growing rapidly to become a crucial area of international scientific and technological and economic interactions.

Important

The forecasts made by numerous experts in the early twenty-first century are coming true. Technologies are beginning to transform people’s quality of life, increase their lifespan, and change industries and the contents of labor. New economic and political power centers are emerging. Simultaneously, the innovation factor increases unevenness of development. Not every state has turned out to be capable of creating adequate mechanisms for adapting state-of-the-art technologies, and even fewer states can make mass use of them. Mass use of new technologies requires institutional, financial, social, cultural, political, and environmental transformations that, taken together, play a positive role, but gaps in even a single area negatively affect the entire innovative system.

The global technological revolution has highlighted both the need to rapidly build up one’s own technological potential (which depends on the international environment and increasingly relies on domestic resources)

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and the need for a comprehensive perspective on national development. Accordingly, the vision of one’s own scientific and technological growth, as it fits into the national strategy and a digital context, becomes vital. Informational transformations have also impacted the global academic revolution. Currently, the world relies on information opportunities and actively looks for talented young people to be trained in new competences. This search is carried out as part of broad international educational cooperation and growing international academic mobility. Another trend in academic transformation is connected with transnational education, which includes remote education for the most talented persons with the greatest promise. This process involves the world’s best educators in specializations that are in the highest demand in today’s society. Despite uneven development, the educational global field is being impressively levelled out in a world where the “knowledge economy” has started to prevail. Countries create their own national higher education systems, including engineering schools. Courses are updated to include new technological foundations of economic development and high humanitarian technologies. At the same time, this area demonstrates a major asymmetry that UNESCO is combating under its Education For All and Lifelong Learning programs, establishing mega-universities in developing and developed states. Both in transnational education and in the context of global innovation processes or global technological transfer, international practice is far ahead of international law.26 The WTO, UNESCO, and the OECD focus on eliminating this contradiction. It is also important to account for another aspect of this process, namely, individual states using education to increase their influence on other countries, social groups, and individuals. Even isolated elements of educational academic degradation should attract the attention of society today if they have a major delayed effect. They should be discussed extensively and carefully corrected at the state level since poorly educated and unmotivated consumers are particularly susceptible to influence and manipulation.

Important

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All the processes listed will inevitably conclude with a transition to the sixth post-industrial technological paradigm, which will also develop within a global information revolution and will take on a clearly digital character. We use the future tense here in the full understanding of the fact that, in advanced developed states, this stage is manifesting itself in different aspects. This means that humanity is gradually being pulled into that paradigm, currently going through a technological “offseason” of sorts.27

The coming wave will be connected with nano-, bio-, information, cognitive and humanitarian technologies, as well as on artificial intelligence penetrating into various areas of human activities. On the one hand, technological capabilities for expanding the biological potential of human beings will appear. On the other hand, there is the risk of losing the human initiative in social development. It is no accident that futurologists believe that the sixth technological paradigm will be marked by NBICS convergence,28 and by technological singularity.29 The “technological offseason” and the digital age have a radical impact on state-of-the-art manufacturing. The re-conceptualization of this phenomenon has resulted in post-industrialism undergoing major changes. Previously, the post-industrial paradigm was idealized and seen as the inevitable future of every country’s development. Service sectors were exalted as the main area of doing business, and the words “service society” were mentioned with increasing frequency. Such notions affected the specifics of the economic development of the information society. In the context of the global information revolution, the business has become primarily geared towards post-industrial priorities, such as finance and trade, with information technologies significantly increasing capital mobility, thereby ensuring its accretion in isolation from the dynamics of real resources. The reproduction pattern has shifted. With the high speed of money turnover and accessibility of loans, gaining profit from upgrading production lines was seen as an uncompetitive solution. With time, there came the realization that post-industrialism does not account for civilizational variability, while the increased importance of the service industry is accompanied by rolling back manufacturing, construction, agriculture

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forestry, transportation, and communications. At the same time, the nonmanufacturing sector, associated with managerial, social, and sociocultural areas, is shrinking—that is, comprehensive public degradation is taking place.30 It is unlikely that the economy created by the new industrial wave will change the situation as long as financial transactions, trading in debt, and information mediation remain more profitable than manufacturing based on robotics and additive technologies. It is therefore important to carefully consider those ailments of the information economy—ailments that stem from the pursuit of maximum profits and that could turn out to be contagious and infect the digital economy, which the global community sees as a driver of national development. Overcoming the impasses of the information economy is becoming an increasingly obvious problem. The very logic of technological waves indicated the inevitable advance of industrial capital. Societies in developed states take specific steps to implement industrialization based on new technological foundations, at least four clusters related to informatization, production automation, optimizing the use of resources, and the humanitarian aspects of people’s lives. In this connection, special attention is drawn to the blurring of the boundaries between the real and virtual world in the industry. This blurring stems from the convergence of information and communication technologies and industrial processes. It is now possible to present the life cycle of any item or edifice in digital form. The core of the phenomenon that ensures the digital transformation of industry is computer-assisted design systems that form a rapidly developing economic sector, the object of international cooperation and international competition.31 The sixth technological paradigm was visibly manifested in the emergent Industry 4.0. President and founder of the World Economic Forum Klaus Schwab picked up this idea and ran with it. He suggested “the Fourth Industrial Revolution” as the main topic of the 2016 Davos meeting. Schwab wrote a book on the topic. At the forum and in his book, he noted that, in terms of the scale of opportunities and dangers, global history has never known anything comparable to Industrial Revolution 4.0, which will be accompanied by mind-blowing technological breakthroughs. The development will be exponential. The breadth and depth of transformations are unprecedented, they span economy and business, the societies of each and every country, and each individual person.

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At the same time, Schwab stresses in the foreword to his book that “while the profound uncertainty surrounding the development and adoption of emerging technologies means that we do not yet know how the transformations driven by this industrial revolution will unfold, their complexity and interconnectedness across sectors imply that all stakeholders of global society—governments, business, academia, and civil society—have a responsibility to work together to better understand the emerging trends.”32 The OECD believes that until 2030, countries will live amid merging technologies ranging from diverse digital capabilities (3D printing, the Internet of Things, advanced robotics) and advanced materials based on nano- and biotechnologies to new processes based on “big data” technologies, artificial intelligence, and synthetic biology. Technological merging results in major changes in multifactor productivity, employment and unemployment, qualifications and competences diversity, income distribution, and influence on trade, welfare, and the environment.33

Digital Economy as a Geopolitical Project The digital economy is becoming a new reality, and it is an extension of global economic trends. It is, therefore, important to understand both its close interconnection with humanity’s preceding achievements on the one hand, and its radical novelty on the other. Experts are now talking about the “golden age” of the digital economy in connection with the mass introduction of relevant technologies in the industry. Ultimately, capital productivity is growing sharply, while the cost of principal resources is falling. The industry is seeing a total drop in prime cost at the junction of the real and the virtual, the processes of making optimal decisions are accelerating, and cloud technologies are becoming widespread. The functioning of manufacturing assets is becoming more profitable, and their investment appeal is increasing.34 At the same time, the world is seeing a digital paradox: the more you develop your own information potential, the more vulnerable to cyberattacks you become.35 While implementing its “soft leadership strategy,” the United States banked on an overall awareness in international affairs and the information supremacy it demonstrates in its relations with its adversaries and friends. However, in its 2010 National

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Security Strategy, the United States acknowledged that “the very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt and destroy.”36 In this connection, the understanding of digital vulnerability is expanding, producing a veritable shock in the United States. The scandal surrounding the myth of Russian hackers meddling in the US elections clearly indicates the snowballing fear about the cyber vulnerability of the United States, despite its colossal information potential.

Important

The mounting contradictions between states in the information space and the lack of international legal instruments for eliminating them create a lawless, free-for-all space that hurts states, political and business circles, and members of society in different countries. Consequently, maintaining peace, stability, and development requires powerful comprehensive efforts. It is no coincidence that the next World Economic Forum in Davos plans to discuss the overlapping problems in the digital age of international economic, scientific and technological relations on the one hand, and international information security on the other overlapping. Modern international relations are increasingly affected by scientific and technological progress. The challenges and threats its energy may create amid political short-sightedness loom ever starker. Consequently, STP cannot be approached with traditional yardsticks, its achievements cannot be used to benefit a single state or a small group of states, even if they are highly advanced and developed. Using old approaches to resolve the problems posited by the global technological revolution in a digital age is perilous for humanity. We need new approaches to international scientific and technological relations and consolidated international management of STP. It is thus crucial that a universal agenda be developed for global cooperation in science and technology with principles, rules, and mechanisms that are on par with the realities and scale of the global innovative process.37

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The leveling out of the technological playing field needs to be accelerated; the world needs to move away from the ideology of a technological race intended to bolster one’s own standing and to weaken the rivals. We see BRICS solidifying its technological standing. The BRICS strategy sets the tasks of creating a consolidated technological platform, a technology transfer network, and networked interactions in research and innovations.38 At the same time, the United States makes it clear in its most recent National Security Strategy, signed by President Donald Trump, that it intends to defend its leadership. To do this, it will rely on its synergetic power, strong industrial potential, and innovative technological basis, all of which ensure that the United States is on the cutting edge of STP.39 In the difficult situation of growing confrontation, the task of ensuring peace, stability, and development for all states becomes particularly relevant. Such an understanding makes it increasingly possible to create a global technological fund controlled by the United Nations and intended to provide politically unbiased assistance to states that are lagging behind. Some share of the intellectual rent could be channeled into this fund. This fund could finance endogenous technological development, assist the creation of national engineering schools, promote the training of a corps of skilled workers, and advance the industrialization of states carried on the basis of new technological foundations. A specialized UN agency should be established for the global technology transfer that would interact with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), UNCTAD, UNESCO, and the World Intellectual Property Organization WIPO, as well as with national governments, to analyze the movement of military and dual-purpose technologies worldwide and the use of the latter for non-peaceful purposes. This organization could act like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the basis of international law and the powers it would be vested with by the international community.

Important

The prerequisites for a global technological partnership are already being formed, taking the shape of a global technological fund,

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Fig. 6.2 Global technological partnership structure in a multipolar world order

a GTT international database, and an international technological cloud resource (Fig. 6.2). In the multipolar world order, these prerequisites will expand. This partnership should rest on legal and ethical norms. Its task is to renew and create an international legal and ethical environment for international scientific and technological relations and international information security. The range of actors in this process includes states, legal entities, and natural persons that initiate socially responsible goods, services, and innovations in industry, agriculture, science, education, energy, transportation, communications, near-earth space, and global information space.

∗ ∗ ∗

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In the context of the increasing influence that STP has on international relations, the first thing that needs to be done is to establish the integrity of public and private law. International legal barriers to the development of equitable international relations in science and technology and international information security need to be eliminated. The gaps in the international law that regulates IRST and IIS need to be filled, which will require special efforts from the international community. It would be wise to start with humanity’s activities in near-earth space and in virtual space, as it is precisely in these areas that certain states and non-state actors increase their activities given the man-made legal gaps. Ethical problems are exacerbating in the digital era. It is no accident that people connected with STP and primarily dual-purpose technologies started discussing the need for a global moral revolution, the importance that moral education has as part of the learning process, increasing the level of culture, and cultivating historical memory. Negative trends are observed in these areas throughout the world as attempts are made to forget the historical truth and the experience of preceding generations, which indicates the increasing importance of the humanitarian aspects of the innovative breakthrough. In this connection, the focus of attention within the sixth technological paradigm is on high humanitarian technologies that support traditional values connected with children, friendship, love, and the priority of collective principles in public life.40 It is important to remember that a scientific and technological revolution needs people that are not only knowledgeable but also highly moral because technological progress is unforgiving of soulless and superficial attitudes. Russia focuses priority attention on these matters. The adoption of the Strategy of Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation demonstrates a deep understanding of this geopolitical reality, as this strategy brings forth the major challenges faced by the state as a combination of problems, threats, and opportunities and also dwells on the priority areas in the scientific and technological progress.41 This Strategy is a plan that includes shaping a state-of-the-art management system in science, technology, and innovations, cultivating effective communication between science and business in order to improve the latter’s receptivity to innovations. Generally, this strategy entails an intelligent reorganization of the system of academic organizations within approximately eight years depending on finding solutions to new important specific problems.

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IIS topics are covered by the Strategy of the Information Society Development in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030 connected to building a national information society.42 A plan for implementing this strategy is required as a condition for Russia to evolve a society where “obtaining, preserving, producing, and disseminating reliable information with account for strategic national priorities holds dominant significance for developing the citizen, economy, and state.” The Strategy outlines the ways for bolstering Russia’s international standing in today’s world in the era of the global information revolution and scientific and technological transformations.

Keywords International relations in science and technology, scientific and technological progress, technological paradigm, global informational revolution, digital era, post-industrial manufacturing, international information security. Self-Test 1. What is the economic and technological development concept of Dmitry Lvov and Sergey Glazyev based on? 2. What are the features of each of the five technological paradigms in the Industrial Revolution viewed through the STP lens? 3. What processes are proof of the gradual transition to the sixth postindustrial technological stage? 4. What effect do the “technological offseason” and digitization have on global development? 5. What can be said about the principal features of the global information revolution? 6. What is the structure of the global technological partnership in a multipolar world?

Notes 1. Dmitry Lvov, and Sergey Glazyev, “Theoretical and Applied Aspects in STP Management,” Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody 1 (1985): 1–2. 2. A.V. Biryukov, Contemporary International Relations in Science and Technology (Moscow: Russian New University, 2014), 32.

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3. M. Blaug, Great Economists Before Keynes: An Introduction to the Lives and Works of 100 Economists of the Past (St. Petersburg: Ekonomikus Press, 2008). 4. Gerhard Mensch, Stalemate in Technology: Innovations Overcome the Depression (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979). 5. Sergey Glazyev, Outstripping Development Strategy in the Context of the Global Crisis (Moscow: Ekonomika Press, 2010). 6. Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages (Moscow: Delo Press, 2011). 7. G.I. Morozov, International Organizations (Moscow: Mysl Press, 1969). 8. V.I. Trubnikov, ed. Essays in the History of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence. Volume 4 (Moscow: SVR Press, 1995), 428; A.V. Zinchenko, P.I. Paskhalny, A.S. Sinaisky, G.G. Kachan, and A.E. Shagov, Nuclear Arms Policy of the Foreign Founders of the “Nuclear Club” (Moscow: Ugreshskaya Press, 2014), 8, 195. 9. Although there has been a veritable avalanche of publications doubting the Moon landing as of late. 10. “Arms Trading,” Voennaya ekonomika (January 11, 2016). 11. Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie 6 (1990): 61–64. 12. It is an imperfect type of competition since the largest most of the products on the market are manufactured by a handful of large firms, each of them large enough to impact the entire market with its actions. 13. See: www.unctad.org. 14. 2006 World Bank Reports. Justice and Development (Moscow: Ves Mir Press, 2007). 15. The difference between industrial espionage and competitive intelligence is small. The negative word “espionage” is replaced with the noble concept of “intelligence,” although they pursue the same goals: obtaining an adversary’s secrets. However, competitive intelligence stressed available sources of information—of which there are many in the digital age—and was not supposed to use “undignified methods” such as recruiting spies with adequate intelligence capabilities or secretly removing documents from busted safes—author’s note. 16. Nikita Moiseyev, Global Community and the Future of Russia (Moscow: MNEPU Press, 1997), 29. 17. Sustainable development is a development concept centered around harmonious relations with the environment and around the interests of future generations. The concept was developed under the directions of Gro Harlem Brundtland of UNEP, who had previously held influential offices in the Norwegian Parliament and government. 18. A. Aptekman, V. Kalabin, V. Klintsov, E. Kuznetsova, V. Kulagin, and I. Yasenovets “Digital Russia: A New Reality,” McKinsey and Co. (July

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19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

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2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Locations/Eur ope%20and%20Middle%20East/Russia/Our%20Insights/Digital%20R ussia/Digital-Russia-report.ashx. V.I. Yakunin, S.S. Sulakshin, V.E. Bagdasarian, S.G. Kara-Murza, and M.A. Deeva, Post-Industrialism: An Essay in Critical Analysis (Moscow: Nauchny Expert Press, 2012), 260. E.A. Rogovsky, The United States: Information Society (Economy and Politics) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniyia Press, 2008). E.S. Larina, and V.S. Ovchinsky, “Crime in the Industrial Revolution of the 21st Century,” Nash sovremennik 4 (2017), 175–189. This thought has been present in many WEF reports in recent years. See: www.civilg8.ru.6853.php. V.V. Ovchinnikov, Global Competition Technologies (Moscow: INES-MAIB Press, 2012), 63. Ibid., 11–13. A.V. Biryukov, Contemporary International Relations in Science and Technology (Moscow: Russian New University, 2014). “The Hour of Frugal Technocrats,” Expert 3 (2014): 48. NBICS convergence means combined power and the interpenetration and interaction of nano-, bio, information, cognitive, and humanitarian technologies. Technological singularity is the point where technological progress becomes so rapid and complex it will no longer be understandable to human beings. This point is presumably followed by the creation of artificial intelligence and self-reproducing machines, the integration of human beings with computers, or a quantum leap in the capabilities of the human brain thanks to biotechnologies. Proponents of technological singularity believe that if an intelligence appears that is radically different from human intelligence, then it will be impossible to predict what will happen to humanity afterwards. Yakunin et al., op. cit. A. Mekhanik, “Business at the Speed of Light,” Expert, nos. 26–27 (June 29–July 5, 2015): 69–74. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (World Economic Forum, 2016), 8. Next Production Revolution: Implications for Governments and Business (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017). A. Grammatchikov, and T. Gurova, “The ‘Digital’ Golden Age is Coming,” Expert, nos. 30–33 (July 24–August 20, 2017): 13. A.V. Fyodorov, and E.S. Zinovyeva, Information Security: Political Theory and Diplomatic Practice (Moscow: MGIMO University Press, 2017), 131. U.S. National Security Strategy. The White House. May 2010, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_ security_strategy.pdf.

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37. A.V. Biryukov, “On the Influence of Scientific and Technological Progress on International Relations in the Digital Age. Global Politics: Old Problems and New Challenges,” Yearbook of the Institute for International Studies 13, no. 3 (2015): 111. 38. BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy (Adopted at the 7th BRICS Summit), Ufa, Russian Federation, July 9, 2015. 39. U.S. National Security Strategy. The White House. December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 40. V.V. Tsyganov. Adaptive Mechanisms and High Humanitarian Technologies. Humanitarian Systems Theory (Moscow: Akademichesky proyekt, Alma Mater Press, 2012). 41. The Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation dated September 19, 2017. 42. Strategy of the Information Society Development in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030 dated May 9, 2017.

Recommended Reading Biryukov, A.V. Contemporary International Relations in Science and Technology. Moscow: Russian New University, 2014. Glazyev, S.Y. Outstripping Development Strategy in the Context of the Global Crisis. Moscow: Ekonomika Press, 2010. Rogovsky, E.A. The US: Information Society (Economy and Politics). Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya Press, 2008. Fyodorov, A.V., and Zinovyeva, E.S. Information Security: Political Theory and Diplomatic Practice. Moscow: MGIMO University Press, 2017. Tsyganov, V.V. Adaptive Mechanisms and High Humanitarian Technologies. Humanitarian Systems Theory. Moscow: Akademichesky proyekt, Alma Mater Press, 2012. Schwab Klaus. The Fourth Industrial Revolution. World Economic Forum, 2016. Yakunin, V.I., Sulakshin, S.S., Bagdasarian, V.E., Kara-Murza, S.G., and Deeva, M.A. Post-Industrialism: An Essay in Critical Analysis. Moscow: Nauchny Expert Press, 2012.

CHAPTER 7

The Political Economy of Global Development Stanislav Tkachenko

Development as nationally and internationally driven efforts to accelerate the bridging of economic, socio-cultural and technological gaps between individual states and groups of states is one of the central constructs in social science and political practice in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Development objectives are achieved by mobilizing the resources available to states and international institutions, which are used to build a functioning market and democratic state and to modernize the economy and society (Tkachenko, 2021). After the Second World War, the concept of the “developmental state” gained prominence. This class of states became a major driving force behind efforts to transform the international relations system in the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, projects related to the acceleration of economic development were implemented in various countries, often within the framework of interstate integration alliances. In the post-war

S. Tkachenko (B) Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_7

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years, the drive for accelerated socioeconomic development (progress) embraced dozens of sovereign states and colonial possessions spanning different continents. The typical hallmarks of developing states include a high percentage of poor citizens, a narrow middle class in the overall population, low literacy rates, hunger, high infant mortality rates, poor infrastructure, and weak governance structures. Let us look at two key features that characterized the development process in the post-war era. First, the post-1945 international debate on the strategy and tactics of development became a battleground for the two major ideological trends of the last century: socialism and capitalism. During this period, the United States abandoned its ambition to defeat the USSR militarily, largely thanks to the nuclear weapons developed in the first socialist state. Washington and Moscow began to search for new mutually acceptable ways to normalize their relations in the international arena. In the 1960s, the world entered a period of “rules-based competition” between capitalism and socialism, ideologically framed by the principle of peaceful coexistence. The developing countries became one of the most important zones of this confrontation. Second, the two world wars clearly demonstrated that Western European countries had lost their ability to exploit the human and natural resources of their colonies in the crude forms that were customary to nineteenth-century imperialism. This opened the way to dismantling colonial possessions. This historically important event did not happen overnight but was rather driven by the spread of democratic institutions and practices, whether in the “Soviet” or the “American” version of democracy. It is worth highlighting the specific features of the particular periods of political economy in the modern era, each of which has its own characteristics.

Developing Countries and the Financial Turmoil of 1945–1982 The timeframe for the first period is from the end of the Second World War until the Mexican default of 1982, which was followed by a whole series of financial shocks in more than 40 developing countries all over the globe.

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During the period we are looking at, dozens of sovereign states that had just emerged from colonial status became key agents of development policy, for which practical reform recommendations were being developed and their effectiveness assessed. They were modeled on the USSR or the states of the Global North, while the proposed development policies were intended to replicate in the underdeveloped countries of the Global South those institutions and practices that were already well established in the industrialized nations. In 1961, developing countries founded the Non-Aligned Movement; in 1964, they launched the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; and in 1974 at the United Nations General Assembly, they called for a New International Economic Order. These initiatives have attracted much attention to the problems of this group of states but have not led to any qualitative changes in their international status. After gaining independence and initiating reforms, many former colonies opted for the Soviet model of development as a priority in their socioeconomic policies. These states focused on a policy of autarky and meeting the need for goods and services at the expense of national enterprises, accelerated industrialization, the development of planning, and state control of all economic activity, while showing hostility toward foreign investment. This strategy stemmed from negative perceptions of the colonial past and, in some cases, from the radical nationalism espoused at state level. In the 1950s and 1960s, a wide-ranging debate arose within the international expert community on the goals of development and the means to achieve them. The most contentious issues included the development strategy (prioritizing balanced or unbalanced economic growth), the prospects for the parallel development of traditional and modern sectors of the economy, and the role of human capital. In the 1970s, there were increasing calls to focus on social indicators, including income distribution, poverty, employment rates and the extent to which basic human needs—food, clothing and housing—were being met, rather than prioritizing indicators of economic growth. The dependency theory that reached its peak in these years was rooted in the idea that the nature of relations within the core–periphery model determined the content of the state-specific characteristics of the development process. The authors of the theory argued that there can be no national solution to the structural problems that hinder development.

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They regarded world imperialism as the source of threat and their principal adversary that adversely affected the development of their former colonies even after they had achieved sovereignty. Since integration into the global market was only possible for this group of countries on the terms of the world’s major powers, the only option open to them was to deepen their specialization that had developed historically during the colonial period: supplying raw materials and food in exchange for manufactured goods and consumer products. In the early stages of the dependency theory, many of its advocates spoke favorably of an import substitution industrialization strategy that was nationalist in content. The idea was to ensure industrial production for the domestic market, thus avoiding the negative economic (financial drain) and technological (the multiplication of technological backwardness) effects for national economies stemming from the massive purchases of manufactured goods from the former colonial powers and other countries of the Global North. In the longer term, the import substitution strategy implied the diversification of the national economy and the development of new industries in it. Import substitution industrialization reached its climax in the 1960s and 1970s, when industrial projects guided by it were carried out in various regions of the world, including in socialist states (for example, Romania and Yugoslavia). The inevitable crisis of import substitution industrialization appeared due for several objective and subjective reasons. These include the small domestic markets of developing countries that hindered the implementation of cost-effective industrial projects; opposition from the world’s leading powers, as well as outright sabotage by transnational corporations, which viewed the markets of developing countries as their fiefdoms. In the mid-1970s, many in the dependency school became strong advocates of the export-led growth model as a condition for building national hi-tech industries and abandoning the path of dependency. This model was based on the idea that industrial sector growth was initially geared toward selling its products on world markets thanks to its competitive advantages (cheap labor, low domestic consumption, high savings rate, cheap raw materials, etc.). The global debt crisis of the early 1980s, which hit developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America particularly hard, led to the collapse of most export promotion projects, triggering an internal crisis in many of these countries.1 Since economic growth in most developed countries of the world—as well as in the USSR—slowed down sharply in

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the 1970s, the economic development models promoted by them (the liberal strategy of “growth phases” based on the ideas of Walt Rostow and the Soviet concept of accelerated industrialization), which implied an active role of countries in transforming their national economies, lost their guiding role for developing nations.2 The only exceptions were the countries of East Asia, which chose to pursue their own concept of development, combining protectionism and active state promotion of economic growth by encouraging the export of national industrial products. Therefore, the protracted crisis of the developed economies in the 1970s and the failure of import substitution industrialization projects revealed the inefficiency of the development models used, highlighting the need for fundamentally new strategies.

The Triumph of Neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus (1982–2000) A new phase of development policy arrived as a result of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis when one of Latin America’s largest economies defaulted on $80 billion in external debt, unable to overcome the effects of falling world oil prices, rising interest rates, and the US dollar exchange rate, coupled with foreign investors withdrawing their funds from the national economy. The solution to the problems faced by the region was suggested by US experts and is known today as the Washington Consensus. This concept recognized only a range of effective political and economic measures that were to be applied both in countries suffering a financial and economic crisis and also in the broader community of nations struggling to achieve positive rates of socioeconomic development. The term “Washington Consensus” became widely used in academia and the media thanks to the research carried out by American economist John Williamson on reforms in Latin America at the turn of the 1990s.3 In his view, the Washington Consensus is the understanding and willingness to act together that was reached in the late 1980s by three institutions based in the US capital: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States Department of the Treasury. The subject of their agreement (consensus) was the “correct” policy of market reforms in developing countries. Many of the ideas embedded in the Washington Consensus reflected the views of the expert community and

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the international financial institutions on Latin American problems in the 1980s. Most governments in this region had completely lost control of state finances, while the “soft” monetary policy of their central banks led to galloping inflation. The main point of the changes brought to developing countries by the Washington Consensus can be described as a shift away from state dirigisme in favor of policies favoring competition and market institutions. The Washington Consensus addressed its recommendations to the elites of developing states without expecting the general public to join the debate on its priorities and implementation mechanisms. The set of recommendations to put Third World states on the path of rapid economic growth included a number of urgent and mostly radical measures, known as “shock therapy.” The authors of this political economy model of development were guided by the following ideas. 1. Fiscal discipline must be strengthened and governments must deal decisively with state budget deficits by increasing tax revenues. 2. Ideally, new priorities in public expenditure policy should be introduced: state subsidies should be reduced, and governments should spend more on education, health, and infrastructure. 3. There is a need for extensive tax reform, with a moderate income tax. 4. Liberalization of the financial market is needed, with interest rates determined by market players rather than national monetary authorities. 5. The exchange rate should be determined by independent market players: developing countries can use “competitive” (artificially low) exchange rates for a limited period of time, which will stimulate exports. 6. Liberalization of foreign trade must become an economic policy priority; customs tariffs should be reduced. 7. Foreign direct investment in the domestic market should be welcomed: it is this that brings the much-needed capital and technological/management know-how to the country. 8. Privatization of state property should be encouraged; inefficient state enterprises must be handed over to private owners without delay.

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9. Deregulation should become a priority for government economic strategy: excessive government involvement in economic life encourages corruption and discrimination against small and medium-sized businesses in favor of big business. 10. Property rights need to be protected because flawed laws and a corrupt judicial system reduce incentives to save and accumulate wealth. These recommendations reflected the realities of Latin American economies, which went through a period in the 1960s and 1970s when government programs to stimulate economic growth, including IMF loans, were popular, as were attempts to create favorable conditions for the inflow of foreign direct investment. The measures to stabilize and subsequently restructure the economies, promoted under the terms of loans from the Bretton Woods Institutions, were a key element of the liberal model of the developmental political economy. The negative aspects of the Washington Consensus had become apparent even before John Williamson published his study. The main shortcomings of this development model include the lack of any alternative to the proposed measures, the failure to take into account the individual characteristics of individual states and regions, financial crises and rising unemployment caused by market deregulation, and the lack of a connection between institutions established at the beginning of the reform period and sound macroeconomic policies in the later stages, and the failure to offer recommendations on how best to privatize state property and reduce state involvement in economic life. The main reason for the failure of the Washington Consensus prescriptions was the idealization of market institutions. Some of them were fundamentally transformed in the post-war period, including in the states of the Global North. One of the founders of the constructivist school of international political economy (IPE), Harvard professor John Ruggie, came up with the theory of “embedded liberalism” to explain this phenomenon.4 In his view, liberal ideas were used by the countries of the Global North within the international system only. At the national level, however, instead of prescriptions based on a liberal economic model, they relied on proactive socioeconomic policies (e.g. Keynesian). The main mission of embedded liberalism in the 1980s was to enrich the traditional social democratic liberalism of developed democracies with social democratic ideas (at the country level) and to effectively promote liberal

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reforms at the global economic level in order to open markets in other countries, reduce customs barriers and guarantee foreign investment.5 The Washington Consensus failed to develop into an effective and successful reform strategy for the states of the Global South because they did not require destructive “shock therapy,” but rather a gradual, smooth, and carefully prepared transition from one stage of socioeconomic development to another. Based on an eclectic theoretical foundation, in which libertarian beliefs were most prominent, the Washington Consensus did not recognize the authority of the state and its executive branch structures to participate in the construction of a development model serving the public interest and favoring balanced socioeconomic development. It is no coincidence that the Washington Consensus was soon replaced by theories that recognized the state as having a guiding role in guiding economic and social reforms. However, the broad international debate on the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s brought many ultra-liberal ideas that were unknown in the Global South, or seen as out of touch with reality, to the center of political discourse. They began to influence the views of parliamentarians and journalists and became a reference for politicians in different countries. Therefore, many of the prescriptions mentioned above have found practical application in developing countries in various regions of the world, including in the post-Soviet states. During the period we are looking at, the liberal international order (LIO) emerged as a core element of the international relations architecture that determines the nature of development processes. In its political-economic dimension, it represented a set of international institutions and practices based on the freedom of movement of goods, services and capital, the protection of private property, individual labor remuneration, and limitation of the public sector economy. A distinctive feature of the LIO was the recognition by all the states involved of the military and political hegemony of the United States as the architect and key player of this order. Therefore, the US influence on the content of development policy and decision-making on financial assistance to individual states reached its peak in the period we are studying. However, the liberal model of development began to show the first signs of crisis soon after the end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s, when the radical market principles that had underpinned development assistance policies in the previous decade came to be reconsidered. Thanks to the efforts of World Bank experts, a so-called pro-market approach

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to development was gradually being adopted by international institutions and individual states.6 It advocated more moderate liberalization of developing economies and recognized the legitimacy of certain government interventions to mitigate or eliminate the negative effects of the market mechanism in case of market failures. The LIO rules were not in line with such forms of state intervention in the economy as supporting emerging industries, manipulating domestic interest rates and state banks granting loans on better-than-market terms. The LIO also ignored the aspirations of developing countries to realize their political goals, such as ensuring national unity and defending state sovereignty. The crisis of the liberal order came during the Trump presidency, but developing nations had started to become disillusioned with its prescriptions back in the 1990s.

The Present Stage: Good Governance and State Dialogue with Market Institutions The 1997–1998 financial crises in Russia and some South East Asian countries exposed the inefficiency of neoliberal conditionality policies that had been promoted by the Bretton Woods Institutions over the decade, with its key focus on cutting public sector economy and budget spending, removing capital controls and domestic market protection measures, while also minimizing social protection measures. The need to develop a new strategy that would combine state and business interests was widely recognized. Ensuring good governance at all levels and the special role of inclusive economic institutions in addressing the challenges of economic modernization came to be seen as crucial to addressing the political economy of development. In the new millennium, the countries of the Global South are affected by globalization processes that have challenged them to comply with the norms of a free market economy as a condition for restructuring their external debt and hopes of attracting investment to support their development. During this period, the United Nations regained leadership in coordinating the international community’s efforts to address development challenges. Two phases can be distinguished, reflecting the changes in international policy in this area.

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2000–2015: The UN Millennium Development Goals At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the international community recognized the global nature of the problems facing developing countries and the need for multilateral cooperation to overcome them. At the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, all UN Member States (189) along with 22 major international organizations endorsed the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This document set concrete, measurable targets in the areas of poverty, health, gender equality, environment and economic development. The targets agreed at the interstate level were scheduled to be achieved in 2015. The MDGs were promoted by various international organizations, among which the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD played a special role. As early as the 1960s, their experts came up with the idea that development should be pursued according to predetermined goals. During the 1990s, the United Nations held a number of major development events, including the World Summit for Children (September 1990), which was particularly notable for its discussions on the most urgent problems facing developing countries. The 1990s were also marked by a crisis of humanitarian organizations that focused on international development assistance. It was expected that those resources that had previously been spent on the arms race would be redirected to support the Global South following the end of the Cold War. But this did not happen, and aid was reduced dramatically. According to estimates by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, international development aid from OECD Member States fell from 0.34% of their gross national product (GNP) in 1991 to just 0.22% of GNP in 1999. The OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in 1996 endorsed a 20-page document on the International Development Goals (IDGs).7 It launched a debate on the need for a qualitatively new phase in the political economy of development, culminating in the adoption of the MDGs at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000.8 The endorsement of the MDGs was a milestone in the history of international development cooperation. For the first time, the nations of the Global North were able to agree on a set of measures to combat not only extreme poverty but also the side effects that it causes. The UN agencies played a coordinating role in the MDG endorsement process. They integrated the agreed goals into their daily work, coordinated their implementation, provided advice to states and NGOs, and maintained an

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ongoing dialogue on the MDGs with donors and the expert community. The United Nations was involved in capacity building of all stakeholders in development assistance, the training of personnel, the funding of NGOs, and the provision of volunteers. At the end of the MDG program, UN entities undertook a comprehensive assessment of its implementation and drafted the way forward, which later served as the basis for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved in September 2015. The eight MDGs endorsed by UN leaders were: 1. To 2. To 3. To 4. To 5. To 6. To 7. To 8. To

eradicate extreme poverty and hunger achieve universal primary education promote gender equality and empower women reduce child mortality improve maternal health combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases ensure environmental sustainability develop a global partnership for development.

For each goal, individual objectives and quantitative indicators were defined, from which conclusions were drawn on the extent to which the objectives have been met. The most notable achievements of the MDG program can be summarized as follows: 1. The number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen significantly. In 1990, almost half the population of the Global South lived on less than USD 1.25 a day. This rate dropped to 14% in 2015. 2. Globally, the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen by more than half, from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015, while the global population grew from 5.2 billion in 1990 to 7.3 billion in 2015. 3. The proportion of undernourished people in the developing regions has fallen by almost half since 1990, from 23.3% in 1990–1992 to 12.9% in 2014–2016. 4. The primary school net enrolment rate in the developing regions has reached an estimated 91% in 2015, up from 83% in 2000.

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5. The number of out-of-school children of primary school age worldwide has fallen by almost half, to an estimated 57 million in 2015, from 100 million in 2000. 6. Many more girls were in school in 2015 compared to 2000. The developing regions as a whole have achieved the target to eliminate gender disparity in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. 7. Despite population growth in developing countries, under-five deaths globally have dropped from 12.7 million in 1990 to nearly 6 million in 2015. 8. Since 1990, the maternal mortality ratio has been cut nearly in half, and most of the reduction occurred since 2000. 9. Over 6.2 million malaria deaths have been averted between 2000 and 2015, primarily of children under five years of age in subSaharan Africa. The global malaria incidence rate has fallen by an estimated 37% and the mortality rates by 58%. 10. In 2015, 91% of the global population used an improved drinking water source, up from 76% in 1990. 11. In 2014, 79% of imports from developing to developed countries were admitted duty-free, up from 65% in 2000. 12. The share of export earnings spent on servicing external debt in developing countries has fallen from 12% in 2000 to 3% in 2013. The global expert community gives different assessments of the extent to which the MDG targets have been achieved. According to experts, not all countries have achieved the desired results, with significant socioeconomic gaps remaining between various countries and regions, and differences persisting among sub-national entities within countries. At the same time, the scale of the achievement was significant, and this fact has been universally acknowledged. The Millennium Development Goals Report, published in 2014, noted that extreme poverty has been cut in half globally, with encouraging developments in health, education, and women’s full participation in society.9 In the final report of 2015, the UN found that several of the MDGs had been fully achieved according to the benchmarks set in 2000. Substantial progress has been made on the remaining targets that had not been fully met, although much remained to be done by the international community.10 The report identified the following problems as the key outstanding issues related to the MDGs:

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• gender inequality persists (women continue to face discrimination in access to work, economic assets, and participation in private and public decision-making); • big gaps exist between the poorest and richest households, and between rural and urban areas: in the developing regions, children from the poorest 20% of households are more than twice as likely to be stunted as those from the wealthiest 20%. Children in the poorest households are four times as likely to be out of school as those in the richest households; about 16% of the rural population do not use improved drinking water sources, compared to 4% of the urban population; • climate change and environmental degradation undermine progress achieved, and poor people suffer the most: global emissions of carbon dioxide have increased by over 50% since 1990; water scarcity affects 40 percent of people in the world and is projected to increase; • conflicts remain the biggest threat to human development: by the end of 2014, conflicts had forced almost 60 million people to abandon their homes—the highest level recorded since the Second World War; • millions of poor people still live in poverty and hunger, without access to basic services: despite the enormous progress, even today, about 800 million people still live in extreme poverty and suffer from hunger; over 160 million children under age five have the inadequate height for their age due to insufficient food; currently, 57 million children of primary school age are not in school. The experience of nearly 200 sovereign states in implementing the MDGs has shown that intergovernmental engagement at the global level, complete with the active involvement of NGOs and integration alliances, has proven effective. It should be pursued even in the face of political obstacles to interstate cooperation, as well as factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic that swept across the globe in early 2020. Cooperation on the MDGs, however, has not changed the competitive nature of interstate relations. The activities of the most developed countries in the international arena have been guided primarily by national interests, with poverty or hunger alleviation in the world’s poorest regions not being the top priority. During the period we are looking at, international financial assistance to the countries of the Global South has

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Table 7.1 Official development assistance from OECD member states (in USD millions)

Year

Amount

Year

Amount

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

54,021 52,767 58,654 69,604 80,199 108,396 105,564 105,020

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

122,890 120,674 128,483 135,111 127,029 134,846 137,538 131,563

Source OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics: total flows by donors. URL: https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/

been increasing gradually, yet the dynamics of such assistance remained unstable (Table 7.1). The Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations, also known as the Doha Development Round, which was designed to link global economic growth with assistance to millions of people living in poverty, found itself in a protracted crisis soon after its launch in November 2001. The involvement of the Bretton Woods Institutions in the MDGs also proved ineffective: the IMF does not consider development as part of its remit, and the World Bank pursues sectoral projects beyond the MDGs for other, often purely financial, considerations. From 2016 to the Present: The UN Sustainable Development Goals The contradictory results of the MDG program sparked widespread debate on how to proceed in this area. Some experts in developing countries suggested abandoning the MDG model, which is based on agreeing common indicators for all states and called for a fundamentally different model for addressing development challenges. They proposed to revisit the development measures based on the Declaration on the Right to Development approved by the UN General Assembly on 4 December 1986. This document was revolutionary for its time, and recognized the right to development as “… an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms may be fully realized.”11 This approach has drawn criticism from liberal economists

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and politicians in most developed countries amid concerns that in their attempts to exercise the right to development, the Global South nations could demand drastic increases in official development assistance. Expert assessments of the implementation of the MDGs have shown that, rather than setting rigid targets for all states, it makes more sense to use locally adapted indicators for addressing development issues, and validating them at the national level through democratic procedures. The concept of globally defined MDGs has its flaws. Aggregated statistics on the MDG implementation masked a lack of positive results in some parts of the world, and the global goals did not take into account national specificities in terms of the level from which to calculate the progress of individual states toward the MDGs.12 The debate on the need to revise the development strategy took place in the context of a changing environment. The MDGs were being implemented at a time of the digital revolution, the spread of ICT and the rapid growth of the post-industrial economy. Also, there was a recognized need to ensure that national economies and their individual sectors were stressresilient; counter inequalities in all their forms; demand clean and reliable energy sources; and overcome the negative effects of urbanization. The MDGs agreed by world leaders in 2000 could not help solve the problems that would later surface. Since 2000, a pool of new development assistance donors has emerged, including China, India, the Russian Federation, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and a number of other countries. Not only have they increasingly provided funding and other assistance to developing countries, but they also offer alternative and often more flexible means of implementing development assistance measures that rival those adopted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee in previous decades. For example, China’s current development strategy, called the “Beijing Consensus” or “China Model,” has attracted a great deal of attention from experts and policymakers in developing countries.13 It is characterized by phased reforms as opposed to neoliberal “shock therapy,” a slow opening of domestic markets to imports, the continued dominance of the state in the national economy, including control of major stakes in leading companies, support for innovation and experimentation, and an authoritarian political regime. In April 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened a group of experts to draft a framework for the post-2015 development agenda. In June 2012, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development

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(also known as Rio+20), which was held in Rio de Janeiro, also called for innovative forms of sustainable development to guide the international community, both within the United Nations system and in individual countries.14 The recommendations produced by these structures set the overall tone for a new global development strategy. It was henceforth to be primarily based on environmental sustainability coupled with respect for human rights and equality of all people. A report released on May 30, 2013, by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda stated: “It is time for the international community to use new ways of working, to go beyond an aid agenda and put its own house in order: to implement a swift reduction in corruption, illicit financial flows, money-laundering, tax evasion, and hidden ownership of assets. We must fight climate change, champion free and fair trade, technology innovation, transfer and diffusion, and promote financial stability. And since this partnership is built on principles of common humanity and mutual respect, it must also have a new spirit and be completely transparent.”15 The priorities laid down in the SDG strategy have been defined quite broadly, and this approach has expanded the tools for their implementation, radically revising the existing areas of interstate cooperation and extending it to several new spheres. The SDGs build on the recognition of the need for international coordination in addressing development challenges such as inclusive and sustainable growth, resilient national financial systems, access to shared resources and climate change. The goals cover a broader spectrum of economic and social sectors and therefore require significantly larger financial resources through all types of investment, the coordinated use of budgetary expenditures, and additional resources from public entities and private companies. The SDGs are being implemented in an international environment that differs markedly from the global political situation at the start of the twenty-first century. The new key megatrends affecting the modern political economy of development include escalating problems caused by climate change, disruptions in the development of globalization processes, accelerated urbanization, and growing migration problems. In the modern era, national economic growth is less likely to translate into poverty reduction for citizens. In 1990, a total of 37.1% of the world’s population was living below the official poverty line, so overall GDP growth in a given country tended to improve the livelihoods of a

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large proportion of the disadvantaged. Today, with 9.2% of the global population living below the subsistence level, the wealthiest groups and the middle class will be the primary beneficiaries of economic growth in a given state, while the numerically and politically insignificant poorest groups are likely to be left outside the circle of those benefiting from economic growth. Another feature of the modern age is the concentration of the poorest people in countries with poorly diversified, resource-based economies and politically unstable and failed states, which are often embroiled in armed conflicts. In such countries, economic growth rarely reduces poverty as there are very few jobs that provide a sustainable source of income for citizens and their families, with only a small number of people close to the ruling circles enjoying the benefits of economic growth. On September 25, 2015, the UN General Assembly endorsed the outcome document of the UN Summit to adopt a new development strategy entitled “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”16 This document approved 17 goals, 169 targets, and 230 indicators for the sustainable development of the planet over a 15-year period. The new document defining global cooperation in the field of development set out the goals as follows: Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere. Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture. Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all. Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries.

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Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development. Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss. Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. The sustainable development agenda encompasses virtually every aspect of modern human life. The projects it envisages require a global investment of between $5 trillion and $7 trillion per year over the entire 15-year period, according to UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The allocation and disbursement procedures for the respective activity will be highly decentralized, yet this is the costliest program in the history of humankind given its scale. National governments have a leading role to play throughout all stages of the development and implementation of the SDGs, while UN entities will act as coordinators and observers. Successful SDG implementation requires a wider range of actors, including regional and local governments, interstate integration structures, business, academia and all citizens. A challenge of this scale has never been placed on the agenda in world history, and its success in achieving the SDGs largely depends on the ability of all the actors identified above to make unprecedented efforts and find ways to cooperate. It is important to note that a wide range of NGOs and charities play a significant role in the SDG process, including Oxfam International in the United Kingdom, ActionAid International in South Africa, World Vision in Canada, Doctors Without Borders in France, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in the United States, and Fingo in Finland. At the current stage of implementing the SDG agenda, we must focus on a key question: Was it the right decision by the leaders of sovereign

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states and international institutions to bring together a wide range of development goals and objectives, a variety of actors, and many areas of politics and economics in a single program? We should keep in mind that the SDGs are being implemented simultaneously in all known types of states, from democratic and highly developed to authoritarian and those that have been lagging behind in their development for centuries. The lack of human, financial and technological resources blocks the building of efficient economies and the development of civil society structures in a number of countries (Table 7.2). It is by no means always possible for foreign partners to intervene promptly to improve things in this or that country. Moreover, the same goals, objectives, and priorities are interpreted differently in different states, depending on local socioeconomic conditions, geographical location, and history. Depending on the type of state, its ability to quickly achieve its stated goals varies. Highly developed countries are in the best position to make progress on decarbonization and clean energy only (SDG 7), while lowand middle-income nations can make strong gains in education, health, and infrastructure development (SDG 9 and 10). For example, a video conference on climate change hosted by President of the United States Joe Biden on April 22–23, 2021 brought together the world’s 40 leading nations, including the United States, China, Russia, India, Japan, and the Table 7.2 Extreme poverty in developing countries in 1990, 2005 and 2019 Regions

East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa All developing countries

Extreme poverty in developing countries in 1990, 2005 and 2019 (percentage of population living on USD 1.90 or less a day, as a percentage of total population, at purchasing power parity in corresponding years) 1990

2005

2019

60 2 16 6 45 54 42

18 5 11 3 34 50 24

1 1 4 7 15 40 9

Source URL: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povDuplicateWB.aspx

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EU countries, while almost all developing countries were not invited to take part. The early years of the implementation of the SDGs show that poor nations, due to their capacity constraints, are not able to focus on the same priorities and achieve the same results as the most economically developed countries. Accelerating urbanization in all regions of the world is not affecting the hundreds of millions of people living in rural areas of developing countries. These are the areas that have the highest levels of poverty, lack access to modern infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, postal services), and have not yet created the right conditions to improve the quality of life. To address these challenges, the SDGs include: 1. developing urban–rural linkages to address development issues; 2. creating conditions to improve the economic situation of the rural population; 3. investing in small family businesses to ensure global food security and increase food production; 4. building the resilience of the poorest households in agrarian areas. ∗ ∗ ∗ Since the end of the Second World War, the states of the Global South have used various methods to manage the political economy of development: from autarkic policies and import substitution to integration into the world economy, export-oriented growth, and democratic reforms. Initially, the focus of reformers and the international expert community was on individual states. In the 1980s, there was a widespread belief that the development process had to follow universal recipes and that taking national specifics into account would only slow down the pace of reform. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the compromising attitude began to dominate: all states, both the most developed and the poorest, should have a say in solving the problems of development, and the reform strategy should reflect the specificities of different regions, individual states, and their constituent sub-national structures. SDG-related projects focus on building effective market economy institutions and democratic society, ensuring socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth. At the micro level, new assistance tools include cash, consumer goods, access to

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health and education services, employment, and pensions for the most disadvantaged families. Since 1999, the G8 countries, including Russia, have provided a total of $95 billion in debt relief to a group of 36 of the most heavily indebted poor countries, creating additional opportunities for them to pursue development goals. A distinctive feature of today’s political economy of development is the combination of the top-down approach, represented by the good governance concept, with a bottom-up approach that aims to provide conditions for addressing social problems that arise from development issues. Each of these approaches has its weaknesses. However, when implemented in parallel, they create the most favorable conditions for sustainable development, combining government resources with funds provided by philanthropists and charities.

Keywords Developmental state, sustainable development, import substitution industrialization, export-led growth, Washington Consensus, Beijing Consensus. Self-Test 1. What are the differences in the approaches of the Washington and Beijing consensuses on the pace of economic reform and the need for a liberal foreign trade policy? 2. Why do some experts argue that gross domestic product and GDP per capita are not sufficiently representative of a developing country’s economy? 3. What is the role of the Russian Federation in development assistance? What tools does Russian diplomacy use to achieve these objectives? In which regions of the world is its assistance to developing states most visible? 4. Do you agree that even high growth rates do not mean that the whole population benefits? 5. Compare the MDGs and the SDGs. What is the continuity of the development goals? In what ways do the two programs differ?

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Notes 1. V.K. Shpringel, “The Foreign Debt Problem and the Economic Development of Latin America in the 1980s,” Economic Journal of the Higher School of Economics, no. 3 (1999): 186–210. 2. Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 3. John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in John Williamson, ed., Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Happened (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1989), 7– 20. 4. J.G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–380. 5. Ibid. 6. World Bank, World Development Report: The Challenge of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 7. Development Assistance Committee. 1995. Summary of the Thirty-Third High Level Meeting, held on May 3–4, 1995 at the Chateau de la Muette, Paris. DCD/DAC/M (95)4/PROV. Paris: OECD. 8. United Nations, Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 2001). 9. United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report (New York: United Nations, 2014). 10. United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report (New York: United Nations, 2015). 11. A.N. Terekhov, and S.L. Tkachenko, Political Economy of Information and Communication Technologies: Russia’s Place in the Global Market (Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publishing House, 2019). 12. In Burkina Faso, for example, achieving the goal of universal primary education by 2015 required efforts that went beyond anything that had been done organisationally and financially in the country in earlier decades. And in neighbouring states, the same goal has been achieved by a relatively small increase in funding for primary education. 13. L.I. Kondrashova, China: Towards a New Model of Social Development (Moscow: FORUM Publishing House, 2017). 14. UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288: The Future We Want, the Outcome Document of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (adopted July 27, 2012), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_ 66_288.pdf.

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15. United Nations, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development: The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (New York: UN Publications, May 30, 2013), 9. 16. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/70/L.1 “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (adopted September 25, 2015), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/pop ulation/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_ 1_E.pdf.

Recommended Reading Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James A. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. Moscow: AST, 2016. Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. Moscow: Territoriya Budushchego Izdatelsky Dom, 2006. Kondrashova, L.I. China: Towards a New Model of Social Development. Moscow: FORUM Publishing House, 2017. Terekhov, A.N., and Tkachenko, S.L. Political Economy of Information and Communication Technologies: Russia’s Place in the Global Market. Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publishing House, 2019. Tkachenko, S.L. Political Economy of the Development and Formation of Democratic Institutions. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University of Economics and Finance, 2021. Wallerstein, Immanuel, World Systems Analysis and the Situation in the Modern World. St. Petersburg: Universitetskaya kniga, 2001.

PART II

Key International and Political Issues and Processes

CHAPTER 8

International Integration in Theoretical Discourse Andrey Baykov

Integration is one of the most prominent global political and economic trends. On the one hand, this is about pooling resources and competing for leadership. On the other hand, it is about the voluntary self-restraint of the freedom of action of states through preferential cooperation. Originating as a bold experiment in Western Europe in the 1950s, integration went far beyond the European continent in the 1980s and 1990s, giving rise to integration blocs in North and Latin America, East and South Asia, and in the CIS space.

A. Baykov (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_8

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The Origins of Integration Concepts Studies by a number of Russian researchers trace the origins of modern integration concepts back to the social sciences of the nineteenth century, although at that time there was no talk of interstate integration as we understand it today.1 Nevertheless, proto-integration concepts did exist. They had two sources. First, the term “integration” was borrowed from the natural sciences. Their intervention in scientific knowledge about man and society was inspired by the hypothesis developed by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) of the origin of species.2 The work of the same name, published in 1859, was a canonical study in terms of the methodology of natural scientific research. The vast body of empirical data accumulated over many years of field observations was complemented by fundamental theoretical research. However, Charles Darwin’s book gained the most traction due to its distinct social orientation. In discussing the origin of species in general, Darwin made no fundamental distinction between animals, plants and humans. Moreover, he may have been one of the first to apply the principle of isomorphism—recognizing the elements of logical similarity between natural and social phenomena—as a way of understanding social reality, admitting that human development follows the same algorithms as the development of all other living beings. Darwinism explained phenomena that had previously been interpreted in religious terms, which made it a new matrix of thought for the enlightened Western European society for decades to come. Like Freudianism, which from the realm of psychoanalysis was soon hastily extended to all areas of social relations, Darwinism made its way into the axioms and metaphors. The validity of which one preferred not to question even in the social sciences—something Charles Darwin gave little thought to while writing his work.

Based on the Darwinist axioms, the integration of states that are close or converging in their intra-systemic characteristics was considered by analogy with the integration of species from the world of living nature that are close or converging in their biogenetic traits. During this process, the observed phenomena manifested themselves with all the rigor of Darwinian logic. At the stage of selection, the most viable units were selected for fusion, and at the stage of adaptation, the variation in traits was smoothed out. Integration envisaged an appropriate

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external and internal homogenization of the actors up to the point of transforming them into a new species.3 The scientific fundamentality of the integration idea in such an understanding was questionable. The idea linked its genealogy to the study of living objects, not social reality, such as society and the state. It echoed the then popular “growth pattern” rooted in Charles Darwin’s thesis that human beings were not fundamentally different from other forms of living matter. This was implicitly extrapolated to the behavior of societies and nations. As Darwinist scholars have pointed out, the language of The Origin of Species encouraged the application of the principles outlined in this work to human society, i.e., it had an ideological message from the very start.4 Second, the source of integration as an ideological construct lies in the modernist concept of state-building, which coincided with the process of the separation of nation-states in Western Europe.5 A socio-political understanding of integration has emerged: integration as a project to create a “nation-state,” aiming to meet the challenges of modernization.6 Modernization was conceived as a process in which, through the creation of a central government, an internal market, a common legal space and a common economic policy, local cultural barriers would disappear, giving way to a common cultural and linguistic (dialect-free) space.

An organic element of this process is the reorientation of community identity from the local to the national level, ensuring its legitimacy. This understanding of integration is still relevant: a policy of adapting ethnic minorities to multicultural societies in Western European states is now also referred to as integration. This approach was used by Max Weber and Émile Durkheim to develop the concept of integration. They were the first to elaborate and clarify such fundamental aspects of integration as social, economic and political. They were also the first to identify the normative, rational and communicative dimensions of integration as an academic challenge and to specifically address them. However, both thinkers applied their constructs to first-stage integration, or, as it was not quite accurate to say later, “national integration.” The legacy of the natural sciences and social theorizing of the nineteenth century is huge for today’s understanding of integration. It is particularly valuable in terms of methodology. The notions of variability,

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adaptability and complication, which were developed within the context of evolutionary views, provided a normative framework for the subsequent understanding (not always correct) of the behavior of states at the stage of nation-state and supranational integration. The idea of development, derived from the metaphor of growth, was the precursor of modern multi-stage theories of integration, the best known of which remains Béla Balassa’s theory of economic integration, put forward over half a century ago.7 But it was not the only one. Distinguishing different types of regionalism in terms of generation is yet another confirmation of the “biological” roots of understanding integration theories, which, like all inexact social sciences, aspire to resemble the exact sciences, but in reality, often limit themselves to just borrowing their conceptual apparatus.8 The first theorist of strictly interstate integration of the classical (linearstage) approach was Jacob Viner.9 Later on, his ideas were enriched with new constructs.10 The theorists of this school had a limited empirical basis: the European communities had not yet passed all stages of development and were a long way from the political union. This group of authors, therefore, used the logical-intuitive and analogical approaches as their main methods of analysis: they chose the examples of the United States and Germany as historical reference points for creating a model of a political union (the last phase of integration). Despite the methodological limitations, the application of the multi-stage scheme can still lead to interesting generalizations and unexpected parallels. For example, contrary to popular belief, the euro is not the only example of a collective currency, or at least of close financial integration. It has at least two approximate equivalents: the CFA Franc Zone (French Colonies in Africa; Colonies françaises d’Afrique), which includes several West and Central African states; and the “swap” agreement system as part of the APT (ASEAN Plus Three) cooperation initiative in Pacific Asia.

The general intellectual significance of classical paradigms of integration analysis does not necessarily imply their universal explanatory power. Since modern integration theories are halfway rooted in the natural sciences, they tend to underestimate the social factors of integration— especially the role of socio-economic patterns and the political and legal traditions of different countries and regions. After all, from the point of view of natural scientific logic, everyone is equal before the laws of evolution.

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The emergence of teachings by Darwin,11 Lamarck,12 and their followers and opponents13 on the origin of species coincided with the triumph of Enlightenment ideas, the advent of the modern age and its inherent belief in progress and development, coupled with the early evidence of benefits brought by social engineering, resulting in the creation of states. The fact that the discovery of selection laws and spread of modernist views on social organization coincided in time and space (in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe) can be considered a historical accident, although such a conclusion looks simplistic: the adoption of these discoveries by society was unthinkable without the corresponding social background and level of social thought. Still, the fact that such coincidences did not occur outside of Europe certainly speaks against the universality of the principle of isomorphism in global social reality. Linearity, development and a multi-stage approach are the transformed mental constructs of natural scientific origin that can hardly be considered exhaustive or even sufficient tools in analyzing modern integration experiments in different parts of the world in the 2010s. Indeed, likening an interstate association to a biological organism will inevitably evoke associations in the spirit of age diagnostics such as retardation and delayed development, which is only appropriate if the phenomena in question begin their development in identical starting conditions. The state of public thought, the belief (or lack of belief) in progress is one such condition. Linear progress in the West and the Golden Age in the East, the “arrow of time” in Europe and the cyclical perception of time in the East are discrepancies that are incompatible with the thesis about the universal “growth pattern” as applied to the dynamics of social processes. The social theory of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries presented by Max Weber, Émile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons had a less noticeable yet no less significant effect on integration theories. It explained how integration could be achieved and revealed the mechanism of integration. Accordingly, the founding fathers of the European, North American and East Asian versions of integration proceeded from the necessity of the division of labor and the convergence of the levels of development of societies, including the cultural and linguistic components. Guided by the same ideas, the proponents of integration, especially in Western

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Europe and East Asia, pay considerable attention to symbolic (normative) integration and the creation of a common identity. Moreover, it is essentially the studies of the nineteenth-century classics of sociology that the modern typology of integration goes back to. According to it, economic integration is understood as the convergence of markets, social integration is understood as the convergence and unification of societies, and political integration is understood as the creation of a supranational state which replicates the “state in general” or the creation of a political community with a sophisticated form of co-governance.14

One of the relatively classical fields of study is integration studies, which grew out of ethnology. In a sense, it is an attempt to theoretically justify Darwinism and its idea of biological evolution, on the one hand, and to deepen Émile Durkheim’s concepts with the notion of group solidarity introduced by him, on the other. Their synthesis, combined with a projection onto integration theory, is what is known as primordialism—the oldest scholarly approach that addresses the issue of ethnicity. Primordialism is based on a view of ethnicities as co-societies imbued with common kinship (biogenetic) bonds. Primordialism is a relatively traditional approach. It emerged at the turn of the twentieth century and took shape in the works of Karl Kautsky and Otto Bauer, the proponents of the so-called Austromarxism. It was later developed in the United States by Dutch-born researcher Pierre van den Berghe.15 Other anthropologists who openly associated themselves with primordialism included R. Shaw, Y. Wong, Clifford Geertz, Edward Shils, and H. Eiseke. In the USSR, the Director of the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union Yulian Bromley was involved in developing the ideas outlined in the primordialist school. In particular, he singled out three historical types of ethnos—tribe, nationality and nation. The criteria of such division were defined exhaustively. Especially interesting is the comparison of the last two elements of the triad. At the stage of the transformation of nationality into a nation, we can observe a tendency toward internal limitedness, toward territorial, economic and political closedness, which manifests itself in the formation of an internal market with a self-sufficient national economic complex, a ramified transport infrastructure, as well as a single political leadership. At this stage, a

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sense of national identity (ideology) emerges among the members of the ethnos, in which identification is primarily based on political grounds.16 Mark Khrustalev, a proponent of primordialism, designed a matrix of inter- and intra-ethnic processes classified according to their direction— divergence (separation) and convergence (coming closer): Processes

Direction Convergence

Divergence

Intra-ethnic

Consolidation

Inter-ethnic

Integration Assimilation Mixing

Separation Partition Diversification

Mixing (between nationalities), assimilation (between nation and nationality) and integration (between nations) turned out to be at the intersection of the inter-ethnic and convergent variables. As Khrustalev himself defines the latter, integration is a two-way movement of two independent, mature ethnos groups, converging in their characteristics but not achieving complete fusion.17 A similar concept is being developed by the former Director of the Miklukho-Maklai Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician Valery Tishkov.18

It is clear that the primordialist approach to integration draws upon, with some variations, the Darwinism and solidarism of the nineteenth century, and in this sense, it is a relatively successful and analytically useful improvement on them, with the caveat that it implicitly reproduces the ideas of development and the metaphor of growth inherent in Darwin’s theory. In this sense, this concept “assigns” integration only to mature states that have overcome local ethnicity in their development. This approach, however, does not address the problem of the disproportionate ethnic composition (or disintegration) of the already established “nation-states,” and in this respect, it is clearly insufficient to explore contemporary realities, for example in the European Union. The methodological relevance of classical integration paradigms, for all their significance, is limited in the light of the explosive growth of

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diverse regional integration experiences over the last 20–25 years. More or less successfully “working” for the integration processes in the European Union, the classical concepts can at best only serve as “starting points” when analyzing contemporary integration options, for example in Latin America and even less so in Pacific Asia. The reason behind the limitations of these concepts, as has been noted in the relevant literature, is their near-total focus on the analysis of European regional material and their tendency to refer to natural scientific analogies.

Experience in Understanding Real Integration Processes For the first time ever, integration became a real international political phenomenon in Western Europe after the Second World War. Scientific views on the integration process have largely focused on the idea of building a homogeneous integrating space based on the unity of cultural symbols, an institutional system and an economic complex. This logic formed the basis of a historically, geographically and culturally specific integration project for Western Europe. However, due to a confluence of circumstances, the most important of which is the decades-long uniqueness of Western European integration, the experience of integration “without prior arrangement” in Western Europe until almost the end of the twentieth century determined the general understanding of international integration among experts. “Revisionism” only became prominent enough in integration theory in the 2000s. The authors of that decade had already clearly articulated a view that analytical approaches based on the study of Western European experience alone were of limited cognitive and explanatory usefulness. For example, prominent British expert and Professor at York University Mark Beeson, who has studied integration experience in East Asia, wrote quite categorically: “… there is no reason to suppose that there is only one possible pattern of regional development, or that the EU represents the successful end point of such processes.”19 A plurality of scientific views and even schools of study on regional integration processes has rapidly developed in the specialist literature.

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Important

For the new generation of foreign researchers it has become typical to recognize multiple integration experiences, specific regional trajectories of integration processes, and diverse forms of their institutional and non-institutional regulation.

The daring idea that West European integration activity is an important yet in a certain sense “accidental” historical and political phenomenon, generated by the mutual interplay of specific historical, cultural and personal factors, has begun to emerge more frequently in the literature. What makes European integration so valuable and different from other integration initiatives is that it has absorbed the deeply developed theoretical constructs of scholars and public figures who have dreamed of European unity for centuries.20 Having established a kind of canon for “conformity assessment,” it has itself become a “victim of the canon”: its creators, due to the long-standing idea of European unity, were always heavily influenced by the speculative normativity of that unity. As a result, over a historically long period of global development, the specific experience of the European communities, and later the European Union, became identified with the phenomenon of integration in general. The progress of integration processes in any part of the world came to be “automatically” evaluated through the prism of what and how the European Union has or has not managed to achieve in the course of its evolution. Another peculiarity of the analytical discourse on integration is the multiplicity and semantic fluidity of the terms, chief among which are the concepts of “integration,” “regionalism” and “regionalization.” In the 1970s and 1980s, a kind of “fear of the word” was felt in the foreign literature describing the experience of inter-state rapprochement in Southeast Asia. The concept of “integration” had by then been monopolized by European scholars, while some other verbal expressions such as “regionalization” and “regionalism” were used to describe similar processes in non-Western areas. By using these terms, non-Europeanists have shielded themselves against criticism from Europeanists, who have long been adamant that there is no integration anywhere outside Western Europe, and therefore the use of the word “integration” in relation to other

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regions is inappropriate. The concepts of “regionalism” and “regionalization” in the context of this “war of terms” embodied a temporary compromise reached with the prevailing understanding of Europeanists. In the 2000s, the described syndrome of fear of using the word “integration” in regional studies by non-Europeanists “penetrated” into Russian science as well. This is probably why Russian scholars have written about integration in Asia infrequently and cautiously, preferring to hide behind the notion of regionalization, which has been interpreted in increasingly broad and ambiguous terms. “Regionalization” has largely proved to be a euphemism for integration to denote integration processes outside the European Union. A wave of publications on regionalization and regionalism came at the end of the twentieth century and in the early years of the twenty-first century.21 In the literature, regionalization has come to be understood as a set of processes that contribute to the economic homogeneity of a region through the greater division of labor,22 and more intensive links between neighboring countries.23

In this context, it was understood that once the intensive development of regional connectivity reaches a high level and regionalization itself has sufficiently matured, it has to be managed, including on a multi-pillar basis.24 “Managed” (institutionalized) integration has come to be referred to in the literature as regionalism—in contrast to “unmanaged” (uninstitutionalized) integration, which has been associated with regionalization. In this usage, regionalization was seen as a kind of early phase and “objective prerequisite” for regionalism. Some papers have specified that regionalization predominantly reflects private sector activity, while regionalism is a combination of “grassroots” economic activity of entrepreneurial capital with purposeful state action. Meanwhile, an analysis of word usage based on comparison across a wide range of publications from the 2000s shows that, in fact, when describing the situation outside Europe, most authors use the terms “regionalization” and “regionalism” to refer to the same group of processes and phenomena that European studies classify as integration issues. Until the 1990s, non-European politicians (for example, those in East Asia) followed academics in avoiding the term “integration,” which was common in post-war Western Europe. Perhaps because the term “integration,” as interpreted by Europeanists, quite clearly suggested a move

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toward supranationalism, while people in Asia did not like supranationalism because it was associated with the power of a government that was “not their own” and therefore with a colonial past. Countries in Asia or Latin America tended to favor combining the idea of regional cooperation with that of a strong home state—and economic liberalization with economic nationalism. At the beginning of the twentyfirst century, however, the fear of using the term “integration” outside Europe has been overcome, and it has begun to appear regularly not only in academic research, but also in speeches and official documents referring to processes in various parts of the world—in East Asia, Latin and North America, and even in Africa. It is important to note that the academic literature of the 2000s does not show any attempt to identify, i.e., to point out the similarity between the integration processes in the European Union and other integration associations. On the contrary, almost all researchers of regional versions of integration analyze their differences with EU integration in depth and in detail.

Important

What is new about the bibliographic situation is that (using the logic of natural science) regional variations of integration are no longer seen as heterogeneous phenomena. Consequently, a general scholarly context of regional studies has finally begun to take shape, in which the North American, East Asian and Latin American models of integration development can be understood as a truly global and general scholarly phenomenon, even if it has distinct regional features.25

New Integration Theories The turn of the twenty-first century saw a veritable explosion of individual and collective studies in the specialist literature, where leading foreign experts on integration, including European integration,26 essentially rejected the idea of the universal explanatory value of theories based on the experience of the European Union.27 A rather large group of

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foreign scholars28 has begun to cautiously construct concepts aimed at understanding the unique European experience in the context of integration development in other parts of the world.29 It was certainly not an attempt to “downplay” the importance of the European integration phenomenon, but the authors clearly sought to include phenomena from other parts of the world into the scope of “integration science.” The body of literature and the hypotheses, observations and explanations it contains, which grew out of these findings in the 1990s, have been collectively referred to as the “theories of new regionalism” (TNR). Based on their analysis of the terms “regionalism,” “regionalization” and “integration,” they highlighted the essential similarity of these concepts, underlining the fundamental homogeneity of the processes they describe, and outlined opportunities for a comparative analysis of the experience of inter-state cooperation in different parts of the world. From this perspective, integration in the European Union started to look like a special case of regionalism. According to researchers, the Western European experience “has lost the characteristics of a normative model, becoming a reference point for the private institution-building efforts of some inter-state groupings.”30 The arguments offered by the adherents of the theories of new regionalism can be divided into two main groups. First, regionalism, being a purely endogenous process, acquires unique features in each part of the world under the influence of economic, socio-cultural, political and historical peculiarities of a particular region.31 Second, the world of the second half of the last century, in which Western European integration emerged, is fundamentally different from the modern world, in which similar situations are irreproducible.32 An original work by the Swedish author Björn Hettne33 on Asian integration processes stands out among the studies in this field.34 Hettne’s approach significantly reduces the normative rigidity of integration criteria, which are usually postulated in the older European theories. In parallel, a prominent Russian expert on European integration Olga Butorina pointed out that if we evaluate regional integration in terms of European integration criteria, “… NAFTA is helplessly stuck at the initial stage, and ASEAN is only approaching it.”35 In addition to Hettne’s studies, it is worth mentioning a fundamental collective work edited by Cornell University Professor T. J. Pempel,36 in which an attempt was made to systematize the criteria of integration,

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bringing together economic, historical, political, cultural and psychological aspects of analyzing regional formats of multilateral cooperation. The authors point to “unique, incomparable geopolitical conditions in which regional integration impulses were born” in Europe and Asia, while highlighting the need to understand both examples of integration as related or at least parallel and theoretically compatible, allowing them to be considered in a single analytical context.

Important

In the literature of the 2000s, there has been a shift away from absolutizing the “normativity” of the European integration experience. They consider NAFTA, ASEAN and sometimes Mercosur on a par with the European Union, although no one questions the quantitative and qualitative superiority and the degree of maturity of the European integration form (“integration type”).

We have already mentioned the researcher Mark Beeson,37 and his work, which builds on the approach of Björn Hettne, stands out among the deluge of new publications for its fresh new interpretation. It is also worth mentioning the excellent logical, though somewhat sketchy, summary history of Pacific integration initiatives by the American researcher Ellen Frost. Other interesting works that are worth a mention include that of Peter Katzenstein,38 who argues against the “classical” five-part scheme proposed back in 1961 by the Hungarian-American theorist Béla Balassa on the sequential evolution from a free trade area through a customs union and a common market to full economic and political integration.39 At the same time, it is important to give credit to Balassa’s foresight: when his book was published, he had not yet seen the key outcomes of integration in Western Europe. However, it cannot be overlooked that, while formally claiming to create a general theory of integration, he could not have reached the level of a truly universal generalization in the early 1960s, before the initial results of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The excessive preoccupation of his followers with stadial determinism has largely paralyzed both the formation of a general theory of integration and the scientific understanding of its regional varieties. The five-part formula offered by Balassa was so much to the liking of

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researchers that they seem to have stopped noticing the inconsistency of its provisions with the real EU experience (let alone other centers of integration). Even today, almost 50 years later, it remains the most developed version of regional economic integration. In contrast to Balassa’s determinism, Katzenstein comes up with a more flexible criterion complex. Katzenstein’s approach is largely free of formalism and “economic bias.” It significantly extends the scope of comparison and increases the possibility to see the features of universal trends in regionally specific phenomena. From a bibliographical point of view, the assessments offered in the above-mentioned works show that, despite the abundance of books published in the European Union that focus on the analysis of its integration experience, a rather large group of scholars, including the authors of European origin (Björn Hettne and Mark Beeson, for example) who overcome methodological limitations of the Eurocentric paradigm of analysis, has generally developed within the school of integration studies. The authors of this group view the phenomenon of inter-state rapprochement, for example in East Asia, as a variant of integration, albeit different from the European type. Judging by the literature of the last 20 years, integration outside Europe is not just a reality, but a reality that has been quite well studied in its many specific aspects, although not understood in terms of the general “regional integration” concept. Regional types and subspecies of integration are not only possible, researchers and observers argue—rather, they emerge as distinctive models and develop in accordance with them, yielding real benefits in terms of stabilizing the regional order and ensuring the economic prosperity of the peoples.

Important

The European Union’s “intellectual monopoly” on the understanding and interpretation of integration outside the European Union is falling apart. Research on the European Union constitutes only a part, albeit a significant one, of the general flow of academic studies on the phenomenon of inter-state integration.

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Research tends to focus more on the effectiveness of local forms of integration and their governance mechanisms, rather than on the degree of replication of European institutions or the relationship between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (both of which are unique European phenomena and of little use for inter-regional comparisons). In terms of content, the starting point of the theories of new regionalism is to distinguish the types of integration according to the scope of convergence and to justify the difference in approaches to their assessment.40 This usually refers to economic, political, socio-cultural and security integration. Since the forms and ways of assessing economic integration tend to overlap between different authors (in terms of the share of intra-regional trade, mutual investment and financial coordination), the European Union, NAFTA, Mercosur, the Southern African Customs Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA) and the APEC forum are all mentioned along the same lines. At the same time, according to another “revisionist” scholar, Christopher Dent, an isolated analysis of these aspects of integration is not productive, since in practice, the development of one depends directly on the maturity of the other. In East Asia, for example, economic integration cannot proceed successfully without the formation of sustainable political coordination mechanisms, which are in turn difficult to imagine given the existing levels of mistrust in the security sphere and weak regional identities. However, deepening economic interdependence could move the region’s countries toward closer political cooperation.41 Interestingly, this reasoning fits into the logic of one of the most classic paradigms of integration analysis—neofunctionalism. In discussing the prerequisites for convergence, Hettne suggests that integration develops due to objective factors of cohesion. This includes ethnic composition, language, religion, culture, history, and an awareness of shared history in the social sphere; trade, investment, and finance in the economic sphere; regime type and ideology in the political sphere; and regional institutions in the organizational sphere. An important feature of TNR is the active use of social constructivism.42 Following Alexander Wendt, the representatives of the latest integration concepts believe that regional identity emerges not within clearly defined geographical, ethnic or linguistic boundaries, but rather within the space where the most intensive economic, political and social contacts are concentrated.43

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Echoing them, Andrew Hurrell argues that the initial prerequisites for integration could be the perceived region and shared identity.44 The former delineates the geographical limits of a region, while the latter indicates the formation of a regional identity, whereby the inhabitants of a given region separate themselves from the inhabitants of other regions (negative identity) and/or key development issues are treated largely in the same way (positive identity). The authors are not unanimous in their interpretations of the phenomenon of identity, let alone optimistic. Building on Benedict Anderson’s concept, who noted the difficulty of creating “imagined communities” (communities linked by ties of shared identity, i.e., selfperception), even within the framework of the nation-state political space,45 back in 1983, Beeson argues that this task is becoming almost unrealistic in, say, the relatively newly liberated countries of Southeast Asia, let alone the whole region, where the formation of a common identity is hampered by lingering inter-state tensions. He noted that France’s refusal to support the draft Constitutional Treaty and the struggles over Turkey’s membership in the European Union served as a serious reminder of how difficult it is to resolve issues of national and regional identity, even in regions with a long tradition of successful cooperation.46 In an effort to formalize the discourse on identity, Hurrell has tried to flesh out the “vision of the region” concept, proposing two differentiating criteria: (1) a region should play an important role in the relationship of each individual country to the rest of the world; (2) a region’s level should form a platform for the coordination of political courses within the region itself.47 The effects of integration are felt if, through the regional level, each state is able to have a cumulatively greater influence on the world stage and address domestic and regional problems more effectively than each of them individually.

Finally, the theories of new regionalism provide for a very productive division, in analytical terms, into de jure and de factointegration. The phenomenon of de jure integration, which refers to formalized cooperation, is evidently mostly attributed to the European Union. East Asia is viewed mainly in the categories of de facto integration.48 A closer look at the concept of TNR sheds light on the core differences between de facto and de jure integration. De facto integration—even if the grouping is

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formalized legally—remains such as long as there is no consensus on the geographical scope of the grouping. Thus, the geographical framework of the European Union took shape a long time ago, and the stages of its enlargement were rather measures to extend the influence of the original “six” countries to the whole of this geographical space. This is why, for example, the question of Turkey’s accession to the European Union has provoked so much debate and strong public dissent: there seems to be continued uncertainty about Turkey’s affiliation with the European Union’s geographical space, with fears among old members that Turkish accession could shake this space or destroy it completely. In East Asia, the final choice of a particular geographical framework does not seem to have taken place. Struggles over the Pacific and continental vectors of integration, embodied, respectively, in the APEC projects, whose participants can hardly be kept within one regional identity in principle, and ASEAN+3, are hindering the institutional structuring of this space.49 The proposed East Asian Community (EAC) project may to some extent signal the crystallization of the geographical basis of East Asian regionalism, but so far only “in draft form” and in the minds of local leaders. In any case, there is clearly an attempt to form a general theory of integration among researchers focusing on the theories of new regionalism. To a certain extent, this is justified: the concept of new regionalism does provide a basis and methodology for comparing groupings with each other and in this sense, it is useful for scholars. ∗ ∗ ∗ Contemporary integration processes are a major global trend. The number and types of economic blocs are growing, new integration programs are being put forward, and the range of concepts for building integration and proto-integration communities of various institutional forms is expanding, including the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), MERCOSUR, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). The diversity of regional versions sometimes prevents integration processes from being viewed as typologically similar. At the same time, judging from the literature of the first decade of the twenty-first century, which had to respond to the diversity of regional

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versions of integration interactions, there was a conscious demand for theories postulating an increasing plurality of viable regional integration models and options in the 2000s and arguing that the European experience is insufficient as the basis of a universal concept of international integration.

Keywords Integration, regionalism, European Union, theories of new regionalism. Self-Test 1. What impact have natural science interventions had on the development of integration theory? 2. How have ethnographic studies contributed to the study of integration processes? 3. How original are the “new regionalism theories”? 4. How do the concepts of “integration,” “regionalism” and “regionalization” relate in contemporary academic discourse? 5. What are the similarities and differences between the European, North American and East Asian versions of integration? 6. What typologies of integration are present in the current literature?

Notes 1. M.V. Strezhneva, The EU and the CIS: A Comparative Analysis of Institutions (Moscow, 1999), 42–43. 2. A second major intervention by the natural sciences in the study of interstate relations can be seen in the emergence in the 1960s and 1970s of a school of “modernists”—mathematicians, programmers and physicists who believed that their methods would bring the missing element of precision and verifiability to the science of international relations. 3. M.V. Strezhneva, op. cit., 5–11. 4. Jonathan Howard, Darwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 134. 5. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York, 1987). 6. V.G. Fedotova, Modernization of the “Other” Europe (Moscow, 1997), 44–109. 7. Béla Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Greenwood Press Reprint, 1982). 8. This refers to the classification of regionalism described in Chapter 2 into first generation (integrated supranational regionalism, successful only in the form of the European Union), second generation (open regionalism, implemented in APEC) and third generation, meaning the development of

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12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

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22. 23. 24. 25.

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inter-regional links (for example, ASEM dialogue as a consultation format established within the EU–ASEAN relationship). Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (London: Steven, 1950). J.E. Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Franz Gehrels, “Customs Unions from a Single-Country Viewpoint,” Review of Economic Studies, no. 49 (1956): 696–712; Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Equilibrium Analysis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970); Béla Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Boston, MA: Irwin, 1961); Michael Michaely, “On Customs Unions and the Gains from Trade,” The Economic Journal 75, no. 299 (1965), 577–583. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Translated by K.A. Timiryazev with corrections and indexes, ed. by Acad. N.I. Vavilov. Series: Classics of Natural Science (Moscow; Leningrad: Selkhozgiz, 1935). Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Selected Works (Moscow, 1959). Gregor Mendel, Experiments on Plant Hybridization (Moscow, 1965). See Werner S. Landecker, Types of Integration and their Measurement (New York, 1999), 322–340. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York, 1981). Yulian Bromley, Ethnos and Ethnography (Moscow, 1973). M.A. Khrustalev, Methodology of Applied Political Analysis (Moscow, 2010). V.A. Tishkov, Requiem for Ethnicity: Studies in Socio-Cultural Anthropology (Moscow: Nauka, 2003). Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia (New York, 2007), 5. From the sixteenth century onwards, with a frequency of about once a century, and even more frequently towards the twentieth century, elaborate projects of the invariant “United States of Europe” emerged among West-European intellectuals. See: Y.A. Borko, From the European Idea to a United Europe (Moscow, 2003). Barry Buzan, and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003). See, for example, Ellen Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 1–15. Christopher Dent, East Asian Regionalism (London, New York: Routledge, 2008), 8. Ibid., 16–21. William Wallace, “Regionalism in Europe: Model or Exception,” in Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International

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28.

29.

30.

31.

32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

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Order, ed. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 207–227. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Regionalism and Asia,” New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 353–368. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Björn Hettne, András Inotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism (London: Macmillan, 1999). Björn Hettne, and Fredrik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000), 457–474; William Wallace, Regional Integration: The West European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994). Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics, no. 44 (April 1992): 466–496. Milner emphasized the fundamental closed nature of Cold War regional structures, which has become blurred under the impact of globalization. Hence the concept of “open regionalism.”. Heribert Dieter, “Report on East Asian Integration: Opportunities and Obstacles for Enhanced Economic Cooperation,” Notre Europe Studies and Research Paper. Paris, 2006. No. 47; Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organisation, no. 58 (2004): 239–275. Björn Hettne, and Fredrik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000), 457–474; William Wallace, Regional Integration: The West European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994). Milner, op. cit. Björn Hettne, “Beyond the New Regionalism,” New Political Economy 10, no. 4 (1999); Björn Hettne, and Fredrik Soderbaum, “The New Regionalism Approach,” Politiea, no. 17 (March 1999); Björn Hettne, and Fredrik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000). Björn Hettne, “Globalisation and the New Regionalism: the Second Great Transformation,” in Globalism and the New Regionalism, ed. Björn Hettne, András Inotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel (London: Macmillan, 1999), 3–24. O. Butorina, “The Concept of Regional Integration: New Approaches,” Kosmopolis 13, no. 3 (2005). T. J. Pempel (ed.), Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, New York, 2005).

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37. Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 38. Peter J. Katzenstein, European Enlargement and Institutional Hypocrisy (Oxford, 2003). 39. Béla Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Boston, MA: Irwin, 1961). 40. Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgot, “Studying Regions: Learning From the Old, Constructing the New,” New Political Economy 3, no. 5 (2000): 333–352. 41. Christopher Dent, East Asian Regionalism (London, New York: Routledge, 2008), 8. 42. Its elements were also used in classical integration theories. For example, Karl Deutsch argued that the intensification of contacts between the societies of the countries that make up the region contributes to the development of the so-called “we-concept,” i.e., a sense of belonging to the community. See: Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). 43. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. 44. Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” Review of International Studies, no. 21 (1995): 331–358. 45. Benedict Anderson (London: Verso, 1983). 46. Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia (New York, 2007), 6. 47. Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” Review of International Studies, no. 21 (1995): 337. 48. Björn Hettne, and Fredrik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” in New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy (London, 2002), 41. 49. Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia (New York, 2007), 7.

CHAPTER 9

Contemporary Conflicts: Typology and Characteristics Andrey Sushentsov

The central theme of the theory of international relations is the problem of uncertainty in the motives that underlie the behavior of nations. It stems from the still not fully understood nature of human consciousness and the multi-component structure of motivation behind human behavior. As research shows, it is still difficult for modern science to predict international relations, despite the expansion of cognitive science and big data tools in the field of research on the motives of human behavior.1 The inadequacy of socio-humanitarian knowledge of man and the state is coupled with the destructive power of the human race, capable of destroying itself several times over in the course of a conflict. This insoluble paradox led scientists to a disappointing conclusion: “God gave physics the easy problems.”2 The situation is aggravated by the fact that the modern international political system is in flux. Political leaders and researchers in the field of

A. Sushentsov (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_9

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international relations are experiencing a subjective feeling of profound destabilization all over the world. The structure of international relations is progressively weakening, not only and not so much in institutional terms, but rather in the broader sense of stable power balances, social norms and perceptions, status hierarchies, and patterns of action.3 While anarchy has always been an intrinsic feature of international relations, it is making itself felt again after a very long period when world politics was highly structured around the Soviet–American confrontation. A structural crisis creates conditions for the aggravation of international conflicts. This manifests itself in two ways. First, the strategic autonomy of actors, especially medium-sized powers that have enough resources to conduct an independent foreign policy, is increasing. Second, the structural crisis makes it difficult to set foreign policy goals. The growing number of provocations, both informational and armed. The disruption of normal diplomatic communication. The blurring of the line between foreign and domestic policies and between foreign policy strategy and tactics. All these are symptoms of this crisis. The popularity of such concepts as “post-truth” and “hybrid conflict” reveals the inability of states to find solid ground on which to build a rational and long-term foreign policy strategy, as well as the inability of researchers to develop a conceptual apparatus capable of conceptualizing the current state of affairs. This chapter explores approaches to analyzing the motivations of parties to contemporary international conflicts.

The Bibliographic Context of Conflict Research The realists describe motivations for conflict behavior in terms of instincts: man is aggressive by nature, it is a feature of the biological species of humans. The liberals believe that conflict is an excess in the process of cooperation. The constructivists argue that a conflict is motivated by differences in the values of the parties. And Marxist’s view conflicts as a protest, a response to unfavorable external factors. In the traditional schools, the set of motivations for conflict behavior is narrow, ranging between fear and pride-fueled ambition.

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Important

In the twentieth century, the mutual behavior of states was based on the analysis of security risks, factoring in fears and manipulating them, unlike, say, in the Middle Ages, when the range of motivations was wider and included the motives of dynastic solidarity, religious intolerance and messianism, knightly valor and altruism. In this sense, the conflicts of the twentieth century were “poorer” in nature.

The Russian realist and conflictology expert Victor Kremenyuk identified two motives for the conflict behavior of modern states: the struggle for survival and the ambitions of rulers.4 The realists believe that fear is the main motivating force in the behavior of states. It is no coincidence that the concept of “balance of power” primarily involves balancing mutual threats.5 “Fear” defines the semantic core of the doctrines of “deterrence” and “mutually assured destruction.” From the point of view of analyzing the motives of conflict behavior, the structural variations of realism are less useful than the classical ones. The neorealists, following Kenneth Waltz, are taking a step back from the level of “participants” in the system, believing it to be insignificant for the system as a whole.6 The same feature is common to the structural versions of liberal theory, in contrast to its classical variations, which emphasize various hypotheses on the motives underlying the behavior of conflicting parties.7 The tendency to underestimate the level of actors is criticized by the constructivists, who believe that the absolutization of structuralism impoverishes the theory of international relations by dehumanizing it. The modernist theories reinvigorated the structuralist constructs with their new emphasis on the relationship between the subjective and the objective in international politics.8 In this sense, the discussion of conflict resolution by political means proved fruitful, resulting, among other things, in Robert Jervis’ concept based on the phenomenon of “perception.”9 The American expert on conflict J. David Singer also called for a comparison of the approaches of the humanities and social sciences to the problem of conflicts.10 In particular, he advocated the study of the conflict from the perspective of general and social psychology.11

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Foreign schools of psychology—psychoanalysis and humanistic philosophy—have developed tools to analyze conflicts at the level of the individual, while behaviorism came up with hypotheses about the macrosocial reasons for conflict behavior. In the 1950s and 1970s, three approaches to examining conflict behavior emerged. The first viewed conflict as a result of natural instincts, a person’s reaction to the impossibility of fulfilling a desire (frustration).12 The second treated conflict as a pathology, a case of the disruption of inhibitory mechanisms in the human psyche, an excess of irrational behavior.13 The third approach considered as pathological only stable forms of conflict behavior based on the motives of “deficiency” or “growth”—this was the basis of Abraham Maslow’s concept.14 The use of his method with regard to the forms of conflict behavior is of considerable interest since this task has not yet become a topic of international political research. An attempt to create a similar model based on the methodology of behaviorism was made in the 1960s by the American conflictology expert Ken Boulding.15 Following the logic of humanistic psychology, Maslow offered an alternative explanation of the reasons for behavior in relation to psychoanalysis and behaviorism. He distinguished two types of behavior—behavior based on growth (natural), which reflects individual personality and has no goal—and functional, i.e., purposeful, behavior. In Maslow’s concept, human motivation appears as a hierarchy of needs. The lower (basic) needs must be reasonably satisfied before the higher ones. In the hierarchy of needs, physiological needs come first, followed by safety and security, loyalty and love, self-respect, and, finally, self-actualization. This concept corresponded in general with the hypothesis of the hierarchy of human needs that was proposed in the early 1990s by the American conflict expert John Burton.16 He viewed human behavior through the prism of (1) physiological needs; (2) social, political, and economic aspirations; and (3) values—cultural determinants. According to Burton, motives at the value level determine the key parameters of conflict management, the degree of intensity of confrontation, and the propensity of the parties to compromise. In his book Motivation and Personality, first published in 1954, Abraham Maslow introduced the concept of two categories of biological motives. The former had as its source a feeling of scarcity, a deficit of something that was deemed necessary for the survival of the individual. The latter was driven by the person’s desire for abundance, growth, or

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self-propagation. For the convenience of the presentation, we will talk here about deficiency and growth motivation. The former is interpreted in the literature as aimed at reducing the tension caused by the failure to satisfy one of the person’s basic needs.17 The latter is aimed at self-mobilization in order to find and experience new and exciting experiences. Maslow believed that only the deficiency motive, which he considered the most distressing, was capable of causing conflicts. However, it is obvious that a growth motive also has the potential for conflictogenity, which can be realized under certain circumstances.

Important

Conflict can arise if the deficiency motive begins to dominate the person’s behavior in a pathological form. But conflict is also probable if the person tries to relieve the internal tension of self-mobilization (the growth motive) by taking it out on others.

For example, this will happen in the case of an unlimited desire of a person to accumulate goods in an amount greater than that required to meet the basic need. Certain parallelism in this sense is represented by the classification of motives and interests of state actors, applied in the works of Russian system-structuralist Mark Khrustalev.18 Proceeding from the logic of conclusions on the nature of human motivation, we can clarify the typology of motives for conflict behavior. Conflict behavior is understood in this chapter as a mode of action in which a conflict is conceived and actually serves as the main tool to achieve the goal. The proposed definition is evaluatively neutral and close to the term “conflict conduct ” (behavior during a conflict). It is implied that the impact of conflict can be both destructive and constructive.19 Conflict can both oppose cooperation and be a form of it. The degree of awareness of the motives of conflict behavior is important. Rationally accepted, it can be the basis of a successful strategy. With a non-rational approach, conflict behavior is a source of unpredictable and often mutually destructive consequences. With excessive motivation, the probability of maintaining a rational approach to behavior in conflict is higher. The self-affirming idea of “I

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am in control” prevails. North Korea, for example, refrains from starting a war against the South, although the threat is constantly there. With the deficiency motive, (self-)critical thinking is blunted. A single goal and the justifying principle of “I am responding” (defensive) dominate. In such a case, a radicalization of the political course is likely at the macro level, for example, in the event of a failed military campaign (Iraq in the 2003 war), and at the micro level—in the general exasperation and dehumanization of the behavior of any armed group (the conflicts in Karabakh, Bosnia and Kosovo). There is reason to believe that the potential for rational influence on behavior based on deficiency motivation is smaller than that motivated by growth. The United States and the Soviet Union sought expansion but did not risk attacking each other. Mutual dislike did not supplant the rational awareness on the part of the superpower leaders of the international reality. Managing a conflict with deficiency-motivated behavior is difficult because the person is focused on a goal that, in his eyes, is vitally important. In this case, it is possible to manage the conflict mainly by freezing it or, on the contrary, by escalating it indefinitely until the source of the conflict is destroyed. The clarification of the term “conflict” helps us to streamline the existing classifications of the types of conflict behavior in international politics. The logic, in this case, may lie in an attempt to typologize on the basis of goals (motives) of actions by conflicting parties.20

Important

A review of the existing opinions and a generalization of patterns that have not yet been reflected in them, suggests the possibility of identifying four motivational types of contemporary international conflicts: resource-based, game-playing, demonstrative, and deviant.

Accordingly, the group of resource-based conflicts includes the subtype of conflicts for leadership, understood as a comprehensive resource. The group of demonstrative conflicts is subdivided into the penitentiary, protest, and affective subtypes, and the group of game-playing conflicts includes the subtype of provocative conflict behavior (see the Table 9.1).

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Table 9.1 Typology of conflict behavior in International Relations Subtype 1

Motivation 2

Definition 3

Examples 4

Resource-based

Being

Classic competition of nations for resources and territory

Deficiency

The desire to compensate for the shortage of foreign policy resources by directly seizing someone else’s resources or “borrowing” them from powerful patrons Manifests itself in the form of interstate competition for primacy. Little depends on the nature of the participants—it also exists within the framework of integration Ethno-political conflicts, as well as conflicts of large countries with small or split actors (terrorist networks, guerrilla movements) The desire of the conflicting parties to show off the formal aspects of the confrontation, contributing to the release of accumulated tension. The goal is to keep the conflict within certain limits for as long as possible Avoiding confrontation of the resource-based type due to the difference in potentials by transferring conflict into the game-playing channel

Problems securing raw materials, geo-economic bridgeheads, and territorial space for countries with fast-growing populations The annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1989. The foreign policies of Georgia, the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine towards the United States in the 2000–2020s US–Russia relations within the CIS zone

Leadership

Being

Deficiency

Game-playing

Being

Deficiency

The escalation of ethno-political conflicts and asymmetrical confrontations in the 1990s and 2020s The confrontation between China and Taiwan (“stable instability”). The relations between Pakistan and India, especially after 1998. Russia–Turkey relations over Syria

Ukraine’s foreign policy towards Russia after 2014

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Subtype 1

Motivation 2

Definition 3

Provoking

Being

The task of the initiator is to stimulate developments, bargaining over the new rules of “contractual confrontation”

Deficiency

Penitentiary

Being

Deficiency

Protest

Being

Deficiency

Examples 4

The policies pursued by Iran and North Korea. Libya under Gaddafi—before its reconciliation with the EU in the early 2000s. Azerbaijan’s strategy on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 Driven by the ideas of The actions by the hopelessness and the Japanese kamikaze and the absence of other options SS Nazi troops in the final for resolving traumatic stages of the Second situations World War Uses punishment as a tool The NATO attacks on of rational management of Yugoslavia in the late the opponent’s behavior 1990s. Both US military campaigns against Iraq. The US and EU policies of anti-Russian sanctions Punishment of the guilty, The policy of the Nazi which is embodied in ideas Germany between the two of vengeance and political world wars. The terrorist revenge ideology of radical Islamists Conflict is seen as a means The rebuff by Soviet of protecting one’s interests Russia of foreign intervention during the Civil War. The Soviet policy during the first phase of the Second World War (1939–1941). The long life of the Jackson–Vanik amendment Conflict as a response to The US strategy of unavoidable and “discarding communism” undesirable changes in the 1950s and “regime change” in the 2000s. Attempts by the Soviet representatives to boycott UN Security Council meetings that coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950

(continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Subtype 1

Motivation 2

Definition 3

Examples 4

Affective

Being

Excessive response to accidental or insignificant irritation, provoking actions of unexpected and disproportionate magnitude Although the person’s purpose is vital and their actions are related to self-preservation, they are limited and inconsistent

The US invasion of Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001

Deficiency

Pathological

Being

Deficiency

The impulsive actions of the State Committee on the State of Emergency during the attempted coup in the USSR in 1991. The behaviour of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the clashes in Kiev in February 2014 Conflict as a result of Politics based on radical pathology. The person nationalism. The actions of resorts to pain-motivated exalted leaders like violence, which takes on an Muammar Gaddafi, independent meaning Mikhail Saakashvili, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Hugo Chavez The person is imbued with The concept of “super an unquenchable desire for security” and security. They are “securitization.” The subconsciously looking for policies of the Baltic States a protector, an ally to lean in the 2000s–2020s on, but cannot find one

The resource-based type of conflict behavior characterizes the desire of the actor or actors to achieve direct or indirect redistribution of the resource sought in their favor. A modern reading of this thesis goes far beyond the spirit and letter of the debate about competition for raw materials, fuel, and markets. The resources that can generate conflicts today are both tangible and intangible goods: on the one hand, for example, the resource of subjugating the economic and production potential of a foreign state, the human resource, the territory itself, and its minerals; on the other hand, the resource of international influence, the domestic political mobilization

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of one’s home country. Let us assume that US–Russia relations within the zone of current and former CIS countries represent a conflict between the two powers over the resource of influence on these states and can hardly be understood in any other way. Since global and regional leadership (or rather, the formal and informal status associated with its acquisition) is itself a comprehensive resource, inter-leadership competition in international relations at all levels is a variant of the modern resource-based conflict. The resource-based type of conflict behavior is used consciously and is based on calculation. An excessive form of this type of conflict is the classic struggle for resources and “living space.” Russian political analyst Eduard Batalov mentions in this connection primarily “… the problems of securing raw material resources and in the first place—the interests related to energy resources; the problems of securing geo-economic bridgeheads that guarantee sustainable and relatively safe and cheap access to these resources; the problems of providing living space for countries with rapidly growing populations.”21 The following types of conflict are distinguished: demographic—the fight for qualified personnel (the “brain drain”); and the fight for the most favorable position in the international division of labor (who produces and exports, and who buys technology). The transformed variant of resourcebased conflict is predominantly an economic and political struggle of the most developed countries for the stability of the structure of the world economy in which they have historically occupied favorable positions. Victor Kremenyuk observed that “the struggle for the stability of the [world] system itself causes destabilization.”22 If the deficiency motive dominates, conflict can arise as one party attempts to “compensate” for this deficiency through direct occupation (for example, the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1989). In domestic politics, the deficiency motive can manifest itself, for example, in the form of showcase repressions, when they are used for the purpose of political mobilization (“beating the dog before the lion”).23 A sophisticated form of resource-based conflict dominated by the deficiency motive can be seen in the attempts by some small and mediumsized states to “replenish” their limited potential (influence, for example), so to speak, at the expense of the resource belonging to their powerful foreign patrons. This was the type of foreign policy behavior displayed by Georgia, the Baltic states, and partly Poland and Ukraine in the 2000s and 2010s. In resolving their real and imagined contradictions with Russia,

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they regularly tried to “join” the diplomatic resources of the United States and other NATO member states. The leadership subtype of resource-based conflict, of course, deserves special attention. It is not simply based on the struggle of ambitions and the overly emotional reactions of elite groups. In leadership conflicts, whatever their formal theoretical and philosophical basis, there is always a resource component. For a long time it was not recognized as such by analysts because it was relatively late that the concept of organizational resource itself came into their focus of their attention.24 From this point of view, leadership is first and foremost about possessing it. A growth-motivated form of leadership conflict manifests itself in the form of interstate competition. Russian international relations scholar Alexei Bogaturov pointed out that “leadership ambitions are characteristic of a huge range of countries, and jealousy of others’ leadership is as conflictogenic as the aggressive reactions of leaders to the attempts of outsiders attempts to challenge this leadership.”25 This type of conflict has little to do with the nature of the participants, in the sense that it also exists as part of integration.

Important

The conflicting nature of contemporary world development lies not so much in the multidirectional and non-linear nature of development, but rather in the fact that, after the collapse of the USSR, all this multidirectionality for the first time became part of a single, emerging global political system.26

The increase in the destructive capacity of the weapons of developed countries is helping to soften their leadership conflict. Mutual military deterrence and intimidation help to shift competition from the militarystrategic to the economic sphere. Conflicts of the leadership subtype dominated by the deficiency motive have historically often taken violent forms. However, in recent decades, power struggles between leading countries have become rare. More often than not, the leader countries use force against clearly weaker countries, or when confronted with non-traditional conflict actors (terrorist networks,

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guerrilla movements, etc.). Hence the explosion of asymmetric conflicts and relevant research in the 1990s and 2010s.27 Included in the conflicts of the leadership subtype is the entire spectrum of ethno-political conflicts and conflicts of self-determination, as well as inter-ethnic conflicts fueled by migration problems. Conflicts between different ethnic groups are most often perceived extremely dramatically by them, as a conflict of values, a struggle for selfpreservation.28 Russian scholar Vladimir Baranovsky wrote that ethnopolitical conflicts “are kneaded on a bizarre mixture of syndromes of mutual rejection, superiority and inferiority complexes, and value incompatibility on a variety of grounds.”29 In international political practice, the game-playing type of conflict persists and continues to evolve and can be interpreted both as a form and as a tool of cooperation. The boundary between conflict and cooperation in such cases is conventional, in the sense that some participants in the system do not seek to excessively reduce the benefits of other participants. Thus, we are not talking about the destruction of the confrontation system. Game-playing conflicts help to release accumulated tension and prevent a real conflict. A game-playing conflict is a conflict that is played by the rules—often unwritten, but respected, nevertheless. One of its accompanying goals may be the feeling of satisfaction from victory (conventional) and the pleasure of demonstrating one’s readiness to fight the opponent. This type of conflict is also based on calculation and interest. The game-playing form of conflict behavior is characterized by the desire of the conflicting parties to show off the formal aspects of confrontation. A typical game-playing situation of this type is the halfcentury-long confrontation between China and Taiwan (“stable instability”). Pakistan–India relations, especially after 1998, can be seen as a more dangerous version of a game-playing conflict.30 Less threatening are the relations between Russia and Turkey regarding Syria, in which neither side can lose face and both rule out a military clash with the other. According to the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, in the most general sense, the moment of game-playing in conflict interaction occurs the minute the warring parties begin to regard each other as an adversary worthy of respect, and the goal of war as a just cause.31 The core of future compromise lies in this reciprocal attitude. Logic tells those in a conflict that if the opponent is worth fighting, then conflict can be avoided. An example of a game-playing conflict can be seen in international security

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cooperation. The American expert on conflict Joseph Grieco, taking a structural approach, argued that this is only possible when each of the participants in the process is equally satisfied.32 Any conflict streamlines relations between the parties along two lines: competition and cooperation. Competition is the conflict content of the relationship, while cooperation forms the framework of the conflict, its structure and rules of behavior. With the mutual game-playing form of conflict behavior, competition ceases to be antagonistic as the parties move from the category of “enemy” to the category of “neither ally nor adversary” (Russia and the United States). Military force ceases to serve only as a means of intimidation, becoming, in part, an object of common concern. The goal of a game-playing conflict interaction is to keep the conflict within strictly defined limits for as long as possible. This observation was scientifically substantiated in the early 1960s in the works by the American psychologist Gordon Allport, who articulated the idea that the means of achieving the goal can replace the goal and itself become a source of satisfaction (thus becoming an end in itself).33 The ontological form of a game-playing conflict is described by the American scholar and politician Henry Kissinger in his famous statement that peace is impossible without balance, and justice without self-restraint.34 The search for conflict management tools in conventionally “stalemate” game situations has yielded the unusual result in the form of the growing trend of game modeling in the strategies of powers in conflict. Thomas Schelling, who explored this theme more thoroughly than anyone else, is the only international relations scholar to have been awarded the Nobel Prize.35 In his 1960 work The Strategy of Conflict, he showed that the factor of uncertainty and the conscious narrowing of one party’s options can play a positive role in terms of conflict management.36 Proceeding from the idea that conflict is ontologically compatible with the formation, maintenance, and development of the political integrity of the community within which it occurs, game-playing conflicts are most suited to the task of institutionalizing a macro-social conflict. The conflict in this case serves as a practical introduction to stability. A variant of the game-playing type of conflict behavior is its provocative subtype, when a party to a potential clash does not aspire to a major war, but rather tries to reveal the intentions of its opponents or induce them

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to engage in tacit or explicit bargaining over what should ideally result in the rules of the forthcoming “contractual confrontation.” With the provocative type of conflict behavior, the task of the “provocateur” is to obtain additional information and stimulate the development of events, playing a game of “trial and error.” The growth motivation is based on calculation and interest, stemming from the need for knowledge and understanding. Examples of this type of behavior are military tactics of combat reconnaissance. In international relations, the Iranian and North Korean governments have been acting provocatively for decades. Libya gravitated toward it for many years under Muammar Gaddafi, until its reconciliation with the EU in the early 2000s. The growth-based provocative type of conflict behavior is at the heart of the plots of many movies about humanity’s first contact with aliens: Earthlings are the first to use force to reveal the aliens’ intentions. This and other similar examples reveal an element of conventional pathology inherent in the way aggressive politicians act, their, as a rule, principled orientation toward increasing military spending. A certain amount of violence is thereby accumulated, and at least some of it must be released. Provocative conflict behavior dominated by the deficiency motive is based on the ideas of hopelessness, the absence of other options for resolving a traumatic situation. It is an unstable, borderline psychological state. According to scholars, examples of this type are the actions by the Japanese kamikaze and the SS Nazi troops in the final stages of the Second World War. A special type of conflict behavior is demonstrative behavior that resembles a struggle for punishing the guilty, a means of negative retribution for misconduct. Such punishment should be obvious to all, flashy in its form (though not always in its results). Only then will the effect of hypothetical learning be achieved, which is one of the most important motives for such conflicts. This type of conflict is related to ethical issues. There are at least three subtypes of demonstrative conflicts. The first of these is the penitentiary type of conflict as such. Retributive conflicts are well known in the West, which upholds the institution of state-like public international law with its inherent formalized systems of encouragement and coercion (the International Court of Justice, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, etc.). Humanitarian interventions and related conflicts are typical penitentiary actions. However, retaliatory conflicts are not unique to the West. China was also involved in them (the war with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in

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1979). Motivations of this kind have repeatedly manifested themselves in conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, wherever elements of archaic tribalism (e.g., the custom of blood feuds or ritual suicide) persist. The being motivation of punitive conflicts uses punishment as a tool for controlling the behavior of actors, which brings it closer to the gameplaying type of conflict behavior. This type may include the type of conflict described by the Russian political scientist Dmitry Feldman as “objectless,” which stems from a violation of moral norms, an attack on personal or public beliefs and perceptions, and a violation of the right to self-determination and the freedom of expression.37 Today, the targets of violence are determined not by ideological or geostrategic considerations, but rather situationally, depending on whether or not certain countries abide by conventionally accepted rules of behavior. The principle of “ethics above the law” began to be effectively asserted in 1943 with the adoption of the Casablanca Declaration, which contained a rule on the punishment of war criminals. Later on, this enabled the question of human rights in certain countries to be placed above the sovereign rights of their governments. In the middle of the twentieth century, penitentiary and restrictive measures of military and economic nature (sanctions and repressions) became part of the political arsenal used by different countries.38 NATO’s attacks on Yugoslavia in the late 1990s were invariably presented as forms of sanctions imposed on a repressive regime that violated human rights. Both US military campaigns against Iraq were characterized by repressive action with elements of a preventive war. The deficiency-motivated type of penitentiary conflicts is embodied in ideas of vengeance and political revenge.39 This type of behavior can be seen in the policies of Nazi Germany between the two world wars and in the half-century-long chronic resentment of radical Islamists toward Israeli governments over the lack of progress in the Middle East settlement. It is telling that the logic of conflict for “just punishment” (for unjust treatment) is widely used by extremists. Osama Bin Laden said of the September 11, 2001 attacks: “What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years.”40 One of the most ideologized subtypes of the penitentiary conflict is the protest conflict. A person involved in this type of conflict views it as a means of protecting his or her interests. We distinguish between passive

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and active forms of protest, but both of them in the eyes of their initiator invariably pursue a negative goal (self-protection). The growth-motivated protest type of behavior represents an “active defense” (the repulsion by the Soviet Russia of intervention during the Civil War, the US strategy to “surround” the USSR, and the policy of the USSR during the first stage of the Second World War). In the same line are the attempted international economic sanctions against the Soviet Union following the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1982, and such odd tensions as the long life of the Jackson–Vanik amendment or the delaying of Russia’s accession to the WTO (in fact, implicitly obstructing it). The deficiency motive dominates behavior that is caused by a reaction to unavoidable and undesirable changes. Passive forms of this kind of conflict are addressed in the works of the Princeton school of “resistance studies” led by James Scott.41 In domestic politics, passive behavioral strategies of conflict include such forms of action as absenteeism (the refusal to vote) or sabotage of elections. An unsuccessful form of such conflicts in diplomatic practice were the attempts by Soviet representatives to boycott the UN Security Council sessions that coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the refusal of the Soviet delegation to sign the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951. Active political forms of protest conflicts dominated by deficiency motivation in the 2000s can be seen in the attempts by US Republican administrations to introduce the ideas of changing regimes whose policies do not correspond to the American understanding of international norms or the protection of human rights into world practice. In the historical context, this is the strategy of “discarding communism” that was pursued by the United States in the 1950s. A layer of active conflict of this kind borders and overlaps with pathological behavior. We are talking about protest-motivated terrorism on the part of marginalized groups in peripheral countries. Incompetence and the inability to use the legal means for satisfying their interests push the desperate to commit crimes, which places terrorism in the category of political-psychological and social-pathological phenomena.42 But before we proceed to examine this, it is important to mention one more subspecies of demonstrative conflict—the affective one. This manifests as a reflex, an irrational hyper-reaction to a relatively random or even insignificant stimulus, which provokes an action of unexpected and disproportionate magnitude. In all of the known cases, the affective

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reaction was related to the person’s desire to make the strongest possible impression on his fellow citizens43 and/or global public opinion. Growth-motivated affective conflicts are more dangerous than those motivated by conventional deficiency. Although the purpose of such behavior is not vital, the injured party’s “righteous anger” can lead to a grotesquely inadequate response to annoyance. A good example here is the behavior of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. From today’s perspective, the US attack on the Taliban looks very much like a predetermination driven by the conscious desire of the Republican establishment to show the world who was in charge. In this sense, “if the Taliban did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them.” Yet it is also clear that Washington was determined in principle to show force anywhere in the world. But there was no understanding of when, where, or against whom such a demonstration would be required. In this sense, the situation with the war in Afghanistan was spontaneous, and the decision to start it was a reaction of affective conflict behavior. Reflecting the sentiments of much of the American public, Bruce Hoffman, a leading RAND analyst and noted counterterrorism expert, criticized the principle of “proportionality” in responding to terrorist attacks, giving an example of overtly “affective analytics”: “It calls, unquestionably, for a proportionate response of unparalleled determination and focus such as we see today in our actions both in the United States and abroad, as well as one that utilizes the full range of formidable tools at our disposal — diplomatic, military, and economic.”44 Deficiency-motivated affective conflicts are less dangerous. Although the goal of parties involved in such a type of conflict is vital, their actions are related to self-preservation and are often limited and inconsistent. An example of this behavior is the impulsive yet unprepared actions of the State Committee on the State of Emergency during the attempted coup d’état in the USSR in 1991. Had the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 actually used WMDs against the advancing “nations of goodwill” troops, it could have been qualified as deficiency-motivated affective conflict. Whatever the motivation, affective conflicts are hard to manage. Their impact on the stability of the international system can be described using the metaphor of a “bull in a china shop” since this type of behavior is based on irrational reactions. But it can be relatively easy to manage affective reactions if they do not escalate into overtly deviant conflict behavior.

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This type represents conflict as a result of pathology. The person in such conflict decides to use pain-motivated violence, which takes on an independent meaning. As a rule, such conflict is very much connected with the personality of the leader of the respective country, his or her mental constitution and personality structure. The subject demonstrates deviant (pathological) reactions when they feel that they are in a situation in which he or she cannot resolve the problem, but very much wants to or believes that they must resolve it.45 The pathological type of conflict behavior is value-motivated, and it is, therefore, difficult to influence it. Growth-motived pathological conflicts are very dangerous, even though their goal is not vital for the actor. Let us look at several varieties of such conflicts. Pathological hostility. This variety unites all actors (from radical Islamists to militarists from democratic countries) for whom peace is not a value, and violence is the main method of self-assertion. Through violence, terrorists achieve (often successfully) international recognition (Yasser Arafat in the middle of the last century, and Hamas in the 2000s), moral victory over the enemy, and their mission on Earth.46 An example of conflict consciousness that develops when war is separated from political goals is found in the works of the eminent Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz: “To obtain that [an advantageous peace] as surely as possible is the endeavor, and for it no momentary sacrifice must be considered too great.”47 For his part, Victor Kremenyuk made the following remarks about the efforts of the US Republican administration to forge the mood of intolerance among the American public following the attacks of September 11, 2001: “Somebody can play on the dark, flawed sides of the nature of an entire people and thereby create a completely different moral and ethical climate in society.”48 In Russian practice, an example of pathological hostility to fellow soldiers is what is known as dedovshchina (the hazing and abuse of junior conscripts in the army) which had become widespread in the military service in the Soviet Union by the late 1960s following the decision to enlist amnestied criminals into the military service on a mass scale. Pathological egoism manifests itself in the form of individualistic nationalism, where pride in oneself is combined with a messianic desire to change others in one’s own likeness. The American liberal political analyst Francis Fukuyama said of the United States, “A country that makes human rights a significant element of its foreign policy tends toward ineffectual moralizing at best, and unconstrained violence in pursuit of

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moral aims at worst.”49 In this sense, American nationalism is as conflictogenic as the ethno-confessional nationalism of small nations based on an inferiority complex. Pathological infantilism is the unconscious or semi-conscious escape from thinking about responsibility for one’s actions by displacing unpleasant associations (advice, arguments) from the sphere of reflection and the preparation of upcoming decisions. Johan Huizinga saw the nature of this phenomenon in the habits of a spoiled child who has no restrictions, whose every need (including obviously false and excessive) is satisfied, and who lack moral restraints; and in the ethics of voluntary self-restraint, sacrifice for the benefit of others, and self-discipline. In this sense, he writes with condemnation of the easily satisfied but never satiated need for banal entertainment, the thirst for gross sensations, and the craving for mass spectacles.50 Among the stimulants of deviant behavior, he also mentions the lack of irony and self-irony, sensitivity to external stimuli, a tendency to exaltation and exaggeration (including of one’s own role), suspiciousness, intolerance and sensitivity to flattery. Infantile conflictogenity can be characterized by a leader’s manic, hysterical agitation from fatigue, acute and concealed insecurity, depression, and inflated expectations from the realization of a “super-idea” (for example, an attempt to overthrow the ruling regime in the absence of any constructive program of action after seizing power).51 Of course, deviant behavior is often connected with a completely different trajectory of development of the leader’s personality and his or her other qualities— above all, fanaticism in all its forms. Thus, the types of leaders who fall into the category of “spoilt” or “capricious kids” or “ascetics” stand in the same row, though the latter clearly prevail. The outbreaks of deviant conflict behavior of this kind in different historical periods have been associated with impulsive and exalted leaders like Muammar Gaddafi, Mikhail Saakashvili, Ruhollah Khomeini and Hugo Chavez (and some other proponents of the “leftist turn” in Latin America).52 Psychological complexes of a similar type characterized the foreign policy activities of the governments of Tymoshenko, Poroshenko and Zelensky in Ukraine in the 2000s and 2010s. On a broader historical scale, such deviant types include Girolamo Savonarola, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot and many others. The deficiency motive in combination with pathological conflict behavior is less dangerous, although the goal of the person’s actions appears to be vital to him or her. A neurotic perceives the world as

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dangerous and hostile. Anything that is unknown and unexpected causes fear, which is conditioned by psychological threat. A deficiency-motivated neurotic is imbued with a persistent desire for security. Such a person constantly searches—on the subconscious level—for a protector,53 an ally on whom he or she can rely, yet cannot find. The parallels to the concepts of “hyper-security” and “securitization” in the literature of the 2000s are telling. The foreign policy behavior of the Baltic states and Poland in the 2000s and 2010s gives many examples of this type of motivation.

The Practice of Managing Contemporary International Conflicts Of course, the proposed classification is not rigid—first of all, because most contemporary international conflicts are of a very complicated nature, and their individual characteristics may fall into different boxes of any conceivable classifier. The US war in Afghanistan, for example, is predominantly a demonstrative conflict of the affective type. At the same time, it also has elements of resource-based conflict characteristics in its leadership form. In this sense, the task of the analyst is to determine the prevalent nature of the conflict and predict its future course. Moreover, due to their inherent dynamics, conflicts can “move” within the analytical matrix from one category to another. So, the game-playing (“contractual”) conflict in the Taiwan Strait could theoretically become a real resource-based conflict one day. The situation on the Korean Peninsula, or in South Asia, could develop in a similar way. Finally, the deviant conflict involving Mikhail Saakashvili in 2008 nearly turned into a real conflict of a resource-based or demonstrative type. Therefore, identifying the transformation of a conflict and its development scenario in one direction or another is the most important accompanying task of the analyst, for whom the classification of conflict will always be only an intermediate stage of work, while the ultimate goal is to predict how events will unfold. When assessing the motives of behavior, one should take into account the possibility of a clash between the different “tiers” of motivations of those involved in the conflict. It is important to make allowances for the influence of both external factors and characteristics of the psychological state of societies, elites and individuals. In such cases, the factor of asymmetrical motivations, mentioned in the works of the American expert on conflict Anatol Rapoport, may take on special significance.54

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Three types of tasks can be defined based on the proposed classification. First, in order to manage confrontation, it is important to diagnose as accurately as possible the form of conflict behavior—one’s own and that of the opponent. Second, it is advisable to identify those types of conflict behavior that could impede a pragmatic approach to resolution, and try not to provoke them. Of particular danger—and scientific interest—are irreconcilable conflicts characterized by a high proportion of subconscious reactions with elements of pathology. The greatest difficulty in the ontological conflicts is the combination of pathological and punitive motivations (such as the “global war on terror”).55 Third, it is reasonable to try and narrow the range of possible inappropriate forms of behavior in a conflict by transforming conflicts of all types into game-playing forms or non-threatening forms of a provocative conflict. This shift is possible when the participants in the conflict management process are growth-motivated. Both sides in this situation tend to listen to reason: you can intimidate them, you can encourage them, or you can combine both tactics. Managing a conflict in which one party is motivated by deficiency is more of a challenge. Unlike growth motivation, the deficiency motivation of a person’s conflict behavior is based on his or her ideas about vital interests, and therefore such a person will be less inclined to compromise. Still, there are at least a few ways to manage this type of conflict. First, it can be achieved by ignoring and isolating in a situation where the threat is weak and the interest in cooperating with the person is secondary. The second way to achieve it is to transform conflict into a game-playing form by changing one’s own behavior and creating incentives for the adversary to comply with the “rules of confrontation.” This is a hard thing to do in case of pathological and affective versions of conflict, yet attempts are being made to achieve results in this area. Based on the examination of the Iraq campaign in the 2000s, some US researchers are writing about the benefits of shifting strategy from “punishment” to “bargaining.”56 Third, a conflict can be managed by transforming the deficiency motivation into the being motivation. No doubt this is a long, costly, and labor-intensive process. However, it can work with conflicts of mixed nature. With this approach to conflict management, a developed country must soberly assess the levels of the enemy’s needs and identify those that are truly vital. The emergence of scholarly works on the problem of justice in negotiation and conflict resolution is symptomatic in this sense.57

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∗ ∗ ∗ To analyze the transformations unfolding in the ongoing crisis of international relations, we need research that would focus not only on studying the structural aspects of world politics but also on analyzing the conflict behavior of nations and their underlying motives. Shifting the focus from the structure of the participants in the international system to their behavior requires new methodological solutions that would allow a high degree of accuracy in describing the situational interactions of the actors. Scholars continue to debate whether conflict can serve as an instrument of stability. Abraham Maslow optimistically believed that humanity was moving toward a conflict-free future through human self-improvement, but this remains a distant prospect right now. A more realistic goal is to reduce the number and severity of international conflicts. Russian political analysts Yuri Davydov58 and Victor Kremenyuk59 are analyzing the movement toward a more stable world based on conflict management with the ultimate goal of reaching an organization of the international environment that would make military solutions disadvantageous. For his part, Nikolai Kosolapov believes that conflict management could be used to “intercept” an emerging conflict, artificially provoke it and channel it into the sphere of managing conflict relations in order to reduce the costs of such a conflict and facilitate its resolution.60 It is important to clarify the boundaries between real, imagined, and pathological incentives for conflict behavior in order to find additional rational grounds for developing a strategy of action in conflict that is based on the desire to establish cooperation within the framework of conflict interaction. As with the Cuban Missile Crisis, states have to hypothesize about their opponent’s motives based on circumstantial evidence. In 1962, the maneuvers of the Soviet and American fleets off the Cuban coast allowed the parties to establish that the enemy was rational and did not seek to plunge the world into nuclear war. In today’s world, it is the behavior of the parties in numerous crises—between India and China, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the United States and North Korea, Russia and Turkey, etc.—that allows us to make sure that “red lines” that should not be crossed still exist. The crises of the early 1960s taught the superpowers the reality of mutual nuclear deterrence. The military and political crises of the 2020s may serve as a prologue to an era of regionalization of the mutual deterrence phenomenon.

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Keywords Conflicts, conflict management, conflict behavior, motivational typology of conflict behavior. Self-Test 1. Why is it necessary to study the psychological roots of conflict? 2. What is the difference between conflicts driven by deficiency and growth motivations? 3. What types of resources can underlie conflict behavior? 4. What type of conflict was the Soviet–American confrontation? 5. How can a leader’s personality structure influence a country’s foreign policy behavior? 6. How does studying the psychological underpinnings of conflict facilitate its management?

Notes 1. Ivan Fomin, Konstantin Kokarev, Andrey Sushentsov, et al., “International Studies in an Unpredictable World: Still Avoiding the Difficult Problems?” European Journal of International Relations 27, no. 1 (2021): 3–28. 2. Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World,” European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2000): 43–76. 3. John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 43, no. 4 (Spring 2019): 7– 50. 4. Victor Kremenyuk, International Conflicts: Problems of Management and Control (Moscow: ISKRAN, 2006), 31. 5. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43. 6. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: AddisonWesley, 1979). 7. For example, the liberal philosopher Adam Smith devoted one of his most highly regarded works to the theory of “moral sentiments.” See: Adam Smith, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” The Philosophical Quarterly 1, no. 3 (2002). 8. They began to flourish in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Journal of Conflict Resolution, published in the United States, opened a fruitful discussion on conflict resolution and resolution by non-violent means.

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9. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 10. His 1965 book on the social and psychological aspects of international relations had 46 chapters, of which only one was written by a professional political scientist. See: J. David Singer, ed., Human Behavior and International Politics: Contributions from the Social-Psychological Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). 11. Theoretically grounded studies on the problems of the correlation between the subjective and the objective within the framework of Marxist methodology are given in the works of the Russian theorist Nikolai Kosolapov. See Nikolai Kosolapov, Social Psychology and International Relations (Moscow, 1983); Nikolai Kosolapov, Political-Psychological Analysis of Socio-Territorial Problems (Moscow, 1994). 12. Jerome Frank, Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (New York, 1967). 13. Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago, 1934); George W. Kisker, ed., World Tension: Psychopathology of International Relations (New York, 1951); Maurice Farber, “Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study of War,” Journal of Social Issues 11, no. 1 (1955). 14. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 15. Ken Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York, 1962); Ken Boulding, “General Systems as a Point of View,” in M. Mesarovich, ed., Views on General Systems Theory (New York, 1964). 16. John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention (Houndmills; Basingstoke; Hampshire; London, 1990). 17. V.V. Kovalev, “The Deficiency Type of Personality Formation,” in Explanatory Dictionary of Psychiatric Terms (Moscow, 1976). 18. Mark Khrustalev, Analysis of International Situations and Political Expertise (Moscow: NOFMO, 2008), 55. The author distinguishes the vital, primary and secondary interests of the state. 19. The Russian socio-psychological literature provides definitions of conflict (conflict behaviour) as a predominantly negative phenomenon. See: N.I. Leonov, Conflicts and Conflict Behaviour: Methods of Study (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2005). 20. The development of the political-psychological typology of the conflict is also addressed in the work of Russian political analyst Nikolai Kosolapov. See: Nikolai Kosolapov, “The Politico-Psychological Typology of Conflict,” Sotsiologichesky Zhurnal, nos. 3–4 (1996). 21. Eduard Batalov, World Development and World Order (Analysis of Modern American Concepts) (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 50. 22. Victor Kremenyuk, International Conflicts: Problems of Management and Control, 86.

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23. John Burton, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton, 1983). 24. The Japanese researcher Akihiko Tanaka was the first to address this topic. See: Akihiko Tanaka, “Is There a Realistic Foundation for a Liberal World Order?” in Seizaburo Sato and Trevor Taylor, eds., Prospects for Global Order, Vol. 2 (London: Royal Institute of International Relations, 1993). 25. Alexei Bogaturov, “‘Conflicts of Decentralization’ of the World System,” in Alexei Bogaturov, ed., Economics and Politics in Modern International Conflicts (Moscow, 2008), 33. 26. M.M. Lebedeva, “Reflexion of Conflicts: The New Quality of ‘Old’ Situations,” in Economics and Politics in Modern International Conflicts (Moscow, 2008), 111. 27. T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ivan M. Arreguin-Toft, How The Weak Win Wars: Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ekaterina Stepanova, “The State and the Man in Contemporary Armed Conflicts,” International Trends 6, no. 1 (16) (January–April 2008); Ekaterina Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects, SIPRI Research Report 23 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Simon Mudren, The Problem of Force: Grappling with Global Battlefield (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009); L.V. Deriglazova, Asymmetric Conflicts: An Equation with Many Unknowns (Tomsk: Tomsk University Press, 2009). 28. I.D. Zvyagelskaya, “The Ethno-Confessional Conflicts of Modern Times and Approaches to their Settlement,” in A.D. Voskresensky, ed., Conflicts and Crises in the East: Ethnic and Confessional (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2008), 35. 29. Vladimir Baranovsky, “‘Temptation of Economization’ of Research on Conflicts,” in Alexei Bogaturov, ed., Economics and Politics in Contemporary International Conflicts (Moscow, 2008), 51. 30. In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. 31. Johan Huizinga, In the Shadow of Tomorrow: A Diagnosis of the Modern Distemper, translated from Dutch into Russian by V.V. Oshis (Moscow: AST, 2004), 150. 32. Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations (New York: Ithaca, 1990), 2–4. 33. Gordon Allport, Personality and Social Encounter (Boston: Beacon, 1960); Gordon Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart Winston, 1961).

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34. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 55. 35. Thomas Schelling, “An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima,” in Nobel Prize Lecture, December 12, 2005. 36. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1960). 37. D.M. Feldman, Conflicts in World Politics (Moscow: International University of Business and Management, 1997), 14. 38. A.A. Sidorov, “Economic Sanctions in International Conflicts: The US Experience,” in Conflicts and Crises in International Relations: Problems of Theory and History, Problems of American Studies. Vol. 11 (Moscow: MAKS Press, 2001), 58–88. 39. Oded Lowenheim, and Gadi Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” Security Studies 17, no. 4 (2008): 685–724. 40. Text of Osama bin Laden’s Statement, The Associated Press. October 7, 2001. 41. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2009). 42. John Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems (London: Martin Robertson, 1979). 43. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 3rd ed., translated from the English (St. Petersburg: Piter, 2008), 65. 44. Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism. After September 11th,” in U.S. Foreign Policy, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State 6, no. 3 (November 2001): 26. 45. Abraham Maslow, “The Origin of Pathology,” in Maslow, Motivation and Personality (St. Petersburg, 2008), 130–136. 46. Eli Lake, “Senior Qaeda Theologian Urges His Followers to End Their Jihad,” New York Sun (December 20, 2007); L. Keath, “Bin Laden Tells Iraq Insurgents to Unite,” Associated Press (October 22, 2007). 47. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Moscow: Eksmo, 2003), 544. 48. Victor Kremenyuk, International Conflicts: Problems of Management and Control, 68. A detailed study of this topic can be found in: T.A. Shakleina, Ideological Support of the Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration (Moscow: ISKRAN, 2003). 49. Francis Fukuyama, “Natural Rights and Human History,” The National Interest, no. 64 (2001). 50. Johan Huizinga, pp. cit., 326.

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51. Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, eds., Strategic Assessment 1995: US Security Challenges in Transition (Washington Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995). 52. V.M. Kulagin, “The Imperishable Nature of Authoritarianism?” International Trends 6, no. 1 (16) (January–April 2008). 53. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 64–65. 54. Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (New York, 1960); Anatol Rapoport, “Models of Conflict: Cataclysmic and Strategic,” in Anthony de Reuch, and Julie Knight, eds., Conflict and Society (London, 1966). 55. Alexei Bogaturov, “‘Constitutional Crisis’ in World Politics,” Cosmopolis 4, no. 2 (summer 2003). 56. E. Rose, “From a Punitive to a Bargaining Mode of Solutions: Lessons from Iraq,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005). 57. Cecilia Albin, Justice in Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Bertram I. Specter, and William I. Zartman, eds., Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International Regimes (Washington: USIP Press, 2003); William I. Zartman, and Victor Kremenyuk, eds., Peace Versus Justice: Negotiating Forward and Backward-Looking Outcomes (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 58. Yuri Davydov, “The Notion of ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Power in the Theory of International Relations,” International Trends 6, no. 1 (4) (January–April 2004): 79. 59. Victor Kremenyuk, International Conflicts: Problems of Management and Control, 52. 60. Nikolai Kosolapov, “Conflict as a Tool for Stability in International Relations,” in Alexei Bogaturov, Nikolai Kosolapov, and Mark Khrustalev, eds., Essays on Theory and Political Analysis of International Relations (Moscow: NOFMO, 2004), 187.

Recommended Reading Frank, Jerome D. Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace New York, 1967. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Kosolapov, Nikolai A, “Political-Psychological Typology of Conflict,” Sotsiologichesky Zhurnal, nos. 3–4 (1996). Kosolapov, Nikolai A. Political-Psychological Analysis of Socio-Territorial Problems. Moscow, 1994. Kosolapov, Nikolai A., “Conflict as a Tool for Stability in International Relations,” in Alexei Bogaturov, Nikolai Kosolapov, and Mark Khrustalev, eds.,

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Essays on Theory and Political Analysis of International Relations. Moscow: NOFMO, 2004, 172–189. Kremenyuk, Victor A. International Conflicts: Problems of Management and Control. Moscow: ISKRAN, 2006. Maslow, Abraham H. Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1960.

CHAPTER 10

The Emergence of a Global Labor Market and Its International and Political Implications The Prerequisites for the Development of the Global Labor Market

Vera Gnevasheva

Economic globalization has been instrumental in transforming the entire system of international economic relations, with a particularly noticeable impact on the dynamics of labor relations within the world economy. The deepening international division of labor (IDL) has led to a gradual exchange of the role and function of labor in individual regions, countries, and subnational segments in building the modern global architecture of labor relations.

V. Gnevasheva (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_10

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The increased international mobility of capital and international trade has stimulated demand, primarily from transnational corporations (TNCs), for cheaper labor to ensure the competitiveness of their products. There has also been an increased demand from certain fast-growing economies to attract the necessary labor for jobs that are not attractive to the local population. Moreover, one more circumstance should be taken into account in this respect. The process of transition to the “knowledge economy,” which has been evolving and intensifying in recent years within the group of highly developed nations, places special demands on the quality and competitiveness of the workforce, prioritizing such characteristics as education, skill levels, and labor productivity. Given the shortage of a “suitable” workforce, national labor markets are beginning to use various national and global mechanisms to find and reproduce it, thus forming a substructure of the global labor market as part of the modern global economy, since only an effective combination of labor, technology, and capital can boost the competitiveness of national economies. Therefore, the world labor market should be regarded as a taxonomic unit which is limited in its scale and scope by the specific features and local barriers of national labor markets, but which still has incentives for continued expansion due to the increasing impact of external globalization factors on national economies. At the present stage of development, the world labor market is characterized by the following trends: • The projected decline in the pace of economic development slows a trend toward a reduction in the time cost of human labor, while also leading to a decline in labor income and a deterioration in working conditions. • The widespread underutilization of labor resources is associated with the process of growing structural imbalances in the labor market: the difficulty of finding jobs that would meet the needs of the labor force fuels unemployment. At the same time, the quality of the work performed by the employed labor force is decreasing. • The problem of insufficient and unevenly distributed jobs that can be classified as decent work, coupled with an appropriate level of wages, work and employment guarantees, safety and health standards, available social protection services, labor protection through the system

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of trade unions, and efforts to reduce all forms of discrimination, remains. • The informal sector retains a stable share of the labor market, though it is by no means always able to offer decent forms of employment. The informal sector reports high rates of poverty among the employed population. Employment is mainly represented by households, self-employment in family enterprises, and the lack of work and social protection. • Inequality in access to quality jobs differentiated in terms of geography (urban and rural areas), gender, and age. The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that income inequality at the global level is gaining momentum. Structural and hidden unemployment poses a particularly serious threat today. The discrepancy between labor supply and demand is estimated at more than 188 million unemployed people in the world as of 2019. Another 165 million people are employed but would like to work more hours. In addition, approximately 120 million people are not classified as unemployed, but work part time, and in fact they are in a position of potential unemployment. Part of the workforce is desperate for work or in constant search of work, admitting that they cannot find a decent job.

Important

More than 470 million people worldwide have inadequate access to paid work as such or are denied the opportunity to work the desired number of hours.

As a result, we can see the following paradoxical trends unfolding: • Employment growth in high-income countries is mainly driven by a decrease in labor productivity. • People are mainly employed in the service sector, where the average added value per worker is relatively low.

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• A number of middle-income countries that have gone through economic crises in recent years are still suffering from high unemployment and are unlikely to balance the labor market in the near future given the weakened prospects for the global economy. • Paid work is no guarantee of decent working conditions or adequate income for most of the world’s 3.3 billion employed people, according to the 2019 estimates. • Insufficient income and other forms of financial support force workers to move to the informal sector, where wages and job security are lower. Even in high-income countries, the number of self-employed is growing. The number of opportunities for such people are usually limited in terms of labor income growth, additional work motivation, and additional social guarantees. In total, around 2 billion workers worldwide are employed in the informal sector, representing 61% of the global labor force. Poor working conditions also manifest themselves in low earnings. In 2019, more than 630 million workers worldwide, or 19% (nearly one in five) of all employed workers, did not earn enough to lift themselves and their families out of extreme or moderate poverty, which is defined as earning less than $3.20 a day in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Projected high employment in middle-income countries, driven mainly by the creation of low-quality jobs, means an increase in the number of the working poor in the near term. The lack of economic growth per capita is one of the reasons why the living conditions of so many workers in low-income countries have not yet improved appreciably. Nevertheless, low-income countries tend to have the highest employment rates (68%), since the labor force must look for jobs regardless of their quality. Among the world’s 11 sub-regions, unemployment rates are highest in North Africa (12%) and Central and West Asia (9%), while the lowest rates are seen in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (3%) and North America (4%). Part-time employment offering limited working hours affects only 1% of all workers in both North America and Eastern Europe, but this phenomenon is much more prevalent in Latin America and the Caribbean (8%), reaching 13% in low-income countries.

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Unequal access to decent work also leads to income inequality. Labor income forms a major portion of the income for the more than 3.3 billion workers around the world. Until recently, reliable estimates of income levels by country and their comparison were unavailable in most countries due to the lack of data on labor income among the self-employed, who make up nearly half of the world’s labor force. The identified trends of the global labor market raise a number of problematic issues that need to be addressed both at the level of national markets and on the global labor market in cooperation with international organizations.

Gender Asymmetry According to the ILO estimates, the current stage of global labor development is characterized by gender asymmetry. Throughout their working lives, women still face serious obstacles to decent work. As highlighted in the ILO Annual Report, there has been little improvement since the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, and significant challenges remain in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the United Nations in 2015. Global labor markets remain unequal in terms of opportunities, affordability, and labor outcomes between women and men. The current labor force participation rate for women worldwide is just under 50%. Women find themselves out of work more often than men, with global unemployment at 5.5% for men and 6.2% for women.1 In all regions of the world, except in East Asia, Eastern Europe, and North America, the unemployment rate for men is lower than for women. The greatest difference in this indicator between women and men is noted in North Africa and the Arab states. In Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, as well as in North America, the gender gap in unemployment has narrowed in the aftermath of the financial crisis, mainly because of the economic downturn in male-dominated industries, but also due to increased employment among married women, many of whom went to work to make up for the loss in family income after men lost their jobs. Women are still disproportionately represented among unpaid family workers.2 The average working day is longer for women (self-employed and salaried workers) than for men, with a difference of 73 min and 33 min per day, respectively, in developing and developed countries.

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The gender gap in the level and quality of employment means that women are limited in their access to systems of social protection based on participation in labor activities (where such systems exist). The fact that women are under-represented among formal workers, have shorter working hours and a shorter work record has a negative impact on their seniority pay and their ability to participate in contributory social security programs.

The Youth Segment of the Labor Market Age is another measure of inequality in the labor market: 267 million young people between the ages of 15 and 24 worldwide (or 22%) are neither working nor studying. According to ILO estimates, youth unemployment remains a global concern. And in almost all regions, young women are more likely to be affected by unemployment than young men. In North Africa and the Middle East, the youth unemployment rate is almost twice as high for women as it is for men, at 44.3 and 44.1%, respectively. At the same time, in North America, East Asia, and Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, youth unemployment is higher among men than among women. In addition, many young people who are employed face restrictions on access to decent work. In Africa, for example, 95% of young workers are employed in the informal sector. With the absolute number of people in the 15–24 age group projected to increase significantly in Africa, creating enough opportunities for decent work is one of the most pressing challenges for this continent. Young workers face significant labor market challenges in Europe and Central Asia. The quality of jobs available to young workers has deteriorated, and temporary employment is on the rise in the regions. In this regard, there is a need for a closer study of the youth group as a primary segment in the formation of the workforce. Today’s youth labor market in Russia, as part of the global market, is characterized by an increasing gap between the labor demands of young people and the possibilities of meeting them. Because young people tend to have little or no practical work experience, their high wage demands make it harder for them to find suitable jobs. Lack of experience often becomes an obstacle to getting jobs, as managers of enterprises

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and organizations prefer to hire specialists with the appropriate work experience. The emergence of problems in the youth labor market is preceded by a period of early labor socialization (in adolescent age). Numerous studies in the field of youth employment show that problems related to the employment of minors, who tend enter the labor market much earlier than in previous years and therefore require greater attention, occupy a special place. The shadow segment is also widely represented in the youth labor market. Minimizing moral, social, and professional losses at the stages of early adolescent socialization could help prevent, to a large extent, the problems of youth unemployment, early labor socialization, and professional demotivation, and form the preconditions for quality workforce development.

Labor Productivity Economic growth in a given country in the context of the labor market can be attributed either to an increase in employment or to the more efficient use of labor. The latter can be described using the labor productivity indicator. This is a key indicator of the economic efficiency of the labor market. Understanding the driving forces, particularly the accumulation of machinery and equipment, improvements in the organization, as well as the physical and institutional infrastructure, the improved health and skills of workers (human capital), and the creation of new technologies, are important for developing policies to support economic growth. Such policies can focus on the regulation of industries and trade, institutional innovation, public investment programs in infrastructure, and the development of human capital, technology, or any combination thereof. Labor productivity estimates can help in the design of labor market policies and the monitoring of their effects. For example, high labor productivity is often associated with high levels or certain types of human capital, indicating priorities for specific education and training policies. Similarly, trends in productivity estimates can be used to understand the impact of wage settlements on the rate of inflation or to ensure that such changes compensate workers (in part) for the productivity improvements they provide. Finally, productivity metrics can help us understand how labor market productivity affects living standards. When the intensity of labor use (the average number of hours worked per year per capita) is low,

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the creation of employment opportunities becomes an important means of increasing per capita income, along with efforts to boost productivity. According to official statistics, labor productivity growth in the OECD region in recent years has been fragile and far below pre-crisis levels. For the most part, the slowdown in productivity growth has been driven by even greater declines in countries that had already performed extremely poor before, such as Chile, Estonia, Korea, and Portugal, undermining the overall pace of convergence with economies that have high levels of productivity. A number of conclusions can be drawn based on the approximate estimates of the key production factors and the nature of their relationship using Russian statistics: • The inclusion of labor resources in production structures is extensive. • Today, we can talk about the excessive and economically inefficient amount of employment in accordance with the economic and production structure. • This also raises questions about the likely increase in hidden unemployment, including in its structural component. • Another important factor is the additional assessment of the quality of labor, which will help create a mechanism to improve the efficiency of its use. • The problem we are looking at—the use of labor as a factor of production—is assessed as structurally disproportionate in accordance with the overall process of reproduction of labor resources.

International Migration The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. It is important to mention a number of common characteristics of international migration in today’s labor market:

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• At the global level, the number of international migrants has increased, but their share in the global population has remained relatively stable. According to current estimates, there are 244 million international migrants in the world (or 3.3% of the world population). • While the vast majority of the world’s population continues to live in the country in which they were born, more and more people are migrating to other countries, especially within their own region. • Most migrate to higher-income countries, even if they are geographically further away. • Work is the main reason why people migrate internationally, and migrant workers make up the vast majority of the world’s international migrants, most of whom are employed in the service sector.

Migration Models The basis of theoretical knowledge about migration developed on the evaluation of empirical data is represented by the laws of Ernest Georg Ravenstein, which he came up with in the late nineteenth century. Later on, in the middle of the twentieth century, a number of methodological rationales for migration processes were elaborated. Let us look at some of them. The Econometric model of Everett Lee.3 This model, created in the 1960s, belongs to the classical migration theories. According to this model, each territory has a different group of migration factors: • pull factors and • push factors, which determine the arrival and departure of migrants, some factors affecting the majority of people and some factors affecting only certain individuals. Together with the pull and push factors, there are also intervening obstacles that influence migration processes.

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Intervening obstacles increase with distance between territories and can serve as restricting factors for migration flows. They include transportation costs, legislative regulation of movements, availability of information about the prospective region of arrival, etc. According to Lee, an individual becomes an active agent who has the ability to independently decide whether or not to migrate. A potential migrant will decide to migrate if the combination of pull and push factors is strong enough to justify the difficulties that potential migrants will experience in the process of moving. Stage of life is an important factor that affects the propensity to migrate. However, while focusing on the economic factors of migration, this approach tends to underestimate non-economic factors: along with many rational reasons for migration, irrational and personal reasons may influence this process as well. The neoclassical theory of migration (Milton Friedman, Paul Samuelson and others, 1960s–1970s) proceeds from the assumption of free competition and a perfect factor market. The theory was originally developed to explain labor migration in the process of economic development. It characterizes migration processes at both the macro and micro levels. This theory views migration as resulting from geographic differences in labor supply and demand. The signal for migration is the difference in wage (income) levels between the home and destination territories. It is also worth mentioning that the level of wages must be sufficient to cover the costs of moving. According to the neoclassical theory, the study of migration is similar to the problem of the efficient allocation of resources, which is why this approach has found practical use in many countries around the world. For example, attempts were made in the USSR to overcome mismatches between the needs of the national economy in certain territories and the availability of a labor force there, arising as a result of uneven economic development. The direction of flows is determined by the economic characteristics of the territories: if the conditions are attractive, then migrants flow in (immigration), if not, they flow out (emigration). The direction of migration flows (from regions with low wages to regions with high wages) and capital flows is opposite.

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The microeconomic model of individual choice (Michael Todaro) defines individuals as rational agents who make migration decisions based on an analysis of the costs of moving and the expected benefits expressed in the form of a wage gap. The model interprets international migration as a kind of investment in human capital. People choose where to move based on the opportunities the destination country offers for them to be most productive, taking into account their skills. Indeed, in low-income countries, the pay gap between unskilled and skilled workers can be around 20%, while in high-income countries it can be 10–30 times higher. The dual labor market theory. According to this theory, developed by Michael Piore in 1979,4 international migration is caused by the constant demand for immigrant labor, which is inherent in the economic structure of developed nations. According to Piore, emigration is caused by such factors as low wages and high unemployment, while immigration, on the contrary, is driven by the need for a foreign workforce. Piore linked the demand for immigrant labor to four fundamental characteristics of a modern industrial society: structural inflation, motivational problems, economic dualism, and labor demographics. In explaining migration flows, Piore identified two interdependent processes: the process of structural inflation and the process of forming a dual labor market. The dual labor market (also referred to as segmented labor market) theory aims at introducing a broader range of factors into economic research. It divides the economy into two parts, called “primary” and “secondary” sectors. The distinction may also be drawn between formal/informal sectors or sectors with high/low value-added. In a dual labor market, the secondary sector is characterized by short-term employment relationships, little or no prospects of internal promotion, and wage determination primarily by market forces. In terms of occupations, it consists primarily of low or unskilled jobs, whether they are blue-collar (manual labor), white-collar (e.g. filing clerks), or service industry (e.g. waiters). These jobs are linked by the fact that they are characterized by “low skill levels, low earnings, easy entry, job impermanence, and low returns to education or experience.”5

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The dual labor market theory generally ignores micro-level decisions, such as an individual’s cost–benefit analysis. Instead, it focuses on immigration as a natural consequence of economic globalization, identifying the factors that pull workers to migrate. It argues that international migration starts from the labor demands of modern civilization. The process of structural inflation is associated with these processes. The theory of the world-systems paradigm. Of significant interest here are the works by Immanuel Wallerstein, who considers migration in the context of the world-systems theory. Wallerstein divides the world (or a particular country) into a periphery and a core. With the expansion of capitalism, the structures of the periphery are changing. Globalization accelerates migration processes, and emerging global cities create demand for immigrant labor as economic relations penetrate the periphery, and a non-capitalist society generates a mobile population that is disposed to migrate abroad. Driven by the desire for higher profits and wealth, owners and managers of capitalist firms entered poor countries on the periphery of the world economy in search of land, raw materials, labor, and new consumer markets. In the past, colonial regimes helped to penetrate the market. In his work “Does India Exist?” Immanuel Wallerstein says6 : “Let us start by a counterfactual proposition. Suppose in the period 1750– 1850, what had happened was that the British colonized primarily the old Mughal Empire, calling it Hindustan, and the French had simultaneously colonized the southern (largely Dravidian) zones of the present-day Republic of India, giving it the name of Dravidia. Would we today think that Madras was ‘historically’ part of India? Would we even use the word ‘India’? I do not think so. Instead, probably, scholars from around the world would have written learned tomes proving that from time immemorial ‘Hindustan’ and ‘Dravidia’ were two different cultures, peoples, civilizations, nations, or whatever.”7 Today, this is possible thanks to neo-colonial government and transnational corporations that perpetuate the power of national elites, who either participate in the world economy as capitalists themselves or offer their country’s resources in international companies on acceptable terms. The theory of return migration. At the same time, in the 1980s and 1990s, there emerged a new economic theory of migration that tried to overcome the weaknesses of rational choice theory. Oded Stark put

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forward a theory based on the neoclassical tradition with an emphasis on the role of households in migration decision-making.8 Stark’s theoretical approach, which sought to explain the mechanism of return migration and to model it without reference to interregional wage differences, relies not on differences in income generation, but on differences in opportunities for using incomes. Return migration occurs because the savings from working in the city have a much higher purchasing power in rural areas than in urban areas.9 The merit of this theory is that it enabled a more detailed explanation of the causes underlying labor migration from developing countries.

Digitalization of the Labor Market According to the World Economic Forum,10 manufacturing has experienced a decade of productivity stagnation and demand fragmentation, and innovation is long overdue. Organizations that have taken Industry 4.011 Innovation to scale beyond the pilot phase has experienced unprecedented increases in efficiency with minimal displacement of workers. Such organizations are described in the international management system as “lighthouses.” The Fourth Industrial Revolution in manufacturing remains a top priority for many leaders of private and public organizations. It is having an enormous disruptive impact on value chains, industries, and business models. With one-third of the total economic value of the Internet of Things (IoT) coming from production, factories are the center of gravity of the ongoing revolution. While manufacturing represents 16% of global GDP, manufacturing industries account for 64% of global R&D expenditures. However, there is potential for worker displacement if changes are not handled properly. Lighthouses highlight the global nature of production—for example, the lighthouse network includes German-owned factories in China and a site in Ireland owned by a US company. This shows that innovation is equally relevant in all geographical areas and contexts, from sourcing basic materials to process industries to advanced manufacturers addressing specialized needs. Furthermore, it proves that companies of all sizes, from established global blue-chips to small local businesses with fewer than 100 employees, can achieve radical Fourth Industrial Revolution innovation.12

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A McKinsey13 report suggests that fewer than 5% of occupations consist of activities that are 100% automatable with today’s technology, while 62% of occupations have at least 30% of automatable tasks. The digitalization of the economy should also be reflected in the process of forming the workforce, the processes of its professional training, and hence the system of professional education. The national project of the Russian Federation “Labor Productivity and Employment Support,”14 which was launched in March 2019, provides for a number of measures to strengthen the impact of the digitalization of the economy on the development of the Russian labor market, to increase labor productivity, enhance the qualitative component of labor, and reduce the quantitative component. Goals of the Labor Productivity and Employment Support national project by 2024: 1. to increase labor productivity by 5% compared to the previous year in the basic non-resource sectors of the economy (manufacturing, agriculture, construction, transport); 2. to engage the 85 constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the implementation of the national project; 3. to engage at least 10,000 large and medium-sized enterprises in the implementation of the national project in the basic non-resource sectors of the economy (with a limit on revenues from RUB 400 million to RUB 30 billion). It is important to highlight the downward trend in the incomes of working people in the Russian labor market today. The current economic situation in Russia shows a stable trend: in crisis situations, wages go into free fall, without encountering any particular obstacles on this path, while the presence of a significant variable component (in the form of various bonuses and benefits) makes it flexible, which creates the so-called problem of the “working poor.” As a result, while maintaining a low level of wages in comparable characteristics and reducing the quality of the labor force as a required characteristic, forms of informal employment are emerging and expanding.

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At the same time, the overall indicators of the labor market balance correspond to the positive development: employment tends to increase, while unemployment drops. Summing up the intermediate results, we can identify the following general trends of the modern labor market: • a decrease in the value of higher professional education as an aspect of the quality formation of the workforce; • the development of the “poverty of the working population” trend; • the sustainable preservation of quantitative labor volumes; • excessive and economically inefficient employment in accordance with the economic and production structure; • a strengthening of the processes of hidden unemployment, including its structural component. Decent work indicators. An important current trend on both the national and global labor markets is the need to define and evaluate “decent work.” In accordance with the recommendations of the International Labor Organization, the following indicators should be included in the assessment: employment opportunities, adequate earnings and productive work, decent working time, equal opportunity and treatment in employment, safe working environment, social security, etc. Let us look at a number of decent work indicators for the Russian Federation in 2010–2019 (see the Table 10.1). Evaluating the decent work indicators, it is important to identify the following obvious trends. In general, the Russian economy shows an overall downward trend in the share of wages in the total volume of GDP. At the same time, as inequality indicators retain their values, there is a uniform decrease in the level of welfare derived from labor income. On the one hand, there is an obvious trend of increased public spending on social security, while on the other hand, there is growing discrimination on the labor market, especially in terms of occupational segregation. Despite the simultaneous decline in the share of the employed within the total population and the decrease in the unemployment rate, a significant disturbing indicator is the increase in the proportion of young people who are neither studying nor working, which is one in ten young people aged 15–24.

12.0

19.0 0.4 8.4 45.6

12.7

18.2 0.3 8.6 48.4

Source Official data of the Federal State Statistics Service: http://www.gks.ru

4.3

4.4

Percentage of employees with excessive working hours 4.7 (more than 48 h per week; “actual” number of hours), % Young people aged 15–24 who are not studying, not 13.8 working and not acquiring professional skills, as a percentage of the total population of the corresponding age group, % Share of the informal sector in total employment, % 16.4 Percentage of children engaged in hazardous conditions of 0.2 work among those aged 5–17, % Rate of fatal occupational injuries (per 100,000 workers), 9.4 persons Number of lost work days as a result of temporary disability 46.8 per one injured person

2012

2011

2010

Indicator

Table 10.1 Decent work indicators

12.1

4.7

2014

47.4

8.0

48.7

6.7

9.71 20.21 0.5 0.5

11.8

4.4

2013

48.6

6.2

20.5 0.5

12.0

4.5

2015

49.0

6.2

21.2 1.2

12.4

4.5

2016

48.7

5.6

19.8 0.4

10.5

3.7

2017

49.3

5.4

20.1 0.2

10.2

3.3

50.6

5.3

20.6 0.2

10.6

3.5

2018 2019

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∗ ∗ ∗ The analysis of the global labor markets requires a multidimensional approach to try and capture the full scope of measuring the global concept of decent work and identifying labor shortages. In addition to general measures of employment and unemployment, it is important to assess emerging global challenges, particularly along the following three key dimensions: • the mismatch between the supply of labor and the needs of workers, which signals an imbalance between the demand for labor and the cost of labor; • the quality of employment and its ability to provide adequate earnings, a safe working environment, and social protection for workers and their families; and • equal opportunities for employees, regardless of gender, age, or geographic location. Less than half of the labor potential is utilized today, and unemployment remains high. In 2019, the United Nations estimated that the total world population aged 15 and over (i.e., the working-age population) was 5.7 billion. Of that total, 2.3 billion (39%) were not part of the labor force, 3.3 billion (57%) were employed, and approximately 188 million were unemployed. The decent work deficit also manifests itself in employment conditions. The ILO’s Decent Work Agenda is not only about access to employment opportunities. It also requires that labor relations ensure an adequate minimum wage and guarantee rights at work and access to social protection. Yet these conditions are not met for a large proportion of workers around the world. The lack of productive, well-paying jobs means that more than 630 million workers—one in five of the world’s workers—live in extreme poverty (i.e., live in households with daily per capita incomes below $1.90 per person at purchasing power parity [PPP]) or in moderate poverty (households with daily per capita incomes between $1.90 and $3.20). According to the ILO, the outlook for the global economy in these circumstances is dubious. Economic activity slowed significantly in the last three quarters of 2018 and is not yet back on track. Based on UN estimates, global economic growth declined from 3.0% in 2018 to 2.3% in 2019. In particular, manufacturing activity has been hit hard, negatively impacting business confidence and investment decisions. Trade and international political tensions further erode confidence and inhibit GDP growth,

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which can have far-reaching effects on employment, following the global chains of wealth redistribution. Although economic growth is projected to pick up slightly to 2.5% in 2021, it may take several years to return to pre-crisis levels. Monetary policymakers have already indicated their willingness to support the economy in the event of a possible recession, but it is unclear how effective their measures will be, given the already very low-interest rates and the remaining imbalances in all markets, including the global labor market. The current prerequisites of socio-economic development determine the new forms of labor market failures, including rising transaction costs of hiring and employment, the formation and strengthening of a specific form of structural unemployment, growing and transforming hidden employment, and an increase in deadweight losses. In assessing the labor market and labor force distribution in Russia, it is not only and not so much economic as it is social factors that matter, which largely form the structure of the labor force distribution. Under these conditions, it is necessary to create and launch mechanisms to influence individual segments of the labor market aimed at further balancing the labor force, including through minimizing the forms of destabilization caused by structural inflation. It is also important to implement a preventive policy to identify the degree of substitution of national workers by foreign immigration, while also additionally determining the quality of the labor force. To address market failures it is necessary to consider and develop programs aimed at motivating internal labor resources to improve labor skills, enhance the level of professional training, and improve the efficiency of labor force redistribution in the internal labor market. The identified market failures associated with structural inflation, as well as inefficiencies in labor distribution with the substitution effect of external immigration, are amplified by the negative externalities of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Keywords Labor resources, return migration, gender asymmetry, global labor market, occupational segregation, hidden unemployment, structural unemployment. Self-Test 1. What are the current characteristics of the national labor market? 2. What are the particularities of the relationship between national and world labor markets?

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3. Identify the main trends in the transformation of the labor market at the global and national levels. What micro- and macro factors determine this process? 4. What are the main characteristics of modern migration and its patterns? 5. How is the digitalization trend affecting the global labor market? 6. What are the main trends in the development of the global labor market?

Notes 1. World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2020. International Labor Organization, www.ilo.org. 2. Women at Work: Trends 2016. ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Geneva, 2016). 3. Everett Lee, “A Theory of Migration,” Demography 1, no. 3 (1966). 4. Michael Piore, Unemployment and Inflation: Institutionalist and Structuralist Views (Sharpe Press, 1979); Michael Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 5. “The Dual Labor Market: Theory and Implications,” in Samuel H. Beer and Richard Barringer, eds., The State and the Poor (Winthrop Publishers), 55–59. 6. Immanuel Wallerstein, “Does India Exist?” http://www.intelros.ru/pdf/ logos_05_2006/valerstain_3-9_logos.pdf. 7. Immanuel Wallerstein, “Does India Exist?” in Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 130–134. 8. Oded Stark, The Migration of Labor (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 9. Oded Stark, “Tales of Migration without Wage Differentials: Individual, Family and Community Contexts,” ZEF Discussion Paper on Development Policy No. 73 (University of Bonn: Center for Development Research, 2003), 6. 10. This is a Swiss non-governmental organization (1971), which is best known for its annual meetings in Davos. It brings together leading business executives, political leaders, prominent thinkers and journalists to discuss the world’s most pressing problems, including health and the environment. 11. Industry 4.0, or the Fourth Industrial Revolution, characterizes the current trend of automation and data exchange development, which includes cyber-physical systems, the Internet of Things, and cloud computing. It represents a new level of production organization and

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value chain management throughout the entire lifecycle of a manufactured product. 12. World Economic Forum, Fourth Industrial Revolution: Beacons of Technology and Innovation in Manufacturing (White Paper). https:// www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_4IR_Beacons_of_Technology_and_Inn ovation_in_Manufacturing_report_2019.pdf. 13. McKinsey is an international consulting company that specializes in solving problems related to strategic management. McKinsey works as a consultant with the world’s largest companies, government agencies, and non-profit organizations. 14. The passport of the national project “Labor Productivity and Employment Support,” approved by the Presidium of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and Priority Projects (Minutes dated September 24, 2018, No. 12), https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/direc-tions/ nacionalnyy_proekt_proizvoditelnost_truda_i_podderzhka_zanyatosti/.

Recommended Reading Carmichael, Gordon Alexander. Fundamentals of Demographic Analysis: Concepts, Measures and Methods. Springer International Publishing Switzerland. https://bibliocatalog.mgimo.ru:2133/book/10.1007/978-3-319-23255-3. Glushkova, V.G., and Khoreva, O.B. Regional Economy. Demographic and Migration Policy: Textbook. Moscow: Knorus, 2016, https://bibliocatalog.mgimo. ru:2129/book/920712. Iontsev, V.A., ed. International Migration of Population and Demographic Development. Moscow: Prospect, 2014, https://bibliocatalog.mgimo.ru:2107/ index.php?page=book_red&id=276562. Martin, Philip, Abella, Manolo, and Kuptsch, Christiane. Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-first Century. Global Management Series. Binghampton, New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 2006, http://bibliocata-log.mgimo. ru:2079/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xww&AN=187656&site=ehost-live (Searching: eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost)). Rofe, A.I. Labor Market: Textbook. Moscow: Knorus, 2018, https://bibliocat alog.mgimo.ru:2129/book/926139.

CHAPTER 11

Digital Transformation of National Economies Lilia Revenko and Nikolay Revenko

The emergence of the digital economy was accompanied by explosive economic growth in the 2010s. This process did not happen overnight. It was the result of technological and organizational prerequisites that had matured over the previous decades. However, it is the rapidity with which the new system of economic and social relations came into being that makes it possible to draw conclusions about the revolutionary changes in global industrial production. Until recently, scholarly works on the digitalization of the world economy occupied a worthy place in the industry and popular science literature, causing heated debates. However, starting in 2016, the topic

L. Revenko (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] N. Revenko The Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_11

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has started to attract a great deal of attention in a wide range of social spheres, from the creation of new technologies to the development of international relations. This is a general trend for both foreign and Russian research. Our study complements the earlier published works (in particular, that of Aleksandr Ageev,1 V.P. Kupriyanovsky,2 A.A. Domrachev,3 and Peter Cowhey4 ) in an attempt to analyze the peculiarities related to the formation of state programs of digital economy development abroad to assess the compliance of a similar program in Russia with the world practice. Given the rapid pace of the formation of the digital economy, it is not surprising that modern literature offers numerous definitions of what a digital economy is. The term was first introduced by Don Tapscott back in 1995.5 The Dictionary of the Information Society and the New Economy refers to an economy that emerges from digital communications,6 and the Oxford Dictionary speaks about an economy that functions mostly through the use of digital technology, especially the internet.7 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) understands the digital economy as “the application of internet-based digital technologies to the production and trade of goods and services.”8 The Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation proposed five definitions of this phenomenon, of which the most relevant one for this study associates digital economy with activities formed “as a result of and based on the widespread introduction of digital/information technologies in production, management, government and other processes to ensure the national interests of the Russian Federation, including improving the quality of life of Russian citizens and the competitiveness of the national economy.”9 According to Russia’s Digital Economy national program, this category “represents economic activity in which the key factor of production is data in digital form, and which promotes the formation of information space based on the needs of citizens and society in obtaining high-quality and reliable information, while also facilitating the development of the Russian Federation’s information infrastructure, the creation and application of Russian information and telecommunications technologies, as well as the creation of a new technological basis for the social and economic sphere.”10 Despite some minor differences in the approaches to its definition, the term “digital economy” is gradually replacing such concepts as “new economy,” “information economy,” and “internet economy.” While not

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fully identical, they are evolving in line with changes in real processes, generally referred to as “digitalization.”

Digitalization and Economic Growth There are two basic approaches to defining the role and place of digitalization in global industrial production: one interprets the current stage of information and technological advances as evolutionary, the other as revolutionary. According to the second approach, the digital economy is seen as the backbone of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, as there is a clear change in the underlying technology and signs of a shift in the technical and economic paradigm. The First Industrial Revolution in the middle of the eighteenth century was based on machine production, the Second (in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) was based on mass production, and the third (in the 1960s) on automation through electronic and information and communication technologies (ICT). Meanwhile, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is characterized by the development of cyber-physical systems, i.e., the unity of physical and digital reality. The concept of the Fourth Industrial Revolution was influenced by Germany’s Industry 4.0 program and the US developments related to the Internet of Things. Its distinctive feature is the widespread introduction of cyber-physical systems in industrial production, which are able to control and optimize it independently. Analyzing the set of problems associated with this phenomenon, Klaus Schwab, founder and president of the World Economic Forum, said in his flagship work: “The Fourth Industrial Revolution will have a monumental impact on the global economy, so vast and multifaceted that it makes it hard to disentangle one particular effect from the next.”11 For all the variety in interpreting this concept, researchers will inevitably face the challenge of theorizing the impact of digital technology on the world economy. This influence is twofold, as is the case with any new complex technological wave: on the one hand, we have the development of economy at a new level of interaction between all its elements; on the other hand, the old system of production and distribution of benefits is being destroyed. It is no coincidence that digital technologies are characterized as “disruptive.” The widespread introduction of digital technologies is seen as one of the most important conditions for increasing the competitiveness of

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national economies all over the world. It facilitates the restructuring of economy, reduces production costs and the costs of commercial operations, enhances efficiency and shortens production times, improves the quality and efficiency of services (including public services), introduces new technologies and technological processes, and provides new opportunities for ordinary citizens to access services, education, and recreation. It also opens up new job opportunities. For example, e-commerce has created 10 million jobs in China (1.3% of the total),12 and the use of mobile applications has led to the employment of about 500,000 people in the United States over five years.13 The introduction of digital technologies has a direct impact on international political interactions. In particular, digital diplomacy has emerged, which helps solve foreign policy problems using new technologies.

Important

At the same time, the digital economy also brought with it new challenges, such as cybercrime, which includes the theft of funds through online transactions, and the theft of personal data and trade secrets. The risk that data collected through ICT can be used by law enforcement agencies to control citizens, and by commercial organizations for the purposes of unfair competition and for putting undue pressure on consumers to buy products or services, has become very real. While supporting new forms of employment, the digital economy also creates costs in the form of job losses in traditional sectors, and the unavailability of institutional social protection mechanisms for self-employed and freelance workers who work remotely through the internet, which can lead to serious financial and health problems in old age or in the event of illness.

Scholars provide different estimates of the economic effect of digitalization. According to the World Bank, digital economy accounts for 6% of GDP in the OECD countries today.14 According to the forecasts of the consulting company Accenture, the increased use of digital technologies could boost productivity for the world’s top 10 economies and add $1.36 trillion to their total economic output in 2020.15 Based on the European Commission’s estimates, the implementation of the Digital Single

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Market Strategy will add 415 billion euros to the European Union’s GDP annually.16

Digitalization as a Factor of National Competitiveness The degree of the digitalization of national economies varies widely around the world. Their progress in this area can be assessed differently, depending on the criteria used for analysis. Yet it is already possible to identify a group of champions in the development of the digital economy. According to a joint study by the World Economic Forum, Cornell University’s Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and INSEAD business school, Singapore is No. 1 in ICT implementation, with Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Japan rounding out the top 10.17 According to a study conducted by the Spanish bank BBVA, the top ten includes Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, the United States, the Netherlands, Japan, Singapore, Norway, Finland, and Sweden.18 Russia ranks 41st in the first study, behind such countries as Chile, Kazakhstan, and Cyprus, and 51st in the second, coming after Slovakia, Mauritius, and Colombia. The European Union has developed the International Digital Economy and Society Index (I-DESI), which is also used to analyze the level of digitalization. It assesses the indicators of member states and the EU as a whole in comparison with 15 other countries.19 According to this analysis, the world leader is Iceland, followed by the Republic of Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, the United States, and Switzerland. Russia is ahead of China, Brazil, Turkey, and Mexico, while lagging behind the EU as a whole and far behind its leaders.20 Researchers use different criteria to assess the degree of digitalization of the economy, giving them different weights in the final assessment. For example, Strategy& experts suggest looking at six indicators: ubiquity (the extent to which consumers and enterprises have universal access to digital services and applications, primarily the availability of broadband and mobile communications networks, the number of personal computers and mobile devices); affordability (the cost of internet connection, tariffs of internet service providers); reliability (the quality of available digital services); speed (access to digital services in Mbps in real time); usability (the level of development of electronic commerce and public services, the

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number of domains and IP-addresses in the country per 100 residents, the number of users of social networks per month); and skill (the number of specialists per 100 residents, the percentage of those employed with a specialized vocational or higher education).21 More accurate results, in the opinion of many economists, are provided by the Network Readiness Index (NRI) compiled by the World Economic Forum, which is based on three groups of indicators: the market, political, regulatory, and infrastructure environment; the readiness of businesses, government and individuals to use ICT; and the use of ICT among them.22 The I-DESI index takes into account the level of development of communications, human capital, internet use, the degree of implementation of digital technologies, and the digital services that are available to the public.23 The development of the digital economy has become an urgent task for Russia. It was first formally outlined by President Vladimir Putin in his address to the Federal Assembly on December 1, 2016.24 Its main areas of focus were defined in 2017, which led to the adoption of the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation,25 the Strategy of the Development of the Information Society in the Russian Federation,26 and the “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” national program.27 Issues directly related to the digital economy are also raised in the nation’s economic security strategy.28 In addition, efforts to promote the digital economy are underway within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (see the Table 11.1). If the Eurasian Economic Union’s digital agenda is implemented by 2025, the aggregate GDP of its member countries will increase by 11%, i.e., by approximately twice as much as it would have grown without it.29 In this context, it is of practical importance to look at foreign experience in the development of the digital economy and at the possibilities of using it in Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). UNCTAD identified 102 digital strategies from countries in all regions of the world in the period from 2012 to 2017, of which 30 exclusively addressed broadband infrastructure, 6 focused on digital business development, and 61 covered both of these important areas.30 Given the variety of approaches to the development of national digital economy strategies, it is the relevant policy documents of major international players—the United States, India, China, and the European Union—that are of the greatest practical and research interest. They were

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Table 11.1 Digital development strategies by region (2012–2017) Regions Developed economies Developing economies Africa Asia and Oceania Latin America and the Caribbean Transitional economies Total

All strategies

Broadband infrastructure

Digital business

32 59 25 16 18

27 54 23 15 16

21 40 17 9 14

11 102

10 91

6 67

Source World Investment Report 2017. Investment and the Digital Economy (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2017): 191, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir20r7_en.pdf

selected for this study because of their scale. Examining them allows us to cover countries with different economic structures and GDP growth rates. This choice paved the way for us to evaluate the diversity of tasks solved by strategic documents for use in Russian economic life.

National Models and Components of Digital Economy The key goals of the US Digital Economy Agenda are to create a favorable environment for American companies and to ensure that the United States takes the lead in setting the standards and rules of the game in multilateral formats. The US Department of Commerce is responsible for implementing the program. The Director of Digital Economy coordinates the four structural divisions involved in this process that fall under the authority of the agency (the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Telecommunications and Information Agency, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and the International Trade Administration). Expert support is provided by the Digital Economy Board of Advisors, which was established in March 2016 and includes representatives from a number of US companies, civil society, and academia. The program focuses on four areas: a free and open internet; trust and security on the web; innovation and new technologies; access and skills.31 A free and open internet. The United States places special emphasis on the fact that one of the conditions for the development of the digital

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economy is the free exchange of information, which requires free access to the internet, the cross-border flow of data and services. A standing working group was set up within the United States Internet Policy Project Group to prepare proposals on how to accomplish this task. A study of economic indicators of the cross-border movement of information was conducted in 2016, which found that exports of potentially ICT-enabled services accounted for 54% ($385.1 trillion) of total services exports in 2014.32 Another focus of this agenda is the reform of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), with the transfer of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions to the private sector. The relevant proposals for IANA were finalized in June 2016.33 One more aspect of Washington’s efforts to stimulate the national digital economy was the appointment of “digital attachés” to a number of US trade missions abroad, who were tasked to explain to American businesses the regulatory measures and ICT policies of the national governments of those countries where they operate, while also facilitating the export of US digital goods and services. The US Department of Commerce considers the creation of such positions one of its most important achievements. Finally, the agency is called upon to actively engage with the European Commission on the disadvantages of US companies in the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe (the contents of which will be outlined below). Trust and security on the web. The development of the digital economy is being constrained by the widespread mistrust among many businesses and ordinary users of the level of protection of personal data and commercial information. In this regard, the US Department of Commerce issued a Privacy Green Paper (2010), launched the Consumer Privacy Act initiative (2012), and prepared a report on privacy in the context of big data (2014). Moreover, in order to protect personal data in social networks, the private sector is invited to develop codes of conduct on the commercial use of facial recognition technology and information by mobile applications. US experts believe that the differences in national approaches to data protection in cross-border transactions seriously impede the global free flow of information and the activities of US export companies. In this regard, one of its most important objectives is to achieve greater comparability of approaches at the global level (based on its own standards, of course) and thereby create conditions for increasing US exports.

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Another focus of the confidence-building efforts is to allay the European Union’s concerns over the protection of personal data handed over to the United States. In this context, safe harbor frameworks were concluded with the European Union (2000) and Switzerland (2009), which were later replaced by privacy shield agreements on the commercial use of personal data (approved by the European Commission and the Swiss government in July 2016 and January 2017, respectively). Finally, ensuring information security is a condition for increasing confidence in the use of ICT. To address this problem, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed the National Strategy for Trusted Identities,34 which aims to solve the problem of insufficiently strong passwords. The Identity Ecosystem Steering Group is working to improve internet authorization mechanisms and standards.35 In 2012, NIST established the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, which includes representatives from government agencies, industry, and academia. Other measures taken by the United States include the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,36 the preparation of amendments to the Encryption and Export Administration Regulations and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the publishing of a white paper on copyright in the digital age. Innovation and new technologies. A crucial focus of the US administration in this regard is patent reform. The Patent Office and the National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) reviewed the effectiveness of copyright law and published a Green Paper on copyright policy, creativity, and innovation in the digital economy (2013).37 It provided the basis for: • the publication of the White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages (2016), recommending, among other things, that courts be given greater flexibility in dealing with damages for copyright infringement38 ; • initiating a proposal for a forum to improve the notification and deletion mechanism created under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; • defining the role of government agencies in the development of the market for licensing of copyrighted works on the internet.

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Other goals include facilitating the access of US companies to hitech solutions, reducing the cost of patents abroad, and simplifying the process of applying for patents. In this regard, the US Department of Commerce is pursuing a policy of harmonizing the patent systems of different countries. In this context, the focus is on ensuring public access to open information from US government agencies, in particular facilitating the retrieval of such information through the implementation of big data technologies. The Commerce Data Advisory Council was set up in 2014 to provide guidance in this area, and the Commerce Data Service was established in 2015 to develop related programs and web services. Another task—ensuring the interoperability of smart grids and platforms—is achieved through the introduction of new standards and software. This goal is addressed by the Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards (2009).39 The importance of its implementation has grown with the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the Industrial Internet, to which the United States has devoted a great deal of attention. The Department of Commerce is making efforts to stimulate the market for IoT devices, particularly through the use of the relevant technology. A Green Paper was published in 2017 with suggestions for the development of this sector.40 The Industrial Internet Consortium was established in 2014 to implement initiatives such as developing open access standards and achieving functional interoperability between platforms and devices. A strategy for the development of the Industrial Internet is being developed. The topic of cloud computing in the United States is discussed through the prism of security, mobility, and interoperability requirements. To this end, a roadmap for cloud computing technologies and standards has been developed, and an inventory of existing standards has been drawn up.41 Work is underway to address the problems of cyber-physical systems. A working group was set up for this purpose in 2014, and a draft framework for cyber-physical systems was prepared in 2015.42 Access and skills. The development of the digital economy is impossible without the appropriate infrastructure and a sufficient number of specialists in the field of digital technologies, or without improving internet literacy in general. Therefore, the United States has developed the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program, which provides for the installation of high-speed networks and the training of specialists to maintain them. A total of $4 billion has already been spent under

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the program, which was allocated under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. In addition to this funding, the State Broadband Initiative was implemented, with about $300 million allocated to gather information for the National Broadband Map.43 In 2015, the Broadband Opportunity Council was set up to prepare proposals in this area for the next two years. In the same year, the BroadbandUSA program was launched to help build a high-speed internet infrastructure at the local level and to improve public ICT literacy. Since mobile and terrestrial wireless broadband communications use a limited set of radio frequencies, work is underway in the United States to allocate 500 MHz for these purposes. A proposal to allocate the 1695– 1710 MHz and 1755–1850 MHz bands is also under consideration. For 5G mobile networks, it is planned to use frequencies above 24 GHz. The United States has several government programs, such as the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, to train qualified professionals and improve overall computer literacy. The main goal of the Digital India program, which was approved in August 2014, is to “transform India into digital empowered society and knowledge economy.”44 The program’s stated objectives are to provide citizens with online access to government services, create a digital infrastructure to which every citizen should have access, and ensure high-speed internet access in order to “prepare India for a knowledge future” and make “technology central to enabling change.”45 The program has been developed by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, and the main agencies responsible for its implementation include the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs headed by the Prime Minister, the Monitoring Committee on Digital India, the Digital India Advisory Group chaired by the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, the Apex Committee on Digital India headed by Cabinet Secretary, the Expenditure Finance Committee and the Committee on Non-Plan Expenditure. Funding for major projects is provided by various ministries and departments of the Government of India. The program is divided into three pillars, each covering a wide range of activities. The first pillar, “Infrastructure as Utility to Every Citizen,” includes six areas of focus:

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1. High speed internet as a core utility. Efforts are focused on building a communications infrastructure, including fiber-optic lines and the use of wireless communications technology. By the end of 2017, a total of 2500 Gram Panchayats46 had been provided with broadband infrastructure in rural areas, and virtual networks and infrastructure had also been created in many new urban settlements. Work is continuing on the development of mobile communications networks throughout the country. 2. Cradle to grave digital identity. Indian experts have come to the conclusion that the twelve-digit individual identification number assigned to each Indian citizen meets the requirements. At the same time, it is necessary to develop the use of mobile phones to enable electronic authentication of citizens. 3. Participation in digital and financial space through mobile phones and bank accounts. There are plans to implement programs called Mobile Seva (which allows government departments and agencies to provide public services to citizens and businesses using mobile devices) and PayGov (a platform that facilitates payment for public services). A special plan (Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana) has been developed to ensure universal access to banking services using at least one account. 4. Easy access to common service centers. These centers are designed to provide public, financial, and social services, as well as private sector services in agriculture, education, leisure, banking, insurance, and pensions, and will be set up in 6000 rural settlements. 5. Shareable private space on a public Cloud. This authentication-based access space is designed to facilitate paperless transactions. Citizens will be able to store electronic versions of official documents and submit them on request to various agencies. 6. Safe and secure cyberspace. There are plans to create a coordinating center for cybersecurity in order to implement the framework National Cyber Security Policy. The “Governance and Services on Demand” pillar includes a similar number of focus areas: 1. Services seamlessly integrated across departments or jurisdictions. The emphasis here is placed on promoting the one-stop-shop principle,

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thus allowing access to a variety of services. Examples of relevant initiatives include the e-Business and e-Commerce projects, and the Open Source and Open API programs, which aim to use an open application programming interface to achieve interoperability and provide access to information and services. A number of common platforms (MeghRaj Cloud Platform, Mobile Seva, PayGov, eSangam, etc.) have been created to help departments and states deliver the integrated services. 2. Government services available in real time from online and mobile platforms. E-governance applications are being developed to allow real-time access from computers and mobile phones to information, services, and the grievance mechanism. The National Optical Fiber Network project is being implemented to provide high-speed communication services at the panchayat level. Under the Mobile Seva project, a national platform was created that is used by all government departments and agencies to provide services through mobile devices and applications. 3. All citizen entitlements to be available on the Cloud. To harness and benefit from computational computing, the Indian government has launched an ambitious initiative called MeghRaj. Its goal is to accelerate the provision of electronic services while optimizing public spending on ICT development. It is based on the principle of “rights at any place and at any time,” meaning that when citizens move, they do not have to go through the registration process and submit documents all over again. Following the creation of the Mobility Fund in October 2014, citizens also no longer need to transfer funds held in a savings account of this fund if they change their place of residence. 4. Government services digitally transformed for improving the ease of doing business. The Indian authorities believe that for businesses to solve many issues, such as opening a firm, obtaining building permits and electricity connections, registering property, obtaining a loan, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, and handling contracts, all services need to be digitalized. The most significant projects in this sphere include:

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a. E-Business—providing businesspeople and investors with the services of national and regional agencies in creating a commercial enterprise based on a one-stop-shop principle. b. MCA21—providing electronic services to meet legal requirements. c. E-commerce—promoting foreign trade by assisting agencies in providing online services and helping foreign trade participants to receive them. 5. Making financial transactions electronic and cashless. For the benefit of government agencies, a centralized payment gateway has been set up across India, which is integrated with the national and state service gateway. 6. Leveraging the Geospatial Information System (GIS) for decision support systems and development. This system is designed to provide access to the information resources of the Survey of India, the National Informatics Center, the National Remote Sensing Center, the Ministry of Earth Sciences, and other agencies. The last pillar, “Digital Empowerment of Citizens,” focuses on five areas: 1. Universal digital literacy. The Government of India has set a goal of ensuring that at least one member of every Indian family should be ICT literate, and the National Digital Literacy Mission has been launched to achieve this goal. Today, there are 5000 centers in the country that train citizens to conduct transactions using digital capabilities. 2. All digital resources universally accessible. The National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy framework stipulates that government agencies should provide the public with access to their databases. It is being carried out through India’s Open Government Data Platform, which serves as a single point of access to all the open information available in various government departments. The government has also committed to providing access to digital resources to citizens with hearing and visual impairments, learning disabilities, physical disabilities, and other problems that prevent them from using computers and mobile phones.

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3. Availability of all documents in the Cloud. This focus area assumes that all documents of government agencies, such as land titles, diplomas and certificates of education, driver’s licenses, and permits, must be placed in the cloud. To access them, institutions and citizens must go through an authorization procedure. 4. Availability of digital resources and services in Indian languages. This point is important given that India has 22 official languages. English, which is mostly used in digital resources, is spoken by only a fraction of the country’s population. The Technology Development for Indian Languages program has been adopted to introduce information processing tools for facilitating the use of digital resources by citizens. To ensure proper representation of Indian languages in the existing and future language technology standards, India actively participates in international structures such as ISO, UNICODE, and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). 5. Collaborative digital platforms for participative governance. To address this problem, a pan-Indian platform, myGov (my government), was created to be used by citizens for discussing various problems and solutions, submitting proposals to the government, and expressing opinions on the actions of government agencies. In March 2015, Premier of the People’s Republic of China presented the concept of the Internet Plus action plan until 2025. The full content of the plan, which complements the Made in China 2025 strategy, was released on July 4 of that year. Made in China 2025 is a long-term plan for the development of Chinese industry. The Internet Plus plan will integrate mobile internet, cloud computing, big data, and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing to encourage the healthy development of ecommerce, industrial networks, and internet banking, and to help internet companies increase their international presence.47 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Cyberspace Administration of China are involved in the implementation of this document. The Chairman of the State Council personally oversees the performance. Work on the plan is being carried out in seven main areas:

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1. Improving internet infrastructure. The task has been set to create modern communications networks. To this end, it is planned to expand and modernize fiber-optic lines, take measures to further develop mobile communications, reduce the prices of internet service providers, and ensure the interoperability of networks. Given the size of China’s territory and the large percentage of its rural population, the government places great emphasis on building broadband lines outside cities and in remote areas, and is improving the mechanism to compensate for the cost of their construction and maintenance. Assistance is provided in creating new experimental platforms and conducting research on the structure of the industrial internet. One of the tasks is to create an open platform to control the implementation of innovations. Work is underway to improve the tag management system and shift to IPv6 protocol. Finally, an integrated internet system is being created based on both networked and stand-alone equipment.48 Measures are also being taken to speed up the implementation of the Broadband China Strategy (approved by the State Council in 2013). In particular, the task has been set to increase the average speed of internet connections to 50 Mbps in cities and up to 12 Mbps in rural areas by 2020. It is also expected to bring the penetration rate of mobile broadband to 85%, and fixed broadband to 70%.49 2. Development of a new generation of information infrastructure. Government agencies are tasked with helping to develop chips, high performance servers and other hardware, as well as applications for the Internet of Things, cloud computing, and big data analysis. 3. Sharing of government resources. The task is to significantly expand and improve the quality of public services. Pilot programs for open access to data from government organizations will also be launched, and access of small and medium-sized businesses to national innovation platforms will be facilitated. 4. Improving safety rules. Additional measures are being taken to improve the level of data protection on the network, and work is continuing on risk assessment. The authorities are promoting the principle of fair competition in the business environment. 5. Creating favorable conditions. Government agencies have been instructed to continue their efforts to eliminate problems that hinder the introduction of ICT to stimulate entrepreneurial initiative,

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innovation, and create conditions for greater use of e-commerce opportunities. 6. Business support. The task has been set to develop services using cloud technologies and introduce credit products and services. In addition, a pilot project of equity crowdfunding will be launched.50 7. Improving intellectual education. Measures are being taken to train more ICT specialists, and computer literacy courses are being organized for ordinary users.51 The topic of the digital economy first emerged on the EU agenda in 2010, when the European Commission (EC) approved the Digital Agenda for Europe, the first of seven initiatives under the Europe 2020 strategy. Based on the experience gained in the implementation of this document, the Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe was approved in May 2015, which incorporated many aspects of the previous Agenda.52 The creation of a Digital Single Market (DSM) rests on three pillars. 1. “Better access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe,” which includes the following initiatives: • Facilitating cross-border e-commerce. The task set by the European Commission is to develop rules that would be trusted by businesses and consumers. For this purpose, national consumer protection and contract rules for the purchase of any product (i.e. the physical or electronic version) are being harmonized, and the Regulation on consumer protection cooperation is being reviewed. • Affordable high-quality cross-border parcel delivery. The European Commission has conducted a study on the reasons behind the high cost of cross-border parcel delivery, which holds back the development of cross-border e-commerce, and will take additional measures to improve the transparency of postal services. • Preventing unjustified geo-blocking, which refers to denying users access to websites based in other member states of the integration association and redirecting them to sites in the country of residence. The European Commission is preparing amendments to the EU legislation to end unjustified geoblocking.

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• Better access to digital content and creating a modern, more European copyright framework. This problem arises when citizens move to another country. In addition, researchers have difficulty accessing copyrighted material. The European Commission has promised to create an effective system to control copyright infringement. • Reducing VAT-related burdens. Due to the lack of a single tax rate in the EU for the cross-border delivery of physical goods, companies have to declare and pay VAT in each individual member state, which negatively affects the development of e-commerce. To solve this problem, the mechanism of a single electronic registration and payment of VAT has been extended to online sales, a common VAT threshold has been put in place for start-up businesses, and the VAT exceptions have been removed for the importation of small consignments from suppliers outside the European Union.53 2. The pillar “Creating the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish” also covers a wide range of issues: • Making the telecoms rules fit for purpose. The European Commission believes that for the development of mobile communications it is necessary to redistribute radio frequencies. In particular, the 700 MHz and 800 MHz frequencies, which are particularly well-suited for ensuring the provision of broadband services and the deployment of 4G mobile networks, should be completely released. The regulator also encourages the creation of high-speed communications networks, especially in inaccessible areas, educational institutions, and research hubs. To this end, the Universal Service Directive is being revised. To create harmonized rules of network neutrality, a package of documents of the single telecommunications market has been adopted. On June 15, 2017, roaming charges within the EU borders were abolished. • Revision of the media framework. This task is related to the emergence of new content distribution technologies and business models. The European Commission is reviewing the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and promoting the catalogues of European film and television studios’ works for use on Video on Demand platforms.

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• Compliance of regulatory frameworks with platforms and proxies, combatting illegal content on the internet. Concerns have been raised in the European Union about the collection of user data by certain platforms and using it for commercial purposes to the detriment of other market participants, as well as the presence of a large amount of illegal content on the internet. National practices are being harmonized to address this problem. • Reinforcing trust and security in digital services and in the handling of personal data. Due to the growth of cyber threats, in particular the number of offenses using digital technology, the directive concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications) is being reviewed (previously, most of its articles applied only to traditional telecoms companies). A public–private partnership on cybersecurity has also been initiated. 3. The pillar “Maximizing the growth potential of the Digital Economy” includes the main activities designed to promote the following initiatives: • Building a data economy. This initiative seeks to promote investment in the Internet of Things, big data, and cloud computing. The European Commission also supports the creation of a pan-European cloud resource, the free flow of data, and the removal of restrictions on the location of data for storage or processing purposes. • Boosting competitiveness through interoperability and standardization. To this end, the 2010 European framework document governing the interoperability of networks, data repositories and devices (the European Interoperability Framework) is being updated, and the EU Rolling Plan for ICT Standardisation is being reviewed. The pan-European catalogue includes national catalogues of ICT standards and interoperability specifications. • Creating an inclusive e-society that provides equal opportunities for all. Given the growing need for IT specialists, the European Commission supports the efforts of EU member states to train personnel, modernize the system of state administration,

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and achieve cross-border interoperability of platforms. Priority is given to improving public services via the internet and enhancing the quality of services provided, including through the introduction of the “once only” principle.54 The possibility is also being explored to create an EU wide e-safe solution (a secure online repository for documents). Efforts are underway to implement a full transition to EU-wide e-procurement, extend and integrate European and national portals to work toward a “Single Digital Gateway,” and accelerate full transition toward interoperable e-signatures. In the context of the EAEU digital agenda, the experience of the European Union in lifting unjustified restrictions on the cross-border movement of digital content, creating an EU-wide cloud resource, and including national ICT catalogues of ICT standards in the pan-European catalogue can be used to the maximum extent possible. ∗ ∗ ∗ Programs, strategies, and plans for the digital economy, as well as the developments within the OECD and the G20,55 reflect the attention given to this issue in all countries of the world. Although these documents vary significantly in content (each taking the national specifics into account), certain areas can be identified that are common to most countries: creating a modern communications infrastructure and data storage and processing centers; promoting the free flow of data; expanding the range of information and communication services; introducing new smart networks, platforms, and technologies while also ensuring their interoperability; developing e-commerce; removing restrictions that hinder the conduct of business; stimulating entrepreneurial initiatives and investment in ICT; providing incentives for small and medium-sized businesses; improving information security and user confidence in Internet services; training specialists; and improving overall computer literacy. Priority is being given to the development of end-to-end digital technologies such as the Internet of Things; the Industrial Internet; artificial intelligence; cloud computing; quantum and new manufacturing technologies; robotics components; cyber-physical systems; big data technologies; wireless communications; additive, 3D, virtual and augmented reality; and blockchain. Efforts are also underway to effectively replace IPv4 with IPv6.

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It is also possible to identify the main areas in which ICT are most widely used, such as smart cities, agriculture, logistics, public administration, digital health, smart energy networks (smart grids), transportation systems, and financial services. Today, Russia is making good progress in most areas of the digital economy. In particular, the development of broadband networks is in full swing, dedicated frequencies for 5G mobile networks are being allocated, data storage and processing centers are being created, measures are being taken to ensure the interoperability of platforms and networks, improve the efficiency of public services using digital technologies, and boost private investment in the ICT sector. A focus is placed on ensuring information security, protecting commercial privacy and personal data during automated data processing, and promoting digital literacy. At the same time, the provision of high-speed internet access in areas away from major population centers is still low, and certain restrictions on the use of ICT by businesses, especially by small and medium-sized enterprises, remain. The system of personal data protection by public agencies and commercial companies is also far from perfect. The following areas should be considered as means to improving the effectiveness of Russian government agencies in promoting the digital economy: • bringing the regulatory framework in line with modern standards; • creating conditions for the free flow of data; • stimulating competition in the field of ICT and the use of digital technology by small and medium-sized businesses, encouraging innovation; • developing and implementing new ICT standards and harmonizing them within the EAEU and the G20; • promoting e-commerce; • taking additional measures to protect consumers when making online transactions and operations; • streamlining efforts to boost business and public confidence in the use of ICT, including by raising the level of network security and tightening control over companies’ use of personal data; drafting a law on consumer privacy rights and codes of conduct on the use of data and facial recognition technology by platforms and mobile apps; • developing a trusted identity strategy in cyberspace; • increasing the effectiveness of copyright protection, stepping up efforts to combat illegal content online; conducting a study on copyright in the digital economy; • facilitating access for businesses to national innovation platforms and cloud services;

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• sending digital technology specialists to work at Russian trade missions in key countries to promote hi-tech exports; • expanding the scope of public services through further implementation of the e-government concept; • improving the performance of e-government, including by expanding public access to the information of government agencies, the storage of documents in the cloud, provided that they are adequately protected, and the introduction of the “once only” principle for the provision of documents. The analysis of global digital transformation trends suggests that there is currently no ideal version of a national strategy that can be used as a model by other countries, including Russia. Even the high degree of economic globalization does not allow for the unification of these programs.

Keywords Digital economy, international cooperation, digitalization trends, ICT, Digital Economy Agenda, Digital India, Internet Plus, EU Digital Single Market. Self-Test 1. How do digital technologies affect international political interactions? 2. What does the digitalization of the economy involve? 3. What are the main goals of the Digital Economy Agenda of the United States? 4. What are the specific features of the Digital India program? 5. What are the objectives of China’s Internet Plus plan? 6. What are the EU’s achievements in the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy? 7. What are the main challenges facing Russia as part of the digitalization trend?

Notes 1. Aleksandr I. Ageev, “Digital Society: Architecture, Principles, Vision,” in A.I. Ageev, Maksim A. Averyanov, Sergey N. Evtushenko, and Elena Y. Kochetova, Ekonomicheskiye Strategii, no. 1 (2017): 114–125.

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2. V.P. Kupriyanovsky, D.Y. Namiot, and S.A. Sinyagov, “Cyberphysical Systems as the Basis of Digital Economy,” International Journal of Open Information Technologies 4, no. 2 (2016): 18–25. 3. A.A. Domrachev, Sergey N. Evtushenko, V.P. Kupriyanovsky, and D.Y. Namiot, “On Innovative Initiatives of the EAEU Member States in the Construction of the Global Digital Economy,” International Journal of Open Information Technologies, no. 9 (2016): 24–33. 4. Peter F. Cowhey, and Jonathan Aronson, Digital DNAL Disruption and the Challenges for Global Governance (Oxford University Press, 2017). 5. Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995). 6. Explanatory Dictionary of the Information Society and the New Economy. 2007, http://information_society.academic.ru/Cifrovaᴙ_∋konomika_ DIGITAL_ECONOMY. 7. Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defini tion/digital_economy. 8. World Investment Report 2017. Investment and the Digital Economy (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2017), 156, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLib rary/wir2017_en.pdf. 9. Proposals of the Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation for the development of the Digital Economy program. January 23, 2017, ES-013-01-17, http://open.gov.ru/upload/iblock/26b/26b 92c038f9edc46a0c81c924b1cc9b5.pdf. 10. Programme “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation,” approved by the Decree No. 1632-r of the Government of the Russian Federation dated July 28, 2017, http://d-russia.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ programmaCE.pdf. 11. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Moscow: E Publisher, 2017), 43. 12. Digital Economy Concept, Trends and Visions: Toward a Future-Proof Strategy (Discussion Paper for International Seminar #1. December 12, 2016), 4, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/513361482271099284/ Digital-Economy-Russia-Discussion-paper-2016-12-20-eng.pdf. 13. Ibid., 5. 14. Digital Dividends. World Development Report 2016. Overview (Washington: World Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2016), 12, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/961621467994698 644/pdf/102724-WDR-WDR2016Overview-ENGLISH-WebResBox394840B-OUO-9.pdf. 15. Digital Density Index: Guiding Digital Transformation. Overview, 2015, https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-digital-density-index-guidingdigital-transformation.

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16. Nikolay S. Revenko, “European Union on the Way to the Single Digital Market,” The World of New Economy, no. 2 (2016): 8. 17. Silja Baller, Soumitra Dutta, and Bruno Lanvin, The Global Information Technology Report 2016. Innovating in the Digital Economy (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016), 16, https://www.wsj.com/public/res ources/documents/GITR2016.pdf. 18. Noelia Cámara, and David Tuesta, DiGiX: Digitization Index. Working Paper (Madrid: BBVA, 2017), 9, https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-con tent/uploads/2017/02/WP_17-03_DiGiX_methodology.pdf. 19. Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. 20. International Digital Economy and Society Index (I-DESI). Final Report. European Union, 2016. 49 pages, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/2016-i-desi-report. 21. Karim Sabbagh, Bahjat El-Darwiche, Roman Friedrich, MilindSingh, Maximizing the Impact of Digitization (Strategy&, 2012), 8, https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/m1/en/reports/maximizing-theimpact-of-digitization.pdf. 22. Jurica Dujmovic. The 10 Most Digitally Savvy Countries in the World. July 19, 2016, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-10-most-digita lly-savvy-countries-in-the-world-2016-07-19. 23. International Digital Economy and Society Index (I-DESI). Final Report. European Union, 2016, 49 pages, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/2016-i-desi-report. 24. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. President of Russia. December 1, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/ 53379. 25. Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation. Approved by Decree No. 642 of the President of the Russian Federation dated December 1, 2016, http://legalacts.ru/doc/ukaz-pre zidenta-rf-ot-01122016-n-642-o-strategii/. On June 24, 2017, the action plan for the implementation of the strategy was approved (see: Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation for 2017–2019 (first stage). Approved by Resolution No. 1325-r of the Government of the Russian Federation dated June 24, 2017, http://static.government.ru/ media/files/g5OvkCKBOKLEhAXjN94ogSBElV39ObPA.pdf). 26. Strategy of the Development of the Information Society in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030. Approved by Presidential Decree No. 203 dated May 9, 2017, http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/ 71570570/.

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27. Programme “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation.” Approved by Resolution No. 1632-r of the Government of the Russian Federation dated July 28, 2017, http://d-russia.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ programmaCE.pdf. 28. The Strategy for the Economic Security of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2030. Approved by Decree No. 208 of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 13, 2017, http://static.kremlin.ru/media/ acts/files/0001201705150001.pdf. 29. The Main Areas of Implementing the EAEU Digital Agenda until 2025, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/dmi/SiteAssets/Kpa tkoeizloℋenieOHCP.pdf. 30. World Investment Report 2017. Investment and the Digital Economy (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2017), 191, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLib rary/wir2017_en.pdf. 31. Nikolay S. Revenko, “U.S. Digital Economy in the Era of Information Globalization: Current Trends,” US and Canada: Economy, Politics, Culture, no. 8 (572) (2017): 85–98. 32. Alexis N. Grimm, “Trends in U.S. Trade in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Services and in ICT-Enabled Services,” U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis (May 2016), 1, https://apps.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2016/05%20may/ 0516_trends_%20in_us_trade_in_ict_serivces2.pdf. 33. IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal Assessment Report. June 9, 2016, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2016/iana-stewardship-transi tion-proposal-assessment-report. 34. National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, http://www.nist. gov/nstic/index.html. 35. The Identity Ecosystem Steering Group, https://www.idesg.org/. 36. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Executive Order (Washington, DC: 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/exe cutive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity. 37. Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy (Green Paper). Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, July 2013, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf. 38. White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages (White Paper). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, January 2016, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf. 39. Chris Greer et al. Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards. Release 3.0. 2014, http://www.nist.gov/manuscriptpublication-search.cfm?pub_id=916755.

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40. Fostering the Advancement of the Internet of Things. Green paper (Washington DC: The Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force & Digital Economy Leadership Team, 2017), 69 pages, https://www.ntia. doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iot_green_paper_01122017.pdf. 41. NIST Cloud Computing Program, http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/. 42. Draft Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems, Release 0.8. Cyber Physical Systems Public Working Group (September 2015), https://s3.amazon aws.com/nist-sgcps/cpspwg/pwgglobal/CPS_PWG_Draft_Framework_ for_Cyber-Physical_Systems_Release_0_8_September_2015.pdf. 43. National Broadband Map—How Connected Is My Community? http:// www.broadbandmap.gov/. 44. Digital India—A Programme to Transform India into Digital Empowered Society and Knowledge Economy. Press Information Bureau. New Delhi: Government of India, Cabinet, August 20, 2014, http://pib.nic.in/new site/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=108926. 45. Cabinet Clears “Digital India” Programme. August 21, 2014, http://ind ianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/cabinet-clears-digital-india-pro gramme/. 46. Local governments at the grassroots level. 47. China Unveils Internet Plus Action Plan to Fuel Growth. July 4, 2015, http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/07/04/ content_281475140165588.htm. 48. Guidance on Actively Promoting Internet Plus Action Plan by the State Council. July 21, 2016, http://en.beidouchina.org.cn/c/83.html. 49. Broadband China Strategy and Its Implementation. China Academy of Information & Communication Technology, https://www.unescap.org/ sites/default/files/Broadband%20China%20Strategy.pdf. 50. Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the “Internet Plus” Action http://www.usito.org/news/state-council-provides-guidance-int Plan, ernet-plus-action-plan. 51. Nikolay S. Revenko, “Digital Economy in China: A New Stage of the Country’s Economic Development,” Informatsionnoye Obshchestvo, nos. 4–5 (2017): 46–47. 52. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2015) 192 final. Brussels: the European Commission, 2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/? uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN. 53. Nikolay S. Revenko, “EU Digital Single Market: Facilitating Access to Goods and Services via the Internet,” Economic Strategies 142, no. 8 (2016): 57–59.

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54. This principle implies the use by public authorities of information previously provided by citizens. 55. L.S. Revenko, ed., International Economic Relations: Pluralism of Opinions in the Age of Change: Collective Monograph (Moscow: MGIMO University, 2017), 271–281.

Recommended Reading Ageev, A.I. “Digital Society: Architecture, Principles, Vision” (Ageev, A.I.; Averyanov, M.A.; Evtushenko, S.N.; Kochetova Y.Y.). Economic Strategies, no. 1 (2017): 114–125. Cowhey, Peter F., and Aronson, Jonathan. Digital DNA: Disruption and the Challenges for Global Governance. Oxford University Press, 2017. Domrachev, A.A., Evtushenko, S.N., Kupriyanovsky, V.P., and Namiot, D.E. “On the Innovation Initiatives of the EAEU Member States in Building the Global Digital Economy.” International Journal of Open Information Technologies, no. 9 (2016): 24–33. Kupriyanovsky, V.P., Namiot, D.E., and Sinyagov, S.A. “Cyberphysical Systems as the Basis of Digital Economy.” International Journal of Open Information Technologies 4, no. 2 (2016): 18–25. Revenko, L.S., ed. International Economic Relations: Pluralism of Opinions in the Age of Change: Collective Monograph. Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2017. Revenko, Nikolay S. “Digital Economy in China: A New Stage of the Country’s Economic Development.” Informatsionnoye Obshchestvo, nos. 4–5 (2017): 43– 50. Revenko, Nikolay S., “Digital Economy of the United States in the Era of Information Globalization: Current Trends.” The United States and Canada: Economics, Politics, and Culture, no. 8 (572) (2017): 78–100. Schwab, Klaus. The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Moscow: E Publishing House, 2017.

CHAPTER 12

Nuclear Deterrence in Contemporary World Politics Alexey Fenenko

Over the past 75 years, nuclear deterrence has been central to international security. In itself, nuclear deterrence forms an integral part of the nuclear factor in international relations, along with such components as nuclear nonproliferation, strategic military planning, arms control, strategic dialogue, and strategic stability.1 At the same time, nuclear deterrence, contrary to popular stereotypes, is not identical to other components of the nuclear factor.2 “Nuclear deterrence” refers only to a certain type of military policy: “taking an opponent’s strategic potential hostage” and threatening to use nuclear weapons to force them not to act.3 After the end of the bipolar world order, which was centered around military competition between the USSR and the United States, the question arose as to how the leading nuclear powers should reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in world politics, as well as in the politics of

A. Fenenko (B) Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_12

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individual states. To date, however, the doctrines of the nuclear powers have been based, at best, on the strategic concepts of the early 1970s. In the past half century, no nuclear power has come up with a qualitatively new understanding of nuclear deterrence. Rather, it is still a question of adapting the logistical means to implement the concepts of half a century ago. The past 50 years have proved, however, that the material and technical capabilities of all nuclear powers still lag significantly behind their strategic doctrines.

Nuclear Deterrence Theory Modern political science often divides history into the “pre-nuclear” and “nuclear” eras. Such a division is not entirely justified: the theory of nuclear deterrence itself is based on the 1920s concept of air power. Its foundations were developed by the Italian general Giulio Douhet (1860–1930) and set forth in his books Command of the Air (1921) and The Probable Aspects of the War of the Future (1928).4 According to Douhet, mastering airspace can radically change the forms and methods of warfare: strategic strikes, he believed, would disrupt the enemy’s rear, drastically reduce its economic potential, and demoralize the population. In this sense, “nuclear deterrence” is a rather archaic concept, based on a century-old understanding of the role of aviation in modern warfare. It was impossible to implement Douhet’s ideas at the technological level of the First World War due to the low lifting capacity and short range of aircraft. Over the next 20 years, technical means were adjusted somewhat to the concept of air warfare.5 During the Second World War, the military and technical level allowed the great powers to test the concept of “air power” in the form of strategic bombing.6 During the Battle of Britain in the autumn of 1940, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command Sir Arthur Harris and Chief of the Air Staff Charles Portal offered Prime Minister Winston Churchill (in office 1940–1945) the concept of strategic bombing against Germany.7 Its main point was to hit the enemy’s critical economic and administrative centers with air power. What was new about this concept was that the focus shifted from a “knockout blow” to an “air siege” of the enemy. To implement this strategy, Halifax heavy bombers were put into service in 1941, followed by the more advanced four-engine Lancaster bombers in 1942. Later, the concept of

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strategic aviation spread to the United States, which produced the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and B-29 Superfortress bombers during the Second World War. At the turn of 1944–1945, special commissions were set up in the United States to assess the consequences of the strategic bombings of Germany and Japan.8 It turned out that these strategic bombings did not force the two countries to abandon their resistance. Even at the final stage of the war, the Third Reich carried out major offensive operations and inflicted strategic defeats on the Allies. The bombings of large cities (such as Dresden, Leipzig, and Tokyo) required a large fleet of bombers and were carried out without serious opposition from enemy fighter aircraft and/or air defense. The way out of the stalemate was to create more powerful means of destruction capable of reaching large targets at low cost, i.e., nuclear weapons. This led to the development of the air war theory supplemented by the concept of atomic blitzkrieg.9 It was difficult to carry out such tasks with the atomic weapons of the 1940s. Calculations made in the late 1940s proved that such new weapons had limited power and could only be delivered to the target by aircraft carriers.10 The Korean War (1950–1953) showed that “air power” can be effectively blocked by air defense and fighter aircraft systems. Things changed with the advent of thermonuclear weapons in 1952–1953. With their megaton power and melting effect, these weapons could theoretically reliably destroy strategic targets and be delivered to their targets by missiles.11 This was the basis on which the concept of nuclear deterrence developed, involving the threat of a strike against an enemy in order to dissuade it from taking any action. The theory of nuclear deterrence was designed to: (1) identify a set of the strategic facilities of the enemy to be targeted by nuclear weapons ; and (2) demonstrate the political advantages that can be derived from putting pressure on the opponent’s will.

Important

The concept of nuclear deterrence emerged in the United States and partly in the United Kingdom. It was a product of Anglo-Saxon strategic culture with its characteristic division of the concepts of “security” and “defense.” Security is understood not as the absence

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of an immediate threat, but as measures to prevent it. Defense refers to a situation where a set of such measures proves ineffective and a direct military threat to the territory arises. The first concept uses the term “danger,” which means a potential threat; and the second uses the term “threat,” which refers to an immediate military danger. This approach to understanding security stands in stark contrast to the European continental tradition (including Russia’s), which views security as a “non-threatening state.” Later on, the concept of nuclear deterrence went through three stages of development.12

1. Deterrence by the threat of a countervalue strike. The new approach was conceptualized by John Foster Dulles, who would go on to become Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration (1953–1960).13 His idea was to put pressure on the USSR and other socialist countries by threatening to launch a massive nuclear strike. In practical terms, this meant being able to take the opponent’s strategic potential (cities and leading industrial facilities) hostage in order to threaten it with unacceptable damage. These provisions served as the basis for two concepts: (1) massive retaliation14 ; and (2) a “new look.”15 The theoretical framework of the New Look approach was developed by British military strategists in 1945–1946 and involved the replacement of large ground forces with nuclear weapons of limited power and range.16 This doctrine was approved by President Dwight D. Eisenhower during his consultations with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The NSC report of August 8, 1953 argued that the nuclear component of the US Armed Forces was less costly to the budget than maintaining conventional forces. Hence the conclusion that there was no need for Washington to achieve parity with the USSR in conventional weapons. NSC 5440 (December 1954) placed the task of deterring the Soviet camp in Central Europe on tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). In December 1957, NATO’s North Atlantic Council authorized the deployment of American TNWs in Europe. The Eisenhower administration distinguished the concepts of “strategic” (SNWs) and “tactical” nuclear weapons (TNWs) to ensure that both concepts (“massive retaliation” and “New Look”) were in place. The first was assigned to the category of security policy: it became a logistical tool

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for implementing a set of measures to prevent aggression through intimidation. The second was assigned to the category of defense: in American strategic concepts, TNWs were viewed as a tool for warfare on the front lines in the event of conflict. 2. Deterrence by the concept of a counterforce strike. The creation by the Soviet Union of means to deliver nuclear weapons to US territory caused concern among American experts. It was not about the threat of an attack by the USSR: the question was how reliable the security guarantees the United States had given its allies were. The Soviet Union could, in their view, force the United States to choose between an all-out nuclear war and a local retreat, while being confident that American politicians would prefer the second option. According to US experts, the strategic crisis could be solved by increasing the reliability (credibility) of the nuclear deterrence system. An updated version of the deterrence theory was elaborated by the American political scientist Herman Kahn.17 The key element of Kahn’s concept of nuclear deterrence was the notion of “nuclear threshold,” meaning the hypothetical time between the beginning of a military conflict and the first use of nuclear weapons. The threshold is considered low if nuclear weapons are used immediately or almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, and high if it is preceded by a long period of time during which conventional weapons are used. Kahn attached particular importance to the psychological moment of “crossing the nuclear threshold.” More recently, the work of the American researchers Alexander George and Richard Smoke shifted this problem from the military to the moral and ethical level, raising the question of whether “crossing the nuclear threshold” meant abandoning any moral constraints on the choice of targets for nuclear strikes.18 Drawing on Kahn’s ideas, the John F. Kennedy administration (1961– 1963) developed a concept of flexible response. It is generally accepted that it was authored by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1961–1968), who proposed the principle of proportionality of the US military response to the nature of the threat.19 As early as the late 1950s, the concepts of “escalation control” and “escalation predominance” emerged in American strategic planning, meaning that the adversary would negotiate after seeing a demonstration of American superiority and would refrain from turning a local clash into an all-out war. The concept of a “counterforce strike” thus involved influencing an opponent with

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the threat of hitting its military targets, which required the creation of full-fledged strategic nuclear forces (SNF), or a “strategic triad.”20 The new version of the nuclear deterrence policy thus implied the redirection of nuclear weapons to both military and civilian targets, demonstrating initial superiority at all stages of a hypothetical nuclear conflict. The further development of this concept was, in fact, related to the search for effective logistical support for the counterforce doctrine. The following options have been proposed in the open literature21 : missile defense systems, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (ISRMS), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), or new types of nuclear weapons. 3. Deterrence by the threat of hitting selected targets. This generation of the nuclear deterrence concept was produced by the Richard Nixon administration (1969–1974). By the early 1970s, a crisis of “flexible response” had appeared, which was triggered by two factors. The first was the expansion of the range of strategic capabilities through the creation of military satellites, high-precision systems, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The second was the achievement by the USSR of a nuclear missile parity with the United States, calling into question Washington’s ability to influence the policies of its Soviet adversary. It was necessary to find a new model of influence on the USSR, including actions in the event that deterrence failed. As a solution to the crisis, the doctrine of “counter-elite strike” was proposed in 1973 by US Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger.22 The idea was to threaten the enemy with hitting its command and control systems before it decides to launch a retaliatory strike. On this basis, a “younger generation” of deterrence experts (Paul Nitze, Colin Gray, Richard Perle, and Patrick Morgan) developed the concept of deterring an enemy by threatening to hit a particular set of its key targets.23 The updated concept of nuclear deterrence relied on a high nuclear threshold. It was assumed that conventional weapons could be used in the early stages of a conflict, with the gradual introduction of TNWs and then SNWs as the conflict progressed. The potential targets for limited strikes included state-controlled industrial and infrastructure facilities directly related to the conduct of war (such as oil facilities, transport routes, railroad hubs, and communications systems). Other sites (coal-fired industries, power plants) and cities were not on the list for destruction. In theory, this suggested that the war could be limited, giving the enemy

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Table 12.1 Evolution of the nuclear deterrence concept Concept

Task

Logistical means

Threat of a countervalue strike Threat of a counterforce strike

Taking enemy cities hostage Taking enemy military facilities hostage Taking key enemy infrastructure hostage

Strategic aviation Strategic nuclear forces (“strategic triad”) Strategic nuclear forces. Intermediate- and shorter-range missiles

Threat of hitting selected targets

a chance to understand the situation and seek reconciliation after the first exchange of blows. At the logistical level, this shifted the focus of deterrence policy from intercontinental nuclear weapons to intermediaterange and shorter-range missiles (ISRMs). These made it possible to take the enemy’s main political control centers hostage due to shorter flying times. The evolution of the nuclear deterrence concept can be represented in the form of a Table 12.1. However, throughout the period of the bipolar confrontation, the concept of nuclear deterrence remained defensive in nature. It was based on the logic of deterring the opponent from committing any actions. This type of deterrence requires: (1) strong strategic nuclear forces (SNF) to maximize the probable damage to the enemy; and (2) high defensive capacity of the SNF so that it can withstand the first attack by an aggressor. The strong SNF capabilities of both superpowers should have provided them with the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in order to deter it from aggression. Crossing the nuclear threshold remained difficult: the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons for defense purposes could be justified if there was an established fact or a high probability of aggression.24 However, these SNF arsenals remained in demand only at the eventual level: as an “immanent” threat that no one has ever tested in practice. In the 1980s, however, the crisis of the “defensive deterrence” model became visible. Its symptoms included:

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• doubts as to the probability of keeping a potential conflict within certain limits; • discussion of the “nuclear winter” hypothesis that raised questions about the parties’ readiness to resort to massive use of nuclear weapons; • management of medium-intensity conflicts without the use of nuclear weapons. The experience of local wars in the Third World involving the Soviet Union and the United States proved that not all military conflicts required the superpowers to resort to the nuclear threat. Perhaps this is why the deterrent effect of nuclear capabilities began to decline by the end of the 1980s.

The United States After the Cold War The end of the Cold War prompted the United States to upgrade its nuclear deterrence concept. On May 12, 1989, US President George H.W. Bush (1989–1993) declared that the country had more urgent tasks than to deter the USSR.25 On September 11, 1990 Bush announced the possibility of building a “New World Order”26 that would be more “democratic” and “open” than the international order during the period of bipolar confrontation. Such a world order could be ensured through meeting the following conditions: • maintaining a forceful separation of the United States from its allies and potential adversaries; • maintaining American economic dominance; • spreading American ideals and values. He was talking about plans to create a politically homogeneous environment in which the United States would act as an economic power and an ideological and political leader for an indefinite period of time. The countries that did not accept the “New World Order” and those that retained the power to oppose the United States were now seen by Washington as strategic rivals. The old policy of “defensive deterrence” of the USSR was not suitable for these tasks. Therefore, the United States began to shift from the old, defensive to the new, offensive deterrence.

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Already within the framework of the flexible response doctrine of the 1960s, American experts came up with three notions: “compellence,” coercive diplomacy, and strategic coercion,27 which were not identical to the term “nuclear deterrence.” The early 1990s saw a revival of the “coercion” concept, which was essentially meant to back up the demands against an opponent with the threat of punishment for disobedience.28 The main task of such diplomacy was to convince the enemy that it is impossible to counter the American threat. The enemy may retreat if it finds that the threat declared by Washington is plausible and the Americans are willing to make it happen, and, of course, if the adversary is rational in its calculations. In theory, it could be used to achieve the following goals: • to stop the unwanted actions of the opponent; • to revise agreements previously reached with the opponent; • to stop the opponent’s hostile actions and demand (under favorable conditions) subsequent changes in its political regime.29 American researcher Patrick Morgan argued that deterrence should be distinguished from coercion.30 He defined deterrence as the use of threat to manipulate the enemy’s behavior in order to stop unwanted actions or force the opponent to do things it did not plan to do. Coercion, on the other hand, involves the limited (metered) use of military force to stop unwanted actions (stopping an invasion or dislodging an enemy from occupied territory). The difference between the two concepts is rather tentative, and when it comes to conflicts, they are almost indistinguishable. Still, Morgan considered coercion technically more difficult than deterrence: it is much harder to get people and governments to stop doing something that has already been started than something that has been carefully planned. Using force to maintain the status quo is psychologically always more legitimate than trying to change it. After the end of the Cold War, the concept of “coercion” turned out to be in demand. A new version of the idea was developed by a group of American and British experts led by Lawrence Friedman, who viewed coercion as a strategy to punish the opponent for violating the status quo.31 The purpose of coercion was to impose an agreement on the enemy and ensure control over its implementation. According to these

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experts, the benchmark model of coercion was the first Gulf War (1990– 1991), which ended with the withdrawal of Iraq troops from Kuwait, the establishment of “no-fly zones” over Iraq and the curtailment of Iraq’s WMD programs under the control of the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).32 “Coercion” has thus come to denote a model of war punishment of a certain regime for its unwillingness to follow Washington’s guidelines. Similar ideas were voiced in 1994 by Paul Nitze, who coined the concept of non-nuclear selective strikes. He believed that the time had come for the United States to reconsider its decades-long dependence on nuclear weapons as its main means of deterrence, that subsequent presidents would not be willing to use nuclear weapons to punish regional aggressors. An alternative would be high-precision conventional weapons, which “will one day perform their primary mission of deterrence immeasurably better than nuclear weapons if only because we can—and will—use them.”33 A tougher way to use high-precision weapons was suggested by the American researchers Harlan Ullman and James Wade. In their book Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (1996), they argued that rapid domination over future adversaries requires an “overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on.”34 In a foreword to the book, US Air Force General Chuck Horner stressed that “deep strike” had a critical role to play in “the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases.” Such deep strikes, Horner believed, would require delivery systems with a range of up to 10,000 km. A year after this book was published, the idea of arming ICBMs with conventional warheads popped up in Congress. These issues were handled by a dedicated bipartisan group tasked with preparing recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for the Quadrennial Defense Review. In general, by the mid-1990s the doctrine of coercion began to be identified with a war launched to punish a given regime. Technically, such punishment could be carried out both with the use of conventional weapons alone and (hypothetically) with the use of a limited number of nuclear weapons. These ideas have been widely used for the modernization of the US concept of nuclear deterrence. In fact, starting around 1995, Washington sought to adapt its tools to the ideas put forward in the first half of the 1990s.

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As early as March 1992, a commission was set up at the US Department of Defense on the initiative of General George Lee Butler to review the US nuclear planning system. In November 1992, Butler succeeded in transforming it into a commission on enhancing the flexibility of US nuclear planning. At the same time, he also established an intradepartmental study group at the US Department of Defense, which developed the concept of a “living SIOP”—a real-time nuclear war plan. According to Butler, it was based on “adaptive planning”—the permanent updating of targets. In the opinion of Butler’s group, only the core of the nuclear policy was to remain unchanged: namely that the US Strategic Nuclear Forces should have a high counterforce capability.35 Butler’s ideas were taken up by the Bill. Clinton administration (1993– 2000). On October 29, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced a comprehensive review of the national nuclear strategy, which had not been undertaken since James Schlesinger.36 On September 18, 1994, Clinton approved a new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States.37 The document stated that the greatest potential threat to the United States was posed by the Russian strategic nuclear forces. Accordingly, the priorities of the US nuclear policy included: • deterring Russia by holding at risk a range of assets valued by its political and military leaders; • maintaining the “potential of reconstitution” of the US SNF: a reserve of weapons to ensure continued deterrence of other nuclear powers; • reorienting part of the US SNF to address future threats; • confirming the predominant focus of US strategic nuclear forces on counterforce options to hit targets. The 1994 US Nuclear Posture Review suggested a variety of scenarios for the use of US strategic nuclear forces, ranging from an all-out strike to a flexible attack against a set of selected targets. The most advantageous version of the deterrence policy was proclaimed to be a combination of the opponent’s key targets. The review reaffirmed the 1962 statement about the predominantly counterforce nature of US nuclear strategy. The main targets for strategic nuclear strikes were declared to be the other side’s nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure, rather than the enemy’s cities and industrial facilities.

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The strategy of offensive deterrence required an expansion of the range of force.38 In this regard, the National Military Strategy published in February 1995 divided US nuclear deterrence policy into three levels. The first level was the continuation of the traditional policy of nuclear deterrence against Russia. The 1994 US Nuclear Posture Review stated that Russia’s SNF continued to be the biggest threat to the US national security. On January 5, 1995, US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry proclaimed a transition to the doctrine of mutually assured safety in relations with Russia.39 Provided the Russian leadership agreed to act in accordance with a set of “democratic values,” the Clinton administration was ready to continue the strategic arms reduction talks. If it refused, Washington reserved the right to retain the capability for bringing its SNF back to the level of the late 1980s. The US SNF retained high counterforce capability. The second level was the containment of China. In the late 1980s, US analysts came to the conclusion that China could become a “new superpower” and was therefore potentially dangerous to the United States. Those concerns grew in the mid-1990s, when China demonstrated its readiness to use force against Taiwan.40 Publications have emerged about Beijing’s expansionist drive to gain control of the South China Sea, Nepal, Vietnam, and the border areas with India.41 According to the 1995 National Military Strategy, a hypothetical US–China confrontation was seen in Washington as a prepared US intervention in Beijing’s conflict with any of its neighbors. The third level was the use of deterrence at the regional level. To achieve this goal, the concept of counterproliferation or compulsory disarmament was developed.42 Its central message was the use of coercive mechanisms to stop the proliferation of WMD. At the official level, this doctrine was applied by US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin on December 7, 1993. A new trend emerged in US nuclear policy: a set of force and para-force measures aimed at the “forcible disarmament of ‘dangerous’ regimes.” In 1997, President Clinton signed a secret Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60), which officials said contained a clause on a nuclear first strike. The PDD-60 document set the following goals for the US SNF: • deterrence of a likely enemy (Russia) by the threat of strikes against a narrow range of targets;

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• ensuring the ability to destroy facilities on the territory of countries attempting to create WMD; • abandoning the retaliatory strike option and shifting to a retaliatory strike concept (the use of nuclear weapons was to begin only after confirmation of a nuclear attack on United States territory). The next step in the transformation of the deterrence doctrine was taken at the beginning of the twenty-first century amid growing concerns over the possible use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. The following were seen as the most likely scenarios for crossing the nuclear threshold: a conflict between the United States and an “intruder state”; a conflict between new nuclear actors; the collapse of a nuclear state (primarily Pakistan)43 ; the use of nuclear weapons by transnational terrorist networks; and retaliation by “legal” nuclear powers against acts of nuclear terrorism. The George W. Bush administration also took strategic innovations into account. The Quadrennial Defense Review (approved by the President on September 30, 2001) confirmed that deterrence remained the core element of the US nuclear strategy. The policy of nuclear deterrence was described as multidirectional, with other nuclear powers, especially China, playing an increasingly important role. The US Nuclear Posture Review signed by George W. Bush on January 8, 2002 provided for Joint Nuclear Operations. To this end, a transition was planned to a new structure of the strategic triad: • offensive strike systems (nuclear and conventional); • defensive systems (missile defense, air defense, civil defense); • infrastructure served by information and space systems. The George W. Bush administration pursued a policy of lowering the nuclear threshold in accordance with the concept of coercion. The 2002 US National Security Strategy suggested the possibility of (1) threatening to use nuclear weapons against terrorist networks and the forces supporting them, and (2) launching (if necessary) preventive strikes on military targets in territories under the control of terrorist networks. The Doctrine of Joint Nuclear Operations of 2005 noted the possibility of the United States using nuclear weapons in local conflicts not only against

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“rogue states,” but also against terrorist networks. In the latter case, the document allowed for two scenarios: 1. if terrorist networks control territories, like the Taliban in Afghanistan; 2. if terrorist networks take control of a “weak nuclear state” (e.g., Pakistan). Major steps to modernize the US nuclear deterrence policy have been taken since the second half of the 2000s. Starting around 2005, US experts began to discuss two scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons. The first is that the United States should be able to launch counterforce strikes against Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear forces under conditions of strategic invulnerability of US territory. The second is that Russia and China will gain the ability to use a limited number of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts to achieve superiority over the United States. The situation worsened after the events of August 2008 in the Caucasus, with the White House making it clear that the possibility of regional conflicts with Russia and China could not be ruled out. After the five day Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the prospect of a limited clash between Russia and the United States no longer seemed a “prohibitive” scenario. According to US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the Russian army has demonstrated that it can effectively block the attacks of US high-precision systems and that its aviation is barely vulnerable to US information and space systems.44 The Secretary of Defense suggested that the United States should try to change the ratio of strategic capabilities with Russia. After the Democratic administration of Barack Obama took office in 2009, US nuclear planning began to focus on a model of radical nuclear reductions for all nuclear-weapon states. On April 8, 2009, the concept of minimal deterrence was announced.45 The document provided for: • a 75% reduction of Russian and US nuclear capabilities; • a reduction in the counterforce capabilities of the United States’ SNF; • redirecting the remaining SNF to key enemy military and economic infrastructure facilities; • an upgrade of the remaining strategic capabilities.

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The US Department of Defense formally adopted the concept of minimal deterrence in 2010, when the Nuclear Posture Review, which combined the traditional and new components of the nuclear deterrence doctrine, was published.46 The 2010 review became the first document to identify the elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of the US policy. The problem of nuclear nonproliferation was given the same importance as that of nuclear deterrence. The reduction of strategic nuclear forces by 75% was to be complemented by the United States’ ability to defeat nuclear threats quickly. The logistical backbone of the offensive deterrence policy was the concept of a Prompt Global Strike (PGS). Its principles were developed back during the George W. Bush administration. In August 2004, the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the concept of global strike as part of CONPLAN 8022. In December 2008, the modernized Operations Plan 8010–08 (OPLAN): Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike was put into effect. Both of these documents envisioned nuclear strikes and conventional weapons options.47 October 24, 2008 is considered the launch date of the concept of Prompt Global Strike, when Secretary of the US Air Force Michael Donley announced the creation of the Global Strike Command (GSC) in the US Air Force. According to Donley, it would “provide strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike operations.” Ideally, the function of the PGS would be to complement the Forward Deployment Force, the Expeditionary Air Force (which could be deployed within 48 hours), and the Aircraft Carrier Strike Group formations. The idea of a PGS was not new. As far back as 1961–1962, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed refocusing US nuclear planning from countervalue to counterforce strikes. McNamara proceeded from the assumption that in a critical situation, the United States would be able to hit the few Soviet liquid-propellant ICBMs that existed at the time before launch. Ideally, according to McNamara, the US Strategic Nuclear Forces would be able to deliver a disarming strike against the airfields of Soviet Tu-95 and M-4 heavy bombers. Another thing is that these tasks have now been largely assigned to non-nuclear high-precision weapons. In terms of logistics, however, the concept of PGS still relies on the military and technological innovations of the 1970s. Global Strike Command units are equipped with B-2 Spirit (1988) and B-52 Stratofortress (1952) heavy bombers and LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs

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(1968). As part of the BSU framework, a series of projects have been launched to create fundamentally new types of weapons: • X-51A Waverider hypersonic cruise missiles, designed to reduce the flight time of high-precision cruise missiles; • experimental orbital aircraft Boeing X-37 (also known as X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle),48 which is designed to operate at altitudes of 200–750 km and is capable of rapidly changing orbits and maneuvering; • the Falcon HTV-2 hypersonic aircraft that could theoretically be used as maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV); • Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) aircraft designed to fly in the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. However, these programs have not brought great results so far. Only the Boeing X-37 and hypersonic X-51A cruise missiles have been partially successful. To date, a more realistic version of PGS is the idea of attacking the enemy with cruise missiles. At the heart of this concept is the task of suppressing air defense systems, which have made a serious step forward over the past 25 years. A promising approach in this regard is the development of the “swarm” concept.49 Its authors pay attention to the sharp rise in the cost of modern combat aircraft, including the most massproduced type—fighters (F-22 and F-35 proved too expensive even for the United States), as well as the emergence of new technological opportunities provided by robotization. Therefore, they offer a radical review of approaches to the form of aviation in the near future. On the logistical level, the PGS projects encountered the problem of cost effectiveness. It is too costly to build such systems against regional adversaries (not to mention terrorist enclaves)—having several aircraft carriers permanently on duty in an operational theatre is sufficient. When it comes to fighting major powers (e.g., Russia and China), it is cheaper and more effective to use SNF (in the case of an all-out conflict), or nonnuclear cruise missiles launched from the territorial waters or airspace of the US allies (in the event of a limited conflict). All the more so since pre-emptive actions by the enemy could lead to the loss of extremely expensive and technologically complex PGS assets. To date, it has not been determined against which adversaries and in what format PGS should be used. In the territories of “rogue nations” and

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“terrorist enclaves,” there is no proper list of targets for the use of such expensive and technically complex means. To hit targets in their territory, it is easier and more effective to use non-nuclear cruise missiles. The conventional strategy of fighting the Taliban using Falcon missiles does not justify itself either financially or strategically—none of the supposed non-nuclear means of the PGS program can yet compare with a massive strike of conventional cruise missiles like Tomahawk. Theoretically, new technical means (e.g. non-nuclear submarinelaunched ballistic missiles) could be used to hit some group of targets on the territory of other nuclear powers. Yet this does not guarantee that the enemy, first, will not respond with nuclear weapons and, second, will stop resisting and make peace. Perhaps the PGS can hit the enemy’s limited infrastructure in a certain theatre of operations (for example, the enemy’s air defense radar systems or airfields). However, for now, there are cheaper and more effective options for solving these problems. The Republican administration of Donald Trump tried to put the strategy of coercion on a more traditional footing. The US Nuclear Posture Review adopted in February 2018 relied on the “escalate to deescalate” doctrine, i.e., a limited strike with tactical nuclear weapons if a conventional conflict threatens to fail, with the goal of subsequently “dictating” the terms of peace settlement.50 This actually repeats the many variations of the Nixon administration’s concept of deterring the enemy by threatening to defeat a limited set of its targets. The updated document ensured that “the United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready and appropriately tailored to deter twenty-firstcentury threats” and reassure the US allies of the power and reliability of Washington’s nuclear umbrella. The new Republican administration justified its intentions by citing the lack of modernization of the US Strategic Nuclear Forces over the previous 25 years, which could possibly put it behind the Russian strategic nuclear forces.51 Technical options for modernizing the US strategic nuclear forces still remain at the level of the 1970s. The main focus is on their naval component. The Trident-P submarine-launched ballistic missiles that entered service in 1990 now carry more than 60% of the nuclear warheads in the US arsenal. High precision solutions made it possible to equip the Trident-P14 with light W76 warheads of 100kt each, which increased the probability of destroying well-defended silos of the enemy’s land-based ICBMs. They are now gradually being re-equipped with W-87 and W-88 warheads, which are designed to hit highly defensive targets. Ideally, this

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could be seen as a means to launch a disarming strike or hit command centers. The withdrawal of the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 also fits into this logic. Their short flight times and high targeting accuracy make them an effective means of delivering a decapitation strike against the enemy. In theory, the United States has two options: (1) recreate the Pershing II intermediaterange missiles of the late 1970s; or (2) develop a new generation of intermediate-range missiles. In the latter case, cooperation with the United Kingdom and France, the traditional nuclear allies of the United States, is possible. • To date, the US version of the offensive deterrence doctrine has been the concept of coercion. However, its strategic and logistical equipment is still at the level of the 1970s. Not a single US administration in the past decade has been able to resolve this contradiction. The solution of this problem will apparently require either a new technical breakthrough or a radical change in attitudes to the role of nuclear weapons.

Russia After the Cold War In the Soviet Union, the doctrine of “nuclear deterrence” was not used officially. A key component of the Soviet nuclear strategy was the concept of constant factors, which was coined by Stalin. According to this concept, the fate of the war was determined by several constant factors, including: (a) the strength of the rear; (b) the morale of the army; (c) the number and quality of divisions; (d) the armament of the army; and (e) the organizational abilities of the army commanding officers.52 The invention of atomic weapons could not, in Stalin’s opinion, fundamentally change the nature of war and the role of permanent factors53 : thus, he believed that the fate of World War III would be decided not by atomic bombardment, but by constant factors. A turning point in the Soviet understanding of the role of nuclear weapons came in the second half of the 1960s. Officially, the Soviet Union denied the strategy of flexible response. “The concept of a limited nuclear war is considered untenable in the Soviet military theory since it is practically impossible to keep a nuclear war within any predetermined limits,”

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read the 1983 edition of the Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary.54 At the same time, prominent strategists of that period (S.P. Ivanov, V.G. Kulikov, A.A. Grechko, D.F. Ustinov, I.G. Pavlovsky) distinguished five types of possible conflicts: • • • • •

a a a a a

temporary full-scale nuclear war; prolonged nuclear war using all types of armed forces; big war with the use of a limited number of nuclear weapons; big war with conventional weapons; local war with the use of conventional weapons.55

This meant that the Soviet military thinking considered the option of a war with limited use of nuclear weapons in one or more theatres of war.56 Army General Semyon Ivanov pointed to the possibility of a war involving several selective nuclear strikes against secondary targets. In this case, according to Ivanov, there would still be two types of war: a global war and a local war, in terms of scale, and a nuclear war and a non-nuclear war, in terms of weapons.57 This point of view echoed the concept of flexible response adopted by NATO in 1967 as the basis of its military and political doctrine. In fact, it was a question of the possibility or impossibility of maintaining a hypothetical conflict between NATO and the CFE at a pre-nuclear level. In the 1970s, the theory of a deep offensive operation was developed under the guidance of Army General Ivan Pavlovsky. It provided for the interaction of ground troops with other branches of the armed forces to ensure an offensive to the full depth of the enemy’s operational structure. The purpose of this operation was a strategic offensive at a higher tempo and to a much greater depth than it was in the final phase of the Second World War. At the same time, a number of senior military commanders (I.G. Pavlovsky, A.A. Grechko, N.V. Ogarkov) conceptualized the nuclear conflict in the classical categories of victory and defeat. “The Soviet military thought has developed ways of conducting military operations both with and without the use of nuclear weapons,” it is said in the collective work Military-Technical Progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR (1982).58 So, in practice, the USSR followed many provisions of the flexible response strategy, including the elaboration of options to keep a hypothetical conflict in Europe and the Far East at a pre-nuclear level. Since the late 1960s, Soviet military and technical programs have

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focused on improving the counterforce capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces (from the creation of MIRVs to the deployment of mobile rail- and land-based ICBMs).59 A new trend in the Soviet nuclear strategy of the 1980s was the concept of an asymmetric response to the US Strategic Defense Initiative program.60 The Soviet experts were alarmed by the fact that the Reagan administration emphasized “exotic” means of destroying missiles and warheads in this program, including various types of lasers, beam weapons, and electromagnetic mass accelerator. The Soviet concept of asymmetric response involved increasing the resistance of the SNF to a pre-emptive strike by the enemy, enhancing the ability of the SNF to overcome missile defense, and developing the means to defeat and neutralize it, especially with regard to its space components. In the early 1990s, Russian experts at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SFDP) came to the conclusion that Russia would not be able to maintain parity with NATO in conventional weapons. This increased the role of the nuclear component of Russia’s military policy. The draft National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (March 1995) declared the main task of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces to be “nuclear deterrence.” Both editions of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (1997 and 2000) stated the task of pursuing a policy of nuclear deterrence to prevent military aggression against Russia and its allies.61 At the same time, the Russian Federation lowered its nuclear threshold. In 1982, the Soviet Union committed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (which was voiced as early as in Leonid Brezhnev’s speech on November 6, 1977). The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (November of 1993) did not include this obligation. The changes were enshrined in the 2000 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which allowed for the use of nuclear weapons to repel aggression with both nuclear and conventional weapons.62 The lowering of the nuclear threshold prompted the Russian leadership to refer to the concept of “assigned damage.” This means the possibility of hitting a certain set of targets in order to force the enemy to negotiate. As General Viktor Yesin put it, “The criterion of ‘unacceptable damage’ has changed. This is why nuclear planning is now based on completely different data. It is believed that a full-fledged nuclear deterrent requires the ability to inflict ‘assigned damage.’”63 The parameters of this damage were indirectly outlined by Russian experts S.M. Rogov, V.I.

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Esin, and V.E. Yarynich. (“After all, even a ‘purely’ counterforce strike by the enemy would lead to the rapid death of 5–10 million people,” they wrote.)64 However, the transition to the concept of “assigned damage” effectively meant Russia’s acceptance of the American concept of “coercion,” i.e., it was a variant of offensive deterrence policy. On a conceptual level, the notion of “assigned damage” means nothing more than a repetition of the 1973 “Schlesinger Doctrine,” which involved deterring an enemy by threatening to hit a select set of targets. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Russian Federation continued to lower the nuclear threshold. In 2003, Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov stated that Russia had the right to launch pre-emptive strikes against an enemy that was preparing for aggression. In September 2004, immediately after the terrorist attack in Beslan, it was announced that Russia had the right to strike terrorist bases anywhere in the world (though it was stressed that such strikes would be carried out with nonnuclear weapons). In 2005, a corresponding amendment was made to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces have been assigned the following new tasks: • demonstrating resolve in times of threat by raising the level of readiness of the strategic nuclear forces, conducting exercises, and changing the dispositions of some of their components; • de-escalating aggression by threatening to launch strikes of various scales using conventional and/or nuclear weapons; • confirming the readiness to use certain components of SNF in combat operations by means of appropriate demonstrations.65 At the official level, it was only in President Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech on February 10, 2007 that the thesis was voiced about an adequate response to missile defense.66 For the first time since 1985, Russia announced the possibility of counteracting unfriendly US actions (in this case referring to NATO expansion and deployment of missile defense in Europe) by military means. To demonstrate the seriousness of its intentions, Russia imposed a moratorium on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in July 2007 and resumed regular flights of its strategic aircraft that had been frozen in 1992 (August 2007). The failure of negotiations on missile defense in 2010–2011 prompted Moscow to toughen its stance. The 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian

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Federation stated that nuclear weapons would remain an important factor in preventing nuclear and conventional military conflicts.67 Military threats to Russia included the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems, the militarization of outer space, the deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems, the spread of WMD, missiles and missile technologies, and the expansion of the “nuclear club.” The document confirmed that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in case of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened.” The Russian leadership subsequently pursued two lines of action here. The first is the modernization of the country’s SNF by increasing their counterforce capabilities. In 2009, the RS-24 Yars mobile and silo-based ICBM capable of carrying four warheads each, and four Project 955 Borei-class nuclear submarines with 64 R-30 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles were put into service. The Tu-160 heavy bombers capable of carrying 12 Kh-55SM or Kh-101 missiles were upgraded. At the same time, the development of new types of nuclear weapons carriers, which President Putin announced in his famous speech on March 1, 2018, is underway. These include the Sarmat ICBM, the Avangard boost-glide vehicle, the Poseidon super torpedo, and the Burevestnik cruise missile with Sarmat and Avangard nuclear power systems. Russia’s innovations have already caused alarm in Washington, with the United States examining the scenario of a Russian counterforce strike against the US strategic nuclear forces.68 The second is the elaboration of the concept of “non-nuclear deterrence.” As early as 2014, the Russian military doctrine adopted the term “non-nuclear deterrence system,” emphasizing the focus on preventing military conflicts by relying primarily on general-purpose forces rather than nuclear capabilities.69 At the end of 2017, Army General and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov described the emerging “nonnuclear deterrence groups” in terms of the weapons systems involved.70 These included the S-400 air defense and anti-missile system, the Bastion anti-ship coastal missile system, ships and submarines with the Kalibr missile system, and, with some reservations, the Iskander-M operationaltactical missile system. (Though, all the above systems are to some extent “dual-use” systems, i.e., they can be used both in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment.)

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An attempt to expand the concept of “non-nuclear deterrence” was made in 2019 by a group of Russian military experts led by Major General Andrey Sterlin.71 They proposed separating local and global objectives of strategic non-nuclear weapons (SNNW). In the first case, strategic non-nuclear weapons should be used to “halt hostilities with superior adversaries in the non-nuclear phase,” which can make strategic deterrence more flexible. In the second case, it is suggested that the tasks of the SNNW should include “the creation of non-nuclear barrier zones for the deployment of opposing strategic forces,” as well as “controlled countervalue escalation of military actions.” Therefore, according to the authors, SNNW could complement nuclear deterrence by providing the “strategic blocking” of local non-nuclear threats, while also preventing “local wars and armed conflicts” from escalating to the nuclear level. At the conceptual level, however, this approach was effectively a return to the ideas of Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who put forward the thesis that modern weapons (primarily high-precision weapons and advances in non-nuclear aviation technology) make it possible to solve tasks previously assigned to nuclear weapons during times of armed conflict. Ogarkov also supported the widespread introduction of automated control systems and some types of high-precision weapons into the armed forces. Ogarkov’s findings meant that the Soviet military thinking approached the idea of conducting a major offensive operation by nonnuclear means. In fact, the USSR began to embrace the concept of a high nuclear threshold, stipulating that a decision to use nuclear weapons might not necessarily be made during a limited war. The new conceptual framework of Russian nuclear deterrence policy was approved by Decree No. 355 of the President of the Russian Federation “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” dated June 2, 2020. This document defines the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence as “a totality of political, military, technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures, united by a common plan and implemented with the support of forces and means of nuclear deterrence, to prevent aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.” Russia thereby definitively accepted the American vision of nuclear deterrence as a policy of preventing military danger by influencing the opponent’s will. (“Nuclear deterrence is designed to ensure that potential adversaries understand the inevitability of retaliation in the

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event of aggression against the Russian Federation and [or] its allies,” the document says.) Situations in which Russia could use SNF include: • receiving reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies; • the use of nuclear weapons or other types of WMD by the enemy on the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies; • the enemy impacting the critical state or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the deactivation of which would disrupt the response actions of the nuclear forces; • aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, where the very existence of the state is threatened. The number of scenarios for a possible crossing of the “nuclear threshold” has thus been expanded. Most interesting is the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to the enemy using WMD against Russia’s allies, or the enemy impacting the critical state or military facilities of the Russian Federation. This means that Russia is coming to accept the concept of “limited nuclear war” at the official level.

Important

The Russian approach to the concept of nuclear deterrence is thus close to the American concept of “coercion.” Like coercion, the Russian concept relies on a high nuclear threshold and assumes the defeat of a select set of targets to force the enemy to peace. However, these concepts essentially reproduce American theories of deterrence of the early 1970s. They assume that an adversary can be deterred from aggression through preventive threats (1) to use a robust general-purpose force, and (2) to inflict “assigned damage” through limited nuclear strikes. In this sense, over the past 30 years, Russia has been absorbing the American concept of “flexible response” rather than proposing its own, qualitatively new concepts.

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Conceptual Shifts in the Strategies of Other Nuclear Powers Other concepts of using nuclear weapons are used by the “secondtier” nuclear powers. These countries do not have enough warheads and delivery systems at their disposal to destroy the strategic potential of Russia or the United States. Their nuclear capabilities allow them to launch only limited strikes of mostly medium and shorter ranges. Despite this, France, the United Kingdom, and China are moving from “defensive” to “offensive” deterrence models. This trend is most noticeable in the policy of France. Among the second-tier nuclear powers, France was the only one to officially proclaim a policy of nuclear deterrence. Its principles were developed during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle.72 The French concept of deterrence was based on the idea that a weaker state in military terms could deter a stronger one from aggression through the threat of a countervalue strike. Several key cities in the territory of a potential enemy were chosen as the most likely targets for nuclear strikes.73 The French concept of deterrence was based on three pillars: 1. dissuasion—influencing the enemy’s will by the threat of a countervalue nuclear strike in order to force it to give up aggression; 2. persuasion—demonstrations of force to dissuade the aggressor from starting a war; 3. defense—the direct use of military force if the deterrence strategy does not work and force has to be used. Initially, this strategy had a defiantly anti-Soviet character.74 However, in 1964, President Charles de Gaulle moved to the concept of “independent military capabilities.” France refused to participate in the American project of multilateral nuclear deterrence and withdrew from the NATO military organization in 1966. But as early as the 1970s, the French deterrence policy underwent its first transformations, with the focus shifting to greater military cooperation between France and the European Community, and recognition growing for the advisability of integrating British and French nuclear forces into the overall deterrence system of the North Atlantic Alliance. In December 1974, Giscard d’Estaing signed a Joint Communiqué with US President Gerald Ford expressing his intention to continue close defense relations as a member of NATO.75 And in 1983,

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French President Francois Mitterrand supported the thesis that the security of the West is indivisible and declared his willingness to complement US nuclear safeguards with national means of deterrence. The second wave of transformation of the French policy of deterrence took place under President Nicolas Sarkozy. His approach was labeled “deterrence within Atlanticism.” The 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security changed the French concept of deterrence.76 The concept of “dissuasion” was replaced by “anticipation and awareness” (“l’anticipation et conscience”), which emphasized the importance of intelligence services and information and space systems. A fourth component was added to the deterrence strategy—“intervention and prevention” (“l’intervention et la prevention”). This was about the ability to use force within the area of France’s strategic interests: the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. The 2008 White Paper confirmed France’s right to launch a countervalue nuclear first strike. In March 2009, France returned to the NATO military organization. Paris retained the three principles proclaimed in 1964 by Charles de Gaulle: (1) France’s autonomous decision to participate in NATO operations; (2) the refusal to place the French contingent under NATO command in peacetime; and (3) the French nuclear forces remain exclusively under national command. Different principles underlie the United Kingdom’s nuclear policy. London was initially oriented toward cooperation with Washington in terms of its military nuclear policy. The British strategic nuclear forces were incorporated into the US nuclear planning system. President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold MacMillan signed an agreement on the participation of British nuclear forces in NATO’s strategic nuclear forces on December 18, 1962, in Nassau, Bahamas. Washington promised to assist London in developing the means for delivering nuclear weapons. London pledged to place its SNF under NATO unified command in the event of war. The Nassau Pact is still in force today in its updated version. The core of the United Kingdom’s SNF is made up of four domestically produced Vanguard-class nuclear missile submarines. But the ballistic missiles they carry are the US-made Trident II missiles provided to London. In 2003, the Americans installed a new system for diverting Trident II missiles on their nuclear-powered submarines. Similar systems have been installed on British submarines. In the event of war, the British SNF would automatically be used together with the American SNF.

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The debate in the United Kingdom on the possibility of nuclear self-disarmament was truly original. On June 20, 2006, the House of Commons Defense Committee published its report entitled “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent.” The UK will need to consider whether nuclear deterrence remains necessary in the current strategic environment, the report said.77 The following arguments were put forward in favor of renouncing nuclear weapons: nuclear guarantees from the United States; the absence of nuclear guarantees from the United Kingdom to allies; the non-use of nuclear warheads during wars; and the danger of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. In June 2007, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett supported the idea of “global zero” and stated that the United Kingdom could become a “disarmament laboratory.” Such projects could make the United Kingdom the first nuclear power to abandon nuclear weapons. However, on May 12, 2010, the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron formed the first coalition government in the country’s post-war history. Cameron’s cabinet then embarked on an offensive foreign policy, dubbed “neo-imperial” by the media. One of the reasons was Cameron’s statement on October 19, 2011, that after the Libyan war, the United Kingdom had “returned to 1943” in terms of its power on the Mediterranean. In October 2010, the United Kingdom’s new Strategic Defence and Security Review “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty” was published.78 The document stressed London’s commitment to a nuclear deterrence policy based on the naval component of the SNF and on the 2006 program to upgrade the Trident II SLBMs and replace the Vanguard-class submarines. The overall nuclear weapon stockpile was reduced to 180, of which no more than 120 were operationally available. Disarmament problems were only mentioned in the context of global UN initiatives. At this point, the United Kingdom and France started to coordinate their nuclear policies. On November 2, 2010, the two countries signed a declaration on defense and security cooperation for a period of 50 years. The document provided for: (1) the creation of common expeditionary forces; (2) increased interaction in the naval and air spheres; and (3) coordination of activities in matters of cybersecurity. At the same time, the sides concluded an agreement on cooperation in the military use of atomic energy, especially the electronic modeling of nuclear tests. The package

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of UK–France agreements of November 2, 2010 was called the “Lancaster House Treaties.” (This name also alluded to the Lancaster dynasty’s fifteenth-century project to create a united Anglo-French kingdom.) Later on, the United Kingdom and France further expanded their cooperation. On January 31, 2013, during a meeting at the airbase near Oxford, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Francois Hollande signed a package of agreed documents that included cooperation in the design and production of military drones and antiship missiles. In addition, a program to train pilots to fly military planes was penciled in. The parties agreed on joint investments in the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston, UK, to jointly develop nuclear weapons and exchange scientific and technical information. An agreement of intent was also signed at the meeting, setting up a structure for the exchange of operational intelligence between the UK and French secret services. In particular, there were plans to jointly collect and process information on French and British citizens participating in militant Islamist groups. For the first time since 1949, the United Kingdom entered into a privileged military-political partnership with a country in continental Europe without US involvement. The UK–France agreements and the subsequent Libyan War in 2011 have effectively changed the structure of the European Union. The dissolution of the Western European Union in 2011 and lack of progress on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) signaled clearly that the leading role in EU military policy was shifting to the UK–France tandem. This automatically makes the European Union more “Atlantic,” i.e., tied to the NATO mechanism and the American presence in Europe. Thus, the potential for dissatisfaction with French policy is growing in continental Europe. The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union in 2020 poses a new problem: France has not renounced the Lancaster House Treaties and formally maintains a priority alliance with London. This alliance was complemented by the UK–Poland Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation concluded on December 21, 2017, which repeats the contours of the “Entente” of 1939. This situation effectively undermines the French concept of a single EU nuclear capability. On the contrary, France is now joining the nuclear alliance between Washington and London through an alliance with the United Kingdom. This scenario renders the project to create a pan-European armed force in the near future unrealistic.

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Unlike France and the United Kingdom, China has never framed its nuclear policy along the lines of deterrence. After it created nuclear weapons in 1964, the government of Mao Zedong took on two restrictions: to not be the first to use nuclear weapons, to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Unlike Russia, China has not revised its commitments since. This, as well as the technical weakness of China’s nuclear capabilities, prevents Beijing from developing its concept of nuclear deterrence. It was only in the 1980s that the conceptual foundations of China’s nuclear doctrine came to light. The first concept—that of “local wars”— did not involve the use of nuclear weapons. The second—the concept of “limited nuclear retaliation”—involved building compact nuclear forces. Such forces were supposed to be capable of carrying out combat missions in various military and political environments and under any military and strategic conditions. This meant that China’s leadership abandoned the idea of achieving parity with the USSR/Russia and the United States. In the 1990s, US experts widely discussed China’s transition to the concept of “limited deterrence.”79 This was about the possibility of using part of China’s nuclear weapons to deter the United States at the regional level. Beijing could hypothetically threaten to launch nuclear strikes against US military bases in the Pacific, American aircraft carriers and targets on the territory of US allies. New trends became visible in China’s nuclear policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The 2008 Defense White Paper emphasized the importance of creating a peaceful environment to boost China’s economic potential. There is evidence that China is developing the concept of “active defense,” which implies a full-scale retaliatory attack against an aggressor and strikes against its vulnerabilities. However, China has not yet announced a new approach to the functional role of nuclear weapons in its military and political strategy. A new maritime strategy may become a special focus of China’s nuclear policy. It is based on the String of Pearls concept, developed in 2010,80 which involves the creation of a series of naval bases along the entire transit route of hydrocarbons from the Middle East to China. This option involves the construction by China of an ocean-going fleet and the strengthening of the naval component of the SNF. This will objectively aggravate the complex of China’s contradictions with neighboring countries (from Japan to Vietnam and Malaysia), while also giving new impetus to the development of US concepts of the “containment of China.”

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At the beginning of the twenty-first century, experts began to discuss the modernization of China’s nuclear capabilities, prompted by the shifts in Beijing’s nuclear doctrine.81 According to the 2008 Defense White Paper, the country’s nuclear forces were aimed at preventing the threat of nuclear weapons being used against China. The document also said that China’s navy was focused on enhancing its “integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterstrike capabilities.” These theses have given rise to numerous publications on changes in Beijing’s nuclear policy. According to Russian experts, the most likely course of action for China over the next few years will be to demonstrate its technical capabilities in order to overcome the advanced US missile defense systems and enhance the combat stability of its strategic nuclear forces including its transition from a “monad” of ICBMs to a “dyad” of ICBMs plus SLBMs.82 A.G. Arbatov and V.Z. Dvorkin predicted in 2005 that China’s nuclear arsenal would improve along three lines over the subsequent 10–15 years: • creation of solid-propellant land-based missiles with a range of 8000–12,000 km; • construction of a next-generation nuclear submarine; • equipping nuclear-powered missile carriers with 16 sea-based ballistic missile launchers with a range of up to 8000 km.83 However, such predictions have not yet materialized for a number of reasons. China only achieved success toward the end of the 2010s. It is developing new Jin-class submarines capable of carrying 12 Julian-2 (JL2) ballistic missiles with a range of 8000–12,000 km. These missiles are the underwater version of China’s newest land-based strategic missiles, the DF-31. According to US expert estimates,84 China had up to 80 intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) by 2020. The DF-26 (Dong Feng-26) missile of this type has a maximum range of 4000 km and is capable of conducting precision strikes against ground and ship targets. The Pentagon estimates the number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) at between 150 and 450. The largest group of China’s missile arsenal is made up of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). US experts put their number at between 750 and 1500, but their ability to carry nuclear warheads remains debatable. China, therefore, does not yet

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have the ability to guarantee the destruction of US strategic capabilities: it can only be about hitting a select set of US targets. First of all, China has failed to offer original research projects in rocket science. Over the past 50 years, Beijing has repeated, with varying degrees of success, the experience of the Soviet missile programs of the 1950s and 1960s. At the new stage, these programs naturally required considerable modernization, yet China has not offered any breakthrough developments. Another reason undermining China’s nuclear ambitions is the insufficient development of basic sciences in China (as in all countries of the Asia–Pacific Region). No other APR nation boasts a full range of research in the natural and exact sciences. They lack theoretical research on such problems, and there are no national scientific schools in the basic sciences. The Asia–Pacific countries have to import Russian space technologies, which makes them dependent on other powers. Another reason is that, since the late 1980s, Beijing has been focusing on a system of “rocket imports” rather than on building national rocket production facilities. China is developing separate segments of the rocket and space industry, yet the key technological solutions come from Russia. Hence the high vulnerability of China’s nuclear program to a possible reduction in imports of Russian rocket and space technology. These trends prevent China’s nuclear capabilities from reaching a qualitatively new level of development.85 It remains technically small and highly vulnerable to a counterforce strike by the strategic nuclear forces of leading nuclear powers. In such a situation, Beijing appears to be betting on a first, rather than a retaliatory or counterforce nuclear strike. At the same time, China is showing its growing strategic capabilities. In October 2019, the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, whose warhead, according to Chinese state media, can reach hypersonic speed, was demonstrated for the first time at a parade in Beijing. Thus, China can be considered the second power after Russia to possess hypersonic weapons. Beijing is currently developing a new generation of Type-096 strategic submarines, the construction of which is scheduled to start in the early 2020s. These measures by Beijing are clearly precautionary in nature against the United States, which in itself is not typical of China’s military policy.

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∗ ∗ ∗ By the early 2020s, the legal nuclear powers had completed their conceptual shift from defensive to offensive deterrence. The defensive model of deterrence treated nuclear weapons as a means of preventing aggression, while the offensive model saw the limited use of force as part of coercing an opponent to perform certain acts that it would not willingly do. Offensive deterrence requires the availability of military-technical systems adapted to carrying out a pre-emptive strike, along with the high security of nuclear weapons, the flexible schemes of using them, and the possibility of joint operations involving both nuclear and conventional weapons. Changes in the nuclear deterrence policy are clearly visible in the doctrines of Russia and the United States, and, to a smaller extent in the nuclear doctrines of the United Kingdom, France, and China. However, the concepts of offensive deterrence proclaimed by the nuclear powers still lag behind their material and technical equipment. They rely on the technical foundations of the early 1970s (remarkably, civilization has not created any fundamentally new weapons since that time). So far, no reliable technical support for the old doctrines has been created. For now, the way out is to raise the nuclear threshold: the ability to conduct hostilities using conventional weapons for a relatively long period of time. In such a situation, a regional conflict between nuclear powers could become a great temptation for political elites in the coming decades.

Keywords Nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, counterproliferation, concept of minimal deterrence, strategies of the nuclear powers, Cold War. Self-Test 1. In your opinion, is it correct to separate the “pre-nuclear” and “nuclear” eras? Provide a reasoned argument. 2. How was the concept of “nuclear deterrence” developed? Identify the main stages in the evolution of this concept. 3. What is the fundamental difference between the US and Soviet/Russian interpretations of deterrence policy? 4. What was new in the approaches to deterrence at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

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5. What are the specific features of the French and British concepts of “nuclear deterrence”? 6. What changes are underway in China’s nuclear strategy?

Notes 1. A.I. Nikitin and P.A. Korzun, eds., International Security, Arms Control, and Nuclear Nonproliferation: 70 Years After the Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 2016); A.G. Arbatov, and V.Z. Dvorkin, eds., Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011); A.A. Kokoshin, Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and the Present (Moscow: KRASAND, 2009). 2. For more detail, see: A.V. Fenenko, Modern International Security: The Nuclear Factor (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2013). 3. A. Arbatov, and V. Dvorkin, eds., Nuclear Deterrence and Nonproliferation (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2005), 12–14. 4. Giulio Douhet, “Command of the Air,” in Collected Works on Air Warfare (Moscow: Voenizdat NKO USSR, 1936). 5. See: V. Kotelnikov, Giant Airplanes of the USSR (Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009). 6. See: V.A. Veselov and A.V. Fenenko, “‘Air Power’ in World Politics,” International Trends 14, no. 3 (46) (2016): 6–27. 7. K. Barz, Swastika in the Air: The Struggle and Defeat of the German Air Force 1939–1945 (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2009). 8. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Washington: Air University Press, 1987). 9. See: R.J. Overy, “Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory Before 1939,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 1 (1992): 73–101. 10. Anthony Cave Brown, ed., Drop Shot. The United States Plan for War with Soviet Union in 1957 (New York: Dial Press, 1978), 1–2. 11. D. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring, 1983): 3–71. 12. A.V. Fenenko, “Modern Concepts of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Trends 10 (2012): 73. 13. John F. Dulles, “A Policy of Boldness,” LIFE 32, no. 20 (1952): 146– 157. 14. The technical basis for “massive retaliation” was the 1960 Strategic Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), which provided for the use of 3400 strategic nuclear warheads for a massive nuclear strike.

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15. This term was introduced by Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his speech at the National Press Club in Washington on December 14, 1953. He used it to describe the first draft of the new administration’s military budget (for the 1955 financial year). As the Admiral was speaking to the press, he used a slang expression associated with the new style of women’s clothing “New Look,” which was coined by Christian Dior in 1947. 16. V.G. Trukhanovsky, English Nuclear Weapons (Historical and Political Aspects) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1985). 17. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Preaeger, 1965). 18. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 19. See: Walter S. Poole, Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960–1968 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). 20. A “strategic triad” includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers (HBs). 21. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983). 22. National Security Decision Memorandum. No. 242. January 17, 1974. Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ nsdm-nixon/nsdm_242.pdf. 23. For more details on these discussions, see: Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 24. N.A. Kosolapov, “Nuclear Deterrence in a Post-Bipolar World,” Lenta. Politics (April 7, 2009). 25. George Bush, Remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony in College Station. May 12, 1989, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=17022. 26. George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress. September 11, 1990, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3425. 27. See, for example: Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander George, and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Westview Press, 1994). 28. George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. 29. This problem was first analysed in detail in: Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, ed. by D. Brennan (New York, 1961). 30. Morgan, Deterrence Now, 1–2. 31. Lawrence Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion. Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 16. 32. Lawrence Freedman, and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict. 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

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33. Paul H. Nitze, “Is It Time to Junk Our Nukes? The New World Disorder Makes Them Obsolete,” Washington Post (January 16, 1994): 1. 34. Harlan K. Ullman, and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington: National Defense University, 1996). 35. William M. Arkin, and Hans Kristensen, “Dangerous Direction,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 30. 36. Reconsidering the Nuclear Strategy: Materials for Les Aspin’s Press Briefing in Nuclear Proliferation (May 1994), vol. 2. 37. Nuclear Posture Review. September 18, 1994, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/95_ npr.htm. 38. See: M.L. Boldrick, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks,” U.S. Army War College (Winter 1995/96), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ usawc/parameters/Arti-cles/1995/1995%20boldrick.pdf. 39. Pursuing a Strategy of Mutual Assured Safety Remarks by Defense Secretary William J. Perry at the National Press Club (Washington, 1995, January 5), http://www.fas.org. 40. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 5–42; Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107–135. These sentiments were summed up in the work: Bill Gertz, The China Threat. How the People’s Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000). 41. David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China?” International Security 21, no. 2 (Autumn 1996): 180–209; Robert S. Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Autumn 2000): 87–123. 42. For more details see: A.V. Fenenko, Theory and Practice of Counterproliferation in US Foreign Policy Strategy (Moscow: KomKniga, 2007). 43. George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 44. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January–February 2009): 28–40. 45. Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, https://dod.defense.gov/Por tals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_ Report.pdf. 46. Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, https://dod.defense.gov/Por tals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_ Report.pdf. 47. Hans Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of American Scientists, February 2010, https://fas.org/blogs/security/ 2010/02/warplan/.

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48. “X-37 Demonstrator to Test Future Launch Technologies in Orbit and Reentry Environments,” https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/ background/facts/x37facts2.html. 49. Paul Scharre, “Robotics on the Battlefield. Part II: The Coming Swarm,” Center for a New American Security (October 15, 2014), https://www. files.ethz.ch/isn/184587/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf. 50. Nuclear Posture Review. February 2018: VII–VIII, https://media.def ense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POS TURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 51. Steve Holland, “Trump Wants to Make Sure U.S. Nuclear Arsenal at ‘Top of the Pack,’” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumpidUSKBN1622IF. 52. I.V. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 5th ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1948): 43–44. 53. Answer of Comrade I.V. Stalin to a correspondent of Pravda about atomic weapons, Voennaya Mysl, no. 10 (1951): 4. 54. Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983): 842. 55. See: A.A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974); I.G. Pavlovsky, Soviet Ground Forces. Origin. Development: Modernity (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985); N.V. Ogarkov, “Defence of Socialism: History and Modernity,” Krasnaya Zvezda (May 9, 1984). 56. V. Sokolovsky, and M. Cherednichenko, “Military Strategy and Its Problems,” Voennaya Mysl, no. 10 (1968). 57. S. Ivanov, “Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy,” Voennaya Mysl, no. 5 (1969): 48. 58. Lt. Gen. M.M. Kiryan, Military and Technical Progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR (Analysis of the Development of Armament, Organization and Methods of Action) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), 312. 59. See: A.A. Kokoshin, Strategic Management: Theory, Historical Experience, Comparative Analysis, Tasks for Russia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 243– 245. 60. S.K. Oznobishchev, V.Y. Potapov, and V.V. Skokov, How an “Asymmetric Response” to Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative was Prepared: Velikhov, Kokoshin et al. (Moscow: LENAND, 2008). 61. Concept of the National Security of the Russian Federation, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (January 14, 2000). 62. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation of February 5, 2010, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (February 10, 2010). 63. V.I. Esin, “It Is Necessary to Proceed Not Only from Virtual Possibilities…” International Trends 9, no. 3 (27) (September–December 2011): 123. 64. Sergey Rogov, Viktor Esin, and Valery Yarynich, “The Fate of Strategic Arms After Prague,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (August 27, 2010), https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-08-27/1_strategic.html.

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65. Urgent Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2003), 42. 66. Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the discussion at the Munich Security Conference. Munich, February 10, 2007, Official website of the President of the Russian Federation, http://archive.kre mlin.ru/appears/2007/02/10/1737_type63374type63376type63377t ype63381type82634_118097.shtml. 67. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010, Rossiyskaya Gazeta. February 10, 2010. 68. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, January 4, 2020, http://russianforces. org/missiles/. 69. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Rossiyskaya Gazeta. December 30, 2014, https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html. 70. Speech by Army General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, at an Open Meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on November 7, 2017, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=121 49743@egNews. 71. A.E. Sterlin, A.A. Protasov, and S.V. Kreidin, “Modern Transformations of Concepts and Power Tools of Strategic Deterrence,” Voennaya Mysl, no. 8 (2019): 7–17. 72. Pierre Gallois, Strategy for the Nuclear Age (Moscow, 1964); Lucien Poirier, Essais de Strategic Theoritique (Paris, 1983); Alexandre Sanguinettie, La France et L’arme Atomique (Paris, 1964). 73. See: I. Tyulin, Foreign Policy Thought in Modern France (Moscow, 1988). 74. According to Nikolai Ogarkov, former Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, the Soviet command believed that the French SNF were primarily aimed at Moscow and Leningrad as the most important cities of the Soviet Union. See: V.A. Veselov, and A.V. Liss, Nuclear Deterrence (Moscow: MAKS Press, 2005), 90. 75. G. Vorontsov, Atlantic Relations and Modernity (Moscow, 1977), 97. 76. Le Livre blanc sur la defense et la securite nationale est public. 31.07.2008, http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/inform ation/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index. html. 77. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. Presented to Parliament by Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command for Her Majesty. December 2006. Crown Copyright. 2006: 25.

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78. Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command for Her Majesty. October 2010. 79. See: Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 5–42; Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Containment’ of China,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107–135. 80. Shen Dingli, “Do Not Shum the Idea of Setting up Overseas Military Bases,” China.org.cn (January 28, 2010), http://www.china.org.cn/opi nion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm. 81. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of [sic]. Beijing (April 27, 2004), https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/doctrine/fs042704.pdf. 82. A.A. Kokoshin, Nuclear Conflicts in the 21st Century, 43. 83. Arbatov and Dvorkin, Nuclear Deterrence and Nonproliferation, 50. 84. “China’s Nuclear Capabilities,” RIA Novosti (January 15, 2020), https:// ria.ru/20200115/1563372422.html. 85. Jeffrey Lewis, “The Ambiguous Arsenal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61, no. 3 (May–June 2005): 52–59.

Recommended Reading Arbatov, A., and Dvorkin V., eds. Nuclear Deterrence and Nonproliferation. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2005. Fenenko, A.V. Modern International Security: The Nuclear Factor. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2013. George, Alexander, and Simons, William. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Westview Press, 1994. Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Preaeger, 1965. Kokoshin, A.A. Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and the Present. Moscow: KRASAND, 2009. Kokoshin, A.A. Nuclear Conflicts in the 21st Century (Types, Forms, and Possible Participants). Moscow: Media-Press, 2003. Morgan, Patrick. Deterrence Now. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Powell, Robert. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Veselov, V.A., and Liss, A.V. Nuclear Deterrence. Moscow: MAKS Press, 2005. Veselov, V.A., and Fenenko, A.V. “‘Air Power’ in World Politics.” International Trends 14, no. 3 (46) (2016): 6–27.

CHAPTER 13

Digital Revolution and New Digital Markets: Competing Technology Platforms Ivan Danilin

A relatively new phenomenon that has a significant impact on global innovation and technological processes, including immediate consequences for international economic and political relations, is the accelerated development of emerging digital technologies and online markets in the 2010s. This was due to a unique set of circumstances. On the one hand, there are complex market and technological changes. The role of digital—information and communication—technologies (ICT) in the global economy continues to grow steadily. Considering the use of ICT in key industries, as well as the effects of ICT, the digital economy now accounts for about a quarter of global GDP.1 An important new development has been the rapid growth of online markets, which are included in the concept of internet economy (online commerce, sharing and other service aggregators, specialized services such as cloud

I. Danilin (B) Primakov National Reserach Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_13

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computing, etc., and related ICT sectors). In less than 15 years, online markets had grown from a fraction of a percent to 4% of global GDP by the end of the 2010s, outpacing both home economies and other ICT industries and markets.2 We are also witnessing the increasingly rapid development of advanced digital technologies (artificial intelligence, big data, blockchain, etc.), which had promised to form future markets and have the potential to transform almost all sectors of the economy and spheres of society, up to diplomacy and the military. On the other hand, since the 2010s, the rapid development of China and some other countries has been undermining the US-dominated unipolar digital world that had been forged by the internet revolution of the 1990s.

Important

In terms of global processes, we can identify a number of important consequences of the new stage of digitalization. First, the emergence of super large internet corporations as a new factor of technological competition (including its global economic and political implications). Second, the growing importance of technological competition between the leading powers, centered around the technology war between the United States and China. Finally, there are broader trends of the “geo-politization” of digital markets, with existing economic contradictions and accompanying geopolitical processes creating technical and economic “zones of influence” in the digital sphere, which are designed to ensure the leadership of powers in the global digital space.

Big Tech as a New Global Player The unique context of the internet revolution has spawned a new phenomenon of the global economy—super large corporations (so-called Big Tech), which play a structural role for online markets and advanced technologies, and now also for innovation processes at the level of entire industries and national economies. Although there are some strong

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players in the European Union, Japan, Russia, and India (sometimes world-class), the Big Tech sphere is largely dominated by two powers—the United States and China. According to studies carried out between 2016 and 2018, these two countries accounted for over 70–80% of all large internet companies (companies valued at $100 million or more and over $1 billion) and about 90–95% of their combined capitalization/value.3 Another important indicator is the absolute leadership in digital technology startups, before the Tech War approximately 50% of them were from the United States, while 25% were from China.4

Important

The emergence of the Big Tech phenomenon is directly related to the specific nature of today’s innovation and market processes in the internet segment, as well as in the financial sector. This is primarily due to the development of online transaction platforms driven by the creation of multilateral markets, where the key aspect of competitiveness is the maximum coverage of target audiences. The low marginal costs of scaling online businesses, as well as the global nature of online markets, have also played a part. Another factor is the situation on global capital markets, where investors looking for new promising investments quickly “pumped up” the most successful companies with huge resources, which, in turn, allowed Big Tech to embark on large-scale expansion, including through the acquisition of rivals and promising startups in new industry and geographic markets.

The number of Big Tech companies is quite impressive. They include both “newcomers” like China’s JD.Com and “veterans” of the digital transformation such as IBM . However, the biggest role is played by two groups of global corporations that focus on internet innovation, control key segments of online markets and investment flows, and are qualitatively superior to other players in terms of key economic indicators. This is a group of American companies collectively called GAFAM (acronym for Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, also known as FAMGA) and China’s BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent ).

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Over the past ten years, these companies have ranked among the largest multinational corporations in terms of online sales, profits, market reach, and other metrics. Most telling is their capitalization growth rate. At the beginning of 2010, the figure for GAFAM was just over $650 billion, compared to approximately $77 billion for BAT .5 Google, Apple and Microsoft were already among the largest companies by capitalization, but were far from the top. By the end of October 2020, internet corporations had taken the lead, with GAFAM ’s combined capitalization at more than $7 trillion and BAT ’s at more than $1.6 trillion, which together represent nearly 9% of the entire global stock market.6 GAFAM and BAT have become major players in the field of innovative development. At the end of 2019, research and development (R&D) and other technological expenditures of this “Group of Eight” topped $121.5 billion. For comparison, this is approximately 11% of the R&D of the world’s largest 2500 companies, whose investments in science and technology, in turn, determine about 90% of global business R&D.7 The R&D budget of GAFAM and BAT is 1.5–2 times higher than the total costs for science and technology of major companies in the automotive and pharmaceutical industries, and more than 10 times higher than those of the leading companies in the aerospace industry. Both groups are becoming important factors of national innovation development as well. In 2018, GAFAM ’s technology spending reached 27.7% of the United States’ total business R&D spending, and BAT ’s was about 6.1% of the Chinese business sector’s science and technology spending.8 And this, despite the fact that businesses account for around 70% of R&D spending in both countries. The role of these super large companies in the development of the venture capital market is equally important. The BAT group accounted for approximately 40% of all startup investments and acquisitions in China by 2017, while GAFAM was responsible for up to 20% of all startup investments and acquisitions.9 Meanwhile, GAFAM (12.5%) and BAT (46%) also were leaders in terms of their share of global investment in unicorn startups, most of which are developing new platforms and related business models, or other emerging digital technologies. It should also be noted that the focus of their attention is increasingly on breakthrough digital technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI). Finally, it is important to mention Big Tech’s tremendous role in advancing digital transformation in the United States, China and, to a lesser extent, in other countries, including the promotion of innovation

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ecosystems, scaling emerging technologies, and encouraging the adoption of new digital solutions by partners and rivals alike.

Important

Big Tech companies have become leading actors in their national innovation systems (NIS). As a result, the development of these digital super-giants and, more broadly, innovation ecosystems is increasingly becoming one of the key factors in the economic development and overall comprehensive leadership of the United States and China.10 This refers both to the traditional dimensions of power (military and soft power) and to the new dimension (digital power).

Defense agencies are clearly showing greater interest in Big Tech to address security issues. If we look at public information (available mainly in the United States), we can see active attempts to engage Big Tech to digitalize defense systems, develop autonomous combat and reconnaissance systems, and so on.11 Given Big Tech’s role in R&D and venture capital investment, the defense community appears to be one of the top beneficiaries of the development of digital giants, though big digital companies try to distance themselves from military tasks, citing reputational and ethical concerns.12 The issues of espionage and new forms of intelligence remain a sensitive yet highly relevant area for digital technology. Even allowing for the scarcity of data from open sources, we cannot rule out the possibility of potential access to various sensitive information through the services provided by digital platforms, including socioeconomic data or information about critical infrastructure.13 It is not surprising that there have been growing restrictions on the access of foreign big companies and startups to personal data, both during the US–China technology war and as part of the European Union’s efforts to advance its digital sovereignty. At the same time, speculation about the risks of such espionage is itself becoming an economic and geopolitical weapon in the spirit of the “Thomas theorem.” For example, consumer fears in developed countries about spying through Chinese online apps or 5G are skilfully exploited by the United States to limit the expansion and competitiveness of China’s technology business.

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Big Tech also plays an important role in terms of cultural and ideological influence. In particular, we should mention neo-Marxist ideas about the role of social media and media platforms in the reproduction of US leadership and influence through the export of mass culture and other elements of what is known as “soft power.”14 The same tendencies are becoming increasingly visible on Chinese platforms, from Tencent to Alibaba services. Closely related to this theme is the debate surrounding the influence of social media and other digital platforms on domestic socio-political and ideological processes in third countries. Due to the many myths and uncertainties surrounding this phenomenon, it is impossible to assess its real scope and depth. However, the ongoing discussions suggest that (as in the case of cyber espionage) Big Tech may have an impact in this area as well—or could serve as a tool of influence for government agencies. This is indirectly confirmed by the high securitization of the problem of “external” influence of foreign actors on citizens through online platforms and social media (cf. China’s Firewall or the attempts of the United States to block the alleged Russian and Chinese “disinformation campaigns”). Finally, one more aspect is the growing role of social media and Big Tech in general for foreign policy, especially diplomacy.15 An almost classic example is “digital diplomacy” (especially for new generations of citizens, starting with millennials), including Twitter diplomacy and other new dimensions of public diplomacy.

Important

In general, super large digital (especially internet) corporations are becoming an important factor not only of competitiveness and development, but also of global influence, leadership and even dominance of the great powers. As a result, the development of these companies as a structural power in the digital sector becomes a key issue in terms of both economic expansion and national security and foreign policy activities.

It should be noted that escalating conflicts between national governments and big digital companies operating in these countries, especially antitrust investigations against Big Tech in the United States and China,

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do not undermine the crucial role played by super large digital corporations in the new global agenda.16 As for the United States, the goal (leaving out the domestic political implications) is not to weaken Big Tech as such, but to overcome the negative trends associated with the excessive concentration of capital and the adverse effects of monopolization on markets and innovation. In other words, the goal is to increase the dynamism and innovativeness of the digital segment, including as a condition for the emergence of new digital giants and (eventually) as a factor for enhancing the competitiveness of the existing ones. For other countries, the rationale may be different, including a higher level of integration in terms of the positions and capacities of businesses and governments.

The US–China Technology War as a Structural Global Conflict Important

The growing importance of digital technologies and major structural digital players for the various dimensions of power and capacity of the powers has led to increased conflicts in this area. The most significant phenomenon in this regard has been the US–China technology war that has been waging since 2018. It overlaps with and adds to trade and economic and geopolitical tensions, becoming an important integral part of a pivotal conflict of our time.

Initially, China served as a “global factory” or supplier of low-margin hi-tech products in global value chains. However, due to consistent government policy and China’s favorable global economic situation, the country was able to gradually build up its scientific, technological, and production potential, with Chinese corporations transforming from imitators into advanced technological and innovative companies, including in terms of business models. Some of the most visible success stories include Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba, ZTE, and many others. China’s innovation and technology companies have also made great strides in the development of certain groups of emerging and transformative technologies, such as AI. In the new environment, the ICT sector—especially the production of personal electronics, advanced telecommunications solutions (which are

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becoming an increasingly important factor), and the internet segment— has expanded its role not only in exports, but also in the development of national innovation systems (NIS). In 2015–2018, China was ready for a new phase of development through the creation of promising 5G telecommunications standards and advanced digital solutions in the field of AI, blockchain, etc., providing conditions for the development of its own sophisticated microelectronic products (albeit mostly using foreign manufacturing facilities). Combined with new personal electronics and internet solutions, 5G networks—if scaled up globally—may both shake American digital hegemony and turn China, driven by the trends of the new digital revolution (the Internet of Things, Industry 4.0, etc.), into a player at least fully equal to the United States. Such a situation was unacceptable for Washington, especially given the continued debate about China undermining US competitiveness, coupled with growing geopolitical tensions. The Donald Trump administration that came to the White House in 2017 launched a trade war and then a tech war against China, extending the restrictions that had been put in place under Barack Obama.17 The attack on China’s digital sector was intended, on the one hand, to reduce the development potential of the Chinese economy and prevent it from moving to a higher level of innovation. Interestingly, the debates on 5G, and to a lesser extent on other emerging digital technologies, were almost in the same “geopolitical” terms as Mackinder’s. Another goal that was pursued quite formally was to limit China’s military and technical might and its intelligence capabilities, taking ideas about the “dual” nature of China’s technological development (including so-called military-civilian integration) into account.18 The technology war addressed a number of key objectives. The first goal was to undermine the positions held by the leading manufacturers of telecommunications systems and personal electronics (Huawei, ZTE, and, from 2021, Xiaomi) and microelectronic products (SMIC, HiSilicon, and promising startups and consortiums) as a driving force behind digital transformations and China’s ambitious plans for a digital breakthrough. In particular, a ban was imposed on the supply of Huawei telecommunications systems to the United States, and a dialogue was initiated with allied and partner countries to end cooperation with China in the 5G sector. Restrictions were introduced on the supply of

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Huawei’s advanced chips and other digital solutions. At first, these restrictions only applied to American companies—with a temporary licensing regime for exports (which was canceled in August 2020). However, later the restrictions were extended to any suppliers using American technology (that is, against almost all global companies). Another focus has been the pressure on up-and-coming Chinese startups related to the development of advanced technologies. For example, under the pretext of violating the rights of the Uyghur minority, sanctions were imposed in the autumn of 2019 against a number of small innovative companies with leading positions in China’s segments of AI (SenseTime Group, Ltd. and Megvii Technology, Ltd.), cloud (CloudWalk Technology and NetPosa), and other emerging technologies. Since late 2018, the United has been cutting China and Chinese companies off from the American science and capital markets as critical drivers of innovation. Starting in the second half of 2019, the participation of US scientists in China’s Thousand Talents program has been curtailed. A number of high-profile investigations have been opened into the illegal transfer of intellectual property to China, which also had an obvious demonstration effect on the academic community. Inspections of US universities for foreign (that is, Chinese) sources of funding began at the end of the year, with departmental and other official documents and recommendations being issued to discourage the use of Chinese money. Any opportunities for legal cooperation, joint scientific events, and other forms of scientific dialogue and interaction have diminished considerably. At the same time, visa restrictions for Chinese scientists and students have been stepped up, and the activities of Chinese professionals already working in the United States have come under the scrutiny of government authorities. Washington has also been reducing opportunities for Chinese investors to access the US venture capital and market. With the adoption of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA, 2018) and, more broadly, export control reform, stricter monitoring (including informal) was put in place, along with additional scrutiny for so-called critical technology. As a result, some deals with Chinese venture capital were put on hold, and some were thwarted altogether, making Chinese investors unwanted partners for US startups and venture capital funds. As a result, as early as 2019, the number of deals with at least one Chinese investor dropped by 30% or more, and their total volume was down by 40%.19

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The United States has tried to limit the access of Chinese companies to the US financial market, in particular by tightening the rules for initial public offerings (the final stage of development for startups) and corporate reporting. Since the spring of 2020, there have been reports of new requirements being worked out by the Department of the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), involving senior exchange executives and members of the US Senate. The formal pretext used by the SEC (which, it should be admitted, has real grounds) was the non-compliance by Chinese companies with the requirements of the SEC and the stock exchanges to provide some information to investors due to the specifics of Chinese regulation (the ban on disclosure of certain information). Finally, in August 2020, the US Department of the Treasury approved new regulations threatening companies that fail to meet the requirements of US regulators with various sanctions, up to and including delisting. Even such giants as Alibaba and Baidu came under threat. The end of Donald Trump’s term in office and the appearance of Joe Biden in his stead changed little in terms of the strategy of the technology war with Beijing. Rather, the “hot” phase of the war transitioned into a “cold” phase—with getting hotter again since the spring of 2022. Apart from the high-profile developments of this new “war,” which threatened the normal functioning of the global digital market (with China being a top producer and buyer of microelectronic products, accounting for up to 40% of the market or more), the events of 2018–2022 clearly signaled the emergence of a new situation in markets, including the crystallization of technological geopolitics as a new vector of international relations.

Digital Technology as a New Field of Global Competition: Toward Digital “Blocs”? Contradictions in the technology sphere—up to and including trade wars—are certainly not new. In particular, they characterized US–Japanese relations in the 1980s. Even in the context of the US–Chinese dialogue after 1991, technology-related claims and sanctions were used occasionally: in addition to arms deliveries, they addressed a wide range of issues, from standards and intellectual property theft to China’s access to US space technology. However, the US–China technology war that was started under Trump is perhaps the first time that commercial technology became a key area of geopolitical competition. Historical parallels here are misleading and

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of little use. For example, if we look at the US–Japanese competition, we can see that Tokyo never displayed any global geopolitical ambitions. As for the Cold War, given its chosen economic model, the USSR was never going to compete with the United States in the field of commercial technology. In addition, we must not forget that, for all the acuteness of the US–Chinese technology conflict, which has serious implications for the world economy and politics, it is only one episode in the struggle for technological leadership, which is increasingly taking on a geopolitical coloring

Important

What we are seeing right now—and what we will continue to see moving forward—is advanced digital technologies becoming a new, independent space of global competition, not only for companies, but also for countries. The reasons are obvious: first of all, the great importance that digital technology has for the economy, security (from military ICT systems and cyber espionage and cyber sabotage challenges to the smooth operation of critical infrastructures), “soft” power, and other aspects of the total capacity of powers. An additional factor of competition is that maximum access to raw data—the “new oil” of the digital economy—is crucial for digital leadership. Maximizing the reach, and ideally control, of data markets means acquiring asymmetric economic and other advantages for corporations and countries alike.

A direct consequence of the current situation is the increasing relevance of issues related to digital (and, more broadly, technological) sovereignty. This topic is most actively discussed in the European Union, where far-reaching plans for technological development are being shaped.20 However, it is de facto characteristic of all actors—from China, with its expanded technical and technological import substitution and robust science build-up, to the United States, which seeks above all to create optimal conditions and directly subsidizes the emergence or “return” from abroad (re-shoring) of some crucial technology businesses.

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Important

Another major trend that is indicative of the global and multidimensional nature of technological competition processes, is the rapidly growing emergence of techno-economic regimes. The formation of these regimes is supported by the creation of their own systems of technical standards and regulations related to technology, investment, etc. (as factors of non-tariff import restrictions and efforts to reduce the competitive advantage of foreign companies) and has some similar features to the zones of influence. In particular, the de facto evaluation of such zones is a factor of technological sovereignty and projection of one’s influence, global power, etc. In the West, the largest project of this kind is the digital “regime” of the European Union.

Unable to create any analogues of GAFAM and BAT and clearly lagging behind in the “race” for AI and other new digital technologies, the European Union has focused on protective measures and efforts to create a special digital jurisdiction. Its main tool is managing access to the European Union’s key competitive advantage in the digital sphere—the European data market, the largest in the world, given Europe’s economic and demographic potential. The European Union is building a specialized pan-European regulatory regime with elements of extraterritoriality. Emphasis is placed both on leveling out what is seen as “unfair” or inconsistent with the spirit of the Union, primarily the US Big Tech competitive practices, and on the tougher (than in the United States and China) protection of consumers, their personal data and other aspects of digital identity as a key standard of the European regime. In fact, the consumer is offered a more comfortable and safer alternative to the American and Chinese models. This creates additional stimuli for the development of European companies, in particular those related to maintaining the new regime and creating digital solutions based on the new regulatory and ethical principles (for example, on the “ethics by design” principle), but also creates more problems primarily for US Big Tech, forcing nonEuropean digital companies to make additional technological investments in the European Union to comply with the spirit and letter of EU laws.

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Along with the development of a common pan-European digital market and preliminary agreements with the United States on privacy, the best known and most important step in this direction was the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR—EU Regulation No. 2016/679 of 2018). Other measures, up to codes of ethics for AI, are also being considered.21 It should also be noted that another focus of efforts is to give European regulation the status of a de facto model, which offers tangible advantages to the holder of key practices in this area—the European Union. For now, the United States is relying more on the expansion of its Big Tech, while putting maximum pressure on its Chinese rivals. However, in the future, the United States will most likely return to the logic of international agreements (that is, the same regimes) to develop the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which were discarded by the Trump administration. As for China, it is trying to create a zone of digital influence based on different principles—through investments, trade agreements, etc., primarily in the framework of its geo-economic mega-project, the Belt and Road Initiative. An important confirmation of this is both the expansion of China’s Big Tech in the Belt and Road countries, the creation of an internet infrastructure and 5G networks as part of this initiative, the development of systems for the collection and analysis of geo- and climate data to support economic objectives, and other measures within the Digital Silk Road concept.22 ∗ ∗ ∗ Digital technology is emerging as a new field and an independent factor in the competition of powers that have significant geopolitical and international political implications, organically complementing the already existing tensions in the sphere of economy and politics. These processes are further intensified by the rapid development of the markets of the future, which are expected to influence the process of laying the foundations for the coming world order.23 The new competition requires new tools and forms of influence and confrontation. A special role will be played by super large digital companies, along with technology wars and the creation of techno-economic regimes. All this leads to the strengthening of “technological sovereignties” and the structuring of the digital

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sphere of influence, including economic, cultural, and other dimensions (verging on the ideology of “blocs”). A separate issue is the role of small and developing countries in the new digital reality. Despite the fact that their digital and/or scientifictechnological and financial potential is significantly lower than that of the leading nations, they also have certain opportunities ahead. One possible strategy is a combination of “local” techno-economic regimes and the development of national or regional Big Tech analogues. The alternative option is a strategy of niche leadership to ensure a worthy role in the markets of the future. A common factor here is the emphasis on emerging and transformative digital technologies as an integral element of the chosen model. Since each of the strategies has its own advantages, the crucial factor will be the international situation on the one hand, and the more general issues of scientific, technological, and socioeconomic development of these countries on the other. Excessive digital “regionalization,” and especially technology wars, are seen as less than optimal or even dead-end ways to develop a digital economy that exists thanks to open innovations and global markets, as well as the universality of standards and norms. Therefore, some compromises and alternative paths of development—even if they do not imply the complete resolution of contradictions—are inevitable. However, their parameters have yet to be determined by the leading countries and other key stakeholders, taking technological, economic, geopolitical, and sociocultural (including values-based) arguments into account.

Keywords Digital economy, emerging digital technologies, Big Tech, technoeconomic regimes, United States, China. Self-Test 1. What is behind the growing geopolitical component of competition in the field of digital technology and markets? 2. What are the key processes and factors that define today’s competition and confrontation of powers in the digital sphere? 3. What is the role of super large digital corporations in the competition of powers in the digital sphere? 4. What are the differences in the approaches of powers to the construction of techno-economic regimes in the digital sphere?

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Notes 1. Measuring the Digital Economy. International Monetary Fund. The Staff Report. 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/ Issues/2018/04/03/022818-measuring-the-digital-economy; Digital Economy Report 2019. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Geneva: United Nations, 2019). 2. Kevin Barefoot, Dave Curtis, William Jolliff, Jessica R. Nicholson, and Robert Omohundro, Defining and Measuring the Digital Economy. Working Paper. The Bureau of Economic Analysis. U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.bea.gov/system/files/papers/WP2 018-4.pdf; Measuring The Digital Economy. 3. Peter C. Evans, and Annabelle Gawer, The Rise of the Platform Enterprise. A Global Survey. The Center for Global Enterprise (2016), https://www.thecge.net/app/uploads/2016/01/PDF-WEB-Pla tform-Survey_01_12.pdf; Rob Fijneman, Karina Kuperus, and Jochem Pasman, Unlocking the Value of the Platform Economy. Dutch Transformation Forum. KPMG N.V. 2018, https://dutchitchannel.nl/612528/ dutch-transformation-platform-economy-paper-kpmg.pdf. 4. A “Unicorn” is a startup with a market value of more than $1 billion. For the shares of different countries among unicorn companies’ jurisdictions, see CB Insights. 5. Calculated mainly based on data from Marketwatch.com. 6. Data as of the end of October 2020. Calculated based on data from YCharts.com and Yahoo Finance. Stock market data: Mark DeCambre, “Value of the World-Wide Stock Market Soars to Record $95 Trillion, Despite Resurgence of Coronavirus,” Marketwatch (November 12, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/value-of-the-worldwide-stock-market-soars-to-record-95-trillion-despite-resurgence-of-cor onavirus-11605196894. 7. The 2020 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. European Commission—Joint Research Centre. JRC123317 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020). 8. Data on the United States: Raymond M. Wolfe, “U.S. Businesses Reported $441 Billion for R&D Performance in the United States During 2018, a 10.2% Increase from 2017,” U.S. National Science Foundation InfoBriefs. NSF 20–316 (August 26, 2020), https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/ nsf20316/. Data on China: “Communique on National Expenditures on Science and Technology in 2018. National Bureau of Statistics of China,” National Bureau of Statistics of China (August 31, 2019), http://www. stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201909/t20190902_1695121.html. 9. Data source: CB Insights.

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10. I.V. Danilin, “The Influence of Digital Technology on Leadership in Global Processes: From Platforms to Markets?” Bulletin of MGIMO University 13, no. 1 (2020): 100–116; I.V. Danilin, and Z.A. Mamedyarov, “The Role of Global Platforms in Stimulating Digital Transformation: Competence and Innovation Aspects,” Bulletin of MGIMO University 13, no. 3 (2020): 267–282. 11. Kate Conger, David E. Sanger, and Scott Shane, “Microsoft Wins Pentagon’s $10 Billion JEDI Contract, Thwarting Amazon,” The New York Times (October 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/ 25/technology/dod-jedi-contract.html. 12. See, for example: Scott Shane, and Daisuke Wakabayashi, “‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work for the Pentagon,” The New York Times (April 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/tec hnology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html. 13. Greg Allen, and Taniel Chan, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/ files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf; Ben Scott, Stefan Heumann, and Philippe Lorenz, “Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Policy”, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung e.V (2018), 14–15, https://www. stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/ai_foreign_policy.pdf. 14. Jin Dal Yong, “Digital Platform as a Double-Edged Sword: How to Interpret Cultural Flows in the Platform Era,” International Journal of Communication, vol. 11 (2017): 3880–3898. 15. Alec Ross, “Digital Diplomacy and US Foreign Policy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 3–4 (2011): 451–455; Corneliu Bjola, and Marcus Holmes, eds., Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2015); Henry Kissinger, World Order (Moscow, AST, 2015), 445–468; Ellen Hallams, “Digital Diplomacy: The Internet, the Battle for Ideas & US Foreign Policy,” CEU Political Science Journal 5, no. 4 (2010): 538–574; Hamad Al-Muftah, Vishanth Weerakkody, Nripendra P. Rana, Uthayasankar Sivaraja, and Zahir Irani, “Factors Influencing E-Diplomacy Implementation: Exploring Causal Relationships Using Interpretive Structural Modelling,” Government Information Quarterly 35, Issue 3 (2018): 502–514. 16. N.I. Ivanova, ed. Innovation Competition (Moscow: Ves Mir, 2020). 17. Bruno Mascitellia, and Mona Chung, “Hue and Cry over Huawei: Cold War Tensions, Security Threats or Anti-Competitive Behaviour,” Research in Globalization 1 (2019); I.V. Danilin, “US–Chinese Technology War: Risks and Opportunities for China and the Global Technology Sector,” Comparative Politics Russia 11, no. 4 (2020): 160–176. 18. Dan Steinbock, “U.S.–China Trade War and Its Global Impacts,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 4, no. 4 (2018): 515–542;

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Haiyong Sun, “U.S.–China Tech War. Impacts and Prospects,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 5, no. 2 (2020): 197–212. Rebecca Fannin, “How the US–China Trade War Has Starved some Silicon Valley Start-Ups,” CNBC (February 1, 2020), https://www. cnbc.com/2020/01/31/chinese-venture-capitalists-draw-back-silicon-val ley-investments.html. Expanding the EU’s Digital Sovereignty. Official website of Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2020 (October 27, 2019), https://www.eu2020.de/eu2020-en/eu-digitalis ation-technology-sovereignty/2352828; T. Madiega, “Digital Sovereignty for Europe,” European Parliamentary Research Service, EPRS Ideas Paper, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/ 2020/651992/EPRS_BRI(2020)651992_EN.pdf. See, for example: Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. 2019. Report. Independent High-Level Expert Group On Artificial Intelligence (Brussels: European Commission), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-mar ket/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai. Huadong Guo et al., “The Digital Belt and Road Program in Support of Regional Sustainability,” International Journal of Digital Earth 11, no. 7 (2018): 657–669; Paul Triolo et al., “The Digital Silk Road: Expanding China’s Digital Footprint,” Eurasia Group (April 8, 2020), https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/ Digital-Silk-Road-Expanding-China-Digital-Footprint-1.pdf; Alex Capri, “Techno-Nationalism and Diplomacy: The US-China Race to Reshape Alliances, Institutions and Standards,” Hinrich Foundation (October 2020), https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/wp/tech/technonationalism-and-diplomacy/. This idea was most aphoristically expressed by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, who said the following about AI: “If someone can ensure a monopoly in the field of artificial intelligence […] he will be the ruler of the world.” See: “Putin, A Monopolist in the Sphere of Artificial Intelligence Could Become the Ruler of the World,” TASS (April 30, 2019), https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6489864.

Recommended Reading Bjola, C., and Holmes, M. Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2015. Danilin, I.V. “US–Chinese Technology War: Risks and Opportunities for China and the Global Technology Sector.” Comparative Politics Russia 11, no. 4 (2020): 160–176.

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Danilin, I.V. “The Influence of Digital Technology on Leadership in Global Processes: From Platforms to Markets?” Bulletin of MGIMO University 13, no. 1 (2020): 100–116. Ivanova, N.I., ed. Innovation Competition. Moscow: Ves Mir, 2020. Mascitellia, B., and Chung, M.. “Hue and Cry Over Huawei: Cold War Tensions, Security Threats Or Anticompetitive Behaviour?” Research in Globalization 1 (2019): 100002. Parker, G.G., Van Alstyne Marshall W., and Choudary, S.P. The Platform Revolution. Moscow: Mann, Ivanov & Ferber, 2017.

CHAPTER 14

Global Energy Trends Igor Tomberg

Fundamental shifts are taking place in the global energy industry. These are systemic changes in the industry’s technological basis. This part of the global economy is on the verge of an energy revolution driven by the transition from industrial to post-industrial energy.

Important

While in the Industrial Age the energy sector relied on the burning of fossil fuels transported over long distances and on the consumption of large amounts of energy, in the post-industrial world, the energy sector relies on renewable energy sources (nuclear), the

I. Tomberg (B) Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_14

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decentralization of sources and consumers, and the efficient use of relatively small energy flows.

Factors of Change and Global Challenges for Energy Markets A number of factors influence the development of the energy industry today. In addition to renewable energy sources, which are touted as the backbone of the future energy industry, the following sources are beginning to make a significant impact: distributed generation, digitalization of the economy, decarbonization of energy and industry in general, the introduction of energy storage systems (batteries, fuel cells), the transition to electric vehicles and, of course, energy conservation and energy efficiency. All this is especially relevant for Russia, which has an energy-saving potential of up to 40%.1 The current development of the world’s energy sector is influenced by two processes—the rapid growth of the industrial energy sector (and consumption of fossil fuels) in developing countries and the gradual transition of developed countries to the post-industrial energy paradigm. One of the key factors in the development of the energy industry is the environment. Within the framework of international environmental agreements (the Kyoto Protocol and post-Kyoto arrangements) and national environmental legislation, legal and economic mechanisms are being created aimed mainly at stimulating the transition to a new type of energy. According to Russian researchers, “under the influence of changes in energy policy and the development of new technologies, the world is entering the stage of the fourth energy transition to the widespread use of renewable energy sources and the displacement of fossil fuels. However, the pace of these changes and the speed of transition are associated with a high degree of uncertainty.”2 The first energy transition was from biomass to coal. In this process, the share of coal in total primary energy consumption increased from 5 to 50% in the period from 1840 to 1900. Coal became the main energy source of the industrial world.

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The second energy transition is associated with a shift in consumption from coal to oil, with the share of oil rising from 3% in 1915 to 45% by 1975. The dominance of oil in the global energy industry ended in the 1970s with the oil crisis. The third energy transition led to the widespread use of natural gas. Its share rose from 3% in 1930 to 23% in 2017, owing to the partial displacement of coal and oil. At the stage of the fourth energy transition, unlike the previous three, the main focus will be on the decarbonization of economy, including a reduction in the industrial use of oil, gas and coal and the transition to renewable energy sources (RES), coupled with efforts to combat global climate change.3 Economic efficiency and the attractiveness of new energy sources are no longer seen as the key driving force, as a qualitatively new factor has come into play—decarbonization and combating global climate change (Fig. 14.1). The energy transition is characterized by increased inter-fuel competition on a global scale. The author of the term “energy transition,” Vaclav Smil, defined it as “the change in the composition (structure) of primary energy supply, the gradual shift from a specific pattern of energy provision to a new state of an energy system.”4

Important

The biggest challenge for humanity in the twenty-first century will be the depletion of natural resources, especially energy resources, and the struggle for the planet’s hydrocarbon and natural resources, which is growing more and more intense with every year. The fundamental interconnection of the world’s basic resources—food, water, and energy—has become apparent. This interconnectedness is viewed by researchers as one of the key global megatrends. According to the US National Intelligence Council report Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, “Demand for these resources will grow substantially owing to an increase in the global population. Tackling problems pertaining to one commodity will be linked to supply and demand for the others”5

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1860

1900

1950

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2040

1 - biomass, including firewood and waste; 2 - coal; 3 - oil; 4 - gas; * - hydro energy; 6 - nuclear energy; 7 - other RES

Fig. 14.1 Changes in the structure of global primary energy consumption by fuel type since the second half of the nineteenth century (Sources Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Skolkovo Energy Centre, New Stage of the Fourth Energy Transition, https://www.eprussia.ru/epr/374/ 9335671.htm)

Reality becomes more complicated every year: clashes of interests between different nations are multiplying, and conflicts—hot, cold, and hybrid—are erupting in different parts of the world, the underlying basis of which remains unchanged. The vast majority of interstate conflicts these days are cantered around energy resource deposits and supply routes, and also around the technology needed for rational methods of their extraction, processing, and use. Political conflicts or conflicts over sales markets, as was the case in the last century, are now increasingly giving way to conflicts over resources. The earthquake that caused the nuclear power plant accident in Japan has dramatically altered the energy picture of the world. Many countries have begun to review their energy policies, aiming for the more cautious

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development of nuclear power, increased use of renewables, and a greater share of gas in the energy mix. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced people and businesses to radically change their usual way of life and face unforeseen economic difficulties. The oil industry was hit hardest by the COVID-19 crisis. In addition to the direct impact of COVID-19 on businesses, the industry has suffered a sharp decline in demand, primarily from the transport sector (road and air transportation), which was most vulnerable due to quarantine measures around the world. For example, demand dropped by 27% in 2020, and this trend is expected to continue. The impact of the pandemic on demand for all fuel types was stronger than during the 2008 financial crisis. The drop in demand affected all fuels: oil (9%), coal (8%), and electricity (5–10%) (however, the recovery in demand for coal for industry and power generation in China may offset larger declines elsewhere). Demand for gas and nuclear power will decrease, while demand for renewables will rise, driven by low operating costs and preferential access to many energy systems.6 Falling demand for all types of fuel has led to greater losses for major companies such as BP and Shell, decreasing the market capitalization of international oil and gas companies (IOCs) by 40–50%, which limits the scale of investment.7 Transformations in the energy sector are inevitable due to fluctuations in oil prices and the climate policies pursued by national governments. Some of them, primarily in Europe, have transitioned almost completed to a low-carbon economy. In other countries, including Russia, traditional energy sources still prevail. The slowdown in transition to a low-carbon economy is due to low oil prices and the pandemic.

State and Outlook of the Global Energy Balance In the oil industry, development trends show the same extreme degree of volatility as oil prices. At the beginning of the century, the key trend was the rapid growth of demand in developing countries compared to declining oil consumption in developed economies. Amidst the depletion of fields with favorable production conditions, this was a prerequisite for a rapid increase in oil prices. China became one of the few drivers of demand, contributing significantly to reduced volatility on oil and gas markets.

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However, the trend had reversed by the end of the 2010s, as the excess supply of crude oil on the markets led to a sharp decline in oil prices and overstocking, up to an acute shortage of oil storage facilities, as well as a crashing drop in investment. The crucial finishing blow for the oil industry and market players came with restrictions on transportation (up to a complete halt in some places), which were imposed in many countries during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Important

Volatile oil prices are an inherent feature of the oil market (Fig. 14.2). The problem lies in the scale of price fluctuations and their causes. A characteristic feature of recent times is the sharp increase in non-economic factors behind changes in oil prices. Therefore, the volatility of the oil market became particularly apparent in 2019–2020, when the drop in oil prices caused by overproduction was compounded by the problems of reduced business activity due to the pandemic. As a result, oil prices not only collapsed, but even went into negative territory.8

Fig. 14.2 Changes in oil prices (Source All About Oil, https://vseonefti.ru/ etc/risksi-v-neftyanoi-otrasli.html)

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Oil prices stabilized somewhat as countries emerged from isolation and business activity recovered. In general, however, most analysts believe that demand for oil will not recover any time soon, and prices will remain low. That being said, the COVID-19 pandemic complicates forecasts: investors are uncertain about future consumer preferences and the transition to cleaner energy sources. The development of the global energy industry is determined by a complex set of changing factors, many of which lie outside the energy industry per se—in politics, economics, and social dynamics. The high degree of uncertainty makes it impossible to rely on extrapolation forecasts and calculations when making decisions, and instead requires global trends that lie outside of energy markets to be identified.9 Uncertainties manifest themselves in the volatility of resource markets (primarily oil and gas), higher risks when implementing investment projects, and the emergence of “black swans.”10 In the first two decades of this century alone there were several such “swans”: the global financial and economic crisis, which caused serious damage to all commodity markets, had a downward effect on energy investment; the emergence of shale gas and shale oil as a significant factor for the hydrocarbon markets; the environmental disasters such as the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and others.11 The gas market is also undergoing major changes. In the coming years, the situation between gas sellers in the main markets will remain highly competitive. And in the medium term, the gas market will become a “buyer’s market,” with highly competitive suppliers. The build-up of proven gas reserves and the diversification of supplies (due to numerous liquefied natural gas [LNG] projects reaching full capacity) have made gas a more affordable resource for consumers. The surge in LNG sales is seriously changing the structure of the global gas market, which is trending toward transformation into a single global market similar to the oil market. “Over the past decade, global LNG consumption has grown four times faster than natural gas production. During the same period, the number of importing countries has more than doubled. Global LNG demand is projected to rise to 580 million tonnes by 2030, and the share of LNG in global gas trade is expected to rise from 35% in 2017 to 52% by 2035,” Alexander Novak, the then Minister of Energy and now Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, said in a video address to the participants of the LNG Producer–Consumer Conference.12 So, by that time LNG will have overtaken the more traditional pipeline gas in terms of sales.

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The general assessment of the consumer countries is that gas is the fuel that dominates only during the transition to a “renewable” energy mix because, from a technological point of view, it is the perfect balancing pole to alternative energy sources. According to Russian experts, gas is set to become the dominant fuel in the energy sector in the next investment cycle, as the cheapest and most accessible resource. Gas generation is becoming a new leader in the energy sector. It wins in competition with other sources (nuclear, coal, renewables) as the cheapest resource, and it is efficient and flexible from a technological point of view. In terms of price, gas generation is now more cost-effective than coal, nuclear, and renewable generation in the world’s main markets, including the European Union, the United States, and China, where coal has traditionally been considered the most cost-effective energy resource. Gas fuel could replace a significant portion of oil in the transportation sector. As of December 31, 2019, the number of natural gas vehicles in the world stood at 28.5 million units, with 33,400 natural gas fuelling stations, according to data from the Natural Gas Vehicle Global (NGV) analytics agency. By the end of 2021, more than 30 million vehicles worldwide are expected to run on natural gas, the agency estimates.13 According to a report by the International Gas Union (IGU), BloombergNEF and Italian energy company Snam, despite a drop in the global demand for gas due to the COVID-19 pandemic, growth will resume as gas will replace dirtier fuels in the energy mix. The Global Gas Report 2020 says medium-term consumption growth is being driven by gas competitiveness, as well as by greater global access to the fuel. The pandemic has disrupted the global energy sector, but low gas prices will eventually spur demand as the economy recovers. We have already seen an unprecedented shift from coal to gas in Europe, and clean air policies in major growth markets such as India and China will encourage greater use of gas in the next few years. Coal retained its position in the energy mix as the “closing” resource as it ensures the stability of the resource portfolio against market fluctuations (coal being one of the most stable resources in terms of price). The share of coal in the world’s fuel and energy balance (FEB) is set to decline in the long term as other balancing resources become more attractive in terms of their environmental impact. The coal power industry has been under pressure in recent years. Coal is being replaced by gas, new air quality standards are being introduced, public campaigns in support of the complete rejection of coal have been

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launched, and renewable energy is becoming. Still, the global demand for coal has increased in the last two years. In the coal industry, the contrast between developed and developing countries has always been most striking. Developed economies are actively transitioning to renewable energy sources. Nevertheless, the use of coal in the world has grown due to Asian countries. The Asian consumption of this resource is projected to reach its peak in 2027. Until then, humans will continue to rely on coal as a basic source of energy. Southeast Asian countries will be the driving force behind this process. By 2040, the share of coal in the region’s energy generation will reach 36%, according to Wood Mackenzie estimates. Wood Mackenzie has also named India and China among the countries where coal is still in demand and where the need for it is growing. In India, the trend is due to strong economic growth (7% in 2018) and the development of the steel industry. It requires electricity, which India produces primarily from coal. The world’s largest consumer of steam coal, China, aims to reduce the use of this resource by 3% by 2023. However, China will continue to play an important role in steam coal consumption as it invests heavily in the coal projects of other countries. In 2018, for example, research group CoalSwarm published a report showing that Chinese companies build, own, or finance 16% of all coal-fired power plants outside of China. Japan is Asia’s second-largest investor in steam coal, having poured $10 billion into such projects between 2013 and 2016, and it is preparing to add $9 billion more. Another global investor is South Korea, which has invested $8 billion in steam coal since 2008.14 Non-traditional renewable energy sources (NRES). The most notable feature of post-industrial development has been the rapid development of new and non-traditional renewable energy (NRES, including tidal, geothermal, solar, wind, and hydro power). Renewable energy, with its innovative technologies, has become one of the most powerful sectors of the global economy, while traditional forms of energy are gradually losing their share of the energy mix.

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Important

The economics of renewable energy are fundamentally different from the economics of conventional generation, so it is impossible to make economic comparisons. Thus, the payback periods of NRES projects lie outside any economic cycles (about 30 years for different types of generation, although rapidly decreasing). Therefore, investments in NRES are investments in the future, and, accordingly, can be funded mostly from state budgets.

In resource-importing countries, renewable and conventional generation parity could be reached within the next 10 years, or even sooner if environmental legislation changes. States with accessible and relatively cheap traditional resources, including Russia, are unlikely to achieve such parity in the next 10–15 years. Technological transition in the energy sector can only happen if there is a strong political will. As economic calculations show, the “market” energy industry benefits from the cheapest resources that are currently available—gas, coal, and oil. Private investment in power generation flows into projects with a short payback period, which in effect perpetuates the existing energy balance. The example of decisions taken by national governments in several countries to restructure the resource portfolio shows the need to introduce economic incentives for market participants. Typically, such solutions are not effective in the short term, either in terms of the system’s economics or in terms of regulation.

Important

The long-term trend in all countries of the world is electrification, which means a gradual transition to a more universal, convenient and efficient energy carrier in all consumption sectors. However, large-scale changes are taking place and will continue in the use of fuels for power generation.

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Interesting

By 2040, coal will reduce its role in power generation more than any other energy source (from 39% to 22–29%). The share of gas will rise (from 23% to 25–27%), but the most significant changes will be demonstrated by NRES, which will see their share jump from 7% to 21–26% by 2040 – this being the most important characteristic of the energy transition.

NRES showed impressive growth in the second 2010s, with wind power capacity increasing six-fold and solar (PV) power increasing eightfold. In the long term, by 2040, renewable energy will demonstrate the highest growth rate—to 6.3–8.3% per year, depending on the energy transition scenario.15 It is important to note that renewable energy currently accounts for approximately 15% of global primary energy consumption, but 13% is hydropower and traditional biomass, while NRES holds only 2%. At the same time, the rapid spread of technologies for generating electricity and heat from solar, wind, biogas, and other non-traditional renewable energy sources and, more importantly, their ever-cheaper cost, are becoming a key element of the current energy transition. Technologies that are now coming into mass use are associated with large information systems: the implementation of various models of smart grids; new materials in construction; the introduction of various generation devices based on renewable resources; and the development of energy storage and distribution systems at various scales. So-called smart grids enable the integration of renewable energy sources into existing power systems—in the field of power transmission they help restore grids after accidents, and in the field of consumption, they ensure peak power management. The issue of smart grid implementation, according to experts, is not so much technical as it is managerial, i.e., related to the creation of an optimal business model and management scheme for the energy system.

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The Climate Agenda and Prospects for Decarbonizing Economies Climate issues occupy an important place among the key trends of the modern energy industry. The opportunities offered by scientific and technological progress for extracting more hydrocarbons and using them more fully as energy raw materials are confronted with serious limitations that are associated with the international campaign against carbon pollution. At the same time, we have to admit that the climate issue is becoming a tool for eliminating competitors in foreign markets. In Paris in December 2015, more than 100 nations signed an agreement to reduce air emissions. The Paris Agreement16 on climate was prepared as part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which provides for measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere starting in 2020 as a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol. It was adopted by consensus during the Conference in Paris on December 12, 2015, signed on April 22, 2016, and entered into force on November 4, 2016. The goal of the agreement is to “enhance the implementation” of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in particular, to keep global average temperature rise “well below” 2 °C and “make efforts” to limit temperature rise to 1.5 °C. The Paris Agreement, as well as the climate agenda in general, has triggered a broad debate in Russian academic and expert circles.

Important

The basic demand of the supporters of the Paris Agreement is the introduction of so-called carbon levies on a global scale, i.e., taxes on carbon dioxide emissions. Unlike the European countries that support the idea, where the overwhelming part of the economy is represented by low-carbon service industries, Russia is heavily dependent on its fuel and energy complex, metallurgy, fertilizer, and cement production. Russia’s official energy policy is aimed at increasing energy production (oil, gas, and coal). But if the Paris

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Agreement is ratified, the country will have to reduce it. Calculations show that the introduction of an emissions tax in Russia will cost $42 billion annually.17

Russia is one of the few countries that exceeded its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol without actually benefiting from it. Between 1990 and 2013, Russia succeeded in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 43%. The country is home to 20% of the world’s forests, and Russia’s taiga is one of the world’s major CO2 sinks. However, current international and national methods do not sufficiently account for this absorption. Russian scholars also believe that the implementation of COP21 is a major factor of uncertainty in the international energy sector.18 The future potential oversupply of non-renewable energy resources, artificially created by the climate agenda, against the background of their declining value (cost) in the subsurface due to their potential lack of demand will accelerate the anticipation of the coming era of “cheap oil.” Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a decrease in the competitiveness of the Russian oil industry compared to its competitors (Saudi Arabia and the United States) due to higher macroeconomic costs (as a result of difficult environmental conditions and an inadequate tax policy to meet the new challenges). In the gas sphere, COP21 is also seen as an instrument of competition for the European gas market, where Russian pipeline gas wins the “war of costs” over American LNG. Hence the active use of both political and climate tools.19 There is a possibility that the Paris Agreement could repeat the fate of the Kyoto Protocol: if the largest greenhouse gas emitting countries (in particular, China and the United States, which together account for 42% of global greenhouse gas emissions) do not fulfill their obligations, the efforts of other countries will not be enough to achieve the desired result.

Important

The EU’s green energy policy is driven not solely by concerns for the environment and the fight against climate change. To a

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great extent, this policy is a response to the depletion of its own hydrocarbon reserves. The European Green Deal, the EU’s new development course, implies radical reforms in the economy, energy and transport. These sectors must become as “green” and carbonneutral as possible. According to preliminary estimates, it will cost the European Union some 3 trillion euros to do this.20

At the same time, the EU authorities will impose requirements on suppliers of goods to comply with the climate-neutral policy. One of the measures could be the introduction of a carbon tax on products imported into the European Union. In fact, this would mean an additional tax on the exporters of carbon-intensive products (mainly in the energy and metallurgical industries). KPMG assessed the possible damage for Russian exporters supplying goods to Europe in 2025–2030 and presented three scenarios of carbon tax introduction in the European Union at a meeting of the working group of the Environment and Natural Resources Management Committee of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. 1. In the optimistic scenario, the European Union would not introduce the tax until 2028 and would only charge on the difference between actual carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions from the production of goods and the EU benchmark volume. The burden for Russian producers in this case would be 6 billion euros over three years (2028–2030). The suppliers of gas, nickel, and copper will be hit hardest, as the carbon intensity of their products exceeds the European requirements by two to three times. The production of oil, petrochemicals, potash fertilizers, and other exported goods is perfectly in line with the European benchmark. 2. In the baseline scenario, the tax is introduced in 2025 and applies only to direct greenhouse gas emissions (directly in the production of products). In this case, the burden for Russian exporters will be 33.3 billion euros in 2025–2030. 3. In the worst-case scenario, the tax could cost Russian suppliers 50.6 billion euros by 2030. This will happen if the cross-border tax is introduced in 2022 and applies not only to direct, but also to indirect CO2 emissions—meaning emissions from sources owned by

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other organizations but somehow related to the activities of the exporter.21 This will be a very serious challenge for Russia’s entire foreign trade system, as Europe is the largest sales region for Russian goods, accounting for over 40% of Russian exports.

Energy Triumvirate Amidst the Energy Transition Important

The three most important centers of the twenty-first-century world order—the United States, China and Russia—largely determine the situation on global energy markets, occupying leading positions in the production and export of energy resources, on the one hand, and in their consumption, on the other.

The United States. The shale revolution in the United States has turned the country from the world’s leading energy importer into a net exporter. New natural resource extraction technologies have effectively propelled the production of oil and natural gas to new heights. Today, the United States is a net exporter of liquefied natural gas, and it can also become a net exporter of oil by the end of the 2020s. The growing shale gas production has far-reaching implications for North America, stimulating major investments in petrochemical production and other energy-intensive industries. It also reshapes international trade flows and significantly affects price levels. By the mid-2020s, the United States could become the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and then a net exporter of oil, while remaining the largest importer of heavy oil, which better matches the technology used in American refineries. It is not only the upstream sector that is affected by the transformation: without a continuous increase in fuel efficiency, the United States will remain a net importer of oil. When talking about the role of the United States in the global energy industry, we must keep in mind that energy prices are closely linked to the dynamics of the US dollar. When the dollar appreciates against major currencies (euro, yen, yuan), energy prices tend to fall. This was the

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trend observed in the commodity markets in 2014–2016. In 2017–2018, the US dollar stabilized against the currencies of the leading industrialized nations, and the global oil and other energy markets became more predictable in terms of price volatility. The dollar’s appreciation against the leading currencies in 2020 was accompanied by another decline in oil prices, followed by a drop in gas prices. In addition, a huge, if not decisive, influence on the levels and dynamics of world oil prices is exerted by modern financial markets, where derivative financial instruments, such as oil futures and options, are traded. These markets are almost entirely under the de facto control of US corporations. The published prices for Brent and WTI oil are actually based on oil futures. In turn, oil futures traded on the New York Stock Exchange depend on the dynamics of commodity stocks of oil in US storages, data on which is published weekly by the American Petroleum Institute. Undoubtedly, the dynamics of commodity stocks indirectly reflects the level of oil consumption in the country. But at the same time, oil futures, like any corporate securities, are strongly influenced by speculative and psychological factors. Surges and falls in oil futures with little fundamental justification add to volatility on oil markets, as was the case in 2020, when WTI crude went deep into negative territory (see above). Over the past 10–15 years, the US energy policy has undergone significant shifts. Structural changes have become visible in many segments of the national energy sector, while the country continues to develop a dependable, affordable, and environmentally acceptable energy system. The most obvious trend is the revival of the US oil and gas industry, where growth rates had been declining in previous decades. The growth of shale gas production has had a significant impact on the development of the North American energy market, bolstering economic efficiency and employment levels. Improved energy efficiency has helped curb rising energy consumption in the United States. According to the International Energy Agency, “growing domestic production of oil, shale gas, and bioenergy, along with demand-side measures such as energy conservation policies and consumption restrictions, could make the United States self-sufficient in energy consumption by 2035.”22 Notable shifts in US energy policy in recent years involve a change in the “energy paradigm” from “leave the reserves to future generations” to “maximize the monetization of existing reserves.”23

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Today we see the “shale revolution” in the United States as an accomplished fact. And it is this technological breakthrough of American producers—which was in due time supported by the national government and lawmakers—that propelled the United States to become self-sufficient producer of energy aspiring to global leadership in this vital area. Indeed, in 2019, the United States topped the global list of oil producers, with its output at 746.7 million tons, or 12.4% of global oil production (followed by Russia with 568.1 million tons, and Saudi Arabia with 556.6 million tons). The United States is also leading in gas production, having reported 920.9 billion cubic meters in 2019 (ahead of Russia, which reported 679.0 billion cubic meters).24 It is to this “shale revolution”—or “shale breakthrough,”25 as it was more aptly named in a forecast by the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation—that the United States owes its leadership in the production of basic hydrocarbons. At the same time, Russian researchers also point to important “limiting factors” that call into question the prospects for further rapid growth of production from shale deposits. These include high production costs; high water consumption (about 7 barrels of water per 1 barrel of oil in low-permeability oil production); environmental risks of contaminating groundwater, soil, and air; and risk of earthquakes in hydraulic fracking operations. It is believed that technologies that could offset these limitations would be based on low-cost, waterless hydraulic fracturing, and modern thermal treatment techniques combined with physical and chemical treatment of hydrocarbon-bearing formations (retorting). If they are successfully developed on an industrial scale, the resource base of the global oil and gas industry will expand significantly, making it possible to build up shale oil production in countries that have not produced oil historically, and to begin production in regions with limited fresh water resources, which together will ensure substantial gains in production. As a result, fields in China, Jordan, Israel, Mongolia, and other countries may be put into use. The main outcome under this scenario would be a decrease in oil prices due to the increased availability of raw materials. The winners in this situation will be the United States, China, and the European Union countries, and the losers will be the OPEC countries and the CIS states. To get a more balanced view of the prospects for shale production, the Engineering- Economic Institute and the Analytical Center for the Russian Government developed the concept (scenario) of “shale failure”

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based on a number of preconditions leading to the reduction of oil and gas production in shale deposits: • • • •

A significant increase in the cost of new production projects. A large resource base is not confirmed. Strict environmental restrictions are being imposed. New technologies for water-free and thermal extraction of shale oil do not work for a number of economic and/or environmental reasons. • Starting in 2020, the US shale oil and gas production had been declining rapidly, and it will virtually cease by 2025. • In the rest of the world, oil and gas production from shale plays is continuing only in those countries where it has already begun, and it is declining quite rapidly to zero.26 The “shale failure” scenario not only preserves the existing alignment of forces in the global oil and gas market, but also significantly strengthens the positions of those countries that were losing in the baseline scenario and in the “shale breakthrough” scenario, such as OPEC countries, Russia and the CIS. The United States, which is now the leading player in the oil market, loses considerably in the “shale failure” scenario. According to this scenario, the country’s oil and gas production drops sharply after 2020, with crude oil imports growing slowly due to the fact that without its own resource base, the US oil refining becomes inefficient. A major energy producer turns into an energy-dependent region, which can only influence the hydrocarbon markets through non-market mechanisms. So, today, the United States’ prospects for global energy dominance depend on the success (or failure) of new extraction technologies and the government’s environmental regulatory measures. Russia. The global energy trends discussed above create both significant risks and new opportunities for Russia. In the medium term, the set of risks will be traditional: growing competition on world energy markets; geopolitical rivalry for control over energy production areas and transportation routes; threats to national sovereignty; terrorism and local conflicts; man-made disasters; risks of the Russian energy sector falling behind global levels in terms of technology; and the moral and physical

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aging of equipment. These risks are in the realm of the state energy policy and will be addressed to a greater or lesser extent. Meanwhile, the entry of the world’s energy industry into the energy transition, which involves the phasing out of fossil fuels in favor of lowcarbon energy, carries all of the above risks in a concentrated form. Of all the fossil fuels that have formed the backbone of the Russian economy, only natural gas is set to boost its share of the global energy balance. According to Russian researchers, “Russia’s budget revenues from energy exports will inevitably decline. The growth in gas exports will partially compensate for the decline in exports of liquid hydrocarbons. However, the transition to more complex conditions of hydrocarbon production will invariably lead to the need to expand benefits and reduce the tax burden, which will result in lower payments to the budget.”27 Russian analysts have been talking for years about the risks of relying on oil and gas revenues for development. The situation on the energy markets is not changing in Russia’s favor. The main problem now is to minimize the risks of the energy transition for the Russian fuel and energy sector. The first obvious solution is to stop relying on the growth of oil and gas revenues and to adopt a cautious approach to investments in the expansion of fossil fuel production and the creation of infrastructure for exporting them. The only exception may be liquefied natural gas production projects. Russia’s LNG has already proven its economic efficiency and price competitiveness fairly well. However, caution is needed even here: during 2020, not a single Final Investment Decision (FID) was made with regard to new LNG projects, including those in Russia. The Russian government understands the situation, too. In 2021, the share of oil and gas revenues in the national budget will fall to one-third for the first time in Russia’s modern history.28 The Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2035, approved in June 2020, says: “World energy markets, which for a long time ensured the dynamic development of the country’s energy sector and economy, are undergoing profound transformation, which significantly changes the volume and structure of demand and leads to increased competition in all key energy export markets for Russia. Changes in the general nature of economic development include: • unstable, relatively slow, and uneven economic growth in different regions of the world; • inevitable new geopolitical and global economic crises;

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• accelerated change of technological modes, high probability of a new technological revolution, and the transition of the global development leaders to a new technological platform. The desire of most countries to diversify their energy mix, develop noncarbon energy sources, and use local fuels, including unconventional ones, is holding back the demand for hydrocarbon imports and is narrowing market niches for Russia.”29 In short, there is a good understanding of the challenges Russia and its economy face as it embarks on the energy transition. And in general, the necessary measures are being taken to minimize its risks, primarily in terms of the structural changes and overall decline in the demand for Russian energy resources. However, some important questions remain: How can we finally move to the development of non-resource industries? And to what extent should the ideas of the energy transition should be applied Russia? According to industry analysts, “it is the fuel and energy sector and the transformation processes taking place there that can give the country a new impetus for development and GDP growth through realizing the enormous potential for energy saving and creating additional demand for industrial products for upgrading the fuel and energy sector. This requires a robust economic and energy policy of adapting the country to the energy transition. But the available window of opportunity is literally limited to 7–10 years.”30 It seems that the sharp increase in competition on European markets calls for a radical change in export strategy, namely, a transition from the struggle for financial results, i.e. maximum profit, to a more flexible strategy of behavior that prioritizes the retention of existing markets and access to new ones. This primarily concerns the expansion of energy exports to Asian countries, above all China. A breakthrough has been achieved in this area in recent years, and we can now justifiably speak of a strategic partnership between Russia and China in the sphere of energy. China proceeds from the idea that close energy cooperation with Russia will help it build an efficient regional system of energy security. Supplies of energy resources from the Russian regions that neighboring China may be more economical and dependable than supplies from other parts of the world. A decisive role will be played by the fact that Russia’s huge reserves of raw materials are geographically close to the Chinese border, which excludes the strategic risks of maritime logistics.

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It is natural that China’s interest in Russian oil and gas resources is growing in line with the increasing political and economic risks related to energy supplies from turbulent regions of the world. The long land border between Russia and China and the reachable distances from hydrocarbon production sites to end points can form the basis for a reliable energy infrastructure and a regional energy security system to ensure economically efficient and reliable supplies of Russian energy resources to China. “Energy supplies are one of the most significant, productive and largescale components of our bilateral cooperation. Last year, energy trade between China and Russia exceeded $40 billion, accounting for a significant share of the record $100 billion trade turnover,” Xi Jinping said at SPIEF 2019.31 For the industries of the Russian fuel and energy sector, it is cooperation with China that allows them to retain a significant share of fossil fuel exports, mitigating the risks of the energy transition and creating a real alternative to the European monopsony on the energy goods market. China is consuming more and more Russian oil. On January 1, 2011, commercial deliveries began via the Skovorodino-Daqing pipeline built as part of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) project. According to the Immigration and Quarantine Department of Heilongjiang Province (Northeast China), the total volume of oil delivered through this pipeline during its operation amounted to 86.51 million tonnes.32 After the second line of the pipeline was put into service on December 30, 2017, the volume of oil pumped through the pipeline is expected to increase from 15 to 30 million tonnes per year. There are plans to expand the supply of oil from seaports and its transit through Kazakhstan via the existing oil pipeline from Omsk. According to forecasts, the total export of oil and petroleum products to China will grow steadily (in 2018 it was 67 million tonnes,33 and in 2020 totaled 70–80 million tonnes).34 The volume of Russian oil supplies to China will now depend more on price dynamics than on joint initiatives. By contrast, full-scale cooperation in natural gas is still in its infancy. Russian pipeline gas supplies to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline began on December 2, 2019. Gazprom and China’s state-owned CNPC signed a contract for the supply of gas and construction of pipeline in May 2014, after ten years of negotiations. The agreement was signed for a period of 30 years, providing for the supply to China of 38 billion cubic meters per year. The total amount of the contract in 2014 prices was $400 billion, with more than 1 trillion cubic meters of gas scheduled to be sold

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to Chinese consumers during its validity period. Gas will be supplied from the Chayandinskoye field (with 1.2 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves) in Yakutia and the Kovykta field (with 2.7 trillion cubic meters of gas, scheduled for launch by the end of 2022) in Irkutsk Region.35 The pipeline will reach its full capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year in 2022–2023. Then the gas passed through it will account for about 9.5% of China’s total demand, which is expected to be 402 billion cubic meters in 2022.36 Russia’s gas policy toward China will depend on the correct determination of China’s future natural gas needs. Of course, in this respect, it is necessary to keep an eye on the Chinese factor of uncertainty: any, even minor, correction of plans to replace coal with gas can shift demand for gas by tens of billions of cubic meters per year in one direction or another. It is also important to keep in mind the obvious—though difficult to predict in detail—growth in demand for all types of energy in developing Asian countries. The situation with the COVID-19 pandemic in most countries means there is no certainty about any prospects for the Chinese gas market. At the same time, China is the only G20 country that is showing positive growth in energy consumption. Wood Mackenzie considers China to be the main and only driver of gas demand growth. The forecasts for Chinese demand are very optimistic (Fig. 14.3). The demand for gas in China will undoubtedly grow faster than in the global economy as a whole. By 2030, China may overtake the European Union in terms of consumption (510 billion cubic meters), and by 2040, its gas market will be equal to half of Asia’s (673 billion cubic meters). At the same time, China’s own production will cover no more than half of these needs. In this case, the Power of Siberia, the Altai gas pipeline, and the planned Power of Siberia 2 projects will also be in high demand. By 2040, Russia could provide up to half of China’s pipeline imports.37 The “Eastern vector” of Russian energy policy is designed to preserve and expand the market niche of the Russian coal. Coal exports have grown steadily, reaching 217.5 million tonnes in 2019, up 3.4%, or 7.2 million tonnes, from 2018. The coal industry’s export quota also showed a steady upward trend: in 2019, it was 49.5%, compared to 36% in 2010, and 17% in 2000—that is, half of the coal produced was exported. Coal exports in 2019 were directed mainly to China – 32.8 million tonnes (+5.2 million tonnes compared to 2018); South Korea (28.3

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1 – consumption (residential and commercial sector); 2 – losses from atmospheric heating;

3 – industrial consumption (or industry); 4 – electricity generation; 5 – transport; 6 – other losses

Fig. 14.3 Growth of gas demand in China (Source Gavin Thompson, “China Unveils the Extent of its Gas Ambitions,” Wood Mackenzie [August 5, 2020], https://www.woodmac.com/news/opinion/china-unveils-the-extent-ofits-gas-ambitions/)

million tonnes, −0.9 million tonnes); Germany (21.3 million tonnes, + 7.5 million tonnes); Japan (20.2 million tonnes, +1.9 million tonnes); the Netherlands (13.8 million tonnes, +1.8 million tonnes, substantially for re-exports); Poland (10.9 million tonnes, −2.4 million tonnes); Turkey (9.4 million tonnes, −2.4 million tonnes); Taiwan (8.5 million tonnes, − 0.8 million tonnes); and India (8 million tonnes, +3.5 million tons).38 China remains one of the top importers of Russian coal, along with South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it exports to Asia–Pacific countries that allow Russia to steadily hold the third position after Australia and Indonesia (460 and 390 million tonnes, respectively) in the ranking of the world’s largest exporters of coal. Coal exports from Russia to China are projected to reach 55 million tonnes per year by the end of the 2020s, double the level of 2018.39 Deliveries will grow due to the high-quality characteristics of coal products and a competitive advantage of Russian coal as a “short logistics leg.” The Ministry of Energy also expects to increase coal supplies to India six-fold by 2025. Overall, Russia supplied about 100 million tonnes of coal to Asia–Pacific countries in 2019.40 ∗ ∗ ∗

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Energy innovation plays a crucial role not only for the development of the global energy industry, but also to a large extent for the whole of human civilization. New energy carriers and energy technologies formed the backbone of the industrial revolutions of the past. No new technological revolution is looming for the energy sector in the next 20–30 years (for example, the use of cheap thermonuclear fusion or a complete switch to hydrogen fuel), but major technological breakthroughs are likely. They can already be seen in the development of unconventional oil and gas resources, the development of new methods of using coal, and the appearance of new types of motor fuel, which can effectively hold down the appreciation of hydrocarbons and lead to major changes in fuel markets, provided that demand continues to grow. Potentially more important are new electrical technologies—storage units (accumulators and supercapacitors) and fuel cells (direct conversion of chemical energy from hydrogen-containing substances into electricity). They will give impetus to the massive use of electricity in the mobile energy sector, while also significantly improving the efficiency of renewable energy resources. The energy transition may have begun, but it will be a long time before hydrocarbons will be phased out. In the long term, fossil fuels will continue to dominate, while the share of non-carbon energy resources will be growing more slowly compared with the previous forecast. The “shale breakthrough” pushed the threat of exhaustion of economically acceptable oil and gas resources, which seemed imminent not long ago, back for two or three decades, effectively cementing the predominantly hydrocarbon structure of the global energy industry. The share of oil and gas in global primary energy consumption will remain essentially unchanged (51.4% by 2040, compared to 53.6% in 2010). The most significant increase in the absolute volume of consumption, and in the share in primary energy consumption, will be ensured by gas. It is no coincidence that many companies and think tanks (for example, the International Energy Agency) have called the next 30 years the “era of gas.” In the future, we are likely to see the growing regionalization of oil and gas markets trends. Despite the integration of oil and gas markets alongside the growth of international trade in oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), there is a growing trend toward their regionalization, leading to markedly different price levels. As a result of the expected transformation of the global energy markets (the hydrocarbon markets in particular), the fuel markets themselves will not change much. However, there may be a noticeable reallocation of forces between the leading players in these markets, and some global players may gain additional opportunities for influence. Russia will, as usual, be more sensitive to negative changes in market conditions. High

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costs and the current tax system limit the competitiveness of Russian energy resources on the global stage. The Russian fuel and energy sector may face severe limitations in the external demand for energy resources at affordable prices, which will create additional risks for Russia’s energy sector, and for the Russian economy as a whole. The problem of climate change has been the main driver of increased interest in the energy transition in recent years. Most projections consider decarbonization as a crucial part, if not the bottom line, of states’ efforts to transition to a climate-neutral energy economy. At the same time, there is still no mechanism for moving to low-carbon energy that will work in the current economic and socio-political reality. It appears that the pace of development of the recognized low-carbon technologies, such as renewables, carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS), electric grids, etc., and the level of coordination in the global community are clearly insufficient to solve the climate and environmental challenges of today. The speed of increasing energy efficiency is also slowing down noticeably. Therefore, there is a need for other new technologies or significant breakthroughs in the use of existing technologies for the generation, processing, and efficient use of energy in order to ensure sustainable development in the future. Since it is currently impossible to predict what these technologies will be, this situation is one of the main factors of uncertainty prevailing in the global energy industry.

Keywords World energy, energy markets, energy security, energy transition, oil, gas, price volatility, decarbonization, greenhouse gas emissions, carbon tax, global warming. Self-Test 1. What 2. What 3. What 4. What with? 5. What 6. What

is an energy transition? are the main characteristics of the fourth energy transition? is an energy balance? What are its components? are the climatic limitations in energy development associated are the risks for Russia in the context of energy transition? do supporters of the Paris Agreement see as their main task?

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Notes 1. Elena Voskanyan, “The New Stage of the Fourth Energy Transition,” Power and Industry of Russia, https://www.eprussia.ru/epr/374/933 5671.htm. 2. Forecast for the Development of the Energy Sector of the World and Russia 2019, https://www.eriras.ru/files/forecast_2019_rus.pdf. The term “energy transition” was proposed by Canadian researcher Vaclav Smil and is used to describe “the change in the composition (structure) of primary energy supply, the gradual shift from a specific pattern of energy provision to a new state of an energy system.” 3. “The Fuel and Energy Complex of Russia. A Look into the Future,” (February 16, 2018), https://www.cdu.ru/tek_russia/issue/2018/2/ 463/. 4. Vaclav Smil, Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects (Santa Barbara (CA): Praeger, 2010). 5. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Words. National Intelligence Council (2012), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf. 6. Global Energy Trends 2020 Edition, https://www.enerdata.net/publicati ons/reports-presentations/world-energy-trends.html. 7. The World’s Oil and Gas Industry is Still in Crisis, https://novostienerg etiki.ru/neftegazovaya-otrasl-mira-vse-eshhe-naxoditsya-v-krizise/. 8. On April 20, 2020, the May futures for US WTI crude oil ended trading at minus $37.63 per barrel, falling to minus $56 per barrel in the course of trading. A minus had never happened before, let alone this deep. 9. Such trends typically include, for example, the trends and dynamics of urbanization and consumption in developing countries, social attitudes, etc. 10. This expression became popular following the publication of Nassim Taleb’s book The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. See: Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Moscow: KoLibri, 2009). 11. The author of the black swan theory, Nassim Taleb, does not view the COVID-19 pandemic as a “black swan” because the disease that hit the markets could have been prevented, “nipped in the bud,” so if it is a swan, it is a “white” one, Taleb said in an interview with Bloomberg. 12. “Novak: LNG Will Overtake Pipeline Gas in World Trade by 2035 and Will Take 52% of the Market,” TASS (October 11, 2020), https://tass. ru/ekonomika/9687375. 13. “Foreign trends in the natural gas market,” Central Dispatching Department of the Fuel Energy Complex – Branch of Federal State Budget Organization Russian Energy Agency of the Ministry of Energy of Russia (September 21, 2021), https://www.cdu.ru/tek_russia/issue/2020/7/ 781/.

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14. “Against the Wind. How Asia is helping coal compete with green energy,” RBC (October 7, 2019), https://quote.rbc.ru/news/article/5d95cd0b9 a794701b38f933a. 15. “Forecast of the Development of the Energy Sector of the World and Russia 2019,” Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (June 18, 2019), https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/doc uments/SEneC/Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_Forecast_2019-02_Rus. pdf. 16. COP21 is an often-used abbreviation for the Paris Agreement (Conference of Parties) adopted at the 21st Conference in Paris. 17. Risks of Implementing the Paris Climate Agreement for Russia’s Economy and National Security (Moscow: IPEM, 2016), https://ria.ru/201 90312/1551727972.html. 18. A. Konoplyanik, “COP21: Goal or Means? Possible Consequences for Russia and International Oil and Gas Markets (thinking out loud),” speech at the 4th International Conference “World Oil and Gas Markets: Sharpening Competition” organized by Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Faculty of International Energy Business of Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas, and the Russian Gas Society, on December 13, 2016 (Moscow: IMEMO RAS), https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/ conf/2016/13122016/2%20. 19. Ibid. 20. Denis Davydov, “EU Green Energy Policy May Be Forced,” Tekno Blog (September 24, 2020), https://teknoblog.ru/2020/09/24/107739. 21. “KPMG Estimates Damage for Russia from Introduction of Carbon Tax in EU,” RBC (July 7, 2020), https://www.rbc.ru/business/07/07/2020/ 5f0339a39a79470b2fdb51be. 22. International Energy Agency. Energy Policies of IEA Countries. The United States 2015 Review (Paris: OECD, 2015). 23. V.I. Ignatov, “Shaping the U.S. Energy Policy,” Molodoy Ucheny, no. 30 (268) (2019): 64–67, https://moluch.ru/archive/268/61818/. 24. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020, https://nangs.org/analyt ics/download/5339_52557684d853cfa03d3dffa18df9b656. 25. Ibid. 26. “Forecast of the Development of the Energy Sector of the World and Russia 2019,” Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (June 18, 2019), https://www.eriras.ru/files/forecast_2019_rus. pdf. 27. Ibid. 28. “Has Russia Come Off the Oil Needle?” http://topneftegaz.ru/news/ view/121210/.

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29. Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2035, http://www.energy strategy.ru/ab_ins/source/ES-2035_09_2015.pdf. 30. “Forecast of the Development of the Energy Sector of the World and Russia 2019,” Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (June 18, 2019), https://www.eriras.ru/files/forecast_2019_rus. pdf. 31. Yulia Magdalinskaya, “Doubling Overall Strength: Joint Energy Projects Have Strengthened the Partnership between Russia and China,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, Special Edition No. 296(8054), https://rg.ru/ 2019/12/30/sovmestnye-energeticheskie-proekty-ukrepili-partnerstvorossii-i-kitaia.html. 32. “China Imported 8.5 million Tonnes of Oil from Russia via SkovorodinoDaqing Pipeline in the First Half of the Year,” https://tass.ru/ekonom ika/3444191. 33. “Export Results of the Fuel and Energy Sector in 2018: Record Highs for Oil, Gas, and Coal,” https://labuda.blog/203872. 34. Adolf Mahin, “China’s Energy Strategy,” Russian International Affairs Council, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ energeticheskaya-strategiyakitaya/?sphrase_id=25562872. 35. Gazprom Launches First Gas Pipeline to China, https://www.rbc.ru/bus iness/02/12/2019/5de4b1e29a7947da6d1db2f3. 36. Sergey Manukov, “Russian Gas Pipeline to Stop Boom in LNG Supplies to China,” Expert.ru (October 22, 2019), https://expert.ru/2019/10/ 22/gaz/. 37. Gavin Thompson, “China Unveils the Extent of its Gas Ambitions,” Wood Mackenzie (August 5, 2020), https://www.woodmac.com/news/ opinion/china-unveils-the-extent-of-its-gas-ambitions/. 38. “Export Results of Russia’s Fuel and Energy Sector in 2019: Record Highs for Oil, Gas, and Coal,” https://sdelanounas.ru/blogs/130385/. 39. “Russian Coal Exports to China Can Double in Ten Years,” RIA Novosti (November 14, 2019), https://ria.ru/20191114/1560925723.html. 40. “The Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation Expects Coal Exports to China to Double Within Ten Years,” https://tass.ru/ekonomika/710 9649.

Recommended Reading Ivanov, N.A. Shale America. US Energy Policy and Foundations of NonTraditional Oil and Gas Resources. Moscow: Magister, 2014. Makarov, A.A., Mitrova, T.A., and Kulagin, V.A. Guidelines for Adapting the World Energy Industry to New Market Conditions. Moscow: Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2018.

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Risks of Implementing the Paris Climate Agreement for the Economy and National Security of Russia. Moscow: IPEM, 2016. Rosenbaum, W. American Energy: The Politics of 21st Century Policy. University of Florida: CQ Press, 2014. Taleb, N.N. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Moscow: KoLibri, 2009. Smil, V. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010. Yanovsky, A.B. “Energy Horizons,” Energeticheskaya Politika, no. 1 (2019): 38– 41. Zhukov, S.V., ed. Global Energy and Economic Trends. Moscow: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2019. Zhukov, S.V., ed. World Economy and Energy: Drivers of Change. Moscow: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020.

CHAPTER 15

Global Environmental Norms and Their Russian Implementation Anne Crowley-Vigneau and Andrey Baykov

The dominant approach to environmental issues in Russia is rather ambiguous, if not paradoxical. On the one hand, the Russian public is hardly involved—at least by the standards of an industrialized country— in the discussion and practical solution of environmental problems. This is compounded by an underdeveloped network of environmental NGOs, increasingly granular government regulation of NGOs in general (especially those receiving foreign funding), suspicion of the Russian media towards non-political (so-called humanitarian) lobbying and environmental lobbying in particular, and a lack of consensus in the Russian research and analytical community on the impact of climate change on the country’s future development. Some experts, who accept that global

A. Crowley-Vigneau University of Reading, Reading, England e-mail: [email protected] A. Crowley-Vigneau · A. Baykov (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_15

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warming is under way, prefer to focus on future benefits and gains, while others question the anthropogenic origin of the observed changes in the natural environment. On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the impressive set of stringent environmental standards adopted in Russia in since the 1990s; Moscow’s consistent accession to major international treaties on environmental protection; and the government’s open recognition, based on statistical data, of the fact that Russia is currently facing some critical environmental challenges that require urgent and effective action. Despite the existence of a very large body of literature on the agenda-setting and policymaking role of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, differentiated by areas of activity, influence, principles, and objectives,1 it appears that the actual impact of these actors on decision-making at the level of individual countries has not yet been fully explored. American political scientists Martha Finnemore, Margaret Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink used constructivist analysis to identify the conditions under which cross-border diffusion of norms occurs. In this regard, they focused on the diversity of actors involved in actual policymaking (understood as the formulation and implementation of rules and norms of permissible behavior at the state, interstate, and supranational levels). The description of the workings of transnational advocacy networks (TAN)2 also sheds light on the mechanisms and international networking that precede the emergence of public environmental policy in the form of specific norms, rules, and institutions. The authors argue that environmental awareness in society and government often dramatically increase when the most enterprising citizens of a country, relevant agencies of its government, local NGOs, and the business community, are involved in horizontal network communities, which also include their counterparts in countries where this norm has already been adopted and successfully monitored. Thanks to diverse (information, advisory, organizational and, less, often financial) support from such transnational networks, political activism advocating for the implementation of a norm within a given country can, over time, push the government to accept the need for regulation that it did not initially support or that was not given due importance. This process has been described in literature as the “boomerang effect.” However, we believe this logic is not fully applicable to Russia. The widely discussed3 life cycle model seems much more suitable for our case.4

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According to this model, after a new norm has passed a certain “tipping point” in terms of being accepted by the international community, some states may accept it even if they do not have the internal incentives necessary for the “boomerang effect” to emerge. At the same time, the reasons that might play a leading explanatory role for the constructivist paradigm (such as the need for social recognition within the international hierarchy and the propensity of social subjects for mimicry) are inadequate for understanding what has been and is happening in Russia. At the same time, the roots of the “Russian paradox” should not only be sought in the specifics of Moscow’s domestic policy or foreign policy strategy. Instead, we need to develop and deepen existing theories on this subject. The Russian case requires a partial adaptation and perhaps even refinement of the explanations already given and, in this sense, indicates a range of promising scientific problems that need to be adequately addressed. The authors of this chapter first examine the environmental challenges that Russia has faced, the measures taken by the government to meet these challenges, and the Russian public’s perception of environmental issues. Then they outline four scenarios describing different ways in which new norms may emerge, as well as the mechanisms behind them. The typology used is based on examples already described in the literature, but it is refined to explain the peculiarities of the Russian case. The purpose of this investigation is to provide new scenarios to further the understanding of the algorithm of norm adoption, thus contributing to the existing constructivist literature. Finally, the authors will attempt to explain, based on input from Russian environmental experts, the motivations behind the government’s past and present adoption of environmental legislation. The authors, however, do not claim to be exhaustive in their examination of either environmental problems or the Russian situation as a whole. In this case, a case study is used to analyze the role of international interaction in the emergence and implementation of environmental norms. Here we should also clarify that the terms “government” and “state,” which are used interchangeably in this chapter, should be understood as the Russian authorities. The terms “adoption” and “institutionalization” are used to mean the official introduction of a norm into the country’s legislation, and the terms “implementation,” “enforcement,” and “application” are used to mean bringing social and regulatory practices into compliance with a legal norm.

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The Beginnings of Environmental Awareness in Russia In the early 1990s, Russia had a rather imperfect environmental legislation. In the USSR, priority was traditionally given to the development of heavy industry, with little attention being given to the efficiency of the use of natural resources. Despite obvious progress in this area, traces of this approach may still be found in Russia’s economy today. Russia’s energy efficiency index (GDP per unit of energy consumed) is 0.23. According to this index, Russia is considerably behind such countries as France (0.11), Germany (0.09), Brazil (0.12), the United States (0.13), and India (0.17), and is approximately at the same level as China (0.24).5 An abundance of natural resources (even if they are not always readily available) disincentivizes the search for ways to optimize their use. Waste management is a case in point here. During the Cold War, taking advantage of the secrecy regime, radioactive materials were sometimes (especially in the early days) simply buried in the ground or dumped into the sea, without much consideration of the long-term consequences. The rapidly deteriorating Soviet infrastructure in the post-Soviet years led on several occasions to documented radiation leaks and other harmful effects for the environment.6 Finally, the collectivization of agriculture resulted in the contamination of a significant mass of agricultural land due to the excessive use of pesticides, which, in some parts of the country, posed a threat to the health of the local population. At the same time, the 1990s saw a significant increase in environmental concerns at the highest levels of government in Russia. Officials and leading experts began to focus more on assessing the negative environmental impact of wasteful attitudes toward natural resources, as well as on developing measures to rectify the situation. During the following years, a significant number of norms were adopted to address these challenges. In addition, Russia ratified most of the important international treaties on environmental protection, and watchdog organizations were established to supervise the implementation of the adopted norms. During the 1990s–2000s, over thirty laws and codes containing environmental protection norms were issued (e.g., Federal Law No. 174-FZ “On Environmental Expert Assessment” dated November 23, 1995; Federal Law No. 89-FZ “On Industrial and Consumer Waste” dated June 24, 1998; Federal Law No. 96-FZ “On the Protection of Atmospheric Air” adopted in May 1999; Land Code of the Russian Federation, No. 136-FZ dated

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October 25, 2001; and Forest Code of the Russian Federation, No. 200-FZ dated December 4, 2006). Each of these regulations was later amended extensively.7 The general framework for environmental regulation was provided by Federal Law No. 7-FZ “On Environmental Protection” dated January 10, 2002. It identified the key priorities in this area, described economic instruments that could be used in environmental protection, regulated the procedure for setting standards and norms, set the rules for accepting indicators and conducting state inspections, and recognized, for the first time, the negative impact of business activities on the environment and specified the measures that could be used for raising environmental awareness. Although this law has been criticized for its internal contradictions, as well as difficulties with its enforcement, it is impossible to deny its complex and progressive nature, which created grounds for pursuing a systematic environmental policy in Russia. The main problems addressed by Russian environmental policy remain the same. These are water quality, the state of forests, air quality, radioactive pollution, waste management and, of course, the effects of climate change. This list is recorded in many doctrinal and legislative sources. However, according to experts, the general legal structure of environmental regulation in Russia lacks conceptual coherence and consistency of implementation. For example, the Presidential Decree of April 30, 2012, established five priority areas of environmental policy: (1) waste management and improvement of the relevant controls; (2) mandatory environmental assessment for certain types of industrial facilities; (3) environmental education in schools; (4) increased transparency of companies regarding their adverse environmental impacts; and (5) improved energy efficiency. The extreme importance of all these five aspects cannot be overestimated. However, what we see is a top-level document incorporating an arbitrary range of issues that seemingly fall under the umbrella of environmental protection but are actually unrelated in practice; this can (and does) lead to decreased effectiveness of the envisaged measures. Despite the general impression that environmental challenges are adequately reflected in the legal system, there is a lack of executive and procedural norms fleshing out the top-level priorities and tasks, which is necessary for the correct implementation of the declared objectives. Being honest in stating the nature of a number of problems is also important. In particular, some environmental threats are difficult to control due to the

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high prevalence of unreported economic activities in the relevant industries. An illustrative example in this case is the problem of deforestation, which is largely due to illegal logging. Another dilemma is worth noting. On the one hand, getting a true idea of the state of the environment requires a range of indicators to be monitored by the relevant authorities. However, such indicators can only describe progress in relation to targets (e.g., the number of trees planted or the area of forests treated). On the other hand, this kind of monitoring cannot provide a complete picture of the problem as a whole (e.g., whether the restoration activities are sufficient to compensate for deforestation).8 Over the last few decades, there have been major improvements in a number of areas, such as greenhouse gas emissions. However, this kind of progress usually coincides with periods of economic downturn. According to experts, “decoupling emissions from GDP has not been achieved” in Russia.9 What is worrying is that while total CO2 emissions have been decreasing in some periods, reflecting GDP dynamics, Russia’s CO2 emissions per capita still grew from 11.3 tonnes in 2000 to 12.8 tonnes in 2012. Meanwhile, in most other European countries, the relative volume of emissions has declined, even though their absolute levels dropped in the downward phase of the business cycle (in France, for example, from 6.7 tonnes in 2000 to 5.5 tonnes per capita in 2012).10 In the 2010s, the energy intensity of GDP in Russia first stabilized and then even declined to 12.4 tonnes of CO2 per capita in 2014.11 Nevertheless, due to the relatively short duration of the period in question, it is still premature to qualify this as a trend and attribute it to the first encouraging results of the energy-saving policy. We should not forget that in the 1990s, the liberalization of the economy and the establishment of mass consumption culture, typical of capitalist society, in Russia led to a significant increase in waste per capita—one of the challenges of market economy. Finally, although government spending on environmental protection, according to Rosstat, more than doubled from 2002 to 2010, it decreased as a percentage of GDP.12 The above shows that environmental problems remain more than urgent in Russia, and despite the existence of a strong legal framework designed to provide an adequate response to these challenges, the progress actually made in this area is clearly insufficient.

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The Role and Scope of Public Awareness of Environmental Issues Russian people are becoming increasingly aware of environmental issues, and they are not indifferent to the negative changes that occur in the immediate vicinity of their place of residence. At the same time, they are not always aware of the underlying reasons behind a particular environmental deterioration, and in many cases they believe that this process cannot be influenced. In a survey conducted by the Higher School of Economics in 2015, 78% of the 1670 respondents indicated that they were interested in the state of the environment.13 However, the same survey showed that only 30% considered environmentally themed public events to be necessary, placing environmental protection lower in the system of state priorities than agriculture, industry, and medicine. This clearly shows that the general public is not completely oblivious to environmental issues but is primarily concerned with satisfying their more immediate needs, especially in periods of economic downturn. Another poll conducted by the Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) showed that more than half of Russians are dissatisfied with the current state of the environment, especially the quality of air and water. In their opinion, the biggest sources of pollution are transport and industry. At the same time, the survey showed that people are mostly not involved in new types of behavior aimed at protecting the environment, although they have nothing against such actions in principle. In particular, traditional Saturday neighborhood clean-ups (52% of respondents said they participated in them) and events held under the slogan “Make Your City Green” (28%) remain popular. However, less than 5% had participated in demonstrations, activities organized by NGOs, volunteer work, or environmental inspections. A total of 65% had never heard of any NGO working locally at all, and 78% had not heard of any local government program aimed at improving the environmental situation. Meanwhile, up to 30% would gladly do more in this area if they had the opportunity. The Russian public is not involved in environmental protection for a number of different reasons. For example, because they are burdened with everyday tasks related to more basic needs, because they are poorly informed about the origins of environmental problems or the means available to address them, because of insufficient infrastructure, or because

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they believe that the state, represented by federal and municipal authorities, is responsible for the environment (this opinion was expressed by 81% of respondents, compared to 16% who believe that responsibility lies with people and businesses).14 The lack of information provided at the local level often results in the population being more informed about international environmental problems than about the problems of their own city or region. The expert community, for its part, is also far from unanimous on the current state of environmental problems and their causes. This further contributes to the public’s perception that there is no point in changing the approach to the issue, and that people cannot have any tangible influence on the current situation anyway. The problem of climate change is a case in point. A number of scientists have publicly questioned whether humans actually have any significant influence on this phenomenon. Others believe that reversing this process is fundamentally impossible, no matter what we do. Some call for mere adaptation and focus mainly on the potential benefits for the Russian Federation. Others deny that the process is happening at all. For example, Vladimir Bashkin from Gazprom’s VNIIGAZ research center and Rauf Galiulin from the Russian Academy of Sciences are not only unconvinced that human activity has any effect on global warming, but even deny it altogether, predicting the inevitable advent of a new “ice age.” Their views have been widely reported in the media. Some publications claim that the “so-called global warming” is nothing more than a marketing trick aimed at curbing the consumption of natural energy resources and forcing Russia to reduce the price of gas.15 Similarly, many experts speculate on the consequences of melting of the Arctic ice. Some focus on the benefits that Russia will reap from increased temperatures in the region, advocating for new regulations for the Arctic.16 Although a number of environmental NGOs operate in Russia, they have failed to find mass support among the population. The literature provides numerous examples of how NGOs in some countries have lost legitimacy for a variety of reasons, including foreign funding, the adverse effects they have on global governance and the fact that many identify them with Western hegemony.17 In the Soviet Union, attempts to protect the country’s natural resources were made by environmental groups based at universities. Among other things, they monitored various human activities that were considered potentially harmful to the environment (e.g., logging and littering) and informed the state about the misuse of natural

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resources.18 This historical fact explains why most Russian NGOs work at the local level, continuing to solve specific local problems, as was the case with the 1996 environmental campaign in Rostov, which was aimed at stopping the construction of a nuclear power plant in the city.19 Increased public interest in environmental issues in the 1990s was followed by the establishment of the Russian Ecological Party “The Greens,” and the scale of the problems identified led to the establishment of federal-level NGOs. Even radical environmental groups (such as Greenpeace) began working in Russia. It was during this time that the conditions for increasing public awareness of environmental issues were most favorable.20 However, when the economic crisis struck, the population had neither time nor the financial resources to participate in environmental advocacy, and by the time the economy recovered in the 2000s, when the standard of living of the average Russian slightly increased, the situation had changed, and concern over environmental issues was no longer on the agenda. At the same time, NGOs were perceived as suspicious agents covering up political goals with environmental concerns. Part of the criticism of NGOs was true due to their low competence: often they were simply unable to attract participants and funding in amounts necessary for effective work. The data published by the NGOs contain little concrete information, and the data that was made available (for example by Greenpeace Russia, which claimed to have involved 270 volunteers in its activities and as many as 208,000 supporters) could hardly be verified.21 In fact, a significant number of volunteers who participated in forest fire suppression activities near their homes did indeed do so together with Greenpeace representatives. However, they were only motivated by a desire to protect the forest in their immediate vicinity, had not helped the organization before, and were not involved in its environmental campaigns thereafter. Based on the above, the situation with environmental protection in Russia seems extremely paradoxical. The question arises: How could such a rigid legal and political structure develop in the country without public awareness? And why do Russians remain poorly informed about local environmental challenges, even if they request such information?

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Factors in the Adoption of International Environmental Standards There are several reasons and conditions for governments to agree to environmental norms (see the table). The first of these scenarios assumes that by the time a piece of legislation is introduced, the population is already quite sensitive to environmental issues, or (which is more common) the growing awareness of environmental threats among the general public and the process of acceptance of relevant norms go hand in hand. In other words, when the public is not concerned about the issue at hand, the government or activist groups carry out a campaign to raise public awareness so that it becomes possible to regulate that group of issues at the legislative and subsequent law-enforcement levels. In democratic regimes, of course, the government would prefer not to pass laws that impose political or economic costs that are sensitive to the electorate (such as laws on energy conservation or waste sorting), unless voters are convinced that the benefits significantly outweigh the losses. This logic also explains why policymaking in new areas is often incremental, and the regulatory pressure becomes more intense as the public becomes more aware of the nature and severity of the challenges. Types of Scenarios for the Adoption of Norms by National Governments Scenarios Main participants/originators

1

2 3 4

Reason for change

Population/government Gradual increase in awareness Activists Scientific knowledge Government Environmental disaster Government Imitation

Obviousness of the problem

Type of Speed of Support action taken adoption by networks

High

Local

High

Yes

Low

Global

Low

Yes

High

Local

High

Yes

Low

Global/local High

No

Source Compiled by the authors

This scenario of norm adoption can be illustrated by the Clean Air Act of 1956 in the United Kingdom, which was one of the first steps in the direction of modern environmental policy.22 The Great Smog that enveloped London in 1952 is said to have claimed 12,000 lives.

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As a result, the city’s population became more aware of the health consequences of air pollution. The government initially tried, mainly for economic reasons, to downplay environmental health hazards. Under pressure from the public and the emerging institutional lobby (formed by organizations such as the National Smoke Abatement Society and the Solid Smokeless Fuels Federation), it was soon forced to backtrack by enacting a number of measures, most famously the Clean Air Act, which restricted smoke emissions from both households and industry. Over time, the government itself began to raise public awareness by issuing guidelines for dwellings, which suggested and recommended switching from fireplaces with permanently open grates to “opening” stoves, pointed out the need for thermal insulation in homes and the preference for burning smokeless fuels.23 In this example, the adoption of regulation went hand in hand with a change in public consciousness, lobbying, and government campaigns. All this was aimed at ensuring the enactment of these laws. The second scenario involves local activist groups building up pressure on the government to adopt norms on environmental issues. The agent of change may be a particular social community that has suffered more than others from pollution produced in certain parts of the country. Such activists may succeed in convincing the entire community and government to accept the norms they advocate. If they do not succeed, which usually happens when “channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered,” they may become part of “transnational advocacy networks” to further pressure their national governments, this time from the outside.24 Transnational advocacy networks play a key role in the adoption of norms at the national level, and often compel governments to address issues not originally on their agenda.25 These kinds of networks are “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange.” They can include a variety of participants, including NGOs, local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, individual intellectuals, parts of intergovernmental organizations, and parts of governments.26 Through various channels, they influence the policies of individual governments. Regardless of how responsive decision-makers are to such influence, they may be forced to participate in international environmental treaties promoted by transnational networks. Such associations can even influence states that resist the regulatory agenda advocated

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by activists—in these cases there is a “boomerang effect,” where advocates of environmental regulation operating in a country put pressure on their government by relying on foreign actors. The boomerang effect is well illustrated by the actions taken in 2010 by the Dongria Kondh tribe in the Niyamgiri region of India. The Vedanta Resources company had planned to develop an open pit mine in the hills of Niyamgiri, where it intended to mine bauxite. The estimated profit was about $2 billion. In addition, the firm—with the permission of the federal government—had already built an alumina refinery not far away, near the town of Lanjigarh. The tribe, familiar with the environmental consequences of a dirty industrial plant, held a local resistance action and issued an international appeal to protect the environment in the region. Survival, a nongovernmental organization specializing in the protection of the traditional way of life of small peoples, offered its support to the tribe. It lobbied for a ban on Niyamgiri bauxite mining, putting pressure on the governments of India and the United Kingdom, as well as the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In 2013, the Supreme Court of India ruled that the Dongria should be able to decide whether the mining would continue. The tribe decided against the mining company, thus closing the issue.27 As part of a campaign organized jointly with NGOs, protests were held in the United Kingdom under the slogan “Save the real Avatar tribe,” drawing a parallel between the characters of the popular film and the Dongria tribe. Through this campaign, Survival gained leverage over the government of India, which sided with the Dongria, including for reputational reasons. It should be noted that the “boomerang model” is a very useful tool for pushing through new norms, because “as the locus of decision-making move[s] upward,” local communities risk having fewer opportunities to express their views on the situation.28 The second scenario, meanwhile, suggests that in cases where the government is not prepared to address a particular issue, citizens can still get their way through transnational advocacy networks. In both the first and second scenarios, people and activists are involved from the beginning in shaping normative change, helping to bring it about. Both remain bottom-up variants of norm assimilation. The third scenario describes cases where a country faces such extreme environmental problems or challenges that both the population and the government are in agreement with one another and usually simultaneously recognize the need for urgent measures to protect the environment.

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The gravity of the situation results in a policy being formulated under conditions of extreme necessity.29 The government, acting as a “natural lawmaker,” develops norms designed to provide a solution to an urgent and clearly understood problem. Although this course of events includes elements similar to the first scenario, there are a number of significant typological distinctions. The main one is that the actor who initiates the creation of norms is not society, pressure groups, or business, but the state. Here we face an approach in which the initiative comes from the top-down, rather than from the bottom-up as in the previous scenarios. Nevertheless, the introduction of the norm and its recognition by the public in this case should not present any difficulties, since this scenario is only possible when the problem is so obvious and vital that no one can deny its existence any longer. This is not typical of environmental problems, which are often characterized by a vague uncertainty of deferred results. The following example from South Korea seems to be a particularly good illustration of the third scenario. The high population density in South Korea, along with the acute shortage of space for waste disposal and serious problems with the littering of coastal ocean waters,30 made waste one of the government’s top priorities in the 1990s. Seoul used all means at its disposal to resolve the situation, from careful sorting to financial incentives. The results of these efforts are impressive: over the course of 25 years, the average daily amount of waste produced per capita in the country was reduced by half, and in 2010 Seoul recycled 66% of its household waste.31 People accepted change because otherwise they faced obvious risks that were too great. Positive changes in the environmental situation were enabled by objective constraints. However, concern about one environmental problem does not mean that a country is immediately ready to address other environmental issues. Thus, the neo-functionalist “spill-over effect” in the third scenario is virtually eliminated. The fourth scenario describes situations in which governments decide to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for a new issue without informing the public and without being lobbied by nongovernmental organizations. Why a government can decide to introduce costly regulations in the absence of apparent demand, with little or no pressure from the outside or below and without being forced to do so by urgent environmental problems is the ultimate paradox, one that can also be seen in Russian environmental regulation. What makes it possible for the government to become voluntarily interested in environmental issues?

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The theory of the “norm life cycle” mentioned at the beginning contains a possible answer to this question.32 According to this theory, after the international dissemination of new rules has passed a “critical point,” a “cascade effect” is triggered. Since many states have already committed to the new norm, it becomes so generally accepted that other states begin to recognize it out of a desire for conformity. A number of environmental norms have already successfully undergone this process, and this can explain their adoption by the Russian Federation. It seems that Moscow has accepted them largely because most states, including its strategic partners, have done so. At the same time, the “norm life cycle” model suggests that, as the new norms go through the cascade, while still at the internalization stage, they start to be perceived as so obvious that they pass into the category of “self-evident” norms. Then they begin to be accepted by default at all levels (not only by states, but also by the public), gaining the status of obligatory norms in the domestic political arena.33 Meanwhile, the environmental legislation adopted in Russia has not yet reached this stage of the cycle, and therefore the validity of formally enshrined norms has not acquired the proper legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The abovementioned transnational advocacy networks contribute to the development of norms within the life cycle. However, their efforts tend to focus on the moment when the norm is adopted by the state. By acting in various ways—providing governments with information on environmental issues, adding new items to the international agenda, “encouraging discursive commitments from states” and properly framing problematic issues, thereby guiding and structuring public and expert debate—transnational networks can encourage governments to legislate on a particular aspect of an issue.34 Moreover, Keck and Sikkink identify four types of strategies that can be followed by transnational advocacy networks: “information politics; symbolic politics; leverage politics; and accountability politics,” the first and the fourth of which can be easily applied at the intergovernmental level. When considering the scenarios of norm adoption, it becomes obvious that Russia is implementing the fourth one, since its interaction—at the intergovernmental level—with other states and international organizations has played a significant role in shaping national environmental legislation. Moscow has joined (or was among the developers of) the majority of international conventions and treaties in the field of environmental protection. These include: the Convention on Biological Diversity

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(1983); the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985); the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987); the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989); the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (1991); the Kyoto Protocol on climate change (2004); the Paris Agreement on climate change (2015); and others. Following its commitments, Moscow has put environmental laws in place that are in line with international standards.35 Although the Russian government does not allow foreign NGOs to directly influence its decisions, the sway they have over international organizations and other states is certainly capable of having an indirect effect on the Russian Federation as well, especially in non-political (humanitarian) issues. This is because transnational advocacy networks (of which the relevant specialized NGOs are an important part) here exert an indirect influence on the foreign state, putting pressure on the governments of their countries (the NGOs’ countries of origin) and contributing to the inclusion of environmental issues on the agenda of international and intergovernmental summits. For reputational reasons, countries usually try not to avoid participating in international treaties designed to solve global problems, and if they do, they are criticized.36 With growing international political tensions, a state that expects to resolve them or, at least, to create the most acceptable conditions for economic development in a difficult geopolitical context, will seek to avoid this kind of reputational loss on less important issues. Therefore, the two main parameters that explain the situation in which a state adopts costly norms without a corresponding demand from the population are (1) the programmatic influence of actions taken by states that are perceived by its leaders as significant, and (2) the number of states that have adopted the norm. This explanation can be compared with the arguments of alternative theories. For example, representatives of “world politics theory” note that adopting norms that are completely new and adopting norms that are widely used elsewhere can be two very different processes. When countries adopt regulations by analogy, despite obvious cultural and other ontological differences, it is called “isomorphic change.” It leads to a society “taking on standardized forms.”37 An example of this is “mass schooling systems organized around a fairly standard curriculum” implemented in many nations without regard for their national contexts.

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Even agrarian countries chose to use the existing model, which reflected the experience of industrial economies, rather than develop their own approaches to mass education.38 Based on this hypothesis, we can assume that the Russian government, at some point, discovered what environmental regulations exist abroad and how they work, and began trying to import the most advanced of those. It can be logically expected that, whereas fundamentally new laws usually have to be pushed through from bottom-up, laws that are already in effect elsewhere can be adopted by the government without much public pressure. This explanation fits within the framework proposed above. Another explanation of Russia’s top-down approach to environmental standards is the influence exerted by epistemic communities, which are defined as networks of “professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”39 Researching attempts to control pollution in the Mediterranean region, Peter Haas came to conclusion that groups of experts can ensure the “introduction of policy alternatives” and, if they have bureaucratic leverage, induce their governments to seek to turn them into laws. Epistemic communities differ from ordinary lobbyists because they do not derive their power from public support—real or assumed—but from their authority, which is based on knowledge and qualifications. In Russia, epistemic communities have gained considerable influence, as they are always ready to fill existing gaps in information and technological awareness in the course of norm development. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a whole network of stakeholders and activists involved in the process of introducing environmental norms, the uptake of international experience in Russia is mainly done at the intergovernmental level. This approach is known as transgovernmentalism, and this form of interaction is indeed preferred in many major countries, including Russia. Transgovernmentalism is based on a “memorandum of understanding, in which two or more regulatory agencies set forth and initial terms for an ongoing relationship” relying on good faith and “their like-minded commitment to getting results.”40 This explanation also fits within the discussed framework. Countries quite often adopt environmental norms as a result of intergovernmental interaction, and

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the greater the number of participants, the greater the pressure to adopt what other countries have already signed up to. For example, the Paris Climate Change Conference of 2015 was attended by 196 governments, including Russia. It resulted in a compromise between states on reducing atmospheric emissions. It was the summit, group pressure, and increased reputational concerns that led countries to adopt the rules, but ideas of global unity in the face of a common problem also played a significant role. For states concerned about protecting their sovereignty, transnationalism offers an opportunity to preserve it while avoiding the damage associated with pressure from politically motivated groups of social activists. States see intergovernmental negotiations as something purely bureaucratic, familiar, and reassuring. This format of interaction makes it easier for them to make concessions while preserving the formal right to refuse to accept norms recognized by other governments. ∗ ∗ ∗ The four models of the emergence and establishment of norms discussed above demonstrate that, in the adoption of new national legislation, the initiative may come from different political levels, both with and without significant international pressure. For large states concerned with protecting their sovereignty, routine (day-to-day) intergovernmental interaction rather than pressure from transnational NGO networks plays a key role. At the same time, the diffusion of norms in this case is faster with the participation of transnational expertise and experience networks (TEENs), whose purpose is to adapt international norms to local country contexts and to facilitate their implementation. At the same time, each of the presented models of normative emergence has a specific impact on norm implementation.

Keywords Transnational advocacy networks, transnational expertise and experience networks, environmental law, norm diffusion, norm adoption, norm implementation. Self-Test 1. What is the “boomerang effect” and who first described it? Give an example from the text or any other example from your own experience analyzing global political relations.

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2. Name the priority areas of environmental legislation in Russia and characterize their development. 3. What is the level of “environmental awareness” in Russia among the general public and what ways of raising awareness among the general public do you know? 4. Explain the mechanics underlying the four scenarios described in this chapter and give examples from the text for each of them. 5. What is the role of epistemic communities? Can they help promote an environmental agenda? 6. What does the acronym TEENs mean? How does this type of agent operate in practice?

Notes 1. Thomas Risse, “Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy,” Global Policy 3, no. 3 (2012): 87–95. 2. Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). 3. E.V. Bakalova, “Constructivism in the Study of International Human Rights Norms. From Genesis, Acceptance and Compliance to Violation, Contestation and Erosion,” International Trends 13, no. 1 (2015): 48–67. 4. Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. 5. Global Energy Architecture Performance Index Report 2015, http:// www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnergyArchitecture_2015.pdf. 6. According to Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Sergei Donskoy, Russia spills 1.5 million tonnes of oil every year. Alec Luhn, “The Town that Reveals How Russia Spills Two Deepwater Horizons of Oil Each Year,” (August 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/env ironment/2016/aug/05/the-town-that-reveals-how-russia-spills-two-dee pwater-horizons-of-oil-each-year. 7. See Legislative Database of the FAO Legal Office, Russian Federation – Forest Code, http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?rec_id= 052932&database=faolex&search_type=link&table=result&lang=eng&for mat_name=@ERALL.

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8. One of the seven indicators tracked by the environmental department of the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (Rosstat), http://www.gks. ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/environme nt/#. 9. Country Review: Russian Federation, http://www.oecd.org/env/cou ntry-reviews/2452793.pdf, 4. 10. European Commission Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), CO2 Time Series 1990–2014 Per Capita for World Countries, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts_ pc1990-2014. 11. Ibid. 12. Comparing the GDP and environmental costs for the years where data is available. Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/ rosstat/ru/statistics/environment/# and http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/ connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/#. 13. “Russian Ecopractices and Attitudes towards Environmental Problems,” Higher School of Economics Informational Newsletter, no. 2 (2015), https://issek.hse.ru/data/2015/09/25/1074029049/%D0%AD%D0% BA%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B8%D0% BA%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F%D0% BD.pdf. 14. K.V. Abramov, “Russian Views on the State of the Environment According to Polls,” VCIOM (June 2013), https://wciom.ru/fileadmin/file/rep orts_conferences/2013/2013-06-17-ekologiya.pdf. 15. “Two Russian Scientists Predict the Beginning of the ‘Ice Age’ as Early as Next Year,” Interfax (February 9, 2013), http://interfax.com.ua/news/ general/139849.html. 16. Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, “Developing International Law Teachings for Preventing Interstate Disaccords in the Arctic Ocean.” New Chances and New Responsibilities in the Arctic Region: Papers from the International Conference at the German Federal Foreign Office in Cooperation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Norway, March 11–13, 2009 (Berlin, 2010), 209–222. 17. Tanja Bruhl, et al., eds., Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik. Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess (Bonn: Dietz Verlag, 2011); Hans-Martin Jaeger, “‘Global Civil Society’ and the Political Depoliticization of Global Governance,” International Political Sociology 1, no. 3 (2007): 257–277; Sarah E. Mendelson, and John K. Glenn, eds., The Power and Limits of NGOs : A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2002); David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue. Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004); Clifford Bob, “The Market for Human Rights,” in Aseem

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19.

20.

21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32.

33.

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Prakash, and Mary K. Gugerty, Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133–154. The Role of Environmental NGOs : Russian Challenges, American Lessons: Proceedings of a Workshop, National Research Council (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2001), https://doi.org/10.17226/ 10240. Vladimir Sliviak, “1996 – Most Successful Anti-Nuclear Year of the 1990s,” Nuclear Monitor, World Information Service on Energy (1996), https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/463-464/ 1996-most-successful-anti-nuclear-year-1990s/. The Role of Environmental NGOs : Russian Challenges, American Lessons: Proceedings of a Workshop, National Research Council (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2001), https://doi.org/10.17226/ 10240. Greenpeace, FAQ, http://www.greenpeace.org/russia/ru/about/faqs/. Clean Air Acts UK, http://www.air-quality.org.uk/03.php. Vanessa Giussani, The UK Clean Air Act 1956: An Empirical Investigation, CSERGE Working Paper (Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, 1994). Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). Ibid. Ibid. Survival—Dongria Tribe, http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/ dongria. Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Dorothy M. Daley, and James C. Garand, “Horizontal Diffusion, Vertical Diffusion and Internal Pressure in State Environmental Policymaking,” American Politics Research 33, no. 5 (2005): 615–644. Chang-Gu Kang, “Marine Litter in the Republic of Korea,” (2003), http://marine-litter.gpa.unep.org/documents/marine-litter-Korea-Kang. pdf. Grace Lee, “Seoul’s Example,” Recycling Today (2012), http://www.rec yclingtoday.com/article/rtge1112-municipal-recycling-seoul/. Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. Andrew P. Cortell, and James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, no. 1 (2000): 65–87. Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

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35. King & Spalding, “Overview of Russian Legislation,” http://www.kslaw. com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/RussianEnvironmental. pdf. 36. Jennifer Erickson, Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation (Columbia University Press, 2015). 37. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, “World Society and the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (1997): 144–181. 38. David H. Kamens, John W. Meyer, and Aaron Benavot, “Worldwide Patterns in Academic Secondary Education Curricula,” Comparative Education Review 40, no. 2 (1996): 116–138. 39. Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1–35. 40. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 183–197.

Recommended Reading Bakalova, E.V. “Constructivism in the Study of International Human Rights Norms. From Genesis, Acceptance and Compliance to Violation, Contestation and Erosion.” International Trends 13, no. 1 (2015): 48–67. Chepurnykh, N.V., Novosyolova, I.Y., Novosyolov, A.L., Bobylev, S.N., and Girusov, E.V., in E.V. Girusov, and N.V. Lopatin, Environmental Science and the Economics of Natural Resource Use: Study Guide. Moscow: UNITYDANA, 2012. Glushkov, V.G., and Lugovskaya, A.M., eds. Regional Economy. Fundamentals of Natural Resources and Ecology: Study Guide. Moscow: KnoRus, 2018. Kalinin, V.M., and Ryazanova, N.E. Ecological Monitoring of Natural Environments: Study Guide. Moscow: INFRA-M, 2015. Matevosova, K.L. Technogenic Systems and Environmental Risk: Study Guide for University Students. Moscow: MGIMO University, 2020. Platonova, I.N. “Sustainable Development of the Global Economy and Russia’s Competitiveness.” Russian Foreign Economic Bulletin 9 (2014): 49–64. Solncev, A.M. Contemporary International Environmental Law and Human Environmental Rights, with a preface by Abashidze, A.K. Moscow: LIBROKOM, 2013, 7–9.

CHAPTER 16

Political Implications of Global Higher Education Sector: The Russian Case Andrey Baykov, Anne Crowley-Vigneau, and Yelena Kalyuzhnova

How national social institutions cope with global-level changes depends on a host of historical, cultural, and social background factors, as well as the specific policies designed and pursued by a given state. “It is not the strongest of species that survive, not the most intelligent, but the most responsive to change”: this famous quotation from Charles

A. Baykov (B) · A. Crowley-Vigneau MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] A. Crowley-Vigneau e-mail: [email protected] A. Crowley-Vigneau University of Reading, Reading, England Y. Kalyuzhnova Henley Business School, Greenlands, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_16

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Darwin can guide and inform our understanding of how the Russian Higher Learning system has grappled with the need to internationalize and participate in the global competition to survive. In spite of the harsh criticism it has faced from within and without (Dezhina, 2014; Smolentseva et al., 2018; Tulohonov, 2014), Russia’s universities and research institutes have since the Soviet period and even Tsarist times housed globally competitive research. While beginning with Peter the Great, Russia looked toward the West for inspiration in founding a modern educational system; in Soviet times it was the Russian higher education system that had become the envy of many countries, was frequently emulated, and served as the destination of educational migration toward the Soviet Union (Graham, 2015). Numerous ground-breaking scientific achievements demonstrated that the Soviet Union had cutting-edge research with an obvious spill-over effect in the sphere of education. Moreover, the Soviet highly centralized organizational structure in education convincingly showed that research and teaching could in fact thrive, at least in some subject areas, in a controlled institutional environment. But the Soviet track record also begs an unpopular question whether certain types of educational systems are best suited to societies with certain structures. While neo-liberalism underlines the universal benefits of letting market mechanisms regulate all spheres including higher education, and western countries along with international organizations emphasize the need for all countries to join in a global network of educational practices, this vision is in no way uncontested (Abramov et al., 2016; Gill, 2016). Indeed, subordinating universities to economic regulation has been shown to deprive universities of their independence and to constrict their creativity (Moutsios, 2012), and the EU’s intention to create through the Bologna process “the most competitive knowledgebased economy”1 (Commission of the European Communities, 2003) is a vivid example of the implementation of new managerialist principles in the sphere of higher education with a ripple effect on universities globally. The rules governing the global system of higher education and its main characteristics are most clearly crystallized in the norm of worldclass universities, which contends that universities should be researchcentered, international, competitive, and serve the interests (and satisfy the demand) of the global market. While norms are standards of behavior and do not always have an “approved” formulation, the norm on worldclass universities was quite distinctly articulated in several World Bank

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publications.2 The tools employed to assess each member’s contribution are international rankings of universities and global impact indexes of academic publications. Attempts are made to measure almost everything, and countries occupy a hierarchical place in the global community of knowledge, which is directly dependent on the performance of their universities in the system. In line with this tendency toward overquantification, even research in the social sciences has moved away from theoretical reasoning toward rigorous empirical studies. And yet, in light of the various downfalls of this global education paradigm and the rising doubts vis-à-vis the quality of the university education based on it, the question arises why the Russian government has taken upon itself to revolutionize its higher education system in accordance with this same exogenous model. Russia’s “5-100 project”, enunciated in May 2013,3 aimed to improve the results of a group of leading Russian universities in international rankings and appears to be a literal transplantation of these organizational norms originating in the West with a view to aligning Russia with the international system. Rather than reforming from within, building up its inner potential and then moving on to the competitive international arena from a position of strength, Russia has entered it as a modest player, a docile apprentice, who has had no other option but to embrace uncritically the pre-existing rules, criteria, and practices. A review of Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) typology of results and processes, which looks at the most productive types of change under different circumstances, together with an analysis of the substance versus the form of education, as well as of Russia’s security concerns in the sphere of higher education and of resistance to project 5–100, allows the authors to shed considerable light on why the Russian government chose to adopt international norms in higher education and how it went about their implementation. Furthermore, applying the theoretical concept of isomorphism as developed by institutional theory to the Russian case provides valuable insights into why Russia follows so closely the educational structures, norms, and institutions emanating from the West. The existing literature on norm diffusion underlines the role of transnational advocacy networks (TAN) that champion and help promote Western educational norms by underscoring the need to partake in the globalization process. Scholars also emphasize the risks of being an outsider when most developed countries have adopted clear integration

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policies in research and education (the most prominent of which being the Bologna Process). Constructivist research reveals the mechanisms affecting norm transfer and adoption but does not fully account for the gaps in implementation and the contradictions between the government’s rhetoric and actions, particularly when considering the case of Russian higher education. We have intentionally mentioned, up until here, educational norms as a general category: while this article will focus mainly on higher education, similar trends can be registered in primary and secondary education, which will also be used as a source of some illustrations. The terms “government” and “state” are used interchangeably in this article to qualify the authorities of a country. The terms “adoption” and “institutionalization” denote a process whereby a norm officially enters the legal system in a country, thus turning into a legal rule; the terms “implementation” and “enforcement” are used to refer to the compliance with a legal rule. In this article, we explore the reasons why states decide to adopt international norms in the sphere of higher education and the factors impacting their implementation, before considering how sovereignty concerns can lead to a dichotomy between the form and content of education. The shortcomings of such an approach are analyzed, revealing that this dichotomy can cause a fundamental mismatch between what is taught and how it is taught. The focus on “catching up” can lead to resistance to projects promoting change in the form of enclaves and to the sub-optimal practices, which endanger the quality of higher education. Last of all, the role of TEENs in helping adapt international norms to a local context is analyzed.

Norm Adoption and Norm Implementation Russia’s decision to adopt international norms appears paradoxical, particularly in times when anti-Western sentiment is running high as a result of the Ukraine crisis, Syria and the sanctions. The diffusion of norms and mimetic behavior has been the object of many studies which show how globalization and the power of the market are critical in shaping the structure of various national institutions. Social constructivism appears to be the most promising analytical framework to explain social change and the role different actors play in creating and diffusing norms. When designing national policies, governments have to consider a number of different factors and are subject to inner and outside influence. Countries involved

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in regional integration processes and practicing open trade are subject to multiple layers of “lobbying”. Transnational Advocacy Networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) exercise pressure on governments at a variety of different levels and operate as a network (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). They influence the process of policy-making even in cases when the government attempts to block it (the “boomerang effect” by which activists involve international actors to put pressure on their national government). Norms can be imported against the will of a state and at the demand of its own citizens. Norm transmission also explains why similar processes unfold synchronously in different countries, which have no direct ties between them. By appropriately framing educational issues, transnational activists— including leading local universities—make governments more sensitive to the importance of participating in the integrated educational systems, regional or global. The costs for a national education system of being marginalized in the global arena are presented as very high. With regards to higher education, the discourse chiefly revolves around the consequences of an economic nature. The concept of “advocacy” and the focus on “pressure” put on a government by, among others, external actors, are useful for understanding Russia’s situation in education in the 1990s, but generally work best with more visible subjects or causes such as human rights. Russia’s concern about its sovereignty coupled with the fact that education is not a highly politicized issue in the international arena make the use of the “boomerang effect” unlikely and TANs in the education sector operate mainly at intergovernmental level and influence through expert and university communities. In this light, within the Institutional Theory, Meyer and Rowan (1977) looked into the reasons why structures and norms are similar in seemingly unrelated places or spheres. They determined that new structures are designed based on existing ones to try to gain “organizational legitimacy” because conforming to the predominant rules of the international system is necessary for survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) coined the term isomorphism in social sciences. The term is borrowed from the natural sciences and originally qualifies the resemblance between two unrelated structures (for example, the expansion of cities follows the same pattern as the growth of clouds). Isomorphic mimicry qualifies a situation when an organism copies a feature of another one which results in an evolutionary advantage such as an edible species of butterfly that looks like another

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so as not to get eaten (Krause, 2013). Yet, used in social sciences, it frequently has the opposite connotation and refers to unproductive imitation. The most shocking illustration of uncritical isomorphism may be what is sometimes referred to as cargo cults, when local tribes of the South Pacific made pretend airplanes, towers, and runways to attract planes with cargo as they had seen in the Second World War.4 Copying the structure did not lead to the expected result and no planes landed in these “make believe” airports. DiMaggio and Powell distinguished between different types of isomorphism, which explain how institutional systems become more alike: coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism, which all exist alongside competitive isomorphism (1983). Competitive isomorphism is linked to market pressures to improve one’s economic position (Shields, 2015). Coercive isomorphism is the result of formal and informal influence from other organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): international organizations such as the World Bank promote educational programs which have universal targets but lead to the homogenization of educational structures worldwide. Normative isomorphism comes from professionalization and establishing general norms to facilitate working processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): for example, international companies choose to recruit employees who have received a standard education from similar backgrounds to increase the chances they will fit in and rapidly become operational. Mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) is most common when there is a void and it is easier to copy an existing structure, which seems to work well elsewhere, than to design your own. Russia in the 1990s was experiencing a void in its secondary educational system and faced a number of serious issues such as corruption and the need to offer equal chances to students all over the country. The government used the American SATs as a model and implemented what began as a similar set of tests used to assess all school-leavers in view of their accession to university. Importing provides legitimacy and when a country is considering something as significant as modernizing its educational system, the government needs to convince all parties involved in the decision-making process that the new model works better than the previous one. Consulting companies, by modeling and promoting “best practices”, play an important role in this form of structural homogenization. The degree to which a structure or country is influenced by isomorphic change depends on a number of hypotheses formulated as follows by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), which we will use to shed

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light on the case of education on Russia. (1) The more an organization depends on another one, the more likely it is to copy that organization’s structure. Russia needed the World Bank’s funds for its educational system and the organization granted the loans to Russia under the condition that its recommendations were considered during the restructuring process, which led to standardization. (2) The greater the interaction with the state and the greater the centralization of resources, the more sensitive a structure is to isomorphic change. The vast majority of Russian schools and universities are state funded, which means they end up being similar to each other. Universities are also in competition in the modernization process and the most successful end up being copied by the remainder. (3) Uncertainty and goal ambiguity are closely associated with isomorphic change. The liberalization of the Russian economy led to a vacuum in education and the need to create something new, which was achieved by imitating models from abroad. These parameters offer some explanations of why Russia in its recent history copied foreign structures and norms. A tendency of convergence in different countries’ curricula and organizational structures, with an evolution toward a similar set of subjects being taught and even to a similar amount of time being devoted to them was revealed in a study of national education systems (Meyer, 1992). The professionalization of teachers, educated worldwide with the same programs and studying the same theories (Piaget, Bourdieu, etc.) gives them similar background knowledge, which they draw upon in the classroom (Meyer, 1992). A comparative study of education systems in the 1970s discovered that Sub-Saharan African countries had school programs and structures which were quite similar to Western ones in spite of the fact that the labor market demands were very different (Schofer et al., 2012). This convergence is not optimal as the local system in this case does not prepare children for their likely future professions and rather encourages a brain drain of the most able among them. While structures often converge by interacting with each other and to be able to work together efficiently, it remains unclear how isomorphism could exist in intention (the state borrowing norms) but not exist in rhetoric (the state does not admit to borrowing norms) or in practice (the norms are not implemented). Recent studies, reviewing why development programs are not always successful, have highlighted the limits of donor-assisted programs promoting education in developing countries by creating formal institutions (Krause, 2013). While funds are provided to modernize education, sometimes the implementation ability of the state is

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limited, which results in a situation described as a “Capability trap” if the state “is engaged in an internal and international logic of development and fail[s] to acquire capability” (Pritchett et al., 2010, p. 1). “Insincere mimicry” is another of the causes for the lack of implementation, with governments pretending to implement reforms and performing formalities instead of actually reforming (Krause, 2013). Yet, these explanations work best in the case of developing countries with no pre-existing educational systems, but do not fully explain the issues related to a country with a developed educational system such as Russia. International norms and structures have been formally adopted in Russia but they have not been fully implemented in their spirit and do not for that reason yield the expected results. Russia does not practice “insincere mimicry” it would seem, because the political discourse of the government does not try to convince its neighbors that it complies with their norms, nor do the authorities publicize the fact that they borrow western norms. As concerns educational reform, Russia does not appear strictly speaking to be stuck in a “capability trap” as the country has a strong centralized bureaucracy capable of introducing the necessary changes. While Western norms are implemented in order for the country to be able to participate in internationalization, they lead to few changes in the content of education because of the uncertainty regarding the need for such changes and because education is increasingly subject to securitization.

Global Integration or a Sovereign Educational System? A country’s ability to integrate efficiently in the global education network hinges on its research potential and teaching capacity, on its social, economic, and political ability to embrace and implement changes and on its willingness to renounce strands of its sovereign control on the educational process. While joining an international educational space cannot be assimilated with participating in a regional integration project, the first does nonetheless require the national state losing the absolute power of decision and control over higher education and research. As previously demonstrated, international educational norms can be adopted formally but if they lead to no changes in the content of education then they create a mismatch, which can result in a deterioration of the quality of higher education. While some countries freely embrace the global norm on world-class universities because the content of their

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education is similar to what is promoted by the western norm or because they feel no threats from the international community, others respond differently and seek to follow international norms formally but remain reticent to foreign interference in their sovereignty. Russia currently faces this difficulty that while its first priority has become to protect sovereignty in education, it recognizes the ongoing need to integrate in the international education community. In the face of this challenge, Russia has adopted the approach of changing the structure of education but not its substance. Rather than being a thought-through strategy, this dichotomy between substance and structure seems to have appeared naturally, resulting from decisions made on a one-time basis. Russia remains attached to its sovereignty in the educational sphere as this can be explained by the fact that education has long been perceived as a tool to influence and form a society. In many countries, an organized educational system was implemented in parallel with the emergence of the nation-state. John Dewey noticed that states used education as a way to maintain and expand their political power (Dewey, 1916) and hence it became a key part of the state’s national sovereignty. Allan Bloom explains the process in more detail, noting “Every educational system has a moral goal that it tries to attain and that informs its curriculum. It wants to produce a certain kind of human being. […] Always important is the political regime, which needs citizens who are in accord with its fundamental principles” (Bloom, 2008, p. 26). This quotation reflects the fact that education at all levels has an impact on society, and reveals that what the state puts in to its national educational system has a direct impact on society within the space of a generation. In this light education appears as a security issue and foreign influence can be a matter of concern for some states. Globalization has limited the autonomy of the state in many issues, including education and has led to “shifts in solidarities within and outside the national state” (Torres, 2002, p. 363). International Organizations (IOs) underline the role the internationalization of education could play in promoting economic growth and world peace, with UNESCO noting that education can teach people how to live peacefully together. Yet, countries fear that by opening up to external pressures impacting education they may lose control of their national educational system. Characters and opinions are formed during childhood and primary and secondary school education have a life-lasting impact on a person’s perception of him/herself and determines the sense of belonging to a collectivity. Higher education is all the more complex

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and strategic because universities are home to the country’s qualified workforce soon to join the labor market but also to house the country’s highest level research. Universities are indeed the sources, integrators, and translators of new knowledge (Kasatkin et al., 2019). Internationalizing a country’s educational system is complex because when a country opens up to an external influence it is hard to assess what are the driving forces behind it. The internationalization of education can have serious consequences such as security threats, loss of human capital, of research, and of funding. The void experienced by Russia in the 1990s, during which various external actors came to play a role in internal issues, has had a lasting effect on the country’s policies. The Soviet Union and the USA started to collaborate on educational matters as early as 1985. The Geneva Summit led to a bilateral agreement to implement student and professor exchanges, promote the learning of English in Russia and vice versa and the mutual allocation of scholarships (Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva, 1985). The first SovietAmerican Private Foundation “Cultural Initiative” appeared in 1988 (Chernyshov, 2007), allowing Russian researchers to receive foreign funding with no involvement of their own government (Kuraev, 2014). These initiatives were the first in a long string, which were effected during the 1980s and especially the 1990s in partnership with the USA and a number of Western European countries. A large number of English language programs were opened in Moscow. The “open doors” policy of the 1990s led to a rapid internationalization of Russian education. The 1992 Education Act marked the beginning of the integration of Russia into the global educational system and changed the structure of education by allowing the creation of privately funded schools and universities. By the end of the 1990s, a large number of US organizations (McArthur, Ford, Carnegie, etc.) were operating in Russia, providing funding and opportunities to study in the USA or do research locally to Russian academics (Kortunov, 2010). These fledgling educational ties, which in the 1980s began as predominantly bilateral, intergovernmental, and ostensibly reciprocal, rapidly became lopsided and expansionist, reflecting the power shift away from Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union and under the financial pressure of economic crisis. Russia became effectively bankrupt and in need of funding for its educational system, and the USA, and more largely the West and international organizations offered funding under the condition that education was developed in Russia as they saw

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fit. The brain drain of Russian academics, continuing to date, has had severe repercussions for the Russian economy. While the scale of this outflow of experts is hard to assess, Russian official statistics reveal that around 35 thousand scientists left Russia in the 1990s (Kawito et al., 2014). Western initiated programs and financing appear in the long term not to have aided Russian science but to have undermined it. While a liberal would underline the benefits for Russia and the international community of these western programs, noting the brain-drain issue is a sad side-effect, a realist scholar could describe it as part of an organized strategy to deprive what was a recently a rival, of its human capital. Russia’s academic capacity suffered severely from these assistance measures which were designed for knowledge sharing and reinforcing cooperation. The country’s recent history has indeed a huge impact on policy-making today in the country. After the void and the economic crisis of the 1990s, Russia has made its sovereignty an absolute priority. The law on foreign agents operating on the territory of the Russian Federation implemented in 2012 reflects this fear of external actors influencing Russian academia and education among other spheres. The 1990s also explain the dichotomy between substance and structure in Russian education as the authors argue that while the Russian government wants the country to formally participate in international education including the Bologna process and benefit from the mutual recognition of qualifications among other things, it is not ready to revolutionize and internationalize the substance of education. Analyzing the content of school textbooks illustrates the differences in the substance of education. For example, while history books in schools aim at objectivity, in reality they reflect the country’s perception of what happened and it is striking that while for French or British children the USA was the major factor in the Allied victory in the Second World War, for Russian children it was the Soviet Union.5 When internationalizing the content of education, it can be difficult to instill in children national sentiment and patriotism. This is also the case for higher education. Indeed, if it is financed from abroad it no longer directly serves the interests of the State.

International Norms in the Russian Context The reform of Russian higher education faces several challenges. The norms imported from abroad by the Russian government have not been sufficiently adapted to the local context and no studies had been

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performed to determine whether they would actually lead to an improvement in the national educational system, even in the best-case scenario. There is a significant risk associated with importing norms without the best practices and experience associated with them, as they may be misinterpreted, socially rejected, and ineptly implemented. In some cases foreign norms may simply not apply well to another social institutional context leading to “fundamental mismatch between teaching and schooling system design” (Pritchett, 2014, p. 14). An anecdotal example of importing an idea indiscriminately was an incident when schools in Auckland, New Zealand were built by pioneers with “high gabled roofs so that snow [would] slide off in winter” in imitation of Scottish schools, not taking into account the fact that it never snows in that part of New Zealand (Minogue, 1965, p. 203). This example appears surprising and far-fetched, yet similar cases abound, especially when the main characteristics of a norm are not studied before being transposed into a different context. A telling example would be the internationalization of Russian education, which is leading to a compulsory second foreign language being progressively introduced in schools in 5th grade (for children who are around eleven years old).6 Russian children start to read and write Russian in schools in year 1 at ages 6–7, according to the traditional system. They begin a first foreign language in year 2 and a third language in year 5. This early introduction of foreign languages is motivated by the fact that most western European children learn two foreign languages. However, copying this practice from abroad, the policy makers failed to consider the fact that in the west formal schooling often starts earlier (on average age 5)7 so children have longer to learn how to read and write in their mother tongue before starting a foreign language, and that a foreign language like English is more accessible to a French child than it is to a Russian child. A consequence of that is that while some children are struggling to master their own language, they have another two languages to acquire. Additionally, the decision to implement a second foreign language is not accompanied by an action plan, schools should independently organize the necessary teaching resources, and there have been recommendations from the Minister for Education and Science Dmitry Livanov that the second foreign language be Chinese.8 The risk is that children learning Russian, English, and Chinese may get terribly mixed up and not be able to speak any foreign languages at all. This example reflects the fact that copying a norm from abroad may not yield positive results.

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In the field of higher education, Russia adhered to the Bologna Process, one of the most visible manifestations of the EU’s soft power (Kasatkin & Ivkina, 2018), and aligned its practices with a number of norms relating essentially to the organization of the educational process. Universities embraced the split between Bachelor’s and Master’s levels, the ECTS credit system, started to deliver Bologna-style diploma supplements, promoted academic mobility (Gounko & Smale, 2007). The Russian government decided to adopt new higher education norms out of fear of being sidelined in the international system, in order for its economy to be internationally competitive and for prestige reasons. Because these norms affected primarily or at least perceptibly the form rather than the substance of education and they were more related to methods than to content, the government expressed few concerns initially regarding their adoption. However, the Bologna process was designed to lead to “a revision of the content of education” too.9 And, crucially, the ways in which the Bologna process has changed the content education have not been fully analyzed. A number of researchers in Europe have expressed regrets that the academic community no longer defines “the purpose, contents, pedagogic mode of higher education [and has been] displaced by transnational policy-making networks” (Moutsios, 2012, p. 4). The privatization of funding, performance measurement, and the organization of universities as a business imply that universities are losing their autonomy. Indeed, the main objective of the EU’s educational project is to make universities fit the needs of the market; with the European Commission openly declaring that the goal of the Bologna Process is to create “the most competitive knowledge-based economy” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). The consequence is that educational programs and research activities are being strongly influenced by the market and scholars are under increasing pressure to meet the new publishing requirements all the while respecting a myriad of educational standards requirements (Gill, 2016). Hence, while Russian universities had pinned their hopes on the fact that internationalization would lead to greater academic and organizational freedom, the opposite is happening with the state exercising ever-larger control on the content and organization of education (Naumenko, 2016). While the Bologna Process has had positive effects in countries of the EU which fully embraced it; other countries struggling to develop a competitive content from the outset or unwilling to renounce some of their sovereign prerogatives, face a dilemma according

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to which the more they copy external structures, the less efficient their inner content generating process becomes. In order to reach greater efficiency in higher education, governments must require that universities reform not only the architecture of education but also its substance. The split between undergraduate and graduate education, while seemingly a formality, has important implications regarding the substance of education. A graduate on the marketplace is expected to have a different set of skills and a narrower field of expertise from an undergraduate. In many Russian universities, the opinion that Master’s degree programs are a sheer continuation of Bachelor’s programs is still commonplace.10 The leadership of many universities does not realize or cannot logistically implement the necessary changes in the curriculum to create a substantive difference between the two levels of training and corporations when they recruit undergraduates still have the impression that these students are those who did not complete their studies (Pursiainen & Medvedev, 2005). When norms affect the structure but not the content of what is taught, then the results for the educational process are unpredictable. Another illustration of this trend is the Russian Academic Excellence Project 5–100, which was designed to maximize the competitive position of a group of leading Russian universities in the global research and education market11 and has for goal the entry of at least five Russian universities into the top 100 of global education rankings. The nature of the objectives of the project, the roadmaps and the composition of the Governing Council are all guided by the aspiration for internationalization and global recognition. The specific criteria of ranking agencies (recruiting more foreign students; mobility programs for researchers, producing world-class intellectual products, etc.) define the main directions of the project. In the competitive race to be the first to meet international criteria, universities focus on copying foreign organizational processes and structures. Emphasizing short-time objectives, ignoring the needs of the local community and encouraging opportunistic behavior are some of the shortcomings of the project. Indeed, when attempting to improve their performance in the ranking category “international student body” some universities have resorted to sub-optimal practices, lowering the admissions barrier for foreign students (for example, their level of Russian), resulting in a deterioration of the level of education. Universities prioritizing ranking results above anything else may spend unreasonable amounts on recruiting foreign professors and might neglect non-rated

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aspects of universities’ activities. Ratings also lead to the underperformance of humanities universities compared to those specialized in natural or engineering sciences (Mustajoki, 2013), worsening the low social status humanities already have in Russia (Torkunov, 2018). The data used by the ranking agencies is also highly subjective and to some extent unreliable due to the natural limitations linked to their methodology. Despite the pseudo-scientific impression they give (Mussard & James, 2018), rating agencies rely on data provided by universities themselves with few outside checking mechanisms and the respondents for surveys are often subject to a selection bias. Other scholars underlined the fact that rankings fail to grasp the singularities of a university (Stratilatis, 2014). The focus on international rankings in non-western countries amounts to the recognition that Western standards for assessing the quality of higher education are universally applicable and valid, thus consolidating Western dominance and giving the USA and its partners the opportunity to realize their aspirations to further consolidate their domination (Torkunov, 2016). Another complication linked to universities’ dependence of their performance in international ratings is that those based in non-AngloSaxon countries have created English-medium programs in all disciplines (Dimova et al., 2015), leading to a loss of the cultural experience linked to communicating in the language of the host country. Offering Englishmedium courses creates groundless expectations among students, that the content and format of the education dispensed will be “western”. Because of the pressure of international ratings, Russian universities are setting aside their specificities as they try to offer students standardized international programs. The need to fit in has led to a loss of diversity in higher education, especially in programs aimed at foreign students.

Resistance and TEENs: Toward Successful Norm Implementation Russia’s top-down approach to reform in education as well as its “fastforward”, catching up strategy of modernizing universities (Mau & Drobyshevskaya, 2012) have brought about a number of challenges. Some of these challenges are related to an internal societal resistance to change, whereas others are associated with an inability to successfully

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implement the new norms. Project 5–100 among other initiatives like the reform of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the closing down of inefficient universities is running up against significant resistance. The concept of “nests of resistance”, otherwise referred to as “enclaves” was elaborated to explain why in the midst of globalization and westernization, deep-rooted resistance drawing upon notions of national identity, clinging to the roots, persists (Bogaturov & Vinogradov, 2002). In a context of changing, unclear or ill-applied legislation, informal understandings retain a key role in social regulation. This is apparent in the sphere of education, where recruitment often takes place based on personal contacts rather than through a fair appeal to candidates on the labor market as noted by the QS Regional Director for Russia and the CIS.12 International norms are implemented regardless of the resistance and profound societal specificities with a stick and carrot policy leading to a phenomenon referred to as decoupling of formal and informal rules. Under-performing universities are being closed down or merged with more efficient universities, and the competition is fierce between institutions to obtain state funding. The new western-inspired measures promoted by the project such as the integration of business-people in the teaching staff, the creation of the position of “president” within a university responsible for financial management and fundraising alongside the Rector responsible for education, the creation of marketing and brand management functions within universities, regular external auditing of university finances are often met with overt or latent resistance. The fact that the new measures are not welcome means that universities may mimic change instead of thoroughly implementing it or some key players may openly or secretly seek to sabotage the project. The concerns expressed by faculty members at Tyumen State University regarding the 5–100 project reflect those of a category of lecturers country-wide13 : They predict a worsening of the quality and discrimination in education (creation of elite bachelors programs), a blind alignment with western norms and practices (obligation to publish in foreign journals, rumors of a foreign rector) and fear for their employment security (optimizing human resources) and a worsening of their material conditions. This conflict reveals some of the problems related to implementing change quickly (Naumenko, 2016). Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) typology of results and processes correlates the process of change (incremental or abrupt) with the result of change (continuity or discontinuity) and reveals four typical kinds of outcomes. Incremental change in a logic of continuity results in reproduction by adaptation, while

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abrupt change in a logic of continuity results in survival and return and, hence, a failure of the adopted policy. This typology sheds a light on the Russian case, as the government chose the strategy of abrupt change and according to the matrix, a positive outcome is only possible if the changes take place in a logic of discontinuity, leading to the breakdown and replacement of the current educational system. However the government does not aim for discontinuity, as it does not want the breakdown of the existing system and its replacement by a new one as this unavoidably presents some security and reputational risks. This typology reveals that abrupt change and continuity, which characterize the current policies, are incompatible. The threat of disturbing the current, very fragile equilibrium in higher education is to be weighed against the potential advantages of becoming a more active member of the global network of universities. In order to implement these innovations, an in-depth analysis of their potential impact on the substance of education needs to be carried out. Specifically following the full execution of the project, what will a Russian Bachelor in political science or biology have learnt? Who will he/she aspire to work for and where? What is more, importing foreign norms without the knowhow related to their implementation can be counterproductive. Here we refer to the role of Transnational Expertise and Experience Networks which play the role of catalyst and facilitator in norm implementation by raising public and state awareness about the problems and the norms and by aiding in the adaptation of international norms to local conditions. TEENs, as they are constituted by actors of a different nature and operate at all social levels, can help through a network-sharing approach, to address and frame issues, to develop realistic targets, and to confront resistance. In the case of higher education, it is useful to consider not only the experience of Anglo-Saxon countries, which initiated the measures, but also of other countries, which adapted them to their local context. The analysis of the only non-Anglo-Saxon university to make it into the QS top ten universities of the world, ETH Zurich, which came 6th in 2020, reveals some of the reasons why it’s so successful. The main one is linked to the fact that it is located in a truly international place buzzing with networks and professionals from all spheres: Switzerland has borders with five countries, three official languages, and a huge foreign student and

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working population. This internationalism promotes the use of English as a common language, at least for work, which means universities have a higher citation index in Anglo-Saxon academic journals. The country invests close to 3.3% of its GPD in research and development in 201714 and is home to the Large Hadron Collider in Geneva giving the country’s institutions the opportunity to benefit from collaborations with leading universities worldwide. Low tax rates coupled with a high standard of living have made Zurich a hub for companies in the sector of life sciences, information and communication technology, high-tech and mechanical engineering. The University’s links with business and industry are very close. ETZ Zurich is a typical example of a university that benefited from TEENs: business shaped by its demands the form of education making it market-oriented, researchers of an international standing teach at the University, the government actively supports education and research, an international population that is fully integrated in global networks (some living abroad and working in Switzerland), a government open since the second half of the twentieth century to the internationalization of education and responsive to the initiatives of a number of different international organizations (OECD, EU, Council of Europe, UNESCO) with Switzerland being qualified as the “Poster child of the Bologna Process” (Bieber, 2016). It is a challenge to be successful in university rankings in the long term all the while improving the quality of education, and each country’s ability to achieve such a result depends on the internal characteristics of a country and its openness to international processes. While the ranking criteria may change over time, improving education will improve a university’s place in the rankings in the long term. ETZ Zurich’s case illustrates the fact that achieving success depends on assembling the right conditions in the right environment. Russian higher education rather than focusing on short-term results could revive some of the Soviet standards of education which were shunned in the 1990s to get back on the path of excellence and open up to Transnational Expertise and Experience Networks to progressively define together with national and international actors what Russia’s path could be for a productive internationalization. International ratings are not usual competitions where the outcome is everything; indeed the process of educating a population adapted to its country and economy should remain the priority. ∗ ∗ ∗

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Multinational business-powered globalization, tighter integration in key world regions, and pro-market neoliberal reforms are all affecting the way the tertiary education sector is construed and governed and have encouraged countries around the world to adopt dominant norms on higher learning. Even countries that take pride in autonomy and the privilege of independent action on the international stage and that are generally concerned about formal and substantive aspects of their sovereignty like Russia, still tend to embrace educational norms constituting the Bologna process and undertake academic excellence initiatives (e.g. the project “5–100”) to enhance their competitive edge and the position of their universities in international rankings. This perceived paradoxical amalgam of the desire to integrate into the global network of universities coupled with fears about security issues (brain drain, disclosure of confidential information, foreign intervention through funding of research and academic programs) leads to a dichotomy between the structure of education, which evolves in line with international norms, and the content of education, which remains to a large extent unchanged. This mismatch between the content and structure and the fast-forward approach to modernizing higher education and research can lead to a degradation of the quality of education in some universities and to the formation of enclaves of tacit, disruptive resistance to the implementation of new norms. Taking a more gradual, incremental approach to change, focusing on developing its assets rather than conforming with global practices and using TEENs to help adjust and calibrate international norms to local conditions are significant pathways to make the process of change beneficial to all players in the sphere of higher education in Russia and elsewhere.

Notes 1. https://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2003/pdf/indicators2003/reist_ 2003.pdf. 2. Jamil Salmi, “The Challenge of Establishing World-Class Universities” (2009); Jamil Salmi, and Philip Altbach, “The Road to Academic Excellence: The Making of World-Class Research Universities” (2011). 3. In accordance with the Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation № 599, “On Measures to Realize State Policy in the Sphere of Education and Science.” 4. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Cargo_cult.

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5. http://one-europe.net/how-wwii-is-taught-in-different-european-countr ies-part-2. 6. http://www.mk.ru/social/2015/09/01/minobrnauki-obyasnilo-kakbudut-vybirat-vtoroy-inostrannyy-yazyk-v-shkolakh.html. 7. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Cou ntries. 8. http://www.nakanune.ru/articles/110984/. 9. http://www.weef2015.eu/Proceedings_WEEF2015/proceedings/pap ers/Contribution1115.pdf. 10. http://rbth.com/articles/2012/09/03/adjusting_to_the_bologna_proc ess_17879.html. 11. http://5top100.com/programs/internationalization/. 12. http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2015/02/24/akademikiprotiv-biznesa. 13. http://www.mngz.ru/tyumen/1554452-gruppa-prepodavateley-tyu mgu-vystupila-protiv-uchastiya-v-livanovskoy-programme-5-100-v-vuzenazvali-ih-opaseniya-mifami.html. 14. https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htmfor comparison Russia spent 1.1% of its GDP on research in 2017.

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Davies, R.W., Davies, R.W., Harrison, M., and Wheatcroft, S.G., eds. The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Dewey, J. Democracy and Education (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004 [1916]). Dezhina, I. “Russia’s Academy of Sciences’ Reform: Causes and Consequences for Russian Science.” Russie. Nei. Visions 77 (2014): 1–27. DiMaggio, P.J., and Powell, W.W. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (1983): 147–160. Dimova, S., Hultgren, A.K., and Jensen, C., eds. English-Medium Instruction in European Higher Education, Vol. 4 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2015). Elutin, V.P. Vysshaya shkola obschestva razvitogo sotchializma. [Higher Education of the Society of Developed Socialism] (Moscow: Nauka, 1980). Finnemore, M. “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and Science Policy.” International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 565–597. Gill, R. “Breaking the Silence: The Hidden Injuries of Neo-Liberal Academia.” Feministische Studien 34, no. 1 (2016): 39–55. Gounko, T., and Smale, W. “Modernization of Russian Higher Education: Exploring Paths of Influence.” Compare 37, no. 4 (2007): 533–548. Graham, L.R. The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 19271932 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). Kawito, M., Gounko, T., and Nungy, M. Comparative Analysis of Higher Education Systems. Issues, Challenges and Dilemmas (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014). Keck, M., and Sikkink, K. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) Kopelevitch, U.H. “Kistorii sovetsko-germanskogo nautchnogo sotrudnichestva v 1926–1932 g.g. [About the History of Soviet-German Academic Cooperation in 1926–1932].” in S.I. Vavilova, ed., Materialy egegodnoi nauchnoi konferentcii Instituta istorii estestvoznania i tehniki im (Moscow: Yanus, 1997), 153–155. Kortunov, A.V. “Globalnoe upravlenie: mezhdunarodnye instituty, modeli, pravo. [Global Management: International Institutions, Models, Legislation].” in Strategicheskie tsennosti i politicheskaya struktura Evro-Antlanticheskoi bezopasnosti (Moscow: MGIMO, 2010), 30–39. Krause, P. “Of institutions and Butterflies: Is Isomorphism in Developing Countries Necessarily a Bad Thing.” Background Note: The Overseas Development Institute (2013): 1–4.

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Kuraev, A. Internationalization of Higher Education in Russia: Collapse or Perpetuation of the Soviet System? A Historical and Conceptual Study (Doctoral Dissertation, Boston College, 2014). Mau, V., and Drobyshevskaya, T. “Modernization and the Russian Economy: Three Hundred Years of Catching Up.” Available at SSRN 2135459 (2012). Meyer J.W. The Global Standardisation of National Educational Systems. Paper Presented at the Nagoya University, November (1992). Meyer, J.W., and Rowan, B. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340–363. Minogue, W.J.D. “Some Problems Relating to the British Influence in New Zealand Education”. Comparative Education 1, no. 3 (1965): 203–209. Article No. 7. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305006650010307 Moutsios, S. Academic Autonomy and the Bologna Process (Aarhus: EPOKE, 2012). Mussard, M., and James, A.P. “Engineering the Global University Rankings: Gold Standards, Limitations and Implications.” IEEE Access 6 (2018): 6765–6776. Mustajoki, A. “Measuring Excellence in Social Sciences and Humanities: Limitations and Opportunities.” in Tero Erkkilä, ed., Global University Rankings (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 147–165. Naumenko E.E. “Adaptation of ‘Project 5-100’ to the Russian Educational System.” Vestnik Kemerovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta kulbtury i iskusstv, no. 35 (2016): 176–182. Pritchett, L. (2014). The Risks to Education Systems From Design Mismatch and Global Isomorphism. CID Working Paper Series. Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M., and Andrews, M. Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure. Center for Global Development Working Paper 234 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2010). Pursiainen, C., and Medvedev, S., eds. The Bologna Process and Its Implications for Russia: The European Integration of Higher Education (Moscow: RussianEuropean Centre for Economic, 2005). Schofer, E., Hironaka, A., Frank, D. J., and Longhofer, W. “Sociological Institutionalism and World Society.” in E. Schofer, A. Hironaka, D. John, and W. Longhofer, eds., The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology (Wiley, 2012) Shields, R. “Measurement and Isomorphism in International Education.” in M. Hayden, J. Levy, and J. Thompson, eds., The SAGE Handbook of Research in International Education (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2015). Smolentseva A., Huisman J., and Froumin I. “Transformation of Higher Education Institutional Landscape in Post-Soviet Countries: From Soviet Model to Where?” in J. Huisman, A. Smolentseva, and I. Froumin, eds., 25 Years of

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Transformations of Higher Education Systems in Post-Soviet Countries (Cham: Palgrave Studies in Global Higher Education. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Stratilatis, C. “University Rankings and the Scientification of Social Sciences and Humanities.” Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 13, no. 2 (2014): 177–192. Streeck, W., and Thelen, K. “Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies.” in W. Streeck, and K. Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1–39. Torkunov A.V. “Challenges to Social and Human Sciences in Russia.” Polis Political Studies 5 (2018), 8–16. Torkunov, A.V. “The Past and the Future of International Political Studies.” International Trends/Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy 14, no. 1(44) (2016): 77–85. Torres, C.A. “Globalization, Education, and Citizenship: Solidarity Versus Markets?” American Educational Research Journal 39, no. 2 (2002): 363– 378. Vigneau, A., and Baykov, A. “Transnational Networks and Russia’s Environmental Policies.” International Trends/Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy 16, no. 4 (2019): 137–153. Zajda, J. “Educational Reform and Transformation in Russia: Why Education Reforms Fail.” European Education 35, no. 1 (2003): 58–88. Abramov R., Gruzdev I., and Terentbev E. “Trevoga i ℈ntuziazm v diskursah ob akademiqeskom mire: meℋdunarodnyN i rossiNskiN konteksty.” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 2, no. 138 (2016): 16–32. Bogaturov, A.D., and Vinogradov, A.V. “Anklavno-konglomeratnyN tip razvitiᴙ. Opyt transsistemnoN teorii.” in Vostok-Zapad-Rossiᴙ. M (2002), 109–128. Kasatkin P.I., Kovalbquk O.A., and Stepnov I.M. “Rolb sovremennyh universitetov v formirovanii cifrovoN povyxatelbnoN volny dlinnyh ciklov Kondratbeva.” Voprosy ℈konomiki; no. 12 (2019): 123–140. Kasatkin, P.I., and Ivkina, N.V. “Kulbturnaᴙ i obrazovatelbnaᴙ sostavlᴙOwie «mᴙgkoN sily» ES.” Sravnitelbnaᴙ politika 9, no. 1 (2018). Kasatkin, P., and Silantbeva, M. “AntropologiqeskiN aspekt globalbnyh modeleN obrazovaniᴙ: poiski i rexeniᴙ.” Polis Politiqeskie Issledovaniᴙ, no. 6 (2017): 137–149. Tulohonov A.K. “Gora rodila myxb, ili ewe raz o reforme RAN.” Vserossiuskiu ℈konomiqeskiu murnal ℈KO, no. 7 (481) (2014): 158– 163.

PART III

Great Powers and the Structuring of Regional Spaces

CHAPTER 17

Reconfiguring Global Space: Great Powers and Their Regional Subsystems Tatiana Shakleina

The two superpowers—the United States and the USSR have been superseded by an extended group of major global and regional powers with their own political agendas that proved impossible to control in any practical terms. The massive megatrend to reconfigure the institutional and territorial fabric of the modern world has been evolving under the influence—and with direct involvement—of this broader circle of leading international players, seeking to build up their weight in world affairs, and is the primary subject of discussion in this chapter. The departure of the USSR as the twentieth century’s second superpower from the global steering process, the beginning formation of new major centers of power that had not enjoyed the status of leading world actors under the bipolar world order (China, India, Brazil, Turkey, etc.), and the arrival of many new small and medium-sized nations looking for a role on the international stage had the combined effect of triggering

T. Shakleina (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_17

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a tectonic process to reconfigure the world’s political frontiers. As the players were gradually coming to grips with the polycentric model of the world order and the respective roles of different countries and institutions, it became increasingly clear that the final word still remains with the leading—typically, regionally dominant—world powers that have the willingness to carry out, and the capacity for, macroregional control, demonstrate ambition for global governance, and pursue their interests in setting the rules of the game that come into conflict and spur competition between them, primarily with regard to changing the principles and norms of the world order. Over the past 20 years, nation states have made their comeback as leading players in greater numbers and with clearer objectives to expand their influence either on a global (Russia and China) or macroregional scale (Turkey, India, and Brazil). There is no ignoring the great powers of the twenty-first century, which need to be closely and realistically assessed in terms of their role and world-order plans in the overall political world-reformatting trend.

A Great Power of Today The unipolar model of the world has stood unchallenged for years following the demise of the Soviet–American global regulation. As the sole remaining superpower in the early 1990s, the United States affirmed its right and obligation to establish and maintain a universal world order. The majority of American and Russian political scientists and policymakers accepted the concept of the unipolar world. But in the late 1990s–early 2000s, some American authors observed that, while large countries like Russia and China had little noticeable impact on the global affairs in the 1990s, especially at the beginning of the decade, they were set to make their presence felt as important centers of influence, reaching across global processes all the way to the underlying principles of the world order. It was George Kennan and Samuel Huntington who signaled the significance of the role to be played by the expanding cohort of great powers, noting at the time that, however pre-eminent the United States was in many domains of power and however free it was to project its policies without consulting other states, it would not be able to resolve any international issues without engaging with other major players.1 In Russia, unlike the United States, the idea of multipolarity (or rather polycentricity) and the new role of nation states as major powers was discussed, albeit marginally, as early as the mid-1990s.2

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Neoliberal concepts ruled unrivaled throughout the political expert communities in both Russia and the United States, providing overarching guidance to the international strategy pursued by the United States and its allies. The Russian government, however, was increasingly turning towards structural-realist views that soon came to underpin the content of its foreign policy documents. A major contribution to the development of a more objective, pragmatic, and reality-based theoretical framework was made by Alexey Bogaturov with his concept regarding the role of great powers in shaping the world order and structural trends, which he illustrated using case studies from East Asian countries. Along with the insightful analysis of the part that major states played in framing the world order, he emphasized the significance of “the environment, the background,” i.e., the small and medium-sized states whose destiny and place in the world were not altogether clear.3 The dissolution of the Soviet Union showed that an independent status could be achieved without war, that it was possible to shift borders, dust off historical and national identities, find a new place in the world and formulate an independent policy. Some polyethnic countries witnessed a rising trend towards ethnic autonomy and, potentially, complete separation. All the processes unfolding as part of the common trend of global reconfiguration, manifested themselves in the following ways: • An increased number of leading world powers that, apart from building their capabilities, were also anxious to influence the design of a new order and engage in the structural organization of large neighboring spaces. • The growth and strengthening of some major states were less than appreciated by the United States, which was intent on its policy of global hegemony and responding to the world’s nascent polycentricity with vigorous action to counter structural and integration projects in Russia, China, the European Union, and Latin America. • The world saw the rise of many new independent nations facing the enormous task of “digesting” and consolidating their independence, national identity, and place, among other players. The international environment had become more complex and harder to control, creating highly competitive conditions for the leading powers, which have sought to lure as many countries as possible under their control and into their projects.

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• The prospect of gaining autonomy or independence became a viable possibility for some ethnic groups within multi-ethnic states, triggering independence movements that were often supported by external players (NATO, the United States, Russia, the European Union, and other countries) so that parts of countries could establish themselves on a separate footing as fully or partially recognized or unrecognized countries/territories. Even so-called frozen conflicts have the smoldering potential to spark a renewed fight/war for independence or territorial revision. • Global reconfiguration has affected international institutions such as the United Nations, which has been struggling to deliver on its mandate of handling global problems and operate effectively with the growing number of leading powers, all of which have different views of the world-order principles and pursue their own interests, plans, and ambitions. Institutions, both old and new, formal and informal, are often competing with each other and thus compromising their capability to deal with the pressing issues of the day. Many purportedly global institutions carry out policies clearly lobbied by individual governments, rather than driven by a commitment to the common interests of humanity. In this context, the actions of many international organizations, as well as those of informal institutions, are associated with an element of irreducible uncertainty. • Significant change in values: whereas the liberal values promoted by the United States and its allies remain attractive, the methods and outcomes of this raise many questions and criticisms, mostly on the part of major non-Western countries, including Russia, China, Brazil, Turkey, and Arab states. Integration megaprojects advanced by Russia and China come, along with their political and economic elements, with their own value proposition, which in combination with the critical reassessment by other emerging and developing countries of their identities and historical traditions may lead to fundamental shifts at the institutional level. • Increased competition for areas that could be used to build military bases, transportation, and trade hubs. Resolute steps by the United States and NATO on the one hand, and by China and Russia, on the other, could result in a considerable redrafting of the spheres of influence and changing involvement of “background” countries in the strategic activities of the Western and Eastern centers.

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Important

The global reconfiguration megatrend cuts across all areas of global development due to the lack of any accommodation between the actors representing the two development paradigms—liberal democracy versus state-guided democracy.4 With no consensus in sight between the leading global centers, the trend of world-order transformation will continue until the areas of direct or indirect influence and presence of the United States, China, and Russia (and possibly, the European Union, Turkey, and India) come to settle within the agreed and duly documented boundaries.

A modern major power can be defined as a state which: • retains an absolute or very high degree of autonomy in conducting its domestic and foreign policies that both serve its national interests and have a significant or decisive impact on global and regional politics and individual countries (world-regulating activity); • possesses historical experience, traditions, and culture of participation in global politics as a decisive and/or active player; • has a culture of thinking globally and being willing and able to act globally; • demonstrates highly motivated and constructive activity to resolve worldwide issues of global development by contributing to the work of various international and regional institutions, proposing the establishment of new ones, and initiating large-scale macroregional and global integration projects; • has all or most traditional attributes of a great power (territory, population, natural resources, military and economic capability, intellectual, cultural, science and technology, and information potential); • has the capability and will to drive structural organization in the neighboring space as the anchor of a regional subsystem. In the twenty-first century, the list of great powers, depending on the scholar you choose (each with their own qualifying caveats), may include the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union as a collective

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center of power, India, Brazil, and Turkey. But actually, there are only three global powers to speak of: the United States, China, and Russia. The great-power status is not merely a function of a country’s military and economic prowess. Building a great-power culture is a lengthy process, which took centuries in the past. Russia emerged and evolved as a state with global plans and ambitions, as well as a great-power culture, which it has preserved through the early twenty-first century. China and the great powers of Europe also enjoy the benefits of similar experiences, and the question is whether they will be able to leverage their historical legacy in today’s circumstances. The United States of America was founded as a special state with aspirations of a great power. Soon enough, the American strategic vision of its mission and destiny took on global proportions, but its full-scale implementation commenced after the Second World War. In spite of the continuously growing influence of neoliberal concepts on the official American ideology, foreign policymaking, and international activities, the United States has been consistently characterized in realist terms as a superpower, a pre-eminent power, a benign empire, an empire of a new type, etc. By dismissing the role of power-center states and promoting organizational and value institutions as regulating centers, the United States has in fact been planning and executing its international agenda on a realpolitik basis. The declared policy of global transformation, involving democratization and the establishment of a global liberal order, has been carried out using traditional tools of force coupled with a massive ideological campaign to popularize and disseminate Western values and perceptions of the world and its future development, and essentially constitutes a foreign policy doctrine of liberal hegemony. While neoliberal ideas per se remained attractive and unchallenged (as ideal concepts), in reality, these ideas were increasingly clashing with what was happening on the ground after the end of the bipolar order. Many regions and states looked to gain or strengthen their independent status and even the countries that were part of the Western liberal habitat (for example, Central and Eastern Europe) did not want to give up their national identities, their status as nation states, or their autonomy with regard to policymaking and statesmanship. Suddenly, it was a time of sprouting small and medium-sized states with an ever growing tendency for autonomous areas to become independent within pre-existing states.5 The increase in the number of major powers came with higher expectations of their status. Modern major states coveted the same benefits as

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America: greater influence and favorable conditions to grow and thrive. As they built up their capabilities—not just economic, but also technological and military potential—the monopoly on global governance began to slip away from the United States. A similar challenge awaited the European Union, which had cast itself as a top-league, nearly global, center of power, but failed to sustain and progress the assumed role in the new century. Structurally, the world order was relying increasingly on three pillars, the United States, China, and Russia, which also happened to be permanent veto-empowered members of the UN Security Council. As hard as the US political strategists tried to keep the European Union, at least conceptually, in the top rankings as a rule-setting global center, the reality was very different, as the European Union’s world-regulating capability continued to degrade in spite of France’s attempts to push forward with more decisive and independent policies. By the end of 2010s, choices had to be made—primarily by the leading European nations—that would be critical for the future alignment of forces in the new world order.6 The United Kingdom, which had long lost its world-regulating status, tried, by leaving the European Union, to regain its position as a leading global power, but, actually continued to mimic European governments that followed in the wake of the US policy aimed at discrediting the America’s opponents (Russian intelligence scandals, anti-Russian propaganda campaigns that showed the overall destructive quality of the British policy meant to compensate for its dependent and weak position in current international relations). The United Kingdom basically went through the same motions as some medium-caliber European countries that were acting on cue to further the American political and ideological agenda (such as Poland, the Netherlands, and Romania), casting yet more doubt on whether the country truly belongs to the great-power league of the twenty-first century.

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Important

The increasing activity and independence of Russia and China, and their more energetic involvement in world-regulating activities compared to the European Union on the global and macroregional scale called into question the ability of the European Union to become a world-order-defining center. The same applies to the United Kingdom, which plays supporting role in the shadow of the United States.7

The 2000s saw a certain kind of leveling up in positions among leading countries, a phenomenon termed “ascendant powers.” The paramount goal for the United States was to maintain and enhance its superpower status; for China, it was to ascend to the status of a full-fledged great power (or even superpower); for Russia, it was to safeguard and consolidate its world-regulating role; for India and Brazil, still on their way to becoming leading global powers, it was to stay on course to develop their great-power attributes; and for the EU members, it was to finally make up their mind as to what part they were willing and able to play in the shaping of the world order and whether they had their own vision of that order as distinct from the American version, and if so, what that vision was. By the end of the 2010s, the picture was slightly different. India and Brazil had slowed down in terms of building up their great-power potential, though India’s drive for enlarging global influence was still noticeable. The European Union had to deal with mounting problems at home and in its relations with the United States. Turkey, regardless of its growing imperial ambitions, had not achieved the desired scale of global (or even regional) influence. Russia and China were the only powers left as the real opponents of the United States. The containment of these two powers became the foremost concern of the American policy as stated in the 2017 US National Security Strategy.8 The United States embarked on a more aggressive policy to contain China and rectify the mistakes made on the Sino–American front, which entailed problems for the United States itself. It also imposed tougher sanctions on Russia, bolstered its defense programs, and adopted an ultimatum-style approach in dealing with the global community, putting

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pressure on its allies in Europe, as well on their long-standing opponents (Iran), using manipulatory tactics in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia), and injecting a dose of instability into international relations in general while maintaining the status quo in chosen regions. Following the presidential elections of 2016, domestic politics in the United States swung wide out of balance and have not fully stabilized ever since. This has inevitably affected the country’s international policy, which has become more authoritarian, categorical, and inconsistent. None of this, however, has dented America’s superpower status in any material way, although the political turmoil raised doubts about the feasibility of acquiring the much-dreamed-of legitimate status of being the sole and unrivaled global leader. The Democrats who came to power in 2021 pushed their global policy yet harder, ever more resistant to any alternatives, although the situation at home remained complex and prone to conflicts in the future. The United States entered a new phase in the fight for global leadership. China has mapped out a global strategy for the long term. While this strategy emphasizes China’s commitment to harmonizing international relations and contributing to economies involved in Chinese projects, the ambitious program is an apparent bid to gain the full status of a leading world power or superpower, drawing close to the United States on all major indicators.9 The boldest claim to superpower status is the Belt and Road (OBOR) initiative, a space-structuring project, and its unveiling alone was a good enough manifestation of an upcoming great power, its world-regulating activity and creativity, which is key to affirming superpower status. India’s lack of such a structural project, its continued sluggishness, and second-rank role in redesigning the world order can be explained by the need to sort out its domestic troubles, build up its military potential, and try and raise its status in the UN Security Council. It is admittedly hard for India to compete with China or Russia in the regional organizations where it continues to be a member (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, SCO) or says it is ready to cooperate (the Eurasian Economic Union, EAEU). India’s options are still limited with regard to the world-order-forming megatrend, in spite of the support from the United States, which recognizes its high status. For these reasons, India is not mentioned among leading global centers in the concepts of most Russian and American political scholars.10

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The same is true for Turkey with its swelling ambitions. The country could nevertheless step up its activity even more with respect to neighboring countries in its attempts to achieve its great-power expectations. This might seem very unlikely, but Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Syria and terrorist groups in the Arab countries, its behavior towards Russia (shooting down a Russian military aircraft in 2015), its deep involvement as a go-between in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020, the rising Islamist sentiment at home, and the tightening of the political regime raise many questions regarding Turkey’s ability to expand its influence and elevate its status to regional hegemony. Yet, it is also important to remember that Turkey is a NATO member with formidable armed forces.11 Why does Russia, in spite of existing imbalances between its greatpower characteristics, continue to be one of the global power centers and a party to the process of shaping the new world order? The answer does not lie only in the fact that it possesses adequate military power, natural resources, or many of the other great-power attributes mentioned earlier. The principal reason is that Russia demonstrates its unyielding will and commitment to act vigorously and globally, taking real action, rather than intervening in critical global issues with nothing more than big statements. It also promotes its own space-structuring project, which is smaller in scale to the Chinese initiative, but aims to build a non-aggressive, integrational, and structuring framework that leaves ample room for action and autonomy for all its participants, and will thus help new independent states preserve and consolidate their sovereign potentialities and pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. Russia is often dismissed as not having an attractive idea to offer, unlike the United States (liberal democracy and values, civil liberties, and human rights) or China (a harmonious world order, non-interventionism, equality, and goodwill in trade and economic policy, etc.). It is commonly maintained that there are two dreams, the American Dream and the Chinese Dream, that have both internal and external components. But what does the Chinese Dream have that has not already been proposed by Russia throughout the years following the end of the bipolar world? Russia did talk about building a new harmonious and fair world, and about the need to renounce ideology, the military tools of policy and war, and promoted peace, the peaceful resolution of global problems, collective decision-making, and polycentricity. These ideas had been articulated long before China came up with its projects after 2013. The ideas set forth by Russia are clear and

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straightforward and do not need reinventing. Russia needs to be more insistent in pushing them forward and standing up for its interests, calculating each of its steps very carefully along the way. Russia has already demonstrated a good measure of patience, tolerance, and altruism in dealing with some regional and global situations. This is well understood in many countries and it adds to the attraction of Russian projects, which encounter tremendous opposition from the United States and the European Union. China’s policy, although it avoids using direct pressure, results in very high competition for Russia and tough choices for the nations participating in Eurasian structures. To better understand the role of leading global powers and ongoing structural processes, we introduce the notion of a regional subsystem of a new type, which is broader than an integration structure and contains world-order-forming elements. A regional subsystem of a new type is a combination of state actors that share: • a common geography (proximity on land, as well as on sea or ocean); • a willingness to act on the basis of common interests and recognized institutions (organizations and norms) in the areas of economy and trade, security, and, occasionally, in the political domain, including matters of world-order regulation (in order to progress the subsystem into a solid and strong collective center of influence in global politics); • a similar historical background and culture (though this is not an absolute prerequisite and may further decline as a factor in the future); • a common anchor which can be represented either by the most powerful (in terms of leading-power attributes) and creative state, or a system of recognized institutions (possible in theory, but may not always work without a central state). The presence of a leader nation among the subsystem’s members (a regional superpower or the largest regional power) can be the decisive factor for the development of the countries within the subsystem. The absence of such a leader may leave the regional space disorganized and exposed to an extra-regional player that would influence the development of individual states and the region as a whole. Without an intra-regional

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anchor leader there can be no subsystem, but a space which can later become a subsystem guided by an external leader. American and European scholars and strategists more often use the concept of a “regional order” that comes with a regional hegemon/leader state, a set of institutions created within the framework of the regional order, mostly to support trade and other economic interactions, and may possibly involve political integration and joint efforts to ensure regional security.12 Yet this concept cannot explain such initiatives as, for example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Rather than regional orders, these involve the structural organization of the states that either plainly belong to a space of shared interests or are prone to such a partnership, without having common borders with the anchor state and many members of the subsystem.

Regional Subsystems of a New Type as Part of the World-Order-Forming Megatrend After the highly competitive Cold War period, the era of realism and state-centric order was pronounced to be over. The term “sphere of influence” was scrapped, as the key controls were to be handed over to the institutions of global governance. Yet, while promoting neoliberal ideas and the liberal model of the world order steered largely through institutions (organizations as well as norms), the United States as a superpower continued to operate, paradoxically, in the realist paradigm, gaining complete dominance in all areas, the military first and foremost, and used both economic methods and military force to achieve its objectives, turning information technology into a powerful and rather destructive propaganda weapon and intervening into home affairs of countries and regions, which led to disruptions, instability and considerable uncertainty about how the situation might develop in the future. Such interventions helped to set favorable conditions for American companies, which is precisely what happened in the Middle East, exploit some countries targeted by the American policy as staging grounds for exerting pressure on other nations, and enhance its military (through military bases), economic, and political influence. What was this, if not the expansion of the American dominion and attempts to keep various regions under control?

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American mainstream political scientists and strategists deny any intent on the part of the United States to expand its spheres of influence, with expansion referring strictly to direct territorial interventions. This approach can be described as semantic tricks, because in the era of globalization, as American political scholars wrote so wordily throughout the 1990s, and of information technology and digitalization, spreading influence and “pattern-programming” control over countries and regions can be achieved by different, more subtle, and sophisticated means, although direct military or paramilitary operations are handy too and far from being a relic of the past.13 Many states covet bigger regional or global leverage. Great powers seek to augment their influence on international processes, the architecture of the world order, and their neighbors, and amplify their voice in international and regional organizations to secure the best terms for their countries’ development. Even medium-ranking states do not shy away from extending their reach across various regional organizations, if not globally (e.g. Poland claims a special role and say in the European Union and NATO in terms of their decision-making apparatuses). In the proposed liberal world order, it is for the American state that the United States wants to provide the most comfortable environment for economic growth, security, and other dimensions of development (which is fairly obvious just from a careful reading of US foreign policy and international trade documents and expert opinion papers), with the intent of liberal project heavily disguised by all the high-minded talk of democratization, dissemination of humanist Western values and institutions. As part of its foreign policy, the United States has been taking steps to readjust the world’s structural setup, aiming to retain its role as the dominant, if not sole, center of power. This is a global project that cannot be accomplished overnight without delay or obstruction and therefore has to be done piecemeal through individual initiatives and subprojects. The conceptualization of American policy moves has been also phased: all the literature on the global organizing role of the United States was published throughout the 1990s and 2000s.14 Yet, eventually, the forced formulation of the liberal world-order concept and its enshrinement as the official ideology brought US foreign policy to an intellectual dead-end. In the Western Hemisphere, there had been two potential regional anchors until the mid-2010s: the United States and Brazil. The United States came up with two projects: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). They

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were more than mere trade agreements. Any pact with a great power comes with multiple implications for the weaker party, such as openness and exposure to potential external control and a more vulnerable position regarding tariff decisions, but, possibly, also with the benefits of better alignment in other organizations, like the WTO. A political rapprochement cannot be ruled out either, leading to the subordination of the weaker state. It would be fair to say that the compact North American regional subsystem, which consists of the United States, Canada, and Mexico (though Mexico often challenges this view), is not only robust and successful, but tends to expand all the way into a broader regional subsystem of the Americas led by the United States as its anchor. The proposed American projects, NAFTA and FTAA, had been designed exactly for that purpose. The turbulent events of 2016 and the instability following the impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and the subsequent socio-economic setback jeopardized Brazil’s efforts to consolidate its regional leadership, in particular as the prospective anchor of the South American regional subsystem of a new type that could function as an autonomous actor, not necessarily opposing the United States, but still with more independence and freedom of choice. Brazil’s foreign policy in the 2000–2010s was based on the concept of “autonomy through diversification” of its external relations. President Lula da Silva and his successors, when compared with their predecessors, were described in the following terms, as former president Cardoso put it: “in terms of foreign policy, President Lula and I stand on the same place, on the fringe of the liberal order. The difference being that I am on the fringe looking in and he is on the fringe looking out.”15 Indeed, Brazil had been ascending notably towards the rank of a leading global power, enhancing its regional and global influence, increasing its activity in the WTO and the UN (Brazil joined the Group of Four seeking permanent membership in the UN Security Council), engaging closely with Russia and other leading non-Western countries (BRICS), and striving to boost regional integration processes that could bring Latin American nations closer together and secure a more self-reliant (but not counter-US) position in the Western Hemisphere. According to Brazilian analysts, Brazil’s early 2010 strategy was to:

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1. Continue its active regional policy in South America seeking not only to advance integration processes, but also to build a consensus among Latin American states on crucial matters of the global agenda. 2. Develop its relations with the United States so as not only to coordinate efforts in addressing regional issues, but to avoid a collision between the two largest democracies of the Western Hemisphere. 3. Steer the execution of its policy of expanding global influence across international institutions to serve its national interests while giving due consideration and respect to the interests of other developing and rising powers.16 Thus Brazil staked its claim to subsystem leadership in Latin America, as well as to a global regulating role along with other major world powers. This was a vision that looked well beyond the US-centric liberal order which was being created. The political crisis of 2016 in Brazil cast a shadow of doubt over the future implementation of that policy. Once the Brazilian ruling elite changes, it will be clear whether Brazil can return to the great-power track and rally Latin American nations into a regional subsystem of a new type in its own right that could coexist along with the North American subsystem. What has been hindering the process is not merely the weakening of Brazil’s position as an integrator of Latin America, but the resistance of the United States, which is reluctant to relinquish its hold on the continent, which had been developing for quite some time under the American guidance.17 The United States had gone to great lengths to build the political and economic frameworks in Latin American states and cultivate their elites, most of whom are graduates of American universities. As many American politicians and experts note, the United States will never permit any extra-regional player to dominate South America. The American position is unsurprising, as these countries are America’s closest neighbors, possessing abundant resources, and for whom their northern neighbor is a major partner in many spheres. So there can be little doubt about how robust their relationship is. The challenge is how to deal with potential problems arising from the intense activity of other powers (primarily, China) in Latin America, as well as from the attempts of leading Latin American nations to upgrade their status in the world politics (Brazil, Argentina) and in the region, and

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diversify their options beyond trade and economy to access regional and global policymaking opportunities. So, if the United States follows its traditional model of addressing such conundrums, it can be expected to use (as has been the case before) all possible tools of pressure and intervention into domestic affairs of, and relations between, individual states. As noted earlier, the US policy has been to attain global control in the long run. To get there, the United States needs to gradually set up appropriate world-order structures under its leadership in both hemispheres. America is flanked by two oceans and therefore projects its structuring activity onto the Atlantic as well as the Pacific space. The Asia Pacific region (APAC) is not an “easy” space to roll out one’s structuring plans for any of the leading powers—the United States, China, Japan, or Russia. In 2003, a group of Pacific countries consisting of Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand, proposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, which, after Brunei joined, was consummated by an agreement in 2006. In 2008, the TPP caught the eye of the Obama administration, and the United States acceded to the agreement in 2015 (formally signed in New Zealand in 2016) only to leave it in 2017 under the Trump administration. The exit from TPP does not mean, however, that the United States has given up its space-structuring plans for the region, where it still has critical interests and strong ties with such major regional powers as Japan, Australia, and Republic of Korea. Some of the APAC states have yet to make their political choices, like Vietnam which has an important strategic position. Under the American Indo-Pacific concept, an important part is accorded to India and Mongolia, which are also included as part of the region in its extended definition. Mongolia pursues a tri-vector policy, whereas India, which claims to be an independent political player, still leans considerably towards the United States, in spite of acknowledging the so-called strategic partnership with Russia, its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). It is not clear how long India will be able to continue straddling all those fences. Can India create its own regional subsystem? This appears very unlikely in the current context, where China is deploying its monumental projects all around India’s borders, the United States and its allies continue to build up their military potential and presence in the region, and many governments are choosing sides between China, the United States, and Russia. India itself is conspicuously unambitious in this department, as

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its priorities lie elsewhere. India is working to grow its potential in order to fully qualify as a major global power. India is falling behind Russia and China in terms of world-regulating and order-designing activity, though it seeks to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto powers. The strategic dilemma India has to tackle is that it is locked in the US–India–China triangle. India has been branded the largest Western democracy, whose political system shares a lot with Western counterparts, and the India lobby in America (Indian-origin professionals), including the expert and academic community, strongly support the American foreign policy and the establishment of the liberal world order, which holds a promise of a special role for India. The George W. Bush administration pronounced India to be a leading world power, and it is often mentioned as a strategic partner of the United States, though India insists on pursuing an independent foreign policy. It is still unclear whether India will offer its own vision of the world order or continue to support the liberal order that the United States is trying to construct. It would be fair to expect India to be better off under the America-centric order, where China would have limited options for projecting its will and influence. Conversely, closer ties between China and Russia in the world-order-shaping process, or between China and the United States, would not leave India much room to operate even in South Asia.

Important

The development of a regional subsystem of a new type in the Asia Pacific under full American control appears problematic and, at this juncture, reconfiguration in the region is hardly possible. For this reason, the United States will be looking for space-structuring options in the Asia Pacific, since the TPP format is unsuitable for that purpose. It is not quite clear how the United State could play the India card, how Japan would behave, how the ASEAN format would evolve, and what strategic priorities would be chosen by small and medium-sized countries, considering the presence of several major players.18 Russia, though not a decisive force in the Asia Pacific, remains a very serious and influential player that can have a tangible impact on the balance of power in the region.

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Another component of the United States’ structure-organizing activity is the transatlantic policy. The so-called transatlantic solidarity of the United States, Canada, and European NATO members could provide the groundwork for building a transatlantic regional subsystem with the United States at the center as its anchor. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement had been continually negotiated since 2013, but was never signed. There are quite a few reasons for this, one of them being the European Union’s determination to hold on to whatever remains of its policymaking independence in different areas, which is already constrained by NATO memberships and the strong American influence in Central and Eastern European states. By the beginning of 2020s transatlantic solidarity and cohesion overplayed EU independence.

Important

Despite the fact that the TTIP agreement was not finalized, we are watching consolidation of a Transatlantic regional subsystem of a new type which, combined with the North American regional subsystem, emerges as an enormous military, political, economic, and ideological structure (accounting for more than 60% of global GDP) controlled and led by the United States with the ability to have a decisive say in global development. This is a desired outcome for many small and medium-sized European nations.

In the 1990s, the European Union positioned itself as one of the global policy centers and an independent maker of its foreign policy decisions, which in the early 2000s led to temporary disagreements with the United States because of the Iraq War in 2003. These disagreements, however, proved but a shallow spat as European institutions, aspiring to a global status, especially the European Court of Human Rights and the OSCE, which were essentially associated with the European Union and were part of its extended definition, actually catered to the common US–EU strategy of establishing a new liberal world order based on Western values. The myth of the European Union’s “soft” power spread, although, as members of the NATO military alliance, Europeans supported the use of military force to resolve conflicts and change political regimes (in Libya

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and Syria) and became a driving force in setting up and sustaining the economic blockade and information war against Russia, which does not seem soft by any measure. The European Union tried hard to “save face” and increase its leverage in world politics. It also wanted to raise its status to being one of the three leading centers of power, as envisioned by American and European analysts in their concepts of a tripolar world. The European Union took steps to expand its sphere of influence, which was in line with the overall structure-organizing trend. The EU institutions could become the anchor for an extended European regional subsystem of a new type, an objective pursued via the Union for the Mediterranean, which has been joined by 43 countries, including the EU members, the Eastern Partnership, the policy of the NATO expansion to the east, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, covering those Central and Eastern European states that used to be Warsaw Pact members and former Soviet republics in the European part of the USSR.19 The EU policy for building its regional subsystem of a new type did not conceal, even at the official level, its plans to integrate large swathes of North Africa, the Maghreb, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe, and strengthen its influence in these regions across all domains, including the political and military spheres. From the very start, the political aspect of the European Union’s structure-organizing policy was no less important than economics and trade. The structural initiatives of the European Union were based on three key principles: enhancing the independence of post-Soviet states from Russia; developing stable constructive relations with immediate neighbors to the east; and liberalizing political regimes in partner states refocused on Western values. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which had originally targeted Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, expanded to cover a much larger geographic range.20 The actions of the European Union were clearly predicated on political and value conditionality with respect to both its economic policy and its overall relations with countries that could become associate members of a fairly large subsystem.21 This approach was a perfect fit with the broader US–EU policy of democratizing the world on the basis of Western values, and implied regime change.

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Important

We can observe today that the pursuit of this policy through military force (NATO), which destabilized some states and weakened others involved in the EU and US-led structuring activities failed to consolidate the European Union and the countries participating in the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean into a European Regional Subsystem of a new type with an autonomous center of gravity and independent policy.

Important

The European Union’s efforts to expand its sphere of influence came into an open and planned conflict with Russian structural projects which, having no such explicit political and value-changing component, focused mainly on common economic and security issues. Regime change was also off the cooperation agenda for implementing the project of the common Eurasian space (from Small Eurasia to Greater Eurasia).

Important

NATO expansion and the Partnership for Peace could, on the one hand, contribute to successful formation of the Transatlantic regional subsystem of a new type. On the other hand, however, they introduced a certain contradiction to the development of the European regional subsystem. “Atlanticists started the real transformation of the geopolitical landscape of the 2000s,” writes Alexey Bogaturov, “by putting new material and human resources at NATO stations in the region [of the transatlantic community].”22 The dominance of the United States in NATO and its global role in

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all dimensions of international politics, as well as its special relationship with the United Kingdom as a historical ally and the existence of “transatlantic solidarity,” made it increasingly unlikely that a distinct European regional subsystem could be set up on its own with a central anchor other than Washington, but rather in one of the European capitals or based on European institutions.

Important

American structure-organizing plans, if successful in both the Western Hemisphere and the transatlantic region, may result in a near-global subsystem, stretching from the borders of Eastern Europe all the way across the two oceans to East Asia, with the United States as its all-powerful NATO-backed center. The “gap” in between, preventing the subsystem from coming full circle, would be Russia—the largest territory in the world—with its Eurasian structural project and China with its behemoth economy and plans for silk road projects, which aim not only to further globalize China’s trade, but also to build up its political and military influence. It is these two powers with their structural plans that truly hamper American global structuring plans to establish the liberal world order, something that the United States is not going to give up.

Regardless of where they rank against the parameters specified in our definition of a great power, Russia and China continue to have a big impact on international relations and world structuring under new conditions. China has not developed a regional subsystem under its leadership. There are several big players in China’s regional environment that would not accept Beijing’s regional leadership (the United States, Russia, India, South Korea, and Japan), and also small and medium-sized states which are either leaning towards the United States or have not yet chosen sides

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and are playing a double or triple game. There are also lingering suspicions (and even fears) regarding the benevolence of the so-called “Beijing Consensus” and China’s reassurances that its primary interest is trade and securing a prosperous and harmonious future for all parties to its projects. China’s global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt, One Road, which includes the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt projects, cuts across many countries in Eurasia, South and Southeast Asia, North Africa and the Arab World, and Europe. Is it possible to organize all the states involved in the BRI into a regional subsystem of a new type, bring them all under dominant Chinese influence, and achieve commonality of interests and policies? Not by a long shot. China would be hard pushed to bring on board even those Central Asian states that remain within the bounds of the Russian project. However much the EAEU members talk about China’s huge financial prowess, they are quite comfortable in the Russian regional subsystem (in spite of all their criticism and complaints), which is more familiar historically and culturally, poses no threats to integrity or independence, provides a very reliable safety cushion in all areas, and guards against aggressive Chinese expansion.23 When talking about China’s projects, as Alexei D. Voskresensky notes, it is important to consider that “external aspects of this concept gave rise to peculiar contradictions of a new kind and even opposition outside China, because the China’s model of external expansion has been encroaching on the sovereignty and rights of ethnic communities both in China (for some ethnic minorities) and beyond, especially in the early phase of the One Belt, One Road implementation.” Voskresensky adds, “China treads fairly lightly in offering its model as a tool for relatively poor authoritarian states that have not yet been able to get on track to successful independent and self-sustaining development. But the Chinese offer is not an altogether free ride, as was largely the case with the USSR some decades back. It comes with very clear, and occasionally tight, financial strings (that’s the modern world for you) as a set of pragmatic principles of geo-economic cooperation.”24 Unlike Russia, China does not have a space where it would have full command and be the anchor of all ongoing processes. Although China is putting a lot of effort in building ties with Central Asia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran, and other Asian states and has a sizable presence in their economies, they do not constitute a sphere of influence under China’s control. Moreover, these countries gravitate towards Russian integration

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projects in which China itself is involved to some extent. Despite the fact that it is the world’s second-largest economy in terms of GDP with massive foreign exchange reserves, China does not seem likely to become a consolidating anchor and is even viewed with apprehension by many small and medium-sized nations. It is not clear how China is going to overcome the dilemma of reconciling its global and macroregional ambitions with the policy of Russia, which anchors the already existing regional subsystem, and the actions of the United States (and its allies), which is also engaged in the macroregional and global structuring process. China’s activity in northern Eurasia and the Arctic will not be taken well by any of the Arctic powers, in spite of the differences between them at the current stage.25 Russia remains the second global power after the United States in terms of activity and creativity. It influences the formation of the world order and is implementing a large-scale structural project in the Eurasian space. Russia has all the attributes of a great power and the expertise to execute massive integration projects. Particularly important is the fact that Russia has preserved its historical experience of macroregional and global activity, regardless of the losses from the breakup of the Soviet Union. Following the demise of the USSR/Warsaw Pact/COMECON Project, Russia continued its space-structuring efforts around its borders and stayed in the center of all global processes in the transforming global order. Russia is not a passive, but an active player in this process. China, too, has risen to a similar level, but only after 2013. The Commonwealth of Independent States could be called a regional subsystem, if you stretch the definition far enough. Its composition changed, with some post-Soviet states shifting loyalties, others wobbling and pondering alternative affiliations. Multiple agreements were signed, but few could be considered as constituent elements of the subsystem’s institutional framework. Russia itself was in a difficult transformational phase, rethinking its place in the world, and grappling with the economic crisis and political instability. It took time for things to settle down, and it was not until the early 2000s that Russia gave a new impetus to the Eurasian initiative. The awareness of the processes unfolding within and near the post-Soviet space was growing gradually in each of the ex-USSR countries amidst the intensifying rivalry between major players—the United States, China, the European Union, Turkey, Brazil, and, of course, Russia. Post-Soviet governments were coming to see how they had really fared on their own without the USSR and what the effects

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of the policies pursued by various players, as well as of such political revolutions as the “colour” revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, had been. Social and economic challenges were looming and there was a clear need for coordination to address security issues. The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development established in 1997 consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (known as GUUAM from 1999, when Uzbekistan joined the organization and then back to GUAM again after the country left in 2002) at the initiative and with political and financial support of the United States as an alternative to the existing institutions initiated and led by Russia, did not live up to the original expectations. The member states failed to work out a common policy and, lacking encouragement and financial support from the United States, the initiative sputtered out. Later on, some of the GUAM states were targeted by the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy along with Belarus and Armenia (Prague Declaration). The signing of the EU Association Agreements and the pressure to choose between the European Union and Russia were among the reasons for the escalating crisis in Ukraine and Armenia’s pivot to Eurasian integration. Georgia and Azerbaijan stayed away from the Eurasian process, though Azerbaijan maintained productive bilateral relations with Russia, whereas Belarus has always been central to that process, alongside Russia and Kazakhstan. Still undecided about their position were Turkmenistan, which remained outside the Eurasian integration framework, and Uzbekistan, which oscillated between joining and leaving the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and struggling to commit to a clear policy.26 Russia’s renewed efforts to progress the Eurasian project, which envisaged large-scale multilevel structure-organizing activity well beyond mere economic integration, under the aegis of the Russian Federation, indicated the formation of a regional subsystem of a new type that we defined as “Small Eurasia” in the early 2000s.27 Small Eurasia had a modest membership, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. Other CIS members were hesitant, but did not turn their backs on these developments. Most importantly, the idea lived on and Russia’s role was increasing. The key institutions underlying this regional subsystem were the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),28 the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),29 and bilateral agreements between CIS

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member states. The SCO in particular became attractive for many countries due to rising security uncertainties on the continent, especially near the borders of many countries engaged in dialogue and interaction with Russia, and the rising interest in economic cooperation with it. Along with its permanent members (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, India, and Pakistan, Iran), the Organization included dialogue partners (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Egypt, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka), observers (Afghanistan, Belarus, Mongolia, and Turkey), and applicant states (Bahrain, Bangladesh, Israel, the Maldives, Syria, and Vietnam). The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the key economic integration project in the region, has evolved in stages on the basis of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Eurasian Economic Space (EES), and Customs Union. The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union was signed in 2014 by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, followed by Armenia, Kyrgyzstan in 2015, Moldova as observer in 2018.30

Important

By the end of the second decade of the 2010s, three structural projects had shown the biggest potential to shape the world in the future: 1. The US-led project to establish global control with the United States as its founding and pre-eminent center. This involves the following stages/components: structure-organizing activity in Latin America (Regional Subsystem of the Americas); the transatlantic project, entailing the deeper dependence of the European Union on the US policy unless the former changes the paradigm of its engagement in the formation of the world order in the twenty-first century (Transatlantic Regional Subsystem with the United States as its anchor); and a possible comeback with structuring initiatives to the Asia Pacific and Arctic regions. 2. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which, if successful, can propel China to a global level of world-order governance, although it would struggle to build its own regional subsystem

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as part of that project because Russia, Turkey, India, and leading European powers are not ready to recognize China as a dominant leading player charge. 3. Russia’s huge Eurasian project, Greater Eurasia, which has a good chance of succeeding by virtue of Russia’s unique position on the continent (continental globality), and the regional subsystem of a new type already being in place under the auspices of the Russian Federation. This is also helped by the fact the “fear” of the “Russian Consensus,” more open and pronounced, both now and in the long term, is dwarfed by the angst over the so-called “Beijing Consensus,” not to mention the “Washington Consensus.”31

∗ ∗ ∗ By the end of the second decade of the 2010s, discussions over who would be shaping the world order and how had come to their logical conclusion. It was no longer possible to deny the role of the state, and that the notion of a leading world power (great or major power) had become fundamental, since these powers are going to be the game-changers in charge of modifying obsolete and creating new institutions. Also, the trend towards global reconfiguration has brought to the forefront leading global and some major regional powers that are already involved in that process, either as initiators and regulators of ongoing transformations or as states feeling the impact of the trend and having to respond to associated structural processes. The key dilemmas and questions facing the world in the next 20–30 years are whether the structural projects of the three top powers are implemented to this or that extent, what compatibility and competition-related problems might arise in the course of implementing such projects, how fierce the differences and opposition are going to be, and how they will be resolved. However dissimilar the three powers are in terms of their potentials, strengths, and weaknesses, they all share a strong commitment to retain and strengthen their world-regulating influence and secure a favorable environment for their development. The biggest question (How peaceful and predictable is this process going to be?) has no definite answer, as the United States continues to employ the entire toolkit of means to

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further its ends and contain its opponents. It would be best if the preservation of peace and the avoidance of conflicts and wars should become the prevailing factor in relations between the United States, Russia, and China, as well as in the behavior of those states on the international scene that are still undecided as to which structural project to join and are not fully aware of the potential consequences of their attempts to take advantage of disagreements between leading powers for their own benefit.

Keywords Great powers, United States, China, Russia, Regional subsystem of a new type, Global reconfiguration, Structural projects, Greater Eurasia, World order Self-Test 1. How can you define a great power in the twenty-first century? 2. What are structure-organizing projects of leading global powers? 3. What regional subsystems of a new type are being set up as part of the world-order-forming process? 4. What structure-organizing activity is conducted by the United States? 5. What can be said about the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of the subsystem-driven reconfiguration of the world order? 6. What are the strengths of the Greater Eurasia project?

Notes 1. Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (March/April 1999): 35–49; Samuel Huntington, “Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite,” The National Interest, no. 75 (Spring 2004): 5–18; George Kennan, “On American Principles,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 116–136. The prominent American scholar Christopher Layne wrote that although “China and Russia are ‘down in dust,’ we shouldn’t be deceived by this temporary situation, because they will rise and the United State should take their role into consideration and come to agreement with them.” See: Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, 2006). 2. E.M. Primakov, “A Multipolar World on the Horizon,” International Relations, no. 10 (1996): 3–13; A.D. Bogaturov, “The Crisis of

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3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

Microsystem Regulation,” International Affairs, no. 7 (1993): 30–40; S.M. Rogov, “Russia and the United States in a Multipolar World,” The US: Economy, Policy, Culture, no. 10 (1992): 3–14; A.V. Torkunov, “International Relations After the Kosovo Crisis,” International Affairs, no. 12 (1999): 45–52. A.D. Bogaturov, Great Powers in the Pacific: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia After the Second World War (1945–1995) (Moscow: US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1996), 67. A.D. Bogaturov, “Chinese Angle in the World System Governance,” Polis. Political Studies, no. 5 (2019): 85–95. There are quite a few examples of how small and medium countries can act. One of the events took place in March–April 2020, when Saudi Arabia unilaterally exceeded the cap under the oil production agreement, collapsing world crude prices, crashing stock markets worldwide, and causing serious economic trouble for many countries, including Russia. The rivalry between resource-producing and resource-consuming nations continues and often degenerates into manipulation. Being the world’s major and absolutely self-sufficient resource producer, Russia still depends on global markets and needs a healthy international environment. Speaking of the European Union, it is worth noting that its international policy in the 2000s–early 2010s was aimed at expanding its area of influence geopolitically and geo-strategically, i.e., there was a clear focus on building a European regional subsystem that would be separate from the transatlantic community and the United States and encompass Eastern European and Mediterranean nations. The European Union, however, has largely curtailed its regional efforts due to domestic issues and disagreements, along with declining influence of European institutions which had aspired to global stature. See, for example: Parag Khanna, The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century (New York, 2009), xiv–xv. Khanna set forth a concept of three empires: American, European, and Chinese, believing that China would rise to be on par with Western empires and would turn its eye to the north and northwest, i.e., to Russia and its neighbors, because the regions bordering China were under Chinese control anyway and were not large and rich enough in resources to stop there. The concepts of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who championed the idea of a “benign” American “empire of a new type,” have also failed the test of time, as the trend towards sovereignization and the growing support for national self-identification around the world proved to be a response to the superpower’s ambition of global dominance under the guise of universal American values. See: Zbigniew Brzezinski.

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9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

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The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: The Basic Books, 1998). National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; Nuclear Posture Review. U.S. Department of Defense (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/ 2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINALREPORT.PDF. A.D. Bogaturov, “Chinese Angle in the World System Governance,” Polis. Political Studies, no. 5 (2019): 85–95. India faces the strategic dilemma of being locked in the US–India–China triangle. India is trying to keep a delicate balance in its relations with both powers, and only an abrupt turn in China’s policy towards a revision of the existing regional status quo may force India to adopt a more pro-American line. India’s leadership shows reluctance to take strong positions and get involved in global problem-solving due to domestic political processes, Indian political culture as a whole, and because of strategic interests. In 2011–2012, during the turbulent period of the Arab Spring, India was said to have chosen to “hide behind the fence.” An analysis of the evolving political situation in Turkey, as well as Turkey’s strategic documents and its behavior on the international arena, led the American strategist George Friedman to cast the country in his scenarios of the future as one of the principal initiators of a possible twenty-first century war in 2050. See: George Friedman. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 153–211. Nadine Godehardt and Dirk Naders, eds., Regional Powers and Regional Orders (New York, 2011), 57. Critical analyses of the US foreign policy can be found in the works of Andrew Bacevich, John Mearsheimer, and others. See: John Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, 2018); Paul R. Pillar, Why America Misunderstands the World: National Experience and Roots of Misperception (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, 2006). Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004); Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010); Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 21st Century (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower

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16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

21.

22. 23.

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(New York, 2007); Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York, 2008); Samuel Huntington, “Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite,” The National Interest, no. 75 (Spring 2004): 5–18; Stephen Walt, “Taming American Power,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 105–120. Quoted in Julio Augusto de Castro Neves, “Brazil as an Emerging Power in the Twenty-First Century,” in Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective, op. cit., 204. Ibid., 196–204. See: V.P. Sudarev, Latin America: New Geopolitical Challenges (Moscow, 2016). Some experts believe that ASEAN institutions could become an anchor for consolidating small and medium-sized states looking for shelter to avoid being caught amidst the big competitive game between the United States, China, and Japan. The Union for the Mediterranean (Barcelona Process) was founded in 2008. Along with the EU members, it included Turkey, Tunisia, Syria, Palestine, Morocco, Jordan, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Algeria. Joining as observers were the Arab League, the Arab Maghreb Union, Libya, Mauritania, and Albania. The Eastern Partnership program was launched in 2009 following the founding summit in Prague (Prague Declaration). It covered six post-Soviet countries: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Ukraine, and Belarus. I.V. Bolgova, “Belarus in the Politics of the European Union,” in T.A. Shakleina, ed., Introduction to the Applied Analysis of International Situations (Moscow, 2014), 217. Political conditionality is a key principle at the heart of all partnership and cooperation agreements (PCA) made by the European Union with all the new independent states. The same idea is incorporated in the European Neighbourhood Policy, under which bilateral action plans need to be signed based on the analysis of the partner state domestic political development. See: I.V. Bolgova, “Belarus in the Politics of the European Union,” in T.A. Shakleina, ed., Introduction to the Applied Analysis of International Situations (Moscow, 2014), 217. A.D. Bogaturov, “Chinese Angle in the World System Governance,” Polis. Political Studies, no. 5 (2019): 95. Another important aspect worth noting is China’s Arctic Policy. In late January 2018, Beijing published a White Paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy.” While it may not be an Arctic power, China is nevertheless looking to become an important, if not dominant, player in the Arctic region. This is a cause for concern for Russia because in the context of China’s intense onshore and offshore activity in southern Eurasia, Russia would prefer to

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26. 27.

28.

29.

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retain the northern region and the Northern Sea Route as a sphere of its special and vital interests. For more details, see https://eadaily.com/ru/ news/2018/02/03/kitay-v-arktike-novaya-holodnaya-voyna. A.D. Voskresensky, “Realization of the ‘Chinese Dream’ in the ‘Xi Jinping Era’: What to Expect for Russia?” World Economy and International Relations 63, no. 10 (2019): 6, 10. A.I. Smirnov and R.T. Mamedli, “The Arctic in the New International Environment: The Problem of Information Threats,” in T.A. Shakleina, ed. Russia and the United States in the 21st Century: Relations of Discontent (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2020), 140–167. See: T.A. Shakleina, Introduction to the Applied Analysis of International Situations, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2016), 218–253. The term “Minor Eurasia” was proposed by the author in 2006, and then the ongoing processes were discussed at the annual conventions of the International Studies Association in the United States. At that time, Russia was increasingly criticized and dismissed as incapable of carrying out any constructive integration policy. See: T.A. Shakleina, “Russia in the New Distribution of Power,” in Vidya Nadkarni and Norma Noonan, eds., Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective: The Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); T.A. Shakleina, “Russian Perspective on the Twenty-First Century Challenges,” in Norma Noonan and Vidya Nadkarni, eds., Challenge and Change: Global Threats and the State in Twenty-First Century International Politics (New York, 2016). The Collective Security Treaty Organization has its beginnings in the 1992 Collective Security Treaty (CST). On October 7, 2002, six CST countries, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan agreed to establish the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on the basis of the treaty. In addition to its members, CSTO includes two observers, Serbia and Afghanistan. In 2004, the UN General Assembly granted the CSTO observer status. Following the creation of the CSTO Collective Forces in 2009, the CSTO Secretariat and the UN Operations Department signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2012, allowing the CSTO troops to be used in the UN peacekeeping operations. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001, building on the Shanghai Five group that included Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan (1996), and joined in 2001 by Uzbekistan. The Organization’s objectives are to maintain stability and security of the member states, fight terrorism and drug trafficking, develop economic, science, and culture relations, and cooperate in the energy sector. Since 2018, Moldova has been an observer in the organization. In addition, a free trade zone has been in place that includes Iran, Vietnam,

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Singapore, and Serbia. The EAEU Treaty came into effect on January 1, 2015. About 50 governments have expressed their interest in potentially joining the Union. President Putin, speaking at the SCO Summit in Tashkent in June 2016, voiced the idea of expanding the EAEU and proceeding with the implementation of the Greater Eurasia project. 31. Speaking of the European Union, it is necessary to note that its international policy in the 2000s–early 2010s was aimed at expanding its area of influence geopolitically and geo-strategically, i.e., there was a clear focus on building a European regional subsystem that would be separate from the transatlantic community and the United States and encompass Eastern European and Mediterranean nations. The European Union, however, has largely curtailed its regional efforts due to internal issues and contradictions, along with declining influence of European institutions which had aspired to global stature.

Recommended Reading Hendrickson, David. Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Mearsheimer, John. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Haven, 2018. Noonan, Norma, and Nadkarni, Vidya, eds. Challenge and Change: Global Threats and the State in Twenty-First Century International Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Paul, T.V., ed. Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Shakleina, T.A., ed. Situational Analyses: Issue 5. International Institutes in Modern World Politics. Moscow: MGIMO University, 2016. Shakleina, T.A. Russia and the United States in Contemporary International Relations. 3rd ed., revised. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2022. Sudarev, V.P. Latin America: New Geopolitical Challenges. Moscow: MGIMO University, 2016. Voskresensky, A.D. “Realization of the “Chinese Dream” in the “Xi Jinping Era”: What to Expect for Russia?” World Economy and International Relations 63, no. 10 (2019): 5–16.

CHAPTER 18

The Institutionalization of Regional Centers in Europe and the Asia–Pacific Andrey Baykov

Growing regional interstate integration, which gave rise to a powerful “core” in Western Europe after the end of the Second World War, led to increasingly similar traits within groups of participating countries elsewhere based on common cultural symbols, institutional and legal systems, and the economy. The concept of homogenization was thus included in the foundation of regional integration around the world and set the direction and scope of integration studies in general. As a result, analysts proceeded from the assumption that the Western European model was the status quo. Therefore, one would assess the level of “integration” of regional organizations by comparing it with the EEC/EU. In such a comparison, as a rule, standard criteria were used: the spread of a supranational decision-making principle and progression along the “Béla Balassa ladder” (see Chapter 9). There is also the lowest common denominator, which is mainly found in economic literature, such

A. Baykov (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_18

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as the share of intra-regional trade in the total trade turnover of member countries. When the school of integration studies was being created in the USSR, there was only one center of integration around which its studies focused—Western Europe. Today, however, many regions are experiencing their own integration trends. Western and Asian leaders and scholars use the word “integration” widely and freely to describe the real economic and political trends in which their countries are participating. The term “integration” has firmly entered the vocabulary of Russian politicians and political scientists when discussing the evolution of the CIS. Of course, not all interstate cooperation can be considered integration. The academic community continues to engage in substantial and rather fruitful discussions regarding the conceptual and criterial aspects of its interpretation. At the same time, in a number of regions, primarily Europe, East Asia, and North and South America, the timing, scale, and level of commitment of local leaders and citizens to such integration programs demonstrate how real, yet also complex the political, economic, cultural, and ideological processes, problems, and results are. By the end of the 2010s, vast empirical material had been accumulated on the development of regional integration centers. This paved the way for a deeper understanding of integration processes and allowed for comparative analysis, thus serving as the basis for the new educational and scientific discipline—“comparative integration.”

The Problem of Effective Management in European Integration An analysis of the history and current state of the governing mechanisms and institutions of the European Union shows that they were formed in a zigzag, jerky manner, with numerous deviations and exceptions from the original framework. The plethora of various policy and decision-making procedures in various domains1 underlines how unique the modern political system of the European Union is.1 It is about differentiation and asymmetry.

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Differentiation implies the formation of subregional mechanisms within the Union for closer cooperation that does not include all member countries, such as the Schengen Agreements, the Euro Zone, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Asymmetry implies making different decisions based on separate procedures: the Community method (simple and qualified majority); the intergovernmental method (unanimity); and strict supranational regulation (autonomy of individual institutions in decision-making, primarily the European Central Bank and agencies). At first glance, the structure of the EU’s governance goes back to the classic republican canon of government, in which the executive, legislative, and judicial branches form a system of checks and balances, and their powers are separated. In the European Union, the European Commission (pseudo-government), European Parliament, European Council (as an analogue of the second chamber of national parliaments in federal countries), and the European Courts perform these functions, respectively. Nevertheless, the seeming resemblance is deceiving, since the Council shares legislative powers with the Parliament, while remaining one of the main executive bodies. Such duplication of functions was achieved by participants of European integration seeking to bolster inter-institutional balance. An agreement is reached between member countries, without which the work of supranational bodies is impossible. The desire to maintain an “optimal” balance of interests of individual countries (and institutions) for the benefit of integration means a low degree of parliamentary participation in decision-making procedures, and a lack of transparency in the practical work of institutions (demographic deficit).

Important

At each stage, up until the beginning of the 2010s, the effectiveness of the European Union served as its key corrective principle, a kind of regulator of the EU institutional practice, i.e., compliance with the local conditions of the European Union and its development goals, the EU governing bodies meeting the expectations of the member countries and their subsequent willingness to give up some

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degree of national control. EU bodies and members followed reality, not theoretical developments. This is the most important generalization of the EU experience in terms of assessing the prospects for the emergence of a general theory of integration.

The topic of management efficiency is somehow related to the topic of federalism, since it relates to the issues of optimal delimitation of the competencies of general (supranational) governing bodies and the powers of the governments of individual countries. But from the standpoint of identifying the regional specifics of the European Union, something else is more important: the European Union had a kind of “invariant” system of governance. Despite the fact that federalism in the EU in the ideological sphere either strengthened or weakened, the focus on a supranational (federal) approach has always remained a guideline for governance.

Important

Even at the very beginning of the integration process, the system of governing bodies of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951) was a miniature prototype of what later developed into the governing mechanism of the current European Union, which embodies a set of predominantly supranational institutions. However, there are insufficient grounds to consider supranationality, to the extent that it is established in the European Union, a universal (global) feature. Nowhere in the world, except for the European Union, is the primacy of the supranational principle and, more importantly, the expressed desire for it, fixed.

In the early 1950s, the desirable seeds of supranational control in Western Europe fell on loosened ideological soil. Western European countries that suffered the greatest losses during the First and Second World Wars saw mass discontent with the powerlessness of state institutions, and not necessarily with the nature of the ruling regimes in particular. The failure of the authorities to save citizens gave way to a general assumption that the former was useless.

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The most radical criticism of the state led to French intellectuals creating the “European Federation.” According to its authors, supranationality was absolutely necessary.2 In addition, the proposal to participate in the integration experiment was addressed to a weakened and occupied Germany, as well as a group of small and weak European countries. This created grounds for it to be imposed (“formalized”). The purely situational feature of 1945 to the 1950s, which allowed France to promote the benefits of supra-nationality amongst its partners without encountering obvious resistance, was eventually elevated to the rank of historical regularity. Europe needed supra-nationality to the extent that it helped meet the ongoing challenges of the community. The fact that no other integration groups have adopted supra-nationality since 1951, and the difficulty with which it was established in the European Union itself, speaks of its Western European nature, rather than something “historically inevitable” for all integration endeavors. If the supranational nature of the ECSC was due to the distinctive post-War situation in Western Europe and the relatively low cost due to the “sectoral” nature of its integration, then the goal of general economic integration outlined in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 created a danger to the socio-economic regimes of the “big six” that had formed after the Second World War (fear of unemployment, mass impoverishment, large contributions to the EEC budget), and weakened government’s control over the development of national economies, and, therefore, over the social situation. After the failure of the Pleven Plan to create a supranational European Army in the mid-1950s, it became clear that upholding a federalist scenario in conditions of general economic integration would be difficult. The ECSC’s success presented a convincing case for “dosed” supra-nationality to serve the cause of integration cooperation. But maintaining the principle of intergovernmental regulation could have curbed fears. This was reflected in the Treaty of Rome (1957), which gave greater importance to the European Parliament, recognizing all languages of the member countries as official and introducing a system for determining a majority by the ratio of votes weighted depending on the population of the member countries. The retreat from supra-nationality in the EEC in the 1960s and 1970s did not extend to the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The successful work of both depoliticized communities justified supranationalism, demonstrating the effectiveness of this type of

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government in principle. In a speech given on May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman prophesied, “Europe will not be created all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built based on concrete achievements, thanks to which actual solidarity will first arise, which the European peoples will consistently extend to all new industries.”3 The EU leadership chose to adapt citizens to the idea of supranational governance by testing its effectiveness. At the same time, one would be mistaken in denying that supranationality is a useful tool for classifying integration projects. The willingness to delegate authority is an important sign of the maturity of the regional community. Supra-nationality, meaning the institutionalization of this willingness in the European Union, should be seen as an unprecedented achievement of European integration. Almost immediately after integration began, supra-nationality was met by serious opponents, including leaders of Western European countries, who tried to balance it with an intergovernmental approach. Additionally, over time, the practice of supranational decision-making proved its effectiveness in certain areas and thus could not be abandoned. However, in areas where the interests of member countries have traditionally been a priority at all stages of the evolution of the European Union, including the very beginning, the process of establishing supranationalism faced difficulties. The “Eastward expansion of Europe,” which began in 1991, did not prevent the European Union from becoming a vertically and horizontally integrated cooperation body within Western and Central Europe. The transition to full-scale regional integration had begun, which was demonstrated by an increased emphasis on the institution of “European citizenship” (first included in the Maastricht Treaty) and increased participation in determining integration paths. Old mechanisms created in the 1960s to hinder public discontent became insufficient as a result of the erosion of the welfare state model. Yet the need to consider the opinion of “European citizens” created difficult political conditions for making decisions regarding integration. The potentially destructive role of voting has increased greatly, for example, during referendums in Denmark in 1992 on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, in France and the Netherlands in 2005 on the ratification of the EU Constitution, and in Ireland in 2007 on the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. If the reason behind France and the

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Netherlands voting against deeper integration was a protest expressed in electoral behavior and was rooted in domestic policy, in Denmark it was mainly associated with possible losses from more intensive cooperation. The results of the referendum in Ireland were caused by something else: along with Greece and Portugal, Ireland received the most significant financial support from the EEC. It is also worth mentioning the history of referendums in Norway, where the decision to join the EEC, made back in 1971, was repeatedly postponed due to negative referendum results (in 1972 and 1994).

Important

The strengthening of the “civil democratic component” in the EU governance paradigm in the 1990s and 2000s was contradictory to the key governance principle of the modern European Union—namely, efficiency. For 50 years, it served as a guarantee against coerced integration, allowing for its pace to be regulated and optimal forms to be found. By the early 2010s, the increasing complexity of the decision-making process hindered the effectiveness of integration policy.

The dynamics of integration and speed at which its new levels are achieved are not entirely determined by politicians or supranational institutions. Their counterbalance is rather a system of restrictions on the part of individual countries, whose population or elites were not ready to take integration to the next level. What at times seems to be a weakness of integration and a “failure in the effectiveness of its institutions” has in fact ensured its smooth flow throughout history. The integration process as such continues to develop in the European Union on a progressive trajectory.

Structure of the Asia and Pacific Integration Space In East Asia, the geographical boundaries of zones of integration tendencies are fluid. This concept can be seen in the practice of holding East Asian summits, where, as of December 2005, India, Australia, and New

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Zealand were invited, as were the United States and Russia since 2011, neither of which is located in East Asia.

Important

The Norwegian researcher Björn Hettne and American expert on East Asia Harry Harding generally deny the existence of “natural (geographical) regions” in the world, pointing out that regional configuration can be decided situationally, depending on the area of cooperation.

In Russian literature, this approach is partly consistent with the definition proposed by A.D. Voskresensky, who defined a region as a set of phenomena of international life occurring in certain territorial and temporal coordinates, united by a common logic in such a way that this logic and the coordinates of its existence are interdependent.4

The Russian Far East, for example, should geographically belong to East Asia, yet non-Russian literature rarely sees it that way, largely as a result of the low level of participation on the part of the constituent entities in the east of the Russian Federation in the economic activities of the region. In other words, when determining members of a region, one can assess the involvement of countries in the regional economy. In this chapter, the East Asian region is considered a combination of two subregional fragments: Northeast Asia (NEA)5 and Southeast Asia (SEA) Asia.6 By the beginning of the 2010s, the merging of the Southeast and Northeast parts of the region into a single economic system was largely completed. The subregion’s historical tolerance to foreign dominance in the areas of investment and trade facilitated this psychological process. An important prerequisite for the merging of subregions into a single region in the 1980s–1990s was Japan’s desire (as well as that of the United States) to relocate labor-intensive, “dirty” industries to Southeast Asia, thus ensuring a further technological breakthrough. Although the environmental impact was just as bad for Southeast Asia as it would

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have been for Japan, the economic benefit for small and medium-sized countries as a result of relocating production outweighed it. The accelerated economic development of Northeast Asia was also largely fuelled by the supply of raw materials from the south-eastern part of the region. Economic growth united Eastern Asian countries, linking them first by ties of trade, production, and raw material supplies, and then by the need for monetary, financial, and technological coordination.

Important

Subregions were being united into a single region in conditions of growing, primarily economic, interdependence. At the same time, politicians in Southeast Asia played the most prominent role in initiating the integration processes, while Japan and the United States reacted to this as potential technological and investment donors.

The development of economic cooperation on a group, regional basis is one of the most popular political slogans among most countries in this part of the world. A feature of the foreign policy strategy of Southeast Asian countries is the principle of collective action by small and mediumsized countries that have realized their strength in solidarity and unity. At first glance, it is even surprising that, since the early 1980s, the objective regional leaders—Japan and China—have been forced to take the opinion of ASEAN on board and accept it as the only basis for discussing almost any issue regarding integration.7 While it was the largest countries (France and Germany) that spearheaded integration in the European Union, it was small and medium-sized states (ASEAN countries) that led the charge for integration in East Asia. There are several circumstances that demonstrate integration trends in the East Asian region. First, an important aspect of integration efforts is the coordination of policies in various areas of interaction, such as trade and transport, as well as the financial and, partly, environmental domains. The concept of “common policies,” characteristic of the European Union, is not relevant in this part of the world. At the same time, in some areas, the paradigm of collective concerted action is beginning to prevail over the scattered individual steps of countries. Thus, ASEAN acts as a consolidated player

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in trade and economic (WTO) or international political negotiations (in relations with the European Union, the United States, Russia, and India), first coordinating its position among themselves, and then announcing it as a collective negotiating platform. Secondly, there have been attempts by countries to consolidate their economies by harmonizing technical requirements and introducing common rules of origin, although they are trying to achieve this without moving toward supra-nationality. To achieve this goal, the countries of the region are introducing measures aimed at integration, such as liberalizing the economic space and facilitating the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Adopted in Singapore in 2007, the “Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community” formulated the medium-term goal of building “a single market and a single industrial base on the scale of the East Asia region” by 2015. This, of course, is not about “complete” liberalization, as in the European Union. The countries of the region are moving toward a more selective coalescence of their economies, taking the level of maturity of specific sectors of the economy of individual member countries into account. Thirdly, after the Asian crisis of 1997–1998, and in an even more pronounced form during the global economic downturn of 2008–2010, a new integration tool was deployed for policy coordination—the creation of common resource “pools” under common management, which was most clearly manifested in actions to protect the financial systems of the countries in the region from currency fluctuations. With this goal in mind, APT countries (“ASEAN plus three”) formed a single fund for the stabilization of national currency fluctuations. Measures to create a common bond market for APT countries were also taken. From the point of view of how integration subjects in East Asia interact, a diverse picture of regional integration has developed, which might be attributed to its “focal-network” type. In this part of the world, there are three, to varying degrees, consolidated centers of integration. The first center is represented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which unites all of Southeast Asia, with the exception of East Timor,8 and the mechanism of cooperation derived from it, the APT, with its membership including China, South Korea, and Japan. As in the case of Europe, the core of integration in East Asia crystallized where the geographic proximity factor was most effective.9 The APT emerged during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 as a tool to mitigate future monetary and financial crises and their impact on

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regional economies. It is important to note that the APT is not a fullfledged organization in the classical sense of the word. This structure functions under ASEAN, acting as its specialized financial coordination body. “External” members of the APT—China, South Korea, and Japan—are gradually moving toward associated membership in ASEAN.

Important

Although rapprochement is progressing unevenly in the integration process, the APT and ASEAN are the multilateral organizational and economic core of East Asian integration.

The asynchrony in the pace and intensity of convergence in this core somewhat resembles that of the European Union, where there are more integrated “old,” and less integrated “new” members. Moreover, at the initiative and under the auspices of ASEAN, integration construction is being carried out throughout the East Asian region. The second center for East Asian integration is represented by the Japanese–American integration process, “disguised” as a military-political alliance. Over the past half-century, it has turned into a system of intensive military-political, investment, and intellectual cooperation that fully meets the strict integration criteria. As in the case of France and Germany, it grew out of the experience of overcoming the armed confrontation of the Second World War. By the late 1980s, both centers found themselves part of the transregional APEC group—the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization, which includes 21 countries and territories in the Pacific, East Asia, North and South America, and Oceania, and which also declared its integrative nature. This is actually the third center of integration, within which two more consolidated integration cores were created. Relations within the APEC framework are becoming increasingly similar to network-type ties, the purpose of which is to mitigate competition between the other two centers of regional convergence. A similar role appears to be played by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (2005). APEC set the task of keeping integration into ASEAN as open as possible, thus ensuring the participation of “white countries,” which was mainly beneficial for non-Asian states (such as the United States

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and Australia), yet less so for Japan. Analytically, APEC maintains the widest possible geographical scope, fully encompassing all of East Asia,10 which is clearly unattainable in the short and medium term. The actual integration component of APEC’s activities is represented to a lesser extent. According to the Bogor Declaration, adopted at the Second APEC Summit in Indonesia in November 1994, the goal was to create a free trade area—first for developed member countries in 2010 and then for developing countries by 2020.11 The first part of this goal is not yet completed, and there is no reason to believe that the second one will also be achieved. Today, APEC operates primarily as a consultation mechanism for Pacific Rim countries, discussing the most important issues of economic development, and in the 2000s, security. Regional integration can be broken down into two different types of interaction depending on how the participants self-identify. The first type openly proclaims and solves issues linked to interstate rapprochement. This is, first and foremost, the core recognized by politicians and scientists alike—ASEAN—the oldest and most influential organization in terms of the ability to consolidate the region. It is important to note that after several rounds of expansion in the 1990s, ASEAN saw a gap in economic development and foreign policy strategy between the “old” and “new” members, which was compared to the “old” and “new” Europe in the practice of the European Union. This is why the integration core of ASEAN essentially operates as part of the five original members— Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, along with Brunei, which joined them in 1984.12 It was within this framework that the first full-fledged free trade zone was launched in the region in 2003. This is where the APT mechanism comes into play. Integration tasks are also proclaimed by APEC. The second type of interaction is characteristic of the Japanese–American center, which formally does not set itself the task of integration. It looks like an ordinary military-political union, but is in fact the most closely integrated entity in the economic sense in the region. It has and continues to create powerful proto-integration impulses that affect the dynamics of integration in ASEAN and the PLA.

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The Institutional Form of Integration in the Asia–Pacific After the Adoption of the ASEAN Charter The ASEAN Charter was adopted in 2007, and entered into force in December 2008.13 For the first time since 1967, it provided a detailed description of the ASEAN institutional mechanism, defined the structure of the ASEAN working bodies in their hierarchy and subordination, and described the decision-making procedures. The document contained several new clauses that changed the previous structure and functioning of ASEAN’s working bodies from the mid-2000s. But mostly, the changes were nominal: the names of pre-existing institutions and positions were changed and their place in the overall organizational structure was clarified. As per the Charter, the ASEAN Summit retained its role as the main body, which operates at the level of “Heads of State or Government of the Member States” (Chapter IV, Article 7, paragraph 1). It is the highest authority in the decision-making process in ASEAN, discusses and proposes the direction of the organization’s activities, makes decisions on key issues related to achieving its goals or the interests of member states, as well as any problems that are brought to the summit at the request of the ASEAN Coordinating Council, ASEAN Community Councils, and ASEAN Sectoral Ministries. The summit, among other things, is authorized to create and dissolve other working bodies of the association and appoint the Secretary-General. Summits are held twice a year in the Member State holding the ASEAN Chairmanship. They can also be convened whenever necessary, as special or ad hoc meetings (Article 7, part 3, paragraphs a, b). According to Article 8 of the Charter, the institution of Foreign Ministerial Meetings, established in accordance with the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 and consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states, was replaced by the Coordinating Council (ASEAN Coordinating Council ) with the same members. The Coordinating Council must meet at least twice a year (Article 8, part 1). The Council is responsible for coordinating the implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit within the national framework; coordinating with the ASEAN Community Councils to enhance policy coherence, efficiency, and cooperation among them; coordinating the reports of the ASEAN Community Councils to the ASEAN

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Summit; considering the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of ASEAN; and approving the appointment and termination of the Deputy Secretaries-General upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General (Article 8, paragraph 2, Points a–g). In the late 1990s, the idea of the ASEAN Community was formulated, based on documents adopted, firstly, at the informal ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 (ASEAN Vision 2020)14 and, secondly, at the Hanoi Summit in 1998 (Ha Noi Plan of Action, 1998).15 The Community, much like the European Union, was based on three “pillars”—the Economic Community, the Socio-Cultural Community, and the ASEAN Security Community. In its final form, this concept was presented during the Bali Summit of 2003. To implement the measures needed for each community, bodies (commissions, committees, experts, and working groups) were formed under the secretariat, the work of which was supervised depending on the field of activity ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) or ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meetings (AEM). The Charter defined the relationship between the organization itself and its communities, including the system of organization and subordination of the mechanisms serving them. In accordance with Article 9 of the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Community Councils were established: (1) the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council; (2) the ASEAN Economic Community Council; and (3) the ASEAN SocioCultural Community Council (Article 9, part 1). The relevant specialized bodies (Sectoral Ministerial Bodies—Article 10) and inter-ministerial bodies related to one of the three areas of cooperation (part 2) began to report directly to them. Councils meet at least twice a year under the chair of a minister from the presiding country (part 5). The duties of the Council include: ensuring the implementation of the relevant decisions of the ASEAN Summit; coordinating the work of the different sectors under its purview, and on issues which cut across the other Community Councils; and submitting reports and recommendations to the ASEAN Summit on matters under its purview (part 4, subparagraphs a–c). Article 11 of the Charter summarizes the legal regulation of the status and duties of the Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat, previously “dispersed” among other documents. The Secretary-General is appointed by the Summit for non-renewable term of office of five years from one of the participating countries based on alphabetical rotation (Article 11, part 1). The Secretary-General participates in meetings of the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Community Councils, the ASEAN

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Coordinating Council, and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies (part 2, paragraph c). He or she has the right to present the views of ASEAN and participate in meetings with external parties in accordance with approved policy guidelines and mandate given to the Secretary-General (paragraph d). In essence, the ASEAN Secretary-General combines the functions of the EU presidency and the EU foreign minister, while not yet being fully one or the other. It is mandatory that the Secretary-General and his secretariat are guided exclusively by decisions made by collective bodies of ASEAN. Member States are prohibited from influencing the Secretariat as it executes decisions already made on a multilateral basis (Article 11, part 9). The Charter underlines the status of the ASEAN National Secretariats, “integration ministries” of such created in each participating country in accordance with the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 (Article 13). Article 20 formalized decision-making principles, with part 1 of the article establishing “consultation and consensus” as the main procedure for reaching such decisions. Part 2 of Article 20 allowed for the summit to situationally choose the appropriate decision-making procedure in the event that consensus cannot be achieved. Should the adopted decision fail to be implemented by one (or several) of the member countries or the ASEAN Charter be breached, such incidents are to be submitted to the ASEAN Summit for decision (Article 20, part 4). Article 21 of the Charter allows each ASEAN Community Council to prescribe its own rules of procedure, including those relating to decision-making methods. This is due to the fact that the price to pay for partial delegation of sovereign powers and, consequently, a partial loss of national-state control in various areas during integration differs. In the European Union, this phenomenon is known as decision asymmetry, a situation in which procedures differ depending on the area of activity. The ASEAN Economic Community Council allows flexible decisionmaking mechanisms, “including the ASEAN Minus X formula” (Article 21, part 2), known in European Union legal practice as constructive abstention. A decision is considered adopted even if several member countries did not wish to support it, giving reasoned explanations for their disagreement. In this case, the decision is announced on behalf of the entire ASEAN, but it is not imperative for those who abstained from voting.

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Some ASEAN countries, such as Singapore and Thailand, are lobbying for a different decision-making formula on economic issues: “2 Plus X,” meaning that if two countries are ready to create an integration zone of accelerated growth among themselves with high requirements for the level of merging in selected areas, then such a mechanism should be open to the participation of all those who agree to these conditions. There are concerns that the selection of this formula as the official one will spur multi-speed integration and further differentiate ASEAN in terms of economic development.

The ASEAN budgetary system is an integral part of the integration process management mechanism. The ASEAN countries decided to form the current budget of the organization based on the principle of sovereign equality, rather than sovereign solvency, which was adopted in many international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The budget was mainly intended to finance the activities of the Secretariat and related administrative bodies using equal annual contributions, the amount of which was regularly reviewed based on the needs of the secretariat and the economic situation (Article 30). Secretariat funding is approved in agreement with the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives (a body consisting of ambassadors of ASEAN countries accredited to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta) and the ASEAN Coordinating Council (Article 30, part 4). Thus, the activities of the ASEAN Secretariat combined elements of partial (visible) supra-nationality and strict national-state control. The former, for example, is demonstrated by the Secretariat staff’s obligation to “disown” the national interests of the country that sent them in relation to member countries’ governments, third countries, and international organizations, and strictly observe decisions achieved in the multilateral framework. At the same time, the budget of the Secretariat, unlike that of the European Commission, which has had its own funding since the early 1970s, directly depends on ASEAN member countries, which clearly limits the Secretariat’s activity. Separate rules and regulations governing the activities of various ASEAN bodies, as well as the SecretaryGeneral, seem to be similar to practices and procedures of the European Union. At the same time, the “ASEAN-N” formula that operates in ASEAN cannot be considered supranational, since abstaining countries are not bound by decisions taken. In conditions of supra-nationality, on the other hand, all members are obliged to implement decisions adopted

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by the community, including members who abstained or voted against such decisions. Article 31 of the Charter deals with election procedures and the mandate of the ASEAN Chairmanship. Chairmanship rotates annually, based on the alphabetical order of the English names of Member States, and the presiding country acts in this capacity for the entire calendar year. Representatives of the chair country at the appropriate official level lead the meetings of the Summit, the Coordinating Council, Community Councils, Sectoral Bodies, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (so-called cross-cutting chairmanship). Judging by the text of the Charter, the institute of chairmanship is granted great organizational and symbolic significance. While the European Union uses the term “presidency,” ASEAN speaks of “chairmanship.” Such a choice of words is of fundamental importance in this case. The term “presidency” links back to the national political systems, while “chairmanship” refers rather to an international organization.

The official and working language of all ASEAN bodies is English (Article 34). In contrast, the European Union has a procedural rule according to which the languages of all member countries are official and must be translated at all EU meetings and in all EU documentation. This practice is difficult to implement in ASEAN-APT. None of the languages spoken in the region meet the criteria of an international language, if by such we mean a language that is compulsory for study in secondary and higher schools in all countries of the region at the same time. Experience suggests that the choice of adequate means of communication is one of the fundamental problems in the creation of any international or regional association. So far, none of the languages of East Asia can eliminate intra-regional linguistic barriers. Therefore, during the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three mechanisms and during the East Asia Summits, English was chosen as the working and official language. Integration processes in the European Union were accompanied by an emphatically attentive attitude to the cultural and linguistic identity of each participant. Therefore, a key element of integration into the European Union is the “security” of individual linguistic identities within the framework of assimilation during the integration process. In other words, it was and still is considered unacceptable for the integration process to cause the erosion of participants’ linguistic identity. This cultural stance in

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policy was expressed in the approval of the formal equality of more than two dozen languages in the European Union. In reality, of course, there was no such equality. In fact, by the end of the 1970s, English was increasingly becoming the informal language of “integration communication,” a fact not officially recognized until the early 2010s. There was no fear of the English language in Asia. There, as in Europe, identity was largely based on politics and not culture, yet Europe’s infatuation with the ideas of political freedom and the continent’s global superiority fostered a respectful attitude toward the languages and local cultures of small ethnic groups. In East Asia, regional identity was largely based on politics rather than culture, with a sense of common resentment for past humiliation and subservience of Asia in the nineteenth–twentieth centuries. These political ideas, as well as the belief that European liberaldemocratic philosophy was superior, lay the foundation for integration projects. Unlike Europe, they did not develop a pathological interest in their diversity, but rather a deep need to find practical and, above all, economically rational forms of implementing their regional solidarity, that being the solidarity of Asian countries with a common (sad) history of being “against the rest.”

According to the formal logic of various milestones in the achievement of state sovereignty, it would seem that non-Western, or rather nonEuropean countries would insist on using all state languages as official ones. This is natural since, after all, the concept of democracy does not necessarily foresee respect for the rights of minorities, even if this causes infringement of the rights of the majority. From the point of view of the criteria of expediency and administrative and procedural efficiency, translation into more than two dozen languages slows down integration into the European Union rather than simplifying it. The approach of East Asian leaders regarding the language issue is, therefore, notably pragmatic. The entry of the ASEAN Charter into force in December 2008 marked its institutionalization and the end of another period in the organization’s development. Arrangements such as ASEAN Plus Three, which emerged as a result of selecting ASEAN’s closest partner-countries, are, on the contrary, far from completing this stage. It is important to note that the ASEAN governance machine serves as the basis for the functioning of

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both the APT Summit and the East Asia Summit (EAS). They do not have their own apparatus, officials, or other administrative mechanisms. Their institutional needs are fully “served” by the ASEAN apparatus. This feature confirms the “dependent” nature of the APT and the EAS from the constituent core and gives additional reason to believe that the leaders of the ASEAN founding countries consider the APT and the EAS as a space for potential expansion of the ASEAN integration core. Research carried out into the topic by English-speaking scholars contains disputes regarding the integration potential in East Asia on the basis of ASEAN, the key principles of which remain non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs and “soft institutionalism.”16 This is strange since the reasons for refraining from supranational governance methods are clearly and rather thoroughly reflected in the literature: sovereignty is typically valued higher in young countries in comparison with those who have experienced it and all its negative manifestations.

Important

The integration practice in ASEAN, and therefore in the entire East Asian region, is characterized by the conscious refusal to create supranational decision-making bodies (such as the European Commission and the Council of Ministers of the EU), which, as is commonly believed, are desirable for the later stages of rapprochement—a customs union and a common market.

It is worth emphasizing that projects carried out within the framework of ASEAN itself do not require supranational regulation. The latter, for example, is obligatory at the stage of a customs union. But the ASEAN countries did not seek to create a customs or even a monetary union. Their plans for rapprochement on a narrow group basis were limited to the format of a free trade zone. The free trade zone formula they chose implied the reduction of tariff barriers in relation to the ASEAN countries themselves without robust customs barriers along the external borders of the group, as would be natural if the concept of a customs union had been adopted. A customs union is conceivable only on a broader regional basis, including at least the whole of East Asia. Otherwise, its creation would mean isolation from the countries of Northeast Asia, the subregion where

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ASEAN’s key trade and economic partners are located—China, Japan, and South Korea. For a free trade area, supranational controls are not necessary. By historically calling the organization an “Association,” the ASEAN founding countries seemingly wanted to emphasize that their goal is to develop cooperation, but without limiting political sovereignty. They “did not actually view integration according to the Western European model.”17 The organizational structure of ASEAN embodies the sovereign equality of the member countries. The most important working body of ASEAN—the annual Foreign Ministers’ Meeting—is held in the capitals of the participating countries on a rotating basis. All other elements of the organizational mechanism—the Coordinating Council, ASEAN Community Councils, and specialized committees (on communications and transport, trade and industry, planning, information, tourism, etc.) also move annually from capital to capital, emphasizing the sovereignty of each country instead of supra-nationality, or borrowing the phraseology of European integration, “Asia of the Fatherlands,” and not “Asian Fatherland.” By the beginning of the 2010s, over 400 annual meetings were being held under the auspices of the association at various levels and in various formats, of which approximately 230 functioned permanently (228 as of July 2010).18 Although Western observers, experts, and journalists remain skeptical and even condescending toward such an abundance of events, calling ASEAN’s work format “talk shops,” they nevertheless help to strengthen trust between experts and officials in the member states, which facilitates interstate dialogue and helps achieve coordinated positions on even the smallest matters, which is important for the local political culture.19 The institutional development of ASEAN is characterized by all member states fully participating in the work of all structures, even if the agenda does not affect their interests directly. Chinese diplomats, for example, were unpleasantly surprised to find that all ASEAN countries expressed their desire to participate in negotiations on the status of the islands in the South China Sea, despite the fact that China has territorial disputes with only half of the ASEAN members. The predominantly informal discussion and decision-making style and emphasis on doing business with external partners collectively are the main features of the so-called ASEAN method (ASEAN Way).20

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In Europe, one’s perception of freedom, including free will, is expressed in the individualistic interpretation of ideas about sovereignty— first of the sovereign, and then of the state—embodied in the majority voting system. Europe has long known the principle of consensus, but only at the very end of the twentieth century did it begin to recognize this principle as one of the foundations of integration self-government, along with voting by majority rule. In Asia, there was no such concept as freedom, but rather a tradition of relatively benign and voluntary subordination of individual freedom to the interests of society. The tradition of individual voting is a later product than the tradition of collective action. Therefore, in Asia, it was consensus—the slow, unhurried, patient progress toward it—that organically formed the foundation of relations between the sovereign countries of Southeast Asia. Their concept was similar to that in Europe, yet its interpretation in ASEAN countries demonstrated several evident original features. ASEAN countries were not initially ready for procedural voting and did not attach too much importance to it, because unwritten agreements can be more dependable than fixed obligations that are not backed by the political will to fulfill them. Accordingly, in the ASEAN negotiating tradition, the priority is the formation of a common political will, and not obtaining a formal arithmetic majority by manipulating the number of votes cast. The “ASEAN Way” is thus a conscious, experientially proven systematic movement toward increasing the effectiveness of individual efforts through collective action. The principle of joint action has become a stable element in the foreign economic and foreign policy strategy of the modern countries of Southeast Asia. It suggests that even at the stage of formation of national development priorities in politics and economics, the paradigm of joint action is put forward as the main instrument for achieving goals.21 To put it another way, all interactions between ASEAN member countries, even at the initial stage of the national policy development, consider the general position of the association. This can, nevertheless, seem as if each country is acting in isolation. The approach of economic rationality, conservation of resources, and reliance on group support has proven its effectiveness. That explains why structures with complex approval systems, like those of the European Union, are not being created. ∗ ∗ ∗

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Due to the specifics of ASEAN, formal democratic procedures are put on the backburner, while informal (network-based) consultations make it possible to find common ground without abandoning the usual nationalstate mechanisms. In East Asia, there was an evident correlation between unification processes and political conditions for cooperation between the countries of the region. Bouts of undue haste, like the Empty Chair Crisis of the EEC in 1965–1966, when integration dynamics could not withstand the pressure of administrative reform, are less typical of East Asian integration due to countries’ more prudent, wait-and-see approach to integration. Crises, of course, have happened here too.22 However, due to a slower convergence rate, they were not perceived as such by researchers and politicians. The integration process in Asia is developing slowly but surely.

Keywords Regional Integration, EU, ASEAN, APEC Self-Test 1. How did the balance between interstate and supranational approaches change in the European integration process? 2. Which historical circumstances paved the way for the consolidation of supra-nationality in the European Union? 3. Which features are unique to regional integration in the Asia–Pacific region? 4. How do various integration associations in the Asia–Pacific region relate to one another? 5. What were the development stages of ASEAN? 6. Why do the decision-making procedures of European and Asian integration associations differ?

Notes 1. See: E. Gromoglasova and M. Strezhneva, “Signs of a New Stage of Institutional Evolution of the European Union (Open Method of Communication),” World Economy and International Relations, no. 9 (2005): 55–66. 2. John McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies (Colorado: Westview, 1999), 15. 3. Robert Schuman, For Europe (Paris, 1963), 16.

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4. Björn Hettne, “Beyond the New Regionalism,” New Political Economy 10, no. 4 (2005): 543–571; Harry Harding, The India–China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). See: East/West: Regional Subsystems and Regional Problems of International Relations (Moscow, 2002), 9; A. Voskresensky, “Regional Subsystems and Regional Problems of International Relations (Posing the Problem),” in East–West–Russia: Digest of Articles (Moscow, 2002). 5. Consisting of China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan. 6. Consisting of Brunei, East Timor, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. It is more correct to interpret Southeast Asia as an “historical region” (the term was introduced by a group of authors from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences), which is understood as “a socio-spatial community characterized by stable borders and a sufficient duration of the historical process common to its constituent countries.” See: A. Vyatkina, ed., SEA: Problems of Regional Community (Moscow, 1987). 7. See also: N. Maletin, ASEAN : Three Decades of Foreign Politics (1969– 1997) (Moscow, 1999), Part II; ASEAN in the System of International Political Relations (Moscow: Science, 1993). 8. ASEAN consists of Brunei, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. 9. V. Samoilenko, ASEAN : Politics and Economics (Moscow, 1982), Section 3. “Great Powers and the Structuring of Regional Spaces.” 10. V.V. Mikheev, Globalization and Asian Regionalism: Challenges for Russia (Moscow, 2001). 11. The Bogor Declaration. Bogor, Indonesia. November 15, 1994, http:// www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/1994.html. 12. For more, see: Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” Policy Studies Monograph. No. 16 (Washington, DC: East–West Center, 2005); Evelyn Goh, “Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the US and China,” RSIS Monograph, No. 7 (Singapore: Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005). 13. The Charter of the ASEAN. http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf. 14. ASEAN Vision2020. Kuala Lumpur, December 15, 1997. 15. Ha Noi Plan of Action. Ha Noi, December 15, 1998. 16. Jorn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 17. Amitav Acharya, Asia Rising: Who Is Leading? (London: Palgrave, 2008), 14. 18. Structure of ASEAN Committees and Working Groups, http://www.ase ansec.org/14422.htm.

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19. Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (Boulder: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 2008), 135. 20. For more on this, see: Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 1–22. 21. Ibid. 22. The first such crisis occurred almost immediately, in 1968, when the sequence and regularity of the Ministerial Meetings provided for by the Declaration were frustrated by new Philippine claims to Sabah (state of Malaysia). See: A.D. Bogaturov, Great Powers in the Pacific: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia Since the Second World War (Moscow, 1997), 158.

CHAPTER 19

Leading Centers of Power and Regional Dynamics in East Asia Ekaterina Koldunova

The first quarter of the twenty-first century was marked by major transformations for East Asia. On the one hand, the region demonstrated a continuity that had been embedded in it since as early as the Cold War and that for more than 50 years had been shaping the patterns of international relations in this segment of the world. On the other hand, however, the region found itself in a brand new situation, driven both by the impressive economic rise of China and the response that came from the leading centers of power in East Asia.

E. Koldunova (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_19

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Continuity and Changes in the Regional Situation in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries East Asia remained focused on further developing and adding complexity to the spatial structure of international relations, with its foundation put in place as early as the Cold War.1 In the 1950s and 1960s, the region as a whole demonstrated classic signs of emerging bipolarity, while in the 1970–1980s, that trend had already begun to erode. This was the combined result of the actions taken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which attempted to come up with its own special strategy in the region, balancing between the United States and the Soviet Union while capitalizing on whatever disagreements the two nations had, and of East Asia smaller nations, which grew increasingly focused on their own economic development. The overall trend to curb leadership ambitions in the region was supported by the rise in the international political identity of small and medium-sized states. This in turn relied on the successful activities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, and targeted the creation of a wide network of ASEAN-centric regional institutions (the ASEAN Regional Forum on security, dialogue partnerships with leading regional and extra-regional powers, the East Asia Summit, and meetings of defense ministers of ASEAN and dialogue partners) throughout the 1990s and the 2000s.2 Despite the persistence of historical conflicts that go back to the bipolar period (the Korea and Taiwan problems and territorial disputes in East and South China Seas), the regional situation has been predominantly non-confrontational since the early 1990s. For a long time, China’s economic growth and its ambition to create a “good-neighborly belt” along its national borders as a way to set up mutually beneficial trade with other nations in the region have been seen as a mostly positive phenomenon. Globally, this came amid greater economic interdependence of China and the United States, massive localization of assembly lines of transnational corporations to the Chinese mainland, and the emergence of China as “the world’s factory.” On a regional level, political elites of a quite a number of countries, primarily ASEAN members, believed in the notion of socializing China by including it in a regional network of multilateral institutions in order to take advantage of the nation’s economic upturn.3

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Following China establishing itself as the world’s second-largest economy (by nominal GDP) in 2010 and the reaction to its growing economic, political, and military strategy activity on the part of major players (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), as well as smaller and medium-sized nations in the region (ASEAN members and South Korea), the regional situation underwent major changes.4 Taking place over a period that is quite short by historical standards, the economic rise of China drastically shifted the overall level of prosperity for its almost 1.4 billion population.5 This resulted in the political and business elites of China voicing their desire to move away from Deng Xiaoping’s famous “hide your strength, bide your time” doctrine, according to which China should act humbly on the global level until all its development goals are achieved in full.6 The launch in 2013 of the project for the macroregional organization of space to support and develop China’s economic activity (the Belt and Road Initiative), as well as the plans to modernize the country’s military and become a global leader in innovation by 2035, all announced by President Xi Jinping in October 2017 as part of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, have caused the most positive perception of this economic rise to give way to more caution and later even concerns on the regional level.7 New issues also emerged in China–US relations: mutual benefit from greater economic interdependence and pre-existing issues of bilateral relations (disagreements in ideology, American support for Taiwan, and claims about China’s neglect of human rights in Xinjiang and Tibet) were no longer the point of focus, increasingly replaced by contradictions in finance, economy, trade, technology, and military strategy. Other regional players (Japan, Australia and India) engaged first in latent and then more visible forms of action to limit China’s economic (and potentially military and political) expansion. These countries stepped up their activity on the regional level both as a result of an internal reassessment of their external environment and in response to US actions to team up within the existing framework of American military alliances and a new four-party format (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad).8

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Important

At the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century, East Asia saw an unprecedented rise in competing projects to organize and reorganize this regional space. Orchestrated by global centers of power (China, the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), these initiatives were at variance with the multilateral inclusive approach promoted by ASEAN.

Key Centers of Power and Their Attempts to Organize Regional Space: China and the United States By the beginning of the twenty-first century, China had emerged as a leading hub of trade and industry in East Asia, capitalizing on its reforms and open door policy launched in 1978, along with its transition to an export-oriented economy. In the 1990s, China’s strategy in, and its approach to, the region underwent some major changes. Moving away from supporting left-wing anti-government movements in Southeast Asian countries, China was no longer seen as a revolutionary driver in the region by mid-1990s. For the first time ever, the country was treated as a good partner in trade, both by nations in Southeast Asia and by the United States, Japan, and Europe. Around the same time, China focused on building a “good-neighborly belt” along its borders, viewing relations with the region’s small and medium-sized countries as a new priority.9 The perception of China was positively affected by the financial support that the nation provided to Southeast Asia during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, with Japan, the key player in the region’s finance and trade since the 1970s, finding itself in a much less favorable position. As a result, attitudes toward China shifted from distrust to it being regarded as a reputable and worthy partner. According to public opinion polls held in the mid-2000s in Thailand, an ally of the United States since the 1970s, as many as 76% of the respondents described China as a good neighbor and ally, while only 9% said the same about the United States.10 During the Hu Jintao administration (2003–2013), China worked very hard to make this change in perception possible. Ideological support for China’s actions

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came from a 2011 white paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development”: in contrast to the notion of “peaceful rise,” coined in 2003, the new concept of a world living in harmony proved much more appealing for everyone around China.11 Economic ties between China and countries in East Asia were enhanced by international trends. Throughout the 1990s, China engaged in consistent efforts to improve its relations with all nations in Southeast Asia, and with ASEAN members. In 1990, the country normalized its relations with Indonesia and Singapore, and in 1991, the rapprochement was achieved with Vietnam and Brunei. In 1991, China also discontinued its support of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The first official contact with ASEAN was established in 1991. In 1996, China was granted the status of ASEAN Dialogue Partner. 2002 saw the signing of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, and in 2003, the country joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. That same year, the Joint Declaration on ASEAN– China Strategic Partnership was signed. During the next decade, Beijing established strategic bilateral partnerships with Indonesia (a strategic partnership in 2005 and a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013), Cambodia (a comprehensive partnership in 2006 and a strategic partnership in 2010), Vietnam (2008), Laos (2009), Myanmar (2011), Thailand (2012), and Malaysia (2013). In 2018, as part of a visit by China’s President Xi Jinping, China, and the Philippines agreed to upgrade their ties to comprehensive strategic cooperation. In 1992, diplomatic relations were established with South Korea, laying further ground to continue expanding economic ties between the two countries. As a result, in just ten years, South Korea became the fifth largest investor in China in terms of foreign direct investment. That same year, South Korea, severed its diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan). In 1998, relations between China and South Korea were described as a partnership for the twenty-first century. This led to the establishment of a comprehensive partnership between the two countries in 2003, and a strategic partnership in 2005. The two nations intensified their cooperation following the signing of an agreement on a free trade area in 2015. China’s economic penetration into the region also came in the form of relations with regimes that Western counterparties were unwilling or unable to trade with for ideological reasons. China demonstrated a special approach to the North Korean issue, aiming to enhance the country’s

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economic dependence on Beijing and to prevent its complete isolation. Despite its support for UN sanctions against North Korea and the overall commitment to achieving a non-nuclear status for the country, China continued to focus on developing formal and informal economic ties with North Korea even after a series of escalations of tension on the Korean Peninsula.12 China managed to solidify its position in economic relations with Myanmar, a state that before the end of the military rule and the establishment of a civilian government in 2011 had been living under tough sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. Even after the sanctions were lifted, China remained Myanmar’s leading trade partner and continued to be the core investor in the national economy before being overtaken by Singapore in 2019.13 The past decades have seen a major rise in China’s economic activity in Cambodia and Laos: these countries have continued to intensify their infrastructure ties with China, becoming part of production chains that were put in place not by international corporations but by China itself (especially in IT and telecoms). Relations with Eastern Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) also continued to strengthen on the back of special inter-party communication channels. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, China played a strong role in multilateral cooperation mechanisms in the region, including extended dialogue formats offered by ASEAN (ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit) and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The process of delimitation and demarcation of borders with its Central Asian neighbors (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and Russia allowed China for the first time in its history to lead the initiative to establish a new regional structure in 2001—the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). That same year, China put forward a number of its own economic initiatives focused on interaction with regional partners, including the establishment of the Boao Forum for Asia, an Asian version of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Later on, it was as part of the Boao activities that Beijing initiated projects for large-scale economic assistance to Southeast Asian countries during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. In particular, at the 2009 Boao Forum, China proposed the establishment of the $10-billion China–ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund to overcome the crisis together and finance key bilateral investment projects. These initiatives were primarily aimed at enhancing the links

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between China and the ASEAN nations and spanned natural resources, energy, communications, and the expansion of the network of regional and subregional transport between the ASEAN nations and China.14 In 2010, alongside Japan and South Korea, China became one of the largest members of the ASEAN+3 multilateral financial fund created in East Asia following the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative, a set of swap agreements initially signed by the region’s countries on a bilateral basis. Having learned the rules of the game of existing global and regional governance institutions, China not only started playing a more active role in them, but also embarked on its own institutions and projects. In 2013, President Xi Jinping, first during his tour of Central Asian countries and then as part of his visit to Indonesia, proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, a macroregional project that comprises several components (the Silk Road Economic Belt for continental Eurasia and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road for Southeast Asia) and is designed to improve infrastructure links between most of the Eurasian continent and China. Later on, the initiative was joined (at least to the extent of expressing interest in Chinese investments) by a number of countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, founded by China in 2016 and tasked with even more ambitious infrastructure development goals than those contemplated as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, included 103 countries geographically located in East, South and Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Oceania.15 At the same time, China did not seek to position itself as a country that wanted to build an alternative to the system of global governance institutions established by the West. On the contrary, as China’s economic prosperity grew, its official representatives tended to downplay the need for a multipolar world, instead arguing for a status quo to be maintained in terms of the liberalization of trade and economy, a trend that made China’s rapid economic growth possible, supported by massive exports to the United States and the European Union.16 On the other hand, more and more voices within China asserted that the proposed Belt and Road Initiative, the emerging system of related financial institutions, and Xi Jinping’s ideas of a “community of common destiny for mankind” and “community of common destiny for Asia” were basically attempts to build the type of regionalization in Asia (and globalization) that could have been much better adjusted to the current international environment.17

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The first cases of the novel coronavirus were detected in the Chinese city of Wuhan in 2019. The disease then spread across the globe and brought to a partial halt the trade and production chains that linked China and Southeast Asian nations, while the United Nation and European countries started thinking about transferring certain production facilities away from China to other locations or having them localized within their own jurisdictions. By that time, experts had already been talking about a slowdown in projects being implemented as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Still, the overall logic of the evolution of East Asia, which assumed asymmetric strengthening of China in its global environment, persisted. The United States and its partial withdrawal from the region’s affairs, including economic matters, during the administration of George W. Bush (2001–2009) also played a role in the regional transformation, contributing both to the rapid economic growth of China and the strong rise in multilateralism. At that time, the United States continued to carry out strategic functions (military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand, and special relations on security with Singapore, New Zealand, and Taiwan) and structural economic functions (support for the processes of trade liberalization and investment presence) in the region. However, a heavy focus on the bilateral format at the expense of multilateral relations and excessive reliance on force in the US foreign policy have led to negative perception of its activities, even by America’s traditional allies in the Asia–Pacific Region.18 The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States and the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Middle East caused the US administration to turn its attention away from processes in the Asia–Pacific. In the context of its war on international terrorism, the United States only showed some interest in the region’s countries that had a considerable Muslim population (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand), which at that time also suffered a series of terrorist attacks (Indonesia in 2003) and increased instability in regions inhabited predominantly by Muslims (southern Thailand and southern Philippines). In terms of trade, the key development in the region for US policy was the start of negotiations with South Korea in 2006 on the establishment of a free trade area (KORUS FTA), a process that culminated in the signing by the United States of the first agreement of this kind with an Asian country in 2010, under President Barack Obama.

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Still, at the beginning of the century, the economic rise of China attracted closer attention from the US leadership, as attempts to institutionalize US–China relations started to play a systemic role for international relations in the Asia–Pacific Region and globally. On the side-lines of the 2004 APEC Summit, the US–China Senior Dialogue was initiated to discuss strategic matters of bilateral relations. According to the United States, this kind of dialogue was needed to help find a way to make China part of the global economic and political system and to do so in line with American interests. A standalone US–China Strategic Economic Dialogue was initiated in 2006 to discuss the economic aspects of bilateral relations, which include, among other things, trade policy. Since the mid-2000s, the United States has been voicing its discontent with the rising trade deficit and what America believed to be an artificially low exchange rate of the Chinese national currency (the renminbi), which helped to create noncompetitive advantages for China in international trade (the same way as the fixed JPY/USD rate in the 1970s proved much more beneficial for Japan, as its economy improved, rather than the United States, and was discontinued by the 1985 Plaza Accord). Barack Obama, who replaced George W. Bush as President of the United States in 2009, had to keep a closer eye on the Asia–Pacific Region. By the time he was elected, the economic growth of China and related structural transformations in the regions had become apparent, while a combination of political and economic problems stemming from the greater interdependence of the Chinese and American economies had become more pronounced. They were exacerbated by the global financial crisis of 2008, which worsened the imbalances in the economies of China and the United States. In September 2008, China became the largest holder of American debt. By 2009, the US trade deficit with China, which had been steadily climbing since 1995, reached $227 billion and continued to rise throughout the next decade (reaching $420 billion in 2018).19 In 2009, the mechanisms of China–US dialogues were merged into one, called the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or S&ED, with two discussion tracks: strategic and economic. During Barack Obama’s time in office, a total of eight annual rounds of the dialogue were held, with China and the United States taking turns as the host countries. Opening the first round of the dialogue, the US President said, “the relationship between the United States and China will shape the twenty-first century.”20 At the same time, China was offered the

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concept of a Group of Two (G2), with the United States and China to establish themselves as two global superpowers. Having learned the lesson of the Soviet Union, which was weakened by the arms race and the constant strain that the need to keep military parity with the United States placed on the economy, China did not support the idea and continued to focus on building a “new type of great power relations”—in other words, something that China views as mutually beneficial and not a zero-sum game.21 Some Chinese analysts described US–China relations as, most importantly, “between the strongest, most developed and most influential nation and the most rapidly growing, globally influential, and largest developing country.”22 Still, the asymmetry that persisted in US–China trade relations, along with China stepping up its activities in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific Region, resulted in a further revision of American policy in the region. During his speech to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, Barack Obama announced that the Asia–Pacific Region was a new priority in the US foreign policy.23 The details of the American pivot to the Asia–Pacific were described in an article by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century” published in the Foreign Policy magazine ahead of the 2011 APEC summit held in Honolulu and chaired by the United States.24 The new US strategy provided for a greater American military presence in the region, with special attention paid to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, a center of territorial disputes between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei (which essentially meant keeping a closer eye on China’s military and technology reinforcement in the region). The political and economic aspects of the strategy, which culminated in an upgraded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), were designed to prevent the region from being pulled into the orbit of China with its exponential growth. The idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (in the form of a preferential trade agreement) was put forward by the United States to Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore as early as 1998. However, the negotiations did not start until 2003. By that time, the remaining participants were New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore. In 2005, Brunei expressed an interest in joining the process. The Trans-Pacific Partnership entered into force the following year. However, the United States was prevented from joining it by the 2008 financial crisis. The American administration went back to this mechanism when it needed specific actions to enhance

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its position in the Asia–Pacific Region. By that time, the region already had two potential pan-Asian projects for multilateral free trade zones: ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) and ASEAN+6 (China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand), which kept the United States out. The arguments in favor of the Trans-Pacific Partnership were based on the fact that in the first decades of the twenty-first century, the Asia– Pacific Region had become entangled in a variety of preferential bilateral agreements. By 2015, Asia had 126 free trade agreements in place, with another 89 at the negotiation stage.25 As a result, the patchwork of contradicting rules and principles of trade only served to increase the costs of doing business and managing production chains in the region (the “noodle bowl effect”). Even multilateral agreements, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area and similar agreements in the ASEAN+1 format, looked more like bilateral arrangements, as each of the participants acted in line with their own tariff schedule. The logic of the US administration was that the region needed a truly multilateral trade liberalization mechanism to clear the controversies entrenched in the existing system of bilateral agreements and to address a whole range of new challenges, such as intellectual property rights protection for a longer period of time than required under the standard WTO rules. The expedited signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership unveiled two fundamentally different approaches to creating rules and regulations of internal trade in the region. These approaches reflected the interests of states of different maturity levels. Despite the emerging services sector, China and a number of Southeast Asian countries effectively represented a group of industrial states, while the tertiary sector and innovations dominated in the United States. As seen from the free trade agreements of ASEAN and ASEAN+1, China and the Association’s members tended to enter into less complex free trade arrangements. By contrast, the interests of the United States, Japan, and South Korea could only be met by treaties that not only enabled free trade principles to be applied to finished goods, but also ensured internal economic regulation that would create the best opportunities for complex production chains needed for technologically advanced nations of the global system to relocate their production facilities without sacrificing their leadership in innovation. In October 2015, the United States managed to reach an agreement with all the countries involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiation

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process (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and New Zealand), with the relevant agreement signed in February 2016. Commenting on the TPP’s crucial importance for the United States, Barack Obama said that it was the United States, and not China, that should lead the way in global trade.26 Such an approach was in stark contrast to the sentiment of 2009, when the US–China dialogue mechanism had only started out under the Obama administration. The US attention to the region was confirmed by a series of highlevel visits. During his term in office, Barack Obama paid four visits to Japan and South Korea, three to China, and nine to Southeast Asia, including Myanmar and Laos, countries that no US president had ever been to before. Indonesia, visited by Obama twice (in 2010 and 2017), was positioned as a country capable of offering the region and the world a viable model of a democratic Islamic state. In 2011, Myanmar started the transition of power from military to civilian government, a process strongly supported by the United States. In addition to traditional alliances, Obama focused on enhancing military cooperation with Vietnam. In 2016, the embargo on US military weapon supplies to the country, in place since 1975, was lifted. The Obama administration also paid due attention to the system of regional multilateral institutions. In 2015, relations between the United States and ASEAN were upgraded to a strategic partnership.

Important

The processes of comprehensive strengthening of American positions in the region started to reverse after Donald Trump won the presidential election in November 2016. His high-profile unilateral withdrawal from the TPP agreement, a subject of high hopes in Asia’s Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam as a way to obtain preferential access to the US market, in January 2017 meant an almost complete break from the views of the Democrats. The result was a fundamentally new situation in the relations between the USA and the region’s countries. While previously East Asian countries were targets of trade globalization, among others pushed forward by American transnational corporations, and had to get used to

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both pros and cons of the phenomenon, now it was the USA that ended up hurt by globalization as production facilities were massively transferred to Asia.

The end of the TPP meant, at least for Donald Trump’s term in office, that the United States had abandoned its leading position in promoting the agenda of economic liberalization in the region, instead opting for harder protectionist policies. On March 31, 2017, Trump issued an executive order announcing the start of an investigation into countries with which the United States had a sustainable trade deficit. And while the document did not expressly mention any specific states, these objectively included first of all China, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Trump initiated a review of a free trade agreement with South Korea, citing the unfavorable terms and conditions of the document’s previous version. An updated agreement was signed in September 2018. At the outset of his term in office, Trump segmented strategic dialogue with China into four areas: Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue, and Social and Cultural Dialogue.27 However, maintaining these tracks on a regular basis proved a challenge. In some areas, dialogues stalled because of the trade war that broke out between the two nations. At the same time, the United State continued to increase pressure on China in trade, military, and technology areas. In 2017, fines and then sanctions over alleged sales of smartphones to Iran and North Korea were introduced against the Chinese telecoms giant ZTE (accounting for 12.2% of the US smartphone market in 2017, according to the company’s data),28 which used American components in its production. In May 2019, US sanctions were imposed on Chinese company Huawei, which was developing 5G internet technologies that the United States believed could be used for intelligence purposes. As a result of US pressure, the company’s operations were banned in Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Taiwan, while the United Kingdom reduced its presence in retail chains to 35%. In 2018, as a way of condemning North Korea for stepping up its military efforts in the South China Sea, the United States withdrew its invitation to China to join the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), a warfare exercise in which China had participated in 2014 and 2016. China did not receive an invitation in 2020 either.

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In trade and economy, part of the new tariffs on Chinese goods were eased only after the first stage of the US–China trade deal signed in January 2020. The deal itself stipulated that China would increase imports of American goods by USD 200 billion over the next two years and enhance intellectual property protection. However, the signing of the trade deal failed to bring about any meaningful change in US–China relations. Controversies grew stronger amid the novel coronavirus pandemic, which started out in the Chinese city of Wuhan in late 2019 and seriously affected the United States (almost immediately after the outbreak, the United States started recording the highest number of COVID-19 cases globally), and on the back of protests in Hong Kong. In November 2019, the US Senate passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, aimed at supporting the protests that had been sparked by the February 2019 amendments to the Hong Kong extradition law to ensure seamless transfers of those suspected of violations of Chinese legislation to the mainland authorities. Although consideration of the draft document was suspended after mass protests began, public unrest did not die out completely. In July 2020, the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas was closed down over allegations of espionage on the part of its employees. On July 23, 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in his speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (named after the US president who changed the attitude of the United States toward China in the 1970s) entitled “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” said that the previous policy of engaging China had failed.29 Another typical aspect of the US agenda in the Asia–Pacific Region under Donald Trump was the increasingly stronger focus on matters of military strategy. The prioritization of bilateral alliances (above all with Japan and South Korea), along with a policy which, at least judging by its rhetoric, was aimed at shifting the burden of financial responsibility for American military presence in the region to its Asian allies, also did not help to increase certainty in the regional situation. The deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defense system in South Korea in March 2017, along with the exacerbation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula in April 2018, and the subsequent pair of summits attended by Trump and Kim Jong-un (in Singapore in June 2018 and in Hanoi in February 2019)—which, failed to deliver any breakthroughs—resulted in a temporary shift of the region’s military strategy toward the Korean Peninsula.

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Trump’s approach to the region in terms of a more general macroregional perspective started to take shape in late 2017, when, during the APEC summit in Danang (Vietnam) in November, he officially supported the idea of using the Indo-Pacific Region as the key base for US foreign policy in the region.30 In December of the same year, the notion of the Indo-Pacific was introduced into the National Security Strategy of the United States, which defined the key regional collision as reflecting the fight between the “free” and “repressive” worlds.31 From the American point of view, the regional structure of the IndoPacific, which includes territories from India to Japan, needs to rely on two pillars: freedom and openness. The former means the freedom of any of the region’s states in terms of the ability to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries and to secure good governance at the national level. The latter means open access to seas and airways and fair and reciprocal trade.32 The military and strategy dimension of the American approach to the Indo-Pacific materialized immediately following the relaunch of the Quad between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India on the side-lines of the ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit in Manila in 2017 (with no involvement of the ASEAN member states). The first attempts at this dialogue date back to 2007 and 2008, but stalled due to the position of the then Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd, who had concerns that China could view such dialogue as aimed against it. It took almost 12 months for the United States to come up with more specific proposals regarding the economic part of the Indo-Pacific concept. In July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the launch of the Indo-Pacific Transaction Advisory Fund (ITAF) and the Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy (EDGE) initiative. The fund set out to provide legal support in drawing up contracts involving American investments in infrastructure projects in the IndoPacific. The goal of the EDGE initiative was to increase US energy exports into the region in order to strengthen its energy security.33 In October 2018, the US Congress adopted the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act (BUILD Act) with a view to doubling (to USD 60 million) US financing of private–public partnership projects in the Indo-Pacific in the areas of infrastructure development, cybersecurity, informational links among low and medium income Asian countries.

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The Role of Second-Tier Players in Organizing Regional Space Important

Despite the intensity of US–China grievances and the renewed attempts to use them to manipulate regional processes, these relations were not the only determinants of the regional situation. In the first quarter of the twenty-first century, actions of second-tier players in the region (Japan, Australia and India) gained much more visibility, represented as their own ideas about what the region should be like.

What makes Japan stand out from the rest of the countries mentioned above is that since the 1990s in pair with the United States it has been acting as a source of the region’s key economic trends. By creating a network of facilities in East Asia linked to large Japanese businesses and featuring a structure that basically reproduced the special Japanese type of capitalism, the Japanese political elites are believed by some researchers to have succeeded in mothballing the situation domestically, postponing the much needed internal reforms by almost a decade.34 In terms of economy, it was largely thanks to Japan that the region saw the emergence of a hierarchical export-oriented model. Although this model was vulnerable to the downturns of 1997–1998 (and partly 2008– 2009) and was, to a certain extent, their root cause. In addition to capital, Japan exported technology to first-wave newly industrialized countries, or NICs (Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) that was no longer cuttingedge for the Japanese economy but could still be put to good use in less technologically advanced countries. In turn, NICs that reached a new level of development thanks to this technological support from Japan then handed over Japanese technology they had borrowed and mastered to the second-wave Asian Tiger nations (Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines), which in turn did the same with Indonesia and the coastline of China. This chain later became known in academic research as the flying geese paradigm. Finished goods were exported to Western countries, with the United States accounting for a considerable share. Also, throughout the 1990s Japan was the main country that provided economic assistance to the

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region’s nations on a bilateral basis. Japan was also the undisputed leader in terms of direct foreign investment (especially in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and in the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese professionals provided consultancy services to ASEAN nations to help them put programs of economic development together, which small and medium-sized regional players were more than content with.35

Important

The process of so-called de facto integration, spanning most of the region, came into being.36 As part of that, economic interdependency, which relied on intra-company regionally segmented specialization and cooperation, grew faster than the development of its formalized institutional and legal forms. In other words, preferential business ties emerged ahead of the bodies and organizations to manage them. The institutional part of the integration processes lagged behind.

In late 1990s, this system was put to a serious test. The financial downturn of 1997 and 1998 undermined Japan’s economic positions in the region. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, regionalization no longer acted as a safety net for Japanese corporations, which had previously opted for locating their production facilities outside of Japan instead of contributing to reforms of the domestic economic system.37 An attempt to revitalize Japan’s economic and political strategy in foreign and domestic affairs was made after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power first in 2006 and 2007, and again in 2012. His name was linked to a set of economic reforms, nicknamed Abenomics, aimed at promoting economic growth and making Japan a more “normal” country (by amending Article 9 of the country’s constitution, which prevented Japan from having its own land, sea, and air forces), as well as pursuing a much more proactive regional and macroregional policy in foreign affairs. After the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, Japan took on a leadership role in the process of signing it in a new revised format (the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, which entered into force in 2018).

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While the creation of the Japanese idea of a “free and open” IndoPacific Region is linked to Shinzo Abe’s second term, the Indo-Pacific concept was also mentioned in his earlier speeches, in particular the one delivered to the Indian parliament in August 2007. Geographically, the Japanese version of the Indo-Pacific Region comprised two continents: Asia with its economic growth and Africa with growth potential, as well as two oceans: the free and open Pacific and Indian oceans. The Japanese concept initially had a strong regulatory component that stressed the need for the “maintenance and protection of international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.”38 While the economic rise of China and India created additional points of growth for the economy of Japan, it also brought about a change in the regional situation, which Japan believed challenged principles such as freedom of navigation and air transit. The regulatory component of the Indo-Pacific concept was also logical development of Japan’s previous strategic idea of building an “arc of freedom and prosperity.” The Japanese version of the Indo-Pacific positioned Japan itself as a nation focused on extensive cooperation not only with the United States and Australia, but also with Southeast Asia, India, and African countries. In this context, the key in detailing Japan’s concept in this area was Shinzo Abe’s speech at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in Kenya in August 2016, when the Prime Minister assured his African partners that Japan viewed the African segment of the Indo-Pacific as an inherent part of this new space and believed it necessary for Japan to become actively involved in subsequent development of African nations in terms of improving their infrastructure, environment, human capital, and business sentiment.39 In addition, Japan’s version of the Indo-Pacific concept went beyond the strategic component, also incorporating a heavy economic angle, which, as noted above, primarily targeted the states of Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. In general, the Japanese approach highlighted the nation’s commitment to creating high-quality infrastructure, as opposed to the Chinese approach, which in Japan’s view ignored environmental protection requirements, the needs of people living in host countries, and the capacity of these countries to operate amid a debt burden associated with loans needed for infrastructure development.40 The 2010s saw a major rise in the regional policy of Australia, a country that was traditionally much less proactive and retained its military

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and political focus on the United States (as a military ally and, alongside New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Canada, a participant in the Five Eyes intelligence sharing alliance), while remaining socially and culturally attached to the Anglo-Saxon nations. The reason for Australia becoming more active in the region was largely the strong growth of China and the increased interdependency between the economies of the two nations, along with more intensive political, economic, social, and cultural ties with East Asian countries. Australia’s stronger economic links to the region were driven by larger exports of Australian resources and the high number of Asian students enrolling in Australian universities: by the 2010s, education exports accounted for up to 70% of Australia’s export revenue, with more than 30% of new university students coming from China.41 As a result of these major transformations in the economy and the social sector, the Australian government revitalized the Asia Literacy targeted program for universities launched back in the 1970s and 1980s that is aimed at raising awareness among Australian citizens of Asian geography, history, economics, society and politics.42 However, the concurrent change in the regional situation and Australia’s greater dependence on regional processes have resulted, first, in an alarmist perception of China’s rise and, second, in a revision of the nation’s strategic focuses. The Australian version of the Indo-Pacific was outlined in the 2016 Defense White Paper and the Foreign Policy White Paper adopted a year later. Both documents emphasized the change in the regional and global aspects of Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific Region, geographically defined as the regions of the Pacific and Indian oceans comprising Northeast and Southeast Asia, India, and the United States.43 The region was viewed as an economically dynamic space that was expected to account for half the world’s economic output by 2050.44 The Indo-Pacific could become a major point of growth for the Australian economy, provided that the regional and global levels maintain an order that ensures free trade and a rules-based order.45 The military-strategic dimension of the Australian concept of the IndoPacific states that Australia’s key strategic defense interests are related to ensuring the security of its territories and maintaining stability in Southeast Asia, the southern part of the Pacific Ocean, and the extended Indo-Pacific Region in partnership with the United States and New Zealand. The document states that, while Australia’s target level of stability and security in the Indo-Pacific is only achievable with the

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involvement of the United States—which in the foreseeable future is set to remain the richest and most technologically advanced nation in the world—increased tensions between the United States and China in the region are observed.46 Trade that previously held them back may now act as a catalyst: with China’s economy on the rise, the country has attempted to rebuild regional relations to suit its own interests.47 In 2020, Australia introduced changes to its position on regional security matters, as shown in the 2020 Defense Strategic Update and the Force Structure Plan. On the one hand, the above documents once again revised Australia’s strategic priorities to favor the regional environment, although this environment was defined in very broad strokes (from Southeast Asia to China and India) and, according to experts, in terms that would be extremely costly to implement (without identifying first and second priority goals in national security). Another major change compared to the previous period was the apparent movement away on the part of Australia from the idea of self-reliance in security to stronger cooperation with key allies, which basically means a return to the policy of “forward defense” of the 1950s and the 1960s.48 India is another pan-regional player that considerably stepped up its policy in East Asia in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Its enhanced focus on the region emerged against the background of an overall revision of the country’s policies after the collapse of the bipolar system and was driven by a search for new points of growth. In 1991, the government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao announced the Look East policy. At that time, the global context (the collapse of the Soviet Union and disappointment about the nature of regional integration in South Asia, where the extreme lack of economic interdependency caused the World Bank to call it a “disintegrated region”) and the domestic situation (economic crisis and security issues in the north-eastern part of the country) drove a comprehensive transformation of India’s Asian policy.49 The Indian government saw the strengthening of economic ties with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN and the Asia–Pacific Region in general as a way to address a whole range of its economic and political problems. Even with China, whose political relations with India were marred by persisting territorial disputes and disagreements, a rapid and consistent growth in trade was observed. Over the past two decades, China’s exports to India increased 45-fold to $70 billion in 2018 and 2019, with China becoming the third largest

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market for Indian goods. Two thirds of components for the Indian pharmaceutical industry were imported from China.50 Given the obvious constraints in its home region of South Asia caused by the ongoing Indo–Pakistani conflict and the overall distrust in India on the part of smaller neighboring countries, closer cooperation with the Asia–Pacific Region was a chance for India to secure its position as the pan-Asian leader.51 The idea of the Indo-Pacific Region, in contrast to Asia–Pacific concepts that often left India out, made it the center of international political and economic forces of a huge space (from Africa to Japan) linking the Asia–Pacific and the region of the Indian Ocean. During the ASEAN-India Summit in 2014, Narendra Modi adjusted the title of India’s Asian policy, nicknaming it Act East as a way to emphasize the nation’s more proactive approach. In addition to economic ties with ASEAN nations, this policy included extended dialogue tracks in relations with South Korea and Japan, which played an especially important role in supporting the Make in India and Digital India programs that were initiated by Narendra Modi and featured strong hi-tech and export components. The Malabar joint naval exercise involving India, Japan, and the United States and held in a trilateral format since 2015 served as a militarystrategic addition to the Indian approach to the Indo-Pacific. In 2020, Australia joined the exercise. The Indian concept of the Indo-Pacific Region was formulated more clearly in 2018, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a speech in front of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The key focus of the speech was the need for India to build cooperation with all players in the region, including the United States, China, Russia, Japan, ASEAN, and Pacific Ocean nations with a view to maintaining the country’s economic momentum. The most important components of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region were defined as a rule-based international order, equality of all nations irrespective of their size and strength, and consent of all instead of the power of the few.52 Russia’s policy in the region was in line with the overall trend for greater political and economic interdependence in East Asia. The preparation for Russia’s first chairmanship of APEC in 2012, the successful holding of the summit, and the subsequent announcement of the “Turn to the East” policy were all signs that the country was becoming less eurocentric in its foreign affairs.53 The sanctions imposed on Russia following the Ukrainian political crisis of 2014 enhanced the country’s focus on

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the Asia–Pacific nations as markets for Russian energy (China, Japan, and South Korea) and tech products (Southeast Asia), as well as sources of state-of-the-art financial services (Hong Kong and Singapore), with the region generally viewed as a more neutral and ideologically unbiased partner. For example, at the peak of the Russia–US/EU sanctions crisis, Russia’s relations with ASEAN were upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2018.

Important

Russia has consistently moved away from formats designed to hold back China. Instead, Moscow prioritized the idea of coupling its own integration project (the Eurasian Economic Union, or EAEU) and China’s Belt and Road megaproject. Despite the Greater Eurasia concept, proposed with a view to strengthening institutional ties with Asian partners and gradually increasing the number of free trade agreements signed between the EAEU and the countries of the region (with Vietnam in 2016 and with Singapore in 2019), the EAEU tended to remain a peripheral project for the region compared to the Belt and Road Initiative and the geostrategic Indo-Pacific concept.

The Response of Small and Medium-Sized Nations For a long time, the relative but not absolute strengthening of larger players provided smaller and medium-sized countries in the region with quite ample opportunities for both political balancing and economic benefits. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, this situation enabled ASEAN countries, first, to build a rather extensive institutional network to interact with all the key regional and extra-regional superpowers that had an interest in the Asia–Pacific Region, and second, to be perceived as an inclusive dialogue platform that was most acceptable for everyone. ASEAN described this concept as its “centrality” in relation to all the processes of multilateral cooperation that operated within a normative political culture developed as part of ASEAN (the ASEAN Way). In its most generalized form, the ASEAN Way meant the special approach of

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the Southeast Asian nations to international relations based on two key traditional norms of behavior known in Indonesian as musyawarah (“consultation”) and muafakat (“consensus”). This approach did not involve a mechanism to comprehensively address regional issues; instead, it essentially focused on avoiding any conflict, be it among the ASEAN members or with external players.54

Important

As the animosities between China and the United States worsened and multilateral approaches lost their attractiveness compared to bilateral and “mini-lateral” ones in the US policy under Donald Trump, with almost all large nations in East Asia coming up with their own concepts on how to organize regional space (with varying degrees of detail and practicability), the “centrality” of ASEAN was increasingly open to doubt. The concepts of the Indo-Pacific Region proposed by large regional players (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), while highlighting their own interests and ambitions regarding the areas of the Pacific and Indian oceans, overlooked the involvement of small or medium-sized countries such as ASEAN members or South Korea.

Although, as noted above, the Quad members met on the side-lines of the ASEAN Summit and the EAS in 2017 in Manila to revive this format, none of the ASEAN nations were invited to participate. The ideas for the Indo-Pacific Region proposed by the Quad members questioned the entire system of regional institutions that ASEAN had consistently worked to build since the 1990s. The erosion of the ASEAN’s “centrality,” however symbolic it might have been, meant that the region’s small and medium-sized countries would be losing their capacity to influence their larger partners, which in future could translate into the loss of a major tool to stabilize regional disagreements.55 The focus of most of the Indo-Pacific concepts on bringing together “free” (democratic) nations also left out the majority of the ASEAN countries. By the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century, most Southeast Asian countries had so-called hybrid political regimes which

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combined democratic and autocratic features. According to a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit ranking countries based on Democracy Index, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore were classified as “flawed democracies,”56 with Thailand being classed as a hybrid regime and Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia all classed authoritarian regimes.57 According to the index methodology, flawed democracies are nations where elections are free and fair and basic human rights are respected, but which have problems in other areas assessed by the index (public governance, political culture, and levels of participation in politics). With military strategy and geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific obviously prevailing over the region’s economic aspects, this structure was even less attractive for ASEAN. Even though Chinese projects as part of the Road and Belt Initiative came under serious criticism, including in Southeast Asia, for limiting the sovereignty of other nations or leading to economic and potentially political dependence on China, none of the countries that promoted the idea of the new region came up with a comprehensive economic alternative for the Indo-Pacific. According to a 2020 survey of experts in Southeast Asian countries conducted by the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 79.2% of respondents still believed China to be the most influential economic power in the region (compared to just 7.9% for the United States), with almost as many respondents (71.9%) expressing their concern over this situation.58 South Korea was also cautious about both the Belt and Road Initiative and all versions of the Indo-Pacific Region, as there was no way the Korean Peninsula could benefit from the materialization of any of them.

Important

The combination of China–US tensions and the way they were projected onto the region became a major challenge for the ASEAN nations, which increasingly found themselves in a position where they had to make political economy and technological choices. This basically meant that the Association had to forgo its key principle of interacting with all the parties involved, an approach that for a long time had secured the region’s economic rise and the enhancement

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of its political identity in the context of the persisting asymmetry in political and economic capabilities.

ASEAN’s response to the challenges noted above came in the form of a document titled ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which was adopted at the 2019 summit in Bangkok and which explained ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. Its key pillars included a commitment to building a constructive political and economic agenda for the Indo-Pacific based on objective processes of greater links among the countries of the Pacific and Indian ocean basins and within an inclusive framework. The change in the regional situation meant, de facto, that ASEAN had to fundamentally review the tools it had been successfully using in the preceding decades. ∗ ∗ ∗ The overall focus of the US foreign policy in the region indicates a transition from involvement and complex bilateral interaction to a policy aimed at putting large-scale restrictions on China in the areas of trade, finance, military strategy, and technology. The Chinese–American disagreements obviously worsened, albeit sometimes mitigated by bilateral agreements. East Asia is not going back to simple bipolarity. Along with the trend described above, we are seeing a fundamental increase in the complexity of regional dynamics, driven by a variety of opposite interests and mixed economic, political, and regulatory ambitions of the region’s key players. The processes of regional multilateral cooperation, which previously helped to curb leadership ambitions and play down controversies, are becoming more fragmented. Mini-lateralism processes are on the rise as part of formats such as the Quad, which came to replace the inclusive multilateralism of ASEAN. As a result, small and medium-sized nations is reduced to have less room for maneuver, making it increasingly difficult for them to pursue a balancing policy, which so far has been moderately tactical and not strategic in nature.

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Keywords East Asia, Asia–Pacific Region, Indo-Pacific Region, China, United States, ASEAN, Japan, India, Australia, Russia Self-Test 1. What do you think are the key benefits and drawbacks of projects to organize regional space as proposed by China, the United States, Japan, Australia, and India? 2. How can you describe and characterize the root causes of the disagreements that China and the United States have in terms of strategy, economy, and technology? 3. What are the key mechanisms of the China–US dialogue? How and why have they evolved during the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump? 4. What are the key tools and forms of involving China in regional processes? 5. Why do you think the countries in the region are concerned about China’s increased influence, despite the rapid growth in trade and economic links? 6. What are the special features of the approach that the ASEAN nations and South Korea have to the concept of the Indo-Pacific Region?

Notes 1. To learn more about this period, see: A.D. Bogaturov, Great Powers of the Pacific Ocean: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia Post-World War II (1945–1995) (Moscow: Konvert-MONF, 1997); Henry Kissinger, On China (Moscow: AST, 2017); A.D. Bogaturov, ed. Systemic History of International Relations 3 (Moscow: NOFMO, 2003). 2. Donald Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009); Ekaterina Koldunova, “Lack of Leadership in East Asia: Chances for Small and Medium-Sized Countries,” International Trends 9, no. 2 (26) (May–August 2011): 70–81. 3. Jusuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement,” Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 117–128.

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4. Since India is becoming actively involved in economic, political, and strategic processes in East Asia, its foreign policy is covered in this chapter, along with actions taken by other regional players. 5. As of 2020, the World Bank classified China as an upper middle-income country. However, around 373 million people in the country were living below the poverty line, which for this category of countries is set at $5.50 per day (China Overview. World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/china/overview). 6. Alexander Lomanov, “Foreign Policy Ideas of Xi Jinping,” in A.D. Voskressenski, ed., The Development Model of Modern China: Assessments, Discussions, Forecasts (Moscow: Strategicheskiye Izyskaniya, 2019), 74; I.E. Denisov, “Foreign Policy Formulas of Xi Jinping: Key Features and Issues of Interpretation,” in D.L. Adamova and I.E. Denisov, eds., China in Global and Regional Policy: History and Present Days, no. 22 (2017): 76–90. 7. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017,” Xinhua, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_ Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_Nation-al_Congress.pdf. 8. National Security Strategy of Japan. December 17, 2013. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/doc uments/2013/icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf; Foreign Policy White Paper // Australian Government. https://www.fpwhitepaper. gov.au/; Keynote Speech by Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India. International Institute of Strategic Studies, https://www.iiss.org/events/ shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2018. 9. Gang Lin, “China’s ‘Good Neighbor’ Diplomacy: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?” in G. Lin, J. Garver, D. Hickey, and M. Chambers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program Special Report, no. 126 (2005). 10. Macabe Keliher, “Dragon Seizes Market Share,” Asia Times (February 10, 2004). 11. “China’s Peaceful Development,” Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (September 6, 2011), http://www. china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm. For more detail, see: Yuri M. Galenovich, Hu Jintao’s Motto: Social Harmony in China (Moscow: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoy Mysli, 2006), 7–12; Olga Borokh and Alexander Lomanov, “The Discreet Charm of China,” Pro et Contra 11, no. 6 (2007): 42.

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12. Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations. Last updated June 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship. 13. Htoo Thant, “Singapore Surpasses China as Myanmar’s Biggest Investor,” Myanmar Times (May 13, 2019), https://www.mmtimes.com/news/sin gapore-surpasses-china-myanmars-biggest-investor.html. 14. “China Sets Up $10 bn Fund for SE Asia,” The Bangkok Post (April 18, 2009). 15. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, https://www.aiib.org/en/aboutaiib/index.html. 16. Vladimir Portyakov, “Vision of Multipolarity in Russia and China and International Challenges,” Comparative Politics 11, no. 1 (2013): 86– 97; “Seizing the Opportunity of a Global Economy in Transition and Accelerating Development of the Asia–Pacific. Keynote Address by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China at the APEC CEO Summit. Da Nang, November 10, 2017,’ Xinhua, http://www.xin huanet.com/english/2017-11/11/c_136743492.htm; “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth. Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, 2017. Davos, January 17, 2017,” Xinhua, http://www.china.org.cn/node_7 247529/content_40569136.htm. 17. Alexander Lomanov, “Foreign Policy Ideas of Xi Jinping,” in A.D. Voskressenski ed., The Development Model of Modern China: Assessments, Discussions, Forecasts (Moscow: Strategicheskiye Izyskaniya, 2019), 55–82. 18. T.J. Pempel, “How Bush Bungled Asia: Militarism, Economic Indifference and Unilateralism Have Weakened the United States Across Asia,” The Pacific Review 21, no. 5 (2008): 566–569. 19. A Decade of the U.S. Trade Deficit with China, https://howmuch.net/ articles/the-us-trade-deficit-with-china-2009-2018. 20. Remarks by the President at the U.S./China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The White House (July 27, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/remarks-president-uschina-str ategic-and-economic-dialogue. 21. Alexei D. Voskressenski, “Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Relations in the China–US–Russia Triangle,” Comparative Politics, no. 1 (2011): 70–88. 22. Feng Shaolei, “Relations Between Russia, China, and the USA Amid the Crisis in Ukraine,” Annual Report of the Institute of International Research 14, no. 4 (2015): 62.

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23. Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament. The White House (November 17, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-presi-dent-obama-australian-parlia ment. 24. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (October 11, 2011), https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-cen tury/. 25. Jong Woo Kang, “The Noodle Bowl Effect: Stumbling Block?” ADB Economics Working Paper Series, no. 446 (August 2015), https://www. adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/172902/ewp-446.pdf. 26. Barack Obama, “President Obama: The TPP Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade,” The Washington Post (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/presid ent-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-globaltrade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story. html. 27. Oleg Timofeev, “Modern China–US Relations: Institutes, Mechanisms and Priorities,” in A.D. Voskressenski, ed., The Development Model of Modern China: Assessments, Discussions, Forecasts (Moscow: Strategicheskiye Izyskaniya, 2019), 434. 28. Yue Wang, “A Victim of the Sanctions: How Trump Ruined China’s Smartphone Company,” Forbes (May 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.ru/ biznes/361645-zhertva-sankciy-kak-tramp-razrushil-kitayskogo-proizvodi telya-smartfonov. 29. “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” Speech by Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (July 23, 2020), https://www.state.gov/commun ist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/. 30. Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit. Da Nang, Vietnam. The White House (November 10, 2017), https://www.whiteh ouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presi-dent-trump-apec-ceo-sum mit-da-nang-vietnam/. 31. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. December 2017. National Security Strategy Archive, p. 45, http://nssarchive.us/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017.pdf. 32. Mike Pompeo, “Remarks on ‘America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,’” U.S. Department of State (July 30, 2018), https://www.state.gov/secret ary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm. 33. Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Fact Sheet (July 30, 2018). U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/ 07/284829.htm. 34. Walter F. Hatch, Asia’s Flying Geese: How Regionalization Shapes Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 2–7.

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35. Ibid., 96. 36. Alexander Rogozhin, “Southeast Asia and Integration,” in A.D. Voskressenski, ed., East/West: Regional Subsystems and Regional Problems of International Relations (Moscow: MGIMO; ROSSPEN, 2002), 358–359. 37. Walter F. Hatch, Op. cit., 5. 38. East Asian Strategic Review 2017 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2017), 237. 39. Diplomatic Bluebook 2017. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102. html#sf03. 40. Tomohiro Osaki, “In Blow to China, Japan’s ‘Quality Infrastructure’ to Get Endorsement at Osaka G20,” The Japan Times (June 25, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/06/25/business/economybusiness/blow-china-japans-quality-infrastructure-get-endorsement-osakag20/. 41. Geoff Maslen, “Sharp Fall in Number of Visas Issued to Chinese Students,” University World News (September 25, 2019), https://www. universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190925132954975. 42. Kirrilee Hughes, “Geopolitical and Social Framings of Australia’s ‘Asia Literacy,’” in Albert Tzeng, William L. Richter, and Ekaterina Koldunova, eds. Framing Asian Studies (Singapore: ISEAS, 2018), 44–63. 43. 2016 Defence White Paper. Australian Government. Department of Defence, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defencewhite-paper.pdf; Foreign Policy White Paper. Australian Government, https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/. 44. 2016 Defence White Paper, 14. 45. Strategic Survey 2018. The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics (Abington: Routledge, 2018), 24–25; Robinson, Paul. “Same Terms, Different Meanings,” Russia in Global Affairs (July 2, 2018), https://globalaffairs.ru/ global-processes/Odni-ponyatiya-raznyi-smysl-19643. 46. 2016 Defence White Paper 2016, 42. 47. Foreign Policy White Paper, 26. 48. Hugh White, How to Defend Australia (Carlton: La Trobe University Press, 2019); Hugh White, “Australia’s New Defence Geography,” East Asia Forum (July 9, 2020), https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/07/ 09/australias-new-defence-geography/. 49. Thongkholal Haokip, “India’s Look East Policy: Its Evolution and Approach,” South Asian Survey 2, no. 18 (2011): 239–247. 50. Mahima Kapoor, “Six Things to Know About India-China Economic Relations,” Bloomberg (June 19, 2020), https://www.bloombergquint. com/economy-finance/six-things-to-know-about-india-china-economicrelations.

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51. Sergey Lunyov, Regionalization and Integration: India and South Asia (Moscow: Yurayt, 2019), 31. 52. Keynote Speech by Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India. International Institute of Strategic Studies, https://www.iiss.org/events/shangrila-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2018. 53. For more, see: Anatoly V. Torkunov, Dmitry V. Streltsov, and Ekaterina V. Koldunova, “Russia’s Turn to the East: Achievements, Problems, Prospects,” Polis, no. 5 (2020): 8–21. 54. For more, see: Ekaterina V. Koldunova, “Which ‘ASEAN Way’ Forward? Southeast Asian Perspectives on Peace and Institutions,” in Aigul Kulnazarova, and Vesselin Popovski, eds., The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 347–366; Ekaterina V. Koldunova, “Dialogue Partnerships in ASEAN’s Foreign Policy,” International Trends 15, no. 3 (50) (July–September 2017): 55–66. 55. Amitav Acharya, “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 (August 2017): 273–279. 56. Democracy Index 2018: Me Too? Political Participation, Protest, and Democracy. A Report by The Economist Intelligence Unit, https://www. eiu.com/topic/democracy-index, 51. 57. Democracy Index 2018, 26. 58. The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS, 2020), 15.

Recommended Reading Baykov, Andrey A. Comparative Integration: Integration Practice and Models in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2012. Bogaturov, Alexei D. Great Powers of the Pacific: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia After the Second World War (1945–1995). Moscow: Konvert-MPSF, 1997. Kissinger, Henry. On China. Moscow, AST, 2017. Koldunova, Ekaterina V. “Dialogue Partnerships in ASEAN’s Foreign Policy.” International Trends 15, no. 3 (50) (July–September 2017): 55–66. Lunyov, Sergey I. Regionalization and Integration: India and South Asia. Moscow: Yurayt, 2019. Torkunov, Anatoly V., Streltsov, Dmitry V., Koldunova, and Ekaterina V. “Russia’s Turn to the East: Achievements, Problems, Prospects.” Polis, no. 5 (2020): 8–21. Voskressenski, A.D., ed. The Development Model of Modern China: Assessments, Discussions, Forecasts. Moscow: Strategicheskie izyskaniya, 2019.

CHAPTER 20

The Evolution of the Latin American Subsystem in International Relations Boris Martynov

The long periods of the formation and evolution of the Latin American subsystem of international relations have seen unstable inherent trends as well as the discrete establishment and uneven distribution of its typologically distinctive features. The complex features of its genesis should be traced back to the formation of 19 independent states in the New World previously known as the Spanish American countries. Although this process started in the first decades of the nineteenth century, it became more apparent on the international arena in the early 1960s, when first integration-based unions of Latin American states—the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM)—emerged.

B. Martynov (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_20

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Features of the Formation of the Latin American Subsystem Obtaining one constituent element, i.e., national identity, is the key to successfully developing the whole, i.e., the regional subsystem consisting of individual states sharing all kinds of political, economic, defense, and other interests. Unless these interests are based on some civilizational and cultural community, they are generally sporadic, and consequently the subsystem is somewhat unstable. Unlike any geographical entity, the civilizational and cultural community as a self-contained historical entity existing beyond human willpower may have different forms of content and reveal itself in specific environments. Therefore, the formation of subsystems in international relations is contingent upon two major factors: (1) the “maturity” of constituent elements—generally, these are geographically proximate states that can define their national identity and interests on the international arena; and (2) presence of a supranational civilizational and cultural community capable of fostering more or less close (or “special”) relations between them in the long term. The establishment of robust regional subsystems in international relations is conditional on another important factor—the existence or absence of an external situation that may pose a real threat to the security of potential participants. The twentieth century has seen plenty of examples both in the Western Hemisphere and outside it. The extended interpretation of “security” that became widespread in the late twentieth century has made it possible to consider other threats—military, economic, information, climatic, etc.—as important prerequisites for the establishment and development of regional subsystems. In the twenty-first century, not only have all the above and other global challenges, including threats to military security in the strict sense, escalated, but, paradoxically, the importance of the geographical and the civilizational and cultural aspects in the formation of regional subsystems has somewhat declined. The evolution of the Latin American subsystem in international relations has been particularly illustrative in this context. Initially, it was based on isomorphism, i.e., the replication of European and North American institutions and values by Latin American states in the nineteenth century. These institutions and values emerged autochthonously during bourgeois revolutions in North America and France. However, as history further showed, these values, and their implementation in socio-political practices

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by the United States and some European countries in particular, were not exactly compatible with Latin America’s endemic features. The canons of the protestant ethic did not resonate well with the Latin American soul: they had a completely different understanding of “happiness.” Also, the absence of a real threat from Spain and, later, the reliance on “the Monroe Doctrine” and “Pan-Americanism” made it difficult for them to affirm a “common heritage of symbols and stories” (Bernard Yack),1 i.e., the foundation of a robust national identity. “Historical experience and sociological analysis show that the absence of an external ‘other’ is likely to undermine unity and breed divisions within a society.”2 This thought expressed by Samuel P. Huntington, quite disputable as it is, turned out to be paradigmatic for the newly independent Latin American republics, which failed to completely establish their national identity. Their uncritical emulation of the articles of the US Constitution, without filling them with any practical content led to the emergence of “formal democracies” where power was vested in elites that, having perfectly mastered the populist ideology, acted under the guise of constitutional norms. “Although democracy has roots going back to the first postindependence regimes in the early 1800s, not a single regime in Latin America has had a continuous history of democratic government,”3 wrote Francis Fukuyama, admitting the paradoxical thought that “no dictatorship in Latin America has succeeded in establishing a state powerful enough to be called totalitarian.” The reason, he believed, was that “none has generated sufficient coercive capacity” to pull off social revolutions whose scope and power could compare to those that occurred in Russia or China. The constant appeals of Latin American policymakers and public figures to the unsuccessful Congress of Panama of 1826 in the absence of real incentives for inter-ethnic unity, as was often noted by Latin Americans themselves, gave rise to inflated expectations of an approaching unity based solely on commonality of language, history, religion, and culture. This, for instance, also had an impact on regional integration projects launched in the early 1960s, shortly after similar processes had started in Europe. However, unlike integration in Western Europe, most Latin American projects, including the most “forward-looking” one (Mercosur), somehow had the same features: inflated expectations, the desire for new “structures,” excessive pretentiousness, and sometimes over-ideologization. And these, after initial successes, ultimately led these projects to failure.

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All this leads us to the conclusion that Latin American countries are still “nations in the making.”4 This process has taken 250 years, but its evident acceleration at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries (the so-called “left turn” and events that followed) signaled some serious qualitative shifts.

Development of Unifying and Integration Processes Over the more than 200 years of their independence, states in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have failed to secure the stable functioning of democratic institutions, ensure adequate levels of national security, and achieve the economic wellbeing they sought. In 1959, Cuba’s attempted escape from the grip of isomorphic development in the context of the challenges of the Cold War led to nothing, but forced replication by its revolutionary government of an alternative model that was nevertheless totally disconnected from its national realities—the socialist model adopted by the Soviet Union. However, Cuba’s example revived the trend toward Latin America’s autonomization in the Western Hemisphere and later on the international scale. This trend (which can be referred to as Latin Americanism, as opposed to Pan-Americanism) would rear its head from time to time before that, in the interwar period and in the first few years after the war. The more convincing rise of a special Latin American subsystem in international relations should be attributed to two circumstances: the beginning of a long and complex process of Latin American integration (LAFTA, CACM, 1960); and the attempts of some states in the region (Mexico, Peru, Panama, and Chile before 1973) to review the foundations and “the philosophy” of the inter-American system and the Organization of American States (OAS).5 The first and the most distinct display of this trend toward autonomization at that period is associated with the signing of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967). This initiative launched by Brazil and Mexico deserved special attention, not only because it led to the creation, for the first time ever, of a large and densely populated nuclear-free zone, but also because the example of Latin American countries turned out to be contagious. Shortly after, nuclear-weapon-free zones were established in other regions of the planet.

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The ideological baggage of Pan-Americanism and the prestige of the OAS sustained a heavy blow as a result of the war fought between Argentina and the United Kingdom in summer of 1982 over the Falkland Islands and other islands in the South Atlantic. Washington’s refusal to comply with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the TIAR, 1947), under which it was supposed to provide aid to Argentina, coupled with its outspoken support for its NATO ally, the United Kingdom, caused an upsurge of indignation in most countries of Latin America and put a long-term freeze on inter-American military communication.6 In the 1980s, disagreements between the United States and Latin American countries over issues connected with the Central American crisis (CAC) reached their peak. The creation of ad hoc mechanisms—the Contadora Group (1983) and the Contadora support group (1985)— in place of permanent OAS arrangements that discredited themselves in the Falklands War spoke volumes.7 First of all, it suggested that the new historical context made the Latin Americans realize once again that they needed their own, common conflict -resolution structures and collective defense mechanisms that would be independent from the United States. This was reflected in the establishment of the Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Coordination (the Rio Group, 1986) as a result of a merger between the Contadora Group and its support group. Its task was to deal with any matters connected with the situation in Latin American countries before referring them to the inter-American organization. Thus, a unique system of political consultation between Latin American countries came into existence in the Western Hemisphere. It was different from the inter-American system and in many ways provided an alternative to it.

However, the consolidation of previously isolated manifestations of “Latin Americanism” into some sort of organization would have been impossible without strong external support. Curiously, in 1981, the governments of Mexico and France signed the Declaration on El Salvador, which satisfied the aspirations of Latin Americans for the peaceful CAC resolution and was inconsistent with the interventionist plans of the Reagan administration. The efforts of the Contadora Group and its support group were consistently supported by the USSR, the Warsaw Pact states, and certain government and civic circles from several

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countries in Western Europe. In their Solemn Declaration signed in June 1983, the EU Heads of State expressed concern at conditions of socioeconomic development in Central America causing poverty, conflicts, and wars. The first conference of foreign ministers from Latin American and European states held in the Costa Rican capital of San José in September 1984 was a landmark event. The creation of the Rio Group was welcomed, in addition to socialist countries, by the governments of France, Spain, Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands. There was ample evidence that, in the context of the intensified global standoff in the 1980s, the EU states were interested in building contacts with the Latin American and Caribbean international subsystem, hoping to reduce, at least partially, their strong dependence on the United States. The development of this subsystem was non-linear and, besides some genetic aspects, was also shaped by the specific features of America’s hegemonism. The latter, apart from the well-established facts of direct and indirect intervention in the affairs of its southern neighbors, political and economic blackmail, support for coups, etc., had a unique ability to maneuver by launching attractive Pan-American initiatives. In the twentieth century, these included such continent-wide projects as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, Ronald Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative, and George Bush Senior’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Although none of these projects has reached its logical end point (moreover, some of them only exacerbated the recurrent problems of Latin America and the Caribbean), they greatly impeded the growth of a self-sustaining regional subsystem that would not depend on the United States. There were also some internal obstacles. Myths and stereotypes about the United States passed down from generation to generation (“intergenerational memory”), such as “shared democratic ideals,” “altruism,” and “readiness to help,” inherited from the period when those countries fought for independence, prevented members of governing elites, other than those directly involved in serving the interests of Washington, from gaining an insight into and safeguarding the national interests of their countries. Having left a mark in the genetic memory of Latin American peoples, these myths raised false hopes for assistance and support from “the Great Northern Neighbor,” disrupting time and again their efforts to overcome dependence. Other factors besides the US strategy to undermine autonomization in the LAC had a negative impact, as well.

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Among them were the persistent and occasionally aggravated controversies between Latin American countries, territorial disputes going back to the colonial period, and geopolitical, internal, and other conflicts. They reoccurred every time that issues connected with Washington’s wrongful behavior toward states in the region temporarily took a back seat. Sometimes it seemed as if the United States needed to be particularly tough on Latin America to render the development of the Latin American international subsystem irreversible. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the “world socialist system” dealt a severe blow to the younger socialist countries. The active involvement of Latin American countries in international affairs was temporarily interrupted. The Soviet Union and its global partners traditionally supported the majority of international initiatives of Latin American and Caribbean states by consistently upholding the international agenda topics they were keen on, such as sovereignty, equality, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and nondiscriminatory and equitable international cooperation. Suffice it to say that in the second half of the 1980s, the positions of the USSR and the LAC countries on different matters put to the vote at the UN General Assembly coincided in nearly 80% of all cases, compared to just 16% of the time with the United States. According to former Minister of External Relations of Brazil Francisco Rezek (from 1991 to 1992), to them, the dissolution of the USSR signified “the disappearance of an alternative pole in global politics that, despite a series of high-risk crises of the Cold War era, ensured a certain balance in international relations.”8 In the early 1990s (the period associated with the paradigm of the “end of History”), the possibility of individual “subsystems” existing in international relations was apparently ruled out against the backdrop of the rosy picture of the inevitable merger of all states on the planet into a single US-led liberal democracy. The liberal democrats that rose to power in Latin America (and not only there!) hailed another continent-wide project proposed by Washington—the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative by George Bush Senior, who proclaimed prosperity and democratic stability for many years to come. But this liberal democratic euphoria did not last long. In these countries, even those representatives of governing elites who welcomed the US plans, having learned through previous “Pan-American” fiascos, chose to entrench the pillars of inter-American cooperation (Mercosur, 1991),

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rather than destroy them. Later on, as America’s plans were given increasingly more concrete expression during the FTAA talks,9 it became clear that Washington, as before, sought one-sided advantages at the expense of its southern neighbors. It pursued the same strategy: getting a stronger hold of states in the region, excluding or minimizing any chances for their “self-formatting.” The failure of the FTAA was largely due to economic crises in Latin American countries in the late 1990s, as well as the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. They pushed the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas to the side-lines of US policy and spared the Latin Americans time and “discretion” to look into their national interests. The Latin American countries sobered up for good following the US interventions in Afghanistan, and especially Iraq. The governments of powerful states realized that they were facing the undesirable prospect not only of being dragged by the United States into their military ventures outside the Western Hemisphere, but also of falling victim to this policy. It thus came as no surprise in 2008 when Brazil launched its National Defense Strategy, the first document in the country’s history stating the need to build “strong armed forces comparable to the armed forces of major states.”10 At the beginning of the century, “the attraction– repulsion syndrome,” as defined by Latin American studies guru Robert Wesson, that the United States and the LAC countries had historically developed started to shift toward “repulsion.” The so-called “left turn” in the LAC countries is generally associated with the democratic rise to power in Venezuela of Hugo Chávez’s leftwing nationalist government (1998). The phenomenal fact that left-wing forces gained power through elections should not be regarded as something “sensational.”11 Rather, it resulted from the decades-long search of the LAC countries for a pattern of constitutional, socioeconomic, and political development tailor-made to match their historical, civilizational, and cultural specificity that would replace the models borrowed from the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. The synchronous rise to power of left-wing or “moderate-left” governments (in Brazil in 2003, Argentina in 2003, Uruguay in 2004, Bolivia in 2005, and Ecuador, Chile, and Nicaragua in 2006) was a signature trend in the early 2000s. These governments were by far not equally ideologized, neither did they use the same methods of government, nor equally sharply criticize the United States, like the charismatic president Hugo Chávez. The latter

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took on a near-global mission—to unite all the LAC states around anticapitalist and anti-American ideas, to be joined, where possible, by other allies on the international scene, such as African countries, China, Iran, Russia, and Belarus. During Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1998–2013), Venezuela became far more politically active in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This country (alongside with Cuba) was one of the founders of a new integration association—ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), which was made up of the most radical “left turn” governments, including Cuba, and some Caribbean island states. Chávez made little secret of the fact that the ALBA bloc was created in response to the North American FTAA. Venezuela’s initiatives revealed the country’s intention to step up as a leader in the development of regional consolidation processes. The “advance” was carried out along two tracks at once—the economic track and the information track. On the economic track, President Chávez launched a special program entitled Petrocaribe (2005), to supply discounted oil to consumers from Central America and the Caribbean Basin. On the information track, he launched the first Pan-Latin American TV channel Telesur, headquartered in Caracas (2005). Venezuela attempted to create the Bank of the South and the Bank of ALBA to serve the financial interests of Latin American countries. ALBA had plans to implement a single Latin American currency, the sucre, tabled the “Latin American gas ring” project—a single network of gas and oil pipelines encompassing all Latin American countries—and a single infrastructure project. Venezuela’s representative at the Council of South American Defense (SADC, 2008), the first regional security organization in the Western Hemisphere without the participation of the United States, repeatedly called for the development of single South American armed forces, a NATO analogy. However, the attempt of Chávez’s government to lead regional processes was faced with some serious challenges. The idea of the Venezuelan leader to revive the Latin American identity lost in the early nineteenth century (the calls to “return to Bolívar,” the institutionalization of new authorities, and other moves, including a new name for the country, new coat of arms, etc.) obviously deserved close attention. But he, too, failed to resist the temptation of me-tooism when he set out to build “socialism of the twenty-first century,” although this time he was imitating Cuba. The plunge in oil prices that led to multiple economic

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problems, the capital flight and brain drain, the widespread crime and corruption, and, last but not least, the US sanctions are all indicative of the fact that Hugo Chávez left behind “a country that was incredibly battered.”12 Venezuela failed to become—and probably never could have—a systemically important country for its nearest neighbors. In 2003, the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT) government led by Luiz Inácio da Silva (“Lula”) came to power in Brazil, which was the seventh largest economy in the world at the time. Its economic, demographic, scientific, technological, and natural resources indicators suggested a much higher potential for regional leadership than those of Venezuela. Hidden tensions between the two countries were largely connected with leadership methods that varied from more radical and “revolutionary” (Venezuela) to less radical strategies (Brazil). These tensions were put to bed in 2011, when Venezuela was accepted to Mercosur, with Brazil being its de facto leader. Against the backdrop of a severe economic crisis and the aggravation of domestic issues in Venezuela, the economic situation in the largest country of the region seemed to be way better. Brazil handled the consequences of the 2008 world economic crisis with little effort, while a series of social reforms lifted more than 30 million people out of extreme poverty.13 The attractiveness of its model enabled Brazil to establish itself for a while as a leader in regional integration processes. Brazil was the initiator of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) comprising 12 South American states in 2007, and the Council of South American Defense (CSAD) in 2008. According to Chilean expert Francisco Rojas Aravena, “the creation of the UNASUR signified that Latin American countries had achieved self-sufficiency in international politics based on the principles of international law and democratic solidarity.”14 As the “tropical giant” strengthened its position as a regional player, it developed “a taste” for pursuing a “big” international policy. This was translated into the Brazil–Turkey initiative on Iran’s nuclear program, the IBAS informal group consisting of India, Brazil, and South Africa (Brazil, 2003) that clearly defined Brazilian diplomatic interests in the South Atlantic, and the “Responsibility While Protecting” (RwP) initiative launched in the UN (2012).15 Having headed the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and joined BRICS and the G20, Brazil had a good chance of joining “the Great Powers’ Club of the twenty-first century” and, considering its growth rate, it looked like it was going to happen very soon. The peaceful rise of the “tropical giant”

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to the heights of international politics was supposed to culminate in its approval as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This did not happen, however. The strengthening of the global megatrend toward the formation of regional subsystems in international relations in the early 2000s, including the LAC subsystem, should not, however, be attributed solely to the efforts of Brazil and other countries in the region. The growth of this unifying trend had been fuelled to a great extent by the aggressive global and regional policy of the United States. At that time, with China growing its economy and other regions of the world strengthening their economic mega-blocs, Washington started to feel the decline in its standing on a global scale, as well as in Latin American countries, very keenly. As noted by some Brazilian authors, the CSAD was created in response to the reactivation in 2006 of the United States Fourth Fleet that had been operative from 1943 until 1950. Just like during the Second World War, the fleet was responsible for operations in the South Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the water areas of the Pacific Ocean around South America. NATO’s attempts to expand its activities to Latin America implicitly postulated in the organization’s documents caused particular concern in the region.16 The militarization by the United Kingdom of its bases in the Falkland Islands and on Ascension Island, and the preservation by the United States of its military bases in Colombia in accordance with Plan Colombia, effectively confirmed the new doctrines, thus allowing NATO to intervene in regional affairs under the pretence of aggravated problems with energy and natural resources.17 The initial expectations connected with the integration of Mexico, Latin America’s second-largest economy, into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) did not materialize. The United States accounts for 80% of Mexico’s exports, meaning that the country was hit hard by the 2008 crisis, which forced it to “reconsider its values.” The attempt of the country’s ruling elite to swap the Mexican national identity for some imaginary “North American” identity fell flat. Participation in NAFTA had not helped Mexico to resolve its pressing issues. In recent years, the country has boosted illicit crop cultivation and drug trafficking into the United States. Organized crime has increased manyfold. Neoliberal reforms under the North American project resulted in “growth without development,” which made Mexico turn toward Latin America.

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In February 2010, some 33 LAC states, including Cuba, attended a summit in Cancún, Mexico, convened by Mexican president Felipe Calderón, where they proclaimed the establishment of a regional organization—the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the successor of the Rio Group created in 1986. The declaration adopted at the conclusion of the summit defined the new union as a “mechanism for political consultation” to build up cooperation between all existing subregional integration associations—Mercosur, the Andean Community (CAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and ALBA—and conduct a coordinated foreign policy. CELAC, of course, was no match for the “Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation” projected by Simón Bolívar in 1826. And yet, it was an important move that united any and all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean around their goal to have an independent position on the international stage. It made the parallel existence of Pan-American and Latin American political structures in the Western Hemisphere a fait accompli.

Important

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, many events in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean were indicative of a new “civilizational recovery,” which, if progressive, could free these countries from the US custodianship to make the Latin American subsystem an important actor in international politics.

The US Factor in the Development and Strengthening of the Latin American Subsystem The need for and desirability of such a subsystem can be explained by the fact that, in the face of the eventual destruction of the legal framework of international politics that is becoming increasingly evident these days, the world needs to actively involve those regions of the planet where respect for international law is traditional and culturally and historically

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grounded. Many international law scholars, including Russian experts,18 believe that the national legal consciousness of any and all Latin American countries is rooted in the Roman Catholic legal tradition and the system of codified law, where there is no room for a legal norm to be cancelled or changed overnight just to keep up with latest trends. Obviously, Bismarck’s famous quote that “force does not need law” could be applied to all these countries. Yet, the simple truth is that the history of Latin America can be considered a history of the peaceful, legal resolution of most regional disputes and disagreements, and the search for and discovery of legal barriers against outside intervention.19 The Latin American countries have always put up way more legal barriers between politics and war as its “continuation by other means” (Clausewitz) than, for example, European countries. Latin America remains the most peaceful region on the planet: so far, it has spent less on armaments than any other major actor in international politics. It has never been involved in severe and prolonged crises, unlike the Middle East. The Latin Americans have almost never been involved in any arms races. The contribution of Latin America to the codification and development of international law can be considered significant. Their role in the development of modern mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes—from negotiations and “good offices” to shuttle diplomacy, mediation, and arbitration—cannot go unnoticed. Latin America was the first region in the world to reduce armaments (in 1902 and 1911) and introduce diplomatic asylum. They have been actively involved in the development of international maritime law, and pioneered the creation of “zones of peace” and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Their traditional support of the principles of the equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, non-intervention in their domestic affairs, and the right to self-determination and human rights, could secure them participation in the resolution of many disputes and the elimination of existing gaps in international law, if they were more actively involved in “big” international politics. One of the gaps impeding the coordinated global fight against terrorism is the absence of a legally valid definition of this term sought by most countries in the region. In this context, how persistent is the megatrend toward the establishment of a special Latin American subsystem in international relations? What are the prospects for strengthening it? “Latin Americanism” cannot be accepted as a constant because, as we said earlier, there is no such thing as a collective Latin American and

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Caribbean identity. So far, “Latin Americanism” has followed a pattern: if it is not confronted with overt pressure from its northern neighbor, it usually dissolves into several “branches.” One of the variants is geographical breakup, when the Caribbean countries, the Andean states, and the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay) start to pursue different interests. Another variant is national and ethnic breakup. Argentina and Uruguay are inhabited by descendants of immigrants from Europe, the countries of the “Andean Belt” are predominantly made up of aboriginals and Ladinos, and the Caribbean states have a high share of African Americans and people of mixed European and African ancestry. And all have cultural differences. English-speaking Caribbean countries are not “Latin” at all per se, as their religion, language, history, political, and legal culture are entirely different. In the meantime, all the countries in the region continue to a greater or lesser extent to question the geopolitical ambitions of “the tropical giant”—Brazil, which, in turn, still feels somewhat insecure about Argentina. All this is compounded by unsettled territorial disputes and controversies between Colombia and Venezuela, Colombia and Nicaragua, Venezuela and Guyana, Guatemala and Belize, Bolivia and Chile, etc. This is just a small portion of controversies that occur between countries in the region when they do not have “a common enemy.” The phenomenon of the so-called Indian Renaissance discussed in recent years adds some special features to this colorful picture.20

Important

Given the fact that the foundations of the national and cultural identity of the states in the region have not become “held their ground,” the prospects for strengthening the regional subsystem should be seen in their attempts to overcome the “lack of freedom” the United States is trying and will increasingly be trying to impose. New important motives, however, are now being added to this familiar picture.

The presumption that US pressure on Latin America will increase in the new century, despite the fact that Washington has started to cede its position as the global economic leader to China, follows from the information contained in Peruvian scholar Monica Bruckmann’s book Recursos naturales y la Geopolítica de la Integración Sudamericana.21 Bruckmann’s

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work provides data indicating the growing dependence of the United States on Latin America’s strategic resources, which will become increasingly more important as science and technology advance. According to Bruckmann, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States imported 93% of its strontium from Mexico; up to 90% of its bauxites and aluminium from Jamaica, Brazil, Suriname, and Guyana; 54% of its tin from Bolivia and Peru; and 23% of its copper from Chile, Peru, and Mexico. As for indium, which is widely used in the metal industry and in the manufacturing of LCD screens, 85% of this rare metal is supplied by a single country—Brazil. Two Latin American countries, Peru and Chile, account for 79% of US imports of rhenium, another rare metal used for heat-resistant alloys in rocket and gas turbine engines. Lithium, a much sought-after rare metal, deserves special mention. According to Bruckmann, four South American countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile—own nearly 99% (!) of the world’s known reserves. Newly discovered large deposits of lithium (around 100 million tonnes) make Bolivia one of the world’s leading producers of the “metal of the twenty-first century.” There is hardly another metal as important in terms of military and daily living needs. The United States gets almost 50% of its lithium from Bolivia.22 The conclusions drawn by Bruckmann are by no means extraordinary. She believes that “in the new century, Latin America will become one of the most claimed regions on our planet.”23 That is all the more true given the fact that the LAC countries remain key exporters of energy resources, such as oil and gas, metal ores, food products, wood and biomaterials, and nonferrous and precious metals. South America has been recognized as having the largest freshwater supplies in the world (13–15% of the global supply). According to many scientists, the global freshwater shortage that is already causing crises and conflicts in many regions (the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia) will be exacerbated starting in the 2030s, affecting such “new” areas as Southern Europe and North America.24 Much can be understood and foreseen by looking at the world and the events that took place in the LAC region in 2012–2019 (the so-called “right turn”) through the lens of the growing deficit of and the increasing demand in some categories of natural resources. For instance, the military coup in Bolivia in November 2019, which overthrew the country’s legitimate president Evo Morales, came as little surprise.25 In our opinion, this should be directly linked to the bilateral agreement concluded between Bolivia and Venezuela in March 2011, whereby the parties approved the

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projected establishment of 18 joint venture plants to produce accumulators and lithium batteries.26 Following the coup, Bolivia joined the sanctions against Venezuela.

Important

As before, America’s attempts to “get back on track” are not restricted to straight-line methods such as interventions or military coups. But now, given Washington’s increasingly less significant economic presence and political authority in the countries lying south of the Rio Grande, these methods will certainly become more hard-line and at the same time more sophisticated. At present, these methods imply playing on the national and state identity of these countries, which is not fully comprehended and acknowledged.

The 2012–2016 events in Brazil, which resulted in a prison sentence for the country’s former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva and the removal from office of then President Dilma Rousseff, force us to revisit the topic of “isomorphism.” The phenomenon of corruption is rooted in the culture of corruption, which has its own national features.27 The perception of corruption in Latin America is different from its perception, for example, in the United States or Northern Europe, which is culturally conditioned. Consequently, the national and cultural differences must be taken into account in the fight against this phenomenon. The automatic projection of “one-size-fits-all” anticorruption methods to Brazil led to a major internal crisis that temporarily discouraged the country from pursuing an active foreign policy. Its efforts to establish the South American subsystem in international relations had been held back. This was immediately followed by a crisis in the multilateral institutions it had co-founded, namely the UNASUR, CSAD, and CELAC. The South American “right–left” split resulted in crises within ALBA and Mercosur. This coincided with the events in Venezuela in 2019–early 2020, which were at times reminiscent of the dramatic twists and turns of the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962. However, it seems that the time of Latin America being “flooded by waves” of democracy, military coups, liberalization, and “left” and “right” turns is over. The “right” turn, in the fullest sense of the word, is not

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worth talking about now after the liberal governments in Mexico (July 2018) and Argentina (December 2019) were replaced with nationally oriented ones. This proves only one thing: today, the pendulum of varying political preferences that impact the thoughts and feelings of the Latin American people who, historically, have been looking for different development models (albeit ones that poorly match their regional specifics), is swinging closely to its central position.

China as a New Player in Latin America and the Caribbean Neither the illusory “socialism of the twenty-first century,” nor the liberalism of “the invisible hand” is in favor in Latin America anymore. Free market relations with a high degree of corporate and state social responsibility and a strong president who takes the opinions of his or her security officials into account—these are probably the option accepted by the leading LAC countries after they had tried to bring back the roots of their national identity “by trial and error.” But does this not mean that, in building their own economic mega-bloc and a strong regional subsystem in international relations, Latin American countries will be tempted to copy another “exotic” model—the Chinese model? Monica Bruckmann and other Latin American scholars who recently showed a keen interest in studying the Shenzhou28 believe that China “offers the Latin American countries a unique opportunity for long-term strategic cooperation to stop the unilateral dependency on the United States.”29 These scholars note that China, which historically has never intervened in other countries’ domestic affairs, respects the sovereignty of the Latin American countries. Unlike the United States, China never uses political and economic blackmail and does not seek to demonstrate by all means possible its superiority “here and now,” as its culture is based on a “long-term vision.”30 However fair these and other statements might be, one cannot but notice two contradictory considerations which can affect the formation of the Latin American “force vector” and the growth of Latin American countries’ negotiating power in international politics. The decline in the share of high value-added products in the exports of better developed Latin American countries (primarily Brazil) was triggered by the increased demand for raw materials in China in 2000–2010. The growing demand for raw materials in China enabled the so-called “left turn” countries

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to completely overcome the consequences of the 2008 crisis and quite successfully implement large-scale social programs. However, the subsequent “covert deindustrialization” affected regional integration processes (including Mercosur) in a negative way. The falling demand for raw materials in China at the beginning of the 2010s was among the factors that brought about severe internal crises in several countries in the region, forced out “left-wing” governments in Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador, and contributed to a slowdown in the foreign political activity of the leading countries in the region. The second consideration is connected with the intensified Washington–Beijing rivalry over Latin America in the twenty-first century, something that was quite predictable. It is no secret that flaws in the US agenda in Latin America—the failure of the ALCA project, lack of attention to Latin America and the Caribbean from the Obama administration, and the near-total neglect of its interests during the Trump administration—helped China to grow its economic “muscles” and boost its political and cultural influence in the LAC countries. For instance, the United States under Trump refused to normalize relations with Cuba, revised the NAFTA treaty, built a wall on the Mexican border, and withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership initiative, which was intended to include the countries of the 2012 Pacific Alliance, a new integration association of Mexico, Columbia, Peru, and Chile.

Important

Arguably, in the context of the US–China standoff, their battle for influence in the LAC countries will be anything but insignificant. The United States is not willing to give up on its historic “sphere of influence,” and neither is China, which has strong and versatile economic interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, therefore their conflict will last for the first half of the twenty-first century. China seeks to boost its overall presence in this region,31 which is not limited to trade and economic and financial aspects, but includes new forms, such as scientific and technical and military and technical cooperation, and is accompanied by strengthened cultural ties.32

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∗ ∗ ∗ The prospects for the future establishment and strengthening of the Latin American regional subsystem in international relations appear to be generally positive. In the long years of the Cold War, the LAC countries became quite adept at taking advantage of the situation by balancing between the two superpowers. Today, new players, such as the European Union, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia, have entered the spotlight on the Latin American economic and political stage alongside the two poles, the United States and China. The former are capable of supporting the regional initiatives. As the importance of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the present and future world becomes more widely understood, so grows Russia’s role in this region.33 The United States is not the only “foreign enemy” capable of facilitating the unification processes between emerging nations. The aggravation of global transborder and multifaceted problems, such as terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, climate change, and the growing deficit of natural resources, requires a collective and convergent response from the Latin American countries facing them. An equally clear collective response and joint efforts are required to tackle the new challenge that emerged in 2020—the coronavirus pandemic. The collective response to these issues in Latin America and the Caribbean would become an important aid for their solution on a global scale. However “favorable” the concurrence of events is, it will be hard to imagine, even in the long term, that there will be a geopolitical collision akin to Latin America and the Caribbean vs. the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Besides, such a collision is undesirable. The prospect of autonomous existence of two regional subsystems in international relations —the North American and the South American subsystems —which probably should establish the required balance of power between themselves seems to be more or less likely. The northern subsystem will include (and already includes) the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean. It is based on mutual free-trade-area arrangements and the principle of “comparative national efficiency based on the imperatives of economic growth and technological capabilities.”34 The southern subsystem that is developing more slowly, yet steadily, will probably include all South American countries led by Brazil. It will also seek to achieve the aforementioned imperatives, but their achievement will be based “on the terms of social solidarity and harmony,”35 when state nationalism becomes key to success on the state level and the Latin American identity becomes key on the subregional level, rather than on any

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norms. It is difficulties in the establishment of this identity that account for the slow and “uneven” development of the southern subsystem. But in the future, if the identity is established successfully, this development will become more steady and long term as compared to the northern subsystem, given the identity incompatibility between the United States and Canada on the one hand, and their Latin American partners on the other. The interests between the two subsystems can be balanced through identity cooperation between the Latin American members of the northern subsystem and their southern partners, which are close to them in terms of civilization and culture. The future autonomization of the southern subsystem is destined to succeed because this trend, just like the northern one, is confidently led by a sole leader, a continental-sized country, the world’s 9th largest economy (as of 2021)—Brazil. The state that has become the unchallenged leader in South America and developed a taste for involvement in global politics will not give up its historical policy to turn into a powerful international actor. In 2019–2020, Brazil’s foreign policy began to eliminate the premises and dogmas of “tropical Trumpism.” President Bolsonaro softened his anti-China rhetoric, and Brazil re-established a partnership with the country. In November 2019, Brazil hosted the 11th BRICS summit, which had been preceded by widespread speculation that the country may exit this dialogue forum. Despite this speculation, Brazil showed that its interest in developing cooperation within BRICS is growing. Brazil as a country and society is mature enough to be guided by its own interests, rather than someone else’s. The “exception” that could have been created by the “Tropical Trump” presidency only proved the rule: there may be some deviations from the main trend in Brazil’s historical development, but they have been and always will be very temporary, momentary. This specific example illustrates the efficiency of historical and civilizational and cultural megatrends in social development, which fight their way through all political and ideological barriers.

Keywords Latin American subsystem in international relations, national identity, civilizational and cultural community, inter-American relations, Latin American integration structures and security structures, Brazil’s foreign policy. Self-Test 1. What are the main factors for the establishment of the Latin American subsystem (subsystems) in international relations?

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2. How can the development of inter-American relations in the twentieth century be described? 3. What factors are indicative of a civilizational and cultural community between the LAC countries? 4. What prevents the countries in this region from establishing a robust national identity and their rapprochement on these grounds? 5. What are the prospects for the future development of the Latin American subsystem (subsystems) in international relations? 6. To what extent will the strengthening of this subsystem (subsystems) be consistent with the interests of the international community and fit into the main megatrends of international politics?

Notes 1. Bernard Yack, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community (Moscow, 2017), 183. 2. Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (Moscow, 2004), 41. 3. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (London, 2011), 357– 359. 4. According to Bernard Yack, “the people” is a quantitative notion, while “the nation” is a qualitative one. “A nation needs time and effort of the people and its leaders to establish a strong and ‘responsible’ nationstate.” Bernard Yack, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community (Moscow, 2017). 5. The United States and Latin America (Moscow, 1978), Chapter 7, 233– 245. 6. See: The Malvinas: The Colonial War of the 20th Century (Moscow, 1984). 7. See: The Central American Conflict: From Confrontation to Resolution (Moscow, 1992); Boris Martynov, The History of International Relations in Latin America and the Caribbean (in the 20th and Early 21st Centuries) (Moscow, 2019), Chapters 7–8. 8. Quoted by Boris Martynov, The History of International Relations in Latin America and the Caribbean, p. 159. 9. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (or ALCA in Spanish) was intended by Washington as a free trade area encompassing all the 33 states of the American continent (with the exception of Cuba), from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. As other global regions were building their economic megablocs, the United States opted for its own bloc—one that was likely to secure it a majority of votes in the WTO (some Western journalists believe

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10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

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the WTO would resemble FTAA+…) and a significant advantage at the UN. Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional. Brasília. 2012. http://defesa.gov.br/ arquivos/estado_e_defesa/livro_branco/ibdn_esp_net_pdf. Suffice it to recall Árbenz’s government in Guatemala (1951–1954), Quadros and Goulart’s government in Brazil (1961–1964), and the Chilean Popular Unity government led by Salvador Allende (1971–1973). Leonardo Coutinho, Hugo Chavez. O Colapso da Venezuela (Porto, 2018), 263. See: Liudmila Okuneva, Brazil: Features of the Democratic Project (Moscow, 2008), 610–772. América Latina y el Caribe: Vínculos globales en un contexto multilateral complejo (Buenos Aires, 2012), 62. Brazil submitted the RwP concept as the antithesis of the Western “Responsibility to Protect” initiative (R2P ) applied by the aviation of NATO countries that intervened in the 2012 conflict in Libya, which resulted in many civilian casualties and an illegal regime change. The Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Alliance. Security Challenges and Risk Factors, www.nato.int. Marcelo Bezerra, “How Far Does NATO Intend to Go?” The International Affairs, no. 3 (2016): 71–87. Marklen Lazarev, Latin America’s Challenges and International Law. Books 1, 2 (Moscow, 1995); Latin America and International Law (Moscow, 2017). Boris Martynov, “West” and “Non-West”: Past, Present … Future? (Moscow, 2015), 67. Zbignev Ivanovsky, ed., Political Conflicts in Latin America (Moscow, 2017), Chapter 6. Monica Bruckmann, Recursos naturales y la Geopolítica de la Integración Sudamericana (Lima, 2012). Ibid., 91. Ibid., 130. The Problems of Water Management in the History of International Relations (Moscow, 2013). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia claimed that the events in Bolivia developed “along the lines of a coup d’état” and urged the country’s political forces to seek a constitutional solution to the internal crisis. Press secretary for the Russian President Dmitry Peskov stated that Kremlin officials hoped that the situation in Bolivia would be normalized by legal means and without involvement of third parties. See: http://www.cambio.bo/noticia.php?fecha=2011-04-01&idn=42175. Boris Martynov, ed., Modern Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean (Moscow, 2017), Chapter 2.

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28. The book by Brazilian scholar and diplomat Henrique Carlos Ribeiro Lisboa entitled China and the Chinese, which is unique in its own way, is illustrative in this sense. It has become the first comprehensive study of China’s history, culture, and traditions in this Latin American country. See: H. Carlos Ribeiro Lisboa, A China e os chins (Rio de Janeiro, 2016). 29. Bruckmann, op. cit., 122. 30. Carlos García Tobón, China su larga marcha hacia la globalización (Bogotá, 2009), 49. 31. President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping stated that, over the next decade, Chinese investments in Latin America would total $250 billion, while their bilateral trade in the same period would grow to $500 billion. See: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/54ae19219a79472 29416368a. 32. Vladimir Sudarev, Latin America in the US–China–EU Geopolitical Triangle (Moscow, 2019), Chapter 2. 33. Boris Martynov, op. cit., Chapter 14. 34. Anatol Lieven, “Progressive Nationalism,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 5 (September–October 2020): 42. 35. Ibid.

Recommended Reading Abashidze, A.K., and Solntseva, A.M., eds. Latin America and International Law. Moscow: RUDN, 2017. Davydov, V.M., ed. Latin America in Contemporary Global Politics. Moscow, Nauka, 2009. Erasov, B.S. Comparative Study of Civilizations: An Anthology. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1999. Larin, E.A., ed. History of Latin America: 1950–2000. Moscow: Nauka, 2004. Martynov, B.F. “West” and “Non-West”: Past, Present … Future? Moscow: Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015. Martynov, B.F. History of the International Relations of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin (20th–Early 21st Centuries). Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2019. Okuneva, L.S. Brazil: Features of the Democratic Project. Moscow: MGIMO University, 2008). Sudarev, V.P., ed. The “Left Turn” in Latin America. Moscow: Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007.

CHAPTER 21

Features of Statehood in the Middle East Irina Zvyagelskaya

The Middle East entered the 2020s in a state of increased instability. Over the centuries of the region’s cultural history, the protagonists of which were all kinds of ethnic and religious groups, it would seem that mechanisms were created for ensuring conflict-free coexistence. Imperfect as these mechanisms may have been from the point of view of the liberal norms of organizing social relations, and however many times they may have failed, they were nevertheless effective enough to ensure the survival of a wide variety of communities, including those whose names have long been forgotten. And then all of this suddenly collapsed, and inter-ethnic and inter-confessional frictions turned into violence on a large scale, becoming the dominant feature of public life. Protest moods and large-scale anti-government actions reflect the pain of acquiring civic consciousness. The crisis of secularism and the failed attempts to establish Islamic rule gave birth to the desire to abandon

I. Zvyagelskaya (B) IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_21

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imposed identitites and appeal to common roots. All of this reflects problems that are common in world development, in forms that correspond to the specific features of Arab societies. Weakening governance and growing chaos became by-products of the Arab Spring, the main participants of which pursued completely different goals, sometimes selfish, but always far from romantic revolutionary— gaining access to power and resources, for example. And yet, the most modernized social groups in Tunisia and Egypt were united by the desire to oust irremovable regimes that only formally existed within the framework of republics. The refusal on the part of the rulers to abide by the rules of the game—for example, the rotation of the ruling elites, the development of institutions (the judiciary and legislative power first and foremost)—deprived them of legitimacy, not only in the eyes of the relatively small-numbered opposition, but also among a rather wide segment of the population. At the same time, the legitimacy of monarchs was not in question, as they existed in the universally recognized system of the dynastic transfer of power, consecrated by tradition, including religious tradition (in Morocco, Jordan and Saudi Arabia). The assertion, which has become commonplace in both the scientific and socio-political discourse, that this process is what caused the destruction of the Sykes-Picot system is,1 at best, not quite correct and, at worst, quite simply wrong.2 To begin with, the threat hangs over a much wider area today than when the agreements were made over one hundred years ago. In Yemen, for example, the question of the separation of the South was discussed first, then the separation of the South and the region of Hadhramaut, and then the preservation of statehood as such.3 While it was expected that Libya would collapse into two or even three historical regions (the prospects for the existence of Fezzan as an independent state always seemed utopian), the country found itself in a state of “primary political broth” filled with all manner of potestary formations—from tribal groups and self-defense forces to government structures claiming international recognition.4 The chaos in this country also affected neighboring states, including Tunisia, whose southern regions have been targeted by Libyan terrorists on a number of occasions. Although Egypt has seen its military and bureaucratic regime restored in a tougher version, it continues to face serious challenges, including in the form of the jihadist groups in the Sinai Peninsula and large cities. At the same time, the exclusion from the political process of the Muslim

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Brotherhood, which enjoys the support of a part of the population, could still be a factor in the destabilization of the regime.

Important

The growing regional turbulence, which is largely down to the progression of the Syrian conflict and the gradual deterioration of the statehood of Syria and Iraq, the collapse of Libya, the tragedy in Yemen, the negative forecasts about the future of Lebanon, and the aggravation of the Kurdish problem—none of these are related to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which essentially boiled down to a redrawing of the map of the Eastern Mediterranean and Iraq. For all the tragedy of the ongoing events, they have not yet led to the abandonment of established state borders, although this could very well happen in the future. Thus, the thesis of the “end of Sykes-Picot” essentially means something that is not related to that most notorious of agreements, but rather to the system of politics and values created by the colonial authorities.

We are talking here about an attempt to include the territories divided by borders and turned into states into some of the spaces that have established themselves in European countries. The demarcation of territory and space that is a feature of modern political science helps us to understand the factors that made Arab statehood fragile and quite unlike European models. According to the definition put forward by the Russian expert Nikolai Kosolapov, “An organized territory becomes a space,” that is, “a virtual construction created […] for the purposes of organizing representations on the basis and with the help of which social practices and/or its parts can be built and reproduced.”5 The inclusion of Arab states in the space of European social and political practices collided with the traditionally closed Arab public space. The concepts of hierarchy, loyalty and the special role of religion that are characteristic of this space and have been preserved to this day, have little in common with the social practices of the West. The widespread revision of the model of statehood that was formed in the region during the struggle

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for national liberation in the first half of the twentieth century raises the question of the degree to which the concept of nation-state applies to it.

The Normative Foundations of Middle Eastern Statehood The independence and normative order of nation-states are determined by their internal cultural homogeneity. If cultural differences played the dominant role in the pre-industrial world—determining social position, forming traditions and encouraging people to act in accordance with them—then culture becomes relatively homogenous during the transition to an industrial society, outlining a kind of social integrity within which people can move freely. A special role in this homogenization is played by the standardization of the literary language—the spread of the printed word, the formation of a unified system of education and an increase in the overall literacy rate. Developed industrial societies are based on innovation and new technologies. They need educated people, and the cost of producing a well-educated and productive member of society is high, because a good education and qualifications are expensive. New forms of self-realization appear.6 Culture is influenced by the changing nature of work. Only the state can take on the task of homogenizing society by building a system of education and enlightenment, which, in turn, becomes one of the main pillars of centralized statehood. At the same time, emergence of independent states under the intense pressure of national liberation movements gives rise to new nationalist movements that now exist in all states with national minorities, which also strive to acquire statehood for themselves. A culture that does not enjoy the patronage of the state seeks to create a state of its own. In the Middle East, modern states were formed within the context of national liberation movements and the anti-colonial struggle. This took place under the powerful influence of Western nationalism within which nation-states began to emerge in nineteenth-century Europe; nation-states where the people shared common values and responsibilities, identified with the state, shared a common culture while at the same time maintaining ethnic differences. Meanwhile, Eastern nationalism developed on the basis of an anti-Western, pragmatic or emotional denial of models introduced from the outside. While both Western and Eastern

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nationalism were based on the idea of self-determination, there were also major differences between them. These differences were noted in particular by the Russian scholar Vitaly Naumkin, who wrote: “If European nationalism, which became the main driving force for the construction of nation states in the nineteenth century, was directed inwards, towards self-reorganization after World War I, then the nationalism of the liberation movements in the countries of the East was initially directed outwards, defined primarily by an antiWestern orientation that never went away, and in some cases actually grew stronger with the achievement of political independence.”7 This conclusion does not apply in equal measure to all the liberated Arab countries, but the borrowing of Western ideologies while at the same time rejecting the European models of social organization is one of the most important features of building independent states in the Arab East. According to the American scholar Adeed Dawisha, the revolutions “gave the Arabs political independence, enhanced their self-esteem, and improved the lot of the poor. But they did not create the political institutions that would inherit and become the custodians of the political legitimacy won by the young reformist leaders who led the revolutionary movement. That era gave the people many things, but it did not give them the institutions that would represent their interests and provide them a voice in the political process. It did not give them freedom.”8 Davishi’s line of thought can be clarified by drawing attention to the fact that the very idea of “freedom” (hurriya) in the Arab East was not at all in the center of social thought, unlike the ideas of “justice and liberation” (tahrir). At the same time, hurriya had deep religious foundations and was always considered an attribute of God, whereas tahrir was understood in a more limited way, primarily through the prism of anti-colonialism. There is no reason to question the need for institutions that ensure sustainable social development. That notwithstanding, they turned out to be of little demand in the Arab societies of the twentieth century. The masses could not dream of modern political representation, fundamentally different from its traditional forms, as they could not see the point in it. And the existing elites considered Western institutions a threat to their own position, since they could produce channels for putting others in power.

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The necessary institutions could have appeared as the result of deep political reforms from above, but there were no politicians who were capable of correctly assessing the need for them either. What is more, the leaders of those states that were liberated from colonialism lived in constant fear—and not without reason—that the development of such institutions would create mechanisms for weakening the central government, lead to the destruction of the fragile political system and discredit the modernist project entirely. This is why the initial attempts to introduce such institutions taken in most countries immediately after gaining independence were reigned in just as quickly. The new leaders were convinced that, given the weak economy and the lack of civil society and experience in democratic dialogue, liberalizing the political system would quickly lead to the collapse of their newfound statehood. Considering the large number of illiterate people who had no idea about the modern system of political participation and the almost complete lack of experience of territorial statement, these fears can be considered largely justified. What is more, the traditional political culture of the Arab countries made introducing a multi-party system particularly difficult. The concept of hizb to denote a political party was initially used to describe any group of people united by a common idea. Within the framework of the Abrahamic worldview, which assumes the existence of a single truth, only the two hizb are possible—Allah and Shaitan, and only one of them is true.9 Accordingly, political pluralism is seen as a rejection of the truth sent down to man by God. As a result, the elites of liberated states, represented for the most part by former army officers, were content with the creation of one party and a rubber-stamp parliament, as well as representative of security structures and loyal soldiers (knowing from their own experience what revolutionary sentiments tend to lead to in the army environment). This was sufficient for governing the countries, but no other social mandate was achieved, not could it be. Moving forward, to the extent that societies modernized and regimes evolved toward hybridization, elements of democratic institutions began to appear within the rigid authoritarian vertical.10

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Nationalism and the Evolution of Political Regimes in the Middle East We should note that it would be incorrect here to suggest that political systems in the Middle East developed in a linear fashion. Rather, the course of its development resembles more of pendulum, although it proceeded differently in each specific case. It can be described in general terms as follows. The brief period of democracy that came immediately after the countries of the region gained independence quickly gave way to thinly veiled authoritarianism (mostly military dictatorships), which fell into crisis by the 1970s, when the first generation of people born in these independent states entered the public stage. Pan-Arabism failed, and the Soviet Union started to cut aid to the Arab countries. This led to a new wave of democratization in the 1970s and 1980s, which was promptly cut short once again and replaced by hybrid political regimes. These regimes held on to the last—the Arab Spring—which, like before, brought with it hopes for democracy that were again thwarted and replaced by disappointment and growing authoritarian tendencies. At the same time, the overall movement of the pendulum is gradually shifting toward the expansion of the democratic space. The problems of institutional development concerned not only the legitimacy and stability of regimes, but also the role of institutions in the process of the gradual transformation of the population into a nation. It is the product of “human beliefs, passions and inclinations.” As the famous English scholar Ernest Gellner wrote, “a mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it.”11 At the same time, Gellner’s example of the formation of nations from below in the history of humankind is a rather rare example, practically unheard of outside of Western Europe and North America, while the problems faced by the Arab world are, on the contrary, extremely common.

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Important

Arab nationalism, which emphasized the cultural community of Arabs and synthesized the main ideas of European socialism and nationalism, were lacking in the main aspect—the recognition of common rights, duties and values, which was reflected in its initially anti-liberal nature (partly due to the fact that liberalism was conceived by Arab nationalists as an element of colonial culture). As a result, even the successful construction of individual states was influenced by the dominant agrarian way of life, ethno-confessional and tribal loyalty, and did not obey the Western canons of creating a dominant civil society.

According to the works of contemporary sociologists, modernization processes are implemented in different ways in different societies. The theory of multiple modernities provides answers to the question of why the results of the “modernization” of societies in the East are so different from those in the West, although they may appear similar on the surface. As the Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt wrote, “The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world – indeed to explain the history of modernity – is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs […] One of the most important implications of the term ‘multiple modernities’ is that modernity and Westernization are not identical; Western patterns of modernity are not the only ‘authentic’ modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others.”12 Part of the problem was that the very idea of modernization was brought to the East from outside and assumed some kind of progressivism—either on the part of the colonial authorities or on the part of their own elites that replaced them, mostly fully integrated into the Western world. As a result, while modernization means freedom in the West, it can mean exactly opposite in the East and bring about a completely unexpected effect. Formally, the only exception in the Middle East was the Israeli statebuilding project carried out under the influence of Western nationalism and carried out within the framework of the British mandate, which

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would soon become too restrictive for it. The Jewish nationalist movement was started by European Jews on the basis of various Western ideological currents. Socialist, Marxist, conservative, radical nationalist and liberal theories and approaches were adapted to national needs, and religious traditions were used in the search for a national identity. These were the elements that, together, helped form the Israeli political system, its main institutions and public orientations, and determined the methods and means used during the state-building process. The Israeli historian Shlomo Avineri draws a close connection between Zionism and the processes of emancipation and the search for national identity that was characteristic of European societies in the nineteenth century. Zionism, according to him, “was intended to solve the problem of the national ‘I’ of Jews in a world of liberalism and nationalism. The solution proposed to them was thus firmly entrenched in the liberalist and nationalist spirit. In a world where slogans of freedom are inscribed on its banner, Zionism demanded freedom for the Jewish people, since this new, revolutionary world led to an understanding of Jewish individuality and the possibilities of Jewish existence.”13 Anti-Semitism was an important, but by no means the only, motivating force behind the formation of Jewish national identity. This took place in the context of the general growth of nationalist movements, the liberalization of public life (which relegated religion to the background) and the destruction of social, class and ethnic barriers. And finally—and this is the most important difference between Jewish and Arab nationalism—the construction of the state was carried out by immigrants from Europe and the Russian Empire. As far as they were concerned, Western models of state building were organic and could not be rejected because the state was established during the fight against British colonialism. At the same time, Israel can hardly be called a nation-state in the classical sense. Its uniqueness lies in the contradiction between the democratic political system as the embodiment of political modernity and the ethnoreligious nature of the state that identifies itself as Jewish. Accordingly, there is no such legal concept as an Israeli, which should include all citizens regardless of the ethnic or religious group or community they represent.

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Dilemmas of Administrative and Territorial Structure The most obvious manifestation of the model that was in the process of forming was the tendency to revise the administrative and territorial structure of states. All the federalization projects developed in the region in the twentieth century were carried out in one of two ways: they were either attempts to unite countries that already existed, in spite of economic necessity and in no way connected with public initiatives, but in the name of ideology or personal ambitions; or they were a way to clandestinely break up an existing state. In neither case did these projects have anything in common with the Western concept of federalism as a geographical expression of democracy. What we are witnessing right now in Yemen, Syria and Libya is the idea of federalization being brought up time and time again as a way to hide attempts by the local authorities and Western experts to come up with a model for maintaining statehood in a situation where its institutions are weakening or disintegrating (or, in the case of Libya, the destruction of the system of personal power that masked the absence of institutions). The experience of Iraq has shown us that such a strategy has its limits. The unity of a loose federation depends on finding a consensus between the regional elites regarding access to the country’s resources, as well as on the interests of third states.14 If the interregional balance is disturbed, or if the international situation changes, the system becomes extremely vulnerable. In other cases (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, etc.), it is usually not about federalization as such, but rather decentralization (allamarcasia) or some other forms of implementing elements of federalism in the country’s governance system. Formally, decentralization in all these states is an official policy aimed at stimulating the development of local communities. In reality, however, its role is always quite different. In Lebanon, we are talking about hidden federalization aimed at balancing the interests of localized ethno-confessional groups. The experience of Lebanon was largely borrowed by the Americans when building the new Iraqi statehood. In Algeria, and especially Morocco, federalization serves as a means of autonomizing certain areas of the country— specifically the Rabat-controlled Western Sahara in Morocco and Kabylia

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in Algeria. At the same time, the question of regionalization or federalization does not even appear to be on the agenda in either country (especially in Algeria, where these issues are viewed through the prism of Berber separatism). In Tunisia, the issue of “defavourized” regions had made its way onto the agenda by the time of the 2011 revolution and was considered in the context of ensuring that the elites of these regions had access to power and the country’s financial resources. In each and every case, federalist tendencies can be explained in two diametrically opposed ways. On the one hand, as the desire to improve the political system, create more precise governance mechanisms and thus make political power more inclusive. This is particularly noticeable in the traditionally super-centralized Egypt, whose current constitution includes six articles devoted to issues of decentralization and the powers of local councils (the 1971 Constitution contained just two articles of this kind). By increasing the electiveness of the local authorities and expanding the powers of local councils in the administrative and financial spheres, the government both involves the regions in governance processes and, at least in theory, stimulates the development of civil society and democracy in the country.15 On the one hand, decentralization has a different meaning in the short term. Increasing the electorate gives greater legitimacy to the central government, but the deficiencies in the electoral mechanisms and weakness of the judiciary allow it to maintain control over the political process. In addition, the process of giving more powers to the regions creates a legal mechanism for integrating the local elites into the political system. On the other hand, federalization can be viewed as an attempt by the central government to preserve the unity of the country by ensuring a consensus with the regional (often other ethnic or confessional) elites. In the case of Iraq, this motivation is particularly pronounced. However, federalization alone is not enough—even if it is seen as a mechanism for preserving statehood only. Fourteen years after the fall of the Ba’ath regime, the country continues to disintegrate, even at the regional level. The most vivid example of this is the confrontation between the cities of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as the military and political maneuvers of the Shiites in the South of the country, and those of the Sunnis in the central regions. One possible explanation for this is that reducing the issue of statehood to the bargaining between elites for

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access to resources turns the problem into a purely market relationship, opening the door to an increasing number of actors and making a national consensus impossible.

Important

Another reason why federalization carried out on ethnic or confessional grounds can lead to catastrophic consequences in the long run is because it secures territories for certain population groups, preventing a single national community from being formed as a result of their diffusion. It can thus become the basis for new conflicts that do not even exist today.

Another manifestation of the revision we have been talking about is that of the identity of state power which can be shaped by the attempt to strengthen its religious principle. No one was more active in this respect than the Islamist forces that were in power in Tunisia and Egypt in the years following their respective revolutions. The Tunisians themselves say that their country is the most liberal of all Arab states, and this was reflected in its 2014 constitution, which included a ban on takfir—the Islamic version of excommunication.16 Thus, paradoxically, the introduction of religious discourse into the country’s basic law has become an instrument for protecting the secularity of the state, although the ban on takfir can be interpreted sometimes as a form of takfir itself. In Egypt, the issue of the role of Islam in society and the country as a whole was a topic of discussion throughout Mohamed Morsi’s term as president. And the provision that the political system is based, among other things, on the Islamic principle of shura (“consultation”) was reflected in Article 6 of the 2012 Constitution. Although this article was deleted from the 2014 version of the text, certain other provisions on the religious identity of the state were preserved. The point here is not only that Sharia was declared the main source of law in the country (the same was proclaimed in the 1971 and 2012 constitutions), but also that Jewish and Christian law are explicitly mentioned as well (Article 3), as is the independence of Al-Azhar as the preeminent Islamic institution (Article 7; Chapter 2 of the constitution—on the basic components of society—opens with this article). Finally, the preamble says the following

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about Egypt: “It is where they [the Egyptians—author’s note] created the most amazing wonders of civilization, and where their hearts looked up to the heavens before earth knew the three revealed religions. Egypt is the cradle of religions and the banner of glory of the revealed religions. On its land, Moses grew up, the light of God appeared, and the message descended on Mount Sinai. On its land, Egyptians welcomed Virgin Mary and her baby and offered up thousands of martyrs in defense of the Church of Jesus. When the Seal of the Messengers Mohamed (Peace and Blessings Be Upon Him) was sent to all mankind to perfect the sublime morals, our hearts and minds were opened to the light of Islam. We were the best soldiers on Earth to fight for the cause of God, and we disseminated the message of truth and religious sciences across the world. This is Egypt; a homeland that we live in as much as it lives in us.”17 The situation in Algeria is somewhat more complicated. For example, during the 2017 parliamentary elections, female candidates were, at the insistence of Islamist forces, permitted to not show their faces during the electoral campaign. At the same time, the 2012 law of the representation of women strengthened gender parity in the government. In Morocco, following the unrest of 2011, the King’s powers were legally desacralized. At first glance, this would seem like a step toward the secularization of the political system, but in the specific case of Morocco, it can also be seen as a concession to Islamist forces opposed to the religious traditionalism that justified the sacred status of the monarch.

Important

There are many similar examples, but they all boil down to one thing—governments in various countries of the region started to pay closer attention than ever before to the religious identity of the authorities, regardless of their domestic political situation. These trends are connected with the foregrounding of the issue of the cultural, historical and religious identity of societies. Hence the third manifestation of the revision of statehood: the sudden rise to prominence of ethno-confessional identity over national identity. This applies first and foremost to countries that have been plunged into the abyss of civil wars and conflicts—Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya (in this case, we are talking ethno-tribal, rather

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than ethno-confessional identity). It also applies to Bahrain, where the confrontation between the authorities and the opposition has a pronounced Sunni–Shia component.

The International Context of the Political Map of the Region The theory of the collapse of the Sykes–Picot system essentially means an acknowledgment of the failure (or at least the weakening) of the model of statehood that took shape in the region during the twentieth century, under the influence of European ideas, and, accordingly, the realization that a different, more archaic model of exercising political power was taking its place. A review of the pre-colonial Arab–Muslim experience may help us understand the essence of this model, which can briefly be described by the following parameters. First, states in the Arab–Muslim world have always arisen as a result of a combination of a religious call (dawah) and the activities of consolidated tribes, traditionally described in the sources by the term ’asabiyya, meaning tribal spirit or tribal solidarity. A strong ’asabiyya, according to the fourteenth-century philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun, allows disparate tribes to join forces and attack cities whose populations had indulged in the benefits of civilization and thus squandered their own ’asabiyya.18 This story of the emergence of a state as the result of the joint efforts of a preacher and a tribal leader repeats itself time and time again in the history of the Arab world. Sometimes these two hypostases can be combined in one and the same person. A similar model, with certain adjustments, was present in the formation of the states of the Almohad, Almoravids, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Senusiyya, Saudis and Seljuks. The essence of the religious call in each case remains the same—the cleansing of negative religious innovations (bid‘ah) and the return to the original purity of Islam. Secondly, the separation of secular and religious power took place relatively early in the Sunni countries (in the middle of the tenth to the middle of the eleventh century). The secular leader (known as the sultan

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from the eleventh century) acquired the fullness of real political power, while the religious leader (the caliph) acquired the fullness of symbolic power. The latter was the only source of legitimacy for sultans and kings (muluk), who, regardless of their power, were completely dependent on the caliph. What is more, the presence of the figure of the caliph symbolized (and, in theory, ensured) the unity of Dar al-Islam (the “Abode of Islam”). A model of multi-level statehood was thus established in the ArabMuslim world, with the highest level represented by the figure of the caliph,19 who united the ummah (“community”), and the lower level represented by various rulers, whose power was theoretically designated by religious authority, but, in reality, were forced to rely on ’asabiyya.

Important

It is from here that we get the third feature of the traditional ArabMuslim state: the fact that it is a religious and tribal—rather than a territorial—formation, a polity that organized the life of a genetically connected social organism with a single religious identity. In this sense, different religious communities living in the same territory represent different political communities, or different states. Such exoticism does not interfere with the territorial organization of power by secular Muslim rulers—sultans or kings (muluk).20

The principles we have described can hardly be applied directly today, supplanting failed projects of national statehood. And we are not even talking about the exotic nature and obvious archaism of traditional Arab-Muslim statehood. First, they reflect just one of the possible interpretations of the historic reality of the region,21 and the creation of Islamic statehood in territories that had previously only known the Greek or ancient Eastern principles of political organization (or had not known them either) is by no means the same as restoring statehood in complex modern societies, where many layers have already been completely modernized. As a result, the main features of (and the very possibility of constructing) a different model of statehood—one that is neither a nation-state nor a traditional Arab–Muslim state—should

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evidently be determined by the nature of the modernization process undergone by the societies of the region. There is another circumstance that cannot be ignored. The weakening of statehood we have described does not only concern the problem of the functioning of institutions; it also concerns the geographical area of influence of the central government. This is most pronounced in countries that are more prone to conflict. The central governments in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and partly Iraq, for example, are more than capable of ensuring security and normal economic life in the capitals and surrounding areas, where the majority of the population is concentrated. As you move away from these zones, the state starts to disappear. The complete destruction of statehood in one zone creates an opportunity for the emergence of competing political centers (Tobruk in Libya, Aden in Yemen, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in Iraq, and Raqqa in Syria). In other cases, society turns out to be capable of self-organization on archaic foundation and building more or less stable (non-state) forms of political and economic existence. A similar situation is observed, in addition to conflict zones, in the southern and western regions of Tunisia, as well as in Kabylia in Algeria and in southern Lebanon. The specific forms of political existence may be different each time. In Tunisia, we are talking about the symbiotic existence of an illegal “border economy” and traditional clans (a similar situation was observed on the Iraqi-Syrian border). In Lebanon, it is the administrative and economic activities of Hezbollah; in Algeria, the formation of coordinating committees of the villages in Kabylia. In each case, we are talking about strengthening the forms of everyday life that existed before, albeit less clearly. The resistance of these primitive forms of social life to external threats is what makes them resilient. That notwithstanding, they cannot serve as the basis for the formation of an alternative statehood because, first, they do not have the potential for territorial growth, and second, they are, at least to begin with, denied the opportunity to integrate into the international space.

Tradition and Modernity in the Institute of Statehood According to the “multiple modernities” theory (which has a number of things in common with the enclave-conglomerate model proposed by Bogaturov and Vinogradov),22 the external similarity of institutions in all formally democratic states does not mean they are automatically

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identical. For example, in Arab countries (though not exclusively there), political parties that in one way or another identify themselves in generally accepted ideological categories (nationalists, liberals, or socialists) in reality often rely on regional, tribal and ethnic groups. While local communal and religious identities receive a new impetus in the process of revising the foundations of statehood, it is typically the modernized layers of society that continue to be the bearers of civic identity. The coexistence of tradition and modernity—not only in the social structure of Middle Eastern societies, but also in the consciousness of citizens, their behavioral models—is closely related to the level of development of modern institutions. There is a well-known formula: the more developed a society, the more developed its institutions. The Russian expert in Arab studies M.A. Sapronova uses this argument in her writings.23 This formula can, of course, be turned on its head—after all, it is the institutions created by the modernized elite that make modernizing society possible. The elites in this case perform the function of a progressor and, in times of conflict, an “internal colonizer.” In countries with relatively developed institutions (for example, Tunisia), national ideas and values are formed through these institutions. In countries that do not have developed institutions (such as Libya), values and guidelines are formed exclusively by the ruler and the political elite (high priests who, incidentally, can themselves be modernized completely), and their fall brings down the entire system of statehood. One of the fundamental differences between Western modernity and Middle Eastern modernity is that the role of religion is understood differently. In the West, the “modern” was combined with secularism. The concept of the “modern state” in this sense meant a secular state in which religious institutions are separated from political power, and religious dogmas and norms do not influence the decision-making process. Religion became a personal, not a state, matter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”24 The concept of “belief” referred to the vast area of ideas outside the religious picture of

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the world, and also included atheism. At the same time, secularism had a different meaning in the Muslim East and was not at all seen in the same way as in Europe, as it took the specifics of Islam itself and the society that professed it into account. Secularism thus meant the separation of religion from politics only, and not from the state, which retained full control over the activities of religious institutions and turned to them as a way to legitimize the most important political decisions. With the advent of postmodernism, which emphasizes the relativity of concepts and rejects absolute scientific knowledge, doubt was cast on the seemingly indisputable paradigm of the search for truth on the basis of rational principles. Postmodernism did not provide answers, primarily because truth is not absolute, and movement toward it was more than disappointing. According to Eric Walberg, an expert from the West, “So far, postmodernism has not presented a compelling alternative to the crisis of modernity, yet the yearning for spirit remains in the face of society’s confrontation with modernity […] In moving beyond secularism, we must move towards modes of consciousness that go beyond mere rationality, that are trans-rational and trans-industrial…”.25 ∗ ∗ ∗ The rejection of the Eurocentric projects proposed by modernity and the total, albeit ultimately hopeless skepticism of postmodernism, which has adopted an instrumentalist attitude toward both modernist and traditional religious values, as well as the search for a new model for the organization of society and the state on the basis of post-secularism, are a sign of the dawn of a new era that we can tentatively call “neomodernism.” Like postmodernism, neomodernism is skeptical and eclectic, allowing for the coexistence of modernity and archaism—and even the modernization of archaism and the archaization of modernity. At the same time, unlike modernity, neomodernism does not shy away from positive statements, but it does feel the burning of the positive fire and seeks truth, even if it turns to the contradictory values of archaism and modernity. The appeal to religion and its politicization have become a characteristic feature of the modern era, a defining moment in the search for a new model of statehood in the region. And only time will tell how successful and durable this new model will be.

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Keywords Middle East, Arab Spring, political Islam, nation-state, post-secularism, modern and archaic, development models Self-Test 1. Is there a connection between the increase in regional turbulence in the countries of the Arab East and the Sykes–Picot Agreement? 2. How applicable is the concept of nation-state to the processes taking place in the Middle East? 3. How does the theory of “multiple modernities” manifest itself in the processes taking place in the Middle East and how does it correlate with the enclave–conglomerate theory? 4. How has the pre-colonial Arab-Muslim experience influenced the exercise of political power in the countries of the Middle East? 5. What role does religion play in the transformation processes taking place in the region? 6. What is the most distinguishing feature of the current stage of the search for a new model of statehood in the countries of the Middle East?

Notes 1. Itamar Rabinovich, “The End of Sykes-Picot? Reflections on the Prospects of the Arab State System,” Middle East Memo, Saban Center at Brookings, no. 32 (February 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/Sykes_Picot_Rabinovich.pdf. 2. V.V. Naumkin, “Does Russia Need to Accede to the Sykes– Picot Agreement?” Russian International Affairs Council (August 22, 2016), http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ nuzhno-li-prisoedinyat-rossiyu-k-soglasheniyu-sayksa-piko/. 3. S.N. Serebrov, “Yemen: National Dialogue and the Problem of Separatism in the South,” Assessments and Ideas: Bulletin of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences 1, no. 5 (2014). 4. K.M. Truevtsev, and O.O Bulaev, “Libya: A Collapsed State and a Hotbed of Regional Instability,” Assessments and Ideas: Bulletin of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences 1, no. 9, https:// book.ivran.ru/f/bull-9-maj-2016.pdf. 5. Nikolai Kosolapov, “Russia: A Territory in the Spaces of a Globalizing World,” World Economy and International Relations, no. 7 (2005): 3.

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6. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Moscow: Progress, 1991). 7. V.V. Naumkin, “Political Processes in the Countries of the East,” in History of the East. The East in Contemporary History (1945–2000), Vol. 6 (Moscow: Vostochnaya literature: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008), 12. 8. Adeed Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from Tunis to Damascus (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), 65. 9. This view persists to this day. Even after 2011, in the context of the lengthy experience of multi-party systems, the idea of political competition still seemed false to a significant part of society in Arab countries: “There are no parties. There is only Allah’s party and Shaitan’s party,” claimed the ordinary people of Tunisia in 2011. This information is taken from field research conducted by V.A. Kuznetsov in June 2011. 10. M.Z. Razhbadinov, Anatomy of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Egypt Before and After the Political Crisis of January–February 2011 (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013), 76. 11. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Moscow: Progress, 1991), 59. 12. S.N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 2–3. 13. Shlomo Avineri, The Main Directions of Jewish Political Thought (Tel Aviv: Biblioteka-Alia, 1989), 25. 14. American experts typically assess the experience of Iraq as positive, believing that federalization helped preserve the unity of the country, which was falling apart. The exact opposite conclusion—that the rejection of unitarity only stimulated the country’s centrifugal forces—is also possible. However, all assessments aside, it is quite clear that the issue of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan as part of the republic has been closely tied in recent years to the question of the distribution of oil revenues between the regions, as well as security concerns. 15. Of course, the formal norms of the Constitution reflect the aspirations of the active part of society at the time the document was adopted, and not a political reality. 16. Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia 2014, Article 6, http://www.arp. tn/site/main/AR/docs/constition.pdf. 17. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014, http://www.sis.gov. eg/Newvr/consttt%202014.pdf. 18. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah. History of Philosophy Yearbook 2007 (Moscow: Nauka, 2008), 178. 19. However, it is also true that the title of caliph started to lose its value from around the eleventh century, which resulted in the rulers of even

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23. 24.

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small states in the Islamic world starting to call themselves caliphs (even the Sudanese dictator Jaafar Nimeiry got in on the act). The concept of “secular Muslim ruler” is not a contradiction in terms. It is fully consistent with the well-known formula “Islam is a religion and a state,” which, from the point of view of modern Islamic thinkers, means that “Islamic secularism” is possible. Ultimately, nothing prevents us from interpreting this reality in neo-Marxist—or any other—categories, abandoning the civilizational approach. A.D. Bogaturov, and A.V. Vinogradov, “The Enclave-Conglomerate Development Model. The Experience of Trans-System Theory,” East– West–Russia: Collection of Essays in Honour of Academic Nodari Simoniya’s 70th Birthday (Moscow: Progress-Tradition, 2002), 109–128. M.A. Sapronova, “The Formation of a New Statehood in the Arab East,” International Trends 13, no. 3 (2015): 26–39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, December 10, 1948, http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/ declhr. Eric Walberg, From Postmodernism to Postsecularism: Re-emerging Islamic Civilization (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2013).

Recommended Reading Dawisha A. The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from Tunis to Damascus. New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013. History of the East. The East in Modern Times (1945–2000). Vol. 6. Moscow: Vostochnaya literature, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008. Sapronova, M.A. “The Formation of a New Statehood in the Arab East,” International Trends 13, no. 3 (2015): 26–39. Streltsov, D.V., ed. The Foreign Policy Process in the East. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2017. Walberg, Eric. From Postmodernism to Postsecularism: Re-emerging Islamic Civilization. Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2013. Zvyagelskaya, Irina. The Middle East Clinch: Conflicts in the Middle East and Russian Policy. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2017. Zvyagelskaya, Irina. The Middle East and Central Asia: Global Trends in Regional Implementation. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2018.

CHAPTER 22

The Role of Global and Regional Powers in the Regulation of Regional Crises Mariya Khodynskaya-Golenischeva

The beginning of the twenty-first century was not an easy time for international relations. Most areas of inter-state interaction were impacted by multidimensional processes associated with the transformation of the world order.1 The new system of international relations is forming in an uneven manner. Resistance can be felt from those states that have lost the skill of negotiation—the ability to take the interests of partners into account and the willingness to make concessions —as a result. On the other hand, we are witnessing the relentless growth of the economic, military and political weight of new players (primarily from among regional powers) who are keen to play a more active role in decision-making on key issues of the global agenda. All this serves to recalibrate the form of collective interaction in the international arena and the settlement of regional crises. As a result, conflicts are “splintered” into areas where the interests of global

M. Khodynskaya-Golenischeva (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_22

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and regional players intersect, making their development unpredictable, and their settlement even more problematic. The volatility with which crises develop is a result of the direct involvement of the states in the region and their divergent interests, as well as their specific experience and methods of responding to problem situations. At the same time, the global community has yet to come up with a methodology for resolving armed conflicts that would correspond to the new reality. The Middle East, which has historically found itself at the intersection of the interests of global and regional powers, was in the eye of the storm during the period under review. A wave of mass unrest broke out in many of the region’s countries starting in 2011. Protesters demanded the democratization of social and political life, the liberalization of the economic sphere, an end to the abuse of power of the special services and respect for basic human rights and freedoms. These events, dubbed the Arab Spring by the media and experts, unfolded in a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, where the people had grown tired of the ineffective methods of governance and the authoritarian style of the ruling elites. In some countries (Tunisia and Egypt, for example), popular uprisings led to internal political changes. In others (for example, Libya), they brought about a complete reformatting of the “image” of the state as a result of outside interference. A number of regimes (for example, in Syria) managed to resist change of any kind—thanks in large part to serious support from the outside. At the same time, the preservation of the existing power configuration did not bring stability and did not prevent the country from turning into an arena of long-term geostrategic confrontation and rivalry between external players. The dynamics of the development of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa region allow us to suggest that the internal component of crises was consistently replaced by an external component. The logic of events is increasingly determined not by the people and not by the struggle between elites, but by the vicissitudes of rivalries between external players—global and regional—whose role is growing steadily. This trend has spread in equal measure to countries where external intervention has brought about forceful regime change and the collapse of statehood, and to countries where protests did not lead to significant political and socioeconomic changes, but rather turned these states into a field for rivalry among external forces.

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Just look at the domestic conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen, where the countries of the region (Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt) played a special role alongside global powers (Russia and the United States). The efforts of these regional powers were concentrated on the opposing armed (and, in some cases, political) forces. Their goal was to change the balance of power “on the ground” and create areas of influence for the long term.

Important

Unlike the global players (Russia and the United States), which mostly invested political resources in resolving the crisis, the countries of the region focused on providing logistical assistance to the specific political or armed groups whose activities could bring geopolitical “returns.” The effectiveness of this approach, which has been proven over time, allows us to talk about regional players assuming a greater—and in some cases a key—role in determining the logic of the development of crises.

The growing ability of the region’s countries to influence the development of conflicts reflects a more global trend that is associated with the objective movement of the international relations system toward polycentricity, which itself implies that regional players (the so-called new centers of power) have a greater role. These processes, in turn, challenge the existing mechanisms for resolving conflicts and dictate the need to look for new tools for resolving them. These tools often appear spontaneously as a result of the failures of the traditional structures (such as the UN Security Council). And in order for them to work, the right balance needs to be found between the involvement of global and regional players in the conflict resolution process, depending on its aspects (components). This makes the demand for working out the methods for resolving regional crises in our time all the more relevant. In this respect, the question of the optimal ratio of the influence that global and regional powers have on conflicts, as well as that of where the “point of equilibrium” between the involvement of the respective players is located, is of particular interest. Finding a balance between traditional (existing) mechanisms

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on the one hand, and new (experimental) tracks with the active participation of the region’s countries on the other, brings us closer to solving the problem of working out effective tools for resolving armed conflicts in the world today.

The Features of the Syrian Conflict Nowhere have these trends manifested themselves more clearly than in the Syrian conflict. Originating within the logic of the popular uprisings that took place across the Arab world in 2011, the conflict grew into an independent and original process that brought forth a number of features in the development of modern international relations. It was most directly affected by the dynamics of the transformation of the international relations system, its logic and “symptoms.” The global players that became entwined in the conflict (Russia and the United States), as well as the countries of the region, used Syria as a kind of political “testing ground,” hoping to play some kind of special role in the events and competing to achieve their own interests. Over the years, the Syrian conflict has turned into a kind of “easel” that depicts the multidirectional, sometimes intersecting and overlapping interests of the various sides, their clashes and entanglements leading to complex military and political combinations, but also giving rise to fundamentally new instruments and settlement mechanisms. The fact that the patterns that emerged during the Syrian crisis later manifested themselves in at least one more armed conflict in the region, namely Libya (a new wrinkle appeared in the Libyan situation in 2019– 2020) indicates that these trends have acquired a sustainable and longterm quality. The experience gained can be applied to resolve regional crises in the future. The evolution of the conflict in Syria and the effectiveness of the mechanisms used in its settlement were largely determined by the processes taking place in the world, including, as we mentioned above, those associated with the desire of regional players to promote their military and political priorities (interests) more actively and aggressively by taking part in the “management” of crisis situations. Without minimizing the importance of the Russia–United States factor, it is important to note that the development of the situation in and around Syria was determined by such states as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

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the United Arab Emirates and Jordan just as much, if not more so. The widespread intervention in the Syrian conflict by external forces cancelled out the initial motives of the organizers and participants of the 2011 protests.

Important

The strengthening of the “institution of external sponsorship” brought the priorities of regional stewards to the agenda of the political and military organizations of the Syrian opposition, making the latter part of the local “dynamics.” The complex, multi-level system of external sponsorship of the Syrian forces “on the ground” complicated the logic of confrontation along the “Syrian government—opposition” line, while at the same time providing opportunities for negotiations to resolve certain aspects of the conflict directly with the stewards of specific organizations.

The evolution of the Syrian crisis has demonstrated the multi-layer nature of modern regional conflicts, which manifests itself in the multilevel internal contradictions that have been “sewn” into them. The first “layer” is the disagreements between global players (Russia and the United States), the second is the disagreements between the countries of the region that are involved in the conflict (Saudi Arabia and Iran; the Middle East Quartet and Qatar; Iraq and Turkey, etc.), and the third is the disagreements between the opposing Syrian sides proper (the Syrian Armed Forces together with the pro-government armed groups against the opposition groups; the Syrian government and the Kurdish forces, etc.). What is more, the system is asymmetrically “pulled tighter” by the contradictions between elements that belong to different levels: for example, the animosities between the United States and Iran, between Turkey and the Kurdish self-defense units; the antagonism of the countries in the region that sponsor the opposition toward the Syrian government; the contradictions between Ankara and Washington (on the issue of using the Kurds to combat terrorism), etc. In this respect, the inter-Syrian conflict itself faded into the background, acting as a background for all these phenomena.

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For all its complexity, this alignment, however, does not need to be locked into the current framework of settlement mechanisms, and provides additional opportunities to find non-standard dialogue formats.

Important

The emerging system of international relations, which is transitional and therefore relatively flexible, has allowed situations to arise where the division into “pro-Assad” (Russia and Iran) and “anti-Assad” (Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States) camps has not prevented “through lines”—interaction between the sponsors of the opposition “on the ground” and antagonists from among the Syrian people themselves—from appearing. The events in Syria have shown that resolving regional crises today requires a balance to be struck between the optimal level of involvement of global players (in this case Russia and the United States) and the states in the region that have a vested interest in the conflict, and whose role in these processes is growing steadily.

Multilateral Formats and Mechanisms for Settling the Syrian Conflict There are two approaches to understanding the features of the development of regional crises today and determining the most effective mechanisms and formats for their settlement (primarily from the point of view of those involved). The first approach is functional (thematic). It involves isolating and categorizing aspects (tasks) as part of crisis management. 1. Global-strategic. This involves cooperation between global players (meaning Russia and the United States). Example: The removal and destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal in 2013 under international supervision and control on the basis of a corresponding agreement between the Russian and American sides and UN

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Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) adopted on the basis of the agreement.2 The development of the counter-terrorism strategy in 2016–2018 and the de facto (i.e., not written into any official document) cooperation between Russia and the United States to counter Islamic State on both banks of the Euphrates. 2. Regional-operational. This refers to participation of a single global player and some countries in the region (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan) in the decision-making process on individual aspects of the conflict Example: The agreement on the introduction of a ceasefire within the framework of the Astana Platform (Russia, Turkey and Iran) in 2017. The creation of de-escalation zones by the participants in the Astana (Russia, Turkey and Iran) and Amman (Russia, the United States and Jordan) formats in Eastern Ghouta, Hama, Homs and Southern Syria (Al-Suwayda, Quneitra and Daraa) in 2017. The agreement between Russia and illegal armed groupings on a ceasefire in the de-escalation zones (Eastern Ghouta and Homs) in spring–summer 2018, with the assistance of some of the countries in the region (Turkey, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). 3. Local-tactical. This does not require the involvement of global players and implies the interaction of the countries in the region directly with the parties “on the ground.” However, global powers can be involved in auxiliary roles if necessary. Example: The singing of local peace agreements between the Russian Center for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring in the Syrian Arab Republic and anti-government armed troops (2015–2018). The resolution of socioeconomic problems in individual regions with due account for local humanitarian measures (for example, organizing a humanitarian envoy to Eastern Ghouta in 2017 following the establishment of contacts between the region’s countries and UN representatives, with Russian assistance in the form of a military police). The agreements between Iran and the Jaish al-Fatah (“Army of Conquest”) group on the exchange of citizens in the Shiite cities of Al Fu’ah and Kafraya and the Sunni district of Yarmouk in 2017, which was mediated by the United Nations.

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Attempts to act in violation of the logic described above did not produce the desired results. Just look at the failure of the US– Russia agreements on the settlement of the troubles in Eastern Aleppo (September 2016), or the abortive arrangement between Moscow and Washington on the introduction of a nationwide ceasefire in Syria (February 2016 and 2017). In both cases, the failure was due to Washington’s inability to exert the necessary pressure on anti-government groups. By that time, the other countries of the region had largely taken over the task of “managing” the illegal armed groups. At the same time, the de facto coordination between the United States and Russia in the fight against Islamic State in the north and north-east of Syria in 2017–2018, though not formalized at the official level (with the exception of the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the Course of Operations in the Syrian Arab Republic)3 confirms that it is interaction between Russia and the United States on global issues, in particular in combating the cross-border threat of terrorism, that has the most serious potential. Global challenges in Syria, despite the deep political differences between Russia and the United States, naturally highlight the need to combine the efforts of the two countries. The second approach is institutional. It focuses on an analysis of the effectiveness of existing mechanisms to resolve the crisis in the region. The effectiveness of the formats used is considered primarily through the prism of the composition of the participants. The mechanisms for resolving regional crises (based on the example of the Syrian conflict) can be divided into the following categories. 1. Traditional mechanisms. This refers to the UN structures and agencies where certain aspects of the resolution of the crisis are discussed (such as the cessation of hostilities, the political process, humanitarian access, etc.). At the center of the “UN architecture” is the UN Security Council, which has adopted several resolutions on various aspects of the Syrian settlement, including the seminal UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which set out the parameters of the political transition. However, these decisions have for the most part remained on paper only. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that the Security Council is “isolated” from the realities on the ground, and, on the other, to the absence of a link between the Security Council and those who sponsor the opposition forces “in the field”.

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The consensus of the members of the UN Security Council “five” is no longer enough. The Council should take the factor of strengthening the “institution of sponsorship” into account in their activities. The fact that major regional players—those who control the forces “on the ground”—are excluded from the relevant discussions eviscerates the content of the discussions and makes implementing their decisions impossible. The same can be said of the UN Security Council resolutions. Take, for example, UN Security Council resolutions 2139 and 2165 (2014), which demanded unlimited humanitarian access to Syria, but did not prescribe a methodology for working with the armed forces on the ground in order to make this access possible; or UN Security Council Resolution 2328 (2016) on the situation in Eastern Aleppo, which was passed after Russia and Turkey had reached an agreement on the evacuation of members of illegal armed groups from the city; or UN Security Council Resolution 2401 (2018), which called for a countrywide ceasefire in Syria. The fact that those countries in the region that have a vested interest in the events had absolutely no input in these decisions prompted collective efforts to resolve conflicts beyond the traditional mechanisms, and led to the creation of parallel formats that included influential regional players (for example, the Astana triangle of Russia, Turkey and Iran).

Important

In the future, the effectiveness of multilateral attempts to resolve a particular regional crisis will largely depend on the ability of the key players involved in the process to provide a “link” between the agreements reached with the participation of interested regional players, on the one hand, and traditional institutions—primarily the UN Security Council—on the other. This could involve creating a kind of “contact group” that includes members of the Security Council and the states of the region, where work would be carried out on draft resolutions to support the agreements reached in new formats. This would contribute to the legitimization of the relevant decisions, and would also increase the chances of their implementation manyfold through the involvement of large regional players

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in charge of forces on the ground. Finally, it would allow those UN structures that need reforming to find their raison-d’être in the medium term.

This much was confirmed by the events of March 2018 in Eastern Ghouta (a suburb of Damascus). UN Security Council Resolution 2401, which was adopted in February 2018 and called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, was not implemented in full: the states sponsoring the activities of the main armed groups in the conflict—the al-Rahman Legion, Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam (sponsored by Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, respectively)—did not take part in the drawing up of the document. Realizing that the wording of the UN Security Council decisions was untenable and dislocated from the real situation, the Russian side turned to direct negotiations with the armed groups themselves and appeals to their sponsors, and was thus able to reach agreements on the evacuation of fighters and their families from Eastern Ghouta. This took place “under the auspices” of the Security Council Resolution, but outside its “context.” Thus, the lack of a “connection” between the UN Security Council and the negotiation activities on the ground confirms the theory that the Security Council’s mechanisms need to be paired with the potential offered by multilateral formats (or bilateral negotiation tracks involving the countries of the region). As for the UN mechanisms themselves, the UN Security Council (as well as other UN structures) will always be a step behind conflicts as they develop; unless it can adapt to modern trends, and not until it is capable of taking the positions of the major players in the region into account. While the decisions taken within the framework of formats that include regional players will have a direct impact on the situation both on the ground and in terms of political development, the Security Council will continue to either get bogged down in squabbles between representatives of the five permanent members or make decisions that are out of touch with the real situation on the ground. The role of special representatives and special envoys of the UN Secretary-General is worth noting separately here. The Syrian “dossier” has demonstrated that this institution will continue to be in demand, primarily in terms of organizing an inter-Syrian negotiation process under

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the auspices of the United Nations—a significant deterrent to the militarization of the situation. What is more, the operation to evacuate militants from Eastern Aleppo in 2016, the concept of which was originally proposed by United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura, confirmed that, in the absence of a consensus among the members of the UN Security Council, representatives of the organization can come up with initiatives to find a way out of a “dead end.” As for the UN’s human rights and humanitarian structures, they need to be significantly depoliticized if they want to play a significant role in resolving regional conflicts, which means moving away from the unconditional orientation toward the Western “school of thought.” 2. Interaction between global powers (the US–Russia bilateral track). Despite the negative dynamics of bilateral relations, Moscow and Washington have been able to achieve impressive results in the settlement of the Syrian crisis. Opportunities for cooperation between Russia and the United States remain. However, this toolkit should be used primarily to address those specific aspects of the crisis that have a “global” dimension, as well as to implement one-time projects that do not involve the participation of the region’s countries. For example, the US–Russia agreements on the removal and elimination of Syrian chemical weapons under international supervision and control in 2014, as well as the de facto joint actions to combat the global threat of Islamic State in Syria in 2017–2018. Many obstacles to US–Russia cooperation in settling regional crises will remain. These include the use of the “Russian factor” in domestic US politics, and the growing influence that regional allies have on the formation of Washington’s policies in the Middle East, including Syria. For example, the anti-Iranian thrust of US policy in Syria, or the actions of the United States to contain the presence of one of its partners in NATO (Turkey) in Libya after its hands were forced by its allies in the Middle East (Egypt and the United Arab Emirates). Finally, these are objective trends that have come about as a result of the strengthened role and potential of regional players, and their growing ability to seize the initiative. As a result, Washington is losing control over the forces and groups on the ground, which makes pursuing an effective policy even trickier. This much was clear from the comprehensive analysis of the results of the US–Russia negotiations on Eastern Aleppo and the ceasefire in Syria in 2016–2017. Neither the agreement to demilitarize Eastern Aleppo (September 2016) nor the Syrian ceasefire agreements (May 2017) have been implemented, which is mostly due to the lack

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of leverage that Washington has over the armed opposition groups and, consequently, the fact that the militants have purposely sabotaged the joint US–Russian decisions. In conditions where the “management” of opposition groups as a whole has passed into the hands of region’s countries (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etc.), the goals and objectives of US interaction with armed groups were “localized” into two main tracks in 2017–2018. The first is the reliance on Kurds from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in carrying out the counter-terrorism agenda. Having quashed the main Islamic State forces in Syria, Washington gradually shifted its efforts to keeping the territories of the Trans-Euphrates that were not under Damascus’ control liberated from terrorists, which entailed building up the Arab component of the SDF. However, the Kurdish forces the United States has teamed up with are localized and unstable. The second is the use of small armed opposition groups consisting of Arabs in districts that Washington had planned to keep under its control. For example, Al-Tanf on the Syria–Jordan border, which the Americans had occupied in order to prevent the spread of Iranian influence by blocking the logistics routes from Iran through Iraq to Syria, which Tehran had been using to create permanent tension on the border with Israel. The United States maintained close contacts with illegal armed groups in the Al-Tanf zone (that it occupied), as well as in the southern de-escalation zone (before it was disbanded). However, these were small armed groupings that did not have the resources to overthrow to regime, or even organize opposition to the Syrian Armed Forces on extended sections of the front. However, the US curatorship of small opposition groups did little to impact the overall military and political situation and only confirmed Moscow’s commitment to its line of diversifying attempts to resolve certain aspects of the crisis through selective interaction with the countries in the region. 3. New multilateral (experimental) formats involving global and regional players. • The Action Group for Syria. The Action Group was established in June 2012 and consisted of representatives from Russia, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait and the four EU institutions.4 The meeting

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of the Group led to the adoption of the Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria (Geneva Communiqué), which became an integral component of the international legal framework for resolving the crisis in Syria and the basis for the first rounds of intra-Syrian negotiations. The Action Group, however, failed to become a permanent coordinating mechanism, and the Geneva Communiqué gradually fell into disuse as a key element of the international legal framework for resolving the conflict. There are several reasons for this. First of all, due to the substantive content of the document. On the one hand, it confirmed the need to maintain or resume the functioning of public services in Syria.5 This was important for Russia in the context of preventing a repetition of what happened in Iraq (de-Baathification, the destruction of state institutions) and Libya (the destruction of statehood). On the other hand, the weak point (from the point of view of Russian interests) was the passage about the creation of a transitional governing body, which would exercise the powers of the executive branch in full.6 This turned out to be unacceptable for the Syrian authorities. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Special Envoys of the UN Secretaries-General (Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi and Staffan de Mistura) worked on the “residual” principle with the Syrian government, on which the implementation of the document largely depended. All attention was focused on contacts with the opposition and its external sponsors. The “catastrophe waiting to happen” worked later and led to a deadlock in intra-Syrian negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva. Finally, the Group’s makeup turned out to be a weak link. The presence of the United Kingdom, France, Kuwait and the European Union in it brought no added value whatsoever, as these countries did not have any real influence on the warring parties in Syria. This, coupled with the absence of Iraq and Saudi Arabia—two countries that did have leverage of the Syrian government and opposition, respectively (the United States opposed the inclusion of Tehran in the Group)—reduced the effectiveness of the discussions. • The International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and its Humanitarian Task Forces.

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One example of the somewhat confused organization of collective interaction on Syria is the 2015 establishment of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), consisting of representatives from Australia, Algeria, Canada, China, the European Union, Egypt, France, Germany, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, and international and regional organizations—the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the United Nations. The launch of Russia’s military operation in Syria in October 2015 served as a catalyst for the creation of the ISSG, prompting Washington to support the intensification of multilateral diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syrian problem. The catalyst for the appearance of the format was the start of Russia’s military operation in Syria (October 2015), which provoked Washington’s interest in stepping up multilateral diplomatic efforts on the Syrian issue. Previously, the United States did not need such mechanisms, relying, as it did, on unilateral military intervention. A number of important decisions were made within the framework of the ISSG. One of the more notable was the Statement of the International Syria Support Group on May 17, 2016, which called for the cessation of hostilities in Syria; another is the document approved on November 14, 2015, which fixed the priorities of political transition.7 Thanks to the efforts of Moscow and Washington, a link was created between the ISSG and the UN Security Council, which made it possible to ensure that the decisions made with the participation of the key countries in the region—UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and UN Security Council Resolution 2268 (2016)—received international legal legitimization. The “weakness” of the ISSG was that it included states that had little influence on the situation in Syria (Australia, the Netherlands, Canada and Japan), which made the format less effective and eventually turned it into a dialogue platform suitable for exchanging views, rather than agreeing on effective measures. What is more, the countries of the region that had leverage on the opposing Syrian parties (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) used the US–Russia factor to shift responsibility for the situation to Moscow and Washington (while they continued to follow their own agendas on the ground). The work of the ISSG involved the creation of Humanitarian Task Forces. Useful as the idea may seem at first, these forces never became an effective mechanism for solving issues related to

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the cessation of hostilities or the provision of humanitarian supplies. The reason is the same—a vague format and the presence of members who did not have a real influence on the situation and only sought to politicize the discussion and introduce irrelevant components into it. This led the United States and Russia to the understanding that consultations needed to be transferred to the format of a “narrow group” of participants (Russia, the United States, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), and this group met in late 2016 to discuss the problem of Eastern Aleppo. • The Astana and Amman formats. The experience of settling the conflict in Syria has shown that formats that involve one or two global players and states in the region that have a vested interest in the events have the greatest “return.” These formats are the Astana track (involving Russia, Iran and Turkey) and the Amman track (involving Russia, the United States and Jordan). Interaction within the framework of these associations initially involved discussions on issues related to solving specific problems on the ground, and was later expanded to include political and humanitarian issues. The greatest success within the Astana format was achieved in connection with the cessation of hostilities in Syria, which made the creation of de-escalation zones possible. The ceasefire agreement reached by Russia and Turkey was approved in the Joint Statement by Iran, Russia, Turkey on the International Meeting on Syria in Astana on January 24, 2017.8 The ceasefire was observed by all sides, and this paved the way for the creation of four escalation zones—in Eastern Ghouta, Hama/Homs, Idlib and Southern Syria (Daraa, Quneitra and Al-Suwayda).9 A “control group” consisting of representatives from Russia, Jordan and the United States (with the latter informally representing the interests of Israel) was established to discuss the situation in the southern de-escalation zone, and a relevant memorandum was adopted.10 Hostilities in the de-escalation zones (which were under the control of the militants) ceased, and humanitarian access were opened. Russia took advantage of this “silence” to launch separate negotiations with field commanders in the de-escalation zones and the subsequent, practically bloodless transfer of the respective territories under the control of the Syrian government.

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The Astana format interacted with the United Nations, whose representatives took part in meetings as observers and moderated the discussions of the Working Group it set up on the exchange of detainees. Coordination with the United Nations also took place regarding the issue of establishing a Constitutional Committee in accordance with the decision made under the “umbrella” of the Astana process in Sochi (the Syrian National Dialogue Congress).11 The Astana format ensured the broader participation of representatives of the Syrian government and opposition forces (both armed and political) in the meetings, which made it possible to tailor the decisions made to the positions of the parties to the conflict. This, as well as the fact that the Astana meetings were attended by states that have a real influence on the forces on the ground, proved to be the correct “recipe” for the format’s success. The work of the Astana platform has demonstrated the benefits of using the potential of regional players (within reason), multiplied by the participation of one or two global powers. The measures adopted in Astana—unlike the US–Russia agreements, which were similar in meaning but never implemented in practice—ensured steady progress in terms of de-escalation and humanitarian access. At the same time, the question of the possibility of extending the mandate of the new settlement formats that include the countries of the region to issues that go beyond the operational level (for example, the political process of resolving the conflict) remains open. It would seem that the new mechanisms for resolving the conflict in Syria can be further strengthened if countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are involved in their work (and their participation is formalized). (Moscow’s agreements with Doha and Riyadh to resolve certain problems in Syria were exclusively bilateral in nature.) • Hybrid (asymmetric) formats. This involves one of the global players making contact “on the ground” with the opposing force, with such a meeting being brokered by an external sponsor of that opposing force. Russia has claimed a competitive political advantage by pursuing an unprecedented policy of openness to direct contacts with all the countries in the region (Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).

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It is thanks to this policy that Moscow was able to gain direct access to anti-government armed groups and their affiliated political structures in Syria. This allowed Moscow to gradually move beyond the established dialogue formats in order to solve specific problems directly in contacts with armed elements. For example, Russia’s bilateral agreements with the armed groups in Eastern Ghouta and Homs on the introduction of a de-escalation regime in 2017; or the ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta, Homs, Eastern Qalamoun and Southern Damascus, which Russian military negotiators were able to work out directly with the militants in spring/summer 2018, and which led to the Syrian government taking control of two of the four de-escalation zones. This orientation toward the states of the region largely determined the priorities of the illegal armed groups, which was in line with the agenda of the specific sponsoring countries. The detachments that were part of the pro-Turkey Operation Euphrates Shield did not seek to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, rather, they implemented a plan to prevent the creation of a “Kurdish belt” in northern Syria. In terms of anti-government attitudes, the Jaysh al-Islam and al-Rahman Legion groups in Eastern Ghouta, loyal to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, respectively, primarily served as a tool for the remote participation of Riyadh and Doha in the political settlement of the Syrian crisis through their involvement in international mechanisms (the Astana format, and the intra-Syrian negotiations in Geneva). Illegal armed groups thus became part of the regional context. In this sense, Russia’s decision in 2015–2016 to put its eggs in the basket of bilateral contacts with the countries of the region in order to gain access to armed groups to solve specific operational and tactical objectives has fully justified itself. Thus, the problem of Eastern Aleppo was settled in December 2016, not as a result of US–Russia negotiations, but as a result of agreements with the Turkish side. The al-Rahman Legion, which had throughout the crisis acted from anti-Russian positions, expressed its readiness for direct negotiations with the Russian side on the situation in Jobar immediately following the escalation of the crisis between Qatar and the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain) in the summer of 2017, which forced Doha to look for ways out of isolation. If Washington looked upon Moscow’s attempts to establish direct contacts with representatives of the armed groups with a certain degree of “jealousy” (due to the fact that it could not bring them under control and out of the fear that illegal armed groups would reach separate agreements

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with Moscow that are unfavorable for Washington), then the countries of the region saw Russia’s direct negotiations with anti-government groups with a fair amount of pragmatism. The Russian side took advantage of this when it was negotiating agreements on the liquidation of the de-escalation zones in Eastern Ghouta and Homs, which involved the disarmament or evacuation of armed groups. A number of factors contribute to the further development of the “institution of external sponsorship.” In Syria, we are talking about the rigid political system that does not provide space for opposition activity, as well as the long-standing and deep-rooted confrontation between the secular regime and Islamists. In Libya, we are talking about the collapse of statehood and the increase in the number of players on the ground, which gives external sponsors the freedom to choose the forces they want to control. For example, the situation in Libya after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi was greatly influenced by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Qatar. While Russia and the United States were involved indirectly, in the case of the regional powers, the Libyan military and political field was divvied up between Cairo and Abu Dhabi, on the one hand, and Ankara and Doha, on the other, which tried to influence the situation through the groups they controlled on the ground. At the same time, cooperation between Russia and Turkey on Libya, primarily the establishment of a ceasefire, confirms the thesis about the demand for contacts between a global power and an influential regional player at the operational and tactical level.

Important

It is a mistake to believe that the decline in the West’s influence on regional processes, including the Syrian conflict, is purely positive. Filling the “vacuum” at the expense of the countries of the region can lead to a significant overrun of the “useful norm” of their involvement in the process of resolving crises.

For example, while the West’s policy of supporting the Syrian opposition was consistent and based on a solid strategy, the line pursued by the countries in the region was characterized by irrationality, often guided in their policies by ambitions and mutual grievances (for example, the

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United Arab Emirates and Egypt were less concerned with whether or not Bashar al-Assad remained in power in 2017 than they were with strangling Qatar economically; in the same way, Saudi Arabia wanted to gain a leg up in its confrontation with Iran). The oversaturation of local dynamics with the priorities of the states in the region thus adds an extra burden to the regional security system, introduces an even more irrational component, makes it less manageable and destabilizes it by layering regional contradictions on an internal conflict. This complicates the process of reaching agreements on resolving crises, and makes managing the situation from a single “center” impossible. In the broader scheme of things, it leads to an imbalance of multilateral cooperation in conflict resolution, uncertainty, and a multivariate development of events. This, in turn, increases the risk of force being used, which can be “triggered” by a localized incident or provocation. One example of this is the massive missile strikes against Syria launched by the United States, the United Kingdom and France on April 14, 2018, in response to an alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma, which the West blamed on the Assad government.

The Special Role of Russia and the United States It is practically impossible to settle regional crises in a stable manner today without the participation of the United States, even if it pursues the narrow agenda of whichever administration happens to be in power at the time. Solving problems on the ground without consideration for Washington’s strategic interests—even if this leads to de-escalation in certain areas—is unlikely to stabilize the situation in the long term. Unencumbered by specific agreements, the United States may attempt to disrupt the status quo both by itself and with the help of its allies in the region. Despite the steady degradation of US–Russia relations, the international system has more to gain by preserving at least the external “skeleton” of interaction between the two countries. The agreements on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria were reached in May 2017 without the participation of the United States, for example, and the ceasefire established in late December 2016, which turned out to be more stable than the peace established on the back of the February 2016 US–Russia agreements, would, however, suggest that this is not the case. That said, we should not forget that Washington became part of the Astana process through its work on the southern de-escalation

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zone. The latter has become the model example of compliance with the ceasefire agreements, which is thanks in part to the active daily interaction between the departments of defense and foreign affairs of Russia and the United States (the work of the Cooperative Monitoring Center in Amman, Jordan, and telephone conversations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Secretary of State of the United States, and between their respective chiefs of the general staff). Similar results proved more difficult to achieve in the other three zones due to the fact that Turkey and Iran had vested interests in those areas, which complicated the interaction of the Astana trio and transferred it to the paradigm of cooperation–rivalry. Despite the disagreements between Moscow and Washington on key aspects of the Syrian “dossier,” US–Russia interaction had, throughout the entire course of the conflict, a “balancing” effect on the course and logic of the settlement of the crisis, and helped discipline the countries of the region and keep them within the parameters of international legal dialogue, thus preventing a sharp escalation of the situation and the collapse of the political process. In a situation where internal dynamics are pushed to the side-lines in favor of an external agenda, it is particularly difficult to find a balance between the external and internal dimensions of the crisis. On the one hand, mutual grievances among the countries of the region (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, etc.) and between the global players (Russia and the United States) were projected not the situation in Syria and the intraSyrian political process. On the other hand, the solutions found by external players should have been interpreted and implemented in the intra-Syrian conflict. One possible principle and mechanism for resolving the Syrian crisis, and regional conflicts as a whole, could be to “layer” solutions on top of one another and adapt them to the internal realities of the situation. The example of Syria proved that Russia was able to effectively take advantage of the tools and formats associated with conflict resolution. This was possible thanks, first of all, to its military presence in Syria, and secondly, to the flexibility and de-ideologized nature of Russian policy—a result of the refusal to fall back on bloc thinking. Russia’s military and political line has, thanks to its consistency and its non-susceptibility to market fluctuations, pierced all layers of the fabric of the conflict. In 2016–2018, Russia managed to get the United States involved in the joint fight against terrorism and participate in every single settlement

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format (the 2013 Action Group for Syria, the 2015 International Syria Support Group, the 2016 Lausanne Platform and the 2017–2018 Astana and Amman formats). This is in addition to Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Moreover, Moscow was able to test out its method of resolving problems on the ground directly with armed groups using the potential of external sponsors: Turkey (on the settlement of the situation in Eastern Aleppo in 2016), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar (the agreement between Russia and illegal armed groups on de-escalation in a number of areas, including Eastern Ghouta, Hama/Homs and Southern Syria). The events of 2016–2017, when the Russian military was able to establish a dialogue with most of the armed groups operating in Syria, put Russia in the unique position of being the only external player that had open channels of communication with all the participants of the Syrian crisis, as well as the ability to influence their decisions. Several years after the start of the conflict, Moscow had worked out interaction formats with almost all the representatives of the political and armed opposition. None of the other actors had such an advantage—not the EU member states (with their US-leaning policies), not Iran (whose interests in the country were based around the factor of religion) and not Egypt (which was dependent on Saudi Arabia in its policymaking). It turned out that Russia, while formally aiding the Syrian government, was nevertheless able to “oversee” a number of opposition forces to varying degrees. To be sure, Russia has not cut off contact with any of the opposition groups. Moscow realizes the importance of establishing interaction with the countries sponsoring the opposition as part of this work. And while the difficulties in bilateral relations made the dialogue with the United States and the European Union a somewhat rocky process, Moscow nevertheless managed to carry out pragmatic and effective work with the countries of the region, both at the bilateral level and within the framework of the Astana format. In this respect, the United States and the European Union, which by 2017 had significantly tempered their support for opposition groups in exile and which had been left out of the Astana process, had to be content with the role of an outside observer, effectively leaving the issue of consolidating Assad’s opponents in the hands of the countries of the region and Moscow. Russia should have done more to develop this advantage beyond the context of the aggravation of global or regional tension. This is not easy given the increasing unpredictability and uncontrollability of the situation

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in the region. What is more, the weakness of the methodology employed by Russia, which involves reaching agreements directly with the parties to the conflict (using the potential of external sponsors), is that it relies on the success of bilateral cooperation (as the crisis in Russia–Turkey relations following the downing by the Turkish military of a Russian SU-24 bomber in November 2015, which had a knock-on effect on the situation in Syria, proved). The combined approach demonstrated by Russia, which involves a high degree of flexibility and the ability to conduct a dialogue in several areas simultaneously, is clearly most in line with the current stage of development of the system of international relations, where the potential of the countries of the region is constantly increasing, and at the same time ensures that the global players continue to have an important—and in some areas key—role. ∗ ∗ ∗ The strengthening of the role of regional powers in the settlement of conflicts, their desire to play an increasingly active role in crisis situations is a long-term trend of modernity. It, in turn, is directly related to the logic of the transformation of the system of international relations toward polycentricity, which implies the strengthening of new centers of power in the region. These processes will continue against the backdrop of a general decrease in the West’s influence, and the unwillingness of the United States (at least in the near future) to carry out a full-fledged military intervention in the affairs of the countries in the region. For their part, the regional powers will increasingly resort to using the “institution of sponsorship” to achieve their interests through the armed groups they control on the ground. The effect of transferring the initiative in the management of regional crises to the countries of the region on the organization of multilateral efforts to resolve conflicts is not clear. On the one hand, it gives flexibility and maneuverability to the process of developing and coordinating steps to resolving crises, provides additional opportunities for selecting partners with whom mutually acceptable agreements can be made on the basis of pragmatism or bilateral “exchanges,” and creates the conditions for the emergence of fundamentally new and inclusive negotiation mechanisms. On the other hand, the strengthening of the role of regional states burdens the process of coordinating measures, “overloading” the process with elements that are not directly related to the essence of the issue. What

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is more, this pattern is an intrinsic part of all layers of the settlement—from the strategic to the operational and the tactical. Despite the growing capabilities and ambitions of the region’s countries, armed conflicts cannot be stopped or prevented by relying exclusively on regional players. Interaction with these states makes it possible to solve operational and tactical tasks. However, due to the different paths being pursued by the countries in the region and the possible clashes of interests, it is necessary to work with them individually, which fragments efforts to find a formula for resolving the conflict and hinders the development of a single roadmap. It is likely that new and “experimental” formats that involve both global and regional players (the choice of regional players should be based on their real influence on the opposing forces on the ground) will be increasingly in demand in the medium term as a means for settling regional crises. In this respect, it is important that a “link” be created between these new mechanisms and the UN Security Council. Given the transitional nature of the world order, this appears to be the best way to organize international cooperation. On the one hand, it can balance the interests of the players involved in the crisis management process. On the other, it can increase the effectiveness of methods developed collectively.

Keywords International relations, world order, Middle East, Syrian crisis, Libyan conflict, terrorism, Russia, United States, UN Security Council. Self-Test 1. What characterizes the transformation of the system of international relations at the present stage? 2. What is the main feature of modern regional armed conflicts? 3. What tools do the countries of the region use to manage conflicts, and what is the main goal of their intervention in crises? 4. How can the contribution of US–Russia cooperation on the settlement of the conflict in Syria be evaluated? 5. What is Russia’s role in the resolution of the Syrian crisis and other regional conflicts taking place today? 6. What bilateral and multilateral mechanisms have proved most effective in resolving certain aspects of the conflict in Syria?

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Notes 1. A.V. Torkunov, Contemporary International Relations and Global Politics (Moscow, 2004), 54. 2. Joint National Paper by the Russian Federation and the United States of America Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons. Geneva, September 14, 2013. 3. Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in the Syrian Arab Republic (September 21, 2015). 4. Meeting of the Action Group on Syria, Convened by the Joint Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States and organized by the United Nations Office in Geneva (June 28, 2012), 1. 5. Final Communique of the Action Group for Syria (June 30, 2012). Annex to Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013). UN Document S/RES/2118 (2013), 13. 6. Final Communique of the Action Group for Syria (June 30, 2012). Annex to Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013). UN Document S/RES/2118 (2013), 13. 7. Joint Statement on the Outcome of the Multilateral Talks on Syria, Vienna (November 14, 2015). 8. Joint Statement by Iran, Russia, Turkey on the International Meeting on Syria in Astana (January 23–24, 2017), 1–2. 9. Memorandum on the Establishment of De-Escalation Zones in the Syrian Arab Republic (May 4, 2017), 1. 10. Memorandum of the Decision by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Russian Federation, and the United States (July 7, 2017). 11. Joint Statement by Iran, Russia and Turkey on the International Meeting on Syria in Astana (September 14–15, 2017), 1.

Recommended Reading Baranovsky, V., and Naumkin, V. The Middle East in the Changing Global Context. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2018. Khodynskaya-Golenishcheva, Maria. Aleppo War and Diplomacy. Moscow: Olma Media Group, 2016. Khodynskaya-Golenishcheva, Maria. Syria: The Difficult Path from War to Peace Moscow: Olma Media Group, 2019. Matveev, I.A. Syria in Conflict. Ed. by V.A. Kuznetsov. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020.

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Mishin, D.E., and Orlov, V.V. Mastering the World. Memorable Pages in the History of the Arab East. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020. Pechatnov V.O., and Streltsov D.V. Countries and Regions of the World in Global Politics. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2019. Truevtsev, K.M. Globalization and the Arab World: Before and After Two Waves of Turbulence. Ed. by V.A. Kuznetsov. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020. Zvyagelskaya, I.D. The Middle East and Central Asia. Global Trends in the Regional Context. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2018.

CHAPTER 23

International Relations in the Post-Soviet Space Andrey Baykov and Irina Bolgova

In the post-Soviet space, relationships have not yet evolved toward new principles of regional engagement, even though the countries of the region are either directly involved in or affected by the processes shaping the world order. When the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) came about in 2015, a new phase commenced in the correlation of integration and disintegration trends, which is manifested in not only ties between individual states, but also in modifications of post-Soviet borders, affected by both internal political instability and interference by extra-regional actors.

A. Baykov (B) · I. Bolgova MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] I. Bolgova e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_23

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The Case of Integration in the Post-Soviet Space: Attraction and Repulsion Factors The concurrent operation of multilateral structures that vary in their geography and thematic scope, as well as the depth of cooperation, can be viewed as a sort of legacy of the situation observed in the post-Soviet space back in the 1990s. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the first multilateral organization in the former Soviet Union, has seen consistently less attention from experts since the sustainable integration core that is the EAEU emerged. The CIS has maintained its broad coverage in the post-Soviet space since its inception, as only Georgia and Ukraine withdrew from the organization in the wake of its military conflict with Russia in 2008. However, this does not seem to meet the foreign and domestic policy priorities of the region’s states any longer. Nevertheless, the CIS remains operational to secure the intrinsic cultural, social and economic ties, serving as a safety net to prevent humanitarian relationships from degenerating to an unacceptable level. The dual role of the CIS in the context of international relations in the former Soviet Union can well be illustrated by the history of its formation and its activities. The founding documents of the CIS and agreements signed during the first years of its existence (1992–1994) preferred the term “integration.” The “demonstration effect” of the Western European experience was apparent. However, although “integration” was the buzzword, what really happened was the disintegration of the existing political, social, and economic structures of a single state. Moreover, consistent allusions to the Western European integration track record, which prevailed in the first half of the 1990s, became the reason the post-Soviet countries had a distorted vision of the situation, which was characterized by a certain ratio of centrifugal and centripetal trends that was dramatically different from that in the European Union at the time. On the one hand, when the CIS was being established, the common economic complex was being dismantled. On the other hand, the European Union has never attained the degree of economic, customs, military-defense, and especially socio-humanitarian consolidation that was observed between the post-Soviet republics at the start of the 1990s. Even today, the CIS to a large extent operates within a common labor market and socio-cultural community, which the European Union is only striving to achieve (social integration is one of the most serious challenges the European Union faces). When it comes to the CIS, though, cohesion in the social sphere

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(owing to cultural and linguistic elements) is often maintained despite the policies of individual countries.

Important

Predictions have been made since the late 1990s—when subregional integration started to evolve in the post-Soviet space— about the upcoming dissolution of the CIS. What is notable is that the CIS was not weakened by the emergence of sub-regional integration formats: while the integration momentum was channeled into them (the EurAsEC, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and later the EAEU, etc.), the role of the CIS as an “umbrella organization” has remained. In this sense, it would be proper and historically pertinent to scrutinize the CIS in a series of other types of international formations that are more similar to the CIS in terms of the way they emerged, rather than in the context of integration associations (in some respects, the CIS has overachieved its integration targets). Examples include the British Commonwealth of Nations or Francophonie (OIF). Considered in this comparative context, the CIS appears as a mechanism to preserve preferential intra-regional ties amidst collapsing political (state) space, not a failed integration project. This approach makes it possible to apply the degree of effectiveness of coordination within the group of countries that make up the CIS as a measure to assess its operation, rather than the generally accepted integration criteria.

The orientation of processes inside the CIS is not identical. However, given the purpose of the establishment of the CIS interpreted above, it is understandable and even natural that, as the political and economic gravitations of the countries of the region are restructured, their interactions (including economic interactions), become differently directed and characterized by a contradictory combination of integration and disintegration processes. The former mostly boil down to arrangements to institutionalize convergence without encouraging microeconomic factors. In the context of this chapter, regional integration is understood as a gradual approximation of the national economies of several countries with

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the aim of ensuring a certain quality of connectedness of economic space that is characterized by the aspiration to the homogeneity of regulations and the prevalence of intra-group economic ties over extra-group ones, or at least their regulatory prevalence. The authors assume that effective, long-term and sustainable integration is achieved by countries on the basis of the merging (direct engagement) of enterprises, private banks, trading firms and other economic entities, i.e., under the dominant influence of microeconomic factors. The set of determinants of economic attraction/repulsion can be examined through the prism of analysis of the evolution of interstate economic relations within the region. Since the collapse of the USSR, declarations about the reconstruction of the common economic area in one form or another had been made as the national economies of some of the CIS members, specifically the strongest economies, began to develop divergently, pursuing deliberate economic individualization. Judging by the documents adopted at that time, while formally calling for the preservation of cooperative ties, Russia focused on a radical economic reform without the “burden of the Union republics.” The Ukrainian leadership believed it was capable of creating an appealing economic model in terms of investments once it was free from the pressures of union center’s directive policy. Belarus and Kazakhstan, which never aspired to economic independence as part of the USSR, were forced to urgently build a new economic structure after its collapse. One way or another, since the early 1990s, each of the former republics sought ways to join the global economy on its own. In the 1990s, all of the CIS members encountered a drop in GDP. The “process of disorganization,” cumulative fragmentation of production links between enterprises accounted for the contraction of the domestic output. Production chains, which had incorporated numerous enterprises, disintegrated as soon as the most viable of them benefitted from the onset of economic liberalization and started building trade relations with third parties—extra-regional economic agents. As a consequence, a virtual economy came about, characterized by non-payments and barter, which kept economic dynamism in check and divided all economic entities into winners and losers. That situation would have been impossible in a command economy and called for psychological adaptation, among other things. The new terms exposed managerial lapses at enterprises, which were paralyzed by the unfamiliar situation, and caused fatal series of miscalculations and faults.

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A significant contraction in trade between the newly independent states became evident from the beginning. Over the first decade of independence, mutual trade turnover within the CIS dropped from 60 to 28.5%, including a decrease in export from 71.8 to 20.2%, and in import from 50.6 to 45.4%.1 Most countries of the former Soviet Union made efforts to redirect their foreign trade relations. The active search for alternatives in foreign economic relations resulted from both the inability of the young states to modernize their respective economies independently and Russia’s lack of means and desire to assist them in doing so. The curtailment of mutual ties was clearly manifested in a slump in cross-country trade. For Russia, the economic disorganization process that was taking place across the entire former Soviet market implied a complete restructuring of foreign economic flows. The very nature of ties fundamentally changed as well. Whereas cooperation of production had prevailed in the past, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the simple exchange of goods, which is characteristic of the initial phase of foreign trade development, was being practiced (despite the USSR being a highly integrated economic space). Also contributing to disintegration were the formation of independent macroeconomic regimes of the post-Soviet sovereign states with their own fiscal, currency and customs mechanisms, as well as the uneven distribution of economic potential, which had been balanced out by the concerted policy of the State Planning Committee back in the years of the Soviet Union. The system of vertical economic ties that had arisen during the Soviet era continues to affect the focus of foreign trade and manufacturing exchanges of the newly independent states. Attempts have been made to break this logic in the export of energy resources, when new routes for transporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian region bypassing the territory of Russia were built with the help of the United States and the European Union. This change did not lead to the intensification of horizontal economic ties between the states involved in the “bypass” project, though. The import-substituting nature of the post-Soviet economies, which implies the use of traditional technologies, turned the Russian markets into virtually the only option for them in terms of trade exchange. However, despite the basis for convergence that had been established, efforts turned out to be insufficient to flesh it out. Successful integration of economic systems is only possible if they are effectively modernized. Furthermore, economic development levels must become comparable, and unification of procedures and practices must be deemed mutually

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beneficial. Economic cooperation statistics for the CIS ruled out any optimism in terms of the group’s global competitiveness. The share of Russia’s CIS partners in the global GDP is still a little over 1%, and 0.8% in world trade. At the same time, several key factors of economic consolidation within the CIS can be identified. First, if cooperation with the ten CIS states did not exist, Russia would still be able to produce about 67% of its former output, whereas other CIS members would be far less successful: Kazakhstan would only be able to produce 48%; Ukraine (before 2018) up to 33%; Belarus 16%; and Azerbaijan 15%. Strong cooperation ties remained in shipbuilding, where Russia collaborates with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and aircraft building, with ongoing cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. In mechanical engineering, particularly in the automotive industry and tractor construction, intensive cooperation remains between the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus, involving Belarus’s MAZ, BelAZ, Gomselmash and Russia’s KAMAZ, GAZ, Rostselmash and others.2 Second, the integrative effect of interaction between the CIS countries in the supply of raw materials is undeniable. Russia supplies many types of raw materials to the CIS, especially fuel and energy resources. In addition to Russia, only Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan can fully meet their domestic fuel and energy requirements and export energy. The other CIS members import between 80 and 100% of the fuel they consume from Russia. Third, the “negative selection” phenomenon paradoxically encourages approximation: the CIS economies are poorly prepared for integration into the world economy because of the poor competitiveness of their products. Products manufactured on the basis of outdated technologies can only be in demand in their own market—the market of the CIS. The technological complementarity of the national economies inherited from the Soviet times has been largely preserved, while in a number of industries modernization has not even started. Fourth, the transport and communication systems of the USSR were markedly more efficient than those in the United States and China, which turned into a factor facilitating economic exchange. Railroads used to carry half of the world’s cargo and a quarter of the world’s passengers. The shortest land and sea (through the Arctic Ocean) routes connecting Europe to the Asia–Pacific Region (APR), which has turned into a new economic center for global development, run through the CIS. According

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to experts, the CIS space can make huge profits from operating its transport and communication systems by connecting the markets of Europe and the Asia–Pacific. In addition to the well-developed system of railways and sea routes, the post-Soviet space also benefits from the Unified Power System, the Unified Gas Supply System and the Unified Water System of the European part of the former USSR. Fifth, the established pattern of migration flows within the CIS, with Russia at its core, also serves as a contributing integration factor, along with the objective need for the enhanced regulation of socioeconomic and labor relations in this context. Russia has turned into the world’s secondlargest recipient of labor migrants. Most come to Russia from the CIS. Their remittances account for 30–50% of their respective national GDPs (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova). Importantly, migration flows do not correlate directly with the status of political relations: for example, studies have found that Ukraine was leading in terms of the number of entries to Russia from the former Soviet Union between 2010 and 2019.3 Finally, the initially poor monitoring and control that contributed to the largely transparent state borders facilitated close and quite effective cross-border cooperation, which over time served as the basis for interstate integration initiatives. This applies primarily to Russia–Belarus and Russia–Kazakhstan relations, which, however, subsequently helped the countries overcome the shocks of the first post-Soviet years and paved the way for the launch of the most successful integration project in the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union. The obvious dominance of Russia is an objective feature of the post-Soviet economic landscape. The Russian Federation accounts for 76% of the total regional gross domestic product (at purchasing power parity), 76–77% of the region’s oil and natural gas output and 65– 66% of the overall export of goods and services. However, this factor notably does not automatically “convert” into increased cohesion of the former Soviet Union. On the contrary, it frequently causes countries with smaller economies to seek ways to protect their economic and political sovereignty. An analysis of the commodity turnover of the CIS reveals the following trend: the more primary resources a country possesses, the sooner it diverges from Russia and begins to redirect its economic endeavors to markets beyond the CIS. High technology, on the other hand, serves as the main integration driver. An economic foundation emerges for countries to join once they have reached a certain level of technical and economic development. Until they do so, members of such “associations”

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will produce low-tech items of more or less the same mix. Instead of complementing each other, they look for ways to diversify consumers of their products. The leading CIS countries produce the same types of goods, mostly commodities. They purchase hi-tech products from markets beyond the CIS, hence the lack of economic motivation for integration.

Important

Based on the above, Russia’s role in the promotion of cooperation processes in the post-Soviet space is high and keeps growing, although its impact on integration momentum is characterized by sets of attraction/repulsion factors that are specific to each party. This notwithstanding, it is still recognized as a technological leader and conductor of modernization impulses. Its role will continue to predetermine its pivot in encouraging and organizing integration processes in the post-Soviet space.

Range of Foreign Policy Orientations of the Newly Independent States Despite the existence of a number of what appear to be declarative subregional formats since the mid-1990s, regional integration in the former Soviet Union became possible only after the systems of national foreign policy priorities had been formed. The search for an attractive integration nucleus by newly independent states located along the perimeter of Russia became a key characteristic that defines the development directions for post-Soviet countries. On the one hand, their autonomous development is obviously impossible in the context of the global trend toward the convergence of economic and political regional bodies (subsystems). On the other hand, most of the post-Soviet countries are characterized by the aspiration to find a new systemic—or at least alternative—center of orientation. Analogies with the foreign policy doctrine of post-socialist Mongolia, known as the “policy of the third neighbor,” naturally come to mind. Just as Mongolia, a small power that is geopolitically sandwiched

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between two giants, Russia and China, found it critical to build active ties with an imaginary third actor (according to different interpretations and at various phases, the United States, the European Union or the world community as a whole), it was important for small and mediumsized CIS members to maintain a balance to preserve their newly gained independence.

Important

Some younger states in this group actively seek to benefit from the “marginality” of their new geopolitical position, attempting to use their geographically intermediate position (between Russia and the European Union, partly between Russia and Turkey, etc.) as the basis for their international political identity and even a foothold for their international economic orientation. After the “conflict of integrations” entered an acute phase in 2014, this logic became characteristic of the foreign policy strategies of Armenia, Moldova and Belarus.4

The newly acquired foreign policy identity showed a number of characteristic features. First, over the previous three decades, the post-Soviet space had turned into an arena open to all kinds of activities by extraregional players. Russia’s claims to a special role were no longer perceived as unfounded. The newly independent states were often faced with a dilemma and had to choose between the competing models of integration in the European Union and the CIS. However, the policy of maneuvering and playing on rivalry was limited by objective factors that still determined the interdependent nature of relations between the former Soviet republics. Economic dependence, or more broadly, the interdependence on the transit of energy resources, is the primary factor. The Russian population outside Russia and the shared historical legacy of both the pre-Soviet and Soviet eras are also challenges to be reckoned with. Regionalization is another problem that adds to the complexity of the processes of forming a foreign policy identity. Having emerged largely as a result of the Soviet policy of ethnic delimitation in the 1920s–1930s and territorial changes following the Second World War, the newly independent states have experienced objective difficulties in shaping their regional

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identities. So far, the political vocabulary has adopted more or less stable definitions for delimiting the countries of the former Soviet Union by their regional belonging: the Baltic States; new Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova); the countries of the South Caucasus, and the Central Asian states. These “conditionally political” sub-regions, with the possible exception of the Baltic States, have neither clear external geographical boundaries nor sufficiently powerful internal integrating factors. On the contrary, more or less rigid bilateral contradictions can be observed within some of the above areas. Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova have nothing in common with each other, except for the fact that they occupy similar locations between Russia and the European Union. The series of conflicts and contradictions in the South Caucasus is the only basis for treating the three countries as a package. There are no sustainable trilateral trade or economic ties between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, they have different foreign policy priorities, and international relations in this conditional region are largely influenced by external factors (close ties with the Russian North Caucasus, and the Turkic component in relations with Iran and Turkey). Central Asia is a more cohesive sub-region in terms of external geographical limits. However, the status of relationships among the five states, the different levels of their economic and political development, and their varied attitudes to integration within the CIS prevent us from treating Central Asia as an established international and political region. The noticeably growing development “bundle” of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan further complicates the definition of regionalization parameters in that part of the world. The trend toward the transformation of the uniform “post-Soviet” vision of the borderlines of the sub-regions and the strengthening of sub-regionalization—priority-basis engagement between the states that are in close political and geographical proximity—continues to deepen. This phenomenon is gradually captured at the level of expert analysis of ongoing processes and the approval of new terminological units. The term “new Eastern Europe” demonstrates the high degree of involvement of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the European Union processes. The new regional context in the Caucasus manifests the unfeasibility of isolation within the framework of the traditional “South Caucasian” prism. Analyses of political and economic trends in Central Asia increasingly incorporate an examination of the situation in Afghanistan, Iran and China.

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The foreign policy strategies of the newly independent states are further determined based on their attitude toward Russia, which acts as the axis of their foreign policy coordinates, rather than by the regional principle. Three groups clearly stand out on this basis: the countries that actively reject preferential relations with Russia (the Baltic States, Georgia, Ukraine, and partly Uzbekistan)—the distancing paradigm; the countries that seek to partially preserve the special nature of their relations with Moscow while maintaining room for maneuver in terms of their foreign policy (Moldova, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)—the maneuvering paradigm; and the countries that consent to maintain their affinity with the cores of Russia-cantered integration processes (Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia)—the convergence paradigm. By 2020, a more or less stable system of foreign policy ties between the CIS countries had presumably been shaped. This system determines the prevalence of the selective integration trend, which is manifested in the fact that cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Union (which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia), as well as Russia’s efforts to consolidate the existing blocs with various functions (the EAEU, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the CSTO, and partially the SCO and the CIS) have been put into the forefront. At the same time, sub-regional multilateral cooperation formats (GUAM and the Central Asian Union) proved to be unviable: without Russia, regional integration in the post-Soviet space is obviously missing the main drivers to ensure economic growth and reach the level of global economic competitiveness.

Regional Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Space Integration processes in the post-Soviet space were driven not only by the countries’ economic performance, but also largely by the way the global terms of trade evolved. As we noted above, the make-up of national economic systems and the search for external sources of modernization led to a significant drop in the intensity of cooperation in trade, energy and agribusiness, as well as the divergence of macroeconomic indicators of post-Soviet economies. Smaller countries—Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Tajikistan—show the highest degree of integration in economic processes in the former Soviet Union.5 Larger economies with diversified structures of economic exchanges find the relative role of engagement with

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the former Soviet republics to be much less significant. International commodity and money flows, along with the degree of openness of national economies, mean more for economic development. According to the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), foreign trade turnover accounts for a third of the region’s combined GDP, whereas in terms of financial flows, the economy demonstrates even more openness, as foreign assets and liabilities account for about 70% of GDP. The foreign economic environment is therefore a key factor that shapes the economic situation in most of the post-Soviet states.6 The motivation to pursue economic integration in the former Soviet Union is dependent on the desire to occupy the most stable positions in the global economy by way of increasing regional multilateral cooperation, which, on the one hand, will provide access to opportunities of open economies and, on the other hand, minimize the aftermath of external shocks. The pace of integration processes directly depends on the geographic proximity of the respective countries. Neighboring states enjoy the most active ties in trade, labor migration, educational exchanges and agribusiness. The increase in the shared commitment to create a large economic cluster in the post-Soviet space led to the completion of the process to build the integration core in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union, which became operational in January 2015. Paradoxically, the EAEU cemented the level of engagement that had already been achieved, rather than creating prerequisites for deepening integration. The institutional structure of the EAEU, which largely copies that of the European Union, is far ahead of the actual integration capacity of the post-Soviet countries and the degree of their trade and economic complementarity and connectivity. The uneven nature of the Eurasian integration process reflects the current correlation between the rational need for economic convergence for the sake of national modernization on the one hand, and the structural and domestic political impediments to its progress on the other. Russia maintains its dominant role in the EAEU, thus fuelling concerns among other member states about their own independence, which is how the central idea of the purely economic nature of Eurasian integration, without the promotion of the political component, came to be. At the same time, Russia’s central role in economic processes within the EAEU— and more broadly in the post-Soviet space—enhances the negative effects of the persisting interdependence. The Russian economic system is dependent on external shocks, both objective and subjective (e.g., sanctions),

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which directly impacts the development of neighboring countries through the depreciation of the Russian rouble, and the drop in consumer and demand and the demand for foreign labor. On the one hand, this situation constantly challenges the attractiveness of cooperation with Russia and Eurasian integration projects as the main parameters of foreign economic interest. On the other hand, an analysis of economic cooperation trends within the integration bloc shows that the share of mutual trade—as a central indicator of integration success—is expanding against the backdrop of the slump in economic growth and reduction of foreign trade activity, and the same indicator narrows against the background of general economic growth.7 This pattern emphasizes the main motivation of post-Soviet integration in the current international environment—the search for the most acceptable terms to maintain a balance between the need for national modernization and state sovereignty. The difficult recovery of the post-Soviet countries following the global meltdown suggests that their economies will be unable to rebound to at least their pre-crisis state without a dramatic economic transformation. Russia’s attempts to take advantage of the situation and expand its influence in the post-Soviet space, including through the promotion of the EAEU format, can so far be viewed as only partially successful. The crisis in Russia, exacerbated by the sanctions, had an immediate negative impact on the economies of the EARY member states: the national currencies depreciated, energy prices spiked and migrant workers returned to their home countries en masse. This clearly demonstrated the degree of dependence of the region’s economies on the level of Russian welfare and economic development. On the other hand, it turned out that the importance of partnerships with Russia does not imply their recognition of Eurasian integration as the only option. On the contrary, the escalation of the international political environment provoked extensive discussions that put the further development of the Eurasian Economic Union project in question, primarily citing risks of weakened national sovereignty. It is under these circumstances that the active search for a new impetus to foster the integration project has been launched. The chief ideologists of Eurasian integration emphasize that integration within the Customs Union has exhausted its potential in terms of ensuring the further growth of mutual trade and promotion of the common internal market, so the EAEU is looking for new incentives. These include the expansion of the EAEU’s list of trade and economic partners and the

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development of the strategy to establish a network of free trade zones with motivated economies. According to official sources at the Eurasian Economic Commission, more than 40 countries have voiced an interest in promoting cooperation with the EAEU. Vietnam became the first country beyond the bloc to sign an FTA with the EAEU in May 2015 (it became effective on October 6, 2016). This was followed by an interim agreement leading to a free trade zone with Iran (May 17, 2018), and FTA agreements with Singapore (October 1, 2019) and Serbia (October 25, 2019). In addition to market scalability, this dimension of Eurasian integration helps alleviate internal contradictions. The partially “closed” nature of the post-Soviet regional associations is due to the initial conditions that applied when they were established, namely, the (semi)transparent borders between the newly independent states with a quite rigid common external border. At the same time, as soon as the former administrative borderlines became state borders, a separate set of problems emerged in the post-Soviet space in terms of international relations. The formalization of the new borders was slow, and they essentially remained transparent. On the one hand, this accounts for the spirit of “commonality” in the former Soviet Union, but on the other hand this may exacerbate security issues (for example, the infiltration of terrorists, or drug trafficking). Furthermore, the situation has aggravated the challenge of maintaining the territorial integrity of the newly independent states, whose borders were originally built on the Soviet vision in order to address the nationalities issue and, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, became contested both from outside and inside (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea). Border transparency has remained a challenge in Central Asia, where demarcation efforts have faced interstate contradictions. The “Shanghai Five” mechanism (China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, launched in 1996), and later the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (following the accession of Uzbekistan in 2001) were established to bring work to settle disputes to the multilateral track. Unlike other sub-regional associations in the post-Soviet space, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in which Russia and China dominate, has expanded beyond the former Soviet Union. In 2017, India and Pakistan became full members of the organization, thus lending it a completely new political significance. The main hindrance to the expansion of the SCO is the complication of the collective decision-making structure, which can block the process altogether. The problem gains relevance in the context of disagreements

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between China and India, and between India and Pakistan, which will import their long-standing conflicts to the new multilateral platform. However, despite its multilateral nature, the organization appears to have sets of bilateral relationships, informally led by Russia and China. While China seeks to include Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan or Tajikistan in the resolution of regional security issues, Russia insists that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is there to address security. The inclusion of India and Pakistan as permanent SCO members in 2018, as well as the lobbying for the candidacy of Iran, manifests Russia’s willingness to ensure a visible counterweight to Beijing’s growing authority in the SCO, while moving the organization from the level of regional cooperation to that global cooperation. This enables Russia, among other things, to avoid tensions between various integration formats. The gradual evolution of the economic and politico-military components of cooperation testifies to the significant potential of the Asian regionalization dimension. However, the complex relationship between Russia and China in terms of the organization’s development prospects and the role of each of its leaders rule out conclusions about any fundamental changes in the development priorities on Russia’s Central Asian borders. In response to China’s economic expansion, Russia insists on the development of economic convergence mechanisms exclusively within the EAEU, while China refuses to expedite military and political cooperation as it pursues foreign policy objectives globally.

The Issue of Energy in International Relations in the Post-Soviet Space All of the key trends in the development of world energy since the early 1990s were reflected in the energy-related engagement within post-Soviet states. The newly independent states became involved in or produced a direct impact on the politicization and securitization of energy issues, added to the significance of gas transit to ensure continental energy security, and contributed to the emergence of new players in regional markets. The current period of price uncertainty in global energy markets, combined with the trend toward a surplus of traditional energy resources in the short and medium terms, has caused some extra-regional players to lose their interest in the energy component somewhat. However, it remains an important area for major international interrelationships in the post-Soviet space.

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Since the mid-1990s, the hydrocarbons of the Caspian offshore region and the territories of the coastal states have been a subject of intense international bargaining. The Caspian Sea, divided prior to 1991 between the USSR and Iran, had remained essentially unavailable for exploration for quite a long time, and its resources were developed on a limited scale. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan benefited the most from the increased focus on Caspian hydrocarbons. The 1993 “contract of the century,” which gave major international oil companies access to Azerbaijani offshore fields, seemed to guarantee the country’s successful economic development. Georgia sought to make the most of its “transit potential,” offering to export Caspian hydrocarbons through its territory to Turkey bypassing Russia via new routes, primarily the Baku–Tbilisi– Ceyhan oil pipeline. The United States appeared to be most interested in the pipeline project, because Washington treats Russia’s persistent control of the flow of energy resources from the Caspian region as an adverse factor for global energy security.8 Russia, on the contrary, did not want a bypass export route and new competitors. In an effort to strengthen the positions of those who support the further expansion of the sphere of economic independence from Russia, Western countries helped form a new association of several countries of the Black Sea–Caspian Sea belt in 1997. The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development was conceived as an organization of exporters of Caspian energy resources and the principal transiters of oil and gas from Russia and its eastern and southern neighbors to the west. The new organization included Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In 1999, Uzbekistan temporarily joined the organization, maintaining its membership until 2005. The young states attempted to utilize their export and transit potential to strengthen their positions on the regional scene and, where possible, improve their geopolitical status. There are reasons to believe that regular “gas transit crises” between Russia on the one hand and Ukraine and Belarus on the other (that have occurred frequently since the mid-2000s) are due to the desire of Kyiv and Minsk to draw international attention, emphasize their geopolitical import in the eyes of the European Union and, lastly, compel the West to lend to and invest in Ukraine and Belarus to modernize their respective gas transport networks.

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The active efforts of Russian diplomacy to diversify export routes starting in the mid-2000s came largely as a response to the initiatives of Ukraine and Belarus in connection with the “gas crises.” Its goal was to find alternative routes to deliver energy to the West while bypassing Ukrainian and Belarusian territories. To achieve this, the major gas transportation project Nord Stream was put in place to export Russian natural gas to the European Union without involving transiters. The South Stream project was proposed to ensure a geographical balance and strengthen the role of Russian natural gas in the south of the European Union. However, after the construction project began, Russia had to suspend it and refocused on Turkey due to the aggravation of contradictions with the European Union over the fundamentals of the development of the post-Soviet states in 2014. The growing role of the United States on international energy markets and its ambition to control the European energy market caused the energy relationship between Russia and the European Union to deteriorate even further.9 The geopolitical and value conflict had a marked negative impact on energy cooperation. The active involvement of China in the commodity segment of the Central Asian economies became a new energy transportation driver in the post-Soviet space. The construction of new pipelines from Central Asia to China altered the political balance in the region considerably. The emergence of China as a major energy importer narrowed the room for Russian economic pressure on the Central Asian countries. Russia lost its edge as a monopoly buyer of Turkmenistan’s energy once the Turkmenistan– China gas pipeline was commissioned in 2009; Kazakhstan cemented its position as a self-sufficient player in Eurasia after the completion of the West Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline system by 2009. The development of the infrastructure network toward China, coupled with the aggravation of political contradictions between Russia and Western countries, prompted Moscow to make an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline to China. In December 2019, the main operational parameters of the Power of Siberia pipeline were agreed, and the project was launched in December 2019. The pace of multilateral energy engagement in the post-Soviet space serves as a vivid illustration of the shift of the center of economic growth toward the east and the interconnectedness of economic and political influence of global players of various levels.

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Important

The energy transportation factor has proved crucial in terms of another aspect of international relations within the CIS space: the struggle to assert the ability to act independently in regional politics relative both to Russia and to neighboring small and medium-sized states. In this context, ownership of energy resources or transit potential becomes an additional economic or political bargaining chip.

As a factor in contemporary international relations, the energy issue largely determined the framework of object–subject relations within the post-Soviet space. On the one hand, possessing energy resources and transit potential empowers the states along the perimeter of Russia’s new borders to remain in the focus of major international players. On the other hand, the global crisis environment has in some measure discounted the international importance of the young states, as energy importers have redoubled their efforts to reduce energy consumption. The desire to improve energy efficiency and search for new sources of energy stands behind the emergence of a long-term trend toward the downgrading of the “energy and commodity value” of the post-Soviet space for importers of natural gas and crude oil, primarily in Europe. Moreover, the curtailment of Ukrainian transit from Russia after 2014 has dramatically changed Ukraine’s role in the EU energy security system: Ukraine turned from a member of the system of European imports into a recipient country benefitting from donor reverse supplies from neighboring European states. The emergence of the “eastern dimension” for energy export by Russia and Central Asian countries ensures sustainable budget revenues of resource-rich countries, but discourages the modernization endeavor in the Western sense of the word.

Extra-Regional Players in the Post-Soviet Space: Characteristics of Global Competition Extra-regional players have largely influenced the development of domestic policy in the former Soviet countries and the system of interrelations between them since they regained independence. Building on

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their pragmatic ambition to enhance their respective authority, extraregional actors have primarily been using ideology-driven foreign policy tools. The policy of involving post-Soviet states in the orbit of influence of the United States and the European Union, which is typical of the first stages of the evolution of the post-Soviet space, manifested itself in the gravitation toward economic and political liberalization and the construction of political systems on the averaged model of Western liberal democracies. Liberalization processes in the former Soviet Union were promoted by the global triumph of the liberal model in the 1990s. However, the desire to accelerate liberalization in some instances had little correlation with the local environment and was based not so much on an analysis of the specific conditions in each country, as they were on some idealized belief in democratization as a universal tool for addressing the economic and political challenges of modernization. These sentiments were partly behind the transformation in 2006 of the GUAM bloc into the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, in which Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova maintained their membership. The symbolic renaming of the association with an emphasis on its “democratic” component was a consequence of the “color revolutions” that occurred in the CIS and heralded a new stage of political relations.10 The “color revolutions” were stirred up in large part along the lines of the US concept of “democratic enlargement” and were encouraged by the civil activity of non-governmental organizations in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, financed from Western charitable foundations and organizations.11 At the same time, the “revolutions” became a reflection of the deep transformation processes taking place in the respective countries. The transition period that began with the demise of the USSR had virtually been completed, and the accumulated discontent exposed the clear lag of political and economic reforms behind the real social development requirements in the young states. Importantly, the “color revolutions” did not lead to a radical change of the political models in any of these countries, although certain adjustments to the functioning of these models were certainly made and resulted in the replacement of some groups of ruling elites with others. The internal political transformations of the mid-2000s culminated in the 2013–2014 unrest in Ukraine. The mass rallies that began in November 2013 were caused by the uncertain position of President Viktor Yanukovych on the EU and EAEU integration projects and his attempt to “keep a foot in both worlds.” Amid the profound structural crisis inside the country, spontaneous protests

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triggered a series of large-scale cataclysms: the coup d’état and Yanukovych’s flight a few months before the scheduled presidential election, the outbreak of regional separatism and the commencement of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, the aggravation of the cultural and ethnic component of political evolution and the decision of a referendum in Crimea to reunite with Russia. The transformational potential of the internal political development in the former Soviet Union has not sputtered out, as evidenced by the political changes promoted by the mass unrest in Armenia in 2018 and Belarus in 2020. However, following the events of 2014, extra-regional players have showed obvious cautiousness and—unlike the period of “color revolutions”—demonstrative non-interference in domestic political processes. The objective incompleteness of the transitional “post-Soviet” phase is manifested in the fact that personalized regimes are put to the test by the withdrawal of long-time political leaders (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan); in less centralized political systems, the challenge comes from the rise of populism (Armenia, Ukraine) and the struggle within the oligarchic core (Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova). At the same time, the dramatic developments in Ukraine concluded the phase of external “revolutionary democratization” of the post-Soviet space, which had started in the mid-2000s. The political elites of the countries that have more or less retained their potential to benefit from contradictions between external players witnessed the scope and unpredictability of possible consequences. This accounts for the conspicuous mitigation of foreign policy rhetoric and the increased variability in the models of interaction with both key regional and extra-regional states, as well as with integration blocs. Since the second half of the 2000s, the foreign policies of Ukraine and Georgia have remained notably pro-Western. However, on the whole, the post-Soviet states are not changing their positions toward antiRussian ones. Rather, they tend to follow a cautious line of maneuvering between Russia, China, the European Union and the United States, with an emphasis on relationships with Moscow. The pro-Western and proRomanian tendencies of a portion of Moldavian society are curbed by the unresolved problem of Transnistria, where the local population shows a pro-Russian orientation. At the same time, the geographic isolation of Moldova from Russia by Ukraine serves as a barrier impeding the implementation of the pro-Moscow sentiment in Moldavian society. Azerbaijan generally maintains constructive relations with Moscow across the entire

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range of bilateral relations. Discrepancies between Russia and Azerbaijan over the Karabakh issue remain an obstacle to closer convergence, but do not yet block the quite constructive dialogue between Moscow and Baku. The Central Asian countries take good care to avoid “anti-Russian excesses,” which were not infrequent in their policies back in the 1990s. Kazakhstan, which has significantly expanded its room for independent foreign policy maneuver over the past two decades, seeks to promote its relations with the United States, the European Union and China without prejudice to its “special ties” with Russia. Tajikistan is aware of its vulnerability in the context of the vast Iran–Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict area and is showing extreme caution when pursuing partnerships with Russia, India, the United States and China, without deviating from the priority of its engagement with Moscow. Uzbekistan has consistently followed the path of maximum possible independence in regional affairs. Having lost its hopes of becoming a privileged regional partner of the United States, the Uzbek leadership no longer wishes to impose any rigid partnership obligation on itself, but instead seeks to build a route of “equal proximity” in its relations with many influential states. Finally, Turkmenistan, which maintains its status of a neutral state, has cautiously, yet increasingly actively promoted its cooperation with Russia and some other CIS countries since the late 2000s, without giving up on opportunities to deepen its relations with Iran, Azerbaijan, and potentially with Afghanistan. Therefore, the new and “very new” independent states are characterized by pragmatism in their foreign policy. Underpinning this pragmatism is their desire to benefit from maneuvering between the leading powers. This position is characteristic of both “limitrophe” states (Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia) and countries that seem to have no alternative to an alliance with Russia. Given the continuing political conflict between Russia and the West, the post-Soviet states see opportunities in the development of a “bridge” policy serving as a mediator between the parties. Against the background of the general trend toward the pragmatization of foreign policy, extra-regional players have changed the nature of their attention to the post-Soviet dimension of their foreign policy strategies markedly. The development of the eastern realm of the European Union’s foreign policy can be attested to its internal institutional transformations and accumulated problems. Since 2014, the chief focus has been on the Ukraine issue, but the European Union has been demonstrating “Kyiv fatigue” recently when it comes to its stance on Ukraine’s

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territorial integrity, economic and energy security, and domestic political reforms. The US policy toward the CIS space is undergoing modifications depending on the awareness of its global role. The Central Asian vector of Washington’s policy is being revised following a decade of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whereas the impact of the United States and the European Union on the former Soviet Union has weakened, the presence of China has noticeably expanded, as Beijing has extended its influence, and not only in Central Asia, where the Moscow–Beijing engagement is institutionalized within the framework of the SCO. China intensifies and differentiates its presence, primarily economic, in the geographically distant postSoviet states. Beijing’s economic influence has not yet transformed into political influence, and by all appearances Russia managed to draw on its experience within the EAEU–Ukraine–EU triangle and mitigate the “integration dilemma” by initiating the alignment of the EAEU and the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt project.12 Nevertheless, the most urgent processes of multilateral interaction in Eurasia are shifting toward the Central Asian region due to the expansion of China’s presence through the implementation of its Belt and Road Initiative. It is China’s policy that is becoming the most important external structural challenge to the system of multilateral engagement within Eurasia. China is currently the EAEU’s main prospective partner and at the same time the main challenge to the development of Eurasian integration, especially given China’s growing financial and economic influence on some former Soviet states. In recent years, trade statistics have pointed to the potential for a drastic redirection of the commercial and economic flows of the EAEU member states toward China.13 Since 2015, the relationship between the EAEU and China has developed within the framework of the concept of “alignment” and the Greater Eurasian Partnership, originally proposed by Russia, which envisages joint conflict-free engagement in the post-Soviet space and the simultaneous designation of Russia and the EAEU as the core element of infrastructure projects promoting China to Western Europe. In this regard, the main component of the “alignment” strategy is the implementation of the economic agreement with China, which is complicated by the enormous financial and economic imbalances between the two partners. The EAEU and China are discussing the possible creation of a free trade zone, but so far this remains purely hypothetical. Nevertheless, the non-preferential agreement signed in late 2019 can be regarded as an important step

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toward harmonizing trade and economic relations between the EAEU and China, as well as the basis for further growth of mutual trade, which had reached approximately $110 billion by 2020. The new level of cooperation with ASEAN became a component of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The Sochi Declaration “Moving Towards a Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit” was adopted following the Russia–ASEAN summit in Sochi in May 2016, alongside the plan for the cooperation between ASEAN and the Russian Federation. The latter document envisages, among other things, the intention to consider mutually beneficial cooperation between ASEAN, the EAEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.14 The progress of integration processes in the security sphere needs to be analyzed largely in the context of external influence. Although some obstacles have been overcome and certain success has been attained, the internal problems in the member countries and interstate tensions between them reduce the status of security cooperation to inert. The existing structures—the SCO and the CSTO—have a broad representation, but the positions of the member states appear to be fragmented. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which has increased its membership, has become less interested in security issues and instead focuses on economic, humanitarian, educational and cultural interaction.15 The CSTO is faced with objective difficulties formulating a unified stance on crises in its member states. The operation of this organization is essentially blocked by the presence of conflicting parties (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), which will be unable to reach a constructive solution when one is needed. The geographical dispersion of the CSTO members accounts for the difference in the national approaches to prioritizing regional security issues. Security challenges that are relevant to the Central Asian countries are not perceived as relevant in Minsk and Yerevan. The chance that the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict will be put on the CSTO’s agenda is one of the main threats to the operation of the organization, which has been repeatedly demonstrated by military escalations following 2016. The issue of Russia’s peacekeeping potential remains unclear, primarily from the perspective of its international formalization and legitimization. Even within the CSTO, there is no consensus on how Russia’s stated intention to ensure extraterritorial protection of Russian citizens, which underlies Moscow’s foreign policy doctrine after the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, can be implemented.

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Once we establish the weakness of institutional security structures, we can move on to a more general premise of the “security vacuum” in the post-Soviet space. The CSTO countries have encountered the need to revise the principles of their operation. Meanwhile, latent instability in Central Asia and instances of explosive destabilization in the Armenia– Azerbaijan relationship once again incite discussions about Russia’s military role in Central Asia and arguments about the “exclusiveness of the Russian factor” as a guarantor of stability in the CIS space.

Important

A new phase of “positional symmetry” of the impacts of regional and extra-regional players in the CIS space has presumably begun as the new world order is being formed. After the Ukraine crisis unfolded, a new short-term consensus was achieved in mutual perception, where “red lines” have been defined for post-Soviet countries, while extra-regional players can use the potential for drastic internal transformations in order to change the status quo.

Along with the apparent internationalization of conflict settlement processes, Russia still remains the initiator of the key stages of these processes and in many ways shapes the international and political framework in which they unfold. At the same time, “new” extra-regional players, primarily Turkey and China, are increasingly interested in the post-Soviet space. That said, Eurasia is becoming a central geographic element of the confrontation between China and the United States and the economic rivalry between China and the European Union. The conflicting nature of the interaction between global players has a potentially destabilizing effect on the development of post-Soviet states, considering that only Russia possesses the toolkit to exert direct influence on troubled areas and has a genuine security interest in maintaining a fair and sustainable regional equilibrium.

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Important

The security situation in the post-Soviet space can be described as “negative stability.” Any destabilization is fraught with the risk of unbalancing the entire system. The current situational equilibrium of influences emphasizes the trend to perceive Russia’s role as more of a natural security guarantor. The question is the degree of conceptualization and integrity of Russia’s goal-setting. The case of Ukraine has proved that the return of global players to the CIS scene can easily and quickly alter the format of the situation.

∗ ∗ ∗ The analysis of the main processes, institutional structures and models of behavior in the post-Soviet space must include the factor of a correlation between centrifugal and centripetal trends. This space is characterized by a more or less free, yet not always stable, process of differentiation, resulting in a situation where some entities find themselves in the diverging trend relative to Russia, and some appear to be in the converging trend. The post-Soviet area is a persistent venue of open international competition, which at times becomes particularly fierce on account of disputes over raw materials or military-political challenges. An additional point is that the development of the political space along the perimeter of Russia’s borders is closely associated with Moscow’s desire to not only strengthen its regional authority, but also consolidate and enhance its status as a leading world power. Having established an individual, largely independent platform for international activity, the political and geographical complex of the newly independent states is susceptible to almost any major global development trend. The current stage of evolution of the newly independent states is marked by their obvious involvement in continental and global processes as both objects affected by external influence and subjects with significant potential for independent action. The factors driving the next round of global competition will include not only the traditional competition for influence between the leading extra-regional actors, which has been fuelled by the policy of balancing and by playing on the contradictions of the countries in question. Internal political transformations in all of the region’s countries—and in many cases the modification in the paradigm of internal political organization and the

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ultimate conclusion of the “post-Soviet” stage of their development—are playing an increasingly important role in determining the parameters of Eurasian structuring.

Keywords CIS, EAEU, post-Soviet space, integration, “negative stability,” multivector policy, “alignment.” Self-Test 1. How and on what basis is the post-Soviet space structured? 2. What is the ratio of convergent and divergent processes in the postSoviet space? 3. What are the features of integration processes in the post-Soviet space? 4. What is the political significance of energy export and transit for the post-Soviet states? 5. What is Russia’s role in the processes ongoing in the post-Soviet space?

Notes 1. L.B. Vardomsky, and S.P. Glinkina, eds. The Post-Socialist World: Results of Transformation. Vol 2: Post-Soviet States (St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2017). 2. S.A. Ivanova, “Contemporary Trends of Integration Cooperation in the EAEU,” Scientific Bulletin, no. 1 (2016), http://ucom.ru/doc/nv.2016. 01.054.pdf. 3. V. Komarovsky, “Russia and the CIS: Migration Flow Behaviour,” Russia and the New Eurasia States, no. 2 (2020): 151–170. 4. Looking to capitalize on their “intermediate” position, the young states tend toward the limitrophe policy, which is mostly characterized by the use of their transit status in a game where they benefit from the exacerbation of relations. The term “limitrophe,” which entered the political parlance of the twentieth century after the dissolution of the Russian Empire and was applied to Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 1920s, was revived in the 1990s. It was often employed to describe almost any state of the former Soviet Union with the exception of Russia. The limitrophe policy is more characteristic of those states which chose to completely disrupt their established ties with Russia and have exploited their geographical

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position to enhance their appeal in the eyes of the European Union and NATO. EDB-2009 System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration. Almaty, 2009. Channels and Degree of Impact of External Shocks on the Economies of EDB Member States. EDB: Thematic Report No. 11. 2019, https://eabr. org/upload/iblock/24a/EABR_Thematic_Report_11_2019_RU.pdf. L.B. Vardomsky, “Eurasian Integration and the Greater Eurasian Partnership,” Russia and the New States of Eurasia, no. 3 (2019): 9–26. Y.V. Borovsky, The World Energy Supply System (Moscow: Navona, 2008), 115. Y.V. Borovsky, “Obstacles to Way of Russian Energy Export: Competition or Rivalry,” Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Russia and the World, no. 2 (2018): 148–157. The change of the ruling elites in the three states—Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan—had a similar scenario. The opposition, which enjoyed broad popular support, challenged the results of regular elections, and came to power through the forceful seizure of government agencies, while internal security agencies remained uninvolved (the November 2003–January 2004 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia; the March 2005 “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan) or through a new ballot, which secured the necessary result (the November–December 2004 “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine). Proposed by US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in 1993, and formalized as the directive of the National Security Council “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” in 1994. Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Linking the Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt, www.kremlin.ru. R.S. Grinberg, and A.G. Pylin, “Eurasian Economic Union: Key Development Trends amid Global Uncertainty,” Regional Economy 16, no. 2 (2020). A declaration and a cooperation development plan with Russia were adopted at the end of the Russia–ASEAN summit, http://tass.ru/pol itika/3301017. In addition to full member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, there is the status of observer states and “dialogue partners.”

Recommended Reading Bogaturov, A.D. International Relations in Central Asia. Events and Documents: Study Guide, ed. by Bogaturov, A.D., Dundich, A.S., and Korgun, V.G. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2014.

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Broers L., Iskandaryan A., Minasyan S., eds. The Unrecognized Politics of De Facto States in the Post-Soviet Space. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute, International Association for the Study of the Caucasus, 2015. Degterev, D.A., and Kurylev, K.P., ed. and comp. CIS Foreign Policy: Study Guide for University Students. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2017. European Union Impact on Central Asia: Political, Economic, Security and Social Spheres. New York, 2018. Lukin, A.V., and Novikov, D.P., eds. New International Relations in Greater Eurasia. Russian Strategy in Changing Geopolitical Dynamics. Moscow: Ves mir, 2020. Makiyenko, K., ed. Allies. Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2020. Pivovar, E. The Eurasian Integration Project. Global Processes in the Post-Soviet Space. Moscow: Aletheia, 2019. Solovyov, E.G., and Chufrin, G.I., eds. Political Processes in the Post-Soviet Space: New Trends and Old Problems. Moscow: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2020. Available at: https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/ 2020/2020-019.pdf. Vedernikova, A.K., ed. The Future of Greater Europe. Prospects for the Development of the Macro-Region. Moscow: Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences; St. Petersburg: Nestor Istoriya, 2020. Zvyagelskaya, I.D. The Middle East and Central Asia. Global Trends in the Regional Context. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2018.

CHAPTER 24

Communication Spaces in the System of Interstate Conflicts Alexey Fenenko

By the early 2020s, the issue of interaction in communication spaces, which include the ocean, air, space, cyberspace and the polar regions, had become part of international relations. Ten years ago, political scientists preferred to call them “commons.” Now that term is being replaced by the concept of “communication spaces.” These spaces are not hospitable for human life, but we have learned how to use them for economic, political and military-strategic purposes. In this sense, these spaces are really communicative (from the Latin communico, “I make common”), as centers of supply, logistics, interaction, communication and contacts. This terminological nuance has a political dimension. Ten years ago, these spaces were perceived by the world’s leading nations as “undivided” and provided a common good. In a sense, they were indeed common, as long as all states formally had equal rights to use them. However, trends of the last decade indicate that these spaces may eventually be divided

A. Fenenko (B) Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0_24

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between the great powers. The competition to redistribute communication spaces can complement the traditional struggle for territory and increase the number of possible scenarios of interstate conflicts.

The World Ocean Ocean spaces are redistributed most fiercely. Historically, the high seas were the first of the communication spaces that states tried to own. As early as the second millennium BC, the phenomenon of thalassocracies emerged—maritime powers that built their economies by establishing control over water trade routes. In the modern era, historians distinguish two rounds of rivalry between maritime powers, called the “maritime ages.” The first maritime age (from the late sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century) was a period of violent struggle between Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain and France, which resulted in the establishment of British maritime hegemony. The second maritime age (from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century) saw the decline of British maritime hegemony and a new round of struggle among the ocean powers: Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the United States and Japan. The outcome of the struggle was the establishment of American hegemony over the world’s oceans, which continues to this day. Between the two “maritime ages,” US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) introduced the concept of “sea power.” In Mahan’s view, it was the countries that possessed powerful fleets, such as Rome, Spain, the Netherlands and Great Britain, that played the key role in world history. Countries that failed to achieve maritime dominance (China, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal and France) lost the struggle for world supremacy. “Sea power,” according to Mahan, did not simply mean the possession of a powerful navy: no less important was the constant presence of the navy in the world’s oceans. The author summarized the path to this goal with the formula “naval fleet + merchant fleet + naval bases = sea power.” The situation in the Soviet Union was somewhat different. The USSR’s attempts to challenge US maritime dominance in the 1970s were unsuccessful. Although Admiral Sergey Gorshkov applied the concept of “sea power” to Soviet ocean strategy, his efforts did not yield the expected result, primarily because the USSR lacked easy access to the world’s oceans. In the 1960s, Soviet diplomacy placed its stake on the development of the concept of “ocean governance.” Its goals were: (1) to prevent

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domination of the world’s oceans by any one power; and (2) to ensure that all countries have access to the use of the world’s oceans. The modern system of international maritime law was created to consolidate the American (or, more broadly, Anglo-Saxon) dominance. In 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson (1916–1920) proposed to make freedom of the seas (ensuring free navigation for all) the basic principle of international maritime law. This concept was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations following the First World War, and reaffirmed after the Second World War. The Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea (1958) postulated the principles of freedom of the high seas, exclusive flag state jurisdiction, the peaceful use of the world ocean, and state sovereignty over internal waters and territorial seas. Eventually, the Americans were compelled to compromise with the Soviets, especially since the USSR had secured the support of developing countries. In 1970, the UN General Assembly established an “international ocean governance” regime, under which all states were given equal rights to exploit the high seas and were to be equally responsible for the fate of their resources. These principles were further elaborated in the Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972) and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974). The legal regime of the World Ocean was finally formalized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which came into force on November 16, 1994. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea gave nation states the ownership of about a quarter of the world’s oceans. State sovereignty extended to internal, territorial and archipelagic waters. The high seas (ocean spaces) were declared neutral, i.e., excluded from the sovereignty of states. A special legal regime was established for the following units: • enclosed and semi-enclosed seas —a sea not used for transit passage to another sea or ocean; • contiguous zone—12 nautical miles from territorial waters over which the State has sovereignty with regard to environmental protection, taxation, customs control and migration; • exclusive economic zone—200 nautical miles from the coastline where the State has exclusive rights to exploit all natural resources; • continental shelf —350 nautical miles from the coastline where adjacent states have an exclusive right to exploit natural and biological resources.

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A separate regime was set up for the international seabed area. The UN Convention provided that no state could claim sovereignty over the seabed beyond its territorial waters. The seabed and ocean floor were declared the “common heritage of mankind,” and the International Seabed Authority was established under the UN to steward it. However, the convention allowed states to exert their sovereignty over adjacent portions of the continental shelf. This was compounded by the uncertainty of the principles that governed the delimitation of the continental shelf. At the end of the twentieth century, the International Court of Justice settled a series of interstate disputes over portions of the shelf. But the mandate to resolve these disputes is now gradually being transferred to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). There is, however, the question of whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction over states that have not ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is also not clear whether the ITLOS may review decisions of the International Court of Justice or earlier agreements. In order to implement “ocean governance,” the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the International Hydrographic Bureau, the International Association of Physical Sciences of the Ocean and the Special Committee on the Exploration of the Sea at the United Nations were established. The great powers also agreed to partially limit military activities in the oceans. The system of ocean governance was further reinforced by environmental agreements. In 1992, participants at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro emphasized the importance of joint efforts to protect of the ocean ecosystem. Right from the outset, however, the leading powers reserved legal opportunities for themselves to partially circumvent the requirements of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. As early as 1983, the USSR declared that it would not accept procedures entailing binding decisions in the resolution of disputes under UN jurisdiction. The same reservation was made by the Russian Federation, for which the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force on April 11, 1997. On August 3, 1984, the G7 countries adopted the “Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters,” which established that decisions on the disposal of natural resources made by the International Seabed Authority were not binding. After a series of negotiations, Washington and the UN Preparatory Commission signed an addendum to this

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document in 1994. The Commission promised to give the United States a number of privileges: not to limit its economic activities on the seabed in disputed areas of the shelf and to move to a group voting system in the Council of the International Seabed Authority. At the same time, the great powers retained the right to divide the remaining part of the World Ocean among themselves. This could be achieved by gradually removing sea areas with disputed status from the jurisdiction of the Convention. Marginal seas are marine areas adjacent to the continent, slightly separated from the ocean by peninsulas and islands. This concept allows neighboring states to declare such spaces as their territorial waters. Marginal seas can be divided among several countries. Precedents for such division exist. The Caribbean countries established a legal regime of “autonomous governance” for the Caribbean Sea in 1990. This sea became the territorial waters of the adjoining countries. In the future, the “Caribbean precedent” may be extended to a number of disputed seas—the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, Chukchi Sea and the Bellingshausen Sea off the coast of Antarctica. Australia and New Zealand are considering creating a similar regime for the Tasman Sea. Territorial seas are marginal seas that states have declared to be under their jurisdiction. In 1920–1924, the Soviet Union declared ownership of the White Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea. After the annexation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in 1945, the USSR declared the Sea of Okhotsk its territorial sea. In 1969, Australia, despite protests by Indonesia and France, declared the Coral Sea its territory. On January 1, 1985, Canada introduced an internal sea waters regime for the Arctic straits that form the Northwest Passage. Enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (also—Mediterranean seas) are defined by the 1982 UN Convention as seas that run deep into the land and are connected to the ocean by one or more straits. Depending on the hydrological regime (wind circulation, currents and salinity level), they are subdivided into intra- and intercontinental. A change in hydrological regime may change the geographical and, consequently, the legal status of these seas and the straits connected to them. There are precedents in international law for the creation of special management regimes for inland seas. In 1857, the Copenhagen Convention was adopted, declaring the open status of the Baltic Sea. It was followed in 1936 by the Montreux Convention governing the Bosporus

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and Dardanelles straits and the Sea of Marmara between them. There may eventually be more discussion on the development of special international legal regimes for the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, the Aegean Sea and the Adriatic Sea. In the Indian Ocean, special systems of governance could be created for the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The area between the Indian and Pacific Oceans—the Banda Sea, the Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea and the Java Sea—is also of great interest. Australian and Indonesian geographers often refer to this complex as the “Australasian Mediterranean,” which supports the claim that this basin should be granted a special legal status. Inland seas have no access to the world’s oceans. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not provide a clear definition of their legal status, although it recognizes the right of non-coastal countries to access such spaces for commercial or scientific purposes. Scientifically, the criteria for classifying water bodies as inland seas rather than lakes are not always clear. This creates conflicts of law, which, in turn, prompts debates on whether the legal status of such bodies needs to be revised. The Caspian Sea presents an interesting precedent with regard to the determination of its status. Since 1991, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have argued over whether the Caspian Sea should be considered a sea or a lake and, accordingly, whether it falls under the basic principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This precedent could play a major role for the Aral Sea, a drainless salt lake on the border of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Unrecognized seas are curious formations that have been independently created by nation states by declaring a part of the World Ocean to be a certain sea. A classic example is the Mediterranean region. For example, Greece independently created the Sea of Crete, Spain created the Balearic Sea, France created the Corsican Sea, Italy created the Ligurian Sea, the Sea of Sardinia, the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Maltese Sea. The International Geographical Union Commission does not officially recognize these seas as distinct from the Mediterranean Sea. But there is a certain habituation effect with regard to these quasi seas: they are in practice marked on numerous geographical maps, atlases, tourist guides, internet sites, etc. Such a strategy can gradually lead to the legalization of these sea areas. After that, the corresponding states may reclassify the unrecognized seas as their territorial seas. The precedent of the Sargasso Sea: this sea is a region of the Atlantic Ocean bounded by currents forming a clockwise ocean gyre. It is not separated from the rest of the ocean by coasts, but by a series of currents.

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This raises two legal questions: first, can the status of the Sargasso Sea be reconsidered if the trajectory of the currents fluctuates? And, second, is it possible to declare parts of the World Ocean as separate sea areas on this basis? (Suffice it to recall the discussions in the United States about the possibility of declaring the Hudson Bay or the Persian Gulf as special seas.) The environmental factor is taking on new significance. Back in 1995, the Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities was adopted. In 2002, the participants of World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (South Africa) recommended that all countries, first, adopt the ecosystem approach to the management of coastal and ocean areas, and second, help third-world countries develop marine policy and integrated coastal area management mechanisms. This opens up opportunities for each state to implement its own environmental policy. Rivalry under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was largely political and diplomatic in nature. In the 2010s, the situation began to change due to China’s transition to a more offensive naval strategy. Admiral Liu Huaqing (1916–2011), who was the commander of the naval forces of the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) from 1982 to 1988, became the theorist of China’s naval strategy (the “Chinese Mahan”). Applying the ideas of the German geopolitical thinker Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), he proposed a project whereby the Chinese fleet would obtain access to the World Ocean by moving along the chain of islands: first from Japan to Indonesia, and then from the Mariana Islands to the island of Guam. An updated version of this maritime strategy was presented in 2010 by Professor Shen Dingli of Fudan University (Shanghai) in the form of the “String of Pearls” concept, which involves the creation of a series of naval bases along the entire hydrocarbon transit route from the Middle East to China. China’s goal under the “Mahan formula” was to establish a chain of military bases outside coastal seas. China established naval outposts in: 1. Djibouti, in order to control the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf and part of the Indian Ocean (it is noteworthy that Djibouti has not ratified the 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which means that China could theoretically have tactical nuclear weapons at its base).

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2. Victoria Harbour in the Seychelles, used for refuelling ships and recreation of Chinese sailors along with the navies of other countries. 3. Great Coco Island (Myanmar)—a radio surveillance center and submarine navigation station. 4. Gwadar Port in Pakistan, where the PLA Navy has deployed electronic intelligence and navigation devices. By 2025 China plans to establish naval bases in Gwadar (Pakistan), the Seychelles, the Maldives, Chittagong Port (Bangladesh) and Hambantota International Port (Sri Lanka). Practicing various operations and training with aircraft carrier strike groups in the oceans is very important for the PLA Navy. Together, these bases are intended to enable the PLA Navy to control the Indian Ocean. This approach clashed with the US desire to maintain its superiority in the Pacific. The conflict in the South China Sea became the epicenter of the US–Chinese conflict. It was an escalation of the territorial dispute over two groups of islands: the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. The former were occupied in 1974 by China, but they are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. The latter are the subject of a dispute between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines. Brunei holds a special position: the country declared the Louisiana Reef in the south of the archipelago as its fishing zone, but did not make any territorial claims. The Spratly Islands are in fact divided between the conflicting parties. Unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea raise the question of whether its shelf zones should be divided in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The conflict escalated on March 22, 2010, when China declared the South China Sea a key area of interest. Those statements provoked a negative reaction at the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi on July 22–23, 2010. US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who was present at the summit, said that the US Navy was ready to help the ASEAN countries and ensure the safety of navigation in the South China Sea. On June 9, 2011, the government of Vietnam said that Chinese ships are not allowed to intrude into its economic zone. Mass anti-Chinese demonstrations were held in Vietnam, and later in the Philippines. On July 20, 2011, China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam developed a set of preliminary guidelines to resolve the territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

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The escalation in the South China Sea has allowed the United States to begin building a renewed strategy for the containment of China. It has signed a pact of agreements with three countries. 1. The Philippines. On November 11, 2011, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and the US Secretary of State signed the Manila Declaration, which confirmed the validity of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. On April 28, 2014, during the visit of President Barack Obama, the parties signed a bilateral agreement on defense cooperation for a period of ten years. In 2011, the Philippines received a Hamilton-class lead frigate from the United States named the Gregorio del Pilar, which sparked a crisis in China–Philippines relations in April 2012. 2. Vietnam. In August 2010, the two countries held their first-ever joint naval exercises in the South China Sea. On September 19, 2011, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam and the Deputy Secretary of State of the United States of the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation. The document identified five areas of US– Vietnam cooperation: the promotion of dialogue at the ministry of defense/department of state level, maritime security cooperation, joint research projects, cooperation in humanitarian affairs, and peacekeeping issues. 3. Japan. During his visit to Tokyo on April 23–25, 2014, President Barack Obama announced that the Japanese government’s scope of responsibility may be expanded. On May 14, 2015, the Japanese government approved a law that allowed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to be used outside the country, thus reversing the previous ban on military operations outside the Japanese archipelago. In 2014, China officially claimed rights to the Nansha Archipelago (the Spratly Islands) and announced plans to produce oil in the immediate vicinity of the islands. In April 2015, the Chinese side began creating new territories on the reefs through sand-dredging operations. On May 26, 2015, China announced a new military strategy under which the Chinese Navy is transitioning from defending exclusively coastal areas to providing security on the high seas. Guided by the concept of active defense, China

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enshrined the right to launch preventive local strikes against the enemy in case of a threat to the defense or the country’s borders. The response of the Obama administration was tough. In May 2015, the Department of State announced that China was occupying the disputed territory of the Spratly Islands by military force. The United States repeatedly called on China to stop developing the new territories of 3 million square kilometers, which Beijing considers its exclusive economic zone. On July 18, 2015, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet Admiral Scott Swift said that the United States was ready to respond to any incident in the South China Sea, and if necessary, could send northwards of four warships to the region. The parties failed to find a legal solution to the problem. On July 12, 2016, the International Court of Justice in The Hague upheld the claim of the Philippine authorities and ruled that China had no “historic rights” to the disputed territories in the South China Sea and could not claim an exclusive economic zone in the area of the Nansha (Spratly) Archipelago. The Chinese authorities, in turn, have not recognized the court’s decision and do not intend to abide by it. Beijing expressly stated that “the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it.” There was an underlying problem behind the incident: the international legal institutions have demonstrated that they have no mechanisms for resolving disputed maritime issues. The Trump administration attempted to move forward with shows of force. On January 23, 2017, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said that the new administration would protect the international status of disputed territories in the South China Sea. In May 2018, the USS Higgins and the missile cruiser USS Antietam sailed within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands in the South China Sea. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China said that Beijing had been forced to send its ships and aircraft to demand that the US ships to leave the territorial waters. In response, a US B-52 strategic bomber made a show of flying near the disputed islands in the South China Sea. The diplomatic conflict in the South China Sea, despite its seemingly local nature, carries global significance. China’s victory would mean that the Chinese fleet would be able to move beyond the coastal seas, and this would create a precedent for the exclusion of some maritime areas from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States and small countries in Southeast Asia, on the contrary, see this conflict as a way to

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preserve the current status quo in the World Ocean, which is extremely advantageous for the United States, while the American maritime hegemony is still in place. In this sense, the conflict in the South China Sea can be seen as a kind of testing ground for future US clashes with countries wishing to challenge its dominance in the oceans.

Polar Regions Shifts in the “ocean governance” system raised the question of whether polar regions—defined as the sea areas around the North and South Poles—should be divided among states. The special term “cryosphere” is frequently used in modern political science to refer to them. A revision of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea would open up the door to changing the legal status of Antarctica. The Antarctic continent was discovered in 1819–1821 by Russian expeditions led by Fabian Gottlieb Thaddeus von Bellingshausen and Mikhail Lazarev. However, the Russian Empire could not claim a full presence in the southern hemisphere without having an ocean fleet. By the mid-twentieth century, a number of states had claimed parts of Antarctica as their territory: • The United Kingdom, which declared the creation of the British Antarctic Territory (20° E to 80° W) in 1908. • New Zealand, which declared sovereignty over the Ross Dependency (150° W, 160° E) and King Edward VII Land (77° S, 155° W) in 1923. • Australia, which claimed Victoria Land (between 44° E and 136° E) and Enderby Land (between 142° E and 160° E) in 1933. • France, which declared the creation of Adélie Land (136° E to 142° E) in 1924 and established a special administrative entity called the French Southern and Antarctic Lands in 1955. • Germany, which proclaimed the formation of New Swabia (10° W to 20° E) in 1939. • Norway, which declared sovereignty over Peter I Island, Bouvet Island and adjoining territories (the “Bouvet sector”) in 1927–1929, and over Queen Maud Land in 1939 (20° W to 44° E). • Chile, which declared the creation of Chilean Antarctica (53° W to 90° W) in 1940. • Argentina, which declared in 1943 the creation of Argentine Antarctica (25° W to 74° W) in 1943.

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The US Antarctic Service was launched in 1939. It explored King Edward VII Land, despite protests by Great Britain and New Zealand, and from 1946 organized Operation Highjump and Operation Windmill in the region. Operation Deep Freeze, a joint Antarctic expedition by the United States and New Zealand, was then carried out in 1955. The very fact that such an operation took place meant that the former British dominions were beginning to engage with Washington rather than London on the Antarctic issue. Until the mid-twentieth century, the USSR’s Antarctic policy was only sporadic. In 1939, the Soviet Union, together with the United States, protested against Norway’s proclamation of its sovereignty over the “Bouvet sector.” But the Soviet geographical maps of the 1930s and 1950s showed the self-proclaimed Antarctic possessions of the great powers as dotted lines. Stalin seemed to be preparing to recognize the division of Antarctica on the model of other continents due to the lack of any Soviet interests in the region. The situation changed after the Soviet Antarctic Expedition in the mid-1950s. The First Soviet Composite Antarctic Expedition (CAE) was arranged in 1955. In 1956, the first Soviet Antarctic observatory, Mirny Station, was founded, and one year later, the Soviet Vostok Station was founded near the South Geomagnetic Pole. This started the process of systematic research of the southern polar region by the USSR. At the same time, neither Washington nor Moscow could establish full control over Antarctica. This prompted both superpowers to start developing a system of Antarctic governance. In 1956, the prime minister of New Zealand proposed to transfer the functions of control and management of the Antarctic to the United Nations. India made similar proposals in 1956 and 1958, seeking to include the use of the Antarctic for the benefit of humankind on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The International Geophysical Year, held from July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, became a platform where the countries that had claims to divide the Antarctic, as well as the USSR and the United States, began negotiations on the future of the region. The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959. It prohibited states from declaring sovereignty over any part of the Antarctic territory or carrying out military activities on it, including nuclear tests and the disposal of radioactive waste. States were also forbidden from conducting economic activity in Antarctica, that is, to mine minerals. The only legitimate use of Antarctica was scientific research.

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Under pressure from the USSR and the United States, most of the competing powers were forced to accede to this treaty, i.e., to withdraw their open claims to Antarctic territories. Moscow and Washington made a reservation that in principle they can put forward their own territorial claims in the Antarctic, though they have thus far refused to do so. The Antarctic Treaty came into force on June 23, 1961. At the same time that the Antarctic Treaty was signed, the USSR and the United States agreed on the neutrality of the Antarctic seas. As early as 1937, the International Geographic Union Commission defined the Southern Ocean with its boundary being the Antarctic Circumpolar Current, passing between 40° S and 50° S. In 1953, the International Geographic Commission confirmed the establishment of the new ocean. (Although the International Geographic Commission had not yet accepted the principle of compulsory division of the World Ocean into five ocean spaces.) Here, however, a legal conflict arose immediately. The Antarctic Treaty area is limited to 60° S, and it is not clear which legal norms are in force between 40° S and 60° S—the norms of that Treaty or the international Law of the Sea. The countries vying for the division of Antarctica took advantage of this window of opportunity. A competition emerged between them for the border territories between 40° S and 60° S (the “subantarctic territories”). Claims were made by Argentina and the United Kingdom (the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands) and Argentina and Chile (the Tierra del Fuego archipelago). Norway, despite protests by the USSR and the United States, upheld the 1927 Royal Decree on its accession to the Bouvet sector. French Antarctic possessions include the Crozet Islands, the Kerguelen Islands, Île Saint-Paul and Île Amsterdam. Australia owns Heard Island and McDonald Islands, as well as the Macquarie Island; New Zealand owns the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island; and South Africa owns the Prince Edward Islands. The United Kingdom claims the Tristan da Cunha Islands and Gough Island, located north of 60° S, as part of its Antarctic territories. The dispute around these islands and their continental shelf raised the question of whether to regard the Antarctic Circumpolar Current (40° S) or the Antarctic Treaty area (60° S) as the border of the Southern Ocean. The 1982 Falklands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina set a precedent for an armed struggle to revise the legal status of the Antarctic territories. At the same time, the non-nuclear status of the

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Antarctic was questioned. (In 2003, the United Kingdom confirmed the presence of nuclear weapons on board its ships during the Falkland War.) The British use of the American military base on Ascension Island (the center of the Atlantic Ocean) raised the question of whether territories outside the continent could be used for military activities in the Antarctic. Influenced by the outcome of the conflict, Brazil declared in 1986 that it had a zone of interest in the Antarctic between 28° W and 53° W. Given these circumstances, Moscow and Washington took steps to strengthen the international status of the Antarctic. Back in 1980, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was signed, confirming the status of the continent as an international nature reserve. In 1986, Antarctica was officially declared a nuclear-free zone. In 1988, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities was opened for signing. The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol) was signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1999. The Protocol reaffirmed the provisions of the 1959 Treaty and imposed a 50-year moratorium on the extraction of minerals in the region. In 2000, the International Geographic Commission defined the Southern Ocean as a special water area below 60° S. In 2001, Russia, supported by the United States, succeeded in establishing the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, with its headquarters in Buenos Aires (Argentina). In 2003, a package of documents to regulate its operation was adopted in Madrid. The Secretariat started its work on September 1, 2004. But on February 17, 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued an advisory note stressing that Russia opposes the recognition of territorial claims in the Antarctic and supports the system of its international governance. The document stressed that long before the Antarctic Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union “repeatedly declared … that it reserved all rights regarding state ownership of the lands (i. e. Antarctica and a number of adjacent islands) discovered and explored in 1820–1822 by the expeditions of Fabian Bellingshausen and Mikhail Lazarev. Russia as the successor of the USSR maintains the same approach to the ‘territorial question’ in the Antarctic.” Interaction in Antarctica was a subject of discussion at the meetings of Russian and Latin American leaders. Such cooperation was declared possible during the visits of President of Chile Michelle Bachelet to Moscow (April 3–4, 2009) and President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev to Argentina (April 14–15, 2010).

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In theory, Russia could benefit from the division of Antarctica. First of all, this would harmonize the Russian position on the Antarctic and the Arctic; second, the Antarctic countries could recognize Russian possessions in the Arctic in exchange for Russia’s recognition of their territories in Antarctica. So far, however, Russia has taken the path of strengthening the Antarctic governance regime. On September 8, 2012, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Antarctic. This meant a partial refusal by Russia to consult with the countries of Latin America on the issue of Antarctica. A more intense struggle unfolded over the status of the Arctic. The modern system for dividing the Arctic was formed as a result of competition between the Arctic countries at the turn of the twentieth century. Referred to as the “sector principle” in international law, this approach divides the Arctic between circumpolar countries into sectors following the meridians coming from the westernmost and easternmost points of the countries’ northern borders and meeting at the North Pole. In 1925, Canada declared that all lands and islands north of the Canadian mainland were subject to its sovereignty. In 1926, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR stated that “All lands and islands, both discovered and which may be discovered in the future […] located in [that sector], are proclaimed to be territory of the USSR.” In 1933, Denmark created a smaller Arctic sector on the basis of its possessions in Greenland. In 1934, Norway followed suit. The smallest sector by area was created by the United in 1928 in Alaska. In this regard, Washington traditionally did not recognize the system of sectoral division, although it did not contest it in practice. Three subarctic states—Finland, Sweden and Iceland—played a special role. They did not receive Arctic sectors, although they had claimed possessions in the Arctic in the past. After the Second World War, Finland lost its access to the Arctic Ocean through the port of Petsamo (Pechenga), which it had received from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic under the Treaty of Tartu signed in 1920. Sweden did not receive the status of an Arctic power, although it is disputing Russia’s claim to be the first country to use the Northern Sea Route. Stockholm refers to the fact that this route was first traversed by the Swedish expedition of Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld in 1878. Iceland did not receive any Arctic possessions due to the lack of territories beyond the Arctic Circle.

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The status of the North Pole and the question of who reached it first remain controversial. In 1948, the Soviet transport aircraft Li-2 delivered the expedition of Pavel Gordienko and Alexander Kuznetsov to the North Pole, although the American side considered this fact unproved. In 1952, a C-47 transport plane landed at the North Pole with the American expedition of Joseph Fletcher and William Benedict. Since 1909, Canada has also laid claim to the pole. The International Court of Arbitration ruled in 1951 that in one hundred years the North Pole could belong to Canada if no other country could prove its right to this territory during that time. In 1979, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to move the eastern border of the Eurasian and North American continents westward to 168° 58' W. This decision caused a territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States over some offshore areas in the Bering and Chukchi seas. On June 1, 1990, the parties signed an agreement under which the disputed territory of 50,000 square kilometers was transferred to the United States. The USSR and the United States basically restored the maritime border to the state on January 1, 1979. The Congress ratified that agreement on September 18, 1990. Washington does not recognize Russia’s claims, and Russia does not consider the agreement to be in force. The boundary dispute in the Bering Sea created a precedent for rivalry between the USSR and the United States in the subarctic territories. There was no clear boundary between the countries in the shelf zones in the Bering Strait, and the territorial border in the Chukchi Sea was not defined either. In 1924, the United States recognized the USSR’s territorial claims to Wrangel Island, but it did not recognize the establishment of the East Siberian Sea as a separate sea area in 1935 and its status as a territorial sea of the USSR. In theory, this allows the United States to question the right of ships to enter the East Siberian Sea, including Wrangel Island. After the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea came into force, the borders of the Arctic states were formally reduced to 12 nautical miles from the coastline. The next 200 miles are designated a special economic zone, in which states have exclusive economic rights, but have no right to interfere with navigation. The implementation of these decisions meant the elimination of the sectoral division system. The Arctic powers had

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to prove their right of ownership in the Arctic Ocean again. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea gave the state’s jurisdiction over the continental shelf (up to 350 miles from the coast) if they could prove that the shelf was an extension of their continental platform. In the mid-1990s, the views of the Arctic powers diverged. The United States advocated for the internationalization of the Arctic Ocean. Washington’s position was shared by subarctic countries—Iceland, Sweden and Finland, which saw the internationalization of the Arctic Ocean as an opportunity to return to the Arctic. Russia and Canada, on the contrary, favored the reassertion of the Arctic sector system. Denmark and Norway were in a difficult position. Both countries had larger Arctic sectors than the United States and were formally interested in maintaining the sectoral system. At the same time, they had territorial disputes with Russia (Norway) and Canada (Denmark). The Russian Federation took the most critical stance on the “Arctic governance” project. First, in 1998, Russia adopted the concept of the “Northern Strategic Bastion,” according to which Russia’s Northern Fleet was to become the core maritime component of the country’s strategic nuclear forces. Second, it was important for Russia to keep the Northern Sea Route (NSR) under its jurisdiction. In 1965, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR introduced a regime that granted the Soviet government exclusive right to open and close the ports of the Northern Sea Route. In 1998, Russia adopted the Federal Law on the Inland Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation, which reaffirmed those principles. Other Arctic powers did not recognize these Russian laws. In order to maintain a dialogue, the Arctic countries created a consultative mechanism. In 1996, at the initiative of Finland, that mechanism formed the basis of the Arctic Council. Its formal goal was to develop measures to protect the unique environment of the northern polar zone. In reality, it became a dialogue platform for adopting coordinated decisions on Arctic issues. The Council included all five Arctic and three subarctic states. The observer countries were the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, China, South Korea, the Netherlands, Poland, France, Japan, India and Singapore.

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Important

The Arctic powers had different views on the possible implications of the “Antarctic precedent” for the Arctic. Only the United States was in favor of automatically applying the principles of the UN Convention on International Law. Other Arctic powers insisted on taking the specific character of the Arctic Ocean, covered with permafrost all the year round, into account. At a summit in Inari, Finland, on October 9–10, 2002, other Arctic powers blocked the attempt to introduce the system of “Arctic governance.”

The failure of “Arctic governance” prompted the Arctic countries to intensify their struggle for the division of the Arctic Ocean shelf. On December 20, 2001, Russia applied to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic shelf. In late 2001–early 2002, the Russian media was busy discussing projects for Russia and Canada to set up a coalition to defend the Arctic sector division system. According to unofficial reports, Ottawa offered Moscow recognition of its right to the Soviet Arctic sector. In return, Russia would have to recognize Canada’s right to the North Pole. However, no such deal ever happened. On June 28, 2002, the UN Commission recommended that Russia revise its submission to address the lack of detailed maps of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev submarine ridges. On April 13, 2004, Denmark claimed ownership of the North Pole based on its connection with the Lomonosov Ridge, which is connected to Greenland. Moscow was not happy about this move, and it led to a dispute between Russia and Denmark about the North Pole shelf zones. Doubt was also cast over the possibility of submitting a finalized application to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. If Denmark could prove that the Lomonosov underwater ridge was an extension of Greenland, it would be impossible to prove that it belongs to the Siberian Shelf. On November 27, 2006, Norway filed an application to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming 250,000 square kilometers of the Arctic shelf. On April 15, 2009, the UN Commission recognized the sovereignty of Norway over 235,000 square

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kilometers as a result, which was in sharp contrast to the Commission’s attitude to the Russian application. This led Russia to try and assert its interests more aggressively. In the summer of 2007, the Arktika 2007 polar expedition led by State Duma Deputy Artur Chilingarov was carried out. Its official purpose was to collect evidence about the connection of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges with the Siberian Shelf. On August 2, 2007, its members set a Russian flag on the ocean floor near the North Pole. This step provoked a negative response from the United States and Canada. In late July 2007, NATO military aircraft flew over the Russian expedition. The United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway made a number of condemning statements on the installation of the Russian flag at the North Pole. (“This isn’t the fifteenth century. You can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say ‘We’re claiming this territory’,” said Foreign Minister of Canada Peter MacKay.) On July 16, 2008, the US Congress held a hearing on the construction of an icebreaker fleet in the Arctic. Moscow retaliated with tough measures. On August 17, 2007, Russia announced it would resume regular strategic aviation flights. On September 20, 2007, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation stated that a preliminary analysis of the Earth’s crust based on the soil profile obtained by Arktika 2007 also proved that the Lomonosov Ridge was a part of the adjacent continental shelf. On July 14, 2008, the Northern Fleet of Russia resumed its military duty in the Arctic Ocean. The crisis of 2007 was partially resolved at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland, on May 27–29, 2008. The Arctic countries agreed to block attempts to establish a comprehensive international legal regime to manage the Arctic Ocean and to solve Arctic problems by peaceful means. Nevertheless, the parties understood the Ilulissat Declaration to be provisional. On January 9, 2009, George W. Bush signed document NSPD-66 on Arctic Region policy, drawn up by the United States National Security Council, which said that the United States had broad and fundamental national security interests in that region. On August 18, 2009, the Government of Canada published its “Northern Strategy,” which declared that the country should develop its Arctic infrastructure and prevent the spread of “ocean governance” principles in the Arctic. At the Oslo Summit on February 8, 2009, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway Thorvald Stoltenberg delivered a presentation on

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expanding Nordic military cooperation in the Arctic, including the possible creation of a joint rapid response force made up of two NATO countries (Denmark and Norway) and two neutral states (Sweden and Finland). This would be a new step toward Sweden and Finland rejecting their neutral status. Faced with this situation, Russia made steps toward rapprochement with Norway, a country that also advocated preserving the sectoral division of the Arctic. On April 27, 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister of Norway Jens Stoltenberg signed the intergovernmental agreement on the maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean in Oslo. Based on that agreement, Medvedev and Stoltenberg signed the Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean on September 15, 2010. The disputed area of the continental shelf (175,000 square kilometers) was divided equally, approximately 88,000 square kilometers for each side. Russia and Norway undertook not to claim each other’s sovereign territory beyond that line and acknowledged each other’s exclusive fishing rights within their respective sector. The parties confirmed the mandate of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission, established in 1976. Russia, however, gave up a significant territorial sector in the Barents Sea. Neither the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty (1920) nor the resolution of the Norwegian Storting (1947) was ever mentioned. Under those agreements, Oslo had guaranteed the demilitarization of Spitsbergen and the right of the USSR to conduct its business activities there and exercise its special economic rights in the archipelago. The lack of reference to those earlier agreements made it possible for Norway to raise the question of revising the status of Spitsbergen, including the removal of Russian settlements. The Murmansk Treaty was, despite certain losses in the private sector, to bring strategic benefits to Russia: its goal was to get Norway to recognize Russia’s Arctic borders. However, at the Second International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk on September 22–23, 2011, the Norwegian side did not recognize Russia’s rights to the Northern Sea Route. A series of incidents in the Barents Sea proved that Norway was squeezing Russian fishermen out from Spitsbergen.

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Important

In the mid-2010s, the prospects for the Russian–Norwegian partnership turned bleak (especially due to the sanctions imposed by the parties against each other in connection with the events in Ukraine). Russian diplomacy began to pay more attention to Denmark, which on December 15, 2014, submitted an application for 350,000 square kilometers of the Arctic shelf. A new factor emerged in the Arctic policy: Russian–Danish controversy over disputed underwater ridges near the North Pole.

In August 2015, Russia filed a “Partial Revised Submission for Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean” with the UN in order to expand the extended continental shelf of the Russian Federation to include the seabed and subsoil resources in the central part of the ocean, which are a natural extension of the Russian land territory. Russia insisted that the Lomonosov Ridge, which runs from the New Siberian Islands through the North Pole toward Canada and Greenland, as well as the Mendeleev Ridge to the east, are an extension of the Eurasian continent and thus do not fall under the 350-mile limit. The region in question, measuring approximately 1 million square kilometers, was included in the first application of the Russian Federation in 2001, which was rejected at the 11th session of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in June 2002, with reference to the insufficiently detailed seabed relief maps attached to the application and the insufficient substantiation of the continental nature of the Lomonosov Ridge and its connection with the continent. The new application, which was filed in 2015, was supported by comprehensive geological and geophysical research conducted over the course of 10 years. In the second half of the 2010s, a new factor emerged in Arctic politics: geographical discoveries. Back in 2008, an expedition aboard the nuclear-powered icebreaker Yamal discovered an island in the southwestern part of the Franz Josef Land archipelago. It was named Kuchiev Island in memory of Captain Yuri Kuchiev, under whose command the Arktika icebreaker reached the North Pole in 1977. In 2013, crews of Russian Mi-26 helicopters discovered Yaya Island in the New Siberian Islands archipelago, near the Stolbovoy and Belkovsky islands. In 2016, a

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Russian expedition on the hydrographic vessel Vizir discovered the disappearance of Pearl Island near Franz Josef Land, which had been described by explorers in the 1950s. According to official data, around 40 new islands, capes and bays were discovered and recorded in the Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya archipelagos between 2015 and 2019. The discovery of new islands occurs roughly in the same areas where explorers of the past reported the existence of mysterious lands. (The discovery of Yaya Island occurred in Vasilievsky Shallow Water— in the same sector of the Laptev Sea where the non-existent islands of Figurin, Mercuria and Diomede were registered before.) These lands have received the status of “ghost islands.” Geographers of the twentieth century declared them non-existent. Recent geographical discoveries have brought them back to the discussion. Researchers offer two explanations for this phenomenon. The first is thermokarst processes (i.e., the melting of underground ice) taking place in the Arctic. The second explanation is poor knowledge of Arctic topography. An original hypothesis was put forward by the Soviet (and later American) researcher Vadim Litinsky, who proposed to correct the coordinates indicated by polar explorers in the nineteenth century with regard for changes in magnetic declination. It may well be possible that their coordinates need to be revised due to the imperfection of the instruments and the historical recession of magnetic variations. A different viewpoint was expressed in 1947 by the Soviet geographer Vitaly Stepanov, who suggested that “Sannikov Land,” “Petermann Land” and “Andreev Land” were not iceberg islands or a case of mirage, but rather very real lands that can no longer be found because they have melted, as they had been formed by fossil ice. A peculiar form of islands exists on the shelf of Arctic seas, constituted by fragments of the ice that bounded the Arctic Ocean during the last glaciation and soil brought by dry winds from the continent and the shelf, which at that time was also land territory. These islands were, until recently, eroding. But, as recent discoveries have shown, the reverse process—their reclamation or the rise of washed-up loess on the shelf—is also possible. Thermokarst processes are underway in the Arctic Ocean, and we do not yet know their depth or duration. Chances of discovering new islets in the “deep Arctic” also remain, especially if the trend toward partial melting of the Arctic ice continues. First, thermokarst processes may occur here, especially if the Great Siberian Polynya expands. Second, new islets may appear if parts of the

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ice cover of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges melt down. So far this is all hypothetical, of course. But in any case, recent discoveries raise the question of whether we have a good idea of the real map of the Arctic.

Important

Over the past 20 years, a whole body of largely speculative literature has emerged about the forthcoming “breakthrough” of China, and even Japan, into the Arctic. It somehow overlooks the fact that the only way for them to enter the region is through the Bering Strait, i.e., it is entirely dependent on the position of the United States. Neither China, let alone Japan, has a single base in the Arctic Ocean. No agreement with Russia on supplying such a base is possible, as Russia has no meridian roads or railways leading from the Chinese borders to the Arctic Ocean (the railway to Yakutsk, which had been planned as far back as 1985, has not been completed yet).

The “China problem” has all but superseded the real tensions between the Arctic countries. The issue of dividing the Arctic shelf remains unresolved, and it is difficult to draw precise boundaries in the Arctic Ocean. The discovery of new islets (if it happens) could add to the problem. First, possible discoveries of islands outside the “special economic zones” will raise the question of their ownership. This, in turn, will raise the question of priority in their accession to one or another of the Arctic powers. Second, new islands will raise the issue of the boundaries of “special economic zones.” Their enlargement may lead to conflicts over the division of disputed waters due to the expansion of sectors that fall under the control of the Arctic states. Third, in the context of the ongoing militarization of the Arctic, the new islets may well become the basis for establishing military infrastructure, even if seemingly insignificant. This is where the race between the Arctic powers to control the still unclaimed islets could begin. The lifespan of such loess or thermokarst islands is not yet known. But in any case, their importance will increase as disputes over the division of Arctic territories intensify.

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Until recently, the Arctic powers competed with each other over the division of ocean and shelf space. There were no direct territorial disputes between them over contested islands. The situation may change in the future, and the Arctic could become an area of territorial struggle.

Outer Space and Airspace An equally fierce rivalry is unfolding in airspace. In the first half of the twentieth century, states proclaimed sovereignty over atmospheric layers belonging to them. The issue of the legal management of that space was considered by the Allies at the end of the Second World War as part of the process of the establishment of the United Nations. In 1944, the International Civil Aviation Conference was convened in Chicago. Its major result was the adoption of the Convention on International Civil Aviation on December 7, 1944: “Whereas the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security” (emphasis mine). At the conference in Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944, the USSR delegation, unexpectedly for the Allies, moved to suggest that the future UN should include a permanent international air force. This idea accorded not only with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Policemen” concept, but also with the views of Winston Churchill, who, in the last volume of his The World Crisis, published in 1929, pointed out the danger of having such a powerful force as aviation in the hands of “irresponsible” national governments and suggested creating an international air force for peace and security. It was precisely to this passage that Churchill drew the attention of the British delegation at Dumbarton Oaks when he was asked for instructions in connection with the Soviet initiative. The idea of an “international police air force” had another origin familiar to both Great Britain and the USSR: the British concept of “air control,” which was first applied in the early 1920s to “pacify” British Somaliland and the Arab tribes that had become part of the British Empire after the First World War and presented a big headache for London. The UN Charter included Article 45 stating: “In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action” (emphasis mine). But as the Cold War broke out, the establishment of an international rapid response force to

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be promptly allocated to the UN Security Council by national land, air and naval forces was put on hold for a long time. The victors in the Second World War, which became permanent members of the UN Security Council, returned to the issue of airspace management at the Geneva Summit in July 1955. The Eisenhower administration (1953–1960) proposed the Open Skies principle, according to which the aviation of all countries could make unrestricted reconnaissance flights over the territory of other states. The USSR feared that with Washington’s superiority in strategic aviation, the implementation of this principle would lead to uncontrolled surveillance of Soviet military targets. The Soviet side was only ready to agree to aerial surveys in an 800-km-wide area on both sides of the contact line between the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries—meaning that Soviet territory would not actually be included in that area. Therefore, even though the United States and Western European countries accepted the idea of “Open Skies,” it was not translated into a legal regime. Under Gorbachev, the USSR agreed to a compromise. At the CSCE Summit in Paris (November 19–21, 1990), a revised text of the treaty was endorsed by the European NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as a mechanism to verify arms control agreements. On March 24, 1992, the Treaty on Open Skies was opened for signature at the CSCE Helsinki Summit. The document enshrined: (a) the principle of state sovereignty over airspace; (b) the right of treaty states to carry out observation flights over each other’s territories; (c) the right to an equal number of observation flights; and (d) detailed inspection procedures for observation aircraft. The Parties to the Treaty on Open Skies established the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna, which takes decisions by consensus. The Commission established a databank for information collected during inspection flights. The Treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002. However, the Treaty on Open Skies was signed in the CSCE summit format and is vulnerable to criticism in this respect. Most of the major Asian and Latin American countries feel marginalized by the development of this regime. EU policy has played a particular role in this regard. As early as 1987, the creation of a “Single European Sky” began. In 2006, the European Conference of Ministers of Transport demanded that bilateral agreements between EU states and other countries be converted into horizontal agreements with the European Union. At the same time, the European Commission began blacklisting airlines that were violating

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environmental standards or pricing policies. But the European Union only gained legal personality after the Lisbon Treaty came into force on December 1, 2009, when the list was already in place. This created grounds for a potential conflict between the European Union and other countries (Russia, China, and partly India), which could consider its actions as a violation of the Treaty on Open Skies. The situation changed in 2007, when Russian strategic aviation resumed regular flights (of particular note are the Russian reconnaissance flights over Canada that took place on March 8–9, 2007). American analysts started to talk about the incompatibility of a number of provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies with the national security interests of the United States. Similar voices were heard in Canada, where the resumption of regular flights of Russian strategic aviation was connected with the diplomatic conflict around the Russian Arktika 2007 expedition. It was becoming increasingly difficult to implement the Treaty. On April 6, 2012, Georgia announced the termination of its commitments to Russia under the Treaty on Open Skies. This set a precedent for countries to withdraw from the Treaty. The next similar precedent occurred during the Russian–Turkish crisis in late 2015–early 2016. On February 3, 2016, Turkey did not allow Russian inspectors to conduct a regular observation flight. Voices for withdrawing from the Treaty on Open Skies were also growing in the United States. In April 2014, The Weekly Standard in the United States published a letter from four members of the Northern Intelligence Committee stating that Russia was introducing new aircraft that “support digital photograph equipment, sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar, and infrared equipment.” On April 15, 2014, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers urged President Barack Obama to deny Russia the right to use new Russian aircraft in US airspace. In response, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia spokesman Alexander Lukashevich said that the American side had for a long time taken “an extremely unconstructive position concerning the inspection of Russian digital surveillance equipment, setting forth requirements not stipulated by the Treaty.” On April 14 and 15, the United States chose to skip an observation flight over Russia and perform the next flight on April 21, 2014. On April 18, 2014, the United States denied Russia permission to carry out an observation flight.

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On May 21, 2020, the US administration announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies in six months. National Security Advisor of the United States Robert O’Brien said that Russia had been monitoring Donald Trump as part of the Treaty on Open Skies. According to his statement, Russian pilots had flown over the White House, as well as over Trump’s golf club. “[T]he Russians used their flights to overfly civilian infrastructure, they used it to overfly the White House, Camp David, Bedminster Golf Course, where the president spends time […] And that was not the point of the treaty,” O’Brien said. The response to the US withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies was sluggish. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, lamented the move. He called on the United States to reconsider its decision, and on Russia to immediately resume full compliance with the Treaty. On May 23, 2020, a group of EU countries said that they regretted the US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Treaty. The foreign ministries of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland issued a joint statement on the matter stating that “The Open Skies Treaty is a crucial element of the confidence-building framework that was created over the past decades in order to improve transparency and security across the Euro-Atlantic area.” The United Kingdom, Norway and Poland did not join the statement. The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Russia would continue to adhere to the agreement. Therefore, the fears of European countries that they would be deprived of surveillance flights because of the collapse of the Treaty on Open Skies are unfounded.

Important

The debate on the airspace management regime entails a discussion of the legal status of outer space. There is no definition of outer space in international law. Most states, following the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (World Air Sports Federation), believe that the boundary between atmosphere and outer space lies at 100 kilometers above sea level. The United States takes a different, functional approach, which says that there is no need to

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establish a clear border between the two spaces. It is better to distinguish between aviation and space activities depending on the type of the apparatus being used. This opens possibilities for states to declare sovereignty over the layers between space and atmosphere.

The norms of space law are enshrined in the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The main principles of space policy reflected in that document were the exploration and use of space in the interests of all humankind, the equality of all countries in space exploration, the conduct of space activities in accordance with international law and a ban on the appropriation of outer space by states. The articles stipulating the use of celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes and the prohibition of launching weapons of mass destruction into space played a special role. However, there are legal gaps within the treaty that could lead to the collapse of the “space governance” regime.

Important

In the early 2000s, a number of states tried to intensify space research. Ambitious space projects modelled on the Soviet and American space programs of the 1960s came into vogue. These events are referred to in the literature as the “second space race” (by analogy with the “first space race”—the Soviet–American competition in 1957–1975). The starting date of the “second space race” is considered to be around 2003–2004 and was triggered by the successes of China in the field of space exploration. Back in 1992, China launched a three-phase manned space program. The China National Space Administration was established on March 25, 1996, in order to manage its implementation. Russia and China concluded an intergovernmental protocol granting Beijing access to Russian rocket and space technologies for peaceful purposes. This made it easier for China to organize the orbital flight of the Shenzhou 3 automatic

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spacecraft in February 2003. On October 15, 2003, China became the third country in the world to conduct a manned orbital flight, using the Shenzhou 4 spacecraft.

China’s successes spurred a group of countries seeking to join the “space club” to move forward with similar projects. In 2001, India launched seven satellites into polar orbits using the GSLV three-stage launch vehicle. The European Space Agency (ESA) intensified its program of developing Ariane launch vehicles, which had been operating since 1979. On October 23, 2004, Brazil launched the VSB-30 two-stage rocket to the boundary between the atmosphere and space. With Russia’s help, Iran put its first research satellite (Sina-1) into orbit (2005) and announced a test of the Messenger rocket (2008). New Zealand tested the model of the suborbital launch vehicle Atea-2 on November 30, 2009, which drew a negative response from China. Australia and Argentina, the United Kingdom and Germany, Hungary and Israel, Indonesia and Spain, South Korea and Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan showed interest in the development of unmanned space exploration. These events triggered an anxious response from the United States. On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush declared the beginning of the “second space race,” which required the United States to launch a new program of space exploration. Studying the Moon and Mars (including through manned flights) as well as monitoring solar system objects were declared NASA’s priority objectives. These decisions were codified in the US National Space Policy in 2006. The US space initiatives compelled Russia, the ESA and China to launch alternative programs, which largely mirrored the priorities of NASA. For several years, the space powers tried to act in the spirit of the 1960s. They started an intense rivalry for the title of pioneer in exploring the surface of the Moon, Mars, Venus and Mercury, the gas planets, and even the Sun. In near space, Russia resumed the deployment of its GLONASS system, which had been interrupted in 1995. Other countries also put forward projects to develop systems such as Galileo (ESA), BeiDou (China), Quasi-Zenith (Japan) and IRNSS (India). The rivalry of peaceful space programs was supplemented by the military programs of the great powers—from the project to create a space anti-missile defense

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echelon by the George W. Bush administration to the tests of anti-satellite weapons by the United States and China. However, at the beginning of the 2010s, all space powers drastically reduced the scale of their research programs. This allowed experts to declare the end of the “second space race.” But in general, the “second space race” did not change the balance of forces in space. Like before, the space powers are divided into five groups: 1. countries that possess the full range of space technologies (the United States, Russia, China); 2. countries capable of implementing individual space projects (ESA, France, Japan, India); 3. countries that are building capacity for future space programs (Brazil, Iran, South Korea, New Zealand); 4. countries that are developing space projects in cooperation with other space powers (Argentina, Venezuela, Israel, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, etc.); 5. countries that are supplying individual rocket technologies to the international market (Ukraine, Belarus, Pakistan).

Important

The six-year stagnation that followed the end of the “second space race” is understandable and logical—the space powers effectively acknowledged the limit of their scientific and technological capabilities. The United States has focused on deep space exploration (primarily mapping of the Solar System planets) using unmanned vehicles. NASA is still the leader in this area. However, in the first half of the 2010s, it scaled back such projects due to their high cost and lack of immediate returns. The reverse side of these successes was the “slump” of the United States in the near space, where it ended up being largely dependent on Russia for its space activity. In spite of its loud declarations, the Americans have not yet managed to create a new generation of manned spacecraft for near space exploration.

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The stagnation of 2012–2018 highlighted a strategic problem for the United States: NASA began to lose its customary role as the world leader in astronautics. Ten years ago, other space powers, including Russia, were setting their space priorities on the NASA model, as far as financial and scientific resources allowed. Now there is a feeling that the United States was not up to the tasks it had declared in 2004. President Donald Trump’s call to resume the space race, voiced in December 2017, has not yet led to any tangible results. America’s leadership in the field of unmanned space flight and deep space exploration is still preserved, but other states are increasingly prioritizing space without any regard for NASA’s activities. Theoretically, they have a chance to make breakthroughs without looking back at the United States.

Important

Russia retains leadership in manned space flight, and the Russian Soyuz spacecraft will remain the only means of delivering astronauts to the ISS in the foreseeable future. Russia has the second largest satellite constellation after the United States. In the spring of 2012, it managed to bring the GLONASS system to regular operation at 1995 levels and to keep a near monopoly on space flights, as well as a leadership on the commercial launch market. But Russia’s accomplishments in the field of astronautics are still largely based on the achievements of the Soviet military-industrial complex, primarily the rocket and space industry, and the successes of Roscosmos are due to the modernization of manned Soyuz-type spaceships, communication satellites and creation of the Strela and Rokot light launch vehicles on the basis of the UR-100N heavy intercontinental ballistic missile decommissioned under the START-1 (1991) agreement. As Russia directed all its efforts to near-space exploration, it found itself on the side-lines of deep space exploration. The failures of Roscosmos’ Lunar, Martian and Venusian projects stand in particular contrast with the successes (albeit limited) of only the United States, and even those of China and Japan.

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To make up ground on Russia, the United States gambled on the development of private manned astronautics. The effort was led by the well-known entrepreneur Elon Musk (born in 1971). In December of 2008, NASA signed a contract with his company Space X to the tune of $1.6 billion that envisaged 12 launches of the Falcon 9 Air carrier and the Dragon spacecraft to the ISS, meant as a replacement for the Space Shuttle program, which was terminated in 2011. Musk’s Crew Dragon spacecraft made its first manned flight on May 30, 2020. It successfully entered orbit and docked with the ISS. This flight caused alarming predictions about Roscosmos’ ability to retain its leadership in manned space exploration. It is true, however, that Musk’s spacecraft was not particularly innovative: it was made possible by the development of the Falcon 9 heavy launcher project started in 2005.

Important

China has also exhausted the potential for a “space breakthrough” it laid down in the early 2000s. It managed to become the third space power, having accomplished manned flights, tested antisatellite weapons, created a national orbital station and implemented projects to launch unmanned automatic stations to the Moon. Right now, the country is developing promising Shenlong next-generation reusable transportation space systems, but it still faces at least two limitations. The first is its high dependence on Russian rocket technologies, the access to which made the breakthrough possible. The second one is its lack of comparable basic science tradition. The “ceiling” of China’s achievement has so far turned out to be on the level of the USSR and the United States in the 1970s.

“Second-tier” space powers are still in a state of stagnation. The ESA has not only frozen independent projects of deep space exploration, but has not even completed the process of creating its own global navigation and communication system (Galileo), similar to the American NAVSTAR and Russian GLONASS. Japan effectively froze its large-scale projects in deep space in 2010 and reformatted them for launching meteorological

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satellites. India’s latest success was the launch of the Mangalyaan spacecraft into Martian orbit in 2014, but all these achievements have come from projects launched in the first half of the 2000s.

Important

We should hardly expect any major breakthroughs in the development of space programs. None of the space powers (including the United States) is implementing scientific and research projects comparable with the “second space race” in 2004–2012. “Secondtier” space powers simply do not have the scientific and technological capacity to implement large-scale space projects by themselves. We can only expect, for example, the European Union to finish deploying Galileo, its global navigation and communications system; China to complete its BeiDou regional navigation and communications system and expand the Chinese satellite constellation; NASA to improve its Mars rovers and launch unmanned stations to the Moon; and Russia to implement its Luna 25 project, creating automatic stations capable of studying the lunar surface (in May 2018, it was put off again, this time to 2021).

Similar processes are taking place in military space. Deployment of US missile defense systems has thus far been limited to the creation of ground-based interceptors, which are basically just a kind of “very-highaltitude” surface-to-air missile. The projects to create a space-based missile defense component that had been revived in the mid-2000s have not materialized so far. The situation with anti-satellite weapons is not much better: Russia and the United States are still working on 1970s research, and China tested a first-generation system in 2007. The suspension of space-rocket programs by great powers leaves us in doubt as to whether they have the technological resources for a breakthrough in the military space sector, even though experts believed such a breakthrough to be inevitable in the mid-2000s. But even the fate of existing projects remains in doubt. They require certain technological breakthroughs that might not be achieved within the next six years. There are profound problems behind this. The space breakthrough of the 1960s was made possible by two factors. First, there

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was a broad process of introducing natural and exact sciences into the Soviet and American schools. Second, the governments funded major projects that would not produce immediate results. Despite all outward differences, the USSR and the United States both followed this model until the mid-1970s. Key Point In theory, this problem could be solved by moving to cooperative space exploration, and a breakthrough could be achieved by combining the American achievements in deep space with Russia’s achievements in near space. However, with growing hostility between the great powers, such a scenario seems little more than a fantasy. Increased military competition in near space seems a more realistic prospect. Given the sanctions war between Russia and the United States, even the ISS, currently the only successful cooperative project in space, could be in jeopardy.

The Global Information Environment The struggle for the division of the information space has emerged as a new sphere of international relations. Before the global information network was created, the concept of “information warfare” meant propaganda through media. However, a parallel concept emerged as early as in the first half of the twentieth century: the technical protection of domestic information space from alien soft power. The United States was a pioneer in this area. The Radio Act of 1912 prohibited foreigners from owning American radio stations, while the Radio Act of 1927 limited foreign ownership of American radio stations to 20% of capital stock. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938 required agents representing foreign governments in American politics, as well as foreign individuals and entities to disclose their occupation and sources of funding. The 1938 Voorhis Act requiring the registration of certain organizations controlled by foreign powers regulates the activities of organizations associated with international or foreign political entities or, according to the definition of the US government, “organizations subject to foreign control.” The USSR’s attempts to take a set of protective measures against the American (or, more broadly, Western) soft power during the Cold War were unsuccessful. The information countermeasures used by the USSR

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(first of all, limiting Western broadcasting on its territory) were largely based on the American model. In 1960, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Decree on Measures to Counteract Hostile Radio Propaganda. Radio receivers and tape recorders officially imported into the USSR were made specifically for the USSR and only had Soviet shortwave and VHF bands. The long-range propagation of radio waves shorter than 20–25 metres is unstable—reception is noticeably worse at night, especially in winter, and more dependent on solar activity than with longer wavelengths. For an experienced radio amateur, overcoming this prohibition was not very difficult. The situation changed with the emergence of the global information space. A crucial step was the emergence of satellite television in 1994, which was able to broadcast information all over the world in real time. This led to the phenomenon of satellite channels: the American CNN and Fox News, the EU’s Euronews, the Russian RT and the Arabic AlJazeera. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this event. It was only with the advent of satellite television that it became possible to implement global governance as a way (albeit limited) to transmit a specific set of information simultaneously to people around the world. At the same time, for the first time in history, the competition of information maps of the world began on a global scale. The next step in the formation of the global information space was the emergence of the internet—a global telecommunications network of information and computing resources. This system emerged as a merger of three networks: 1. the experimental ARPANET created by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the US Department of Defense; 2. the US National Science Foundation’s NSFNet; 3. the World Wide Web system developed by the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). The underlying technology for this network was developed in the 1970s. The principle of electronic protocols was invented at that time, upon which the first electronic services emerged: electronic mail and mailing lists. In 1991, the main network service—the World Wide Web— was launched. It provided a simpler way to search for information and

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could host graphical, video and audio files. In 1993, the world’s leading media began to use the electronic network to publish digital versions of their publications. On this foundation, the concept of “Internet,” including the World Wide Web, email, mailing lists and services, was finally formed by 1997. With this event, managing the information space became technically feasible. Internet governance means establishing control over key resources (domain names, IP addresses, internet protocols and the root server system), content, registration operations and the domain and address assignment system. In early 1990s, an international community called International Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and an international professional organization called Internet Society (ISOC) were established. In 1998, the leading functions were vested in the international non-profit organization Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). It is technically independent from the government, though the US Department of Commerce was involved in its creation. In the late 1990s, ICANN underwent a reorganization. A subsidiary of the company, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), was created to manage IP addresses, top-level domains, MIME data types and internet protocol parameters. The IANA delegates its IP allocation authority to regional registrars. There is a series of Regional Internet Registry (RIR) internet organizations which deal with internet addressing and routing issues and obtain their status from ICANN. A new step in the development of the information space was the emergence of social networks. A social network is defined as a platform, an online service or a website designed to build, reflect and organize social relationships on the internet. Social networks started to gain popularity in 1995, when the American portal Classmates.com came into being. The following years saw dozens of similar services appearing alongside each other. But the official start of the social networking boom is considered to be 2003–2004, when the United States launched LinkedIn, MySpace and Facebook. In the Russian-speaking segment of the internet, social networks such as Odnoklassniki and VKontakte (now VK) started to gain popularity in 2006. (Facebook only became available in Russian in 2008.) Social networks enabled all participants to talk and exchange content in real time around the clock.

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Important

The emergence of social media has posed a challenge for modern systems of state power. First, they have brought about communities with identities that are autonomous from the state. Second, communities that were not friendly to state power could now exist without formally violating the law. Third, such communities could be transnational and act in opposition to a particular state. Fourth, as demonstrated by the Arab Spring (2011), the change of power in Ukraine (2014) and the mass protests in the United States (2020), social networks have huge mobilization potential. They made it possible to mobilize protest voters almost in real time and simultaneously across large geographical areas.

Advances in information technology have led to the emergence of concepts such as “information warfare.” Pioneers in this field were the American researchers John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who considered information warfare as a part of network-based cyberwarfare. Arquilla and Ronfeldt asserted that the future of the military domain would be defined by “netwars” conducted with the use of mass media. Their book about the uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas on January 1, 1994, demonstrated a new model of warfare when many autonomous or semi-autonomous units, not subject to strict centralized control, act for a common purpose. Such a war can concentrate on influencing the consciousness of the masses, the elites or both. “Combat units,” following a central order, can attack separately or may come together for a massive strike. The American international relations theorist Colonel Richard Szafranski, who, following Arquilla and Ronfeldt, viewed information warfare through the prism of military and political conflict, went even further. He interpreted information warfare as active measures aimed at changing the individual conceptual framework of each enemy, and then the enemy’s collective system of values. He considered the destructive influence on political decision-making, aimed at undermining the coherence and efficiency of the process, to be a particular priority. Such an interpretation of information warfare is also characteristic of a number of Russian political scientists.

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Important

The new understanding of information warfare differed from the classical concepts of propaganda in two ways. The first is the emphasis on the role of artificial intelligence technologies and the growing automation of information storage and transmission systems. Blocking computer systems could theoretically lead to blocking the whole system of state and military control. The second is the possibility of manipulating mass consciousness by forming a certain picture of events. This understanding of information warfare was recorded in a series of American documents: the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003), the National Cybersecurity Initiative (2008) and National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (2011).

The rise of the concept of information warfare has exacerbated the problem of internet governance. Several approaches emerged in this area in the early 2000s. EU countries and the United States argue that ICANN should retain its leading position as an autonomous company. China and countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa are demanding that ICANN be placed under the control of the International Telecommunication Union. A more flexible position is held by Russia, which has managed to create its own domain of the internet—the Runet. Discussions about the creation of an international legal regime of internet governance began in the second half of the 1990s. In 1998– 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions which postulated the necessity to begin developing the notion of “information security” and to establish international standards for global information systems security. Some of those provisions were reflected in the Charter on Global Information Society adopted at the G8 Summit in Okinawa (2000). On November 22, 2002, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Resolution 57/53, indicating the inadmissibility of the user information and telecommunications technologies and means to adversely affect the infrastructure of states. At the time, it was perceived as an indirect condemnation of the US policy regarding the preparation of a military operation in Iraq.

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In the early twenty-first century, the debate on the principles of information security was replaced by the question about direct internet governance. The debate began at the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was asked to organize a working group on internet governance to define the term and prepare a report for the next summit in Tunis in 2005. UN General Assembly Resolution 58/32 “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” followed on December 8, 2003. In accordance with this resolution, a group of governmental experts was established in 2004 to study complex issues of information security. The World Summit on the Information Society in Tunis (November 2005) failed to achieve the desired results. In 2006–2009, there were no major developments in the sphere of internet governance. But that period saw a series of precedents for increasing government control over the system. In 2006, the United States adopted its “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” which declared that satellite internet would play a greater role as the least vulnerable to terrorist attack. In the spring of 2007, Estonia’s servers were subjected to massive hacker attacks, which NATO countries blamed on Russia. In 2008, Sweden passed a law to tighten control over internet traffic coming from Russia. Also in 2008, China confirmed its demands to remove Taiwan’s “.tw” top-level domain from the internet and announced the possibility of switching to national IDN domains. These events showed that states were considering strengthening national regulation of the internet. Of particular interest is the concept of possible military operations in cyberspace. A new understanding of this concept was given by the crisis in Russian–Estonian relations in the spring of 2007. The peak of the crisis was on April 29–30, 2007, when the Estonian government announced a massive hacker attack on government and banking sites. On May 1, 2007, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia Urmas Paet declared that his country and consequently the entire European Union was under attack by Russia. According to him, attacks were being carried out against the European community and involved organizing cyberattacks, picketing embassies and provoking civil disobedience in an EU member state. On the same day, Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo accused the Russian government of organizing hacker attacks and suggested that

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NATO experts equate cyberattacks on servers of NATO members with military aggression. NATO did not comment on the Estonian statements regarding the Russian attack. In 2008, it established the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Tallinn following the relevant decision of NATO defense ministers. However, the Bronze Soldier crisis was the first time that a NATO country had accused Russia of aggression (albeit in the form of cyberattacks) and raised the possibility of invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. A precedent was set when an attack on information systems by unknown hackers was regarded by one country as an act of aggression on the part of another. In 2006, the United States adopted its National Strategy to Fight Cyberterrorism. On September 19, 2007, it announced the creation of the Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER) as part of the US Air Force, a special unit of the Defense Department responsible for ensuring military operations in virtual space and the security of military information systems. On June 23, 2009, the order on its creation was signed by the US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Increasing the role of operations in cyberspace is also envisaged in the Quadrennial Defense Review published on February 1, 2010. Consolidation of this trend undermines the unity of global information sphere. By the early 2010s, the tendency to protect one’s own information space had prevailed in Russia too. On February 27, 2012, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published his article “Russia and the Changing World,” which indicated the danger that the use of “soft power” by external actors poses for Russia. “The notion of ‘soft power’ is being used increasingly often. This implies a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence. Regrettably, these methods are being used all too frequently to develop and provoke extremist, separatist and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries,” Putin wrote. In July 2012, the State Duma adopted amendments to the Law on Non-Profit Organizations, which defined the procedure for assigning foreign agent status to Russian nonprofits. This was followed in November 2014 by a law that prohibited Russian parties from making transactions with foreign states, international organizations and social movements, NGOs performing the function of a foreign agent, as well as Russian legal entities with foreign participation of more than 30% of the share capital.

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Under such circumstances, Moscow adopted measures to strengthen its information space. In the summer of 2018, Federal Law No. 374 on Amendments to the Federal Law on Combating Terrorism and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Related to the Fight against Terrorism, dated July 6, 2016 (better known as the “Yarovaya Law”), came into full force in Russia. According to Article 15, organizers of information distribution on the internet are required to store data on all transfers of text, audio and video information, as well as data on users within one year from the date of their implementation. The content of messages should be stored for up to six months after their transmission. Having this information at their disposal, operators are obliged to provide it to authorized agencies upon request. In October 2018, the government approved the rules for verifying the users of messenger services: from now on, messenger services are obliged to check the number registration of mobile operators in order to identify users. A new round of struggle in the information space began at the end of 2016, when an unprecedented campaign claiming “Russian interference” in the US elections was launched in the United States. There were regular calls in Congress to “punish Russia” with sanctions for threatening American democracy. An atmosphere of vulnerability in the face of an external adversary, unprecedented since the mid-1950s, had developed in American society. In September 2018, the United States published its National Cyber Strategy, which advocates a shift to a more active and even offensive approach. According to the document, law enforcement agencies associated with the Department of Defense have the right to take offensive actions in cyberspace (such as hacking attacks in response to the actions of other states). During the Cold War, the Americans liked to emphasize that the USSR was stifling their “radio voices”—the Voice of America and Radio Liberty. This, American experts argued, proved the ineffectiveness of the Soviet system, since Soviet citizens wanted to listen to Western media. Today a similar argument can be made about the United States itself. If it is “dangerous” for Americans to listen to Russian media, then this means that Americans are not sure about their country and their system. As US diplomat George F. Kennan said, he who limits information loses, he who actively disseminates it wins. The response of American society to “Russia’s actions” is a form of mobilization: closing its information space to the opponent, restricting the rights of Russian citizens on the territory

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of the United States and restricting the right of its citizens to receive information from the outside. Russia and the United States failed to reach an agreement on resolving the conflict in cyberspace. On April 22, 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated that it would not provide Washington with any unilateral guarantees of cybersecurity and noninterference in domestic processes in general and elections in particular. On July 26, 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it expected the United States to respond to the proposed initiatives (including within the framework of the UN).

Important

These trends mean that the information space may, like others, become the subject of division between the great powers. Something similar happened at the beginning of the 20th century, when the great powers restricted each other’s rights to distribute foreign press and telegraph lines on their territories. The global information environment of the 19th century broke up into national information spaces. The speed of division of the modern information environment will probably depend on the possibility of creating national equivalents of the internet.

∗ ∗ ∗ The struggle for the division of communication spaces reflects a fundamental shift in the structure of the international security environment. The understanding of space has gone beyond the “territorial” geopolitics of the 19th century. In addition to physical and geographic territories, it includes information flows, communication and transport systems, and mechanisms for shaping public opinion and control over water resources. At the same time, the understanding of space went beyond the limits of geo-economic concepts of the late 20th century. Interaction within the “commons” assumes not so much interstate cooperation in their development as rivalry over the principles of their division. Hence the inevitable

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surge of interest in modern socio-political thought to geopolitical studies of the 19th century. Similar ideas chimed in the Russian liberal editorials of the 1990s. At that time, the development of “new spaces” was considered a factor that unified states in the face of “new challenges.” The trends of the late 2010s prove the opposite. An increasing number of spaces leads to new forms of interstate or even transnational conflict. In this sense, the transition to a “spherical” model paradoxically revives theories of “hard power” and geopolitical rivalry. In the modern world, it is practically impossible to accomplish a large-scale reshuffle of the political map without a major military conflict. Expansion into communication spaces can become an alternative to territorial expansion. But at the same time, the competition for communication spaces leads to an accumulation of reasons and scenarios for possible interstate clashes. Previously, wars could have been started with a clash on land or sea; now, in addition to those spaces, a confrontation may also erupt in the polar, air, space and information spaces. This alone increases the conflict potential of interstate interaction.

Keywords Communication spaces, World Ocean, ocean spaces, ocean governance, cryosphere, Antarctic, Arctic, airspace, open sky, outer space, information space, the internet, information warfare. Self-Test 1. Why has modern political science shifted from the concept of “commons” to “communication spaces”? Define the term “communication spaces.” 2. What aspects of international maritime law require more detailed consideration and clarification? 3. How does the competition for Antarctic and Antarctic territories manifest? 4. What international political controversies regarding the division of the Arctic remain unresolved? 5. What are the origins and current state of the Open Skies regime? 6. How is the position of the leading states on information space governance changing?

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Recommended Reading Barsegov, Yuri. The World Ocean: Politics, Law, Diplomacy. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983. Bogaturov, A.D., ed. Russia’s International Relations in New Political Spaces. Space. Circumpolar Zones. Air and Sea Spaces. Global Information Sphere. Moscow: LENAND, 2011. Brindley, D., ed. Antarctic Ocean, Austral Ocean, Southern Ocean. Washington: National Geographic Society, 2014. Dodds, Klaus. Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim. Chichester; New York: Published in association with Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge by J. Wiley, 1997. Fenenko, Alexei. “International Rivalry for the Development of Common Spaces.” International Trends 8, no. 1 (2010): 14–30. Kokoshin, A.A., scientific editor. Russia and International Security in Space. Moscow: KRASAND, 2013. Kosolapov, Nikolai. “A Spatial-Organizational Approach to the Analysis of International Realities.” International Trends 5, no. 3 (15) (September–December 2007): 57–65. Mathiason, John. Internet Governance. The New Frontier of Global Institutions. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Moltz, James Clay. The Politics of Space Security. Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. Veselov, Vasily. “Space Technologies and Strategic Stability: New Challenges and Possible Responses.” Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 25: International Relations and World Politics 9, no. 2: 65–104. Walton, C. Dale. Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic Perspective. London: Routledge, 2009.

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Index

A Antarctic Treaty, 612–614 ASEAN, 9, 58, 108, 113, 184, 192, 193, 195, 197, 199, 429, 442, 453–467, 470–474, 479, 480, 483, 485, 488–494, 499, 595, 599, 608, 653

B BAT , 319, 320, 328 Big Tech, 318–322, 328–330 BRICS, 51, 60, 61, 67, 68, 71, 73, 75, 111, 113, 148, 154, 426, 510, 520

C coercion, 23, 78, 90, 92, 97, 216, 287, 288, 291, 295, 296, 299, 302, 483 conflict, 8, 78, 80, 82, 84, 85, 93, 95, 203–208, 211–226, 283, 284, 286, 290, 291, 294, 295, 297, 301, 310, 323, 327, 402,

414, 422, 432, 489, 491, 505, 518, 522, 525, 527, 540, 541, 549–554, 556, 559, 561, 562, 564–569, 574, 581, 589, 593–596, 608, 610, 613, 614, 626, 637, 642, 643 CSTO, 6, 57, 436, 443, 583, 587, 595, 596 D digitalization, 244, 249, 251, 253–255, 272, 318, 336, 425 E enforcement, 7, 37, 216, 254, 367, 369, 374, 390, 624, 641 G GAFAM , 319, 320, 328 geopolitical competition, 326 global governance, 4, 32, 42–49, 51–56, 60, 61, 67, 69–71, 103, 372, 414, 419, 424, 475, 635

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Baykov and T. Shakleina (eds.), Polycentric World Order in the Making, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5375-0

657

658

INDEX

globalization, 8, 14, 20, 46, 64, 103, 104, 106–114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 135, 137, 139, 140, 163, 170, 200, 231, 232, 242, 272, 389, 390, 402, 405, 425, 475, 480 global market economy, 30 global security, 4, 31 great powers, 4, 6, 14, 19, 20, 27, 32, 53, 77, 139, 280, 322, 414, 415, 417, 602, 604, 605, 612, 629, 633, 634, 642

H hegemony, 4, 23, 29, 136, 138, 162, 324, 372, 415, 418, 422, 602, 611

I integration, 6, 9, 61, 65, 109, 113, 114, 116, 117, 139, 153, 155, 158, 167, 172, 174, 181–198, 201, 213, 267, 323, 324, 345, 358, 389, 391, 394, 396, 402, 405, 408, 415, 417, 423, 424, 426, 427, 434–437, 443, 445–451, 453–456, 459–466, 488, 490, 501, 503, 504, 509–512, 518, 520, 573–575, 577–585, 587, 591, 592, 594, 595, 598 internationalization, 45, 104–106, 114, 120, 394–396, 398–400, 404, 596, 617

L labor market, 232–238, 241, 242, 244, 245, 248, 249, 393, 396, 402, 574

leadership, 6, 10, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 52, 57, 118, 132, 134, 137, 139, 146, 148, 163, 181, 186, 208, 212–214, 222, 290, 298, 300, 307, 318, 319, 321, 322, 327, 330, 351, 400, 421, 426, 427, 433, 441, 450, 470, 477, 479, 485, 493, 510, 576, 593, 631, 632

M Maastricht Treaty, 450 migration, 8, 10, 33, 62, 79, 95, 106, 112, 170, 214, 238–243, 249, 388, 579, 584, 603 Murmansk Treaty, 620

N NATO, 6, 22, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 50, 56, 57, 71, 86, 98, 100, 132, 136, 213, 217, 282, 297–299, 303, 304, 306, 416, 422, 425, 430–433, 505, 509, 511, 522, 557, 599, 619, 620, 625, 639, 640 NGOs, 61, 164, 167, 172, 365, 366, 371–373, 375, 376, 379, 383, 384, 640 nuclear deterrence policy, 284, 290, 292, 301, 305, 310 nuclear weapons, 81, 99, 156, 279, 281–286, 288, 289, 291–293, 295–308, 310, 607, 614

P Paris Agreement, 346, 347, 359, 361, 379 peacekeeping, 216, 443, 595, 609 polycentricity, 14, 26, 28, 29, 34, 47, 120, 414, 415, 422, 549, 568

INDEX

Q quantum, 153, 270 R realist paradigm, 26, 424 S SCO, 6, 51, 56–58, 60, 71, 421, 428, 436, 443, 444, 474, 583, 586, 587, 594, 595 sovereignty, 23, 25, 137, 140, 158, 163, 321, 327, 328, 352, 381, 390, 391, 395, 397, 405, 434, 462–465, 483, 492, 507, 513, 517, 579, 585, 603, 604, 611, 612, 615, 618, 624, 625, 628 space race, 628–631, 633 structural changes, 16, 23, 70, 354 T the West, 8, 9, 11, 21, 57, 81, 90, 98, 99, 133, 185, 216, 304, 328,

659

388, 389, 396, 475, 527, 532, 541, 542, 564, 565, 568, 588, 589, 593, 652, 653, 655 Treaty of Rome, 193, 449 Treaty of Tartu, 615 Treaty on Open Skies, 63, 86, 625–627

W world order, 4–6, 10, 13, 14, 16–22, 24–37, 46, 47, 55, 57, 70, 71, 74, 78, 113, 134, 149, 279, 286, 329, 349, 413–417, 419–425, 429, 430, 433, 435, 437–439, 547, 569, 573, 596

Y Yalta–Potsdam system, 70

Z zones of influence, 318, 328