Politics in High Latitudes: The Svalbard Archipelago 9780773593565

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POLITICS IN HIGH LATITUDES The Svalbard Archipelago by WILLY ØSTRENG Translated by R. I. Christophersen

McGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY PRESS MONTREAL 1978

Firt published in the United Kingdom by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London Norwegian Edition Det politiske Svalbard © Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AJS, 1975 This edition Q C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1978 ISBN 0-7735-0312-9 Legal Deposit 1st Quarter Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec

To Cecilie and Elisabeth

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS ix Preface to the Norwegian Edition x Preface to the English Edition 1 1. Introduction: What is Svalbard? 1 (a) Geography and Topography (b) Historical Survey 2 3 (c) Administration 4 (d) Population 4 (e) Natural Resources and their Exploitation 10 (f) Communications and Tourism 11 (g) Scientific Activity 12 (h) Nature Conservation 2. Svalbard as a Political Phenomenon 13 16 3. From Paris 1920 to Longyearbyen 1925 (a) The Mining Code 16 (b) Negotiations with Germany and Russia 18 (i) Negotiations with Germany 19 (ii) Negotiations with Russia 20 22 (c) Measures to safeguard Norwegian Interests (d) Svalbard—a Dependency or Part of the Kingdom of Norway? 23 (e) Conclusions 24 4. Svalbard's Formal Status and Norway's Responsibility 26 29 5. The Principle of Equal Treatment 32 (a) Putting Workers' Protection Laws into Practice 34 (b) The Criteria for Oil Prospecting (c) The Supply of Air Photographs and Trigonometric 36 Material to Foreign Interests 40 (d) Licences for Polar Bear Shooting (e) Standardisation of Conditions in the Norwegian 41 Mining Communities 44 6. The Principle of Demilitarisation 44 (a) Practical Application before the Second World War 46 (b) The Second World War 46 (i) Official Attitudes to Svalbard's Status 47 (ii) The `Reconquest' of Svalbard

Contents (iii) Military Significance of the Occupation (iv) Proposals for Revision of the Svalbard Treaty (c) The Post-war Period (i) The Norwegian—Soviet Exchange of Notes in 1951 (ii) The Airfield Question (iii) The ESRO Presence (iv) Soviet Reconnaissance Activities (d) Summary 7. Property, Revenue and Internationalisation (a) The Rights of Pre-Treaty Claimants (b) Local Use of Revenue (c) Internationalisation (i) The Svalbard Continental Shelf 8. Norwegian Sovereignty (a) The Earliest Years (b) Soviet Attitudes (c) Norwegian Exercise of Sovereignty (i) Protection of Native Fauna and Flora (ii) Taxes, Dues and Duties (iii) Allocation of Radio Frequencies (iv) Implementation of the Road Traffic Act, Para. 55 (v) Postal Services 9. Phases in Norway's Relationship to Svalbard (a) The 'Laissez-faire Period' (b) The `Verbal Period' (c) The `Action Period' 10. Norway's Alternatives 11. Epilogue: 1975-1976 (a) Norway's Svalbard Policy (b) Norwegian—Soviet Relations (i) The `Wives Case' (ii) The Interpretation of Article 9 (c) Other Countries' Interests (d) The Economic Zone round Svalbard Appendixes 1. Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920 2. Svalbard Act of 17 June 1925 3. Svalbard Mining Code of 7 August 1925 Notes Bibliography Index vi

49 50 54 54 55 57 58 59 60 60 60 62 63 67 67 71 73 73 74 75 76 77 79 79 80 80 86 92 92 95 95 97 99 99 101 105 108 117 127 131

FIGURES Map: Svalbard 5 10 Mining Claims in Svalbard Map: The Svalbard Continental Shelf 66 Government Grants to Adolf Hod's Svalbard Expeditions 1921-25, compared with Grants for 70 Svalbard Administration after 1925 Government Grants for Svalbard Administration 1955-75 82 TABLES 1.1 Svalbard's Population 1923-75 4 Coal Produced and supplied by Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani to Main Consumers, i970-74 6 1.3 Coal Reserves in Longyear area, 31 March 1972 6 1.4 Concessionaires in Svalbard 7 1.5 Production Statistics 1920-75 8-9 1.6 Traffic and Freight 11 9.1 Budget for Svalbard Administration 1926-75 84

Vil

PREFACE TO THE NORWEGIAN EDITION This book is the result of a major research project which is being carried out at the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda. The book is an extension of a previous work, published in Norwegian in 1974, which analyses the genesis of the Svalbard Treaty (Economics and political sovereignty: the interplay of interests in Svalbard's political status). The main problem tackled in Politics in High Latitudes is to investigate the application of the Svalbard Treaty in practical politics by the Norwegian authorities and by other countries with interests involving Svalbard. A short introductory chapter has been included in order to provide a certain measure of factual information on Svalbard which, it is hoped, will provide a useful background, even though it has no direct bearing on the main theme dealt with. In its final form the text owes a great deal to the assistance accorded by a number of private individuals and institutions. If the author had not been given access to the records of the Royal Norwegian Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Industry, as well as the Workers Protection Directorate, the Norwegian Polar Institute and the State Archives, this book would never have seen the light of day. For this reason I should like to express my sincere thanks to these institutions and their staffs. I have had complete access to all the material in all the records involved, covering the period 1920-40. Access to material covering the period 1940-6, on the other hand, has been restricted in all institutions. This has affected the scope and nature of my investigation in two ways: in the first place it has proved impossible to provide a complete historical account of all important and relevant events in and in connection with Svalbard. In the second place my analysis revolves round problems;rather than a chronological account of events. I should like to expressmy gratitude to my colleagues at the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation—Finn. Sollie, Kim Traavik, Gunnar Skagestad and Per Antonsen—for their critical appraisal of my manuscript and their constructive suggestions. Professor Torkel Opsahl of the University of Oslo and Morten M. Kallevig, legal advisor to the Ministry of Industry, have provided me with important comments on legal aspects, both national and international, of my thesis. I should also like to express toy thanks to Laila Sollie and Sonja Cottis Østreng. Finally, I should emphasise that the views set out in the book and the conclusions arrived at are entirely my own. Lysaker, 8 January, 1975

WILLY ØSTRENG

Ix

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION Since this book was first published in 1975, Svalbard has become the subject of increasing political attention, both in Norway and internationally. A number of events of decisive importance for the future development of Svalbard have taken place between the appearance of the Norwegian edition and the present. These events have been incorporated in the present book—either interspersed in the original text or in Chapter 11, which is entirely new. A number of minor revisions and amendments have also been included, based on recent research results and fresh access to sources. In other respects the book is identical with the first edition. The revised edition also owes a great deal to the kind assistance and efforts of several individuals. In this connection I should like to single out my friend and colleague Kim Traavik, Sigmund Hoftun of the publishing firm Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, and my translator, R. I. Christophersen of Oslo University. Lysaker, January 1977

WILLY ØSTRENG

1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SVALBARD? (a) Geography and Topography Svalbard is the collective name for an Arctic archipelago situated north of Norway, between 74° and 81°N latitude and 10° and 35°E longitude. The land area of about 62,400 sq.km. is equal in size to Belgium and the Netherlands. Spitsbergen (formerly known as West Spitsbergen) is the largest of these islands, with an area of some 39,000 sq. km, or slightly less than Denmark and Switzerland, but considerably larger than Albania, Israel and Lebanon. Svalbard is a land of bleak and jagged mountains, sharply indented with fjords and valleys, and with twothirds of its land area covered by glaciers. A branch of the Gulf Stream runs along the west and north coasts of Spitsbergen, exercising a favourable influence on the climate. The temperature on the west coast seldom drops below — 30°C, and in summer seldom exceeds + 10°C, even though temperatures of over 20°C have been recorded at certain points. Svalbard is the most accessible of all Arctic regions, and can be reached by sea from May until well into November. Nowhere else is there a regular scheduled seaborne transport service which approaches so near to the North Pole. In spite of its northerly position, Svalbard has a rich flora. A total of 169 different species of plant have been registered, and of these 162 are regarded as native flora. In addition, mosses, lichens and a few species of mushroom are to be found, but there are no trees. As regards the fauna, wild reindeer, Arctic fox and polar bear are the only native mammals. The musk-ox and the Arctic hare have been introduced from Greenland. Altogether, some forty-five different species of bird have been observed, a great many of which nest locally. Thanks to the influence of the Gulf Stream, the oceanic bioproduction is particularly high. The banks round Bjørnøya (Bear Island) and further north are very rich in fish, and have been extensively fished. The seal also has its habitat in these regions, while the walrus is almost extinct. Geologically, Svalbard is highly interesting. In several places warm springs are to be found, in conjunction with quaternary volcanoes. Coal occurs in chalk, carbon and tertiary formations. A coal-bearing tertiary belt covers about 7,000 sq. krn. from Isfjord in the southwest to Storfjord on the east coast of Spitsbergen. This coal is of excellent 1

2

Politics in High Latitudes

quality. There are also lesser stocks of asbestos, iron ore, zinc blende and iron pyrites. Since 1960 several companies have prospected for oil; the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani (Great Norwegian Spitsbergen Coal Company) actually began the search for oil as far back as 1926. (b) Historical Survey The exact date of the discovery of Svalbard is not known with any certainty. Fridtjof Nansen maintained that Norwegians probably visited the archipelago on at least one occasion between the ninth and the fourteenth centuries. He was supported by ancient Icelandic records, which mention "Svalbardi funnin" in 1194. Consequently there are good grounds for assuming that the Dutchman Willem Barents was rediscovering Svalbard when he stepped ashore in 1596 after an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate the Northwest Passage. This rediscovery also led to a fresh discovery—the large schools of whale in the local fjords. As a result, the early seventeenth century witnessed a considerable amount of activity by English, Dutch and Dano-Norwegian whalers. In the middle of that century, however, whaling ceased, for the simple reason that the whale disappeared almost overnight from these waters. England and the Netherlands were no longer interested in Svalbard; only Denmark-Norway maintained an interest in the archipelago, as well as the claim to sovereignty. During the century that followed this first period of intensive whaling there was little economic activity in Svalbard; however, there is definite evidence that the Russians were actively engaged in such pursuits as catching reindeer and trapping fur-bearing animals, as well as collecting eiderdown. After the rediscovery in 1596 and right up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, Denmark-Norway had consistently laid claim to sovereignty over Svalbard. After the Napoleonic Wars, however, events took a new turn when Frederick VI of Denmark was forced at the Treaty of Kiel in 1814 to cede Norway to the King of Sweden, while the dependencies of Greenland, Iceland and The Faeroes were retained by Denmark. The status of Svalbard underwent no change, either at Kiel or in the following years. Gradually the idea gained ground that it was a no-man's-land, a belief also accepted in Norway. Nevertheless, it was the Norwegians who in the latter half of the nineteenth century took the lead in exploiting the resources of the archipelago. The discovery of large coal deposits in West Spitsbergen at the end of the century once again attracted men of various nationalities to these islands. `Black coal', however, proved a source of dispute, and chaotic conditions prevailed among the various interested parties. The conflicting interests of the great powers made any settlement impossible. Three international conferences on Svalbard were held in Christiania before the First World War, but none produced any results. If anything, these efforts exacerbated the measure of disagreement. For

Introduction: What is Svalbard?

3

this reason Norway decided at the conclusion of the First World War to submit the problem to the Versailles Peace Conference, which agreed to assist in finding a permanent solution. The result was that Norway's sovereignty was recognised; on 9 February 1920 the Svalbard Treaty was signed in Paris, and on 14 August 1925 Norway formally accepted responsibility.

(c) Administration Svalbard is administered by a Governor (sysselmann), who combines the functions of district judge and revenue officer. He possesses the same authority as a county Governor (fylkesmann) on the Norwegian mainland, but at the same time he acts as chief constable and notarius publicus. The sysselmann, who is under the authority of the Ministry of justice, resides in Longyearbyen all the year round. From the juridical point of view he is subject to the jurisdiction of the Tromsø City Court. The Commissioner of Mines is responsible for ensuring the observance of the Mining Code, which applies to all nationalities in Svalbard. Svalbard is part of the Kingdom of Norway: it has nevertheless no status as a borough, a county or a separate electoral district. Nor are the islands joined administratively to any county either as an integral part of it or as a parish in a municipality. This is due to its special economic and social status, its geography and topography and the character of its population. The Norwegians who live there are regarded as domiciled in Norway, and have the right to vote in elections to the Storting, Norway's national assembly, their votes being registered in advance. These votes are subsequently counted in the constituency where the voter was domiciled before departure for Svalbard. Norwegian state revenues collected in Svalbard are not included in the national budget, but are credited to a special Svalbard budget. Nor does the population enjoy local self-government on the same lines as is enjoyed in the rest of Norway, although the establishment of the Svalbard Council in 1971 was a step in this direction. The Svalbard Council consists of representatives of all significant Norwegian institutions in Svalbard, and is intended to act as an advisory body for the local and central administration in questions which they submit to it. The Council may also initiate independent action in matters of importance to the population; in addition, it organises and runs the Longyearbyen welfare services. Motions tabled in the Storting have requested the Government to consider to what extent local self-government can be introduced in Svalbard, and whether the achipelago might be accorded a modified form of county status. There is little to suggest that any such changes are likely to occur in the near future. A move of this kind would in any case demand comprehensive reforms in the administrative and fiscal systems, changes in the legal code, and a decision on the vexed question of

4

Politics in High Latitudes

whether self-government should also include the subjects of foreign powers. The Russians in Svalbard exercise a wide measure of administrative authority over their own mining communities, despite the fact that they are nominally subject to Norwegian jurisdiction. They have their own consul in Barentsburg. (d) Population In relation to its land area Svalbard has a very small population— approximately 3,000. They live on Spitsbergen island, along Isfjord, and are concentrated mainly in Longyearbyen, Barentsburg and Pyramiden. In addition, some thirty persons have lived in recent years at Ny Alesund, and another twenty or so at Sveagruva, at the head of Van Mijen fjord. Russians outnumber Norwegians by two to one. According to the terms of the Svalbard Treaty subjects of all countries who are parties to this. treaty have the right to reside in the archipelago and to exploit its economic potential on an equal footing with Norwegians. Ever since the early 1930s, however, only Norwegians and Russians have taken advantage of these rights. Nationals of other countries have only paid brief visits to the archipelago in connection with various scientific research projects. Table 1.1 SVALBARD'S POPULATION 1923-75 Year 1923 (31 Dec.) 1930 (1 Dec.) 1950 (1 Dec.) 1961/2 (winter) 1964/5 (winter) 1966/7 (winter) 1967/8 (winter) 1969/70 (winter) 1970/71 (winter) 1971 (31 Dec.) 1972 (31 Dec.) 1973 (31 Dec.) 1974 (31 Dec.) 1975 (31 Dec.)

Norwegians

1,156 807 942 983 908 980 987 1,004 1,Q52 1,004 987 1,177

Russians

Total

2,605 2,054 1,648 1,845 1,900 1,920 1,833 2,022 1,943 1,893 2,485 2,254

1,282 550 3,761 2,961 2,610 2,828 2,808 2,900 2,822 3,026 2,995 2,897 3,472 3,431

Source: Statistisk Arbok 1923-75.

(e) Natural Resources and their Exploitation Coal _mining is by far the most important source of livelihood in Svalbard. Both the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani A/S and the Soviet state-owned company Arktikugol have had an annual

5

Introduction: What is Svalbard?

DanskeyQ

~ 1 79 Kongsij. ~•

NY-Alesun

Newton- !• topen

K. Mohn

vag` 9 ` pitebergen Heley-str. \ 9 *. Sw 00 forland 4.o ø rr.iY o~hhamn Barentsoya ,78Salpynten st`f~ongYearbye Gro '1.,-arentsbur~ø' ' eø.t o

l

r

Bellsund Kreløya øø R cherchefj usenHornsund Hornsundtlnd øyane Hopen Sørkapp io 10 15 25 Source: NOU. Naturvern på Svalbard, no. 19, 1973.

SVALBARD

SVALBA

Politics in High Latitudes

6

production, since the early 1960s, of approximately 400,000 150,000 tons. Soviet-mined coal is shipped to Murmansk, for use in the north Russian power stations, while about 50 per cent of the Norwegian coal is used by the firm Norsk Koksverk (see Table 1.2). Stocks of coal at Barentsburg are small, while those in Pyramiden are believed to be considerable. The official Norwegian calculation is that Arktikugol's future annual production will be about 250,000 tons. Coal reserves in the Longyear area may total as much as 14f million tons. Experts in the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani ASS caclulate that the present reserves in this area should suffice for about twenty years' production. Deposits in Sveagruva, some 60-70 kilometres from Longyearbyen, are of very high quality; and operations there too may be expected to continue for twenty years. Table 1.2. AMOUNTS OF COAL PRODUCED AND SUPPLIED BY STORE NORSKE SPITSBERGEN KULLKOMPANI TO MAIN CONSUMERS, 1970-74

Norsk Koksverk West Germany North Norway Metallurgical industry

1970

1971

1974'

215,000 80,000 40,000

1972 245,000 80,000 34,000

1973'

204,000 95,000 48,000

250,000 75,000 35,000

260,000 75,000 35,000

78,000

80,000

74,000

90,000

100,000

425,000

415,000

433,000

450,000

470,000

'Figures for 1973-4 based on agreements negotiated in 1972. Table 1.3. COAL RESERVES IN LONGYEAR AREA (31 MARCH 1972) (tons) Mine Specific figures

3

4

183,486 557,198

Probable figures 1,296,680

5

6

12,000 1,337,620

7

Total - 2,090,304

- 1,548,029 3,400,000 6,644,709

Total of specific and probable 1,480,166 557,198 coal reserves 1,500,000 427,401 Potential

12,000 2,885,649 3,800,000 8,735,013 - 1,000,000 2,800,000 5,727,401

Grand Total

12,000 3,885,649 6,600,00014,462,414

2,980,166 984,599

Source: St. pip. no. 79 (1972-3): Statens engasjement ifortsatt gruvedrifi pa Svalbard.

7

Introduction: What is Svalbard?

The oil age arrived in Svalbard in 1960. So far no workable deposits of oil or gas have been found, and moreover Norwegian geologists are doubtful of the possibility ofdiscovering commercially exploitable fields there: the geological age and porosity of the sedimentary strata make discoveries of this kind unlikely. To date, 1,279 claims have been allocated in Svalbard, covering an area of 12,075.15 sq. km. These cover both coal and oil. Once a company has been conceded a claim for a mineral, it automatically acquires sole rights to production in the area. The condition which the Norwegian State imposes for allocation of concessions of this kind is that a company should have discovered geological material proving or indicating mineral deposits. The accepted procedure is for the company to submit a sample of this material to the Commissioner of Mines, together with a report of the discovery. If the material is found satisfactory, the company is allotted prospecting rights, i.e. sole rights to the production of the mineral in question within the area allocated. Should the company fail to complete or carry out its specified prospecting obligations, the area allocated once again becomes available to other prospective applicants. Table 1.4. CONCESSIONAIRES IN SVALBARD' Amoseas (Calasiatic & Topco-C & T) Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkomp. A/S Arktikugol Norsk Polar Navigasjon A/S Finagruppen A/S Adventdalen Kullfelt Kings Bay Kull Comp. A/S Den norske stat Midnight Sun Oljeselskap Johan Horn Total

Concessions 304 226 100 450 38 59 2 55 27 18 1,279

Sq. km. 2,977.88 2,161.85 963.25 4,212.65 365.36 441.22 20.00 522.44 249.90 160.60 12,075.15

As of 31 December, 1975. Source: Utmdlsoversikt Svalbard pr. 31.12.75, av 19 februar 1976, Det Konglige Departement for Industri og Håndverk.

Over the years, a large amount of trapping has taken place in the Svalbard area, but the importance of this activity has gradually diminished. During the 1971-2 and 1972-3 seasons only two trappers wintered in Svalbard. Admittedly, there is still a certain amount of small-whale hunting and bearded seal trapping, but probably trapping and catching will slowly fade out owing to the quota restrictions, conservation measures and other environmental protection regulations that have come into force in Svalbard in recent years.

8

Politics in High Latitudes Table 1.5. PRODUCTION STATISTICS 1920-75 Year 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967' 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Total prod. (foto)

293,904 325,425 275,019 251,185 188,419 243,095 265,705 426,107 532,808 708,801 783,821 766,135 626,518 625,000 565,407 350,000 6,007 96,431 336,499 515,000 580,000

Source: Statistical Yearbook. 1923-75.

Quantifies ojcoal shipped (tons) 130,794 172,370 326,041 340,942 450,000 413,000 290,340 295,729 278,849 239,719 195,530 216,103 257,120 355,943 453,841 634,819 703,676 745,000 606,000 611,685 540,963 146,501 294 62,732 281,192 420,324 531,313 513,656 719,237 713,930 666,712 615,433 618,558 691,787 733,696 696,071 666,744 796,734 716,357 695,882 811,201 784,396 847,484 820,862 822,594 692,856 843,149 875,307 860,708 886,406 873,2(11 853,513 831,585

Number Employed Slimmer

Winter

1,417 1,398 1,166 1,522 1,741 1,431 969 760 695 736 464 647 781 2,198 2,211 2,260 2,320 2,545 2,350 2,665 2,600 2,421 570 600 1,600 2,656 3,500 3,600 3,700

1,035 924 913 1,194 1,499 578 753 615 605 439 441 671 1,942 1,838 2,260 2,300 2,353 2,470 2,316 2,459 2,226 0 485 1,551 2,429 2,836 3,412 3,570 3,458 3,031 2,942 3,378 3,498 3,858 3,971 3,300 3.400 3,200 2,600 2,500 2,500 2,400 2,500 2,400 2,523 2,509 2,493 2,390 2.338 2,353 2,492 2,551

Introduction: What is Svalbard?

9

Of which amount from Norwegian Mines

Coal prod. (tons)

336,499 436,130 456,542 363,905 469,994 453,403 427,500 340,521 322,147 390,024 384,168 287,962 251,697 403,615 369,053 472,848 382,398 442,074 425,625 433,763 426,620 346,243 385,263 483,987 455,665 431,200 411,503 461,040 465,014

Value (1,000 kr)

34,100 34,400 33,318 24,610 27,650 34,700 31,000 20,300 34,700 31,000 20,300 I7,600 21,700 20,400 21,600 27,549 32,320 33,994 34,385 33,995 26,775 32,908 42,716 43.160 42,600 45,765 67,566 73,029

Source: Statistical Yearbook. 1923-75.

Coal exports

Staff

Workers

Total wages of workers and staff (1,000 kr)

76,880 109,186 208,363 229,596 266,202 286,000 281,340 295,729 278,849 239,719 195,530 216,103 246,960 280,104 304,841 315,951 297,506 290,876 287,426 298,439 271,234 37,087 294 62,732 281,192 420,324 425,867 327,003 470,446 460,027 403,817 333,894 308,445 341,884 338,962 310,226 208,818 316,339 318,430 329,082 440,868 401,324 454,285 418,909 417,508 265,533 394,114 432,520 422.704 439,785 413,742 411,780 375,812

43 53 43 23 92 94 92 94 93 99 115 108 111 114 106 111 109 102 109 105 108 109 112 109 106 103 107 125 115

969 1,109 1,180 953 934 917 898 748 814 965 1,083 791 626 536 543 586 639 530 494 550 580 567 586 547 517 560 528 546 570

14,809 20,478 22,445 18,835 20,809 18,540 17,592 16,955 16,954 22,177 28,402 21,455 17,349 15,616 15,163 18,459 18,389 17,750 17,392 20,154 24,230 23,265 25,188 24,859 26,142 29,670 32,066 39,890 49,385

Personnel

Politics in High Latitudes

10

Kong Karls land R

BARENTSØYA

CaT ta Ø Hom Flrtalineppon ED Kings Bay kull Comp. riig Trust ArklØ m Midnight Sun EN AB Ad dslØ Kullfelt El Honk polet NavIgaslon A/S Spitsbergen as ØØ Q IN Staten

..r

SVALBARD

HOPEN

MINING CLAIMS IN SVALBARD Source: White paper, no. 30 (1973-4). Virksomheten pa den norske kontinental-sokkel m.v. (Activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, etc.). (f) Communications and Tourism Right up to 1934 the colliers were the only regular sea link between Svalbard and the Norwegian mainland. In that year sea links were strengthened when the passenger vessel Lyngen was granted a government subsidy for the purpose of carrying out five to eight voyages to Svalbard during the summer months. Ih the winter, on the other hand, the population of Svalbard were completely cut off from the outside world. The situation improved somewhat when the first airmail service was introduced in 1949, making it possible to extend the `visiting season' from one. to two months in spring. Ten years later, when mail, freight and passenger services were taken over by Braathen's SAFE, Svalbard could at last enjoy year-round contact with the outside world. Planes landed and took off from the permafrost winter landing strip in Adventdalen. In the spring of 1971 the Norwegian Government decided to build an all-the-year-round landing strip at Hotellneset, outside Longyearbyen, and it became available for regular service in the autumn of 1975. Construction costs had by then exceeded 49 million kroner. The new landing strip is expected to play a decisive part in Svalbard's

Introduction: What is Svalbard?

11

development—to cope with plans which exist for the building of one or more hotels. Table 1.6. TRAFFIC AND FREIGHT Passengers to and from Svalbard By the express coastal steamer By other ships By air Freight (in tons) to Svalbard Mail (in tons) to Svalbard

1971

1972

3,138 1,173 1,026 939

4,450 1,396 2,846 1,208

10,796 79

15,126 83

Svalbard's internal communications are poorly developed. There are few roads, and those that exist have mainly been built in or in connection with the `towns'. Transport from one built-up area or settlement to another is either by means of the sysselmann's service launch, the Nordsyssel, or by express coastal steamer, and to a smaller extent by light aircraft and helicopter. Light aircraft have relatively little difficulty in utilising the many natural landing strips that are to be found in the archipelago, while helicopters can land almost anywhere. During the winter months snow scooters are the commonest means of conveyance. The Russians provide their own internal means of transport between their mining communities, using their own vessels and helicopters.

(g) Scientific Activity Svalbard is one of the most thoroughly researched polar areas. Scientific research and exploration started as long ago as 1827, with the first Svalbard expedition by the Norwegian geologist B. Keilhau. In the nineteenth century the Swedes Torell and Nordenskiold carried out major research and exploration in the archipelago. Not until 1906, with expeditions led by Gunnar Isachsen and Adolf Hoel, did Norway become seriously involved in this work. Hoel was the first leader of the Norwegian Explorations in Svalbard and the Polar Seas organised in 1928. Twenty years later, in 1948, this institution was extended and reorganised, and named The Norwegian Polar Institute. Svalbard remains to this day the most important field of operation of the Polar Institute: every year, or every other year, the Institute organises expeditions to the archipelago. Since Norway assumed sovereignty in 1925, a number of countries have mounted expeditions which have made valuable contributions to knowledge of the whole archipelago. Of particular importance has been the work carried out by expeditions from Cambridge University,

12

Politics in High Latitudes

England. The Russians were not particularly active in this work until the race for oil started, when they made up for lost time with a spate of activity. (h) Nature Conservation As long ago as 1914, Norway submitted proposals for establishing national parks in Svalbard, but this met with no response at the time. Not till the last few years have measures of this kind been introduced. Today three national parks have been established—those of South Spitsbergen, Forlandet and North-West Spitsbergen. In addition, two large reservations have been set up—the North-East and South-East Svalbard Nature Reserves—and as many as fifteen bird sanctuaries. The latter are relatively small, and at the moment are only to be found on the west coast of Spitsbergen. Measures have also been introduced to reduce the damage caused to the natural environment by technical and economic activities. These are laid down in detail in `Provisional Regulations of 28 May 1971, for Regulating Encroachment on the Countryside in Svalbard and Jan Mayen'.

2 SVALBARD AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON The Svalbard Treaty was adopted at the Peace Conference at Versailles on 9 February 1920, amid the ruins of the old Europe. It was one piece in a jigsaw puzzle which was to put an end once and for all to war as a means of solving international conflicts. This great vision was never more than a dream, and only twenty years later Europe was the scene of a fresh war, more terrifying and destructive than the first, but the Svalbard Treaty was one of the few international agreements made at Versailles which was not wiped out by National Socialism; it also survived the Second World War, and the subsequent Cold War. Not only did the Svalbard regime survive the postwar period; but alongside the confrontation of the two major power blocs, it held out hope for peaceful coexistence. While politicians from the East and from the West found it difficult to sit down and negotiate, Norwegians and Russians worked side by side in Svalbard without any signs of discord. The low level of political tension engendered by the Svalbard regime and its capacity to survive these intense international conflicts has never been the object of any political or academic attention worth mentioning. As a subject for political debate even in Norway, the archipelago has always remained on the periphery. No party has sought or won mandates by making Svalbard a major item in its election platform. For this reason not many people are familiar with the archipelago's history, and still fewer are aware of its present-day political and juridical problems. Acquaintance with Svalbard tends to be restricted to the rare occasions when the press sniffs out so-called "scandals" such as the King's Bayl case and the Caltex affair. International interest in Svalbard can hardly be said to have been any greater: since the mid-1930s Russians and Norwegians have been the only nationals permanently established or resident there. Other nationalities have restricted their commitments to scientific research of limited duration. For this reason Svalbard has remained largely a binational sphere of interest for a long period. However, it would appear today that Svalbard's peripheral position, both in national and in international politics, belongs to past history rather than to the future. It was no coincidence that the problems associated with Svalbard and the Barents Sea should have been on the agenda during Prime Minister 13

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Bratteli's political discussions in Moscow in March 1974. Key words in this context are petroleum and national security. The Svalbard Treaty (see Appendix) is based on six fundamental principles (hereafter referred to as the Svalbard model), all of which refer to one or several articles in the treaty. (a) Internationalisation of the right of access and to economic exploitation (The principle of internationalisation). The vessels and subjects of all contracting parties shall have equal right to fishing and catching within the areas mentioned in Article 1 and their territorial waters. The said subjects shall also be permitted to engage in all sorts of maritime, mining and commercial activity in the waters, fjords and ports of this area. The only condition in this connection is that they abide by local laws and regulations (Article 3 of the Treaty). (b) Equal treatment of the subjects of all contracting parties (The principle of equal treatment). In Article 7 Norway pledges herself to "accord the subjects of all contracting parties treatment based on complete equality" in accordance with the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. The principle of equal treatment is explicitly expressed in Articles 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8. This, a main principle in the agreement on Svalbard, is applied only in the spheres expressly mentioned in the Treaty. (c) Svalbard is demilitarised (The principle of demilitarisation). Norway has pledged herself not to establish or to allow other nations to establish any naval base or to erect any fortifications in Svalbard. The archipelago shall not be used for warlike purposes (Article 9). (d) Taxes, dues, and duties levied in Svalbard are to be spent in Svalbard (the principle of local use of revenue accruing from taxes, dues, and duties). Section 2 of Article 8 states that taxes, dues, and duties levied in Svalbard are to be spent exclusively for Svalbard's benefit. In other words, the purpose of taxation is to cater to the needs of Svalbard, and therefore revenue from taxes, dues and duties should not exceed what is required for this purpose. (e) Recognition of previously established rights (the principle of the rights of old claimants). Section 2 of Article 6 states that rights acquired through occupation of land areas in Svalbard prior to the signing of the 1920 treaty are to be recognised. Any claims to such rights should be submitted via the Danish Government, which had declared its willingness to assist in this matter (Section 2, Article 10). (f) Unless otherwise stated in the Treaty, the principle of full Norwegian sovereignty shall apply (the principle of sovereigny). Norway was awarded sovereignty over Svalbard. The only limitation to this sovereignty is to be found in the exceptions explicitly set out in the Treaty (Article 1). Section 2, Article 2 of the Treaty charges Norway with responsibility for ensuring the preservation and, if necessary, the re-establishment of the flora and fauna of Svalbard. This is an important responsibility, but not in itself a separate principle; it is subsumed in the principle of sovereignty, and may be regarded as one specific aspect of it.

Svalbard as a Political Phenomenon

15

In this book we shall discuss the question whether these principles have been observed by the nations that have been active in Svalbard during the period 1925-76. In discussing this problem we shall deal with various aspects, e.g. has the situation in Svalbard been such as to make it possible for the model to be put into practice? Have alternative versions of the solution, not established in the Treaty, been practised?—and ifso, what do these involve? Have the necessary conditions been present to enable the model to function? If so, what conditions were present, and which of these must be regarded as necessary conditions? If not, what conditions were absent? If parts of the model have been put into practice, do possibilities exist for putting them into practice in future? And so on.

3 FROM PARIS 1920 TO LONGYEARBYEN 1925 On 9 February 1920 the Norwegian Minister to France, WedelJarlsberg, signed the Svalbard Treaty in Paris. Some five years later, in a simple ceremony at Longyearbyen, the Minister ofJustice, Paal Berg, took formal possession of the archipelago as a part of the realm of Norway. The Norwegian Government took advantage of the years between these two occasions to solve a number of problems which needed to be solved before formal occupation could take place. During this period a number of important events took place and decisions were taken which were to prove important preconditions both for the actual occupation and for Norway's subsequent exercise of sovereignty. During the transitional phase, 1920-5, Norwegian governments endeavoured (I) to draft a mining code for the archipelago; (2) to obtain recognition of the Svalbard Treaty by the governments of Germany and the Soviet Union; (3) to introduce measured to secure Norwegian interests and claims for the Svalbard Commissary; and (4) to decide en the national status of the archipelago.' (a) The Mining Code Mining was the industry of greatest importance to Svalbard. For this reason there was considerable interest in international circles in the mining code that was to be drafted. When it was clear that Norway would be entrusted with the task of' establishing this code,' the Government immediately set up a committee to draft proposals. The demands in the Treaty for equal treatment prevented the Committee from utilising Norwegian concession legislation as a basis for its work. It therefore concluded that the principle of the right of the first finder to mining and operating rights would have to be the underlying principle of the code. The proprietor's share of these enterprises was not to exceed 10 per cent. This principle was firmly established in Norwegian, as well as foreign, mining codes at that time. Article 6 of the Treaty could be interpreted as meaning that preTreaty claimants possessed unlimited rights to mining on their property. In principle, the Committee was of the opinion that this was not the correct interpretation, but nevertheless decided, for several reasons, to grant older occupants the right to as many claims as they 16

From Paris 1920 to Longyearbyen 1925

17

might wish within a year from the date of their property right being recognised. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry shared this fundamental view. At the same time, there was some anxiety lest this period of grace might not prove acceptable to all interested parties, and so the Ministry decided to extend this period to two years. In other respects it abided by the findings of the Committee. The Government's final draft also stated that the legal provisions relating to workers' protection at all times, which were valid in the Mining Code of Norway, were also to apply to Svalbard, subject to such amendments and adjustments as the Crown might lay down. There was to be a considerable international reaction over this point subsequently, and over that involving landowners' rights. Article 8 of the Treaty made it incumbent on the Norwegian Government to inform the contracting parties of the draft proposal for the Mining Code three months before it was to come into force. The Foreign Ministry's position, however, was that once Norway arrived at an agreement with Sweden and Great Britain (the only countries apart from herself with relatively substantial mining interests in the archipelago), the other countries would accept the draft without raising any major objections. For this reason the draft was initially submitted to the Swedish Government. However, the Swedish Government raised a large number of objections, many of them far-reaching. They mainly involved the rights of proprietors. In the Norwegian draft proposal, these were given two years in which to stake their claims, but the Swedes insisted on five years, with sole rights to mining operations during these years. Furthermore, they insisted that landowners' participating interests in their own property should be increased from one-tenth to one-quarter. The Norwegian Government accepted both objections, and made the necessary amendments. After being amended in accordance with the Swedish objections, the draft proposal was submitted to the British Foreign Office. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry hardly expected that Britain would have any substantial objections, and that the draft could then be submitted to all the signatory powers. However, Britain raised numerous and fundamental objections, inspired by the Northern Exploration Company, which at the time was hovering on the brink of bankruptcy and was in dire need of capital. For this reason the company demanded sole operating rights on its property. This was clearly a matter it regarded as important, and its Board strove energetically to influence public opinion in Britain in favour of its claim.3 Apart from some support among members of Parliament, not many took an active stand on behalf of the company. This did not deter the directors, who merely changed tactics in their efforts to obstruct the draft. They engaged Sir John Simon (later Lord Chancellor) for this purpose. As the Norwegian Foreign Ministry had feared, Article 6 of the Treaty was now cited in support of proprietors' claims to sole mining rights on their own ground.

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The Norwegian Government declared that a demand of this kind was contrary to the Norwegian concept of law, and intimated that Norway would not be able to assume responsibility for governing the archipelago unless Norwegian legal principles were applied. The British Government, for its part, was averse to Norway renouncing responsibility for the islands. The net result was a compromise to the effect that older proprietors were given sole rights for mining operations for a period of ten years after receipt of documents establishing their claim patent. This time-span was subsequently established in the Mining Code as final.4 The Norwegian Government did not submit the draft to the Netherlands Government, and this omission provoked an immediate reaction. The Dutch had only recently mined Svalbard coal, but once they had begun operations their commitment was strong and assiduous.b Hendrik C. Dresselhuys, chairman of the Nederlandsche Spitsbergen Compagnie and chairman and parliamentary leader of the Freedom League in the Dutch National Assembly, asked in a written question to the Dutch Government whether his company might not also be justified in expressing an opinion on the draft proposal, on an equal footing with interested British parties. As a result, , the Dutch Government submitted a request to Norway to make the draft available in confidence. The Norwegian authorities refused to accede to this request; their negotiations with Britain and Sweden had already taken a year and a half; their patience was now sorely tried, and they were anxious to conclude the negotiations. Not surprisingly, the Dutch Government took offence. Its objections were sweeping. In common with the British, they demanded that proprietors should enjoy sole rights to mining operations on their own ground; they could also not agree to Norwegian workers' protection provisions being applicable in Svalbard. Negotiations therefore reached deadlock; however, time was on the side of the Norwegian Government and its views. The Foreign Office in London, impatient at the stalemate, demanded that the Treaty should be ratified without further delay. From the Dutch point of view, disagreement was also regrettable; as their Foreign Minister, van Karnebeck, had long worked to strengthen the position of the smaller nations in international politics by means of cooperation between small and medium-sized nations. The dispute with Norway proved a setback to the attainment of this goal, which required an amicable settlement. In the event, the stalemate was overcome and after Norway had made a few amendments to the draft, the Dutch decided that they could accept the code. (b) Negotiations with Germany and Russia Germany and Russia had a long history of involvement in Svalbard. However, they were debarred from participation at the Versailles Peace Conference, where Svalbard's status was finally decided. The

From Paris 1920 to Longyearbyen 1925

19

Norwegian authorities realised that in the long run this factor might prove a source of political problems. Norway was in future to have sole responsibility for Svalbard, but this might prove highly problematical if these two important countries chose to ignore the Treaty on the grounds that their interests had not been satisfactorily or sufficiently taken into account. It was therefore essential for the Norwegian Government to obtain their recognition of Norwegian sovereignty in the archipelago. (i) Negotiations with Germany. In Article 118 of the Versailles Treaty, Germany renounced all rights and claims vis-a-vis the Allies and associated powers, as well as all rights to former German territory. A measure of uncertainty arose as to whether this Article would also apply to Svalbard. The German Government believed that it would not, and therefore the Norwegian Government considered it politically unwise to contradict the Germans on this point, as long as the Entente did not do so. For this reason negotiations were initiated between the two countries. In the spring of 1920 the German Government requested Norway's permission to subscribe to the Treaty immediately after its ratification. The Norwegian Government was not authorised to decide this question, responsibility for which, according to the Treaty, rested with France. The request was thus passed on to Paris, and a reply was received a few days later—which, surprisingly, was favourable. When its contents were made known to the German Government, the latter stepped up its former claims. The Norwegian Government was now asked to help ensure that Germany was accepted as a signatory to the Treaty. This manoeuvre has its political explanation: if Germany were accepted as a signatory, this would be tantamount to international recognition that the country was one of a small group of nations with particular interests in Svalbard. If, on the other hand, it were merely allowed to adhere to the Treaty, this would mean, from the political and international point of view, that the other nations regarded Germany's interests in the area as modest and limited. At a time when its international status was low, Germany had everything to win and nothing to lose by a manoeuvre capable of improving its position generally. Once again the Norwegian Government reacted favourably. Both in Paris and in London, it put out unofficial feelers; but in neither capital would further concessions be considered. In face of this reaction, Norway maintained that Germany would only be allowed to adhere to the Treaty, and its status as a signatory power could not be considered. After these events, little of significance occurred until the autumn of 1923, when the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Michelet, was anxious to obtain final clarification of the German Government's attitude. On Michelet's own initiative the draft mining code was therefore conveyed to the German Foreign Ministry with a request for its comments. This was an unconventional approach for which the Treaty provided no

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warranty. Transactions of this kind were to have been entrusted to the French Government, and the French envoy in Norway raised this point with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The Norwegian authorities replied that this was a matter of great urgency, and that Norway wished to smooth the way for Germany's speedy adherence to the Treaty. Meanwhile, the German Government had come under pressure from vested interests at home, which maintained that too little time had been available to prepare claims for submission to the Svalbard Commissioner. The Norwegian Government was informed of this; this time, too, German demands were favourably received by the Norwegians. After various deliberations, the Government decided to set a dead-line for the coming-into-force of the Mining Code, namely three months after ratification. The deadline for submission of claims was, in the event, extended six months. This concluded once and for all the Norwegian-German exchange of notes on Svalbard.

(ii) Negotiations with Russia. Article 10 of the Svalbard Treaty states: `Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian Government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties.' Since Russia did not take part in the Versailles Conference, this was a surprisingly generous recognition, of its traditional interests in Svalbard. The new leaders in Moscow, however, were differently disposed: contrary to expectations, they lodged a protest with Norway, declaring that the Treaty was not binding on the Soviet Union, as it had been drawn up without its cooperation. This protest initiated a Norwegian-Russian exchange of notes. In the autumn of 1922 Foreign Minister Mowinckel decided to try to persuade the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to issue a declaration to the effect that the Soviet Union would raise no objection to the Treaty. In the Foreign Affairs Commissariat, however, attention had been drawn to Article 10 of the Treaty, which appeared to restrict Soviet rights in Svalbard to Soviet nationals. How would this Article apply, for example, to nationalised Soviet ships? This question was submitted to the Norwegian Government, which returned an unambiguous answer: the same rules would necessarily apply to nationalised Soviet ships as to the vessels of other nations. Despite this answer the Soviet Government sent a new protest to Norway early in 1923, this time concerned with the provisions of Article 2 of the Mining Code, which might be interpreted as meaning that Soviet government trusts would not be allowed to carry out mining operations in Svalbard. The note was in somewhat forthright terms, and hinted at the possibility that the trade agreement between the two countries might be

From Paris 1920 to Longyearbyen 1925

21

terminated. In its reply the Norwegian Government made it clear that the Mining Code did not prohibit trusts from carrying out mining operations, provided these constituted independent juridical persons operating with their own capital. The Government went on to express the hope that the Soviet Government, on reviewing the matter, would abandon the standpoints adopted in its notes. With this reply, it sent the Treaty and the Mining Code. Prospects of arriving at a speedy settlement with the Soviet Union were now exceedingly slim. Internationally, the status of its new regime was not strong. Even though it had concluded trade agreements with a number of states, only a handful had recognised its Government de jure. Breaking out of this isolation and achieving recognition of its lawful Government was therefore given priority. Thus the heads of the Russian Foreign Ministry were constantly on the lookout for states which might have a particular interest in taking this step, and Norway clearly belonged to this category. In a conversation with People's Commissar Chicherin at the Lausanne Conference in 1923, the Norwegian envoy Johan Irgens had the impression that the Soviet Union might consider adhering to the Svalbard Treaty, provided Norway recognised the new regime. In view of this, Foreign Minister Michelet decided on a fresh move. He now proposed that Norway should seek to persuade the signatory powers to allow the Soviet Union to adhere to the Treaty without its Government being formally recognised. This question was ventilated in Petrograd—however, the move was doomed to failure. Michelet, after all, had not offered the Soviet Government what it had `requested', and what it most needed—formal recognition. Consequently, the result was merely a polite negative, in which the Commissariat emphasised that it did not doubt the goodwill of the Norwegian Government. Norway's breakthrough finally came when the Soviet Government achieved a corresponding breakthrough—recognition by Great Britain on 1 February 1924. Events now fell into place. The Soviet Government immediately declared that it was willing to adhere to the Svalbard Treaty, in return for Norwegian recognition. There was no longer any reason, as far as Norway was concerned, for postponing recognition now that Britain had opened the sluice gates. On 15 February, Minister Alexandra Kollontay and Foreign Minister Michelet signed a declaration on the negotiation ofquestions which still remained to be settled between the two countries. On February 6 Minister Kollontay conveyed a verbal note in which the Russian Government accepted Michelet's offer to request the signatory powers to agree to Soviet adherence to the Treaty before the Government had been formally recognised by all of them. The note went on to state that the Soviet Union recognised Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard, and would raise no objections to the Treaty of 9 February 1920. Thus the last international obstacle had been removed.6

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(c) Measures to safeguard Norwegian interests According to the Svalbard Treaty, the occupations that have taken place in Svalbard before the signing of the Treaty, whether these be Norwegian or foreign, shall be tried by a Danish Commissioner and subsequently—in se far as they cannot be recognised by the Commissioner as a result of conflicts or for other reasons—by an international arbitration tribunal with its seat in Copenhagen, consisting of representatives of each of the powers whose nationals have lodged claims which have not been recognised by the Commissioner.?

This, in a condensed form, is the procedure chosen by the Versailles Conference to decide claims based on occupations carried out before the Treaty came into force. At a meeting in the Department of Commerce on 8 January 1923 between representatives of the state and of private coal-mining companies, a committee was set up," established on an order-in-council dated 17 September 1925, entrusted with `drawing up conditions for common action (vis-a-vis the Danish Commissioner) by the Norwegian companies'.ø The Committee was to ensure `cooperation between the claims of the various occupants [so that] there should be no risk of mutually conflicting views with regard to the principal legal matters being raised that involve occupations'.10 From a national point of view a united front of this kind was of great importance. As it turned out, however, Norwegian vested interests submitted conflicting claims to the Commissioners, an expression not so much of different legal views as of conflicting economic interests. The Government also took steps to safeguard the state's interests. In the order-in-council setting up the Committee, a former foreign minister, Arnold Raestad, was appointed `the state's representative to safeguard the interests of the Norwegian state in the settlement of the Svalbard occupation'.11 The Norwegian official attitude was that `all land at Svalbard not recognised by the Commissioner and the tribunal as legally occupied and subject to the laws governing private property is to be regarded as Crown lands'.'2 In a commentary, the Ministry of Justice declared that the extent to which this `right' derived from the territorial right of sovereignty, on the one hand, or from property right as defined by civil law, on the other, was purely theoretical and a question of terminology with no bearing on the substance of the matter. Sovereignty thus conferred on the Norwegian state the right to administer all land which the Treaty and the Mining Code had not allotted to others." Together with the Committee mentioned above, Raestad did an effective job; their work was of great importance to the subsequent handling of Norwegian claims, and for the safeguarding of Norwegian interests generally. The Danish Government appointed Professor Kristian Sindballe as Commissioner. On 10 September 1927 he completed his work.1d Neither then nor later did his decisions provoke sufficiently strong

From Paris 1920 to Longyearbyen 1925

23

protests for the need to summon an arbitration tribunal to arise.15 Here too constructive work was done. (d) Svalbard—a Dependency or part of the Kingdom of Norway? The Svalbard Treaty restricted Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard on a number of points.'s For this reason it was difficult to decide on the precise status of the archipelago and its relationship to the realm. Was it to be a dependency, i.e. a Norwegian territory outside the borders of the mother-country, or was it to constitute an integral part of the kingdom? In the winter of 1924 the Government tabled a motion in the Storting, a Bill on Svalbard, without committing itself. It was, however, known to be in favour of as loose an association as possible, so that if it later proved desirable, the archipelago could be relinquished without any change in the Constitution. It was the opinion of the Government that Svalbard should be a dependency." The Bill aroused a considerable discussion in the Storting, and it was difficult to reach an agreement. The outcome of the debate therefore was that the Bill was passed back to the Government with the request that the right accorded Norway in Article 1 of the Treaty should be adequately expressed in the Bill. This request was granted. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry now came to the conclusion that Svalbard should form part of Norway, a view shared by the Ministry of Justice. During the ensuing debate in the enlarged judicial committee, its members divided into two factions. Venstre (the Norwegian Liberal Party), which was in a minority on the Committee, proposed that Article 1 in the Bill should read: `Svalbard is part of the Kingdom of Norway'. The majority— Høyre (the Conservative Party) and Bondepartiet (the Agrarian Party)—considered that it would be a slight upon national self-esteem to incorporate into the realm a territory over which Norway did not exercise full jurisdiction. For this reason the majority proposed the following form of words: "Svalbard is subject to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Norway", i.e. with the status of a dependency. After a protracted debate the Storting nevertheless chose the form of words proposed in the Bill, on the basis of votes cast by Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party) and Venstre. Thus Svalbard became part of the kingdom. August 14 was selected as the date for Norway to take possession of Svalbard, and an order-in-council decreed that the Mining Code, the Treaty and the Svalbard Act should come into force on the same date. The Minister of Justice, Paal Berg, was to preside at the annexation ceremony at Longyearbyen on behalf of the Norwegian Government. After a short speech Paal Berg concluded by reading out the King's declaration: `We, Haakon, King of Norway, do hereby declare in accordance with our order-in-council of 7 August 1925, that Svalbard (Spitsbergen with adjacent islands and Bjørnøya) is today annexed as a part of the Kingdom of Norway.'

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(e) Conclusions In his book Svalbard in International Politics 1872-1925, Trygve Mathisen wrote of the German-Norwegian informal negotiations: `Norway had shown a willingness to help which bordered on the unnecessary, and which nearly caused annoyance among some of the signatory powers.'19 Some of the signatory powers came close to being irritated by Norway's treatment of this matter, but that her complaisance bordered on the unnecessary is at best debatable. Complaisance towards Germany and the Soviet Union was, among other things, the result of the Norwegian policy of neutrality. The ideology of neutrality, which Norway had tested and established during the First World War, also remained the absolute touchstone in foreign policy decision-making after the war. The political balancing act which she had performed between the belligerents during the war was continued in peacetime. From the Norwegian point of view, it would have been almost inconceivable to accept sovereignty over Svalbard without Soviet and German recognition. Nor, as a matter of course, could the Government ignore the fact that the idea of neutrality had been explicitly linked with Svalbard before 1920. This had been first expressed in 1907, at the time of the international exchange of notes on Svalbard's association with Norway. The question took on added relevance because of unrest over strikes in the British mining community in Svalbard. On that occasion the Imperial Russian Foreign Ministry expressed the opinion that Norwegian acquisition of the archipelago would prove a simple and beneficial solution. The Russians proposed, moreover, that consideration should be given to linking the Svalbard question with forthcoming neutrality negotiations. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry recognised fairly soon that lumping these two issues together might complicate both rounds of negotiation, and therefore the proposal was not put into effect.19 Ten years later, in 1917, Svalbard was once again discussed in the context of neutrality. This time the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, was the person responsible. In an article in the American Journal of International Law he discussed the complicated legal and political problems that had to be solved in order to establish an effective regime in Svalbard. He concluded on a prophetic note: `The nations of Northern Europe, now warring against one another, will prefer to abandon the principle of terra nullius and permit a neutral Scandinavian power to assume territorial sovereignty over the archipelago, rather than to attempt further to solve so complex a problem.'20 One year later Lansing submitted a memorandum setting out twenty-nine `essentials' for regulating and solving the problems which, he believed, Europe would have to face at the conclusion of hostilities. `Essential' No. 28 stated concisely: `The sovereignty of Spitsbergen to be granted to Norway.'21 Because of its special knowledge and collective propensities, the

From Paris 1920 to Longyearbyen 1925

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Norwegian Government would have found it difficult not to tackle the Svalbard question from the point of view of neutrality during the years 1920-4. Its complaisance enabled it to detach the solution of the question from the general premises of the Versailles peace settlement. The Svalbard solution was not part of a dictated peace; it had the support of victor and vanquished alike, and in this respect was unique. It was ofgreat importance to Norway that German and Soviet interests should be taken care of in such a way that any German-Russian bitterness over the post-war settlement would not embrace Svalbard, and in this the Norwegian Government was successful. It was largely due to Norwegian complaisance that a solution was actually possible. During the Christiania conferences in 1910, 1912 and 1914 it had been impossible for the parties to agree on the rights and obligations which would devolve in future on the various nationalities in the archipelago. Naturally, all were anxious to obtain the best possible conditions for themselves, and to safeguard their own national interests. Thus it was not surprising that the Swedish and British objections to the Norwegian draft for the Mining Code should have been so far-reaching, or that the Norwegian Government should have shown such willingness to meet these demands. Complaisance and frankness were, indeed, necessary if several nationalities, with varying interests and views, were to agree on a single solution. The more strictly national questions—Svalbard's constitutional position and the preparation of national claims for the Svalbard Commissioner—were also solved satisfactorily. However, it can fairly be said that Norwegian governments, as they came and went, did no more than solve the problems that had to be solved before Norway could take up its responsibility for the archipelago. In retrospect one may ask whether the Government should not have analysed and attempted to solve some other problems such as, for example, what kind of duties and rights the Treaty imposes on Norway, and what policy would be most expedient in carrying out these duties. We will attempt, even if somewhat indirectly, to deal with these questions.

4 SVALBARD'S FORMAL STATUS AND NORWAY'S RESPONSIBILITY When the Svalbard Treaty was signed in Paris on 9 February 1920, the states with major interests in Svalbard' had agreed to recognise Norway's full and unrestricted sovereignty over the archipelago.' This recognition, however, was not without its quid pro quo. In the first place, signatory powers reserved the right to most kinds of economic activity on an entirely equal footing with Norwegian nationals. This right was to apply to fishing, trapping and all kinds of maritime, mining, industrial and commercial activity.3 No nationality was to enjoy special favours; all were to be treated equally and to have equal economic rights.4 This ideal of equality, which permeates the entire text of the Treaty, also applies to the right to access and sojourn, the use of public telegraph stations, the opportunity to acquire, exploit and practise the right to property, working conditions, mining rights, taxes, duties and dues.' The principle of equal treatment was explicitly laid down in five of the Treaty's ten articles. This principle was a precondition for the coming into force of the Treaty in 1920, and must be regarded as a guiding principle in the Svalbard agreement.' The right of the Norwegian authorities to dispose of taxes, duties and dues levied in the islands as they thought fit was also restricted. As we have seen, revenue of this nature was to be spent exclusively for the benefit of Svalbard, and should only be levied to the extent warranted by such requirements.' In addition, Norway had to pledge herself not to establish—or allow the establishment by other nations of—any marine base or any fortifications in the Svalbard area. The archipelago, which was thus demilitarised, was never to be used for warlike purpose.' In other words, Norway received a very special and highly restricted sovereignty over the archipelago. This solution, however, must have appeared to Norway's negotiators at Versailles as the only one possible in the negotiating environment in which the Treaty was hammered out. Historical circumstances, changed interests and the actual interplay of power could almost be said to have produced in the Svalbard Treaty the natural end-product of a long and complicated international process. The Treaty was in many ways a synthesis of divergent interests between nations in the post-war period.' The Treaty lays down, however, that Norway's full and unrestricted 26

Svalbard's Formal Status and Norway's Responsibility

27

sovereignty applies to the areas where it is not limited by the Treaty. This means in matters not affecting the demilitarisation provision; the limit imposed on levying and spending of taxes, duties and dues; free access and the right to engage in economic activity, or the equal treatment provisions. In the Norwegian view, it is an accepted principle in interpreting the Treaty that the restrictions incorporated into its text are exhaustive, and cannot be given extended interpretation. Thus, apart from the explicit limitations inherent in the Treaty, the Norwegian State has been entrusted with the role of legislator, administrator and executor of justice. In cases of doubt, the interpretation which involves the least limitation of the Norwegian exercise of authority shall be the one used as a basis for negotiation.10 Even so, there is no absolute guarantee that the question of interpretation will always be decided according to this rule, or by Norway alone. Situations can be envisaged in which other nations do not consider Norwegian interpretations as serving their own interests, and it is reasonable that in such cases they will protest against the Norwegian interpretation, or only accept it with reservations. Both the U.S.A. and Great Britain, for example, made reservations regarding the Norwegian interpretation of the Treaty." But the problem is that the Treaty provides no hard-and-fast rule on how such disputes are to be solved. It can therefore reasonably be assumed that if disputes of this kind arise, every attempt will be made to reach a solution by negotiation. Should this prove unsuccessful, it should be possible to submit the disputes to the International Court at The Hague. Anyone engaged in any kind of activity in Svalbard is subject to Norwegian law. In the 1925 Svalbard Act an attempt was made to establish a framework for the exercise of Norwegian sovereignty (see Appendix). In the archipelago, the following Norwegian legislation applies: civil law, criminal law and legislation on the administration of justice, unless otherwise stated (cf. Para 2). The general rule, however, is that Norwegian law does not apply to Svalbard unless the contrary is specifically stated in the law itself. A relatively large number of Norwegian laws today have been made to apply to the archipelago.12 Para. 3 of the Svalbard Act goes on to say: `The statutes relating to public officials, to payment for public acts, to coins, measures and Weights, to the postal and telegraph service, to labour protection and to labour disputes shall apply to Spitsbergen with such amendments as the King may lay down out of regard for the local conditions.' The Government may also issue general regulations concerning the Church, education, social welfare, public order, expulsion, medical health services, building activities, fire services and combustible articles, shipping, aviation and other means of communication, patents, mining, hunting, trapping, fishing and all industries, the protection of animals, plants, natural formations, tracts of land and antiquities, and

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returns to the Central Statistical Office (Para. 4 of the Svalbard Act). Several orders-in-council have been promulgated since 1925 containing the regulations which govern these spheres.19 Whether by means of laws or merely by regulations, the Norwegian administration of Svalbard takes into account the local and special conditions. The basic principle, however, is that legislation as well as the enforcement of laws and regulations must be characterised by nondiscrimination and equal treatment of parties to the Treaty. From this it follows that the Norwegian Government not only has the sovereign state's right to the exercise of authority, but also a treaty obligation to maintain effective administration of the archipelago. Here right and duty are two sides of the same coin. This is furthermore emphasised in the preamble to the Svalbard Treaty, where it is stated that the parties to the 'Treaty are desirous 'of seeing these territories provided with an equitable regime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilisation'. Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard does not depend on its being engaged in economic activity there. Her sovereignty is unconditional and independent of the degree of such activity. However, Norway recognises that sovereignty entails an obligation to maintain a government and an administration which is invariably appropriate to conditions in the archipelago.14 This is her traditional policy, formulated in the 1930s." From the point of view of constitutional and international law, Svalbard is unique, its regime having no analogy anywhere else in the world. This means that the Norwegian authorities have never been able to draw on the experience gained by other governments in other areas similarly governed, but have always had to resort to their own juridical and political judgment. It has been, and remains, a difficult task, and the fact that the archipelago does not have its own body of laws has made the task no easier. The statutes that apply to Svalbard are scattered throughout Norges Lover (The Laws of Norway) and have never been collected in a single volume. This may at times have had an influence over longer-term political aims in Norway's exercise of authority, because personnel dealing with Svalbard in the central administration are not always trained jurists, but are as likely to be, say, economists, engineers or sociologists, with no formal training in applying the country's laws. In dealing with Svalbard affairs nonjuridically trained officials would consequently often confine themselves to statutes directly affecting only the matter under review, overlooking the relevance of laws applying to adjacent areas. This could easily result in a short-sighted approach. The continued lack of a separate body of laws for Svalbard could thus have proved an impediment to the political control of the archipelago's development,1e but during the Svalbard debate in the Storting on 15 December, 1975, the Department of Justice was asked to make good this deficiency. As a result, a separate code of laws for Svalbard is now in existence.

5 THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT The principle of equal rights is not applied in the same way to all nationalities in Svalbard. In the context of the Treaty, Norwegians enjoy a special position: Norwegian nationals in Svalbard, in common with Norwegians generally, are subject to Norwegian law, irrespective of any restrictions on sovereignty contained in the Treaty. This special position follows from the general principle of international law that a multi-national convention which accords certain rights in a given country's territory to the nationals of other countries cannot be interpreted as constituting a limitation on the country's exercise of authority over its own nationals. When Norway accepted responsibility for Svalbard in 1925, accepting at the same time the clearly defined limitations in sovereignty incorporated in the Treaty, the Government in fact pledged itself not to renounce its authority over Norwegian nationals. Nor.did any of the states that took part in the negotiations on Svalbard's international status in Paris in 1919 wish to impose such pointless restrictions. The sole purpose of restrictions on sovereignty was to safeguard the strategic and economic interests of the participating states in the area. The only obligation imposed on the Norwegian Government in this connection is that it cannot treat Norwegians `more favourably in any respect' than foreign nationals.' It is also clear that the principle of equal treatment in Svalbard only applies as between the nationals of the various parties to the Treaty. For example, the principle is not applied to any scientific activity that various international organisations may carry out in the area.2 When Norway assumed sovereignty in 1925, several companies and nationalities were active in the archipelago, but only a few years later the number of companies and nationalities had been reduced to two. This gradual run-down occurred in the following way. Of the foreign companies, the Svenska Stenkolaktiebolaget Spetsbergen (Swedish Spitsbergen Coal Company) closed down its workings in 1925, and in 1934 sold its property to the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani. The Nederlandsche Spitsbergen Compagnie ceased production in 1926, and sold its property and production equipment to the Russian State Trust Arktikugol in 1932. The Anglo-Russian Grumant Company (as its name implies, a joint British-Russian undertaking) also sold its property to Arktikugol in 1931. The Norwegian Bjørnøen 29

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Company closed down in 1925, while the Kings Bay Kullkompagnie continued to operate right up to 1929, when it was compelled to give up. In 1933 the Norwegian state took over this company by the simple process of writing off its debt to the state. The British-owned Northern Exploration Company sold its property and rights to the Norwegian state in 1932 for 100,000 kroner. In 1924 the operations of the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate were greatly reduced. The company then endeavoured to sell its property to the Norwegian state; however, this deal was not concluded until 1952, by which time its operations had ground to a halt.3 Thus Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani ('Store Norske') and the Soviet State Trust Arktikugol alone continued operating in the 1930s, while the other companies found it impossible to maintain production. This trend was caused mainly by two sets of factors. First, it soon became obvious that expectations regarding the archipelago's economic potential had been greatly exaggerated, and among other things, returns on investment were low. At the same time it soon emerged that the problems of maintaining production in Arctic regions had been consistently underestimated. So it was gradually realised that Svalbard was less attractive as an investment area than originally assumed. The most important reason for this recession, however, was the uncertain economic climate of Europe in the 1920s, which made it difficult for the companies to find markets for their coal. Stocks piled up and profits slumped, together with the incentive to continue operating. Only Store Norske and Arktikugol were economically placed and sufficiently motivated to continue despite the recession.' However, of greater importance for Svalbard than the cause of this process of recession was the result: namely that only two nationalities— the Norwegians and Russians—thereafter maintained a continuous presence and operations in Svalbard. This has had a profound influence on conditions and development in the archipelago. One important consequence has been that the Norwegian authorities have concentrated their attention mainly on the bi-national set-up, and only to a lesser degree on the activities of other nationalities. The Russians and Norwegians, in fact, were not the only ones with interests in Spitsbergen. From the beginning of the 1930s a number of other nationalities maintained a presence in the islands, though only for brief periods; either they had no intention of remaining permanently, or they lacked the necessary qualifications. Scientific expeditions and tourist traffic are examples of the sort of activity for which a permanent presence has been neither desirable nor possible. However, the question of permanent or temporary presence, is irrelevant to the question of equal treatment of different nationalities. All are to be treated equally, irrespective of the length of their stay. This is a demand rooted in international law. Nevertheless, the length of

The Principle of Equal Treatment

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their stay is of significance for the opportunity which it gives to the various parties to confirm whether they are discriminated against in relation to others. Organisations, companies, etc., with a permanent presence will have a natural interest—and in fact, often an economic one—in not being discriminated against as compared to other interested parties. This is because the daily life and activities, and possibly the very existence of the interested parties may be at stake. Permanent presence provides the basis and opportunity to ensure that this will not occur. `Nonpermanents', on the other hand, are only present in Svalbard with limited objectives, and provided they are not discriminated against in such a way that the object of their stay is delayed or prevented, they will have less opportunity for and interest in carrying out a check of this kind than permanent parties. Thus `moderate' discrimination might occur without being discovered or complained of. Yet it is clear that no documented examples of any discrimination can be discovered before 1960. The permanent bi-national situation in Svalbard continued right up to 1960, interrupted only by the war years.5 That year represents a temporary (possibly lasting) change, for it saw the start of the oil age in Svalbard. Several large multinational concerns have subsequently started drilling or prospecting for oil in the archipelago and surrounding waters. If oil is found in commercially viable quantities, it is likely that these companies will establish permanent operations and a permanent presence. An establishment of this kind does not depend merely on exploitable oil reserves being found in the archipelago itself. Exploitation of oil and gas potential in the Barents Sea—and, for that matter, in other adjacent regions in the Arctic—may well have the same effect. Svalbard would be a suitable base in these regions for backing up drilling and exploration activity, if harbour installations, export terminals and storage plant were to be constructed. Even coal, in view of the present world energy crisis, might attract foreign capital and interests. In other words, there are several parallel and simultaneous lines of development which may also result in a new multinational era coming to pass in Svalbard. Should this happen, the demand for equal treatment will be strengthened. Even though the permanent multinational phase is not yet a definite reality, the situation in the islands was so radically changed in the 1960s that this decade deserves more detailed treatment. During the thirty-five years preceding 1960 the Norwegian authorities were not compelled to face any major problems in observing the obligation to equal treatment written into the Treaty. No difficulty was experienced in putting this into practice in the relationship between Russians and Norwegians: generally, this merely meant refraining from giving Norwegians preferential treatment. Besides, the principle of

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equal treatment, which applied mainly to economic activity, was not considered particularly relevant to scientific expeditions. About 1960, however, the situation took a new turn, when several nationalities were involved in economic activity. From then on there was increased emphasis on the obligation to equal treatment, and this took various forms. (a) Putting Workers' Protection Laws into Practice In compliance with the Svalbard Treaty and the Mining Code, Norway has the duty of ensuring satisfactory workers' protection in Svalbard. Para 26 of the Mining Code lays down that the statutory provisions regarding protection of workers in force in Norway shall also apply to Svalbard, with such modifications as local conditions necessitate (see Appendix). These provisions are specified in detail in an order-in-council of 26 January 1973, and in the Workers' Protection Act of 7 December 1956. Immediately after Norway had assumed sovereignty, the first mining commissioner for the archipelago was appointed, with the task of administering the Mining Code of 7 August 1925, which in practice would involve surveying claims and supervising workers' protection measures.6 During the Kings Bay debate in the Storting in 1962 this dual function was severely criticised, a number of members of the House claiming that the two functions could not be exercised satisfactorily by one man.' Their criticism proved effective: in an order-in-council of 13 November, 1964, the Commissioner of Mines was relieved of his duty to supervise workers' protection; this would now come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labour and Municipal Affairs, which appointed a special Commissioner of Labour Inspection for Svalbard. The Norwegian authorities responsible for the administration of Svalbard are perfectly alive to the importance of a consistent and equal exercise of the provisions governing workers' protection for all nationalities in Svalbard. On the other hand, the possibility could never be excluded that an exercise of this kind might well create problems in Norway's relationship to the Soviet Union. From the early 1930s a practice had gradually evolved whereby the Norwegian authorities have avoided, as far as possible, any interference in `internal' Soviet affairs in Svalbard. As a result, the-Russians have grown accustomed to a large measure of autonomy, which they would not be prepared to abandon easily. Since it was very likely that Arktikugol would oppose any attempt to introduce workers' protection provisions in the Soviet mining communities, it would be unwise to allow the authority of the law to apply the Workers' Protection Act to any foreign concern. If this were done, the results might easily be a difference in treatment. Despite this problem, the Storting decided to make the Act applicable to

The Principle of Equal Treatment

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Svalbard, and it is now the responsibility of the central administration to find a solution to this tricky problem. In a letter from the Department of Municipal Affairs to the Workers' Protection Directorate of 16 July 1964, it was laid down that `the enforcement of workers' protection provisions should essentially take the form of advice and recommendations [author's italics] to the Russian mining authorities'.8This was n word-for-word repetition of the contents of a departmental memorandum of 1960 on the administrative set-up in Svalbard. When the first Commissioner of Labour Inspection took up his appointment in 1964 he was given oral instructions that `advice and recommendations' should continue to be the usual practice.8 In other words, the authorities solved their dilemma by continuing their nonintervention policy vis-a-vis the Russians, while the workers' protection legislation was made to apply to other nationalities. This was bound to have repercussions. However, other nations have only to a very limited extent engaged in activity to which the Workers' Protection Act applies. For this reason the experience available covers individual cases rather than general trends and tendencies. In connection with oil drilling at Blåhuken in 1965-6 the provisions of the Workers' Protection Act for Svalbard were conveyed to American Overseas Petroleum (Amoseas) with the following accompanying text: `As stated orally, your activity at Svalbard is covered by the Workers' Protection Act for Svalbard of 21 December 1962. You will have to acquaint yourself with all provisions of the Act and see that they are observed at all times."0 The text received by Amoseas is worded not as advice but as an injunction. There is another important formal difference in the respective approaches made to Arktikugol and Amoseas; rules of this kind are nearly always submitted to the Russians with an oral notification that new provisions have been made applicable," whereas Amoseas was instructed both orally and in writing to adhere to the regulations. This is an important difference because the oral form is less suitable than the written form for conveying an injunction. If one compares the treatment accorded to Amoseas in 1965 with that generally accorded Arktikugol, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that aformal and real difference in treating the two interested parties exists, with Arktikugol as the more favoured. This difference in treatment by the Norwegian authorities is not deliberate, but is an unlooked-for consequence of the transition from a bi-national to a multinational presence. The policy of non-intervention was rooted in a period which is now practically at an end, being the result of the special Norwegian-Soviet relations in Svalbard during the years 1925-60. With the transition to multinational activity, the policy of non-intervention has now lost its most important justification. The Russians have refused to accept the consequences of this point of view, while for their part the Norwegian authorities have tried to avoid pushing matters to extremes. The result therefore has been that the policy of non-intervention is only gradually being modified vis-a-vis the

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Russians; on the other hand, consideration for Norwegian sovereignty in Svalbard generally calls for thoroughgoing application of workers' protection regulations by the `new' nationalities. This is now done, but the result inevitably involves a difference of treatment. The Norwegian authorities are caught here in a vicious circle, which would be difficult to break unless the Russians themselves consider it in their own interests that the policy of non-intervention should end. Meanwhile, Norway faces a problem which may well have political consequences internationally. (b) The Criteria for Oil Prospecting In April 1961 the American Caltex oil company was granted 201 oil prospecting claims in Svalbard; these were the first claims to be allotted. Clause 9 of the Mining Code states that anyone who by lawful search shall discover a natural deposit, containing or believed to contain minerals or rocks ... acquires thereby, in preference to subsequent discoverers, a right to the discovery, provided he, in the presence of two witnesses and by marks in solid rock and besides not later than ten months after having located the discovery through written notification, informs the Commissioner of Mines thereof.

Notification to the Commissioner of Mines must be signed by the claimant and, among other things, must contain information on the nature of the discovery, and a geological sample.12 It was realised in the Department of Industry that the provision relating to the handing-in of a sample would be difficult to carry out fully in the case of oil. It would be difficult for an oil company to carry out drilling of this type in a period of only ten months, and it is unreasonable too to suppose that oil companies would be willing to incur the heavy costs of starting drilling operations without having first secured their claims.'s Furthermore, the Mining Code was aimed originally at regulating mining and not drilling for oil. Although there were thus good grounds for dispensing with the provisions relating to samples, the Department at first insisted on the requirements laid down in the Mining Code. Caltex raised objections to this decision, which the Department duly accepted. Caltex were then allotted claims on the basis ofso-called geological indications, in this case interpretations of aerial photographs.14 In 1962 the company was allotted an additional thirtyfive claims based on geological indications.1s In January 1963 Arktikugol applied for oil claim patents in Svalbard, the basis consisting of `geological indications' of oil. The claims were published, but were subsequently refused because the Norwegian Polar Institute, to which the material had been submitted, declared that the geological material was not satisfactory. Arktikugol protested against the decision; however, it accepted the rejection and submitted additional material, but this too was declared unsatisfactory by the experts of the Polar Institute. This time Arktikugol's management

The Principle of Equal Treatment

35

would not accept the rejection. The company now made several ddmarches to the Norwegian authorities, maintaining inter alia that Norway would be violating the principle of equal treatment written into the Svalbard Treaty if the claim were refused.18 The Department of Industry was in some doubt as to how to tackle this situation, and in the autumn of 1963 discussions were initiated between its representatives and those of the Foreign Ministry and the Norwegian Polar Institute. Their deliberations were concentrated on the question whether geological indications were acceptable as a basis for awarding claims, and if so, what criteria should be met. Those present soon agreed on the need to have this and related problems more closely analysed before a final decision could be made. On 21 November 1963 the so-called Coordinating Committee was set up, and on 5 February 1964 its findings were submitted: the Department of Industry was advised to recognise the Russian claims on the grounds that `geological indications may be sufficient having regard to the rules of the Mining Code . . .'17 The Committee also pointed out that Arktikugol's application should not be dealt with differently from that submitted by Caltex, or more strictly. The Department of Industry now accepted that Caltex's geological samples had been rather scanty; and that Arktikugol's application had been dealt with differently from that of Caltex, which, inter alia, had not submitted its samples to the Norwegian Polar Institute. If the Department had refused to admit Arktikugol's claims, that company would undoubtedly have been subjected to stricter treatment than Caltex. Rejecting the Soviet application might also have damaged Norwegian-Soviet relations. After reconsidering the case, the Department of Industry now decided that Arktikugol should be granted its claims. There are grounds for believing that the central administration in Norway attached great importance to the foreign policy aspects of this problem. It was clearly recognised that what was at stake was not geology but politics. There was a choice of two alternative decisions: either to stretch the provisions of the Mining Code once more, or to set aside the principle of equal treatment. The Department of Industry chose the former alternative. It had gradually been recognised that the Caltex claims did not conform with the provisions of the Mining Code. In 1965 Foreign Minister Halvard Lange accordingly declared that in dealing with the first applications for oil-drilling claims a mistake in procedure has been made.18 Because foreign policy considerations proved the decisive element in the Svalbard administration, Norway probably avoided political complications with the Soviet Union. In 1962 and 1965 a Norwegian company, Norsk Polarnavigasjon, was also awarded oil-drilling rights in Svalbard. Once again the basis for submitting these claims was that of geological indications of oil. The 1965 allocation, however, was the last to be made on the basis of what

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we might call 'Caltex premises'. In 1966 new guidelines, involving a substantial tightening-up, were issued.'9 Three significant factors emerge from the oil claim case. First, the Russians are highly `Treaty-conscious'. They invoke the Treaty whenever they feel that Norwegian administrative decisions threaten their legitimate rights, in contrast to other nationalities, which have never on any occasion invoked the principle of equal treatment. Secondly, the oil claim case is an example of the fact that in Svalbard there is no reneging or backing out. Once the Norwegian authorities have made a decision within a particular sphere, this will provide a norm or standard until such time as the authorities change the premises for their decisions. In the oil claim case, six years passed before the new provisions were enforced. Such interim periods allow a great many problems to arise, which could have been avoided had the first decision been preceded by careful evaluation. Thirdly, in the oil claim case the principle of equal treatment was not violated, but the obligation of the authorities to pursue this principle in their administrative proceedings meant that the provisions in the Mining Code had to be considerably stretched if this obligation were to be fulfilled. It might even be possible to maintain that in this case the authorities were guilty of a breach of the provisions of the Mining Code. (c) The Supply of Air Photographs and Trigonometrical Material to Foreign Interests At the end of the 1950s, in addition to activity by foreign scientists, there were also a number of expeditions df a more commercial nature. At the same time important developments were taking place in aerial photography. Apart from oblique photography techniques of vertical photography were now being used. For scientific as well as commercial purposes, vertical is much to be preferred to oblique photography. Both aerial photography and trigonometrical techniques used in mapmaking are important for locating economic resources. In 1962 the right to distribute vertical photographs from Svalbard was transferred to the Norwegian Polar Institute which, in a letter to the Department of Industry, raised a number of principles in connection with making vertical photographs available to foreign expeditions, and there was underlying reference to the fact that vertical photographs were made available in the summer of 1960 to American interests. The principle of equal treatment made it important, in the opinion of the Polar Institute, that material of this kind should in future also be made available to other foreign nationals. However, this should be done only according to well defined conditions and with certain limitations.20 In June 1962 there was a meeting between representatives of the Department of Industry, the Norwegian Polar Institute and the Foreign Ministry in Oslo, at which it was agreed that Norway had no obligation to make vertical photographs available to foreign nationals

The Principle of Equal Treatment

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because production of material of this kind had not been financed from the Svalbard budget. However, oblique photographs would continue to be available on the same lines as before.Y1 On 17 April 1962 Kaare Lundquist of the Polar Institute was visited by two representatives of the Soviet embassy in Oslo, with a request from the Institute of Arctic Geology in Leningrad for aerial photographs of Svalbard, as well as a catalogue of coordinates for the trigonometric grid in the archipelago. In this connection the Coordinating Committee maintains that the Soviet request involved `copies of all Norwegian maps and aerial photographs for the Svalbard archipelago. The request also [involved]22 copies of vertical photographs'.23 Because American interests had previously had access •to material of this kind, the Committee considered that this should also apply to other nationalities. It would then be possible to `avoid Russian uncertainty about Norway's willingness to maintain the principle of equal treatment'.24 The Coordinating Committee's statement that the Soviet request included vertical photographs must be based on a misunderstanding. At his meeting with members of the Soviet embassy on 17 April, Lundquist was handed a list of requests from the Leningrad Institute, which included a `set of aerial pictures from Svalbard'.25 It was explained that `horizontal photographs' were required. Lindquist asked if obliques were meant, and this was confirmed.28 On 20 June 1962 the Institute of Arctic Geology made a direct approach to the Polar Institute in a letter which, among other things, referred to the previous contact between the embassy and the Polar Institute. This letter, too, makes no specific mention of vertical photographs: the Russian institute merely asked for `pictures of the whole archipelago'.27 This request could have been complied with by supplying oblique photographs, but there was no follow-up by the Russians, probably because of the cost of the pictures and currency problems. On no occasion, either in writing or orally, was the Polar Institute informed that the Institute of Arctic Geology wanted vertical photographs. The truth is that the Russians did not ask for the same material which had previously been made available to the Americans. Appraisal of the situation in the light of the principle of equal treatment was therefore neither necessary nor relevant. After 1966 it has not been possible to invoke this principle in connection with vertical photographs. In February of that year, a memorandum issued by the Department of Industry established that vertical photographs would after all be available on certain specified conditions,~8 one of the conditions being that they can only cover limited areas.29 The photographs supplied to the Americans in the summer of 1960 covered only a limited area. On the other hand, the Coordinating Committee seems to have been right in implying that the principle of equal treatment was set aside in

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the handing over of trigonometrical material.30 Such material was made available to American but not to Soviet interests. The reasons for this are contained in a letter of 9 May 1963 from the Foreign Ministry: In the opinion of the Foreign Ministry, the Norwegian attitude to the present request should be based on the fact that surveying SvalLard is to be undertaken by Norwegian authorities and that the completed maps will be made available to parties to the Treaty and other interested parties on ordinary commercial terms. The Norwegian authorities cannot be compelled to supply the basic material used in the production of maps. Nor is it desirable that such material should be supplied.31

This episode is entirely unique, being the only occasion during the Soviet Union's fifty-year presence in Svalbard when it has been accorded less favourable treatment than other nations. The trend in the Norwegian exercise of authority has rather been to accord the Soviet Russians favourable treatment. The Soviet mining communities have largely administered themselves, and for long periods been independent of Norwegian administrative measures.S2 However, this isolated breach of a long tradition aptly illustrates the special problem of the decentralised and pragmatic nature of Norway's Svalbard administration. In 1962 there was, admittedly, a centralised administration of Svalbard—on paper. An order-in-council of 20 May 1936 entrusted the responsibility for administering Svalbard to the Department of Commerce (subsequently Department of Industry), but although all Svalbard matters were formally under this Ministry's jurisdiction, the authorities recognised that this arrangement was not fully carried out in practice, as various departments of state were constantly dealing with matters which properly affected them.38 Accordingly, in 1965 the administration of Svalbard's affairs was transferred from the Department of Industry to the appropriate specialist ministries)" Matters relating to the budget, the Tax Assessment Board and matters that did not plainly belong to the province of some other department were dealt with by the Ministry of Justice. At the same time the socalled Interdepartmental Svalbard Committee was set up as a coordinating and consultative body for the central administration. The secretariat of this committee was placed under the Department of Justice." Thus a number of ministries, boards and committees are involved in the Norwegian political decision-making process for Svalbard. Formally, Svalbard is administered through the Department ofJustice, but no actual central organ, such as a permanently established and operating Svalbard office, exists either in the Department of Justice or in the decision-making structure itself. In other words, the structure is highly decentralised. This description perhaps does not do justice to the role of the Polar Committee.38 In the course of its relatively short lifetime, this Committee has made its mark as a useful instrument in polar policy, not

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least thanks to its expert knowledge and coordinating capacity. However, it suffers from a number of the same administrative and organisational weaknesses as the rest of the structure; for example, it has no permanently operating secretariat with Svalbard as its only sphere of operation. This weakens some of the continuity of its work. Moreover, the Committee's composition appears to have the same effect, as many of its members have more important tasks than looking after the affairs of Svalbard. This in turn means that the Committee fails to fill the vacuum caused by the absence of a permanent Svalbard office or secretariat. Such an office would not have replaced the Committee, but merely have supplemented and strengthened the continuity of its work. The Norwegian Polar Institute, which formally comes under the Department of Industry, is in many ways representative of continuity in the Norwegian administration of Svalbard. But even this institution is incapable of solving the essential problem of coordination. The Institute's primary aim is, after all, scientific research. To sum up, the Norwegian structure for the administration of Svalbard is markedly decentralised; coordinating functions are partly but inadequately taken care of by the Polar Committee; the Norwegian Polar Institute represents structural continuity; and the set-up is excessively dependent on the personalities of those who at any time are involved with polar policy. There has been no thorough investigation of the effect of this structure on Svalbard decision-making, but there are grounds for assuming that decentralisation makes it difficult for the authorities to evolve long-term policies. This feature of the decisionmaking process affects the local exercise of authority in Svalbard. The Governor can seek the advice of many bodies and institutions in Norway, but common to all of them is that they are markedly `caseoriented', and render advice on this basis rather than in terms of a longterm Svalbard policy. Thus the local exercise of authority vested in the Governor loses something of its political purpose. Decentralisation may also result in the Norwegian authorities failing to obtain a clear picture of the effect of their various measures on Norwegian sovereignty in the archipelago. In other words, the authorities lack an administrative apparatus capable of giving them an overview of the situation at any given time. It is in this light that the Norwegian Polar Institute's action in supplying trigonometrical material to the Americans, while the central administration, when it became aware of the circumstances in 1962, wished to end this service, must be seen. Professional evaluation may, as in this case, clash with longer-term, political considerations; a fact which the Norwegian political authorities now seem to have recognised. During the Svalbard debate in the Storting on 15 December 1975 a strong case was made for Norwegian polar administration to be reorganised. A unanimous report submitted by the Storting Foreign Affairs Committee declared that `administratively there would seem to

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be a need for an organisation responsible at all times for coordinating the central administration's conduct of Svalbard affairs and for the task of taking the necessary action as far as Norwegian policy in Svalbard is concerned.'37 This was desirable because it could hardly be assumed that the various specialist departments have the necessary knowledge of the special conditions obtaining in Svalbard. Svalbard has inter alia a special international status, and foreign settlements, while the Norwegian community in the archipelago is of a very special structure. By submitting all matters to a central Svalbard body, the necessary expertise on Svalbard will be available in taking action.38

Hence the Foreign Affairs Committee requested the Government to set up a committee which would urgently consider measures for strengthening the political and administrative conduct of affairs in Svalbard. On 28 March 1976 the Government agreed to this request.3a The committee is expected to submit its findings at the end of 1976. The contours of a new administrative structure already seem to be emerging. Prime Minister Nordli recently declared that the Government will press for the establishment, in the relatively near future, of a central administrative body to deal with Svalbard. Here the Government and the Storting appear to be pursuing the same objectives. It is reasonable to assume that the committee's findings take these political goals into account and that the Norwegian authorities will in future achieve an improvement in their capacity for political and administrative control of developments in Svalbard. (d) Licences for Polar Bear Shooting Paragraph 2 of an order-in-council of 26 June 1970 states that the hunting and trapping of polar bears in Svalbard cannot take place without authorisation by the Department of Agriculture or whatever authority the Department may authorise. Gun licences for polar bear shooting can be issued by local chief constables, in compliance with the Act of 9 June, 1961, relating to firearms and ammunition. This law has been made applicable to Svalbard (para 32), and in this respect applies to all nationalities residing in the archipelago. In Svalbard itself the Governor is responsible for gun licences. However, according to an instruction issued by the Department of Justice to the Governor, it was considered undesirable for firearms to be licensed to Soviet nationals in connection with the allocation of shooting permits for polar bear hunting in the ensuing season. As far as can be ascertained, there are no corresponding instructions relating to the other nationalities active in the archipelago. The Russians are the only nationality who have been temporarily exempted from the provisions relating to gun licences. This exception, apparently gave rise to no problems with other nationalities, but this is primarily, because of the limited importance of this question for other nationalities, and the somewhat modest scope of polar bear shooting in 1971. Moreover, in

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1973 a,five-year ban on the shooting of polar bears became operative 40 Even so, it should be emphasised that this provisional exemption from gun licences applied to Soviet citizens and to no one else. The experience in Svalbard has shown, among other things, that once a practice has become established, any subsequent attempt to change it will inevitably be fraught with problems. This is especially true of relations with the Russians. Unilateral exceptions at one point in time can result in a difference in treatment later. One need only cite the problems which the authorities face in putting into practice the workers' protection regulations. There is good evidence for believing that it is more important to play strictly according to the rules of the game when granting advantages to the Russians than in dealing with other nationalities. (e) Standardisation of Conditions in the Norwegian Mining Communities In accordance with Norwegian mining tradition and the Mining Code for Svalbard, the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani has a number of social responsibilities in Longyearbyen. This also applies to other nationals within their respective communities in Svalbard. In recent years, however, the Norwegian state has gradually attempted to assume a modest share of the Store Norske's social obligations in Longyearbyen. For example, the Department of Church and Education covers teachers' salaries and the cost of instructional material. The State also makes grants for maintaining the school and the indoor sports stadium in Longyearbyen. This trend is also noticeable with regard to the health service. In White Paper No. 39, 1975-6, relating to Svalbard, the Government supports the idea that the Norwegian population of Svalbard should receive' the same health service as people living in the rest of Norway. The aim is to standardise—one could say Norwegianise'—conditions in the Norwegian mining community. Yet even this process ofstandardisation cannot be considered apart from the principle of equal treatment. The Mining Code (clauses 26-33) enumerates the social duties of the Svalbard mining communities, regardless of nationality. For example, `the employer is bound to furnish his workers with healthy and proper dwellings, and, as far as circumstances permit, to provide sanitary arrangements" (clause 27). It goes on: `The employer is bound to keep at the establishment a supply of necessary medicines, surgical instruments and dressings ... The Ministry may enjoin on the employer the maintenance of a hospital suitable for the purpose with an isolation hospital and the necessary outfit and attendance.' In relieving Store Norske, a private company, of some of these and similar obligations, and at the same time not doing so for Arktikugol, the state has treated Store Norske more favourably than the Russian company. If the process ofstandardisation had gone further, Store Norske could have had access to funds which could have been invested in production. Arktikugol

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would then have been able to invoke the principle of equal treatment, and demand the same benefits in Barentsburg and Pyramiden as the Norwegian state provides for its own mining communities. However, the Government found the solution to this problem as the result of another, entirely unrelated problem that occurred many miles south of Arctic Spitsbergen. The latter half of 1973 saw a recession in the international maritime freight market. Rates sank, and the number of ships laid up increased menacingly; thus Norway, with her considerable shipping interests, faced grave economic and employment problems. The Bergen shipowner Hilmar Reksten, owner of about a quarter of the shares in Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani, was among those who suffered, and the freight crisis forced him to sell his shares in Norwegian industrial concerns, including Store Norske, to give him much-needed liquid assets. On 11 June 1975 the Storting authorised the Government to purchase the shares." Some months later two other shipowners, Johan Horn and H.P. Westfal-Larsen, intimated that they too were interested in selling their shares in Store Norske to the state. The stage was now set for the state to take over control of Store Norske completely, and the Government was not slow to seize its opportunity.42 The State take-over of Store Norske thus solved the problem of equal treatment which had faced the Norwegian authorities in standardising conditions in Longyearbyen. With the take-over, the responsibility, in accordance with the Mining Code, to provide social welfare services in the company's mining communities in the archipelago, devolved on the Norwegian state, acting through the company. Even though the solution to this matter was satisfactory, from the point of view of the Norwegian authorities, the government's action—or rather inaction— clearly illustrated the need for a centrally coordinated organ to administer Svalbard. The Norwegian Svalbard administration has now adopted concrete measures to change conditions. It has been publicly stated that the Norwegian authorities `fully respect the restrictions in sovereignty that the Treaty imposes on [Norway], primarily the obligation to equality of treatment' and that the central administration `takes its obligations in this field very seriously'.43 However, past discrepancies are difficult to tidy up once these have proved advantageous to a super-power. The Norwegian Svalbard administration has certainly learned this by experience. During the period 1925-76 we do not find many examples of differences in treatment; only in recent years is there documentary evidence of it. This might appear paradoxical, since from the mid-1960s up to the present the Norwegian exercise of sovereignty has been noticeably tightened, not least vis-a-vis the Russians. However, the paradox is more apparent than real. In fact the two phenomena— difference in treatment and the writing of documents—are closely

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linked: the more actively and consciously sovereignty is exercised by Norway, the greater is the volume of reports by the central and local administration. To discover where the shoe pinches, the problem has to be clarified and discussed, and this can be done through departmental memoranda and reports. Discriminatory treatment may have occurred earlier than 1960, even though evidence is lacking. It should once again be added that the question of equal treatment has only come into focus in the most recent period, with a multinational presence in the archipelago.

6 THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMILITARISATION Svalbard must never, according to article 9 of the Treaty, be used for warlike purposes. In addition, Norway has engaged not to establish, or allow the establishment of, any naval base or the construction of any fortification in the territory. The only reservation in this connection involves Norway's rights and obligations resulting first from membership of the League of Nations,' and today from the United Nations, including the Security Council's power to pass resolutions with regard to measures in the event of a breach of the peace, etc. The demilitarisation provision merely prevents the setting up of permanent naval bases or fortifications. This explains why on several occasions after the Second World War Norwegian naval vessels and military aircraft have been able to visit Svalbard. (a) Practical Application before the Second World War At the Versailles Peace Conference there was international agreement on the demilitarisation of Svalbard. The strategic location of the archipelago was obvious, and it was thus important to forestall any possibility of future military misuse. During the years following Versailles, the same states acted in complete agreement with this obligation. However, a number of states with well-established Svalbard traditions had been debarred from taking part in the Versailles Peace Conference. One of these was Russia, whose proximity to Svalbard meant that it was bound to be particularly interested in the question of the archipelago's military status. Svalbard could be used as a base to threaten Russia and also for Russia to threaten others. For this reason it is useful to look more closely at Russian attitudes to the status of the archipelago in relation to security. Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century successive Russian governments have given relatively high priority in their foreign policy to establishing and consolidating their position in Svalbard.2 One of the reasons for this is that the archipelago comprises the northernmost limit of the sea lane between Norway and Spitsbergen, and foreign powers might seriously interfere with the passage of ships to and from the Murmansk—Archangel area. For over a hundred years Russian governments have endeavoured actively to prevent such interference, 44

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either by ensuring a Russian presence in the islands or by establishing a system of control which would prevent other countries from using Svalbard for military purposes. Through the Soviet mining communities based there Moscow has been able to gain first hand information to ensure that Svalbard has not been developed as a military base threatening north-west Russia, and that the Svalbard Passage is not used in such a way as to menace free transit. The security aspects of Soviet policy must be considered in relation to the country's general strategic position. Russian shipping is to a large extent dependent on free passage through various straits in order to reach international waters. This applies to all four base areas: the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Pacific. A feature common to the last three is that powers or power groups which traditionally have had strained political relations with the Soviet Union can maintain a close watch on them, thus keeping naval movements under surveillance. The magnitude of this threat varies from one passage to another, and • also with time. Traditionally the least exposed are the Bering Strait and the Svalbard Passage, the former being of minimal importance. Thus the Svalbard Passage provides the Soviet Union's safest access to the oceans of the world and a vital entry to the Northeast Passage. Ever since 1871 any crisis, for example in the Baltic, has provoked increased Russian vigilance in the north. The formula seems to be: the greater the danger of a blockade of the Baltic the higher the priority given to free passage to and from Russian harbours in the White Sea.3 The problem was not clearly expressed by the Russians during the years 1925-41 because at that time it was not critical: none of the states involved took any steps that might have been interpreted as a breach of the demilitarisation provision. Although no source material is available actually proving that the Soviet Union in the 1930s was working actively to enhance its security interests in Svalbard, there is evidence that indicates such activity. In 1932 Polish scientists were working on Bjørnøya. Norway was asked whether there was any objection to stores of provisions intended for the Polish colony being transported by a Soviet expedition on its way to Bjørnoya. Naturally, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry had no objection to an arrangement of this kind, and acquainted the Poles with its assent. A few days later the Foreign Ministry received a strictly confidential report from the Norwegian legation in Warsaw, which declared that it was impossible not to report that in initiated circles in Poland it is considered quite definite that the aspirations of the Soviet authorities with regard to Svalbard are promoted by exploiting every opportunity, including scientific expeditions, to further their interests in the archipelago ... and for that reason in scientific circles, both in Warsaw and in Cracow, Norway was warned to be constantly aware of the danger emanating from those quarters.'

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The report concluded by mentioning that the Polish Bjørnøya expedition `after having initiated fresh investigations' was not desirous of making use of the `permission given, as there is an unwillingness to expose Poland to the danger of being involved in Russian machinations in this connection'.5 Available material does not suggest that the Norwegians took any action in this connection, possibly because they believed that the report was greatly exaggerated, or because the Foreign Ministry, for various reasons, did not wish to pursue the matter; but the possibility that the episode throws an interesting light on the Soviet Union's security interests in the area cannot be excluded. Similar episodes in more recent years render an interpretation of this kind both reasonable and probable. (b) The Second World War (i) Official Attitudes to Svalbard's Status. On 27 July 1941, 5 days after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Molotov asked the British ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, whether any steps would be taken by the British to defend Svalbard against German attack. Cripps replied that no such plan existed. Molotov found this answer unsatisfactory, and in July of the same year the Russians themselves drew up a plan, the gist of which was that the Soviet Union and Great Britain should jointly occupy the archipelago. According to this plan the British would make the necessary naval units available, and be responsible for the naval part of the operation, while the Russian contribution would consist of landing troops. It was explicitly emphasised that occupation would last only for the duration of the war, and that Great Britain and the Soviet Union would jointly guarantee that the troops would be evacuated at the conclusion of hostilities. This plan was the result of Soviet Russian fear that the Germans had plans to occupy Svalbard and use the archipelago as a base for attacks against the Soviet Union.e The British Government chose to discuss the Soviet proposal with the heads of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry before making up their minds. When Foreign Minister Lie was contacted he immediately declared that he disagreed with the proposal, and that a joint British—Soviet occupation would constitute a gross violation of Norwegian rights and obligations. The archipelago was, after all, Norwegian territory. However, Lie maintained that he believed the Norwegian government would be willing to discuss the question if the plan was regarded as a desirable step in the Allied conduct of the war.' In the latter half of July discussions were initiated between Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Norway on possible military operations in Svalbard. The Norwegian delegation included Commander Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, Captain J. E. Jacobsen, and Major Aage Pran. During the negotiations Riiser-Larsen made it clear that military

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defence would be a violation of the Svalbard Treaty. He emphasised, however, that if it should prove necessary to set aside the provisions of the Treaty, on account of the military situation, then this was a question that the Norwegian government alone would have to decide.8 RiiserLarsen further maintained that it might be necessary to evacuate the population if Svalbard coal were used to feed the German war machine and not—as had been the intention—to heat houses in North Norway. To start with the Russian negotiators were averse to the idea of evacuation; in their opinion it would be better to establish a sort of local home guard, by arming the Soviet mining communities. But they soon realised that such a plan would be frustrated by the Allied inability to provide supplies, and for that reason they withdrew their proposal.' Subsequently the Russians pressed for an Allied occupation of Bjørnøya; there were two reasons for this, first, that it would anticipate a possible German occupation, and secondly that it would make it possible to establish a meteorological station to provide a continuous weather report service in the Arctic. This proposal met with a great deal of sympathy, but was nevertheless rejected because of the exposed position of the island.'' These negotiations throw an interesting light on the attitude to Svalbard of the three governments at this stage of the war. The Russians placed great emphasis on the danger of the Germans establishing themselves in Svalbard. They therefore worked to ensure that this danger should be anticipated by Allied military measures. The British Government expressed doubts as to the desirability of Allied operations in the area. On the other hand, they were prepared to carry out limited measures, such as the evacuation of the population. The Norwegian attitude was two-sided: in view of the difficult war situation the government was willing to consider Allied military operations in Svalbard but it also maintained that any such move would have to be carried out with large-scale and active Norwegian participation. The result of the negotiations in London fulfilled Riiser-Larsen's expectations. At the end of August and the beginning of September 1941 the population of Svalbard was evacuated by units of the Royal Navy, who were also instructed to destroy vital parts of the production equipment in the mines and to set fire to coal and oil stores." The reasons for this were given in a statement issued by the Norwegian Government: Because of the course of the war, and the military plans there is reason to believe the Germans harbour in connection with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, it has been necessary to take certain precautions to prevent the Svalbard region being used by the Germans to further their military aims'.12

(ii) The `Reconquest of Svalbard. When Einar Sverdrup, director of the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani, arrived in England after being evacuated from Longyearbyen, he immediately raised with the

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Norwegian government the question of sending a minor expeditionary force to Svalbard in order to take care of Norwegian interests.13 The idea was by no means new: during negotiations in London in July the government had expressed its willingness to discuss a possible occupation of Svalbard. After Norwegian—British discussions on this issue, new negotiations were initiated, as a result of which it was agreed that Svalbard should be won back from the Germans, who, following the evacuation of Norwegians, had established a small garrison in Longyearbyen.14 On the afternoon of 30 April 1942 the icebreakers Isbjørn and Selis left Greenock in Scotland, carrying a Norwegian force of fifty men, under the command of Einar Sverdrup, commissioned for this purpose as a lieutenant-colonel in the Norwegian Army. Their task was `to deny the use of Svalbard to the Germans, establish a meteorological station and ensure that no damage took place at the mines'.'b At the beginning of May the force sailed up Isfjord, en route for Barentsburg, but before the ships could tie up to the quay, they were attacked by German Condor planes. One of the boats was sunk, and thirteen men were killed or wounded. Einar Sverdrup was among those killed. The rest of the force managed to make their way across the ice to land." The authorities in London soon realised what had happened in Isfjord, and preparations were made to send a relief and follow-up expedition. On 15 June Commander Ernst Ullring was ordered to lead the second expedition. On 2 July the force reached Svalbard. The Norwegian force now numbered about 150 men, who were posted at various points round Isfjord. Emplacements were dug, and guns set up in Barentsburg; these were later supplemented by three Bofors guns. The garrison was also well supplied with small arms." The object of the occupation is set out in the instructions which the military governor of Svalbard, Ernst Ullring, received from the Chief of the Norwegian Defence Command: 1. Chain of command: The Military Governor as such is directly responsible to the Norwegian High Command. He is the supreme military authority in Svalbard and commander of military forces there. 2. Objectives: It is the duty of the Military Governor: (a) To maintain Norwegian sovereignty and Norwegian interests in Svalbard, and in so far as this is possible with the available means, to defend Svalbard against enemy activity; (b) To assist the representative of the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompagni to take care of the mines; (c) To administer the work of the meteorological station; (d) To report everything of military interest that comes to his knowledge, as well as everything that may be assumed to be of interest to the Chief of Defence and the Norwegian Government."

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The first military task involved investigating and obtaining information about German activities in Longyearbyen. A reconnaissance was undertaken, but before any action was set on foot by the Norwegians, the German garrison was evacuated by air. This has been described as the `reconquest' of Svalbard. (iii) Military Significance of the Occupation. Trygve Mathisen describes the military importance of Svalbard during the war as follows: Viewed in a broader perspective, Svalbard did not play any important part during the war. I t was never used as a base, either by naval nor by air forces; nor was it of much value to convoys sailing to North Russian ports, although ships may have taken advantage of its sheltered waters for refuelling."

In a wider context this is undoubtedly a correct estimate of Svalbard's military importance. On the other hand it is clear that the archipelago was used as an integral part of the Allied conduct of war against the Axis powers in several ways: —The greatest advantage of the occupation was that it made it possible to send daily weather reports from this part of the Arctic. The military importance of uninterrupted weather reports is obvious. The Allies calculate that they lost approximately two hundred aircraft in connection with escort and reconnaissance work in the Arctic during the period from the evacuation of Svalbard to the re-establishment of a weather-reporting centre in Barentsburg in the summer of 1942.20 —The Norwegian garrison was important as a base for attacks on German installations in West Spitsbergen. In July 1943 a Norwegian patrol, led by Commander Ullring, destroyed a German weatherreporting station at Signehavn in Krossfjorden.2' Raids of this kind helped to reduce the use the Germans could make of the archipelago. —Once the occupation had taken place, Bellsund was occasionally used as a refuelling base for Allied vessels. The immense distance from Iceland, where convoys bound for north Russia were mustered, made it necessary for escorting destroyers to refuel en route. This could either be done at sea—a highly hazardous operation—or in the Svalbard fjords, provided the archipelago was in Allied hands.22 —The Germans appear to have believed that Svalbard was occupied by relatively large forces. On 8 September 1943 the battleship Tirpitz, assisted by the Scharnhorst and nine destroyers, sailed up the Isfjjord and bombarded Barentsburg, Grumant, and Longyearbyen. Troops were then landed, and one-third of the 152-man Norwegian garrison were taken prisoner. Six hours after the attack had been initiated the German force returned to its base in Alta in North Norway. Had the Germans been sufficiently well informed of the modest scale of the Norwegian occupation, it is hardly likely they would have committed such a powerful naval and military force to this attack.23 The fact that they

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believed it to have been on a larger scale may have influenced their planners. These examples show that Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty was allowed to lapse during the war; the provisions of the Treaty simply did not apply to the relationship between Germany and Norway once the Germans had occupied Svalbard early in 1942. Norway and her Allies were no more bound by the Treaty than was Germany. (iv) Proposals for Revision of the Svalbard Treaty. Early in November 1944 Foreign Minister Trygve Lie visited Moscow, to discuss among other things Soviet military operations in Finnmark. On 12 November, immediately after discussions had been formally concluded, Lie and the Norwegian ambassador, Rolf Andvord, were asked to attend a meeting with Molotov in the Kremlin. The latter opened the proceedings by pointing out that the Svalbard Treaty would have to be revised, because it conflicted with the interests of the Soviet Union, and had been adopted without Russian consent. Instead, Svalbard should `belong to both countries as a condominium; [also] Bjørnøya, which previously was Russian, should be Russian once again'.24 The wish was also expressed that Lie would do his best to ensure that the matter was settled in a manner that would be advantageous to both countries. `We must reach agreement, because in the present situation the Soviet Union is bottled up'.25 Molotov then got to his feet, `produced a map, placed his clenched fist on the Dardanelles, and said: "We're bottled up here." [He then moved his hand across to Oresund:] "We're bottled up here. Only in the north is there an outlet, but this war has shown that the line of communication with the north of Russia can be cut or threatened. This must not be allowed to happen again in future.28 We cannot rest before this matter has been solved", Molotov continued. "The legitimate rights of the Soviet Union are at stake; but if we can find a solution to this matter, the question of our security in the north will have been solved for all time." '27 Foreign Minister Lie raised certain objections, but without becoming involved in a discussion with Molotov: he merely mentioned that he had no authority to discuss the question and promised to raise the matter with the Norwegian government once he had returned to London. Back in London, he immediately appointed a committee2s to study the question and establish the Norwegian standpoint. It was assumed that the Russian proposal had been prompted by security reasons, and the Norwegian government was therefore willing to initiate a discussion with the Russians on a repeal of or amendment to Article 9, but discussions on a repeal of the Treaty, or on Russia's territorial demands, were not acceptable. In the middle of December the Government despatched its reply to Moscow: The Norwegian Government realises that the present war has shown that

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neutralisation of Svalbard, based on the Treaty, is no longer a solution capable of satisfying the interests of the states most concerned, viz. Norway and the Soviet Union. The Norwegian Government assumes that the United States, which is a party to the Svalbard Treaty, is of the opinion that Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty should either lapse or be replaced by a new Article permitting the military utilisation of the archipelago to be adapted to a universal or regional security system." The Norwegian Government in this way demonstrated that it was willing to start negotiations. On the Norwegian side these were led by Ambassador Andvord and provisionally concluded in April 1945. The Norwegians proposed a joint communiqué in which the principle of joint responsibility for the defence of Svalbard would be stated; Soviet claims to Bjørnøya were not recognised.30 No reply was received from the Russians. The discussions were concluded on the express condition that negotiation should be re-opened once Norway was a free country.s' During the Peace Conference in Paris in August 1946 Molotov resuscitated the Svalbard question, reiterating the Soviet Union's desire for a common defence but skirting the idea of Norway ceding Bear Island. Three months later, during the session of the United Nations in New York, he again broached the question. On these occasions Foreign Minister Lange undertook to submit the matter to the Storting, and this was done in a secret session in February 1947. The attitude of the House, however, was clear: the international situation had changed radically since the draft for a joint communique was submitted by the Norwegian negotiators, and the circumstances that would have prompted carrying its suggestions into effect were no longer present. Nevertheless, the Storting declared its willingness to continue negotiating, to arrive at a satisfactory amendment to-the Treaty.32 After the Storting had expressed its views the Soviet Union allowed the matter to lapse. Why? The lack ofRussian source material precludes a precise answer to this and similar questions with regard to Soviet Svalbard policy in the years 194-4-7. One can only speculate, from the actual conduct of Soviet policy, on the arguments made use of during the negotiations, and on the extremely scanty sources which exist. Two questions appear to have been central in this connection: Why did the Soviet Union demand a revision of the Svalbard Treaty in 1944? And why did Molotov revert to this question after the conclusion of hostilities when only a few months later, without demur, he accepted a Norwegian rejection of these demands? The Norwegian historian Knut Eriksen considers it reasonable to interpret Molotov's own explanation of the demarche in 1944 literally: The war and the Allied convoy service had shown the importance of the northerly line of communication with the Soviet Union. The Russian leaders were interested in securing this line of communication for the future. A Russian military presence in Svalbard could to some extent help to ensure this. The

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autumn of 1944 provided a convenient point of time to demand a revision of the Svalbard Treaty. Military victory over Germany was assured; the Soviet Union turned its attention to the postwar settlement, and thanks to its enhanced position as a Great Power could work to improve the Soviet Union's strategic position on a long-term basis. At the same time the Soviet Union undoubtedly realised that Norway was negotiating from a position of weakness. Her Government was in exile in a foreign country. (This was a weakness, but at the same time a strength, as formal agreements had to wait until normal constitutional processes could function.) Norway was occupied by the Germans, apart from East Finnmark, which the Russians had already invaded, and moreover Norway had failed to maintain the demilitarisation of Svalbard. Added to this was the lack of interest which the western powers appeared to have shown for Trygve Lie's fear.33

This is a reasonable explanation, and agrees with the Soviet Union's experience of the war; but it is impossible entirely to exclude the possibility that Molotov's dØrche might have been the result of a Soviet misunderstanding of the actual situation in Svalbard after the evacuation in September 1941. In a conversation between Commissioner of Mines Gunnar Aasgaard and Naumkin, a director of Arktikugol, in the summer of 1947, the latter maintained that `the Russians' believed that Svalbard had been occupied by British troops in 1942, and that the British garrison had been stationed there throughout the war.34 This conversation prompted a report from Aasgaard in which he requested the Department of Industry to emphasise `that it was Norwegian troops who reconquered Barentsburg and Longyearbyen from the Germans in 1942, and it was the Norwegian garrison that was later stationed up there'.35 There is no source material to indicate that Naumkin, in using the term `the Russians' was alluding to the Soviet government. Two facts, however, suggest this: as a director of Arktikugol it is reasonable to suppose that Naumkin was close to the centre of decision-making in the Soviet bureaucracy in questions relating to Svalbard. His official position, in other words, gives us some idea of the weight which can be attached to his statements. One other fact might also indicate that the Soviet government actually believed that the archipelago was occupied by the British. After the Allies had agreed to evacuate the population of Svalbard, the Russians dropped out of the negotiations, which were continued between the Norwegian and British authorities. The reoccupation of Svalbard was therefore decided on without Russian collaboration. In a memorandum to the Minister of Defence in January. 1942 the Norwegian Admiral Danielsen maintained that the Russians should be informed of this plan.38 The Ministry of Defence conveyed this to the Foreign Ministry, requesting that department to consider the question and take the necessary steps. So far as is known the Foreign Ministry omitted to inform the Soviet Government of the occupation plan. In view of this it is reasonable to suppose that Naumkin's remarks might represent the actual belief of the Soviet Government and I shall

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assume that such was the case. On this conditional basis, the Soviet Government may have felt confident that given British forces in Svalbard and a British naval presence in the surrounding waters, the Germans would not be able to establish themselves in Svalbard and thus use the islands as a base for attacks on convoys or on Russian territory. In this way the north flank was relatively safe, as long as the war continued. By 1944, however, victory over Germany was only a question of time, and the attention of statesmen was directed to postwar Europe. An assumed British presence in Svalbard, which at one stage of the war was regarded as a sufficient guarantee ofsafety, in 1944 came to be regarded by the leaders in Moscow as a threat. Mutual suspicion among the Allies during the concluding phase of the war was obvious. It was not least to the fore in Moscow. To the Russians the assumed presence of the British in Svalbard might represent a serious security problem. The possibility of the British exploiting their position in Svalbard, politically or militarily, could not be discounted: the old British theme of an `Arctic Gibraltar' in Svalbard had been publicly mooted in Great Britain as far back as 1912. Churchill's anti-communism was an additional factor which might help to increase suspicion about Britain's postwar intentions. If Molotov believed that Svalbard was occupied by British forces, it would be imperative for him to eliminate this threat: he might be able to achieve this merely by citing the existing Treaty. The archipelago, after all, was demilitarised, and Great Britain had no warranty in international law to continue its occupation. That Molotov nevertheless initially chose another approach may have been because he was in doubt with regard to the possibility of Britain being willing to withdraw unless this demand was backed by a show of force. This Norway did not possess. If, on the other hand, Molotov could point to a joint agreement with Norway, he would enhance both the credibility and the legitimacy of a demand for withdrawal. Clearly he intended to secure the best possible position should a conflict with Great Britain arise. Trygve Lie observed later in this connection that `it was clear that his [Molotov's] purpose was to achieve an agreement with Norway alone, which could then be presented to the other powers as a fait accompli.'a7 It is reasonable to suppose that after the war, as in 1944, Molotov hoped for Norwegian cooperation. From the point of view of the Kremlin a Soviet military presence was much to be preferred to a demilitarised Svalbard. The war had demonstrated the strategic importance of.the archipelago. If the Russian demands had been met the Soviet Union would have secured a more advanced position, so that the warning time in the event of enemy attack would have been reduced, and the possibility of surveying the Arctic improved. Soviet bases in the archipelago would also create a counterpoise to American military positions in Iceland and Greenland. In other words, the object may have been to create a military balance in the north.

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Eriksen tends to believe that the Soviet &marches had more limited and defensive aims. By pressing claims for Norwegian—Soviet defence installations in Svalbard, Molotov may among other things have hoped to prevent a similar demand by the USA and Great Britain being acceded to by the Norwegians. It would be difficult for the Norwegian government to grant such demands after first rejecting Soviet proposals. Moreover, the Soviet Union needed to emphasise that this part of the world belonged to its own sphere of interest and not to that of the western powers. In this light Molotov's approach could be regarded as a warning to Norway not to allow the western powers access to Svalbard, thus incidentally constituting an indirect warning to the USA and Britain. If this conjecture is correct, it would explain why Norwegian rejection of military installations in the islands was not followed up by fresh Soviet pressure. In Eriksen's opinion this explains `the sporadic way in which the Soviet Union used the Svalbard question as a sort of "rod in pickle" policy. Apart from Molotov's surprising dØrche in 1944 it was a question all the time of a mild pressure policy.'$'" Thus the Soviet Union's Svalbard policy during the years 1949 '17 appears to have been dominated by strategic considerations. Whether their motives were offensive-defensive or revisionist-status quo-oriented is difficult to decide, in view of the limited source material available. (c) The Post-War Period (i) The .Norwegian—Soviet Exchange of Notes in 1951. The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the Finnish—Russian treaty of friendship and assistance in 1948 provided the immediate occasion for Norway to abandon the `bridge-building' line and opt instead for membership of NATO. This choice was a definite breach with Norway's traditional policy of neutrality and could hardly pass unnoticed in Moscow. As part of the joint command system of the NATO alliance it was decided in December 1950 to establish a North Atlantic Command. This included the northernmost Norwegian territories, including Jan Mayen and Svalbard. The matter was submitted to the Storting, and on 12 October 1951 the first Soviet protest was lodged. Three days later, in a fresh note, the Soviet Union maintained that an arrangement whereby Svalbard was to come under an Atlantic command was a direct breach of the demilitarisation clause in the Svalbard Treaty. It was furthermore maintained with some vehemence that this new arrangement would damage Soviet interests, and that relations between the two countries would deteriorate. The note concluded by stating: `Acting in this way the Norwegian Government takes upon itself the entire responsibility for the result of such a policy.'39 On 30 October the Norwegian Government despatched an answering note, in which it was pointed out that no military fortification or base had been established Svalbard, nor would the government allow any state this

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privilege. The note went on to declare that Norway, by virtue of her sovereignty, would protect all legitimate rights and interests in Svalbard, and to express the hope that other states which were bound by the provisions of the Treaty would maintain their obligations in the same way.40 On 12 November, in its reply to the Norwegian note the Soviet government repeated its protests, describing the Norwegian policy as an unfriendly act: The Soviet Government is unable to recognise as legal the act of the Norwegian Government by which it places Spitsbergen and Bjørnøya [Bear Island] under the authority of the command of the Atlantic Pact.'44 Foreign Minister Halvard Lange replied to this Soviet note in the Storting on 1 December. In his speech he refuted the assertion that Article 9 of the Treaty had been violated as a result of Norway's membership ofNATO. He emphasised that none of Norway's NATO allies would take such a step, and for this reason it was his hope that no other nation had plans of this kind.42 The Soviet notes were couched in somewhat vehement tones. Clearly the Russian leaders were greatly concerned with developments in the Svalbard area, the more so as developments in other sea lanes were also liable to appear somewhat disturbing from Moscow's point of view. With Denmark a member, it would be possible for NATO to prevent free egress and entry through Oresund and the Belts. At the same time the possibility of Greece and Turkey being drawn into the Atlantic defence system was being [iiscussed; American supplies of armaments to these two countries emphasised that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, too, might be controlled by the USA and NATO. The point of the notes was therefore to make it clear that the Soviet Union was prepared to use all means to secure access to the sea. Through the notes sent in reply by the Norwegians and Lange's assurances in the Storting that the demilitarisation provision had not been violated by Norway's NATO membership, and thanks to the opportunities that existed for keeping an eye on all this through the Soviet mining communities in Svalbard, the Soviet leaders could satisfy themselves that the situation had not been altered, and the episode therefore went no further than the exchange of notes. Nevertheless, it served to illustrate the connection between the Soviet Union's anxieties about the straits in general and their reactions to Svalbard in particular. (ii) The Airfield Question. Nineteen fifty-eight witnessed a new exchange of notes between the two countries, this time in connection with an allthe-year-round landing strip for planes in Svalbard. The company known as Norsk Polarnavigasjon had drawn up plans for building a landing strip near Ny Alesund. The Norwegian authorities were interested in this plan, and negotiations were started for a lease of the necessary land. On 5 March 1958 Lange stated in the Storting: `I believe ... it may be said that Norwegian interests will be served by a civil airfield in Svalbard.' This soon provoked a reaction: on 29

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November the Norwegian government received a note from the Soviet Union protesting against the plan, which—so it was maintained— contravened the Svalbard Treaty. The Norwegian note of reply emphasised the civil and private nature of the airfield. The matter now took a surprising turn: during the foreign policy debate in the Storting on 27 January 1959, Lange declared that the Norwegian authorities had no plans for building an airfield in Svalbard, and that the proposed project did not satisfy the technical standards required for the construction of a modern airfield. The authorities then withdrew from their negotiations with Norsk Polarnavigasjon. Why? The preparatory investigations carried out by Norsk Polarnavigasjon in Svalbard were conducted in financial cooperation with the Arctic Institute of North America, which apparently received financial support from the military authorities in the USA. The Soviet Russians were aware of this. On 26 October 1959 the Soviet Union submitted a fresh protest to Norway. The Norwegian government replied that it had taken the necessary steps to put an end to the foreign financial support and the Norwegian plans. In this way a fresh exchange of notes came to an end.44 In view of the international situation obtaining in 1958-59, it is probable that the Soviet leaders considered the question of an airfield in Svalbard an attempt to provide a civilian excuse for an American military infiltration. An airfield, which in next to no time could be transformed and used as an American base, so close to the Soviet sphere of interest was totally unacceptable in Moscow, as at that time the importance of advanced bases and defence in depth was given great emphasis. The Soviet authorities were aware of the American reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory, which had been going on since the mid-1950s, and which culminated in the U-2 scandal in April/May 1960. An airfield in Svalbard would facilitate the carrying out of similar missions and provide the American defence with greater depth. By December 1971 the Kremlin had changed its tone. During Prime Minister Kosygin's visit to Norway it became clear that the Soviet Russians were favourably disposed to `plans for building a Norwegian government airfield in Svalbard'.44 This was the turning-point, and events followed thick and fast. On 30 March 1973 the Norwegian government presented White Paper No. 108 on the airfield in Svalbard, and less than two months later the Storting agreed that construction work could start. By the autumn of 1975 the airfield was complete. There are a number of reasons for the Soviet volte-face: not least important was the fact that the Soviet leaders were more or less presented with a Norwegian fail accompli as far as the building of the airfield was concerned. As far back as 15 May 1971—before Kosygin's visit to Norway—the government had formally decided to table a motion in the House on the building of an airfield at Hotellneset. Soviet

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leaders, precluded from raising any legal objections, were faced with two alternative reactions: (1) They could protest against the Norwegian decision on political premises, thus risking political tension in an area where they were keen to preserve the peace; or (2) they could accept the Norwegian plan, and if possible endeavour to influence its accomplishment through diplomatic channels. The choice was not very difficult: the Soviet Union, just as much as Norway, was in need at the time of an airfield in Svalbard, and was therefore interested in the completion of the airfield. Moreover any possible security misgivings would be slight in 1971 compared to what they were in 1958-60. The policy of détente between East and West had in general created a favourable climate for moving away from rigid positions, and practical requirements need not automatically be subject to security evaluations. The Norwegian Government had also made their premises for the construction of an airfield perfectly clear: the airfield, which was to be a civilian one, was to be constructed and run by the Norwegian state, and not by private individuals as had been the idea in 1958-60. Any doubt that might have existed with regard to the civilian nature of this project was swept away in the communiqué issued after Kosygin's visit. This stated briefly that `the airfield to be built in Svalbard, in compliance with Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty, will never be used for military purposes to the detriment of any country's security'. Consequently, there was no reason for opposing the Norwegian plans. During his conversation in Oslo, Kosygin was informed that Norway `was prepared to discuss with the Soviet authorities questions relating to the Soviet use of the airfield'.45 He accepted this invitation, and negotiations were started. One of the results of these was that Aeroflot was allowed to have a staff of five or six persons permanently stationed at the airfield in order to take care of practical problems in connection with Soviet Union flights to Svalbard.46 This agreement is concerned purely with air transport, but this does not mean that it has no bearing on security policy. Soviet personnel stationed at the airfield provide a safety factor for the Russians: thanks to the presence of on-the-spot observers they can satisfy themselves of the civilian use and purpose of the airfield. This serves the interests of both countries.

(iii) The ESRO Presence. On 3 September 1964 the Norwegian Government gave the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) provisional permission to build a telemetric station at Kongsfjord in Svalbard, subject to detailed negotiations.4' These were concluded on 21 September 1965 and an agreement was signed between Norway and ESRO. The Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (Norges TekniskNaturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd) was to run the station, the chief

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task of which would be to transmit and receive signals from satellites placed in orbit round the earth by ESRO for purely civilian research.48 Soviet misgivings with regard to the military usefulness of the telemetric station were expressed in a note of 17 February 1965 and in a conversation between the Prime Minister, Gerhardsen, and Kosygin that year. The Norwegians pointed out that the aim of the station was exclusively civilian and scientific. This assurance clearly failed to satisfy the Russians. Four years later, on 30 April 1969, the Soviet Government sent a memorandum to the Norwegian Government, again revealing its fear of the military potential of any installation. The Soviet Government is still of the opinion that the telemetric station in Svalbard, apart from its purely scientific purposes, could be used for military purposes, in particular for carrying out cosmic, radio-technological, and other forms of intelligence activity over the territory of the Soviet Union, and that its real tendency can only be determined by constant surveillance and supervision of its activity by Soviet experts.49 The Norwegian Government had long been keen to establish the telemetric station, on national as well as scientific grounds, but, always anxious not to provoke the Soviet Union unnecessarily, consistently conducted an `open door' policy and allowed Russian scientists to visit the station whenever they wished to do so. Scientists from other countries were naturally granted the same privilege.60 Thanks to the visits of their scientists the Russians were able to convince themselves of the civilian-scientific nature of ESRO's activities. The ESRO agreement lapsed in the spring of 1974 and the station no longer operates.

(iv) Soviet Reconnaissance Activities. The Russians have excellent opportunities to keep watch on the activities of other nationalities in Svalbard. They can do this both through the reports of their own scientific expeditions, which are allowed to move freely throughout the archipelago, and by aerial reconnaissance carried out by helicopters. (They have at present [1977] five large modern M1-8 helicopters stationed at Kapp Heer, outside Barentsburg.) At regular intervals, also, they visit expeditions from other countries, usually two or three days after camp has been set up,5' with opportunities to inspect their equipment and learn their purpose. These activities may be seen in the light of the Soviet Union's security priorities; the only surprising aspect is that they are carried on so openly. The Norwegian authorities have made it clear that no country other than Norway can `exercise any form of authority in Svalbard, not vis-d-vis its own nationals either'.52 Yet some of the surveillance by the Russians seems to constitute a violation of Norwegian sovereignty.

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(d) Summary Russian Svalbard policy from 1941 to the present day has constantly reflected a fear that the archipelago might be used as a base for acts hostile to the Soviet Union. Two aspects of this fear have been expressed: (1) that Svalbard might be used as a base for controlling the sea passage between North Norway and West Spitsbergen; (2) that Svalbard might be used as a base for hostilities against north-west Russia. The latter fear was expressed both during the Second World War and in the exchanges of notes in 1951 and 1958-60. Developments in military technology have reduced the importance of Svalbard as a forward base, but the exchange of notes on the potential use of the ESRO station shows that space research has resulted in the existence of installations which might be used against the Soviet Union. Thus Svalbard does still possess some (though considerably reduced) value as a military base. On the other hand control of the northern sea passage may pose just as great a threat today as in the last century. Bjørnøya, midway between Norway and Spitsbergen, is particularly important. The Soviet authorities clearly recognised this in 1941, and again in 1944 when they submitted their demand for a `return' of Bjørnøya. Climate is an outstanding factor in the island's importance. In years when there is a great deal of drift, ice may be found as far down as the northern extremity of the island, so that surface vessels are forced to proceed south of it. The Soviet notes have emphasised that the Soviet Union cannot accept a radical change in the status quo in this area. On the other hand Norway's open door policy has sufficed to reassure Moscow. There is no peacetime example of Norway ever having violated Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty, and the Russians have been in a position to satisfy themselves on this point, thanks to their permanent presence in the archipelago. Moreover Norway's openness has helped to facilitate Russian surveillance and critical situations have been confined to notes. It is hardly likely, therefore, that a change in status in the Svalbard area is currently given high priority in the Kremlin.

7 PROPERTY, REVENUE AND INTERNATIONALISATION (a) The Rights of Pre-Treaty Claimants' It was agreed at the Versailles Conference that property claims submitted before the signing of the Treaty of 9 February 1920 should be conveyed to the Danish Government.2 By an order-in-council of 17 September 1925 the Danish Government nominated Professor Kristian Sindballe of the University of Copenhagen as Commissioner for Svalbard. The task of the Commissioner was to examine the validity of claims submitted before the signing of the Svalbard Treaty. The deadline for submitting claims was 14 November 1925. By then seventy-four claims from twenty-six different claimants had been received, and of these twenty were Norwegian. Apart from Norwegian claims, thirty-three British, three Dutch, nine German, three Swedish, and twelve Russian claims were submitted. Many of the claims submitted clashed, some betILeen and some within individual nationalities. The Commissioner for Svalbard, had no easy task. He elected to negotiate with the parties whose claims clashed—a laborious and time-consuming business, but one which was successfully concluded, as all disputed claims were settled round the negotiating table. On 10 September 1927, after Norwegian Explorations in Svalbard and the Polar Seas had drawn up maps covering the various territories, the Svalbard Commissioner signed his Report.3 None of the original twenty-six claimants raised any objection. Professor Sindballe's work as Svalbard Commissioner made a considerable contribution to a peaceful development of relations between property owners in West Spitsbergen. Before 1920 the situation had been marked by internal conflict; after 1927, the basis for disputes had been removed. During the following years the Norwegian Government bought up most of the properties originally owned by private interests.4 (b) Local Use of Revenue The taxes, dues, and duties paid in Svalbard do not provide revenue for the Norwegian state coffers; they are earmarked exclusively for Svalbard, and can only be levied to the extent local needs warrants The most important sources of revenue are the export duty on minerals, fees 60

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for claims, and taxes paid by individuals and companies. Export duties today are fixed at one per cent of the value of the first 100,000 tons exported; thereafter the rate drops 0.1 per cent of the value of each 100,000 tons. The annual duty payable per claim is fixed at Kr.1,500, while income tax for individuals is 4 per cent and company tax 10 per cent.° Together, these sources of revenue in 1974 provided more than 90 per cent of the receipts in the Svalbard budget. It is a Norwegian principle that the administrative expenses for the archipelago should be covered in the Svalbard budget and balanced by the revenue accruing to it. This aim has not always been fulfilled: from time to time the Svalbard budget has received support from the national budget (see Table 9.1, p. 84). In future—not least owing to the construction and running of the Svalbard airfield—the need for greater revenue will increase. Funds for this can be obtained in three ways: by increasing the budgetary grants made to Svalbard, by raising loans to be paid back on some future occasion, or by raising taxes. If the alternative chosen is to transfer funds from the national budget, then a well-established principle in Norway's administration of Svalbard will be overruled. There is nothing today to suggest that this course of action, which, furthermore, might prove very costly to the Norwegian Government, will be seriously considered by the central authorities,' who seem to be working towards a higher rate of taxation; the raising of loans for the time being hardly appears to be a likely alternative. The Norwegian authorities have always stuck to the principle of local expenditure of funds accruing from taxes, dues, and duties levied in Svalbard. Even so, this principle has created problems in Norway's relations to Arktikugol. On several occasions during the last twenty years the Norwegian authorities have been anxious to raise the rate of taxation in order, among other things, to compensate for the general rise in prices, and to make larger sums available for Svalbard. Moves of this kind have not met with Russian enthusiasm: when the annual dues for claims were raised from Kr.500 to Kr.1,500 on 1 January 1972 Arktikugol refused to pay the new rates. The reason for this was given in a Soviet note to Norway on 22 December 1971. On this occasion the Soviet Union questioned Norway's right to raise duties and dues beyond the level established in 1925. Subsequently the company has expressed its willingness to accept the higher rate.° Even so, this episode throws light on the Soviet Union's general unwillingness to accept tax increases, particularly in regard to individual taxation. Ever since 1955 the individual tax rate has been Kr.6 per Russian per month (the so-called poll tax), whereas in the case of other nationals it has been 4 per cent of taxable income.° On several occasions the Norwegian authorities have taken steps to raise the tax to Kr.9 per Russian, but without any result.10 The Russians have consistently maintained that their mining communities do not derive sufficient benefits from the measures initiated with revenue from Svalbard. They

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are unwilling to pay for measures which mainly benefit Norwegians," and hold the view that a rise in the rate of taxation must be considered in relation to the principle of equal treatment. In this relationship Norwegians are more favourably treated than Russians. This argument is doubtful; if Norwegians receive more than the Russians, this is because they pay more. So far everyone has received in relation to his contribution. If the Russians accept tax increases, they will probably receive benefits in return geared to the amended tax rates. In other words, the Russains cannot reasonably invoke the principle of equal treatment. As long as their resistance to tax increases persists, Norway will be forced to counterbalance their favourable tax situation by providing better `administrative' conditions for other nationalities. But this imposes an obligation: the day all nationalities pay equal taxes, Norway will have to spread her administrative measures more evenly. Even a modest increase of Kr.3 on the individual tax rate affects such issues as the organisation of the Norwegian Svalbard administration, the number of local officials, the infrastructure, and so on. The essence of Norway's Svalbard policy cannot be considered independently of the administrative structures in which decisions are made: here there is a mutual interdependence. The Russian argument may not provide the real reason for opposing an increase in the poll tax; it is just as likely that the argument is a substitute: Soviet unwillingness might, for example, be explained as a demonstration of an intransigent attitude towards Norway. But by accepting the Soviet argument the Norwegians can to a certain extent establish the basis for future handling of this matter. The export duty, which has already been established at the maximum pervnitted by the Treaty,12 cannot be raised either, except by a complicated juridical-political process. It might therefore appear that the possibilities of raising the revenue level in Svalbard are slight; however, further possibilities exist. In the first place a multinational establishment in Svalbard would automatically provide increased revenue; secondly, this development contains so much security dynamite, that even the Russians might be expected to abandon their traditional resistance to a rise in the level of taxes, dues, and duties.19 (c) Internationalisation The principle of internationalisation means that nationals of the states adhering to the Treaty can remain in Svalbard for short or long periods carrying out economic and/or scientific activity. So far thirty-nine states have adhered to the Treaty, but only a small number of these have made use of their rights of sojourn. This is not because the Norwegian authorities have raised difficulties, but because interest in the archipelago has been insufficient. (i) The Svalbard Continental Shelf There seem to be two ways of settling this issue: either to place the shelf

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under full Norwegian sovereignty in accordance with international law, or to bring it under the Svalbard Treaty regime. In the latter case the shelf will remain under Norwegian sovereignty, but citizens of all Treaty powers will have access to the area and its resources on an equal footing with Norwegians. This would mean that sovereignty would be more restricted than otherwise. Oslo's argument is that the Svalbard Treaty applies only to the islands and the territorial waters, whereas the continental shelf falls outside the Treaty area. The claim that the Treaty should apply to the shelf is rejected on the grounds that the limits to Norwegian sovereignty have been exhaustively enumerated in the Treaty, which cannot be given an extended interpretation in the light of current economic interests. Thus, according to Oslo's view, the Svalbard shelf is subject to Norwegian jurisdiction on the basis of Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention, or—more specifically—the exploitability criterion of that article." The juridical reasoning in support of this interpretation is based on Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Treaty. In Article 1 Norway is granted sovereignty over `all islands great or small and rocks appertaining thereto' situated between 10° and 35° longitude East of Greenwich and 74° and 81° latitude North. Article 2, however, states that `nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters'. Article 3 states that `nationals of all the High Contracting Parties ... shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters'. In other words, the scope of the Treaty is here extended to cover territorial waters, which in 1971 were fixed at four nautical miles. The reason why territorial waters are mentioned in the Treaty is that Articles 2 and 3 include `fishing' and 'maritime enterprises'. The principle of equal treatment and the principle of internationalisation, as laid down in Articles 2 and 3—and hence restrictions on Norway's sovereignty— apply only to the land area and territorial waters of Svalbard. However, in the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) of 6 May 1976 the chairman of Committee II at the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) suggests that the future seaward boundary of the continental shelf should be `the outer edge of the continental margin, or ... a distance of 200 nautical miles ... where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance' (Art. 64). If this provision were to be included in a future law of the sea treaty, it would largely satisfy Norwegian needs with regard to the Svalbard shelf, since it would buttress the claim that there is a continuous continental shelf from the Norwegian mainland to the deep seabed north of the Svalbard Archipelago.15 At this point, a majority of the participants at UNCLOS seem to be

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either in favour of draft Article 64 or willing to accept it, at least if accompanied by a provision for revenue—sharing in the area between 200 miles and the continental margin (see Art. 70 of the RSNT). This attitude has received support from the fact that several influential coastal states have made it clear that they will not be parties to a treaty lacking reference to the continental margin as one of the criteria for determining the outer limit of the continental shelf. Even so, fairly strong pockets of resistance against the margin concept remain, for instance in the African group and among landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states. These countries are pressing for the 200 miles line as the outer limit. Hence the unlikely contingency that the margin concept may be dropped cannot be ruled out.1s A limit based exclusively on distance, however, might mean that Norwegian sovereignty, measured from the coast of the mainland, failed to reach as far as and past the Svalbard Islands (see p. 00). The distance between North Norway (Finnmark) and Spitsbergen Island is about 355 nautical miles. In other words, if 200 nautical miles line were to be the sole criterion for determining the seaward boundary of the continental shelf, then the shelf between Finnmark and Spitsbergen will be measured from two starting points: from Svalbard and from the mainland." But even if this were to happen, according to the Norwegian point of view Norway would retain the sovereign rights which the country claims to have in accordance with the Continental Shelf Convention. Support for this interpretation is found once more in Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty, which established Norway's `inviolable sovereignty' over the archipelago. But, as indicated, any restrictions on this sovereignty, apply only to land areas and territorial waters, not to the continental shelf's Thus, the continental shelfaround Svalbard has to be regulated in accordance with the terms of the Shelf Convention and Norwegian Law.1° It is, however, by no means a foregone conclusion that this interpretation will find widespread international acceptance. Anders Orvin, Director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, foresaw as far back as 1958 that, should the Svalbard Treaty apply to the continental shelf around the islands, the countries adhering to this treaty would be able to claim the same rights to the exploitation of the ocean floor as they already have in exploiting the land area.20 Today, the Norwegian authorities would be wise to take into account the possibility of this prophecy coming true. There are good economic reasons why the other parties to the Treaty could be expected to dispute the Norwegian claim. If major reserves of oil are found, and if the shelf is to be part of the Svalbard Treaty area, other European nations and the USA will have a secured right to participation in the exploration and exploitation of the resources. What is more, they will be able to do so on non-discriminatory and extremely favourable conditions. The Treaty and the Svalbard Mining Code

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provide unusually favourable conditions for economic activity. The current company tax rate is 10 per cent, which compares favourably with the 55-80 per cent that the companies taking part in the North Sea Oil bonanza have to meet. (There is, incidentally, no great risk of a sudden and dramatic rise in the tax rate. Article 8 of the Treaty stipulates that `taxes, dues, and duties levied in Svalbard shall be devoted exclusively to the said territories [the Svalbard Islands], and shall not exceed what is required for the object in view'. Obviously, the amount of money that can be poured into a small and sparsely populated area like Svalbard is strictly limited. Thus, the Norwegian authorities are not in a position to increase the tax rate at will. Against this background it is hardly surprising that several Western governments, notably the US and the UK, have made it clear that they harbour reservations about the Norwegian view with regard to the status of the Svalbard shelf. The Soviet Union, however, has explicitly rejected Norway's claim and emphasised that the Svalbard Treaty should apply to an undefined shelf area around the archipelago. This attitude is somewhat surprising. Unlike the European industrial nations and the USA, there is no reason why the USSR should give high priority to the resource potential of the area. The oil and gas reserves of other parts of the Soviet arctic are more than large enough to keep the nation busy for a long time. On the other hand, if the USSR maintains its rejection of the Norwegian claim it is in effect doing its bit to open the area up to oil companies from NATO countries. That prospect can hardly be viewed with equanimity in the Kremlin: the area in question is of vital importance from a defence point of view. Thus one would assume that the Soviets are not indifferent to the question of who is actually doing the exploration and exploitation of the shelf in the Svalbard area. More specifically, it would seem that from the Kremlin's point of view Norwegian oil activity under strict Norwegian control and regulation would be preferable to nationals of the thirty-nine countries that are parties to the Svalbard Treaty enjoying the free and equal access that would be the logical consequence of the official Soviet policy. This apparent inconsistency has led to speculation that the rejection of the Norwegian claim may primarily be a tactical stance designed to achieve concessions in the ongoing Norwegian-Soviet negotiations on the delimitation of the Barents Sea Shelf. We have no way of knowing whether that is actually the motive or not, but traditional as well as current security interests in the area suggest that Moscow may gradually move towards acceptance of Norway's claim to sovereign rights over the Svalbard shelf. The political problems that have arisen appear to have created a fertile atmosphere for political change. The Soviet Union and Norway would probably be best able to protect their national interests by promoting the same views, and at a given time might present a united

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political front in opposition to western countries, not excluding the NATO countries. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that Norway may persuade her NATO allies of the threat to security that an internationalisation of the Svalbard shelf might involve. A first important step in this direction would be to establish the actual value of this shelf as a source of petroleum. At present facts are hard to come by; if, for example, the shelf should turn out to be comparatively uninteresting from the point of view of commercial exploitation of oil, it should not be difficult to rally western support for the Norwegian view. If, on the other hand, investigations produce the opposite result, Norway would at any rate have done her best to ensure that all parties concerned are provided with the best possible base on which to arrive at sensible political decisions. For this reason it is important to initiate seismic investigations in the area. Foreign political, scientific, security, and commercial interests should co-operate to this end. The oil age has created new problems and new circumstances for Norwegian foreign policy, not least in the Svalbard area.

THE SVALBARD CONTINENTAL SHELF (A) =Dividing line of Norwegian and Soviet national waters. Source: Finn Sollie, `Norges Kontinentalsokkel og grensespørsmål på havbunnen', in Arbok 1972173: Utvalget for rustningskontroll og nedrustning.

8 NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY Norway has been awarded sovereignty over Svalbard. This means that Norway may determine the form of government and legislate for the archipelago without any intervention from other states. The only limitations are explicitly laid down in the Treaty.' Norwegian sovereignty covers `all islands great and small and rocks appertaining thereto' between 10° and 35° longitude east and between 74° and 81° latitude north, as well as the territorial waters, whose extent is laid down as four nautical miles. (a) The Earliest Years A great many years were spent hammering out a solution to the Svalbard problem: to a large extent this was due to conflicting national mining interests. After the conditions of sovereignty had been clarified mining continued to be the dominant economic activity. For this reason the Mining Code was just as important a document to a number of states as the Treaty itself.2 As a result, relations between the various nationalities in Svalbard depended to a large extent on the way in which Norway administered the Mining Code. As might have been expected, the Norwegian authorities made use of the experience and tradition they had acquired from similar activity in Norway. A basic tenet in Norwegian mining tradition was that the various mining companies should be responsible for developing and administering their own mining communities. This meant undertaking various functions which in other parts of the country would accrue to the authorities. As a rule the company would be responsible for running schools, hospitals, power supplies, internal communications, roads and streetlighting, providing a cultural outlet, etc. Thus Norwegian mining communities were to a large extent `self-administered' units within the national community.' In Svalbard this tradition had unintentional effects on the exercise of authority. The fact that these `towns' were left to their own devices resulted in the various nationalities constructing their own Svalbard communities according to their own customs and pattern. The Svalbard towns, did not develop into typical Norwegian towns in the administrative sense of the word, but became selfgoverning townships of various nationalities situated in Norwegian territory. To a marked extent they were `company towns', dominated 67

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and administered by the company management, independent of nationality. The tact that Norway's commitment in the initial stages was not very strong was further emphasised by the distance separating the mainland from the archipelago, and by the fact that communications between the two areas were severed from six to eight months every year owing to difficult ice conditions. The policy with regard to mining was in complete agreement with the Government's general and traditional Svalbard policy. Before 1910 the Government had worked energetically to establish a `minimum' regime in Svalbard, to ensure that economic activity could function under satisfactory legal conditions. In the opinion of the Government this should be achieved by means of a condominium of the states involved.' The Government had never aspired to an active exercise of sovereignty: minimal administration and commitment was sufficient to achieve the desired legal status. It was consequently not surprising that the Government chose a low profile after 1925. Any other approach would have been remarkable. At the same time it should be emphasised that this attitude was in the interests and to the liking of other nationalities. Inevitably from time to time the Government was criticised for its lukewarmness. An article in Tidens Tegn, a national daily, sets the tone (1928) : `The first thing to strike one is bound to be that everything is not just as it ought to be ... One gets ... the impression that communication with the dependency, the archipelago of Svalbard, is still mainly established on the same lines as before Norway was awarded sovereignty of these territories.'5 Nineteen years later, the periodical Internasjonal Politikk elaborated what Tidens Tegn had insinuated. In an unsigned article it was asserted that the Norwegian authorities did not interfere in `internal Soviet—Russian administration' in Svalbard.6 This was an accurate description of the actual state of affairs, but-it was neither informative nor new as far as the authorities were concerned. Svalbard governors, from J. B. Bassoe in 1925 to Håkon Balstad in 1950, had on several occasions expressed themselves, verbally and in writing, to this effect. Most of the governors were not only aware of the problem: they were also inspired with a desire to do something about it. But they lacked the most elementary capacity to translate this desire into action. The scant grants made by the Storting to Svalbard during these years militated against an active exercise of authority outside the Norwegian mining communities,. The Governor, for example, did not have his own service vessel before the early 1930s, and for this reason was not very mobile. Admittedly, he managed from time to time to make good this deficiency by making occasional trips in privately owned vessels, but an arrangement of this kind could never be anything but sporadic and unsatisfactory. An incident from 1925 clearly illustrates this problem. In the autumn of that year Governor Bassoe arrived by boat at Green Harbour on an official visit. The boat, however, had to leave before he

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69

had completed his errand; and as no other vessel was available, he was forced to stay on in Green Harbour till the spring of 1926. He was then picked up by a Norwegian ship which chanced to pass by and took him to King's Bay.' These and similar incidents give some idea of the difficult practical conditions under which the Governor was forced to work. The administrative aspects of his post hardly made the exercise of authority any easier. In 1929 a new departure was introduced: the Governor would not reside in Svalbard during the winter months, when the Governor of Troms, from his office in Tromsø, would carry out his functions; a temporary governor was to be appointed for the summer months, during which period he would remain in the archipelago.8 However, summer was always the most difficult time for carrying out inspections outside Longyearbyen, and the Governor would have his hands full performing the various tasks in connection with the shipments of coal. Helge Ingstad, Acting Governor in 1933-4, pointed this out: `In the present circumstances, the only police authority in the archipelago throughout the summer is precluded from reaching areas outside the mining town and adjacent districts.'8 According to Ingstad, winter was `the time for tours of inspection outside Longyearbyen'.10 But in winter the Governor would be resident in Tromsø. The Commissioner of Mines was not much better off. He, too, was absent from the archipelago during the winter months, which he spent in Oslo." The Mining Commissioner aptly described the situation in a letter he wrote to the Department of Commerce in 1927, when he pointed out that `in the course of the winter, when shipping is at a standstill, [generally from mid-October], people live in isolation in the various mining communities'." Summer, too, was a busy time for the Mining Commissioner, and it was consequently difficult to set aside sufficient time for inspecting foreign mines. At the end of the 1920s the Mining Commissioner was given a service vessel of his own.13 This was an important event, which helped to increase the number of tours of inspection. Unfortunately the boat was not particularly suitable for use in the inhospitable regions around Svalbard. The Commissioner, who had an opportunity of seeing it before it was purchased by the Government, observed among other things that `this vessel has been laid up for several years, and consequently looks rather the worse for wear'.14 Even so, the boat was purchased. After the Second World War the Mining Commissioner acquired a new boat, but even this proved unsatisfactory. In 1952 Kaare Lundquist of the Norwegian Polar Institute expressed his concern: `In the course of the six summers I have spent in Svalbard quite a number of people, including myself, have been greatly concerned when we knew that the Polarkull [the Mining Commissioner's Boat] was out in heavy weather." Not till 1934 did the Governor acquire his own service vessel, and

70

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even then immediate use could ntit be made of it as the necessary funds for running and maintenance had not been made available,16 it spent a great deal of time lying at anchor off Longyearbyen, when it could have been used for inspection tours round the coast. This stringent economy also affected the question of building a Norwegian state-owned icebreaker for use in Svalbard. This question came to a head in the early 1920s after it was obvious that Norway would be awarded sovereignty over the islands. The need for an effective exercise of sovereignty and for extending the season during which coal shipments could be made were advanced as reasons for acquiring a vessel of this kind. The Norwegian authorities, however, turned down every request of this kind. Of the many countries with interests in the Arctic, Norway was in fact the only one that did not possess a state-owned icebreaker. As far back as 1923 Denmark had five (1000 kr.)

14. aug. 1925

400'375 350 325 300275250

Average grant for scientific purposes before 1925: Kr. 207,760

225200175150125 -

Average grant for the administration of Svalbard after 1925: Kr. 90,140

I

1007550It I i Ili 1921 -22 -23 -24 -25 26/n 27/213 2e/29

1.

I

1

ti

29/39 3o/31 31/32 32/33

GOVERNMENT GRANTS TO ADOLF HOEL'S SVALBARD EXPEDITIONS 1921-25, COMPARED WITH GRANTS FOR SVALBARD ADMINISTRATION AFTER 1925 Source: Stortingsproposisjonene: The Svalbard Budget 1926-33, and Ski om Svalbard og Ishavet, 1-11, 1929.

Norwegian Sovereignty

71

state-owned and two private icebreakers;" Canada had five,1e while Russia had at least twelve.18 In 1924 the Swedish Government made a grant for the building of an icebreaker to be used inter alia in Svalbard to assist the Swedish mining community in the Van Mijen Fjord;2° but the Norwegian Government did not consider that there was any need for a state-owned icebreaker. Subsequently, a number of committees were set up, and their findings submitted, but at no time has the Norwegian Government found any grounds for changing its point of view. The state of affairs we have described could not be satisfactorily dealt with without improved access to funds: grants for the administration of Svalbard were very insubstantial at this time. The Director of the Norwegian Explorations in Svalbard and the Polar Seas, Adolf Hoel, gave an apt description of the approach to grants for Svalbard in 1932 when he declared: 'If we consider our Svalbard budget, there has ... on the whole, during the period before we took over Svalbard, been an increase in this budget, but during the years since we assumed sovereignty over Svalbard, there has been a steady and marked decline in grants for scientific purposes in this part of our country.'21 In other words, the Norwegian authorities started their cheeseparing policy after sovereignty had been assumed. In 1924-5 a total of Kr.377,000 was made available for Svalbard, while the grant in the early 1930s was around Kr.80,000 (cf. figure, p. 70).22 The use of the `pruning-knife' in Svalbard affairs was traditional as far back as 1871, when Norway was practically `offered' sovereignty; the Norwegian Government at that time turned the offer down on the grounds that `the acquisition of Svalbard would cost the state money'.23 This happened again in 1907, when Norway had another opportunity to acquire Svalbard.29 The account of Norwegian exercise of sovereignty during these first important years has been presented in so much detail in order to show the sort of problems local representatives of Norway's authority had to face. It was not the will to exercise this sovereignty that they lacked but the opportunity of doing so. (b) Soviet Altitudes In 1932 the Norwegian Consulate in Archangel came across an article in the Soviet daily Pr. Severa which included the following sentence: `Many of the [Soviet nationals125 who are up there have chosen Spitsbergen (the Soviet colony) as their permanent residence.'Y8 Thirtyeight years later, in 1971, the following lines appeared in Komsomolskaja Pravda: `In 1920 the archipelago was made subject to Norwegian sovereignty. In Spitsbergen, at Longyearbyen, there is a Norwegian governor representing the Government there and exercising administrative authority over the Norwegians.' 47 These quotations are interesting: they largely reflect the wilfulness that has been a feature of Soviet behaviour in Svalbard since Norway was granted sovereignty. As

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Politics in High Latitudes

far back as 1931 the Governor reported to the Department of Justice that he for his part had made clear to the Russians that it was `a matter of course that they were in every respect subject to the Norwegian laws and regulations in force in Svalbard, and that they cannot claim any special status'. The Governor had `therefore, in a number of written communications to the Russians, informed them of the laws and provisions with which he was anxious to familiarise them, in particular tax laws'.28 He concludes, however, by saying that `the Russians so far have in no way reacted to these memoranda. No answers have been forthcoming to the requests for information contained in these letters.'29 During the years that followed—right up to the mid-1960s—we find time and again the same state of affairs described in the internal correspondence of the Norwegian central administration. Early in 1948 the English journalist Frank Illingworth applied to the Norwegian Embassy in London for permission to visit Svalbard in the summer of that year. His request for such a visit involved practical problems—transport, accommodation, etc., and were a constant headache to the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani, which felt morally obliged to look after visitors when they came, but nonetheless did not encourage visits. The visitors were regarded as a nuisance was pointed out to the Foreign Ministry several times. Illingworth's request once again focused attention on this question. In a conversation between Brodtkorb, Director of the Store Norske, and the head of the Foreign Office expressed sympathy for the company's problems in this matter. But, the Press Service stated, it had always emphasised the difficulties of getting a sea passage and accommodation whenever they received requests. On the other hand, foreign countries should not get `the erroneous impression that we [Norway] have anything to hide in Svalbard. For this reason, in certain cases prominent foreign press representatives should be given an opportunity to go there'.3° Illingworth was clearly of sufficient distinction, and the Embassy in London recommended him warmly, further supported by the Foreign Ministry.31 Transport and accommodation were accordingly arranged for him. Illingworth subsequently wrote several articles in various periodicals describing his visit. In the Geographical Magazine he described relations between the Governor and the management of the mining companies: Today the Islands are administered by a Norwegian Governor, Haakon Balstad. A nuggety, heavy jowled man, he is judge, lawyer, policeman, tax collector, with power over both the Norwegian and Russian Settlements. But I very soon learned that the real power is vested in the mine managers, Russian and Norwegian. None may land at the settlements without the permission of the mining companies.32 The last two sentences are a fairly accurate reflection of actual conditions, especially regarding the Russian mining communities. Gunnar Aasgaard, Commissioner of Mines at the end of the 1940s, held

Norwegian Sovereignly

73

the same view. In a report to the Department of Industry he observed: `The Russians are very much on their guard against any person entering their area in Svalbard unannounced—this was also the general rule in the years before the war.'33 However, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry was reluctant to take any steps to put things right. In a letter to the Norwegian Polar Institute in 1949, the Ministry advises `that visitors should be requested not to encroach on Soviet areas, and in no case should they do so without first having obtained permission to do so from the Soviet proprietors'.34 It is now a custom for both the Commissioner of Mines and the Governor to announce their arrival to the Soviet mining towns before inspecting the installations.3S This practice is liable to lead to certain complications, as an incident in 1947 illustrated. On 6 September that year the Commissioner' of Mines, Aasgaard, visited Arktikugol's Pyramid mines at Billefjord, where the company had its administrative headquarters and its largest contingent of workers. In the course of conversation the Russian director, Naumkin, informed him that work now involved rebuilding and geological surveys, and that only two mineshafts were working in the Pyramid mine and the Barents mine. When Aasgaard requested proof of this by visiting Barentsburg and Grumantbyen, his request was rejected on the grounds that the Russians had nothing to show.38 Aasgaard accepted this but subsequently made it clear to the Department of Industry that 'it would be an advantage if the Commissioner of Mines could carry out inspections unannounced'.37 There are political, economic and cultural reasons why the various mining communities in Svalbard were `left to themselves'. Only to a small degree were the Governor and the Commissioner of Mines given the necessary powers to exercise Norwegian sovereignty over the entire archipelago. Tore Gjelsvik, Director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, has aptly described the situation: `Relations between Russians and Norwegians in Svalbard are good. The towns are, unfortunately, rather isolated, both for natural and other reasons. An exchange of semiofficial visits, sporting events, and dances, etc., takes place, but in other respects these towns live their isolated lives.'36 This was written in 1964, but applies to the entire period 1925-76. (c) Norwegian Exercise of Sovereignty (i) Protection of Native Fauna and Flora. So far we have concentrated our attention on relations between Norwegian administrators and the mining towns. This, however, is only one aspect of the problem; even though catching and hunting have been carried out on a considerably smaller scale than mining, it has remained a reality throughout the entire period under review. Article 2 of the Svalbard Treaty states that `Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation

74

Politics in High Latitudes

and, if necessary, the reconstitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial waters'. Para. 4 of the Act of 17 July 1925 relating to Spitsbergen states that `the Crown may issue general regulations concerning ... hunting, catching, fishing ... protection of animals, plants, natural formations, tracts of land and antiquities'. In compliance with the Svalbard Treaty and the Svalbard Act a number of Orders-in-Council and regulations have been promulgated from 1932 and up to the present with an eye to protecting the natural environment. Svalbard covers a large area—over 62,000 square kilometres—and hunting activity is spread over large parts of this area. In view of the limited means at his disposal it is inevitable that the Governor has been unable to exercise the necessary supervision to ensure that these provisions have been observed. As far back as 1934 the fear was expressed that `a not inconsiderable violation of the hunting and protection provisions, as a result of which stocks of reindeer and birdlife have been appreciably reduced' undoubtedly occurs.'9 Rules for conservation of stocks of reindeer were introduced as early as 1925. Forty-five years later, in 1970, a hunter made a similar observation: `The Governor has no hope of ensuring that the fishing and trapping laws are observed'.40 During the years between these two observations a number of other people have called attention to the same state of affairs. Infringement of the regulations seems to have been a permanent problem throughout this period: it is more or less openly acknowledged by Norwegian authorities today.41 Despite the unsatisfactory opportunities for supervision, culprits have been caught by the Governor on several occasions, but the typical feature of these episodes is that they were the result of pure coincidence. In 1970 the Governor happened to come across a number of Russians who had been illegally shooting geese; irrefutable proof of this was available on the spot. The penalty imposed by the Governor was a fine, which was collected with the aid of the Soviet Consul.92 The importance of this incident will be considered in greater detail in another context.

(ii) Taxes, Dues and Duties. Staff and workers in the Soviet state-owned Arktikugol company have annually paid an income tax based on an assessment—the so-called poll tax. The reason for this is that the Russians have never submitted income tax returns to the Tax Assessment Board, as laid down in the Svalbard tax laws, and which the said Assessment Board for Svalbard has repeatedly asked for.49 For this reason the income tax rate for Russians has been fixed at Kr.6 per head per month.44 This has meant a tax levy of Kr.73 per Russian annually. If we assume that a Norwegian miner earns approximately Kr.30,000 a year and pays tax at the rate of 4 per cent, in accordance with the law, this will produce about Kr.1,200 annually. In other words, the difference in tax between a Norwegian and Soviet worker is

Norwegian Sovereignty

75

about Kr.1,100, i.e. a difference ofsome 1,500 per cent, if we presuppose that Russians and Norwegians earn the same amount. The actual tax relationship, however, is best illustrated by calculating the difference in comparative figures. The result will then be that the Norwegian tax burden, in relation to the Russian, is 100 to 6. We should point out that the Russians have a different kind of wage system from the Norwegians. Russian workers get some of their wages paid in kind (food, clothing, etc.) This makes it difficult to give the exact amount of their wages, in terms of kroner, and makes it hard to find a basis for calculating taxes. In comparing Norwegian and Soviet workers' tax burdens, a certain differential must be accepted.45

(iii) Allocation of Radio Frequencies. According to the International Telecommunications Convention of 12 November 1965, Norway is required to regulate radio transmissions on Norwegian territory, with a view to rational utilisation of wavelengths. This obligation also applies to Svalbard. Article 4 of the Svalbard Treaty, however, states that `owners of landed property shall always be at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes wireless telegraphy installations, which shall be free to communicate on private business with fixed or moving wireless stations, including those on board ships and aircraft'. This provision has highlighted the question of whether property owners in Svalbard also have the right to use radio transmitters without a concession outside their property. The Norwegian view on this is that property owners are entitled to establish radio stations without a licence issued by Norwegian authorities only within their own areas. Radio stations belonging to scientific or other expeditions are consequently in the ordinary course of events subject to the control of the Norwegian authorities. At the end of the 1960s the attention of the Norwegian authorities was drawn to several cases of unwarranted use of radio transmitters by Russian scientific expeditions. The matter was brought to the notice of Moscow through diplomatic channels, but the Russians appear, at any rate for the moment, to be unwilling to accept the Norwegian viewpoint, and the question has as yet not been settled between the two countries. In official quarters in Norway it has been pointed out that `while Soviet nationals and institutions have not been subject to Norwegian administrative control (e.g. with regard to the allocation of radio frequencies), control of this kind has been enforced vis-a-vis e.g. scientific expeditions from other nations'.46 The facts of the case appear to be that all nationalities, with the exception of the Soviet Russians, have sought permission to use radio transmitters and frequencies without being requested to do so by the Norwegian authorities. In all known cases permission of this kind has also been given, and there is agreement here between the Norwegian

76

Politics in High Latitudes

interpretation of the Treaty and the behaviour of these interested parties, without the authorities having actively worked to make this practice an integral part of their administrative control: such lack of initiative is an important point in this connection. It is clear that the Norwegian authorities exercise insufficient control with and supervision of Soviet expeditions, and there are several reasons for this. First, while most foreign scientific institutions inform the Norwegian Polar Institute and the Governor of any impending expedition to Svalbard, Soviet expeditions generally omit to do so.47 There is no obligation to register at Svalbard: nonetheless, ever since the 1920s foreign expeditions have consistently informed the Norwegian authorities of impending activities. There are several reasons why the Russians have not consistently done so: unlike other nationalities they know Svalbard intimately. This means that Soviet expeditions can be supported and relieved by their own mining communities, should a crisis arise. Other foreign expeditions, on the other hand, would depend on Norwegian assistance in similar cases. On several occasions the Norwegian authorities have not been apprised of Soviet expeditions to Svalbard until they read about them in Soviet newspapers.4ß There is also a political explanation: by omitting to inform Norwegian authorities about impending expeditions to the islands, the Russians demonstrate their independence. In the light of this it is naturally difficult for Norway to exercise any effective control. But at the same time it should be pointed out that over the years Norwegian governments have not made use of the opportunity for surveillance which is written into the Treaty: Article 5 declares inter alia that an agreement is to be negotiated on the conditions for carrying out scientific research in Svalbard. Norwegian authorities have still not taken any steps to have this agreement drafted. And so for fifty years the authorities have been deprived of any possibility of carrying out more effective control of foreign research activity in Svalbard. Second, the non-intervention policy with regard to internal Soviet conditions has merely accentuated this problem of control.49 As a result, Soviet Russian expeditions have to a large extent been able to avoid Norwegian administrative control, whereas other foreign expeditions have considered their interests best served by facilitating it. (iv) Implementation of the Road Traffic Act, para. 55. The Norwegian Road Traffic Act of 18 June, 1965 applies to Svalbard, with such amendments as are necessary with regard to local conditions. `Provisions for the applicability of road traffic legislation to Svalbard and ,Jan Mayen', issued by the Department of Communications on 14 April 1967, state furthermore that Para. 15 of the Act shall apply to Svalbard. This states quite simply: `Motor vehicles shall be registered.' Para. 16 of the same Act makes it possible for the Department of Communications to

Norwegian Sovereignty

77

`exempt certain groups of motor vehicles from the obligation to register'. Soviet motor vehicles, in contrast to Norwegian motor vehicles in Svalbard, are not registered; this can only mean that they are exempt from the obligation to register, despite the fact that no official exception exists for Soviet personnel in Para. 15 of-the Road Traffic Act.b" Svalbard comes under the jurisdiction of the State Vehicle Licensing Authority in Tromsø, which occasionally visits the archipelago in order to check Norwegian motor vehicles. Soviet motor vehicles, of which, admittedly, there are not very many, are never subject to this kind of control. As of 31 December 1972 there were 318 licensed motor vehicles in Svalbard, of which 216 were snow scooters and 39 passenger cars. (v) Postal Services. The Post Office Act of 8,June 1928, is applicable to Svalbard.'' In accordance with this Act the Post Office enjoys sole rights to deliver and transport closed envelopes and printed or written cards between Norway and foreign countries.52 Furthermore, it is forbidden to send letters and cards between Norway and countries abroad without the intermediacy of the Post Office, and unless material thus consigned has been franked by the Norwegian Post Office. This ban does not apply to official correspondence.53 Postal services to and from the Norwegian mining communities operate through the Post Office in Longyearbyen in accordance with the Post Act. During the investigations and drilling operations carried out by the FINA Group on Edge Island in 1972, mail was conveyed either through Longyearbyen or through post offices in Norway. No dispensation has been granted for the conveyance of mail to and from the Soviet mining communities in Svalbard. The Russians have solved this problem independently of the Norwegian Post Office, sending all their post by Russian coal boats to Murmansk, where the mail is franked, stamped, and forwarded. No distinction is made between private and official correspondence, and as a rule Norwegian stamps are not used.54 This procedure has been established by Norwegians who have sent letters from Barentsburg to themselves in Oslo: letters of this kind have been stamped and forwarded from Murmansk.55 It is clear that the Post Office Act is not enforced in the Russian mining towns, but applies to other nationalities. There may be many reasons for this: practical considerations are obviously one. Neither of the parties involved has any reason to complain of costly and cumbrous administrative measures. From the point of view of the Norwegian authorities, however, the question has another side. It is difficult to accept that practical considerations should overrule Norwegian laws. What is at stake is Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. The opening of Svalbard

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Politics in High Latitudes

Airport may help to change this practice vis-a-vis the Russians, as Norwegian authorities may now cite this event in their insistence that all post should be conveyed by the Longyearbyen Post Office for forwarding by air. An arrangement of this kind would be both practical and in agreement with Norwegian law. Russian custom and not Norwegian law is practised in the Russian mining towns. This situation was established immediately after Norway assumed sovereignty, and still exists. In view of this it is not surprising that the Austrian newspaper Neuer Kurier should have carried an article on 25 March 1955, with the headline: `Spitsbergen unter zwei Flaggen' (Spitsbergen under two flags). This was certainly how the situation must have appeared in the eyes of foreign countries.

9 PHASES IN NORWAY'S RELATIONSHIP TO SVALBARD Norwegian official attitudes to the state of affairs in Svalbard have not been uninfluenced by developments. Slowly but surely the Svalbard policy has undergone a change, covering three relatively distinct periods—(a) the 'Laissez-faire Period' (1925-50), the `Verbal Period' (1950-65), and the `Period of Action' (1965- ).

(a) The 'Laissez-faire Period' This period bears all the hallmarks of classic liberalism. The Government, content to remain unobtrusively in the background, was perfectly willing to leave the development of Svalbard in the hands of individuals and companies, and had neither the wish nor the will to commit itself beyond the minimum necessary to ensure that individuals and companies should enjoy the best possible conditions for working and operating on their own premises. This period has been sufficiently well covered in foregoing chapters to render a résumé of the main points sufficient. The Norwegian Government had no desire for active commitment. After 1925 it extended its traditional policy, which aimed to establish a minimum regime, so that economic activity could function in a state of sufficient legality, and this, in the opinion of the Government, was ensured by the Treaty and the Mining Code. No additional measures were necessary. The most characteristic feature of this period is the policy of cheeseparing, which was supported by both Storting and Government, and had been one of the main features of Norway's Svalbard policy ever since 1870. It was in sharp contrast to what successive Governors and Commissioners of Mines considered was required. The centre and the periphery of the administration were thus in this case in disagreement. The traditional freedom enjoyed by Norwegian mining communities helped to entrench the `minimum policy' and the effects of cheeseparing. The large measure of internal independence enjoyed by the mining communities chimed in with Norwegian as well as foreign interests. 79

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Politics in High Latitudes

(b) The `Verbal Period' This period witnessed a marked willingness to accept changes. This emerges in the internal correspondence of the central authorities. On the other hand, little or nothing is done to change existing practice. The willingness is for the time being verbal. By and large, the policy of strict economy was continued. The chief concerns of the Government were its `minimum' policy and its mining policy. Governor Balstad struck the right note in a letter to the Department of Industry in 1949: I have previously maintained that the Government must make it clear in Svalbard that this is Norwegian territory, subject to Norwegian sovereignty; this must be done in such a way that it can be understood by foreigners who come here and also by people who live here and who consider this part of the country as their own.'

Balstad was here expressing what most of his predecessors had already drawn attention to on several previous occasions. The difference is that from 1949 to 1950 observations of this kind began to have their effect on the central administration's treatment of Svalbard matters; in other words, we are witnessing a breakthrough. The departments of state, paticularly the Foreign Ministry, from now on devoted considerably greater attention to the problems of the archipelago. In 1958, for example, the Foreign Ministry, in a note to the Department of Industry, asked for `a summary of control measures exercised vis-d-vis the companies, and in particular how these are carried out vis-a-vis Soviet installations . . . and what difficulties supervision of Soviet installations involves'.2 The contents of this letter are typical of those in a number of departmental notes and memoranda from this period. The central authorities were clearly taking stock of the situation, and endeavouring to obtain an overall picture of the state of affairs, and particularly of relations with the Soviet Russians. The Kings Bay disaster in 1962 and its political aftermath provided the impetus to jolt the central authorities from the exploratory phase to the action phase, and the Caltex case which followed on its heels completed the movement3 From now on internal correspondence is to a much greater extent geared to action. We get, for example, such passages as: In the opinion of the Foreign Ministry it is particularly important that the Governor should have a complete overall view of the most important matters involving Svalbard, and should be placed in a position in which he can exercise effective surveillance with the activity taking place there. This necessitates an extension of the administrative facilities at his disposal.'

(c) The `Action Period' The need to strengthen the administrative apparatus had now been recognised by the Government. This has had a number of concrete results: by an order-in-council of 31 November 1964, the

Phases in Norway's Relationship to Svalbard

81

Commissioner of Mines was relieved of his labour inspection duties, which were assigned to a new appointment—Commissioner of Labour Inspection in Svalbard. In 1965 the interdepartmental Svalbard Committee was set up, composed of senior civil servants from the departments most involved, with coordinating functions and tasks. It subsequently developed into an important policy organ. From 1965 to the present the staff in the Governor's office in Longyearbyen has gradually increased. In 1966 a special post was established in the Foreign Ministry to deal with matters involving polar policy: this is run by an official with the rank of ambassador/counsellor. The police force has been increased; in 1971 a special Environmental Officer was appointed, and in 1974 an Environmental Adviser to the Governor was established on a temporary basis. Grants for the administration of Svalbard also show a steady increase from 1955 to 1976 (cf. p. 82): the big jump from 1974 to 1975 can be explained mainly by the large amounts earmarked for the building of the airport. The decision to build an airport is yet another step in the direction of enhancing the facilities for effective exercise of Norwegian authority. All these measures represent a strengthening of Norway's ability to exercise jurisdiction over Svalbard.This has been expressed in concrete action and a tightening up of former practice. Some progress can be noted: whereas Norwegian authorities previously had difficulty in obtaining returns for taxes, dues, and duties from the Russians, the Governor and Commissioner of Mines today receive all the figures they ask for. Furthermore the question of unwarranted use of radio transmitters outside the area of Soviet property has been raised by the Foreign Ministry and complaints to this effect conveyed through diplomatic channels. The incident involving fines imposed on Russians engaged in illegal shooting of geese is also an example of a stricter approach. In 1970 some of the Soviet claims reverted to the Norwegian state. The Russians had on that occasion failed to conform to the working obligation which the Mining Code imposes on claimants; reversion was accepted by the Soviet Union.5 In June 1973 three national parks, two nature reserves, and fifteen bird sanctuaries were established in Svalbard by Order-in-Council. Thus on a number of occasions Norway has taken steps that have clearly emphasised Norwegian sovereignty, and the Russians have accepted these. At the same time it should not be overlooked that the Russians have on a number of occasions refused to accept such tightening-up measures. They have, among other things, objected to the `Safety Regulations for Search and Drilling for Petroleum in Svalbard', maintaining that the aim of these regulations is to introduce restrictions on geological surveys and the search for oil, in which they are particularly concerned and that restrictions of this kind are incompatible with the Svalbard Treaty and the Mining Code.

Politics in High Latitudes

82 (1000 kr.) 12000 11500 11000 10500 10000 9 8500 6000 7500 7000 6500 6000

VERBAL PERIOD

ACTION PERIOD

4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1 SSlss isr°7howisr 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 7475

GOVERNMENT GRANTS FOR SVALBARD ADMINISTRATION, 1955-75 Source: St. prp.

nr. l: The Svalbard budgets 1955-75.

The Soviet Union was also the only country to object to the Norwegian provisions for the protection of bird and animal life. These objections have been raised in a number of spheres, including the establishment of bird sanctuaries and nature reserves. In a number of notes the Soviet Union has pointed out that measures carried out in recent years in these areas far exceed what their object warrants and what, according to the Russian view,.the Treaty intends.6 Nevertheless there are.uumerous indications that the Russians are coming round in the matter of jurisdiction, and the question now is perhaps how far they will go. After all, on one occasion they submitted

Phases in Norway's Relationship to Svalbard

83

to the exercise of Norwegian authority after they had initially opposed it. This was when they finally agreed to pay the higher rate of claims dues in 1972.' The situation today appears to be that the Russians are increasingly willing to allow Norwegian authorities to intervene in the case of violations of the law outside their own property areas, while they still wish to maintain their very considerable degree of self-administration within their mining communities. In this connection two central questions arise: Why do the Russians object to Norwegian jurisdiction over the Soviet property areas? Is this unwillingness in the Soviet interest? These two questions are closely connected, but in this context only the former is relevant. It is doubtful, however, whether the Soviet Union, on a long-term basis, stands to gain from this kind of resistance. From the security point of view it may prove to be a net loss.8 Why, then, are the Russians opposed to changes? From the purely historical point of view the reason appears to be that the Soviet Union considers the Svalbard Treaty a historic coincidence. At regular intervals, throughout the years from 1920 to 1976, indignant articles have appeared in Soviet newspapers describing how Norway acquired sovereignty in 1920. A passage in Nauka Zhizn from 1952 is typical: It was only remembered in 1920 in the heat of military intervention against the young Soviet Republic. The American and British imperialists hastened, without Russia's agreement, to hand Spitsbergen over to Norway. At the same time Medvezhii Island,' lying 240 miles to the south of the archipelago, was included in Spitsbergen.'" This attitude probably underlies the Soviet wish to retain their autonomy. Their reasoning seems to be that since Norway acquired Svalbard by coincidence, the Russians should enjoy internal independence by way of compensation. This attitude does not necessarily imply that the Soviet Union today cherishes revisionist plans for Svalbard. After all, throughout the period from 1925 to 1976 Norway has proved to the Soviet Union that she is a capable and acceptable possessor of the archipelago, and that the Svalbard Treaty constitutes no serious security drawback for the Russians." One factor might suggest that the Soviet Union would also like to discount the rights Norway possesses in accordance with the Treaty. In 1948 the Soviet Svalbard expert M. Stavnitser published a book in which, among other topics, he discusses the attitude of the Soviet Union to the Treaty. In it he states that `the Treaty established a number of such serious restrictions to Norway's full and unrestricted sovereignty that the exercise of sovereignty was actually reduced to nothing'.12 In a country such as the Soviet Union, with its press censorship, it is hardly likely that an interpretation of this kind would have been allowed to see the light of day unless the authorities so wished. No matter what the reasons may be, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union today should find it difficult to alter an administrative practice

Politics in High Latitudes 84 Table 9.1. BUDGET FOR SVALBARD ADMINISTRATION 1926- 75 Budget year

The Accounts Surplus (+), deficit (-), balance (0)

Budget size Kr.

1926/7 1927/8 1928/9 1929/30 1930/1 1931/2 1932/3 1933/4 1934/5 1935/6 1936/7 1937/8 1938/9 1939/40 1940/5 1945/6 1946/7 1.947/8 1948/9 1949/50 1950/1 1951/2 1952/3 1953/4 1954/5 1955/6 1956/7 1957/8 1958/9 1959/60 1.7.-31.12. 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

85,000 115,000 125,000 81,000 83,000 72,000 70,000 96,000 110,000 121,500 156,500 211,500 196,500 254,050 329,939 636,975 589,300 1,181,099 920,840 933,100 932,700 1,141,200 1,068,900 1,270,100 1,196,100 1,432,300 1,556,300 1,447,400 1,147,700 717,200 1,221,900 1,521,100 2,453,025 1,592,100 1,686,700 1,918,100 1,891,600 2,314,400 2,483,100 2,765,200 3,399,200 5,158,000 4,003,000 9,882,000 12,096,000

Kr.

+61,150 +45,943 -9,436 +71,497 -753 +37,188 +44,508 -8,062 +113,009 +122,946 +71,525 +136,625 +8,078 + 127,918 -300,217 -141,083 +238,486 +362,339 -563,831 + 115,319 +882,700 -61,547 -562,927 +793,677 + 112,047 +276,416 -616,153 +531,064 +249,055 -210,714 +314,096 -360,831 -1,059,649 -89,670 + 106,376 +122,727 -118,200 -286,400 -646,100 +32,100 -930,000 -948,592 -205,706 -5,480,000' -6,684,000'

Phases in Norway's Relationship to Svalbard

85

which has persisted for over fifty years. It goes without saying that the Russians—in common with other nationals—do not wish to pay more than absolutely necessary for their activities in Svalbard. But in this respect they are in a dilemma: on the one hand they arc keen, from the security point of view, to ensure that the situation in Svalbard remains virtually unchanged; on the other hand they are unwilling to renounce traditional advantages which must also be considered in the light of security policy. If the Soviet Russians still want a form of selfgovernment, Norway, which is bound by the principle of equal treatment in its exercise of sovereignty, will be forced to practise the principle of self-government for all nationalities in Svalbard. This would mean, in the multinational phase envisaged, that Norway would lose all control of the activities of all nations operating in Svalbard. From the point of view of security this would be entirely unacceptable to the Soviet Union. There are therefore to some extent grounds for believing that the Soviet Union will gradually accept an increased measure of Norwegian jurisdiction in the closed Russian mining communities as well. The action phase is in its infancy: by continuing to pursue the line of activity and action it is possible that Norway will succeed in controlling developments. This would be in the interests of Norwegians and Russians alike. The success of the action policy, however, will stand or fall by the willingness of the Storting to grant the necessary funds, the Government's ability to carry out its new policy, and the composition and structure of the Svalbard administration.13

10 NORWAY'S ALTERNATIVES Reviewing the period 1925-76 a number of cardinal observations on Norwegian—Soviet relations in Svalbard spring to mind. The fact that only two nationalities have taken advantage of their right to a permanent presence in the archipelago has clearly affected the Norwegian exercise of sovereignty in the area. To some extent this binationality has made interaction between Russians and Norwegians easier, because the latter have been able to exercise their sovereignty without day-to-day consideration for permanently established third parties, thus easing legal practice and achieving a substantial measure of flexibility. This applies in particular to the period 1930-60. On the other hand this freedom has also created special problems. The existing situation has fostered expectations of preferential treatment for Soviet nationals and mining communities, and indeed a tendency to regard this as their `right'. The Russians have in this way grown accustomed to a greater degree of self-administration and immunity than the Svalbard Treaty would appear to warrant. From this point of view Norway might actually be regarded as a victim of bilateralism. This became clearer after 1960, when several nationalities in search of oil established themselves in Svalbard. The relationship super-power/small state can also be considered in this context. There is no denying that on several occasions Norwegian authorities have considered that their best interests would be served by retaining a low profile in their exercise of authority vis-à-vis the Russians. The menacing tone of the language used in Soviet notes to Norway and the certainty that the Soviet Union possessed the capacity to suit the action to the word, may have induced successive Norwegian governments to allow the Russians to live `in peace' in Svalbard. Any attempt on the Norwegian side at rigid interpretation of the rules might have created a tense situation. From this point of view the Norwegian non-intervention policy has been a suitable political alternative calculated to reduce the scope of potential disputes. As a result relations between the two population groups have at all times been excellent. The close connection between Arktikugol and the Soviet authorities has also created problems. Arktikugol's activity and approach to Norway during the period under review could be expected of any firm anxious to secure the best possible working conditions and results. In the 86

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case of Arktikugol, however, it has frequently been difficult to distinguish between measures calculated to serve purely commercial and economic interests and measures calculated to serve Soviet foreign policy interests. The Soviet authorities have themselves contributed to a blurring of this distinction;. occasionally, for instance, Norwegian applications confined to economic and administrative matters and addressed to the management of Arktikugol have been answered by official notes. In view of this it is easier to understand why foreign policy aspects may count in the official treatment of Arktikugol. Foreign policy, for example, was an ever-present feature of the Caltex case. This state of affairs has been of varying validity and effect ever since Norway's assumption of sovereignty, but the results have always been the same: Norwegian sovereignty in Svalbard is subject to greater restrictions than was foreseen in the Treaty of 1920. In practice the Russians have been allowed to live their own `national' lives in Barentsburg, Grumantbyen and Pyramiden. On occasion, too, the principle of equal treatment has been inconsistently applied. But it is important to emphasise that violations of this principle have not been grave, and have never been the expression of a conscious Norwegian political approach. They have in every case been the result of insufficient personnel and administration, inadequate coordination between different civil service departments, and the unduly low priority accorded to Svalbard matters both in a political and in an economic context. The remaining principles of the Svalbard Treaty, on the other hand, appear to have been consistently observed by the Norwegian authorities and by the nationalities who have been active in the islands. It is particularly important to note Norwegian policy in relation to demilitarisation. It is hardly an exaggeration to maintain that the Soviet Union today accepts the state of things in Svalbard. This is primarily due to three factors. In the first place, successive Norwegian governments have shown by their actions that Norway is sincerely concerned to observe her treaty obligations. Norwegian authorities have demonstrated this in extreme international situations, as, for example, during and immediately after the Second World War. In the second place the Treaty secures the presence of Soviet nationals in the islands, so that they have been in a position to follow developments in the area at first hand. In the third place—and no less important— Norway is a small country, quite incapable of threatening the dominant position of the Soviet Union in the Arctic generally speaking. Norwegian exercise of sovereignty in Svalbard consists of four main components: 1. Normal exercise of sovereignly, established by treaty This is carried out in compliance with Norwegian law and international law, and is an altogether dominant factor in Norwegian exercise of authority in Svalbard.

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2. Favourable treatment of Soviet mining communities compared with .Norwegian mining communities This practice, though not in violation of law, nevertheless constitutes a special case and should be considered as a separate factor. The issues involved include such matters as the poll tax, exemptions from the Post Office Act, the Road Traffic Act, etc. 3. Non-intervention in internal Soviet affairs 4. Inconsistent application of the principle of equal treatment This is by far the most dominant feature of the exercise of authority, but together with the policy of non-intervention the one that has perhaps the most important bearing on Norwegian exercise of sovereignty. These components have to a varying extent been in effect from 1925 to 1976; in recent years, however, there has been a tendency to tighten the Norwegian exercise of sovereignty by greater and more conscious emphasis on components I and 2; and, taking the short-term view, a wish to eliminate 4, which has never been an expression of any conscious intention. So far it has not proved politically feasible to change the policy of non-intervention, but, taking the longer view, there is a possibility of change on this point as well. The fact that the exercise of Norwegian sovereignty has been inconsistently practised, involving more marked restrictions than the Treaty warrants, presents problems for the authorities. However, the development that is taking place in present day Svalbard may help to change the circumstances in which the exercise of sovereignty takes place. Today international companies are drilling for oil in Svalbard: American, French, Belgian, and other foreign interests are involved. If oil or gas in commercially exploitable amounts is found, there are grounds for believing that these nationalities will establish a permanent presence. The development in the Barents Sea may produce the same result. The possibilty of a new permanent presence in Svalbard is consequently very much a reality. A possibility of this kind is bound to affect Norwegian sovereignty. The Norwegian Government would be faced with the two alternatives of either changing their policies in accordance with the new situation, or continuing to practise a policy of non-intervention. Should it choose the latter course, then in theory two lines may be pursued: 1. To subject the new great power interests to Norwegian administrative control, but to continue to exempt the Russians. This would place the Norwegian Government in an untenable position. The reaction might be a demand for equal treatment, or a revision of the Treaty. Should the Government refuse to meet this demand, the

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probable outcome would be that every interested party would either act on its own initiative or in some other way ignore Norwegian sovereignty. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the Norwegian Government or the other signatories to the Treaty would be interested in a development of this kind. 2. To practice non-intervention vis-a-vis all major power interests. This alternative is more practicable, but would render such remnants of the Norwegian sovereignty as still remain in the archipelago completely illusory. There are no grounds for believing that any of the parties concerned would wish a development of this kind. For this reason total non-intervention must be written off as unacceptable both from Norwegian and from a foreign point of view. The only sensible approach would appear to be to define and consistently carry out a new policy adapted to changed conditions, although there is no guarantee that a choice of action of this kind would be without its problems. On the contrary: the Russians have enjoyed all the advantages of the policy the Norwegian authorities have pursued up to the present. For this reason a number of problems will arise. For example, is it likely that the Russians will be willing to submit, to a greater extent than they have done hitherto, to Norwegian administrative control? And is it likely that they will forgo these advantages, and in addition accept an American, French, and Italian presence, without any form of compensation? It is, of course, impossible to answer these questions, yet certain comments can be made. What is certain is that the Russians have no legal means of preventing American, French, Italian and Belgian nationals from settling and engaging in permanent activity in the archipelago. The Svalbard Treaty accords the same economic rights to nationals of all nations who are signatories of the Treaty. The Russians have to accept this. If, despite everything, the Russians were to oppose any change in the traditional pattern of equal treatment to all nationals, citing for this purpose a kind of juridical precedent, the situation might prove untenable, not least for the Russians themselves, as the other great powers might demand equal treatment, with the result that they too would enjoy non-intervention. This would mean that American, French and Italian settlements in Svalbard would not be subject to control and supervision. The Russians would certainly be unable to accept a situation of this kind. Should Americans operate near the Russian coast, then the Soviet Union would insist on constant control and surveillance. Successive Russian governments, from 1870 onwards, have been anxious to secure their presence and influence in Svalbard, lest Svalbard might provide a starting point for actions hostile to Russia. In

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order to obviate this possibility the Russians have at all times endeavoured to obtain information on the dispositions of other great powers in the area. Access to sources of information might be reduced if Svalbard were to become an area with a permanent western superpower presence unconstrained by Norwegian authorities. In a situation of this kind, the Russians, in contrast to what was previously the case, might be dependent on Norwegians being allowed to exercise their authority to the full. As shown in Chapter 6, the Soviet authorities are anxious to ensure that the archipelago remains demilitarised: unrestricted exercise of Norwegian authority would be the most obvious and suitable method of achieving this. In the present situation it is therefore likely that the Russians will eventually prefer to accept Norwegian authority, thus ensuring that the activities of othersuperpowers are subject to control and surveillance. The western powers are no less interested in Soviet activity being controlled. The reasons for this are obvious. Both sides—East and West—have the same wish for control and the same need for information. If Norway is anxious to put an end, once and for all, to the policy of non-intervention, then the chances of reaching an agreement by negotiation would appear favourable. Both parties would like to know what the other is doing: the price for knowledge of this kind is supervision and control of one's own activity. In this case it would seem that the price is worth paying. In other words, Norwegian authorities would be in a very favourable initial position if and when the question of changing the existing exercise of sovereignty should arise. The Government could without more ado play one party off against the other, in order to enforce its treaty-established rights in any future situation. It is not only a question of negotiating skill: the authorities must provide the conditions necessary and suitable for an effective exercise of authority; the Governor and the Commissioner of Mines must be given increased capabilities for carrying out their duties. In the widest sense of the word this is a matter of Svalbard's infrastructure, of the number of persons exercising authority, and of the general strategy of polar policy. This is bound to cost money, but if the authorities are to keep a firm hand on the tiller, these investments are necessary. For this reason it is important to establish what measures are required. The financial aspects of a development of Svalbard's infrastructure will also facilitate a change in the existing tax policy. Even though it is the task of the Norwegian political authorities to provide the funds for development, it is in the interests of most nationalities that these funds should be available. The Russians not least—in view of the security importance they attach to the islands—are interested in this. On political grounds, therefore, the Russians themselves may be anxious to abolish the poll tax system and replace it by a higher rate of taxation of their own nationals. From the Russian point of view this

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would be one of several necessary measures to satisfy their own needs and interests in the archipelago. As far as the desirability of Norwegian Government contribution is concerned, this is not merely a matter of making it technically easier for the Governor to carry out his duties: it is just as much a question of investing in political credibility. Investment will enhance the credibility of the Norwegian ability to carry out the control and surveillance functions established in the Treaty. Political assurances that Norway is prepared to tackle this task without a corresponding development of the infrastructure, are hardly likely to be believed in Moscow. History has taught the Russians that local Norwegian authorities have not had the necessary communications to carry out their administrative control functions throughout the entire Svalbard archipelago. In difficult situations both Governor and Commissioner of Mines have had to request Russian help in the communications sector. In view of the development now proceeding in Svalbard, dependence on foreign assistance might well result in Norway's becoming the victim rather than the master of the situation. In this respect political willingness and investment are two aspects of the same case, and it would be difficult to separate the two without far-reaching political consequences. In other words, there are grounds for a fair measure of optimism regarding the chances ofchanging Norwegian exercise of sovereignty in Svalbard. This, admittedly, presupposes that Svalbard will once again become the object of multinational interest over a long period of time.

11 EPILOGUE: 1975-1976 In 1975 Svalbard was a subject of considerable interest and attention among Norwegian politicians. This was not surprising, as the time was ripe for a political showdown. In the course of the Spring, the Government submitted a White Paper on Svalbard and Norwegian Svalbard policy;' August 14 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Norway's assumption of sovereignty over the archipelago; barely two weeks later, on 2 September, Svalbard Airport was inaugurated, and on 15 December the Storting held its most comprehensive debate on Svalbard since the 1920s. The archipelago was visited by King Olav, Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli, several members of the Government, and three Storting committees (Finance, Industry and Foreign Affairs) either in association with these events or at other times. During this period conditions in the archipelago also attracted considerable attention abroad. This was most clearly emphasised when the authorities in Norway, the USA and Great Britain initiated exploratory talks on current problems in the area. The greatest publicity was focused on Norwegian—Soviet relations as a result of the so-called `wives case', which many regarded as a trial of strength between the two countries. The year 1975/6 was thus remarkably eventful and this chapter will consider the most significant events relating to Norway's Svalbard policy; to relations between Norway and the Soviet Union in the archipelago; and to foreign interest in the area generally. (a) Norway's Svalbard Policy The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund, has repeatedly maintained that the fundamental aim of his country's policy in Svalbard and adjacent areas is to `contribute to ensuring that any development of resources and any increased economic activity that occur may assume a harmonious and balanced form, so that international disputes and conflicts may be avoided'; if this is to be achieved, it is necessary to `carry out a clear and correct maintenance of sovereignty on the basis of the Svalbard Treaty, to avoid any discriminatory treatment of parties to the Treaty, and to cooperate with the interested parties that have engaged themselves in Svalbard in questions raised by Norwegian government and control'.3 92

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During the Storting debate on the Government's Svalbard White Paper and the findings of the Foreign Affairs Committee Report (Instilling no. 75), all parties expressed their support for this major aim, as well as all important questions of principle relating to Norway's future policy. The need for a more active development of the Norwegian community and more effective Norwegian exercise of authority were also emphasised during this debate. It was also openly admitted that the authorities had been guilty of neglect in the affairs of the archipelago, but that amends would now be made by means of concrete political measures. Otto Lyng, who introduced the debate in the Storting, expressed it in his summing up: It now remains for the ministers present [viz, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Industry and justice] to draw the attention of the Minister of Finance, as pleasantly as possible, to the fact that the Storting is prepared to support the intentions of the White Paper and the Report by concrete action.'

In the White Paper the Government expressed itself in favour of maintaining a reasonable measure of Norwegian economic activity in the archipelago, for various reasons. First, supplies of coal from Longyearbyen are important to industry on the Norwegian mainland, particularly the coke works in Mo i Rana and the ferrosilicium industry. It was also emphasised that the scope for employment available in Longyearbyen had played an important role in the economy of North Norway, and might be expected to continue to do so. It was a still more important factor that continued economic activity wöuld provide the necessary basis for Norway effectively to exercise its treaty obligations regarding administration and the maintenance of law and order; protection of the environment, etc. Also owing to the special circumstances prevailing in respect of Svalbard, it is very important that the state should have a maximum degree of direction and control over Norwegian activities there. It is far from satisfactory to leave to private interests decisions on the scope of continued national commitment. From the point of view of the public interest, purely economic considerations will represent only a part of the overall basis for evaluation .5

This view was translated into concrete political action on 11 June 1975, when the Storting authorised the Government to purchase shipowner Hilmar Reksteri's shares in Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani (see Chapter 5). The Foreign Ministry stated that it was `of considerable importance that the State should enjoy full direction and control of all activity in these highly sensitive areas' .6 Tests have in fact been started on coal resources in the two claims of the Kings Bay Kullkompani at Kongsfjorden. Even though the state has no concrete plans for restarting operations there, the Department of Industry has suggested that these claims might be transferred to Store Norske, which would thus be in possession of all the Norwegian State's mining rights for

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coal in Svalbard.' Parallel with this suggestion, proposals have now been submitted for administering the state's petroleum activities in Svalbard through the medium of the Norwegian State Oil Company (Statoil). As forecast in the White Paper, greater state commitment in the archipelago's economic activities will be followed up by a strengthening of the local and central administrative apparatus. On 28 March 1976, as was mentioned in Chapter 5, the Government set up a committee to examine the composition and functions of the Norwegian Svalbard administration. Its findings, now published, recommend the setting up of a separate Svalbard department in the Ministry of Justice, with coordinating functions. Political control would be in the hands of a special government committee, comprising a still unspecified number of members of the Government. Furthermore, the Committee recommends that the Polar Committee should be enlarged by the addition of a representative of the Ministry of Communications, and that the chairman of the Polar Committee should no longer be the Minister of Justice, but the Head of the new Svalbard department. These findings have now been submitted to the Government for consideration, and the outcome is still unknown. In the Government's opinion the same considerations apply to Norwegian research in Svalbard as to economic activity. Therefore, it considers that the scope of scientific and exploratory research should be widened: this will also create a larger measure of balance in Svalbard policy. In other words, the state's commitment is not to be based exclusively on economic activity, and state grants for exploration and research will probably be stepped up in future. The White Paper is devoted largely to the question of developing— or, rather, normalising—Norwegian communities in the archipelago. Bearing in mind local conditions, the object is to create a basis for more or less the same living conditions and the same degree of influence for the individual citizen on the development of the local community as is the case in communities of comparable size on the Norwegian mainland. The Government believes that schools, hospitals and housing should be community problems and not the concern of private enterprise. This process of normalisation should also encourage an extension of grassroots democracy in Longyearbyen: the Government intends gradually to expand the sphere of authority of the local Svalbard Council, so that its powers will more closely resemble those of a municipal council. This could probably, for example, be achieved by granting the Council the right to nominate lay judges, children's welfare boards, members of the Health Board, the local educational authority, etc. The Government has also indicated that a special local budget will be set up for Longyearbyen, with the local Council empowered to grant supplies.° By the end of 1975 it was clear, therefore, that the Norwegian

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authorities intended to make considerable efforts to change the state of affairs in Svalbard. This means in practice that the policy of cheeseparing and maintaining a `minimum regime' in the archipelago will cease. However, the speed at which this process can be carried out will depend not only on the willingness of the Norwegian authorities to commit themselves more actively; the question whether the conditions for a policy of this kind exist is just as important, since Soviet objections to Norwegian administrative measures and statutory provisions have long frustrated Norway's capacity to take full control of developments. In the current period, too, the Russians have lodged such objections. (b) Norwegian — Soviet Relations (i) The `Wives Case'. In February—March 1974 Norwegian and Soviet civil aviation authorities opened negotiations on the Soviet use of Svalbard Airport. Aeroflot representatives submitted a request to station eighteen to twenty officials on the airport. Since Aeroflot would, on average, be operating only one flight to Svalbard in each week, Norway could hardly be in a position to accede to a request of this kind. On March 7 an agreement was reached sanctioning the stationing of a Soviet staff of five to six persons.9 This, however, was not the end of the negotiations; technical, commercial, residential and other practical questions in connection with the Soviet presence on the airport and in Longyearbyen still remained to be clarified. The result was a copious compact consisting of a main agreement, as well as ten separate agreements or contracts, between Aeroflot and the Norwegian Directorate of Civil Aviation.1° In case of problems of interpretation or dispute in the implementation of the agreements, the parties were agreed on settling these `amicably through negotiation' or—if negotiations failed to produce agreement—`by arbitration in accordance with Norwegian law.!". The need for activating this procedure was soon to arise. In the autumn of 1975 Aeroflot was represented at Longyearbyen by a staff of five officials. In addition, one of the officials had his wife living with him. Nevertheless, the total number of Russians did not exceed the figure on which the two countries reached agreement in the compact of March 1974. There were, however, indications that this figure would be exceeded. In the middle of November, the Norwegian airport commander received a list of personnel which showed that Aeroflot intended to allow its officials to have their wives permanently quartered in Longyearbyen. The Soviet station commander also planned to have his two children staying there. This would have meant the Russian contingent being increased to twelve persons, only six less than Aeroflot had requested in 1974. The Norwegian authorities made it clear to the Russians in Longyearbyen that this doubling of the contingent was unacceptable, as it violated the terms of Contract no. 6 relating to lease of living quarters. The Russians did not reply; but their silence did not mean

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that the Norwegian position had been tacitly accepted in Moscow. On the evening of 23 December a Soviet TU-154 aircraft arrived at Svalbard Airport with two new officials, as well as three wives and four representatives of the authorities in Moscow. Included among the cargo were four double beds, which made it clear that the wives intended to stay. This, at any rate,, was the conclusion of Governor Eldring and Airport Commandant Sæbe, who straightaway contacted the authorities in Oslo. The Norwegian authorities now made it clear to the Russians in Longyearbyen that they had violated Contract no. 6, and that Norway would have to consider repudiating the agreement unless the number of residents were immediately reduced to the pre-subscribed figure. The Soviet station commander refused to accept this, and a dispute was inevitable. An exchange of opinion now followed between the authorities of the two countries. The Norwegians maintained that only the station commander had the use of a family apartment, and so was in a position to have his family living with him. The small apartment and the four individual rooms leased to Aeroflot, on the other hand, were only intended for one person each. It was pointed out that Norwegian airport personnel living in individual rooms were not able to have their wives living with them, and the same rule would therefore have to apply to the Russians. It is not officially known what arguments the Aeroflot representatives put forward; but it is reasonable to suppose that they pointed out that the lease agreement did not explicitly state that individual rooms could only be occupied by one person. Only subletting and the keeping of animals is forbidden according to the wording of the agreement.'2 On 5 April negotiations were started between representatives of Aeroflot and the Norwegian Directorate of Civil Aviation in order to reach an amicable solution. Four days later they were concluded, and a result achieved: a family, with children, would continue to be allowed to live in the three-room apartment, while not more than a total of five persons were to be quartered in the small apartment and the individual rooms. The wives who had taken up residence were given until 1 June, 1976 to leave Longyearbyen.13 It was definitely established that the Soviet contingent would not exceed five to six persons, plus the station commander's family. It is not known why the Soviet Russians accepted this solution after first refusing to accept the Norwegian viewpoint, which was more or less identical with the result achieved in the negotiations. The sequence of events in the `wives case', its background and its implications have been interpreted in a number of ways: however, all the interpretations are speculative. No one knows the true Soviet motives. Nevertheless, the outcome provides a basis for certain observations and comments. First, like the raising of the Claims Tax in 1971, it shows that the Russians are capable of deferring to Norwegian administrative measures which they

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have previously opposed. Secondly, Soviet reactions conform to what we have previously described as a pattern, namely an apparent willingness to submit to Norwegian administrative measures that apply to conditions outside the Soviet mining communities. However, in 1975-6 the Russians also demonstrated that they will continue to oppose Norwegian statutory regulations within their own treaty areas, and in cases which they consider purely internal. For example, the Soviet authorities recently refused to register a newly-built power station in Barentsburg. Clause 12 of the Workers Protection Act of 7 December 1956, which specifically applies to Svalbard as well as Norway, states that boilers and pipelines placed under pressure cannot be used before the Labour Inspectorate has given its permission. The Act goes on to state that such installations are to be registered, inspected and maintained in accordance with rules laid down by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. This statutory regulation applies formally in Barentsburg because the power station in question is powered by coal. However, the Soviet authorities have not conceded that their installations should require Norwegian registration. Nor do they recognise that Norwegian air transport legislation, which requires the registration of aircraft, should apply to them. As a result, the helicopters at Kapp Heer outside Barentsburg operate without being registered. (ii) The Interpretation of Article 9. On 21 October 1976 an article was published in the Soviet Government organ Izvestia, which once again accused Norway of infringing the demilitarisation clause in the Svalbard Treaty. The newspaper stated that breaches of this kind had occurred on a number of occasions in the post-war period; inter alia, the Norwegian Government had allowed naval and air force units to call at Svalbard. It was also pointed out that a prominent Norwegian Foreign Ministry official had recently stated that the Svalbard Treaty was no bar to the stationing of a Norwegian mi'itary garrison in Svalbard. In other words, the Russians appear to consider that certain types of civilian installation and brief visits by military units of the Norwegian defence forces contravene Article 9. A typical expression of this kind of interpretation is to be found in an article by the Soviet jurist R. V. Dekanosov in the Soviet Yearbook of International Law (1968): According to the Treaty of 1920, demilitarisation of Spitsbergen stipulates prohibition of both the setting up of any constructions and devices which can be used for military purposes, and any measures aimed at using the territory for military purposes, including such measures as could in any way facilitate such use in future. The combination of regimes of demilitarisation and neutralisation enhances this effectiveness. Under Article 9, Norway is obliged to take appropriate measures to stop any action on the part of any state aimed at using Spitsbergen for military purposes. But this does not mean that Norway is entitled to establish in the Archipelago various fortifications, to build airfields, etc., under the pretext of its defence."

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The view of the Norwegian authorities, on the other hand, is that Article 9 `only prevents the establishment of permanent naval bases and fortifications'.15 According to this interpretation, the Norwegian authorities have on several occasions in the post-war years allowed Norwegian military aircraft to land and naval units to call at the archipelago. As shown in Chapter 6, a Norwegian military force was stationed at Spitsbergen in the Second World War, inter alia for the purpose of preventing other nations from utilising the islands for warlike purposes. It is the Norwegian view that this could be done because the intention was defensive, and because the aim of the garrison was to prevent the infringement of Article 9. Professor Frede Castberg, for many years consultant in questions of international law to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, supports an interpretation of this kind: As far as I can see, the reasonable aim of the provisions of Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty must be to prevent this area from serving as a base for belligerent operations in a war between great powers, whether Norway is a belligerent or not ... As far as Norway's defence of Svalbard is concerned, I cannot understand that the parties to the Treaty could have any reasonable grounds for preventing a defence of this nature, provided on the part of the' Norwegians that only such measures are carried out as are capable of turning Svalbard into a base for warlike operations in other areas. From the purely linguistic point of view it seems to me that the expression `be used for warlike purposes' does not involve purely defensive measures, but the exclusive aim of preventing the occupation of this area with a view to its exploitation for warlike purposes ... In any case 1 consider it legally defensible to establish a Home Guard in Svalbard, or in some other way to train Norwegians in Svalbard for defence against an attack on the archipelago ... My conclusion is, in fact, that Norway is in no way obliged to carry out a military defence in Svalbard, but that, within the limits pursuant to Article 9, it must be able to defend Svalbard against attack. Norway must be allowed in peacetime to make preparations for a defence of this nature against attack. And in particular it cannot be considered a violation of the Treaty to establish a Home Guard in Svalbard, with a role that is in every sense purely one of local defence.18 The Norwegian. authorities have no definite plans at the moment for stationing a military garrison in the archipelago. If the Soviet view were to be accepted literally, it would involve severe restrictions on economic activity in the area. All infrastructural development connected with such activity would then be ruled out of order by Article 9. The Russians have certainly imposed no restrictions of this kind on themselves—as in the case of the helicopter base at Kapp Heer; nor have they raised any objection to the building of the airport outside Longyearbyen by the Norwegian state, after having originally protested against such plans for a number of years (see Chapter 6). Because the Russians do not impose restrictions on themselves over infrastructural building, and because of their apparent inconsistency over the building of the air base, it is tempting to attribute their reaction

Epilogue: 1975 1976

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to various Norwegian measures to political necessity rather than to a correct juridical attitude. The Izvestia article probably expresses an anxiety long felt in the Soviet Union, namely, that Svalbard might be used as a starting point for hostile action directed against Soviet territory and against shipping in the area. The need to emphasise this vis-a-vis Norway and possibly other countries is still felt in Moscow. Norwegian—Soviet relations in Svalbard have consequently developed in 1975-6 according to a pattern that has gradually emerged during the last ten years. Broadly the difference from previous years is that developments in the area are now attracting greater national and international attention. The growing political interest of foreign countries in Svalbard was clearly shown in 1975-6, and might eventually give a new turn to developments in the area (see Chapter 10). (c) Other Countries' Interests In 1975 exploratory talks were started between Norway and a number of other countries, particularly Great Britain and the USA, on current problems in the Svalbard/Barents Sea area. Several meetings have been held. On a visit to Oslo in September 1975, the Assistant US Secretary of State, Robert Ingersoll, stated that the American authorities were reviewing their attitude to the Svalbard question, and were formualting guidelines for their own Svalbard policy. When the Minister of State at the British Foreign Office, Roy Hattersley, visited Oslo in April 1976, it was stated that his talks had given him a better understanding inter alia of the Norwegian attitude to the status of the Svalbard continental shelf. It is too early yet to talk of any results that these talks may produce. The growing international importance of the Arctic in scientific, economic and other respects may lead to a multinational presence in Svalbard, regardless of these talks. A current possibility is the American research project, the Nansen Drift Station, the aim of which is for a mixed international team of scientists and explorers to repeat Fridtjof Nansen's voyage on board the Fram across the Arctic Ocean (1893-6), using the converted icebreaker Burton Island. The expedition is planned to start from the New Siberian Islands in September—October 1978, with the object of measuring and recording various scientific data along the line of drift. For this purpose the use of Svalbard Airport for the replacement of crews and the flying in of provisions to the Burton Island is being considered." (d) The Economic Zone round Svalbard On 1 January 1977 the Norwegian Government established an economic zone of 200 nautical miles around the Norwegian mainland, with the purpose of creating a basis for effective protection of fishing resources and to secure the economic livelihood of the coastal .population. To the Government it was also important that the

100

Politics in High Latitudes

establishment of 200–mile economic zones by other nations would result in increased pressure on the Norwegian fishing banks, which in turn would accentuate the serious problem of over-fishing that already exists in this area.1B The question of establishing an economic zone for the protection and regulation of the fish resources around Svalbard has been investigated by a committee of experts. Its findings have been submitted to the Government for political evaluation and action, but have not been published. According to the Norwegian press, there are grounds for assuming that the Committee proposes the establishment of an economic zone round Svalbard, and that Norway should grant foreign fishermen access to it on terms laid down by its own authorities. As far as can be understood, the Committee's conclusions are based on the assumption that Norway possesses full and unrestricted sovereignty within this zone, in accordance with the Svalbard Treaty, as the restrictions on sovereignty embodied in it only apply to land and territorial waters and not to the sea outside.19 For the moment the date of establishing the zone is unknown, but the Soviet Union's decision in December 1976 to establish a provisional zone of 200 nautical miles may hasten the setting up of a zone round Svalbard. Should this not be the case, foreign fishermen now fishing within the Norwegian and Soviet zones in the Barents Sea will be free after 1 January, 1977, to fish in the areas near Svalbard where fry grow to maturity, a development which would hardly be acceptable to the Norwegian Government. The fishermen of several nations—Britain, West Germany, East Germany, Poland and others—earn their livelihood in the Barents Sea, and the establishment of an economic zone round Svalbard will inevitably affect their interests. This might well bring several governments into direct and immediate involvement in the development and problems of the whole area. Hence it is clear that Svalbard is gradually coming to occupy a more central position in both Norwegian and international politics.

APPENDIXES Appendix 1.

Treaty of 9 February, 1920, relating to Spitsbergen The President of The United States of America; His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Denmark; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Majesty the King of Norway; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; His Majesty the King of Sweden, Desirous, while recognizing the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, including Bear Island, of seeing these territories provided with an equitable r6gime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilisation, Have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries with a view to concluding a Treaty to this effect: Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows: Article 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognize, subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, comprising, with Bear Island or Beeren-Eiland, all the islands situated between 10° and 35° longitude East of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude North, especially West Spitsbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, Wiche Islands, Hope Island or Hopen-Eiland, and Prince Charles Foreland, together with all islands great or small and rocks appertaining thereto. Article 2. Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters. Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their teritoral waters; it being clearly understood that these measures shall always be applicable equally to the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege or favour whatsoever, direct or indirect to the advantage of any one of them.

Occuplere of land whose rights have been recognized in accordance with the terms of Articles 6 and 7 will enjoy the exclusive right of hunting on their own land: 1) in the neighbourhood of their habitations, houses, stores, factories and installations, constructed for the purpose of developing their property, under conditions laid down by the local police regulations; 2) within a radius of 10 kilometres round the headquarters of their place of business or works; and in both cases, subject always to the observance of regulations made by the Norwegian Government in accordance with the conditions laid down in the present Article. Article 3. The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equ.. liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining ana commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality. They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account or for any enterprise whatever. Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be in force in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1 shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward voyage for the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or coming from the said territories, or for any other purpose. It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard to exports, imports and transit traffic, the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties, their ships and goods shall not be subject to any charges or restrictions whatever which are not borne by the nationals, ships or goods which enjoy in Norway the treatment of the most favoured nation; Norwegian nationals, ships or goods being for this purpose assimilated to those of the other High Contracting Parties, and not treated more favourably in any respect. No charge or restriction shall be imposed

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Appendix 1

on the exportation of any goods to the territories of any of the Contracting Powers other or more onerous than on the exportation of similar goods to the territory of any other Contracting Power (including Norway) or to any other destination.

complete equality and in conformity with the stipulations of the present Treaty. Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public utility and on payment of proper compensation.

Article 6. Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired rights of nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall be recognized. Claims arising from taking possession or from occupation of land before the signature of the present Treaty shall be dealt with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which will have the same force and effect as the present Treaty.

Article 8. Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified in Article 1 mining regulations which, especially from the point of view of imposts, taxes or charges of any kind, and of general or particular labour conditions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for the benefit of the State or of the nationals of any one of the High Contracting Parties, including Norway, and shall guarantee to the paid staff of all categories the remuneration and protection necessary for their physical, moral and intellectual welfare. Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to the said territories and shall not exceed what is required for the object in view. So far, particularly, as the exportation of minerals is concerned, the Norwegian Government shall have right to levy an export duty which shall not exceed 1 per cent of the maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100 000 tons, and beyond that quantity the duty will be proportionately diminished. The value shall be fixed at the end of the navigation season by calculating the average free on board price obtained. Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, the draft mining regulations shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers. If during this period one or more of the said Powers propose to modify these regulations before they are applied, such proposals shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted to examination and the decision of a Commission composed of one representative of each of the said Powers. This Commission shall meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Government and shall come to a decision within a period of three months from the date of its first meeting. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority.

Article 7. With regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercise of the right of ownership of property, including mineral rights, in the territories specified in Article 1, Norway undertakes to grant to all nationals of the High Contracting Parties treatment based on

Article 9. Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission of Norway to the League of Nations, Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the

Article 4. All public wireless telegraphy stations established or to be established by, or with the authorisation of, the Norwegian Government within the territories referred to in Article 1 shall always be open on a footing of absolute equality to communications from ships of all flags and from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the conditions laid down in the Wireless Telegraphy Convention of July 5, 1912, or in the subsequent International Convention which may be concluded to replace it. Subject to international obligations arising out of a state of war, owners of landed property shall always be at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes wireless telegraphy installati ns, which shall be free to communicate on private business with fixed or moving wireless stations, including those on board ships and aircraft. Article 5. The High Contracting Parties recognize the utility of establishing an international meteorological station in the territories specified in Article 1, the organisation of which shall form the subject of a subsequent Convention. Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific investigations may be conducted in the said territories.

Svalbard Treaty

said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes. Article 10. Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian Government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties. Claims in the territories specified in Article 1 which they may have to put forward shall be presented under the conditions laid down in the present Treaty (Article 6 and Annex) through the intermediary of the Danish Government, who declare their willingness to lend their good offices for this purpose. The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon as possible. Powere of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe may confine their action to informing the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative at Paris, that their ratification has been given, and in this case, they shall transmit the instrument as soon as possible. The present Treaty will come into force, in so far as the stipulations of Article 8 are concerned, from the date of its ratification by all the signatory Powers; and in all other respects on the same date as the mining regulations provided for in that Article. Third Powers will be invited by the Government of the French Republic to adhere to the present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall be effected by a communication addressed to the French Government, which will undertake to notify the other Contracting Parties. In witness whereof the abovenamed Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty. Done at Paris, the ninth day of February, 1920, in duplicate, one copy to be transmitted to the Government of His Majesty the King of Norway, and one deposited in the archives of the French Republic; authenticated copies will be transmitted to the other Signatory Powers. Annex. 1. (1) Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, notification of all claims to land which had been made to any Government before

103

the signature of the present Treaty must be sent by the Government of the claimant to a Commissioner charged to examine such claims. The Commissioner will be a judge or jurisconsult of Danish nationa;:ty possessing the necessary qualifications for the task, and shall be nominated by the Danish Government. (2) The notification must include a precise delimitation of the land claimed and be accompanied by a map on a scale of not less than 1 : 1,000,000 on which the land claimed is clearly marked. (3) The notification must be accompanied by the deposit of a sum of one penny for each acre (40 area) of land claimed, to defray the expenses of the examination of the claims. (4) The Commissioner will be entitled to require from the claimants any further documents or information which he may consider necessary. (5) The Commissioner will examine the claims so notified. For this purpose he will be entitled to avail him'.if of such expert assistance as he may consider necessary, and in case of need to cause investigation to be carried out on the spot. (6) The remuneration of the Commissioner will be fixed by agreement between the Danish Government and the other Governments concerned. The Commissioner will fix the remuneration of such assistants as he considers it necessary to employ. (7) The Commissioner, after examining the claims, will prepare a report showing precisely the claims which he is of opinion should be recognised at once and those which, either because they are disputed or for any other reason, he is of opinion should be submitted to arbitration as hereinafter provided. Copies of this report will be forwarded by the Commissioner to the Governments concerned. (8) If the amount of the sums deposited in accordance with clause (3) is insufficient to cover the expenses of the examination of the claims, the Commissioner will, in every case where he is of opinion that a claim should be recognised, at once state what further sum the claimant should be required to pay. This sum will be based on the amount of the land to which the claimant's title is recognised. If the sums deposited in accordance with clause (3) exceed the expenses of the examination, the balance will be devoted to the cost of the arbitration hereinafter provided for.

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Appendix I

(9) Within three months from the date of the report referred to in clause (7) of this paragraph, the Norwegian Government shall take the necessary steps to confer upon claimants whose claims have been recognised by the Commissioner a valid title securing to them the exclusive property in the land in question, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced in the territories specified in Article 1 of the present Treaty, and subject to the mining regulations referred to in Article 8 of the present Treaty. In the event, however, of a further payment being required in accordance with clause (8) of this paragraph, a provisional title only will be delivered, which title will become definitive on payment by the claimant, within such reasonable period as the Norwegian Government may fix, of the further sum required of him. 2. Claims which for any reason the Commissioner referred to in clause (1) of the preceding paragraph has not recognised as valid will be settled in accordance with the following provisions: (1) Within three months from the date of the report referred to in clause (7) of the preceding paragraph, each of the Governments whose nationals have been recognised will appoint an arbitrator. The Commissioner will be the President of the Tribunal so constituted. In cases of equal division of opinion, he shall have the deciding vote. He will nominate a Secretary to receive the documents referred to in clause (2) of this paragraph and to make the necessary arrangements for the meeting of the Tribunal. Within one month from the appoint(2) ment of the Secretary referred to in clause (1) the claimants concerned will send to him through the intermediary of their respective Governments statements indicating precisely their claims and accompanied by such documents and arguments as they may wish to submit in support thereof. (3) Within two months from the appointment of the Secretary referred to in clause (1) the Tribunal shall meet at Copenhagen for the purpose of dealing with the claims which have been submitted to it. (4) The language of the Tribunal shall be

English. Documents or arguments may be submitted to it by the interested parties in their own language, but in that case must be accompanied by an English translation. (5) The claimants shall be entitled, if they so desire, to be heard by the Tribunal either in person or by counsel, and the Tribunal shall be entitled to call upon the claimants to present such additional explanations, documents or arguments as it may think necessary. (8) Before the hearing of any case the Tribunal shall require from the parties a deposit or security for such sum as it may think necessary to cover the share of each party in the expenses of the Tribunal. In fixing the amount of such sum the Tribunal shall base itself principally on the extent of the land claimed. The Tribunal shall also have power to demand a further deposit from the parties in cases where special expense is involved. (7) The honorarium of the arbitrators shall be calculated per month, and fixed by the Governments concerned. The salary of the Secretary and any other persons employed by the Tribunal shall be fixed by the President. (8) Subject to the provisions of this Annex the Tribunal shall have full power to regulate its own procedure. (9) In dealing with the claims the Tribunal shall take into consideration: (a) any applicable rules of International Law; (b) the general principles of justice and equity; (c) the following circumstances: ( i) the date on which the land claimed was first occupied by the claimant or his predecessors in title; (ii) the date on which the claim was notified to the Government of the claimant; (iii) the extent to which the claimant or his predecessors in title have developed and exploited the land claimed. In this connection the Tribunal shall take into account the extent to which the claimants may have been prevented from developing their undertakings by conditions or restrictions resulting from the war of 1914 —1919.

Svalbard Act 1915

(10) All the expenses of the Tribunal shall be divided among the claimants in such proportion as the Tribunal shall decide. If the amount of the sums paid in accordance with clause (6) is larger than the expenses of the Tribunal, the balance shall be returned to the parties whose claims have been recognised in such proportion as the Tribunal shall think fit. (11) The decisions of the Tribunal shall be communicated by it to the Governments concerned, including in every case the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian Government shall within three months from the receipt of each decision take the necessary steps to confer upon the claimants whose claims have been recognised by the Tribunal a valid title to the land in ques-

105

bon, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced in the territories specified in Article 1, and subject to the mining regulations referred to in Article 8 of the present Treaty. Nevertheless, the titles so conferred will only become definitive on the payment by the claimant concerned, within such reasonable period as the Norwegian Government may fix, of his share of the expenses of the Tribunal. 3. Any claims wich are not notified to the Commisioner in accordance whith clause (1) of paragraph 1, or which not having been recognised by him are not submitted to the Tribunal in accordance with paragraph 2, will be finally extinguished.

Appendix 2.

Act of 17 July, 1925, relating to Spitzbergen Chapter I. Relation of Spitsbergen to Norway. § 1.

Spitsbergen forms a part of the Kingdom of Norway. To Spitzbergen belong Bear Island, West Spitzbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, King Charles Land, Hope-Island, Prince Charles Foreland, together with all islands, great or small and rocks appertaining thereto between 10° and 35° longitude east of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude north. § 2. Norwegian civil and penal law and the Norwegian legislation relating to the administration of justice apply to Spitzbergen, where nothing to the contrary has been provided. Other statutory provisions do not apply to Spitzbergen, unless specifically provided. § 3. The statutes relating to public officials, to payment for public acts, to coins, measure and weight, to the postal and telegraph services, to labour protection and to labour disputes shall apply to Spitzbergen with such amendments as the King may lay down out of regard for the local conditions.

§ 4• The King may issue general regulations concerning the church, school and poor relief services, concerning public order, concerning expulsion, concerning the medical and health services, concerning the building and fire services, concerning combustible articles, concerning shipping, aviation and other communications, concerning patents etc., concerning mining, hunting, catching, fishing and other industries, concerning protection of animals, plants, natural formations, tracts of land and antiquities and concerning returns to the central statistical office.

Chapter II. Government and administration of justice. § 5. In Spitzbergen there shall be a Governor appointed by the King. The Governor shall have the same authority as a District Governor. He is also chief of police, notary public and assistant judge in the court of first instance, in so far as no special officials are appointed to these posts.

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Appendix 2

§ 8. The Court of Assessors for Spitzbergen shall be the Court of Assessors in the judical circuit which the King determines. § 7. The functions of the court of first instance, probate court judge and judical recorder shall be assigned to the court of first instance which the King determines. § 8. Under the Governor as assistant judge shall sort: (1) Cases which the Act relating to judicial procedure in penal cases or other statutes have assigned to the court of first instance; (2) paternity cases which the judge of the court of first instance deems can best be elucidated in Spitzbergen; (3) cases concerning private service or other private employment relationships; (4) other cases relating to capital claims, when the value of the object in dispute does not exceed Kr. 2 000,—, or when both parties ask for a judgment and the Governor is willing. The Governor can also perform taldng of evidence and registrations. § 9. In cases where mediation between the parties is obligatory the court shall undertake such mediation. The court stipulates the time and place for court sittings and the notice which parties and witnesses shall have. The statutory provisions relating to court vacations do not apply to Spitzbergen. Witnesses and experts are not bound to meet at a distance exceeding 10 km from the place where they reside or sojourn when summons is served, unless the court gives them special order to attend. As regards allowance for conveyance and board the King shall issue regulations. § 10. Evaluation In expropriation cases is undertaken by three legal surveyors. Appeal against an evaluation is heard by five legal surveyors with the Governor as chairman. If the case is particularly important, the King may, on the petition of a party, determine that the Governor and two legal surveyors shall effect the evaluation. Appeal against the evaluation shall in such case be heard by five legal surveyors with a surveyor judge, whom the King appoints, as chairman.

§ 11. Court witnesses, legal surveyors, lay judges and assessors for court sittings in Norway shall be selected from the panels which are established for the court in question. In Spitzbergen the Governor shall appoint court witnesses, legal surveyors and lay judges. They must be Norwegian subjects, be of age and not deprived by judgment of their right of voting in public affairs. The persons appointed are bound to accept the task. Allowance for conveyance and board can be granted to them according to rules laid down by the King. Process-servers shall be appointed by the Governor. § 12. Seizure, sequestration, distraint proceedings, and forced sale relating to real property or mining rights in Spitzbergen shall be performed in Norway by the judge of the court of first instance. Other enforcement action shall sort under the Governor. Forced sale of real property and mining rights shall be announced once in the Norwegian Gazette with at least 3 months' notice and by affixation of a notice at the office of the court. Forced sale of moveables shall be announced by notices and in other suitable manner. § 13.

The register of mortgages in Spitsbergen shall have a separate folio for each real property, each mining claim and each leased piece of State land. As to the designation of properties and mining claims in the regieter of mortgages and as to the keeping of the regieter of mortgages, the King shall issue more detailed regulations. Chapter ill. Special rules concerning personal legal relations.

§ 14. Guardians for minors or for persons declared incapable of managing their own affairs shall be appointed by the Governor. He shall without delay send notification of such appointment and a statement of the capital assets of the person under guardianship. The King shall issue more detailed regulations as to how the assets shall be administered and as to supervision of the guardians. § 15. The declaring of a person as incapable of managing his own affairs on account of men-

Svalbard Act 1925

tal infirmity can be done temporarily by the Governor, when a medical certificate of the infirmity is presented. § 16. Both civic and ecclesiastical solemnization of marriage may be performed without publication of banns. § 17. If a marriage contract (ektepakt) is executed prior to the marriage, and the person performing the solemnization of the marriage endorses the contract with an attestation of the date, the contract shall be valid also in relation to a third party from the date of the solemnization of the marriage, if it is registered within one year. § 18. Mediation between spouses under the provisions of the Marriage Act may be performed by the Governor or by a person authorized to solemnize marriage. § 19. When the Governor issues paternity and alimony writs he shall stipulate a time-limit for the institution of a paternity suit. The Governor shall also function as bailiff of alimony pursuant to the statutes relating to parents and children.

§ 20. The child welfare committee shall consist of the Governor and two members whom he appoints. At least one of the members shall be a woman. § 21. The statutes relating to allodial possession (odelsrett) and right of primogeniture (Asetesrett) shall not apply to Spitzbergen.

Chapter IV. Special rules relating to property. § 22. All land which is not assigned to any person as his property pursuant to the Treaty relating to Spitzbergen shall be State land and as such be subject to the State's right of ownership. No one may gain a prescriptive right of ownership or use of State land. Rights which the State possesses over vended State land cannot be lost by prescriptive right.

107

§ 23. Over land which has been assigned to private proprietor under the Treaty relating to Spitsbergen subjects of the states which are parties to the Treaty can without special licence acquire both right of ownership and right of use. The same applies to a lawfully formed company, the board of which has its seat in these states. The keeper of the register of mortgages may demand evidence from the authorities concerned in the home state that a foreigner or a foreign company fulfils these conditions. § 24. If the proprietor or user of real property in Spitzbergen does not reside or have permanent abode in Norway or Spitzbergen, he must have an authorized agent who is resident in the Kingdom to represent him in all matters relating to this property. The same applies when the proprietor or user is a company, whose board has its seat in a foreign state. The power of attorney with the name and status of the agent shall be registered. If no such power of attorney has been given and registered, the judge of the court of first instance can appoint an agent at the request of anyone interested. The appointment shall be registered and shall be valid until the owner or user himself registers a power of attorney. § 25. The King can issue regulations as to how the boundaries of private land shall be marked. When a real property is divided, the Governor shall appoint two men to draw up a certificate of division with the necessary particulars of the part separated off. Title-deed to the separated portion must not be registered before the certificate of division. § 26. The ground proprietor has sole right of hunting and catching on the property: a) in the vicinity of dwelling houses, houses, magazines, work-shops and other buildings which have as their purpose the utilization of the property; b) within a distance of 10 km from the main seat of the activity or utilization of the property. The ground proprietor has the sole right of hunting, catching, collecting of eggs and down in eggeries or downeries which are protected

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Appendix 3

by licence of the King. The protection shall be announced in the Norwegian Gazette and the locality shall be marked in the manner the King prescribes.

transport device, water conduit, power line, telegraph or telephone installation. (2) when the State in other respects needs the ground for public or scientific use.

§ 27. Outside the areas which are specified in § 26 hunters, catchers, fishermen, collectors of eggs and down shall be entitled to have cabins and other establishments which they need for sojourn and work, provided that it is not an inconvenience to the ground proprietor. Anyone who wishes to carry on scientific investigations shall have the same right outside the areas specified in § 26, liters a). Dispute concerning the application of these regulations shall be decided by the Governor with final effect.

The proprietor and other possessors of rights shall be given opportunity to make a statement before the King gives the permission.

§ 28. Enforced relinquishment of a right of ownership or use of real property in cases other than are warranted by the Mining Code may be permitted by the King: (1) when the State or a private person wishes to build a harbour, quay, dock, road,

Chapter V. Miscellaneous provisions. § 29. The King can decide that persons and companies from states not party to the Treaty relating to Spitzbergen can acquire mining rights, rights of ownership or use in real property in Spitsbergen, wholly or partly on the same conditions as the ones to which they would be subject if they belonged to one of the Contracting Parties. § 30. This Act shall enter into force on the date decided by the King.

Appendix 8.

The Mining Code (the Mining Regulations) for Spitzbergen, laid down by Royal Decree of 7 August, 1925 as amended by Royal Decree of 11 June 1975 Chapter I. Introductory provisions. § 1. This Mining Code shall apply to the entire Archipelago of Spitzbergen (Svalbard), comprising, with Bear Island, all the islands situated between 10° and 35° longitude East of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude North, especially West Spitzbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, Wiche Islands (King Karls Land), Hope Island (Hopen) and Prince Charles Foreland, together with all islands great or small and rocks appertaining thereto. § 2. (1) The right of searching for and acquiring and exploiting natural deposits of coal, mineral one and other minerals and rocks which are the object of mining or quarrying, subject to the observance of the provisions of this Mining Code and on equal terms with regard to taxation and in

other respects belongs, in addition to the Norwegian State, to: a) All nationals of those States, which have ratified or adhered to the Treaty relating to Spitzbergen. b) Companies which are domiciled and and legally established in any of the said states. A company is considered as domiciled in the state in which its board has its seat. (2) That a person or a company fulfils the conditions here stipulated, must at the demand of the Commissioner of Mines be verified through a proper affidavit of a competent authority in their home country, and the competency of such authority if it is not a Norwegian authority, must be certified by a Norwegian legation or consulate in the state concerned, or by the legation or consulate in Norway of such state.

Svalbard Mining Code

(3) Any dispute as to whether a mineral or rock is of such nature as mentioned in item (1), shall be finally settled by the Ministry concerned on report of the Commissioner of Mines. § 3. (1) Persons who have no domicile, nor any permanent place of residence in Norway or in Spitzbergen and companies, the boards of which have not: their seat in Norway or in Spitzbergen, in order to be able to acquire and exercise the rights mentioned in § 2, must have an agent permanently resident in Norway or in Spitzbergen, whose name, position and place of residence have been reported to the Commissioner of Mines, and who is empowered to represent them in court and in relation to mining operations in Spitzbergen. (2) Upon a failure to comply with the requirement, the Judge of the court of first instance at the place where the Commissioner of Mines has his office, at the request of anyone interested, may name an åttorney. Such attorney shall have the same authority as mentioned in item (1), until the party concerned reports the appointment of another attorney. § 4. (1) Any application to Norwegian authorities that has to be made within a certain term, purusant to this Mining Code, must be filed with the authority concerned before the expiration of such term. (2) If an application is not worded in the Norwegian language, the authority concerned may demand a translation thereof, duly certified, to be submitted within a certain term and, upon a failure of the applicant to comply therewith, may refuse to consider the application. § 5(1) The powers which according to the Mining Ordinance are conferred upon the Commissioner of Mines, may by the Ministry concerned, to such extent as needed, be delegated to inferior officers of the mining service. (2) The decisions of such officers may be submitted to the Commissioner of Mines for reconsideration and the decisions of the Commissioner of Mines likewise to the Ministry provided the decisions have not been given during a claim survey in which case the procedure of § 13 applies.

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(3) The decisions of other inferior administrative authorities, with reference to the Mining Code, also may be submitted to higher authority for reconsideration. § 6. Public officials serving in Spitzbergen are not allowed to notify any discoveries, to obtain any claims, or to be proprietor of or partner in any claims, nor to be agents for sale of discoveries or claims in their districts. Chapter II. On search and discoveries. § 7(1) The search for natural deposits of the minerals and rocks mentioned in § 2 may be made on one's own property as well as on that of any other party, and on the State land. (2) Any person who desires to search on the property of some other party or on the State land, must have a licence from the Commissioner of Mines or from the chief of police, and he is bound to produce such licence on request. (3) The licence shall be valid for two years from the date of issue, and confers upon the searcher the right of undertaking any work considered necessary or expedient in order to search for the minerals and rock mentioned in § 2, or in order to examine discoveries already made, also including work, the object of which fa to make a preliminary examination of the deposit in order to decide whether it is worth working. (4) No search must be made within the claim of any other party, unless the holder of the claim has given the permission. (5) No search must be made within a distance of 500 metres from any factory or industrial establishment under construction or in operation, any line of transport or quays or from any dwelling house, not including huts for catching, fishing or whaling expeditions which are only occasionally used, unless consent is given by the proprietor and tenant of the plants or the building. Nor must any search be made within any such distance from any public or scientific establishment, church or cemetery. § 8. (1) The searcher is bound to indemnify any damage which, through the search, is caused to the proprietor of the ground or any other party.

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(2) Anyone preventing any party from lawful search shall indemnify any provable loss which the searcher has suffered through any futile journey of otherwise. § 9. (1) Anybody who, by lawful search, shall discover a natural deposit, containing or supposed to contain minerals or rocks as mentioned in § 2, acquires thereby, in preference to subsequent discoverers, a right to the discovery, provided he, in the presence of two witnesses, by marks in solid rock or, by other lasting and satisfactory means, visibly locates a discovery point and besides, not later than 10 months after having located the discovery, through a written notification informs the Commissioner of Mines thereof. A discovery notice may also, before the expiration of this term, and with full legal effect, be filed with the chief of police, who in that case as soon as possible shall transmit It to the Commissioner of Mines. (2) The discovery notice must be signed by the claimant and shall contain: a) The name, domicile and nationality of the elshesnt and the witnesses, and, in the cases mentioned in § 3, the name and address of the appointed attorney. b) Accurate description of the situation of the discovery point and of the kind of marks used, accompanied by a eketchmap in a scale öf not less than 1 : 100 000 on which the discovery point shall be marked. c) Exact statement of the moment when the discovery was marked. d) Information of the nature of the discovery under reference to a sample, banded over at the same time, of the minerals or rocks found. e) Reference to an enclosed declaration from the witnesses that the discovery point was marked in their presence and how the marking took place. (3) Anybody who wants to notify several discoveries must for each of them file a separate discovery notice. (4) If a discovery notice which does not comply with the prescriptions of Items (2) and (3) has been filed in due timethe right to the discovery is preserved if the defects are remedied within a term to be fixed by the Commissioner of Mines. (5) The provisions of items (1) — (4) are correspondingly applicable when any par-

ty will take up a deposit which has reverted to the State land, whether it has been worked or not. § 10. (1) The right to a discovery which has been acquired by a discoverer according to § 9, besides the right of carrying out on the place of discovery the operations mentioned in § 7, item (3), also entitles him, in preference to subsequent discoverers, to demand a claim on the discovery point. (2) The right to the discovery lapses if an application for a claim survey has not been filed with the Commissioner of Mines within 5 years after the discovery was marked, or if any other party before the expiry of the said term has obtained a claim on the discovery point, see § 12, item (2), litre d). (3) The right to a discovery that has been filed for record may be transferred. The transfer is not valid before having been notified to the Commissioner of Mines.

Chapter III. On claim patents. § 11. (1) The claim survey shall bo made by the Commissioner of Mines at the latest within 2 years after an application has been filed, if natural conditions or any other circumstances do not make it impossible. (2) The time for such survey shall be notified in the official gazette designated for the purpose within the end of the month of the year in which the survey la to be held. The notification shall contain: a) The name, the domicile and nationality of the applicant. b) Information concerning the situation of the discovery point and the time reported for the marking of the discovery. c) The time and the place for the survey. d) Summons to all who claim to posses a better right to the claim to meet and look after their interests during the survey. The Commissioner of Mines besides Phould send reprints of the notification t those who are supposed to be interested in the survey. It is, however, of no consequence for the furthering of the survey, that such information has not been transmitted or not been received by the party interested.

Svalbard Mining Code

(3) Kr. 1500,— shall be paid for the dealing with an application for a single claim. If an applicant asks for several claims in the same neighbourhood and at the same time, or if several applicants jointly ask for claims in the same neighbourhood and at the same time, Kr. 600,— shall be paid for each additional claim stated in the application. The claims applied for are considered as lying in the same neighbourhood, when between the discovery points which are lying farthest from each other the distance does not exceed 30 kilometres. Payment for a claim survey shall be made to the Commissioner of Mines simultaneously with the application for same. § 12, (1) On making the claim survey the Commissioner of Mines first decides whether the applicant is entitled to obtain any claim. (2) If so, he makes the survey observing the following provisions: a) The discovery point must lie within the boundaries of the claim. b) If several discovery points that are recorded are situated so near to each other that the right to get a claim op o e of the discoveries is dependent on e manner in which a claim is given or another discovery, he who first has marked a discovery point may choose in what manner he wishes the survey to be undertaken. If he does not attend the claim survey, the Commissioner of Mines shall decide in what manner the claim for his discovery is to be subsequently given, if he demands a claim. c) The claim shall be given as a plain superficies having a square content as per the request of the applicant and the character of the deposit up to 1000 hectares. Ordinarily the claim shall be given in the form of a rectangular parallelogram, the length and breadth of which are fixed by the applicant himself, the limitation being that the length may not be more than 4 times the breadth. Dispensations from the rectangular form should be given by request of the applicant, when this is dictated by configuration of the coast-line or other natural boundaries, and provided that the claim in no direction exceeds a length of 7 kilometres. The boundaries are

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comprised within vertical planes passing through the boundary lines on surface and projected indefinitely downwards. d) If the claim covers several discovery points the right to obtain claim for the rest lapses. (3) The claim survey shall be entered in an authorized book. The Commissioner of Mines, when requested shall supply a verified extract of the book against a fee of Kr. 2,— per sheet or part thereof. (4) When a claim has been granted, the Commissioner of Mines shall send to the applicant a patent for each separate claim according to the claim survey that has been allotted to him. A proclamation of the issuing of such patent shall be published in the public gazette instituted for that purpose. § 13. (1) If any party intends to contest the decisions of the Commissioner of Mines in a claim survey, proceedings must be commenced within 6 months after proclamation of the issue of the patent has appeared in the public gazette, or if survey has been refused, within 6 months after such refusal. (2) The claim is final when the time for beginning an action has expired without such action having been instituted or when an action instituted in proper time has been validly decided, withdrawn or dismissed. § 14. (1) When the claim has become final the holder of the claim has acquired the sole right to extract all the minerals and rocks mentioned in § 2 through mining operations within the claim, provided that he complies with the requirement to work made incumbent on him in § 15. (2) The holder of the claim is entitled to mine and retain other minerals and rocks to such extent as is necPaaary or expedient for the operations. What has been mined but not used in the said manner may be disposed of by the proprietor of the ground. (3) Any voluntary or compulsory transfer of the right to a claim and any voluntary or compulsory establishment or transfer of mortgage rights or any other rights to a claim can with full legal effect only be done in the manner stipulated for real property.

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(4) On the application of the bolder of the claim the Commissioner of Mines may divide a claim by making part of it a special claim. The division Is to be made without a claim survey on the spot. Otherwise § 12, items (3) and (4) and § 13 shall apply correspondingly. The fee is Kr. 600,— for each claim to be divided from the original claim. § 15. (1) When 4 years have elapsed from 1st October of the year after the claim became final the holder of the claim is bound to commence mining operations within the claim to such an extent that in the course of each succeeding period of 5 years at least 1 500 man-days work are employed in mining operations in the claim. (2) For a number of not more than 25 claims, which in their entirety are lying within a distance of not over 15 kilometres from a fixed point, indicated by the claim-holder to the Commissioner of Mines, such obligatory work of the claimholder shall be considered as having been performed when he inside one or more of these claims performs as many days' work as imposed upon him by item (1) for all claims aggregately. (3) Reports concerning the number of days' work performed during each working year, counting from let October one year until 30th September the next year, shall be delivered to the Commissioner of Mined before the following 31st December. (4) When a petition is delivered to the Commissioner of Mines in the course of a period, or at the latest on 31st December of the year in which the period elapses, the Ministry concerned on the report from the Commissioner of Mines, may dispense from the provisions in items (1) and (2) for the period in question by exempting from the duty of working, or by reducing the number of days' work required for the fulfilment of such duty. The conditions for such dispensations are: a) That the holder of a claim proves that essential hindrances for which he cannot be made answerable are or have been checking the operations, such as special and passing circumstances connected with the operations, or with the utilization or sale of the products or, b) that the holder of a claim proves that one or more claims which he wishes

to be left out of consideration in the calculation of the days' work are necessary as a reserve for claims which are being worked. § 16. (1) Should any holder of a claim fail to comply with the requirements for work according to § 15, items (1) and (2), without having in due time applied for and obtained dispensation, his claim lapses at the end of the calendar year following, provided he does not in the course of same make up for lost work besides performing the average number of days' work which belong to one year of the new period. (2) If sufficient work has been done to maintain the right to one or more of the claims, but not to all of them, the Commissioner of Mines shall decide which claims are to be considered as lapsed, provided the holder of the claim has not made his choice and stated same to the Commissioner of Mines within the expiration of the year mentioned in item (1). (3) When a claim has lapsed according to the above provisions neither the claim nor any part thereof can again be allotted to the holder of the claim nor to any company in which he possesses a majority of the shares, in case another holder of a registered discovery makes an application for a claim within the said area before the expiration of the current period of 5 years. § 17. (1) When the claim has become final, the annual due to be paid by the holder of the claim is up to Kr. 1500,— for each claim. For this due the State shall have a first priority mortgage right in the claim concerned, and the due may be collected in accordance with the rules fixed for the collection of taxes on real property. (2) If, by sale of the claim execution, sufficient covering of outstanding dues is not obtained, the claim lapses. Then it may not again be allotted to the holder of the claim, nor to any company in which he possesses a majority of the shares, unless the dues outstanding together with costs have first been paid including also the dues which have accrued in the meantime. § 18. Besides in those cases mentioned in §§ IG and 17 a claim lapses when the claim-holder,

Svalbard Mining Code

after having paid the dues owing, through a written declaration to the Commissioner of Mines, abandons his right to the claim. In that case the provisions in § 16, item (3) shall apply correspondingly. Chapter IV. On the relation to the proprietor of the ground. § 19. (1) The proprietor of any ground on which a claim has been given is entitled to a participation in the operations for not exceeding one fourth. If he desires to make use of this right he must notify the holder of the claim of the share which he claims, within one year after the patent was published in the public gazette. He may then also demand that a corresponding part of what has been extracted is to remain on the spot until an agreement has been established as to the terms of participation. If a claim has been given on the ground belonging to several, the proprietors are entitled to participate jointly in the operations for not exceeding one fourth, the expenditure and income being divided equally amongst them. If any of said proprietors is unwilling his interest shall become the property of the others. (2) When the proprietor of the ground or any other party to whom he may have transferred his rights has declared his willingness to participate in the operations, a written contract shall be made concerning the terms, on the basis, that the proprietor or the holder of his rights is bound to participate proportionately to the share he demanded in all the costs of the operations and the establishments for the utilization of the output and with a right to participation in the profits, In both cases from the commencement of the operations. If the parties do not agree, either of them, within 6 months after the expiry of the time mentioned in item (1), may demand the Commissioner of Mines to fix the terms. If the proprietor of the ground will not accept the decision of the Commissioner of Mines he may, within 6 months after it was made known to him, either transfer his right to someone who accepts the terms or withdraw from any participation in the operations. § 20. (1) A claim-holder has the right to demand the assignment by the Commissioner of Mines of the ground needed for foot-

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paths, roads, railways, tramways, aerial ropeways, dumps, surface buildings, stores, quays and other establishments connected with the working of the mines. (2) Within the areas mentioned in § 7, item (6), no other cession can be claimed than that which is needed for the operations of any claim-holder for footpaths, roads, railways, tramways, aerial ropeways, power transmission and quays. For the acquisition of the control of the ground in auch places the permission of the Commissioner of Mines must be obtained in default of an agreement. Before any decision is made, the Commissioner of Mines shall give the proprietor of the ground and other holders of rights the opportunity of being heard. A permission must not be given unless the Commissioner of Mines finds that the interest of other parties be not thereby materially prejudiced, and conditions for the security against such prejudice shall be made if necessary. (3) For any damage and inconvience caused through cessions in accordance with § 1 or § 2, the proprietor of the ground as well as any other holders of rights may claim an indemnification which, failing an agreement, shall be stipulated by an evaluation. (4) The ground ceded by a proprietor according to items (1) or (2) shall revert to the main ground as a full property when the use has been finally waived, or when the claim has lapsed. After the final discontinuation of the operations the holder of a claim has a period of 3 years to clear the ground to such extent as he may desire. What has not then been removed shall belong to the proprietor of the ground. If, however, within the time mentioned, any party has obtained a new claim on the abandoned mine, the previous holder of the claim has the right to transfer to the new holder his establishments, houses and machines. Chapter V. On the mining. § 21. The provisions in this chapter concerning mines shall have a corresponding application to surface working as far as they are suitable. §22. (1) The working of a mine shall be effected in a minerlike manner.

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(2) He, or those, who are to superintend the technical management on the spot, must have the necessary professional knowledge and experience. (3) No mine workings must be commenced in those places where search is prohibited according to § 7, item (5), except by permission of the proprietor or the user of the ground; air may underground work take place on these premises, unless the work, exclusively to the judgment of the Commissioner of Mines, is of such nature or is carried on in such a way that no subsidences are caused thereby or no other damage is inflicted on buildings or plants on the surface. No peimission as mentioned above is needed, however, if such buildings or plants have been erected after the claim has become final. In order to commence or carry on underground work within the distance mentioned in § 7, item (5), from public or scientific establishment, church or cemetery, permission is required of the King. (4) At any establishment employing workmen who are not Norwegians, at least one officer must be appointed who understands Norwegian and can make himself understood in the Norwegian language and, if necessary, also in the foreign language commonly used at the mine. § 23. (1) At every mine there shall, if the Commissioner of Mines deems it necessary, be kept a record in which shall be entered monthly a report on the operations and everything happening of interest to the mine, and to the conditions of the deposits. Of this record an extract — made in accordance with a form prescribed by the Commissioner of Mines — shall be sent for each working year, before 31st December, to the Commissioner of Mines. (2) For each mine, that cannot in its entirety be overlooked on the surface, there shall further be prepared a map (mine plan), which must be supplemented as the operations are advancing. One copy of the map shall be kept at the mine, and another shall be forwarded to the Commissioner of Mines. (3) The information and the maps which the Commissioner of Mines receives according to this section should only be used for official purposes and must not be made available to others.

§ 24. To such extent as may be done without special difficulties and expenses, endeavours should be made in the course of operations to avoid the destruction of any geological and mineralogical formations or any other natural curiosities or places which may be supposed to be of scientific or historal importance. § 25. (1) If the holder of a mine for which surveying is prescribed, desires, temporarily or definitely, to discontinue the operations, he shall inform the Commissioner of Mines to that effect as soon as possible. (2) Any timbering and support provided for the safety of the mine, must in such cases not be damaged or removed without the permission of the Commissioner of Mines. (3) Mine openings must be filled or surrounded with a proper fence. Chapter VI. On protection of workers. § 26. (1) The statutory provisions regarding the protection of workers at any time in force for mining In Norway shall also apply to mining in Spitzbergen with such modifications and adaptations however as may be laid down by the King, due regard being had to the local conditions. (2) What has been stipulated in §§ 27-33 concerning workers shall also apply to any other person employed in the mining operations at the place. § 27. (1) The employer is bound to furnish his workers with healthy and proper dwellings, and, as far as circumstances permit, to provide sanitary arrangements. Further instructions concerning the manner of building and the fitting up of the houses shall be issued by the Ministry concerned. The Ministry also may make it incumbent on the employer to provide for a meeting-hall and a proper collection of books in a language known by the workers. (2) The employer is bound to keep at the establishment a supply of the necessary medicines, surgical instruments and

dressing articles. More detailed instructions in this respect shall be issued by the Ministry concerned.

(3) The Ministry may enjoin on the employer to maintain a hospital suitable for the purpose with an isolation hospital and

Svalbard Mining Code

the necessary outfit and attendance, calculated to accommodate as large a number of patients as the Ministry may decide. When the Ministry finds it necessary, the employer shall also be required to supply medical attendance on the spot §28. (1) At the time of the year when the communication with the outside world may be expected to be interrupted through ice, it is incumbent on the employer to take care that there in present at the establishment such supplies of food, clothing and other necessities of life as his workers shall need for at least one year's maintenance. The stores shall be distributed in safe depots. More detailed regulations for the implementation of these provisions shall be issued by the Ministry concerned. (2) The chief of police, in case of emergency, may order, or himself effect, the sending home of as many workers as he finds necessary in order to make the supplies suffice for the maintenance of those remaining. Complaint does not cause postponement § 29. Arms, munitions and explosives as well as alcoholic beverages and narcotics may be imported into Spitsbergen only in accordance with regulations issued by the King, due regard being paid to the needs of the companies. § 30. (1) The net proceeds of the trade which the employer himself or through others carries on with the workmen, or is interested in, at the place concerned, shall after audited annual accounts be used for the general welfare of the workmen. The application of these profits shall be decided by the employer in conjunction with a committee appointed by the workers who, in the case of dispute, may demand that the matter be referred to the decision of the chief of police. In calculating the net proceeds of such trade the employer is entitled to deduct a reasonable interest on the capital engaged in the establishment (2) The provisions of item (1) shall also be applicable If the employer has any profit on his maintenance of the workers in Spitzbergen.

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§ 31. (1) The employer shall take care that his workers in case of illness receive hospital attendance until they have become well, or at any rate until they are in a condition to be sent home. The repatriation in this case shall be paid by the employer. (2) The employer, moreover, is obliged to pay compensation for the loss of working income during illness. (3) The King shall issue more detailed regulations concerning the obligation to provide attendance during illness and concerning the conditions for and the amount of the compensation for loss of working income during illness. § 32. If any worker in doing his work is injured by an accident which was not caused intentionally by the victim of the accident, it is incumbent on the employer, besides the obligations mentioned in § 31, to pay to the victim or, in the event of his death, to his survivors, a compensation in accordance with regulations issued by the King. § 33. (1) The employer shall give to the Ministry concerned, through a bank guarantee, insurance or in some other manner, satisfactory security for the claims of the workers. The amount of the guarantee sum shall be fixed and the security offered shall be approved by the Ministry. (2) If the requirement to give security be not complied with, the Ministry may fix a daily fine, running until the matter is settled. The fine shall be collectable by distraint It shall be employed as provided for in § 30.

Chapter VII. Transitional provisions. § 34. (1) Persons and companies who make territorial claims on the basis of acts of appropriation or occupations that have taken place before the signing of the Treaty relating to Spitzbergen, if their claims are notified in conformity with § 1, item (1) of the Annex to the said Treaty shall be entitled, without any hindrance from the stipulations in this Mining Code but also without this involving any acknowledgment of their claims,

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to carry on prospecting and mining operations within the areas claimed, as long as their claims have not lapsed or been rejected pursuant to the provisions of the said Annex. During this interval no other person has the right of prospecting or mining within said areas. (2) The provisions in Chapter V and VI shall also apply to mining operations, carried on according to item (1), from 1st September, of the year after the Mining Code has entered into force. § 35. (1) The persons and companies who pursuant to the provisions of the Annex to the Treaty relating to Spitzbergen are recognized as proprietors of a certain territory, shall be granted as many claims as they desire within the boundaries of their property, subject to the following conditions: a) That the act of appropriation or occupation upon which the acknowledged ownership is founded has taken place with a view to utilize the territory for mining operations, or has been followed by development or exploitation for that purpose; b) That an application for a claim survey, containing information of the nature of the deposit under reference to a sample, contemporarily handed over, of the minerals and rocks found and accompanied by the stipulated fee, is filed with the Commissioner of Mines within 10 years after the claimant's title-deed for the property has been issued pursuant to the provisions in the Annex to the Treaty re-

lating to Spitzbergen, § 1, item (9), or § 2, item (11), provided that the title-deed is or becomes definitive. The fee to be charged is Kr. 00,— for the first, and Kr. 200,— for each succeeding claim within the boundaries of the same property. In these cases the provisions of § 11, item (1) and item (9), last paragraph, and of § 12 item (1), item (2) liters c), item (3) and item (4), shall be applicable mutatis mutandis, while the other provisions of §§ 9 to 12 are not applicable. (2) Until the expiry of the term mentioned in item (1), liters b), and provided the application for a claim is filed in proper time, until the claim has become final, the recognized owner has the exclusive right to carry on prospecting and mining within his territory. During this period the provisions in Chapter V and VI shall apply. (3) Persons and companies mentioned in item (1) are exempted from the claim dues mentioned in § 17 for claims acquired pursuant to item (1). The same shall apply to claims being asked for under reference to discoveries which they have notified during the ten-year period mentioned in item (1) liters b). In other respects the provisions of this Code shall apply to the claims. Final provision. §30. This Mining Code shall enter into force from such time as shall be determined by statute.

Publisher's Note: The above Appendixes are a facsimile of `Report No. 39 to the

Norwegian Storting concerning Svalbard'.

NOTES Chapter 2: Svalbard as a Political Phenomenon I. As the King's Bay case is not directly dealt with in the text, the following brief account may prove useful. Since 1933 the Norwegian Government, represented by the Ministry of Industry, has been the owner of, and responsible for running, the mining company Kings Bay Kullkompani Ny Ålesund. Ever since operations were restarted after the Second World War, this company has suffered a number of underground explosions that have cost in all sixty-three lives. On 5 November 1962 a fresh explosion occurred, when twenty-one workers lost their lives. This disaster and its political and juridical aftermath has subsequently been reffered to as the King's Bay case. Immediately after the accident, a commission was set up to examine the circumstances surrounding the explosion. The commission concluded that it was impossible to decide with any certainty what had caused the accident, but having been pressed for time, it felt that there was a need for further investigation. On 1 January 1963 the so-called Tønseth Commission was established in order to continue this work. This Commission established that safety regulations in the Ny Alesund mines had not been observed. This unleashed a violent public debate, which soon spread to the Storting, where the non-Socialist parties attacked the Gerhardsen Government for its alleged failure to observe safety provisions in the Kings Bay mines. In the opinion of the non-Socialists, the Government was fully responsible constitutionally for what had occurred. The Labour Party denied these charges of negligence, and declared that neither on constitutional nor on parliamentary grounds could responsibility for the accident be imputed to the Minister of Industry. The result of the debate, however, was that the Gerhardsen Government had a majority of the Storting ranged against it, and was forced to hand over power to a non-Socialist coalition government led by John Lyng, leader of the Conservative parliamentray group. The King's Bay accident had a juridical aftermath. Mining at Ny Ålesund has been discontinued since the 1962 disaster. Chapter 3: From Paris 1920 to Longyearbyen 1925 1. Much of the information contained in this chapter is taken from Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in International Politics: 1871-1920. The facts reproduced here have been greatly compressed, and merely include data of interest in our context. Readers wanting a more detailed account are recommended to read Mathisen's book. 117

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2. Article 2 of Svalbard Treaty. 3. Cf. the energetic resistance made by this company to Norwegian sovereignty during the years 1918-20. See Willy Ostreng, Økonomi og politisk suverenitet. Interessespillet om Svalbards politiske status, Oslo University Press, 1974, Chap. 5. 4. Clause 35 of Spitsbergen Mining Code. 5. Ostreng, op. cit., Chap. 6. 6. Mathisen, op. cit., pp. 251-68. 7. Memorandum on the occupations of Svalbard and the State dated 23 May, 1925, State Archives. 8. Order-in-Council of 17 September 1925. The members of the Committee were Carl Lundh, Ole Røed-and Trygve Klausen. 9. The companies were Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani A/S, Bjornøen A/S, Kings Bay Kullkompani A/S, A/S De Norske Kullfelter Spitsbergen and A/S Svalbard. 10. Order-in-Council of 17 September 1925. 11. Ibid 12. Memorandum on occupations of Svalbard and the State, 23 May 1925. 13. T Mathisen, op. cit., p. 288, fn. 2. 14. Doss. P2B 3a/18. Letter from the Royal Danish Embassy to the Norwegian Prime Minister dated 16 September 1927. 15. Svalbard Commissioner: Claims to land in Svalbard. Parts I and II. 16. The Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920. 17. See Para. 1 of the Constitution. 18. Mathisen, op. cit., p. 257. Mathisen, op. cit., pp. 66-7. Robert Lansing, `A unique international problem', American journal of International Law, 1917. Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: a Personal Narrative, pp. 192-7. Chapter 4: Svalbard's Formal Status and Norway's Responsibility 1. The USA, France, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. 2. Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty. 3. Ibid., Articles 2 and 3. 4. Ibid., Articles, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8. 5. Ibid., Articles 4, 7, and 8. 6. See Ostreng, op. cit. 7. Article 8 of the Svalbard Treaty. 8. Ibid., Article 9. 9. See Mathisen, op. cit. 10. See White Paper No. 39 (1974-5), relating to Svalbard. 11. See Chapter 7, section on `Internationalisation'. 12. See The Laws of Norway 1Ø.-1971. Examples of laws have been made applicable: Laws of 5 April 1927, Para. 84; 29 May 1928, no. 7; 29 May 1929, no. 4, Para. 15; 14 March 1930, Para. 11; 16 June 1939, no. 7, Para. 1; 19 June, 1974, no. 5 Para. 2; 9 April 1948, no. 2, Para. 23 8 December, 1950, no. 3, Para. 18; 15 December 1950, no. 4, Para. 12, no. 7, Para. 21; 23 October 1959, Para. 30; 9 June 1961, no. 1, Para. 32; 8 June 1962, no. 4,

Politics in High Latitudes

13.

14. 15. 16.

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Para. 20; 18 June 1965, no. 4, Para. 1; Customs Act, 10 June 1966, no. 5, Para. 2; 13June 1969, no. 38, Para. 1; 19 June 1969, no. 65, VIII, Para. 4; and 21 May 1971, no. 47, Para. 1. See The Laws of Norway 1685-1971. Examples oforders-in-council that have been made applicable: 15 June 1928 (Health Act); 22 February 1935 (Fire Service); 1 March 1929, with subsequent amendments (flammable objects); 1 July 1926 (Industrial Tribunal); 7 August and 29 October 1925, 26 June 1970 (claim boundaries); 23 July 1971 (interim petroleum provisions); 27 May 1938, 24 February 1939, 26 August 1955, 26 June 1970 (polar bear shooting); 27 May 1938, and 26 August 1955 (protection provisions); 26 February, 1932 (plants). Interim provisions for regulating encroachment on the natural environment, 28 May 1971. Air Transport provisions for Svalbard, 23 November, 1973. Circular from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of27 September 1965. Archives of the Department of Industry. Budget proposals, White Paper no. 164, 1932. State Archives. See Chapter 5(c).

Chapter 5: The Principle of Equal Trealmenl 1. Article 3 of Svalbard Treaty. 2. The Svalbard Treaty is quite clear on this point, and applies exclusively to the nationals and companies of signatory states. See Article 3. 3. Anders Orvin, 'Twenty-five years of Norwegian sovereignty 1925-50', Polar Record, no. 6, 1951-3, pp. 183-4. See also White Paper no. 39 (1974-75), relating to Svalbard. 4. Willy Østreng, Norsk suverenitetsutovelse på Svalbard. Det internasjonale perspektiv', p. I (mimeograph), The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation. 5. Kings Bay Kullkompagnie did in fact commence mining operations at the end of the 1940s, but as this was a Norwegian company, there continued to be only two nationalities permanently resident in the archipelago. 6. See Chapters 3 and 6 of the Svalbard Mining Code. 7. Letter from the Department of Industry to the Department of Justice of 28 October, 1966. Archives of the Department of Industry. 8. Letter from the Department of Municipal Affairs to the Directorate of Labour Inspection of 16 July 1964. Archives of the Department of Industry 9. Telephone conversation with Commissioner of Labour Inspection Klette, 9 October 1972. 10. Letter from the Directorate of Labour Inspection to American Overseas Petroleum Ltd. (Amoseas) of 3 September 1965. Archives of the Department of Industry. 11. Conversation with Commissioner Klette and Mines Superintendent Johnsen on 9 October, 1972. 12. The Svalbard Mining Code of 7 August 1925, Para. 9, subpara 2 (d). 13. Kjell Fjortoft, 'Rapport fra Svalbard. En del av Norge?', p. 139. 14. Ibid., p. 140. 15. Confidential Report no. III from the Coordinating Committee for Svalbard of 5 February 1964. Parts of this Report have been published in Folkeblader no. 6, 1974.

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16. Letter from the Department of Industry to the Commissioner of Mines of 25 February 1965; Archives of the Department of Industry. 17. Confidential Report no. III from the Coordinating Committee for Svalbard, 5 February 1965. Cf. note 15. 18. Aftenposten, 8 September 1965. 19. Cf. `Tildeling av oljeutmål på Svalbard. Geologiske indikasjoner. Skriv av 3/6-66' Department of Industry. 20. The contents of this letter are reproduced in Report No. III of the Coordinating Committee for Svalbard, which is reproduced in facsimile in Folkebladet, no. 6, 1974. 21. See facsimile in Folkebladet, no. 6, 1974, p. 8. 22. Sentence transposed into past tense by the author. 23. See facsimile in Folkebladet, no. 6, 1974, p. 8. 24. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 25. This list is in the archives of the Norwegian Polar Institute. 26. Written notes from meeting made by Kaare Lundquist. 27. Letter to the Norwegian Polar Institute from the Institute for Arctic Geology in Leningrad of 20 June 1962: Archives of Norwegian Polar Institute. 28. Note from the Ministry of Industry to the Norwegian Polar Institute of 17 February 1966; Supplying of vertical photographs of Svalbard. 29. Ibid., subpara 7. 30. See facsimile in Folkebladet, no. 6, 1974, pp. 8-9. In this section the author's views are based exclusively on the Report of the Coordinating Committee for Svalbard, as no other alternative material was available. 31. Ibid. 32. See Chapter 8 on Norwegian Sovereignty. 33. Sec White Paper no. 39 (1974-5), relating to Svalbard. 34. See order-in-council of 6 January, 1965. 35. Ibid. 36. The Polar Committee, originally designated the Interdepartmental Svalbard Committee, is a 'bi-polar committee' in the sense that it deals with matters involving both the Arctic (Svalbard) and the Antarctic. The functions of the Committee are of both a consultative and a coordinating nature. The Icct inv. on which the order-in-council for the establishment of the Committee was based, includes the following: `Should a specialist Department make a decision contrary to the expressed opinion of the Council. the Department concerned must first submit the matter for discussion to the Government. The Council's view in this matter must then he expounded.' The Committee's decision vis-a-vis the organs in which formal authority to make decisions is vested may therefore be said to be relatively strong. The Committee expresses an opinion on all important matters involving Polar policy before a decision is made in the respective specialist departments. '11w Committee consists of representatives of the Departments of Finance, Industry and Municipal Affairs, and the Foreign Ministry is represented by its experts on Arctic and Antarctic questions. The Norwegian Polar Institute is represented by its Director, while the Committee Chairman is the Minister of Justice. 37. See Report submitted to the Storting no. 75 (1975-6), from the Committee of Foreign and Constitutional Affairs relating to Svalbard, p. 6.

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38. Ibid. 39. Members of the Committee: Professor Olav Gjærevoll (chairman), Jan Skåre and Fredrik Beichmann. 40. White Paper no. 39 (1974-5) relating to Svalbard. 41. See press release from Department of Trade, Statens kjop au aksjer i norske selskaper tilhørende skipsreder Hilmar Reksten og selskaper disponert av ham, 11 July, 1975. 42. See Bill no. 125 submitted to the Storting (1975-76): Statens ervery av samtlige aksjer i Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani A/S. 43. Per Vennemo, `Oil ushers in a new multinational phase in Svalbard', extract from lecture at Svalbard Conference, Oslo, 2-4 April 1973. Aftenposten, 2 April 1973.

Chapter 6: The Principle of Demilitarisation I. The Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920, Article 9. 2. Willy Østreng, Svalbards situasjon i storpolitisk perspektiv. Internasjonal politikk, no. 3, 1974. 3. This is discussed in W. Østreng, Svalbards situasjon i storpolitisk perspektiv. The tremendous expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet in recent years is a further indication of the importance attached to free access to and from harbours in the North. 4. Doss. P7D 6/11. Highly confidential report from the legation in Warsaw dated 20 December 1932. 5. Ibid. 6. E. A. Steen, Norges sjokrig 1940-45, note 7, p. 172. 7. Ibid. 8. Steen, op. cit., p. 174. 9. Ostreng, op. cit., p. 15. 10. Steen, op. cit., p. 239. ll. Ernst Ullring, `The evacuation and reconquest of Spitsbergen' in Minneskril for bauta-avdukningen over falne pa Svalbard, August 1949. 12. S. Kristoffersen, Nordenfor nord, p. 175. Oslo, 1968. 13. Ullring, op. cit., p. 15. 14. Steen, op. cit., pp. 231-48. 15. J. G. Elbo, `The War in Svalbard 1939-45', Polar Record, 1952, No. 44, p. 488. 16. H. C. Hansen. `When the Norwegian flag was once again planted in Svalbard', Polarårboken, 1945, pp. 98-9. 17. T. Mathisen, Svalbard in the changing Arctic, p. 44. 18. Steen, op. cit., p. 259. 19. Mathisen, op. cit., p. 44. 20. Steen, op. cit., pp. 260-I. 21. E. Ullring, 'Protracted wartime tour of Svalbard', Polarårboken 1949, pp 7-26. 22. Steen, Norges Sjokrig, p. 169. 23. Mathisen, op. cit., pp. 42-3. 24. Trygve Lie, Hjemover, p. 158. Oslo, 1958. 25. Lie, op. cit., p. 159.

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26. Ibid. This is also confirmed by Ambassador Rolf Andvord in his autobiography, Med hånden pa hjertet, p. 238. 27. Lie, op. cit., p. 159. 28. The Committee consisted of Trygve Lie (chairman), C. J. Hambro, Arnold Rorstad, Arne Ording and H. C. Berg. It was also to constilt Ambassadors Rolf Andvord and Erik Colban. 29. Lie, op. cit., pp. 163-4. 30. Lie, op. cit., pp. 169-71, see also Mathisen, op. cit., pp. 46-60. 31. Lie, op. cit., p. 170. 32. Resolution adopted by the Storting on February 15, 1947, reproduced in `Postwar Diplomatic Exchange between Norway and the USSR concerning Svalbard', Polar Record no. 44. 1952. 33. Knut E. Eriksen, `Svalbard 1944-47 - et brennpunkt i østjvestrivaliseringen', Internasjonal Politikk, no. 1, 1976, p. 112. 34. Letter from the Commissioner of Mines to the Department of Industry, Handicrafts, and Shipping of 31 March 1948. Norwegian Foreign Ministry archives. 35. Ibid. 36. Memorandum of 13 January 1942, drawn up by Admiral Danielsen, reproduced in E. A. Steen, Norges Sjokrig, 1940-45. 37. Lie, op. cit., p. 158. 37b. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 114. 38. Lie, op. cit., p.171. 39. Soviet note of 15 October 1951, to the Norwegian Government. 40. Norwegian note of 30 October 1951, to the Soviet Government. 41. Soviet note of 12 November 1951, to the Norwegian Government. 42. Foreign Minister Halvard Lange's speech in the Storting, 1 December 1951. 43. Odd Gunnar Skagestad, 'Norsk Polarpolitikk. Hovedtrekk og utviklingslinjer i norsk polarpolitikk 1905-70', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1971, pp. 72-3. 44. Norwegian-Soviet communique of 7 December 1971, reproduced in UD-informasjon, no. 42, 8 December 1971. 45. Ibid. 46. Norwegian-Soviet agreement on the use by Soviet aircraft of the Norwegian State-owned civilian airport `Svalbard Lufthavn, Longyearbyen', of March 1974. 47. Note to members of the Government of 9 December 1964: Archives of the Department of Industry. 48. Note to members of the Government of 2 May 1968: Archives of the Department of Industry. 49. Translation of Soviet-Russian memorandum of 30 April, 1969: Archives of the Department of Industry. 50. Skagestad, op. cit., pp. 76-7. 51. See Finn Sollie, `The interaction of the Arctic and the North Atlantic: a Norwegian perspective', paper presented at Conference on New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, Reykjavik, 24-26 October 1975. 52. White Paper no. 39 (1974-5) relating to Svalbard, p. 8.

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Chapter 7: Property. Revenue and Internationalisation I. Svalbard Treaty, Article 6 Para. 2. 2. Ibid., Article 10, Para. 2. 3. Adolf Hod, Svalbard, Vol. I, pp. 79-81. 4. Sec Chapter 5. 5. Svalbard Treaty, Article 8, Para. 2. 6. See White Paper no. (1974-5) relating to Svalbard. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. See Chapter 8, section on `Taxes, Dues and Duties'. 10. Report no. 3 of Coordinating Committee, as published in Folkebladet, no. 7, 1974. 11. Ibid. 12. Svalbard Treaty, Article 8, Para. 8. 13. See Chapter 10. 14. Jens Evensen, `Oversikt over oljcpolitiske spørsmål, bl.a. på bakgrunn av utenlandsk oljelovgivning og utenlandsk konsesjonspolitikk'. Findings submitted at the request of the Department of Industry, pp. 112-18. 15. See White Paper no. 39 (1974-5), relating to Svalbard. 16. See Helge Vindenes, 'Aktuelle problemer foran FNs konferanse om havets folkerett', and Kim Traavik, 'Erobringen av det indre rom- Ressurser og Konflikter på havbunnen'. both in Internasjonal Politikk, no. 3b, supplement, 1973, and K. Traavik and W. Østreng, 'Ocean Law and Security: Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea', Ocean Development and International Law journal, vol. 4, no. 4, 1977. 17. Finn Sollie, 'Norges kontinentalsokkel og grensespørsmål på havbunnen', Year Book 1972-73. Committee on Armaments Control and Disarmament. 18. J. Evensen, op. cit. 19. Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, Article I, and order-incouncil of 31 May 1963, and order-in-council of 21 June 1963. 20. Statement on the International Law of the Sea by Orvin, 28 February 1958: Archives of the Norwegian Polar Institute. Chapter 8: Norwegian Sovereignty 1. Svalbard Treaty, Article 1. 2. See Chapter 4. 3. Conversation with Tore Gjelsvik, Director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, in May 1973. 4. Willy Ostreng, økonomi og politisk suverenitet. Interessespillet om Svalbards politiske status. Oslo University Press, 1974. 5. Captain T. Thommesen, `Svalbard og Norge', Tidens Tegn, 5 July, 1928. 6. Svalbard, in Internasjonal politikk, no. 1, 1947. 7. Letter from Commissioner of Mines to the Department of Trade, 23 August, 1927, State Archives. 8. Bill no. 1, 1932, on the budget for the administration of Svalbard for the budgetary period 1 July 1932 to 30 July 1933. 9. Letter from Helge Ingstad to the Governor dated 7 August 1934, State Archives.

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10. Ibid. 11. Letter from Commissioner of Mines to the Department of Trade of 2 March 1928. State Archives. 12. Letter from Commissioner of Mines to the Department ofTrade 23 August 1928. State Archives. 13. Letter from Hj. Batt to Odd S. Rasmussen A/S dated 24 March 1927. State Archives. 14. Letter from Commissioner of Mines in Svalbard to the Department of Trade dated 18 January 1927. State Archives. 15. Letter from Kåre Lundquist to the Department of Industry dated 7 July, 1952. Norwegian Polar Institute archives. 16. From an interview with Helge Ingstad, Bergens Tidende. 17. Doss P7B 1/21: List of Danish icebreakers and ships that can also be used as icebreakers. 18. Doss P7B1/21: Report from the Legation in Montreal to the Foreign Ministry, 29 December 1923. 19. Doss P7B 1/21: Report from the Consulate in Archangel to the Foreign Ministry, 17 January 1924, and Report from Petrograd to the Foreign Ministry, 16 ,January 1924. 20. Doss P7B 1/21: Report from the Swedish Foreign Ministry to the Norwegian Lagation in Stockholm, 15 December 1923, and Report from the Legation in Stockholm to the Foreign Ministry, May 1924. 21. Doss P7A 2/27: Letter from Adolf Hoel to the Department of Industry dated 12 November 1932. 22. Ibid. 23. Trygve Mathisen, Svalbardini internasjonal politikk, 1871-1915, p. 25. 24. Op, cit., p. 63. 25. Inserted by the author. 26. Report from the Foreign Ministry to the Department of Industry, 23 November 1933. Archives of Department of Industry. 27. Ignatjenko, `Spitsbergen', Komsomoljskaja Pravda, 8 August 1971. 28. Report from the Governor to the Department ofJustice dated 7 October, 1931. State Archives. 29. Ibid. 30. Note from the Head of the Foreign Ministry Press Service dated 8 October. 1948: Norweigian Polar Institute Archives. 32. Frank Illingworth, `Life in Spitsbergen', Geographical Magazine, January 1949. 33. Report from Commissioner of Mines to the Department of Industry dated 31 March 1948. 34. This letter is in the Norwegian Polar Institute archives. 35. All the reports from the Commissioner of Mines and the Governor that the author has seen show that this is still the practice. 36 Report from Commissioner of Mines to the Department of Industry dated 31 March 1948. 37. Ibid. 38. Tore Gjetsvik, 'Svalbard-en norsk utpost i nord', lecture to Norwegian Engineers' Association, Oslo Branch, 4 March 1964. 39. Tidens Tegn, 28 July 1934. Helge Ingstad describes his first season in his official capacity among the people of Svalbard.

Politics in High Latitudes 40, 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47.

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55.

125

Lofotposten, 24 December 1970. See White Paper no. 39 (1974-5) relating to Svalbard. From the records at Polhøgda. Bill no. 1, 1965-6: The Svalbard Budget. Ibid. See Chapter 7 in the section dealing with local application of revenue from taxes, dues and duties. From a conversation between Odd Gunnar Skagestad and Kaare Lundquist, Assistant Director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, subsequently confirmed in a conversation between Lundquist and the author. The reference here is to the annual reports of the Governor for the period 1960-70. The 1969 report, for example, states: `We have no check on Russian expeditions.' From the Polhøgda archives. T. Mathisen, Svalbard in the changing Arctic, pp. 66-7. See Minutes of the meeting of the Svalbard Committee, no. 6, 1970. See The Svalbard Act of 17 July, 1925, Para. 3. See The Post Office Act of 8 June 1928, Para. 3. Ibid. This information was given to the geologist Tor Siggerud of the Norwegian Polar Institute in a conversation with the Soviet consul in Svalbard. The information was conveyed to the author in a conversation with Siggerud at the Norwegian Polar Institute on 2 December 1974. Tor Siggerud has sent a letter of this nature. It is in .his possession.

Chapter 9: Phases in Norway's Relationships to Svalbard. 1. Report from the Governor to the Department of Industry 25 September 1949: Archives of the Department of Justice. I. Report from the Governor to the Department of Industry, 25 September, 1949: Archives of the Department of Justice. 2. Letter from the Foreign Ministry to the Department of Industry of 28 June, 1958. 3. See Chapter 5, section on `Criteria for Oil Prospecting'. 4. Letter from the Foreign Ministry to the Department of Industry dated 22 May, 1964. Archives of the Department of Industry. 5 Conversation with Commissioner of Mines Tormod Johnson, 1 January 1971 6 See White Paper no. 39 (1974-5) relating to Svalbard. 7. Ibid. 8. See Willy Ostreng, `Norsk suverenitetsutøvelse på Svalbard. Det internasjonale perspektiv' (mimeo.) and see Chapter 10. 9. Signifying Bjørnøya (Bear Island). 10. B. Grigoriev, `Russia in Spitsbergen', in Nauka Zhizn, 1952. 11. See Chapter 6. 12. Quotation taken from a report from the Moscow Legation to the Foreign Ministry dated 25 June, 1948. 13. See Chapter 5.

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Chapter 11: Epilogue: 1975-1976. I. White Paper No. 39 (1974-75) relating to Svalbard. 2. Speech in the University Festival Hall, Oslo, on 14 August, 1975, on the occasion of the Svalbard Jubilee, by the Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund. 3. Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund's Statement on Foreign Affairs in the Storting, 28 May 1976, printed in UD-informasjon No. 31, 4 June 1976. 4. Storting Proceedings No. 1, 1976, p. 1911. 5. White Paper No. 39, p. 52. 6. Stortingsproposisjon No. 125 (1975-76): Statens ervery av samtlige aksjer i Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani A/S, p. 12. 7. Storting Report (Innstilling til Stortinget) No. 204 (1975-76): `Om undersøkelser av kullfelter ved Ny lesund, Svalbard, og økning av tilskottet til Kings Bay Kullkompani A/S på statsbudsjettet for 1976'. 8. See White Paper No. 39. 9. `Norske-Sovjetisk avtale om sovjetiske luftfartøyers bruk av den norske staflige flypass "Svalbard Lufthaven", Longyearbyen, av 7. mars 1976. art 3' (Norwegian-Soviet agreement on use of Svalbard Airport by Soviet aircraft.). 10. The following contracts were entered into: No. I on provisioning services; No. 2 on supplies of fuel; No. 3 on traffice services; No. 4 on lease of communications via radio link Svalbard Airport-Longyear--Barentsburg; No. 5 on lease of telephone link; No, 6 on lease of accommodation, offices and storage space; No. 7 on accommodation of transit passengers; No. 8 on lease of cars; No. 9 on purchase of provisions; No. 10 on welfare facilities in Longyearbyen. In addition, Main Agreement of 17 June, 1975. 11. Main Agreement of 17 June 1975, Para. 17. 12. Contract No. 6 between the Directorate of Civil Aviation and Aeroflot, negotiated on-17 June 1975. 13. Minutes of 9 April 1976, of discussions between Aeroflot and the Norwegian Directorate of Civil Aviation in Contract No. 6. 14. R. V. Dekanosov, `Demilitarisation and' Neutralisation of Spitsbergen'. The passage quoted has been taken from the summary of this article in The Soviet Yearbook of International Law 1966-67, Moscow, 1968, p. 193. 15. White Paper No. 39, p. 10. 16. Memorandum by Professor Frede Castberg, `Forsvaret av Svalbard', 11 October 1950, see also Castberg's memorandum: Atlanterhavs-paktens kommandosystem og Svalbardtraktaten of 15 November 1951. 17. See Scientific Plan for the Proposed Nansen Drift Station, National Academy of Sciences, Washington DC, 1976. For a shorter description of this project see Finn Sollie, `Nansen-driften og Svalbard', NUPPs series HHD. No. 8, 8 October 1976. 18. Prime Minister Nordli's statement in the Storting, 5 October 1976, on the date for the setting-up of Norway's economic zone, reproduced in UDinformasjon No. 44, 6 October 1976. 19. See Articles 2 and 3 of Svalbard Treaty, and Chapter 7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Andvord, Rolf, Med hånden pd hjertet, Oslo 1964. Arnesen, Odd, 'Et besøk hos russerne på Svalbard', Polarårboken, 1939. Ausland, John C., `US and Spitsbergen', translation of article from Aftenposten, 27 April, 1976. , `USA og Svalbardpolitikken', Aftenposten, 26 April, 1976. Brown, R. N. R., 'Svalbard today', Scottish Geographical Magazine, 1948. Brundtland, Arne Olav, `Amerikansk Svalbardinteresse—norsk fordel?',' NUPI's pressetjeneste, series A, no. 22. Dekanosov, R. V., 'Demilitarisation and neutralization of Spitsbergen', in Soviet Yearbook of International Law, 1966-67, 1968; Dole, N. A., America in .Spitsbergen: The Romance of an Arctic Coal Mine, Boston 1922. Elbo, J. G., `The war in Svalbard 1939-45', Polar Record 1952, no. 44. Eriksen, Knut E., 'Svalbard 1944-47—et brennpunkt i Øst-Vestrivaliseringen', Internasjonal Politikk, No. 1, 1976. Evensen, Jens, `Oversikt over Oljepolitiske Spørsmål', betenkning utarbeidet etter

oppdrag fra Industridepartem. Jan. 1971. Fjørtoft, Kjell, Rapport fra Svalbard. En del av Norge? Oslo 1972. Fleischer, G. A. Naermere om Svalbardtraktaten og bergvcrksordningen, Foredrag på Svalbard kon fermi sen 1973. Frydenlund, Knut: Speech in the University Aula on 14 August, 1975, on the occation of the Svalbard Jubilee. Hansen, H. C., 'Da det norske flagg atter ble plantet på Svalbard', Polarårboken 1945. Hoel, Adolf Svalbard bn. 1-2-3, Oslo 1966. , 'Mitt liv for polartraktene'. Unpublished MS. , 'Spitsbergen og Bjørnøyas kulforekomster og deres betydning for vårt land', Teknisk Ukeblad, no. 31, 1922. Holmsen, A., 'Nord-Norge, Svalbard', Geografisk lesebok 3, Oslo. Illingworth. F.. 'Life in Spitsbergen', Geographical Magazine, Jan. 1949. Ingstad, Helge, Svalbard, Icsualc i Universitetets Aula, 14 August 1975. , Landet med de kalde kyster, Oslo 1949. Jensen, Gunnlcik, Spitsbergen og Norge i Utenrikspolitikken. Knudsen, Einar, 'Et besøk i Ny-Alesund', Den Norske Turistforenings• Arbok, 1926. Kristoffersen, S., Norden nord, Oslo 1968. Lansing, Robert, The Peace Negotiations: a Personal Narrative, New York 1921. , 'A unique international problem', American journal of International Law, 1917. Lie, Trygvc, Hjemover, Oslo 1958. Liljcquist, Gosta, Arktis Utpost, Stockholm 1960. Mathisen, Trygve, Svalbard i internasjonal politikk 1871-1925, Oslo 1951. 127

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no. 101-32. Orvin, Anders, 'Twenty-five years of Norwegian sovereignty, 1925-50', Polar Record, no. 1, 1951-53. Pedersen, Gunnar, 'Svalbard—utvikling eller stagnasjon', Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, no. 1, 1968. Scheen, Erland, `Et blad fra Spitsbergens tu risthistorie', The Spitsbergen Swindle, Oslo 1961. Scientific Plan for the Proposed Nansen Drift Station, National Academy of Sciences, Washington D.C., 1976. Skagestad, O. G., .Norsk Polarpolitikk, Hovedtrekk og utviklingslinjer i norsk polarpolitikk. 1905-70, Oslo 1975. Sollier Finn.,' `Norges kontinentalsokkel og grensespørsmål på havdunnen', urbok 1972173, Utvalget for rustningskontroll og nedrustning.

, 'T'he interaction of the Arctic and the North Atlantic: a Norwegian Perspective', paper presented at the Conference on New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic. Reykjavik 24-26, Oct. 1975. , `Nansen-Driften og Svalbard', NUPIs serie HHD, no. 8, 8 Oct. 1976. Statens engasjement i fortsatt gruved rift på Svalbard, St.prp. no. 79, 1972-73. Stavnitser, M.. Russerne pa Spitsbergen, Moscow, 1948. Steen, E. A., .,Vosges sjokrig, 1940-45, Bn. 7, Oslo. Stortingsforhandlingene nr. 246, 1975, 15 des. Svalbarddebatten. Stortingsinnstilling nr. 204, (1975-76): Om undersøkelser av kullfelter ved NyÅlesund. Svalbard og oking av tilskottet til Kings Bay Kull Comp. A /Spå statsbudsjettet for 1976. Stortingsmelding nr. 39, 1974-75 vedr. Svalbard. Stortingsproposisjon nr. 108 (1972-73) vedr. bygging av flyplass på Svalbard. Stortingsproposisjon nr. 125, (1975-76): Statens e rve ry av samtlige aksjer i Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani A/S. `Svalbard', Internasjonal Politikk, no. 1, 1947. Tamber, 'Svalbard sommeren 1941', Norsk tidsskrift for sjuvesen, May 1941. Thommesen, T., `Svalbard og Norge', Tidens Tegn, 5 July, 1928. Traavik, Kim, 'Erobringen av det indre rom— ressurser og kon flikter på havhunnen', Internasjonal Politikk no. 36. Supplement 1973. Traavik, Kim, and W. Østreng, 'Ocean Law and Security: Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea', Ocean Development and International Law journal, vol. 4, no. 4, 1977. Udgaard, Nils Morten, Great Power Politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy, Oslo, 1973. , 'Sovjetisk nei til norske lovregler på Svalbard', Aftenposten, 2 March 1976. Ull ring, E., 'På langtur på Svalbard under k rigen', Polarboken, 1949. , `Evakuering og gjenerobring av Spitsbergen', Minneskrift for baulaavdukningen over falne pa Svalbard, August 1949. Vennemoe, P., 'Oljen bringer Svalbard inn i en ny multinasjonal fase', Aftenposten, 2 April 1972. Vindenes, Helge, Aktuelle problemer foran FNs konferanse om havets

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status, Oslo 1974. 'Svalbards situasjon i storpolitisk perspektiv', Internasjonal Politikk, no. 3, 1974. , 'Norsk suverenitetsutøvelse på Svalbard. Det internasjonale perspektiv', Fridtjof Nansen—Stiftelsen på Polhøgda. , 'Det sovjetiske stredeproblem og Norge', Arbok 1972/73: Utvalget for

rustningskontroll og nedrustning. , 'Barentshavet og nasjonal sikkerhet', Samtiden, no. 7, 1975. Aasgaard, G., 'Svalbard etter krigen', Polardboken 1949. , 'Svalbard under og etter verdenskrigen', Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift II, 1946.

INDEX Aasgard (Åsgard), Gunnar, 52, 72-3 Action periods, 80-2 Adventdalen, 10 Adventdalens Kullfelt, 7, 10 Aeroflot, 57, 95-6 Albania, 1 Alta, 49 Amoseas, 7, 33 Andvord, Rolf, 50-1 Arbeiderpartiet (Labour party), 23 Arctic, 1, 45, 47, 49, 53, 65, 70, 87, 99 Arctic Institute of North America, 56 Arctic Ocean, 99 Arktikugol, 4, 6-7, 10, 29-30, 32-5, 41, 52, 61, 73-4, 86-7 Arkangel, 44, 71 Axis powers, 49 Balstad, Håkon, 68, 72, 80 Baltic, 45 Barents, Willem, 2 Barentsburg, 4, 6, 42, 48-9, 52, 58, 73, 77, 87, 97 Barents Sea, 13, 65, 88, 99-100 Barentsøya, 10 Bassøe, J. B., 68 Belgium, 1 Bellsund, 49 Berg, Paul, 16, 23 Bering Strait, 45 Billefjord, 73 Bjørnøya, 1, 23, 45-7, 50-1, 55, 59, 83 Black Sea, 45 Blåhuken, 33 Bondepartiet (Agrarian party), 23 Bosphorus, 55 Bratteli, Trygve, 14, 92 Brodtkorb (Director), 72 Braathen SAFE, 10 Caltex, 34-6 Caltex affair, 13, 34-6, 80, 87 Cambridge University, 11

Canada, 71 Castberg, Frede (Professor), 98 Cheeseparing policy, 67-8, 71, 79-80, 95 Chicherin, Georgij, 21 Christiania, 2 Christiania Conferences 1910, 1912, 1914, 25 Churchill, Winston, 53 Cold Wars 13 Commissioner of Labour Inspection, 32-3, 81 Commissioner of Mines, 3, 7, 32, 34, 52, 69, 72-3, 79, 81, 90-1 Continental Shelf Convention, 63-4 Coordinating Committee, 35, 37 Copenhagen, 22 Cracow, 45 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 46 Czechoslovakia, 54 Danielsen, Admiral, 52 Dardanelles, 50, 55 Dekanosov, R. V., 97 Denmark, 1-2, 55, 70 Denmark-Norway, 2 Dresselhuys, Hendrik C., 18 East-Germany, 100 Economic zone, 99-100 Edgeøya, 10, 77 Eldring, Leif, 96 Entente, 19 Eriksen, Knut, 51, 54 ESRO-presence, 57-9 Europe, 13, 24, 30, 53

Faeroes, 2 Finagruppen (FINA), 7, 10, 77 Finnish/Russian Treaty of Friendship and Assistance of 1948, 54 Finnmark, 50, 52, 64 First World War, 2-3, 24 131

132

Index

Forlandet National Park, 12 Fredrik VI King (of Denmark), 2 Frydenlund, Knut, 92 Gerhardsen, Einar, 58 Germany, 16, 18-20, 24, 46, 50, 52-3; see also East Germany, West Germany Gjelsvik, Tore, 73 Governors (Sysselmannen), 3, 11, 39 40, 68-9, 72-4, 76, 79-81, 90-1, 96 Great Britain, 17-19, 21, 27, 46, 53-4, 65, 92, 99-100 Greece, 55 Green Harbour, 68 Greenland, 1-2, 53 Greenock, 48 Grumantbyen, 49, 73, 87 Grumant Company, 29 Gulf Stream, I Hattersley, Roy, 99 Hod, Adolf, II, 70-1 Hopen, 10 Horn, Elin, 10 Horn, Johan, 7, 42 Hotellneset, 10, 56 Høyre (Conservative party), 23 Haakon, King (of Norway), 23 Iceland, 2, 49, 53 Illingworth, Frank, 72 Ingersoll, Robert, 99 Interdepartmental Svalbard Committee, 38, 81; see also Polar Committee Institute of Arctic Geology, 37 International Court at The Hague, 27 Irgens, Johan, 21 Isachsen, Gunnar, 11 Isbjørn, 48 Isfjord, 1, 4, 48-9 Israel, l Jacobsen, Captain J. E., 46 Jan Mayen, 12, 54, 76 Icebreaker case, 70-1 Ingstad, Helge, 69

Kapp Heer, 58, 97-8 Keilhau, Baltazar, 11 Kiel, 2 Kings Bay, 69 Kings Bay case, 13, 32, 80, 117 Kings Bay Kullkompani, 7, 10, 29, 93 Kollontay, Alexandra, 21 Kongsfjord, 57, 93 Kong Karls Land, 10 Kosygin, Alexei, 56-8 Kremlin, 50, 53, 56, 59, 65 Krossfjord, 49 Laissez-faire period, 79 Lange, Hatvar, 35, 51, 55-6 Lansing, Robert, 24 Lausanne Conference, 21 League of Nations, 44 Lebanon, 1 Lie, Trygve, 46, 50, 52-3 London, 19, 48, 50, 72 Longyearbyen, 3-4, 10, 16, 23, 41-2, 47, 49, 52, 69-71, 77-8, 81, 93-6, 98 Lundquist, Kaare, 37, 69 Lyng, Otto, 93 Lyngen, 10 Mathisen, Trygve, 24, 49 Michelet, Christian Fredrik, 19, 21 Midnight Sun Oljeselskap, 7, 10 Mining Code, 3, 16-18, 20-I, 23, 25, 32, 34-6, 41-2, 65, 67, 79, 81, 108-16 Minimum policy, 68-9, 79-80, 95 see also Policy of non-intervention Mo i Rana, 93 Molotov, V., 46, 50-1, 53-4 Mowinkel, Ludvig, 20 • Moscow, 14, 20, 44, 46, 50, 53, 55-6, 59, 65, 75, 96, 99 Murmansk, 6, 44, 77 Nansen, Fridtjof, 2, 99 Nansen Drift Station, 99 National Socialism, 13 NATO, 54-5, 65-6 Napoleonic Wars, 2 Naumkin (Director), 52, 73 Nederlandsche Spitsbergen Cornpagnie, 18, 29

Index Netherlands, 1-2, 18 New York, 51 New Siberian Islands, 99 Nordenskiold, Adolf Erik, I Nordli, Odvar, 40 Nordsyssel, 11 Norges Lover, 28 Norsk Koksverk, 6 North Atlantic Command, 54 North Norway, 6, 47, 58, 64, 93 North Pole, 1 North Sea, 65 Northern Exploration Company, 17, 29 Northeast Passage, 2, 45 Northwest Spitsbergen National Park, 12 Norway, 1-3, 11-14, 16-21, 23-9, 32, 34-6, 43-6, 50-7, 61-8, 70-1, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85-7, 90-I, 95-100 Norwegian Bjørnøen Company, 29-30 Norwegian Explorations in Svalbard and the Polar Seas, 11, 60, 71 Norwegian Polar Institute, 11, 34-7, 39, 64, 69, 73, 75 Olav V, (of Norway), 92 Oresund, 50, 55 Orvin, Anders, 64 Oslo, 63, 69, 77, 96, 99 Pacific, 45 Paris, 3, 16, 19, 26, 29, 51 Parliament, 17 Petrograd, 21 Poland, 45-6, 100 Polar Committee, 38-9, 94, 120 see also Interdepartmental Svalbard Committee Polarkull, 69 Policy of Non-intervention, 32-4, 76, 83,85-6,88-90 see also Minimum policy Poll tax, 61-2, 74, 87, 90 Pran, Major Aage, 46 Principle of Demilitarisation, 14, 26-7, 44-59, 87, 90, 97-9 Principle of Equal Treatment, 14, 16, 26-43, 62, 85, 87-9

133

Principle of local use of revenue accruing from taxes, dues and duties, 14, 26-7, 60-2, 87 Principle of Internationalisation, 14, 26-7, 62-6, 87 Principle of the rights of old Claimants, 14, 60, 87 Principle of Sovereignty, 14, 26-7, 67-78, 87 Pyramiden, 4, 6, 42, 73, 87 Reksten, Hilmar, 42, 93 Riiser-Larsen, (Commander) Hjalmar, 46-7 Royal Navy, 47 Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 57 Russia, 18, 20, 44-5, 71, 83, 89 see also Soviet Union Ræstad, Arnold, 22 Sæbø, Airport Commandant, 96 Scharnhorsl, 49 Scotland, 48 Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate, 30 Second World War, 13, 44, 46, 59, 69, 87, 97 Selis, 48 Signehavn, 49 Simon, Sir John, 17 Sindballe, Prof. Kristian, 22, 60 South Spitsbergen National Park, 12 Soviet Union, 16, 20-1, 24, 32, 35, 38, 45-6, 50-2, 54-9, 61, 65-6, 82-3, 85-7, 99 Spitsbergen, 1-2, 4, 10, 23-4, 27, 30, 42, 44, 49, 55, 58-60, 64, 71-2, 74, 78, 83, 97-8 Statoil (Norwegian State Oil Company), 94 Stavnitser, M., 83 Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani, 1, 4, 6-7, 10, 29-30, 41-2, 47-8, 72, 93 Storfjord, 1, 10 Storting, 3, 22-3, 28, 32, 39 10, 42, 51, 54-6, 68, 79, 85, 92-3 Storting Foreign Affairs Committee, 39

134

Index

Svalbard Act of 17 July 1925, 23, 27, 74, 105 Svalbard administration, 38-40, 42, 62, 70, 82, 84-5, 94 Svalbard Commissary, 16, 20, 22, 25, 60 Svalbard Continental Shelf, 63-6, 99 Svalbard Council, 3, 94 Svalbard Passage, 45 Svalbard Treaty, 3-4, 13-23, 25-9, 31-2, 35-6, 44, 47, 50-7, 59-60, 62-5, 67, 73-6, 79, 81-3, 85, 87-9, 91-2, 97-8, 100, 101-5 Sveagruva, 4, 6 Svenska Stenkolaktiebolaget Spetsbergen, 29 Sverdrup, Einar, 47-8 Sweden, 17-18 Switzerland, 1

Tirpilz, 49 Torell (Explorer), 11 Treaty of Kiel, 2 Troms, 69 Tromsø, 69, 77 Tromsø City Court, 3 Turkey, 55

Ullring, (Commander) Ernst, 48-9 United Nations, 44, 51 United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, 63-4 United States of America, 27, 54-6, 65, 92, 99 U-2 scandal, 56 Van Karnebeck (Foreign Minister), 18 Van Mijen Fjord, 4, 71 Venstre (Liberal party), 23 Verbal period, 80, 82 Versailles, 13, 26, 44 Versailles Peace Conference, 3, 13, 18, 20, 22, 44, 60 Versailles Treaty, 19, 25 Warsaw, 45 Wedel-Jarlsberg (Minister), 16 Westfal-Larsen, H. P., 42 West Germany, 6, 100 see also Germany West Spitsbergen see Spitsbergen White Sea, 45 "Wives Case", 94-6