Political Science: Scope and Theory (Handbook of Political Science, V. 1.) 0201026015

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POLITICAL SCIENCE: SCOPE AND THEORY

HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Volume 1

POLITICAL SCIENCE: SCOPE AND THEORY E d ite d by

FRED I. GREENSTEIN P rin c e to n U n iv ersity NELSON W. POLSBY U n iv ersity o f C a lifo rn ia , B erk eley

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ADDISON-WESLEY PUBLISHING COMPANY Reading, Massachusetts Menlo Park, California • London • Amsterdam • Don Mills. Ontario • Svdne\

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This book is in the A DDISON-W ESLEY SERIES IN P O L IT IC A L SCIEN CE

C opyright © 1975 by A ddison-W esley Publishing C om pany, Inc. Philippines copyright 1975 by A ddison-W esley Publishing C om pany. Inc. All rights reserved. N o p a rt o f this publication may be rep ro d u c e d , stored in a retrieval system, o r tran sm itted , in any form o r by any m eans, electronic, m echanical, photocopying, recording, o r otherw ise, w ithout the p rio r w ritten perm ission o f the publisher. Printed in the U nited States o f A m erica. Published sim ultaneously in C anada. Library o f C ongress C atalog C ard No. 73-11886 ISBN 0-201 02601 -5 A 8C D EFG H IJ HA 798766

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PREFACE

Early in his career, the fledgling political scientist learns th at his discipline is ill-defined, am orphous, and heterogeneous. T his perception will in no way be re b u tte d by th e ap p earan ce o f a presum ably encyclopedic eight-volum e work entided The Handbook o f Political Science. Ind eed , the persistent am orphousness o f o u r discipline has constituted a central challenge to the edito rs o f the Handbook and has b ro u g h t to its creation both hazards and oppo rtu n ities. T h e oppo rtu n ities were a p p a re n t enough to us w hen we took on th e editorial duties o f th e Handbook; the hazards becam e clearer later on. A t the outset, it seem ed to us a ra re occasion w hen a publisher opens quite so large a canvas an d invites a pair o f editors to paint on it as they will— o r can. We im m ediately saw th at in o rd e r to do the jo b at all we w ould have to cajole a goodly n u m b e r o f o u r colleagues into th e belief th at o u r canvas was in reality T o m Sawyer’s fence. We did not set o u t at th e begin­ ning, however, with a precise vision o f th e final p ro d u c t—i.e., a w ork that w ould be com posed o f these particular eight volumes, dealing with th e pres­ ent a rra y an d n u m b er o f contributions and enlisting all th e p resent con­ trib u to rs. R ather, the Handbook is the p roduct o f a long an d in some ways accidental process. An account o f this process is in o rd e r if only because, by describing th e necessarily adventitious character o f the “decisions” th at p ro ­ d uced this work, we can help th e re a d e r to see th at the Handbook is not an a tte m p t to m ake a collective p ro n o u n cem en t o f T r u th chiseled in stone, but ra th e r an assembly o f contributions, each an individual scholarly effort, w hose overall p u rp o se is to give a warts-and-all p o rtrait o f a discipline th at is sdll in a process o f becom ing. W e first becam e involved in discussions about th e project in 1965. Addison-W esley h ad already discussed the possibility o f a handbook with a n u m b er o f o th e r political scientists, encouraged by th eir happy experience v

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with a two-volume com pendium o f highly respected review essays in social psychology (Lindzey, 1954), which has since been revised and expanded into a five-volume work (Lindzey and A ronson, 1968-69). O f the various people to whom Addison-W esley aired the handbook idea, we evidently were am ong the most persistent in encouraging such a project. No d o ubt the reason was that we were still close to o u r own graduate work in a d ep artm en t w here a careful reading o f many o f the chapters in The Handbook of Social Psychology was in some ways m ore fundam ental to learning o u r trad e than a com parable exposure to many o f the m ore con­ spicuous intellectual edifices o f the political science o f the time. G ard n er Lindzey, in writing his introductory statem ent to the first edition o f The Handbook o f Social Psychology (reprinted in the second edition), described our needs as well as those o f budding social psychologists in saying that the accelerating expansion o f social psychology in the past two decades has led to an acute need fo r a source book m ore advanced than the o rdinary textbook in the field but yet m ore focused than scattered periodical literature. . . . It was this state o f affairs that led us to assem­ ble a book that would rep resen t the m ajor areas o f social psychology at a level o f difficulty ap p ro p riate for graduate students. In addition to serv­ ing the needs o f graduate instruction, we anticipate that the volumes will be useful in advanced u n d erg rad u ate courses and as a reference book for professional psychologists. With the substitution o f “political science” in the appropriate places, Lindzey’s description o f his own purposes and audiences reflects precisely what we thou g h t Addison-W esley m ight most usefully seek to accomplish with a political science handbook. In choosing a pair o f editors, the publisher m ight well have followed a balancing strategy, looking for two political scientists who were poles ap art in their background, training, and views o f the discipline. T h e publisher m ight then have sought divine intervention, praying for the m iracle that would bring the editors into sufficient agreem ent to m ake the planning o f the Handbook— or any h andbook— possible at all. Instead they found a pair of editors with com plem entary but basically sim ilar and congenial perspectives. We were then both teaching at Wesleyan University and had been to g raduate school together at Yale, at a time when the political science d e­ p artm ent there was m aking its widely recognized contribution to the m oder­ nization of the discipline. Each had recently spent a year in the interdisciplin­ ary am bience of the C enter for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. M oreover, we were both specialists in Am erican politics, the “field” which in 1973 still accounted for three-quarters o f the contributions to The American Political Science Review. T h e re were also com plem entary divergencies. W ithin political science, Polsby’s work and interests had been in national politics and

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policy-m aking, w hereas G reenstein’s w ere m ore in mass, extragovernm ental aspects o f political behavior. O utside political science, Polsby’s interests were directed m ore tow ard sociology an d law, and G reenstein’s tended tow ard psychiatry an d clinical an d social psychology. T o begin with, neith er we n o r th e publisher could be sure w ithout first gath erin g evidence th at th e discipline o f political science was “ready” for a handbook com parable to the Lindzey work. We were sure that, if it was at all possible for us to b ring such a handbook into being, we would have to em ploy the Aristotelian tack o f w orking within and building u pon existing categories o f endeavor, ra th e r th an the Platonic (or Procrustean) m ode o f inventing a co h eren t set o f m aster categories and p ersu ad in g contributors to use them . First, at o u r request th e publisher inquired o f a n u m b er o f distin­ guished political scientists w hether they felt a need would be served by a handbook o f political science sim ilar to The Handbook of Social Psychology. T h is inquiry went to political scientists who had them selves been involved in extensive editorial activities o r who were especially known for th eir attention to political science as a discipline. T h e responses were quite uniform in favoring such a handbook. T h e particular suggestions about how such a handbook m ight be organized, however, were exceptionally varied. B ut fo r­ tunately we had asked o n e fu rth e r question: W hat half-dozen or so indi­ viduals were so authoritative o r original in their contributions on some topic as to m ake them prim e candidates for inclusion in any political science handbook, no m atter what its final overall shape? H ere agreem ent reem erged; the consultants were rem arkably unanim ous in the individuals nam ed. Seizing the advantage provided by that consensus, we reached the fol­ lowing agreem ent with the publisher. We would write the individuals who constituted what we now saw as a prim e list o f candidates for inclusion as au th o rs and ask w hether they would be willing to contribute to a handbook o f political science, given a long lead tim e and freedom to choose the topic o f th eir essay. (We did suggest possible topics to each.) It was agreed that unless we were able to enlist m ost o f those with whom we were corresp o n d ­ ing as a core g ro u p o f contributors, we would not proceed with a handbook. Since all but one o f th at g ro u p indicated willingness to contribute, we signed a publishing agreem ent (in Septem ber 1967) and proceeded to expand o u r core g ro u p to a full set o f contributors to what we then envisaged as a three-volum e handbook, draw ing on o u r core contributors for advice. O u r queries to the core contributors were a search not so m uch for structural and organizational suggestions as for concrete topics and specific contributors to add to the initial list. T h e well-worn term “increm ental’’ suggests itself as a sum m ary o f how the table o f contents o f The Handbook of Political Science then took shape. As th e n u m b er o f contributors increased, and as contributors themselves con-

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tinued to m ake suggestions about possible rearrangem ents in the division o f labor and to rem ark on gaps, the planned th ree volumes expanded to eight, most o f which, however, were sh o rter than the originally intended three. T h ro u g h o u t, Addison-W esley left it to us and the contributors, within the very broadest o f boundaries, to define the overall length o f the project and o f the individual contributions. A nd throughout, we urged the contributors not to seek intellectual anonym ity in the guise o f being “m erely” sum m arizers—o r em balm ers—o f their fields but ra th e r to endeavor to place a distinctive intellectual stam p on their contributions. A necessary condition o f enlisting the initial gro u p o f contributors was a production deadline so far in th e fu tu re as to dissolve the concern o f ra­ tional individuals about adding to th eir intellectual encum brances. As it tu rn ed out, o u r “safely rem ote” initial deadline (1970) was in fact a drastic underestim ation o f the nu m b er o f postponem ents and delays.* Along with delays th ere have been occasional withdrawals, as individual contributors recognized that even with a long fuse the task o f p rep arin g a handbook article would be a m ajor one and would inevitably p reem pt tim e from o th er projects and interests. D eparting contributors were often helpful in suggest­ ing alternatives. Both th ro u g h the late enlistm ent o f such substitutes and through the addition o f collaborators taken on by invited contributors, we feel we have been spared a table o f contents that anachronistically represents only the cohort o f those individuals who were responsible fo r the shape o f political science circa 1967. W hether one builds a handbook table o f contents a priori o r ex post facto, some basis o f organization em erges. We m ight have organized a h an d ­ book aro u n d : 1. “political things” (e.g., the French bureaucracy, the U.S. Constitution, political parties); 2. nodes or clusters in the literature (community power, group theory, issue voting); 3. subdisciplines (public adm inistration, public law, com parative govern­ m ent, political theory, international relations); 4. functions (planning, law-making, adjudication); 5. geography (the A m erican Congress, the politicoeconomic institutions of the U.S.S.R.);

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6. or any com bination o f the above and fu rth e r possibilities. Any o f o u r colleagues who have tried to construct a curriculum in political science will sym pathize with o u r dilemma. T h e re is, quite simply, no * For the comparable experience o f Handbook of Social Psychology editors with delays, see Lindzey, 1954, p. vii, Lindzey and Aronson, 19f)8-(>9, p. ix.

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sovereign way to organize o u r discipline. A lthough m uch o f o u r knowledge is cum ulative, th ere is no set beginning o r end to political science. A part from certain quite restricted subdisciplinary areas (notably the m athem atical a n d statistical), political scientists d o not have to learn a particular bit o f inform ation o r m aster a particular technique at a particular stage as a p re­ requisite to fu rth e r study. And th e discipline lacks a single widely accepted fram e o f reference o r principle o f organization. Consequently, we evolved a table o f contents that to some extent adopted nearly all the approaches above. (N one o f o u r ch ap ter titles contains a geographical reference, but m any o f th e chapters em ploy one o r m ore explicitly specified political sys­ tem s as data sources.) T h e protean classifications o f subspecialization within political science an d the ups and downs in subspecialty interests over the years are extensively review ed by Dwight W aldo in his essay in Volume 1 on political science as discipline and profession. A fu rth e r way to recognize the diversity and change in o u r discipline—as well as the persisting elem ents— is to note the divisions o f disciplinary interests used by the directories o f th e Am erican Political Science Association, the m em bership o f which constitutes the great bulk o f all political scientists. A glance at the th re e successive directories which have been c u rren t d u rin g o u r editorial activities is instructive. T h e 1961 Biographical Directory of the American Political Science Association (APSA, 1961) represents a last glim pse at a parsim onious, staid set o f subdis­ ciplinary categories th at would have been readily recognizable at the 1930 A nn u al M eeting o f the Association. 1. A m erican National G overnm ent 2. C om parative G overnm ent 3. In ternational Law and Relations 4. Political Parties 5. Political T h eo ry 6. Public A dm inistration 7. Public Law 8. State and Local G overnm ent In the next Biographical Directory (APSA, 1968), th ere appeared a categorization th at was at once p ared down and m uch expanded from the 1961 classification. A m ere th ree “general fields” were listed. T h e first was “C ontem porary Political Systems.” M embers electing this general field were asked to specify the country o r countries in which they were interested, and those countries were listed parenthetically after the m em bers’ nam es in the subdisciplinary listing, presum ably out o f a desire to play dow n the im por­ tance o f “a rea studies” as an intellectual focus and to accentuate the im por-

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tance o f functional o r analytic bases o f intellectual endeavor. “International Law, O rganization, and Politics" was the second general field, and “Political T heory a n d Philosophy” was the third. But the 26 categories in Table 1 were provided fo r the listing o f “specialized fields.” T hey included some venera­ ble subdivisions, perhaps in slightly m ore fashionable phrasing, and o th er distinctly nonvenerable subdivisions, at least one o f which (political socializa­ tion) did not even exist in th e general vocabulary o f political scientists ten years earlier. In this Handbook, the 1968 categories have many parallels, including th e general principle o f organization that excludes geography as a specialized field criterion while at the same tim e recognizing th at political scientists can and should study and com pare diverse political settings. Dip­ lomatically avoiding the presentation o f a structured classification, the editors o f the 1968 Directory relied on the alphabet fo r th eir sequence o f specialized fields. TABLE 1 Subdisciplinary categories used in Biographical Directory of the American Political Science Association, 1968 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

Administrative law Administration: organization, processes, behavior Budget and fiscal management Constitutional law Executive: organization, processes, behavior Foreign policy Government regulation of business International law International organization and administration International politics Judiciary: organization, processes, behavior Legislature: organization, processes, behavior Methodology Metropolitan and urban government and politics National security policy Personnel administration Political and constitutional history Political parties and elections: organizations and processes Political psychology Political socialization Political theory and philosophy (empirical) Political theory and philosophy (historical) Political theory and philosophy (normative) Public opinion Revolutions and political violence State and local government and politics Voting behavior

Even with this burgeoning o f options, many m em bers o f the discipline evidently felt th at their interests were not adequately covered. Goodly num -

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bers took advantage o f an o p p o rtunity provided in the questionnaire to the APSA m em bership to list “o th e r” specialties, referrin g , for exam ple, to “political sociology,” “political behavior,” “political developm ent,” “policy studies,” “com m unication,” “federalism ,” and “interest groups.” T h e 1973 Biographical Directory (APSA, 1973) attem pted still an o th er basis o f classification, a revised version o f the classification used in the 1970 National Science Foundation Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel. Braving a stru ctu red ra th e r than alphabetic classification, the authors o f this taxonom y divided the discipline into nine m ajor classes and a total o f 60 specialized classifications, with a re tu rn to the antique dichotom y o f foreign versus U.S. politics. T h e specifics o f the 1973 listing are given in T able 2. TABLE 2 Subdisciplinary categories used in Biographical Directory of the American Political Science Association, 1973 I Foreign and Cross-National Political Institutions and Behavior 1. Analyses o f particular systems or subsystems 2. Decision-making processes 3. Elites and their oppositions 4. Mass participation and communications 5. Parties, mass movements, secondary associations 6. Political development and modernization 7. Politics of planning 8. Values, ideologies, belief systems, political culture II 9. 10. 11. III 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

International International International International

Law, Organization, and Politics law organization and administration politics

Methodology Computer techniques Content analysis Epistemology and philosophy o f science Experimental design Field data collection Measurement and index construction Model building Statistical analysis Survey design and analysis

IV Political Stability, Instability, and Change 21. Cultural modification and diffusion 22. Personality and motivation 23. Political leadership and recruitment 24. Political socialization 25. Revolution and violence 26. Schools and political education 27. Social and economic stratification

(co n tin u ed )

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V 28. 29. 30. 31.

Political Theory Systems of political ideas in history Ideology systems Political philosophy (general) Methodological and analytical systems

VI 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Public Policy: Formation and Content Policy theory Policy measurement Economic policy and regulation Science and technology Natural resources and environment Education Poverty and welfare Foreign and military policy

VII 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. VIII 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

Public Administration Bureaucracy Comparative administration Organization and management analysis Organization theory and behavior Personnel administration Planning, programing, budgeting Politics and administration Systems analysis U.S. Political Institutions, Processes, and Behavior Courts and judicial behavior Elections and voting behavior Ethnic politics Executives Interest groups Intergovernmental relations Legislatures Political and constitutional history Political parties Public law Public opinion State, local, and metropolitan government Urban politics

As will be evident, the present Handbook contains articles on topics that a p p ear on n eith er o f the two recent differentiated lists and omits topics on each. Some “omissions” w ere inadvertent. O thers were deliberate, resulting from o u r conclusion either that the work on a particular topic did not ap p ear rip e for review at this time o r that the topic overlapped sufficiently with others already com m issioned so that we m ight leave it out in the in­ terests o f preventing o u r rapidly expanding project from becom ing hopelessly large. T h e re also were instances in which we failed to find (or

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keep) au th o rs on topics th at we m ight otherw ise have included. H ence re a d ­ ers should be forew arned about a featu re o f th e Handbook that they should know w ithout forew arning is bound to exist: incom pleteness. Each reviewer will note “strange om issions.” For us it is m ore extraordinary that so many able people were willing to invest so m uch effo rt in this enterprise. It should be evident from o u r history o f th e project th at we consider the rubrics u n d e r which scholarly work is classified to be less im portant than the caliber o f the scholarship and th a t we recognize the incorrigible tendency o f inquiry to overflow the pigeonholes to which it has been assigned, as well as the desirability th at scholars rath e r than editors (or o th e r adm inistrators) define the boundaries o f th eir endeavors. T h e re fo re we have used rath e r sim ple principles fo r aggregating essays into th eir respective volumes and given them straightforw ard titles. T h e essays in V olum e 1 on the n atu re o f political theory which follow W aldo’s extensive discussion o f the scope o f political science are far from innocent o f reference to em pirical m atters. T his com ports with th e com m on observation th at m atters o f theoretical interest are by no m eans rem oved fro m the concerns o f the real world. A nd although we have used th e titles Micropolitical Theory an d Macropolitical Theory for Volumes 2 and 3, we have m eant no m ore thereby than to identify the scale and m ode of conceptuali­ zation typical o f the topics in these volumes. H ere again the read er will find selections th at extensively review em pirical findings. Similarly, although the titles o f Volum es 4, 5, and 6 on extragovernm ental, governm ental, an d policy-output aspects o f governm ent and politics may ap p ear to imply m ere data com pilations, the contents o f these volumes are far from atheoretical. T his is also em phatically tru e o f Volume 8, which carries the title International Politics, a field th at in recent decades has con­ tinuously raised difficult theoretical issues, including issues about the p ro p er n a tu re o f theory. V olum e 7 carries the title Strategies of Inquiry ra th e r than Methodology to call attention to the fact that contributors to that volum e have em phasized linking techniques o f inquiry to substantive issues. In short, con­ tributions to the eight volumes connect in many ways th at can be only im perfectly suggested by the editors’ table o f contents or even by the com ­ prehensive index at the end o f Volume 8. It can scarcely surprise readers o f a m ultiple-authored work to learn th at what is before them is a collective effort. It gives us pleasure to acknow­ ledge obligations to five groups o f people who helped to lighten o u r p art o f th e load. First o f all, to o u r contributors we owe a debt o f g ratitude for their patience, cooperation, and willingness to find the time in their exceedingly busy schedules to produce the essays that m ake up this Handbook. Second, we than k th e m any helpful Addison-W esley staff m em bers with whom we have w orked for their good cheer toward us and for their optimism about this project. T h ird , the senior scholars who initially advised Addison-W esley to

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un dertake the project, an d who may even have pointed the publishers in our direction, know who they are. We believe it would add still an o th er burd en to the things they m ust answ er for in o u r profession if we nam ed them publicly, b ut we want to record our rueful, belated appreciation to them . Fourth, Kathleen Peters and B arbara Kelly in Berkeley and Lee L. Messina, C atherine Smith, and Frances C. Root in M iddletown kept the paper flowing back and forth across th e country and helped us im m easurably in getting the jo b done. Finally, o u r love and g ratitude to B arbara G reenstein and Linda Polsby. A nd we are happy to rep o rt to Michael, Amy, and Jessica G reen­ stein, and to Lisa, Emily, an d Daniel Polsby that at long last their fathers are o ff the long-distance telephone. Princeton, New Jersey Berkeley, California

F.I.G. N.W .P.

REFERENCES Américain Political Science Association (1961). Biographical Directory of The American Political Science Association, fourth edition. (Franklin L. Burdette, ed.) Washington, D.C. American Political Science Association (1968). Biographical Directory, Fifth edition. Washington, D.C. American Political Science Association (1973). Biographical Directory, sixth edition. Washington, D.C. Lindzey, Gardner, ed. (1954). Handbook of Social Psychology, 2 volumes. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Lindzey, Gardner, and Elliot Aronson, eds. (1968-69). The Handbook of Social Psychol­ ogy, second edition, 5 volumes. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

CONTENTS

Chapter 1

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise Duright Waldo, Syracuse University Perspective on Perspectives: A Note on Method The Tradition of Political Science The Development of Political Science in the United States: Formation of the Matrix Growth of Self-Consciousness and Search for Identity: Political Science before World War I The Middle Period: Political Science from World War I to World War II The Recent Period: Political Science since World War II Centripetal and Centrifugal Tendencies Fields and Foci Political Science Viewed Internationally Toward a Postbehavioral Political Science The Faces of Political Science

C hapter 2

The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives J. Donald Moon, Wesleyan University Introduction: Alternative Models of Political Inquiry The “Scientific" Ideal The Interpretation and Explanation of Political Action Interpretation, Theory, and Models of Man Explanation, Interpretation, and Political Inquiry: An Overview xv

1 2 4 18 23 41 50 73 80 110 113 116

131 131 134 154 182 207

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A Postscript on the Relationships among Political Theory. Political Philosophy, and Political Evaluation Bibliographical Note Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

209 216

The Contemporary Relevance of the Classics of Political Philosophy Dante Germino, University of Virginia

229

Preface Introduction: On the “Uses” of Political Philosophy Political Philosophy as a Conversation of Many Voices T he Classics as Touchstones of Political Philosophy What is Man? What is the Paradigmatic Society? What is History? Philosophy, Theory, and Nonnoetic Thought Conclusion: T he Relevance of Political Philosophy Bibliographical Essay

229 233 236 237 239 243 248 250 256 262

The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification Felix E. Oppenheim, University of Massachusetts

283

Descriptive Political Concepts in General The Role of Explication Explicating Political Concepts Categorical and Comparative Concepts T he Language of Normative Political Inquiry Conclusion: Unresolved Issues

284 289 297 309 314 328

Political Evaluation Brian Barry, Nuffield College, Oxford, England Douglas W. Rae, Yale University

337

Introduction Requirements of Evaluation Conflicts among Criteria Six Pure Criteria Coping with Complexity Five Political Principles Conclusion

337 340 349 357 368 377 394

CONTENTS OF OTHER VOLUMES IN THIS SERIES

V olu m e 2 1 2 3 4 5

V o lu m e 3 1 2 3 4 5 6

V o lu m e 4 1 2 3 4

MICROPOLITICAL THEORY

Fred I. Greenstein. Personality and Politics David 0. Sears. Political Socialization Moshe M. Czudnowski. Political Recruitment J. David Greenstone. G roup Theories Dennis J. Palumbo. Organization Theory and Political Science

MACROPOLITICAL THEORY

Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez. Political Development Robert A. Dahl. Governments and Political Oppositions Juan J. Linz. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes Michael Taylor. T he Theory of Collective Choice Charles Tilly. Revolutions and Collective Violence Arthur L. Stinchcombe. Social Structure and Politics

NONGOVERNMENTAL POLITICS

Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. Political Participation Philip E. Converse. Public Opinion and Voting Behavior Robert H. Salisbury. Interest Groups Leon D. Epstein. Political Parties xvn

xi'Hi

Contents of Other Volumes

Volume 5

GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

1 Han>ey Wheeler. Constitutionalism 2 William H. Riker. Federalism 3 4 5 6 Volume 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Volume 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Volume 8

Anthony King. Executives X elson W. Polshy. Legislatures Martin Shapiro. Courts Mark Node! and Francis Rourke. Bureaucracies POLICIES AND POLICYMAKING

Harold D. Uisswell. Research in Policy Analysis: T h e Intelligence and Appraisal Functions Joseph A. Pechman. Making Economic Policy: Flit* Role o f the Economist Haivey M. Sapolsky. Science Policy Charles F. Gilbert. Welfare Policy Duane Lockard. Race Policy Robert C. Fried. Comparative Urban Policy and Performance Bernard C. Cohen and Scott A. Harris. Foreign Policy John G. Grumm. The Analysis o f Policy Impact STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY

Clement F. Vose. Sources for Political Inquiry: I Library Reference Materials and Manuscripts as Data for Political Science Jerome M. Clubb. Sources for Political Inquiry: II Quantitative Data Harry Eckstein. Case Study and Theory in Political Science Hayxvard R. Alker, Jr. Polimetrics: Its Descriptive Foundations Richard A. Brody and Charles X. Brown stein. Experimentation and Simulation Richard W. Boyd and Herbert H. H\man. Survey Research Gerald H. Kramer and Joseph Holding. Formal Theory Herman Kahn. On Studying the Future INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

1 Kenneth X. Waltz. Theory of International Relations 2 Dina Zinnes. Research Frontiers in the Study o f International Politics

George H. (¿uester. T he World Political Svsiem 4 Richard Smoke. National Security Affairs ”> Robert (). Keohane and Joseph S'. X\e. International Interdejx'ndence and Integration 6 Leon Upson. International Liu*

3

/ POLITICAL SCIENCE: TRADITION, DISCIPLINE, PROFESSION, SCIENCE, ENTERPRISE D W IG H T WALDO

Political science is concerned centrally with m atters indicated by such words as politics, governm ent, state, society, policy, authority, an d power. But precisely w hat m atters it should be concerned with, with what ends in view, w ith the use o f what m eans— these are subject to differing opinions. T h e d ifferen ces in opinion are sometim es o f no essential im portance, an d cer­ tainly th e re are large areas o f consensus am ong contem porary political scien­ tists. B ut som etim es the differences are p rofound. T hey cannot be ignored if th e p u rp o se is an u n d erstan d in g o f political science. In a widely cited and highly reg ard ed form ulation o f recent years, that o f David Easton, political science is the study o f the authoritative allocatior o f values for a society. It focuses on the “political system,” which is conceivec as th at behavior o r set o f interactions th ro u g h which authoritative allocation: (“bin d in g decisions”) are m ade an d im plem ented for a society (Easton, 1953, 1965a, 1965b, 1968). T h e wide acceptance o f this form ulation suggests th at it is a useful, congenial form ulation. Probably m ost political scientists would accept it as at least a good first approxim ation o f what political science is about. However, some w ould find it unacceptable, some would insist on this o r th at am end­ m en t befo re acceptance, some would accept it only if perm itted to define its key term s in th eir own way. T o appreciate the difficulties o f definition it is necessary to u n d erstan d that both th e n oun science and the adjective political are problem atical, con­ tentious. In its broadest construction, etymologically an d historically legiti­ m ated, science is simply (though nothing here is simple) “know ledge.” In its strictest construction science is only knowledge o f a certain type, obtained The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of Andrew Hegedus and Henry Muse.

1

2

Politicai Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

and legitim ated according to the canons o f a specified m ethodology. Be­ tween the two extrem es are a wide variety o f possible constructions. All the possible constructions com e entangled in a web o f history an d rep resen t varied societal arran g em en ts and philosophies. T h e selection o f the “correct” (or most “useful”) conception o f science is itself som ething o f an act o f faith, not a scientific act. T h e difficulties o f the adjective political have already been suggested. From absolutist to anarchist no one doubts th at a som ething, d enoted by such term s as “g overnm ent” or “the political,” exists an d is o f m ajor im port for h u m an life and destiny. “It” can be as real as a tax levy, a military draft, or an execution cham ber; “its” presence is clear to the perceptive, even in so-called stateless societies. But w hat “it” is, is subject to varied in terp reta­ tions an d som etim es heated disputes. As with the n o u n science, the adjective political comes entangled in a web o f history, with differing constructions rep resen tin g d ifferin g societal arrangem ents and conflicting philosophies. Again, th e re is no au thority (i.e., accepted by all political scientists) to which to appeal. As a practical m atter, some solve the problem o f defining political science, practically an d operationally, by an appeal to science: Political science concerns only “political” phenom ena th at can be studied scientifically, ac­ cording to a strict definition o f science. T his resolution is not unreasonable. N either is it beyond reasonable objection. In its conflicting interpretations o f p urpose and m ethods, political sci­ ence is little d ifferen t from the o th er social sciences; indeed, in this it is m uch less d ifferen t from physics o r biology than is custom arily presum ed. W hat unites political scientists is a great deal o f ag reem ent at th e com m onsense level on w hat constitutes the stu ff o f th e “political,” and a belief that the en terp rise to which they address themselves is o f central im portance to hum an life, collective an d individual. T h e re are lim itations and dangers in all b rie f definitions o f com plex m atters. In any case, the aim o f this essay is to fu rth e r an u n d erstan d in g o f political science “in the ro u n d ,” not to attem pt an authoritative definition. It is now tim e to set fo rth the term s and conditions o f the attem pt. PERSPECTIVE ON PERSPECTIVES: A NOTE ON METHOD Honesty an d fairness com pel an attem p t to speak for the whole o f political science. But at best such an attem pt m ust be lim ited and flawed. T h e re is no unquestionable “objective” perspective: Personal opinion, selective percep­ tion, individual idiosyncrasy inevitably shape the product. So th at the read er may u n d erstan d an d evaluate w hat follows, the au th o r here sets forth the m ethods th at will be em ployed and the points o f view th at will be adopted. 1. T h e prim ary m ethod em ployed will be historical-interpretative. It is prem ised th at to u n d erstan d political science one m ust view it in its origins,

Perspectives on Perspectives: A Note on Method

3

its develo p m en t, and its environing circum stances. T h e au th o r will not p re­ sum e, however, th at because political science patendy bears the m arks o f its history and resp o n d s to its environm ent, it is wholly “explained,” that it has n o force o r validity o f its own. 2. T h e cen ter o f attention will be the contem porary U nited States; that is, th e historical-interpretative approach will be used as a m eans o f u n d ersta n d ­ ing contem porary political science in the U nited States, not for its own sake o r “in g en eral.” Recent and contem porary political science outside the U nited States will be noted chiefly as it relates to political science in the U nited States. 3. A lthough th e evolution o f the “strict” interpretation o f political science in th e U nited States will be sketched and its rationale a n d m ethods d elin eated — this has been the central story o f A m erican political science for fo u r generatio n s— th ere will be a steady intent to m aintain a spectrum -w ide view, an “ecum enical” approach. For th e a u th o r an attem pt at ecumenicism is a congenial labor. T h e drive to m ake political science a “g enuine” science, after the m odel o f the physical sciences, com m ands his respectful attention. O n the o th e r hand, he Finds “softer” versions o f political science intellectually respectable and sociopolitically useful: “tru e .” For w hat is one to say o f the large and com ­ plex politically organized societies o f the past and present? T h a t they did function o r do function w ithout political knowledge? By instinct and in ignorance o f sociopolitical cause and effect? For the au th o r this is an unac­ ceptable presum ption. 4. Political know ledge, th at is to say political science, is cum ulative. T his prem ise is one o f com m on sense. But it is not nonsense, on a reasonable in terp retatio n o f the historical record. In the strict in terp retatio n o f science, “cum ulative” know ledge m ust have certain strict theoretical qualities—else it is neither scientific knowledge n o r cum ulative. T his is not the place to explicate the arg u m en t and to exam ine its rationale. N or does one assert that this arg u m en t is “w rong”; on th e contrary, fo r its purposes and within its limits, it is probably “right.” W hat is prem ised is that political science is an en terp rise in which, th ro u g h tim e an d with experience and study, we gain m ore know ledge o f things political. In th e au th o r’s view, it is absurd to believe that the Greeks had no political science because they did not have a theoretical system analogous to m odels o f scientific endeavor set fo rth in the tw entieth century; th at the Rom ans, whose political achievem ents still shape m uch o f the w orld’s politics, m ade no advances in political science beyond the Greeks; th at the A m erican Founding Fathers did not have m ore political knowledge available to them than to th e G reeks and Romans; that in the latter third o f the tw entieth century we do not have, in the corpus o f A m erican political

4

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

science, m uch m ore political science than was available to the F ounding Fathers. This is not to assert th at everything that is w ritten in political science is a “contribution” and every new political technique o r institution is an “ad ­ vance.” It is to say, on th e one han d to those who feel that the ancients already knew it all, an d on th e o th er hand to those who feel we yet know nothing truly scientific (but surely one day will): We have learned m uch political science an d we are learning more. THE TRADITION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE W hatever th e outcom e o f am bitions to construct a science o f politics o f com plete generality, political science is carried on in a particular tradition. T his tradition ineluctably shapes th e m anner in which students o f the politi­ cal address th eir subject. “T rad itio n ” is used h ere broadly to refer to such m atters as institutional form s, systems o f thought, ideas o f justice, perceptions o f reality, an d styles o f argum entation. T h e position taken is th at w hat has h ap p en ed in history— m ore precisely (if still loosely) W estern history— gives political sci­ ence its purposes, its m ethodologies, its technologies; and th at u n d e rsta n d ­ ing o f political science is impossible w ithout know ledge o f th e unique history in which it is em bedded an d to which it is heir. Political science may well be in some senses a n atural science. B ut that it is also in som e senses a cultural science is wholly clear. This is hardly the place to speak at length o f the tradition o f political science. In fact, th ere are no works in which the tradition, in the ro u n d and in full, is treated. Histories o f political tho u g h t treat one aspect o f the tra d i­ tion at length b u t give scant attention to the developm ent o f political institu­ tions. O th e r works are lim ited in o th er ways: e.g., A nderson (1964) gives a ro u n d ed account b u t only for the ancient period; Pollock (1960) provides an overall view but a patchy an d im perfect one; M ackenzie (1967, introductory chapters) provides an excellent sketch but not a full discussion. T h e m atter can perhaps be best treated in short compass not by trying to develop a history in which the various aspects o f the tradition are seen to interrelate but by saying som ething about each o f several o f the m ore im portant as­ pects. Political Institutions T h e essential points h ere are two. O ne is that W estern history has provided for political science a certain rep erto ire or inventory o f political institutions for com parative and illustrative purposes. T h e o th er is that certain o f these political institutions proved, in one way and an o th er, decisive for the values an d techniques assum ed by recent political science.

The Tradition of Political Science

5

“W estern” has been used as a lim iting adjective. But an account or analysis m ust begin with experience that is general for civilized m ankind; an d it m ust be recognized th at W estern civilization only gradually and never entirely d ifferen tiated itself from a m atrix o f N ear-E astern experience. T h e decisive first step was th e neolithic revolution, leading to settled agriculture. T his “sim ple” step was o f enorm ous consequence. In a com plex m esh o f cause an d effect it b ro u g h t increased population, m uch greater occupational specialization, the grow th o f cities, technical (and in a loose sense, scientific) advance, the rise o f traditions o f learning, grow ing social differentiation and complexity. In th e N ear East, though th ere cam e to be im p o rtan t littoral and island civilizations, the first and decisive developm ents centered on th e valleys o f m ajor rivers, particularly the T igris-E uphrates a n d th e Nile; and the crucial factor was the developm ent o f the “public w orks” which controlled and directed th e river waters (Childe, 1946; Eisenstadt, 1963; McNeill, 1971). Politically, an all-im portant transform ation took place. T h e com para­ tively simple, familial-tribal arran g em ents for “governance,” suitable to h u n t­ ing an d food-gathering cultures, were replaced by o th er political form s and styles. In general term s, the distinguishing characteristics o f the new political arran g em en ts were larg er size, m ore definite boundaries, increased dif­ ferentiation in political pow er as between groups o r classes, the developm ent o f belief systems (“ideologies”) to justify and sustain the exercise o f strong pow er over wide areas, kingship as the central an d uniting institution; and in th e service o f royal power, th e grow th o f both a specialized m ilitary ap ­ paratu s and a civilian bureaucracy o f priests, scribes, clerks, and technicians. T h ese events are not simply “ancient history”; causal arrow s fly from them into the present. T o a significant degree this ancient experience (ex­ ten d in g over millennia) has been determ inative for all later political experi­ ence. T h e ancient em pires were n ot “states” in the m odern sense, even less nation-states. But they created certain patterns that have e n d u re d o r re ­ c u rre d . T h e R om an experience, which is o f u n d o u b ted im portance for the political present, to a significant degree was built on and influenced by these ancient em pires. T h e G reek experience, which is also a living presence, was in p art shaped by opposition to and in a dialectical interaction with the “barbarian” despotism s. Probably chiefly for geographical reasons (rugged terrain and m any islands) G reek political developm ent took a d ifferen t tu rn : many small, in d ep en d en t political units— so-called city-states— instead o f large u n i­ fied kingdom s, th ro u g h the classic period an d until the M acedonian con­ quest an d unification. A lthough m any o f the G reek city-states w ere despotic an d m uch o f their political experience was not unlike that o f th eir larger and o ld er neighbors, the many units m ade for diversity and experim entation. O f p re-em in en t im portance were the political history and the developm ent o f

6

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

the civic culture o f A thens. T h ese led, in the fifth an d fourth centuries B.C., to the birth o f a trad itio n o f political analysis and discussion th a t is very m uch a p art o f contem porary political science. O n that subject, m ore below. T h e present concern is with political in­ stitutions. In the G reek experience several factors are im portant for later political science, although th eir influence, ra th e r th an being direct and con­ tinuous, was m ediated th ro u g h later students o f politics. O ne such factor was the developm ent in A thens o f a form o f dem ocratic governm ent, which was to become not so m uch a m odel as an inspiration for subsequent genera­ tions. A nother was the coexistence o f m any in d ep en d en t political units that were m ore o r less equal; this “w orld” o f city-states foreshadow ed the m odern world o f nation-states an d in some ways influenced its evolution. A nother was the diversity in political developm ent am ong the city-states, providing m any “m odels” o f th e politically possible and stim ulating com parative politi­ cal analysis. T h e Rom an political experience extended over centuries and varied greatly— from small republic to “w orld” em pire. T h e Rom ans were th e heirs o f th eir predecessors, an d to some ex ten t they adopted, adapted, and synthe­ sized; b u t th eir political experience was unique and massively im p o rtan t for subsequent political developm ent. T h o u g h Rome “fell” in the fifth century, the Eastern Em pire survived till 1453, and the Holy Rom an Em pire launched by C harlem agne in 800 e n d u red into the Napoleonic period. It is impossible to study the rise o f the m odern political system w ithout being im pressed with the fact th at it is erected on foundations laid dow n in antiq­ uity. T h e re would be general ag reem ent th at the m ain influence o f the R om an experience has been on the legal com ponent o f m od ern political institutions: With the Rom ans law becam e and has rem ained centrally in­ volved with the political. B ut the Rom an influence is so vast and varied as to m ake even a b rie f sum m ary impossible. Tw o fu rth e r observations m ust suf­ fice. O ne is th at in the transition from the medieval to the m odern, the Rom an exam ple was studied and invoked endlessly. T h a t the “exam ple” was com plex and even som etim es contradictory, susceptible to use in varied and even opposing ways, com plicates the story but in no way refutes the generalization. T h e o th e r observation is th at a review o f the vocabulary o f m o d ern politics signifies the R om an association o f many central concepts, including state, hation, governm ent, republic, im perialism , constitution, citi­ zen, and liberty. T h e m edieval influence on o u r political tradition certainly was not neg­ ligible, and it can be discerned, for exam ple, in systems o f representation and in legal procedures. But its m ain im pact concerns a developm ent that goes back to th e later R om an Em pire, namely, the introduction o f a new type o f religious com plem ent and com ponent: religion claim ing universality

The Tradition of Political Science

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an d a validity sustained by an authority above and beyond the m undane political. For m ore than a m illennium the p ro p e r articulation o f the spiritual an d th e tem poral “pow ers” was the central preoccupation o f politics, both in practice a n d in political th o ught. In th e secularization o f th o u g h t th at accom­ panied th e rise o f th e m o d ern state system, the problem , as such, reced e d —albeit after paroxysm s o f violence. B ut the resulting varied, p rag ­ matic solutions to the problem o f the “two pow ers” became a p art o f o u r political heritage. N or should th e secularly inclined presum e th at for a secu­ lar age the im p o rt o f the m atter ends with church-state relations. O n the contrary, questions concerning such m atters as civil rights and civic obliga­ tions, the origin, validity, and possible universality o f m oral norm s, civil disobedience and revolution, are p erhaps posed at all and certainly are posed in some o f th e styles they assum e because o f the Christian centuries. T h e d ebt owed to the past by the m odern state system in general an d by its com ponent states in varying degree an d differing m an n er is obvious. But th e m o d ern state system is o f course a new ch ap ter in W estern political experience. T h e m o d ern states were created by pow erful political actors, aided m ore o r less by skillful political thinkers. Both took what they needed o r w anted from the past an d used it for contem porary purposes. New fac­ tors, pre-em inently the idea and sentim ent o f nationalism , evolved (or “h ap ­ p e n e d ”) an d becam e a p art o f th e state system. O ld ideas, preem inently dem ocracy, were revived an d (m ingled with medieval survivals) became a p a rt o f th e state system. But for all the qualifications that m ust be m ade and fo r all the com plications that m ust be recognized, there is a discernible p atte rn : It is m eaningful to speak o f the m odern state system. It is a recog­ nizable stage in th e succession o f dom inant political styles which constitute fo r political science its tradition. T h e state system exists. Political science, as science o r as discipline or profession, m ust recognize its institutional m atrix o r pay a price in irrele­ vance and futility. But this is not to say that the state system is perm anent, th e en d o f political change. O n the contrary, the state system is patently u n d e r severe stress; p erhaps we have begun a transition to a new political condition o f m an. A knowledge o f o u r political tradition creates an aware­ ness o f change. It also creates an awareness o f the continuity in change. P olitical Thought From o n e point o f view it is unrealistic to discuss political institutions and political th o u g h t separately; th o u g h t and action are clearly interw oven. At any tim e a political system is justified an d sustained by a rationale—myth, ideology, philosophy, theory, o r whatever; and political actions are norm ally related by some logic to ends thus justified. T his is tru e even when th e tribal level o f hum an association has been attained. O n the o th er hand, th ought about political action can take m any form s, and it can exist on varying levels.

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

W hen it attains a high level o f sophistication, abstractness, and selfawareness, it gains a certain indep endence from im m ediate circum stances. A tradition o f political th o u g h t gains self-consciousness, providing facts and ideas from the past against which the present can be assessed and from which, perhaps, a fu tu re can be projected. In the West th ere is such a tradition o f political thought. It is o f course related to the history o f W estern political institutions. Political thinkers are characteristically concerned with solving existing problem s, an d even if they have am bitions to speak sub specie aetemitatis, later generations will discount the claim. But this tradition o f political th o u g h t— it has been called the G reat D ialogue— has a degree o f independence. Study o f it has som etim es consti­ tu ted the m ain p art o f a form al education in “politics.” It is a p a rt of, or at least a background for, c u rre n t curricula in political science. Development o f the Great Dialogue. T h e G reat Dialogue in the West began in A thens, which was then at o r ju st past its political apogee, as a p art o f one o f the m ost rem arkable cultural-intellectual flowerings in history. T h e older civilizations o f the N ear East had achieved notable successes in the building o f political institutions. T his had not been done th ro u g h sheer instinct. T h o u g h t, often sustained o r insightful, an d will an d force were all necessary to th e achievem ent. B ut it was in classical A thens that th o u g h t about the political first reached what subsequent generations would reg ard as a high level. T h e re , stim ulated by difficult political problem s and sustained by the generally high intellectual attainm ent, political th ought reached levels o f abstractness and generality far above those o f the past an d seldom to be reached in the future. N o attem pt will be m ade, h ere o r in the following discussions, to “tell the story” o f even the m ajor political thinkers o r to sum m arize (much less analyze) th eir products. T h a t is the aim o f m any books, including, am ong the better known o f th e general treatm ents, those o f Catlin (1939), Sabine (1964), and Wolin (1960). R ather, the aim is the m odest one o f relating the tradition o f political th o u g h t to th e developm ent o f political institutions and, generally, to give a sense o f the developm ent o f an intellectual tradition. (H ere and elsew here the use o f “d evelopm ent” and “grow th” are not m eant necessarily to imply an upw ard m ovem ent— this is a com plex question— but to signify change resulting in increasing complexity and options.) T h e conditions that stim ulated the A thenian Greeks to raise the level o f political thou g h t to new heights have been suggested. Defense against the “b arb arian ” em pire o f th e Persians was n o t only a military exercise but a stim ulus to inquiry into the question: W hat does it m ean to be Greek? W ar betw een th e A thenians and the au th o ritarian , militaristic— but G reek— Spartans likewise led to self-exam ination and introspection. Diversity am ong the city-states stim ulated questions and provided a wealth o f com ­

The Tradition o f Political Science

9

parative experience, on a scale on which it could be observed an d u n ­ derstood. T h e A thenian ex perim ent with dem ocracy o pened a new phase in political life, and the generally high cu lture provided a favorable milieu for thought. B ut above all, it was a sense o f trouble th at challenged political th o u g h t to rise to a new level: A thens, w eakened by war and troubled by dom estic problem s, was th reaten ed with decay an d decline. T h e response o f A thenian thinkers, notably Socrates (469?-397 B.C.), Plato (427-347 B.C.), and A ristode (384-322 B.C.), did not preserve o r re ­ store A thens. B ut it was a truly rem arkable p roduct o f the h u m an intellect. T h e writings o f Plato and A ristotle laid the foundations for a tradition o f political inquiry which is still vital after alm ost two an d a h alf m illennia. T h e questions they asked are still asked. T h e political categories they established are still com m on coin. T h e m odes o f th o u g h t they exem plified— Plato m ore philosophical, speculative, “idealistic,” A ristotle m ore factual, scientific, “sensible”— still have their followers an d protagonists. T o be sure, some reg ard the G reek-established tradition o f discourse as m ore o f a handicap th an a help in building a genuine science o f politics. But even o f these, most would say th at at least A ristotle pointed the study o f politics in the correct direction. Several aspects o f th e G reek achievem ent should be underscored. T h e first is hardly likely to be d en ig rated by any political scientist: T h e Greeks “created ” the political, th at is, delineated the political, differentiated it fro m —b u t also related it to —o th er aspects o f individual and collective exis­ tence. T h is origin is appropriately signified by the fact th at “political” and its cognates derive from the G reek w ord for city-state, polis. Second an d related, th e G reeks created political science in the sense o f an activity, conscious of itself as an activity, devoted to a study o f the political. T h ird , the Greeks created a lasting aw areness o f the problem s in h eren t in the duality o f individual-polity (“state”): N either "is” the other, but each is m eaningless w ithout th e other. W hat citizenship is, w hat obligations it entails, what ben­ efits it confers, what (if any) “rights” are beyond and opposed to it— the discussion o f such m atters can hardly be free from G reek influence. Fourth, th e G reeks first seriously addressed a central, baffling, recu rrin g problem in political study, namely, the relationship o f “what is” to “w hat o u g h t to be.” T h e paths they m ade in dealing with the problem o f the relationship o f the factual an d the ethical have since provided points o f d e p a rtu re , if not ac­ cepted routes, for subsequent political inquiry. T h e philosophers o f the Hellenic and early Rom an periods, especially the Stoics, deserve notice. W ith only slight exaggeration it is said that classi­ cal G reeks could not im agine m an ap art from the polis that had n u rtu re d him. B ut the polis fell victim to decay and destruction, and in the larger, m ore im personal and troubled world following the M acedonian conquests, the Stoic philosophers found a distinction between the individual and his

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

political com m unity quite im aginable, in fact even desirable. T hey contrib­ uted to the tradition o f political th o u g h t a sense o f individuality, o f p er­ sonal im portance and dignity, o f essential hum an equality, existing apart from the political and p erh ap s in opposition to it. T hey contributed also to a related idea: that one’s m em bership in some o th er com m unity, perhaps a com m unity o f m ankind in general, is m ore im portant th an m em bership in a particular political com m unity. T hey began the elaboration o f the idea o f a “state o f n atu re” somehow preceding o r opposed to civil society; and they developed the idea o f “natu ral law,” law God-given o r somehow im m anent in the universe, which provides norm s o f conduct to which a p ro p er polity will conform . T hese ideas w ere to have im portance in th e developm ent o f th e Rom an Em pire, in the developm ent o f the m edieval political world, in th e developm ent o f m odern political thought. T h e Rom ans were not, o f course, given to speculation and philosophy, an d no Rom an stands am ong th e “greats” in the history o f political thought. N evertheless, their pragm atic success, the power, d ep th , an d longevity o f the R om an political experience p rofoundly affect political th o u g h t dow n to the p resen t (and probably into any im aginable future). T h e re w ere th ree causa­ tive factors. O ne was m agnitude: T h e Rom an political experience was itself vast and varied, extending from prim itive city-state to w orld em pire. Given Rom e’s paradigm quality for subsequent centuries, political thinkers could and did search its history fo r precedents and ideas relevant to their p u r­ poses. A nother was its “co n d u it” function: In one way o r another, the Ro­ m ans conveyed m uch o f the political th o u g h t o f antiquity into the medieval w orld and thus into th e m o d ern world. Indeed, they did n o t merely “convey” in a passive o r accidental sense; they adopted m uch previous political th o u g h t, particularly th at o f th e Hellenic period, as th eir own. T h ird , the R om an practical genius resulted in a great and overarching system o f law. W ith the Rom ans the polity becam e a “creature o f law.” T h e im portance o f this circum stance for later institutional developm ent can hardly be exagger­ ated, b u t its im portance for political th o u g h t (to the extent th at this is sepa­ rable) is also p rofound. M uch theorizing has proceeded in legal m odes, and even those otherwise inclined have had to reckon with the force o f the idea th a t the legal and political a re closely conjoined. T hese th re e ways o f influ­ ence, though separable for some purposes, were closely jo in ed th rough Rom an law. T h e great codifications that came in th e twilight o f the Rom an experience sum m ed the R om an political experience and em bodied a re p e r­ toire o f historically derived political ideas. T h e political thought o f the medieval period was in som e ways rich, and certainly it was sometimes com plex. Men o f undo u b ted high talents, includ­ ing D ante (1265-1321) and St. T hom as Aquinas (1225-1274), contributed to it. But because o f the styles and idioms in which it was fram ed and the specific issues (such as the investiture o f bishops) to which it was addressed,

The Tradition o f Political Science

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m uch o f it seems m ore rem ote to contem porary sensibilities than the writ­ ings of eith er th e classical G reeks or the Stoics. For present purposes, atten ­ tion can be lim ited to two aspects. T h e first is w hat Sabine (1964, p. 180) designates as “the most rev­ olutionary event in th e history o f w estern E urope, in respect both to politics and to political philosophy.” T his event was the rise o f the Christian church, with its claim o f the right to govern spiritual concerns in independence o f the political. Actually, the Christian church but climaxed and intensified a m ovem ent tow ard cleavage into two worlds. Pre-C hristian philosophies, especially Stoicism, as well as o th e r “eastern” religions o f the Rom an period, provided ideas an d p rep ared the em otional climate. T h e conversion o f Em­ p e ro r C onstantine to C hristianity signifies that the problem o f the relation between church and state was posed before the fall o f Rome and the crea­ tion of a strong papacy; St. A ugustine (354-430) explored the question in dep th in his City o f God. But it was in the m edieval period, in contests between Pope and Holy Rom an E m peror, and in the early m odern period, when the m o d ern state was form ing, that the great intellectual battles were fought. In p a rt th e significance o f th e great controversies concerning the two powers lies again in a “conduit” function. T h e past was a living presence to the debaters, and Stoic and R om an sources, as well as specifically C hristian sources, were m ined and developed; a tradition o f th ought was preserved and extended. But the central significance o f the controversies lies in the idea that th ere is a realm o f hum an experience properly beyond the power o f governm ent, th at th ere is another institution o f equal or greater stature, th at the individual is at core “sacred” and is not merely a secular object. T h e force o f these ideas survived the particular argum ents and the particular beliefs th at anim ated them . T hey “left a residuum w ithout which m odern ideas o f individual privacy and liberty would be scarcely intelligible” (Sabine, 1964, p. 196). T h e o th er m atter w arranting attention is the influence o f feudalism. Som e m odern governm ental institutions that limit o r disperse political power, including constitutionalism , representation, and judicial in d ep en ­ dence, owe a debt to the evolution o f feudal institutions and ideas in the medieval period. T h ese in tu rn , however, owe some debt to earlier ideas and to th e lim itation on the political at the center o f the debate over the two powers, church and state. The m odem period. T h e m o d ern nation-state system is not the G reek citystate system writ large o r a congeries o f small Roman em pires or, even less, a projection o f m edieval-feudal institutions. It is som ething different, histori­ cally unique. It has its own distinctive characteristics, some o f which—above all nationalism — had no close equivalent in preceding eras. Yet it is incon­

12

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

ceivable w ithout the legacy o f the past. T h e political past presents a vast inventory o f ideas and institutions. So varied is the inventory that it can be draw n on to support positions quite opposed: to glorify citizenship o r to denigrate it, to centralize pow er o r to disperse it, to justify small political entities o r large ones. It can be used to justify nearly all form s o f regim es (at least in th eir “p u re ” as against “debased” form ) and to suggest a precedent for nearly all types o f arrangem ents. T h e conscious use o f the past in a r­ gum entation, com m on th ro u g h most o f the m odern period, is not cu rrendy in favor. B ut this does not m ean that the influence o f the past is ended. We write on a palimpsest on which the previous tracings can always be descried. From one perspective the m ain and characteristic polidcal th ought o f the m odern period divides itself into th ree categories: that concerned with creating and justifying the m odern state, that directed tow ard changing and im proving th e state, and th at seeking to destroy o r transcend the state. In the first category one would place Machiavelli (1469-1527), Bodin (1530?-1596), and Hobbes (1588-1679). Locke (1632-1704), B entham (1748-1832), and Jo h n Stuart Mill (1806-1873) fit satisfactorily in the sec­ ond. M arx (1818-1883), Bakunin (1814-1876), an d K ropotkin (1842-1921) exem plify the third. N or is it wholly accidental that when one seeks theorists to fit the categories, th ere is a chronological sequence in the nam es that com e m ost easily to mind. O f course no classificatory scheme does justice to the com plexity o f the facts. T h e re are not th ree neat chronological periods. In any century, indeed in any generation, there has been a wide diversity o f theory. Some theorists (Locke, for one) fit plausibly into two categories, and others fit only with violence into any (what shall be done with Rousseau?). Yet the scheme has a certain utility in un d erstan d in g m odern polidcal thought. T h re e tendencies exist, and th ere is even a ro u g h chronological ordering. O th er perspectives and classificatory schemes are not only possible but, for certain purposes, m ore useful: state authority versus private rights, in­ terest in dom estic affairs versus interest in relations am ong states, o rien ta­ tion tow ard past versus orientation toward future, regim e preference, level o f generality, influence o f tim e and circum stance, style o f argum entation. A perspective germ ane to present purposes is suggested by a question: W hat m odern theorists have been m ost clearly in line with the recent drive toward a m ore empirical-analytical political science? Relevant though it undoubtedly is, the question is not easy to answer. T hose seeking a “h ard ” political science have d iffered significandy am ong themselves as to the implications o f the quest. T hey have d iffered am ong themselves, for exam ple, as to the relative em phasis to be placed on the em pirical as against the rational, and on applied science as against p u re science; an d thus they ho n o r differen t intellectual ancestors. Nevertheless, in

The Tradition of Political Science

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a gen eral way it is possible to indicate those whose work has most clearly foreshadow ed o r influenced political science, as that discipline has d e ­ veloped in the tw entieth century. Machiavelli is a convenient beginning, and some would arg u e the only p ro p er one. His w ork—and h e re we focus on The Prince—was frankly secu­ lar in tone in a milieu still dom in ated by religious considerations. It stood outside the Stoic-Christian natural-law tradition, which was to rem ain p rom ­ inent into th e n ineteenth century; it was “practical” in its concentration on political pow er as against political ethics; it sought frankly to discern cause and effect in th e generation and m aintenance o f political power. Widely read an d often cited, Machiavelli presum ably had some influence in the creation o f the m o d ern state. (H e som etim es has been credited with “invent­ ing” th e te rm —lo stato, from th e Latin root stare.) Certainly he has served as reference point or m odel for subsequent students o f the political whose bent has been pragm atic, realistic, applied. H obbes is a n o th er whose work was to appeal to later students interested in developing a scientific politics. His Leviathan shares with The Prince a driving interest in the pow er o f the ru ler. Despite m uch talk o f religion it is hardly less secular in tone; alm ost as m uch as The Prince it stands outside the natural-law tradition; it too professes to see political m an as he is ra th e r than to speak to w hat political m an o u g h t to be. B ut th ere are distinct differences in to n e and m ethodology. H obbes had am bitions beyond his im m ediate in­ terest in consolidating royal power; h e was consciously trying to establish politics on a scientific base. T h e re is an abstractness and a logical rigor, even an appeal to the authority o f m athem atics, that many later students seeking to establish a tru e science o f politics w ere to find attractive. Many— b u t far from all. Some have found him too little the em piricist and too m uch the philosopher, too little given to careful observation and too m uch given to a geom etrical-deductive m ethod w ithout genuine scientific roots. A French w riter o f the sixteenth century, Bodin (1530?-1596), an d a F rench w riter o f the eighteenth century, M ontesquieu (1689-1755), contrib­ u ted notably to th e study o f politics in the contem porary spirit— tho u g h the fo rm er and perhaps even th e latter were less contem porary in some ways th an eith er Machiavelli o r H obbes. Like Machiavelli and Hobbes, and for sim ilar reasons, Bodin was interested in consolidating royal power, and his ch ief contribution to political th o u g h t was in the elucidation o f the idea o f sovereignty, th e suprem e pow er o f the m onarch (by extension o f the state). B ut Six Books Concerning the Republic, in which he dealt with the concept o f sovereignty, constituted a general and detailed treatm ent o f politics in a m ore o r less secular spirit. T h e am bition, in fact, was to do for m odern politics w hat A ristotle had d o n e fo r ancient politics. Today B odin’s Republic ap p ears flawed and tedious. B ut it rein troduced factors into the stream o f

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

political study th at had long been absent; above all, it rein tro d u ced the historical-com parative m ethod, and it sought to place the political in social an d physical context (Franklin, 1963). M ontesquieu presents an interesting com parison with his com patriot, Bodin. Living two centuries later, he feared civil strife and anarchy consid­ erably less, royal pow er m uch m ore, illustrating both the relevancy o f politi­ cal th o u g h t to context and the “progression” in theorizing about the state noted above. Like Bodin, he is noted in the history o f political th o u g h t for one o u tstanding contribution: th e elucidation o f the theory o f th e separation o f powers, a halter on political pow er ra th e r th an a sp u r to it. In The Spirit of the Laws he sought, as Bodin had done, though not so pretentiously, a gen­ eral treatm en t o f politics. M ontesquieu’s accom plishm ent, too, was seriously flawed an d contains m uch th at today is reg ard ed as irrelevant an d even superstitious. However, he surpassed Bodin considerably in seeking to place the political in total context: physical, cultural, psychological, sociological. It is this am bition th at com m ends him to the tw entieth century, how ever lim­ ited his accom plishm ent in this respect (Shackleton, 1961; M erry, 1970). A n o th er F renchm an, m ore im m ediately im p o rtan t for th e contem po­ rary study o f politics, stands in the tradition o f B odin and M ontesquieu. Alexis d e Tocqueville (1805-1859) is the au th o r o f two m ajor works, The Old Regime and the French Revolution and Democracy in America. Seen as a political philosopher, d e Tocqueville is ju d g e d a careful expositor an d sym pathetic critic o f dem ocracy. Viewed as a political scientist, he is credited with seeking to place the study o f politics (above all, dem ocratic politics) in context. T h e m an and his writings are wholly congenial to th e contem porary spirit, w hat­ ever disagreem ent th ere may be with his conclusions. N ot only did he treat contem porary them es, such as social stratification, industrialism , and mass culture; he did so with a pen etration th at still com m ands attention (Mayer, 1960). T his sketch o f m odern political th o u g h t from the perspective o f th e scientific am bitions of th e c u rre n t century is o f course only suggestive. A th o ro u g h review would exam ine many m ore claims, including, for exam ple, those o f Jerem y B entham (1748-1832) and J o h n S tuart Mill (1806-1873) — though th e latter perhaps m ore for his Logic than for his political essays. B ut even a b rie f review can hardly om it com m ent on Karl M arx (1818-1883). M arx’s influence on the scientific study o f politics is unquestionably im p o rtan t—if only because it is widely ju d g e d to be im p o rtan t and m en act and react accordingly. But it is exceedingly difficult to say in what precisely the im portance lies; and any statem ent on the subject is open to challenge. T h e beginning point is to note that M arx, though undoubtedly an im p o rtan t political th in k er (or some would say, an anti political thinker), was also m ore an d other. His whole system o f th o u g h t included elem ents from m any

The Tradition o f Political Science

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realms o f knowledge (economics, philosophy, and history, for exam ple), it was very com plex, and it changed significantly in the course o f his intellec­ tual life. Beyond that, he com bined with a dedication to science as he inter­ p reted it a reform ist and revolutionary zeal that has seldom been equalled. O ne can perhaps approach the tru th o f the m atter by distinguishing between two things. O n e is th e substantive contributions. M arx’s findings and assertions about such m atters as class phenom ena and the relationship o f thought, including political thought, to the historical circum stances in which it takes place— these are o f such prim a facie force and wide accep­ tance that they can hardly be ignored, w hatever the conclusion as to their validity o r the intellectual m ethods by which they were reached. They are an im portant com ponent o f contem porary political science (indeed o f social science in general) because they have im portantly determ ined its agenda. T h e second m atter is M arx’s “m ethods.” H ere differing, and contrary, opin­ ions reign. At one extrem e are those who would deny that, even in his laborious gathering o f data in the British M useum , he was doing other than p utting a cutting edge on preconceived opinions. At the o th er extrem e are those who agree with his own view that the m ethod o f dialectical materialism is a uniquely useful tool for discovering sociopolitical tru th , and that using it makes the reaching o f socialist conclusions necessary and “scientific” (Averini, 1968; Lichtheim , 1964, 1971). The problem o f categorization. T his is p erhaps an ap p ro p riate place to take note o f a m atter that may o r may not be obvious, but that in any case is im po rtan t to the u n d erstan d in g and should not be neglected. Although it is custom ary to speak o f “political thinkers,” and this is for many purposes a legitim ate usage, the category is by no m eans clear and exclusive— as the exam ple o f M arx signifies. Many of the so-called political theorists— Plato, Aristotle, St. T hom as, H egel— have been, above all, philosophers, and their political th o u g h t has been b ut a p art o f a larger body o f philosophic thought. Some have been “professional” m en — legalists, clerics, journalists, bureaucrats— and their political thought represented an offshoot o f their professional work o r p erhaps an avocation. Increasingly in the m odern period, and culm inating in th e late nineteenth century and the early tw en­ tieth century, those who produced significant political theory m ight be des­ ignated as “general” o r “u n d ifferen tiated” social scientists. T h e ir political thought has been a p a rt o f study and thought spanning m uch of the range of the m ore specialized disciplines—such as economics, psychology, history, sociology— th at occupy the terrain o f the behavioral o r social sciences in the contem porary university. Probably few o f those we designate “political theorists” became im por­ tant in th e history o f political theory by saying to themselves: Now I will

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

produce political theory. R ather, they addressed themselves to im m ediate and often u rg en t problems. T h e designation “political theory” is largely ex post facto, a ju d g m en t o f subsequent times. T h u s it is th at in atten d in g to the developm ent o f political thought, perhaps in any sense but certainly with respect to the developm ent o f the scientific aspirations o f recent political science, one m ust be aware o f rigid categories, careful not to p reju d ge w hat is o r is not political, an d sensitive to the intim ate involvem ent o f the political with the whole h u m an enterprise. O ne im plication o f this is th at there are w riters not ordinarily treated (or only m entioned) in the histories o f political th o u g h t who may nevertheless have considerable significance for the developm ent o f contem porary politi­ cal science. T o illustrate: Francis Bacon’s political writings, as such, earn him only m inor m ention in the histories. B ut it is certain th at his Novum Organum (1620), his praise o f science an d his exegesis o f scientific m ethod (as he conceived it), had m ore influence on political writers o f th e n ineteenth and tw entieth centuries than his political writings. A nother exam ple is Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744), whose extraordinarily original work cannot be sensibly classified; but this work cam e eventually to influence work in many areas o f social science (e.g., M arx and Engels acknow ledged a debt to him). As the nineteenth century advanced and the tw entieth century opened, the concom itant grow th o f social science and its “interm ix tu re”— as it seems retrospectively, following th e subsequent separation o f social science into a half-dozen academ ic disciplines— m ake th e tracing o f ideas and ju d g m en ts o f “influence” especially difficult. C ertainly one needs to be aw are th at a n u m b er o f m ajor w riters who are claim ed (with considerable legitimacy) by o th er disciplines as their intellectual ancestors and founding fathers were also political w riters, or at least th at th eir ideas, given recent tendencies in political science, are now ju d g e d to be im p o rtan t for political science. In this connection one can m ention, am ong the im p o rtan t nam es, A uguste Com te, Emile D urkheim , Robert Michels, V ilfredo Pareto, G eorg Simmel, F erdinand T ónnies, an d Max W eber. I f one is to u n d erstan d c u rre n t political science, an u n d erstan d in g o f the ideas and influence o f such figures is quite as im por­ tan t as an u n d erstan d in g o f the ideas and influence o f those (ancient o r recent) recognized as “in the family.” T h e re are even some cases in which the influence o f one “in th e family” is m ediated th ro u g h the “outsiders”; thus it is probable that de Tocqueville has had influence on Am erican politi­ cal science m ore via E uropean sociology than directly. The Languages o f Politics T his b rief sum m ary o f the tradition o f political science can be concluded with some com m ent on th e languages with which the political has been addressed. C ertainly an aw areness o f th e language factor is necessary not only for an u n d erstan d in g o f the tradition, historically considered, but fo r

The Tradition o f Political Science

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an u n d erstan d in g o f c u rre n t tren d s and controversies. O ne perceives—or does n o t perceive— as languages provide categories and m odes o f relating and evaluating them . “Language” is used h ere prim arily in the sense o f differen t idioms, specializations, realm s o f discourse; especially, for present purposes, the philosophical, the legal, the religious, the scientific. (But th e subject is m uch broader. W hat is the im port o f the fact that, since the tim e o f the ancient em pires, the W estern tradition o f political science has developed within a single language family, the Indo-E uropean?) At risk o f oversim plification, one can say th at each o f the fo u r m ain stages in the developm ent o f the polity in the West (i.e., following th e ancient em pires) was accom panied by the rise o f a distinctive language for addressing the polidcal. T h e language o f the period o f th e G reek polis was philosophical; the language o f the R om an world em pire was legal; the language o f the feudal period was re ­ ligious; the* language o f th e m o d ern state is scientific. Qualifications are im m ediately necessary. First, not only is th ere no s h arp break between epochs; th ere is a cum ulative effect: L ater epochs in­ herit the languages o f the past and continue to use them in addition to developing th eir new distinctive language. Second, although each o f the languages undoubtedly has distinctive characteristics, th ere is nevertheless a tendency to m erge at the peripheries: T h e historical association o f philosophy and theology is not accidental; theology and law are sometimes stitched together; an d science has its metaphysics, despite heroic efforts to free it o f philosophical “taint.” In d eed, th e belief system o f science can be reasonably arg u ed to have im p o rtan t aspects o f philosophy, o f law, and even o f religion. (Perhaps th e d ifferen t languages speak to m any o f th e “same things” but in differing styles? B ut p erhaps also each reveals a tru th which the o th ers conceal?) T h ird , the fourfold classification takes no account o f some “languages” m ore o r less im p o rtan t in all four periods. T h e logic which Aristotle shaped an d sh arp en ed has had a p ro fo u n d and incalculable effect on the m an n er in which the W estern m ind perceives reality, form s categories, and directs ac­ tion; an d its influence is a p p a re n t in all four periods o f W estern politics, w hatever the fu tu re may hold with reference to the developm ent (or revival o r “reception”) o f non-A ristotelian logics. A nd what is one to say o f rhetoric, “persuasive” language? T h e study o f rhetoric is closely connected with the political from th e school o f the Sophists to the O xford U nion; and anyone who fancies th at rhetoric is absent from contem porary political science (even at its m ost “scientific”) cannot have read its literature o r attended its m eet­ ings. F ourth, it is recognized th at a full developm ent o f the subject would take account o f the complexities already suggested but would be obliged to take account o f the fact th at each o f the four main languages is itself

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

com plex—a language family, so to speak. T h u s philosophy is divisible into such aspects as epistem ology and ontology; law into natu ral and positive, civil and com m on, public an d private; theology into apologetics, homiletics, an d exegesis; science into applied and pu re, experim ental and theoretical (plus o f course its specialization by field an d its use o f the languages o f special logics, statistics, and m athematics). All the com plicated m atters so sum m arily indicated w ould have to be explored if the significance o f language for the enterprise o f political science w ere to be fully understood. I f contem porary political science had an A ristot­ le, he m ight well choose this app roach to his subject. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: FORMATION OF THE MATRIX “T h e study o f politics in the U nited States today is som ething in size, content an d m ethod unique in W estern intellectual history.” T h u s a foreign observer introduces his study o f political science in the U nited States (Crick, 1959, p. xi). In what follows the objective is to u n d erstan d why and how this political science developed. Why, o f th e various W estern countries, did the U nited States take the lead in developing political science in the tw entieth century? W hat kind o f political science did it develop? W hat was selected, what re ­ jected, from the W estern political tradition? T o what ex ten t has this political science been peculiarly A m erican? T o what extent and in what ways has it transcended its location in th e Am erica o f the late nineteenth century and th e tw entieth century, becom ing a generalized (or generalizable) political science? Such questions can n o t be satisfactorily answ ered in b rief compass. In d eed , they cannot be answ ered to the satisfaction o f all who call them ­ selves political scientists, w hatever the length o f the answers. Nevertheless they indicate the kind o f know ledge that is sought. Some Preliminary Observations: A Point o f View Restated All societies, even the so-called stateless ones, may be said to have a political technology. T h a t is, they have a set o f institutional arrangem ents for m aking authoritative allocations o f values for society, to use the language which has been most widely accepted in recent years to define the political. As civiliza­ tion develops, th at is, as size and com plexity increase, th e institutional a r­ rangem ents for dealing with the political tend to becom e m ore form ally d ifferentiated, to becom e in some aspects (not necessarily in all, as an ­ thropologists well know) m ore com plicated. At some point what can be called political knowledge becomes form alized. T h e rules th at govern political life are “codified”— p erhaps reduced to w ritten record if the culture has reached this stage; and know ledge o f “cause and effect” with respect to the political becomes specialized, role-differentiated, and may also be codified.

Development of Political Science in United States: Formation of Matrix

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Knowledge o f cause and effect is not necessarily codified separately from the rules o f political life; in fact, close interm ingling— in the West in law— has been typical. At some point in the developm ent o f a society, “political know ledge” may be said to exist: “W hat works” for that society is known. W hen the political know ledge reaches a certain level o f complexity, sophistication, and self-consciousness, one can call it political science if he wishes to accept a soft definition o f science. It may be observed that if one accepts th e point o f view that the findings o f science are always contingent and falsifiable, no society can get beyond “w hat works,” i.e., what is em pirically dem onstrable, however m uch its political science is im proved and refined. In the history o f th e West, codification o f political knowledge has been sometimes fairly well advanced. T his has been particularly tru e of the m od­ ern period. T h e state system did not simply “h ap p en .” It developed because political know ledge perm itted it to develop; and it developed as it did be­ cause o f the n atu re o f the political knowledge it inherited and itself d e­ veloped. T his is not to assert the prim acy o f ideas over “facts.” How can one u n d erstan d th e developm ent o f the state system ap art from H enry IV, the G reat Elector, Louis XIV, N apoleon, Bismark? It is to assert that political know ledge— o r political science— played an im portant an d in some respects decisive role. T h e types o f political know ledge that are accum ulated and transm itted an d th e m an n er in which accum ulation and transm ission take place vary widely, according to culture, institutional arrangem ents, and circumstances: T h ey are neith er foreordained n o r im m utable. C ertain general patterns may be discerned within an area th at shares m uch o f a culture and a history. T h u s th ere has been a w idespread C ontinental disposition— from Spain to Russia, from Scandinavia to G reece— to m erge law and political knowledge in a single set o f intellectual-institutional arrangem ents, a set which encom ­ passes the functions o f teaching, learning, an d exercise. B ut to say that they “m e rg ed ” the two is to p u t th e m atter from the viewpoint o f an outsider: W hy law and the political m ight seem so naturally the “same thing” should be clear from th e foregoing discussion o f the W estern political tradition. M ore in need o f explanation are th e type and m easure o f separation that took place in England and, in addition, the rise o f the A m erican notion o f a political science, which recognizes a distinction between legal and political know ledge and proposes to p attern the teaching and learning o f political know ledge on the natu ral science m odel. W hat is necessary if o n e is to understand political science in the U nited States is an awareness both o f th e patterns and possibilities presented by W estern history and o f th e particular circum stances presented by the A m erican experience. From th e two, som ething “unique in W estern intellec­ tual history” indeed has been created. It is necessary to take some account,

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Politicai Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

however brief, o f some o f the background and environing factors which led to the em ergence o f a discipline o f political science and helped to give it the particular form th at it assum ed. The American Political Experience A m erican political science may achieve (or may already have achieved) some o f its universalistic aspirations, but plainly in its origins and developm ent it is related to A m erican history in m uch the same fashion th at a national litera­ ture, however m uch influenced by foreign sources and currents, is related to national experience. Paradoxically, even the idea o f a political science rising above parochial circum stances is a product o f a certain set o f circum stances and is in that sense culture-bound. T h e A m erican political experience begins with well over two centuries o f “Englishm en living in A m erica,” in which tim e certain English political institutions, such as the com m on law, were perm anently im planted. B ut also in that period the g ro u n d was p re p a re d for significant divergences. Notably, the “federal” p attern had already been developed in essentials by long ex­ perience o f divided jurisdiction an d rule betw een L ondon and the colonies. T h e Revolution was m ade an d th e C onstitution fram ed in the nam e o f ideas derived from m any British sources, as well as from C ontinental sources reaching back into antiquity. Nevertheless, “the first new nation” had been created, and its political experience was to be a significant d e p a rtu re from anything presented by the W estern political past. Im p o rtan t features o f this political experience include: a w ritten C on­ stitution featu rin g the principle o f popular sovereignty, a bill o f rights, a territorial division o f powers, and a functional separation o f powers; the flourishing o f the ideas and ethos o f liberalism, largely derived from E uro­ pean sources, but freed o f th e restraining pow er o f the E uropean past; an experience-grounded feeling o f individual independence and local self-rule; the developm ent o f an en d u rin g two-party system and a luxuriant g ro u p life with political associations; the rise o f a vigorous nationalism and a related notion o f national “m ission,” susceptible, however, to varying and even con­ flicting interpretations; the grow th o f theories and practices o f dem ocracy superim posed on th e original republican design; and a d eep and pervasive sense that the A m erican experience is or will become the human experience. Such m atters are w ritten deeply into Am erican political science, so deeply that they may not be noticed by Am ericans who take them for granted. The Citizen Literature An im p o rtan t aspect o f A m erican political developm ent, arising from it and contributing to it, has been the so-called citizen literature. T h e U nited States, it appears, has not p roduced a great political philosopher. But in the course o f its distinctive political developm ent it has produced a rich stock o f politi­ cal writings, some o f undoubtedly high literary, rhetorical, and expository

Development o f Political Science in United States: Formation of Matrix

21

m erit. T h e D eclaration o f In d ep en d en ce and even the C onstitution, from one point o f view, can be so reg ard ed. T h e Federalist papers, w ritten to explain and justify the C onstitution, are p rom inent in the literature. In­ cluded also are notable presidential addresses and state papers, opinions re n d e re d in leading judicial decisions, fam ous speeches and letters o f statesm en, editorials ap p earin g in influential new spapers and journals, and so forth. In th e latter p art o f th e tw entieth century, when the C onstitution may not even a p p ea r as an ap p en d ix in an introductory textbook, the reading and study o f th e citizen literatu re o f A m erican politics may be easily over­ looked as an influence on political science. But in the post-Civil W ar form a­ tive period a stu d en t o f politics m ight be required to m em orize, recite, and construe the C onstitution, as well as o th er literature deem ed central to na­ tional experience. T h e influence o f such training is readily ap p aren t in early political science. T h e influence o f th e citizen literature today is problem atical. B ut to the ex ten t th at th e spirit an d concepts o f the citizen literature rem ain diffused in the corpus o f political learning, th ere is an influence— an influence which it is reasonable to presum e is related to some o f the strains an d conflicts discussed below. Industrialization, Urbanization, Specialization A m erican economic an d social life en tered into sweeping transform ations in the latter p art o f th e n in eteen th century. T h e fact that a self-conscious political science d id arise, th at it arose when it did, th at w hen it arose it took the form it did take, m ust be und ersto od as a p art o f these transform ations. T h e victory o f th e N orth in th e Civil W ar m eant, o f course, the victory o f industrialism over agrarianism , and it was followed by a rem arkable era o f capitalist developm ent and exploitation. T h e events and characteristics o f that e ra —such as the closing o f the frontier, the rapid grow th o f cities, the continued and increasing im m igration, the rise o f large com m ercial and industrial units, the sp read in g adulation o f technology and o f science u n d e r­ stood in a vulgarized Baconian fashion as knowledge giving pow er and con­ trol, the shifting o f class pattern s and stresses, the em ergence o f the U nited States as a m ajor world state—created new political needs and problems. Sim ultaneously, however, they created new opportunities and resources for responding. Increased wealth, for exam ple, perm itted the grow th o f new centers o f learning. Respect for technology and science stim ulated and licensed the rise o f new types o f knowledge, and expanding com m erce and im proved tran sp o rtatio n facilitated th e im m igration o f ideas as well as o f people. Im plied in these developm ents and o f great im portance for o u r p u r­ poses was the advance o f professionalization an d o f specialization in learned callings generally. A m ore varied and com plex econom y and a m ore com pli­

22

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

cated society had as correlates increasing— and increasingly varied and esoteric— know ledge and technologies: both “h a rd ,” such as engineering, and “soft,” such as law. By m idcentury th ere was already significant move­ m ent tow ard increased specialization and professionalization, notable even in the traditional callings o f the law and the ministry; and it is clear— in retro sp ect—th at old bases for the generation and transm ission o f knowledge w ould have to be tran sfo rm ed and new ones created. T h e rise o f th e “idea” o f social science in its contem porary sense, and establishm ent o f the several social science disciplines, were p a rt o f a larger societal adjustm ent to a changed m ode o f life. Rise o f the New University and Reception o f European Learning A m erican social science is n o t only heir to a m illenia-old W estern tradition; it can n o t be u n d ersto o d a p a rt from specific E uropean influences and con­ tributions o f the nin eteen th and tw entieth centuries. T h e university in which social science has been n u rtu re d is in m any respects a com paratively recent “im portation” (Veysey, 1965). A nd the flow o f ideas an d talent from E uro­ pean sources was crucial n o t only in the form ative period o f the several disciplines; it has continued to be o f vital im portance. Institutions o f h ig h er education, known as “colleges,” had o f course existed from early colonial times, and m id-nineteenth-century Am erica was sprinkled with a fairly large num ber. T hese institutions, originally m odeled m ore o r less on English (and Scottish) prototypes, offered “advanced” instruction— above all, p rep aratio n for th e ministry. B ut no A m erican in­ stitution was, by E uropean standards, a strong o r “tru e ” university. H enry A dam s’s account o f his H arvard years in his Education is indicative: T h e university tau g h t n eith er very m uch n o r very well. It was scarcely a place for the generation an d diffusion o f new knowledge. A few am bitious o r curious young A m ericans were finding th eir way into E uropean universities before the Civil W ar, an d significant num bers followed their exam ple in the decades th ereafter. Most went to G erm any, whose universities were then the envy o f the world. O n their re tu rn they not only com m anded know ledge an d skills in advance o f w hat could be im parted at hom e; they also b ro u g h t new concepts o f the p ro p e r nature o f a univer­ sity. T h ese new concepts fitted the needs o f an increasingly com plex indus­ trial society, and jo in ed to native initiatives, particularly the M orrill Act o f 1862, they w orked a transform ation in the A m erican university system. O lder institutions, such as H arv ard and Colum bia, vied with new ones, such as Jo h n s H opkins an d Cornell, in becom ing “genuine” universities. For present purposes the central fact is th at the university becam e the center o f a new an d intense learned specialization, of professionalism , and o f research, i.e., o f the creation o f new knowledge. T hese developm ents chiefly affected instruction, m ethods, and arrangem ents at the g raduate level. In ­

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deed, they m ight be said to have had the effect o f adding a new level: T h e Ph.D. was superim posed on th e A.B. an d M.A. and became the accepted criterion o f p rep aratio n fo r research and teaching “at the highest level.” A lthough th e U nited States has been preem inendy the hom e o f discipli­ nary specialization and professional organization in the social sciences since the late nineteenth century, contem porary E uropean influence has been im p o rtan t from the beginning and rem ains so. T h a t influence is exerted on A m erican social science in several ways. It may occur th ro u g h works and exam ple (thus Bagehot, D urkheim , M arx, Michels, Pareto, Weber). It may com e th ro u g h A m erican study abroad (thus, for political science, Burgess and H erb ert B axter Adam s, Goodnow and D unning). It may be exerted when E u ropean scholars lecture o r teach briefly in the U nited States (thus, for political science, Bryce and Laski). It may result from the im m igration to the U nited States o f m atu re and highly trained scholars (thus, for political science, a distinguished roster from Lieber to Friedrich). Especially in its origins and early developm ent, political science owes a large and unm istakable d eb t to E u ropean influences. T h e stimulus and ex­ am ple o f the G erm an Staatsimsenschaft, centered on the concept of the state, engrossed with th e concept o f sovereignty, and focused on law as the em bod­ im ent o f state will and sovereign pow er, are evident in the majority o f the sem inal early works. French influence was less pervasive but im portant and m uch to the same effect; state, sovereignty, law— and history— were at the cen ter o f a general, w estern E u ropean approach to the political. British influence was also im portant. T h e im pact o f Jo h n S tuart Mill, H erb ert Spencer, W alter Bagehot, and Jam es Bryce is often conspicuous in the early works. In d eed , the British influence (speaking now to political science, not to social science in general) may be as im portant as the Continental. With passing tim e probably it becomes m ore im portant: Bryce is m ore relevant to contem porary political science than Bluntschli, Wallas than W appaus. But the British influence is m ore difficult to assess; closeness in history, culture, and above all, language reduces visibility ra th e r th an enhances it. GROWTH OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SEARCH FOR IDENTITY: POLITICAL SCIENCE BEFORE WORLD WAR I It is now clear th at conscious concern fo r the political can vary in many dim ensions, th at search for the “s tu f f ’ o f politics is both old and still continu­ ing, th at the idea o f political science is com plex and controversial, and that a sense o f discipline o r profession am ong those devoted to the study o f politi­ cal science is not in itself decisive with respect to significant results. But clearly also the em ergence in the U nited States in the late nineteenth century and th e early tw entieth century o f an academic discipline and a sense o f profession was an im portant event in the history o f the study o f politics.

24

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

Reflecting in its origins a national experience, the “creation o f political sci­ ence” also interacts in the shaping o f th at experience as the tw entieth cen­ tury advances and, indeed, becomes a po ten t influence in the study o f poli­ tics in much o f the world. T h e objective now is knowledge o f th e m ain features o f this developm ent and u n d erstan d in g o f some of the implications. Academic Political Science P rior to 1880 Much o f im portance for the fu tu re o f political science took place in British N orth America, in th e experiences o f revolution and constitution-m aking, and in A m erican history in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But the contribution o f academ ic political science to what occurred was m arginal. T h a t contribution consisted o f the p erpetuation, through teaching, o f the W estern political tradition an d , increasingly, the Am erican strain o f th at tradition; and o f the inculcation o f that tradition in a relatively small num b er o f citizens who were to occupy positions o f m ore than average influence. In m ore than th ree centuries no im portant work o f political th o u g h t was p ro ­ duced in the colleges, no significant political innovation was devised and launched, no research was conducted th at resulted in what contem porary political scientists would reg ard as w orthy political science. T h e record o f college teaching o f political science from the beginning down to 1900 has been painstakingly researched and recorded in considera­ ble detail by A nna H addow (1939). O n the basis o f th e record she has set forth, several observations p ertin en t to p resen t interests may be m ade. A lthough the term “political science” was occasionally used from an early date (both in and o u t o f academ ia), th e usage was both broad and loose. Only gradually did the term acquire the implications that were to be given it thro u g h the grow ing prestige o f science and the increasing connec­ tion between scientific enterprises and the university. T h e object o f teaching, p erhaps first o f all, was the form ation o f m oral character (of the private person and o f the citizen) and, second, training for participation in public life, as m inister, m agistrate, o r whatever. T h e teach­ ing o f political science was not conducted in an academ ic “d e p artm en t” o f political science. R ather, it was em bedded in a “classical” curriculum m od­ eled m ore o r less on that o f the English university o f th e time and having a prom inent religious orientation. T h re e types o f m aterials served as the m ain bases o f instruction in political science: (1) selections from classical literature, including histories, which served to point a political m oral as well as to instruct in language an d history; (2) classics o f political thought, such as works o f Plato and A ristode from antiquity and Locke and H arrin g to n from the recent past; a n d — increasingly— (3) treatises and “textbooks.” T h e works o f the fathers o f international law, G rotius, P ufendorf, Vattel, and B urlam aqui, were widely used. A nd especially favored w ere works o f “philosophy.” Frequently studied w ere Francis H utchinson’s A Short Introduction to Moral

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Philosophy (several chapters o f which were devoted to “Politics”); and above all, after its publication in 1785, William Paley’s The Principles o f Moral and Political Philosophy. In a view o f the en tire period from the establishm ent o f the first col­ leges to 1880, several evolutionary trends are evident. O ne is simply an increase in the stock o f m aterials on which to draw fo r instruction, as well as increasing diversity in those m aterials. T h e works o f M ontesquieu, Guizot, A dam Sm ith, and d e Tocqueville, for exam ple, were draw n on to some extent w hen they becam e available. A nother tre n d was tow ard differentia­ tion and secularization. “Philosophy” was becom ing differentiated and d i­ vided in to separate pursuits. N ot only was “n a tu ra l” philosophy separating from “m oral” philosophy, but “political philosophy” was becom ing distinct from “ethics.” H istory and economics w ere beginning to develop selfaw areness; and the study o f law was m oving rapidly tow ard professionaliza­ tion. A n o th er clear tre n d was tow ard “A m ericanization,” especially, o f course, a fte r independence and union. A m erican texts and treatises, such as the works o f Francis W ayland, L aurens Hickok, Francis Bowen, Jam es Kent, an d Jo se p h Story, increasingly com peted with foreign works fo r instruction in m oral an d political philosophy, political econom y, and ju risp ru d en ce. O f m uch g reater im port, however, was a large an d increasing attention to the docum ents o f A m erican nationhood, the citizen literature. T h e D eclaration o f In d ep en d en ce and the C onstitution became central items in some courses o f study. T o these were ad d ed , according to tim e and political-sectional taste, The Federalist, the letters, papers, an d speeches o f statesm en (W ashington’s Farewell A ddress was o f course a favorite), landm ark judicial opinions, legislative resolutions, and patriotic addresses. T h e “A m ericanization” o f th e study o f political science was natural and u n d e r th e circum stances unavoidable; it was also perhaps desirable. In any event, since education in citizenship and training for public service were central objectives o f pedagogy, the g ro u n d was p rep ared fo r the ambiguities an d tensions th a t were to becom e troublesom e w hen political science aspired to becom e “truly” scientific. Francis Lieber: Symbol and Portent At the sam e tim e th at political science was rapidly becom ing “A m ericanized,” th ere ap p eared a p o rte n t o f the C ontinental, especially Germ anic, influence th at was soon to becom e im portant; the c areer and writings o f Francis Lieber. As indicated, the C ontinental influence was exerted indirectly th ro u g h the im portation o f institutional arran g em en ts and academ ic values— the m odern university— and th ro u g h A m erican study o f political and social sci­ ence abroad. B ut a significant am o u n t o f th at influence has been exerted

26

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

thro u g h the m igration o f G erm an (and Austrian) trained scholars, especially after the rise o f Nazism. W ithin the period from 1880 to the present, A m eri­ can political science was in m any respects m ost “parochial” in the second and third decades o f this century, after the replacem ent o f th e first generation o f E u ropean-trained leaders by the products o f the new A m erican g raduate schools an d before the arrival o f th e able and influential scholars who fled Nazi persecution. B erlin-born, university-trained, and o f liberal persuasion, Lieber cam e to the U nited States (after a b rie f period in England) in 1827 to escape the conservative reaction following the N apoleonic wars. (As a patriotic Prussian he fought at W aterloo, but that fact did not prevent later im prisonm ent for his liberal ideas.) In 1835 he was elected Professor o f History' and Political Economy at South C arolina College, where he rem ained until elected to the chair o f history an d political econom y at C olum bia College in 1857. At his request, because he wished to em phasize “Government, Political Philosophy, or, as o u r great m aster [Aristotle] called it, Politics,” his designation was changed to Professor o f H istory and Political Science (though in 1865 the trustees tra n sferred him to the Law School with the title o f Professor o f Constitutional H istory and Public Law). W hile at South C arolina College, Lieber published th e several works that established his rep u tatio n . His m asterw ork, Cixril Liberty and Self-Govern­ ment, was often used as a textbook after its publication in 1853. “Influence” is of course difficult to dem onstrate, but in any event Lieber struck a new note in m idcentury political science, and his innovative effo rt was widely recognized— as the call to Colum bia signifies. W hatever his influence on the events o f the 1880s (he died in 1872), he is interesting as a harbinger o f the com ing m ingling o f C ontinental and Anglo-Am erican m otifs and styles. T h e essence o f the m atter is th at Lieber’s tem peram ental and doctrinal liberalism enabled him to bring a G erm anic philosophic-juristic perspective to bear on A nglo-A m erican political institutions. O f these political institu­ tions he had g reat knowledge; indeed, for them he en tertain ed g reat respect and affection. B ut his background saved him from a m ere parochial adula­ tion. He paired obligations with rights, duty with liberty, and he p u t all in context o f philosophy and history. I f his d eep concern with civic duties was to seem quaint and stuffy to later generations o f political scientists, his equal concern for civil liberties (perhaps inconsistently?) has not gone out o f fash­ ion. The Rise o f University-Based Political Science Stim ulated by the social, institutional, and intellectual developm ents noted above, political science program s o f a new type were created in the univer­ sities in the 1880s. Political science thereby was to reach a self-consciousness

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o f a h ig h er level— o r at least o f a d ifferen t type— than had ever been reached before. In the 1970s these first attem pts to achieve a “gen u in e” political science are likely to seem prim itive and naive. But not only are th ere continuous lines o f developm ent dow n to th e present; to a rem arkable d e ­ gree, problem s and controversies th at were to trouble th e profession p e re n ­ nially w ere clearly foreshadow ed in the first decades o f the new political science. T h e year 1880 m arks, at least symbolically, the birth o f the new political science. In J u n e o f that year th e trustees o f Colum bia (even then still called C olum bia College) authorized th e creation o f a School o f Political Science. T h e m oving spirit in this act o f creation was J o h n W. Burgess, who becam e head o f the School and a potent influence in early political science, both th ro u g h his shaping o f this archetypical en terp rise an d th ro u g h his writings. Burgess m oved im m ediately an d energetically, upon receiving the authoriza­ tion o f the trustees: “A lthough th e period o f gestation may have been long and painful, the School sp ran g alm ost fully form ed at birth from th e m inds o f Burgess an d his young associates” (Somit and T an en h au s, 1967, p. 2 1).1 T rain in g for a European-style Ph.D. began at once; research-based disserta­ tion not only was req u ired , but had to be published. In 1886 the School in au g u rated the Political Science Quarterly, which for decades was the main channel for scholarly writings in political science and becam e the prototype fo r later political science jo u rn als. A second m ajor beginning, at T h e Jo h n s H opkins University, evolved m ore gradually. Jo h n s H opkins was founded in 1876 with the purpose o f em ulating E uropean universities by offering instruction at the g rad u ate level, an d historian H erb ert B axter Adam s becam e a m em ber of its fo u n d ­ ing faculty. Adams took the lead in developing at H opkins a program o f advanced training an d research in history and political science, which from his point o f view were closely jo in ed if not indeed the same enterprise considered in two aspects. In 1877 Adam s fo u n d ed th e Jo h n s H opkins His­ torical and Political Science Association and in 1883 established The Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Science. Both were precedents for later associations and publication series. O th e r universities, m ost notably perhaps the University o f M ichigan u n d e r the leadership o f Charles Kendall A dam s, m ade “starts” in establish­ ing g rad u ate training in this early period but, for various reasons, were unable to achieve lasting m om entum . Until the tw entieth century was well begun, it was to Colum bia an d Jo h n s H opkins that o th er universities chiefly tu rn e d for teachers with the doctorate w hen they wished to introduce the new political science. As the supply o f A m erican-trained political scientists built up, foreign train in g tap ered off; it becam e less fashionable, as well as less necessary. By the tim e o f W orld W ar I, political science was widely

28

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

tau g h t in colleges an d universities. As a graduate-level enterprise it was well rooted in a score o f leading academ ic centers, an d some of the new er ones were now p rep ared to com pete fo r leadership positions. O f the two pioneer program s, it was th at o f Colum bia, with a greater openness to interaction with disciplines o th er than history, which was to prove m ore relevant an d influential for the political science o f the mid- and late-tw entieth century. B ut th e characteristics the two program s shared were o f g reater im p o rt than th eir differences. In em ulation o f C ontinental m od­ els, both em phasized the g rad u ate level ra th e r th an th e u n d erg rad u ate, and both sought to abandon th e homiletic, m em orization-and-recitation em ­ phasis o f the past. Both em phasized research, th e production o f new knowl­ edge from the exam ination o f data, as against philosophical speculation and deduction from “first principles.” Largely in im itation o f C ontinental scholar­ ship b u t also som ew hat influenced by Darwinism, both focused on the historical-com parative m ethod as th e basic scientific m ode o f discovering the laws o f political life. Both em phasized the sem inar and the lecture as m ethods o f instruction. Both accepted Lehrfreiheit and Lemfreiheit as ideals, how ever qualified those principles w ere u n d e r the constraint o f circum ­ stances. Most im p o rtan t an d fundam ental, the leaders o f the new m ovem ent, w herever located, ten d ed to share a com m itm ent to scientism.2 T h a t is, im pressed with the achievem ents o f the natural sciences, they believed the way tow ard th e discovery o f g reater (or “tru e ”) knowledge in the political sp h ere lay in the application o f m odes o f th o u g h t and m ethods o f research which had d em onstrated th eir potency so effectively in such areas as physics and biology. T h e com m itm ent to scientism, plus the belief that the political is analytically an d to some d eg ree em pirically distinguishable from the total social field, plus th e continuing dedication o f institutions and resources to th e attainm ent o f scientific knowledge o f the political— together these form ed the base o f a new A m erican political science. Som ething new and d iffe re n t in th e study o f politics was being created, not ju st for Am erica b u t in history. T o som e extent th e uniqueness is q u an ­ titative. N ever before had persons in such num b er and resources in such am o u n t been devoted to a scientific study o f politics as was to be tru e in the com ing decades. How ever, th e uniqueness is also qualitative. A lthough the idea th at the political is a distinguishable p art o f th e total social field is to some extent ancient, to be sure, the adoption o f th e singular form , political science, nevertheless signified a d e p a rtu re in perspective and usage. T h e style chosen, political science, signified both a com m itm ent to a sharpened u n d e r­ standing o f the m andates o f scientific m ethod and a d e p a rtu re from a E uro­ pean, especially Gallic, view o f “th e political sciences,” conceived as the vari­ ous disciplines (sometimes including foreign languages) p ertin en t to state-

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craft. A lthough the new usage did n o t find im m ediate and universal accep­ tan ce— and occasionally it still contests with “politics” o r “g overnm ent”— nevertheless it did establish a clear dom inance in the decades after 1880. T o arg u e th e distinctiveness, indeed th e uniqueness, o f A m erican politi­ cal science an d its im portance fo r contem porary political inquiry is not to assert that a genuine and generalizable political science has in fact been realized. P erhaps the scepticism and open-endedness th at are presum ed to characterize science would itself pose the achievem ent o f this goal as a con­ tin u in g question. In any event, w hether a “g enuine” political science is yet in being is a question often read d ressed, sometimes in cool appraisal, som e­ times in heated contention. In such discussions and debates the significance o f the W estern-A m erican context is obvious and undeniable. In addition to its self-im posed scientific mission, A m erican political science has im portant tasks in greater o r lesser d eg ree im posed by (and often willingly accepted from ) its political context, th e m ost im p o rtan t o f which are th e transm ission o f a civic cu ltu re (or “teaching citizenship”), prep aratio n o f students fo r ' public careers, an d participation in public affairs, if only indirectly, th ro u g h studies that have im pact on public policy. T hese activities, together with readily available dom estic data an d cultural im m ersion, tend to give an \ A m erican coloration to A m erican political science. Ultimately, the problem s presented by such considerations reach to the problem atic if not o paque center o f the enterprise o f social science: W hat kind o f social know ledge with w hat relationship to tim e, space, and cu ltu re is possible? Pre-W orld W ar I Political Science: Developments and Characteristics N o attem pt can be m ade to treat the developm ent o f political science in ro u n d ed , narrative form . T h e nam es and them es are too many, th e in te rre ­ lations too com plex. But for certain analytical and com parative purposes it will be useful to draw attention to some o f the p ro m in en t aspects o f political science in the pre-W orld W ar I period. Decline o f the historical-comparative method. As noted, at both Colum bia and Jo h n s H opkins (though with d ifferin g em phases) the historical-com parative m ethod highly pro m in en t in nineteenth-century C ontinental scholarship was accepted as integral to the en terp rise o f political science. E. A. F reem an’s dictum “History is past Politics and Politics present H istory” was som ething o f an official m otto at Jo h n s H opkins, and at Colum bia, despite greater openness to economics and o th e r concerns, the prim ary em phasis was also on history. At center, the historical-com parative m ethod was concerned with the discovery and elucidation o f “laws” o f developm ent, in this case, o f course, political developm ent.

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

Almost from the beginning th ere was som e resistance. W oodrow Wil­ son, at Jo h n s H opkins in the 1880s for g rad u ate study, protested “rum m ag­ ing” thro u g h docum ents as against observation o f political “life.” Im m ediate practical concerns soon began to draw attention o f the com paratively few political scientists away from serious historical research. O th er disciplines increasingly presented them selves as attractive sources o f ideas and m ethods; the “g ran d ” period o f the historical-com parative m ethod was pass­ ing, even on the C ontinent, with changing intellectual fashions. For w hat­ ever reasons, the vogue o f th e historical-com parative m ethod, taken seri­ ously, was com paratively brief. In general, th e close jo in in g o f political science and history characteristic o f early political science (academic d epartm ents of H istory and Political Science were com m on in th e early period) declined decade by decade as o th er interests m ultiplied an d new er conceptions of scientific m ethod moved to the fore. By m id-tw entieth century, history ten d ed to be viewed, not as a prim ary source o f political “laws" or even o f political “u n d erstan d in g ,” b u t as one am ong o th er “sources”— a sometimes useful hun tin g g ro u n d fo r hypotheses, a convenient collection o f illustrations, and a possible checkpoint for inferences derived in studies o f the contem ­ porary. Dissociated from serious historical study, the com parative m ethod was em ployed in two m ain areas. O ne was the study o f foreign governm ents. But the study o f foreign governm ents was lim ited for the m ost p art to E uropean and E uropean-derived governm ents; and th e “com parison” tended to be descriptive an d formalistic. T h e o th e r was the study of local and state governm ents. T hose governm ents, particularly o f th e states, were often spoken of as “laboratories" in which com parative experim entation could take place. Again, however, when com parisons were actually m ade, they were prim arily descriptive an d formalistic, and they w ere m ore concerned with political action than with political knowledge. Only after W orld W ar II did th e com parative m ethod again em erge as a central concern o f th e scientific enterprise.

The “Am ericanization” o f political science. T h e rapid decline o f the historical-com parative m ethod may be viewed as but one aspect of a m ore general tendency: the A m ericanization o f political science. In general, con­ cepts and styles o f thinking characteristic o f C ontinental political science and widely adopted by the first generation o f self-conscious Am erican political scientists tended to fade as dom estic program s leading to the doctorate ex­ p an d ed and m ultiplied and as indigenous interests asserted themselves. C on­ tinental political science was centrally concerned with the state, sovereignty, and law. Early A m erican political science echoed those concerns. Political

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science was “the science o f the State,” and several seminal early works had State in their titles. T h e re was m uch concern for the n atu re and locus o f sovereignty. T h e origins o f law and its relationship to the political were m atters o f serious concern. Such subjects were approached, typically, with a m ethod th at m ingled history, “theory,” and philosophy. A “tradition” o f g rad u ate study was form ed about these m atters and the style in which they were ad d ressed —a tradition that, though continuously eroding, proved long-lasting. W ith considerable plausibility it can be argued that changes in vocabu­ lary and style o f address suggest m ore “progress” th an exists, that there is m ore o f W oodrow Wilson, W. W. W illoughby, and Frank Goodnow in con­ tem porary political science than is suspected. Nevertheless, it is clear that significant changes in tone, scope, and em phasis took place between the form al founding o f political science and W orld W ar I. A som ew hat exotic im port was shaped m ore or less to native uses, and certainly additional interests were successfully asserted to be a p art o f political science. It is notable that “British im ports” tended to rise as the C ontinental declined, obviously d u e in part to a com m on language but probably m ore im portantly to the closer congruity o f governm ental institutions and p rob­ lems, as well as greater com m onality in intellectual fashions and approaches to problem -solving. Jam es Bryce’s American Commonwealth was recognized as an im p o rtan t work, and it was an influential one; and Bryce, though British, was elected fo u rth President o f the A m erican Political Science Association (Ions, 1968). W alter Bagehot’s English Constitution and Physics and Politics were im p o rtan t in shaping th e outlook o f many. A. V. Dicey was widely read, and G raham Wallas’s Human Nature in Politics had some im m ediate, as well as a lasting, influence. In general the British influence was in the direc­ tion o f th e factual, th e em pirical— broadly, “realism .” O f course, th ere was a range o f political experience and concerns im­ p o rta n t for A m ericans to which few foreign works spoke directly or im portantly—o r indeed acceptably. Foreigners m ight, for exam ple, have som ething to say to the problem s arising from im m igration, industrializa­ tion, and urbanization; certainly they could provide guidance with respect to such a problem as establishing an honest and efficient civil service. But did they have anything significant to say to im portant m atters peculiarly A m eri­ can: a w ritten constitution, federalism , the tripartite separation o f powers, state governm ent, and so forth? W hatever the answ er given to this question (usually negative), such Am erican institutions dem anded an d received in­ creasing attention from political scientists as their num bers grew and specialization advanced. T his is an ap p ro p riate place to note that Am erican political science has had from its beginning (w hether the “beginning” is taken as the late eigh­

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teenth o r the late nineteenth century) a certain ambivalence. O n the one hand, it has been rem arkably open to foreign experience an d influence, with the im p o rtan t qualification th at th e experience and influence fall (on the whole) within the liberal-constitutional-dem ocratic band o f the spectrum . This receptivity is endlessly d em onstrated, from the F ounding Fathers o f the Republic th ro u g h th e F ounding Fathers o f the discipline and u p to the present. From “R om an” Senate to Scandinavian O m budsm an, from Aristotle to the latest “im p o rtan t” foreign scholarly work, the im ports are legion. O n the o th er hand, from the beginning o f the national period th ere has also been a freq u e n t and sometimes ard en t sentim ent that A m erican political science (again, w hether broadly o r narrow ly construed) is unique and perhaps uniquely im portant for the world, a type and range o f knowledge deserving o f export o r em ulation. T his is hardly the place to explicate the ironies and explore the nuances o f this ambivalence; or to relate the am ­ bivalence to its context o f A m erican history and thought; o r — even less— to try to sift evidence and weigh claims. But some appreciation o f the foreignA m erican-foreign dialectic is necessary to an u n d erstan d in g o f political sci­ ence. Reformism. "R eform ” motives in political science are perh ap s im portant at any tim e— even, paradoxically, w hen the motive is to p u rg e political science o f reform ism in the interests o f science. Certainly they were im portant in the early decades. A m erican history provided proscenium , setting, and to some extent lines for the political science actors: How to deal with the stresses arising from ex uberant capitalism, “ro u n d in g out the nation,” massive im­ m igration, the grow th o f cities? How to adjust a political system fram ed by eighteenth-century republicans, but significantly altered by Jacksonian dem ocracy, to a new national experience? T h e various reform motives and m ovem ents were to prove, if not in­ com patible in some g rand logical resolution, at least contrary and confusing in what they seem ed to require in and from political science. Problem s and conflicts soon developed, and some o f them still trouble political science. A m ong the relevant reform s, one already noted was the refo rm —or “creation”— o f the university. T h e institutional fram ew ork, the professional workways an d m ores it provided have been decisive for m uch that has h ap ­ pened. In th e long ru n , these “institutional” factors have proved m ore im­ p o rtan t th an the “contents” o f the C ontinental political science, with which, in the im porting, they ap p eared o f a piece. T h e em phasis on the university as a fount o f new knowledge (expressed in term s o f research and publica­ tion), the im portance attached to g raduate training and th e Ph.D. as the symbol o f research com petence, the conception that, above all, the university should be devoted to ideals expressed by the word science— these elem ents

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have been im portant in political science from its beginnings u p to the pres­ ent. A n o th er area o f refo rm concerned leadership. T h e period in which national leadership was provided by the “natural aristocracy” was now long gone, and obviously (it appeared) the prescriptions o f Jacksonian dem ocracy would n ot m eet the new needs. M eans m ust be created, it was thought, to produce new leaders equal to new times; if received institutions did not m eet the need, then new institutional m eans m ust be devised. T h e rise o f political science unquestionably owes som ething to the notion that it could inspire and instruct the politicians, journalists, lawyers and others (including businessm en) who had public leadership roles. A n o th er reform m ovem ent centered on the civil service. T h e Jacksonian “spoils system ” was ju d g e d to be, for the new conditions, not simply inade­ quate but pernicious as well. It not only failed to provide the necessary com petence in governm ent service; it poisoned politics as well. D orm an B. Eaton’s Civil Service Reform in Great Britain (1880) provided both a spur and plausible rem edies, and the assassination o f President G arfield in 1883 by a “disappointed office-seeker” dram atized the need for change. T h e new polit­ ical science, it was widely hoped, could not only provide guidance on the principles to be followed in purifying and strengthening the public service; it could provide the necessary expertise for adm inistrative functions and im ­ p art it to potential civil servants. H ere W oodrow W ilson’s essay o f 1887, “T h e Study o f A dm inistration,” ‘ is extraordinarily revealing. His central concern is America: How to preserve and stren g th en th e A m erican dem ocracy now that “it is getting to be h a rd e r to run a constitution than to fram e one.” “R unning” the governm ent m ust now be taken seriously; it is no longer a m atter that “clerks” can arrange after “doctors” have agreed on principles. W here can we learn th e necessary “science?” From E u ropean countries, w here it has long been taken seriously. No m atter th at we do not approve o f their undem ocratic ways; th eir knowl­ edge o f efficient m eans can be borrow ed, cleansed o f autocratic contagion, and adjusted to serve our ends. A political science that m erely provides “intelligent critics” o f governm ent does not go far enough. “We m ust p re ­ pare b etter officials as th e apparatus o f governm ent.” It is w orth noting that the exam ple set by the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, created in France in th e 1870s to train candidates for governm ent service, was n ot lost on the founders o f political science. A lthough the G er­ man university, with its research em phasis, was preem in en t in their thoughts, the activities at the Ecole Libre, as well as the British reform s flowing from the T revelyan-N orthcote rep o rt, often served as inspiration (though not necessarily as m odels to be closely copied). A n o th er refo rm m otif was education for citizenship. T h e m ultifold in­

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

crease in population since 1790 had been paced by the spread o f dem ocratic ideas and expectations: the Republic had become a Democracy. No longer would it suffice to ensure the political education o f clergym en, lawyers, m er­ chants, and gentlem an farm ers; the fate o f the polity now d ep en d ed on a m ultitude o f hom esteaders, laborers, shopkeepers, a n d —even— im m igrants ign o ran t o f the language o f their adopted country. T o “thinking people” in general th e situation presented itself as perilous. Fortunately, the rem edy seem ed obvious. As put in the H ouse o f Com m ons after the reform bill o f 1867: “Now we m ust educate o u r m asters.” How should this be done? T h ro u g h m any m eans, including the press, mass education, and special program s. But did not higher education have an im portant role, and especially, was this not an obligation o f the burgeoning land-grant universities, which owed th eir very existence to the Republic? Much evidence indicates th at the problem o f education for citizenship was deeply involved in the establishm ent o f the new political science. T o some leaders it was obviously a m atter o f subordinate interest, but to others it was a prim e mission—even a m issionary duty. Political science was viewed not as an encapsuled p u rsu it o f esoteric know ledge but as a vehicle for inculcating in the citizen th e principles o f the Republic and for strengthen­ ing those principles by the discovery o f new knowledge ap p ro p riate to changed conditions. T o teach American governm ent was the first task and central obligation. N or was the m atter one to be determ ined solely by politi­ cal scientists. T h e citizens had an interest and the m eans to m ake it felt, most im portantly th ro u g h freq u en t legislative injunction that A m erican govern­ m ent (sometimes “citizenship”) m ust be taught in the public universities as well as in prim ary and secondary schools. T h e three motifs, leadership education, education for governm ent ser­ vice, and citizenship education are logically separable and were often sepa­ rated in fact, in term s o f prim ary interest and m anifestations. But they were also sometimes closely related and intertw ined. N or do these th re e motifs stand alone as “refo rm ” interests. T o u n derstand political science in the pre-W orld W ar I period, one m ust perceive that it was deeply involved in — it was an aspect o f—the cu rrents o f reform ism which cam e to be desig­ nated Progressivism, as well as, to some extent. Populism. T h e them es and m ovem ents o f Progressivism arid Populism —civil service reform , the direct election o f senators, electoral reform , the reconstruction o f m unicipal governm ent, the initiative and referen d u m , and still o th ers—were a p art o f the political science o f the time, as the record abundantly attests. “Professional” considerations and characteristics. T h e Am erican Political Sci­ ence Association was created in 1903, m ore o r less as a consequence o f an initiative o f the previous year to found an “A m erican Society for C om para­ tive Legislation.” T h e founding m eeting took place in New O rleans in con­

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nection with m eetings o f th e Am erican Historical Association and the A m erican Economic Association. (T he fo rm er had been founded in 1884, the latter in 1885. T h e A m erican Statistical Association was founded in 1888, th e A m erican Academ y o f Political and Social Science in 1889. T h e A m erican Sociological Association was also created in 1903.) T h e m em ber­ ship o f the Association in 1904, its first full year, was ju st over two h u n d red . By the beginning o f W orld W ar I the m em bership was approxim ately fifteen h u n d red , but it declined to thirteen h u n d re d by 1920, presum ably for warrelated reasons. In 1906 the A m erican Political Science Association began publication of the American Political Science Review. It had been preceded by the Proceedings of the American Political Science Association (which contained learned articles, especially those p resented as “papers” at the annual meetings); in 1914 the latter was discontinued, in effect m erged with the Review. T h e previously noted Political Science Quarterly (1886) and The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1890) had preceded b o th —and still continue. (O ther university-sponsored jo u rn a l o r serial publications also preceded the organs o f th e Association b ut proved less durable.) T h e jo u rn als o f o th er learned societies, law jo u rn als, and organs such as the National Municipal Review (1912) provided additional outlets for publication. College and university recognition o f the new political science, reflected in the establishm ent o f separate departm ents o f political science, proceeded slowly. Only a few existed by the tu rn o f the century, and in 1920 the n u m b er was still sh o rt o f fifty. M ore com m on until long after the establish­ m ent o f the Association was the com bination o f political science with an o th er discipline (or disciplines). In 1914, at “89 colleges, political science was jo in ed with history; with history and economics at 48; with economics and sociology at 21” (Somit and T an en h aus, 1967, pp. 56-57). T h e “o u tp u t” of A m erican doctorates in political science is difficult to ascertain because o f record-keeping and classificatory problems. O n an annual basis it is esti­ m ated as: “From 1885 to 1900, th re e o r four; from 1900 to 1910, six to ten; from 1911 to 1915, ten to fifteen; and from then to 1921 about eighteen to twenty” (Somit and T an en h au s, 1967, p. 58). As to “fields” in the early period, some broad generalizations are possi­ ble. By a wide m argin, A m erican governm ent was the m ain object o f atten ­ tion and o f pedagogy. (Most teaching, o f course, was o f undergraduates.) But “A m erican governm ent” is not a single thing, and courses devoted to selected aspects, such as constitutional law o r municipal governm ent, were com m on. C om parative governm ent was a recognized area. A lthough m uch of its literatu re had the limitations indicated above, there were able m en and durable works. International law and relations received a fair am ount of attention; but distinguished w ork by Am ericans was not notable. T h e history of political thou g h t was a small field, dom inated by William A. D unning at

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

Columbia and by those trained u n d e r him. Public adm inistration and public opinion were hardly yet recognized fields, but works later credited as laying their foundations were published (for exam ple, Frank J. G oodnow ’s Politics and Administration and A. Lawrence Lowell’s Public Opinion and Popular Government). Some o f th e earliest political scientists essayed m ajor treatises aim ed at “laying o u t” political science m ore o r less entire. Some were ably done and still speak in some m easure to the contem porary political scientist: thus works by Jo h n W. Burgess, William W. C rane and B ernard Moses, W oodrow Wilson, W. W. Willoughby, and Frank J. Goodnow. (These works were largely aim ed at professional peers. T hey were supplem ented an d succeeded by textbooks, largely undistinguished, directed tow ard students.) But on the whole the early treatises, however ably done, were derivative, owing a large debt to E uropean political science and advancing little beyond it. T h e re was a conspicuous absence o f m ajor original works o f a theoretical nature, gro u n d ed either in philosophy o r the logic and m ethod o f natural science. An exception, perhaps, is A rth u r F. Bentley’s The Process o f Government (1908), which later cam e to fam e and influence. But Bentley was not a “political scientist,” and his work was little noted and less praised at the time by those who so designated themselves. From d ata such as th e foregoing and from even a cursory survey o f the early literature, a n u m b er o f fu rth e r observations can be m ade and generali­ zations draw n. Political science on the eve o f W orld W ar I was hardly o f a clear and single m ind about th e identity it asserted and only with charity m ight be designated either a discipline o r a profession. D ifferentiation from o th er social sciences was far from com plete; the struggle for separate d ep artm en ­ tal status was only well begun. T h e establishm ent o f the A m erican Political Science Association certainly represented a forw ard step and was decisive for much o f what was to happen in later decades. But clearly the Association was not, in this period, com posed o f a highly differentiated m em bership. Al­ though academically trained and located political scientists assum ed a dom ­ inant position from th e beginning, the majority o f the m em bers were journalists, reform ers, lawyers, politicians, adm inistrators, and so fo rth — persons o f many backgrounds and occupations who were obviously “interested” and whose knowledge m ight be considerable but whose entitle­ m ent to the designation “political scientist" would rest on the loosest con­ struction o f the term . But then, on th e o th er hand, academically located political scientists were less clearly differentiated, specialized, and “professional” than they would later become. For many who instructed in political science this was only a course o r two along with courses in history, economics, o r whatever. F u rtherm ore, there was a tradition and presum ption o f activism born o f the forces noted above: Political science was not merely for the library an d

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classroom , not a w ithdraw n scientific quest. It was for purposes o f national survival, of civic im provem ent, o f dem ocratic health. T h e political scienust, it was thougiuThas special responsibilities as citizen. Engagem ent in some form o f political life was com m on, not ju st on the p art o f th e rank-and-file academ ician, but on th e part o f th e leaders o f the new political science. W oodrow W ilson’s career, from professor through university presidency and gubernatorial office to President o f the U nited States, was m erely the most notable in a general pattern. Probably it is fair to say th at there was some decline in the average level o f scholarly-scientific writing as the volume increased. T h e “peaks” re ­ m ained high, as, for exam ple, th e works o f Charles A. B eard, H enry Jones Ford, Frank J. G oodnow, A lbert Bushnell H art, and A. Lawrence Lowell attest. But the valleys becam e b ro ad er as the ranks o f would-be political scientists swelled and outlets for publication increased. A num ber o f factors were involved— in addition to the fact that “publi­ cation” early becam e a factor in professional visibility and academ ic prom o­ tion. O ne was the decline o f the historical-comparative m ethod. With the fading of its claims and aspirations, and in the absence o f an o th er au th o rita­ tive “scientific” m odel to replace it, th ere came a degradation o f its m ethods: a trivialization o f its attention to “source” docum ents, formalistic description and com parison without clear purpose. But the w idespread acceptance of “nonscientific” objectives was m ore centrally relevant. T o the extent that political science has as objectives the transm ission o f civic culture, public en­ lightenm ent, and im provem ent o f the polity, do o th er criteria than scientific criteria become relevant in ju d g in g research and publication? W hatever on e’s answer, pedagogic-reform ist motives help to account for a great deal o f reportorial, descriptive, and hortatory writing in the Progressive e ra — writing alm ost wholly “d e ad ” to the contem porary reader. The Emergence o f Enduring Motifs and Problems As ju st suggested, one may, when perusing the literature o f the pre-W orld W ar I period, have a sense th at the m aterial in hand is quite as rem ote from contem porary issues as a Byzantine theological disputation. But the opposite is also possible: a recognition o f m aterial bearing on an issue that is highly contem porary and perhaps even in heated contention. In the interest o f gaining perspective on the enterprise o f political science, it will be useful to note (or to note again) the em ergence o f certain en d u rin g themes. We may appropriately begin by focusing on the m atter o f definition, or m ore precisely, self-image. In what kind o f enterprise did the early political scientists conceive them selves to be engaged? W hat were reg ard ed as its distinguishing features, its divisions, its boundaries? T h e early political scientists for the m ost p art accepted th e designation “political science” w ithout serious question as to its appropriateness (though “g o vernm ent” and “politics” were the favored term s o f some). It was easy for

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

them to do so, given the context o f language a n d history. T h e history o f the term (sometimes “science o f politics” o r the “political sciences”) would be difficult to write. C ertainly the usage was not new. T h e F ounders o f the Republic spoke easily o f the “science” o f politics. W. J . M. M ackenzie notes th at the term political science “was used unselfconsciously in the m iddle o f the nineteenth century” (M ackenzie, 1967, p. 16). T h e re was no need to search fo r a new term , since “political science” was so flexible it could ac­ com m odate tradition as well as signify am bition for the future. Science in a new sense, to be sure, was “in th e air,” transform ing th e old usage, sh arpening concepts, an d w hetting ambitions. B ut one m ust beware o f viewing the scene with th e lenses o f tw entieth-century science and scien­ tific philosophy. T h e “new er” m eaning o f science was really “old,” given by diffusion and refraction o f the ideas o f Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Darwin, an d Spencer. N ot ju s t in the p o p u lar m ind but in the m inds o f able publicists (sometimes even o f bona fide natu ral scientists), science was intimately jo in ed with “nonscientific” ideas and sentim ents, above all, the idea o f progress. Karl P earson’s classic statem ent o f V ictorian scientific philosophy an d m ethodology, The Grammar of Science, was not published until 1892, and th ere is no evidence o f its influence until m uch later. B ernard Crick’s thesis th at it was not science b u t technology that becam e the “im age” o f Am erican political science (Crick, 1959) is perhaps overargued, but it contains m uch tru th . Certainly the en terp rise o f political science was decades old before it seem ed ap p ro p riate to reflect seriously on the implications o f a distinction between p u re science and applied science. Nevertheless, it should be noted an d em phasized that a n u m b er o f the creators and leaders o f the new political science were highly self-conscious about th e "science” to which they aspired. T hey conceived that th e fu tu re o f political science lay in following the lead o f natural science, and (given p re ­ vailing ideas) they were know ledgeable about w hat this ap p eared to m an­ date. Jo h n W. Burgess, M unroe Sm ith, and Jesse Macy were am ong those who argued for following the natural science m odel (Somit and T an en h au s, 1967, pp. 2 8-29). In general, the arg u m en t was against “d eduction” and debate; it was for induction, com parativeness, experim ents, and search for “laws.” This em phasis has a contem porary ring. Even the distinction between fact and value, which was to becom e so im p o rtan t later, may be said to have been enunciated (though these term s were not used) in 1884 by William W. C rane and B ern ard Moses in Politics (p. 3;. O n the o th er h an d , th en as now th ere were doubters and dissenters about th e possibility o f m aking politics into a tru e o r exact science. Some were equivocal: thus, on the whole record, W oodrow Wilson. In any event, distinctions were not so clearly draw n in the early period, and n eith er scien­ tific philosophy n o r scientific m ethod was m uch argued. Political scientists on the whole were content to p u rsu e th eir own interests, confident that th eir labors satisfied some scientific standard as well as practical need.

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A ttem pts to divide an d delineate the object o f attention are worthy o f note; twofold an d threefold divisions early becam e popular. T h e C rane and Moses Politics, th e T h e o d o re Woolsey Political Science (1877), and the Frank J. G oodnow Politics and Administration (1900) favored a twofold division. In the first two (depending on how one interprets the language) the division was betw een science and art, o r theory and practice. In the last it was o f course between politics (as d eterm ining the will o f the State) and adm inistra­ tion (as executing the will o f the State). T h reefo ld division was favored by Burgess in Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (1890) and by W. W. W illoughby, in The Nature of the State (1896). Som it an d T anenhaus (1967, p. 24) translate the language in which Burgess expressed his tripartite division into the contem porary distinction am ong political com m unity, type o f regim e, a n d adm inistration in power. W illoughby divided political science am ong “d eterm ination o f fundam ental philosophical principles,” “descrip­ tion o f political institutions, or governm ental institutions considered at rest,” and "the d eterm ination o f laws o f political life and developm ent, the motives that give rise to political action, the conditions that occasion particular politi­ cal m anifestations. . .” ( pp. 382-383). C ontem porary dichotom ies an d trichotom ies presum ably carry us some distance beyond these, b ut it is n ot irrelevant to the gaining o f perspective to ask critically: How? Why? Beyond cavil, m uch that has recently appeared as a gain in u n d erstan d in g can be found, at least in o th er language and in germ , in the early literature. Some o f the early w riters— for exam ple, B agehot and Bryce, Ford and Lowell— had a fair und erstan d in g o f “func­ tionalism ,” even if they did not use the term (Landau, 1968a, 1972). As already m ore than merely suggested, in the early period there em erged the perennial problem s o f the relationship o f political science to o th er disciplines: How— and how m u ch— distinct and separate? How can o th er disciplines serve political science? A nd how can political science avoid being “used,” even captured? T h e dialectical processes o f (1) a drive toward specialization and autonom y in the social sciences and (2) a search for fru it­ ful relationships, perhaps the recognition o f a total social science, the crea­ tion o f a unified social theory, were already in operation. T h e initial intim ate involvem ent with history was gradually relaxed. T h e decline o f political econom y may be read in the creation o f separate discipli­ nary organizations for economics an d political science. T h e professionaliza­ tion o f legal training in separate schools was well advanced by the tu rn o f the century. Close relationships with all three, history, economics, an d law, were writ deeply into th e W estern political tradition, but they were now being atten u ated , changed qualitatively as well as quantitatively with the pressure of specialization and u n d e r the sp u r o f scientific aspirations. O n th e o th er h and, new relationships were becom ing im portant. T h e concurrently em erging discipline o f sociology exerted an attraction. A num ber o f pre-W orld W ar I political scientists saw sociology, ra th e r than

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Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

history, as being the m ost closely cognate field o f inquiry, perh ap s as provid­ ing a general theory o f society in which all specialties could be somehow united. T h e rising discipline o f psychology began to reveal in the works o f G raham Wallas and A. Lawrence Lowell the attraction it w ould exert. T h e work o f Lowell, particularly his “Oscillations in Politics,” also foreshadow ed the use o f statistics for analytical purposes. Finally, in this noting o f them es and problem s, it is ap p ro p riate to re tu rn to the subject o f th e m ultiple roles o f political science. T h e relation­ ships betw een its several roles, especially the strain betw een scientific aspira­ tions and “extrascientific” activities, em erged as problem s in the early period o f self-conscious political science. T h e problem s presented, at least in their range and intensity, are distinctive for political science as an academically based social discipline. (Similar problem s exist, I believe, in economics and history but to a lesser degree, less still in sociology, an d hardly at all in anthropology.) T h e extrascientific functions o f political science concern, broadly, transm ission o f the political tradition and culture, considered both as a com ­ plex o f beliefs and as a set o f institutions, and aid in m aking received politi­ cal ideas and institutions “w ork,” im proving them and ad ap tin g them to changing conditions. They include education o r training fo r leadership roles (especially but not lim ited to those clearly political), for governm ent service m ore or less professional in n ature, and for exercising the general respon­ sibilities o f citizenship. T hey include engaging in research aim ed (at w hat­ ever level and how ever direct o r indirect) at providing guidance in public policy. A nd they may involve an extra responsibility, nam ely, to participate in some fashion in public affairs as one with a special know ledge o f things political. As indicated above, these extrascientific functions derived from both foreign and dom estic sources. Given the problem s o f the A m erican polity, it seem ed only natural to expect the new political science to assist in their resolution by providing a special learning and a special teaching. In Europe, it was observed, academic political science (m ore generally, higher educa­ tion) provided special training for governm ent service, and political scientists were characteristically active in political life in addition to fulfilling their scholarly-scientific roles. N or were the extrascientific functions accepted u n ­ willingly. T o the new political scientists the several roles o f researcherscientist, teacher o f citizenship, guide in preparation for leadership or governm ent service, and refo rm er o r activist fitted together, on the whole, w ithout incongruity o r conflict. “Science” had yet to assum e its narrow er and firm er m id-tw entieth century connotations, and role-conflict was m ore latent than overt. Still, as W orld W ar I ap p ro ach ed — the evidence in th e proceedings o f the annual m eetings o f the Association and in the reports o f its com m ittees is

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clear— the special problem s arising from the m ultiple roles o f political sci­ ence w ere beginning to em erge. THE MIDDLE PERIOD: POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM WORLD WAR I TO WORLD WAR II T h e selection o f the two world wars as chronological “m arkers” in the d e­ velopm ent o f political science is in p a rt only a m atter o f convenience, serving to divide experience into sections o f fairly equal length and m anageable size. But it is also m ore. Both wars, in various ways, affected political science and political scientists directly, and both resulted in significant sociointellectual changes in th e environm ent o f political science. Each o f the th re e periods has its distinctive tones and colors, as m uch because o f changing circum ­ stances as because o f changes in leading actors; and the changes in circum ­ stances were often w ar-related. The Interwar Matrix T h e a b ru p t en d in g o f the Progressive Era bro u g h t not only a change in the em otional climate; it b ro u g h t changes in the agenda o f reform s an d activities to which political scientists addressed themselves. In the w ar “dem ocracy” had triu m p h ed ; b ut in its victory it had lost some o f its innocence and élan. T h e force o f th e notion th at “the cu re for dem ocracy is m ore dem ocracy” was h ard ly exhausted (and still is not). But th ere was a grow ing sense that, at least in simplistic form s, it was an idea whose tim e had passed. T h e en o r­ mities o f the war induced an uneasy sense that, despite the dissolution o f the H ohenzollern and H apsburg autocracies abroad (and their replacem ent by self-determ ination, constitutionalism , and dem ocracy) and the “re tu rn to norm alcy” at hom e, all was not well. How had the war happened? W hat were the im plications for governm ent? For the enterprise o f social science? It was a n atu ral, if not inevitable, conclusion th at the cause o f past catastrophes and the potential for m ore lay in unequal developm ent: T h e “pow er-producing sciences” had o u tstrip p ed the “pow er-controlling sciences.” In the interests of dem ocracy, even o f survival, this relationship m ust be changed. Not less science but m o re— in th e social sciences. (“T h e cure for science is m ore science” ?) O f course, the R om anoff autocracy had been replaced not by constitu­ tional dem ocracy b ut by Bolshevik dictatorship, a m ajor new featu re in the w orld’s political landscape. A new ex perim ent in international o rd er, the League o f Nations, came into existence, faltered, and then “failed.” T h e triu m p h s o f fascism in Italy and th en o f Nazism in G erm any were followed by the alarm s, incursions, and crises th at heralded W orld W ar II. A rising tide o f restlessness, sometim es leading to civil d isorder o r rebellion, charac­ terized the extensive colonial areas aro u n d the world. T h e w orld-encircling

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G reat D epression had resulted in the New Deal in the U nited States, a nexus o f governm ental changes, political realignm ents, and intellectual develop­ m ents o f d eep and lasting significance. T hese were only m ajor features o f a national and international situation replete with implications for the en terprise o f political science. In various ways historical events in th e interw ar years affected political science, and some o f these will be indicated. Retrospectively, however, p erh ap s the won­ d e r is not th at they affected political science but that the response to them was not greater. Disciplinary-Professional Developments T h e m iddle period o f political science was genuinely '“m iddle” with respect to m uch o f an intellectual n ature. In various quantitative an d organizational aspects also, it bridges betw een the first and th ird periods. Quantitative and organizational factors. In 1920 the m em bership o f the A m erican Political Science Association, down somewhat through the war years, was 1300. But it reached 2800 by the eve o f W orld W ar II and this tim e increased d u rin g the w ar years, reaching 3300 in 1945. (M em bership figures for all periods are approxim ations, an d they include institutional as well as personal m em berships.) Registrations at the annual m eetings rose m ore sharply, from fewer th an 200 in the early twenties to m ore than 1000 by 1940. In d ep en d en t academ ic d epartm ents o f political science gradually increased in n u m b er and in size. T h e n um ber o f d ep artm en ts offering train ­ ing leading to the Ph.D. increased significantly; “leadership” o r “prestige” d ep artm en ts grew in nu m b er an d becam e m ore widely distributed about the country. (Somit and T a n en h au s estim ate that Ph.D. “o u tp u t” went from “35 Ph.D .’s in 1925 to 45 by 1930, 60 in 1935, and 80 in 1940,” declining then d u rin g the war years [1967, pp. 101-102].) T h e American Political Science Review, solidly established as the central o rg an (and main public evidence o f the existence) o f the Association, evolved slowly u n d e r the guidance o f M anaging Editor Frederic A. Ogg, who held that position for nearly a q u a rte r o f a century. T h e pattern o f extensive coverage o f “developm ents,” inclusion o f m aterial o f a reportorialinterpretive n atu re on such m atters as constitutional law an d state and local governm ent, was continued. T h e coverage o f m aterials o f that type, plus “ news and notes” on such m atters as personnel and program s, often left, in th e opinion o f critics, inadequate space for learned articles and reports on research. In organizational stru ctu re the Association changed hardly at all in the m iddle period. U p to and th ro u g h W orld W ar II the stru ctu re rem ained (one m ight say) that o f a learn ed society rath e r than o f a profession. An

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annually elected President, a Council with overlapping three-year term s, a M anaging Editor for th e Review, and a part-tim e S ecretary-T reasurer (to handle th e business-adm inistrative side) constituted the essential m echanism. T o one now reviewing the reco rd it seems obvious that it would be only a m atter o f tim e until a national office with a continuing staff would be estab­ lished. B ut “refo rm ” in this direction was resisted; it was in fact still opposed by m any m em bers o f the Association w hen it finally did occur after W orld W ar II. M eanwhile im p o rtan t organizational developm ents o f an o th er sort had begun to m anifest them selves: the creation o f regional and specialized or “field” organizations. T o be sure, these were not entirely new. T h e early graduate program s had sponsored “associations” o f colleagues, students and alum ni, an d th ere had been a short-lived m idw estern political science o r­ ganization in the early period. Various organizations, such as the National Civil Service R eform League and N ational M unicipal League, in which some political scientists participated actively, had some o f the qualities o f later “field” organizations. But th e establishm ent o f the Southern Political Science Association in the interw ar period was unquestionably an im portant new developm ent. It has e n d u re d and grow n, providing a prototype for o th er regional associations in the post-W orld W ar II period. T h e jo u rn als o f these associations, beginning with the (Southern) Journal of Politics in 1939, have becom e im p o rtan t m edia fo r publication and inform ation. A lthough these jo u rn a ls have a regional em phasis, all are m ore o r less general political sci­ ence jo u rn a ls in term s o f coverage and authorship. T h e creation o f the A m erican Society for Public A dm inistration in the late thirties appears to be d ifferen t in n atu re and in its implications for the fu tu re. Specialized “cause,” “interest,” and even “activity” organizations had long existed, an d political scientists had participated in them , but the A m eri­ can Society for Public A dm inistration was the first “field” organization. In the 1920s and 1930s, public adm inistration had become one o f the “fields” o f political science in th e sense o f gaining specialized textbooks and courses u n d e r this rubric. T h e creation o f the Society and the establishm ent (in 1940) o f its organ, the Public Administration Review, represented in p a rt a conviction by those specializing in public adm inistration that their interests w arranted attention beyond that given th ro u g h the A m erican Political Sci­ ence Association. T h e form ation o f the A m erican Society for Public A dm inistration re p ­ resents one o f the centrifugal forces at work in political science, the tendency o f special interests and “fields” to assert a m ore o r less separate identity, to create m echanism s for expression in addition to — perhaps even separate fro m — the Am erican Political Science Association. With continuing growth o f the Association and increasing specialization o f interests, the form ation o f

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organizations to give special attention to these interests has em erged as a phenom enon. W h eth er and to w hat extent it is a “problem ’’ depends on the perspective with which it is viewed. Am ericanization and “re-Europeanization.” T h o u g h hardly w orld-em bracing in its interests, political science in its origins and First decades was open to many W estern influences. In d eed, its rise clearly cannot be understood ap art from these influences. T h e election o f Jam es Bryce as the fourth President o f the A m erican Political Science Association is symbolic, as well as being a testim ony to the accom plishm ents and influence o f that able British scholar. But by the advent o f W orld W ar I a substantial “A m ericanization” had occurred. It was most notable, o f course, in the establishm ent o f dom estic program s o f training fo r the Ph.D. A fter the tu rn o f the century it became rare for a political scientist to include even a year of foreign study in his prep aratio n . Disciplinary interests tu rn e d inw ard. T h e g ran d design o f Burgess for a com parative political science was forgotten, an d attention tended to be focused on practical problem s o f governance in the U nited States. W orld W ar I did not im m ediately and obviously do m uch to broaden the scope o f political science. Public adm inistration, em erging as a “Field" with its First textbooks in the twenties, was almost wholly focused on the dom estic scene, despite universalistic claims for its “principles.” Indeed, the resulting national m ood o f isolationism found some direct reflection in polit­ ical science, as in the work o f Charles B eard. But in various ways, some indirect and long-range (even paradoxical—an arg u m en t for “national interest” m ust be p u t into a fram e o f history and theory), W orld W ar I did result in b roadening the range o f political science and m oving it tow ard internationalization. Im m ediately, the im portance o f international relations and law was o f course underscored. T h e newly established dem ocratic states provided fresh foreign-com parative m aterials, however superficial the treatm en t thereof. T h e establishm ent o f the League o f N ations and its collapse; the creation and end u ran ce o f the U.S.S.R.; the rise o f Fascism-Nazism; the om inous threats o f a new world conflagration— all the im p o rtan t political events flowing from W orld W ar I inevitably were reflected in political science to some degree. Perhaps the most im portant “b ro ad en in g ” effect was indirect in the sense that the cataclysm and its afterm ath helped to m otivate Charles M erriam and others in a crusade to achieve a political science sufficiently well gro u n d ed to an ­ ticipate and avoid political disasters. Tendencies tow ard parochialism and inbreeding in the interw ar period were significantly an d increasingly countered by foreign scholars. In the twenties and thirties a n u m b er o f able and influential B ritish-trained politi­ cal scientists, including G. E. G. Catlin, H erm an Finer, and H arold Laski,

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became a “presence,” n ot only th ro u g h w riting but th ro u g h lecturing and sometimes teaching in A m erican universities. M ore im p o rtan t for postWorld W ar II political science, as the W orld W ar I “settlem ent” collapsed in ruins, th e resulting dislocations an d persecutions bro u g h t about the m igra­ tion o f a considerable n u m b er o f C ontinental political scientists, prim arily from th e G erm an-speaking areas, to th e U nited States. Ind eed , th e m igrants were not only political scientists b ut social scientists in o th er disciplines, some of whose work has significantly “im pacted” political science. A nd the m igra­ tion included not only C ontinental-trained scholars but younger émigrés, who w ere to receive at least th eir advanced disciplinary training in the United States—and becom e disciplinary leaders. For illustrative purposes, a few nam es (representing both o f the categories above) will suffice: H an n ah A rendt, Karl Deutsch, A lfred Diam ­ ant, William Ebenstein, H einz Eulau, Carl Friedrich, Ernest Haas, Stanley H offm an, H ans Kelsen, H enry Kissinger, H ans M orgenthau, Fritz M orstein Marx, Franz N eum ann, Sigm und N eum ann, Leo Strauss. T h e list o f im portant contributors to the literature is long, the “story” much too com plex even to oudine. T h e im p o rtan t point is th at the contribution and influence o f the C ontinental-derived political scientists have been so great d u rin g the past generation th at it is impossible to im agine what the present contours o f political science m ight be if they had n ot participated in its creation. It is not that the influence has been o f a piece. O n the contrary (as even a slight acquaintance with the nam es above indicates) the ém igrés have rep resen ted many interests and “fields,” as well as divergent traditions, philosophies, and m ethodologies. All parts o f political science have been enriched, and the resulting total is m ore com plex. Other disciplinary-professional factors. D uring the interw ar period political science becam e decisively “academ icized.” O n the eve o f W orld W ar I fewer than h a lf the m em bers o f the A m erican Political Science Association held academ ic appointm ents; b ut on the eve o f W orld W ar II a large m ajority o f the m em bers were academics. W hether the shift tow ard an academ ic center o f gravity rep resen ted a tacit decision to becom e a “discipline” ra th e r than a “profession” is a com plicated m atter th at will receive some attention below. For th e present the following factors are worthy o f note. Academics, by the n a tu re o f th eir role and position, have an unusual oppo rtu n ity for study, analysis, and reflection. O n the record, th e re is no doubt that this o p p o rtunity was involved in the creation o f “self-conscious” political science. M oreover, at least those in favorable university locations have th e incentive, the time, and the skills to develop positions o f leadership. T h e A m erican Political Science Association was essentially created by academics. From its inception dow n to the present, academics have been p re p o n d e ra n t in the officialdom and m eetings o f the Association.

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But as has been indicated, in the early period the distinction betw een academ ic an d nonacadem ic, professor an d “practitioner,” scientist-specialist and political participant was far less sh arp than it was later to become. T h e record indicates th at some form o f political participation (elective o r ap p o in ­ tive, part-tim e o r occasional full-tim e, partisan o r form ally governm ental) was w idespread am ong the early academics, including those in leadership roles. T hey thus blended fairly easily into what, until W orld W ar I, consti­ tuted the m ajority o f th e Association’s m em bership: elected and appointed officials, civic leaders, lawyers, journalists, refo rm ers— w hoever m ight have a special interest in public affairs and hoped thus to forw ard it. Political party m em bership (or som etim es inclination o r preference) also shifted significantly in the interw ar period, a m atter not irrelevant to the u n d erstan d in g o f political science. Only for the fairly recent period are reasonably full data on party identification o f rank-and-file m em bers o f the Association available. B ut it is a reasonable surm ise that until the thirties party identification was fairly evenly divided betw een the Republican and Dem ocratic parties (with p erhaps some leaning, particularly in the early years, in the Republican direction). Down to th at tim e, certainly, prominent political scientists were identified with both parties in not too unequal n u m ­ bers. T h e G reat D epression and the New Deal, however, b ro u g h t a tidal m ovem ent in the Dem ocratic direction. Responsibility for th e fo rm er ten d ed to be assigned to the Republicans. T h e Dem ocratic party was nom inally (if not entirely in fact) responsible for the latter, and it evoked wide su p p o rt am ong political scientists for a n u m b er o f reasons. Since the late thirties a substantial m ajority (at p resen t approxim ately three-fourths) o f the m em ­ bership o f the Association have been Dem ocratic in their party identifica­ tion. In the interw ar period the im portance o f history and law were slowly an d gradually— but only slowly and gradually—dim inished.3 But an ­ thropology, sociology, an d psychology, also “rising” disciplines in the academ ic firm am ent, received increasing attention. A lthough they tended to be m ore praised and enjoined (Barnes et a l., 1925; O gburn and G oldenweiser, 1927) than actually used th ere were exceptions, notably H arold Lasswell’s Psychopathology and Politics (1930). Economics, ahead in the gam e o f status an d recognition, ten d ed to be m ore envied as a m odel (thus, nota­ bly, G. E. G. Catlin’s Science and Method of Politics, 1927) than substantively used; th ere was no significant im pulse to recreate political econom y. T h e serious use o f quantitative m ethods did begin to gain ground; for this S tuart A. Rice’s Quantitative Methods in Politics (1928) is a landm ark volume. T h e thirties saw a serious and significant use o f quantitative m ethods in several fields, well beyond past efforts. T h e em ergence o f public adm inistration as a recognized “field” has

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been noted. In the thirties public opinion also began to gain recognition as a specialized area o f scholarly-scientific inquiry— if not exactly in political sci­ ence, at least o f great im portance for it. In political theory the two decades produ ced a n u m b er o f respectable, even impressive, works, as the following signify: Francis W. Coker, Recent Political Thought (1934), Charles H. Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) and G eorge H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (1937). However, these were in the historicalphilosophical-interpretive style, an d beyond such works “theory” for the period m ust be sought eith er in th e m ethodological disquisitions and dis­ putes o r in substantive works addressed to particular problem s o r areas. T h e study o f com parative governm ent, still overw helm ingly centered on constitu­ tional governm ent in th e West, resp o n d ed sometim es sluggishly, sometimes imaginatively, if erratically, to the challenges presented by com m unist and fascist regim es. As suggested, the study o f international relations was stim u­ lated by W orld W ar I an d the events following in its train. A lthough m uch o f w hat was done was descriptive, hortatory, o r legalistic, some works, p a r­ ticularly p roducts o f the “Chicago school” in the thirties, m ade both substan­ tive an d m ethodological advances. All things considered, it was probably in the study o f Am erican governm ent, and especially in its m ore “political” aspects, th a t the greatest advances w ere m ade. A m ong th e works recognized as im p o rtan t in their own day an d symbolic for the fu tu re were the follow­ ing: H aro ld F. Gosnell, Getting Out the Vote (1927); E. Pendleton H erring, Group Representation Before Congress (1929); A rth u r N. Holcombe, The Political Parties o f To-Day (1924); C harles E. M erriam and H arold F. Gosnell, Non-Voting; Causes and Methods o f Control (1924); Peter H. O degard, Pressure Politics; The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (1928); S tuart A. Rice, Farmers and Workers in American Politics (1924); and Elm er E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure, and the Tariff (1935). The Reassertion o f Scientism and the Sharpening o f Role Conflict Som e o f the most im p o rtan t events o f the interw ar period have ap peared only by im plication in the account to this point. T h ey concern the reassertion o f th e scientific am bitions o f political science and the counter-assertion o f th e extrascientific aspects o f th e enterprise. T hese events gave direction and tone to m uch o f w hat took place in th e interw ar period. T h ey also w ere a p rep aratio n fo r—one m ight say a rehearsal fo r— the controversies of post-W orld W ar II centering on behavioralism . O n e can speak o f the “reassertion” o f scientific am bitions because the force o f the early am bition to m ake political science a “genuine” science after th e m odel o f the n atu ral science was gradually dim inished. It was di­ m inished by th e in h eren t difficulties o f the task, by the often unfavorable

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circum stances u n d e r which it was p u rsu ed , by conflicting interpretations o f w hat the objective enjoined, and especially by the fact that those who called them selves political scientists accepted, willingly o r by force o f circumstances, extrascientific obligations th at not only com peted for resources b u t often seem ed to be in conflict with the dictates o f science. T h e reassertion o f the scientific am bition cam e early in the twenties, “p eak ed ” in the m iddle o r late twenties, significantly dim inished in the early thirties as o th er cu rren ts in political science becam e ascendant and the tu r­ bu len t sociopolitical environm ent engaged the attention o f political scientists, but again g ath ered force as th e thirties drew to a close. T h e reassertion o f scientism is closely associated with the nam e and activities of Charles E. M erriam . In his essay o f 1921, “T h e Present State o f the Study o f Politics,” a n d in his book o f 1925, New Aspects of Politics, M erriam indicted contem po­ rary political science for its lack o f scientific vigor, sounded a call for renew ed scientific endeavor, and set forth his own ideas for scientific progress. M erriam ’s efforts led first to the establishm ent in the Association o f a C om ­ m ittee on Political Research and th en to a series o f th ree N ational C onfer­ ences on th e Science o f Politics (1923-1925). U n d er M erriam ’s leadership the University o f Chicago becam e noted for a serious and sustained effo rt to stress the “science” in political science. Unquestionably, a disproportionate am ount o f the im p o rtan t work o f the thirties was d o n e by the “Chicago school” (the term is often used, b u t th ere was no “school” in a strict sense); and a significant n u m b er o f the leaders o f the later behavioral m ovem ent w ere trained th ere in the thirties. T h e leader o f the cou n terreform ation was T hom as H. Reed o f H arvard University. Reed rep resen ted and spoke forcefully for the interests con­ cerned with citizenship education and p reparation for politicalgovernm ental careers— in general, civic education and activism. In 1927 Reed becam e chairm an o f the Association’s recently created Com m ittee on Policy. T his vantage point was skillfully used. Reed was successful in obtain­ ing for his com m ittee at first m odest an d then substantial foundation financ­ ing. W ith this su p p o rt he was able, for several years, to m ount a cam paign aim ed at m aking the Association m ore broadly based (i.e., less disciplinaryprofessional) and political science m ore directly effective in political life, a cam paign th at included, am ong o th er activities, a national radio program , “You and Y our G overnm ent.” As Somit and T an en h au s (1967, p. 88) p u t it, “T h o u g h neither M erriam nor Reed cap tu red the Holy Land, o r cam e close to it, both crusades left th eir m ark on the discipline.” Both “crusades” seized territory and produced converts; both left a legacy o f ideas an d attitudes im portant for fu tu re events. Each em phasized d ifferen t potential roles for political scientists as individuals and for political science as a self-conscious enterprise. T h e role

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conflict that was en g en d ered was clearer, m ore intense, than it had been d u rin g th e early period, though not so sh arp as it was to becom e following W orld W ar II. N ot know ledge o f the past for its own sake but u n d erstan d in g o f the present is th e central objective o f this essay. T his objective w arrants some fu rth e r observations on the “crusades” o f the twenties and thirties, ap art from the fact th at to say no m ore w ould be to oversim plify and distort history. A lthough differences o f opinion were m any and often sharp, to picture two m onolithic parties in contest is incorrect. T h e re was little arg u m en t that political science should abandon all but one o f its roles. Few believed that political science should forsake its claim to “science"— though m any would insist on a “soft” definition o f th e term . T h e partisans on each side often had, am ong them selves, significantly d ifferen t positions on im p o rtan t issues o f m ethod and strategy. M erriam him self was not only scholar and academ ic, h e was a som etim e political activist. His belief in science was a rd e n t an d his u n d erstan d in g o f it, in context, sophisticated. But above all, he was interested in dem ocracy, and what he sought was to p u t science into th e service o f dem ocratic principles. He felt no inconsistency at all in trying sim ultaneously to forw ard science and dem ocracy. T h e historical context m ade it very easy to perceive the two goals as co n g ru en t, if n o t indeed the sam e goal. Both A m erican dem ocratic political th o u g h t and pragm atic philosophy, then prom inent, saw dem ocracy as essential for scientific progress an d science as a reinforcem ent o f dem oc­ racy: Both req u ire experim entation, an honest search for reality, a public test o f tru th . For M erriam the need was essentially for w hat cam e to be called “policy science,” and he saw aid com ing especially from psychology and quantitative m ethods. William B. M unro saw physics as the p ro p e r m odel for a genuine political science; an d unlike m any others who em phasized the need for m ore science, he arg u ed th at it was not a p ro p e r function o f political scientists to teach dem ocratic citizenship. G. E. G. Catlin, in his The Science and Method of Politics and o th er writings, perhaps advanced fu rth est tow ard the value-free, “p u re science” position. His thesis th at “pow er” is the essence o f the political and th at a science o f politics thus should address itself to political pow er was, as the record testifies, a persuasive one to m any inclined in the direction of m ore science. T hose on the “o th e r side” in th e debates o f the tim e— notable am ong them , William Y. Elliott, Edw ard S. Corwin, and Charles A. B eard — on the whole opposed n eith er the idea o f science n o r the aspiration tow ard it: T o the extent th at scientific m ethods are useful, let us use them . R ather, they decried w hat they reg ard ed as pretentiousness and unrealistic am bitions,

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and they a rg u e d — strongly— against the possibility and (or) desirability o f a value-free political science. Elliott’s The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics (1928) was and is the a p p ro p riate “co u n ter” to The Science and Method of Politics. In perusing these two works, one advances his u n d erstan d in g not only o f the m iddle years b u t o f the controversies following W orld W ar II. Finally, it should be noted th at th e rank and file o f political scientists were at m ost interested partisans in th e debates o f their leaders on the fu tu re o f science in political science. Most were teachers o f political science in colleges and universities, an d the objectives o f th e teaching were seen (particularly at th e u n d e rg rad u ate level, w here m ost o f the teaching was done) prim arily as p rep arin g students for public careers o r for effective dem ocratic citizenship. (Some saw them selves as hum anists seeking the trad i­ tional goals o f a liberal education. T hey saw the study o f politics as useful in this context. B ut they were sceptical not only o f scientific aspirations but of th e efficacy o f training for public service and “teaching citizenship.”) In the increasing em phasis on g rad u ate training and particularly in the grow ing pow er o f th e Ph.D. in securing place and status, the C ontinental em phasis on research had seem ingly triu m p h ed . B ut perhaps m ore in form than in substance. In th e A m erican context, teaching, for m ost academ ic political scientists (and m ost political scientists were academics), had to be placed ahead o f research; an d th e aims o f that teaching had to be o th e r than com petence in research — scientific or otherwise. THE RECENT PERIOD: POLITICAL SCIENCE SINCE WORLD WAR II As the “recen t” period becomes the “contem porary” period, clarity and ob­ jectivity becom e m ore difficult. T h e size and com plexity of political science increase with every year while the perspective is sim ultaneously foreshort­ ened. Later, some observations on and analyses o f contem porary political science will be ventured. But im m ediately, the objective is to view the period since W orld W ar II as a whole, in the m an n er attem pted for th e preceding periods. H istorical Factors T h e m ajor events and tren d s o f the past three decades are hardly obscure, and th eir im pact on political science is obvious and often noted. It is well, nevertheless, to p u t the recent period into context. Even the “p u rest” physi­ cal science exists in a unique historical context and is affected by it. We may begin by noting that although the New Deal was an event o f the thirties, m uch o f its im pact on political science was delayed and long-lasting. It b ro u g h t about both an increased involvem ent o f political scientists with governm ent and a change in the type o f involvem ent: m ore full-time em ­

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ploym ent in adm inistrative positions— especially in federal g overnm ent— for a significant period, followed by a re tu rn to academia. T his increased in­ teraction blended into and was increased by the mobilization for an d p ro ­ secution o f W orld W ar II, which b ro u g h t social scientists by th e thousands into governm ent service. T o be sure, in m any instances th e social scientists were only app ren tice o r potential, and the service was military; but this circum stance may have heightened, not lowered, the impact. T h e often-noted result o f personal governm ental service for political scientists was to dem o n strate to them a gap between governm ental reality as experienced an d the exhortations, abstractions, and “facts” o f their disci­ pline. F u rth erm o re, political scientists found that their discipline, in com pari­ son with economics, was less well u n d erstood and certainly less well recog­ nized for em ploym ent purposes. (Public adm inistration had found some recognition in the civil service classification system; but since political science as such was n o t a recognized expertise, many political scientists found th em ­ selves en terin g governm ent em ploym ent as “econom ists,” o r w hatever.) T h e effects o f personal governm ental experience were m anifested in various ways. In public adm inistration, fo r exam ple, an enlarged and deep en ed “case study” m ovem ent was an attem p t to close the gap between theory and facts. But beyond question the m ain result was to create a m ood favorable to the postw ar behavioral m ovem ent. T h e inadequacies o f then-contem porary political science were exposed, and th e need for g reater penetration, m ore “realism ,” was dem onstrated. T h e W ar itself an d th e consequent altered world and national situations created new problem s an d o p portunities, to which th ere were m ore specific responses. Following the second world cataclysm, a world organization was again created; b u t this tim e th ere was no “retu rn to norm alcy.” Instead, there was intense com petition betw een superpow ers and th eir satellites and allies, cold w ar th reaten in g to becom e— and marginally becom ing— hot war. Old nationalism s were reasserted an d new ones developed. T h e centuriesold W estern p enetration and dom ination o f the non-W estern world, already in decline, was decisively reversed; m any “new nations” o f greatly differing n atu re and size cam e into the aren a o f international politics. T h e U nited States, by force o f circum stances now a superpow er and by national decision resolved to play a m ajor role in world affairs, set u p o n various courses o f action: the m aintenance, for the first tim e in history, o f a sizeable actionready military force; the “containing” o f com m unism by m eans that m ight (and occasionally did) include m ilitary action; aid in restoring the econom y o f noncom m unist E urope; military aid to allies and potential allies. A socalled Revolution o f Rising Expectations occurred; “developm ent” became a w orldw ide preoccupation and expectation, closely related to national and ideological com petition. A m erica’s M arshall Plan assistance to E urope was followed by an d bro ad en ed into “Point F o u r” aid to developing nations.

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T h e study o f international politics and related subjects was tre m e n ­ dously stim ulated by these m om entous changes. Both in num bers attending to such m atters and in the vitality and creativeness o f the response, th ere is a sh arp contrast to the interw ar period. T h e study o f com parative govern­ m ent, now com ing to be called com parative politics, was also greatly stim u­ lated. N ot only was its scope b ro ad en ed geographically in an attem p t to encom pass governm ent w herever found; its conceptual apparatus was re ­ constructed with th e aim o f em bracing political phenom ena o f all ideological coloration, cultural variation, an d socioeconomic complexity. Political scien­ tists by the h u n d red s, especially those identified with public adm inistration, had periods o f service in “technical assistance” projects in developing coun­ tries. T h e result was a related an d sim ilar attem p t to b roaden and stren g th en public adm inistration to enable it to cope with adm inistration — m ore widely, “developm ent”— in non-W estern contexts. In a n u m b er o f ways technical and scientific changes (“advances”) rooted in o r following W orld W ar II have been highly consequential for political science. T h e creation o f fission-fusion bom bs has profoundly af­ fected the study o f international politics and national security. T h e invention o f the electronic co m p u ter an d th e rap id developm ent o f com puter technology (“h a rd ” and “soft”) are o f course closely related to advances in the size and sophistication o f voting studies. M ore generally, the great developm ent in d ata gathering, storing, an d m anipulating capacities, in the m achine’s ability to replace, expand, an d sim ulate hum an thought, is consequential for all o f political science. T h e rapid rise o f national and international air travel has perm itted and stim ulated a level o f intellectual interchange and foreign study never before possible. In addition to th eir effects on A m erican politi­ cal science, th e developm ent o f travel and com m unications technology pa­ tently has contributed to an “internationalizing” o f political science. T h e u p su rg e in the su p p o rt o f scientific research and developm ent, particularly after the launching o f earth-orbiting satellites by the U.S.S.R., resulted in some increased su p p o rt for the social sciences and has, in one way or an o th er, affected the research and attitudes o f political scientists. Relevant to m uch that has h ap p en ed to and in political science is the fact that the past q u a rte r century has been a period o f rapid national grow th and, on the whole, econom ic prosperity. T h e m ost obvious relationships concern the size o f th e en terp rise and the level and types o f support. T h e increase in population and especially th e phenom enal increase in higher education m eant a grow ing base o f su p p o rt for political science, inasm uch as academ ia is the location for most disciplinary activity. O n an u n p reced en ted scale, fu n d in g for special program s and fo r research was obtainable. For a n u m b er o f reasons foundation su p p o rt was often generous (but by no m eans equally available to all “interests” in political science), and governm ent sup­ p o rt becam e increasingly a factor (but, again, selective in its objectives).

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T h o u g h the m ost obvious correlations o f grow th an d affluence are with quantitative aspects o f political science, there may have been effects on the tone a n d directions o f political science: on problem s researched, on con­ cepts, o n results. In th e most recen t period, especially, som e have charged th at political science, in attending to its personal and professional interests, has been opportunistic, thus lending its su p p o rt to an unjust “Establishm ent.” It is o f course impossible to treat in a few lines “intellectual” develop­ m ents o f the postw ar years in relation to political science, b u t two factors deserve m ention even in this b rief sketch. O ne is the continuing decline o f idealist philosophy an d th e ra th e r ab ru p t decline o f pragm atic philosophy; an d the concom itant rise o f logical positivism, together with a m ore general interest in “philosophy o f science.” T h e o th e r (which is also a “quantitative” m atter) is th at the postw ar years were “grow th” years, not only for political science but for th e social sciences in general. O th e r social sciences (and o th er fields, including psychology, statistics, logic, and m athem atics) w ere also a d ­ vancing rapidly, an d the social sciences in general were striving tow ard m ore a n d “p u re r” science, u n d e r conditions th at favored th e diffusion o f concepts a n d techniques. Cause an d effect are tangled and obscure (to say the least). B ut both m aterial an d intellectual forces seem often to have w orked together to stim ulate an d su p p o rt the behavioral m ovem ent in political science. Finally, in this sketch o f factors providing th e m atrix o f political science since W orld W ar II, note m ust be taken o f m ajor events, shifts in trends, and changes in em otional climate since the m iddle and late sixties: for the qual­ ifying p h rase “u p to fairly recendy” m ust be added to m uch o f w hat has been set forth. Perhaps it is too m uch to say th at in recent years th e U nited States has en tered into a T oynbeean T im e o f T roubles. B ut m uch has h ap ­ p en ed in recen t years that, by wide agreem ent, is “dow n” o r “b ad ”; and the national m ood, as th e sixties drew to a close and the seventies began, can p erh ap s be characterized as one o f anxiety, exasperation, an d malaise. A m ere listing o f some o f the events and problem s m ust here suffice: a w ar th at, in the m an n er in which it was en tered into and in the issues it raised, created division and em bitterm ent; a “w ar against poverty” that created expectations th at perhaps could not be, and in any case w ere not, realized; an econom ic recession o f serious proportions; the assertion o f racial-ethnic rights an d identity; an increase in and increasing recognition of u rb an -cen tered problem s; episodes o f violence and civil disorder; the rise o f th e so-called C ounter-C ulture; the revival o f o ld er form s o f radicalism to­ g eth e r with the em ergence of a self-styled New Left; the rapid rise to p ro m ­ inence o f problem s o f pollution and o f ecological problem s in general. F or p resen t purposes there should be ad d ed explicitly w hat is to some exten t im plied: Recent years have witnessed what is probably a falling o ff o f su p p o rt for form al education. C ertainly (here econom ic recession and d e ­ m ographic factors e n te r in) the postw ar expansion o f higher education has

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significantly slowed. T h e re has been som ething o f a w ide-spectrum decline in respect o r reg ard for governm ental institutions and a decline in belief in the efficacy o f “g overnm ental solutions” (paradoxically, while legislatures continue to resp o n d to requests for “solutions” an d governm ental em ploy­ m ent continues to increase). T h e re is a noticeable rise in hostility tow ard m odern technology and even som ething o f a “revolt” against the institutions an d cu ltu re o f science. At this point one cannot know the full im port for political science o f the events and m ovem ents o f recent years. W hat is tem porary aberration and w hat th e beginning o f a long-term trend? W hat are transient sym ptom s and w hat underlying causes? W hat is peculiar to Am erica and w hat related to b ro ad er cu rren ts o f world history? O ne can confidently assert th at the events and tren d s o f recent times have had som e effect, to date, on political science— as will be observed below. B ut one can only hazard guesses as to the future. Professional-Disciplinary Developments In general, the post-W orld W ar II period has been a good period for politi­ cal science. T o be sure, the “upw ard curve” may to some extent only reflect the national grow th and prosperity (particularly the grow th o f h igher educa­ tion); an d m any political scientists are critical o f some “achievem ents.” N evertheless, the en terp rise o f political science expanded greatly in size, and in m any ways it prospered. A nd the opinion o f m ost political scientists is that, by m eaningful and legitim ate criteria, th e enterprise has significantly advanced from its position a generation ago. Growth and organizational change. At the close o f W orld W ar II, the A m eri­ can Political Science Association had a m em bership o f 3300. In late 1972 the m em bership stood at 15,800. T h e n u m b er o f political science departm ents in colleges an d universities has risen to approxim ately 1340, though in m any (mostly the sm aller institutions) political science is still com bined with one or m ore o th er disciplines. T h e n u m b er o f d epartm ents aw arding the Ph.D. d eg ree has risen to m ore th an one h u n d re d , and the n u m b er o f Ph.D.s aw arded annually is approxim ately 700. A lthough “excellence,” as com ­ m only ju d g e d , is certainly not equally distributed on a geographical basis, m uch less am ong all institutions aw arding the Ph.D., nevertheless the “nationalization” o f high stan d ards and high rep u tatio n already a p p a re n t in the interw ar years has continued. In the post-W orld W ar II years m ajor organizational changes were m ade in the A m erican Political Science Association, changes which m oved it away from th e “learned society” m ode tow ard the “professional association" m ode. O n th e eve o f W orld W ar II the Association still functioned w ithout a continuing national center. Clerical-business m atters were largely divided

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betw een a S ecretary-T reasurer and the M anaging E ditor o f the Review. T h e Executive Council and th e President had lim ited powers; Association com ­ mittees ten d ed to have a life o f their own, often a source o f em barrassm ent o r a cause o f an g er to many m em bers; with increasing size and complexity, the plan n in g and conduct o f m eetings became increasingly a problem . Im m ediately after the war Association affairs en tered into a period o f crisis— o r at least o f reform ism and contention. T h e result was m ajor changes, ad o p ted in 1949 and rapidly p u t into effect. T h e Executive Council was abolished and replaced by a Council with an in n er Executive Com m ittee. T h e office o f President Elect was instituted to ensure greater continuity o f leadership. A national office with a small but continuing staff was established in W ashington, headed (at first part-tim e, b u t soon full-time) by an Execu­ tive D irector. In the early fifties actions were taken to m ake the Association m aster in its own house by reducing the autonom y o f its committees. In th e general view o f the m em bership o f the Association, the reform s have resulted in a greatly im proved situation (certainly dissatisfactions have n o t ru n in the direction o f a re tu rn to previous arrangem ents). Political science has a continuing “presence” in the national capital. Stability, con­ tinuity, a n d regularity in Association affairs have been forw arded, services to m em bers expanded. Association com m unication with governm ent organs and personnel, as well as with o th er professional associations and with fo u n ­ dations, has been gready facilitated. W ith a national office and a continuing staff, th e Association has been enabled to develop and adm inister a consid­ erable n u m b er o f program s and activities: internships, aw ards, training p ro ­ gram s, an d so forth. D u rin g th e same period th at the overarching organization for political science has been strengthened, a developm ent o f an o th er sort has taken place, nam ely, the establishm ent o f regional political science associations. T h e creation o f th e S outhern Political Science Association in the thirties was noted above. T h a t organization has been jo in ed by a Midwest Political Sci­ ence Association, a W estern Political Science Association, a Pacific N orthw est Political Science Association, a New England Political Science Association, a N orth east Political Science Association, an d a S outhw estern Political Science Association. (T he exact d ate o f establishm ent o f regional associations is dif­ ficult to fix, since characteristically they have begun on an inform al basis.) F u rth er, a n u m b er o f state political science associations have been form ed; th e re are even a considerable n u m b er o f associations representing cities, m etropolitan areas, and parts o f large, populous states. A national political science h o n o r society, Pi Sigma A lpha, was founded in 1920; it is a m em ber o f the Association o f College H o n o r Societies and has approxi­ mately 150 chapters. T hese regional and o th e r associations are not “divi­ sions” o f th e Am erican Political Science Association; they are independent, tho u g h n o t in any im portant sense com petitive. “Supplem entary" may be the

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best term to characterize the relationship. Many, probably a m ajority, o f political scientists have m em bership in two or m ore political science associa­ tions. Political science publications. In the recent period the volum e o f political science publications has burgeoned because o f a n um ber o f interacting fac­ tors. T hey include th e increase in the n u m b er o f political scientists and the resulting increase in research and writing, a grow ing m arket (especially for teaching materials), and above all, changes in intellectual orientations and the exploration o f new areas. In fact, the volume o f publication is now so large th at it is no longer possible for a political scientist, faced with many dem ands on his tim e, to have m ore than a superficial know ledge o f the total enterp rise o f political science. T h e A m erican Political Science Association now has two main organs. T h e American Political Science Review, though increased in size th ro u g h the years, has been supplem ented since 1968 by PS. (R epresenting both Political Science and “post script,” as the first issues indicate, P S now stands alone.) T h o u g h the m aterial in th e two organs is not sharply differentiated, the form er contains chiefly reports on research, general essays, and coverage (th ro u g h reviews and notes) o f political science publications; the latter con­ tains chiefly a variety o f m aterial relating to disciplinary-professional affairs (meetings, com m ittee rep o rts, personnel changes, etc.). T h e jo u rn als published by the regional associations, th o u g h giving some special attention to the region served, are w ide-spectrum , in the sense that they not only cover political science in general but also publish m aterial from political scientists outside the region. T h e S outhern Political Science Associa­ tion publishes the Journal of Politics. T h e organ o f the W estern Political Science Association is Western Political Quarterly, that o f the Midwest Political Science Association is Midwest Journal of Political Science', th at o f the N o rth ­ east Political Science Associations is Polity. G eneral o r w ide-spectrum jo u r ­ nals include two with university associations: Political Science Quarterly (Columbia University) and Review of Politics (University o f N otre Dame). As one moves beyond the w ide-spectrum journals, it is impossible in short compass either to catalog o r to describe the periodical literature (much less the occasional o r irreg u lar “soft-cover” literature) o f contem porary polit­ ical science. Some jo u rn als focus on what has conventionally been considered a “field” o r subdiscipline; thus Public Opinion Quarterly, Public Administration Review, and World Politics. But quickly boundaries become indistinct, “field” labels useless. T h e variety is suggested by the following titles: American Be­ havioral Scientist, American Politics Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, Jour­ nal of Comparative Administration, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Policy Studies Journal, Public Management, Public Policy. (A n um ber o f th e new er jo u rn a ls are published commercially, not as organs o f learned o r professional societies.)

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T h e essential point is th a t although the literature o f political science has a fairly well agreed-upon core, it has no recognizable periphery, in term s o f w here political scientists publish o r in term s o f m aterials germ ane to political science b ut produced by those n ot nominally political scientists. T h e interests and activities o f political scientists move outw ard toward and become m in­ gled with those o f the o th e r social sciences, with those o f the o th er learned professions (especially law), with those o f traditional intellectual endeavors (literature, philosophy, m athem atics), with those o f new er intellectual foci (systems theory, co m p u ter technology, operations research), with those o f politicians, publicists and journalists. Jo u rn als o f considerable, perhaps even crucial, value to political scientists ru n to several score (even putting aside for the m om ent foreign publications). T h e “book” literatu re o f political science— in annual volum e several times th at o f a generation ago— is even less sharply edged than the periodi­ cal literature, lacking publishing sources that are identified only with politi­ cal science. T o be sure a “co re” literature can be distinguished, each item of which is identifiable by the prom inence o f the au th o r as a political scientist o r by th e fact th at the book treats a subject that convention o r em erging consensus regards as political science. But no m eaningful boundary can be discerned. Political scientists write for many purposes and for many publics; and m any persons from o th e r disciplines and professions w rite books that contribute to (or at least contain m aterial germ ane to) political science. “Academ ization” and “p r o fe s s io n a liz a tio n T h e “academ ization” o f political science noted for the interw ar years has continued in the post-W orld W ar II period. In the years before W orld W ar I the majority o f the m em bership o f the Association was nonacadem ic (in the sense o f location an d em ploym ent). Im m ediately after W orld W ar I academics became a m ajority, and the size o f th eir majority has increased th ro u g h the years, reaching approxim ately seventy-five p ercent o f the personal m em bership. T h e shift did not occur as the result o f Association policy; that is, th ere was no conscious intent to discourage nonacadem ic m em bership or to favor academ ic m em bership. Its causes, rath er, m ust be sought in th e “situation,” in certain characteristics of A m erican political and educational institutions, and in certain events and developm ents. Obviously m uch that has been recounted indicates a raising o f stan­ dard s, the developm ent o f criteria for ju d g in g achievem ent, and the estab­ lishm ent o f firm organizational bases for political science research and o th er activities. Beyond d oubt political science has successfully asserted its claim as an academ ic discipline. H as it also, by virtue o f what has been achieved, m oved in the direction o f professionalization? T h a t it has done so is the com m on opinion o f political scientists w riting about political science. Such an opinion is not unreasonable. T h e developm ent o f g ro u p self-consciousness, criteria o f excellence, and separate organizational bases are usual aspects o f

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professionalization. But in m oving tow ard an academ ic base and a discipli­ nary m odel, political science may have m oved away from , not tow ard, con­ gruency with o th er professional criteria. T his m atter receives fu rth e r atten ­ tion below. The Behavioral Movement By alm ost any m easure the m ost im p o rtan t aspect o f post-W orld W ar II political science has been th e rise o f “behavioralism ”: the controversies it en g en d ered , its success in com ing to dom inate m uch o f organized political science, the changes it b ro u g h t in th e m atters to which political scientists atten d , and the m an n er in which they are addressed. A lengthy essay would be necessary to treat the subject even in m oderate detail, and what follows can only be designated a sketch. However, no m ore (if indeed as m uch) is need ed by those who have at least a general acquaintance with th e “story.” A nd for others, a vast literatu re— substantive, polemical, in terp retativ e— is readily available; in fact, it is unavoidable in any m oderately extended a tten ­ tion to the w ritten record o f th e period. T h e behavioral m ovem ent may be in terp reted as a renew ed and rein ­ forced effo rt to take the “science” in political science seriously, to make political science a tru e o r g enuine science. T h e m odel taken was natural science, i.e., the physical and biological sciences. T o a lesser degree (or at a d ifferen t level) the m odels were psychology and o th er social sciences deem ed to have been m ore successful than political science in approxim ating the n atu ral science m odel, a t least in some o f th eir aspects. T h e term “behavioralism ” to designate the reinvigorated scientism had several sources. Well before m idcentury “behaviorism ” was a well-developed point o f view and m ethod in psychology, stressing observable behavior over introspection an d subjectivism. Som e debt exists in this direction, but there was no sim ple borrow ing. W hat h appened was m ore com plicated— and som ew hat obscure. Certainly p a rt o f the story concerns the fact th at “be­ havior” grew in favor in the post-W orld W ar II years; to scientistically in­ clined social scientists it p u t the focus o f attention w here it should be, on w hat could be observed and “objectively” studied. Part o f the story concerns th e p h rase “the behavioral sciences,” which cam e into vogue at m idcentury. “T h e behavioral sciences” conveyed a scientistic intent, i.e., an intent to focus on observable behavior. It also served to divide the intellectual-disciplinary universe in a m ore o r less new m anner. Disciplines o r parts o f disciplines with the a p p ro p riate focus (e.g., m uch o f psychology) were, by definition, included; those with an in ap p ro p riate focus (e.g., m uch o f history) were excluded. Strictly intellectual and “strategic” motives were m ingled, it ap ­ pears, in this new usage. For a n u m b er o f reasons foundation and govern­ m ental su p p o rt for “behavioral science” was easier to secure th an su p p o rt for “social science.” Be that as it may, the adjective “behavioral” was con­

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verted in the course o f events into the n oun “behavioralism .” and within political science the term cam e to designate the m ovem ent tow ard a h a rd e rsh a rp e r science. T h e reasons for th e resurgence o f scientism have been suggested above. T hey include the New Deal, W orld W ar II, and its afterm ath o f reconstruc­ tion and “developm ent.” T hey include the em ergence o f com m unism and fascism, rapid change in th e w orld’s political m ap, the new position o f the U nited States as a superpow er, th e cold war. Many political scientists, either from observation and reflection o r from personal experience, were im­ pressed with what seem ed a wide gap between the political science they p ro ­ fessed and a political science that could adequately explain and control the “real” political world. Also relevant were o th er types o f m otivation, for ex­ am ple, th e discovery that a putative expertise in political science had little value in securing governm ent em ploym ent and the feeling that o th er social sciences were m ore advanced along th e road tow ard science. Advances in technology, both “soft” and “h a rd ” (typically in com bina­ tion) also en te r in. T h e em ergence o f operations research from W orld W ar II, for exam ple, suggested new interrelations and potentialities for social science. T h e advance o f survey techniques, both for social-political and for com m ercial purposes, and especially the invention and rapid developm ent o f the electronic co m p u ter and related data processing equ ip m en t provided the foundation for studies o f a scale and com plexity that had previously been impossible. Intellectual advances and changes in philosophic styles e n te r in as well. Some pertain to the o th er social sciences, som e concern m athem atics and statistics, often both together, as with gam e theory. O f especial im portance was the “reception” o f logical positivism, which largely displaced pragm atism as “th e” scientific philosophy. Logical positivism’s sh arp separation o f fact and value categories and its assertion that, though values lend them selves in various ways to scientific scrutiny, th eir “valida­ tion” is outside the realm o f science presented an intellectual “m ap” quite d iffere n t from that readily available to earlier political scientists with scientis­ tic inclinations—and to their opponents. Behavioralism was n o t— and is not, if it can be said still to exist “as such”—a clear and firm creed, an ag reed-upon set o f postulates and rules. It has sometim es, with reason, been designated a “m ood” o r “persuasion.” Ideological and religious com parisons are not inappropriate. M arxists have in com m on certain basic beliefs about history, social causation, a n d morality, an d in a sense they are “u n ited ” in what they oppose. But they are neverthe­ less often divided radically on doctrine, strategy, tactics, and objectives. Prot­ estant C hristians have had in com m on an opposition to the Catholic church; but the roads to salvation chosen by d ifferen t branches and sects have var­ ied. Behavioralists, like Marxists and Protestant C hristians, have sometimes p resen ted a m ore o r less unified fro n t against the “enem y”; b u t— like M arx­

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ists and P rotestant C hristians— they have often disputed and contested am ong them selves— over doctrine, strategy, tactics, and objectives. Despite the lack o f clarity and consensus, an attem pt m ust nevertheless be m ade to indicate some m ain tendencies and tenets of behavioralism . Negatively, behavioralism set itself against “m ere” description, “raw ” (“barefoot”) em piricism , “sim ple” factualism; against metaphysics, abstract speculation, and deduction from “first principles”; against “g ra n d ” in te rp re ­ tations o f history, th e contem porary world, and fu tu re evolution; against legalistic m odes o f th o u g h t and “institutional” m odes o f analysis; against entangling political science with m oral o r ethical m atters— at least if that led the political scientist qua political scientist to “prescribe.” Positively, be­ havioralism favored studying successful sciences to learn and know how to apply p ro p e r scientific m odes o f th o u g h t and m ethods o f research; focusing attention on actual, observable behavior, i.e., on w hat actors in fact do o f political significance; seeking, carefully appraising, and testing em pirical theory, i.e., theory about the behavioral w orld; fully and scrupulously gathering data, b u t d oing so with theoretical guidance and for theoretical (testing) purposes; learning and applying as m uch m athem atics and espe­ cially as m uch statistical-quantitative m ethodology as the phenom ena o r data perm it; w orking tow ard the attainm ent o f “higher-level” generalizations, i.e., those which explain m ore phen om ena with greater clarity, simplicity, and economy; in general, striving tow ard the goals o f explanation, prediction, and control. T o some these generalizations may seem too pat o r too sweeping, and to others they may seem inaptly put, with incorrect em phasis and m isleading effect. In any case, it should be m ade explicit th at th ere are a n u m b er o f im portant m atters on which avowed behavioralists have spoken with m ore than one voice. O ne o f them concerns the feasibility and desirability o f a “paradigm ” for political science as a whole, a theoretical construct which would serve to orient and guide theory and research for the entire disci­ pline. A n o th er (som ewhat related) concerns the uniqueness and purity o f the political, the extent to which political science should seek its own separate identity as against integration with the constructs and activities o f o th er social sciences. A nother concerns the role and status o f “applied” research, its im portance m easured against and its contribution to “p u re” research (or theory). A n other (related but not identical) concerns th e possibility, p oten­ tial, and desirability o f “policy research”— w hether it can be do n e w ithout com prom ising scientific integrity, its p ro p e r m eans and limits, its claim on scarce scientific resources, its m orality (in the service o f what ends, d e te r­ m ined by whom?). Behavioralism g athered force in the forties, and its status in the fifties may fairly be described as a “m ovem ent.” T h o u g h it lacked both a unifying organization and a single creed, it had effective leaders and ard en t, able

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partisans, especially am ong the y o unger political scientists. As suggested, a n u m b e r o f factors w orked in its favor. N ot the least was com paratively a d ­ vantageous financing in su p p o rt o f training (or retraining) and research. Research (m ore broadly, “publication”) is th e acknow ledged, favored ro u te to strategic location and prom otion in academ ia. Behavioralists in n u m b er m et the pragm atic test. In th e fifties an d especially in the sixties, they suc­ ceeded in reaching high and strategic positions in academ ia and in the Association. T h e behavioral m ovem ent evoked stro n g and occasionally fierce resis­ tance in academ ia an d in th e Association. T h e sources o f the resistance have— again— been suggested. Som e political scientists were essentially hum anists, reg ard in g the study o f political experience as a source o f insight an d wisdom, to be sure, but not as a field for the application o f “h a rd ” science. Some, deeply steeped in philosophy and law, ju d g e d behavioralism a barb arian rep u d iatio n o f an invaluable, hard-w on heritage. Many were prim arily interested in “practical” politics o r pressing issues o f policy, and they saw behavioralism as, at best, an irrelevance. Many saw their mission as the p rom otion o f dem ocratic citizenship and found shocking the sentim ent th at “the political scientist has no m ore responsibility for dem ocracy than the sociologist has fo r th e family.” Still others were interested prim arily in p re p ­ aration for governm ent service an d fo u n d in behavioralism little or nothing p ertin e n t to that end. Even less than the behavioralists did th eir o pponents present a united front; the professor o f political philosophy and the professor of budgeting often had little in com m on but opposition to w hat both reg ard ed as d a n g er­ ous o r irrelevant. T h ey could an d often did p resent telling argum ents against behavioralism : the difficulties, practical and theoretical, in achieving behavioral goals; the u rg en t political-m oral issues sh unted aside; the im por­ tance o f the im m easurable an d im ponderable; the gaps between data and theory; the p o n d ero u s m ethodological “packing” for inconsequential re ­ search “trips.” T h e o p p o n en ts also had th eir situational advantages. A fter all, they began in possession o f most o f the positions o f status and strength. Ancient an d respectable traditions could be draw n upon for support. Power­ ful forces in society were interested in th eir goals. A nd if foundations were prim arily interested in financing behavioral research, legislatures were prim arily interested in financing citizenship education and practical training. T h e period o f strong, som etim es bitter en co u n ter lasted, roughly, from 1950 to 1965. By the latter d ate the behavioralists, it m ight be said, had won a qualified victory. T h ey had cap tu red many strategic positions, and the intellectual m ap o f political science had been greatly altered th ro u g h their efforts. It may be closer to correct to say th at by the mid-sixties the situation had been so changed th at o n e could not speak in any m eaningful sense o f “sides” o r “victories”: political science had becom e too com plex, argum ents

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too subtle, opinions too tem p ered , em otions too exhausted. W hat were now to becom e im p o rtan t were influences originating in th e turm oil and ferm ent o f the late sixties and early seventies. T hese again posed behavioralism as an issue, b u t in a n o th er context and in altered ways. Public-Oriented Activities and Responsibilities T h e intent now is to take some note o f activities and responsibilities of political scientists o th er th an those with a strict intellectual-disciplinary orien­ tation. T h e problem is to find a designation that does not imply a ju d g m e n t on the w orth o f the activities and responsibilities or o f th eir rig h t to be reg ard ed as a p a rt o f political science. T h e designation “public-oriented activities and responsibilities” is perhaps an acceptable solution. In any event, the activities and responsibilities discussed can be characterized by such term s as: outw ard-looking, applied, activist, “service.” T h e term inological problem pertains to the m ixed heritage o f political science and to differences o f opinion, often sharp, on the present obligations and fu tu re developm ent o f an enterprise th at designates itself as political science. T o som e these public-oriented activities and responsibilities are not properly reg ard ed as a p a rt o f political science. T hey may be ju d g e d to be salutary, desirable fo r perform ance by som eone in or out o f organized polit­ ical science. B ut they are reg ard ed as beyond, o r at least only m arginal to, the scientific endeavor, as nonscientific or extrascientific. T hey may be ju d g ed as futile, wasteful, annoying, an d even em barrassing to a scientific e n te r­ prise. T his is not to imply th at the strict scientist is w ithout a sense o f responsibility. Indeed, in his view the duty o f political science is to achieve science. It is in the scientific p u rsu it th at duty is fulfilled and the public truly served. T o o th er political scientists public-oriented activities and responsibilities are the h eart o f the enterprise. T hese political scientists may o r may not be sceptical o f the scientific claims and aspirations o f their colleagues. But they believe th at we already have m ore and b etter “political science” th an is now in practice, and th at th e first priority is to ensure w ider know ledge and application. T hey may believe th at the political scientist has civic resp o n ­ sibilities beyond o r additional to scholarship and research in politics, resp o n ­ sibilities th at are not adequately fulfilled by separating the roles o f political scientist and private citizen. For such beliefs th ere is, as observed above, w arrant in tradition and etymology. M oreover, what is concerned is not simply an “academic" arg u m en t. Som etim es public-oriented activities and responsibilities are m andated by the source o f funds, and thus an ingrained sense o f duty and a form al req u irem en t may be m ingled—and thus also the politics o f th e polity and those o f the academ y may be m ingled. Public-oriented activities an d responsibilities do not lend them selves to

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sharp categorization, and, w hen categorizing is attem pted, two or m ore are often blended. B ut at least four types are distinguishable. 1. Citizenship, or civic education, centers on conveying a know ledge o f A m erican political institutions and o f the rights and duties o f citizens to u n d e rg ra d u ate collegians (in som e public institutions a legal requirem ent). But it has m any o th er possible aspects, including the p rep aratio n o f (or advising on th e p rep aratio n of) teaching m aterials for secondary and even elem entary curricula, as well as extra-academ ic lecturing. 2. Education fo r public service has th re e m ain aspects. O ne, beginning with citizenship education but going beyond it, seeks to im part extra knowledge (and p erh ap s an extra feeling o f responsibility) to those, such as lawyers and journalists, whose careers will have a special relation to and im pact on the political realm . T h e second concerns those who en ter political life as such, seeking and holding elective office o r at least supplying ex p ert counsel to such persons. Recognizing th at it does not have a m onopoly, to say the least, on th e source o f practical political knowledge, political science nevertheless seeks to convey political expertise to those who aspire to elective office. It aims a t conveying a practical know ledge, leading to success in achieving office; b ut it aims also, and m o re im portandy, to convey know ledge and inculcate values that will m ake p erfo rm ance in office m ore intelligent and publicly responsible. T h e third aspect concerns those who will en te r public service as appointed em ployees o r officials. H ere again political science oc­ cupies far from a m onopoly position. But here again political science is active: an d for th is aspect discrete courses, curricula, an d p ro g ram s— typically u n d e r the rubric “public adm inistration”— are m uch m ore a p p a re n t than for the first two. Som etim es the special education or training is u n d erg rad u ate. Much m ore frequently it is grad u ate, and occasionally it is “special” o r “m id­ c areer.” 3. Policy study and guidance covers a wide range o f activities, centering in academ ia but often ranging far afield, as in advising as consultant (to governm ent agency, political party, etc.) o r in public lecturing. A t one end o f the spectrum , acuvity u n d e r this heading may be reg ard ed as properly “sci­ entific”: inquiry aim ed at increasing knowledge o f how policy in general o r in a particular area is in fact m ade. At the o th er end o f the spectrum , by com m on agreem ent, advice on p re fe rre d policy in a certain area would be reg ard ed as “norm ative.” Between the extrem es are many activities in which “scientific” and “norm ative” aspects are jo in ed together in d ifferen t combi­ nations, often leading to theoretical and program atic disputes. T h e concept o f “policy science,” a frequently used term and one often used to designate a research am bition or program , is especially troublesom e. T h e intent, obvi­ ously, is somehow to join the norm ative and the scientific. But w hether this

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can be done, an d how it is to be done, are com plicated and contentious m atters. 4. Participation in public affairs w arrants recognition as a distinguishable type o f public-oriented activity u n d ertak en by political scientists, even though, patently, the preceding categories may involve some participation in public affairs. Some political scientists are “activists” in eith er partisan or “issue” politics. Some seek elected office; if successful, they may continue in a political career, o r they may re tu rn after a period to a teaching or research position. Many m ore political scientists spend som e period, from a few m onths to several years, in some sort o f appointed governm ental position. A ltogether, the ran g e an d variety o f participation in public affairs is great. Political scientists with stro n g scientific interests may look askance at such activities, may in fact reg ard them as irresponsible defections from the p ro p er role o f the political scientist. Political scientists o f an o th er m ind argue that political science has special responsibilities in public affairs, and th at personal experience in the “s tu f f ’ to which political science is addressed is a valuable, p erhaps even necessary, p art o f professional education in political science. It is difficult to generalize about the public-oriented activities and re ­ sponsibilities o f political science in the post-W orld W ar II period. T hey are sometimes interm ingled with scholarly-scientific pursuits, reliable d ata are unavailable, an d interpretations vary. N evertheless, some “global” observa­ tions are possible. O ne is th at public-oriented activities often have been attacked by behavioralists, and those engaging in them have been sometim es placed in a defensive position by the strength o f th e behavioralist m ovem ent. A nother is that despite the stren g th o f the drive tow ard a “p u re r” science of politics, public-oriented activities generally have not only survived but have increased— in absolute term s if not in term s o f p ro p o rtio n o f com parative resources (as allocated to teaching and research in academ ia). A n o th er is that in at least one area, nam ely, public service education, th ere has been an increase both in absolute and in relative terms. Developments in fou r areas. Some fu rth er observations about each o f the four areas will be hazarded. With reg ard to citizenship education, though th e total volum e o f such activity has rem ained high, the idea and the practice have suffered “erosion” from several sources. It is not simply that the scientifically inclined have found it an extrascientific d rain on resources. T h e re has often been a re ­ lated sentim ent th at “indoctrination” o r “teaching o f values” is an im p ro p er academic activity. Ironically, a sim ilar sentim ent som etim es issues from the other end o f the spectrum . H um anists, those to whom “liberal arts” is a

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sacred term , find “teaching citizenship” a crude form o f m ind m anipulation, unw orthy o f education rightly conceived. O thers, in and out o f political science, have leveled th e criticism th at such teaching, in effect if not in intent, is ideologically biased: W hat is conveyed is a simplistic, idealistic u p p er- or m iddle-class view o f the Am erican experience an d potential. A final an d p erhap s m ost telling observation is th at som e studies have p ro ­ d uced what ap p ears to be good evidence that “teaching citizenship” in the m an n er custom arily attem pted n eith er produces lasting know ledge n o r im ­ proves civic efficiency o r m orality. T h e response to such criticisms has been chiefly in accordance with the behavioral cu rren ts o f recen t years. An attem pt has been m ade to m ake citizenship education (both collegiate and precollegiate) less form alistic and “rom antic,” m ore realistic an d analytical. As this implies, an attem p t has also been m ade .to jo in citizenship education m ore closely with a realistic in tro ­ d uction to co ntem porary political science in general, introducing theoretical, com parative, an d m ethodological considerations into an area previously dom inated by form al description and m oral exhortation. T his is an ap p ro p riate place to take note o f th e Citizenship C learing H ouse-N ational C en ter fo r Education in Politics (CCH-NCEP), which cam e into existence as th e result o f som e postw ar activities aim ed at stim ulating g reater participation in politics by political scientists and m ore effective e d u ­ cational prep aratio n via political science for political careers. (T hough the efforts were focused as indicated, th e objectives o f CC H -N C EP m ight be characterized as, m ore generally, “political education.”) In m any ways the CCH -N CEP was successor and descendant o f th e Association’s interw ar C om m ittee on Policy, noted above. (T hom as H. Reed, who had dom inated th e Com m ittee on Policy, was highly influential in the creation o f CCHNCEP.) But CCH -N CEP, th o u g h largely a “political science” operation, was n ot form ally a p art o f the Association. N ourished by substantial foundation su p p o rt, CC H -N C EP m ounted a sizable program o f internships, confer­ ences, and so forth. In th e mid-sixties, when foundation su p p o rt was no longer forthcom ing, CC H -N CEP ceased operation; at th at tim e, th e Associa­ tion, gaining some foun d atio n sup p o rt, launched a som ew hat sim ilar— though also som ew hat d iffe re n t— program . Education for public service, as suggested, has been expanded d u rin g th e past q u a rter century, so fa r as concerns education for appointive posi­ tions. But what has taken place poses the question: Has the expansion taken place “within political science”? T h e answ er depends on w hat definition o f political science is accepted. Several tren d s m ake the question relevant. Most o f the education (or “train in g ,” th e term that m any w ould reg ard as m ore apt), so far as it is carried on in political science d ep artm en ts, is centered in the subdiscipline o r field o f public adm inistration. B ut public adm inistration

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has long had a separate professional association, an d political scientists specializing in public adm inistration are often restive an d sometimes seces­ sionist, feeling th at th eir interests are slighted. D evelopm ents o f an o th er kind are relevant. W hat is taught in the e d u ­ cational program s is less and less derived from political science, m ore an d m ore derived from o th e r sources (including but not limited to th e o th er social sciences). Some sep arate g rad u ate schools o f public adm inistration o r public affairs now exist, an d th eir n u m b er is slowly increasing. Also, d u rin g the recent period, schools o f business adm inistration have been developing p rogram s for “public sector” adm inistration; and recendy created generic “schools o f adm inistration” also have developed program s for public sector em ploym ent. Additionally, an increasing am ount o f education o r training for public em ploym ent is now “in-house,” that is to say, carried on within governm ental jurisdictions. As to policy study and guidance, perhaps it is desirable first o f all to underscore the am biguity o r am bivalence o f such activities vis-à-vis behavioralism. In some contexts an d in som e ways, policy study, even gui­ dance, is reg ard ed as quite respectable, scientifically considered, as well as m orally desirable as a m eans o f forw arding liberal-dem ocratic interests. H arold Lasswell, often th o u g h t o f as “th e” behavioralist of recent decades, has firmly su p p o rted th e “policy science” concept. B ut m uch, perhaps most, o f w hat is done by political scientists in the nam e o f policy research would not m eet acceptable scientific standards in the ju d g m e n t o f those who are strong in their behavioral convictions, however desirable it may seem to those who do it and how ever useful it may be to those who receive it. T his would be true, for exam ple, o f th e bulk o f the research o u tp u t o f the several score o f b u reau s— variously titled: bureaus (or institutes) o f public adm inis­ tration, bureaus o f state and local governm ent, bureaus o f public affairs— associated at least loosely with d ep artm en ts o f political science. (Characteristically, such units have training, consulting, o r some o th er “ser­ vice” functions.) Second, it should be observed that th e area o f policy research and gui­ dance has some similarities to th at o f education for public service. It too has ten d ed to becom e m ore interdisciplinary: less dom inated by concepts and m ethodology originating in political science, m ore characterized by a m ix­ tu re o f concepts and m ethodologies. A nd it too has ten d ed increasingly to be carried on u n d e r institutional arran g em en ts that are outside political science departm ents an d do not have “political science” in the institutional designa­ tion: often “institutes” for policy research, in general o r for specific areas. Participation in public affairs continues at a high level in absolute term s. Political scientists in n u m b er participate part-tim e or, fo r some period, full­ time in some aspect o f public affairs. T hey consult, testify, aid in cam paigns, take “tours o f d uty” at hom e o r abroad, m ake public addresses, an d so forth.

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B ut this activity m ust be viewed in the context o f what was noted above in the discussion o f “Academ ization an d Professionalization.” T h e dividing line betw een political scientist an d non-political scientist is sh arp er than it once was, a n d the “rules” governing political participation, as well as the ju d g ­ m ents placed on it, have subtly changed in half a century. Significant Changes in the Disciplinary Map T h e in ten t in what im m ediately follows is to indicate some o f th e m ore significant changes in the disciplinary “m ap” of political science since W orld W ar II. T h e n atu re o f these changes has been suggested— som etim es m ore than m erely suggested— above; an d the im plications o f some changes will be indicated m ore fully in what follows this section. B ut th e objective o f achiev­ ing a reasonably clear view o f th e recent and contem porary scene will be served both by em phasis and by fu rth e r inform ation at this point. From structure to process. Somit an d T an en h au s (1967, p. 133) conclude their review o f political science as a learned discipline in th e interw ar years with th e generalization: “T h e re was, in fine, a gradual shift in interest from stru c tu re an d policy to process.” In the recent period th e shift from struc­ tu re to process has continued and accentuated. T h e injunction to move from static to dynam ic m odes o f analysis has been a prom inent them e of behavioralism . Tw o related reasons for this em phasis appear. O ne is scientific-m ethodological: Political science m ust move beyond descriptiveprescriptive, institutional-legalistic approaches and develop theory and data ap p ro p ria te for a truly scientific enterprise. T h e o th er is related to the historical milieu: A world o f rap id change and turbulence m ust have a political science ap p ro p riate to th e times, one that can act intelligendy in such a world. W hether political science in the recent period has m oved also from “policy” to “process” is a com plicated question; the answ er given will d epend on in terp retatio n an d definition— eventually perhaps on the definition of political science. C ertainly what cam e to be regarded as m ainstream political science has evidenced little interest in policy in the substantive sense (e.g., labor policy, agricultural policy, tax policy). But attention to som e aspect o f the “policy-m aking process,” in line with the stress on process, has been substantial; and the idea o f “policy science,” using scientific m ethodology to achieve dem ocratic policy objectives, has had em inent sponsorship (includ­ ing prom inently, as noted above, th at o f H arold Lasswell). Typically, policy research by political scientists, w h ether “old style” o r “new style,” has in­ volved interdisciplinary cooperation (chiefly with economists); an d typically, it has taken place in bureaus and institutes only loosely connected with (or detached from ) academic d ep artm en ts o f political science.

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Expansion o f the comparative m ethod. For a n u m b er o f reasons the use o f som e type o f com parative m ethod becam e a p ro m in en t featu re o f postW orld W ar II political science. T h e rise o f com m unism an d fascism an d th e rap id post-W ar increase o f non-W es tern states w ere a sp u r to the com parative m ethod. T hese develop­ m ents created a challenge to develop conceptual and m ethodological m eans to em brace in m eaningful com parison political phenom ena across the ideological spectrum , across varying historical-cultural matrices and, geog­ raphically, a ro u n d th e en tire w orld. T h e costs o f turbulence, the risks o f violence, the need for “developm ent" seem ed obvious. An ex p an d ed and d eep en ed use o f the com parative m ethod, it was hoped, w ould produce knowledge useful in gaining control o f events an d guiding p ro p e r develop­ ment. W hat ap p eared to m any to be scientific-m ethodological im peratives reinforced practical an d altruistic motives. T h e scientific m ethod (it was asserted) is com parative: W here scientific advance has occurred, some form o f com parison, guided by theory and scrupulous in use o f data, has been o f the essence. T h e problem fo r political science is clear, however difficult the solution. It is to discern those m odes o f com parison that m eet the criteria o f scientific m ethodology, hold prom ise o f significance o f findings, and can in fact be carried out, given constraints o f time, data, and so forth. Not surprisingly, the im pulse to use the com parative m ethod in an ex p an d ed an d m ethodologically m ore sophisticated way centered in th at p art o f the discipline which had been designated com parative governm ent, but which now cam e to be designated com parative politics. T h e shift in term inology signified a wish to shift from a focus on W estern dem ocratic institutions to conceptualizations an d techniques that would perm it signifi­ cant com parisons across an d am ong all political systems, cultures, and ideologies. T o this en d a search both intensive and extensive was m ade for ap p ro p riate theories and research m ethods, a search not only th ro u g h the heritage o f political science b ut th ro u g h the entire inventory o f theories and research m ethods o f th e social sciences. (T he Social Science Research Council’s Com m ittee on C om parative Politics, 1954 to 1967, played a m ajor role in the reinvigoration an d transform ation o f com parative studies. T h a t Com m ittee, h eaded first by Gabriel A lm ond and then by Lucien W. Pye, was extraordinarily vigorous, an d its influence extended beyond “com parative politics” in any strict sense.) T h e new em phasis on com parative m ethod affected all parts o f political science to some degree. A vigorous com parative adm inistration m ovem ent, arising in the Fifties and flourishing in the sixties, was a prom inent aspect o f public adm inistration. In international relations, experim entation with com ­ parative m ethodology has ran g ed from relatively sim ple “m odels” to a t­ tem pts to em brace all countries o f the world in analyses that will yield sig­

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nificant com parative data. In the study o f judicial behavior, legislative activ­ ity, policy “o u tp u ts,” executive style, voting preferences, m etropolitan o r­ ganization, national and regional political “cultures”— across th e span o f interests and activities o f political science— attem pts have been m ade to use com parative m ethods with g reater sophistication an d precision. Transformation o f international relations. As with com parative politics and for sim ilar reasons, th e area o f international relations was significandy tran s­ form ed in its natu re. T h e causes are now obvious: the sw eeping changes in th e political m ap o f the w orld, th e im pulses and resources o f behavioralism , th e em ergence o f th e U nited States as a superpow er in a situation o f ideolog­ ical conflict and cold war, the ever-present th reat o f catastrophe. In the new historic context, past approaches an d “solutions” seem ed largely shallow o r irrelevant. New ideas and attitudes, m uch g reater d ep th an d b read th in research seem ed patently an d u rg en d y needed. Such o lder interests as diplom atic affairs and international law w ere not entirely abandoned, b u t they w ere subjected to new “approaches” in the intensified scientific m ode. Above all, new interests, specializations, and ac­ tivities em erged; and im p o rtan t interrelations with o th er disciplines, both in the o th e r social sciences an d beyond, w ere established. Som ew hat as public adm inistration had d o n e in the post-W orld W ar II period, international relations ten d ed to becom e a substantial, varied “w orld” in itself, with very im p o rtan t relations outside political science and some im pulses tow ard au ­ tonom y. Expansion o f voting and opinion studies. In the recent period a com bination o f factors led to such grow th and vigor o f voting and opinion studies th at those studies cam e to rep resen t “behavioralism ” to m any political scientists. Such studies were signaled by earlier works and nourished by d eep an d en d u rin g interests of political scientists; an d as indicated above, the study o f public opinion had assum ed an im portance by th e thirties that w arranted a sepa­ rate jo u rn a l. In th e thirties an d forties two developm ents, opinion polling centered on predicting elections and m otivational research centered on com m ercial objectives, th o u g h having only tenuous connections with political science, helped to develop techniques an d concepts which could be tu rn e d to the purposes o f serious political research. A fter the war, the rap id develop­ m ent o f the co m p u ter an d allied technologies, the availability o f foundation sup p o rt, related developm ents in o th e r disciplines, and th e reinvigorated drive toward science com bined with th e o th er factors to create a “critical mass.” It ap p eared to m any th at a gen uine “b reak th ro u g h ” tow ard a genuine science o f politics eith er was im m inent o r had now in fact occurred. W hat­ ever th e ju d g m e n t o f history will be, the accom plishm ents have been sub­ stantial. New levels o f predictability an d precision have been reached; a

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d eep er, m ore com prehensive know ledge o f political m otivation has been attained; an d m ore u n d erstan d in g o f the relation o f political to socioeconomic variables has been gained. At th e cen ter o f this area o f political inquiry is one o f the m ost im por­ tan t institutional developm ents o f th e recent period, th e Inter-U niversity C onsortium for Political Research. O rganizationally and geographically, the C onsortium revolves about the C enter for Political Studies (until 1970-1971, the Political B ehavior P rogram ) and th e Survey Research C enter, two o f the constituent units o f th e Institu te for Social Research o f the University o f M ichigan at A nn A rbor. Focm ed in 1962, the C onsortium is an association o r p artn ersh ip o f educational an d research institutions, now num bering sev­ eral score. T h e m em bership includes substantially all universities offering g rad u ate instruction, as well as som e offering only u n d e rg ra d u a te instruc­ tion; an d it includes foreign (especially C anadian) institutions. M em ber in­ stitutions help to su p p o rt th e activities o f the two centers, which provide research facilities, training, and data for m em ber institutions; and the activities o f the centers an d th e C onsortium , thus m utually reinforced, are aided fu rth e r by fo undation o r o th e r “outside” support. T h e significance o f th e C onsortium runs fa r beyond “survey research.” A nn A rbor becam e a cen ter for sum m er training program s in quantitative m ethods and related m atters long before th e C onsortium was form ed, and special training and research program s m ore o r less “behavioral” have been continued an d expanded. A lthough th e political act o f voting and survey techniques o f research have been at the cen ter o f attention, th ere is no clear p eriphery o f research interests, m uch less o f influence; the centers and the C onsortium have been im p o rtan t both as symbols and as active centers o f influence in the behavioral m ovem ent. Revitalization o f theory. In The Political System o f 1953 David Easton writes in his preface: “T oday in th e U nited States . . . it has become increasingly difficult to appreciate why political theory should continue to be included as a central p art o f political science. T h eo ry has becom e increasingly rem ote from the m ainstream o f political research” (p ix). T h e situation, as it p re­ sented itself to Easton (and to m any others), was th at in political science the study o f political theory ten d ed to tu rn backward tow ard history an d o u t­ w ard tow ard philosophy an d belles lettres, to concern itself mainly with in ter­ p retin g theorists o f the past ra th e r than with guiding cu rre n t research. M eanwhile, m uch research suffered from lack o f theoretical sophistication, o ften displaying a cru d e “fact-gathering” empiricism . W hatever the situation in 1953, two decades later a ju d g m e n t can fairly be m ade th at the recent p eriod has been one o f significant theoretical vitality and creativeness. Again, history m ust ju d g e th e full im pact and lasting sig­ nificance o f the accom plishm ent; but th at the accom plishm ent overshadows

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th at o f the earlier periods seems clear. Easton’s argum ent, set forth in The Political System, th at research an d theory be b rought together in a focus on the political system, proved to be highly influential an d is itself p art o f and evidence for the theoretical vitality. B ut tho u g h patently influential, Easton’s argum ent for a focus on the political system did not carry all before it. In fact, the chief characteristic o f “theory” in th e recent period may be diversity. O ften th ere has been th eo ret­ ical contradiction and conflict (indeed bitter battles) centering on behavioralism ; but th e variety o f theories has been too great, the argum ents too varied an d subtle, to rep resen t the situation simply as a two-sided a rg u ­ m en t on the possibilities and m erits o f a “science” o f politics. It is possible only to suggest th e variety o f theoretical endeavor. Various kinds o f traditional theoretical w ork—exegesis, analysis, textual exam ina­ tion, re in te rp reta tio n — have achieved a high level, both on the p art of em igre scholars and on th e p art o f younger, domestically educated scholars. O n the o th er end o f the spectrum , so to speak, behaviorally inclined political scientists have w ritten sharply an d creatively in the area w here political re ­ search confronts philosophy an d m ethodology. Much o f what has taken place may be in terp reted as a continuation o f the G reat Dialogue; certainly th ere has been considerable discussion and controversy about the place o f the writings o f th e “G reats” in a possible science o f politics. Much o f what has been w ritten, particularly by younger theorists d u rin g the past decade, is difficult to place on any “spectrum .” Some o f it retu rn s to old them es (e.g., citizenship, authority) but in new ways; some is idiosyncratic (but possibly significant) speculation or projection; some argues for new ways of defining o r perceiving the political; some works the borders o f and expands on recent philosophic trends. O pinions, naturally, vary on the “correctness” and w orth o f w hat is produced. But what is clear is that able, well-trained, an d sharply honed m inds are at work. In the conventional classification o f political scientists, there are those designated “theorists,” an d the present discussion focuses on these. How­ ever, an outstanding featu re o f the recent period is th at the line between “theorists” and o th er political scientists has become indistinct, problematical. In a way not tru e o f the m iddle period o f political science (though there are interesting resem blances to the first two decades o f self-conscious political science), “theory” o f some kind inform s m ost work, and often it is con­ sciously and carefully treated. A grow ing theoretical sensitivity and sophisti­ cation o f political scientists in general may, in retrospect, prove to be the m ost im p o rtan t developm ent o f th e recent period. Rise o f scientific philosophy and methodology. T h e rise to prom inence o f scientific philosophy an d m ethodology testifies eloquently to the im pact o f behavioralism . In the interw ar period a course on “scope and

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m ethod in political science” was a reg u lar featu re o f doctoral training; and a course on “research m ethods in political science” m ight also be required. T h e first was likely to be basically “orientation”: a survey o f the traditional literature o f the “fields,” o f “relations” with o th er social sciences, and o f m ethods (e.g., historical, legal, com parative). T h e second w ould alm ost cer­ tainly cen ter on library research and th e mechanics o f scholarship, though it m ight also ven tu re to give some skill in elem entary statistical techniques. In the post-W orld W ar II period, particularly in the sixties, a radical change occurred. Courses in “scope ja n d m ethods” and “research m ethods” now centered o n the ideas an d m ethods associateJ wiUr behavioralism ; ‘n many grad u ate curricula new courses were introduced to^ieal in a m ore concen­ trated way with some aspect o f scientific philosophy and m ethodology. Stu­ dents w ere likely to be advised (or required) to take courses in o th er d e ­ partm en ts, courses in scientific philosophy, m odern logic, statistical tech­ niques, algebra, calculus, an d so forth. M uch attention was paid, one way or an o th er, to the m ore scientific aspects o f o th er social sciences, and to areas or foci (such as “operations research”) w ithout clear disciplinary location but with putative scientific value. Accordingly, m uch o f the “language” o f political science has changed. Somit and T an en h au s (1967) portray the change graphically. An o ld er generation spoke knowingly o f checks and balances, jus soli, divesting legislation, brokerage function, quota system, bloc voting, resulting powers, proportional representation, pressure group, sovereignty, dual federalism , lobbying, recall an d referen d u m , Posdcorb, quasi-judicial agencies, co n cu rren t majority, legislative court, Taylorism , state o f n atu re, item veto, unit rule, and natu ral law. From today’s younger practitioners th ere flows trippingly from th e tongue such exotic phrases as boundary m aintenance, bargaining, cognitive dis­ sonance, com m unity pow er structure, conflict resolution, conceptual fram ew ork, cross-pressures, decision m aking, dysfunctional, factor analysis, feedback, F ortran, gam e theory, G uttm an scaling, homeostasis, in p u t-o u tp u t, interaction, m odel, m ultiple regression, m ultivariate analysis, non-param etric, payoff, transaction flow m odel, role, simula­ tion, political systems analysis, T test, u n it record equipm ent, variance, and, o f course, political socialization.4 T h e literatu re o f political science o f course reflects th e change. In the interw ar years, the jo u rn als and books showed a gradual increase in the use o f some sort o f “quantitative m eth o d .” In the post-W orld W ar II period, especially in the sixties, the use o f statistical m ethods becam e m ore com plex and sophisticated, m athem atical and quasi-m athem atical form ulations were frequently used, and vocabularies became increasingly technical and

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esoteric. Even intro d u cto ry textbooks cam e to reflect the new political sci­ ence. T h e changes in th e m ap o f political science w rought by th e drive tow ard science are obvious an d indisputable, b u t as m uch o f the foregoing indicates, th e behavioral m ovem ent has n o t—by a long m easure— com pletely tra n s­ form ed political science. T o begin with, m any who reg ard themselves as behavioralists would deny any objective beyond “refo rm ,” th at is, th e p u rifi­ cation a n d im provem ent o f a basically sound tradition o f inquiry. Certainly th e older “w orld” o f political science still exists in m any places and in m any ways. T o som e ex ten t a new vocabulary may be th at and litde m ore, new term s for older, en d u rin g concerns. T o some extent, even, learning the new political science has been b u t a tactic o f survival, a strategy fo r evading— and ultim ately d efeatin g — the “invader.” T h e topics treated in this discussion o f significant changes in th e m ap o f political science w ere not selected at random . N either, however, is th ere a presu m p tio n th at they include all th e significant m atters to which a com ­ prehensive survey o f recen t political science w ould atten d . N ot included, for exam ple, a re th e revived an d sh arp en ed focus on th e “g ro u p ,” the use o f th e concept o f cu ltu re in studies o f “political c u ltu re ,” the use o f socialpsychological concepts in studies of “political socialization.” It has seem ed m ore a p p ro p ria te to discuss som e im p o rtan t m atters elsewhere; and m any can at best be only m entioned.

CENTRIPETAL AND CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES Political science as a self-conscious en terp rise is engaged in a continuous process o f definition and redefinition. T his process is conscious in that th ere are always those seeking to d efin e “the political” an d to specify the m ethods ap p ro p riate for its exam ination. It is also unconscious in th at m any factors (as is now clear) o th e r th an form al definition d eterm in e the shape and direction o f the en terp rise: th e vagaries o f national experience, influences from o th er social sciences, technological changes, an d so forth. N ot all changes lend themselves to th e in terp retatio n that they are “centripetal” o r “centrifugal” in th eir effect; nevertheless, to view political science as continuously ex­ periencing such opposing forces offers a useful perspective. The Problem o f Identity It is ap p ro p riate to begin by rem em bering th e unique n atu re o f the e n te r­ prise. T h e idea o f a political science, as against the looser idea o f “the political sciences,” has enjoyed a pragm atic success in th e sense that the

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en terprise begun u n d e r this style nearly a century ago has n o t m erely su r­ vived b u t grown enorm ously an d , in m any ways, p rospered. Few would deny th at it has p ro d u ced know ledge th at is (in som e sense) tru e and skills that are useful. Political science is widely recognized as a legitim ate social science. T h e re is no im p o rtan t th re a t to its conunued in d ep en d en t existence. R ather, th ere are m any reasons why fu rth e r grow th an d achievem ent can be antici­ pated with confidence. T h e reasons why political science has been able to m aintain its identity are o f various kinds and o p erate at d ifferen t levels. Some are environm ental and situational: th e fact th at political science, once conceived an d bo rn , was seen as a vehicle for conveying the political cu ltu re and has often been su p p o rted with this en d in view; the fact th at an en terp rise devoted to “science” has been u n d ertak en in a society with a high reg ard for things scientific; th e fact th at th e en terp rise has been u n d ertak en in a m odern society characterized by relative wealth, large size, an d g reat specialization o f function. Som e o f th e in tegrating forces are sociopsychological. T hose who are (so to speak) socialized into the subculture known as political science and whose social position, livelihood, an d personal sense o f identity are as­ sociated with th e fortunes o f political science have a natural interest in e n ­ suring its identity, integrity, and prosperity. O rganizations, once form ed, strive tow ard grow th— o r at least p erp etu atio n — and engage in behavior ap p ro p riate thereto, such as goal definition an d redefinition. Some o f th e integrating forces operate at the conscious level, such as attem pts at defin in g the “political” o r the “scientific,” alone o r in relation to each oth er, in a m an n er th at will com m and the acceptance o f those willing to m arch u n d e r th e political science ensign. In the early period o f political science it was conventional to define political science as inquiry into the natu re and functioning o f “th e state.” In the m iddle period the idea that the p ro p e r object o f inquiry is “pow er,” m ore precisely “political pow er,” gained prom inence. In th e recent p eriod, in which systems theory has enjoyed m uch popularity and acceptance, the idea th at political science should con­ cern itself with “the political system” has been persuasively argued an d has been widely accepted. O th e r “d efining” ideas have also, o f course, been advanced; and both “state” an d “pow er” continue to have th eir ad h eren ts and uses. Characteristically, m ost o f the forces that have o r are intended to have a unifying effect also have a divisive effect, with resulting paradox. A lthough the wealth, size, and specialization o f the A m erican environm ent have sup­ ported th e em ergence o f an in d ep en d en t political science, the sam e factors lend en co u rag em en t to fu rth e r specialization an d independence. A rgum ents aim ed at unifying political scientists by agreem ent on some particular con­ ception o f subject m atter o r some program o f p ro p e r m ethodology evoke controversy an d raise threats o f schism. Again, ideological and religious

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analogies are ap p ro p riate: In the “politics of political science” both strict partisan and p o p u lar fro n t m ovem ents are discernible; political science has both ecumenicists and sectarians; “d o ctrine” is im portant in contests within political science an d in relations between political science and o th er disci­ plines and groups. In the recent period the behavioral m ovem ent has of course been th e cen ter o f m uch controversy, in some ways unifying, in some ways divisive. Relations With Other Disciplines and Foci Relations with o th e r disciplines naturally constitute an im p o rtan t elem ent in th e continuing process o f self-identification, one replete with contradiction an d irony. Political science, it has been said, is “like Poland, open to invasion from every side.” Patently, “the political” does not exist in isolation. In the existential world it is intricately interm ingled with history, culture, law, econom ic life, social phen o m en a in general. O th er disciplines not only lay claim to such areas but sometim es assert th at the political, in p art o r even in whole, is properly viewed as subservient to the areas to which they claim jurisdiction. Political scientists cannot deny the importance o f nonpolitical phen o m en a for the political, n o r do they generally wish to deny the rele­ vance o f what o th er disciplines may have to “contribute” to und erstan d in g the political. In d eed , the idea o f a total u nderstanding o f th e social realm , th e concept o f a “unified social science,” has not simply intellectual respecta­ bility b u t m uch em otional appeal. How, th en , to find the optim um balance, the p ro p er, fruitful interrelations? Much o f the history o f political science could be w ritten in term s o f the relationships with o th e r disciplines and with intellectual enterprises or foci which d o not necessarily have disciplinary status. Some generalizations and observations on this subject are ap p ro priate. Political science, as noted, began in close conjunction with history. T h e relationship has rem ained im po rtan t in many ways, despite m any forces ten d in g toward separation. Recently th ere has been some arg u m en t for a closer liaison. In any event, inertia and institutional convenience serve to m aintain significant connections; in nearly two h u n d re d u n d erg rad u ate col­ leges, history and political science still are taught in a unified departm ent. Political science also began in close relationship with the study o f law. T h e re, too, th e record is one o f gradually attenuating connection. Law has con­ tinu ed its professionalization, centered in graduate professional schools of law. M eanwhile political science has gradually lessened its interest in law on the “substantive” side, shifting its attention, u n d er behavioral influences, to judicial-legal behavior, to law as a political phenom enon. Well before W orld W ar I some leading political scientists argued that the crucial relationship o f political science is with sociology, conceived as the study o f the social realm entire, an d various essays in the m iddle period

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m ade a case for the necessity o f g ro u n d in g the study o f the political in the study o f society in general. In the recent period relationships with sociology became very im portant. T h e cu rren ts o f behavioralism m oved in concert with im p o rtan t cu rren ts in sociology. Political scientists often looked to sociology for useful concepts an d perspectives; and perhaps m ore im por­ tant, leading sociologists tu rn e d th eir attention to the study o f the political. T h e interchange betw een the two disciplines becam e so prom inent, in fact, that “political sociology” came into use as a term to designate the substantial area o f m utual concern. As the record m akes clear, economics and political science were not created simply by a su n d erin g o f nineteenth-century political econom y. But the su n d erin g has always been considered by some an e rro r, leaving both o f the separate disciplines w ithout an adequate base, eith er for explanatory theory o r for public policy guidance, an d resulting in a varied pattern o f ad hoc cooperation, am ateu r im provising, and “b o rd er raids.” O ne o f the sa­ lient features o f the recen t period has been m ovem ent tow ard a closer, m ore “rational” jo in in g o f th e interests o f econom ists and political scientists. W hat is ju d g e d to be some o f the m ore original and useful work in political science has been do n e by econom ists applying to politics concepts and m odes o f reasoning taken fro m the econom ist’s disciplinary tool kit. Some political scientists, attracted by the seem ing success o f economics in developing q uan­ titative m ethods and “pow erful” theory, have sought eith er to borrow useful ideas and m ethods o r to reconstruct political science along lines analogous to economics. (T he idea th at “pow er” in political science should be analogous to “wealth” in economics was in fact forcefully argued in the twenties, an d that relationship has rem ained to some a desirable and feasible objective.) Most im p o rtan t is the fact th at in recent years the case for a construction o f a new political econom y (i.e., for a closer, m ore systematic joining, w hatever the nam e and the resulting disciplinary rearrangem ents) has been m ade with cogency and, it appears, considerable persuasiveness. T h e idea that a theory (or science) o f politics m ust be g ro u n d ed in a theory (or science) o f h u m an n atu re is one o f the oldest and most respecta­ ble in th e tradition. It is hardly surprising, th erefo re, th at an im p o rtan t part o f the developm ent o f political science concerns this am bition. It will be recalled that M erriam ju d g ed psychology to be o f prim e im portance in the drive to make political science genuinely scientific, and m uch o f Lasswell’s work centered on the jo in in g o f the psychological (particularly psychoanaly­ tic theory) and the political. In the post-W orld W ar II period the argum ent for the necessity for a firm psychological base has been carried forw ard with intelligence and force, and m uch substantive work in this vein is a charac­ teristic o f recent decades. In fact, so many, so varied, so intricate are the interrelations between the m any branches and facets o f psychology and political science in the recent period that they defy generalization— except this generalization.

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Interrelations with and borrow ing from o th er “dom ains” are im portant, but noting this fact m ust suffice. Som e dom ains have disciplinary status, as does anthropology. Some a re interdisciplinary “clusterings” o r “foci” w ithout distinct disciplinary bases (though they may be rep resen ted by learned jo u r ­ nals), such as systems theory, cybernetics, and com m unications theory. Some o f th e “h a rd e r” behavioralists have seen the ro u te to a genuine political science as ru n n in g not th ro u g h cognate fields but directly th ro u g h the phys­ ical sciences an d m athem atics. Obviously, the above-noted analogy to P oland’s problem o f m aintaining its integrity has some force. Political science is not able and perhaps should not be able to assert exclusive claim to the study o f the political; its dom ain is entered frequendy an d p en etrated deeply by o th er disciplines. B ut clearly, too, the “invaders” are frequently welcomed and are ju d g e d as m aking use­ ful contributions to the study o f politics. N or is th e invasion simply one-way. Political scientists in th e quest fo r m ore knowledge and better instrum ents en ter o th er realm s frequently an d in num ber. Few would deny that the advance o f know ledge is served by the considerable crossing o f borders, w hatever the severity o f th e accom panying “boundary problem s.” Satellite Organizations and Secessionist Movements All organizations, no m atter how large an d successful, are faced with prob­ lems o f division within a n d loss o f m em bers at th eir boundaries. Indeed, success and bigness, by th e ir n ature, create such problem s (as the history o f religious, political, business, an d o th er organizations dem onstrates). In a society characterized by m uch freedom to organize and by a high propensity to create organizations, as is the U nited States, internal division and loss o f m em bers is likely to take place th ro u g h the creation o f new, m ore or less supplem entary, m ore o r less com petitive or “c o u n ter” organizadons. T h e A m erican Political Science Association is not exem pt from universal ten d en ­ cies in organizational behavior o r from the general characteristics o f o u r organizational culture. It is ap p ro p riate to take note o f some o f th e divisive and “centrifugal” aspects o f political science as they m anifest themselves th ro u g h the affairs o f the Association. In the Association as in m any o th er organizations, including the overall social science “family” o f disciplinary-professional organizations to which the Association belongs, the ferm en t, turbulence, and discord o f the late sixties and early seventies have been reflected. N ot surprisingly, th ere have been “antiestablishm ent” an d “proestablishm ent” forces, which have reflected them selves in the creation of, respectively, a Caucus for a New Political Science an d an Ad Hoc Com m ittee, both rep resen tin g loosely structured organizations-w ithin-the-organization. N either “side” has won all the organi­ zational battles fo r control o f the official ap paratus o f the Association and for guidance o f the evolution o f political science in th e n ear future. In general, “proestablishm ent” forces have been decisively predom inate; but

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“accom m odation” an d com prom ise have taken place, with some full or p ar­ tial victories (in term s o f personnel an d policies) going to the dissidents and with a general relaxation o f th e a rd e n t partisanship characteristic o f turnof-the-decade Association affairs. As this essay is being written, it appears certain that A m erican political science will not su ffer a m ajor organizational schism, that the m ain lines o f developm ent in the political science o f the sixties will continue to be p red om inate in the Association. T his conclusion leaves open, how ever, the question o f the long-range influence o f som e o f the opinions an d tendencies rep resen ted by the “antiestablishm ent.” T hese could, in th e long ru n , gain m ore acceptance a n d — conceivably— becom e decisive in “official” political science. A lthough th e struggle betw een “two sides” was often o f the essence, to rep resen t th e organizational ferm en t an d strife o f recent years in th at way is nevertheless a m isleading sim plification. Both “sides,” especially th e dissi­ dents, represented varying points o f view, causes, an d consdtuencies; and calculations o f a strategic o r tactical n atu re in term s o f g ro u p objectives, ra th e r than general “ideology,” were characteristically decisive. R epresenta­ tives o f the w om en’s liberation m ovem ent, o f blacks an d oth er racial-ethnic m inorities m ight be willing to jo in forces in su p p o rt o f a politically “activist” role fo r the Association, an d o f course they w ere likely to su p p o rt each o ther; but ultim ately each g ro u p rep resen ted distinctive interests. (Those interested in the politics o f the Association will find o f interest the several analyses of Association voting, as well as o th e r m aterials, published in PS.) T h e organized groups and loosely organized “groupings” that have em erged within th e m ainstream o f political science in recent years constitute an im p o rtan t addition to th e factors th at certainly rep resen t com plexity and probably can be construed to rep resen t some qu an tu m o f divisiveness (and at least potential dispersion). B ut additionally, th ere are at any given time a n u m b er o f “n orm al” interests and groups th at find that the Association (or m ore broadly, m ainstream political science) does not fully o r fairly rep resen t th eir interests. A com m on response to that feeling is the establishm ent o f a separate organization to express and prom ote those interests. C haracteristi­ cally, . such sectoral o r “special p u rp o se” organizations rem ain relatively small, do not aim at m ajor Association change, and are not inclined tow ard secession. T h ese groups may have a form al structure, with officers an d dues, b ut m ost o f th eir m em bers rem ain m em bers o f th e Association. T h e Associa­ tion, on its part, “recognizes” the existence o f such groups. Since they are n ot a part o f th e official ap p aratus o f the Association, they cannot be treated as such. But relations with the satellite organizations are polite and may even be cordial; and some Association recognition and services may be extended to them . T h e program s o f the an n u al m eetings o f the Association are instructive. In addition to th e official Association program , th ere are “events” an d m eet­

Centripetal and Centrifugal Tendencies

79

ings in wide variety an d in great n u m ber. It is now custom ary fo r the offi­ cially p rin te d p ro g ram to contain notice o f m any o f them u n d e r th e heading “C ourtesy Listing o f U naffiliated G ro ups.” In the m ost recent (1972) p ro ­ gram this featu re ru n s eight pages an d contains m uch variety. M any o f the listing are university social events o r m eetings o f state or regional associa­ tions; th e re are also irreg u lar an d ad hoc concerns o f no great im port for p resen t purposes. B ut also listed are m eetings o f a wide variety o f “com m it­ tees,” “caucuses,” “organizations,” a n d “associations.” Some, again, may have no g reat o r continuing significance. B ut some do rep resen t im p o rtan t in­ terests o f long standing, interests th a t may later be b ro u g h t within the offi­ cial ap p aratu s or, conversely be rem oved from u n d e r the Association’s roof. T o list some o f the entities serves to illustrate a n u m b er o f points: A m erican Society for Political a n d Legal Philosophy, Caucus for a New Political Science, Caucus o f Foreign B orn Political Scientists, C om m ittee on H ealth Politics, Com parative U rban Research, C onference for th e Study o f Political T h o u g h t, C onference G ro u p on C om m unist Studies, C onference on Inter-U niversity G am ing and Sim ulation, International Studies Associa­ tion, Inter-U niversity C onsortium fo r Political Research, Latin-A m erican D evelopm ent A dm inistration Com m ittee, Policy Studies O rganization, Polit­ ical Scientists Interested in Diplomacy, T h e Polycentric Circle, W om en’s Caucus for Political Science. It is impossible to know the ex tent to which the Association has lost individual m em berships to alternative centers o f attraction or clusters of interests th at have “hived o f f ’ to com plete independence (or that were inde­ pendently created an d have not been incorporated). W hat is clear and im ­ p o rta n t is th at th e idea o f a political science, em bodied in the Association, has survived an d continues to thrive. T h e question w hether o th e r related organizations, foci o f study, an d professional activity are also “political sci­ ence,” even thou g h they do not b ear that title, is at one level a m atter of sim ple definition and arbitrary classification, but at an o th er level (as we have seen) a question that involves in its answ er questions o f history, philosophy, traditio n , and national experience. It was observed above that a m ajor sector o f political science, in tern a­ tional relations, has shown some secessionist tendencies. T hey are evidenced by the creation o f the International Studies Association, by the existence of in d ep e n d en t jo u rn als, and in o th er ways. O th er sectors of political science, as evidenced by satellite organizations and otherwise, occasionally become restive and m ore o r less seriously discuss “disaffiliation.” In only one, how­ ever, is separation both im p o rtan t (with respect to size, at least) and fairly well advanced. T his sector is public adm inistration. Public adm inistration, gaining its separate textbooks and o th er literature after W orld W ar I, becam e a recognized field o f specialization within politi­ cal science. T h a t is, it gained recognition as such in curricula, in the Review,

80

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

and in Association program organization. In the fifties a n d especially in the sixties, however, th e status o f public adm inistration as a p a rt o f political science becam e clouded. Its literatu re received less attention in the journals, it ap p eared less frequendy as a topic on the program s o f m eetings, and so forth. M eanwhile, th e A m erican Society for Public A dm inistration, estab­ lished in 1939, proved durable. Its m em bership rivals th a t o f the Association in num ber, and m any who teach an d do research in th e field o f public adm inistration are prim arily oriented tow ard the Society— though they may rem ain m em bers o f the Association and even have a lively interest in its affairs. W hat is involved in this gradual but incom plete m ovem ent tow ard sep­ aration is very com plex, beyond thorough probing here. B ut several observations— and a conclusion— are w arranted. Public adm inistration is the m ost “professional” p a rt o f political science in the sense that, tho u g h only a m inor fraction o f governm ental adm inistrators are tra in e d in public ad ­ m inistration, such training does lead (norm ally w ithout difficulty) to em ­ ploym ent in public adm inistration, i.e., to a career o th er th a n th at o f teaching and research. T h e m ajority o f the m em bers o f the Society are “practitioners,” not academics. T h e “applied” interests o f the public adm inistrationist and his profes­ sional “reference g ro u p ” drew heavily on his energy an d attention in the years w hen th e behavioral cu rren ts g ath ered strength a n d centered the at­ tention o f m ost political scientists on m atters o th e r than adm inistration. In ­ creasingly, the public adm inistrationist found the concepts and research findings o f o th er disciplines, especially those o f economics, sociology, and social psychology, m ore p ertin e n t to his interests and needs than those o f political science. F u rth er, o th e r organizations o f professionals in o r related to public adm inistration ex erted an attraction: organizations o f personnel specialists, budget officers, planners, city m anagers, and so forth. In short, it appears th a t public adm inistration is a “special case,” and that what has h ap p en ed an d may h appen in this area has lim ited relevance to o th er areas o f political science (K aufm an, 1956; W aldo, 1972). FIELDS AND FOCI W hether to present in this essay quantitative d ata bearing on th e fields and foci o f political science, d a ta indicating relative em phasis and changing em phases th ro u g h time, has constituted a difficult question. In principle it seem ed highly desirable to d o so. But practical problem s severely limit the usefulness o f quantitative data. For some possible indices (e.g., Ph.D. specialization, courses taught) data are incom plete, unavailable, or, if availa­ ble, questionable. For all indices (including books published o r reviewed and program s o f the annual m eetings) there are baffling problem s o f classifica­

Fields and Foci

81

tion an d in terp retatio n . T h e conclusion was that jo u rn a l articles provide the best basis for an analysis. P resented below are d ata o n articles published in general political sci­ ence jo u rn als d u rin g five selected periods. U ndoubtedly o f som e value, these data give clear evidence o f certain em phases and tren d s an d provide a basis for various hypotheses an d speculations. Plainly, however, th eir value is lim ited, an d they are p ro p erly preced ed by some explanations an d w arnings. Problems of Categorization A stan d ard language for th e “p arts” o f political science does not exist. Politi­ cal scientists speak o f “concentrations,” “fields,” an d “subdisciplines,” but they d o so loosely and o ften interchangeably. D iffering principles o f classification— geographic, functional, m ethodological— are used, som etim es in com bination, to indicate titles o f courses, parts o f curricula, sections o f program s, an d divisions o f jo u rn als. M oreover, em phases shift an d fashions in term inology change (e.g., com parative governm ent becom es com parative politics), m aking longitudinal com parisons difficult and questionable. No w arran t can be given, obviously, th at th e categories an d classes selected fo r use in analyzing and presen tin g th e data are “correct.” T hey m ingle an attem p t to recognize th e m ost w idespread usage with ju d g m en ts on the m ost reasonable analytic concepts. Fitting jo u rn a l articles into categories, however the latter are stated, is difficult. Jo u rn a l articles are n ot w ritten to suit the convenience o f indexers and cataloguers, m uch less th at o f analysts at some fu tu re time. T o be sure, m ost articles can be categorized w ithout serious difficulty, b u t for som e a m ore o r less arb itrary decision m ust be m ade. The “Perim eter” Problem T h e problem o f w hat is o r is n ot to be recognized as “political science” is faced at a n u m b er o f points in this essay. It is involved in the decision to include in th e analysis only general jo u rn als o f political science in the U nited States. (T h e nam es o f the jo u rn a ls are listed in the explanatory notes follow­ ing T a b le I.) T h e results would have been d ifferen t if specialized and “field” jo u rn als were in clu d ed , for exam ple, World Politics and Public Administration Review. T o a rg u e th a t they should be included is not unreasonable. B ut taking this route, o n e enco u n ters nagging questions w ithout reasonable answers. I f the Public Administration Review, th en the jo u rn als o f public personnel adm inis­ tration? T h e en tire large an d heterogeneous periodical literature o f public adm in istratio n ? O n into th e literatu re o f public affairs in search o f “public ad m in istratio n ” items? T h e decision to include only general jo u rn als o f political science was a practical o n e, w ithout prejudice as to b ro ad er as against n arro w er definitions

82

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

o f political science. B ut focusing on th e “cen ter” does help to clarify w hat political science has been an d is in the m inds o f those most deeply com m it­ ted to it in term s o f education, position, an d self-image. By definition, a m easure o f quantity is n o t a m easure o f quality. Nevertheless, a special caveat may be desirable. Unless the d ata are in ter­ p reted with som e know ledge o f qualitative changes, they risk concealing m ore than they reveal. T h e above-noted changes in th e disciplinary “m ap” in the recent period, fo r exam ple, are litde signified in the following data. Data from Five Periods T h e tables p resen t d ata from five periods. T h e first, 1909-1914 (excluding 1913; see notes following T able I), was selected to rep resen t political science at the conclusion o f its form ative period, after disciplinary status had been asserted an d before W orld W ar I had caused any “distortions.” T h e second period, 1925-1929, rep resen ts “norm alcy” in th e interw ar period. T h e th ird period, 1939-1941, presents political science following the New Deal but before W orld W ar II had ex erted a significant effect. T h e fo u rth period, 1952-1954, presents political science as affected by W orld W ar II, its conse­ quences, an d the beginning o f significant behavioral influence. T h e fifth period, 1969-1971, rep resen ts political science in the latest period fo r which d ata w ere available. Patentiy, the d ata in th e tables speak clearly to some m atters, in a Del­ phic m an n er to others, an d w hat they “say” is subject to varying in te rp re ta ­ tions. T h e com m ents on th e tables call attention to some salient features, suggest some explanations, and pose som e questions. T hey are in no sense inten d ed as authoritative. T hose fam iliar with the history o f political science o r those highly specialized in som e p a rt o f it undoubtedly will wish to ques­ tion some o f the interpretations. (T h e com m ents, by category, re fe r both to T able I and to Tables I I - 1 th ro u g h 11-13.) Explanatory Notes fo r Tables 1 through II-13 Tables I th ro u g h 11-13 are based on the same d ata an d should be construed as on e consecutive table. T h e following inform ation supports an d am plifies the necessarily concise table headings. As noted, jo u rn a ls included in th e analysis were limited to general jo u r ­ nals o f political science in th e U nited States. T h ey w ere as follows: 1. American Political Science Review

la. Proceedings of the American Political Science Association 2. Political Science Quarterly 3. Journal o f Politics 4. Review o f Politics

Fields and Foci

5.

83

Western Political Quarterly

6. Midwest Journal o f Political Science 7. Polity T h e jo u rn a ls included w ere n ot th e sam e in all periods, however. N um bered as above, th e jo u rn a ls in each period w ere as follows: 1909-1914: 1, la , 2 (See note below) 1925-1929: 1, 2 1939-1941: 1, 2, 3, 4 1952-1954: 1, 2, 3 ,4 , 5 1969-1971: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 N ote: Because publication o f th e Proceedings was suspended d u rin g 1913, no jo u rn a l articles for th at year w ere coded. T h e re fo re th e first period was actually 1909-1912 and 1914. In som e o f the tables, distribution by class within the given category resulted in classes with too few observations for analysis. Dashes a p p e a r in th e ap p ro p ria te colum ns o f those tables. Because o f ro u n d in g , som e o f the colum ns showing percentages may n o t total 100%. Technical Note In addition to th e term inological an d categorization problem s noted in th e text, additional problem s w ere en co u n tered in using d ata from a previous coding o f articles. T h e distribution o f articles fo r the 1925-1929, 1939-1941, an d 1952-1954 periods w ere adapted from a p rio r publication (W aldo, 1955, pp. 3 8 -41). T h e 1909-1914 and 1969-1971 periods were coded for th e presen t essay to p erm it a m ore extensive com parative analysis. Since it was obviously impossible to define objective standards of categoriza­ tion, both coders w ere p erm itted to assign jo u rn a l articles to m ore than one category. T h u s, one article may yield m ore th an one “observation.” T h is m ultiple classification p ro ced u re resulted in an obvious disparity that had to be reconciled to p erm it com parative interpretation. T h e first coder, it seems, was far m ore liberal than the second in his use o f m ultiple classification. T h e ratios o f th e sum o f “observations” to the sum o f actual articles for the first coder w ere as follows: 2.33 for the 1925-1929 period, 2.85 for th e 1939-1941 period, an d 2.81 for the 1952-1954 period. T h e ratios fo r th e second co d er were 1.04 for the 1909-1914 period and 1.13 for th e 1969-1971 period. In o rd e r th at some d eg ree o f num erical consistency between the two coders could be achieved, the total n u m b er o f observations was assum ed to

84

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE I. Distribution of articles in general American political sci­ ence journals by category for given time periods. Articles by category

1909- 1914 Number

Percent

1925- 1929 Number Percent

Normative and descriptive theory Comparative govern­ ment and politics

29

10

69

14

66

23

130

26

International politics, organizations, and law Legislative affairs

26 23

9 8

22

4

62

12

3

1

24

5

9 6

3 2

33

6

9

2

Politics, parties, and pressure groups Public opinion, voting, and elections Presidency Organization and administration American government (other than federal)

1

0

34

7

38

13

51

10

Public policy analysis (substantive)

58

32 8

6

Judicial affairs

3

20 I

Public law and jurisprudence

14

5

26

5

8 284

3 100

8 508

2 100

273

—

218

—

Study of political science Total observations Total articles

2

be the relevant referen t on which the percentage distributions were based. T h u s the percentage distributions presented in Tables I and I I - 1 through 11-13 have been com puted by dividing the num b er o f observations within a category (class) and tim e period by the total num ber o f observations for th at time period. Clearly, this p ro cedure will achieve a degree o f num erical con­ sistency only and will not account for variations in the categorical percep­ tions o f the two coders. Normative and Descriptive Theory T h e relatively little attention given to theory in any sense at the end o f the form ative period is clear, as is a consistent strength for this category in the

Fields and Foci

1939- 1941

1952- 1954 Number Percent

85

1969- 1971 Number Percent

N um ber

Percent

159

21

255

22

172

22

145

19

260

22

139

18

30

4

10

60

31

4

122 64

6

55

8 7

52

7

56

5

82

10

32

4

59

5

122

15

62

8

28

2

10

1

55

7

41

4

7

1

44

6

51

4

70

9

76

10

155

13

36

5

17

2

15

I

22

3

34

5

40

3

10

1

9

1

17

2

8

1

746

100

1163

100

793

100

262

—

718

—

702

—

last th ree periods. (See Table I.) T h e relationship between “History o f politi­ cal ideas, theory and ideology” an d “N orm ative political theory and political philosophy” is w orthy o f note. (See T able I I - 1.) T h e “untheoretical" bent o f the first period is again evident, as is a consistent near-equality between the two in all subsequent periods. “Descriptive political theory and political science m ethodology” is m inuscule in th e first period, but it is u p sharply in the second period (reflecting the M erriam -led m ovem ent toward scientism) and has grown rel­ atively strong. “C onstruction o f general political theory,” showing a fairly high level in the first period, very high levels in the m iddle periods, and a sh arp d ro p -o ff in the m ost recent period, presents special problem s o f in-

86

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE II-1. Distribution of articles in “Normative and descriptive theory" category in general American political science journals by class for given time periods Articles by class

1909-1914 Number Percent

1925-1929 Number Percent

Normative and descriptive theory

29

100

69

100

History of political ideas, theory, and ideology1

19

66

21

30

3

10

21

30

1

3

7

10

6

21

20

30

Normative political theory and political philosophy2 Descriptive political theory and political science methodology3 Construction o f general political theory4

1. Includes prim arily discussions, descriptions, d evelopm ental analysis o f idea o f p articu lar theorists, particu lar trad itio n , p articu lar d o ctrine, schools, or times. 2. Includes m o re general an d /o r analytical discussions o f ideas, theories, an d /o r political “th o u g h t.” 3. Includes sim ulation, rational m odel building, philosophy o f science, and form al m odel building. 4. Includes gen eral theories o f State Rights, Politics, G o v ern m en t, O rg an iza­ tion, an d broad-scale m odel building.

terp retatio n because o f the heterogeneity of m aterials it includes. (See note 4.)

Comparative Government and Politics T h e relative strength o f com parative studies in the first and following periods is impressive; the decline in the m ost recent period is puzzling (see T able I). Obviously “interpretation" is necessary. Many o f the “Inform al o r form al case studies” in the earlier periods (see T able 11-2) would now be reg ard ed as shallow and unw orthy o f publication. C ertainly m uch com para­ tive study in the most recent period has been published in newer, m ore specialized jo u rn als (e.g., Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Comparative Administration). Still, the dom inant position o f the case study in the recent period raises the question w hether the wave of “com parativeness” following W orld W ar II is receding.

Fields and Foci

1939-1941

1952- 1954 Number Percent

Num ber

Percent

159

100

255

45

28

46

87

1969--1971 Number

Percent

100

172

100

75

29

74

42

29

74

29

61

35

7

4

19

8

30

17

61

38

87

34

7

4

International Politics, Organization, and Law T h e attention given to international affairs im m ediately preceding W orld W ar I is surprising; but one m ight have expected m ore attention to in tern a­ tional affairs in the interw ar years, especially fo r the years 1939-1941 (see T able I). T h e move upw ard a fter W orld W ar II (and after the beginning o f the cold war) is as expected. But th e decrease in the m ost recent period, as with com parative studies, invites com m ent. T h e decrease is especially puz­ zling with respect to “International behavior,” given that students o f in tern a­ tional politics have inclined tow ard behavioralism . (See T able II-3.) Presum ­ ably publication in specialized jo u rn als (e.g., World Politics) accounts for m uch o f the drop-off. T h e cyclical p attern for international law catches o n e’s attention, but p erh ap s it is o f no g reat significance. O n the o th e r h an d , the upw ard slope fo r “C onstruction o f general theory in international politics” and its sh arp increase in the most recent period probably speak to som ething significant.

The “Domestic” Categories T h e following eight categories deal prim arily with A m erican politics, though n o t exclusively so. O n th e average, a little over 50 percent o f the articles have fitted into these categories, with very little variation between periods. T h e relatively large d ro p in th e fo u rth period (down to 44%) is as m ight be

TABLE 11-2. Distribution of articles in “Com parative governm ent and politics" category in general A m eri­ can political science journals by class for given time periods

Articles by class Comparative govern­ ment and politics Informal or formal case studies Cross-cultural and/or cross-nation-state analysis5 Construction of general theory of comparative politics 5.

1925--1929

1909 -1914

1939--1941

1952--1954 Number Percent

1969--1971 Number Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

66

100

130

100

145

100

260

100

139

100

57

87

67

52

72

50

162

62

110

79

9

14

63

49

73

50

94

36

26

19

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

2

3

1

Includes all co m parative studies except U.S. o r A m erican state political party studies.

TABLE 11-3. Distribution o f articles in “International politics, organizations, and law" category in general American political science jo u rn als by class for given time periods

Articles by class International politics, organizations, and law Informal or formal case studies International behavior8 Substantive studies of international law Construction of general theory in international politics7

1909- 1914 Number Percent

1925- 1929 Number Percent

1939- 1941 Number Percent

1952- 1954 Number Percent

1969-•1971 Number

Percent

26

100

22

100

30

100

122

100

GO

100

15

13 5

59

50 33

40

33

23

15 10

49

9

58 34

51

42

9

55 15

1

4

3

14

1

3

11

9

2

3

1

4

1

5

4

13

11

9

16

27

6. Includes both national and supranational behavior analysis, relations between two or more states, policy form ulation involving more than one state, world and regional activities. Also includes reports of international events o f professional interest. 7. Includes simulation and decision-making studies.

Oo

90

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE II-4. Distribution of articles in “Legislative affairs” category in general American political science journals by class for given time periods Articles by class Legislative affairs Biographical Particular legislators and legislative problems Particular bills and laws8 Legislative reform 9 Theory of legislative functions

1909- 1914 Number Percent

1925- 1929 Number

23 0

100

62

0

3

Percent 100 5

4

17

19

31

1

4

31

13

57

19 20

5

22

1

2

32

expected (given th e salience o f overseas affairs), and th e re tu rn to a norm al p attern in the last period may be significant. Legislative affairs. T h e sh arp dip dow nw ard for this category for the period 1939-1941 (Table I) and the in term ittent o r cyclical n atu re o f some o f the classes (Table 11-4) present problem s in interpretation. Perhaps explanation is to be sought m ore in the tem p er and problem s o f Am erican politics than in the internal dialectic o f political science. Politics, parties, and pressure groups. T h e small showing for this category in the first period (Table I) reflects the climate and interests o f Progressivism: R eform and purification were d o m inant motifs; parties and politicians were only m arginally respectable. T h e advance o f “realism ” in the m iddle period is evident (Table II-5): Pressure groups were “discovered,” lobbying became a phenom enon w orthy o f professional attention, and the study o f leaders and elites became a serious and continuous interest. Public opinion, voting, and elections. As for the preceding category and for sim ilar reasons, the showing for the first period is m inuscule (Table I); all items concern “Election laws and adm inistration”— a practical and “refo rm ” interest that generally slopes o ff to the present (Table 11-6). Again, realism asserts itself in the interw ar period and continues strong, particularly in the class “Political behavior, political socialization, and mass behavior.” T h e

Fields and Foci

1939- 1941 Number Percent

1952- 1954 Number Percent

1969- 1971 Number

Percent 100

100

0

64 4

6

55 0

10

32

22

35

6

11

10

16 18

25 28

1

10

32 32

6

2 11

1

3

4

6

42

77

31

100

0

91

0

d ro p -o ff in “Political opinion form ation and m ovem ent” in the recent period presum ably is accountable to specialized publication. The Presidency. It is no surprise th at interest in the Presidency was high following the New Deal (Table II-7). B ut w hat accounts for the m ore recent decline? Surely n ot th at this institution has grow n less consequential. Various hypotheses suggest themselves; fo r exam ple, in a period in which com para­ tive studies are in vogue, the Presidency does not lend itself (except in lim ited fashion) to com parative study. Perhaps the answ er is to be found prim arily in th e peculiar n atu re o f th e institution: T h e re are special p ro b ­ lems o f accessibility and availability o f data. T h e large literature on the Presidency tends to be the p ro d u ct not o f political scientists but o f jo u r ­ nalists, “publicists,” an d fo rm er W hite H ouse officials. Organization and adm inistration. T h e data here, taken as a category, are easily in terp reted . In the first period, interest in public adm inistration existed only in germ (as in issues o f m unicipal reform ), tho u g h the ground for its d e ­ velopm ent had been p re p ared earlier, particularly by W oodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow. T h e first textbooks ap p eared in the twenties, and rapid grow th in curricula an d program s was forw arded by a num ber o f factors, including th e activities o f the P resident’s C om m ittee on A dm inistrative M an­ agem ent in th e m id-thirties (Table 11-8). T h e creation o f the A m erican Soci­ ety for Public A dm inistration in 1939, as well as the grow th o f specialized (e.g., personnel and finance) organizations, created com peting centers for professional loyalties an d provided alternative publication m edia, thus effec­ tively “d rain in g ” m ost o f public adm inistration from political science.

'O

Nj

TABLE 11-5. Distribution of articles in “Politics, parties, and pressure groups" category in general Ameri­ can political science journals by class for given time periods Articles by class

1909-1914 Number

Percent

1939-1941

1925-1929

1952- 1954

1969--1971

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

24

100

100

56

100

82

100

37

17

30

17

21

Politics, parties and pressure groups

3

Political parties10

2

-

11

46

52 19

Political leadership or elite behavior

1

_

6

25

19

37

16

29

25

30

Pressure groups and lobbying

0

0

1

4

5

10

6

11

11

13

Construction of general theory in organized group behavior

0

0

6

25

9

17

17

30

29

35

10.

Includes all studies of political party activity on ihe federal, slate, a n d local level.

TABLE 11-6. Distribution o f articles in “Public opinion, voting, and elections” category in general American political science jo u rn als by class for given time periods

Articles by class Public opinion, voting, and elections Election laws and administration Political behavior, political sociali­ zation, and mass behavior Political opinion formation and measurement Communications and construction of general theory

1909- 1914 Number Percent

1925- 1929 Number Percent

1939- 1941 Number Percent

1952- 1954 Number

Percent

1969--1971 Number Percent

9

100

33

100

32

100

59

100

122

100

9

100

12

36

3

9

6

10

11

9

0

0

12

36

20

63

32

54

84

69

0

0

4

12

6

19

15

25

23

19

0

0

5

15

3

9

6

10

4

3

94

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE II-7. Distribution o f articles in “Presidency” category in general American political science journals by class for given time periods Articles by class Presidency Presidential institutions Presidency-federal bureaucracy relations

1909--1914

1925- 1929

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

6

-

9

-

2

_

1 1

«

1

_

0

0

7

_

3

_

0

0

Presidential policy formulation and execution process

0

0

3

Construction of general theories of the Presidency

1

.

0

Presidencycongressional relations Presidency-judiciary relations

0

American government (other than federal). O ne “su rp rise” here may be that a renew ed interest in state affairs (often involving econom ic analysis and/or interstate com parisons), in local affairs (spurred by the “u rb an crisis”), and in problem s o f th e federal system (evidenced by m any special commissions and new arrangem ents) does not suffice to bring the level o f com paradve attention u p to the level o f the first th ree periods. A lthough the analysis by class within category may often seem to be too refined, it is still not subtle enough to m ake some significant points. T h u s none o f th e items for “Local politics, adm inistration, and law” for the recent period concerns local adm inistration o r law; i.e., they all concern the political dim ension o f local governm ent. Public policy analysis (substantive). However im perfectly the data m irro r the substantive policy interests o f political scientists, they present m ore than random clues, and, when read in the context o f history, they speak to o u r professional posture. Some policy areas, especially “H ealth, education, and w elfare,” have a certain constancy. O thers have a “hot flash” quality: thus “Civil liberties” in 1952-1954, an obvious response to M cCarthyism (Table 11-10). B ut patently th ere is selectivity in responding to “h o t” issues. In the

Fields and Foci

1939- 1941 Number Percent

1952- 1954 Number Percent 28 1(H)

1969- 1971 Number Percem 10

62

100

14

23

8

29

4

-

18

29

4

14

3

-

15

24

5

18

1

-

7

11

2

7

1

-

8

13

8

29

0

0

0

1

4

1

0

95

-

recent period o f intense ecological concern, th ere has not been a single item addressed to “Resources and conservation policy.” T h e m ost significant d atu m is presum ably the decline, in the m ost re ­ cent period, to 5 percent o f the total for the category as a whole. T his change appears to be an obvious reflection o f behavioralist interests and influence. Judicial affairs, and public law andjurisprudence. T h e data reflect the decline o f interest in the substantive and philosophic aspects o f law an d the recent grow th o f behavioral studies (Tables 11-11 and 11-12). The Study o f Political Science T h e sh arp upw ard m ovem ent fo r “Research trends and bibliography” in the period 1952-1954 is a paten t reflection o f th e then-grow ing controversy over behavioralism (Table 11-13). But perhaps the most significant point these data m ake is that political science has given little attention in its jo u r ­ nals to the activity to which, by a large m easure, the most tim e is given: teaching.

96

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE 11-8. Distribution of articles in “Organization and administ­ ration” category in general American political science journals by class for given time periods Articles by class

1909-1914

1925-1929 Number Percent

Number

Percent

1

_

34

100

1

_

5

15

0

0

9

27

0

0

13

38

0

0

1

3

0

0

1

3

Administration of particular programs

0

0

9

Private administration

0

0

3 0

0

Construction of general organization and ad­ ministration theory

0

0

2

6

Organization and administration Public fiscal activity Personnel administra­ tion and organization development Organization and management Comparative administra­ tion and technical assistance International administration

“Science Manpower” Data: Political Science Data from an o th er source are available for use in trying to “get a picture” o f the interests and activities o f political scientists. T h e source, a rep o rt on “Am erican science m anpow er,” resulting from a survey conducted by the National Science Foundation in 1970 (published 1971), is the second issue of a proposed biennial National Register o f Scientific and Technical Personnel. T hese data are unquestionably o f som e value. T hey bear on place and type o f em ploym ent, as well as specialization, and thus are relevant to the discussion (see below) of professionalization. But these data are also subject to various limitations and m ust be in terp reted with caution. T hey were gathered from a questionnaire distributed to m em bers o f the Am erican Political Science Association. T h u s some who consider them selves political scientists would not have received the questionnaire. (T hough trained as political scientists, they m ight have allowed their m em bership to lapse, p ar­ ticularly if em ployed outside academ ia.) And o f course, not all who received

Fields and Foci

1939-1941 N um ber Percent

1952--1954 Number Percent

91

1969-1971 Number Percent

55

too

41

100

7

_

9

16

5

12

0

0

11

20

6

15

2

-

16

30

6

15

1

-

0

0

3

7

1

-

0

0

2

5

0

4

7

7

17

3

6

3

7

1 0

12

22

9

22

2

0 —

0

-

the questionnaire responded. (W ere those with a “science” orientation m ore disposed to respond, given the sponsorship and nam e of the survey?) T h e following tables were constructed from data in th e report. T h e categories (“fields”) used in the tables are those used in the questionnaire and the re p o rt thereon. (In the questionnaire and the rep o rt, th e categories are broken into subcategories, which are ignored for present purposes. T h e re p o rt also contains d ata on “levels”— Ph.D., M.A., and A .B.— which are lum ped together in the tables.) C ontrolling for years o f experience (Table III), one can draw some conclusions reg ard in g specialization. Political theory has been a com paratively steady, though relatively small, field o f interest. M ethodology has been a field of increasing interest for younger political scientists. In te rest in public policy is fairly steady, but it “peaks” am ong those who becam e political scientists in the late thirties and early forties. Public adm inistration has been declining in its attraction for

TABLE II-9. Distribution o f articles in “American governm ent (other than federal)” category in general American political science jo u rn als by class for given time periods

Articles by class

1909- 1914 Number Percent

1925- 1929 Number Percent

1939- 1941 Number Percent

1952- 1954 Number Percent

1969-■1971 Number Percent

American government (other than federal)

38

100

51

100

44

100

51

100

70

100

Federal-state rela­ tions and regionalism

6

16

2

4

12

27

20

40

3

4

State politics, adm in­ istration, and law

9

24

31

61

22

50

22

43

40

57

Local politics, adm in­ istration, and law

23

61

18

36

10

23

9

18

27

39

TA BLE 11-10. D istribution o f articles in “Public policy” category in general Am erican political science jou rnals by class for given time periods

Articles by class

1909--1914

1925--1929 Number Percent

Number

Percent

Public policy analysis (substantive) Foreign policy

58 0

100 0

32 8

Industrial and commercial policy

17

30

1939--1941

1952--1954 Number Percent

Number

Percent

100

76

100

155

25

10

13

0

0

2

1969-1971 Number Percent 36

100

22

100 14

2

5

3

9

6

3

8

Agriculture policy Labor and management policy

3

5

0

0

6

8

3

2

1

3

10

17

2

6

6

8

17

11

1

3

Resources and conservation policy

2

3

3

9

5

7

5

3

0

0

Health, education, and welfare policy

4

7

2

6

6

8

10

6

12

34

Fiscal and budgetary policy

9

15

0

0

0

0

2

1

0

0

Civil liberties11 O ther12

4 9

7 15

1 16

3 50

1 40

3 53

18 69

12 45

4 13

10 36

11. 12.

Inclu d es bo th in tern al security a n d civil rights. In clu d es tra n sp o rta tio n , co m m unications, civil-military relations, a n d g en e ra l policy studies.

NO VO

TABLE 11-11. Distribution o f articles in “Judicial affairs” category in general American political science journals by class for given time periods

Articles by class

1909- 1914

1925- 1929

Percent

Number

Judicial affairs

Number 3

Percent

-

8

-

Case studies and biography

0

0

0

0

Judicial organs and administration

1

.

Judicial behavior and activities Construction of general theory of judicial behavior

1939- 1941 Number 17

Percent

1952- 1954 Number Percent

1969-•1971 Number

Percent

100

15

100

22

100

3

18

4

27

1

5

4

7

41

3

20

3

14

1

4

7

41

5

33

15

68

1

0

0

0

3

20

3

14

0

TA BLE 11-12. D istribution o f articles in “Public law and ju risprudence" category in general American political science jo u rn als by class for given time periods

Articles by class

1909- 1914 Number Percent

Public law and jurisprudence Public law

14 11

Jurisprudence

3

_

1925- 1929 Number Percent

1939--1941 Number Percent

-

26 20

100 77

34 22

100 65

-

6

23

12

35

1952- 1954

1969- 1971

Number

Percent

Number

40

100

10

24 16

60

3

-

40

7

-

Percent

TABLE 11-13. Distribution of articles in “Study o f political science” category in general American political science journals by class for given time periods Articles by class Study of political science Teaching of political science and citizenship education Research trends and bibliography

1909--1914

1925--1929

1939-•1941

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

8

_

8

_

9

_

6 2

4 -

4

3 -

6

-

1952--1954 Number Percent

1969-1971 Number

17

100

8

2

12

3

15

88

5

Percent

—

102

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE III. Percentage distribution of political scientists by field for given years of professional experience, 1970

Field Total Political theory Methodology— political science

Years o f Professional Experience 10-14 15-19 20-24 I year 2-4 5 -9 years or less years years years years 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 7.1 9.4 7.4 7.9 6.3 7.7 5.2

4.2

2.5

1.7

1.8

0.1

6.9 7.4

6.8 8.2

6.8 10.0

8.4

8.9

15.3

8.1 16.0

22.0

3.5

4.3

4.0

3.0

2.9

1.9

Foreign and cross-national political institutions and behavior

28.0

23.8

25.0

19.5

17.8

13.5

U.S. political insti­ tutions, processes, and behavior International law, organization, and politics

22.3

26.0

26.0

23.7

26.0

26.0

13.2

12.4

12.3

15.0

12.7

11.6

5.9

6.6

5.6

7.2

7.5

6.0

Public policy formation and impacts Public administration Political stability, instability, and change

Political science, other

Source: T ab ic A-52, p. 212, N ational Scicncc F ou n d atio n , 1971. N ote: Becausc o f ro u n d in g , colum ns may not tocal 1009f.

younger political scientists; but this change m ust be interpreted in light o f the separatist tendency o f public adm inistration. T h e evidence that “Political stability, instability, and change” shows com paratively little interest for any age g ro u p is difficult to in terp ret, because the category (however im portant) is not a custom ary “field.” T h e two areas that attract the greatest n u m b er o f political scientists are foreign and dom estic governm ent. T h e fo rm er has been steadily increasing its share o f political scientists since W orld W ar II. Interest in dom estic gov­ ern m en t is relatively steady betw een cohorts, following som ething o f a cycli­ cal pattern . In terest in international affairs shows some decline since W orld W ar II; but perh ap s this, too, rep resents m ore a tendency to separatism than an absolute decline in interest. T able IV indicates the strong pedagogical orientation of political science

Fields and Foci

Years of Professional Experience 25-29 30-34 35-39 40 or more years years years years

103

No report of years of experience

1009Ì 5.6

1007. 4.8

1009? 5.7

1009£ 5.5

1.4

1.7

0.1

-

1.2

11.3 20.7

13.1 24.5

7.3 22.0

6.4 26.6

7.4 12.3

1.4

0.1

1.6

4.6

3.6

12.7

10.9

11.4

7.3

19.8

21.1

18.3

22.1

26.6

24.6

18.8

18.8

25.2

11.9

13.9

7.0

7.0

4.9

11.0

9.8

1007r 7.4

and the difference between fields in this respect. In all fields except public adm inistration, teaching is re p o rte d as the prim ary work activity. T able V again indicates the pedagogic orientation o f political science. For political scientists in all ten age groups, educational institutions are the chief em ployer— by a significant m argin. Em ploym ent outside academ ia is highest for those with 20 to 35 years o f professional experience. “Social Science Manpower”: Comparative Perspectives T h e d ata in Tables VI th ro u g h X perm it some com parisons betw een politi­ cal science and fo u r o th er social-behavioral disciplines: anthropology, economics, psychology, and sociology. T h e data are derived from American Science Manpower, 1970 (National Science Foundation, 1971), from the 1970 annual rep o rt on N ational Science Foundation funding for research proj­ ects, an d from the central offices o f the several national disciplinary associa­ tions. T h e limitations o f the data are obvious. T hose pertaining to American Science Manpower, 1970, were noted above. In two tables data from this

104

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE IV. Percentage distribution of political scientists by primary work activity for given fields, 1970

Field Political theory Methodology— political science

Primary Work Activity Management Research or and Total development administration Teaching 74 7 100% 8 100%

24

20

39

Public policy formation and impacts

100%

15

23

45

Public administration

100%

8

45

32

Political stability, instability, and change

100%

17

11

52

Foreign and cross­ national political institutions and behavior

100%

13

8

65

U.S. political institutions, processes. and behavior

I007f

9

13

65

International law, organization, and politics

100%

9

10

67

Political science. other

100%

7

17

49

Source: T ab le A-50, p. 206, N ational Science F ou n d atio n , 1971. N ote: Because o f ro u n d in g , rows may not total 1009f.

source are com bined with data from the two o th er sources.5 Still, in ter­ preted with caution th e d ata are instructive in various ways. T able VI indicates th at political science is a middle-sized social science discipline, roughly com parable to economics and sociology, m uch sm aller than psychology, m uch larger than anthropology. T able VI also offers evi­ dence on the question raised above as to the representativeness o f th e politi­ cal science respondents to the National Science Foundation survey. Only 39.1% o f political scientists participated in the 1970 survey, presum ably the m ore “scientifically” inclined. (However, what would account for the spread between the econom ists—95.3% — and the anthropologists—28.8%?) fab le V II indicates com paratively the prim ary work activity o f the five

Fields and Foci

Primary Work Activity Exploration, Forecasting, Consulting reporting O ther

Not employed

No report o f work activity

2

6

3

-

-

2

8

1

3

3

2

3

5

4

3

5

3

4

2

2

5

4

7

3

-

2

2

7

2

-

2

2

6

3

-

2

2

6

3

1

4

5

10

6

105

2

disciplines. Political scientists m ore th an any o f the o th er four consider their prim ary work to be teaching. T h e second m ost frequent prim ary work activ­ ity is m anagem ent and adm inistration; in this they are roughly com parable to the o th er disciplines. But political science is lowest in the proportion o f its m em bers rep o rtin g research and developm ent as the prim ary work activity. T able V III bears on place o f work and indicates that m ore than threefourths o f political scientists work in educational institutions. But in this there is no striking contrast with the o th e r disciplines; m ore than h alf o f those in each o f the o th e r disciplines work in academ ia. O f all political scientists, 6.8% work in the federal governm ent, 3.4% in governm ent on other levels, 3.3% in n o n p ro fit corporations, and 1.8% in business an d in-

106

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

TABLE V. Percentage distribution of political scientists by type of employer for given years of professional experience, 1970 Type of Employer Years of professional experience 1 or less 2 to 4

Educational Federal O ther Total institutions government government 100% 70.6 3.5 3.5 100% 4.2 3.6 76.3

5 to 9 10 to 14

100% 100%

82.1 76.8

4.8 6.4

3.3 4.0

15 to 19 20 to 24

100% 100% 100%

77.8 76.5

6.6

4.9

8.1 10.9

5.2 4.7

11.6 3.4

2.7 3.4

3.7 3.9

1.9 1.7

25 to 29

67.3

30 to 34 35 to 39 40 or more

100% 100% 100%

72.8 72.9 70.4

No report

100%

78.6

Source: T ab le A-10, p. 75. N ational Science F oundation, 1971. N ote: Because o f ro u n d in g , rows may not total 100%.

Table VI. Distribution of association members, NSF registrants in 1970, and employ­ ment status for selected social sciences

Discipline Political science Anthropology

Number of members in the national association (1) 16,600

Number of registrants with NSF in 1970 (2) 6,493

Percent of national membership who registered with NSF in 1970

4,600

1,325

39.1 28.8

Number of registrants employed full-time (3) 5.552 1,188

Economics Psychology

14,052

13,386

95.3

11.959

34,000

26,271

23,309

Sociology

10,950

7,658

77.3 69.9

5,943

Sources: (1) T h e latest association reco rd s as o f M arch, 1973: (2) p. 31, N ational Science F o u n d atio n , 1971: (3) p. 43, N ational Science F ou n d atio n , 1971.

Fields and Foci

107

Type of Employer No report Industry Non-profit Not of type of and Selforganization business employed Military Other employed employer 3.2 1.7 0.1 11.5 2.1 3.0 3.1 7.8 0.7 1.2 0.1 1.9 0.9 2.1 0.6 1.2 0.9 3.2 0.3 1.2 3.3 3.3 0.9 2.3 0.3 2.3 0.3 3.9 0.6 2.8 .7 0.9 1.1 0.7 4.6 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 1.5 4.7 1.4 2.8 1.9 3.8 2.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 5.8 2.2 1.8 1.3 6.8 1.7 1.7 3.4 0.8 5.9 3.7 17.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 3.2 0.6 7.6 1.0 0.3 0.8 2.2 -

-

-

-

TABLE VII. Percentage distribution of NSF registrants in 1970 by primary work activity for given social science disciplines

Discipline Political science Anthropology Economics Psychology Stxiology

Teaching 58.3 55.7 39.5 25.9 51.2

Research and development 10.5 21.2 20.5 23.2 18.6

Management and administration 16.5 11.2 21.9 18.7 13.7

Source: Table A-12, pp. 80-81, National Science Foundation, 1971.

Other 14.7 11.9 18.1 32.2 16.5

108

Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise

T ABLE VIII. Percentage distribution of NSF registrants in 1970 by type of employer for given social science disciplines

Discipline Political science Anthropology Economics Psychology Sociology *Sourre:

Educational institution

Federal, civilian and military

76.9 80.7 58.6 56.5 74.0

6.8 2.3 12.2 6.8 3.5

O ther govern­ ment 3.4 1.0 5.1 9.7 3.9

Non­ profit 3.3 2.7 3.9 7.8 4.5

Business and industry 1.8 0.8 13.6 7.3 1.6

O ther 7.8 12.5 6.6 11.9 12.5

T able A-8, pp. 55-56, N ational Science F oundation, 1971.

dustry. T his pattern is som ew hat similar to those o f anthropology and sociology but ra th e r d ifferen t from those o f economics and psychology. T able IX indicates the distribution o f all federal “grants and awards" to the five disciplines in 1970. (Data for the level of funding are not given for recipient disciplines as such. H ence caution in interpretation is necessary; but Table X provides at least partial clarification.) Political science is fourth in the n u m b er o f m em bers receiving any type o f federal financial support. T h e rank o rd e r o f the social sciences is not changed by rem oving those who work directly for the federal governm ent. (Significantly, economists far o u t­ num ber political scientists in em ploym ent by the federal governm ent, both in absolute num bers an d in relative ratios.) T able X confirm s th at political science has fared relatively poorly in generating federal financial su p p o rt for its research activities. O f course, all the disciplines receive research funding from a wide variety o f sources other than the federal governm ent, and for political science d u rin g the past two decades, funding from the Ford Foundation and the Social Science Research Council has been significant. B ut the table does indicate the relative levels of su p p o rt from one highly im p o rtan t source. Perhaps the relatively poor showing for political science is related to its late acceptance by the National Science Foundation as a “science” (a story m uch too com plicated to be re ­ counted here) and is d u e for rapid im provem ent. But as recently as 1970, at least, political science received the smallest am ount o f money as a discipline, received the smallest am o u n t p er capita, and had the fewest projects funded. In sum: As a social science, political science attracts its “share” o f a d h er­ ents; but there is reason to believe that cleavage along a “science/ nonscience” line is particularly significant for the discipline. Political scientists for the most p art work in academ ic environm ents and identify their prim ary work activity as teaching, a pattern m ore like anthropology

Fields and Foci

TA BLE IX.

109

Distribution o f federal financial support for selected social sciences

Discipline Political science Anthropology Economics Psychology Sociology

Number of registrants receiving federal support in 1970 (1) 1,516 417 4,660 10,060 2.297

Percent of registrants employed full-time receiving federal support* 27.3 35.1 39.0 43.2 38.7

Number of registrants working for federal government (civilian and military) (2) 442 31 1,637 1,795 273

Number of registrants receiving federal funds through contracts or grants in 1970 (1) 1,074 386 3,023 8,265 2,024

Percent of registrants employed full-time receiving federal funds through contracts or grants in 1970t 19.3 32.5 25.3 35.5 34.1

Sources: (1) p. 31, N ational Science F o undation, 1971; (2) pp. 45-46, N ational Science F o u n d a­ tion, 1971. * P ercentage d erived by dividing colum n 1 o f T able IX by colum n 4 o f T able VI. t P ercentage d erived by dividing colum n 4 o f T able IX by colum n 4 o f T able VI.

TABLE X. Distribution of National Science Foundation grants and awards for re­ search projects in selected social sciences 1970 NSF 1970 NSF support for research per support for Mean association research per Number of Total, 1970 registrant funding NSF support member in projects per project in 1970 1973 funded for research in 1970 in 1970 (in dollars) (in dollars) (in dollars) (in dollars) Discipline (2) (2) (1) (1) 26,668.27 72.29 184.83 45 1,200,072 Political science 22,214.70 Anthropology 160 772.69 2,682.53 3,554,352 339.10 95 47,780.53 4,539,150 323.03 Economics n/a n/a Psychology n/a n/a n/a Sociology

3,558,990*

325.02

464.74

86

41,383.60

Sources: (1) N ational Science F oundation, Grants and Awards for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1970, W ashington, D.C., U.S. G overnm ent P rinting O ffice. 1971, pp. 35-42 (totals via additions); (2) see T ab le VI for association m em bers an d registrants. * Includes su p p o rt for social psychology projects, n/a-data not available

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an d sociology (the smaller disciplines) than like economics and psychology (the larger disciplines). Political science has been less successful than the o th er disciplines in gaining financial su p p o rt for research from the federal governm ent; but this circum stance needs to be in terp reted in the light of history and in th e context o f m any factors, some o f which are not even m entioned in this essay. POLITICAL SCIENCE VIEWED IN T E R N A T IO N A L LY T o give a b rief survey o f political science outside the U nited States proved to be the most vexing task im posed by the preparation o f this essay. T h e re are many sources o f data, but often they are incom plete and not current. Characteristically— for reasons that are understandable and forgivable —collections o f data fo r the world as a whole or any substantial part o f it are undiscrim inating an d likely to be misleading. D ifferences in lan­ guage, tradition, national “style,” and ideology present severe problem s o f accuracy o f knowledge and com parability o f data. Above all, th ere is the problem o f definition and perspective: W hat shall be called “political sci­ ence” and by what w arrant? T h e aim o f inclusiveness and dictates o f p ru ­ dence lead to heaping in one basket labeled “fru it” apples, oranges, bananas, tom atoes, corn, coconuts, rice, and potatoes. In the introductory section the legitimacy o f a broad interpretation o f “political science” was recognized and, indeed, argued. P rem odern polities had and contem porary non-W estern polities have political science, i.e., polit­ ical knowledge. Also it may be reem phasized that Am erican political science, though “som ething in size, con tent and m ethod unique in W estern intellec­ tual history” (to repeat the words o f B ernard Crick), owes incalculable debts to E urope. In its origins and in every stage o f its developm ent it has been inspired an d enriched by E uropean thought, as the account above testifies. Indeed, the record o f influence and contributions is broader, involving the sweep o f history and intercultural borrowings. In short, to speak o f the growth o f political science internationally is not simply to speak to the ex p o rt and installation o f a product labeled “M ade in the U.S.A.” So m uch prefaced, the question posed is: W hat is the extent and status o f self-conscious political inquiry of the type developed in the West and particularly in the United States? Some general observations are an a p p ro ­ priate beginning. Since W orld W ar II the notion o f a self-conscious political science, con­ ceived in the singular (as against the “political sciences”), indep en d en t in status (as against subordination to o r inclusion in o th er social sciences o r law), and aspiring toward the type o f scientific base and achievem ent o f th e natural sciences, has been slowly gaining acceptance in a significant n um ber o f countries. Im portant in the process o f diffusion and acceptance has been

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th e stro n g influence exerted by the U nited States in m uch o f the world in the post-W orld W ar II period. Specifically, this influence has often been exerted th ro u g h the exchange o f scholars and professionals in the Fulbright and o th er (often foundation) exchange program s, and th ro u g h program s o f aid an d technical assistance. T h e creation, via UNESCO, o f the International Political Science Association, both provided an im portant channel for A m erican influence (given the p rep o n d eran ce o f A m erican political scien­ tists an d the ease and attractiveness o f foreign travel) and became itself a m ajor source o f interaction an d influence. Generally, th e spread o f political science has been forw arded by the spread and influence o f the same forces that favored th e grow th o f political science in the U nited States. For these forces “m odernization” may be the best sh o rth an d notation: industrialization, specialization, secularization, and so forth. Such forces have abetted the spread not simply o f political science b ut o f behavioral an d statistical m odes, o f contem porary social science in general, th at is, o f th e com plex o f ideas, attitudes, and m ethodologies which envelop an d su p p o rt political science. Claim ing a su p erio r political knowledge and im proved techniques for studying political reality, political science encounters resistance (often open hostility) from established elites concerned with studying and teaching the political, especially in the universities; and as a result, political science characteristically finds its hom e eith er in institutes o r foundations separate from (or only loosely affiliated with) the older universities o r in new er (often regional o r provincial) universities, in which tradition is weaker and new experim ents can m ore readily be u n d ertak en . O n the o th er hand, elites (including com m unist elites) may o ffer a qualified entrance, seeking what instrum ental utility new tools may offer, o r p erhaps calculating that th ere may be a com petitive loss if the "gam e” is not entered. A Geographical View N ot surprisingly, w estern an d central E urope evidence fair strength and considerable prom ise. British political science rem ains heavily w eighted to­ ward historical-philosophical-hum anistic interests, but th ere is also a signifi­ cant am o u n t o f political science in the new er idiom . (T he m ore traditional view is rep resen ted by Political Studies [1953 to the present]; newer cu rren ts are b etter rep resen ted in British Journal of Political Science [inaugurated in 1971 ]). T h e new er political science (as against “the political sciences” and public law) has m ade considerable headway in France, som e progress in Italy, very little in Spain. H ere an d th e re in West G erm any significant p ro g ­ ress has been m ade against deeply en tren ch ed traditional approaches; little headw ay has been m ade in A ustria. Switzerland is enigm atic: deeply trad i­ tional b ut still the base o f influential “m o d ern ” social science. T h e N eth er­ lands is m oving rapidly an d impressively; Belgium has m ade a start. T h e re

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are im p o rtan t “enclaves” in th e Scandinavian countries; and Sweden, w here political studies have long been recognized as such (a C hair in Rhetoric and Politics was established as early as 1622), is especially strong. In Russia and eastern E u ro pe, political science experiences not only the constraints o f the public law tradition but those o f M arxist ideology and com m unist regim e. In Russia these constraints are effective, for the m ost part, in preventing the rise o f political science in the W estern (“bourgeois”) sense. Poland an d Yugoslavia, however (and Czechoslovakia briefly, until 1968), are “fre e r” and, in d iffering ways, su p p o rt a significant quantum o f m o d ern social science, including political science. In Asia it is J a p a n that leads; despite the strength o f traditionalism and law, an im pressive effo rt is being m ade. India, com bining indigenous m ate­ rials an d m ingled British and A m erican influences, makes a significant effort. Several o f the o th er countries, including the Philippines, Malaysia, Pakistan, an d South Korea, have at least the beginning o f m o d ern political science. T h e People’s Republic o f C hina has political studies in its own style, o f course, but no (known) political science in the present m eaning. For a n u m b er o f reasons, including the proxim ity o f the U nited States, C anada m ounts an im pressive effort. O f th e historic “settled” British dom in­ ions, A ustralia follows C anada. New Zealand and South A frica, in very dif­ feren t ways, have some teaching and research in political science. In Latin America, political science is generally in thrall to law, though th ere are occasional spurts o f significant achievem ent. In the N ear East, T u rk ey probably leads, though the small Israeli effort is impressive. T h e re are “islands” o f political science in th e A rab countries but only that. T h e sam e o r a sim ilar generalization can be m ade for Africa. A fter this horseback survey, both caveats and apologies are in o rder. T h e perspective, to repeat, is not only W estern b u t th at o f contem porary political science in the U nited States. No attem pt has been m ade to ju d g e the significance o r achievem ents o f political science o f o th er types and in con­ text. Ju d g m en ts m ade for countries o r areas were ro u g h , and they were qualitative only in the sense indicated; outstanding work occurs w herever it occurs, and it occurs in m any places. An adequate tre atm e n t o f political science worldwide would req u ire a lengthy book. T h e following d ata m ust serve to conclude this b rief treatm ent. A recent census o f National Political Science Associations (in PS, Spring, 1972) indi­ cates th at thirty-one countries have one o r m ore political science associations o f some sort. But “o f some sort” m ust be em phasized, since th ere is great heterogeneity (if not o u trig h t incompatibility). A pproxim ately h alf o f the national associations have an association publication o f som e sort. B ut the publications d o not necessarily rep resen t all political science— o f w hatever type— for the countries concerned. T h e UNESCO World List of Social Science Periodicals lists nearly two h u n d re d jo u rn als that, on a broad interpretation,

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m ight be classified as political science journals. C onsiderably less than half o f them would be “political science” in a sense recognizable to m ost o f the m em bership o f the A m erican Political Science Association. O nly about oneth ird o f the associations hold m eetings. T h e In tern atio n al Political Science Association was fo u n d ed in 1949 u n d e r UN ESCO sponsorship. Formally, the Association is com posed o f na­ tional political science associations, but individual m em berships are also pos­ sible. T h e Association holds triennial congresses and publishes International Political Science Abstracts an d the International Bibliography of Political Science. Individual m em bership now (1972) stands at about 450. A lthough it has individual m em bers in m any countries, the great majority o f individual m em bers are w estern E uropean an d A m erican. In fact, nearly h alf are Am erican. TOWARD A PO STBEH AVIO RAL POLITICAL SCIENCE? It is hardly o p en to dispute that the tendencies collectively known as behavioralism , in the ascendant in th e fifties, reached a position approaching dom inance in A m erican political science in the sixties. T o be sure, political science was n o t reconstructed entire. G reat num bers o f political scientists rem ained unconvinced, even antagonistic. Many “nonbehavioral” activities continued; m any deep-flow ing cu rrents (some generated long before Am erican political science) continued largely undisturbed. B ut those known as “behavioralists” becam e pro m in en t, probably dom inant, in th e affairs o f the political science associations and in m ost o f the leading faculties o f politi­ cal science. Books, jo urnals, convention program s, research g ran ts— many oth er indices testify to the vigor and wide acceptance o f behavioralism . As the sixties drew tow ard a close, however, behavioralism received a new challenge. T h is new challenge had its sources in the intellectual ferm ent and social-political turbulence th at m arked A m erican life in the m iddle and late sixties an d continued, if dim inished, into the seventies. In general, the new challenge sp ran g from the two phenom ena known as the New Left and the C ounterculture. T o speak thus in categorical term s is to oversim plify and risk m isunderstanding, but an explication o f recent history, taking account o f th e com plexities o f events and the subtleties o f ideas, is beyond the scope o f this essay. In the late sixties the new dissent centered in the creation within the Am erican Political Science Association o f a so-called Caucus for a New Polit­ ical Science. T h e Caucus (predom inantly but by no m eans exclusively younger political scientists) acted vigorously, som etim es stridently, in an at­ tem pt to nullify o r reverse do m in an t patterns o f political science. T h a t no m ajor victories, in term s o f election o f officers o r control o f Association affairs, went to the dissidents is not necessarily a m easure of effect, especially

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long-term , or o f the validity (or invalidity) o f the ideas and actions advanced. T h e term “postbehavioral” cam e into use to designate the m ood and program m atic in ten t o f the new dissenters. T hose who would accept this designation vary greatly am ong them selves, b u t some o f the m ain tenets and tendencies can be indicated.

“Postbehavioral” Tenets and Tendencies Political science has becom e too narrow ly defined, too “professional,” too m uch identified with th e established o rd er. Political scientists, personally and collectively, should be m ore concerned with “values,” with issues o f justice, freedom , and equality, with political activity. In a period of stress, turm oil, an d gross inequities, it is irresponsible to carry on “as usual” in academ ic detachm ent. At m inim um , political scientists need to be concerned with is­ sues o f public policy an d political reform ; perhaps they should becom e en ­ gaged with issues o f radical sociopolitical reconstruction. Driven by the am bition to becom e a genuine science, political science has constricted an d crippled itself philosophically and m ethodologically. T h e fact-value distinction has en couraged an undesirable foreshortening o f vi­ sion and a m oral insensitivity. Em phasis on m ethodology borrow ed from the natu ral sciences has resulted in m uch research that is trivial— “elegant,” perhaps, b ut inconsequential, even for its ostensible purpose o f helping to create a science o f politics. A concentration on scientific philosophy (knowledge o f which is not necessary to “d o ” political science) and on scientific m ethodology (which pertains only to m ethods o f proof, not to the m ore im portant m atters o f discovery o r creation) has squeezed the vitality from political science. No longer the M aster Science o f the G reeks, it concerns itself with a narrow range o f p h en o m en a that lend themselves to treatm en t by approved m ethods. In fact, political science is becom ing apolitical. Political science needs to becom e im aginative, creative (even playful), open to th e world. M odern n atural science, after all, is but a “school o f consciousness,” on e am ong m any. It represents a m onopolistic expropriation o f th e m eaning o f “science,” i.e., know ledge in its original sense. T h e m onopoly m ust be broken. Such views w ere expressed not ju st orally but in articles, m onographs, and books. (G raham and Carey, 1972; Kariel, 1972; M arini, 1971; Surkin and Wolfe, 1970; Easton, 1969; McCoy and Playford, 1967) A newly fou n d ed jo u rn a l, Politics and Society, though covering m ore than “political science,” reflects the new currents. It seeks to provide an alternative to “the leading professional social science jo u rn a ls” which “continue to be obsessed with technique at the expense o f politics.”

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Effects and Implications Im m ediately, the effect o f the form ation o f the Caucus fo r a New Political Science was to com plicate the politics o f political science. T h e interests o f political scientists have always been too diverse, the opinions too varied and subtle, to p erm it division into a small n u m b er o f sharply defined “parties.” But th e controversies concerning behavioralism (like the controversies o f the twenties and early thirties) did create a certain bipolarity between those holding m ore traditional interests and opinions and those seeking to ad ­ vance the cause o f science. Probably by the mid-sixties th ere was decreasing tension and controversy. A fter years o f sometim es heated disputation, the situation could p erh ap s best be conceived as a spectrum , with the position o f the m ajority o f political scientists on the philosophic-m ethodological issues rep resen ted by the central bands. T h e rise o f the Caucus, the events in the historical context that caused and accom panied it, the opinions it rep resen ted , and the issues it forw arded served to com plicate issues and confuse the politics o f political science— and to provide m aterial for those with a taste for irony. In a form al sense, the positions arg u ed by Caucus m em bers often were those o f th e traditionalists (e.g., the im portance o f values, a loose as against a strict interpretation o f science). O n the o th e r h an d , the political causes they ardently espoused were likely to be ab h o rren t to the traditionalists— but attractive to m any behavioralists. O n the crucial question o f the n atu re o f the Am erican Political Science Association— w hether it should becom e a m ore active force in political life (e.g., by passing resolutions on pro m in ent issues o f the day, “educating,” and lobbying) o r rem ain essentially neutral, focusing on disciplinary-professional concerns— th e decisions have tu rn e d in the latter direction. O n this question traditionalists and behavioralists (now becom e “establishm ent” and in that sense traditional) have been able to m uster a substantial majority. T h e long-range significance o f the “postbehavioral” forces is an o th er m atter, com plicated and problem atical, hidden from view. Perhaps from the vantage point o f 1980 the rise o f th e Caucus and the proclam ation o f a “postbehavioral sensibility” will ap p ear but a tem porary aberration, an o th er d e to u r in a m arch tow ard a m ore scientific politics. Perhaps a new balance o f forces will em erge, a rearran g em en t o f professional ends and m eans, m o­ tives and techniques, in which science is cultivated less for its own sake and used m ore in a conscious attem pt to realize p referred values. Relevant to eith er o f these possibilities is the fact th at m any o f the recent dissidents are younger political scientists well schooled in scientific philosophy and well trained in behavioral research m ethods. W hatever develops, it will develop in relation to cues and com m ands from the environm ent within which political science exists. T h e events and

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m ovem ents in recent political science have had th eir co u n terp arts in the o th er social sciences. In d eed , they are a p art o f currents o f th o u g h t and patterns o f activity th a t also affect the hum anities and the well-established natural sciences. Beyond these are the complexities and im ponderables o f u nfolding history. T h e p ru d e n t will avoid prediction. THE FACES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE I f anything is clear from the foregoing, it is that political science is not a single, simple thing. R ather, it is an aggregation o f varied interests and activities in a com plex relationship with its environm ent— o r its several changing environm ents. No d o u b t it has significant aspects th at are not explored in this essay: political science as technology o r as ideology, for exam ple; or political science as a symbolic system; or as itself a political system (or subsystem). Perhaps these aspects deserve m ore than the hints and asides they have received. Be th at as it m ay, this essay can appropriately end with a focusing on five aspects o f political science o f u n doubted im portance. T o some extent this presentation will be recapitulation and sum m ary. But some new data will be included; and with good fortune, the u n d erstan d in g o f political science will be forw arded by a m ore careful delineation of categories and their interrelation. Political Science as Tradition T h e early p art o f this essay presum ably m ade it indisputably clear that political science has traditional aspects. Political science exists in the context o f a specific history. In im p o rtan t ways this history is a living presence. A heritage th at is both intellectual and institutional inevitably contributes shape and color to political science. Probably the heritage o f th e past, in one way and another, is m ore im p o rtan t for political science than for the o th er social sciences. Certainly this is tru e o f the literary-philosophical heritage. No o th er social science approaches political science in the antiquity and richness o f its historical literature. Some hold this to be a disadvantage and are ap t to cite A lfred N orth W hitehead’s dictum th at a science th at hesitates to forget its founders is lost. O thers respond that a science that forgets its founders may also be lost, or they cite Shakespeare’s “W hat’s past is prologue.” W hoever wishes a dem onstration o f the tensions and am biguities posed for political science by its heritage need look no fu rth e r th an the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, w herein the m ost em inent political scientists take diverse and even contrary positions on the relationship o f classical political th o u g h t to contem porary scientific ambitions. We cannot p u t tradition aside simply by deciding to do so. It is the past

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that gives us o u r language o f politics, the categories by which the political is perceived and understo o d ; an d to devise a new language poses heroic dif­ ficulties. T o d o so as a scholarly scientific exercise can serve certain limited purposes. (T o some extent, fo r certain purposes, political science does so.) But o u r political tradition, now becom e c u rre n t culture and institutions, would rem ain largely unaffected by such an academ ic effort. T h e “stu ff” political science addresses has a stubborn, intractable quality im parted to it by its history. From one point o f view, political science is a “n atu ral” science. People, as well as objects and artifacts w ithin the purview o f political science, are of course physical phenom ena. B ut political science is also inevitably a “cu ltu re” science, which m ust deal, how ever it can, with the intangibles o f culture. T hese intangibles also may be held to be a p a rt o f the natural o rd e r and thus am enable to the m ethods o f science. But even if this is granted in principle, the solution to crucial m ethodological problem s does not necessarily follow. W hat language o f politics is there, w hat language o f politics can th ere be, that is n o t culture-bound? W hat is tru e o f the “political anim al” qua political anim al, a p a rt from the circum stances o f any particular tim e, place, and culture? A t less global levels, the questions posed are faced in day-to-day political science, especially when it tu rn s its attention beyond national bou n d ­ aries. Political Science as Discipline Discussions o f political science by political scientists characteristically re fe r to it as both a “discipline” and a “profession”; a w riter often shifts from one to the o th e r term from page to page or even within the same p aragraph. Political scientists apparently believe that political science is both a discipline and a profession (in addition to being a science), and (or) th at th ere is little difference betw een the two. Is this point o f view w arranted? Etymology is o f lim ited value here, but it is a legitim ate starting point in addressing this question. “Discipline” derives fairly direcdy from the Latin disciplina— instruction, tuition. Medieval and early m odern history add layers o f association to the core m eaning o f teaching-and-leam ing. M oral rectitude, p ro p e r conduct, and o perating skills, as well as cognitive knowledge, are a part o f discipline in church, university, guild, and military contexts. But secularization and th e rise o f m o d ern science act in tu rn to strip away the medieval an d early m o d em associations. In th e university, Lehrfreiheit and Lemfreiheit serve to reduce the authority o f received knowledge and prolif­ erate “fields” o f knowledge. In com m on usage today a discipline m eans, both simply an d loosely, “a subject that is tau g h t,” “a field o f study.” Plainly, then, in com m on usage political science is a discipline. It is a subject th a t is taught; it is recognized as a field o f study. Pragmatically, it has successfully asserted itself, it exists, and th e re is no im portant th reat to its

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continuance. In leading colleges and universities it has departm ental status with its accom panying (substantial though not com plete) autonom y. It is (usually) in d ep en d en t from o th er social sciences, and its departm ental status is similar to “disciplines” in the hum anities an d th e natural sciences. B ut th e n — one m ust quickly n o te— d epartm ental status goes also to such en te r­ prises as physical education, hom e economics, and journalism , which are not ordinarily reg ard ed , even by th eir practitioners, as disciplines. W hen political scientists refe r to political science as a discipline, they do have in m ind the fact th at it exists as a recognized field of study, has d e ­ p artm ental status, and is form ally equal to cognate fields o f study. Q uite plainly however, this pragm atic success and com monsensical m eaning is not all they have in m ind. M uch o f the foregoing evidences that th e re would be considerable diversity and some disagreem ent in the responses political sci­ entists would give to th e question: W hat claim does political science have to disciplinary status? B ut th ere would be wide agreem ent on certain m atters, centrally on the assertions th at “th e political” is important enough to deserve concentrated study, and that it is both empirically and analytically distin­ guishable enough from o th er phenom ena to w arrant separate study. T h e argum ents and evidence th at would be adduced in su p p o rt o f these contentions would relate, for the m ost p art, to em erging “professional” qual­ ities a n d — especially— to a claim that political science has attained o r is in the process o f attaining the status o f a genuine theoretical science. T his is the argum ent, for exam ple, o f David Easton in his treatm en t o f “Political Sci­ ence” in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968, pp. 282-298, p. 289). H e begins by positing an “identity crisis” for political science at m idcentury but then continues, “T h ro u g h the efforts to solve this identity crisis it has begun to show evidence o f em erging as an autonom ous and in d ep en ­ d e n t discipline with a systematic theoretical structure o f its own. T h e factor that has contributed m ost to this end has been the reception and integration o f the m ethods o f science into the core o f the discipline.” T his statem ent illustrates a widely shared belief. It also illustrates the soft and slippery n atu re o f “discipline”: While political science shows evidence o f becoming a discipline (first sentence), it already is a discipline with a core (second sen­ tence). Political Science as Profession Can political science be designated as a profession? In what ways is it a profession, in what ways not? T hese are questions it is difficult to answ er because it is difficult to know w hat we are talking about. H ere (as against discipline) it is not for lack o f an extensive serious literature. R ather, perusal o f the literatu re brings as m uch bew ilderm ent as clarification. Some o f the difficulties in achieving a clear focus pertain to differences in history and thus to the em pirical p h enom ena designated as professional. W hereas “divinity, law, and physick” are by wide agreem ent the archetypical

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professions, in the m o d ern period th ere is divergence in th e evolution o f the professions on th e C o n tinent an d in Britain. O n the C ontinent the profes­ sions grew u p in close association with the universities and the state. In Britain they grew u p outside th e universities an d beyond the state. T h e U nited States inherits parts o f both traditions (including th e writings that in te rp ret th e two traditions), mixes them , and o f course adds distinctive new ingredients. T h e rise o f m o d ern science presents a m ajor com plication. Som e o f the alleged characteristics o f professionalism an ted ate m o d ern science an d (or) seem to have no necessary relationship with it. O n the o th e r hand, the ideas and institutions o f science have become so interm ingled (especially in the university) with professionalism that some in terp reters effectively equate the two. All in terp reters find “know ledge” to be essential to the definition (or understanding) o f professionalism . M ust this know ledge m eet certain epistemological and m ethodological criteria? O r are sociological characteristics, e.g., g ro u p norm s an d service to clients, determ inative? Some o f th e difficulties relate to perennial m ethodological problem s in the social sciences. Most o f th e treatm ents o f professionalism utilize an ideal-typical o r attribute-cluster m ethodology. T h a t is, from the em pirical phenom ena presum ptively o r ostensibly “professional,” they select for atten ­ tion (and designate as defining) those characteristics th at seem m ost general and im portant. But w hat is an essential characteristic for one may be m argin­ al o r irrelevant for an o th er. A persistent difficulty— som ewhat related, som ew hat d iffe re n t—is th at th e “is” an d the “o u g h t” are both involved. It is widely believed (by professionals an d nonprofessionals) th at professionals oug h t to act in certain ways, e.g., place client-interest above self-interest. Does the “o u g h t” becom e an “is”? How an d fo r w hat purposes? Some social scientists find ideal-typical and attribute-cluster study o f the professions to be o f little value or p erh ap s even a m isleading search for “essence.” T h e y would reject w hatever cannot be “operationalized”; o r they find th at such approaches miss im p ortant aspects o f social reality, o r th at they divert attention (especially by including altruistic “oughts”) from the im p o rtan t m atter o f th e distribution and exercise o f pow er in society. Such doubts an d objections are not w ithout force— obviously. B ut p u t­ ting them aside, w hat help does the considerable body o f writing on profes­ sions and professionalism give in addressing the question: Is political science a profession? T h e m ost general an d im p o rtan t attributes o f a profession ap p ear to be the following (here I use th e m ethodology o f the w riters I survey, and the result is subject to th e reservations noted). 1. T h e profession possesses a body o f knowledge. T his knowledge is, e.g., “generalized and systematic,” “esoteric o r difficult.” It may consist o f “ab­ stract principles arrived at by scientific research and logical analysis.” T h e

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body o f know ledge may be a “m onopoly.” In any event those who hold it m ake claims o f extraordinary knowledge. 2. Inculcation o f th e body o f know ledge comes from prolonged study and (or) socialization in the profession. 3. T h e practitioners, i.e., those who are already professionals, exercise a general surveillance over th e body o f knowledge, assist in an d supervise the training o f new professionals, articulate and enforce norm s o f professional behavior. Custom arily th e practitioners are organized in an association (or associations), an d m any o f th eir professional functions are exercised th ro u g h th e association (or associations). 4. T h e profession is in som e sense public. T his public quality both confers privileges and imposes obligations. T h e form er prim arily constitute a certain autonom y in control o f m atters pertaining to the profession. T h e prim ary obligation is to re n d e r certain services, objectively an d impartially. O th e r characteristics are often specified: thus, that the profession have a place o f “esteem ” in society; th at it have a set o f symbols and symbolic functions; th at it have a relationship with the university; th at th e re be professional-client relationships. Patently no unequivocal answ er is possible to the question: Is political science a profession? B efore one addresses the question, however, it is ap p ro p ria te to adduce additional d ata reg ard in g its scientific-professional characteristics. T h ese data, again, are derived from th e N ational Science F oun d atio n ’s 1970 study o f American Science Manpower (NSF, 1971). Political scientists constitute only 2% o f all scientists an d technical p e r­ sonnel (these two categories h e reafter com bined as “scientists”). O f all scientists, 40% have Ph.D.s, 30% have M.A.s, an d 27% have B.A.s. O f all political scientists, 61% have Ph.D.s, 38% have M.A.s, and 1% have B.A.s. (Rem em ber: T hese data a re based on rep o rts from “w orking” political scientists. T h e total n u m b er o f those with B.A.s in political science is o f course larg er th an the n u m b er with h ig h er degrees.) O f all scientists, 31% work in business o r industry, 42% in educational institutions, and 10% in the fédéral governm ent. O f all political scientists, 1.8% work in business or industry, 76.9% in educational institutions, 5.4% in the federal governm ent, 3.5% in state and local governm ent, and 1.4% in the military. O f those in th e federal governm ent, 65% are engaged in ad ­ m inistration, 14% in research an d developm ent, 13% in exploration and forecasting. T h e p ro p o rtio n o f m anagers is larg er for state and local go vernm ent (71%), and the p ro p o rtio n o f teachers is h ig h er for the military (28%). O f all scientists, 31% rep o rted th eir prim ary work as research and d e ­ velopm ent, 22% m anagem ent and adm inistration, and 23% teaching. O f

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political scientists, 10.5% rep o rted th eir prim ary work as research and d e ­ velopm ent, 16.5% m anagem ent an d adm inistration, 58.3% teaching. In p ro p o rtio n to th e whole, a significantly larg er n u m b er o f political scientists teach th an econom ists, a som ew hat larg er n u m b er th an sociologists. O f all political scientists, 3.4% are em ployed by n o n p ro fit organizations. O f these, 66% are engaged prim arily in adm inistration, 32% prim arily in research and developm ent. Very few political scientists are self-em ployed; m ost o f those who are self-em ployed engage in consulting. T h o u g h subject to th e lim itations noted above, these data point to the following conclusions. Political science is cen tered in academ ia. T his is tru e com p ared with th e sciences in general. It is tru e com pared with the closely related disciplines o f economics and sociology. W hatever the size o r signifi­ cance o f the research p ro d u ct o f political science in academ ia, teaching is the m ain “w ork” o f academically em ployed political scientists. T his does not necessarily signify th a t political scientists— m ore precisely, those who teach prim arily o r exclusively— are n ot professionals. For teaching is an “occupa­ tion” for which th e claim of “profession” is com m on. T h ese data, to g eth er with w hat has been said above about the history and “nonscientific” functions o f political science, p erm it th e following con­ clusions. T h e teaching o f citizenship, the in terp retatio n an d inculcation o f a civic culture, political socialization (how ever such m atters may be designated) absorb a g reat deal o f the tim e an d energy o f political science. Political science generally does little to train for roles o th e r than teaching and re ­ search, th o u g h som e parts o f it do so to a significant deg ree (e.g., public adm inistration for practicing public adm inistration). T h e following observations are also in o rd er. M uch o f the tim e and energies o f those who teach political science goes not only beyond science and beyond civic education in any narrow sense, but to realization o f the purposes o f “liberal education” in term s o f conveying a sense o f the political in history, in h u m an destiny. M uch o f the “p ro d u ct” o f political science is invisible, in the sense th at no statistics display it; it is woven into lives and careers th a t becom e statistics in o th e r categories. Political science becomes the u n d e rg ra d u a te specialization (“m ajor”) o f a large n u m b er o f students. Many o f them follow careers, such as in law an d journalism , to which politi­ cal science contributes know ledge an d skills. T o a n u m b er o f professions, political science, as a “discipline,” plays a role analogous (of course the anal­ ogy is n ot exact) to th at which biology plays to m edicine o r physics to en ­ gineering: a shaping, contributing role. Let us now re tu rn to the criteria o f profession. T o w hat extent, in what ways, does political science fit o r n ot fit the criteria? W ithout d o u b t political science possesses a “body o f know ledge.” T h e question w h eth er this body o f know ledge is based in science is not irrelevant, but n eith er is it necessarily determ inative o f the question o f professionalism .

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Recognized professions have been based on an d m any utilize know ledge that is o th er than that based on m o d ern em pirical theoretical science. W ithout d o u b t the know ledge o f political science is inculcated in a course o f training th at is prolonged, an d socialization th ro u g h teacherstu d en t interaction (and p eer g ro u p interaction) is a lengthy, com plicated process. Again, those who are already the acknow ledged “professionals” (as evi­ denced by h ig h er degrees, professional achievem ent—especially research an d form al status) p erfo rm a surveillance function. T hey set standards, ju d g e com petence, adm it th ro u g h “gates,” enforce norm s. Som e o f this is d o n e thro u g h professional associations (adm ission to the publication m edia, aw arding o f places on convention program s, an d so forth), but centrally it is perfo rm ed th ro u g h academ ic organization, com bining hierarchical and collegial-peer styles. T h e question w h eth er political science is in som e sense public is ra th e r m ore com plicated. U nquestionably in som e ways it is; in fact, its connection with th e civic tradition gives it certain “sacral” aspects. U nquestionably it has a large am o u n t o f autonom y. O rdinarily th e state does not, crudely and blatantly, reach into university an d association to set standards, determ ine prom otions, an d so forth. B ut often governm ent does, in o n e way and an o th er, “intervene,” as in th e setting o f “req u ire d ” courses; and occasionally its intervention may be reg a rd ed (by m any political scientists at least) as mischievous o r despotic. T h e questions th at are raised in th e balance be­ tween public expectations an d control, an d professional perform ance and autonom y, go beyond the relation betw een state an d profession. T hey reach to th e n atu re o f th e university (and the principle o f “academ ic freed o m ”) an d to general questions o f civil rights. O f o th er criteria fo r professional standing that have been advanced, the one th at may be m ost relevant is a professional-client relation. (Some discus­ sions place m uch weight on fee-for-service and on m utual obligations, such as obedience and confidentiality.) H ere political science seems to have tro u ­ ble, though to reg ard the stu d en t as client goes some distance in fitting political science to the criterion. However, it is probably b etter not to press the case fo r professional standing beyond a certain point, but ra th e r to argue the relevance o f o th e r “m odels,” such as discipline and science. A fter all, few professions are professions, if th e criteria are applied rigorously. A nd u n d e r the influence o f science an d o f m o d ern organizational styles, all professions, even the archetypical ones, may be becom ing less ra th e r than m ore professional in term s o f historically derived criteria. Political Science as Science W hether political science is a science, w h eth er it can becom e a science, how it can become a science, w hat kind o f science it is o r can becom e— such m atters

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have been discussed since the study o f politics attained self-consciousness. T hey have been discussed frequently and at length in the literature of Am erican political science, especially d u rin g the recent period. Much o f this essay has been a com m entary on the subject— on th e points o f view held, on the argum ents advanced, on the “politics o f political science” as shaped by changing opinion on the issues. This, then, is hardly the place to review the m any and com plex issues, m uch less to explore them in d ep th . I shall simply set forth again a personal perspective: I reject both the view that th e ancients “knew it all” and that we have only to re tu rn and d rin k o f th eir wisdom; and the view that the only way political science can become a science is to cast o ff the “yoke o f the past.” O n a broad construction o f the term “science,” political science is a science. T h e inform ation an d theory that it m usters and organizes is knowledge. T his know ledge is both tru e and useful. This knowledge is also cumulative. Each one o f these four assertions would have to be explained and qual­ ified in an ex tended discussion. But they would also have to be explained and qualified if m ade about biology or astronom y. For that m atter, except for the first assertion, they would have to be explained and qualified if m ade about physics, which is the “defining case” for the strict as against broad use o f the term “science.” W hether o r to what extent political science can becom e a science in the strict sense, i.e., one that resem bles physics and (or) fits the specifications o f an “advanced” o r “tru e ” science as set forth in the literature known as philosophy o f science, is an open question to be answ ered by the future. T h e aspiration is an u nderstandable and legitim ate one. T h e aspiration is also open to serious d o u b t and respectable contrary argum ent. In any case, growth in political knowledge will continue; political science will advance in u nd erstan d in g o f the political. Political Science as Enterprise W hether (or to what extent o r in w hat ways) political science is a discipline, a profession, o r a science clearly d ep en d s on definition o f term s and in terp re­ tation o f facts. From my point o f view, it is o r has aspects o f all three. No single organizational style can (or should try to) contain or em body it. It has and should have a variety: professional associations, learned societies, academic departm ents o r bureaus, “invisible colleges.” No single “paradigm ,” however strictly o r loosely that m uch used and abused term is interpreted, can (or should try to) contain o r em body it. Political science is m ultifaceted, and it needs perspectives and theories ap p ro p riate to purpose and circumstance. “Professions profess, sciences know.” W hat is ap p ro p riate for one is not ap p ro p riate for the other. A distinction between theoretical (or “p u re ”) and practical (or “ap p lied ”) science has utility for certain purposes. But it does not, w ithout straining the ordinary usage o f term s, serve to classify and

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contain all th at is relevant to w hat political science is an d should be. Only a broad-spectrum term , such as “enterprise" o r “endeavor,” serves to indicate all th at is involved. T h e range o f concerns an d activities indicated by the political is o f central im portance in the hum an experience. T h e politi­ cal has been an im portant dim ension o f the hum an experience since the beginning o f civilization (and before, by som e interpretations). It will rem ain as an im p o rtan t dim ension if and when the state system is supplanted. T h e task o f political science is to m uster as m uch knowledge, skill, an d wisdom as possible in atten d in g to this dim ension.

NOTES 1. T he author acknowledges his debt to Somit and Tanenhaus, 1967, for the discus­ sion in this section. 2. In this discussion, “scientism” has the dictionary-authenticated meaning of “advocacy of the application of the principles derived from the natural sciences to other disciplines.” T hat is, though sometimes used pejoratively, the term has in this essay (as in Somit and Tanenhaus) its simple descriptive sense. 3. If I may be permitted a personal note: Well over a third o f my own graduate training in the late thirties consisted o f constitutional history, English and American: international, constitutional, administrative, and municipal law; and jurisprudence. Perhaps no doctoral program during recent years would have permitted such an allot­ ment of effort. 4. Reprinted by permission from The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism by Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 190-191. 5. Membership figures for the disciplinary associations are especially troublesome. Not only do they vary by the month and move with academic and economic trends, but the membership categories among associations vary, e.g., “institutional," “student,” “interested."

REFERENCES Alker, Hayward R. (1965). Mathematics atul Politics. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan. Almond, Gabriel (1966). “Political theory and political science.” American Political Science Rextiew 60:869-79. American Political Science Association Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education (1971). “Political education in the public schools: the challenge for political science." PS 4:431-57.

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Anderson, William (1964). Man’s Quest for Political Knowledge: The Study and Teaching of Politics in Ancient Times. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. Averini, Shlomo (1968). The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. London: Cam­ bridge University Press. Bailey, Stephen K., et al. (1955). Research Frontiers in Politics and Government. Washington: Brookings Institution. Barents, Jan (1961). Political Science in Western Europe: A Trend Report. London: Stevens. Barnes, Harry E., with K. W. Bigelow, Jean Brunhes, and others, eds. (1925). The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences, New York: Knopf. Bluhm, William T. (1965). Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modem Politiccd Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Brecht, Arnold (1959). Political Theory: The FoundcUiom of Twentieth Century Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Brecht, Arnold, and Sheldon Wolin (1968). “Political theory” (1 Approaches, Brecht; II T rends and goals, Wolin). In David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12. New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan. Butler, David E. (1959). The Study of Political Behavior. London: Hutchinson. Catlin, George E. G. (1927). Science and Method of Politics. New York: Knopf. _________ (1939). The Story of the Political Philosophers. New York: McGraw-Hill. _________ (1962). Systematic Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Charlesworth, James C., ed. (October 1962). The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science (special issue). Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sci­ ence. _________ (December 1966). A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods (Monograph 6 in a series). Philadelphia: American Academy o f Political and Social Science. _________ (October 1968). Theory and Practice of Public Administration: Scope, Objec­ tives, and Methods (Monograph 8 in a series). Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. Childe, V. Gordon (1946). What Happened in History. New York: Penguin. Committee for the Advancement of l eaching, A.P.S.A. (1951). Goals for Politiccd Science. New York: Sloane. Connery, Robert H., ed. (1965). Teaching Political Science: A Challenge to Higher Educa­ tion. Durham: Duke University Press. Cowling, Maurice (1963). The Nature and Limits of Political Science. Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press. Crane, William W., and Bernard Moses (1884). Politics: An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Constitutional Law. New York: Putnam. Crick, Bernard (1959). The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Dahl, Robert A. (1961). “T he behavioral approach in political science: epitaph for a monum ent to a successful protest.” American Political Science Review 55:763-72. _________ (1963). Modern Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. de Jouvenel, Bertrand (1961). “On the nature o f political science.” American Political Science Review 55:773-9. de Sola Pool, Ithiel, ed. (1967). Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. Deutsch, Karl W. (1963). The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control.' New York: Free Press o f Glencoe. Easton, David (1953). The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. New York: Knopf. _________ (1965a). A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. _________ (1965b). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley. _________ (1968). “Political science.” In David L. Sills (ed .), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12. New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan. _________ (1969). “T he new revolution in political science.” American Political Science Reinew 68:1051-61. Eaton, Dorman B. (1880). Civil Sen>ice Reform in Great Britain. New York: H arper. Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (1963). The Political Systems of Empires. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Elliott, William Y. (1928). The Pragmatic Rei'olt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State. New York: Macmillan. Eulau, Heinz (1963). The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. New York: Random House. _________ (1968). “T he behavioral movement in political science." Social Research 35:1-29. Eulau, Heinz, and James G. March, eds. (1969). Political Science. Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Franklin, Julian H. (1963). Jean Bodin ami the Sixteenth Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History. New York: Columbia University Press. Friedrich, Carl J. (1963). Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Germino, Dante (1967). Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory. New York: Harper. _________ (1972). “Some observations on recent political philosophy and theory.” The Annals 400:140-8. Gosneil, Harold F. (1927). Getting Out the Vote: An Experiment in the Stimulation of Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Graham, George J., and George W. Carey, eds. (1972). The Post-Behavioral Era: Per­ spectives in Political Science. New York: McKay. Haas, Michael, and Henry S. Kariel, eds. (1970). Apfrroache\ to the Study of Political Science. Scranton, Pa.: Chandler (Intext).

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Hacker, Andrew (1963). The Study of Politics: The Western Tradition and American Origins. New York: McGraw-Hill. Haddow, Anna (1939). Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1900. New York: Appleton-Century. Herring, E. Pendleton (1929). Group Representation Before Congress. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Holcombe, A rthur N. (1924). The Political Parties of To-Day: A Study in Republican and Democratic Politics. New York: Harper. Holler, Frederick L. (1971). The Information Sources of Political Science. Santa Barbara, Cal.: A.B.C.-Clio Press. Hyneman, Charles S. (1959). The Study of Politics: The Present State of American Political Science. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. International Political Science Association (1969). Synthesis Report on the I.P.S.A.: 20 Years Activities, 1949-1969. Brussels: International Political Science Association. Ions, Edmund S. (1968). James Bryce and American Democracy, 1870-1922. London: Macmillan. Irish, Marian D., ed. (1968). Political Science: Advance of the Discipline. Engle\v, and so on u p the list until each person in x has been com pared for well-offness with the person in jy who has the same ran k in g (Table 5). T hus, TABLE 5 Rank

1 2 3 4 5

Utility x y 9 6 5

8 5 5

5 2

4 2

if we suppose that the num bers in T able 5 represent interpersonally com ­ parable utility values, we can see at once that x R y and not )i R x, hence x P >'-7

A lthough dom inance is most easily visualized in the way we have just described, one o f its strengths is that it does not actually req u ire the people in the situation to be ranked; thus we can say th at x R y on the m inim ax criterion if x R y on dom inance, even if we cannot identify th e w orst-off person in each situation. All we need to know is that each person in jy can be paired with som eone in x who is at least as well-off. A fu rth e r strength is that, although the operation o f the dom inance criterion does require in ter­ personal com parisons, it requires only a limited n um ber o f them , and they have to be only in term s o f better- and worse-off. No estim ate o f the am ount better- or w orse-off is needed, n o r is the even stronger condition o f the addibility o f utilities. T his is significant in view o f the fact that w henever dom inance is satisfied, utilitarianism is satisfied.8 T h e cost o f this ap p a ren t creation o f som ething for nothing is that dom inance shares two weaknesses o f Pareto optim ality. First, although dom inance is less d em anding than Pareto optimality, it still involves the considerable requirem ent that, roughly speaking, to each person in one situation th ere should correspond a person in the o th er who is at least as

Six Pure Criteria

367

well-off. Second, dom inance, like Pareto optim ality, can easily produce a result w here neither x nor)> R x holds; and, if this result is in terp reted as m eaning that x \y , inconsistency can arise w hen m ore than two situations are com pared. T h u s, in T able 6, 1 P 2 an d 2 1 3 . For an o rd erin g this com bina­ tion requires that 1 P 3, b u t we in fact find that 1 I 3. TA BLE 6 A

B

c:

100

11

11

100

10

10

100

100

9

T h e conclusion we can draw about Pareto optim ality and dom inance is that, w hen they give rise to n o th in g but relations betw een pairs o f people which satisfy either x R y or y R x, th e situation in the resultant o rd erin g o f all possible situations which comes out ahead o f the rest has strong claims since it also leads on m inim ax an d utilitarianism . (T he converse does not hold, incidentally: one situation can be p referred to an o th er on th e criterion o f both m inim ax and utilitarianism w ithout being better on eith er Pareto optim ality o r dom inance.) U nfortunately, however, the condition that all the situations to be com pared should be related in this way is a very restrictive one. It m ight be th o u g h t th at the answ er is to introduce lexicography to break th e ties th at arise when n eith er x R y r.or y R x. T his is a wild goose chase, however. If we have P areto optim ality o r dom inance followed by m inim ax o r utilitarianism , we may as well simply have m inim ax or utilitarianism , since the outcom e will always be the same. I f we have Pareto optim ality or dom inance followed by equality, we can still get inconsistency. Table 7 illustrates such a situation fo r the case o f dom inance. H ere 2 P 3 by the dom inance criterion. T h e dom inance criterion does not produce any o th er p referen ce ord erin g , so 1 I 2 and 1 I 3. However, by th e equality TA BLE 7 A

B

11

11

9

100

100

11

10

10

10

c:

368

Political Evaluation

criterion, 3 P 1 and 1 P 2, which entails th a t 3 P 2. We thus get a more severe form o f inconsistency than we had with dom inance alone. Finally, m ajority as a second criterion will obviously do no good since it cannot itself produce an ordering. Lexicography makes m ore sense in relation to equality, the ordinary form o f m inim ax an d utilitarianism . T h u s, if two situations are ju st as good on th e equality criterion, it seems minimally d aring to say that if one is better th an an o th er on th e dom inance criterion, it is to be p referred , but we m ight well p u t in utility o r m inim ax as tie-breakers instead. Similarly, m inim ax in its o rdinary form cries out to be followed by som ething else, since two situations in which th e w orst-off persons are equally well-off m ight well be very d ifferen t in o th e r respects. Utility o r equality could function as tie­ breakers unless one follows the logic o f m inim ax and adopts th e strong form o f th e criterion. T h e criterion o f utilitarianism could be followed sensibly by eith er m inim ax or equality. T h e introduction o f lexicographic orderings o f criteria serves to cut out certain flagrantly absurd results o f using a single criterion. T h u s it rules out any implication th at if two situations are equally good on th e egalitarian criterion, th ere is nothing to choose between them , even if one satisfies the conditions o f dom inance—or even Pareto optim ality—in relation to the o th er. B ut even so, it does not really help very m uch. All we have to d o is to alter the exam ple ju st given. We say th at situation x satisfies the criterion o f dom inance (or Pareto optim ality) in relation to y, but y is an infinitesimal am o u n t m ore equal than x, and we get th e result th a t} is to be p referred to x, lexicography o r no. It m ight be argued that this is an artificial exam ple and that two situa­ tions should be regarded as equally good on a criterion if they are within some range o f similarity. B ut what range? Implicitly the criterion m ust be the range that produces sensible results. T his may be a fair description o f the way we sometimes operate. T h a t is to say, we have some idea o f the am o u n t o f difference on the most im p o rtan t criterion that makes it unlikely th at o u r o rd erin g would be changed if we looked at the next most im portant criterion, and so on. B ut th e underlying logic o f evaluation here is the logic o f trade-offs, simplified in a rule-of-thum b way to a sort o f lexicography. It is m isleading to think o f it as a true exam ple o f lexicographic ordering. It is in fact one o f the simplifying devices we use to cope with the intractable difficulties o f trading o ff criteria against one another. It is to a review o f these m ethods o f simplification that we now turn. SEC TIO N V: COPING W ITH CO M PLEXITY We have suggested that no single criterion will do for evaluation. N everthe­ less, all the various proposed single criteria that were discussed were on the rig h t general lines, as we in terp reted them , in that they were concerned with

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hum an well-being an d nothing else, and they differed only in th e way they attrib u ted value to d ifferen t features o f the am ount and distribution o f well-being. A nd we have suggested that, in the absence o f religious o r p a r­ ticularistic values with no hope o f general acceptance, hum an well-being is th e only possible foundation o f political evaluation. However, th ere are m any reasons why two people, both com m itted to hum an well-being as the only basis o f evaluation, m ight disagree over th e preferability o f two situa­ tions. First, they may d iffer in th e relative weight they give to the am ount as against the distribution o f well-being, and second, they may actually have d ifferen t criteria for th e rig h t distribution o f well-being. In addition, th ere is the point which for convenience we left over from th e previous section: Conceptions o f well-being may them selves differ. “H appiness,” “p leasure,” “interest,” “w elfare,” “good,” and “satisfaction,” for exam ple, are no m ere synonyms, and all em phasize d ifferen t facets o f the end-state which we are referrin g to generically as “well-being,” though we should allow fu rth e r th at each o f these words itself allows infinite scope for argu m en t about its precise signification. We could try the m aneuver o f say­ ing that th ere is an overriding concept (often in the past taken to be “h ap p i­ ness”) with a n u m b er o f subsidiary com ponents. But this does nothing really to resolve the problem because the arg um ent simply shifts to o n e about the relative im portance o f th e com ponents. It is a somew hat depressing thought that most o f the possible moves were m ade by Aristotle and that subsequent scholars have n o t only advanced little on Aristotle but even failed to agree about the answers he him self gave. M oreover, th e “am ount” o f well-being is itself a pretty form idable factual question— so form idable that some have argu ed that it is not a factual question at all. We do not accept this conten­ tion but do recognize that, even if all possible inform ation is available, two people may still in some cases disagree about w hether, say, th e total o f well-being was g re ate r before o r after some social change. Finally, as we have already observed, the move from states o f affairs to policy choices may involve predictions about causal sequences which in the natu re o f the case can often be hardly b etter th an guesses. In the light o f all this, we m ight w onder w hether the fundam ental prem ises o f political evaluation set any limits to what can be justified. Could not a governm ent always d efen d itself w ithout rep u d iatin g o u r fundam ental basis o f evaluation? T h e answer, surely, is that a governm ent can indeed always put forw ard a justification but that it will not always be very plausible. Several observations are in o rd e r here. It is significant th a t when the spokesm en o f regim es appeal to the “decent opinion o f m ankind,” it is norm ally to considerations o f hum an well-being in some form that they attem pt to relate th eir actions. We find that apologists of even the most barbarous regim es do not simply rep udiate these considerations. F urther, although no regim e is w ithout its apologists, some apologetics m anifestly fail to im pose on w ell-inform ed people whose interests o r passions are not al­

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ready engaged. T h e two techniques by which the indefensible is d efen d ed are always the same: causal assertions an d selection o f effects.9 First, it is claim ed unjustifiably that the actions in question w ere necessary to bring a b o u t—or to prevent from com ing ab o u t— such-and-such a state o f affairs. Second, o f the effects attrib u ted to the action, those which are favorable are pointed o u t an d the rest silendy passed over. T h e re is absolutely no reason why a well-inform ed person should not be able to say th at defenses o f this kind are simply unacceptable. We can draw consolation from the fact th at even at the tim e som ething is h appening, those whose interests o r passions are not directly involved can som etim es reach som ething approaching con­ sensus. Recent exam ples are the condem nation by a sort o f world public opinion o f the Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia, th e U nited States bom bing o f N orth V ietnam , th e seizure o f pow er by the G reek colonels, and the suppression o f the Bangla Desh m ovem ent in East Pakistan. I f we extend o u r view to the past, w here interests an d passions are less imm ediately in­ volved, we find an even m ore striking tendency to consensus. Few Rom an Catholics can now be found to defend the to rtu rin g and bu rn in g o f the Inquisition, few Com m unists the Stalin purges, and few S outherners the institution o f slavery. It would be foolish to build too m uch hope on this tendency, but it would also be m istaken, we suggest, to be carried away by the difficulties to the point o f believing nothing can ever be settied. N evertheless, the fact rem ains th at political evaluation is obviously a form idable undertaking. How can people do it? O ne answer often given is that, for most people most o f the time, the form ulation and expression of ap p a re n t political evaluations is not a rational activity. Stated an o th er way, what pose as political evaluations are only to a m inor extent oriented tow ard reality. T hey may be form ed to satisfy personal needs; for exam ple, a sense o f personal failure may be relieved if it is attributed to the m achinations o f som e g ro u p (scapegoating). O r the exchange o f political evaluations may serve purely social functions o f expressing friendship and solidarity with some people and hostility to others. T h e large elem ent o f tru th in this view should be borne in m ind as a qualification to everything that follows, b ut we shall not p ursue this line any fu rth er. Instead we shall look at the ways in which the evaluative process may be sim plified to bring it within the compass o f hum an capabilities. U nfortunately, the work o f social psychologists does not seem to be o f m uch help here. T ru e, they have noticed the problem : Problem s calling for good ju d g em en t can be extrem ely com plex: th ere can be a large nu m b er o f alternatives, each with many factors, the fac­ tors can have m any levels, or even be continuous; and they can interact. It seems likely that when the problem becomes com plicated enough, people simplify it in one way or another. (Yntema and T org erso n , 1967, p. 312)

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B ut th e m ethods o f simplification these authors go on to m ention, though no d o u b t reducing “cognitive strain,” would be obviously irrational from an instru m en tal point o f view. A nd m ost experim ental studies seem to be d e­ voted to providing yet m ore evidence for the adage “th e re ’s nowt so queer as folks.” (See the various reviews in Edw ards and Tversky, 1967.) In one experim ent, subjects h ad to evaluate ellipses whose “w orth was [arbitrarily] defined in such a way th at it always increases with size, thinness and brow nness and was a reasonably sm ooth function o f those th re e factors (Yntem a and T o rg erso n , 1967, p. 309). It was found th at m ost subjects took some very ro u g h short cuts. B ut political evaluation, though inherently m ore com plex than evaluating ellipses, has th re e m itigating features. First, the underlying values are not given arbitrarily by an experim enter but are fam il­ iar bits o f o n e’s m ental fu rn itu re. Second, evaluations o f the m ain features o f one’s political universe can be m ade over m any years; it is not necessary to start from scratch each time. Finally and m ost im portant o f all, we are not forced (as the laboratory subjects w ere) to invent o u r own ways o f dealing with the difficulties o f m ultiple criteria. Political evaluation has been aro u n d for a long time, and a lot o f intelligent people have p u t their m inds to it. O r in m o re resonant language, there is no need for m en to “tra d e each on his own private stock o f reason” when they can “avail themselves o f the general bank an d capital o f nations and o f ages” (Burke, 1910, p. 84). T h e best way to develop th e last point is to tu rn from political evalua­ tion to the evaluation o f private conduct. In the sphere o f private conduct it is essential to the peaceful coordination o f d ifferen t people’s actions that some fairly specific guidelines for action should supervene betw een the indi­ vidual decision-m aker and the ultim ate criteria such as are given by utili­ tarianism .10 How, then, is m oral ju d g m e n t possible? T o this K antian-sounding ques­ tion we re tu rn the D urkheim ian answ er that it is m ade possible by society. We single out in particular th re e sim plifying m echanisms, which we call focal descriptions, duties and obligations, and partial goods. Needless to say, we claim no originality fo r these features o f m oral evaluation; at most, we claim only to have p u t them in a slightly d ifferen t perspective. T h e first device, th at o f focal descriptions, is socially derived in th at the term refers to conventions for th e p ro p er and adequate description o f acts themselves. D’Arcy (1963) has called attention to the fact that, although th ere a re m any ways in which a given sequence o f events involving a hum an agent can be described, we do n o t have carte blanche to pick and choose am ong them to suit the m oral conclusions we want to arrive at. T h e re are some act-descriptions with a sort o f privileged status, such th a t if one o f them applies to a certain situation, we cannot om it it from the description of the act w ithout being properly accused o f m isleading o u r listener, unless the context is a very special one. D’Arcy calls these act-descriptions “non-elidable.” For exam ple, if am ong the possible descriptions o f w hat h ap p en ed is that one

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m an killed an o th er, we cannot “elide” it by referrin g only to his contracting a muscle, causing a shot to be fired, o r starting a war. T h e se focal descrip­ tions, as we shall call them , re fe r to characteristics th at are always relevant to the evaluation o f actions. O f the theoretically indefinite n u m b er o f things th at a m an m ight be said to be doing a t any time, certain features have been picked o u t by experience as always im portant. Anyone, as D’Arcy points out, w hatever general principles he professed, would feel th at he had been d e ­ nied ad eq u ate inform ation on which to ju d g e an act if it tu rn e d out that it was covered by the description “H e killed a m an” and this description had been w ithheld. Duties and obligations as simplifying devices are closely connected with focal descriptions. In fact, they may usefully be reg ard ed as a class o f focal descriptions. Focal descriptions draw o u r attention to features o f action which are im p o rtan t for evaluation; such features are usually enough by them selves to determ ine the verdict, w hatever else m ight be said about the case. Duties an d obligations have the same property. N eglecting o u r duty o r failing to keep o u r obligations is in itself prim a facie evidence th at we have acted wrongly, though rebuttal is possible, by showing th at the neglect o r failure was the m eans to some greater good. Duties arise from jobs, families, a n d so on; obligations are essentially contractual. N either would be very felicitously em ployed in o rdinary speech to describe why we o u g h t not to kill o th e r people: M u rd er is a focal concept on th e same level as breach o f duty o r obligation although philosophers have usually inflated the concept o f “breach o f duty” (or obligation) to cover all the act-descriptions which lead, alm ost irrespective o f anything else, to condem nation. T h e th ird simplifying device, which we call “partial goods,” is in effect the recognition o f a division o f labor in the production o f good and th e prevention o f evil. It has a naturally close connection with the “com m on sense” notion o f duty we have ju st described. Indeed, th e notion th at it is m ore im p o rtan t to do your duty than to go hell-for-leather after the greatest happiness o f th e greatest nu m b er really d epends for its plausibility on the idea that th e world will be b etter in th e long ru n if everyone cultivates his own g ard en rath e r than giving a dig here and a hoe th ere. U nderlying the notion o f “partial goods” is the idea that each m an should (at any rate most o f the time) concentrate his efforts on those in some special relationship to him , and th at this p u rsu it o f partial goods will get m ankind n earer the general good than will any alternative overall strategy. We shall not inquire fu rth er into the soundness o f these simplifying devices in individual m oral­ ity; but, to th e extent that these devices can themselves be m odified by political action, they are obviously within the sphere o f political evaluation, and some o f what we say below will in fact be relevant to them . In politics we cannot expect to find things as relatively straightforw ard as in individual m orality, but th e previous discussion can serve as a guiding

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thread . T h e things to be evaluated are heterogeneous. As we saw in Section II, they include the acts o f those with political authority and o f those seeking to replace them , o f those voting for them o r appointing them and o f those seeking to influence th eir decisions; policies pursued over tim e by political authorities; “policy outcom es,” by which we u n d erstan d states o f affairs which are claim ed to be to some d eg ree the result o f action o r inaction by political authorities; political institutions as they actually operate; rules, laws, an d constitutions. In each case, o f course, not only what exists can be evaluated but w hat m ight exist instead. Indeed, w hat exists cannot be evaluated except with referen ce (even if implicitly) to what m ight exist in its place— if the world as it exists is th e only possible one, it is, trivially, both the best o f all possible worlds and the worst o f all possible worlds. T aking into account this diversity in the objects o f evaluation, we should perhaps not be surp rised th at we find in politics a less clear-cut situation with respect to focal descriptions th an we did in individual m orality. It is still tru e that, of all th e ways in which an object o f evaluation m ight be described, some would be th o u g h t o f as always having too trivial a relation to any significant hum an concern to be acceptable as the description. B ut at the o th er end o f the scale, if we ask w here the privileged, non-elidable descrip­ tions in politics are, we seem to finish u p with m uch the same list as before. T h e difference is that, relatively speaking, this list covers less g ro u n d in politics. T h u s euphem ism s for killing people, such as “saving souls” (the Inquisition), “liquidating class enem ies” (the Bolsheviks) o r “the Final Solu­ tion” (the Nazis) are recognizable as tendentious attem pts to lose a morally relevant feature o f a policy in a m ore general description o f it. Similarly, any description o f the British g o v ern m en t’s Com m onw ealth Im m igrants Act o f 1968 which failed to m ention th at it broke a prom ise m ade by the British governm ent at the tim e o f Kenyan independence to those who chose to retain British nationality would be an incom plete description. As we have already suggested, descriptions o f this kind seem to play a sm aller part in political evaluation than in the evaluation o f individual con­ d u ct outside a political context. T h is comes about because an act falling u n d e r the sam e description can have a larger variance o f relative m oral significance w hen it is a political act than when it can be viewed realistically as simply an individual act within a fixed social context. For laws an d institu­ tions it is even clearer th at th ere are not descriptions with built-in prim a facie evaluation. Evaluation consists in characterizing the thing to be evaluated o r in pointing to its consequences an d evaluating those. If the description does n ot itself carry an evaluation, the way in which individual acts a re evaluated is norm ally the same: We eith er say that an act can be characterized as generous, disinterested, unfair, cowardly, etc., or we draw attention to its consequences and arg u e that they were good o r bad. (This can be done eith er by characterizing the consequences or by relating them

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directly to the general g ro u n d o f evaluation in term s o f suffering, health, etc.) F or individual acts, th e m ost im p o rtan t characterizations are called vir­ tues and vices—at least, th at is what they have traditionally been called. In political evaluation, the m ost im p ortant characterizations may be called polit­ ical principles, tho u g h a tinge o f the sam e em barrassm ent hangs about “political principles” as about “virtues an d vices”— somehow the term s are considered a little pom pous o r priggish. We shall not be d e terred by these sem antic qualms. As with individual acts, an object o f political evaluation may be charac­ terized in term s o f a political principle, o r its consequences may be described and eith er related directly to the general g ro u n d o f evaluation o r charac­ terized in term s o f a political principle. T h u s, a law w ithdraw ing the protec­ tion o f habeas corpus m ight be characterized as a reduction o f personal liberty, w hereas a speech w hipping up public feeling on the “law and o rd e r” issue m ight be said to have b ro u g h t about consequences which themselves could be characterized as consdtuting a reduction in personal liberty. T h e role played by characterizations in practical political evaluation is crucial. It is these stan d ard foci o f attention which help to fill in th e gap betw een w hat we have called the general basis o f evaluation in term s o f hum an well-being and the ever-changing welter o f political phenom ena to be evaluated. Explaining how the m ost im portant o f these political principles— dem ocracy, justice, freedom , the public interest, and so o n — work is a large p a rt o f th e study o f political evaluation, an d we shall take it u p in Section VI. In broad term s, however, we suggest that the reason why these are able to function as stan d ard foci lies in the fact th at these concepts succeed in cap tu rin g features o f objects o f evaluation which are im p o rtan t to people who nevertheless d iffer in their interpretations o f well­ being and p ro p er distribution. B ut even if these characterizing concepts are o f some help, th ere is still the problem that th ere is m ore than one o f them . As we saw, an im p o rtan t sim plifying device fo u n d in the ordinary m oral evaluation o f individual be­ havior is the idea o f duties. In political term s, the equivalent would be a list o f things which political authorities m ust do o r m ust not do, such th at failure to com ply would be prim a facie evidence o f culpability so strong that only highly exceptional circum stances could overcom e it. T h e most obvious a t­ tem pts to supply such a list are the various declarations o f the rights o f m an o r o f h u m an rights that have been pro d u ced in the past two h u n d re d years. Like duties in relation to individual conduct, these codes are pow erful weapons in the struggle to simplify evaluation. T hey provide, we suggest, stan d ard s o f governm ent perform ance failure to m eet which can widely be ag reed to constitute prim a facie gro u n d s for censure. Like duties in the evaluation o f individual conduct, rights against the state, then, are things

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th at anyone, w hatever his ultim ate evaluations, can agree are im portant. Freedom o f m ovem ent, assembly, an d speech, freedom from detention ex­ cept after trial u n d e r a preexisting law— these are the kinds o f thing that form a com ponent o f the good life on alm ost any interpretation, an d they do not seem liable to offend any reasonable distributive criterion. So-called social rights, such as those incorporated in the U nited Nations D eclaration o f H um an Rights (1948), have been criticized, not as undesirable in themselves, b u t as lacking the same absolute priority as the m ore trad i­ tional civil rights. (See the articles by C ranston and R aphael in Raphael, 1967. T his criticism may indeed be correctly applied to the article about holidays with pay seized on by critics.11 However, it does seem com patible with almost any conception o f hum an well-being and any plausible criterion for th e distribution o f this well-being to say that states should give a high priority to the relief o f destitution relatively to any o th er and perhaps g ra n d e r aims th a t they m ight pursue. U nfortunately, although th e ravages o f w ar have been a constant threat to life an d well-being, only a tiny fraction o f the energy th at has gone into the im provem ent o f dom estic conditions has been applied to the prevention o f war. T his obtuseness about priorities— plus, o f course, th e genuine dif­ ficulties o f prescription for a H obbesian w orld—results in a lack o f generally accepted constraints on the warlike action o f states. T h e req u irem en t that states should not com m it aggression is a precept o f very lim ited usefulness since, as H obbes pointed out, the distinction between aggression and selfdefense is logically unclear in a condition o f anarchy; and “genocide” ap­ pears to be condem ned unequivocally only w hen it is p ursued as an end in itself, not when it comes about as a by-product o f military strategy. It would take us too far afield to do m ore h ere than point out this great, perhaps ultim ately disastrous, lacuna in the com m only conceived duties o f states. Before leaving the subject o f “duties” for states, we m ust note th at they play an im p o rtan t p art in stru ctu rin g decision-m aking at a m ore hum ble level. G overnm ents lay u p o n them selves, th eir successors, and th eir subordi­ nate bodies “statutory duties,” which have precisely the function o f defining priorities: I f a body has to choose between carrying out its duties and doing o th er desirable things, the u n d erstan d in g is that it should opt for the duties. T h u s th e city o f Glasgow was recently deciding between building an o pera house and treatin g th e sewage which it now discharges raw into th e Clyde. It is relevant to the decision that the latter is, whereas the fo rm er is not, a statutory duty o f the corporation. T h e foregoing leads to th e th ird sim plifying device, which we called “partial goods.” As we saw before, th ere is a close connection with duties, since some duties at least m ake sense only in the context o f a division o f labor. T his is tru e in politics as well. A m unicipal fire service, say, is expected to provide as m uch service in preventing an d putting out fires as its budget

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will allow— not to spend its m oney on books for the public libraries because those in charge o f the fire service regard th at as a better way o f em ploying th e m arginal penny o f taxpayers’ money. B ut this division o f labor obviously makes sense only if funds are in fact being allocated to o th e r purposes. T his exam ple illustrates division o f labor by fiat. As is well know n from academic study, not to m ention personal experience, th e goals set for an organization are usually “displaced” to some degree, since they will tend to be pursued only insofar as the pursuit serves th e interests and am bitions o f those in the organization. But outsiders obviously can evaluate m ore easily the perform ance o f an organization if it has relatively clear-cut goals th an if it is simply in business to im prove hum an welfare, as is, for exam ple, an exclusively philanthropic foundation. Division o f labor can also, needless to say, com e about nonbureaucratically. T h e exam ple already given in connection with the m oral evaluation o f individual conduct can be used to illustrate this point. If parents look after th eir own children, most children will be looked after w ithout the need for any overall plan to assign people to look after children. T h e archetype o f this sort o f “division o f labor” occurs in classical econom ic theory. Adam Smith arg u ed that a “hidden h a n d ” would bring about results that, taken as a whole, would be generally reg ard ed as desirable even if nobody (except the governm ent— a deus ex m achina introduced to fill the logical gaps) was doing any m ore than pu rsu in g his own o r his family’s self-interest. “It is not from the benevolence o f the butcher, the brew er, o r th e baker, th at we expect o u r din n er, b u t from th eir reg ard to their own interest” (Smith, 1961, Vol. 1, p. 18). In a fu rth e r developm ent, political com petition is seen as perform ing the same alchemy w here collective decisions are unavoidable. It is plain that, although these institutions may simplify the decision­ m aking problem for most o f the actors, they do not get rid o f the problem o f m ultiple criteria o f evaluation. T h e outcom e still has to be evaluated, an d it is o f course notorious that these evaluations—o f such institutions as the family, the free-m arket economy, and representative g o v ern m en t— have been am ong the most controverted in the past two centuries. W hat price in d ep en d en t decision-m aking when cultivating one’s own g ard en m eans kill­ ing the fish and birds with insecticide? But the point rem ains that the problem o f evaluation is m ore feasible if we focus on institutions ra th e r than on millions o f individual acts. T h u s, if one is trying to apply the criterion th at people should get the goods they want, it would be absurd to try to find out what all people want and then see w hether they are getting it. A price system provides a m uch m ore feasible basis for talking about want satisfac­ tion. As a first move, one can m ake the assum ption th at people are choosing, within the limits o f th eir incom e, the com bination o f goods they prefer. T his presum ption can be challenged in various ways, and it may well be necessary

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to m ake big adjustm ents to allow for ignorance o r m isinform ation. B ut even this process, ro u g h an d ready as it may be, leaves us in a m uch better position to estim ate want satisfaction th an we would be if we had to study each perso n ’s tastes an d then m atch them up with his purchases. SEC TIO N VI: FIVE PO LITICAL PRINCIPLES We are now at last in a position to say som ething about the “big w ords”— dem ocracy, freedom , an d the like— which are thought, rightly, to form an im p o rtan t p art o f th e subject m atter o f an article on political evalua­ tion. We hope that what has gone before serves to put into context the role which we conceive these political principles as playing in political evaluation. We arg u ed th at political evaluation requires practical aids if it is to be possi­ ble. T h e re m ust be sim plifying devices standing between what we have called the general g ro u n d o f evaluation and evaluations o f particular actions, policies, institutions, etc. A m ong these sim plifying devices, the most im por­ tant are political principles, criteria o f evaluation derived from different interpretations o f the general g ro u n d o f evaluation, an d em phasis on d iffer­ en t aspects o f it, plus factual beliefs about hum an behavior and society. N ote that the term “political principles” covers prescriptions for choice o f alm ost any deg ree o f specificity. F or exam ple, Sir A nthony Eden learned at M unich (and m isapplied at Suez) th e principle “Do n ot give in to threats from dictators.” T his principle fits o u r form ula well enough. It is derived from factual beliefs concerning the insatiable appetites o f dictators, the ef­ fect o f appeasem ent on the perceptions o f the threatening party about the appeasing party, an d so on. By way o f such factual beliefs, the principle can be connected to the general g ro u n d o f evaluation if one holds fu rth e r that successful aggression by dictators allowed to go unchecked leads in the long ru n to a bigger w ar an d g reater suffering and death than would have occur­ red had the aggression been stopped earlier. It is clear that we can n o t hope to discuss, even in a similarly sketchy fashion, o th er principles at th at level o f specificity. We have to concentrate on the most general principles o f all—and that, o f course, brings us back to the “big w ords.” Strictly speaking, a word is not itself a principle, and the word “principle” is p erhaps m ost happily applied to maxims governing con­ duct in a fairly specific way. B ut it is certainly not a freak usage to say, for exam ple, “T h e party is dedicated to the principle o f equality (social justice, o r w hatever).” If we w ant to spell the “principle” out in a plonking m anner, we m ight say th at the principle co rresponding to “equality” is “W hen evaluating, give great weight to equality” or m ore succinctly, “Equality is im p o rtan t.” However, we shall follow the com m on habit o f treating the key words as themselves em bodying principles.

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T h e study o f the way in which political principles are m arshaled in argum ents about evaluation— th e study o f political rh eto ric—is one o f the most potentially rew arding fields o f inquiry, we believe. It is a field with surprisingly little systematic work in it. Stevenson (1944) gave interesting invented illustrations o f argum ents centering on the application o f concepts, but his discussion o f them is vitiated by his general theory, according to which words act directly on people’s feelings as a result o f conditioning—an im plication o f which is that any m ethod o f persuasion has an equally rational basis o r lack o f it, the only criterion being success. T h e best treatm ents, we suggest, concern them selves with legal reasoning, such as those o f H art (1961, C hap ter 7) and Levi (1949). Legal argum ents, especially in the higher courts, tu rn on the question w hether such-and-such a concept should be deem ed to cover such-and-such an adm itted state o f affairs. T his obviously has som ething in com m on with political casuistry, though one should bew are o f moving too incautiously from th e enclosed legal world to the inherendy m ore open-ended world o f politics, w here it is always a possible move (though one with ram ifying implications) to say, “Well, if th a t’s w hat th at principle com m its m e to, I’ll forsw ear the principle.” A rgum ents over the definitions o f words have consequences w hen the words are “freed o m ” o r “equality,” even if this fact is less im m ediately clear th an that it may m ake a difference for som eone betw een going to jail o r not w hether a co u rt accepts a certain definition o f “public ro ad ” o r “vehicle.” If you can convince people that some principle they accept (say, equal o p p o r­ tunity) covers some m atter they h a d n ’t applied it to before (say, opening jobs to women) you may thereby change th eir behavior. It m ight a p p ear that every strong ad h e re n t o f a principle has a simple enough strategy in seeking to extend the application o f the principle as far as possible. But th ere is a counterstrategy, akin to th at practiced by the Russians against N apoleon, o f w eakening a concept by encouraging its over­ extension. In most controversies, as H arris (1971) rem arks, “at least one side finds it useful to redefine the o th er side’s basic dem ands so th at they becom e unobjectionable” (p. 24). T h u s the waxing and w aning o f evaluative concepts requires careful interpretation. T h e rise o f a principle to prom inence may m ean a genuinely increased acceptance o f it in its original form , or it may be a sign that it has achieved popularity at the price o f losing content. Conversely, the same object may be pu rsu ed in two superficially opposed ways. Suppose, for ex­ am ple, that you were concerned about reducing the im pact o f the idea o f equality. You m ight try to absorb it by suggesting, say, that all defensible uses o f it m ake it merely a special case o f justice. O r alternatively, you m ight blow it u p so that it subsum es all distributive criteria, by arguing, for exam ­ ple, that th e essence o f the idea o f equality is that equals (however defined) are to be treated equally. Both kinds o f move have been m ade by conserva­

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tive liberals anxious to rob the idea o f equality o f its dangerous potential but unwilling to ap p e a r as overt partisans o f inequality. I f we consider the last two centuries, we find a rem arkable degree o f stability in the basic concepts em ployed. All the m ain counters o f debate fo u n d today— freedom (or liberty), justice, equality, the public interest, dem ocracy— are to be fo u n d in th e Declaration of the Rights of Man draw n u p in the early stages o f the French Revolution. N or is this a m atter o f stability in the words covering a transform ation in the sense. We find that most o f th e subsequent connotations o f these key words (with th eir characteristic equiv­ ocations) may be found in the Declaration. Such variation in the uses o f the words as we find over tim e and from one place to an o th er may be accounted for by recognizing that th ere can be changes in the em phasis placed on alternative interp retatio n s o f the words th at were c u rren t all along. Now it seem s fair to say th at th e Declaration of the Rights of Man is one o f those docum ents re fe rred to a th o u san d o r ten thousand times for every one it is read; but to such an extent are we still living on the intellectual capital o f the F rench Revolution th at it will be useful to quote its first six articles.11 I. Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect o f th eir rights. Civil distinctions, th erefo re, can be founded only on public util­ ity. II. T h e end o f all political associations is the preservation o f the natural and im prescriptible rights o f m an; an d these rights are Liberty, P rop­ erty, Security, and Resistance o f O ppression. III. T h e N ation is essentially the source o f all sovereignty; n o r can any individual, o r any body o f m en, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. IV. Political Liberty consists in the pow er o f doing w hatever does not injure an other. T h e exercise o f the natural rights o f m an, has no o th er limits th an those which are necessary to secure to every other m an the free exercise o f the same rights; an d these limits are determ inable only by the law. V. T h e law o u g h t to prohibit only actions h u rtfu l to society. W hat is not prohibited by the law should not be hindered; nor should any one be com pelled to th at which the law does not require. VI. T h e law is an expression o f the will o f the com m unity. All citizens have a rig h t to concur, eith er personally o r by their representatives, in its form ation. It should be the same to all, w hether it protects o r punishes; an d all being equal in its sight, are equally eligible to all honours, places, and em ploym ents, according to their different abilities, w ithout any o th er distinction than that created by their virtues and talents.

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T o say th at “we” are still living on the intellectual capital o f the French Revolution may ap p ear a highly culture-bound (or “N atocentric”) ju d g ­ m ent. W ho are “we” in this context, anyway? O f course, qualifications to this sw eeping statem ent are in o rd e r, but not so m any as m ight at first blush be supposed. T h e main exceptions to be noted are first the nineteenth-century reactionaries, who h ated everything the Revolution had stood for, an d sec­ o nd the tw entieth-century Fascists and Nazis— the two stream s being linked, as Nolte (1965) has shown, by M aurras and his circle. O n the o th er hand, M arxism is, in evaluative term s, no m ore than a variant o n the ideals o f the F rench Revolution. T hose n ineteenth-century conservatives, such as Mosca, who linked Rousseau an d M arx displayed a sure instinct for the political ju g u lar. C onsidered as an evaluative system, M arxism is partly an attack on the p retentions o f capitalist societies to provide for all citizens the rights set out in the Declaration an d partly a vision (of a form quite com m on am ong nineteenth-century thinkers as d ifferen t as B akunin and H erb ert Spencer) o f a society in which liberty, equality, and fraternity would be realized with­ o u t the necessity for th e coercive ap p aratu s o f the state. In practical term s, M arx can be said to have m ade two claims, both o f which are consistent with th e principles already m entioned. First, he suggested th a t a capitalist society is a pow er system which m akes a m ockery o f dem ocracy, an d second, he pointed o u t that the rule o f the em ployer over the wage e a rn e r d u rin g w orking h ours is in itself a serious infringem ent o f liberty. H ad we been writing a few years ago, it would have been tru e to say that M arxism had contributed noth ing distinctive to the vocabulary o f evaluation. T h e recen t vogue o f the concept o f “alienation” requires an am endm ent, though it m ust be said that the desire to trace the concept to M arx (rather than H egel o r Feuerbach) is a strategic exigency o f radical politics. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844 (Marx, 1959), in which the concept occurs extensively, are largely derivative o f A dam Sm ith and Feuerbach (A lthusser, 1969). I f M arx, instead o f leaving these exercise books to the “gnaw ing criticism o f the rats,” had published them a n d th en died, it is doubtful th at anyone today would call him self a M arxist, o r that his nam e would be known to m ore th an a handful o f scholars. M oreover, even after all the effo rt that has been ex pended in recent years, th e re still does not seem to have em erged any in terpretation o f “alienation” which is not m ore clearly expressed either as liberty, equality, o r fraternity. If we take an alternative tack and look at the evaluative criteria by which political parties and governm ents claim to be guided and in virtue o f which they m ake dem ands on others, we again find an extensive com m on elem ent, which again can be derived directly from the ideas o f the F rench Revolution. We can illustrate this contention by looking briefly at th e Soviet U nion and the eastern E u ro p ean regim es on the one hand and th e so-called T h ird

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W orld on the other. Now the Com m unists, whatever their practice, a p p ar­ ently do not avow distinctive criteria o f evaluation. T h u s we get th e so-called G erm an Dem ocratic Republic an d the phenom enon o f a Soviet academ ician gravely assuring an international conference (IPSA, 1964) th a t all the hum an rights re fe rre d to in the U nited N ations Declaration o f H um an Rights (of which the Soviet Union is, o f course, a signatory) are cherished faithfully in Russia. N or is this, as some zealous apologists o f the Soviets have suggested, a m atter o f the use o f the same word (e.g., dem ocracy) with a d ifferen t m eaning (see M acpherson, 1958). Stalin’s constitution o f 1936 is a docum ent th at satisfies all the dem ands o f late-nineteenth-century W estern liberalism. It not only specifies all kinds o f safeguards for individual liberty, b u t it also provides for the rig h t o f the constituent states o f th e federal republic to secede and for the autonom y o f ethnic groups within these states. Such innovations as th ere have been seem to be ways o f stating traditional W estern ideas in ideologically acceptable ways: “Socialist legality” is simply “legality,” and th e substitution o f the “interests o f the toiling masses” for the “public interest” does not am o u n t to m uch, since officially everybody is a m em ber o f the “toiling masses”—except those who actually deserve the nam e, the inhabitants o f the labor camps. In eastern Europe, too, the official aims are not (as, for exam ple, they were in Nazi Germ any) in any way novel, and the various m ovem ents o f refo rm that have occurred in m ost of those countries have been based essentially on the dem and that the regim e should actually live u p to its professed aims. In the West, we m ight rem ark, the process o f clothes-stealing is very far advanced: In 1970 one could see in France C om m unist Party posters calling for proportional representation to break the grip o f the “totalitarian” Gaullists. Any generalization about the heterogeneous collection o f countries known as the T h ird W orld is obviously perilous, but it does in fact seem true to say th at th eir independence m ovem ents (w hether early, as in Latin America, o r later as in Asia and Africa) m ade their dem ands in the nam e of such principles o f the French Revolution as national self-determ ination and popular sovereignty and that their postindependence elites are alm ost invar­ iably com m itted, at least formally, to similar criteria o f evaluation in relation to th eir dom estic policies. T h e two exceptions, which we have already noted, are significantly en ough both explicitly opposed to the ideas o f the French Revolution: politico-religious reaction ru n n in g from , say, de M aistre to the Syllabus of Errors, and the m ore activist creeds o f fascism and Nazism. Al­ though by 1942 these traditional and novel m ovem ents o f antiliberal, a n ­ tidem ocratic, antiegalitarian thought, in various m ixtures and com binations, underlay almost every regim e in E urope between Britain and Russia, they are now very m uch in decline, even within their strongholds o f th e Iberian peninsula and the Vatican. T h e ir one area o f growth is in the regim es o f the white m inorities o f South Africa and Rhodesia. Let us say again that we do

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not reg ard this as accidental: Such doctrines are inherently less satisfactory than those o f the Declaration o f the Rights o f Man. T h e ideas o f reaction and fascism are not likely in the long ru n to appeal to a g ro u p w ider than the specific beneficiaries. A uthoritarianism (with or w ithout religious u n d e rp in ­ ning) cannot allow the o p en expression o f the wishes o f most people; and ideas o f racial purity o r bellicose national destiny are bo u n d to create a self-defensive coalition o f those outside the charm ed circle.

In th e rem ain d er o f this section we shall discuss five principles which play a central role in political evaluation: the public interest, justice, free­ dom , equality, an d dem ocracy. We shall try to show how each connects to the general g ro u n d o f evaluation and a little about th e interrelationships am ong them . 1. The Public Interest In broad term s, the connection between “the public interest” and the general g ro u n d o f evaluation is m anifest in that interest, along with happiness and the satisfaction o f wants, was introduced as one o f the conceptions o f the ultim ate stu ff whose am o u n t and distribution constitute th e raw m aterial o f evaluation. But w hat is “interest” exactly, and what does the qualification “public” do? Briefly, “interest,” used w ithout fu rth e r specification, always appears to have carried an em phasis on m aterial advantage and thus to find its hom e especially in econom ic an d quasi-econom ic discourse. “Public” is a fam iliar enough word (as in public parks, public transport, public perform ances, and so on), and it is o f course the antonym o f “private.” T h u s the public interest is the m aterial advantage o f a broad and und efin ed g ro u p o f people, as opposed to private interests, which are m aterial advantages confined to p a r­ ticular and specifiable people. We can illustrate this usage with a fam ous passage from The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1961). [An individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to prom ote the public interest, n o r knows how m uch he is prom oting it. By p referrin g the su p p o rt o f dom estic to that o f foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing th at industry in such a m an n e r as its p ro d u ce may be o f the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, an d he is in this, as in m any o th er cases, led by an invisible hand to prom ote an e n d which was no p art o f his intention. N or is it always the worse for th e society that it was no p art o f it. By pursuing his own interest he f re ­ quently prom otes that o f the society m ore effectually than w hen he really intends to prom ote it. I have never known m uch good d o n e by those who affected to tra d e for the public good. (Vol. 1, pp. 4 7 7 -8 )

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T h an k s to G u n n ’s (1969) study, we can trace the developm ent o f the concept in seventeenth-century England. From the start it was used to em ­ phasize the im portance o f m aterial considerations in state policy, as against th e m uch m ore inclusive concept o f the “com m on good,” the pursuit o f which for medieval writers such as D ante and Aquinas had tended to sum u p the duties o f princes. In particular, it was used by the opponents o f the S tuarts to insist th at state policies should be defensible by showing that tangible advantages would accrue to actual people. As a consequence o f this origin, th ere was a tendency to get confused about the relation between public interest an d private interests: I f the public interest is defined in con­ tradistinction to a m istrusted raison d’etat, is it not simply m ade up o f private interests? In d eed , it was declared a virtue o f m em bers o f Parliam ent th at they had substantial private interests, on the grounds th at they would th e re ­ fore have a strong incentive to p u rsu e the public interest. However, this does n o t m ean th at public an d private interest w ere identical, though G unn som e­ tim es suggests that they were. T h e public interest was seen mainly as consist­ ing in the trim m ing o f state expenditures; th erefo re the biggest propertyow ners would have the biggest stake in pursuing it. In any case, by the m iddle o f th e century H arrin g to n (1924) had analyzed the logic o f the concept faultlessly by arg u in g th at the m em bers o f any group have some com m on interests an d som e opposed ones. H arrin g to n drew the inference th a t the nearest practical ap proxim ation to the public interest is the interest o f a m ajority and thus arrived at a case for taking com m unal decisions by m ajority vote, an idea we shall take u p below w hen discussing democracy. Nowadays, the “public in terest” can still be used, as it was in the tim e o f the Stuarts, to advance the interests o f th e citizens at large against the state—certain taxes o r policies may be said to be against the public interest— but it has also in h erited som ething o f the old raison d'etat. T h e claim is som etim es m ade th at it is in the public interest to spend billions o f dollars to p u t a m an on the m oon o r millions o f pounds to build supersonic airlin­ ers. Yet those planes may never be allowed to fly or, if they do, will m ake life very unpleasant fo r people below. B ut the claim, however specious, is that these achievem ents will p ro d u ce tangible benefits for people o th er th an the contractors an d th eir em ployees. T h u s the concept o f “public interest” still m aintains its connection with the idea o f broadly diffused m aterial advan­ tages. As we said, the connection between the public interest and the general basis o f evaluation is clear en o u g h . It is also however, clear that the concept o f the public interest falls sh o rt o f being equivalent in scope to the general basis o f evaluation. First, “in terest” is one com ponent o f the possible valued states but does not encom pass the whole o f either want-satisfaction or h ap ­ piness. Second, “the public in terest” is not simply the aggregate o f all in­ terests lum ped together, how ever utilitarians may have defined it so offi­

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cially. W hen I scratch my back in the bath, I benefit an d nobody else loses, so th ere is a net gain in hum an welfare, b ut I am not advancing the public interest thereby. A nd th ird , public interest does not include any reference to distributive considerations, though some o f the quotations in G u n n ’s book reveal th at even in the seventeenth century the usual expansionist forces were at work, an d some people w ere saying th at the public interest consisted in the protection o f “ju st rights.” 2. Justice We now have an ap p ro p riate cue for tu rn in g to the broadest o f the distribu­ tive concepts, th at o f justice. T h e notion o f justice is rooted in th at o f a judicial decision, and we may surm ise th at some w ord roughly translatable as “justice” will be found in the vocabulary o f any society with some form o f judicial m echanism for settling disputes. In tracing the descent o f the G reek word dike, indeed, we can go back to a time w hen decisions were taken by arbitrary m eans (i.e., m ethods not involving reference to any argum ents but involving such things as the use o f scales), an d dike referred to these o u t­ comes. Later, the m ore refined conception that decisions themselves should correspond to an external standard was incorporated into dike (Huizinga, 1970, pp. 101-2). By the time that Aristotle wrote, in Book V o f the Ethics, what is still the best discussion o f the concept, it had acquired the sense o f an external criterion by which not m erely judicial decisions could be assessed as ju st o r unjust (depending on w hether they were rig h t o r wrong) but also any decision concerning th e distribution o f goods, privileges, and penalties could be criticized. A lthough conservative writers have unsurprisingly been draw n to the idea th at justice should be understood to m ean only conform ity with positive law, the w ord “justice” today carries both a reference to judicial outcom es and a b ro ad er reference to any social arrangem ent from washing dishes in a family to the existence o f private property in a nation. A lthough the d em an d for justice is one o f the m ost potent in the political arsenal, the concept, in its b ro ad er sense, is almost devoid o f substantive content. As Aristotle observed, justice is a kind o f equality or, m ore exactly, p ro p o rtio n ­ ality. In its most simple form it is a m atter o f seeing that what A gets and the degree to which he has some relevant attribute is in the same ratio as that between w hat B gets an d the degree to which he has the same attribute. (See Perelm an, 1963 and N athan, 1971). T h e substantive question, o f course, is what characteristics are to count as relevant. A nd again as Aristotle noted, differen t social groups ten d to want d ifferen t lists. All we can say h ere is th at there seems to have been a fairly well-established tre n d over several cen­ turies, which still continues, toward accepting as relevant only actions and achievem ents as against such things as skin color (or o ther “racial” charac­ teristics), age, o r sex. A bstracting from the actual properties on the basis o f which it is claimed

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that benefits, burdens, and sanctions should be assigned, we are left with the form al principle o f justice: D ifferences in tre atm e n t m ust be justified by reference to some p roperty or o th er o f the people involved. T his may ap­ pear to be a pretty toothless principle, but in fact it has a surprising am ount o f bite. A strict utilitarian would be obliged to look only at the total sum o f well-being, but from the point o f view o f justice a situation would be defec­ tive in which one person was very well-off an d an o th er very badly-off al­ though th eir personal characteristics were sim ilar—even if no alternative arran g em en t would produce as great a sum total o f well-being. T h e insistence that th ere be a reason (and not simply a utilitarian one) for differences in people’s lots m akes the principle o f justice a potentially explosive one. It m akes an im m ense difference to the way one looks at the world how far one is p rep a red to go in asking the question: Is this just? At one ex trem e are the conservatives, who wish to confine the question o f justice to the application o f the law: Justice is done provided that people whose characteristics d iffer in ways specified by law are treated differendy according to the legal specification. At the o th e r extrem e are what m ight be called cosmic questioners, who indict God (or N ature) for injustice in visiting the innocent with suffering an d d e a th —an d do not find the counterquestion “W here wast thou w hen I laid the foundations o f the earth?” (Job 38:4) very satisfying. In between fall those who wish to challenge various social a r­ rangem ents in the nam e o f justice. Let us suppose that som eone asks in any society having private property w hether th e distribution o f p roperty is just. T h e answer to this question is not really in doubt. Most gross differences in wealth are the result o f inheri­ tance and cannot conceivably be related to personal characteristics. T his illus­ trates vividly the point th at the prim ary dispute about justice is its sphere o f application. T h e sensible conservative will not try to show that the distribu­ tion o f p ro p erty is ju st. H e will arg u e th at an unequal distribution o f p ro p ­ erty is desirable for various reasons, an d that this is incom patible with any attem p t to ask why the particular people who are rich should be rich, and so on. Perhaps, though, it is really surprising how relatively seldom the conser­ vative finds him self called on to argue in these term s. Most people m ost o f the tim e accept th e m ain features o f th eir social institutions as beyond ques­ tion. How often, to take the most far-reaching exam ple, do people anyw here see as raising an issue o f justice the fact that th e biggest d eterm inant o f one’s life chances is the country one is born in. T h e ultim ate basis o f evaluation we have described as concerned with the am o u n t and distribution o f well-being. T h e present discussion should m ake clearer the contention that sharp differences o f evaluation can arise not only from differences in the conception o f well-being o r ap propriate distribution but also in the relative im portance given to, say, distribution against o th e r things. N othing fu rth er needs to be said about the relation o f

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“justice” to the ultim ate basis o f evaluation, since justice is itself the most general distributive concept. But we shall have to discuss its relations to the o th er concepts, the closest o f which is equality. 3. Equality “Justice” is acknow ledged as desirable on all hands, and the biggest question concerns its p ro p e r sp h ere o f application. Equality has no such privileged position. You can be against equality as well as for it. We can explain this in crude an d general term s by pointing o u t th at two people m ight agree th at A should be treated ju sd y with respect to B while one thinks this entails equal treatm en t w hereas the o th e r (because o f d ifferen t criteria for ju st differenti­ ation) thinks it entails unequal treatm ent; but th ere can be no such equivoca­ tion if they argue in term s o f equality. M ore precisely, w hereas “justice” is used only to claim th a t outcom es o f certain kinds should be related to the possession o f relevant characteristics, “equality” is used to reb u t the idea th at possession o f some specific characteristic o r characteristics should be related to outcom es o f certain kinds. N ote th at it does n o t follow from this definition that equality between possessors o f p roperty x and nonpossessors o f property x will result in the m em bers o f both categories being treated identically. W hat the definition does m ean is th at if they are treated differently, it will be on the basis o f the possession o r nonpossession o f some pro p erty o th er than x. We can illustrate this by going back to th e call fo r equality as it was expressed in the French Revolution. T h e essence o f this was a dem and for “equality before the law— in o th e r words, a dem and for the cessation o f the practice u n d e r which the nobility w ere treated m ore favorably by the legal system th an others. Equality in this sense, th en , m eans that any two m en who have com m itted the same offense should be dealt with in the same way, even if one is a noble and one a com m oner. B ut it does not m ean th ere should be no legal penal­ ties o r that the legal penalties for all offenses should be the same. A sim ilar analysis can be m ade o f equality between the sexes, racial equality, equality am ong ethnic o r religious groups, etc. In this context, for exam ple, “equal pay” m eans simply th at persons differing in sex o r race but doing th e same jo b are paid the same; it has no im plications for the d ifferen ­ tials in pay betw ;en jobs. In d eed , to the extent that, say, racial groups oc­ cupy d ifferen t segm ents o f the stratification hierarchy, any reduction in the im portance o f race as a d eterm in an t o f position in the hierarchy will, o th er things being equal, result in a g reater spread o f positions for the num bers o f each group. In the U nited States, for exam ple, blacks enjoy (if th at is the word) a fair degree o f hom ogeneity in occupational prestige and incom e (Blau and D uncan, 1967, pp. 238-41), whereas whites, except for real dow n-and-outs, are kept o ff the bottom o f the lad d er by blacks. Racial equal­

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ity would m ean a m uch g reater social dispersion for blacks an d a som ew hat g reater one for whites. N ot surprisingly, the strongest pressure for racial equality (as against a straight im provem ent in conditions) comes from blacks who are in the best position to benefit (Wilson, 1960) an d the m ost violent resistance from whites whose only advantage is the color o f th eir skin. T h e re are, o f course, b ro ad er claims th at can be m ade in term s o f equality, an d it is with referen ce to these th at people are called egalitarians o r antiegalitarians. We have so far discussed claims that some feature or features should not be bases fo r treating people differently in certain re ­ spects; b u t it m ay be m aintained th at no features should be bases for treating people differently in certain respects. T h e m ost abstract claim o f this kind is th at people should be equal as potential bearers o f rights (see Vlastos, 1962; Williams, 1962). T his m eans in the last analysis only th at some reason has to be given fo r treatin g people differently, an d thus it com es to m uch the same as th e claim th a t the criterion o f justice should actually be applied. M ore concrete, th o u g h closely related, is th e dem and for “social equality." Al­ th ou g h this notion has a ran g e o f in terpretations, its core m ight be expressed as a rejection o f Disraeli’s “two nations,” a dem and th at everyone should be treated as equal in dignity— as an “end in him self," to use K antian te r­ minology. Political equality an d econom ic equality, at least in principle, are fairly straightforw ard dem ands for similarly unconditional equality. In prac­ tice, the fo rm er tends to be identified with one-m an-one-vote representative dem ocracy, th e latter with a move tow ard equalization o f ea rn e d incomes and a reduction o f property-derived incomes. O nce again, we should ask briefly how equality ties in with th e grounds o f evaluation. Since it is concerned with the distribution o f things th at peo­ ple want, th ere is, as with justice, a direct connection. In addition, equality can be su p p o rted as increasing th e total am o u n t o f well-being. T h e simplest arg u m en t on these lines d ep en d s on the idea o f the dim inishing m arginal utility o f m oney: if a penny w ere tra n sferred from a m illionaire to som eone w ithout en ough to eat, the gain to th e latter would be greater th an the loss to the form er; this would also be tru e o f a second penny, a th ird , a n d so on for quite a lot o f pennies. 4. Freedom T h e term “freed o m ” is so po ten t that one is hardly surprised to find its definition ex ten d ed in all kinds o f ways (C ranston, 1953). T h e fundam ental idea, we suggest, is that to be free is to be left alone to do what you want to do. It is easy to see how this links with the general g ro u n d o f evaluation, since the absence o f restrictions on doing what you w ant m ust in general increase the chance o f doing what you want, and “doing what you w ant” is one form ulation o f the stu ff whose am ount an d distribution are the concern

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o f political evaluation. Freedom is also arg u ed to be an essential condition o f happiness, both because people need to be able to explore ways o f living for them selves an d because they can learn from the experiences o f others. In contrast to the concepts we have so far exam ined, that o f freedom does not provide any criterion for adjudicating between th e claims o f d iffer­ en t persons. W hat h appens w hen somebody exercises his freedom in a way th a t is dam aging to the interests o r welfare o f som ebody else? Giving people freedom m eans simply not p reventing them from doing w hat they want. B ut th en freedom for everybody, as Hobbes pointed out, m eans a condition o f total anarchy. Every law, as B entham put it, is an infraction o f liberty. It does not help, as some have supposed, to introduce an explicit distributive criterion at this point and speak o f the m axim um liberty com patible with an equal liberty fo r others. F or th e m axim um liberty is still simply an absence o f all constraints. T his conclusion o f course follows from the definition we have posed in term s o f an absence o f constraints. O ne possible way out is to expand the m eaning o f “freed o m ” so th at it provides a criterion for adjudicating be­ tween conflicting interests. T h is involves redefining a “constraint” so th at som ebody else doing som ething you d o n ’t like counts as a constraint on your action. Such a definition, however, destroys the distinction between being free to act an d being pleased with what happens to you. In fact, if the advantages o f constraints on oneself and constraints on others are to be com pared, it is necessary to red u ce the two sides o f the equation to a com ­ m on m easure, which can be only want-satisfaction. Freedom will then be maxim ized on a basis o f equality when one achieves a uniform set o f legal or o th e r obligations such that the m arginal constraint ju st produces a net b en efit— in o th er words, w here any additional constraint would cause m ore hard sh ip to those constrained from doing what they would like to do th an it generates satisfaction am ong those who would suffer the consequences o f th e o th ers’ doing what they w anted. This, however, is simply utilitarianism , in terp re ted in the “liberal” way, with wants as the raw m aterial o f aggrega­ tion, an d expressed in a ra th e r obscure form , which conceals all the difficul­ ties about distribution associated with the utilitarian position. It should p erh ap s be pointed out parenthetically that, even if the rules apply equally to everyone, they do not necessarily bear on everyone with equal severity. Som e may want very m uch to do things that are prohibited and may be adversely affected by things th at are allowed; others may be m ore fortunate on both counts. I f freedom is inflated so that it comes to the same as getting w hat you w ant and not getting what you d o n ’t want, it follows, o f course, th at the distinctive featu re o f freedom as absence o f constraints is lost. T his burying o f freedom as a distinctive value can be d efended in relation to the general basis o f evaluation by the arg u m en t, som etim es m ade, that being left alone is

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o f no use if one is starving. Rich and poor alike are free to sleep u n d er bridges. Lt does not in fact follow th at absence o f constraint is not to be valued in its own right; it is simply not very valuable unless o th er conditions a re also m et (Berlin, 1969, pp. 124-5). But one can say that the extent to which it is valuable is purely the extent to which it does satisfy wants. T his, however, could be said o f any principle— that its fulfillm ent is desirable only to the extent that it can be justified with reference to the gen­ eral g ro u n d o f evaluation. T h e point o f each o f the principles we are discus­ sing is to highlight certain features which actions, policies, constitutions may o r may not exhibit. T hese features are ones o f which it is widely believed that, w hen they are present, then (other things being equal) the action, policy, constitution, o r w hatever will tend tow ard a better am ount an d dis­ tribution o f well-being th an exist if they are not present. T h u s the point o f m aking freedom a principle is to em phasize the im portance o f not being constrained. T o say it is im p o rtan t is not o f course to say that it is the only valuable thing. It is inevitable that absence o f constraint will clash with o ther principles an d that in some situations it will be th o u g h t better on balance not to do the th in g th at would maximize freedom . It is quite illum inating to think in this way o f “freed o m ” as a counterw eight to the “public interest” in p ar­ ticular. “T h e public in terest” is used in the form ulation o f dem ands that people should be stopped from doing things they m ight otherw ise do: It is “contrary to the public interest” to build a house here, publish that piece o f inform ation, an d so on. “F reedom ” em bodies exactly the opposite claim — that people should be allowed to do w hat they w ant to do. Similarly, though less centrally, freedom may conflict with the claims o f justice and equality, since the achievem ent o f distributive ends may well entail prevent­ ing people from doing w hat they would otherw ise have done. As a coda, but an im p o rtan t one, we should notice that freedom can be claimed n o t only for individuals but for gro u p s o f any size. “F reedom ” here m eans th e absence o f constraints on the action o f the collectivity; freedom for a g ro u p is o f course com patible with the oppression o f m em bers o f that g ro u p by the collectivity. I f we are concerned to include in o u r analysis the leading ideas o f the past two centuries, the idea o f g ro u p freedom is crucial, because it underlies the notion o f national sovereignty, which first redrew the m ap o f E urope an d then, especially in the period after 1945, m ore than doubled th e n u m b er o f nominally sovereign states while reducing formally d ep en d e n t colonial regim es to a few scattered relics. Indeed, if we apply the harsh b u t realistic test o f an idea’s potency which consists in asking how many people have died for it, the answer is very clear. In the last two h u n d re d years the n u m b er o f people who have died in the service o f nationalist m ovem ents or in wars perceived as necessary to defend a sovereign state m ust o u tn u m b er those who died in the cause o f individual liberty by tens o r even h u n d red s o f thousands to one. We do not wish to

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suggest th at this should be given too m uch credence as an index o f the significance o f ideas, but it is nevertheless thought-provoking. Since we have insisted th at the ultim ate g ro u n d o f evaluation lies in th e well-being o f individual hum an beings, th e relation to it o f g ro u p freedom m ust necessarily be indirect. It cannot, however, be doubted th at the desire to be governed with and by people w ho are th o u g h t o f as sim ilar in some respect is an im m ensely strong one. In general, it is quite rational to wish to be in a state with o th er people who are as sim ilar to oneself as possible. Since any state has a m ore o r less extensive set o f uniform , enforced rules, th ere is a g rea ter possibility (w hether it is exploited or not) o f having rules that satisfy people as those subject to the rules are m ore sim ilar in outlook and p reference. 5. Democracy T h e arg u m en t can be fu rth e r extended by connecting the idea o f national self-determ ination with that o f dem ocracy. T his connection was m ade ex­ plicitly in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the whole com plex o f ideas surely reached the peak o f its influence in the Versailles Peace T reaty, which followed the First W orld W ar. I f one starts from the arg u m en t o f the previ­ ous p arag ra p h that uniform ity in the population makes satisfactory uniform rules a possibility, the extension to dem ocracy involves simply the claim th at if th e rules are such as are approved by a m ajority o f this uniform popula­ tion, they should be satisfactory to all. (This m ight be taken as a crude statem ent o f one strand in Rousseau, 1947.) T h is theory, which assum es a uniform ity o f aspirations an d interests am ong “th e people” and regards the object o f politics as the service o f this “general will,” has been dubbed “populistic dem ocracy” (Dahl, 1956), the “radical theory o f rep resen tatio n ” (Beer, 1965), an d even “totalitarian dem oc­ racy” (Talm on, 1960). (See also Shils, 1956.) It is not, indeed, the only a rg u ­ m ent in favor o f dem ocratic governm ent. At the same time, although o th er a r­ gum ents may be able to take account o f a certain diversity o f aspirations and interests in the population, they cannot deal with the problem posed by a m inority sharply d ifferentiated from the rest. T h e resort to nationalism to pa­ per over the cracks, in o th er words, is a response (though often a lethal one) to a genuinely insoluble difficulty in dem ocratic politics. We have been ru n n in g ahead an d need to go back and p rep are the g ro u n d for m ore detailed analysis. Democracy, then, m eans “rule by the people”— a “p u re ” condition o f dem ocracy would be one in which (by w hat­ ever m eans) it occurred th at every state-im posed rule were such as a m ajor­ ity o f the citizens wished. In practice, “dem ocracy” m eans what the Declaration stated, the right o f every citizen to share in the election o f the legislature, plus (it is now understood) either direct election o f the head o f the executive o r indirect influence over th e executive via its responsibility to the legislature. A separate article would be required to investigate how far

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th e m achinery o f representative dem ocracy produces the coincidence in pol­ icy p referen ces by which we d efin ed the p u re concept. (For som e prelim i­ nary rem arks, see Barry, 1970, C hapters 5 -7 .) All we can do is state the argu m en ts for representative dem ocracy an d note w ithout discussing the em pirical assum ptions they require. T h e most general arg u m en t, then, m ight be expressed by saying th a t the rulers o f a country will at least have an incentive to deal with com plaints sh ared by large num bers o f people, since they a re otherw ise liable to be voted out at the next election. T his arg u m e n t— that the voters know “w here the shoe pinches”—can be found back in seventeenth-century E ngland. “Can any m an tell better than your­ selves, w here your shoe pinches you, an d what is most ex p ed ien t for you to do?” (A nonym ous, 1647). T o the extent th at we are p re p a re d to assum e th at representative in­ stitutions do result in m ajority preferences for policies being p u t into effect as collective decisions, we can ad o p t a stronger arg u m en t to this effect: I f the policy p referred by the m ajority is always chosen, the average num ber o f people satisfied by each collective decision will be higher th an u n d e r any alternative decision rule. But, to re tu rn to o u r them e, neither this argum ent no r th e vaguer preceding one rules o ut the possibility o f a distinct perm a­ n en t m inority, whose pinching shoes are a m atter o f indifference if not actual pleasure to a m ajority, an d whose policy preferences are consistently voted dow n. T h is is a distressing an d som etim es disastrous feature o f dem ocratic politics, but the difficulty is in h eren t in the hypothesized set o f preferences. It can at least be shown that, in a p u re m ajoritarian dem ocracy, the m ax­ im um possible p ro p o rtio n o f the electorate who can lose is sm aller than u n d e r any o th er system. T h u s, if ju s t u n d e r h alf o f a society can “lose o u t” u n d e r a purely dem ocratic regim e, a larger n u m b er may lose o u t u n d e r any alternative (Rae, 1971). O ne com m on form o f magical thinking leads a n um ber o f authors to suppose that decision by unanim ity escapes this difficulty. T his leads W olff (1970), for exam ple, to say th at only practical considerations prevent u n an i­ m ous decision from resolving this central problem o f the d efeated (and th ere fo re “non-autonom ous”) m inority. C alhoun’s doctrine o f “co ncurrent m ajorities” is a sim ilar exam ple (C alhoun, 1953), and so, too, are a num ber o f works which d efen d the prevalence o f veto-points in the contem porary operation o f the U.S. federal governm ent. In every case, the arg u m en t is fixed myopically on defeats arising from the positive action o f governm ents. T his is, o f course, well and good if everyone is satisfied with the status quo and th e society is so static that this satisfaction is never disturbed. In such a case, n o g ro u p can suffer a significant defeat, since it necessarily is able to block th e im position o f policies to which its m em bers object a n d will th ere­ fore p erm it only the im position o f advantageous policies. W hat all this ig­ nores is the resistance o f governm ent policy to the desire for change. I f the

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status quo works to the disadvantage o f certain groups and a very restrictive regim e prevents th eir changing policies, a serious disadvantage has been encountered. Most significant o f all is the fact that regim es o f this type m ake it possible fo r changes favored by nearly everyone to be rejected. In term s o f o u r discussion o f “forced choice” in Section II, this conception o f decision­ m aking gives a logically special place to the status quo. Democracy, defined in term s o f the conform ity o f collective decisions to m ajority preferences, is pretty clearly not acceptable as a sole political p rin ­ ciple. It is easy enough to think o f ways in which what a majority wants would not, if enacted, bring about a better am o u n t and distribution o f well­ being than would some alternative (including the alternative o f not doing anything). O ne possibility is that those m aking up the m ajority may have p refer­ ences which ru n co u n ter to th eir own interests, out o f ignorance, miscalcula­ tion, shortsightedness, o r passion. A nother possibility is th at those m aking u p the m ajority may be genuinely advancing th eir own interests but at th e expense o f those in th e m inority, the outcom e being an inequitable distribu­ tion o r an avoidable loss o f overall well-being. A nd a th ird possibility is that the policy p re fe rre d by a m ajority may be evaluatively acceptable if one looks only at the g ro u p bound by th e collective decision but unacceptable because o f its effects on those outside the group. T h u s th ere are severe problem s facing the inventor o f constitutions, since it is o n e thing to show that dem ocracy is capable o f producing bad outcom es and an o th er to find institutions that are not vulnerable to the same fault. But it is not a theoretical difficulty; all we have to do is allow for com peting principles. In doing that, we implicitly acknow ledge th at on some occasions w hat is m ost dem ocratic may not, on balance, be th e best thing that could happen. T h e doctrine that o u r cherished principles are good only on the whole and may sometim es need to be overridden requires a certain sophistication to appreciate, however. In the rough and tum ble o f political debate, how often does one h ear some principle ridiculed because, if it were followed inflexibly, it would sometim es have bad consequences? Intellectuals, in a m ore systematic way, often start from the same assum ptions. Berlin (1969), after referrin g to the natural tendency o f all but a very few thinkers to believe th at all the things they hold good m ust be intimately connected, o r at least com pati­ ble, with one an o th er continues: T h e history o f th o u g h t, like the history o f nations, is strewn with exam ­ ples o f inconsistent, o r at least disparate, elem ents artificially yoked

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to g eth er in a despotic system, o r held to g eth er by the d an g er o f some com m on enem y, (p. 128n) It is th erefo re hardly surprising th at ad h eren ts o f dem ocracy have tried to anticipate attacks by reform ulating the concept o f dem ocracy so as to draw th eir sting. T h e re are two routes. O ne is to build into the concept o f dem ocracy th e presence o f various devices (an en tren ch ed bill o f rights, etc.) th a t in term s o f o u r original definition are antidem ocratic.13 T h e o th er ro u te — word-m agic, p u re and sim ple— is to m ake desirable ends p art o f the definition o f dem ocracy. In com m on parlance, we would speak o f . . . a dem ocratic aim in the p u rsu it o f social justice or, to quote a fam ous docum ent, o f happiness. T h ey are aims which, again in com m on parlance, are called dem ocratic ends, to be achieved by dem ocratic means. (Meisel, 1962, pp. 352-3) T his obviously opens u p a rich vein o f potential confusion since “dem ocratic m eans” may not lead to “dem ocratic ends,” an d “dem ocratic ends” may be achieved by o th er than “dem ocratic m eans.” A nd it destroys any distinctive m eaning fo r “dem ocratic” : I f justice and happiness are part o f the connota­ tion o f “dem ocratic,” th ere is not m uch difference between saying some policy is dem ocratic and saying that it is good— saying, in o th er words, th at it is evaluated highly on the basis o f the general g ro u n d o f evaluation. T h e re is no point in having a principle o f dem ocracy because it no longer draws attention to any special features. T h e first ro u te is subject to the same objection, though in a m odified form . T ailoring th e principle so th at it corresponds precisely to the institu­ tions o f particular societies— the so-called W estern dem ocracies— weakens the force o f the evaluation. Satisfying m ajority preferences is a virtue, and so is safeguarding the rights o f m inorities, but they are distinct and potentially opposed virtu es.14 Calling a society dem ocratic, if one m eans that its institu­ tions in som e way o r an o th er balance these two virtues, is adm ittedly m ore precise th an saying it scores high on the basis o f the general g ro u n d o f evaluation; but it still conceals a crucial part o f the process o f evaluation, which concerns the weighting that should be given to the two features o f majority will and individual o r m inority rights. T h e result o f fudging to g eth er these two potentially incom patible fea­ tures in o n e principle is to inhibit serious discussion o f the relative im por­ tance o f m ajority rule an d limits on its scope, since it is alm ost impossible to find the concepts in which to pose the issue. T his result may not inspire universally shared regret. We noted at the beginning o f this section the possibility that o p ponents o f some principle may seek to debilitate it by exten d in g its range so that it loses its original bite. T h e incorporation o f an antagonistic principle within the original concept m ight be regarded as a

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m ore subtle form o f subversion. At least in the U nited States th ere seems today to be a quite com m on tendency to associate the principle o f dem ocracy prim arily with restraints on the m ajority— a curious reversal, presum ably gratifying to those who benefit m ost from the status quo an d th erefo re stand to lose most if the “sleeping giant” were ever to stir.

Before closing this section, let us look briefly at relations am ong the five concepts that have been exam ined an d their use in arg u m en t. T h e relations, as we have noted in particular cases already, are both com plem entary and com petitive. T h u s, to pick u p exam ples already m entioned en passant, dem o­ cracy is related to public interest via the notion th at th e interest o f the m ajority is a reasonable, practical approxim ation; and it is also directly re ­ lated to the notion o f political equality, even tho u g h universal suffrage may seem to the sophisticated a ra th e r attenuated form o f equal pow er. C om peti­ tive relations, as we saw, exist betw een the public interest and freedom in particular, b u t also betw een th e public interest an d justice o r equality. Justice and equality them selves may be either com plem entary or com petitive, while both (as we saw) may conflict with freedom . Finally, dem ocracy in any given instance may produce outcom es conflicting with any o r all o f the rest. Given this complexity, it would be understandable to w onder w hether these concepts really simplify political discourse. W ould it not be sim pler, som eone m ight ask, to cut out the m iddle-m en an d argue directly from the am o u n t an d distribution o f well-being? We do not think this would help. T hese concepts have developed to express im portant, th o u g h diverse, con­ siderations th at have to be w eighted before one says that a state o f affairs em bodies a desirable am o u n t an d distribution o f well-being. I f these criteria did not exist, they o r som ething quite like them would have to be invented. SECTIO N VII: CONCLUSION “It seems obvious that, in o rd e r to ju d g e how well a system perform s, one needs th ree elem ents: criteria o f value, w orth, goodness, excellence, desira­ bility; d ata about the behavior o f the system; and ways o f applying th e criteria to the behavior o f the system in o rd e r to m easure the degree o f value, w orth, goodness, excellence, desirability” (Dahl, 1967, pp. 169-70). D ahl’s rem ark can be ex ten d ed as follows. I f we wish to ask w hether a given political institution o f form A in a certain society would be im proved by being m odified to form B, we have to p erform th ree tasks. First, we need to set u p some criteria o f evaluation which will enable us to say th at one set o f consequences is preferable to some o th er set o f consequences. Second, we need to develop a theory which will tell us the likely consequences o f having form A o f the institution ra th e r than form B in a society with such-and-such

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relevant characteristics. A nd th ird , we have to b rin g these two together by ask­ ing w hether the consequences o f A are likely to be better or worse than the consequences o f B on the basis o f o u r criteria o f evaluation. T his ch ap ter has been addressed to the first o f these tasks only. T h e second task is, o f course, the subject o f political science w henever it extends beyond description, an d a n u m b er o f the o th e r entries in this Handbook may be reg ard ed as rep o rts on the “state o f th e a rt” with respect to various institutions, while th e ch ap ter by Michael T aylor in V olum e 3 contains a generally relevant discussion at a high level o f abstraction. We wish here only to re p e a t a point we m ade at the beginning o f this chapter. A political scientist, having focused his attention on som e political phenom enon, may analyze its consequences in any term s he chooses. B ut he can have litde hope th at anyone else will take an interest in his conclusions unless he focuses his attention o n consequences that have some direct bearing on the am ount and distribution o'f h u m an well-being— in o th er w ords, consequences th at have som e evaluative im port. T h u s the second task cannot be carried out effec­ tively unless th ere is at least tacit awareness o f the first. It should be m ade clear, if it has not becom e clear already, th at no analysis o f evaluation can hope to be uncontroversial. Perhaps the most disputable feature o f this account is its ultim ately “consequentialist” com­ m itm ent. T h a t is to say, although we acknow ledge the possibility o f ju d g in g political acts by “characterizing” them ra th e r th a n by referrin g to their con­ sequences, we suggest that attaching evaluative im plications to such “charac­ terizations” can be d efen d ed in term s o f the usual effects on the am o u n t and distribution o f well-being o f acts so characterized. O u r analysis th erefo re does n o t fit th e m oral belief systems o f those w ho claim th a t the rightness o r w rongness o f kinds o f acts may be derived from a knowledge o f the will o f a su p ern atu ral being o r may be discovered by “intuition.” However, we should like to re p ea t h ere the observation th at, w hen people with differing religious convictions o r d ifferin g m oral intuitions co n fro n t one an o th er, they are not likely to find a com m on basis for arg um ent unless they are p rep ared to go behind th eir beliefs about the rightness and w rongness o f kinds o f acts to some m o re general prem ises, which, we suggest, can scarcely be o th er than th e am o u n t an d distribution o f hum an well-being. T h e discussion in this ch ap ter leads u p to o u r setting out and describing briefly a n u m b e r o f principles th at are widely used in the evaluation o f states o f affairs an d thus (given a “consequentialist” approach) in the evaluation o f alternative institutions o r policies. We have suggested th at these principles o p erate as m ediators betw een the m ost general basis o f evaluation— the am o u n t an d distribution o f hum an well-being— and decisions o r recom ­ m endations to be m ade in particular cases. By concentrating attention on aspects o f well-being an d its distribution that have been found im p o rtan t in m aking evaluations, these principles help to solve the difficulties which, we

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pointed out earlier in the article, are in h eren t in any attem pt to apply very abstract criteria o f evaluation directly to com plex phenom ena. O u r conception o f the place o f political principles in political arg u m en t has implications which ru n co u n ter to two opposite an d , we believe, equally incorrect ideas. It is sometim es suggested (on the basis o f a variety o f philosophical positions, ranging from “m oral sentim ent” th ro u g h “contractualism ” to “n atural law”) that, b u t for the contam inating effect o f the special interests which arise from d ifferen t positions in society, etc., all hum an be­ ings (or all “rational” hum an beings) would be able to reach agreem ent on political principles. At the o th er extrem e is the idea th at political principles are m erely a m atter o f taste—and de gustibus non est dispuiandum. Sometimes it is tacitly assum ed that these two positions exhaust the range o f possibilities. T h u s W eldon (1956) says o f political principles that “if they are m ade p re­ cise, it can no longer be claim ed with m uch plausibility th at they are, o r even m ight be, generally acceptable to all hum an beings” (p. 30) and moves straight from this to the assertion th at “Everyone can decide what are his own political principles” (p. 33) and the conclusion that political principles are stop signs, like “Keep o ff the grass” notices, which do not have to be set up anyw here in particular (p. 34). O u r position avoids these extrem es, though o u r claim fo r it rests not on its being a com prom ise but on its being correct. In o u r analysis, com plete agreem ent on political principles an d the ap p ro p riate tra d e -o ff am ong them would require that everyone share (1) the same view o f the precise con­ stituents o f hum an well-being an d the relative im portance o f these con­ stituents, (2) th e same criteria (with the sam e weightings) for adjudicating between the well-being o f d ifféren t people, and (3) the same causal generali­ zations connecting well-being to the features o f situations picked out by the principles. We do not see any likelihood th at these conditions will ever be m et, an d we th erefo re anticipate that political principles and the priorities to be observed am ong them will always be m atters o f controversy. But at the same tim e we suggest that any theory m ust stand condem ned which cannot m ake sense o f the phenom enon o f argument about political principles. I f principles were simply “Keep o ff the grass” notices which each person was free to place w here he chose, all that anyone could do would be to note that somebody else had placed his notices in a different place from his own. In o u r view, however, a principle em bodies an implicit connection with the ultim ate basis o f evaluation, an d it is this which provides th e possibility o f argum ent. M ore significant, it is this implicit claim which sets limits to what can (logically) be advanced as a principle, since it m ust be possible to see how the fulfillm ent o f the principle m ight conceivably be taken to contribute to a desirable am o u n t and distribution o f hum an well-being. If som eone puts a “Keep o ff th e grass” notice on o r near some grass, we can arg u e about the

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propriety o f his doing so. Now th ere is, o f course, nothing that physically prevents som eone from erecting such a notice in the m iddle o f an asphalt parking lot, ju st as th ere is no physical impossibility in enunciating any prescription as a political principle, even one which is com pletely arbitrary. B ut a “K eep o ff the grass” notice in the m iddle o f a parking lot will not fulfill the function o f a notice, nor will a principle with no connection to any conception o f hum an well-being. T h e one will not keep anyone o ff any grass; th e o th er will not convince anyone th a t the principle should be ob­ served. B oth are out o f place.

NOTES 1. Two policies are mutually exclusive when they are incompatible in some respect, not necessarily in every respect. Thus a parliamentary bill to which ten separate amendments are moved gives rise to 2 10 alternative policies plus the alternative of defeating the bill in any form, in other words, retaining the status quo. It may be objected that our definition makes the num ber o f alternative policies in a given matter potentially infinite. We regard this not as an objection to our definition but as a real problem. In practice, of course, the num ber of alternatives considered has to be reduced to manageable proportions, but this is often a pretty rough and ready affair, and we think our definition of an alternative is useful in emphasizing that most alternatives are never considered. 2. O ur definition of an alternative entailed that there was a potentially infinite number of alternatives conceivable at any time; now our definition o f a decision entails that the choice among them is taken at every instant. Having committed ourselves to one infinity, we see no great reason to draw back from multiplying it by another. T he practical position in relation to both is exactly the same: Attention must be restricted in some more or less arbitrary way to some alternatives on any question and some questions at any time. But it is useful for our conceptual scheme to em­ phasize that there is an enormous, if implicit, process of selection going on. 3. It is not possible within the scope of this chapter to discuss the alternative ideas that have been proposed about the ultimate basis o f evaluation. A good collection of the traditional theories is Sellars and Hospers (1952). For recent developments see Warnock (1967). 4. This is the meaning of a commitment to lexicographic hierarchy as a principle of decision. However, if we knew in a given case what the alternative policies were, wre might be able to sum up our preferences by using lexicography, even if we in fact gave some independent weight to each of several criteria. T he possibility of doing so depends, roughly speaking, on there being a finite minimum distance between any two alternatives in terms of the higher-order criterion and a finite maximum distance between the best and worst alternatives in terms o f the lower-order criterion. 5. Indifference curves cannot intersect because we mean by a criterion of evaluation that, other things being equal, more fulfillment of it is better than less.

6 . This criterion has a certain similarity to one discussed by Sen (1970, pp. 150-1 and 154-6). But the notion there presented of each person deciding whether he would prefer to be himself with his own tastes or other people with their tastes seems to us

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Political E valuation

to amount to a complicated way of talking about estimates of comparative utility. 7. When the number o f people in the two situations is different, the best-off people in the situation with more people should be eliminated from consideration until num ­ bers are equal in the two situations, and the comparison of pairs then carried out. As already noted, this move maintains the link with minimax in both forms, though for utilitarianism (in both total and average utility forms) the link is severed. The most we can say is that if * is the situation with more people, then x R y and * P j on dominance entail x R> and* P y on utilitarianism; but> R x and> Px on dominance do not entail anything about utilitarianism. We shall not further consider dominance with unequal numbers of people.

8 . It is perhaps worth repeating here that, while dominance entails utilitarianism and minimax, it is in turn entailed by Pareto optimality. Hence Pareto optimality also entails utilitarianism and minimax. 9. These strategies are, in the logic of our conditions for evaluation, made available by the difficulties arising from risk and uncertainty. T hat is, one can seldom be sure about connections between policies and resultant conditions (Ai to Ci), and it is there­ fore possible to call attention to the more desirable conditions which occur simul­ taneously with the application of a policy (for any two conditions C> and Cj, one can associate the policy with the more highly valued of the two). 10. See Hodgson, 1967; and for an unintentionally hilarious account of the difficulties facing a conscientious utilitarian, see Book 4, Chapter 5, of Sidgwick (1907). 11. Article 24: “Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limita­ tion of working hours and periodic holidays with pay." 12. Translation is that in Paine (1906), pp. 95-6. 13. A nice example, drawn from the discussion of “democracy” in an American text­ book on contemporary ideologies (Christenson et al., 1972) is the following: “T here are limits to what the majority can do. It cannot oppress the minority: expropriate their property, diminish their citizenship, infringe their rights, or deny them the freedom to oppose and seek to become the majority” (p. 186). Although the last point merely specifies the continuation of majority control, the first rules the achievement of a socialist economy as incompatible with democracy. T he second and third are too vague to comment on usefully (they are not spelled out), but presum a­ bly they are also intended to cover limits on the majority other than those on actions inconsistent with the maintenance of majority rule. 14. “Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience" (Berlin, 1969, p. 125).

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Beer, Samuel H. (1965). Modern British Politics. London: Faber. Bell, Daniel (1960). The End of Ideology. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Bennett, Jonathan (1968). “Whatever the consequences.” In Judith J. Thomson and Gerald Dworkin (eds.), Ethics. New York: Harper and Row. Pp. 211-36. Bentham, Jeremy (1948). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York: Hafner. Berlin, Isaiah (1969). “Two concepts of liberty.” Four Essays on Liberty. London: Ox­ ford University Press. Pp. 118-72. Black, Duncan (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blau, Peter M., and Otis D. Duncan (1967). The American Occupational Structure. New York: Wiley. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Burke, Edmund (1910). Reflections on the Revolution in France. London: Dent. Calhoun, John C. (1953). ,4 Disquisition on Government. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Christensen, Reo M., A. S. Engel, D. N. Jacobs, M. Rejai, and H. Waltzer (1972). Ideologies and Modem Politics. London: Nelson. Cohn, Norman (1970). The Pursmt of the Millenium. London: Paladin. Condorcet, M. J. A. N. C. (1785). Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix. Paris. Cranston, Maurice (1953). Freedom: A New Analysis. London: Longmans. Dahl, Robert A. (1956). Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. -------------- (1967). “The evaluation of political systems.” In Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Contemporary Political Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. -------------- (1970). After the Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dahl, Robert A., and Charles E. Lindblom (1953). Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York: Harper. D’Arcy, Eric (1963). Human Acts: An Essay in Their Moral Evaluation. Oxford: Claren­ don Press. Downs, Anthony (1956). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Ed wards, Ward, and Amos Tversky, eds. (1967). Decision Making: Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Gunn, J. A. (1969). Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century. London: Routledge. Harrington, James (1924). Oceana. Heidelberg: Skrifter Vetenskaps-Socienteten I. Harris, Nigel (1971). Beliefs in Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hart, Herbert L. A. (1961). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hodgson, David H. (1967). Consequences of Utilitariansim. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Huizinga, Johan (1970). Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture. London: Paladin. H untington, Samuel P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Vale University Press. Landes, David S. (1969). The Unbound Prometheus. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. Laslett, Peter (1965). The World We Have Lost. New York: Scribner. Levi, Edward H. (1949). An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lindblom, Charles (1968). The Policy-making Process, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prenuce-Hall. Lipset, Seymour M. (1963). The First New Nation. New York: Basic Books. Luce, Robert D., and Howard Raiffa (1957). Fights, Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley. Macpherson, Crawford B. (1958). The Real World of Democracy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. March, Jam es G., and H erbert A. Simon (1958). Organizations. New York: W’iley. Marx, Karl (1959). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Progress Publishers. May, K. O. (1952). “A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions.” Econometrica 20: 680-4. Meisel, James H. (1962). The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite. Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press. Moore, Barrington, Jr. (1972). Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery. London: Allen Lane, Penguin. Myrdal, G unnar (1958). Value in Social Theory. London: Routledge. Nathan, N. M. L. (1971). The Concept of Justice. London: Macmillan. Nolte, Ernst (1965). Three Faces of Fascism. London: W eidenfeld. Paine, Thom as (1906). The Rights of Man. London: Dent. Perelman, Chaim (1963). The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. London: Routledge. Rae, Douglas W. (1971). “Political democracy as a property o f political institutions.” American Political Science Revieiv 65:111-9. Raphael, David D., ed. (1967). Political Theory and the Rights of Man. London: Mac­ millan. Rawls, John (1958). “Justice as fairness." Philosophical Review 67:164-94. _________ (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. Rescher, Nicholas (1966). Distributive Justice. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1947). The Social Contract. In Ernest B arker (ed.). Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau. London: Oxford University Press.

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Sellars, Wilfrid, and John Hospers, eds. (1952). Readings in Ethical Theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Sen, Amartya K. (1970). Collective Choke and Social Welfare. San Francisco: HoldenDay. Shils, Edward (1956). The Torment of Secrecy. Glencoe, III.: Free Press. Sidgwick, Henry (1907). The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan. Simon, Herbert A. (1955). ‘‘A behavioral model of rational choice." Quarterly Journal of Economics 68:99-118. Smith, Adam (1961). The Wealth of Nations. London: Methuen. Stevenson, Charles L. (1944). Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press. Talmon, J. L. (1960). The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. New York: Praeger. Taylor, Michael (1970). “T he problem of salience in the theory o f collective decision-making.” Behavioral Science 15. Vlastos, Greogry (1962). “Justice and equality.” In Richard B. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice. Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-Hall. Warnock, Geoffrey (1967). Contemporary Moral Philosophy. London: Macmillan. Weber, Max (1949). The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Weldon, Thomas D. (1956). “Political principles." In Peter Laslett and Walter G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Williams, Bernard (1962). “The idea of equality." In Peter Laslett and Walter G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd series. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wilson, James Q. (1960). Negro Politics. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Wolff, Robert P. (1970). In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper. Yntema, D. B., and W. S. Torgerson (1967). “Man-computer cooperation in decisions requiring common sense.” In Ward Edwards and Amos Tversky (eds.). Decision Mak­ ing: Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Pp. 300-14. Originally published in IRE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics, HFE-2 (1961), 20-6.

INDEX

INDEX

Abel, Theodore, 217 Absolutism, strategic, 351 Achinstein, Peter, 216, 218 Act-descriptions, 371 Action vs. movement, 161, 164 Almond, Gabriel, 134, 141, 170, 194 309,310 Ago thon, 239 Alienation, 380 Alston, William P., 295, 314 American Political Science Associa­ tion, 34, 35, 42, 54 “ Amoral familism,” 173 Anarchy, 388 Anderson, William, 4 Anscombe, G.E.M., 166 Anthropomorphism, 179, 182 Apel, Karl-Otto, 217 Appraisals, 315-316, 317 Arendt, Hannah, 212, 272 Aristotle, 9, 162, 206, 230, 233-234, 237, 240, 244, 245, 248, 249, 252, 253, 259, 260, 263, 323, 326 Arros, Kenneth, 341 Ashby, R.W., 292 Austin, John, 307, 309 Authority, 192, 287, 303, 304 Averini, Shlomo, 15, 229 Axiom of choice, 197 Axiom of transitivity, 197

405

Bachrach, Peter, 307 Baier, Kurt, 318 Bakunin, Mikhail, 12 Ban field, Edward C., 171, 172-173, 174, 181,219 Banks, Arthur, 312 Bames, Harry E., 46 Barry, Brian, 131, 214, 215, 220, 221, 284, 391 Bay, Christian, 325 Bedau, Hugo A., 287 Beer, Samual H., 176-177, 181, 219, 390 Behavioralism, 58-62 Behavioralists, 258 Behaviorism, 292-293, 294, 295, 297, 299 Benda, Julien, 255 Benn, S.I., 284, 289, 308 Bennett, Jonathan, 351 Bentham, Jeremy, 12, 14, 220, 326, 360 Berelson, Bernard, 293 Berger, Peter L., 216 Bergson, Henri, 233, 261 Berlin, Isaiah, 292, 389, 392, 398 Bernstein, Richard J., 220 Bigongiari, Dino, 264 Bios thedretikos, 240, 245, 259 Black, Duncan, 341 Blalock, Hubert M., Jr., 216 Blaj, Peter M., 386 Bodin, 12, 13

406

Index

Brandt, Richard, 217, 321 Braybrookc, David, 306, 308 Brcines, Paul, 274, 275 Brodbeck, May, 216, 217, 286, 299, 330 Brody, Richard A., 186 Brown, Norman O., 250, 274 Brown, Robert, 313 Buchanan, James M., 205, 220 Burke, Edmund, 247, 371 Calhoun, John C., 391 Calvin, John, 230, 234 Campbell, Norman, 216 Capitalism, 247 Care, Norman S., 293 Carey, George W., 114, 276 Cassinelli, C.W., 289, 330 Casvistry, 378 Catlin, George E.G., 8, 46, 49 Causal structure, 135, 136 Causation, 300-301, 305 Childe, V. Gordon, 5 Chomsky, Noam, 274 Christensen, Reo M., 398 Christianity, 232, 240, 241, 245 medieval, 242 Civilizations, 232, 235, 242, 246, 247, 250 Classification, 309-310 Clement of Alexandria, 241 Cnudde, Charles F., 313 Coercion, 299 Cohen, Robert S., 219 Collectivities, 298-299 Collingwood, R.G., 180 Columbia University School of Political Science, 27 Communism, 244 Concepts categorical, 309-311 comparative, 311-314 extreme-type, 311 quantitative, 313-314 Conceptual frameworks, 140 Concurrent majorities, 391 Condorcet, M.J.A.N.C., 247, 341

Conflict, 191 Connolly, William, 286, 318 Consensus, 170, 193 Consequentialism, 395 Conservatism, 247 Conservative party, 177 Constitution, 20, 21 Constitutive meanings, 168-171, 173,176, 178, 181,206, 208, 209 Constitutive norms, 167, 207 Control, 300, 301, 305 Conventions, 133, 167-168, 178, 208 Cosmopolis, 245 Cox, Richard, 275 Crane, William W., 38 Cranston, Maurice, 387 Crick, Bernard, 38, 252 Criteria, aggregation of, 342-344 conflicts among, 349-357 interpretability of, 342 Croce, Benedetto, 258, 260 “Cumulative knowledge,” 3 Dahl, Robert A., 156-160, 285, 28 7, 290, 291, 301, 304, 306, 311, 312, 313, 363, 390, 394 Dahrendorf, Ralf, 191, 192, 193 Dallmayr, Fred R., 276 Dante, 10, 262 D’Arcy, Eric, 371 Davidson, Donald, 217, 297 Decision-making, 203 Declaration of Independence, 21 Definitions, 290-291 explicative, 290-291, 308 persuasive, 323-327 reportative, 291, 308 stipulative, 290 de Grazia, Sebastian, 274 dejouvenel, Bertrand, 212, 273 Democracy, 306-307, 313, 386, 3 9 0 -3 9 4 as maximin consent, 390 Den tier, Robert A., 132 d’ Entrévès, Alexander Passerin, 2 6 4 , 27 7 , 321 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 14

Index

Deutsch, Karl W., 140, 141, 277, 297, 305 Dexter, Lewis, 231 Diminishing marginal utility, 387 Dispositional concepts, 301 Dispositional practices, 294 Dominance, 365-368 Donnellan, Keith S., 296 Douglas, Mary, 216 Downs, Anthony, 141, 195-197, 198-199, 200,201 Duncan, Otis D., 386 Duties, 371 Duverger, Maurice, 138 Easton, David, 1, 70, 114, 118, 141, 276, 285, 293, 298,304,318 Eaton, Dorman B., 33 Eckstein, Harry, 190, 191 Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, 33 Ecumenicism, attempted, 3 Edwards, Ward, 371 Efficiency, 343, 362 Egalitarianism, 286, 309, 311, 313 Elliott, William Y., 49, 50 Ellul, Jacques, 274 Emmet, Dorothy, 217 Empiricism, 291-292, 294, 297 Enlightenment, 252 Equality, 287-288, 310, 343, 361-362, 378, 386-387 before the law, 386 political, 387 racial, 387 sexual, 386 social, 387 Essentialism, 290 Etzioni, Amitai, 274 Eulau, Heinz, 231, 285, 293, 298, 302 “ Exchange theory,” 195 Explanation of action, interpretative, 161-167, 174, 204, 206 limitation of, 182-186 Explanation of action, naturalist, 156161 Explanation, quasi-causal, 186-191, 192, 204, 208

407

Explanation, scientific, 135-140 “ covering-law model,” 136-137, 157 “explanation-sketch,” 157 “nomological explanation,” 136-137, 18 Falco, Mario J., 134 Fallacy of reification, 286, 322 Fay, Brian C., 131, 212, 219 Federalist papers, 21 Feierabend, Ivo, 190 Feierabend, R., 190 Feigl, Herbert, 142, 218, 219 Ferejohn, John, 202-203 Ferkiss, Victor, 274 Fetscher, Irving, 235 Feyerabend, Paul K., 147, 148, 218, 219, 220 Filmer, Sir Robert, 264 Fiorina, Morris, 202-203 Flathman, Richard E., 274, 284, 293 Foot, Philippa, 301, 318 Forced choice, 344-345 Formalism, 290 Fourth Republic, 136 Frankena, William K., 319, 326, 330 Franklin, Julian H., 14 Freedom, 287, 288-289, 304, 305, 378, 387-390 of choice, 288 feeling free, 288-289 free actions, 289 social or political, 288 of speech, 288 from want, 288 Friedrich, Carl J ., 264, 272, 277, 288 Functionalism, 192 Garfinkel, H., 216 Geertz, Clifford, 180 Gellner, Ernest, 179, 297 General possibility theorem, 341 Germino, Dante, 131, 209, 251, 272, 275, 276 Gibson, Quinton, 216, 323 Gilbert, Allan, 264

408

/ ridex

Ginsberg, Morris, 327 Goldberg, Arthur, 131, 146, 298 Goldenweiser, Alexander, 46 Goldman, Alvin L., 217, 297 Goodman, Paul, 274 Goodnow, Frank J., 39, 91 Gosnell, Harold F., 47 Government, 246 Graham, George J., 114, 276 Gramsci, Antonio, 235, 243, 256, 260 Great Dialogue, 8-11 Greenstein, Fred, 131 Gregor, A James, 134, 284, 289, 309, 310 Gross, Bertram M., 285 Grotius, Hugo, 230 Grumm, John G., 138 Gunn, J.A ., 383 Gurr, Ted Robert, 190, 220

Haas, Michael, 312 Habermas, Jiirgen, 134, 217, 219 Hacker, Andrew, 307 Haddow, Anna, 24 Hanson, Norwood Russell, 147, 216 Hare, R.M., 318, 319, 322, 330 Harre, Ron, 216 Harrington, James, 383 Harris, Nigel, 378 Hart, H.L.A., 160, 212, 284, 302, 303, 320, 378 Hartz, Louis, 252 Hayek, F.A., 326 Hegel, Georg, 230, 231, 234, 235, 239, 243, 248, 252, 254, 255, 260, 262, 264 Hempel, Carl G., 132, 138, 142, 145, 155, 158, 159-160, 173, 216, 218, 285, 290, 291, 294, 301, 310, 313 Hcrmeneutical or interpretative circle, 172-173, 208 Herring, E. Pendleton, 47 Hesse, Mary B., 216 History, 248-250, 255 philosophy of, 248 Hobbes, Thomas, 12, 13, 134, 135, 209,

231, 236, 239, 241, 246, 248, 249, 252, 260, 264, 288 Hodgson, David H., 398 Holcombe, A rthur N., 47 Holsti, Ole R., 186 Holt, Robert T., 220 Homans, George Caspar, 195, 216 Honoré, A.M., 160 Hook, Sidney, 307 Hooker, Richard, 241, 255 Hospers, John, 397 Huizinga, Johan, 384 Humanism, 242, 250, 261 anthropocentric, 238, 241, 243, 246, 249,261 metastatic, 238, 243, 247, 250, 261 theocentric, 238, 241, 243, 245, 246, 249-250, 261 Hume, David, 134, 288 Huntington, Samuel P., 347 Hyneman, Charles S., 307 Ideal-types, 176 Incrementalism, 346 Indifference curves, 354 Individual relevance, 347-348 Individualism, 252 Influence, 170, 299, 300, 301 Institutional fact, 318 Instrumental rationality, 210 Intentional action, 133, 155, 161, 164, 178 Intentions and inner states, 165 Interest, 382 Internal consistency, 341 International relations, theories of. 235-236 Interpretations, testing of, 171-17 7 Introspection, 165 Intuitionism, 319 Ions, Edmund S., 31 Jay, Martin, 217 Johns Hopkins University, 27 Johnson, Chalmers, 193, 314 Judaism, 232, 240 Justice, 322-323, 364, 384-386

Index

Kalleberg, Arthur L., 310 Kant, Immanuel, 230 Kaplan, Abraham, 172, 284, 285, 292, 299,309 Kariel, Henry, S., 114 Kaufman, Arnold S., 292 Kaufman, Herbert, 80 Kelley, Harold H., 195 Kim, Jaegwon, 217 Knowledge, 253, 254 practical, 253 productive, 253 theoretical, 253 Korner, Stephan, 216 Kropotkin, Prince, 12 Kuhn, Thomas S., 141, 195, 218, 219

Labour Party, 177 Lakatos, Imre, 141, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 194, 207 Landau, Martin, 39 Landes, David S., 345 Landesman, Charles, 293 Languages of politics, 16-18 Lasch, Christopher, 274 Lasswell, Harold D., 46, 66, 252, 284, 285 Laws, 132, 133, 134 “ accidental” generalizations, 138 counterfactual conditionals, 138, 139, 189 vs. general statements, 137 generalizations, 133, 136-138 “ necessity” of, 138, 139 subjunctive conditional, 138, 139, 189 unrestricted universal statem ent, 138 Legal institutions, 301-303 legal concepts, 303 legal system, 303, 322 Legitimacy, 287, 321-322 Lenski, Gerhard, 285 Levi, Carlo, 174 Levi, Edward H., 378 Lexicographic hierarchy, 351-352 Liberalism, 246, 261 Liberty, 379

409

Lichtheim, George, 15 Lieber, Francis, 25-26 Lindblom, Charles E., 347, 363 Lipset, Seymour M., 337 Locke, Don, 166 Locke, John, 12, 230, 231, 241, 246, 248, 249, 252, 260, 264, 316 Logical empiricism, 141 Lonergan, Bemard J., 260 Louch, A.R., 295, 296 Luce, Robert D., 346 Luc km an, Thomas, 216 Luther, Martin, 234

Machiavelli, 12, 13, 230, 231, 236, 241, 246, 248, 249, 252, 254, 260, 261 264, 316 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 175, 217 Mackenzie, William J.M., 4, 38 Macpherson, Crawford B., 381 Madden, E.H., 216 Majority rule, 363-364, 383 Man, 238, 239-243, 245, 246, 248, 249, 253, 255, 257 mature man, 240, 245 political man, 242 Mandelbaum, Maurice, 299, 302 March, James G., 285, 344 Marcuse, Herbert, 250, 259, 274, 327 Marginal rates of substitution, 353 Marini, Frank, 114 Maritain, Jacques, 249 Martin, Jane R., 217 Marx, Karl, 12, 14-15, 230, 234, 235, 236, 239, 243, 247, 248, 250, 252, 254, 260, 261, 265, 275, 276, 381 Marxism, 380 Masterman, Margaret, 141, 216 Maxwell, Grover, 216 May, K.O., 341 Mayer, Jacob P., 14 McCoy, Charles A., 114 McNeill, William H., 5 Meaning, openness of, 309 Meaning of action, 178, 180, 191, 207 Meehan, Eugene J., 276-277

410

Index

Meehl, Paul E., 220 Meisel, James H., 393 Mental states, 299-300 Merrian, Charles E., 47, 48-49, 252 Merry, Henry J., 14 metastasis, 243, 250 Methodological holism, 299 Methodological individualism, 299 Methodology hermeneutical model, 133 interpretative model of inquiry, 132, 133, 135, 155, 175, 177, 206, 207 model of political and social inquiry, 132 “ naturalist” model, 132, 133, 155, 175, 206, 207 and political philosophy, 211-212 “ positivist” model, 132 scientific model of inquiry, 134, 135 Mill, John Stuart, 12, 14, 135 Miller, Warren E., 231 Minimax, 364-365 Mitchell, Edward J., 187 Models of man, 192-195, 204, 208, 209, 210 Montegranesi society, 173 Montesquieu, 13, 14, 230, 325 Moore, Barrington, Jr., 274, 345 Moral principles, 315, 316 More, Sir Thomas, 244 Morgenthau, Hans J., 252 Moses, Bernard, 38 Myrdal, Gunnar, 338 Myth, 234, 248 Nagel, Ernest, 138, 139, 140, 216, 284, 315 Natanson, Maurice, 216 Nathan, N.M.L., 384 Naturalism, 319 Neubauer, Deane E., 313 Neurath, Otto, 1 74 New Deal, 50-51 Noetic thought, 256 Nolte, Ernst, 380 Normative political inquiry, 314-328 North, Robert C., 186

Northrop, F.S.C., 262 Nozick, Robert, 212 Oakeshott, Michael, 236, 273 Obligations, 371 Observation terms, 298 Odegard, Peter H., 47 Ogbum, William F., 46 Olson, Mancur, Jr., 195, 200 Open society, 233, 256, 258 Operationalism, 293-294, 297-298, 299, 311-313 Operative ideals, 176 Oppenheim, Felix E., 212, 217, 218, 273, 284, 287, 290, 300, 311, 314, 317, 319 Ordeshook, Peter C., 202 Paci, Enzo, 250 Paine, Thomas, 398 Pap, Arthur, 290 Paradigmatic society, 243-248, 258 Paranzino, Dennis, 18 7 Pareto optimality, 362-363, 365 Parkinson, G.H.R., 289 Partial goods, 371, 375 Pegis, Anton C., 264 Perelman, Chaim, 384 periagoge, 239 Peters, R.S., 167, 284 Philosophers, 236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 244, 248, 254, 255, 257 Philosophy, 235, 236, 248, 249, 250256,258, 261 classical, 240 Greek, 241 history of, 235, 260 meaning of, 235 practical, 234-235 study of, 256, 257 uses of, 235 Pi Sigma Alpha, 55 Pitkin, Hannah F., 212, 322 Plato, 9, 210, 231, 233-234, 235, 237, 239-240, 243, 244, 2 4 5 ,2 4 8 ,2 4 9 , 252, 255, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 322

Index

Play ford, John, 114 Polanyi, Michacl, 169 Polis, 241, 244, 245, 252, 261 Political evaluation, 209, 213-214 Political institutions, 4-7 ancient empires, 5 Greek experience, 5 medieval influence, 6-7 modern state system, 7 neolithic revolution, 5 Roman experience, 6 Political phenomena, explanation of, 131 Political philosophers, 230, 231, 233 Political philosophy, 209, 233, 235, 236, 241, 248, 251, 252-253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 260, 262 analytic, 317, 321 classics of, 229-230, 231, 237, 248, 252, 254, 257, 259-260, 261 Greek, 232 history of, 233, 236-237, 252-253 relevance of, 256-262 uses of, 230, 233-236, 256 Political reality, 231, 232, 236, 253, 257, 261 Political science, Americanization of, 3032,44-45 Political science, definition of, 1-2 by David Easton, 1 Political science, development.of in the United States, 18-23 American political experience, 20 citizen literature, 20-21 industrialization, 21-22 political knowledge, codification of, 19 specialization, 21-22 urbanization, 21-22 university, rise of, £2-23 Political science, as discipline, 117-118 Political science, as enterprise, 123-124 Political science, as profession, 118-122 Political science, rise of university-based, 26-29 Political science, as science, 122-123 Political science, tradition of, 4-18, 116117 political institutions, 4-7

411

political thought, 7-16 politics, languages of, 16-18 Political science, before World War I, 23-41 academic political science before 1880, 24-25 historical-comparative method, decline of, 29-30 Lieber, Francis, 25-26 reformism, 32-34 rise of university-based political science, 26-29 Political science, from World War I to World War II, 41-50 Americanization and “re-Europeaniza­ tion,” 44-45 in ter war matrix, 41-42 quantitative and organizational factors, 42-44 scientism, 47-50 Political science, since World War II, 5073 behavioral movement, 58-62 comparative method, expansion of, 68-69 historical factors, 50-54 professional-disciplinary developments, 54-58 public-oriented activities and responsi­ bilities, 62-67 scientific philosophy and methodology, rise of, 71-73 theory, revitalization of, 70-71 voting and opinion studies, expansion of, 69-70 Political Science Quarterly, 27 Political scientists, 37-38, 231, 232, 254, 255,258 Political society, 233 Political thought, 7-16 Athenian thinkers, 8-9 categorization, problems of, 15-16 Christian church, rise of, 11 experiment with democracy, Athenian, 9 feudalism, influence of, 11 Great Dialogue, 8-11

412

Index

during medieval period, 10-11 modem period, 11-15 “ natural law, ” 10 Roman contribution to, 10 “ state of nature,” 10 Stoics, 9-10 Politics, 245, 252-254, 257 American, 230 electoral, 230 history of, 230 international, 230 Pollock, Frederick, 4 Polsby, Nelson, 131, 132 Polyarchy, 306 Popper, Karl R., 218 Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., 141, 194 Power, 285, 287, 288, 289, 304, 305, 308 Practical inference, 163, 164, 166, 184185, 189, 191, 192, 208 Practical syllogism, 162 Practices, interpretation of, 168-171, 172 Preference ordering, 197 constraints on, 198 Prescriptions, 314-315 Progress, 252 Property, private, 385 Property concepts, 286-287 Przeworski, Adam, 175 Public administration, 230 Public interest, 347, 382-384, 389, 394 Punishment, 299 Q u i n e , Willard van O r m a n , 147

Radicalism, 235 Radnitzky, Gerard, 171, 217 Rae, Douglas W., 138, 205, 214, 215, 221, 391 Raiffa, Howard, 346 Raphael, David D., 375 Rapoport, Anatol, 200, 305 Rational choice paradigm, 195-204, 206 Rational choice research program negative heuristic, 202 positive heuristic, 198-200, 202

“ Rationale” explanations, 166 Rationalism, 252 Rationality, of action, 158, 192 as dispositional concept, 158 Rationality, of science, 207 Rawls, John, 273, 276, 323, 364 Raz, Joseph, 303, 308, 321 Reagan, Michael D., 307 Reason, 249 Reasons for action, 156, 160, 163, 165, 207 Reed, Thomas H., 48-49 Rees, W.J. 212 Reformism, 32-34 Reich, Charles A., 274 Relativism, 350 Representation, 170, 176-177, 231, 232 elemental, 231 existential, 231 transcendental, 231 Relational concepts, 287 Representation, 390 proportional, 381 “ Reproductive fallacy,” 179 Revelation, 249 Revolution, French, 379 Rice, Stuart, 46, 47 Richardson, John M., Jr., 220 Richardson, Lewis F., 184, 186 Rieselbach, Leroy N., 277 Rights, 320-321, 379 minority, 393 Riker, William H., 195, 202, 285 Risk, 345-347 Rokkan, Stein, 183 Role expectations, 192 Role of laws and generalizations in explaining actions, 156-161, 166 Roman law, 10 Rorty, Richard, 218 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 215, 230, 242243, 247, 252, 254, 260, 264, 324, 390 Rudner, Richard S., 179, 181, 218 Rule-following, 169 Russell, Bertrand, 288 Russett, Bruce M., 187

Index

Sabin, George H., 8, 11, 47 Satisficing, 344 Scarrow, Harold A., 311, 312, 315 Schattschneider, Elmer E., 47 Scheffler, Israel, 218 Scheler, Max, 257 Schlesinger, G., 293, 294 Schlick, Moritz, 291 Schütz, Alfred, 216, 295 “ Scientific” ideal, 134-154 explanation, scientific, 135-140 theories, choice and testing of, 145153 theories, scientific, 140-145 Scientific progress, 195, 200-204 Scientific research programs, 151-153, 194-195, 196,208 positive heuristic, 198-200 Scientism, 47-50 Scriven, Michael, 218 Searle, John R., 167-168, 180, 301, 318, 319 Self-understandings, 132 Sellars, W.F., 220, 397 Sen, Amartya K., 341, 397 Shackleton, Robert, 14 Shaffer, Jerome A., 297, 300 Shapere, Dudley, 218 Shils, Edward, 390 Sibley, Mulford Q., 293 Sidgwick, Henry, 398 Simon, Herbert A., 216, 284, 285, 305, 344 Simon, Yves, 274 Skinner, B.F., 277 Smart, J.J.C., 218 Smith, Adam, 382 Smith, Paul E., 132 Smith, T.V., 252 Social change, 175, 183, 191, 210 Social sciences, 251 behavioral, 251 Society, 243, 244, 247, 255 class, 248 closed, 245, 258, 262 communist, 248 Socrates, 9, 232, 244, 261, 263

413

Somit, Albert, 27, 35, 38, 39, 42, 48, 67, 72,124 Spector, Marshall, 144, 145, 216 St. Augustine, 11, 230, 231, 241, 245, 248, 252, 260, 263 St. Thomas Aquinas, 10, 241, 260, 263 “ State,” 230, 248 Statements descriptive, 316 metaethical, 316 normative, 316 Stevenson, Charles L., 319, 324, 378 Stoicism, 245 Stoics, 9-10 Stokes, Donald E., 231 Strauss, Leo, 273, 275 Surkin, Marvin, 114 Symbols, 251 Talmon, J.L., 390 Tanenhaus, Joseph, 27, 35, 38, 39, 42, 48, 67, 72, 124 Taylor, Charles, 168, 170, 220, 318 Taylor, Michael, 351,395 Taylor, Paul, 315, 316, 317, 330 Teune, Henry, 175 Textor, Robert, 312 Theocentric humanism, 239, 241, 245, 246,248-249 Theoretical adjustment, 202 Theoretical concepts, 298 Theories, 133, 134, 140-145, 204, 210, 251 “correspondence” rules, 143 empirically interpreted terms, 143 falsification of, 145-148 hypothetico-deductive system, 143 and interpretative explanations, 186 “ orthodox” view, 141-145 primitive terms, 142 semantical rules, 142 testing of, 145-153 theoretical terms, 143 uninterpreted postulate system, 142 uses of the term, 141 Thibaut, John W., 195

414

Index

Thompson, Kenneth W.f 236 Thorson, Stuart, 131 Thucydides, 236 Torgerson, W.S., 370 Toulmin, Stephen, 216, 218 Tradition, 4 Tullock, Gordon, 205, 220 Tversky, Amos, 371 Unanimity, 391 Uncertainty, 345-347 Unfreedom, 287, 288, 301, 305 Unintended consequences of action, 182, 184, 208 Urmson, J.O ., 320 Utilitarianism, 360-361, 388 Utility function, 197, 203 Utopia, 244

Voting, 164-165, 169, 199 Wahlke, John C., 231 Waismann, Friedrich, 309 Waldo, Dwight, 80, 83 Waismann, Friedrich, 309 Waldo, Dwight, 80, 83 Want-satisfaction, 388 Warnock, Geoffrey, 397 Wartofsky, Marx W., 219 Weber, Max, 161, 219, 220, 234, 338 Weinstein, W.L., 289 Weldon, Thomas D., 284, 396 Wellmer, Albrecht, 167, 217 White, Alan, 293 Williams, Bernard, 387 Willoughby, Wes tel W., 36, 39 Wilson, Bryan, 217 Wilson, Jam es Q., 387 Wilson, Woodrow, 31, 33, 91 Winch, Peter, 295, 296 Winch, Peter, 167, 168, 169, 170, 178, 180-181,184,217 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 216, 289 Wolfe, Alan, 114 Wolff, Robert Paul, 274, 325, 326, 391 Wolin, Sheldon, 8, 254, 255 Wood, Ellen Meiksins, 213 Woolsey, Theodore, 39

Value cognitivism vs. value noncognitivism, 319 Value judgments, 315, 317 instrumental, 316 Values of science, 134 Van Dyke, Vernon, 140 Verba, Sidney, 1 70, 306 Verstehen, 180, 184, 294-297 Veysey, Laurence, 22 Vlastos, Gregory, 387 Voegelin, Eric, 231, 232-233, 245, 249, 256, 273, 275, 276 Von Leyden, W., 325 Yntema, D.B., 370 Von Wright, Georg Henrik, 163, 164, 165, 166, 184-185, 216, 218, 219, 300, 302, 330 Zagoria, Donald S., 187, 188, 190