Political Advocacy and American Politics: Why People Fight So Often About Politics 9780367275563, 9780367275570, 9780429296598

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“Richey and Taylor provide a timely contribution to the literature on political discord. Skillfully, they fnd a way to examine incivility through various types of interpersonal communication to demonstrate why Americans need to continue to discuss and interact over politics. Unquestionably, Political Advocacy and American Politics will become a must-read in political behavior.” Shauna Reilly, Professor of Political Science, Director of the Institute for Student Research and Creative Activity, Northern Kentucky University “Political Advocacy and American Politics is a must-read for political behavior scholars. The project is very well researched and sheds new empirical light on a normatively important political behavior that scholars of politics often overlook.” Jefrey M. Glas, Lecturer of Political Science, School of Public and International Afairs, University of Georgia “An important read for anyone wishing to understand today’s turbulent times, the conditions that drive ordinary citizens to forcefully advocate for their political beliefs, and the importance of contentious political talk for American democracy.” Stacy Ulbig, Professor of Political Science, Sam Houston State University

POLITICAL ADVOCACY AND AMERICAN POLITICS Political Advocacy and American Politics provides a detailed explanation as to why citizens engage in interpersonal advocacy in the United States. Sean Richey and J. Benjamin Taylor eloquently show how campaigns, social media, and personality and partisanship afect one’s propensity to advocate for candidates, which often leads to arguments about politics. Using original qualitative, survey, and experimental studies, Richey and Taylor demonstrate the causes of political advocacy over time in the political environment and at the individual level. While some worry about the incivility in American politics, Richey and Taylor argue political talk, where confict is common, is caused by high-activity democratic processes and normatively benefcial individual attributes. Furthermore, Richey and Taylor argue that advocacy—when conceptualized as a democratic “release valve”—is exactly the kind of confict we might expect in a vibrant democracy. Political Advocacy and American Politics: Why People Fight So Often About Politics is ideal for university students and researchers, yet it is also accessible to any reader looking to learn more about the role campaigns and personal attributes play in the decision to advocate. Sean Richey is Associate Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. He is also the Director of Georgia State University’s Political Survey Research Lab, which he founded. He researches American politics, with a specialization in elections, voting behavior, public opinion, and quantitative methodology. His research has appeared in several peer-reviewed books and in articles published in academic journals, such as Political Research Quarterly, the British Journal of Political Science, Political Communication, Political Behavior, International Studies Quarterly, and others. He was a Fulbright Fellow from 2013 to 2014 at the University of Tokyo, and he was a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Tokyo between 2004 and 2006. J. Benjamin Taylor is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kennesaw State University. He teaches and researches American politics with a specialization in elections and voting behavior, political communication, media politics, and public opinion. His research has appeared in two peer-reviewed books and in numerous articles in academic journals, such as Political Communication, Politics and Religion, American Politics Research, PS: Political Science & Politics, and Presidential Studies Quarterly.

POLITICAL ADVOCACY AND AMERICAN POLITICS Why People Fight So Often About Politics

Sean Richey and J. Benjamin Taylor

First published 2021 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Taylor & Francis The right of Sean Richey and J. Benjamin Taylor to be identifed as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-27556-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-27557-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-29659-8 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

CONTENTS

List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgments

viii x xi

1

Introduction

2

A Theory of Political Advocacy

20

3

Why and How People Advocate

37

4

How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy

56

5

Exploring the Role of Social Distance and Social Media

76

6

The Psychology of Political Advocacy

94

7

Conclusion

Appendix: Political Advocacy and American Politics Index

1

113 128 147

FIGURES

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

4.5

Percentage of ANES Respondents Who Advocate for a Candidate in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1972–2016 Number of Battleground States by Election, 1992–2016 Average Ideology of Republican Party Identifers, 1972–2016 Average Ideology of Democratic Party Identifers, 1972–2016 Perceived Ideology of the Republican Party, 1972–2016 Perceived Ideology of the Democratic Party, 1972–2016 Afective Partisanship, 1978–2016 Frequency Respondents “Fight” When Advocating About Politics, Study 2 (Spring 2020) Angry Party Frequencies Among Advocates, Study 2 (Spring 2020) Reasons Non-advocates Choose Not to Advocate, Study 2 (Spring 2020) Preferred Mode of Advocacy, Study 1 (Winter 2020) and Study 2 (Spring 2020) Presidential Election Final Vote Diference, 1972–2016 Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Total Campaign Spending, 1972–2016 Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Electoral Competitiveness, 1972–2016 Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Electoral Competitiveness by Political Interest, 1972–2016 Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Campaign Spending by Political Interest, 1972–2016

3 8 9 9 11 11 13 46 47 50 51 61 63 64

67

68

Figures

4.6

4.7

5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3

Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Electoral Competitiveness by Political Knowledge, 1972–2016 Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Campaign Spending by Political Knowledge, 1972–2016 Blocking on Social Media Percentage of Pew Subjects Who Find Social Media Disagreement “Stressful” and “Less in Common” Predicted Probabilities for the Efect of Extraversion on Political Advocacy, 2012 and 2016 Predicted Probabilities for the Efect of Neuroticism on Political Advocacy, 2012 and 2016 Predicted Probabilities for the Efect of Negative Partisanship on Political Advocacy, 2012 and 2016

ix

69

70 88 89 107 108 109

TABLES

3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

Summary Statistics for Study 1, Winter 2020 Summary Statistics for Study 2, Spring 2020 Logistic Regression Model for Political Advocacy in Presidential Election Years, 1972–2016 OLS Estimation for the Treatment Efect of Social Media on Advocacy, Study 1 Treatment Efects for Communication Mode, Study 1 OLS Estimation for the Treatment Efect of Social Media on List on Advocacy, Study 2 Treatment Efects for Social Media on List, Study 2 Determinants of Opinions About Social Media Political Conversations Summary Statistics, 2012 American National Election Study Summary Statistics, 2016 American National Election Study Logistic Regression Models for Political Advocacy, 2012 Logistic Regression Models for Political Advocacy, 2016

40 40 65 81 82 85 86 90 99 100 102 105

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Author names appear in alphabetical order indicating equal authorship. We are grateful for the numerous scholars who have given us feedback and reviews on this book either in part or in whole. This manuscript is made better for their critical eye, but—as always—any mistakes are our responsibility alone.

1 INTRODUCTION

Incivility is a constant topic in popular discourse on American politics. A short perusal of the pages of The New York Times opinion page between the 2016 presidential election and the 2020 election yields a never-ending cascade of thought-pieces bemoaning the end of civility in American social and political life.1 For instance, Bornstein (2018) interviews the Director of the Consensus Building Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, about the systemic challenges to civility. The outcome of their conversation is, essentially, that macro-level incivility should not be allowed to result in micro-level incivility. That is, people should be willing to engage with others in ways that allow them to explore their positions and not result in an argument. The assumption made clear by the conclusion of this conversation—which is typical of many opinions and editorial pieces published since 2016—is that arguing about politics is normatively bad. We take issue with this claim. Why do Americans argue about politics, and why is the type of political discussion that generates arguments—advocacy—increasing? We know that it is highly doubtful that anyone will change their minds based on political arguments (Lodge and Taber 2013). Additionally, for most people, the stress and frustration that comes from these arguments are not going to be worth it. Yet, we show with clear empirical evidence that Americans are fghting about politics today more than ever. We fnd that over half of Americans try to discuss with another person why they should support a diferent candidate or party in the month preceding the election in 2016. These kinds of encounters—with the ensuing arguments and potential incivility—are the basis for the breathless punditry complaining about the level of incivility in American politics and what it is doing to our civil society and social fabric (e.g., see Brooks 2018). We need

2

Introduction

to understand (1) why contentious, uncivil discussion is increasing, (2) what causes it, and (3) explore if it is truly normatively problematic. We show that as American politics has become more competitive and contentious in the last 20 years, it has increased the likelihood that someone advocates on behalf of a candidate. As a natural outcome of this increased advocacy, people are more likely to get into political arguments or fghts. Advocacy often turns into an argument because it inherently means discussing politics with someone who thinks diferently. If two people thought the same things, then there would be no reason for advocacy in the way we conceptualize it here. Since modern elections seem more momentous due to the increased competitiveness and contentiousness, more people are likely to promote their candidates in everyday political discussion. However, when they do so, they encounter others who are also in the same stimulated electoral environment who also believe that the election is important. Thus, the competitive and contentious elections create advocates for campaigns who, rather than merely discussing politics, may actually argue about it because they are trying to pull people to their side. Of course, the likelihood one may advocate on behalf of a candidate or party is mediated and moderated by social network composition, by one’s political interest, knowledge, efcacy, and basic psychological traits and a range of other factors. As explicated in-depth in Chapter 2, we have a three-level theory to explain political advocacy as an interaction of macro-level campaign infuences, mid-level social network infuences, and micro-level individual infuences. While these factors all matter, it is implausible that the inherent basic psychology of Americans has changed much in the last 20 years. Furthermore, the nature of social network composition probably will not have changed that greatly either. Thus, considering advocacy over time, the chief explanation of the great increase in political advocacy in the last 20 years will be found by examining changes at the macro-level campaign environment. The American National Election Studies (ANES) has been asking a question about political advocacy in a national representative survey during every presidential election since 1972. Figure 1.1 shows that the amount of political advocacy in the last 20 years has signifcantly increased according to ANES respondents. For instance, before the 2000 election, 26.8 percent of Americans reported trying to talk to someone about why they should support a candidate or party in an upcoming election. Since 2000, the percentage of Americans who report doing this has jumped to 42.9. This is around a 16-percentage point increase, which is statistically signifcant (p ≤ 0.001). To explain the increase in political incivility, we must explain the increase in advocacy in this period. Note that the rise of political advocacy predates social media, a fnding we replicate with qualitative and quantitative data later in the book. We show in-depth in Chapter 4 that competitive and contentious elections is the chief explanation for the increase in political advocacy, but this generates a puzzle: If competitive elections are normatively valuable and competitive elections generate

Introduction

3

FIGURE 1.1 Percentage of ANES Respondents Who Advocate for a Candidate in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1972–2016.

contentious, argument-riddled political talk, is incivility as troublesome as some public intellectuals would have us believe? We use the balance of this chapter to discuss incivility in American politics. Scholarship on incivility and normative theories of political discussion suggest there is room for argumentation as a valuable aspect of a vibrant democracy. Next, we explore ways campaigns, polarization, and partisanship afect arguing about politics. Finally, we conclude with an outline of the book and summary fndings for each chapter.

(In)Civility in American Politics The fundamental presupposition of most of the lamentations from popular writing on incivility in politics is that it is a scourge that needs to be eradicated. This ignores the fact that political arguments are endemic to a successful liberal democratic society. The more passionate citizens are about their society and the freer they are to express their beliefs, the more likely they are to have intense heated arguments. The safe release of passions in political argumentation—even if they are unpleasant or ofensive—is preferable to sequestering or stifing them because it stops them from metastasizing into much larger social problems.

4

Introduction

Incivility in politics has been debated by democratic theorists for centuries. In the American context, James Madison (1787) famously described the problem in Federalist No. 10 with the following passage: There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the frst remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Madison’s Federalist No. 10 says that factions—groups of likeminded individuals— are endemic to a free society. The efects of factions—such as angry mobs, incivility—may be deleterious, so the question becomes how to avoid that. Madison points out two options: destroy factions or give everyone the same opinions. Giving everyone the same opinions is obviously not possible, but to destroy factions, however, you would be destroying the very thing that makes self-government possible. This is why he describes the “frst remedy” as “worse than the disease.” You cannot have a thriving successful democracy with fully developed civil liberties and not run the risk of a bunch of people screaming at each other about politics or—in the modern context—ranting hysterically on social media. Political arguments are the price one pays for a free, democratic society. Given this history, and if we understand the value of political engagement, normatively, where do concerns about political incivility get their energy? One of the main areas where incivility is identifed is at the elite level, particularly in political media. There is no doubt that political media in the United States are increasingly ideological and increasingly polarized (Ladd 2012; Levendusky 2013). In fact, there is evidence that political elites have been increasingly polarized for since the early 1990s (Baum and Groeling 2008). The result is a media ecosystem where thought leaders engage with polarized counterparts on a regular basis. Because of availability bias, pundits and public intellectuals may perceive that there is widespread intractability in American politics, which leads to their complaints about incivility in recent years. Despite the complaints about incivility being the result of an insulated media culture, Americans are increasingly identifying incivility as a problem themselves. In a 2019 Pew Research study, Americans claim that their interactions with others on politics are becoming increasingly negative (Drake and Kiley 2019). A possible instigator of the rise in incivility is President Donald Trump. This fnding reinforces, again, the nature of elite-driven incivility. As Trump’s rhetoric ratchets up emotions, his supporters and detractors get more afectively engaged, which results in more uncivil interactions among Americans in general. Because both pundits and the public at-large identify incivility as a concern, incivility is increasingly a topic of political science research. Importantly, scholars

Introduction

5

note, as we do, that not all incivility is the same. When it comes to interpersonal incivility, Sydnor (2019) notes that the some Americans get more engaged as politics gets more contentious. These “confict approaching” individuals become enlivened with political incivility rather than turned of. Similarly, Brooks and Geer (2007) fnd that uncivil campaign messages engage some voters more than others. The upshot for research on incivility is that rather than considering it a discrete event—something is civil or uncivil—we need to think about it as a continuum. Indeed, scholarship on incivility fnds that there is a tipping point where incivility becomes less productive for everyone, but there is a range where incivility may not be merely benign, but may be helpful for democratic engagement (Boatright et al. 2019). The beneft of our conceptualization of political advocacy is that it falls within this region of acceptable political incivility. Advocacy, as we will show, is potentially confictual. Advocacy need not always result in political arguments or confict, but the willingness to engage in such confict is generally a prerequisite for advocacy. Moreover, advocates fnd their motivation derived from legitimate expressions of support for a candidate, it is easy to see how political arguments a natural outcome of free and fair elections. Just as Madison points out the dangers of eliminating factions, we do not want to diminish someone’s ability to advocate for their candidate. Doing so would limit the amount of political arguments in society, which is itself an anti-democratic outcome. Rather than spending so much time complaining about the level of arguments in society, those who are concerned with incivility in American politics should focus on political elites and the outcome of their heated rhetoric rather than the arguments of the mass public.

Many Reasons to Not Fight About Politics Despite the copious writing and concern about the extent to which people fght about politics in the United States, there are profound reasons to doubt that people will want to fght about politics. Simply put, advocacy is a high-cost activity with very little reward or chance that the advocate will see tangible benefts from their behavior. Since Downs (1957), we have understood that it is highly unlikely that any single act of political participation will lead to a change in an election. Even if we assume that an advocate can engage with numerous people in an election, if the advocate can sway 20 voters in her social network to support the candidate she endorses, it is not plausible that these 20 votes would switch the outcome of an election. Just as with the paradox of voting, the perplexing question is why some many citizens engage in the social cost of potentially picking a fght with someone, without having a likely reward of it achieving an electoral victory. The standard political science explanation for why people engage in a costly campaign action even though it will not fip electoral outcomes is that they

6

Introduction

have been socialized to view it as their duty to support their candidate. Although the “D” term in the classic Riker and Ordeshook (1968) model— V(oting) = C(osts) -  B(enefts) + D(uty)—was originally used to explain why people bother to vote, it can be applied to any costly campaign activity. For our purposes, it is the most parsimonious explanation for the high level of political advocacy in the United States. Social norms can create a powerful psychological beneft from supporting a candidate through advocacy that outweighs the costs of getting into an argument about the election for some people. Sinclair (2012) shows that social norms are indeed one of the chief mechanisms through which social infuence occurs. We can expect that those people who choose to advocate have been socialized to value advocacy inand-of-itself at a greater level than the perceived social costs of fghting about politics. Despite these debates over the intrinsic rationality of incurring possible social sanctions, the embedded psychological norms of supporting a candidate are going to be crucially important to determining who bothers to advocate. In Chapter 6, we delve deeper into the psychological predispositions that promote advocacy and fnd clear evidence that personality traits—measured with the standard Big Five index—correlate in expected ways with the likelihood to advocate. This links advocacy to the growing and broader literature on the Big Five and helps explain how environmental factors can serve as a cue to wouldbe advocates that their potential costs are decreasing. As the perceived beneft that is derived from doing their duty to support their candidate rises in competitive contentious elections, we should expect those who are more psychologically predisposition to tolerate confict will be more likely to engage in advocacy and thereby get into fghts about politics. We now examine more in-depth how changes in the macro-level environment have arisen that are conducive to fghting about politics because these conditions encourage political advocacy.

Competitive and Contentious Elections Create Fighting About Politics In the last 20 years, American elections have simultaneously grown more competitive, partisan, polarized, and hostile. These conditions have mobilized the public to become advocates for candidates and—through this advocacy— they are more likely to get into conficts over the election. Specifcally, we show how advocacy will lead to more political fghting recently because of greater competitive elections, partisan sorting, elite polarization, and afective partisanship. We demonstrate each one of these conditions empirically and state how each one of them would promote advocacy, starting with competitive elections.

Introduction

7

Competitive Elections Although the etiology of the growing competitiveness of American elections is not clear, it is a clear empirically demonstrable fact. American elections in the last 20 years are vastly more competitive than they have been throughout most of the 20th century. In recent American history, neither the Republican Party nor the Democratic Party has asserted its dominance at the presidential level. This is in contrast with prolonged periods in American history where one party held sway for long periods of time (e.g., see Burnham 1971). With increased competitiveness between the parties and dealignment from the parties at the mass level (Dalton 2013), presidential elections seem to matter more. Particularly in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, where Democratic nominee Vice President Al Gore lost to Republican nominee, then-Governor of Texas, George W. Bush by 537 votes in Florida, the notion that presidential elections could be won by a few hundred votes was seared in the minds of Americans. The competitiveness of these elections makes it seem as though there is a greater duty to advocate on behalf of candidates. From a functional point of view, it may be doubtful that any advocate could mobilize even a few hundred votes. Nonetheless, presidential campaigns are adept at promoting the idea that it is your duty as a supporter of the candidate to advocate. For example, in recent elections, campaign data analytics create scafolds where they pinpoint supporters based on email lists and donation histories. The campaigns then use these scafolds to target messages designed to move supporters up one level. This means if you are a small donor (less than $20), they might get you to donate another $20. Similarly, they know if their supporters have engaged in cellphone calling banks or other at-home type of political activities. If they can motivate the support who has never called anyone to call or talk to 3 people they can then try to get them to talk to 10, then 20, until they have an active campaign volunteer (see Sides et  al. 2018). This is an example of the way a campaign might generate a formal volunteer, but the same thing happens for informal supporters. People who simply have an afnity for the candidate or party receive highly targeted messages designed to motivate their behavior. In our theoretical model, if the duty outweighs the costs, then we can expect a large percentage of Americans to engage in this activity contingent on individual factors and social network composition. Figure 1.2 shows that the number of battleground states in the United States has greatly increased since 1992. We defne battleground states as any state which had a 5-percentage point or less diference between the two major party candidates in the presidential election. Under this defnition, the number of battleground states almost doubles from four to seven between 1992 and 2016. Since the Electoral College determines the election by state, a greater number of competitive states should increase advocacy. In Chapter 4, we show with a more

8

Introduction

FIGURE 1.2

Number of Battleground States by Election, 1992–2016.

nuanced measure of competitiveness that this correlation holds even while controlling for a host of alternative explanations of political advocacy.

Partisan Sorting Another factor that makes advocacy more likely now is that elections matter more in the sense that the parties have sorted to become ideologically coherent (Levendusky 2009, 2010). Partisan sorting is the process by which conservatives coalesce around one party and liberals coalesce around another (Abramowitz 2010). Figures 1.3 and 1.4 demonstrate this process over the last 50 years in American politics. Using the ANES survey, we use the ideology and party identifcation questions to create an average of those who are identifying as “conservative” among Republicans and “liberal” among Democrats between 1972 and 2016. For the fgures, the y-axis measures the average ideological score for all respondents who identify for the party in question. Ideology ranges from “1” to “7,” where “1” is very liberal and “7” is very conservative. A high average, then, would mean that the population is more conservative; a lower average means that the population is more liberal. Figure 1.3 shows that Republicans are becoming more conservative, on average, with each passing election. The average ideology score among Republicans in 1972 is around 3.5, while in 2016 it moves to 4.5. There are minor fuctuations, but the trend is clear.

Introduction

FIGURE 1.3

Average Ideology of Republican Party Identifers, 1972–2016.

FIGURE 1.4

Average Ideology of Democratic Party Identifers, 1972–2016.

9

In Figure 1.4, there is a similar trend among Democrats. Between 1972 and 2016, Democrats are becoming more liberal, on average. In 1972, Democrats were, on average, “slightly liberal.” In 2016, ANES respondents who identifed as Democrats were “moderately liberal.” While these diferences may seem mild, it is a substantial change over the course of the last ten elections.

10 Introduction

Ideological homogeneity within political parties is not altogether uncontroversial. Ideological coherence creates more extreme public policy because party in the majority has less internal divisions (Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Furthermore, as all elected ofcials are reelection focused (e.g., Mayhew 1974), the fear of losing the election becomes greater because elections have policy-specifc consequences—fear spurs action. People will view the election as having direct consequences which will potentially be highly rewarding or highly threatening (Mason 2015). Legislative compromise will decrease, and electoral competition will become zero-sum, with much clearer winners and losers. In this kind of contentious environment, we can expect people to care more about the electoral outcome which would generate more advocacy on behalf of candidates. Since everyone is in the same electoral environment, we can expect those to whom advocacy is directed will be more likely to be resistant because they also fear the outcome of these elections. In this situation, we can expect advocacy to turn quickly into political arguments.

Elite Polarization Similarly, research has clearly shown that elites have become more polarized (e.g., see Hare and Poole 2014 for more detail). The exact causal mechanism is not clear as to whether this polarization is a response to partisan sorting or vice versa or some other factor is causing both polarization and sorting. Even while the nature of what causes these outcomes is currently under debate, it is clear that elites are more polarized in terms of voting on legislation, supporting or opposing appointments and nomination, bill co-sponsorship and rhetoric (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). This in turn means we can expect more confict from political elites over legislation and less compromise to solve issues and proposed solutions. This polarized environment only matters for our theory to the extent voters can identify it and, in doing so, understand elections as having clearly recognizable outcomes that are potentially advantageous or imperiling. If voters do not perceive elite polarization, then it cannot be said to motivate their behavior. Conversely, if voters are able to identify elite polarization, having clear electoral consequences can motivate people to advocate for their candidate and be resistant to others advocating for an opposing candidate. These conditions are the perquisite for having more arguments about politics. To demonstrate that voters can identify elite polarization, we turn again to the ANES. The ANES asks respondents to place leaders, parties, and organizations on standard seven-point ideological scales. Here, we use the placement of the Democratic Party and Republican Party on the ideology scale as a measure of perceived partisan-ideological homogeneity. As a reminder, ideology ranges from one to seven, with one being the most liberal and seven being the most conservative. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show that voters increasingly perceive the

Introduction

FIGURE 1.5

Perceived Ideology of the Republican Party, 1972–2016.

FIGURE 1.6

Perceived Ideology of the Democratic Party, 1972–2016.

11

Republican Party as more conservative and that the Democratic Party is more liberal. The trends are fairly stable between 1972 and 2016. It is notable that for the last three election cycles the trend shows the Grand Old Party (GOP) being identifed as more conservative over time as well as the Democrats being more liberal. The overall observations for these graphs are that voters identify

12 Introduction

partisan-ideological homogeneity over time, which results in voters seeing elite behavior as being more attached to ideological visions of how the country should be run. The efect is that a liberal Democrat, for example, will be more fearful of a conservative Republican Party and will be more likely to advocate for candidates who are against it.

Affective Partisanship As American politics has become increasingly focused on social identities as drivers of political behavior, scholars note that partisanship’s role as an identity has increased in strength as well, resulting in “afective partisanship” (Iyengar et  al. 2019; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Afective partisanship is the relative dislike for the other party compared to the level of like for the party that someone supports. Afective partisanship is a corollary to competitive elections and explains why there are fewer and fewer “swing voters” in American elections (Shaw 2008). In essence, afective partisanship is a measurement of how much you dislike the other party compared to your party. It is typically measured by subtracting a feeling thermometer scale, 0 to 100, measuring how much “warmth” someone has for a political party. By subtracting the thermometer score of the opposing party from the thermometer score of the supported party, we can determine the level of afective partisanship. For example, if someone felt 100 degrees of warmth to the Democratic Party and 50 to the Republican Party, they score 50. To continue this example, if someone felt 50 to the Democratic Party and 50 to the Republican Party, then they would score 0. The higher the score, the more afective partisanship. Figure 1.7 shows the absolute value of the thermometer score for the Democratic Party subtracted by the thermometer score for the Republican Party for every federal election in the United States between 1978 and 2016 in which an ANES survey was felded. The data are from the ANES cumulative time series. What we see is in the 1978 election, a large percentage of the population had a score of 0, which signifes that they felt equal warmth toward both parties. By the 2016 election, very few respondents felt this way and many more felt disproportionally warm toward one party and cool to the other party. These changes signify growing afective partisanship in America. It is now more likely that a Democrat dislikes the Republican Party, or that a Republican dislikes the Democratic Party whereas in previous decades one may have felt warmly toward one’s own party and neither warmly nor coolly to the other. The days of those positive partisanship days are past; we are now frmly in the grips of negative partisanship. This matters for advocacy because when someone advocates for a party’s candidate, the person they are advocating to will be much more likely to dislike that party then they were in the 1970s. As such, we can expect this increased dislike for the opposing party to generate more political arguments when someone advocates.

Introduction

FIGURE 1.7

13

Afective Partisanship, 1978–2016.

The combination of these factors—competitive elections, partisan sorting, polarization at the elite levels, and afective partisanship—creates a zeitgeist in which the rise of interpersonal political advocacy occurs. Advocacy, as we will explain in the next chapter, is a unique type of interpersonal political communication, and being able to deeply examine the causes of advocacy that is crucial for the current moment in American politics. Despite the rational basis to avoid advocacy as well as the ever-decreasing odds that one’s advocacy might infuence someone; advocacy continues to be on the rise. We need to examine what causes advocacy and who advocates and non-advocates are.

Methodologies Used We use qualitative, survey research and experimental methodologies in this book. A multimethod approach allows us to investigate the causal relationships for causes of political advocacy—thereby helping us understand why people may fght about politics. We specifcally look for causal relationships because we want to know that the factor claimed to cause the something is in fact the actual cause and not simply an artifact of another relationship or efect. There are three chief issues that create problems for research and may cause correlations that seem to be causation. These three problems are: (1) endogeneity,

14 Introduction

(2) omitted variable bias, and (3) generalizability. To the extent we can, we try to ameliorate these concerns with our research designs. The frst of these problems is endogeneity. Endogeneity is essentially a problem of bi-causality or circular logic. With endogeneity the key problem is that the variable that the researchers are claiming to be the cause is the efect. In other words, if we say, “X causes Y,” but an equally valid theory might be that “Y causes X,” we have an endogeneity problem. The statistical relationship will show a signifcant infuence, but the temporal or directional efect of infuence not able to be known. The second of these problems is omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias occurs when the cause and the efect are actually caused by the third, unaccounted for variable. In the previous example, if we assume that X does indeed come before Y, so the temporal relationship allows for causality, we might not be accounting for Z, which results in the observed changes in both X and Y. Because both the causal variable and the efect are being caused simultaneously by the third omitted variable, it will create a correlation between them, but this correlation is spurious. The gold standard for causality is a randomized experiment, where one group is randomly assigned to take the treatment and a control group is given a placebo. If we can establish unit homogeneity—that is the treatment and control groups have no meaningful diferences between them on any variable of interest— then any changes observed in the dependent variable can be directly attributable to the treatment condition. This makes it possible to fnd a statistical relationship that is in fact a causal relationship. Here the frst two problems go away. We know that the treatment causes the measured efect, so there is no endogeneity. Because the randomized groups will be very similar to each, and only one group gets the treatment, then there will be no omitted variables. Even though experiments account for endogeneity and omitted variable, they sufer from the third common problem: generalizability. Generalizability occurs when a research study has fndings that only apply to the specifc situation or context in which the research was conducted. Outside of this setting, the results will not hold. The research fnding is merely an artifact of the observational setting in which the research is conducted. Often this is because participants in experiments choose to be in these experiments. Thus, these participants are not typical people. They may have economic or other reasons that cause them to join and, in many ways, they will not be similar to the average person. Thus, the research fnding is biased by external validity problems. By conducting survey experiments on a representative sample of Americans, we hope to overcome all three of these problems. We augment this experimental research with additional qualitative research, which allows a deeper impression of the data generating process from respondents. Additionally, we use nationally representative survey data to uncover overtime trends that would not be possible to detect this research conducted now. As with any good research, we are careful

Introduction

15

to lay out the ways in which our fndings have limitations in each chapter. No research is perfect, but by acknowledging the limitations we are able to clearly identify the validity of our fndings. We conclude this chapter with a detailed outline for the remainder of the book.

Detailed Chapter Outline Generally, this book is designed to test the determinants of political advocacy. Advocacy is a contentious form of political communication, but it is necessary in a thriving democratic society. We examine advocacy qualitatively, the causes in the political environment and individual level, and examine how new technologies afect advocacy. The specifc details are as follows:

Chapter 2: A Theory of Political Advocacy In this chapter, we lay out our theory of political advocacy. We examine why advocacy has increased over time despite the myriad reasons why advocacy is an unlikely behavior. Our theory is that there are three levels of infuence that will mediate the propensity to advocate: (1) the macro-level political environment, (2) the middle level of the composition of the social network, and (3) the micro-level individual characteristics that make someone more or less likely to advocate. In the last 20 years, the individual-level characteristics and social network compositions have not changed in America much, but the macro-level has become more competitive. This makes conditions more conducive for political advocacy, which leads to more fghting about politics. We posit that the increase in political advocacy is due to more highly contested elections in the last 20 years with more ideologically coherent and distinct candidates in America. The increase in competitive, contentious elections increases the likelihood that people will take a stand for their candidate. When they do, they are more likely to get into a fght with someone about politics.

Chapter 3: Why and How People Advocate In this chapter, we use two open-ended qualitative surveys using online convenience samples from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce. This method gives us a chance to get an in-depth look into the reasons people advocate or not. It also allows us to probe the extent to which anger or confict plays a role in the decision to engage in what we theoretically think would be a contentious style of communication. Interestingly, it also allows us to explore the modes Americans use to advocate. Finally, we also use this qualitative data to explore the reasons why one may choose to not advocate. Our qualitative results generate several hypotheses we can test using quantitative data, and this gives us the chance to use process tracing to highlight the areas our theory may

16 Introduction

need further support or validation. Importantly, using qualitative survey responses lets us explore beyond the correlations we use in other chapters. In this chapter, we give respondents the time and space to explain themselves and their positions on political advocacy.

Chapter 4: How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy We investigate the macro-environmental factors our theory predicts will increase political advocacy. Specifcally, we test the relationship that political campaigns have with political advocacy. Using logistic regression models of ANES cumulative data from presidential elections from 1972 to 2016, we fnd that greater campaign spending correlates with greater political advocacy. We also fnd that the likelihood of being an advocate correlates with competitive elections. Additionally, we fnd that interest in politics, partisanship, efcacy, political knowledge, and socioeconomic status leads to a greater likelihood of advocacy. We break these results down by political interest and political knowledge, and fnd diferentiated results when interacted with competitiveness and campaign spending. Generally, these results show how the electoral environment motivates political advocacy.

Chapter 5: Exploring the Role of Social Distance and Social Media The development of social media deals with one of the barriers to advocacy: the costs of engaging a potentially contentious type of interpersonal communication. How does social media afect the propensity to advocate? Using two experiments, we test the efect of social media on political advocacy as well as having social media be an additional mode of advocacy. Additionally, we test the impact of social distance—family, friends, and strangers—on the likelihood of advocacy online and ofine. We fnd that people generally express a desire to advocate face-to-face. For social distance, people are more likely to advocate to friends relative to other relationships but are least likely to advocate to strangers (compared to family). This chapter helps demonstrate that advocacy is a face-to-face phenomenon, but—based on other evidence—we know advocacy does happen on social media. We use Pew Research data to explore these online advocates and understand the contentious nature of online political advocacy. The primary takeaway for online advocacy is that, like face-to-face advocacy, contentiousness and stress are part of the process.

Chapter 6: The Psychology of Political Advocacy What are the individual-level factors that predict political advocacy in American politics? We know that the macro-environment provides the stimulation needed to increase advocacy overtime. What we do not know is how individual

Introduction

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psychology, behaviors, attitudes, and demographics afect advocacy in these advocacy-prone elections. We examine this using the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections with ANES data. We develop a model to test our hypotheses about how components of the Big Five and negative partisanship result in increased levels of political advocacy. Generating predicted probabilities, we show the substantive efect and demonstrate that psychological aspects of political behavior help explain a signifcant portion of political advocacy at the individual level. Even in environments where political advocacy is already incentivized, we now know that extraversion, neuroticism, and negative partisanship also predict advocacy while controlling for state-level competitiveness, political interest, knowledge, and political efcacy.

Chapter 7: Conclusion We conclude the book by summarizing the arguments and results. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the fndings and speculate on the future of political advocacy. We speculate that the nationally competitive environment in which Americans have lived for the last 20 years may not last forever. This has signifcant implications for political advocacy in the long term. We then suggest seven ways in which future researchers could successfully analyze political communication and campaigns in conjunction. We suggest that there is plenty of room for more research on political advocacy in the American context, but there is equally room for more research in comparative contexts as well. In addition, we list and examine other potential forces which may delimit political advocacy.

Note 1. Google returns over 240,000 hits for news items with the word “civility” in the headline.

References Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Baum, Matthew A., and Tim Groeling. 2008. “New Media and the Polarization of American Political Discourse.” Political Communication 25 (4): 345–65. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2010. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. 2nd Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Boatright, Robert G., Timothy J. Shafer, Sarah Sobieraj, and Dannagal Goldthwaite Young, eds. 2019. A Crisis of Civility?: Political Discourse and Its Discontents. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Bornstein, David. 2018. “Opinion | Recovering the (Lost) Art of Civility.” The New York Times, October 29, sec. Opinion. www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/opinion/ recovering-the-lost-art-of-civility.html.

18 Introduction

Brooks, David. 2018. “Opinion | the Failures of Anti-Trumpism.” The New York Times, April 9, sec. Opinion. www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/opinion/trump-republicans. html. Brooks, Deborah Jordan, and John G. Geer. 2007. “Beyond Negativity: The Efects of Incivility on the Electorate.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 1–16. Burnham, Walter Dean. 1971. Critical Elections: And the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Dalton, Russell J. 2013. The Apartisan American: Dealignment and Changing Electoral Politics. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper. Drake, Bruce, and Jocelyn Kiley. 2019. “Americans Say the Nation’s Political Debate Has Grown More Toxic and ‘Heated’ Rhetoric Could Lead to Violence.” Pew Research Center (blog). July 18. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/americans-say-thenations-political-debate-has-grown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-toviolence/. Hare, Christopher, and Keith T. Poole. 2014. “The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics.” Polity 46 (3): 411–29. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2014.10. Iyengar, Shanto, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra, and Sean J. Westwood. 2019. “The Origins and Consequences of Afective Polarization in the United States.” Annual Review of Political Science 22: 129–46. Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood. 2015. “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59 (3): 690–707. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152. Ladd, Jonathan M. 2012. Why Americans Hate the Media and How It Matters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. “The Microfoundations of Mass Polarization.” Political Analysis 17 (2): 162–76. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpp003. ———. 2010. “Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Beneft of Elite Polarization.” Political Behavior 32 (1): 111–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-009-9094-0. ———. 2013. How Partisan Media Polarize America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Madison, James. 1787. “The Federalist Papers: Congress.Gov.” www.congress.gov/ resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-10. Mason, Lilliana. 2015. “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’: The Diferential Efects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59 (1): 128–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12089. Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. 2nd Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2016. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. 2nd Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American Political Science Review 62 (1): 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S000305540011562X. Shaw, Daron. 2008. “Swing Voting and U.S. Presidential Elections.” In The Swing Voter in American Politics, edited by William G. Mayer, 75–101. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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Sides, John, Daron Shaw, Matt Grossmann, and Keena Lipsitz. 2018. Campaigns and Elections. 3rd Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sydnor, Emily. 2019. Disrespectful Democracy: The Psychology of Political Incivility. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

2 A THEORY OF POLITICAL ADVOCACY

In a democracy, the willingness to engage in discussions about politics or pertinent social issues is one of the most important behaviors. There is more, however, than merely discussion that makes for a lively and vibrant polity. Among types of discussion, advocacy may be one of the most crucial activities given the normative and practical expectations we have for citizens in a democratic society. Advocacy requires and hones skills and interests that refect the kind of normatively good qualities we generally want in a participatory political system. At a minimum, advocating requires interest in politics, knowledge of candidates and issues and a sense of efcacy, which are also necessary for other types of political behavior. So, understanding and explicating the individual level under which one may choose to advocate is important. There are environmental and system-level factors to consider, socioeconomic and social network factors, and psychological predictors that all create the conditions where advocacy may occur. In this chapter, we lay out our theory of political advocacy. First, we defne advocacy and discuss how advocacy is diferent than other types of political communication. Then, we highlight how advocacy is an unlikely type of political communication. Next, we demonstrate that—despite the myriad of reasons that advocacy is an unlikely behavior—it is not only common but actually on the increase in recent years. Finally, we detail our theory and show the various levels and variables we believe are related to the propensity to advocate.

What Is “Advocacy?” Advocacy is a specifc type of political communication where individuals attempt to recommend their preferred candidate or policy in discussion with another person. Advocates try to infuence the vote of others by either trying to get an

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unmobilized person to vote or trying to get someone to change their preferences or intensity of support. Advocates, then, are engaging the kind of political discussion that is contentious. Importantly, having a measure of this that is both valid and reliable is paramount. Given our conceptualization of advocacy, we operationalize advocacy with the following question: “During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?” In some surveys, we adjust the wording to be, “Generally speaking, do you try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in an election?” In both cases, the question seeks the same information: do people try to advocate to others about which candidate or political party they should support in an upcoming election. We derived this question from an original question wording on the ANES survey questionnaire. This question measures a diferent phenomenon than other types of political communication, such as general political discussion. General political discussion questions ask subjects to identify if they merely discuss politics at all during a campaign or in some recent period. There is a large, growing literature on political discussion (Zuckerman 2005) that clearly shows that interpersonal communication has a profound infuence on political behavior (Ryan 2010). Talking politics transfers important information (Eveland 2004; Gastil and Dillard 1999), motivates participation in politics (Klofstad 2007; McClurg 2006), infuences vote choice (Huckfeldt 2001), and promotes tolerance (Ikeda and Richey 2009). Past research on discussion also yields key network and individual factors that make discussion more likely (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Missing from this research though is an analysis of the predictors at various levels of not just discussion but also advocacy more specifcally. To help adjudicate the nuances of these two types of political communication, we now explicate the fundamental diferences between political discussion and political advocacy.

Political Discussion Versus Advocacy Political discussion research continues to be important because almost all political activity is afected by the attitudes and behaviors of those with whom people interact on a frequent basis (Sinclair 2012). Even something as determinative on beliefs and behaviors as partisan identifcation is swayed by social infuence (Klar 2014). Democratic theorists such as Habermas (1984) and Dewey (1927) point to open, direct statements of one’s opinions to others—advocacy—as being central to deliberation in the public sphere. A clear articulation of one’s beliefs is benefcial in discourse theory because it educates others on the reasons to support a candidate (Cooke 2000). Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) show the value of the free expression of beliefs within diverse networks by demonstrating the benefts and implications of the open expression of political disagreements. Note that this diversity can come from actual disagreement about politics or merely

22 A Theory of Political Advocacy

the intensity of support for a candidate. There can also be diversity in whether or not the person being advocated to is motivated to be involved in the campaign at all. Regardless, the purpose of advocacy is to get someone to change, and that usually requires an articulation of one’s ideas and suggest the potential for confict. The purpose of this project is to explicitly test the determinants of this important subset of political communication, which has more often been ignored or simply lumped in with general political discussion. Most interpersonal political communication research has focused on general aspects of political discussion, such as the amount or frequency of discussion. The problem with this as a measure is that it is both a low bar for citizen engagement and disregards other, more complicated but similarly important ways to communicate politics. Within the political networks literature, network congruence on pertinent attitudes and beliefs or candidate preferences is used to estimate the efect of networks on vote choice or policy positions (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). While extremely interesting, this overlooks other types of communication, such as advocacy. Furthermore, most research on a closely linked concept—persuasion—is predicated on elite persuasion of the masses (Koch 1998; Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996; Zaller 1992), the status of the speaker, the attention and cognitive capability of the listener, and the quality or strength of argument (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997; Lau, Smith, and Fiske 1991; Petty and Cacioppo 1984). Advocacy, however, merits more investigation because advocating for a candidate requires citizens to elaborate on their beliefs about candidates or issues specifcally and is a dialogue of real-world importance. Speaking out to those who might not share your beliefs or level of intensity can be a daunting task. Nonetheless, political theorists and social scientists assert that vibrant political discussion will lead to increased political participation, representation, and improve democracy generally (Button and Mattson 1999; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mill 1998; Simon 2002). Even though some research suggests that disagreeing ideologies in networks decrease participation (Eveland and Hively 2009; Mutz 2002, 2006), advocacy does not necessarily entail ideological disagreement. As previously mentioned, one could advocate to those who have not yet committed. Advocates will try to convince others to either become active or—if active already—to increase their level of support, or even to change sides when they feel that there is a legitimate chance their preferred candidate can win. Advocacy is much more involved than a simple discussion. Political discussion can be superfcial or intensely passionate, but discussion is not always intended to advocate for one’s preferred positions, party, or candidate. Thus, advocacy is a step beyond discussion into a realm of political communication where occasional confict is expected. Advocacy may be more akin to actually taking part in a campaign, which is another political behavior frequently measured in similar types of research. However, yet again, advocacy is diferent than campaign

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activity because as a member of a campaign, there is a social distance or division between the discussants as individuals. If I volunteer for a campaign and knock on your door, when you and I engage in a discussion about my preferred candidate, I may consider this a type of “advocacy.” However, I am acting as an agent of the campaign, so—while I must have some level of afnity for the candidate and their positions—my behaviors are not mine but rather me acting on behalf of a candidate. This is not the case with interpersonal political advocacy. Interpersonal political advocacy is where I, as myself, seek to engage with another person to change their mind or generally infuence them to take my personal position as their own. This is a much more intimate and potentially fraught type of interpersonal political discussion.

Why Advocacy Is Unlikely Advocacy is contentious. The fact that advocacy is potentially confictual matters because we know Americans do not like to engage in this type of political discussion. From the social axiom about never discussing religion or politics to the mountain of political science and communication literature on this topic, we simply know that political discussion where confict or disagreement is likely is avoided by signifcant portions of American adults (Prothro and Grigg 1963; Morey, Eveland, and Hutchens 2012; Mutz 2006). This fnding is robust over many decades (e.g., see Prothro and Grigg 1963). To delve deeper into reasons for advocacy avoidance, we discuss the primary potential hurdles would-be advocates have to overcome before they might engage with someone. First, an advocate needs to be secure in her own expertise, knowledge, and experience. In this sense, she acts as a type of “citizen trustee.” In theories of representative democracy, trustees, in contrast to delegates, behave in accordance with their own proscriptions for the political questions they face (Dovi 2018). Our conception of an advocate is similar; this person takes action—advocates— because they believe themselves to be in the best position to inform, direct, and infuence others based on the advocate’s understanding of the political issue at hand. Note that advocates do not need to be correct in these attitudes or positions. For instance, let us take a hypothetical American who thinks that requiring pre-existing conditions being covered by insurance is good public policy, but then advocates for a politician who would see the Afordable Care Act repealed.1 This person may be quite secure in their positions even if they are not logically consistent. Thus, it is not the logical consistency of one’s convictions that is a prerequisite for advocacy, but the strength of one’s convictions. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that people who have not deeply considered their own positions on pertinent political issues or candidates would try to advocate to someone else. If one tried to advocate but encountered someone who was more studied in their opinions or positions, the person who initiated to the discussion would

24 A Theory of Political Advocacy

likely feel embarrassed or shamed. Thus, it is more likely the case that advocates are those people who have some level of certainty in their attitudes and positions and would therefore be less likely to feel bad if someone to whom they might advocate was similarly studied in their opinions and responses. Another potential hurdle for advocacy is their level of objective knowledge or their capacity to employ heuristics to overcome gaps in objective knowledge. Advocates need to be able to identify not only whom they support but also why they support that candidate or political party. At a minimum, we expect that advocates will be more likely than the average American to be knowledgeable about politics, politicians, and political party positions. This knowledge does not need to be encyclopedic. The fact is that most Americans do not know or care much about politics (Bartels 2007; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). This lack of general knowledge might be overcome with heuristics or cognitive short cuts (Lau and Redlawsk 2006), but only the more sophisticated voters are likely to be able to employ these shortcuts efectively. Thus, most Americans should not meet the knowledge or sophistication requirements to be advocates. The biggest obstacle for someone to overcome along the way to becoming an advocate is one’s comfort and capacity to handle confict. Confict avoidance is well understood as the main deterrent for engaging in political discussion of any sort (Ulbig and Funk 1999). Confict avoidance or acceptance is increasingly being identifed as a crucial component to a wide range of political behaviors in the United States (Sydnor 2019). Advocacy is a type of discussion that seems to encourage confict, so it is exactly the kind of behavior that should be rare. As it happens, based on American National Election Study data between 1972 and 2016, advocacy is not only increasing, but is increasing substantially in the last four cycles. Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of respondents in the ANES who report advocating during the election by year. Between 1972 and 2016, an average of 38 percent of ANES respondents reported advocating. This is clearly sizable, but not near a majority of Americans. Thus, we classify this behavior as common, but not ubiquitous. Perhaps more important for our purposes, advocacy—as reported by ANES respondents—was relatively stable around the mean from 1972 to 2000. Then, in 2004, there is a noticeable jump in advocacy, and it has remained above the 1972–2016 average consistently in the last four election cycles. The causes of advocacy, in general, and this increase recently, specifcally, are the focus of this project. Given the reasons we might expect this behavior to be rare, political advocacy ofers us a chance to unpack contentious political behavior at a contentious time in American politics with predictions at several levels of political behavior.

A Theory of Political Advocacy We show that fghting about politics has increased because political advocacy has increased. Our theory is that there are three levels of infuence that will

A Theory of Political Advocacy

25

mediate the propensity to advocate: (1) the micro-level of individual characteristics, (2) the middle level of the composition of the social network, and (3) the macro-level of the political environment in which the person lives. We posit that the increase in political advocacy is due to more highly contested elections in the last 20 years with more ideologically coherent and distinct candidates in America. The increase in competitive, contentious elections increases the likelihood that people will take a stand for their candidate. When they do, they are more likely to get into a fght with someone about politics. Given the expectations that advocacy is a behavior impacted at three levels, our predictions based on our theory are that the conditions that predict for advocacy are: (1) increased political competition at the macro-level, (2) social network-relevant characteristics such as social distance and network ideological homogeneity, and (3) political interest and engagement, negative partisanship, and personality-based disposition to engage in an overt way at the individual level. In the last 20 years, the individual-level characteristics and social network compositions have not changed in America much, but the macro-level has become more conducive to advocating about politics, which leads to more fghting about politics. As we begin to understand more about the complexities of human behavior, simple theories that rely on one level of analysis (e.g., micro/individual or macro/system) cannot encompass the full explanatory power of a multi-level theory. Furthermore, as measurement techniques have become more precise, we can now test these various components to ascertain the extent to which one level of predictors is more powerful or important. We now explain how our theory suggests advocacy is encouraged or inhibited at each level.

How Advocacy Is Affected by the Political Environment As the political competition increases, citizens get cues from agenda setters and opinion leaders that their actions (e.g., advocacy) can be helpful for their preferred electoral choices. This happens primarily through political campaigns. We know that election campaigns are generally benefcial for citizen competence and political engagement (Coleman and Manna 2000; Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004). In their classic study on voter engagement, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) demonstrate that voter mobilization is crucial for spurring political participation. Between the 1960s and 1980s, roughly 50 percent of the decline in voter participation can be directly tied to a lack of voter mobilization. Furthermore, the way campaigns create engagement and draw media attention produces periods of signifcant learning for citizens (Benoit, Hansen, and Verser 2003). Developing an operational defnition for “campaign engagement” is somewhat difcult, but roundly accepted measures are campaign competition and campaign spending. Campaigns that spend money can generally be considered as those with a competitive race (Bowler and Donovan 2011), so having increased levels

26 A Theory of Political Advocacy

of spending is indicative of a more engaged political environment. The efects of campaign spending—as a measure of an engaged environment—are demonstrated at several levels of American politics. At the state level, Hogan (2013) shows increased campaign spending generates more political involvement, even accounting for factors like legislative professionalism and competitive states. For federal races, Coleman and Manna (2000) show that campaign spending in congressional elections has myriad benefts for citizens. Spending increases policyspecifc knowledge, awareness of issues surrounding the election, and boosts competitiveness by making voters question assumptions about incumbents (Coleman and Manna 2000). Coleman (2001) also notes that these benefts are not concentrated among more politically engaged groups. The benefts of spending— higher candidate knowledge or issue awareness—are distributed evenly across socioeconomic groups and political ideologies (Coleman 2001). This is important because the struggle citizens typically have with political knowledge is well documented (e.g., Bartels 1996, 2005, 2007; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Kuklinski et al. 2000). Furthermore, we know that citizens actually use vigorous campaign spending as a heuristic for the competitiveness of an election (Huckfeldt et al. 2007; Wolak 2009). Advocacy is an individual-level phenomenon—it is a type of citizen-to-citizen, interpersonal political communication. However, as demonstrated by the preceding literature, macro-level conditions can afect micro-level behavior. We believe that this is the case with advocacy. Advocacy is a contention type of political communication, and people are unlikely to engage in advocacy if they do not believe there is a good reason. At the macro-level, that would mean a competitive election where the costs of the behavior are outweighed by the perceived benefts. If an election is not going to be competitive, there is no reason to incur that social cost. Thus, advocacy is more likely when the macro-political environment is competitive.

The Impact of Social Distance and Mode of Communication Though we clearly expect the political environment to be a signifcant predictor of political advocacy, other drivers of political advocacy are at the social network and individual level. Social network research continues to be important because almost all political activity is afected by the attitudes and behaviors of those with whom people interact on a frequent basis (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). There is not a consensus, however, on the efect of the types of discussion within these networks, and—as advocacy stands apart from discussion generally— there is clear reason to investigate the network efects on advocacy. For some, disagreement within a network can be a catalyst for political activity (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004), while others suggest disagreement can be harmful for participation in politics (Mutz 2006; Mutz and Mondak 2006; Mutz 2002). Increasingly, scholars are showing that the efects of social

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ties within networks are not as straightforward as once thought. The type of disagreement or discussion needs to be taken into account as well as the strength of the tie the discussant has with the person with whom they disagree (Morey, Eveland, and Hutchens 2012; Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013). When considering discussion in social networks, political disagreement is vital to understand because it is common (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004), but research on the efects of disagreement is divided (Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013). For example, Mutz (2006) suggests that disagreement happens in heterogeneous networks, and actually may depress the propensity to be politically active. She points out that many social networks are homogeneous and these networks are the most efcient at producing activists for their cause, which may or may not be consistent with good democratic citizenship (TheissMorse and Hibbing 2005; Mutz 2006). In homogeneous networks, opinion leaders are better able to motivate others to action. Building on that notion, Mutz (2006) adds that those who discuss politics within heterogeneous social networks are less likely to speak vigorously for their cause than those who discuss politics within homogeneous networks (see also Mondak 1995). She fnds that while heterogeneous social networks may be benefcial to increasing tolerance and understanding other viewpoints, they retard vigorous political participation by limiting direct appeals to action. Thus, Mutz (2006) draws a distinction between participatory and deliberative democracy. Advocacy could happen when one’s discussant takes an opposing point of view, or it could take place when one’s discussion partner is uncommitted or weakly in favor of the preferred point of view. The frst situation would likely mean higher levels of confict and disagreement, but the second is not necessarily confict-ridden but it would certainly be a high-cost activity on the part of the advocate. Given the seemingly ambivalent nature of advocacy as an activity, there are two key empirical questions to answer: (1) how much confict occurs when people advocate and (2) we need to untangle the extent to which network composition and the strength of personal ties to the advocated matter. When considering personal ties, those to whom one may advocate are probably not those closest (i.e., family) or most distant (i.e., strangers), but people who fall in between (i.e., family). A common thread in social network and group politics research is studying what allows network members to deviate from group norms by introducing new preferences. Advocating for a political candidate would be exactly the kind of discussion that would bring new information to bear inside the network, but this entails costs because some network members may not feel the same way about the new information. Hollander (1958) claims that members are able to introduce new information that changes the preceding group norm because they are allowed an “idiosyncrasy credit” by other group members. The group tolerates deviance as long as the member brings new information into the group has this credit among discussants.

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This may not be the case for all political communication, however, as NoelleNeumann (1984) points out they may fall into a spiral of silence and simply not speak their minds to avoid confict. Noelle-Neumann claims that individuals will be reluctant to oppose an idea or position contrary to theirs if they feel it is gaining traction with the public. She suggests that Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) two-step process is circumvented when this happens. Mutz (2006) also suggests that very close relationships also have spirals of silence because these relationships are too valuable to damage with political disagreement. Combining these three strands of research shows the type of networks which promote advocacy. Based on the combined logic of this prior literature, we hypothesize that very close and more distant relationships should have less advocacy, but somewhat close relationships will have enough idiosyncrasy credit to allow for advocacy. We also think advocacy should only exist in heterogeneous networks because it will be directed to either independents—people who simply are not committed— or the opposing side with the goal of changing their opinions. Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) show that networks often have disagreeing members and that disagreement can produce political engagement. The nature of network infuence suggests that people do openly disagree about politics. Also, Gastil and Dillard (1999) show that open discussion with disagreeing others increases public opinion quality. This idea—that politically homogeneous social networks lead to more political involvement—counters political theorists and social scientists who assert that vibrant and diverse political discussion will lead to increased political participation, representation, and improve democracy generally (Mill 1998; Button and Mattson 1999; Simon 2002). Deliberative democratic theorists prefer open advocacy that motivates politics across divisions in society because they claim that open deliberation creates space for true democracy and political decision making (Fishkin 1991). More than merely hearing the other side, what is important is when people actually try to convince the other side. Thus, it becomes crucial to know when people feel comfortable enough to advocate to others, particularly in the context of social networks. Advocates, it should be noted, are not necessarily opinion leaders. Advocates may difer from opinion leaders because they do not necessarily have superior knowledge, but they share the same role of clearly articulating their opinions in their networks. Considering research on opinion leaders is an important starting place when thinking of advocacy. Opinion leaders are integral to theories on interpersonal political communication. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) suggest these individuals infuence the vote choices of others through recommendations. Opinion leaders are the fulcrum for political communication in the “two-step fow” of political discourse (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Opinion leaders are generally knowledgeable about the product or candidate for which they are advocating (Myers and Robertson 1972), so there is ample reason for members of their social network to pay attention to their recommendations. Venkatraman

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(1989) fnds that for opinion leaders to be efective three conditions may be necessary: (1) interpersonal infuence, (2) interconnectedness, and (3) homophily— a homogeneous social network. Political scientists have studied opinion leadership for decades using frequency of discussion or strength of opinion as a proxy (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Political advocacy is a straightforward extension of opinion leader scholarship, as opinion leaders may try to infuence the vote of their social network (Chan and Misra 1990). The research on opinion leadership suggests some of the theoretical guidelines for our research. Opinion leaders are efective face-to-face communicators, and generally come from within the social networks to whom they are advocating (Venkatraman 1989). Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) research also highlights the degree to which there is opinion leadership within groups rather than between groups (homogeneity), which they term horizontal infuence. But social intimates can disagree about politics, and, thus, we can test the impact of social homogeneity on advocacy (see Klofstad 2007). The type of communication advocacy entails may be sensitive, so it is an open question as to whether advocates are more likely to try to communicate face-to-face rather than on social or other media. Social media is important to consider because, in recent years, a major development for political advocacy has been an increase in political communication and activity online. The availability of Internet forums, particularly Facebook and Twitter, make advocating less costly and simple. There is, however, evidence that these forums also lower the overall tone of discourse and breed contentiousness (Duggan and Smith 2016). Moreover, scholars have observed that much of the discussion that Americans encounter through social media is ideologically homogeneous and rife with selective exposure (Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015; Bond and Messing 2015). Nonetheless, Americans are increasingly using social media to support and advocate for political candidates (Anderson et al. 2018). Whether we are conceptualizing online social networks or in-person social networks, the idea is the same. Advocacy, as a confict-based type of communication, will be best practiced at a distance that (1) allows for the discussion to be relevant, but (2) will not endanger the relationship in a substantive way. Thus, understanding the diferences in the ways social network composition and mode of communication afect the likelihood of advocating is an important empirical question.

The Impact of Psychology and Personality The fnal question empirical question we answer is: beyond the traditional predictors for advocacy and given the macro and network efects, what are the psychological and psycho-attitudinal predictors of political advocacy in the modern era? Answering this question helps us close the circle on the fnal level of predictors. Even though we have macro- and network-level hypotheses, we

30 A Theory of Political Advocacy

also need to understand how psychology and personality afect these encounters because there is ample reason to suspect that they will be critically important. First, among those who might branch out to other types of advocacy encounters (e.g., social media), only those with extroverted personality types will be the most likely to advocate. Personality is increasingly an important component for political behavior research. As such, it makes sense to consider the implications of personality on the propensity to advocate. For the purposes of political advocacy, the Big Five indicators—openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism—are the most relevant psychological and personality-based constructs (Gerber et  al. 2011). For our purposes, we focus on extroversion as the main personality component that will make advocacy more likely. At the personality and psychological level, extroversion is defned as an “energetic approach toward the social and material world” (Gerber et al. 2011, 267). Extroverts may be less concerned about the potentially contentious nature of advocacy overall. Moreover, extroverts get rewarded when they are active and involved with those around them (Wilt and Revelle 2017). This makes the social costs of advocacy lower compared with people who score highly on other Big Five indicators. Specifcally, if there are components of the Big Five that will decrease advocacy, it is likely conscientiousness and neuroticism. Conscientiousness is “socially proscribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goaloriented behavior” (Gerber et  al. 2011, 267), while neuroticism measures the extent to which an individual has emotional stability. People scoring highly on conscientiousness are likely to respect and uphold social norms (Jackson and Roberts 2017), and advocacy is the type of political communication that is likely to violate those norms. People who are more emotionally stable are more likely to be involved in political advocacy because of the high levels of knowledge and efcacy required. Several studies demonstrate extroverts are signifcantly more engaged in politics generally. Mondak and Halperin (2008) demonstrate extroversion is associated with increased levels of political participation across several election cycles using multiple nationally representative surveys. Importantly, they show that extroversion is a signifcant predictor of increased political discussion. It would seem, then, that this quality would also predict who may be an advocate, and particularly those who may be more likely to advocate in venues where advocacy is generally less likely (i.e., either face-to-face or online). This is the case because beyond predicting a more engaged set of political behaviors, extroversion is also correlated with more political engagement online (Gerber et al. 2013). To the extent conscientiousness and neuroticism limit advocacy, it would follow other evidence that conscientiousness and neuroticism have efects decreasing some political activities. Specifcally, conscientiousness is associated with a decreased propensity to turnout to vote (Gerber et al. 2011, 2013), which might stem from the negative efects conscientiousness has on political efcacy (Mondak

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and Halperin 2008). Neuroticism decreases political interest (Gerber et al. 2011), which is a prerequisite for being an advocate. While there is some evidence suggestive of the pro-engagement aspects of conscientiousness—Mondak and Halperin (2008) fnd high conscientious individuals are more likely to attend political meetings—the efects of political discussion are weak to non-signifcant. Clearly, the main drivers of political discussion are extraversion and openness to experience, but extraversion is our component of interest. Beyond the Big Five, another aspect of afective politics that we believe will have a predictive efect on political advocacy is negative partisanship or afective polarization. Negative partisanship is the relatively recent phenomenon where Americans’ vote choices are no longer driven as strongly by their afnity for their preferred party or ideological group, but rather the antipathy they feel for the other side (e.g., see Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). While advocacy is the proactive promotion of a specifc candidate or party, it may not be the love of that candidate or party that drives one to advocacy. It could, in fact, be the stronger aversion to see the advocated candidate’s opponent win. For instance, in 2016, someone who advocated for Donald Trump may not have had any specifc desire to see Donald Trump win, but would rather see Hillary Clinton lose (or vice versa). As elections consist of discrete choices, the desire to not see someone elected certainly seems like suffcient reason to engage in advocacy. Negative partisanship is associated with several important political behaviors in the recent American political environment. Voters with high levels of negative partisanship are less likely to split their ticket in an election (Abramowitz and Webster 2018). This, again, indicates that negative partisanship should afect political advocacy because those who vote a straight ticket would very likely engage others about their vote choice. Finally, the increased nationalization of non-Presidential races is generally the direct result of negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster 2018), which again highlights why negative partisanship will be associated with advocacy. The nationalization of politics makes the need to speak out all the more pressing for those who would be advocates for political candidates and parties lest the wrong candidate, even at the local level, get elected.

Conclusions Put simply, political advocacy is an important and understudied area of political communication that can explain the increasing acrimony in American politics. In this chapter, we developed a novel theory for the conditions under which political advocacy should be more and less likely. At its most basic level, advocacy is a confictual type of interpersonal political discussion that is made more likely by an invigorated political environment. It should also be more likely when potential discussants are at an appropriate social distance. There is a reason to

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suspect that advocacy can be made more likely when engaging online via social media platforms, but this is an empirical question that needs to be answered. Finally, at the individual level, beyond expected variables like political interest, political knowledge, and political efcacy, we believe certain personality types and afective polarization will be correlated with increased political advocacy. Studying advocacy is important because, despite it being relatively stable for much of the 20th century, since 2004 advocacy has increased substantially and is on the rise. As noted in the introduction, there is a great deal of concern about civility in American politics. However, advocacy is a type of communication that lends itself to incivility. Is it necessarily the case that incivility and confict are normatively bad for American politics? We do not think so, and we think the empirical evidence will show that this uncivil type of political discussion helps people engage in politics in a more robust way. Moreover, advocacy—the willingness to engage and support a candidate for election with others—is exactly the kind of activity we want Americans to do. There is an increasing concern among policymakers and social commentators that civic literacy and engagement is on the decline. Increases in advocacy seem to belie this point. Advocates demonstrate civic literacy and are engaging in a robust way when they communicate their preferences with their fellow discussants. So far, we have explicated the reasons for this book and laid out our theoretical justifcation for our expectations on the causes of political advocacy. In the next chapter, we take our frst empirical look at these causes with two qualitative surveys. Specifcally, we claim in these frst two chapters that advocacy is a confict-ridden type of communication. We investigate this and ask deeper questions about why people advocate in Chapter 3.

Note 1. This is, in fact, a very common phenomenon. Specifcally, Kaiser Family Foundation (2018) found that most components of the ACA were quite popular, but the law itself was not.

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3 WHY AND HOW PEOPLE ADVOCATE

In this chapter, we take a deep dive into the reasons Americans decide to advocate or not. Furthermore, we probe the extent to which confict and confict avoidance are aspects of this choice. We ask three questions: fundamentally, Why do people decide to advocate? To what extent, if any does confict and the desire for—or to avoid—fghting about politics become an important component of the decision to advocate? Moreover, once someone decides to become and advocate, What method do they prefer to use and why? By answering these questions, we are able to confrm grounding aspects of our theory and concentrate on testing the multi-level predictors highlighted in Chapter 2. Based on the literature and theory we laid out in the previous chapter, it is clear there has not been enough attention on advocacy as a standalone type of political discussion. This is a crucial gap to fll because we see that advocacy is on the rise. Though some of the predictors we expect to be linked with increased advocacy over time are macro- and network-level variables, one of the most important things we can do when investigating a phenomenon like advocacy is to simply ask people: Do you do this, and why? To be sure, some of our knowledge gap is the result of a lack of attention, but some of it stems from the lack of available data. What knowledge we do have about advocacy comes from large-N survey data. Surveys are a wonderful tool for investigating political advocacy—indeed, we use them extensively—but surveys do not allow us the space for Americans to fully explain, in their own words, why they may or may not advocate. We rectify that in this chapter. In this chapter, we use two open-ended qualitative surveys using online convenience samples from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce. This method gives us the chance to get an in-depth look into the reasons people advocate or not. It also allows us to probe the extent to which anger or confict

38 Why and How People Advocate

plays a role in the decision to engage in what we theoretically think would be a contentious style of communication. Interestingly, it also allows us to explore the modes Americans use to advocate as well. Finally, we use qualitative data to explore the reasons why one may choose to not advocate as well. Our theory generates several hypotheses we can test using qualitative data, and this gives us the chance to use process tracing to highlight the areas our theory may need further support or validation. Importantly, using qualitative survey responses, let us explore beyond the correlations we use in other chapters. In this chapter, we give respondents the time and space to explain themselves and their positions on political advocacy.

Hypotheses Based on the literature review and theory laid out in Chapter 2, we have two initial hypotheses to test and one research question to explore. First, we hypothesize that people advocate because they have a desire to inform others. Those who do not advocate will similarly not do so because they do not feel as though it is their responsibility. Second, we hypothesize that people fnd advocacy to be a contentious mode of communication. Third, a research question we have is: Why do advocates prefer certain modes of advocacy? We believe that the answer could rely on some sense of internal comfort in interpersonal communication or it could be that some people prefer the lower costs of certain modes.

Observational Procedures Because we are interested in allowing our respondents the time and space to explain their attitudes and behaviors, we employ surveys with both close-ended and open-ended responses. Qualitative surveys are immensely valuable for a project of this nature because we want to give subjects the chance—in their own words—to explain their reasons for engaging or not in advocacy. Using their responses, we can employ process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) to highlight the ways subjects’ responses afrm or disprove aspects of our theory. To answer our research questions for this chapter, we felded two surveys using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers in the Spring of 2020. MTurk workers are a well-known and reliable pool for convenience sample subjects. Previous scholars fnd MTurk sample results replicate previous fndings from nationally representative surveys (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). However, for our study, we are not concerned with replicating nationally representative sample. Our main concern is to get thorough responses to our open-ended questions about advocacy, but we also want a larger sample than is typical when using qualitative interviews. Most qualitative interview samples consist of subjects ranging from a handful to a few dozen. When interviewing subjects who are elites, experts, or exemplars

Why and How People Advocate

39

of rare phenomena, this is perfectly legitimate. The methodological rigor of qualitative surveys and interviews rests with the selection of those interviewees and the questions researchers ask. For us, advocacy requires a larger sample (e.g., larger than 100) because we are trying to get a deeper look at it, and we need a sample that refects the general public in some sense. We are not interested in why experts advocate nor is advocacy so rare that understanding why fve to ten people do it will be enough. To generate our samples, we conducted a survey that frst uses an opening battery of general demographic questions, personality batteries, and relevant political attitudes. Once subjects competed these batteries, we ask our standard advocacy question: “Generally speaking, Do you try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in an election?” In the frst study, subjects who answered in the afrmative were prompted to tell us more about their responses, and we asked a follow up about the modes of communication they used to advocate. For those who reported not engaging in advocacy, we asked them to go into more depth about that choice and explain what factors make them not engage in advocacy. For the second study, we asked the same advocacy question, but followed it up with questions about the nature of the advocacy subjects employ (i.e., when they advocate, does it turn into a “fght” about politics). The next section details our results and analysis.

Results and Discussion Summary Statistics and Demographics: MTurk Samples We begin our analysis with a general breakdown of the sample and cross tabulations of interest for Study 1. Study 1 took place in early 2020. Subjects entered the survey environment by clicking a link posted to an MTurk advertisement. Overall, despite using a convenience sample, our respondents refect nationally representative surveys in some important respects. Specifcally, when asked if they ever tried to advocate to someone, about 38 percent of the respondents say they have, and 62 percent say that they have not. As noted in Chapter 2, this mirrors recent ANES percentages on the same question. So, for the standpoint of having a sample that exhibits a behavior at the same rate as the general population, we have some confdence in this aspect of our study’s generalizability. We captured several important demographic categories to assess the overall generalizability of our sample. With regard to the racial or ethnic background of our subjects, 85 percent of our subjects in Study 1 was identifed as white. Recent data show that the white population is only about 70 percent of the US population, so our sample does overrepresent whites. To assess socioeconomic status, we asked about educational attainment.1 About 58 percent of our subjects in Study 1 had at least a bachelor’s degree, who is much more educated than the

40 Why and How People Advocate

general population (Fry and Parker 2012). However, for an MTurk sample, this is to be expected (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). For partisanship, we asked the standard partisan identifcation question used in the ANES for the last 70 years.2 The sample leans a bit more Democratic than the overall US population with 47 percent identifying as Democrats, 27.5 percent Republicans, and 24.5 percent Independent (1 percent responded “other”) (e.g., see American National Election Studies 2020).Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics for Study 1. For Study 2, we asked the same set of demographic and basic political orientation questions. Subjects in Study 2 participated in this survey in the Spring of 2020. Overall, the basic demographics are generally similar to those in Study 1. In Study 2, roughly 32 percent of subjects reported advocating during an election.While this is lower than Study 1, this is still within the normal historical range. Study 2 is 82 percent white, just over 51 percent male, 48 percent Democratic, 20 percent Republican, and the majority hold a bachelor’s degree or higher.These summary statistics largely follow Study 1 with a few minor differences.This sample is similarly moderately ideological.Table 3.2 displays the summary statistics for Study 2. Interestingly, TABLE 3.1 Summary Statistics for Study 1, Winter 2020

Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Advocate Ideological Democrat GOP White Male Age Education

0.386 1.485 0.467 0.273 0.855 0.562 38.628 4.315

0.488 1.164 0.500 0.446 0.352 0.497 11.492 1.328

0 0 0 0 0 0 22 2

1 3 1 1 1 1 87 8

Note: MTurk subjects, Winter 2020; N = 199.

TABLE 3.2 Summary Statistics for Study 2, Spring 2020

Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Advocate Ideological Democrat GOP White Male Age Education

0.328 1.348 0.484 0.200 0.826 0.515 41.348 4.353

0.470 1.078 0.500 0.401 0.379 0.500 10.524 1.323

0 0 0 0 0 0 22 1

1 3 1 1 1 1 74 8

Note: MTurk subjects, Spring 2020; N = 215.

Why and How People Advocate

41

both samples average age is around 40 years, which is in the age demographic most likely to be involved in politics generally (Pew Research Center 2018).

Probing Advocacy To lead into the qualitative portions of the survey, we asked all subjects to report if they generally tried to persuade people to support candidates or political parties in elections. For those who responded in the afrmative, we asked this follow-up question in Study 1: “We’d like to know more about your response. . . . In a few sentences using the textbox below, please tell us why you try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in elections.”3 In the following sections, we use subjects’ whole or partial responses that exemplify the main themes drawn out among both advocates and non-advocates.4 The purpose of these questions is to allow our subjects to tell us what advocacy means to them. Our theory highlights a few critical components that require empirical validation, and some of this validation can be ascertained with correlations in large-N data. However, some of our suppositions need more exploration. This question, and the follow-ups to it, allow for this exploration, and give us the opportunity to process trace our theoretical mechanisms for advocacy as a general political behavior.

Do You Advocate? Why or Why Not? Among some respondents professed a need to inform or serve some sense of civic duty. These subjects see their role as something like an opinion leader among their friends and family. As an example, consider this statement from a subject who reports being an advocate: I try to persuade people by letting them know the actual stances of the diferent candidates. Pretty much everyone I talk to about politics has no real idea of what the candidate stands for. So, I come in an attempt to show that just because you think they like something doesn’t mean that they actually stand for it. The intent for this subject is to serve a civic function by helping those to whom he advocates learn more about the candidates and their stances. Importantly, a crucial component of advocacy for this discussant is providing some measure of corrective information. Note that he says his advocacy is to highlight areas where his discussion partners may be misinformed. This sentiment is shared by another advocate who is also concerned about making sure his discussants have “the whole story:” I like to make sure people are properly informed. Sometimes people only see what’s on TV instead of form[ing] their own opinions. TV stations

42 Why and How People Advocate

are swayed and portray inaccurate info sometimes, so it’s good to make sure people know the whole story. These two subjects highlight the responsibility advocates place on themselves for informing their discussion partners. This is an important insight that supports the basic foundation of advocacy: advocacy is more than merely discussing politics; it is a robust, position-taking endeavor that takes a high degree of knowledge and self-assurance. As it happens, these two subjects are both white, male Republicans, but these sentiments are prime exemplars of this civic virtue sentiment. Another white Republican, but this time a woman, also highlights the importance of informing her co-discussants when she advocates. Her position is that those who do not follow politics should be made more informed by people like herself. She says, I try to persuade people close to me who do not follow politics and are completely out of the loop. Their vote matters and I try to explain why they should vote a certain way and how it would be for the better of our country. I simply try to inform them. So, for this advocate, the process of advocacy is more about being the primary informer because, as she notes, her discussion partners may be “out of the loop.” This subject seems to view her role as less of a corrector of misinformation, but more of a frst informer. These two motivations—civic duty and frst informer—repeat themselves over and over again in subject responses to our initial question. Importantly, the sense of civic duty is not the purview of Republicans only. Several advocates who note the importance of informing others identify as Democrats. A white, male Democrat said, I try to get people’s views and understand them and then show them how I see it from my perspective. I also want what is usually best for everyone as a whole, as to just individually. If there is something seriously wrong with a certain candidate, people also need to know what it is and what it means. A lot of people are under and misinformed with regards to politics, so they need help. Another white, male Democrat said, “I feel like it is my duty as a person that cares about my community and future to try to afect change by speaking with people to try to change their mind. I think that many people do not have access to the same information that I do or have the time to research.” These two sentiments, again, hit on the civic duty and frst informer ethos that seems to motivate many of the advocates in Study 1.

Why and How People Advocate

43

Clearly, among those who advocate, there is a sense that they need to take this behavior on because there is a need to inform others about what there is to know. Furthermore, there is a need to correct perceived misinformation or misperceptions. In a sense, these advocates are advocates because they think there is a civic mission involved with their speaking out. Despite the potential for confict, they advocate because they have something to ofer. Additionally, the link between advocacy and sense of civic duty is further demonstrated among non-advocates. Many of our subjects who reported not advocating specifcally identify their relative lack of a sense of responsibility for informing others as a reason for their non-advocacy. Demographically and politically, non-advocates who identifed their lack of responsibility to inform others are mainly women5 and are split ffty-ffty in terms of partisanship. Subjects who specifcally mentioned it not being their responsibility to inform others also hinted at or declared out-right that advocacy entailed less than amicable conversations. However, these respondents were quite clear that their lack of advocacy is linked to it not being their “responsibility” to persuade or otherwise move others to their point of view. One respondent, a male, African American Democrat, said, “It’s not my place to try to persuade someone to vote a certain way. It’s up to people as individuals to do their own research and know who they’re voting for and why. I think it’s dumb to try to push people a certain way.” This respondent is not alone in his assertion that “it’s up to people as individuals to do their own research.” This sentiment was shared generally among non-advocates. Furthermore, one Democratic woman felt like even trying to advocate at all was “hopeless,” as she stated: I don’t feel like you can sway someone’s decision. People will actively fght against information that violates their beliefs, and the same goes for politics. Only they can change their own minds about who to vote for. Trying to sway them in my direction is hopeless. These two comments demonstrate the extent to which non-advocates see others as autonomous in their own political decision-making process. We see this by comments about how “only they can change their own mind” (emphasis added) and “it’s up to people . . . to do their own research.” Non-advocates clearly do not share the same sense of civic duty as advocates when it comes to the capacity for this type of interpersonal political communication to make a diference. Another aspect non-advocates draw out routinely is their position that advocacy will not, in fact, make much of a diference. This ties back to advocates’ drive to be an opinion leader. Non-advocates, it seems, do not believe that their efort would be warranted because their discussion partners would not listen anyway. As discussed in Chapter 2, recall that being an opinion leader is a mix of two things: (1) knowledge about the topic on which one is leading

44 Why and How People Advocate

opinions and (2) the external efcacy to motivate action and discussion on that topic. For non-advocates, they seem to lack both of these items. On the lack of relevant knowledge, several subjects pointed out that they did not feel qualifed or motivated to advocate specifcally because they did not know enough about politics. One Democratic man says, “I am not educated enough myself to feel I can persuade people to vote one way or the other. I also don’t have the charisma.” Another Democrat says, “I do not know much myself, so me trying to convince someone else to do something does not make much sense. It is often the case that others know more than I do and try and persuade me to do such things. I do not listen to politics very often.” Both of these responses demonstrate the lack of relevant knowledge is a hindrance to engaging in political advocacy. However, of the two main opinion leader qualities—knowledge and efcacy—efcacy seems to be a stronger driver of non-advocacy in general. We use this insight gained from the qualitative data to test these factors in the next chapter using ANES survey data. Several non-advocates specifcally identifed their lack of efcacy—the sense that their actions would make a diference—as a key in their lack of interest in advocating. One subject, an independent, African American man, says, “I fnd that people are set in their ways politically. Trying to change their mind usually starts an argument. I also think people are free to do what they want.” Another subject, this one an independent, white man, says, “For the most part I’ve found that it’s impossible to convince someone to vote for or against a person.” Both examples exemplify the responses of many non-advocates who say there is simply no point in advocacy because they do not feel like they would be able to change the mind of their discussion partners in any event.

Non-Advocacy as Confict Avoidance It is notable, however, that similarly embedded in the above response is something that is referenced more than any other reason for non-advocacy. Nonadvocates profess to eschew advocacy because advocacy, for the plurality of our non-advocate subjects, is tantamount to confict, arguing, and fghting. Sydnor’s (2019) pathbreaking work shows individuals’ predilections for confict avoidance and acceptance play a signifcant role in a range of important political behaviors. A key reason why we think advocacy should be an unlikely activity is because of its inherently confictual nature. Advocacy is a behavior and type of interpersonal political discussion where confict and disagreement are not just likely, but common. These claims, however, warrant investigation, and Study 1 subjects demonstrate there is validity to our theory of advocacy. While those who report advocating did not express any innate desire to engage in confict or seek out political arguments, those who report not advocating certainly pointed out the potential for confict as a primary reason for avoiding this behavior in general.

Why and How People Advocate

45

Of the roughly 62 percent of our Study 1 subjects who report not advocating, a clear plurality of them reference the social costs of advocacy either directly or as an additive to their main reason for not advocating. Clearly, the possibility that advocacy might descend into an argument and that it may be emotionally taxing is a deterrent for many non-advocates. Take, for example, this Democratic woman who says, “Politics is a pretty emotional area for a lot of people, I don’t think there’s really any point in trying to change anyone’s mind. It also seems unnecessary; everyone is entitled to their own beliefs and opinions regardless if they match mine or not.” This person’s response encapsulates the way confict avoidance is implicit even when the main reason for not being an advocate is a lack of efcacy. For others, confict avoidance is much more explicit and takes the lead in moving them away from advocating for their preferred candidate or political party. A white, male independent subject states, I tend to be non-confrontational person, and politics leads to confict, even if it is just a discussion. I prefer not to engage in these conversations. It is unlikely I will change someone’s mind and it is unlikely they would change mine, so I see it as a waste of time. This theme is hit again by a white Republican man stating, “I don’t like to engage in political discussion, it always seems to end ugly! So, I try to steer clear of any religious or political engagement. It seem[s] more of a personal belief.” A Democratic Hispanic man says, “Seems like a great way to start an argument. It will lead to talking about issues one disagrees with the other person no matter which candidate you choose.” All of these respondents specifcally note their desire to avoid confict as the main reason they avoid advocacy. For some, like the frst subject, there are other reasons mingled in the thought, but the clear driver for non-engagement is a desire to avoid confict. This idea is referenced numerous times among our Study 1 subjects who report not advocating. Some are quite succinct, like this Democratic man who states, “Trying to persuade people into voting usually results in an argument,” while others worry about the fall out for personal relationships given the inherently confictual nature of advocacy. Given our theory of advocacy and the responses we have among non-advocates, we think it is prudent to delve more specifcally into the confict components of advocacy. To do this, we turn to Study 2.

Probing Advocacy as “Fighting” About Politics For the second study, we asked the same advocacy question, but followed it up with questions about the nature of the advocacy subjects employ (i.e., when they advocate, does it turn into a “fght” about politics?). As noted in Table 3.2, about 32 percent of subjects reporting engaging in advocacy, which is a slightly

46 Why and How People Advocate

"How often do you fight about politics when you advocate?" 80

Percent of Respondents

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Always

Most of the time

About half the time

Sometimes

Never

Frequency Respondents “Fight” When Advocating About Politics, Study 2 (Spring 2020).

FIGURE 3.1

smaller percentage than Study 1 but still within the national range based on ANES data. When asked about how often this activity led to a fght about politics, the answers are revealing and displayed in Figure 3.1. In Study 2, 85 percent of advocates report “fghting” about politics at least sometimes. This evidence supports our theoretical claim that advocacy is a contentious form of political communication. This evidence demonstrates that advocacy is, in fact, contentious for the vast majority of those who report doing so in this sample. We also asked about who generated or received most of the anger in the discussion, the advocate or their partner? About half of the advocates in Study 2 report both they and their discussion partner getting equally angry during the conversation. About 33 percent of subjects report that their discussion partner was the main angry party, while only 5 percent report that they were the main angry party. Very few subjects (8 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively) report that it was only their partner or only themselves who got angry. These results are displayed in Figure 3.2. To probe the nature of confict and advocacy more deeply, we asked a followup question where subjects could further explain their behaviors. We asked, “In a few sentences, describe why you decided to advocate with them even though it might have ended up in a fght?” Given that probe of advocacy in general in Study 1, this question allows us to more specifcally target why advocacy is undertaken even though confict is possible if not expected. This is an important

Why and How People Advocate

47

"Who got angry most of the time?"

Percent of Respondents

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

FIGURE 3.2

Only them

Mostly them

Both of us

Mostly me

Only me

Angry Party Frequencies Among Advocates, Study 2 (Spring 2020).

question to answer because of the ample research suggesting Americans avoid confictual political discussion most of the time. Given that a relatively high percentage of Americans engage in this confict-ridden type of discussion, we need to know why and what they think they will get out of it.

Why Advocate If You Think There Will Be a Fight: A Qualitative Examination A theme that emerges in the responses to the frst open-ended question—why advocate if it might end up in a fght—is that, as with Study 1, advocates have a strong sense of civic duty and efcacy. Over and over again, advocates give responses like, “I thought I had information that might change their mind,” “[b] ecause I felt strongly for the candidate and knew every vote counts,” or “I felt my views were important and would help the country, and I wanted to convince people that they were right; I also tried to convince people to vote at all.” Additionally, several subjects mention the intense antipathy they had for a specifc candidate or issue position. One subject, a Democratic Asian man, says, “I think Donald Trump is an idiot and I wanted them to realize that. I wanted them to see the facts and come to that realization themselves.” Similarly, white, male Republican says, “Because usually the other person [is] mouthing of MSM [mainstream media] lies, failing to see all the stories they have gotten wrong over the years, and always one sided. Just trying to open their eye[s] to the truth, but usually to no avail.” As demonstrated by these examples, advocates have a deep sense of efcacy and civic duty, but when probed about advocacy despite the chance of confict, the much-discussed aspects of negative partisanship begin appearing in respondents’ thinking.

48 Why and How People Advocate

For some respondents, the traditional appeal of their candidates is a draw. One respondent stated, “I believed strongly that my candidate was the best choice. I disliked the other candidate intensely.” For this Republican man, the appeal of his preferred candidate is there, but he takes care to note that he dislikes the “other candidate” as well. This trend appears in several advocates’ comments. Another respondent, a white Democratic woman, says she advocates despite the chance it may result in a fght, “Because anyone trying to elect [R]epublicans any time in the last 10 years or this year needs to be set straight.” Negative partisanship, where the afective response against a candidate or party is the driving force for support, is clearly evidence among those who engage in advocacy.

Is It Diffcult to Fight About Politics? At this point, based on the responses to open-ended questions, we have established that advocates identify their civic duty and feelings of efcacy as reasons for their participation in this complex type of political discussion. Furthermore, in Study 1, we see that confict avoidance is important for non-advocates. With Study 2, we asked advocates to specifcally address the confictual nature of advocacy and determine if confict is common. However, even if advocates are more comfortable fghting about politics than their non-advocate counterparts, it is still empirically relevant to know if advocates fnd fghting about politics distracting or challenging, or rather if they fnd confict invigorating. Indeed, the division among advocates is stark—many advocates report having difculty or reservations about engaging in confictual advocacy, but some report being enlivened by the experience. One subject says of fghting, “It is very stressful for me; I don’t like confict at all, but I overcame that sometimes because I felt the issues I was arguing for were just that important.” Here, as with previous subjects’ statements, there is an acknowledgement of civic duty that helps overcome her initial apprehension, but the experience is nonetheless fraught and not something she relishes. Another subject, who expressed a sense of civic duty and positive partisanship when asked why she advocated, says, I hate to fght and argue and political discussions are tough because people tend to feel very passionately about their candidates and belief system and it’s difcult to get people to change their mind once they’ve decided. It can get very emotional and very personal. In this statement we again see the concern about fghting and arguing is considerable, but the sense of responsibility she feels overcomes this potentially mitigating situation. Unlike these two subjects, some of the respondents have no problem engaging in an advocacy jousting match. An independent white woman who said she advocated because it was important for her to show her discussion partners they supported a person “who

Why and How People Advocate

49

could absolutely cause harm” (negative partisanship) says, for her, advocating is “[v]ery easy, I have no trouble speaking my mind when I see ft.” Similarly, a Republican white man says, “[o]h, not at all. I enjoy it, especially with someone who is completely oblivious to facts.” Both of these advocates demonstrate the pro-confict attitudes that may be needed to advocate under some circumstances. Advocates who relish the opportunity to engage in a verbal confict in support of a political candidate or party are likely to do so even when there is not much chance they may change someone’s mind. For these advocates, advocacy is not instrumental but rather intrinsic to the way they want to engage in politics. While these subjects exemplify those who enjoy the opportunity to fght about politics, some subjects are wary of hurting relationships. Of the risk of fghting while advocating, a white Democratic woman says, “[n]ot difcult at all. I consider myself to be reasonably well informed with solid arguments. It was a little challenging to back of a bit and not be hurtful to avoid damaging relationships, but the discussions themselves are easy.” When asked about why she might advocate in the frst place, a white Democratic man, says, “[i]ts relatively difcult because I am not confrontational by nature. The actual act is easy, as my debate/convincing skills are good, but the actual decision to use them was difcult. My in-laws tend to be much more conservative than me and I knew there could be personal consequences for expressing my opinions.” These two subjects highlight the inherent tension in the decision to advocate. For one, the potential for fghting is, in fact, an incentive to advocate, while the other subject expresses some discomfort. Both subjects specifcally point out that a source of any reservations they have are the relationships with those closest to them. This goes to another component of our theory. Advocacy, to the extent it is likely or possible, will be least common among those who are socially closest to the advocate. These subjects indicate that social distance is a running concern for themselves and something that afects their advocacy.

Non-Advocates and Confict Avoidance in Study 2 As in Study 1, we are also interested in the reasons non-advocates avoid advocacy in Study 2. Because evidence in Study 1 supports our hypothesis that advocacy is confictual—particularly as non-advocates identify wanting to avoid confict as a reason to not engage in advocacy—we wanted to get a more specifc look at the reasons people avoid advocacy in general. Of course, confict avoidance is one of many reasons people may choose not to advocate, but there are certainly others. To investigate these reasons, we asked non-advocates to select all the reasons that cause them to avoid advocacy. We based the response choices in this question on the results from Study 1. They could select more than one response. The results are displayed in Figure 3.3. Non-advocates report not advocating primarily because they want to avoid fghting about politics. Among non-advocates, 53 percent of them chose confict

50 Why and How People Advocate

I want to avoid fighting with them.

It is not normally what I talk about.

Other reason

I don't care about politics.

I didn't like any candidates. 0

FIGURE 3.3

10

20

30

40

50

Percent of Respondents Reporting Reason

60

Reasons Non-advocates Choose Not to Advocate, Study 2 (Spring 2020).

avoidance as one of the reasons why they do not advocate. The second most common choice, “not normally what I talk about,” probably refects the general lack of interest in politics that is likely common among non-advocates. We know from the qualitative responses that advocates profess notions of civic duty and efcacy, which stems from a generally higher level of interest in politics overall. It makes intuitive sense that many non-advocates would, in general, just not talk about political candidates or parties much. It is important to note, however, that relative few subjects reported simply not caring about politics (12 percent) or not liking any candidates (10 percent). This shows that rather than being totally apathetic, the main driver for non-advocates is confict avoidance.

Advocacy and the Mode of Communication When it comes to communicating about politics in 21st century American politics, social media is top-of-mind for many people. According to Pew Research, nearly half of all Americans are “politically active” on social media (Anderson et al. 2018). Based on their data, Pew reports that Americans believe social media are particularly useful for engaging on important political issues and getting elected ofcials to pay attention to their opinions. Social media are also a logical place where people may engage in advocacy, and there is evidence that social media engagement results in signifcant amounts of afective engagement—particularly anger (Duggan and Smith 2016). Based on this evidence and our goal of exploring the gamut of political advocacy behaviors, we

Why and How People Advocate

51

asked subjects in both Study 1 and Study 2 in what mode they were most likely to engage in political advocacy, and we asked Study 2 subjects if their mode of choice had anything to do with the chances for advocacy to result in fghting about politics.

Mode of Advocacy Figure 3.4 displays the results for preferred mode of advocacy for both Study 1 and Study 2 subjects. Overall, a clear majority of subjects in both studies prefer advocating face-to-face. This fnding is notable because, when given the opportunity in the abstract to identify the venue of advocacy, one might be given to assume social media would be the more likely mode because of the low costs and ubiquity of social media platforms. However, we see this is clearly not the case. Social media is the second most common selection in both studies, but it lags far behind face-to-face conversation. In Study 1, after subjects told us which mode they preferred for advocacy, we probed their selection by asking this follow-up question: “You said you usually try to advocate using the following method: [method here]. In a few sentences .  .  . please tell us why you chose that method to persuade others.” Answers to this question will give us insight to how people feel about these various modes of advocacy. As is clear from Figure 3.4, face-to-face communication is the most popular mode of advocacy, so we start with some examples of subject responses for this mode.

Face-to-Face Social Media Text Phone Letter Other 0

10

20

30

Study 1 FIGURE 3.4

2020).

40

50

Percent of Respondents

60

70

80

Study 2

Preferred Mode of Advocacy, Study 1 (Winter 2020) and Study 2 (Spring

52 Why and How People Advocate

A prime example of the types of responses the face-to-face advocates is provided by a Democratic woman who says, It’s easier to communicate with people that way and they respond better to human interaction; if you are behind a screen, people don’t tend to treat you like you are human. Fights tend to escalate more quickly, and I fnd people are more receptive to information face-to-face. Versions of this answer appear again and again. For face-to-face advocates, there is something important, special about human connection and looking another person in the eye to explain why they should vote for a specifc candidate or political party. Some people are also worried about information being misinterpreted. A Republican woman states: It is better in this type of situation to relay my opinions face to face. That way an actual conversation can take place. Posting this information on social media will leave my thoughts and opinions open to someone’s interpretation and my opinions might not come across as strong as they would in a face to face conversation. Here, the subject is clearly concerned about having their thoughts misunderstood or taken lightly. In a face-to-face advocacy scenario, this subject believes she will be better able to make her case in a way that her discussion partner will understand both her point and her intensity. For some, face-to-face communication may also have a generational component, such as this Democratic man who says, “Face to face is what I prefer. I am 52 and like the old-fashioned way. Just works for me and its more personal and allows me to read body language.” The importance of nonverbal communication was repeatedly stated by these respondents who preferred to advocate face-to-face. Despite the fact that a clear majority of Study 1 subjects prefer face-to-face advocacy, 29 percent report engaging in advocacy via social media. The primary reasons that emerge from these open-ended responses are: (1) convenience and (2) the opportunity to engage a wider audience in the message. One Democratic man says, “This day in age everyone uses social media more than the other options. Reach a vast network of people easier.” Another person, a Republican man, says, “I choose this method because you can reach more people. Social media is the easiest way to reach millions of people as opposed to just around the area where you live.” Another subject mentions that social media allows options to form groups which enhances the advocacy experience. The subject states, “This is because of the wide reach it’s got, [I] tend to reach majority of my friends at the same time. Sometimes, we could even form a close group where we share ideals and discuss at length.” With these examples typifying the responses from most social media advocates, it is clear that to the extent social

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media is preferred that is the case because social media decreases the costs of advocacy and these advocates do not place a premium on the “human connection” in the same way face-to-face advocates do.

Can Mode Affect Confict? In Study 1, advocates refecting on their mode of advocacy routinely mention the mode they chose being superior for getting their point across or reaching the most people. However, given that confict and fghting is integral to advocacy as a behavior, we asked subjects in Study 2 if their choice of mode was selected to avoid fghting or make confict in the advocacy process less likely. As with Study 1, Study 2’s subjects clearly preferred advocating face-to-face, and many subjects report preferring face-to-face advocacy because—as in Study 1—it is easier to have a human connection when you are able to look someone in the eye. One subject, an African American Democratic man, says, “[I]t’s easier to judge reaction and talk when you are face to face. Otherwise you can just be ignored, deleted or whatnot. [F]ace to face brings so many small things that other communication does not have.” This sentiment is echoed by an independent man, who says, No, it is usually easiest to talk face to face, as one can gauge a person’s reaction better and know when to avoid a heated argument. Words also can be misconstrued in texts or on social media easily, and the nuances of a face to face conversation are often better. With these comments, it is clear that subjects who engage in face-to-face advocacy do so because they want to engage the full range of human communication (e.g., tone of voice, facial expression, etc.), but they are also not shy about the face that these advocacy experiences may result in a fght. Face-to-face advocates are people who may not be looking to start a fght about politics but are not fearful about the fact that a verbal confict may develop. Social media advocates choose that mode because it allows them to decrease their costs of communication, but does it also allow them to avoid fghts if they want? It seems, based on responses to Study 2’s open-ended question, it does not. One social media advocate points out that social media actually makes contentious advocacy more possible. This Democratic woman says, “Because it’s easier to fght with someone I don’t have to deal with in real life. Pretty hard to take your car in for repairs or maintenance if you’ve had a fght over politics with your mechanic.” Another subject points out that arguing on social media actually makes face-to-face engagements with the same person more civil. They say, No, I didn’t choose it for that reason [avoid a fght]. It does help with that, however. People act more civilly in person if we’re able to argue online. It helps to preserve relationships if we don’t get too heated online.

54 Why and How People Advocate

Conclusions In this chapter we establish that advocates engage in this type of interpersonal communication because they have an interest in politics, political knowledge and efcacy that drives them to engage. This is notable because, as we demonstrate, advocacy is a confictual type of political discussion. Confict in interpersonal communication is usually something people avoid, but—for advocates—it may not be the driver of their advocacy, but it is clearly not a deterrent. We show that non-advocates generally feel that trying to promote a particular politician or political party is not their responsibility. Furthermore, among nonadvocates, the overriding reason why they avoid this type of political discussion is because they want to avoid confict. With these baselines now established, we can explore further components of our theory. To this point in the literature, overlooking advocacy meant that we needed to fll several gaps in both our theoretical and empirical foundations of political advocacy. We have started that project in this chapter. However, there is much more to do. Given the barriers to entry for advocacy, what are the environmental, network, and individual-level factors that make advocacy more and less likely. These are the tasks for the next chapters of this book.

Notes 1. Education and income are strongly correlated (Wolfnger and Rosenstone 1980), and income survey questions tend to be unreliable (Moore and Welniak 2000). 2. See the appendix for all survey question wording and fow evidence. 3. In some cases, we edited the statements subjects made for grammar or spelling. 4. The full datasets for both Study 1 and Study 2 are available upon request. Please contact the authors. 5. Many of these exemplar subjects are white as well, but that is expected given percentage of our respondents who are white.

References American National Election Studies. 2020. “ANES (Www.Electionstudies.Org): These Materials Are Based on Work Supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Numbers SES 1444721, 2014–2017, the University of Michigan, and Stanford University.” ANES | American National Election Studies (blog). https://electionstudies. org/data-center/. Anderson, Monica, Skye Toor, Lee Rainie, and Aaron Smith. 2018. “Activism in the Social Media Age | Pew Research Center.” Research Blog, July 11. www.pewinternet. org/2018/07/11/public-attitudes-toward-political-engagement-on-social-media/. Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. “Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.Com’s Mechanical Turk.” Political Analysis 20 (July): 351–68. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr057. Duggan, Maeve, and Aaron Smith. 2016. “Americans, Politics and Social Media | Pew Research Center.” Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech (blog). October 25. www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the-political-environment-on-social-media/.

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Fry, Richard, and Kim Parker. 2012. “Record Shares of Young Adults Have Finished Both High School and College.” Pew Research Center’s Social & Demographic Trends Project (blog). November 5. www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/11/05/record-shares-ofyoung-adults-have-fnished-both-high-school-and-college/. George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Moore, Jefrey C., and Edward J. Welniak. 2000. “Income Measurement Error in Surveys: A Review.” Journal of Ofcial Statistics 16 (4): 331. Pew Research Center. 2018. “An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (blog). August 9. www.peoplepress.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validatedvoters/. Sydnor, Emily. 2019. Disrespectful Democracy: The Psychology of Political Incivility. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Wolfnger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

4 HOW CAMPAIGNS STIMULATE ADVOCACY

In this chapter,1 we investigate the macro-environmental factors that we theorize will encourage political advocacy. Specifcally, we test the relationship that political campaigns have with political advocacy. We know relatively little about how campaign activity infuences this type of interpersonal communication. Campaigns are exercises in mass advocacy where the candidate, their surrogates, and activists verbally joust with another campaign to try to convince voters to vote for them. It is well established that vigorous campaigning is a catalyst for citizen action in elections (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). As noted in Chapter 2, because advocates are looking for elite-level cues to begin their advocacy, we posit that increases in competitiveness and campaign spending will correlate with an increase in the likelihood of citizens advocating for a candidate. Competitive elections should be more stimulating environments producing more arguing about politics. Simply put, if we all know who is going to win the election, we do not have much to argue about. However, if the election is close, it will make advocating about the election seem more meaningful because there is something tangible to debate. We can expect that presidential elections, such as 1996, where the outcome was well-known in advance should have less advocacy. However, close elections like 2000 and 2016, should have much more arguing about politics because people will feel more engaged with the election and concerned about the outcome. Thus, we expect competitive elections to have more arguing due to greater advocacy. We also anticipate that campaigns with greater resources will work as more powerful stimulants on the likelihood of advocating for a candidate. Greater campaign spending may enlist citizens into the campaign, thereby promoting citizens to speak on behalf of a candidate. More campaign spending will allow more mobilization because workers for the campaign will be able to do more

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door knocking and get out the vote eforts. Also, more campaign spending will equate to more political advertising which should engage more of the population in the campaign by informing them of the dominant issues and presenting emotional imagery which should spark action (Geer 2006). Campaign advertising that uses salacious claims and hot button issues may make the election environment more likely to create arguing about politics. Additionally, campaigns with more spending are able to hire more sophisticated campaign advisers who are able to derive sophisticated messaging that is more likely to elicit an emotional response from the public (Brader 2006). Based on these ideas, we posit that greater campaign spending creates an excited environment that drives citizens to advocate for their preferred candidate. Interestingly, many pundits and scholars worry over the infuence of campaign spending in discouraging citizen involvement in politics. Campaign spending is thought to depress enthusiasm for politics, primarily through negative advertising (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996). We know, however, that campaigns generally distribute information that helps lower the costs of participating (Downs 1957), and bring people into politics through mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The ability of campaigns to engage in mobilization and spread campaign information should be greater with increased spending. Moreover, research also shows that even negative campaigns have benefts for politics, such as higher quantities of issue-specifc charges and generating public engagement (Geer 2006). Also, negative campaigns might encourage learning by promoting information searches (Brader 2006). Based on these fndings of the positive infuence of campaigns on citizens’ engagement, we need to investigate whether campaign spending encourages citizens to fght on behalf of a candidate. We test whether greater levels of campaign spending correlate with an increase in this especially confictual type of interpersonal communication about politics. Using logistic regression models of ANES data from presidential elections from 1972 to 2016, we fnd that greater campaign spending correlates with greater political advocacy. We also fnd that the likelihood of being an advocate correlates with competitive elections. Additionally, we fnd that interest in politics, partisanship, efcacy, political knowledge, and socioeconomic status lead to a greater likelihood of advocacy. We break these results down by political interest and political knowledge and fnd diferentiated results based on the level of competitiveness and campaign spending. Generally, these results show how the electoral environment motivates political advocacy. This chapter serves an important link in our theory of advocacy. It is crucial because, as an individual-level phenomenon, we might be tempted to look at the individual-level predictors and correlates alone. As we show in Chapter 3, there is a great deal to discuss and explore with regard to attitudes and psychological dispositions. However, it is important to understand that citizens are not advocating for the sake of advocating. There needs to be an environmental spur,

58 How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy

otherwise the variation and marked recent uptick in advocacy between 1972 and 2016 shown in Chapter 2 can only be explained as something fundamentally changed in the American public between 1972 and 2016. While there are clearly some important structural diferences, the electoral environment—the more competitive and combative style of nationalized politics we see in the United States today—is an important environmental stimulus for generalized political advocacy.

Campaigns and Interpersonal Communication Campaign spending is now in the billions of dollars (Center for Response Politics 2020), so it is crucial to understand fully how this spending infuences democratic practices. Candidates spend to increase their vote share (Nagler and Leighley 1992), inform voters (Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004), and—in the case of incumbents—keep control of the ofce they hold (Currinder and Green 2010). Even though spending per se does not equal higher rates of turnout in the aggregate (Geer and Lau 2006), campaign resources infuence outcomes—the more money candidates have, the better they do (e.g., see Partin 2002). These results are found in models that account for endogenous relationships, as better candidates may receive more donations (Erikson and Palfrey 1998; Gerber 1998; Rekkas 2007). One common worry is that campaign spending is often used for negative advertisements, which is a hotly debated aspect of money in American politics. Some scholars fnd that negative campaigns decrease turnout and make citizens more cynical about politics (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996). Others in this debate claim that negative advertisements, indeed ad spending generally, actually mobilize the electorate (Geer 2006; Geer and Lau 2006; Goldstein and Freedman 2002), so perhaps even negative advertising may incite more advocacy. What is notable about the literature on campaign efects is the dearth of research on how campaigns interact with interpersonal communication. Scholarship on campaign spending has generally centered on the marginal efects on vote choice or turnout of each additional dollar spent on behalf of candidates (Currinder and Green 2010). We add to this literature and advance it in a new way. We examine if campaign spending turns citizens into localized advocates for political candidates. We posit that campaign intensity makes advocacy more likely. When there is a highly active campaign, advocates should feel more motivated to speak out. These active campaigns provide stimuli that cue those who are inclined to become advocates when—absent these macro cues— they may stay quiet. After all, campaigns are, at their core, “forums for public deliberation” (Simon 2002, 11). We expect that campaign intensity—measured here by competitiveness in campaign spending—will correlate with a greater likelihood of advocacy.

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Advocates will try to convince others to either become active or—if active already—to increase their level of support, or even to change sides when they feel that there is a legitimate chance their preferred candidate can win. One could also advocate to those who have not yet committed. Importantly, the campaign environment is an important cue because advocacy is a contentious form of political communication. Most people do not actively seek out confict in their discussions, so the motivation to advocate needs to be both internal to the advocate while also being encouraged from environmental factors.

Hypotheses Our frst hypothesis, then, is that campaign spending will correlate with a greater likelihood of citizens advocating for their preferred candidate. Campaign spending is a hallmark of vigorous campaigns and may create a macro-environment that pushes citizens to advocate their positions. Our second hypothesis is that more competitive elections will have more political advocacy. Our third, fourth, ffth and sixth hypotheses, are that if campaign spending is interacted with political interest and political knowledge, we expect there to be diferential efects in the predicted likelihood of advocacy, with those who are more interested and more knowledgeable being disproportionately stimulated by campaign spending and competitive elections.

Data We use American National Election Survey (ANES) data from the United States presidential election years 1972–2016 to model the causes of advocacy (American National Election Studies 2020). The data, questionnaires, response rates, and detailed information on the survey methodology are available at the ANES Web site.2 The dependent variable, advocacy, is measured with a question that asks the respondent “During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?” (coded 1 if yes and 0 if no). In general, around 35 percent of the population advocates for a candidate or party in presidential election years. This shows that advocacy is a substantial political communication behavior, but there are caveats to understand with this measure. One issue is that the question does not probe the frequency of advocacy. As we know that frequency of discussion leads to more participation generally (Eveland and Hively 2009; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2002; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), it would be useful to see if the frequency of advocacy demonstrates similar results. At present, we cannot because the ANES question specifcally noting the frequency of advocacy is not asked in all surveys used in this dataset. Thus, we use the dichotomous measure. Furthermore, the wording of the questions means that we do know

60 How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy

if the respondent advocates to someone who is like-minded politically (homogeneous) or someone who is opposed to the respondent’s position (heterogeneous). This is a general measure of advocacy, but because it has not been deeply explored in political science to this point so the need for empirical analysis is evident.

Election-Year Predictors The independent variables combine objective electoral results and campaign spending data with survey data. The campaign spending data are from La Raja (2008, 31), augmented with data from opensecrets.com after 2004. Spending fgures are normalized to 2016 dollars and listed in hundreds of millions of dollars.3 These data include measures of hard money for each party’s presidential candidate and soft money. These are the total expenditures reported to the Federal Election Commission from the candidate’s campaign. Interestingly, these data show a Republican advantage in spending in every election except 2008, 2012, and 2016. After 2008, Democrats broke the Republican money advantage by utilizing the Internet as a fundraising tool to signifcantly increase the number of small donors (i.e., donations smaller than $200 per donation). Beyond campaign spending, a more generally competitive environment may make citizens advocate more because when the electoral outcome is not clear citizens may feel that their advocacy to those with whom they interact may change votes or opinions. Our variable, competitiveness, operationalizes this measuring the closeness. To do this, we calculate the fnal diference in electoral percentage between the Republican and Democratic candidates in an election year as a proxy for overall competitiveness in actual votes (not Electoral College votes) for each state. This is an accepted proxy for competitiveness, as it represents a concrete evaluation of the closeness of the electoral outcomes and is commonly used (e.g., see Mayhew 1974). Figure 4.1 shows the mean of difference in two-party vote share for presidential elections. We can see that diferences in the two-party vote share vary wildly over the time period in question. The least competitive election in this time frame is the 1972 election that saw Richard Nixon completely overwhelm George McGovern. Similarly, in 1980 and 1984, Ronald Reagan was able to win comfortably over Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale, respectively. However, since 1984, no electoral margin between the Democratic and Republican candidates has been larger than 8.5 percent, and the most recent elections have been progressively more competitive. Some of this competitiveness is driven by the increased levels of polarization among partisans and partisan sorting (Abramowitz 2010), which we discussed in Chapter 1 and when we outline the individual-level variables. We also include election year control variables that may infuence advocacy. We include a dichotomous measure of whether there is an incumbent president in the presidential election. Incumbents may have stronger mobilization teams

How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy

FIGURE 4.1

61

Presidential Election Final Vote Diference, 1972–2016.

and campaign infrastructure with deeper attachments from voters. Incumbency, then, may lead to greater advocacy.

Individual-Level Predictors There are several individual-level predictors we need to consider when modeling political advocacy. However, because of the nature of ANES longitudinal data, there are important variables such as personality traits that are not possible to include for this chapter. Nonetheless, we can test and control many important variables that help demonstrate the robustness of the environmental stimulants on political advocacy. Future chapters will delve into more of the network and individual attitudinal and psychological predictors. For this model, we can control for political interest and involvement. Based on the qualitative results in Chapter 3 and the political science literature, we know political interest may make someone more likely to advocate. We measure political interest by whether the respondent is not much (0), somewhat (1), or very interested (2) in politics. Partisan attachment should make the respondent more likely to advocate. We have no reason to suspect that strong Democrats or strong Republicans would be more or less likely to advocate or might advocate diferently. Indeed, in the qualitative responses we see that a sense of partisanship (positive and negative) is referenced numerous times by advocates. Thus, we think the strength of partisanship is the most theoretically relevant variable and is coded as not attached to any party (0), slightly (1), somewhat (2), and strongly partisan (3).

62 How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy

For advocates in the qualitative study, having efcacy—the sense that what one does can make a diference in politics—seems to play a role in advocacy and is does in other political behaviors (e.g., Finkel 1985). Efcacy is measured with the ANES standard index of respondents’ feelings toward their ability to infuence politics and how well they feel the government responds to citizens’ concerns (Cronbach’s α  =  0.6353). Similarly, we think trust in government may facilitate advocacy because these individuals are likely to feel that their input on behalf of a candidate can make a diference. However, trust in government may actually decrease advocacy because if one thinks that the government is going to “do what is right” they may be less likely to feel their advocacy for one party or candidate over another is warranted. This is an open empirical question. We measure political trust with a question asking, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?” One of the most enduring fndings in American political behavior is that political knowledge spurs political participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). We think the same should be true for political advocacy. Political knowledge is measured with a standard open-ended question where respondents are required to recall their congressional representative’s name, coded “1” if the respondent is correct and “0” if the respondent is incorrect. We also control for relevant demographic variables. Specifcally, we control for being male, Black, income (in $5,000 increments), education by degree attainment, and age. Just as these variables have been efective at predicting other types of political activity (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfnger and Rosenstone 1980), we believe that they may afect advocacy. The fundamental claim in this chapter is that advocacy is a subset of discussion, and that advocacy is correlated with processes that may not actually afect the amount of discussion. We make no a priori clams, however, as to whether discussion is a cause of advocacy or not. Thus, we exclude discussion.

Methods Given the dichotomous measure of our dependent variable, we use logistic regression to estimate our models.4 Regular logistic regression models may be problematic with these data, which are clustered in states and over diferent election years. We need to account for this clustering, which violates the IID assumptions of regression modeling (Menard 2010; Wooldridge 2010). Our data incorporate election year-level variables as well as individual-level variables that vary for everyone. Theoretically, we know there is a signifcant potential for clustering because Electoral College calculations are done in diferent electionyear environments. This is also statistically justifed, as a likelihood-ratio test showed signifcant clustering in the data. When data are in this nested structure, it violates the independence assumption in linear models and can induce a type

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of bias. Here we control for the between-state and between-year variances as well as the between-individual variance (Wooldridge 2010, 6). We use a logistic regression model with standard errors clustered on election year to account for the clustering of respondents within years (Menard 2010). Note that these are not panel data because the dependent variable is only recorded once for diferent survey respondents in every election and not over time. The data are, however, clustered in election years, which may cause circumstances that infuence the level of advocacy. Note, also, that we fnd similar results from logistic regression models without clustered robust standard errors. Importantly, endogeneity—a perennial concern for social science generally—is not a signifcant concern for us here. It is highly unlikely that people advocating to their neighbors or friends about a political candidate or campaign would encourage a campaign to spend more money than it plans to spend in the frst place. However, it might be the case that an underlying cause of both campaign spending and advocacy is present, such as a competitive campaign. That is controlled for here, so any concerns about signifcant endogeneity or bi-causal relationships should be mitigated.

Results Bivariate Logistic Regression Models Figure 4.2 shows the results of a bivariate logistic regression model which looks at the relationship between campaign spending and advocacy. We see quite clearly that increases in campaign spending correlates with greater advocacy.

Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Total Campaign Spending, 1972–2016.

FIGURE 4.2

Note: Estimate based on weighted ANES data from a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors for elections year.

64 How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy

Measured in infation adjusted dollars, Figure 4.2 shows that going from an election that had zero dollars spent to an election that had around $2.5 billion spent in total by both campaigns would raise the likelihood of other advocacy by around 10 percentage points. This simple model does not control for any other factors. Nonetheless, it does demonstrate, graphically, the basic relationship which will be confrmed in more sophisticated modeling later. This change from the lowest to the highest values of campaign spending equates to about one-fourth standard deviation change in the likelihood of advocacy. Moving to Figure 4.3, we see a similar graph for competitiveness. Figure 4.3 shows the predicted probabilities of advocacy at diferent levels of competitiveness, as measured by the diference between the Republican and Democratic candidates for the presidency in these election years. There is a strong, linear relationship that as competitiveness increases (i.e., the absolute diference between the two major party’s vote share gets smaller), people are more likely to advocate for a political candidate. This, again, confrms our hypothesis that competitive elections are stimulating environments which produce more political advocacy. To get a sense of the substantive impact for this model, consider that a change from the least competitive election to the most competitive election results in

FIGURE 4.3 Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Electoral Competitiveness, 1972–2016.

Note: Competitiveness is measured by the percentage point diference in presidential two-party vote share in the United States; estimate is based on ANES data from a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors for elections year.

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around a 12-percentage point increase in the likelihood of advocacy. This equates to about a one-third of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable. As with spending, we see that more competitive elections have more people advocating for their candidates and thus we can expect more political fghting in competitive elections.

Multivariate Logistic Regression Results We now examine the full model with predictors at two levels for political advocacy. Level 1 has individual-level predictors of advocacy and Level 2 has election-year predictors. All three models show that the level predictors explain around 30 percent of the variance in the likelihood of advocating (Table 4.1), which can be seen by the intraclass correlation (ICC) statistic.5 All specifcations show that political advocacy correlates with increased competitiveness and campaign spending, although with the campaign spending variable added in Model III

TABLE 4.1 Logistic Regression Model for Political Advocacy in Presidential Election Years, 1972–2016.

Variable

Model I Coefcient

Model II

Model III

(S.E.)

Coefcient

(S.E.)

Coefcient

(S.E.)

Election Year-Level Variables Total Spending 0.104** Competitiveness −0.015* Incumbent −0.124

(0.000) (0.006) (0.153)

0.102* −0.019** −0.035

(0.000) (0.006) (0.115)

0.103† −0.018** −0.020

(0.000) (0.006) (0.104)

Individual-Level Variables Partisanship —— Political Interest —— Efcacy —— Political Knowledge —— Political Trust —— Black —— Income —— Education —— Age —— Male —— Intercept −0.408*

—— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— (0.176)

0.174*** 0.830*** 0.004*** 0.400*** −0.006*** —— —— —— —— —— −3.386***

(0.021) (0.030) (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) —— —— —— —— —— (0.138)

0.222*** 0.852*** 0.002*** 0.328*** −0.006*** −0.181* 0.049* 0.089*** −0.010*** 0.159** −3.346

(0.016) (0.028) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (0.084) (0.021) (0.018) (0.003) (0.050) (0.164)

N = 26,876 χ2 = 19.318***

N = 20,592 χ2 = 4250.487***

N = 18,910 χ2 = NA

Note: ANES cumulative fle, 1972–2016; election year variables obtained from La Raja (2008), Open Secrets, and media reports for popular vote results.

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the p-value for spending is 0.06. As there are only 12 elections covered in this model, the inclusion of more predictors slightly raises the p-value from 0.04 in the frst two models to 0.06 in Model III. Thus, we can be reasonably confdent that stimulation in the macro-level environment correlates with greater political advocacy in presidential election years. This supports our hypothesis and indicates that campaign spending and competitive elections generates a contentious type of interpersonal communication. As citizens get cues from campaign spending or have their political awareness heightened by a competitive electoral environment, they are more willing to engage in a potentially confictual behavior—advocating to their discussion partners. Importantly, the campaign spending’s correlation with advocacy remains even when controlling for powerful individual-level predictors, such as political interest and partisanship. Among the Level 1 variables, our predictions are generally borne out. We see that political interest has a substantial and positive correlation with advocacy. Less substantial but reliable and positive efects on advocacy are observed for greater partisanship, efcacy, and political knowledge. Also consistent with our expectations, education, income, and being male correlate with greater advocacy in all models. These results match our expected predictions. Being older, having higher levels of political trust, and being Black have a negative correlation with advocacy in all models. As we noted, political trust could reasonably be expected to increase or decrease advocacy. It seems that those who have higher levels of political trust are less likely to advocate, which supports the idea that those who think the government will do what is right are less motivated to advocate. The remaining control variables were signed in the anticipated direction but fell short of conventional levels of statistical signifcance. The most powerful predictor for political advocacy among all variables tested here is political interest, so it is valuable to assess the substantive impact of such an important variable. Interpreting the coefcients, we see that if the average respondent increased one level in political interest (e.g., “not much” (0) to “somewhat” (1)), ceteris paribus, that would correlate with around a 19-percentage point increase in advocacy rates and is signifcant at the p < 0.001 level. This is an incredibly powerful efect and bears out results from the qualitative chapter. Many non-advocates expressed explicit lack of interest in politics or campaigns. While the advocates did not identify interest per se, we see that moving from no interest to at least somewhat interested in politics has a substantial efect on the likelihood someone advocates even controlling for other important variables. These results show that the campaign environment is one way in which macro-level input can relate to political interpersonal communication, but also individual-level predictors such as political interest and political knowledge also infuence advocacy. The next step is to determine if there are important interaction efects between these two levels—the macro and micro.

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Interaction Effects We now look at interaction efects between election year-level variables—competitiveness and total campaign spending—with the predictors that had the largest individual-level impact on the likelihood to advocate—political interest and political knowledge. Based on the model on the variables that were included in Table 4.1, Figure 4.4 shows the interaction effects between competitiveness and political interest. We see that those who lack any interest in politics do not become more likely to advocate even when elections are closer. If, however, the respondent is somewhat or very interested in politics and there is a clear interaction effect whereby the more interested they are disproportionately more likely to advocate. For people with moderate and high political interest, competitiveness leads to more advocacy. Intuitively, if someone is not at all interested in politics, no matter how competitive their election is, they will not become more likely to argue with someone about politics because they do not care about the subject. If, however, someone is interested in the election and it is a close election, then we can expect that person to greatly care about the outcome and be more willing to risk a potentially

Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Electoral Competitiveness by Political Interest, 1972–2016.

FIGURE 4.4

Note: Competitiveness is measured by the percentage point diference in presidential two-party vote share in the United States and is interacted with political interest; estimate is based on ANES data from a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors for elections year.

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argumentative engagement with someone else. As we know from the qualitative results, fghting about politics is common when people engage in political advocacy, but the mere potential of fghting about politics drives most would-be advocates into being non-advocates. As we know campaign spending is an important motivator for political engagement, we look at the interaction efect for spending on political interest in Figure 4.5. We see a similar efect here also as those who are interested in politics become even more likely to advocate about the election and his spending increases. The strongest efect for campaign spending is concentrated on ANES respondents with the highest levels of interest in politics. This demonstrates the environmental cue efect of campaign spending. Those who are the most interested are also the more likely to recognize the increased levels of campaign spending. When this signal is received, these people turn from observers of politics into advocates for their candidate or political party. The somewhat interested and the not at all interested are not quite as motivated to advocate by spending as they are by overall competitiveness. In fact, increased spending seems to have a depressive efect for those who are not interested, but this efect is not distinguishable from zero.

Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Campaign Spending by Political Interest, 1972–2016.

FIGURE 4.5

Note: Campaign spending is measured by using data from La Raja (2008) and Open Secrets and is interacted with political interest; estimate is based on ANES data from a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors for elections year.

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Given the strength of the results in the original model, another important variable to test is political knowledge. As is well demonstrated in the political science literature, political knowledge is one of the most robust, enduring predictors of political engagement in American politics (e.g., see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Now, turning to the models of political knowledge, we see in Figure 4.6 that there is a modest, positive efect for competitiveness and political knowledge. Those who are politically knowledgeable are signifcantly more likely to advocate than non-politically knowledgeable respondents if it is a competitive election. As elections become less competitive, these groups have overlapping confdence intervals. This demonstrates another way the macroenvironment can implore certain individuals to become advocates. Those with higher political knowledge can discern the increased competitiveness in the general political environment and use that as their cue to engage in a contentious form of political communication. Moving to interaction efects for campaign spending and political knowledge, we see an interesting result in Figure 4.7. This fgure shows that campaign spending makes those who are low in political knowledge disproportionately more likely to advocate. As campaign spending goes up, those with lower levels

Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Electoral Competitiveness by Political Knowledge, 1972–2016.

FIGURE 4.6

Note: Competitiveness is measured by the percentage point diference in presidential two-party vote share in the United States and is interacted with political knowledge; estimate is based on ANES data from a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors for elections year.

70 How Campaigns Stimulate Advocacy

Interaction Efect Predicted Probabilities of Advocacy at Diferent Levels of Campaign Spending by Political Knowledge, 1972–2016.

FIGURE 4.7

Note: Campaign Spending is measured by using data from La Raja (2008) and Open Secrets and is interacted with Political Knowledge; estimate is based on ANES data from a logistic regression model with clustered standard errors for elections year.

of political knowledge go from signifcantly less likely to advocate to statistically indistinguishable from high political knowledge respondents in the ANES between 1972 and 2016. In other words, this is the opposite efect of what was shown in Figure 4.6 for competitiveness and political knowledge. Competitiveness makes everyone more likely to advocate, but high political knowledge respondents are still more likely than their lower political knowledge counterparts. With spending, lower political knowledge Americans become more like their high political knowledge compatriots. Given this result, we can deduce that this is because, in general, those with lower political knowledge are likely to be afected by campaign advertising. Campaign advertising is the chief source of spending for campaigns with advertising accounting for over 50 percent of the expenditures for some presidential campaigns (Center for Response Politics 2012). Reports in 2020 suggest that total campaign advertising could amount to over $10 billion for the 2020 presidential election cycle (Bruell 2019). Campaign advertising plays a similar role here as soft media (Baum 2003, 2005) and extreme media (Taylor 2017) do for political knowledge. As low political knowledge citizens engage with

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these types of media, they learn more than their high political knowledge counterparts and become more likely to engage in politics as a result. The same appears to be happening with campaign spending increasing the likelihood of advocacy for low political knowledge ANES respondents. Additionally, we can assume this is the case because we know that campaign advertising, specifcally, plays a signifcant role in afecting the evaluations of candidates and vote choice (Franz and Ridout 2007). Campaign advertising has been shown to help those who have low political information to understand politics (Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004). Advertising makes those who do not understand politics more likely to become interested in the election because it clearly and simply explains the issues within the election. Once they become more interested in the election, they will be more likely to advocate for a particular candidate. Those who already start with high political knowledge already understand the basic issues and the campaign advertising is not as informative for them. The result is that spending, which is a proxy for advertising in most cases, is not as efective in promoting political advocacy for this group.

Conclusion In this chapter, we examined the macro-level correlates of political advocacy. Chiefy, this chapter demonstrates that as electoral competition and campaign spending increase so, too, does the likelihood that individuals become advocates for their preferred candidate or political party. We theorized that active campaigns are the macro-level environment signal that citizens use to know if they should speak out for the candidate they support. We fnd that advocacy correlates with competitive elections even while controlling for other likely determinants, such as socioeconomic status and attitudinal variables. We also fnd that greater campaign spending has a positive and signifcant correlation with advocacy. We fnd disproportionate efects based on political interest and political knowledge. Those who are politically interested and knowledgeable are activated to advocate differentially depending on the competitiveness and spending levels in a campaign. For competitive elections, high political knowledge citizens advocate at higher levels than their lower political knowledge counterparts despite the most competitive elections generating more advocacy from all citizens regardless of political knowledge levels. However, for low political knowledge individuals, increasing campaign spending makes them statistically indistinguishable from their high political knowledge counterparts in terms of the likelihood of advocating. This chapter serves an important function in our larger story about political advocacy in the United States. First, this chapter is important because it further explores an area of interpersonal communication with serious implications for practical politics. To date, almost all research on interpersonal communication has focused on determinants of political discussion generally (e.g., see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2006). While general political discussion is obviously

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very important, understanding political advocacy—in its own right—is also important given the type of political communication that it is: citizen-to-citizen political talk that is riddled with the potential for confict. Because scholars have either overlooked advocacy as a dependent variable or confated it with discussion, there is still more we need to explore. The second thing this chapter accomplishes is it highlights a way in which campaign spending and competitive campaigns are a net beneft for democratic activity. Since the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) decision, ever-increasing levels of campaign spending have been the target of many wouldbe reformers. Their argument is that increasingly unfettered campaign spending is normatively bad because it is nothing more than the buying of democracy. They claim excessive levels of spending make it difcult to impossible for average Americans to be involved in campaigns in a robust way. Without limits on campaign spending, only those who are the richest will be able to participate and any opinions outside the mainstream will be silenced as a result. The problems with these claims, to this point, are that—empirically—campaign spending and media buys do not necessarily equate to electoral victory. For instance, Michael Bloomberg, the former mayor of New York City and erstwhile 2020 Democratic presidential candidate, spent over $1 billion to over the course of a 104-day campaign only to win a single primary—American Samoa (Montellaro 2020). Moreover, even those who would see signifcant limits put on campaign fundraising and spending are, in fact, the candidates who are raising the most money using small-dollar donations from millions of people (e.g., Sen. Bernie Sanders) (Lai et  al. 2020). At the highest levels of politics, which we study here, the relationship between every dollar raised and spent does not immediately connect to additional vote share. Empirically, it does not appear that people can simply “buy” a presidential election. Coupled with the fact that we fnd greater campaign spending is stimulative and promotes advocacy about politics, perhaps some of the fears about campaign spending are misplaced. Of course, one may be tempted to say that advocacy, as a contentious form of political discussion, has negative consequences as well. Simply put, the more money spent in the campaign, the more likely people are to argue about politics. Is it really the case that we want people to be getting into verbal fghts about politics? It may be that those who choose to argue about politics are stimulated by campaign environment because they have seen advertising on television which promotes hot button issues. These advertisements prime would-be advocates to want to engage because their preferred candidate or party is demonstrating, through their advertisements and campaign spending, that they need the advocate’s help. This is what makes them more likely to get into a fght with someone about their political ideas. Campaign advertising is often about issues that are salacious and would create anger, so the afective engagement component is certainly plausible.

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However, we argue that this is exactly the kind of activity you want citizens in a vibrant democracy to use. If there is going to be incitement from politicians and political parties about the “most important election in our lifetimes,” then you want citizens to engage in a way that is commiserate with democratic norms: interpersonal communication. We would rather want citizens to use advocacy, even in heated ways, with their voices rather than with methods. Advocacy is the outlet for democratic emotional heat. If the lid is kept on, then the democratic pot may overfow in ways that are less democratic in nature. We believe that argument is further supported by the third way this chapter improves our understanding of advocacy. The third way our understanding of advocacy is improved is by showing the ways political interest and political knowledge afect advocacy when interacted with competitiveness and campaign spending. In general, as we might expect, those with higher levels of political interest are generally more encouraged to advocate when either competitiveness is close or spending is high. However, for political knowledge, we fnd that campaign spending acts as an equalizer for political advocacy in ways that general competitiveness does not. This allows us to link campaign spending to other social institutions of seemingly limited normative political value (i.e., soft news) that act as a democratic stimulant rather than a depressant. Campaign spending erases the advocacy edge for high political knowledge individuals. If advocacy is something we want to encourage, then this is an important fnding. By engaging in a back-and-forth—even in a contentious way—people who might have otherwise sat on the sidelines are now engaged in the democratic process. There can be a little doubt that this is a net beneft for democracy.

Notes 1. This is a signifcantly updated version of an article in Political Communication 29(4). 2. The ANES Web site is www.electionstudies.org/studypages/cdf/cdf.htm. 3. Spending data are taken from La Raja (2008, 31) for 1976–2004 and from Open Secrets for 2008–2016, which can be found at their Web site: www.opensecrets.org/ pres12/index.php. 4. All model estimates and fgures are created in Stata 16. 5. Because our variables of interest are at Level 2 (the election year variables), we report the ICC for that level only.

References Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. American National Election Studies. 2020. “ANES (Www.Electionstudies.Org): These Materials Are Based on Work Supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Numbers SES 1444721, 2014–2017, the University of Michigan, and Stanford University.” ANES | American National Election Studies (blog). https://electionstudies. org/data-center/.

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Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. 1996. Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate. New York: The Free Press. Ansolabehere, Stephen, Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon, and Nicholas Valentino. 1994. “Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?” American Political Science Review 88 (4): 829–38. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082710. Baum, Matthew A. 2003. “Soft News and Political Knowledge: Evidence of Absence or Absence of Evidence?” Political Communication 20: 173–90. http://dx.doi. org/10.1080/10584600390211181. ———. 2005. “Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (2): 213–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.0092-5853.2005.t01-1-00119.x. Brader, Ted. 2006. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Bruell, Alexandra. 2019. “Political Ad Spending Will Approach $10 Billion in 2020, New Forecast Predicts.” Wall Street Journal, June 4, sec. C Suite. www.wsj.com/ articles/political-ad-spending-will-approach-10-billion-in-2020-new-forecastpredicts-11559642400. Center for Response Politics. 2012. “Expenditures | OpenSecrets.” www.opensecrets. org/pres12/expenditures.php. ———. 2020. “Cost of Election | OpenSecrets.” Opensecrets.Org, April 3. www.opense crets.org/overview/cost.php. Currinder, Marian L., and John C. Green. 2010. “Money and Elections.” In The Electoral Challenge: Theory Meets Practice, edited by Stephen C. Craig and David B. Hill. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper. Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1998. “Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach.” The Journal of Politics 60 (2): 355–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/2647913. Eveland, William P., and Myiah Hutchens Hively. 2009. “Political Discussion Frequency, Network Size, and ‘Heterogeneity’ of Discussion as Predictors of Political Knowledge and Participation.” Journal of Communication 59 (2): 205–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1460-2466.2009.01412.x. Finkel, Steven E. 1985. “Reciprocal Efects of Participation and Political Efcacy: A Panel Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (4): 891–913. Franz, Michael M., and Travis N. Ridout. 2007. “Does Political Advertising Persuade?” Political Behavior 29 (4): 465–91. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9032-y. Freedman, Paul, Michael Franz, and Kenneth Goldstein. 2004. “Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 723–41. Geer, John. 2006. In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Geer, John, and Richard R. Lau. 2006. “Filling in the Blanks: A New Method for Estimating Campaign Efects.” British Journal of Political Science 36 (2): 269–90. https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0007123406000159. Gerber, Alan. 1998. “Estimating the Efect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables.” American Political Science Review 92 (2): 401–11. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585672.

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Goldstein, Ken, and Paul Freedman. 2002. “Lessons Learned: Campaign Advertising in the 2000 Elections.” Political Communication 19 (1): 5–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 105846002317246461. Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Information and Infuence in an Election Campaign. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lai, K. K. Rebecca, Josh Katz, Rachel Shorey, Thomas Kaplan, and Derek Watkins. 2020. “The Donors Powering the Campaign of Bernie Sanders.” The New York Times, February 1, sec. U.S. www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/01/us/politics/democratic-presidential-campaign-donors.html. La Raja, Raymond J. 2008. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. www.press.umich.edu/293864/ small_change. Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. 2nd Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Menard, Scott. 2010. Logistic Regression: From Introductory to Advanced Concepts and Applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Montellaro, Zach. 2020. “Bloomberg’s Final Bill: $1 Billion for a 104-Day Campaign.” POLITICO, April 20. www.politico.com/news/2020/04/20/bloomberg-1-billion104-day-campaign-197216. Mutz, Diana C. 2002. “The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (4): 838–55. https://doi. org/10.2307/3088437. ———. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Nagler, Jonathan, and Jan Leighley. 1992. “Presidential Campaign Expenditures: Evidence on Allocations and Efects.” Public Choice 73 (3): 319–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/ BF00140925. Partin, Randall W. 2002. “Assessing the Impact of Campaign Spending in Governors’ Races.” Political Research Quarterly 55 (1): 213–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 106591290205500109. Rekkas, Marie. 2007. “The Impact of Campaign Spending on Votes in Multiparty Elections.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (3): 573–85. https://doi.org/10.1162/ rest.89.3.573. Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York, NY: Macmillan. Simon, Adam F. 2002. The Winning Message: Candidate Behavior, Campaign Discourse, and Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, J. Benjamin. 2017. “The Educative Efects of Extreme Television Media.” American Politics Research 45 (1): 3–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X15600516. Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wolfnger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wooldridge, Jefrey M. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 2nd Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

5 EXPLORING THE ROLE OF SOCIAL DISTANCE AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Thus far, we demonstrate that advocacy is a confict-ridden type of communication where the environment plays a signifcant role in afecting one’s likelihood of advocating. During elections where the competition is strongest and campaign spending is highest, advocates are primed to jump into action by trying to advocate to others about the candidates and parties they support. This macro view, while important, necessarily obscures important infuences from the social network through which advocacy takes place. In this chapter, we begin to explore two of these aspects: social distance composition and mode of advocacy. We posit that the development of social media as a forum for political communication has lowered the social costs associated with advocacy as a contentious form of political communication and that this manifests itself diferentially based on the strength of the ties. Chapter 3 showed that when advocates are asked about their mode of political advocacy, they generally reported preferring faceto-face advocacy. This needs to be tested experimentally to see if there is a signifcant diference between these two modes of advocacy, as there is reason to suspect that social proximity may afect the willingness of people to engage in political advocacy on social media and face-to-face. It is necessary to measure the impact of social proximity on advocacy because social intimates often disagree about politics (e.g., Klofstad 2007). We expect discussants who are socially farthest away from the advocate to be the ones for whom social media advocacy is more likely. Closest ties are proxied as family members and those farthest away are proxied as people are not acquainted with the advocate. We expect those in the middle level, which we proxy as friends, to be more likely to advocate in face-to-face discussions. We fnd that, overall, people are much less likely say they advocate using social media. We also fnd evidence for our theory of social distance. This comports with

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the earlier qualitative data, so we feel secure in saying that trying to convince someone to support your preferred candidate or party is an interpersonal, face-toface phenomenon, but that advocates are also wary of damaging relationships with those closest to them. However, despite face-to-face advocacy being the most likely scenario, sizable portions of both the qualitative subjects and these experimental samples reporting using social media to do the type of political communication we are describing. Thus, we feel it is important to explore these people a bit more and do so using Pew survey data on social media and political engagement. This chapter continues in the following manner: First, we lay out our theory and hypotheses for the chapter. Next, we explain the research design for two experiments. We then discuss our fndings from the experiments. Finally, we explore more in-depth the people who use social media to attempt to convince others to support their preferred candidate or party. We conclude with thoughts for the reasons people prefer face-to-face advocacy despite the facts that: (1) advocacy is contentious and (2) social media decreases the costs for communication relative to face-to-face political talk.

Theory and Hypotheses We have two sets of hypotheses, one for the general social distance theory of advocacy and one for the mode of advocacy. We start by explicating the social distance theory then we move to the diferences by mode. First, we predict that social distance afects the likelihood that someone would advocate. Specifcally, people will be wary of advocating to people who are too close (family) or too far (strangers). The most likely advocacy target then would be friends. Friends are socially close enough so that most people would feel secure in their relationship should the conversation get contention as most advocacy is. People are less likely to advocate to family, relative to friends, because they would be wary of damaging such an important and socially proximate relationship should the advocacy exchange become an argument. We think people are similarly less likely to advocate to strangers because most people would be uninterested in creating a confictual discussion environment with someone one does not know at all. When it comes to diferences in advocacy by mode, we theorize that the choice of whether to advocate face-to-face or by means of computer-mediated communication will also be based on social distance. Specifcally, we expect faceto-face political advocacy to fourish in networks in which the relationships among individuals are “close-but-not-too-close.” Where there is greater social distance between individuals, social media would provide a relatively more convenient and less socially costly platform for advocacy. That is, friends would tend to engage in face-to-face advocacy whereas mere acquaintances (being more distant) would be more likely to engage in advocacy on social media. Social proximity would thus correlate with the likelihood of advocacy only to a point, after which the

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risk of damaging untested relationships over political disagreements would become too great. We further theorize that distant relationships would not provide fertile ground for political advocacy owing to the potential for confict. These theoretical considerations yield one research question with three between-groups predictions, and four within-group predictions. We explore the research question and test the between-groups predictions with the experimental treatments, but we test the social distance within-groups predictions using correlations. First, we expect that, in general, people will more likely to say they will advocate via social media relative to face-to-face interactions because of the low costs involved. However, given evidence from the qualitative chapter, we have reason to suspect that people may prefer advocating face-to-face. This means, rather than a traditional hypothesis, we have an empirical question to answer: Are people more likely to advocate on social media or face-to-face? Second, we expect a preference for social media advocacy for individuals who are unacquainted. We expect this because the potential for intense faceto-face disagreements to threaten thinly held fragile relationships. That is, where social ties are weak, face-to-face interactions would be a less common forum for intense political discussions than social media forums. We formulated two countervailing hypotheses for families (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) because the literature on political discussion in families is ambivalent. There is good evidence to suggest advocating for political candidates within a family context is exceptional, particularly in the case of face-to-face conversations (see Mutz 2006). As previously noted, the potential social costs for this often contentious type of communication are considered high. Accordingly, we suspect that social media might create sufcient physical distance to overcome family members’ reluctance to advocate in the context of face-to-face interactions. Alternatively, however, we consider the possibility that social media might not be used for political advocacy between family members to avoid the public airing of family discord. We thus formulated two competing hypotheses, both with adequate theoretical grounding. We expect friends, unlike people in general, strangers, or family members, to be more likely to engage in political advocacy in the context of face-to-face interactions than through social media. Formally, expectations are as follows:

Empirical Research Question RQ1: Is advocacy more likely on social media or face-to-face? • Given the nature of social confict avoidance and low costs of online communication, advocacy may be more likely via social media. • Given the results of the qualitative data and the evidence that social media communication is generally based on homophily, advocacy may be more likely in face-to-face communication.

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Advocacy by Mode (Between Groups) H1: Advocacy will be more likely for those advocating to strangers who have social media as an option than those who do not have it as an option. H2: Advocacy will be more likely for those advocating to friends who have social media as an option than those who do not have it as an option. H3: Advocacy will less likely for those advocating to family who have social media as an option than those who do not have it as an option.

Advocacy by Relationship (Within Groups) H4a: Advocacy will be less likely for those advocating to family who have social media as an option than those advocating on social media to friends. H4b: Advocacy will be less likely for those advocating to family who do not have social media as an option than those advocating to friends. H5a: Advocacy will be less likely for those advocating to strangers who have social media as an option than those advocating on social media to friends. H5b: Advocacy will be less likely for those advocating to strangers who do not have social media as an option than those advocating to friends. H6a: Advocacy will be more likely for those advocating to strangers who have social media as an option than those advocating on social media to family. H6b: Advocacy will be less likely for those advocating to strangers who do not have social media as an option than those advocating to family.

Research Design Study 1 To test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey experiment from May 20 to 24, 2019, using Qualtrics. The sample of respondents is representative of the United States in terms of age, race, and gender. In all, 1,539 Qualtrics subjects responded to the survey, but only 225 completed the full instrument, passed the attention checks, and matched the quotas. All participants answered the same set of pretest questions relating to demographics and political attitudes and behaviors. We then assigned the participants randomly to one of two blocks (one block for social media and one for face-to-face communications) of three questions regarding their willingness to advocate for a political candidate. These questions relating to the dependent variable for each condition difered only with respect to the mode of communication. Thus, the block of questions relating to face-to-face advocacy concerned the likelihood that respondents would try to persuade “a family member/a friend/someone you do not know too well” to vote for a candidate that he or she did not currently support in a

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“face-to-face conversation.” The block of questions relating to social media substituted for “face-to-face conversation” advocacy in the form of “a conversation on social media, such as Facebook or Twitter.” The possible responses were rated on Likert scales ranging from “extremely unlikely” (1) to “extremely likely” (5). In sum, respondents were asked three questions in either a face-to-face block or a social media block appearing as follows: Face-to-Face Block How likely would you be to try to persuade (a family member) (a friend) (someone you do not know too well) to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation in person? Social Media Block How likely would you be to try to persuade (a family member) (a friend) (someone you do not know too well) to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation on social media, such as Facebook or Twitter? The dependent variable for testing Hypothesis 1 is an additive scale of the likelihood of political advocacy across all social relationships.1 By using the additive scale as the dependent variable, we are able to use ordinary least squares (OLS) to test the treatment efect of social media on the likelihood of engaging in political advocacy. The independent variable for all models below is a dichotomous indicator for the random assignment of the participants to the social media treatment. To assess unit homogeneity, we used a pairwise correlation, which indicated that the treatment and control groups were balanced with respect to relevant demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral variables.2 This balance justifes the attribution of any diferences between responses to random assignment to the specifed mode of communication, either face-to-face or social media.

Study 2 Study 2 utilizes a convenience sample survey felded at a large southeastern university in Fall 2019 to execute a list experiment. For their participation, students were ofered extra credit. Student-based convenience samples are often not generalizable when used for correlational analyses. However, because there is a nationally representative survey to which we might compare the results, we analyze these correlations understanding the necessary caveats. As with Study 1, all subjects answered a pre-test battery of questions and were then randomly assigned into one of two treatment conditions. The frst

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condition asked subjects to express how likely they were to advocate to a family member, friend, or stranger using any of the following methods: face-to-face, written letter, phone call, email, or text message. The second block asked subjects the same questions with the same options except “social media such as Facebook or Twitter” is added as an option. In Study 1, the subjects are given only two modes for advocacy—social media or face-to-face. In Study 2, we are trying to see if rather than a discrete choice, social media advocacy is additive in nature. That is, if people are given social media as a choice among other modes to communicate their advocacy, are we more likely to see social media generate higher levels of advocacy than non-social media? The answer choices for the list experiment dependent variables are the same as Study 1. They are Likert scales ranging from “extremely likely” (5) to “extremely unlikely” (1). We assess unit homogeneity for this study by performing pairwise correlations. Overall, there are no signifcant diferences on relevant control variables between those assigned to the treatment or control. Thus, any diferences we fnd between the treatment and control can be attributed to the addition or lack of “social media” as an optional mode for advocating.

Results Study 1 Results for Research Question Our frst test explores whether people are more likely to advocate in person or online. There are arguments for both positions, so this question warrants an empirical test. One reason why social media might make advocacy more likely is that they have lowered the costs of many forms of communication and created opportunities to communicate that might not otherwise exist. However, as noted in Chapter 3, most advocates in our qualitative analyses report preferring to advocate face-to-face. We test this in Table 5.1. As can be seen in Table 5.1, our results in this nationally representative survey experiment conform to the responses in the qualitative chapter. In general, people TABLE 5.1 OLS Estimation for the Treatment Efect of Social Media on Advocacy, Study 1

Social Media Intercept

Coefcient

(S.E.)

−0.267* 2.828*

(0.149) (0.106) N = 225, R2 = 0.01

Notes: *p ≤ 0.05 for one-tailed signifcance test. Data were obtained from the original, nationally representative survey. The social media/face-to-face discussion mode was randomly assigned.

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simply prefer to advocate face-to-face when given the discrete choice between face-to-face and social media.These respondents indicated being signifcantly less likely to advocate on social media than in the context of face-to-face communication. Substantively, we can interpret this result as a decrease (βˆ =−0.267, S.E. = 0.149) of about one-fourth of a standard deviation from the mean for advocating overall ( x = 2.69, s = 1.127). Despite the statistically signifcant effect, this is a substantively mild difference. These results make sense given our evidence from Chapter 3 and from a theoretical perspective. While political advocacy is a type of communication between individuals who do not share a preference for a given candidate or whose preferences are not apparent, scholarship on social media participation suggests discussants on these platforms tend to share political positions and attitudes—homophily. In essence, social media engagement is generally between people who share the same general positions, so advocacy—in the way we defne it for this research—may not be an important goal for many social media communicators. Thus, advocacy is unlikely on social media for the simple reason that it is unnecessary. The negative efect that we found is consistent with this understanding and represents a rebuke to the impact of decreasing communication costs that create increasing opportunities for advocacy.

Results for Study 1: Experimental Hypotheses Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 predict the likelihood of advocacy on and of of social media changes based on the relationships of the individuals involved. We expected strangers (H1) and friends (H2) to be the most likely advocacy target on social media, and that family (H3) would be the least likely social media advocacy target. For friends, there is a signifcant diference between social media and

TABLE 5.2 Treatment Efects for Communication Mode, Study 1

Strangers

Social Media Cutpoint 1 Cutpoint 2 Cutpoint 3 Cutpoint 4

Friends

Family

Coefcient

(S.E.)

Coefcient

(S.E.)

Coefcient

(S.E.)

−0.325 −1.116 −0.3205 1.12 2.353

(−0.239) (0.196) (0.183) (0.197) (0.274)

−0.463* −1.634 −0.735 0.799 2.123

(0.241) (0.213) (0.186) (0.185) (0.255)

−0.463* −1.427 −0.685 0.721 2.011

(0.240) (0.205) (0.187) (0.187) (0.248)

N = 225 Prob. > χ2 = 0.1733

N = 225 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0537

N = 225 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0529

Notes: *p ≤ 0.05 for one-tailed signifcance test. Data were obtained from the original, nationally representative survey. The social media/face-to-face discussion mode was randomly assigned.

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face-to-face advocacy, but the direction of the relationship is opposite to our expectation. For strangers, there is no statistical diference in the expressed likelihood of advocating to people you do not know well on social media or face-to-face. While this does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis, it does demonstrate that the social distance here creates a dynamic where social media advocacy is just as likely as face-to-face advocacy.

Results for Study 1: Within-Group Hypotheses To adjudicate the results for the within-groups hypotheses, we use correlational analyses designed to tell us if there are diferences in the likelihood of advocacy between the relationships within experimental groups. We want to know if there is evidence that our theoretical predictors about advocacy by social distance. To our knowledge, no nationally representative survey or research project has tested this theory or these hypotheses. Because we are testing the diferences between responses on these three variables, we use a diference of means test. For Hypotheses 4a and 4b, we are testing the relationship between advocating to family and friends using social media or face-to-face. For the social media conditions, the mean for advocating to family is 2.59 and the mean for advocating to friends is 2.64. Using a t-test for unequal variances and a one-tailed test for a directional expectation, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no diference in the likelihood of advocating to friends over family via social media. The mean for friends is higher, but there is no statistically meaningful diference. For the face-to-face condition, the mean for family is 2.90 while the mean for friends is 2.91. For both the social media and face-to-face conditions, subjects do not report diferences in their advocacy between friends and family. It appears to the extent subjects in this sample are willing to advocate at all, they are willing to do so equally to friends and family. Turning to Hypotheses 5a and 5b, we test the relationship between advocating to strangers and friends on and of of social media. Starting again with the social media conditions, we see that the mean for advocating to strangers is 2.44 and the mean for friends is 2.64. Using a diference of means test with a one-tailed hypothesis test due to the directional expectation, we can reject the null hypothesis (α   = 0.10; p  = 0.06) that there is no diference between advocating to friends and strangers using social media. As we expected, advocating on social media is more likely than to strangers who are socially too distant. Turning to strangers and friends and face-to-face advocacy, we see, again, we can reject the null hypothesis. The mean for advocating to strangers (x   =  2.65, S.E.  =  0.119) is signifcantly diferent than the mean for advocating to family (x   =  2.91, S.E. = 0.108) using a one-tailed, directional hypothesis test (p  = 0.026). People are more likely to advocate to friends, regardless of the mode, than to strangers, which comports with our theory of social distance and advocacy.

84 Exploring the Role of Social Distance and Social Media

Now, we move to the last set of social distance comparisons for Study 1. Testing Hypotheses 6a and 6b, we expect that people will be more likely to advocate to family relative to strangers face-to-face, but less likely on social media due to the costs associated with this type of confictual interpersonal communication. We start by assessing face-to-face advocacy and we fnd that there is a signifcant diference between family ( x   =  2.90, S.E.  =  0.120) and strangers ( x   = 2.65, S.E. = 0.119) using a one-tailed test (α   = 0.05; p  = 0.03). This confrms our expectation that people are more willing to advocate to family face-to-face rather than strangers. This also confrms evidence from the qualitative chapter. People are generally wary of getting into these conversations with complete strangers face-to-face but may be willing to do so with family. Turning to Hypothesis 6b, we fnd there is not much diference in the willingness of people to use social media to advocate to family versus strangers. In fact, we expected that people would be more willing to advocate to strangers (x  = 2.44, S.E. = 0.115) in this mode but fnd that they are slightly more likely to advocate to family (x   =  2.59, S.E.  =  0.118) on social media, but this difference is not statistically signifcant. It is important to note two things. First, simply because our subjects preferred advocating in person to social media advocacy does not mean social media advocacy does not happen. As we demonstrate, the substantive efect is modest, so it is clear that some people do advocate on social media. Second, this study presents face-to-face and social media advocacy as a discrete choice. Considering the range of communication options available to people at any given time, a discrete choice may not represent the empirical world. Social media advocacy may represent an additive process. Perhaps social media advocacy is in addition to face-to-face advocacy. To test this possibility, we move to Study 2 and our list experiment.

Study 2 Results for Research Question The basic research design for Study 2 has already been laid out, but there are several things to highlight from that section before we examine results from this study. First, this being a student sample, the sample is larger giving us greater statistical power, but it is also a much younger population. Being a younger population is important because both Millennials and Generation Z are more likely to use social media overall (Dimock 2019; Pew Research Center 2019). While this should not afect our expectations, it is a caveat to be noted. Also, this study’s treatment is much more subtle. Social media is added to a host of options as ways in which one might try to advocate. So, this study represents a hard case for our theory, and treats social media as an additive to advocacy rather than a discrete choice between social media or face-to-face.

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TABLE 5.3 OLS Estimation for the Treatment Efect of Social Media on List on Advocacy,

Study 2

Social Media Intercept

Coefcient

(S.E.)

−0.172 7.113***

(0.209) (0.148) N = 1,250, R2 = 0.0005

Notes: *p ≤ 0.05 for one-tailed signifcance test. Data were obtained from a student sample. The social media list item for discussion mode was randomly assigned.

To answer our empirical research question, we create an additive measure of advocacy across all groups as we did with Study 1. Table 5.3 displays the result from this OLS estimation.The results show that like Study 1, people who got the social media treatment expressed lower levels of advocacy overall, but—unlike Study 1—the effect here is insignifcant. This means that there is no substantive difference in the likelihood of advocating between those who have social media as an addition to a list of modes compared to those who do not have social media as an option. As we previously noted, this is a subtle treatment, so we are not too surprised by the lack of an effect here. Nonetheless, this is an empirical question that needed addressing, and now we see that the discrete choice (Study 1) generates increased likelihood for face-to-face advocacy, while having a list does not yield a statistical difference.

Results for Study 2: Experimental Hypotheses Returning again to the expectations for H1, H2, and H3, we present three ordered logit models for adding a social media option on the list as a treatment. Recall that we expect people would be willing to advocate to strangers and friends with social media, but not their families. In Study 2, there is evidence that our social distance theory has validity. Looking at the efect adding social media as an option on the list of modes, subjects are signifcantly less likely to say they will advocate when the advocacy target is their family member. This is an important replication of the previous sample in Study 1, and it confrms our theoretical expectation. For strangers and friends, both efects are signed in the negative direction, but neither reaches levels of statistical signifcance. Thus, we cannot make any claims about whether social media makes people more or less likely to advocate to these advocacy targets. However, it is notable that these groups are not less likely given this new treatment. It seems, based on these results, that we can say when given a range of modes in which someone may advocacy, adding social media to that list does not make someone signifcantly less likely to advocate. To further explore the efect of social distance within treatment conditions, we turn to the correlational hypothesis tests for Study 2.

86 Exploring the Role of Social Distance and Social Media TABLE 5.4 Treatment Efects for Social Media on List, Study 2

Strangers

Social Media Cutpoint 1 Cutpoint 2 Cutpoint 3 Cutpoint 4

Friends

Family

Coefcient

(S.E.)

Coefcient

(S.E.)

Coefcient

(S.E.)

−0.003 −0.901 −0.149 0.754 2.086

(−0.100) (0.080) (0.075) (0.078) (0.103)

−0.042 −1.576 −0.785 0.052 1.370

(0.100) (0.089) (0.078) (0.075) (0.086)

−0.168* −1.561 −0.739 −0.007 1.242

(0.100) (0.089) (0.078) (0.075) (0.084)

N = 1,252 Prob. > χ2 = 0.9684

N = 1,250 Prob. > χ2 = 0.6700

N = 1,252 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0933

Notes: *p ≤ 0.05 for one-tailed signifcance test. Data were obtained from a student sample. The social media list item for discussion mode was randomly assigned.

Results for Study 2: Within-Group Hypotheses Starting again with Hypotheses 4a and 4b, we are testing the relationship between advocating to family and friends using any modes on a list including social media and not including social media. For the social media list group, we fnd that the mean for advocating to friends ( x  = 3.16, S.E. = 0.055) is signifcantly higher than the mean for advocating to family ( x   = 3.09, S.E. = 0.056) using a one-tailed hypothesis test ( α   = 0.05; p  = 0.01). While the efect is modest, this confrms our expectations. This also suggests that the non-signifcant fnding on this same hypothesis in Study 1 may be due to a statistical power issue and that result was in the expected direction. Nonetheless, we fnd the efect we expected with this relationship, and it is signifcant. Turning now to Hypothesis 4b—friends ( x   =  3.20, S.E.  =  0.054) versus family ( x   =  3.22, S.E.  =  0.056) without a social media mode option—we fnd there is no statistical diference ( α   = 0.05; p  = 0.34). Here again, as with Study 1, we fnd that subjects report being no more or less likely to advocate when they are given the option to do so not including social media. For this sample, then, there is some evidence that social media has an efect of promoting advocacy among friends relative to family members. Hypotheses 5a and 5b compares the diferences between advocating to strangers and friends. Starting with the social media list option group, we fnd there is a signifcant ( α   = 0.05; p  = 0.00) and substantial diference in advocating to friends ( x   = 3.16, S.E. = 0.055) and strangers ( x   = 2.67, S.E. = 0.055). For the non-social media listed option group, we fnd the same statistically signifcant ( α   =  0.05; p  =  0.00) and substantively signifcant diference between friends ( x   = 3.20, S.E. = 0.054) and strangers ( x   = 2.67, S.E. = 0.054). These results replicate the efect from the previous study and given credence to our theory

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of social distance regardless of mode. When it comes to attempting to persuade someone to vote for a preferred candidate or political party, engaging in that conversation is more likely when the discussants are at least acquainted and not strangers. Finally, coming to Hypotheses 6a and 6b for the list experiment, we test the diferences in the likelihood of advocating to family versus strangers. Starting with the sans social media list, there is a signifcant diference ( α   =  0.05; p  = 0.00) between advocating to family ( x   = 3.23, S.E. = 0.055) and strangers ( x   =  2.67, S.E.  =  0.054) given a list of modes without social media. This replicates our previous fnding and is what we expected. Considering face-toface advocacy is the most prominent choice on the list, most people are more likely to advocate to their family rather than a stranger. For the list containing the social media option, we expected that people would be more likely to advocate to strangers, but we fnd that is not the case. Even with social media as an option, people are signifcantly ( α   =  0.05; p  =  0.00) more likely to advocate to family ( x   =  3.09, S.E.  =  0.056) rather than strangers ( x   =  2.67, S.E.  =  0.055). This is contrary to our expectations and reaches statistical signifcance, which did not happen in Study 1.

Social Media and Political Disagreement Beyond our results in these experiments and harkening to the results in Chapter 3, something that is made evident repeatedly is that people prefer advocating face-to-face. This is because advocacy is a contentious confict-ridden type of interpersonal communication, and most people feel more comfortable doing this while being able to look their counterparts in the eye. However, there is a subset of people who we fnd prefer to engage in this behavior through social media. From the qualitative data, it seems that social media advocates prize having a larger audience and more people involved in their discussion. Are there other aspects of advocacy that afect social media advocates? To answer this question, we use data from the Pew Research Center, which has been leading the way in gathering data on these new forums for political communication and debate. We use the Pew American Trends Panel Wave 19 Survey conducted during July 12–August 8, 2016. This is a nationally representative sample survey that is conducted online, but samples are gathered by a traditional phone call methodology. Once the respondent accepts the invitation to be in the survey, they then fll it out online. This survey focuses on diferent aspects of American society across many waves of respondents. This wave was focused on hostility on social media. It has detailed questions about what happens when people disagree online. The frst option that the technology like social media provides, which may be diferent than a face-to-face conversation, is the ability to “block” someone. It is not always possible to ignore someone in a face-to-face

88 Exploring the Role of Social Distance and Social Media

conversation but this technological feature allows social media users to permanently remove another person from their feed or timeline. This feature may promote homophily, which has important implications for political discussion online. To investigate this novel feature of social media, we use a question from the Pew survey that read, “Did you block, unfriend, or change your settings to see less of someone because they posted things that you disagreed with?” which was coded dichotomously. Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of respondents who blocked someone on social media for posting something political with which they disagree. We fnd that over one-third of Americans say they have blocked someone on social media for posting something political. This suggests two important outcomes: First, homophily—creating an echo chamber for oneself by following and interacting only with people who share one’s political positions—is a major factor. The technological convenience of shutting out those you disagree with is a tool that simply may not be possible in face-to-face situations. Second, almost two-thirds of Americans will tolerate political disagreement to some extent and we should expect a fairly large number of Americans to be exposed to political disagreement online. Thus, we need to explore more in-depth what happens when Americans are exposed to political disagreement in social media. Two questions included in the Pew survey are particularly important for understanding what happens when people are exposed to political disagreement

FIGURE 5.1

Blocking on Social Media.

Note: Pew American Trends Panel Wave 19 Survey, July 12–August 8, 2016.

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in social media. These questions address how much political disagreements are “stressful and frustrating” versus “interesting and informative” on social media. Additionally, there is a question asking how much commonality you have with the people with whom you disagree. Specifcally, each question is worded as: “In your experience, when you talk about politics with people on social media who you disagree with, do you generally fnd it to be (1) interesting and informative or (2) stressful and frustrating” and “And in your experience, when you talk about politics with people on social media who you disagree with, do you usually fnd that (1) you have more in common politically than you thought or (2) you have less in common politically than you thought.” These are near optimal data to analyze in-depth disagreement online and what political and demographic factors—if any—correlate with these answers. Figure 5.2 shows that two-thirds of other Americans fnd political conversations with those they disagree with on social media to be stressful. Only one-third fnd online disagreements on social media to be interesting and informative. One issue with the question wording is that the conversation could simultaneously be stressful and informative, but the question forces the respondent to choose the best description of it. This shows that people fnd disagreement online to be a stressful process. These fndings refect our

FIGURE 5.2 Percentage of Pew Subjects Who Find Social Media Disagreement “Stressful” and “Less in Common.”

Note: Pew American Trends Panel Wave 19 Survey, July 12–August 8, 2016.

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qualitative examination in Chapter 3 and explain why some people avoid political advocacy online. Moving to the analysis of respondents’ impressions of their social media counterparts, Figure 5.2 shows that 70 percent of respondents discover that they have less in common politically with someone they disagree with then they had originally thought. A political disagreement should openly display the diversity of opinions in one’s social network and these fndings make intuitive sense. This may be a benefcial process, as normative democratic theory posits that there are benefts for true preference revelation so that you can know the actual diversity in your social network and perhaps learn from with whom you disagree. Exposure to political disagreement has been shown to correlate with political tolerance (Mutz 2006, 2002). One beneft of disagreeing with those in your social network is that it may allow people to know the true level of diversity of opinions in society. To move beyond an observational analysis, we create models testing the effect of relevant variables on two dependent variables using the Pew American Trends dataset.Table 5.5 shows logistic regression estimations of two models: frst, stressful (1) or not stressful (0) and second, less in common (1) or more in common (0). Compared to other datasets like the ANES, Pew datasets have fewer potential control variables. However, they do measure what we consider to be the most relevant control variables: ideology, partisanship, and demographics. The variable we use is ideological (0–3, with higher number being more ideological), which is a folded measure of the traditional ideological scale. As in other chapters, we think people who are more ideological in general, rather than any specifc ideology, will be more likely to experience stress and less in common with their social media TABLE 5.5 Determinants of Opinions About Social Media Political Conversations

Variable

Stressful

(S.E.)

Less in Common

(S.E.)

Ideological Republican Democrat Age Female Education Income Black Hispanic Intercept N χ2

0.271*** −0.236 −0.017 −0.069 0.332*** 0.032 0.048** −0.853*** −0.323* −0.032 3,263 114.653***

(0.053) (0.306) (0.305) (0.040) (0.077) (0.029) (0.018) (0.136) (0.135) (0.359)

0.194*** 0.040 0.246 0.025 0.218** 0.021 0.041* −0.343* 0.028 −0.129 3,234 42.775***

(0.054) (0.316) (0.315) (0.041) (0.078) (0.030) (0.019) (0.139) (0.144) (0.369)

Note: *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, and ***p ≤ 0.001, two-tailed signifcance test. Data were obtained from a Pew American Trends Panel Wave 19 Survey.

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partners. Next, we control for being a Democrat or Republican.These are dichotomous variables so that “independent” is the omitted category.We control for age in years, being a woman, education, income, Black, and Hispanic.The gender, race, and ethnicity variables are dichotomous. Education and income are categorical. We see that both models show that the same factors are statistically signifcant and in the same direction. In both models, those who are ideological are more likely to fnd conversations stressful and less likely to fnd commonality with whom they disagree. Additionally, women also fnd these conversations to be more stressful and discover more diversity in their social network than they had previously thought. Those with higher incomes fnd these conversations to be stressful and discover they had less in common with the people that they are disagreeing with about politics. Being Black correlates with fnding these conversations to be less stressful and also thinking that they have more in common with those that they are disagreeing with about politics about when compared to other racial groups. Being Hispanic correlates with being less likely to fnd these conversations to be less stressful, but there was not a signifcant fnding in the model about less or more commonness of disagreement. The rest of the variables were not statistically signifcant. The important fnding from these Pew results is that ideological people, even while controlling for other variables, are more stressed by online encounters and fnd less commonality online. These encounters are exactly the type of experiences that might lead someone to advocate online. While we do not test that here explicitly, it is understandable that someone who fnds they are not of the same opinions as their fellow social media users and fnds this stressful might try to convince someone on their timeline to see things their way. These fndings might also explain why, when given the choice between face-to-face and online— most people prefer face-to-face. As noted numerous times in Chapter 3, there is simply something important about being able to look one’s advocacy target in the eye when engaging in this type of interpersonal communication.

Conclusions Advocacy involves the efort to convince other people to assume positions—in this case, willingness to vote for a political candidate—that they do not currently hold. The extent of advocacy on social media is a part of the scholarly discussion only beginning to be explored. We hypothesized that social media would mitigate the costs of advocacy for individuals depending on the relationship. Using two original experiments—one nationally representative survey and one student sample—and Pew American Trends data, we compared the propensity to advocate for candidates using computer-mediated as opposed to face-to-face modes of communication, a list experiment where social media is one of many modes, and looked at the nature of social media encounters with political content. Overall, we fnd that participants are generally more reticent to advocate

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on social media than in face-to-face discussions, particularly the case in closer social relationships. We fnd some evidence for our theory of social distance and advocacy. Finally, we fnd that being more ideological introduces more stress in social media political encounters, and that ideologues fnd less commonality between themselves and those with whom they communicate via social media. To some extent, our expectations were guided by economic theories of political communication according to which social media decreases the social costs of engaging in political discussions. However, the lower rate of advocacy on social media makes sense given that communication through social media is characterized by homophily and pro-attitudinal selective exposure (Bond and Messing 2015). Advocacy is more likely to occur in arenas in which attitudes difer, which has not been the case within online communities. There is, in other words, no need to preach to the choir. Though people do not prefer advocating online relative to face-to-face, a non-trivial portion of people take to social media platforms to engage in advocacy. When we analyze this subset of people with the Pew American Trends data, we see quite clearly that nearly one-third of social media users report trying to homogenize their environments through blocking. Still, that leaves two-thirds who do not. This is an encouraging sign, normatively. It is important that people are exposed to ideas and positions that are not the same as their own, even if that induces stress. The Pew data make evident that this is occurring as well. Ideologues to engage on social media are more likely to reporting having stressful encounters, and they are more likely to encounter those who difer from themselves. All of this makes for a conducive environment for advocacy. Simply because social media is not the preferred mode for advocacy, we can see that the conditions—indeed, self-reports of this behavior—exist and are important for future research. In the end, our opening question still remains: What causes and facilitates the increases in advocacy we see in the last 20 years? So far, we have explored qualitative data that suggest advocacy is a contentious form of interpersonal communication that seems to require elevated levels of political knowledge, efcacy, and some sense of civic duty. We know, also, that the campaign environment can stimulate advocacy as it has in presidential elections between 1972 and 2016. This chapter shows that advocacy is a face-to-face phenomenon, but that online advocacy creates conditions that might promote advocacy. The last area of inquiry is this: In conditions where advocacy is most likely, what individual-level traits make advocacy more or less likely? What role do personality, psychology, behavior, or attitudes play in promoting advocacy? To answer these questions, we move to Chapter 6.

Notes 1. The scale ranges from 1 to 5 ( x   = 2.69, S.E. = 1.127); Cronbach’s α   = 0.92 (SM), 0.85 (F2F). 2. For these variables, see Table A1 of the Web Appendix.

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References Bond, Robert, and Solomon Messing. 2015. “Quantifying Social Media’s Political Space: Estimating Ideology from Publicly Revealed Preferences on Facebook.” American Political Science Review 109 (1): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000525. Dimock, Michael. 2019. “Defning Generations: Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins.” Pew Research Center (blog). January 17. www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/. Klofstad, Casey A. 2007. “Talk Leads to Recruitment: How Discussions about Politics and Current Events Increase Civic Participation.” Political Research Quarterly 60 (2): 180–91. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907301708. Mutz, Diana C. 2002. “Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice.” American Political Science Review 96 (1): 111–26. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0003055402004264. ———. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pew Research Center. 2019. “Demographics of Social Media Users and Adoption in the United States.” Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech (blog). June 12. www. pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.

6 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL ADVOCACY

Over the course of this book we have explored the reasons why advocates and non-advocates profess to undertake this kind of contentious, confict-based interpersonal communication. We have also examined how, at the national level, political competition and campaign spending correlates with advocacy even taking into account predictors at the individual level. Furthermore, we also show that social distance has some efect on who is the most likely advocate target, and that advocacy, due to its contentiousness, is mostly done ofine as a face-to-face endeavor. In this chapter, we specifcally look at the individual level to predict political advocacy in the 2012 and 2016 elections. Using the 2012 and 2016 American National Elections Study, we estimate models of political advocacy taking into account individual-level psychological and attitudinal variables that are known to afect political behavior in modern American politics. This is the most robust model of political advocacy we present. Importantly, this model incorporates more than previous models because we are focusing on the two most recent presidential elections, which allows us to use the two most recent iterations of the ANES with their extensive psychological, attitudinal, and behavioral question batteries. In general, we fnd that extroversion and neuroticism play important roles in one’s propensity to advocate. Additionally, we fnd that negative partisanship— dislike for the opposition combined with positive afect for one’s own party—is a primary motivator for political advocacy in 2012 and 2016. These fndings, coupled with the evidence in previous chapters demonstrate that, at the individual level, political psychology has a lot to tell us about the reasons people decide to advocate in highly stimulated campaign environments. There is no doubt that competitive elections and campaign engagement spur advocates to action, but even in these environments, not everyone becomes an advocate.

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This chapter gives us a more specifc look at who these people are, and what motivates their behavior.

Theory and Hypotheses The basis of this chapter is the increasing evidence that psychology and personality play important roles motivating political behavior in the United States (Mondak 2010; Gerber et  al. 2011; Huddy, Sears, and Levy 2013). We know that traditional predictors like political interest, political knowledge, and efcacy are important for generating political behavior, and we think that will be the case for political advocacy as well. We show as much in Chapter 3. The innovation for this chapter is a step beyond those traditional predictors and correlates for advocacy to show how personality traits like extroversion, emotional stability, and negative partisanship impact advocacy in the 2012 and 2016 elections. Our main personality variables of interest are the Big Five. We described the Big Five in detail in Chapter 2, but a short refresher is in order here. First, the components of the Big Five are openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Given the evidence from previous work looking at how the Big Five impact politics in the United States, we have predictions for each component. The most important component of the Big Five for predicting political advocacy will be extraversion. Extraverts are people who take “an energetic approach toward the social and material world” (Gerber et al. 2011, 267). Given what we have already demonstrated about advocates from the qualitative data, this seems to be a strong component to their orientation to the political world. In fact, in a preliminary analysis, we model the Big Five along with several other known predictors of political behavior and fnd extraversion correlates in one of our two qualitative studies.1 Advocacy is a contentious form of political communication, and if one is going to take the risk of fghting about politics it is likely that person is an extravert. This leads us to Hypothesis 1: Extraversion will be positively related to political advocacy. Next, we think agreeableness will be negatively related to political advocacy. Agreeableness “contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation toward others with antagonism” (Gerber et al. 2011, 267). People who have a more prosocial orientation are likely less willing to engage in political advocacy because it may lead to confict. However, advocacy is an engagement in the political system that attempts to get others to see another point of view, which may be amenable to agreeable personalities. On balance, to the extent agreeableness has an efect at all, we think agreeableness is likely to dissuade political advocacy. This results in Hypothesis 2: Agreeableness will be negatively related to political advocacy. Conscientiousness represents “socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-oriented behavior” (Gerber et al. 2011, 267). In essence, people who are conscientious are rule followers and conform to the social mores and

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social conventions. Given the nature of political advocacy, it seems unlikely that conscientious people would engage in this type of behavior. Advocacy is in direct contravention to the social convention of avoiding difcult conversations, which conscientious people would likely uphold. Advocacy is, by defnition, a difcult conversation—trying to convince someone to support a candidate for an election is rife with potential social transgressions. This leads us to Hypothesis 3: Conscientiousness will be negatively related to political advocacy. Neuroticism—or its corollary “emotional stability”—“contrasts even-temperedness with negative emotionality” (Gerber et  al. 2011, 267). Neuroticism is related to a host of negative results for political behaviors (e.g., see Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak 2010). We think neuroticism will be particularly important for political advocacy because of the potential for confict. People who are more neurotic by this measure are more likely to avoid situations where there will be heightened emotional engagements (Antonioni 1998; Sydnor 2019). This leads to Hypothesis 4: Neuroticism will be negatively related to political advocacy. The last Big Five trait we measure is openness to experience. People who have higher scores on this measure are “open” to “the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individuals’ mental and experiential life” (Gerber et  al. 2011, 267). Openness is generally related positively to political behavior, so we think the same will be true here. People who are more open to experiences may be more willing to engage with people about their vote choices and may be more likely to advocate. This is diferent, however, than extraversion. Between the two of these traits, we think extraversion is the most important because it is more directly linked to the type of overt engagement needed to advocate. Openness, conversely, is more about embracing the variety of experiences one may encounter. Certainly, advocacy may be one of those experiences, which leads us to Hypothesis 5: Openness will be positively related to political advocacy. The last direct hypothesis we have for this chapter concerns negative partisanship. As afective engagement becomes more understood in political science, we are beginning to understand the depth of this psychological process. People can be positively or negatively disposed toward a party or politician, but—as prospect theory might predict (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)—negative evaluations are more strongly felt and better motivators for action. The result is that even when one might love their party or politician, they are more motivated for action when the dislike for the opposition is more (Abramowitz and Webster 2018). This helps explain why the president’s party loses in mid-term elections, but also why politicians increasingly focus on dragging down the favorability ratings for their opponents. Considering advocacy, there must be a fairly strong motivation that generates the impetus to overcome the social proscriptions about difcult conversations or the potential for interpersonal confict generally. Negative partisanship is a perfect motivator for this kind of discussion. Therefore, our sixth and fnal formal hypothesis is: Negative partisanship will be positively related to political advocacy.

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A Note About the 2012 and 2016 Elections Chapter 4 clearly establishes the environmental stimulant needed to promote political advocacy in presidential elections. As personality trait distributions in the population are quite stable and other individual-level variables may not change much over time, we feel strongly that the most important factor leading to political advocacy is the political zeitgeist. Nonetheless, it is critical to understand how these individual-level predictors impact the propensity to advocacy in any given election because the literature shows that there is good reason to suspect they are important. As such, it is important to understand the general environment for the presidential elections in question: 2012 and 2016. The 2012 presidential election saw incumbent Democratic President, Barack Obama, run against former Republican Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney. The 2012 election is the frst presidential election since 1976 where both major presidential candidates opted out of the public fnancing system, and it is the frst in the post-Citizens United world where SuperPACs and other outside groups could spend money on behalf of candidates. In all, the Obama campaign spent $721 million while the Romney campaign spent $449 million (Center for Response Politics 2013), both of which represent substantial increases over the 2008 expenditures for the respective major parties. In the end, the election was close with President Obama winning 332 Electoral College votes to Romney’s 206, which represented 51.1 percent of the vote for Obama and 47.2 for Romney. The 2016 presidential race was only the second election since 1952 neither a sitting president nor vice president sought the presidency. The Clinton campaign spent about $563 million whereas the Trump campaign spent $325 million (Center for Response Politics 2017). The 2016 presidential race is notable for many reasons not the least of which is that it ended up being only the fourth presidential election in United States’ history where the popular vote winner lost the Electoral College. Hillary Clinton earned about two million more votes nationally for 48.2 percent of the vote nationally to Donald Trump’s 46.1 percent of the vote. Trump, however, won the Electoral College with 304 votes compared to 227 votes for Clinton. These two elections represent the exact environments that might stimulate political advocacy. Thus, these years make fnding correlates of advocacy at the individual level a hard case. We are estimating predictors for political advocacy in an environment where even marginal cases may already be activated to advocate. If we can fnd robust and meaningful efects here, then we can have some assurance that the efects we have are real.

Data For this chapter, we use data from the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Study. Importantly, the data and analyses for this chapter are not exactly the same as used in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, we used the ANES cumulative

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time series dataset, which compiles a set of uniform questions the ANES has asked in each election between 1952 and 2016. Here, we are looking only at the two most recent presidential elections. These two more recent presidential elections ft our needs for two reasons. As highlighted in previous chapters, competitiveness at the national level and campaign spending are the two environmental drivers of advocacy. The 2012 and 2016 elections were quite competitive, especially 2016. Secondly, these last two iterations of the ANES have the most robust set of personality, psychology, and attitudes in the time series. Moreover, these two datasets ask these extensive batteries using the same questions, so the survey responses are directly comparable but in diferent years and electoral contexts. Simply put, these datasets give us the most leverage over variables that will afect advocacy at the individual level. Finding evidence of the impact of personality traits in both election years will give us strong claims about their importance. The variables used to construct our models are the same in both years. The summary data for 2012 and 2016 are displayed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. The dependent variable, advocate, measured “1” if someone tried to talk to another person about why they should vote for or against one of the candidates or parties in the election and “0” if they did not.This is the same dependent variable we use in Chapter 4. Our main variables of interest for this chapter are the Big Five—extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. Each of these is constructed from two constituent questions (one reverse coded). These questions are aggregated and divided by two to yield a continuous measure of the personality trait described. We name these variables for the refecting the highest measure. For instance, extraversion is actually a measure of introversion as well. Someone scoring near “1” or low end of this variable would be categorized as an introvert. The Big Five scale used in the ANES is the Ten Item Personality Index, and has been validated in both psychology and political science (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003; Gerber et al. 2011). Next, we code several variables that deal with diferent areas of psychology and cognition. First, Word Sum is a measure of cognitive ability where survey respondents attempt to match words with their appropriate defnitions ranging from “0” to “10.” This measure is validated as an accurate measure of cognition (Malhotra, Krosnick, and Haertel 2007), and we use it here to test for the possibility that advocacy may be more likely among people with higher levels of cognitive abilities. Authoritarianism is created from the social conformityautonomy scale (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). To create our variable, we use principal component analysis fnding the scale loads strongly onto the frst factor, so we capture that factor as the variable. Authoritarians are generally less willing to engage in cognitively difcult processes, so—to the extent this has an efect on advocacy is likely to be negative. Finally, we code negative partisanship as the absolute value of the diference between the Democratic Party and Republican

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TABLE 6.1 Summary Statistics, 2012 American National Election Study

Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Observed

Advocate Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness Word Sum Authoritarian Negative Partisanship Media Consumption Discussion Frequency Partisan Ideological Political Knowledge Political Interest Trust in Government Internal Efcacy External Efcacy Democrat Republican White Black Income Male Education Age Competitiveness (L2)

0.416 4.128 5.129 5.611 4.952 4.854 6.794 0.000 41.275 3.322 2.393 1.882 1.116 1.707 3.368 1.249 3.832 2.388 0.526 0.338 0.593 0.172 11.584 0.481 2.974 49.442 0.143

0.493 1.274 1.094 1.130 1.229 1.139 2.364 1.356 30.585 1.784 2.048 1.065 0.972 1.205 1.118 0.534 0.993 1.095 0.499 0.473 0.491 0.377 4.501 0.499 1.159 16.821 0.091

0 1 1 1 1 1 0 −2.853 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 17 0.008

1 7 7 7 7 7 10 1.616 100 7 7 3 3 4 1.118 5.342 .993 1.095 0.499 0.473 0.491 0.377 4.501 0.499 1.159 16.821 0.091

5,507 5,487 5,490 5,492 5,487 5,490 5,790 5,474 5,846 5,611 3,926 5,890 5,300 5,510 5,911 3,002 3,011 3,006 5,890 5,890 5,914 5,914 3,860 5,914 5,864 5,854 5,905

Note: ANES data can be obtained at www.electionstudies.org.

Party feeling thermometers ranging from “0” to “100” with the highest end meaning the most negative partisanship. This follows measurement from Abramowitz and Webster (2018). As noted in the previous section, we expect negative partisanship to have a strong, positive relationship with advocacy. Our next two variables control for behaviors related to advocacy. Media consumption is a measure of the number of days (0–7) respondents consume news on any platform about the presidential race. If advocacy is about trying to make one’s case for a candidate or party to someone else, it makes sense that would-be advocates would watch the news to stay informed. The second behavioral variable is discussion frequency. This variable is also a count as it

100 The Psychology of Political Advocacy TABLE 6.2 Summary Statistics, 2016 American National Election Study

Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Observed

Advocate Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness Word Sum Authoritarian Negative Partisanship Media Consumption Discussion Frequency Partisanship Ideological Political Knowledge Political Interest Trust in Government Internal Efcacy External Efcacy Democrat Republican White Black Income Gender Education Age Competitiveness (L2)

0.501 4.220 5.202 5.699 4.970 5.047 6.994 0.000 39.255 5.539 4.002 1.873 1.283 1.962 2.856 3.554 3.092 2.414 0.456 0.407 0.711 0.093 15.386 0.470 11.170 49.575 0.146

0.500 1.377 1.139 1.124 1.262 1.123 2.346 1.573 29.509 1.959 2.370 1.068 0.966 1.024 0.854 0.893 0.960 1.082 0.498 0.491 0.453 0.290 8.080 0.499 2.324 17.580 0.109

0 1 1 1 1 1 0 −2.299 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 18 0.0022

1 7 7 7 7 7 10 1.763 100 7 7 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 28 1 16 90 0.463

3,648 3,590 3,589 3,595 3,597 3,589 4,066 3,501 4,176 4,267 2,971 4,248 3,304 4,009 3,639 4,249 3,636 3,635 4,248 4,248 4,271 4,271 4,069 4,219 4,227 4,150 4,243

Note: ANES data can be obtained at www.electionstudies.org.

measures the number of days respondents discuss politics with anyone else. Advocacy is a type of discussion, but it is a not the same thing as merely “discussing” politics. As a result, we posit based on previous literature that the more a respondent discusses politics, the more likely they are to advocate for their preferred candidate. To control for the efects of attitudinal strength, we create a folded partisanship and ideological scales. These scales range from “0” for independent or moderate, respectively, to strong partisan or very ideological (“3”). We also code for being a Democrat or Republican (“0” or “1”) to make sure there are no

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party-specifc efects, but the main driver of advocacy is likely to be the relative strength of partisanship or ideology, thus, we use the folded measures. Political knowledge (0–4) is a count of the number of fact-based questions respondents answer correctly regarding political ofceholders and positions in the United States and the United Kingdom. This measure robustly correlates with myriad political behaviors in the United States (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), so we think that will be the case with political advocacy. Advocates need to know what they are advocating about, thus political knowledge is a prerequisite. Advocates are also people who have a great deal of interest in politics generally, so political interest is coded from “1” to “4” with those having the least to “a great deal” of interest in politics. We expect this variable to correlate positively with advocacy. For the next three variables—trust in government, internal efcacy, and external efcacy—we use the traditional ANES question wording. In 2012, these variables were part of an experimental test using new response items. The 2016 ANES reverted back to the traditional questions and responses for all subjects on these questions. For uniformity and the ability to compare across samples, we use the traditional measures as well. Trust ranges from “1” to “5” and with those at the higher range indicating that they trust the government to do what is right “always.” Internal efcacy ranges from “1” to “5” with respondents at the highest level indicating they have an “extremely good” understanding of political issues. External efcacy ranges from “1” to “5” as well with the top end of the scale being respondents who “strongly disagree” with the sentiment that public ofcials “don’t care” what people like them think. For demographic and socioeconomic status controls, we include the following variables: White, Black, income, male, education, and age. White, Black, and male are all dichotomous variables with “1” measuring the afrmative of that category. Income is a continuous variable that measures household income in 20 categories. Education is similarly a continuous category that measures the highest level of degree attainment by years educated. Finally, age is a continuous measure refecting the number of years respondents report being alive. The last control variable is competitiveness. In Chapter 4, we showed that competitiveness at the national level—as well as campaign spending—are strongly and positively correlated with advocacy in presidential election years between 1972 and 2016. Importantly, this measurement of competitiveness is at the state level for the years in question—2012 and 2016. We add this for these models because we want to control and account for the possibility that being in a state with a closer election will result in a greater willingness to advocate. To be clear, our theory is that national-level competitiveness and spending are the cues advocates use to start their advocacy, so this is merely a control variable to account for state-to-state variation that may be possible. As we are looking at 2012 and 2016 individually with these models, so we do not need election year controls.

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Results Advocacy and the 2012 Presidential Election To begin our analyses, we start with the 2012 ANES and estimate the efects of our variables on political advocacy in that year’s presidential election. Table 6.3 displays the results for our three models. Model I displays the results for a Big TABLE 6.3 Logistic Regression Models for Political Advocacy, 2012

Variable

Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness Word Sum Authoritarian Negative Partisanship Media Consumption Discussion Frequency Partisan Ideological Political Knowledge Political Interest Trust in Government Internal Efcacy External Efcacy Democrat Republican White Black Income Male Education Age Competitiveness (L2) Constant

Model I

Model II

Model III

Coefcient

Robust (S.E.)

Coefcient

Robust (S.E.)

Coefcient

Robust (S.E.)

0.141*** −0.010 0.070* 0.020 0.084* —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— −1.782***

(0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.023) (0.028) —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— (0.181)

0.095** 0.010 −0.032 −0.115* 0.013 −0.014 0.039 0.007** 0.022 0.222*** 0.171* −0.029 0.110** 0.235*** 0.036 0.095* −0.018 −0.224 −0.040 —— —— —— —— —— —— −0.010 −2.051***

(0.036) (0.050) (0.078) (0.057) (0.051) (0.026) (0.046) (0.002) (0.027) (0.032) (0.071) (0.050) (0.038) (0.049) (0.117) (0.047) (0.047) (0.198) (0.211) —— —— —— —— —— —— (0.768) (0.476)

0.122** 0.047 −0.059 −0.129* −0.049 −0.037 0.021 0.008** −0.004 0.264*** 0.163† −0.068 0.098* 0.235*** 0.079 0.143* 0.041 0.057 0.163 −0.050 −0.082 −0.019 0.210 0.066 0.006 −0.185 −2.418***

(0.047) (0.057) (0.073) (0.062) (0.052) (0.032) (0.059) (0.002) (0.042) (0.044) (0.093) (0.061) (0.044) (0.056) (0.134) (0.061) (0.071) (0.244) (0.271) (0.139) (0.225) (0.017) (0.147) (0.061) (0.004) (0.840) (0.604)

N = 5,466 χ2 = 138.41***

N = 1,754 χ2 = 968.74***

N = 1,262 χ2 = 828.47***

Notes: Logistic regression models of ANES data; robust standard errors clustered by state; †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, two-tailed signifcance test.

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Five-only model. Model II shows the results for a Big Five plus the other psychological and attitudinal variables. Model III displays the results for the full models, which includes the relevant demographic and socioeconomic control variables. All models are logits, which are the appropriate choice for our dichotomous dependent variable (Borooah 2002), advocacy. To protect against Type II errors and to account for the state-based efects of competitiveness and the locations of the ANES respondents, we use robust standard errors clustered on state. Though our hypotheses have directional expectations, we use two-tailed tests for signifcance for all models. Recall that our main expectations are that extraversion and openness will be positively related to advocacy, while agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism will not. People rating highly on extraversion and openness are those who are more likely to engage with new people and ideas, and they are the most willing to engage in what might be uncomfortable situations. Agreeableness is indicative of those who have prosocial and communal orientation toward others, so they are unlikely to engage in this contentious type of political talk. Similarly, conscientious people are those who are attuned to social mores and structure, so these are the people who would follow the dictum of avoiding personal topics in polite conversation. People who are more neurotic are less emotionally stable, so they potentially anger-flled encounters advocates engage in would be an unwelcome experience for these people. In our Big Five-only model, we see that two of our expectations are borne out, while one is in the opposite direction. Specifcally, extraversion and openness are both positive and signifcant, while conscientiousness is also positive and signifcant. The conscientiousness result is in the opposite direction than our expectations. However, as this is a limited model, adding relevant controls may account for this unexpected result. Model II adds controls for other psychological and attitudinal variables. These results comport much more clearly with our expectations, particularly for the Big Five. Again, we see that extraversion is positive and signifcant. Openness, however, is still positive, but no longer has a statistically meaningful efect. Conscientiousness is now negative but not signifcant, and neuroticism is now negative and signifcant. Both of these efects are in the expected directions. Moving to cognition, we see neither Word Sum nor authoritarianism has signifcant efects. However, negative partisanship is positive and signifcant, which is exactly what we predicted. Those who have the most negative afect are the most likely to advocate because they are likely more willing to fght about their preferred candidates and party in the 2012 election. As negative partisanship becomes more understood, we see how it infuences many parts of American politics including the propensity to advocate. Similarly, those who are more partisan are more likely to advocate in Model II. The frequency of discussion, political knowledge, political interest, and internal political efcacy are all positive and signifcant predictors of political advocacy in Model II. These results comport with our expectations. Some variables we expected to be signifcant—ideological and trust in government—do not appear to have

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any efect. However, the results for discussion and interest, specifcally, make the efects for the Big Five and afective partisanship more striking. Even accounting for these behavioral and attitudinal variables, the personality and psychological predictors we theorized drive advocacy in recent elections are still robust. To fully test our theory and hypotheses, we estimate the fully explicated Model III. In Model III, the efects for extraversion and neuroticism are both statistically signifcant and in the directions we hypothesized. The same is true for negative partisanship. These personality and afect-based variables demonstrate a crucial point: in modern American political behavior, we must take into account the implications of personal-based diferences and afective engagement. That these variables are signifcantly related to advocacy while taking into account the other variables in our model demonstrates their robustness in 2012. Simply put, in 2012, extraverts and those with higher levels of negative partisanship are more likely to advocate. People with less emotional stability are less likely to advocate, which matches how we theorized they should behave. For behavior and attitudes, we see clearly that the frequency with which a respondent discusses politics is positive and signifcant. Similarly, those who are more partisan are more likely to advocate (p < 0.10). Political knowledge and political interest have their theorized positive and signifcant relationships with advocacy, and so too does internal political efcacy. Of note in Models II and III is the non-signifcant efect of state competitiveness. The competitiveness that matters for political advocacy is at the national level. Whether or not one’s state is competitive does not seem to drive political advocacy, though one might make a normative argument that it should. Used in these models as a control variable, state-level competitiveness is not a factor for political advocacy in 2012. Of the demographic and socioeconomic variables, none are signifcant, but with their addition, we see the other variables in the model perform the way we expect. On model performance, with each iteration we are explaining more variance in the dependent variable.To assess model ft, we use a receiver operator characteristic (ROC) and calculate the area under this ROC curve.This measure tells us the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable the model is explaining. For Model I in Table 6.3, the area under the ROC is 0.57 or 57 percent. In Model II the area under the ROC is 71 percent, while in Model III we get 72 percent. Thus, with each model we achieve a better model ft and discrimination.

Advocacy and the 2016 Presidential Election Table 6.4 displays the results for logit estimations for political advocacy in 2016, which generally replicate the results from 2012. As previously noted, these variables are exactly the same except that they are measured with respondents from the 2016 ANES. Also, the state-level competitiveness measure is updated

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TABLE 6.4 Logistic Regression Models for Political Advocacy, 2016

Variable

Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness Word Sum Authoritarian Negative Partisanship Media Consumption Discussion Frequency Partisan Ideological Political Knowledge Political Interest Trust in Government Internal Efcacy External Efcacy Democrat Republican White Black Income Male Education Age Competitiveness (L2) Constant

Model I

Model II

Model III

Coefcient

Robust (S.E.)

Coefcient

Robust (S.E.)

Coefcient

Robust (S.E.)

0.137*** 0.026 0.036 −0.012 0.153*** —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— −1.626

(0.027) (0.025) (0.034) (0.028) (0.035) —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— (0.236)

0.086** 0.061† −0.091* −0.101** 0.072 0.019 0.009 0.007** −0.032 0.164*** 0.133† 0.077 0.118* 0.368*** 0.064 0.104† −0.102 −0.046 −0.277 —— —— —— —— —— —— −0.264 −2.418

(0.031) (0.037) (0.043) (0.039) (0.045) (0.022) (0.033) (0.002) (0.029) (0.023) (0.073) (0.064) (0.057) (0.076) (0.057) (0.067) (0.053) (0.175) (0.187) —— —— —— —— —— —— (0.426) (0.484)

0.085** 0.053 −0.085† −0.087* 0.081† 0.000 −0.004 0.006** −0.047 0.172*** 0.146* 0.067 0.113† 0.370*** 0.072 0.114† −0.093 0.014 −0.353 0.030 −0.360 0.001 0.095 −0.036 0.006 −0.384 −2.358

(0.047) (0.057) (0.073) (0.062) (0.052) (0.032) (0.059) (0.002) (0.042) (0.044) (0.093) (0.061) (0.044) (0.056) (0.134) (0.061) (0.071) (0.244) (0.271) (0.139) (0.225) (0.017) (0.147) (0.061) (0.004) (0.840) (0.585)

N = 3,573 χ2 = 71.72***

N = 2,198 χ2 = 569.30***

N = 1,262 χ2 = 828.47***

Notes: Logit models estimated in Stata 15; ANES data; robust standard errors clustered by state; † p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, two-tailed signifcance test.

to refect state-level competitiveness from the 2016 election. As with the 2012 models, we construct three successive models using a logit estimation with robust standard errors clustered on the respondents’ states. Starting with the Big Five-only model, Model I, we see extraversion and openness are both positive and signifcant. These results match our expectations

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for both direction and efect. However, the three other components of the Big Five do not reach sufcient levels of statistical signifcance. It is important to note, once again, that extraversion is a signifcant positive predictor of advocacy once again. This fnding continues to be robust between years and throughout all model specifcations. It is increasingly evident that this component of personality is crucial for political advocacy. Model II shows, again, that extraversion and agreeableness are positive and signifcant when taking into account other psychological, attitudinal, and behavioral variables, while conscientiousness and neuroticism are negative and signifcant. Openness loses the statistical signifcance it had in Model I. Of these, only agreeableness is contrary to expectations, but—again—this may be an artifact of a less robust model. Importantly, extraversion, conscientiousness, and neuroticism are performing as expected. As with the 2012 estimations, negative partisanship is once again positive and signifcant. Discussion frequency, partisanship, political knowledge, political interest, and internal efcacy are—as with 2012—positive and signifcant predictors of political advocacy. Ideological and internal efcacy are signifcant at the p < 0.10 level, so these results need some caution, but they match the 2012 results and are in the expected directions. The replication of the 2012 results with the 2016 models is apparent. This gives us confdence that our theorized relationships are not artifacts of statistical modeling, but we can be more certain with a full model that includes both demographic and socioeconomic variables. Model III is the most robust explication of our logit model for political advocacy in 2016. Starting with the Big Five, extraversion and openness are positive and signifcant, while conscientiousness and neuroticism are negative and signifcant. This matches the expectations for these Big Five components and shows that extraversion and neuroticism replicate the 2012 results. Over two elections with two nationally representative samples, we have good evidence that extraversion and neuroticism play crucial roles in predicting political advocacy in recent presidential election years. On psychological and cognitive predictors, we see that partisan afect is a signifcant predictor once more. Negative partisanship is a positive and signifcant predictor in all four models where it is estimated. Along with extraversion, this quality—negative afect toward one of the political parties—is a robust predictor in both 2012 and 2016. Word Sum and authoritarianism are, once again, not signifcant. Discussion frequency, partisanship, political knowledge, political interest, and internal political efcacy are all positive and signifcant predictors for advocacy in 2016 as well. These fndings are in the expected direction and show that these qualities are robust predictors of political advocacy in presidential elections across the two most recent election cycles. However, as with 2012, none of the demographic and socioeconomic predictors are signifcantly related to political advocacy. This is notable given the impact some of these variables (i.e., education) have on political behavior generally, but with these fndings being the same over two

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election cycles we can be comfortable with the main efects being driven by psychological and attitudinal variables and behaviors. Just as with the 2012 models, we need some sense of how our models are preforming with each successive set of estimations. With each model, the area under the ROC curve increases, so our 2016 models are explaining more of the variance with each estimation.

Estimating Substantive Effects Coefcients for logit estimations are difcult to interpret, so to know what the substantive impact of a given variable on the dependent variable is we generate predicted probabilities. The two most important sets of analysis we have the efects of the Big Five components extraversion and neuroticism and the efect of negative partisanship. We take each of these variables in turn to describe their substantive impact on the likelihood someone might advocate in the 2012 or 2016 election.

Big Five: Extraversion and Neuroticism Figure 6.1 displays the predicted probabilities for the efect of extraversion on advocacy using the full models from the 2012 and 2016 ANES and holding all other variables at their means. This fgure combines both year estimations with the 2012 model on the left and the 2016 model on the right. Using the full models as a baseline, the probability that someone may advocate in 2012 is 0.56 or 56

FIGURE 6.1 Predicted Probabilities for the Efect of Extraversion on Political Advocacy, 2012 and 2016.

Note: Probabilities are based on Model III for 2012 and 2016 ANES data using logistic regression with clustered standard errors on respondents’ states.

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percent (S.E. = 0.02 or 2 percent) and in 2016 it is 0.61 or 61 percent (S.E. = 0.01 or 1 percent). Based on our theory, greater advocacy in the 2016 election should be the case because it was more competitive and there was more money spent overall. Thus, the main efect accounting for the diferences, though they are minor, between the 2012 and 2016 elections is the general electoral environment. Looking now at the predicted probabilities for extraversion, we see that in both 2012 and 2016 there is a clear, positive efect as respondents become more extraverted. Based on the slope of the lines, the efect for both years is quite similar. Introverts are less likely to advocate in both 2012 and 2016. As we move toward the mean for extraversion ( x   = 4.12 in 2012; x   = 4.22 in 2016) in each graph, we see the 95 percent confdence intervals overlap the predicted odds of advocating. Moving up a standard deviation (S.D. = 1.27 in 2012, S.D. = 1.37 in 2016) we see that extraversion has a powerful and statistically signifcant efect on political advocacy in both years. Those who are the most extraverted are substantially more likely to advocate, even in 2016 with a close election and engaged electoral environment. Overall, the change from being an introvert to an extravert in 2012 is 18 percent and in 2016 the change is 14 percent. This demonstrates that the impact of this personality trait is profound on political advocacy. Extraversion, while important, is not the only personality component of the Big Five we think matters. Indeed, as we theorized and demonstrated in the models, neuroticism or emotional stability is signifcant for political advocacy as well. Figure 6.2 displays predicted probabilities for neuroticism while holding all other variables at their means.

Predicted Probabilities for the Efect of Neuroticism on Political Advocacy, 2012 and 2016.

FIGURE 6.2

Note: Probabilities are based on Model III for 2012 and 2016 ANES data using logistic regression with clustered standard errors on respondents’ states.

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As with extraversion before, the efect of neuroticism is clear: negative and signifcant for both 2012 and 2016. Unlike extraversion, based on the slope of the line, the efect of neuroticism appears to be slightly less strong in 2016 compared to 2012. Starting at the low end of the scale, those who are more emotionally stable are much more likely to advocate. Moving toward the mean for neuroticism ( x   =  4.97, S.E.  =  1.22 in 2012; x   =  4.95, S.E.  =  1.26 in 2016) it is clear that there is a strong downward efect. As people become more neurotic, they become less likely to advocate overall. This is particularly the case for 2012 as the diference between being emotionally stable (1) and neurotic (7) is a decrease of 18 percent. For 2012, the diference is much milder with neurotics being 12 percent less likely to advocate than people with high levels of emotional stability.

Negative Partisanship: The Power of Affective Politics Our last set of predicted probabilities deal with the efect of afective engagement, specifcally, negative partisanship. We know this has a signifcant efect on the likelihood of advocating: those who are higher in negative afect are more likely to advocate. We need to explore the substantive impact of this statistical artifact. We do this in Figure 6.3. As with the previous two fgures, the 2012 ANES model is on the left, while the 2016 ANES model is on the right.

FIGURE 6.3 Predicted Probabilities for the Efect of Negative Partisanship on Political Advocacy, 2012 and 2016.

Note: Probabilities are based on Model III for 2012 and 2016 ANES data using logistic regression with clustered standard errors on respondents’ states.

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Observationally, the efect of negative partisanship in 2016 relative to 2012 corresponds roughly with neuroticism. There is a steep slope for 2012 and a milder efect in 2016. Looking at the average and standard deviation changes ( x   =  41.27, S.D.  =  30.58 in 2012; x   =  39.25, S.D.  =  29.50 in 2016), the odds of advocating are about 53 percent in 2012 and about 60 percent in 2016. Those who were the lowest in negative partisanship in 2012 had a 47 percent chance of advocating. In 2016, the odds that someone would advocate a little better than 50–50 at 54 percent. At the highest levels of negative partisanship, the chance someone would advocate in 2012 is about 70 percent, while in 2012 the estimate comes in at 67 percent. The min–max diferences for these two elections are substantial. The diference in the percent chance someone would advocate in 2012 is 20 percent and in 2016 is 16 percent. The results from these predicted probabilities show, of the personality and psychologically based predictors, negative afect is the most powerful stimulant for political advocacy. It is clear that extraversion and emotional stability are important in their own right, but—even accounting for these personality components—being afectively engaged is the prime motivator for advocating in 2012 and 2016. In the next section, we conclude this chapter and discuss the implications of our fndings for future elections.

Conclusions In this chapter, we show that extraversion, neuroticism, and negative partisanship are signifcant predictors of political advocacy. Extraversion and negative partisanship make advocacy more likely while neuroticism makes advocacy less likely. These efects hold while taking into account other known predictors of political behavior like partisanship, political knowledge, internal political efcacy, and political interest. Even accounting for those who are simply more likely to discuss politics being more likely to advocate, we fnd the efects for these personality and afect-based predictors. These fndings are important because they demonstrate that even in years where the environment may be generating most of the advocacy we see, there is still an infuence from personality and afect. It is important to demonstrate the ways personality traits impact American political behavior. Additionally, we show that emotional stability also plays a large role, which buttresses our claims about the type of political discussion advocacy is. Advocacy is contentious and may lead to fghting about politics, which means people who are more likely to engage it are more likely to be even-tempered. People who are prone to confict avoidance—like people who are neurotic—are more likely to avoid advocacy as well. These fndings comport with our results in Chapter 3. An equally important fnding is the result for negative partisanship. Negative partisanship continues to be one of the fastest growing literatures in Political Science, and we add to it here showing how negative partisans are more likely

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to advocate. Negative partisans are motivated by their antipathy toward their opposition to one of the parties or candidates. This negative afect drives them to engage in advocacy despite the inherent risks of this type of political communication. This fnding is robust across both years and all model specifcations. These negative emotions prove to be a powerful driver of political behavior. There are certainly ways to augment these fndings in the future. One of the things we attempt to do is control for state-level efects. In general, we fnd that competitiveness and campaign spending are national-level predictors of advocacy because it is the national race that generates attention and activity. A race may be close in a state even in fairly robust victory at the national level (e.g., the 1996 presidential election). Future work, however, can look more at the statelevel variables we simply cannot control for here. Additionally, as we have surveys that include more psychological and personality variables, we can look at these longitudinally as well. The lack of these variables in more ANES time series studies is a drawback. Nonetheless, with more time and more data we will be better able to look at the various levels of our theory to connect them more directly. We now turn to the conclusion to talk more about directions for future research and position the fndings in this project in the larger literature.

Note 1. See the appendix for MTurk models predicting advocacy. These data are a convenience sample, so we report them for informational purposes only.

References Abramowitz, Alan I., and Steven W. Webster. 2018. “Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans.” Political Psychology 39 (S1): 119–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12479. Antonioni, David. 1998. “Relationship between the Big Five Personality Factors and Confict Management Styles.” International Journal of Confict Management 9 (4): 336–55. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022814. Borooah, Vani K. 2002. Logit and Probit: Ordered and Multinomial Models. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Center for Response Politics. 2013. “2012 Presidential Race | OpenSecrets.” www. opensecrets.org/pres12/. ———. 2017. “Behind the 2016 Candidates: Campaign Committees and Outside Groups.” OpenSecrets. www.opensecrets.org/pres16/raised-summ. Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Feldman, Stanley. 2003. “Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism.” Political Psychology 24 (1): 41–74. Gerber, Alan, Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, and Conor M. Dowling. 2011. “The Big Five Personality Traits in the Political Arena.” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (1): 265–87. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051010-111659.

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Gosling, Samuel D., Peter J. Rentfrow, and William B. Swann. 2003. “A Very Brief Measure of the Big-Five Personality Domains.” Journal of Research in Personality 37 (6): 504–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1. Huddy, Leonie, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. 2nd Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47: 263–91. Malhotra, Neil, Jon A. Krosnick, and Edward Haertel. 2007. “The Psychometric Properties of the GSS Wordsum Vocabulary Test.” In GSS Methodological Report. Stanford, CA: Department of Political Science, Stanford University. https://pdfs.semanticscholar. org/4215/47762912bf3aa82a2114325bc31a06e262df.pdf. Mondak, Jefery J. 2010. Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Stenner, Karen. 2005. The Authoritarian Dynamic. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Sydnor, Emily. 2019. Disrespectful Democracy: The Psychology of Political Incivility. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the main fndings of this project and speculate on the future of political advocacy. We develop seven suggestions for ways future researchers could successfully analyze political communication and campaigns in conjunction. One of the chief fndings of the book is that advocacy often leads to arguments or fghting about politics. We created a theory that predicts three levels of infuence on political advocacy. We theorized that there is infuence at the macro-level from the campaign environment, a mid-range level that is made up of social network composition, and a micro-level of individual characteristics, such as personality traits, negative partisanship, and political interest. We also theorized that these interact, so that, for example, someone who is politically interested will be more likely to advocate in a competitive election than a noncompetitive one. Following this logic, determining the factors that increase political advocacy informs us on one of the reasons political acrimony is increasing. We fnd stimulating electoral environments that are more contentious and competitive lead to an increase in political advocacy. Due to the seeming momentousness of competitive and contentious elections, people are more engaged and are not dissuaded by the potential for arguments which results in more advocacy. In times of less contentiousness and less competitiveness, political advocacy is less necessary because there is not much people to argue about regarding politics. However, in our current political environment—featuring partisan sorting, elite polarization, and negative afect toward the opposing party—people are compelled to advocate for their preferred candidate or party, and this results in more confictual interpersonal communication. In Chapter 3, we use qualitative research to show those who choose to be non-advocates are attuned to the futility of trying to change people’s minds

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about political issues, as these attempts often fail. Additionally, some feel that it is more respectful to avoid trying to change other people’s ideas. For those who engage in advocacy, it is primarily based on a desire to correct what they see as wrong opinions. Most of our respondents who advocate said that they choose to engage in face-to-face discussions when they advocate because of the value of nonverbal communication and the potential for misunderstandings to be exacerbated by computer-mediated communication. Of those who said they choose social media to advocate, convenience was the primary driver of the choice to advocate through these platforms. Our analysis of overtime survey data in Chapter 4—additionally augmented by further analysis in Chapter 6—shows that competitiveness and campaign spending were key drivers of advocacy. Additionally, at the individual level we found that political interest, partisanship, political efcacy, political knowledge, and education are the main aspects that increase advocacy. We also show in Chapter 4 that there are interactions between these variables—such as that those who are politically interested and in a more competitive campaign environment or in a more campaign has more spending are even more likely to advocate. Our experiment results in Chapter 5 show that at the social network level, advocacy depends on the composition of the network. People will choose different modes of communication with diferent types of relationships. Our experimental data show that the choice of the advocacy is dependent on the target of political advocacy and the communication mode that used to advocate. Chapter 5 demonstrates that political discussion research should consider the composition of the social network and how that interacts with the selection of either computer-mediated communication or face-to-face discussion. Chapter 6 shows that personality traits, as measured by the Big Five index, have a large and robust efect on the likelihood to advocate. As we know, personality has a profound efect on political behavior, is not surprising that it also afects the likelihood to advocate. Of these personality traits, we see that extroversion is a clear driver of the willingness to advocate. This make intuitive sense as extroverts will be more likely to have a conversation about politics and people who are more open minded will be more likely to want to engage others in debates about politics. We demonstrate that people who score highly on neuroticism are less likely to advocate with matches with these individuals being more averse to confict. Crucially, we demonstrate that negative partisanship is a strong predictor of advocacy following recent research that shows the power of negative emotions to motivate political behavior. We also show that an alternative measure of personality—authoritarianism as measured by the SCA scale— does not in fact show an infuence on advocacy. In sum, Chapter 6 shows that in addition to the nature of the campaign environment and the composition of the social network, innate traits of personality also afect the potential expression of advocacy.

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Now, we detail the need for political advocacy and how it may change with future developments in campaign environments and information technology.

The Need for Political Advocacy Although we have clearly demonstrated in this book that a potential negative externality of political advocacy is an increase in fghting about politics, we need a robust enthusiastic advocative citizenry for a successful democracy. When citizens are engaged in a campaign, they are more likely to vote and more likely care about the issues and research them. Democratic theory suggests that opinions aggregated through an electoral process will generate a near optimal outcome, as long as there is no systematic bias in the proportion of the population who participates and those who do participate are knowledgeable. We know, however, that real life democracy seldom approaches this high standard. Though there are alternative explanations as to why people are able to make satisfactory decisions in democracies due to such factors as heuristics (e.g., Popkin 1991), opinion aggregation (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992), and advice from opinion leaders (e.g., Katz 1957; Kingdon 1970), none of these important factors negates the fact that democracies will improve decision making by having a more knowledgeable and engaged citizenry. Although fghting about politics is often portrayed as detrimental to democracy by popular media and public intellectuals, it is rather a sign of a successful political system where free speech and deliberation might be available to those who would participate. Advocates advocate because they care, and those who care about their society are more likely to sacrifce for it and are more likely to be willing to give up their time and energy to care for it. More importantly, we have suggested that advocacy, even when it is confrontational, works as a democratic release valve. Passions that might otherwise result in unproductive informal political action (e.g., protests that lead to violence or actual hostilities between the government and its citizens) are constructively funneled into a system that acknowledges and—sometimes—responds to issues and concerns. The alternative is a frustrated citizenry that cannot express their desires clearly for fear of being “uncivil” to their fellow discussants. While it is often easy to take advocating for candidates and other types of political fundamental rights for granted, most of the world citizens do not enjoy them (Dalton 2013). Rather than concerning ourselves with fghting about politics as an outcome of political advocacy, we should welcome a robust electoral process that generates an enthusiastic voter pool. Fundamentally, we cannot have a successful democracy and not have an engaged citizenry who occasionally fght about politics. Advocacy is necessary in a free, democratic society, and—based on the necessity of advocacy—we now explore possible future expressions of support for candidates by examining the future of political advocacy.

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The Future of Political Advocacy and Campaigns Our multipart theory captures many relatively stable factors infuencing the willingness to advocate for a candidate. For example, it is not likely that innate psychological traits will change for the vast majority of the population. Personality and psychological traits like the Big Five are generally stable in the population over decades (e.g., see Mondak 2010). There are, however, factors involving communications, party systems, and electoral processes that can determine whether advocacy is more likely or less likely in the future. Although we cannot be sure of any particular changes that will occur in the future, we base the following projections on the assumption that the current political and electoral paradigm will not last forever and that the historical norms of the United States politics may reoccur (i.e., one party dominant over a period of time). Chiefy—notwithstanding our fndings in Chapter 5—the infuence of information technology on communicative processes is an obvious source of potential change for political advocacy. Although it is almost limitless in its potential to allow communication currently, one thing that the history of the Internet has shown is constant innovation. During what seems like a plateau of innovation, disruptive technologies suddenly burst through to create a new mode of communication with the accompanying norm development. While we cannot predict what this innovative technology will be, it is easy to assume that some change will happen based on the constant innovation of the last 30 years. This new, as of yet not ubiquitous mode of communication will alter the potentiality for political advocacy. Furthermore, it is possible that the reticence we fnd for advocacy on social media will become less common as social media evolve and become more deeply ingrained in the lives of Americans. Additionally, we can foresee that America’s current competitiveness will probably not last, as the history of elections in the United States oscillates between periods of partisan dominance and robust competition. Specifc predictions about the ideological direction or party that will become dominant are more than likely going to fail because the multiplicity of factors that produce these electoral realignments are near impossible to foresee with accuracy. Nonetheless, it is possible and reasonable to assume the pendulum of American political competitiveness will swing back toward the less competition side in the future. Issue evolution will produce partisan shifts that correspond with electoral dominance (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989). Policy entrepreneurship will allow one party to seize on an issue or a host of issues that engage the public and cause it to see them as the best party to solve this previously unconsidered policy problems (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Issue ownership will allow this party to dominate for decades (e.g., Egan 2013). Electoral realignment cycles, to the extent they are discernable and empirically valid (Mayhew 2008), are commonly suggested to be 30 years in the making (Burnham 1971). An electoral realignment that produces partisan dominance will naturally lead

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to less political advocacy because the elections will be competitive and seem less momentous. Of the potential causes of decreased political engagement, perhaps the most obvious cause would be that parties become less sorted and ideologically coherent. Currently, the Democratic and Republican parties are incredibly polarized (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019), but it need not always be this way. Elections in the United States are predicated on single-member districts with frst-past-the-post elections. These electoral systems almost always result in a two-party system (Duverger 1963; Riker 1982). Party politics and American political behavior related to parties in the United States is a function of Duverger’s Law and historical processes that created a highly antagonistic party system. Beyond the original period in the 1820s, the United States has had several “Eras of Good Feelings” whereby the parties were not so clearly ideologically diferentiated—such as the middle of the 20th century, often typifed by the “Cold War Consensus.” During these periods, particularly in the post-war era, partisanship primarily functioned as a sociological process handed down from one generation to the next, but generally weaker with each step (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). As partisanship increasingly weakened, the United States saw the rise of numerous intra-party (e.g., Wallace in 1968, Reagan in 1968, Kennedy in 1980, and Buchannan in 1992 to name a few) third-party challengers who had impressive showings in popular vote (e.g., Wallace, Anderson, and Perot) and Electoral College votes (e.g., Wallace), but the two-party dominance persisted and participation waned (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Eras where the two major parties operate more toward valance issues (e.g., Stokes 1963)—where everyone agrees on the importance of an issue but how to deal with it is the debate—may result in less engagement from the electorate overall, and there is no reason to assume that this cannot happen again. If either of these two factors of competitiveness or contentiousness decreases, our results suggest that we can expect less advocacy in the future. In many ways, the current period—ideologically distinct parties and increasingly polarized mass politics—is optimal to produce advocates and the arguments about politics that follow. Though we cannot know how or when the American political system will evolve, we can be sure that change will happen. It is important for future researchers to continue to study political advocacy because the evolution of the American political system may afect advocacy in the ways we theorize, or it may be something entirely diferent. In the meantime, we believe that there are at least seven areas with great potential that future research should investigate.

Seven Topics for Future Research Because advocacy is understudied, there are ample avenues for future research. First, there are ways to improve on the research we have in this book. For instance, more work should be invested in testing the determinants of advocacy

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within social networks. We test the likelihood of advocacy to advocacy targets with varying relationships to the experimental participants, but there are better designs—such as snowball surveys—to approach this question. As with our research, these empirical questions are often unable to be fully tested due to data availability issues but should be the focus of future research. Beyond improving the research we present in this book, there are seven topics that may afect advocacy but are currently unanswered and will beneft political science, generally, by being investigated more fully.

Heated Elite Rhetoric Efforts and Fighting About Politics One issue commonly discussed is how heated elite rhetoric may make the public more willing to argue with each other. If elites are more willing to trash their opposition, it might make their followers more willing to get into heated arguments as well. We know that elites have become more polarized and this has led to an increase in rhetoric that in a prior era would have been unacceptable (e.g., see Mann and Ornstein 2016). We do not currently know at what level this intense rhetoric will infuence the average person to become more hostile to those who think diferently than them. It is possible that, as with other trends in polarization, norms of communication at the elite level will be instructive for norms of communication amongst the mass public (Abramowitz 2010). If elites violate these norms and produce rhetoric that is argumentative and belligerent, it is plausible that those who listen to these elites will see it as acceptable to also be argumentative and belligerent. Future researchers should closely examine the changes in elite rhetoric and how this infuences the public’s willingness to engage in political argumentation. The relationship between political rhetoric and public opinion is intensely debated. There are some scholars who believe that rhetoric can frame public opinion and is able to sway the public in the familiar “bully pulpit” process (Kernell 2006). Additionally, there has been a large amount of work on agenda setting whereby elites are able to get the public to focus on a particular issue (Canes-Wrone 2006). In particular, presidential rhetoric has been able to focus public opinion on issues on which the president commonly speaks (Tulis 1987). Finally, elite rhetoric can help prime issues so that the president or an elected ofcial is evaluated by considerations of their performance on the focused policy (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). To summarize these three strands of literature, these scholars show the political rhetoric infuences both public’s opinion on matters and their consideration of issues. There is, however, a large literature that the pushes back against the conception of elite rhetoric as a “hypodermic needle of efect” whereby what the president or other elected ofcials say is directly infuential on the public (Edwards 2006). The minimal efects paradigm suggests that political beliefs

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are so inculcated, pre-considered and attached to partisan identifcation, that elite rhetoric will not be signifcantly infuential (Klapper 1960). Thus, it is unclear whether elite rhetoric will be infuential in making people more likely to engage in arguments within interpersonal communication and this would be an interesting place for researchers to further pursue the fndings of this book.

Two-Step Flow and Fighting About Politics A more nuanced understanding of modern communication is derived from the minimal efects paradigm that suggests is that there is a two-step fow whereby opinion leaders who are interested in politics listen to elites and spread their message to their social network through political discussion (Katz 1957). One possible mechanism for elite infuence of arguing about politics is that as the elites become more belligerent to each other, opinion leaders will feel more comfortable being belligerent to dissension in their social network. In this case, the mechanism by which elites are infuential will be through opinion leaders. As elite rhetoric becomes more heated, we can expect opinion leaders to push their opinion more strongly within their network. If this happens, we can expect opinion leaders to engage in more argumentation. The key distinction from the causal relationship that was described in the preceding section is that it posits that not all people will engage in more heated rhetoric, simply those who are highly interested in politics and are therefore more likely to have more exposure to belligerent and argumentative elite rhetoric. As most people do not have a deep abiding interest in the nuances of elite communication, it is highly unlikely that the average person will have much infuence in their communicative processes by hearing elites discuss politics in a more heated fashion. However, for those few Americans who make a hobby of politics, commonly listen to political rhetoric, and are deeply attached to the issues that are being debated, it is plausible that these people will have a greater propensity to be infuenced by the violation of norms of communication in the current era of elite polarization. An interesting avenue for future researchers is to investigate whether opinion leaders have changed the way they communicate to those in their network as elites have changed their norms of communication. Of note, is that mass media has also changed its norms of communication, as cable news opinion shows, talk radio and political blogs have all featured an increase in heated political rhetoric and trash talking (Berry and Sobieraj 2013; Bostdorf 2017; Cohen 2015; Jamieson and Cappella 2010). As opinion leaders are more likely to consume this media (Katz 2001), it is also interesting to investigate whether these changes in media discourse have infuenced opinion leaders to change their ways of communicating within their network.

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Differential Effects by Social Media Platform It will also be interesting to examine the infuence of social media disaggregated by specifc platforms. Communication via Twitter is diferent than communication via Facebook and its efects will probably also be diferent. Diferentiation occurs due to what the technology allows, such as Twitter’s character limitations, and also in the informal norms of what is acceptable to be communicated on these platforms. Additionally, as a response to the foreign infuence in the 2016 election, the 2020 novel coronavirus pandemic, and trolling generally, these social media platforms have developed diferent standards of acceptable communication that are enforced through algorithmic processes which are proprietary to each platform (Feiner 2020; Heilweil 2020; McAlone 2016). Therefore, each proprietary algorithmic enforcement mechanism will eliminate diferent styles of speech because they are calculated in a diferential manner. Studying confict through social media should be considered on a platformspecifc basis. Statements such as “social media has X efect” are near meaningless because each social media platform has vastly diferent communication processes and norms (Bond and Messing 2015; Vargo et  al. 2014). Better research on social media will specify the exact communicative process that is allowed on the platform and how those diferences have generated diferences in communicative norms over argumentation. As such, it is important for researchers to diferentiate the specifc social media platform and its specifc efects on how political argumentation happens. Specifcally, researchers should analyze communication that happens both in public and in private, as these diferences will be dictated by what is allowed to be held private on the platform. We can expect argumentation that is in public to be radically diferent than argumentation that is held private, as selfcensorship and image management are prime considerations in social media communication. As some platforms allow greater control over what can and cannot be seen by those outside of the communication dyad, we can expect diferences based on platform in the hostility and belligerent of the arguments that are made. Thus, future researcher examining political fghting online should consider the diferences of specifc social media platforms in-depth.

GOTV Efforts and Fighting About Politics We know from experimental research that there are superior methods for motivating voters (e.g., Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003). Researchers should investigate whether these strategies are also efective at inducing advocacy for candidates. There has been a tremendous increase in interest in mobilization in the last 30 years. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) showed that mobilization is one of the key elements that determines whether someone gets involved in politics. Part of this

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increase in interest is also due to more rigorous scientifc eforts to understand get out the vote (GOTV) eforts, such as the famous Gerber and Green (2000) experiments. These experiments convincingly show that GOTV eforts will increase turnout by a small amount. These experiments have been tried now in dozens of situations with a multitude of communication devices, such as phone calls, door knocking, postcards and so on and most of them have been able to show small efects in boosting turnout in convincing feld experiments (see Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Green and Gerber 2019; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003). Primarily, door knocking is the one method that has been shown to have the greatest efect on the propensity to vote. As campaign strategists seek to expand their margins in competitive elections, the 2- or 3-percentage point increase in vote share demonstrated in the Gerber and Green experiments are persuasive because in many elections margins this small can be determinative. Because of this, modern campaigns are laser-focused in generating mobilization through GOTV eforts. In a sense, these campaigns are creating advocates for their candidate who, even if they can convince one or two friends or relatives to support their candidate, can help move an election in the aggregate (e.g., see Del Deo and Stern 2006). Mobilization, especially through door knocking, is really a form of structured advocacy, as it features interpersonal communication designed to change inform and ofer alternative vote options, or at least infuence the choice whether to vote or not. Campaign volunteerism—unlike traditional, interpersonal advocacy that is done with friends and family—is done to someone whom the volunteer has never met before and they are potentially disturbing by knocking on their door or calling them without being invited. This seems to be a situation rife for confict. Interrupting someone from their daily lives to push a candidate in a highly contentious and competitive election will probably provoke arguing and fghting about the election in some cases. Yet, currently there is no literature to our knowledge that analyzes in-depth the potential for this institutionalized form of advocacy to provoke greater fghting about politics. Future research would beneft by examining this potential issue.

Effects for Different Types of Campaign Spending In Chapter 4 we show that campaign spending correlates with greater advocacy. Additionally, show that there is an interactive efect between campaign spending and political interest and political knowledge. We have not, to this point, examined specifc types of spending and their efects on advocacy due to the imprecision of our data. We use only aggregate totals of spending for Republican and Democratic candidates. More nuanced spending measures are needed to appropriately test these efects. It may be interesting for future researchers to investigate specifc types of spending such as advertising on social media vis-a-vis advertising on television, or researchers may be able to adjudicate the diference between

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the cost-per-vote for GOTV eforts or other types of spending and the relationship with political advocacy. There is a largely held worry that campaign advertising is a negative force in modern elections. The ability of campaigns to manipulate voters through salacious and provocative campaign advertising has been a constant source of consternation (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Because of the frst amendment, advertising is unvetted with only minimal restraints on what is disallowed. Campaigns utilize advertising to highlight hot-button issues and often engage in forms of demagoguery. Campaign advertising is also often rife with halftruths, misinformation, and dishonesty (Brader 2006). It is highly plausible that these hot-button issues will stimulate voters to care more about the election after viewing the advertisement. If they care more, then they may be more likely to advocate to others about the issues that discussed in the ad. Thus, we can expect that greater campaign spending on advertising leads to more political advocacy. It is also possible that hiring campaign organizers—who typically facilitate GOTV eforts—is another type of campaign spending that especially encourages advocacy. Also, given the nature of our data, our results only test total spending by the campaigns themselves. In the years after Citizens United, SuperPACs and other big-money groups are increasingly important for advertising and all other types of electioneering activities (Klumpp, Mialon, and Williams 2016). Future research in this area should examine spending by groups other than the candidate’s own organization. Additionally, we attempted to ascertain the diferences between the parties in terms of hard spending, but the results were somewhat mixed. These issues would be fruitful for future researchers to investigate.

Conspiracy Theories and Fighting About Politics Another commonly discussed worry about modern politics is the spread of conspiracy theories (Oliver and Wood 2014; Richey 2017). A conspiracy theorist is a political advocate under our defnition because they are trying to change someone’s mind about a political issue. While it is true that conspiracy theories have been a well-established part of American life for decades (Cheathem 2019; Cleaves 2019), modern expressions of these theories are more easily detected through social media. In previous eras, conspiracy theories were largely shunned by mass media, and therefore less likely to be discovered by the average person except through idiosyncratic word-of-mouth or chain-letter events. In the modern context, due to algorithms in social media which produce recommendations based on the number of prior clicks, infuriating posts which posit conspiracy theories are often rage-clicked by people who are against these conspiracy theories (Peters 2017). Yet, each click generates more likelihood that the algorithm will uprank the post and show it more often to others (Lee 2016). As more and more people click the infuriating conspiracy theory post, a vicious

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cycle escalates where it becomes even more likely to be viewed. This process generates the viral spread of misinformation even as some social media frms are trying to quell this behavior (e.g., Chokkattu 2016). It is important to note that most clicks and those engaging are people arguing with the conspiracy theorists. This means that the number of views is not a valid measure of how many people in the population endorse the conspiracy theory. Many of these clicks will lead to heated arguments over the conspiracy theory, so arguing with conspiracy theories is a form of political argumentation based on political advocacy. Because conspiracy theories are advocates and this advocacy is leading to increased argumentation, future research is into how political ideas and political advocacy leads to increased political fghting should specifcally examine the highly contentious subject of conspiracy theories and how these interrelate with an increase of incivility.

Fighting About Politics in Comparative Perspective We have chosen the United States to study, but almost three billion people live in countries with signifcant electoral competition (Dalton 2013). Each one of these nations has specifc histories and deeply rooted animosities that will express themselves in electoral processes. Oftentimes religious ethnic cleavages and past historical disputes manifest themselves in the party system, so it is highly plausible that political arguments will fow directly from people advocating for political parties that are attached or represents a hated outgroup. While political arguments in most advanced democracies do not lead to political violence, electoral violence is commonplace and often extreme in the developing world. Those who wish to study electoral violence would beneft by examining the causal mechanisms explicated in this book. It seems that political advocacy in societies with deeply held animosities would lead to political arguments and a small percentage of them would escalate into political violence. Conversely, Mutz (2006) clearly shows that homogeneous networks produce participation, while heterogeneous networks promote tolerance without encouraging participation. Researchers should examine whether these same conditions hold for advocacy in other nations. More specifcally, researchers should examine post-confict developing democracies, to determine if the prior conficting groups associate with political parties and examine if any subsequent advocacy for those political parties lead to new outbreaks of confict.

Final Thoughts One of the most discussed issues of the last two decades has been the increasing acrimony in American politics. Rarely does a day go by that newspapers do not have an opinion-editorial lamenting the increased incivility in politics in the United States. An important role for social science is to arbitrate whether

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perceived social problems are in fact legitimate. We have taken this approach with political fghting by creating a novel theory, tested with rigorous empirical methods and data analysis to determine the causes and outcomes of advocacy. Our research has shown that this increase is caused by our competitive and contentious elections combined with the social network and individual-level factors. Our research is benefted from multimethod approach that examined qualitative, quantitative, and experimental research methods. We show that fghting is often an outcome of a healthy aspect of robust democratic processes and political advocacy. Political advocacy is the necessary outcome of an enthusiastic and engaged democratic citizenry and it is not something to fear, but to encourage. This normatively benefcial activity leads to greater political acrimony. It is possible that the level of acrimony could rise to such an extent that there could be political violence, which would be something to take much more seriously. Currently, however, there is not large-scale political violence despite the relatively high levels of political hostilities in America. We have argued, that, in fact, one of the reasons that we do not have political violence is that people can freely express, without trepidation or fear, their beliefs and support for candidates. We began this book by showing that over half the public advocated for a candidate in the 2016 presidential elections. To be sure, many of these advocates got into hostile arguments that may result in anger for their counterpart or the positions of their discussion partner. If we only examine the rancor, it is tempting to think that our politics are headed down a path of unsustainable confict. However, acrimony in the United States is a function of the success of our democratic system, not a symbol of its failure. The free expression of endorsements of political candidates and the vigorous robust debate that fows from openly supporting candidates is a demonstration of the vitality of the American system. Far from apathetic, we see that politics in the United States is enthusiastic and invigorated. As an outcome of this enthusiasm, our politics have rowdy public debates flled with exaggerations, insults, convoluted arguments, and an occasional piece of wisdom. It is certainly better to be this way because without vigorous debate, we have a quiescent public who simply take what they are given without the exercise of important democratic rights and responsibilities.

References Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Abramowitz, Alan, and Jennifer McCoy. 2019. “United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump’s America.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681 (1): 137–56. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002716218811309. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2010. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. 2nd Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

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Berry, Jefrey M., and Sarah Sobieraj. 2013. The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Bond, Robert, and Solomon Messing. 2015. “Quantifying Social Media’s Political Space: Estimating Ideology from Publicly Revealed Preferences on Facebook.” American Political Science Review 109 (1): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000525. Bostdorf, Denise M. 2017. “Obama, Trump, and Refections on the Rhetoric of Political Change.” Rhetoric and Public Afairs 20 (4): 695–706. Brader, Ted. 2006. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat.” American Journal of Political Science 52: 959–78. Burnham, Walter Dean. 1971. Critical Elections: And the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cheathem, Mark R. 2019. “Conspiracy Theories Abounded in 19th-Century American Politics.” Smithsonian Magazine, April 11. www.smithsonianmag.com/history/ conspiracy-theories-abounded-19th-century-american-politics-180971940/. Chokkattu, Julian. 2016. “New Google Algorithm Lowers Search Rankings for Holocaust Denial Sites.” Digital Trends, December 25. www.digitaltrends.com/web/googlesearch-holocaust/. Cleaves, Rachel Hope. 2019. “Perspective | Why Americans Turn to Conspiracy Theories.” Washington Post, October 21. www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/21/ why-americans-turn-conspiracy-theories/. Cohen, Dan. 2015. “What the Google Books Victory Means for Readers.” The Atlantic, October 22. www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/what-the-googlebooks-victory-means-for-readers-and-libraries/411910/. Dalton, Russell J. 2013. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 6th Edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Del Deo, Adam, and James D. Stern. 2006. So Goes the Nation. Documentary Film. IFC Film. Duverger, Maurice. 1963. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York, NY: Wiley. Edwards, George C. 2006. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Egan, Patrick J. 2013. Partisan Priorities: How Issue Ownership Drives and Distorts American Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Feiner, Lauren. 2020. “Schif to Google and Twitter: Please Be More Like Facebook When It Comes to Coronavirus Misinformation.”CNBC, April 30. www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/ schif-asks-tech-frms-to-follow-facebooks-lead-on-misinformation.html. Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2000. “The Efects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” American Political Science Review 94 (03): 653–63. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585837. Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” American Political Science Review 102 (1): 33–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540808009X.

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Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2019. Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Green, Donald P., Alan S. Gerber, and David W. Nickerson. 2003. “Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments.” Journal of Politics 65 (4): 1083–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00126. Heilweil, Rebecca. 2020. “Twitter Now Labels Misleading Coronavirus Tweets with a Misleading Label.” Vox, May 11. www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/11/21254889/ twitter-coronavirus-covid-misinformation-warnings-labels. Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. News That Matters: Television and American Opinion, Updated Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Jamieson, K. H., and Joseph N. Cappella. 2010. Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers. 2009. “Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined.” The Journal of Politics 71 (3): 782–99. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0022381609090719. Katz, Elihu. 1957. “The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis.” Public Opinion Quarterly 21 (1): 61–78. https://doi.org/10.1086/266687. ———. 2001. “Media Efects.” In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, 12:9472–9. Cambridge, UK: Elsevier. Kernell, Samuel. 2006. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. 4th Edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Kingdon, John W. 1970. “Opinion Leaders in the Electorate.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (2): 256–61. Klapper, Joseph T. 1960. The Efects of Mass Communication. New York, NY: Free Press. Klumpp, Tilman, Hugo M. Mialon, and Michael A. Williams. 2016. “The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections.” The Journal of Law and Economics 59 (1): 1–43. https://doi.org/10.1086/685691. Lee, Newton, ed. 2016. Google It: Total Information Awareness. New York, NY: Springer. Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. 2016. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York, NY: Basic Books. Mayhew, David R. 2008. Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. McAlone, Nathan. 2016. “Google Does a Better Job with Fake News Than Facebook, But There’s a Big Loophole It Hasn’t Fixed.” Business Insider, November 19. www. businessinsider.com/google-has-a-fake-news-loophole-2016-11. Mondak, Jefery J. 2010. Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Mutz, Diana C. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Oliver, J. Eric, and Thomas J. Wood. 2014. “Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(s) of Mass Opinion.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (4): 952–66. https:// doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12084. Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Peters, Jeremy W. 2017. “A Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theorist, a False Tweet and a Runaway Story.”The New York Times, June 10, sec. Politics. www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/ us/politics/comey-fake-news-twitter-posobiec.html.

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Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Richey, Sean. 2017. “A Birther and a Truther: The Infuence of the Authoritarian Personality on Conspiracy Beliefs.” Politics & Policy 45 (3): 465–85. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/polp.12206. Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” American Political Science Review 76 (4): 753–66. https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400189580. Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York, NY: Macmillan. Stokes, Donald E. 1963. “Spatial Models of Party Competition.” The American Political Science Review 57 (2): 368–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/1952828. Tulis, Jefrey K. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vargo, Chris J., Lei Guo, Maxwell McCombs, and Donald L. Shaw. 2014. “Network Issue Agendas on Twitter during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election.” Journal of Communication 64 (2): 296–316. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12089.

APPENDIX Political Advocacy and American Politics

Summer 2019 Nationally Representative Survey Informed Consent Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this survey. Before continuing, please read and agree with the following statements. •

• • • • • • • • •

I agree to participate in this study, and I afrm that I am 18 years of age or older. I understand that the intent of this research is to gather opinions and experiences on various political and social events, and beliefs. Additionally, . . . I understand that my participation in this online survey is voluntary and that the time required to participate will not exceed 25 minutes. I understand that all information I provide is confdential and that my name will at no point be associated with any information I provide herein. I understand that my IP address will not be revealed. I understand that the research has no known risks to me. I understand that I may skip any questions that I do not wish to answer. I understand that I am being ofered the opportunity to participate in this survey because I am part of a Qualtrics survey panel. I have the right to stop participation at any time without penalty. I also understand that if I do not respond in the afrmative to the following two questions the survey will be terminated, and no information will be collected.

Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or

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problems regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, #0111, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268. If you have any questions regarding this study, please reference Study #19-535.

Affrm Age •

I am at least 18 years old. • •

Yes. No.

Partisan Identifcation •

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, and independent, what? • • • •

Democrat. Republican. Independent. Something else.

Strong Democrat if “Democrat” selected. •

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? • •

Strong Democrat. Not very strong Democrat.

Strong Republican if “Republican” selected. •

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? • •

Strong Republican. Not very strong Republican.

Partisan Lean if “Independent” selected. •

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? • • •

Closer to the Republican Party. Closer to the Democratic Party. Neither.

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Ideology •

When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative? • • • • • • •

Very conservative. Somewhat conservative. Slightly conservative. Moderate; middle of the road. Slightly liberal. Somewhat liberal. Very liberal.

Trump Feeling Thermometer •

We would now like to get a sense of your opinion about President Donald Trump. Please rate your feelings toward President Trump using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward the individual/group; ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorably toward the individual/group, that you don’t care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50-degree mark if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the individual/group. •

Slider ranging from 0 to 100.

Vote Trump •

If the election for President was being held today, how likely is it that you would vote for President Donald Trump. • • • • • • •

Very unlikely. Unlikely. Somewhat unlikely. Undecided. Somewhat likely. Likely. Very likely.

Gender •

Are you male or female? • •

Male. Female.

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Married •

Are you married, widowed, divorced, separated, or never married? • • • • •

Married. Widowed. Divorced. Separated. Never married.

Race •

Please check the category below to indicate what race(s) you consider yourself to be. • • • • • •

White. Black or African American. American Indian or Alaskan native. Asian/Pacifc Islander. Multi-racial. Other.

Hispanic/Latino •

Are you of Spanish, Hispanic or Latino descent? • • • • • • • •

No, I am not. Yes, Mexican. Yes, Puerto Rican. Yes, Cuban. Yes, Central American. Yes, South American. Yes, Caribbean. Yes, other.

Employed •

Are you currently employed full-time? • •

Yes. No.

Church Attendance •

We’d like to know how often you went to religious services during the past 12 months, not including weddings or funerals. You can answer in

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any of the fve diferent ways below; whichever one would be most accurate for you. • • • • •

More than once a week. About once a week. About once a month. A few times. Did not go at all.

Follow News •

How closely are you following news about the 2020 presidential election? • • • •

Very closely. Somewhat closely. Not too closely. Not at all.

Political Knowledge •

For how many years is a United States Senator elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of ofce for a US Senator? •

•

Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court? •

•

Open-ended response.

How many US Senators are there from each state? •

•

Open-ended response.

Who is the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom? •

•

Open-ended response.

Open-ended response.

Which party currently holds the majority in the United States House of Representatives? •

Open-ended response.

Tolerance •

Please express your thoughts on the following perspective: “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are diferent from our own. • •

Yes, I agree. I agree to a certain extent.

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• • •

133

I can neither agree nor disagree. I do not think so. I disagree.

Big Five •

We’re interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. • • • • • • • • • •

Extraverted, enthusiastic . . . Critical, quarrelsome . . . Dependable, self-disciplined . . . Anxious, easily upset . . . Open to new experiences, complex . . . Reserved, quiet . . . Sympathetic, warm . . . Disorganized, careless . . . Calm, emotionally stable . . . Conventional, uncreative . . . •

Describes me . . . • • • • • • •

Extremely poorly. Somewhat poorly. A little poorly. Neither poorly nor well. A little well. Somewhat well. Extremely well.

Social Capital •

Now, tell us about how actively you participate in voluntary or charity groups, such as the PTA, recreational sports leagues or civic organizations like the Rotary Club? • • • • • •

Daily. More than once a week. Once a week. Once a month. Once a year. Almost never.

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Vote •

Are you currently registered to vote? • •

Yes. No.

Vote Often •

How often do you vote in national elections? • • • •

Never. Rarely. Sometimes. Often.

Face-to-Face Block (question order randomized)

Family •

How likely would you be to try to persuade a family member to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation in person? • • • • •

Extremely likely. Somewhat likely Neither likely nor unlikely. Somewhat unlikely. Extremely unlikely.

Friend •

How likely would you be to try to persuade a friend to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation in person? •

Answer choices match ‘family.’

Stranger •

How likely would you be to try to persuade someone you do not know too well to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation in person? •

Answer choices match ‘family.’

Social Media Block (question order randomized)

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Family •

How likely would you be to try to persuade a family member to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation on social media, such as Facebook or Twitter? • • • • •

Extremely likely. Somewhat likely Neither likely nor unlikely. Somewhat unlikely. Extremely unlikely.

Friend •

How likely would you be to try to persuade a friend to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation on social media, such as Facebook or Twitter? •

Answer choices match ‘family.’

Stranger •

How likely would you be to try to persuade someone you do not know too well to vote for a candidate they do not currently support in a conversation on social media, such as Facebook or Twitter? •

Answer choices match ‘family.’

Fall 2019 Student Sample List Experiment For the 2019 student sample, the pre-test questions are the same as the pre-test questions in the Summer 2019 nationally representative sample noted above.

Informed Consent Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this survey. Before continuing, please read and agree with the following statements. I agree to participate in this study, and I afrm that I am 18 years of age or older. I understand that the intent of this research is to gather opinions and experiences on various political and social events, and beliefs. Additionally, . . . •

I understand that my participation in this online survey is voluntary and that the time required to participate will not exceed 25 minutes.

136 Appendix

• • • • •

I understand that all information I provide is confdential and that my name will at no point be associated with any information I provide herein. I understand that my IP address will be collected but will not be revealed. I understand that the research has no known risks to me. I understand that by participating in this research project I will receive an incentive of I have the right to stop participation at any time without penalty. I also understand that if I do not respond in the afrmative to the following two questions, the survey will be terminated, and no information will be collected.

Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, #0111, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-6407. If you have any questions regarding this study, please reference Study 20-158: Fall 2019 POLS 1101 Student Survey *** Non-Social Media Block (question order randomized)

Stranger •

Imagine Election Day is in less than a month. How likely are you to try to persuade someone you do not know too well to vote for a candidate they do not currently support by using any of the following methods? • • • • •

Face-to-face conversations. In a written letter. On a phone call. In an email. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). •

Answers via Likert scale below . . . • • • • •

Extremely likely. Somewhat likely. Neither likely nor unlikely. Somewhat unlikely. Extremely unlikely.

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Family •

Imagine Election Day is in less than a month. How likely are you to try to persuade a family member to vote for a candidate they do not currently support by using any of the following methods? • • • • •

Face-to-face conversations. In a written letter. On a phone call. In an email. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). •

Five-point Likert scale.

Friend •

Imagine Election Day is in less than a month. How likely are you to try to persuade a friend to vote for a candidate they do not currently support by using any of the following methods? • • • • •

Face-to-face conversations. In a written letter. On a phone call. In an email. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). •

Five-point Likert scale.

Social Media Block (question order randomized)

Stranger •

Imagine Election Day is in less than a month. How likely are you to try to persuade someone you do not know too well to vote for a candidate they do not currently support by using any of the following methods? • • • • • •

Social media such as Facebook or Twitter. Face-to-face conversations. In a written letter. On a phone call. In an email. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). •

Answers via Likert scale below . . . • •

Extremely likely. Somewhat likely.

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• • •

Neither likely nor unlikely. Somewhat unlikely. Extremely unlikely.

Family •

Imagine Election Day is in less than a month. How likely are you to try to persuade a family member to vote for a candidate they do not currently support by using any of the following methods? • • • • • •

Social media such as Facebook or Twitter. Face-to-face conversations. In a written letter. On a phone call. In an email. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). •

Five-point Likert scale.

Friend •

Imagine Election Day is in less than a month. How likely are you to try to persuade a friend to vote for a candidate they do not currently support by using any of the following methods? • • • • • •

Social media such as Facebook or Twitter. Face-to-face conversations. In a written letter. On a phone call. In an email. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). •

Five-point Likert scale.

Winter 2020 MTurk Qualitative Survey Informed Consent Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this survey. Before continuing, please read and agree with the following statements. I agree to participate in this study, and I afrm that I am 18 years of age or older. I understand that the intent of this research is to gather your opinions

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and behaviors related to political advocacy and political communication in the United States. Additionally, . . . • • • • • •

I understand that my participation in this online survey is voluntary and that the time required to participate will be around 15 minutes. I understand that all information I provide is confdential and that my name will at no point be associated with any information I provide herein. I understand that my IP address will not be collected or revealed. I understand that the research has no known risks or direct benefts to me. I have the right to stop participation at any time without penalty. I also understand that if I do not respond in the afrmative to the following two questions, the survey will be terminated and no information will be collected.

Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3417, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-6407. If you have any questions regarding this study, please reference Study #20-388

Age •

What is your year of birth? •

Open-ended response.

Education •

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? • • • • • • • •

Less than high school degree. High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED). Some college but no degree. Associate degree in college (2-year). Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year). Master’s degree. Doctoral degree. Professional degree (JD, MD).

140 Appendix

Gender •

What is your gender? • •

Male. Female.

Ethnicity •

Are you Spanish, Hispanic, Latino, or none of these? • •

Yes. None of these.

Race •

Choose one or more of the races that you consider yourself to be . . . • • • • • •

White. Black or African American. American Indian or Alaska Native. Asian. Native Hawaiian or Pacifc Islander. Other. •

Select all that apply.

Partisan Identifcation •

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, an Independent or something else? • • • • •

Republican. Democrat. Independent. Other (fll in the blank). No preference.

Ideology •

Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal (left) to extremely conservative (right). Where would you place yourself on this scale. •

Slider.

Appendix

141

Big Five •

We’re interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following pair of words describes you, even if one word describes you better than the other. • • • • • • • • • •

Extraverted, enthusiastic . . . Critical, quarrelsome . . . Dependable, self-disciplined . . . Anxious, easily upset . . . Open to new experiences, complex . . . Reserved, quiet . . . Sympathetic, warm . . . Disorganized, careless . . . Calm, emotionally stable . . . Conventional, uncreative . . . •

Describes me . . . • • • • • • •

Extremely poorly. Somewhat poorly. A little poorly. Neither poorly nor well. A little well. Somewhat well. Extremely well.

Advocacy—Introduction We are now going to ask you some questions about things you might do during political campaign season. When answering these questions, think back to the 2012 or 2016 presidential campaigns or consider how you might act now or in the run up to 2020.

Advocate •

Generally speaking, do you try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in an election? • •

Yes. No.

If “Yes” on Advocacy

142 Appendix

Advocacy Detail •

We’d like to know more about your response . . . In a few sentences using the textbox below, please tell us why you try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in elections. •

Open-ended response; Textbox.

Advocacy How •

When you attempt to persuade other to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in elections, which communication methods are you most likely to use? • • • • • •

Face-to-face communication. Social media such as Facebook or Twitter. In a written letter. On a phone call. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). Other.

How Detail •

You said you usually try to advocate with the following method: *piped text from previous answer here*. . . Using a few sentences in the textbox below, please tell us why you would choose that method to persuade others. •

Open-ended response; Textbox.

If “No” on Advocacy

Advocacy No Detail •

We’d like to know more about your response . . . In a few sentences using the textbox below, please tell us why you do not try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in elections. •

Open-ended response; Textbox.

Spring 2020 MTurk Qualitative Survey **This is a revision to Study #20-388; the same informed consent is used for this sample. Additionally, the front-end pre-qualitative questions are also identical.

Advocacy—Introduction We are now going to ask you some questions about things you might do during political campaign season.

Appendix

143

When answering these questions, think back to the 2012 or 2016 presidential campaigns or consider how you might act now or in the run up to 2020.

Advocate •

Generally speaking, do you try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in an election? • •

Yes. No.

If “Yes” on Advocate

Fighting •

How often did you fght about politics with those to whom you advocated? • • • • •

Always. Most of the time. About half the time. Sometimes. Never.

Angry •

Who got angry most of the time? • • • • •

It was only them. It was mostly them. It was both of us. It was mostly me. It was only me.

Calm •

How often did you have calm discussions about the topic? • • • • •

Always. Most of the time. About half the time. Sometimes. Never.

Fight Qualitative •

In a few sentences, describe why you decided to advocate with them even though it might have ended up in a fght? •

Open-ended; Textbox.

144 Appendix

Fighting Diffculty •

In a few sentences, describe how difcult fghting about politics was for you. •

Open-ended; Textbox.

Advocacy How •

When you attempt to persuade other to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in elections, which communication methods are you most likely to use? • • • • • •

Face-to-face communication. Social media such as Facebook or Twitter. In a written letter. On a phone call. Over text message (e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp, SMS, SnapChat, etc). Other.

How Detail •

You said you usually try to advocate with the following method: *piped text from previous answer here*. . . Using a few sentences in the textbox below, please tell us why you would choose that method to persuade others. •

Open-ended response; Textbox.

If “No” on Advocate

Advocacy No Multi-Select •

Please tell us why you did not try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in elections. Click all that apply. • • • • •

I want to avoid fghting with them. I don’t care about politics. It is not normally what I talk about. I didn’t like any of the candidates. Other reason.

Advocacy No Detail •

We’d like to know more about your response . . . In a few sentences using the textbox below, please tell us why you do not try to persuade people to vote for or against one of the candidates or parties competing in elections. •

Open-ended response; Textbox.

1.00 −0.12 −0.11 −0.08 0.09 −0.07 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.02 −0.07

Social Media Trump Thermometer Vote Trump Follow News Political Interest Reg. to Vote Vote Often Ideology Gender Age White Black

1.00 0.76* −0.009 0.09 −0.03 0.03 −0.42* 0.006 0.07 0.12* −0.06

Trump Thermometer

Note: *p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test for signifcance.

Social Media

 

1.00 −0.06 0.17* −0.04 0.03 −0.38* 0.07 0.15* 0.15* −0.15*

Vote Trump

1.00 −0.53* 0.29* −0.32* 0.02 0.05 −0.19* 0.04 −0.06

Follow News

1.00 −0.21* 0.32* −0.004 −0.012 0.21* 0.02 −0.09

Political Interest

1.00 −0.54* 0.13* 0.004 −0.12 −0.02 0.04

Reg. to Vote

1.00 0.02 0.06 0.32* 0.10 −0.11

Vote Often

1.00 0.08 0.10 0.07 −0.05

Ideology

1.00 0.45* 0.11* −0.29*

Gender

1.00 0.17* −0.29*

Age

APPENDIX TABLE 1 Pairwise Correlations With Tests for Signifcance, Nationally Representative Sample, Summer 2019

1.00 −0.43*

White

1.00

Black

Appendix 145

146 Appendix APPENDIX TABLE 2 Pairwise Correlations With Tests for Signifcance, Student Sample,

Fall 2019  

Social Media

Political Interest

Social Media 1.00 Political Interest 0.04 1.00 Dem. −0.003 −0.11* GOP 0.003 −0.05* Ideology 0.01 0.03 White −0.05 −0.08* Male −0.02 0.03 Age 0.007 −0.12*

Dem.

GOP

1.00 −0.44* −0.52* −0.32* −0.15* −0.01

1.00 0.60* 1.00 0.38* 0.26* 0.09* 0.17* −0.01 −0.01

Note: *p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test for signifcance.

Ideology White

Male

Age

1.00 −0.01 1.00 −0.03 0.006 1.00

INDEX

advocacy 2, 20–1, 31–2, 54; future of 116–17; importance 115; mode 50–3; versus political discussion 21–3; presidential candidates 3; reasons 41–4; theory of 24–31; unlikelihood 23–4 afective partisanship 12–13 agreeableness 95 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce see Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce American National Election Studies (ANES) 2 Anderson, John B. 117 ANES see American National Election Studies battleground states 8 Big Five index 6, 95 bivariate logistic regression models, Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce 63–5 blocking, social media 88–9 Bornstein, David 1 Bush, George W. 7 campaigns: future of 116–17; spending 121–2; stimulation 56–9 Carter, Jimmy 61 “citizen trustee” 23 civility, importance 5–6 civil liberties 4 Clinton, Hillary 31, 97 Coleman, John J. 26

communication: interpersonal 58–9; mode 50–3; social distancing and mode of 26–9 comparative perspective, fghting about politics 123 competitive elections 6–8, 61 confict avoidance 24, 44–5, 49–50 conscientiousness 95–6 conservatives, Republican Party identifcation 9 conspiracy theories 122–3 Democratic Party: ideology identifers 9; perceived ideology 11; see also political parties Dewey, John 21 diferential efects, social media platforms 120 Dillard, James P. 28 discussion frequency 99 Downs, Anthony 5 Duverger’s Law 117 elections: battleground states 8; competitive 6–8, 61 election-year predictors 60–2 Electoral College 7 elite polarization 8–10 elite rhetoric 118–19 experience 96 face-to-face discussions 114 Federalist No. 10 4

148 Index

fghting about politics 45–9; comparative perspective 123; conspiracy theories 122–3; two-step fow 119 Gastil, John 28 Geer, John G. 5 get out the vote (GOTV) eforts see GOTV (get out the vote) eforts Gore, Al 7 GOTV (get out the vote) eforts 120–1 Habermas, Jürgen 21 Halperin, Karen D. 30–1 Hansen, John Mark 25 heuristics 24 Hogan, Robert E. 26 homogeneity, ideological 10 Huckfeldt, Robert 21, 28 ideology: homogeneity 10; partisan sorting 8–10; perceived 11 incivility 1, 3–5 individual-level predictors 61–2 interpersonal communication 58–9 Johnson, Paul E. 21, 28 Katz, Elihu 28 Kennedy, Ted 117 Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 28 logistic regression results, Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce 65–6 Madison, James 4 Manna, Paul F. 26 McGovern, George 61 Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce 37–9, 71–3; interaction efects 66–71; methodology 62–3; results 63–71; summary statistics and demographics 39–41 media consumption 99 methodology: ANSE study 13–15; Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce 62–3 mobilization eforts 120–1 mode of communication 50–3 Mondak, Jefery J. 30–1 Mondale, Walter 61 MTurk Qualitative Survey 138–45 multivariate logistic regression results, Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workforce 65–6 Mutz, Diana C. 27–8

nationally representative survey 128–35 neuroticism 96 Nixon, Richard 61 Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth 28 non-advocacy as confict avoidance 44–5, 49–50 Obama, Barack 97 objective knowledge 24 openness 96 Ordeshook, Peter C. 6 partisan sorting 8–10 perceived ideology, partisan sorting 9 Perot, Ross 117 personality, impact on advocacy 29–31 polarization, elite 10–12 political advocacy see advocacy political discussion versus advocacy 21–3 political environment infuence 25–31 political parties: afective partisanship 12–13; elite polarization 10–12; ideology identifers 9 presidential candidates, advocacy 3 presidential races, battleground states 8 psychological impact on advocacy 29–31, 94, 110–11; results 102–7; study data 97–101; substantive efects 107–10; theory and hypotheses 95–6 Reagan, Ronald 117 Republican Party: ideology identifers 9; perceived ideology 11; see also political parties Riker, William H. 6 Romney, Mitt 97 Rosenstone, Steven J. 25 Sinclair, Betsy 6 social distancing 91–2; mode of communication 26–9; study 76–87 social media 91–2; blocking 88–9; diferential efects 120; political disagreement 87–91; study 76–87 spending, campaigns 121–2 Sprague, John 21, 28 Student Sample List Experiment 135–8 SuperPACs 97 Sydnor, Emily 5, 44 Trump, Donald 4, 31, 97 two-step fow, fghting about politics 119 Wallace, George 117