Policymaking for a Good Society: The Social Fabric Matrix Approach to Policy Analysis and Program Evaluation 0387293698, 9780387293691

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Policymaking for A Good Society: The Social Fabric Matrix Approach to Policy Analysis and Program Evaluation

Policymaking for A Good Society: The Social Fabric Matrix Approach to Policy Analysis and Program Evaluation

by F. Gregory Hayden University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Springer

Library of Congress Control Number: 2005933285 ISBN: 10: 0-387-29369-8

e-ISBN: 0-387-29370-1

ISBN-13: 978-0387-29369-1 Printed on acid-free paper © 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, Inc., 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. Printed in the United States of America. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springeronline.com

To Theresa M. Hay den

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations Preface

ix xiii

Chapters 1.

Introduction

2.

Policy Paradigms Should Be Consistent with the Complexity of Reality

13

3.

Instrumental Philosophy and Criteria

21

4.

General Systems Principles for Policy Analysis

51

5.

Social Criteria and Socioecological Indicators

61

6.

The Social Fabric Matrix

73

7.

Illustrations of the Social Fabric Matrix

109

8.

Timeliness as the Appropriate Concept of Time

145

9.

Evaluation for Sufficiency: Combining the Social Fabric Matrix and Instrumentalism

187

The Social Fabric Matrix in a Metapolicymaking Context

199

10.

1

Notes and References

229

Index

245

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Tables 3-1.

7-1.

Alternative Models and Their Explanations of Different Phenomena Cost-Plus Percentages that Multiply CIC Costs

24 119

Figures 2-1.

Policy Analysis

17

2-2.

Integrated Systems

18

3-1.

Social Policy A: Antitrust Area

35

3-2.

Six Integrated Social Policy Areas

38

5-1.

Policy Analysis Paradigm

64

5-2.

Policy Analysis Paradigm with Primary Criteria

67

6-1.

Noncommon-Denominator Process Matrix

86

6-2.

Hypothetical Social Fabric Matrix

89

6-3.

Closed Digraph

91

6-4.

Unidirectional Digraph

91

6-5.

Simple Social Fabric Matrix

92

List of Illustrations

X

6-6.

Simple Social Fabric Matrix Digraph

93

6-7.

Data Management Spread Sheet

93

6-8.

Convergence of Balanced, Unidirectional, and Centralized Systems

96

7-1.

General Social Fabric Matrix of CIC System

111

7-2.

General Social Fabric Digraph Network of CIC System

112

Social Fabric Matrix of Contracts and Costs during CIC Preoperational Phase

113

Social Fabric Digraph Network of Contracts and Costs during CIC Preoperational Phase

115

Social Fabric Matrix of Institutional Components during CIC Operational Phase

120

7-3.

7-4.

7-5.

7-6.

High Level Mapping of CIC Network Structure

7-7.

CIC Operational Cost Network

7-8.

Social Fabric Matrix of the Daily Federal Funds Market Social Fabric Digraph of the Daily Federal Funds Market

7-9.

7-10.

121 124-125

126 129

High Level Mapping of the Daily Federal Funds Market

130

7-11.

Digraph of the Open Market Desk System

131

7-12.

Digraph of the Federal Reserve System

132

List of Illustrations 7-13.

xi

Social Fabric Matrix of Components that Generate Livelihood Strategies in Theethandapattu, Tamil Nadu, India

134

SFM Digraph among Key Components of Livelihood Strategies

135

General Social Fabric Matrix for Surface Water Management in Nebraska

138

7-16.

Social Fabric Matrix of the Current Era

139

7-17.

Digraph of Relationships among Regulatory Institutions under the 1984 Legislative Bill 1106 in Nebraska

140

Relationships among Regulatory Institutions and Water Users' Institutional Organization in the Application Process

142

Evolution of Technology, Time Measurement Instruments, and Temporal Concepts

166

8-2.

Digraph of Overlapping Processes

173

8-3.

Process Digraph of Different Process Frequencies. High frequency of B is Modified for Low Frequency of A

179

Evolution of Figure 8-2 with Acquisition and Loss of Nodes and Deliveries. Loss of Nodes Indicated by Shaded Circles. New Deliveries Indicated by Dotted Lines. Nodes Lost are 3, 9, and 10. Nodes Gained are 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.

181

Wetland Ecosystem Model

190

7-14.

7-15.

7-18.

8-1.

8-4.

9-1,

xii

List of Illustrations

9-2.

Delivery Criteria Indices (m and n)

193

9-3.

Decision Space with Two Criteria Indices

193

10-1.

Policy, Strategy, and Tactics of Policymaking: Phases and Levels of Metapolicymaking

200-201

10-2.

Bureaucratic Approach

203

10-3.

Pseudostrategic Approach

204

10-4.

Scholarly-King Approach

205

PREFACE

Society, ecological systems, and technological combinations are sets of ongoing processes that are organized as integrated systems and networks. Consequently, real-world problems—whether labeled social, economic, environmental, or technical—are a result of the ongoing processes that organize and coordinate integrated parts to make undesirable deliveries to each other. Furthermore, the processes are guided by numerous policies and concomitant rules, regulations, requirements, and enforced behavioral patterns. Therefore, there is no reason to expect processes to change or problems to be solved without policy changes. The processes are ongoing, so changes in undesirable deliveries are dependent on changes in policies. One premise of this book is that too often policy analysis is conducted with knowledge bases and tools that are not appropriate for the task of analyzing and understanding complex socioecological and sociotechnical systems leading to wasted resources, policy failure, and frustration. The conjunction of the complexity of problem contexts and inappropriate policymaking that follows from insufficient analysis has left citizens frustrated and bewildered. Citizens want problems solved, yet they have lost faith in the ability of policymakers to implement solutions necessary to achieve a good society. Another premise is that it is not necessary to continue down that destructive path. In response, the purpose of this book, briefly stated, is to explain how to model, analyze, and make policy for the social fabric in which society's problems are enmeshed. Such policymaking requires that attention be given to the integration of an array of concerns including philosophy, engineering, institutional analysis, and ecology. The book includes that array of concerns—as well as others—but more important, it explains how the "social fabric matrix" can be used to design policy research, generate and analyze program scenarios, and conduct "metapolicymaking" consistent with problem resolution. The contribution expected from modern science and philosophy for solving problems has not materialized because of the absence of a general systems methodology for guiding cross-disciplinary research and policy analysis. Because

xiv

Preface

policymaking is the most important inquiry a society conducts, philosophy, science, and systems theory need to be applied as an integrated whole. This book is about how to conduct such inquiry. Chapter 1 explains the general paradigmatic approach and how the concepts and concerns of the book are organized and elaborated in order to accomplish the book's purpose. This book was completed with the assistance of an extensive sociotechnical system that provided me with research findings and assistance from colleagues, policy analysts in numerous kinds of agencies, scholars, research libraries, foundations, universities, consulting contracts, students, research assistants, professional associations, and so forth. Although it is not possible to individually acknowledge all the organizations involved and relevant persons in those organizations, their contributions are recognized as important. The material in the book is very dependent on many different scientific and philosophical contributions made during the last 100 years. That recognition is not just perfunctory. Those contributions are recognized throughout the book as the foundational structure for the analysis, planning, and policymaking recommended. The book is very dependent on the scholars responsible for those contributions. My service to governors, mayors, and legislators; involvement in policy research; consulting for various public, corporate, and nonprofit organizations; and service on boards and commissions were crucial in the completion of research for and testing of the book's substance. Those experiences provided the opportunity to apply the social fabric matrix to real-world problems and to have the conclusions tested under fire in the advocacy process. My students at the university and the research analysts in government agencies with which I have been associated have made two important contributions. First, they gave important feedback with regard to the effectiveness of the manuscript as it has been used as a learning text in the classroom and for research teams. Second, their research projects have demonstrated the instrumental practicality of the social fabric matrix approach. Appreciation goes to Jan Hime, Amanda Mausbach, Kathleen Kramer, and John Hayden for the importation, creation, and programming of graphics to a common format for adding to the manuscript.

Preface

xv

Pam Royal served as the project's administrative assistant, typed all the drafts of the manuscript, and worked tirelessly and cheerfully to see that the manuscript was finished. Her commitment and excellent work is especially appreciated. By far, I am the most indebted to my wife, Theresa, to whom the book is dedicated. The book reflects her valuable ideas, constructive criticism, suggested improvements, and editing assistance. Additionally, her love and sustained encouragement have been crucial. F. Gregory Hayden Lincoln, Nebraska

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is to explain an approach to policy analysis and planning that will allow us to capture the complexity of the world around us and be consistent with modern science. We know the world to be very complex because modern social, physical, and ecological sciences have demonstrated the numerous, sometimes fragile, transactions among various system components and also because modern technology has created numerous, sometimes fragile, kinds of relationships among various aspects of the social, physical, and ecological world in which we live. The understanding we have gained from science and from experiencing the technological society on a day-today basis has led to a great transformation in our ideology and paradigm for viewing the world, but has yet to produce a good society. Numerous books, articles, pamphlets, television shows, and courses of study have been devoted to explaining societal evolution and the paradigmatic shift that has transpired in the last 150 years. That work is taken as given, and this book is devoted to how to complete the analysis to make policy decisions in our private and public institutions and how to organize resources through policymaking that is consistent with our social beliefs and the needs of the natural environment. Because we no longer believe that life—as structured in an institutional and ecological milieu—is one-dimensional, our measures and analytical tools cannot be one-dimensional. Because we no longer think that beliefs and values can be ignored if, for example, we want successful irrigation systems or health care plans, an approach is needed to integrate what sociologists and anthropologists know about beliefs and values with the expertise of engineers, ecologists, agronomists, economists, physicians, and other expertise as needed for the problem at hand. This integration can no longer be the kind that has persons with different expertise working in isolation, and their independent work then placed under one cover. The analysts need to be guided by a common model or, to use Einstein's term, a common frame. The engineers* work must be guided by belief criteria, the sociologists'

2

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

analysis should be consistent with the relevant technology, the economists' models need to be non-equilibrium systems, policymakers' actions are to be the result of integrated modeling, and so forth. This book is based on a premise currently not in vogue in the public mind. The premise here is that we know enough, care enough, and have adequate resources and technology to solve our social, economic, and environmental problems. Or, stated differently, this book is optimistic by current standards of cynicism and pessimism. Our knowledge base is sufficient to do the research to understand our problems, our will is more than adequate, our work ethic is strong, our resources are abundant, and people are sufficiently educated to carry out the tasks in a technological society. One major deficiency is that we have not had the analytical means necessary to meld our will, knowledge, and institutions into a policy paradigm that allows us to obtain success.1 Current cynicism and pessimism regarding the possibility of success are not based on deficiencies of character, but, rather, on continual validation through failure. People work more hours only to watch their wages and salaries fall; they support more environmental protection endeavors only to learn that pollution levels continue to grow and species continue to be lost; people gain higher levels of education and training only to remain underemployed. Government employees work hard, gather more data than ever, and access greater computer capability, yet productivity problems continue to abound; tax payments to governments and consumer payments to corporations continue to grow, but every day we see infrastructure deteriorating and consumer products becoming shoddier. Production has grown on a global scale and trade has increased among nations, while per-capita income in over half of these nations is lower than a decade ago and slavery continues to grow and spread; the resource commitment to health care is massive, yet the reality of the American health care system is that it is very sick; and billions of public dollars are poured into farm payments, while commodity prices remain low and family farms continue to fail. In the 1999 edition of the book, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy, which is devoted to the synthesis of laws, regulations, and judicial doctrines for the legal profession, the authors state (1) that we no longer have "faith in the ability of officials to define and carry out policies that advance the public interest.. .,"2 (2) that the fundamental tensions among science, ethics, and economics remain unresolved today, and (3) that fundamental social and environ-

INTRODUCTION

3

mental issues offer neither reconciliation nor peaceful resolution, but, rather, a set of contradictions which constantly defy solution.3 For reasonable people, these observations validate a hypothesis of failure in the laboratory of reality. However, failure and contradiction are not necessary because it is possible to organize our resources and institutions in a manner consistent with the complexity of a modern society and in a manner to achieve a good society. The traditional paradigm has crumbled. More correctly, it has finally crumbled after approximately 150 years of deterioration. Louis Menand explained in his recent book that it took nearly 50 years after the Civil War to develop the set of ideas to help people cope with the conditions of modern life. Those instrumentalist ideas were developed mainly by four people: Oliver Wendell Holmes, William James, Charles S. Peirce, and John Dewey. They changed the way Americans think, the views they express, and the way they live.4 Now a new approach for socioeconomic and socioecological policymaking is required if the quality of our lives, our institutions in general, our political economy in particular, and the environment are not to continue to deteriorate. Karl Polanyi stated that the classical deterministic model was swept away with the massive broom of new legislation enacted around the world in the 1930s. As we look back, however, it is apparent that much of that legislation was allowed on an exceedingly experimental basis and was approved in desperate reaction to the global economic depression, not because of permanent changes in ideology or because of a paradigm shift for the community in general. That is not to say that there had not been a great loss of faith from the 1830s to the 1930s in deterministic models such as the classical unregulated market system. Yet the glimmer of hope that the faith could be resurrected continued to glow, at times rather brightly. In many ways, though, faith in the old paradigm died in the late 1960s and the 1970s when pronounced changes in ideological beliefs led to the realization, as George Lodge stated in 1974, that "the United States is in the midst of a great transformation, comparable to the one that ended medievalism . . . . The old ideas and assumptions are being eroded."5 There is probably no better example of the emerging ideology during that period than the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, because the act adopted an organic view for environmental protection. Much of the political ideology expressed since the 1970s can be interpreted as an attempt to restore the old ideology, and the reactionary policies formulated with the reinstatement of that old ideology have served the

4

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

purpose of proving the reasons for its continued demise. This contemporary "testing" of reactionary hypotheses has unintentionally served the purpose of validating why the old approaches never made sense. The instrumentalist ideas which now guide Americans and the adoption of those ideas in the public arena have resulted in a difficult struggle against competing belief systems and powerful interests during the past 100 years. The adoption of instrumentalism, as developed by Holmes, James, Peirce, and Dewey has now emerged.6 Instrumentalism forms the base of ideas upon which this book is built. This book is neither about the demise of the old ideological view of the world nor about the rise of the new whole-system ideology that has been patched together from numerous sources in reaction to social and technological assaults on the traditional paradigm. Others have sufficiently logged that course and explained the emergence of the new view of the world in which we live. Now it is time for the development of new policy analysis and planning tools to successfully allow for a more systemic view to influence policymaking. The development of a new policy paradigm recognizes that relevant program evaluation and policy analysis must take into account the integrated system of beliefs that are relevant to the problem context and must recognize that any problem context contains different, and sometimes, conflicting systems of belief. This is a "how to" book for policy analysts and policymakers to use for policy and program analysis in order to design policies and programs that more efficiently and effectively solve problems. It is a book about, to use Robert Westbrook's explanation of instrumentalism, how to conduct an appraisal through critical scrutiny by investigating the conditions under which problems arise and for estimating the consequences of acting upon them. These estimates are to consider the efficiency of the end-in-view for reconstructing the problematic situation. This involves "foreseeing the consequence of utilizing the means necessary to achieve the desired end and the consequences achieving it might have for the whole range of one's interests (that is, the way the end would itself function in subsequent experience as a resource or obstacle)."7 To accomplish this, three concepts are dominant. They are context, criteria, and consequences. The policy tool kit must be able to (1) define the context that is producing the problem and the context that will exist after policies and programs are implemented to solve the problem, (2) apply criteria in order to judge which programs will

INTRODUCTION

5

achieve the desired ends, and (3) judge program efficiency by the consequences resulting from the policy actions. During the last century, numerous books and articles have been written about what the desired ends of policy ought to be, the measurement of the common good, and the good society. Two books that were publication successes and received broad acclaim were books with the same title, The Good Society, One was written by Walter Lippmann in 19378 and the other by Robert N. Bellah et al. in 1991.9 The success of both indicates that society continues to be concerned about policymaking for societal improvement. During the 54 years that separated their publication, society, in addition, became sensitive to the deterioration of our living systems and human health due to the intensive utilization of our ecological systems and the resulting pollution. In 1984, Herman Daly and John Cobb, Jr. recognized the growing environmental problem in their book, For The Common Good,10 and explained that in order to be successful in understanding and solving a problem, policy analysts need to integrate social, economic, and environmental components. The need for such an integrated approach has been demonstrated by numerous writers during the last century. Examples in addition to those already mentioned include John Dewey's The Public and Its Problems (1927),11 Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation (1944),12 Kenyon B. De Greene's Sociotechnical Systems (1973),13 George Lodge's The New American Ideology (1974),14 and Marc Tool's The Discretionary Economy (1979).15 The intellectual, philosophical, and environmental base has been established, and grasped, by the reading public as necessary for establishing the good society. That base is taken as given. The purpose here is to build upon that base by explaining how ideas contained therein can be applied in real-world settings through the Social Fabric Matrix (SFM) to achieve the good society. The SFM is an integrated process matrix designed to express the attributes and relationships of the parts as well as the integrated process of the whole in order to define and appraise the real-world social, technological, and ecological system context that contains the problem of interest. Included in the context are the social, technological, and ecological criteria that can also be articulated and integrated in the SFM. Social life is a series of transactions among institutions, technology, persons, agencies, and the elements of the ecological system. In reality, these components are guided by the application and enforcement of normative criteria. To understand social problems, the criteria need to be included in the

6

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

policy analysis model. The diverse array of social, legal, ecological, economic, financial, technological, and belief criteria that help shape and structure the institutional context can be included in the SFM to determine their importance and to determine whether the criteria may need to be changed in order to solve socioecological problems. Furthermore, the SFM allows for the identification and measurement of the consequences of policy and program implementation. The book will occasionally note the failures of approaches traditionally used for evaluation and analysis. For example, failures of neoclassical cost-benefit analysis are mentioned, along with its failure to pass judicial muster. Given its failures, cost-benefit analysis will be less and less relied upon to guide real-world policymaking in the future. The main purpose of the book, however, is not to critique other approaches. It is, instead, to develop and explain a policymaking approach for solving problems. That approach is explained in Chapters 2 through 10.

Policy Paradigms Should Be Consistent with the Complexity of Reality The general paradigmatic approach and its components are introduced through two simple diagrams in Chapter 2 (Figures 2-1 and 2-2). The first exhibits the process of policy analysis. The second outlines the relationships among the components of a socioeconomic system. The components are (1) cultural values, (2) social beliefs, (3) personal attitudes, (4) social institutions, (5) technology, and (6) the ecological system. All these components need to be integrated to understand a problem context and to plan policy to solve a problem because the components are not separate in reality. They are unitary in the configuration and integration of our institutions such as business corporations, families, government agencies, hospitals, and so forth.

Instrumental Philosophy and Criteria Scientific analysis is laden with beliefs and values; therefore, analysts and social thinkers in general should explicitly state the philosophy and criteria guiding their scientific work. Chapter 3 does so. The philosophy being followed is that laid down by instrumentalists such as

7

INTRODUCTION

Charles Peirce, John Dewey, Rollo Handy, and Richard Mattessich. Attention to both scientific and social criteria is crucial in undertaking policy analysis and planning. The selection and handling of criteria depends on the philosophy adopted. The philosophy that was influenced by and is consistent with democratic policymaking is designated as instrumentalism. Three conceptual ideas guiding instrumental policymaking are (1) the transactional approach to science, (2) a problem orientation, and (3) judging results by consequences. Their importance for policy analysis is explained in Chapter 3.

General Systems Principles for Policy Analysis In terms of analytical approaches to systems, most of the principles of general systems analysis (GSA) are consistent with instrumental policy analysis because GSA is a body of principles that are formulated to be relevant to all systems whether social, technological, ecological, or economic. The development of instrumentalism has been concurrent with the development of GSA. Although both areas were inspired by the recognition of transactional processes and holistic systems, very little intellectual cross fertilization and integration of knowledge bases has transpired between the two intellectual traditions. Through the years, knowledge, scientific methodology, and experience accumulated across scientific disciplines that converged to find commonality among systems. In Chapter 4, twelve principles of systems theory that are consistent with instrumentalism are explained. Policy analysis approaches that attempt to deal with the world in a systemic manner should be consistent with those twelve principles.

Social Criteria and Socioeconomic Indicators Chapter 5 builds on instrumental philosophy and system principles in order to establish an approach for measurement and indicators. The approach emphasizes that the creation of measurement and indicators is socially guided; therefore, the social context, beliefs, and values must be defined early in the process of determining indicators, and interjected throughout the process of arriving at numerical representation.

8

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

Numerical indicators and measures are very abstract. Their generation and collection begin with basic values and beliefs that help define a social problem for which indicators are needed and with social beliefs about how to solve the problem. From that base, measurement theory is applied, survey and collection procedures are designed, and data collection is undertaken. Throughout the process, criteria are designed and applied to arrive at measures and indicators. After techniques are stacked on procedures which are stacked on criteria through assumptions and more techniques, numerical representation is completed. Thus, numbers, that is, numerical facts upon which we must be dependent for policymaking, are abstractions from the philosophy and social criteria used to create them. Numerical indicators are one of the most abstract entities of the research process. These facts are laden with values, beliefs, and ethical standards. That is why they can be so useful. Yet, they cannot be useful without the technical means for their use. The SFM, as explained in Chapter 6, is a means to organize facts for meaningful policy analysis.

The Social Fabric Matrix Although policy science must be abstract, policy research and analysis must be concretized for a particular context with particular beliefs, institutional, technological, and ecological entities; and with the specification of relationships among them. The SFM, which is explained in Chapter 6, is the tool kit for articulating and integrating various categories of concern for the study of real-world contexts. One set of concerns includes those of (1) philosophy, (2) theory, (3) statistical and mathematical techniques, and (4) policy. The SFM allows for the expression of a philosophical context that is normative, deontological, and systemic. It is constructed to allow for the expression of theories and principles and to encourage the collection of data and indicators in a manner to both test and utilize those theories for policy. Another set of concerns is drawn from anthropology, social psychology, economics, and ecology. As mentioned above, they are (1) cultural values, (2) societal beliefs, (3) personal attitudes, (4) social institutions, (5) technology, and (6) the ecological system. They serve as the main components of the SFM. Criteria, institutions, and ecological systems regularly undergo evolutionary transformations. The SFM expresses these concerns by articulating the integration of flows and deliveries.

INTRODUCTION

9

The cells in the SFM are not determined by mathematical techniques, but, rather, are determined by what is found in reality. Yet, the SFM allows for the application of a broad and diverse range of statistical and mathematical techniques, especially Boolean techniques. The SFM is designed for policy analysis. This is so because it allows for the description of a "what is" matrix in order to define the problem, as well as a comparative "what ought to be" matrix of the policy and programs that are under consideration in order to compare the current state of affairs to the state of affairs expected from the new programs. The relationships and components of a socioecological system call for an array of different kinds of measures and indicators in order to define and evaluate a system. This array can be handled by the SFM; thus, it contains the database necessary for the evaluation of policies. The SFM can be used to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of policies by defining the system before the application of new policies and comparing the pre-policy SFM to the post-policy SFM. In summary, the purpose of the SFM is (1) to conduct policy analysis in a manner to understand the multidisciplinary system that produces the social, economic, ecological, or technological problem; (2) to design and analyze an alternative system based on policies under consideration in order to determine the consequences to expect from the policies; and (3) to compare the consequences of the original system with the consequences of the alternative system to determine whether a policy set is one that improves or worsens overall conditions when the array of impacts is compared for the systems.

Illustrations of the Social Fabric Matrix Chapter 7 is devoted to the presentation of four different abridged SFM and digraph studies in order to illustrate the systems derived from the SFM approach and the diverse kinds of problems and policy contexts to which it can be applied. The first two cases presented also demonstrate the use of the computer program, ithink, which is a program that is useful for completing the digraph and processing data for the SFM.

10

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

Timeliness as the Appropriate Concept of Time Modern concepts of time are one of the most ignored issues of importance in policy analysis. Modern time concepts are implicitly ignored to the detriment of the analysis when time stream discounting techniques are used to determine value. Modern time concepts need to be brought to bear for the analysis to be useful for policymakers. In modern thought, time is no longer an exogenous concept, but, rather, another element in the sociotechnical system. Different temporal conditions occur for different kinds of institutional experiences. There can be a difference in temporal rhythms and temporal clocks from institution to institution. One time and one clock do not exist across institutions. Time changes among institutions, especially in a complex society. For policymaking to successfully sequence and coordinate the social deliveries of programs consistent with when deliveries are needed, the concept of "timeliness" should guide policy analysis. Timeliness is based on the idea that the correct amount of social goods and services be delivered at the appropriate point in the social process for the integration, maintenance, and improvement of the system to which policies are directed. Chapter 8 will explain modern concepts of time, the importance of timeliness, and how the SFM and digraph can be utilized to conduct time analysis and to plan for timely delivery. Changes in the substantive flows and deliveries in the SFM and digraph also provide for realtime systems. Traditional time concepts and clocks are not sufficient for the space-time coordination that is needed to solve social and ecological problems. The timing system needs to internalize events in a socially relevant sequence. Such sequencing places social problems into a context which is ideally timed by the succession of events and deliveries relevant to that socioecological context.

Evaluation for System Sufficiency: Combining the Social Fabric Matrix and Instrumentalism The purpose of Chapter 9 is to combine the concepts of the SFM and instrumentalism with the knowledge of complex social systems in order to explain evaluation for system sufficiency. Furthermore, the chapter explains why concepts from the discipline of ecology such as "sustain-

INTRODUCTION

11

ability" and "biodiversity" are neither meaningful nor operative except in the context of sociotechnical systems.

The Social Fabric Matrix in a Metapolicymaking Context The purpose of the final chapter is to provide an overall view of the policymaking of policymaking, that is, "metapolicymaking," and to place the SFM approach to policy analysis in the context of a metapolicymaking paradigm. The metapolicymaking paradigm includes the phases of policymaking, ranging from theory and philosophy to advocacy and budgeting, and the phases are divided among levels of policymaking—policy, strategy, and tactics. The phases and levels are explained in conjunction with each other, emphasizing that a systemic approach to research like the SFM is necessary for successful policy to be formulated and made operative.

CHAPTER 2

POLICY PARADIGMS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE COMPLEXITY OF REALITY

There is a plethora of policy analysts, research consultants, professors, planners, and scientists with concomitant labs, bureaus, university research departments, policy institutes, survey centers, and so forth. Coincidently, the world's problems continue to grow. Yet, the recommendation here is that more research is needed. E. F. Schumacher, on occasion, stated that a neurotic is one who, upon discovering that he is going in the wrong direction, doubles his speed. Is the thesis of this book based on such neurotic tendencies? No. Evidence abounds to demonstrate that some research has been going in the wrong direction. Arguments, however, do not follow that encourage a continuation of that journey. The argument is that a holistic, integrated, and systemic methodology is needed if we want to avoid wasting our research resources, or, worse, creating more serious problems. Research has been used as a powerful weapon to support policies that help create severe environmental and health problems.1 Such research is not completed by analysts trying to improve the quality of life and the environment. The more serious problem is the case of researchers who are well meaning, yet have a very narrow or misguided concept of reality, and use scientific models consistent with that concept. For example, some neoclassical economists occasionally startle the public by recommending the selling of babies, encouraging smoking because it kills people, approving the institution of women selling themselves into slavery, and similar kinds of policy conclusions. At a professional economics meeting I attended, a woman economist accused her male colleagues of being vicious because they approved of women selling themselves into slavery. That accusation, however, is a mischaracterization if one understands economics as it is often espoused and taught in university economics departments. A component of the model which commands the brain ware of many economists is an assumption that what people do in everyday life is determined by utility

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POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

maximization of the participating individuals. If that is the model in one's tool kit, then it follows from that model that women who sell themselves into slavery have rationally calculated their utility functions, and they are selling themselves because it gives them the greatest satisfaction. Using classical logic, this is an acceptable conclusion given the model. The gender and personality traits of economists are not the issue, however. The problem is with the utility maximization model of analysis. First, utility does not exist in the real world; thus, people cannot calculate utils or maximize utility. The idea of utility was found to be invalid by social scientists in the 1800s. Second, extensive use of hedonistic pleasure seeking as a determinant of behavior is dangerous and has been rejected by all societies. Third, utilitarian theories, although verbally adopted by authoritarian collectives like the Nazi powers of the World War II era, cannot guide policy because they are neither internally consistent nor operational. Fourth, the idea of utility maximization is based on the idea of action and bargaining among atomistic individuals in the marketplace, while the real-world effort of policy needs to be based on how to reach a reasonable consensus among overlapping institutional organizations. The idea that consumption in the market could make social relationships transparent is an illusion, "an illusion of transparency, an illusion of readable social relations, behind which the real structure of production and real social relationships remain illegible."2 Finally, the utility maximization which neoclassical economists claim is captured by market procedures emphasizes a given fixed procedure for decision making rather than a focus on outcomes and how to change procedures to achieve desired outcomes. Policymaking encompasses outcomes as well as procedures and societal as well as individual concerns. Ideas like utility maximization ignore culture, social beliefs, institutions, power relations, traditions, procedures, and so forth, and, therefore, are not useful with regard to real-world policy analysis and decision making. Changing rules and procedures to implement social beliefs about what will make for a good society is usually an important part of policymaking. "To realize justice in its fullest sense—as encompassing outcomes as well as procedures and societal as well as individual consideration—it seems that a shared conception of the good is necessary."3 Iris Young found with regard to the controversy surrounding the siting of hazardous waste sites that much of the controversy revolved around fixed procedures. "The issue of justice raised by community residents in the

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15

siting case, however, calls into question just those institutional structures that justify some decision making procedures."4 Consequently, utilitarian ideas for capturing and analyzing the real world are irrelevant to those who want reliable policy analysis. Neoclassical economists who assume that hedonism is an appropriate base for making decisions and that utility exists further assume that the pecuniary prices charged by corporations can serve as a reflective measure of utility maximization. Thus, they argue that corporate prices can be utilized as the measure of benefits and costs for the analysis of public programs and that monetary prices are to be the common denominator. This approach creates serious political problems for public policymaking because it enhances the measure used and control of analytical outcomes by those organizations whose interests, transactions, and decisions are expressed in monetary terms—that is, corporate organizations. This is true for most of the policymaking concepts recommended by the neoclassical paradigm such as costbenefit analysis, the Coase theorem, and Pareto optimality. The adoption of price as the measure of value endows corporations with exaggerated legitimacy and power in three ways. First, in a semiotic sense, corporate symbols are elevated to serve as the standard for policy analysis, and, therefore, the legitimacy of the corporate organization is elevated. To take the symbols of one institution as the measure and purported common denominator of a complex social process alienates and demotes other symbols in the minds of citizens and policymakers. If market prices are elevated to serve as the common denominator for everything, where does this kind of measure leave religious organizations, for example, who must determine the number of children who can be fed by a government program? Policymakers will inquire about the dollar value of feeding children. How do environmental organizations calculate the number of species that can be saved by a program that has been advocated? What is the dollar value of an endangered beetle in a South Dakota wetland? Emphasis on the monetary symbol of corporations as the correct measure shuts out the measures of other institutions such as family, religion, government, NGO, courts, science, and so forth. The other institutions are limited in making their case about concerns and criteria that are important to them. Second, in terms of political power, the selection of the corporation's criterion of success—that is dollar flows—as the social criterion of success provides a definite advantage in terms of political legitimacy, standing, and power. Whatever increases dollar flows for

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corporations is measured as an increase in social welfare. Third, the selection of corporate price as the appropriate measure means the analytical apparatus of the corporation becomes the dominant model for analysis. Financial accountants of corporations, for example, are experts on corporate dollar flow and, therefore, they possess the expertise to dominate analysis and discussion in the policymaking process. Religious leaders, welfare mothers, and ecologists, on the other hand, are not experts in financial discounting and cost accounting, and, thus, are at a disadvantage in the process. How is it possible to argue for clean air to prevent asthma in children when limited to market prices and dollars as the criteria? In terms of a policymaking paradigm, the argument that price is a measure of social value is what logicians term a "category mistake." A category mistake is the treatment of a concept as if it really belongs to one logical type of category, when it belongs to another. For example, to say that the square root of four is white makes no sense because it is impossible meaningfully to predicate the color of a number. When an economist argues that the price an individual is willing to pay a corporation is the criterion for judging value, a category mistake is made. The willingness to pay for a good or service is a subjective want. That is inconsistent with the purpose of public policy. The purpose of public policy is to provide for social beliefs through political association and public processes. When asking for public programs to submit to the criterion of market price, "the economist asks of objective beliefs a question that is appropriate only to subjective wants. . . . One cannot establish the validity of these beliefs by pricing them, nor can that mechanism measure their importance to society as a whole."5

Approach to Policy Analysis and Evaluation Figure 2-1 can be used to assist in understanding a more realistic approach to policy analysis and evaluation—one might say, an approach cluttered with the complexity of reality. Figure 2-1 is a schematic representation of a policy analysis paradigm that follows the lead of the policy scientist Yehezkel Dror6 for designing indicators intended to serve the purposes of public policy. Figure 2-1 indicates, starting on the left, that social beliefs, values, and ethical standards are prerequisites for determining social goals and establishing primary criteria. Pri-

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17

Figure 2-1. Policy Analysis

Social Beliefs, Values,

and Ethical Standards

—•

Primary Criteria

and

Social Goals

Qualification

Socioecological Models And Methodologies

Secondary Criteria, Social Indicators, and Performance Indicators

Quantification

mary criteria are put into operation and monitored through the development of secondary criteria. Secondary criteria are the social and performance indicators or measures. Consistent with Instrumentalism, Figure 2-1 reflects John Dewey's concept of social measurement as a spectrum from qualification to quantification.7 It includes a "feedback loop" from the secondary indicators back to social beliefs, ethical standards, and primary criteria in order to reflect that in public policymaking, the secondary indicators will provide negative or positive information feedback to those entities. Secondary criteria, or measurement indicators, are found through the application of socioecological models and methodologies. The adequacy of the modeling will determine whether the indicators and measures have any meaning and relevance to societal goals. The examples above about slavery and selling babies are cases where societal beliefs and goals are not being integrated with secondary criteria, modeling, and indicator creation.

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Design and Application of Socioecological Models The design and application of socioecological models should be completed in a manner to demonstrate and explain the relationships among the components relevant to the problem being studied. As outlined in Chapter 1, the components to be integrated in order to understand a system are: (1) cultural values, (2) social beliefs, (3) personal attitudes, (4) social institutions, (5) technology, and (6) the ecological system. All these components should be integrated to understand a problem area or to plan policy to solve a problem because they are not separated in reality. Figure 2-2 is an illustration of the relationships among the components that will be explained more fully below in Chapter 6. As is apparent, the components function together as a system because of the deliveries and flows among the components. Figure 2-2. Integrated Systems

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19

Figure 2-2 is in marked contrast with much of the modeling used in policymaking. Ecological system models which contain no social institutions or technology and only a measure of one flow within the system are common in ecology literature. Examples are models for wetlands located in rural areas that do not include the institutions and technology of agriculture and that include only energy measures among components in the wetlands. However, it is the practices of agriculture that set in motion the sociotechnical processes that deliver eroded soil to the wetlands, soil that fills the wetlands and carries pesticides and herbicides that kill species in the wetlands. The literature in economics regarding economic production models are often equally naive. Such models usually are based on the Cobb-Douglas production function. On the input side, Cobb-Douglas does not include natural resources from an ecological system, entrepreneurial ability, energy, social beliefs, technology, financial capital, and so forth. On the output side, the production function does not include pollution, although the production of goods and services is not possible without pollution. Such ecological and economic modeling is not useful for policy analysis to solve problems of degraded ecological systems. The normative criteria illustrated in Figure 2-2 are most important entities for understanding and analyzing any policy concern. The three normative sets of criteria are social belief criteria (NB), technological criteria (NT), and ecological system criteria (NE). All three are criteria for the judgment of social institutions. Social beliefs are expressed in legal statutes, contracts, agency rules, regulations, operating procedures, and legislation. NT and NE are not defined in an anthropocentric sense. Technology does not think about and decide upon normative criteria. Technology is the combination of tools, skills, and knowledge that is employed by social institutions such as corporations. The technological norms are the criteria conveyed to society as a result of the combination selected by particular societal units. Once selected and adopted, technology becomes woven into the social fabric "in such a fashion as to build its own necessity."8 Likewise, no assumption is being made that an ecological system designs beliefs from mental reflection. Instead, NE represents the normative criteria consistent with the maintenance of a particular kind of ecological system as institutions apply technology to the ecosystem in order to extract resources and dispose of waste. To change institutionalized waste disposal systems, for example,

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policymakers need to change the set of criteria, NE, used to judge the systems. It is through institutional structures and patterns that the various normative criteria are expressed. Likewise, institutions are the battleground for the clash among various criteria. For example, there is a traditional social belief (NB) that workers' health should be protected, yet a new technology may be implemented that requires a new technological norm (Nj) which produces a certain level of cancer among the workers. Environmental impact analysis submitted by corporations as part of a licensing process for a particular technological design for waste disposal is required to include projections for the expected level of cancer. The policy process will decide which set of criteria is to be applied to evaluate the institutional and technological structure. Or, as a different example, people may decide they would like to alter the current ecosystem by implementing new criteria for less hazardous waste to be delivered from corporations to groundwater. This would initiate a conflict between the new criteria and current technological criteria (Nj). The normative criteria are necessary for a social system to establish efficiency. NB, N E , and NT deliver sets of subcriteria to authority institutions such as courts. The designated subcriteria become the standards to be applied by the institutional authority to determine efficiency. Efficiency means the ability to produce or achieve a desired effect. For society, the desired effects are determined by the normative criteria which are utilized to evaluate and judge efficiency. For example, courts deliver authoritative codes and regulations to corporations in order to establish the obligations of corporations with regard to requirements to protect the ecosystem. In turn, the corporations that are given authoritative power deliver requirements to processing units such as factories. Such requirements, for example, deal with supervising, auditing, monitoring, producing, storing, loading, transporting, and disposing of hazardous waste. For efficiency, the requirements must be enforced consistent with normative criteria. Given the importance of instrumental philosophy and normative criteria in policymaking, the next chapter is devoted to explaining their relationship to the policy context.

CHAPTER 3

INSTRUMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND CRITERIA

The philosophy whose development was influenced by and is consistent with democratic policymaking is designated as instrumentalism, transactionalism, or pragmatism. Three conceptual ideas from instrumentalism stand out as especially important for guiding policymaking endeavors. They are: (1) the transactional approach to science, (2) a problem orientation, and (3) judging by consequences. A transactional approach defines how we should go about observing and studying phenomena if we are to successfully gain an understanding of how the phenomena function. The transactional approach designs observation processes in order to observe and understand a problem within a full ongoing systemic process. A problem orientation requires that the problem itself should guide what kind of system should be designed to collect data, gain comprehension, and formulate policy. Instrumentalism differs from other philosophies in emphasizing that policy decisions and evaluation ought to be based on consequences, broadly defined. Instrumentalism is, of course, much broader than these three concepts, including ideational definitions for democracy, intelligence, association, community, scientific criteria, facts, and so forth. The main concern of instrumentalism is to provide assistance to the community for problem solving. This concern can be simply stated, as follows: (1) Humans spend their lives in organizational relationships and cannot function except through viable association. The organizational relationships overlap, intersect, and interact in a complex interplay of discourse and action. (2) Humans cannot experience viable association except through common beliefs and symbols, thus, association itself does not constitute a community. Productive association requires common beliefs, common symbols, and obligations that are mutually recognized.

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(3) Common beliefs, symbols, and recognized obligations cannot exist except through common education and socialization processes. (4) Effective and viable education and socialization processes are not possible except through inquiry into how to structure such processes. (5) Inquiry must be constant and ongoing if social processes are to be improved and problems solved. (6) An ongoing inquiry process cannot exist except through community institutions and organizations. (7) To undertake the inquiry necessary for ensuring viable community institutions and problem solving, a transactional approach to inquiry is necessary. A society i n c l u d e s obligations, rules, and requirements which require decision makers to determine socially appropriate actions.1 This requires policymakers to complete efficiency evaluations in order to make judgments based on criteria drawn from social beliefs. Thus, efficiency considerations in policymaking begin with social criteria in order to know what is desirable. People living together in a social system requires that members be immersed in obligation to one another. In a social system, policy choices and actions are about institutional and organizational actions. "Action is behavior under the governance of some larger understanding... ."2

Transactional Approach of Instrumental Inquiry The transactional approach to inquiry may be best understood by contrasting it with the approaches of self-actional and interactional approaches.3 The self-actional model is a means of inquiry where things are viewed as acting under their own powers. Explanations of phenomena are attributed to essential objects such as great leaders, germs, rational consumers, superior genes, and so forth. In the selfactional approach, humans are usually given superior status. As Stephen Jay Gould explained, it is as if evolution were carried on for

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23

four and a half billion years in order to establish that the superior human being is the most important component of all processes. When the self-actional model is complicated to the point of indicating relationships, a system is perceived to be made up of atomistic agents bouncing off each other as they undertake their self-interested action. Self-guided action radiates out from each individual and independent part. The first row of Table 3-1 indicates the kinds of selfactional explanations given with regard to intelligence quotient (I.Q.) scores, hunting, and finance. To explain high I.Q. scores, the selfactional proponent would attribute it to the child's being smart; to explain hunting success, a myth would be created about a great hunter, for example, the myth surrounding the American fur trader Jim Bridger; and, to explain financial success, the proponent of such modeling would attribute it to financial genius. Further observation of systems brought the realization that more than individual agents were involved in any particular situation, thus, encouraging the adoption of interactional models. The interactional model emphasizes that, for example, across from the financial genius were stock sellers from whom the genius was buying, or bond buyers to whom sales were being made. Likewise, in the situational equation with the great hunter was the hunted, and with the smart student was the involvement of a teacher. The interactional model followed the mechanistic balance theories of Newtonian physics, where thing is balanced against thing in a causal interconnection. "Inter" means between, and the emphasis was on the relationship between agents. This led to numerous kinds of equilibrium models, such as the equilibrium between supply and demand in economics.4 Often a moral or value connotation was given to the equilibrium, indicating that it was good. Not only was it an equilibrium from which we should not expect deviation, but one from which we should not want deviation. Returning to Table 3-1, the second row contains interactional explanations. The interactional explanation for I.Q. scores became the relationship between the student and the instrument, or between the student and the teacher. Considerable resources were devoted to studying the latter relationship. These studies, referred to as "Pygmalion in the Classroom," explained that when teachers were led (by the investigator) to believe a student was really very bright, the student's scores improved markedly on the next I.Q. exam because the teachers treated the

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Table 3-1: Alternative Models and Their Explanations of Different Phenomena IP^v. Models

Concerns

Intelligence Quotient

Hunting of Game

Finance

11

Smart child.

Great hunter.

Financial genius. 11

Interaction between student and teacher or between student and test instrument.

Match, check, and balance between cunning of hunter and prey across geographical area. Overlapping systems of federal, state and local governmental agencies, National Rifle Association, Scout organizations, property rights, court decisions, Congress, Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Act, Environmental Protection Act, Natural Resource Districts, environmental advocacy groups, gun clubs, gun and ammunition producers and distributors, gun importers, hide processors, and so forth.

Equilibrium of supply and demand.

^v.

II Self-actional Model II Interactional Model

|| Transactional Model

Overlapping systems of school quality, home life, teachers' concern, early learning opportunities, school board policy, sales taxes, federal laws, nutrition, court decisions, life experiences, productivity of the economy, beliefs, attitudes, family income, activities of federal, state and local governmental agencies, and so forth.

11

Overlapping sys- 11 terns of banks, Federal Reserve System, G-8, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, international electronic currency, saving and loan associations, Resolution Trust Fund, FDIC, Community Reinvestment Act, regulations of federal, state and local governments, property rights, court decisions, government and labor union pension funds, comptroller of currency, stock and bond markets, and so forth.

INSTRUMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND CRITERIA

25

student as a bright student. Likewise, if teachers were led to believe that a student with high scores had low scores, teachers no longer gave him the attention of a gifted student, thereby causing scores to fall. The explanation for hunting prowess, under the interaction model, was a game of "cat and mouse" between the hunter and prey as they matched and checked (balanced) each other with attacks and counter moves across a geographic area. This mythical model was impressed into the popular mind at its most basic level in the movie Sergeant York in which Gary Cooper showed the geometric balance in turkey hunting which was supposed to have served him well later in similar action in war. The interaction balance theory for finance was explained as the traditional equilibrium between the forces of supply and demand. The self-actional and interactional models appear rather simplistic when confronted with the complexity of reality. This is the reason for the evolution of scientific modeling to the transactional approach. "Trans" means across, and the emphasis is on the reality that there are numerous rules, regulatory criteria, enforcement agencies, laws, institutions, and beliefs across any relationship or transaction; numerous overlapping forces guide the agents and their actions. For example, a can of Coca-Cola may have the same properties for the chemist whether it is manufactured and distributed in an Islamic country or a capitalist country. The beliefs, property rights, and decision making rules that guide the manufacture and distribution, however, are very different, thereby leading to different production structures, distribution patterns, and pollution levels. The Coke, as it is passed among the social transactions, does not function by itself. It is not self-actional. Neither are human agents and institutions that are connected to Coke. The transactional approach is a system of theories explaining action without attributing final motive to elements; other detachable, reduced, independent entities, agents, or to reality.5 Neither is an attempt made to detach relations from the elements or agents. Transactional analysis was pioneered in physics, and emphasizes fields, within fields, within fields. It is even more valid in the social and ecological sciences and is usually applied through integrated process analysis. A transaction can be taken as designating the full ongoing process in a field where the connections among the aspects and phases of the field and the inquirer are in a common process. The use of the word "common" is not to imply harmonious. A common process may

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exhibit conflict, violence, and destruction as a regular characteristic of the process. If we think about studies completed with regard to the three areas in Table 3-1, their transactional complexity is apparent. With regard to LQ. scores, we know that home life, school quality, teacher concern, early learning opportunities, property taxes, federal law, nutrition, court decisions, life experiences, productivity of the economy, beliefs, attitudes, pollution, family income, and a whole host of other transactional patterns are involved in determining the kind of I.Q. score received by a student. This means that I.Q. scores are rather arbitrary as a measure of student ability, and thus courts, in the United States, have become involved to guide their use and in some cases outlaw the tests completely. Again, the court is playing the role of one of the many institutions that are across the relationship between students and the I.Q. instrument. When we study the so-called great hunters of the past, we find hunting expeditions, not self-actional loners. And seldom have the social hunting organizations in U.S. history confronted nature through an interactional balance. In fact, the opposite has been the case. For example, after the organized buffalo hunters finished systematically applying their technology, the buffalo were gone. The myths surrounding Jim Bridger are that he was a great self-actional mountain man whose hunting prowess for stripping the West of fauna was of heroic proportion. The truth of the matter is that Jim Bridger was a great transactional planner who organized several regional tribes and numerous European-Americans in order to obtain hides and furs for the European trading companies with whom he had legal contracts. To fulfill the contracts, he made himself the chief across several tribes for the hunting and trapping. The groups were tactically organized with specific geographical responsibilities. Today, of course, hunting in the United States is predominately a consequence of government-sponsored activities with numerous governmental agencies coordinating activities with other private, quasigovernmental, and non-profit organizations. Buffalo "hunting" is often conducted by the sponsoring agencies placing the "hunters" in the center of a pen with rifles and having the buffalo run around the perimeter until the hunters have killed their allotted number of buffalo. The amount of hunting and fishing depends on government funds allocated, the amount of game and fish stocked, and the numbers protected by the relevant agencies and organizations. The third row of Table 3-1

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27

is an abbreviated list of social institutions that provide for the hunting and fishing transactions. Similarity, government plays a large role in the global financial sector. The banking system includes the Federal Reserve System, the International Group of Eight (G-8), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the international electronic currency system, the local savings and loan (and therefore the Resolution Trust Fund), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Community Reinvestment Act, state governments, labor union pension funds, the bond market, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, property rights, and so forth. Field of concern, upon field of concern, upon field of concern; context overlapped with context; criteria layered upon criteria—that is the transactional world of finance. Further inquiry informs us that the lines between the areas in Table 3-1 need to be erased with regard to some concerns because education, hunting, and finance are all part of the same world. Federal Reserve policies influence economic growth, which influences family incomes, which influence activities for child development. Interest rates and bond rates help determine the cost of school facilities. Can the schools afford the new computers which help prepare children for the technological world of work? The schools educate those who become biological scientists, field workers, attorneys, conservationists, and managers for the wildlife agencies, as well as computer scientists, attorneys, economists, regulators, and managers for the financial sector. All three sectors function, on a daily basis, conscious of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. No simple self-action and interactional models can be found in reality. What do these examples teach us? They teach that we have, first, a need for the transactional approach of instrumental philosophy; second, that we need a problem orientation to know what to study; and third, that we need to seek complexity in our thinking about and modeling of reality. We need to "seek complexity and order it."7 The frustration of many, when the complexity of our ordinary world is presented during policy deliberations, leads those frustrated with the complexity of reality to invidiously admonish: "Follow the KISS principle. Keep It Simple, Stupid!" Of course, KISS is not a principle at all. It is contrary to scientific findings. It is usually the expressed frustration of someone who learns that society has found that the models used by the KISS proponent do not take into consideration

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either the complexity of reality or the consequences that society wants considered; for example, a frustrated engineer who wants a simple analysis while society wants ecological impacts, regional incomes, health, and community integrity also to be considered. Retorts to that KISS response that are equally invidious, but more appropriate acronyms, are KICK: "Keep It Complex, Knucklehead" and another KISS: "Keep It Safe Stupid." After the interactional balancing of acronyms, however, the difficult task of policy modeling still waits to be accomplished. Although it is important to see the need to seek complexity and order it, the accomplishment of such a task is an expensive and difficult undertaking. To fulfill the need for modeling transactional complexity is the purpose of the social fabric matrix presented below in Chapter 6. The SFM is organized to provide the transactional approach with the analytical power to provide the needed transformative vision to solve problems.

Problem Orientation Because of the great overlap among areas-as illustrated with the education, hunting, and finance examples-it is never possible to study everything connected to an area of concern. Policy inquiry would be impossible if all connections were to be pursued. Likewise, to recommend the study of an area, such as finance, is equally misleading because it is not possible to define finance except by defining a problem. For some finance problems, the bond market is of prime importance, while for other finance problems, social beliefs of rural people are the primary concern. The solution is to define the context of inquiry by the problem to be solved. The problem may be a theoretical problem or it may be an applied hazardous waste problem. In the policymaking process, "problems can be defined and depicted in many different ways, depending on the goals of the proponent of the particular depiction of the problem and the nature of the problem and the political debate. The process of defining problems and of selling a o

broad population on this definition is called social construction" Without defining the problem, there is no indication of where to start, go, or stop in the policy research. "The social construction of a problem is linked to the existing social, political, and ideological structures at the time. The United States still values individual initiative and re-

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sponsibility and therefore makes drinking and driving a matter of personal, not societal, responsibility."9 Beliefs, interests, and desires guide the selection and definition of a problem. Thus, a housing finance problem will be defined very differently by a construction management group than by low-income housing advocates. A problem-solving orientation is neither radical nor conservative, but, rather, is aimed at "particular problems which arise on particular occasions."10 Inquiry into a problem leads to an understanding of the consequences to expect from alternative solutions, and problem solving through knowledge creation leads to an accumulation of wisdom.

Consequences Instrumentalist philosophy builds on the understanding that human social action has consequences. The purpose of policy analysis is to discover the consequences of particular actions, and to formulate policy so as to secure some consequences and avoid others. If we accept the fact that consequences are important, we can deal with problems and ask what needs to be done to obtain the consequences wanted or desired. The power to detect consequences varies with the instrumentalities of knowledge at hand. Therefore, to seek validity with regard to policy requires that we have the instruments to structure problems consistent with transactional systems. The purpose of this book is to provide for such an instrumentality. The concern for consequences is a reason for the endorsement of democracy. Humans using democratic institutions will force the consideration of a broad range of consequences as well as the distribution of the consequences. Many approaches appeal to theoretical paradigms, or epistemology, or preferred ideology to justify policy. For example, some emphasize exclusive use of the market system as their model. This is inconsistent with instrumentalism and the concern for consequences. The market system is a particular institutional structure which ignores many consequences that society considers important. For this reason, democracy is essential to control the consequences of the market and to implement other institutional structures. Some problems can be solved—that is, consequences improved—with more competitive market activity, while other problems can only be solved with less market activity and more dependence on other institutions.

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Those who demand a particular system or policy without regard to consequences are making decisions inconsistent with pragmatism and democracy.

Technology Because of numerous attempts by scientists and philosophers, with both positive and negative connotations, to create a holistic philosophy from technology, a brief explanation is in order to clarify that such attempts are inconsistent with instrumentalism. Technology has been defined and conceptualized in numerous ways, sometimes confusing it with science, other times making it quasi-religious. One of the important conceptual breakthroughs contributed by Clarence Ayres was the understanding that technology is the combination of tools, skills, and knowledge.11 All three are present in all technology. Additionally, every new technology is connected to the past because new technology, as Ayres clarified, is a new combination of past technologies. Sometimes they are very different combinations, other times they are small changes in the proportions of current combinations. Potentially there is a wide array of permutations and combinations of tools, skills, and knowledge possible. This means that predictions about the direction of new combinations are impossible, because it is not possible to predict the kinds of combinations that persons in different situations in various institutions might complete. It also means that the technological discovery process is not subject to the law of diminishing returns, because the technological base continues to grow and diversify and, therefore, the potential for new combinations grows at a faster and faster rate. A historical continuum can be traced for all technology because new technology is a combination of prior technologies. Technology, to use an old cliche, is the tail that wags the dog. Nothing has been more powerful in shaping historical change than the innovation of new technological combinations. The combination of the high keel of the Viking ships with the flat-bottomed ships of the Mediterranean changed the face of continents, because these ships had the capability to be sent out on the high seas. The combination of the steam engine and the spinning jenny led to numerous social changes, to include squalid living conditions during the industrial revolution. The "one-way" disc plow, that is, the combination of the rolling disc with the frame of the moldboard plow, played a major role in the creation of

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31

the "Dust Bowl" of the Great Plains of the United States. The series of combinations that gave us the machine gun made centuries-old war maneuvers obsolete. The combining of Boolean mathematics with the guitar transformed music forever, as the guitar was electrified. The combination of the computer and telephone technology has created a twenty-four-hour-per-day gambling casino in international currencies, which has disconnected exchange rates from relative economic productivity. If there is one issue that is clear, it is that technology when implemented is not neutral, although some have attempted to claim that it is. New technology fundamentally and permanently alters human patterns of life and societal arrangements. It is not neutral. The neutrality argument, along with other philosophical claims, has been made because technology has become such a powerful and integral part of human lives. Four great minds of the Twentieth Century who dealt extensively with technology and its moral and philosophical meaning are Joseph Schumpeter, Clarence Ayres, Jacques Ellul, and E.F. Schumacher. Schumpeter, who recognized how new technology destroyed institutions, made the evaluation that it was "creative" destruction.12 He arrived at this conclusion without the study of any particular technology or set of technologies and without establishing the philosophy, criteria, or political system that could have been utilized to arrive at such an evaluative judgment. Ayres wrote at length about the destructiveness to the social and economic order caused by new technology. His writing exhibited full approval, and a bit of joy, as he explained the fall of one social order after another over the centuries due to new technological combinations. He offered a philosophical rationale for his delight. Indeed, Ayres finally recommended that technological change itself be our philosophical base for determining what is morally appropriate. Ayres' rationale was seriously flawed by changing the definition of the word "progress," by utilizing tautological arguments, and by equating technological change with instrumental value. Ellul, quite in contrast with Ayres, found that technological change was morally vulgar. For him, the real problem was that modern society had made technology the center of all philosophy and social life. Modern society, therefore, was constantly devoted to the discovery and innovation of new technological organization to clean up the consequences resulting from technology's most recent societal dissolu-

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tions. For him, this drastically narrowed the human mind to "minding the machine" and arranging societal functions for the destruction of values, social institutions, moral standards, and so forth, as those entities interfered with new methods of organization needed for new technological innovations.14 Although a great deal can be learned from Ellul, he definitely overstates. We are surrounded with examples of societal control over and guidance of technology in order to protect and improve institutions, social beliefs, and the ecological system. Schumacher correctly explained that technology, as such, was neither good nor bad, and that particular tool combinations needed to be evaluated for the social and ecological context in which they were to be used. For Schumacher, technology was to be guided, controlled, and regulated by humans through policy, and it was to be simply an ingredient in social and ecological matters, not the philosophical base.15 Unfortunately, many of Schumachers insights about technological policy were ignored because of the religious and ideological ideas in which his insights were wrapped. He never carried his insights into a policy analysis paradigm. Instead of trying to make technology and technological change into a mysterious force, evil phenomenon, philosophical base, or panacea for humankind, we need to understand that technology is one of the ingredients in the social matrix (see Figure 2-2). Like other ingredients, technology needs to be researched and evaluated through a transactional analysis that is problem oriented and concerned with consequences. There is a need to assess the appropriateness of particular technologies that are being considered for adoption in a particular situation. Equally important is the need to recognize that new technological combinations are made by social institutions, that they are selected through judgments and decisions made within social institutions, and that they function and are maintained through the working of social institutions. Society decides upon the technological combinations. Once those combinations are selected and adopted, requirements are placed upon social institutions. Those requirements are usually not refined; they allow for latitude in institutional patterns. This does not mean that the knowledge of some potential combination that is not implemented makes for technology. Technology does not operate "on its own" as some self-actional or self-organizing force, and it does not function in some interactional relationship vis-a-vis society or the ecological system. Although institutions are often changed to fit a different technology and thereby change society, the policy decisions for restruc-

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turing are made by social institutions. As Dewey emphasized, technology is directed and guided throughout the innovation and implementation process.16 He argued that much of the direction for technology was based on inappropriate criteria, and he explained the need for the application of intelligence through instrumental evaluation. Whether or not an innovation should be considered good depends "on the direction which human beings deliberately give the change."17

Policy Criteria in a Transactional Context Throughout the policymaking process, criteria need to be utilized. In spite of that fact, interest in the subject of criteria was scarce until the latter Twentieth Century. The works of Charles Peirce and Thorstein Veblen emphasized criteria—Peirce with explicit discussion of the character of criteria and Veblen with active application of criteria in his evaluation of various economies and institutions. Few scholars continued to emphasize their tradition. Thirty years ago, it was unique to find a discussion of criteria even briefly presented in books concerned with policymaking, planning, political science, economics, and the like. Today, such discussion has become much more robust. Given the fact that we are the political descendants of the Greeks, one might have expected evaluative criteria to have been a major concern all along. As the interest in the subject has grown, so has the breadth of its definition. In current literature, the term "criteria" is often used interchangeably with standards, goals, decision rules, particle levels, and so forth. For the purpose here, the original definition of criteria as standards for judgment is recaptured. Policy evaluation is prior to and determines the establishment of policy goals, program standards, decision rules, and so forth. Or, stated differently, we need to judge and decide what policy is wanted before we can determine what goals, decision rules, or particular standards are to be implemented. For example, applying the decision rule of producing where marginal costs are equal to marginal benefits is not a policy judgment. The judgments have been made prior to the selection of that decision rule. Refined mathematical representations can be developed for the parameters and variables of some decision rules; policy judgments are not so rote or devoid of social process dynamics. United States Senator John Kerry recently articulated the difference well during a television appearance

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when, in response to a statement, he said, "I want to know how you made the judgment, not how you made the decision. What judgment and wisdom guided you?"

Normative Criteria Should Guide Research We have learned from semiotics that a connection exists between the conditions of signification and the conditions of validity and verification. The interpretation of signs influences what is believed to be valid. The meaning of signs, objects, words, and ideas "is linked to a cultural order, which is the way in which society thinks, speaks and, while speaking, explains the 'purport' of its thought through other thoughts."18 This means "every attempt to establish what the referent of a sign is forces us to define the referent in terms of an abstract entity which moreover is only a cultural convention."19 The instrumental conception of criteria can be defined as an interpreter of social beliefs. Criteria stand between beliefs and interpretations of policy. Given the multidimensionality of beliefs and social systems, we need to take account of the multidimensionality of criteria. Normalized beliefs and social myths guide the selection of research problems and the articulation of normalized criteria. Normative criteria in turn should guide the research agenda if the research is going to be helpful in making policy for the relevant social context. Thus, we might visualize the process as displayed in Figure 3-1.

Criteria Are to Be Consistent with Cultural Values and Social Beliefs As outlined in Figure 3-1, there is a core of cultural values that are the ultimate criteria for the beliefs and myths of a social system. The anthropological literature, at least since the 1920s, has clarified the distinction between culture and society and therefore between cultural values and social beliefs. The cultural values are the dominant core and seldom change, especially in a policymaking period. Societies, as they change, through policy initiatives or otherwise, continue to be reformulated to make institutions and social beliefs consistent with the cultural values. Being aware of the cultural values and explicitly incorporating

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Figure 3-1. Social Policy A: Antitrust Area

them into the design and determination of beliefs and policy criteria will assist in avoiding unnecessary social tension, alienation, strife, and numerous reformulations. The same is true for dominant core social beliefs if they are not going to be challenged or changed. The traditional cultural core is expressed differently as society evolves, even though the cultural values remain stable. Closely associated with the core values are dominant social beliefs with which other social beliefs are to be consistent. In different areas, for example, antitrust policy or family policy, there are belief clusters that conform to the basic beliefs and values and are enforced in the institutional process for that area through legal codification, judicial decisions, working rules, and so forth. Figure 3-1 indicates a social belief cluster for the antitrust area. It is mainly due to infringements on the belief clusters that problems (meaning the failure of institutions, behavior, or attitudes to conform to beliefs) are defined. Beliefs themselves can also be identified as a problem. Of course, there are cases where institutions and applied beliefs are inconsistent with the more dominant beliefs. Those are more serious problems (many times resulting in violent activity before the problem is solved) than when the inconsistency is with less dominant beliefs.

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As displayed in Figure 3-1, the policy criteria for an area are to be relevant to the problem context and consistent with social belief criteria and with the social desires and ends that define the problem. Mark Okrent has explained that, for the instrumental pragmatist, the web of beliefs alone is not sufficient for consistency. "Rather, it is a web of beliefs and desires, or ends. Pragmatists understand mind and language in terms of action. When we think of behavior as action, we think of it as performed for the sake of some end, in light of some beliefs, and the behavior is action only to the extent that the beliefs and desires of the agent together make the action reasonable or rational." Criteria are drawn in order to guide the action of evaluating to determine whether policy is reasonable. "In actual practice the problem itself specifies or generates (as inquiry proceeds) the criteria of its resolution . . . ."21 An example is the ongoing evolution of criteria creation and evaluation for policies to develop apples. Policy criteria for apples have not been designed by looking at apples, nor are they designed by a self-actional agent, nor an interactional balancing of supply and demand. First, the criteria for a good apple in the United States are the consequence of many different overlapping institutions, knowledge bases, and competing interests that include government agencies, research universities, regulatory agencies, consumer protection groups, health advocates, technological systems, labor unions, nutrition researchers, growers1 cooperatives and their attorneys, environmental protection agencies and their attorneys, foreign trade inspectors, advertising agencies, fertilizer and pesticide production corporations, and so forth. And there are lobbyists, scientists, government and university analysts, with billions of dollars associated with those institutional processes. They are all involved in designing, refining, testing, creating, and applying the criteria forjudging apples. Second, the apple design criteria that are conveyed to scientists in universities, such as shelf life, color, shine, susceptibility to bruising, nutrition, size conformity, herbicide and pesticide tolerance, and health risk, do not come from the apple. We do not observe apples to find the criteria. The criteria are determined through socioeconomic processes. We did not need to find an apple to know a good apple; the kind of apple wanted did not exist. It was created by policy-driven science. Advanced technology, of course, plays a major role in our beliefs about the kind of apple tree that ought to exist. When it became clear that a machine could grasp a tree by the trunk and shake the fruit

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from it, the question became, can a tree be designed to withstand the shaking and its fruit to resist the bruising? The answer in some cases has been yes. Consistency between criteria and policy evaluation is not circular. It is not circular to say that a tractor and a plow must be technologically consistent to function together. A call for linkage does not mean that a tractor and plow are the same. Likewise, it is not circular to say that we can judge policy as acceptable when it is consistent with criteria. Criteria stand between the social system and the policy evaluation. "Instead of there being anything strange or paradoxical in the existence of situations in which means are constituents of the very end-objects they have helped to bring into existence, such situations occur whenever behavior succeeds in intelligent projection of ends-inview that direct activity to resolution of the antecedent."22 Social beliefs are given by society and serve as the criteria for policy criteria. Figure 3-2 (of which Figure 3-1 is a part) clarifies that the policy criteria for evaluating antitrust policy is to be consistent with the beliefs, policy criteria, and evaluation in all the other societal areas in Figure 3-2. For example, antitrust policies could allow prices to reach such a level that most families could not maintain a real income sufficient to support family needs. An example is the failure to enforce antitrust regulations of prescription drugs, thus allowing prices in the United States to rise to a level from six to ten times greater than those in England and Germany, respectively, for the same drugs. Or, on the other hand, policies enforcing fierce competition may push prices so low that corporations will destroy the ecological system (Social Policy E in Figure 3-2) in order to lower costs to meet the low prices. Another aspect with which criteria are to be consistent is with different social arrangements and different social beliefs of different groups that share the same cultural values. The multidirectional concerns in establishing criteria are not limited to cases where there are common beliefs. This could be demonstrated by the overlap of more than one Figure 3-2, each with the same culture but different societal beliefs. The concern for pluralism "entails the use of multiple sets of evaluative criteria."23 for resolving policy questions. Within a nation with a common culture, different beliefs and institutions exist among different groups if freedom of varying associations is allowed, for example, distinct religious groups that have the same culture. Institutions and laws can vary from nation to nation with the same culture, or from

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Figure 3-2. Six Integrated Social Policy Areas

state to state, region to region, or religion to religion with the same culture. In the United States, agricultural policy that fits the Amish of Pennsylvania may not fit the wheat farmers of Montana or Cargill's corporate hog factories of the High Plains. If free association and differences in the structure of association is a Western belief, then policies should reflect those differences, and the formation of policy criteria for evaluating them should be guided by the differences. As the technological society advances, we can expect even greater variation in the kinds of association and beliefs among groups. Finally, formation of policy criteria is constrained in some areas by the overlap of policies with other cultures, either within a nation or transnationally. This multicultural concern could be demonstrated with

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the overlap of more than one Figure 3-2, each with different cultures and usually with different societal beliefs. Within the United States, the Amish farmer in Pennsylvania and CargilPs corporate pig factory executives are members of the same Western culture. Yet within the United States, cultures different from the mainstream culture with different cultural values are a reality; for example, the nations-within-the nation of the descendants of the original tribes that existed prior to European immigration. Likewise, cultural differences exist between nations, as in the case of India and the United States, and those differences are crucial when formulating global policies. In summary, differences in cultures and societies, and the institutional overlap of the same, requires that policymaking be an arduous task. The arduous task is to define, design, and apply criteria consistent with all the overlapping policy concerns for each particular social group across various groups and cultures. The issue is one of constraint, and whether a set of criteria is adequate depends on what surrounds the policy area. If the real institutional constraints and belief criteria are not recognized and heeded, some groups will be severely harmed as policy criteria are narrowly focused on misguided beliefs. No better example of narrowly focused and misguided criteria can be found than in the well-known memo of Lawrence Summers featured in The Economist. In the memo, Summers indicates that he selected money-making as the dominant policy criterion and, therefore, judged that it was efficient to create health hazards for low-income people in Africa and ecological damage for their habitat.24 These kinds of conclusions are not new in neoclassical economics. The same policy criterion of money-making was utilized by Burton Weisbrod a few decades prior to Summers, to demonstrate that the pecuniary value of keeping young white males in school was four times that for young black females. Thus, he concluded that no special effort should be made to educate the latter. The lack of concern at the policy level for multisocietalism and multiculturalism results from a lack of emphasis on multidimensional criteria in policy evaluation. One of the reasons that narrow and misguided criteria, abstract metaphors, and simple models have developed that are so misleading for policymaking is because analysts have divorced themselves from the institutional reality of policymaking. The more that policy analysts are in the real world bumping shoulders with labor leaders, observing street gangs, being handled by lobbyists, haranguing policy assistants

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to find a database, meeting with religious leaders, calling think tanks and university professors for relevant theory, discussing problems at steel mills, arguing with ranchers at horse shows, being heckled at commission meetings, being challenged at legislative hearings by politicians, visited by advocacy group attorneys with threats of lawsuits, and facing opposing scientists on television—the more there is of realworld involvement—the less there is an opportunity for simplistic criteria, metaphors, and models to take over. Charles Anderson referred to the problem of the policy scientists divorcing themselves from reality as "the problem of overpractice"26 in which the policy scientists are so intent on rational perfection of technique that they build esoteric systems that are insufficiently cognizant of social reality. The more abstract the policy models, the less reliable; they often do not even give the correct direction. Abstraction means "removing the clutter." That clutter, however, is the social life process, and no idea has legitimacy except as it is embedded in a life process. Power bumps, mental jostling, and legal body checks on our body of theory all help to dissolve simple abstract metaphors and replace them with complex ones corresponding to the real world. If policy criteria are to be based on social ideas, social experience is necessary for designing them. As Charles Peirce emphasized, ideas are a semiotic product. For policy criteria, ideas need to be the semiotic product of a heavy dose of real-world experience.

Criteria and Contextual Shift If modeling that is too abstract or esoteric can be avoided, there is still the intimidating task of designing criteria consistent with the new beliefs and institutions that will be necessary to solve a problem. Making new beliefs the locus of concern can be referred to as the "contextualshift" aspect of policy criteria. Earlier it was explained that criteria are to be consistent with belief clusters in the relevant context, yet problem solving usually requires changes in institutions, beliefs, and technology—that is, it requires changes in the context. There is no contextual shift if the problem can be solved by selecting policies that will align and strengthen the bonds of current institutions and beliefs. If, however, the socioeconomic problem is more pronounced, it is usually a mistake for the policy criteria to be made consistent with current beliefs. To utilize such criteria to select policy arrangements will not

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solve the problem. Institutions usually need to be changed to solve problems. This means a major task of any policy analysis is to design a set of criteria that will be consistent with the new set of beliefs and institutions necessary for solving the problem. As the contextual shift is taking place, new technology or other disruptions can change the context markedly. This is why technology assessment, prior to innovation, is crucial. The faster disruptions happen, the less opportunity for the instrumental research process to gain an understanding of the most reasonable policy and the less opportunity for the policy to be successful. The contextual-shift approach to policy analysis calls for an extensive and expensive investment in policy research. Although expensive, the alternative of committing billions of dollars on resources for misaligned policies that fail is even more expensive, very frustrating, and harmful to citizens. The research is necessary for designing and refining the criteria so that policy will lead to a new context consistent with the needs of the whole social matrix. Irrespective of the extent of research, an overriding pragmatic criterion is that "it is not until after one has acted on certain hypotheses that the situation will eventuate which will either confirm or disconfirm the proposed solution."27 One of the basic assumptions of democracy is that we will make policy mistakes. That is one of the reasons the quick reaction allowed in a democracy is necessary. Given the task at hand, mistakes will be made because the policy criteria were designed for a world that does not yet exist. When we begin to implement that world, there are sure to be mistakes in both the criteria that were selected and the institutional arrangements. To fulfill the iterative process, procedures for constant monitoring of policy consequences and subsequent reformulation of policies and programs are necessary. "One cannot know prior to taking actions whether they will eventuate in the desired consequences because the confirming state of affairs not only does not exist when the question of the truth of a particular solution is raised, but its very existence is contingent upon many interrelated factors, one of which is the particular procedure or procedures one takes . . . in dealing with the problem."28 The function of democracy cannot be fulfilled in a vacuum. Policies must be implemented to be tested and to improve social modeling. If social modeling is not ongoing, guidance will not be available for the democratic policymakers. This means a major part of policy analysis will be to study the community structural changes that

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take place as a result of the application of a set of criteria and their resulting policies, and to change the criteria if they lead to undesirable consequences.

Criteria as Process No attempt is being made to contend, as some who have tried to save the foundationalist view have stated, that criteria can be interpreted and applied objectively. First, objectivity is not desired; the purpose is for normative criteria to be applied. (In addition, no superior group with the powers of objective interpretation and application is being assumed. Persons with the kind of personality or ideology that leads them to want to pursue objective truth should probably be considered dangerous because too often they think they find it.) Consistency with social criteria is the goal of policy judgments. The refinement of the interpretation and application of criteria is achieved through discretionary processes made up of legislative bodies, judicial proceedings, research inquiries, advocacy efforts, and so forth. The validity of the interpretation and application of criteria depends on the extent of social processing, or social interference if you will. Marc Tool explained that what is required is a criterion of judgment that draws on and is reflective of experience and a continuously refined product of reasoned reflection.29 The reflection of experience and the resulting challenge to criteria and their interpretation come swiftly in a democracy, as do the counter challenges. The challenges are swift because consequences are real and not necessarily pleasant for all parties involved. The process, called democracy, is what some refer to as being too "messy" to allow for a policy science. Quite the opposite is the case. The democratic process refines criteria so that more refined analysis and evaluation are possible. In the policy world, refinement and order are the consequences of conflict within discretionary processes.

The One Best Way Is Not Viable Conflicting strands have been interwoven through the social sciences that revolve around whether there is "one best way." One strand has emphasized that new technology requires a new social structure and process that is consistent with the new technology. This often implies

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that there is one best way for society to be structured. Coexisting with this is the view that instrumentalism requires democracy, which allows for alternative kinds of associations. In a democracy, different groups structure their associations and behavior quite differently. The Tavistock sociotechnical studies in Europe found that automobile factories with similar technology in different countries have very different social structures and social relationships in the factories. In addition, from observation we recognize that modern technology encourages even greater diversity among the social structures of different groups. Much of the frustration of Western global policy analysts, after the dissolution of the Soviet-United States dominated system, exists because so many countries and social groups have structured themselves according to models that do not coincide with the "one best way" envisioned by Western analysts. The general problem with much analysis is the "search for criteria that are appropriate to all cases in the genre."30 As Sadler explains, it is a mistake to assume that "commonality" is the principle that is taken to validate a set of criteria. This is not possible unless the cases are the same. "But as the variety of cases expands, the probability that a common set of criteria will be uniformly applicable decreases, simply because the number of potential criteria which could be drawn upon is large."31 It may be that the idea for the "one best way," or "the optimum" as the neoclassical economist would say, comes to us not from observation, but rather from the same tradition that gave us "objective truth." "Beginning with Plato, the Greeks fashioned their gods according to mathematical form, and the Romans and Christians continued the tradition. This was carried into science and analysis in the Western world because early science was an extension of religion, and like religion, science was searching for the truth—the one truth—the one objective truth according to mathematical form."32 The mistaken idea that there is one acceptable set of beliefs and criteria has had a long history in philosophy. Chisholm stated this mistaken idea as follows: "If we find a pair of beliefs that contradict each other, we will reject at least one of them."33 If we believe in (or have) discretionary democracy and free association, and if new technology allows for more diversity, then numerous different social structures are viable. Thus, the job of designing policy criteria also becomes much more difficult. A single set of criteria for health care policy, for example, is not possible. A different

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set of criteria is needed for each context, and a still different set where the contexts overlap. What will be attempted to be accomplished with policies in the United States, for example, will differ depending on whether it is for the Amish, the Mormons, recent Somalian immigrants, the Winnebago-Americans, or Orthodox Jews. It may be satisfying to read neat formulae as often presented in policy science literature, however, the formulae accomplish little more than to please psychological predilections. Reality is much more complex and detailed. That detail is what planners and civil servants work with in the bureaucracies of our city, county, state, and national governments, where they are constantly monitored and challenged on a daily basis by the citizenry and the citizenry's qovey of lawyers. The reality of policy criteria is the detail of numerous different kinds of group contexts. The only alternative for avoiding this kind of messiness (as it is often called) is the "one-bestway" solution, as has been attempted during some of the darker and more brutal eras of human history. For too long, the general idea that compromise and common ground are the solution has frustrated good policymaking. While compromise and common ground are essential for a democracy to function, that does not mean that one policy or a unified common ground with regard to normative criteria should be sought and enforced throughout the social setting. Former President Jimmy Carter once stated with regard to diversity of beliefs, when interviewed on a televised news report: "Diversity need not be a handicap." Then he added, "We can find a common ground." No. The two statements are in conflict. That they are in conflict logically is not the concern. The important concern is that the statements are in conflict with designing relevant criteria. This kind of "common ground" thinking leads either to abstract, mushy criteria that will not fit any context well, thus accomplishing very little, or to a firm set of criteria that ignore the beliefs and unique associations of certain groups. When such groups are silenced institutionally by being ignored, criteria cannot be properly drawn. Such marginalization, in addition, leads to anger and civil unrest, a situation that has become more common. The ripping and tearing of our social fabric because of cavalier criteria contribute to the social disruption and violence that can engulf local communities as well as global relationships.

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Mandates Criteria are also relevant to the arguments about mandates in a democracy. Difficulty occurs when mandates from the central government are stated in terms of rules, flow levels, and requirements to take a particular action or to establish a particular technical procedure; for example, when the central government requires that every city of a certain size should construct a waste treatment plant of a particular kind or that every student attending school should be vaccinated. Such mandates ignore contextual variety. Treatment plants may not be necessary if the city does not generate a high level of waste or if the natural environment is robust enough to cleanse the water without treatment. Every student may not need to be vaccinated if some are from families that have already provided for their vaccinations. The more instrumental approach in a democracy is for the central government to define and establish criteria for local governments, corporations, and families to use in making judgments and decisions; for example, criteria about being free from a particular disease or maintaining clean water. In this way, local institutions and decision makers can be more creative in designing alternative ways to meet the criteria. More importantly, they can respond to the criteria consistent with the relevant context. Because of the focus on inquiry and validation in instrumentalism and because of the community orientation recommended for policy analysis, there are numerous safeguards within the process itself against the subjectivity of an individual local government gaining the upper hand. Schlagel has stated that because problems are identified by the community in a democracy, and the criteria of their solution are subject to external review with publicly accessible evidence, the application of applied pragmatic criteria is no more susceptible to subjective abuse and is no less rigorous than that of any other criteria.34 In contrast to the centralized mandate approach, some champions of local government have overlooked the necessity for the central government and constitutional bodies even to mandate criteria. An example is Eleanor Ostrom, who, in her Crafting Institutions, a book that is generally helpful, explains that in crafting institutions for irrigation systems, all the multiple layers of government should be making rules for the success of such irrigation systems. She outlines three levels of rules: (1) operational rules, which directly affect the day-to-day

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decisions of water users and suppliers at the local level; (2) collectivechoice rules, which indirectly affect operational rules through policymaking, management, and policy adjudication rules; and (3) constitutional-choice rules, which determine who is eligible to participate in the system and what specific rules will be used to craft the set of collective-choice rules, which in turn affect the set of operational rules.35 Ostrom's paradigm depends exclusively on rule making, an excessive dependence for two reasons. First, constitutional action is finalized mainly through judicial judgments, and the latter are mainly finalized by the provision of criteria for other bodies to use in making decisions. Thus, the idea of constitutional rules being the dominant mode is inconsistent with the experience mode of judicial bodies. Second, Ostrom has indicated that most rules must be made at the local level in order to allow for the diverse kinds of decisions that must accompany the diverse contexts at the local level. As she correctly states, rules codified by external administrative agencies, national legislation, and the judicial arena rarely reflect the particular circumstance of a particular system.36 If most rules must be made at the operational level, and if mandates from the collective legislative and judicial bodies are needed, then how can the desired effect be achieved when bodies have been provided only with rule-making functions? It cannot. Thus, the collective policymaking and judicial bodies need to depend more on criteria. Criteria can be established without establishing special rules; thus, creativity can be used to define rules, technology, and institutions that are consistent with the criteria and with local situations. The neoclassical tradition in economics fails to recognize social system criteria and norms and instead concentrates on rules—rules justified in terms of pecuniary enhancement without reference to social morality. For neoclassicalists, the rules are to guide procedures without concern for social or ecological outcomes or consequences. Of course, without criterial norms, it is not possible to make judgments about what rules ought to exist and about whether the consequences from the rules are consistent with the normative components. Market rules are emphasized in the neoclassical paradigm so as not to have to judge market consequences by society's moral and ethical criteria established to judge the legitimacy of markets. Conclusions are not possible when analysis is separate from either the relevant context or consequences. To separate the analysis of rules from their real-world

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context and from the impact of those rules on society leads to degradation of society and limits the possibility of salutary policymaking.

Science Is a Policy Area Since science plays a major role in modern policymaking, it is important to recognize that there is considerable pluralism in science with regard to the set of social beliefs and resulting criteria. Science is an area of policymaking, and scientists aspire to be accurate policymakers with explicit criteria. A spectrum of writing, ranging from that of Gjessling Gustrom to that of Stephen Jay Gould, emphasizes that science is influenced by the conceptual system of the culture and society. Science, like other policymaking areas, is directed, constrained, and controlled by normative social criteria. It is conducted by a community of inquirers with similar policies, strategies, and tactics for scientific activities. "The belief in an independent, self-subsistent universe, knowable at least in principle, provided the ontological setting for most scientific inquiry and philosophic speculation in the West, until recently, as Dewey persuasively argues in the Quest for Certainty"2*1 A few decades ago, young recruits in economics were drilled in the beliefs of the objective logical positivists with a catechism of belief criteria about coherence, correspondence, external verification, a specified logic, and so forth. Ernan McMullin said of logical positivism: "It was, perhaps, the most ambitious foundationalism in the entire history of philosophy, outdoing even that of Aristotle. And as we know, it collapsed."38 Science today is organized and directed around an array of various sets of normative propositions that, in turn, are organized around an array of different integrated sets of beliefs, and is practiced through an array of different contextual criteria. "There are many other criteria involved in science besides those of valid argument." Instrumentalist science, as a world theory, is holistic, integrative, and evolutionary. "Insofar as a world theory stakes out intellectual claims, either explicitly or implicitly, it purports to be knowledge, and as such it is subject to the criteria for meaning and knowledge whatever those criteria may be."40 Scientific criteria are policy standards for scientific rationality and interpretation. "The mistake of the logical positivists was to reduce rationality to logicality in the hope of making verification a simple and non-controversial affair, thus making possible a conven-

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iently sharp line of demarcation between science and the fuzzier sorts of human activity. But even at the very level of observation, there is the matter of choosing the concepts in terms of which the observation will be expressed . . . ."41 Because of the relationship between science and the contextual framework, "science cannot, in consequence, be constructed in logicalist or foundationalist terms."42 This means we should no longer talk in terms of truth or not truth, but, rather, in terms of being valid or not valid, or making warranted or nonwarranted assertions. Are the findings valid or warranted in terms of the normative criteria and context selected? Foundationalists, like their fundamentalist counterparts in the religious world, claim there are basic foundations or fundamental truths that are given. When we observe more closely, however, what is assumed to be truth apart from societal beliefs is usually consistent with dominant societal beliefs and cultural values. As with other policymaking areas, human institutions provide the criteria and context of science. Scientific criteria and context are policy decisions made by the bureaucracies of research universities, corporate financing sources, and other institutions. Today, the normative criteria of science are dispensed more and more, along with the massive sums of money for doing the research, from government bureaucracies that have the legal and ethical responsibility to direct scientific research. In addition, scientific journals endorse policy criteria directives through the articles accepted and through the evaluation process. Science does not take place in a vacuum. The actors called scientists are cultural and social actors. Science is organized in social institutions; sciencing is a social policy process. Thus, the fierce intellectual battles about policy science criteria are important. The basic social beliefs and normative policy criteria for conducting scientific inquiry are extremely important today because scientific findings are very influential in general, and because different scientific criteria give us different social results. If we return to Figure 3-2, we are reminded that scientific policy criteria inconsistent with other areas will likely damage the other areas. For example, late in the 1800s and early 1900s, scientists generated I.Q. test scores and related experimental results from which the scientists claimed to have found some ethnic groups to be mentally inferior. Had that evidence been allowed to stand, the United States could not have survived as a democracy. Likewise, our system will not be allowed to prosper if the neoclassical standard of the market is to be the scientific criterion for

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making judgments about ecological systems policy, educational policy, international trade policy, or the like. Kathryn George emphasizes that what is defined to be sustainable agriculture depends on which members of the community select the criteria to guide the scientific work for determining sustainable practices.43 The same is true of other areas. Scientific knowledge is not discovered; it is created through the application of beliefs and scientific policy criteria. The models that are identified as the context corresponding to the relevant problem are created and selected by the scientists. This means science, and therefore scientific knowledge, is not a consequence of idle curiosity. "Science advances by adopting the instruments and doings of directed practice, and the knowledge thus gained becomes a means of the development of arts which bring nature still further into actual and potential service of human purposes and valuations."44 Thus, science is a directed activity.

Conclusion For the directed activity of policymaking to be successful, criteria are needed for judging the various alternatives available to achieve a solution to the problem at hand in a manner that is consistent with the communities1 standards of morality and justice. As stated above, for policy criteria to fulfill this role, they need to be embedded in the context of pluralistic social beliefs and overlapping institutions. The approach explained here is inconsistent with the narrow ideological approach so prevalent in neoclassical economics in recent decades. Neoclassicalists have endorsed a narrow set of policy rules to confine and overpower the rich criterial texture found in our pluralistic world. Karl Polanyi, in his Great Transformation (one of the most important books written in the Twentieth Century), explained the dangers of allowing the narrow rules of a market system to overpower social criteria and social rules. To avoid the repression and subjugation of the community requires that the multitude of social beliefs be given standing in policy judgments. This is an arduous policy task, but the alternative is the destructive approach of adopting criteria external to contextual reality. Formulating criteria for an instrumentalist policy framework is a huge research undertaking; however, it is exceeded by the larger adverse policy consequences that follow without it.

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Concurrent with the development of instrumental evaluation since the late 1800s has been the development of general systems analysis (GSA). Although researchers and advocates in both areas were inspired by the recognition of transactional processes and holistic systems, there has been little intellectual cross-fertilization between the two endeavors and few attempts to integrate their knowledge bases for policy analysis. Some of the general systems principles are consistent with instrumentalism and are presented next because they can assist as organizing theories for the application of instrumental philosophy.

CHAPTER 4

GENERAL SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

General systems analysis (GSA) is based on principles that are relevant to all systems whether social, biological, technological, ecological, or economic. The GSA principles presented here are a set with which methodologies and models need to be consistent if those methodologies and models are to be useful in explaining and evaluating socioecological systems. Through the years, knowledge, scientific methodology, and experience accumulated across scientific disciplines and converged to find commonality among systems. Common systems principles and characteristics, such as openness, complexity, wholeness, hierarchy, and regulation were found to be useful in explaining the functioning of all systems. In 1941, Andras Argyal stated that "with regard to dynamic wholes, one would expect that a given part functions differently depending on the whole to which it belongs. We would expect that the whole has its own characteristic dynamics."1 The commonality of these dynamics, according to Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, allows for them to be described as systems theory. "Systems theory is basically concerned with problems of relationships, of structure, and of interdependency rather than with the constant attributes of objects."2 The function of GSA in evaluating government programs, social costs, public goods, and environmental policy is as a tool kit of principles for understanding systems. The principles are to be used to describe and explain the working of socioecological systems in order to allow for the evaluation of the system and its parts, and allow for a system to be compared to alternatives. The principles are not just a descriptive nomenclature. They are theories for organizing analysis, explaining systems, and judging policies. To assist in understanding the relevance of GSA to the evaluation of systems, 12 relevant systems principles and their characteristics are defined and explained here.

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System Defined "A system is a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes."3 Objects are the elements and components of the system. Attributes are the properties of the elements and components, and relationships are what tie the system together. The relationships to be considered "depend on the problem at hand, important or interesting relationships being included, trivial or uninteresting relationships excluded."4 To use Kenyon De Greene's definition, "in the most general sense, a system can be thought of as being a number or set of constituents or elements in active organized interaction as a bounded entity, such as to achieve a common whole or purpose which transcends that of the constituents in isolation."5 There is no end to a system. Any relationship or delivery between components leads to additional deliveries, and to positive and negative feedback deliveries. One-dimensional systems (such as would be implicit in an assumption that human consumption is the end of economic activity) are not real-world systems.

Openness All real-world systems are open systems, and all open systems are nonequilibrium systems. "Open systems are those with a continuous flow of energy, information or materials from environment to system and return."6 There are misconceptions which arise, both in theory and practice, when social organizations are regarded as closed rather than open. "The major misconception is the failure to recognize fully that the organization is continually dependent upon inputs from the environment and that the inflow of materials and human energy is not a constant."7 Systems and their environments are open to each other, and subsystems within the systems are open to each other as well. Living systems both adapt to their environment and modify their environment. GSA divides the analysis between the system under consideration and the system's environment. The system description is referred to as the internal description, or the state of the system. However, all systems are influenced by an external description, which is outside the boundaries of the system. For example, a wetland ecology receives inputs such as contaminants, sediment, and nutrients

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from agriculture. Although inputs from (often called forcings) and outputs to (often called responses) the external environment are important to the system, no attempt is made to model the systemic structure of the environment itself. The environment has only a functional "black box" purpose to the system. The term "environment" as used in systems analysis may mean an ecological system if, for example, the system under study is a socioeconomic system. If, however, the system of interest is an ecological system, then the socioeconomic system is the environment. In systems analysis, environment refers to the functional area outside the system. Because real-world systems are constantly open to their environments, systems cannot reach an equilibrium state. One of the goals of analysis is to be able to match up the two kinds of system descriptions. "The external description is a functional one; it tells us what the system does, but not in general how it does it. The internal description, on the other hand, is a structural one; it tells us how the system does what it does . . . ."8 Four external functions of the natural environment for the social system have been explained by James A. Swaney.9 The functions are: Natural goods production, which includes wilderness, greenery, landscape, scenery, and so forth. It is often competitive with natural resource utilization, and is restricted in quality and quantity by the production of effluents from households and production centers. Natural resources, which includes the raw material and energy sources taken from the ecosystem, upon which the production of goods and services is dependent. Natural resources represent only part of one of the two flows from the environment to the economy. They flow to the private and public production centers. Living systems or life support services, which are the services necessary for life in the environment, human communities, and work places. They include oxygen for workers in the economy and carbon dioxide that is "breathed" by farmers' fields. Life support services provided by the environment are hampered by growth in the production of economic goods. The "key point is that the life support system cannot be . . . priced or otherwise allocated by the economy." 10 Sink function, which refers to the fact that all wastes from all parts of the environment and from the economy are disposed of in the environment. This sink function can no longer be taken for granted, because overloading the sinks with wastes and pollution from the

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households and production centers increasingly interferes with the environment's other three functions. Among the most important natural resources used up have been the living systems destroyed by industrial waste disposal.

Nonisomorphic Real world systems are not isomorphic from part to whole. Isomorphic systems are systems in which the whole is a reflection of the parts; for example, the sum of the parts. The idea that systems can be studied by looking at individual parts is often referred to as reductionism. The nonisomorphic, or holistic, approach to analysis has been viewed by scientists and policy analysts as a major departure from earlier mechanistic and reductionist thinking. In living systems, the parts work according to the structure of the system. Work procedures are guided by the requirements of technology, and human consumption is guided by social requirements. GSA allows investigators to accomplish two procedures very important to an investigation. First, it allows for identifying and defining the system of the problem area, which is embedded in the overwhelming complexity of the real world. Second, it provides a means of disaggregating the system into subsystems without practicing reductionism. As Robert Rosen explained, a reductionist hypothesis cannot be true for many of the defined properties of greatest interest about systems.11 The task, thus, is to disagggregate or fractionate a system into nonisomorphic systems so that "(a) each of the fractions, in isolation, is capable of being completely understood, and most important, that (b) any property of the original system can be reconstructed from the relevant properties of the fractional subsystems . . . ."12 In this way, subsystem systems can be effectively analyzed consistent with the original system.

Equifinality The equifinality property of systems means that open systems "can reach the same final state from differing initial conditions and along a variety of paths . . . ."13 Because systems are not automatic equilibrium systems, they respond to changes in the external environment to achieve a system goal. Only by adjusting the system

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can open systems attain a steady state. The degree of equifinality is reduced as more control mechanisms are introduced.14 For example, if a technology rigidly sets the requirements of the social system, the flexibility of the social system in dealing with pollution is reduced. The concept of equifinality becomes important, for example, when determining the restoration of an ecosystem. Since there are alternate paths to achieving system viability, some paths may be less expensive to restore in terms of resources than other paths.

System Components Real-world systems studies, whether they are called sociotechnical, socioecological, or socioeconomic, are concerned with the integration of the components of the social, technical, and natural ecological subsystems. The components of systems, as stated in earlier chapters, are: (1) cultural values, (2) social beliefs, (3) personal attitudes, (4) technology, (5) social institutions, and (6) the natural environment.

Control and Regulation Crucial to systems, and therefore an important focus of GSA, is the control and regulation mechanism of systems. System control and regulation takes place through rules, requirements, and criteria. Two types of controls are emphasized in GSA. The first type of control is that every system element or subsystem which makes a delivery to another element or system exerts control "if its behavior is either necessary or sufficient for subsequent behavior of the other element or system (or itself), and the subsequent behavior is necessary or sufficient for the attainment of one or more of its goals."15 This is control through relationship and requirement linkages. An example is the effect of habitat cover on the kind and structure of wildlife in a habitat. Different kinds of ground cover control for different kinds of species populations. Before elements or systems can perform the behavior pattern, which gives them the first type of linkage control, however, other control mechanisms and rules are needed to determine their behavior. These constitute the second type of control. "Biological and social structures are not objective in

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the sense of physical laws. They are coherent systems obeying dynamical laws and syntactical rules that are distinguished from isolated physical systems by their ability to change their internal constraints and thereby change the rules of the game."16 The functioning of DNA is an example of system rules which give DNA extraordinary authority over cellular collectivity, and "the development of multicellular organisms . . . shows that the cells do not simply aggregate to form the individual, as atoms aggregate to form crystals. There are chemical messages from the collections of cells that constrain the detailed genetic expression of individual cells that make up the collection. Although each cell began as an autonomous 'typical' unit with its own rules of replication and growth, in the collection each cell finds additional selective rules imposed on it by the collection which causes the differentiation." The presence of controls and constraints in a system is a distinguishing characteristic of living systems. Technology is another example of system control. It provides requirements for social systems. These are often in the form of criteria, which must be met (see Figure 2-2). The technical component "contributes preeminently to the self-regulating features of the system."18 In this way, "the technological system sets requirements on its social system and the effectiveness of total production will depend on how adequately the social system copes with these requirements."19 In social systems, primary controls are social belief criteria. They give the social system structure. Social structure includes constraints, rules, customs, beliefs, legal codes, and the like. These structure social systems by guiding social and economic action, by legitimizing transactions, and by requiring deliveries to be made. As clarified above, in addition to the cultural, technological, and social, there are ecological system constraints. These are also part of the system, and when overridden, the system is degraded.

Hierarchy In view of system control, it is probably not surprising that all systems experience hierarchical arrangements of many kinds. Laszlo defined hierarchies as "higher order systems, which within their particular environments constitute systems of still more indecisive order."20 Howard Pattee, as well, emphasized the control of hierarchy in systems.

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"In a control hierarchy the upper level exerts a specific dynamic constraint on the details of the motion at a lower level, so that the fast dynamics of the lower level cannot simply be averaged out. The collection of subunits that forms the upper level in a structural hierarchy now also acts as a constraint on the motions of selected individual subunits. This amounts to a feedback path between levels. Therefore, the physical behavior of a control hierarchy must take into account at least two levels at a time."21 The feedback path among levels needs to be taken into consideration when modeling systems for policy analysis.

Flows, Deliveries, and Sequences Systems might be identified as flows of sequenced deliveries. The concept of flow is fundamental to systems. "Internal and external descriptions of systems are wholly complementary approaches to modeling systems structures and this equivalence can be seen through the unifying concept of flow. If a system has been described internally in terms of a number of state variables between which are defined certain relational functions, then these state variables can be considered to change as results of flows occurring."22 It is important to include input flows from the natural system delivered to socioeconomic systems in order to complete analysis of a socioeconomic system. Likewise, it is important to explicitly include output flow from the socioeconomic system to complete environmental impact assessment and valuation. The delivery flow through the system process is the substance of socioeconomic life, and is a way to measure thresholds of change. Within a system, there are tolerance levels with regard to variation of deliveries. Systems respond to flows according to the level, or amount, of the flow. It is through flow levels that systems are integrated. For example, the level of aggregate demand delivered in the economy influences the level of employment. Delivery levels inconsistent with the tolerance threshold will create negative feedback for change. As examples, food deliveries may be inadequate or the air pollution level may be too great.

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Negative and Positive Feedback For policy purposes, especially with regard to the natural environment, the system concept of negative and positive feedback is very important. "Negative feedback is associated with self-regulation and goaldirection, positive feedback with growth and decay."23 The inputs of living systems consist not only of energy and material, but also of information, all of which "furnish signals to the structure about the environment and about its own functioning in relation to the environment."24 Feedback is a form of inter- and intra-systemic communication in which the past performance of the system yields information to guide its present and future performance. Negative feedback systems are error-activated and goal-seeking in that the goal state is compared with information inputs on the actual state and any difference (error) provides an input to direct the system toward the goal state. Negative feedback, thus, leads to the convergence of system behavior toward some goal. "When the system's negative feedback stops, its steady state disappears, and the system terminates."25 One of the main benefits of democracy is the negative feedback and interference from the citizens, who evaluate the condition of the system and compare it to the goal desired. What makes the open systems approach so vibrant from a policy standpoint is the fact that it views the environment as being an integral part of the functioning of a sociotechnical system. Thus, external forces that affect a system need to be accounted for in the analysis of the system. Furthermore, negative feedback mechanisms are needed to provide information about environmental changes that will affect the system in order to better understand what, if any, policies need to be made to ensure a continued effective system. Positive feedback systems, in which positive feedback information overwhelms negative feedback information, tend to be unstable since a change in the original level of the system provides an input for further change in the same direction. "Society and technology tend to reinforce one another in a positive feedback manner, which is not always desirable. At the same time there is often a loss of negative feedback and self regulation." For example, if an agricultural system based on cultivation technology is not incorporating the negative information regarding soil erosion, the system will continue its growth until destruction.

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Differentiation and Elaboration Biological and social systems' behavior is distinguished from nonliving systems' behavior by the unique character of the tendency of living systems to evolve toward greater and more significant differentiation and complexity. This idea has been expressed in almost all significant disciplines. Katz and Kahn have stated with regard to social systems that "open systems move in the direction of differentiation and elaboration . . . . Social organizations move toward the multiplication and elaboration of roles with greater specialization of function."28 A similar evolution exists with regard to the economy. "In the economic sphere, a traditional society displays relatively little division of labor, but modern societies produce a proliferation of highly differentiated and specialized occupational statuses and roles."29 Differentiation and elaboration become important characteristics when considering policies both in terms of anticipating changes in systems and changes that policies will engender.

Real Time The time concept most consistent with GSA is system real time. It is inconsistent with classical ideas about time. Ludwig Von Bertalanffy explained that according to the classical Kantian system: "There are the so-called forms of intuition, space and time, and the categories of the intellect, such as substance, causality and others which are universally committal for any rational being. Accordingly science based upon these categories, is equally universal . . . . Newtonian time, and strict deterministic causality, is essentially classical mechanics, which therefore, is the absolute system of knowledge, applying to any phenomenon as well as to any mind as observer. It is a well-known fact that modern science has long recognized that this is not so."30 Modern science applies the time concept which is most appropriate for the subject under investigation. "The biologist finds that there is no absolute space or time but that they depend on the organization of the perceiving organism."31 A similar idea is found in the concept of experienced time. "Experienced time is not Newtonian.

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Far from flowing uniformly . . . it depends on physiological conditions."32 Time is not a natural phenomenon; rather, it is a societal construct. The construct should be consistent with the GSA view and counter to the reductionist view. Time, if it is to be a useful tool for policy analysis, should be what usually is connoted by the word "timeliness." Timeliness requires that we ask the question: Which policy program will sequence and deliver the right amount of deliveries to the correct components at the right points in the socioecological system to allow for integration, maintenance, and restoration? Temporal evaluation that judges whether a project correctly sequences the delivery of impacts with system needs is consistent with the basic concepts of real time, as found in computer science. Real-time systems relate to the sequential events in a system rather than to clock time. The system itself defines when events should happen.

Evaluation Systems are maintained through regulation, control, correction, and adaptation as a consequence of evaluation. Evaluation is common to all systems. Consistent with GSA, "analysis, evaluation and synthesis of systems is not concerned primarily with the pieces . . . but with the concept of the system as a whole; its internal relations, and its behavior in the given environment."33 The focus of evaluation is to identify the value of the various entities as they contribute toward making the socioecological system viable. Viability includes the idea that there be redundancy in the system network and deliveries to maintain system sufficiency. Evaluation assists in making decisions about the maintenance, coordination, and restoration of systems through the coordination and sequencing of relevant events and sufficient flow deliveries. For program and policy evaluation, both instrumental philosophy and system principles need to be applied. To complete such inquiry, measurement, data bases, and statistics are necessary. Legitimacy in numerical matters depends on social and philosophical relevance. This means that relevant facts and valid numbers are socially constructed indicators. A review of this understanding is the task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL CRITERIA AND SOCIOECOLOGICAL INDICATORS

The preceding two chapters were devoted to the importance of instrumental philosophy, criteria, and systems principles for policymaking. To capture the benefits of those concerns, the difficult task of generating databases consistent with their guidance is necessary. The policy analysis of the modern age both uses and directs the development of large quantities of data and information that are social indicators. The purpose of this chapter is to present a general methodology for creating social indicators. The methodology rejects the possibility of socioeconomic or ecological evaluation via any single criterion. The first section of the chapter is devoted to the conceptualization of measurement in a public policy context, with the second section devoted to particular examples. As explained earlier, research should be context specific. This rule should especially be heeded in policy research, and the research and measurement should be consistent with the relevant context. The context is defined by the problem. "An essential question to ask of any piece of policy research is: whose problem' is being investigated? A f problemf in social science can mean one of various things."1 What we identify as policy problems is determined by our cultural values and social beliefs. Thus, the values and beliefs should be consistently applied in all aspects of the design and construction of policy research and measurement. Thorstein B. Veblen was an early proponent for binding analysis and data collection to belief criteria. In 1899, he explained in the Theory of the Leisure Class that: "The ground on which a discrimination between facts is habitually made changes as the interest from which the facts are habitually viewed changes . . . . The particular point of view, or the particular characteristic that is pitched upon as definitive in the classification of the facts of life depends upon the interest from which a discrimination of the facts is sought."2 As was emphasized in the social indicator movement that began in the 1960s, all useful measures are ultimately social. They are recognized as social

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indicators to indicate that they are relevant to some social context, rather than as ultimate "measures" having universal applicability. Kenneth Land stated that "a social indicator may be defined as a statistic of direct normative interest which facilitates concise, comprehensive, and balanced judgments."3 Therefore, "the criterion for classifying a social statistic as a social indicator is its informative value which derives from its empirically verified nexus in a conceptualization of a social process."4 "Social process" should be defined broadly, as indicated above in Figure 2-2. For social indicators to be completed in the area of water resources, for example, it is necessary to draw on knowledge from the disciplines of political science, geography, philosophy, ecology, economics, and engineering. Consistent with instrumentalism, it is important to recognize that policy indicators should be developed consistent with the problem, the relevant system, and the social belief criteria. This does not mean that every fact and number used in a particular program analysis has to be generated anew. Industries already created and available may suffice. However, before using an indicator that already exists in a database, it is imperative to determine whether its creation was designed and collected consistent with the needs of the current context. Likewise, analysis should not be contorted to fit a database that already exists. Does the indicator have the appropriate background, come from the correct home, have a proper upbringing, and exhibit the qualities of growing up right?

Indicator Design for Policymaking To design relevant indicators, the measurement standards, as summarized from John Dewey,5 should be applied. They are: Consistent with the Problem. Indicators should be consistent with the needs of the socioecological problem being pursued. Indicators should not be recycled data collected for other purposes. Not Necessarily in Numerical Form. Indicators are not all in numerical form. Qualification as well as quantification indicators are needed. System Quantification. Mere separation of discrete objects is not the basis of numerical identity. Quantification should be designed to express a system. Aggregation. Aggregation of discrete objects is not a case of measuring, but mere counting. Until a system is defined, quantification leads to indeterminate or incommensurable aggregates.

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Limiting. Social measurement must be relative and limiting—relative to the system and expressing the limits required by all systems. Systems Characteristics. Systems principles of arrangement and order should guide numerical expression. Thus, the data system should be designed to articulate patterns, sequences, ordering, and linkages. Integrated. It is important to remember that, in reality, systems are not disintegrated. Environmental conditions, institutions, and organisms exist only as a synthetic whole. Indicators should assist in understanding and evaluating the integrated system. Non-social Entities. System specification must include those indicators needed to apply physical and biological laws and their interactions, along with technology and its relationships. Site-specific Ecology. System specification must also include conditions like soil, sea, mountains, and climate—the ecological system in general. Thus, a social indicator system should be a geobased data system. Figure 5-1 (which is an elaboration of Figure 2-1) demonstrates that social indicators are designed as the secondary criteria for the more primary criteria. The primary criteria are the social policy goals that follow from the societal beliefs, values, and ethical standards. Factfinding cannot be separated from beliefs and values. "The realm of fact can be neither defined nor specified without using certain values, that it is impossible to stand firmly on the fact side of the fact-value distinction, while treating the other as vaporous, and finally, that the same processes which carve facts out of undifferentiated unconceptualized stuff also carve out the values."6 Figure 5-1 reflects the concept of measurement as a spectrum from qualification to quantification, as explained by John Dewey. For example, a society with a cultural value that stresses dynamic individual action will have policy goals for good health. Thus, to assess public health programs, it is necessary to design operational measures (secondary criteria) such as the number of hospital beds per thousand of population, the change in the disease level, and so forth. It is important, as the economist Roland McKean clarified long ago, that the indicator be consistent with the primary goal, because operationally the indicator becomes the public policy decision criterion.7 It is possible conceptually to distinguish between primary and secondary criteria, but operationally it is not. The secondary criteria become the action criteria. A primary goal of, let us say, an efficient engine, differs greatly in reality depending on whether one uses a horsepower

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Figure 5-1 • Policy Analysis Paradigm: Socioecological Indicators

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Technology Before beginning to discuss the particular phases and levels in Figure 10-1, to which most of this chapter will be devoted, this section will address the issue of technology. It is important to emphasize that the study of any phase-level conjunction in Figure 10-1 should focus on technology. One of the primary reasons for the failure of modern society to solve its problems is the failure of policymakers and policy scientists to direct their focus in this way. The aspect of policymaking most ignored in the policy science literature is technology. The great power of technology comes from its important role in defining and determining social relationships. Therefore, one of the first ingredients to be considered for any problem is technology. The way we live, the way we relate to each other, the way we communicate, or whether we do, are all heavily influenced by technology. Technology, as defined earlier, is the combination of tools, skills, and knowledge, which are organized as the industrial arts of a society. Its change stimulates creation of new social relationships and thus a new society. The social sciences have long understood technology's impact on well-being and its impact on the structure and process of society. Institutional economics was built on these ideas. "The institutionalists saw technological innovation as the preeminent factor which determines the institutional superstructure of modern society."3 Technology is not the consequence of some benign natural evolution. The tools, knowledge base, and skills are deliberate acquisitions that are usually "ceremonially encapsulated," to use Paul D. Bush's term,4 by the social forces that have the power and policy means to direct and guide the development and use of technology. Polanyi believed the strength of the policy-technology connection was such that policy, not process, determines alternative technology as well as alternative ways of instituting technology.5 Veblen was pessimistic about the possibility of technology being directed for the good of the social whole because of the encapsulated hold that the corporate business world had on technology. Reminiscent of Veblen, Dewey stated, "[T]he simple fact is that technological industry has not operated with any degree of freedom. It has been confined and deflected at every point; it has never taken its own course. The engineer has worked in subordination to the business manager whose primary concern is not with wealth but with the interest of property... ."6 More recently, the

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ability of corporations to guide, control, and suppress technology has received considerable attention.7 From a policy analysis perspective, real technological advancement or progress, when subjected to a serious transactional assessment, is much more infrequent than usually assumed. To be sure, there is a vast explosion and proliferation of new knowledge, skills, and innovations in the form of new gadgetry, new molecular combinations, computers, engineered genetic mutations, artificial intelligence, and cloning. And these are often combined to provide for human, social, economic, and general biophysical enhancement. Yet too often, the combination is not enhancing, but, rather, deteriorating. Knowledge, intelligence, and inquiry—what we usually call research—are powerful weapons in the determination of the kind and structure of technology that will be instituted and of the enhancing or deteriorating uses to which it will be put. For this reason the research universities and think tanks have become a fierce battleground in the political battle to direct and control research and technology. The established centers of corporate power have learned the lesson that technology structures society, that it influences the degree of centralization in the decision processes and influences the condition of ecosystems. Corporations have arrived at the conclusion that social and physical technology can be controlled to a great extent by controlling research centers. By influencing the selection of researchers and professors, and guiding the funding for research, they can also influence and guide the kind of technology, society, decision processes, and ecosystems that will emerge. With this realization, business corporations, along with other power centers with a similar interest and ideology, have invaded the universities. The power structure and conditions of life are at stake; thus, universities have become combat zones for their determination. The battle has been fierce, but to date very onesided with corporate power centers generally prevailing. One example is the success regulated industries have had in promoting the theoretically bankrupt ideas of neoclassical cost-benefit analysis. David Bollier and Joan Claybrook explain this success as follows: The success of regulated industries in winning respectability for cost-benefit analysis is symptomatic of an important political fact: industry dominance of regulatory knowledge and debate. By funding public policy institutes, trade associations, research projects, and university chairs, regulated industries have helped

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POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY underwrite scholarship stressing the costs and constraints imposed by regulation. The void in knowledge about health and safety regulation can be traced to the superior resources that industries command in generating regulator knowledge and disseminating i t . . . . Victims of corporate misconduct . . . lack the financial means and political organization to give greater intellectual dimension or currency to the beneficial freedoms that regulation can secure for them.8

Those economic power systems that stand in opposition to the development and use of technology to enhance human life and the ecosystem have their act together—from theory to bureaucratic appointments, from ideology to computer data systems, from rhetoric to power bases, from the provision of research funds to the sponsorship of scientific journals, from the influencing of universities to the destruction of regulations. They are organized and they are delivering. They are effectively wielding complete paradigms, from philosophy and theory to advocacy and operations. Technology, which is one of the most important ingredients of human welfare, has become a foul word in the minds of many people because it is so regularly associated with hazardous spills, unemployment, cancer, community disruption, consumer victimization, ozone depletion, and so forth. If technology is to advance in the sense of enhancing progress for human and ecosystem welfare, the people's legislative bodies must explicitly and directly take back control of the research functions of their public universities. The concept of technological change without progress is not new. John Dewey recognized that in a holistic sense, advancement is infrequent9 because the expanded ability to capture energy, increase speed, and process information often is not matched by the ability of human governing bodies to analyze and control themselves and their technology. But Dewey held "steadfast to his faith in science, in collective intelligence, and in a machine age that. . . will be a means of life and not its despotic master."10 For Dewey, "the evils in our system, . . . call for knowledge and scientific insight to surmount difficulties and eliminate sources of defect and ill; they call for a renewal of spirit, for moral development, and for a remaking and redirection of social forces and conditions."11 None of these relates to the call now being imposed on research universities by corporate donors.

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Policymakers have been concerned with determining, through technological assessment, which direction is forward. But there is no implication "that something ought to be done simply because it can be done, scientifically and technologically. We do not intend the intrusion of any kind of technological determinism."12

Metapolicymaking The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to consideration of the phases and levels of Figure 10-1. The three levels—policy, strategy, and tactics—for each phase will be discussed, beginning with Phase I: Theory, and continuing through Phase X: Sociotechnical Change.

Phase I: Theory A. Policy: Creation of Integrated Systems Knowledge. The titles for the levels in this phase (Figure 10-1, left-hand column) are taken from the title of the journal, Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, and Utilization. The concept of the "creation of knowledge" is particularly germane to the inquiry and discovery process of policy analysis and to the creation of theories and warranted assertions. This concept recognizes that science and knowledge creation are completed by humans, through discretionary action within their social processes. Knowledge is not "out there' waiting to be discovered. It is created. As Gunnar Myrdal stated, there is an inescapable a priori element in all scientific work. This means the frame of reference is not given for analysts; it is created by them. As will be explained later, the a priori assumptions and frame of reference for knowledge creation need to be consistent with the context of the problem to be solved; otherwise the resulting theories and warranted assertions will not be relevant to policymaking. Milton Lower explained that this is why Veblen cautioned against the "given and immutable" frame of economists in the classical tradition. Veblen said of that tradition, it "limits their inquiry in a particular and decisive way. It shuts off the inquiry at the point where the modern scientific interest sets in."13 Therefore, when neoclassical economists insist on the market system ideology as their a priori element and market models as their

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frame of reference, the findings of their inquiry are usually irrelevant to policymaking. What was left of the "given and immutable" competitive market system that is the base for the neoclassical model was swept away around the globe in the 1930s. In the United States, institutional economists played a major role in structuring the New Deal that designed and implemented the welfare state, consistent with the work of Veblen and Commons. Prominant institutionalists such as Rexford Tugwell and Adolf Berle were major advisors to President Roosevelt. The thrust and direction of the New Deal has continued especially in the environmental protection and citizen entitlement areas.14 The "alphabet soup" of the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Commission), FDA (Food and Drug Administration), EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), ASCSS (Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service), and SCS (Soil Conservation Service) begun in the New Deal, or added since, is a core which helps guide our lives and regulates the economy in the United States today. The frame of reference for the creation of knowledge needs to be relevant to this reality. B. Strategy: Diffusion of Knowledge. "Information processes are part of a policymaking process. Information is one of the main bases for power and influence."15 Some even depict "professionals as dominating the policy process through professional issue networks in and out of government that have replaced the old, special-interest pressure groups."16 William Melody has explained how information flows and communication technologies are central to policymaking as well as how the control of these by powerful interests can determine the kind and flow of decisions. "A major challenge for public policy will be to find methods to insure that developments in the information and communication sector do not exacerbate class divisions in society and that its benefits are spread across all classes."17 C. Tactics: Utilization of Knowledge. A well-developed scientific base with regard to the utilization of knowledge now exists. From that work, a number of conclusions can be gleaned. First, multidiscipline interfacing is necessary on a regular basis. Second, it is necessary for researchers to stay involved in the application process of scientific findings if those findings are not to be corrupted. Research has shown that "information is processed in wondrous ways, few of which are replicative of the original information."18

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Information is a weapon—a rather powerful weapon—in the policymaking process; thus it is abused and misused. Scientists need to regularly correct misinterpretations of their work and to convey through the policymaking process, which includes the media in a democracy, when their findings are being incorrectly utilized to achieve misdirected policy. Third, applied research needs to provide for the dovetailing of research information and the information needed by planners and policymakers. The results of policy science research, if they are to be adopted, need to be translated into numerous formats and modes for utilization by those not familiar with the original scientific knowledge. The policy tools discovered will need to be written up for the media; data must be transferred to agency computers; new software must often be developed for use in the public policy research agencies; and training manuals are needed to train operational personnel on the use of new technology. Much of the literature regarding the innovation of basic scientific ideas into commercialized products applies here. Policy science utilization must deal with the same kind of technology transfer problems as other products. Fourth, it is necessary to deal with the concept of information lead. This concept is in agreement with Melody's ideas presented above: "In order to have power and influence, an actor should build up an information lead over the other actors, or, on the other hand, reduce his information arrear."19 Or, stated differently, excellent research is of little use if it is not timely. The need for control in the policymaking process is obvious at the strategic and practical levels when observing Figure 10-1. There is also need for standardization and control at the policy-research level. When verification of theories or social research techniques is sufficient to give them warrant, they are standardized. There can be no intelligent objection to standardizing instrumental equipment, theoretical and practical. Standardization is necessary for efficiency and precision in control. But there is fundamental cause for intelligent objection when control over the standardized equipment is substituted for control in the solution of an actual problem which the use of the standardized equipment can give. When such substitution is made, the use of the equipment, instead of enriching experience and helping its growth, stunts and distorts it.20

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Phase II: Philosophy A. Policy: Instrumentalism. The philosophy recommended, as explained earlier, is instrumentalism, as Dewey named it. It is a philosophy inherently concerned with policy. "For those who believe it is the philosopher's task to juggle the universe on the point of an argument, Dewey is a complete disappointment. The world he starts out with and also ends with is the common world we all live in and experience every day of our lives." As James Street explained, "instrumental valuation was concerned with the intellectual selection of future alternative actions,"22 or, as William James stated, the instrumentalist method "is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences."23 B. Strategy: Emphasize Problems and Consequences. An orientation toward problems and consequences is the instrumentalist strategy. It is also an effectiveness strategy. Great effort can be saved during research, deliberations, discussions, and lobbying if the focus is maintained on the problem at hand and the need to look at consequences. Alternative agendas can be turned aside if discussions are continually brought back to the problem. If policymakers and analysts continue to emphasize the consequences of a problem—how many children are dying, how much venture capital is needed, the extent of soil erosion—attention will be directed to policy research for achieving altered consequences. People are concerned with problems and consequences. Policy advisors should not distract by bringing alternative ideologies and personalities into the discussion. They should bring the knowledge base to bear and tenaciously maintain, in very clinical language, the focus on the problems and consequences. There is power in the problem and consequences strategy—power well beyond political portfolio. The basis of legitimacy of policy scientists is research competence. They cannot appeal to a political base; they are brought into the policymaking process to recommend answers to problems. When instrumentalists give testimony, irrelevant questions may well be posed. It is wise, for the purposes of informing, to turn every question toward the relevant research base of the problem at hand and to use the time to explain the research. This is true whether in open testimony or back room discussions. Precious clock time available should not be used to explain why the question is irrelevant. The opposition is under the same pressure of clock time so they will probably

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not want the session to end without making their own points. Only if the opposition severely attacks for not answering the question (now they look like bullies) does one explain why the question as directed is irrelevant. Explanations should be offered with politeness (still in clinical language) and thoroughness (now they look like irrelevant bullies). It is important for the legislators, the press, the bureaucracy, and lobbyists to deal with the problem and consequences as defined by the research. Only with that kind of intense focus will its strengths, weaknesses, and meaning become understood. Policy analysts are not elected officials. They should not undermine their legitimacy and credibility by making the conjectures that are rightly expected of politicians. They should not become advocates of a view for a politician without a verified research base. If they act like politicians, they will divert attention from problems and consequences. If they want to assume the role of a politician, they should run for election. The instrumental researcher's strategy should be to focus attention constantly on the set bounded by the problem and its consequences, and the incremental changes needed to transform the first set into the latter set. C. Tactics: Build Participatory Democracy. None of the policy considerations and strategies discussed above are possible without a democracy that provides for and ensures freedom of inquiry, open hearings, problem-solving processes, public research universities, the diffusion and utilization of information and knowledge, and so forth. Government intervention to sustain such conditions through democratic processes should be relevant and continuous. Democracy is the tactical necessity and operational expression of instrumentalism. It is also a weapon—the most powerful weapon instrumentalists have. In all respects of policymaking, they should constantly strengthen democracy and its operation. The assistance of political scientists and public administration scholars must be enlisted to help find better ways to make a democracy function at the operational level. Research, philosophy, norms, and legislation can all be lost if the operational tactics are not consistent with the democratic ideal. How agencies should be structured, or procedures routed, or monitoring conducted, or bureaucrats disciplined, or task force membership determined, or administrators selected, or research and devel-

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opment contracts structured—are all issues to be considered at the tactical level in order to strengthen democracy. Conservative economists such as Milton Friedman and James Buchanan understood that democracy is the enemy of the unfettered market system, or of any other dogmatic ideology that is intended to structure the economy in a manner to make humans and their institutions subservient to it in an immutable manner. Both men called for changes in the system of Western democracy to stop democratic processes from intervening through the government to solve social problems. In Polanyi's terms, they want a system in which the economic and financial institutions dominate, structure, and direct society. Does this mean that instrumentalists cannot complete policy research or offer relevant advice in nondemocratic societies? No, it means that they can never be as effective as under conditions of democracy. It also means that they should use every opportunity to complete research and seek advice from oversight committees committed to open critique and discussion as in a democracy. Thus in conclusion, instrumentalist tactics are to approach all the phases and levels in Figure 10-1 in a manner consistent with democracy. Progress in that direction is more possible in some cases than in others.

Phase III: Ideology A. Policy: Community Perspective. Instrumentalism is an ideology. It is a broad base of beliefs about knowledge, philosophy, ceremony, technology, government, and political theory—beliefs that are organized in a systemic and congruent manner. An ideology is the integration and systematization of congruent beliefs. The institutionalist ideology is certainly a different kind of ideology than most, but it does fit the definition of an ideology. It differs in kind from ideologies that prescribe immutable structures and behavior patterns predetermined for societies and humans, respectively. Instrumentalism has no predetermined socioeconomic structure to dictate to people. It is an approach to science, evaluation, and policymaking—an approach that arrives at beliefs through scientific inquiry. These beliefs regarding policymaking were outlined by Jerry Petr. He stated that this "approach to economic policy is (1) values driven, (2) process-oriented, (3) instrumental, (4) evolutionary, (5) activist, (6) fact-based, (7) technologically focused, (8) holistic, (9) non-dogmatic, and (10) democratic." 4 These

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are beliefs, which are systemic and integrated, beliefs about the most effective way to approach policy. Generally, this ideology can be categorized as community oriented, meaning it is believed that people's lives are organized and their welfare determined by a community's organic social process. The community, which is more than the sum of its parts, has special ongoing needs. If those needs are not regularly met, whether it be factory, neighborhood, city, or global community, the people in the community will be alienated, frustrated, and without means to satisfy basic needs. The promise of policymaking can be fulfilled if there is a sense of societal purpose, "an end of fragmentation and individualism, a coming together around the need for more equitable distribution of wealth and power among all " 25 This includes the community's explicit provision of citizen membership rights for goods and services such as education, credit, housing, health care, and so forth. For a well-designed community that can coordinate the resources necessary to provide the goods and services (without bads and disservices such as excessive degradation of the natural environment and disintegration of the community) necessary to fulfill membership rights, government planning is required. Instrumentalists "acknowledge that government has the responsibility and should have the capacity to perform the task of community analysis and planning, as well as of determining priorities and allocating resources accordingly." Such determinations and allocations must, as noted above, be and remain democratically accountable. B. Strategy: Utilize Holistic Systems Analysis. The ideological strategy of communitarianism is to practice holism; to take a holistic approach to all aspects of policymaking, whether it is in conducting research, lobbying, building statistical bases, or writing a legislative bill. Holism is a modeling approach and perception of reality that integrates real-world elements and components into wholes that are comprehensive systems. Holism rejects the atomistic and reductionist approach. It has been found that reality is organized so that transactional (rather than interactional or self-actional) wholes guide and determine the behavior of the parts of a system. This should be heeded throughout the policymaking process. For example, many databases have been compiled from a reductionist point of view. They cannot be recycled into holistic models. Sloppy science, as stated above, harms people and environments. "The scientist cannot be left to devise our undoing, however unwittingly."27 Neither can the planner or policy-

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maker. "The old idea of scientific specialization has given way to a new conscientiousness of the interrelatedness of all things. Spaceship earth, the limits of growth, the fragility of our life-supporting biosphere have all dramatized the ecological and philosophical truth that everything is related to everything else."28 It is going to be necessary to educate large numbers of experts in holistic science and planning tools. Without a large cadre of competent holists, we will continue to throw resources down reductionist holes; billions will be provided for largescale programs that make life less bearable. C. Tactics: Select Beliefs, Attitudes, Actors, and Criteria. One of the reasons that governments continue to spend billions without constructive or progressive results is that there has not been a detailed concern to make tactics consistent with strategy. At the tactical level, it is necessary to select specific beliefs and attitudes consistent with the communitarian ideology and to implement them through the selection of relevant criteria and actors. It is especially necessary to select the correct actors at the level where policy, strategy, and tactics are conducted. This cannot be done without personnel who are not only competent in their area of expertise but who also have the appropriate beliefs, attitudes, and ideology. If the minds of operation personnel are not in sympathy with the beliefs about what is to be accomplished, it is unlikely that much will be accomplished. A potpourri of beliefs and ideologies among cabinet officers and ministers, and among directors in the bureaucracies, will lead to a potpourri of de facto policies and programs that will at best be in conflict with each other, and worse, move policy in the wrong direction.

Phase IV: Problem Definition A. Policy: Structure and Process Oriented Description. As stated earlier, the problem orientation is the only reliable way that instrumentalists have found to organize scientific research and policymaking. Since solving social problems always requires changing institutions, and in many cases technology, the problem should be described in terms of the structure and process that are delivering the problem. With most studies, "the examination of the problem is all too often neglected and not continually repeated throughout the course of the study. Thus the result is that many fine efforts are directed at a problem which

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is not at the heart of the matter." Social problems, from the delivery of carcinogens to the delivery of low incomes, are delivered through the process of the social structure. Policy and process are inseparable. The goal is to define the sequence of events in a process. Thus, problem definition should be a structure and process description. B. Strategy: Define Sociotechnical and Socioecological Setting. The context of any research is important. If the context is not relevant to the problem to be solved, the structure and process that need to be impacted by policy will not be the appropriate ones. Therefore, the problem definition should be embedded in the sociotechnical setting in order to know the institutions and technologies that need to be changed. This means a great deal of the research should be done in the field, standard operating procedure manuals, and court records. C, Tactics: Create Narrative and Statistical File. As noted, the problem is too often neglected in policy research. The author's experience has found the same to be true at the tactical level. Managers, administrators, and fiscal analysts seldom are aware of the research that initiated programs, how the problem was defined, or the context of the problem. Thus, the definitions and findings, including notes from field observations and surveys, should be brought on line in the computer system for ready access in the bureaucracies. The problem definition should be readily available to tacticians in all phases so they are constantly reminded of what problems they are attempting to solve.

Phase V: Context A. Policy: Conceptual Framework of the Social Fabric Matrix and Digraph. Harold Lasswell, whose work is often credited with creating the area recognized as policy science, emphasized, consistent with what has been explained above, that the approach of policy scientists is problem-oriented and contextual. A framework is needed to insure that the context is holistic and transactional. Most policy scientists agree that the main deficiency in the policy sciences is the lack of an integrated framework to carry the theory and research into the policy area in an organized and effective manner. Yngve Ramstad has stated that theory "will be meaningful (instrumental) only if it permits one to act correctly, that is to show how institutions can be altered in a spe-

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cific context so as to actually effect the intended consequences." He added that the social fabric matrix and digraph approach is the holistic framework best suited for such an instrumental endeavor. The SFM allows for diverse technical expertise to be harnessed into a unified system to strengthen evaluation and decision making. Thus, the character and structure of the SFM is an instrumental tool for organizing policy analysis for complex systems. B. Strategy: Case Study Approach. The strategy of the SFM approach was explained above in Chapters 6 and 7. As is evident from the description above, the context strategy of instrumental policymaking is case-by-case studies that are problem-oriented and can be completed with the holistic SFM framework. C. Tactics: Computerize Spreadsheets and Statistical Analysis. The social fabric matrix research can be made operative at the tactical level by computerizing the digraph spreadsheets as explained above, and thereby be utilized for agency monitoring, data updating, and statistical analysis.

Phase VI: Measurement A. Policy: Contextual Social Indicators. The social indicator movement that began in the 1960s is no longer a movement. Now it is understood that all useful measures are social. It is now broadly understood that price is not the measure of either programs or benefits, nor is there any other measure that can be a common denominator. Various interests have promoted various elixirs that were to serve the common denominator function. There is no such easy solution to measurement. Indicators must be developed consistent with the problem, the context, and the ideological criteria. "There is the recognition that all observation, all measurement, all experience is necessarily subjective. Neither the measurer, the measure, nor the measured is absolute." The policy with regard to indicators was explained above in Chapter 5. B. Strategy: Determine Consequences, Requirements, Relationships, and Monitoring Indicators. Following Dewey's advice, the strategy with regard to social indicators for policymaking is to derive

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the indicators and database needed to complete the contextual analysis with the social fabric matrix and to monitor policy. As was explained in Chapter 5, it is necessary to develop indicators that can be used to indicate the following: 1) consequences, 2) requirements, 3) relationships, and 4) monitoring. All of these are defined and available in the social fabric matrix and digraph. C. Tactics: Construction of Databases. These measurement indicators should be established in the governmental computer mainframe and made readily accessible as a database for agencies, lobbyists, and citizens. As tacticians from those groups insist on data that are useful in making policy decisions, we can overcome one of the lingering criticisms of social indicators. Possibly the most striking error of commission for which the societal accounting movement can be faulted has been the lack of decision making relevance of its products. The irony of the so-called "Information Age" is that information is less and less available for two reasons. First, although there is more and more concern with the latest hardware and software, there is less and less concern about the theoretical and conceptual base for what is useful and what is useless information. The volume of data could be drastically cut if the data were meaningfully organized. It is not so organized; therefore, many users have great volumes of data but little useful information. Second, many people can no longer access the information sources. In the past, printed copy was available to almost everyone through public and university libraries. Now that more and more of our databases and text are available only via computer access, fewer citizens can access the information base necessary for democratic deliberations and control. The SFM and measurement approach explained above provides a conceptual framework for meaningful information and knowledge. The tactical responsibility is to provide computer systems so that all agencies can access each other's databases and provide computer access to citizens as well.

Phase VII: Select Programs A. Policy: Design Alternative Programs. There is no training or framework with which the author is acquainted that guarantees that policy scientists can arrive at creative program alternatives. The policy

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scientist will be in a much better position to be insightful and design viable alternative programs if he or she has been immersed in Phases I through VI. Of course, neither should a bit of experience at the strategy or tactical levels in Phases VII through X hinder (although it sometimes does). A mixture of scientific research, field work, policy experience, and a review of solutions utilized in other societies is usually helpful but not always sufficient to design creative policy alternatives. B. Strategy: Test Alternatives in the Social Fabric Matrix and Digraph. The strategy for program development is to test alternative programs with the social fabric matrix to determine direct and indirect consequences. The SFM articulates and describes the structure, process, and deliveries of the problem area. Programs designed to solve the problem can be tested in the SFM. Selection criteria can be applied in order to determine if the program created has improved or deteriorated the situation. C. Tactics: Efficiency Tests Based on Consequences and Effectiveness. The tactical task is to judge the myriad consequences that any program manifests and to select the best program. Because there is no common denominator, policymakers have the opportunity to judge the different mixes of results projected for the different programs. Effectiveness can be determined for the different programs by comparing the total consequences of each program with the budgetary requirements of each program. Therefore, it provides an alternative to the cost-benefit analysis of neoclassical economics.

Phase VIII: Advocacy A. Policy: Advocacy Research. Policy advocacy is a matter of doing the research, getting organized, and working your network. Sound easy? It is not. It is the most difficult, with the least probability of success (although often great fun), of all the phases. All the resistance to change, to include ceremonial lag as well as established power, comes into play. Advocacy research integrates, combines, and repackages basic research in order to persuade. One of the best procedures for pursuing advocacy research is the use of a citizen task force if the task force is provided with an adequate and competent staff that can utilize the scientific research base already completed.

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Because advocacy research builds on basic policy research, there sometimes is a communication problem. First, as stated earlier, a tremendous knowledge gap exists in the transfer process due to the lack of attention to the diffusion and utilization of knowledge. Advocates may not be able to understand the basic research, and the scientists may have no contact with the advocates. Second, the interest of advocates is to pursue the interest of their group and therefore they have a tendency to be less concerned than they should be about the quality of the basic research that they utilize to support those interests. The third and most severe problem is that there is a paucity of research being conducted that provides adequate understanding of modern problems. Before basic research can be utilized, it must already have been completed. President Lyndon Johnson, when asked what is the most important ingredient to policy success, is purported to have said, "Seize the moment! Seize the [expletive deleted] moment!" Relevant basic research needs to be on the shelf when the opportunity for its use presents itself or it will not be possible for advocates to seize the moment to pursue problem resolution through policy initiatives. This chapter is not about politics; it is not a handbook on how to run a political campaign. Advocacy, however, comes close to political campaigning, and shares some of the same goals and techniques. This means that a special effort must be made not to allow policy research to be subverted by politics. However, a couple of caveats concerning any presumed neat separation of advocacy and politics are in order, lest we think we can become sanitized from politics. First, a policy or idea entrepreneur without some political savvy is just another promoter. Second, let's remember how John R. Commons explained the commonality between politicians and others involved in concerted effort. He wrote, "political parties, like all concerted action, . . . have the very practical purpose of getting and keeping control of the officials who formulate the will of the state."32 In the same way, those engaged in policy or advocacy research cannot ignore politics. Neither should advocates ignore that they are in a power struggle. Concerted action is "designed to get and keep control of the concern and its participants."33 Nor should we be surprised when opponents who are in that struggle flex their muscles or kick below the belt. Be assured they do. This is why progress is slow at best, and extremely difficult in the usual case. In a year, "there will be maybe 11,000 bills introduced in this Congress. Maybe 600 or 650 will be passed, and out of those, 400 to 500 are standard reauthorization bills. So what we are really taking about is a

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salmon ran of policy and ideas. You've got to have persistence. When you're working ideas, you've got to be prepared to hang in there."34 In addition to the counsel for persistence, I would add organization. B. Strategy: Organize Elements and Symbols. The strategy for advocacy is organization, organization, and more organization. The computer is now key to that organization. It is no longer possible to match the opposition without computer-based organization. Policy and program advocacy is where task force reports, corporate jets, favors, lobbyists, scientific testimony, media manipulation, special interests, direct mail pieces, and computers are mixed—hopefully in a finetuned manner—and usually fail, especially in the short term. Every aspect of the advocacy process has to be organized: the corporation jets to take advocates to Washington, DC, Austin, or Paris; the production and mailing of the four-page direct-mail piece; the identification and briefing of those who will give public testimony; the letters-to-theeditor campaign; the schedules and volunteers; the free media effort; the paid media effort; the areas to be canvassed door to door; money for the canvassers. They all need to be organized. On and on organization grows. Strategy studies for organizing policy advocacy have received little attention from instrumentalists or from academics in general, although advocacy is an important linkage between policy research and the adoption and implementation of new programs. Even though social theory has dealt little with these organizational techniques, it does clarify what must be organized and what must be included in the network and lobbying effort. Social research defines and explains the elements, beliefs, and ceremonial symbols central to organizing advocacy efforts. C. Tactics: Networking and Lobbying. The job of the tacticians and operations personnel is twofold. First, it is to use symbolic means to achieve instrumental results; to use symbols to acquire substance. It is the job of the lobbying and networking process to close the gap between symbols and substance by making the consequences wanted into the symbols that others want. Second, it is to create new symbols when necessary. Instrumentalists have explained the importance of mental habits, the power of symbols, and the relevance of both in pat-

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terning social institutions for both instrumental and deleterious purposes. The life process, to include policymaking, takes place in a social and cultural milieu in which symbols are essential for organization and communication. The anthropologist, Raymond Firth, has stated that "man does not live by symbols alone, but man orders and interprets his reality by his symbols and even reconstructs it."35 Thus, as Charles Elder and Roger Cobb explain: "Public policymaking tends to be a highly stylized and ritualized process. It is replete with symbolism that conveys reassurances and serves to rationalize the product, whatever it may be."36 Policy innovations need social and cultural moorings. A social symbol is a human invention; "people invent them, acquire them by learning, adapt them, use them for their own purposes."37 New symbols are "likely to occur in the face of dramatic events or major changes in the natural, social, or political environment."38 Symbols may "emerge as a consequence of their deliberate advocacy by political leaders or issue entrepreneurs."39 In some cases, a new policy may be so different from traditional institutional norms that new symbols will need to be generated to adequately represent the new policy. "New symbols can be created and old ones redefined (or discredited) so as to create a climate conducive to a significant policy innovation."40 A significant difference needs to be noted between traditional lobbying and the standard for instrumentalists. Traditional lobbying has too often appealed to, and thereby reinforced, any symbol, whether or not the symbol and the institutions it represented were deleterious. Consistent with Dewey, means determine ends, so if deleterious symbol manipulation is used, it will encourage a deleterious result. Events must be exploited through effective symbol management. The instrumentalist standard, however, is that symbols should not be utilized that will reinforce deleterious consequences or institutions. Symbols must be utilized to generate human responses. Lobbying, to be consistent with instrumentalist thought, requires that social symbols and institutions to which the lobbying effort is appealing be instrumental. In this way, lobbying for a new program is also reinforcing social and mental habits that have been found to be instrumental. In addition, an education and propaganda process will need to be developed in order to convince people of new symbols and social patterns needed to make the program a success.

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Lobbying is referred to as the fifth estate of government, although not necessarily the fifth in power. There is more than the vast inequality in access to lobbying funds that is fueling the growth in lobbying. The more technology grows, and consequently, the more society becomes differentiated and complex, the more the lobbying component must and will grow. Lobbying will grow, and lobbyists, who are becoming much more technically competent about their subject matter, are crucial to policymaking. It is no compliment to most universities that they have masters' degrees in business administration but not the equivalent for educating lobbyists. Instrumental research is ready-made for lobbying and organizing networks. It contains both the skeleton and the flesh. "The concerted action of politics within a concern is founded on passion, stupidity, inequality and mass action, yet it can be investigated scientifically. .. ."41 Such scientific inquiry is that to which instrumental research is devoted. It identifies power bases, deliveries, losers, winners, social groups, key social actors, institutions, beliefs, inequalities, government agencies, corporate interlocks, and so forth. Before an effective lobbying effort can be mounted, the actors, institutions, technologies, and financial flows must be identified. Instrumental analysis is problem oriented; thus, it turns to the analysis needed to analyze the problem. As problems change, different methods, principles, data, and statistical techniques are needed. As problems change, different alliances are needed for policymaking. The analysis of the problem tells us with whom the lobbying effort should seek alliances. It will be bankers in some cases, the GI Forum in others, the Sierra Club in others; and all three together in other cases. As the problem changes, the alliances change. Lobbyists are familiar with this. This is why civility and honesty are important among policy enemies. Today's enemy is tomorrow's friend in policymaking.

Phase IX: Program Budgeting A. Policy: Monetary, Rules, and Judicial Budgeting. Budgeting for programs is the process of allocating resources to continue old programs and create new ones. It includes: 1) the allocation of money flows, 2) making statutory changes, 3) making administrative changes, and 4) bringing about new judicial rulings in order to create new institutions, new technologies, and new human behavior patterns. Budget-

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ing is not just a matter of allocating money. Probably far more resources are allocated and institutions changed through statutory, administrative, regulatory, and judicial means than through monetary allocation. Taxation, bond indebtedness, and monetary allocation theories are well developed. What needs research attention is the design of budgeting systems that reflect budgeting beyond the allocation of money. B. Strategy: Agency Allocation. The program budgeting strategy is to allocate and coordinate the monetary, statutory, administrative, and judicial changes across the agencies in a manner to allow for the creation of new instrumentalities necessary for delivering social beliefs and social programs to the correct clients. C. Tactics: Budget Requests and Rule Changes. The accountants, auditors, and fiscal analysts need to have skills and knowledge from an array of scientific disciplines to carry out the budget requests and performance audits. That has been understood by many budget agencies that have hired multidisciplinary staffs. However, the multidisciplinary personnel many times continue to be forced into the mold of narrow models and dualistic double-entry accounting systems. As stated earlier, these are the actors most likely to become divorced from the original values, beliefs, and intent of programs. The tactical recommendation for all the phases has been designed, in part, to try to overcome this problem

Phase X: Sociotechnical Change A. Policy: Creation of Institutions. The final phase is the building of new institutions consistent with programs and budgets. At the policy science level the main research activity is the design of institutions, the definition of roles to make the institutions effective, and the forecasting of behavior-effective models. B. Strategy: Creation of Instrumentalities. The strategic level of sociotechnical change is concerned with the creation of instrumentalities. The emphasis is on specific programs that need to be accomplished and strategies to make them a reality. These are usually applied systems that are manifest mainly in social and technological in-

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novations; new airport systems, new disease prevention systems, new weapon systems, new industry regulation systems, new environmental protection systems, and so forth. C. Tactics: Operations and Procedures. At the tactical level are the technicians, clerks, word processors, labor unions, tractors, knowledge bases, water supplies, and so forth that are to be managed and administered in efficient systems. This level actually puts the system variables in the right place each day to deliver the results of the policymaking process. Theory with regard to the rigidity of mental habits is very relevant here. Old-line managers and bureaucrats with skills, knowledge, tools, and ideology from an undergraduate or graduate program of the distant past are often unable to understand the connection between belief systems and their own operations. Many times those who have worked their way up through the bureaucracy have learned "the system," and the last thing they want to do is endanger their positions with a new mode of operation. It is important to realize that if operations and procedures in the active bureaucracy are inconsistent with the theory, intent, and strategy of policymaking, then pushing progressive bills through legislative bodies or achieving instrumental court decisions will be of little value. Likewise, to design policy research or programs without considering the viability of tactical operations to finalize the research findings and programs, limits the value of the research no matter how intellectually pleasing or elegant it may be. "Instrumentalists see planning and administrative 'control' as essential ingredients of economic organization whether in the public or the private spheres."42

Summary In summary, the emphasis has been to extend and broaden the tool kit of instrumental policymaking to include research and expertise for all the phase-level conjunctions of Figure 10-1. Without this extended base, the delivery of instrumental policy can break down. Policy science research cannot be utilized without effective principles from the strategic, management, and administrative sciences that have been grounded in a similar intellectual tradition. Likewise, managers and administrators are doing little more than carrying out procedures if they are not operating consistent with the philosophy, ideology, and research

SFM IN A METAPOLICYMAKING CONTEXT

227

from the policy level, as is indicated in Figures 10-2, 10-3, and 10-4. Relevant policymaking research on any complex social problem requires expertise in all phases of policy research. Significant policymaking for a good society requires concerted efforts to coordinate policy research with all phases of strategy and tactics.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Chapter 1: Introduction 1.

The emphasis on the importance of analytical means is not intended to convey a perception that numerous other aspects are not involved in preventing good policy. My experience in the policymaking arena precludes such naivete. Experiences have made me painfully aware, for example, of the tremendous power and influence of entrenched corporate interests in the policy process. That experience has also made me aware that one of the strongest weapons against such interests is well publicized results from competent research. For an example of the power of research and advocacy with regard to reducing the power of the atomic energy industry in Washington, D.C. see: Duffy, Robert J. Nuclear Politics in America: A History and Theory of Government Regulations. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1997.

2.

Anderson, Frederick R., Robert L. Glicksman, Daniel R. Mandelker, and A. Dan Tarlock. Environmental Protection: Law and Policy. New York: Aspen Law and Business, 1999, p. xxvii.

3.

Ibid., p. xxviii.

4.

Menand, Louis. The Metaphysical Club. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001.

5.

Lodge, George C. The New American Ideology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976, p. 3.

6.

Menand. Op. cit., p. 441.

7.

Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 408-409.

8.

Lippmann, Walter. The Good Society. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company 1937.

9.

Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. The Good Society. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.

10. Daly, Herman E. and John B. Cobb, Jr. For the Common Good. Boston: Beacon Press, 1994. 11. Dewey, John. 1927.

The Public and Its Problems.

New York:

Henry Holt and Company,

12. Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944. 13. De Greene, Keynon B. Sociotechnical Systems. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973. 14. Lodge. Op. cit. 15. Tool, Marc R. The Discretionary Economy. A Normative Theory of Political Economy. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1979.

230

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY Chapter 2: Policy Paradigms Should Be Consistent with the Complexity of Reality

1.

See Hayden, F. Gregory. "Policy Concerns Regarding Ecologically Sound Disposal of Industrial Waste Materials." In Marc R. Tool and Paul D. Bush, eds. Institutional Analysis and Economic Policy. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, pp. 466478.

2.

Baudrillard, Jean. The System of Objects. New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 195-196.

3.

English, Mary. "Siting, Justice, and Conceptions of the Good. Public Affairs Quarterly 5 (January 1991), p. 9.

4.

Young, Iris M. "Justice and Hazardous Waste." In Michael Bradie, Thomas W. Attig, and Nicholas Rescher, eds. The Applied Turn in Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 171-183. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy, 1983, p. 177.

5.

Anderson, Frederick R., Daniel R. Mandelker, and A. Dan Tarlock. Environmental Protection: Law and Policy. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1984, p. 35.

6.

Dror, Yehezkel. Public Policymaking Reexamined. Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968; and Dror, Yehezkel. Policymaking Under Adversity. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986.

7.

Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.

8.

Hamilton, David. "Comment Provoked by Mason's 'Duesenberry Contribution to Consumer Theory.'" Journal of Economic Issues 35 (September 2001), p. 746.

Chapter 3: Instrumental Philosophy and Criteria 1.

Anderson, James A. and Elaine E. Englehardt. The Organizational Self and Ethical Conduct. Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 2001, pp. 6-12.

2.

Ibid, p. 9.

3.

The terminology of self-action, interaction, and transaction is taken from: Handy, Rollo. Value Theory and the Behavioral Sciences. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1969, pp. 52-68.

4.

Equilibrium models are inconsistent with the open systems of the real world (see Chapter 4).

5.

Handy. Op. cit, pp. 59-60.

6.

Ibid., p. 60.

7.

Geertz, Clifford. "The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man." In Clifford Geertz, ed. Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 34.

8.

Birkland, Thomas A. An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of Public Policymaking. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, p. 122.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 9.

231

Ibid., p. 123.

10. Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and American Democracy. University Press, 1991, p. 245.

Ithaca:

Cornell

11. Ayres, Clarence E. The Theory of Economic Progress. New York: Schocken, 1962. 12. Schumpeter, Joseph A. University Press, 1961.

The Theory of Economic Depvelopment.

New York:

Oxford

13. Ayres. Op. cit. 14. Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. New York: Vintage, 1964. 15. Schumacher, E.F. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. Harper and Row, 1975.

New York:

16. Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1954, p. 108. 17. Ibid. 18. Eco, Umberto. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, p. 61. 19. Ibid., p. 66. 20. Okrent, Mark. "The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth." (December 1993), p. 392.

Inquiry 36

21. Schlagel, Richard H. Contextual Realism: A Metaphysical Framework for Modern Science. New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1986, p. 236. 22. Dewey, John. Theory of Valuation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, p. 49. 23. Pankratz, David B. Multiculturalism and Public Arts Policy. Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1993, p. 22. 24. The Economist. "Let Them Eat Pollution." 322 (February 8, 1993), p. 66. 25. Weisbrod, Burton A. "Preventing High School Dropouts." In Robert Dorfman, ed. Measuring Benefits of Government. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1965. 26. Anderson, Charles W. Press, 1990, pp. 43-44.

Pragmatic Liberalism.

Chicago:

The University of Chicago

27. Schagel. op cit., p. 232. 28. Ibid. 29. Tool, Marc R. The Discretionary Economy: A Normative Theory of Political Economy. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1979, p. 289.

232

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

30. Sadler, D. Royce. "The Origins and Functions of Evaluative Criteria." Theory 35 (Summer 1985), p. 282.

Education

31. Ibid., p. 292. 32. Olson, Paul A. The Journey to Wisdom. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, pp. 1-27. 33. Chisolm, Roderick M. "Reply to Amico on the Problems of the Criterion." ical Papers 17 (March 1988), p. 233.

Philosoph-

34. Schlagel. Op. cit. p. 236. 35. Ostrom, Eleanor. Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. Francisco: TCS Press, 1992, p. 45.

San

36. Ibid., p. 47. 37. Schlagel. op. cit, p. 203. 38. McMullin, Ernan. 'Two Faces of Science." Review of Metaphysics 27 (June 1974), p. 658. 39. Ibid., p. 669. 40. Lee, Donald S. "Adequacy in World Hypotheses: Metaphilosophy 14 (April 1983), p. 515.

Reconstructing Peppers Criteria."

41. McMullin. Op cit, p. 671. 42. Ibid, p. 675. 43. George, Kathryn Paxton. "Sustainability and the Moral Community." Human Values 9 (Fall 1992), pp. 48-57.

Agricuture and

44. Dewey, John. The Quest for Certainty. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1929, p. 85.

Chapter 4: General Systems Principles for Policy Analysis 1.

Argyal, Andras. Foundations for a Science of Personality. University Press, 1941.

Cambridge: Harvard

2.

Katz, Daniel and Robert L. Kahn. "Common Characteristics of Open Systems." In F.E. Emery, ed. Systems Thinking. Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1976, p. 90.

3.

Hall, A.D. and R.E. Fagen. "Systems Organization and the Logic of Relations." In Walter Buckley, ed. Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968, p. 81.

4.

Ibid., p. 82.

5.

De Greene, Kenyon B. Sociotechnical Systems: Factors in Analysis, Design, and Management. Englewood Cliffs: Princtice-Hall, Inc., 1973, p. 4.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

233

6.

Ibid., p. 36.

7.

Katz and Kahn. Op. cit, 101.

8.

Rosen, Robert. "Some Systems Theoretics Problems in Biology." In Ervin. Laszlo, ed. The Relevance of General Systems Theory. New York: George Braziller, 1972, p. 53.

9.

Swaney, James. "Elements of a Neoinstitutional Environmental Economics." Journal of Economic Issues 21 (December 1987).

10. Ibid., p. 337. 11. Rosen. Op. cit., p. 53. 12. Ibid. 13. De Greene. Op. cit, p. 37. 14. Katz and Kahn. Op. cit, p. 100. 15. Ackoff, Russell L. "Towards a System of Systems Concepts." Management Science 17 (July 1971), p. 670. 16. Pattee, Howard H. "The Role of Instabilities in the Evolution of Control Hierarchies." In Tom R. Burns and Walter Buckley, eds. Power and Control: Social Structures and Their Transformation. London: Sage Publications, 1976, p. 179. 17. Pattee, Howard H. Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems. New York: George Braziller, 1973, p. 77. 18. De Greene. Op. cit, p. 47. 19. Ibid. 20. Laszlo. Op cit, p. 19. 21. Pattee. Op. cit, p. 77. 22. Bryant, James W. "Flow Models for Assessing Human Activities." European Journal of Operations Research 4 (June 1980), p. 73. 23. De Greene. Op. cit., p. 22. 24. Katz and Kahn. Op. cit. p. 95. 25. De Greene. Op. cit, p. 78. 26. Ibid., p. 7. 27. Pattee, Howard H. "The Complementarity Principle in Biological and Social Structures." Journal of Social and Biological Structures 1 (June 1978), p. 99. 28. Katz and Kahn. Op. cit, p. 99.

234

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

29. Hunter, David E. and Phillips Whitten. The Study of Cultural Anthropology. New York: Harper and Row, 1978, p. 287. 30. Bertalanffy, Ludwig Von. General Systems Theory: Foundation, Development, Applications. New York: George Braziller, 1969, p. 226. 31. Ibid., p. 229. 32. Ibid., p. 236. 33. Hall and Fagen. Op. cit, p. 92.

Chapter 5: Social Criteria and Socioecological Indicators 1.

Blumer, Martin. The Uses of Social Research Investigation in Public Policy-Making. London: George Allen & Urwin, 1982, p. 51.

2.

Veblen, Thorstein B. Company, 1899, p. 9.

3.

Land, Kenneth C. "On the Definition of Social Indicators." American 6 (November 1970), p. 323.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938, pp. 200, 205, 211, and 499.

6.

McGill, Dan M., ed. Social Investing. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1984, pp. 3-4.

7.

McKean, Roland N. Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967, p.25.

8.

State of Ohio v. U.S. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

9.

Blumer. Op cit., p. 52.

The Theory of the Leisure Class.

New York:

The Macmillan

Sociologist

New York:

10. Rohrlich, George F., ed. Environmental Management. Cambridge: Balinger Publishing Co., 1976, p. 274.

Chapter 6: The Social Fabric Matrix 1.

Warfield, John N. Societal Systems: Planning, Policy and Complexity. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976, p. 63.

2.

Geertz, Clifford. "The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man." In Clifford Geertz, ed. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 17.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

235

3.

De Greene, Kenyon B. Sociotechnical Systems: Factors in Analysis, Design, and Management. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 3.

4.

Rohrlich, George F., ed. Environmental Management. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976, p. 276.

5.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking the World Order. New York: Touchstone, 1997.

6.

Neale, Walter C. "Institutions." p. 1182.

7.

Ibid, p. 1183.

8.

Von Wright, Georg H. Practical Reason. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 74.

9.

Allport, Gordon W. "The Historical Background of Social Psychology." In Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds. Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume I: Theory and Method, pp. 1-46. New York: Random House, 1985, p. 31.

Journal of Economic Issues 21 (September 1987),

10. Wolman, Benjamin B , ed. Dictionary of Behavioral Science. Nostrand Reinhold, 1973, p. 243.

New York:

Van

11. Allport. Op. cit,p. 36. 12. Ibid, p. 6. 13. Harre, Rom and Roger Lamb, eds. In The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983, p. 591. 14. Allport. Opcit,p. 37. 15. McGuire, William J. "Attitudes and Attitude Change." In Gardner Lindsey and Elliot Aronson, eds. Handbook of Social Psychology. Volume II: Special Fields and Applications., pp. 233-346. New York: Random House, 1985, p. 255. 16. Rokeach, Milton. "Some Unresolved Issues in Theories of Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values." In Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1979, pp. 261-304. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980, p. 275. 17. Wright, Will. Six Guns and Society: A Structural Study of the Western. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, p. 135. 18. Rokeach, Milton. Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change. San Francisco: Josey-Bass, Inc., 1968, p. 116. 19. Hamilton, David. "Comment Provoked by Mason's 'Duesenberry's Contribution to Consumer Theory.'" Journal of Economic Issues 35 (June 2001), p. 476. 20. Polanyi, Karl. "The Economy as Instituted Process." In Karl Polanyi et al, eds. Trade and Markets in Early Empires. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957, p. 250.

236

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

21. Eisner, Wolfram. "An Industrial Policy Agenda 2000 and Beyond—Experience, Theory, and Policy." In Wolfram Eisner and John Groenewegen, eds. Industrial Policies After 2000. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, p. 448. 22.

Ibid., p. 451.

23. Parkes, Don and W.D. Wallis. 1980. "Graph Theory and the Study of Activity Structure." In Tommy Carlstein, Don Parkes, and Nigel Thrift. Human Activity and Geography. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980, p. 77. 24.

W.E. Moore, quoted in Ibid., p. 76.

25.

Mattessich, Richard. Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology: An Epistemology of the Applied and Social Sciences. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1978, p. 290.

26.

Ibid. p. 289.

27. State of Ohio v. U.S. Department of Interior. 880 F. 2d 432. (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Chapter 7: Illustrations of the Social Fabric Matrix 1.

High Performance Systems, Inc. (HPS). An Introduction to Systems Thinking: ithink Software. Hanover, NH: High Performance Systems, Inc., 1997.

2.

Hayden, F. Gregory and Steven R. Bolduc. "Contracts and Costs in a Corporate/Government System Dynamics Network: A United States Case." In Wolfram Eisner and John Groenwegen, eds. Industrial Policies After 2000. Boston and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.

3.

Copies of the contracts may be requested by email from either the author, [email protected], or the Central Interstate Compact Commission, [email protected].

4.

U.S. Department of Energy/Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 10 Code of Federal Regulations §61. Online. Available from http://www.gpoacess.gov/cfr/index.html.

5.

Hayden and Bolduc. Op. cit, pp. 250, 252, and 253.

6.

Fullwiler, Scott. "A Framework for Analyzing the Daily Federal Funds Market." doctoral dissertation. University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE, 2001.

7.

Ibid., p. 103.

8.

Ibid.

9.

Ibid.

10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., p. 104. 12. Ibid.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

237

13.

14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., pp. 104-105. 17. Ibid., p. 105. 18. Ibid., p. 255. 19. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Natarajan-Marsh, Tara. "Confronting Seasonality: Socioeconomic Analysis of Rural Poverty and Livelihood Strategies in a Dry Land Village." doctoral dissertation. University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE, 2001. 21. Yang, Youngseok. "Crafting Hierarchical Institutions for Surface Water Resource Management of the Platte River: A Case Study for the Assessment of Institutional Performance and Transformation." doctoral dissertation. University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE, 1996. 22. For explanations of these laws, see: Ibid., pp. 136-256. 23. Ibid., pp. 241-242. 24. Ibid., pp. 242 and 244. 25. Ibid., pp. 244 and 246.

Chapter 8: Timeliness as the Appropriate Concept of Time 1.

Hampden-Turner, Charles and Alfons Trompenaars. NY: Doubleday, 1993.

The Seven Cultures of Capitalism.

2.

Commons, John R. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968 [1923], p. 379.

3.

Cottle, Thomas J. and Stephen L. Kleinberg. The Present of Things Future: Explorations of Time in Human Experience. New York: The Free Press 1974, p. 166.

4.

Gale, Richard M. "Human Time" in Richard M. Gale, ed. The Philosophy of Time. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books 1967, p. 30.

5.

Cottle and Kleinberg. Op. cit., p. 166.

6.

Ibid., p. 167.

7.

Ibid., p. 168.

238

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

8.

Priestly, J.B. Man and Time. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1963, p. 160.

9.

Ibid., p. 172.

10. Adams, John and Uwe J. Woltemade. "Village Economy in Traditional India: A Simplied Model." Human Change 39 (Spring 1970), pp. 49-56. 11. Cottle and Kleinberg. Op. cit., p. 162. 12. Priestly.

Op. cit., p. 152.

13. Ibid., p. 158. 14. Ibid. 15. Russell, J. L. "Time in Christian Thought." In J.T. Fraser, ed. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1968, p. 66.

The Voice of Time.

16. Pattaro, Germano. "The Christian Conception of Time." In Cultures and Time. Paris: The UNESCO Press, 1976, p. 187. 17. Russell. Op. cit., p. 66. 18. MacGregor, Geddes. The Hemlock and the Cross: Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1963, p. 91.

Humanism, Socrates, and Christ.

19. Lodge, George C. The New American Ideology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976, p. 58. 20. Priestly. Op. cit, p. 166. 21. Ibid, p. 64. 22. De Greene, Kenyon B. Sociotechnical Systems: Factors in Analysis, Design, and Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973, p. 207. 23. Max-Neef, Manfred A. From the Outside Locking in: Experiences in "Barefoot Economics." Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1982, p. 150. 24. Ibid, p. 140. 25. Ibid, p. 150. 26. Priestly. Op. cit, p. 69. 27. Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas. Analytical Economics: Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 69. 28. Einstein, Albert and Leopold Infeld. Simon & Schuster, 1938, p. 6.

Issues and Problems.

The Evolution of Physics.

29. Ornstein, Robert E. The Psychology of Consciousness. Javanovich, 1977, p. 105.

Forge Village, MA:

New York:

Harcourt Brace

NOTES AND REFERENCES

239

30. Toffler, Alvin. Future Shock. New York: Random House, 1970. 31. Priestly. Op. cit, p. 67. 32. Royce, Josiah. "The Temporal and the Eternal: The Development of Its Philosophical Meaning." In Charles M. Sherover, ed. The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophical Meaning. New York: New York University Press, 1904 [1975], p. 401. 33. James, William. "The Perception of Time." In Charles M. Sherover, ed. The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophical Meaning. New York: New York University Press, 1890 [1975], p. 382. 34. Hall, Edward T. The Silent Language. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1890 [ 1959], p. 382. 35. Priestly, op. cit, p. 67. 36. Floyd, Keith. "Of Time and the Mind." Fields 10 (Winter 1973-74), p. 50. 37. Ibid. 38. Chapin, Jr., F. Stuart. Human Activity Patterns in the City: and Space. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1974, p. 9.

Things People Do in Time

39. Ibid., p. 10. 40. Ibid. 41. Hayden, F. Gregory with Larry D. Swanson. "Planning Through the Socialization of Property Rights: The Community Reinvestment Act." Journal of Economic Issues 14 (June 1980), p. 354. 42. De Greene. Op. cit, p. 61. 43. Ibid. 44. "Real time" is something of a misnomer; a term more descriptive of the concept is "system time." 45. Nelson, Edward A. "A Working Definition of Real-Time Control." P-3089. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965, p. 18. 46. Sackman, Harold. Computers, System Science and Evolving Society: The Challenge of Man-Machine Digital Systems. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967, pp. 223-235. 47.

48.

. "Futurists on the Future." 1981), p. 23.

Los Angeles Business & Economics 6 (Summer

. Computers, System Science and Evolving Society. Op. cit., p. 42.

49. Szali, Sandor. "Time and Environment: The Human Use of Time." Hungarian Quarterly 19 (Summer 1978), pp. 138-139. 50. Max-Neef. Op. cit, p. 139.

The New

240

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

51. Szali. Op. cit.,p. 134. 52. Ibid. 53. Gurevich, A. J. "Time as a Problem of Cultural History." UNESCO, 1976, p. 242.

Cultures and Time. Paris:

54. Szali. Op. cit.,p. 135. 55. Ayres, Clarence E. The Theory of Economic Progress. New York: 1944 [1962], p. 144.

Schacken Books,

56. Szali. Op. cit.,p. 133. 57. Sackman. Computers, System Science and Evolving Society. Op. cit., p. 250. 58. Ibid. 59. Blaunt, J.M. "Space and Process." Professional Geography 13 (1961), pp. 1-7, quoted in Edward L. Ullman. "Space and/or Time Opportunities for Substitution and Prediction." Transactions Institute of British Geographers. New Series 4 (1979), p. 126. 60. Ullman. Op. cit, p. 127. 61. Parkes, Don and W.D. Wallis. "Graph Theory and the Study of Activity Structure." In Tommy Carlestein, Don Harkes, and Nigel Thrift, eds. Human Activity and Time Geography. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980, p. 78. 62. Ibid., p. 81. 63. Ibid., p. 77. 64. Ibid., p. 76. 65. Denbigh, K.G. An Inventive Universe. 1975, p. 27.

London:

Hutchinson & Co. Publishers Ltd.,

66. Sipfle, David A. "On the Intelligibility of the Epochal Theory of Time." The Monist 53 (September 1969), p. 511. 67. Bergson, Henri. "Time as Lived Duration." In Charles M. Sherover, ed. The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning. New York: New York University Press, 1975, p. 226. 68. Parsons, Stephen D. "Time, Expectations, and Subjectivism: Prolegomena to a Dynamic Economics." Cambridge Journal of Economics 15 (December 1991), p. 414. 69. Ibid, p. 415. 70. Ibid, p. 419. 71. Whitehead, Alfred. "Two Kinds of Time Relatedness." In Charles M. Sherover, ed. The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning. New York: New York University Press, 1920 [1975], p. 332.

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72. Hall, Edward T. The Dance of Life: The Other Dimension of Time. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1983, pp. 48-49. 73.

. The Silent Language. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959, p. 28.

74. Lane, Paul M. and Carol J. Kaufman. "The Standardization of Time." In Robert L. King, ed. Marketing: Positioning for the 1990s Proceedings of the 1989 Southern Marketing Association, 1989, p. 4. 75. Juster, F. Thomas and Frank P. Stafford. "The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings, Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement." The Journal of Economic Literature 29 (June 1991). 76. Hall. Op. cit. 1983, pp. 53-58. 77. Juster and Stafford. Op. cit., p. 515. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Lane and Kaufman. Op. cit., p. 5. 81. Dewey, John. "Time and Individuality." In Charles M. Serover, ed. The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning. New York: New York University Press, 1940 [1975], p. 423. 82. Jaques, Elliott. The Form of Time. London: Heineman Educational Books, 1982, p. 51. 83. Bausor, Randall. "Toward a Historically Dynamic Economics: Examples and Illustrations." Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 6 (Spring 1984), p. 360. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid., p. 362. 87. Ibid., p. 371. 88. Norton, Bryan G. "Context and Hierarchy in Aldo Leopold's Theory of Environmental Management." Ecological Economics 2 (1990), p. 119. 89. Mitch, William J. and James G. Gosselink. Wetlands. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, Inc., 1986, p. 158. 90. O'Neill, R.V., D.L. DeAngelis, J.B. Warde, and T.F.H. Allen. "A Hierarchical Concept of Ecosystems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 23. 91. Dewey, Op. cit., p. 423. 92. Whitehead. Op. cit, p. 341.

242

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY Chapter 9: Evaluation for Sufficiency: Combining the Social Fabric Matrix and Instrumentalism

1.

Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958, p. 123.

2.

Ibid.

3.

Norton, Bryan. Toward Unity Among Environmentalists. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 6.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Daly, Herman E. and John B. Cobb, Jr. For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Boston: Beacon Press, 1989, p. 41.

6.

Ostrom, Elinor. Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. Francisco: C.S. Press, 1992.

7.

The source of Figure 9-1 is: Kadlec, Robert H. and David E. Hammer. "Modeling Nutrient Behavior in Wetlands." Ecological Modeling 40 (March 1988), p. 40.

8.

Mitch, William J. and James G. Gosselink. Wetlands. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Inc., 1986, p. 151.

9.

Levins, Richard. Evolution in Communities Near Equilbrium." In Ecology and Evolution of Communities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 48-49.

San

10. Ibid., p. 49. 11. Ibid., p. 47.

Chapter 10: The Social Fabric Matrix in a Metapolicymaking Context 1.

Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems, 2nd ed. Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1954, p. 135.

2.

Lodge, George C. The New American Ideology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980, p. 319.

3.

Gellen, Martin. "Institutionalist Economics and the Intellectual Origins of National Planning in the United States." Journal of Planning, Education and Research 4 (December 1984), p. 78.

4.

Bush, Paul D. "The Theory of Institutional Change." Journal of Economic Issues 21 (September 1987).

5.

Polanyi, Karl. "The Economy as Instituted Process." In Polanyi, Karl et al. eds. Trade and Markets in Early Empire. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957, p. 249.

6.

Dewey. Op. cit, p. 108.

243

NOTES AND REFERENCES 7.

Dunford, Richard. "The Suppression of Technology as a Strategy for Controlling Resource Dependence." Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (December 1987), pp. 512525; and Wassily Leontief. "The Choice of Technology." Scientific American 252 (June 1985), pp. 37-45.

8.

Bollier, David and Joan Claybrook. "Freedom from Harm: The Civilizing Influence of Health and Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: Public Citizen and Democracy Project, 1986, p. 203.

9.

Dewey, John. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, p. xxx.

10. Levin, Samuel M. "John Dewey's Evaluation of Technology." Economics and Sociology 15 (January 1954), p. 134.

American Journal of

11. Ibid. 12. Tool, Marc R. The Discretionary Economy: A Normative Theory of Political Economy. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1979, p. 296. 13. Quoted in: Lower, Milton D. "The Concept of Technology Within the Institutional Perspective." Journal of Economic Issues 21 (September 1987), p. 1161. 14. Ostrander, Gilman M. "Thorstein Veblen." In Gilman M. Ostrander, ed. Progressive Era. Clio, MI: Marston Press, 1971, p. 23.

Ideas of the

15. Leemans, Arne. "Information as a Factor of Power and Influence." Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 7 (September 1986), p. 45.

Knowledge:

16. Ibid. 17. Melody, William. "Information: An Emerging Dimension of Institutional Analysis." Journal of Economic Issues 2\ (September 1987), p. 1337. 18. Blumer, Martin. The Uses of Social Research: Social Investigations in Public PolicyMaking. London: George Allen & Urwin, 1982, p. 35. 20. Leemans. Op. cit., p. 54. 21. Dewey, John. "The Supremacy of Method." In Milton R. Kinvitz and Gail Kennedy, eds. The American Progmatists. New York: Meridian Books, 1960, p. 190. 21. Ratner, Joseph. "Introduction to John Dewey's Philosophy." In Rollo Handy and L.C. Harwood, eds. Useful Procedures of Inquiry. Great Barrington, MA: Behavioral Research Council, 1973, p. 23. 22. Street, James. "The Institutionalist Theory of Economic Development." Economic Issues 21 (December 1987), p. 1870.

Journal of

23. James, William. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907, p. 50. 24. Petr, Jerry. "Fundamentals of an Institutional Perspective on Economic Policy." Journal of Economic Issues 18 (March 1984), p. 1.

244

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

25. Lodge, George C. The New American Ideology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, p. 39. 26. Ibid., p. 297. 27. Ibid., p. 95. 28. Ibid., p. 20. 29. Coates, Joseph F. "The Role of Formal Models in Technology Assessment." Technological Forecasting and Social Change 9 (1976), p. 145. 30. Ramstad, Yngve. "A Pragmatist's Quest for Holistic Knowledge: The Scientific Methodology of John R. Commons." Journal ofEconomic Issues 20 (December 1986), p. 1097. 31. Lodge. Op. cit, p. 329. 32. Commons, John R. Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1935, p. 752. 33. Ibid., p. 749. 34. Quote by Pat Choate in: Rothenberg, Randall. "The Idea Merchant: Pat Choate Sells Economic Policies." The New York Times Magazine (May 3,1987), p. 44. 35. Firth, Raymond. "Symbols: Public and Private. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1973, p. 20. 36. Elder, Charles D. and Roger W. Cobb. The Political Use of Symbols. New York: Longman, 1983, p. 21. 37. Firth. Op. cit., p. 427. 38. Elder and Cobb. Op. cit, p. 30. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., p. 110. 41. Commons. Op. cit, p. 748. 42. Gellen. Op. cit, p. 78.

INDEX

alternatives ecological sets, 191 evaluate with the SFM, 9, 75, 102-106 valuation, 64-65 Anderson, Charles, 40 Argyal, Andras, 51 Aristotle, 188 Arnold, Thurman, 109 attitudes defined, 81-85 paradigmatic component, 6 responses, 82 signs, 81 social fabric matrix, 8, 81-85 system component, 18, 55, 75 tastes, 83 Ayres, Clarence, 30-32

Bausor, Randall, 177 beliefs (see social beliefs) Bellah, Robert N., 5 Bergson, Henri-Louis, 158, 172 Berle, Adolf, 210 Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, 59 Bollier, David, 209 Boolean matrix and digraph, 90-94 graphical clocks, 171-182 Buchanan, James, 214 Bush, Paul Dale, 206

Carter, President Jimmy, 44 Chapin, F. Stuart, 161 Claybrook, Joan, 207 Coase theorem, 15 Cobb-Douglas production function, 19, 84 Cobb, Jr., John, 5, 188,223 Cobb, Roger, 203 common denominator, 15, 71 Commons, John R., 145, 221 complexity, 1, 6, 54, 59 democracy, 44 institutions, 189 nonequilibrium, 54-55, 195-196 seek complexity, 27-28, 73

social fabric matrix, 73 consequences, 4, 5, 21, 29,42 context, 4 criteria, 33-43, 187-188 decreasing options, 188 democracy, 29-30 instrumentalism, 29-30, 188 social fabric matrix, 118,217-218 cost-benefit, 6, 207 corporate prices, 15-16 corporations, 15-16,208 Crafting Institutions, 46, 189 criteria, 4 context, 33-43,48, 187-188 contextual shift, 41-42 contradiction, 43-44 cultural values, 76 democracy, 41-42, 44 digraph indices, 192-194 ecological, 5 normative, 5-6, 8, 35-37 pluralism, 38-39 policy evaluation, 37, 194 primary, 17 process, 42-43 scientific, 48 secondary, 17 social, 5, 8-9 technological, 5 cultural values criteria, 35-40 defined, 75-79 deliveries, 83 distinction from beliefs, 77-78 paradigmatic component, 6 social fabric matrix, 75-79 system component, 18,55, 75 values-beliefs connection, 77, 80 cynicism, 2

Daily Federal Funds Market, 123, 126-132 Daly, Herman, 5, 188 De Greene, Kenyon B., 5, 52 democracy, 41-44 instrumental approach, 45-46

246

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

mandates, 45-47 Denbigh, K.G., 172 Dewey, John, 5, 7, 17 consequences, 188 democracy as negative feedback, 58 instrumentalist ideas, 3 measurement, 17, 62-63 scientific inquiry, 47 technology, 33,208 timeliness, 164, 182 Dictionary of Behavioral Science, 81 Discretionary Economy, 5 Dror, Yehezkel, 16

ecological systems biodiversity, 11, 103-104 defined, 84-85 embedded in sociotechnical, 189 evaluation, 103-106 extinction, 192-194 harmonization in nature, 195 institutions, 84-85, 189-192 irreversibility, 193 living systems, 53, 195-196 natural goods production, 53 natural resources, 53 normative criteria, 19 options limited, 188-194 paradigmatic component, 6 radioactive waste disposal, 109-125 sink function, 53-54 social fabric matrix, 8, 84-85, 187-197 sufficiency, 10-11, 187-197, 192-194 sustainability, 10-11, 187-188 system components, 18, 55, 75 system disruption, 192-194 technology, 189-190 efficiency defined, 20, 64, 195 judged by consequences, 5 social criteria, 80 values and beliefs, 80 Einstein, Albert common frame, 1, 74 intuition, 158 Elder, Charles, 223 Ellul, Jacques, 31-32 Eisner, Wolfram, 97 Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology, 81 environmental policy

organic view, 3 precautionary, 187 social fabric matrix, 103-106, 187-197 sufficiency, 187-197, sustainability, 187-188 Environmental Protection: Law and Policy, 2 evolution clocks and temporal concepts, 165-171 species, 195-196 technological, 30-33 time, 165, 180-181

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 27 Federal Reserve System, 27, 132 Firth, Raymond, 223 Folklore of Capitalism, 109 For the Common Good, 5 Friedman, Milton, 214 Future Shock, 159

Geertz, Clifford, 73 general systems analysis (see systems) George, Kathryn, 49 Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas, 158' Good Society, 5 good society, 1,5, 14-15 Gould, Stephen Jay, 47 Great Transformation, 5, 50 great transformation, 3-4 growth maximization, 194 GSA, general systems analysis (see systems) Gustrom, Gjessling, 47

Hall, Edward T., 160, 174 Handbook of Social Psychology, 82 Handy, Rollo, 7 holistic, 4, 7, 13,54,220, 156 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 3 Huntington, Samuel P., 76

ideology, 3 impediments, 195 whole system, 4 illusion of transparency, 14 Infel, Leopold, 158 institution(s), 2

INDEX culture, 77-78 defined, 79-81 ecological paradigms, 189-192 paradigmatic component, 6 policy, 189-192 social fabric matrix, 8, 77-78 system components, 18, 55, 75 technology, 32 instrumental philosophy consequences, 4, 5, 21, 29,42 context 187-188 criteria, 34-43, 187-188 defined, 3-4, 6-7,21-30, 187 democratic policymaking, 7 development of ideas, 3-4, 7, 21-33 sufficiency, 187-197 end-in-view, 4 experience, 42-43 ideological impediments, 195-196 judging by consequences, 7 problem orientation, 4, 7, 28-29 social fabric matrix, 187-197 systems principles, 7 technology, 30-33 time analysis, 182-185 transactional approach to, 7, 33-34

James, William, 3 Johnson, President Lyndon, 221 justice, 2,14-15

Kahn, Robert L., 51 Katz, Daniel, 51 Kaufman, Carol J., 175 Kerry, Senator John, 34 KISS principle, 27-28 KICK principle, 28

Lane, Paul M., 175 Laszlo, Ervin, 56 Lazwell, Harold, 217 Levins, Richard, 195-196 Lippmann, Walter, 5 Lodge, George, 3-5, 195 Lower, Milton, 209

mandates, 45-47

247 Mattessich, Richard, 7, 102-103 Max-Neef, Manfred, 157-158, 165 McGuire, William J., 82 McKean, Roland, 64 McMullin, Ernan, 47 measurement Dewey on social measurement, 17 fact/value, 63 networking and lobbying, 227-229 primary criteria, 17, 64 qualification to quantification, 17, 63 secondary criteria, 17, 65 social 17 social indicators, 62-66,223 Melody, William, 211 Menand, Louis, 3 metapolicymaking, 203-231 advocacy, 225-229 diagrammatic overview of, 204-205 ideology, 218-220 instrumental philosophy, 216-218 levels and phases, 203-213 participatory democracy, 217-218 problem defmitiion problems and consequences, 216-217 problem definition, 221-222 program budgeting, 229-230 select program, 224-225 social fabric matrix context, 11, 222 sociotechnical change, 230-231 transactional processes, 7 theory creation of integrated systems, 213-214 diffusion of knowledge, 214 linkage to theory and operations, 215, 230-231 utilization of knowledge, 214-215 methodology, 51 science is a policy area, 47-49 models common, 1 complex, 73 deterministic, 3, 59 integrated process, 5, 18, 38 interactional, 23-27 logical positivism, 47 mechanistic, 54 one-dimensional systems, 52 rates and levels, 163 reductionist, 54

248

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

self-actional, 23-27 sustainable, 191-192 transactional, 22-28 Myrdal, Gunnar, 209

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,3 Neale, Walter, 79 neoclassical economics common denominator, 15 corporate prices, 15-16 category mistake, 16 hedonism, 15 illusion of transparency, 14 objectivity, 43-44 time analysis, 155-158, 175-176 utility, 13-15 normative criteria, 19, 80, 102-103, 192-194 networks social fabric matrix digraphs, 91, 93, 96-97,114,129-132,136,138, 140-141, 173, 179, 181 social fabric matrix ithink digraphs, 121, 124-125, 130-132 social fabric matrix, 97 timeliness, 183 defined, 18,97 New American Ideology, 5 noncommon denominator, 86-88 non-equilibrium, 2, 52, 86-87

objectivity, 42-43 one best way not viable, 43-45 Open Market Desk, 131 Ornstein, Robert E., 158 Ostrom, Eleanor, 46, 189

paradigm general, 6 paradigmatic shift, 2-3 Pareto optimality, 15 Patee, Howard, 56 Peirce, Charles, 3, 7, 33,40 pessimism, 2 Petr, Jerry, 214 Plato, 44 Polanyi, Karl, 3, 5,49, 162, 214

policy, 199-205, 209-226 analysis, 4, 195-196 decreasing options, 188 evaluation, 10-11, 102-106, 187-197 paradigm, 6 SFM, 11,75, 102-106 science, 47-49 sufficiency, 187-197 systems, 187 policymaking advocacy, 220-224 delivery criteria, 194 inappropriate paradigms bureaucratic, 206-207 pseudo-strategic, 206-208 scholarly kings, 208-209 strategy, 199-205, 209-226 tactics, 199-205,209-226 timeliness, 162-165 problem context, 4 orientation, 4,28-29 social construction, 28-29 Public and Its Problems, 5 Quest for Certainty, 47

Ramstad, Yngve, 217 Rosen, Robert, 54 Royce, Josiah, 159 rules, 20,22, 25,45-46 belief criteria in contracts, 111-117

Sackman, Harold, 164 Schumacher, E.F., 13, 31-32, 156 Schumpeter, Joseph, 31 delivery criteria, 194 Semiotics attitudes, 81 corporate prices, 15 real-world experience, 40 signs, 34, 81 Seven Cultures of Capitalism, 146 SFM (see social fabric matrix) Shackle, G.L.S., 172 Siffre, Michel, 159 Smith, Adam, 195 social beliefs contract terms, 109, 114-117 defined, 79-81 deliveries, 83

INDEX normative criteria, 19, 35-40 paradigmatic component, 6, 17 primary system controls, 56 social fabric matrix, 79-81 system component, 18, 55, 75 systems, 3-4 social fabric matrix (SFM) applied cases (see social fabric matrix case studies) attitudes, 81-83 Boolean matrix/digraph, 90-94 cellular information, 89-90 complexity, 73, 187 component integration, 85-86 cultural values, 79 defined, 5, 8-9, 73-75, 85-88, 106-108, 118,203 delivery concept, 85, 192-194, 196-197 ecological systems, 84-85 evaluation, 102-106 flow concept, 85-86 illustrations of, 9 indicators, 192-194 institutions, 79-81 instrumentalism, 187-197 ithink% 119,121-125, 128-132 metapolicymaking, 11, 187-197, 222 noncommon denominator, 86-88 post-policy, 9 pre-policy, 9 principle of association, 73 principle of model exchange, 73 process matrix, 86-87 social beliefs, 79-81 spreadsheets, 93-94 sufficiency 187-197 system analysis, 94-106, 187 system components, 18,55 technology, 84 time analysis, 184-185 timeliness, 145, 184 social fabric matrix case studies, 110-143 Central Interstate Compact, 109-125 Bechtel, 110-118 beliefs as contract terms, 111-114 cell deliveries, 114-117 context, 118 contract analysis, 114-119 cost, 113-119 institutions, 110-120 conclusions, 142-143 Daily Federal Funds Market, 123-132

249 cell deliveries, 126-128 Federal Reserve System digraph, 132 findings, 130-131 institutions, 128-130 Open Market Desk System digraph, 131 ithink networks, 109, 121, 124-126, 130-132 livelihood strategies in India, 133-134 cell deliveries, 135 conclusions, 133-134 livelihood strategies digraph, 136 Platte River surface water assessment, 134-142 cell deliveries, 138-139 regulatory institutions and water users digraph, 141 regulatory institutions digraph, 140 water management digraph, 138 social indicators, 7-8, 16-17,223 abstract measures, 8 common denominator, 71-72, 102 consequences, 65 creation, 16-18 criteria indices, 192-194 design, 62-66 instrumentalism, 62 multiple criteria 61, 102-103 monitoring, 65 normative interest, 62 primary criteria, 17, 64-70 problem orientation, 61-62 qualification to quantification, 17, 63 relationship, 65 requirement, 65 role of criteria, 8 secondary criteria, 17, 64 Sociotechnical Systems, 5 Summers, Lawrence, 39 Swaney, James A., 54 systems alternative paths, 55, 98-99 complexity, 51, 54 constituents and components, 52, 55, 100 control, 55-56, 99 defined, 51, 54-55, 94-95, 98-99 deliveries, 57, 100 differentiation and elaboration, 59, 101 equifinality, 55, 101-102 evaluation, 60, 102-106, 162-165, 182-185

250

POLICYMAKING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY

external description, 52-53, 58 feedback negative, 52, 57, 100 defined, 58 positive, 52, 57, 100 defined, 58 flows, 57, 100 general systems analysis (GSA) defined, 7, 51-60 hierarchy, 56-57, 100 internal description, 52-53 non-equilibrium, 2, 52 nonisomorphic, 54, 97-98 norms, 102-103 openness, 52-54 defined, 52-53, 95-97 inputs from environment, 52, 96-97 rates and levels, 163 real time, 59-60, 101-102 regulation, 55-56, 99 relationships, 51,55 requirements, 55 sequences, 57, 100 social fabric matrix, 94-108 state, 52 subsystems, 95-97 technology, 165-171 timeliness, 162-165 Szalai, Sandor, 165

technological society, 1, 2, 30-32 technology change without progress, 210-211 combination, 30, 84 defined, 84 institutional guidance, 32 instrumentalism, 30-32, 37 normative criteria, 19 paradigmatic component, 6 policymaking corporate control, 206-208, 211-212 impediments in use of, 210-211 limiting options, 188 positive feedback, 58 social fabric matrix, 8, 84 system components, 18, 55, 75 system control, 56 time and clocks, 165-171, 184 Theory of the Leisure Class, 61 time analysis, 156-161

baseball, 156-157 Christian, 149-151 clock, 10, 156-158,167-170 cultural, 147-148 cyclical, 148-149 defined, 10, 145-149, 155-156 evolutionary, 180-181 graphical clocks, 171-182 instrumental analysis, 182-185 Kantian system, 59 neoclassical discounting, 151-154 Newtonian, 59 passing, 146, 153 processes, 165, 171-172, 174-181, 178-181 psychological, 158, 160 real time, 59-60, 101-102, 163-165, 168, 172-173, 178 social time, 101, 147, 171-172,182 societal construct, 60 subjective, 158-160 technological evolution, 165-169, 184 temporal conditions, 10 traditional, 10 Western, 149-156 timeliness appropriate concept, 10, 145 defined, 10,60, 145,161 planning decisions, 161 social fabric matrix, 145 system planning, 161-162, 164 transactional approach to science, 21-28 complexity, 26 context, 34 defined 25-26 instrumentalism, 22-28 Toffler, Alvin, 159 Tool, Marc, 5,42 Tugwell, Rexford, 210

U.S. General Accounting Office, 70-71 U.S. Supreme Court, 27, 179 utilitarian theories, 14-15 utility, 6, 13-15, 158

values (see cultural values) Veblen, Thorstein, 33, 61

INDEX Warfield, John, 73 Weisbrod, Burton, 39-40 Westbrook, Robert, 4 Western values, 77 wetlands, 19,84-85, 189-192 Whitehead, Alfred, 84, 183, 188

Young, Iris, 14