Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka 3030660176, 9783030660178

Citation preview

Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Edited by Ishtiaq Jamil Tek Nath Dhakal Sk Tawfique M Haque Laxmi Kanta Paudel Hasan Muhammad Baniamin

Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka

Ishtiaq Jamil · Tek Nath Dhakal · Sk Tawfique M Haque · Laxmi Kanta Paudel · Hasan Muhammad Baniamin Editors

Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka

Editors Ishtiaq Jamil Department of Administration and Organization Theory University of Bergen Bergen, Norway Sk Tawfique M Haque Department of Political Science and Sociology North South University Dhaka, Bangladesh

Tek Nath Dhakal Central Department of Public Administration Tribhuvan University Kathmandu, Nepal Laxmi Kanta Paudel Public Administration Campus Tribhuvan University Kathmandu, Nepal

Hasan Muhammad Baniamin Department of Political Science and Sociology North South University Dhaka, Bangladesh

ISBN 978-3-030-66017-8 ISBN 978-3-030-66018-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This book is a result of long-standing collaboration between institutions of higher education and research in the North and the South. It is based on doctoral dissertations by scholars from the South, prepared in close collaboration with academics from their host institutions and the Northern institution. The chapters in the book focus on contemporary issues in governance and public policy at the macro- and micro-levels—that is, policy management and implementation both at the central and local levels—in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Given the diverse use of governance concepts, we focus on a limited number of social issues such as empowerment, the inclusion of minorities, institutional trust, policy implementation, and local service delivery. Although Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have recently opted for democratic governance, the journey to establish and consolidate democracy has been filled with many challenges. Bangladesh had a promising start on its journey to establish democratic governance in 1991. After holding free and fair elections (four times) for two decades, many people are now raising questions about whether the country is heading toward one-party rule. Even so, Bangladesh has made tremendous socioeconomic progress in the last few decades, with increasing life expectancy, a noticeable increase in school enrollment, and a higher GNI (Gross National Income) per capita. But social inequalities and income gaps are also increasing. Inclusive policies and the implementation of gender-friendly policies have faced challenges. The practice of v

vi

PREFACE

governance has been a combination of rigid laws coupled with paternalism and informal relations that have widened the avenues of corruption. Transparency and accountability have been difficult to establish because of impunity. Nepal’s Maoist movement has worked for many years to limit elitism in governance. It has achieved some success, especially with the end of higher caste rule in 2005. Now the country has become a republic and has recently adopted a federal system. It is in the process of completely overhauling its system of governance. However, all the studies on Nepal in this volume were carried out before the new federal system started operating. The recent changes are therefore not discussed in the book, also because it is too early to evaluate the present system in terms of the positive and negative effects of its governance. In 2015, in the midst of the transition period, Nepal was hit by a massive earthquake that caused a huge loss of life and property. This disaster significantly affected the Nepalese economy and the system of governance. The research on Nepal that is discussed in this book was conducted during the political transition period and in the midst of the natural disaster. Sri Lanka’s 25 years of civil war obviously disrupted its socioeconomic progress, internal peace, and security. The civil war ended in 2009, but ethnic and religious tensions still persist. On top of this, an unhealthy blame game within and across political parties has marred peace and political harmony in the island country. The political struggle has led to frequent changes of leadership in the past few years, making political governance in Sri Lanka unsure and uncertain. From these brief portrayals of the three countries, it should be easy to see that their governance and policy implementation are affected by tensions and dilemmas: Governance is weak and policy implementation is poor. The chapters in this book focus on these challenges and how they affect the common people. The studies are based on hard evidence that took several years to collect, compile, organize, analyze, and formulate in readable prose. The chapters you now read are therefore based on objective data meticulously collected by the researchers. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies have been used to analyze country-specific cases. This does not, however, rule out the general applicability of the findings to the whole context of the country and beyond its borders. The studies are rich in terms of connecting different theories of governance and policy studies to empirical data.

PREFACE

vii

Given the richness in theory, methodological discussions, and analysis of data, the book is relevant for students and scholars of political science, public administration, public policy, and governance studies. It is an invaluable resource for students and academics who are interested in South Asian politics, administration, governance, and public policy in general and Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka in particular. The studies in this volume reveal how empirical research is carried out— from the development of theory to putting concepts to use (operationalization), data collection, and analysis. The studies may therefore function as guiding examples for prospective researchers to develop their own empirical research. We would like to express our gratitude to a number of institutions and individuals who have worked very hard to make this book a reality. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), through its NORHED programme (the Norwegian Programme for Capacity Building in Higher Education and Research for Development), has provided financial support for our collaboration in education, research, and dissemination, and for enabling partnerships to develop between the University of Bergen in Norway, Tribhuvan University in Nepal, North South University in Bangladesh, and the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka. For this we are deeply grateful. We would also like to thank the contributing authors who have shown great interest in the book project, and our publisher, Palgrave Macmillan. We would also like to thank Steinar Askvik who has been an advisor to some of the scholars who contributed to this volume. Finally, Arlyne Moi has been meticulous in copy editing and deserves special thanks from us all. Bergen, Norway Kathmandu, Nepal Dhaka, Bangladesh Kathmandu, Nepal Dhaka, Bangladesh Winter 2020

Ishtiaq Jamil Tek Nath Dhakal Sk Tawfique M Haque Laxmi Kanta Paudel Hasan Muhammad Baniamin

Contents

1

2

3

4

5

6

Understanding Governance in Three South Asian Countries Ishtiaq Jamil, Tek Nath Dhakal, Sk Tawfique M Haque, Laxmi Kanta Paudel, and Hasan Muhammad Baniamin Lower Institutional Performance but Higher Institutional (Dis)Trust in South Asia: A Piece of Puzzle Hasan Muhammad Baniamin

1

25

Women’s Micro-Entrepreneurship: Can It Lead to Sustainable Empowerment in Nepal? Sarbani Kattel

55

Governance of Agricultural Service Delivery at the Grassroots Level in Nepal Laxmi Kanta Paudel

81

Policy Advocacy for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of the Board of Investment of Bangladesh Tabassum Zaman An Analysis of the Role of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Implementing the National Labor Migration Policy in Sri Lanka K. D. Dushmanthi Silva

107

137

ix

x

7

8

9

10

CONTENTS

The Nexus Between Citizenship Rights, Quality of Government, and Public Services: Evidence from Sri Lanka Ramesh Ramasamy The Citizen’s Charter in Nepal: An Effort to Achieve Quality of Governance at the Local Level Sushmita Acharya Process-Based Performance Framework for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Policy Implementation in Bangladesh Najmus Sayadat Patient-Doctor Trust at Local Healthcare Centers in Rural Bangladesh Md. Mahfuzul Haque

Index

165

189

207

233

259

List of Contributors

Sushmita Acharya Central Department of Public Administration, Public Administration Campus, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal Hasan Muhammad Baniamin North Bangladesh

South

University,

Dhaka,

Tek Nath Dhakal Central Department of Public Administration, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal K. D. Dushmanthi Silva Department Ruhuna, Matara, Sri Lanka

of

Sociology,

University

of

Md. Mahfuzul Haque South Asian Institute of Policy and Governance (SIPG), North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh Sk Tawfique M Haque Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh Ishtiaq Jamil Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway Sarbani Kattel Central Department of Public Administration, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal Laxmi Kanta Paudel Public Administration University, Kirtipur, Kathmandu, Nepal

Campus,

Tribhuvan

xi

xii

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Ramesh Ramasamy Faculty of Arts, Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya, Kandy, Sri Lanka Najmus Sayadat Deputy Secretary at the PPP Authority, Prime Minister’s Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh Tabassum Zaman Department of Economics, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3

Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5

Fig. 2.6

Relation between the Human Development Index, 2015, by UNDP, and trust in civil service in different countries (Note Both reference lines are drawn based on median values, and trust in civil service is measured from the data of WVS 6, EVS 4, and GoT 2. Source Baniamin, 2019a) Relation between the Democracy Index (2015) by the economist intelligence unit and trust in civil service in different countries (Note Both reference lines are drawn based on median values, and trust in civil service is measured from the data of WVS 6, EVS 4 and GoT 2. Source Baniamin, 2019a) Relation between the Corruption Perceptions Index (2015) by transparency international and trust in civil service in different countries (Note Both reference lines are drawn based on median values, and trust in civil service is measured from the data of WVS 6, EVS 4, and GoT 2. Source Baniamin, 2019a) Trust in the civil service in the OECD countries (Source World Value Survey 6 and European Value Study 4) Trust in the civil service in the non-OECD countries (Source World Value Survey 6 and Governance and Trust Survey 2) People’s perceptions of politicians’ involvement with corruption (%) (Source GoT 2 Survey)

29

30

31 32

33 35

xiii

xiv

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 2.7 Fig. 2.8 Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 10.1

People’s perceptions of civil servants’ involvement with corruption (%) Evaluation of an action based on different logics (Source Author’s construction based on March & Olsen, 1996) Organizational structure of agricultural service delivery system in Nepal (Source Ministry of Agricultural Development [2015]) Analytical framework for the study (Source Developed by the author using governance theory) Independent variable: The policy advocacy process (Source Bardach [2000] and Kingdon [1984]) Analytical framework of the study (Source Researcher’s own construction) The relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable Analytical framework for the study (Source Author’s own construction) Framework for the study

35 38

85 89 111 112 197 217 240

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 3.8 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 5.1

People’s perceptions of corruption among politicians and civil servants (%) Characteristics of female micro-entrepreneurs (N = 83) Length of business activity and number of employees Relationship between the four forms of power and empowerment Power over: Female micro-entrepreneur’s control over income earned (N = 83) Power over: Female micro-entrepreneurs’ ownership of assets Female micro-entrepreneurs’ decision-making areas (N = 83) Female micro-entrepreneurs’ involvement in social issues (N = 83) Summary of four structures of power and empowerment Effectiveness of agriculture service delivery (N = 150) Cross tabulation of authority delegation and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 140) Cross tabulation of institutional capacity and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 141) Cross tabulation of people’s participation and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 145) Cross tabulation of organizational coordination and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 141) FDI trends and growth rate in Bangladesh

36 65 66 67 68 69 70 72 74 94 94 98 98 101 108

xv

xvi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7 Table 5.8 Table 5.9 Table 5.10 Table Table Table Table Table

6.1 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2

Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 9.1 Table 10.1 Table 10.2

Major policy reviews by the BOI for ministries and agencies in 2013 Investment barriers disclosed by the BOI’s activities The BOI’s criteria for evaluating the Industrial Policy of 2015 A sample of the BOI’s review of the draft “Development Finance and Aid Assistance: Bangladesh” The BOI’s preparatory performance in policy advocacy The BOI’s persuasion efforts Challenges Discussed by Investors at the BOI’s Promotional Events Event to mobilize stakeholders The status of the BOI’s policy output, based on the majority of respondents Summary of the sample Profile of the focus group discussions Profile of the interviewed participants Public governance theories and administrative practices Service providers’ evaluation of municipal functioning after the implementation of CC: Percent distribution, N = 35 Citizens’ evaluation of municipal functioning after the CC’s implementation: Percent distribution Regression analysis for independent variables of municipal performance List and composition of key respondents Health service delivery at Pirganj UHC, Thakurgaon Departmental proceedings against medical officers posted at different UHCs

118 120 121 122 125 125 126 127 131 145 174 175 192

199 200 201 219 245 252

List of Boxes

Box 5.1 Box 5.2 Box 5.3

Capital Market Information on the BOI’s Website (BOI, 2015) Investment Opportunity in Bangladesh Capital Market (BOI, 2015) The Case of a Japanese Delegation

114 115 128

xvii

CHAPTER 1

Understanding Governance in Three South Asian Countries Ishtiaq Jamil, Tek Nath Dhakal, Sk Tawfique M Haque, Laxmi Kanta Paudel, and Hasan Muhammad Baniamin

The term “governance” is used in a variety of ways and has multiple conceptions (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998), even to the point where it is sometimes portrayed as all inclusive. The “vagueness of the term and its widespread application have led some observers to complain that it

I. Jamil (B) Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway e-mail: [email protected] T. N. Dhakal Central Department of Public Administration, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal S. T. M. Haque · H. M. Baniamin Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh L. K. Paudel Public Administration Campus, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_1

1

2

I. JAMIL ET AL.

has become an ‘empty signifier’” (Offe 2009, cited in Fukuyama, 2016, p. 90). We constantly hear phrases such as “good governance” (WB, 2017), “global governance” (Bevir, 2011, p. 1), “sound governance” (Farazmand & Carter, 2004), and “good enough governance” (Grindle, 2004, 2007). Perhaps the popularity of the term can be chalked up to its inclusiveness; it is broader than the traditional government concept, and it encompasses other actors such as non-governmental organizations and civil society (Weiss, 2000). “Governance” became a buzzword during the 1980s and included actors, institutions, and processes outside the traditional government system. It is now broken down into different levels—local governance, global governance, multilevel governance—and used to denote different processes in different sectors, for instance economic governance, health governance, corporate governance, and political governance (Kjær, 2004). There are four reasons for the emergence of governance. First, the end of the Cold War allowed access to more information about events inside various countries; second, a process of democratization ensued, with elections taking place in most countries to legitimatize rule; third, many states have experienced the involvement of non-governmental actors in development initiatives, in issues of human rights, minority rights, and gender and environmental issues to the point where they now experience themselves as invaded by other actors; and fourth, the principle of Westphalian sovereignty—that is, the idea of a state’s sovereign right to non-interference—has given way to interference in order to address aspects such as human rights. The domestic policies of nation-states are now under scrutiny. This has led to the emergence of supranational entities such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Weiss, 2000).

Seven Concepts of Governance Despite its multiple connotations, we present some of the ways the term governance is used in the literature of political science and public administration as well as how it is used directly or indirectly by the authors of this volume.

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

3

Governance as Good Governance Governance is very often equated with good governance. The concept of good governance became popular among international and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF; they had it as their top agenda and catchword to reform public institutions and administrations across the developing world. Access to international aid and assistance depended on the extent to which countries in the Global South were willing to reform their institutions in line with the preferences of international institutions. Aid conditionality became an instrument to reform the public sector in the developing countries. According to the World Bank, bad or mal governance is the key to all ills and economic crises (Kjær, 2004). To establish good governance, it was seen as necessary to achieve accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and efficiency in the public sector. However, this stance of governance capacity ex-ante as advocated by the World Bank has changed to ex-post, meaning those countries who have managed to reform their public sector along the lines mentioned above are the ones that qualify for the World Bank’s assistance. Consequently, the notion of good governance has “changed from being something to promote in developing countries to being a requirement before recipient countries are allowed loans in the first place” (Ibid. p. 175). The World Bank has defined governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources” (Weiss, 2000, p. 797). In the same passage, Weiss outlines the bank’s view of governance as consisting of three key elements: 1. The form of the political regime, 2. The process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development, 3. The capacity of a government to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions. In later years, the World Bank has also included human rights and democracy as important ingredients of good governance. Good governance is therefore about bringing economic, social, and political change. To do this, power is an important element, especially in exercising authority in the management of resources.

4

I. JAMIL ET AL.

In its 2017 report, the World Bank (2017, p. 3) redefines governance as “the process through which state and nonstate actors interact to design and implement policies within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and are shaped by power. Power as the ability of groups and individuals to make others act in the interest of those groups and individuals and to bring about specific outcomes.” In addition to power, the bank now emphasizes three other aspects: first, the creation of formal institutions and rules to implement policies, second, the inclusion of non-state actors such as civil society organizations and business lobbies, and third, the notion that governance takes place at different levels from the international to the local, being practiced in international bodies, national state institutions, local government agencies, and community or business associations. The dimensions of governance often overlap, creating a complex network of actors and interests. The UNDP defines governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences” (Weiss, 2000, p. 797). Since the early 1990s, the UNDP’s focus regarding good governance has involved a shift from traditional public administration reforms such as decentralization to addressing social and legal issues such as human rights, legislative support, judicial reform, and corruption. Empowerment with emphasis on democracy and freedom is the key to governance as envisaged by the UNDP. Daniel Kaufman and colleagues define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et al., 1999, p. 1). Therefore, the focus of good governance is not on dismantling the state and encouraging economic liberalization. Rather, good governance is to be achieved by keeping alive the appropriateness of government rather than a minimalist state. Economic and social developments, including the deepening of democracy and social justice, are to be achieved in the “shadow of hierarchy” rather than through the absence

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

5

of state institutions. Good governance, therefore, does not mean less but sometimes more appropriate government (Weiss, 2000). Governance as Better Policy Implementation Governance, according to some scholars, refers to the processes of decision making and the implementation of various decisions. In line with this conception, Fukuyama (2013, p. 4) explains governance as “[a] government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.” But there is a debate about what should be prioritized in governance: democracy first, then state capacity, or the other way round. Those countries that boast of being consolidated democracies—for instance the Scandinavian, Northern European, and North American countries—developed state capacities long before they became democratic. The multilateral organizations (WB, UNDP, IMF), having learned from state-driven development in East Asia, have now shifted away from their earlier emphasis on democracy and started emphasizing state capacity. The argument is that the building of state capacity is what developing countries need to meet the basic needs of citizens and to promote well-being and welfare. If we interpret Fukuyama’s definition of governance, it is not that governance requires democracy to be good; rather, it is the efficient delivery of public services that ensures good governance, and it can take place in democratic regimes such as we find in Scandinavia, as well as in authoritarian regimes such as we find in China and Singapore. In support of this interpretation, it is worth noting that while India is the largest democratic country in the world, it suffers from weak governance and poor policy implementation. Governance is therefore, from this perspective, about policy performance, that is, the capacity of a government to put policies into effect. More and more countries are now democratic, but the social and economic conditions of common people have not improved substantially, especially in the developing and transition countries.1 Poverty is reduced

1 In 2019, 100 countries were democracies (electoral + liberal democracy) compared to 80 countries which were either closed or electoral autocracies. In 1997, the number of democracies was 38 (electoral + liberal democracy) while the number of closed or electoral autocracies was 117. In the case of South Asia, most were closed autocracies (five out of 8 countries) in 1997, while none in 2018 (Source: L¨uhrmann et al. [2019].

6

I. JAMIL ET AL.

in most countries, but economic and social inequality have increased; corruption, favoritism, clientelism, patronage, abuse of power, and malgovernance thwart redistributive development. Establishing free and fair elections and a representative democracy are not enough to improve socio-economic conditions. As stated, it is due largely to developments in East Asia that state capacity has attracted attention in recent years. Most countries have an assortment of well-designed policies due to learning and policy transfers from within and across national contexts. However, it is in the implementation stage that many countries falter; policies that should be effective in generating positive development outcomes are often not adopted, or are poorly implemented, or end up not being implemented at all. Too little attention is paid to learning why some policies succeed in some contexts but fail to generate positive results in others. Today’s developing countries face several governance challenges such as poor service delivery, slow growth, corruption, poor distribution of resources, and the “natural resource curse.” All such challenges require rethinking the process by which state and non-state actors interact to design and implement policies—in a word: governance. Governance as Ensuring Quality of Government Another stream of thought, one spearheaded by the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, argues that quality of government ensures human well-being whereas dysfunctional institutions cause human misery (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012). Quality of government and its cousins “good governance” and “state capacity” denote government having impartial institutions. When exercising public power, the basic norm should be impartiality in delivering public goods (Ibid. p. 3). Impartiality is also associated with institutions preserving natural common-pool resources (common goods) and avoiding the “tragedy of the commons,” that is, situations where they destroy common goods for sake of short-term gain. Sustainable development goals have been

V-Dem Dataset v9, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/ vdemcy19 accessed 19.12.20).

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

7

launched with a pledge to bring changes in social, economic, and environmental issues, thus to reduce inequality, improve standards of living, and protect lives and the planet. The scholars who emphasize impartiality, however, further argue that it needs to be supplemented with a public ethics of care (PEC). PEC emphasizes sensitivity and responsiveness to individual needs when implementing policies. This is because impartiality, which is based on rule of law, may ensure uniformity and standardization but may lack responsiveness to some peculiar and particular needs of citizens. PEC therefore elevates the importance of policy responsiveness. Governance as Fostering Institutional Trust Governance conceived as fostering institutional trust concerns how citizens evaluate public institutions. A positive evaluation of public institutions is interpreted as denoting good governance and a negative evaluation as reflecting poor or weak governance. When citizens have confidence in a country’s key institutions—its democracy, government, civil service, justice system, police, or in its institutions of higher learning—what does this indicate? If citizens’ assessments of an institution are positive, this indicates that the institution is performing according to institutional norms and citizens’ expectations. While interpersonal trust is measured on the basis of mutual reciprocity, goodwill, and civic engagement (Leonardi et al., 2001), trust in public institutions is measured on the basis of citizens’ confidence in the institutions, denoting that they perform according to the normative expectations of citizens. What is the significance of institutional trust? Citizens’ trust in public institutions is an indication of how well public organizations are managed and how successful the democratic governance is (Askvik, 2007; Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003; Kim, 2005, p. 611; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Higher institutional trust suggests that public institutions meet citizens’ needs and aspirations. In other words, trust reflects the extent to which citizens consider public institutions legitimate, valid, and acceptable (Jamil & Baniamin, 2020, p. 2). According to Jamil and Askvik (2016, p. 647), “trust is claimed to be the foundation of democratic societies.” Citizens’ positive evaluation of public institutions may encourage them to participate more in public affairs, and they tend to comply more with rules and regulations (Van Ryzin, 2011; Wong et al., 2011), while lower

8

I. JAMIL ET AL.

trust creates a political environment in which it is difficult for leaders to succeed (Hetherington, 1998). Given its importance in governance, various studies have sought to explain institutional trust. Three factors in particular have been used to explain it: performance, legitimacy, and authoritarian culture. Performance-Based Trust (Output Oriented) As noted above, performance is the factor most often used to explain institutional trust (Askvik et al., 2011; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Van de Walle et al., 2008). This explanation is rooted in rational choice theory (Wong et al., 2011), with the argument that actors calculate social transactions based on analyzing costs and benefits. When an institution performs better than it used to, it will attract a higher level of institutional trust than it used to. Legitimacy-Based Trust (Input Oriented) While the performance-based explanation is largely concerned with output or results to account for institutional trust, van Ryzin (2011) argues that “processes” of service delivery can be even more important than the outcome itself. In this regard, fairness, equity, respect, and honesty are especially important. When the process is fair, people even accept outcomes that go against them, for instance when getting a traffic ticket or losing a court case. Authoritarian Culture-Based Trust (Norms and Values Oriented) In contrast to the performance-based and legitimacy-based approaches to explaining trust, the authoritarian culturalist camp may be considered a new way of explaining inflated or naïve trust. From this perspective, trust in political institutions is exogenous, originating outside the political sphere. It is rooted in cultural norms and communicated through earlylife socialization (Mishler & Rose, 2001). The idea is that culture differs from one country to the next, and oftentimes from one region to another within the same country. Recently Ma and Yang (2014) proposed the “authoritarian orientation” as a possible cultural factor for explaining high institutional trust in East Asian countries; they associate an authoritarian culture with unquestioning obedience and reliance on authorities such as the government, political leaders, teachers, elders, or anyone with a higher social rank and reputation. As an ordinary citizen, one is expected to pay respect to such authorities and not to challenge their judgments and

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

9

actions. This cultural orientation is deeply rooted in Asian societies where paternalism and authoritarianism are widespread. Especially in Chinese culture, Confucian traditions emphasize that children’s loyalty to their parents and family is vital. Such values extend to the public sphere as well; loyalty to the king and the state is also crucial. Outside China, in East Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the authoritarian orientation is also strong—although some observers claim it is on the verge of change (Welzel & Russell, 2017). In South Asia, Confucianism is not a dominant doctrine, but hierarchy still plays a dominant role. Hierarchy defines ways of addressing and speaking to people, methods of visual communication (e.g., ways of looking at others), and even standing and sitting in front of others. It differentiates the communication between social classes and defines norms. These norms specifically highlight how a poor person from a lower class can talk to a person with higher status, and how citizens are to praise and show support for the powerful and the rich (Jamil, 2007). What are the implications of trust for governance? Institutional trust in society has many positive impacts. First, it enhances partnership between the state and society, thus enabling the government to be more responsive to societal preferences and to curb corruption. It also makes citizens more law abiding. Trust is therefore the foundation of modern democracy, cementing the state and society together in a way that enables democratic governance to take deep root. A country or a society devoid of trust may plunge into conflicts that render it weak, fragile, or a failed state. Governance as a Market and the Emergence of NPM New Public Management (NPM), which flowered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is well-illustrated in the writings of public administration experts like Hood (1991, 1995), Osborne and Gaebler (1993), and Pollitt (2016). It has put pressure on the traditional public administration (Ferlie et al., 2007), that is, the input mode of public administration emphasizing processes, the primacy of rule following, neutrality, and standardization in producing results. NPM focuses instead on output public administration, which treats results as more important than how they are produced. In order to achieve results, private-sector management principles and economic liberalization need to be incorporated into public institutions to streamline their structures and processes so

10

I. JAMIL ET AL.

they can operate like private-sector organizations. Input-oriented public administration is about the legitimacy of decisions on processes, representativeness, and legality, whereas output-oriented public administration is about the effective implementation of decisions (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011, p. 127; Dan & Pollitt, 2015; Lægreid, 2017). NPM-inspired reforms focus on structural devolution, horizontal specialization, market and management principles, and efficiency (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007a, cited in Christensen & Lægreid, 2011, p. 126; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). This form of public administration is based on the hypothesis that more market, management, and corporatization will lead to greater efficiency without negative side effects. It reflects several not-obviously-related strands of thought and seeks to use some practices of corporations (private firms) such as benchmarking, performance measurement, pay for performance, and contracting out. The hybrid character of NPM comprises, on the one hand, economic organization theory emphasizing centralization and contractualism (i.e., “make the managers manage”), and on the other hand, managerialism focusing on decentralization and devolution (i.e., “let the managers manage”). At its core, NPM involves a bargain whereby public agents are granted increased autonomy in return for greater accountability. To summarize, NPM has five main features (Hood, 1995; Kettl, 2000; Kickert, 1997; Lane, 2000; Politt et al., 2007 cited in Klijn, 2012, pp. 203–204): 1. It seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government performance, i.e., from input and process to output and outcome. 2. It uses ideas and techniques originating from the private sector, i.e., blurring public-private sectors. 3. It increasingly uses privatization and outsourcing to fulfill public functions, i.e., governance by contract. 4. It uses market mechanisms such as competition in the delivery of services, i.e., ensuring service quality. 5. It uses performance indicators to measure results or outputs of privatized units or the services that have been contracted out, i.e., more measurement and quantification. Although many of these features and concepts of NPM are still present in the more recent writings on governance, NPM’s heyday has long since passed. NPM was first put into practice in Britain, New Zealand,

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

11

Australia, and the United States. But the effort to introduce market-like mechanisms into the public sector never sat well with many continental Europeans; coming from a more statist tradition, they disliked the introduction of market mechanisms and business practices into the public sector. Especially during the 1990s, NPM was associated with government downsizing and privatization, which many considered as a reduction of state capacity. Several studies pointed to the cultural embeddedness of NPM (e.g., its dependence on the prior existence of a Weberian state) and showed that there was considerable cross-country variation in its effectiveness (Schick, 1998). NPM’s emphasis on specialization and sector-based expertise led to increased fragmentation and a lack of coordination between government agencies. As a response, post-NPM reforms such as “joined-upgovernment” and “whole-of-government” were adopted in countries that were the pioneers or trail blazers in adopting post-NPM reforms (e.g., the UK). The goals of these reforms were increased coordination and integration between government agencies and to better address “wicked” problems and issues reaching across sectors, administrative levels, and policy areas. These reforms were therefore introduced as answers to “departmentalism,” tunnel vision, and “vertical silos” (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011, p. 132). NPM works best in contexts characterized by higher level of economic development, proper functioning of formal market economy, the presence of rule of law, sound administrative infrastructure, and state capacity. Many of these characteristics are absent in the South Asian countries (Sarker, 2006). Governance as Network Governance Governance as networks refers to the interdependence of actors who collaborate to produce public goods. Sometimes it is referred to as “governance without government,” meaning that there is no one center but multiple centers; there is no sovereign authority because the networks have considerable autonomy (Kjær, 2011). According to Rhodes (1997, p. 15). “Governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdependence, resourceexchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state.” According to this conception, governance has now moved away from a hierarchic to a market mode that involves multiple actors and levels.

12

I. JAMIL ET AL.

Therefore, in a complex, fragmented, and multilevel governance scenario, networks are essential for implementing public policies (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005). Sørensen and Torfing (2018, p. 303) further argue that “it can (network governance) help us to understand how interactive forms of governance may improve the functioning and impact of democratically elected governments.” The emergence of globalization, the growing number of “wicked” problems, the rise of democracies throughout the world, and the increasing interconnectedness among nations make it clear that no single actor has the capacity, knowledge, and authority to single handedly manage the affairs of the state. A multilevel model of governance with multiple actors possessing diverse resources is required. The shift is inevitable: from an unicentric government to a governance network with multiple actions involving a plethora of public and private actors (Torfing, 2012, pp. 100–101). In view of the above, a governance network is defined as “a horizontal articulation of interdependence, but operationally autonomous actors from the public and/or private sector who interact with one another through ongoing negotiations that take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework; facilitate self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy; and contribute to the production of public regulation in the broad sense of the term” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007, cited in Torfing, 2012, p. 101). If we dissect Sørensen and Torfing’s definition, certain elements require more discussion. First, both public and private actors must recognize that mutual dependence is necessary. This means that actors with divergent interests must exchange and pool resources in order to govern. In the real world, we observe the proliferation of public-private partnerships where different public and private actors pool their resources to achieve public goods. Second, the relations between the actors are horizontal. The actors therefore have autonomy in relation to each other, and no actor has the sole power and authority to resolve disagreements. Third, negotiations are the basis of interaction among actors. These negotiations can consist of interest-based bargaining or deliberations to arrive at a common understanding of problems, solutions, and challenges. Network governance is not apolitical, nor is it merely an exchange of resources and a seeking of mutual agreement to achieve a common goal. Rather, it involves a complex power play and negotiations. Compromise is often the outcome of such negotiations.

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

13

Governance as Institutions Governance is about politics and the exercise of power in producing public goods (World Bank, 2017). In short, instead of economic and sociological variables to explain politics, the institutional approach emphasizes the primacy of institutions in explaining social and economic developments. This approach to public administration combines political science and organization theory to study political institutions (Christensen & Lægreid, 2013). A core argument is that organization matters; how to organize is not a technical, but a political issue, because it enables and constrains which problems are considered relevant and which solutions are regarded as appropriate in a political-administrative context (Christensen & Lægreid, 2018). Consequently, the “rules of the games” are important. There are two ways to understand and explain policies (March & Olsen, 1984, 1996). The first is to see them as based on trading, as in a market where individuals and groups act on their interests and where negotiation and bargaining are common. The second way is to explain policies from an institutional perspective. Here politics is more integrative, which involves individuals and groups being socialized into the norms and rules of institutions. Individual action is thus a result of a person’s identity and belonging to a particular institution. The first approach explains individual behavior on the basis of the logic of consequences, with individual interests taking precedence. Individual action is driven by the desire to maximize consequences. In the institutional approach, institutional norms and rules are the sources of inspiration for individuals’ actions. Soldiers, for example, act in ways that are based on military rules, and public officials act on the basis of civil service laws. According to the institutional perspective, individual preferences are results of identity and belonging to a particular institution, and individual acts represent a logic of appropriateness that justifies actions as what is accepted and expected. Institutions are therefore seen as stable and persistent and as not allowing rapid and automatic change. One example is that although constitutions in most countries allow equal opportunities to all citizens, the right to individual freedom varies from country to country. This is because institutions, regardless of whether they are regulative, normative, or cultural, will cognitively constrain or facilitate individual actions, thus leading to variations in actions across contexts and cultures (Kjær, 2004). This principle of constraining or facilitating goes some way

14

I. JAMIL ET AL.

to explain why some institutions are efficient and others not. The World Bank, incidentally, identifies inefficient institutions as the root cause of mal-governance and the economic differences between societies.

Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka The major reason for having presented the various concepts of governance is to understand how they provide contexts of analysis for the chapters in the book. The purpose of the book is to present governance in different contexts and to elucidate what it means in these three countries. While the chapters do not cover all South Asian countries, the issues that are explored, highlighted, and analyzed in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka also have commonalities with issues elsewhere in South Asia. The region has great variation in terms of population, ethnicity, religion, language, and geography. There is also great divergence in political culture, political stability, and regime type. But some issues are common to all these countries, as most of them follow the Westminster model of governance that is a legacy of British colonialism, with ingredients such as hierarchy, rigidity, and top-down and centralized administrative systems. These aspects, which are still deeply rooted in public administration and institutions of governance in this region, have led to hybrid governance. South Asia’s public institutions are “sticky,” in the sense that it is hard to eradicate rigidity and to speed up their response to societal needs. Other sectors, however, especially the private sector and to some extent civil society organizations, are changing rapidly and spearheading the socioeconomic progress. It is not that public administration in South Asia in general and in these three countries in particular is devoid of change; rather, these countries are lagging behind in terms of adjusting to the changes in other sectors. This is the case not only in the internal context of each South Asian country but also in comparison with the changes taking place in the public sector in Southeast and East Asia. It is a wellknown fact that Southeast and East Asian states have played a crucial role in their own rapid socio-economic development (Jamil et al., 2015). Another aspect common to South Asian countries is that formal institutional mechanisms and standard operating procedures are overshadowed

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

15

by informal relations between citizens and higher authorities. This patronclientelism is well-documented in Jamil et al. (2013). In these countries, citizens generally accept a more hierarchical social order and seldom oppose the existing power structures. Due to uncritical loyalty, few “exit options”—that is, there are usually few if any alternative service provision entities—and less raising of voice, public institutions do not change readily to accommodate people’s demands and needs. Changes in South Asian public institutions have always been driven by top-down initiatives, either by the central government or advocated by international institutions. Because bottom-up initiatives driven by people’s mobilization are rare, this reflects what we can expect in terms of policies and their implementation. Therefore, deficits or gaps in policy implementation remain a fact, and governance tends to favor the preferences of elites in society. Globalization and the development of information and communication technology have given large impetus to change in these three countries. As a result, we increasingly observe the adoption of a number of policies aimed at inclusion, local-level decentralization, and the involvement of the private sector and civil society in policy implementation and governance. However, we also observe tension in the interaction between public administration and citizens. Although some administrative reforms have reduced elitism, South Asian public administration is still elitist. It is also still traditional and paternalistic in its relations with other actors. Paternalism and clientelism exist in all institutions and influence interpersonal relations within the organizations as well as the way they relate to politics, citizens, the private sector, and civil society (i.e., charities and community groups). In a paternalistic culture, personal relations are important because they give access to the government’s decision-making process and resource mobilization. Those who do not participate in this patron-clientelism suffer and are denied benefits, even when they have a legal right to the benefits. The chapters in this book capture some of these peculiarities of governance in South Asia, particularly those in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The chapters also provide critical analysis and important insights into how policies are designed and implemented and how private and public interests are incorporated into them. More specifically, this book tries to explain the following issues: • What is the status of macro-level and micro-level policy-based governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka?

16

I. JAMIL ET AL.

• How are the public service mechanisms structured, and how do they provide services to the public? • What factors contribute to or hinder well-functioning policy-based governance? • How do the service providers, service seekers, and various stakeholders perceive the services provided by the governments? • What are relationships like between the state and various groups in society, and between the government and private actors who collaborate on initiatives? Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have been struggling to achieve effective governance at both the center and periphery—that is, at the central, provincial, and local levels. This puts emphasis on democratic engagement, particularly through deliberative practices. The governments in the three countries seek to use participatory governance to deepen citizens’ participation in the governmental process. This entails examining assumptions and practices common to the traditional Westminster model of governance that generally restricts the realization of genuine democracy. The book does not define governance in the context of these three countries in particular or in the context of South Asia in general, but primarily focuses on interrelated questions of competence, empowerment, trust generation, inclusion, and capacity building, questions related to both micro-governance and macro-governance, the impact of policies adopted by the governments in the areas of service delivery, women’s empowerment, institutional trust, access to entitled rights and privileges, civic engagement, and the factors that facilitate or inhibit policy responsiveness—all within the context of the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

Contents of the Book In the following chapter (Chapter 2), “Lower Institutional Performance but Higher Institutional (Dis)Trust in South Asia: A Piece of Puzzle,” Hasan Muhammad Baniamin argues that citizens can have high institutional trust despite experiencing poor governance and the relatively poor performance of government institutions. His analysis indicates that citizens in some South Asian counties show a higher level of institutional trust than do citizens in many developed countries that have better quality

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

17

of governance and better-performing public institutions. Why this inconsistency? Based on survey data and empirical studies, the chapter explains the inconsistent trend of inflated institutional trust in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Analyses of the data and the published studies indicate that an authoritarian cultural orientation among people in these countries may contribute to their inflated trust in government institutions despite those institutions’ poor performance and the weak governance in the countries. Chapter 3 is entitled “Women’s Micro-Entrepreneurship: Can It Lead to Sustainable Empowerment in Nepal?” Here Sarbani Kattel asserts that women’s participation in Nepal’s national economy has been at the forefront of policies and plans since the 1980s, the argument being that getting women to establish their own small businesses will empower them at the same time as boosting development and helping to eradicate poverty. One approach adopted by various development agencies has been to set up programs whereby women can generate their own income, particularly through micro-enterprise development schemes. Kattel’s main objective in the chapter is to understand whether women from Kathmandu Valley have actually become empowered after engaging in microentrepreneurship. In this endeavor, she uses four structures of power theorized by Rowlands (1997) as a conceptual guide. The study uses a mixed-method approach and data collected from 83 female microentrepreneurs. A major finding is that despite the women’s high level of involvement in micro-entrepreneurship, their empowerment is still weak. This is because they identify themselves as inferior to the male members of their household. They are dependent on the men due to the patriarchal culture. Micro-entrepreneurship has thus contributed little to these women’s empowerment. The major obstacles to their empowerment are their self-image, identity, and status in the family in relation to male members of the household. Laxmi Kanta Paudel, in Chapter 4, “Governance of Agricultural Service Delivery at the Grassroots Level in Nepal,” examines the effectiveness of three agriculture service centers: one in Betrabati (in Nepal’s mountain region), one in Naubise (in the hill region), and one in Prasauni (in Terai or the plains region). Kanta Paudel asks why, despite their similar institutional structure, these service centers vary in terms of performance. He measures their performance based on the quality of services, timely delivery of services, the achievement of goals, and users’ accessibility and satisfaction with the services. These performance variables are explained by four independent variables: authority delegation, institutional capacity,

18

I. JAMIL ET AL.

people’s participation, and organizational coordination. The findings are varied both in terms of the influence of the independent variables and across the three ecological regions. In Chapter 5, “Policy Advocacy for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of the Board of Investment of Bangladesh,” Tabassum Zaman provides an overview of the policy advocacy of an investment promotion agency—the Board of Investment (BOI)—which works in the field of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Bangladesh. Zaman dives into the nitty-gritty of policy advocacy through an in-depth case analysis that measures the BOI’s performance in policy advocacy in the field of FDI. Four policy advocacy stages are measured: problem identification and agenda setting, policy remedy, advocating policy, and monitoring and evaluation. In seeking to measure the policy advocacy process, Zaman’s study compares the BOI’s policy advocacy practices with the benchmarks of policy advocacy introduced in FDI directives set forth in Bangladesh’s industrial policy. The industrial policy identifies the specific area of policy advocacy for BOI and other investment promotion agencies. Zaman finds that the BOI is not fulfilling its potential output in policy advocacy for FDI. In Chapter 6, “An Analysis of the Role of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Implementing the National Labor Migration Policy in Sri Lanka,” Dushmanthi Silva explains that policy studies deal mostly with the steps of putting policy goals into action, the main ones being problem identification, policy decision, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Policy makers place importance on the policy goals and expect bureaucrats to implement the policies they have formulated. In this linear process, the implementation stage, in which bureaucrats are key players, is especially important. Following the bottom-up approach to policy implementation and Winter’s (2012) integrated model, Silva examines the role of bureaucrats in implementing Sri Lanka’s Labor Migration Policy. She finds “gaps,” identifying them as non-implementation of policy, or as failure to achieve policy goals. Ramesh Ramasamy, in Chapter 7, “The Nexus between Citizenship Rights, Quality of Government, and Public Services: Evidence from Sri Lanka,” says there are two main arguments with regard to minorities’ citizenship rights. First is that in multi-ethnic societies, minorities are more prone to encounter limitations in their citizenship rights due to discriminatory policies and practices. The second is that the legal status of citizenship is the factor most likely to enable individuals belonging to

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

19

disadvantaged social groups to effectively enjoy legally mandated public services. Ramesh explores the ways in which legal citizenship and existing policies and practices have helped Sri Lanka’s plantation community to gain access to public services. The chapter throws light on how policies and practice affect access to public services in an ethnically diverse society such as we find in Sri Lanka. Ramesh argues that merely granting citizenship to people will not end their years of exclusion and discrimination. Policies and the ways they are practiced vary substantially in ethnically diverse societies, and this considerably affects minorities’ ability to enjoy their citizenship and legally mandated public services. Sushmita Kaphle, in Chapter 8, “The Citizen’s Charter in Nepal: An Effort to Achieve Quality of Governance at the Local Level,” shows how a citizen’s charter can streamline local service delivery and affect the quality of governance. To this end, Kaphle analyzes the influence of organizational, cultural, and political factors on municipal performance in delivering services. Her findings, which are based on a sequential and explanatory mixed method of research, show that the quality of governance—in terms of transparency, responsiveness, service quality, and impartiality in delivering local services—is gradually improving after the implementation of the citizen’s charter. However, citizens’ participation in municipal activities and their access to officials and information are still found to be poor. Chapter 9 is “Process-Based Performance Framework for PublicPrivate Partnership (PPP) Policy Implementation in Bangladesh.” Here Najmus Sayadat analyzes Public-Private Partnership (PPP)—a publicpolicy tool the government of Bangladesh uses to collaborate with the private sector to develop the country’s infrastructure and services delivery. Sayadat studies the actors involved in this type of long-term infrastructure contract and how they interact, thus to explain the PPP policy network and PPP performance. His study involves a qualitative research approach and two PPP case studies, one considered successful, the other not. He finds that sharing common goals, risks, costs, resources, and information, and building trust-based relationships and consensus are major processes for successful PPP implementation. The case study evidence demonstrates a positive relationship between these PPP processes and PPP performance. The findings confirm that PPPs with long-term infrastructure contracts represent a hybrid form of organization that requires process management along with traditional methods of central steering in order to be successful.

20

I. JAMIL ET AL.

In Chapter 10, “Patient-doctor trust relationship at Local Health Care in Rural Bangladesh” Md. Mahfuzul Haque argues that ‘Patientsdoctor’ trust depends on patients’ perceived trustworthiness of doctors, propensity of trust by the patient, on the basis of their fulfillment of positive expectations. Employing Kim’s dimensions of trustworthiness, the study was carried out in six peripheral rural health institution in Bangladesh, namely Upazila Health Complex (UHC) with the doctors as targets of trust. The trustworthiness dimensions, such as credible commitment, competence, and honesty and fairness, benevolence, and non-discriminatory service provisions were found to be important in analyzing and explaining trust in UHC in rural Bangladesh. In other words, citizens’ trust in the healthcare system and health personnel, including doctors, is generated primarily by both clinical factors such as competence, and non-clinical factors, particularly the dimensions of trustworthiness.

References Askvik, S. (2007). Political regime and popular trust in the civil service: South Africa and Norway compared. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 9(1), 69–85. Askvik, S., Jamil, I., & Dhakal, T. N. (2011). Citizens’ trust in public and political institutions in Nepal. International Political Science Review, 32(4), 417–437. Bevir, M. (2011). Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma. In M. Bevir (Ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Governance (pp. 1–16). Sage. Bouckaert, G., & Van de Walle, S. (2003). Quality of public service delivery and governing networks. In A. Salminen (Ed.), Governing networks: EGPA yearbook (pp. 299–318). IOS Press. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2011). Democracy and administrative policy: Contrasting elements of New Public Management (NPM) and post-NPM. European Political Science Review, 3(1), 125–146. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2013). Scancor and Norwegian public administration research development. Nordiske Organisasjonsstudier, 15(4), 91–110. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2018). An organization approach to public administration. In The Palgrave handbook of public administration and management in Europe (pp. 1087–1104). Palgrave Macmillan. Dan, S., & Pollitt, C. (2015). NPM Can Work: An optimistic review of the impact of New Public Management reforms in central and eastern Europe. Public Management Review, 17 (9), 1305–1332.

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

21

Farazmand, A., & Carter, R. (Eds.). (2004). Sound governance: Policy and administrative innovations. Greenwood Publishing Group. Ferlie, E., Lynn, L. E., & Pollitt, C. (2007). Introductory remarks. In E. Ferlie, L. E. Lynn, & C. Pollitt (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public management (pp. 1–4). Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? Governance, 26(3), 347–368. Fukuyama, F. (2016). Governance: What do we know, and how do we know it? Annual Review of Political Science, 19, 89–105. Grindle, M. S. (2004). Good enough governance: Poverty reduction and reform in developing countries. Governance, 17 (4), 525–548. Grindle, M. S. (2007). Good enough governance revisited. Development Policy Review, 25(5), 533–574. Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. American Political Science Review, 791–808. Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69(1), 3–19. Hood, C. (1995). Contemporary public management: A new global paradigm? Public Policy and Administration, 10(2), 104–117. Holmberg, S., & Rothstein, B. (Eds.). (2012). Good government: The relevance of political science. Edward Elgar. Jamil, I. (2007). Administrative culture in Bangladesh. AH Development Publishing House. Jamil, I., & Askvik, S. (2016). Introduction to the special issue. International Journal of Public Administration, 39(9), 647–651. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01900692.2016.1177835. Jamil, I., Aminuzzaman, S. M., & Haque, S. T. M. (Eds.). (2015). Governance in South, Southeast, and East Asia: Trends, issues and challenges (vol. 15). Springer. Jamil, I., Askvik, S., & Dhakal, T. N. (2013). Understanding governance in South Asia. In I. Jamil, S. Askvik, & T.N. Dhakal (Eds.), In search of better governance in South Asia and beyond (pp. 13–35). Springer. Jamil, I., & Baniamin, H. M. (2020). How culture may nurture institutional trust: Some empirical insights from Bangladesh and Nepal. Development Policy Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12520. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido, P. (1999). Governance matters (World Bank policy Research Working Paper [2196]). Kim, J. Y. (2005). ‘Bowling together’ isn’t a cure-all: The relationship between social capital and political trust in South Korea. International Political Science Review, 26(2), 193–213. Kjær, A. M. (2004). Governance. Polity. Kjaer, A. M. (2011). Rhodes’ contribution to governance theory: Praise, criticism and the future governance debate. Public Administration, 89(1), 101–113.

22

I. JAMIL ET AL.

Klijn, E. H. (2012). New public management and governance: A comparison. In D. Levi Faur (Ed.), Oxford handbook of governance, (pp. 201–214). Oxford University Press. Lægreid, P. (2017). New public management. In Oxford research encyclopedia of politics. Leonardi, R., Nanetti, R. Y., & Putnam, R. D. (2001). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lührmann et al. (2019). V-Dem Dataset v9, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19. Ma, D., & Yang, F. (2014). Authoritarian orientations and political trust in East Asian societies. East Asia, 31(4), 323–341. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. The American Political Science Review, 78(3), 734–749. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1996). Institutional perspectives on political institutions. Governance, 9(3), 247–264. Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), 30–62. Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1993). Reinventing government: The five strategies for reinventing government. New York: Penguin, 16, 16. Pollitt, C. (2016). Managerialism redux? Financial Accountability & Management, 32(4), 429–447. Rhodes, R. (1996). The new governance: Governing without government. Political Studies, 44, 652–667. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability. Open University Press. Rowlands, J. (1997). Questioning empowerment: Working with women in Honduras. Oxfam. Sarker, A. E. (2006). New public management in developing countries. International Journal of Public Sector Management. Schick, A. (1998). Why most developing countries should not try New Zealand’s reforms. The World Bank Research Observer, 13(1), 123–131. Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2005). Network governance and post-liberal democracy. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 27 (2), 197–237. Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2018). The democratizing impact of governance networks: From pluralization, via democratic anchorage, to interactive political leadership. Public Administration, 96(2), 302–317. Stoker, G. (1998). Public-private partnerships and urban governance. In J. Pierre (Ed.), Public-private partnerships in Europe and United States. Macmillan. Stoker, G. (2002). Governance as theory: Five propositions. International Social Science Journal, 50(155), 17–28.

1

UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THREE …

23

Stone, D. (1997). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. Norton & Co. Torfing, J. (2012). Governance networks. In D. Levi Faur (Ed.), Oxford handbook of governance (chapter 7). Oxford University Press. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (1997). Governance for sustainable human development. A UNDP policy document. UNDP. Van de Walle, S., Van Roosbroek, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2008). Trust in the public sector: Is there any evidence for a long-term decline? International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(1), 47–64. Van Ryzin, G. G. (2011). Outcomes, process, and trust of civil servants. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21(4), 745–760. Weiss, T. G. (2000). Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges. Third World Quarterly, 21(5), 795–814. Welzel, C., & Russell, D. (2017). Cultural change in Asia and beyond: From allegiant to assertive citizens. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 2(2), 112–132. Wong, T. K. Y., Wan, P. S., & Hsiao, H. H. M. (2011). The bases of political trust in six Asian societies: Institutional and cultural explanations compared. International Political Science Review, 32(3), 263–281. World Bank. (1989). Sub-Saharan Africa: From crises to sustainable growth. World Bank. World Bank. (2017). World development report: Governance and law. World Bank Group.

CHAPTER 2

Lower Institutional Performance but Higher Institutional (Dis)Trust in South Asia: A Piece of Puzzle Hasan Muhammad Baniamin

In the discourse on governance, citizens’ trust in public institutions (institutional trust, sometimes referred to simply as “trust” in this chapter) is gaining increasing attention. This is because such trust is thought to indicate how public organizations are managed and how successful they are (Askvik, 2007; Askvik & Bak, 2005; Askvik & Jamil, 2013; Bouckaert et al., 2005; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). Increased institutional trust could also indicate something about whether decisions made by public institutions are legitimate and neutral. Various countries’ efforts to reform public services (e.g., Re-inventing Government in the United States, La Rélève in Canada, and the Next Steps Program in the UK) were carried out to increase trust in government (Barnes & Gill, 2000; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003, cited in Kampen et al., 2006). Using performance-based logic, the governments of these

H. M. Baniamin (B) North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_2

25

26

H. M. BANIAMIN

countries assumed they could restore the public’s trust if the government institutions delivered and demonstrated good results (Bouckaert, 2008). The causes and the effects of public trust are, however, complex (Kim, 2010). Citizens’ responses to various surveys (e.g., the World Values Survey, Afro-barometer, Asia-barometer, and the Governance and Trust Survey) show that there can be relatively high institutional trust despite documented low institutional performance and poor governance. Data from the Governance and Trust Survey 21 (GOT 2) indicate that some South Asian counties (e.g., Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) show a higher level of institutional trust when compared with many developed countries where the quality of governance is higher and the performance of public institutions is better. Why does this inconsistency arise? This chapter aims to explain the inconsistent trend in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka based on GOT survey data and empirical studies—mainly Baniamin (2019a) and Baniamin et al. (2020). These studies are selected because these explain the inconstant trends of having inflated trust in the three sample countries based on the same GOT survey. Both the analyses of the data and the two published studies indicate that an authoritarian cultural orientation (ACO) may contribute to inflated institutional trust among citizens. Because of ACO, people perceive authority differently than do those who do not have such an orientation, and this contributes to their higher level of institutional trust. The chapter also discusses the implications of ACO on governance, organizational management, and teamwork. It ends with some critical remarks on the studies used to explain inflated trust in the South Asian countries and offers ideas for future research on institutional trust.

Institutional Trust and Its Importance Bradach and Eccles (1989) identify three governance mechanisms that can be mixed for better performance: market, authority, and trust. According to these thinkers, market opportunism can be mixed with bureaucratic control, and institutional trust can moderate the extreme effects of both the market and authority. Giddens (1996, p. 34) defines trust as “confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events.” It is claimed that trust has substantial links to

1 Another round of this survey was conducted in 2008–2009.

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

27

social and economic development, the effectiveness of political systems, personal happiness, better health and education, higher income, tolerance of minorities, and other beneficial societal outcomes (Almedom, 2005; Portes, 1998; Realo et al., 2008; Rothstein & Eek, 2009). Kim (2005) observes that a high level of citizens’ trust in public institutions can ensure good governance and the successful implementation of policies. In a similar tone, Van der Meer and Dekker (2011) claim that trust works as the glue to keep systems together, and as the oil to lubricate the policy machine. According to the governance paradigm, citizens’ participation and networking in governing are crucial because they are closely related to the degree of trust among the different actors (Doh, 2014). In new democracies, a relatively high level of institutional trust can facilitate democratic consolidation, while in authoritarian regimes, such reported trust may reflect how strongly such regimes are holding on to power (Wong et al., 2011). Without trust in government institutions, citizens may not follow rules, cooperate in the provision of collective goods, or respond appropriately in times of emergency (Van Ryzin, 2011). A low level of institutional trust may indicate the potential for a crisis in governability (Cook & Gronke, 2005). Due to the lack of trust, “flexibility and discretion become severely constrained” and “it hinders informal relationship[s] and lead[s] to an excessive dependence on rules, formal procedures, regulations and legalisms” (Ruscio, 1996, p. 463). Fukuyama (1995) claims that levels of trust can explain many of the differences in economic progress among countries. This could be because trust can make transactions easy and efficient (Ruscio, 1996). The causal direction of trust, however, is unclear (Lee, 2012). Statistical analysis only indicates that social trust correlates positively with certain political, social, and economic conditions that are “normatively desirable” (Rothstein & Eek, 2009). On the one hand, trust can be a source of efficiency in market transactions (Granovetter, 1985), which can lead to more efficient economic outcomes and create better functioning of institutions (Lee, 2012) because it facilitates fruitful interactions within organizations. On the other hand, the level of trust can also be a consequence, not the cause of institutional performance (Lee, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Rothstein, 1998, 2002). Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) show that in Sweden, citizens who interact with “need testing” welfare institutions have less trust in the institutions than do people who only interact with universal welfare institutions (non-need testing). This, they argue,

28

H. M. BANIAMIN

is because people may perceive need-testing institutions as less impartial due to the problem of eligibility assessments of the service recipients. Such assessments are often based more on subjective perceptions than on objective judgment (Welch et al., 2004). This is why Christensen and Lægreid (2005) emphasize the need for more comparative research between countries, to understand the sources and variations of institutional trust. The different dynamics of institutional trust are therefore triggering substantial scholarly interest for further research on trust.

Trust and the Theoretical Expectations A large body of literature shows that the degree of institutional trust in a country is related to a range of governance indicators (e.g., ArmahAttoh et al., 2007; Grönlund & Setälä, 2011; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). According to the rational choice theory, when policies are not implemented, when services are not provided efficiently and effectively, and when power and authority are misused, a situation of mistrust can arise (Askvik & Bak, 2005). Various definitions of institutional trust also reflect these connections. Miller and Listhaug (1990, p. 358) define institutional trust as the “evaluation of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public.” A biased, unfair, and corrupt system generally goes hand in hand with low levels of trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). Poor institutional performance reduces the degree to which individuals trust their government (Hutchison & Johnson, 2011). Thus, the “quality of government” and the “degree of performance” of different institutions in a country are associated with the extent of citizens’ trust in those institutions (Doh, 2014). According to this train of thought, in countries with relatively low quality of governance and poor institutional performance, there should be a lower level of institutional trust than in countries that have higher quality of governance and better institutional performance.

Inconsistencies Between Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Evidence: A Piece of the Puzzle The situation, however, is not that straightforward, for survey data uncovers a puzzle. The latest data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 6 (2010–2014) and the European Values Survey (EVS) 4 (2008–2010) indicate that in quite a number of countries that are not members of

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

29

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereafter called non-OECD countries), the trust levels in the civil service are higher than the trust levels in the civil service in the OECD countries. These non-OECD countries have a much lower performance level as measured in the Human Development Index (HDI), which is published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (objective measure of performance), than do most of the OECD countries (Fig. 2.1). Furthermore, most of the non-OECD countries score low in the Democracy Index (2015) published by the Economic Intelligence Unit, and in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International (Figs. 2.2 and 2.3).

Fig. 2.1 Relation between the Human Development Index, 2015, by UNDP, and trust in civil service in different countries (Note Both reference lines are drawn based on median values, and trust in civil service is measured from the data of WVS 6, EVS 4, and GoT 2. Source Baniamin, 2019a)

Lower Trust

Higher Trust

30

H. M. BANIAMIN

Q2

Q3

Authoritarian

Q1

Q4

Full Democracy

Fig. 2.2 Relation between the Democracy Index (2015) by the economist intelligence unit and trust in civil service in different countries (Note Both reference lines are drawn based on median values, and trust in civil service is measured from the data of WVS 6, EVS 4 and GoT 2. Source Baniamin, 2019a)

On the basis of rational calculations, it would seem reasonable to assume that trust in public institutions is higher in established and wellfunctioning democracies than in other countries, because the public institutions in well-functioning democracies are supposed to be more responsive to people’s needs (Grönlund & Setälä, 2011). Such a connection, however, is not reflected in the empirical data indicated in Fig. 2.2.

Lower Trust

Higher Trust

2

Q2

Q3

Higher Corruption

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

31

Q1

Q4

Lower Corruption

Fig. 2.3 Relation between the Corruption Perceptions Index (2015) by transparency international and trust in civil service in different countries (Note Both reference lines are drawn based on median values, and trust in civil service is measured from the data of WVS 6, EVS 4, and GoT 2. Source Baniamin, 2019a)

Figure 2.3, which reveals a pattern similar to the inconsistent relationship between democracy and institutional trust shown in Fig. 2.2, also indicates that a country’s citizens can report surprisingly high institutional trust despite them also acknowledging a high level of corruption in government institutions. Thus, the performance and governance-based explanations become problematic for explaining inflated levels of trust in the civil service in non-OECD countries. Due to the inconsistences

32

H. M. BANIAMIN

between theoretical expectations and empirical findings on the relationship between institutional trust and performance, Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003, p. 891) say that “this is a very rational and mechanistic reasoning, only part of which corresponds to reality.” The higher level of trust is not only visible for the civil service of many non-OECD countries, but also for many of their other public institutions such as the judiciary, and the legislature (parliament). The way in which the countries are positioned in boxes Q1 and Q3 in Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 is more or less consistent with the “governance and performance-based hypothesis” that higher performance and better governance lead to higher institutional trust (situation of Q1), and alternatively, that lower performance and poorer governance generate lower institutional trust (situation of Q3). However, the positioning of the countries in Q2 and Q4 does not cohere with this logic of performance and quality of governance. The countries that have lower trust despite higher performance and better governance (situation of Q4 in Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) are explained by post-materialism and the rise of critical citizens (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Norris, 2011). Due to these factors, people become critical of the traditional performance of a government and begin to care more about the environment, human rights, gender rights, and other types of post-materialist issues. Meanwhile, the situation of Q2 in Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 poses a puzzle because several countries display higher trust despite lower performance and poor governance (Figs. 2.4 and 2.5).

Fig. 2.4 Trust in the civil service in the OECD countries (Source World Value Survey 6 and European Value Study 4)

2

50 0

92

7877 76 7373

70 6867 66666665 636362

616060 59

535353 515151 49 46464645

33

42 39 373736 3535

Uzbekistan Malaysia China Singapore Bahrain Bangladesh Nepal Kazakhstan Ghana Azerbaijan Belarus Sri Lanka Philippines India Taiwan Kyrgyzstan Rwanda Thailand Hong Kong Nigeria Kuwait Zimbabwe Cyprus Brazil Russia Morocco Georgia Jordan Libya Ukraine South Africa PalesƟne Algeria Pakistan Armenia Trinidad & Tobago Lebanon Egypt

100

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

Fig. 2.5 Trust in the civil service in the non-OECD countries (Source World Value Survey 6 and Governance and Trust Survey 2)

Trying to Solve the Puzzle of Inflated Trust The trend of inflated institutional trust is visible not only in one survey alone but in surveys taken at different times by different organizations (e.g., the World Value Survey, the Asia-barometer, the Afro-barometer, and the Governance and Trust Survey). They all indicate that citizens in some countries report relatively high levels of institutional trust despite experiencing poor institutional performance and poor governance. How might it be possible to explain this puzzle? Is Quality of Data a Possible Explanation? Problems relating to the reliability of data from WVS 6 and EVS 4 may possibly explain the inflated trust reported in the underperforming countries. However, among all the available data sources on institutional trust and the related issues, these data sources are considered quite comprehensive, reliable, authentic, and rigorous. Many scholarly articles have already been published based on these databases (e.g., Buzasi, 2015; Delhey et al., 2011; Inglehart & Welzel, 2010; Jung, 2017; Norris, 2013). Statistics from EVS alone show that up to November 2017, 1643 scholarly publications were based on its survey (EVS, 2017). Nevertheless, the repeated use of such data cannot be a good argument for reliability; rather, it is the realization that multiple surveys come up with the same anomalous finding. The two published studies discussed in this chapter (Baniamin, 2019a; Baniamin et al., 2020) mainly use GoT 2 survey data to analyze the level

34

H. M. BANIAMIN

of institutional trust in the sample countries. Most of this survey’s questions are similar to WVS 6 questions. The GoT 2 survey questionnaire was prepared in English by two faculty members from the University of Bergen, Norway. After this, the partnering teams from the three countries translated the questionnaire so that it could be easily understood by the local respondents. Three universities, one from each country, collaborated with the University of Bergen.2 In each university, a research team worked under the leadership of an academic. For sampling, the respective country’s voter list was used to choose a sample from the population. Around 50 respondents were randomly selected from each selected polling station. During this selection process, various demographic attributes were taken into consideration. It can therefore be said that the samples from these countries are random and representative. Owing to all these procedures, it can also be said that the data from GoT 2 is relatively reliable. Sometimes, however, it was difficult to locate the selected respondents from the lower income group because of their “floating” nature. There are thus some problematic issues of representativeness within the lower income group. Does the Fear Factor Matter? Another possible explanation for the higher level of institutional trust despite lower performance and poor governance may be that people are afraid to give honest responses. If this is the case, people would be reticent to talk about corruption in public organizations and among public officials. Focusing on South Asia, Figs. 2.6 and 2.7 indicate that most of the respondents (around 90%) from the GoT 2 survey expressed their opinions on corruption committed by political leaders and civil servants. If the fear factor truly applies, then respondents would have chosen a safe option such as “don’t know,” or even refrained from answering the survey questions. Table 2.1 indicates that the percentage of “don’t know,” “not answered,” and “system missing” in the GoT 2 survey is less than 10%. This means most of the people freely expressed their opinions on corruption, indicating that fear was not a decisive factor when they evaluated various public institutions. Some studies (Shi, 2001; Wang, 2005) also show that while people are critical of their authorities (they talk about corruption), they at the 2 The North South University in Bangladesh, Tribhuvan University in Nepal, and the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka.

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

35

96.40

Fig. 2.6 People’s perceptions of politicians’ involvement with corruption (%) (Source GoT 2 Survey)

97.00 96.00 95.00 94.00 93.00 92.00 91.00 90.00 89.00

Fig. 2.7 People’s perceptions of civil servants’ involvement with corruption (%)

96.00 94.00

93.10 91.50

94.50 91.10

92.00 90.00

87.80

88.00 86.00 84.00

same time display relatively high institutional trust. In a study on China— where there is also inflated institutional trust—Shi (2001) finds a very weak correlation (r = .04 to .14) between political fear and institutional trust. Similarly, in the GoT 2 survey, people express opinions on corruption among their authorities, but at the same time, express relatively high trust in their public institutions. Fear may therefore not be an important factor to influence the survey data.

Politicians Civil servants Politicians Civil servants Politicians Civil servants

Bangladesh

5.2 3.2 18.9 10.2 7.1 2.4

Everyone

48.1 39.9 33.6 25.6 50.2 30.5

Quite many

33.7 40.1 21.1 27.0 27 38.3

Some

6.1 7.9 17.9 25.0 12.1 23.3

Just a few

.8 1.7 1.4 3.3 .4 1.4

None

6.0 6.9 6.2 8.0 2.9 3.7

Don’t know

– – – – .4 .4

Not answered

.2 .2 .8 .9 0 .1

System missing

100 100 100 100 100 100

Total

Note The “Not answered” option was only available for Sri Lanka, and the question asked was “Are the politicians/civil servants involved with corruption?” Source Author’s own calculation

Sri Lanka

Nepal

Involvement with corruption

People’s perceptions of corruption among politicians and civil servants (%)

Country

Table 2.1

36 H. M. BANIAMIN

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

37

A Search for Additional Theoretical Explanations Since the trend of inflated trust in public institutions in certain underperforming countries is systematic, it is necessary to explore other possible theoretical explanations and their empirical applicability. Rational choice institutionalists posit that actors have a fixed set of preferences and behave entirely instrumentally to maximize the attainment of these preferences (Hall & Taylor, 1996). However, sociological and historical institutionalists argue that the preferences and actions of actors are shaped by the contexts or the cultural arrangements in which they find themselves (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Rational choice institutionalists thus argue that preference formation is exogenous (originating from outside the individual), while historical institutionalists argue that it is endogenous (originating from within the individual) (Thelen, 1999). Sociological institutionalists have a notion of preference formation which is similar to that of historical institutionalists. Historical institutionalists use two approaches to explain human actions: the calculative approach and the cultural approach. According to the calculative approach, human actions are instrumental and based on a strategic cost-benefit calculation. The cultural approach, by contrast, predicts that human actions are not fully strategic but bounded by an individual’s worldview (Hall & Taylor, 1996). According to the rationalist perspective, institutional trust develops through inductive reasoning. However, a person’s calculative nature can also be shaped by non-calculative cultural values. Ruscio (1996, p. 461) indicates that a non-calculative approach to explaining human actions depends on values, norms, obligations, and duties, all of which can influence behavior in combination with self-interest. If this is correct, culture can shape actions by providing ends or values by which the actions are guided. Culture could thus be a central causal element for institutional trust (Grimes et al., 2015). To explain calculative actions and cultural actions, March and Olsen (1996, 1998) describe two forms of logic: the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. According to the logic of consequences, people’s actions are based on their expectations of consequences (March & Olsen, 1998). On the other hand, according to the logic of appropriateness, people’s decision-making processes will be biased toward what their social norms deem to be right, rather than on what a cost-benefit calculation would consider best (Balsiger, 2016). Under this latter logic,

38

H. M. BANIAMIN

actors’ behavior is based on “the institutionalized practices of a collectivity and mutual understanding of what is true, reasonable, natural, right and good” (Olsen, 2007, p. 3). This accounts for how people think, feel, and organize themselves. Their loyalty, devotion, respect, friendship, as well as hate, anger, fear, envy, and guilt are made appropriate to particular identities in particular situations (March & Olsen, 1996). Thus, when comparing the logic of consequences with the logic of appropriateness, it is the latter that extends beyond the scope of the cost-benefit strategy and gives a more comprehensive view of human motivation for a specific action. Based on these two logics, we can create a 2 × 2 matrix which helps us understand human processes of evaluating events and actions (Fig. 2.8). Examining Fig. 2.8, it appears that for the first quadrant (Q1), both logics play significant roles in the process of evaluating actions. Here, people’s logics are guided by cost-benefit calculation, but that calculation is also shaped by social norms and behavior. In the second scenario (Q2), people’s actions and their evaluations are mainly influenced by social norms and values. People tend to do what is socially acceptable and desirable instead of just basing their actions on cost-benefit analysis. This can explain behavior such as ethnic cleansing, blood feuds, and moral

High Logic of Appropriateness

Low Low

Q2: Mainly norms and values shape actions and their acceptability

Q1: Rational and objective choices are influenced by norms and values

Q3: Zone of indifference

Q4: Evaluations of actions are based on rational and objective choices only

Logic of Consequences

High

Fig. 2.8 Evaluation of an action based on different logics (Source Author’s construction based on March & Olsen, 1996)

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

39

heroism (March & Olsen, 2011). Quadrant 3 (Q3) is a “zone of indifference,” which indicates a lack of applying any logic. Evaluations in such cases are probably affected by randomness. In quadrant 4 (Q4), actions and their evaluations are mainly based on cost-benefit logic, as predicted by rational-choice theory. In reality, most evaluations of actions can probably be characterized as falling under scenario Q1, and least of all under scenario Q3. This is because for every evaluation, people usually apply one or more type of logic, which can be based on rational calculation or values, or a combination of both (Baniamin, 2019b). Explanations from Empirical Studies From the previous section’s theoretical discussion, it appears that norms and values can also affect institutional trust. The two published articles (Baniamin, 2019a; Baniamin et al., 2020) undergirding this chapter indicate that an authoritarian cultural orientation (ACO) may contribute to inflated institutional trust among citizens in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. These articles state that performance and governance indicators may, on their own, be insufficient to explain a higher level of trust in the civil service in non-OECD countries. An additional variable based on cultural orientation is required. The argument in support of this additional variable is that the existence of “power distance” or an “authoritarian cultural orientation” (ACO) in many non-OECD countries may contribute to a higher level of institutional trust despite the lower socioeconomic performance of public institutions as compared with similar institutions in OECD countries. High ACO indicates unquestioning obedience, loyalty, and reliance on authorities such as the government, political leaders, teachers, elders, or anyone with a higher social rank, status, and reputation than that of the individual concerned (Ma & Yang, 2014). Accordingly, people with high ACO accept a strong hierarchical social order, and this may contribute to creating blind trust in authorities. Conversely, people with low ACO may challenge authorities and question the appropriateness and effectiveness of various public institutions. People possessing either of these contrasting cultural values will therefore assess the effectiveness of an institution differently, and this can contribute to differences in their level of institutional trust. People with higher ACO tend to have higher institutional trust principally because they tend to defer to authority. Their cost-benefit logic (i.e., the logic of consequences) is affected by their obedience to authority.

40

H. M. BANIAMIN

This obedience relates to the degree of appropriateness of certain behaviors that are connected with values and norms. We can therefore see the importance of the logic of appropriateness for determining the level of institutional trust. This can provide a possible explanation to why there is inflated trust in public institutions in the sampled South Asian countries. Most interestingly, the perceived rating of the service delivery in the sample countries is also influenced by ACO. People with higher ACO usually assess civil servants positively; they have a comparatively strong belief that civil servants are prompt, efficient, and tend to treat people equally. The effect of ACO on institutional trust can be considered a “pull factor” and a reason why we observe inflated trust in the sampled underperforming countries. In contrast, post-materialistic culture and the rise of critical citizens (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Norris, 2011) work as “push factors” and decrease the level of institutional trust as found in various developed countries. These pull and push factors may contribute to creating the gap in the level of institutional trust identified between the non-OECD and OECD countries. This may provide a possible explanation to the main research puzzle of the study, that is, why citizens in certain non-OECD countries have higher institutional trust than their counterparts in the OECD countries, despite there being poorer institutional performance and poorer governance in the non-OECD countries. The findings revealed in Baniamin (2019a) and Baniamin et al. (2020) indicate that certain values which people possess can shape their worldview and lead to them having inflated institutional trust despite their experiences of low institutional performance and poor governance. Thus, the logic of appropriateness (here ACO) can shape the application of the logic of consequences. The endogenous effects of these factors (performance/governance and cultural orientation) on institutional trust are also indicated by Ruscio (1996), who confirms that norms and values influence behavior in combination with self-interest. Ruscio claims that people’s different social obligations cause them to calculate differently. Thus, people with relatively high ACO also have a relatively high level of institutional trust. This can explain the existence of inflated trust in the sampled countries despite their underperformance in most indicators of governance. According to Sztompka (1999), this kind of inflated trust can be regarded as blind or naive, because these trusting people

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

41

discount negative evidence and take a “pure leap of faith.” The findings of Baniamin (2019a) and Baniamin et al. (2020) are consistent with the observations of Van Ryzin (2007) and Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003, 2007). Van Ryzin (2007) warns that it is too simplistic to assume that citizens directly respond to government outcomes. Rather, their trust in government reflects the way they interpret their government’s performance. Implications of the Identified Cultural Attribute Baniamin (2019a) and Baniamin et al. (2020) do not explore the possible effects of ACO on governance and management style. Other related studies, however, may give us some indications of the possible effects of ACO on such aspects. In this connection, it may be useful to state that the definition used to describe ACO is close to what Schwartz (1999) calls “hierarchical cultural value” and what Hofstede et al. (2010) call “power distance.” Schwartz (1999, p. 27) defines hierarchical cultural value as “a cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (social power, authority, humility, wealth).” People who have this value comply with the obligations and the rules attached to hierarchal roles and show deference to superiors. Hofstede et al. (2010, p. 61) indicate a similar dimension with the concept of power distance, which they define as the “extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.” Governance At the state level, ACO can be beneficial because there is less resistance to governance due to the loyalty of the people. Countries with proper leadership may prosper, as top-down decisions are easier to implement. East Asian countries such as Singapore and South Korea probably benefit from this kind of culture. Cheng et al. describe the leadership style in these Asian countries as paternalistic, for leaders have authority and control over subordinates, and rewards are granted to subordinates in exchange for their acquiescence. But this leadership style can be problematic if authorities are corrupt. In an obedience-based culture, it is difficult to make authorities accountable; rather, such a culture can facilitate the misuse of power and repressive governance (Bouckaert & Van de

42

H. M. BANIAMIN

Walle, 2003). Welzel and Dalton (2017) show that an allegiant culture is beneficial for effective governance while an assertive culture can ensure accountable governance. Similarly, Jain and Jain (2018) show that in high power-distance situations, the demand for transparency decreases. This is why lower trust is considered a healthy democratic attitude (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003). As Dalton and Ong (2005) claim, Western societies are rights-based and individualistic, and these qualities are consistent with the competitive elements of democracy. Here, people have the freedom to disagree with leaders and to demand more consultative leadership. East Asian societies, by contrast, are paternalistic and show allegiance to authority. Such qualities are inconsistent with democracy. This is why, while discussing Asian culture, Fukuyama (1998, p. 1) states that “… people are born not with rights but with duties to a series of hierarchically-arranged authorities, beginning with the family and extending all the way up to the state” (cited in Chang & Chu, 2006). Organizational Management Khatri (2009) has identified a number of organizational-level effects of ACO. In a high power-distance context, decision making and the implementation of decisions in an organization can be speedier, but the quality of decisions may be poorer because there may be a lack of input from lower-level employees. In such an organization, jobs are narrowly and tightly specified, and top-level managers are occupied with making routine and minor decisions. They may need to get involved in micro-management. Communication usually takes place vertically, and lower-level employees are unwilling to participate in decision making. Older and senior employees receive respect due to their longer tenure in the organization. An organization with high power distance is prone to unethical behavior since the top-level officials do not need to justify their decisions. A study by Lian et al. (2012) finds that subordinates with a high power-distance orientation are more tolerant of supervisory mistreatment than are subordinates with a low power-distance orientation. Group Work There is one study which can be indicative of the group level effect of ACO. Anicich et al. (2015), who have done research on Himalayan mountain climbers (total 30,625 climbers from 56 countries), show that

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

43

more climbers from countries with a hierarchical culture reach the summit of a given peak than do climbers from other cultures, but at the same time, there is a larger percentage of climbers from the hierarchical culture who die along the way. This study therefore reveals both functional and dysfunctional aspects of hierarchal culture; there may be success in reaching the summit due to increased coordination, but that performance may be impaired because the concerns and voices of lower-ranking climbers are blocked. Life Satisfaction Baniamin et al. (2020) indicate one possible individual level effect of ACO, namely, that people with higher ACO tend to have higher satisfaction in life than do people with low ACO. This may be because the high ACO people do not worry much about various problematic issues. On the other hand, people with lower ACO tend to experience higher stress, perhaps because of their assertiveness and consciousness. Being assertive and conscious of rights may lead them to do more intense and sophisticated evaluation and calculation of different events and actions. The discrepancy between the reality and the higher-expected standard may cause frustration and negatively affect their life satisfaction.

Concluding Remarks and Some Caveats Baniamin (2019a) and Baniamin et al. (2020) can have several limitations which should be kept in mind. Future research on institutional trust is needed to address these potential limitations. First, there can be a problem in the conceptualization of the main dependent variable “institutional trust” and in its measurement. The two studies consider trust and confidence as similar constructs. This is because terms such as trust, confidence, perception, and image of government are often used interchangeably as catch-all terms (Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). Various surveys also measure trust through confidence. Luhmann (1988, cited in Joon, 2004), however, makes a distinction between confidence and trust. Confidence, he argues, is associated with asymmetrical relationships and is related to real danger and contingency. Alternatively, the concept of trust is associated with modern society, where danger is replaced with risk and is dependent on a calculation of risk. Thus, according to Luhmann, there are differences between confidence and trust. If a person does not

44

H. M. BANIAMIN

have any alternative solutions to a given problem, then he or she is in a situation of confidence. The survey component used to measure institutional trust in the two studies is “I am going to name a number of organizations and institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?” It is possible that this measure of institutional trust may reflect different things in different societies. In some countries, it may reflect Luhmann’s (1988) concept of confidence, as there is higher power distance between an ordinary person and an authority figure. People in such societies would rely on an authoritative person or institution to solve their problems, but such problem-solving mechanisms are not automatic or matters of course. In many cases, the people will be dependent on the whim of the authority and will have very limited alternatives for dealing with such unpredictable behavior. They will be helpless because of limited opportunities to bargain or negotiate with the authority. Simply raising their voice can bring further trouble. In a high power-distance culture, demonstrations of obedience and loyalty may often help people gain favor from the authority. In such situations, the power is asymmetrical, and if an authority does not intend to provide services, or if that authority treats people unfairly, then in most cases, people will have very little say in the matter. In contrast, in modern societies that have more freedom and formal space to negotiate with authorities and to create pressure on them if they act unjustly, trust is related to the calculation of risk. It therefore appears that the current measure of institutional trust may have different meanings in different countries. The higher institutional trust in underperforming countries can be analogous to confidence in God: for any personal misfortune or disaster, confidence in God may not decline; rather, it may incite the believer to pray even more, and to show confidence in God precisely in order to gain God’s favor. There may also be a limitation on the measurement of the main independent variable “ACO.” The respondents who scored high in the measure of ACO may have done so because they benefit from this kind of obedience-based system, but in practice, they may not actually be all that obedient to the authority. For instance, those who supported the statement “it is natural that those with power, money, and belonging to a high-status family background should be respected and obeyed,” may have done so because they are beneficiaries of this hierarchical system,

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

45

but in reality, they may not be all that obedient toward their authority. Baniamin (2019a) and Baniamin et al. (2020) try to minimize the effect of this problem by controlling for the income level of the respondents. The studies do not discuss the formation of ACO or the mechanisms through which it develops in a person or in a society. Only the relationship between ACO and institutional trust is explored. Nor do the studies explore the dynamics between specific and diffuse trust as indicated by Easton (1975). The unit of analysis for the studies on institutional trust is mainly individual, but country-level analysis could have made their claims (such as the effect of ACO) more convincing and comprehensive. Next, there can be a problem in the measurement of independent variables. The two studies use perceived performance to understand institutional trust, since institutional trust is supposed to be formed based on people’s perceived understanding of performance. Although such perceptions cannot be created without objective evidence, Yang and Holzer (2006) have identified three factors which can moderate or mediate performance-trust relationships: (a) grievance asymmetry—good performance can go unnoticed while bad performance and its related grievances can affect trust; (b) summation—there are different agencies in civil service and government, and some of them may feature more strongly than others in citizens’ minds; (c) expectations —citizens may differ in their expectations, and this is why their reactions to the same level of performance can vary. The perception-based data for the studies can be affected by these factors, but the studies do not develop further techniques to address the issues. There is another limitation to the measurement of performance-related indicators: the studies do not distinguish between the performance of civil service and that of government. Performance indicators such as the “reduction of poverty” or “management of the economy” can point to the performance of both civil service and government, but the contributions of these may differ. But the studies do not distinguish between the two areas of performance precisely because of their connected and complex nature. Van de Walle et al. (2008) also point this out and mention that it is difficult to measure the performance of the public sector as a whole. The studies do not explore the role of political scandal, which can cause institutional trust to fluctuate quickly (Bowler & Karp, 2004). And then there is the perceptual bias of survey responses, which can cause considerable variation in perception-based data (Erlingsson & Kristinsson, 2016).

46

H. M. BANIAMIN

For example, people usually overestimate the threat of crime and corruption. According to Anderson and Singer (2008), people’s ideological predisposition can affect their evaluation of performance, and accordingly, their institutional trust level. People who identify themselves as politically right wing are less likely to view inequality negatively than do others (Anderson & Singer, 2008). The findings of the two studies may be affected by these factors, but since there are clear statistically significant trends in the studies, the findings can be important to contemplate further. Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003) list different performance indicators and identity-related indicators to explain institutional trust, but a number of these identity-related indicators are not included in the two studies’ analyses. For example, party loyalty as an explanatory variable for institutional trust is not included, even though it is a very important variable for defining trust in different countries (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Christensen & Lægreid, 2005). The studies also do not include some context-specific identity variables. For example, in Sri Lanka, the ethnic division between Sinhalese and Tamil respondents may affect respondents’ level of institutional trust. Similarly, in Nepal, ethnicity and caste may have affected respondents’ institutional trust. A study by Askvik et al. (2011), however, shows that different identity variables have little significance in explaining the degree of institutional trust in Nepal. Methodologically, the studies can have “common method bias,” which is a systematic variance among the variables that is due to the measurement method itself, rather than to the theoretical constructs the measurements represent (MacKenzie & Podsakoff, 2012, cited in Jakobsen & Jensen, 2015). In Baniamin (2019a) and Baniamin et al. (2020), both the dependent and the explanatory variables are measured from the GoT 2 survey. Therefore, the findings of these studies can be affected by common method bias. The regression models in the analysis sections of the articles on institutional trust may also have limitations. The institutional trust variable is measured by a 4-point Likert scale that does not reflect an ideal continuous variable. Using linear regression to analyze the dependent variables may therefore have limitations. However, there is literature (such as Pasta, 2009) which lends support to the use of ordinal variables for linear regression. Based on the two key studies undergirding this chapter, it appears that many developing countries have higher institutional trust when they

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

47

should have lower trust due to lower performance and poor governance. Because of this mismatch, the institutional trust in these countries can be considered inflated or blind. Such unwarranted trust may be a problem for these countries as indicated by political science literature (Van de Walle & Six, 2014). For example, according to the classical liberal theory, distrust is rational and trust is naive (Hardin, 2002), for with a high level of trust, there is a risk that checks and balances will be hollowed out (Van de Walle & Six, 2014). As such, the decline of inflated trust may not be a problem. Instead, it may indicate that people are becoming increasingly sophisticated about the conditions of trust (Warren, 1999). This means their blind trust is reduced and they become more objective in analyzing the performance of public institutions. This may help create pressure on authorities and induce them to improve their performance. The two studies do not develop mechanisms to differentiate between which types of trust increase efficiency and which types are so naive as to create governance-related problems. In liberal Western societies, having higher trust can probably increase efficiency, but in non-liberal societies, having higher trust can create governance-related problems such as the failure to ensure accountable and responsive governance. In these latter societies, less blind or naive trust can help to improve governance quality. The limitations identified in this section of the chapter may provide food for thought for future studies on institutional trust. Having the same measurement for ACO across all the countries may lead to more rigorous analysis and help to measure the power of this variable in explaining institutional trust within and across societies. If, by adopting an experimental research design, we can change the extent of different cultural orientations (e.g., ACO and post-materialism) and can find the effects of such changes on institutional trust, then we might possibly gain robust support for the effects of these cultural attributes on institutional trust.

References Almedom, A. M. (2005). Social capital and mental health: An interdisciplinary review of primary evidence. Social Science and Medicine, 61(5), 943–964. Anderson, C. J., & LoTempio, A. J. (2002). Winning, losing and political trust in America. British Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 335–351. Anderson, C. J., & Singer, M. M. (2008). The sensitive left and the impervious right: Multilevel models and the politics of inequality, ideology, and legitimacy in Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4–5), 564–599.

48

H. M. BANIAMIN

Anicich, E. M., Swaab, R. I., & Galinsky, A. D. (2015). Hierarchical cultural values predict success and mortality in high-stakes teams. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(5), 1338–1343. Armah-Attoh, D., Boadi, E. G., & Chkwanha, A. B. (2007). Corruption and institutional trust in Africa: Implications for democratic development (Working Paper No. 81). Afro-barometer. Askvik, S. (2007). Political regime and popular trust in the civil service: South Africa and Norway compared. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876980601145748. Askvik, S., & Bak, N. (Eds.). (2005). Trust in public institutions in South Africa. Ashgate. Askvik, S., & Jamil, I. (2013). The institutional trust paradox in Bangladesh. Public Organization Review, 13, 459–476. Askvik, S., Jamil, I., & Dhakal, T. N. (2011). Citizens’ trust in public and political institutions in Nepal. International Political Science Review, 32(4), 417–437. Baniamin, H. M. (2019a). Linking socio-economic performance, quality of governance, and trust in the civil service: Does culture intercede in the perceived relationships? Evidence from and beyond Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 41(3), 127–141. https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2019.1658926. Baniamin, H. M. (2019b). Relationships among governance quality, institutional performance, and (dis)trust: Trends and tensions: A quest for critical ingredients of institutional trust (Doctoral dissertation). University of Bergen, Norway. Bergen Open Research Archive. Baniamin, H. M., Jamil, I., & Askvik, S. (2020). Mismatch between lower performance and higher trust in the civil service: Can culture provide an explanation? International Political Science Review, 41(2), 192–206. Balsiger, J. (2016). Logic of appropriateness. Encyclopedia Britannica. https:// www.britannica.com/topic/logic-of-appropriateness. Bouckaert, G. (2008). Managing performance: International comparisons (new edition). Routledge. Bouckaert, G., & Van de Walle, S. (2003). Comparing measures of citizen trust and user satisfaction as indicators of ‘good governance’: Difficulties in linking trust and satisfaction indicators. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 69(3), 329–343. Bouckaert, G., Lægreid, P., & Van de Walle, S. (2005). Introduction. Public Performance and Management Review, 28(4), 460–464. Bowler, S., & Karp, J. A. (2004). Politicians, scandals, and trust in government. Political Behavior, 26(3), 271–287.

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

49

Buzasi, K. (2015). Languages, communication potential and generalized trust in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence based on the Afro-barometer Survey. Social Science Research, 49, 141–155. Bradach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust: From ideal types to plural forms. Annual Review of Sociology, 15(1), 97–118. Chang, E. C., & Chu, Y. H. (2006). Corruption and trust: Exceptionalism in Asian democracies? The Journal of Politics, 68(2), 259–271. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2005). Trust in government: The relative importance of service satisfaction, political factors, and demography. Public Performance & Management Review, 28(4), 487–511. Cook, T. E., & Gronke, P. (2005). The skeptical American: Revisiting the meanings of trust in government and confidence in institutions. The Journal of Politics, 67 (3), 784–803. Dalton, R. J., & Ong, N. N. T. (2005). Authority orientations and democratic attitudes: A test of the ‘Asian values’ hypothesis. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 6(2), 211–231. Delhey, J., Newton, K., & Welzel, C. (2011). How general is trust in “most people”? Solving the radius of trust problem. American Sociological Review, 76(5), 786–807. Doh, S. (2014). Social capital, economic development, and the quality of government: How interaction between social capital and economic development affects the quality of government. Public Administration, 92(1), 104–124. Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British Journal of Political Science, 5(4), 435–457. Erlingsson, G. Ó., & Kristinsson, G. H. (2016). Making sense of corruption perceptions. Quality of Governance (Working Paper Series, 2016:13). European Values Study (EVS). (2016). European values study 2008. Integrated Dataset, ZA4800, v.4.0.0 (2016-04-15). https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12458. GESIS. European Values Study (EVS). (2017). The EVS bibliography. http://www.eur opeanvaluesstudy.eu/news/44/the-evs-bibliography-has-been-updated.html. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. Free Press Paperbacks. Fukuyama, F. (1998, September). Asian values and civilization. In ICAS Fall Symposium “Asia’s Challenges Ahead,” University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Giddens, A. (1996). The consequences of modernity. Stanford University Press. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510. Grimes, A., MacCulloch, R., & McKay, F. (2015). Indigenous belief in a just world: New Zealand M¯ aori and other ethnicities compared (Motu Working Paper No. 15–14). New Zealand.

50

H. M. BANIAMIN

Grönlund, K., & Setälä, M. (2011). In honest officials we trust: Institutional confidence in Europe. The American Review of Public Administration, 42, 523–542. Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5), 936–957. Hardin, R. (2002). Trust and trustworthiness. Russell Sage Foundation. Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. McGraw Hill. Hutchison, M. I., & Johnson, K. (2011). Capacity to trust? Institutional capacity, conflict, and political trust in Africa, 2000–2005. Journal of Peace Research, 48(6), 737–752. Inglehart, R. (2006). Mapping global values. Comparative Sociology, 5(2), 115– 136. Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change and the persistence of traditional values. American Sociological Review, 65(1), 19–51. Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2010). Changing mass priorities: The link between modernization and democracy. Perspectives on Politics, 8(2), 551–567. Jain, S. S., & Jain, S. P. (2018). Power distance belief and preference for transparency. Journal of Business Research, 89, 135–142. Jakobsen, M., & Jensen, R. (2015). Common method bias in public management studies. International Public Management Journal, 18(1), 3–30. Joon, H. (2004). Social capital, post-materialism and institutional confidence in South Korea: 1981–2003. Development and Society, 33(2), 165–183. Jung, J. H. (2017). Country-level differences in the effects of financial hardship on life satisfaction: The role of religious context and age-contingent buffering. Society and Mental Health, 2156869317725892. Kampen, J. K., De Walle, S. V., & Bouckaert, G. (2006). Assessing the relation between satisfaction with public service delivery and trust in Government: The impact of the predisposition of citizens toward Government on evaluations of its performance. Public Performance & Management Review, 29(4), 387–404. Khatri, N. (2009). Consequences of power distance orientation in organisations. Vision, 13(1), 1–9. Kim, S. (2005). The role of trust in the modern administrative state: An integrative model. Administration & Society, 37 (5), 611–635. Kim, S. (2010). Public trust in government in Japan and South Korea: Does the rise of critical citizens matter? Public Administration Review, 70(5), 801–810. Kumlin, S., & Rothstein, B. (2005). Making and breaking social capital: The impact of welfare-state institutions. Comparative Political Studies, 38(4), 339– 365. Lee, C. S. (2012). Welfare states and social trust. Comparative Political Studies, 46(5), 603–630.

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

51

Lian, H., Ferris, D. L., & Brown, D. J. (2012). Does power distance exacerbate or mitigate the effects of abusive supervision? It depends on the outcome. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97 (1), 107. Luhmann, N. (2000). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In G. Diego (Ed.), Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations. Electronic edition, Department of Sociology, University of Oxford (Chapter 6, pp. 94– 107). http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/luhmann94-107.pdf. Ma, D., & Yang, F. (2014). Authoritarian orientations and political trust in East Asian societies. East Asia, 31(4), 323–341. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1996). Institutional perspectives on political institutions. Governance, 9(3), 247–264. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international political orders. International Organization, 52(4), 943–969. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2011). The logic of appropriateness. In The Oxford handbook of political science. Oxford University Press. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/978019 9604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-024. Miller, A. H., & Listhaug, O. (1990). Political parties and confidence in government: A comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States. British Journal of Political Science, 20(3), 357–386. Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), 30–62. Norris, P. (2011). Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited. Cambridge University Press. Norris, P. (2013). Does the world agree about standards of electoral integrity? Evidence for the diffusion of global norms. Electoral Studies, 32(4), 576–588. Olsen, J. P. (2007). Understanding institutions and logic of appropriateness: Introductory essay (Working Paper No. 13). ARENA, Center for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2070/e8d7df 89dc2ffc727dbac17d65d3b6120dd3.pdf. Pasta, D. J. (2009). Learning when to be discrete: Continuous vs. categorical predictors. In SAS Global Forum, Paper 248. ICON Clinical Research. Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1–25. Realo, A., Allik, J., & Greenfield, B. (2008). Radius of trust: Social capital in relation to familism and institutional collectivism. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 39(4), 447–462. Rothstein, B. (1998). Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare state. Cambridge University Press.

52

H. M. BANIAMIN

Rothstein, B. (2002). Social capital in the social democratic state. In R. D. Putnam (Ed.), Democracy in flux: The evolution of social capital in contemporary society (pp. 289–332). Oxford University Press. Rothstein, B., & Eek, D. (2009). Political corruption and social trust: An experimental approach. Rationality and Society, 21(1), 81–112. Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2008). The state of social capital: An institutional theory of generalized trust. Comparative Politics, 40(4), 441–459. Ruscio, K. P. (1996). Trust, democracy, and public management: A theoretical argument. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6(3), 461– 477. Schwartz, S. H. (1999). A theory of cultural values and some implications for work. Applied Psychology, 48(1), 23–47. Shi, T. (2001). Cultural values and political trust: A comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. Comparative Politics, 33(4), 401–419. Sztompka, P. (1999). Trust: A sociological theory. Cambridge University Press. Transparency International (TI). (2015). Corruption perceptions index 2016. https://www.transparency.org. Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 369–404. Van de Walle, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2003). Public service performance and trust in government: The problem of causality. International Journal of Public Administration, 26(8–9), 891–913. Van de Walle, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2007). Perceptions of productivity and performance in Europe and the United States. International Journal of Public Administration, 30(11), 1123–1140. Van de Walle, S., & Six, F. (2014). Trust and distrust as distinct concepts: Why studying distrust in institutions is important. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 16(2), 158–174. Van der Meer, T., & Dekker, P. (2011). Trustworthy states, trusting citizens? A multi-level study into objective and subjective determinants of political trust. In S. Zmerli & M. Hooghe (Eds.), Political trust: Why context matters (pp. 95–116). ECPR Press. Van de Walle, S., Van Roosbroek, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2008). Trust in the public sector: Is there any evidence for a long-term decline? International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(1), 47–64. Van Ryzin, G. G. (2007). Pieces of a puzzle: Linking government performance, citizen satisfaction, and trust. Public Performance & Management Review, 30(4), 521–535. Van Ryzin, G. G. (2011). Outcomes, process and trust of civil servants. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21(4), 745–760.

2

LOWER INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE …

53

Wang, Z. (2005). Before the emergence of critical citizens: Economic development and political trust in China. International Review of Sociology, 15(1), 155–171. Warren, M. E. (Ed.). (1999). Democracy and trust. Cambridge University Press. Welch, E. W., Hinnant, C. C., & Moon, M. J. (2004). Linking citizen satisfaction with e-government and trust in government. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15(3), 371–391. Welzel, C., & Dalton, R. (2017). Cultural change in Asia and beyond: From allegiant to assertive citizens. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 2(2), 112–132. World Values Survey (WVS). (2016) World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010–2014, Official Aggregate v.20150418. World Values Survey Association (www.worldv aluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid. Wong, T. K. Y., Wan, P. S., & Hsiao, H. H. M. (2011). The bases of political trust in six Asian societies: Institutional and cultural explanations compared. International Political Science Review, 32(3), 263–281. Yang, K., & Holzer, M. (2006). The performance–trust link: Implications for performance measurement. Public Administration Review, 66(1), 114–126.

CHAPTER 3

Women’s Micro-Entrepreneurship: Can It Lead to Sustainable Empowerment in Nepal? Sarbani Kattel

Women’s organizations and various international women’s conferences over the last three decades have reiterated the need for women’s empowerment and the importance of women playing a greater role in their own development. In this regard, the Gender and Development (GAD) approach has been considered essential in eliminating gender inequality and in mainstreaming gender concerns (Malla, 2011). The GAD approach argues that the subordination of women is rooted in social and structural inequalities and in the ideological value system emanating from patriarchal socialization. GAD seeks to restructure social and institutional components to make room for women-friendly policies and to create an environment in which women act as agents of change. Since the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, mainstreaming gender concerns in all development endeavors has been recognized as a strategic imperative. One of the most important frameworks implemented in developing countries has been to empower women economically, through

S. Kattel (B) HomeNet, South Asia, Kathmandu, Nepal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_3

55

56

S. KATTEL

developing income-generating activities and micro-enterprise development programs. Empowerment through entrepreneurship had become important in Nepal from the start of the Ninth Development Plan (1997–2002). This has led the government, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, and sectoral programs to use micro-credit schemes, saving and credit activities, skill development, and enterprise development training as tools to increase the livelihood, status, and empowerment of women in both rural and urban areas. But despite the growing attention on improving the status of Nepalese women, their enduring disempowered status continues to be a concern (Lamichhane, 2014). Nepalese society is strongly patriarchal. Deeply entrenched cultural norms and a gender-based socialization process restrict women’s mobility, participation, and leadership from childhood onward (FWLD, 2006; Pandey, 2010; Sahavagi et al., 2015). Child marriage is still forced upon young girls (MOWCSW, 2016; Plan Nepal, 2012), and women are still victims of gender-based violence (Asia Foundation, 2010). In Nepal, women’s freedom and autonomy are often curtailed due to the concept of honor (ijjat ), not for their own sake alone, but also for sake of their family’s prestige and reputation (Rankin, 2003). This ideology confines women to the sphere of their home and immediate neighborhood, to traditional women’s work (e.g., working in the fields or self-employment), and to fulfilling religious and social obligations (Rankin, 2003). Furthermore, women are still unrecognized by society as decision makers, especially with respect to economic assets, financial transactions, and health care (Pradhan, 2015; Shrestha 2012; Tiwari, 2014), and they are still excluded from inheriting parental property (Pandey, 2010). Empowerment has been a buzzword in Nepal, but people’s understanding of it is limited. There is a general perception in Nepalese society and in government institutions that if women are provided with the necessary credit, services, and training to develop skills, they will be able to gain employment or become self-employed. If this happens, they could become economically independent, change their oppressed status, gain greater control of resources, and play a larger role in decision making. This perception is widespread in Nepal, but without most people taking into consideration what empowerment entails and how it can be achieved in practice. The mention of two issues can serve to highlight the slow progress of raising the status of Nepalese women despite widespread programs

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

57

and advocacy for empowerment. First, depending on an organization’s priorities, it will understand empowerment as either a single aspect such as income, education, health, social participation, or political and legal rights. As such, the need to involve both men and women in the initiatives has been misunderstood (Basnet, 2008; Subedi, 2010). Empowerment has not been seen as a holistic concept but as an organizationally framed ideology. Yet it is a grave mistake to believe that one component alone, when implemented, will create empowerment for women. To exemplify, in the name of empowerment, organizations working in the field of income-generating programs for women are focusing only on a woman’s level of income as an indicator of her empowerment, yet without addressing other aspects such as her health, education, assets, social/family belonging, and her sense of identity or self-esteem. Second, income-generating and micro-enterprise development programs are—in the name of women’s empowerment—providing training that is “womenfriendly,” meaning that it combines well with women’s traditional roles in birthing and raising children and in working in the sphere of the home. Nevertheless, it is not clear that such training really does have any connection to women’s empowerment; more likely is that it further entrenches the status quo (Basnet, 2008; DCSI, 2009–2018). The contribution of this chapter is to explore and analyze the status of women’s empowerment after the women engage in micro-enterprise activity, and the extent to which this empowerment is sustainable. The study is framed by a theory of empowerment proposed by Rowland (1995), who identifies four types of power that constitute empowerment: power over, power to, power with, and power within. Empowerment is a process; for it to be sustainable, change needs to take place at different levels in a woman’s life. The aim here has been to identify female microentrepreneurs’ perceptions of empowerment in a holistic manner and to identify whether empowerment comes to expression in their life through the four forms of power: power over (as control over income from business, and access and use of resources); power to (as decision-making ability); power with (as solidarity); and power within (as self-esteem). This approach looks not only at whether the women have access to income or resources, but also at whether they have control over them, and if so, whether that control influences other areas of their life. The approach thus questions the sustainability of empowerment through the development of micro-entrepreneurship.

58

S. KATTEL

The chapter is organized as follows: First, a theoretical frame is established by describing the literature on micro-entrepreneurship and empowerment theory and by qualifying what empowerment means in the context of the research. This is followed by an account of the method used to conduct the research. The third section presents findings regarding the female micro-entrepreneurs’ perceptions of empowerment, which are assessed based on Rowland’s four concepts of power. The concluding discussion offers remarks and reflections on the sustainability of the female micro-entrepreneurs’ empowerment.

Theory Micro-Enterprise—A Strategy for Development A country’s context shapes the way an enterprise thrives and survives. All growth of the enterprise starts from something small, which then acts as a driving force for development. According to Nepal’s Industrial Policy of 2011, micro-enterprise is “an economic unit engaged in the production and distribution of goods and services at household level” (MOI, 2011). A micro-enterprise involves self-employment and may also involve a few other workers or family members. The enterprise runs on little capital investment and can be carried out in a fixed or mobile business location. This sector is primarily characterized by self-employment, but also by features such as reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of the enterprise, a small scale of operation, labor-intensiveness, adaptive technology, and minimum skill (MOI, 2011). Micro-enterprises compete in the market with similar local enterprises. Marketing channels mostly constitute local shops, door-to-door sales, and bazaars. Female micro-entrepreneurs are mostly involved in retail sales, services, and in manufacturing handmade items. Such activities are attractive to women because they require relatively little specialized technical knowledge and little investment. Women are on the whole less involved in sectors that require large investment such as industries and primary production (Bahmani et al., 2012, p. 48). Women engage in the microenterprise sector due to its ease of entry and exit. Such flexibility allows labor and capital to be used in profitable areas, enables diversification, and is less susceptible to shocks. Women also tend to prefer business activity in sectors in which they are traditionally employed (Rosa & Dawson, 2006, cited in Bahmani et al., 2012).

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

59

Historically, Nepalese women and minority groups have suffered profound discrimination by the state and its institutions (Bennett, 2005). The political system of the Rana Regime (1846–1951) and the Panchayat system (1960–1990) primarily benefited high caste Nepalispeaking Hindu men from the country’s central hilly region. Nepal only became a democratic state in 1990. At this time, at least in theory, some space was given to diverse groups to express their opinions and assert their rights as citizens. Even so, only high caste Hindus and urban-based educated Newars enjoy power and privileges today (Bennett, 2005). The transition to a democratic form of government has failed to be inclusive of the diverse ethnicity in the country. Those who are left out are women, Dalits (formally known as the “untouchable castes”) and the “tribal” indigenous ethnic groups (currently known as the Adivasi Janajatis or indigenous nationalities) (Bennett, 2005). Those neglected by the political order gave support to the Maoist movement that focused on bringing their demands into public debate. This led to the Maoist insurgency in 1996, which capitalized on caste, ethnic, and gender-based disparities. The war ended in April 2006, whereupon Nepal declared itself as a secular, multi-ethnic, and multilingual country recognizing 103 mother tongues (S2, 2015). Numerous policy changes have helped eliminate various laws and acts that discriminate against women. Nepal has seen more genderfriendly constitutional and legal frameworks and improvement in the representation of women in the public sphere, especially in the police force, the Judiciary, the Parliament, and the Constitutional Assembly (S2, 2015). Nepal has also been on track to meet the United Nations Development Program’s Millennium Development Goals on reducing child mortality and improving maternal health. Furthermore, there has been a considerable increase since 2001 in women’s access to economic resources, property, and micro-credit (Sahavagi et al., 2015). Nepal’s drive to include women in the development arena and to place importance on their socio-economic status started gradually—from micro-credit schemes and literacy drives to enterprise development programs. The 9th (1997–2002) and 10th (2003–2007) five-year plans adopted a “gender and development” perspective and emphasized mainstreaming gender, reducing gender inequality, and promoting the empowerment of women (CBS, 2003 cited in CBS, 2014). Micro-entrepreneurship thus became an important strategy for livelihood development and the empowerment of women. It has been

60

S. KATTEL

advocated as an economic development strategy and as a means for encouraging change in the status quo of women’s oppression, increasing their quality of life, and re-addressing the balance of power within the family unit. Nevertheless, there are also critics of micro-enterprise projects. The critics claim that they are often fragmented and uncoordinated, leading to a duplication of efforts and inefficient use of resources (Sharma, 2014, p. 2). Furthermore, traditional “women’s work” is still the dominant area in which women have their micro-enterprises, and these are segregated from “men’s work,” for instance in manufacturing and service provision (ADB, 2015, p. 16). According to Lamichhane (2014), women tend to pursue traditionally women-friendly trades such as working in beauty parlors, sewing, knitting, handicraft, and agriculture, due to these being socially accepted and culturally prescribed female occupations. Household work, everything having to do with reproductive functions and child rearing, and unpaid agricultural activities are of course also traditional occupations which women still tend to pursue. Major constraints faced by women entrepreneurs include a shortage of financing (Ascher, 2012; Fairlie & Robb, 2009; Huges & Storey, 1994; Marlow & Patton, 2005; OECD, 1998; Sugaraj & Salve, 2014), a lack of adequate knowledge on how to conduct a market study or make products popular (Sugaraj & Salve, 2014), high competition from transnational corporations (UNESCAP, 2005), low risks taking, and a lack of self-confidence to expand the business (Langowitz & Minniti, 2007; Verheul et al., 2006). According to critics, women who become micro-entrepreneurs face numerous constraints, and their perceptions of empowerment and disempowerment are a concern. Empowerment Theory The concept of empowerment is complex and ambiguous and lacks a universally accepted definition. Its meaning is much-debated and varies depending upon the socio-cultural, economic, and political contexts of a country (Malhotra & Schuler, 2005, p. 17). In Nepal, the concept is used in development discourse. It has remained ambiguous for the general public as well, but is commonly used at the planning and policy level by local government and international donor agencies (Basnet, 2008). Despite the unclarity, there are a few key but overlapping terms often included in defining empowerment, such as options, choice, control, and

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

61

power. Most often, these are used to refer to women’s ability to make decisions and to affect outcomes of importance to themselves and their families (Malhotra & Schuler, 2005). Jo Rowlands (1998) has raised questions regarding the definition of empowerment and believes that the concept of power determines the definition of the empowerment process. For Rowland, power needs to be understood within “the dynamics of oppression and internalized oppression” (Rowland, 1995, p. 102). Less powerful people may lack the ability to participate in formal or informal decision making, thus to exert influence. This may result in them thinking they lack the capacity to make decisions. As such, they inhibit themselves from striving for change. Rowland therefore sees the concept of empowerment as being defined and influenced by four structures: power over, power to, power with, and power within. Power over has been the dominant definition of power within diverse literature. Authors throughout time have emphasized power as domination (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963; Dahl, 1961; Giddens, 1977 cited in Clegg, 1989; Haugaard, 2012; Lukes, 1974; Marx & Engels 1967; Weber, 1947), associating it with control, compliance, resistance, and manipulation. In the context of empowerment from a gender perspective, power over denotes control over aspects that were once denied to women. For instance, many women in Nepal have been denied access to land ownership despite the government’s provision to reduce property taxes on land owned by women. Power over, for these women, denotes gaining access to land that was once off limits to them. Power to denotes “outcome power” which is defined as “the ability of an actor to bring about or help bring about outcomes” (Dowding, 1991, p. 48 cited in Dowding, 2006). It can also denote to resist change (Cornwall, 2016). Giddens (1997, cited in Karlberg, 2005, p. 5) defines power to as “transformation capacity” or “the capacity to achieve outcomes.” Power with is regarded as coactive power (Follett, 1942 cited in Karlberg, 2005, p. 6). Feminist theorists see this type of power as the ability to act in solidarity with others. It is defined as having “capacity to produce change,” “nurturing,” and “empowering others” (Miller, 1982, cited in Karlberg, 2005; Gammage et al., 2016). Power within refers to individual conscientization, that is, the strengths of individuals based on self-acceptance and self-worth. It relates to how individuals can analyze their experience of how power operates in their life in order to gain the confidence to act to influence and change the present situation into something better, without

62

S. KATTEL

fear (Townsend, 1999). This type of power is characterized by individuals’ increased awareness and desire for change. The four structures of power provide a clear understanding of what empowerment entails from a gender standpoint. The meaning of empowerment is strongly rooted in how an actor interprets power. These four forms of power are used as a basis for analysis, to identify women’s areas of empowerment in this study. Operationalizing Empowerment As stated, since the concept of empowerment is vague, scholars construct definitions of it according to a particular context, thus keeping the essence of the term at a general level. In this study, empowerment is defined as the process through which powerless women gain greater control over resources and critical decision making after engaging in micro-enterprise activity. Empowerment entails women’s ability to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make decisions , entitled to have economic opportunity, and able to fight against the oppressive nature and structure of the society and the state. This definition takes an individualistic viewpoint, as seen from the perspective of “the self,” and challenges the ideology of patriarchy and gender-based discrimination against women. As Rowland (1995) might put it, the power over, power to, power with, and power within factors push women to develop their capabilities.

Methodology Study Context The study was carried out in three administrative districts in Nepal: Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, and Lalitpur. Together, these three districts are known as Kathmandu Valley. With a population of more than 2.5 million and with an annual population growth rate of 4.78% (CBS, 2014), Kathmandu Valley is densely populated. This is largely due to migration. Kathmandu Valley alone comprises 24% of Nepal’s total urban population, out of which 77% have migrated from rural areas (MOF, 2015/2016, p. 162). The migrants come in search of good infrastructure such as education and health care, and on account of the industrial sites located in the three districts. In the industrial and commercial areas, there are many female micro-entrepreneurs who represent diverse socio-economic classes

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

63

and ethnic groups. Due to the high influx of people from other districts, studying women in Kathmandu Valley means studying women from other areas of Nepal. Their voices provide insight into factors contributing to or constraining their level of empowerment. A review of literature on empowerment through microentrepreneurship in Nepal has revealed that there is a lack of independent critical investigation of programs/status in urban areas. Most of the studies are based on rural areas. This present study, by focusing on an urban area, will add knowledge to a comparatively less researched but important area of empowerment and entrepreneurship. There are currently no statistics documenting the number of formally and informally run women’s micro-enterprises in Nepal, and particularly none for Kathmandu Valley. Informally run enterprises remain largely invisible, while formally run women’s micro-enterprises are inadequately documented. Sample For this study, I used a mixed-method approach with an explanatory and sequential design (Creswell et al., 2003). I also designed a semistructured survey that I conducted in the three aforementioned districts. Altogether, 83 female micro-entrepreneurs in retail, manufacturing, and various service sectors answered the survey questions through face-to-face interaction. Many female entrepreneurs were unable to read and write, so this motivated me to talk with them personally in order to fill out the survey forms. I also conducted 18 in-depth interviews with government officials and personnel from government-run training institutes, local NGOs, micro-credit institutions, trainers, the Women’s Federation, and other associations. To add value to the primary data, I obtained secondary information from government documents, reports, journal articles, newspaper articles, and books. I collected the data used in the analysis in 2015 and 2016. The survey participants were selected through snowball sampling due to the difficulty of locating female micro-entrepreneurs in the three districts. This was largely because there was no particular organization working solely with micro-enterprise at the time when the survey was administered. In its Industrial Policy of 2011, the Government of Nepal recognizes microenterprise as a category of entrepreneurship alongside cottage, small, medium, and large industries. However, the category of micro-industries

64

S. KATTEL

still has not been added to the listings formulated by the Department of Cottage and Small Industries (DCSI), under the Ministry of Industry, despite there being a total of 17,956 female entrepreneurs registered in Kathmandu Valley between the fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2014 (DCSI, 2009–2014). This is one reason why the semi-structured survey was administered to the 83 micro-entrepreneurs. Participants were screened at the time of referral, which ensured that they fell within the micro-enterprise category defined by Nepal’s Industrial Policy of 2011. According to the policy, enterprises having the following conditions are considered micro-enterprises: Investment is up to 200,000 rupees (USD 1880)1 as fixed capital except for the cost of the house or land; the entrepreneur is engaged in management; there are a maximum of nine employees, including the entrepreneur; annual financial transactions amount to less than 2,000,000 rupees (USD 18,800); and if an engine is used, the engine capacity must be less than ten kilowatts. As stated, the female micro-entrepreneurs involved in this study were engaged in small-scale manufacturing, trade, production, and the service sector. Sample Characteristics Table 3.1 outlines some characteristics of the female micro-entrepreneurs who responded to the survey. It accounts for their location, age, marital status, ethnicity, education, and family structure. Results show that 37% of the respondents were from Kathmandu district, 35% were from Lalitpur district, and 28% were from Bhaktapur district. The distribution of respondents indicates that 56% were between 31 and 40 years of age, and 86% were married. With regard to respondents’ level of education, results indicate that 46% had either completed secondary education (Secondary Education Examination: grade 10) or completed the higher secondary level (grade 12). Those who were only able to read and write accounted for 21% of the respondents. All the female micro-entrepreneurs who were involved in this study worked in the types of businesses that are traditional for women, examples being beauty parlors, tailoring, shoemaking, handicraft, and readymade food. These types of businesses give women time to fulfill household

1 Exchange rate of 106.38 as of April 4, 2016.

3

Table 3.1 Characteristics of female micro-entrepreneurs (N = 83)

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

Characteristic 1. Geographic location Kathmandu Bhaktapur Lalitpur 2. Age group 20–30 31–40 41–50 51 and above 3. Education Can read and write Primary (under SEEa ) level Secondary (completion of SEE or intermediate) level College (Bachelor) 4. Marital status Single Married Divorced Widowed 5. Family structure Joint family Nuclear family

65

N = 83 (100%) 31 (37%) 29 (35%) 23 (28%) 17 47 09 10

(21) (56) (11) (12)

17 (21) 13 (15) 38 (46) 15 (18) 06 71 04 02

(07) (86) (05) (02)

42 (51) 41 (49)

a SEE = Secondary Education Examination

Source Field study, 2015–2016

duties and take care of children. As Table 3.2 shows, the majority of the women (46%) had been running their business between one and four years, whereas 55% had been in the business for five years or more. The respondents who had run their business for more than five years but had not progressed to the small-business category used their firms as a household survival strategy and either chose not to grow or lacked the necessary financing to upgrade their business (Nichter & Goldmark, 2005). Almost half of the respondents (45%) were the only workers in the enterprise.

66

S. KATTEL

Table 3.2 Length of business activity and number of employees

Characteristic 1. Length of time of business establishment 1–4 years 5–8 years 9 years or more 2. Number of employees None 1–2 employees 3–4 employees 5–6 employees 7–9 employees

N = 83 (%)

38 (46) 23 (28) 20 (27) 37 26 08 02 10

(45) (31) (10) (02) (10)

Source Field Study, 2015–2016

Findings Women’s Perception of Empowerment I measured the empowerment outcome in two ways. First, I asked the participants to talk about their understanding of the concept of empowerment and indicate whether they felt empowered. Second, I asked them a series of questions in order to further elicit how they understood the concept. Among the surveyed, 66% did not know what empowerment meant. The remaining participants answered the following: capability to lift oneself up from an oppressive state and being able to make one’s own decisions; women’s rights; self-dependency; knowledge and awareness; and gaining of skills. With regard to the perception on being empowered, 69% claimed they were not empowered. Five variables were used to further analyze the areas in which women showed that they were either empowered or dis-empowered. These are: control over business earnings and access to resources (for power over); decision-making capability (for power to); solidarity (for power with); self-esteem (for power within). Table 3.3 summarizes the responses to the questions relating to these variables.

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

67

Table 3.3 Relationship between the four forms of power and empowerment Independent variables

Questions asked

Power Over: (1) Control over business earnings

Discussion with spouse/family on how to spend earnings?

(2) Access to resources

Power To: Decision-making capability

Power With: Solidarity

Dependent variable (Empowerment)

Women were secondary earners. They would need to discuss with spouse/family on how they spent their earnings. Control over earning was low and subject to spouse/family approval Any ownership of assets? Majority do not own any assets Do you need permission Women who own assets need to use them? permission to use them. The empowerment process entails having access to resources and the freedom to use them which women in this study lacked Who makes decisions: Women had the ability to make You yourself; jointly, or decisions in buying household family members? 16 items, buying jewelry, mobility, decision-making topics and seeking further skill enhancement or education while continuing to fulfill household responsibilities. The empowerment process entails having decision-making capabilities not only within the traditional women’s realm, but also within the men’s realm. This includes making decisions on finances, loans, buying or selling assets, etc., which women in this study did not have such decision-making opportunity Women are unorganized to Have you worked with raise issues on gender organizations on social inequality. The empowerment issues? process entails the ability to organize with others to enhance rights and reduce gender inequality. The majority of women in the study were unorganized to reap the benefits of solidarity

(continued)

68

S. KATTEL

Table 3.3 (continued) Independent variables

Questions asked

Dependent variable (Empowerment)

Power Within: Self-esteem

Self-esteem

Women showed poor self-esteem due to (1) inability to make independent decisions; (2) difficulty in maintaining work-life balance; (3) lack of financing; (4) cultural barriers; and (5) fear of criticism. The empowerment process entails having knowledge, belief in oneself, and self-esteem to work toward better business opportunities. For the majority of the micro-entrepreneurs, self-esteem was low and blocked by these constraints

Source Author’s own construction

Table 3.4 Power over: Female micro-entrepreneur’s control over income earned (N = 83) Characteristic 1. Average monthly earnings NPR 10,000 or less ($94 or less) NPR 11,000–15,000 ($103–$142)a NPR 16,000–25,000 ($151–$236) NPR 26,000–35,000 ($245–$330) NPR 36,000–55,000 ($338–$517) NPR 56,000 and above ($526 or >) 2. Discussion with spouse/family on how to spend earnings? No Yes a Exchange rate of 106.38 as of April 4, 2016

Source Field Study, 2015–2016

n (%)

21 13 30 03 08 08

(25) (16) (36) (03) (10) (10)

40 (48) 43 (52)

41%

3

Table 3.5 Power over: Female micro-entrepreneurs’ ownership of assets

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

Characteristic 1. Any ownership of assets? Land House Land and house None 2. Do you need permission to use it/them? (N = 33) Yes No N/A

69

N = 83 (%) 20 11 02 50

(24) (13) (03) (60)

31 (93) 02 (07) 50 (60)

N/A—Not applicable Source Field Study, 2015–2016

Four Structures of Power Power Over: Control Control over Business Earnings. Table 3.4 presents the income distribution of the respondents in frequency percentage. These earnings were profits realized from the respondents’ business operations. The majority of women (41%) had an average monthly income of less than NPR 15,000 ($142); 36% had an average monthly income of between NPR 16,000 and NPR 25,000 ($151–$283); and 23% were found to have even better earnings. The women in this study were secondary earners who depended heavily on their husbands or other family members in financial matters. Despite earning an income, 52% of the women who were married mentioned that they had to discuss how they spent their income with their husbands. Due to the rule of “classic patriarchy,”2 some of the women felt the need to discuss their expenditure with their husband/family. Access to Resources and the Use of Them. In terms of assets, 60% of respondents did not have anything in their own name, whereas 40% had access to either a house, land, or both (see Table 3.5). However, of those who did have access to land, 93% mentioned that they needed permission to use it. Survey respondents claimed that having access to land is merely a window dressing scheme to show that women are asset holders, for in

2 For a discussion on classic patriarchy, see Kabeer (2011).

70

S. KATTEL

reality, women do not have permission to use the assets. There has been a slight increase in women gaining the edge in property ownership, but it has been considered an urban phenomenon in which women from privileged backgrounds are owners of houses and land (Pandey, 2010). Power to: Capacity Having the capacity to understand the inequality that exists within the household and to act against it is the important aspect of empowerment. The literature claims that in order to build women’s capacity, it is necessary for them to have the ability to make critical decisions that influence their life. Important Decisions: Who Makes Them: Self, Husband, Joint, or Family? The female micro-entrepreneurs were presented with 16 decisionmaking topics and asked to identify who it was who made decisions for each topic. They could choose between four options: self, husband, joint (both husband and wife), or family (see Table 3.6). Table 3.6 Female micro-entrepreneurs’ decision-making areas (N = 83) Decisions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Buying household items Taking further skill development training Mobility Buying jewelry Further educational programs Going to parental house Health checkups for oneself Opening a business Children’s health checkups Upgrading business Diversifying business Children’s educational expenses Expenses for religious events Taking out a loan Husband’s or family’s health checkups Buying or selling land

N/A—Not applicable Source Field Study, 2015–2016

Self Husband Response in % 57 48 47 43 40 40 31 29 22 21 21 19 19 16 5 4

5 2 8 7 2 13 15 11 10 11 11 24 5 18 13 13

Joint

Family

N/A

28 34 28 36 33 24 46 41 54 48 48 41 40 46 66 36

11 15 17 13 16 12 8 19 11 21 21 12 36 20 15 47

–

– 11 – 4

4

–

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

71

Decision Making: Self. The majority of decisions made by female micro-entrepreneurs were on six topics only: buying household items, taking further skill development training, mobility outside the home, buying jewelry,3 further education programs, and going to parental home. Being able to enroll in educational programs or to take further training to develop their skills was dependent upon their ability to manage household responsibilities at the same time. Decision Making: Joint. Decisions on nine topics were made jointly: children’s education, health checkups for the husband, health checkups for other family members, health checkups for the women themselves, opening a business, upgrading the business, diversifying the business, religious expenses, and taking out a loan. Decision Making: Family. Buying or selling land was considered a family decision. This corroborates findings regarding access to resources, as 93% of the women needed permission to use resources. Women still have very low decision-making power regarding access to or the disposition of assets. Table 3.6 suggests that women who are micro-entrepreneurs have a slightly higher opportunity to make decisions about household matters, buying jewelry, mobility, and enrollment in further skill enhancement courses and education. However, they have less power to make independent decisions related to buying or selling land, taking out a loan, and expanding their business. Power with: Solidarity Power with has been strongly identified as making a change in one’s status or level of empowerment through group cooperation, mutual support, solidarity, and collaboration. To assess participants’ understanding of this concept as a means for empowerment, I asked them to indicate their involvement in organizations or any social activities that have helped in reducing social conflict and promoting gender equality. In this study, 92% 3 In contrast to the situation in countries where jewelry purchases other than a wedding ring would be considered non-essential, for Nepalese women, jewelry is considered essential, especially gold jewelry (gems and other precious stones are considered essential for Mongolian culture). A woman is given gold jewelry by her family and in-laws on the occasion of her marriage, and after the wedding, it is mandatory for her to wear some sort of gold jewelry. Nowadays, many women have begun buying gold jewelry as investments, as collateral for loans, or as saleable items in case of emergency. The more jewelry a woman has, the higher her status.

72

S. KATTEL

Table 3.7 Female micro-entrepreneurs’ involvement in social issues (N = 83) Characteristic 1. Involvement in a group or organization? No Yes 2. Have you worked with other organizations on social issues? No Yes

N = 83 (%) 07 (08) 76 (92) 69 (83) 14 (17)

Source Field Study, 2015–2016

of the female micro-entrepreneurs were involved in one or more organizations, the majority of which were savings and credit institutions. When asked about group cooperation in regard to decreasing social conflict or promoting gender equality, only 17% (Table 3.7) reported being actively involved in social issues. This included resolving disputes between people, within families, and on domestic violence. However, when it came to the topic of gender equality, the majority of these women acknowledged that gender inequality exists and that they work in a manner conducive to avoiding confrontation with their husband or family. In this study, very few female micro-entrepreneurs were engaged in activities specifically geared toward producing social change, mostly because they were already involved in local non-governmental organization or women’s associations/federations. Working as a collective unit usually involves spending time travelling, and if the women needed to take care of children, this may also have prevented them from becoming involved in organizations for social change. Power Within: Self-Esteem Power within is integral to empowerment. It assists women in their ability to become empowered. Power within can also be described as self-esteem, or as the courage a woman possesses to change her status and to achieve a more balanced environment. Female micro-entrepreneurs’ self-esteem was assessed based on a series of partly-open questions about identifying their personal constraints. The five most pronounced constraints were (1) the inability to make independent decisions, (2) the inability to maintain a balance between their work and other aspects of life, (3) a lack of finance, (4) cultural barriers, and (5) fear of criticism.

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

73

The women in this study believed they were generally under someone else’s control, usually that of a husband, brothers, in-laws, or parents, and that this curtailed their decision-making ability. This led them to believe they were unable to make independent decisions. The women also acknowledged not being able to reap the benefits of doing something independently due to the tradition of early marriage. But in spite of the patriarchal nature of Nepalese society that has created an environment in which the majority of critical decisions are in the hands of husbands or other family members, the women in this study agreed that they were also capable of making good decisions. With regard to business, they believed that men were equipped to conduct business proficiently and make sound financial decisions due to their ability to move about freely, their diverse network, and by not having household duties. The women acknowledged having increased self-confidence through the work they did, but for anything else, they felt dependent on their husband and family. They saw their personal constraints as the prime factors for low self-esteem. A women’s level of self-esteem identifies whether she is able to assess her individual situation and have the ability to overcome the patriarchal culture of subordination. The women in this study still lacked power within; they were aware of their situation of subordination but were unwilling or felt unable to act in ways that would lead to changing that status. Discussion Empowerment, in this study, is linked with the ability to earn an income, the ability to overcome financial dependence on others, and freedom of mobility. From an economic point of view, the female microentrepreneurs understood empowerment as the ability to earn money and to spend it on household needs and children’s necessities. They also related it to having freedom of mobility, mostly to attend meetings held by savings and credit cooperatives. Attendance at such meetings was also supported by the spouse if a loan was required. Despite some positive steps toward empowerment, viewing these women’s status in light of the four outlined dimensions of power reveals that no significant results have been achieved. The adherence to social norms and traditional attitudes, also women’s status of being dependent on others, is very noticeable in this study, on account of their inactiveness in raising issues of gender

74

S. KATTEL

inequality, and their subordination and permission-seeking behavior in important issues pertaining business activities such as taking out a loan and using assets (Table 3.8). With such behavior, there can only be slow progress toward gender equality and women’s empowerment. This prompts the question of whether micro-entrepreneurship can lead to sustainable empowerment. The findings from the study suggest that personal limitations faced by women who are micro-entrepreneurs have restricted them from contributing more time to their business. The women talked about their inability to make independent decisions, to maintain a work-life balance, and the lack of adequate financing as factors limiting their ability to classify themselves as successful businesswomen. They also pointed out that orthodox Hindu family norms were central in limiting their role as businesswomen. Table 3.8 Summary of four structures of power and empowerment Power over

Power to

Power with

Power within

Empowerment

Capability to earn an income for household expenses and children’s expenses

Ability to be part of a savings and credit cooperative for saving and loan purposes

Enough self-esteem to have the courage to open a micro-business

Non-Empowerment

- Discuss how income will be spent - Permission needed to take out a loan - Majority did not have access to property. Those who had property needed permission to use it

- Better freedom of mobility - Decision making on household expenses, buying jewelry, mobility, and further trainings - Major decisions were either made jointly or by family members

- Inactive with regard to voicing opinions on issues of gender inequality and subordination

- Low self-esteem

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

75

The women were shown to have power and agency to make decisions relating to household purchases, buying jewelry, mobility, and taking training courses if they could simultaneously fulfill household responsibilities such as chores. Any other major decision pertaining to their health and business had to be decided jointly with the husband or by the family. In Nepalese society, decision-making authority mainly lies with the men in the family. Any joint decisions are heavily influenced by the husband or other senior authorities in the family. This has caused many women in this study to refrain from making independent decisions. Because of orthodox Hindu family norms, female micro-entrepreneurs confine themselves to the home sphere to fulfill duties relating to children, family, and their business. This obviously limits many women from taking the steps necessary to upgrade their business and achieve growth. Additionally, the fear of social criticism limits the women’s will to take risks. From the very beginning, a woman is questioned by family members, seen as incapable of starting or sustaining a business without help from the husband or family. She is judged as incompetent to talk with people to set up the business, or to network with the right people. Her self-esteem is often questioned. These forms of negative assessment from a husband, family members, or people in the community take a heavy toll that limits the woman’s willingness to take risks or try out innovative ideas and new areas of business. These are some of the reasons why women are confined to traditionally women-friendly businesses and occupations. Furthermore, female micro-entrepreneurs’ perception that they are usually under the control of others lowers their self-esteem and makes them dependent on either their husband or family members. Despite believing in their own decision-making capability, they leave important decisions to their husbands or family members. According to Rowland (1997), such self-perception is also connected to “internalized oppression” where women, through a process of socialization, internalize and accept without question their position of subordination. This also creates an environment of gender inequality and further limits women’s decision-making power. The perception that female micro-entrepreneurs are unable to control the direction of their life paves the way for them to believe that they are not empowered. The findings of this study show that gender hierarchies are still being reproduced and that the traditional patriarchal family model has not been challenged much by female micro-entrepreneurs in Kathmandu

76

S. KATTEL

Valley. Patriarchal socialization continues to limit women’s empowerment. There are some indications that women have been somewhat empowered through their enterprises, but their constraints limit them from becoming agents of change. Empowerment as a process needs to be sustainable. To achieve sustainability, there needs to be a shift in consciousness that enables women to understand their situation and act either alone or together to bring about substantial change in their lives. While the Constitution of Nepal recognizes the rights of women— including the right to safe maternity and reproductive health, freedom from all forms of exploitation and discrimination, and equal rights to property—the concepts of gender equality and empowerment have not been ingrained in women’s minds. Rather, women are weakened by the structure of development being based on a male-centric ideology that undervalues women’s decisions. This results in deadlock in implementing Gender and Development (GAD) and gendering-mainstreaming policies for the empowerment of women. The push toward gender equality is hampered by Nepal’s historically institutionalized gender discrimination, socially constructed practices of women’s inferiority, and the patriarchal mindset. The Constitution of Nepal eliminates these forms of injustice and promotes equal rights and opportunities, yet the enforcement of the Constitution in this area is weak. Women themselves need to understand their value and to strive toward gender equality. Increasing women’s power and the strength of their voices through solidarity—in practice, by engaging with community groups, associations, and trade unions—can help foster strength among female micro-entrepreneurs. Furthermore, women’s inclusion in programs that strengthen their perception of themselves by changing the historically created mindset and beliefs can promote women’s self-esteem and help them strive toward a balance of power. Finally, policies geared toward women’s empowerment need to be implemented in coordination with various institutions, not only in order to measure their effectiveness but also to avoid misuse and duplication. This would provide a better outreach and a stronger message of unity.

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

77

References ADB. (2015). Asian development outlook 2015 update: Enabling women energizing Asia. Philippines: Asian Development Bank. Ascher, J. (2012). Female entrepreneurship—An appropriate response to gender discrimination. Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovation (JEMI), 8(4), 97–114. Asia Foundation. (2010). Preliminary mapping of gender-based violence, Nepal. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/GBVMappingNepal.pdf. Basnet, S. R. (2008). Income generating programmes and the socio-economic empowerment of rural women in Nepal (Doctoral dissertation). University of Reading. Bennett, L. (2005). Gender, cast and ethnic exclusion in Nepal: Following the policy process from analysis to action (conference presentation). New Frontiers of Social Policy, Arusha, Tanzania. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Bennett.rev.pdf. CBS. (2014). Population monograph of Nepal: Volume I (Population). Central Bureau of Statistics, Kathmandu. Clegg, S. R. (1989). Frameworks of power. Sage. Cornwall, A. (2016). Women’s empowerment: What works? Journal of International Development, 28, 342–359. Creswell, J. W., Clark, V. L. P., Gutman, M. L., & Hanson, W. E. (2003). Advanced mixed methods research designs. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research. Sage. DCSI. (2009–2018). Industrial promotion data. Department of Cottage and Small Industry, Ministry of Industry, Kathmandu. Swetkali Publishers. Dowding, K. (2006). Three-dimensional power: A discussion of Steven Lukes’ power: A radical view. Political Studies Review, 4(2), 136–145. Fairlie, R. W., & Robb, A. M. (2009). Gender differences in business performance: Evidence from the characteristics of business owners survey. Small Business Economics, 33, 375–395. FWLD. (2006). An update of discriminatory laws in Nepal and their impact on women: A review of the current situation and proposals for change. Kathmandu: Forum for Women, Law and Development. Gammage, S., Kabeer, N., & Van Der Meulen Rodgers, Y. (2016). Voice and agency: Where are we now? Journal Feminist Economics, 22, 1–29. Haugaard, M. (2012). Rethinking the four dimensions of power: Domination and empowerment. Journal of Political Power, 5(1), 33–54. Huges, A., & Storey, D. J. (1994). Finance and the small firm. Routledge. Kabeer, N. (2011). Between affiliation and autonomy: Navigating pathways of women’s empowerment and gender justice in rural Bangladesh. Development and Change, 42(2), 499–528.

78

S. KATTEL

Karlberg, M. (2005). The power of discourse and the discourse of power: Pursuing peace through discourse intervention. International Journal of Peace Studies, 10(1), 1–25. Lamichhane, R. H. (2014). Hindering factors of female participation in TVET in Nepal. Technical and Vocational Education and Training Development Journal, 1(14), 12–18. Langowitz, N., & Minniti, M. (2007). The entrepreneurial propensity of women. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31(3), 341–364. Malhotra, A., & Schuler, S. R. (2005). Women’s empowerment as a variable in international development. In D. Narayan (Ed.), Measuring empowerment: Cross-disciplinary perspectives (pp. 71–88). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Malla, M. V. (2011). Political socialization of women in Nepal. Adroit Publishers. Marlow, S., & Patton, D. (2005). All credit to men? Entrepreneurship, finance and gender. Entrepreneur Theory Practice, 29(6), 717–735. Ministry of Finance (MOF). (2015/2016). Economic Survey. Nepal Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Industry (MOI). (2011). Industrial Policy of 2011. Nepal Ministry of Industry. MOWCSW. (2016). Nepal hosts its first Girl Summit to end Child, Early and Forced Marriage [Press release]. Retrieved on June 12th 2016. Available at: http://www.mowcsw.gov.np/en/pub.php?pid=49. Nichter, S., & Goldmark, L. (2005). Understanding micro and small enterprise growth. microREPORT #36: United States Agency for International Development (USAID). http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnady362.pdf. OECD. (1998). Women entrepreneurs in small and medium enterprises. OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264162785-en. Plan Nepal (2012). Child Marriage in Nepal, Research Report. Plan Nepal, Save The Children, World Vision International Nepal. Kathmandu. Retrieved on June 4th 2017. Available online at: http://www.wvi.org/sites/default/files/ Child%20Marriage%20in%20Nepal-%20Report.pdf. Pandey, S. (2010). Rising property ownership among women in Kathmandu, Nepal: An exploration of causes and consequences. International Journal of Social Welfare, 19(3), 281–292. Pradhan, P. (2015). Gender issues and women’s participation in water users’ associations (WUAs) in irrigated agriculture in Nepal. Journal of Graduate Volunteer Centre, 12(2), 262–297. Rankin, K. N. (2003). Cultures of economies: Gender and socio-spatial change in Nepal. Gender, Place & Culture, 10(2), 111–129. Rowlands, J. (1995). Empowerment examined. Development in Practice, 5(2), 101–107.

3

WOMEN’S MICRO-ENTREPRENEURSHIP …

79

Rowlands, J. (1997). Questioning empowerment: Working with women in Honduras. Oxfam Print Unit. Rowlands, J. (1998). A word of the times, but what does it mean? Empowerment in the discourse and practice of development. In H. Afshar, (Ed.) Women and empowerment. Illustrations from the third world (pp. 11–34). Palgrave Macmillan. S2. (2015). Revisiting the status of women in Nepal. Shtrii Shakti. Sharma, T. N. (2014). Importance of Nepal vocational qualification framework its proposed structure. Technical and Vocational Education and Training Development Journal, 1(14), 1–11. Sahavagi., DidiBahini., & FEDO. (2015). Progress of Women in Nepal (1995–2015) Substantive Equality: Non-negotiable. In S. Pudasaini (Ed.). Kathmandu. Shrestha, B. (2012). Gender study on knowledge and decision making on maternal health care in Nepal. Health Prospect, 11, 1–6. Subedi, P. (2010). Nepali Women at the crossroads. Sahayogi Press. Sugaraj, J. M., & Salve, P.S. (2014). Constraints/challenges faced in a journey of women entrepreneurship in the development in Western Maharashtra. IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF), 3(2), 53–60. Tiwari, S. (2014). Exclusion of Madhesi women in decision making. Academic Voices, a Multidisciplinary Journal, 4(1), 68–72. Townsend, J. G. (1999). Power from within: Getting out of that house! In J. G. Townsend, P. Alberti, M. Mercado, J. Rowlands, & Z. Rowlands (Eds.), Women and power: Fighting patriarchy and poverty. Zed Books. UNESCAP. (2005). Developing women entrepreneurs in South Asia: Issues, initiatives and experiences. http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/indpub 2401.pdf. Verheul, I., Stelvan, A., & Thurik, R. (2006). Explaining female and male entrepreneurship at the country level. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 18(2), 151–183.

CHAPTER 4

Governance of Agricultural Service Delivery at the Grassroots Level in Nepal Laxmi Kanta Paudel

This chapter analyzes agriculture service centers at the grassroots in Nepal, probing the extent to which they meet people’s needs and expectations. Thapa (2010) as well as Singh and Colavato (2005) state that services provided through Nepal’s agriculture service centers (ASCs) are inadequate to fulfill their intended purpose and that the quality of services is poor. This, they argue, is due to the ASCs being over-centralized, non-responsiveness to local needs, lacking trained human resources and adequate technology, and having inadequate capacity to regulate and ensure quality control. Furthermore, the ASCs have little or no participation with the private sector and do not coordinate their activities with other stakeholders. According to Ashby et al. (1995), agricultural extension services are public enterprises guided by an overarching development paradigm (i.e., they are guided by a defined modality or path to follow to achieve development, based on a codified set of activities and/or based on a vision regarding the functioning and evolution of a socioeconomic

L. K. Paudel (B) Public Administration Campus, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_4

81

82

L. K. PAUDEL

system), and are still top-down in nature. A general weakness of the topdown structure for agricultural-development initiatives is that it bypasses resource-poor people and their organizations. This trend is apparent in the agricultural extension service in Nepal, which constantly neglects the issues and concerns of resource-poor farmers. Agriculture is the backbone of Nepal’s economy, generating almost one-third of the GDP (27%). 65.7% of the total population still depends on agriculture for its livelihood (MOAD, 2020). Agriculture plays a pivotal role in reducing poverty, ensuring food security, sustaining members of poor and marginalized communities, and in helping to create a balance of trade. The successive governments have therefore been investing around three percent of the budget in this sector, and various policies, plans, and strategies have been implemented, examples being the Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP) (1995–2015), the National Agriculture Policy (2004), the National Agriculture Extension Strategy (2007), and the Agriculture Development Strategy (2015). Despite these governmental efforts, data on employment generation, self-sustaining farming, professionalism in farming, and migration to foreign labor markets indicate a deteriorating trend. It is therefore not surprising that the problems of agriculture service delivery are often debated. Although the agricultural sector’s annual growth rate in the 13th plan (FY 2013/2014– 2015/2016) was expected to be as high as 4.5%, it turned out to be a mere 2.22% (NPC, 2016, p. 3). This demonstrates a sharp decline in the agricultural sector, negative growth, and poor societal contributions. It also reflects a great discrepancy between what is promised and what is delivered in terms of providing agriculture services at the grassroots level. Against this backdrop, the present study focuses on identifying the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery at the grassroots level in Nepal, and the factors affecting effective service delivery.

Grassroots Governance as a New Paradigm for Effective Service Delivery The rise of formal grassroots organization as key actors in service delivery in developing countries can be understood as a new form of governance. This is because such organizations encourage citizens to participate in planning, decision making, and benefit sharing (Aminuzzaman, 2013). Governance can take place at different levels, from grassroots to global (Rosenau, 1995). “Grassroots governance” as a new paradigm primarily

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

83

focuses on state administration systems at the county level and below. It also focuses on effective service delivery at the grassroots level through interaction between the supply side and the demand side. “Grassroots governance” in this present study refers to the lowest tier of government—agriculture service delivery units (ASCs)—which provide agriculture services to Nepalese farmers through group meetings or field visits. Governance is also about “maintaining public-sector resources under some degree of political control and developing strategies to maintain government’s capacity to act” (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 232). Governance thus offers management tools that replace highly centralized, hierarchical structures with decentralized management environments where decisions on resource allocation and service delivery are made closer to the point of delivery. It encompasses government activities geared toward fulfilling the goals and objectives of policy-based programs or service-delivery projects. Nepal’s ASCs are grassroots organizations (the lowest tier) for delivering agriculture services. For service delivery to be effective at this level, users must find the services affordable, accessible, and of satisfactory quality (Shrestha, 2009). ASCs provide technical support (e.g., training on high-yield products) and deliver pesticides, seeds, fertilizers, and equipment to service seekers through visits, interaction, discussion, or direct delivery at the service centers themselves. All such activity is understood as “grassroots governance” in this study. The grassroots level differs from the central and provincial levels of governance in that it is not associated with policymaking but with the implementation of policies by street-level bureaucrats such as junior technician and junior technical assistants. As such, the ASCs are clearly on the supply side of governance.

Agriculture Service Delivery at the Grassroots Level in Nepal The Nepalese government’s agriculture extension service is intended to educate, disseminate information, and support the livelihoods of Nepalese farmers. Its major objectives are to provide productive input and services and to teach farmers about improved technologies for increasing their production, income, and standard of living (DoA, 2005). Further, the extension service helps to improve the farming communities by forming farmers’ groups. Through working together in groups, farmers can better

84

L. K. PAUDEL

articulate their needs and decide how to make best use of available resources. Nepal put some effort into agricultural development during the Rana regime (1846–1951), but it was limited to solving the food crisis and surviving the effects of recession brought about by two world wars. Since 1950, the government has implemented several extension models and approaches with donor support or support from the government itself. These have contributed significantly in terms of education and the transfer of technology. Now there are also various non-governmental organizations providing extension services to farmers, either on contract or on a partnership basis. Altogether, therefore, the agricultural extension service providers in Nepal can be identified as falling into four groups: governmental ASCs, community-based organizations (CBOs) such as farmers’ associations and cooperatives, non-governmental developmental and institutional organizations, and private service providers (processors, contractors, and consultants). There are 378 ASCs at the grassroots level. A single ASC must cover about 8,000 farm households (Dahal, 2010) and is manned by three frontline extension workers at the level of junior technician or junior technical assistant. Figure 4.1 presents the organizational structure of the agricultural service delivery system in Nepal. Nepal’s National Planning Commission (NPC, 2016) mentions some critical issues and challenges for the country’s agricultural extension services. These include low service coverage, poor technical competence among extension workers, low investment in agriculture, and poor infrastructure. Together, these shortcomings make the extension system inefficient. In the past the government used the “Training and Visit System,” the “Integrated Rural Development Approach,” and the “Tuki Approach” for agriculture service delivery. These proved costly and timeconsuming and did not ensure adequate coverage or technical support. In 1989 the Department of Agriculture started using what could be called the “Group Approach.” This involves transfers of knowledge, new technology, additional support, and providing credit to farmers’ groups. Through this approach, service providers (government and nongovernment partners) are meant to work closely with farmers’ groups in training and spreading the use of new technology. This is currently the main approach for agricultural development in Nepal (KC et al., 2003). However, even now, the coverage of the extension service remains below

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

85

Ministry of Agricultural Development

Department of Agriculture Programme Directorates Regional Directorates of Agriculture (5) District Development Committee (75) District Agriculture Development Offices (75)

Agriculture Service Center (378)

Farmers’ Group and Farmers

Fig. 4.1 Organizational structure of agricultural service delivery system in Nepal (Source Ministry of Agricultural Development [2015])

20%, service quality is poor, and the efforts are largely ineffective (Dahal, 2010). Many ministries—for instance for health, education, agriculture, and the postal service—have offices at district level, and these play a significant role in delivering the services of the respective ministries. Some districtlevel offices have delivery units at the Ilaka (neighborhood) level as well as at the Village Development Committee (VDC) level. ASCs are established for the delivery of agriculture services at the area level. They all have the same mechanisms, processes, and institutions, however, service delivery has been inefficient and ineffective in all geographical regions,

86

L. K. PAUDEL

owing in part to the long chain of command, insufficient funding, and poor prioritization (Koirala, 2005, pp. 2–5). As can be gathered from this brief overview, the Nepalese government has tried various approaches for delivering agriculture services but has had little success. Against this backdrop, the present study attempts to identify the real-life situation of the current agricultural service delivery and its effectiveness.

Governance Theory and Analytical Framework Theorists over the years have come up with diverse ideas about what governance is. O’Toole (2000, p. 276), for starters, states that governance theory highlights the multivariate character of policy, considers the design and operation of policy structures and actions, and focuses on the “multi-layered structural context of rule-governed understandings, along with the role of multiple social actors in arrays of negotiation, implementation, and service delivery.” To address the issues of effective governance, it is therefore, according to O’Toole, important to attend to the various social actors and ideas about how those actors work together to achieve goals. To build on O’Toole as the starting point, Peters and Pierre (1998, pp. 232–233) theorize that “governance is about maintaining publicsector resources under some degree of political control and developing strategies to carry on government’s capacity to act.” For these thinkers, the management tools of governance replace highly centralized hierarchical structures with decentralized management environments where decisions on resource allocation and service delivery are made closer to the point of delivery. Peters and Pierre also state that governance, as a process sensitive to its political and cultural environment, is likely to appear in different institutional forms in different national contexts. The theme of governance as a process continues in Dhakal’s (2007) theorization, for he views governance as a process of accelerating public affairs in the interest of the people, and as a means for intra/interinstitutional cooperation, institutional arrangements in policymaking, development, and for providing services for the good of the collective. Governance can also be seen as a set of institutions by which authority is exercised, public policy is carried out, and public services are provided. Baral (1993, p. 1) therefore describes it as “a process of

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

87

political management, ensuring popular legitimacy, responding to problems through appropriate mechanism and strategies, remaining neutral in providing basic human rights to activities undertaken at the state level. Order, popular legitimacy and accountability of the power elites are the requirements of a modern state, where rule of law rather than of [the] individual prevails.” A focus on ordinary people is central to several governance theorists, for they see it as a seeking to integrate the common masses in the development process, enhancing their capacity and increasing their access to productive resources. Through decentralized governance, citizens can participate in and be part-owners of the policymaking processes. Governance also serves to increase coordination, coherence, and collaborative networks among a wide variety of actors such as public sector organizations, corporations, private organizations, civil society organization, and international organizations (Warren & Weschler, 1999, p. 119). Based on these ideas about what governance is, one could say that governance consists of the mechanism, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interest, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences. One could then infer that governance takes place at both the grassroots and global levels as well as at the traditional governmental levels, where it consists of the activities through which “commands” flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued (Rosenau, 1995). Some theorists of course also see problems with governance. Jain (2009, pp. 8–14) questions whether the Western-generated theories and practices of governance are applicable in the Third World. Have theorists adequately taken into consideration various indigenously developed alternatives more suited to meeting people’s basic needs, the eradication of poverty, and the protection of human rights? For Jain, effective governance in South Asian countries requires a high level of moral determination. Civil servants must justly serve the society through individual moral responsibility, accountability, sacrifice, compassion, justice, and an honest effort to achieve the common good. He also suggests some strategies for bringing about better governance in South Asia: adopting a normative model for efficiency, effectiveness, and service quality; synergy between the public and private sectors for capacity building; transparency and accountability for the responsiveness of both the institutions and service providers; the adoption of information technology for a smoother

88

L. K. PAUDEL

interface between the government and citizens; and restoring moral standards in public life for performing jobs on moral grounds. To these strategies, one can add Kjær’s (2004) thoughts on participatory governance—that it functions best within an institutional setup that includes citizens from both the central and the local level, and that they should participate not only in decision making but also in implementation. But what actually is the basic intellectual heritage underlying the theorization of governance? Hyden (2011, p. 4) identifies the field of public administration as having influenced the governance discourse to emphasize effectiveness , while international relations and comparative politics have led to emphasizing legitimacy. The emphasis on effectiveness tends to encourage a managerial and technocratic approach to governance, while the emphasis on legitimacy gives rise to a focus on the political aspects of governance. If effectiveness is prioritized, then governance will be treated as an instrument to get things done as effectively as possible and with the greatest effect, for instance when donors deliver aid. But when legitimacy is prioritized, actors will think more about how things are done; they will be concerned about respect for the rule of law and how the state interacts with citizens. To summarize, governance is theorized as encompassing components such as effective service delivery, institutional capacity, citizens’ participation, accountability, organizational coordination, delegation, transparency, practical and technical mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interest, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences. Governance can take place at the grassroots and global levels. This study focuses on the delegation of authority, people’s participation, organizational coordination, and institutional capacity for explaining the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery at grassroots or ASC level in Nepal. The effectiveness of agriculture service delivery is the dependent variable, and factors affecting agriculture service delivery are the independent variables. The analytical framework for the study is presented in Fig. 4.2.

Effectiveness of Agriculture Service Delivery: Dependent Variable Singh (2009, pp. 28–38) states that governance should make public services accessible and affordable to people in the deprived world, and that the degree of spending on innovation and pro-poor governance depends

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

89

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Authority delegaƟon Rules, regulaƟons, and process DEPENDENT VARIABLE EīecƟveness of agricultural service delivery at the grassroots level in terms of

InsƟtuƟonal capacity AllocaƟon of resources Employees’ professionalism Use of technology People’s parƟcipaƟon Mechanisms of people’s parƟcipaƟon (group vs individual)

Timely delivery Quality of service Achievement of goals Accessibility SaƟsfacƟon with the services

OrganizaƟonal coordinaƟon Intra-organizaƟonal Inter organizaƟonal

Fig. 4.2 Analytical framework for the study (Source Developed by the author using governance theory)

largely on state politics. Similarly, Shrestha (2009) and Dhakal (2007) explain that governance should establish responsive linkage between the government and the citizens, and that effective public service is assessed based on citizens’ satisfaction with the quality of the service. Against this backdrop, this study defines “the effectiveness of agricultural service delivery at the grassroots level” as the quantity of tangible outputs measured in relation to official objectives or targets, timely delivery, quality of service, as well as the satisfaction of beneficiaries in terms of accessibility and affordability.

Factors Affecting Agriculture Service Delivery: Independent Variables Authority Delegation Authority is the legal right of a person to command his or her subordinates. Authority flows from statutory provisions as well as from superiors to subordinates and is used to complete a task (Dahal, 1996; Shrestha, 1996). “The delegation of authority is the delivery by one individual

90

L. K. PAUDEL

to another of the right to act, to make decisions, to acquire resources and to perform other task[s] in order to satisfy the given responsibilities” (Rondinelli, 1983, p. 18). Therefore, the delegation of authority confers the power to govern subordinates to accomplish certain duties in the form of work that involves innovative power to solve the problem under consideration. For agriculture service delivery at the grassroots level to be effective, adequate authority must be delegated through a policy design (rules, regulations) for accomplishing the given job. Similarly, decisions regarding procedures for accomplishing the job must align with rules and regulations that ensure equal opportunity, symmetric information, and fairness (Singh, 2009). This research investigates the hypothesis that the delegation of authority, particularly as regards rules, regulations, and the process of service delivery, determines the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery. To explain the independent variable via this dependent variable, the hypothesis is that the higher the delegation of authority, the more effective the service delivery. Institutional Capacity Cornell (2002, p. 8) explains institutional capacity as decision making, control over assets, strategies, programs, the institutional environment, the rules and incentives set up by any society as it organizes itself in pursuit of its objectives, and institutional effectiveness. Furthermore, Singh (2009) claims that institutional capacity depends upon the availability of human and physical resources and how they are allocated to execute the services successfully. Institutional capacity also depends upon the professionals who are able to execute programs or services effectively due to their knowledge, experience, training, innovative quality, and ability to use information technology (Jain, 2009). Since institutional capacity is integral to effective agriculture service delivery, it was measured in terms of decision making, control over assets, strategies, programs, and the institutional environment. Against this backdrop, it is hypothesized that the higher the institutional capacity, the better the agriculture services. People’s Participation People’s participation is “a process by which people exercise their voice through new forms of deliberation, consultation and mobilization to inform and to influence larger institutions and policies by being engaged

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

91

in the decisions and processes which affect their lives” (Gaventa, 2002, pp. 1–2). Public participation helps to identify the felt needs of the people, empower disadvantaged groups, integrate indigenous knowledge systems into project designs, and provides learning opportunities for local people. People’s participation in this study will be measured based on the existing institutions’ capacity to deliver services, organize groups, develop social workers, and provide leadership for women’s groups and disadvantaged groups. It will also be measured based on the participation of people in setting targets, making choices, and their assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the services delivered. Given that the ASCs are providing services to farmers, it is essential to determine to what extent people’s active involvement determines the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery at the grassroots level. The hypothesis is that people’s participation determines the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery. Organizational Coordination Organizational coordination plays a significant role in service delivery because it affects the processes through which people are served (Jamil, 2014). Verhoest and Bouckaert (2005) state that inter-organizational coordination is more network-based, while intra-organizational coordination is more hierarchy-based. In light of the Nepalese government having established organizations such as health centers and health posts, post office, schools, and policing at the grassroots level, this study attempts to discern and measure what kinds of coordination exist between ASCs and other organizations that are responsible for providing public services. Since this study presupposes that the effectiveness of service delivery depends on an organization’s own internal coordination and the coordination of the collective efforts of various organizations to make the delivery of services available, accessible, and affordable, the hypothesis is that the higher the organizational coordination, the better the service delivery. Overview of the Research Hypotheses H1: H2:

The higher the delegation of authority, the more effective the service delivery. The higher the institutional capacity, the better the agriculture services.

92

L. K. PAUDEL

H3: H4:

People’s participation determines the quality of service, achievement of goals, and accessibility of agriculture services. The higher the organizational coordination, the better the service delivery.

Research Methodology This study uses a sequential and explanatory mixed method. The data were collected in two ways. First, a fixed-response questionnaire (a questionnaire survey) was administered to the service receivers in order to map the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery at the grassroots level. The data collected through this method were then rated quantitatively using a Likert scale and checklists. Second, semi-structured interviews were conducted with people who received service from the service delivery points (ASCs). This made it possible to obtain rich detail (thick descriptions) to determine whether there were discrepancies in the information. Sampling Strategy and Study Areas To make the study as representative as possible, the Central Development Region (CDR) of Nepal was selected as the area of study. The CDR has more ASCs (94) than the other development regions. In addition, three districts—Rasuwa from the mountains, Dhading from the hilly area, and Bara from the lowlands—were selected by using a stratified random sampling method. Narrowing the scope further, the Prasauni ASC (Bara district), Naubise ASC (Dhading district), and Betrabati ASC (Rasuwa district) were selected using a purposive sampling method, so that the selection of ASCs could be unbiased. The core rationale for selecting the three ASCs from the three CDR districts was to explore whether there was any variation in the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery in the three geographically and ecologically different regions, despite the delivery institutions, process, mechanism, and service delivery provisions of the ASCs being the same. Do these ASCs vary in terms of the four independent variables? The mountainous region in the north is thinly populated compared to the lowlands in the south. Given the differences in population density, topography, and temperature, it is expected that the performances of these

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

93

ASCs would also vary. For example, in the thinly populated mountainous region, people’s participation would be crucial to make the ASCs more inclusive, whereas in the south, because of the large population, it would perhaps be more vital to focus on coordination, delegation of authority, and higher institutional capacity among the organizations implementing agricultural and farm policies. Ecologically different regions may have different agricultural needs, and the ASCs need to respond to these. Given the diversity of needs in every region, it is difficult to develop a specific hypothesis about the relationship between the independent variables and the performance of the ASCs in all three regions. The point of departure in this case is therefore inductive, in the sense that we analyze how the independent variables affect the performance of the ASCs in the three ecological regions, and thereafter, relate the findings to the theories. Size of Study Sample The study involved a total of 150 respondents from the aforementioned districts, all of whom received services from the ASCs. Their responses were used to map attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions regarding the effectiveness of agricultural service delivery at the grassroots level in Nepal. The service receivers for the questionnaire survey were selected through a random sampling method (e.g., from the farmers’ groups by a lottery method), and those who were interviewed were selected through purposeful sampling. The qualitative data obtained from the interviewed respondents (N = 15) were used to decipher the complex processes of authority delegation, resource allocation, service delivery, institutional capacity, people’s participation, and organizational coordination, all of which are significant for explaining the effectiveness of service delivery. The strategy’s main objective was thus to analyze subtle relationships and intricate processes involved in service delivery. The data were analyzed using the statistical tool of cross tabulation to find the association between the dependent and independent variables.

Results and Discussion Effectiveness of Agricultural Service Delivery at the Grassroots Level The effectiveness of agriculture service delivery is explained in terms of the timely delivery of services, the quality of services, the achievement of

94

L. K. PAUDEL

Table 4.1 Effectiveness of agriculture service delivery (N = 150) Indicators

Service centers

Timely delivery of services Quality of services Accessibility of services Achievement of goals Satisfaction with the services Total N

Betrabati

Naubise

Prasauni

Total

44 40 34 28 50 50

52 30 24 30 50 50

16 26 10 3 46 50

37 32 23 23 49 150

Source Field study, 2017

Table 4.2 Cross tabulation of authority delegation and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 140* ) Authority delegation Betrabati

Effectiveness of service delivery Total N

Disagree Agree

Naubise

Prasauni

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

56 44 100 32

91 9 100 11

87 13 100 24

65 35 100 23

90 10 100 27

96 4 100 23

Number expressed in italics represents percentage Source Field study, 2017 * “Do not know” is excluded from data analysis

goals, users’ satisfaction with the services, and the accessibility of services (Table 4.1). Timeliness of Services Delivery Regarding the timely delivery of services from the ASCs, the most satisfied respondents (52%) were from Naubise, and the least satisfied (16%) were from Prasauni. In combination, only 37% of the respondents were satisfied with the time required for service delivery. This means about two-thirds of the respondents did not think the services were delivered in a timely manner. When the service receivers were further interviewed, ten out of

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

95

15 said that to get service in a timely manner depended on Afno Manche (i.e., having developed a personal relationship with the civil servant, or through some persuasive means) rather than following the due process. Quality of Services When asked about the quality of services, the most satisfied respondents (40%) were from Betrabati’s ASC, and least satisfied (26%) were from Prasauni’s ASC. In aggregate, only 32% of the respondents were satisfied with the quality of services. This indicates that more than two-thirds of the respondents denied that they were getting good quality service. Those who were dissatisfied (68%) thought it could be improved by increasing the number of service providers, effective training of both the service receivers and service providers, increasing the availability of good-quality fertilizers and seeds, women’s participation, and increasing the availability of irrigation facilities. Accessibility of Services When asked about the accessibility of services, the respondents from Betrabati’s ASC were most satisfied (34%), and the least satisfied were from Prasauni (10%). Overall, only 23% of the respondents were satisfied with the accessibility. This means that more than three-fourths of the respondents were dissatisfied with this issue. In the qualitative interviews, when asked why the services were inaccessible, the majority (10 out of 15) said the main reasons were the distance of service centers from their home, inadequate number of staff, and inefficiency. The other interviewees (5 out of 10) said it was mainly due to the apathy of the service providers in providing the services. Achievement of Goals Regarding the achievement of service center goals, once again, the responses varied between regions. Naubise’s ASC scored best (30%), followed by Betrabati (28%), and least of all Prasauni (3%). In combination, only 23% of respondents perceived that the ASC goals were achieved. The reasons they gave were lack of resources, insufficient number of service providers, inefficient service, and peoples’ lack of

96

L. K. PAUDEL

awareness and knowledge relating to modern farming methods and technology, resulting in a substantial amount of time being spent on each client. Satisfaction with the Services Regarding satisfaction with the services, 50% of respondents from Naubise and Betrabati (the hilly and mountainous regions, respectively) were more satisfied than the respondents from Prasauni (46%). Combined, around half of the respondents (49%) were satisfied with the ASCs’ services. The main reasons for this were greater awareness among service receivers in the hilly and mountainous regions. The above discussion reveals that the respondents from Prasauni were the least happy with the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery. When it comes to the other two service centers (Betrabati and Naubise), there is variation in responses. Naubise’s respondents were happiest with the timeliness of service delivery and achievement of goals, whereas Betrabati’s respondents were happier about the quality and accessibility of services. In general, however, all the respondents were dissatisfied with the effectiveness of agricultural service delivery at the grassroots level. The findings on effectiveness of service delivery are varied in these three service centers. There is no consistent pattern in the ways people perceive different aspects of service delivery. However, it seems that people in general do not perceive service delivery to be effective as most of the percentages are around 50% or below. In the case of Prasauni, all aspects of effective service delivery are assessed by people to be below 50%, which means the majority of people assess these services negatively.

Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Agriculture Service Delivery In the previous section, the discussion focused on the attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of service receivers regarding their experiences of the ASCs’ service delivery. The purpose of this section of the chapter is to analyze factors such as authority delegation, institutional capacity, people’s participation, and organizational coordination, all of which affect agricultural service delivery at the grassroots level in Nepal. Bivariate analysis was used to discern the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables, in other words, how the effectiveness

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

97

of agriculture service delivery is affected by independent variables such as authority delegation, institutional capacity, people’s participation, and organizational coordination. Authority Delegation When authority is delegated to individuals or groups, this facilitates their ability to perform their duties autonomously. Such duties can include making decisions and acquiring resources for performing the tasks required to fulfill a given responsibility (Rondinelli, 1983). It is therefore necessary that adequate authority be delegated through a policy design (rules, regulations) in order to accomplish the given job appropriately and to deliver services effectively. It was hypothesized (H1) that the higher the delegation of authority, the more effective the service delivery. Authority delegation was assessed based on the adequacy of laws for service delivery, adequate authority for service delivery, proper division of responsibilities, adequate rules and regulations to guide service providers in accomplishing their given tasks, and whether service providers could distribute and utilize resources autonomously. Table 4.2 shows the relationship between authority delegation and ASC effectiveness, as perceived by service receivers. Table 4.2 demonstrates that only in the case of Naubise was H1 (that more delegation of authority leads to more effectiveness) supported. That is, there is a positive relationship between authority delegation and effectiveness of service delivery. In the other two cases (Betrabati and Prasauni), the relationship is negative, meaning that effectiveness of service delivery does not depend on authority delegation. Institutional Capacity Institutions have structures, processes, and behaviors that have a positive impact on the delivery of services. These not only shape the service providers’ behavior but also the behavior of service receivers by making them responsible to the demands of the service providers (Jain, 2009). It was hypothesized (H2) that the higher the institutional capacity (e.g., adequate information and financial, human, and material resources), the better the agriculture service delivery. Institutional capacity was measured based on the availability of resources and their timely delivery to farmers, adequate authority for service delivery, professional efficiency of service

98

L. K. PAUDEL

providers, competence of service providers, adequacy of physical and human resources, appropriate institutional environment, and the right to make decisions on the allocation of resources. Table 4.3 shows the relationship between institutional capacity and the ASC’s effectiveness, as perceived by service receivers. Table 4.3 shows that there is a positive relationship between institutional capacity and effectiveness of service delivery in all the service centers. In Betrabati and Naubise ASCs, half of the respondents (50%) who were asked about their experiences perceived that institutional Table 4.3 Cross tabulation of institutional capacity and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 141* ) Institutional capacity Betrabati

Effectiveness of service delivery Total N

Disagree Agree

Naubise

Prasauni

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

67 33 100 31

50 50 100 14

71 21 100 34

50 50 100 14

93 7 100 35

67 33 100 13

Number expressed in italics represents percentage Source Field Study, 2017 * “Do not know” is excluded from data analysis

Table 4.4 Cross tabulation of people’s participation and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 145* ) People’s participation Betrabati

Effectiveness of service delivery Total N

Disagree Agree

Naubise

Prasauni

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

65 35 100 26

68 32 100 19

88 12 100 26

67 33 100 24

93 7 100 30

85 15 100 20

Note Number expressed in italics represents percentage Source Field Study, 2017 * “Do not know” is excluded from data analysis

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

99

capacity matters for the effectiveness of services. Similarly, the respondents of Prasauni (33%) thought there was a positive link between institutional capacity and effectiveness of the agriculture service delivery compared to seven percent who disagreed. The above information results in the finding that institutional capacity was perceived by citizens to have a relatively high positive relationship to effective service delivery. In other words, the hypothesis “the higher the institutional capacity, the better the service delivery” is valid in all three service centers. People’s Participation People’s participation entails active involvement by internal and external stakeholders in the decisions and actions that affect them. As a minimum requirement, participation must include the ability to influence decision making and not just seek acceptance of a decision or action (Lloyd et al., 2007). Participation is possible if the service providers and service receivers demonstrate willingness to work together for a specific purpose. However, in the context of this study, the service providers play a particularly pertinent role in encouraging peoples’ participation through organizing mechanisms such as forming groups and arranging exposure visits, seminars, interaction, and field schools for integrated pest management. There is a strong theoretical proposition that grassroots organizations can be responsive if they can fulfill the expressed needs and expectations of the service receivers and can deliver what they have promised (Blair, 2000). The service providers therefore play an important role in people’s participation because their sincerity and willingness to perform the tasks matter more than the input of farmers. This is partly because most farmers in developing countries like Nepal have relatively little awareness of the services the ASCs can provide (Thapa, 2010). It was assumed (H3) that if there is higher people’s participation, there will be better agriculture service delivery. People’s participation was measured based on the involvement of service receivers in decisionmaking process, the availability of services to deprived groups, freedom to choose between various options, the sharing of benefits, and service providers’ reception of feedback from service users. Table 4.4 shows that the relation between people’s participation and ASC effectiveness was positive except in the case of Betrabati’s ASC. This means people’s participation is instrumental for service delivery in Naubise and Prasauni ASCs

100

L. K. PAUDEL

but not in Betrabati. Therefore, H3 is only valid for the former two ASCs but not for the latter. Organizational Coordination Organizational coordination is an important aspect of service delivery at the grassroots level. The organizations may deal with agriculture, health, education, postal delivery, veterinary science, and forestry, and although they may perform more or less self-contained tasks, no agency or department at the local level can always work in isolation from others (Zafarullah, 1998, p. 96). Without such coordination, it is difficult to meet people’s needs and fulfill the objectives of plans, policies, and programs. One aim of this study is to discern the current status of inter- and intra-organizational coordination for the delivery of agriculture services at the grassroots level. Each organization working at the grassroots level may have a different structure to its chain of command. Furthermore, although all the organizations function independently and attend to their own tasks, they all serve citizens, and in many cases, the same people. Various organizations such as volunteer groups, national and international non-governmental agencies, and private enterprises deliver agricultural services at the grassroots level. Ensuring coordination between them is difficult, since much more has been said about coordination than has actually been done to improve it. Coordination thus remains a principal “philosophers’ stone” in the analysis of good public administration (Jennings & Crane, 1994, cited in Peters, 2006, p. 115). Coordination is obviously a multidimensional activity which takes place among a number of actors across a range of activities (Sommers, 2000, p. 4), and it has become a complex and crucial issue both for daily operations and for policy implementation (Panday, 2006, p. 2). It was assumed that if there is higher organizational coordination, there will be better agricultural service delivery (H4). Organizational coordination was measured based on the organizational capacity for coordination, the legitimacy of the organization, the formal organizational structure, expertise, skills, and leadership qualities. Table 4.5 shows the relation between organizational coordination and the effectiveness of service delivery, as perceived by service receivers. Table 4.5 shows that 47% of the respondents from Betrabati compared to 25%, and 36% respondents compared to 20% from Naubise agreed that organizational coordination aided the effectiveness of agricultural service

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

101

Table 4.5 Cross tabulation of organizational coordination and effectiveness of service delivery (N = 141* ) Organizational coordination Betrabati

Effectiveness of service delivery Total N

Disagree Agree

Naubise

Prasauni

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

75 25 100 28

53 47 100 17

80 20 100 35

64 36 100 11

90 10 100 40

90 10 100 10

Number expressed in italics represents percentage Source Field study, 2017 * “Do not know” is excluded from data analysis

delivery. This indicates that the hypothesis “the higher the organizational coordination, the better the service delivery” is supported. In the case of Prasauni, the hypothesis is not supported because both groups (those who agreed to H4 and those who disagreed to it) had similar percentages (10%). This means there is no relationship between organizational coordination and the effectiveness of services. Overall, it was found that organizational coordination was envisaged as a critical factor for effective service delivery in the case of Betrabati and Naubise ASC, but that there was a relatively low perception of an association between organizational coordination and the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery in the case of Prasauni ASC. To summarize the findings above of the relationships between independent and dependent variables, it was found that there is no consistent pattern in the ways independent variables influence the effectiveness of service delivery in these three service centers. There are variations in the ways they affect the dependent variables depending on the nature of the service centers. Despite their similar institutional setup, these service centers cater to different clientele and given diverse experiences of these clientele with service centers at different time periods, their effectiveness is also assessed differently. This might explain why there are variations in assessments of service delivery and what factors affect effective service delivery.

102

L. K. PAUDEL

Conclusion This chapter tried to discern the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery through the ASCs at the grassroots level in Nepal, more specifically, to explain the extent to which the ASCs were effective in fulfilling their given objectives, and how much actual benefit there was to the service recipients. For this, factors such as institutional capacity, the delegation of authority, people’s participation, and organizational coordination were considered to explain the effectiveness of service delivery, in combination with timely delivery of services, good quality of services, users’ satisfaction with services, and achievement of goals. This study revealed that the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery at the grassroots level varied in the three geographical regions. It was perceived as more effective in the mountainous and hilly regions than in the lowland Terai region. The main reasons for ineffectiveness were cited as lack of effective training of both the service receivers and service providers, unavailability of good-quality fertilizers, seeds and irrigation facilities, lack of women’s participation, inadequate number of staff, lack of resources, inefficient service, and peoples’ lack of awareness and knowledge relating to modern farming methods and technology. Regarding the factors affecting effective agriculture service delivery, it was found that more delegation of authority leading to more effectiveness is supported only in the case of Naubise. The finding shows that institutional capacity was perceived to have a relatively high positive relation to effective service delivery in all three service centers. The relation between people’s participation and ASC effectiveness was positive except in the case of Betrabati’s ASC. There was a relatively high perception of an association between organizational coordination and the effectiveness of agriculture service delivery in the case of Betrabati and Naubise ASC. Institutional capacity, people’s participation, and organizational coordination were perceived to have a stronger relation to effective service delivery than did the delegation of authority. Final lessons discerned from these findings are, first, that irrespective of where these ASCs are located, the organizational variable of coordination is an important factor for the success of ASCs. ASCs need to coordinate their activities with other public as well as private organizations, and to do so on both the horizontal and vertical levels. Said differently: ASC’s success depends on how well activities are coordinated with different organizations across different levels. Second, institutional

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

103

capacity was also revealed to be vital. This factor was explained in terms of the allocation of resources both human and physical, and employees’ professionalism and use of information technology to provide effective service delivery. Institutional capacity enhances service providers’ attitudes and motivation to provide services in an efficient manner. Third, people’s participation was shown to be necessary for making effective decisions, providing services to deprived groups, choosing between options, sharing benefits, and receiving feedback from service users. Finally, it was revealed that the delegation of authority, which involves the prescribing of rules and regulations, had less of a relation to the effectiveness of service delivery. This study therefore concludes that proper institutional capacity, people’s participation, and organizational coordination are critical variables for effective service delivery and are more significant than the delegation of authority.

References Aminuzzaman, S. M. (2013). Governance at grassroots–rhetoric and reality: A study of the Union Parishad in Bangladesh. In I. Jamil, S. Askvik & T. N. Dhakal (Eds.), In search of better governance in South Asia and beyond. Springer. Ashby, J. A., Gracia, T., Gurrero, M. P., Quiros, C. A., Roa, J. I., & Beltran, J. A. (1995). Institutionalizing farmer participation in adaptive technology testing with the ‘CIAL’. In Agricultural Research and Extension. Network Paper No. 57 . Overseas Development Institute. Baral, L. R. (1993). Problems of governance. Konark Publishers. Blair, H. (2000). Participation and accountability at the periphery: Democratic local governance in six countries. World Development, 28(1), 21–39. Cornell, S. (2002, May 21–23). What is institutional capacity and how can it help American Indian nations meet the welfare challenge? Paper for the symposium on Capacity building and sustainability of tribal governments: The development of social welfare systems through preferred futuring. Washington University, St. Louis. Dahal, D. R. (1996). The challenges of good governance. Kathmandu: Center for Governance and Development Studies. Dahal, H. (2010, August 7–14). National agriculture extension system: A country report [on] Nepal. Presented in the workshop Rural development for high-level officers of AFACI member countries. Suwon, Republic of Korea. Dhakal, T. N. (2007). Challenges of civil society governance in Nepal. Journal of Administration & Governance, 2(1), 61–73.

104

L. K. PAUDEL

Dhakal, T. N., & Jamil, I. (2008). Delivery of basic services. A key issue of governance in Nepal. Public Administration Journal, 12(13), 1–16. DoA. (2005, December 13–14). Proceedings of national agriculture extension workshop. Department of Agriculture, Nepal. Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? CGD Working Paper 314. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Gaventa, J. (2002). Exploring citizenship, participation and accountability. Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, 33(2). Hyden, G. (2011, June 29–30). Improving governance: Lesson learnt for future challenges. Keynote address delivered at the international conference In Search of better governance: Prospects and challenges. Kathmandu, Nepal. Jain, R. B. (2009). Towards good governance: A South Asian perspective. Nepalese Journal of Public Policy and Governance, 25(2), 1–18. Jamil, I. (2014). Inter-organizational coordination in urban governance in Bangladesh: A tale of two cities. South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance (SJPG), 34(1). KC, G. K., Pradhan, D., Upadhayay, B. P., & Upadhyay, S. (2003, May 6). Nepal: Agricultural extension experiences, challenges and opportunities. Country paper presented at the Regional workshop on operationalizing agriculture extension reform in South Asia, New Delhi, India. https://info. worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/51025/ZipAgExtension1/ag_extens ion1/Materials/Plenary/Nepal.pdf. Accessed 13 October 2015. Kjaer, M. A. (2004). Governance. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Koirala, P. (2005). Public service delivery mechanism and rural poverty in Nepal (Economic Review No. 17 Occasional Paper). Research Department, Nepal Rastra Bank. Lloyd, R., Oatham, J., & Hammer, M. (2007, December). Global accountability report (Briefing paper no. 109). One World Trust. Ministry of Agricultural Development. (2015). Quaterly Bulletin. Kathmandu: MoAD. Ministry of Agriculture Development. (2020). Quarterly Bulletin. Kathmandu: MoAD. National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal (NPC, GoN). (2016). The Fourteenth Three Year Plan (2016–2019). Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. O’Toole, L. J. (2000). Research on policy implementation: Assessment and prospects. Journal of Policy Administration and Theory, 10(2), 263–288. Panday, D. R. (2006). Corruption, governance and international cooperation. Transparency International Nepal. Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without government rethinking public administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8(2), 223–224.

4

GOVERNANCE OF AGRICULTURAL SERVICE DELIVERY …

105

Peters, B. G. (2006). Concepts and theories of horizontal policy management. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), Handbook of public policy (pp. 115–138). Sage. Pierre, J., & Peters, G. (2000). Governance, politics and the state. St. Martin’s Press. Rondinelli, D. (1983). Projects as instruments of development administration: A qualified defense and suggestion for improvement. Public Administration and Development, 3(4), 307–327. Rosenau, J. N. (1995). Governance in the twenty-first century. Global Governance, 1(1), 14. Shrestha, S. K. (2009). A baseline survey on perceptions (particularly disadvantaged group) on the quality of public service and goods. Kathmandu: SDC. Singh, A. (2009). Innovations in public service delivery for ordinary citizens. Nepalese Journal of Public Policy and Governance. Public Administration Campus, Kathmandu, 28–40. Singh, P. B., & Colavito, L. A. (2005, December 13–14). Partnership and collaborative efforts in the delivery of agricultural services. In Proceedings of Agriculture Extension Workshop. Kathmandu. Sommers, M. (2000). The dynamics of coordination. Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University. Thapa, T. B. (2010). Agriculture extension services delivery systems in Nepal. A report submitted to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, UN Complex, Pulchowk, Nepal. Verhoest K., & Bouckaert G. (2005). Machinery of government and policy capacity: The effects of specialization and coordination. In Painter M, & Pierre J. (Eds.), Challenges to state policy capacity. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Warren, M. A., & Weschler, L. F. (1999). Electronic governance on the internet. In G. D. Garson (Ed.), Information technology and computer application in public administration: Issues and trends. Idea Group Publishing. Zafarullah, H. (1998). National administration in Bangladesh: An analysis of organizational arrangements and operating methods. Asian Journal of Public Administration, 20(1), 79–112.

CHAPTER 5

Policy Advocacy for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of the Board of Investment of Bangladesh Tabassum Zaman

Introduction Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is crucial for economic development in many countries. From 1995 to 2005, the developed countries attracted 70% of global inward FDI and were the source of 88% of global outward FDI (Rajput et al., 2012). Foreign assets are used to reduce the domestic savings gap, balance of payments deficit, inflation rate, public deficit, foreign exchange gap, unemployment rate, and poverty level. Foreign assets also help maintain steady growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Gross National Product (GNP), stabilize interest and exchange rates, and increase income per capita. They are vital for improving physical and human infrastructure and enabling access to technological know-how (Rahman, 2015). It is therefore easy to understand that developing countries want FDI. The trend and growth of FDI inflow in Bangladesh are, however, unsatisfactory (Table 5.1).

T. Zaman (B) Department of Economics, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_5

107

108

T. ZAMAN

Table 5.1 FDI trends and growth rate in Bangladesh

Fiscal year July–June

Net FDI (in million USD)

Growth rate of net FDI inflow (%)

2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015 2015–2016 2016–2017

803.78 744.61 792.74 768.69 960.59 913.02 779.04 1194.88 1730.63 1480.34 1833.87 2003.53 2454.81

Base Year -7.36 6.46 -3.03 24.96 -4.95 -14.67 53.37 44.83 -14.46 23.88 9.25 22.52

Source Bangladesh Bank Survey, 2018

Table 5.1 shows that although Bangladesh’s FDI inflow is increasing, the growth rate is very unpredictable. The country’s FDI performance comes vividly to light when comparing the total amount of FDI inflows into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) during the period 2008–2017: India received 87.8% of the total inflow of FDI, followed by Pakistan with 5.3%. Bangladesh ranked third with only 3.6%, Sri Lanka received 2%, and the other SAARC countries received less than 1% (Akter, 2019). Even though Bangladesh’s government has offered many incentives, there has been almost no fresh FDI investment. According to the World Bank (2017), FDI in Bangladesh is less than 2% of its GDP. Based on statistics from the last few years, it is clear that the reinvestment of locally earned profit accounts for most direct investment in Bangladesh. Fresh FDI inflow continues to decrease almost daily (Abdin, 2015). Although the net inflow of FDI stood at USD $3.61 billion in 2018, the sources for more than one-third of this amount ($1.31 billion) were reinvestment earnings of the existing multinational entities in Bangladesh (Asjadul, 2019). Bangladesh is thus a minor player in FDI, with $1.5–2 billion of inflows in the fiscal year 2014 compared with India’s $28 billion, Indonesia’s $18 billion, Malaysia’s $12 billion, and Vietnam’s $10 billion. This says a lot about Bangladesh’s lack of a sufficiently favorable investment climate

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

109

(GED, 2015). Tabassum and Ahmed (2014) use a multiple regression method to analyze the relationship between FDI and economic growth in Bangladesh during the period 1972–2011. They found that domestic investments exerted a positive influence on economic growth, whereas FDI and open trade were less significant. In their study, the lagged response variables followed by F-statistics revealed that the independent variables were jointly significant, as the P-values were less than 0.01 in all the models. The assumption that changes in FDI inflows could change economic growth was therefore not ascertained in Tabassum and Ahmed’s study from 2014. A country’s productive human capital, sound macroeconomic policies, and institutional stability are claimed to be preconditions for its FDI-driven growth (Makki & Somwaru, 2004). The Government of Bangladesh is surely aware of this and has implemented some policy reforms to stimulate economic growth, yet it has failed to attract a handsome FDI inflow (Rayhan, 2009). Complicated bureaucracy, corruption, high inefficiency, policy inconsistency, the absence of autonomy for regulatory bodies, the lack of cooperation with the Board of Investment (BOI), and administrative coordination problems are just some of the obstacles to increasing the country’s FDI inflow (Kafi et al., 2007; Rahman, 2012). To try to change this situation, the Seventh Five Year Plan (SFYP, 2016–2020) focuses on dynamic export-oriented sectors, financial sector reforms, tax administration, enforcement contracts, economic zones, branding of special products, and overall governance to boost FDI in Bangladesh (GED, 2015). The SFYP is aligned with Bangladesh’s Industrial Policy of 2010. It is this policy that guides the Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs). The IPAs are entrusted with the task of promoting FDI. They do this image building, investment promotion, and policy advocacy for attracting FDI. In general, their policy advocacy appears to be most closely associated with FDI inflow (Morisset & Johnson, 2004). The study accordingly explores the policy advocacy of the Board of Investment (BOI)—presently known as the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority, the oldest investment promotion agency in Bangladesh—by analyzing how it pursues policy advocacy in compliance with the industrial policy guidelines for FDI. The next section of this chapter presents the theoretical construction of policy advocacy for Bangladesh’s IPAs. This is followed by an account of

110

T. ZAMAN

the study’s analytical framework and methodology. The focus then shifts to the BOI’s actual policy advocacy output (the dependent variable) seen in comparison with its potential output (as mentioned in the industrial policy, 2010) and the policy advocacy process (the independent variable). The chapter concludes with a summary of the most important findings and some recommendations for how the BOI and other IPAs might be able to meet their potential.

Theoretical Aspect of Policy Advocacy Policy advocacy is defined as IPA efforts to effect changes in regulations, laws, government policies, and their administration, as pertaining to fields such as investment, trade, labor, immigration, real estate, taxes, infrastructure, technology, and education (UNCTAD, 2008). Policy advocates and their supporters—from individual donors to major funders—obviously want to see measurable results of their advocacy efforts (DeVita et al., 2004; Fagen et al., 2009). Policy advocacy efforts are well documented by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) in terms of outputs of implementing agencies, target group compliance with policy outputs, the actual and perceived impact of policy outputs, and major revisions in statutes or policies. In this regard, a model of logic is used to link policy resources, activities, and outputs to a specific problem or situation to pursue policy goals (Millar et al., 2001). The dependent variable for the present study, the output of policy advocacy, will be measured by comparing the BOI’s policy advocacy output with the FDI policy guidelines; the independent variable, the process of policy advocacy, will be measured by the standard phases of policy advocacy implementation as outlined by Bardach (2000) and Kingdon (1984). The potential output of policy advocacy (the dependent variable) is highlighted in the following aspects of Bangladesh’s Industrial Policy of 2010 (Board of Investment, 2012): i. FDI should be attracted in the areas of high-tech, innovative industries that have the potential for skill and technology transfer to the host country. ii. The capital market should be presented to foreign investors, and they should be told about favorable incentives, ceilings, restrictions, guidelines, and other facilities for them.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

111

Problem idenƟficaƟon and agenda seƫng

Policy Remedy

SelecƟng evaluaƟve criteria FormulaƟng several policy alternaƟves ProjecƟng outcomes Choosing the best policy proposal to advocate

Process of Policy Advocacy AdvocaƟng Policy

PreparaƟon Persuasion MobilizaƟon Decision making/consensus building

Monitoring and EvaluaƟon

Fig. 5.1 Independent variable: The policy advocacy process (Source Bardach [2000] and Kingdon [1984])

iii. Dual taxation revocation agreements or any other agreements between different countries should be promoted to attract FDI. iv. The Board of Investment and Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA) should jointly devise policy guidelines/directives for the appointment of foreign experts. v. Facilities for the thrust sector are needed. This sector includes industries that require preferential policy support to harness their high growth potential. The policy advocacy process (the independent variable), as outlined by Bardach (2000) and Kingdon (1984), can be broken into four steps: problem identification and agenda setting, policy remedy, advocacy of policy, and monitoring and evaluation. The policy advocacy process is clarified further in Fig. 5.1.

Analytical Framework of the Study The dependent variable, that is, the BOI’s advocacy output, depends on the process of policy advocacy, which is the independent variable. The study’s analytical framework is presented in Fig. 5.2.

112

T. ZAMAN

Policy Advocacy Process (Independent variable) 1. Problem idenƟficaƟon and agenda seƫng 2. Policy remedy 3. AdvocaƟng policy 4. Monitoring and evaluaƟon

Policy Advocacy Output (As per IP, 2010) (Dependent variable) ඵAdvocacy on innovaƟve industries ඵAdvocacy on capital market ඵAdvocacy on bilateral trade agreements ඵAdvocacy on foreign experts ඵAdvocacy on thrust sector

BOI’s policy advocacy performance Fig. 5.2 Analytical framework of the study (Source Researcher’s own construction)

Research Methodology For this study, the researcher used an exploratory case-study approach (Yin, 2014) to analyze the BOI, the oldest investment promotion agency in Bangladesh. To collect primary data, the researcher used observation and conducted interviews, and for secondary data, the researcher drew on

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

113

relevant literature such as BOI records and documents from other government organizations as well as visual documents posted on the BOI’s Facebook page and webpage. The researcher analyzed how the BOI has implemented FDI directives introduced by the Industrial Policy of 2010. The policy advocacy on the directives is based on a specified process as per Bardach (2000) and Kingdon (1984). The study particularly focuses on the BOI’s policy advocacy, since it appears to have the strongest association with FDI inflows, followed by image building, investor services, and investment generation in general (Morisset & Johnson, 2004, p. 34). For data collection, the researcher used convenience sampling, which is a non-random sampling method. This is because the respondents were located in different levels and different sections of the BOI, and their views were deemed to be essential to answer the research question: “How is the BOI pursuing policy advocacy in the field of FDI?” 39 respondents were interviewed. It was found that among 25 transcripts of semi-structured interviews most codes (53%) occur in the first interview analyzed, and 91% by the sixth interview. The point of meaning saturation is defined in terms of the last interview in which a novel code “dimension” is identified. Meaning saturation is usually achieved earlier for codes representing concrete notions (normally by the 9th interview) (Hennink et al., 2017). Accordingly, this study did not find any additional issue or meaning after the 39th respondent of the sample survey. The sample consists of BOI employees, employees of the Prime Minister’s Office (the authoritative body for the BOI), key informants from other IPAs and think-tanks, and informants such as policy analysts, investors, and media personnel. The respondents were chosen due to their association with the BOI’s policy advocacy, either directly or indirectly. The study period was from 2009 to June 2016, when the last bits of information were gathered. 2009 marked the start of Sheikh Hasina’s time as prime minister of Bangladesh, and she remained in the post throughout the entire period.

Exploring the Dependent Variable: Policy Advocacy Output The BOI’s policy advocacy output as per the Industrial Policy of 2010 (Board of Investment, 2012) is identified in this section of the chapter. The industrial policy guidelines are used as the benchmark for measuring the BOI’s policy advocacy output. The dependent variable is assessed

114

T. ZAMAN

based on what the BOI is producing as policy advocacy output following the standard consecutive stages of policy advocacy. These are stated below.

Policy Output for High-Tech, Innovative Industries, and the Capital Market The study finds that the BOI produced no policy remedies for the capital market or for innovative high-tech industries during 2009–2014. The BOI could not respond to the capital market reactively because the Ministry of Finance did not ask it for such a review. Neither did any private entrepreneur nor any private business chamber ask it for any policy input on the capital market (BOI, 2009–2014). However, the BOI did some preparatory work on the capital market and innovative industries. For example, for the convenience of investors, the BOI’s Web site gives an overview of the country’s capital market and offers updated information on several issues related to the capital market of Bangladesh (Box 5.1): Box 5.1 Capital Market Information on the BOI’s Website (BOI, 2015) • Investment opportunity and freedom • Legal security for investment • Economic freedom and economic data on the financial sector • Bangladesh Bank and banking history • Information on stock exchanges • Investment Corporation of Bangladesh • Security and exchange commission • Scheduled banks and cooperative banks • Insurance • Non-bank financial institutions • Micro-finance institutions • Quick facts on the financial sector

The BOI has also produced exploratory reports on the potential of the capital market and Bangladesh’s ICT sector. One BOI report on the capital market is mentioned in Box 5.2.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

115

Box 5.2 Investment Opportunity in Bangladesh Capital Market (BOI, 2015) Bangladesh’s capital market is investment friendly and there is no restriction for foreign investors to invest in Bangladesh. At present, our market capitalization is US $41.74 billion, and the current price-earnings ratio is only 17, which indicates that this market is now quite open to longterm investment. The capital market is undergoing continuous reforms to upgrade and integrate with the international capital markets. The Bangladesh Security and Exchange Commission (BSEC) is taking many steps to make a congenial atmosphere for investors. It offers incentives to investors in terms of exemptions and quotas that are competitive in nature. Other initiatives to make the capital market more attractive are promulgating BSEC rules (2015), green financing for long term investors, strengthening market surveillance, establishing a clearing and settlement company, bringing stability into the secondary market, policy formulation on financial education, etc. Due to the above-mentioned steps, Bangladesh’s capital market is getting more attention from foreign and nonresidential Bangladeshi (NBRs) investors, and hopefully it will get more investors in the near future. Source: www.boi.gov.bd

During the study period, the BOI was involved in promoting innovative, high-tech industries and the capital market through seminars, symposiums, business forums, research reports, and other channels. For example, at an international policy and investment summit in 2016, the BOI raised the issue of Bangladesh’s capital market to show its potential to investors. Another example is that at an international business forum in 2014, the BOI focused on the light engineering sector’s value and specific investment opportunities (BOI, 2014). BOI also produced reports on industries within the ICT sector, renewable energy, and light engineering, to name a few. However, the BOI did not produce any policy remedy for innovative and high-tech industries in Bangladesh (BOI, 2009–2014). The study therefore finds that for high-tech and innovative industry advocacy, the BOI had partial involvement in problem identification and agenda setting, but it produced no output at the policy-remedy stage. It remained active in only the advocacy stage. One can therefore argue that the BOI engaged in the stages of advocacy in a disorganized, nonsequential manner.

116

T. ZAMAN

Policy Output for Trade Agreement Between Different Countries A Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA) is a type of policy framework the BOI is regularly involved with and to which it offers valuable policy insights. However, it does not itself develop the BIAs—this is the responsibility of the ministries. Since independence in 1971, Bangladesh has signed 28 BIAs that have involved policy insights from the BOI. During the period in which this study was carried out, the BOI chairman was found to be visiting other countries, signing memorandums of understanding, and meeting with foreign delegations to implement the BIAs properly. Moreover, in seminars, summits, and other types of meetings, the BOI’s informed opinions on BIAs were communicated and discussed. The study therefore finds that in the area of bilateral trade agreements, the BOI, despite being only partially involved in problem identification and agenda setting, remained active in producing output at the policy remedy and advocacy stages. However, the BOI entered into the stages of advocacy in a disorderly way, participating in the policy remedy phase without being actively involved in the problem identification and agenda setting phase.

Policy Output on Hiring Foreign Experts Jointly with BEPZA The study finds that the BOI did not formulate policy guidelines for hiring foreign experts jointly with BEPZA from 2009 to 2014, nor did it involve itself in reviewing any policy regarding appointing foreign experts. One key informant from the BOI gave the following explanation: When the investors seek work permits, we fix the terms and conditions for the foreign employees, and they vary from company to company. In this connection, we follow the BOI guidelines of 2011 on hiring foreign employees. However, we have not worked together with BEPZA or any other IPAs to devise joint guidelines for foreign expert appointments because we do not feel the need for it.

A key official from BEPZA confirmed the situation:

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

117

We have a work-permit standing committee, and the BOI executive chairman and our executive chairman are both members. We follow our Act, which includes guidelines for hiring foreign experts. Since we discuss hiring issues in the standing committee, we do not find it necessary to devise policy directives jointly with the BOI.

The study finds that the BOI and BEPZA are subject to different legislation (acts) and therefore differ in their guidelines. The BOI’s guidelines for hiring foreign experts include details pertaining to duration, procedure, extension, and the cancellation of work permits, among other things (BOI, 2012), whereas BEPZA’s guidelines do not spell out the procedure regarding work permits. The study finds that since BEPZA follows the same procedure followed by the BOI, it should consult with the BOI when needed. BEPZA has already received financing from the World Bank for consultancy support to facilitate work permits and other services, stream line its system, and increase its capacity building (BEPZA, 2014). BEPZA may therefore have an urge to improve the work permit issues. Since the BOI and BEPZA deal with different domains of investment, this justifies them having separate guidelines for work permits. The study therefore finds no immediate need by both BEPZA and the BOI to devise joint policy guidelines for hiring foreign experts. Both organizations address this issue in the designated meetings where they cooperate with each other. However, while BEPZA acknowledges a need to improve the work permit process, the BOI is satisfied with the guidelines it already has. Although BEPZA is improving its work permit process and other services with assistance from the World Bank, it does not cooperate with the BOI in this regard. The BOI informants reflect indifference on the issue. The BOI is found to be totally ignorant about the policy advocacy guidelines in the FDI policy on foreign experts, since it is not involved in any advocacy stage for this specific agenda.

Policy Output for Thrust Sector Promotion The BOI defines the thrust sector as a sector which includes industries that require preferential policy support to harness their high growth potential. It may include industries that currently occupy a dominant position in the economy, industries with potential but as-yet unrealized robust growth, and industries that are still at a nascent stage (BOI, 2012). One

118

T. ZAMAN

Table 5.2 Major policy reviews by the BOI for ministries and agencies in 2013 Serial number

Policy

Ministry/Agency

1

Ministry of Industries

3

Amendment of Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation(BSCIC) Act, 1957 Grameen Social Business Initiative Policy National Drug Policy, 2013

4

National Handicraft Policy

2

Ministry of Finance (ERD) Ministry of Health and Family Planning Ministry of Industries

Source Policy and Planning Wing, BOI

key informant clarified the BOI’s role in promoting the thrust sector as follows: The BOI gets involved from time to time in promoting the thrust sector. While engaging in policy advocacy, it keeps in mind how the sector’s industries can be further developed. Since the BOI is in the Agriculture Advisory Committee, it offers its policy insights for the development of the agriculture sector. The BOI also organizes seminars and other events to promote investment in Bangladesh’s thrust sector.

The study finds that the BOI provides policy reviews on the promotion of the thrust sector. During 2009–2014, the BOI produced ten out of 32 policy reviews, all of which focus directly on the thrust sector of Bangladesh. Some of the BOI’s important policy reviews for thrust sector industries are presented in Table 5.2. During the study period, the BOI was active in most of the stages of advocacy for promoting Bangladesh’s thrust sector, and this indirectly helped the FDI to grow. The following section of this chapter identifies the status of the BOI’s policy advocacy process (the independent variable for the study).

Status of the Independent Variable: The Policy Advocacy Process The BOI provides advocacy during the formulation and implementation of relevant policies required by concerned ministries. It also

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

119

provides policy advocacy to different private business chambers, foreign entrepreneurs, and foreign diplomatic missions (APA, 2014–2015, p. 20). The following subsections explore the BOI’s policy advocacy in different phases.

Problem Identification and Agenda Setting The study finds that the BOI is increasingly involved in communicating with investors, public institutions, and other stakeholders to promote potential FDI. To this end, it organizes seminars, workshops, dialogues, road shows, and investment forums (APA, 2014–2015). A byproduct of such events is that barriers to investment come to light. However, the BOI has not tried to tackle these barriers in an institutional or well-organized way. One informant from the Business Initiative Leading Development explains part of the problem: The BOI is not a research organization and it does not have any architecture of policy advocacy. It mostly produces policy reviews, which are required by government ministries and agencies. It lacks policy advocacy in the agenda setting, monitoring, and evaluation phases. It therefore does not appear that the BOI has a systematic policy evaluation.

Table 5.3 presents some efforts of the BOI that have either directly or indirectly disclosed investment problems in Bangladesh. The BOI has the responsibility to identify problems and barriers to investment in collaboration with other stakeholders, but it does not do so in a routinely established manner. Moreover, the BOI does not explore problematic policies proactively, and this is another factor that may deter national development goals in the area of FDI. Part of the problem here is that the BOI has inadequate research capacity, but on top of this, the authorized ministries and agencies do not ask the BOI to get involved in such practices as pursued by IPAs in Bangladesh. To prioritize the agenda of policy advocacy therefore appears to be beyond the BOI’s capacity. Finally, although problem identification and agenda setting are the first standard practices of IPAs when they start a policy advocacy process, the BOI improvises within the scope of its capacity but not in a standard manner.

120

T. ZAMAN

Table 5.3 Investment barriers disclosed by the BOI’s activities Events organized by the BOI

Dates

Disclosed investment barriers

Bangladesh Investment and Policy Summit

2016

The BOI’s Proactive Policy Prescription

2015

Unveiled some investment-related problem: • Absence of Bangladesh in Trans-Pacific Partnership • Poor export growth compared with other progressing countries in Asia A BOI researcher sent a report to the education secretary on labor productivity, citing how Bangladesh is lagging behind in the Knowledge Economy Index. Bangladesh ranked least successful among all South Asian countries during 1995, 2000, and 2012, with the respective index values of 2.47, 1.77, and 1.49. Among other South Asian countries, Sri Lanka was the most successful (the index values are 4.25, 4.3, and 3.63) in developing a knowledge-based economy, followed by India (3.57, 3.14, and 3.06), Pakistan (2.78, 2.12, and 2.45), and Nepal (2.71, 2.06, and 1.58) (World Bank, 2012)

Source Researcher’s own construction from respondents’ views

Policy Remedy The activities of the BOI in three consecutive phases of policy remedy are explained below: Selecting Evaluative Criteria The BOI’s policy-related opinions are claimed to be shaped by its vision and mission (APA, 2014–2015, p. 5).The BOI considers FDI inflow, employment generation, quality of labor, thrust sector development, policy convergence, regulation, and institutional reforms as its evaluative criteria. A sample of the BOI’s suggested evaluative criteria for the Industrial Policy of 2015 is given in Table 5.4. The examples in Table 5.4 indicate that the BOI is dynamic in selecting evaluative criteria for producing policy remedies related to FDI.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

121

Table 5.4 The BOI’s criteria for evaluating the Industrial Policy of 2015 Evaluative criteria of the BOI

Significance of the evaluative criteria

Institutional arrangement for investment

The proposed change in the Industrial Policy of 2015, which suggests that different investors should be registered by different ministries, is not only contradictory to the BOI Act, but also cumbersome for the investors. Accordingly, the BOI recommends that it should be clear in the IP 2015 that whoever is the authorizing agency for sector-wise investment registration should keep in mind the convenience of the investors The BOI urges that there be a change in the sector-wise investment pattern based on consideration of the contributions of each sector. Accordingly, the BOI’s opinion is that the service sector investment target should supersede the industry sector target, if Bangladesh, being a transition economy, follows the investment pattern of developed countries such as Britain and the USA

Sector-wise investment

Source Responses of key informants

Formulating Several Policy Alternatives The study explored the BOI’s policy remedy process. A key respondent from the BOI explained it in the following way: Whenever the BOI is asked for its opinion on a policy, the request is sent to the relevant department of the BOI. It is then processed in one of two ways. The first way is that the department director and deputy directors study the policy, make a draft and send it to the executive chairman. The executive chairman then makes the required modifications and sends it back to the designated ministry. The second way is to call a meeting involving all the departments in the BOI. This is used when the policy involves new issues that need to be discussed or when the policy is very complex. It may require more than one meeting. The decisions made at the meetings are compiled and sent to the designated ministries.

In this connection, the study identified the following categories of policy remedies produced by the BOI: Public Policy. During 2009–2014, government ministries and organizations asked the BOI for 33 policy reviews (BOI, 2009–2014). The majority of these requests came from government ministries and a few

122

T. ZAMAN

came from government agencies. No requests came from private business chambers, individual entrepreneurs, or foreign diplomatic missions. A sample of the BOI’s written response to a draft sent by the Economic Relations Division, Ministry of Finance in 2015 (BOI, 2015) is presented in Table 5.5. As Table 5.5 shows, the BOI’s review recommends expanding investment sources, reviewing tax structures in order to attract export promoting industries, transparency, and increasing the capacity of government institution, along with strengthening its own capacity. Bilateral Investment Agreements. The BOI is involved in Bilateral Investment Agreements (BIAs) in two ways. Most of the time it writes policy alternatives regarding specific clauses in BIAs. The second way, which is less frequent, is to participate in inter-ministerial meetings and to offer insights along with other stakeholders. All the insights are compiled by the relevant ministry and included in the BIA draft. As stated earlier, since independence in 1971, Bangladesh has signed 28 BIAs that have involved policy insights from the BOI. Other Types of Policy Remedies. The BOI coordinates with other stakeholders in the Private Sector Development Policy Coordination Table 5.5 A sample of the BOI’s review of the draft “Development Finance and Aid Assistance: Bangladesh” Page 11

Page 11

Page 15 Page 15

Page 74

In addition to the liberalization of the current and capital accounts, an energy bond1 can be introduced as a source of financing for the investment sector In addition to short-term opportunities in specific niche areas (export processing zones, special economic zones, shipbuilding), sustainable development of the Board of Investment through empowerment and strengthening its capacity is needed for FDI expansion Aggressive and professional promotion of the economic zones, shipbuilding, and pharmaceuticals should be ensured There is a need for a review of the corporate tax regime in terms of taxes, tariffs, and duty incentives, to ensure coherence with the objective of attracting export promoting industries Strengthening the capacity and transparency of the National Board of Revenues should be ensured

1 Energy bonds are used to support energy sectors by raising funds from the capital market.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

123

Committee, which meets regularly in the prime minister’s office. The committee meetings are usually chaired by the principle secretary, and the aim is to provide policy prescriptions. The BOI also provides policy advocacy on national five-year planning. It follows up this task every three months. Recently, the BOI offered opinions on the seventh five-year plan. The study therefore finds that even though the BOI provides policy remedies in a passive manner, it does produce various categories of policy responses. Projecting Outcome and Choosing Best Policy Proposals to Advocate The BOI does not follow a rigorous process of formulating several policy alternatives by involving all its departments and other stakeholders. Consequently, it does not compare the policy alternatives in terms of their goals, expectations, and projected outcomes, nor does it necessarily choose the best option. The reality is that the BOI often gets only one day to reflect on a given policy, as required by the ministries and agencies. Moreover, it believes it is the ministries themselves who should ask for other stakeholders’ opinions and that it is not the BOI who should be responsible for involving others to participate in its advocacy. Other IPAs such as the aforementioned BEPZA and the Export Promotion Bureau also confirmed that they are not involved in the BOI’s policy remedy process. The study therefore once again finds that the BOI produces varieties of policy remedies but does so in a superficial rather than rigorous way.

Advocating Policies The four consecutive steps of the BOI’s advocating of policies are given below: Preparation From 2009 to 2014, the BOI was involved in producing 32 policy reviews (BOI, 2009–2014). From 1980 to 2012, it reviewed drafts of 28 bilateral investment treaties (BOI, 2016). Its policy advocacy was ranked as “very good” in 2013–2014, based on eight reviews, and “good” in 2014–2015, based on seven reviews as per the Annual Performance Agreement (APA,

124

T. ZAMAN

2015–2016).2 To explain: At the end of each year, the Government of Bangladesh looks at the achievements of a ministry/division, compares the achievements with the targets, and determines the composite score. The raw score is obtained by comparing the achievements with the previously established target values: excellent (100–96%), very good (95–86%), good (85–76%), fair (75–66%), and poor (65% and below). The BOI produces annual reports, newsletters, bulletins, leaflets, flyers, writes up success stories, sector profiles, and other related material. Nevertheless, the number of these publications is very low (APA, 2015– 2016). Two of its research projects, one in 2013–2014 and the other in 2014–2015, were rated “very good” (APA, 2015–2016, p. 14). From 2013–2014 to 2014–2015, it published nine press releases (BOI, 2015). For evidentiary support, it does not produce case studies or impact reports through surveys, but it does produce some market analysis. Some of the BOI’s significant preparatory materials are listed in Table 5.6, followed by their scores: Considering the weight of different categories of preparatory materials, the Annual Performance Agreement (APA) shows that the BOI is producing a satisfactory amount of preparatory materials for policy advocacy. In this stage of the study, it is important to mention that since the BOI is not responsible for formulating policies, it does not advocate particular policies but promotes different investment issues. In the next subsection, the BOI’s persuasion, mobilization, and consensus building are analyzed. Persuasion Through seminars, symposiums, and road shows held on a regular basis, the BOI not only attracts new and existing investors but also attempts to persuade potential investors and supporters and to win over opponents. Table 5.7 presents the status of the BOI’s persuasion as per its APA. Considering the weight of the tools of persuasion in the APA, the BOI appears to have done an inadequate job of persuading investors from

2 The Annual Performance Agreement is essentially a record of understanding between a minister representing the people’s mandate, and the secretary of a ministry/division responsible for implementing this mandate. A Performance Agreement provides a summary and rankings of the most important results that a ministry/division expects to achieve during the financial year using different indicators.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

125

Table 5.6 The BOI’s preparatory performance in policy advocacy Performance indicator (PI)

Weight of PI

Criteria value

2

2—Excellent 1—Very good 20—Excellent 19—Very good 18—Good 17—Fair 16—Poor 9—Excellent 8—Very good 7—Good 15—Excellent 14—Very good 13—Good 12—Fair 11—Poor

Research conducted Newsletter, bulletin, leaflet, flyer, success story, sector profile published

1

Policy advocated

1

Books, journals, and periodicals

1

Actual value

Average performance

2013–2014

2014–2015

1

1

Very good

7

9

Less than poor

8

7

Very good—Good

8

13

Less than poor

Source Guidelines for Annual Performance Agreement (APA), 2015–2016

Table 5.7 The BOI’s persuasion efforts Performance indicator (PI)

Weight of PI

Criteria Value 3

Seminars, workshops, dialogues conducted

1

Road shows conducted Investment fairs, forums organized Investors counseled

1

11—Excellent 10—Very good 9—Good 8—Fair 7—Poor 2—Excellent 1—Very good 2—Excellent 1—Very good

1

4

Actual Value 2013–2014

10,956—Excellent 10,400—Very good 9900—Good 9300—Fair 9000—Poor

2014–2015

Average performance

3

6

Less than poor

1

1

Very good

1

1

Very good

2730

6700

Source Board of Investment Annual Performance Agreement (2015–2016)

Less than poor

126

T. ZAMAN

Table 5.8 Challenges Discussed by Investors at the BOI’s Promotional Events The five-year plan’s specific FDI targets are not always fulfilled. There is no specific policy with details about the role of FDI Bureaucratic tangles and crude laws conflict with the existing industrial policy and create barriers in preparing business documents Having unskilled local manpower results in currency outflows to hire managers from abroad Source Researcher’s own construction

2013 to 2015. Both the public and the private sector confirm from time to time that the BOI performs unsatisfactorily in this area (The Daily Star, 2015). Table 5.8 presents some of the critical challenges investors have mentioned in conjunction with the BOI’s promotional events. From Table 5.8, it is evident that quality matters when persuading people to engage in FDI. At the promotional events, the BOI could not explain to investors why the FDI targets were unfulfilled. The complicated regulatory affair, corruption, and lack of skilled manpower also pose barriers to investment in Bangladesh. Such problems are intermittently raised by investors, but the BOI’s lack of a systematic advocacy process may also be said to share part of the responsibility for the lack of investment. Mobilization It is uncommon for the BOI to try to persuade decision-makers to act on a certain issue by repeatedly conveying the same message about the same problems voiced by various sources. However, in some cases, for instance when a recurring problem is identified or an issue is repeatedly raised, the BOI forms a committee with other stakeholders to try to solve the problem or address the issue. Table 5.9 outlines one such attempt.

3 Targets and criterion values are tools for driving performance improvements. Target levels contain an element of stretch and ambition. The targets must be achievable, aligned with the priorities stated in the Perspective Plan 2010–2021, Sixth Five Year Plan, and be consistent with the Medium-Term Budget Framework of the Government of Bangladesh.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

127

Table 5.9 Event to mobilize stakeholders Event

Held on

Participants

Activities

Round-table dialogue on the blue economy 4

August 26, 2014

Foreign Minister Energy Advisor of Prime Minister Secretary for the Maritime Affairs Unit Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief Executive Officer, Business Initiative Leading Development (BUILD)

• The BOI raised the issue of strategic partnership with neighboring countries such as India and Myanmar to utilize the potential of Bangladesh’s blue economy and to expand marine education for acquiring wider knowledge to explore the resources. • A question was raised: “Who will unearth the potentials of the blue economy – the government or the private sector?”

Source Researcher’s own construction from primary and secondary data

After the round-table event in 2014, the Government of Bangladesh proposed a resolution for sustainable development in 2015 that was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN. The resolution’s purpose was to achieve economic growth in 17 areas by 2030, with 14 of the areas relating to the blue economy. Many experts suggest that the Government of Bangladesh should create an organization to acquire the resources of the sea as quickly as possible, as there is an unlimited scope of opportunity to extract these resources (The Daily Star, 2018). Consensus Building For building consensus, the BOI uses, among other things, inward and outward delegations, investors’ forums, taskforces, luncheon ceremonies, and round-table dialogues. These instruments work in a more institutionalized setting than do other means for consensus building. Inward and outward delegations are worth special mention because they are frequently used. Inward and Outward Delegations. From 2009 to 2014, the BOI was frequently involved with inward and outward delegations, with a greater

128

T. ZAMAN

emphasis on inward delegations (BOI, 2009–2014). Among these, the BOI considers eleven of the delegations in 2013 and ten in 2014 as major. According to the BOI’s annual report, major delegations were to be foreign and inward. The work process of one specific delegation is shown in Box 5.3. Box 5.3 The Case of a Japanese Delegation A Japanese delegation wants Bangladesh to bring together all the agencies pertinent to foreign investors under the umbrella of the BOI. It requested that the BOI be responsible for at least the major types of permission needed to set up a business, for instance permission to trade, import, bond and factory licenses, environmental clearance, taxpayer’s identification numbers, value added tax registration, certificates for fire safety, and tax exemptions. The delegation called for a dedicated economic zone—free from flood and within 1.5 hours drive from Dhaka’s city center. The zone should be at least 300 acres, with the possibility of future expansion by 250–500 acres. The incentives provided and the price of land should be comparable to that in other Asian countries. All the rules and regulations of business should be implemented and controlled by the government authority. In response to this, a high-level meeting was held on August 10, 2014 at the Bangladesh Bank (BB). Representatives of the Japan External Trade Organization and the Japan International Cooperation Agency were present, and representing the host nation were officials from the BOI, the National Board of Revenue, the Ministry of Commerce, and other relevant ministries. The meeting was chaired by the BB Governor, and the minutes were forwarded to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) so that the suggestions are properly assessed. In this regard, the BOI will request that the related agencies assign officers with adequate decision-making authority to the BOI so that the foreign investors’ needs can be addressed quickly and in one place. The BOI and the BB will work with the PMO to follow up the issues of upgrading and expanding the physical facilities, logistics, and labor at the BOI, thus to offer efficient service delivery to foreign investors. Source: Case made by the researcher from The Daily Star report, August 14, 2014

4 The Blue Economy conceptualizes oceans and seas as “development spaces” where spatial planning integrates conservation, sustainable use of living resources, oil and mineral wealth extraction, bio-prospecting, sustainable energy production, and marine transport.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

129

Box 5.3 demonstrates how the BOI is trying to address the challenges faced by foreign investors in Bangladesh and how it attempts to resolve the problem of coordinating different tiers of administration. It not only coordinates high-powered meetings but also actively pursues the objectives of such meetings for decision making and consensus building. The study therefore finds that the BOI, in its policy advocacy process, is regularly involved in the stages of preparation, mobilization, and building consensus. Monitoring and Evaluation The study reveals that the BOI is absent from the monitoring and evaluation phases of policy advocacy. One respondent from the BOI explains the situation: We are just one of many stakeholders who give policy prescriptions in the form of policy drafts and send them to the respective ministries. The final policy will include the prescription of not only the BOI but also others, so it is a combination of reflections from all the stakeholders. It is therefore illogical to monitor our reflection on the policy alone, since the final policy is an output of the combined effort of many stakeholders.

The central mechanisms of policy monitoring and evaluation are largely absent in Bangladesh (Fifth Five Year Plan), so it is not surprising that the BOI is also found to be inactive in policy monitoring and evaluation processes. Moreover, the study finds that from 2008 to 2015, the BOI only had access to proposed data to analyze investment trends. It did not have the resource to collect the actual data or to monitor the situation. One key respondent from a private think-tank mentioned the condition of the BOI in the following way: When Bangladesh requested that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) review its Investment Policy, UNCTAD collected data from the Bangladesh Bank but not from the BOI, as it depends on others for these types of data for its investment trend analysis.

The study also finds that in the policy advocacy process, the BOI is unable to respond adequately regarding policy impact, effectiveness, space for improvement, lessons from policy changes, and so on. Policy evaluation

130

T. ZAMAN

is thus impossible using the type of policy remedy and data the BOI produces. To summarize the phases of policy advocacy (the independent variable): The BOI is not operationally active in problem identification, agenda setting, monitoring, and evaluation. It is, however, found to be active in the policy remedy and advocating phases. The next section of the chapter evaluates policy advocacy output (the dependent variable) by establishing a causal relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable.

Evaluating the Dependent Variable: Policy Advocacy Output During the research period, a gap was identified in the BOI’s policy output for the majority of FDI policy directives. The study explains this gap as being due to the BOI’s capacity in advocacy. The individual phases of policy advocacy were analyzed based on respondents’ perceptions and the available documentary evidence. Since the monetary and evaluative phases of advocacy are beyond the BOI’s jurisdiction, the study summarizes the three actual phases of the BOI’s policy advocacy. In the majority of advocacy cases, the finding is that the BOI enters only partly into problem identification, agenda setting, and policy remedy phases, and it enters more fully into the advocating policy phase (the third phase). The overall findings are summarized in Table 5.10. Finally evaluating the BOI’s policy advocacy output, the study found that, the organization follows an unsophisticated process rather than the guidelines and standard phases of advocacy as introduced by Bardach (2000) and Kingdon (1984). As the oldest investment promotion agency in Bangladesh, the BOI should function as a research institute in the field of FDI, highlighting the unexplored sectors for FDI as well as the current crude policies hampering FDI. Its current capacity and forms of advocacy are insufficient for steering and achieving the FDI potential. This is especially the case for sectors such as high-tech and innovative industries, the capital market, and exports, which are crucial for FDI. The study therefore finds that the BOI’s current policy advocacy may not be having enough impact on FDI progress in Bangladesh.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

131

Table 5.10 The status of the BOI’s policy output, based on the majority of respondents Status of the Dependent variable: the BOI’s policy output

Status of independent variable—The policy advocacy process

Implications

Case 1. Less than satisfactory level of advocacy in high-tech, innovative industries, and the capital market

• The BOI did not explore problematic policies proactively in the high-tech and innovative sectors, but did work reactively • Its inadequate research capacity hindered its ability to identify problems and prioritize the agenda accordingly • The BOI neither produced any policy remedies on capital market nor on innovative high-tech industries • The BOI organized seminars, symposiums, business forums, wrote research reports, and so on for advocating high-tech industries and the capital market of Bangladesh with the help of other stakeholders • The BOI actively participated in policy remedy and advocating policy on trade agreement issues • Problem identification and agenda setting were found to be beyond the BOI’s purview • Issues related to hiring foreign experts in the export sector were not actively explored by the BOI in consultation with BEPZA • Policy remedy and advocating policy were not found to be a concern for BOI, either proactively or reactively

Among the four cases, the BOI was found to be addressing the issues of bilateral trade agreements and the thrust sector, but it was ignorant about high-tech and innovative industries and the capital market, and about guidelines on hiring foreign experts. Furthermore, in pursuing advocacy, the BOI did not follow the stages of advocacy in a sequential manner for any case. The BOI therefore only does a partial job of performing policy advocacy

Case 2. Satisfactory level of advocacy in trade agreements between different countries

Case 3. Less than satisfactory level of advocacy in deducing guidelines on hiring foreign experts jointly with BEPZA

(continued)

132

T. ZAMAN

Table 5.10 (continued) Status of the Dependent variable: the BOI’s policy output

Status of independent variable—The policy advocacy process

Case 4. Satisfactory level of advocacy in thrust sector promotion

• The BOI’s problem identification was done in consultation with authorized ministries and agencies when promoting the thrust sector • Agenda setting and prioritizing were beyond the BOI’s capacity • The BOI contributed many trust-sector policy remedies and organized various events for stakeholders in order to advocate for the thrust sector in Bangladesh

Implications

Source Researcher’s own construction

Conclusion and Way Forward The main objective of this study was to explore how the BOI pursues policy advocacy in the field of FDI. The study evaluated the BOI’s actual advocacy using Bangladesh’s FDI policy guidelines as the benchmark. It was found that the BOI was partially implementing the policy directives through policy advocacy and that it did this in an informal manner. For any given field of advocacy, it did not follow the stages of policy advocacy sequentially. It only used some of the policy advocacy instruments, and mostly in an unorganized way. When exploring the four policy advocacy areas as directed by FDI policy, it was found that the BOI was partially active in both the problem identification and policy remedy stages, but was more active in the advocating policy phase (the third stage of the policy advocacy process). When combining the performances of all stages of policy advocacy in the designated areas, it became clear that the BOI performed partial policy advocacy. A gap therefore loomed between the actual policy advocacy and the benchmark as set forth in Bangladesh’s Industrial Policy of 2010. An underlying assumption of this study has been that if an IPA practices systematic policy advocacy, this will enable it to perform more in line with its potential. In other words, if an IPA follows the four consecutive

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

133

stages of the policy advocacy process, it is more likely to be effective and achieve the objectives as defined in the guidelines. The study therefore recommends that the BOI follows the four stages of policy advocacy. In this endeavor, the BOI could link up with the higher authority and other relevant stakeholders, as reflected in Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1980) model for hierarchical integration between institutions for policy formulation, implementation, and output. Since the BOI is the oldest and most important IPA in Bangladesh, it is expected that other IPAs will follow its lead when trying to contribute to FDI development in Bangladesh. The findings of the study reflect the situation of FDI performance in Bangladesh. There is indeed a relationship between FDI, trade, and the growth rate of per capita GDP for Bangladesh, but the thrust sectors are still relatively unexplored. This becomes obvious when making FDI comparisons between the South Asian countries, for the FDI inflow in Bangladesh is revealed to be insignificant. This situation is also confirmed in a report by the World Bank from 2017. Bangladesh lags behind other South Asian countries in starting businesses, getting credit, protecting minority investors, dealing with construction permits, and trading across borders (Dhaka Tribune, 2018). Bureaucratic complexities and rigidity, corruption, the high cost of inefficiency, policy inconsistency, and coordination problems are major obstacles to FDI inflow in Bangladesh. All such factors contribute to why the IPAs in general are not fulfilling their potential.

References Abdin, M. J. (2015). Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bangladesh: Trends, challenges and recommendations. International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, 4(8), 276. https://doi.org/10.4172/2162-6359.100 0276. Akter, S. (2019). Comparative analysis of FDI in SAARC and ASEAN countries. Journal of Economics and Finance, 10(2), 1–5. Asjadul. (2019). 2018 net FDI inflow at $3.61b. The Financial Express. Retrieved from http://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/economy/2018-net-fdiinflow-at-361b-1556077108. Bardach, E. (2000). A practical guide for policy analysis: The eight-fold path to more effective policy solving. Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press. BEPZA. (2014). http://www.bepza.gov.bd/public/storage/upload/tender/ file_1406195842.pdf. Board of Investment. (2009). Annual Report. Government of Bangladesh.

134

T. ZAMAN

Board of Investment. (2010). Annual Report. Government of Bangladesh. Board of Investment. (2011). Annual Report. Government of Bangladesh. Board of Investment. (2012a). Annual Report. Government of Bangladesh. Board of Investment. (2012b). Investment in Bangladesh, handbook and guideline (5th ed.). Board of Investment, Prime Minister’s Office , Bangladesh. ISBN 984-32-3656-4. Board of Investment. (2013). Annual Report. Government of Bangladesh. Board of Investment. (2014a). Annual Report. Government of Bangladesh. Board of Investment. (2014b, July). Bangladesh investment review, quarterly newsletter of Board of Investment. Prime Minister’s Office, Government of Bangladesh, issue 5. Board of Investment. (2014c, October). Bangladesh investment review, quarterly newsletter of Board of Investment. Prime Minister’s Office, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, issue 6. Board of Investment. (2015). Investment opportunity in Bangladesh capital market. Board of Investment website. http://www.boi.gov.bd/. Board of Investment. (2015–2016). Annual Performance Agreement. Prime Minister’s Office, People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Board of Investment (BOI). (2016). Report of Strategy and Program Department, 2015–2016. Government of Bangladesh. Byron, R. K. (2014, August 24). Japan seeks one-stop service to raise FDI. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/japan-seeks-one-stop-service-toraise-fdi-38379. DeVita, C. J., Montilla, M., Reid, B., & Fatiregun, O. (2004). Organizational factors influencing advocacy for children. Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, the Urban Institute. Fagen, M. C., Reed, E., Kaye, J. W., & Jack, L. (2009). Advocacy evaluation: What it is and where to find out more about it. Health Promotion Practice, 10(4), 482–484. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524839909339584. General Economic Division (GED). (2015). Seventh five-year plan (FY2016FY2020): Accelerating growth, empowering citizens. Government of Bangladesh. https://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/sites/unicef.org.bangla desh/files/2018-10/7th_FYP_18_02_2016.pdf. Hennink, M. M., Kaiser, B. N., & Marconi, V. C. (2017). Code saturation versus meaning saturation: How many interviews are enough? Qualitative Health Research, 27 (4), 591–608. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732316665344. Kafi, A., Main Uddin, M., & Islam, M. (2007). Foreign direct investment in Bangladesh: Problems and prospects. The Journal of Nepalese Business Studies, 4(1). Kingdon, J. W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives and public policies (2nd ed.). Brown and Company: Little.

5

POLICY ADVOCACY FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT …

135

Makki, S. S, & Somwaru, A. (2004). Impact of foreign direct investment and trade on economic growth: Evidence form Developing Coutries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(3), 795–801. Millar, A., Simeone, R. S., & Carnevale, J. T. (2001). Logic models: A systems tool for performance management. Evaluation and Program Planning, 24(1), 73–81. Ministry of Finance. (2012). Bangladesh economic review. Economic Adviser’s Wing, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of Industries. (2010). Industrial Policy 2010. Government of Bangladesh. http://www.moind.gov.bd/site/view/policies. Morisset, J., & Johnson, K. A. (2004). The effectiveness of promotion agencies at attracting foreign direct investment. Foreign Investment Advisory Service, occasional paper 16. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Ntv. (2014, April 23). GP focused as largest investor in Bangladesh. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zK_s0QQZKTw. Ntv. (2015, June 24). Foreign direct investment decline in Bangladesh. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bkmcD8FZZY. Ovi, I. H. (2018, November 1). Ease of doing business: Bangladesh lowest in South Asia. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/ 2018/11/01/ease-of-doing-business-bangladesh-lowest-in-south-asia. Rahman, A. (2012, May). Foreign direct investment in Bangladesh, prospects and challenges, and its impacts on economy. A project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Professional Master in Banking and Finance, Asian Institute of Technology, School of Management, Thailand. http://www.bankingandfinance.ait.asia/sites/default/files/report/ report_afsanarahman.pdf. Rahman, A. (2015). Impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth: Empirical evidence from Bangladesh. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 7 (2), 178–184. Rajput, N., Garg, R., Jain, A., & Razput, A. (2012). Trends and patterns of flow of FDI in developed countries and developing countries: A comparison. International Journal of Social Science & Interdisciplinary Research, 1(9), 14. Rashid, H. (2018, May 14). Blue economy – Are we ready for it? The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/economics/blue-eco nomy-are-we-ready-it-1575823. Rayhan, M. A. (2009). Foreign direct investment in Bangladesh: Problems and prospects. ASA University Review, 3(2), 101–113. Rothstein, B. (1998). Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare state. Cambridge University Press. Sabatier, P., & Mazmanian, D. (1980). The implementation of public policy: A framework of analysis. Policy Studies Journal, 538–560, Article first published

136

T. ZAMAN

online: September 9, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1980.tb0 1266.x. Tabassum, N., & Ahmed, S. P. (2014). Foreign direct investment and economic growth: Evidence from Bangladesh. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(9), 117. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2008). Investment promotion agencies as policy advocates. Investment Advisory Series, series A, no. 2. United Nations, p. 1. World Bank. (2012). Measuring knowledge in the world’s economies. World Bank Institute. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUNIKAM/Resour ces/KAMbooklet.pdf–0. World Bank. (2017). Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). World Bank Data Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD. GD.ZS. Yin, R. (2014). Case study research: Design and methods (5th ed.). Sage.

CHAPTER 6

An Analysis of the Role of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Implementing the National Labor Migration Policy in Sri Lanka K. D. Dushmanthi Silva

Introduction Sri Lanka adopted a form of public bureaucracy after becoming a Britishcrown colonial state in 1802.1 A modern version of public administration replaced the old feudal system in 1833, when the country was still under British rule (Navaratna-Bandara, 2013). From then onward, until constitutional reforms were introduced in 1972 and 1978, one of the important functions of the bureaucracy was to maintain the form of the colonial administration—even though the country had gained independence in 1948. Thus, although the Public Service Commission became an organ of an independent country, it was still heavily influenced by the colonial mindset and did not necessarily pay attention to the needs and challenges that the new nation faced (Navaratna-Bandara, 2013, p. 476). Since 1 The first Western invasion was by the Portuguese in the 1500s; the Dutch invaded the country in 1658, and the British in 1796.

K. D. Dushmanthi Silva (B) Department of Sociology, University of Ruhuna, Matara, Sri Lanka © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_6

137

138

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

that time, various governments have come and gone, largely adjusting and transforming the system to suit their own political ideologies and agendas. Although there is a substantial amount of literature available on the bureaucratic system in Sri Lanka (Gunawardane, 1989; NawaratneBandara, 2013; Warnapala, 1974), most of the texts discuss the country’s civil service or public administration as a whole. There is no study focusing solely on the role of bureaucrats. This present study focuses on the modern bureaucratic system, narrowing the scope to the policy implementation stage and the particular role of bureaucrats in this stage. Constitutionally, three bodies function in the public policy process: the president, the cabinet, and the parliament. These have the power to make policies, while lower-ranking public officials act as implementers (Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978). At present, and like any other developing country, Sri Lanka suffers from ineffective policy implementation. Some scholars have pointed to the politicization of the bureaucracy, lack of financial resources, and lack of coordination, as root causes for policy failures in developing countries (Abeyratne, 2013; Jain, 1987; Jamil & Pandey, 2012; Warnapala, 2012). Only a few scholarly works have examined this issue in the Sri Lankan context (Abeyratne, 2013; Jayasuriya, 2000; Nawaratne-Banda, 2013; Warnapala, 2012). This present study therefore aims to fill gaps in the existing literature by exploring factors that limit policy implementation in Sri Lanka. This study mainly discusses the role of street-level bureaucrats in implementing Sri Lanka’s National Labor Migration Policy. These bureaucrats are employed by the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), which is the main organization that implements the policy. In light of the study’s purpose, I interviewed migrant women, manpower agencies, and SLBFE bureaucrats, given that they are key stakeholders involved with the migration process. Although the bureaucrats hold positions at different hierarchical levels in the organization, they all deal directly with service seekers and are therefore, for the sake of this study, considered street-level bureaucrats.

Background of the Study Sri Lanka’s migrant workforce—that is, Sri Lankans who migrate to other countries to work—earns the greatest amount of foreign currency for the country annually. In 2017, this group contributed around 1,091,972 million rupees (US $ 6 billion, approximately) to the national economy.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

139

Sri Lanka’s total overseas migrant-worker population was approximately 212,162 persons in the year 2017. Overseas migration has opened employment opportunities for many women who previously may not have been active in the workforce in Sri Lanka. In the past two years, 84% of female migrant workers (including women employed as housemaids) were engaged in low-skilled employment mainly in the Middle East (SLBFE Annual Report, 2017). Considering the contribution of migrant workers to Sri Lanka’s holdings of foreign currency, the country, in 2009, adopted the National Labor Migration Policy, which spells out non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labor migration. This policy follows principles of international human rights, particularly in offering protection for marginalized people or groups. The National Labor Migration Policy is committed to the “governance, protection and empowerment, and development of migrant workers” (National Labor Migration Policy, 2009, p. 4). The primary legal authority that governs labor migration in Sri Lanka is, as mentioned, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), established under Act 21 of 1985, and amended in 1994 and 2009, respectively. The objective of this Act is to govern, supervise, and regulate the migration process. Later in 2009, in alignment with this Act, the National Labor Migration Policy was adopted by the SLBFE. The key issues for protection and empowerment in the policy encompass the security and welfare of migrant workers. This includes providing services to migrant workers during the preparation stage (i.e., recruitment, training, registration, and actual departure from Sri Lanka), helping them through the difficulties they may face while abroad (e.g., exploitative situations, abuses), and attending to the needs of returnees who need to reintegrate into Sri Lankan society (National Labor Migration Policy, 2009, p. 19). The National Labor Migration Policy sets two minimum requirements to prospective migrant workers. The minimum age requirement is 18 years, and the preferred age is above 21 years, while the literacy level (minimum proficiency is the ability to read and write) is especially emphasized. According to the policy, these minimum requirements ensure the welfare and protection of migrant workers. Policymakers have identified the role of manpower sub-agencies as the leading cause of workers suffering abuse and exploitation. All manpower agencies are therefore requested to register with the SLBFE.

140

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

Problems faced by Sri Lankans working abroad include culture shock and social alienation, which can result in emotional suffering and sexual exploitation. To protect and empower these workers, the policy emphasizes that they should receive guidance on health issues, particularly concerning the risk of HIV infection. HIV training is one component of the SLBFE pre-departure course. The policy also covers insurance schemes, pension schemes, and education scholarships for children of migrant workers, in recognition of their contribution to the country. The policy recognizes the role of Sri Lankan diplomatic missions in host countries and their mandate to protect Sri Lankan migrants. Along with the diplomatic missions, the state must take responsibility to safely repatriate migrant workers in the case of any emergency they may face (National Labor Migration Policy, 2009, pp. 19–21). Scholars in the field of migration (Arunathilake, 2014; Hettige et al., 2012) have pointed to the absence of programs specifically targeting returnee migrant workers, to ensure their successful reintegration into the society of their homeland. Even if primary health care needs of returnee migrant workers are minimal, and even if mental and physical health care needs are identified and provided for, including medical services, psychiatric services, and counseling, there is still a need to focus more on psycho-social issues in the reintegration process (Hettige et al., 2012). Besides health issues, there are social issues that mainly concern the families of migrant workers. If a mother migrates and leaves her children behind, there will be a lack of care that affects the children in numerous ways: for instance, schooling, health, and physical and mental development (Ukwatta, 2010; Wickramasekra, 2013). The policy acknowledges this problem and states that women with children under the age of five cannot apply for foreign employment. Nevertheless, women are still found to be migrating and leaving their children with a father or an elderly person at home. This raises questions about the policy’s successful implementation. Despite all these issues, the major concern of migration studies is the harassment and violence which female migrants experience in host countries and during the pre-departure stage in the home country. According to data collected by the SLBFE in 2017, there were 3,074 complaints lodged by women; they reported sexual harassment at their workplaces in the host countries, not being sent back to Sri Lanka after the contractual period ended, and non-payment of the promised salary (Annual Statistical Report SLBFE, 2017). Thus, this present study aims to explore how far

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

141

the National Labor Migration Policy has been able to protect women. In the process, it also examines the extent to which the street-level bureaucrats perform their roles in implementing the policy in this whole process of migration.

Statement of Research Problem: Policy Implementation Failure or Policy Implementation Gap? Many scholars argue that the government should be more active in protecting migrant workers and have followed up by suggesting policy changes (Maznavi, 2004; Pinnawala, 2009; Wickramasekara, 2013). Most often, they highlight that the policy should protect migrant workers and that the primary aim of the SLBFE should be the same. The SLBFE Act of 1985 has given ample power to bureaucrats to counteract malfunction in the migration process, especially regarding recruitment agencies. This is especially so for cases where recruitment agencies contravene any Act or regulation, when they have been convicted of any offense under the Act, when they fail to pay compensation to their employers in foreign lands, or when they have furnished false documents. All such activities are grounds for cancelling a recruitment agency’s license (SLBFE Act, no. 21, 1985). Both the vision and the mission statement of the SLBFE clarify that the primary objective is to train and build skilled Sri Lankan labor with the ultimate goal of developing the country’s economy, so the SLBFE’s role in the migration process is not merely to protect the migrants. But the SLBFE Act of 1985 has many clauses that do protect migrant workers both directly and indirectly. Regulating the recruitment industry therefore gives some protection to the migrants. Before the Act, men and women migrated through personal or informal channels and with no legal protection (Pinnawala, 2009). To counter the aforementioned problems which migrant workers face (e.g., physical harassment, non-payment of promised wages, etc.), the SLBFE Act of 1985 has been amended and new policies have been adopted. Under such amendments, the penalties which must be paid by the offending recruitment agencies increased from SLR 250 to SLR 20,000–100,000. Furthermore, to ensure the protection of employers in foreign lands, all migrant workers are required to register with the SLBFE and can be checked by SLBFE officials at the airport departure terminal.

142

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

If such a person is found to lack registration papers, he or she is sent to the nearest police station. Nevertheless, questions remain regarding the protection provided by the authorities. When there is failure, the bureaucrats tend to blame the migrants. Sometimes bureaucrats fail in their responsibility to ensure security due to their failure to give legal support. This pinpoints the low efficacy of public policy on the migration of women to Middle Eastern countries. This is a situation of either a policy implementation gap or a policy failure, as explained by scholars of public policy management. McConell describes policy failure as “absolute non-achievement” (McConell, 2015, p. 231). This takes place when there is a gap between policy objectives and policy outcomes. The larger the gap, the larger the implementation deficit. Policy failure or the implementation gap implies a situation where, even though the implementing authorities have made maximum efforts to achieve the goals of lawgivers, they ultimately produce an adverse outcome (McConnell, 2010). This situation prompts a question to be answered in the study: Although the policy on labor migration in Sri Lanka has focused on protecting and empowering migrant workers, the female migrants are largely exploited and face physical and sexual harassments in foreign countries. Why, then, has the policy not achieved its objectives? To answer this, it is necessary to examine the bureaucratic system in Sri Lanka, thus to understand how bureaucrats fulfill their role and to identify how responsive they are to citizens in order to achieve the policy goals.

Theoretical Framework To explain the role of street-level bureaucrats, the present study draws on theories of policy implementation and street-level bureaucracy. Theories of policy implementation fall into three categories: top-down, bottom-up, and a synthesis of these two. The top-down theory defines policies as goals to be achieved. Pioneers of this theory are Pressman and Wildavisky (1984) and Van Meter and Van Horn (1975). As Hill and Hupe (2014) explain, successful implementation depends on linkages between organizations and departments at the local level (Hill & Hupe, 2014). Top-down theorists generally emphasize the main actors of policy decisions and neglect lower-level bureaucrats.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

143

As for the bottom-up theory, Michel Lipsky (1980), Winter (2002), and Hull and Hjern (1982) claim that lower-level (street-level) bureaucrats should be given the discretionary power necessary to re-invent policies so that they can fit with the local need (Hill & Hupe, 2009). The most interesting point is one they cite but which is made by Lipsky: “Street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, … work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out” (Lipsky, 1980, p. xii). According to the bottom-up theory, policy implementation depends on such street-level bureaucrats. The third (synthetic) theory highlights the weaknesses of the topdown and the bottom-up approaches to policy implementation, yet sees the wisdom of combining their strengths as a mixed approach. Winter (2012) claims that when policy implementers only use one approach, vital issues addressed by another approach could be left out. On this basis, he introduces the integrated implementation model (Winter, 2012) and the idea of evaluating policy implementation. The evaluation focuses on the performance and outcomes of the policy implementation process. Implementation output is understood more as policy content at an operational level—it is not the policy or law itself—and results (outcomes) are the consequences of implementation output (Winter, 2012, p. 14). Winter’s integrated implementation model identifies five variables in policy implementation: policy formation and process, organizational and inter-organizational implementation behavior, street-level bureaucrats, target group response, and socio-economic context (Winter, 2012). In this present study, I use Winter’s (2012) integrated model to explain street-level bureaucratic behavior as an independent variable in evaluating migration policy implementation in Sri Lanka. The main research questions of this study are as follows: First, to what extent is the policy that is intended to help the labor migrants able to protect female labor migrants? Second, what factors affect the role of bureaucrats in the process of policy implementation in Sri Lanka? According to the bottom-up theory of policy implementation, the role of street-level bureaucrats has an impact on policy implementation, while, according to the top-down theory, successful policy implementation is achieved primarily through authoritative policy decision-making at the top level (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Both Lipsky (1980) and Winter (2002, 2003, 2012), meanwhile, emphasize the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats. Following the implementation process in Winter’s integrated model, the role of street-level

144

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

bureaucrats (independent variable) is identified as a factor that affects successful policy implementation (dependent variable) in the Sri Lankan context. Thus the question: What role do the street-level bureaucrats play—what do they do—to ensure the protection of migrant workers? To explore this, I selected various explanatory variables from the literature on street-level bureaucracy to explain the behavior of street-level bureaucrats. This involves, for instance, the bureaucrats’ understanding of policy goals, resource availability, the motivation of bureaucrats, their boundaryspanning capacity, and their attitudes to the target group and the policy they are tasked to implement. This chapter explores how these variables influence bureaucrats to implement the policy, and to what extent they achieve the National Labor Migration Policy goals as stated in the policy document. Policy goals are measured based on the training given to the migrant workers, the strengthening of the existing laws that regulate the recruitment of migrant workers for various types of employment, and a mechanism to monitor and minimize abuse.

Methodology I used a qualitative research design to analyze participants’ views on policy effectiveness because such a design can accommodate exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory case studies (Yin, 2009). Given that this study analyzes the effect of the role of bureaucrats on implementing the Labor Migration Policy in Sri Lanka, I develop it more like a causal explanation. It is therefore appropriate to explain this as a descriptive case study. As already stated, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) is chosen as the unit of analysis. Its bureaucratic structure contains 30 managers under nine deputy general managers, three assistant general managers, one general manager, and a chairman. In addition to these positions, there is a deputy general manager for the internal audit department (Table 6.1). The SLBFE is the main regulatory authority for foreign employment, tasked to implement the National Labor Migration Policy. The SLBFE is under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry for Women’s Affairs also engage with the SLBFE to achieve policy objectives. I selected as respondents bureaucrats at different levels of the SLBFE (from senior management to ground level), along with returnee migrant women, personnel from labor recruitment agencies, and sub-agents.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

145

Table 6.1 Summary of the sample Participants

Number

Tools of data collection

Types of data Data related to policy, functions of organization, available resources, assessment of SLBs Data about the policy and its impact, functions of the organization Policy implementation, obstacles in implementation, bureaucrats’ attitudes to their work and target group, available resources Policy implementation, bureaucratic system and obstacles to implementing policy, attitude on policy implementation and target group, available resources Bureaucratic system Service received from SLBFE, accountability of SLBs, relationship with SLBs Their intervention in migration process Service received from the SLBFE, challenges in migration process Impact of women’s migration

General manager

01

SSI

Additional general manager

01

SSI

Deputy general manager

09

SSI

Manager (including regional office)

10

SSI

Staff officers Local manpower agencies

03 04

SSI SSI

Sub-agents

02

IDI

Returnee migrant women

10

IDI

Migrant women’s families Total

05

IDI

45

SSI: Semi-structured interviews IDI: In-depth interviews (All interviews were conducted by the author in 2015)

146

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

These latter respondents were interviewed because they are also the stakeholders in the migration process. They were selected from the district of Kurunegala because this is where a large number of migrant women live and where recruitment agencies are located. The total sample size of respondents is 45. The sample of bureaucrats was selected purposively; it also includes bureaucrats from the regional center located in Kurunegala. To select the rest, a snowballing method was used. As for data drawn from texts, the National Labor Migration Policy is the main source. Secondary data are culled from relevant published and unpublished documents, journals, and government annual reports. Through such means, it is possible to obtain relevant and appropriate data on respondents’ behavior and attitudes (Creswell, 2014). I interviewed all the street-level bureaucrats at their workplaces. This gave me the opportunity to observe their behavior and their relationships with clients, thus helping me understand their behavior and how it affects their performance in policy implementation. In sum, a qualitative research method is appropriate for this research because it provides the mechanism to examine the actions and behavior of street-level bureaucrats and to understand policy implementation and its effectiveness. The National Labor Migration Policy commits to the “governance, protection and empowerment, and development of migrant workers” (National Migration Policy, 2009, p. 4). Among these three goals, this study, as mentioned, focuses mainly on the protection of migrant workers as outlined in the policy document. In this document, the key issues for protection and empowerment encompass the security and welfare of migrant workers. This includes providing services to migrant workers during the preparation stage (i.e., recruitment, training, registration, actual departure), helping them deal with difficulties they may face, helping them get out of exploitative situations, dealing with abuse, and helping returnees reintegrate into Sri Lankan society (National Migration Policy, 2009, p. 19). Issues such as these formed the basis for discussions with the interviewees.

Findings Gaps in Policy Implementation in Sri Lanka The study focuses on the actions taken by the SLBFE in implementing the National Labor Migration Policy and the effectiveness of policy implementation. This latter aspect is measured based on the provision of improved services and their impact, for instance, the delivery

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

147

of comprehensive training and awareness, the strengthening of existing laws, regulating recruitment, and monitoring and minimizing abuse. Such aspects are used to analyze how far the SLBFE has achieved the goal of protecting female migrant workers from abuse and harassment. At the same time, I cross analyze and validate data based on the reflections of female participants and manpower agencies. One of the SLBFE’s main activities is to conduct training programs for migrant workers, especially domestic workers. These programs are designed as pre-departure training for male and female caregivers bound for Israel, female housekeepers and caregivers bound for the Middle East domestic sector as a whole, and housekeepers and caregivers bound for the domestic sector in Europe, the Far East, East Asia, and other countries. Especially for women who wish to migrate as domestic workers, the SLBFE has designed a 21-day residential training program that also includes language training. Empirical data reveal some limitations in the 21-day program’s capacity to reach its objectives. At present, this training concentrates mostly on women’s behavior, self-protection, counseling, and well-being, in addition to teaching the women how to operate electrical appliances and the like. The bureaucrats have found that as the program progresses, it might help women to get more information on safe migration. In the experience of both the bureaucrats and the female migrants, the allocated time— 21 days—is insufficient to produce well-trained domestic helpers. But it is hard to extend the training because the SLBFE faces problems with an inadequate supply to the labor market, and it competes with other countries that supply labor. The organization must therefore limit the duration of the training. Moreover, the SLBFE has delivered many awareness programs countrywide to promote safe migration. Along with the awareness programs, the SLBFE publishes newspaper advertisements and TV advertisements, but not very frequently, due to cost-cutting. Data collected from deputy general managers and managers at the SLBFE reveal that the training programs need more well-trained instructors, since the dissemination of knowledge and information depends on the instructors. The current instructors are women who have previously worked as housemaids abroad, and they have only their work experience to rely on when training the newly recruited women. The data also reveal that female migrants develop strong relationships with recruitment agencies and sub-agents (a middleman carries out communication between a recruitment agency and a female migrant).

148

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

Trusting middlemen more than the SLBFE is a problem, as it leads to unprotected migration: Women largely believe the recruitment agency or sub-agents. They get information from their friends or relatives, and they believe them more than us. Therefore, most women do not [use] the proper channel to get the information. Once they face problems, only then do they come to us. (A manager)

As this respondent confirms, although the SLBFE is the main mechanism for controlling the migration process, women still have insufficient communication with the organization. Instead, they rely more on recruitment agencies or sub-agents. The female migrants’ lack of understanding also factors into why the policy has not achieved the expected results. However, so far, the SLBFE has not focused on how it could modify and adjust its programs to fit with the needs of its target group and thus obtain better results. According to the data, the effectiveness of the training program in ensuring women’s protection has made little improvement, and according to data gathered from returnee women migrants, it is irrelevant. The bureaucrats have themselves identified some limitations to the training program, for instance the all-too-short time period for the training, the inadequacy of recruiting former domestic servants as instructors, and not having the latest technology or household equipment similar to that found in the Middle East. No action has been taken thus far to revise the training in accordance with the migrant workers’ evaluation and feedback. According to the returnee respondents, the training program is ineffective because the situation in the workplace depends on the employer, the employee, and the workload. This leads to the conclusion that policy effectiveness has not been achieved as expected. Strengthening the law on migration will not be successful until the government controls corruption and errors in the system. The intervention of sub-agents and the making of fake documents—for instance, fake training certificates, birth certificates, passports, and family background reports—decrease the involvement of SLBFE and its validity as a controlling body, yet the SLBFE has not identified any mechanism to control these malfunctions in the migration process. This was revealed from women’s own experiences.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

149

According to the female migrant interviewees, the SLBFE does not provide them with adequate protection. They lack correct information for safe migration and for their protection while working abroad. They are not well treated by foreign recruiting agencies or by the Sri Lankan diplomatic missions. The evidence stated above reveals that women face several difficulties due to miscommunication. This training actually didn’t help me; handling electrical goods is not a big thing, once you go there you can learn, for me, it took only a few weeks. Language is a problem. If we are facing a problem, our SLBFE officers advise us to run away from the house. In the training, we are given all the contact numbers, that is true, but as ladies do not know the language or do not know the road, etc., how can we find the embassy? Once I faced a terrible situation, but luckily, I met a good taxi driver who dropped me at the embassy, but many women were harassed while running on the streets. (Migrant woman)

This indicates that the policy goals are not reflected by women’s experiences. There is a gap in the relationship between the SLBFE and female migrant workers. It is the recruitment agencies that help women the most. On the other hand, the recruitment agencies’ intervention as middlemen is also an obstacle to the women’s ability to receive correct and relevant information from the SLBFE. Moreover, SLBFE statistics from 2014 show that out of a total of 8,750 complaints, 8,518 were from domestic servants regarding workplace problems. This is yet another piece of evidence showing that female migrant workers are still vulnerable in the pre-departure stage as well as during their work period, and it also helps explain why the SLBFE has not achieved its goals. An organization’s effectiveness depends on its perceived viability and legitimacy (Palumbo et al., 1984). However, this study shows that the SLBFE is only minimally able to spread information and conduct a useful training program. Further, because it has done a poor job of handling complaints and of preparing documents, its legitimacy has decreased. The majority of the bureaucrats who were interviewed as well as the female migrant workers highlight that having fraudulent documents made via illegal channels is the way to avoid legal formalities. This makes women more vulnerable in the pre-departure stage and limits the SLBFE’s ability to protect them in the workplace.

150

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

One of the policy’s great achievements is that only registered manpower agencies now have the authority to send workers overseas. However, the study reveals that the intervention of manpower agencies, their sub-agents, and their relationship with bureaucrats limit the effectiveness of activities implemented by the SLBFE. Sub-agents in particular play a significant role in finding women from villages and bringing them to the manpower agencies. The women develop a close relationship with these sub-agents, as they are sometimes known people in the village or nearby area. The women trust these people and the manpower agencies and can avoid having direct contact with the SLBFE. Although the purpose of the law is to protect migrant workers, in practice, it largely favors recruitment agencies. The system of blacklisting or suspending recruitment agencies is ineffective because prospective migrant workers have no access to any list of blacklisted agencies. Thus, the SLBFE does not maintain transparency. This permits illegal recruitment agencies to function, and, as a result, women who migrate through these illegal agencies are in a vulnerable situation, for only registered agencies take responsibility for their workers in the host country. The intervention of the SLBFE in legal problems in foreign lands is minimal, and a substantial number of migrant workers, especially women, end up in safe houses in the Middle East.2 Although there are laws to weaken illegal migration and corruption, malpractice of the laws restricts the policy implementation. A SLBFE Desk has been established at the airport to trace illegal migrant workers but those who work there have difficulty monitoring the departure of labor migrants because so many move to the same place. The SLBFE Desk’s success in performing its duties is largely thanks to the experience of the bureaucrats who man it. They also provide services to migrant workers who register at the last moment for their future protection. There is also a problem with the inaccuracy of the data maintained by the SLBFE, as some migrants are recorded twice. For example, a migrant can be counted when he or she first leaves Sri Lanka and then again when returning to the home country for a short visit. Moreover, some records are not updated until after problems are solved, so the monitoring of 2 Safe houses are run by the Sri Lankan embassies. These are places where migrants can stay when they face employment problems. They are given food and medicine, and those migrants who are imprisoned or serving a jail term can receive legal support with a view to their release.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

151

issues becomes questionable. Less monitoring will have a negative influence on minimizing abuses. Although some improvements are observed in policy implementation, the data gathered in the study still indicate gaps in policy implementation and limitations in reaching policy objectives.

Factors Affecting the Role of Bureaucrats in Policy Implementation in Sri Lanka This section explores three questions: (1) To what extent do the streetlevel bureaucrats ensure the protection of female migrant workers? (2) What roles do these bureaucrats perform? (3) How do they really act in their assigned roles, and what limits them from achieving the policy objectives? The answers to these questions aid analysis and provide a broader picture of how policies become successful—or not—due to street-level bureaucratic practices. Lack of Positive Attitudes Among Bureaucrats The study reveals that street-level bureaucrats’ attitudes to migrant workers and their attitudes regarding the roles they perform significantly affect their performance. Negative attitudes to policy changes and implementation are highlighted as relevantly affecting policy implementation. Due to politics and the political agenda of the government, bureaucrats must implement several policies, and with some changes from time to time. According to the interviewed bureaucrats, some of the changes are unfeasible, as the policies and circulars are inappropriate to the real problem-solving strategy; they are instead aligned with the political manifesto of whatever government is in power at the time. The bureaucrats are nevertheless duty-bound to follow these directives. In this regard, they convey a negative attitude to policies and policy changes. A major problem in our system is there is no continuation of policies. There are a number of circulars distributed within months but who can follow all these? When the new government assigned, they have changed the previous rules and practices. Those who favour the present government follow new rules, others do not. (A Deputy General Manager)

152

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

We cannot accept all the rules made by the government. We have pressure from different non-governmental agencies and media regarding our policies, we even know that some are useless and not feasible. At that time we use our experience and knowledge. (A Deputy General Manager)

Furthermore, positions within the bureaucracy are highly politicized, and officials with anti-government sentiments are not in a position to implement the policy successfully. All this is revealed through interviews with street-level bureaucrats: As my political ideology was not aligned with the previous government, they discriminated against me. Even though I fulfilled all my qualifications, I didn’t get opportunities to attend foreign programs, so why should I work hard here – I just worked for the salary. (A manager)

As this quote makes clear, the political ideology of bureaucrats influences the way they implement policies. The study period of this analysis coincided with a crucial transition period in Sri Lankan politics.3 Due to political changes, many officials were transferred internally, and this happened several times during the period of the study. Such changes had an impact on attitudes to the management system of the organization. It led to negative attitudes to policy implementation among the bureaucrats, thus to their inability to fulfill policy goals. Most importantly, bureaucrats’ attitudes to female migrant workers are negative. The majority of bureaucrats are men, and they hold stereotyped attitudes about women. They believe migrant women are shrewd and cunning, and they do not trust what the women say about their bad experiences in foreign countries. This prevents the bureaucrats from offering proper services to victims: Women also cheat the agency, by taking money from the agency and not going on time, or coming back before the contract terminates. Due to one complaint, an agency may get suspended and will lose [its] whole business. It is unbelievable that these migrant women were that much

3 This research was carried out in 2015, the time when Sri Lanka’s president was voted out of office. People were divided between supporting ex-President Mahinda Rajapakse and newly elected President Maithripala Sirisena. The United National Party, which Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe led, became the governing party.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

153

sexually abused by the employer, maybe this is the simple reason they give when they want to come back home. (A manager)

The above statement exemplifies the attitude that many officials have regarding reports of harassment by migrants’ employers; they claim that women are dishonest and merely trying to get compensation. They accuse the women of lacking good morals. Another factor found in the study is favoritism; bureaucrats favor recruitment agencies with whom they have close links and from whom they receive certain illegal benefits. Consequently, in the case of a dispute between a female migrant and a recruitment agency, the bureaucrat may side with the latter. Especially in regional centers, bureaucrats are friendly with recruitment agencies and care much less about the female migrants. Consequently, these women become victims of the system and do not receive the benefit of the policy. Poor Knowledge of Policy Goals The literature on policy implementation states that unambiguous policy goals may lead to policy implementation success. If this is the case, bureaucrats need to be very clear about policy goals. The collected data prove that almost every official at the SLBFE was aware of the SLBFE Act, which they must follow. All top-level bureaucrats who were interviewed were fully mindful of the Act, comprehended the sections relevant to their duties, and highlighted the importance of implementing the Act. However, among these same bureaucrats, only a few were able to demonstrate clear knowledge of what the National Migration Policy is and its relevance to the SLBFE Act. An obstacle to policy implementation is that the SLBFE officers do not properly understand the policy, while the majority of bureaucrats fail to understand the link between the action plan of the organization and the national policy. This denotes their low understanding of the policy and its goals. Furthermore, the study identifies inefficiency in the process of organizing programs, since many interviewed bureaucrats commented that they had not received the action plan at the beginning of the calendar year. As a result, they were unable to achieve the expected targets. This is mainly the fault of the SLBFE Planning Division, which is responsible for making yearly plans and the five-year corporate plan for the organization.

154

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

There is no systematic way of preparing the action plan, it should be distributed at the beginning of the year, but here it comes in the middle or just before the audit inquiry; nobody cares about the action plan. (Deputy General Manager).

This shows that there is no proper planning to initiate the policy in an effective manner. And DGMs have not given any importance to the action plan; hence, they do not share it with Managers. Managers have no knowledge of the action plan. However, the finding is that the policy goal is not fully internalized by these officials. They are more concerned with paperwork than with the needs and real problems the women face during the migration process. A policy will not be successful unless the implementers acquire proper knowledge and understanding of the policy objectives; this is identified as one factor influencing effective policy implementation in Sri Lanka. Low Bureaucratic Commitment Bureaucrats’ motivation and willingness to take responsibility lead to successful outcomes in the whole policy implementation process. So it is appropriate to ask: How motivated are the bureaucrats who deal directly with female labor migrants? For starters, could their salary affect their motivation? The findings of the research confirm that officers at all levels are satisfied with the salary and other incentives they receive. Apart from the salary, both the managers and the deputy general managers receive a cost of living allowance, a year-end bonus, a risk allowance, and an attendance allowance. Moreover, the deputy general managers are entitled to have a car with a driver. Other managers are entitled to use office transport services. In addition to these benefits, the bureaucrats get interest-free housing loans, medical coverage for channeling doctors, and for other medical expenses. All of the bureaucrats benefit from free uniforms, tailoring, and transport at a concessional rate. All the streetlevel bureaucrats are entitled to apply for grants covering the cost of their higher education. None of the interviewed bureaucrats expressed dissatisfaction regarding salary or other incentives received. According to top-level officers, the street-level bureaucrats are well paid when compared with those in other government agencies. This organization comes under the statutory board, and officers’ pay is higher than in other

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

155

government organizations. All the bureaucrats are provided with sufficient infrastructure facilities and financial incentives in order to motivate them to commit to the organization, and they are very satisfied with what they receive. Nevertheless, the study further explored whether financial resources may be the major factor that motivates bureaucrats in policy implementation. Non-financial incentives such as regular promotions and freedom to make decisions also affect their performance, and these factors can be detrimental to the way they fulfill their roles. Most of the high positions are filled based on personal connections and favors; thus, most bureaucrats are not satisfied with the promotion scheme practiced within the organization. Further, the politicization of bureaucracy is also highlighted, as many interviewees lament that they were not promoted during the previous regime due to their personal political views. Frequent transfers within the division and constant changes of policies are other factors. These factors reflect the motivation as well as the attitude towards policy implementation and this leads to non-implementation of policy. Even these frequent transfers became a challenge for me when collecting data as my respondents were transferred within a week different departments, I could not continue some of my interviews with them. I did not get my promotion on time. As my political ideology is not aligned with the previous government, they discriminated me though I have fulfilled all my qualifications. I am about to submit my Master’s thesis too. Not only the promotion, I did not get opportunities to attend foreign programmes. (A Manager) Transfers are not happening genuinely. It is all about their personal political agenda, actually we are powerless, our peers do not have any cooperation; some make rumors and top-level management accept it. Even though the present government says ‘good governance’, but top level management is not practicing any good governance here. (A Manager)

Even the trade unions represent party politics and do not represent and work for employees’ rights. This dissatisfaction and demotivation lead to the non-implementation of the policy. Many female bureaucrats are discriminated against on the basis of gender. Gender discrimination is especially significant among the management. Furthermore, since most of the senior managers are men, they do

156

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

not have enough sense of female issues when providing service to female labor migrants. When it comes to freedom to make decisions, most managers and lower-level officials do not enjoy the freedom of making decisions or of using their discretionary power as decision-makers. They face numerous limitations within the laws and regulations and feel alienated or powerless in their positions. This demotivates them and partly accounts for why they lose interest and the will to initiate new programs or implement policies. Low Capacity as Boundary Spanners Boundary spanners can be defined as “individuals who interact with the environment across the organizational boundaries” (Robertson, 1995, p. 73). As boundary spanners, street-level bureaucrats are expected to gather information from external organizations and to incorporate this information into their performance. To make relationships stronger, boundary spanners should have good communication skills. In this study, I explored how these street-level bureaucrats cooperate with other relevant organizations to solve the problems faced by migrant women; they must communicate with several ministries and manpower agencies, especially when the workers are abroad and need to be brought back home. The study reveals that top-level bureaucrats have good boundaryspanning capacities when they communicate with other organizations, ministries, foreign embassies, and so forth. The managers have face-toface communication with manpower agencies and migrant workers, and they are deeply involved in solving problems. However, they lack good communication and interpersonal relations with other organizations due to their personal agendas or politics. Some documents have to be issued by the divisional secretary which would get delayed unnecessarily. So it is not our problem; we usually do not communicate with other organizations for solving the problems of migrant workers unless it is very serious like repatriation, bringing back the dead body, etc. At the pre departure stage there are lots of formalities which need to be completed by different government organization like divisional secretariat, village officer; if they delay the process at their level then the whole process might get delayed. We cannot get involved in those processes; it is not our duty. (A Deputy General Manager)

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

157

As already stated, some street-level bureaucrats lack power to make decisions on account of being discriminated against due to some political or personal issues within the organization, and they must consult the senior bureaucrats. This limits their role as boundary spanners. Given that issues relating to migrant workers become widely debated in mass media, bureaucrats are pressed to cooperate with other relevant organizations, especially in the case of a migrant worker’s death or physical harassment. The study also reveals that language is a barrier to communication for both the migrants and the bureaucrats, especially when migrants appear in court cases or when there is a need to deal with police in Middle Eastern countries. Usually, the bureaucrats act as boundary spanners to a certain extent, in order to communicate with and negotiate between the migrants, their employers, and officials in the host country. However, data reveal that the information they gather externally, for the future development of the organization, is minimal. This indicates the limitation of these bureaucrats’ role as boundary spanners. Given how they perform their stipulated duties within the given frame, they are not recognized as boundary spanners. Adequate but Misused Resources and Inadequate Technical Expertise Resources are considered one of the important variables with regard to the role played by bureaucrats. In this present study, financial, technical, and human resources are considered. Financial resources are essential to successful policy implementation. This study focuses on annual allocations for staff development, allocations for maintenance, and funds allocated to policy implementation such as publicity and welfare for migrant workers and their maintenance. As a self-funding organization, the SLBFE largely depends on income generated from recruitment agency fees and individual recruitment fees. In addition, it earns money from license fees, CESS tax (a form of tax levied by the government for a different purpose), Sri Lanka-South Korea labor recruitments (an annual recruitment of labor based on an agreement between both countries), training fees, reimbursement of expenses through the Overseas Workers’ Welfare Fund, the commission received from the Air Ticket Unit, foreign aid, contributions from the World Bank and International Labor Organization (ILO) projects, and interest from investments. The SLBFE’s total income for the year 2014 was 3,469

158

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

million Sri Lankan rupees (US $1,921 million) and its total expenditure was 3,397 million SLR (US $1,881 million). The organization’s main expenditures are in the following categories: staff salaries and wages, establishment expenses including infrastructure development, operational expenses including maintenance of vehicles and computers, expenses for publicity and TV and radio advertisements, awareness programs, promotional expenses including marketing and market research, visits to manpower recruiting countries to establish new contracts, and signing memorandums of understanding. The welfare fund, which the SLBFE maintains using the individual registration fees, is totally allocated to welfare activities such as training, insurance, paying compensation, welfare for children, housing, and various other relevant activities. Therefore, it is evident that this organization is financially strong enough to provide better service to clients. The data reveal a lack of accountability and transparency in spending money. Misuse of money and corruption at all management levels paralyze the program. In addition, political interference results in spending the money to fulfill political promises given by ministers during elections. Currently, an audit inquiry is underway regarding the misuse of money, as confirmed by one manager: The previous regime was the most corrupted period. The foreign minister pumped all the money from the SLBFE for his political propaganda and even for personal matters, misused the official resources … gave more priority to developing unnecessary infrastructure at the minister’s office … nobody talks about those things. (A manager)

Officials also identify a lack of coordination and lack of management in finance, which restricts meeting the policy goals in the organization. Since bureaucrats at the SLBFE are the key actors in the organization, providing successful service depends on their administrative skills and analytical input in order to change the policy to meet migrants’ needs. However, the study reveals that most bureaucrats lack analytical capacity, especially regarding the issues which migrant women face throughout the process. Pre-departure issues such as the involvement of unreliable subagents and the submission of fraudulent documents are unsolved due to the lack of innovative ideas from bureaucrats.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

159

The problem here is that no one is analyzing the problem of domestic workers; every government tried to give minimum attention to the problem. Only after the problem occurred or when media highlighted the problems, then it draws government’s attention. The problem is like an iceberg; the hidden part is big; but no one analyses deeply the problem. They see only the tip of the problem; no one is doing research on the problem…no proper investigations (A Deputy General Manager). We are giving good training to the officers; but in return we are getting nothing from them. They do not come with innovative ideas to minimize corruption and protect the migrant workers. (The General Manager)

The study finds that since the SLBFE comes under a statutory category, it has its own procedure for recruiting officers. However, in practice, officer recruitment is based on political intervention, and such employees are not committed to their duties; they are not interested in actively participating in any training program to enhance their knowledge; their focus is instead on wielding political influence so as to survive in the organization. Unqualified recruitment due to political intervention also affects the non-implementation of the policy. According to deputy general managers, lack of education and inexperience of supportive staff make the implementation slow. Some people do not have common sense when we are working with them. It creates unnecessary problems between clients and the SLBFE. (A Deputy General Manager)

This indicates there is a problem regarding the SLB’s level of knowledge. Similar comments were received from some of the managers working at the regional office too. The knowledge of the SLBs related to their capability of analyzing and evaluating problems (Thomas & Grindle, 1990). These findings indicate that the analytical knowledge of SLBs is directly related to how policy is implemented by SLBs. Due to the aforementioned lack of adequate knowledge and lack of awareness of their responsibilities, some street-level bureaucrats fail to make the right decisions in a timely manner. Moreover, they are afraid to make decisions that go against the political views of high-level officials. This certainly affects policy implementation.

160

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

Finally, technical resources and know-how affect the way the bureaucrats fulfill their roles. Bureaucrats in regional offices have weaker technical knowledge than those at the head office. Their lack of knowledge and inefficiency in using technology result in them transferring part of their workload to the head office. This obviously affects the outcomes from the regional offices. The study therefore finds that lacking technical expertise and misuse of financial resources limit successful policy implementation.

Conclusion This chapter attempted to explain the extent to which Sri Lanka’s National Labor Migration Policy enables the protection of female migrants and how the street-level bureaucrats play their roles to achieve this policy’s goal. To pursue the aim of the study, Winter’s integrated model was employed in combination with the street-level bureaucracy theory. Lipsky (1980) demonstrates the importance of street-level bureaucrats in implementing policies, showing that top-level command and well-defined policy objectives are, on their own, insufficient for successful policy implementation. Effective policy implementation, policy implementation failure, and non-implementation of policies are key issues discussed in the field of public policy. To ensure success in policy implementation, bureaucrats play important roles. But some essential components must be in place for them to perform their roles successfully. The disposition of implementers is found to be the most important component when discussing effective policy implementation. At the same time, the level of acceptance of policy objectives may enhance the implementation procedure, as there may be opportunities to disown or reject policy objectives. Moreover, the commitment of bureaucrats in implementing the policy is crucial for successful implementation. Bureaucrats’ attitudes toward the policy therefore affect their execution of the policy. In the case of the National Labor Migration Policy in Sri Lanka, the study revealed that the policy has not been effectively implemented. Female migrant workers are placed in vulnerable situations even though the policy intention is to protect them and their families. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan experience of policy implementation shows that bureaucrats’ attitudes and acceptance of policy goals are as important as a sound understanding of the policy goals. Unless bureaucrats are serious about

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

161

implementing the policy, and unless they have a positive attitude to the policy, the policy is unlikely to meet its targets. Developing countries generally lack financial resources, often to such an extent that it affects policy implementation. The study found that in the case of the SLBFE, it is not the lack of financial resources but their mismanagement in combination with corruption and malpractice of the law that hinder successful implementation of the National Labor Migration Policy in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, less political intervention in bureaucrat recruitment and promotion would be likely to encourage bureaucrats to be more committed to policy implementation. When promotions are given based on qualifications and not due to political influence, bureaucrats may be inspired to commit to their work in a productive manner. Finally, a corruption-free working environment would also help bureaucrats have more peace of mind. Managing the financial resources and utilizing the expertise where it is needed may affect policy implementation success. Corruption practiced by recruitment agencies, with the collusion of bureaucrats, also leads to non-implementation of the policy. Finally, from this study on policy implementation in Sri Lanka, it can be concluded that the major element of successful policy implementation is the successful performance of bureaucrats. For this to happen, there is a need for strong commitment on the part of street-level bureaucrats toward the policy and the target group. Only when the bureaucrats play their roles well—with positive attitudes to the target group and the policy objectives—will policy implementation be successful.

References Abeyrathne, U. (2013). Participatory development and beneficiary implementer syndromes: A study on National Poverty Alleviation Programme in Sri Lanka. Social Sciences and Humanities Review, 1(01), 156–186. https://hss.ruh.ac. lk/ejournal%20vol03/publications/volume01/development_beneficiary.pdf. Arunatilake, N. (2014). Impact of migration and remittances on social mobility in Sri Lanka. In T. Kim & A. Mulakala (Eds.), Social mobility: Experiences and lessons from Asia. Asia Foundation/Korea Development Institute. Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research design (4th ed.). Sage. Gunawardene, A. S. (1989). The bureaucracy. In T. Navaratne, P. Fernando, & C. Elangasekara (Eds.), Public administration in Sri Lanka; A symposium. SLIDA.

162

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

Hettige, S., Ekanayake, E., Jayasundere, R., Rathnayake, A., & Figurado, P. (2012). Understanding the psychosocial issues faced by migrant workers and their families. Sri Lanka Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare. Hill, M., & Hupe, P. (2009). Implementing public policy (2nd ed.). Sage. Hill. M., & Hupe, P. (2014). Implementing public policy (3rd ed.). Sage. Hjern, B., & Hull, C. (1982). Implementation research as empirical constitutionalism. European Journal of Political Research, 10, 105–115. https://ejpr. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1982.tb00011.x. Jain, R. (1987). The role of bureaucracy in policy development and implementation in India. Southeast Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 15(02). http://www. jstor.org/stable/24491120. Jamil, I., & Panday, P. (2012). Inter-organizational coordination and corruption in urban policy implementation in Bangladesh: A case of Rajshahi City Corporation. International Journal of Public Administration, 35(5). https:// doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2012.661169. Jayasuriya, L. (2000). Welfarism and Politics in Sri Lanka, Experience of a Third World Welfare State. Perth: University of Western Australia. Lipsky, M. (1980). Street level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services. Sage Foundation. Mazmanian, D., & Sabatier, P. (1983). Implementation and public policy. University Press of America. Maznavi, N. (2004). Reforming the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Act: Increasing protection for migrant workers and employing lessons from the Philippines. Migrant Workers; LST Review, 14(201). McConnell, A. (2010). Policy success, policy failure and grey areas in-between. International Public Policy, 30(3), 345–362. https://pdfs.semanticscholar. org/eed8/031f3228199c52332acb2cb21118e8ecea2e.pdf. McConnell, A. (2015). What is policy failure? A primer to help navigate the maze. Public Policy and Administration, 30(3–4), 221–242. National Labour Migration Policy for Sri Lanka. (2009). Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare. Navaratna-Bandara, A. (2013). History and context in public administration in Sri Lanka. In L. Sabharwal & E. Berman (Eds.), Public administration in South Asia. CRC Press. Palumbo, D. J., & Maynard-moody, S. (1984). Measuring Degrees of Successful Implementation: Achieving Policy versus Statutory Goals, Evaluation Review, 8(1)‚ 45–74. Pinnawala, M. (2009). Gender transformation and female migration: Sri Lankan domestic workers negotiate transnational household relations. Shaker Publishing.

6

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF STREET-LEVEL …

163

Pressman, J., & Wildavisky, A. (1984). Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland. University of California Press (First edition 1973). Robertson, P. J. (1995). Involvement in boundary-spanning activity: Mitigating the relationship between work setting and behavior. Journal of Public Administration and Theory, 5(1), 73–98. Sabatier, P., & Mazmanian, D. (1979). The conditions of effective implementation: A guide to accomplishing of policy analysis. Policy Analysis, 5(4), 481–504. Sabatier, P., & Mazmanian, D. (1980). Implementation of public policy: A framework of analysis. Policy Studies Journal, 8(4), 538–559. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment. (1985). Act, No. 21 of 1985. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment. (2014). Annual Budget Report. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment. (2017). Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment. Sri Lanka Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare. (2009). National Labor Migration Policy for Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Parliament Secretariat. (1978). The constitution of the socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Thomas, J. W.‚ & Grindle, M. S. (1990). After the Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in Developing Countries. World Development, 18(8)‚ 1163– 1181. Ukwatta, S. (2010). Economic and social impacts of the migration of Sri Lankan transnational domestic workers on families and children left behind. https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/ 63080/8/02whole.pdf. Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The policy implementation process: A conceptual framework. Administration & Society, 6(4), 445–488. https://doi.org/10.1177/009539977500600404. Warnapala, W. (1974). Civil service administration in Ceylon: A study in bureaucratic adaptation. Department of Cultural Affairs. Warnapala, W. (2012, September 4). Public bureaucracy and development. The Island. http://www.island.lk. Wickramasekra, P. (2013, January 23–25). Globalization, international migration and development: Rhetoric and reality [Keynote address]. International conference on migration, Colombo, National Science Foundation. Winter, S. C. (2002, August 29–September 1). Explaining bureaucratic behaviour in social and regulatory policies. Paper prepared for the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. Winter, S. C. (2003, November 6–8). Political control, street-level bureaucrats and information asymmetry in regulatory and social policies. Paper prepared

164

K. D. DUSHMANTHI SILVA

for the Annual Research Meeting of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Washington, DC. Winter, S. C. (2012) Implementation perspectives: Status and reconsideration. In G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), The handbook of public administration. Sage. Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods. Applied social research method, series 5. Sage.

Dushmanthi Silva obtained her PhD from the University of Tribhuvan, Nepal. She is a senior lecturer at the Department of Sociology, University of Ruhuna, Sri Lanka. The main focus of her teaching is on gender studies, research methodology, social aspects of child labor, and the sociology of migration.

CHAPTER 7

The Nexus Between Citizenship Rights, Quality of Government, and Public Services: Evidence from Sri Lanka Ramesh Ramasamy

A substantial amount of empirical evidence supports the claim that the persistent marginalization and underdevelopment experienced by ethnic minorities stem from long-standing structural discrimination, of which the deprivation of nationality remains a central feature (Christina & Martina, 2010, p. 193; Kymlika & Norman, 2004, pp. 30–31; Lister, 1997). Nevertheless, merely granting citizenship to stateless people is unlikely to repair the long-standing discrimination and institutionalized exclusion that stem from poor governance, unresponsive public institutions, and discriminatory policies and practices. This pattern pushes ethnic minorities into an extremely vulnerable situation because it blocks them from gaining access to governance institutions and welfare services (Houtzager & Archarya, 2010, p. 1; Shunsuke, 2013, p. 17). The unfortunate pattern is found in Sri Lanka, in the plantation community. These

R. Ramasamy (B) Faculty of Arts, Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya, Kandy, Sri Lanka © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_7

165

166

R. RAMASAMY

people are a legacy of the indentured colonial system of the nineteenth century, under which people from South India migrated to the newly developed plantations in Sri Lanka. Since the beginning of their time in Sri Lanka, the migrants encountered many types of discrimination and structural inequality in the socio-economic sphere. Although they are now Sri Lankan citizens with full legal status, they are still marginalized within the society and have been for decades, especially in governance structures, and they continue to remain unintegrated with mainstream social development. To correct this situation, there is a need to understand the long-standing structural inequalities and their dynamics from the perspectives of citizenship and quality of government. It has been argued that to be “full members” of a community, citizens should possess civil, political, and social citizenship rights (Marshall, 1950). Most importantly, social citizenship rights are vital for full citizenship, as they enable individuals from disadvantaged social groups to effectively exercise the rights of civil and political citizenship (Jones & Gaventa, 2002; Lister, 1997; Marshall, 1950). The concept of social citizenship began developing in the late nineteenth century and continued through the mid-twentieth century, aided in particular by the expansion of the welfare state in many countries after World War II. According to Marshall (1950, p. 8), “social citizenship encompasses a range of rights including economic welfare, social security, and welfare services, emphasizing that citizens have the right to share to the full in the social heritage and the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” This definition clarifies the citizen’s entitlement to social rights, and it offers a standard for a dignified and decent life. In a similar vein, advocates of quality of government show that access to public services and enjoyment of formal citizenship rights depend on the impartial and fair working of public institutions and officials. When policy implementers are neutral, fair, impartial, benevolent, honest, and rule-bound, the above principles can be practiced in an even-handed manner (Jørgensen & Sørensen, 2012; Liu et al., 2019; Nabatchi, 2017; Rothstein & Kumlin, 2010; Suzuki & Demircioglu, 2019). The legal status of citizenship should ideally bring with it a range of social rights, including the right to gain access to public services. Nevertheless, that legal status alone is insufficient for creating a state of equality and social solidarity; it is more likely to be achieved through the universal provision of social rights. A global approach to the provision of social services

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

167

is essential for realizing the full potential of such services as components in transformative social policy. Access to social services can reduce inequalities across income, class, gender, ethnicity, and location. Integrated systems of social service provision grounded in universal principles can be redistributive, act as powerful drivers of solidarity and social inclusion, and improve the capabilities of the poor. If disadvantaged people are provided with equal access to the same kinds of services enjoyed by other groups, universalism may also act as an instrument for redistribution and social inclusion (UN, 2010, p. 162). What we observe in Sri Lanka, however, is a form of fragmented universalism that has diminished the availability and quality of public services for minorities and undermined the effectiveness and redistributive outcomes of universal welfare policies. What has caused this fragmented universalism? To begin with, it seems clear that how public institutions implement policies in diverse contexts is likely to single out certain groups based on identity and social affiliation (UN, 2010, p. 162). This could be one reason for the plantation community’s enduring lack of access to social rights. But the one question immediately triggers several more: Can formal citizenship put an end to years of exclusion and institutional discrimination? In what ways does formal citizenship help people gain access to state-funded welfare services and entitlements? And why have plantation people been unable to reap the benefits of formal citizenship? Existing theory does not provide a good understanding or answers to these questions, in part because the problem is under-researched in the Sri Lankan context. The present chapter therefore aims to help fill the gap in research by examining Sri Lanka’s public service delivery through the lens of citizenship and the quality of government.

The Sri Lankan Case The legacy of statelessness is part of Sri Lanka’s post-independence history. In 1948, when Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain, many plantation Tamils were deprived of their citizenship. Not until the late 1980s did the process of granting them citizenship begin, and it was finally achieved through the Citizenship Acts of 2003 and 2009.1

1 The Citizenship (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 2003, and Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Act No. 5 of 2009.

168

R. RAMASAMY

Sri Lanka is therefore often considered a “success story” in addressing statelessness. The plantation community mainly consists of descendants of immigrants from South India, brought to work on Sri Lanka’s plantations in 1837. They are variously identified as Indian Tamils, Plantation Tamils,2 and Hill Country Tamils. In 1931, plantation people were reckoned to constitute 15.43% of the country’s total population, yet by the time of the Census Report of 2011, they accounted for only 4.2%. The census report thus shows a stark reduction in the ratio between plantation Tamils and the population as a whole. After the deprivation of citizenship rights in 1948, several talks between the government of India and the government of Sri Lanka were held regarding the future of the stateless people in Sri Lanka. In 1964, both countries finally reached an agreement, called the Srima -Shastri Pact of 1964. According to the Pact, out of an estimated 975,000 stateless people, India agreed to accept 525,000 with their natural increase, while the Sri Lankan government agreed to grant citizenship to 300,000 along with their natural growth (Sahadevan, 1995). Implementing the Pact resulted in a mass expulsion of the third and fourth generations of the plantation community—people who had never even seen India (Kader, 2017; Sahadevan, 1995). The plantations are recognized as the “homeland” and domicile of this community. About two-thirds of the families living on the plantations are either workers or their dependents. The remaining third, although freed from estate labor and involved in other activities, continue to live on the plantations. The plantations are therefore recognized today as the plantation people’s permanent residential areas. Many social structures are to be found on the plantations, and some of them are discriminatory. Failure to understand the long-term impact of statelessness and the ongoing structural discrimination endured by plantation Tamils can further extend their marginalization. This chapter aims to generate deeper understanding of the connection between citizenship rights, quality of governance, and access to public services for the plantation Tamils. For most citizens in a country, governance expresses itself in the form of public service delivery, as public services are the main—if not the only—means of contact that individuals have with their government and bureaucracy. As a result, people judge the quality of governance based 2 The terms “plantation people” and “plantation Tamils” are used throughout the chapter.

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

169

on their experience of receiving essential public services and of how they are treated by officials. In other words, the state-citizen relation plays a substantial role in shaping citizens’ perceptions of the quality and performance of governance. Citizens tend to assume that their country is poorly governed if they cannot access essential services, if public services are of poor quality, and if they must pay bribes to access the services to which they are already entitled. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring the plantation Tamils’ access to public services in Sri Lanka. The first section offers theoretical insights and operationalizes the variables of the study. This is followed by an elucidation of the study’s design, an examination of the factors that influence access to public services, and an analysis of the impact of the quality of government and formal citizenship on access to public services. The chapter closes with a summary of the findings.

Determinants of Access to Public Services: Theoretical Insights There is evidence that the delivery of public services to ethnically and socially disadvantaged groups is likely to improve if these groups have formal citizenship (Blitz & Lynch, 2011; Haque, 1999; Kymlika & Norman, 2004; Marshall, 1950; Wass, 2011), service access that is equal to that of other groups in society (Aday & Anderson, 1974; De Jong & Rizvi, 2009; Penchansky & Thomas, 1981; Ribot & Peluso, 2003), and if civil servants adhere to the principles of impartiality, integrity, fairness, and equality before the law (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014; Rothstein, 2011, 2019; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Stensöta, 2012). In this study, the variable access to public services is the dependent variable, and citizenship and quality of government are independent variables. The aim is to explain how far and in what manner the independent variables influence public service delivery in Sri Lanka. Access to public services is measured based on respondents’ perceptions. Three dimensions of access are considered: availability of services, affordability of services, and accessibility. For both policymakers and citizens, access is conceptualized as seeking the effectiveness of various welfare programs and public policy. From the service provider’s point of view, the concept denotes resources, the volume of services, distribution, redistribution, and organizational

170

R. RAMASAMY

structure. From the citizen’s perspective, it is about convenience, information, quality, equality, availability, and the accessibility of services (Aday & Anderson, 1974, p. 212). In other words, access is equated with entry into state institutions and the utilization of services. According to Penchansky and Thomas (1981, p. 128), the concept of access is most frequently seen as relating to citizen’s ability, willingness, and means to enter the service delivery mechanism. Penchansky and Thomas (1981) understand the critical dimensions of access to include availability, accessibility, accommodation, affordability, and acceptability. The present study, however, focuses only on the dimensions of accessibility, affordability, and availability. This is because during the pilot study, the dimension of acceptability showed similarity with the three selected dimensions. Furthermore, it was difficult to collect empirical evidence for acceptability due to the sensitivity of information and the lack of operational measures. Therefore, partly because accommodation and acceptability did not have a significant impact on answering the research questions and partly in order to avoid ambiguity in data collection and to ensure validity and reliability, only three dimensions were used. According to Ribot and Peluso (2003, p. 156), “access is by all possible means by which a person can benefit from things, namely, the ability to obtain mandated public services and goods.” These theorists find limited access to be the most obvious problematic factor in the delivery of public services in marginalized communities. Jong and Rizvi (2008, p. 4) propound that access to public service depends, first, on the societal commitment and institutional capacity to deliver services, and second, on citizens’ own ability and capacity to access and use the service. In this study, institutional aspects of access (service delivery system, service centers, the volume of services, dissemination of information, coordination), as well as citizens’ aspects of access (utilization of services, capacity to access services, quality, and satisfaction), are contemplated to understand the influence of the independent variables on access. Respondents were asked various questions based on the above operational measures, all in order to map their access to public services.

Quality of Government A growing body of literature indicates that the quality of government has a substantial influence on improving access to governance, public service

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

171

quality, and institutional quality. According to Rothstein and Teorell (2008), quality of government refers to the impartiality of institutions that exercise government powers. They argue that public institutions and officials need to adhere to the key principles of impartiality and fairness in implementing policies and programs. When implementing policies and delivering services, public officials need to be impartial and professional and treat every citizen equally, irrespective of personal liking (Cupit, 2000, cited in Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). Here, impartiality means strictly following the rule of law and standard operating procedures, and not being influenced by informal connections or acting on one’s own preferences. Importantly, the notion of quality of government and its fundamental principles can help researchers understand the extent to which public officials and institutions in Sri Lanka uphold the principles in service provision and their impact on the plantation community. When a society is diverse, these principles are all the more pertinent for creating just, inclusive, and unbiased institutions at all levels, irrespective of all differences between people in the society. This is a central tenet of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal no. 16.3 In general, citizens interact mostly with street-level bureaucracy and are likely to encounter various forms of (mal)treatment; therefore, front-line officials must follow the principles of impartiality and fairness in welfare service provision. In the case of plantation Tamils, given that front-line officials are entrusted with substantial power, they seem to have considerable influence in determining access to public institutions and public services. This pattern enables them to disregard the correct principles of service provision and to favor their own personal preferences in policy implementation. Citizens favorably evaluate government performance when public institutions assure equal treatment and procedural justice in administrative processes (Van Ryzin, 2015). Similarly, fair treatment of citizens, neutrality, and impartiality are considered critical public values in service provision (Jørgensen & Sørensen, 2012; Nabatchi, 2017). It is argued that government impartiality enhances service quality both from the recipients’ side and the public services’ (civil servants’) supply side (Suzuki & 3 Sustainable Development Goal no. 16: To promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000 247785.

172

R. RAMASAMY

Demircioglu, 2019, p. 5). Here, impartiality is viewed as the mindset of public officials; it is this group’s mindset that is of special interest because they considerably influence the public’s perception of the working of public institutions and hold discretionary power in making and implementing decisions. This chapter, however, intends to examine impartiality and fairness from the point of view of both the service seekers (plantation Tamils) and public officials, in order to understand how impartiality and fairness are practiced by specific service providers. This is an area which has thus far been under-researched. The chapter also examines the level of trust that plantation people have in public institutions (hereafter called “institutional trust”), thus to understand what constitutes their perception of such institutions’ trustworthiness. Institutional fairness and impartiality are positively correlated with institutional trust—they can raise the general level of trust as well as close the trust gap between the majority and the minority—because institutional fairness has a strong positive impact on minorities (Rothstein & Kumlin, 2010, p. 68). People learn lessons about the trustworthiness of people in their society by generalizing their perceptions of institutional fairness. If the bureaucratic institutions fulfill their duties in line with objective indicators, this is likely to increase fairness and impartiality in governance structures, which are also linked with procedural justice. Against this backdrop, qualitative evidence of institutional fairness and impartiality (or the lack thereof) in relation to plantation Tamils would help us understand what shapes institutional trust in Sri Lanka.

Social Citizenship Existing literature demonstrates a close connection between public services and citizenship. Citizenship scholars argue that the legal status of citizenship encompasses a range of social, civil, and political rights, enabling one to enjoy public services, specifically social rights (Lister, 2005; Marshall, 1950). Social rights may include education, health, employment, housing, social security benefits, economic welfare, and other public services offered by the government through state funding. Civil rights may include the right to expression, movement, assembly, individual freedom of thought, religion, and so on, while political rights may include the right to vote, political participation, and to hold office (Marshall, 1950, pp. 21–27). But it seems that civil and political rights are

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

173

on their own unlikely to enable one to exercise the full potential of citizenship; for this, social rights are necessary. It is claimed that the exercise of some rights in one area depends on certain rights in other areas. For instance, the right to participate in politics directly or indirectly is dependent upon both civil rights and social rights, and enjoying civil rights is dependent upon social rights, and vice versa (Marshall, 1950, cited in Lister, 2005, p. 477). Social rights point to the principle of equal status in the social sphere, and the state guarantees such equality through the citizenship contract (Lister, 2005, p. 479). The chapter therefore only explores the plantation Tamils’ social rights, since they already have civil and political rights. Revi (2014, p. 460) argues that working migrants participate in the economic life of a country by adding value and paying taxes. Still, they are not entitled to exercise full social rights that stem from legal membership in the political community. In other words, marginalized communities and economic migrants contribute significantly to growth, but they are often thought to be parasitic on the welfare system of the host society (Isin & Turner, 2008, p. 11). In the study on which this chapter is based, the impact of formal citizenship rights was measured through development indicators such as education, health, right to housing, land, employment, participation in civil service, higher education, and the level of poverty, which were measured via a set of questions and a review of a large volume of secondary material.

Design of the Study A qualitative research approach was used to collect data to answer the research questions. The data were collected through semi-structured and in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) in Kandy and Nuwara Eliya districts in the later part of 2015 and early 2016. Plantation people live in nine districts of Sri Lanka; of these, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, and Kandy are home to the majority of these people. I selected the districts of Kandy and Nuwara Eliya because approximately 57% of the plantation people live in Nuwara Eliya and form the majority, while the Kandy district is home to only 16% of the plantation people (DCS, 2011). This enabled me to make comparisons when exploring the dynamics of the problem of access to public services and the factors involved in it. I selected a tea plantation managed by a private company in the Nuwara Eliya and a government-owned tea plantation in the Kandy.

174

R. RAMASAMY

Table 7.1 Profile of the focus group discussions Categories of respondents

1 2 3 4

Plantation workers Non-workers Plantation youth Teachers Total

No. of FGDs and participants Nuwara Eliya

No. of participants

Kandy

No. of participants

01

07

01

09

01 01

09 10

01 01

08 09

01 04

07 33

– 03

08 34

Source Field Notes, 2014/2015

This gave scope to examine the service delivery status in the private and government-owned tea estates. Using the purposive sampling technique, I conducted 55 interviews (28 in Kandy and 27 in Nuwara Eliya) and four FGDs among various categories of respondents: plantation workers, plantation youth, plantation political leaders, trade union representatives, plantation managers, civil society activists, public servants, and academics. The interviewed sample consisted of 31 male and 23 female respondents from 19 to 55 years of age. The FGD participants consisted of 17 male and 14 female respondents. Interviews and FGDs helped me map perceptions and attitudes concerning public service delivery, accessibility to services, policies, practices, institutional challenges, implementation of policies, and access to public institutions. I collected secondary data by reviewing published and unpublished documents, journals, and government reports. Each FGD included seven to ten purposively selected respondents, and discussions lasted for about one and a half hours. All discussions were recorded with respondents’ prior permission and transcribed based on relevant themes and patterns to match and analyze the data. Respondents for both the interviews and the FGDs were selected through mixed purposive sampling (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 111), using criteria such as social background, ethnicity, age, education, profession, and gender. Plantation people, management, and service providers were incorporated into the sample design to prevent bias in the data collection and findings. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide the profiles of the respondents selected through the different methods for accessing reliable data.

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

175

Table 7.2 Profile of the interviewed participants Categories of respondents

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Plantation residents Plantation management Local and central politicians NGO/Civil society activist Trade unions Teachers/academics Civil servants Total

Selected cases

Sample size

Nuwara Eliya

Kandy

11 3 2

11 3 1

22 06 03

1

2

03

1 1 8 27

1 1 8 27

02 02 16 54

Source Field Notes, 2015/2016

The sample frame appears to be relatively male-dominated. Although females form the majority in the plantation sector, it was difficult to select female respondents from different categories and elicit responses from them concerning issues of access to public service due to a sense of fear. During the interviews, which were conducted in homes in the presence of their husbands or relatives, I observed attempts by husbands or relatives to influence the women’s responses and views. They might have felt that exposing negative views on public institutions and services could increase the likelihood of further discrimination and exclusion in governance structures. Furthermore, female public servants were reluctant to talk on this issue at their office premises and in the presence of their male colleagues, probably in order to avoid unnecessary problems. The survey respondents ranged from 19 to 55 years of age and above. The study, however, primarily represents the views of people between 31 and 55 because the respondents in this age group participated more actively in the study as compared with other age groups. The educational level also varies—a significant proportion had completed the advanced level and above, and the rest had completed either primary or secondary education levels. This also appeared to influence their responses. The respondents with higher degrees were mostly public servants. The civil servants and plantation workers form the majority of respondents in this study, and different occupations showed the respondents’ exposure and experience with government institutions and their views on public service

176

R. RAMASAMY

delivery. Further, the research captured the working experience and the aspect of being raised on a plantation, both of which helped me understand the extent to which public servants are aware of the problems, rights, and entitlements of the plantation people. Finally, the variable of ethnicity reflects Tamils and a few Sinhala public servants and plantation managers. This variable allowed me to form a balanced view in analyzing data and in understanding the problematic phenomenon of the study. In this study, several steps were taken to ensure reliability of responses collected through interviews and FGDs. Theoretically, reliability denotes pursuing the same procedures used by earlier researchers with a view to arriving at same findings. Accordingly, reliability helps to minimize errors and biases in the study (Yin, 2014, p. 48). In order to increase reliability, the study adopted the case study research designs used by previous researchers. Further, a clear case study database and protocol were developed to ensure reliability of responses collected through interviews and FGDs in the study areas. Interview guide and the steps taken during pre-field work, during fieldwork, and report preparation have been documented in a diary based on timelines in order to ensure the consistency of responses. Transcripts and codes, themes and patterns were re-checked to ensure that the empirical evidence or responses do not contain mistakes. Before the actual field data collection, a pilot study was conducted by using the interview guide to check the appropriateness of the data collection tools and to make changes in the interview and FGD guides to capture reliable and authentic information. Findings of the pilot study were useful to crosscheck the final findings of the study including responses. Variables and some of the questions of this study were mostly same, as those other scholars have used in the similar topics of study. Therefore, research instruments adopted in this study are well organized, recognized and well accepted in the academia, and widely used, which helped further enhance the validity of the responses and the research process as a whole.

Findings and Discussions This section has two parts. The first part discusses the current status of access to public services in the plantation sector, and the second part examines the influence of the quality of government and citizenship on access to public services.

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

177

Current Status of Access to Public Services in the Plantation Sector Citizens’ Capacity, Participation in Governance, and Access During the stateless period (1948–1988), trade unions were the plantation community’s principal instrument for bargaining and winning workers’ rights. By the late 1980s, the citizenship laws transformed trade union politics into parliamentary politics. Nevertheless, this study finds that prolonged statelessness and lack of participation in governance seem to have an enduring impact on the plantation people’s capacity to access public services, even now that they are rightful citizens. Public institutions play a pivotal role in shaping access for individuals belonging to disadvantaged communities, such that they can benefit from their welfare rights. Thus, people’s capacity to make contact with public servants in diverse arenas tends to influence their ability to actually gain access to public services. A significant number of respondents noted that “those with better contacts, better education, and better endowments are more likely to gain access to public services.” Evidence shows that various forms of contact such as trade union affiliation, ethnicity, and informal relationships with officials influence gaining access in the plantation sector. That is, members of powerful trade unions seek their political and union leaders’ support to influence officials to get things done. In some instances, members use the influence to build an informal relationship with officials, allowing both parties to share benefits; this is most of all visible in social security programs, subsidy distribution, relief services, poverty alleviation, and local-level infrastructure development projects. Empirical evidence also shows that public officials can act unfairly during the service delivery process, for instance, through control mechanisms, modes of selection, communication, or through interviews. The outcome may be to limit accessibility and eligibility. This is noted in poverty alleviation and social security programs. Applications are mostly available in the Sinhalese language, and there is a high probability of rejecting Tamil applications due to the lack of Tamil-speaking officials. Furthermore, due to unsatisfactory documentation (birth certificate, identity card, voter registration) on the part of the plantation people, they cannot fulfill the requirements to become eligible to receive services. Officials strictly impose these requirements on plantation people, causing them to need to go back and forth between plantation management and

178

R. RAMASAMY

public institutions to collect and submit these documents. In practice, most fail to meet deadlines in submitting relevant documents due to administrative red tape and limited access to proper information in the Tamil language, causing more delays. Another critical condition that Sri Lanka’s public institutions impose on this community is that they need to submit residential proof supplied by the plantation manager in order to access social security benefits, poverty relief, subsidies, and numerous other services. This criterion is only applicable to plantation people of Sri Lanka, and it needs to be tested with other contexts where the plantation industry exists, for instance in India and Kenya. It was noted in the FGDs that plantation people are ill-informed on certain public services and are uncertain and scared of dealing with these institutions due to their previous bitter experiences. They seem to have become fearful of dealing with public institutions due to lack of interaction—partly because of poor civic virtues and skills. This indicates that when ethnic minorities and marginalized people persistently experience indifferent or discriminatory treatment by public institutions, they develop a negative perception or attitude about public institutions, which makes them avoid interacting with such institutions and officials. Access to Local-Level Governance Institutions and Service Delivery The present study indicates that those who deserve public services such as poverty relief, elderly care, food rations, health care, subsidies, employment, and housing are prone to encounter systematic discrimination. The local-level public institutions (Divisional Secretariats) provide these services, and many public officials are involved in the distribution process. As per the evidence, the distribution is not entirely free from political interference. Local-level political organizers and representatives of the ruling government are more likely to exert influence in a manner that benefits their supporters and partisan politics. In general, the ethnic majority’s political representatives tend to support their own communities, and public officials also tend to play favorites due to ethnic affiliation and vested interests. In such cases, plantation people are more likely to receive minimal access due to their lack of political representation and the ethnocentric political patterns that influence governance institutions. In some instances, civil servants support the ethnic majority’s political leaders who determine the eligibility criteria for public services and resource distribution in ways that benefit the ethnic majority more than

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

179

others. This bias seems to be reflected in all spheres of service provision, including education, health, transport, housing, employment, land distribution, and social security provision. For instance, as per the disaster management regulations, plantation people are not entitled to receive disaster relief because they do not own land—the application itself indicates the ownership, attested by the Village Officer. Interestingly, it is argued that since plantation people live on privatized plantation-company land, they can no longer claim land ownership. This does not apply to other citizens in Sri Lanka. Lack of land ownership appears to negatively influence people’s ability to gain access to some other services as well. In poverty alleviation programs, estate workers4 are not considered eligible participants because they work on estates and receive a fixed daily wage of 4 USD. Non-workers living on the estates are eligible for poverty alleviation programs, but there are still many obstacles to obtaining the benefits. This indicates that when officials apply rules and procedures, they fail to comply with what is stipulated in generally accepted laws and procedures. It also shows that marginalized communities are simply not entitled to take part in the solid substance of civilized life, even though they have gained formal citizenship. The issue of formal citizenship was entirely solved in 2003, but the status of access to public services and public institutions and the nature of service delivery continue to remain unchanged. The following statement further illustrates this: In fact, we all are citizens of Sri Lanka, but I cannot say that our lives have become better after obtaining citizenship; our life depends on plantation industry and management, we do not enjoy the substantial benefits of citizenship rights. I would say it is only nominal citizenship. Our day-today life becomes hard, as we only depend on limited welfare services. We are still being treated as second-class citizens in the larger framework of governance in this country. A 33-year-old plantation worker from Nuwara Eliya (2015)

4 The plantation community is comprised largely of two groups. The first group includes the estate or plantation workers—they work and live on the tea plantations. The second group includes the non-estate workers; they live on the plantation settlements but do not work there. This group also includes retired workers, youth, and those who work outside the estates. The people in this second group live on the estates but do not receive any support from plantation management because they are considered non-estates workers. They rely on public services even though such services are not fully accessible.

180

R. RAMASAMY

The above respondent lamented that the plantation Tamils were not enjoying rights such as health care, education, housing, land, and social security in a manner equal to that of other communities. For instance, only 5.6% of the plantation people own a house, whereas home ownership is 83.7% at the national level; and the national poverty headcount is 4.4% at the national level, but it is at 11% on the plantations (Institute of Policy Studies, 2017). It is argued that poor participation in governance has pushed this community into an increasingly vulnerable situation. This is profoundly unfortunate, for studies reveal that individuals who participate in society, governance, and politics are more likely to become “active citizens.” Such engagement and participation play a vital role in democratizing state institutions. Structural and Geographical Marginalization Another issue that has become increasingly important in the plantation community is the plight of non-workers and their access to public services. It is evident that the plantation community is undergoing rapid transformation, from worker families to non-estate worker families, due to the expansion of educational facilities, employment opportunities, and increased connectivity outside the plantations. The study discovered that about 45% of the people living in the study area did not work on the plantations (Field Study, 2015). This increase in the number of non-workers leads to its own set of problems that the estate management must grapple with. Many respondents said they encountered double discrimination in that they are ignored by the estate management as well as by the government agencies. During the interviews and FGDs, non-workers mentioned that “we are no more laborers, but we are equal citizens of Sri Lanka. Why are public servants unable to understand this reality? We need public services that are delivered to the rest of the communities.” The study finds that barriers to accessing public services arise under specific conditions. First, the geographical location of public services may affect their accessibility and availability, as receivers need to spend money on transportation. A pattern of housing and residential concentration may also create barriers based on the location of service centers. A considerable number of respondents reported that geographical access to public institutions is a serious problem. They see the expense incurred for acquiring public service as problematic. For instance, to obtain a birth certificate, one must fill out an application form in the government agency.

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

181

This involves the significant cost of travel and a salary reduction due to a missed workday on the estate. Analyzing responses indicates that acquiring civil registration and other public services is a financial challenge for plantation people, caused by the public institutions’ location. They must take time off work, thus lose pay. This underscores the problems of lack of citizen capacity, prolonged statelessness, limited access to information, geographical isolation, and structural barriers, all of which are primary reasons why the plantation community still has limited access to public services.

The Influence of Quality of Government and Citizenship on Access to Public Services Quality of Government, Policy Practices, and Public Service Delivery Despite the formal citizenship guaranteed in Sri Lanka’s constitution, the realization of rights and entitlements is challenging due to policies, indifferent policy practices, and modes of governance. Addressing the governance issues this community faces and rectifying the discrimination they have endured partly depend on inclusive governance. Deep-rooted, structural barriers to their inclusion often persist despite law reforms. As already stated, this community’s distance from formal state structures has led to their prolonged exclusion from the governance process. The sorry situation also relates to the absence of the state within the plantations, for they continue to be run as private businesses, with the plantation companies taking over many functions that state institutions execute in other parts of the country. Dependence on the plantation companies for welfare needs and the brokerage by trade unions (linking with plantation companies and outsiders) has perpetuated the distance from and limited access to state institutions. The state’s poor penetration into the plantations paved the way for the plantation companies to take over quasi-governmental functions in the areas within their control. Eventually, these companies came to be characterized as non-democratic and quasi-government service providers. As such, it is hard to define the boundary between non-state and state functions. But there is more: owing to the enclave nature of the plantation community and the lack of citizenship rights, trade unions in the sector have provided the main link between the community and the outside world for many years. Plantation workers are often members

182

R. RAMASAMY

of long-established trade unions who mediate between workers and their employers and deal with external agencies such as the service delivery institutions, police, and other state institutions, on behalf of their members. Trade unions continue to have political patronage, by which they interact with public institutions to get things done. Many respondents stated that trade unions have failed to bring effective changes into their lives due to conflicts of interest. A significant number of respondents also stated that policies seem to be discriminatory in many instances, and in cases where the policies are fair and impartial, implementation appears to be unfair. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, specific eligibility criteria in some policies are more likely to discriminate against this community, examples being poverty alleviation and social security programs. Some policy implementation processes are also discriminatory, since discretionary power, clientelism, ethnicity, and political links appear to shape service delivery at the local level. This affects the poor and marginalized sections of society and also the governance. Indifferent policy practices, unfair institutional working, and clientelist practices remain significant barriers in making public services available to the poor and the marginalized. However, in practice, some rules, regulations, norms, affiliations, associational relationships, and institutional working are more prone than others to exclude certain groups of the population from public institutions (Kabeer, 2000, pp. 86–87). Such a situation is likely to threaten the key idea of inclusive citizenship. This shows that existing governance structures make it difficult for poor segments of the population to have a rightful share in public service provision and development. The study finds that the plantation people are very distrustful of street-level bureaucrats because the latter hardly visit the estates and are unlikely to fulfill this community’s needs and demands. Moreover, the ill-treatment of this community by officials seems to have a reverberating impact on institutional trustworthiness in that bad experiences appear to influence children, family, and community members to such an extent that they not only generate but also entrench negative perceptions of public institutions. But the study has also attempted to capture the views of public servants to understand how they perceive plantation people. The civil servants who were interviewed revealed that they trust the plantation community less than other groups in society, particularly when plantation people seek

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

183

identification documents, housing, poverty relief, and various social security payments. In such contexts, public servants take a long time to verify the documents produced by plantation people. It may take days and even weeks to receive a response from public institutions. A substantial number of plantation respondents noted that “We seldom visit government institutions, and therefore, we cannot express our views on trust in government institutions.” Public officials stated that “We tend to treat everyone equally, regardless of citizens’ affiliations; but due to established rules and procedures, some may not fulfill the eligibility criteria to obtain certain services, and we need to work in accordance with rules and regulations. In such situations, they do not trust us” (FGDs in Kandy, 2015). Public officials further articulated that the lack of identification documents and the plantation management’s considerable delays in producing residential proof make some plantation people ineligible to access certain services. This means that even the deserving and the poor do not receive some services unless they produce these documents. However, there is no mechanism to rectify the situation by providing services using discretionary power. This in turn shows the degree of benevolence among public officials toward deprived communities. This is similar to situations in India involving so-called “low caste people” (Mendelsohn & Vicziany, 1998). Corruption and Patron-Clientelism in Service Delivery According to this study, corruption is another factor that affects qualityof-government principles in service delivery. As one 45-year-old male worker noted, “On most occasions, if we do not bribe the officials, we get hassled, and there is a great delay in service provision.” This indicates the influence of monetary incentives in service delivery, which they call “speed money.” The empirical evidence shows that on some occasions, the village officer expects money or another form of incentive to deliver certain services. A considerable number of respondents agreed that they are sometimes inclined to provide gift payments and petty cash for covering refreshments and meals to speed up the process. Various types of petty corruption also have a negative impact on institutional trust. But respondents do not necessarily see these practices as immoral, unethical, or infringing regulations because they result in getting business done. Bribes range between Rs. 250 and 20,000 (2–15 USD) and mainly depend on the nature of the service required. As evidence shows, bribes

184

R. RAMASAMY

are low to obtain a birth certificate, identity card, proof of residency, permits, poverty alleviation benefits, and subsidies and payments for elders and pregnant mothers. Bribes are higher for services relating to school admission, employment, the provident fund, passports, electricity connectivity, and registering properties and business. During the interviews held in Kandy, plantation people stated that “We go to government institutions with hope and confidence, but, in most instances, return with distrust and disappointment.” Here, one could argue that if citizens experience systematic discrimination by public officials, if they perceive that their voices are not being heard, or if they feel they are not treated in line with established procedural fairness and professionalism, they may stop trusting government institutions. Inclusive Citizenship and Quality of Governance: Causal Explanation The above discussion explains how the unfair application of universal procedures shapes access to public services for minorities and negatively affects the quality of public institutions and citizenship rights. Better access to public services depends on consistently following the stipulated process laid down formally in various rules and regulations, thus to benefit all citizens in an even-handed way. As Van Ryzin (2011, p. 748) argues, “If the process is unequal, then public institutions cannot expect citizens to abide by rules and regulations, or cooperate in the service provision, as it depicts administrative malpractices.” In ethnically diverse societies like Sri Lanka’s, the propensity for exclusion remains relatively high; the ethnic majority and minorities compete for resources, especially those distributed through welfare programs and social security benefits. If impartiality is not institutionalized in the working of public institutions, it is likely to create unfavorable conditions for deserving and disadvantaged groups when they, as rightful citizens, try to gain access to such benefits. The empirical evidence and theoretical framework of the study lead to the conclusion that the active inclusion of marginalized groups in the service delivery system largely depends on ensuring quality-of-government principles—this, in turn, is more likely to provide inclusive institutions and citizenship. It can be argued that formal citizenship has value only when the capability of citizens becomes functional, which only occurs when citizens can practice citizenship rights. Dell’Olio (2002, p. 293) notes that social integration or solidarity cannot be attained in a community

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

185

where opportunities and rights are unequally distributed. As the empirical evidence implies, the loss of citizenship rights leads to a condition of multi-dimensional cumulative disadvantages among plantation people in general, and governance spheres in particular.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the impact of citizenship and the quality of government on access to public services in the Sri Lankan context. The quality of government was determined in terms of impartiality, fairness, equality before the law, institutional trustworthiness, efficiency, integrity, helpfulness, and incorrupt actions of public institutions and officials. The study finds that the lack of citizens’ capacity and participation in governance caused by long-standing institutionalized discrimination, statelessness, exclusion from local-level governance structures, and geographical isolation have diminished plantation people’s access to public services. Moreover, it is found that the quality of government has a significant influence on access to public services in Sri Lanka. The findings reveal a mismatch between the constitutional guarantee that establishes the legal status of citizenship and the actual citizenship rights that the plantation people enjoy. This situation in Sri Lanka may mirror the situation of sections of minority communities in other developing societies as well. This chapter further confirms that institutional structures, rules, and practices that shape how people behave play a leading role in perpetuating exclusion or promoting inclusion. Overall, the chapter provides the following conclusion: formal citizenship status is unlikely to end the institutionalized discrimination and lifetime exclusion experienced by formerly stateless people. This is due to the poor quality of government, exclusive citizenship practices, ethnocentric policies, and institutionalized discrimination in ethnically polarized societies. All such factors are likely to inhibit deprived people from gaining access to state-funded welfare services and the full potential of their formal citizenship. Similarly, ethnocentric policies and practices and mono-ethnic influence in governance structures single out ethnic minority plantation people and distort the notions of quality of government and inclusive governance. This pattern is reflected in welfare policies, including health, education, housing, employment, and social security programs, where public officials and institutions tend to use different eligibility criteria and exclusionary procedures to limit access. This is evident when

186

R. RAMASAMY

the national development indicators are compared with those of the plantation community. Although the chapter provides an analysis of the dynamics between citizenship, quality of government, and public service delivery in the context of Sri Lanka, it also opens avenues for further inquiry in other contexts. The study has certain limitations in terms of data, study areas, and methodology. However, the evidence derived from the existing data can be used to explore the nexus between citizenship rights, quality of government, and public services in other contexts, and thus contribute to further research on the topic.

References Aday, L., & Anderson, K. (1974). A framework for the study of access to medical care. University of Chicago. Blitz, B. K., & Lynch, M. (2011). Statelessness: Global problem, relevant literature and research rationale. In B. K. Blitz & M. Lynch (Eds.), Statelessness and citizenship: A comparative study on the benefits of the citizenship (pp. 5–19). Edward Elgar. Cenus of Population and Housing. (2011). Department of census and statistics. Colombo: Sri Lanka. Christina, S., & Martina, M. (2010). From migrant to citizen: Testing language and testing culture. In C. Mackenzie. (Ed.), Citizenship, identity and immigration: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan. Dahlberg, S., & Holmberg, S. (2014). Democracy and bureaucracy: How their quality matters for popular satisfaction. West European Politics, 37 (3), 515– 537. De Jong, J., & Rizvi, G. (2009). The dynamics of access: Understanding the mismatch. In J. De Jong, & R. Gowher (Eds.), State of access: Success and failure of democracies to create equal opportunities (pp. 275–286). Brookings Institution Press. Dell’Olio, F. (2002). Supranational undertakings and the determination of social rights. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(2), 292–310. Haque, M. S. (1999). Citizenship and public administration. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 65(3), 309–325. Houtzager, P. P., & Archarya, A. K. (2010). Associations, active citizenship, and the quality of democracy in Brazil and Mexico. Theory and Society, 40(1), 1–36. Institute of Policy Studies. (2017). Tea industry in transition in Sri Lanka: 150 years and beyond. Institute of Policy Studies.

7

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, QUALITY …

187

Isin, P. E., & Turner, S. B. (2008). Investigating citizenship: An agenda for citizenship studies. In E. F. Isin, P. Nyers, & S. B. Turner (Eds.), Citizenship between Past and Future (pp. 5–17). Routledge. Jones, M., & Gaventa, J. (2002). Concepts of citizenship. Institute of Development Studies. Jong, J, De., & Rizvi, G. (2008). The state of access: Success and failure of democracies to create equal opportunities. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Jørgensen, T. B., & Sørensen, D. L. (2012). Codes of good governance. Public Integrity, 15(1), 71–96. Kabeer, N. (2000). Social exclusion, poverty and discrimination: Towards an analytical framework. Institute of Development Studies, 31(4). Bridgton. Kader, B. A. (2017). Upcountry Tamils: An endangered community in Sri Lanka. Solidarity for Malayagam. Kymlika, W., & Norman, W. (2004). Citizenship in diverse societies. Oxford University Press. Lister, M. (2005). ‘Marshalling’ social and political citizenship: Towards a unified conception of citizenship. Government and Opposition, 40(4), 471–491. Lister, R. (1997). Citizenship: Feminist perspectives. Macmillan. Liu, H., Gao, H., & Huang, Q. (2019). Better government, happier residents? Quality of government and life satisfaction in China. Social Indicators Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-019-02172-2. Marshall, C., & Rossman G. (2011). Designing qualitative research (4th ed.). Sage. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. Cambridge University Press. Mendelsohn, O., & Vicziany, M. (1998). The untouchables: Subordination, poverty, and state in the modern India. Cambridge University Press. Nabatchi, T. (2017). Public values frames in administration and governance. Perspectives on Public Management and Governance, 1(1), 59–72. Penchansky, R., & Thomas, J. W. (1981). The concept of access: Definition and relationship to consumer satisfaction. Medical Care, 19(2), 127–140. Revi, B. (2014). T.H. Marshall and his critiques: Reappraising social citizenship in the twenty first century. Citizenship Studies, 18(3–4), 452–464. Ribot, C. J., & Peluso, N. L. (2003). A theory of access. Rural Sociology, 62(2), 153–181. Rothstein, B. (2011). The quality of government, corruption, social trust, and inequality in the international perspective. University of Chicago Press. Rothstein, B. (2019). Epistemic democracy and quality of government. European Politics and Society, 20(1), 16–31.

188

R. RAMASAMY

Rothstein, B., & Kumlin, S. (2010). Questioning the new liberal dilemma: Immigrants, social networks and institutional fairness. Comparative Politics, 43(1), 63–80. Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What is the quality of government: Theory of impartial government institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165–190. Sahadevan, P. (1995). India and overseas Indians: The case of Sri Lanka. Kalinga. Shunsuke, K. (2013). Governance over Estate Tamils in the Tea Plantation community of the Upcountry Sri Lanka (Unpublished PhD thesis submitted to International Graduate School of Social Sciences). Japan: Yokohama National University. Stensöta, H. O. (2012). Impartiality, and the need for a public ethics of care. In S. Holmberg & B. Rothstein (Eds.), Good government: The relevance of political science (pp.87–102). Edward Elgar. Suzuki., K., & Demircioglu, M. A. (2019). Is impartiality enough? Government impartiality and citizens’ perception of public service quality. Working Paper Series: 07. The Quality of Government Institute. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. (2010). Combating poverty and inequality: Structural change, social policy and politics. UNRISD. Van Ryzin, G. G. (2011). Outcomes, process and trust of civil servants. Journal of Public Administration Theory and Research, 21(4), 754–760. Van Ryzin, G. G. (2015). Service quality, administrative process, and citizens’ evaluation of local government in the US. Public Management Review, 17 (3), 425–442. Wass, L. V. (2011). Nationality and rights. In K.B. Blitz, & M. Lynch (Eds), Statelessness and citizenship: A comparative study on the benefits of nationality (pp. 20–37). Edward Elgar. Yin‚ R. K. (2014). Case study research design and methods. (5th Ed). London: Sage.

CHAPTER 8

The Citizen’s Charter in Nepal: An Effort to Achieve Quality of Governance at the Local Level Sushmita Acharya

Nepal’s municipalities are the prime urban local government units responsible for providing services to the people under their jurisdiction. After the enactment of the Local Self Governance Act of 1999, the local governments began focusing more on responsiveness and accountability in delivering services to the people in their jurisdictions (Rai & Paudel, 2011, p. 17). Following the international reform trend to streamline local services, the Citizen’s Charter (hereafter CC) was implemented at the municipal level in Nepal in 2008. This study examines the service delivery performance of Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City Office, hereafter, LSMCO. Lalitpur Metropolitan City is one of the oldest cities in Nepal. It was initially inhabited primarily by the Newari people, the indigenous people of Kathmandu Valley. Owing to rapid urbanization, however, the city is now home to a mixed population with diverse social, cultural,

S. Acharya (B) Central Department of Public Administration, Public Administration Campus, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_8

189

190

S. ACHARYA

and economic characteristics. Hence, to acquire variation in people’s perceptions regarding municipal service provisions, LSMCO is taken as representative of the majority of cases where the CC has been implemented at the local level in the country. The CC is a recent development in the field of public administration reform in Nepal. Its aim is to bring grassroots service-delivery institutions closer to the people in the respective jurisdictions and to give them clear information. Previously, there was no means of free access to public information. “A citizen charter of local government services has been a gleaming initiative in the spirit that it has taken citizen centric governance to a new platform; such an initiative creates a sense of quality governance” (Sharma, 2012, p. 92). The CC thus has the potential to bridge the information gap between service providers and seekers. In this study, the CC is understood as local government’s impartial delivery of services. It therefore stands in contrast to Afno manche,1 a Nepali concept that points, among other things, to the informal connections for getting jobs done in public offices. Several studies have explored the special relationship between a person who needs something and a person who has the ability to give something (e.g., Subedi, 2014). As Subedi (2014, p. 56) points out, Afno manche leads to activities being organized in ways that are informal and personalized, thus compromising the operation of formal structures in the market and the bureaucracy. In essence, the CC aims to build trust and promote democracy (Jamil & Dhakal, 2010). Its narrower aim, however, is that it will lead to citizens having clear information regarding the documents needed to get required services, and that services will be delivered in a neutral, impartial, and non-discriminatory manner resembling the standard of a legal-rational Weberian bureaucracy. Before proceeding further, it is worth explaining Nepal’s two-tier system of local governance: the District Development Committee (DDC) is the upper tier, and the lower tier is comprised of Village Development 1 Afno manche is a Nepali term that can be translated as “one’s own people”. It refers to relationships of a reciprocal nature with an implicit hierarchy. It may partly be based on ascribed principles derived from kinship and marriage, but most significantly, Afno manche relationships have to be confirmed in symbolic practices expressing the content of the relationship. Afno manche relations can thus be strategically developed between people unconnected by kinship and marriage, and afno manche ties between people who are connected by kinship and marriage may be weakened if not confirmed by appropriate symbolic exchanges of gifts, information, and services (Subedi 2014, p. 56).

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

191

Committees (VDCs) and municipalities. VDCs are rural local governments units, and municipalities are urban local government units. Both are responsible for delivering public services. This chapter analyzes the quality of local governance performance on the basis of such indicators as neutrality, transparency, service quality, and timely response. The main research objective is to examine the performance of Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City Office (LSMCO) after it implemented the CC. Has there been any improvement in service delivery? In an effort to answer this question, the study examines the present status of CC (provisions and implementations) in LSMCO as a local unit of governance, thus to elucidate the extent of influence of organizational, cultural, and political variables on municipal performance in service delivery. The study is based on data collected during 2015–2016, just before local-level elections (2017) in Nepal. These elections took place in three phases from May to September 2017, and provincial elections were held in November and December 2017. During the data collection period, Kathmandu was the only metropolitan city in Nepal, with LSMCO as the Sub-Metropolitan City. This study therefore does not represent the new local structural (provincial) changes that happened after 2017. At present, Nepal is divided into seven provinces. These provinces are sub-divided into 293 urban municipalities (6 metropolitan cities, 11 sub-metropolitan cities, and 276 municipalities) and 460 rural municipalities. On the whole, the newly-established municipalities are larger in size and vested with greater authority and responsibility for service delivery than was the case before 2017.

Theoretical Discussions Various studies assert that the administrative systems of South Asian countries are characterized by inefficiency and corruption in service delivery (Acharya, 2010; Atreya, 2002). These countries have “traditional systems” of governance that are insensitive and hostile to serving the people (Sharma, 2012, p. 87), and on the whole inadequate for responding to the social and political needs of citizens (Jamil et al., 2013. p. 12). Jamil et al. opined, “South Asia is gradually introducing democratic practices in its quest for better governance” (2013, p. 6). This global reality is a precursor for the rise of the concept of good governance, with the aim of restructuring and reforming public service,

192

S. ACHARYA

also in developing countries such as Nepal. According to Paudel (2013, p. 179), conventional socio-cultural values, lacking public awareness, a lack of accessibility to officials, people’s lacking participation in governance, political instability, and the government’s lacking commitment to service delivery are the major obstacles to policy implementation in Nepal. Likewise, in hierarchical organizations, there are information gaps between subordinates and superiors, and these also become barriers to policy implementation. Such communication gaps are described by Hofstede (2001) as stemming from power-distance, which leads to information asymmetry between service-providers and service-recipients as well as between subordinates and superiors in municipalities. It can therefore be assumed that citizens’ easy access to officials as well as open and free communication with them may enhance the performance of government institutions, as free and open communication increases the level of transparency in the governance system. Kovac and Gajduschek (2015) have described theories of public governance as falling into three major groups—Weberian public administration, New Public Management, and good governance—on the basis of the time period of their origin (Table 8.1). The Weberian theory assumes that public organizations are organized hierarchically, with formalization and legalities as their basic principles. Procedures, methods, responsibilities, rights, and duties are assigned to various units and positions throughout the organizational structure. Table 8.1 Public governance theories and administrative practices

Main period

Main principles

Role of the state

Weberian public administration

New public management

Good governance

Nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth century Legality, equity, responsibility, formalism,

From the 1980s on

From the 2000s and on

Efficiency and Participation, effectiveness, economy, transparency, users’ orientation responsiveness, accountability All powerful: the state Minimal: the state Collaborative: should solve all ensures, but does not partnerships for societal problems provide public services co-decision-making and products

Source Adopted and modified from Kovac and Gajduschek (2015, pp. 11–12)

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

193

Weberian bureaucracy focuses on input governance. As stated, in this chapter, I explore how organizational, cultural, and political variables influence municipal performance after the implementation of CC. In a highly formalized and centralized Weberian structure, only incremental changes in the three areas are possible, and processes are highly regulated through elaborated planning and control. By contrast, in a more organic structure, there is greater flexibility in delegating responsibility. During the 1980s, New Public Management represented a major breakthrough in public sector management. Its aim was to make the public sector transparent, cost-effective, and more output or result oriented. Today the pattern has shifted to good governance, which focuses on partnership with civil society. This is where the CC comes in, as it is also a product of focusing on output governance, yet with more societal participation and less emphasis on process. The CC is based on the assumption that the nature and type of the administrative system and its effective and efficient performance are prerequisites for delivering transparent and accountable services to people. If designed and implemented correctly, the CC has the potential to enhance accountability, minimize corruption, and promote better service delivery. Theoretically speaking, participatory and democratic governance will practice the bottom-up relationship between citizens and the state, and the CC is one of the steps to bring transparency into the system by following the bottom-up approach in service delivery. In the view of Arnstein (1969), people’s participation in governance matters depending on the developmental stage of the society; some governance systems will be non-participatory, while others will engage with and empower citizens.

What is Quality in Governance? There is no doubt that governance is a vague concept, and measuring the quality of governance is even more complicated. This study has operationalized quality of governance by policy performance in service delivery. Victor (2017) links the assessment of quality with the performance of a government. The major concern here is simply this: How is it possible to study and analyze the quality dimension in governance? Fukuyama (2013) defines governance as “a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services.” Based on his functional definition, it can be argued that governance is about a government’s ability to make and enforce laws and to deliver services. In other words, governance is about

194

S. ACHARYA

policy performance. Performance would therefore also be an important dimension of quality of governance. Based on the above, it becomes obvious that one of the basic functions of governance is to deliver services. When delivering services, public institutions need to be embedded in social structures and to follow their specific cultural codes as public institutions meant to serve people. Fukuyama (2013) is of the opinion that states need to operate according to general, transparent, impartial, and predictable rules. Rotberg (2014), meanwhile, argues that quality of governance is not just about impartiality (as per Rothstein) or bureaucratic autonomy and capacity (as per Fukuyama); rather, it is mostly concerned with measuring the approximation of actual service deliveries. So in an actual sense, quality of governance refers to performance that also ensures transparency and accountability in service delivery. From the above discussion, it is obvious that good governance is open to different interpretations. For this present study relating to the CC in Nepal, I focus on four core principles of good governance: transparency, accountability, impartiality, and efficiency. Transparency pertains to the free flow of information and the degree of clarity and openness with which decisions are made. Transparency in decision making and implementation reduces uncertainty and can curb corruption among public officials. Accountability means political actors are responsible to society for what they say and do. Decision-makers in government, the private sector, and civil society organizations are accountable to the public and to stakeholders. Public officials are accountable to citizens and responsible for their behavior. This means it is imperative for them to be responsive to the needs of the citizenry. Impartiality is rooted in legal frameworks. The law requires public officials to be fair, efficient, and neutral in delivering services. Everyone in society deserves equal treatment, everyone should have equal opportunity to participate in governance, and to have access to information regarding service provisions. Efficiency concerns the best use of limited human and financial resources. Out of the various social accountability tools, the CC is a strategy that is likely to ensure good governance at the local level in Nepal, and to promote quality service by being transparent, accountable, impartial, and efficient. With the implementation of the CC, service recipients are expected to receive timely, reliable, and accurate service with value for money. Value

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

195

for money means the best combination of price and quality is achieved when meeting the needs of citizens. To explain: as customers of public services, citizens have the right to complain about the services if they feel something has gone wrong in the course of service delivery. This study also explores how culture can influence the behavior of members of a public organization, and how their behavior in turn influences the organization’s performance. According to Hofstede (1991, p. 5), “culture refers to collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others.” Hofstede identifies power distance as a fundamental dimension of the national culture. It can lead to a communication gap as well as a social gap between service providers and service seekers. This study examines power distance with respect to authority and power sharing in society, and its starting assumption is that the stronger the power distance, the more rigidity there is in the organization, and the greater the gaps between hierarchical levels. Political leaders’ awareness of and enthusiasm for implementing the CC is also essential for effective and efficient service delivery at the local level. But without the public’s involvement and support, there is little chance to put policies into effect. This is especially so with the CC, for it needs wide public participation and strong commitment from political leaders to influence reform activities. Citizens’ participation is the mechanism by which the public join in determining how information is shared, how goals and policies are set, and how resources are allocated to programs (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). But citizens’ participation is not simply a matter of ordinary people getting involved in the CC policy process; it also means they actively participate in decision making at the local level.

Local Government and the CC The CC is a tool for changing a local government’s process-oriented and traditional Weberian bureaucratic system into a more citizen-centric and people-oriented system. When Nepal’s municipal governments implemented the CC, they expected it to strengthen civil servants’ accountability and improve local service delivery. They expected people’s participation in the policy implementation process to improve administrative efficiency, make the local government organizations respond quickly to the needs and aspirations of the people, and enhance the quantity and quality of services (Shrestha, 2013, p. 56). Nevertheless, people’s mere presence does not constitute participation; rather, it is their level of

196

S. ACHARYA

involvement in policy implementation processes, for the sake of mutual benefit. The CC was officially introduced in Nepal through enacting “Guideline for Making Effective the Governmental Services, 1998” (GoNOPMCM, 1998). It received a further boost from the Good Governance Act of 2008. With this legislation, it became mandatory for every public office to introduce the CC for the convenience of users, informing them of all the procedures they need to go through to receive services from the concerned officials. As a consequence of this legislation, the LSMCO, in 2016, published the CC booklet “Citizen’s Charter 2073,” which contains detailed information regarding the cost of services, the documents that citizens need to present to get work done, and the tentative time required for various services. This booklet was published during the period when I collected my research data. It signifies that the CC culture is developing, authority is becoming more decentralized, and the focus is shifting to service delivery. In addition to the CC, skilled and competent human resources (HR) are crucial to bring innovative ideas into the existing system. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argue that while examining the characteristics of resources, it is important to look at the organizational capacity of employees’ deployment. When service providers are trained and act professionally, it becomes easier to implement the CC efficiently and effectively. Based on the above discussions, I formulate four hypotheses: H1 and H2 concern the organizational variables, H3 concerns the cultural variables, and H4 concerns the political variables. H1: H2: H3: H4:

The clearer the information, the better the performance of LSMCO. The greater the HR capabilities, the better the performance of LSMCO. The more access there is to officials, the better the performance of LSMCO. The more citizens are politically aware and engaged in advocacy, the better the performance of LSMCO.

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

197

Analytical Framework of the Study Based on the review of literature, I developed a framework for analyzing LSMCO’s performance in service delivery after it implemented the CC (Fig. 8.1). The Organizational variables point to the organizational structure and operationalized resources, namely (i) clarity of information with respect to organizational goals, objectives, and procedures, (ii) accessibility to Independent variables Organizational variables (i) Degree of clarity of information on goals and objectives

Dependent variable

(ii) Accessibility to services (iii) HR capabilities

Municipal Performance Transparency Responsiveness

Cultural variables involving power distance (i)Degree of open communication

Service-Quality Impartiality

(ii) Degree of citizen’s accessibility to officials (iii) Responsiveness to service seekers Political variables (i) Political capabilities

(ii) Degree of civic advocacy and awareness (iii) Citizen participation

Fig. 8.1 The relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable

198

S. ACHARYA

services, and (iii) HR capabilities. The cultural variables relate to power distance and are operationalized as (i) the degree of open communication, (ii) the degree of citizens’ accessibility to officials, and (iii) officials’ responsiveness to service seekers. Finally, the political variables concern political leadership and citizens’ participation. These are operationalized as (i) the political capabilities of leadership, (ii) the degree of civic advocacy and awareness, and (iii) citizens’ participation. In exploring how the organizational variables influence municipal performance after the introduction of the CC, I begin with the hypothesis (H1) that clarity on goals, information, and objectives in an organization after it has implemented the CC would bring impartiality in service delivery. A meaningful implementation of the CC reflects citizens’ priorities, the institutional support through senior management and staff, and includes a well-functioning grievance redress mechanism. The basic principle of the CC emphasizes citizens’ rights to information and the responsibility of service providers to deliver services in a transparent manner. In this study, transparency is defined as the information provided to the general public by the municipality, regarding government activities and services. It can be assumed that the higher the level of citizens’ advocacy and representation, the better the CC’s implementation. Civic representation in this study refers to the active involvement of the citizens in implementing the CC in Nepal’s municipalities. Their participation matters in municipal functioning, for the more they realize their value and rights as citizens, the better will be the performance of local government in terms of making the service-provision system transparent, accountable, responsive, accessible, and impartial.

Overview of Research Methodology This study has a case-study research design and uses a quantitative method. To map the respondents’ views on municipal service delivery, I devised two sets of structured questionnaires and administered to two groups of respondents: service recipients and municipal officials. These surveys focused on services rendered by municipality to the public in terms of service quality, predictability, responsiveness, and accountability toward public. The total sample size of the study was 251. 216 of the questionnaires were answered by service recipients, and 35 questionnaires

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

199

were answered by LSMCO officials. In the Service recipients as respondents are those people who are the residents of Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City and who come to LSMCO offices to do various types of business such as mandatory registration, filling out or filing tax-related papers, seeking construction permits, and so on. I selected the respondents on a random basis in order to achieve variation in responses. To obtain accurate and reliable information, I administered the survey and collected the data myself. This enabled me to gain the best possible information and knowledge about the phenomena, context, and the existing situation of local services, local governance, and the CC’s implementation. Through the process, the variables under investigation became clearer and more understandable. For secondary data, I drew on the municipality’s own publications and bulletins.

Data Analysis and Findings Service providers’ evaluations on municipal functioning were focused on such areas as rigidity of organizational rules, structuring of different work roles, and ease of communication between superiors and subordinates. The results are presented in Table 8.2. As depicted in Table 8.2, it has been found that 70% of respondents agreed that work roles are structured in municipality and only 23% of officials have agreed that the rules in municipalities are rigid and complex. Moreover, only 34% of municipal officials have agreed that subordinates Table 8.2 Service providers’ evaluation of municipal functioning after the implementation of CC: Percent distribution, N = 35 Statements

Agreed % (partly and strongly)

Work roles are structured in municipality 70 Rules in municipalities are rigid and complex 23 Subordinates feel free to discuss an issue with boss 34 Q. Please provide your opinion on the following statements (1-Strongly disagree, 2-Partly disagree, 3-Partly agree, 4-Strongly agree and 5-Do not know) Source Field Survey, 2015–2016

200

S. ACHARYA

feel free to discuss an issue with their superiors. The above findings indicate, on the one hand, that municipalities function according to rules and work responsibilities in them are structured. On the other hand, most of the subordinates obey their superiors’ orders and hardly discuss any issue with seniors. This indicates the existence of power distance in the municipalities. Citizens’ evaluation on the quality of services after the CC’s implementation in LSMC is examined based on four categorical statements. These concern officials’ responsiveness to service seekers, transparency in process, equality in treatment, and improvement in service quality. The results of responses are presented in Table 8.3. Table 8.3 shows that most LSMC residents are positive about the service provision. The variable “Officials have become more responsive” is prominent, with the highest mean value of 3.58, as 62% of respondents agree completely or partly with the statement. Improvement of service quality has a mean value of 3.51, with 60% of respondents agreeing completely or partly with statement “Service quality is improving” in the municipality after the implementation of CC. Similarly, the majority of Table 8.3 Citizens’ evaluation of municipal functioning after the CC’s implementation: Percent distribution Citizens’ evaluation of municipal functions after the introduction of the CC Measures

Mean Scale (1–5)

(Completely + Partly) Agree (%)

Disagree (%)

Total Neutral (%)

Officials have 3.58 62 25 13 become more responsive Service quality is 3.51 60 24 16 improving Procedures have 3.43 58 36 6 become more transparent Officials treat 3.30 56 32 12 everyone equally Q. Please give your opinion on the following statements (1-Completely disagree, 2-To some extent disagree, 3-Neutral/no change, 4-Partly agree, 5-Agree completely) Source Field Survey, 2015–2016

( N) 214

212 212

214

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

201

respondents claim that “Officials treat everyone equally” and that “Procedures have become more transparent.” Overall, the findings in Table 8.3 reveal a positive evaluation of municipal services by residents of Lalitpur Municipality. In the next phase of the analysis, regression analyses (ordinary least square) were carried out to discover which variables affect service delivery the most. The findings are presented in Table 8.4. In Table 8.4, Model 1 includes the organizational variables (i) clarity of information, (ii) accessibility to required services, (iii) and HR capabilities for service delivery. It is evidient in Table 8.3 that model 1 explains 28% of the total variation in the municipal performance. The three variables are statistically significant, with beta coefficients of 0.48, 0.24, and 0.14, respectively. This indicates that the clarity of information, the increased accessibility to required services, and the increased HR capabilities promote better municipal performance. Table 8.4 Regression performance

analysis

for

Model 1 Organizational variables Clarity of information Accessibility to required services HR capabilities for service delivery Cultural variables Openness in communication pattern Public access to officials Responsiveness to service seekers Political variables Political capabilities of leader Civic advocacy and awareness Citizens’ participation Adjusted R 2 Note * p < .05 ** p < .01 Source Field survey 2015–2016

independent Model 2

variables Model 3

of

municipal

Pooled variables

0.48** 0.24**

0.47** 0.21**

0.14*

0.16**

0.28

0.06

0.08

0.14* 0.12

0.09 0.08

0.04

0.09 0.01 0.14 0.04

0.08 0.02 0.05 0.32 N = 216

202

S. ACHARYA

Model 2 includes the cultural variables (i) openness in communication pattern, (ii) public access to officials, and (iii) responsiveness to service seekers. As is evident, this model explains only about 4% of the total variation in the municipal performance. Out of the three variables, only “public access to officials” is found to be statistically significant, with the beta coefficient of 0.14. This indicates that public access to officials, after the CC’s implementation, matters a lot more in people’s evaluation of municipal performance than do openness in the communication pattern and responsiveness to service seekers. Model 3’s variables are (i) political capabilities of the leader, (ii) civic advocacy and awareness, and (iii) citizens’ participation. Like Model 2, Model 3 also explains only 4% of the total variation in the municipal performance. In a pooled model, all variables are combined in one regression equation, and this pooled model explains 32% of the total variation in municipal performance. This is higher than in any of the other models. The pooled model shows that the organizational variables are statistically significant with beta coefficients of 0.47** , 0.21** , and 0.16** , respectively. Since the relationship indicates a positive trend, it can be argued that the increased clarity of information, (ii) the increased accessibility to required services, (iii) and the increased HR capabilities for service delivery are the extent of municipal performance. Hence, the pooled model shows that the overall impact of the independent organizational variables has a strong correlation with the LSMCO’s performance after it implemented the CC. The cultural variable “Public access to officials” was also found to have a statistically significant relationship with municipal performance. This indicates that the organizational culture is changing and having some impact on municipal performance. It is therefore evident that the organizational variables followed by the cultural variable of public access to officials have the greatest influence on the LSMCO’s performance, and that the independent political variables have the least influence. Based on the analysis thus far, Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 (The clearer the information, the better the performance of LSMCO; The greater the HR capabilities, the better the performance of LSMCO; The more access there is to officials, the better the performance of LSMCO) are supported by the findings. Why were the political and cultural variables found to be insignificant in influencing municipal performance? One reason could be that there had been no election at the local level in Nepal for a long time, thus

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

203

creating a leadership vacuum in local government for more than a decade. This means people’s participation in local decision making was impeded. Civic advocacy and people’s awareness were also disrupted. With this as background, people as well as officials held the opinion that things could have been better if there was an elected mayor as the political leader of the municipality. Although some political awareness was registered among citizens, it was too little to affect the LSMCO’s performance. This also indicates that an elected political leader in the municipality is essential for improving the municipality’s performance. Regarding the cultural and political variables, all (except public access to officials) were found to be insignificant, which are also reflected in lower R square values for models 2 and 3.

Conclusion The objective of this chapter was to explain the status and the level of municipal performance. First, the study shows that there is progress in service delivery after the CC was implemented in Lalitpur Municipality (LSMCO). Citizens’ demand for good-quality service delivery from the municipality has been increasing day by day. The municipal officials have in turn become more responsive. Second, all the independent variables—organizational, cultural, and political—were theoretically derived and hypothesized to influence the municipality’s performance. The regression analysis shows that there are statistically significant relationships between the municipal performance and the organizational variables, followed by the cultural variables. It can therefore be concluded that the decision to introduce the CC has generated some good governance principles and improved the quality of municipal performance in terms of service delivery. However, the political variables such as civic advocacy and participation, which are necessary for good governance, were found to be missing. Despite this, there are signs of improvement in service delivery, which is possible due to the HR capabilities of the officials and municipal willingness to serve the people. Finally, this study portrays the basic outcome of implementing the CC at the local level in Nepal. Since it has incorporated all possible essential factors that make the findings meaningful, they may be equally relevant and applicable in other contexts as well.

204

S. ACHARYA

References Acharya, S. (2010). Implementation of citizen’s charter and improving municipal services in Nepal: Myth or reality (M Phil thesis). Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Norway. Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Planning Association, 35(4), 216–224. Atreya, B. (2002). The applicability of new public management to developing countries: A case from Nepal (Doctoral dissertation). Victoria University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia. https://vuir.vu.edu.au/15559/1/Atreya_ 2002compressed.pdf. Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is Governance? Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 26(2), 347–362. Government of Nepal (GoN). (1998). Guideline for making effective the governmental services. Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. McGrawHill. Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Sage. Jamil, I., Askvik, S., & Dhakal, T. N. (2013). In search of better governance in South Asia and beyond. Public administration, governance and globalization. Springer. Jamil, I., & Dhakal, T. N. (2010). A report on status of the implementation of citizen charter in municipalities in Nepal. CDPA. Kovac, P., & Gajduschek, G. (Eds.). (2015). Contemporary governance models and practices in Central and Eastern Europe. NISPAcee. Paudel, N. R. (2013). Public policy implementation: A case study of reproductive health service delivery at local level in Nepal. Lap-Lambert. Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the corporation. Harvard Business Review, 68(3), 79–91. Rai, J. K., & Paudel, N. S. (2011). Discourses of local governance in Nepal: An analysis of legislation, constitutional processes and civil society demands. https://www.forestaction.org/app/webroot/vendor/tinymce/editor/plu gins/filemanager/files/3.%20%202011_11.1_Feb_Discourses%20of%20L ocal%20Governance%20in%20Nepal_JR_NSP.pdf. Rotberg, R. I. (2014). Good governance means performance and results. Governance, 27, 511–518. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12084. Subedi, M. (2014). Afnomanchhe: Unequal access to public resources and institutions in Nepal. Dliaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 8, 50–86. Sharma, D. (2012). An evaluation of a citizen’s charter in local government: A case study of Chandigarh. India. Journal of Administration & Governance, 7 (1), 86–95.

8

THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER IN NEPAL: AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE …

205

Shrestha, S. K. (2013). The reforms in the public administration for the flow of result-oriented service (Seminar Working Paper, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung). Kathmandu. Victor, A. E. (2017). The quest for ascendant quality: An introduction to contemporary philosophy and methods for strategically orchestrating the transformation towards andbeyond quality excellence in everything you do. On QUEST.

Sushmita Acharya is a lecturer at Tribhuvan University in Nepal. She holds a Ph.D. (2019) in public administration from Tribhuvan University, Nepal, and a master’s degree (2010) in public administration from the University of Bergen, Norway.

CHAPTER 9

Process-Based Performance Framework for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Policy Implementation in Bangladesh Najmus Sayadat

Since the 1990s, the Government of Bangladesh has been encouraging the private sector to get involved in developing infrastructure and delivering services. As per the Private Sector Infrastructure Guidelines-2004, the Ministry of Shipping and Bangladesh Land Port Authority (BLPA)1 decided to develop 12 land ports on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis through private investment, the aim being to store and handle cargo in better and more efficient ways. According to the annual report of the Ministry of Shipping (GoB, 2013) and official records of BLPA, 1 Bangladesh Land Port Authority (BLPA) or Bangladesh Sthala Bandar Kartipaksha (BSBK) in the Bangla language is a statutory body of the Government of Bangladesh. It was established in 2001 to facilitate and improve export-import activities with neighboring countries through the land routs. Among 23 land ports under BSBK, five are now operated by private companies in the PPP mode. The other land ports are operated solely by BSBK.

N. Sayadat (B) Deputy Secretary at the PPP Authority, Prime Minister’s Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_9

207

208

N. SAYADAT

six Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects have been implemented. Among these, one PPP started operating as expected after the construction of physical facilities, four PPP projects are currently operating at the same time as building physical facilities, and the last one has not yet managed to start any activity. Therefore, from PPP implementation experiences in Bangladesh’s land port sector, it is evident that under the same public authority, the policy performance of one PPP differs from that of another. This indicates a major policy implementation deficit. The main objective of this study is to analyze the implementation of PPP-managed projects, the processes involved, and to what extent these projects have achieved their policy objectives. In cases where policy objectives fail, what can explain the failure? The chapter is organized in the following manner: First, it describes policy implementation processes, including the organizational form of PPP and methods for policy analysis. Second, it discusses PPP performance and processes, and then, based on theoretical discussion, develops a framework for analyzing PPP policy implementation. Third, it highlights the methods used in the study. The subsequent section analyzes the data and presents the findings. The chapter concludes with recommendations for further research.

PPP Management Strategies and Policy Implementation Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is an engaging concept found in recent literature on public sector management and governance. Linder (1999) calls it the “PPP phenomenon” with multiple meanings. Hodge and Greve (2011) elaborate that PPPs exist at the project level, governance level, policy level, and organization and management level, and that they emerge in different ways based on the historical or cultural context of the given nation. Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) define PPP as cooperation between public and private actors to jointly develop products and services as well as share risks, costs, and resources. This definition indicates that the organizational form of managing PPP projects is collaborative, which emphasizes process management strategies. In contrast to above, Bovaird (2004) defines PPP as “a working arrangement based on a mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector organization with any organization outside of the public sector.” Bovaird thus indicates that the organizational form

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

209

of managing a PPP project, which is based on a contract, involves a high level of mutual commitment between the partners. In this same line of thought, Van den Hurk and Verhoest (2015) as well as Willems (2014) consider PPPs that operate on long-term infrastructure contracts as having a hybrid project form that combines the features of both contractual and collaborative forms. This view has also been supported by Alam et al. (2014), in their study of two Australian infrastructure PPPs. Based on the above, one can understand that two types of management strategies are mainly used in PPPs: process management strategies and project management strategies. Process management strategies are mainly used in “collaborative” PPPs. Here the focus is on activating actors, creating support, removing institutional and cultural differences between organizations, and exploring various potentials. Project management strategies focus on control, specifying goals, keeping the budget, and legal enforcement. These strategies are mainly employed in “contractual” PPPs (Klijn et al., 2008). Process management strategies rely on cooperation, trust, and commitment between the actors, and project management strategies rely on central steering from the government. According to Jun Park and Jeong Park (2009), the hybrid public-private collaborative organizational form, which involves a high level of cooperation among the actors and a high level of government-based central steering, results in better performance than do the other organizational forms. On the other hand, policy implementation is about how policy intentions translate into actions (John, 1998; Knill & Tosun, 2020; Parsons, 1995). According to Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983, cited in Hill & Hupe 2014 p. 7), “Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objectives(s) to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, ‘structures’ the implementation process.” It is therefore prudent to map the PPP policy implementation process and how it is managed. What kind of organizational mechanism has been developed to implement policies? Does it follow the traditional top-down approach to policy implementation, or does it have a more bottom-up form of management that encourages participatory or inclusive governance based on the active involvement of both government and

210

N. SAYADAT

non-government actors? Does PPP management conflict with the traditional administrative system in Bangladesh, which is top-down and based on favoritism and patron-clientelism? Indeed, literature on PPP reveals it to be a hybrid form of organization requiring both a top-down and a participatory form of management. This is why the performance of the hybrid PPP is explained by a synthetic model that combines both the top-down and bottom-up perspectives of policy implementation. Scholars who hold the top-down perspective argue that policy implementation is linear, meaning that once a policy is formulated, it is implemented through being steered with clear objectives, adequate resources (both human and financial), and strong coordination (Pülzl & Treib, 2006). In contrast, bottom-up scholars argue that policy implementation is not a linear activity because it involves the active support and interpretation of the street level bureaucrats who actually implement the policy. The interaction between street level bureaucrats and beneficiaries decides the ultimate fate of policy implementation and how the policy achieves its goals (Pülzl & Treib, 2006). Meanwhile, scholars who emphasize synthesized models adopt the top-downers’ concern with effective policy execution as their starting point but then blend it with several elements from the bottom-up perspective (Pülzl & Treib, 2006). Among the synthesizers, Scharpf (1978, cf. Pülzl & Treib, 2006) tries to reconcile the idea of political steering by a central government with bottom-up scholars’ argument that the transformation of policy goals into action depends on the interaction of a multitude of actors who have their own interests and strategies. By introducing the concept of policy networks to implementation research, Scharpf (1978) suggests giving more weight to the processes of coordination and collaboration among separate but mutually dependent actors (cf. Pülzl & Treib, 2006). Kickert et al. (1997) take the concept of policy networks forward and develop an interactive perspective of network theory. Alexander (2012), Klijn and Teisman (2003), Koppenjan (2005), and Van Gestel et al. (2012) also argue in favor of this interactive perspective. These scholars follow the policy network theory when analyzing PPPs, and they largely emphasize qualitative analysis of actors’ interaction. I too consider PPPs as having a network form of organization. In this study, I argue that the policy implementation deficit faced by a public partner in implementing a PPP mainly arises from overlooking processes of coordination and collaboration, in other words, from overlooking the participatory form of management. Based on the above, I aim in this study

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

211

to explore process management strategies used in PPP implementation and their implications. There is one research question: To what extent can process management strategies explain PPP policy performance?

PPP Policy Performance and Process Management Strategies Assessing policy performance in a network is complex because many actors with different objectives are involved. This is why, from a network standpoint, it is inappropriate to unilaterally assess a public actor’s effectiveness in achieving policy goals. As Klinj and Koppenjan (2000) emphasize, the evaluation needs to be based on the performance of all the actors and the dynamic character of their interaction in the given network. An ex-post satisfying criterion offers a probable solution for measuring the success and failure of policy processes. “Ex-post satisfaction assessment” means, in practice, that individual actors judge how the outcome of the policy process has benefited them, what the outcome has cost them, and how the outcome fits into the changing environment. Indeed, after the conclusion of the policy process, interviewing actors about their satisfaction can overcome problems of unilateral assessment. When actors have achieved an outcome that signifies an improvement from the earlier situation for all, or when an undesirable situation is avoided through cooperation, this represents a win-win situation. This win-win situation criterion needs to be used in the network performance assessment (Klinj & Koppenjan, 2000). Provan and Milward (2001) propose a framework for evaluation that examines a network’s effectiveness at different but interrelated levels, each with its own criteria. Within this framework, a PPP’s performance is assessed in terms of the sustainability of the actors’ partnership. If we combine insights from the above-mentioned literature, policy performance would be measured by whether it meets policy design goals, the ex-post judgment of actors based on their satisfaction about the process and the outcome in combination with a win-win situation, and by the network’s level of effectiveness.

Meeting Policy Design Goals Meeting policy design goals denotes a situation in which jointly agreed objectives mentioned in the PPP agreement are achieved. Shenhar et al.

212

N. SAYADAT

(2002) suggest that meeting design goals can be measured by determining whether the developed infrastructure meets technical specifications, operational specifications, and the delivery schedule, and whether it was completed within the budget. However, given that Bangladesh’s land port PPPs are designed as revenue sharing ventures, meaning the private partner who operates a port is obligated to pay both a fixed amount and a variable amount to the public partner, the private partner’s success in meeting payment obligations is another aspect to measure. Stakeholders’ Satisfaction with Benefits Gained The key stakeholders in PPPs are the public partner, the private partner, and the users. Yuan et al. (2009) and Zhang (2006) identify the public partner’s satisfaction as being based largely on benefits gained through the improved quality of the particular public service, the reduction of disputes, claims, and operation-related complexities, and significant risk transfer. Shenhar et al. (2002), Dvir et al. (2003), and Zhang (2006) place importance on measuring the private operator’s satisfaction with benefits gained based on its commercial success, development of new products or service line development, development of new knowledge and expertise, the reputation gained, the achievement of a quantifiable rate of growth, and gains in operational efficiency. According to Jamali (2007), users’ satisfaction refers to the satisfaction they have from improved service quality. Jamali (2007) contextualizes the service quality dimension for user satisfaction in the following ways: consistent flow of activity without any damage done (this measures reliability), promptness in dealing with users’ inquiries or complaints (this measures responsiveness), attending to clients with a welcoming and positive attitude (this measures courtesy), the cost to clients for using the service (the measure of economic efficiency), and the cleanliness, orderliness, and good condition of the physical facilities (this measures the tangible scope of the service). Network Level Effectiveness To survive, a network must become a viable inter-organizational entity. Provan and Milward (2001) propose a framework for evaluating a network based on the following parameters: new entrepreneurial development, innovation, new knowledge generated in service delivery, quality

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

213

services delivered, the belief of both parties that they have attained sufficient strength of collaboration, and, by the emergence of a new regulatory framework for strengthening and transforming the network structure. PPP Processes and Their Management Strategies Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001), in their conceptualization of PPP processes, emphasize goal sharing. This means public and private actors jointly develop products and services as well as share risks, cost, and resources. Bovaird (2004) could be said to expand this goal sharing idea with his focus on mutual commitment in a working arrangement between the public and private sectors. Skelcher (2007), meanwhile, indicates actual ways in which government and private actors work together in pursuit of societal goals and specifically in realizing public policy goals. Add to this Greve and Hodge’s (2007) pinpointing of interaction between actors, cooperation between adversarial actors, dialogue between parties on innovative processes, risk sharing, and safeguarding relationships built on trust. Finally, Brinkerhoff (1996) argues that the policy implementation process calls for consensus building, the participation of key stakeholders, conflict resolution, compromise, contingency planning, and adaptation. Based on the above literature, processes for PPP implementation can be broadly identified as goal sharing, communication and information sharing, trust building, relationship building, consensus building, and risk and resource sharing. Empirical studies also find that these processes can explain PPP performance. Goal Sharing The goals of the public sector and the private sector are different. Goal sharing is therefore a process of aligning each partner’s goals in such a way that if the project’s objectives are met, each partner’s goals will also be met. Samii et al. (2002) find this goal symmetry to be one of the success factors at the PPP formation stage. Similarly, Jacobson and Ok Choi (2008) see goal sharing as a specific unifying vision and find it to be one of the major success factors for PPPs. Now, it is important to understand the strategies for goal sharing. Howlett et al. (1995) mention that policy goals and their ranking in importance must be clearly pointed out to the implementers; they need clear instructions on what exactly they are expected to do and what their priorities should be. Similarly, Samii et al. (2002) emphasize that the framework of cooperation needs to be drafted

214

N. SAYADAT

internally and kept simple and flexible, with low-level details and legal implications also needing to be reviewed by the partner organizations. Finally, Rui (2008) emphasizes that after setting goals jointly, it is important to keep the provision of incentives for the partners in the agreement, as this will restrict goal divergence and interest incompatibility. Communication and Information Sharing It is difficult to build good relationships between PPP actors who have divergent interests, strategies, and operational realities. These difficulties are gradually removed through constant efforts to openly communicate and share information. Jamali (2004), in his investigation of the critical success factors for PPP implementation, found that the most important reasons for poor performance were too little coordination and information sharing, and the challenge of working across sectors with divergent strategic and operational realities. However, to enable the partners to communicate, work, make decisions across their respective organizational boundaries, and to level out differences in working styles and culture, scholars stress the importance of communication structures and the need to jointly develop a set of working practices (Samii et al., 2002). According to Samii et al. (2002), many cases of poor performance in a relationship result from failure to communicate at the senior management level, from each party’s failure to understand the business goals of the other party, and from breaking the protocols of formal disciplines regarding how the parties should communicate. It is therefore best to set up parallel structures, level out differences in working styles and culture, and jointly develop working practices and procedures. Furthermore, as Farquharson et al. (2011) emphasize, the regular flow of information on the project’s performance from the private partner and the public partner’s responsibility to monitor the performance through planned and random checks are also reflections of a good partnership. Trust Building Trust is defined as a psychological state in which people accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about the intentions or behavior of others (Rousseau et al., 1998). Fernandez (2009) indicates that trust has an independent and positive effect on overall contractual performance. Ezezika et al. (2013) also find this trust to be paramount to effective governance and successful partnership. However, trust cannot be mandated or merely asserted in a PPP agreement; it needs to be built

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

215

and earned through action and behavior. It also needs to be nurtured throughout the PPP’s whole life cycle (PPP Unit, 2004). What are the mechanisms the partners use to enhance their mutual trust? From Fernandez’s (2009) point of view, trust-building efforts are comprised of actions that enhance dependability, predictability, and faith in the partners. Samii et al. (2002) articulate that for an effective partnership, each partner needs to be able to relate to and show appreciation, respect, and understanding for the other partner. Alam et al. (2014) demonstrate in their study that in a successful PPP, trust develops between the partners through a series of informal meetings between actors, and that these meetings ultimately contribute to PPP success. Relationship Building Relationships between the actors can develop through interorganizational cooperation, meetings, and interaction and consultations with relevant stakeholders, particularly with the citizens who are concerned about the project throughout all its phases. The purpose of building relationships with stakeholders is to ensure that the concerned individuals and groups are appropriately engaged and continue to support the project. The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) finds that effectively managing relationships with stakeholders is a key to achieving long-term success in a PPP (PPIAF, 2016). PPIAF therefore points out that the public partner plays a significant role in informing stakeholders about the project and ensuring that they do not unnecessarily slow down the project, for instance when there is a need to obtain a permit from another government department. Consensus Building Consensus building is a process whereby partners come to general agreement on an issue. It may be a matter of one partner coming to accept the other partner’s views and opinions. Samii et al. (2002) find consensus building to be one of the cornerstones of the PPP model’s success. According to them, consensus building offers necessary flexibility and creates an interactive environment that enables development and experimentation with new ideas in the “positive” decision-making process. It also strengthens the feeling of ownership among the partners and heightens commitment and trust. Consensus building is also vital for formulating balanced solutions to problems (issues or disputes) during the period of complex decision making in a PPP.

216

N. SAYADAT

Risk and Resource Sharing Risk in a long-term PPP arises due to uncertainty regarding the occurrence of certain events (e.g., changes in government policy, delays in accessing land, reduction of estimated demand) that can raise costs, reduce earnings, and affect the PPP’s overall performance. This is why the risk management process—involving identification, assessment, allocation/sharing, mitigation, and review—is important throughout the life of the PPP. A key principle in allocating specific risks in a PPP is to give them to the party who can best manage them. When demand-related risks are borne by the private operator, the PPP agreement allows the private operator to collect user fees. In such a scenario, if a user fee is determined by the government, the public partner needs to adjust it based on necessity at the time, thus to maintain an alignment between the project’s rate of return and its capital cost for the private partner (Farquharson et al., 2011). Alam et al. (2014) found that in managing risk and uncertainty, breaking down a large project into several mini-projects and distributing tasks and responsibility among partners were very effective. Resource sharing is a process of forming partnerships between organizations with interdependent resource endowments. According to Chen (2008), unequal partners often distort the relationship, so a more shared, equitable power allocation among partners may have desirable effects on collaboration outcomes. Partner organizations can share resources in ways that can be measured by assessing the extent to which the organizations combine resources, share information, appreciate each other’s contributions, and work together to achieve collective goals. Alam et al. (2014) found that when project personnel shared skills and experience through formal and informal settings, this enhanced collaborative performance. The above variables are highly interrelated and may affect PPP implementation. For example, if there are unclear or ambiguous goals can lead to misinterpretation and misunderstanding by partners in the project which may impede communication between partners (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Similarly, poor communication between partners can challenge partnership development and trust building which are important for successful project implementation. At the same time, less trust and consensus building may impede risk taking and sharing of resources (Knill & Tosun, 2020).

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

217

Framework of Analysis From an interactive perspective, PPP policy performance is the result of enhanced process-management strategies. Treating performance as the dependent variable and processes as the explanatory variable, the following “Process-based PPP Performance Framework” is developed as an analytical framework for this study (Fig. 9.1). The framework explains that in a long-term infrastructure contract type PPP, process management activities—that is, goal sharing, communication and information sharing, trust building, relationship building, consensus building, and resource and risk sharing—will lead to better policy performance, understood as meeting policy design goals, stakeholder satisfaction, and network effectiveness. The general hypothesis about the relations between the processes and the policy performance is articulated a hypothesis: H: The greater the effort in process management strategies, the better the policy performance for a PPP. Process-Based PPP Performance Framework Explanatory Variables: PPP Processes

Dependent Variable: PPP Performance

1.Goal Sharing 2. Communication & Information Sharing Public Partner PPP Policy and Guidelines Concession Agreement Relevant Act, Rules & Regulations

Private Partner

3. Trust Building PPP Performance

4. Relationship Building

5. Consensus Building

6. Resource & Risk Sharing

Fig. 9.1 Analytical framework for the study (Source Author’s own construction)

218

N. SAYADAT

Research Methodology For this study, I used a case study strategy in combination with a qualitative research method. A case study strategy is the best option because it deals with more variables of interest than data points. It also relies on multiple-source-based evidence that is thereafter triangulated to increase rigor. Here, a multiple-case design with two cases is used: Teknaf Land Port PPP (Case A) and Sonamasjid Land Port PPP (Case B). A is measured as a success but not B. To explain: When considering the achievement of policy design goals—that is, construction of the required infrastructure and payment made to the public authority— Case A is a success. Also, when considering the private investor’s ability to arrange financing for building the infrastructure and completing the expected tasks, Rashed et al. (2013) identify Case A as an example of successful implementation. On the other hand, when examining Case B, Khan (2011) takes into consideration the private partner’s failure to build necessary infrastructure, overdue payment to the public partner, commercial non-success for the private partner, and substandard service delivery to the users, and identifies Case B as unsuccessful (Khan, 2011). The people I chose to interview were managers from public and private partners, high officials from the Ministry of Shipping, national-level PPP experts, and academics. I conducted semi-structured interviews with the key actors from the organizations involved in two networks, and indepth interviews with the other officials and experts. Both purposive and snowball sampling were used to select the respondents. There were 32 (thirty-two) interviews in all (Table 9.1). To minimize bias and error during the research process, and to enhance internal consistency, I used a “triangulation approach” that involved frequent references to primary data derived from interviews, secondary or documentary data such as the minutes of meetings, official letters, and other official correspondence, as well as external documentary evidence such as newspaper and magazine articles, annual reports, company websites, and fliers. I analyzed the data in two stages: withincase analysis and cross-case synthesis. When doing within-case analysis, I treated each case as a stand-alone entity. Later, I used cross-case synthesis to further develop, validate, or refute the findings of the within-case analysis. In reality, both within-case analysis and cross-case synthesis can often occur synergistically and interactively (Paterson, 2010).

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

219

Table 9.1 List and composition of key respondents Key Respondents

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

BLPA [Chairman, Director (Traffic), Superintendent Engineer, Executive Engineer, Assistant Director (Traffic)] Case A and Case B (Managing Director / Director, General Manager, Manager, Deputy Manager) Service recipients (Importer, Exporter, C & F Agents) Ministry of Shipping (Additional Secretary and Joint Secretary) Academicians/ experts (Professor of DU, CEO of PPP Authority, and MD of IIFC) Ex Officials (Ex-Chairman, BSBK, Ex Commissioner, Customs and Ex Superintendent Engineer, BSBK)

TOTAL

Teknaf Land Port PPP Case A

Sonamasjid Land Port PPP Case B

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

3

3

32

Source Author’s own construction

Discussion of Findings Teknaf Land Port PPP (Case A) Teknaf Land Port is located on the banks of the Naaf River at Teknaf, Cox’s Bazar district, and covers 27 acres. This port is mostly used for the transit of people and goods between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Bangladesh Land Port Authority (BLPA) was interested in developing

220

N. SAYADAT

and operating this land port through private participation on a BuildOperate-Transfer basis. The selected bidder offered BLPA 28.09% of the gross revenue share from the port operation earnings. The estimated project cost was US$ 3.5 million. BLPA signed an agreement in August 2006 with United Land Port Teknaf Ltd., a project company formed by the selected bidder. Partial commercial operation started along with signing the land lease agreement. Full commercial operation was scheduled to start two years after the official land hand-over date. Due to a delay in making a decision regarding the revision of the infrastructure requirement, full commercial operation started in July 2012. During operation, the private partner has had to bear the risk of losing revenue on account of legally and illegally built jetties near the port. Internal passenger transport has shifted from the PPP jetty to these other jetties. BLPA is unable to solve this problem. Thus, with BLPA’s consent, the private partner has filed a writ petition to the higher court against persons and authorities connected with illegal jetty operation. But despite the revenue risk, this project has met the delivery schedule, as the required infrastructure was built within two years of the official land handover date. Furthermore, the private company conforms with technical and operational specifications and pays the revenue share to the government regularly. Due to infrastructure development and payment to the government, government officials consider this PPP as a success (Source: BLPA officials). Sonamasjid Land Port PPP (Case B) Sonamasjid Land Port is BLPA’s first land port with private participation on a Build-Operate-Transfer basis. The land port is located in Chapai Nawabganj district on 19.10 acres of land, just 200 m away from the Indian border. Panama Trading Company Ltd. was selected as the private partner for port operation because it offered the government the highest revenue share of all the bidders (49% of gross revenue). The estimated cost of the project was US$ 2.1 million. BLPA signed the agreement in October 2005 with the Panama Sonamasjid Port Link Ltd., a project company formed by the bidder. Partial commercial operation started in September 2006 with limited facilities. Since then, however, the private partner stopped paying the revenue share to the government and has made no progress in constructing the necessary infrastructure. Due to these defaults, BLPA issued a termination

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

221

notice in June 2008. After this, the Infrastructure Development Company Ltd. (IDCOL), a leading consortium member of financing institutions, used its step-in rights in the project. To overcome the default, IDCOL changed the project company’s structure and nominated another person as its managing director. BLPA approved these changes with the condition that the new operator would pay the overdue revenue share and complete construction within four years of commercial operation. Accordingly, the commercial operation date was fixed in October 2010. However, the new operator could not complete the infrastructure and was irregular in paying dues. BLPA issued a second termination notice in 2014. The minister of the Ministry of Shipping mediated the issue and the termination notice was eventually suspended. In operating this land port, two major issues have arisen. First, the private partner risks revenue loss from the vehicles coming from India that are loaded with crushed rock and fly ash. Due to insufficient space inside the port, these vehicles go to the importers’ premises outside the port for unloading. Additional land therefore needs to be acquired to handle these goods. Second, the amendment of agreement on determining the location, size, and construction of the physical facilities has been pending for a long time. This amendment is required for smooth operation. But in addition to these issues, it is due to this project not meeting technical and operational specifications, not keeping to the time schedule, failure to stay within its budget, and failure to pay the contractual revenue share to the public partner, that the government officials consider this PPP an unsuccessful case (Source: BLPA officials). Cross-Case Synthesis for PPP Performance A PPP’s policy performance is conceived as a success, first of all, when it achieves its policy goals, satisfies the stakeholders, and demonstrates the network’s sustainability. For Case A, the construction of required facilities was completed in a timely manner with minor variations, and the revenue share has been paid to the government on a regular basis. In Case B, technical specifications of the required facilities were not followed, the private operator could not meet the deadline, and it is irregular in paying the revenue share to the government. From the study findings, it is evident that Case A has met most of the policy design goals while Case B has not. Second, in Case A, the public partner and users of the facilities were found to be satisfied with the infrastructure facilities and service delivery.

222

N. SAYADAT

The private operator completed building all facilities for internal passenger transport from Teknaf to Saint Martin Island. But due to passenger ships landing at other legally and illegally established jetties, the private partner is losing revenue from passenger transport. Respondents from the private operator nevertheless did not deem the project commercially unsuccessful: They stated that corporate sector goals are being accomplished. In Case B, the level of satisfaction of all relevant stakeholders is low. This port still functions, but with persistent limitations and dissatisfaction. Third, in Case A, BLPA officials have gained adequate experience of managing collaborations between the partners and can pursue further partnership with the private sector. Moreover, the public partner has noticed some provisions in their BLPA Act 2001 and has proposed an amendment to the Ministry. The proposal addresses situations in which the private operator may claim enhanced legal rights in port operations. In Case B, BLPA officials express a lack of interest in partnership with the private sector. The sustainability of the PPP network is thus high in Case A and low in Case B. Cross-Case Synthesis for PPP Processes From the interactive perspective of network management, PPP policy performance depends on the extent of process management strategies used by the actors. These management strategies are goal sharing, communication and information sharing, trust building, relationship building, consensus building, and resources and risks sharing. This section of the chapter presents a comparative picture of how these strategies are used in the two cases. Goal Sharing In following time-bound procurement stages, the public partner selects a preferred private partner and the two sign a PPP agreement. Policy and program goals are shared with the preferred partner through bid documents, the PPP agreement, and through negotiation. For Case A, the agreement was signed based on a mutual understanding of a common goal within the prescribed time of the procurement processes: When BLPA publish a request for proposals, we submitted our bid documents and the agreement that we signed was signed based on our full understanding. (A representative of the private partner)

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

223

The perception of accountability to each other, that is, to respond to each other positively, is also found to be high among the partners. This contributes to achieving jointly set goals. In Case B, procurement steps took longer than expected because the private partner took more than seven months to sign the agreement. Furthermore, it could not deliver benefits in a desired manner. The agreement was signed, but in some financial covenants, consensus was not achieved between the actors: The concession agreement was prepared by BLPA. We, as the selected private partner, sent our comments on that draft, but they were not approved by BLPA. Without signing the agreement, we would not be able to get a work order, so we were compelled to sign it. (A representative of the project company)

The perception of accountability between the partners is relatively opaque in Case B. This was revealed in the interviews with officials from both the public and the private partners. Indeed, responses from the interviewees could not confirm accountability to each other in Case B. Nevertheless, the public partner followed the standard format for agreement in both cases. All respondents mentioned that the agreement was drafted in a comprehensible manner and that almost all the goals and provisions were arranged systematically based on their respective importance. Moreover, in both agreements, there was no incentive mechanism for better performance and aligning the goals. It is therefore evident that goal sharing processes were used to a moderate extent in Case A and to a lesser extent in Case B. Communication and Information Sharing Communication between the public and the private organization generally takes place at different levels. In both PPPs, communication at the business and operational level is frequent and mostly takes place among senior executives. Case A is found to be transparent in maintaining financial records and in sending a yearly audited financial statement to BLPA. In Case B reporting is mostly absent. Case A uses information and communication technologies (ICTs) to expedite service delivery and for communication between the partners (e.g., computer-based data entry, CCTV-based monitoring system, and

224

N. SAYADAT

Internet-based communication). Case B still uses a traditional communication system (formal letters, telephone, and fax) and has limited progress in information exchange. But the attitudes of the implementing officials also play a great role in communication among the actors. BLPA officials are found to have a more positive attitude about Case A than Case B: For Case A: Even though the public partner could have done this project alone, it was fruitful to have a partnership. For Case B: The public partner could have managed this project alone, but due to the BOT framework, we had to enter into a partnership, which has given us a rather more negative than positive experience. (A BLPA respondent)

Indeed, this attitude is prevalent among BLPA officials. In contrast, when discussing the complexity of port operations—due to the socio-politicaladministrative nexus, local complexity in revenue collection, local political culture, and geopolitical aspects—both the private operators show a positive attitude toward the public partner by mentioning that they on their own could not implement the project. In sum, the extent of efforts in communication and information sharing is high in Case A and low in Case B. The higher extent of communication and information sharing in Case A reflects power sharing, a positive attitude to working together, and the building of an environment conducive to arriving at a win-win situation. In Case B, the lack of transparency and inadequate communication and information sharing cause cooperation to break down and generate dissatisfaction among the actors. Trust Building Trust is crucial for developing a working relationship between actors. Making commitments and acting so as to fulfill them are important ingredients in building trust. In Case A, trust was built gradually during interaction and communication between the public and the private partner. But the private partner had to gain trust based on its commitment to constructing infrastructure and by maintaining company accounts. A top executive of United Group explains the company’s efforts and attainment of the public partner’s trust:

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

225

While making decisions about the revision of the infrastructure construction requirement, BLPA agreed that our position was right. So, they allowed us to start operating the port with the constructed facilities. Secondly, in complying with the audit objections sent by BLPA, we, as the private partner, complied with all the audit objections within the stipulated time. … So, between the BLPA and United Group, there is no deficiency in trust. (United Group executive)

The BLPA chairperson also indicated his full trust and confidence in Case A, as the private partner honored the terms and conditions of the agreement. He further expressed that due to its performance, BLPA’s trust in the private partner has been increasing day by day. The trust-building scenario is different in Case B, as we can gather from a remark from two BLPA respondents: I have zero trust in the private partner of Sonamasjid Land Port because of frequent breach of promises. (A BLPA executive) As the private partner’s performance is not satisfactory, I have less trust in the private partner’s ability and intention. (Another BLPA executive)

The public partner received bank cheques from Case B that on several occasions bounced. This contributed to diminishing trust among the partners. A senior executive of the project company acknowledged this deficiency: We could not pay BLPA as per our promise. Moreover, due to not having sufficient money in our bank account, the cheque we sent to BLPA was dishonored by the bank. (Sonamasjid Land Port senior executive)

Mutual appreciation is considered an important trust-building strategy, because such appreciation enhances trust among the actors. The private operator in Case A showed appreciation for BLPA in a letter thanking BLPA for taking the right step against shifting a shrimp landing station from Teknaf Port to Chittagong. BLPA officials also mentioned that they appreciate the private partner of Teknaf Land Port. There is no such record of appreciation found in Case B. Finally, it is important to note that informal communication as an important trust-building strategy was found to be used by the partners in both cases. From the above, it is evident that efforts to build trust are much greater in Case A than in Case B. In Case A, trust has been enhanced since the

226

N. SAYADAT

very start of the partnership. The opposite is true for Case B: Here there is a diminishing trend in trust due to the private partner’s consistent breach of promises, negligence in constructing infrastructure, and less strategic information sharing. This is reflected in decision making on important issues in the policy process. Case B has experienced more “negative” decisions or “non-decisions.” Consequently, dissatisfaction prevails among the partners. Relationship Building The relationship building process is measured by how often meetings are held and how partner organizations use their authority and power to realize jointly decided activities. In both the cases, bi-lateral meetings are held to address issues and discuss other relevant matters. In Case A, of all the decisions made in the meetings, most of the decisions (38 out of 43) were eventually implemented. In Case B, most of the decision (50 out of 83) were not implemented within the deadline. Formal stakeholder meetings at project sites are held almost at regular interval in Case A, whereas in Case B, these meetings are held only to respond to emergencies, and they are not well-documented. In addition to the above-mentioned meetings, since 2011, “Advisory Committee” meetings headed by the Minister have been held three times to discuss issues related to Case A, but no such meetings have taken place for Case B. In the case of support projects, which are required for a port’s proper functioning (e.g., improvement of a connecting road), the implementation responsibility lies with the public partner. Here as well, Case A is ahead of Case B. Therefore, documentary evidence shows that the extent of efforts in relationship building is moderate in Case A but low in Case B. Consensus Building There are many issues—for instance changes in agreements and disputes— about which the partners must make decisions and reach consensus. Consensus building denotes agreement between partners about a particular problem, or the making of joint decisions. Consensus ensures a win-win situation for the partners. In Case A, most of the decisions have been “positive” and “win-win,” and the private and public partners’ expectations have mostly been met during re-negotiation of the agreement and through solving problems. In Case B, negotiation on the agreement amendment did not proceed with effective decision making. Moreover, since the very start of the development work, the private

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

227

partner raised several issues and problems with BLPA, but most of these have remained either unresolved or have been solved in a manner that cannot be described as win-win. It is the case that officials who advocate in favor of any PPP usually assist in consensus building, as doing so speeds up decision making. In Case A, there are such officials among the partners who promote PPP. But in Case B, there are no instances of any officials who have advocated for the betterment of the PPP. Consensus building has therefore rarely happened in Case B. Disputes can be resolved through amicable settlement, expert mediation, and arbitration. If these three mechanisms fail, an aggrieved party may move to the court (this is not recommended for PPP). If a dispute is not solved at one level, it escalates to the next higher level. In Case A, the private partner informed BLPA several times about the internal passenger jetty operation and subsequent financial loss to BLPA, but it did not seek an amicable settlement. As the dispute is beyond the BLPA’s control, the private partner filed a writ petition to the court. This means the judiciary is drawn in to solve problems. In Case B, the private partner applied to the public partner to settle disputes related to their financial loss and imposition of an undisclosed revenue share, but BLPA did not seek dispute resolution. Again, this evidence shows that the extent of effort used to build consensus is moderate in Case A, but low in Case B. Resource and Risk Sharing In Case A, there has been sufficient agreement to keep the relationship interdependent through resource sharing arrangements. The private partner built high-quality infrastructure through its sister concern and has employed professional expertise in its operation. The private partner is also relatively satisfied with the tariff schedule and did not complain about it. To a certain extent, mutual learning and experience sharing between the organizations are also evident. However, the biggest revenue loss continues, mainly due to the private jetties operating internal passenger transport, and because BLPA has been unable to provide much assistance in shutting down the competing facilities. This aspect of revenue risk and incapability of managing the risks through inter-departmental coordination has raised some tension among the partners. In Case B, there has been too little agreement to create an interdependent relationship between the partners. From the beginning of port operation, the private partner has been raising concerns over the tariff schedule and its different charges. This signifies persistent dissatisfaction

228

N. SAYADAT

with the tariff schedule. Based on interviews and documentary evidence, it is also clear that there is inadequate learning and experience sharing between the partners, and there is no evidence of sharing the construction risk through employing a construction contractor. The private partner alone took the responsibility to build the physical facilities. Moreover, the private partner takes all the revenue risk stemming from the vehicles that drive outside the port boundary to unload at the importers’ premises. Here, revenue loss is continuing due to BLPA’s lack of assistance in acquiring or renting new land to expand the port space. BLPA as the public partner was found incapable of managing this risk. Therefore, resource and risk sharing processes were used to a moderate extent in Case A and to a lower extent in Case B. The argument of this study, which follows from the network management approach to policy implementation, is that a policy’s success results from using a higher level of process management strategies. Theoretically, a higher level of process management enhances cooperation among partners and assists “positive” decision making. When “positive” decisions are made, this satisfies the actors and leads the policy process toward successful implementation. Here, all the processes identified in the analytical framework are employed either at a moderate or higher level in Case A, leading ultimately to this PPP being a “success case.” These processes are employed to a lesser extent in Case B, ultimately leading this PPP to being an “unsuccessful case.” Due to all the explanatory variables being aligned in the same direction, it can be said that the core hypothesis is confirmed, that is, that PPP processes explain PPP performance. The network management approach to policy implementation is therefore found useful in explaining the policy process and its success or failure in Bangladesh’s PPPs. The study findings also confirm prevalent arguments in the PPP literature: First, a jointly set goal is a prerequisite for making a PPP successful. Second, frequent communication and transparency in information sharing enhance both cooperation and satisfaction among the actors. Third, relentless effort to build trust enhances confidence among the partners. Fourth, consistent stakeholder consultations enhance the partners’ cooperation and the legitimacy of the PPP. Fifth, solving problems and disputes affects performance to a great extent. Finally, risk cannot be fully transferred; rather, it must be shared in order to secure the expected performance outcome.

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

229

Concluding Remarks This study investigated the implementation of PPP-managed projects, the processes involved, and to what extent these processes have achieved policy objectives. In doing the investigation, I followed the interactive perspective on network management and its related theoretical framework. For my research strategy, I used a qualitative research method with two case studies. The findings show that the use of process management strategies affects PPP policy performance. This study therefore confirms that PPP is a hybrid form of organization that needs process management strategies along with central steering in order to be successful. This study also finds that the interactive perspective of network management is conducive for analyzing the PPP policy process in Bangladesh. PPP as a policy tool has received substantial attention in Bangladesh. The findings therefore have significant policy implications in the national context. However, in addition to using empirical evidence to confirm confirming theoretical claims, it is also necessary to search systematically for the reasons behind the theoretical claims (e.g., perceptions about PPP, the relevant training of officials, organizational culture). More research is needed to better understand PPP policy implementation, especially to understand the broader socio-cultural and political contexts of the given country and to develop links between governance, policy, and the organizational aspects of PPPs. A comprehensive study of these aspects might be useful in reaping the benefits of PPP as a policy tool.

References Alam, Q., Kabir, M. H., & Chaudhri, V. (2014). Managing infrastructure projects in Australia: A shift from a contractual to a collaborative public management strategy. Administration & Society, 46(4), 422–449. Alexander, R. (2012). Network structures and the performance of brownfield redevelopment PPPs. Public Performance & Management Review, 35(4), 753– 768. Bovaird, T. (2004). Public-private partnerships: From contested concepts to prevalent practice. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70(2), 199–215. Brinkerhoff, D. W. (1996). Process perspectives on policy change: Highlighting implementation. World Development, 24(9), 1395–1401.

230

N. SAYADAT

Chen, B. (2008). Assessing interorganizational networks for public service delivery: A process-perceived effectiveness framework. Public Performance & Management Review, 31(3), 348–363. Dvir, D., Raz, T., & Shenhar, A. J. (2003). An empirical analysis of the relationship between project planning and project success. International Journal of Project Management, 21(2), 89–95. Ezezika, O. C., Deadman, J., Murray, J., Mabeya, J., & Daar, A. S. (2013). To trust or not to trust: A model for effectively governing public-private partnerships. AgBioForum, 16(1), 27–36. Farquharson, E., de Mästle, C. T., & Yescombe, E. (2011). How to engage with the private sector in public-private partnerships in emerging markets: World Bank Publications. Fernandez, S. (2009). Understanding contracting performance: An empirical analysis. Administration & Society, 41(1), 67–100. GoB. (2013). Annual Report, 2012–13. Ministry of Shipping, Government of Bangladesh. Greve, C., & Hodge, G. (2007). Public private partnerships: A comparative perspective on Victoria and Denmark. In T. Christensen and P. Lægreid (Eds.), Transcending new public management: The transformation of public sector reforms. Ashgate. Hill, M., & Hupe, P. (2014). Implementing public policy: An introduction to the study of operational governance. Sage. Hodge, G., & Greve, C. (2011, 2–4 June). Theorizing public-private partnership success: A market-based alternative to government [Conference presentation]. Public Management Research Conference, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, New York, USA. Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., & Perl, A. (1995). Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems (vol. 3). Cambridge University Press. Jacobson, C., & Ok Choi, S. (2008). Success factors: Public works and publicprivate partnerships. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 21(6), 637–657. Jamali, D. (2004). Success and failure mechanisms of public private partnerships (PPPs) in developing countries: Insights from the Lebanese context. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 17 (5), 414–430. Jamali, D. (2007). A study of customer satisfaction in the context of a public private partnership. International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 24(4), 370–385. John, P. (1998). Analysing public policy. Pinter. Jun Park, H., & Jeong Park, M. (2009). Types of network governance and network performance: Community development project case. International Review of Public Administration, 13(sup. 1), 91–105.

9

PROCESS-BASED PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK …

231

Khan, M. F. K. (2011). Bangladesh comprehensive private sector assessment: Addressing binding constraints for higher growth. Report prepared for the Asian Development Bank. Kickert, W. J., Klijn, E. -H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (Eds). (1997). Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector. Sage Publications. Klinj, E., & Koppenjan, F. (2000). Public management and policy networks. Public Management, 2(2), 135–158. Klijn, E.-H., & Teisman, G. R. (2003). Institutional and strategic barriers to public-private partnership: An analysis of Dutch cases. Public Money and Management, 23(3), 137–146. Klijn, E.-H., Edelenbos, J., Kort, M., & van Twist, M. (2008). Facing management choices: An analysis of managerial choices in 18 complex environmental public-private partnership projects. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(2), 251–282. Knill, C., & Tosun, J. (2020). Public policy: A new introduction. Red Globe Press. Koppenjan, J. (2005). The formation of public-private partnerships: Lessons from nine transport infrastructure projects in the Netherlands. Public Administration, 83(1), 135–157. Linder, S. H. (1999). Coming to terms with the public-private partnership: A grammar of multiple meanings. American Behavioral Scientist, 43(1), 35–51. Parsons, W. (1995). Public Policy. Edward Elgar. Paterson, B. L. (2010). Within-case analysis. In A. J. Mills, G. Durepos, & E. Wiebe (Eds.), Encyclopedia of case study research (pp. 971–974). Sage Publications. PPIAF (2016). Strategy, delivery and commissioning. PPP guide: The PPP certification program guide (Chapter 7). Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF): The World Bank Group. PPP Unit. (2004). National Treasury PPP manual, module 6: Managing the PPP agreement. National Treasury PPP Unit, South Africa. Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414–423. Pülzl, H., & Treib, O. (2006). Implementing public policy. In F. Fischer, G.J. Miller, & M.S. Sidney (Eds.), Handbook of public policy analysis (Chapter seven, p. 89–109). Taylor and Francis Group. Rashed, M. A., Alam, M. M., & Faisal, F. (2013, February 22–24). The performances and challenges of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects in Bangladesh. [Conference presentation]. Bridging the policy-action divide: Challenges and prospects for Bangladesh, University of California, Berkley, USA.

232

N. SAYADAT

Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 393–404. Rui, M. (2008). Public-private partnerships and the management of expressways in China: An agency theory approach [Master dissertation]. Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands. Samii, R., Van Wassenhove, L. N., & Bhattacharya, S. (2002). An innovative public–private partnership: new approach to development. World Development, 30(6), 991–1008. Shenhar, A. J., Tishler, A., Dvir, D., Lipovetsky, S., & Lechler, T. (2002). Refining the search for project success factors: A multivariate, typological approach. R&d Management, 32(2), 111–126. Skelcher, C. (2007). Public-private partnerships and hybridity. In L. E. L. Ewan Ferlie, Jr., & C. Pollitt (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public management. Oxford University Press. van den Hurk, M., & Verhoest, K. (2015). The governance of public-private partnerships in sports infrastructure: Interfering complexities in Belgium. International Journal of Project Management, 33(1), 201–211. Van Gestel, K., Voets, J., & Verhoest, K. (2012). How governance of complex PPPs affects performance. Public Administration Quarterly, 36(2), 140–188. Van Ham, H., & Koppenjan, J. (2001). Building public-private partnerships: Assessing and managing risks in port development. Public Management Review, 3(4), 593–616. Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The policy implementation process: A conceptual framework. Administration & Society, 6(4), 445–488. Willems, T. (2014). Democratic accountability in public–private partnerships: The curious case of Flemish school infrastructure. Public Administration, 92(2), 340–358. Yuan, J., Zeng, A. Y., Skibniewski, M. J., & Li, Q. (2009). Selection of performance objectives and key performance indicators in public–private partnership projects to achieve value for money. Construction Management and Economics, 27 (3), 253–270. Zhang, X. (2006). Public clients’ best value perspectives of public private partnerships in infrastructure development. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 132(2), 107–114.

CHAPTER 10

Patient-Doctor Trust at Local Healthcare Centers in Rural Bangladesh Md. Mahfuzul Haque

The trust that patients have in doctors has had a dominant position in clinical or medical research but has been less researched from the perspective of public administration. What constitutes patients’ trust in doctors, and as such, can explain institutional trust in the Upazila Health Complexes (UHCs) in rural Bangladesh?1 Patient-doctor trust results from the fulfillment of positive expectations about treatment and continuity. This may eventually influence a patient’s choice of physician. The quality of treatment in rural healthcare institutions in Bangladesh depends on factors such as the availability of doctors, proper diagnoses and treatment, and the supply of medicine. These factors represent criteria that must be met in order to call a UHC a “responsive” service institution. 1 Upazila denotes a sub-district, which is the second-lowest administrative unit in Bangladesh (the lowest level is the union parishad). Upazilas operate according to a decentralized model of governance and have locally elected representatives and public officials.

Md. M. Haque (B) South Asian Institute of Policy and Governance (SIPG), North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5_10

233

234

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

The preliminary report of the Bangladesh Health Facility Survey 20172 provides evidence of the lack of necessary equipment in public healthcare facilities across the country. Reports on the shortage of doctors and unfilled positions in UHCs also abound.3 There is therefore a perception of deteriorating healthcare in UHCs as compared with that available from private clinics located in districts across the country. But this does not preclude local health services from being trustworthy. It is important to stress that UHCs, by being local, are readily accessible, and that they are affordable, even to the poorest in society, and that they remain the major choice for primary healthcare. So it is worth asking: To what extent are UHCs trustworthy? What aspects—either clinical or non-clinical—influence citizens’ trust in doctors? Who among Bangladesh’s population use UHC services the most? This chapter focuses on the patient-doctor relationship with reference to institutional trust in UHCs. In this context, “Institutional trust” denotes the trust citizens have in public institutions—for whatever reason; it does not necessarily reflect actual trustworthiness but may still indicate something about the institution’s trustworthiness. The objective of this chapter is to use Kim’s (2005) dimensions of institutional trustworthiness to explain the factors that generate institutional trust and to assess the level of such trust in UHCs. I begin by introducing the primary healthcare system for Bangladesh, then explain the relevance of trust in UHCs. The definition of trust is next on the agenda, followed by an account of Kim’s (2005) dimensions of institutional trustworthiness, the study design, and the study method. The latter part of the chapter analyzes the data gleaned from observations and qualitative interviews. I seek to answer two questions: What is the status of patients’ trust in UHCs? How can patients’ trust in UHCs be analyzed using Kim’s (2005) dimensions of institutional trustworthiness?

The Primary Healthcare System at the Grassroots Level in Bangladesh Upazila Health Complexes (UHCs) serve as the main institutional hubs offering clinical, promotive, and preventive healthcare services at the 2 The Daily Star, June 30,2019. 3 The Daily Star, August 2019.

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

235

grassroots level in rural Bangladesh. Below the UHC level are the Union sub-centers and community clinics (CC), which also constitute part of the infrastructure for delivering primary healthcare. Primary healthcare, which includes essential services that are based on practical, scientifically sound, and socially accepted methods, is universally accessible and affordable to community members. It includes services delivered at an out-patient department (OPD) and an in-patient department (IPD), plus a whole range of health services for preventive and clinical care. Curative and promotive services along with emergency obstetric care, gynecology, and basic laboratory services have expanded the deliverables of UHCs. The UHCs also now provide e-health services, an extended immunization program, a reproductive health program, and a piloting health insurance program. Depending on their territorial jurisdiction, UHCs serve from 175,000 to 480,000 persons. They run 50-bed hospitals with both male and female wards. The patients are charged a nominal amount for out-patient and in-patient services. Diagnostic services, radio imaging, and ambulance services are available but limited and dispensed on a payment basis. Below the UHC level are the CCs. They are located in villages, serve approximately 6,000 persons each, and deliver what is called an “essential service package.” This package includes reproductive healthcare, safe motherhood, family planning, maternal nutrition, adolescent care, neonatal care, and communicable disease control.

The Relevance of Trust in UHCs Trust is conceived as deriving from institutional and cultural influences (Bromiley & Harris, 2006, p. 125) and as a fundamental mechanism in all social contexts (Bachmann, 2006, p. 395). If this is the case, UHCs will influence patients’ trust at the same time as dispensing health services. Despite the government’s persistent policies to make primary healthcare accessible to the population and to improve the existing primary health services, UHCs tend to fail to provide the expected quality of services. This may be due to the increase in demand for UHC services over the years, primarily on account of referrals from CCs and the wide catchment area of each UHC. There are many aspects within each UHC that can affect institutional trust: for example, the availability of doctors, out-patients’ waiting time for a consultation, and the availability of doctors at the emergency department. For in-patient services, there

236

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

is the waiting time to gain admission, the availability of hospital beds, the availability of doctors, their routine visits to the wards, the quality of care by nurses, the hospital diet for patients, and the cleanliness of the wards. The UHC services are therefore relevant for generating institutional trust and may also indicate something about the overall institutional performance.

Trust Defined Trust is a multifaceted term conceptualized by cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions (Lewis & Weigert, 1998, cited in Kim, 2005, p. 621). Kim (2005, p. 621) defines institutional trust as the willingness of a citizen to be vulnerable based on the belief that an institutional actor will meet the expectations of the citizen, even in situations where the citizen cannot monitor or control the institutional actor. Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” According to this definition, trust is a mental attitude (of the trustor) that is expressed as “a leap of faith” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 108). There is an implicit assumption that trust will always lead to beneficial outcomes. The negative outcomes are only realized with hindsight. Based on the above definitions, “to trust” implies a belief that reflects an actor’s positive expectations about an outcome; the trustor also believes the other actor (the trustee) will not resort to opportunism during or after a given point of time (Gargiulo & Ertug, 2006, p. 166). Trust in institutions has often been defined on the basis of performance and the way institutions function (Askvik & Jamil, 2013; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Möllering, 2006; van de Walle et al., 2008, cited in Baniamin et al., 2019). Well-functioning institutions are therefore likely to fulfill positive expectations and to generate a high level of trust. Kim (2005, p. 620–621) points out that trust is a cognitive decision by individuals who, based on their evaluative beliefs about institutions, are willing to grant them leeway to make discretionary decisions. Furthermore, says Kim, trust entails an emotional attachment by those who are involved in the trusting relationship. Lastly, trust concerns behavior; institutional actors, he stresses, must be competent, credible, and willing to act for the benefit of the public. In this same passage, Kim reviews trust variables proposed by several authors and advances a conceptual model for

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

237

trust in governmental institutions. He argues that five factors (or dimensions) affect their trustworthiness: credible commitment, competence, benevolence, honesty, and fairness.

Kim’s Dimensions of Institutional Trustworthiness and Patients’ Trust in UHCs According to Kim (2005), credible commitment among staff members is crucial for making an institution trustworthy, for only when the staff are committed will they serve the institution as best they can. Competence as an institutional variable refers to the knowledge and skills necessary for performing institutional roles. For health institutions, competence refers to the ability of the doctors to diagnose, prescribe treatment, and effectively deliver services. Competence has been identified as a factor of trustworthiness by several scholars, namely Butler (1991), Knee and Knox (1970), Lieberman (1981), Carnevale (1995), Kass (1990), La Porte and Metlay (1996), and Levi (1998, cited in Kim, 2005, p. 623–624). The competence of service providers gives citizens assurance of the required services, causing them not to worry. Competence among service providers in an institution thus contributes to the institution’s trustworthiness. In Bangladesh, the competence of institutional actors is often observed to be compromised; opportunism may overshadow any act of benevolence, and staff members may lack commitment, which may also affect service delivery. Therefore, when assessing institutional trust in UHCs, it is important to question whether the doctors and other health service providers have the necessary skills and knowledge to diagnose and treat patients, but also to ask whether they combine their competencies with credible commitment in providing services, and whether they pursue a benevolent policy geared toward the welfare of patients. Benevolence as an institutional value tends to produce more trust in citizens. Authors such as Berman (1997), Braithwaite (1998), Hart (1984), Shaw (1997), and Wicks et al. (1999) argue that citizens tend to trust in government when they feel the government shows genuine care and concern for them (Kim, 2005, p. 625). According to Roger C. Mayer et al. (2006, p. 92), “benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive.” Such benevolence demonstrates the willing and helping attitudes of service providers and may even reflect an extrinsic reward for

238

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

them in providing services. Benevolence as a dimension of the trustworthiness of institutions is manifested by service providers’ friendly attitudes and the institutions’ programs focusing on service receivers’ well-being. This may result in the institutions being more trustworthy. Using benevolence as a parameter when measuring institutional trust in UHCs, it is necessary to question whether doctors and other service providers show benevolence to patients through dedication when tending to their welfare. Institutions are benevolent when they provide information (e.g., through setting up a help desk for patients’ enquiries), when they promise certain services by citizens charter (such charters also provide information, e.g., the availability of various services and whether such treatments would cost anything), and carry out awareness-and-prevention campaigns for communicative or non-communicative diseases. The Extended Program of Immunization and administering vitamin-A capsules to children to boost their immune system and to offset night blindness are further examples of distributing benevolent services. With regard to the dimensions of honesty and fairness, Hardin (1998, cited in Kim, 2005, p. 626) argues that the behavior of institutional actors must be free from self-interest. For example, if doctors choose to divert patients from UHCs, or to trade their quality time in UHCs for private practice, this amounts not only to unfairness but also results in dishonesty from a professional standpoint. Likewise, the non-residency of doctors in the health complexes and their unauthorized absence from UHCs have been viewed as vicious problems.4 In one newspaper story, a doctor was reported to be receiving a salary while absent from his assigned upazila.5 This situation not only raises ethical questions but also signifies deeper problems in dealing with the issue of doctors’ absenteeism, which is estimated to 40 percent according to some studies. Doctors’ residency in the UHC complex not only ensures their availability during the official hours of the day but also satisfies the need for attending to emergency patients. Non-residency and unauthorized absence from UHCs, or commuting

4 “PM irked by doctors’ absence at upazila level hospitals,” Daily Star, October 08, 2018. “Crisis of doctors at upazila hospitals,” Daily Star, October 9, 2018. “Government clams down on doctor absenteeism,” Dhaka Tribune, July 26, 2015. 5 “Beton Gramey, Thaken Dhakay” [“salaried at rural workstation, but lives in Dhaka”], Doinik Amader Shomoy, May 21, 2013.

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

239

from nearby towns to work every day, constitute professional misconduct that raises questions about integrity and honesty, thereby weakening trust in the public institutions. However, poor housing in upazilas and a lack of opportunity for career development are often put forward as genuine concerns of the doctors—and these concerns can be used to justify doctors’ unauthorized absenteeism from UHCs. Fairness as a dimension of trustworthiness refers to the nondiscriminatory behavior of institutional actors. As Kim (2005, p. 627) sees it, fairness implies treating service seekers equally and consistently, in line with the expectations. Public trust declines when some service seekers are treated more favorably than others. A non-discriminatory patient-centric approach will uphold patients’ trust in UHCs. To conclude: In the study on which this chapter is based, Kim’s dimensions of institutional trustworthiness—credible commitment, competence, benevolence, honesty, and fairness—have been used as variables for studying and explaining patients’ trust in UHCs.

Study Design Dependent Variable The dependent variable of this study is patients’ trust in their local UHC. It is assumed that a patient’s positive expectations about receiving health services would be fulfilled on the condition of the UHC’s proper institutional performance. In this study, the fulfillment of a patient’s expectations is measured by “frequency of visits.” The higher the patient’s frequency of visits to the UHC, the greater his or her reliance on and trust in the UHC. The higher frequency of visits would also result in greater treatment continuity. Independent Variables Using Kim’s (2005) conceptual framework for institutional trustworthiness, the independent variables of the study are derived as competence, credible commitment, integrity/honesty, benevolence, and fairness. Competence is a clinical variable while cooperation, compassion, and benevolence are non-clinical variables. The argument for this categorization is that patients’ trust depends on health professionals’ competence, particularly the knowledge and skill of doctors, as well as on

240

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

INDIPENDENT VARIABLES Institutional Factors: Clinical factor Competence

Independent variables observed in UHCs are seen as sources of trust

Trust in UHC Frequency of visits

Non-clinical factors Credible commitment Benevolence Integrity/honesty Fairness

Fig. 10.1

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Framework for the study

behavioral aspects such as kindness and sympathy when interacting with patients. Figure 10.1 shows the framework for the study.

Method In order to assess patients’ trust in UHCs, I gathered qualitative data in six UHCs in the following districts: Ali Kadam UHC in Bandarban district (south-eastern Bangladesh), Chakaria UHC in Cox’s Bazar district (south-eastern Bangladesh), Gabtoli UHC and Sharia Kandi UHC in Bogura district (northern Bangladesh), Pirganj UHC in Thakurgaon (far north-western Bangladesh), and Debiganj UHC in Panchagarh district (north-western Bangladesh). My tools of data collection were observation and qualitative interviews with patients at the out-patient department (OPD), both prior to their consulting a doctor and after their consultation. I did observations particularly when patients reported to the UHC, whether visiting alone or with some family members, when they were in the process of getting a token for out-patient services and when they waited for the doctor. I observed how long their consultation time was and their receiving of medicines from the UHC. Likewise, I interviewed patients at the in-patient department (IPD). I asked them questions about their ailment, the duration of their stay, their experience of receiving treatment from the doctors and nurses, the need for an aid (preferably a family member to stay in the

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

241

hospital along with the patient), their supply of medicines, and the quality of meals served in the ward. I also observed the activities of doctors and nurses closely. It was possible to interview a few doctors and nurses, so I asked them particularly about the kind of patients they receive, what patients’ health complaints are, and about what they find challenging when providing quality care and services. In addition to interviewing patients, doctors, and nurses, I also interviewed UHC officials, health directorate officials, and some key informants from the upazilas who were selected on the basis of their local residency and practical knowledge about UHC services. This was in order to substantiate the observations and findings of the interviews at the UHCs.

Data Analysis Dependent Variable Patients’ Frequency of Visits to a UHC for Treatment A higher frequency of visits to a UHC for primary healthcare is indicative of a patient’s high reliance on the UHC and his or her dependence on UHC services. It is therefore argued that the higher the frequency of visits to a UHC by a patient, the higher is his or her trust in the UHC. A higher frequency of visit to UHC is a measure for patients trust according to my observation and interview with the patients. Because, in the absence of trust in doctors, they would have resorted to nearby towns for treatment. Since UHC offers primary health care and offers treatment on a wide range of diseases such as cold, fever, headache, and general weakness which are treated at OPD. During the study it was observed that most of the patients reported ailment due to cold, cough, fever, and skin diseases. Several women patients come for regular check-up for prenatal care and services related to gynecological symptoms. Most UHC’s have obstetric care unit with necessary staff for immediate preparation for delivery of pregnant women. The above-mentioned services are available at UHC which attract patients to visit these centers and get immediate attention and relief. Patients’ trust in UHC develops from such interactions, acquaintances, and rapport with doctors and other health personnel from their repeated treatment. During the interviews, most respondents said they always come to the UHC for treatment and do not go anywhere else. It was observed that both male and female patients usually arrive at the OPD during

242

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

morning hours. Female patients are either accompanied by female family members or young children. Female patients visit the OPD more than do male patients. This is because female patients visit on account of their own needs and those of their children, while their male counterparts are working or unavailable during the time of the visit. People from 20 to 40 years of age visit UHCs more often than do people over 50. Most female patients are married and have the occupational status of housewives. Most male patients report being smallholding farmers, day laborers, small business owners, or in occupations such as carpentry or tailoring. When asked about educational attainment, most respondents report having little education or being illiterate. With respect to economic background, most belong to a very low-income category. The distance for commuting to and from UHCs varies, as UHCs may serve the population within a radius of 5 to 10 km. In larger upazilas the commuting distance may be even greater. Commuting takes place either in tri-wheelers or battery-operated easy bikes, rickshaws, and vans. As stated, UHC patients are often poor and have little education. Many of these patients said that even though they get free treatment at the UHC, many of the prescribed medicines must be purchased from a regular pharmacy. This adds an extra burden on them financially. Here is a report from one such patient: Patient from Kuptola, Shariakandi, district Bogura (50 years old). She always goes to the UHC whenever there is a medical need. Last time she visited, she got most of the prescribed medicines from the doctor. On one or two occasions, she had to buy medicines from local medical stores.

What this informant says is confirmed by others. For her as for many other patients, the local UHC is the first point of contact, and also for those referred from the CCs. It can therefore be argued that patients’ frequency of visits to UHCs is an indication of their reliance on and trust in UHC services. Independent Variables As already stated, competence is a clinical independent variable, and credible commitment, benevolence, honesty, and fairness are non-clinical independent variables. How, then, do these variables come to expression through the observations and qualitative interviews?

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

243

The Clinical Independent Variable: Competence From the perspective of patients, the competence of doctors implies the ability to diagnose and prescribe proper treatment and medication and to undertake certain urgent procedures to bring about relief and comfort. A major part of the treatment provided in UHCs is geared toward alleviating symptoms. This follows from doing physical examinations and learning about patients’ medical or health history. Patients with health complications are referred to the secondary or tertiary level of healthcare in the district. Doctors at UHC are well reputed and experienced in treating patients. Several specialist doctors are deputed in UHC along with other general physicians. The doctors placed at UHC are government registered physicians who possess necessary training and expertise prior to their placements. Besides, the doctors have been serving for quite some time at UHC, and patients have become well acquainted with their competence as medical officers. Specialists and consultant physicians for eye, ear, nose, and throat are also posted in UHCs. But UHCs suffer from a lack of necessary equipment to treat certain problems such as eye complaints. This is also a problem for UHC dentists; there may be a dentist posted at a UHC, but he will be unable to treat patients due to a lack of necessary equipment. Patients may therefore have no choice but to seek the services of private practitioners. The following case of an emergency medical intervention at a UHC depicts a doctor’s competence as a general physician, as perceived by patients: Patient (27 years old). A man swallowed poison and was brought to the Debiganj UHC, under Panchagarh district. It was a medical emergency. Poisons are sold and widely available for use as insecticides in rural agricultural areas. The people who brought the man to the UHC said he had suffered an emotional breakdown and swallowed insecticide in an attempt to commit suicide. He was screaming, had severe abdominal pain, a burning sensation in his chest, and impaired consciousness. The patient was rushed to the emergency department. The emergency medical officer immediately “washed” the stomach and treated the patient without delay. Any delay would have resulted in death. The patient survived due to his timely arrival at the emergency department and due to the immediate treatment by the emergency medical officer. Key informant: An Upazila Vice Chairman (52 years old). He visited the UHC recently on account of a personal health issue. He thinks that

244

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

considering the UHC’s limited resources, its services are quite satisfactory. He believes the doctors are competent and trusted by the people, but since there is a shortage of doctors, it is hard for them to deliver the highest quality of services. The UHC he uses only has two doctors, but the total number of sanctioned positions is for 16 doctors. Despite their postings at UHCs, doctors do not live near their workplaces. Patient: Jobed Ali (70 years old). He says he comes to the UHC quite often to check his blood pressure and seek medical advice. He says he knows the doctors and gets treatment whenever he comes. The UHC doctors, he says, are experienced general physicians. Like most of the rural population, he depends on the UHC as the first point of contact whenever there is a health emergency. In complicated cases, he says, patients are referred to Bogura district hospital, but more qualified doctors are needed here so that patients do not have to go to Bogura. He complains that qualified doctors posted to the UHC stay too short a time and seek to transfer elsewhere. Particularly at night, the UHC emergency services often suffer due to the lack of doctors. Many doctors commute from Bogura, and this often affects UHC services because the doctors arrive late for work and leave early.

It may be inferred from the above that although the competence of UHC doctors is desirable and meets expectations, competent doctors are hard to retain. Unless there are adequate incentives along with a monitoring and control system, competence as the main criteria for posting a doctor to a UHC may open up for opportunism. The case of a patient who was interviewed at Gabtoli Upazila, under Bogura district, captures the treatment situation at his local UHC: Patient: Abdul Matin (40 years old). Abdul Matin is a married man. He visits the UHC whenever he needs any treatment. He sometimes also visits Bogura for better treatment. Last time he visited the Gabtoli UHC was about two months back. He lives close by so it is easy for him to visit the UHC quite frequently. He says every time he comes to the UHC he is properly treated and given medicines. He does not have to buy any medicine from an outside pharmacy. He says most of the time the medicines supplied by UHC are adequate. The doctors, he says, have generally been available during the out-patient department’s opening hours, but sometimes he has had to wait for a doctor. Last time he visited the UHC was due to having a cold and fever. The doctor examined him and gave him medicines. But there is a shortage of doctors, and most of the time he has been treated by a health assistant whom he could not rely

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

245

on in place of a doctor. The medical assistant is experienced in dealing with common colds, fever, headaches, and so on, but he cannot [is not allowed to] treat patients.

UHCs also perform limited surgical procedures. Table 10.1 shows the volume of patients at Pirganj UHC, Thakurgaon district (from 2011 to 2014) who have had a caesarian section, thus revealing Pirganj UHC’s competence in this area. The table also shows that Pirganj UHC’s antinatal services have increased significantly over the years. This suggests that more people are now dependent on these services at the UHC. According to the Pirganj Upazila Health Bulletin 2013, the number of patients who received OPD services at the UHC from January to December that year was 52,301, while the emergency department treated 1,503 patients. The total number of patients admitted to the IPD was 9,090, and the number of reported deaths was 45. The top ten reported diseases or medical issues were assault (1,417 cases), diarrhea (795 cases), accidents (303 cases), hypertension (293 cases) pneumonia (163 cases), typhoid (134 cases), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (123 cases), asthma (104 cases), and anxiety disorder (122 cases). Caesarian operations are considered major surgery requiring skilled and competent doctors. Although there were some maternal and newborn deaths from 2011 to 2014, the number of recipients of anti-natal and post-natal services has remained high during these years. Greater awareness among the rural population, access to services, and the perceived competence of UHC doctors have Table 10.1 Health service delivery at Pirganj UHC, Thakurgaon Year

ANC recipients

No. of deliveries

No. of deliveries through caesarian section

PNC services

No. of No. of maternal deaths of deaths newborns

(Jan–Dec 2014) (Jan–Dec 2013) (Jan–Dec 2012) (Jan–Dec 2011)

4,408 5,500 6,480

2,432 2,457 1,569

662 834 154

2,778 4,347 3,681

10 13 1

7

4,448

1,147

64

2,667

4

4

ANC = anti-natal care; PNC = post-natal care Source Data Pirganj Upazila Health Complex, Thakurgaon, Bangladesh

246

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

kept the demands for health services high. Other UHCs included in the study also demonstrate similar trends of service provision that suggest doctors’ competence. While talking to some people who live in the same neighborhood as Pirganj UHC, I learned that patients suffering from heart or kidney disease cannot get any treatment at the UHC. They go to specialized hospitals or are referred to the secondary or tertiary level of healthcare. Many key informants said the UHC services are good only for some common diseases, initial health checkups, and for getting referrals. As a first point of contact, UHCs deliver quite effective services for problems such as fevers, colds, urinary tract infections, asthma, cesarean surgeries, tubectomies, and various minor operations. This is confirmed by a key informant: Key informant in one district. UHCs provide primary healthcare and emergency and obstetric care to patients. They also provide post-natal and anti-natal care and initial diagnostic and consultancy services in order to refer patients to the secondary or tertiary level. UHCs are considered trusted institutions, as doctors and nurses provide free medical care and medicines. He says that the main challenge is to cope with the patient load despite the limited number of medical officers. The residential accommodations available for medical officers at UHCs are also limited and need major refurbishment. Young medical officers need to pursue advanced degrees and must be released from the UHC they work at whenever they are nominated. Many doctors must live some distance from the UHC where they are posted since there are no suitable accommodations in the upazila. He says that patients with more complicated health issues are transferred to secondary hospitals where they may get better treatment. UHCs are not designed to deal with such patients, and, moreover, there is limited diagnostic capacity. He says that patiently listening to the patients may be the key to building trustworthy patient-doctor relationships and providing effective treatment.

Doctors’ competence may hold potential for opportunism and encourage private practice alongside working at UHCs. Doctors’ competence may also be weakened through the gradual politicization of the placement and transfer of medical officers, thus leading to a decline in observing professional norms at UHCs. As some of the informants stated, there are shortages of doctors at some UHCs. The lack of doctors of course causes service delivery to

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

247

suffer. The few doctors who are on hand are often so busy that they must rely on paramedics and health assistants to do consultations in the OPD. From the above discussions, it may be inferred that the doctors posted in UHCs are generally competent, but due to a lack of doctors, necessary equipment, and support staff, proper treatment may often be delayed. It is also inferred that some doctors’ opportunistic behavior may result in them running a private practice alongside working at a UHC, recruiting patients from the UHC, and at the same time depriving many others of service at the UHC. Non-Clinical Variables How credible is the commitment of UHC doctors? Doctors’ commitment to patients is seen to be part of their fiduciary responsibility with regard to treatment and care. This commitment is operationalized by timely attendance in emergency care, providing out-patient services, routine visits to the general ward, and a patient-friendly attitude. In contrast, unauthorized leaves of absence and delays in reporting for duty raise questions about doctors’ commitment. Most respondents said they found the doctors committed to their work. Doctors’ commitment, however, depends on their motivation, overall work environment, and on the attitudes of patients. For example, if a patient is disrespectful, impatient, complains, or does not follow the prescribed treatment regimen, this can in turn affect a doctor’s commitment. During an interview in Chakaria UHC, a patient with an injury to his forehead (due to altercations) was impatient and complained about the UHC doctors for not attending to him. When the resident medical officer was contacted to draw attention to the matter, it was revealed that the man had already received initial treatment; perhaps he was still agitated due to the head injury. But in general, most patients who received treatment from the six UHCs covered in this study expressed satisfaction. It is also observed that during natural calamities, UHCs have rendered services to the communities very effectively, thus also demonstrating committed service. However, there may be deviations in a few cases involving the need for closer examination or with regard to more responsive care, as in the following case:

248

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

Motiur Rahman (pseudo name) (ca. 55 years old). Mr. Rahman is an elected chairman of a union council. He was admitted to the local UHC for treatment of a cold and a respiratory problem. As a patient and as a local representative, he expected more attention and care from the UHC authority. The head of the UHC did not visit him during his stay in the hospital. He wondered how the ordinary patients were treated because, as he himself was an elected public representative, he was not attended by the head of the UHC, namely the Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer (UHFPO). Mr. Rahman recalls that services have deteriorated over the years. Many patients are diverted to private clinics for better care. There are shortages of medical doctors, particularly for eye and dental care. He observes that only a few doctors live at the UHC while others live in towns and commute. Hence, doctors’ non-residency in the UHC and their practice of commuting from nearby towns raise questions about their full commitment.

A teacher in Pirganj Pilot School, Thakurgaon district, who was also asked about the commitment of UHC doctors, tells a different story: Teacher, Pirganj Pilot School. The services at the UHC have improved in recent years. Doctors who are actually from the area have been posted at the UHC. This has helped us retain them, and they’ve been able to provide more responsive services. The UHC mostly serves poor patients, while the affluent people seek treatment in private clinics in town. Nonlocal doctors tend to apply for a transfer when they are posted here. As far as the commitment of the UHC doctors is concerned, not all doctors are equally motivated and committed. He believes monitoring and supervision can improve the level of commitment.

The UHFPO for Gabtoli upazila, Bogura, in his interview, also speaks about the perceived commitment of UHC doctors: The UHFPO for Gabtoli upazila, Bogura. Doctors’ commitment to patients is a professional responsibility. At times there may be minor lapses in providing prompt services. But it would be unjust to say that all doctors are uncommitted. The real test of doctors’ commitment lies in their service to patients. He believes that to develop a healthy and trustworthy doctor-patient relationship, the doctors’ full length of tenure should be maintained. A sense of commitment and service to the patients can enhance doctors’ trustworthiness.

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

249

Syed Ali (pseudo name) (aged 42). Mr. Ali visits the local UHC whenever he has the need. According to him, doctors are generally committed, but they receive a large number of patients at the out-patient department every day. They are therefore usually under pressure to see patients quickly. There is also pressure from waiting patients, particularly women, as they do not want to leave young children at home on their own for too long. But when there are fewer patients, the doctors do spend more time and are not in such a hurry.

From the above, it may be observed that not all doctors display equal commitment to their work at the UHC. Many doctors do not live on UHC premises or in upazila headquarters, so they commute from nearby towns. When this matter was discussed with the UHFPO, he said that UHCs try to provide the best possible services with the limited number of doctors and health personnel. Those who live on the UHC premises have more work-related pressure than those who live elsewhere. According to some of the interviewees, increased monitoring, the provision of incentives, and deputing doctors to their “home” upazila can ensure more responsive health services. Are the UHC doctors benevolent? During the interviews, patients were asked whether they perceived UHC doctors to be good, helpful, and concerned for their welfare. Most interviewed patients thought the doctors were usually helpful and concerned for their welfare. More than anything else, patients placed importance on the extent to which they felt they were heard and could express their concerns. The older patients admitted to the IPD were found to be quite happy with the doctors’ regular rounds in the ward and the doctors’ expression of concern for their gradual recovery. The UHC authorities who were interviewed said they carry out initiatives and campaigns to build patients’ awareness of health issues. They also provide outreach services with regard to healthcare and administer vitamins and preventive medicine in the upazilas. During the interviews, the benevolence of doctors was also evidenced through the mention of their responsiveness, vigilance, and close monitoring of elderly and critically ill patients, for instance those with respiratory tract infections or pneumonia. Providing compassionate care is not only a gesture of benevolence but also a professional norm. Patients are often subjected to neglect through being unattended. An excerpt from an interview with a patient

250

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

from Gabtoli upazila, Bogura district, captures a common perception of compassionate care: Patient: Syed Jamal (42 years old). Syed Jamal visits the UHC whenever there is a need for medical services. He thinks the UHC doctors are generally trusted because they are qualified doctors appointed by the government. He says it is often impossible to provide compassionate care due to the huge number of patients and so few doctors. But when there are fewer patients, the doctors do spend more time and do not hurry. Since the number of patients in the OPD is generally high, a single doctor is pressed for time to see patients quickly. There are also pressures because patients do not want to wait a long time. Despite the insufficient number of doctors, the attending doctor was compassionate to him and gave him the care he expected to receive.

Another patient from Gabtoli Upazila, under Bogura district, expands on the situation at the UHC: Patient: Doly Akhtar (45 years old). Doly comes to the UHC when she needs medical treatment. She also visits and consults doctors outside the UHC. The quality of treatment at the UHC is quite good, but there is a shortage of medicines. She says she did not have difficulty either in seeing or communicating with the doctors. The doctors are trustworthy, she adds, but sometimes they must deal with so many patients that they cannot spend enough time with each one. Not all patients are treated with care and compassion, she thinks, but for poor patients, the UHC services are free, so what else could be expected? Generally speaking, the elderly and female patients receive more compassionate care from the doctors than do other patients. But not all doctors are the same. The UHC services will be more trustworthy if doctors become more attentive to patients and if the availability of medicines is ensured.

Based on the information from these respondents, it may be inferred that not all patients receive benevolent and compassionate care at UHCs. In general, old people and young children are more prone to receive compassionate care than are young men. Is there a lack of integrity and honesty among UHC doctors? It is observed that the most common form of inappropriate behavior displayed by UHC doctors is their unauthorized absence from duty. As stated, most doctors do not live in a UHC complex and instead commute every day from nearby towns. Most of the patients, however, reported that the

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

251

doctors were available during consulting hours. When I tried to verify this observation, I learned that patients have little information about the availability of the designated doctors; they do not know the exact number of doctors available or who is absent on a particular day. Patients’ responses to this question were therefore probably based on their knowledge on the available doctors who they encountered during their consultation or treatment at the UHC. When studying the integrity and professionalism of health personnel at UHCs, I reviewed 100 departmental proceedings of medical officers across the country on the basis of the available sources published by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare during the year 2013–14. The review can serve as a basis for assessing the concern, honesty, and integrity of the medical officers posted at UHCs. It shows that out of 100 cases, there were 17 cases of misconduct, 71 cases of unauthorized absence, 3 cases of misconduct and corruption, 4 cases of criminal proceedings, and 1 case of inefficiency (Table 10.2). In all, 25 doctors or medical officers were removed or dismissed from service on charges of misconduct due to unauthorized absence and other allegations. 19 such cases were resolved with punishment that includes stopping salary increments for some time, 26 such proceedings ended up with issuance of censure and warning, and 25 proceedings were dropped. These figures relate to only 100 cases that were collected for the purpose of this study in a given time period. Indicators, such as misconduct, unauthorized absence from work, inefficiency, corruption, and so on, are important determinants to assess doctors’ level of integrity and professionalism. From the above information, it may be said that UHC doctors’ integrity and honesty may be wanting to some extent. Are the services at UHCs fair and non-discriminatory? The interviews with officials and patients revealed that UHCs have a policy of non-discrimination that is generally enforced in all UHCs. Making unofficial payments may expedite more caring service but will also lead to discrimination in service delivery. It is observed that the services at UHCs are generally non-discriminatory and fair. For example, most of the UHCs have introduced a citizens’ charter to increase transparency regarding their services and to increase patients’ knowledge and information, not least about costs. In one UHCs, a board was hung up to display the list of available medicines. UHCs are also encouraged to deliver improved health services through tele-medicine and other health packages. During the interviews, the majority of respondents opined that the UHC provides

1

1 1

-

3

2

17 71

1

3

4

2 100

Number Show of cases caused/ proceeding drawn

25

3

1

1

5 15

-

Proceedings dropped/Released

26

-

1

-

6 19

-

Censured/ Warned

19

1

-

-

2 16

-

Salary increment held up

2

-

1

-

1

-

Promotion held up/ Down-graded

2 25

-

-

-

3 19

1

Removed/Dismissed from service/compulsorily retired

Source Compiled from sources published by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bangladesh, 2013–2014

1 Unauthorized absence from work 2 Misconduct 3 Misconduct and unauthorized absence from workplace/UHC 4 Misconduct and inefficiency 5 Misconduct/and Corruption 6 Criminal Proceedings/ temporary suspension 7 Long Absence Total

Offenses

Table 10.2 Departmental proceedings against medical officers posted at different UHCs

252 MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

253

non-discriminatory and fair services. Only a few respondents were of the opinion that preferential treatment is given to a few locals based on their social background. Key informant: A schoolteacher. Overall, the services at the out-patient department are somewhat OK, with a moderate crowd of patients. No evidence was found that the patients are discriminated against based on their social backgrounds, nor are any patients released from the hospital without receiving treatment. He mentions that if you know someone in the UHC, that might affect the service you get, especially when there are too few doctors on hand. Furthermore, doctors and other staff may favor the rural powerful elites, giving them more attention and being more responsive to them than to the poor. On the whole, however, he finds services at the UHC to be non-discriminatory. Key informant: Director of Primary Healthcare, Dhaka. He says the key challenges for primary healthcare are to strengthen the health system, address the equity issue for the targeted population, develop the capacity for service provision, increase service providers’ commitment and other non-clinical qualities, and develop indicators for assessing accountability. He thinks the patients are more or less happy with the treatment, but they tend to be very sensitive about non-clinical issues. They want to be treated with courtesy, politeness, and kindness, and they want doctors and other staff to be supportive to patients and their family members. He says that providing quality services has been a priority in primary healthcare. For further improvement, a quality assurance policy has been implemented in pilot upazilas and will gradually be extended to all the upazilas.

Conclusion The objective of this chapter has been to explain and assess patients’ trust in UHCs in light of Kim’s (2005) dimensions of institutional trustworthiness. In particular, the chapter tried to answer two questions: What is the state of patients’ trust in UHCs? What can be learned by using Kim’s (2005) “dimensions” when studying trust in UHCs? To assess patients’ trust in UHCs, a qualitative study was carried out in six peripheral upazilas (sub-districts) of Bangladesh. The upazilas were selected based on their relative remoteness from the capital, with the assumption that remote health centers have less resources and therefore a low service-delivery capability. Patients’ trust in UHCs—the dependent variable—was operationalized by “frequency of patients’ visits,” which would denote the level of their

254

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

reliance on and trust in the UHC in their area. It was hypothesized that the higher the frequency of visits, the higher the level of a person’s trust in the local UHC. Kim’s (2005) dimensions of institutional trustworthiness were used as variables to explain patients’ trust in UHCs.

Clinical Variable With respect to the clinical independent variable, the study findings suggest that patients tend to have a high level of trust in the competence of UHC doctors. Doctors’ competence relates to the diagnosis and treatment of influenza, fever, common colds, coughs, and other common ailments. UHCs also perform certain surgical procedures which require a high level of competence and skills. According to this study, all UHC doctors are registered physicians, and therefore, they are regarded as competent. The trust in doctors’ competence would only erode in the case of wrong treatment that might result in death.

Non-Clinical Variables The non-clinical variables of commitment, benevolence, honesty, and fairness have been studied to see how they affect patients’ trust in UHCs. During the interviews, most patients were found to agree that the doctors and officials at their local UHC were committed, benevolent, honest, and fair. This means patients have high expectations and a high level of trust in the treatment they receive. But despite UHCs’ service orientation being based on commitment, benevolence, honesty, and fairness, there could be certain deviations with regard to absenteeism and breaches of professional norms. The prevalence of high trust in UHCs may, however, raise questions about the differences in health services in the country in general, since UHC healthcare is popularly perceived as ranking lower than the care available from private clinics—this popular perception stands in contrast to what was found in this study. The major finding of the study is that people visit UHCs frequently. This is an indication of high trust, but it may also mean there is no exit option for poor and less educated people. Another major finding is that the quality of UHC services is observed to vary depending on the clientele size and the number of available health personnel. From a theoretical perspective, Kim’s (2005) dimensions of institutional trustworthiness—commitment, competence, benevolence, honesty,

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

255

and fairness—have been found to be relevant for the study. However, according to other literature (Gopichandran & Chetlapalli, 2013; Kao et al., 1998; Rowe & Kellam, 2009; Thom et al., 2004), the patientdoctor trust relationship relies more on non-clinical and humane aspects than on the clinical aspect of competence. Kim’s (2005) conceptual framework would therefore need to be supplemented by more nonclinical aspects such as patients’ concern for privacy, the importance of rapport and communication, and the importance of compassionate care, all of which manifest genuine concern and care for the patients. Despite all the explanatory variables used in this study, it was not possible to ascertain which ones played the most dominant role in building patients’ trust in UHCs. A quantitative design would perhaps be appropriate for finding that out. What is clear, however, is that patients tend to base their initial trust on the behavioral and humane aspects of the treatment regime, rather than on clinical competence. As such, patients’ initial trust formation depends more on extrinsic factors, such as commitment (cooperation), benevolence (compassionate attitude focusing on patients’ well-being), honesty, and fairness, rather than the intrinsic qualities of a physician—that is, his technical competence and skills necessary for providing treatment and care. The study tried to discover the tacit knowledge that actually construes patients’ trust in UHCs by deploying a qualitative rather than quantitative method. It was found that patients do give importance to the behavioral cues of physicians, examples being their attention to the patients, body language, use of local dialects to establish effective rapport and communication during consultations, and by respecting privacy. All such aspects are no less important than having competence as physicians, and they must be given due consideration if patient-centric primary healthcare in rural Bangladesh is to be achieved and sustained.

References Askvik, S. & Jamil, I. (2013). The institutional trust paradox in Bangladesh. Public Organization Review, 13, 459–476. Springer Science Business Media. Bachmann, R. & Zaheer, A. (Eds.) (2006). Handbook of Trust Research. Edward Elgar. Baniamin, H. M., Jamil, I., & Askvik, S. (2019). Mismatch between lower performance and higher trust in the civil service: Can culture provide an explanation? International Political Science Review, 41(2), 192–209.

256

MD. MAHFUZUL HAQUE

Berman, E. M. (1997). Dealing with cynical citizens. Public Administration Review, 57 (2), 105–112. Braithwaite, V. (1998). Communal and exchange trust norms: Their value base and relevance to institutional trust. In A. Braithwaite & M. Levi (Eds.), Trust and Governance (pp. 46–74). Russell Sage. Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 999–1023. Bromiley, P. & Harris, J. (2006). Trust, transaction cost economics, and mechanisms. In R. Bachmann & A. Zaheer (Eds.), Handbook of trust research (pp. 124–143). Edward Elgar. Butler, J. K. (1991). Toward understanding and measuring conditions of trust: Evolution of a conditions of trust inventory. Journal of Management, 17 (3), 643–663. Butler, J. K. (1999). Trust expectations, information sharing, climate of trust, and negotiation effectiveness and efficiency. Group & Organization Management, 24(2), 217–238. Carnevale, D.G. (1995). Trustworthy government: Leadership and management strategies for building trust and high performance. Jossey-Bass. Gargiulo, M. & Ertug, G. (2006). The dark side of trust. In R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer (Eds.), Handbook of trust research, 165–186. Edward Elgar. Gopichandran, V., & Chetlapalli, S. K. (2013). Dimensions and determinants if trust in health care in resource poor settings – A qualitative exploration. PLoS ONE, 8(7), e69170. Hart, D.K. (1984). The virtuous citizen, the honorable bureaucrat, and “public” administration. Public Administration Review, 44 (special issue), 111–120. Kass, H.D. (1990). Stewardship as a fundamental element in images of public administration. In H. D. Kass & B. L. Catron (Eds.), Images and identities in public administration (pp. 113–131). Sage. Kao, A. G., Green, D. C., & Davis, N. A. (1998). Patients’ trust in their physicians. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 13(10), 681–686. Kim, S.-E. (2005). The role of trust in the modern administrative state: An integrative model. Administration & Society, 37 (5), 611–635. Knee, H. W., & Knox, R. E. (1970). Conceptual and methodological considerations in the study of trust. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14(3), 357–366. La Porte, T. R., & Metlay, D. S. (1996). Hazard and institutional trustworthiness: Facing a deficit of trust. Public Administration Review, 56(4), 341–347. Lieberman, J. K. (1981). The litigious society. Basic books. Mayer, R. C., Schoorman, F. D., & Davis, J. H. (2006). An integrative model of organizational trust. In R. M. Kramer (Ed.), Organizational trust: A reader (pp. 82–110). Oxford University Press.

10

PATIENT-DOCTOR TRUST …

257

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of Political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), 30–62. Möllering, G. (2006). Trust, institutions, agency: Towards a neoinstitutional theory of trust. In R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer (Eds.), Handbook of trust research, 355–376. Edward Elgar. Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Journal, 23, 393–404. Rowe, J., & Kellam, C. (2009). Trust: A continuing imperative. Home Health Care Management and Practice, 22(6), 417–423. Shaw, R. B. (1997). Trust in balance: Building successful organizations on results, integrity, and concern. Jossey-Bass. Sztompka, P. (1999). Trust: A sociological theory. Cambridge University Press. Thom, D. H., Hall, M. A., & Pawlson, G. L. (2004). Measuring patients’ trust in physicians when assessing quality of care. Health Affairs, 23(4), 124–132. van de Walle, S., Van Roosbrook, S., & Bouckaret, G. (2008). Trust in the public sector; is there any evidence for a long-term decline? International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(1), 47–64. Wicks, A. C., Berman, S. L., & Jones, T. M. (1999). The structure of optimal trust: Moral and strategic implications. Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 99–116.

Index

A Abuse, 6, 139, 144, 146, 147, 151, 153 Access, 2, 3, 15, 16, 19, 57, 59, 61, 66, 67, 69, 71, 74, 87, 107, 129, 150, 165–171, 173–181, 183–185, 190, 192, 194, 196, 201–203, 245 Accessibility, 17, 89, 92, 94–96, 169, 170, 174, 177, 180, 192, 197, 198, 201, 202 Accountability, 3, 10, 87, 88, 145, 158, 189, 192–195, 198, 223, 253 Advocacy output, 110, 111, 114, 130 Advocating policies, 123 Affordability, 89, 169, 170 Afno manche, 95, 190 Agriculture extension, 83 Agriculture service centers (ASCs), 17, 81, 83–85, 88, 91–102 Anti-natal care (ANC), 245, 246 Assets, 56, 57, 67, 69–71, 74, 90, 107

Attitude, 42, 73, 93, 96, 103, 144– 146, 151–153, 155, 160, 161, 174, 178, 212, 224, 236–238, 247, 255 Authoritarian cultural orientation (ACO), 17, 26, 39–45, 47 Authority delegation, 17, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97 Autonomy, 10–12, 56, 109, 194 Availability, 90, 95, 97, 99, 144, 167, 169, 170, 180, 233, 235, 236, 238, 250, 251

B Bangladesh, 14–20, 26, 36, 39, 107–110, 112–116, 118–122, 124, 126, 127, 129–133, 208, 210, 212, 219, 228, 229, 233–235, 237, 240, 253, 255 Behavior, 13, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44, 74, 97, 143, 144, 146, 147, 194, 195, 214, 215, 236, 238, 239, 247, 250

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 I. Jamil et al. (eds.), Policy Response, Local Service Delivery, and Governance in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66018-5

259

260

INDEX

Bilateral Investment Agreements (BIA), 116, 122 Bottom-up theory, 143 Boundary-spanning capacity, 144 Bureaucracy, 109, 137, 138, 142, 144, 152, 155, 160, 168, 171, 190, 193 Bureaucracy Bureaucrats, 18, 138, 141–158, 160, 161 C Caesarian, 245 Capacity, 3–6, 11, 12, 16, 61, 64, 70, 81, 83, 86, 87, 91, 100, 117, 119, 122, 130–132, 147, 158, 170, 177, 181, 185, 194, 196, 246, 253 Capital market, 110, 114, 115, 130, 131 Case study(ies), 19, 124, 144, 176, 218, 229 Challenges in studying institutional trust, 47 Child marriage, 56 Choice, 8, 28, 37, 39, 60, 91, 233, 234, 243 Choosing best policy proposals, 123 Citizen’s charter (CC), 19, 189–191, 193–200, 202, 203 Citizens’ trust, 7, 20, 25, 27, 28, 234 Citizenship rights, 18, 166, 168, 173, 179, 181, 184–186 Civic advocacy, 198, 201–203 Clarity of information, 197, 201, 202 Clientelism, 6, 15, 182 Commitment, 160, 161, 170, 192, 195, 208, 209, 213, 215, 224, 237, 247–249, 253–255 Communication, 9, 15, 42, 147–149, 156, 157, 177, 192, 198, 199, 201, 202, 213, 214, 216, 217, 222–225, 228, 255

Communication gap, 192, 195 Community-based organization (CBOs), 56, 84 Community clinic (CC), 235 Compassionate care, 249, 250, 255 Confidence, 7, 26, 43, 44, 61, 184, 225, 228 Consensus building, 124, 127, 129, 213, 215, 217, 222, 226, 227 Control, 26, 41, 56, 57, 60–62, 66, 67, 73, 75, 81, 90, 148, 177, 181, 193, 209, 227, 235, 236, 244 Coordination, 11, 43, 76, 87, 91, 93, 100, 102, 109, 133, 138, 158, 170, 210, 214, 227 Corruption, 4, 6, 9, 31, 34–36, 46, 109, 126, 133, 148, 150, 158, 159, 161, 183, 191, 193, 194, 251, 252 Credible commitment, 20, 237, 239, 242 Critical decision making, 62 D Decentralized governance, 87 Decentralized management environments, 83, 86 Decision making, 5, 15, 37, 42, 56, 57, 61, 66, 67, 70, 71, 73–75, 82, 88, 90, 99, 129, 143, 192, 194, 195, 203, 215, 226–228 Decisions, 5, 10, 18, 25, 41, 42, 56, 61, 62, 66, 67, 70–76, 83, 86, 90, 91, 97–99, 103, 121, 126, 142, 155–157, 159, 172, 194, 203, 209, 214, 220, 225, 226, 228, 236 Dependent variable, 43, 46, 67, 68, 88, 90, 96, 110, 111, 113, 130–132, 144, 169, 217, 239, 253

INDEX

Deprivation, 165, 168 Developing countries, 3, 5, 6, 46, 55, 82, 99, 107, 138, 161, 192 Development, 2–6, 11, 13–15, 17, 55–60, 71, 76, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87, 92, 107, 118–120, 122, 127, 133, 139, 140, 146, 157, 158, 166, 173, 177, 182, 186, 190, 193, 212, 215, 216, 220, 226, 239 Diplomatic missions, 119, 122, 140, 149 Discretionary power, 143, 156, 172, 182, 183 Discriminatory treatments, 178 Disempowerment, 60 Dissatisfaction, 154, 155, 222, 224, 226, 227 District development committee (DDC), 190 E Education, 27, 57, 62, 64, 65, 67, 71, 84, 85, 100, 110, 120, 127, 140, 154, 159, 172–175, 177, 179, 180, 185, 242 Effectiveness, 10, 11, 17, 27, 39, 76, 82, 86–94, 96–103, 129, 146, 148–150, 167, 169, 192, 211, 217 Empowerment, 4, 16, 17, 55–63, 66–68, 70–74, 76, 122, 139, 146 Equality before law, 169, 185 Equal treatment, 171, 194 Ethnically stratified societies, 184 Ethnic majority, 178, 184 Ethnic minorities, 165, 178, 185 Evaluation, 7, 18, 28, 38, 39, 43, 46, 119, 129, 143, 148, 199–202, 211 Expertise, 11, 100, 160, 161, 212, 227, 243

261

Exploitation, 76, 139, 140 F Fairness, 8, 20, 90, 169, 171, 172, 184, 185, 237, 239, 242, 254, 255 Favoritism, 6, 153, 210 Female migrant workers, 139, 147, 149, 151, 152, 160 Financial resources, 138, 155, 157, 160, 161, 194 Formulating several policy alternatives, 121, 123 Fraudulent documents, 149, 158 Freedom, 4, 13, 42, 44, 56, 67, 73, 74, 76, 99, 155, 156, 172 G Gender, 2, 32, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 71, 72, 74, 76, 155, 167, 174 Gender and Development (GAD), 55, 59, 76 Gender-based violence, 56 Gender hierarchies, 75 Gender inequality, 55, 59, 67, 72, 74, 75 Geographical isolation, 181, 185 Goal achievement, 17, 92, 94–96, 102 Goals, 6, 11, 19, 83, 86, 87, 95, 119, 123, 142, 144, 146, 149, 153, 158, 195, 197, 198, 209–214, 216–218, 221–223 Goal sharing, 213, 217, 222, 223 Good governance, 2–7, 27, 155, 191–194, 203 Good Govenrance Act, 196 Government, 2–12, 15–17, 19, 25–28, 31, 32, 39, 41, 43, 45, 56, 59–61, 63, 82–84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 108–110, 113, 119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 138, 141, 146,

262

INDEX

148, 151, 152, 154–157, 159, 168, 171–175, 178, 180, 183, 184, 189–195, 198, 203, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 220, 221, 235, 237, 243, 250 Grassroots governance, 82, 83 H Harassment, 140–142, 147, 153, 157 Health, 2, 20, 27, 56, 57, 59, 62, 70, 71, 75, 76, 85, 91, 100, 140, 172, 173, 178–180, 185, 234, 235, 237–239, 241, 243–247, 249, 251, 253, 254 Human resources (HR), 81, 98, 157, 196, 198, 201–203 I Illegal migration, 150 Illegal recruitment agencies, 150 Immunization program, 235 Impartiality, 6, 7, 19, 169, 171, 172, 184, 185, 194, 198 Implementation, 5, 6, 10, 15, 18, 19, 27, 42, 83, 86, 88, 110, 118, 133, 138, 140, 142–145, 150, 151, 153–155, 159–161, 174, 182, 191, 193, 194, 198–200, 202, 208–211, 213, 214, 216, 218, 226, 228, 229 Implication of authoritarian cultural orientation (ACO), 26 Incentives, 90, 108, 110, 122, 154, 155, 183, 214, 223, 244, 249 Inclusive citizenship, 182, 184 Inclusive institutions, 184 Income, 17, 27, 34, 45, 57, 69, 73, 74, 83, 107, 157, 167 Income-generating programs, 56, 57 Independent variables, 17, 18, 44, 45, 67, 68, 88–90, 92, 93, 96, 97,

101, 109–111, 118, 130, 143, 144, 169, 170, 197, 201, 203, 239, 242, 254 Indicators, 10, 28, 39, 40, 45, 46, 57, 94, 172, 173, 186, 191, 251, 253 Individual conscientization, 61 Information sharing, 213, 214, 217, 222–224, 226, 228 Infrastructure, 11, 19, 62, 84, 107, 110, 155, 158, 177, 207, 212, 217, 218, 220, 221, 224–227, 235 Innovative industries, 110, 114, 130, 131 In-patient department (IPD), 235, 240, 245, 249 Institutional capacity, 17, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96–99, 102, 103, 170 Institutional trust, 7–9, 16, 17, 25–28, 31–35, 37, 39, 40, 43–47, 172, 183, 233–239, 254 Institutional working, 182 Integrated implementation model, 143 Integrated rural development approach, 84 Inter/intra–institutional cooperation, 86 Interviews, 63, 92, 95, 112, 113, 145, 152, 155, 173–177, 180, 184, 218, 223, 228, 234, 240–242, 247–249, 251, 254

K Knowledge, 12, 58, 60, 63, 66, 68, 84, 90, 91, 96, 102, 120, 127, 147, 152–154, 159, 160, 199, 212, 237, 239, 241, 251, 255

INDEX

L Labor migration, 139, 142 Leap of faith, 236 Legal, 4, 15, 18, 19, 57, 59, 87–89, 139, 141, 142, 149, 150, 166, 172, 173, 185, 190, 194, 209, 214, 222 Legal citizenship, 18, 19, 166, 185 Legislation, 117, 196 Legitimacy, 8, 10, 41, 87, 88, 100, 149, 228 Local governance, 2, 190, 191, 199 Long-term infrastructure contract, 19, 209 M Malpractice, 150, 161, 184 Management strategies, 208, 209, 211, 213, 217, 222, 228, 229 Manpower agency, 138, 139, 145, 147, 150, 156 Marginalization, 139, 165, 166, 168, 178, 182, 184 Marginalized communities, 82, 170, 173, 179 Michel Lipsky, 143 Micro-credit, 56, 59, 63 Micro-enterprise development, 17, 56, 57 Micro-entrepreneurship, 17, 57–59, 63, 74 Middle Eastern countries, 142, 157 Migrant women, 138, 144–146, 152, 156, 158 Migrant workforce, 138 Migration, 62, 82, 138–143, 145, 146, 148, 154 Mixed-method approach, 17, 63 Mobility, 56, 67, 70, 71, 73–75 Mobilization, 15, 90, 124, 126, 129 Monitoring, 129, 147, 150, 151, 223, 244, 248, 249

263

Monitoring and evaluation, 18, 111, 119, 129, 130 Motivation, 38, 103, 144, 154, 155, 247 N National labor migration policy, 18, 138–141, 144, 146, 160, 161 Nepal, 14–17, 19, 26, 36, 39, 46, 56, 59–63, 76, 81–85, 88, 92, 93, 96, 99, 102, 189–192, 194–196, 198, 202, 203 Network level effectiveness, 212 New Public Management (NPM), 9–11, 192, 193 Non-clinical, 20, 234, 239, 242, 253–255 Non-discriminatory, 20 Non-governmental organizations, 2, 56, 72, 84 O Opportunism, 26, 236, 237, 244, 246 Opportunities, 13, 44, 62, 67, 68, 71, 76, 90, 91, 115, 122, 127, 139, 146, 152, 155, 160, 180, 185, 194, 239 Oppression, 60, 61 Organizational coordination, 18, 88, 91–93, 96, 97, 100–103 Organizational structure, 84, 100, 170, 192, 197 Other types of policy remedies, 122 Out-patient department (OPD), 235, 240–242, 244, 245, 247, 249, 250, 253 P Participation, 16, 17, 19, 27, 56, 57, 81, 88, 91, 93, 95, 98, 99, 102, 172, 173, 177, 180, 185, 192,

264

INDEX

193, 195, 198, 201–203, 213, 220 Patriarchal socialization, 55, 76 Patriarchy, 62 Patron-clientelism, 15, 210 People’s participation, 18, 88, 90–93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103, 193, 195, 203 Performance, 5, 8, 10, 16–19, 25–29, 31–34, 39–41, 43, 45–47, 92, 93, 108, 132, 133, 143, 146, 151, 155, 156, 161, 169, 171, 189, 191–198, 201–203, 208–211, 213, 214, 216, 217, 221–223, 225, 228, 229, 236, 239 Persuasion, 124 Plantation community, 19, 165, 167, 168, 171, 177, 180–182, 186 Plantation management, 175, 177, 183 Policies and practices, 18, 19, 165, 185 Policy, 5–7, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 27, 59, 60, 64, 83, 86, 87, 90, 97, 109–111, 113–126, 129–131 Policy advocacy output, 110, 113, 114, 130 Policy advocacy process, 18, 110, 111, 118, 119, 129, 131–133 Policy effectiveness, 144, 148 Policy formation, 143 Policy goals, 18, 110, 142, 144, 149, 152–154, 158, 160, 210, 211, 213, 221 Policy implementation, 5, 15, 18, 19, 100, 138, 142–146, 150–155, 157, 159–161, 171, 182, 192, 195, 196, 208–210, 213, 228, 229 Policy makers, 18 Policy output for high-tech, 114

Policy output for thrust sector promotion, 117 Policy output for trade agreements between countries, 116 Policy output on hiring foreign experts jointly with BEPZA, 116 Policy practices, 181, 182 Policy remedy, 18, 111, 115, 116, 120, 121, 123, 130–132 Policy studies, 18 Political control, 83, 86 Political ideology, 152, 155 Political interference, 158, 178 Politicization, Policy failure, 138, 142, 155, 246 Poverty reduction, 45 Power, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 17, 27, 28, 41, 44, 47, 57–62, 67–69, 71, 73–76, 87, 90, 138, 141, 151, 157, 171, 195, 216, 224, 226 Power distance, 39, 41, 42, 44, 192, 195, 198, 200 Power over, 57, 61, 62, 66–69 Power To, 57, 61, 62, 66, 67, 70 Power with, 57, 61, 62, 66, 71, 74 Power within, 57, 61, 62, 66, 72–74 Pre-departure, 140, 147, 149, 158 Preparation, 123, 129, 139, 146, 176, 241 Primary health care, 140, 241 Problem identification and agenda setting, 18, 111, 115, 116, 119, 131 Procedural justice, 171, 172 Process, 2–6, 8–10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 34, 37, 38, 56, 57, 61, 67, 68, 75, 76, 85–88, 90–93, 95, 97, 99, 111, 113, 117, 121, 123, 126, 128–130, 138–141, 143, 145, 146, 148, 153, 154, 156, 158, 167, 171, 176–178,

INDEX

181–184, 193, 195, 196, 199, 200, 208–211, 213, 215–218, 222, 223, 226, 228, 229, 240 Professional efficiency, 97 Professionalism, 82, 103, 184, 251 Projecting outcome, 123 Promotions, 18, 109, 112, 118, 122, 130, 132, 155, 161, 252 Protection, 87, 139, 141, 142, 144, 146, 148–151, 160 Public administration, 2, 4, 9, 10, 13–15, 88, 100, 137, 138, 190, 192 Public policy, 86, 121, 138, 142, 160, 169 Public-Private Partnership (PPP), 12, 19, 208–223, 227–229 Public sector, 3, 11, 14, 45, 87, 193, 208, 213 Public services, 5, 16, 18, 19, 25, 86, 88, 89, 91, 166–182, 184–186, 191, 192, 195, 212

Q Qualitative data, 93, 240 Qualitative research design, 144 Quality dimension, 193, 212 Quality of governance, 17, 19, 26, 28, 32, 168, 193, 194 Quality of government, 6, 18, 28, 166, 167, 169–171, 176, 181, 185, 186 Quantitative data, 255 Quasi–governmental, 181

R Recruitment agencies, 141, 144, 146–150, 153, 157, 161 Regulating recruitment, 147 Reintegration, 140

265

Relationship building, 213, 215, 217, 222, 226 Resource and risk sharing, 217, 227, 228 Resource-poor people, 82 Resources, 3, 6, 12, 19, 41, 56–60, 62, 66, 67, 69, 71, 83, 84, 86, 87, 90, 95, 97, 98, 102, 103, 110, 127, 145, 157, 158, 169, 184, 195–197, 208, 210, 213, 216, 222, 244, 253 Respiratory Tract Infection, 249 Returnees, 139, 146 Role of street-level bureaucrats, 143, 210 Rowland, Jo, 17, 57, 58, 61, 62, 75 S Safe migration, 147, 149 Salary, 140, 152, 154, 158, 181, 238, 251, 252 Satisfaction of services, 17, 94, 96, 102 Selecting evaluative criteria, 120 Self-confidence, 60, 73 Self-employment, 56, 58 Self-esteem, 57, 66, 68, 72–76 Sequential explanatory mixed method, 19, 92 Service delivery, 6, 8, 16, 19, 40, 82–86, 88–94, 96–103, 170, 174, 177–179, 182–184, 189, 191–198, 201–203, 212, 218, 221, 223, 237, 246, 251 Service quality, 10, 19, 85, 87, 171, 191, 198, 200, 212 Skill development, 56, 70 SLBFE Act, 141, 153 Social citizenship, 166, 172 Social rights, 166, 167, 172, 173 Solidarity, 57, 61, 66, 67, 71, 76, 166, 167, 184

266

INDEX

Sri Lanka, 14–19, 26, 36, 39, 46, 108, 120, 137–144, 146, 149–152, 154, 158, 160, 161, 165–169, 171–173, 178–181, 184–186 Sri Lanka Bureau of foreign employment (SLBFE), 138, 139, 144 Stakeholders, 16, 81, 99, 119, 122, 123, 126, 129, 131–133, 138, 146, 194, 212, 213, 215, 226, 228 Stakeholders satisfaction, 212, 221, 222 Stateless people, 165, 168, 185 Street-Level Bureaucrats, 83, 138, 141–144, 146, 151, 152, 154, 156, 157, 159–161, 182, 210 Strengthening the existing laws, 144, 147 Sub-agents, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 158 Sustainability, 57, 58, 76, 211, 221, 222 T Target group, 110, 143–145, 148, 161 Technical competence, 84, 255 Technical resources, 160 Theory, 8, 10, 13, 28, 39, 47, 57–59, 86, 87, 93, 142, 143, 160, 167, 192, 210 Timely delivery of services, 17, 93, 94, 102 Top down, 14, 15, 41, 82, 142, 143, 209, 210 Trade unions, 76, 155, 174, 175, 177, 181, 182

Traditional system, 191 Transformation capacity, 61 Trust, 7–9, 16, 17, 20, 25–30, 32, 33, 37, 40, 42, 43, 45–47, 152, 172, 183, 190, 209, 214, 215, 224, 225, 234, 236, 237, 239–242, 253–255 Trust and culture, 8 Trust and Survey, 26, 33 Trust benefit, 236 Trust building, 213–217, 222, 224, 225 Trust theory, 47

U Upazila, 239 Upazila Health Complex (UHC), 20, 233–255

V Value for money, 194 Van Meter and Van Horn, 142, 216 Village Development Committee (VDC), 85, 191 Violence, 72, 140 Vulnerable, 149, 150, 160, 165, 180, 236

W Welfare rights, 177 Willingness, 75, 99, 154, 170, 203, 236 Women, 16, 17, 55–76, 91, 95, 102, 139–142, 147–150, 152–154, 175, 241, 249 Workplace, 146, 148, 149, 244