Policing and Cbrn Hazards: Advancing Cbrn Competence in Police Education 1032372133, 9781032372136

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Policing and CBRN Hazards

This book makes an important contribution to police scholarship by focusing on the critical need for law enforcement personnel to receive education on chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) hazards. Under the CBRN umbrella are chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, biologically derived toxins, radiological particulate hazards, and other agents, any of which have the potential to inflict bodily harm, incapacitation, or death. Such weapons have been a part of human history for centuries, starting with biological warfare, later shifting over to chemical warfare, and in the last century, radiological and nuclear warfare. The greater availability and accessibility of such materials necessitates that first response and investigation is no longer limited to the military but is required of police forces reacting to incidents in the community, whether acts of terrorism, traffic accidents, or standard industrial incidents. In this book it is argued that basic knowledge of CBRN is essential for police officers at all levels to assess and protect crime scenes, as well as to investigate cases involving CBRN materials. The author uses case studies and technical education to instruct police on how and when CBRN agents can be used maliciously, and the best methods for identifying, analysing, monitoring, and investigating related incidents. The text makes a clear case for integrating CBRN studies into police education so that first responders are enabled to assess incidents and share information with emergency management and other services to determine the most effective equipment and personnel to deploy. This book is essential for police educators and trainers in both universities and police academies, those administering or engaged in in-service police training, and scholars studying policing, criminal justice, and terrorism. Patrick Wengler is a Project Officer in the Assistance and Protection Branch of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Prior to joining the OPCW in 2020, he was a Police Inspector,

Programme Assistant in Higher Education, Senior Lecturer at university and subject matter expert teaching for various international organisations. His main responsibilities include working on capacity building and non-proliferation projects, all aspects of emergency management as well as scene assessments of contaminated environments. He holds a Master of Science in Security Studies from the London Metropolitan University (UK), a Master’s in CBRN first responder and decision making from the University of Rome Tor Vergata (IT), a Bachelor of Arts degree in Applied Investigation from the University of Sunderland (UK), a Hazardous Material Technician qualification from the New Jersey State Police (US) and is a qualified CBRN operator by the CBRN School in Rieti (IT).

While the author is a serving member of staff at OPCW, The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the OPCW.

Innovations in Policing

This series explores innovations in the field of policing and offers the latest insight into the field through research, theoretical applications, case studies, and evaluations. Famous innovations developed over the course of the late 20th century and into the turn of the 21st century include approaches such as community policing, ‘broken windows’ policing, problem-oriented policing, ‘pulling levers’ policing, third-party policing, hot spots policing, CompStat, and evidence-based policing. Some of these approaches have been successful, and some have not, while new innovations continue to arise. Improving police performance through innovation is often not straightforward. Police departments are highly resistant to change, but through such research we expect to find further refinement of our knowledge of ‘what works’ in policing, under what circumstances particular strategies may work, and why these strategies are effective in improving police performance. The Case for Youth Police Initiative Interdependent Fates & the Power of Peace Nina Rose Fischer The Police Identity Crisis Hero, Warrior, Guardian, Algorithm Luke William Hunt Why the Police Should be Trained by Black People Natasha C. Pratt-Harris Policing and CBRN Hazards Advancing CBRN Competence in Police Education Patrick Wengler For more information about this series, please visit: www.routle​dge.com/ Routle​dge-Inno​vati​ons-in-Polic​ing/book-ser​ies/RIP

Policing and CBRN Hazards

Advancing CBRN Competence in Police Education

Patrick Wengler

First published 2024 by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 and by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Patrick Wengler The right of Patrick Wengler to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. ISBN: 978-1-032-37213-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-37557-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-34077-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775 Typeset in Bembo by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

Acknowledgements  List of Figures  List of Tables  List of Boxes  Preface  Glossary 

x xi xii xiii xv xviii

PA R T 1

Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts  1 Etymology of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents and the Context on How Policing Is Involved  Etymology of Abbreviations Related to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents  4 Introduction to Political Violence and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism with Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents  5 What Can Be Understood under Terrorism and Where Does It Come From?  8 What Does Terrorism with Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents Imply for Policing?  9 2 Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents Used Maliciously (as a Weapon)  12 Group 01: State Terrorism  13 Group 02: Religious Terrorism  18

1

3

12

viii Contents

Group 03: Marxism-Oriented Terrorist Groups  23 Group 04: Single Issue Terrorist Groups  24 Group 05: Lone Wolves, Acts of Terrorism, and Crime  24

3 The Impact of Planes as Transportation of Goods and Living Beings  Airport, Planes, and Cargo: A Risk for Law Enforcement Officers?  33 Freight – Cargo and Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents  37 Accidents with Dangerous Goods  38 Infrastructure Risks: Terror Threat and Terror Acts  39 4 Bad Examples  Wrong Response due to Lack of Training and Knowledge  43 Anthrax Suspicion, 2016  44 Another Suspicious Case Happened in 2018  45 Border-Crossing Incidents: A Reflection  45

33

43

PA R T 2

CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities 

49

5 Education on CBRN/HAZMAT for Police Officers  51 Current CBRN/HAZMAT Training Availabilities  51 Police Training and Education Related to CBRN/HAZMAT Incident Response  52 Possible Set-Up and Training Implementation  53 6 The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN  Overview on Current CBRN/HAZMAT Courses for Law Enforcement  58 Teaching Subjects That Should Be Taken into Consideration  59 Subjects to be Covered in CBRN/HAZMAT Response  62 Capabilities  66

57

PA R T 3

Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT  7 Subject Content for CBRN/HAZMAT Police Education  Detailed Look into Subject Content for CBRN/HAZMAT Police Education  72

69 71

Contents ix

CBRN/HAZMAT Levels of Training  77 Operations Level  81 Technician Level  84 Incident Command  85 Operational  85 Tactical  87 Strategic  88

8 Investigation, Report Writing, and Intelligence Analysis  Investigation  92 First Person on Scene Template  92 First Look Report  94 Evidence Collection Command Post (ECCP)  94 CBRN/HAZMAT Final Report  95 9 Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum in CBRN/HAZMAT  How to Implement a Training Schedule on CBRN Topics  98 Continued Professional Development (CPD)  100 Awareness Course (One Full Day)  105 Specialised Training Courses  105 Bibliography  Index 

91

98

109 116

Acknowledgements

This book is the first of its kind targeting specifically law enforcement training and education in the field of CBRN or HAZMAT (hazardous material). Some may argue that this should not be about a single first responder organisation rather than a joint responders guide. However, this book rather than teaching CBRN-related subjects explains the necessity for law enforcement officers and agencies to receive training in this specific area, since policing is always left out of discussion, teachings, and response to CBRN incidents. Nevertheless, past incidents have shown that this is no longer the case and law enforcement involvement in this subject area is more than necessary. There are many publications and books on toxicology, applied chemistry, and response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents referred to as CBRN/HAZMAT, mainly for firefighter medical or military personnel but unfortunately nothing referring specifically to policing. Hence, the reason for dedicating this book to the law enforcement community explaining why and how the subjects could be implemented and what it should entail without implying what needs to be taught since this should be based on the national guidelines and standard operating procedures. This work came together with passion for both sides of CBRN and policing. I hope sincerely that this book will help the law enforcement community in better understanding the importance of the subject matter in their daily work and the risks they might be exposed to if the necessary understanding, equipment, and training is not present.

Figures

6 .1 Overall incident response steps to be covered  6.2 Incident commander steps to cover  6.3 Legislation related to training, education, and CBRN/ HAZMAT response  6.4 Full cycle response capability after completed training  7.1 Intercultural conflict style  7.2 The science of danger and the impact of CBRN/ HAZMAT agents  8.1 CBRN nine-liner  8.2 First look report  8.3 Report sample  9.1 Full cycle of exploitable outputs of all three educational pillars 

62 63 64 66 74 82 93 94 96 100

Tables

9.1 List of continued professional development topics in HAZMAT/CBRN  9.2 Awareness course topics  9.3 Operations course topics  9.4 HAZMAT and CBRNe course qualification schedule 

101 105 106 107

Boxes

1 .1 Meaning of terrorism in ancient Greek time 1.2 Explanation of the word terrorism and its application by Clausewitz 2.1 Explanation of STEP 1–2–3 Plus UK first response 2.2 Motivation and CBRN weapons of Aum 2.3 Highlighting the question as to why no training is to be found based on EU regulation on exposure to chemical agents for police officers 3.1 Highlighting any issues in emergency landings of a sick traveller on a plane 3.2 Question on decision making for a plane that lands in an emergency due to a sick traveller 7.1 Personnel exposure risks 7.2 Definition of SOP 9.1 Describing the attractiveness of employer in regard to continued education

9 9 18 22 26 35 37 79 84 99

Preface

Any study of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear and explosive agents (CBRNe) is conducted in single areas such as chemical, biological, or nuclear physicist degrees. This book is not intended for academic and research purposes in these fields. This book has a focus on first line responders mainly the law enforcement officer providing some insights on the importance in covering some CBRNe subject in their formal education. There are many books and publications published when it comes to the topics of CBRNe or hazardous materials (HAZMAT). The acronym CBRNe is known from a military jargon, while hazardous materials comes from a civilian perspective. The differences between the two are that CBRNe takes into consideration not only precursors for chemical weapons but also chemical and biological and nuclear weapons. Hazardous material however, mainly focuses on toxic industrial chemicals and its precursors that can be used for the production of (i) home-made explosives (HME), (ii) improvised drug laboratories, and (iii) improvised production of chemical-biological weapons. So far, a range of topics has covered aspects of CBRNe and HAZMAT such as: toxicology, history of chemical and biological weapons, legal implications and international conventions, medical impacts and procedures, psychological impacts, non-proliferation, nuclear deterrence, and safety and security from laboratory and workers’ perspectives working at chemical, biological, or nuclear plants. Some publications additionally cover operational procedures for medical, military, and firefighter personnel. Hence, so far little work or research has been conducted on how this specific subject would have an impact on policing. Policing itself is undergoing constant changes, where formal education is playing a more and more important role, yet none of these subjects have made it into the teaching curriculum. Some topics were partially added, providing only low value mostly because the treated subjects were at a technician level where police officers in most countries do not have any identification equipment at hand.

xvi Preface

The education of police officers is slowly becoming a graduate profession, where one might think that topics on CBRNe/HAZMAT would be considered since conventions are transformed as well into national legislation having an impact on operational aspects. One might argue that therefore, the world has become a safer place. However, empirical data show that still many incidents and accidents are taking place with named agents and higher education is not integrating CBRNe/HAZMAT-related topics into police education, despite having the empirical data backing up the importance of teaching response to CBRNe of HAZMAT incidents. Many CBRNe/HAZMAT agents are transported via road, train, plane, and ship providing a risk to the officer while responding to an incident involving any kind of CBRNe/HAZMAT agents by not being properly trained. Conventions and regulations implied in national legislation cover for example the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Convention, Convention on Nuclear Safety, Dangerous Goods Regulation, the SEVESO Directive, and Occupational Health and Safety at work, just to name a few. All of this legislation, however, is unfortunately not covered in the formal education of police officers, having direct implications on their work. One could argue that while undergoing formal education at a university, international and national regulations dedicated to CBRNe and HAZMAT have earned their place in policing studies. Nevertheless, when looking at the educational curriculum of police officers mostly classical themes are treated such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, organised crime, money laundering, car accidents, burglary or theft, and environmental crimes, which are some of the classic response scenarios but not limited to these. Higher education is becoming a requirement in some countries, which is a nice step forward. However, the taught topics have not changed much. It is true that when it comes to CBRNe it is a low-level high impact incident and one might argue why invest additional time in training law enforcement officers in the subjects of CBRNe when there are other emergency services trained in the response to such incidents? Given the immense complexity and challenges on integrating CBRNe and HAZMAT into formal and non-formal police education, this book was written specifically to discuss and explain not only its importance but as well to provide some ideas about how education on such complex subjects and legislation could be implemented. The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 will provide an historical overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT implications on policing covering accidents, crime, and terrorism. Part 2 will analyse and explain the different topics that are essential to be taught to police officers who are involved in responding to, but not limited to,

Preface xvii

CBRN/HAZMAT incidents and why such training would benefit the police officer as policing per se. The third part of this book will provide some insights on what a training programme should look like and the topics it should cover and how it could be implemented in a training curriculum for specialised units or patrol police officers.

newgenprepdf

Glossary

CBRN CBRNEe Ebola EOD EUROPOL HAZMAT Hot Zone INTERPOL MERS SARS SEVESO SWAT TICs WMD Zika

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, environmental, and explosive agents Virus causing problems with bleeding Explosive Ordnance Disposal European Police Hazardous material Direct area of CBRN release (three-layer system) International Police Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome EU Industrial Safety Regulations Special Weapons and Tactics Special Weapons and Tactics Toxic industrial chemicals Weapon of mass destruction Virus chiefly spread by a mosquito bite

Part 1

Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

1. Etymology of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents and the Context on How Policing Is Involved 2. Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents 3. The Impact of Planes as Transportation of Goods and Living Beings 4. Bad Examples

3 12 33 43

In this part of the book, we will provide a wide concept of the meaning of terrorism and crime with chemical, biological, and radiological agents, and what impact this might have on policing. We will use some case studies to demonstrate the importance for police to have the capacity to investigate cases with the above-named agents and why it is important. For this purpose, we will as well analyse the linguistic approach on some abbreviations that are used in this context and why they can be misunderstood and perhaps what could be a better way to refer to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, and radiological agents in the form of abbreviations that will not categorise the incident into something it is not. We shall see some examples of international and regional incidents that marked the impact of malicious use of chemical, biological, and radiological agents and the wider context on how this could be important for the law enforcement community. The following four chapters are meant to provide a holistic approach on showing the development over years of terrorism and crime with named agents and how in the 21st century they are part of our everyday life. Finally, if anything this short overview should create a clear picture that law enforcement is exposed almost daily to some extend to crime or terrorism with chemical, biological, and radiological agents. This clearly demonstrates the need for training and adequate preparation to face these risks.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-1

2  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

I hope that this overview enhances your understanding of the importance of this topic for the law enforcement community and provides you with a thorough baseline to emergency response and training necessities in this context.

Chapter 1

Etymology of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents and the Context on How Policing Is Involved

• • • •

Etymology of Abbreviations Related to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents Introduction to Political Violence and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism with Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents What Can Be Understood under Terrorism and Where Does It Come From? What Does Terrorism with Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents Imply for Policing?

4 5 8 9

Introduction This chapter analyses what is meant by the terminology terrorism by analysing its roots and concept of political violence and radicalisation leading to terrorism. The chapter provides a description of various terrorist groups and their timelines. It provides a baseline on the definition of terrorism and how this might impact policing while investigating or responding to CBRN crimes or acts of terrorism and what does it mean for policing accepting that new threats have arisen and that police officers are now more than ever confronted with HAZMAT/CBRN agents that need to be investigated. In addition, this chapter looks into etymology and the origins of the words CBRN and WMD, since, as everything, language and meaning changes over the years. The explanations provided in this chapter will help you to understand how everything fits together but mainly focuses on CBRN and terrorism rather than crime, which will be discussed in the next chapters.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-2

4  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

1.1  Etymology of Abbreviations Related to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents Most first responders and military personnel are very familiar with the acronyms WMD (weapon of mass disruption), CBRNEe (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, environmental (E) and explosive agents (e)), HAZMAT (hazardous material), and TICs (toxic industrial chemicals). Depending on the background and training of a person the use of the named acronyms is very specific to a targeted area of response. The reason why I think it is necessary to include a short chapter about these abbreviations is because over a few years now I could regularly observe a misunderstanding and categorisation of these acronyms. For example, when it comes to the abbreviation WMD (weapon of mass destruction), which today is directly linked to chemical and nuclear warfare. This abbreviation was not present until the 1930s and not even linked remotely with what it stands for today. Even during the First World War where the deliberated release of chemical agents was conducted and has imbedded in our history World War One as ‘the chemical war’, there was no specific terminology. It can be argued that it became connected somehow with the dropping of the atomic bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima due to its high impact and later followed by chemical, biological, and radiological agents malicious releases. However, the origin of this abbreviation has a different story and traces back to the era of the civil war in Spain under General Franco. Some of you might know the painting Guernica painted by Pablo Picasso (2009; Simkin, 1997). Guernica can be seen as the birthplace of the terminology ‘weapon of mass destruction’. You are wondering why? The first massive destruction occurring using the terminology ‘WMD’ has been observed by a priest named Father Alberto Onaindia (Preston, 2017) when the German Luftwaffe ‘Condor Legion’ experimented their bombing capacity via aeroplane. The first aerial-bombardment was conducted in Spain at the village of Guernica in 1937. The village of Guernica was bombed because they were opposing the Franco Regime. Franco, having had some ties with the Germans, authorised the German Luftwaffe to test their weapon capacity, and by doing so, the Germans did Franco a favour at the same time. Since Spain was at war, it was the perfect opportunity for the Germans to test aerial bombing. A Londoner newspaper referring to the bombing of the village of Guernica used the phrase weapon of mass destruction, but then it was not related to any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon. However, it was used to describe the result of the aerial bombing of the German Luftwaffe. This tactic was later used by the Germans during the Second World War and was known as Blitzkrieg (Mallon, 2019).

Etymology of CBRN and Context on How Policing Is Involved  5

This attack was the first where the use of a weapon of mass destruction took place under this definition. This attack with weapons of mass destruction was captured by Pablo Picasso who painted a picture known as Guernica, which was shown in 1937 at a French exhibition (Picasso, 2009). Later on, as explained, the definition of WMD was extended during the Second World War with the dropping of the atomic bomb. With the dropping of the atomic bomb, another terminology arose in the 1950s as ABC (atomar, biologic, and chemical) changing later in the 1960s to NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical). These acronyms reflect mainly nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, with the only purpose of killing or injuring on the battlefield. These agents were specifically built to do so and would have no other use in any of today’s industrialisation processes. Some of these abbreviations are still used today in Europe by military defence schools. However, only after the 1960s did the United States military use another acronym, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear), which is now widely used. Over the last century the abbreviation CBRN has seen an update by adding to it ‘E’ and ‘e’. The capital letter ‘E’ stands for environment, where the ‘e’ stands for explosives. Nevertheless, these abbreviations are mainly used in a military context. From a civilian perspective the acronyms HAZMAT and TICs are more widely used. The main difference between CBRN agents and HAZMAT will be quantity and the toxicity levels. Meaning, I can achieve the same result with HAZMAT or with TICs than with CBRN agents, however, I would need a much larger amount to inflict the same harm. The only thing all of the acronyms have in common is that they can trigger mass casualties.

1.2  Introduction to Political Violence and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism with Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents Criminal or terrorist acts involve political goals. As once stated by Clausewitz (2014: 47), ‘War is a higher level of politics’ and when it comes to ‘terrorism’ the same statement can be made since also terrorism is a form of ‘war’. Terrorists, as do criminals, have and always will have their political goals. No matter who the perpetrator is, any means and opportunity are welcome to achieve their goal(s). This includes the use of any possible means at their disposal, which includes also chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. No matter the way such agents, or weapons are used, law enforcement agencies are confronted with very perplexing and complicated

6  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

investigations, since it is their duty to investigate and determine the cause of such incidents and attacks as they are crimes. CBRN and HAZMAT being consisting parts in our industrialisation processes, makes the risk higher, of malicious use, because it is easy to gain access to such agents or agents that have a dual use capacity, including the risk of accidents during the production process in industry being higher. Exposure and investigation in any area involving CBRN and HAZMAT agents will challenge the police in any possible thinkable way, since, until today, police exposure to such events was quite limited. Nevertheless, over the last century, crimes and terror attacks and incidents implicating CBRN and HAZMAT agents have grown. To understand the police exposure to crime and terrorism with CBRN and HAZMAT agents, a profound look needs to be taken into the political violence and radicalisation leading to the terrorism process, helping to understand the ‘why’ and ‘how’. Police exposure to CBRN and HAZMAT agents is not limited to crimes and ‘terrorism’ but also includes the whole industrialisation process: (a) production; (b) transportation; (c) stocking; (d) usage; (e) waste disposal, including natural diseases that the police officers might be confronted with, e.g. at airports. From a terminology perspective, CBRN agents are linked to the terminology of weapons of mass destruction referred to as WMDs being part of the struggle and fight in trying to bring peace and preventing the use of such terrible weapons. However, this terminology might not be up to date in the 21st century since hazardous materials are always part of CBRN agents. One can argue that the only difference that is needed to inflict harm is the quantity based on the chemical properties such as its toxicity, which is the same for biological agents such as, for example, Ricin, Aburin, Butilium Toxin, and Saxitoxin. Therefore, for the chemical part non-weaponised chemical agents are as well referred to as ‘toxic industrial chemicals’ (TICs). When looking back to the past, our history shows what the outcome can be when using chemical agents as weapons (the First and Second World Wars) including past events in recent years. With this development that took over during centuries starting with biological agents, over to chemical agents, and down the road in the last decade nuclear and radiological warfare, police officers are confronted more and more on an almost daily basis with incidents involving such agents (hazardous materials). Some examples are events implying chemical agents but not categorised as CBRN/WMDs, but as TICs or any other kind of biological infectious agents or diseases (e.g. Ebola) (CDC, 2018), or natural occurring radioactivity (e.g. stones) (Llope, 2008) being it open or closed sources or radioactive dirty devices (bombs).

Etymology of CBRN and Context on How Policing Is Involved  7

Therefore, from a terminological point of view for future references all hazardous material and agents faced are referred to as HAZMAT/ TICs, which implies biological, chemical, and radiological agents but in more general terms, without confusing it with the military term CBRN, which is brought in direct correlation with WMD, which is applied when talking about chemicals that have been produced and can be only used as a weapon. The definition of HAZMAT and TIC is crucial because it respects all the incidents that are taking place daily with the named agents (hazardous materials/TIC). This will show the changes that have occurred over centuries and why it is vital to teach also this subject matter to police officers as they may have to respond to an incident with a chemical, biological, or radioactive background. The responsibility of law enforcement includes the response to domestic threats posed by crimes and terrorism in many ways that have emerged and changed over the years. It can be argued that there has been a shift of classic symmetrical warfare to asymmetrical warfare.1 Chemical, biological, and radiological weapons have become one of the tools of so-called terrorists and criminals but not limited to them. According to INTERPOL, it might be that States Parties are also using these weapons as a tool for spreading fear and death, or just for demonstrating force and determination, which could fall under the category of state terrorism in such a case. There are different forms of so-called terrorist groups. The terrorist groups can be divided into the following six main groups: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Single issue groups; Marxists or millenarists; Nationalist left or right extremism; Religious groups; State-sponsored; Lone wolf (five different types)

David Rapoport (2018) divides the above-named terrorist groups also into a linear timeline, going back four decades, stating that every ‘terror’ group was present only in a precise timeline: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

18th-century Anarchism wave; Early 19th century 20’s Anti-Colonial wave; Mid-19th century during the 60’s the New Left wave; End 19th century 80’s till the 21st century the Religious wave; Unknown, only time will tell?

According to Rapport, now has come the time for a new terrorist wave but this remains an open discussion if we are still in the religious phase or

8  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

if we are entering another one. It can be argued that a lone wolf wave will not be the next terrorism wave since lone wolves have been in society for a long time and undertaken terror attacks, e.g. (a) 1914 Gavrilo Princip who assassinated the Austrian-Hungarian Archduke, which led to the First World War; (b) 1973 Richard Reid known as the Shoe bomber; (c) 1995 Timothy McVeigh who bombed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) building in Oklahoma. State terrorism could eventually be an option since it might shape into different forms depending on what is intended. A state’s weapon of choice for deterrence and gaining respect at the international level might be chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons (tools of fear to be used). Now nuclear weapons have given the power to demand or just say ‘No’ to another country’s rules, or oppression. At the same time, nuclear weapons prevent the sudden invasion from a stronger opponent, thinking twice before invading a country with nuclear power (weapon) due to the fear that one might use the nuclear arsenal to respond adequately. The best example for this theory is the case of the United States and Russia’s post-Second World War approach. More recently, the United States and North Korea. Possessing nuclear weapon capabilities now (2023), suddenly in a country that was ignored for a long time, diplomatic talks have begun. The Nuclear States, like the United States, tried to prevent North Korea from improving its nuclear weapon capabilities but were unsuccessful. Nuclear weapons can achieve different reactions from the citizens or governments, but in the end preventing, monitoring, and controlling the production of WMDs will not be enough. The psychological effect such weapons might have on the civilisation or society including a country’s political involvement and decisions, is unpredictable as will be the impact on the economy and food security. We have talked a lot about terrorism and its different groups and form but what is terrorism actually? As with every language over time the language and its significance change and becomes another meaning. As of today, there is no universal description of what terrorism is. Therefore, a profound look will be taken at the terminology of terrorism since it may have more than just one implication as already mentioned, to provide a better understanding as to why HAZMAT and CBRN agents might be a choice for criminals and terrorists.

1.3  What Can Be Understood under Terrorism and Where Does It Come From? Going back to ancient times, the origins of the word terror/terrorism came from the Latin language and was applicated during wars. It can be referred to as the following:

Etymology of CBRN and Context on How Policing Is Involved  9

Box 1.1  Meaning of terrorism in ancient Greek time. – terrori hostibus esse = being the fear of the enemies; – terrere aliquis poena magnitude = terrorise someone with the magnitude of ... These two terminologies were seen for centuries as integration of psychological effects and tool of war as mentioned, in 1918, by Clausewitz (2014: 47) stating the following: Box 1.2  Explanation of the word terrorism and its application by Clausewitz. Terrorism is just a more extensive form of politics. As this quote is perhaps not quite as accurate today, some scholars have tried to tackle the issue hoping to find a more detailed explanation. According to James and Brenda Lutz (2011: 2), a more accurate definition and characteristic of the word terrorism adapted to our time helping to define and understand what terrorist means can be seen as the following: Terrorism involves political aims and motives. It is violent or threatens violence. It is designed to generate fear in a targeted audience that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable organization. The violence involves a non-state actor or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence, or both. Finally, the acts of violence are designed to create power in situations in which power had previously been lacking. Currently, there is not one specific definition of terrorism available since scholars are still undecided over the definition and have different opinions.

1.4  What Does Terrorism with Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents Imply for Policing? Police officer are confronted daily with TICs that are being used by the industry in a variety of ways, used maliciously or accidently at crimes, terror acts or incidents. With transportation by road, the accessibility in local stores of chemicals that can be bought without wider control, and the different information that can be found on the internet on how to produce and develop several

10  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

chemical or biological agents, ‘weapons’ are present. Perhaps the development will be seen as CBRN agents or as a weapon of mass destruction, but the psychological effect will be there. It can be argued that less toxic or effective WMDs could be characterised as weapons of mass disruption. Hence, understanding what terrorism means and why one would use such terrible weapons to achieve their aims could help to deter and prevent the future use of TICs also referred to as HAZMAT (hazardous materials) agents to be used in a criminal or in terrorism act, by knowing what to look out for. This knowledge may help police officers to understand that chemical or biological warfare or crime is not a new phenomenon and was used for particular purposes during war campaigns and terrorism acts in the past and present. However, as one can observe, the use of such agents is shifting from massive-scale attacks to a more precise use, like a scalpel or psychological suppression. The agents are used for assassinations and looking into the future, there is the fear of radioactivity (and the possibility of radioactive dirty devices (RDD) or radioactive improvised devices (RID)), which is more a weapon of mass disruption than destruction due to its nature of creating fear and panic. This development surely brings new challenges to policing as police never were that much confronted with any of these subjects, which were mainly seen in a military or civil defence capacity. Therefore, the police officer must have a basic knowledge to detect and analyse a HAZMAT/CBRN incident or threat. To achieve this mission several pieces of information and knowledge are needed. The police officer would have to gather all the needed information so that he/she will be able to analyse the incident or accident. If a standardised, harmonised way of doing so is present, a quicker assessment and more effective response can be guaranteed in such incidents or attacks. Health and safety of the police officers also plays a significant role while responding to such incidents. No matter the environment, the police officer has to respond to terrorism, crime, or natural disasters and having an essential awareness of protection, contamination, and decontamination may help them to remain operational and fulfil their duties (e.g. Spanish flu outbreak). It can be argued that hazardous materials are of utmost importance for the industry process and therefore, widely spread. Unfortunately, hazardous materials are not limited to industrial use. The same agents are used, maliciously terrorising people, for crime or terroristic purposes, i.e. acid attacks. The terror coming from such agents might not always be from human accidental or malicious release, but sometimes natural disasters are responsible as well. To serve and protect, police officers need therefore the right knowledge and training to perform their duty and responsibility to the population they have sworn to protect.

Etymology of CBRN and Context on How Policing Is Involved  11

Conclusion This chapter analysed the etymology of used abbreviations such as CBRNEe and WMD, the origins of the terminology, where it comes from, and what it means and what might have influenced its meaning and perception over the years. The perception has clearly changed over wars, terrorism, and criminal acts from what it was used to describe at the beginning. It can be clearly observed that the changes and its perception are coming from past events. Nevertheless, after 9/11 we have seen a change as well in perception of the word and meaning of terrorism besides WMD and CBRN. As of today, there is no universal definition and scholars are still arguing what it might be. Therefore, we analysed the origin and root that could cause terrorism by using some point of views from Clausewitz, Brenda and James Lutz as well as Rappaport. These approaches might help to better understand why someone would use CBRN weapons and what this could mean from a policing perspective. From a policing point of view, CBRN weapons play a bigger role in their precursor role or toxic industrial chemicals since they can be bought in the market without extensive restraints. In addition to the whole area of CBRN and TICs, the word HAZMAT was introduced covering a wide range of hazardous materials, which have their place in industry and which we are exposed to on a daily basis. After this first chapter the reader should have an oversight on how everything could fit together.

Note 1 Warfare: engagement in or the activities involved in war or conflict.

References CDC. (2018). History of Ebola virus disease. Retrieved from www.cdc.gov/vhf/ ebola/hist​ory/summar ​ies.html Clausewitz, C. (2014). Vom Kriege. Hamburg: Nikol Verlag. Llope, W. (2008). Radiation and radon from natural stone. Houston, TX: Rice University. Lutz, J., & Lutz, B. (2011). Terrorism: The basics (1st ed.). London: Routledge. Mallon, W. (2019). WMD: Where did the phrase come from? Retrieved from https://his​tory ​news​netw​ork.org/arti​cle/1522 Picasso, P. (2009). Guernica, 1937 by Pablo Picasso. Retrieved from www.pablo​ pica ​sso.org/guern ​ica.jsp Preston, P. (2017). Guernica. London: BBC History Magaine. Rapoport, D. C. (2018). The four waves of rebel terror and September 11. Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropologies, 8. Retrieved from http:// anthro​poet​ics.ucla.edu/ap0​801/ter ​ror Simkin, J. (1997). The Spanish Civil War: Guernica. Retrieved from https:// sparta​cus-educ​atio​nal.com/SPg​uern​ica.htm

Chapter 2

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents

• • • • • •

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents Used Maliciously (as a Weapon) Group 01: State Terrorism Group 02: Religious Terrorism Group 03: Marxism-Oriented Terrorist Groups Group 04: Single Issue Terrorist Groups Group 05: Lone Wolves, Acts of Terrorism, and Crime

12 13 18 23 24 24

Introduction This chapter focuses on HAZMAT and CBRN agents that have been used in the past by the mentioned terrorist groups. We are going to analyse state terrorism, religious terrorism, Marxism, right-wing terrorism, single issue terrorist groups, and lone wolf terrorism by outlining some historical incidents of the past and the outcome of the used CBRN agents. This will provide the reader with a deep knowledge of how HAZMAT and CBRN agents have been used in the past to harm, injure, or kill someone or larger groups of people covering their political goals, and the different forms that the police officer might be confronted with.

2.1  Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents Used Maliciously (as a Weapon) In ­chapter 1, we have talked very vaguely about the six main terrorist groups that exist at the moment; knowing where the word terrorism comes from, and what the meaning was and how it has evolved over time. Now we take a more profound look into some single cases involving (i) state terrorism, (ii) religious groups, (iii) single-issue groups, and (iv) lone wolves in relation to chemical, biological, and radiological agents and their intentional, malicious release whether with a terrorism or criminal background. DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-3

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  13

There may be many more examples of chemical, biological, and radiological acts of terrorism or criminal intents present, however the most notable cases are considered, showing (a) the necessity and (b) importance for law enforcement personnel to get trained or at least receive an awarenesslevel training in the subject matter.

2.2  Group 01: State Terrorism 2.2.1  US Navy and the San Francisco Release of a Biological Weapon The first test was conducted in 1950 by the US Navy, experimenting with the release of a cloud of Serratia marcescens1 (bacteria), which affects the respiration and shows infections of the skin. A US Navy ship was spraying the bacteria into the air for six days in order to analyse how a biological agent would react when dispersed by terrorists in San Francisco. The experiment took place in the bay of San Francisco, where almost one million people were infected (National Research Council (US) Subcommittee on Zinc Cadmium Sulfide, 1997; Thompson, 2015). The bacteria named above can be found in soil and water and is known for producing bright red pigment. This was one of the reasons why this particular agent was chosen to see if there would be any effect (Herra & Falkiner, 2017). Unfortunately, the bacteria triggered health issues in contaminated citizens, and one person died. The intended release was not made public until 1976 when Ronald Reagan ended the Germ Warfare programme.2 However, until that period many similar tests have taken place (Thompson, 2015). 2.2.2  US Government The second incident or staged attack was between 1956 and 1958 in Florida, in the town of Georgia. Mosquitoes, which were assumed to be infected with the yellow fever, were released to gain knowledge on how the dispersal of such agents via an air attack would occur and what kind of impact it would have on the city and its civilisation. To the present day, most of those documents are still kept ‘Top Secret’ (Cenciarelli, Rea, Carestia, & D’Amico, 2013). 2.2.3  Georgi Markov Assassination in London in 1978 and the Copycat Umbrella Murder in Germany in 1979 In 1978 Georgi Markov was assassinated with Ricin.3 Owing to the unique nature of the contamination of Markov, this assassination became known under the name of the Umbrella murder. An umbrella was used to

14  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

secretly inject the deadly agent into the body of Markov, a defected communist, who at that time was living in the United Kingdom (CNN, 2003). An interesting fact is that Ricin is the bridge between chemical and biological weapons due to its toxicity and is today on the scheduled list of the Chemical Weapons Convention (OPCW, 2019). Markov worked for a national radio station (BBC) and another station known as Free Europe. When Markov was on his way home from his BBC office waiting at the bus station, he felt suddenly a painful stitch in the back of his right thigh. When he turned around, he saw a man in his 40s picking up a dropped umbrella. Once the man picked up the umbrella, he hailed a taxi and disappeared. Having no idea what just might have happened, Markov went home but managed to explain to his colleague what he had experienced at the bus station. In the same evening, Markov developed high fever and was taken to hospital in London and underwent treatment for blood poisoning. Three days later, he died (Cummings, 1996). When an autopsy was conducted, a pellet was found where he had been stabbed with the umbrella. Once the evidence was found and analysed, medical doctors were able to define the used agent, and they found out that it was Ricin. The Ricin was encapsulated in wax so that it melted once injected into the body. This murder is still not solved. The only knowledge on the perpetrator is that the Bulgarian secret service had ordered the killing (Holdsworth & Mendick, 2013). Several years ago, unclassified documents by the Bulgarian intelligence services showed up. The file that appeared named only one agent as working for the Bulgarian secret services at that time in London. The suspected person admitted espionage but never admitted the killing of Markov. The Bulgarian Government claimed that the alleged crime was time barred due to the expiration of the statute of limitation4 set forth by Bulgarian law and closed the investigation. Therefore, the case was never solved (Edwards, 2008). A quite interesting fact is, no later than one year after an almost identical assassination happened in Germany. A 40-year-old man was stabbed with the same device. The only difference was that he was not struck with Ricin but with Mercury. Shortly after, the infected person died in Germany, Hannover. Therefore, this hit is seen as the copycat umbrella murder (Gardner, 2012). 2.2.4  Alexander Litvinenko’s Poisoning, 2006 Alexander Litvinenko, a former agent of the KGB,5 was assassinated by fatal ingestion of polonium. The presumed assassination by the Kremlin of Alexander Litvinenko left radioactive traces through London and Hamburg in Germany. In London

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  15

alone, 40 different places were contaminated (aeroplane, football stadium, restaurants, and hotels) pushing police capacities to their limits. Avoiding panic, the investigation took place under secrecy. London’s public transportation system and the Tube was screened for any radioactive traces. One only could imagine the decontamination6 and cleaning process of material and people that would have been necessary to take the radioactive agent away. Strangely, the poisoning with Polonium-2107 of Litvinenko took place the same day western scholars and journalists were invited to Russia to pose questions to the Russian president about talks with NATO (White, 2007; WHO, 2013), while the European Union and NATO summit was being held in Riga. In other words, more questions arose. Where did the Polonium come from and who assassinated Litvinenko and why? Currently, only what remains are speculations (BBC, 2015). All the trouble that the perpetrators went to, to willingly or unknowingly poison Litvinenko with Polonium, makes it even more strange that everywhere the perpetrators went, there were radioactive traces8 that were followed from London (UK) to Hamburg (Germany) (Tagesspiegel, 2006) but when it comes to the aeroplane that was used to fly from Germany to London, no traces of Polonium were identified (Handelsblatt, 2006). 2.2.5  VX Attack in Malaysia, 2017 In 2017 everyone looked at Malaysia because Malaysia became the scene of a murder with the chemical weapon known as VX. VX, applied in warzones in the form of gas, typically creates a large amount of gas, which if used in the classical way, would have incapacitated, and contaminated many passengers and citizens at the airport where the attack took place in this case. Strangely, the only person suffering from VX exposure was Kim Jong Nam, the brother of Kim Jun Ung. The motive behind it is still unclear, but this case raises new threats, which makes it essential for police officers to stay on track with new technologies and new developments in chemical and biological weapons. In this particular case, the chemical producing VX was applied to the face of Kim Jong Nam in two separate steps directly behind each other. VX is very hard to detect since it is odourless, colourless, and tasteless and can be found in liquid form. Its pure form is an oily liquid. VX is a persistent chemical to the environment, which means that it can be present for a long time. For VX to be volatile, the temperature needs to be 25 degrees Celsius. VX is part of the family of nerve agents whose use is forbidden via the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC). The reason why the VX agent was rubbed in the face, is because its penetration is faster through the head, neck, eyes, and ears and inhalation, ingestion, and through injection via the skin. Via hands and

16  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

feet, the penetration is not quite as effective and takes much longer to penetrate the human body. The head has greater blood proximity and less fat deposits and therefore is faster, easier, and better to penetrate (TheSundaily, 2017). The threat posed by the methodology that was applied is quite alarming not only because North Korea is not a signatory country of the CWC. 2.2.6  The Skripal Case, 2018 The Skripal case is one of the most recent and intimidating crimes that has happened in the 21st century with a chemical agent. Until the 1990s, Mr Skripal was a former Russian Spy, and from the 1990s until an unknown date, he was also a double agent, spying as well for Spain and the United Kingdom while continuing to spy for Russia (Dobbert, 2018). Police investigations eventually determined that foreign citizens were behind the attack. The attack with an unknown chemical agent created panic not only at a national but also at an international level. The London Metropolitan Police led the incident response and besides them, the UK military was involved as well. As of today, the main reason why he and his daughter were poisoned is still unclear. The interesting observation, however, is the police response to the scene. It was only when sitting on a bench at the Play Park in Salisbury in front of the local stores, that they showed symptoms of a chemical exposure at the same time as people were passing by. The bystanders thought that they were having an overdose from drug abuse. The symptoms can include (a) nausea and vomiting, (b) headache, (c) disordered mental state, (d) blurred/painful vision, and (e) involuntary faecal incontinence (Health-Protection, 2018). When a detective-sergeant from the Metropolitan Police investigated the Skripals’ house after they were seen as having some of the reactions mentioned earlier, the police officer received a non-lethal dose of the chemical nerve agent and developed some symptoms slightly after his contamination and needed to be hospitalised. At first, the police officer did not take the symptoms for anything other than stress and fatigue. The symptoms started shortly after when he was back at his duty station – (a) heat, (b) stress, and (c) pin prick pupils. Not giving any thoughts to the symptoms, the police officer went home. When sleeping in his bed, his body was dripping with sweat, and only then was he hospitalised. The reason why the police agent got contaminated is still unclear; it can only be argued that it is because he was not wearing any kind of personal protective equipment besides his forensic protective suit, and when finished with the investigation of the house, the forensic suit was taken off and stored.

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  17

Chemical nerve agents are persistent in liquid form and somehow, it found its way onto the police officer. At the same time, it can be argued that the principles of forensic approach as well as knowledge related to any HAZMAT agent were not present. At a later stage, the investigation found out that the door handle of Mr Skripal’s house had been contaminated with the nerve agent. Nevertheless, this incident created many contaminated zones, which created more significant risks for the untrained and underequipped police officers. They were guarding (zoning off the scene) without any additional personal protective equipment, which might have protected them from further exposure of a chemical nerve agent. During the whole process of this investigation, the actual dispersal device was only found at a later stage. Besides the multiple crime scenes and emergency services responding to the scene, this incident gives significant insights into the response of such cases. The multiple crime scenes show the major difficulties in multiple crime scenes with chemical agents when used as a poison. If the movements of the persons can be traced back, the eventual Hot Zone is quite large. This example of the police officer who got contaminated without knowing, contaminated his police car, duty station (locker room), endangered his family and contaminated his home. In all this process the family lost almost all their possessions in the clean-up from a chemical weapon agent, just because it did not come to the police officer’s mind that the reason for the reaction of those two people may not be an overdose from drugs. Here the JESIP programme for the UK STEP 1–2–3 Plus – Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel should be noted. If Step 2 had been taken into consideration this might have changed the outcome. The named system states the following: Therefore, it can be argued that if the so-called standard protocol had been followed, in the end, no harm would have come to the police officer. Forensic police response should consider these procedures when investigating a scene and call it a contaminated crime scene and handle it as such. In the same context, it can be argued hypothetically that the JESIP principles were not applied since otherwise no police officer would have been exposed to the chemical agent. As mentioned above, the dispersal device, respectively, the container that was containing the chemical agent was not found at that moment. Several questions might be asked as to why. Nevertheless, a few days later in a town not far away from Salisbury, two persons showed the same symptoms as the Skripals on the bench. The paramedics were called twice to the same house, and at first, there was a suspicion of drug abuse since the only information that the paramedics received was contamination from an ‘unknown substance’. Later the same day, New Scotland Yard identified the agent and confirmed via

18  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

Box 2.1  Explanation of STEP 1–2–3 Plus UK first response. First responders should follow the ‘STEP 1–2–3 Plus’ process to judge what actions the situation requires and follow the CBRN First Responder Flow Chart when three or more people nearby are incapacitated for no apparent reason STEP 3 (Chilcott, Larner, & Matar, 2018): Step 1. One person incapacitated with no apparent reason Approach using standard protocols. Step 2. Two people incapacitated with no apparent reason Approach with caution using standard protocols. Porton Down9 that the agent was the same nerve agent. The named couple visited a shop in Salisbury. The couple received the contamination of the agent by picking up a perfume sample (BBC, 2018). However, the bottle itself that Ms Sturgess, the wife of the couple received as a gift from the named shop they visited was only identified four months after the incident as the source of contamination with the chemical agent (Rahim, 2019). The police officer who responded to the scene with the paramedics was hospitalised due to the fact that the constable was showing some kind of reaction, including skin irritation. This case shows again how important it is not to rush to the scene and not to touch anything when an unknown agent is responsible for medical distress (Second Salisbury police officer ‘treated for suspected poisoning’, 2018). Besides the eventual multiple crime scenes, which needed to be sealed off and investigated, the clean-up and restoration process needs to be taken into consideration as well. This led to a cost of £347,000 (EmburyDennis, 2018). The clean-up and the challenges the police were exposed to were expected to take several months, to investigate and clear the scene (Press Association, 2018). It can be argued that this is one of the largest police involvements in the 21st century related to an attack with chemical weapons in Europe.

2.3  Group 02: Religious Terrorism According to Bruce Hoffman (1954: 31) religious terrorist groups can be understood as: Terrorism can be motivated by religious ideologies and grievances. Religious terrorism is particularly dangerous due to the fanaticism of

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  19

those who practice it and their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the cause. Religious terrorists are more likely to use ‘all in’ tactics such as suicide bombings. This is made possible by religious teachings used to justify and even encourage this kind of self-sacrifice.

2.3.1  Bhagwan Shree Ranjee Cult, 1984 Rajneesh Chandra Mohan who created the Bhagwan Shree Ranjee cult was responsible for poisoning salad bars in Dallas, Oregon with the bacterium Salmonella Typhimurium10 strain. This was the first criminal attack where a biological agent was deliberately spread. Chandra Mohan Jain was a popular spiritual leader in India preaching an electric doctrine of eastern mysticism, individual devotion, and sexual freedom, which attracted thousands of followers. He left India over a dispute with the local government and bought a ranch in Dallas, Oregon where his followers built a city as a retreat for the cult, integrating an airport, an electric station, and a meditation centre with the capacity to support ten thousand people. The ranch was called Rajneeshupuram, and his followers were called ‘synyasins’, which means orange people. Chandra, who named himself Bhagwan in the 1980s, meaning the embodiment of God, later in 1988 changed his name to ‘Gautama the Buddha’ claiming that he was the reincarnation of Buddha himself (Wolfson, 2018). In 1990, Bhagwan apparently died and took the name Osho Rajneesh meaning ‘on whom the heavens shower flowers’ still related to Buddhism, leading a spiritual cult back in India. When referred to their cause and the biological contamination of salad bars the ‘new cult’ always refers to a manipulation, conspiracy from the US Government. Twenty-eight years after the death of the Osho cult’s Guru, the cult still does not admit what happened in Oregon (McCafferty, 1999). Chandra’s views were based on Buddhism with the mentality of ‘freedom to do whatever you want’ expressing rejection of constraints put by society or the system and adopting a free-love philosophy where his meditation sessions mostly ended up in huge group orgies between his followers (Moran, 1999). Because the cult in Oregon faced other charges and investigations on drug smuggling, illegal migration, arson, and murder, the local residents were not very happy with the cult. In 1984, the cult deliberately contaminated salad bars with salmonella. A strain was bought and cultivated by the Ranjee Cult and used to contaminate salad bars with the intention of making citizens ill during the coming local election so that the election’s outcome would be more in their favour, by taking over control of the county legally via the election. The main reason why the cult tried to

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gain control over the area arose due to controversial construction issues at the ranch, and they were challenged locally via the court limiting new construction. It can be argued that this specific topic pushed the cult to proceed with their malicious biological attack. After the examination of salmonella in various bars, the FBI investigation showed that the named salmonella came from the Rajneeshee medical centre where it was cultivated. The cult had contaminated salad bars and coffee creamer with salmonella. It took more than one year to associate the attacks with the cult because at the beginning there were no indicators, or a crime or terror acts even if it was the first assumption that the investigators had. However, without proof, this hypothesis was not pursued for various reasons. The reasons can be explained as the following points: 1. There was no motive since the elections were not held in the same period and no-one knew at that time that it was just a ‘dry run’ to see if the attack would be efficient and proficient. 2. No terrorist group or organisation claimed responsibility for the act. Normally if someone deliberately conducts such an attack, they claim it for propaganda purposes. 3. Police officers investigating the scene could not establish a pattern to link an unusual behaviour to it. 4. No employee held a grudge against their employer. 5. As the salad bars had apparently been contaminated more than once the hypothesis was that the person responsible for this act would be seeking revenge. 6. Point 5 was considered because several employees became ill before the local health department recognised their illness and sent them home. 7. No incident like this had ever happened before to the investigators’ knowledge. 8. The investigators thought about a more complicated scenario as so many people were contaminated with Salmonella. 9. During outbreaks like this, the sources are sometimes not found, and therefore, a terrorist or criminal act was at first not taken into account (Török, 1997). This type of bacteria is easy to cultivate and get access to without having a substantial biological background. With the intentional contamination, the cult managed to contaminate around 750 people. 2.3.2  Aum Shinrikyo During the 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese religious cult group was known for having tested several different bioweapons, including (i) Botulin

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  21

Toxin, (ii) Anthrax, (iii) Cholera, (iv) the Q fever, (v) VX, and (vi) Sarin. Aum produced Sarin and VX; and both agents were used in several assassinations and assassination attempts. Aum Shinrikyo was a syncretic religious belief cult drawing upon Asahara’s interpretations of elements. Asahara was inspired by Indian Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism along with Hinduism, taking Shiva as the main image of worship and incorporating millennialist ideas. In a five-year timeframe, several different types of biological and chemical weapons were produced, and attacks carried out on civilians and those opposing, threatening the cult and not following their views and ideologies. The assassinations were seen as a justified cleansing cause, referred to as ‘cleaning karma’ (karma-otoshi) or ‘poa’. Asahara held close ties with the Yakuza,11 and was planning crimes involving mass destruction. Years before the cult became so violent, the brightest minds were recruited. The different forms of recruitment process included mind control, psychedelic drugs, secret trials, violence, and blackmailing. Asahara had seen himself as an incarnation of the Indian god ‘Shiva’,12 the god of destruction. In 1988, when the Aum cult started their criminal activities, they forced members to donate to the cult and held them captive until they engaged with the demands, which brought the cult to the attention of law enforcement who began looking into the cult. When in 1989 several members of the cult wanted to leave, they were found strangled to death under Asahara’s orders. The house of a lawyer who was criticising the cult was also raided and his wife and older son kidnapped. The lawyer himself was beaten to death, and the wife was strangled by other members of the kidnapping party. When local police investigated the scene, they missed significant evidence, i.e. ‘an Aum Shinrikyo badge’. The disappearance of the lawyer’s family did not raise any further suspicions, and the case was closed. From this point on, more murders and assassinations were conducted to help their cause. The police did not find proof and did not investigate further, which could be seen as a positive feedback for the cult to continue their killings since no punishment was to be received. Asahara decided in the same period that to fulfil his purpose, they would need to rule Japan, which would allow them to spread his apocalyptical teachings and spread his so-called wisdom. Another interesting fact, besides the wish to produce weapons of mass destruction and kill people not following the cult’s views and way of thinking, is that Asahara’s blood was apparently analysed at Kyoto University. They stated that his blood was unique and claimed they found a unique DNA-strand (form). Therefore, Asahara told his followers that by drinking his blood they would acquire some of his good karma and he sold blood samples for thousands of dollars, calling it the blood initiation rite.

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Before producing a large number of chemical weapons, the equipment had to be bought. So, Aum bought two or three cube-shaped fermenters. The capacity volume of the drums was around 10,000 litres. For the Aum cult, their strategy was not to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The primary reason why they produced them was more out of a fascination with the creation of the product and bringing them into reality by being able to produce and use them. It can be argued that due to their passion for the production process the Aum cult was able to create Sarin, VX, and Chlorine Gas, but were less successful at creating biological weapons due to a more complicated process that is required to produce such weapons. Aum tested its Sarin on sheep at Banjawarn Station, a remote pastoral property in Western Australia, killing 29 sheep. The stockpiles of Sarin found on site were enough to kill four million people. They also tried to obtain strains of the Ebola virus in Africa while they were on a ‘humanitarian mission’. The cult was able to conduct several biological attacks in Tokyo, but they were luckily unsuccessful (Cenciarelli et al., 2013; Olson, 1999). Aum’s most malicious use of the chemical weapon Sarin was on 27 June 1994, when the cult released Sarin in the Metro station in the city of Matsumoto. This release killed 13 people and prompted 6,000 others to seek hospital treatment. It can be argued that due to the lack of knowledge of hazardous materials (chemical and biological) and the involved processes including the necessary equipment to create chemical or biological weapons, the police were unaware of its production and malicious use. Without having any detection, identification, and monitoring equipment, they were unable

Box 2.2  Motivation and CBRN weapons of Aum. Aum & CBRN weapons: For assassinations; Sarin release in Matsumoto Nagano; Sarin release Tokyo subway; VX for assassination; Hydrogen Cyanide attack in a bus; Dispersing Anthrax Bacillus from their HQ; Tried acquiring Ebola in Zaire. Motivation: take the sins of the world, and claiming to transfer to the followers spiritual power and ultimately take away their sins and evil deeds.

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  23

to detect any of these try-outs until it was too late. At the same time, the try-out on animals (sheep) in Australia was a huge sign that someone, in this case, Aum had produced some sort of weapon capable of killing large amounts of living beings. Even if the exact agent was not known, finding 29 dead sheep is quite suspicious, and the presence of a toxin or bacteria should be taken into consideration. This case shows how important it is for police officers to receive training and education in HAZMAT/CBRN response, awareness, and recognition. If the police would have paid more attention, it can be argued then the attack on the subway station with Sarin could have been avoided.

2.4  Group 03: Marxism-Oriented Terrorist Groups 2.4.1  The Ricin Case in the United Kingdom In 2005 in the United Kingdom, father and son (Ian and Nicky Davidson) were members of a right-wing supremacist organisation, known as the Aryan Strike Force or the Wolf Pack, idolising Adolf Hitler, and his work such as Mein Kampf trying to promote ‘the creation of an international Aryan group who would establish white supremacy in white, countries’. They were able to produce Ricin (Biotoxin) (CDC, 2011). The amount of Ricin they produced was enough to kill 10 people. Ricin, depending on its form (solid, liquid, or gas), can be dispersed in various forms such as (a) indoors via aerosol, (b) contaminating water supplies, (c) contaminating food, (d) can be released outdoors as an aerosol, and in (e) agriculture contaminating agricultural products (CDC, 2011). Police investigators were able to investigate the family because of their right-wing orientation and publicly calling on a purification against Muslims, and their purchases on Amazon, of books, like The Anarchist Cookbook and The Poor Man’s James Bond. When the police investigators searched their house, they found a jar in a kitchen cupboard. Upon its verification, the liquid, which looked like an oily substance, was identified as Ricin. This is also the first case where a person/citizen was convicted of producing chemical/biological weapons since the Second World War under the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) (Wainwright, 2010). The reason why Ian Davidson was afterwards prosecuted for creating a chemical weapon is that Ricin is listed by the OPCW (Organisation on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) on their Schedule 01, where other chemical weapons such as VX,13 and Tabun14 are listed (OPCW, 2019). Ricin is deadlier than Cyanide, as stated by IHS Jane’s CBRN Handbook series ( Jane’s, 2011: 223).

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2.5  Group 04: Single Issue Terrorist Groups The FBI classifies ecological terrorist groups as: ‘Threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmental–political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature’ (FBI, 2012). The groups classified as eco terror groups are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The Animal Liberation Front (ALF); The Earth Liberation Front (ELF); Greenpeace; Sea Shepherd Conservation Society; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA); and EarthFirst.

The listed ecological terror groups are not normally seen as a threat. However, in their activist wing are people who have more interest in conducting continued political violence (terrorism) to force a change of behaviour from citizens, private businesses and governments if they deem it a necessity to help their cause. Especially the environmental movies are taken into consideration here due to their extremist interest increasing their actions towards vandalism and terrorist activities still assuming it is in the interest of their cause (FBI, 2002). 2.5.1  Eco Terrorism In the case of Greenpeace not being seen as a threat, their activist group managed in 2017 to gain access to a nuclear power site next to the reactor. They were not able to penetrate the internal security layer to gain access inside the reactor because they got stopped by a local security company from the gendarmerie that is positioned on site. Nevertheless, the Greenpeace activists were able to shoot fireworks up in the sky in front of reactor number 02. Only then, and not earlier did the security company intervene. This poses an enormous security risk for nuclear power plants and police officers are here more confronted with terrorism and radioactive risks than anywhere else (Energeek, 2018).

2.6  Group 05: Lone Wolves, Acts of Terrorism, and Crime Under this group, a lone wolf can be understood as an individual person that is protesting against a perceived grievance or wrongly attributed governmental action or inaction. Not interested in changing the system, they have fixed goals around a specific issue (St. Andrews University, 2013).

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  25

2.6.1  Anthrax Letters Case (US) In 2001, right after the 9/11 incident, the United States faced a biothreat. An unknown person was sending Anthrax15 letters via the post office to US citizens and government officials. The Anthrax case in 2001 made a considerable shift in policies related to combatting CBRN-related crime and terrorism. The investigation into the Anthrax letters took the FBI eight years. The investigation identified Bruce E. Ivins as the responsible person for sending the letters. Ivins can be seen as the enemy within since he was working as a biologist at the US: Army Fort Detrick biodefence lab in Frederick (US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases) (Warrick, 2010). The letters sent out by Ivins to government officials and news agencies containing weaponised Anthrax killed five people, and 17 were contaminated (CNN, 2018). After this incident, the Postal Service bought more than 4.8 million masks and 88 million gloves to protect their employees. Nevertheless, this case shocked the whole system not only in the United States but also in Europe. In the States, this case brought about a new approach to the topic of CBRN and HAZMAT and more resources were given to equipment and training for law enforcement agencies (Butler, Cohen, & Friedman, 2002). In Europe, however, for law enforcement officers, nothing has changed, and no more training or equipment was bought. The European Union integrated response planning to CBRN terrorist acts, but on the educational side not much has been done for the security of European countries in educating the police officers (Chatfield, 2018). 2.6.2  Breaking Bad Fan (TV Show) (UK) In the Liverpool area of the United Kingdom, a man named Mohammed Ammer Ali tried in 2015 to acquire Ricin via the Dark Net16 from an undercover FBI agent. The Ricin that the person mentioned earlier bought was enough to kill hundreds of people. At the same time, Mohammed asked what if the Ricin used indoors in food and water would still work. Not much was and is known about his plot and what he tried to do. The Ricin was shipped to his home in an electric remote-controlled car containing 500 mg of Ricin, and he claimed he wanted to buy the same quantity every month. The joint investigation of the FBI and Counter-Terror Unit in the UK made it possible to arrest Mohammed before he was able to conduct any further steps. Since his arrest, Mohammed has been convicted under the CWC of trying to obtain chemical weapons (Robinson, 2015).

26  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

2.6.3  Hydrogen Cyanide Poisoning by Police Officer In 2016, a police officer was arrested under suspicion of poisoning his sister and her boyfriend’s water bottle with cyanide.17 After the two named persons had taken the food or drunk the water, the symptoms of poisoning appeared: (a) nausea; (b) unconsciousness. When the medical doctor arrived on the scene, he could only certify the death of the two persons (Thiel, 2016). The police cadets who helped during the search to find the dispersal device were not using any protective equipment. They suspected that cyanide was used to commit the crime, administered in liquid form via droplets and afterwards the container thrown away. The minimal PPE18 that should be worn is vinyl gloves to protect the skin from any contact with cyanide avoiding absorption through the skin of the chemical. Cyanide posing poses still a risk in smaller quantities when absorbed via the skin, ingested, or inhaled. The symptoms of a small amount of cyanide poisoning include (a) dizziness, (b) headache, (c) nausea and vomiting, (d) rapid breathing, (e) rapid heartrate, (f ) restlessness, and (g) weakness (CDC, n.d.b). Police officers were not wearing any PPE while looking for the container, so one could argue that the police officers were not aware of the danger that liquid cyanide poses to the human body or had any idea about contamination of chemicals. At some point, the investigators found the discarded container. This scenario resembles very strongly a nerve agent case, where a police officer got contaminated with the chemical because he touched the container that contained the agent. The police who had not faced before any sort of crime involving chemical agents as a form of assassination and not being aware of the risks and contamination of decontamination procedures, faced issues in their chemical crime scene response. If they had been complying with the local legislation on chemical training and education it is worth asking: Since the national legislation has existed since 2002 and the European Union legislation since 1998 (European Union, 2018), no amendments from the police point of view have been taken into consideration to date (Interview with police officer, 2018).

Box 2.3  Highlighting the question as to why no training is to be found based on EU regulation on exposure to chemical agents for police officers. Why was no training and knowledge present?

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  27

Conclusion All examples drawn upon show that the risk faced by using CBRN/ HAZMAT agents is more present than one might think. Being it accidents or the malicious intent to use or produce chemical weapons is more than present. The cases used are real incidents that have occurred and they make their point that timely response and intervention is key to preventing and deterring such agents being used maliciously but as well they show how important it is to respect certain protection and detection procedures, and be able to recognise when such weapons have been used. Since the Sarin attack in Tokyo many years have passed, and one might argue that the case was a wake-up call for policing in this area. However, only limited dedication is given to these topics even today. 9/11 and the Anthrax case as well as Covid might have triggered some more interest in police education. However, as with many things in this area the amount of training that would be needed to train police officers is tremendous and one might argue, why go over all these hurdles if such events are very infrequent? In this case it should be taken into consideration that even though it will be a low-level possibility, the impact such events have can be very highlevel impact scenarios where only limited quantities can create a huge economic impact such as in the Skripal case. Ignoring these threats will not only expose the police officer to unjustified health and safety issues but their family and innocent citizens. Overall, the lessons learned from the described events from a policing perspective have been negligible.

Notes 1 Serratia marcescens (bacteria): This bacterium grows as a slimy pink substance that sometimes forms in moist areas around homes. It is most frequently observed in toilet bowls, on surfaces in shower stalls and bathtub enclosures, on tiles, in sinks, and in pet water dishes. This red or pink pigmented bacterium is known as Serratia marcescens and is the most common cause of the pink ‘stuff’. Serratia bacteria are common inhabitants of the environment and can be found in many places, including human and animal faeces, dust, soil, and surface waters. The bacteria will grow in any moist location where phosphorous containing materials or fatty substances accumulate. Sources of these substances include soap residues in bathing areas, faeces in toilets, and soap and food residues in pet water dishes. Many times, the pinkish film appears during and after new construction or re-modelling activities. Others have indicated the pink ‘stuff’ occurs during a time of year when their windows are open for the majority of the day. These airborne bacteria can come from any number of naturally occurring sources, and the condition can be further

28  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

aggravated if customers remove the chlorine from their water by way of an activated carbon filter. In recent years, the popularity of home water filtration systems has grown tremendously, and the presence of Serratia has appeared more and more frequently in homes that remove the chlorine disinfection from the water supply. 2 Germ Warfare means the use of disease-spreading microorganisms as a military weapon. 3 Ricin is a lectin and a highly potent toxin produced in the seeds of the castor oil plant, Ricinus communis. The median lethal dose of Ricin for mice is around 22 microgrammes per kilogramme of body weight via intraperitoneal injection. Oral exposure to Ricin is far less toxic. 4 Under the definition of the statute of limitations can be understood the maximum time which parties involved in a legal matter have time to initiate a legal process from the date an alleged offence has been committed. This time varies depending on the type of offence (Majski, 2019). 5 KGB: (Committee for State Security, secret service), the principal security agency for the Soviet Union from 1954 until its break-up in 1991. 6 Decontamination is the known process of removing, neutralising, or destroying any harmful substance (chemical, biological, or radiological). 7 Polonium is a naturally occurring radioactive material that emits highly hazardous alpha (positively charged) particles discovered in the 19th century by Marie Curie. Small amounts of Polonium-210 are present in the soil and atmosphere and in everyone, having small amounts of it in their body. At high doses, it damages tissues and organs, but it cannot pass through the skin, and must, therefore, be ingested or inhaled into the body to cause damage. 8 Radioactivity is produced by an atom that spontaneously emits energetic particles or waves (radiation). This radiation is emitted when an unstable (i.e. radioactive) nucleus transforms to some other nucleus or energy level. 9 Porton Down is a science park, situated just north-east of the village of Porton, near Salisbury in Wiltshire, England. It is home to two British government facilities: a site of the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) – known for over 100 years as one of the UK’s most secretive and controversial military research facilities. 10 A form of salmonella that causes food poisoning in humans. Salmonella itself is a bacterium that occurs mainly in the gut, especially a serotype causing food poisoning. 11 Yakuza, also known as gokudo ̄ ‘the extreme path’, are members of transnational organised crime syndicates originating in Japan. 12 Shiva, also known as ‘Mahadeva’ (lit. the greatest god), is one of the principal deities of Hinduism. He is the supreme being within Shaivism, one of the major traditions within contemporary Hinduism. 13 VX is a human-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent. VX was developed in the United Kingdom in the early 1950s. It is odourless and tasteless. It is an oily liquid that is amber in colour and very slow to evaporate. It evaporates about as slowly as motor oil. 14 Tabun is a human-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of the known chemical warfare agents. They are similar to insecticides (insect-killing chemicals)

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  29

called organophosphates in the way they work and the harmful effects they cause. However, nerve agents are much more potent than organophosphate insecticides. Tabun was developed as a pesticide in Germany in 1936 and is also known as ‘GA’. Tabun is a clear or colourless-to-brown liquid (depending on purity). It is tasteless and has a faint fruity odour. Tabun can become a vapour if heated. 15 Anthrax is a bacterial disease caused by infection with Bacillus anthracis. The same bacteria can lead to three forms of the disease: (a) cutaneous; (b) anthrax intestinal; (c) anthrax inhalational (or pulmonary) anthrax. Anthrax occurs among grazing animals in many parts of the world, including livestock in parts of Australia, most commonly in central New South Wales in what is known as the ‘anthrax belt’, which stretches from central–east Queensland into northern Victoria. Sporadic incidents in animals have also occurred in Western Australia. Anthrax is a very rare disease in humans. 16 Dark Net: an umbrella term describing the portions of the Internet purposefully not open to public view or hidden networks whose architecture is superimposed on that of the Internet. 17 Cyanide is a potentially deadly chemical, existing in various forms, which is colourless, such as hydrogen cyanide (HCN) or cyanogen chloride (CNCl), or can be found in a crystal form such as sodium cyanide (NaCN) or potassium cyanide (KCN). Cyanide sometimes is described as having a ‘bitter almond’ smell, but it does not always give off an odour, and not everyone can detect this odour. Cyanide is also known by the military designation’s AC (for hydrogen cyanide) and CK (for cyanogen chloride). 18 PPE: Personal protective equipment is protective clothing, helmets, goggles, or other garments or equipment designed to protect the wearer’s body from injury or infection. The hazards addressed by protective equipment include physical, electrical, heat, chemicals, biohazards, and airborne particulate matter.

References BBC. (2015). Timeline: Alexander Litvinenko death case. Retrieved from www. bbc.com/news/uk-30929​940 BBC. (2018). Amesbury Novichok poisoning: Couple exposed to nerve agent. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/uk-44719​639 Butler, J. C., Cohen, M. L., & Friedman, C. R. (2002). Collaboration between public health and law enforcement: New paradigms and partnerships for bioterrorism planning and response. Bethesda: Emerging Infectious Diseases. CDC. (2011). Ricin: Biotoxin. Retrieved from www.cdc.gov/niosh/ers​hdb/eme​ rgen​c yre​spon​seca​rd_2​9750​0 02.html CDC. (n.d.b). Facts about cyanide. Retrieved from https://emerge​ncy.cdc.gov/ agent/cyan​ide/bas​ics/facts.asp Cenciarelli, O., Rea, S., Carestia, M., & D’Amico, F. (2013). Bioweapons and bioterrorism: A review of history and biological agents. Defence S&T Tech Bull, 6(2), pp. 111–129. Chatfield, S. (2018). Member states preparedness for CBRN threats (terrorism). Brussels: European Parliament.

30  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

Chilcott, R. P., Larner, J., & Matar, H. (2018). The United Kingdom’s initial operational response and specialist operational response to CBRN and HazMat incidents: A primer on decontamination protocols for healthcare professionals. Emerg Med J, 36, pp. 117–123. CNN. (2003). Ricin and the umbrella murder. Retrieved from http://edit​ion. cnn.com/2003/WORLD/eur​ope/01/07/ter ​ror.poi​son.bulgar ​ian CNN. (2018). 2001 Anthrax attacks fast facts. Retrieved from https://edit​ion. cnn.com/2013/08/23/hea​lth/anth​rax-fast-facts/index.html Cummings, R. (1996). Bulgaria: Georgi Markov, victim of an unknown cold war assassin. Retrieved from www.rferl.org/a/1081​550.html Dobbert, S. (2018). Ein Giftanschlag, der Befürchtungen weckt. Retrieved from www.zeit.de/poli​t ik/ausl​a nd/2018-03/ser​g ej-skri​pal-russl​a nd-nato-alexan​ der-lit ​w ine​n ko-atten​t at-spion​age-mord Edwards, R. (2008). Poison-tip umbrella assassination of Georgi Markov reinvestigated. Retrieved from www.telegr​aph.co.uk/news/2158​765/Poi​son-tipumbre​l la-assass​inat​ion-of-Geo​rgi-Mar​kov-rei​nves​t iga​ted.html Embury-Dennis, T. (2018). Salisbury attack: Novichok poisoning response ­vehicles in Wiltshire buried in landfill site. Retrieved from www.inde​pend​ ent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/salisb​u ry-att ​ack-novic​hok-poison ​i ng-amesbury-wiltsh ​ire-rus​sia-emerge​ncy-vehic​les-bur ​ied-a8518​126.html Energeek. (2018). Intrusion à la centrale de Cattenom: Greenpeace devant la justice. Retrieved from https://lenerg​eek.com/2018/01/03/intrus​ion-a-lacentr​a le-de-catte​nom-gre​enpe​ace-convoq​uee-dev​a nt-la-just​ice European Union. (2018). Legislative framework on dangerous substances in workplaces. Retrieved from https://osha.eur​opa.eu/en/the​mes/danger​ous-sub​ stan​ces FBI. (2002). Domestic terrorism section chief, Counterterrorism Division. Retrieved from https://archi​ves.f bi.gov/archi​ves/news/testim​ony/the-thr​eatof-eco-terror ​ism FBI. (2012). Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, FBI before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, February 12, 2002 ‘The threat of eco-terrorism’. Retrieved from www.f bi.gov/congr​ess/con​g res​s02/jarbo​e021​ 202.htm Gardner, T. (2012). German man stabbed with poison umbrella dies a year after attack which has chilling echoes of infamous Markov assassination. Retrieved from www.dailym​a il.co.uk/news/arti​cle-2143​522/Ger​m an-man-stab​bed-poi​ son-umbre​l la-dies-year-att​ack-chill​i ng-ech​oes-infam​ous-Mar​kov-assass​i nat​ ion. html Handelsblatt. (2006). Polonium–Spur führt weiter nach Norden. Retrieved from www.hande​lsbl​att.com/art​s _un​d _st ​yle/aus-aller-welt/fall-litwi​nenko-polonium-spur-fuehrt-weiter-nach-norden/2743480.html Health-Protection. (2018). Amesbury nerve agent incident: Answering your ­frequently asked questions. Retrieved from https://publ ​iche​a lth ​m att​ers.blog. gov.uk/2018/07/06/amesb​u ry-nerve-agent-incid​ent-answer ​i ng-your-fre​quen​ tly-asked-questi​ons/ Herra, C., & Falkiner, F. R. (2017). Serratia marcescens. Retrieved from www. anti​m icr​obe.org/b26.asp

Terror Groups Analysed in Relation with CBRN Agents  31

Hoffman, B. (1954). Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Holdsworth, N., & Mendick, R. (2013). Prime suspect in Georgi Markov umbrella poison murder tracked down to Austria. Retrieved from www.telegr​ aph.co.uk/news/ukn​ews/crime/9949​856/Prime-susp​ect-in-Geo​rgi-Mar​kovumbre​l la-poi​son- murder-tracked-down-to-Austria.html Jane’s. (2011). IHS Jane’s CBRN response handbook. London: Jane’s Information Group. Majski, C. (2019). Statute of limitations definition. Retrieved from www.inves​ tope​d ia.com/terms/s/stat ​ute-of-limi​t ati​ons.asp McCafferty, D. (1999). Old Bhagwan, new bottles. Retrieved from https:// web.arch ​ i ve.org/web/20 0 ​ 5 020 ​ 4 075 ​ 8 38/w w w.sa lon.com/books/feat​ ure/1999/10/20/osho Moran, S. (1999). The secret world of cults: From ancient Druids to Heaven’s Gate. London: Quadrillion Publishing. National Research Council (US) Subcommittee on Zinc Cadmium Sulfide. (1997). Appendix A: Historical background of the U.S. biologic-warfare program. In Toxicologic assessment of the army’s zinc cadmium sulfide dispersion tests. Washington, DC: National Academies Press (US). Retrieved from www.ncbi. nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK233​494/ Olson, K. B. (1999). Aum Shinrikyo: Once and future threat? Emerg Infect Dis, 5(4), pp. 513–516. doi:10.3201/eid0504.990409 OPCW. (2019). Toxic chemicals. Retrieved from www.opcw.org/chemi​cal-weap​ ons-con​vent ​ion/anne​xes/annex-chemic​a ls/sched​u le-1 Press Association. (2018). Police officer given all-clear after Novichok exposure scare. Retrieved from www.theg ​uard ​ian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/07/pol ​iceoffi​cer-in-hospi​t al-over-potent​ial-novic​hok-expos​ure Rahim, Z. (2019). Salisbury attack: Novichok bottle was not recovered for more than three months, police say. Retrieved from www.inde​pend​ent.co.uk/news/ uk/crime/salisb​u ry-att​a ck-novic​hok-bot​t le-perf​u me-ser​g ei-skri​pal-rus​s iaa9120​576.html Robinson, M. (2015). British father-of-two allegedly bought Ricin that could kill hundreds of people that was delivered to his home in a toy car but was caught in FBI sting. Retrieved from www.dailym ​a il.co.uk/news/arti​cle-2957​ 211/Brit ​i sh-fat​her-two-bou​g ht-ricin-kill-hundr​e ds-delive​r ed-toy-car-cau​ ght-onl​ine-sting-FBI.html Second Salisbury police officer ‘treated for suspected poisoning’ as force admits decontamination yet to begin. The Telegraph. (2018, March 22). Retrieved from www. telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/22/second-salisbury-police-officertreated-suspected-poisoning St. Andrews University. (2013). The war model of response. St. Andrews: St. Andrews University. Tagesspiegel. (2006). Polonium-Spuren in Hamburg bestätigt. Retrieved from www.tages​spie​gel.de/poli​t ik/mordf​a ll-lit ​w ine​n ko-polon ​ium-spu​ren-in-hamb​ urg-bes​t aet​igt/785​524.html TheSundaily. (2017). Traces of VX poison found on clothes of both accused. Retrieved from www.thes​unda​i ly.my/arch​ive/tra​ces-vx-poi​son-found-clot​ hes-both-accu​sed-JTARC​H489​912

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Thiel, M. (2016). Mysteriöse Todesfälle in Bereldingen: Polizist soll Essen vergiftet haben. Retrieved from www.wort.lu/de/loka​les/myste​r io- ese-todesfaelle-inbereldingen-polizist-soll-essen-vergiftet-haben-57ee3d- f8ac730ff4e7f6731e Török, T. (1997). A large community outbreak of salmonellosis caused by intentional contamination of restaurant salad bars. JAMA, 278(5), pp. 389–395. doi:10.1001/jama.1997.03550050051033 Thompson, H. (2015). In 1950, the U.S. released a bioweapon in San Francisco. Retrieved from www.smi​thso​n ian ​m ag.com/smart-news/1950-us-relea​sedbiowea​pon-san-franci​sco-180955​819 Wainwright, M. (2010). Neo-Nazi Ian Davison jailed for 10 years for making chemical weapon. Retrieved from www.theg​uard​ian.com/uk/2010/may/14/ neo-nazi-ian-davi​son-jai ​led-chemi​cal-wea​pon Warrick, J. (2010). FBI investigation of 2001 Anthrax attacks concluded; U.S. releases details. Retrieved from www.was​h ing ​tonp​ost.com/wp-dyn/cont​ent/ arti​cle/2010/02/19/AR20​1002​1902​369.html??nor​edir​ect=on White, S. (2007). Litvinenko and after. Transformation Group Newsletter, 2(1), pp. 1–6. WHO. (2013). Tuberculosis and air travel. In WHO (ed.) Guidelines for prevention and control (pp. 5–8). Geneva: WHO. Wolfson, S. (2018). The free-love cult that terrorised America – and became Netflix’s latest must-watch. Retrieved from www.theg​uard​ian.com/tv-andradio/2018/apr/07/cult-ore ​g on-1980s-ter ​r or-netf ​ l ix-docu ​ m ent ​ a ry-wildcoun​t ry

Chapter 3

The Impact of Planes as Transportation of Goods and Living Beings

• • • •

Airport, Planes, and Cargo: A Risk for Law Enforcement Officers? Freight – Cargo and Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents Accidents with Dangerous Goods Infrastructure Risks: Terror Threat and Terror Acts

33 37 38 39

Introduction This chapter looks into the world of transportation modes via aeroplane discussing issues that police officers might face in regard to passengers or dangerous goods that are transported. This topic has quite a universal approach since HAZMAT agents or biological issues with citizens can be faced everywhere and are not limited to airports. However, airports have a transcontinental connection, which makes it easier to become the main source for international cross-contamination as was seen during the Ebola outbreak in 2014 and more recently with Sars Cov2. This chapter looks at the risks from a HAZMAT and CBRN perspective and how they impact on law enforcement officers. This chapter takes a detailed look at transportation via air since an airport has more rules than any other shipping modality. Even though we look at airport cargo and freight centres all the named topics are applicable to any other mean of transportation or critical infrastructure.

3.1  Airport, Planes, and Cargo: A Risk for Law Enforcement Officers? As explained in the introduction, the terminology for weapons of mass destruction was not present until the 1930s and is connected to the first aerial bombing by plane. While in this context the planes were dropping bombs as with everything there has been an evolution. DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-4

34  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

It can be argued that the aeroplane itself can be seen as a weapon of mass destruction, as seen during 9/11. Nevertheless, this was not the first time that such a thing was planned and attempted. Over the years, criminals, and terrorists (state actors, religious, and lone wolves) have tried to use aeroplanes combined with hazardous materials (chemical, biological, and nuclear agents) for their purpose. The United States for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or a lone wolf trying to blow up planes and religious terror groups trying to make an aeroplane explode over Paris just to name a few. Besides the plane that can be used as a WMD, 9/11 showed as well how the first response to such events can have long-term effects on the responding officers exposing them to various deadly chemical or biological agents in the air, which are inhaled and only a few years after the event kill the host since they have created irreversible damage to the human body (Haelle, 2021). The massive amounts of kerosene1 produced fire and therefore, chemical fumes. It can be argued that the chemical fire of the aeroplane posed a direct threat to the health of the people involved related to the dispersion of chemical particles and agents being dangerous to human life and health. The glass and asbestos set free due to the impact were one of them (Dunn & Fox, 2018). Nevertheless, aeroplanes normally transport people and goods on a daily basis. From a dangerous goods perspective these are: (a) chemicals, (b) biological agents (A-B-C)2 and (c) radioisotopes through shipment via plane and truck around the world. This means that police officers working at airports are exposed to many different factors that are not limited to their direct function as police officers but due to the nature and operations that happen at an international airport they are also exposed to a wider range of incidents including chemical, biological, and radiological agents and crimes including the prevention of future events like 9/11. The following is an example of chemical exposure from a truck making a delivery to the airport: A police officer gets called to an accident where a truck is leaking a chemical from its cargo component. Without any previous knowledge on how to respond to the scene the police arrive on the scene and do the normal checks such as on the driver’s licence, etc., omitting however to ask for the shipping papers providing valuable information on the shipment and their hazards. This means that the risk the police officer gets exposed to a toxic chemical is quite high and irreversible injuries may occur.

The Impact of Planes as Transportation of Goods and Living Beings  35

Box 3.1  Highlighting any issues in emergency landings of a sick traveller on a plane. An emergency landing was initiated due to an illness of one of the passengers who feels sick. Not knowing what the reasons are it is well known that it is unsafe rushing to the scene without having the right protection, as many biological diseases might be present depending on where the plane is coming from, e.g. Ebola. Respecting that aspect and how the agents can be dispersed, especially in a plane, as long as the agent is not identified it is to be assumed that the contamination is volatile. Police officers, also responding to such incidents but without having the right PPE should avoid any on-scene work without some level of protection. The biological risks one might be exposed to are coming from various directions: (a) passengers, (b) cargo (c) zoonotic diseases3 flown in, and finally (d) the aeroplane itself as previously explained. From the passenger perspective, the following biological example and critical thinking can be used. Therefore, it can be once more argued that it is of utmost importance to have basic knowledge of biological virus, toxins, and bacteria for these reasons. Based on such scenarios that have happened and luckily no-one has been further injured or contaminated, I like to refer to incidents as such where police officers respond without taking into considerations wider impacts as ‘No Knowledge Incidents’. The risk of exposure to zoonotic, tropical, and any other biological disease at an airport should be taken more seriously even if rarely encountered. However, as recent events have shown (Ebola and Sars Cov-2), it is necessary to recognise such evolutions over time. Some of the possible biological diseases that can be found at an international airport from the police perspective are (Nicks, 2018): • • • • • • • •

Zika MERS SARS Ebola Measles Rift Valley Fever Cholera Malaria

36  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

• • • • •

Dengue Fever Tuberculosis Polio Avian Flu Yellow Fever.

An example is a passenger who is infected with (e.g. Ebola)4 without knowing. Another biological scenario could be: Knowing the incubation time of Ebola it can be possible that the symptoms only show themselves in the aeroplane or eventually at the border control (CDC, 2014). Alternatively, when passing the NonSchengen5 passport control. At this point, police officers will be confronted with a Cat A biological disease posing a serious threat, but without equipment to maintain and guarantee the safety of passengers, e.g. in case of a riot, being able to guarantee the security of the designated Hot Zone.6 This is an important issue since the airport is the only border for Non-Schengen flights of the country (European Union, 2020). The risk that a passenger infected with Ebola could be on one of these flights is real, and the police officer would be the first person that the particular passenger would come into contact with and this would also be the frontline detection of such cases. From a chemical-radiological perspective the following issue needs to be taken into consideration as well: The radiological response for airport police officers is the passengers and their belongings getting scanned and inspected for any chemical residue and for checking in their handbags what they are bringing with them on board. This goes for every single passenger of any age, sex, and religion as for any item that is going into the secured area of the airport. The hand luggage is screened via x-ray machines, which poses an additional risk to the operator and the passenger since no radiological measurement units are present to detect any radioactive isotope leaking in the case of any damage to the scanning machine. Another point to take into consideration is with the chemical scanning machines when they have detected a chemical on the watch list (e.g. TNTP,7 nitroglycerine8), because the number of security personnel trained on the exploitation of chemical information and residues is minimal. Therefore, the police officer called upon is responsible for analysing the received information from the machine and decides which further steps are to be taken. By interpreting the information

The Impact of Planes as Transportation of Goods and Living Beings  37

correctly, the problem may be resolved. However, as security personnel police officers do not have the knowledge about chemical information exploitation. Box 3.2  Question on decision making for a plane that lands in an emergency due to a sick traveller. What are the decisions to be taken and based on what grounds?

3.2  Freight – Cargo and Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents As mentioned earlier we spoke about goods to be transported named dangerous goods (DGR). Dangerous goods are divided into nine categories. The categories from 1–9 (DGI, 2016), in which radioactive substances are included, as are biohazard (SDIS, 2015) which are divided as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Explosives; Gases; Flammable liquids; Flammable solids; Oxidising substances; Toxic and infectious substances; Radioactive material; Corrosives; Miscellaneous dangerous goods.

In the named categories (1–9), two of them must be stored separately from other chemical categories due to the nature of risk: (a) categories 4 and 5 have to be stored together apart from all the other dangerous goods because of their dangerous nature when wet; (b) radioactive material has to be stored in a separate ‘bunker’ for security and safety reasons. This basic knowledge is pre-elementary for a police officer at an airport when dealing with chemicals and radioactive agents. Related to biological agents, the pharma department can have more than 62 infectious diseases (SDIS, 2015) stocked and ready to get shipped out via plane. As known, biological contamination and its dangers will not show directly, but at a later stage, mostly at hospitals. The same goes for radiation sickness. For example, in 2016, security personnel got contaminated by a leaking radioactive parcel at the airport of Cologne in Germany, measuring a high dose of radioactivity coming out of it (General Anzeiger, 2016). Nevertheless, it should worth mentioning that all the approaches are also useful for any other mean of DGR transportations.

38  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

3.3  Accidents with Dangerous Goods Police officers, responding to any accidents that occur at the cargo freight centre are limited in their response, especially when dealing with a chemical, radiological, or biological incident. At this stage, the information flow and on-scene incident management are of utmost importance. This process includes integrated information gathering so that the dispatch can send the necessary support units, e.g. (a) airport firefighter or (b) civil protection, and (c) the professional firefighter chemicals unit. The process of information gathering also consists of setting up the security zone and staging area. Once all is set up, the gathered information might help to determine what exactly happened and a finalised report is filed with all the evidence gathered to be sure that if a third person was involved an intent or criminal act can be excluded. However, sometimes it also happens that just a chemical is leaking due to bad handling or wrong packaging and in the worst case, it is leaking in the aeroplane itself, which brings with it a whole other dimension, adding the aeroplane as a chemical hazard itself due to the massive amount of kerosene it has loaded as well as the shipment it might contain. Besides human-created accidents, the response also covers the investigation of any strange objects. Take, for example, a palette with pharmaceuticals loaded on a plane and attached to it a typical white box without any markings or signs nor any mention on the shipping papers. For some reason this object has made it into the cargo plane and when workers found this particular item panic arose. For the police officer responding to such an incident, the following questions will arise: • • • • • • •

What is the origin of the unknown object? Why did someone put it there? Is it a bomb? Is the cargo aeroplane full of fuel and fully loaded? What is written on the cargo manifest (pharmaceuticals and chemicals loaded?)? Are there any other planes standing next to this one (posing additional risks)? Does the longer the plane stays on the ground mean the more money they lose?

If the responding police officers have received full CBRN/HAZMAT training and education the major incident plan will not be called out, and by doing an elementary police investigation focusing on CBRN/ HAZMAT agents, a major crisis can be avoided. This example shows how important it is to include CBRN/HAZMAT education and training in airport police units.

The Impact of Planes as Transportation of Goods and Living Beings  39

3.4  Infrastructure Risks: Terror Threat and Terror Acts Moving from cargo and transportation of passengers to infrastructure, an airport facility might also be compromised, and therefore it is necessary to know the limitations of police officers and the equipment available to fulfil the duties. Easily accessible water supplies for example may pose a considerable risk since they can be poisoned. An airport itself has a significant CBRN/HAZMAT exposure risk. Adding infrastructures security and risk assessment makes the police response more complicated and the officer must have CBRN knowledge so that any further threat can be apprehended or dealt with in a professional, effective, and efficient way. An example will be used to better explain the reason. The reason for threats related to the infrastructures is if terrorists or activists would disseminate any biohazard or chemical agent in the airport departure hall. With the regular staff not being trained nor aware of how to handle such incidents, those threats might very fast create panic and turn into an uncontrollable Hot Zone. Such incidents would include the knowledge on when to shut down or put on the ventilation system or the fire prevention system, and when, in the case of the mentioned above scenarios, a prompt evacuation is necessary. However, it is imperative to avoid cross-contamination and try to keep the passengers together for eventually mass decontamination or medical check-ups. Knowing that everything related to biological agents’ contamination, no direct signs and symptoms will be present. Such an incident took place in Germany in 2017 at one of their international airports in Hamburg when several people began coughing. Sixty-eight passengers were injured describing their symptoms as (i) heavy breathing, (ii) feeling of vomiting, and (iii) the eyes burning. The police investigation showed that an unknown person had unleashed, by mistake CS gas in front of the air-conditioning unit, dispersing the chemical in Terminal 1&2 near the security controls. The incident mentioned a leak of gas, but in the end, it was CS gas. This case shows how important the right recognition of chemical agents’ exposure and symptoms is to define the right response (Abendblatt, 2017). With thousands of passengers travelling every day, the flow needs to be guaranteed, and the flight schedule should not suffer under any circumstances under HAZMAT incidents. It is of utmost importance to handle these situations very quickly to prevent a disaster (e.g. cross-contamination of a chemical product or biological virus, etc.). It must be known how to evacuate and put in place staging areas at airports since the HAZMAT field makes a small incident very complicated, and we need to be prepared for it.

40  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

Conclusion A police officer’s job includes investigation as well as response. This topic will in the future play a more significant role in policing and therefore it is better to start sooner rather than later to train all police officers in this subject. An international airport does not only fly passengers from one destination to another but also transports cargo (freight). All sorts are nowadays being shipped by flight, the only products not being shipped by civilian flights are explosives. So, we find in the ‘dangerous goods’ categories (DGR) listed above everything from categories two to nine. If an incident occurs with any product from categories two to nine this could be challenging for police units since, how can a police officer at the incident report and investigate without the right protection? Also, sometimes the police will be on site before the fire department so how they respond and handle the situation might then help the fire department to do their work better. Finally, with the right knowledge the response time might be much shorter and the response to such accidents, or incidents much quicker. So, just by knowing the standard dangerous goods marking placards and labels of DGR, this may help to assess the eventual danger and response. This means also knowing, for example: (i) where to get the shipping papers, (ii) how to protect yourself, and (iii) how to avoid getting contaminated by knowing what to look out for. The police unit at the international airport is more exposed to HAZMAT and CBRN agents than any other police units. It is noted how CBRN plays a role, the connection in the day to day life of the work, and why police officers should receive basic knowledge training to better respond and assess the risk. It is of utmost importance that also the policing institutions start respecting national and international laws and apply them to their procedures and educational programmes.

Notes 1 Kerosene is a light fuel oil obtained by distilling petroleum, used mainly in jet engines and domestic heating boilers; paraffin oil. 2 Biological agents are divided into three different categories. Category A is highpriority agents including organisms that pose a risk to national security because they can be quickly disseminated or transmitted from person to person, result in high mortality rates and have the potential for a significant public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption, and require particular action for public health preparedness. Category B, the second-highest priority agents, include those that are moderately easy to disseminate; they result in

The Impact of Planes as Transportation of Goods and Living Beings  41

3 4 5

6 7

8

moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates (CDC, n.d.a). Category C is the third-highest priority agents including emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of their (a) availability, (b) ease of production and dissemination, (c) potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and significant health impact. Zoonotic disease is a disease spread between animals and people. Zoonotic diseases can be caused by viruses, bacteria, and fungi. The Ebola virus disease (formerly known as Ebola haemorrhagic fever) is a severe, often fatal illness, with a death rate of up to 90%. The illness affects humans and nonhuman primates (monkeys, gorillas, and chimpanzees). Extra-Schengen control point – which means non-EU nationals or EU nationals coming from a country that is not part of the Schengen agreement where they have to present a valid travel document and a visa if required, or a residence permit, as well as documents that justify the purpose of their stay and prove that they possess sufficient financial resources to support themselves during their stay. Hot Zone refers to an area that is considered to be dangerous. It generally entails special equipment to protect occupants, because there is a high risk of infection. TNTP: The trimer is known as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) or tricyclic acetone peroxide (TCAP). As a non-nitrogenous explosive, TATP has historically been more challenging to detect, and it has been used as an explosive in several terrorist attacks since 2001. Nitroglycerine, also known as trinitroglycerin, nitro, glyceryl trinitrate, or 1, 2, 3–trinitroxypropane, is a dense, colourless, oily, explosive liquid most commonly produced by nitrating glycerol with white fuming nitric acid under conditions appropriate to the formation of the nitric acid ester.

References Abendblatt, H. (2017). Neue Erkenntnisse nach Gasalarm am Hamburger Flughafen. Retrieved from www.abe​ndbl​att.de/hamb​urg/artic​le20​9592​075/ Ern​eut-Rett​ungs​eins​atz-am-Flugha​fen-Hamb​urg.html CDC. (2014). Ebola outbreak in West Africa epidemic curves. Retrieved from www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hist​ory/2014-2016-outbr​eak/cum​u lat ​ive-cases-gra​ phs.html CDC. (n.d.a). Category A and B biological agents. Retrieved from www.cdc. gov/cpr/publi​cati​ons/2008/append ​i x6.pdf DGI. (2016). The 9 classes of dangerous goods. Retrieved from www.dgiglo​bal. com/clas​ses Dunn, L., & Fox, M. (2018). 9/11 first responders begin to feel attack’s long-term health effects. Retrieved from www.nbcn​ews.com/storyl ​ine/9-11-anni​vers​ ary/9-11-first-res​pond​ers-begin-feel-att​ack-s-long-term-n908​306 European Union. (2020). Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration. Retrieved from www.echr.coe.int/docume​nts/hand​book ​_ asy​lum_​eng.pdf

42  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

General Anzeiger. (2016). ABC-Alarm im UPS-Zentrum am Flughafen Köln/Bonn. Retrieved from www.gene​ral-anzei​ger-bonn.de/reg ​ion/ sieg-und-rhein/troisd​o rf/ABC-Alarm-im-UPS-Zent​r um-am-Flugha​fenK%C3%B6lnB​onn-art​icle​3334​819.html Haelle, T. (2021). Health effects of 9/11 still plague responders and survivors. Retrieved from www.sci​enti ​fica​meri​can.com/arti​cle/hea ​lth-effe​cts-of-9-11still-pla​g ue-res​pond​ers-and-surviv​ors/ Nicks, B. A. (2018). 13 travel diseases you need to know. Retrieved from https:// refere​nce.medsc​ape.com/slides​how/tra​vel-disea​ses-6006​331#35 SDIS. (2015). Dangerous goods airport Luxembourg. Findel: SDIS.

Chapter 4

Bad Examples

• • • •

Wrong Response due to Lack of Training and Knowledge Anthrax Suspicion, 2016 Another Suspicious Case Happened in 2018 Border-Crossing Incidents: A Reflection

43 44 45 45

Introduction This chapter covers bad examples that have happened from a police perspective showing how important it is to know how to respond to CBRN incidents from a policing perspective in order to guarantee the health and safety of the police officers at all moments, including the knowledge of basic personal protective equipment that should be worn when investigating such incidents. This chapter provides an overview on some examples that have happened in the past to provide an overview and the importance of said knowledge.

4.1  Wrong Response due to Lack of Training and Knowledge In 1986, the United States Department for Occupational Health and Safety (OSHA) started working on the Hazwoper regulation, brought out in 1987, trying to put in place some standards in police response related to chemicals. A video was produced showing a truck that had a chemical loaded and was leaking. The police patrol officer observing the leaking stopped the truck. The driver of the truck, not being aware that anything was leaking, responded to the police officer’s question that the cargo contained paint and sulfuric acid.1 Not knowing what chemical substance the police officer was dealing with, he and the truck driver went to the back of the truck and opened the container. When opening the container, the truck driver got a massive dose of some white power and began coughing DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-5

44  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

directly afterwards. At this point, the driver and the police officer are contaminated. The police officer, also beginning to cough slightly, passed the information through to the dispatch centre and requested an ambulance for the injured driver but not for both of them. Later, when the police officer left the driver on the side of the road next to the truck, the police officer, also coughing, has now also contaminated his patrol car. When the ambulance arrived, they parked directly next to the truck where fumes were still coming out. The ambulance personnel with equipment walked right through the contaminated area, contaminating not only themselves but also the equipment. In this specifically mentioned case, which was done as an instruction video, many mistakes have happened, e.g.: 1. The police officer did not check the shipping papers; 2. The police officer had no idea about chemical substance nor ERG2 – the driver got contaminated; 3. The police officer got contaminated; 4. The ambulance officer and equipment got contaminated; 5. The police officer did not receive a medical check-up; 6. The police patrol car became contaminated; 7. The ambulance also became contaminated. All those mishaps would lead at a later stage to contaminating part of the hospital and police station. Which injuries and diseases can be promoted to create several Hot Zones in this case? Hot Zones are also called exclusion zones or zones with restricted access mostly divided into Hot Zone, Warm Zone, and Cold Zone – red, orange, and green. One might argue that this was the state in 1986 and therefore today such incidents should not happen. Unfortunately, from personal experience, this is not true. In police, many mishaps happen when dealing with chemical or biological agents, mainly because there is no training and no adequate equipment present.

4.2  Anthrax Suspicion, 2016 In 2016, during a hot summer period that year, a suspicious box with a whitish powder near the main train station was called into the local police. The police officers who responded to it were wearing no PPE and were in short sleeves since it was hot. Once arrived on the scene the police officers looked into the box wearing at most one pair vinyl gloves.3 The police officers requested a drug test via the dispatch sending another unit over. During the same time, the civil protection unit received a call regarding a suspicious box eventually found to be containing Anthrax, which was at a later stage communicated to the police officers. During this time, the

Bad Examples  45

police officers had already been exposed to the agent. When the Anthrax notification came in, a Hot Zone was created. Strangely, all the police officers involved, including regional command who came out to the site, were not wearing any protective equipment while being next to the Hot Zone. The civil protection unit responding to the incident was taking samples of the powder but was unable to tell which agent it was. It is common that a special ambulance is also deployed in such cases and the onboard medical doctor took a look at the power in the box (without PPE). After that, the civil protection unit was not able to identify the powder and this particular doctor made the assertion, just by looking at it, that it was not Anthrax (Interview with police officer, 2016). After this incident, the same doctor gave the police officers the information that if they felt sick in the next 15 days, they should seek medical treatment mentioning this incident. Knowing that the incubation time of Anthrax takes one to seven days, this advice might raise serious questions (CDC, 2017).

4.3  Another Suspicious Case Happened in 2018 In 2018, suspicious letters were sent to a citizen’s home. The citizen’s wife opened one of the letters, and white powder came out. The citizen immediately called the police who, when they arrived on the scene, put a security cordon around the whole block. Which, in the case of Anthrax suspicion, is nonsense. Covering the letter with a towel so that it cannot be dispersed in the room and sealing the room would have been the right approach from a policing aspect. Therefore, it can be argued that sealing off the complete area, a whole block for a letter containing white powder does not make sense. This again shows how important it is that police officers have the right additional training and knowledge. Related to the cases mentioned earlier, a lot of police agencies do not see the necessity of teaching their personnel about hazardous material response arguing that police officers are not confronted with such incidents and that they are not responsible for dealing with them.

4.4  Border-Crossing Incidents: A Reflection Unfortunately, the past has shown in various cases that as soon as biological, chemical, and radiological agents are involved in accidents or incidents, they rarely are confined to one place but depending on weather conditions spread over borders (e.g. Chernobyl nuclear cloud, and the aviation flu). In these two cases, the contamination was border crossing, and the police officers were exposed too to these agents. Not having received any specialised training and/or equipment, police officers, being in daily contact with citizens, are exposed to chemical, biological, or radiological

46  Historical Overview of CBRNe and HAZMAT Incidents and Impacts

agents more than ever; primarily those working on particular Hot Spots like train stations or airports where large numbers of people are present when travelling. This raises the questions of how such incidents should be responded to from a policing aspect, what regulations are developed and how they are implemented. This covers basics such as PPE to detection and measurement equipment.

Conclusion There are many more examples that can be drawn upon, but the above examples have made the point. So, we see that a police officer is exposed to a very wide range of hazardous material agents or chemical, biological, and radiological agents. They are going from crime over terrorism to natural disasters to the transportation of goods and people. The danger today of being exposed to any of the agents named above is higher than ever. The police officer is charged in investigating and responding to incidents and tackling crime and terrorism in domestic-related conflicts. How can a police officer do their job when the additional knowledge apart from what they need to know to do their job is not present? Being able to identify a chemical, biological, or radiological hazard is only possible with the right training and equipment to guarantee that the police officer is able to fulfil their duty in a way that they stay safe and secure about what they are doing and the situation they are facing. Ignoring this threat will expose the police officer to unjustified health and safety issues. As seen in the Novichok case, a police officer got contaminated with a deadly chemical agent but survived. This could have been avoided if the right training and knowledge had been present. All examples drawn upon show that the knowledge of how to assess and respond to the scene correctly is important. It goes without saying that if the right response procedures are not trained and regulations not respected the State itself would be under scrutiny of felony and cannot use any excuses for a bad incident response where civilians or police first responders got injured. Laws exist and should be applied, however, if no importance is given to them, working in this area could be dangerous, making it difficult to investigate under such conditions any forms of crime. As long as no knowledge is present in first-line police responders how can change happen and how can lives be saved?

Notes 1 Also known as vitriol, a mineral acid composed of the elements sulphur, oxygen, and hydrogen, with molecular formula H2SO4. It is a colourless,

Bad Examples  47

odourless, and syrupy liquid that is soluble in water, in a highly exothermic reaction. This chemical is unique because it causes not only chemical burns but also secondary thermal burns as a result of dehydration. This dangerous chemical is capable of corroding skin, paper, metals, and even stone in some cases. If sulfuric acid makes direct contact with the eyes, it can cause permanent blindness. 2 ERG: Emergency response guidebook: A guidebook for first responders during the initial phase of a dangerous goods/hazardous materials transportation incident is used by emergency response personnel in Canada, Mexico, and the United States when responding to a transportation emergency involving hazardous materials. 3 Vinyl gloves are produced from the granules of PVC (polyvinyl chloride), one of the most common plastics, and plasticisers (mostly phthalates). PVC is rigid plastic but when mixed with phthalates becomes flexible and mouldable. Vinyl gloves comply with regulations concerning plastic materials (both for medical devices and materials intended for food contact norms), unlike latex gloves and nitrile gloves, which comply with rubber-related norms.

Reference CDC. (2017). Anthrax. Retrieved from wwwnc.cdc.gov/tra​vel/yel ​lowb​ ook/2018/inf​ecti​ous-disea​ses-rela​ted-to-tra​vel/anth​rax Interview with a police officer, 2016

Part 2

CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities

5. Education on CBRN/HAZMAT for Police Officers 6. The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN

51 57

In the first part of this book, we have reviewed some incidents and concepts of CBRN and HAZMAT and why it is important to teach police officers in this area. In this part of the book, we will be analysing the different steps where police are involved and why such training would benefit the police officer as policing per se and why the necessity of a training curriculum in this area is important and what are the possibilities. The European Policing Agencies such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL offer training in cooperation with the European Police College (CEPOL), which is quite weak and limited. EUROPOL offers via CEPOL two different types of training related to CBRN, which are around one week of training, which does not build a strong knowledge of CBRN topics. Apart from the one week of training, the participants’ profile is mainly focused on two groups – Explosive Disposal Ordnance (EOD) and forensic personnel (CEPOL, 2019). Whereas INTERPOL also conducts training in CBRN in cooperation with EUROPOL and CEPOL, their primary training does not imply continued education for first responders, but is mainly directed at senior officials and specialised units such as EOD and forensic personnel (INTERPOL, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). Still, even with INTERPOL having CBRN response units, teaching and education in Europe, we lack in education for police officers. The current CBRN response training that is on the market for police officers focuses more on post-incident response than in the prevention. All that a regular police officer on patrol could observe is not part of any training. If, for example, during a car check, lab equipment for chemical or biological purposes is found or observed, suspicion should arise, and a more thorough investigation should take place DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-6

50  CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities

determining what the intent of the citizen is with these utilities (since today almost everything can be used in a dual-use capacity). At the same time, some European projects are focusing on CBRN training and education for European countries. The projects like eNotice under the H2020 (European Union, 2017b), Encircle (European Union, 2017a), EDEN (European Union, n.d.) and the Gift (European Union, 2015) will show in time if they are having a substantial impact on education in the policing sector or not. A basic knowledge might help the police officer (all levels) to assess better the scene, which implies a faster response and remaining safe and protected in order to fulfil their duties. On the other hand, police officers are the ones charged with investigating crimes and crimes with CBRN materials, which are part of this. Signs and symptoms might give clues and therefore, the police officer now, more than ever should have basic knowledge in this topic (CBRN) as the events of the last five years (2014–2019) have shown.

References European Union. (2015). Generic integrated forensic toolbox for CBRN incidents. Retrieved from https://cor​d is.eur​opa.eu/proj​ect/rcn/192​217/factsh​ eet/en European Union. (2017a). European CBRN innovation for the market cluster. Retrieved from http://encir​cle-cbrn.eu/rela​ted-proje​cts-2/ European Union. (2017b). European network of CBRN training centres. Retrieved from https://cor​d is.eur​opa.eu/proj​ect/rcn/210​213/factsh​eet/en European Union. (n.d.). EDEN, End-user driven DEmo for cbrNe. Retrieved from https://eden-secur ​ity-fp7.eu/eden,id,11,about.html INTERPOL. (2019a). Bioterrorism. Retrieved from www.inter ​pol.int/Cri​mes/ Terror ​ism/Biote​r ror ​ism INTERPOL. (2019b). Chemical and explosive terrorism. Retrieved from www. inter ​pol.int/Cri​mes/Terror ​ism/Chemi​cal-and-Exp​losi​ves-terror ​ism INTERPOL. (2019c). Radiological and nuclear terrorism. Retrieved from www. inter ​pol.int/Cri​mes/Terror ​ism/Radio​logi​cal-and-Nucl​ear-terror ​ism

Chapter 5

Education on CBRN/HAZMAT for Police Officers

• • •

Current CBRN/HAZMAT Training Availabilities Police Training and Education Related to CBRN/ HAZMAT Incident Response Possible Set-Up and Training Implementation

51 52 53

Introduction This chapter analyses the training that is available for police officers and provides a proposition on how future courses on CBRN/HAZMAT could be implemented for policing schools or specialised units. The topics discussed are an indication of what should be covered without imposing anything since all of these topics will depend on national legislation and on the standard operating procedures. Besides covering some training aspects that should be involved in the training curriculum of law enforcement officers, this chapter also provides a short oversight of what programmes are available at an international level in Europe via international organisations. For the sole purpose of this chapter, I want to stress that this does not mean that some countries do not have a specialised units that focus on CBRN/HAZMAT-related issues. However, the made argument is that specialised training focus is given more to special operations units than training provided to patrol officers.

5.1  Current CBRN/HAZMAT Training Availabilities The different steps where the police are involved during a CBRN/ HAZMAT incident and their responsive procedures reflect upon their training received in this area. Therefore, covering CBRN and HAZMAT topics would be beneficial to the police officer as policing per se. The European Policing Agencies such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL offer training in cooperation with the European Police College (CEPOL), DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-7

52  CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities

which is quite weak and limited. EUROPOL offers via CEPOL two different types of training related to CBRN, which are around one week of training, which does not build a strong knowledge of CBRN topics. Apart from the one week of training, the participants’ profile is mainly focused on two particular groups: EOD and forensic personnel (CEPOL, 2019). Whereas INTERPOL also conducts training in CBRN in cooperation with EUROPOL and CEPOL, their initial training does not imply continued education for first responders, but is mainly directed at senior officials and specialised units such as EOD and forensic personnel (INTERPOL, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). Still, even with INTERPOL having CBRN response units, teaching and education in Europe is lacking since their focus lies more outside the European Union as their current projects show. The current CBRN response training that is on the market for police officers focuses more on post-incident response than in the prevention. Everything that a regular police officer on patrol might be confronted with or observe is not part of any training. For example, during a car check, lab equipment for chemical or biological purposes is found or observed in the car, suspicion should arise, and a more thorough investigation should take place determining what the intent of the citizen is with these utilities (since today almost everything can be used in a dual-use capacity). Nevertheless, at the same time, the European Union supports several European projects that focus on CBRN training and education for European countries. The projects like eNotice under the H2020 (European Union, 2017b), Encircle (European Union, 2017a), EDEN (European Union, n.d.) and the Gift (European Union, 2015) will show in time if they are having a substantial impact on education in the policing sector or not. Only recently, due to the current health crisis (COVID-19), has more attention been given to the education of police officers in CBRN such as the projects Proactive and Shotpros (Shotpros, 2020) as well as from the academical side via the University of West London and the London Policing college (The London Policing College, 2020) who have identified several gaps and challenges due to lack of training in the named subjects.

5.2  Police Training and Education Related to CBRN/ HAZMAT Incident Response Knowing that police knowledge and training is quite large and takes a lot of time and money, until today most police officers who have received any kind of CBRN or HAZMAT training are only to be found in Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units or Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units.

Education on CBRN/HAZMAT for Police Officers  53

The primary reason to include such topics in police education, can be argued as follow: Every person having contact with chemical agents has to be trained on the right manipulation and regulation (EU-OSHA, 2000; European Union, 1998) as will be the case for most police officers on patrol facing large amounts of dangerous goods being transported through the streets. The objective to deepen the knowledge on HAZMAT/ CBRN incident response, including treating and learning the recognition and adequate response to such agents will not make the officer an expert, but it will make the response quicker and maintain health and safety principles and demonstrate safe handling procedures with weapons while wearing personal protective equipment, which according to international law must be respected. The police officer will be able to demonstrate deep knowledge on how to maintain and set up a Hot Zone, a staging area, and demonstrate a profound knowledge of incident command and crisis management. Therefore, additional classes should be integrated into policing education since hazardous material are more than ever present today, being it in crime, suicide, or industry. There are three training programme possibilities with low-level budgets, discussed below. Hence the importance for police officers to know the laws and regulations going from (a) criminal law over to (b) general penal law, (c) new technologies law, (d) road conduct laws, and (e) environmental law, just to name a few that can all be linked to chemical, biological, and radiological agents. New technologies are coming with the development of the industry, posing new threats as well as imposing new laws. Police officers need to be always at the forefront of knowledge to confront modern crime and accidents daily. Therefore, this topic should be made mandatory for law enforcement personnel to have at least a basic awareness knowledge on CBRN/HAZMAT incidents and how the applied regulations are applicable in their field.

5.3  Possible Set-Up and Training Implementation Following are three proposed ways on how training could be set up to make sure that all different aspects and units will benefit the most from it at their own level. 5.3.1  Solution 01: Generic Training at the Police School The first solution would be integrating a lesson plan on the police education level in the school itself, where new police agents are being trained

54  CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities

and educated. This will allow all the police officers to have the same universal background while dealing with HAZMAT/CBRN agents. It goes without saying that the teaching focus does not rely in each sector on in-depth knowledge of chemistry, biological, and radiology. It is essential in addition that the police officer understands how to: a) b) c) d) e) f ) g) h) i) j) k) l)

Recognise; Identify; Assess; Protect; Set up a Hot Zone, and staging area; Perform emergency decontamination; Play the role of incident commander if required; Manage additional units arriving on the scene; Cordon off the area; Investigate in the contaminated area; Collect evidence; Establish a chain of custody.

5.3.2  Solution 02: Continued Education For police officers who have already successfully completed the police school, an education programme on HAZMAT/CBRN agents should be included on the yearly continued education mainframe. For several reasons: a) b) c) d) e)

Strengthening the knowledge; New duty station; New responsibilities; New challenges; Working in a SEVESO1 environment as defined by EU legislation.

5.3.3  Solution 03: Specialised Education Continued specialised education when working in a unit that has higher potential to be exposed to HAZMAT/CBRN agents such as: a) b) c) d) e) f )

SWAT; EOD; Crime investigator; Community policing; Highway patrolling; Evidence collection.

Education on CBRN/HAZMAT for Police Officers  55

In this case, less time can be spent on teaching at the policing school. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that it does not take away from basic general knowledge that should be taught in the policing school for the simple reason that (a) notification (communication) and (b) response procedures need to be generalised so that an (a) efficient and (b) proficient response can be granted. Therefore, it can be argued that the third solution should only be seen as an additional unit-specific education.

Conclusion As can be seen with the proposed solutions, it can be argued that some relevant topics can be introduced or included in the training curriculum of law enforcement officers without taking much time in consideration or financial burden. However, it always depends on the impact that some might see that these topics could or should have or if they are not considered at all while focusing on more current issues than CBRN/ HAZMAT education. Nevertheless, continued education in this environment should not be taken lightly and should receive some consideration. The previous chapters show how important it is to have some kind of training in these subjects.

Note 1 The SEVESO Directive was adopted in 1982 as European Union Directive 82/501/EC. The purpose of the directive was to prevent major accidents at facilities that store, produce, or use dangerous substances in sufficient quantities to constitute serious health, safety, or environmental risk.

References CEPOL, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training. (2019). Training activities in CBRN. Retrieved from www.cepol.eur​opa.eu/advan​ ced-sea​rch/cbrn%20p​roje​cts EU-OSHA. (2000). Directive 2000/54/EC – Biological agents at work of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work. Brussels: European Union. European Union. (1998). Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to chemical agents at work (fourteenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). Brussels: European Union. European Union. (2015). Generic integrated forensic toolbox for CBRN incidents. Retrieved from https://cor​dis.eur​opa.eu/proj​ect/rcn/192​217/factsh​eet/en European Union. (2017a). European CBRN innovation for the market cluster. Retrieved from http://encir​cle-cbrn.eu/rela​ted-proje​cts-2/

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European Union. (2017b). European network of CBRN training centres. Retrieved from https://cor​d is.eur​opa.eu/proj​ect/rcn/210​213/factsh​eet/en European Union. (n.d.). EDEN, End-user driven DEmo for cbrNe. Retrieved from https://eden-secur ​ity-fp7.eu/eden,id,11,about.html INTERPOL. (2019a). Bioterrorism. Retrieved from www.inter ​pol.int/Cri​mes/ Terror ​ism/Biote​r ror ​ism INTERPOL. (2019b). Chemical and explosive terrorism. Retrieved from www. inter ​pol.int/Cri​mes/Terror ​ism/Chemi​cal-and-Exp​losi​ves-terror ​ism INTERPOL. (2019c). Radiological and nuclear terrorism. Retrieved from www. inter ​pol.int/Cri​mes/Terror ​ism/Radio​logi​cal-and-Nucl​ear-terror ​ism Shotpros. (2020). Improve performance of European police officers by developing VR enhanced training. Retrieved from https://shotp​ros.eu/ The London Policing College. (2020, October). 2nd international police education [online] conference. Retrieved from www.thelo​ndon​poli​cing​coll​ege.org. uk/

Chapter 6

The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN

• • • •

Overview on Current CBRN/HAZMAT Courses for Law Enforcement Teaching Subjects That Should Be Taken into Consideration Subjects to be Covered in CBRN/HAZMAT Response Capabilities

58 59 62 66

Introduction This chapter discusses the implementation phases of the proposed training, covering incident response steps, incident command and control procedures, legislation, and capability development. The objective is to deepen the knowledge on HAZMAT/CBRN incident response, including treating and learning the recognition and adequate response at a policing level with such agents. The knowledge will not make the officer an expert, but it will make the response quicker and maintain health and safety principles and demonstrate safe handling procedures with weapons while wearing personal protective equipment, which according to international law have to be respected. Every person having contact with chemical agents has to be trained on the right manipulation and regulation (EU-OSHA, 2000; European Union, 1998). The police officer will be able to demonstrate deep knowledge on how to maintain and set up a Hot Zone, a staging area, and demonstrate a profound knowledge of incident command and crisis management. Therefore, additional classes should be integrated into policing education since hazardous materials are more than ever present today, being it in crime, suicide, or industry. There are three training programme possibilities with low-level budgets.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-8

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6.1  Overview on Current CBRN/HAZMAT Courses for Law Enforcement A basic knowledge might be helpful for every police officer (all levels) in order to assess better the scene with CBRN agents, which implies a faster response and guaranteeing safety as it is regulated by internal directives and national legislation, i.e. Health and Safety (EU-OSHA, 2020a, 2020b). Health and safety legislation states clearly that the employer is responsible for guaranteeing employees’ health and safety. Having the right education in this area will help the police officers, to remain safe by knowing how to apply the principles of personal protective equipment, monitoring, communication, and decontamination practices in such cases. On the other hand, police officers are the ones charged with investigating crimes and crimes with CBRN materials and therefore, would need additional training in Dangerous Goods Regulations as well as the chain of custody, packing, and labelling. Being able to identify signs and symptoms might give clues about the agents that were used or are present and therefore, the police officer now, more than ever should receive basic knowledge in this area (CBRN) as the events of the last five years (2014–2019) have shown. Wengler (2020) states that chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons have always been part of humans’ history. From biological warfare to chemical warfare and in the last century, adding radiological and nuclear warfare to the scene. Those agents are not any more related only to warfare, which implied a military response only but involve today as well crimes and terrorism, including state terrorism as well, i.e. (i) Novichok (Corera, 2020), (ii) Litvinenko (BBC, 2016), (iii) Gregory Makov (Holdsworth & Mendick, 2013), and (iv) Kim Jong Nam (VX: The poison that killed Kim Jong Nam, 2017) cases. However, over the years, this very specific and one of a kind topic has changed. Chemical, biological, and radiological agents being available and transported via air, railway, train, and by road are quite readily available and with open borders and intercontinental connections easier to hide and use. Today, the response to such tasks is not only limited to the military, firefighters, and civil protection units but also medical units as well as police forces covering various areas such as (i) identification, (ii) analysis of collected substances, (iii) risk mitigation, (iv) cordoning off the area, (v) sampling, and (vi) crime scene investigation including providing official reports that will be used by prosecution services in order to punish the offender. In addition to all of these essential parts to be considered is (i) advising, (ii) communicating with citizens and fellow police officers, and (iii) inter-agency cooperation. Therefore, it can be argued that ‘TODAY’ the education of police officers who might be exposed on regular bases to CBRN/HAZMAT agents is missing. The right education goes hand in hand with their work

The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN  59

environment as they might be exposed to hazardous material agents. Not having the right education and training will push the police officer directly to their limits when responding to such incidents (CBRN/HAZMAT). This being said, the following text explains more in-depth the necessary subjects that should be taken into consideration in the new teaching curricula of police officers and also provides different approaches on how the educational programme could be implemented following three main principles: 1. Attractiveness of the employer. 2. Inter-operability/inter-agency cooperation. 3. Recognised continued education (CPD – continued professional development).

6.2  Teaching Subjects That Should Be Taken into Consideration 6.2.1  Police Training and Education Related to CBRN/HAZMAT Incident Response So far, police education and training related to CBRN agents is limited to the civil protection and the firefighter. However, as CBRN and HAZMAT becomes more and more relevant for police work it needs to be understood that the know-how cannot be gained or learned in a short amount of time since it is quite a broad field, which involves specialised responders such as other disciplines, e.g. EOD, laboratory technician, forensic investigations. As of today, most police officers having received any kind of CBRN or HAZMAT training are only to be found in Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units or Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units with limited knowledge. In Europe, only a few SWAT units have a dedicated team such as Germany with one company, GSG9 (NTV, 2019) and France, GIGN. Most of all the other units are dependent on the military, civil protection, or fire services when it comes to any CBRN/ HAZMAT-related scenarios and the average police officer who is almost all the time first on the scene is not receiving enough training and education in this sector. All the above leads to the primary sense and reason why such topics should be included in police education. Therefore, the following can be argued. The objective to deepen the knowledge on HAZMAT/CBRN incident response, including treating and learning the recognition and adequate response at the policing level with such agents enhances the response

60  CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities

procedures and the primary directive of saving lives. The knowledge, however, will not make the police officer an expert but will make the response quicker by (i) maintaining health and safety principles and (ii) demonstrating safe handling procedures with weapons while wearing personal protective equipment. According to international law, and by domestic legislation, every employee having contact with chemical agents has to be trained on the right manipulation and regulation (EU-OSHA, 2000; European Union, 1998). The CBRN/HAZMAT training is divided into three main categories allowing the programme to be as flexible as possible and being adopted quickly into daily life building upon employer attractiveness and continued education principles. Following the various proposed programmes and content, the police officer will be able to demonstrate profound knowledge on how to maintain and set up (i) a Hot Zone, a staging area, and demonstrate a profound knowledge of (ii) incident command and crisis management integrated into (iii) an inter-agency cooperation scenario as well as being able to advise the upper chain of command on actions to be taken, which includes the right communication during such events. Therefore, additional classes (CPD) should be integrated into policing education since hazardous materials are more than ever present today, being it in crime, suicide, or industry. 6.2.2  Training Programme One: Generic Training at the Police School The first solution would be integrating a lesson plan during the police basic education in the school itself, where new police agents are being trained and educated. This will ensure that all the police officers have the same universal background while dealing with HAZMAT/CBRN agents. It goes without saying that the teaching focus does not rely in each sector on in-depth knowledge in chemistry, biology, and radiology but rather provides general knowledge. The police officer must understand how to: • • • • • • •

Recognise Identify Assess Protect Set up the Hot Zone, and staging area Perform emergency decontamination Play the role of incident commander if required

The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN  61

• • • • •

Manage additional units arriving on the scene Cordon off the area Investigate the contaminated area Collect evidence Establish a chain of custody.

6.2.3  Training Programme Two: Continued Professional Education For Police officers who have already successfully completed the police school, an education programme on HAZMAT/CBRN agents should be included on a yearly continued education mainframe. For several reasons: • • • • •

Strengthening the knowledge New duty station New responsibilities New challenges Working in a SEVESO environment as defined by EU legislation.

The benefits of continued professional education in itself will be discussed further in ­chapter 9. 6.2.4  Training Programme Three: Specialised Education Continued specialised education when working in a unit that has higher potential to be exposed to HAZMAT/CBRN agents such as: • • • • • • •

SWAT EOD Crime investigator Community police Highway patrol Evidence collection team Response procedures for animals and disabled citizens.

In this case, less time can be spent in teaching at the police school. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that it does not take away from the basic general knowledge that should be taught in the police school for the simple reason that (i) notification (communication) and (ii) response procedures need to be generalised so that (i) an efficient and (ii) proficient response can be granted. Therefore, it can be argued that the third solution should only be seen as an additional unit-specific education.

62  CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities

6.3  Subjects to be Covered in CBRN/HAZMAT Response Underneath can be found an overall generic overview of the different modules that should be covered in the teaching for police officers, which should include the following topics: • • • • •

Incident response Incident commander Legislation (domestic and international) Capabilities Response procedures with animals and for disabled citizens.

Every topic has its importance, which is explained briefly in each of the categories before covering the primary training curricula and its importance. 6.3.1  Incident Response Figure 6.1 covers the five core topics explaining the main components related to incident response, which will be explained in ­chapter 7. The five components will give the police officer the basic knowledge on how to detect, identify, and monitor (DIM) CBRN/HAZMAT agents, which will enable them to notify dispatch accordingly, who will then be able to send the right and necessary additional units without exposing them to any dangers. As long as the first response on the scene involves the police, they need to be able to secure and identify the access points and evacuate if necessary the citizens to a safe area and initiate the first steps of incident command. These steps will help in stabilising and securing the scene, making it possible for any additional first responder units arriving

Figure 6.1 Overall incident response steps to be covered. Created by the author.

The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN  63

on the scene to do their job without being distracted and maintaining their focus on the problems at hand. Once the incident is resolved, and no more CBRN agents are present, the restoration phase starts (decontamination and restoration) so that the area does not pose any further threat. 6.3.2  Incident Commander Figure 6.2 covers the five central core topics that should be known by every police officer covering the main components for the incident commander capabilities and responsibilities that make it easier when responding to and coordinating CBRN/HAZMAT events or incidents, be they man-made or natural disasters. This specific topic will be explained in-depth in ­chapter 7. The incident command is divided generally into three different levels, which cover the different responsibilities, i.e. operational, tactics, and strategy. Depending on the role and responsibility of the police officer, the different levels of incident command should be taught and applied. This approach, however, is generic and can be used for any occurring incident and emergency response agency. The incident commander has the overall responsibility of covering every one of the five steps showed in Figure 6.2 as well as advising and informing the higher chain of command. If necessary, other public authorities such as ministers (always depending on their function and level of responsibility, of course) will be notified. 6.3.3  Legislation (Domestic and International) As shown in Figure 6.3, the four main areas that should be covered include the legislation and laws. The laws and legislation cover various subjects such as (i) education, (ii) labelling, (iii) crime scene investigation, (iv)

Figure 6.2 Incident commander steps to cover. Created by the author.

64  CBRNe/HAZMAT Training Analysis Based on Current Availabilities

Figure 6.3 Legislation related to training, education, and CBRN/HAZMAT response. Created by the author.

evidence collection, (v) chain of custody, (vi) internal regulations, and (vii) Dangerous Goods Regulations. For police officers, it is imperative to know the laws and legislations around CBRN/HAZMAT agents for various reasons. One of the main reasons is that after the response or crime scene investigation, it is essential to determine if a crime has taken place and on what grounds, i.e. domestic and international legislation. For example: The Ian Davidson case of 2010 in the United Kingdom where after an investigation on right-wing Terrorism, investigators found a home-made Ricin which is on the schedule of the chemical weapons convention (CWC) and therefore got sentenced based upon the CWC (Association of Chief of Police Officers, n.d.). The second part is as important as the first one. Police officers with CBRN/HAZMAT knowledge and competence should also be part of the decision-making process of new legislation based upon CBRN/ HAZMAT incidents as recent events have shown, i.e. COVID-19 (Dodd, 2020). Police officers are responsible for enforcing the law and legislation; however, policymakers do not take into consideration what impact the legislation might have on the ground, i.e. police enforcing the law. In some countries, police officers are involved in the legislative process. However, these countries are limited and only a few such as the United Kingdom and even then only if the legislation is based on fighting crime, i.e. acid attacks, knife crime. When considering the health crisis that started in early 2020, i.e. COVID-19, no police officer was involved in shaping the legislation, and its impact at the beginning of the created lockdown by the legislation was devastating. During the lockdown, a general panic broke out among the citizens who stormed the grocery shops creating a massive interruption in food and water supplies. Police were sent out to shops and malls to maintain security, safety, and to implement the legislation on distancing, i.e. 2m as

The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN  65

well as one hour per day allowed outside their homes for physical activity. In the United Kingdom, this started to become stricter when observing how citizens had started to behave, stating that they would impose stricter control on what citizens were doing and check if these things were essential or not. This was entirely beyond their competence and restriction since it goes against human rights; however, various cases happened. It went to a point where government officials and high-ranking police officers got involved, stating that this was not meant as such and was seen as a misunderstanding of the legislation. The UK Government in various cases warned police officers against their ‘heavy-handed’ tactics. There was an overreach of the lockdown powers that they applied during the lockdown. These warnings were for police officers throughout the United Kingdom. Primarily because in the eyes of some police officers citizens were buying non-essential items, they started to check the items people were buying, which is against the fundamental rights of a person (Robertson, 2020). 6.3.3.1  Example 01 In South Yorkshire, a police officer verbally abused a family on their own doorstep because they allowed their children to play in their own garden during lockdown (Robertson, 2020). The garden was not shared with any other persons not living in the same family household and was on private property. 6.3.3.2  Example 02 Police used drones in order to find people who were walking on the streets during lockdown even though it was allowed for a limited time during the day, i.e. one hour for sport per day and grocery shopping. People received a citation for minor acts for not respecting the lockdown rules in the police’s point of view. Therefore, the police got criticised by stating that they were applying ‘draconian tactics’, by enforcing the lockdown legislation without knowing their limitations of power, creating a police state (Picheta, 2020). 6.3.3.3  Example 03 Despite the lockdown rules and social distancing regulations, the police in some countries did not respect the distance rules, i.e. no face mask in police cars. Despite the UK, for example, mandating its citizens to wear a face mask where the social distancing rules cannot be respected, the police officers did not follow the same legislation. However, they could fine its citizens if not doing so.

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Therefore, also here it can be argued that if police officers do not wear any face masks where they should, including for example when policing riots and manifestations where the risk is quite high not to respect the social distancing, a face mask should be worn. The police are in most cases strangely just unaware of specific laws that they have to police as well as to respect them themselves (Dearden, 2020).

6.4 Capabilities Once the main three points in sections 6.2.2., 6.2.3., and 6.2.4. are covered in the educational process at the end, the police officer will be able to provide a full response cycle for incidents involving CBRN/HAZMAT incidents, by saving lives and reducing harm. However, the applied knowledge will not be limited to scenarios involving CBRN/HAZMAT incidents, but some of the taught topics will also be able to be applied in various other scenarios such as (i) car crash, (ii) the aviation sector, and (iii) the catering industry. Only once the above main topics are covered can a full 360-degree response be guaranteed. However, it should be taken into

Figure 6.4 Full cycle response capability after completed training. Created by the author.

The Necessity of Designing Police Education in HAZMAT/CBRN  67

consideration that these subjects need to be part of a continued education mainframe in order to guarantee the strengthening of the knowledge and its evolution. This will guarantee that the police officer maintains operational knowledge and know-how. Therefore, it can be argued that after covering all the teaching points, the following response cycle would be covered in a HAZMAT/CBRN response from police officers as can be observed in Figure 6.4, also known as JDM (joint decision-making model).

Conclusion Needless to say, the proposed teaching subjects and approach are not meant to give the law enforcement community a monopoly on CBRN response and investigation, which by definition are joint disciplines involving several agencies who must work together. Indeed, inter-agency cooperation during a CBRN response is crucial given that each agency is operating under its specific mandate (national legislation, role and responsibilities) and has different objectives. Therefore, a prompt and effective response can only be achieved if these objectives are coordinated. A well-rounded approach is called for, which today is even more important than ever.

References BBC. (2016). Alexander Litvinenko: Profile of murdered Russian spy. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/uk-19647​226 Corera, G. (2020). Salisbury poisoning: What did the attack mean for the UK and Russia? Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/uk-51722​301 Dearden, L. (2020). Police ‘unaware’ of government’s face mask law announcement, leaders reveal. Retrieved from www.inde​pend​ent.co.uk/news/uk/ home-news/face-mask-law-engl​a nd-pol ​ice-coro​navi​r us-boris-john​son-a9619​ 001.html Dodd, V. (2020). Rushed UK coronavirus laws led to wrongful convictions, say police. Retrieved from www.theg ​uard​ian.com/law/2020/may/15/rus​hed-ukcoro​navi​r us-laws-led-to-wrong ​f ul-conv ​icti​ons-say-pol ​ice EU-OSHA. (2000). Directive 2000/54/EC – Biological agents at work of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work. Brussels: European Union. EU-OSHA. (2020a). Technical recommendations for monitoring individuals for occupational intakes of Radionuclides. Retrieved from https://osha.eur​opa.eu/ en/legi ​s lat ​ion/gui​deli ​nes/techni​c al-reco​m men​d ati​ons-mon ​itor ​i ng-indi​v idu​ als-occup​atio​nal-inta​kes EU-OSHA. (2020b). Legislations on chemical, biological and ionizing radiation. Retrieved from https://osha.eur​opa.eu/en/sea​rch/gui​deli​nes?search​_ blo​ck_f​ orm=chemi​cal&op=Sea​rch&f%5B0%5D=main_t​ags%3A70

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European Union. (1998). Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to chemical agents at work (fourteenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). Brussels: European Union. Holdsworth, N., & Mendick, R. (2013). Prime suspect in Georgi Markov ‘umbrella poison’ murder tracked down to Austria. Retrieved from www. telegr ​a ph.co.uk/news/ukn​e ws/crime/9949 ​856/Prime-susp ​e ct-in-Geo​r giMar​kov-umbre​l la-poi​son-mur​der-trac​ked-down-to-Aust​r ia.html NTV. (2019). Drohnen, Helme, Schutzanzüge: Neue Ausrüstung für Polizei. Retrieved from www.n-tv.de/reg ​iona​les/nieder​sach​sen-und-bre​men/Droh​ nen-Helme-Schutz ​a nzu​e ge-Neue-Ausr ​uest ​u ng-fuer-Poli ​z ei-arti​c le2​1230​ 060.html Picheta, R. (2020). UK coronavirus response criticized as people are filmed by drones and stopped while shopping. Retrieved from https://edit​ion.cnn. com/2020/03/31/uk/uk-pol ​ice-coro​navi​r us-tact ​ics-gbr-intl-scli/index.html Robertson, A. (2020). Police tell locked-down Brits they can’t go in their own GARDENS: Officer scolds family for letting their children play on the lawn – before force bosses apologise for ‘ill-informed’ approach. Retrieved from www. dailym ​a il.co.uk/news/arti​cle-8207​393/Sales-Eas ​t er-eggs-wine-barbec ​uespaddl​i ng-pools-soar-ahead-four-day-break.html VX: The poison that killed Kim Jong Nam. (2017). [Film] Directed by Eva Tam & Menglin Huang. United States: Associated Press Fuji Television. Wengler, P. (2020). Is it important teaching on CBRN/HAZMAT related subjects? Canterano: CBRNe Book Series, Aracne editrice Press.

Part 3

Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

7. Subject Content for CBRN/HAZMAT Police Education 8. Investigation, Report Writing, and Intelligence Analysis 9. Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum in CBRN/HAZMAT

71 91 98

This third part builds upon Part 2 by providing a more in-depth overview on what should taught on CBRN/HAZMAT response programme by providing some additional case examples and introducing some additional practices such as communications, which one might argue are widely taught in policing schools. Nevertheless, the Sars Cov2 pandemic has shown that when it comes to more specific topics policing is not very good at communicating. This can be down to having no knowledge in CBRN/HAZMATspecific subjects but also reflecting one’s own fear from something that one might not understand and fear. Hence, the importance of re-introducing this subject while covering specific aspects of it when responding to such incidents. Part 3 shows and highlights the different subjects that should be taught for the simple reason that CBRN/HAZMAT events are far from being day to day incidents and should be responded to as such.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-9

Chapter 7

Subject Content for CBRN/ HAZMAT Police Education

• • • • • • • •

Detailed Look into Subject Content for CBRN/ HAZMAT Police Education CBRN/HAZMAT Levels of Training Operations Level Technician Level Incident Command Operational Tactical Strategic

72 77 81 84 85 85 87 88

Introduction As observed in previous chapters, an emphasis was given on past events and reasoning as well as introducing some aspects why law enforcement officers should undergo some sort of CBRN/HAZMAT training during their career. Despite the previous coverage some important parts were left out, which one might argue are well known and taught in policing schools. However, past events have shown that that is not the case. Having knowledge in how to manage CBRN/HAZMAT incidents might well be very helpful from the incident’s perspective, but with this we are leaving out how to deal with victims. Some part of this subject is taught in police academies however, topics such as intercultural competence and communication skills during major incidents are not widely covered. This chapter introduces therefore three additional subjects, i.e. intercultural competence, communication, and legislation besides covering in more detail some of the CBRN/HAZMAT response modules. The content of the proposed themes should be used as guidelines and can be adopted accordingly to national needs and legislation. It goes without saying that most of the education one might receive is inter-disciplinary

DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-10

72  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

and might find its use not only in CBRN/HAZMAT incidents but also during normal day to day business.

7.1  Detailed Look into Subject Content for CBRN/ HAZMAT Police Education In order to be effective in CBRN/HAZMAT response, two additional topics need to be covered, which can be integrated into the incident response and incident command topics such as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. These topics are (i) intercultural competence and (ii) communication, which might be part of the specific modules for CBRN/HAZMAT response, but they should also be considered as a separate module that should be taught for the following reasons in the CPD curriculum: • • • • •

We live in a mixed cultural society and understanding the culture around us helps in our response and communication procedures. Ability to provide the right communication and message to all the citizens. Understanding the different cultural believes and customs. Language barriers. The specific work environment has a specific culture and way of communicating.

These two modules are applicable in every single situation that police officers might be exposed to when responding to any kind of incident, covering as well various aspects that will be discussed in the next two points before covering all the CBRN/HAZMAT-specific content. Intercultural knowledge and communication are as necessary as any other knowledge in a CBRN/HAZMAT response. However, these topics are also underestimated in policing. Overall, all the modules and topics combine to give a fully comprehensive approach from operations to the decision-maker and advisor position within the police when responding to CBRN/HAZMAT incidents, natural disasters, and terrorist acts. 7.1.1  Intercultural Competence Today we live in a multicultural world where borders are not present any more, and one can travel around the globe. Intercultural competence is, therefore, understood as the knowledge of language and culture of the countries and continents ( Jackson, 2014a). When the military, for example, deploys to another country or continent the soldiers undergo specific training and education helping to educate the military personnel in understanding the culture and its language such as the ‘Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit’ society for international

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collaboration (GIZ) (GIZ, n.d.). However, these modules are not part of the police education and should be integrated. Today, no matter where one is is working, diversity in culture is mixed and in order to communicate and respond in an efficient way these topics should be integrated into police education and uniquely when dealing with CBRN/HAZMAT agents. One reason, for example, is that citizens who have migrated from a war zone where chemical weapons were used, and they or their family members were exposed to them, might react differently from the local citizens who were never exposed to such weapons and therefore, their understanding and reactions might differ and pose a threat to the police response and themselves or for others. However, another aspect on its importance of why intercultural competence should be taught can be argued as follows. When talking about the culture, one directly links the world culture to citizens and their cultural belonging, i.e. language, beliefs, and looks. However, public service organisations have their own culture and beliefs and language, which is often forgotten, which goes for all public services. Especially when it comes to more complex and specific topics such as dealing with CBRN/HAZMAT incidents, organised crime, and terrorism, the police response and actions taken might for most of the citizens not be understandable and vice versa. Therefore, even if police officers and citizens have all the same background, misunderstandings and lack of communication might be arising because of the different points of view. Intercultural competence is therefore essential to be taught as well. Especially in the response of CBRN/HAZMAT incidents. As argued by Jackson (2014a), our cultural orientation begins the moment we are born. Beliefs, values, worldviews, traditions, cultural norms, scripts, and languages are part of it ( Jackson, 2014a, 2014b). The intercultural competence is linked, therefore not only to citizens, and police officers, but it integrates the disabled persons of our society as well. If the police officer does not know their culture and language, how will the police officer be able to understand and know how to respond to a crisis where these citizens are involved? This means that with the intercultural competence the police officer will be able to respond better, and communicate to the citizens as well as advise their higher-ups accordingly on their communication strategy as well as additional response procedures and decontamination guidelines taking into consideration all the aspects, including disability and religion as well as the issues they might bring with them ( Jackson, 2014b). 7.1.2 Communication As previously discussed, and explained in the intercultural competence section, the way in which it is communicated is very important, especially

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during a CBRN/HAZMAT incident. Such incidents might have different impacts such as the COVID-19 crisis, which started in 2020, where communication issues and misunderstandings could be observed ( Jackson, 2014c). In order to avoid the knowledge gaps as explained in the previous examples, police officers should undergo not only CBRN/HAZMAT training, but also incident command capabilities, communicating accordingly within, and they should be part of any decision-making process as well because depending on our communication, the message will be perceived differently and the response might not be the one that was the goal. As an incident commander, one should also advise the higher-ups on the right communication strategy as well as the appropriate message to be sent in order to save lives. As can be observed in Figure 7.1, the conflict interactions styles mandate communication during crisis management. Depending on how the message is communicated, the message might be perceived differently. During the COVID-19 crisis, several messages created tensions between the police and the citizens as well as governments with international organisations and their neighbouring countries. They were closing their borders, which went against the Schengen agreement (Schengen-info, 2020).

Figure 7.1 Intercultural conflict style (Jackson, 2014c).

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One of the most significant dilemmas at the beginning was the communication around personal protection and face masks as well as some governments not taking the health crisis (biological incident) seriously and comparing it with the seasonal flu, but also there was no translation for foreign or disabled citizens, e.g. sign language. As an example of non-proper communication, the UK Government got criticised mainly by its citizens upon its crisis response to the coronavirus. At the beginning, the information and risk got downplayed such as it is only like flu. This approach took place until the moment the prime minister was infected with the virus and underwent treatment for it. The UK is the EU country that waited for the longest to shut down the country. Afterwards, there was a substantial shift in its response and the information that the government was providing to the citizens. What ministers said was also most of the time controversial and created misunderstandings, such as if face masks work or not, when should they be used and when not (Reynolds, 2020). At the same time, the same can be said of the World Health Organisation (WHO), which was the lead during the COVID-19 crisis, as it made the same mistakes. At the beginning of the crisis they stated that face masks would only be beneficial for ill or sick people in order to prevent droplets being dispersed and that it made no sense for healthy people to wear a face mask (Howard, 2020). However, shortly after, this message changed into another direction. They then stated that now face masks should be worn by everyone in order to avoid cross-contamination and spreading of the virus. This approach could have been taken directly, knowing how fast the virus was spreading in China. Communication and intercultural competence go hand in hand and are essential in any situation or incident response where citizens are involved. The police officer will benefit from it, but these two specific topics should not be limited to police officers but should be integrated into every government department at every level in order to avoid misunderstanding, which leads to tensions. Having proper intercultural knowledge and communications skills helps to shape useful laws and legislation that takes into consideration the police response, their culture of work, and the citizens. 7.1.3 Legislation Another critical aspect for law enforcement officers is the knowledge of the criminal law because without it, the police officer is unable to fulfil their duties. Today, the legislative knowledge the police officers needs to have is quite huge to absorb. However, none of the needed laws and legislation covers so far any laws and legislation on chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

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In a world where incidents, crime, and natural outbreaks are becoming more frequent, the police need to be able to maintain law and order. However, in this particular case, it will be difficult since there is no knowledge present. Without knowing what the specific national and international legislations impose and determine as a weapon (chemical, biological, and radiological), it is hard for the police to investigate in the right direction as well as having the right guidelines in places such as health and safety when dealing with such cases. On the other hand, it can be argued that having the legislative knowledge on CBRN agents and weapons, law enforcement officers should also be involved in the creation of new laws when applicable to CBRN agents and its occurring natural dangers. For example, during the COVID-19 crisis, which is classified as a health crisis, health officials created legislation and restrictions in order to minimise the spread and infections. In order to guarantee the infection rate decreasing and the ‘lockdown’ respected, the police were charged with enforcing the restrictions based upon the legislation. However, as explained previously in ­chapter 6, issues arose because the police were charged with a difficult task, i.e. enforcing a law that was out of the ordinary mission for police officers, such as for example enforcing new legislation on wearing face masks in shops. This was impossible to enforce on a national level during the easing of lockdown in July 2020 (Corbishley, 2020). Therefore, the following legislation should be covered in the police training and education, being as part of their basic training, continued education (CPD), or only for specialised units. Nonetheless, it would make sense that every police officer would have some basic understanding of these rules since they will also cover operational security and risk assessments. A third reason is that in various legislations the law mandates that the employer provides to every one of its employees training on chemical agents when exposed to them regularly. In the case of the police officer, he/she is exposed daily to such agents due to all the chemical and radiological agents that are transported via the roads. Examples include: responding to an accident involving a truck that has chemical agents on board, an explosion at a factory that uses chemical agents, medical transport with biological contaminating agents, airport police exposed to chemical, radiological, and biological agents stocked and shipped via a cargo centre, just to name a few. Therefore, it can be argued that these three points emphasise the importance of implementing these subjects in their law studies: 1. Investigating and criminal prosecution of the use and production of CBRN agents. 2. Decision-making advisers for laws and legislation concerning policing on CBRN/HAZMAT agents and its natural outbreaks.

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3. Legislative responsibility from the employer to the employee when exposed to CBRN/HAZMAT agents. The training should, therefore, include the following legislation, laws, or acts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); National law against chemical weapons; Biological Weapons Convention (BCW); National law of biological agents and its weaponising; Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards; 6. International and National Health and Safety Legislation for chemical biological and radiological agents; 7. SEVESO regulation; 8. Planning and Response legislation if present (i.e. Civil Contingency Act 2004, which mandates emergency response planning guidelines for the risks exposed in the respective area. If no such regulation is present, it should be taken into consideration and having a response plan elaborated and ready).

7.2  CBRN/HAZMAT Levels of Training Various levels of CBRN/HAZMAT should distinguish specific training, i.e. (i) awareness, (ii) operational, (iii) technician, and (iv) incident commander. Having a separation of levels allows training police officers at a large scale and low cost because it involves only a few hours of teaching in order to gain an awareness level (four hours) which later on can be built upon. Whereas, for example, the technician level, which is a 2–3week class, could be limited to the personnel that are physically handling such agents including SWAT units, environmental police, and forensic units. This approach would make it possible for every police officer to have at least basic knowledge and therefore more eyes on the street and the response can be more focused as well at a preventative instead of only an incident response level. This would make the police response at every level more efficient and proficient. In order to do so, the following levels should include the following topics. 7.2.1  Awareness Level The awareness level is a four-hour classroom-based course only where the police officer will be exposed for the first time to information on hazardous materials, what they are, where they are, and how they can be

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recognised as well as the Dangerous Goods Regulations. This level will not gain the police officer any specific incident response capabilities yet. However, he/she will be able to respond in a defensive capacity by identifying and communicating the right and necessary information when responding to an incident or accident involving hazardous material. The learning objectives at this level should be the following. 7.2.2  Introduction to the Different Levels and Responsibilities As part of the first module that brings the student into the area of CBRN/ HAZMAT various points will be discussed and outlined so that the police officers understand the main difference between a CBRN/HAZMAT incident and typical incidents as well as awareness, operational, and technical levels. This includes the identification of exposure and contamination routes into the body and which hazardous materials can enter the body. In addition, this section covers the chemical classifications providing the police officer with an understanding of chemical, biological, and radiological agents, their exposure and toxicity, as well as different states such as solid, liquid, and gas, and vapour density. This section gives the police officer some basic knowledge on how to describe CBRN/HAZMAT agents and use time, distance, and shielding principles in order to maintain physical safety. 7.2.3  Health and Safety for Hazardous Material This section builds upon the introduction and integrates new topics such as the emergency response guidebook, which can be used as a tool for first responders. The book helps to identify and recognise chemical hazards that are transported by road, train, and air and informs about their flammability, toxicity, and reactivity with water. Health and safety for hazardous materials is covered, as well as a short introduction to exposure rates and health and safety at work covering mutagens, mutations, and chronic exposure effects on the human body including pregnancy and the foetus. Once these are understood, the section covers the personnel exposures that might occur and builds upon its four routes of exposure, which were briefly covered in the introduction. These include the following points in more depth. In addition to these subjects, this section will integrate the effects that can be seen immediately, felt delayed and exposed at a local level. Once the understanding of exposure risks and contamination routes is understood the principles of physical protection and personal protective equipment is introduced for chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

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Box 7.1  Personnel exposure risks. 1.  Inhalation: The inhalation of, for example, hazardous vapours or gases can get into our lungs, and are most of the time directly absorbed into the bloodstream and circulating through the body. The same goes for viruses. Therefore, it is vital to avoid inhaling hazardous materials by staying upwind of an incident and a prudent distance away and having some respiratory protection. 2.  Ingestion: Any agent that can come into contact with the mouth by putting it into the mouth by hand-to-mouth contact. Particles that are inhaled can be coughed up from the lungs and then swallowed or transmitted to another person, e.g. coronavirus, flu. 3.  Absorption: Many chemicals and biological agents can enter the body being absorbed towards the skin. These include our eyes. 4.  Injection: Chemicals and biological agents could penetrate the skin. For example, stepping on a contaminated nail or puncture yourself on a contaminated needle during a search on a drug addict. 5.  Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL): OSHA permits a maximum one-time exposure amount for workers who are exposed to hazardous agents. This amount is a legal standard via international, and national regulations and should never be exceeded. 6.  Threshold Limit Value (TLV): The TLV expresses the concentrations of any airborne substances that a person can be exposed to during normal working conditions in a repeated exposure without suffering any effects on their health. 7. Time Weighted Average (TWA): The TWA goes hand in hand with the TLV. It is a method that is used to set the permissible workplace exposure limits.

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7.2.3.1  Detecting and Identifying Hazardous Materials and Their Presence In order to (i), detect, (ii) identity, and (iii) assess the scene, the Dangerous Goods Regulation and its sign and symbols are investigated and explained in this section. This includes shipping papers and where to find them, as well as analysing provided information. This will help to determine the presence of hazardous materials. This process can be referred to as the six-process step covering observation and intelligence gathering awareness. The following steps are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Occupancy and location; Container shapes; Markings and colours (including identification numbers); Placards and labels; Shipping papers and other documents; Senses.

7.2.3.2  How to Use the Emergency Response Guidebook Once all the steps mentioned earlier have been covered, the police officer will be taught more specifically on the ERG (the Emergency response guidebook) and on how to use it. This will be achieved, for example, via case studies. It also covers WISER (Wireless information system for emergency responders; NIH, n.d.) and JESIP ( JESIP, n.d.). 7.2.3.3  How to Manage the Scene Once all the basic concepts and procedures have been outlined, the last part integrates an awareness of how to manage the scene, which can be seen as a pre-section that should be taught before starting the incident command modules giving a clear idea of how it works and what it is about. The basic setup includes the three different levels during the incident response (operational, tactical, and strategic); why it is essential to have an Incident Command System (ICS) and what it comprises in each step, e.g. (i) response operations, (ii) planning process, (iii) involved logistics, and, if applicable (iv) financial and administrative issues, and (v) scene management covering the different zones: (i) hot, (ii) warm, and (iii) cold zone. In order to do criminal or forensic investigation in a contaminated area additional training is necessary so an additional module should be taught on the Evidence Collection Command Post (ECCP). 7.2.3.4  Small Tabletop Exercise To strengthen the knowledge, all the modules are followed by a short, simple tabletop exercise, which gets more complex at each level.

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This is to show the student how to apply the gained knowledge during an incident. This will expose them to the decision-making process while being confronted within a real-life scenario.

7.3  Operations Level In comparison with the awareness level and learning outcomes, the ­operations level builds and strengthens what the police officer has learned before at the awareness level, which can be covered in a three-day course of between 24 and 30 hours. The gained knowledge will give the police officer already some hands-on expertise of being able to conduct small live-saving manipulations to maintain operationality in a contaminated or exposed area. This means that the police officer will be able to don and doff personal protective equipment, analyse the incident, plan a response, apply decontamination procedures, and have basic knowledge of on-scene incident command. To be able to achieve the set goals, the training programme includes the following learning objectives. 7.3.1  Incident Analyses At the operations level, in order to undertake a proper incident analysis the police officer will be taught more in-depth knowledge of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. This will explain the chemical bases, neutrals, and acids, oxidisers, asphyxiation, corrosiveness, explosive agents, and the physical properties, i.e. solid, liquid, gas. For the biological part, all the hazardous agents will be covered, i.e. toxins, fungus, virus, and bacteria and parasites. Last but not least radiological agents and their different categories, i.e. alpha, beta, gamma, neutron, and x-ray as well as how to protect against the different levels (time, distance, shielding) will be discussed. Being able to analyse what agents are present at the incident will trigger a specific response plan, which depending on the substance involved in the incident might be less or more dangerous. Therefore, it is crucial to have the right understanding of the different agents and the dangers they pose. This means that not only the notion of CBRN/HAZMAT agents will be covered. The science of danger and its implications will be covered as well, which includes the topics that can be seen in Figure 7.2. 7.3.1.1  Health and Safety Assessment Once the incident has been analysed, a health and safety assessment needs to be done before the response can be planned safely and effective. This topic can help the police officer not only in a CBRN/HAZMAT environment but can be applied to any situation where a response plan needs to be created. However, in this case, to make a risk assessment, the police officer

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Figure 7.2 The science of danger and the impact of CBRN/HAZMAT agents. Designed by the author.

needs to be able to know the different entries a CBRN/HAZMAT agent might have into the body based on the prior learning module awareness, which pathways are building upon the awareness level, and introduce protective measures that can be taken such as personal protective equipment to minimise the risk. Without the awareness module the assessment cannot be made. This includes signs and symptoms as well that might be observed or smelled at the scene from a safe distance without endangering themselves. Various hints such as a large number of dead animals, e.g. birds around the scene are some indicators for chemical agents or any other unnormal sign and symptom, e.g. more than one person having the same symptoms or rashes. Taking into consideration that when exposed to CBRN agents, symptoms might not be present straight away depending on the exposure dose rate received or exposed. This will lead the police officer to a risk assessment knowing which measures he will need to take respectively and as a first step. A risk assessment could be done with the help of a chart determining until which point the police officer is safe and at which level they would need to use PPE or keep a distance. 7.3.1.2  Planning Response and Incident Command Principles Once all the subjects mentioned earlier are treated and analysed, the police officer will receive guidance in how to plan the response, which

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additionally includes incident command principles that are also interdisciplinary and not only related to CBRN/HAZMAT agents. However, in a CBRN case, this means that the following points need to be responded to: 1. What are the hazardous materials? 2. What is the population that might be exposed to the release of CBRN agents? 3. Are there any environmentally sensitive areas? 4. What is the wind direction? 5. What are the protective measures available? 6. Can vulnerable areas presented by the situation be identified? Once all the data and intelligence are collected, they will need to be recorded, creating a timeline of the release. This will help to predict its developments and analyse the best approach. In the record, the types of hazards present will be written down as well as explaining apparent signs and measurements that were present or taken to determine the agent on the scene. 7.3.1.3  Implementing Response In this part, the police officer will learn the main differences of defensive and offensive action, deciding how to respond to the incident without coming into actual contact with the CBRN/HAZMAT, which is beyond their level of capability, and equipment roles and responsibilities. The response of the police officer will be limited to the elimination of vapour pressure or any other ignition source, notifying and, if necessary, evacuating the area. 7.3.1.4  Evaluation of the Provided Response Over time, people have come to realise that it is necessary to write down procedures to save the experience gained when dealing with a recurring problem. Procedures then are guidelines that have been shown to have a high probability of success in certain situations. With new situations, general procedures are used until experience allows us to be more specific. A SOP fulfils the need for consistency in performance with a concern for safety. It must always be remembered that decisions are made based on experience, either personal or educational that are written into a procedure, and the decision-maker has the final say not the procedure. The importance of developing and implementing effective standard operating procedures has been continually stressed as one of the primary ingredients of an effective safety programme. Indeed, SOPs must be established and followed to assure safe, effective emergency scene operation.

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Box 7.2  Definition of SOP. SOP DEFINITION STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES SOPs are established and prescribed methods for performing tasks and operations that occur on a routine basis during an ­incident response. 7.3.1.5  Restoration Brings Everything Back to ‘Normal’ Termination1 activities are divided into three phases: (1) debriefing the incident, (2) post-incident analysis, and (3) critiquing the incident. 1. An effective debriefing should: • Inform responders exactly what kind or type of hazardous material they were exposed to. • Identify equipment damage and unsafe conditions requiring attention. • Assign information, gathering responsibilities for post-incident analysis and critique. • Summarise the activities performed. • Reinforce the positive aspects of the response. 2. A post-incident analysis is conducted to: • Determine the level of financial responsibility. • Establish a clear picture of the emergency response for further study. The post-incident analysis should focus on four key topics: command and control; tactical operations; resources; support services.

7.4  Technician Level At the technician level, the topics that were included in the awareness and operations course will be treated more in-depth. However, this level has a higher practical portion that gives the police officer a practical knowledge and hands-on experience working in a contaminated area. This means starting to trust and get accustomed to PPE and the decontamination procedures in setting everything up when planning the response. In addition, the topics CBRN, crime, and terrorism will be covered to give the police officer a full round-up knowledge, including the historical events of past criminal and terroristic attacks involving CBRN/ HAZMAT agents. The police officer will learn the modus operandi of criminals and terrorism as well as signs and symptoms related to any

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CBRN/HAZMAT attack when responding to the scene of an accident or incident.

7.5  Incident Command The module of incident command is essential and can be applied to any incident or response procedures since it works in all the different scenarios being it domestic violence, hostage rescue, terror incident, industrial accident, CBRN attack. The incident command module teaches the police officer not only how to assess but also how and what to communicate as well as deciding which unit and equipment should be deployed in order that their mission is a success. However, the incident response has various stages, i.e. tactical, operations, and strategic. These levels might be taken part in at different levels and therefore this module is separated into three different levels each taking one week to achieve. The operational level involves the first responder, the tactical level would be the incident commander managing the local area and the strategic level can be seen as the responsible regional commander who covers the political impact of the region as well in cooperation with the government and the different ministries. Also, once this generic module is achieved, the police officer can maintain the span of command, the span of control, command resilience, and can interoperate with different agencies. The general incident command module that every law enforcement officer should receive during their initial training should integrate the following learning objectives: • • • • • • •

A review of the national and inter-agency incident command system if present Applicable laws on health and safety Science of danger and risk assessment Tactical approach (public order, tactical teams, search and rescue) Knowledge of HAZMAT and CBRN agents at an awareness/operations level Personal protective equipment Documentation procedures.

In law enforcement agencies where such a system is not in place can only be advised to create an inter-agency incident command system since it would benefit the response time and on its proficiency.

7.6 Operational Once the general module has been taken, the operational module builds upon the learning outcomes and not only strengthens the knowledge

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but introduces new complex topics on CBRN incidents by exposing the police officer to its practical application as well. At this level operational management will also play a role in order to oversee their unit and at the same time make the operational decisions, which might have an impact on the incident’s response and recovery. In order to do so, the following learning objectives should be covered at this level. 7.6.1  Management of On-Scene Response The operational incident commander’s response responsibility depends on guidance from national, regional, and local policies to minimise the risk to first responders and tactical incident managers. This is as important as any other response as it guarantees that operational and tactical incident commanders as first responders can work according to the rules with all the agencies involved without being investigated at a later stage for non-compliance. 7.6.2  Establishing a Clear Line of Communication In order to be able to advise on guidelines and to secure additional help, equipment, and funds as well as inter-government cooperation it is also essential to have a transparent chain of command and to communicate the appropriate information at every level so that the best decisions can be taken. This will be mainly based on intelligence-led data, information from various sources, which will have an impact on agencies and units involved as well as secrecy if necessary. 7.6.3  Tactical and Strategic Comprehensiveness of the Response and Management of Operational Units Deployments The operational commander is responsible for the overall operational approach and is the main lead in deciding what is done, when, and how, which includes deciding what information is to be shared with other services. He/she has the overall responsibility and can manage various units at the same time. At this level, the tactical commander needs to be able to manage operations as well as inform the upper chain of command at the strategic level for additional guidance and support if necessary. 7.6.4  Multiagency Cooperation Lead The operational incident commander will also share information with other organisations that are involved in the incident response, covering

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the military, fire services, and health authorities so that all the units deployed work efficiently and proficiently together with the same objectives avoiding duplication of work. 7.6.5  Science of Danger and Operational Risk Assessment However, in order to be able to make the best decisions, the incident commander needs to have all the information on hand as well as having a good understanding of the science of danger so that the accurate risk assessment can be done. This will build upon the science of danger studies that the police officer has undertaken at the operational level, which integrates new information and data evaluation such as having in mind the bigger picture instead of working on one single issue as before. 7.6.6  Record Keeping Of course, as with everything, the police officer no matter what they are doing needs to show that the response and decisions taken were fundamental. They need to keep a record of all their decisions and information gathered since depending on the case everything would need to be written in a file, which could lead to a criminal charge or prosecution. However, the reason for record keeping is not limited to criminal prosecution but could be used as well if a police officer becomes ill or gets hurt during the response making sure that no operational mistakes were made and that the standard operating guidelines (SOP) were respected.

7.7 Tactical The tactical incident commander is the person who has the general oversight of the incident response and are charged with collecting all the information from all the units and commanders involved and developing the response plan and deploying additional units when deemed necessary. The tactical commander is also in permanent contact with strategic command, whereas the operational commander will be in permanent contact with the tactical incident commander. The modules that are covered for the tactical incident commander are the same as for the general and operational one. However, the main difference is that he/she needs to see the bigger picture of the incident as well as knowing what is going on besides this incident with other units and be able to manage more significant events and the incident involving different units and agencies. The topics include (i) gathering intelligence and data, (ii) risk assessment (chemical, biological, radiological), (iii) response planning, (iv) setting up

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communication lines, (v) managing multiagency response on site, and (vi) assessing the broader implications of the incident.

7.8 Strategic The strategic level is mainly for higher ranking police officers who are responsible over a region or area and communicate in a direct line with the responsible ministries and government agencies. The strategic incident commander is very rarely on site but can be found at the central dispatch centre or crisis room. For the level of incident response, the following learning objectives should be covered. 7.8.1  Analysing and Assessing Intelligence Data in Cooperation with Other Agencies This helps in developing a dynamic CBRN strategy, which is appropriate in assessing the threat while looking at the bigger picture. Therefore, all the available collected intelligence in coordination with consultation of partner agencies and adhering to applicable legislation, laws, and guidance ensures a positive resolution of the operation. This means that all the appropriate legislations of all the respective emergency services are taken into consideration as well as contingency acts or any other response plan or procedure. 7.8.2  Development and Implementation of Command and Control Protocols This involves developing command and operations protocols, including inter-agency cooperation and determining how and with whom information is shared. 7.8.3  Multiagency Cooperation In order to be able to cooperate in a multiagency environment, regular meetings and training should take place between the key players so that they know who has what information and are then able to assist each other and develop a joint response strategy and SOPs. 7.8.4  Identifying Resources This means responding to the right identification adequately and establishing the right levels of resources needed including an inter-agency operation to maintain capability and CBRN response

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7.8.5 Communication This means being able to maintain a clear and understandable communication line both from the bottom up and the top down as well as with other involved agencies being able to have a general resource and response oversight of the scene. 7.8.6  Incident Monitoring Under incident monitoring the strategic police officer will be able to monitor the ongoing response and decide which CBRN resources would be needed in order to maintain operational effectiveness from other units or more specialised units, depending on the information received from their tactical commander as well as intelligence from other agencies, which includes foreign agencies 7.8.7  Record Keeping Same as for all the other levels.

Conclusion The above discussions show clearly why CBRN-related subjects should be included in the police educational curriculum and it gives some guidance on how this can be achieved. In order to integrate the above-mentioned subjects, various possibilities were offered that would make every police school programme complementary. The outlined subjects and their different approaches face the new challenges and cover all the necessary aspects in policing when faced with crimes involving CBRN/HAZMAT agents as well as accidents or disasters. Needless to say, the proposed teaching subjects and approach are not meant to give the law enforcement community a monopoly on CBRN response and investigation, which by definition are joint disciplines involving several agencies that must work together. Indeed, inter-agency cooperation during a CBRN response is crucial given that each agency is operating under its specific mandate (national legislation, role and responsibilities) and has different objectives. Therefore, a prompt and effective response can only be achieved if these objectives are coordinated.

Note 1 Termination: The cessation of emergency tactical operations to include documentation, debriefing and the eventual post-incident analysis, and critiquing.

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References Corbishley, S. (2020). Police Chief says ‘absurd’ face mask rule will be impossible to enforce. Retrieved from https://metro.co.uk/2020/07/14/pol​ice-chief-saysabs​urd-face-mask-rule-will-imp​ossi​ble-enfo​rce-12986​720/ GIZ. (n.d.). Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. Retrieved from www.giz.de/en/html/index.html Howard, J. (2020). WHO stands by recommendation to not wear masks if you are not sick or not caring for someone who is sick. Retrieved from https://edit​ion.cnn. com/2020/03/30/world/coro​navi​r us-who-masks-rec​omme​ndat​ion-trnd/index. html Jackson, J. (2014a). Culture and the primary socialization process. In Introducing language and intercultural communication (pp. 49–72). London: Routledge. Jackson, J. (2014b). Cultural dimensions of conflict situations: Intercultural conflict styles. In Introducing language and intercultural communication (pp. 260–261). London: Routledge. Jackson, J. (2014c). Managing language in intercultural conflict. In Introducing language and intercultural communication (pp. 249–271). London: Routledge. JESIP. (n.d.). Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Programme. Retrieved from www.jesip.org.uk/ NIH. (n.d.). Wireless information system for emergency responders. Retrieved from https://wiser.nlm.nih.gov/ Reynolds, E. (2020). People in the West are ignoring advice to stay home. That’s because it’s too confusing, one expert says. Retrieved from https://edit​ion. cnn.com/2020/03/23/eur​ope/coro​n avi ​r us-lockd​own-flou​t ed-italy-uk-intlgbr/index.html Schengen-info. (2020). Schengen area crisis: EU states close borders as coronavirus outbreak grips bloc. Retrieved from www.schen​genv​isai​n fo.com/news/schen​ gen-area-cri​sis-eu-sta​tes-close-bord​ers-as-coro​navi​r us-outbr​eak-grips-bloc/#

Chapter 8

Investigation, Report Writing, and Intelligence Analysis

• • • • •

Investigation First Person on Scene Template First Look Report Evidence Collection Command Post (ECCP) CBRN/HAZMAT Final Report

92 92 94 94 95

Introduction Chapter 8 discusses the benefit that the previous proposed topics might have when dealing with a crime scene that would be contaminated with CBRN/HAZMAT agents, covering the topic on writing CBRN/ HAZMAT investigations and intelligence reports as well as the whole documentation process (chain of custody) when responding to the incident. These topics go hand in hand with the physical response to the incident. However, it should be noted that for the whole process to be a success, legislations and procedures need to be present. Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that before any detailed report can be written a standardised template should be used to gather the information – intelligence according to national guidance. This will have three major advantages: (i) gathering the important information, (ii) being able to communicate fast to the dispatch unit what can be observed or was found; and finally (iii) all the necessary information one gathered to write into the final report. As you know by now, a CBRN/HAZMAT incident is not a common response, an incident encountered on day to day operations. The topics highlighted in ­chapter 8 are the outcome of implementing CBRN/HAZMAT education in policing and show how important it is to have the right knowledge besides showing the complexity of such operations. This chapter only provides a short overview on what needs to be done to investigate in a contaminated environment. DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-11

92  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

8.1 Investigation Exposure and investigation in any area involving CBRN/HAZMAT agents will challenge the police officer in every possible way, since, until recently, police exposure was quite limited to such events (Fish, Stout, & Wallace, 2011). Nevertheless, over the last century crimes, terror attacks, and incidents implicating CBRN/HAZMAT agents have grown. Considering that not many police officers are trained to conduct investigations in contaminated environment states (Fish et al., 2011), there is a massive gap in policing as well as on training providers. So far, most literature, as well as training, can be found in programmes such as the hazardous technician programmes in the United States (State Police NewJersey, 2004). Therefore, in order to prevent any health and safety issues during crime scene investigations in a hazardous environment, several operating procedures and legislations need to be considered, as stated by Fish et al. (2011). These considerations include: (i) the right approach to the crime scene, (ii) intelligence collection, which might help in choosing the right equipment, and (iii) personal protective equipment, as well as (iv) setting the allowed time for working at the crime scene, which is essential especially when radioactive materials are in play. This approach however, can only be applied if the right knowledge is present.

8.2  First Person on Scene Template It is known that when responding to an incident in general information on what happened is crucial in order to dispatch the right units but as well to inform the first responder arriving on the scene what circumstance may await them. When responding to an incident with CBRN/HAZMAT agents this statement is even more important and delicate. Having the right information at an early stage is very important, since it tells the agent implicated in the incident, or used during a criminal act. This information will help not only to tell which protective equipment needs to be worn for first responders rushing in but as well which security perimeter (area cordon) needs to be set up as well as requesting the right specific response units. Therefore, when an incident happens and the first person arrives at the scene, it is of utmost importance to gather the right information. Figure 8.1 shows the nine lines or points template, which represents a quick form of all the critical information that should be collected during the first 5–10 minutes after arriving on the scene. This allows the law enforcement officer to gather all the necessary information and so be able to share it directly with dispatch who can inform other emergency

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Investigation, Report Writing, and Intelligence Analysis  93

Figure 8.1 CBRN nine-liner (Wengler, 2018).

94  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

services. At the same time, this template has all the information that is needed for inclusion as an initial part of the incident report and first look report. However, this nine-liner only covers the first response, approach gathered information.

8.3  First Look Report A second tool or template that could be used for continued assessment of the incident and keeping up to date the information would be the first look report as shown in Figure 8.2. This will give additional information to the responding police officer to ensure better knowledge of the incident at hand and the collected information can be used at a later stage as comprehensive information on the nine-liner, which will help the police officer to be more precise in their report having started as well a picture map, which is a crucial part for the investigation report.

8.4  Evidence Collection Command Post (ECCP) In the last few years, in different parts of the world, different crimes related to the production and the use of improvised chemical weapons have taken place. This circumstance has generated the need to harmonise the forensic investigative procedures of these scenes with those of technical information collection. This is done in order to process the crime scene efficiently and acquire evidence with certified procedures that are useful to support legal prosecution at the international level.

Figure 8.2 First look report.

Investigation, Report Writing, and Intelligence Analysis  95

The overall steps undertaken in the investigation are also called the chain of custody in relation to the investigation in a contaminated area. The 12 steps as set out by the FBI are guidelines setting the sequence in which the investigation and sampling shall take place. The 12 steps include (i) preparation, (ii) scene approach, (iii) securing and protecting the scene, (iv) preliminary survey, (v) evaluation of physical evidence, (vi) starting to write down the information collected, (vii) creating a photographic map of the crime scene, (viii) creating a diagram or sketch, (ix) searching the premises with the DIM equipment, (x) recording of all physical samples taken, (xi) final survey, (xii) releasing the crime scene. The reason for having specific guidelines including the chain of custody when dealing with CBRN/HAZMAT agents is not only meant for the operator’s safety but also to guarantee the validity of the sample taken as well as accountability of the operators. With the example of the ECCP, it shows clearly how several of the proposed taught modules can fit all together. While dealing with a CBRN/HAZMAT incident the five main competencies are needed: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Incident command (Bronze–Silver–Gold); Evidence collection in contaminated environment; Intercultural competence (witnesses and inter-agency cooperation); Communication (effective communication between responding units or gathering witness reports); 5. Overall knowledge of CBRN/HAZMAT. The Evidence Collection Command Post is the area where all evidence that was sampled is received. Depending on the state of the evidence (contaminated or not) it will be processed and catalogued before it is submitted to the laboratory for further analysis. The procedures and explanations are simplified for the specific example. However, one can understand which complications these procedures might bring with them when not taught in the area of CBRN/HAZMAT.

8.5  CBRN/HAZMAT Final Report Finally, once all the information is collected (visual data, laboratory findings, sketches, etc.) and the incident response is over, a comprehensive and detailed report needs to be written as shown in Figure 8.3. This report should cover not only the basics such as date and time, where it happened, what happened and the eventual modus operandi of the perpetrator but also specialised topics need to be included covering aspects such as contacted people, evacuated area on orders of …, equipment used and

96  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

Figure 8.3 Report sample page 01 of the CBRN incident report.

registration number, proof of right calibration, if equipment got contaminated how it was dealt with, detailed chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear fact sheet, which should be covered as well extensively in the sketch and picture map just to name a few additional important points. Needless to say, each agency has their own template, and this should only be used as a reference to what should be included in order to maintain transparency of the response avoiding any doubt of cross-contamination.

Investigation, Report Writing, and Intelligence Analysis  97

Conclusion Using this short example, without being too specific since that would be beyond the scope of this book, one can now understand how complex investigating or responding to a CBRN/HAZMAT incident can be – even though it could be argued that incidents as such are still low level. Nevertheless, being low level, they bring with them high intensity on the level of equipment and manpower. In this case what would be the approach in your country? Are you able to investigate such incidents while having enough manpower trained and equipment ready to go? Imagine how many officers are on a normal day shift? Are you still able to conduct a response in this environment? All these questions should be asked when thinking about the previously discussed chapters and their utility. The topics discussed in this chapter are only scratching the surface of a very much more complex topic but highlight the importance of including basic knowledge for all law enforcement officers.

References Fish, J. T., Stout, R. N., & Wallace, E. W. (2011). Practical crime scene investigations for Hot Zones. London: CRC Press. State Police New-Jersey. (2004). HAZMAT emergency response course (14th ed.). New Jersey: Hazardous Material Worker Training Centre. Wengler, P. (2018). First responder CBRN 9-liner pocket response card. Defence S&T Technical Bulletin, 11(2).

Chapter 9

Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum in CBRN/HAZMAT

• • • •

How to Implement a Training Schedule on CBRN Topics Continued Professional Development (CPD) Awareness Course (One Full Day) Specialised Training Courses

98 100 105 105

Introduction This chapter covers in which way the named subjects could be implemented in police training and education. There are several options, which for diversity purposes are divided into three main groups: (i) continued education, (ii) basic awareness course; and (iii) technician-level course for specialists. Nevertheless, all provided solutions on subject and time are purely dependent on the needs of the unit. The proposed differentiation should help the different units to develop their SOPs and determine what is mandatory and what is supplementary training so that a baseline can be created, making a response to CBRN/HAZMAT incidents more efficient and proficient.

9.1  How to Implement a Training Schedule on CBRN Topics Needless to say, CPD should be granted anyhow since today CPD is one of the main aspects of employer attractiveness and providing a responsible development in a fast-changing world. As already stated by Wengler (2020), police officers are not escaping the change of evolution and the evolution of CBRN threats and risks is becoming increasingly greater, making the integration of CBRN topics in police training necessary. In addition, this kind of training gives the officer knowhow in managing such events hence leading to a faster response, saving lives. Nevertheless, this means as well that police officers will be able to: (i) detect crime at an earlier stage, (ii) collect the right evidence, and (iii) DOI: 10.4324/9781003340775-12

Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum  99

process the evidence and intelligence accordingly in order to be used eligibly in court. From an employer perspective, this would lead to a broader coverage of expertise and knowledge that can be built upon. However, the time issues that are persistent in police education and training as well as its implied costs must be acknowledged when including the broad topics that need to be covered before the police officer is operational. In order to continue with the police officers’ educational process several learning processes should be taken into consideration especially when talking about CPD such as the different learning factors: (i) formal, (ii) non-formal learning, (iii) intentional and incidental learning. Generally speaking, this means that every aspect of learning should be taken into consideration as long as a learning curve is present. However, the main reason for the integration can be described by using Herzberg’s two-way Factor Theory of Motivation (Steers, Mowday, & Shapiro, 2004). Herzberg’s theory identified factors that influence the satisfaction of each single person at work. The main factors can be divided into two categories: (i) motivators and (ii) hygienic factors. Under motivators one can understand the main satisfaction that the achievements, advancement, responsibilities, and recognition is given by the work one is conducting. Whereas the hygiene factor looks more at it from the organisational side (e.g. stability, working conditions, salary, just to name a few). Herzberg states that if the hygienic factors are taken away basically the police officer will be dissatisfied. Out of this argument it can be stated that even though continued education is provided the impact it will have will still be positive. Therefore, it can only be advised to integrate CBRN/HAZMAT topics into the police education for one simple reason. The more the police officer gets exposed to incidents involving such agents he/she will seek training and education. If this type of training or education is offered, it will lead not only to maintain job satisfaction but maintain attractiveness on diversity for the employer when recruiting new police officers. Box 9.1  Describing the attractiveness of employer in regard to continued education. In other words, (i) motivation is equal to intrinsic, psychological factors and (ii) hygienic is equal to extrinsic, environmental factors. In order to focus more on the educational part, the hygienic factor will be considered only. Herzberg states that the extrinsic factors do little to provide job satisfaction however are needed to provide factors that prevent the work leading to dissatisfaction. Strangely, he states that they do not lead to motivating factors or provide motivation but only lead employees to no work dissatisfaction.

100  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

Figure 9.1 Full cycle of exploitable outputs of all three educational pillars. Designed by the author.

Hence, offering various continued education possibilities in this subject provides benefits to both sides. There are several ways to do this. One way as already stated above was via CPD, another way will be to integrate a general awareness module into the police education and the third option would be for specialised units only, which are exposed to CBRN/HAZMAT agents on a regular basis. However, to guarantee a full spectrum of knowledge transfer, all three pillars should be integrated as can be observed in Figure 9.1. Only in this way can the full spectrum of CBRN/HAZMAT knowledge create exploitable outputs that will be guaranteed by the education and CPD building programmes.

9.2  Continued Professional Development (CPD) In order to implement the CPD structure on CBRN/HAZMAT-related subjects, Table 9.1 provides not only possible topics but gives also indications of time that needs to be spent in order to be able to acquire the knowledge on each topic.

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Table 9.1 List of continued professional development topics in HAZMAT/CBRN. Created by the author. Month 1

2

3

Week 02 4

5

1

2

3

Week 03 4

5

1

2

3

Week 04 4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Continued professional development (CPD) Criminal investigation in hazardous environment Live agent training Sampling Decontamination Radioprotection Incident command & control Communication during CBRN events Reporting and intelligence collection CBRN report writing Bio. intelligence exploitation Chem. intelligence exploitation Tactical command Level 01 Tactical command Level 02 Tactical command Level 03

(continued)

Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum  101

Topics

Week 01

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Month Topics Introduction to HAZMAT & CBRN Health and safety How to detect HAZMAT/CBRN agents ERG Guidebook Scene management Planning the response Communicating the findings Understanding basic chemistry, biology and radiology Basic hazard risk assessment Health and safety analysis Response planning Personal protective equipment Keeping record of in and out Implementing response plan After incident mitigation and recovery

Week 01 1

2

Week 02 3

4

5

1

2

Week 03 3

4

5

1

2

Week 04 3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

102  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

Table 9.1 Cont.

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Month Topics

Week 01 1

2

Week 02 3

4

5

1

2

Week 03 3

4

5

1

2

Week 04 3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Basic biology Basic radiology Personal protective equipment Basic monitoring principles Decontamination Hazards and risk Response planning Confinement and containment Record keeping in and out Evidence log and record keeping Terrorism and CBRN agents

(continued)

Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum  103

Emergency decontamination Practical exercises Introduction to HAZMAT technician role and responsibilities Basic chemistry

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Month Topics Chemical warfare agents Biological warfare agents Radiological warfare agents Dispersal devices How to respond Evidence collection Tactical operations in HAZMAT/CBRN environment Legislations CWC BWC NWC CBRN/HAZMAT legislative ethics Health and safety legislation for HAZMAT materials Dangerous Goods Regulations: Aviation and Road Crime scene Management ISO/IEC 17020

Week 01 1

2

Week 02 3

4

5

1

2

Week 03 3

4

5

1

2

Week 04 3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

104  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT

Table 9.1 Cont.

Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum  105

9.3  Awareness Course (One Full Day) In order to implement the awareness structure on CBRN/HAZMATrelated subjects, Table 9.2 provides a full overview of the awareness topics, giving indications of time needed to be spent in order to be able to acquire the knowledge on each topic. Table 9.2 Awareness course topics. Created by the author. Month

Week 01

Topics

1

2

3

Week 02 4

5

1

2

3

Week 03 4

5

1

2

3

Week 04 4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Module 01 Awareness Introduction to HAZMAT & CBRN Health and safety How to detect HAZMAT/ CBRN agents ERG Guidebook Scene management Planning the response Communicating the findings Practical exercise

1hour 2 hours 4 hours 8 hours 16 hours 1 week 2 weeks

9.4  Specialised Training Courses 9.4.1  Operational Course In order to implement the specialised course structure on CBRN/ HAZMAT-related subjects, Table 9.3 provides a clear structure and clear indications of time that needs to be spent in order to be able to acquire the knowledge on each topic and achieve the respective qualifications.

106  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT Table 9.3 Operations course topics. Created by the author. Month

Week 01

Topics

1

2

3

Week 02 4

5

1

2

Week 03

Week 04

3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4

5

Module 02 Operations Understanding basic chemistry, biology, and radiology Basic hazard risk assessment Health and safety analysis Response planning Personal protective equipment Keeping record of in and out Implementing response plan After incident mitigation and recovery Emergency decontamination Practical exercise

1hour 2 hours 4 hours 8 hours 16 hours 1 week 2 weeks

9.4.2 Hazardous Material Technician and CBRN Course In order to implement the specialised course structure on CBRN/ HAZMAT-related specialised training, Table 9.4 provides a clear structure and clear indications of time that needs to be spent in order to be able to acquire the knowledge on each topic and achieve the respective qualifications.

Possible Implementation Strategy for Learning Curriculum  107 Table 9.4 HAZMAT and CBRNe course qualification schedule. Created by the author. Month

Week 01

Week 02

Week 03

Week 04

Topics

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Module 03 HAZMAT technician Introduction to HAZMAT Technician role and responsibilities Basic chemistry Basic biology Basic radiology Personal protective equipment Basic monitoring principles Decontamination Hazards and risk Response planning Confinement and containment Record keeping in and out Evidence log and record keeping Practical exercise Module 04 CBRN technician Terrorism and CBRN agents Identifying terrorism Chemical warfare agents Chemical agents exercise Biological warfare agents Biological agents exercise Radiological warfare agents (continued)

108  Insight of a Possible Police Education Programme on CBRNe/HAZMAT Table 9.4 Cont. Month

Week 01

Week 02

Week 03

Week 04

Topics

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Radiological agents exercise Dispersal devices How to respond Evidence collection Practical exercise

Conclusion The provided tables clearly show how relevant topics to the discussed thematic could be implemented, providing not only some guidance on hours to spend in teaching but as well providing a better knowledge on the larger subjects covered to achieve a competence from a policing point of view. The proposed subjects and hours should only be seen as an indication and can be expanded according to the needs of the unit. Nevertheless, some thought should be given to the provided tables and a minimum requirement should be set up on what is mandatory training and what could be a supplementary training.

References Steers, R. M., Mowday, R. T., & Shapiro, D. L. (2004). Introduction to Special Topic Forum: The future of work motivation theory. The Academy of Management Review, 29(3), 379–387. https://doi.org/10.2307/20159​049 Wengler, P. (2020). Is it important teaching on CBRN/HAZMAT related subjects? Canterano: CBRNe Book Series, Aracne editrice Press.

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While the author is a serving member of staff at OPCW, The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the OPCW.

Index

Note: Page numbers in italic refers to Tables. Abbreviations 1, 3, 4, 5, 11 see also Absorption 26 Academies 31, 71, 113 Accidently 9 see also; Accidents 6, 33, 38, 40, 45, 53, 55, 89 Acid 10, 41, 43, 46, 47, 64, 81 Acronym p. 4, 5 see also; ABC 5, 42, 111; PPE p. 35, 45, 46, 82, 84 Activists 24, 39 Advising 58, 68 Aerial bombing 4, 33 Aeroplane p. 4, 15, 33, 34, 36, 38, 35 Agents p. 1–20, 26, 29, 35, 37, 58, 59, 79–85 see also; CBRN agents, 40, 54, 61, 63, 73, 76, 91, 100; Biological agents 34, 43; CBRNe 4, 11, 69; Chemical agents, 39, 53, 57, 60; Hazmat agents 37, 38, 54, 61, 62, 73, 77, 85, 91, 100; Radiological agents 37, 45, 53, 75, 78; Nuclear agents 34; Nerve agents 16, 18, 15, 17, 26, 29; SARIN 22, 23, 27; VX 21, 23, 58 Agriculture 23 Airport 15–40 see also; Dangerous Goods 34–58; Dangerous Goods regulation 64–80; DGR 37–40 Alexander Litvinenko 14–29, 67 Anarchist cook book 23 Animal Liberation Front 24 Archduke 8 Aryan group 23 Asbestos 34 Assassination 10; Markov, Georgi 13–14; Litvienko, Alexander 14–15 Asymmetrical warfare 7

Atomic 4–5 Atomic bomb 5 Aum Shinrikyo 20–21 Avian Flu 36 Baseline 2–3 Battelfield 5 Bhagwan Shree Ranjee Cult 19–31 Bio defence 25 Biological risks 33–36; Aburin 6; Bacteria 13, 20, 23, 35, 81; Infectious diseases 6–47; Blood poisoning 14; Butilium toxin 6; Cholera 21; COVID-19 27, 52, 64, 74–76; Serratia marcescens 27 Biological weapons 13–23 see also; Anthrax 21–43; Biological weapons convention 77 Blitzkrieg 4 see also; bomb 4–8; bombing 19, 33, 34; Bombardment 4; Condor Legion 4 Borders 36–90 see also; border crossing 43–45 Buddhism 21–57 Cargo 33–40, 76 Casualties 5, 93 Category of state terrorism 7 CBRN/HAZMAT: Additional factors 73, 86; Complexity and challenges of 91, 97 CBRN/HAZMAT cases: First officer unaware of agent 18, 85; Procedure for responding to such incidents 44–46, 52–53, 69, 92–94

Index 117 Cepol 49–55 Chain of command 63–86 Chain of custody54- 61, 95 Chemical Weapons Convention 23–25, 64, 77 see also; chemical war 4; chemical weapons 17; Chemical fumes 34; bitter almond 29; chlorine 22–28 Chemical properties 6 Civil Contingency Act 2004 77–88 Civil defence 10 Civil protection 44–59 Civil war 4 Classroom 77 Clausewitz (1918) 5–9 Cold zone 44, 80, 93 Command and control 57 Command resilience 85 Communication 55–95 Complex 73, 86 see also; Complexity 91, 97 Confusing 90 Connected 4 Container 17–43 Contamination 10–39 see also; contamination was border crossing 45; emergency decontamination 54; cross-contamination 75 Continued Professional Development (CPD) 59–60, 72, 76, 98–101 CPD 59–101 Crime 6–46 see also; Crime scene 17; criminal prosecution 76; CBRN crime 89 Criminal act 5, 10–11, 20, 38, 9; Criminal activities 21; Criminal law 53, 75; Criminal prosecution 76, 87; Criminal or forensic investigation 80 Crisis Management 53–57 Cummings (1996) 14, 30 Curriculum 49, 72, 89 Customs 72 CWC 16, 25, 23, 64 Dangerous Goods 34–58; Dangerous Goods regulation 37–40, 64–80 David Rappaport 11 Death 7, 19, 21, 26 Decontamination 10, 15, 39, 58, 73; Emergency decontamination 54–60; Decontamination procedures 81, 85 Defence 5–28

Deliberate 4, 19, 20 Destruction 1–33 Determination 7 Deterrence 8 Development 6–53, 57 Diplomatic 8 Discussion 7, 89 Diseases 6, 37 Dispersal devices, of agents 13, 23, 35, 45, 75 Disposal 5–6, 49, 59 Dissatisfaction 99 Diversity guidelines 73–99 DNA 21, 49–52 Dobbert (2018), 16, 30 Documents 14, 41, 80, 111 Domestic conflicts 43–46, 63–67, 75–77, 81–89; Domestic legislation 60, 62, 64; Domestic violence 85 Door handle 17–25, 65 Draconian law 65 Drug 16–21 see also; Drug test 44; Drug addict 79 Dual use 52 Duplication of work 87 Earth Liberation Front 24 Earth First 24 Ebola 8–34 see also; Haemorrhagic fever 41 Economy 8 Education 23–50 see also; education programme 52–59; education principle 60–66 Emergency 47 see also; Emergency response 63, 77, 84; Emergency Response Guidebook 80; Emergency services 17, 92 Equipment 16–102 ERG 44–47, 102 Etymology 1–11 European Union 25, 41, 55, 68 Europol 49–52 Evaluation of physical evidence 95 Evidence 14, 38 see also; collect evidence 38, 54, 61; evidence collection 80; evidence collection command (ECCP)point 80–98 Evolution 33, 35, 67, 98 Exhibition 5 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 49–59; Explosive agents 4

118 Index Exposure 6–39, 55, 67 Extra-Schengen 41 Face mask 65–90 fact sheet 96 Father Alberto Onainda 4 FBI 8–31 see also; FBI Investigation 25–32; FBI 12 steps 95 Fermenters 22 Filtration system 28 Firefighter 38, 58, 59 Fireworks 24 First look report 91–94 First responder 4, 18, 46–114 First-line 46 Food security 8 see also; Contaminating Food 23; Food residues 27; Food poisoning 28 Fort Detrick 25 Franco Regime 4 Frontline 36 Fundamental rights 65, 86–87 Gaining respect 8 Gavrilo Princip 8 Gendarmerie 24 General Franco 4 General penal law 53 General terms 7, 31 German Luftwaffe4 GIGN 59 Goods 33–39 Greenpeace 24, 30, 110 Gregory Markov 58 Grocery shopping 64–65 GSG9 59 Guernica 4–11, 113–114 Guidelines 67 Handelsblatt (2017) 15 Handling procedures 53, 57 Harm 5–17, 66 Hazwoper 43 Hazardous material 4–7, 10–11, 34, 45, 53, 57, 59–60, 77–79, 80–84, 92; Hazardous Material Technician 106; HAZMAT 4–7, 10–12, 17, 23–28, 33, 39–40, 49, 53, 54, 57, 59–61 Hazards 29 HAZMAT 3–114 Health and safety 57, 77, 111 Health crisis 52–76

Herzberg 99 Higher education 61–88 Hinduism 21 Hiroshima 34 History 6–29 HME xvii Holdswort & Menedick (2013) 14, 31, 58, 68, 112 Home-made 64 Hot zone 39–53, 60, 80, 93–97, 111 Human body 16, 34 Hungarian 8 Hydrogene Cyanide 22, 26, 29, 46 Hypothesis 20 Ian Davidson 23, 64, 114 Identification 22, 58, 78, 30, 88 Ideologies 18–21 Illness 20, 35, 41 Improvised 20, 94 Incapacitated 15 Incident command 53–71, 74, 82–101 Incident response 16–17, 51–59, 62, 75, 77, 78, 84, 85, 88 Industrial 4–10, 85 Industrial chemicals 4–6 Industrialisation 5–6 Infections 13 Information 9–31, 34–44, 66–113 Infrastructure 33, 39 Ingested 26 Initial training 85 Initiation rite 21 Injection 15, 28, 79 Integrated lesson plan 53, 60 Intelligence 66–99 Intercultural competence 71–95 International collaboration 73, 109 International law 53 International level 94 Internet 9, 29 Interoperability 90 Interpol 7, 50–56 Invasion 8 Investigate 6–23, 46–61, 86–97 James and Brenda Lutz (2011) 9, 11, 23 Jesip 17, 80 Joint decision making model 67 Kerosene 34–40 Kidnapped 21

Index 119 Kill 31–34, 58, 68, 71, 113–114 Kim Jung Nam 15, 58, 68, 114 Know-how59, 67 Laboratory 28, 59, 95 Language 3, 8, 73, 75, 90, 112 Language barriers 72 Latin language 8 Law Enforcement 2–33, 51–109 Lawyer 21 Learning objectives 78, 81, 85, 86, 88 Legal 19, 28, 79, 94 Legislations 57, 62, 64, 66, 77, 111 Letters 27 Linguistics 1 linked 4, 6, 53, 73–74 Liquid 15, 23, 28, 29, 47, 78, 81 Live-saving 81 Lockdown 64–65, 76 London 4, 13–16, 52 Lone wolf 8, 12, 34 Malaria 35 see also; Dengue Fever 36 Malaysia 15 Malicious 4, 27 Mandate 67, 74, 76, 77, 89 Manpower 97 Marie Curie 28 Marking panelsn 38, 40, 80 Marxism12 Mass casualties 5, 93 Mass disruption 10 Measles35 Mein Kampf 23 MERS 35 Metro Station 22 Military defence 5, 10, 28–29 Military personnel 4 Milleniarists 7, 21 Mohammed Ammer Ali 25 Money laundering 38, 52 Monitoring 8, 22, 58, 67, 89, 103, 107, 110 Morbidity41 Mortality 40–41 Motivation 22, 99, 108, 114 Motives 9 Multiple crime scenes 18 Nagasaki 4, 34 Natural disasters 10, 46, 72, 63 Natural outbreaks 76

NBC 5 Nerve agent 15–19, 26, 29 New Scotland Yard 17 New technologies 15, 53 Nine-liner 93, 94 Nine lines 92 Non-compliance 86 Non-formal learning 99 North Korea 8 Nuclear4–8, 24, 34, 45, 96 Nuclear arsenal 8 Nuclear weapons 8 Nitro-glycerine 36 Occupational Health and Safety at work 4 Oklahoma 8 0n-scene 35, 38, 81, 86 Operating 51, 67, 84–89, 92 Operational commander 85–89 Oregon 19 Organophosphates 27–29 Origin 3–4, 8, 11 Outcomes 81 Pablo Picasso 5 Panes 20 Panic 10, 15–16, 38–40, 64 Paris 34 Passengers 16, 33, 35–40 Patrol car 43–44, 52 Peace 6 Penetration 15–16 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 24 Performance 56, 83 Personal protective equipment 16–17, 43, 53–58, 60, 78, 81–85 Perspective 5–6, 11, 27, 34–36, 43, 71, 99 Pharmaceuticals 37 Plane 4, 33–36 Police 1–94 Polio 36 Political goals 3–9, 12, 24, 85 Polonium 14–15 Poor man’s James Bond 23 Porton Down 18 Postal Services 25 Powder 44–45 Precursors 11 Preliminary survey 94 Preventing 6, 8, 27 Private property 65

120 Index Procedures 17, 27–28, 40, 46, 52–53, 57, 61–64, 72–73, 80–86, 91–95 Processes 5–29, 38, 64, 66, 74, 80–81, 94–95, 99, 112 Production 6, 22, 41, 76, 94 Programmes 40, 51, 60, 92, 100 Prosecution 58, 76, 87 Protective equipment 16, 17, 26, 29, 43, 45, 53, 57, 58, 60, 78, 82, 83, 85, 92 Psychological 8, 10, 99 Psychological effect 8, 10; Fever 13, 14, 21, 35–36, 41 Radicalisation leading to terrorism 3 Radical 3 Radioactive dirty devices 8, 10 Radiological 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 28, 36–38, 46, 59, 76, 87, 96 see also; Radiological Agents 33–34, 45, 53, 59, 75–78, 81; Rdd 10 Regulation 3, 43–47, 53, 57–58, 60–65, 77–80 Religious 20–21, 34 see also; religious groups 7, 12; religious terrorism 12, 18–19; religious waves 7 Research 28 Responders 4, 18, 46, 49, 52, 59, 80, 86, 92 Responding 18, 3, 10, 35, 38, 45–47, 59, 69, 72, 85–97 Restriction 65, 76 Revenge 20 Richard Reid 8 Ricin 6, 13, 14, 23, 25, 64 Rift Valley Fever 35 Right extremism 7 Right wing 12, 23 Risk assessment 5, 76, 81, 83, 85, 87 Role and responsibilities 83, 87 Ronald Regan 13 Roots 3 Rules 8, 33, 65, 76, 86 Safety 10, 17, 27, 36–37, 43, 46, 53 see also; Safety legislation 18, 57–58, 60, 64, 76–77; Legislations 57, 62, 64, 66, 77, 111 Salmonella 19, 20, 28 Samples 21, 45, 95 San Francisco 4 Sarin 21, 22, 23, 27 Sars Cov 2 33, 35, 69

Saxitoxin 6 Scenarios 27, 35, 29, 59, 66, 85 Scene management 104–105 Science of Danger 81–87 Sea Shepperd 24 Second World War 5, 6, 23, 28 Secret service 14 Security 9, 25, 36, 37–40, 45, 64, 76, 92 Serratia marcescens 28, 33 SEVESO 54, 55, 61, 77 Shape 8, 22, 75, 80 Share 65, 87, 88, 92 Sheep 22–23 Ship 13 see also; shipped 25, 33, 37, 40, 76; shipping papers 37, 44, 80; shipment 34, 37 Shoe bomber 8 Single issue terrorist groups 24 Skin 13–18, 26–28, 47 Skin Irritation 18 Skripal 16–17, 27 Social distancing 65–66 Society 8, 19, 24, 73 SOP 83–88, 98 Spain 4 Span of command 84 Span of control 85 Spraying 13 Stabilising 62 Staging area 38–39, 53–54, 57, 60 Standard operating procedures 50–51, 83–84, 87 State 8, 16, 46, 66, 95 also; State terrorism 7, 12–13 Strategic command 86–89; see also command 86; incident command 71, 80, 86 Studies 3, 76, 80, 87 Subject(s) 7, 13, 55, 57, 62–69, 76, 78, 82; see also Subject matter 7, 13 Suicide19, 53, 57, 60 Sulfuric acid 43, 47 Suspicious 45 see also; Suspicious letters 45; Box, 45 SWAT 52, 54, 59, 61, 77 Symbolic 24 Tabun 23, 29 Tactical 71, 80, 84–87 Tactical incident commander 85, 87 Technical information 94

Index 121 Technician 59, 71, 77, 84, 92, 98, 105 Terminology 3–11 Terrer aliquis poena magnitude 9 Terror 6, 9, 33, 92; see also Terror groups 24 Terrore hostibues esse 9 Terrorism 2–13, 25, 46, 58, 64, 84; see also Terrorist groups 18, 34 Thompsom (2015) Threats 3–29, 39, 53, 98 TIC’s 4–11 Time weight average 79 Timelines 3, 7, 82 Timothy McVeigh 8 TNTP 36, 41 Tokyo 22, 27 Tools 7 Toxic 10, 28 37 see also; Toxic industrial chemicals 4, 11, 34; Toxicity 6, 14, 78; Toxin(s) 6, 21, 23, 35, 81 Train 40–46 see also; Training 4–10, 23–27, 38, 44–52; Training curriculum 51; Transcontinental connection 33 Transportation by road, air and train 58, 76, 78 Trigger 5, 17, 27, 81 Truck 34, 43–44, 76 Tuberculosis 35

Umbrella murder 13 United Kingdom 14, 17, 24, 28, 64 United States 5, 8, 25, 34, 43, 47, 92 Universal definition 11 University 21, 52 Unknown 7, 16–18, 25, 38–39 Unpredictable 8 VX 15, 21–23, 28, 58 Violence 3–6, 21, 24, 85 Virus 22, 35, 39, 75–81 Vynil gloves 25–26, 44, 47 Warfare 6–13, 58 Warm zone 44, 80 Waste 6 Water supplies 23, 39, 64 Weapons 1–11, 14–26, 33, 52, 57–60, 64, 73, 76, 94 Weapons of mass destruction 1, 4, 6, 10, 22, 33 WMD 3–11, 34 World Health Organisation 75 X-ray 36, 81 Yellow fever 13, 36 Zoonotic diseases 35, 41