Plutarch's three treatises on animals : a translation with introductions and commentary 9781138570849, 1138570842

Citation preview

PLUTARCH’S THREE TREATISES ON ANIMALS

This volume offers a new translation of Plutarch’s three treatises on animals— On the Cleverness of Animals, Whether Beasts Are Rational and On Eating Meat—accompanied by introductions and explanatory commentaries. The accompanying commentaries are designed not only to elucidate the meaning of the Greek text, but to call attention to Plutarch’s striking ­anticipations of arguments central to current philosophical and ­ethological discourse in defense of the position that non-­human animals have ­intellectual and emotional dimensions that make them worthy of inclusion in the moral universe of human beings. Plutarch’s Three Treatises on Animals will be of interest to students of ­ancient philosophy and natural science, and to all readers who wish to ­explore the history of thought on human–non-­human animal relations, in which the animal treatises of Plutarch hold a pivotal position. Stephen T. Newmyer is Professor Emeritus of Classics at Duquesne University in ­Pittsburgh, USA. He has published extensively on classical views on the intellectual and emotional dimensions of non-­human animals, and is the author of Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (­Routledge, 2006), Animals in Greek and Roman Thought: A Sourcebook (Routledge, 2011) and The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (Routledge, 2017).

ROUTLEDGE CLASSICAL TRANSLATIONS

Routledge Classical Translations provides scholars and students with ­accurate, modern translations of key texts that illuminate distinctive aspects of the classical world and come from a range of periods, from early Greece to the Byzantine empire. Volumes include thematic groupings of texts, texts from important authors as well as texts from the Byzantine period that are relevant for the study of the classical world but which remain inaccessible. Each volume has accompanying notes and commentary that provide a solid framework for deeper understanding of the material. As well as providing translations of significant texts, the series makes available material that is untranslated into English or difficult to access, and places these texts within new contexts to open-­up areas of study and support research. THE LOST HISTORY OF PETER THE PATRICIAN An Account of Rome’s Imperial Past from the Age of Justinian Thomas Banchich THE SORROWS OF MATTIDIA A New Translation and Commentary Curtis Hutt and Jenni Irving MUSAEUS’ HERO AND LEANDER Introduction, Greek Text, Translation, and Commentary Silvia Montiglio PLUTARCH’S THREE TREATISES ON ANIMALS A Translation with Introductions and Commentary Stephen T. Newmyer

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/classicalstudies/series/CLTRA

PLUTARCH’S THREE TREATISES ON ANIMALS A Translation with Introductions and Commentary

Stephen T. Newmyer

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Stephen T. Newmyer The right of Stephen T. Newmyer to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-­Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-57084-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-70318-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

FOR T H E HONOR A BL E W I L L I A M S . S T IC K M A N I V, “A G o o d M a n S k i l l e d i n S p e a k i n g ”

CONTENTS

ix xi

Acknowledgements Preface

1 Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence, or On the Cleverness of Animals (De sollertia animalium) 1 Introduction

1

Translation

20

2 Whether Beasts Are Rational, or Gryllus (Bruta animalia ratione uti) 95 Introduction

95

Translation

106

3 On Eating Meat (De esu carnium) 128 Introduction

128

Treatise I: Translation

138

Treatise II: Translation

156 169 177

Bibliography Index

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to Amy Davis-Poynter and Lizzi Risch at Routledge who welcomed this project with enthusiasm and guided me to its conclusion. Their remarkable forbearance and indulgence with my many questions and requests along the way deserve my special thanks. The sensible editorial hand of Gail Welsh showed me, in a gentle way, that there is always room for improvement.

ix

PREFACE

In the Introduction to his 1995 edition of Plutarch’s dialogue Bruta ­animalia ratione uti (Whether Beasts Are Rational), also called Gryllus, Giovanni ­Indelli observed that Plutarch’s animal-­related treatises had to that date not attracted much scholarly attention.1 He cites in support of his ­observation a slightly earlier comment by Francesco Becchi that makes the same claim.2 Writing a few years after Indelli, Giuseppina Santese, in her Introduction to the edition of Plutarch’s De esu carnium (On Eating Meat) that she and Lionello Inglese had composed, noted that that treatise had itself been little studied or read, and had not yet been the subject of any special investigation.3 In the decades since Indelli and Santese made these observations, ­research on the animal treatises of Plutarch (ca. 50–120 ce) has progressed apace. A substantial body of scholarship now exists that includes monographs in a number of languages analyzing the three treatises as a group, volumes of essays devoted to one or another of the treatises, and numerous in-­depth studies of individual passages in the three works.4 In addition to such ­interpretative studies, critical editions and translations of the three Plutarchan treatises on animals, De sollertia animalium (On the Cleverness of Animals), Bruta animalia ratione uti (Whether Beasts Are Rational), or Gryllus, and De esu carnium (On Eating Meat), have appeared in a number of languages in recent years. As the works of Indelli and Inglese and Santese cited above suggest, important editions with translations and commentaries have been directed to a non-­English-­speaking audience.5 Although the animal treatises of Plutarch have inspired a rich body of secondary scholarship in English in the past two decades, he has been less well served in the case of English-­language editions and translations of the three works, despite the pivotal position that they hold in the history of classical thought on the place of non-­human species in the hierarchy of animal creation.6 Plutarch’s treatises on animals, along with the treatise De abstinentia (On Abstinence) by the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry (234–ca. 305 ce), constitute the only extant Greek works that view non-­human animals from a predominantly philosophical perspective, and that attempt to define the

xi

P R E FAC E

nature of human–non-­human animal relations and obligations. R ­ eaders who wish to study in English translation Porphyry’s elaborate defense of abstinence from meat eating are fortunate now to have the admirable t­ ranslation and commentary by Gillian Clark.7 The most recent English translation with commentary on the three animal treatises of Plutarch remains that published in the Loeb Classical Library in 1957.8 The ­commentary to the Loeb edition, provided in the ample footnotes, is directed rather narrowly to classical scholars and is consequently rich in citations of parallel passages from other classical authors, quite often cited without comment on their relevance to the Plutarchan context, in cross-­references to other works of Plutarch, again often cited without comment, and in identifications of ­passages in Greek works to which Plutarch refers. Plutarch’s animal treatises have likewise not attracted much attention from translators in the more “popular” press. On the Cleverness of Animals and Whether Beasts Are Rational were included in a Penguin selection from Plutarch’s ethical works.9 These translations are accompanied by minimal notes limited for the most part to occasional identifications of Plutarch’s citations from other authors. The Introduction to the volume scarcely ­ ­alludes to the animal treatises included in the selection, and the translation of each animal treatise is preceded by an introduction of one-­half-­page or less. Whether Beasts Are Rational is translated again in a more recent ­Penguin collection of Plutarch’s essays, with generous commentary and references to other works of classical literature alluded to in the treatise.10 The remaining two animal treatises of Plutarch are not included in that edition. On Eating Meat, Plutarch’s plea for a vegetarian regimen that advances some arguments not found even in the much more extensive work of ­Porphyry on the topic, does not appear to have been translated into ­English or to have been the subject of an English-­language commentary since the publication of the Loeb edition. It has thus remained impossible for an interested reader to find an English translation of Plutarch’s three treatises on animals in a single volume with the exception of the Loeb, either in the form of a scholarly edition with Greek text or in the more popular format of the sort offered in the Penguin series. Plutarch’s treatises on animals, like Porphyry’s systematic defense of ­abstention from meat eating, possess an interest for a broader readership today than was addressed by the Loeb edition. The decade of the 1960s witnessed, in the United States and in Europe, an acceleration of interest in issues of social justice that manifested itself, in the United States, in the Civil Rights Movement and in Women’s Liberation, among other causes. In this same period, the so-­called Animal Rights Movement began to call attention to the mistreatment and exploitation of non-­human animals in the food, medical, entertainment and cosmetic industries, and the argument was advanced by philosophers and animal activists that humans cannot justly deny

xii

P R E FAC E

rights to non-­human species that they without question accord to other humans, because the assumptions upon which such denial has rested since classical antiquity, in particular the supposed unique possession of reason by human beings, are either false or without moral relevance. In his historical account of changing attitudes toward other species, Richard Ryder has written of this period, “The reawakening of interest in the ‘rights of animals’ in the 1960s and 1970s was not due, initially, to proselytizing, but to the spontaneous conclusion arrived at by many people that it was plainly illogical as well as unjust to discriminate so grossly on the basis of species.”11 Since the 1960s, a monumental body of literature has been produced, by ethical philosophers, animal behavioral scientists, social activists, and even novelists, devoted to analysis of the complex issue of man’s place in the hierarchy of animal creation and of his obligations, or lack of obligations, toward other species. For persons who seek to gain a historical appreciation of the development of thought on human–non-­human relations, the animal treatises of Plutarch occupy a pivotal position since they address many of the issues that form the basis for current debate on the topic, and they anticipate, at least in embryonic form, many of the arguments advanced by animal advocates today.12 Available English translations and commentaries on Plutarch’s animal treatises scarcely allude to Plutarch’s anticipations of modern thinking on animals, and their publication antedates the appearance of much of the most significant secondary-­source analysis of the treatises. Recent scholarship on the treatises has tended to focus, in the case of each of the three works, on certain key issues central to a full appreciation of the meaning of the Greek text. In the case of On the Cleverness of Animals, scholars have endeavored to define the dimensions of animal “reason” or “rationality,” as Plutarch employs these terms, to identify the philosophical antecedents of his pronouncements on the intellectual capacities of non-­ human species, and to note the instances where he appears to deviate from earlier Greek speculation on animal mentality. Whether Beasts Are Rational has inspired lively debate on the question of animal language, and on the knotty problem of how we are to judge the tone of a lecture delivered by a pig to a hero of Greek mythology. On Eating Flesh has proven interesting to scholars because of the surprising “modernity” of the arguments that it advances in support of the meat-­free lifestyle. I have endeavored to take account of these issues in composing the introductions and commentaries to the three works. In light of the timeliness of Plutarch’s works on animals, a fresh t­ ranslation of the three treatises that seeks to place them in the context of Greco-­Roman discussion of animal issues, and at the same time to clarify their relation to current philosophical and scientific thought on non-­human animals, may help to render Plutarch’s thought on animals accessible both to classical scholars unfamiliar with current debate on human–non-­human relations

xiii

P R E FAC E

and to readers in other disciplines who wish to become familiar with seminal texts that date from the earliest stages of that debate. I hope that this volume may be of interest not only to students of classical literature and philosophy but also to “Greek-­less” readers who seek to gain some knowledge of classical thought on animals through study of primary source texts. For that reason, I transliterate all Greek technical terms that come under discussion, and I either translate or paraphrase all passages from Greek and Latin authors that I cite in the Commentary.13 Since a reader may have a particular interest in one of the treatises contained in the volume, the translation is designed so that each treatise may be studied independently of the others. Some topics covered in the introduction to one treatise may therefore reappear in some form in the introduction to another of the treatises, and some secondary sources may be cited with full bibliographical particulars in the notes to more than one of the treatises, which reduces the need to consult the notes to another treatise for guidance on works cited. For readers who are not classicists, I cite works of Plutarch which are not translated in this volume, and those of other Greek and Roman authors, by their commonly used English names. All translations of Greek and Latin texts in this volume are my own. A would-­be translator faces formidable challenges in undertaking to render Plutarch into another language. In his study of Plutarch, D. A. Russell offers a perceptive analysis of the author’s style which makes clear a number of the principal challenges involved. Labeling Plutarch “a conscious artist in an elaborate manner,” Russell calls attention to his “varied syntax and sophisticated word-­order.”14 As to Plutarch’s choice of words, Russell notes that “his vocabulary is three times that of Demosthenes,”15 and that he has a marked penchant for abstract terms. Overall, Russell detects in Plutarch a style that may be characterized as elevated and long-­w inded, learned and elusive, and difficult to represent effectively in any other language. I have tried in my translation to steer a middle course, in light of the issues that Russell lays out so eloquently. Where possible, I attempt to reproduce the syntax of Plutarch’s sentences, which are rich in dependent clauses and participial constructions, in hopes of giving some idea of the elaborateness of his style, but I have not hesitated to divide long sentences into smaller units when clarity is at stake, in the belief that subject matter deserves to take precedence over rhetoric. Russell notes of every attempt to present Plutarch in another language, “Much of the flavor of course evaporates in translation.”16 I hope that enough of the flavor of Plutarch remains in my translation to provide Plutarch a new and appreciative audience of readers who care deeply about animal rights, animal welfare, environmental integrity and other social issues that were largely still in an embryonic stage when the three treatises contained in this volume last appeared together in English translation.

xiv

P R E FAC E

Notes 1 Giovanni Indelli, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali: ­introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1995) 20, “Sulle quattro opere nel loro complesso c’è una non copiosa letteratura …” ­Indelli includes in his enumeration here Plutarch’s De amore prolis (On Love of Offspring) along with the three treatises devoted entirely to animals, namely De sollertia animalium (On the Cleverness of Animals), Bruta animalia ratione uti (Whether Beasts Are Rational), or Gryllus, and De esu carnium (On Eating Meat). 2 Indelli 20 note 41, citing Francesco Becchi, “Istinto e Intelligenza negli Scritti Zoopsicologici di Plutarco,” in Michele Bandini and Federico G. Pericoli, eds., Scritti in Memoria di Dino Pieraccioni (Florence: Istituto Papirologico G. Vitelli, 1993) 60, who notes that the animal treatises of Plutarch are works “che hanno sinora riscosso un interesse assai limitato de parte della critica.” 3 Introduction to Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, eds. and transl., Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne: introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1999) 7, “è stato scarsamenta letto e studiato, nè mai fatto oggetto di un’ indagine specifica.” 4 The Bibliography section in each number of Ploutarchos, the journal of the International Plutarch Society, is a helpful guide to editions, translations and studies of all works of Plutarch, and individual issues of the journal frequently contain original scholarship devoted to Plutarch’s works on animals. 5 De esu carnium is translated as well in Donatella Magini, transl., Plutarco: Del Mangiar Carne. Trattati sugli Animali (Milan: Adelphi, 2001). All three animal treatises of Plutarch are translated, with introduction, ample commentary and bibliography, in Pietro LiCausi and Roberto Pomelli, transl., L’Anima degli ­Animali: Aristotele, Frammenti Stoici, Plutarco, Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi, 2015). Two of the animal treatises may be studied in French in Myrto Gondicas, transl., L’Intelligence des Animaux, suivi de Gryllos, traduit du grec et présenté par Myrto Gondicas (Paris: Arléa, 1991). De sollertia animalium has been translated with extensive commentary in the excellent edition with Greek text of Jean ­Bouffartigue, ed. and transl., Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales, Tome XIV, 1re Partie, Traité 63, l’Intelligence des Animaux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012). De esu carnium is available in Portuguese translation with commentary in Joaquim Pinheiro, transl., Plutarco: Sobre Comer Carne (Coimbra: Imprensa da ­Universidade de Coimbra, 2019). 6 In her excellent survey of the considerable body of literature devoted to the human animals in Greek and Roman literature, Julia Kindt, study of non-­ “­Review ­A rticle: Capturing the Ancient Animal: Human/Animal Studies and the ­Classics,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 137 (2017) 213–225, while taking into account recent analyses of Plutarch’s animal treatises, does not include in ­ her discussion the topic of translations or commentaries on Plutarch or other ­classical authors who discuss non-­human animals. 7 Gillian Clark, transl., Porphyry: On Abstinence from Killing Animals (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 8 Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, ed. and transl., Plutarch: Moralia XII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). 9 Rex Warner, transl., Plutarch: Moral Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971). 10 Robin Waterfield, transl., Plutarch: Essays (London: Penguin, 1992). 11 Richard Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (­Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 4. Ryder dates the birth of modern interest in ethical issues relating to the treatment of non-­human species to the publication of a

xv

P R E FAC E

major article, “The Rights of Animals,” by British novelist and animal activist Brigid Brophy in the Sunday Times in October 1965. 12 For an analysis of Plutarch’s anticipations of arguments encountered in ­animal rights literature and animal behavioral science, see Stephen T. Newmyer, ­Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and ­London: Routledge, 2006). 13 The Greek text of the treatises that I have followed in preparing my ­translation is that of C. Hubert, ed., Plutarchi Moralia, Vol. VI. Fasc. 1, recensuit et ­emendavit C. Hubert (Leipzig: Teubner, 1959). I have compared the Greek text of this edition against that in the editions of Cherniss and Helmbold, of Indelli, of Inglese and Santese, and of Bouffartigue (see notes 1, 3, 5 and 7, above), and I note ­i nstances where I follow a reading other than that in Hubert. 14 D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 21. 15 Russell 22. 16 Russell 23.

xvi

1 WHETHER LAND OR SEA ANIMALS HAVE MOR E INTELLIGENCE, OR ON THE CLEVER NESS OF ANIMALS (DE SOLLERTIA ANIMALIUM ) Introduction Only a few persons now dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (1871), Chapter 3

Plutarch’s longest and most detailed examination of the intellectual ­endowments of non-­human animals, and of the consequences for human conduct toward other species that in his view flow from a demonstration of such endowments in other animals, is generally known by the imprecise and somewhat generic Latin title De sollertia animalium, usually translated as On the Cleverness of Animals.1 The treatise has strong claims on the attention of the modern reader with an interest in the history of ideas on the nature of animal intellect and on human–non-­human animal relations. Plutarch’s ­contention that all animals have at least a share of reason and the conclusion that he draws from that contention, that human beings have a moral obligation toward non-­human animals, places him outside the mainstream of Greek philosophy and ethics. In addition, the treatise anticipates a number of ideas central to current debate on the place of non-­human animals in the hierarchy of animal creation and on man’s ethical relationship to other species. On the Cleverness of Animals is cast in the form of a dialogue which ­concludes with an extensive catalogue of examples of “resourcefulness” or “ingenuity” (the sollertia of the Latin version of the title) in non-­human species set forth in the course of an elaborate comparison of the intellectual properties of land- and sea-­dwelling creatures, a narrative technique reflected more clearly in the Greek title of the work which may be translated as Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence. This comparison is set forth in the course of a debate, occupying the latter 30 chapters of the 1

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

work (965D–985C), in which one of the interlocutors in the dialogue offers evidences of the intellectual superiority of land-­dwelling species, after which another argues for the superiority of sea-­dwellers. The treatise ends abruptly, with no decision reached on the question under discussion, a fact that has prompted some scholars to conclude that the work survives in an incomplete state. Another explanation that has been advanced for the apparent suddenness with which the work ends is that Plutarch may not have intended in the first place to argue that one group of animals was intellectually superior to the other.2 Some scholars, moreover, have branded Plutarch’s technique of analyzing the intellectual properties of non-­human animals by juxtaposing land- and sea-­dwelling creatures as intrinsically artificial and useless, based as it is on a distinction that has no real biological significance.3 The literary setting of On the Cleverness of Animals, as well as the identity of the interlocutors who contribute to the debate, have long intrigued ­scholars. More than a century ago, Max Schuster argued that the work ­reflects Plutarch’s activities as a teacher in his native town of Chaeronea in Boeotia, in the course of which Plutarch would lecture on various ­philosophical topics to friends and interested parties who were devotees of Academic, Stoic or Epicurean philosophy.4 A relaxed, congenial and open-­m inded atmosphere prevailed at such gatherings, if one may judge by the ambience suggested in On the Cleverness of Animals. Schuster maintains that Plutarch accepted no money for the instruction that he offered, and that the discussions dramatized in his dialogues were conducted at the writer’s home. A remark near the opening of the treatise (960A) stating that the thesis of animal rationality had been advanced “yesterday” suggests that the reader is “dropping in” on the continuation of an ongoing discussion. Apparently hunting was a topic prominent in the discussion of the previous day (959C), and the issue of the interplay of sportsmanship, amusement and cruelty inherent in the practice of hunting seems to have been debated. The most prominent interlocutors in the first seven chapters of the work, in which evidences of rationality in non-­human animals are set forth (959A–965B), are Autobulus, who is generally identified as Plutarch’s father, and Soclarus, who is believed to have been a friend of Plutarch’s family. Not all of the other named speakers in the dialogue can be identified with certainty.5 The date of composition of On the Cleverness of Animals is, like the identity of some of its speakers, a matter of speculation. Although most of Plutarch’s philosophical treatises provide no clues as to their date of composition,6 On the Cleverness of Animals contains one historical reference that has been used to date the work. On one occasion, a speaker relates, a dog performing in a play that appeared to be dead suddenly came to life and rushed about happily and excitedly, an action that moved the “elderly Vespasian,” who was in the audience (974A). This might be taken as evidence that the dialogue was composed after the accession of the emperor Vespasian in 69 ce but before his death in 79 ce. The reference is in fact of little value since the dialogue might have appeared many years after the anecdote 2

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

took place. Bouffartigue argues for such a later date on the grounds that the work suggests an experienced author who is comfortable in mingling philosophy, rhetoric and science.7 The principal interest that On the Cleverness of Animals holds for the ­modern reader, however, does not lie in the comparative chapters which present zoological lore often inferior to the best of previous Greek science and which are replete with anecdotes of wondrous actions and abilities in non-­human species that have questionable zoological merit.8 Indeed, Plutarch’s very choice of animal species to illustrate one or another aspect of animal “cleverness” in these chapters is not original with him, but closely mirrors other classical treatments of the topic.9 It is principally in the seven chapters (959A–965B) that precede the comparative chapters that the particular interest of the treatise lies for the modern reader, for here Plutarch offers a detailed and spirited defense of what may be considered the overall thesis of On the Cleverness of Animals, embodied in the comment by one of the interlocutors early in the dialogue, that “all animals in one way or another have a share (metechein) of reason and understanding” (960A). On the Cleverness of Animals constitutes the earliest extant Greek defense of the proposition that non-­human animals possess at least a modicum of reason and that human beings have a moral obligation to take account of their ­interests in their interactions with them.10 These first seven “theoretical” chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals seek to clarify the manifold senses in which non-­human species may be said to “share in” rationality by delimiting the dimensions of that rationality and by offering examples to illustrate that contention. Plutarch’s position is that the rational faculty in animal species is correctly understood to exist in a “more or less” relation from one species to another, rather than in an “all or nothing” relation, as the Stoics held. He argues that the error of the Stoics in estimating the intellectual dimensions of non-­human species is to fault animals for not exhibiting the perfection of reason when nature did not design some species to exhibit that perfection (962C). One cannot expect to find the fullness of reason even in human beings, Plutarch maintains, although they, unlike other animals, have at least the capacity to perfect their reason through education and fostering (962C).11 He acknowledges, at the same time, that the intellect of non-­human animals, in comparison to that of human beings, is “weak” (asthenē) and “muddy” (tholeron) (963B). Plutarch characterizes the difference in intellectual capacity between animal species as one of quantity rather than of quality, since, in his view, all animals possess at least some degree of reason, and some, like human beings, possess more than others, although reason manifests itself in all species in similar ways with similar results: like human beings, other species have sufficient intellect to enable them to navigate their lives successfully, securing food while defending themselves against their natural enemies, raising their young, constructing secure dwellings, and engaging in some form of communication. Moreover, Plutarch contends, one regularly speaks 3

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

of “madness” in an animal when its behavior is erratic or when it suffers from an affliction like rabies. Madness is an aberration of the intellectual faculties of a creature. One would hardly speak of the disturbance of the intellectual faculties of an animal if it did not have such faculties in the first place. Hence, when a rabid dog fails to recognize its master, its judgment and reason are disordered, and any philosophers who fail to acknowledge these facts are, he maintains, either simply disregarding the evidence of their senses or deliberately questioning the truth (963E–F). The philosophers whose views Plutarch here and throughout the treatise On the Cleverness of Animals most consistently characterizes as misguided and oblivious to the clear evidence of the senses are the Stoics, against whom his arguments for the presence of a degree of reason in non-­human animals are principally directed.12 Even when he does not name the school, it is clear that he has them in mind since he frequently alludes to the titles of treatises written by adherents of the school and he mockingly cites terms and concepts that have a technical sense in Stoic philosophy.13 He rather frequently alludes to the theories of the influential Stoic theoretician and logician Chrysippus (ca. 280–207 bce), who appears to have contributed substantially to the Stoic conception of the intellectual limitations of non-­ human animals.14 It is important to note that, although Plutarch challenges the Stoic contention that non-­human animals are devoid of reason and presents an elaborate case against that position, he does not question the initial premise of his philosophical adversaries that the possession of reason confers moral standing. His approach is to argue rather that this prerequisite does indeed exist in all animal species. In Stoic teaching, actions which in human beings are directed by “reason” (logos) are directed in non-­human species by “impulse” (hormē). This impulse enables non-­human animals to flee their natural enemies and to pursue their natural prey, but does not empower them to carry out higher mental functions like choice or the exercise of will, much less to aim at goodness and justice. The origin of this distinction between human beings and other animal species lay for the Stoics in the makeup of the animal soul. According to Stoic teaching, every animal has an eight-­part soul, consisting of the five senses, the capacity for utterance, the capacity for reproduction, and an eighth part called in Stoic doctrine the hēgemonikon, a kind of ruling or guiding principle.15 This functions in all animals as a kind of overarching guide that directs the actions of the soul. In human beings, the hēgemonikon attains to rationality when a person reaches the age of seven or 14, the two ages variously cited by Stoic authorities as marking the onset of reason, but it remains irrational in other species. Morally speaking, the human being now possesses the impulse toward goodness, while the non-­human animal possesses merely the impulse to survive. The impulse (hormē) of non-­human animals is sufficient to distinguish them from plants, but non-­human animals do not rise to the level of human beings. This dichotomy leads to a 4

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

permanent alienation between human beings and other animals that has profound consequences for human morality. In Stoic parlance, human beings have no covenant of justice with non-­human animals.16 The interlocutor who advances the Stoic point of view in On the Cleverness of Animals asks with some alarm how life could continue if human beings are expected to deal kindly and harmlessly with other species, as one would naturally do with beings endowed with reason. To do so would compel humans to be deprived either of life or of justice (964A–B). In his biography of Chrysippus, Diogenes Laertius informs us (Lives of the Philosophers VII. 129) that the eminent Stoic had himself taken up the topic of interspecies justice, and had declared that there could be no question of such justice because of the “unlikeness” (anomoiotēta) that exists between human beings and other animals arising from the absence of reason in non-­human animals. Chrysippus is alluding here to the Stoic doctrine of οἰκϵίωσις (oikeiōsis), a concept that is frequently judged to be the cornerstone of the Stoic ethical system. The Greek term resists translation.17 The noun oikeiōsis is certainly related to the noun oikia, “house, household,” to the verb oikeioun, “to appropriate, to claim as one’s own,” and to the adjective oikeios, “of one’s house, belonging, friendly.” That which is opposite to oikeios is allotrios, “belonging to another, foreign.” Some translations of oikeiōsis that scholars have suggested include “belonging,” “kinship,” “affiliation,” “appropriation,” “attachment” and “bonding.” All translations that scholars have put forward stress the ideas of commonness, of creature sympathy, and of shared experience. In his biography of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, Diogenes Laertius offers a helpful picture of the Stoic conception of animal bonding (Lives of the Philosophers VII. 85–89). According to the Stoics, Diogenes explains, the “first impulse” (prōtē hormē) of any animal at birth is toward self-­preservation because every animal is by nature dear to itself. This causes an animal to flee things that are harmful and to seek out things that it recognizes as “akin” (oikeia, VII. 85). In time, every animal reaches out from itself to recognize others that are akin to itself. The later Stoic Hierocles (second century ce) likened this process to the formation of concentric circles in a pond that grow ever wider. In the case of human beings, these circles eventually encompass the whole of humankind. The operation of this “widening” was of central importance in Stoic ethics, for the recognition of kinship in others was for the Stoics the origin of justice. While humans feel kinship with other humans, and non-­human animals with other non-­human animals, the bond of oikeiōsis can never exist between humans and other animals because of the limitations of the soul of non-­human animals. A human being, on attaining to rationality, feels increasingly alienated from other animal species, for the lifestyle, interests and goals of rational beings have nothing in common with those of irrational beasts. The goal of human life is to follow the promptings of reason that teach humans to live in accord with virtue, while the goal of the life of 5

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

irrational animals is to obey the urgings of impulse (hormē) that guarantee self-­preservation. In the view of the Stoics, a being whose actions are directed toward a goal of moral improvement, that is, the human being, has nothing in common with a being whose actions are directed merely to keeping it safe from danger, that is, the non-­human animal. Plutarch’s interlocutor Soclarus, who advances the Stoic position in On the Cleverness of Animals, acknowledges that both the Stoics and the Peripatetics maintain that justice could not be born into the world but would remain formless, if all animals were held to be possessed of a share of reason (963F–964A). It is striking that Plutarch employs in this passage the same verb (metechein, “to share in, to partake of”) that he uses to characterize the nature of rationality in non-­human animals near the beginning of the treatise, in what may be considered the “thesis statement” of the work (960A). Again he seeks to emphasize that reason in the animal kingdom is to be understood to stand in a “more or less” relation rather than in an “all or nothing” relation.18 Soclarus’ objection is answered by Autobulus, who presents a more animal-­ friendly vision throughout the dialogue. He suggests that the Stoics have taken an exaggerated position, since there is no injustice involved in an act of human violence against animals that would seek to harm human beings, but only when such violence is directed against harmless animals (964C–D). Such an approach deprives neither animals of reason nor humans of justice. The ethical stance which the Stoics adopted toward non-­human species, against which Plutarch argues in On the Cleverness of Animals, may justly be viewed as a “moralization” of the views of Aristotle on the intellectual endowments of non-­human animals. While Aristotle drew clear distinctions between the intellect of human and non-­human animals, he stopped short of drawing the sorts of moral distinctions between the species that Plutarch challenges.19 It is noteworthy that Aristotle draws a more categorical distinction between the species in his ethical and political treatises than in his zoological works, where he presents a somewhat more generous construction of the intellectual faculties of non-­human animals. At Politics 1332b3–6, for example, Aristotle declares that other animal species live “primarily by nature,” whereas “man lives by reason as well, for he alone possesses reason.” In his Metaphysics, he makes a very similar observation that, while all animals have by nature the power of “sensation” (aisthēsis), and while all animals live by their “impressions” (phantasiais), human beings live also by “skill and reasonings” (technēi kai logismois) (Metaphysics 980b26–28). In History of Animals, however, Aristotle presents a more positive view of the intellectual capacities of non-­humans, allowing them a faculty that he terms “practical intelligence” (sunesis), and he goes so far as to suggest that the intellectual faculties of all animals stand in a “more or less” relation from one animal to another (History of Animals 488b15–16), a position with which Plutarch agreed. While Aristotle draws rather firm distinctions between the intellectual capacities of humans vis-­à-vis those of other animals, he does 6

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

not conclude therefrom that humans are better than other animals because of their superior mental endowments, but rather merely different from them. The Stoics subsequently incorporated features of Aristotelian zoology into an ethical system grounded in the belief that a profound and uncrossable boundary separates mankind from the remainder of animalkind. The absence of reason in non-­human animals precludes the existence of any oikeiōsis between the species, but the Stoics drew the further conclusion that the unique possession of reason by human beings accords them a moral standing denied to the remainder of animal creation. In Cicero’s dialogue De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the Ends of Good and Evil), the interlocutor who explicates the Stoic ethical system thus characterizes the school’s position on the superior moral value of human beings (III. 67): But in the same way that there exist the bonds of right between men and men, so do they feel that there is no bond of right with the beasts, for Chrysippus has well observed that other things were born for the sake of men and gods while men and gods exist for their own fellowship and society, so that men may use beasts for their advantage without injustice.20 If rationality and moral value are to be viewed as linked, as seen in the Stoic model, Plutarch viewed it as his task to prove that non-­human animals do in fact demonstrate evidences of some degree of reason. Since even the Stoics acknowledged that all animals know from birth which things they should pursue and which they should flee, they must, according to Plutarch, have the ability to “judge” (krinein), to “remember” (mnēmoneuein), and to “pay heed” (parechein), capacities essential to differentiating that which is to be pursued from that which is to be avoided (960F). Creatures that are born without the capacities of memory, preparation and judgment, not to mention such capacities as fear and desire, could not exercise these functions if they were by nature devoid of some degree of reason (960E–F). In support of his thesis, Plutarch cites with approval the observation of the Aristotelian philosopher Strato that a creature could not possess any sensation (­aisthēsis) “without some understanding” (aneu tou noein) (961A). Although Plutarch is noteworthy as one of very few ancient thinkers who argue the position that non-­human species demonstrate evidences of rational activity, his case for animal rationality is not without difficulties and has been faulted by critics who point out, as shortcomings in his presentation, an imprecise use of terminology in referring to the dimensions of animal intellect,21 and a number of what appear to be contradictions in his position on animal rationality between the case developed in his three animal-­related treatises and his assertions elsewhere. Some scholars have maintained that these contradictions arise rather from the context in which they occur than from any real and fundamental difference in philosophical 7

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

stance on the part of Plutarch.22 One such passage that has been frequently singled out by critics occurs in Plutarch’s treatise De amore prolis (On the Love of Offspring), wherein he argues that the rationality of human beings affords them an understanding of such concepts as justice, virtue and divinity, concepts that non-­human animals lack because they are “irrational” (aloga, 493B). Whereas human beings are endowed with reason, other species follow nature more closely. Plutarch’s point here is therefore not so much that non-­human animals are inferior to human beings in their intellectual faculties but rather that they have fewer opportunities than do humans to run afoul of their intellectual faculties by deliberate surrender to external passions. In a real sense, non-­human animals can therefore be said to live more in accord with nature because they do not have the capacity to contravene that nature. Equally problematic is Plutarch’s observation, De fortuna (On Fortune) 98C, that if human beings did not possess intellect (noun) and reason (logon), their life would not differ from that of other animal species. Scholars have sought to demonstrate that even this passage does not after all deny reason to non-­human animals, but merely implies that humans have a greater degree of reason than do other species, so that Plutarch’s observation here is in fact in line with his position in On the Cleverness of Animals that rationality exists throughout the animal kingdom in a “more or less” relation.23 Here too, what appears to be a contradiction in Plutarch’s position on animal rationality can be viewed rather as a critique of the failings of human beings who, although they are naturally endowed with intellects superior to those of other animal species, violate their better instincts by a perverted application of their intellectual faculties which enables them to indulge in vices that do not lie open to other animal species that cannot act contrary to their more limited intellectual faculties.24 Plutarch’s elaborate argument for the presence of a degree of reason in non-­human animals, which constitutes the central theme of the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B) and which immediately precedes the comparison of the intellectual capacities of land- and sea-­dwelling creatures, culminates in a discussion (963F–965B) which may be viewed as the topic toward which these early chapters point: if all animals are indeed endowed with at least a modicum of reason, is it the case that human beings stand in some sort of ethical relationship with them? Specifically, do humans have a debt of justice toward non-­human animals?25 The fact that the discussion of the possibility of a relationship of justice between the species immediately precedes the comparative chapters might suggest that the reason why neither land-­dwelling nor sea-­dwelling animals are ultimately declared to have superior mental endowments is that Plutarch’s real goal in the treatise is to suggest that all animals, ­regardless of their intellectual capacities, stand in a relationship of justice with human beings. 8

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

The interlocutor Soclarus inaugurates this discussion of interspecies justice with his observation (963F) that both the Stoics and the Peripatetics held that, if we take the view that all animals have a share of reason, justice could not come into existence. For the Stoics, reason possession was a prerequisite for moral consideration. A debt of justice was owed only to rational beings, and only human beings are the sort of creatures that can be included in a covenant of justice. A denial of an obligation of justice toward non-­human species was implicit in the doctrine of oikeiōsis, which posits an unbridgeable gap separating rational from irrational beings. Humans are freed from any need to take into account the potential interests of other species because they are “unlike” (allotrion) human beings and they share with humans nothing that may be defined as oikeion, the opposite of that which is allotrion. Tad Brennan has suggested that the term oikeion, in Stoic parlance, refers to that which is “an object of concern” to human beings.26 Non-­human animals, because they are devoid of reason, cannot be such an object of concern. To some extent at least, the Stoic case against according moral value to non-­human animals likely arose from a recognition of the realities of life in the pre-­industrial ancient world. To eschew the use of animals as sources of food, as beasts of burden, and as implements of war, would render life virtually impossible.27 Soclarus, in setting forth the Stoic position, observes (964A) that, in the view of both the Stoics and the Peripatetics, humans could not live “humanely” (philanthrōpōs) if they conducted themselves “without harm” (ablabōs) toward other animals: the nexus between human life and animal subjugation is clearly articulated here. Soclarus takes comfort, however, in the thought that it is impossible for human beings to act unjustly toward creatures that have no conception of justice toward human beings (964B). One cannot harm creatures that have no conception of right action. Autobulus, however, suggests a solution to the dilemma that Soclarus posits: it is not unjust to make use of animals that are gentle and harmless as our helpers in human endeavors, but it is unjust to abuse them (965B). Nor is it unjust for human beings to kill animals that are dangerous and that seek to harm human beings. This solution neither denies reason to other animals nor undermines the concept of justice. Moreover, he charges (964C), the Stoics are not in a position to make their denial of reason to non-­human species a justification for denying an obligation of justice (dikaiosunē) to them since, he charges, the Stoics have not adequately proved their thesis that non-­human animals are in fact irrational. The discussion of justice toward non-­human animals ends with a brief catalogue of examples of unjust actions perpetrated by human beings against other animals (965A–B) that is fascinating for the remarkable similarity that it bears to enumerations of human behaviors toward other animals that are condemned by modern animal rights philosophers and animal advocates and welfarists. Autobulus judges it to be unacceptable 9

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

to include foie gras in one’s diet, or to force animals to perform acts that are unnatural to them, inspiring fear in them and compelling them to be cruelly separated from their young. Hunting and fishing are also singled out as pursuits that amuse human beings by visiting suffering and death on other creatures. Plutarch’s catalogue of human interactions with other animal species that he considers to be morally unacceptable strikingly foreshadows the motto of the American animal rights organization PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) which states that “Animals are not ours to experiment on, eat, wear, use for amusement, or abuse in any way.”28 It is precisely in this sort of passage that the value of Plutarch’s treatise On the Cleverness of Animals lies for the student of the history of human–non-­human animal relations, for he is the earliest extant Greek author who argues that human beings have an obligation toward other species to take into consideration the possibility that their lives have value because they are in some ways “akin” to human beings.29 The force of Plutarch’s argument is to reject the strictures against non-­human animals that are fundamental to the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis. It is important to keep in mind that Plutarch’s case for an ethical relationship between the species is predicated on an acceptance of the Stoic principle that reason confers moral value, an acceptance which inspires the lengthy demonstration, in the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals, that all animals have at least a modicum of reason. In his defense of vegetarianism, On Eating Meat, Plutarch advances a second type of argument according to which the claim that non-­human animals have to just treatment at the hands of human beings is not predicated on the presence or absence of reason in them. In this second type of argument, Plutarch suggests that the capacity of other animal species to experience suffering and joy makes it incumbent upon human beings to take their interests into account in their relations with them, not least because they, through their vocalizations that humans mistakenly interpret as meaningless, ask for justice from their human tormentors (On Eating Meat 994E–F).30 Plutarch’s case for an ethical relationship between humans and other animal species, viewed in its entirety, rests, therefore, not solely on an acceptance of the Stoic argument that reason confers value and a demonstration that, contrary to the Stoic position, all species have such value as participants in the world of rational beings, but also on the argument, prominent in the work of American animal rights philosopher Tom Regan, that animals can be harmed through deprivation of pleasures that are natural to them and through infliction of harm by human beings.31 The idea that the capacity of a creature to suffer confers moral value and that it is therefore wrong for humans to visit such suffering upon them, finds its classic modern expression, long before Regan, in the often-­cited dictum of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), “The question is not, Can they reason?, nor, Can they talk?, but, Can they suffer?”32 10

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

The view that intellectual capacity and moral value are linked, a view that, as we have seen, was accepted by Plutarch in On the Cleverness of Animals and the negative consequences of which he sought to mitigate in his argument that other animal species do have at least a portion of reason, survived the classical world to become perhaps the single most influential idea governing human–non-­human animal relations in Western history.33 Concern for the suffering of non-­human species did not figure prominently in classical discourse, and its anticipation in Plutarch is noteworthy. In recent decades, ethical philosophy, neuroscience and cognitive ethology, the branch of biology that investigates animal cognition, have developed the terms of this debate in directions that ancient philosophy and natural science could not have anticipated. It is increasingly asked, by both philosophers and scientists, whether superior intellect does in fact confer moral value. As the question is posed by some animal advocates, what does it matter, after all, if human beings are more intelligent than other species? Perhaps other criteria, like the capacity of other animals to suffer and to feel joy and to take in interest in their own lives, are what should concern humans. This latter possibility found a place in Plutarch’s animal philosophy at a time when it was scarcely envisioned elsewhere. The case for rationality in non-­human animals that Plutarch develops in the first seven “theoretical” chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965D) is defended by citation of numerous instances of what Plutarch regards as illustrations of various aspects of the intellectual properties of other species that are set forth in the course of the 30 chapters (965D–985C) that constitute the comparison of land- and sea-­dwelling creatures. Here too Plutarch’s manner of argument bears a striking similarity to modern discussions of the intellectual and moral dimensions of non-­human animals in that Plutarch’s exposition relies heavily upon anecdote and anthropomorphization, types of evidence that classical scholars find of dubious value in the same manner as do some modern philosophers and ethologists who question the claims of developed intellectual and moral capacities in non-­human species advanced by some of their philosophical and scientific colleagues. Although Plutarch’s reliance upon anecdote and anthropomorphization in the comparative chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals is perhaps the aspect of his “zoology” that has most consistently attracted the negative attention of critics for over a century, even the most casual perusal of the comparative chapters is sufficient to convince the reader that, in other aspects of his relation to natural science as well, Plutarch was no Aristotle, a fact that some critics hold against him. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Plutarch, in his comparison of land- and sea-­dwelling animals, examines other species primarily as a moralist rather than as a biologist, and his intention in so doing is to extract appropriate lessons for human conduct toward the remainder of animal creation. One can hardly deny the criticism 11

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

of Vittorio d’Agostino, writing almost a century ago, that Plutarch’s zoology is little more than an assemblage of interesting anecdotes.34 Very similar criticisms are still encountered in discussions of Plutarch’s animal treatises. Recently, Bouffartigue noted that Plutarch’s zoological lore is intended to astonish the reader, and he calls attention to Plutarch’s frequent use of terms denoting wonder, amazement and paradox.35 It is not surprising, then, that Plutarch is not always careful to distinguish mythological creatures from animals found in nature if the mythological creatures illustrate a point that he is eager to make. Nor is it likely that Plutarch’s zoological insights are to any significant degree the result of direct observation. Occasionally, an interlocutor in the dialogue claims to have been an eyewitness to an event that he describes. Aristotimus claims (973A) to have heard a story from two individuals who were witnesses to the strange behavior of a jay at Rome, and he shortly after claims (973E) to have witnessed himself the astonishing behavior of a dog in the Roman theater. Such claims may be merely literary embellishments intended to lend immediacy to the narrative, although, given Plutarch’s obvious affection for his animal brethren, it is plausible that his own experiences have on occasion worked their way into his narrative in some form. Since Plutarch cites some of the same animal species that other writers cite to illustrate virtues or vices in other species, scholars suspect that Plutarch relied predominantly on commonplace books for his examples.36 Plutarch’s tales, mentioned above, of a talented jay that taught itself the music of a trumpet after meditating on the melodies of the instrument, and of a scene-­stealing dog that delighted Roman theatergoers by appearing to spring back to life on cue in the course of a play, are typical instances of the sort of anecdotal evidence of animal intellect with which he seeks to demonstrate that other species have traces of rationality, and both illustrate at the same time his tendency to view behaviors in other species in terms that “humanize” those behaviors. Plutarch anthropomorphizes non-­human behavior to such an extent that he frequently seems willing to conclude that behavior in a non-­human animal that resembles a particular behavior in a human being is an instance of that same behavior in the non-­human animal. This anthropomorphizing approach in Plutarch is traceable as well in his take on the issue of whether non-­human animals are capable of emotional states. In Plutarch, behavior in a non-­human animal that, if observed in a human being, would be indicative of the presence of a particular emotion in a human is taken as evidence that that same emotion is occurring as well in the non-­human animal.37 Plutarch’s reliance upon anecdote and anthropomorphization has been condemned as detrimental to his credibility as a writer on zoological lore since Dyroff’s early study of Plutarch’s animal psychology.38 Although recent decades have witnessed greater willingness on the part of some philosophers, psychologists and animal behavioral scientists to countenance the idea that, as Plutarch had maintained, intellectual capacities in animals exist in a “more or less” relation, that is, that 12

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

rationality is a continuum, other animal investigators still adopt what may be viewed as a Neo-­Stoic position according to which man’s superior intellect affords him a moral standing that other species cannot claim. Proponents of this position resist attempts to isolate continuities between human beings and other animals, and find the use of anecdote and anthropomorphization to illustrate such continuities to be particularly noxious strategies. In his book Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel, ecologist Carl Safina discusses at length the hostility once aroused in the scientific community by assertions of continuities between species that relied to any degree on anecdotal evidence or on an anthropomorphizing stance, a hostility that was most intense during the years in which behaviorism prevailed in animal studies. To anthropomorphize was, he notes, sufficient to destroy an academic career in that environment. ­Safina’s description of scientific orthodoxy under behaviorist domination closely mirrors, in modern scientific parlance, the attitudes against which Plutarch fought in his refutation of the Stoic position on the superiority of human beings to other species: Professional animal behaviorists inserted a hard divider between the nervous system of the entire animal kingdom and one of its species: humans. Denying the possibility that any other animals have any thoughts or feelings reinforced what we all most want to hear: We are special. We are utterly different. We are better. Best. (Talk about projecting!)39 The decades since the decline of behaviorism, with its opposition to any talk of thoughts or feelings in non-­human animals, have witnessed an increasing acceptance, in both philosophical and scientific circles, of the position that other animal species demonstrate evidences of cognition in a relationship that is correctly understood as a spectrum in which human beings provide the most developed example of intellectual sophistication, and that it is scientifically valid to employ anecdotal evidence and anthropomorphizing analogies to describe that spectrum of cognition in the animal world. Ethologist Marc Bekoff argues that researchers may justly employ both anecdote and anthropomorphization, bolstered by rigorous neurological study of similarities between human and non-­human brains, because, in the final analysis, we have no choice but to interpret non-­human animal behavior in terms that make sense to us. He speculates that the tendency of human beings to view other species in humanlike terms may be “hardwired” in the human brain. Perhaps our need to view other animals in human terms, he suggests, may help us to make ethical decisions in our behavior toward them.40 Bekoff’s stance suggests that the battle that Plutarch waged in his treatise On the Cleverness of Animals is slowly being won, and in terms that Plutarch would have understood and approved. 13

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

Notes 1 On the frequent unsuitability of the Latin titles to Plutarch’s philosophical treatises, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006) 30. D. A.  ­Russell, Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 164, notes that even the Greek titles given to Plutarch’s treatises are probably not original with the author himself. In this volume, I call the treatise whose Greek title translates as Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence by the English translation of its Latin title, On the Cleverness of Animals, since the treatise is generally referred to by that ­English title in scholarship devoted to it. 2 Both explanations for the abrupt ending appear in the comment in Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, Plutarch: Moralia XII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984; reprint of edition of 1957) 479, “To some editors the ending is suspicious because of its brevity and vagueness; they regard it as added by an ancient editor who could not find the original termination. But the sudden turn at the end may merely indicate that the whole debate is in reality a single argument to prove the thesis that animals do have some degree of rationality.” 3 Already Adolf Dyroff, Die Tierpsychologie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia (Würzburg: Bonitas-­Bauer, 1897) 7 note 1, had branded the sea–land approach to comparison “recht privitiv.” Similarly, Jean Bouffartigue, ed., Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales, Tome XIV, 1re Partie, Traité, 63 l’Intelligence des Animaux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012) viii, charges that the seriousness of the topic under discussion is vitiated by the silliness of the manner of argument, “mais le sérieux de la question est miné par le caractère artificiel et presque ludique de la joute.” It is worth noting, however, that Plutarch is not the only ancient writer on animals whose criteria of classification are liable to strike us as less than cogent. In his life of Theophrastus (ca. 370–287 bce), Diogenes Laertius lists treatises by that philosopher devoted to discussions of animals that are believed to bear grudges, to animals that burrow, and, particularly reminiscent of Plutarch’s ­approach, to animals that live on dry land (Lives of the Philosophers V. 43). Plutarch’s technique of comparing the excellences of land-­ dwelling animals against those of sea-­dwellers recalls his employment of the synkrisis, or “side-­by-­side judgement,” which follows all but four of the paired biographies of his Parallel Lives and which compares and contrasts the moral qualities of his biographic subjects. Some scholars have found these comparisons less than convincing and far-­fetched. On Plutarch’s use of the synkrisis, see David H. Larmour, “The Synkrisis,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2014) 405–416, and Stephen T. Newmyer, “Human-­A nimal Interactions in Plutarch as Commentary on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten Fögen and Edmund Thomas, eds., Interactions Between Animals and Humans in Graeco-­Roman Antiquity (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 233–252. 4 Max Schuster, Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De sollertia animalium, mit besonderer Berüchsichtigung der Lehrtätigkeit Plutarchs (Dissertation, Munich) (Augsburg: Himmer, 1917) 1–21. Bouffartigue xviii–xix argues that Plutarch does not provide sufficient information to support Schuster’s interpretation of the setting of the dialogue. 5 On the identity of the characters of the dialogue see Helmbold 319 and Bouffartigue xv. An invaluable resource for identifying the personages mentioned in the works of Plutarch is Bernadette Puech, “Prosopographie des Amis de Plutarque,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 33, 6 (1992) 4831–4893.

14

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

6 On the difficulty involved in attempting to date the philosophical works of Plutarch, see Introduction to On Eating Meat note 10. 7 Bouffartigue xx–xxi. 8 The comparative chapters well illustrate the fascination with “animal wonders” that is the main feature of the branch of ancient literature on non-­human animals designated by the term “paradoxography,” which is primarily interested in marvelous and incredible behaviors and abilities in non-­human species. Bouffartigue xii, charging that the emphasis on this sort of material causes the scientific value of the treatise to be debased, calls attention to the fact that the Greek verb θαυμάζϵιν (thaumzein), “to wonder at, to be astonished at,” appears, in verbal and adjectival forms, 14 times in the course of the treatise. The treatment of animals in Pliny the Elder’s Natural History and in Aelian’s Nature of Animals is similarly heavily indebted to this sort of wonderful lore. See Mary Beagon, Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 8–11 and “Wondrous Animals in Classical Antiquity,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 414–440, and Steven D. Smith, Man and Animal in Severan Rome: The Literary Imagination of Claudius Aelianus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 196–198. Kenneth Kitchell, “A Defense of the ‘Monstrous’ Animals of Pliny, Aelian, and Others,” Preternature: Critical and Historical Studies in the Preternatural 4 (2015) 125–151, argues that one may sometimes defend accounts of animal marvels in ancient authors as real facts debased by poor observation, while some such accounts have suffered from frequent retelling. It is somewhat ironic that elsewhere Plutarch, whose accounts of non-­human animals certainly do not shy away from the marvelous and the grotesque, condemns the propensity in human beings to seek out the odd and sensational because of a perverted sense of curiosity about life, De curiositate (On Curiosity) 517D–521D. Plutarch does not seem to heed his own advice. Plutarch’s fascination with animal wonders calls attention to the fact that his interest in non-­human animals is not after all primarily biological but rather ethical: what interests him is the moral lessons for human conduct that may be learned from the actions of other animal species, and in this, his goal does not differ substantially from that of his Lives, in which the actions of historical figures teach the consequences of virtue and vice. Plutarch’s “biology” has long been the subject of harsh criticism. Dyroff 40 note 4 had observed of Plutarch’s scientific lore, “Bedenklich ist bei Pl. sehr vieles,” and he charges that Plutarch possessed a genuine interest in other species but did not have the mental acuity or taste for cautious investigation that would have made him a man of science in the manner of an Aristotle. 9 Sherwood Owen Dickerman, De Argumentis Quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem Obviis e Structura Hominis et Animalium (Dissertation, Halle, 1909) and “Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek Psychology,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 42 (1911) 123– 130, demonstrated that ancient writers regularly cite the ant, the bee, the spider and the swallow as exhibiting various aspects of animal intelligence, often discussing the various species in the same order of presentation. Dickerman, “Some Stock Illustrations” 130, speculates that most ancient writers on animal intellect are dependent upon some earlier, now-­lost source, perhaps the Pre-­socratic philosopher Alcmaeon of Croton, for both this choice of species and for the order of presentation. Bouffartigue xxxvi–xlvi discusses the question of the underlying literary source of the animal anecdotes in Plutarch, Pliny the Elder and Aelian, and notes that Aelian at times reproduces the phraseology of Plutarch without

15

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

mentioning his name, and at times discussed anecdotes pertaining to particular species in the order in which the same anecdotes occur in Plutarch. This leads him to suspect a common literary source for the two authors. Bouffartigue also observes that Aelian’s manner of presentation of anecdotes is often more exuberant and embellished than is Plutarch’s. That embellishment at times consists of a moral reflection on the part of Aelian in which the behavior of some non-­ human animal is declared to be more praiseworthy than that of human beings. 10 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers V. 49, notes that Theophrastus wrote a one-­volume treatise entitled On the Intelligence and Character of Animals. The title suggests that Theophrastus might have treated some of the issues of animal intellect and behavior that are covered in On the Cleverness of Animals. It is impossible to determine the extent to which Plutarch may be indebted to the earlier treatise for doctrine and examples. Urs Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977) 164–170, offers a valuable discussion of the possible contents of this lost treatise. 11 This passage in De sollertia animalium is analyzed and discussed in greater detail in Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 34–35. 12 Plutarch’s response to Stoic philosophical doctrine is analyzed in the classic work of Daniel Babut, Plutarque et le Stoïcisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969). See also Jan Opsomer, “Plutarch and the Stoics,” in Beck 88–103. 13 A number of Stoic technical terms are cited disparagingly at On the Cleverness of Animals 961C–D. On Plutarch’s mocking use of Stoic technical terminology, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 34–36. 14 Plutarch mentions Chrysippus by name (On the Cleverness of Animals 980A–B), in the course of the land- and sea- comparison, mocking him for his inordinate fascination with a certain species of crab that he never failed to discuss in his works. Chrysippus’ theories and technical vocabulary are alluded to without mention of his name at On the Cleverness of Animals 961C–E. For further discussion of Chrysippus in the animal-­related treatises of Plutarch, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 57–60. 15 The Stoic conception of the nature of the animal soul, both human and non-­ human, is set forth in Aetius, Placita IV. 4. 4 (=SVF II. 827) and IV. 21 (=SVF II. 836). The eight-­part division of all animal souls is cited there as part of the teachings of Chrysippus. 16 In On Eating Meat, Plutarch was about to take up the topic of whether there is after all no covenant of justice with non-­human animals at the point where the treatise breaks off (999B). 17 S. G. Pembroke, “Oikeiōsis,” in A. A. Long, ed., Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone, 1971) 114, calls the concept “a central idea in Stoic thinking from the start,” while noting that it has “a persistent reputation for being impossible to translate.” Similarly, Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties and Fate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 154, notes that the term has eluded successful translation, and cites, as “unsuccessful candidates” for translation of the term, “appropriation,” “affinity,” and “familiarization.” Although the concept is most consistently associated with the Stoics and is considered to be central to their ethics, some scholars suggest Theophrastus as the philosopher who first gave expression to the idea. On the Theophrastean connection, see C. O. Brink, “οἰκείωσις and οἰκειότης: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory,” Phronesis 1 (1955–1956) 123–145. In his treatise on vegetarianism, De abstinentia (On Abstinence), the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry (234–ca. 305 ce) explains at some length (III. 35) Theophrastus’ position that humans and

16

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

other animals are akin because all have the same “principal elements” (archai), that is, flesh, skin and bodily fluids. Francesco Becchi, “Lignes Directrices de la Doctrine Zoopsychologique de Plutarque,” Myrtia 17 (2002) 159–174, argues forcefully that Plutarch’s conviction that human beings owe a debt of justice to non-­human animals because of their kinship with human beings and their common elements is heavily influenced by Theophrastus’ theory of interspecies kinship. See especially 169–173. 18 Porphyry offers a similar characterization of the Stoic position on the consequences for human morality that would follow if non-­human animals are judged after all to stand “in a relation of kinship” (oikeiōs, On Abstinence I. 4) with human beings: the very concept of justice would founder since non-­human species are, according to the Stoics, “of no concern to us” (mēden hēmin prosēkonta, I. 4). 19 Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 2, writes of this distinction, “Aristotle, I believe, was driven almost totally by scientific interest in reaching his decision that animals lack reason. But in the next generation the Stoics and Epicureans had a moral concern because they both had theories of justice which denied justice to animals, on the grounds that animals lack reason. The Stoics further saw animals as providentially designed for us.” 20 Cicero, On the Ends of Good and Evil III. 67, sed quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, et bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint since iniuria. For further discussion of Stoic views on the interconnectedness of kinship and justice in Stoic ethics, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54, and Animals, Rights and Reason 22–26. 21 Already Dyroff, Die Tierpsychologie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia 56, charged that Plutarch does not make exact distinctions in his use of technical psychological vocabulary, and appears to employ the terms sunesis, dianoēsis and phronēsis interchangeably. Philip Sidney Horty, “The Spectrum of Animal Rationality in Plutarch,” Apeiron 50, 1 (2017) 103–133, offers a subtle analysis of the vocabulary that Plutarch employs to characterize the intellectual features of non-­human animals, and he concludes that Plutarch maintains that non-­human species operate intellectually at a much lower level than do human beings. The nature of animal intellect must, in Horty’s view, be understood in a qualified sense as a kind of practical wisdom sufficient to allow non-­human species to carry out the activities of daily living. 22 An excellent analysis of apparent contradictions between Plutarch’s pronouncements on animal rationality in On the Cleverness of Animals and his pronouncements on the topic elsewhere is presented in Francesco Becchi, “Irrazionalità e Razionalità degli Animali,” Prometheus 26 (2000) 205–225. Becchi demonstrates that most of the apparent contradictions can be explained as due to the context of the work in which they occur, and that frequently Plutarch’s intention is not to argue that non-­human species are intellectually inferior to human beings but rather that humans contravene and abuse the superior intellect with which they are endowed. Similarly, Giuseppina Santese, “Animali e Razionalità in Plutarco,” in S. Castignone and G. Lanata, eds., Filosofi e Animali nel Mondo Antico (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 1994) 141–170, argues that apparent contradictions in Plutarch’s estimation of the intellect of non-­human species arise from the differing nature of the treatises in which the topic is discussed, and that he always maintains the position that all animals have in common the properties of rationality, perception and imagination.

17

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

23 On this passage, see Becchi, “Irrazionalità e Razionalità” 215 and Santese, “Animali e Razionalità” 165. 24 In his dialogue Whether Beasts Are Rational or Gryllus, Plutarch allows the pig Gryllus, who has been temporarily endowed with speech by the witch Circe, to argue that non-­human animals have a greater natural propensity toward virtuous behavior than do human beings because their virtues, including courage and temperance, are not, as is the case with sophisticated human beings, in reality perversions of virtues (987B–C). Whereas, for example, warfare among non-­ human animals entails genuine courage free of deceit, among human beings it often involves trickery and unscrupulous behavior (987C–D). This is because human beings have the capacity to pervert their better natures, while other species with less developed intellectual faculties do not. On this passage, see Commentary to Whether Beasts Are Rational note 26. 25 Plutarch’s case for an obligation of justice toward non-­human animals is discussed at length in Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason, Chapter 3, “Just Beasts,” 47–65. It is important to note that Plutarch does not advance the argument, in On the Cleverness of Animals, that other animal species have themselves an understanding of justice, although he does assert that the behavior of ants suggests that they have in them the “seeds of justice” (spermata dikaiosunēs, 967E). For a discussion of modern ethological views on the possibility of a sense of justice or fair play in non-­human species, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 52–53. 26 Brennan 158. 27 In his dialogue Septem sapientium convivium (Banquet of the Seven Sages), the interlocutor Solon laments (159B) that the human need for food makes injustice unavoidable because it involves taking the lives of other beings, be they animal or plant. 28 Website of PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). 29 It is possible that the argument that human beings have a debt of justice toward other species because of their innate kinship with them may have appeared in the animal writings of Theophrastus, in particular in his lost treatise On the Intelligence and Character of Animals. See note 17. 30 For a discussion of this passage, see below, Introduction to On Eating Meat, pp. 132–133. 31 On Regan, see Introduction to On Eating Meat note 21. 32 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1798) Chapter XVII. 33 Animal rights philosopher Gary Steiner, Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) ix, well characterizes the persistence of the idea that reason and moral status are linked, “There is a long and regrettable history of thinking in the West according to which human beings are morally superior to animals and hence enjoy the prerogative to use animals for whatever purposes they see fit. A predominant tendency in this thinking is to suppose that our putatively superior intellect entitles us to treat animals as if they were created to satisfy our desires.” Steiner 134–137 offers a detailed analysis of the contribution to this historical reality made by the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis. Steiner xi makes it clear that he prefers sentience to cognitive capacity as a criterion for moral considerability. 34 Vittorio d’Agostino, “Sulla Zoopsicologia di Plutarco,” Archivo Italiano di Psicologia 11 (1933) 35, calls Plutarch’s zoology “più che altro una raccolta di aneddoti interessanti.” 35 Bouffartigue xii–xiii.

18

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

36 Helmbold 313–314 contends that “there can be little doubt … that a considerable variety of works has been utilized.” On the possible identity of sourcebooks which Plutarch may have consulted, see above, note 9. 37 For a detailed examination of Plutarch’s view of the operation of the emotions in non-­human species, see Stephen T. Newmyer, The Animal and the Human and Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2017) Chapter 7, “Animal Affect: ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Emotional?” 121–133. 38 Dyroff 46 suggests that it never occurred to Plutarch how dangerous to research on animals such anthropomorphization (Vermenschlichung) could prove. On Plutarch’s tendency to anthropomorphize, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 7, and The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought 63 and 74 notes 80–81. 39 Carl Safina, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (New York: Henry Holt, 2015) 28. 40 Marc Bekoff, The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: New World Library, 2007) 131.

19

Translation Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence, or On the Cleverness of Animals (De sollertia animalium)1

959 1. AUTOBULUS:2 When asked what sort of man he considered the poet Tyrtaeus3 to be, Leonidas4 said, B “One good at [arousing]5 the souls of young men,” since he instilled eagerness, along with courage and the love of honor, in the youths so that they took no thought of themselves in warfare. I am afraid, my friends, that the encomium on hunting6 that was read aloud yesterday may excessively arouse our young men who are fond of hunting to the point that they come to view all other activities as trivial and worthless, and cling to this exclusively. After all, I sense that I myself became rather caught up with excitement again, not in keeping with my age, and longed, like Euripides’ Phaedra, “to shout to the hounds and chase the spotted deer.”7 C So did the speech move me with the subtlety and persuasiveness of its arguments! SOCLARUS: Quite true, Autobulus! That speech seems to have aroused the art of rhetoric from a long period of neglect,8 charming the youth and putting them in a spring-­like mood. But what pleased me most was the introduction of gladiators, and the argument that not the least reason to praise hunting was the fact that, after it directs toward itself our inborn or acquired love of armed conflict between human beings, it provides a pure spectacle of skill and intelligent courage ranged against unreasoning force and violence,9 a fact that accords well with the passage in Euripides: “The strength of man is small, but D With his subtlety of mind He overmasters the fierce offspring Of sea and land and mountain.”10 2. AUTOBULUS: In fact, my dear Soclarus, they say that it was from that very source that there came upon men an insensitivity to suffering and a cruelty that tasted slaughter and grew accustomed, in the chase and the hunt, to feeling no disgust at blood and wounds of animals but rather to delighting in their slaughter and death. And so it was in Athens: the first man 20

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

who died at the hands of the Thirty was a certain informer who was said to have been rightly condemned, and so too the second and third. After that, proceeding little by little, they attacked honest men and eventually did not spare the best citizens.11 E So too the first man who killed a bear or a wolf was held in high esteem, and some cow or pig was declared guilty of having tasted the sacred offerings and was deemed worthy of death.12 Next the consumption of deer and hare and gazelle introduced the consumption of the flesh of sheep and, in some places, of dogs and horses. And tearing and chopping up the tame goose and the dove, that “companion of the hearth,” as Sophocles says,13 not as in the case of weasels or cats, out of hunger for food, but for pleasure and a delicacy,14 they fortified the bloody and brutish part of man as much as possible, and were shut off from and rendered insensitive to pity, blunting their sense of gentleness for the most part. F The Pythagoreans of old, on the other hand, practiced gentleness toward animals in order to inspire humane feelings and compassion.15 960 Habitual action is a powerful inducement to guide the human being through the working of emotions that come to dwell in a human being little by little. Well, somehow we have without noticing it come in our discussion upon a topic in no sense unrelated to our topic of yesterday nor to that which we shall shortly take up today.16 As you know, yesterday we expressed the view that all animals, in some way or another, have a share of thought and reasoning capacity,17 and we offered a pleasant opportunity to our young huntsmen to debate the intellectual properties of sea- and land-­dwelling animals. We will decide the question today, it appears, if the supporters of Aristotimus and Phaedimus still stand by their challenges. B The former fellow offered himself to his companions as an advocate for the position that the land produces creatures superior in intellect, while the latter would argue that those of the sea do so. SOCLARUS: They do hold fast to their positions, Autobulus, and they will be here in just a moment. I saw them getting ready at dawn. But, if you’re willing, before the debate commences, let us take up some topics that were appropriate to yesterday’s discussion but did not find an opportunity to be covered or were discussed without due seriousness because we were drinking.18 It seemed to me that there was some clamor of objections arising from the Stoics on a matter of substance, namely, that, just as the immortal is opposed to the mortal and the incorruptible to the corruptible, and the corporeal to the incorporeal, C so too must it be that the irrational is opposed to and set against the rational: this latter among these pairs must not be left incomplete and imperfect.19 3. AUTOBULUS: Well, dear Soclarus, who ever held such a view, that, while a rational element exists in things, there is no corresponding irrational? There is an irrational element in abundance in things that are bereft of a soul: we do not need any other antithesis to the rational. Everything that is 21

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

without a soul, since it is irrational and devoid of understanding, is at once opposed to that which has reason and understanding along with a soul.20 And if anyone contends that nature is not complete, but that nature which is besouled possesses both a rational and an irrational element, another will contend that besouled nature has both a representational element and a nonrepresentational element and a sentient element and an element that lacks sensation. D This is so that nature may have these antithetical and opposed properties and shortcomings equally balanced in each comparison. But if he is misguided who looks for both the sentient and the insentient in the class of besouled creatures, and also for that which does and does not possess a representational element, inasmuch as every besouled creature is already possessed of both a sentient and a representational element, so likewise will he be unreasonable who demands that a besouled creature possess both a rational and an irrational element, since he is arguing against men who believe that nothing that possesses sensation does not also possess intelligence, and that there is no creature that does not by nature possess some degree of belief and rationality as well as perception and impulse. E For nature, which they correctly say does everything toward some purpose and goal,21 did not create a sentient being for the single purpose of perceiving when something is happening to it. But since there exist many things which are akin to it and foreign to it,22 a being would not survive for a moment if it did not learn to avoid some things and to enter into association with others. Now, perception supplies the knowledge of both of these to each being. Creatures born with no capacity to reason or judge or recollect or attend could not by any means perform those actions of pursuing and seizing upon things that follow upon a perception of usefulness and of steering clear of and fleeing those things that are harmful and troublesome.23 F Those creatures that you deprive altogether of expectation, memory, intention, preparation, hope, fear, inclination and grief, have no use for eyes and ears, though they have them.24 It would 961 be preferable to be free of all sensation and representation if one has no means of making use of these faculties, than to experience pain and distress and anguish if one has no means of evading them. There is a statement by the natural philosopher Straton25 that argues that it is not at all possible to have perception without mental action. Oftentimes when we are reading, the letters confront our sight and sounds reach our ears, but these things escape our notice because our minds are focused elsewhere. Then in time the mind refocuses, and goes after every item that it had let pass by while reading. Just so it is said, “The mind can see, the mind can hear: the rest is deaf and blind.”26 This means that, if there is no understanding present, sensation experienced by the eyes and ears produces no perception. For that reason, King Cleomenes,27 B when a recitation was praised during a drinking party, replied, when asked if it was not an excellent

22

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

performance, that others must take up the question since his mind was in the Peloponnese. Therefore it is necessary that all of us who have sensation also have intellect, if we are born to have sensation because of intellect. Let us accept then that sensation does not need the mind in order to perform its own task. But when the sensation is removed that produces in a being the capacity to differentiate the kindred from the alien, what is it that henceforth recalls and fears the painful and desires the useful?28 And when this capacity is not present, what is there in creatures C that devises and prepares for them lairs and hiding places and traps for the creatures that they catch and escapes from their attackers?29 And these are the very same writers who wear us out30 with their “Introductions,”31 always defining “purpose” as “indication of accomplishment,” “design” as “impulse before an impulse,” “preparation” as “action before an action,” and “memory”32 as “comprehension of a proposition in the past of which the present is comprehended by sensation.”33 None of these is not a function of reason, and all of them are found in all animals. Of course this goes for mental processes which they call “notions” when they are at bay but “thoughts” when they are in action. D And too, while they acknowledge that all emotions in common are “faulty judgments and opinions,”34 it is remarkable that they disregard many actions and motions in animals that are indicative of anger, fear, and, indeed, jealousy and envy.35 Besides, they punish their dogs and horses when they do wrong, not without purpose but to chasten them, instilling in them through pain that mental distress that we term repentance.36 Pleasure37 that comes through the ears is called “enchantment,” and that coming through the eyes is “sorcery.” They make use of both against animals in the hunt. Deer and horses are “enchanted” with pipes and flutes,38 and E they summon crabs from their holes by overpowering them with flutes,39 and they say that the shad comes to the surface of the water and approaches when there is singing and clapping. And also, the horned owl is captured by such enchantment as it tries to work its shoulders rhythmically, delighting at the sight of singers.40 As for those who stupidly assert on this issue that animals neither feel pleasure nor anger nor fear, and cannot make preparations or remember, but that the bee “as it were remembers,”41 and the swallow “as it were makes preparations,” and the lion “as it were displays anger,” and the deer “as it were senses fear,” how, I wonder, will they react to those who assert that animals do not see or hear but F “as it were see” things and “as it were hear,” and do not make sounds but “as it were make sounds,” and do not live at all, but “as it were live”! These statements, it seems to me, are no more contrary to clear facts than are those others. 4. SOCLARUS: Well then, Autobulus, include me among those who believe what you say. And yet when I compare the character and lifestyles and actions 962 and behaviors of animals to those of human beings, I notice not

23

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

only a great deficiency of attainment among animals and no clear aiming toward virtue for which reason is born,42 nor any advancement toward it or desire for it, so that I am at a loss to understand how nature granted the beginning of reason to creatures that are not capable of attaining to its end. AUTOBULUS: But this does not sound strange, Soclarus, to those philosophers whom we are discussing. Although they maintain that love of offspring is the starting point for our community life and our sense of justice, and they observe that this is powerfully developed in animals, they deny and refuse to believe that animals have a share of justice.43 B Mules are not without organs of generation: they are able to use their genitals and wombs with pleasure, but they cannot reach the goal of reproduction. Consider this too: is it not ridiculous to assert that persons like Socrates and Plato take part in wicked conduct to no less a degree than does any slave, and that they are just as foolish, undisciplined and unjust, and then to fault the imperfect and imprecise inclination toward virtue in animals as being the absence of reason and not a state of weakness and incompleteness of virtue, inasmuch as they agree that vice is an imperfection of reason, a failing that infects every animal?44 C We see that cowardice, intemperance, injustice and malevolence are found in many animals.45 He who maintains that a creature that is not born to exhibit the fullness of reason does not exhibit any reason at all, is in the first place no different from someone who maintains that an ape does not have a share of ugliness or a tortoise a share of slowness because the former is not capable of beauty or the latter of speed. In the second place, he does not take note of the difference that is right before his eyes: reason is innate in every creature, whereas real and complete reason comes from cultivation and training. Therefore, there is a share of the faculty of reason in all living things, but they cannot claim that even a human being has the uprightness and wisdom that they seek.46 Just as there is a difference in sight from one creature to another and of flight from one to another D (hawks and cicadas do not see alike, nor do eagles and partridges fly alike), so too not every being that possesses reason has the flexibility and keenness of that faculty in the highest degree attainable.47 While there are many examples in animalkind of sociability, courage and cleverness at procuring and managing the materials of life,48 so too on the other hand there are examples of their opposites, of injustice, cowardice and silliness in animals.49 The topic which forms the subject of today’s debate proves my point.50 On the premise that there is some difference, some assert that land-­dwelling animals are by their nature more advanced toward virtue, while others assert that sea-­dwellers are. E This is obvious if you compare storks with hippopotamuses. The birds care for their fathers while the hippopotamuses kill their fathers in order to mount their mothers.51 So too if you compare doves with partridges. Male partridges make off with the eggs and destroy them52 because the female will not allow copulation when she is tending the eggs, 24

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

whereas male doves take their turn in the care of their offspring, warming the egg and being the first to feed the nestlings. The male drives the female back to the eggs and the nestlings by pecking her if she has been away a long time. While Antipater53 censured F asses and sheep for their lack of cleanliness, he unaccountably overlooked lynxes and swallows: lynxes dispose of their urine by hiding it and making away with it, while swallows teach their young to dispose of their droppings outside the nest.54 Why do we do not say that one tree is less intelligent than another55 in the manner that a sheep is less intelligent than a dog, or that one vegetable is less courageous than another, as a deer is less courageous than a lion? 963 Or, just as in the case of stationary objects, one is not slower than another, as too with voiceless things one is not more weak-­voiced than another, so too, in the case of those beings that by nature do not have the power of understanding, one is not more cowardly or lazier or more intemperate. The differences that we observe arise from the greater or lesser degree of understanding, of one sort in one creature and of another sort in another. 5. SOCLARUS: But it is astonishing how the human being excels other animals in his readiness to learn and his quickness of wit and in those things that relate to justice56 and to sociability. AUTOBULUS: And yet, my friend, many animals outdistance all human beings, one in size, another in speed, yet another in keenness of sight and sharpness of hearing.57 Man is not for that reason blind or weak or deaf. B We run, if more slowly than deer, and we see, if less keenly than hawks, and nature has not left us bereft of strength and size, even though we are nothing in these capacities when compared to the elephant and the camel.58 Similarly, let us therefore not say of beasts, if their understanding is less keen and their thought processes inferior [to ours], that they do not understand or think at all, and that they have no reason, but rather that their reason is weak and clouded, like an eye that is dim-­sighted and confused.59 If I were not eagerly looking forward to our young men, C learned and well-­versed in lore as they are,60 collecting examples, one of them selecting animals from land and the other those from the sea, I would not refrain from enumerating countless examples of quickness to learn and of cleverness in animals, of which grand Rome has provided us buckets- and shovels-­ full of examples from the imperial theaters.61 But let us leave these things fresh and untouched for them to ornament with their eloquence. I want to examine a small matter with you at leisure. I believe that every part and faculty has its own shortcoming and defect and affliction, as the eye experiences blindness, the leg lameness and the tongue faulty pronunciation, each of which defects is found in no other faculty. There can be no blindness in that which was not born to see or lameness in that which was not meant to walk, nor would you call an animal that has no tongue D inarticulate62 or one without a voice a stammerer. Therefore, that which 25

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

by its nature does not understand or reason or think is not to be termed witless or deranged or mad, for it is not possible to be “afflicted” if one does not possess a capacity of which the affliction consists of a deprivation or imperfection or some other failing. Certainly you have come upon mad63 dogs, as I have mad horses. Some say that cattle64 and foxes exhibit madness too. Dogs furnish examples enough, since this [condition in them]65 is undisputed. This supports the contention that animals possess reason and understanding in no small degree, for rabies and madness are the afflictions arising when their rational faculty becomes disturbed and disquieted.66 E We do not say that their sight or hearing is disordered. Similarly, in the case of a human being who becomes melancholy or deranged, he who does not acknowledge that it is the faculties of thought or reckoning or remembering that become upset and corrupted in that person, is wrong-­headed (we customarily state of deranged persons that they “are not themselves,” but have “left their senses”). Likewise, the person who does not believe that mad dogs have undergone anything other than a loss of their faculties of thought, reckoning and memory, so that, in their mental disorder, they do not recognize F the faces of their loved ones and avoid their usual diet, that person seems either to be ignoring facts or, if he does take into account the conclusion that is to be drawn from the facts, to be holding out against the truth.67 6. SOCLARUS: Your conjecture seems correct. The Stoics and the Peripatetics in particular hold out for the opposite position, namely, that justice could not come into existence, but would be altogether formless and insubstantial, 964 if all animals had a share of reason.68 In that case, it will be necessary either that we commit injustice if we do not spare them, or that we live the life of animals if we give up the use of them. I omit the countless numbers of Nomads and Troglodytes who know of no other food but meat.69 But for us who live, I believe, in a civilized and benevolent manner, what activity will remain for us on land or sea or in the mountains, what manner of diet, if we learn to B conduct ourselves in an innocent and innocuous manner toward all living beings, as is incumbent upon us if they are possessed of reason and are akin to us?70 So we have no solution to this impasse, which either deprives us of life or of justice, unless we take heed to that ancient boundary and law by which, according to Hesiod, he who divided up the species and accorded to each of them its own proper behavior, allowed “That fish and fowl and winged birds should eat Each other, in which justice has no home; Justice he gave to man,”71 to exercise toward one another. Those who do not have the capacity to act justly toward us cannot be treated unjustly by us.72 Those who reject this argument have not left any path, C broad or narrow, for justice to insert itself. 26

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

7. AUTOBULUS: My friend, you have articulated what is “dear to the hearts”73 of these men. We must not allow philosophers, like women in the pains of childbirth, to fasten about their necks a charm to hasten birth, so that they may easily and without toil give birth to justice for us. They do not allow to Epicurus, in the case of the largest objects, even a small and trifling concession, namely, the swerve of a single atom to the slightest degree,74 so that the stars and animalkind and chance may come into existence and so that free will would not be destroyed for us. It is necessary for them to shed light on something that is obscure and to seize upon something that is obvious and, in the case of justice, to make no conjecture concerning animals75 unless the matter is agreed upon and they do not themselves argue in some contrary manner. D Justice has another path76 which is not so precarious and precipitous and does not lead along a path of discarded truths. My son and your companion,77 my dear Soclarus, points out the path, under the guidance of Plato, to those who are not contentious but are willing to follow along and learn. Empedocles and Heraclitus78 take it as a fact that man is not totally free of injustice when he handles animals as he does: often humans lament and rail at “nature,” claiming that she is “necessity” and “war,” and that she contains nothing that is unmixed and pure, but E is instead actuated by unjust passions. Thus they say that birth itself arises from an act of injustice, with the mortal and the immortal joining together, and that the being that is created is nourished, contrary to nature, on the limbs of its parent. Nevertheless, while this appears excessively severe and bitter, there is a remedy which does not deprive animals of reason but enables those who make use of animals in a seemly manner to preserve the claim of acting justly. When the wise men in ancient times introduced this, gluttony, allying itself with luxury, rejected it and made away with it, but Pythagoras took it up again, teaching humans to benefit without being unjust. F For they do not commit injustice at all who punish and slay those animals that are savage and dangerous79 while placing the tame and sociable species in the service of humans as our coworkers, as each was born to do, “Offspring of horse and ass and spawn of bulls,” which Prometheus in Aeschylus says he “gave” to us, 965 “Like slaves, to take our work upon them.”80 And likewise we keep guard with dogs and raise goats and sheep to milk and shear. Human life is not lost or eradicated if men to not have platefuls of fish or goose liver pâté, or if they do not slaughter beef cattle or goat kids for banquets, nor compel animals against their will to exhibit bravery and to fight while men lounge in the theater or amuse themselves at the hunt,81 27

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

while they destroy those that do not by nature defend themselves.82 I think that the individual who seeks to amuse himself and to make merry should do so with creatures that play along cheerfully, not as when Bion83 remarked that B youths throw stones at frogs in jest, but that the frogs do not die in jest but for real. Similarly, those who hunt and fish delight in the suffering of their dying prey,84 some of the creatures having had their cubs and nestlings snatched from them. It is not those who make use of animals who commit injustice, but those who use them cruelly, carelessly and savagely.85 8. SOCLARUS: Hold on, Autobulus! Rein in your attack! Here come a number of men, all of them hunters, whom you won’t easily bring around to your position and to whom you should not cause pain. AUTOBULUS: Good advice! Well, I recognize Eubiotus86 C and my cousin Ariston, and Aeacides and Aristotimus here, the son of Dionysius from Delphi, and Nicander the son of Euthydamus, “experienced,” as Homer says,87 at hunting on land and for that reason allied to Aristotimus. Phaedimus comes along too, with Heracleon of Megara and Philostratus of Euboea in company with him, those islanders and coast-­dwellers, “whose thoughts are of the sea.”88 Here is our comrade Optatus: like the son of Tydeus, “you could not tell which side he champions.”89 Optatus, “with many prizes from the sea and mountain hunts,”90 has glorified the Huntress and Dictynna.91 D It is obvious that he has come with no intention of allying himself with one side or the other. Or do I guess incorrectly, my dear Optatus, that you will be a neutral and impartial arbitrator for the young people? OPTATUS: Your surmise is quite correct, Autobulus, since long ago Solon’s law that punished those who championed neither one side nor another in a civil conflict was abandoned.92 AUTOBULUS: Sit with us, so that if we need a witness, we will not trouble the works of Aristotle93 but will come away with a true verdict by following your expertise. SOCLARUS: Well then, young men, have you come to an agreement on the order of presentation? PHAEDIMUS: We have, after much wrangling. E As Euripides says, “The lot, the child of Chance, presiding here,”94 Brings the land animals first into court, before sea creatures. SOCLARUS: Well then, Aristotimus, it’s time for you to speak and for us to listen. 9. ARISTOTIMUS: The court is open for the pleaders …95 … and some [fishes]96 waste their sperm when they go after the females that are giving 28

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

birth. A species of mullet that they call pardias 97 feeds on its own slime. And during the winter the octopus sits and devours itself, “In fireless home and joyless haunts,”98 so lazy or senseless or gluttonous it is, if not guilty of all three. For this reason, Plato, while setting forth his Laws,99 discouraged or F rather enjoined young men against conceiving a love for hunting the denizens of the sea since no training in courage or exercise of intelligence or anything that fosters strength or speed or agility is provided to those who busy themselves in hunting bass or conger eels or parrot-­wrasse. 966 But on land, courageous animals give a workout to the danger-­loving and manly qualities of those who fight the animals.100 Cunning animals sharpen the intelligence and sagacity of their pursuers, and swift animals give practice to the strength and industry of their opponents. This is what has made hunting a fine pursuit, while fishing has nothing so splendid about it. Which one of the gods deigns to be called “Conger-­slayer,” as Apollo is called “Wolf-­slayer,”101 or who is called “Mullet-­slayer,” as Artemis is called “Deer-­slayer”?102 And is it strange if it seems nobler to a person to have caught a deer or a gazelle or a hare than to have bought it, or conversely, what is strange if it seems more dignified to have bought a tunny-­fish or a crab or a bonito than to have caught one? B The lowliness and the absolute resourcelessness and lack of cleverness in them has rendered fishing base and dreary and unworthy of a free person. 10. On the whole, the endowments by which philosophers103 demonstrate that animals have a share of reason are purposefulness, preparedness, memory,104 emotions, care for offspring,105 gratitude for benefits and recollection of past injuries; likewise, the capacity to find that which is necessary to life, and demonstrations of virtues like courage,106 sociability,107 self-­discipline and largeness of spirit. Let us inquire whether it is not the case that sea-­ dwellers are devoid of these qualities, or perhaps have some faint and indistinct glimmer of them which an observer can scarcely discern. It is possible to pick out and observe C clear and distinct and powerful examples of each of the qualities that I have isolated in the case of land-­dwelling and earthborn creatures. As a first example, contemplate the purposefulness and preparedness of bulls when they kick up dust as they prepare for battle,108 and of wild boars when they sharpen their tusks. And in the case of elephants, since their tusks become blunted and worn down when they dig at and cut down the trees that they consume, they use one of their tusks for this purpose but keep the other sharp and pointed for self-­defense.109 And too the lion always walks with its paws clenched, concealing the claws within so that they do not dull their points by wear or leave a ready trail for those who are tracking them.110 D It is not easy to detect a sign of the lion’s claw, and hunters who come upon these indistinct and obscure tracks are led astray and go off the trail. You have certainly heard that the mongoose arms itself for battle 29

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

in a manner not inferior to that of the hoplite, with so much mud does it cover itself, putting about itself a coat when it prepares to do battle with the crocodile.111 We see the preparedness of swallows before they produce offspring: how well they place solid twigs about as a foundation, and then they mold the lighter pieces around this. And if they perceive that the nest needs some sticky mud, they E fly along the surface of a pond or lake, touching the surface with the tips of their wings, just so that they become damp but not weighted down by the moisture. They then gather up some dust and smear it over and bind the parts that are loose and are slipping apart. In regard to its shape, the nest is in no way angular or many-­sided, but it is as uniform and spherical as they can finally make it. Such a nest is sturdy and roomy and does not allow outside animals to get a hold to make an attack.112 For more than just one reason, one might feel amazement at the handiwork of the spider, the common model for women’s looms and hunters’ nets.113 The exquisiteness of the thread and the uniformity of the weave, which has no interruptions or warp, F reveals rather the continuity of a thin membrane and a stickiness that is achieved with some unseen gluelike substance that is intermixed with it. Also, its coloration, which gives the web an airy and hazy look, prevents it from being seen, but most remarkable of all is the way in which the spider, like a clever net fisherman, quickly draws the web tight and seizes upon the prey, 967 as soon as it perceives it and detects its presence. The fact that we see and observe this every day gives credence to my account. Otherwise it would seem a mere tale, as I thought the tale of the crows in Libya that, when in need of something to drink, toss stones [into a vessel], filling it up, and raise up the water until it can be reached.114 Later, when I saw a dog on board a boat dropping some pebbles into a half-­empty jar of oil while the sailors were away, I was amazed at how it perceived and understood that lighter substances are forced upward when heavier ones settle under them. There are similar stories about Cretan bees and the geese of Cilicia. B When the bees are about to go around some windy promontory, they ballast themselves with little stones so as not to be carried past it.115 And the geese, because they fear eagles, put a little stone in their mouths when they are passing over the Taurus Mountains, as if muzzling and bridling their fondness for noise making, so that they can pass by in silence and undetected.116 The manner in which cranes fly is also well known. Whenever the wind is strong and the air turbulent, they do not fly, as in fair weather, in a straight line or in a crescent-­shaped formation, but they form at once a triangle and they cleave the air with the point of it so C that they do not break the formation. Whenever they land, the birds that are on guard at night support themselves on one foot, while in the other foot they grasp and hold tight to a stone. The stress involved in holding the stone forces the bird not to fall asleep for a long time, but whenever it lets go, the falling stone quickly wakes the bird that has released it.117 Hence it is not surprising that Herakles tucked his bow under his arm and, 30

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

“His mighty right arm placed upon it, sleeps, Pressing his left upon his club.”118 Nor am I surprised at the man who first guessed how to open a closed oyster when I read about the clever tricks of cranes. Whenever one swallows a closed mussel, it puts up with the D discomfort until it senses that it has been softened and loosened by the warmth of its stomach. Then it vomits up the opened mussel and removes the edible portion that has been exposed.119 11. It would be impossible to discuss exhaustively the domestic arrangements and provisions of ants,120 but neglectful to overlook the topic entirely. Nowhere does nature have so tiny a mirror of greater and finer actions. They display a reflection of every virtue, as in a drop of clear water. “Affection dwells therein,”121 that is to say, in their sense of fellowship, and their devotion to hard work is the very image of courage. And too there are many seeds of temperance and wisdom and justice.122 E While denying that animals have a share of reason, Cleanthes said that he had witnessed the following sight: some ants came to another anthill, carrying a dead ant. Some ants came out from the anthill to communicate with them, and then went back in again. This happened two or three times. Finally, some ants carried up a larva from below, as if as a ransom for the corpse. F Some of the first group of ants picked up the larva and, handing over the corpse, departed. The courtesy that they exhibit when they meet is one of those things that is obvious to all, as those that are not carrying anything move from the path for those that are carrying a load to allow them to pass.123 Also obvious is the way in which they gnaw through and tear apart things that are difficult to carry and maneuver, so that they are easier for a number of them to carry.124 Aratus considers it a sign of rain when ants arrange and cool their eggs in the open, “Or ants that brought up all their eggs in haste, From hollow nest.”125 Some do not write “eggs” here but rather “provisions,”126 that is, the grain that they have laid up when they sense it is moldy 968 and they fear that it will be rotted and decayed. But their anticipation of the germination of wheat trumps every conception of their intelligence. Wheat does not stay dry and free from decay, but falls apart and becomes milky as it germinates. In order to keep it from going to seed and losing its nutritional value, the ants eat out the portion from which the wheat sends forth its new shoot.127 I do not approve of those who [mutilate]128 anthills in order to study them “anatomically,” so to speak. In any case, they remark that the path down from the opening is not straight or easy for another creature to pass through. B It terminates in three hollow areas after breaking up into winding and twisted 31

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

paths supplied with chambers and perforations. One of these hollow areas is their common dwelling, while another is the chamber in which they store provisions, and the third is where they house their dying comrades.129 12. I do not think that you will judge it inappropriate if I introduce elephants130 after discussing ants so that we may consider the nature of the intellect found in the smallest animals alongside that in the largest, for it is neither buried in the latter nor deficient in the former. Others are amazed at how elephants are taught to learn and display various sorts of C stances and gyrations, the complexity and subtlety of which would not be easy for humans to memorize and retain.131 I view the intellect of the elephant as revealed more in its self-­generated and self-­taught132 feelings and motions that are, so to speak, unmixed and pure. Not long ago at Rome, when a large number of elephants were being taught to adopt some tricky stances and to turn around in complex formations, one of them that was very slow to learn and was repeatedly rebuked and punished, was observed by itself in the light of the moon D rehearsing and practicing its lessons.133 Hagnon134 relates that some while ago in Syria, an elephant was being raised in a house, and its keeper would each day, on receiving its ration of grain, steal away half of the grain and keep it dishonestly. One day, when the master was present and looking on, the keeper poured out the whole measure. The elephant, looking on, raised its trunk and separated the grain and put half of it off to one side, thereby accusing the keeper as eloquently as possible of wrongdoing.135 Another elephant, whose keeper would mix stones and dirt into its barley, scooped up some ashes and threw them into the pot when the keeper’s meat was cooking. E Yet another elephant, at Rome, having been abused by children who pricked its trunk with their styluses, raised one of them aloft and seemed about to dash it. When an outcry arose from the onlookers, the elephant gently placed the child back on the ground and walked away, considering it adequate justice for a child of that age to have been frightened.136 They tell other wonderful tales about wild, free-­ranging elephants, in particular about their crossing rivers: the youngest and smallest offers to go first into the water. The others look on. If the smallest sticks out above the water, there is substantial surplus of water that affords them F confidence.137 13. I think, at this point in my presentation, that I should not overlook the case of the fox because of its similarity. The mythographers say that a dove released from the ark served as a signal to Deucalion that the storm was still in force when she returned, but that it was now fair weather when she flew away.138 Even now, the Thracians, when they set out to cross a frozen river, use a fox to test the firmness of the ice. 969 Moving along slowly, it puts its ear forward. If it senses by the sound that the water is flowing by near the surface, it judges that the depth of the frozen water is but slight, and it 32

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

draws back if it is allowed to. If it does not hear sound, it is encouraged and proceeds on.139 Let us not say that this is an instance of perceptual acuity devoid of reason, but rather a syllogism derived from a perception, namely: “That which makes a sound is in motion; that which is in motion is not frozen; that which is not frozen is liquid; that which is liquid gives way.” So too logicians140 say that a dog, when at a place where the road is divided into branches, employs the disjunctive syllogism with several terms, reasoning to itself, B “The prey has run along this path, or that one, or that one. It did not go along that one or that one. So, it went along the remaining one.”141 Perception provides nothing beyond the minor premise: reason adds the other premises and the conclusion. But in truth the dog does not need such testimony, for it is false and ambiguous. Perception itself points out the path of the animal’s flight by its traces and droppings, without a nod to disjunctive and conjunctive propositions.142 One can observe the dog’s natural powers by many other actions and experiences and obligations which are not perceived by the nose and ears, C but which are performed and observed solely by the intellect and reason. It would be absurd of me to speak of the dog’s self-­control and obedience and shrewdness to you who observe and deal with these things every day. When the Roman Calvus143 was slain in the civil wars, no one was able to cut off his head before they had surrounded and cut down the dog that guarded and defended him. King Pyrrhus144 while on the road encountered a dog that was watching over the body of a slain man. Learning that it had remained there for three days and had not eaten, and that it had not abandoned the body, D he ordered that it accompany his retinue. A few days later there was an inspection of the troops in the presence of the seated king. The dog was in attendance, lying quietly. When it beheld the murderers of its master passing by, the dog rushed at them, barking wildly and turning repeatedly toward Pyrrhus, so that not only he but everyone present became suspicious of the men. Arrested at once and interrogated, they confessed to the murder after some small bits of outside evidence had been introduced, and they were punished.145 E They say that the dog of the wise Hesiod did the same thing, convicting the sons of Ganyctor of Naupactus by whom Hesiod was murdered.146 More striking than these examples that we have mentioned is what our fathers learned about while they were studying in Athens. A man who had slipped into the temple of Asclepius took the more compact silver and gold offerings and withdrew, thinking that he had escaped notice. When none of the temple attendants took heed of its barking, the watchdog, named Capparus, pursued the temple robber. It did not give up when hit with stones at first. F At dawn, the dog did not come close to him but followed the robber, keeping an eye on him, and he did not accept the food that the man offered him. The dog passed the night keeping watch on him when he stopped to rest, and when he set out once again, the dog got up and followed after him, 33

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

wagging its tail at others whom he encountered on the road but watching the robber and keeping close to him. The men who were looking into the matter heard this from persons who had encountered them and had told them the color and size of the dog, and they applied themselves more earnestly to the pursuit. When they apprehended the man, they escorted him back to Crommyon.147 970 The dog led the group back, turning about excitedly and filled with joy, as if it viewed the robber as its own catch and quarry. They voted to provide its food at public expense and entrusted this task to the priests for all time, imitating the kindness of the Athenians toward the mule. When Pericles was building the Parthenon on the Acropolis, stones were brought, of course, by many teams of animals each day. Now, one of the mules that had taken part enthusiastically in the work and had been retired because of age would go down to the Ceramicus148 and B would always meet up with teams carrying stones, turning around with them and walking together with them, as though encouraging them and urging them on. The people of Athens, astonished at its ambition, decreed that it be fed at public expense, in the same manner as a vote taken to feed an athlete retired due to old age.149 14. Therefore,150 we must agree that those who maintain that we have no relation of justice toward animals are correct,151 as far as sea creatures and those that inhabit the depths are concerned. These creatures are completely devoid of sociability,152 without natural affection, and free of all pleasantness of disposition. Homer put it nicely when he said, in reference to a man who seemed unsociable and savage, “the blue-­g ray sea begot you,”153 in the belief that the sea produces nothing kind or gentle. A person who uses such language of land-­dwelling animals is harsh and savage. C Or will you even deny that there was a relation of justice between Lysimachus154 and the Hyrcanian dog that alone stayed by his corpse and, when the body was cremated, rushed up and leapt onto the pyre? They say that the eagle kept by Pyrrhus (not the king but some private citizen) acted in the same manner. It stayed close to his body when he died and hovered about the bier when the body was borne off. At last, it settled itself down onto the bier and was burned with him.155 When King Porus156 was wounded in the battle against Alexander, his elephant gently and carefully drew out D many of the javelins with its trunk, and though it was itself badly off, it did not stop until it sensed that the king had lost much blood and was slipping off his horse. Fearing he would fall, it knelt down to provide him a painless slide down. Bucephalas,157 when free of his saddle, allowed his groom to mount him, but when he was adorned with his royal trappings and collars, he did not allow anyone but Alexander to mount him. If others attempted to approach him, he would rush at them 34

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

and neigh loudly and rear up, trampling those who E could not get out of the way in time and escape. 15. I am not unaware that my examples will seem rather random to you, but it is not an easy task to find any clever animal that provides an example of just one virtue alone.158 Their love of honor appears in their affection for their offspring,159 and their cleverness is revealed in their nobility, while their versatility and sagacity cannot be separated from their courage and spirit. Certainly, for those who wish to divide up and distinguish such features, dogs offer an example of a mind that is at the same time tame and lofty when they turn away from animals that cower before them, as is perhaps referred to here: “The howling dogs rushed forth. Odysseus Crouched down with cunning and let fall his staff,”160 for dogs no longer attack creatures that subjugate themselves and adopt a submissive stance.161 They say also that the preeminent dog of the Indians, […]162 by Alexander, lay still when a stag and a boar and a bear were let loose and paid no attention to them, but when a lion appeared, the dog rose up and readied itself for combat, 971 showing itself the opponent of the lion while disdaining all of the other beasts.163 Dogs that hunt hares enjoy ripping them apart, and they eagerly lap up their blood if they kill them themselves, but if, as often happens, a hare gives up and, having exhausted its breath in a final run, dies, the hounds, on coming upon it, do not touch it at all. They stand about and wag their tails, as if they strive not for food but rather for victory and the thrill of competition.164 16. Although there exist many examples of cleverness, I will pass over foxes and wolves and the tricks of cranes165 and jackdaws, B which are plain enough to see, and shall cite Thales the oldest of the Wise Men,166 not the least of whose marvelous deeds, they say, was to have gotten the better of a mule by a clever trick. One of the mules that carried salt slipped by chance upon entering a river and, once the salt had melted away, it was freed of its burden, and it took note of the reason why and bore it in mind. As a result, each time it stepped into the river, it purposely lowered itself and soaked the bags, bending down now to one side and now to the other. When Thales got word of this, he ordered them to fill the sacks with wool and sponges instead of salt, and to drive the mule into the water after they had outfitted it in this manner. C So, when it had carried out its usual performance and had filled its load with water, it realized that its clever ruse was unprofitable and in future it crossed the river with such care and watchfulness that the water never touched its burden even by accident.167 Partridges demonstrate another sort of cunning while exhibiting their love for their offspring. They train their nestlings, when they are not yet able 35

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

to escape, to lie on their backs if they are being pursued and to hold some lump of earth or litter so as to conceal themselves. The mothers draw the pursuers away and distract their attention by darting about at their feet and rising up little by little, D until they give the impression that they are being caught, and they lure them away from their nestlings.168 Hares, on returning to their lairs, arrange their leverets one here and one there, often leaving the distance of a plethron169 between them, so that, if a man or a dog comes around, they are not all endangered at the same moment. The hares themselves run about leaving tracks in many places, and finally they take powerful leaps away from their tracks and settle down to sleep.170 The bear, prior to being overtaken by that state called hibernation, and before she becomes E entirely torpid and heavy and immobile,171 cleans out her den and, when about to go down into it, she adopts as light and shallow a step as possible, moving on the tips of her paws, and she turns her body around and backs into the den.172 Hinds generally give birth along the road, where carnivorous beasts do not approach. Stags, when they perceive that they have grown heavy from fat and plumpness, withdraw to protect themselves by hiding when they do not trust in flight. F The manner in which hedgehogs defend and protect themselves is the subject of a proverb: “The fox knows many things, the hedgehog one– But that one great.”173 When the fox approaches, as Ion174 says, “It curls its spiny body in a knot, And lies immune to claw and tooth.”175 But its foresight in caring for its young is even more subtle. In the autumn, it burrows under vines and with its feet it shakes grapes from the clusters onto the ground. After rolling around in them, it gathers them up onto its spines. 972 Once, when I was a child, I happened to see176 one that looked like a bunch of grapes crawling or walking along, so covered with fruit was it as it moved.177 It then goes down into its den and gives the grapes to its young to take from it and share. Their lair has two openings, one facing south and the other north. Whenever they perceive a change in the air, just as helmsmen alter their sail, they stop up the opening that faces the wind and open the other. A certain man in Cyzicus observed this and got a reputation for being able to foretell on his own from which direction the wind would blow.178 B 17. Juba179 says that elephants exhibit sociability along with intelligence. Those who hunt them dig out pits and cover them with thin twigs and light 36

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

rubbish. Now, whenever one of those that are traveling in groups falls in suddenly, the others bring wood and stones and toss them in, filling the space of the pit so that the elephant can easily exit.180 He relates also that elephants, without any instruction, pray to the gods, purifying themselves in the sea and supplicating the rising sun by raising their trunks like hands.181 Hence they are the animal most loved by the gods,182 C as Ptolemy Philopator183 witnessed, for when he had defeated Antiochus and wished to reverence the god in splendid fashion, he carried out, among many other offerings, a sacrifice of four elephants. Having dreams at night after this event in which god threatened him angrily because of that sacrifice, he performed many acts of atonement and set up four bronze statues of elephants.184 The sociability of lions is in no way inferior. The young ones take the slow and elderly lions out on the hunt. Whenever the older ones grow tired, they sit down to rest and the younger ones go hunting. If they catch anything, they roar D like the bleating of a lamb. The old ones take note of this and participate in the feast.185 18. The loves of many animals are wild and furious, but some species exhibit a refinement not unlike that of humans and an approach to lovemaking not without its charm.186 Such was the case of the elephant at Alexandria that was a rival in love to Aristophanes the Grammarian.187 They were in love with the same garland seller, and the elephant was no less insistent a suitor. It brought her fruit when it had passed by the market, and it stood beside her for long periods, E working its trunk like a hand inside her clothing and gently touching her tender breasts.188 A serpent189 that developed a love for an Aetolian woman would come to her at night, sliding underneath her body along her skin, without harming her intentionally or by accident, and it would always depart discretely around dawn. Since it did this repeatedly, the woman’s family moved her far away. The serpent did not come by for three or four nights while it apparently looked for her and wandered about. When it finally located her after much difficulty, it coiled about her without its usual gentleness but rather roughly, F pinning her arms to her body with its coils and whipping her legs with the end of its tail, demonstrating a light and affectionate anger that contained more forbearance than chastisement.190 The tale of the goose in Aegium that was in love with a boy and that of the ram that lusted after the harp-­player Glauke,191 which are well-­ known, I omit because I suspect that you have had enough of such accounts. 19. Starlings192 and crows193 and parrots194 that learn to use speech and that provide their instructors a readily-­moldable and imitative vocal path for them to form and teach, 973 seem to me to support and advocate for other animals on the question of their ability to learn, teaching us that in a certain sense they partake of uttered reason and internal reason.195 For that reason it is utterly ridiculous to compare them with animals that do not 37

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

possess sufficient voice even to bellow or roar.196 What music and charm there is in their natural and untrained voices! The most learned and eloquent writers bear witness to this when they liken their sweetest poems to the songs of swans and nightingales. Since teaching entails more application of reason than does learning, we must believe Aristotle when he says that animals teach too.197 B He says that a nightingale had been observed teaching its nestlings how to sing.198 Supporting his contention is the fact that nestlings separated from their mothers at an early age sing in an inferior manner.199 Nestlings raised in the company of their mothers are taught and learn not for glory or fame, but rather for the pleasure of competing with each other in song and because they love the beauty of their voice rather than its usefulness. I can tell you a story on this subject that I heard from many Greeks and Romans who witnessed the incident.200 A certain barber who had a shop in Rome opposite the precinct that they call the Market of the Greeks reared a C marvelous creature, a jay capable of producing many tones and notes201 that reproduced human words and the sounds of animals and the notes of musical instruments202 without any prompting, making it rather a habit and a matter of honor to leave nothing unspoken or unimitated. It happened that a certain wealthy man from the area was being carried to his grave to the accompaniment of many trumpets. As was usual, they halted in front of the shop, and the trumpeters, who were well-­received and ordered to play on, remained there for a considerable time. After that day, the jay was voiceless and speechless, not making even the sounds that indicate its own wants and needs. D Passersby who previously had been amazed at the parrot’s voice were now even more astonished at its silence. Other bird handlers were suspected of poisoning it, but most people conjectured that the blast of the trumpets had knocked out its hearing. Neither of these explanations was true, but it was instead a period of training, it would seem, and of retreating into itself for the sake of its imitative skills, as it prepared and readied its voice like a musical instrument. All of a sudden its voice returned and shone forth with none of its customary old imitations but E articulating the melodies of the trumpets with the instruments’ intervals and voicing all of their modulations while executing all the rhythms of their tunes. Thus, it appears, as I said above,203 that self-­instruction is a greater evidence of reason in animals than is quickness to learn [from outside tutelage].204 I think I should not pass over one particular instance of learning in a dog, something that I witnessed myself in Rome.205 The dog appeared in a mime that had a dramatic plot, and it offered up representations of the actions that were appropriate to the emotions and activities that were being portrayed. When they feigned an attempt to poison it with a drug that induced sleep but was, in the context of the play, supposed to be fatal, the dog F took the bread in which the poison had been infused, and, a short time later, it resembled a person who was trembling and stumbling and drooping his head. Finally, it 38

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

stretched itself out like a corpse and allowed the actors to drag it about and move it around as the plot of the play dictated. When the dog realized from the words spoken and the actions depicted that it was the appropriate moment, it stirred, at first quietly, as if roused from the depths of sleep, 974 and then raised its head and gazed about. Then, to the amazement of the audience, it got up and walked to the appropriate actor and fawned on him with joy and affection, so that the entire audience and Caesar (old Vespasian206 was present then at the Theater of Marcellus) were much affected. 20. Perhaps we come off as ridiculous when we play up the capacity of animals to learn, since Democritus207 shows that they are our teachers in very important matters, the spider in the case of weaving and mending, the swallow in house construction, sweet-­sounding swans and nightingales in our imitation of their songs.208 We see in animals a substantial portion of the three divisions of the healing art, B for they do not make use of pharmaceuticals alone.209 When they have devoured a serpent, tortoises eat marjoram and weasels eat rue. Dogs clean themselves out with a certain type of grass when they have digestive problems. The snake sharpens and refines its dimmed eyesight with fennel. When the bear emerges from hibernation, it eats wild arum as its first meal. Its sharp taste opens up the animal’s gut which has grown tight. At other times, when it has become nauseated, it betakes itself to anthills and sits there, sticking out its tongue which is slippery and soft with sweet moisture, until it becomes covered with ants. C It swallows them down and this helps it recover. The Egyptians say that they have observed and imitated the practice of the ibis that purges itself with salt water, for their priests cleanse themselves with water from which an ibis has drunk.210 If water is tainted or in some way unwholesome, an ibis will not go near it. Some animals, on the other hand, heal themselves by abstaining from food, as wolves and lions do. When they have become glutted with flesh, they lie down and rest, sunning themselves. The say that a tigress, if a kid is offered to her, maintains a fast for two days, and on the D third, though she is famished, she asks for some other food and tears her cage apart. They say she spares the kid because she regards it as a companion and cage-­mate.211 They also tell how elephants employ surgery. They stand around those that have been wounded and easily and without harm they draw out spears, javelins and arrows without ripping their skin.212 Cretan goats, when they have eaten dittany, easily expel arrows and provide pregnant women a lesson easily learned, that that herb has abortifacient qualities. There is nothing other than dittany that goats seek and go after when they are wounded. 21. Although these examples are amazing, they are less so than [the case of] those creatures that have E an understanding of number and the ability to count,213 as do the cattle that live in the area of Susa. They irrigate the royal pleasure garden there with water raised in buckets, the number of which is 39

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

pre-­set, for each animal raises one hundred buckets per day. It would be impossible to trick them or force them to raise more. Indeed, though they have often tried it as an experiment, the cow resists and does not move once she had delivered her assigned quota, so precisely does she calculate and remember her tally, as Ctesias of Cnidus has reported.214 The Libyans laugh at the Egyptians when they tell the tale of the oryx F that lets out a cry215 on that day and hour when the star rises that they call Sothis and that we call both the Dog Star and Sirius. When the star rises at the exact moment with the sun, they say that all goats turn to the east. They maintain that this is a very powerful proof of its cycle and that it agrees exactly with their mathematical tables. 975 22. So that my account may end with a crowning touch, come, let me “move from the sacred line,”216 and say a bit about the sense of the divine in animals217 and about their prophetic powers. It is no small or ignoble branch of the art of divination but a very ancient one that takes its name from birds, for their sharpness and intellectual acuity and their responsiveness to every mental image due to their suppleness of mind provides the god an instrument for his prophetic work. He prompts them to employ their voices and chirpings and to assume their formations that are now opposing and now favoring, like the wind, […]218 some of them impeding actions and endeavors and others guiding them to their conclusion. B For that reason, Euripides calls birds in general the “heralds of the gods.”219 Socrates says of himself that he was the “fellow-­slave of the swans.”220 Likewise, among kings, Pyrrhus221 enjoyed being called “Eagle,” and Antiochus222 “Hawk.” Well then, although there are thousands upon thousands of examples of land-­ dwelling and flying animals that foretell the future for us, it is not possible for the advocate of sea creatures to point out a single instance,223 for they are all dumb and blind with respect to foreknowledge, and they have been consigned to the godless and titanic224 abode, as into the dwelling of the unholy, where the rational and intellectual part of the soul has been snuffed out, for they have the smallest portion of sensation, C confused and washed out, so that they seem to be gasping for air rather than living.225 23. HERACLEON: Get ready, my dear Phaedimus, and rouse yourself to defend the denizens of the sea and islands for us! This is no children’s game, but a formidable contest and oratorical display that lacks only the judicial bar and the raised platform.226 PHAEDIMUS: Well, Heracleon, there is obviously an ambush lying in wait for us, for while we were hung over yesterday and in a stupor, this gentleman, cold sober, attacked us on purpose.227 I can’t beg off. Admirer of Pindar that I am, I don’t want to have this sort of reputation: D “To make excuses when combat comes your way Casts valor into utter darkness.”228 40

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

So then, you have a lot of free time since it is not your discourse that lies idle but your dogs and horses and fishing nets and hunting nets, because a “day of rest” has been granted today to all land and sea creatures because of our debate.229 But fear not. I will use [our time]230 judiciously, introducing no opinions of philosophers or Egyptian tales or unsubstantiated Indian or Libyan anecdotes.231 I will provide a few of those facts which are witnessed everywhere by those who work the sea and which have eyewitness credibility. E Nothing impedes one’s view of the behavior of land animals, for one’s senses enjoy a wide-­open panorama. But the sea furnishes only a few stingy glimpses and covers in darkness the birth and upbringing and modes of attack and mutual defense of its denizens. There are among these not a few instances of intelligence and memory and sociability that we cannot observe and that thus hinder our argument.232 And also, land-­dwelling animals, because of their similarity of birth and their dwelling together with humans,233 have in some measure taken on human characteristics and derive some benefit from their upbringing and teaching234 and from their imitation of humans. This contact sweetens their bitterness and sullenness, F just as fresh water sweetens sea water when mixed with it, and all of their dullness of wit and heaviness is wakened from its slumber and warmed to life by the excitement of human contact. But the life of sea creatures, because it is cut off by great boundaries from association with human beings, is alien and 976 distinct, a thing unto itself, untouched by foreign influences as a result of its location, rather than its nature. For their nature, which is receptive to such information as does reach them and holds onto it closely, renders many eels, called “sacred” in Arethusa,235 obedient to humans, and many fishes in many locations pay heed to their names.236 So do they tell of the moray eel of Crassus whose death Crassus mourned. Once, when Domitius asked him, “Did you not weep when your eel died?” he replied, “Did you not refrain from weeping when your three wives died?”237 The crocodiles of the priests not only recognize their B voices when they call but even allow themselves to be touched, and they open their mouths wide and present their teeth to be cleaned by hand and to be wiped with linen cloths.238 Our dear Philinus239 returned recently from traveling around Egypt, and he told us that he had seen an old woman in Antaeopolis240 asleep on a bench with a crocodile that stretched out modestly beside her. They say that, a long time ago, when King Ptolemy summoned the sacred crocodile and it did not pay heed or obey when the priests entreated it and begged it, they thought that this action foretold the death of the king, which occurred not long after.241 C Thus it would seem that the race of sea-­dwellers is not lacking in the highly-­regarded art of divination. I understand that around Sura, a village in Lycia between Phellus242 and Myra, men sit and make divinations with fishes, in a skillful and rational manner, as one would with birds, observing their swimming and their retreats and pursuits. 41

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

24. Well then, let these be enough examples to prove that these animals are not alien to us or devoid of human sensibilities.243 The totality of sea life affords sufficient evidences of their pure and natural intelligence. No creature that swims, and does not merely attach itself to rocks and cling there, is readily captured by humans and cannot be overmastered without hard work, D as asses are by wolves and bees by bee-­eaters244 and cicadas by swallows and snakes by deer which easily draw them forth (hence the name of the deer is derived not from its “swiftness” but from its “attracting” of the snake).245 The sheep summons the wolf by striking its hoof, and they say that many animals, and especially the ape, approach the panther because they delight in its scent.246 But with almost all sea creatures, their wary sense of presentiment, which is on guard against attacks because of its intelligent functioning, makes fishing no easy task but one that requires all sorts of equipment and E clever strategizing against the fish. This is obvious from many examples that are ready to hand. Fishermen do not like for an angling rod to be thick, although they do need one that is flexible because the fishes that are caught thrash about. They choose instead a slender rod so that it does not stir up the suspicions of a fish by casting a wide shadow. Also, fishermen do not make the fishing line thick with multiple strands for the loop, nor do they make it rough since that provides evidence of a trick to the fish. They also arrange it so that the threads that must extend toward the hook appear as white as possible. In that way, they escape detection in the seas because of the similarity of color. F As for the words of the poet: “She hurled into the depths of sea like lead Affixed to horn from oxen of the field That comes, a harbinger of death, to greedy fish,”247 some persons misunderstand this and suppose that the ancients used the hair of oxen for their fishing lines, so that they assert that “keras” means “hair,” and that for that reason “keirasthai” means “to get a haircut.”248 They say that 977 in Archilochus, a “keroplastēs” is someone who enjoys arranging and embellishing the hair.249 This is not true, for they use the hair of horses that they take from males. The females render their hair weak by wetting it with their urine. Aristotle250 says there is nothing clever or subtle in these verses but that in fact a bit of horn was placed around the line before the hook since when the fishes encountered something else they chewed it through. They use hooks that are rounded to catch mullets and bonitos which are small-­mouthed because they are wary of a hook that is broader. Oftentimes a mullet is wary even of a rounded hook and circles around it, lashing the bait with its tail and B gulping down the pieces that it has dislodged. If it cannot do this, it closes its mouth and puckers up and, touching it with the tip of its lips, it nips at the bait. 42

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

The sea-­wolf has more manly courage that does the elephant:251 when it falls victim to a hook, it draws it out from itself, not from some other fish. It twists this way and that, widening the wound, and endures the pain of the tear until it dislodges the hook. The alōpēx does not often approach a hook but avoids the bait, but if it is caught, it immediately turns itself inside out.252 Because of its elasticity and suppleness, it can naturally turn and twist its body so that, when its inner parts are outside, C the hook falls off. 25. Well then, these examples show intelligence and the skillful and remarkable employment of that intelligence for their advantage. Other fishes display sociability and affection for each other,253 along with understanding, like the anthias254 and the parrot-­wrasse. When a parrot-­wrasse has swallowed a hook, the others that happen to be roundabout leap at the hook and nibble it off.255 These fish present their tails from outside to their comrades that have fallen into a fish-­trap and pull them, when they eagerly latch onto their tails, and draw them out.256 The barbiers go to the rescue of their comrades even more vigorously. They lift the fishing line along their backs and raise their spines in an attempt D to saw the line and to break it in two on the sharp edge.257 Indeed, we do not know of a land animal that undertakes to fight for another animal in danger, not the bear nor the boar nor the lioness nor the leopard. In the arena, animals of the same species huddle together and stand in a circle with one another, but they do not know to or intend to help one another, rather fleeing and darting away as far as possible from a wounded or dying animal. The tale of the elephants that carry [materials] to ditches and raise by a ramp a comrade that has slipped in,258 is, my dear friend, exceedingly farfetched and something that enjoins us to believe it on the order of a royal decree, namely, from the books of Juba.259 E If it is true, it demonstrates that many sea-­dwellers are not at all inferior in community spirit or understanding to the most intelligent of land-­ dwellers. I will soon devote a separate discussion to their sociability. 26. Fishermen, who note that most fish elude wounds from the hook by defensive measures like those of wrestlers, resort to force like the Persians, using dragnets, since for those caught in them there is no escape either through reasoning or through cleverness.260 Mullet and rainbow wrasse are caught in casting-­nets and round-­nets, as are goby and sea bass. F Fishermen trawl and gather the so-­called “net fish,” the mullet and gilthead and scorpion fish, into their dragnets, the sort of net that Homer has correctly labeled the “catch-­all.”261 But the galē262 has strategies even against this, in the manner of the sea bass. When it senses that a net is being dragged, it forcefully separates the mud at the bottom and scoops it out by striking against it. When it has made a space that allows the net to pass over it, it thrusts itself into that space and holds close to it until the net has passed by.263 When the dolphin realizes that it has been caught in the folds of a net, it waits patiently, not upset but rather glad, for it feasts on the endless supply 43

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

of fish that are present, without any effort on its part. But as soon as it approaches land, it escapes by eating through the net. 978 If it does not escape, it suffers no harm the first time, but the fishermen sew rushes in its crest and release it. If it is caught again, they punish it with blows, recognizing it by the stitchery. This seldom happens, for most of them feel grateful that they have been forgiven the first time and take care not to do harm in the future.264 Moreover, although there are many examples of cautiousness, vigilance and elusiveness, we ought not to pass over the behavior of the cuttlefish. It has along its neck the so-­called mytis, full of a dark liquid that they call “ink.”265 B Whenever it is overtaken, it releases the liquid, contriving thereby to slip away and to elude the gaze of its pursuer by causing the sea to be darkened around it. It imitates the gods of Homer who oftentimes steal away and rescue those whom they choose in a “dark cloud.”266 But enough of this. 27. We may observe ingenious examples in many of sea creatures of their skill at attacking and catching prey. The starfish, which knows that its body dissolves and liquefies everything that it touches, offers up its body and pays no heed when it is touched by creatures that approach and overtake it. Of course you know the capacity of the torpedo267 not only to render rigid any creature that comes into contact with it, C but even to create a heavy stiffness right through the net in the hands of the fishermen who touch the net. Some who have made trial of this say that if one is beached, those who pour water on it from above feel the painful sensation running along the hand and dulling the sense of touch since the water is altered and modified. Since it has an innate sense of this capacity, it never launches a frontal attack and never endangers itself.268 Circling its prey, it sends forth its discharges like arrows, first infecting the water and D then the victim through the water, which can neither defend itself nor flee but is held fast as if by chains and is frozen stiff. The so-­called “fisherman,”269 well known to many, derives its name from its behavior. Aristotle says that the cuttlefish employs the same trick.270 It lets down from its neck, in the manner of a fish hook, a tentacle which has the property of lengthening when released or of winding back up when the fish draws it in. When it sees a small fish nearby, it allows it to bite the tentacle and little by little it draws it back without the fish noticing, and it leads it in, until the fish that has been snagged is within easy reach of its mouth. E Pindar has made the octopus’ change of color271 well-­known when he writes: “In all the cities where you come to dwell, Be minded like the sea beast’s skin,”272 And similarly Theognis: “Take on a mind that, like the octopus, Adopts the color of the rock it makes its perch.”273 44

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

Now, the chameleon does change colors, but not from any stratagem or attempt to conceal itself, but rather out of fear because it is by nature timid and lacking in courage. This process is accompanied by an abundance of air, as Theophrastus says.274 Almost the entire body of the animal is made up of its lungs, F which is proof that its body is air-­laden,275 in consequence of which it readily undergoes changes. Now, the color change of the octopus is intentional and not the result of accident,276 for it changes color on purpose, employing the device to elude what it fears and to catch its prey. It thereby catches the latter which cannot escape, and escapes the former which passes on by. The claim that it devours its own tentacles is false,277 but the claim that it fears the moray eel and the conger is true because it is ill-­treated by them278 and cannot do anything about it since they slip away. 979 At the same time, the crayfish easily overmasters it when it gets caught in its grasp since its smoothness is no help against its rough exterior. Yet if the octopus manages to thrust its tentacles inside, the crayfish perishes. Nature has devised this cycle and repetition of pursuit and escape from each other as a contest of shrewdness and intelligence.279 28. Well then, Aristotimus has told us about the hedgehog’s foreknowledge of the winds,280 and he expressed admiration for the triangular formation of cranes in flight.281 I can’t cite even one crane from Cyzicus or Byzantium,282 but I know all the “sea-­hedgehogs”283 that ballast themselves with stones B when they sense that a storm and swollen sea are coming in order to keep themselves from being turned upside down because of their lightness or swept away when a wave develops, and to ensure that they stay firmly in place because of the little stones.284 The alteration of the flight path of cranes in opposition to the winds is not characteristic of just one species, but all fishes are so minded and swim against wave and current, taking care that, when a blast from the rear rushes at them, their scales do not get folded back, thereby rendering the body bare and rough. For this reason, they always maintain a prow-­forward position, C since in that way they slice through the water, which exerts pressure on their gills and, flowing smoothly by, forces their rough skin down rather than pulling it up. As I said, this is common to all fishes excepting the sturgeon. They say that this fish swims against the wind and current and does not fear any roughening of its scales because the overlaps do not face in the direction of the tail. 29. The tunny fish senses the equinox285 and the solstice so keenly that it teaches men about these, and it needs no astronomical tables to do so, for wherever it happens to be when the winter solstice overtakes it, it stands fast in that location and remains there until the equinox. D But as to that clever stratagem of the crane that grasps the stone so that it will be roused from sleep if the stone is dropped,286 how much more clever is the trick of the dolphin, which “May neither stop nor halt its forward course.”287 45

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

By nature it is in constant motion,288 and the cessation of its motion is also the cessation of its life.289 When it needs sleep, it raises its body to the surface of the sea and then lets itself sink, on its back, lulled by the rolling motion of the water as it hangs suspended, until it touches bottom. Awakened by this, it hastens back up and, when on top of the water once again, it lets itself go again and is borne downward, devising thereby a sort of rest mingled with movement.290 E They say that tunnies do the same thing for the same reason. Since I have just finished an account of the tunny’s mathematical foreknowledge of the reversal of the motion of the sun, to which Aristotle bears witness,291 listen to an account of its understanding of arithmetic. But first, let me tell you about its understanding of optics, of which Aeschylus seems not to have been unaware, for he says somewhere: “Left-­glancing, like the tunny fish.”292 They do seem to have weak sight in the other eye. This is why, when they enter the Black Sea, they hug the right side and, when they exit, they hug the opposite side, always intentionally and sensibly entrusting their protection to their stronger eye.293 F It seems that a knowledge of arithmetic is necessary to their sociability and their mutual affection, and they have reached a high level of mathematical knowledge:294 since they take delight in feeding together and swimming together in schools, they always form their school into a cube, solid on all sides and consisting of six equal planes. They then swim in formation, guarding the square front and back. 980 In truth, the lookout who tracks the tunnies, if he reckons up with exactness the number of fish on the surface, immediately reports the entire count of the fish, since he is aware that the depth is equal to the breadth and length. 30. Their tendency to herd together has given the bonito295 their name, which I believe is true also of the pelamys.296 No one could cite the number of other species of fish that are observed living together sociably in schools, but let us rather turn our attention to creatures that display a unique type of partnership and symbiosis. Among these is the pinna-­g uard about which Chrysippus spilled a huge quantity of ink,297 for it occupied a front seat in every one of his writings, whether on physics or ethics. B He did not inquire into the sponge-­g uard, for he would not have left it unmentioned. Well then, the pinna-­g uard is a crab-­like creature that lives with the pinna and sits in front of its shell, keeping guard and allowing the shell to be open and gaping wide until one of the little fishes that constitute its prey happens to fall in. Then it nips the flesh of the pinna and goes inside it. The pinna then closes its shell, and together they eat the prey that is ensnared within. A little creature, not crablike but rather resembling a spider,298 is in control over the sponge. The sponge is neither lifeless nor without sensation nor bloodless, clinging as it does to rocks as do many creatures, C but it has 46

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

a distinct sort of movement, inward on itself and outward, which needs a kind of reminding and supervision. It is loose-­textured and relaxed in the pores because of its idleness and sluggishness. Whenever something edible happens by, the guard gives a signal and the sponge closes about it and devours it. Moreover, if a person comes along and touches it, it is informed by the guard that scratches it. The sponge shudders, so to speak, and closes its body by stiffening and contracting it, so that it is no easy task for fishermen who want to cut it away from underneath. The murex,299 grouping together like honey bees, make a comb in which they are said to reproduce.300 They gather up D edible pieces of oyster-­g reen and seaweed that cling to shells and provide each other a kind of circular feast in rotation, distributing food in order to one after the other. 31. How could anyone be the least bit surprised at the sociability of these creatures when the most unsociable and savage of animals that rivers, lakes and seas produce, the crocodile, shows itself to be amazingly inclined to partnership and kind feeling in its association with the plover? The plover is a bird that dwells in marshes and around rivers that guards the crocodile, not providing its own food but feeding off the crocodile’s leavings. When it senses that E the mongoose, while the crocodile sleeps, is plotting against it, smearing itself with mud like an athlete covering itself with dust,301 it rouses the crocodile by making noises and by pecking at it. The crocodile is so gentle toward the bird that it opens its mouth wide and allows it inside. It is pleased that the plover calmly picks out and removes with its bill the pieces of food that are caught in its teeth. When the crocodile has had enough of this, it tips its snout up as a signal and does not lower it until the plover takes note of this and flies away.302 F The so-­called “guide”303 is a fish small in size and shaped lie the goby. It is said to resemble a ruffled bird because of the roughness of its scales. It always accompanies one of the great whales and swims in advance of it, guiding its path so that it doesn’t run aground in the shallows or fall into a lagoon or some strait that is difficult to exit.304 981 The whale follows it, as a ship follows the tiller, altering course obediently. Anything else, be it animal, ship or stone, that it engulfs in its gaping mouth is utterly destroyed immediately and perishes, completely consumed. But the little fish that it recognizes it takes into its mouth like an internal anchor. The fish sleeps inside it while the whale lies motionless and is moored. When the fish comes out again, the whale follows it and does not forsake it day or night. If it does, the whale wanders about and goes astray, and many whales have perished when beached, without a pilot, so to speak. We saw this ourselves not long ago near Anticyra.305 B They say that, prior to that incident, when a whale ran aground not far from Bouna306 and rotted, a plague occurred. Well then, may we justly compare with these partnerships and companionships the friendships of foxes and snakes that Aristotle says exist because of their mutual hostility toward the eagle,307 and those of bustards and 47

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

horses308 because the birds like to come near and pick over the dung? I do not myself observe this same degree of care for one another even in bees or ants, for although they all promote the common interest, there is no regard or thought in any one of them for any other individual. 32. We will note this difference even more when we turn our attention C to the oldest and greatest of social relations, namely, those of reproduction and childbearing. First of all, fishes that live in a sea that lies beside lagoons and that receives rivers, retreat to those when they are about to spawn, in pursuit of the gentleness and calmness of the waters, since calm water is ideal for spawning. In addition, lagoons and rivers are free of wild creatures so that the offspring may be safe. This is why a great many fish spawn about the Black Sea.309 It does not produce any large creature excepting a slight-­ bodied seal and a small dolphin. Moreover, the mingling of rivers emptying D into the Black Sea, which are very numerous and large, provides a gentle and suitable mixture for fish giving birth. The most amazing tale is told about the anthias,310 which Homer calls the “sacred fish.”311 Some, however, take “sacred” in the sense of “great,” just as they call the os sacrum312 the “great bone,” and they term the serious illness epilepsy the “sacred disease.”313 Others understand “sacred” in the ordinary sense, as “dedicated” or “hallowed.” Eratosthenes314 seems to be speaking of the gilthead315 when he writes, “Swift sacred fish with gold upon its brow.”316 Many suppose that the sturgeon is meant here, for it is rare and not easily caught, though it appears often about Pamphylia.317 When they catch one, the fishermen don wreathes and put wreathes on their boats, and when the fishes sail by, the men receive them with shouts and clapping and hold them in high honor.318 E But most people suppose that the anthias is the fish that is called “sacred,” for wherever it is seen, there is no ferocious sea beast. Sponge divers dive with confidence and fish spawn without fear, as if the fish were a guarantor of their safety. The reason for this behavior is hard to account for, whether the sea beasts flee the anthias as elephants flee a pig319 or lions flee a cock, or whether there are indications of places that have no sea beasts, which the fish recognizes and keeps guard over, being intelligent and possessing a good memory. 33. In truth, both parents look out for the welfare of their offspring. The males do not eat the young, F but rather stand by guarding the eggs, as Aristotle relates.320 Some males follow the females and sprinkle the eggs with milt little by little. Otherwise the young do not grow but remain imperfect and stunted. In particular, the wrasse constructs something like a nest from seaweed and surrounds the spawn, sheltering it from the swell. 48

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

982 The love of the dogfish for its young is not inferior to that of any of the tamest creatures in its kindliness and goodness of spirit. They give birth to the egg and then they nourish and carry the offspring not outside but inside themselves, as if from a second birth.321 When they grow larger, they release them and teach them to swim nearby. Then they take the young into themselves through the mouth and allow their bodies to be used as a dwelling place, as a place to feed, and as a refuge until the young can fend for themselves.322 B The care of the tortoise for the birthing and wellbeing of her offspring is amazing. The mother comes out of the sea and gives birth near the water. Since she is unable to incubate them or to remain on land for an extended period, she drops the eggs onto the sand and heaps overtop of them the softest of the sand. When she has covered them over and has hidden them safely,323 some say that she scratches and marks the place, making it easy for her to recognize, while others say that she leaves the unique markings and impressions because she has been turned over by the male. What is still more remarkable, she watches for the fortieth day324 C (the eggs are developed and hatched in that time period of time) and then approaches them, each tortoise recognizing her own treasure, and she opens it more happily and eagerly than a man does a chest of gold. 34. Crocodiles behave similarly in other respects, but their capacity to calculate their location defies human understanding and reckoning. They say in consequence that the animal’s foreknowledge is not a matter of reason but of divination. Neither more nor less, but only so far as the Nile in flood will overflow and cover the earth, just so far does the female go to deposit her eggs,325 D with the result that a farmer who comes upon this scene may take note and report to others how far the river will advance. She performs this calculation so that she can sit on her eggs while wet herself without her offspring getting wet. When the young abandon their shells, the mother rips to pieces with her mouth and slays the one that, on emerging from the egg, does not at once grab hold of whatever presents itself, be it a fly or a gnat or an earthworm or a blade of straw or grass.326 She loves and tends to those that are high-­spirited and active, dispensing her affection by judgment free from emotion, as the wisest of men consider correct. Seals likewise give birth on dry land, and they little by little bring their offspring forth to make trial of the sea, quickly bringing them back again. E They do this many times in succession until the young are accustomed to it and grow brave, enjoying sea life.327 Frogs employ a call at the time of their mating, producing the so-­called “wail,” a sound signaling attraction and mating.328 When the male has drawn the female to him, they await the night together, for they cannot mate in the water and they are afraid to do so on land during the day. When it turns dark, they come forth and mate with pleasure. Otherwise when they make their call they are awaiting rain.329 This is one of the most certain of signs. 49

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

35. But, dear Poseidon, what a ridiculous mistake I have almost made! F While dwelling on seals and frogs, the sea creature that the gods love most, the wisest of them all, has escaped my attention. What nightingales can justly be compared with the halcyon330 in its love of song, what swallows in its affection for its young, what doves in its love for its mate, or what bees in its workmanship?331 Whose births and offspring and labor pangs has the god more honored? They say that one single island was anchored fast to welcome the delivery of Leto’s children.332 But they say that when the halcyon is about to give birth around the time of the solstice, the god makes the whole sea calm and waveless.333 983 Because of her, men willingly sail for seven days and seven nights at the height of winter, reckoning travel on sea to be safer than on land at this time. If I should be required to speak briefly of every virtue that she has, she is so attached to her mate that she sits with him not just on one occasion but throughout the year, and she accepts his advances, not out of licentiousness, since she never mates with another male, but rather out of affectionate regard and friendliness, like a married woman.334 When the male grows weak from age and finds it burdensome to keep up, she takes over, carrying him in his infirmity and feeding him, B never deserting him or leaving him alone. She lifts him onto her shoulders and carries him about everywhere, caring for him until the end of his life.335 With regard to her affection for her offspring and her provisions for the welfare of her young, when she senses that she is pregnant, she turns immediately to the task of building her nest, not lumping together mud or fixing the nest onto walls or roofs as swallows do, nor using many parts of her body in the work, as the bee employs its body to enter and open the wax, its feet all in contact at the same time to separate the entirety into hexagonal compartments. C But the halcyon, with just one simple tool to do her work, her mouth, and nothing else to work along with her and to assist in construction, what wonders she devises and fashions that one could scarcely believe unless he beheld what she had fashioned by herself, or rather beheld her “shipbuilding.” This alone of many designs cannot be capsized or submerged. She collects the spines of the garfish and gathers up and binds them one to the other,336 entwining with the straight ones those that are aslant, as if she were pulling thread through the warp, introducing twists and bends of one through the other, so that she forms a structure rather oblong in shape, like D the fisherman’s basket. When she has finished it, she takes it and places it at the water’s edge where the sea laps it gently and teaches her how to plug it where it is not well fitted together and to fill it in where she sees that it has been loosened by the blows. She binds it and tightens the joints so that the whole cannot be undone or pierced even by stone or iron. No less astonishing are the proportions and shape of the hollow cavity. It is so shaped as to allow only her to enter in. The entrance is totally hidden and not observable by others so that not even any seawater can penetrate inside. E I assume that 50

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

there is none among you who has not seen the nest. Since I have seen it often and touched it,337 it occurs to me to recite or chant the verse: “Once such a thing there by Apollo’s shrine”338 I beheld, the altar of horns, sung of as one of the so-­called seven wonders,339 because it needs no glue nor any other sort of bond, being fastened and held together solely with horns from the right side of the animals. May the god be gracious …340 to a man who is beloved by the Muses and is an islander when he sings of the siren of the sea, and may he laugh at the objections that my detractors raise. Why … Apollo … Conger-­slayer,341 since he knows that Aphrodite, F who was born from the sea, reckons all [sea] creatures as sacred to her and as her brethren, and that she derives no joy from the slaughter of any of them. You know that at Leptis,342 the priests of Poseidon do not consume any sea creature at all, and that those initiated into the mysteries at Eleusis worship the red mullet as sacred,343 and that the priestess of Hera at Argos refrains from eating it out of respect. This is because the red mullet in particular kills and devours the sea-­hare344 which is lethal to humans. For this reason, these animals have immunity, being considered friendly toward man and a source of protection. 984 36. In truth, many Greeks have temples and altars dedicated to Artemis, “Goddess of the Fishnet,”345 and to Apollo, “God of Dolphins.” The place that the god made his chosen seat,346 … the inhabitants are descended from Cretans who received divine guidance from a dolphin. The god did not himself change form and swim before the fleet, as the tellers of tales relate, but rather he sent a dolphin that guided the men and brought them to land at Cirrha.347 They say also that Soteles348 and Dionysius, who were sent to Sinope by Ptolemy Soter to escort Serapis back,349 were blown off course by a strong wind around Malea when they had the Peloponnese on their right. B Then, when they were lost and disheartened, a dolphin appeared at the prow and, one might say, appealed to them to follow it, leading them then to a safe haven with gentle swells where they might remain unharmed, until the animal conducted and led them on and put the vessel safe on land at Cirrha. After making sacrifice in thanksgiving for their safe voyage, they realized that they needed to take down one of the two statues, that of Pluto, and to make a cast of that of Persephone and to leave it behind. It is understandable that the god would find the music-­loving nature of the dolphin pleasing.350 Pindar compares himself to this animal and says that he is roused, C “Like a dolphin on the sea, That lovely music of the flute Stirs up on waveless depths.”351 51

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

But it is even more likely that its love for man has rendered it dear to the gods, for the dolphin is the only creature that loves man for his own sake.352 Among land animals, some do not associate at all with human beings, while others, the tamest, do so out of necessity because humans feed them, as the dog, the horse and the elephant do with the humans with whom they dwell. Swallows live inside houses to secure those things that they need, namely darkness and a sufficient degree of safety, but they fear man as a wild beast. The dolphin alone possesses by nature that which the best philosophers seek: friendship without advantage. D Although it has no need of anything from any human being, it is a kindly friend to all humans and has aided many. No one has not heard the story of Arion, which is much talked about.353 You yourself, my friend, conveniently reminded us of the story of Hesiod,354 but “you did not reach the story’s end.”355 When you introduced the anecdote about the dog, you should not have omitted the dolphins since the information that the dog provided when it howled and attacked the murderers would have been unilluminating had not the dolphins taken up the corpse as it floated on the sea near the temple of Nemean Zeus, one group eagerly receiving it from another group and, putting it on land at Rhium, showing that he had been slain.356 E Myrtilus of Lesbos357 tells the story of Enalus of Aetolia who was in love with the daughter of Smintheus. She was thrown into the sea by the Penthilidae on the order of the oracle of Amphitrite. When he leaped into the sea after her, he was carried safely to Lesbos by a dolphin.358 And the good will and friendship of the dolphin toward the young man of Iasus seemed to amount to love in light of its intensity. It swam and played with him by day and it allowed him to come into close contact with its body. When he mounted into it, it did not flee away but joyfully carried him, wandering wherever he guided it. On one occasion, in the midst of heavy rain and pounding hail, the youth fell off and drowned. F The dolphin took up the body and delivered it and himself onto the land.359 It did not abandon the body until it had itself died, thinking it just to have a share in the death for which it thought itself responsible. The design on the coins of the people of Iasus is a memorial to this calamity, a depiction of a youth carried by a dolphin.360 As a result of this, the stories about Coeranus, fabulous as they were, gained an audience. 985 A Parian by birth, he bought in Byzantium a net-­full of dolphins that had become entangled in a net and were in danger of being slaughtered, and he set them all free. A bit later, they say, he was sailing in a penteconter that had fifty pirates on board. In the strait between Naxos and Paros, the story goes, the ship capsized and the others perished, but it is said that a dolphin slipped beneath him and raised him up.361 He was deposited on shore at Sicinus, near a cave which is to this day pointed out and called Coeraneum. It is said that Archilochus is referring to this in the verse: “From fifty men the kind Poseidon Left only Coeranus.”362 52

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

B Later, when he died, his relatives burned his body near the sea. A large number of dolphins appeared along the shore, as if making it clear that they had come for the funeral and staying until it was completed.363 Stesichorus364 relates that the shield of Odysseus had a dolphin as its device, and Critheus365 reports that the Zacynthians keep alive the memory of why that is so. Telemachus, while a small child, fell into deep water near the shore and was rescued by dolphins that took him onto their backs and swam with him to land. For that reason, his father had a carving of a dolphin on his signet ring and this same ornament on his shield, C as payback to the animal.366 Well, after I promised you at the outset that I would not tell you any fables, I have somehow inadvertently, in the course of my dolphin tales, run aground on Odysseus and Coeranus, and I impose this sentence on myself: I shall stop talking at this point! 37. ARISTOTIMUS: Gentlemen of the jury, you may vote now. SOCLARUS: We have for some while now agreed with Sophocles words: “Well has the argument of two opposing sides Come fixed together at the middle point,”367 for by putting together what you have stated in opposition to one another, you will fight a good battle against those who deny reason and understanding to animals.368

Commentary 1 On the Greek title of the treatise, see Introduction p.  1 and note 1. The Greek title of the treatise hints at a solution that the work fails to deliver, since ultimately no decision is rendered as to “whether land or sea animals have more intelligence.” The adjectival form of the noun ϕρόνησις (phronēsis) appears, in the title of the work, in the comparative degree, ϕρονιμώτϵρα (phronimōtera) to refer to a type of intellectual capacity possessed in a greater degree either by land-­dwelling or sea-­ dwelling animals. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1140a24–33, defines phronēsis as a kind of practical wisdom that enables a human being to deliberate successfully concerning his own welfare and advantage toward the attainment of the good life. He acknowledges as well (1141a26–28) that even some non-­human animals may be said to possess phronēsis since they have a capacity for prudence concerning the regulation of their own lives. Jean-­Louis Labarrière, “De la Phrone­ ellegrin, eds., Biologie, sis Animale,” in Daniel Devereux and Pierre P Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1990) 405–428, argues that Aristotle is somewhat ambiguous in his use of the term phronēsis in the case of the 53

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS





intellectual capacities of non-­human animals, at times using the term synonymously with the term sunesis, a sort of practical intelligence that enables an animal to navigate successfully the necessities of its life. This latter type of intellectual activity is closer to the meaning of sollertia found in the Latin version of the title of Plutarch’s treatise, since that term describes a kind of cleverness or resourcefulness or adroitness. 2 Autobulus, the interlocutor in On the Cleverness of Animals who defends the position that all animals have a “share of thought and reasoning capacity” (960A), was the father of Plutarch. He refers (964D) to Plutarch as his son and as the companion of Soclarus. On this identification of Autobulus, Robert Lamberton, Plutarch (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001) 9, notes charmingly, “Characteristically, Plutarch’s father’s name is an item of information that Plutarch neither reveals nor hides. By general agreement, we have it recorded in the odd dialogue Whether Land or Sea Animals Are Cleverer,” in which one interlocutor is “a sweet old man named Autobulus, who at one point casually refers to ‘my son, dear Soclarus, your friend’ who teaches philosophy in the tradition of Plato (964d). This son can hardly be anyone but Plutarch.” Soclarus, who advances the Stoic-­inspired argument in the dialogue that animals are devoid of reason, has been identified as a citizen of Chaeronea, Plutarch’s hometown in Boeotia, and a close friend of Plutarch who was granted Roman citizenship through the intervention of Lucius Mestrius Soclarus. The names of the remaining participants in the dialogue are introduced at 965B–C, at the point where the discussion of the intellectual capacities of non-­human animals ends and the comparison of land- and sea-­dwelling creatures commences. The interlocutor Heracleon takes part also in the Plutarchan dialogue De defectu oraculorum (On the Decline of Oracles). Concerning the remaining participants in On the Cleverness of Animals, Helmbold 318 note c, remarks, “Of the other speakers in this dialogue, nothing is known except what may be inferred from the present work.” On the question of the identity of the individuals who are mentioned in the works of Plutarch, see Introduction note 5. 3 The Spartan elegiac poet Tyrtaeus (seventh century bce) was known for composing rousing verses intended to inspire the Spartan armies to valor in battle. 4 Leonidas was the king of Sparta (ca. 490–480 bce) who fell at Thermopylae with 300 Spartan warriors in the war against the Persians. 5 The text is corrupt here. I follow the reading in Hubert (κακκονη̑ν). ­Bouffartigue 67 note 2 discusses various readings that have been suggested by scholars and translates the corrupt word as “ennoblir.” 6 The reference here to an “encomium on hunting,” the first of a substantial number of references to hunting in the treatise, has received considerable scholarly attention. According to the so-­called Lamprias Catalogue of the works of Plutarch, he wrote a treatise entitled On Hunting, now lost. Some scholars consider the reference here to be an

54

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

allusion to that lost work, although no indication of its authorship is given in the present passage. Hubert Martin, “Plutarch’s De Sollertia Animalium 959B–C: The Discussion of the Encomium on Hunting,” American Journal of Philology 100 (1979) 99–106, discusses a number of problems raised by the reference to the “encomium,” and he concludes that a real work is intended, but not the now-­lost treatise of Plutarch. More recent scholarship on the “encomium” is surveyed in Bouffartigue xxi–xxiv. Hunting is a recurring theme in On the Cleverness of Animals, and the practice is both favorably and unfavorably judged. In the present passage, ­Autobulus expresses concern that young men will become fixated on it to the exclusion of other pursuits, but at the same time he admits that, despite his age, the reading of the encomium on hunting inspired in him a desire to “chase the spotted deer.” The interlocutor Soclarus, who throughout the dialogue advances the Stoic view on the irrationality of non-­human animals, opines (959C) that hunting illustrates the contrast between human skill and intellect and the unreasoning violence of other species. Later, the interlocutor Aristotimus makes a similar observation (966A) that the opportunity that hunting provides a person to match wits against cunning and swift animal adversaries makes hunting a noble pursuit. In contrast, Autobulus, who had admitted to a degree of excitement on hearing the encomium on hunting read aloud, but who is the speaker who advances the position in the opening seven chapters of the treatise that non-­human animals have a share of reason, laments (959D) that the savagery involved in hunting causes humans to become insensitive to the sufferings of animals and to feel no disgust at blood and gore. He remarks similarly (965B) that hunting and fishing are objectionable because they encourage men to amuse themselves by causing the suffering and death of animals, even separating the young of animals from their mothers. Inasmuch as the comments on the practice of hunting made in On the ­Cleverness of Animals are put into the mouths of a number of interlocutors who advance positions that may not necessarily reflect the beliefs of Plutarch, one may run the risk of over-­reading the text to draw firm conclusions on his position from their statements, but it is worth noting that, since the first seven chapters of the treatise are devoted to a defense of the position that all animals have at least a share of reason, it seems justifiable to conclude that Plutarch would disapprove of a practice that visited deliberate harm and suffering on other reasoning beings. Pietro LiCausi and Roberto Pomelli, L’Anima degli Animali: Aristotele, Frammenti Stoici, Plutarco, Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi, 2015) 221, make this point forcefully, “Una volta che si è dimostrato che è possibile parlare di forme di intelligenza degli animali, sarà infatti quanto meno difficile giustificare ogni forma di violenza su di essi.” Katarzyna Jazdzewska, “Not an ‘Innocent Spectacle’: Hunting and Venationes in Plutarch’s De sollertia animalium,” Ploutarchos N. S. 7 (2009/2010) 35–46, observes that hunting is an important theme in the treatise, but that it is not

55

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

coherently treated: Autobulus opposes hunting but is conciliatory to hunters. She argues that the answer to the apparent inconsistency of the theme in the treatise lies in Soclarus’ designation of hunting as a “spectacle” (959C) and in his description of the Roma arena, for he has in mind the staged hunts (venationes) of the arena. It is these, she argues, that Autobulus condemns, and she cites in defense of her position Plutarch, Praecepta gerendae reipublicae (Precepts on Statecraft) 822C, where he recommends that all state spectacles, including gladiatorial shows, be removed that excite a taste for bloody and murderous actions. On Plutarch’s attitudes on hunting, see also Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006) 31–33 and 73. 7 Euripides, Hippolytus 218–219, slightly modified. 8 Long ago, Max Schuster, Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De sollertia animalium, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehrtätigkeit Plutarchs (Dissertation, Munich) (Augsburg: Himmer, 1917) argued that De sollertia animalium was intended as a rhetorical school exercise produced at a school that Plutarch conducted in his hometown of Chaeronea. The rhetorical cast of the treatise, he argues, is traceable in the technique of comparison between land- and sea-­dwelling creatures and in the fact that no conclusion is ultimately drawn as to which type of creature is superior since the work was not intended as a serious scientific investigation (62). Similarly, Helmbold 312 remarks, “The occasionally bantering tone may serve to indicate that we have before us something of a school exercise from Plutarch’s own academy, with perhaps the first draft of the second part composed by pupils.” 9 See note 3. 10 This fragment from the lost Aeolus of Euripides (fragment 27 Nauck) is cited by Plutarch also at On Fortune 98D, in a slightly different form. 11 Plutarch, On Eating Meat 998A–B, makes this same argument that human beings, once they have developed a taste for the slaughter of other animals, move easily into the slaughter of their fellow ­human beings since such treatment of other species renders them insensitive to violence. He cites the same example in that passage of the increasing violence of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens as proof that one act to violence makes the next that much easier to countenance. See Commentary to On Eating Meat Treatise II notes 28–31. 12 Porphyry, On Abstinence II. 29, records that the first sacrifice of an animal occurred when an ox, returning from the field, tasted a cake that had been set out for sacrifice and a farmer in anger struck the animal dead with an axe. Previously, Porphyry records, sacrifices had been restricted to crops and human beings were vegetarian. 13 The play in which the phrase occurred is unknown (Nauck 782). 14 In both of Plutarch’s other animal-­related treatises (Whether Beasts Are Rational 991C–D and On Eating Meat 994A–B and 995C), human beings are accused of eating animals not out of necessity, as other species are compelled to do, but merely to add luxury and variety to their diet.

56

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

In all three treatises, the same term (ὄψον, opson “delicacy, relish”) is used to designate the frivolous food choices that humans demand. 15 On Plutarch’s attitude toward Pythagoras and his teachings and his references to Pythagoreanism in his animal-­related treatises, see Introduction to On Eating Meat, pp. 129–130. 16 On the literary setting of the dialogue, see Introduction, p.  2 and note 4. 17 This observation may be considered to be the “thesis” of the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B), that all animals “have a share of” reason. The dimensions of the rational capacities human species are explored in these “theoretical” chapters. of non-­ Plutarch’s approach in these chapters is to argue, largely in opposition to the Stoic position, advanced in the dialogue by the interlocutor Soclarus, that rationality in animal species is correctly viewed as a “more or less” relationship rather than as an “all or nothing” relationship. The placement of this “thesis” statement is noteworthy, coming as it does immediately after Autobulus’ reference (959F) to Pythagoras’ attempts to inspire humane feelings and compassion for other species in mankind, and shortly before Plutarch introduces the concept of interspecies kinship (960E–F). Plutarch argues in the first seven chapters that, while the Stoic contention that reason is of paramount importance may be valid, their conclusion from this position that only human beings have reason is ultimately indefensible, and, at the same time, that reason is not after all the sole criterion for assessing the value of a living being. The capacity for sensation, and indeed for suffering, must likewise be taken into account, as Pythagoras contended. Having stated that all creatures have a share of reason, Plutarch proceeds to demonstrate how that circumstance proves that all living creatures are akin. He thus mounts a twofold attack on the Stoic position on the intellectual and moral inferiority of non-­human animals by arguing both that other species possess at least a modicum of reason and are therefore akin to their human brethren, and that their capacity to suffer must be taken into account in human–non-­human relations. This latter contention finds expression in the subsequent discussion of justice which is prominent in the first seven chapters of the treatise. For an analysis of Plutarch’s case for rationality in non-­human species, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason, Chapter 2, “The Nature of the Beast: The Search for Animal Rationality,” pp. 10–47. See also Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 7–8 and note 21. Plutarch’s case for the presence of reason in non-­human species has been criticized for a number of perceived shortcomings. In his early study of Plutarch’s animal psychology, Adolf Dyroff, Die Tierpsychologie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia (Würzburg: Bonitas-­Bauer, 1897) 56, charged Plutarch with imprecision in his use of technical philosophical vocabulary and with a less than perfect understanding of the subtleties of the Stoic position on animal intellect which he attacks in the treatise, so that he uses technical terms referring to various dimensions of

57

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

animal intellect interchangeably. Similarly, Plutarch has come under attack for his heavy reliance on anecdote and anthropomorphization in the development of his case for rationality in non-­human species, and for his consequent tendency to judge that actions and behaviors witnessed in non-­human animals that appear to resemble similar actions and behaviors in human beings are evidence that non-­human species possess skills generally viewed as unique to human beings. 18 Such comments as these provide only the most general impression of the literary setting of the dialogue and do not offer any proof that the dialogue reflects a debate that actually took place. Bouffartigue xviii, in his discussion of the setting of On the Cleverness of Animals, observes justly, “La mise en scène du dialogue est des plus discrètes. Ni décor ni mobilier ne sont évoqués … Il n’est pas sans importance, toutefois, que le texte établisse une unite de lieu entre les événements de la veille (la lecture publique d’un discours, un banquet et une amorce de discussion), et la dialogue lui-­même.” 19 Soclarus refers here to the Stoic theory of opposites set forth by Chrysippus (ca. 280–207 bce) in his treatise Πϵρὶ ϵ᾿ναντίων (Peri enantiōn, On Opposites), according to which that which is rational in the universe must be counterbalanced by that which is irrational, that which is immortal by that which is mortal, and that which is indestructible by that which is destructible. The fragments of Chrysippus’ treatise on opposites are found in SVF II. 172–180. Soclarus suggests here that rational creatures, that is, human beings, must necessarily be balanced by irrational creatures, that is, non-­human animals. 20 Autobulus accepts Soclarus’ assertion that the rational is counterbalanced by the irrational, but he locates the irrational in those things in nature that are devoid of soul. The Stoics did not deny that non-­ human animals possess a soul. Therefore, non-­human animals do not constitute the irrational element of creation. On the Stoic theory of the eight-­part soul that all animals possess, see Introduction, pp. 4–5 and note 15. 21 Aristotle, Politics 1253a9, states that nature does nothing in vain. The Stoics adopted this idea in their own doctrine that the universe was the work of Providence, and that nature did nothing in vain in fashioning it (SVF II. 1140). 22 Plutarch’s use of the terms “akin” (οἰκϵι̑ ον, oikeion) and “alien” (ἀλλότριον, allotrion) here indicate that he is alluding to the Stoic ethical doctrine of οἰκϵίωσις (oikeiōsis), the sense of kinship, bonding or belonging that living creatures feel toward other living creatures. In Stoic teaching, humans sense their kinship with other humans as non-­human animals sense their kinship toward other non-­human animals, but humans do not sense this kinship toward non-­human animals because non-­human animals are irrational. From birth, all living beings have the capacity to sense what other beings are akin to them and with which they can therefore safely associate while at the same time recognizing those that are alien to them and are thus to be avoided. Kinship theory became the cornerstone of Stoic ethical philosophy and the starting 58

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

point for their position that human beings cannot stand in any relation of justice toward non-­human animals because other species are not rational and are therefore not akin to humans, and his mention at this point of the concept of kinship and alienation prepares the way for the upcoming discussion of interspecies justice. On Stoic kinship theory, see Introduction, pp.  5–7 and Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason, pp. 20–26. 23 Autobulus argues here that, since all animals clearly know by nature what things they must pursue and avoid as either beneficial or harmful to their lives, they must have some innate reasoning capacity. The conclusion, Autobulus implies, that naturally follows from that fact is that all animals are in fact akin (oikeioi), contrary to the position of the Stoics. 24 It is noteworthy that Plutarch includes hope, fear and grief, concepts that are now viewed as types of emotions, in his list of those capacities in animals that follow upon the possession of sensory organs, since emotional states were generally viewed in classical psychology to be impossible for non-­human animals. In Aristotelian psychology, emotions (πάθη, pathē) were considered to be phenomena that inspire persons to change their opinions concerning their judgments, and that are accompanied by pleasure and pain (Rhetoric 1378a20–22). According to Aristotle’s definition, fear is an emotion that arises from the impression that evil is at hand. Fear would therefore lie outside the capacity of the non-­human animals because they could not make the judgment that danger is imminent. Further, Aristotle argued, Politics 1253a10–18, that non-­human animals do not have a sense (αἴσθησις, aisthēsis) of good or bad or right or wrong so that certain emotions that depend upon the recognition of such normative concepts would be impossible for non-­human animals. Similarly in Stoic theory, a rational element was presupposed in Stoic psychology. According to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 110–114, the Stoic Zeno held that every emotion entailed a contraction or motion of the soul that followed on a judgment (κρίσις, krisis) that some proposition is true. Fear is the emotion that follows a judgment that danger is near. Non-­human animals, in Stoic theory, are irrational and can therefore not evaluate their experiences or experience emotions in response to them. Plutarch’s case for emotional states in non-­human species, as it appears subsequently in the argument of On the Cleverness of Animals, depends heavily upon anecdote, anthropomorphization and analogy with emotional states in human beings. It is upon these same sorts of arguments that the case for emotions in non-­human species is based in current cognitive ethological thought and in the polemic of animal rights philosophers, and this approach is still attacked as unsound. For a discussion of Plutarch’s views on emotions in non-­human animals and on the current state of debate on emotions in non-­human animals, pro and con, see Stephen T. Newmyer, The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), Chapter 7, “Animal Affect: ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Emotional?” pp. 121–133, with bibliography. 59

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

25 Straton of Lampsacus (ca. 340–269 bce), whom Plutarch terms here a “natural philosopher” (ϕυσικός, phusikos), was head of the Peripatetic school of philosophy following Theophrastus. In his brief life of Straton, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers V. 59–60, lists works by him on natural phenomena, on logic and on ethical topics. 26 This verse is cited as well by Plutarch at On Fortune 98C and at On the Fortune of Alexander 336B, where he attributed it to the comic playwright Epicharmus (530–440 bce). Porphyry, On Abstinence I. 4, cites the first half of the verse, without attribution. 27 Cleomenes III was king of Sparta (235–222 bce). He is the subject of a biography by Plutarch. 28 Plutarch again alludes to the Stoic ethical theory of oikeiōsis here, mentioning the capacity in all animals to recognize from birth that which is akin and that which is alien to them. Autobulus’ question is ironically intended, for no animal loses this capacity because every animals is endowed with a degree of intellect. 29 Aristotle, Physics 199a22–26, maintains, in contrast to Plutarch’s statement here, that the activities of non-­human animals are not the result of technological skill, forethought or planning. 30 The Stoics are meant here. Plutarch, Stoic Self-­Contradictions 1038B, employs the same verb ἀποκναίϵι (apoknaiei, “wears out, wearies”) that he employs here, to complain that the Stoic Chrysippus, in every one of his works, tires the reader with constant reminders of the natural affinity that humans have toward each other, a reference to Stoic oikeiōsis theory. 31 Helmbold 331 note c, observes, “Introductions” or “Elementary Treatises” were “titles used by Chrysippus …” 32 On Plutarch’s disparaging references to Stoic technical terms, see Introduction, p. 4 and note 13. 33 Bouffartigue 72 note 34, observes of this last definition, “Plutarque est le seul à transmettre cette definition de la mémoire …” 34 Plutarch repeats this characterization of the Stoic understanding of the emotions (πάθη, pathē) in his treatise Moral Virtue 441C, where he states that they claim that emotions are intemperate reason arising from evil and mistaken judgments that have been allowed to gain strength. Later in that same treatise (447A), his characterization of their view is close to that given in the present passage, in that he states that they hold that desire, anger and fear are merely perverse judgments. See note 24. For a detailed and subtle analysis of Stoic doctrine on the emotions, see Margaret R. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 35 The question of the emotional capacities of non-­human animals remains a topic of intense debate among ethologists and philosophers. Neuroscientist Marc D. Hauser, Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), who is willing to attribute anger and fear to some non-­human species, draws the line at what he terms “normative emotions” (213), those that require an observer to make

60

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

moral judgments about a situation. He writes (224) of the capacity for such emotions in non-­human animals, “[My] hunch is that they lack the moral emotions or moral senses. They lack the capacity for empathy, sympathy, shame, guilt, and loyalty.” In contrast, biologist Marc Bekoff, The Smile of a Dolphin: Remarkable Accounts of Animal Emotions (New York: Discovery Books, 2000) 24, who contends that some non-­ human species experience a broad range of emotional states, including love, joy, shame and grief, bases his position on the analogous brain structures that humans and non-­human species share and on the presence of identical neurochemicals across species that are involved in the production of emotions in human beings. This leads him to conclude that non-­human animals do share some of the emotional states that humans experience. Bekoff’s position, like that of Plutarch, has come under attack from scientists and philosophers as relying on anecdote and anthropomorphization. Bekoff argues, however, that these tools, when added to rigorous biological observation, are valid. Unabashedly anecdotal and anthropomophizing in its approach is Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: Delacorte Press, 1995), a work that at times sounds quite Plutarchan in its enthusiastic retailing of amazing and touching anecdotes that are taken to illustrate a range of emotional states in non-­human species. Ecologist Carl Safina, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (New York: Henry Holt, 2015) 29, observes on the current state of the acrimonious debate on animal emotions “Simply deciding that other animals can’t have any emotions that humans feel is a cheap way to get a monopoly on all the world’s feelings and motivations. People who’ve systematically watched or known animals realize the absurdity of this. But many still don’t.” 36 Plutarch’s observation that the Stoics punish their dogs to instill in them the sort of pain which, when experienced by human beings, is termed “repentance” (μϵτάνοια, metanoia) illustrates a characteristic charge that he makes when attacking the Stoics: their positions, he likes to point out, are marked by glaring self-­contradictions. In the present instance, Plutarch charges that the Stoics, inadvertently and in contradiction to their position on non-­human animals, attribute to them both rational and emotional dimensions, for the punishment assumes that the animals can reflect upon its purpose, and that, at the same time, they can experience such emotional states as fear or anguish which the punishment would arouse. Plutarch devoted an entire treatise, De Stoicorum repugnantiis (Stoic Self-­Contradictions) to what he views as a characteristic failing of the Stoics. 37 In his life of the Stoic Zeno, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 114, gives the Stoic definition of “pleasure” (ἡδονή, hēdonē) as an irrational elation in the presence of that which seems to be worth choosing. The pleasure that entices through the ears is called “enchantment” (κήλησις, kēlēsis). Stobaeus, Eclogae II. 9, 20 (=SVF III. 402) says that,

61

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

according to the Stoic definition, pleasure that enters through the eyes by means of cunning or trickery is called γοητϵία (goēteia). Plutarch’s wording here is so close to the Stoic formulation of these definitions that it is clear that he has the Stoics in mind. 38 Aelian, Nature of Animals XII. 44, recounts that Libyan mares are captivated by music and dance about to the sound of pipes, following the herdsman while he plays and halting when he halts. If he plays with greater intensity, the mares weep tears of delight. 39 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 31, observes that crabs take so much delight in flute music that they not only emerge from their holes, but even leave the sea under the influence of the music. 40 In Aelian’s discussion of the musical tastes of horned owls (Nature of Animals XV. 28), he not only corroborates Plutarch’s claim that they are caught by musicians, but he adds that dancers who thus hunt the owls have named a dance after the animals, and that the owls are delighted to know that humans imitate them! 41 Helmbold 335 note c, observes of Plutarch’s repeated use here of the phrase “as it were,” “A favourite expression of Aristotle’s; but it is the Stoics who are being reproved here …” The Stoics maintained that, while non-­human animals are irrational, they have faculties which are analogous to the rational faculty in human beings, so that what appear in non-­human animals to be instances of a certain intellectual or emotional activity are merely “as it were” that activity. Seneca, On Anger I. 3. 6, for example, observes that animals lack emotions, but do have certain impulses similar to those emotions (muta animalia humanis affectibus carent, habent autem similes quosdam impulsus). With regard to analogous intellectual activity, Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II. 29, states that man has mind, while in beasts, there is something similar to mind (in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis). Plutarch’s series of “as it were” assertions, satirically intended, become increasingly exaggerated culminating in the notion that, if one were to follow the Stoic position to its conclusion, one could claim that animals were not really alive at all. 42 In Stoic teaching, the presence of reason is a precondition for the growth of virtue, so that, in their view, children, while still irrational, cannot be viewed as possessing either virtue or vice, but once they attain to rationality, they may be considered to demonstrate one or the other (SVF III. 537). In Plutarch’s view, non-­human animals are naturally disposed to virtuous behavior. At Whether Beasts Are Rational 987B, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus argues, in opposition to Soclarus’ position here, that non-­human animals have a greater natural propensity toward the production and perfection of virtue than do human beings, without need for instruction or provocation. Aelian, in the Preface to Nature of Animals, observes that it is a remarkable fact that, while human beings are blessed with reason and speech, other animals have by nature a share of virtue as well as of many human excellences. On the virtues of non-­ human animals, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 36–39.

62

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

43 Plutarch, On the Love of Offspring 495C, takes up the subject of the relation between love of offspring and the birth of justice, giving there a somewhat less generous reading of the capacity for justice in non-­human animals, which he there calls “irrational” (ἄλογα, aloga), than that which he here puts into the mouth of Autobulus. In the case of non-­human species, the love of offspring exists in an imperfect and inadequate state that cannot lead to a true sense of justice. Autobulus, on the other hand, places no such strictures on the sense of justice in non-­human species, and he is arguing for the presence of reason in other species, which is denied in the passage in On the Love of Offspring. Some scholars have taken this apparent contradiction as an indication that, when he wrote On the Love of Offspring, Plutarch was under the influence of Stoic thought, while other scholars have argued that no real contradiction exists. Francesco Becchi, “Irrazionalità e Razionalità degli Animali,” Prometheus 26 (2000) 212–215, suggests that Plutarch downplays the intellectual endowments of non-­human animals only to contrast the natural and untainted actions of non-­humans with the decadent actions of humans who circumvent their superior intellectual endowments. As in On the Cleverness of Animals, Becchi concludes, Plutarch is arguing that all animals have some degree of intellectual activity. On apparent contradictions in Plutarch’s stance on animal rationality, see Introduction, pp. 7–8 and note 22. 44 Plutarch is again arguing that all animals have a share of reason and have therefore at least some inclination toward virtue, however imperfect it may be. Certain classes of living beings, be they human or non-­ human, do not by nature possess perfect reason, nor can they therefore exhibit perfect virtue, but this does not mean that they possess no reason at all. In non-­human animals, as in slaves, reason is imperfect but nevertheless present. Slaves and non-­human animals share this imperfect reason and imperfect virtue, inasmuch as they are two classes of beings not designed by nature to exhibit the perfection of reason. Nevertheless, human beings have the possibility of perfecting their innate reason through what Autobulus calls “care and education” (962C), an option that does not lie open to non-­human animals. 45 In Whether Beasts Are Rational 992C–D, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus, arguing as Autobulus has that non-­human animals have a share of reason, maintains that such vices as stupidity and slothfulness in some animals species are in themselves proof of reason, for they are manifestations of imperfect reason. 46 Plutarch refers sarcastically to the Stoic notion of the inaccessibility of true wisdom. Plutarch, Stoic Self-­Contradictions 1048E, notes that the Stoic Chrysippus said that neither he himself nor any of his acquaintances or relatives was a good person, not to mention the remainder of mankind, who are madmen and fools. Cicero, On the Ends of Good and Evil IV. 21, states that, in the view of the Stoics, all vices and sins are equal, and all who have made progress toward virtue but have not yet attained to it, are miserable and equal to the wickedest of mankind.

63

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

47 Plutarch cites the example of gradations in physiological capacities between animal species to support his overall thesis that the intellectual capacities of non-­human animals exist in a more-­or-­less relation, rather than in an all-­or-­nothing relation. 48 Autobulus alludes to the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis, which held that every creature has an innate knowledge of what things it must pursue and what it must avoid to ensure the successful conduct of its life. Seneca, Moral Letters CXXI. 6, holds that non-­human animals know by nature how to manage their lives, for “they come into being with this knowledge: they are born fully-­trained” (cum hac scientia prodeunt. instituta nascuntur). Autobulus, in contrast to Seneca and the Stoics, argues that this knowledge is bolstered by a degree of reason. On Stoic oikeiōsis theory, see notes 22–23. 49 Although Plutarch’s animal treatises are replete with examples of animal “virtues” of the sort that Autobulus singles out here, the “vices” of non-­human species are scarcely mentioned and not illustrated beyond the merest hint. See note 45. 50 On the possibility that the dialogue is intended as a rhetorical exercise in a school that Plutarch conducted, see note 8. 51 Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 23, reports this filial devotion among storks, and in his account of the less than devoted behavior of the hippopotamus toward its father, Nature of Animals III. 19, he reports that it is the most impious of animals, for it eats its parent. 52 Aristotle, History of Animals 613b24–29, says that male partridges destroy the eggs because the males are ill-­behaved and mischievous. Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 16, includes the sexual motive for the male’s behavior that Plutarch mentions. 53 The reference is probably to the Stoic philosopher Antipater of Tarsus (second century bce), who is believed to have written a book about animals. 54 The term that Plutarch employs here for “urine,” λυγγούριον ­(lungourion), means the urine of lynxes. The term was sometimes used of amber because of the belief that lynx urine would harden into a yellowish stone. Pliny, Natural History VIII. 137, speaks at length of this notion, observing that lynx urine dries into a flame-­colored solid, which some say is how amber is formed. The lynx, he notes in agreement with Plutarch’s account here, covers is urine to hasten the process of solidification. Aelian, Nature of Animals IV. 17, corroborating this account, adds that the urine, once solidified, is used for engravings. Pliny, Natural History X. 92, gives the same account of the bowel habits of swallows that Plutarch gives. 55 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus employs this same image, asking, Whether Beasts are Rational 992C–D, why we do not say that one tree is less endowed with understanding than another. 56 Soclarus denies that non-­human animals can approach human beings in their capacity to participate in two aspects of life that were essential to Stoic ethics, namely justice and social life. The Stoic position on

64

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

the impossibility of a relationship of justice between human beings and non-­human animals is treated at some length below (963F–965A). In Whether Beasts Are Rational, the talking pig Gryllus, who had maintained that non-­human animals possess the cardinal virtues of wisdom, prudence, courage and justice, was about to take up the topic of justice when the treatise breaks off (999A). For a detailed discussion of Plutarch’s position on the topic of justice between the species, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54 and Animals, Rights and Reason, Chapter 3, “Just Beasts: Animal Morality and Human Justice,” pp. 48–65. Soclarus likewise denies that non-­human animals can approach humankind in the matter of “sociability” (κοινωνία, koinōnia). The notion that human beings participate naturally in a kind of social union with other humans may be viewed as an aspect of Stoic oikeiōsis theory, according to which human beings from birth sense a kinship with other humans that in time leads to social union and civilized society. Cicero, On the Ends of Good and Evil III. 65, argues that the fact that no one would wish to live alone in the desert, even if surrounded by pleasures, proves that humans are “born for society and intermingling and for a natural union with our fellowman” (intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos). In the subsequent discussion, Plutarch provides numerous anecdotal examples of “sociability” in non-­human animals (966B, 972B, 972C, 977C, 979F, 980D). 57 Most ancient writers were willing to acknowledge the obvious fact that, however much the intellectual endowments of human beings may surpass those of other animal species, non-­human animals have a natural anatomical advantage over humans in their possession of claws, fangs, fur, beaks and other defensive tools. Pliny, Natural History VII. 2–3, gives an affecting account of how man is cast forth into the world by nature, rather like a cruel stepmother, naked and helpless, with none of the defensive features provided by nature to other of her offspring, so that man alone of animals must acquire everything necessary to life from outside of himself. Aristotle, Parts of Animals 687a23–687b2, puts an interesting spin on the fact of man’s shortcomings by arguing that only man can change his weaponry at will, making him therefore far more versatile than are other animal species. For a discussion of ancient views on the anatomical superiority of non-­human animals and of some texts which maintain in contrast that humans are in fact naturally anatomically superior to other species, see Newmyer, The Animal and the Human, Chapter 3, “‘Man Alone of Animals’: Three Classic Ancient Texts,” pp. 23–43 and Chapter 6, “Body Image and the Rise of Civilization,” pp. 107–120. 58 Seneca, De beneficiis (On Benefits) II. 29. 1–2, observes that human beings are never satisfied with the gifts that the gods have bestowed upon them, but complain that they do not have the bulk of the elephant or the

65

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

speed of the stag or the lightness of the bird, and they are even impertinent enough to complain that the gods have not made them their equal. 59 In line with his thesis (960A) that all animals possess a share of reason, Plutarch maintains here that all reason exists in all animal species in a “more or less” relation, rather than in an “all or nothing” relation, in the same manner that one species has the advantage over others in matters of strength or size. See note 17. 60 The adjectives that Autobulus chooses to describe the young men who will debate the relative excellences of land-­dwelling versus sea-­dwelling creatures, ϕιλόλογοι (philologoi), “loving learning, loving argumentation,” and ϕιλογράμματοι (philogrammatoi), “loving books,” both suggest an appreciation of their subject that is derived from handbooks rather than from first-­hand study and eyewitness familiarity with the information that they relate, and lend support to the position that the dialogue has the flavor of a school exercise. See note 8. 61 Plutarch provides examples of instances of clever behavior of non-­ human animals in the Roman arena at 968C and E. On the thematic function of the Roman arena in Whether Beasts Are Rational, see note 6. 62 Aristotle, History of Animals 535b1–3, states that animals that have no tongue or a tongue that cannot move freely “do not speak articulately” (οὐ διαλέγϵται, ou dialegetai). Apparently Aristotle would have disagreed with Autobulus. On ancient views on the vocalizations of non-­ human animals, see Andrea Tabarroni, “On Articulation and Animal Language in Ancient Linguistic Theory,” Versus 50–51 (1988) 103–121, Maria Fusco, “Il Linguaggio degli Animali nel Pensiero Antico,” Studi Filosofici 30 (2007) 17–44, and Thorsten Fögen, “Animal Communication,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 216–232. 63 The term that Plutarch uses here for “mad” (λυττώσαις, luttōsais) is a participle derived from the noun λύττα or λύσσα, the Greek term used for rabies. Pliny, Natural History XXIX. 100, explains that there is a small worm on the tongue of dogs which is called lytta in Greek, and that if it is removed when dogs are still puppies, dogs will not go mad. 64 Bouffartigue 78 note 70, maintains that Plutarch has in mind here the excitability of horses and the distraction caused in cattle by the bite of the gadfly. 65 I supply the words in brackets because the verb has no expressed subject. 66 Plutarch regards the mental disarrangement observable in cases of rabies to be indications of disturbance of the rational faculty of an animal, and not of the action of pathogens. In any case, his description of the behavior of a rabid dog is accurate. 67 Plutarch once again attacks the Stoics here. 68 Cicero, On Duties I. 50, sets forth the Stoic position on the connection between reason and justice, explaining that, in their view, “in no respect are we human beings further from the nature of beasts, in which we often say that there is courage, as in horses and lions, but we do not say

66

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

that there is in them justice, fairness or goodness; for they are devoid of reason and speech” (neque ulla re longius absumus natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes). This denial of a relationship of justice between the species arises from the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis: since non-­human species are irrational, in Stoic teaching, they have no kinship with rational beings, that is, with human beings. Human beings stand in no ethical relation with other species, in consequence of which humans may use them as they wish. Cicero, On the Ends of Good and Evil III. 67, notes that the Stoic Chrysippus held that “humans have no bond of right with the beasts” (homini nihil iuris cum bestiis). Consequently, Chrysippus concluded, “humans may use animals to serve their needs without injustice” (bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem possint sine iniuria). Cicero’s connection of reason and language in On Duties is significant since it was important that participants in a relationship of justice be able to verbalize an understanding of morality and to assert their desire to be included in a relationship of justice, which was impossible for irrational animals that have no meaningful language. In On Eating Meat 994E, Plutarch attempts to refute both the Stoic charge that non-­human animals have no meaningful language and that human beings cannot stand in a relation of justice with non-­human animals. He there depicts an animal at the point of slaughter pleading with its slayers to take its life only out of necessity and not out of a desire for a more elaborate meal. Human beings assume incorrectly that the utterances of the animal are “inarticulate” (anarthrous) and not the pleas for justice (dikaiologias) that they in fact are. Human beings, in Plutarch’s view, must include non-­human animals in a covenant of justice if they have some understanding of the meaning of justice and some ability to articulate that understanding. For detailed discussion of this passage and bibliography on the philosophical issues raised in it, see Commentary to On Eating Meat Treatise I notes 24–28. 69 On the exclusively carnivorous diet of the Nomads and Troglodytes, see On Eating Meat Treatise I note 8. Strabo, Geography XVI. 4. 17, states that the diet of the Troglodytes consisted of meat and bones chopped up and baked in skins. They drank a mixture of blood and milk. 70 Soclarus recognizes that all human activities that involve interaction with other species, whether those activities involve encounters with other animals in farming, hunting, fishing or eating, necessarily have moral implications for human beings. He immediately after this acknowledgment posits a dilemma that arises for human beings who contemplate the notion of justice toward other species: either we admit that non-­human animals are to be included in a covenant of justice with human beings, in which case the concept of justice founders, or we must forego the advantages of civilized life. The stringent position that the Stoics adopted with regard to including other animals in a covenant of justice with humans may be viewed in part as a consequence of the

67

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

realities of preindustrial life: human beings could not live comfortably without heavy dependence on other animals for labor and food. Their doctrine of oikeiōsis relieved the Stoics of the need to feel guilt at the use of non-­human animals to serve their needs, a doctrine to which Soclarus alludes in his assertion of the undesirability of regarding other species as “possessed of reason and akin to us” (λογικοι̑ ς καὶ ὁμοϕύλοις, logikoîs kai homophulois). In his life of the Stoic Zeno, Diogenes Laertius noted (VII. 129) that the Stoics held that there could be no question of justice between human beings and other animals because of their “unlikeness” (ἀνομοιότητα, anomoiotēta). For Cicero’s formulation of this idea, see note 68. 71 Hesiod, Works and Days 277–279. This passage constitutes the earliest surviving Greek text that draws an ethical distinction between humans and other animals. While Hesiod’s verses are appropriately cited by Soclarus to back up his assertion that non-­human animals cannot have a conception of justice, it is interesting to note that Hesiod makes a point of stating that the god gave justice to human beings, in the manner of a gift, so that one may assume that before receiving this gift, human beings were in no respect superior to other animals, and that their elevation to a station of moral superiority was not due to any commendable action on their part. 72 Citing this passage, Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 119–120, observes, “The Greeks also discussed whether animals themselves exercised justice or had a sense of it … The only case I have noticed of such an argument is one attributed to the Stoics and Peripatetics (i.e., Aristotelians), that there can be no such thing as wronging those who do not exercise justice (dikaiopragein) toward us. The point here is more one about the lack of reciprocity than about the lack of a sense of justice.” In his course of his classification of the divisions of justice, Aristotle includes reciprocal justice (τὸ ἀντιπϵπονθός, to antipeponthos, Nicomachean Ethics 1132b21), the sort of justice that deals with requiting offenses with equal offenses, although he was speaking solely of human justice. Contrary to Sorabji’s assertion, Plutarch in fact provides more than one anecdotal example in non-­human animals of the sort of reciprocal justice that Aristotle defines (On the Cleverness of Animals 968E, 970B–C, 984F). Modern ethological research has shown that some species do demonstrate examples of reciprocity, whether it be positively viewed as altruism or negatively as revenge. Frans deWaal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1996) and The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York: Harmony Books, 2009) 173–182, provides examples of apparent acts of reciprocal justice in the animal kingdom, in which non-­ human animals settle scores for hurts that they have suffered from their peers, or share food when food has been provided for them on previous occasions.

68

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

73 Euripides, Ino fragment 412, 3 Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta Kannicht. 74 Autobulus refers to the Epicurean doctrine of the παρέγκλισις (parenklisis), or “swerve” of the atom. Although there is no detailed discussion of the concept in the surviving fragments of the works of Epicurus, the concept is discussed in detail in Lucretius, On the Nature of Things II. 216–293. According to Lucretius, atoms, which normally fall in straight paths, diverge from those paths and collide as a result of this swerve (Latin, clinamen). If this random action did not occur, there would be no creation. The Epicurean school used the concept of the swerve as well to argue for free will, to which Plutarch alludes here, for the randomness of the occurrences of the swerve removes the possibility of determinism in the universe. The concept is explained at length also in Cicero, On The Ends of Good and Evil I. 18–20. Plutarch was not well-­disposed to Epicureanism, and Epicurean doctrines come under attack rather frequently in his works. A number of treatises that he devoted to attacks on the school are lost, but three survive: Adversus Colotem (Against Colotes), an attack on a work written by Colotes, a pupil of Epicurus; Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum (Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible), an attack on the central Epicurean doctrine that pleasure is the goal of life; and An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum (Is “Live Unknown” a Wise Precept?), an attack on the Epicurean notion that one should avoid celebrity. For a helpful discussion of Plutarch’s views on Epicureanism, see Eleni Kechagia-­Ovseiko, “Plutarch and Epicureanism,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2014) 104–120. 75 That is, they should refrain from asserting that non-­human animals are irrational. 76 At this point, Autobulus undertakes a refutation of the dilemma posed by Soclarus (964B) that, if human beings accord justice to non-­human animals, either the very concept of justice will be confounded or human life will become impossible. 77 Autobulus refers to Plutarch himself. See note 2. 78 Empedocles charges (DK31 B128 = Inwood 122) that human beings committed the greatest abomination when they ripped out the life from animals and devoured their limbs, and he laments (DK31 B139 = Inwood 124) that he did not die before tearing animals apart for food. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1373b14–16, notes that Empedocles had held that, with regard to that which has life, it is not just for any person to take that life. Plutarch speaks approvingly of Empedocles’ stance on abstention at On Eating Animals 997E. In Plutarch’s treatise Banquet of the Seven Sages, the interlocutor Solon laments (159B–C) that nature has made it impossible for humans to live free of injustice because they must sustain their own live by taking the lives of other living creatures, whether plant or animal. On Solon’s observation, see On Eating Meat Treatise II note 8. Plutarch seems to mention Heraclitus in the present passage not as an authority on the notion that humans and non-­human animals stand in a relation of justice toward each other, but rather for his idea (DK22 B80)

69

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

that strife and necessity produce everything in life, an idea to which Autobulus refers. Empedocles likewise stresses the operation of necessity (ἀνάγκη, anankē) in the universe (DK31 B115 = Inwood 11). 79 In his biography of Pythagoras, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VIII. 3, reports that Pythagoras enjoined human beings to go to war against lawlessness, never harming or killing a plant that is harmless or an animal that does not injure humans. Similarly Porphyry, On Abstinence II. 22, quoting from the text of Theophrastus’ treatise De pietate (On Piety), states that it is acceptable to slay all irrational animals that are “by nature unjust” (ἄδικα τὴν ϕύσιν, adika tēn physin) while it is unjust to eradicate those animals that are not impelled by their nature to do harm, for humans have no relation of justice with animals that are harmful and that do wrong by their nature but only with animals that do not exhibit such a malevolent nature. The position articulated here is set forth with particular forcefulness in the ethical fragments of Democritus (ca. 470–ca. 370 bce) who maintained (DK68 B257–258) that a human being who kills unjust animals that desire to do harm are blameless, and that one should by all means kill such animals because one receives thereby a greater share of justice in every society. 80 These verses, from the lost Prometheus Unbound of Aeschylus (Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 189a Radt), are cited by Plutarch also at On Fortune 98C but are otherwise unknown. 81 Autobulus’ list of behaviors that he considers objectionable anticipates the motto of the animal rights organization PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), “Animals are not ours to experiment on, eat, wear, use for amusement, or abuse in any way.” It is noteworthy that Autobulus here expresses in passing a negative view of hunting, although the pursuit is at times more sympathetically viewed in the treatise. See note 6 for a discussion of the motif of hunting in On the Cleverness of Animals. 82 At On Eating Meat 994B, Plutarch makes a similar point about human food choices: we do not eat dangerous animals against which we must defend ourselves, but rather those that are harmless and tame and are devoid of natural defenses against us. See On Eating Meat Treatise I note 19. 83 Bion of Borysthenes (ca. 335–ca. 245 bce) is most often associated with the Cynics, and is considered the inventor of the diatribe, a popular philosophical form of a satirical nature that mocked human failings in a lighthearted manner. Helmbold 354 note a, comments on Plutarch’s mention of Bion here, “Bion and Xenocrates were almost alone among the Greeks in expressing pity for animals.” He seems to forget Plutarch himself. Acts of deliberate, wanton cruelty toward non-­human animals are not common in ancient accounts of human–non-­human interactions. An instance of such an act is recounted by Plutarch, On Eating Meat 996A–B, where an Athenian is punished for flaying a living ram. 84 See note 81. With Autobulus’ charge that hunters and fisherman enjoy the suffering of their prey, compare the observation of Matt Cartmill,

70

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1993) 229, “Even some hunters concede that the main motive for hunting is a simple, weasel-­like joy in killing things and seeing foamy blood on the ferns.” 85 The issue of the suffering of non-­human animals does not figure prominently in ancient discussions of human treatment of other animals. Since the criterion for according moral standing to a being in ancient philosophy was the presence or absence of reason in that being, the Stoics concluded that human beings could have no obligations toward non-­ human animals and could use them as they wished and treat them as they wished, as is revealed in Cicero’s exposition of the Stoics position on human treatment of non-­human animals (see note 68). Plutarch here suggests a different model: it is unjust to mistreat animals, not because they are not rational, but because they are sentient beings that can suffer. It is therefore, in his view, morally unacceptable to visit cruelty upon them. Herein Plutarch anticipates a trend in modern animal rights philosophy to reject the centuries-­old primacy of reason as a criterion for moral worth and to substitute a concern for a being’s capacity to suffer. Animal rights philosopher Gary Steiner, Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status and Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) xi, illustrates this position, “I reject the traditional prejudice that moral status is in any way a function of cognitive capacities. I argue instead that sentience—the capacity to experience pleasure and suffer pain—is a sufficient condition for equal consideration in the moral community.” See further, Introduction, pp. 70–71. 86 On the identity of the personages mentioned by Autobulus, see note 2. 87 Plutarch cites the adjective from Odyssey VIII. 263, where it is applied to dancers. 88 The phrase occurs at Iliad II. 614 and Odyssey V. 67. Plutarch slightly alters the form of the verb as it occurs in Homer to fit the syntax. 89 Homer, Iliad V. 85. The son of Tydeus is Diomedes, whose heroic exploits are the subject of Iliad V. 90 The source of this verse is unknown. 91 The huntress goddess Artemis is sometimes called Dictynna, “Goddess of the Fishnet,” from δίκτυον (diktuon), “fishing net,” as she is referred to at 984A. Artemis was worshipped under this name especially in Crete. 92 Plutarch, Solon 98A–B, reports that one of Solon’s peculiar laws was that mandating that a person who took neither side in a factional disagreement should be disenfranchised on the grounds that the person is indifferent to the common good and more interested in protecting his own welfare. Plutarch calls the law strange and surprising. Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians VIII. 5, mentions the law and gives the same motivation for its passage. 93 Autobulus has in mind especially the zoological treatises of Aristotle, probably in particular History of Animals. The zoological lore recounted in the comparative chapters that follow is in fact more anecdotal and less

71

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

biologically informed than the material set forth in Aristotle’s zoological works. See Introduction note 9 on Plutarch’s use of commonplace books for examples of animal behavior in the comparative chapters. 94 The fragment is from a play of Euripides of unknown title (Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 989 Kannicht). 95 A lacuna occurs here, the length of which is difficult to determine. Bouffartigue 84 note 105 surmises that Aristotimus advanced the thesis that sea animals are inferior to land animals, although he expresses uncertainty as to how Aristotimus would have handled that topic at its first introduction here. 96 The subject is unexpressed in the Greek text. The syntax suggests that Aristotimus had just contrasted another group of fishes with those that waste their sperm. 97 The noun παρδίαϛ (pardias) is not found elsewhere, and scholars substitute πϵραίαϛ (peraias), a type of mullet. Aristotle, History of Animals 591a24, says that the peraias feeds on its own slime and is therefore always hungry. 98 Hesiod, Works and Days 524–525. Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 27, states that the octopus is the most omnivorous of all sea creatures, and, if it cannot find prey, will eat its own tentacles. Aristotle, History of Animals 591a5, denies that the octopus devours itself. 99 Plato, Laws 823d–824a, dictates that only those types of hunting are acceptable that inspire courage by forcing the hunter to run, shoot or strike his prey. Thus the prey of the hunter should be limited to land-­dwelling quadrupeds. Fishing, in contrast, is lazy and requires no show of courage. 100 See Cartmill 233, “The connection of hunting with masculinity runs deep, and both hunters and their critics often comment on this. Hunting has been a stereotypically male activity throughout most of Western history … Some hunters think that their sport affirms their virility as well as their masculine identity.” 101 This epithet occurs at Sophocles, Electra 6. 102 Artemis is called ϵ᾿λαϕήβολοϛ (elaphēbolos), “deer slayer,” at Homeric Hymn to Artemis II. 2. Plutarch, Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table Talk) 660D, mentions a festival to Artemis called the Elaphēbolia. 103 It is not clear to which philosophers Aristotimus is referring. 104 Autobulus had maintained (961B–C) that these capacities are found in non-­human animals and allow them to distinguish those animals that are hostile to them from those that are friendly. 105 Plutarch, On the Love of Offspring 494E–F, notes with approval that, in the case of non-­human animals, both parents care for their offspring with equal fortitude and endurance. 106 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus offers a lengthy exposition of the courage of non-­human species at Whether Beasts Are Rational 987B–988E. 107 Examples of “sociability” (κοινωνία, koinōnia) in non-­human animals are found at 970B, 972B, 975E, 977C and E, 979F and 980E. 108 In his account of this phenomenon, Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 1, adds that the bull, like a human wrestler, acts as his own trainer, withdrawing

72

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

to a private place to prepare himself for combat, while refraining from sexual activity and living with self-­restraint. The same anecdote is recounted in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 51. 109 This anecdote is repeated with very similar details by Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 56 and by Pliny, Natural History VIII. 8. 110 Plutarch, De curiosite (On Curiosity) 520F, repeats this claim of lions. Aelian, On Nature IX. 30, states merely that lions wipe out their footprints to prevent hunters from detecting their location but he leaves out any mention of the claws. 111 Plutarch repeats this anecdote at 980E. Aristotle, History of Animals 612a16–20, says the animal covers itself with mud to protect itself from the bite of the asp, and Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 22, agrees with Aristotle’s account. 112 The nest building skills of the swallow are described in similar detail in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 22. Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 24, adds an anthropomorphizing touch to his account of swallow architecture by noting that the female swallow places wool that she plucks from sheep over the exposed twigs in the nest to prevent the fledglings from feeling discomfort. In a similar vein, Aristotle, History of Animals 612b23–27, in his description of swallow nest building, remarks that the swallow builds just as do human beings. Swallows are one of the animals often cited in ancient accounts of animal intelligence. See Introduction note 9. 113 Spiders are another animal whose skill at building is routinely cited in ancient accounts of animal intelligence. Aristotle, History of Animals 623a7–623b3, goes into some detail describing the various types of webs that spiders weave and their hunting tactics with webs. Similar detail is found in the account of spider webs in Pliny, Natural History XI. 79–84. Less detailed but still appreciative accounts are found in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 17–18 and Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 21. See note 112. 114 This stratagem is described also by Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 48 and Pliny, Natural History X. 125. This behavior has often been commented upon by ornithologists who note that corvids, a group of birds that includes crows, ravens, jays and magpies, have impressive problem-­solving skills. Ornithologist Tony Angell, Ravens, Crows, Magpies, and Jays (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978) Preface, notes, “To the degree that corvids do these things they are set apart from other avian families and it appears that no other birds approach their level of intelligence.” See Stephen T. Newmyer, “Tool Use in Animals: Ancient and Modern Insights and Moral Consequences,” Scholia N. S. 14 (2005) 3–17. 115 This behavior of bees is recorded also by Aristotle, History of Animals 626b25–26, Pliny, Natural History XI. 24 and Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 13. The bees are called Cretan only in Plutarch’s account. 116 Plutarch repeats this anecdote below at 979A–B and in his treatise De garrulitate (Talkativeness) 510A–B, where he states that human beings can learn a lesson from cranes that take measures to prevent the overuse of their tongues.

73

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

117 In Pliny’s version of this anecdote, Natural History X. 59, dropping the stone serves to convict the drowsy bird of “negligence” (indiligentia). Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 13, agrees closely with Plutarch’s account. 118 This fragment of an unknown tragedy (Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 416 Kannicht-­Snell) is not cited elsewhere. 119 Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 35, gives the same account. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II. 124, and Pliny, Natural History X. 115, state that this strategy is employed by the spoonbill (platalea in Cicero, platea in Pliny). 120 The ant joins the bee and the swallow in ancient accounts of animal behavior as an animal whose actions most clearly suggested a level of intelligence, perhaps in even a higher degree than in the case of the bee and the swallow. This is suggested in Plutarch’s anecdote (967E) of the Stoic Cleanthes (331–232 BCE), who subscribed to the Stoic position that non-­human animals are irrational but, as Plutarch relates, found himself impressed by what he apparently regarded as an action that suggested at least some purposefulness, although Plutarch does not comment specifically as to what conclusions Cleanthes drew from the actions of the ants. In his version of the anecdote, Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 50, observes that Cleanthes was compelled, despite his own arguments against the idea, to concede that non-­human animals are not without some degree of “reasoning power” (λογισμόϛ, logismos). On ants in ancient accounts of animal intelligence, see Introduction, note 9 and notes 112–113 above. For a discussion of the anecdote of the ants, see LiCausi and Pomelli 112–113, who note that the anecdote does not seem to be found outside of Plutarch and Aelian. The action of the ants offers an instance of the sort of “pay back” behavior termed reciprocal justice. See note 72. 121 Homer, Iliad XIV. 216 122 Aristotimus ascribes to ants the four cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. On the elaborate exposition of these virtues in non-­human animals by Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus, see Introduction to Whether Beasts Are Rational pp. 97–99 and note 10. Bouffartigue xxxii notes that the cardinal virtues are in fact seldom mentioned in On the Cleverness of Animals, a fact which is remarkable in light of the comparative length of the treatise and the efforts of the defenders of both land- and sea-­dwelling animals to point out the respective excellences of the animals that they champion. 123 In his account of the anecdote, Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 25, states that this behavior shows how respectful and considerate the ants are. 124 Aristotimus’ description of the action of the insects recalls the remarkable behavior of leafcutter ants. 125 Aratus, Phaenomena 956–957. Vergil, Georgics I. 379–380, includes this action of the ants among his catalogue of animal behaviors that signal the approach of rain. 126 Some, according to Aristotimus, read ἤια (ēia), “provisions” here, rather than ὤια (ōia), “eggs.” This pedantic observation suggests that Plutarch was consulting a commentary on Aratus while composing this sentence.

74

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

127 In his account of this activity, Pliny, Natural History XI. 109, remarks that it provides evidence of the industriousness and hard work of ants. 128 The manuscript tradition here is corrupt. I follow Bouffartigue who reads πηρο ̑υνταϛ (pērountas), “maiming, mutilating,” over Hubert’s πληρο ̑υνταϛ (plērountas), “filling,” which makes little sense in the context. 129 Aelian, Natural History VI. 43, agrees with Plutarch’s account of three chambers, but he states that this allows for the dwellings of male ants to be separate from those of female ants. 130 No animal impressed ancient naturalists more profoundly than did the elephant, whose intellectual and emotional dimensions were the subject of numerous anecdotes. Pliny, Natural History VIII. 1, offers an extraordinary encomium on the excellences of the elephant, an animal that he declares to be “nearest to human perceptions” (proximum humanis sensibus), capable of understanding the language of the country where it lives, responsive to affection and honors, and endowed with virtues “which are rare even in humans” (quae etiam in homine rara), among which he lists honesty, wisdom, justice and even reverence for the heavens. 131 Aristotimus admiringly describes the gyrations that elephants are taught to perform as examples of their quickness to learn, but Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus chastises human beings for forcing non-­human animals to learn to perform movements and actions that are contrary to their nature for the mere amusement of humans (992A–B). See Commentary to Whether Beasts Are Rational note 99. 132 Similarly, the talking pig Gryllus expresses admiration for the numerous skills that non-­human animals learn unaided that help them to live their lives successfully, Whether Beasts Are Rational 991E–F. See Commentary to Whether Beasts Are Rational notes 93–98. 133 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 6, relates this anecdote in similar language. Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 11, goes into some detail on the subject of the dancing lessons which elephants at Rome received, and he comments admiringly on the restraint that the animals displayed when they were beaten for not learning their steps, for they did not allow themselves to show anger at the punishment. 134 Hagnon of Tarsus (second century bce) was a pupil of the Stoic philosopher Carneades and a rhetorician. On Plutarch’s mention of him here Bouffartigue 90 note 148 observes, “on n’a aucune idée du type d’ouvrage dans lequel une telle notice a pu prendre place.” 135 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 52, relates this anecdote in a similar manner. On the mathematical skills on non-­human animals, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Calculating Creatures: Ancients and Moderns on Understanding of Number in Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N. S. 89 (2008) 117–124. 136 The behavior of the elephant illustrates the “pay back” characteristic of reciprocal justice. See note 72. 137 In Pliny’s account of this anecdote, Natural History VIII. 11, the younger elephants go first so that the older and heavier ones do not wear away

75

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

the river bed by their weight and thereby make the river deeper and more difficult for the younger animals to cross. 138 The similarity of Plutarch’s account to the biblical flood story is striking. Although there survive other Greek accounts of Deucalion and the flood, Helmbold 376 note a, observes, “Plutarch is the only Greek author to add the Semitic dove story …” 139 Plutarch recounts this anecdote also at De primo frigido (The Principle of Cold) 949D. Pliny, Natural History VIII. 103, includes the anecdote in his account of animals that provide warnings to human beings. Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 24, recounts the anecdote in language closely parallel to that of Plutarch. 140 Aristotimus refers to Stoic logicians, and in particular to Chrysippus who was known for his work on logic. The anecdote of the “reasoning dog” that follows is associated in ancient sources with Chrysippus. 141 In his discussion of Stoic doctrine on the varieties of arguments contained in his life of Zeno, Diogenes Laertius notes, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 79, that Chrysippus distinguished five types of syllogisms. The type involved in the scenario of the dog in Aristotimus’ exposition is of the sort called in Diogenes’ account the fifth disjunctive syllogism. In this type, if one alternative can be contradicted, the other is true. The anecdote is recounted as well in Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 59, Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 45, where it is called the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism, and at Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 6. Referring to this anecdote Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals 26, observes, “Chrysippus is not here conceding that the dog really reasons. But he presumably allows that it has perceptual appearances, even negative ones corresponding to the absence of a scent.” 142 It is surprising that Plutarch, who is eager to prove that non-­human animals have the faculty of reason, dismisses the evidence of the dog’s ability to distinguish between alternatives as an example of that reason. 143 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals VII. 10, the Roman’s name is Galba. Calvus has been restored in the text of Plutarch from what appears to be a fragmentary form of a name. In any case, the Calvus in question is unknown. The anecdote of King Pyrrhus that Aristotimus recounts next is also found in the passage of Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 10. 144 King Pyrrhus of Epirus in northwestern Greece (319–272 bce) is most famous for his costly victories against the Romans. 145 In Aelian’s elaborate version of the anecdote, he includes a moralizing reflection that the dog’s actions illustrate that even animals have been given a share of kindliness and affection, which, though existing in a greater degree in human beings, are not put into practice by human beings who are given to committing atrocities against their friends for the sake of money. 146 Plutarch repeats the anecdote at 984D and provides an extended version of the tale at Banquet of the Seven Sages 162C–F without mention of the dog. Even Thucydides, Histories III. 96, alludes briefly to the murder of Hesiod. 76

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

147 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals VII. 13, the robber confessed to his crime under torture. The name of the dog is not given in Aelian. 148 The Ceramicus (Κϵραμϵικόϛ, Kerameikos) was a section of northwestern Athens known as the district of the potters (kerameis). 149 This anecdote appears rather frequently in ancient sources. Plutarch recounts it also in his biography of the elder Cato (339A–B) without mentioning the Ceramicus. In Aristotle’s version, History of Animals 577b30–578a2, a decree was passed to allow the mule to eat freely from grain supplies set out in trays by grain merchants. Pliny, Natural History VIII. 175, records that the mule was 80 years old, but disregarded its age to encourage the other mules in their labors, which moved the Athenians to decree that it be allowed access to the stands of grain dealers. Aelian’s account, Nature of Animals VI. 49, agrees in most details with Plutarch’s version at 970B. 150 The sudden change of subject here suggests a lacuna. 151 Aristotimus has the Stoics in mind here. On the topic of justice toward animals, see especially 963F–965B and notes 68–78. 152 This charge is specifically denied by Phaedimus, the defender of sea-­ dwellers, at 975E, although he admits that the virtues of underwater creatures are difficult to witness. 153 Homer, Iliad XVI. 34, uttered by Patroclus to Achilles in frustration at the hero’s stubborn refusal to rejoin battle. 154 Lysimachus (ca. 355–281 bce), the friend and successor of Alexander, became king of Thrace, Macedon and Asia Minor. The anecdote is found also at Pliny, Natural History VIII. 143, and Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 25. 155 Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 40, gives a double version of the anecdote. An eagle belonging to Pyrrhus (Aelian does not specify whether he means the king or Plutarch’s private citizen) starved itself on the death of its owner, while another eagle owned by a private citizen threw itself on its owner’s pyre. At Natural History VI. 29, Aelian describes an eagle that both starved itself when its master fell ill and leapt onto the boy’s pyre when he died. 156 Porus was king of the Pauravas, an Indian people, and was defeated by Alexander at the battle of the Hydaspes River (326 bce). Plutarch recounts this same anecdote in his Life of Alexander 699B–C. Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 37, agrees with Plutarch’s accounts. 157 Bucephalas (or Bucephalus), whose name means “Ox-­head,” from a brand mark in this shape on his flank, was Alexander’s favorite horse that only he was able to tame. In his version of the anecdote recounted in Plutarch, Pliny, Natural History VIII. 154, relates that the horse would allow anyone to mount him if he was not wearing his trappings. 158 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus remarks similarly, Whether Beasts Are Rational 987B–C, that it would be difficult to find any virtue that animals do not have in a greater degree than do the wisest humans. 159 On the love of offspring in non-­human animals and the part that it plays in the birth of justice, see note 43. 77

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

160 Homer, Odyssey XIV. 30–31. 161 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1380a25, and Pliny, Natural History VIII. 146, both state that dogs will not attack humans when they sit down. Pliny notes as well, Natural History VIII. 48, that lions will not attack humans who adopt a suppliant pose before them. Aristotle likens this behavior in dogs to the lessening of anger in a human being when the individual against whom the anger is directed humbles himself. 162 The text is corrupt here. 163 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 1, recounts this anecdote in very similar detail, adding that the dog recognized its real enemy in the lion. 164 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 2, suggests that the dog will not tear up a hare that is already dead because it does not wish to take credit for another’s labors, inasmuch as the dog’s interest in the hunt is its natural love of honor and not a desire for the meat. 165 The tricks of cranes are detailed in 967B–C. 166 Thales of Miletus is generally included in the traditional listing of Greek sages of the sixth century bce. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers I. 40–44, notes that at times one individual was substituted for another in the list. Plutarch’s dialogue Convivium septem sapientium (Banquet of the Seven Sages) is an account of an imaginary dinner at the court of Periander of Corinth (reigned ca. 627–585 bce) at which Thales took part. 167 This anecdote is told in very similar detail in Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 42. 168 Plutarch repeats this anecdote at Whether Beasts Are Rational 992B. In Pliny’s version of the anecdote, Natural History X. 103, the bird pretends to be injured and as soon as the hunter is about to lay hands on her, she moves off a bit further, until she has evaded his grasp and the nestlings are safe. 169 A plethron is equivalent to 30 meters or 100 Greek feet. 170 This ruse is alluded to briefly in Aelian, Nature of Animals XIII. 11. 171 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 127, reports that the sleep of the hibernating bear is in the first two weeks so deep that is cannot be aroused even by blows. 172 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 3, reports that the bear avoids detection by lying down and entering its den on its back, dragging itself along and thereby avoiding all traces of paw-­prints. 173 This proverb is attributed to the iambic poet Archilochus (seventh century bce) by the compiler of proverbs Zenobius (early second century ce) (V. 68 Leutsch-­Schneidewin). The poet may mean that, while others have various defenses, his sole means of attack is his iambs. 174 Ion of Chios (ca. 480–ca. 420 bce) wrote tragedies and other types of poetry. 175 Zenobius cites these verses in the same passage in which he discusses the verses of Archilochus discussed in note 173, and attributes them to Ion of Chios. 176 On claims of eyewitness observation of the phenomena detailed in On the Cleverness of Animals, see Introduction, pp. 11–12 and note 36.

78

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

177 In the version of this anecdote given in Pliny, Natural History VIII. 133, the hedgehog covers its spines with fallen apples. Even more fantastic is the variant of the anecdote in Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 10, where he records that the hedgehog rolls on crates of figs and stores up the figs that attach themselves to its spines so that it has food for times when food is scarce. Helmbold 394 note b, judges the phrase “so covered with fruit was it as it moved” to be “an unnecessary explanation” contained in the manuscripts. 178 Aristotle, History of Animals 612b4–9, relates this anecdote of a man in Byzantium. Plutarch alluded again to this anecdote at 979A, mentioning both Cyzicus and Byzantium, suggesting that he has the passage of Aristotle in mind at that point. 179 Juba, king of Mauretania (ca. 48 bce–23 ce), known for his learning, was a prolific writer in many genres, including history, and was often cited by Plutarch and other writers. The anecdote reported by Plutarch is found at Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker III. 275. 180 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 24–25, discusses the elephants’ efforts to rescue their comrades without mentioning Juba as his source. In Aelian’s account of the anecdote, Nature of Animals VI. 61, he compliments the dutifulness of the elephants and contrasts it with the family troubles of human beings. 181 The ancients seem to have been fascinated with the question of whether non-­human animals have some conception of divinity. See Commentary to Whether Beasts Are Rational note 110. For a discussion of the topic, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Paws to Reflect: Ancients and Moderns on the Religious Sensibilities of Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N. S. 75, 3 (2003) 111–129. 182 Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 2, relates that a king once sent a contingent of men to slay some elephants for their tusks, and along the way, a pestilence struck and killed all but one of the men, who reported the incident to the king. This allowed the king to discover that elephants are “beloved by the gods” (θϵοϕιλϵῖϛ, theophileis). 183 Ptolemy IV Philopator (ca. 244–205 bce) defeated Antiochus III of Syria at Raphia in southern Palestine in 217 bce. He had a large number of elephants in his fighting force. 184 Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 44, relates this anecdote, adding the observation that elephants worship the gods while humans doubt if they exist and question, if they do exist, whether they have any concern for human beings. 185 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals IX. 44, the old lions lick the young ones as if to congratulate them on their success at the hunt before they partake of the feast. 186 At Whether Beasts Are Rational 990C–F, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus discusses the sexual activity of non-­human animals in some detail, with conclusions that differ in some particulars from the presentation of Aristotimus. Since Gryllus is in that passage arguing for the temperance exhibited by non-­human animals, his emphasis is on the natural

79

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

restraint and modesty of non-­human species in their lovemaking, rather than on the wildness of their passions. A notable difference between Aristotimus’ account and that of Gryllus is the pig’s condemnation of unions of human beings with other animals (990F), which Aristotimus describes (972D–F) with wonderment rather than horror. For a fascinating discussion of interspecies unions in classical literature, see Craig A. Williams, “When a Dolphin Loves a Boy: Some Greco-­Roman and Native American Love Stories,” Classical Antiquity 32 (2013) 200–242. 187 Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257–180 bce) was head of the Library at Alexandria (195–180) and was famous for his work on linguistic and textual topics, in particular his work on the text of the Homeric poems. In his version of this anecdote, Pliny, Natural History VIII. 13, compliments the elephant for having the good taste to become the rival in love of a great scholar! 188 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 38, notes that elephants are fond of perfumes, and he implies that it was this fondness that first attracted the attention of the elephant to the garland seller. 189 The term that Plutarch employs here, δράκων (drakōn), Latin draco, is used sometimes generically to refer to a snake, while other authors use it of larger snakes, especially of nonpoisonous varieties. See Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr., Animals in the Ancient World from A to Z (London and New York: Routledge, 2014) s. v. “draco.” 190 In Aelian’s version of this anecdote, Nature of Animals VI. 17, which takes place in Judaea, the girl was afraid of the snake’s ardor and she moved away for a month, and when she returned, the snake whipped her legs in anger at being scorned. Aelian draws the conclusion from this anecdote that Zeus and the other gods do not overlook other species but indicate their regard for them by such an occurrence. 191 In Aelian’s retelling of this anecdote, Nature of Animals V. 29, both a goose and a ram were in love with Glauke. 192 Pliny, Natural History X. 120, records that in his own time, members of the Roman royal family had a starling (Latin sturnus) and some nightingales that were taught to speak both Greek and Latin, and that they practiced diligently, learning new phrases daily and constructing longer and longer sentences. Statius, Silvae II. 4. 19, states that the starling faithfully reproduces the words that it has heard. 193 Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 4, asserts that crows, jays and parrots remember what they hear, listening diligently to their teachers, and have been known to report on wrongdoing that they have overheard in their homes. He argues that the complexity and variety of bird speech indicates the presence of reason in the animals. 194 Pliny, Natural History X. 117, states that, whereas other birds imitate the human voice, the parrot actually talks. Aelian, Nature of Animals XIII. 18, notes that the Brahmins of India placed parrots above all other birds as the only type of bird capable of imitating human speech convincingly. He adds, XVI. 17, that parrots that spend time around humans learn to speak like children and become as talkative as they are, but that

80

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

parrots that live in forests do not produce intelligible speech. Near the end of his dialogue On Animals, Philo of Aexandria, who opposes the argument advanced earlier in the work that animals are rational, states (98) that the utterances of blackbirds, crows, parrots and other birds have no more meaning than do the sounds of a flute, and they do not indicate the operation of reason in the animals. 195 Aristotimus’ mention here of “uttered reason and internal reason” is an allusion to the Stoic doctrine of reason in its linguistic manifestation. The Stoics distinguished what they termed λόγοϛ προϕορικόϛ (logos prophorikos), or “vocalized reason, meaningful speech,” from λόγοϛ ϵ᾿νδιάθϵτοϛ (logos endiathetos), “internal reason, thought.” The latter of these gives meaningful vocal expression to the former. In Stoic teaching, the capacity for meaningful speech arises in the part of the soul called the ἡγϵμονικόν (hēgemonikon), or “governing principle.” While all animals have this component of the soul, it remains non-­rational in the case of non-­humans animals, so that their utterances cannot issue from reason and cannot therefore have meaning: their utterances cannot be the product of thought. This is what Philo of Alexandria means in his assertion that the utterances of birds have no more meaning than the notes of a wind instrument (see note 194). Aristotimus argues that the ability of birds not only to imitate human speech but to form words and to learn human language proves that birds possess both forms of reason: their utterances do indicate the operation of reason. The Stoic position on the two types of reason is explained in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos (Against the Mathematicians) VIII. 275 (=SVF II. 135), who states that the Stoics held that non-­human animals do not differ from humans in uttered reason, since crows, parrots and jays utter articulate sounds, but in internal reason. The Stoic doctrine on the two types of reason is set forth also in Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 2. For a detailed discussion of the concept, see Max Mühl, “Der λόγοϛ ϵ᾿νδιάθϵτοϛ und προϕορικόϛ von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 7 (1962) 7–56 and Stephen T. Newmyer, “Speaking of Beasts: the Stoics and Plutarch on Animal Reason and the Modern Case against Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N. S. 63, 3 (1999) 99–110. 196 Aristotle, History of Animals 535b17, observes that fishes can produce only squeaking sounds because they have no lung, windpipe or pharynx. 197 Aristotle, History of Animals 608a18–21, states that some animals are capable of teaching and learning, both from each other and from humans, because all animals have at least some hearing. 198 Aristotle, History of Animals 536b17–19, states that the nightingale has been observed teaching its nestlings to sing, which suggests that song must be learned and is not the same thing as the voice. 199 This claim is repeated at Whether Beasts Are Rational 992B–C. 200 On claims of eyewitness observation, see note 176. 201 Aristotle, History of Animals 615b19–21, states that the jay has a great variety of voices and utters a different one almost daily. Aelian, Nature

81

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

of Animals VI. 19, notes that the jay can imitate all sounds, and especially the human voice. On Porphyry’s assertions on the vocalizations of the jay, see note 193. 202 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 19, states that some birds imitate the neighing of horses and others the sounds of raindrops. 203 Aristotimus has not in fact made exactly this observation previously. 204 I have added the words in brackets since self-­learning vs. learning from outside has been the topic. 205 See note 176. 206 On attempts to date the composition of On the Cleverness of Animals on the basis of this mention of Vespasian, see Introduction, pp. 2–3 and note 7. 207 Plutarch’s reference here is the sole source for this statement of Democritus (DK68 B154). The animals that Democritus is credited with singling out, the spider, the swallow and the nightingale, are standard examples cited in ancient accounts of the intelligence of non-­human animals. See Introduction, p. 3 and note 9. 208 These activities of the swallow and spider are detailed at 966D–E. 209 Aristotimus numbers pharmacy, surgery and dietetics as the three branches of the healing art, all of which are practiced by non-­human animals in some fashion. In the course of his life of Plato, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers III. 85, states that there are five branches of medicine: pharmacy, surgery, dietetics, diagnostics and the prescription of remedies for pain. The topic of “animal doctoring” is taken up by the talking pig Gryllus, Whether Beasts Are Rational 991E–F, with some of the same examples of animal cures that Aristotimus cites. Gryllus emphasizes more so than does Aristotimus the idea that a knowledge of cures in non-­human animals is a matter of nature and not of teaching. Plutarch offers a more detailed discussion of medical knowledge in non-­ human animals at Quaestiones naturales (Natural Questions) 918B–E, where some of the remedies catalogued by Aristotimus and Gryllus are cited. 210 Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride (On Isis and Osiris) 318C, states that the ibis taught the Egyptians the use of enemas through its practice of purging itself, and he notes as well in that passage that the ibis will not touch tainted water. Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 35, notes that the ibis first taught the Egyptians the art of purging the intestines, but he says modestly that he will leave it up to others to explain exactly how it did so! 211 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 2, tells this anecdote of a πάρδαλιϛ (pardalis), a big cat that may have been a leopard or a panther. Aelian moralizes his account with the observation that, unlike the restrained behavior of the cat, humans are more likely to betray their relations. On the identity of the pardalis, see Kitchell, s. v. “leopard.” 212 This behavior is attributed to the elephant of King Porus at 970D, and Phaedimus, the defender of the intelligence of sea-­dwellers, alludes disparagingly to the anecdote at 977B.

82

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

2 13 On the mathematical skills of non-­human animals, see note 135. 214 Ctesias of Cnidus (fifth century bce) was court physician to King Artaxerxes II of Persia and author of historical works about Persia and India. The anecdote referred to here (Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker 34) is known only from Plutarch’s account and from Aelian, Nature of Animals VII 1. 215 Pliny, Natural History II. 107, and Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 8, report that the oryx sneezes to mark the rise of the Dog Star. 216 The reference is to a Greek board game called pesseia, resembling chess, in which players cross a median line on the board. Hence the phrase means something like “take one’s best shot.” 217 On ancient views on the spiritual dimension of non-­human animals, see note 181. 218 The manuscript is corrupt and ungrammatical at this point. 219 This phrase is not found in the surviving tragedies of Euripides. Plutarch may have had in mind Ion 159, where the playwright speaks of a bird as the “herald of Zeus.” 220 Plato, Phaedo 85b. 221 On Pyrrhus, see note 144. 222 Antiochus II Hierax (ca. 263–226 bce), son of Antiochus II (ca. 287–246 bce), was called ἵϵραξ (hierax), “hawk,” because of his greed. 223 Phaedimus refutes this charge at 976B–C, citing an instance of a sacred crocodile that would not come to King Ptolemy when summoned by him, an action which portended the king’s death. Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 4, repeats this anecdote, admitting that he does not know which Ptolemy is in question. 224 According to Hesiod, Theogony 736–739, the Titans, when defeated by Zeus, were consigned to Tartarus for eternity, and not to the bottom of the sea. At On Eating Meat 996C, Plutarch associates the “Titanic” in general with that which is irrational, unordered and violent, as he does here, but he does not draw any connection there with the sea. 225 Plutarch may be alluding here to Plato’s description, Timaeus 92b, of fishes, which are fashioned by the gods from the stupidest of human beings and live in the most extreme abode, in muddy depths, in keeping with their lack of intelligence. 226 Helmbold 414 note a, observes on this comment, “That is, it is so realistic that one might imagine oneself in the lawcourts or the public assembly.” 227 Phaedimus may have in mind here the remark of Alcibiades in Plato, Symposium 214c, that it is unfair to pit a drunken man against sober ones in a debate. 228 Pindar, fragment 228 Snell-­Maehler. The verses are not cited by any other author, but appear again in identical form in Plutarch, An seni respublica gerenda sit (Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Life) 783B. 229 That is, there will be no hunting or fishing on this day of the debate. 230 I have supplied the words in brackets because the text contains no noun here. Something like “leisure time” or “day off” must be intended.

83

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

231 He has in mind the sorts of tales narrated at 976A, 974C and F, and 976B. On this comment of Phaedimus, Bouffartigue 104 note 263, observes that Plutarch seems to portray Aristotimus as more reliant upon the opinions of others, while Phaedimus is portrayed as possessing better critical faculties and exactitude of mind. 232 Aristotimus had charged (966B and 970B) that sea-­dwelling animals are devoid of sociability and memory. 233 Pliny, Natural History IX. 1, states that is the nature of land animals to “live in a sort of association with human beings” (hominum quadam consortione degentia indicata natura est). Phaedimus’ argument in 975E–F takes a hint from Stoic kinship theory since he concedes that land-­ dwelling animals appear to reveal more natural kinship with human beings than do sea-­dwellers, to the point that land-­dwelling animals have taken on human characteristics. 234 Phaedimus’ point is illustrated in the anecdote of Aristotimus (973E) of a dog that learned to perform in pantomimes. In contrast, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus argues strongly, Whether Beasts Are Rational 991F–992A, that non-­human animals are self-­taught. 235 There were fountains called Arethusa in Elis in the Peloponnese and on the island of Ortygia near Syracuse on Sicily and the text does not make clear which is intended. Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 4, alludes to the eel of Arethusa, also without making clear which is intended. 236 Pliny, Natural History X. 193, recounts that, while fishes have no ears, they nevertheless hear, for they come to the sound of clapping, and in the aquarium of the emperor, various sorts of fishes come when called, sometimes even individually. 237 Plutarch repeats this anecdote at De capienda ex inimicis utilitate (How to Profit by Your Enemies) 89A and at Praecepta gerendae reipublicae (Precepts on Statecraft) 811A. It occurs as well in Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 4. Lucius Licinius Crassus (140–91 bce) was co-­c ensor in 92 bce with Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus with whom he frequently quarreled. Pliny, Natural History IX. 172, tells a similar story of the Roman orator Hortensius who so loved his eel that he likewise wept at its death. 238 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 4, offers a similar account, without mentioning the linen cloths. The willingness of the crocodile to have its teeth cleaned was noted already by Herodotus who relates, Histories II. 68, that the mouth of the crocodile becomes filled with leeches because of all the time that it spends in the water, and the crocodile allows the sandpiper to hop in its open mouth and eat the leeches. The crocodile, Herodotus notes, enjoys this and never harms the bird. 239 Titus Flavius Philinus of Thespies in Boeotia was a close friend of Plutarch. At Questionum convivalium libri (Table Talk) 727B, he is described as a vegetarian follower of Pythagoras. See Puech, “Prosopographie” 4869. 240 Antaeopolis, the ancient town of Tjebu, was located in southern Egypt on the eastern bank of the Nile.

84

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

2 41 See note 223. 242 The location of this town in Lycia is unknown. Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 5, describes this divination with fishes and mentions the names of the same Lycian towns where the practice took place. 243 Phaedimus asserts that the denizens of the sea have “kinship” with human beings and are not “alien,” another hint at Stoic oikeiōsis theory. 244 The bee-­eater (μϵ´ροψ, merops) is a bird that, according to Aristotle, History of Animals 615b25–28 and Pliny, Natural History X. 99, feeds its parents. 245 Phaedimus gives a punning and farfetched etymology for the name of the deer (ϵ᾿´λαϕοϛ, elaphos) which, he claims, is not derived from its “swiftness” (ϵ᾿λαϕρότηϛ, elaphrotēs), but from its “attraction of the snake” (῾ϵ´λξιϛ ὄϕϵωϛ, helxis opheōs). 246 Aristotle, History of Animals 612a12–15, notes that the panther is aware that other animals take delight in its scent, and it uses it to attract prey. Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 40, reports that the panther hides in foliage and waits for its prey to be enchanted by its scent, leaping upon them when they are so under its spell. 247 Homer, Iliad XXIV. 80–82, with reference to Iris’ swiftness. 248 The noun κϵ´ραϛ (keras) means “horn.” 249 The scholiast on the verses of Homer cited in note 248 states that later authors used the word “horn” to describe a horn-­like arrangement of the hair, and he cites a verse from Archliochus that mentions an individual named Glaucon as a person who “arranges his hair in horns” (keroplastēn) (Archilochus fragment 117 West). 250 The reference to Aristotle may be incorrect here, unless Plutarch refers to the edition of the poems of Homer that Aristotle is credited with producing. Helmbold reads here “Aristarchus,” a reference to Aristarchus of Samos (ca. 216–144 bce), head librarian at Alexandria and editor of Homer. 251 Phaedimus alludes to Aristotimus’ account of the surgical prowess of the elephant, detailed at 974D. 252 Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 12, details this action of the “fox shark” (ἀλώπηξ, alōpēx). The fish that Plutarch has in mind is in fact the sea scolopendra, to which he attributes this behavior at De sera numinis vindicta (The Slowness of Divine Justice) 567B. 253 This contradicts Aristotimus’ assertion (970B) that sea-­dwellers do not exhibit sociability. See note 152. 254 The identification of the fish called here ἀνθίαϛ (anthias) is in doubt. Helmbold 426 note a, states that it is “probably the Mediterranean barbier, Serranus anthias.” 255 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 4, tells this anecdote of the anthias, remarking that their behavior is like that of loyal comrades and trusty fellow-­soldiers. 256 Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 22, states that mice rescue a companion that has fallen into a jar by latching onto each other’s tails and drawing the unfortunate mouse from the jar.

85

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

257 This action is detailed in Ovid, Halieutica 46–48, and in Pliny, Natural History IX. 182. 258 This is described at 972B. The cooperative helping behavior of elephants is in fact frequently commented on by ethologists. deWaal, The Age of Empathy 133, describes a rescue effort similar to that in Plutarch in which elephants worked together to rescue a calf that had fallen into a mud hole, “The matriarch and another female started working on the problem, one of them climbing into the hole on her knees, while the mud was creating deadly suction on the calf. Both females worked together, placing their trunks and tusks underneath the calf until the suction was broken and the calf scrambled out of the hole.” 259 This is a joking reference to the fact that the anecdote questioned here by Phaedimus is attributed to King Juba at 972B. 260 Herodotus, Histories III. 149 and VI. 31, describes how the Persians, after invading an island, would join hands, forming a human net-­like chain which reached from one coast to the other. The soldiers would then advance together and round up the inhabitants of the island. 261 The noun that Plutarch employs here for the catch-­all net, πάναγρα (panagra), is not found elsewhere. Homer, Iliad V. 487, speaks of a λίνον πάναγρον (linon panagron), a “net that catches all.” In Homer’s usage, the term is adjectival. 262 The identity of the fish called here γαλη̑ (galē) is not certain. Aelian, Nature of Animals XV. 11, describes it at some length, noting that it is sometimes called hepatus, also unidentified. Aelian claims that it can blink its eyes and that it feeds on the eyes of all dead creatures that it finds. 263 Oppian, Halieutica III. 121–125, describes this stratagem of the sea bass. 264 In his version of this anecdote, Aelian, Nature of Animals XI. 12, the dolphins take care not to be caught a second time because they are ashamed to have been captured in the first place. 265 Aristotle, History of Animals 524b15–23, describes the mytis at some length, stating that cephalopods do not have viscera but have instead the mytis, upon which rests the ink sac, from which they discharge ink when they are frightened. The cuttlefish has the most ink. The noun used by both Aristotle and Plutarch for “ink” (θολός, tholos) also means mud or dirt dissolved in water. Aristotimus employs the term in an adjectival form at 963B to describe the reasoning powers of non-­human animals as clouded or muddy. 266 This phrase occurs at Iliad V. 345, when Apollo rescues Aeneas from combat by enveloping him in a dark cloud. 267 Aristotle, History of Animals 620b20–24, relates that the torpedo (νάρκη, narkē) has the ability “to cause numbness” (ναρκᾶν, narkān) in any creature that comes near it as it lies burrowed in sand. Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 14, adds that he has heard from individuals who have experienced the phenomenon that if a person even touches the net in which the torpedo is caught, he experiences numbness throughout his entire body.

86

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

268 Pliny, Natural History IX. 143, states that the torpedo is well aware of its power and does not itself suffer from its capacity to inflict shocks. 269 The “fisherman” (ἁλιϵῦς, halieus) is also called the “fishing frog” (batrachos). Aristotle, History of Animals 620b11–20, explains that it has hair-­like projections above its eyes, the ends of which are rounded to resemble bait. 270 Aristotle, History of Animals 621b30, calls the cuttlefish the “most roguish” (πανουργότατον, panourgotaton) of the cephalopods because of its use of tricks. 271 Aristotle, History of Animals 6224–14, says that the octopus, which he brands as stupid for coming near the hand of a human being if it is put under the water, changes its color to match its surroundings as a stratagem for hunting prey. 272 Pindar, fragment 43 Snell-­Maehler. Plutarch cites the verses again at Natural Questions 916C. 273 Theognis 215–216, cited again by Plutarch at Natural Questions 916C, following the verses of Pindar also cited at 916C (see note 273). 274 Theophrastus, fragment 189 Wimmer. Aristotle, History of Animals 503b2–4, states that the chameleon changes color when it is inflated. At Parts of Animals 692a21–23, he attributes its change of color to fear and a lack of blood. 275 Pliny, Natural History VIII. 122, holds that the chameleon is the only animal that does not live on food or drink but only on the nutrition that it derives from air. 276 Plutarch asserts that the color change of the octopus is a function of its intelligence rather than an instinctual act. This explanation is offered as well in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 30. 277 This idea is introduced also at 965E, at which point Aristotimus seems to accept it as true. See note 98. 278 Pliny, Natural History IX. 87, denies that the octopus devours its own tentacles, but states that the conger eel chews them. 279 See note 277. 280 See 972A and note 178. 281 See 967B. 282 Aristotomus mentioned only cranes of Cyzicus (972A). Plutarch seems to have in mind here the version of the anecdote in Aristotle, History of Animals 612b4–9, where both Cyzicus and Byzantium are mentioned. See notes 178 and 281. 283 Helmbold 439 note e, remarks of this creature, “i. e., the sea-­urchin, regarded by the ancients as a sort of marine counterpart of the hedgehog because of the similar spines.” 284 Pliny, Natural History IX. 100, and Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 33 also record this behavior. 285 Aristotle, History of Animals 598b25–27, and Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 42 comment on the astronomical skills of this fish. 286 See 967C and note 117. 287 The source of this verse is unknown.

87

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

288 Pliny, Natural History XI. 235, reports that the dolphin is the only animal that suckles its young while in motion. 289 Aelian, Nature of Animals XI. 22, also comments on the perpetual motion of the dolphin and he agrees that it dies if it ceases movement. 290 Pliny, Natural History X. 210, in contrast, states that both dolphins and whales have been heard snoring. 291 Aristotle, History of Animals 598b25–29, states that some fishes cease movement at the winter solstice. 292 Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 308 Radt. The verse is cited also by Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 42. 293 Pliny, Natural History IX. 50, and Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 42, both record this phenomenon. 294 On the mathematical skills of non-­human species, see note 135. 295 Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae (Learned Banqueters) 278a, notes that Aristotle thought that the name of this fish, ἀμία (amia), possibly to be identified with the bonito and mentioned at 966B, could be derived from its tendency ἅμα ἰέναι (hama ienai), “to go together,” because of their tendency to accompany other fishes. 296 The identity of this fish is in doubt. Bouffartigue 118 note 350 speculates that it may be a variety of tunny fish. Plutarch etymologizes its name as derived from πέλϵιν ἅμα (pelein hama), “to be together.” Pliny, Natural History IX. 47, states that this type of fish is in the springtime called pelamydes, from the Greek word for “mud” (πη̑λος, pēlos) because of its habit of burrowing in the mud. 297 Plutarch, Self-­Contradictions of the Stoics 1035B and 1039B, similarly criticizes Chrysippus for his repetition of topics. See note 30. The identity of the pinna-­g uard is somewhat in doubt. The pinna appears to be a bivalve, while the pinna-­g uard is described in ancient sources as a kind of shrimp or crab. Athenaeus, Learned Banqueters 89d, supports the description of the action of the pinna-­g uard that Plutarch gives here. He states that the pinna is a kind of oyster (ὄστρϵον, ostreon) and that the pinna-­g uard (πινοϕύλαξ, pinophulax), a small crab, nips at passing fish to signal to the pinna that food is near. If the pinna is deprived of the pinna-­g uard, Athenaeus claims, it will perish. In that passage, Athenaeus mentions that Chrysippus discussed the pinna and the pinna-­ guard in his work On Good and Pleasure. 298 That is, the creature is in fact a kind of crab, despite its appearance. Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 16, describes the actions of the crab in language unusually close to that of Plutarch, suggesting a common source. Aelian even includes the remark that the sponge needs to be reminded to move. Phaedimus’ remark that the sponge is neither lifeless nor without sensation or blood recalls the comment of Aristotle, History of Animals 588b20, in the course of his discussion of how nature progresses from the inanimate to animals by very slight gradations, that the sponge is in every respect like a plant. Pliny, Natural History IX. 148, maintains, in contrast, that sponges clearly have intelligence because they are aware of the presence of sponge-­gatherers and they contract

88

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

when they approach to make themselves difficult to harvest. Plutarch attributes this action to the presence of the spiderlike crab. 299 The murex is the sea snail from which was derived the purple dye highly valued in antiquity. 300 The mistaken idea that the murex builds a honeycomb-­like structure is derived from Aristotle, History of Animals 546b18–21. 301 This ritual is mentioned also at 966D. 302 On the dental hygiene of crocodiles, see note 239. 303 The identity of this fish is in doubt. 304 Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 13, claims that all fishes have need of guides, excepting the shark. If the guide dies, the large fish is sure to die as well. Oppian, Halieutica III. 62–110, tells of the “guide” (ἡγητήρ, hēgētēr) of the whale which functions as the eyes and ears of the whale. To capture the whale, Oppian recommends that the guide be captured first since the large beast is helpless without it. 305 Anticyra is a port town on the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth. 306 The location of Bouna is unknown. Some scholars have suggested that the town of Boulis is meant, which was not far from Anticyra. 307 Aristotle, History of Animals 610a12, states that foxes and snakes are friends because both live underground. 308 Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 28, states that the bustard is quite fond of horses, and that it ignores all other animals but delights in flying up to the horse and keeping it company. 309 Plutarch may be borrowing here from the lengthy discussion in Aristotle, History of Animals 598a30–598b2, on the fishes of the Black Sea. Aristotle claims that the Black Sea is notably free of savage fishes, with the exception of dolphins and porpoises. 310 On the anthias, see 977C and note 255. 311 Homer uses the phrase “sacred fish” (ἱϵρὸς ἰχθύς, hieros ichthus) at Iliad XVI. 407, but not in reference to the anthias. 312 The os sacrum is the large bone at the base of the spine. 313 The author of the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease states (1) that he does not regard epilepsy as any more sacred or divine than any other disease. Plato, Timaeus 85a–b, explains that the disease derives its name from the fact that it affects the divine parts of the victim’s nature residing in the head. 314 Eratosthenes (ca. 285–194 bce) worked as librarian at Alexandria and was known for the range of his writings, on mathematics, literary criticism, philosophy and poetry. 315 On the gilthead, see 977F. 316 Eratosthenes, Hermes fragment 14 Hiller (= fragment 12 Powell). 317 Pamphylia was a region in southern Asia Minor. 318 Aelian, Nature of Animals VIII. 28, describes this celebration in very similar language. He notes too that some people think that the celebration was held when the anthias was caught rather than the sturgeon. 319 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 38, states that the elephant is terrified of the squeal of a pig.

89

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

320 Aristotle, History of Animals 568b1–14 and 621a21–29, describes this activity on the part of the males of a type of fish that he calls the γλάνις (glanis). 321 Aristotle, History of Animals 565b25–26, relates that the dogfish releases its young and takes them back inside its body, a capacity that it shares with the angel fish and the torpedo. 322 Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 17, states that the offspring of the dogfish slip immediately back inside their mother’s womb if they become frightened. Oppian, Halieutica I. 734–741, adds that the dogfish experiences pain when taking its offspring back into its body, but it nevertheless does so willingly. 323 Aristotle, History of Animals 558a4–14, describes the hatching of the young and the maternal care of various types of tortoises. Pliny, Natural History IX. 37, agrees with Aristotle’s observation that the mother turtle sleeps on the eggs at night. 324 Aelian, Varia Historia (Historical Miscellany) I. 6, recounts that sea turtles are so proficient at reckoning numbers that they keep count of the days since they laid their eggs, and on the fortieth day, they dig up their young and take them off with them. 325 Aelian, Nature of Animals V. 52, claims turtles and crabs similarly remove their eggs to high ground to avoid inundation, and that asps do so with their young. 326 Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 3, states that the father tears a newborn crocodile to pieces if it does not immediately seize some creature because he considers the young animal to be illegitimate, but if the young animal does exhibit this savage behavior, it is loved by both parents and considered one of the family. According to Pliny, Natural History X. 10, a similar paternity test is carried out by the sea-­eagle (haliaëtus). The adult bird compels the young to look directly at the sun. If the young bird blinks, the adult expels it from the nest as illegitimate. 327 Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 9, gives a similar report of seal behavior. Pliny, Natural History IX. 41, reports that the mother seal brings her young down to the water on the twelfth day. Oppian, Halieutica I. 686–701, offers a fanciful description of how, on the thirteenth day after birth, the mother seal takes her young into the water to introduce them to her home country, as it were, giving them a guided tour of the wonders of the deep. 328 Aristotle, History of Animals 536a9–15, notes that the frog is capable of making its distinctive croaking, called ὀλολυγών (ololugōn), because of the peculiar formation of its tongue, and that it constitutes the male mating call. Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 13, states that the call is like a lover’s serenade. 329 Plutarch, Natural Questions 912C, repeats and elaborates this claim, stating that the frog emits this croak as a sign of joy, in happy anticipation of the approach of rain. 330 The halcyon, although frequently mentioned in ancient sources, is of uncertain identity. Aristotle, History of Animals 542b21–25, states that it is the bird most rarely seen, appearing only at the setting of the Pleiades and at the solstice. 331 On the swallow and bee as stereotypic examples of animals whose behavior serves as a model for human beings, see Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals note 9. 90

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

332 Zeus’ wife Hera, enraged that Leto was pregnant by her husband, forbade every land to allow her to give birth there, but the island of Delos, which floated and was not moored to the sea bottom, allowed her to give birth on it, and as a reward it was anchored to the sea bottom by four pillars. Delos became especially dear to Apollo. See Callimachus, Hymn to Delos 273. 333 Pliny, Natural History X. 89–90, notes of the halcyon that it breeds only at midwinter, during what are called the “halcyon days,” at which time the sea is calm and navigable. 334 Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus speaks at length, Whether Beasts Are Rational 989A and 990C–D, of the natural chastity of non-­human animals, which he contrasts with the promiscuity of human beings. See Whether Beasts Are Rational, Commentary notes 72–74. 335 Aelian, Nature of Animals VII. 17, mentions a bird called the κηρύλος (kērulos) which lives with the halcyon, which carries it on its back when the kērulos is old and feeble. Aelian contrasts this considerate treatment of the elderly with the scorn that human beings have for old people. Aristotle, History of Animals 593b14, mentions the kērulos in the course of his description of the halcyon but does not offer any anecdotes of its behavior. 336 Aristotle, History of Animals 616a19–32, describes the construction of the nest of the halcyon, which he states is made of the bones of the garfish. Aelian, Nature of Animals IX. 17, gives an account of the building of the nest of the halcyon that agrees closely with that given in Plutarch. 337 Both Bouffartigue 60 note 409, and LiCausi and Pomelli 491 note 280, take note of the fact that it is not clear to what object Phaedimus is referring that is often observeable. 338 Homer, Odyssey VI. 162, slightly altered. 339 The altar of horns is mentioned as a marvel by Martial, Book of Spectacles 1. 4, and Ovid, Heroides XXI. 99–102, numbers it among the wonders of Delos, but Plutarch is the first author who includes it among the Seven Wonders. 340 There is a lacuna here, and the text of the remainder of the chapter is uncertain in places so that the meaning remains unclear. 341 There is a lacuna here as well, and the connection of the text with the previous sentence is in doubt. At 966A, Aristotimus states that Apollo is never called “Conger-­slayer.” 342 There seems to be some geographical confusion in the account given here. Leptis Magna on the Libyan coast, the site to which Plutarch seems to refer, does not appear to have had a cult of Poseidon. At Table Talk 730D, Plutarch again mentions Leptis as a cult site of Poseidon where the priests abstain from fish, and he numbers as well the Egyptians, Syrians and some Greeks among those who avoid fish. The motivation of those groups, he suggests there, is a desire to act justly and to remove luxury from their diet. Porphyry, On Abstinence II. 61, agrees that the Syrians eat no fish, and at IV. 7, he mentions that some Egyptians avoid fish. 343 Porphyry, On Abstinence IV. 16, reports that the priests at Eleusis abstain from fish and fowl. 344 The sea-­hare is a mollusc with two projections that resemble the ears of a hare. Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 45, states that it resembles a snail without a shell. He notes that it causes stomach pain or death when eaten. 91

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

3 45 See note 91. 346 A lacuna must be assumed here. The grammar is incoherent. 347 The third Homeric Hymn to Apollo 393–403 relates how Apollo, in the guise of a dolphin, guided Cretan sailors to Cirrha, near Delphi. 348 The name Soteles has been supplied here by editors from Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 361F, where the anecdote is also related, including the name of Soteles. 349 Tacitus, Histories IV. 83–84, tells this anecdote of Ptolemy I Soter (ca. 367–282 bce) in some detail. 350 The claim that the dolphin is partial to music is found repeatedly in ancient sources. In Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Sages 162F, the interlocutor Solon remarks that it is well known that the dolphin loves music and will follow it. Pliny, Natural History XI. 137, claims that dolphins can obviously hear because they are enchanted by music and can be caught when under its spell. 351 Pindar, fragment 140b Snell-­Maehler. 352 With this claim that dolphins alone among non-­human animals have an affection for human beings as human beings, Plutarch inaugurates a series of anecdotal accounts (984C–985B) of behaviors by dolphins that seem to indicate in them what would be viewed, if seen in human beings, as instances of altruism, philanthropy, and a sense of reciprocal justice. R. H. Barrow, Plutarch (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967) 116, has written, with reference to this set of anecdotes, “The long section given to the dolphin as the most intelligent of animals (the only one which takes the initiative in becoming friendly with man), anticipates in small compass what is now being written about this animal.” Barrow is referring to instances reported by cognitive ethologists of dolphins that come to the aid of their fellow-­dolphins when they perceive that they are injured, and likewise to reports of dolphins raising out of the water human beings whom they see foundering and carrying them safely to shore. The ethical dimension of such actions is currently the subject of intense debate among philosophers and animal behavioral scientists. They ask whether such behaviors on the part of non-­human animals qualify them to be viewed as moral agents, that is, as individuals who perform actions for moral purposes: do the dolphins intend to help? This would require on the part of the aiding animals sufficient mental capacities to allow for perspective taking on their part, that is, for the recognition that another creatures is in need and that they can help. Philosophers and cognitive ethologists who deny the possibility that non-­human animals can be moral agents argue that animals would have to have language to articulate the position that they act out of a desire to help. In the terms of the argument developed in On the Cleverness of Animals, the anecdotes in 984C–985B clearly suggest to Plutarch what would now be viewed as moral agency, while his Stoic opponents would argue that the lack of reason and of meaningful language on the part of non-­human animals would render such agency impossible. For a detailed analysis of these sections in On the Cleverness of Animals, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason, Chapter 5, “Beauty in the Beast: Cooperation, Altruism and Philanthropy among Animals,” pp. 76–84. 353 It is rather surprising that Plutarch merely alludes here to the most famous ancient tale of dolphin “philanthropy,” that of the rescue of the 92

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

singer Arion by a dolphin, which was retold in classical authors with various interpretations and emphases. Herodotus, Histories I. 23–24, recounts that the poet Arion of Methymna on Lesbos, when set adrift by Corinthian sailors who sought to rob him of the money that he had earned on a concert tour, was rescued by a dolphin that carried him back to the court of Periander of Corinth where he was staying. On returning to the court of Periander, the sailors told him that Arion had safely reached his destination of Taenarum in Sicily, but when the singer appeared in court, the sailors were arrested. Pliny, Natura History IX. 28, adds the detail that the animal was drawn by the sound of Arion’s playing since dolphins love music. Aelian, Nature of Animals XII. 45, likewise emphasizes the love of music characteristic of dolphins. The tale is recounted at some length in Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Sages 161A–162D, where it is heavily moralized. A school of dolphins is now involved, and the animals are said to behave toward Arion in a manner “kindly-­disposed” (ϵὐμϵνω̑ς, eumenōs) toward him. For an analysis of the passage in Banquet of the Seven Sages, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium,” in José Ribeiro Ferreira, Delfim Leão, Manuel Tröster and Paula Barata Dias, eds., Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch (Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanisticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009) 497–507, and “Human-­Animal Interactions in Plutarch as Commentary on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten Fögen and Edmund Thomas, eds., Interactions between Animals and Humans in Graeco-­Roman Antiquity (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 242–248. 354 See 969E. 355 Homer, Iliad IX. 56. 356 At Banquet of the Seven Sages 161D, Plutarch says that the animals worked as a team carrying the body, passing it along from one to the other, as if they viewed it as a duty necessary and incumbent upon all of them. 357 Myrtilus of Methymna on Lesbos (third century bce) wrote Lesbiaka, a history of Lesbos. The passage referred to is preserved as Fragmenta der Griechischen Historiker III. 477. 358 This anecdote is recounted at length by Plutarch at Banquet of the Seven Sages 163A–D. 359 Aelian, Nature of Animals VI. 15, recounts this tale at length. In his account the youth was accidentally killed when his veins were severed by the dorsal fin of the dolphin during vigorous play with the animal. Aelian does not speculate, as does Plutarch, on the feelings of the dolphin at having caused the death of its human playmate. Pliny, Natural History IX. 27, gives an unadorned version of the anecdote, mentioning only the mutual affection of the boy and the dolphin. 360 Bouffartigue 134 note 439, observes, “Le type du personnage chevauchant un dauphin est relativement commun dans la numismatique grecque.” 361 On modern accounts of such aiding behavior on the part of dolphins, see note 353. 362 Archilochus, fragment 192 West. This is the sole source for the verse. 363 Plutarch here suggests that some animals are capable of the emotion of grief. Pliny, Natural History IX. 25, offers a very similar tale of dolphin grief, in the case of a dolphin that played with a boy at Naples and 93

ON THE CLEVERNESS OF ANIMALS

allowed him to ride on its back. When the boy died of natural causes, the dolphin came to their usual meeting place and “sad, and in the manner of a mourner, it also died of grief, as no one could doubt” (tristis et maerenti similis ipse quoque, quod nemo dubitaret, desiderio expiravit). Aristotle and the Stoics denied that non-­human animals were capable of true emotions because they were functions of reason and involved mental operations that non-­human animals could not perform. For a discussion of ancient views on the operation of the emotions, and of current scientific and philosophical debate on the question of the emotional capacities of non-­human animals, see notes 24 and 35. 364 Stesichorus, fragment 225 Page. 365 Nothing is known of this author. 366 This anecdote is otherwise unknown. 367 Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta 867 Radt. 368 Neither side is declared victorious, but both sides are commended for making a successful case for the presence of reason in non-­human animals. On the question of whether the ending of the treatise is complete as it survives in the manuscripts, see Introduction, pp. 1–2 and note 2.

94

2 WHETHER BEASTS AR E R ATIONAL, OR GRYLLUS (BRUTA ANIMALIA R ATIONE UTI ) Introduction It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863), Chapter 2

In the opening lines of the Introduction to his translation of Plutarch’s dialogue Whether Beasts Are Rational, also known as Gryllus, William C. Helmbold calls attention to a number of issues that have complicated study of this brief but charming work, Many will find this little jeu d’esprit as pleasant reading as anything in Plutarch. In part, this may be due to its (perhaps accidental) brevity; but its originality and freshness are undeniable. These qualities have, to be sure, puzzled a number of scholars who are still disputing whether the sources are principally Epicurean or Peripatetic or Cynic.1 Helmbold, with a gentle swipe at the long-­w indedness normally characteristic of Plutarch, calls attention to the brevity of the treatise, due perhaps, he suggests, to imperfect transmission of the text; to its relatively lighthearted nature, which is in sharp contrast to the seriousness which marks On the Cleverness of Animals and On Eating Meat; to its apparent generic uniqueness; and to the identity of the several philosophical schools that have been regarded by scholars as potential sources for the theoretical portions of the dialogue. Underlying Helmbold’s characterization of Whether Beasts Are Rational is a recognition of the fundamental disjunction between the amusing tone of the work, arising in part from its parodic features, and the work’s engagement with ideas traceable to a number of philosophical traditions that suggests some deeper message beneath its playful exterior. This 95

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

playfulness led Helmbold to speculate that Plutarch may have written the dialogue “when he was quite young,”2 on the assumption that the mature and serious Plutarch would not have produced such a witty miniature. The work provides no internal clues to its date of composition, which is not surprising in view of its mythological setting, and some scholars have argued that the work’s uncertain relationship to a number of philosophical schools ­complicates the issue of dating.3 The narrative framework of Whether Beasts Are Rational, which contributes to the originality and freshness of the work which Helmbold acknowledges, is at the same time the principal source of scholarly debate on the philosophical allegiance and intent of the little work. Whether Beasts Are Rational is the only extant Plutarchan dialogue with a mythological setting and with characters drawn from the world of Greek myth, a circumstance which might be expected to cast doubt on the serious intent of the argument set forth in the dialogue. Moreover, the work advances a position that one does not encounter in either On the Cleverness of Animals or On Eating Meat, namely, that non-­human animals are intellectually and morally superior to human beings.4 When one takes into account the fact that this provocative thesis is advanced in Whether Beasts Are Rational by a pig endowed with speech, the reason for the frustration voiced by scholars who have attempted to assess the message of the little work becomes clear. Can the reader, scholars have asked, give credence to moral philosophy expounded by a talking pig? As is the case with a number of Plutarch’s philosophical treatises, the Greek title of the dialogue, translated in this volume as Whether Beasts Are Rational, does not adequately represent the contents of the work. The Greek title, Πϵρὶ του̑ τὰ ἄλογα λόγῳ χρη̑σθαι (Peri tou ta aloga logōi chrēsthai), may be rendered as On the Use of Reason by Animals. Since Plutarch is known to have composed another work, now lost, with a very similar title, some confusion has arisen as to which of these works has survived.5 Plutarch’s philosophical works are more frequently referred to by Latin titles, given to them at some later date, which are often even less faithful representations of the contents of the works in question than are the Greek titles.6 Two Latin titles are attached to Whether Beasts Are Rational, and most scholars refer to the work by some translation of the longer of these, Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti, which is a close translation of the Greek title of the work. The work is also referred to as Gryllus, from the name assigned to the talking pig who delivers the philosophical message of the dialogue. The Greek name “Gryllus” is derived from the verb γρυλίξω (grūlizō), “grunt,” as of a pig, and the noun γρυ̑λος or γρυ̑λλος (grūlos, grūllos) signifies a pig, or “grunter.”7 Hence, the name of the swinish interlocutor in the dialogue may be translated as “Squeaker” or “Grunter” or “Oinker.” The name Gryllus is assigned, somewhat offhandedly, to the pig who is endowed with speech and assigned to present the point of view of non-­human animals in Whether Beasts Are Rational. The dialogue is a reimagining of the famous 96

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

scene in Homer’s Odyssey (X. 203–574) in which the hero Odysseus asks the witch Circe to return his men to human form from the pig form into which she has turned them. In Plutarch’s reworking of the scene, the witch suggests to Odysseus that this might not be so simple as he supposes, for they might in fact not desire to leave their present form and to return to life as human beings (986A). She singles out one pig and endows him with speech so that Odysseus may sound him out on the subject, and when the hero asks Circe by what name he should address him, she suggests that “Gryllus” is as good a name as any (986B). When Odysseus explains to Gryllus that he has petitioned Circe to reconvert his men, Gryllus stops him up short, and assures him that he has come to realize, now that he has experienced both states, that life as a pig is preferable to life as a human being, whom he labels that most wretched of animals (986D–E). Although the narrative setting of Whether Beasts Are Rational is most directly dependent on Odyssey X, scholars have in recent years argued that the rather negative portrayal of Odysseus in Plutarch’s dialogue shows the influence of post-­Homeric Greek literature, in particular of tragedy, in which the cruelty and vanity of the hero are stressed.8 At the beginning of the dialogue, Odysseus admits that he will gain glory among his fellow Greeks if he succeeds in his mission to have his comrades returned to human form (985E), and Circe mocks him for his “love of honor” (philotimiān) which she suggests might prove detrimental to himself as well as to his comrades. The witch hints here at the subsequent argument of the dialogue, a significant portion of which is devoted to an exposition of the idea that qualities that appear to be virtues in human beings are after all perversions of those virtues, and that humans are naïve and misguided in believing that they are in possession of excellences that are present in pure form only in non-­ human animals. It is the philosophical agenda of the talking pig to prove the truth of this position in the course of the dialogue, and the eloquent pig employs Odysseus as a straw man whose arguments he demolishes by a demonstration that non-­human animals are by nature predisposed to those virtues to which humans mistakenly lay claim (987B). Ironically, it is a pig who systematically lays bare the pretensions and cruelties of Greece’s most illustrious living hero.9 Gryllus proceeds to prove that life as a pig is preferable to life as a human being by demonstrating, in the bulk of his presentation, that other animals excel humans in those virtues to which humans most like to lay claim. The soul of non-­human animals, he begins, is like a field whose soil is so fertile that it produces its crops without need of cultivation: so does the soul of non-­human animals produce a crop of virtues (987A). This, Gryllus explains, is because the soul of non-­human animals is “more naturally adapted” (euphuesterān, 987B) and “more perfectly formed” (teleioterān, 987B) toward the production of virtue. Moreover, in non-­human animals the virtues appear in their pure and genuine form. The virtues that Gryllus 97

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

singles out for discussion are those often viewed as the “cardinal virtues” in Greek philosophical thought: “wisdom” (phronēsis), “courage” (andreiā), “justice” (dikaiosunē), and “temperance/moderation” (sōphrosunē).10 Not surprisingly, Gryllus begins his examination of the virtues with an analysis of “courage,” for this is an attribute closely associated with Odysseus and one in which the hero takes especial pride. In human beings, Gryllus argues, courage is more accurately to be described as a fear of punishment and disgrace: humans act with apparent bravery merely to avoid disgrace (988C). Ironically, Odysseus, known for his clever tongue, offers no rebuttal to Gryllus’ charges, but merely comments on the pig’s eloquence and urges him to expound his views on “temperance” (988F). Gryllus’ strategy in discussing temperance is similar to that employed in his discussion of courage: he argues that non-­human animals display the virtue in a pure and undiluted form. Only human beings covet riches, elaborate feasts and unseemly sexual pleasures. Non-­human animals, in contrast, control their desires in all of these things (989F). The pig argues for the superiority of non-­human animal behavior in the matter of desires by offering a classification of types of desires: those that are natural and necessary, like food; those that are natural but unnecessary, like sex; and those that are unnatural and unnecessary, like elaborate meals and expensive clothing and jewels (989B–C).11 Only human beings care for such luxuries, while other animal species content themselves with modest and easily-­attainable meals and sexual intercourse only in season (990B–C). Nor do non-­human animals indulge in homosexual unions as do the heroes of Greece (990D–E).12 The conclusion that Gryllus draws from this line of argument arises directly from the thesis that underlines his comparison of human and non-­human animal behavior throughout his discussion of the cardinal virtues, namely, that non-­human animals are superior to human beings in that their conduct is in accord with nature and does not do violence to that nature (990F). Gryllus’ consideration of temperance concludes with a comparison of the eating habits of humans and of other animal species, which bears a close resemblance to the set of arguments marshalled in Plutarch’s treatise On Eating Meat to prove that the eating habits of human beings are marked by excess and violence. Human beings, Gryllus argues, unlike other animals, cannot be satisfied with simple foods that are easily attainable and simply prepared, but they seek out the exotic and luxurious, and sustain their own lives by depriving other species of theirs in a cruel and bloodthirsty manner (991C). A further proof of human incontinence is the fact that, unlike other species, humans are omnivorous: nothing escapes the appetites of man (991D). At the point where Gryllus takes up the third of the “cardinal virtues,” “wisdom” (phronēsis), a break in the text occurs that renders it impossible to gain a full picture of his case against humans, but in many respects, Gryllus’ surviving assertions recall Plutarch’s characterizations of animal 98

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

intellect in On the Cleverness of Animals, although Gryllus’ presentation is relatively compressed. Gryllus’ presentation on animal wisdom is introduced abruptly, in the course of a discussion of the use of condiments by humans to season their meals (991D), an indication that a lacuna is to be suspected at this juncture. The pig’s thesis in his treatment of this virtue is identical to that encountered in his discussion of temperance: non-­human animals possess wisdom by nature. They know without instruction how to tend their wounds and how to self-­medicate with soothing and healing herbs and drugs (991E–F). In this activity, Gryllus contends, nature is the teacher, and if Odysseus refuses to call this wisdom, he must devise some other appropriate name by which to describe the phenomenon (991F). The conclusions that Gryllus draws from his examples of animal behaviors suggesting the presence of wisdom in non-­human animals are once again highly reminiscent of Plutarch’s position on the presence of reason in non-­humans. On the basis of his examples, the pig asserts that the soul of non-­human animals is not “without a share” (amoiros, 992C) of reason and intelligence, a choice of words that calls to mind the statement of the interlocutor near the beginning of On the Cleverness of Animals, that all animals “have a share of reason and understanding” (960A).13 Shortly after (992D), Gryllus asserts that reason exists in non-­human animals in a “more or less” relation, again recalling arguments set forth in On the Cleverness of Animals, and he employs the same verb (metechein, 992D) to describe the notion of “shared” reason that Autobulus had employed in On the Cleverness of Animals 960A. Unfortunately, the text of Whether Beasts Are Rational breaks off just as Odysseus asks the pig how creatures that have no knowledge of the divine can be reckoned to be rational.14 The pig’s response, and any discussion that might have followed of the fourth “cardinal virtue,” “justice” (dikaiosunē), are missing.15 As Helmbold has observed,16 one of the most challenging aspects of study of Whether Beasts Are Rational is the determination of its philosophical allegiance or allegiances, and scholars have drawn varied conclusions on the topic of Plutarch’s borrowings from Greek philosophical schools. The question is complicated by the fact that a number of the pig’s observations may be traced to more than one school. Gryllus’ repeated emphasis on the simple life led by non-­human animals that contrasts sharply with the love of luxury and self-­indulgence characteristic of human life, echoes the praise of austerity and the rejection of excess that are encountered in Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean depictions of ideal human conduct. Gryllus’ often-­repeated claim that non-­human animals are immune to desires and passions that are foreign to them recalls the Stoic injunction to “live according to nature,” a goal to which human beings, according to Stoic teaching, should strive and one which, in Gryllus’ estimation, non-­human animals cannot fail to attain.17 Other scholars have viewed Whether Beasts Are Rational as essentially Cynic in inspiration, beginning with the pronounced theriophilic 99

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

bent of the work in which human life is denigrated by praising the simple and unspoiled lives of other animals. Further Cynic touches in the work include Gryllus’ insistence that human beings are the unhappiest of animal species (986D–E), the assertion that the desire for fame, riches and sexual indulgences, characteristic of human beings but not of other animals, is blameworthy, and the claim that the life of non-­human animals is preferable because it naturally rejects all unnecessary behaviors.18 Some have viewed Gryllus’ classification of desires (989B–C) as a borrowing from Epicurean thought.19 It is important to keep in mind, in discussing the sources of Gryllus’ philosophical pronouncements, that these are after all the musings of a talking pig, and that therefore his entire presentation may be ironically intended. Plutarch may have wished to mock the schools whose doctrines are set forth with such solemnity by the earnest porker. Although the ideas that Gryllus presents may in themselves be deserving of careful consideration, the heaping up of philosophical commonplaces derived from several schools may be an aspect of the humor of the little dialogue and not the exposition of a consistent and serious philosophical position. This fact requires the reader to confront the difficult question posed by Whether Beasts Are Rational: how is one to evaluate Gryllus and the message that he presents? That is to say, what exactly is Gryllus? If he can speak, he must be viewed as human since, in Greek thought, non-­human animals do not have genuine speech because they are not rational.20 David Konstan has argued that Gryllus must therefore be viewed either as purely a pig or as a human in pig form, for there is no third choice.21 Hence, Gryllus cannot be viewed as a talking pig because he would have to be rational. Tom Hawkins has described the idea of talking animals in Greek thought as a “category crisis,” and he concludes that Plutarch did not intend the reader to believe that Gryllus or other non-­human animals are truly rational and therefore capable of the virtues that Gryllus ascribes to them.22 Such speculation on the complex issue of Gryllus’ identity and function in the context of Whether Beasts Are Rational leads to the surprising conclusion that, in some respects at least, the work is more difficult to interpret than are the more substantial and philosophically dense Plutarchan treatises on animals, On Eating Meat and On the Cleverness of Animals. Although Whether Beasts Are Rational cannot be said to have earned a place in the history of philosophical speculation on human–non-­human animal interactions and obligations by its anticipation of ideas encountered in current animal rights philosophy, as have both On Eating Meat and On the Cleverness of Animals, the little work has enjoyed an afterlife not shared by the other two works. Homer’s episode of the encounter of Odysseus with the formidable witch Circe, the passage supplying the narrative framework for Plutarch’s dialogue, proved immensely influential on subsequent European literature in the works of authors who were fascinated by the dynamic of the 100

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

relationship of the hero with the seductive and dangerous witch.23 The episode of Circe’s conversion of Odysseus’ men into animals finds a prominent place in such postclassical retellings of the Homeric scene. In his dialogue Circe, published in 1549, Giambattista Gelli (1498–1563) portrays the pig-­ convert Grillo, who joins an oyster, a mole, a buck, an elephant and other animals, arguing, as had Plutarch’s Gryllus, that it is preferable to be any animal but a human being. Plutarch’s dialogue proved influential upon seventeenth-­c entury French writers as well who took the episode of Odysseus’ encounter with a talking pig in a quite new direction. The theologian Fénelon (1651–1715), remembered today primarily for his didactic novel Les Aventures de Télémaque (1699), likewise inspired by Homer, included in his collection Dialogues des Morts (1693) a dialogue entitled “Ulisse et Grille,” which draws its inspiration from Odysseus’ remark near the end of Plutarch’s dialogue (992E) that one cannot judge as rational animals that have no knowledge of the divine. In Fénelon’s dialogue, the pig rejects the false immortality that Odysseus’ quest for fame confers, and describes the true immortality that Christianity offers. Without true religion, Grille argues, human beings would be no better than beasts. Fénelon is not arguing that a pig is superior to a human being, but rather that a human being has the hope of true salvation if he follows a life of virtue.24 The distinguishing characteristic of the French pig is his ability to envision the rewards of true faith to which Odysseus, who worships fame in the manner of the Greeks, remains blind. It is interesting to speculate on what Plutarch, dedicated priest of Apollo at Delphi who never makes mention of Christianity, would have thought of Fénelon’s pious reimagining of his pig-­philosopher Gryllus, who is well schooled in pagan ethical theory. Perhaps, as an ardent student of religions, Plutarch would have found the sermonizing French pig intriguing and amusing.

Notes 1 Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, eds., Plutarch: Moralia XII (­Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957) 489. 2 Helmbold 490, with a tart comment on Plutarch’s usual prolixity, “It is only too likely that the more mature Plutarch would have gone on and on.” 3 Giovanni Indelli, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali: introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1995) 21–33, discusses the complicated issue of Plutarch’s philosophical borrowings in Whether Beasts Are Rational, and labels the work (34) “un’ operetta fondamentalmente retorica” that shows no strict allegiance to any one school and that does not allow for the conclusion that the work is early. 4 See Giuseppina Santese, “Animali e Razionalità in Plutarco,” in S. Castignone and G. Lanata, eds., Filosofi e Animali nel Mondo Antico (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 1994) 160, “Ci troviamo, come è evidente, nel Grillo, in presenza di una chiara, decisa affermazione della superiorità etica e razionale dell’ animale, tesi che però non trova riscontro altrove nell’ opera plutarchea.” The notion that

101

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

non-­human animals are morally superior to humans and at least as rational as they has been dubbed “theriophily,” or “love of beasts,” a position which George Boas, “Theriophily,” in Philip P. Wiener, ed., Dictionary of the History of Ideas (New York: Scribners, 1973) IV, 384, defines as “a complex of ideas which expresses an admiration for the ways and character of animals.” Boas notes that ideas put forward by proponents of this position often include the assertion that non-­human animals are either as rational as humans, or, if less so, that they are better off without developed reason, and that they are happier than humans and more morally advanced. Boas views ancient expressions of such ideas as a reaction to Aristotle’s position that only man is a rational animal, and he calls attention to the fact that theriophilic sentiments in ancient literature may be merely ironic, intended not so much to elevate non-­human animals as to castigate human beings for their failings. James E. Gill, “Theriophily in Antiquity: A Supplementary Account,” Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969) 401–412, provides a more detailed analysis of the place of Whether Beasts Are Rational in the history of theriophilic thought than is found in Boas, and he concludes (412) that in the treatise “the major elements of the tradition of theriophily have at least been united into an argument which is coherent if not logical.” 5 The so-­called Catalogue of Lamprias, a listing, of uncertain date, of the works of Plutarch, gives as numbers 127 and 135 two works of similar title, one of which may refer to the extant treatise Whether Beasts Are Rational. The other of these works is lost. Angelo Casanova, “The Time Setting of the Dialogue Bruta animalia ratione uti,” in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener, eds., Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society (Málaga: University of Málaga Press and Logan: Utah State University Press, 2005) 121–131, argues that the title Whether Beasts Are Rational cannot be correct for the work so entitled, since it more accurately reflects the subject matter of On the Cleverness of Animals. 6 On the difficulties posed by the titles by which Plutarch’s philosophical treatises are known, see D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 164, “The conventional Greek titles … are probably not Plutarch’s own; the Latin titles vary somewhat in different editions.” 7 Lucas Herchenroeder, “τί γαρ του̑το πρὸς τὸν λόγον; Plutarch’s Gryllus and the So-­Called Grylloi,” American Journal of Philology 129 (2008) 347–379, notes that Whether Beasts Are Rational has been studied principally for its connection to philosophy, while its connection to Greek comedy has been neglected. He points out that the Greek noun grūllos also referred to a type of vulgar dance, and he speculates that the dialogue may have been accorded some form of dramatic presentation. 8 Angelo Casanova, “Il Grillo di Plutarco e la Tradizione della Figura di Ulisse,” Plutarchos N. S. 4 (2006/2007) 19–28, argues that the figure of Odysseus in Whether Beasts Are Rational is more directly influenced by the portrayal of the hero in Odyssey XII than in Odyssey X, and he maintains that Plutarch was influenced more heavily by post-­Homeric literature, especially by tragedy, than by Homer in his negative portrait of Odysseus, whose wiliness and dishonesty are rather favorably portrayed in Homer. He argues some of these same points in “Il Grillo di Plutarco e Omero,” in Jacques Boulogne, ed., Les Grecs de l’Antiquité et les Animaux: Le Cas Remarquable de Plutarque (Lille: UL3, 2005) 97–109. 9 The Greek reader would not have missed the irony involved in a narrative in which a pig gets the better of a wily Greek hero since the pig was held in low regard by the Greeks. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II. 160, notes that the Stoic Chrysippus (ca. 280–207 bce) is said to have remarked that the gods furnished

102

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

the pig with a soul that acted like salt, to preserve the animal until a human being could eat it. 10 The cardinal virtues as given in Plutarch correspond to those listed in Plato (Republic 427a–434c), but others are at times included in ancient enumerations. For a helpful discussion of the cardinal virtues, see Helen North, “Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature,” in Luitpold Wallach, ed., The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) 165–183. For a more detailed discussion of the place of the cardinal virtues in Whether Beasts Are Rational, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Human-­A nimal Interactions in Plutarch as Commentary on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten Fögen and Edmund Thomas, eds., Interactions between Animals and Humans in Graeco-­Roman Antiquity (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 233–252. Christophe Bréchet, “La Philosophie de Gryllos,” in Boulogne 43–61, maintains that the argument set forth by Gryllus is in fact more immediately indebted to Plato’s tripartite division of the soul (Republic 435b ff.) than to ancient enumerations of the cardinal virtues, and that Gryllus argues that, in each of its parts, the soul of the non-­ human animal is equal or superior to that of the human being: in the case of the “appetitive” (epithūmētikon) part of the soul, non-­human animals are not subject to excesses common in human beings; in the “spirited” (thūmoeides) part, the animal soul is purer; and in the “rational” (logistikon) part, the non-­human soul is not inferior to that of the human. In the dialogue De animalibus (On Animals) by the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 bce–ca. 50 ce), which survives only in an Armenian translation, the interlocutor Alexander discusses at considerable length the excellences of non-­human animals, illustrating in succession their wisdom, moderation, courage and justice (10–71). Many of the examples of the virtues that Philo cites are those found in Gryllus’ presentation, suggesting a common source for both authors. On the use of stock examples in classical accounts of animal behavior, including those of Plutarch and Philo, see Introduction note 9 to On the Cleverness of Animals. The Armenian text of Philo’s On Animals is translated, with extensive commentary, in Abraham Terian, ed., Philonis Alexandrini de Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981). 11 The classification of desires presented here by Gryllus is most closely associated in ancient philosophy with the ethical doctrine of Epicurus; see his Letter to Menoeceus 127–128 and his Principal Doctrines (Kuriai Doxai) XXIX. 12 The Greeks seem to have taken an inordinate interest in the question of whether non-­human animals engage in same-­sex unions. Plato (Laws 836c) states that they do not, while Pliny the Elder (Natural History X. 166) records that hens engage in activity that resembles sexual union if they cannot locate male partners. Modern biology has shown that Gryllus is mistaken. Bruce Bagemihl, Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), shows that homosexual activity can be isolated in 400 species. 13 On the function of this concept as the central thesis of On the Cleverness of Animals, see Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 3–4. 14 For a discussion of ancient notions on the possibility that non-­human animals have a concept of the divine, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Paws to Reflect: Ancients and Moderns on the Religious Sensibilities of Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N. S. 75, 3 (2003) 111–129. 15 Ironically, Plutarch’s treatise On Eating Meat also breaks off just as the topic of justice toward non-­human animals is about to be taken up (999B). For a

103

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

discussion of Plutarch’s views on the issue of whether human beings have a debt of justice toward other species, and of whether non-­human animals have a sense of justice operative in their own lives, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006) Chapter 3, “Just Beasts: Animal Morality and Human Justice,” 48–65. 16 See Introduction, pp. 95–96 and note 1. 17 In his Lives of the Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius states (VII. 87) that already Zeno (ca. 334–ca. 262 bce), the founder of the school, had espoused the doctrine that the goal of human life was to live in accord with nature. While the exact meaning of this assertion has been much debated, it appears to entail the idea that, in the case of human beings, living in accord with their nature requires them to live a life of reason and to choose virtuous behavior over excess and perversion. Because, in Stoic teaching, non-­human animals are viewed as irrational, they cannot choose to live a life of virtue. For them, living in accord with nature involves heeding the promptings of “impulse” (hormē) which guides them and allows them to live successful if not virtuous lives. For a helpful discussion of the possible connotations of the Stoic concept of “living in accord with nature,” see Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties and Fate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) 134–153. 18 The Cynic borrowings in Whether Beasts Are Rational are analyzed in detail in Jorge Bergua Cavero, “Cinismo, Ironía y Retórica en el Bruta ratione uti de Plutarco,” in Estudios sobre Plutarco: Paisaje y Naturaleza (Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1991) 13–19. For a discussion of the Cynic denunciation of unnecessary luxuries and of the Cynic understanding of the concept of “living in accord with nature,” see William Desmond, Cynics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008) 77–161. Urs Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977) 188–191, argues that Whether Beasts Are Rational is influenced by Cynic satire, in which heroic ideals were regularly mocked and comparison of contrasting lifestyles was made by someone who had known both. Thus, in his view, Plutarch’s intention in the dialogue was to imbue a Cynic genre with his own ethical and psychological ideas. 19 See note 11. For a survey of scholarly opinions on Epicurean elements in Whether Beasts Are Rational, see Indelli 22–24. 20 See John Heath, The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 6, “The primacy of reason as a distinguishing criterion derived over time from the far more obvious fact of experience that beasts do not speak. ‘Dumb’ animals do not possess any language.” For a historical survey of classical ideas on the nature of animal vocalization, and of the part played by reason in the capacity for meaningful language in any species, see Maria Fusco, “Il Linguaggio degli Animali nel Pensiero Antico: Una Sintesi Storica,” Studi Filosofici 30 (2007) 17–44. Fusco’s discussion of Plutarch (30–32) is limited largely to content summary of Whether Beasts Are Rational. See also Thorsten Fögen, “Animal Communication,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 216–232. 21 David Konstan, “A Pig Convicts Itself of Unreason: The Implicit Argument of Plutarch’s Gryllus,” Hyperboreus 16–17 (2010–2011) 371–385. For an enlightening discussion of some of the anthropological problems that the figure of Gryllus presents as a human–non-­human hybrid, see Pietro LiCausi and Roberto Pomelli, eds., L’Anima degli Animali: Aristotele, Frammenti Stoici, Plutarco, ­Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi, 2005) 200–202.

104

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

22 Tom Hawkins, “Eloquent Alogia: Animal Narrators in Ancient Greek Literature,” Humanities 6, 3 (2017) doi: 10.3390/h6020037. 23 For a historical survey of this literature, see Bernhard Paetz, Kirke und Odysseus: Überlieferung und Deutung von Homer bis Calderón (Berlin: deGruyter, 1970). Paetz is particularly interested in appearances of the myth in Spanish sources. Rather surprisingly, he does not mention Plutarch’s dialogue. Emmanuel Hatzantonis, “I Geniali Rimaneggiamenti dell’ Episodio Omerico di Circe in Apollonio Rodio e Plutarco,” Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 54 (1976) 5–24, taking note of Paetz’ omission of the Plutarchan reworking of the episode in Whether Beasts Are Rational, offers a reading, consisting largely of content summary, of Plutarch’s dialogue. 24 For a more detailed discussion of the appearance of Gryllus in seventeenth-­ century French authors, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Of Pigs and People: Plutarch and the French Beast Fable,” Ploutarchos 13, 1 (1996) 15–22, where additional bibliography is cited. For discussion of Gryllus’ appearances in Spanish and Italian literature, see Indelli 14–18.

105

Translation Whether Beasts Are Rational, or Gryllus (Bruta animalia ratione uti)1

(985) D 1. ODYSSEUS: I think I have learned these things, Circe, and I believe I will remember them.2 But I would gladly learn from you whether you number any Greeks among those whom you have changed from men to wolves and lions.3 E CIRCE: Many, my dear Odysseus. But why do you ask? ODYSSEUS: Because, by Zeus, I think I would gain great honor among the Greeks if, with your kind cooperation, I could take my comrades home, restoring them to human form and not allowing them to grow old in the bodies of wild beasts, against nature, enduring a miserable and inglorious life in that form.4 CIRCE: Here’s a fellow who supposes that his own quest for honor should be allowed to bring catastrophe, not only upon himself but, because of his stupidity, on his companions and on people who have no connection with him! ODYSSEUS: You’re stirring and brewing up another potion5 of words for me, Circe! You will surely turn me into a beast if you convince me that it is a catastrophe to turn F from a beast into a human being. CIRCE: Haven’t you already done something even more astonishing to yourself in rejecting an immortal and ageless life with me,6 and hurrying off through countless perils to a mortal wife who, I can assure you, is already an old woman, 986 so that you can become even more renowned and admired than you already are, pursuing empty glory and a phantom instead of truth?7 ODYSSEUS: Let that be as you say, Circe. What’s the point of quarreling repeatedly about the same things? Please oblige me and free the men. CIRCE: By Hecate,8 it’s not that simple! These are no ordinary creatures. First ask them if they wish it.9 If they refuse, my noble friend, reason with them and bring them around. If you don’t persuade them and they come out on top in the debate, be satisfied that you’re mistaken about yourself and your friends. B ODYSSEUS: Why do you mock me, blessed lady? How could they debate10 with me or I with them as long as they are asses and pigs and lions?

106

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

CIRCE: Take heart, most ambitious of men! I will give them understanding11 and speech for your sake, or instead, one of them will be enough to speak for all. There! Talk with that one. ODYSSEUS: How shall I address him? Who was he among men?12 CIRCE: What difference does that make to your discussion?13 Call him Gryllus,14 if you like. I’ll withdraw now so that he doesn’t seem to be trying to please me, contrary to his own views. C 2. GRYLLUS: Greetings, Odysseus! ODYSSEUS: And to you, by Zeus! GRYLLUS: What do you wish to ask me? ODYSSEUS: Since I know that all of you were once human beings, I pity you all, but it is natural that those who were Greeks who have fallen into this misfortune should concern me more. Therefore, I’ve asked Circe to release any one of you who wishes it and to restore him to his former appearance, sending him home with us. GRYLLUS: Stop, Odysseus! Not another word! We too all think poorly of you since you were falsely acclaimed as a fellow who seemed more intelligent than other men, you who fear a D change from worse to better because you hadn’t given it any thought. Just as children fear medicines from their doctor15 and run away from their school lessons, things which convert them from sickly and ignorant sorts into healthier and wiser beings, so have you shrunk away from being transformed from one creature into another, and at this very moment you consult with Circe, shaking in fear that she may turn you into a pig or a wolf before you realize it. And you urge us, who live with countless blessings, to abandon all of them and the woman who provides them and to sail off with you, having become once again human beings, E that most hard-pressed and ill-fated of creatures!16 ODYSSEUS: It seems to me, Gryllus, that you lost not only your form but your intelligence as well because of that potion!17 You’re full of strange and utterly twisted notions. Perhaps some delight in this sort of body bewitched you into taking on this shape?18 GRYLLUS: Neither of these, King of the Cephallenians.19 But if you would like to reason together20 rather than to trade insults, I who have experienced both sorts of life21 will easily win you over to realize that we rightly love this manner of life rather than the other. ODYSSEUS: I’m very eager to hear! 3. F GRYLLUS: And I to tell you. Let’s begin then with the virtues in which, I see, you humans take great pride on the assumption that you humans excel

107

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

beasts in justice, wisdom, courage and the other virtues.22 But answer me this, o wisest of men!23 I once heard you telling Circe about the land of the Cyclopes24 that, although it is not plowed at all and although no one plants anything there, yet it is by nature so excellent in quality that, on its own, it produces every sort of crop. 987 Do you think more highly of this land than of the harsh soil of Ithaca that feeds goats and scarcely yields even a small, stingy and worthless harvest after much effort and struggle?25 And don’t take offense and answer me out of regard for your homeland rather than in accord with the truth. ODYSSEUS: Well, I have no need to lie, for though I love and embrace my homeland more, yet I praise and admire the other. GRYLLUS: Well then, we shall say that the wisest of men B deems it right to praise and approve one thing but to prefer and hold dear another. I suppose you would have made the same answer about matters of the spirit too since the situation is the same as with the land: that spiritual soil is better which produces virtue without effort, just as is that land that produces crops spontaneously. ODYSSEUS: It’s as you say. GRY LLUS: Then you are at this moment agreeing that the soul of beasts is more naturally suited and constituted for the production of virtue, for without instruction or command, as if unsown and unplowed, it brings forth and strengthens that virtue which is appropriate to each creature.26 ODYS SEUS:

And that virtue is shared by animals, Gryllus?

4. GRYLLUS: What virtue, rather, is not found in them more so than in the wisest of humans? C Take first the virtue of courage, in which you take great pride, feeling no shame when you are called “bold”27 and “destroyer of cities,”28 you who with tricks and ploys deceive men who know only a forthright and noble manner of warfare and who have no acquaintance with tricks and lies,29 and who give to your villainy the name of that virtue which least countenances villainy. Yet you see that the style of attack against each other and against you humans that animals employ is free of trickery and artifice, for animals defend themselves with manifest courage and true valor. Nor do they fear any D legal summons or indictment for desertion of duty. Rather it is in their nature to flee subjugation and to maintain their courage till the end. They are not beaten even when their bodies are vanquished and they do not give up in spirit but die in the fray. When many animals are perishing, their valor withdraws, along with their high-spiritedness, and becomes gathered into one part of their body,30 standing strong against their slayer, leaping about and flashing anger until, like a fire, it becomes quenched altogether and dies out. They do not entreat their slayer nor do they ask for pity or acknowledge defeat, nor does a lion become the slave to a lion or a horse to a horse, E as a human does to a human, welcoming that 108

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

name that is derived from cowardice.31 In the case of those animals that humans overmaster by tricks and traps, those that are full-grown refuse food and bear up against thirst, inviting and embracing death over slavery. To nestlings and cubs, which are easily led and docile because of their age, they offer all sorts of deceitful allurements and beguilements32 bewitching them, and in time they build in them a taste for pleasures that are contrary to their nature33 and that enfeeble their lives, so that in time they accept and endure this so-called “taming” which is in reality a feminization of their courage. F From these examples it is easy to see that courage is inborn in animals. In humans, endurance34 is contrary to their nature. You can easily observe this, excellent Odysseus, from the fact that in animals, the natural inclination toward courage is equal in the sexes and the female is in no way inferior to the male35 in undertaking those tasks necessary to the struggle for life and protection of offspring. You’ve heard of the sow of Crommyon which, though female, caused Theseus such trouble.36 988 And her wisdom would not have profited the Sphinx as she sat high upon Mt. Phicium37 weaving her riddles and obscure pronouncements, had she not excelled the Thebans in strength and courage. They say that the Teumesian vixen38 lived somewhere around there, “a baleful creature,”39 and nearby the serpent that did battle with Apollo for the oracle at Delphi.40 Your king received Aethe from the Sicyonian as the price for exemption from military service.41 He planned that admirably, since he preferred a brave and spirited horse to a cowardly soldier! You have yourself observed that leopardesses and lionesses are in no way inferior to the males in spirit and strength,42 whereas while you are off at war, your wife sits at home by the hearth-fire, B not, like the swallows, defending herself from those who come against her and her household, even though she’s a Spartan.43 Why would I bother to mention Carian and Maeonian women?44 It is obvious from my examples that humans have by nature no share of courage,45 for otherwise women would be equally courageous. Thus it is that you practice courage under compulsion of law and not willingly or intentionally but in servitude to custom or censure and the views and opinions of outsiders. C You undergo dangers and difficulties, not because you are courageous but because you fear some other eventuality even more,46 just as that one of your companions who arrives first takes up the light oar not because he scorns it but rather because he fears and avoids the heavier one, and just as one endures the lash so as not to be wounded and defends himself against an enemy rather than be tortured or killed, not because he is courageous in facing those prospects but because he is afraid of the other possibilities. Thus it is clear that your courage is in reality prudent cowardice and your bravery is fear that knows how to escape some consequences by embracing others. In short, if you suppose that you are superior to beasts in courage, D why is it that your poets address the greatest fighters as “wolf-minded” and lion-hearted” and “boar-like in courage,”47 but no one of them addresses a lion as “man-hearted” or a boar as “man-like in 109

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

courage”? Just as, I believe, when poets call swift persons “wind-footed”48 and handsome men “god-like,”49 they exaggerate in their imagery, so do they liken the work of the mighty warriors to higher things. The reason for this is that high-spiritedness is, one might say, the tempering and cutting edge of courage.50 Animals employ this in a pure form in their battles, whereas in the case of you humans, it is mixed with calculation, E like wine with water, so that it shrinks away in the face of dangers and is found wanting when it is needed. Some of you deny that this high-spiritedness should have a place at all in combat, and maintain that warriors should put it aside and employ calculation instead. This is correctly reasoned in the case of self-preservation, but it is a base assertion as regards valor and self-defense. How can you not consider it absurd that you fault nature because she did not supply your bodies with stings and teeth for self-defense,51 when you remove or curtail the spiritual armor with which you were born? 5. ODYSSEUS: Gracious, you must have been a formidable Sophist, Gryllus!52 Even now, F speaking from your swinish state, you attack your topic powerfully! But why haven’t you taken up temperance next in succession?53 GRYLLUS: Because I thought you would first attack what I had said.54 You are eager to hear about temperance because you are the husband of the most chaste among women and you suppose that you provide the model of restraint since you scorned the advances of Circe.55 In this respect, you are no different in self-control from any other animal, for they do not seek to consort with their betters, 989 but enjoy the pleasures of love with their own species. Thus it is no surprise if, just as the Mendesian goat in Egypt, when penned up with many beautiful women, was not eager to have intercourse with them56 but was instead excited by the nannies, so you are happy with the sort of relations familiar to you and do not wish to sleep with a goddess when you are a mortal. Countless cawing crows will make a joke of Penelope’s chastity, for every crow, when her mate dies, remains a widow, not for just a short while but for nine generations of men.57 Thus B it is that your Penelope is surpassed in chastity by any crow you please. 6. Well then, since you did not fail to notice that I am a Sophist, let us put some semblance of order to my argument by defining temperance and distinguishing the desires by kind.58 Temperance, then, is a kind of containment and ordering of the desires that removes those that are alien and superfluous while regulating those that are necessary in a timely and modest manner.59 You perhaps notice countless differences in the desires …60 Those that pertain to eating and drinking are natural and necessary. Sexual desires, which find their origin in nature, are termed natural but not necessary, C for one may forego them and readily dismiss them. The sorts of desires that are neither necessary nor natural, that pour in from outside because of your emptyheaded notions and ignorance of the good, are like a crowd of aliens in a population that overpowers the native citizens. But beasts, which have souls 110

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

that are closed to and free from alien passions, live lives that are untouched by false opinion, as if far from the sea,61 and are free from elegance and refinement. But they closely mind their self-control and carefully regulate their desires, D for those that reside in them are neither numerous nor alien, In truth, at one time gold bewitched me no less than it does you as a possession like no other, and silver and ivory seduced me as well. I thought that the man who possessed the greatest quantities of those things was blessed and godlike, whether he be a Phrygian or a Carian more lowborn than Dolon and more ill-fated than Priam.62 At that time, when I was always hung up on those desires, I derived no satisfaction or joy from the countless other joys of life that I had on hand in boundless quantity, but rather complained of my life as a person E wanting in life’s finest things and having no share in good fortune. Thus I recall that, when I saw you in Crete ostentatiously decked out in fine attire,63 I envied neither your wisdom nor your virtue, but I adored and wondered at the fineness of your subtly-worked garments and the woolly softness of your purple cloak (its buckle was gold and had, I believe, some trifle carved on it in relief). I followed you about, bewitched, like a woman, but now that I have given up those empty notions and am cleansed of them, I pass by gold and silver with scorn, F like so many stones, and when I am full and settle down to rest, I would less happily lie on your woolen cloaks and carpets than on deep, soft mud. None of those alien desires dwells in our souls.64 For the most part, our life is governed by necessary desires and pleasures, and we engage with those that are not necessary but natural in a manner that is neither undisciplined nor incontinent.65 990 7. Let’s first go through those pleasures. Our pleasure in fragrant things that naturally arouse our sense of smell,66 besides possessing a utility that is free and simple, provides us in addition a certain service in distinguishing what is edible, for the tongue is said to be and is the interpreter of what is sweet and bitter and sour when flavors come into contact with the sense of taste and mix together.67 Our sense of smell, before we taste things, is a guide to the nature of each item that we ingest, distinguishing things with greater discernment than do royal tasters,68 admitting that which is appropriate to us but driving away that which is foreign,69 and it does not allow the latter to touch or distress our sense of taste. B Instead, it discredits and accuses the bad before damage is done. Otherwise our sense of smell causes us no trouble, as it does to you humans, forcing you to mix incense and cinnamon and nard70 and aromatic leaves and Arabic reeds71 with a kind of bewitching art to which the name “unguent making” is given, so that you at great cost buy an effeminate luxury that has no use at all. Although its nature is such, still it has corrupted not only all women but even most men, so that they do not wish to lie with their wives unless they smell of myrrh and fragrant powders.72 C But sows lure boars and nanny goats lure he-goats and other beasts lure their mates with their own distinct smells, fragrant with fresh 111

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

dew and meadow grass, and induce them to mate out of mutual affection. The females do not put on airs and adopt trickery and witchery and deceits to fulfill their desires, nor do the males, stung by lust, purchase the act of procreation with money or exertion or bondage.73 They share a love that is free of deceit, at the proper season and without payment. This love awakens at the appropriate time of year, like the sprouting of plants, and then it is quickly cooled.74 D The female does not accept the male after conception, not does the male attempt to approach her. So it is that pleasure is held in little honor by us, whereas nature is everything to us.75 The desires of animals have not to this day accepted the intercourse of males with males or females with females.76 But there is much of that sort of thing among your grand and noble classes. I don’t even mention the lower classes. Agamemnon came to Boeotia hunting Argynnus who was eluding him,77 and falsely accusing the sea and the winds,78 he E bathed his noble body in Lake Copais,79 hoping there to quench his passion and free himself of his desire. Similarly, Heracles abandoned his companions80 and betrayed the expedition, seeking after a beardless youth. On the rotunda of Ptoian Apollo,81 one of your people inscribed “Achilles is Fair,”82 although Achilles had already at that time had a son.83 I understand that the inscription is still there.84 Yet if a cock mounts another cock because there is no female available,85 it is burned alive because some prophet or soothsayer declares it to be a great and terrible omen. So it is that men themselves are agreed that F animals possess greater temperance and do not go against nature in their pleasures. In the case of you humans, not even nature aided by law holds your intemperance in check, but as if swept along by a torrent, your desires produce in many cases a dreadful outrage and turmoil and confusion of nature: men have attempted to have sex with goats and sows and mares, and women have been wild with lust for male animals.86 991 From such unions spring up your Minotaurs and Aegipans87 and, I suppose, your Sphinxes and Centaurs. On occasion, a dog has eaten a man from hunger and a bird has tasted human flesh out of necessity, but they have never approached a human being for sex.88 But these animals and many others besides are compelled to endure the outrageous lusts of humans. 8. Thus while humans are so base and incontinent in the desires that I have catalogued, they stand convicted of being even more so in the case of necessary desires, being surpassed by animals in temperance. These are the ones that have to do with eating and drinking.89 B We animals always combine some degree of usefulness with our pleasure in these activities, whereas you, in your pursuit of pleasure more than of nourishment, are chastised by many serious illnesses that bubble up from one source, the repletion of your bodies, and fill you with all manner of flatulence that is difficult to purge. To begin with, each animal has one food that is appropriate to it: for some, that is grass, for some others, roots or some sort of fruit. Those that eat meat do not turn to any other sort of food and do not deprive weaker animals of their 112

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

food: the lion allows the deer and the wolf the sheep to feed on that which is natural to it. C But man, who is driven in his pursuit of pleasures to all varieties of food by his gluttony, tasting and sampling everything as if he has not come to know what food is suitable and proper to him, is the one true omnivore. To begin with, he devours flesh not from any want or hardship (he has at his disposal, at every season, one variety of plant and grain after another to harvest and gather and enjoy without growing weary from the very abundance).90 Instead, because of his love of luxury and his boredom with only essential foods, he goes in pursuit of those which are not necessary and which are befouled by the slaughter of animals, a practice much more savage than the behavior of the wildest beasts, for blood and gore and flesh D are food appropriate to the kite and the wolf and the snake, but they are a delicacy for humans.91 Secondly man makes use of every sort of food and does not abstain from most of them, as do beasts, or make war on just a few of them out of his need to eat: practically nothing that flies or swims or dwells on land has escaped your so-called civilized and hospitable tables. 9. Enough of that, then. You use animals as delicacies to sweeten your meal. Why, then …92 But the intelligence of beasts provides no room for useless and empty skills. Nor, in the case of those that are essential, E do animals import them or buy them, or attach any one individual tightly to a single branch of knowledge. Our intelligence, from its own self, produces skills that are natural and appropriate to it.93 We are told that all Egyptians are physicians.94 With animals, not only is each a self-taught physician,95 but, in the case of food, warfare, hunting, self-defense and music, each animal by nature has a talent for it. From whom have we pigs learned to go to rivers when we are sick to catch crabs? Who taught tortoises to eat marjoram after they have devoured a snake? Who taught goats in Crete to go after dittany F when they have fallen victim to arrows, since the arrowheads fall out when they have eaten it? If you say, as is indeed the truth, that nature is their teacher,96 you raise the intelligence of beasts to the wisest and most powerful of first principles. But if you do not reckon that this should be labeled either reason or intelligence, then you must scout out a nobler and worthier term for it since in its actions it without doubt represents a finer and more marvelous power.97 992 It is no untaught or uneducated capacity, but rather one that is self-taught98 and self-sufficient not due to any lack of strength. Because of the strength and perfection of its native virtue, it pays no heed to additions to its intelligence that arise from outside sources. Those animals that men train and instruct in support of their luxurious lifestyle and their amusement possess intelligence that enables them to accept training that is in conflict with the nature of their bodies.99 I pass over puppies that are trained to hunt and colts that are trained to prance to a beat, and crows that learn to talk and dogs that are taught to jump through revolving hoops. In the theaters, horses and oxen perform precise routines involving lying down 113

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

and B dancing and maintaining tricky poses and movements that are not at all easily performed by human beings, actions that they have learned and remembered and memorized as a display of their quickness to learn but that have no other utility at all. And if you do not believe that we are capable of learning skills, hear how we are even able to teach them. When partridges are making an escape, they accustom their nestlings to hide by falling on their backs and holding a lump of earth in front of themselves with their claws.100 One can also see on the tops of roofs how adult storks instruct the young storks in their first attempts at flight. And too nightingales instruct their nestlings in song. Nestlings that are caught while C young and are brought up by humans sing poorly, as if they left off their instruction too early …101 but since I have assumed this new bodily form, I wonder at those arguments that the Sophists102 employed to convince me that all animals except human beings are irrational and devoid of understanding. 10. ODYSSEUS: So, then, Gryllus, you are transformed and now argue that even sheep and asses are rational? GRYLLUS: Even from these creatures, noble Odysseus, one can conclude that beasts are not by nature devoid of reason and understanding.103 Just as one tree is not D more or less inanimate than another, but all exhibit that quality in equal degree (since no one of them has a share of soul), so one beast would not seem weaker in intellect or slower to learn if all beasts did not possess reason and understanding, some more and some less than others.104 Keep in mind that the quickness of wit and shrewdness of some animals attests to the stupidity105 and sloth of others, as when you compare an ass and a sheep with a fox or wolf or bee …106 as if [someone were to compare] Polyphemus107 to you or the Corinthian Homer108 to your grandfather Autolycus.109 E I do not believe that there is as big a distance from one beast to another as there is from one human to another in their understanding and reasoning and memory. ODYSSEUS: But consider, Gryllus, whether it is not an awful act of violence to allow reason to those who have no innate understanding of the divine.110 GRYLLUS: Will we not then say, Odysseus, that you who are so wise and extraordinary were born of Sisyphus …?111

Commentary 1 On the title of the treatise, see Introduction, pp. 95–96 and note 5. 2 The opening words of Odysseus have occasioned much scholarly comment since it is not clear what the hero is promising to remember. On the wording, Helmbold 493 note a, notes the similarity of Odysseus’ first words to Horace, Satires II. 5. 1, a dialogue between Odysseus and the seer Tiresias, at which point the hero asks the seer to answer another question in addition to what he had already told him (Hoc quoque, Tiresia, praeter narrata petenti/ responde). The reader is presumed to be 114

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

dropping in on a conversation already under way. On the use of a similar attention-grabbing device at the beginning of On Eating Meat Treatise I, see Commentary note 2. Angelo Casanova, “The Time Setting of the Dialogue Bruta animalia ratione uti,” in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener, eds., Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society (Málaga: University of Málaga Press and Logan: Utah State University Press, 2005) 122–123, noting that no one has satisfactorily explained what Odysseus promises to remember, suggests that Plutarch may be alluding here not to the episode in Odyssey X which provides the setting for Whether Beasts Are Rational, in which Odysseus’ men are turned into pigs and subsequently returned to human form, but rather to Odyssey XII. 37–38, where Circe gives parting instructions to Odysseus and commands him to pay attention to her words. Casanova maintains (124) that the opening sentence of Whether Beasts Are Rational “takes up, in a direct and punctual fashion, these two Homeric lines.” 3 Odysseus’ companion Eurylochus expresses hesitation to enter Circe’s dwelling lest he and the other Greeks be turned into swine, wolves and lions (Odyssey X. 431–433). 4 Plutarch portrays Odysseus’ motivation for petitioning Circe to return his men to human form to be a desire for glory, an ignoble preoccupation that the witch immediately characterizes as an instance of the hero’s recklessness and stupidity (985E). Later in this same section (985E), Circe mocks Odysseus’ lust for glory as a pursuit after a phantom. Homer’s Odysseus, on the other hand, is driven by more philanthropic considerations. He laments to Circe (Odyssey X. 383–387) that he, as a righteous man, cannot enjoy the food and drink that she serves him before he sees his men returned to human form. 5 Circe administered a “potion” called κυκϵών (kukeōn) to Odysseus’ men to effect their transformation into swine (Odyssey X. 235–236). It is mentioned by name at Odyssey X. 290 and 316. kukeōn, from Greek κυκάω (kukaō, “stir,” “mix”), refers, outside the Homeric context, to a drink made of barley, water, cheese and wine. A variety of kukeōn was used in the ceremonies of the Eleusinian Mysteries that seems to have had drug-like properties 6 In Homer, Circe does not offer Odysseus immortality, even stating (Odyssey X. 489) that he should not stay with her against his will. Circe’s words in Plutarch are more reminiscent of Calypso’ offer (Odyssey X. 135–136 and 206–213) to make Odysseus immortal. 7 See note 4. 8 In some accounts, Circe was the daughter of Hecate, the goddess of magic and witchcraft (see Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheke IV. 45. 2–3). 9 In Homer’s account, Odysseus does not speak to his companions who have been converted into pigs. 10 The indignant tone that Odysseus adopts here in his accusation that Circe is mocking him is triggered by the witch’s suggestion that he persuade the pig by a process of “debate.” The term that Circe chooses to characterize the discussion that Odysseus should have with the pig, 115

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

διαλϵ´γϵσθαι (dialegesthai, “to converse with,” “to reason with”) strikes him as absurd and insulting since irrational beasts like pigs must be viewed as incapable of reasoned debate. On Greek views of the linguistic capacities of non-human animals, see Introduction, p. 100 and note 20. 11 Circe says of her pig converts that she will “render them συνιϵ´ντας” (sunientas, 986B), that is, possessing σύνϵσις (sunesis). Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1143a1–18, provides a detailed definition of this mental faculty. According to Aristotle, sunesis is a kind of understanding that renders an individual capable of comprehending what another person says and of making judgments. Aristotle is speaking solely of the mental faculties of human beings. If the term is seriously intended here in Plutarch’s scene, Circe may be suggesting that the pig endowed with speech can be trusted to know the truth of what he says, so that his indictment of the failings of Odysseus and of other human beings can be regarded as accurate. Likewise, the pig may be assumed to understand the arguments that Odysseus makes. This interpretation may, however, be an over-reading of the text, given its lighthearted nature. 12 Odysseus’ question is a variation of the Homeric formula of greeting addressed to a stranger, which typically asked the country of origin of the stranger, his background and the reason for his travels. Circe herself (Odyssey X. 325–328) employs such a formula to inquire who Odysseus can be that he is immune to the effects of her potion that transformed his companions. 13 LiCausi and Pomelli (see Introduction note 21) suggest (465n8) that Circe’s somewhat exasperated tone here is another expression of her contempt for Odysseus’ preoccupation with insignificant and mundane details like reputation and name. See note 4. 14 On the meaning of the name Gryllus, see Introduction, pp. 96–97. The name Gryllus is in fact encountered in Greek texts in the case of ­h istorical personages. The father and one of the sons of the historian Xenophon bore the name Gryllus. 15 Gryllus’ image recalls the famous passage in Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I. 936–942, repeated at IV. 11–17, in which Lucretius states that, just as doctors who seek to give children a dose of bitter medicine place honey around the cup to trick them into drinking and thereby regaining health, so does he disguise the seemingly bitter taste of Epicurean philosophy with the honey of his poetry. 16 The adjectives that Gryllus employs to characterize the unfortunate status of human beings in the scheme of animal creation have been variously emended by scholars. If the reading followed here, that found in Hubert, is correct, Gryllus’ argument may be viewed as an instance of theriophilic thought, in which non-human animals are viewed as by nature happier than are human beings, even if their intellectual capacities are inferior to those of humans. Shortly after this assertion, Gryllus argues that non-human animals are morally superior to human beings, another tenet of theriophilic thought. See Introduction note 4 for instances of theriophily in Greek literature. 116

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

17 Odysseus seems to forget that he is conversing with a pig whose ability to speak might suggest some level of intelligence. See Introduction note 20 on animal speech. 18 Helmbold 499 note a, suggests that Odysseus may intend to imply that the human being converted into a pig called Gryllus was of a swinish disposition even when human, and that only his outward appearance has been altered. 19 Cephallenia is an island off the western coast of Greece that constituted part of the realm of the family of Odysseus. In his Catalogue of Ships, Homer states (Iliad II. 631) that Odysseus led the Cephallenian fleet to Troy. Laertes, the father of Odysseus, is called the leader of Cephallenia at Iliad XXIV. 378. Some scholars have detected a pun, in Gryllus’ description of Odysseus as “King of the Cephallenians,” on the Greek word κϵϕαλή (kephalē), “head,” since Odysseus regards himself as “brainy.” 20 Gryllus employs the same verb here (διαλϵ´γϵσθαι, dialegesthai) to characterize the nature of his verbal interactions with Odysseus that Circe had employed (986B) to particularize the sort of intellectual qualities with which she will endow her pig convert to enable him to debate with Odysseus (see note 11). Gryllus hereby makes clear that he believes that his forthcoming arguments will have the weight of truth and persuasiveness. 21 Urs Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977) 189, views the motif of comparison of two lifestyles by an individual who has experienced both to be characteristic of Cynic Menippean satire, “Ein solcher Vergleich zweier Lebensformen durch eine Person, die aufgrund einer Verwandlung beide selbst kennengelernt hat, scheint ebenfalls bereits in der älteren menippeischen Satire vorgenommen zu sein.” See Introduction note 18. 22 On Gryllus’ exploration of the Greek “cardinal virtues” of justice, wisdom, temperance and courage, see Introduction note 10, with bibliography. 23 Indelli, Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali 119 note 36, observes here, charmingly and certainly correctly, “No manca, secondo me, un velo di ironia.” 24 Gryllus’ memory fails him here. In Homer (Odyssey IX. 105–115), Odysseus describes the encounter that he and his shipmates had with the Cyclopes to King Alcinous of Phaeacia, not to Circe. The details of the fertility of the land of the Cyclopes that Gryllus includes here are those found at Odyssey IX. 109–111. 25 The poor quality of the soil of Ithaca is commented upon repeatedly in the Odyssey. Odysseus’ son Telemachus tells King Menelaus of Sparta (Odyssey IV. 605–608) that Ithaca is grazed by goats, being devoid of grassy stretches and of pastureland, while Odysseus tells Alcinous that Ithaca is harsh and rugged, although he does not expect to see a sweeter place on earth (Odyssey IX. 27–28). 26 Gryllus is preparing the way for the argument that he will make in the course of his debate with Odysseus, that non-human animals are 117

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

naturally disposed toward virtuous behavior. Subsequently, Gryllus will argue (991F) that this natural disposition toward virtue arises from the circumstance that non-human animals are taught by nature (ϕύσις, phusis), which functions in them like reason or intellect. If human beings choose to deny that this is an instance of reason, Gryllus demands (991F) that they suggest a better term for it. He even goes so far as to claim that this faculty in non-human animals is superior to the intellect of human beings. Gryllus seems to confuse reason with what modern animal behavioral scientists would classify as “instinct.” An instance of this is his assertion (992A) that the practice of self-medication in animals is “self-taught” (αὐτομαθής, automathēs) rather than “untaught” (ἀμαθής, amathēs). Gryllus’ simple psychology of virtues is rejected in the account of the origin of virtues found in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1113b3–6, according to which virtues are matters of deliberate choice and of voluntary action, rather than matters of nature. 27 Odysseus is called “bold” (θρασύς, thrasus) at Odyssey X. 436. 28 In the Homeric epics, Odysseus is repeatedly termed “destroyer of cities” (πτολίπορθος, ptoliporthos): Odyssey VIII. 3; XIV. 447; XVI. 442; XVIII. 356; XXII. 283; Iliad II. 278; X. 363. 29 Odysseus’ predilection for trickery and lies is often illustrated in the Homeric poems. The part that he played in the planning and deployment of the Trojan Horse is referenced at Odyssey VIII. 492–495 and XI. 523–525. In the first of these mentions, the poet remarks that Odysseus led the horse into Troy as a “trick” (δόλον, dolon, 494). In the latter, Odysseus himself says that he was charged with opening the compact “ambuscade” (λόχον, lochon, 525) to release the Greeks from inside the horse when it was within the city of Troy. 30 Helmbold 503 note b, suggests that Plutarch has in mind here the case of eels or snakes whose tails continue to twitch even after the animals are dead. 31 Gryllus offers a punning and false etymology. He suggests that the word “slavery” (δουλϵία, douleia) is derived from the word for “cowardice” (δϵιλία, deilia). 32 The word translated here as “beguilements” (ὑποπϵττϵύματα, hupopetteumata) seems not to appear elsewhere in Greek literature and editors suspect a problem with the text at this point. 33 Gryllus maintains that non-human animals, if uncorrupted by contact with human beings, live “in accord with nature” (κατὰ ϕύσιν, kata phusin). Contact with humans compels them to act “contrary to nature” (παρὰ ϕύσιν, para phusin). The ideal of Stoic moral philosophy was “living in accord with nature,” which, in the case of human beings, entailed living in accord with the dictates of reason. This, in the view of the Stoics, was impossible for non-human species because they are irrational, a position which Gryllus implicitly opposes here. Without mentioning the name of the sect whose views he opposes, he turns on its head one of the central tenets of Stoic philosophy. On “living in accord with nature” in Stoic ethics, see Introduction note 17.

118

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

34 I follow here the reading of Hubert, who chooses καρτϵ´ρησις (karterēsis), “endurance,” over the reading παρρησία (parrhēsia), “openness of speech, frankness,” followed in some editions, since the subject under discussion in the present passage is that of courage rather than of manner of expression. 35 According to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VI. 12, the philosopher Antisthenes (ca. 446–366 bce) held that virtue (ἀρϵτή, aretē) is the same for men and for women. 36 Early in his heroic career, the young Theseus is said to have slain a wild sow that terrorized the inhabitants of the town of Crommyon which lay between Corinth and Megara. Some said the animal was named Phaea although this was at times given as the name of the old woman who owned the sow. Plutarch, Theseus 9, recounts that some held that the old woman was herself nicknamed “the sow” because of her savage behavior, and that it was this woman whom Theseus slew. In Plato’s Laches, Socrates remarks (196e–197c) that the interlocutor Nicias would judge that even the sow of Crommyon could not be adjudged to be courageous, and Nicias replies that he considers the sow to have been fearless and rash but not courageous. 37 The famous Sphinx whose riddle Oedipus solved sat on Mount Phicium, near Thebes. 38 The Teumesian vixen, known as uncatchable, ravaged the countryside around Thebes. According to Apollodorus, Bibliotheke II. 4. 6–7, the Thebans each month offered up the son of a citizen to keep the animal from worse predation. To defeat the beast, the locals set against it a dog capable of catching anything that it pursued. Zeus in time turned both animals into stone to resolve the paradox posed by their unique capabilities. 39 Many editors judge the words in quotation marks to be a citation from some unidentifiable source. 40 In the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, the monster that Apollo defeated at Delphi to assert his control over the site is called δράκαινα (drakaina, 300), “she-dragon.” Elsewhere, Greek Questions 293C, Plutarch calls the monster male. 41 King Agamemnon accepted the mare Aethe from Echepolus, son of Anchises of Sicyon, in return for which he was not compelled to accompany the king to Troy (Iliad XXIII. 295–298). 42 A contrary view is expressed by Aristotle, History of Animals 608a33– 34, who states that female members of all species excepting bears and panthers are “less spirited” (ἀθυμότϵρα, athumotera) than are their male counterparts, a sentiment repeated, with the same exceptions, by Pliny the Elder, Natural History XI. 110. 43 Odysseus’ wife Penelope was the daughter of the Spartan prince Icarius. Gryllus suggests that her placid demeanor at home during Odysseus’ absence of many years belies the reputation for courage enjoyed by Spartan women, who were known for spurring on their sons to valorous behavior and for downplaying the loss of sons in battle. See Sarah B. Pomeroy, Spartan Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 57,

119

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

“Spartan women were renowned for enthusiastically sacrificing their sons for the welfare of the state. Instead of lamenting at the death of their sons, they took pride in the bravery that had led to that fate.” 44 The inhabitants of Caria, in southern Asia Minor, and of Maeonia, later called Lydia, also in Asia Minor, were reputed to be soft and weak. 45 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers X. 120, notes that the ­Epicureans held that courage is not “natural” (ϕύσϵι, phusei) but arises from a “calculation of advantage” (λογισμῳ̑ του̑ συμϕϵ´ροντος, logismōi tou sumpherontos). 46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1116a17–20, in the course of his definition of “courage” (ἀνδρϵία, andreiā), states that the courage of ordinary citizens, as opposed to that of philosophers, is inspired by thoughts of the penalties and censure that follow upon cowardice. 47 These are Homeric epithets. “Wolf-minded” (λυκόϕρων, lukophrōn) appears as a proper name at Iliad XV. 430; “lion-hearted” (θυμολϵ´ων, thūmoleōn) appears at Iliad V. 639 and VII. 228; “boar-like in courage” (συῒ ϵἴκϵλος ἀλκήν, suï eikelos alkēn) appears at Iliad IV. 253. 48 The Homeric epithet “wind-footed” (ποδήνϵμος, podēnemos) is used of the messenger-goddess Iris at Iliad II. 286 and elsewhere. 49 In Homer, “god-like” (θϵοϵιδής, theoeidēs) is often applied to Paris (e.g., Iliad III. 16). 50 Gryllus suggests that “courage” (ἀνδρϵία, andreiā) and “high-spiritedness” (θυμός, thūmos) are identical. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1116b23–25, states, in contrast, that courage arises from considerations of nobility, whereas high-spiritedness can occur even in non-human species that are prompted to action by pain or hunger, although no elements of nobility accompany their actions. 51 Although Greek and Roman naturalists and philosophers regularly emphasized the intellectual superiority of human beings over other species, they were in most cases willing to concede the physiological superiority of other species over humans. In the famous “myth” on the topic of the teachability of virtue that Plato places in the mouth of the Sophist Protagoras, in the dialogue named for him, Protagoras explains that the foolish Epimetheus bestowed every advantage of self-defense and bodily strength upon non-human animals, in consequence of which his clever brother Prometheus stole “practical wisdom” (ἔντϵχνον σοϕίαν, entechnon sophiān, 321c) and fire from Athena and Hephaestus so that humans would not be at a disadvantage against other species. An especially bleak assessment of the physiological inferiority of humans to other species is found in Pliny the Elder, Natural History VII. 2, where the Roman encyclopedist states that Nature is a cruel stepmother to human beings, having fashioned them to be creatures totally dependent upon assets derived from outside themselves, while she outfitted other species with claws, fangs, feathers and fur for protection and defense. There is a remarkable exception to this general concession of physiological superiority to non-human species in Xenophon, Memorabilia I. 4, where he argues that the forethought of the gods has caused human

120

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

beings to be more thoughtfully and purposefully designed anatomically than are other species. For a detailed analysis of the passages in Plato, Xenophon and Pliny, see Stephen T. Newmyer, The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (London and New York: Routledge, 2017) 23–43. 52 Gryllus admits below (992C) that he had at one time allowed the Sophists to convince him that only human beings are rational. 53 At this point, the conversation turns from the “cardinal virtue” of “courage” to that of “temperance” (σωϕροσύνη, sōphrosunē). On the part played by the so-called “cardinal virtues” in Gryllus’ presentation, see Introduction, pp. 97–99. 54 Gryllus may be alluding to Odysseus’ reputation for quickness of speech and rhetorical brilliance. 55 In Homer, Odyssey X. 337–344, Odysseus refuses to enter the bed of Circe for fear that she will deprive him of his manhood, until she swears a solemn oath not to harm him. 56 According to Herodotus, Histories II. 46, the citizens of Mendes in the Nile Delta venerated goats. The historian appears to contradict Gryllus, for he notes in that passage that, in his own time, a goat was seen to have had intercourse in public with a woman, an action that Herodotus calls astonishing. 57 Aelian, Nature of Animals III. 9, records that crows are remarkably faithful to their mates and love them intensely. When one of a pair dies, the other remains mateless. The longevity of crows was proverbial in ancient sources. Hesiod, fr. 304 Merkelbach-West (= Plutarch, The Decline of Oracles 415C), likewise states that crows live nine generations of the lifetime of human beings. Aristophanes, Birds 609, varies the claim somewhat, stating that crows live five generations of the lifetime of humans, still a remarkable lifespan for a bird! 58 On the classification of desires, see Introduction note 11. 59 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1117b25–1118a1, offers an extended definition of temperance and its operation in the lives of humans and of other animals. He defines it as a mean with regard to the pleasures, specifically certain pleasures of the body, including those pleasures that arise from the senses. 60 There appears to be a break in the text at this point. 61 Helmbold 513 note e, on Gryllus’ comment, “the sea is the symbol of mischievous foreign influence.” Aristotle, Politics 1327a11–40, speaks at length on the question of whether proximity to the sea is detrimental to states because it can encourage the influx of foreigners and of foreign goods. 62 Phrygia and Caria, as well as other parts of Asia Minor, were known for supplying Greece with slaves. See David Lewis, “Near Eastern Slaves in Classical Attica and the Slave Trade with Persian Territories,” Classical Quarterly 61 (2011) 91–113. King Priam of Troy was proverbial for his ill fortune, having lost his sons and his city in the course of the Trojan War. When Priam comes to the tent of Achilles to ransom the body of his son

121

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

Hector, he movingly contrasts Achilles’ father Peleus, who can rejoice that his son still lives, with himself who has lost his sons (Iliad XXIV. 490–501). Dolon, a Trojan who offered to spy on the Greeks and was slain by Odysseus and Diomedes in the course of his expedition (Iliad X. 314–464), is described as ugly though swift-footed, his natural repulsiveness enhanced by the wolf pelt that he wears while on his spying mission. Gryllus considered the man who possessed riches, no matter how lowly or unfortunate he might be, to be nevertheless godlike. 63 Gryllus alludes to the fictitious autobiography that Odysseus recites to his wife Penelope, while still in disguise (Odyssey XIX. 165–189), in which he says that he, a Cretan himself, had seen Odysseus at the court of King Minos on Crete. 64 Pliny, Natural History VII. 5, in the course of a lengthy exposition on the manifold ways in which human beings are from birth beset with shortcomings and natural failings, notes that only humans care about luxuries and therefore fall victim to greed and ambition. For an analysis of this passage in Pliny, see Newmyer, The Animal and the Human 36–39. 65 Gryllus seems to refer to the practice of nonhuman animals to mate only in season, a natural continence which he elaborates approvingly below (990C–D). 66 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1117b17–18, denies that non-human animals take pleasure from the senses, except accidentally. 67 Greek natural philosophers took great interest in the operation of the organs of sensation. Aristotle, On the Soul 422a16–19, maintains that tastes are triggered on the tongue by the presence of liquid in the mouth but not before liquid is present. Theophrastus, On the Senses 25, reports that the physician Alcmaeon (fifth century bce) taught that tastes are produced by the action of the tongue which dissolves substances by the action of its heat and transmits information on the tastes to the brain. For a translation and analysis of the treatise of Theophrastus, see George Malcolm Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (London: Allen & Unwin, 1917). Gryllus’ account seems to follow Alcmaeon’s explanation. 68 Xenophon, Cyropaedia I. 3. 9, speaks of the duties of such royal tasters at the court of the king of Persia who protected the king from poisoning. Tacitus, Annals XII. 66, recounts that poison was administered to the Roman emperor Claudius by his own taster Halotus. He notes also, Annals XIII. 16, that what prince Britannicus ate and drank was always tasted first by such an attendant. 69 In his life of Epicurus, Diogenes Laertius reports, Lives of the Philosophers X. 34, that Epicurus taught that every living creature experiences two sensations, pleasure and pain, the former of which is “appropriate” (οἰκϵι̑ ον, oikeion) to the creature, while the latter is “foreign” (ἀλλότριον, allotrion) to it. Gryllus employs these two technical terms here in his exposition that Epicurus had used. 70 This is spikenard, an aromatic plant from India.

122

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

71 Helmbold 517 note f, remarks of this plant, “Probably here sweet flag, Acorus calamus L.” 72 Dierauer 192 detects Cynic inspiration in Gryllus’ attack on the sexual behavior of human beings which is part of his critique of natural but unnecessary desires, “Kynische Einschlag scheint auch die folgende Erörterung über das Liebesleben (990B–D) zu verraten, die sich im Abschnitt über die natürlichen, aber nicht notwendigen Begierden (989F–991A) findet.” 73 Gryllus overlooks the possibility that the mating practices of non-human species may involve instinctual actions, and he anthropomorphically attributes modesty and openness to such mating, in contrast to the self-interestedness of human sexual encounters. 74 Pliny, Natural History X. 171, notes that, whereas other species mate at specific times of year, human beings mate at all hours of the day and night, an indication, he remarks, that other species grow satisfied while humans never do. 75 Plutarch, On the Love of Offspring 493C, argues that in non-human animals, nature (ϕύσις, phusis) exists in an unmixed and simple form that keeps them from coveting the unnatural pleasures that humans, with their superior powers of reason, devise and then covet. On “living in accord with nature” as a Stoic ideal, see note 33 and Introduction note 17. 76 Gryllus is mistaken. On homosexual unions in non-human species, see Introduction note 12 with bibliography. 77 King Agamemnon built a tomb for his lover Argynnus when the young man drowned in the Cephissus River in Boeotia. See Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae (Learned Banqueters) XIII. 80D. 78 Helmbold 520 note b, suggests that a short lacuna may be suspected here. 79 Lake Copais was in central Boeotia. 80 This incident occurred in the course of the Argonautic expedition and was treated repeatedly in classical literature. For treatments in epic poetry, see Apollonius, Argonautica I. 1207–1357 and Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica III. 521–666. See also Theocritus, Idyll XIII and Propertius I. 20. 81 The shrine of Ptoian Apollo was in Boeotia on Mount Ptoon. 82 The inscription of the sort to which Gryllus refers was commonly found on Greek vases, especially in Attica but elsewhere as well. Such inscriptions typically included the name of a male, usually young, and the adjective καλός, kalos, “fair.” 83 To avoid his having to take part in the expedition to Troy, Achilles’ mother Thetis hid her young son on the island of Scyros in the court of King Lycomedes. Achilles had an affair with the king’s daughter Deidamia. The son born of this affair, Neoptolemus, also known as Pyrrhus, to whom Gryllus refers, subsequently became notorious in mythology for slaying the Trojan king Priam. See Aeneid II. 506–558. 84 A number of scholars have reasonably concluded that this statement must be a parenthetical observation rather than a remark by Gryllus

123

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

since, inasmuch as Gryllus must be viewed as contemporary with Odysseus and Achilles, the inscription might be expected to be still visible so that Gryllus’ comment would be superfluous. 85 Aristotle, History of Animals 631b17–19, states that some male birds are by nature so effeminate that they allow male birds to mount them. 86 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 972D–F, speaks at some length of unions of human beings with animals of various species, and an interlocutor in that dialogue, on introducing the topic of the sexual activity of non-human species, states (972D) that their love making is in some cases wild and in other cases as delicate and refined as in human beings. In that passage, the speaker does not express the contempt for interspecies unions that Gryllus does here. Such interspecies unions are discussed also in Aelian, Nature of Animals I. 38 and VII. 43, in both cases the love of an elephant for a woman. 87 All of the creatures that Gryllus catalogues here are half-human. Aegipan (“Goat-Pan”) is sometimes regarded as identical with Pan, the half-man-half-goat divinity, and sometimes viewed as distinct. His parentage is variously given. Hyginus, Fables 155, says that he was the son of Zeus and one Boetis, although his mother is elsewhere given as Aega. Gryllus uses the name in the plural, meaning “creatures like Aegipan.” It is worth noting that here, as elsewhere in his writings on animals, Plutarch draws his examples indifferently from the real world and from the world of mythology, and is satisfied to do so if they prove the point that he is presently arguing. 88 Gryllus’ assertion is contradicted elsewhere in Plutarch. In the examples of interspecies unions that Plutarch catalogues at On the Cleverness of Animals 972D–F, the elephant, the serpent, the goose, and the ram that loved human beings are all described as approaching the human being after whom they lusted, and in no case does the human approach the non-human animal. Aelian, Nature of Animals XV. 14, states that red apes in India lust after women and are therefore kept out of cities. On interspecies unions, see Judith Hindermann, “Zoophilie in Zoologie und Roman: Sex und Liebe zwischen Mensch und Tier bei Plutarch, Plinius dem Älteren, Aelian und Apuleius,” Dictynna 8 (2011) (http://dictynna.revues.org/717). 89 Gryllus’ attack on the culinary “intemperance” of human beings (991A– D) recalls a number of elements in Plutarch’s critique of human dietary excesses in On Eating Meat I and II, especially the arguments that human beings, who insist upon an enormous variety of exotic foods, end up bloated and sickened (995A and C); that animal foods are a mere relish to humans in their quest for luxury (996F and 997B); and that the omnivorous diet of humans forced them to acts of cruelty (994A–B, 994E, 997A–B). 90 At On Eating Meat 993C–994B, Plutarch argues at length that, whereas some non-human species by nature subsist solely on the flesh of other animals, human beings, for whom nature provides an enormous bounty of plant foods, cannot make the argument that necessity forces him to devour other animals.

124

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

91 Similarly, at On Eating Meat 994–B, Plutarch charges that, for human beings, meat is a mere “appetizer” (ὄψον, opson) whereas it is for some other species their sole source of sustenance. Plutarch employs the same Greek word for “appetizer” in the present passage. 92 There is obviously a lacuna at this point since the topic turns abruptly to the third of the so-called “cardinal virtues,” namely “wisdom” (ϕρόνησις, phronēsis, 991D), leaving Gryllus’ consideration of animal “temperance” in matters of diet unfinished. Helmbold 525 note f, judges that the lacuna here may have been of considerable length. Gryllus’ final observation on the dietary practices of humans is a further charge that they use animals merely as an “appetizer.” See note 90 above. 93 At On the Cleverness of Animals 973E, Plutarch argues that the capacity for self-instruction (αὐτομάθϵια, automatheia) that non-human animals demonstrate is evidence of their innate reason. Earlier in that treatise (966B), he had isolated such capacities in non-human animals as memory, preparedness and care for offspring as examples of reason that does not rely on instruction. Many of the capacities that Plutarch isolates in the examples that Gryllus offers would now be classified as the operation of instinct, although he regards them as examples of reason and nature working in tandem. Of such instinctual behavior, Seneca, Moral Letters CXXI. 23, remarks that it is “inborn, not taught” (nascitur ars ista, non discitur). On frequently-cited examples of innate and untaught skills in non-human species that were regarded in classical authors as instances of animal intelligence, see the classic study of Sherwood Owen Dickerman, “Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek Psychology,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 42 (1911) 123–130. 94 This may be a misunderstanding of the statement of Herodotus, Histories II. 84, that Egypt is full of doctors, and that they are all specialists in just one malady. At the same time, Homer, Odyssey IV. 231, states that every Egyptian is a physician, and given the Homeric context of the dialogue, perhaps Gryllus has the epic text in mind. 95 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 974A–B, states that non-human animals practice the three divisions of medicine, namely, pharmaceutics, dietetics and surgery, and he offers (974B–D) numerous examples of the healing practices of dogs, snakes, tortoises, elephants, bears, wolves, lions and tigers. The examples of tortoises devouring marjoram after eating snakes that Gryllus cites is mentioned at 974B, while that of Cretan goats consuming dittany to induce arrows to fall from their bodies when they have been wounded occurs at 974D. Some of these examples of self-medication in non-human examples are recounted in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 38–39, suggesting that Philo and Plutarch may both have consulted some of the same literary sources. See Dickerman on the stereotypic nature of claims of animal sagacity in Greek sources. 96 See 990D and note 75 above. 97 On the Cleverness of Animals is the only animal-centered treatise of Plutarch in which it is stated that the intellectual faculties of non-human

125

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

animals might in fact excel those of human beings. Plutarch’s position elsewhere on the relative intellectual capacities of non-human species vis-à-vis those of human beings is that non-humans have a “share” of reason. Gryllus’ assertion here is an instance of theriophilic admiration for the excellences of non-human species. See note 16. 98 On the self-taught nature of the life-sustaining actions of non-human animals, see note 93. Gryllus uses the same term, αὐτομαθής, automathēs, “self-taught,” here in adjectival form, to characterize this faculty in non-humans that Plutarch had employed at On the Cleverness of Animals 973E. 99 Plutarch speaks, On the Cleverness of Animals 968B–C, of elephants trained at Rome to perform maneuvers in the theater that were so complicated that human beings had difficulty performing them. It is noteworthy that the tone of the passage in On the Cleverness of Animals is rather different from that traceable in Gryllus’ account, since the speaker in On the Cleverness of Animals speaks admiringly of the cleverness of animals in mastering such complex gyrations, whereas Gryllus is contemptuous of attempts by human beings to teach non-humans animals to perform actions that are contrary to their physiological endowments. Similar elephant maneuvers are detailed in Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 27. 100 This stratagem of partridges is recounted as well at On the Cleverness of Animals 971C and by Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 35. 101 The instruction that nightingales provide their young in song is detailed also at On the Cleverness of Animals 973B. Scholars reasonably suspect a lacuna at this juncture because of the abrupt change of topic. 102 Helmbold 529 note g, notes, “Probably the Stoics are meant (by anachronism).” It was the Stoics who taught that non-human animals are devoid of reason. Plutarch’s case against the Stoic position that non-human animals are irrational is developed in detail at On the Cleverness of Animals 960A–961F. See Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 34–36 on Plutarch’s arguments in that passage. 103 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 960A, states that all animals “share in” (μϵτϵ´χϵιν, metechein) thought and reasoning capacity. On Plutarch’s case for rationality in non-human animals, see Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 3–9, and Commentary on the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965D), passim. See also Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 30–47. 104 Plutarch employs this same argument on the degrees of reason exhibited by various animal species as evidence that all species possess at least some reason at On the Cleverness of Animals 962F–963A. 105 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 962D, is willing to admit that some animal species exhibit such faults as cowardliness and stupidity. 106 Hubert, whose text I follow in this translation, notes that some editors suspect a lacuna at this place, although this is not universally accepted by editors.

126

W H ET H ER BE A ST S A R E R AT IONA L

107 The Cyclops Polyphemus captured and devoured Odysseus’ companions but was duped by Odysseus into believing the hero’s name was “Nobody,” so that when he had been blinded by Odysseus and his companions, he shouted to his fellow-Cyclopses that he had been blinded by “Nobody,” and they advised him simply to pray. This tale is recounted at length at Odyssey IX. 105–566. 108 The reference is not to the epic poet but apparently to someone notorious for his stupidity. 109 Autolycus was the son of Hermes and the father of Anticlea, wife of Laertes and mother of Odysseus. Homer, Odyssey XIX. 396–397, states that Hermes granted him skill at thievery and deception. 110 Philo of Alexandria, On Animals 100, ends his treatise with a very similar observation that it is an act of sacrilege to elevate non-human animals to the level of human beings and to regard other species as their equal. Plutarch takes up the topic of the sense of the divine in non-human animals as well in On the Cleverness of Animals 972 B in the case of elephants and at 975A in the case of birds. The question of whether non-human animals have an understanding of the divine was an issue of some interest to ancient writers. See Stephen T. Newmyer, “Paws to Reflect: Ancients and Moderns on the Religious Sensibilities of Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N. S. 75, 3 (2003) 111–129. 111 In some post-Homeric accounts, Sisyphus was said to have been the father of Odysseus. Plutarch, Greek Questions 301D, relates that Sisyphus raped Anticlea when she was still a virgin and fathered Odysseus. Gryllus alludes here to Sisyphus’ reputation as an atheist. Many editors believe that the dialogue is incomplete in its present state, and some feel that the portion that is lost would have been of considerable length. One would have expected, at the very least, that Odysseus would reply to the question of Gryllus with which the dialogue ends. Moreover, if Gryllus had carried to its conclusion his analysis of the Cardinal Virtues in non-human animals, he would have next taken up “justice” (δικαιοσύνη, dikaiosunē), which remains untreated in the dialogue as it is preserved.

127

3 ON EATING MEAT (DE ESU CAR NIUM )

Introduction And yet somehow the most matter-­of-­fact person could not help thinking of the hogs; they were so innocent, they came so trustingly; and they were so very human in their protests— and so perfectly within their rights! Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (1906), Chapter 3

The philosopher Xenocrates of Chalcedon (ca. 396–314 bce), who headed the Academy following Plato’s immediate successor Speusippus (ca. 407–339 bce), is believed to have written the first treatise in Greek devoted entirely to a defense of a meat-­f ree lifestyle.1 Because this treatise is lost, we cannot determine with certainty on what grounds Xenocrates advocated abstention from meat. In his own defense of vegetarianism, De abstinentia (On Abstinence) IV. 2, the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry (234–ca. 305 ce) cites the biographer Hermippus (third century bce) as stating that Xenocrates enjoined humans “not to harm animals.” Hermippus speculated that Xenocrates may have so instructed because he believed all animals to be in some manner akin. The loss of Xenocrates’ text is regrettable since it would be fascinating to know whether he originated arguments that appear later in Plutarch and Porphyry, or perhaps advanced arguments that do not appear at all in subsequent classical defenses of vegetarianism. In light of the loss of Xenocrates’ treatise, the survival of Plutarch’s treatise Πϵρὶ σαρκοϕαγίας (On Eating Meat), commonly known by its Latin title De esu carnium (On Eating Meat), is fortunate since it constitutes the earliest relatively complete work devoted to the vegetarian lifestyle that survives from the classical world.2 Unfortunately, the text of the work is less well preserved than that of Plutarch’s other treatises on animals, De sollertia animalium (On the Cleverness of Animals) and Bruta animalia ratione uti (Whether Beasts Are Rational). At times, lacunae render the argument of the work difficult to follow, and occasional passages are virtually incoherent. At least 128

ON E AT I NG M E AT

one relatively lengthy passage (994B–D) appears to have been derived from some other work of Plutarch, and to have been placed in its present location either by him or by a later editor, which interrupts the flow of thought in the surrounding text. The mutilated state of the text may contribute to the fact that De esu carnium remains the least-­studied of Plutarch’s essays on human–non-­human animal relations.3 A good deal of earlier scholarship devoted to On Eating Meat focused on the question of whether the extant work constitutes one treatise or two, and the issue remains unresolved.4 Moreover, some scholars have interpreted a passing comment by Plutarch to mean that he had composed still other works, now lost, in defense of vegetarianism.5 A second question, equally puzzling and likewise ultimately unanswerable, that occupied earlier scholars is that of the date of composition of On Eating Meat relative to Plutarch’s other two animal-­related treatises. While the text itself offers no clues as to its date of composition, the sometimes overheated rhetoric of the work has led some scholars to conclude that De esu carnium antedates Plutarch’s other works on animals because of a certain stylistic and philosophical “immaturity” that they detect in it.6 The rhetorical cast and the heavily moralizing character of the work, taken together, have led to the conclusion that Plutarch was under the influence of the Cynic-­Stoic diatribe in the composition of the treatise.7 Indeed, the very philosophical position adopted in the work has led some to argue that it must be early on the grounds that Plutarch, as a mature thinker, could not have and therefore did not champion vegetarianism after a relatively early stage in his literary career. Frederick E. Brenk, for example, sees in the work the “exaggerated rhetoric and naïveté associated with Plutarch’s youthful works,” in this case betraying its author’s “youthful sincerity and idealism and the appeal of the heart over the head.”8 Some scholars have taken Plutarch’s enthusiastic advocacy of abstention in On Eating Meat to be evidence of an early allegiance to Pythagorean teachings. Typical of this position is the observation of Helmbold that the two parts of On Eating Meat “probably depict faithfully a foible of Plutarch’s early manhood, the Pythagorean or Orphic abstention from animal food. There is little trace of this in his later life …”9 Already Haussleiter, in his history of vegetarian thought in antiquity, had declared Pythagoras to be the figure who principally inspired Plutarch’ advocacy of the meat-­free lifestyle.10 More recent scholars have adopted a more nuanced stance on the influence of Pythagorean doctrine in On Eating Meat. Damianos Tsekourakis, for example, has correctly noted that, while Plutarch several times refers to Pythagorean arguments, in none of these instances does he display the enthusiasm for the doctrine of transmigration that figured heavily in the earlier philosopher’s case for abstention.11 Indeed, in the opening sentence of On Eating Meat, Plutarch expresses astonishment that anyone can ask what led Pythagoras to abstain, when the more cogent question is what led 129

ON E AT I NG M E AT

the first man to touch bloody flesh to his lips (993A–B). Scarcely more enthusiastic for Pythagoras’ stance is Plutarch’s statement that, although the doctrine of metempsychosis is not proven to the point that one can accept it totally, the uncertainty inherent in the question should at least give one pause (998D). Evidence that Plutarch’s mentions of Pythagoras constitute less than a ringing endorsement of the earlier philosopher’s doctrine of transmigration calls attention to other, closely related issues that complicate our appreciation of Plutarch’s own position on abstinence, including the question of Plutarch’s own level of commitment to the vegetarian way of life, and the problem, arising directly from the former question, of apparent contradictions between Plutarch’s ardent support of abstention in On Eating Meat and what appear to be less doctrinaire pronouncements in other of his works on the need for abstinence, if not actual endorsements of a carnivorous diet. An apology for the vegetarian lifestyle, even when clothed in language so fervent if not indeed frenzied as that of Plutarch, does not in itself guarantee that its author followed his own advice to the letter. Some scholars who have offered accounts of the development of vegetarian philosophy since classical antiquity have taken isolated passages in a number of ancient authors as proof that the individuals who penned them were devoted and consistent vegetarians. In his historical survey of attitudes toward non-­human animals, psychologist Richard D. Ryder declared categorically, “The philosophers Porphyry and Plotinus, and the statesman Seneca, all followed a vegetarian diet, but the most outstanding exponent of this habit was Plutarch …”12 A much more judicious assessment of the question is that of Daniel A. Dombrowski, “Many important thinkers from antiquity were greatly impressed with vegetarian thought: Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Theophrastus, Ovid, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and others.”13 Dombrowski wisely stops short of concluding that any of the individuals whom he catalogues can with absolute certainty be declared to have been a practicing vegetarian, however enthusiastically each may have spoken of the meat-­free lifestyle. Plutarch had occasion to discuss food choices in a number of the more than 70 treatises that constitute the corpus of his philosophical and ethical treatises that are known together as the Moralia, and his enthusiasm for abstention appears to vary according to the nature of the works in which references to food occur. In his lengthy and diffuse assemblage of dinner table conversations, the Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table Talk), Plutarch and some friends discuss matters of diet in a relaxed and jovial setting. Even in the context of that work itself, some degree of inconsistency may be detected. In one conversation, the question of whether seafood is superior to meat from land-­dwelling animals is discussed (667C–669E), a question that suggests that both choices are acceptable to the discussants, but in the course of that same conversation, one interlocutor remarks that people feel greater shame when slaughtering land-­dwelling animals than sea-­dwellers 130

ON E AT I NG M E AT

because of the pitiful cries that land animals emit at slaughter (669D), an admission of some scruples on the part of some individuals. At one point, Plutarch himself, one of the interlocutors in the work, observes that human beings at an earlier point in history may have been compelled to eat meat, and he acknowledges that they even now cannot readily abandon the practice because they find meat eating to be pleasurable (730A). His observation here is not angry or critical of the practice but constitutes merely a matter-­ of-­fact statement of his perception of the situation.14 A similar, partially receptive attitude toward meat eating is traceable in Plutarch’s dialogue De sanitate tuenda praecepta (Advice about Health). Here Plutarch acknowledges that meat eating has become for humans a kind of perverse “second nature,” and he enjoins humans to consume meat only as a supplement to a diet made up of foods that are “more in accord with nature” (132A). Meat, after all, promotes indigestion (131F). In this case, we should perhaps view Plutarch’s observations not as an endorsement of meat eating but rather as a concession to what he realizes are the realities of human life, so that the best that one can expect of human beings is restraint rather than abstinence. In another symposiac work, the Convivium septem sapientium (Banquet of the Seven Sages), the interlocutor Solon laments that human beings are forced to commit injustice because of their need to eat, for to take the life of any living entity allows one being to thrive at the expense of another (159C–D). Hence a human being should strive to eat as little as possible. Although Solon’s position bears some similarity to Plutarch’s connection of meat eating with injustice in On Eating Meat (994E, 997E–998A, 999A– B), Solon does not clearly differentiate meat from other food sources, and he seems more concerned with the health of the human soul when weighed down by food than he is with the plight of animals slaughtered for meat.15 Our brief survey of passages from a number of Plutarch’s treatises in which food choice is at least touched upon incidentally suggests that we cannot find total consistency in our author. Plutarch does seem to acknowledge that most human beings will not likely lose their taste for animal food, however preferable and praiseworthy the adoption of a meat-­free lifestyle might be. In this acknowledgment, Plutarch displays the pragmatism that marks his approach to philosophical questions in general, although it stands in stark contrast to the uncompromising position adopted in On Eating Meat. One might argue that the seemingly accepting attitude toward meat eating that appears in Table Talk is a reflection of the symposiac nature of that work overall, in which all manner of culinary topics may be expected to be aired and treated in a light-­hearted manner, given the relaxed nature of the treatise. We may conclude, from the passages discussed above, both that Plutarch demonstrates less consistency than practicality in his pronouncements on meat eating, even if the majority of his statements on the practice are unenthusiastic if not critical, and that it is probably unwarranted to label him categorically as a lifelong vegetarian. 131

ON E AT I NG M E AT

We have seen that Plutarch’s case for the meat-­free lifestyle does not seem to rest to any significant degree on the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis or reincarnation, a type of argument that may be considered primarily religious in nature. At the same time, Plutarch advances virtually every other type of argument encountered in ancient discussions of abstention, and at times he offers arguments rarely seen elsewhere in ancient vegetarian polemic but encountered regularly in modern vegetarian literature. Summarizing ancient argumentation on abstention, Urs Dierauer has noted that religious arguments figure much more prominently in classical sources than in modern vegetarian literature, while concern for the suffering of animals is less frequently detectable in ancient texts than in modern. He notes as well that almost all arguments that occur in modern polemic have counterparts in classical literature.16 Plutarch’s own choice of arguments for abstention makes him a particularly intriguing case study. While we may isolate examples in Plutarch of virtually every type of argument advanced in ancient vegetarian polemic, we find comparatively few appeals to what may be termed religious/spiritual considerations, while those that may be viewed as ethical/ philosophical and scientific/hygienic predominate. In this respect, Plutarch emerges as a distinctly “modern” advocate for the vegetarian lifestyle in the terms that Dierauer sets forth. The issue of animal suffering is surprisingly prominent in Plutarch’s case for abstention from meat, while it appears comparatively infrequently in writers prior to Plutarch who treat the topic, a fact that lends support to an assertion of “modernity” in his manner of argument. In his study of Plutarch’s philosophy of vegetarianism, Michael Beer observes justly, “It is his concern with the suffering of animals that not only makes him almost unique in the ancient world … but renders him eerily prescient of the sorts of arguments offered by modern philosophers espousing the cause of animal rights,”17 and his assessment of Plutarch’s approach is likewise correct when he asserts that he “attempts, through shock tactics, to destroy any justification for meat eating.”18 The validity of Beer’s observation on Plutarch’s use of “shock tactics” is demonstrated with particular clarity in Plutarch’s gut-­wrenching scene (On Eating Meat 994E–F) of animals about to be slaughtered crying out to their slayer to spare them if their death arises not from necessity but merely from the desire for a tasty meal.19 The brief passage is strikingly “modern” in its appeal to several arguments raised in vegetarian polemic today. Unstated but undeniably present in the scene is the assumption that animals that are about to be slaughtered sense the imminent danger that encompasses them.20 This awareness of impending death is triggered, in Plutarch’s view, from the presence in animals of a share of reason, which had prompted his lament (994E) that human beings are not deterred from the act of slaughter by any recognition of the “extraordinary

132

ON E AT I NG M E AT

degree of intelligence” (peritton en sunesei) in the animals whose lives they are taking. This obliviousness leads humans to conclude erroneously that the utterances of the animals seeking justice from their slayers are merely “inarticulate sounds” (phōnas anarthrous, 994E) rather than the “calls for justice” (dikaiologias, 994E) that they in fact are. It is interesting to note that Plutarch comments in this same passage on the injustice entailed in depriving food animals not only of their lives but even of sunlight during their confinement, a scene that anticipates the so-­called Harm as Deprivation Argument that philosopher Tom Regan would make a cornerstone of his case for animal rights.21 It is wrong, as Plutarch and Regan argue, for human beings to deprive animals of the joys that they might take in the simple pleasures of their own lives. Similarly “modern” in tone is Plutarch’s insistence that meat eating is detrimental to human health. Beer considers this line of argument to be central to Plutarch’s case against the eating of meat, observing, “The main impetus of Plutarch’s argument lies in his assertion that the human body is not designed to consume flesh.”22 While one might object that Plutarch seems even more concerned with combatting the cruelty involved in the meat-­based diet, the scientific/hygienic argument which Beer stresses certainly does figure prominently in Plutarch’s case for abstention. He asserts (994F–995A) that the bodily anatomy of human beings suggests that they are not naturally carnivorous, since they do not possess the talons or claws that assist those species that are naturally carnivorous, while the human stomach does not produce the chemicals necessary for the digestion of flesh. Because animal flesh is thus unnatural to humans, they must resort to cooking and otherwise altering it before they can tolerate a meal that it by its nature improper to them (995B–C). Precisely these arguments are made by Matthew Scully in his study of the suffering inflicted upon non-­human animals by human beings: Our bodies, too, do not appear to have been designed for eating flesh, a point easily established by examining the statistics on heart and vascular disease … or by going to the mirror, opening your mouth, and asking yourself why it is that you do not see fangs. Indeed, what is all this genetic tampering with animals, to make their flesh paler and leaner and softer, but an admission that normal meats are not, after all, particularly healthy?23 Another type of argument that Plutarch brings to bear that has a strikingly “modern” feel is his contention that the mistreatment and slaughter of animals, whether in the service of food procurement or merely in an act of wanton cruelty, inevitably leads to the mistreatment of one’s fellow human

133

ON E AT I NG M E AT

beings, as we are drawn ever deeper into depravity through acts of escalating viciousness (998B). From the slaughter of oxen and sheep and cocks, humans are drawn to acts of war and slaughter. Plutarch offers here an early formulation of the principle, frequently commented upon in discussions of the psychology of serial killers, that cruelty toward animals in childhood often presages a propensity toward murder in adulthood.24 As a final example of Plutarch’s forward-­looking approach to vegetarian polemic, we may note his insights into what might be called the “psychology of meat eating.” He betrays some awareness of the possibility that the consumption of meat may arouse a level of shame or even disgust in human carnivores. In his study of the symbolic aspects of meat, anthropologist Nick Fiddes calls attention to what he views as a desire on the part of meat eaters to “eschew confronting certain aspects of meat’s identity.”25 This squeamishness is most readily observable in the attempt to disguise the origin of animal foods by substituting designations like “beef,” “pork,” “venison” and “veal” for the names of the animal from which each is derived.26 In a similar fashion, cooking serves, in Fiddes’ view, to distance meat eaters from the reality of their action. He argues, “Cooking ameliorates the stark animality of the flesh, by altering its colour, imposing a human hallmark since we are the only species to possess this skill, and confirming, beyond doubt, the death of the beast.”27 Plutarch has taken note of the squeamishness that the consumption of animal flesh may arouse in human beings, remarking that the wealthy employ cooks and chefs as “corpse dressers” (nekrokomois, 994F) because they cannot bear to eat the flesh of dead animals without first altering it by cooking and pickling it so as to render acceptable to the human body “what is foreign to it” (995B). Plutarch’s point is precisely that of Fiddes: humans do not wish to be reminded of the savagery that their diet entails. In his analysis of ancient defenses of the vegetarian lifestyle, Dierauer divides the arguments marshaled by its advocates into three categories: those that focus on the welfare of animals; those that focus on the welfare of both humans and animals; and those that focus primarily on the welfare of humans. Plutarch advances ten of the 12 arguments that Dierauer includes in his three categories, failing to mention only the assertions that the meat-­ free lifestyle brings a human being closer to the divine, and that it renders the human more godlike, two arguments which Dierauer includes among those that he characterizes as focusing on human concerns and interests.28 The omission of these two arguments supports a conclusion that Plutarch relies less on appeals to religious/spiritual considerations than is otherwise observable in ancient defenses of abstinence. We cannot expect to find, in Plutarch or in any extant ancient text on abstention from meat, some compelling arguments encountered in modern polemic, for example, the ecological consideration that the production of meat is not cost-­effective because of the enormous amounts of grain products required to feed animals that 134

ON E AT I NG M E AT

yield relatively small amounts of meat, or that food animals are fed chemicals that are potentially hazardous to humans in order to improve the quality, taste and appearance of the meat that they yield. Such considerations lay outside the experience of classical culture. At the same time, we cannot fail to be impressed by the range and variety of arguments marshaled by Plutarch within the brief compass of On Eating Meat, so many of which still find a place in vegetarian literature.

Notes 1 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis VII. 32. 9, states that Xenocrates, in his treatise Πϵρὶ τη̑ς ἀπὸ τω̑ν ζῴων τροϕη̑ς (On Nourishment Derived from Animals), maintained that consumption of meat is unprofitable for human beings because it renders the human soul like that of irrational beasts. It would seem that Xenocrates’ objection here arose rather from a concern for human spiritual welfare than from any concern for the sufferings of food animals. Johannes Haussleiter, Der Vegetarismus in der Antike (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1935) 198–201, offers a useful analysis of Xenocrates’ views on animals in which he concludes that human spiritual purity was the philosopher’s principal concern. 2 For a detailed analysis of De esu carnium and of references to vegetarianism in other works of Plutarch, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006) 85–102. For general studies of Plutarch’s defense of vegetarianism, see Daniel A. Dombrowski, The Philosophy of Vegetarianism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984) 86–102 and his “Philosophical Vegetarianism and Animal Entitlements,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Life and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 546–550; Damianos Tsekourakis, “Pythagoreanism or Platonism in Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch’s ‘Moralia’,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 36, 1 (1987) 366–393; Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on the Moral Grounds for Vegetarianism,” Classical Outlook 72, 2 (1995) 41–43; and Urs Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung in der griechisch-­römischen Antike (mit einem Ausblick aufs Alte Testament und frühe Christentum,” in Manuela Linnemann and Claudia Schorcht, eds., Vegetarismus: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft einer Lebensweise (Erlangen: Harald Fischer Verlag, 2001) 35–45. 3 See Preface note 3. 4 See Santese, Introduction to Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne (Naples: D’Auria, 1999) 13 notes 16–17. She cites much the same bibliography on the question that is found in Cherniss and Helmbold, Plutarch: Moralia XII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) 537. 5 At De esu carnium 996A, Plutarch states that, two days previously, he had noted in a discussion that the Athenians had punished a man who had flayed a ram while it was alive. That text does not in itself seem to support the contention that Plutarch is alluding to other works on the topic. Cherniss and Helmbold 537 and Tsekourakis 366, cite this reference in Plutarch in support of their belief that he composed more works on vegetarianism than the extant On Eating Flesh. 6 Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung” 36, concludes that the work, which he finds loose in structure and argument, is probably a product of Plutarch’s twenties or thirties because of its manner of presentation which he brands as

135

ON E AT I NG M E AT

“drastisch” and its overwrought rhetoric which he views as filled with “radikalen Überspannungen.” 7 For an early formulation of this position, see F. Krauss, Die rhetorischen Schriften Plutarchs und ihre Stellung im plutarchischen Schriftenkorpus (Dissertation, Munich, 1912) 77 ff. 8 Frederick E. Brenk, In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch’s Moralia and Lives (Leiden: Brill, 1977) 57 and 70. Aldo Tirelli, “Etica e Dietetica nei De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta,” in Italo Gallo, ed., Plutarco e le Scienze (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1992) 392, observes that Plutarch in time realized that human beings cannot reasonably be expected to live a meat-­free life, prompting Tirelli’s comment, “ecco il bon sens del Plutarco maturo.” 9 Cherniss and Helmbold 537. As a sobering antidote against claims that evidence of early support for a lifestyle that Plutarch may subsequently have abandoned provides some certainty on the chronology of his works, we should keep in mind the observation of D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972) 3, “There are no works that can be shown to have been written in youth … Hardly anything is datable.” 10 Haussleiter 228, “Fragen wir endlich, wer von allem Plutarch die Anregung zu seiner Überzeugung gab, so ist in erster Linie natürlich Pythagoras und seine Schule zu nennen.” 11 Tsekourakis 380. Plutarch mentions Pythagoras by name at On Eating Meat 993A, the opening sentence of the treatise; at 997E; and at 998A. Tirelli, in contrast, agrees with Haussleiter, judging Plutarch to be “faithful to Pythagoreanism” (“ligio al vegetarismo pitagorico,” 391), and he views Plutarch’s devotion to Pythagorean doctrine as a demonstration of “almost absolute intransigence” (“pressochè assoluta intransigenza,” 391). 12 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 23. 13 Dombrowski, “Philosophical Vegetarianism and Animal Entitlements” 535. 14 For further discussion of diet in Plutarch’s Table Talk, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 88–89. 15 Topics related to non-­human animals in Plutarch’s Banquet of the Seven Sages are discussed in Stephen T. Newmyer, “Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium,” in José Ribiero Perreira, Delfim Leão, Manuel Tröster and Paula Barata Dias, eds., Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch (Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanisticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009) 497–504. 16 Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung” 55. 17 Michael Beer, “The Question Is Not, Can They Reason?, Nor, Can They Talk?, But, Can They Suffer?: The Ethics of Vegetarianism in the Writings of Plutarch,” in David Grumett and Rachel Muers, eds., Eating and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2008) 96. 18 Beer 103. 19 On this passage, see Commentary, pp. 147–150. 20 Dombrowski, “Philosophical Vegetarianism and Animal Entitlements” 548, calls attention to the “fearful reactions to the smell of other animals’ blood at the slaughterhouse” that animals at the point of slaughter experience. 21 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) 96–99. For further discussion of this passage in Plutarch, with special reference to its anticipation of arguments employed in animal rights literature, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 92–95. On conditions in modern

136

ON E AT I NG M E AT

meat-­producing farms, see the classic work of Jim Mason and Peter Singer, Animal Factories (New York: Harmony Books, 1990) and, more recently, Peter Singer and Jim Mason, The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter (Emmaus: Rodale Press, 2006), and Erik Marcus, Meat Market: Animals, Ethics, & Money (Boston: Brio Press, 2005). 22 Beer 104. Beer 105 faults Plutarch for not taking into account the possibility that meat eating may not after all be unnatural or lacking in nutrition for humans. 23 Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002) 320. 24 Beer 105 regards as specious Plutarch’s contention that cruelty to animals may lead to homicide. He seems here to ignore evidence from criminology. Jeremy Wright and Christopher Hensley, “From Animal Cruelty to Serial Murder: Applying the Graduation Hypothesis,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 47, 1 (2003) 71–88, offer a fascinating overview of evidence in support of what they term the “graduation hypothesis,” which argues that the presence of cruelty to animals in the developmental stages of an individual’s life may predict interpersonal violence in that individual at a later stage of life. They note (75), “Cruelty to animals allows children either to become desensitized to heartless violence or to learn to enjoy the feelings of administering pain and suffering. This may ultimately fuel their desire to graduate to human violence.” This last sentence strikingly echoes Plutarch’s formulation of the idea. 25 Nick Fiddes, Meat: A Natural Symbol (London and New York: Routledge, 1991) 44. 26 Fiddes 97 makes the intriguing observation that speakers of English have chosen to employ French-­derived names for meat products so as to distance themselves from “the full conceptual impression of stating the name of the devoured animal.” 27 Fiddes 114. 28 Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung” 56. Dierauer includes the Or phics, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Ovid’s depiction of Pythagoras’ position, Apollonius of Tyana, Musonius and Porphyry in his tabulation.

137

Treatise I: Translation 1 On Eating Meat (De esu carnium)

993 1. Well then, you ask2 on what grounds Pythagoras3 abstained from meat eating, but I wonder B in what emotional state or frame of mind or thought the first human being touched slaughter to his mouth and brought to his lips the flesh of a dead animal, setting out tables of stale corpses, and still labeled as “food” parts that a little while before had voice and movement and sight.4 How did his eyes endure the carnage when the creatures were slain and skinned and dismembered? How did his nose tolerate the stench? How did the defilement not repel his sense of taste when it encountered the wounds of other beings and drank off the juices and fluids of lethal sores?5 C “The skins began to move, the flesh to moan, Both cooked and raw, as if the voice of cattle.”6 This is fiction and storytelling, but the meal is truly monstrous, to hunger after a creature that is still bellowing and to give guidelines on what creatures are to serve as nourishment when they are still living and chattering, and to make provisions for seasoning and roasting and serving. We ought to inquire into the man who first introduced this behavior, not the one who ended it at length.7 2. One might say that the origin of the practice among those who first undertook to eat meat was their lack of resources.8 D For it was not while they spent their time in lawless desires and in abundance of necessities that, swept away into unsuitable and unnatural pleasures, they arrived at this practice. If they were to gain sensation and the power to speak at this very moment, they might say, “O fortunate and beloved of the gods, you who live now, what a life has fallen to your lot, you who enjoy a boundless harvest of good things! How many crops sprout for you! What a bountiful vintage! What riches from the plains, what delights from fruit trees are yours to pluck!9 You have the capacity to live in luxury without defiling yourselves!

138

ON E AT I NG M E AT

The most melancholy and fearsome age of the world welcomed us, who fell into great and helpless poverty from the moment of our birth. E Air mixed with thick and unstable moisture and fire and the raging of winds hid away heaven and the stars.10 ‘Not yet did sun sit firm and fixed in place, heeding its course, Dividing dawn from dusk, and led them back, To crown the seasons rich with fruit and buds, And earth endured the shame’11 of lawless overflowing rivers, and many areas were ‘disfigured by the marsh,’12 and rendered wasteland by the deep mud and wild thickets and underbrush. Nor did we yet know of cultivation of fruits, and we had no tools for handicrafts nor for any art supplied by skill.13 Our hunger never let up, nor did any seed then available await the annual time of planting. What wonder is it if, contrary to nature,14 we made use of the flesh of animals, when even mud was devoured, and F ‘the bark of trees was gnawed,’ and it was a lucky find ‘to come upon a blade of sprouting grass or rush.’15 When we had sampled and eaten acorns,16 we danced for joy around some oak tree, calling it ‘life-­g iver’ and ‘mother’ and ‘nourisher.’ 994 In those days, that was considered a feast, but all else was full of turmoil and gloom. What madness, what passion drives you nowadays to bloodlust, you who have so many of life’s necessities? Why do you claim falsely that the earth cannot sustain you?17 Why do you profane Demeter the law-­g iver and dishonor Dionysus the gentle god of the vine, as if you do not receive enough from them? Don’t you feel ashamed when you mingle the fruits of the field with blood and gore? You call serpents and leopards ‘savage,’ you who don’t take second place to them when it comes to cruelty and bloodthirstiness. B For them, slaughter is a source of nourishment, but for you it is a delicacy!”18 3. For we do not eat lions or wolves in self-­defense: we leave them alone, but we slay harmless, tame animals without stings or teeth to bite us, animals which, by Zeus, nature seems to have produced for the sake of their beauty and gracefulness …19 It is as if someone, seeing the Nile in flood and filling the land with its fertilizing and productive waters, would not express admiration at what this signifies, at how it richly nourishes the crops most productive of human health, but seeing a crocodile swimming about somewhere or an asp or mice, savage and loathsome creatures, C would call them the cause for his censure and his need to act as he does. Or, by Zeus, [it is as if]20 someone, after taking note of this farmland filled with cultivated crops and weighed

139

ON E AT I NG M E AT

down with stalks of grain, and then looking under the crops and detecting somewhere a stalk of darnel or dodder, would cease to harvest and gather the crops, but would complain [about the underbrush]. And what about this? What if someone, observing the speech of an orator who was in the full flood of his eloquence in some legal case and was carried away in his defense of some person in peril, or, indeed, in the condemnation of reckless deeds and [assertions],21 D borne along in his eloquence in a manner neither simple not unadorned but with a great range of emotions intended to impress the many varied dispositions of his listeners and of the litigants which he must win to his side and convert, or, indeed, calm and tame and quiet down, what if that someone, then, overlooking this aspect of the issue and taking the measure of the overall [performance], were to pick out mistakes in expression in the speech, as it progressed, carried along with it in its onrush, mistakes that slipped out with the remainder of the speech? And seeing … of some popular orator …22 4.23 But nothing shames us, not the fresh bloom of their skin, E not the persuasiveness of their harmonious voices, not their cleverness of spirit, nor the cleanliness of their manner of living and the extraordinary degree of intelligence in the poor creatures,24 but for the sake of a bit of flesh we deprive25 their lives of the light of the sun,26 of the span of life to which they were born and begotten. Then we imagine that their vocalizations and squeaks are inarticulate27 and not the supplications and entreaties and pleas for justice28 of each creature saying, “I do not beg you to let me off if you act from necessity but only if you act from wanton cruelty. Kill me in order to eat, but not to enjoy a more enticing meal!”29 Oh what savagery! It is horrifying to see the carefully-­set dinner table of wealthy people who hire cooks and chefs to dress the corpses.30 F It is even more horrifying to see the table when it is cleared since more is left over than was eaten. So these creatures die in vain! Still other persons, who abstain from the dishes set before them, do not allow them to be cut or chopped up, but, while interceding for the dead, they do not avoid the living.31 5. Well then, we’ve heard that those men say that nature is the origin [of meat eating] …32 That meat eating is not natural for a human being33 is proven in the first place by the physiology of the body, for the body of the human is not like that of any animals born for a carnivorous diet: a human being does not have a hooked beak or sharp talons 995 or strong teeth,34 nor does a human have the elasticity of the stomach or the warmth of air sufficient to convert and digest a heavy and fleshy diet. On the basis of these facts, the smoothness of our teeth, the small size of our mouth, the softness of our tongue, and the sluggishness of our digestion, nature rejects the eating of meat [in human beings]. If you say that you were born for such a diet, then slay yourself what you want to eat, but do it with your own strength, not 140

ON E AT I NG M E AT

using a cleaver or a club or any sort of axe. Just as wolves and bears and lions B kill what they eat, kill an ox with your own hands or a pig with your own mouth, or rip apart and swallow down a lamb or a rabbit, just as those animals do.35 But if you wait for what you eat to become a corpse and if the presence of life in an animal makes you ashamed to enjoy it as a meal, why do you, contrary to nature, devour a creature once it has lost its life? Still, no one would eat a creature deprived of its life just as is, but people boil and roast and alter the carcass with fire and drugs, changing and converting and overpowering it with innumerable seasonings so that their sense of taste, thus deceived, may accept what is foreign to it. There is a charming anecdote about a Spartan fellow who bought a little fish at an inn and gave it to the innkeeper to prepare. C When the innkeeper asked for cheese and vinegar and oil, the Spartan replied, “Well, if I had those things, I would not have bought the fish!”36 But we are so fastidious in our bloodthirstiness that we need condiments for meat, mixing together olive oil, wine, fish sauce and vinegar with Syrian and Arabian seasonings, as if we were actually preparing a corpse for burial!37 When the flesh is softened and broken down and in a sense dissolved, it is a task for the digestive system to get the better of it, and even if the digestive process does win out, there follow a terrible feeling of fullness and bouts of indigestion. 6. Diogenes was so bold as to eat octopus raw, D in order to do away with the need to prepare it with fire. Having covered his head with his threadbare cloak and brought the flesh to his mouth, he proclaimed, “I am endangering myself and running a risk for your sake!” Some risk!38 Did the philosopher not risk his life in the same way that Pelopidas did for the sake of Theban freedom, and Harmodius and Aristogeiton did for the Athenians, when he did battle with the raw octopus, in order to make our lives more beastly?39 In addition to that, eating meat is not only contrary to the nature of our bodies, E but it also weighs down our souls from fullness and satiety.40 “For wine and overindulgence in meat render the body strong and powerful, but the soul weak.”41 And so that I may not incur the hatred of athletes,42 let me cite as an example my own countrymen. The Athenians used to call us Boeotians dull-­w itted and foolish, especially because of our gluttony.43 “These people are pigs …,”44 and Menander [says], “… who have jaws …,”45 and Pindar [says], “and … to learn …,”46 “dry brightness [is] the wisest soul,” according to Heraclitus.47 Empty jars make a sound when struck, but when they are full they do not respond to blows.48 Thin bronze vessels pass along sounds in a circle, F until someone blocks and deadens the sound by laying hold of the vessels as the sound progresses around.49 When the eye is overly full of moisture it feels dazed and lacks the strength for its natural tasks. When we look at the sun through an overabundance of dense air that brings along with it a host of unfiltered vapors, we do not see it as pure and bright but rather as indistinct and robbed of the strength of its rays. Similarly, it is 141

ON E AT I NG M E AT

absolutely certain that, when the body is agitated and bloated and weighed down by foods not natural to it, 996 the brilliance of the soul and its splendor takes on a dullness and an indistinct quality, not possessing the bright light and sharpness necessary to proceed to the subtle and obscure goals of human affairs. 7. Apart from that, does a disposition toward love of humanity not seem to be a marvelous thing?50 What person, so kindly and humanely disposed toward creatures that are not akin, would harm a human being? A couple of days ago I mentioned in a lecture51 a remark of Xenocrates that the Athenians punished a man who had skinned a ram alive.52 It seems to me that the man who tortures a creature while it is alive is no worse than the man who takes away a living creature’s life by slaying it. B Yet it seems we take more note of acts that are contrary to custom than of those contrary to nature. I spoke on that occasion in a somewhat popular fashion. I hesitate even to broach that topic which is the basis for my opinion, great and mysterious as it is and “difficult to believe for men who are clever,” as Plato says,53 and who think mortal thoughts, just as a skipper of a ship [hesitates to shift direction] in a storm or a playwright hesitates to raise the theatrical machine when his play is in progress.54 Perhaps it is well to make a start by citing the verses of Empedocles …55 for he states metaphorically that souls are bound up in mortal bodies because they are atoning for the slaughter and eating of flesh and for consuming one another.56 C And yet this line of thought seems to be older, for the story of the sufferings of the dismembered Dionysus and of the outrageous acts of the Titans who tasted his blood and were punished for it with thunderbolts, is a myth that speaks symbolically of rebirth.57 The ancients termed “Titans” that part of us which is irrational and disordered and violent and derived not from the divine but from the demonic, that is, “those being punished and paying a penalty.”58

Commentary 1 On the question of whether Treatise I and Treatise II of On Eating Meat are in fact two parts of the same work or constitute separate works, see Introduction, pp. 128–129 and note 6. 2 The particle ἀλλά (alla), the first word in the Greek text, can be used in Greek to denote opposition to something said previously, indicating that an earlier discussion of the current topic had occurred, or it can be used to suggest an objection to another point of view. Here Plutarch seeks to make clear that he considers the question of Pythagoras’ objection to meat eating, which some individual is imagined to have raised, to be of less importance than the broader issue of what could have induced any person to devour a dead animal. The bluntness and suddenness with which the sentence begins, with its second-­p erson direct address to some

142

ON E AT I NG M E AT

imaginary individual who had raised the question of Pythagoras’ abstention, is evidence of the rhetorical cast upon which scholars have often commented. See Introduction, pp. 129–130. 3 Pythagoras (sixth century bce) is cited here as the classic Greek exponent of the meat-­free lifestyle. Scholars have disagreed on the degree of influence which Pythagoras exercised on Plutarch’s own advocacy of abstention, but Plutarch does not exhibit particular enthusiasm for the argument, sometimes viewed as the central pillar of the earlier philosopher’s case, that the possibility of reincarnation renders a carnivorous diet precarious for human beings. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VIII. 12–13, discusses theories on Pythagoras’ abstention, and he maintains that while some held that he advocated abstention to prevent humans from consuming other besouled creatures, the real reason was to inspire a simple lifestyle in humans and to render them satisfied to live on easily procurable foods that promote health of mind and body. A helpful overview of ancient views on the origins of Pythagoras’ advocacy of abstention is found in Damianos Tsekourakis, “Pythagoreanism or Platonism and Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch’s Moralia,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 36, 1, 370–379. On Plutarch’s relation to Pythagoras, see Tsekourakis, passim, and Introduction, pp. 129–130. 4 Plutarch’s expression of revulsion at the mere contemplation of man’s first experience of tasting animal flesh recalls Empedocles’ lament (DK31 B139 = Inwood 124) that he did not die before first committing evil by touching flesh to his lips. Plutarch (On the Cleverness of Animals 959E) outlines man’s gradual progression from slaying dangerous predators, a praiseworthy endeavor, to the slaughter of harmless species which men then begin to taste, a process that gradually dulled man’s sense of pity while feeding man’s lust to kill. Meat eating thus emerges as an evil that, once first introduced, becomes uncontrollable and, quite literally, “all-­consuming.” 5 In the composition of his treatise “A Vindication of Natural Diet” (1813), the poet Shelley (1792–1822) was much influenced by Plutarch’s description of the repulsive actions that the preparation of meat necessitates, observing, “It is only by softening and disguising flesh by culinary preparation, that it is rendered susceptible of mastication or digestion; and that the sight of its bloody juices and raw horror, does not excite intolerable loathing and disgust,” “A Vindication of Natural Diet,” in E. B. Murray, ed., The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Volume I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 80. Immediately after this outburst, Shelley mentions Plutarch by name for his similar description of the horrors of meat preparation and consumption. On Shelley’s debt to Plutarch in his vegetarian polemic, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch and Shelley’s Vegetarianism,” Classical Outlook 77, 4 (2000) 145–148. 6 Odyssey XII. 395–396. The citation is particularly apt here because the sacrificial animals that Homer depicts seem by their actions to remind their slayers that they had just been alive, possessing the movement and

143

ON E AT I NG M E AT

sight of which the animals described by Plutarch as turned into food for human beings had themselves been deprived. Such miraculous behavior on the part of animals is rare in Homeric scenes of sacrifice. 7 According to Pliny, Natural History VII. 209, one “Hyperbius son of Mars” was the first human being to slay an animal, and Prometheus was the first to slay an ox. Pliny’s comment appears in a catalogue of “firsts” in human technological advancement. The individual who ended the practice is Pythagoras. Nothing is known of Hyperbius. Plutarch’s interest in this opening chapter of On Eating Meat I in the identity of the first human being who prepared animal flesh for human consumption is a reflection of the fascination among classical authors with the question of the “first inventor” (πρω̑ τος ϵὑρϵτής, prōtos heuretēs, Latin primus inventor) of various objects and activities. At times, authors sought by such investigation to establish who bears the blame for the institution of an activity, in this case the consumption of animal flesh, that deserves to be censured. See Adolf Kleingünter, Protos Euretes: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestellung (Leipzig: Akademie Verlag, 1933). 8 “Necessity” is often cited, in ancient accounts of the earliest stages of human life on earth, as the origin of meat eating. In such accounts, humans are viewed as having not yet learned successful farming techniques or as having been hindered by crop failures or a lack of productive farm land. Even ardent defenders of abstention in antiquity were willing to excuse certain groups from an obligation to pursue a meat-­free diet if they were compelled by their environment to live almost exclusively on flesh. Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 964A, mentions among such groups the Nomads and the Troglodytes. In a similar passage, Porphyry, On Abstinence IV. 21, adds the Ichthyophagi (“Fish-­Eaters”) to the Nomads and Troglodytes as peoples whose carnivorous diet may be excused because of the infertility of their home territory which yields no plant crops. 9 A number of ideas common in Greek anthropological speculation on the early stages of human life are touched on in the outburst of Plutarch’s primitive man. The notion that earth at one time supplied abundant plant food without the need for human effort appears in Greek accounts of the so-­called Golden Age, and it appears already in the Works and Days of Hesiod (ca. 700 bce), wherein he outlines living conditions during the five ages of man that he distinguishes (Works and Days 109–201). In the Golden Age, “bountiful earth on her own bore abundant and boundless fruits” (Works and Days 117–118). Advocates of abstention took this concept of earth’s natural bounty as proof both that early man was vegetarian and that the adoption of a carnivorous regimen signaled a decline in human virtue, an idea that is hinted at throughout the first chapter of Plutarch’s On Eating Meat I. In his dialogue Whether Beasts Are Rational, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus argues (991C) that human beings were drawn away from the abundance of plant foods that earth offered up and first sampled animal flesh because of their taste for luxury and their innate cruelty. Plato, Republic 372a–c, seems to recommend a

144

ON E AT I NG M E AT

vegetarian diet in his ideal state, a regimen that Socrates in that passage associates with good health and peacefulness. An excellent analysis of Greek views on the earliest stages of life on earth is provided in W. K. C. Guthrie, In the Beginning: Some Greek Views on the Origins of Life and the Early State of Man (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957). See also Gordon Lindsay Campbell, “Origins of Life and Origins of Species,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 233–247, with additional bibliography. 10 Plutarch’s description of atmospheric conditions on earth in its earliest stages mentions the four element or “roots” (stoicheia) identified by the Presocratic Empedocles (ca. 492–432 bce) as the constituents of matter (DK31 B71 = Inwood 74). The depiction of conditions as windy, turbid and dark, due to the fact that the sun had not yet come into existence, is similar to Ovid’s poetic description (Metamorphoses I. 15–20) of primal chaos in which the elements of nature were not yet illuminated by sunlight. A particularly elaborate account of earth’s earliest state in which the operation of the primal elements is described is found in the historian Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheke I. 7. 11 These verses have been attributed to Empedocles (DK31 B154). Many scholars view the attribution as dubious (see Santese in Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, eds., Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne [Naples: D’Auria, 1999] 184 note 10 for discussion and bibliography). Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation with a Commentary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), omits the verses from his edition. 12 The phrase appears to be the end of a verse of uncertain authorship, perhaps a continuation of the verses dubiously attributed to Empedocles cited just above (DK31 B154). 13 Plutarch’s speaker imagines a period so early in the development of human life that no advances had yet been made through the use of “technological skill” (τϵ´χνη, technē). Such skill was regarded by the Greeks as a possession unique to human beings that enabled their remarkable rise in culture and civilization, including their conquest of the land and the invention of agriculture. Aristotle, History of Animals 588a29–30, argued that humans possess “technological skill, wisdom and intelligence” (technē kai sophia kai sunesis) while other animals have only “some other similar capacity” (tis hetera toiautē phusikē, 588a30–31). In the Metaphysics, Aristotle stated that humans live by “technological skill and reasonings” (980b27–28). Other ancient writers, including Plutarch, Pliny the Elder and Aelian (ca. 170–235 ce), cite examples of apparent tool use in non-­human animals as proof that other species are endowed with a degree of “technological skill.” Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 967A, Pliny, Natural History VII. 125, and Aelian, Nature of Animals II. 48, all relate that crows and ravens drop pebbles into jars of water to raise the water to a level at which they can drink. Anecdotal evidence of this sort is still cited by cognitive ethologists and animal rights philosophers

145

ON E AT I NG M E AT

to argue for conscious mental activity in non-­human species. On tool use in non-­human animals, see Carl Safina, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (New York: Henry Holt, 2015) 193–199 and Stephen T. Newmyer, The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (London and New York: Routledge, 2017) 112–117. 14 The notion that consumption of animal flesh by human beings is “contrary to nature” (para phusin, 993E) figures prominently in ancient and modern vegetarian polemic, most especially in the anatomical argument that the dentition and digestive apparatus of human beings are not designed to tear flesh or to digest it. Plutarch raises these points below (994F–995A). For a modern articulation of this idea, see Introduction, p. 133. 15 The two brief phrases enclosed in quotation marks have been taken to be poetic fragments since they appear to be iambics. Their source is unknown. On Plutarch’s citations from Greek poetry, see Ewen Bowie, “Poetry and Education,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2014) 177–190. Bowie observes that Plutarch never comments on the poetic value of the verses that he cites, and he suggests that he may not even have cared for poetry. Citations from poets in Plutarch’s works are, in Bowie’s judgment, a reflection of his philosophical background and of his elite education. 16 Classical literature is full of claims that acorns were a staple of the diet of primitive mankind. Vergil, Georgics I. 147–149, states that Ceres first taught humans the principles of agriculture when acorns were in short supply. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V. 937–940, relates that primitive man, when earth supplied her gifts without cultivation, rested among the acorn-­bearing oaks. Juvenal, Satires VI. 1–10, with a typically grotesque twist on the motif, describes how women, in the Golden Age, were still virtuous, unsophisticated and hairier than their “acorn-­belching husbands” (glandem ructante marito, VI. 10). 17 The adoption of a meat diet is viewed as an insult to Mother Earth who is capable of supplying all necessities of human life in abundance. Porphyry, On Abstinence II. 32, in a passage derived from the now-­lost treatise On Piety by Theophrastus (ca. 372–287 bce), contends that men should make offerings to the gods and to the earth in thanks for abundant crops. Earth is labeled in the passage in Porphyry as the “hearth of gods and men,” and as “our nurse and mother.” 18 Human beings are seen as being in a position to make a real choice to abstain from meat eating, whereas true carnivores cannot. Below (994E), Plutarch depicts an animal at the point of slaughter pleading with its slayers to spare its life if the human acts not from hunger but merely from a desire to secure a tastier meal. Here, as often in his vegetarian polemic, Plutarch views meat eating as a sign of human fondness for luxury. Similarly, Plutarch argues (996F) that, if humans must eat meat, they should do so with a feeling of shame and only out of necessity rather than from a desire for luxury.

146

ON E AT I NG M E AT

19 Plutarch maintains (On the Cleverness of Animals 964F) that there is no injustice involved in slaying animals that are dangerous to humans and seek to harm them, nor in taming more human-­friendly species to aid in human labors. Plutarch’s point that humans slay for food use only tame species has been raised in modern discussions of meat production and consumption. Nick Fiddes, Meat: A Natural Symbol (London: Routledge, 1991) 138, observes, “Carnivores are also, apparently, not to our taste.” Various reasons for this fact may be cited, in Fiddes’ view (139–142): the flesh of carnivores is too strong-­t asting for human enjoyment; only animals perceived by humans as victims rather than as predators are chosen for human consumption, since humans, as predators themselves, feel a sort of bond with other predatory species; the diet of carnivores may spread disease to humans who eat them. Scholars posit a lacuna at the beginning of Chapter 3. The subject broached at the beginning of Chapter 3, the human practice of eating only tame animals, seems to be introduced suddenly and does not follow smoothly from the previous discussion. Similarly, an entirely new and likewise unrelated topic is taken up after the initial comment on harmless vs. dangerous animals as potential human food sources. A lengthy series of examples and analogies follows (994B–D), the precise context of which never becomes entirely clear. The source of 994B–D has been debated. Helmbold 547 note C suggests that the passage comes from an entirely separate work of Plutarch and that it has been inserted here where it seems inappropriate. He notes that the opening sentence of Chapter 4 follows smoothly upon the opening sentence of Chapter 3, which lends support to the suspicion that 994B–D has been interpolated from some other work. 20 I insert the words in brackets, which are not found in the Greek text, to allow the apparent set of hypothetical situations that are imagined in this obscure passage to flow more smoothly. 21 The text is again troubled here. Some editors have suggested that the correct reading for the word “assertions” should be a verb rather than a noun. 22 The sentence ends without a main verb, and the participle “seeing” has no direct object, so that the point of the hypothetical situation posed in 994D remains unclear. 23 At the beginning of Chapter 4, Plutarch once again takes up the topic introduced in the first sentence of Chapter 3 and interrupted by the interpolated section that constitutes the remainder of Chapter 3, namely the idea that human beings limit their consumption of animal flesh to tame and domestic species. Plutarch’s development of the topic in Chapter 4 is striking for several reasons. The argument presented in Chapter 4 is set forth by an animal at the point of slaughter that, like the pig in Plutarch’s treatise Whether Beasts Are Rational, is imagined as endowed with speech to bring charges against human beings for their moral shortcomings in their treatment of other species, in this case their injustice toward them.

147

ON E AT I NG M E AT

Although one may detect in the paragraph hints of Plutarch’s condemnation of the human desire for luxury, in their craving for expensive and exotic foods (see notes 9 and 18 above), the main thrust of his argument in Chapter 4 is the idea that the human consumption of animal flesh violates a covenant of justice that should be observed between species that are all endowed with intelligence and a capacity to enjoy life. It may be this emphasis upon the ethical implications of meat eating for human beings set forth by Plutarch’s talking animal in Chapter 4 that prompts the observation of Inglese and Santese (193), “L’Autore fonda qui il divieto di cibarsi di carne su considerazioni incentrale sull’animale, piutosto che su osservazioni di tipo antropocentrico.” If the passage is viewed in the light of arguments advanced in modern animal rights polemic, however, Plutarch’s arguments and examples emerge as more animal-­c entered than Inglese and Santese allow, and adopt the point of view of the animals in question more so than that of the humans who misuse them. For more detailed analysis of Chapter 4, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 94–96 and “Plutarch on the Moral Grounds for Vegetarianism,” passim. 24 Plutarch explores the nature and dimensions of animal intellect at length in the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B), wherein he develops the thesis that all animals have a share of reason and understanding (960A), so that rationality in animals must be viewed as a continuum. In the present passage, his emphasis is less on the specific degree of rationality detectable in animal species than on the consequences for human morality that arise from acknowledgement that all animals are endowed with some intellectual faculties. Hence Plutarch satisfies himself here with the general observation that animals are endowed with an “extraordinary degree of intelligence” (peritton en sunesei, 994E). The term that Plutarch employs here (sunesis) to characterize the intellectual faculty discernible in non-­human animals that comes into play in the scenario that he develops denotes a capacity to “comprehend quickly” or to “understand” (see the extended discussion of the term in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1143a1–19). The term is thus well chosen here in light of the fact that Plutarch’s animal is imagined as being moved to speak because it understands the mortal danger in which it finds itself. No subtler distinctions of animal intellect are needed in the context. 25 Plutarch’s use of the verb “deprive” (ἀϕαιρούμϵθα, aphairoumetha, 994E) is striking and will resonate with readers familiar with arguments in favor of abstention developed by philosophers of the animal rights movement. The verb aphairein has connotations of depriving, excluding and hindering, all of which would seem to enter into Plutarch’s picture of an animal deliberately kept from those aspects of life that might be expected to enable it to enjoy its own life. Plutarch anticipates here the so-­called Harm as Deprivation Argument developed by animal rights philosopher Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of ­California Press, 1983) 96–99 (see Introduction, p. 133 and note 21). Regan argues that animals may be harmed by human beings not merely

148

ON E AT I NG M E AT

by having pain visited upon them but also by being deprived of the opportunity to exercise preferences in their lives. Death is the ultimate deprivation that humans visit upon animals because it precludes all future exercise of preferences that an animal might employ in an effort to render its life more satisfactory to it. Plutarch and Regan both see abstention as incumbent upon human beings who seek to avoid injustice toward other living creatures. Plutarch is highly unusual among ancient thinkers is maintaining that non-­human animals have interests that humans need to take into account, and in concluding therefrom that taking those interests into account is a matter of justice for humans. 26 Critics of the techniques of modern intensive farming regularly decry the unnatural conditions in which food animals are confined prior to slaughter, including the deprivation of natural light which they often experience. Aysha Akhtar, Animals and Public Health: Why Treating Animals Better Is Critical to Human Welfare (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 90, observes, “To sum up the realities of animals raised for food, the overwhelming majority are housed in extremely filthy, overcrowded conditions without access to fresh air, sunlight or room to move about normally.” 27 The question of whether the vocalizations of non-­human species are meaningful was of paramount importance in Greek philosophical thought, not least because the ability to use meaningful, articulate language was viewed as the single most important factor that distinguished human beings from other animals. Language was viewed in classical thought as the outward manifestation of the faculty of reason (λόγος, logos), and only human beings were judged to be rational. The same term (logos) was used in Greek to indicate both reason and speech, and the two cannot be easily separated in Greek thought. John Heath, The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 6, argues that the term logos was first applied to speech and only subsequently to reason, “The primacy of reason as a distinguishing criterion derived over time from the far more obvious fact of experience that beasts do not speak. ‘Dumb’ animals do not possess any language.” Rather clear distinctions between the intellectual capacities of human beings and of other animals are traceable in Aristotle. At Politics 1332b3–6, he declares that other species live “primarily by nature” while “man lives by reason as well, for he alone has reason.” Non-­human animals were similarly declared to be irrational by the Stoics, whose position Plutarch is primarily opposing here in his characterization of animal utterances. In the teaching of the Stoics, the capacity to produce meaningful language arises in the animal soul, in a division of the soul that they termed the ἡγϵμονικόν (hēgemonikon), a sort of guiding or governing mechanism which, in the case of human beings, attains to rationality over time but which remains irrational in non-­human animals. Reason, conceived linguistically, is bipartite in Stoic doctrine: an “inner reason” (λόγος ἐνδιάθϵτος, logos endiathetos), equivalent to “thought,” gives rise

149

ON E AT I NG M E AT

to an external manifestation of reason called λόγος προϕορικός (logos prophorikos), a kind of “uttered reason” or “speech.” Because the utterances of non-­human animals do not arise from a rational hēgemonikon, they are devoid of meaning. Plutarch rejects this notion in his assertion that humans are mistaken in labeling animal vocalizations as inarticulate. He discusses the topic of animal language more extensively at On the Cleverness of Animals 973A. On animal language see also Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 2–3, where the two Stoic logoi are discussed. Plutarch’s views on the language of non-­human species are analyzed in detail in Stephen T. Newmyer, “Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and Plutarch on Animal Language and the Modern Case against Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 63, 3 (1999) 99–110. 28 On Plutarch’s views on justice toward non-­human animals, see note 25 and his extended discussion at On the Cleverness of Animals 963F–965B, with the Commentary on these sections and notes 67–85. The words of the animal about to be slaughtered suggest that Plutarch believed that some non-­human animals have a concept of justice. The notion becomes more piquant here since Plutarch portrays an animal lecturing a human being on the true meaning of justice. The idea that some non-­human species practice a form of justice in their interactions with conspecifics and with other species is currently the subject of investigation by cognitive ethologists. Frans deWaal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) 218, argues that, since morality is grounded in neurobiology and the nervous systems of mammalian species are similar, with the weighing of ethical concepts traceable to specific areas of the brain, “It should not surprise us … to find animal parallels.” 29 Plutarch again associates the practice of eating meat with man’s pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle, and he again contrasts necessity, in which case a carnivorous diet is at least excusable, with luxury, which always merits censure. On “necessity” and luxury in human food choices, see notes 8 and 9. 30 Plutarch likens the preparation of meat dishes to the process of embalming a corpse. At 995C, he elaborates this image, noting that the process of marinating meat in spices and oils is tantamount to “embalming a corpse for burial” (nekron entaphiazontes). 31 It is possible that Plutarch has the Cynics in mind here. Below (995C–D), Plutarch relates that the famous Cynic Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 413–324 bce) ate octopus raw as a sign of rejection of the practice of cooking flesh. Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Diogenes the Cynic, notes that some thought the philosopher died of colic after eating raw octopus, Lives of the Philosophers VI. 76. Plutarch’s talking animal does not consider the practice of the Cynics to be any more praiseworthy than that of humans who employ chefs to prepare elaborate dishes with cooked meats. While the Cynics “intercede for the dead” in avoiding cooked meats, they nevertheless eat raw flesh and thereby do not “avoid the living.” Since antiquity, the cooking of meat has been associated with culture

150

ON E AT I NG M E AT

and civilization, while the consumption of raw flesh denotes crudeness and lack of cultural advancement in human beings. Fiddes 89 observes, “Raw meat, dripping blood, is what is eaten by wild, carnivorous animals, not by civilised humans. We position ourselves above animals in general by eating meat, and above other carnivores by cooking it. Raw meat is bestial and cooking sets us apart.” Already from the time of Hesiod (ca. 700 bce), the theft of fire from the gods carried out by the rebellious Prometheus, and his gift of it to human beings, which enabled the cooking of meat, was viewed by the Greeks with some ambivalence. While Prometheus was seen as a culture hero who bestowed upon mankind a gift that afforded mankind a more refined lifestyle, the theft represented a source of hostility on the part of the gods toward human beings. As punishment for the theft of fire, Zeus created Pandora who released misery into the world of human beings and forced them to live a life full of troubles and hard work. Prior to this, according to Hesiod, Works and Days 90–91, “bountiful earth supplied all of man’s needs,” an apparent suggestion that humans had previously been vegetarian. 32 Hubert proposes a lacuna at this point, which seems correct since the object of “origin” is not stated in the text. “Flesh eating” must be supplied in light of the subsequent discussion in Chapter 5. 33 Plutarch had briefly touched on the idea that meat eating is “contrary to nature” (παρὰ ϕύσιν, para phusin, 993E) in Chapter 2 (see note 14), and here it is declared to be not “natural” for human beings (οὐκ ... κατα` ϕύσιν, ouk kata phusin,“not according to nature”). In Chapter 5, Plutarch introduces a number of arguments from human physiology to prove this thesis. 34 On the unsuitability of human anatomy for a carnivorous diet, see note 14. Percy Shelley, “A Vindication of Natural Diet,” in E. B. Murray, ed., The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 79–80, seem to have been directly influenced by this passage in Plutarch when he asserts, “Comparative anatomy teaches us that man resembles frugivorous animals in every thing, and carnivorous in nothing; he has neither claws to seize his prey, nor distinct and pointed teeth to tear the living fibre.” On Shelley, see note 5. 35 Shelley, “A Vindication of Natural Diet” (Murray, 1993) 80, charges, “Let the advocate of animal food, force himself to a decisive experiment on its fitness, and as Plutarch recommends, tear a living lamb with his teeth …” On Plutarch’s arguments for abstention based on the unsuitability of human anatomy for a meat diet, see Introduction, pp. 132–133. 36 The anecdote alludes to the proverbial simplicity of Spartan life. The innkeeper offers the other foods because plain fish would have been unappealing to many persons, but the Spartan counters that he would have been satisfied with the other items without needing the fish as well. 37 See note 30 on Plutarch’s imagery here. 38 See note 31 on Diogenes’ diet of octopus. The anecdote was repeated many times in classical sources, with various interpretations of the

151

ON E AT I NG M E AT

meaning of the philosopher’s behavior. Some regarded it as an example of the Cynic desire to reduce human life to the barest necessities by banishing luxuries, while others viewed it as an attempt to draw attention to himself. Plutarch suggests that Diogenes in fact ran no risk by eating raw octopus, and that, moreover, the consumption of any animal food is deleterious to human health and spiritual welfare. Plutarch had related the anecdote of Diogenes eating raw octopus in his treatise Aquane an ignis utilior (Is Water or Fire More Useful?), in the course of a discussion of populations that live without the use of fire. In that passage (956B), he also quotes the claim of Diogenes that he risks his life for his fellow citizens by consuming the octopus raw. Plutarch does not in that context mock Diogenes since he is illustrating the point that, whereas some peoples can live without fire, no one has ever claimed that a human being can live without the use of water. 39 Plutarch sarcastically equates Diogenes’ culinary stunt with instances of individuals who genuinely risked their lives for their compatriots. The fourth-­c entury general Pelopidas, who was the subject of a biography by Plutarch, died in the course of his military campaign to increase the influence of Thebes while reducing that of Sparta, the enemy of Thebes. In 514 bce, the Athenian tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton assassinated Hipparchus, son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus (608–528 bce), but failed to assassinate his brother Hippias, and the two were executed. They were subsequently venerated as champions of Athenian freedom against tyranny. 40 Arguments for abstention that might be viewed as “spiritual” in that they deal with effects of meat eating on the welfare of the human soul are not prominent in Plutarch, although the idea that a meat diet weighs down the soul is often viewed as having been central to Pythagoras’ case for abstention. Plutarch does not seem to have been strongly drawn to Pythagorean arguments in his formulation of his own case for a meatless regimen (see Introduction, pp. 129–130 and note 12). In the opening sentence of On Eating Meat I (993A), he brushes aside the question of what led Pythagoras to abstain and asks rather what led the first human being to touch animal flesh to his lips. Spiritual arguments for abstention are more prominent in Porphyry’s treatise On Abstinence, where the Neoplatonist stresses the idea that bodily desires, including the desire for animal food, hinder the philosopher’s search for unity with the divine (On Abstinence III. 26). On the arguments for abstention advanced by Pythagoras, Plutarch and Porphyry, and on their use of spiritual arguments in developing their cases, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 19–22. 41 This quotation is cited, in identical language, by the Christian theologian Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 215 ce) in his Stromateis (Miscellanies) VII. 6, where the theologian attributes it to a physician named Androcydes (fourth century bce) who, according to Pliny the Elder, Natural History XIV. 58, advised Alexander the Great to moderate his drinking of wine. Plutarch cites this quotation from Androcydes repeatedly elsewhere.

152

ON E AT I NG M E AT

42 Porphyry, On Abstinence I. 26, says that Pythagoras made an exception to his ban on meat eating in the case of athletes because it improved their strength. In his life of Pythagoras, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VIII. 13, says that an athletic trainer named Pythagoras, and not the philosopher by that name, recommended a meat diet to athletes. 43 Plutarch’s hometown, Chaeronea, was in Boeotia, a region of Greece often mocked in Greek authors for producing dull-­w itted citizens. W. Rhys Roberts, The Ancient Boeotians: Their Character and Culture, and Their Reputation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895) 1–9, offers an intriguing discussion of what he terms (1) “the stigma resting upon the Boeotians, both in antiquity and in later times.” He catalogues and discusses passages in Greek authors that accuse the Boeotians of swinishness, drunkenness, gluttony and overall stupidity, and he cites On Eating Meat 995E as evidence that the Athenians were instrumental in attaching this reputation to the Boeotians. 44 The origin of this short quotation is uncertain, but it may derive from a lost comedy. 45 This fragment comes from a lost comedy of Menander (ca. 342–ca. 291 bce). 46 Plutarch apparently intended to include a longer citation from Pindar’s Olympian VI but a lacuna intervenes at this point. The phrase of Pindar that Plutarch cites here, Olympian VI. 89–90, is followed by a reference by the poet to the “old reproach ‘Boeotian swine.’” 47 DK22 B118. The exact wording of the fragment from Heraclitus is in doubt so that its interpretation is uncertain. 48 Plutarch likens an overfed human being to a full jar that gives off no sound, while the individual who avoids such satiety retains his “purity of tone,” and exhibits no dullness of spirit. He employs a metaphor to illustrate his point that overindulgence drags down the soul. 49 In his dialogue Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table Talk) 721B–D, Plutarch offers a rather elaborate discussion of the capacity of vessels to conduct sound. He portrays an Epicurean philosopher named Boethus lecturing the other interlocutors on the ease or difficulty with which sound is conducted through various materials. Because gold and stone have a more compact atomic structure, the philosopher remarks, sound is muffled and short-­lived when passing through them, whereas vessels composed of bronze produce more melodious sounds because their atomic structure is more rarified, affording an easy passage for sound. 50 Kindness toward animals, here manifested in abstention from killing them for food, is said to foster ϕιλανθρωπία (philanthrōpia), a “love of humanity.” Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 959A, had stated that the Pythagoreans practiced “kindness toward animals” (tēn eis ta thēria praotēta) in an effort to instill “love of humanity and love of compassion” (to philanthrōpon kai philoiktirmon) in human beings. The operation of love for one’s fellow human beings is a subject that interested Plutarch intensely, and it plays a prominent role in his symposaic works, wherein the topic of interpersonal relations is discussed in an atmosphere of revelry

153

ON E AT I NG M E AT

and camaraderie. See the essays in José Ribeiro Ferreira, Delfim Leão, Manuel Tröster and Paula Barata Dias, eds., Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch (Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanisticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009). On the interest that issues of interpersonal kindness held for the Greks, Inglese and Santese remark (207 note 2), “Non c’è autore Greco che, a partire da Omero, non abbia trattato il tema della riconoscenza, della mutual affezione, della benevolenza, sia umana sia divino.” 51 This statement has been taken as evidence that Plutarch had composed other essays on the topic of vegetarianism. See Introduction, p. 129 and note 5. 52 Xenocrates fr. 99 Heinze. On Xenocrates’ contribution to vegetarian thought in antiquity, see Introduction, p. 128 and note 1. Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 209, in commenting on this fragment, states that Xenocrates’ pronouncement is an instance of what may be judged to be “purer examples of concern for animals as animals.” Concern for animals as suffering creatures does not figure prominently in ancient discussions of human–non-­human animal relations, and its appearance here makes the loss of the text of Xenocrates lamentable. Further evidence of Xenocrates’ concern for the sufferings of animals is reported in Diogenes Laertius’ life of the philosopher, where he relates, Lives of the Philosophers IV. 10, that Xenocrates once welcomed to his bosom a sparrow that flew to him when pursued by a hawk. Xenocrates stroked the bird and remarked that a suppliant must not be betrayed. Sorabji notes that such anecdotes seem to suggest a concern for the pain and fear that animals may experience, although he acknowledges that the fragments do not specifically comment on this. 53 Plato, Phaedrus 245c. At this point in Plato’s dialogue, Socrates is about to take up the topic of the immortality of the soul, and he predicts that his argument will be believable only to the wise though not to the merely clever. 54 The text of the passage in which the metaphors derived from sailing and theatrical practice occur is troubled so that the exact meaning is somewhat uncertain. 55 The text of Empedocles is not cited since a short lacuna occurs at this point. Helmbold 559 and Inglese and Santese 211 both speculate that the verses may have been those cited also at 998C, where the subject is likewise metempsychosis. 56 Empedocles’ notion of metempsychosis as atonement for consumption of flesh is treated in DK31 B115 (= Inwood 11). 57 According to the theogony of the Orphics, a religious sect associated with the legendary singer Orpheus that dates to the sixth century bce, Zeus mated with his daughter Persephone and fathered Dionysus, identified with the god Zagreus in Orphic teaching. Zeus intended Dionysus to succeed him as king of heaven but his wife Hera, jealous that her husband had fathered the child with another woman, inspired the Titans to

154

ON E AT I NG M E AT

attack Dionysus. They murdered him and ate all of him except the heart, in consequence of which Zeus incinerated the Titans with his thunderbolts. Mankind was subsequently born from the ashes of the Titans and of the consumed Dionysus, which accounts for the elements of the sinfulness that is encountered in mankind. For a reconstruction of texts associated with Orphic religion, see M. L. West, The Orphic Poems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), especially Chapter 5, “The Death and Rebirth of Dionysus,” pp. 140–175. 58 Plutarch alludes here to Hesiod, Theogony 209–210, in which the poet offers a dual etymology for the term “Titan,” according to which the Titans “stretched out” (titainein) to castrate Ouranos, although in fact only Kronos was involved in this action, and because of this deed, “vengeance” (tisis) would eventually follow. Plutarch references only the second of these etymologies in his mention of punishment and penalty. See M. L. West, Hesiod: Theogony, edited with Prolegomena and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) on verses 209–210 for a discussion of the Hesiodic etymologies. The text of the first treatise ends here rather abruptly and inconclusively, suggesting that some part has gone missing. Helmbold 561 states that the text “breaks off at this point,” and he concludes his text with a series of dots.

155

Treatise I I: Translation 1 On Eating Meat (De esu carnium)

[996] D 1. Reason prompts us to come up with fresh arguments and enthusiasm following yesterday’s lecture on meat eating.2 It is difficult, as Cato remarks, to talk to stomachs that have no ears,3 and the potion of familiarity has been drunk,4 like the drink of Circe, E “a drink [that quells] distress, pain, guile and grief.”5 Nor is it a simple thing to pull out the fishhook of meat eating since it is caught up and stuck in our love of pleasure.6 It would be a good idea for us, like the Egyptians who remove the stomach of a dead person7 and, cutting it up under the sun, cast it away as being the cause of all our wrongdoings, to cut out our own gluttony and bloodthirstiness and to keep ourselves untainted for the rest of our lives. The stomach is not in itself bloodthirsty, but it is made so by a lack of self-­control. If, indeed, it is impossible for us to be without blemish because of our familiarity with misconduct, we shall at least F feel shame at our behavior and approach it rationally: we shall eat meat from necessity, not from gluttony.8 We shall take a life, but only in sadness, not in arrogance or wanton cruelty, as they do in many cases today,9 shoving red-­hot spits down the throats of pigs, so that 997 the blood may be quenched by dipping the iron into it and so it may break up and soften the flesh. Others leap on the udders of sows and kick them so that, when they have mixed together the blood and milk and gore of the unborn creatures that they have destroyed (O purifying Zeus!), they may devour the most inflamed part of the animal. Yet others sew up the eyes of cranes and swans and, locking them in darkness, they fatten them, seasoning their flesh with exotic compounds and sauces.10 2. It is clear from these examples that they have made a pleasure out of lawlessness, not because of the need for food or because of any necessity or constraint, B but because of gluttony and arrogance and insolence. And just as in the case of women who have no bounds to their lust, which

156

ON E AT I NG M E AT

experiments with everything and is led into misdeeds through its incontinence and falls into unutterable behavior, so too do acts of incontinence in eating pass beyond the necessary bounds set by nature, and provide the appetite with a variety of savage and indecent choices.11 The organs of sensation fall ill, one with the other, and are drawn together and behave in a dissolute manner when they do not hold to natural standards. Hence the ear, when sickened, destroys one’s appreciation for music.12 From this our corrupted and dissolute sensibilities crave debauched groping and effeminate tickling. C These things taught the sight to take no delight in war dances13 or gesticulations or polished dance steps or statues or paintings, but rather to view the slaughter and death of men and their injuries and wars as the most valuable sort of spectacle. So too does incontinent intercourse follow lawless feasting, and cacophonous tones follow debauched lovemaking, unnatural sights follow shameless songs and strains, and a lack of feeling and callousness toward other human beings follow savage spectacles. For this reason, the divinely excellent Lycurgus,14 in his three Rhetrae,15 [prescribed] that the doors and roofs of houses be constructed with saw and axe and that D no other tools be applied to the structure, not because he had any objection to gimlets and adzes and the sort of tools that are used for fine work, but because he knew that one would not bring a gilded couch into such an abode, nor venture to introduce into an unadorned dwelling silver tables and purple rugs and expensive gemstones.16 A simple dinner and a democratic lunch are the natural companions of such a house and couch and table and cup, but all sorts of luxuries and expenditures follow upon a base lifestyle, “Just as the new-­weaned foal runs with its mother.”17 3. Now, what sort of meal is not extravagant if some creature is put to death for it? Do we consider a life to be a trifling expenditure? E I do not mean [by “life”] the [reincarnated] spirit of one’s mother or father or friend or child, as Empedocles said, but rather that life that has a share of sensation, of sight, of hearing, or mental representation, of intelligence which is acquired from nature to enable it to pursue what is appropriate to it and flee from what is alien to it.18 Consider which philosophers humanize us better—those who urge us to consume our children and friends and fathers and wives when they have died,19 or Pythagoras and Empedocles who accustom us to be just toward other species.20 You laugh at the man who does not eat cattle, but when we see you cutting off and eating pieces of your dead father or mother, sending a portion to some of your friends who are not present or F summoning those who are close by and giving them a share of the meat, are we not to laugh? But perhaps we err here too when we touch their books without washing our hands and faces and feet and ears unless, by Zeus, it

157

ON E AT I NG M E AT

is a purification of these things to speak of those topics “while washing out the salt from our ears with fresh discourse,” as Plato says.21 998 If one were to place these books and their teachings side by side,22 the former [would be worthy doctrine]23 for the Scythians and the Sogdians and Black Cloaks, about whom Herodotus’ account inspires distrust.24 But the teachings of Pythagoras and Empedocles were law to the Greeks of old … and their dietary regimens …25 [since we owe no debt of justice to irrational animals].26 4. Who then were those who later decreed this? “Who first forged robbers’ evil-­working knives, First tasted flesh of oxen at the plow.”27 In this manner, indeed, do tyrants begin their slaughter. B So in Athens they first put to death the worst of the sycophants, a man who was judged to have deserved it, and likewise then the second and third.28 Thus, having grown accustomed to the practice, they allowed Niceratus the son of Nicias to be put to death 29 and Theramenes the general30 and Polemarchus the philosopher.31 Similarly, at first some dangerous wild animal was eaten, and then some bird or fish was torn apart. The urge to kill, having gained practice on those creatures, turned to the ox of the field and the sheep that provide clothing and the domestic cock. Honing our insatiable desires, we little by little advanced to the C slaughter of human beings and to wars and bloodshed. But if someone proves that souls use common bodies in their reincarnations and that that which is now rational becomes irrational and that that which is now tame becomes wild again, and if nature changes everything and leads all life into a new abode,32 “enfolding unfamiliar garb of flesh about them,”33 this will not turn aside the savage and unbridled [element in some persons]34 and the inclination in some to put in their bodies sickness and heaviness and to destroy a soul that has been twisted into lawless conflict, when we are unaccustomed to entertaining a guest or celebrating a marriage or spending time with friends without bloodshed and slaughter. D 5. And yet if the explanation given concerning the transmigration of souls back into bodies is not deserving of belief, nevertheless the doubt involved commands great caution and wariness.35 It is as if a person in the course of a nighttime military encounter who has drawn his sword against a man who has fallen and whose body is covered in armor, were to hear someone say that he did not know for sure but thought and believed that the person lying on the ground was that fellow’s brother or father or tent-­mate. Which is better, to accept a false conjecture and to treat an enemy as a friend, or to scorn a report that is not certain and to do away with a comrade as an enemy? E

158

ON E AT I NG M E AT

Observe Merope in the tragedy raising her axe against her son in the belief that he is her son’s killer and saying, “This blow I deal you is more costly.”36 Such an uproar she creates in the theater,37 arousing the audience with fear and dread that she might act before the old man can lay hold of her and she slays the young man. If some other old man should stand beside her and say, “Strike! He is your enemy!” and yet another were to say, “Do not strike! He is your son!” which would constitute the greater injustice, to forego the punishment of one’s enemy because of one’s son, or to be caught up in the murder of one’s son because of anger toward an enemy? When there is no hatred, then, or anger impelling us to murder, or any thought of self-­defense or fear for ourselves,38 F but a creature stands as an offering for our pleasure, with neck bent back, and some philosopher says, “Kill it! It is an irrational beast,”39 while another says, “Stop! What if the soul of some relative or friend has made its way in there?” The danger, by the gods, is the same if I refuse to eat the flesh or if, in disbelief, I kill my child or some other kin.40 999 6. This argument concerning the eating of meat is not the equal of that of the Stoics.41 What is the great “tension” with regard to the stomach and the kitchen? Why, when they regard pleasure as effeminate and criticize it as neither good nor “advanced” nor “appropriate,” are they so serious about these pleasures? It would be logical, if they banish perfume and cakes from their banquets, for them to feel disgust at blood and flesh.42 As it is, just as they, one might say, philosophize in accord with their accounting books, and curtail their expenditures at their banquets in the case of useless and superfluous things,43 so do they not banish the savage and bloody sort of expenditure. “Yes,” they say, “we have nothing in common with irrational beasts.”44 B Nor, one might reply, does one with perfume or exotic spices. Turn away from such things and drive off that which is useless and unnecessary in pleasure. 7. Well then, let us look at this claim that we have no covenant of justice with animals, arguing not in a cunning or sophistical fashion but keeping in view our emotions and speaking like human beings and examining …45

Commentary 1 On the relation of Treatise II to Treatise I, see Introduction, p. 129 and note 5. 2 See note 1, and Introduction, p.  128. Plutarch’s assertion here that he will adduce fresh arguments and speak with renewed enthusiasm about the topic of abstention had led some scholars to conclude that On

159

ON E AT I NG M E AT

Eating Meat should be viewed as two distinct treatises rather than as two parts of the same work. 3 Plutarch relates this anecdote, in almost identical language, in his biography of the Roman statesman Cato the Elder (234–149 bce), where he is portrayed as attempting, in the course of a oration, to dissuade the common people of Rome from ill-­timed demands for distributions of grain (Cato 8). In that passage, Plutarch is illustrating Cato’s fondness for peppering his speech with pithy sayings. 4 Plutarch likens the force of habit, in this case the long-­accepted practice of eating meat, to a powerful potion like that of the witch Circe, called κυκϵών (kukeōn) by Homer (Odyssey X. 290) and by Plutarch in this passage, the effect of which is hard to resist. On kukeōn, see also Whether Beasts Are Rational, Commentary note 5. 5 The verse has been attributed to Empedocles (DK31 B154a) but the attribution is in doubt. 6 Plutarch frequently contrasts necessity with a desire for pleasure as the origin of a meat-­c entered diet (see, in Treatise I, 993C–D and 994E, and below, 996F and 998E, as well as On the Cleverness of Animals 991C–D). In his Quaestionum convivalium libri (Table Talk) 730A, Plutarch observes that necessity may have compelled early man to adopt a carnivorous diet, but it is now difficult to break the habit because meat eating is perceived as pleasurable. Modern animal rights advocates still find themselves compelled to combat the notion that the consumption of meat is justified because of the pleasure that it brings to human beings. Philosopher Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) 334 asserts, “First, and most obviously, no one has a right to eat something just because they happen to find it tasty or just because they happen to derive satisfaction from cooking it well.” This is so, in Regan’s view, because the pleasure of a few human beings does not override the suffering of many animals slaughtered for food. 7 In Herodotus’ account of the Egyptian process of mummification (Histories II. 86), he details the process by which the entire contents of the abdominal cavity were removed, after which some organs were placed in so-­called canopic jars for preservation. Porphyry, On Abstinence IV. 10, adds the detail, not found in Herodotus, that the embalmers held the box containing the canopic jars up to the sun and prayed for the deceased. This practice may be the origin of Plutarch’s mention of cutting up organs in the sunlight. Plutarch’s statement that the stomach was discarded as the source of wrongdoing is incorrect since it was enclosed in one of the canopic jars. In Plutarch’s dialogue Septem sapientium convivium (Banquet of the Seven Sages) 159B, the interlocutor Solon makes this same claim that the Egyptians exposed the entrails to the sun, and he there adds the detail that they then cast the organs into the river. 8 On Plutarch’s contrast between necessity and luxury as the origin of meat eating, see note 6, with references there to other appearances of the topic in On Eating Meat. In Banquet of the Seven Sages, Solon adopts an even more extreme view on the topic of human diet, lamenting (159B–C) that a human being is compelled to sustain his own life through the destruction 160

ON E AT I NG M E AT

of another organism’s life, whether that be the life of an animal or of a plant. Thus, Solon argues, even the meat-­free regimen of Orpheus is rather a quibble (sophisma, 159C) than a genuine instance of the avoidance of injustice, since an injustice is committed instead against a plant. 9 Expressions of sympathy for animals as victims of deliberate acts of wanton cruelty at the hands of human beings are rare in classical literature. Plutarch had mentioned, in Treatise I (996A) (see ad locum note 52), the account of Xenocrates detailing the punishment of an Athenian for flaying a living ram. The most famous instance of such an expression of sympathy for animals experiencing deliberate abuse is the reaction of the spectators at the Theater of Pompey upon the occasion of its opening in 55 bce, when a herd of elephants in the arena was tormented with spears. In desperation, the elephants, after attempting to defend themselves, raised their trunks and appeared to beg the spectators for help. This so moved the spectators that they rose up against Pompey and cursed him. See the accounts of the incident, with slight variations in details, in Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares (Letters to His Friends) VII. 1. 3; Seneca, De brevitate vitae (On the Shortness of Life) 13. 6–7; and Pliny, Natural History VIII. 20–21. For further discussion of this incident, see Stephen T. Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006) 114 note 51. 10 Plutarch, Table Talk 692C, expresses similar disgust at the practice of castrating pigs and cocks to soften their flesh to satisfy the market for luxurious foods. His more extensive account in the present passage of cruelties perpetrated against animals by food producers eager to cater to the tastes of jaded human beings offers a remarkable foreshadowing, in certain of its details, of the practices common in modern intensive farming, the cruelties of which form a regular target of vegetarian polemic and animal rights literature alike. The art of producing liver pâté is frequently singled out for its cruelty. Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002) 120, notes of the practice of force-­feeding ducks for this delicacy, “all of it obtained by forcing a metal pipe down the ducks’ throats and pumping pounds of food until their livers are grotesquely enlarged …” Pliny, Natural History X. 60, reports that the practice of fattening thrushes, storks and cranes for human consumption began around the time of Augustus, and that cranes are in his own time the most coveted species for that purpose. He also notes, Natural History XI. 210–211, without the horror expressed by Plutarch at such practices, that the udders of sows that have miscarried are tastier than those of sows that have given birth, while the udders of sows that have been slaughtered the day after they have given birth are next tastiest, provided that the sows have not been allowed to suckle their babies. 11 Plutarch introduces a variation of his often-­employed contrast between necessity and luxury in dietetic choices. “Necessity” is now contrasted with “arrogance” (hubris) and “insolence” (koros). At Table Talk 705B–C, Plutarch deals at length with the dangers of incontinence in various arenas of human life. In that passage, incontinence is viewed as a disordered 161

ON E AT I NG M E AT

operation of the reason which blinds human beings to the inevitable consequences of overindulgence in food, drink, sex, and even theatrical and musical entertainments. Although the virtues of continence were praised by all ancient philosophical schools, the idea that excess of any sort constitutes folly is perhaps most closely associated with the Epicureans. Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 130, states that that person takes most pleasure in luxury who views it as unnecessary, for all natural pleasures are easily obtained while luxuries are difficult to obtain. For a poetic elaboration of this Epicurean doctrine, see Lucretius, On the Nature of Things II. 20–36. Similarly Epicurean in inspiration is Plutarch’s implied contrast between pleasures that are natural and necessary with those that are unnatural and unnecessary, such as the desire for exotic foods and gluttonous portions. Plutarch appears to allude here to the Epicurean classification of desires set forth, for example, in Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus 127–128. At Whether Beasts Are Rational 989C, Plutarch’s talking pig Gryllus offers an elaborate discussion of the Epicurean classification of desires in the course of his attempt to prove that non-­human animals restrict their desires to those that are natural and necessary, in contrast to human beings who indulge in those that are neither natural nor necessary. 12 Plutarch, Table Talk 705D–706C, develops at some length the topic of the dangers involved when human beings fall victim to luxuries that enter through the ears and eyes, not to mention those that attend overindulgence in food, drink and sexual activity. Similarly, Porphyry, On Abstinence I. 34, details the negative effects on spiritual welfare that stimulation of the sense organs causes. When aroused by stimulation entering through the ears, he observes, some humans are liable to lose their reason and to act as if stung by a gadfly, while others writhe in an effeminate manner. 13 In his account of the origin of dance in human society, and of the varieties of dance that are to be reckoned decorous and worthwhile for humans to perform, Plato (Laws 816b–c) singles out the “war dances” (πυρρίχαι, purrhichai) that Plutarch mentions here, which, Plato laments, are no longer appreciated by senses that have been corrupted by luxury and can no longer take pleasure in the sound or sight of modest dance. 14 The semi-­legendary Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus (eighth century bce?) was the subject of a biography by Plutarch, at the beginning of which he admits that nothing can be said of him with any certainty. Despite this, Plutarch attributes to him a number of measures that were designed to combat luxurious living including the practice of requiring Spartan men to eat in common mess halls so as to discourage luxurious dining at home (Lycurgus 10). Porphyry, On Abstinence IV. 3, adds the detail that Lycurgus’ culinary reforms were undertaken in part because the lawgiver felt that the consumption of meat was a sign of luxury, and he suggests that Lycurgus’ reforms encouraged a vegetarian regimen. In Treatise I (995B–C), Plutarch had referred approvingly to the sparing

162

ON E AT I NG M E AT

diet of the Spartans in his anecdote of a Spartan who chose to eat a fish without condiments. 15 Plutarch, Lycurgus 13, notes that the lawgiver insisted that his laws not be written down, so that his laws were termed ρ῾η̑τραι, rhētrai, “verbal agreements, covenants,” ” hence, “unwritten laws.” 16 Plutarch, Lycurgus 13, repeats and elaborates his comments given here on the lawgiver’s prescriptions for the building of houses, mentioning again Lycurgus’ insistence that only the saw and axe be used in their construction. 17 This fragment is attributed to Semonides of Amorgos (seventh century bce) (fragment 5 West). The text as Plutarch cites it is all that survives of the original poem. 18 Plutarch indicates that his opposition to the consumption of meat is not grounded in an adherence to the Empedoclean doctrine of metempsychosis, but rather in a consideration of the intellectual capacities of the animals whose lives are sacrificed to feed human beings. His vocabulary here recalls his account of the dimensions of animal intellect set forth in the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B). In the present passage, he maintains that non-­human animals have a “share” (metechousan, 997E) of sensation, perception and intelligence. He employs the same verb metechein, “to share,” at On the Cleverness of Animals 960A, where he introduces the idea that will be argued at length in the first seven chapters of that treatise, namely, that non-­human animals have a “share of thought and reasoning capacity” (see Commentary on 960A). It is noteworthy that here, as often in his defense of vegetarianism, Plutarch distances himself from the Pythagorean-­Empedoclean doctrine of reincarnation. On Plutarch’s attitude toward metempsychosis as an argument in favor of abstention, see Introduction, pp. 129–130. Plutarch’s use of the terms “appropriate” (oikeion) and “alien” (allotrion) indicates that he is alluding to the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis, “kinship, bonding, attachment,” according to which every creature, from birth, naturally tends to pursue that which it recognizes as akin to itself, and to flee that which it recognizes as alien to itself. See Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 5–9. 19 According to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 121, the Stoic Zeno countenanced cannibalism under circumstances of extreme duress, and he records as well, in his life of the Stoic Chrysippus, Lives of the Philosophers VIII. 188, that Chrysippus, in the third book of his treatise On Justice, allowed for the consumption of human corpses. 20 Although Plutarch suggests that for both Pythagoras and Empedocles, abstention from animal food was primarily a question of justice toward other species, the motivations of both thinkers remain the subject of scholarly debate, with some scholars concluding that a concern for human spiritual purity was paramount in the thought of both philosophers. In that case, it might be argued that, for both Pythagoras and Empedocles, human self-­interest outweighed considerations of animal welfare. At the same time, a desire to act in accord with the dictates of justice

163

ON E AT I NG M E AT

might in itself suggest an element of self-­interest on the part of human beings who do not wish to damage themselves by acting counter to the dictates of good ethical practice. On the question of the motivations of Pythagoras and Empedocles, see Commentary to Treatise I note 3, with bibliography, and Urs Dierauer, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung in der griechisch-­römischen Antike (mit einem Ausblick aufs Alte Testament und frühe Christentum,” in Manuela Linnemann and Claudia Schorcht, eds., Vegetarismus: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft einer Lebensweise (Erlangen: Harald Fischer Verlag, 2001) 13–18. 21 Plato, Phaedrus 243c. Plutarch cites this text also at Table Talk 706D and 711D, with slight variations. 22 The Stoics are contrasted with Pythagoras and Empedocles, the former viewed as harsh in their views toward non-­human animals while Pythagoras and Empedocles enjoined kindness toward other species. 23 The text is uncertain at this point although the gist is clear: the views of the Stoics are well-­suited to wild and savage peoples like those whom Plutarch goes on to mention. 24 The Scythians, Sogdians and Black Cloaks (Melanchlainoi) are cited as examples of uncivilized Asian peoples to whom the severe philosophical doctrines of the Stoics might be expected to appeal. The Scythians were a semi-­nomadic people who occupied territory in central Asia east of the Vistula and who were proverbial among classical authors for their savage and uncivilized ways. They are treated at great length in Herodotus, Histories IV. 1–144, an account of great value for its insights into their character and lifestyle. Herodotus states, Histories IV. 26, that the Issedones, a people who dwelled near the Scythians and whom Herodotus describes as similar to the Scythians, ate the flesh of their dead fathers mixed with the flesh of animals, a custom commented on as well by Porphyry, On Abstinence III. 17. Plutarch may have had this custom in mind in his mention (997E) of Stoic views on cannibalism. The Sogdians were a people who dwelled in what is now Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with their capital at Samarkand. Their culture reached its high point in the sixth century bce. Herodotus, Histories IV. 20, says that the Black Coats were a non-­Scythian people who dwelled north of the Scythians. At Histories IV. 107, he states that they all wear black coats, although in other respects they resemble the Scythians. Some scholars believe that Plutarch confuses the Black Coats with the Issedones since the latter had been named by Herodotus as devouring their dead. 25 The text is corrupt at this point. Plutarch seems to connect the idea that, in ancient times, it was considered unlawful and sacrilegious to eat or even kill a harmless animal, a prohibition again referred to by Plutarch at Table Talk 729E, with the teachings of early advocates of abstention including Pythagoras and Empedocles, on the assumption that the ancients were inspired by the injunctions of these thinkers to practice justice toward other animals. 26 This clause is clearly an interpolation here. It is only marginally connected to the context and it seems to be grammatically unconnected to

164

ON E AT I NG M E AT

the surrounding text. It appears to be lifted from On Eating Meat 999B, where it is given in slightly different wording and where its appearance is logical since Plutarch is at that point about to take up the topic of human justice toward non-­human species, a topic left untreated because the Greek text breaks off at that point. The sentence is found also, in wording similar to its two appearances in On Eating Meat, at On the Cleverness of Animals 970B. 27 In his astronomical poem Phaenomena, the didactic poet Aratus (ca. 315–240 bce) describes here (131–132) the coming of the Bronze Age. The initiation of the practice of slaying plow oxen is said to coincide with the inauguration of a carnivorous diet among human beings. 28 At On the Cleverness of Animals 959D, Plutarch cites this same example of the behavior of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens (404–403 bce) to make the point that he makes here: just as human cruelty advances in the case of interpersonal relations, so do humans graduate in their cruelty toward other animals. After initially slaying animals potentially harmful to human beings, they advance to the slaughter of tame animals and those that are helpmates to humans in their labors and that pose no danger to them. 29 Nicias (ca. 470–413 bce) was the ill-­fated Athenian general whose hesitation and superstition contributed to the spectacular defeat of the Athenian forces at Syracuse in the Sicilian Expedition (415–413 bce) during the course of the Peloponnesian War. The sufferings of the Athenians in the stone quarries at Syracuse, and the death of Nicias, are movingly recounted in Thucydides, Histories VII. 86–87, and in Plutarch’s biography of Nicias, Nicias 27–30. Xenophon, Hellenica II. 39, suggests that the death of Nicias’ son Niceratus at the hands of the Tyrants may have been prompted by the great wealth of his family. 30 The politician Theramenes helped to set up the Thirty Tyrants and was numbered among them, but after a falling out with the tyrant Critias, he was executed. His death is recounted in Xenophon, Hellenica II. 56. 31 In his speech Against Eratosthenes, delivered in 403 bce, after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants, the orator Lysias (459–ca. 380 bce) accused Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty, of capturing and contributing to the execution of his brother Polemarchus (Against Eratosthenes 5–25). Plutarch calls Polemarchus a “philosopher” here because he figures in the first book of Plato’s Republic, inviting Socrates to the home of his father Cephalus for a philosophical discussion (Republic 327b). Also, at Phaedrus 257b, Plato mentions that Polemarchus had philosophical interests. 32 Plutarch again expresses some hesitation to accept the doctrine of metempsychosis as fact, and he seems to underline that skepticism by offering a catalogue of the various claims that were made by proponents of one or another version of the doctrine. 33 Empedocles (DK31 B126 = Inwood 113). 34 The text is uncertain in a number of places in the final paragraph of Chapter 4. I have added the words in brackets to supply the sense that seems to be required by the context. On the textual challenges presented

165

ON E AT I NG M E AT

in the final paragraph of Chapter 4, see Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, eds., Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne (Naples: D’Auria, 1999) 224–227 notes 4–5. 35 This statement constitutes at the same time both a clear statement of Plutarch’s skepticism on the validity of the doctrine of metempsychosis and an expression of hesitation to reject it outright, along with a somewhat grudging admission that the doctrine may have something to recommend it after all. At the very least, it furnishes Plutarch with another defense of abstention, and it is his most positive pronouncement on metempsychosis, however weak his endorsement may be. 36 The verse is a fragment (456 Nauck) from the lost tragedy Cresphontes by Euripides. Cresphontes, king of Messenia and son of Merope, was murdered by his rival Polyphontes. Merope, thinking she was about to assassinate Polyphontes, almost slew her surviving son Aepytus, but was told just in time that the person she was about to strike was her son. Aristotle, Poetics 1454a4–6, praises this scene in Euripides as a particularly effective piece of theater and he notes that Merope recognized her son in time. 37 D. W. Lucas, Aristotle: Poetics, Introduction, Commentary and Appendices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) 154, remarks on this passage, “If Plutarch saw the play himself, this must be one of the last recorded performances of Euripides in the ancient world.” 38 Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 995E, is willing to concede that human beings have the right to protect themselves against animals that intend to do them harm, but he laments that humans moved on from there to the slaughter of harmless animals, a sentiment repeated in Treatise I of On Eating Meat (994B). The reference in On the Cleverness of Animals to the justifiable killing of noxious animals that eventually leads to the slaughter of harmless species occurs in the context of a discussion of the morality of the practice of hunting, a topic on which Plutarch seems to have been conflicted. See Commentary to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 54–56. 39 The “philosopher” in question is a Stoic, as is made clear from the objection of the speaker that the creature about to be slain is merely an irrational beast and therefore merits no consideration. The subject of the rational properties of non-­human species takes up the greater part of the first seven chapters of On the Cleverness of Animals (959A–965B), and Plutarch’s polemic in those chapters is directed principally against the Stoic doctrine that non-­human animals are irrational. See Commentary on those chapters in On the Cleverness of Animals, and, for a detailed discussion of Plutarch’s case for rationality in non-­human species, see Newmyer, Animals, Rights and Reason 10–47. 40 The text of the final sentence of Chapter 5 is corrupt and has been subjected to much rewording by textual critics. 41 Having spent some time discussing the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis and having suggested that it is in itself not sufficiently well proven to serve as an argument for abstention, Plutarch turns his

166

ON E AT I NG M E AT

attention now to the Stoics, whom he mentions here by name for the first time in the treatise. 42 Plutarch mocks Stoic technical philosophical terms (“tension,” “ad vanced,” “appropriate”) and accuses the Stoics of hypocrisy in scorning pleasures while not at the same time banishing meat from their diet. They thus emerge, in Plutarch’s estimation, as pleasure-­seekers since he viewed the consumption of meat as a sign of luxury (see note 6). In his life of Zeno, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 117–118, discusses the austere lifestyle of the Stoics who rejected pleasures, drinking a little wine but not allowing themselves to become drunk. He does not comment on their taste for meat. 43 “Useless and superfluous things” is an allusion to the Stoic doctrine of “indifferents” (ἀδια´ϕορα, adiaphora), which Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers VII. 104, explains as referring, in Stoic parlance, to those things that contribute neither to happiness nor unhappiness. These “indifferents” include health, wealth, reputation and strength, none of which, Diogenes notes, was considered by the Stoics to be necessary for human happiness. 44 Plutarch alludes again to the Stoic doctrine of “affinity” or “kinship” (οἰκϵίωσις, oikeiōsis) citing the objection advanced by some unnamed Stoics that human beings have nothing “in common” (οἰκϵι̑ ον, oikeion) with irrational beasts. See Introduction to On the Cleverness of Animals, pp. 5–9, and note 18. 45 Since the text of Treatise II breaks off at this point, it is impossible to know how Plutarch would have developed the topic of justice toward animals. The topic is introduced somewhat suddenly at this point, but it may have been suggested by the discussion of the Stoics at the end of Chapter 6. Plutarch elsewhere attacks the Stoics for denying a juridical relationship between human beings and other species on the supposed lack of kinship with non-­human animals that are devoid of reason. See, for example, On the Cleverness of Animals 963F–964A, Banquet of the Seven Sages 159B–C and Table Talk 730A for discussion of justice toward animals. See also notes 25 and 28. For a detailed discussion of Plutarch’s concept of justice as it operates in human–non-­human animal relations, see Stephen T. Newmyer, “Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54 and Animals, Rights and Reason, Chapter 3, “Just Beasts,” 48–65.

167

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Texts, translations and commentaries DK = Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, ed. and transl., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951–1952). SVF = Johannes von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964; reprint of the edition of 1905). Aelian: A. F. Scholfield, transl., Aelian: On the Characteristics of Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959). Aristotle: D. M. Balme and Allan Gotthelf, eds., Aristotle: Historia Animalium. Volume I: Books I–X: Text (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). I. Bywater, ed., Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). Cicero: W. Ax, ed., M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia, Vol. 45: De Natura Deorum (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1968). Walter Miller, transl., Cicero: De Officiis (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1913). Claudio Moreschini, ed., M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta Quae Manserunt Omnia Fasc. 43: De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (Munich and Leipzig: Saur, 2005). Diogenes Laertius: H. S. Long, ed., Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). Empedocles: Brad Inwood, ed. and transl., The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation with Introduction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

169

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Homer: Thomas Allen, ed., Homeri Opera (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). Lucretius: Marcus Deufert, ed., Titus Lucretius Carus De Rerum Natura Libri Sex (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2019). Philo of Alexandria: Abraham Terian, ed. and transl., Philonis Alexandrini de Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981). Pliny the Elder: H. Rackham, transl., Pliny: Natural History (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1949). Plutarch: Jean Bouffartigue, ed. and transl., Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales, Tome XIV, 1re Partie, Traité 63, l’Intelligence des Animaux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012). Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold, ed. and transl., Plutarch: Moralia XII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984; reprint of edition of 1957). Myrto Gondicas, transl., L’Intelligence des Animaux, suivi de Gryllos (Paris: Arléa, 1991). C. Hubert, ed., Plutarchi Moralia, Vol. VI. Fasc. 1, recensuit et emendavit C. Hubert (Leipzig: Teubner, 1959). Giovanni Indelli, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Le Bestie Sono Esseri Razionali: introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1995). Lionello Inglese and Giuseppina Santese, ed. and transl., Plutarco: Il Cibarsi di Carne: introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento (Naples: D’Auria, 1999). Pietro LiCausi and Roberto Pomelli, transl., L’Anima degli Animali: Aristotele, Frammenti Stoici, Plutarco, Porfirio (Turin: Einaudi, 2015). Donatella Magini, transl., Plutarco: Del Mangiar Carne. Trattati sugli Animali (Milan: Adelphi, 2001). Joaquim Pinheiro, transl., Plutarco: Sobre Comer Carne (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2019). Rex Warner, transl., Plutarch: Moral Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971). Robin Waterfield., transl., Plutarch: Essays (London: Penguin, 1992). Porphyry: Gillian Clark, transl., Porphyry: On Abstinence from Killing Animals (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). Seneca: L. D. Reynolds, ed., L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

170

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary literature d’Agostino, Vittorio, “Sulla Zoopsicologia di Plutarco,” Archivo Italiano di ­Psicologia 11 (1933) 21–42. Akhtar, Aysha, Animals and Public Health: Why Treating Animals Better Is Critical to Human Welfare (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Angell, Tony, Ravens, Crows, Magpies, and Jays (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978). Babut, Daniel, Plutarque et le Stoïcisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969). Bagemihl, Bruce, Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). Barrow, R. H., Plutarch (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967). Beagon, Mary, Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Beagon, Mary, “Wondrous Animals in Classical Antiquity,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 414–440. Becchi, Francesco, “Irrazionalità e Razionalità degli Animali,” Prometheus 26 (2000) 205–225. Becchi, Francesco, “Istinto e Intelligenza negli Scritti Zoopsicologici di Plutarco,” in Michele Bandini and Federico G. Pericoli, eds., Scritti in Memoria di Dino Pieraccioni (Florence: Istituto Papirologico G. Vitelli, 1993) 59–83. Becchi, Francesco, “Lignes Directrices de la Doctrine Zoopsychologique de Plutarque,” Myrtia 17 (2002) 159–174. Beer, Michael, “The Question Is Not, Can They Reason?, Nor, Can They Talk?, But, Can They Suffer?: The Ethics of Vegetarianism in the Writings of Plutarch,” in David Grumett and Rachel Muers, eds., Eating and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2008) 96–109. Bekoff, Marc, The Emotional Lives of Animals (Novato: New World Library, 2007). Bekoff, Marc, The Smile of a Dolphin: Remarkable Accounts of Animal Emotions (New York: Discovery Books, 2000). Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hurt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). Bergua Cavero, Jorge, “Cinismo, Ironía y Retorica en el Bruta ratione animalia uti de Plutarco,” in Estudios Sobre Plutarco: Paisaje y Naturaleza (Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1991) 13–19. Boas, George, “Theriophily,” in Philip P. Wiener, ed., Dictionary of the History of Ideas (New York: Scribners, 1973) IV, 384–389. Bowie, Ewen, “Poetry and Education,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 177–190. Bréchet, Christophe, “La Philosophie de Gryllos,” in Jacques Boulogne, ed., Les Grecs et les Animaux: Le Cas Remarquable de Plutarque (Lille: Collection UL3, 2005) 43–61. Brenk, Frederick E., In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch’s Moralia and Lives (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Brennan, Tad, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).

171

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brink, C. O., “Οἰϰείωσις and Οἰϰειότης: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory,” Phronesis 1 (1955–1956) 123–145. Campbell, Gordon Lindsay, “Origins of Life and Origins of Species,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 233–247. Cartmill, Matt, A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1993). Casanova, Angelo, “Il Grillo di Plutarco e Omero,” in Jacques Boulogne, ed., Les Grecs de l’Antiquité et les Animaux: Le Cas Remarquable de Plutarque (Lille: Collection UL3, 2005) 97–109. Casanova, Angelo, “Il Grillo di Plutarco e la Tradizione della Figura di Ulisse,” Plutarchos N. S. 4 (2006/2007) 19–28. Casanova, Angelo, “The Time Setting of the Dialogue Bruta animalia ratione uti,” in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Titchener, eds., Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society (Málaga: University of Málaga Press and Logan: Utah State University Press, 2005) 121–131. Desmond, William, Cynics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008). Dickerman, Sherwood Owen, De Argumentis Quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem Obviis e Structura Hominis et Animalium Petitis (Dissertation, Halle, 1909). Dickerman, Sherwood Owen, “Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek Psychology,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 42 (1911) 123–130. Dierauer, Urs, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977). Dierauer, Urs, “Vegetarismus und Tierschonung in der griechisch-­römischen Antike (mit einem Ausblick aufs Alte Testament und frühe Chrstentum,” in Manuela Linneman and Claudia Schorcht, eds., Vegetarismus: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft einer Lebensweise (Erlangen: Harald Fischer Verlag, 2001) 9–72. Dombrowski, Daniel A., “Philosophical Vegetarianism and Animal Entitlements,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Life and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 535–555. Dombrowski, Daniel A., The Philosophy of Vegetarianism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984). Dyroff, Adolf, Die Tierpsychologie des Plutarchos von Chaironeia (Würzburg: Bonitas-­Bauer, 1897). Fiddes, Nick, Meat: A Natural Symbol (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). Fögen, Thorsten, “Animal Communication,” in Gordon Lindsay Campbell, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Life and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 216–232. Fusco, Maria, “Il Linguaggio degli Animali nel Pensiero Antico: Una Sintesi Storica,” Studi Filosofici 30 (2007) 17–44. Gill, James E., “Theriophily in Antiquity: A Supplementary Account,” Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969) 401–412. Graver, Margaret R., Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

172

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Guthrie, W. K. C., In the Beginning: Some Greek Views on the Origins of Life and the Early State of Man (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957). Hatzantonis, Emmanuel, “I Geniali Rimaneggiamenti dell’ Episodio Omerico di Circe in Apollonio Rodio e Plutarco,” Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 54 (1976) 5–24. Hauser, Marc D., Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (New York: Henry Holt, 2000). Haussleiter, Johannes, Der Vegetarismus in der Antike (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1935). Hawkins, Tom, “Eloquent Alogia: Animal Narrators in Ancient Greek Literature,” Humanities 6, 3 (2017) doi: 10, 3390. Heath, John, The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus and Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Herchenroeder, Lucas, “Τί γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον; Plutarch’s Gryllus and the So-­ Called Grylloi,” American Journal of Philology 129 (2008) 347–379. Hindermann, Judith, “Zoophilie in Zoologie und Roman: Sex und Liebe zwischen Mensch und Tier bei Plutarch, Plinius dem Älteren, Aelian und Apuleius,” Dictynna 8 (dictynna.revues.org/717) (2011). Horty, Phillip Sidney, “The Spectrum of Animal Rationality in Plutarch,” Apeiron 50, 1 (2017) 103–133. Jazdzewska, Katarzyna, “Not an ‘Innocent Spectacle’: Hunting and Venationes in Plutarch’s De sollertia animalium,” Ploutarchos N. S. 7 (2009–2010) 35–46. Kechagia-­Ovseiko, Eleni, “Plutarch and Epicureanism,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2014) 104–120. Kindt, Julia, “Review Article: Capturing the Ancient Animal: Human/Animal Studies and the Classics,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 137 (2017) 213–225. Kitchell, Kenneth F., Animals in the Ancient World from A to Z (London and New York: Routledge, 2014). Kitchell, Kenneth F., “A Defense of the ‘Monstrous’ Animals of Pliny, Aelian, and Others,” Preternature: Critical and Historical Studies in the Preternatural 4 (2015) 125–151. Kleingünter, Adolf, Protos Euretes: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestellung (Leipzig: Akademie Verlag, 1933). Konstan, David, “A Pig Convicts Itself of Unreason: The Implicit Argument of Plutarch’s Gryllus,” Hyperboreus 16–17 (2010–2011) 371–385. Krauss, F., Die rhetorischen Shriften Plutarchs und ihre Stellung im plutarchischen Schriftenkorpus (Dissertation, Munich, 1912). Labarrière, Jean-­Louis, “De la Phronesis Animale,” in Daniel Devereux and Pierre Pellegrin, eds., Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1990) 405–428. Lamberton, Robert, Plutarch (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001). Larmour, David, “The Synkrisis,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2014) 405–416. Lewis, David, “Near Eastern Slaves in Classical Attica and the Slave Trade with Persian Territories,” Classical Quarterly 61 (2011) 91–113. Lucas, D. W., Aristotle: Poetics, Introduction, Commentary and Appendices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). Marcus, Erik, Meat Market: Animals, Ethics, & Money (Boston: Brio Press, 2005).

173

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Martin, Hubert, “Plutarch’s De Sollertia Animalium 959B–C: The Discussion of the Encomium on Hunting,” American Journal of Philology 100 (1979) 99–106. Mason, Jim and Peter Singer, Animal Factories (New York: Harmony Books, 1990). Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: Delacorte Press, 1995). Mühl, Max, “Der λόγος ἐνδιάϑετος und πϱοφοϱιϰός von der älteren Stoa bis zur ­Synode von Sirmium 351,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 7 (1962) 7–56. Murray, E. B., ed., The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Newmyer, Stephen T., The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought: The ‘Man Alone of Animals’ Concept (London and New York: Routledge, 2017). Newmyer, Stephen T., “Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium,” in José Ribiero Ferreira, Delfim Leão, Manuel Tröster and Paula Barata Dias, eds., Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch (Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanisticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009) 497–507. Newmyer, Stephen T., Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (New York and London: Routledge, 2006). Newmyer, Stephen T., “Calculating Creatures: Ancients and Moderns on Understanding of Numbers in Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 89, 2 (2008) 117–124. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Human-­A nimal Interactions in Plutarch as Commentary on Human Moral Failings,” in Thorsten Fögen and Edmund Thomas, eds., Interactions between Animals and Humans in Graeco- Roman Antiquity (Berlin and Boston: deGruyter, 2017) 233–252. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Of Pigs and People: Plutarch and the French Beast Fable,” Ploutarchos 13, 1 (1996) 15–22. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Paws to Reflect: Ancients and Moderns on the Religious Sensibilities of Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 75, 3 (2003) 111–129. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Plutarch and Shelley’s Vegetarianism,” Classical Outlook 77, 4 (2000) 145–148. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a Modern Debate,” Scholia N. S. 1 (1992) 38–54. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Plutarch on the Moral Grounds for Vegetarianism,” Classical Outlook 72, 2 (1995) 41–43. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and Plutarch on Animal Reason and the Modern Case against Animals,” Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica N. S. 63, 3 (1999) 99–110. Newmyer, Stephen T., “Tool Use in Animals: Ancient and Modern Insights and Moral Consequences,” Scholia N. S. 14 (2005) 3–17. North, Helen, “Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature,” in Luitpold Wallach, ed., The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) 165–183. Opsomer, Jan, “Plutarch ad the Stoics,” in Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell, 2014) 88–103. Paetz, Bernhard, Kirke und Odysseus: Überlieferung und Deutung von Homer bis Calderón (Berlin: deGruyter, 1970).

174

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pembroke, S. J., “Oikeiôsis,” in A. A. Long, ed., Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone, 1971) 114–149. Pomeroy, Sarah, Spartan Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Puech, Bernadette, “Prosopographie des Amis de Plutarque,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 33, 6 (1992) 4831–4893. Regan, Tom, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Roberts, W. Rhys, The Ancient Boeotians: Their Character and Culture, and Their Reputation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895). Russell, D. A., Plutarch (London: Duckworth, 1972). Ryder, Richard D., Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). Safina, Carl, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (New York: Henry Holt, 2015). Santese, Giuseppina, “Animali e Razionalità in Plutarco,” in Silvana Castignone amd Giuliana Lanata, eds., Filosofi e Animali nel Mondo Antico (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 1994) 141–170. Schuster, Max, Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De sollertia animalium, mit besonderer Berüchsichtigung der Lehrtätigkeit Plutarchs (Augsburg: Himmer, 1917). Scully, Matthew, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002). Singer, Peter and Jim Mason, The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter (Emmaus: Rodale Press, 2006). Smith, Steven D., Man and Animal in Severan Rome: The Literary Imagination of Claudius Aelianus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Sorabji, Richard, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Steiner, Gary, Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). Stratton, Malcolm, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (London: Allen & Unwin, 1917). Tabarroni, Andrea, “On Articulation and Animal Language in Ancient Linguistic Theory,” Versus 50–51 (1988) 103–121. Tirelli, Aldo, “Etica e Dietetica nei De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta,” in Italo Gallo, ed., Plutarco e le Scienze (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1992) 385–403. Tsekourakis, Damianos, “Pythagoreanism or Platonism and Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch’s Moralia,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 36, 1 (1987) 366–393. deWaal, Frans, The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York: Harmony Books, 2009). deWaal, Frans, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1996). West, M. L., The Orphic Poems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). Williams, Craig A., “When a Dolphin Loves a Boy: Some Greco-­Roman and Native American Love Stories,” Classical Antiquity 32 (2013) 200–242. Wright, Jeremy and Christopher Hensley, “From Animal Cruelty to Serial Murder: Applying the Graduation Hypothesis,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 47, 1 (2003) 71–88.

175

INDEX

Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to endnotes. abstention xii, 69, 129–30, 132–4, 143–4, 148–9, 151–3, 159, 163, 166; advocates of 129, 143–4, 164; arguments for 152, 166; Plutarch’s case for 130, 132–3, 143, 151; spiritual arguments for 152 abuse 9–10, 17, 70 Achilles 112, 121n62 Aelian 15–16, 62, 64, 72–91, 93, 121, 124, 145, 169, 173; discussion on the musical tastes of horned owls 62n40; manner of presentation of anecdotes 16n9; and the Nature of Animals 15, 62n38, 62n39, 62n42, 64n51, 64n51, 64n52, 64n54, 72–3, 73–4, 74–8, 79–80, 82–4, 85–91, 93; reproduces the phraseology of Plutarch without mentioning his name 15, 16n9 Agamemnon, King 112, 119n41 Alcinous, King 117n24, 117n25 Alcmaeon 15 Alexander the Great 34, 35n15, 77n154, 77n156, 77, 152n41 allotrion (“alien”) 9, 58n22, 122n69, 163n18 American animal rights organization see PETA anatomy 133, 151n14 ancient literature 15, 102; see also literature ancient philosophy 11, 71, 103; see also philosophy ancient texts 132, 134; see also texts ancient thinkers 7, 149; see also thinkers ancient world 9, 132 anecdotes 11–13, 58–9, 61, 73, 73n109, 74n117, 74n120, 74, 76n141, 76–80,

82–7, 92–4, 151–2, 160, 163; about dogs 52; and anthropomorphization 11–13, 58, 61; of behaviors by dolphins 92n352; at De primo frigido (The Principle of Cold) 76n139; manner of presentation by Aelian 16n9; of “sociability” in non-human animals 65n56 Angell, Tony 73n114 animal behaviors 13, 72, 74, 98–9, 103 animal emotions 61, 171 animal flesh 133, 139, 143–4, 148, 164 animal intellect 1, 12, 15–16, 16n10, 17n21, 57–8, 148n24 animal language xiii, 150n27 animal rights xiii–xiv, xvi, 14, 16–19, 56–7, 59, 62, 126, 128, 132–3, 135–6, 148, 160–1, 166–7, 174–5; movement xii, 148; philosophers 59, 145, 148 animal species 3–6, 8, 10–13, 15, 18n25, 57n17, 63n45, 65n57, 65, 98, 100, 126, 148 animal speech 117n17 animals 25, 134, 138, 142; aiding 92; carnivorous 151; cruelty to 137n24, 137; depriving 27, 133; frugivorous 151n14; homosexuality in 103n12; irrational 5–6, 67, 70, 116, 135, 158–9, 166–7; land-dwelling 14, 21, 24, 34, 41, 84, 130; noxious 166 anthropomorphization 11–13, 19, 38, 58, 59n24, 61n35, 73n112 ants 15, 18n25, 31n11, 31, 32n12, 39n20, 48n31, 74n120, 74–5 arguments xii–xiii, 8, 10–11, 18, 20, 59, 74, 76, 97–8, 114, 116–17, 124,

177

INDEX

83–5, 90n330, 121n57, 121, 154n52, 158n4 birth 5, 7, 27–8, 36, 41, 48–50, 52, 58, 60, 90n327, 91, 91n332, 161, 161n10, 163n18 Black Sea 46, 48n32, 48, 89n309, 89 blood 20n2, 34n14, 35n15, 55, 67n69, 88n298, 113n8, 136n20, 139n994, 142n7, 156, 159 Boas, George 102n4 Boeotia 2, 54, 84, 112, 123, 153 Boeotian swine 153n46 Boeotians 141, 153 Bouffartigue, Jean 12, 14n3, 14, 14n4, 15n8, 15n9, 16, 58n18, 66n64, 72n95, 74n122, 75n128, 75n134, 84n231, 88n296 Boulogne, Jacques 102n8, 103n10 Bréchet, Christophe 103n10 Brenk, Frederick E. 129, 136n8 Brennan, Tad 9, 16n17, 104n17 bulls 29n10, 72n108 Byzantium 45n28, 52, 79n178

132–6, 147–8, 151–2; advanced 128; anatomical 146; fresh 156, 159; scientific/hygienic 133; spiritual 152 Aristotimus 28, 72n95, 72n96, 75n131, 76n140, 77, 79–80, 81n195, 82n203, 82n209, 84 Aristotle 6, 46–7, 53, 68n72, 68–9, 71–3, 78–9, 81, 85–6, 87–91, 116, 120–2, 145, 148–9, 169; History of Animals 6, 64n52, 66n62, 71n93, 72n97, 73n113, 77n149, 81, 81n198, 81, 85–8, 88n298, 89, 90n320, 90–1; Nicomachean Ethics 53n1, 68n72, 116, 118, 120n46n46, 120n49n50, 122, 148n24; Politics 6, 58n21, 59n24, 121n61, 149n27 Artemis 29, 51, 71–2 Asia Minor 77, 120–1 Athenaeus 88, 123 Athenians 34, 70, 77, 135, 141–2, 153, 161, 165 Athens 20, 33–4, 56, 77, 158, 165 athletes 34, 47, 141, 153 Autobulus 9, 20–1, 23–5, 27–8, 54–7, 59n22, 59, 63n43, 63, 63n44, 63n45, 64n48, 64, 69–70, 70–2 Babut, Daniel 16n12 Bagemihl, Bruce 103n12 battles 13, 29–30, 34, 53n37, 54n3, 77n156, 109–10, 119n43, 141n6 Beagon, Mary 15 beasts xi–xiii, xv, 7, 18, 56–7, 62–7, 74–5, 77–9, 81–2, 91–2, 95–7, 99–106, 108–10, 113–15, 149–50; large 89; luring their mates with their own distinct smells 111n6; wild 52, 106 Becchi, Francesco xi, 17, 17n22, 17–18, 63n43, 63 Beer, Michael 132–3 bees 15, 23, 30, 42, 47–8, 50, 73–4, 90, 114 behavior 4, 12–13, 16, 26, 41, 44, 58, 85, 113, 138, 156; aiding 93; devoted 64; instinctual 125; miraculous 144; philosopher’s 152; restrained 82; savage 90, 119; valorous 119 beings see human beings Bekoff, Marc 19n40, 61n35 Bentham, Jeremy 10 Bergua Cavero, Jorge 104n18 besouled nature 22 birds 30, 40n22n22, 40–1, 47n31, 47–8, 73n114, 78n168, 80n194, 80–1,

“Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature” 103n10 cardinal virtues 65, 74n122, 74, 98–9, 103, 117n22, 121n53, 125n92, 127n111 Caria 120n44, 121n62 Carian women 109, 111 carnivores 36, 133–4, 146n18, 147n20, 151n14, 151n31 carnivorous animals 36, 133, 151n14, 151n21 carnivorous diet 151n34 Cartmill, Matt 70n84, 71n84, 72n100 Casanova, Angelo 102n8, 115n2 Castignone, Silvana 17n22 cats 21, 82n211 cephalopods 86n265, 87n270 Chaeronea 2, 54, 56, 153 chemicals 133, 135 Cherniss, Harold 14n2, 135n5 Christianity 101 Chrysippus and his treatise on opposites (Peri enantiōn) 58n19 Cicero 17n20, 62n41, 63n46, 65n56, 66–7, 68n70, 69n73, 74n119, 74, 102n9, 161n9, 169; and the connection of reason and language 67n68; De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the Ends of

178

INDEX

Good and Evil) 7; exposition of the Stoic position on human treatment of non-human animals 71n85 Circe 106–8, 110, 115n2, 115n4, 115n5, 115, 115n10, 115, 116n11, 116, 116n12, 116n13, 117n20, 117, 121n55; conversion of Odysseus’ men into animals 101; and the hesitation of Eurylochus to enter the dwelling of 115n3; mocks Odysseus for his “love of honor” (philotimiān) 97, 115n4; petitioned by Odysseus to reconvert his men 97; words in Plutarch reminiscent of Calypso’ offer to make Odysseus immortal 115 Cirrha 51n984, 51, 92n347 citizens 34, 54, 77n155n155, 77, 119, 121 Civil Rights Movement xii civil war 33 Clark, Gillian xii Cleanthes 31n11, 74n120 Cleomenes, King 22 cognitive capacities 18n33, 71n85 cognitive ethological thought 59n24 cognitive ethologists 11, 92, 145, 150 consumption 21, 143, 147, 151–2, 154, 160, 163; of animal flesh 134, 144, 146–7; human 144, 147–8, 161; of meat 134–5, 162–3, 167 cooked meats 150; see also meats cooking 32, 133–4, 151, 160 courage 18n24, 18, 20n1, 24, 29, 29n10, 31n11, 35n15, 65n56, 66, 98, 103, 108–10, 117, 119–21; of animals 29n9; boar-like in 109, 120n47; intelligent 20; manly 43; of women 109 courageous 25, 109, 119n36, 119 courts 28, 28n9, 93, 122n63, 122n68, 123n83 crabs 16n14, 23, 29n9, 88n297, 88, 88n298, 113n9 cranes 31, 35n16, 45n28, 45, 73, 78, 87, 156, 161 creatures 7, 9–10, 21–5, 28, 42, 44, 46–7, 51–2, 56–7, 86–8, 90, 107–8, 138, 140–2, 157–9; besouled 22, 143; dead 86; irrational 58; little 46; living 57–8, 69, 122, 149; loathsome 139; ordinary 106; rational 58; suffering 154; unborn 156; wild 48 Crete 71, 111, 113, 122 crocodiles 30, 41, 47n31, 47, 49n34, 84n238, 84, 139

crops 56n12, 97, 108, 139n3, 140, 146n17 crows 30, 37, 73n114, 73, 80n193, 81, 110, 113n9, 121, 145, 171 cruelty 20, 71, 97, 124, 133–4, 137n24, 137, 139, 161, 165; to animals 137n24, 137; innate 144n9; wanton 70n83, 133, 156, 161n9 culture 145, 150, 153, 164, 175 cunning 35, 55, 62, 159 curiosity 15, 73 cuttlefish 44, 86–7 Cyclopes 108, 117n24 Cynics 70n83, 95, 99–100, 104n18, 150n31, 150n31, 150n31, 150, 152n38, 172; and Epicurean depictions of ideal human conduct 99; and Stoic diatribe 129; understanding of the concept of “living in accord with nature” 104n18 Darwin, Charles 1 De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the Ends of Good and Evil) 7 death 20–1, 41–2, 52, 55, 71, 77, 84, 91, 93, 132, 134, 149, 155, 157–8, 165; of Crassus 41; embracing 109; king’s 83 deer 21, 23, 25, 29, 42, 85n245, 113n8 Democritus 39n20, 70n79, 82n82, 82n207 desires 23–4, 67, 91n342, 92, 97–100, 110n6, 111–12, 112n8, 132, 134, 146c18, 148c23, 158, 162n11, 163n20 Desmond, William 104n18 Devereux, Daniel 53n1 deWaal, Frans 68n72, 86n258, 150n28 Dickerman, Sherwood Owen 15, 125 Dierauer 134, 135n6 diet 10, 26, 56n14, 67n69, 91n342, 125n92, 130–1, 134, 136, 140, 146–7, 163, 167; carnivorous 67, 130, 140, 143–4, 150–1, 160, 165; fleshy 140; human 160; meat-based 133, 160; meat-free 144 dietetics 82, 125 digestion 133, 140, 143 dikaiosunē (obligation of justice) 9, 98–9, 127 Diogenes the Cynic 152n38, 152n39 Laertius, Diogenes 5, 14n3, 16n10, 59n24, 68n70, 70n79n79, 76n141, 104n17, 122n69, 143n3, 150n31, 152, 153n42, 154n52, 167; Lives of Philosophers VI 119n35, 150n31; Lives of the Philosophers VII 5, 61n37, 76n141, 163n19, 167n42, 167n43

179

INDEX

disease 89, 147 doctrine 16, 58, 68, 100, 104, 129–30, 158, 165–6; ethical 58, 103; of metempsychosis 130, 132, 154n55, 154n56, 163n18, 163, 165n32, 166n35, 166, 166n41 dogfish 49n33, 90n321 dogs 21, 23, 26–7, 35, 39n20, 41, 61nh36, 66, 66n63, 66, 113n9, 125n95 dolphins 43n26, 45n29, 48n32, 51–3, 80, 86n263, 88, 89n309, 92, 92n352, 92, 92n353, 93–4, 171, 175 Dombrowski, Daniel A. 130, 135n2 dragnets 43 drinking 21, 110, 112, 116, 152, 167 dwellings 3, 40–1, 50, 75; see also houses Dyroff, Adolf 12, 15, 17n21, 19n38 eagles 24, 34, 40, 47, 77 eating habits 98, 150, 152 eels 41, 84, 118 eggs 24–5, 31, 48–9, 64, 74, 90 Egyptians 39n20, 40n22, 82n210, 82, 91n342, 91, 113n9, 156, 160n7 elephants 32n12, 36, 37t17, 37n17, 37n18, 43n25, 75n130, 75t136, 79–80, 124–5 emotions 12, 16, 19, 21, 23, 29, 38, 49, 59–62, 93–4, 104, 140, 159, 171–2; animal 61, 171; experiencing 59; moral 61; normative 60 Empedocles 27, 69n78, 70, 130, 137n28, 142n7, 143n4, 145, 154, 157–8, 160, 163n20, 163–4, 164n25; notion of metempsychosis 154; stance on abstention at On Eating Animals 69, 69n78 endorsements 130–1, 166 Epicureans 17n19, 69, 95, 120n45, 162; depictions of ideal human conduct 99; doctrines 69, 162; philosopher 153 Epicurus 27, 69n74, 69, 103n11, 122n69, 122, 162 Eratosthenes 48n32, 165n31 ethical philosophy 11, 58 ethics 1, 16, 46, 137, 173, 175 Euripides 20, 28, 40, 56n7, 56n10, 69, 72n94, 166n37 evidence 2, 4, 7, 11–13, 33, 38, 42, 75n127, 76n142, 125n93, 129–30, 136n9, 137, 153–4, 154n52; anecdotal 12–13, 145; clear 4

evil 7, 59–60, 69, 143 external reason, (logos prophorikos) 81, 150 factory farming 149n26 fear 7, 22–3, 31, 41, 45, 48, 52, 59–61, 87, 98, 107–9, 121, 154, 159 Ferreira, José Ribeiro 93n353, 154n50 Fiddes, Nick 134, 137n25, 147, 151 fishermen 42–4, 47–8 fishes 26–8, 41–4, 44n27, 44, 45n28, 45–8, 72, 81, 88n295, 88, 151n36, 158, 163; angel 90; displaying sociability 43; little 46–7, 141; sacred 48, 89; savage 89; spawning 48 flesh 17, 21, 39, 46n30, 124n90, 133–4, 138, 140–4, 146n14, 147, 154, 156, 158–9, 161n10, 164; cooking 150; eating xiii, 133, 135, 151; human 112; raw 150–1 Fögen, Thorsten 14, 66n62, 93, 103n10, 104n20 food 33–5, 39, 47n31, 47, 68n70, 68, 69n78, 79, 87–8, 98, 112–13, 130–1, 160–2, 161n10, 162n12; choices 57, 70, 130–1, 150, 175; distributing 47; exotic 124, 148, 162; luxurious 161; plant 124, 144; procurable 143; procurement 133; sources 131, 147 frogs 28, 49–50, 90n328 frugivorous animals 151n14 fruits 36, 37n18, 79n177, 112n8, 139 Fusco, Maria 104n20 Gill, James E. 102 gluttony 27, 113, 141, 153, 156 goats 27, 39, 108, 112–13, 117, 121 Golden Age 144n9, 146n16 “governing principle”, hēgemonikon 4, 81n195, 81, 149 grain 31–2, 77, 113, 140, 160 grapes 36 Graver, Margaret R. 60n34 Greece 97–8, 117n19, 153n43 Greek xi–1, 3, 14–15, 53, 66, 68, 76, 96–102, 102–7, 115–20, 122–3, 125, 142–7, 149, 172–5; comedy 102n7; literature 97, 116, 118; literature (ancient) 116n16, 118n32; mythology xiii, 96; philosophical thinking 98, 149; poetry 146; texts xii–xiii, xv–xvi, 68, 72, 88, 116, 125, 142, 147, 165

180

INDEX

Gryllus see Whether Beasts are Rational Guthrie, W.K.C. 145 gyrations 32n12, 75n131, 126n99 “Harm as Deprivation Argument” 133, 148n25 harmless species 143n4, 166n38 Hatzantonis, Emmanuel 105n23 Hauser, Marc D. 60n35 Haussleiter, Johannes 129, 135n1 Hawkins, Tom 100 hawks 25 health 131, 143, 145, 167; human 133, 139, 152; regaining 116 Heath, John 149n27 hēgemonikon (“governing principle”) 4, 81n195, 81, 149 Helmbold, William C. 14n5, 54n2, 56n8, 62n41, 70n83, 79n177, 95–6, 99, 114n2, 125n39, 126n102, 129, 147 Hensley, Christopher 137n24 Heraclitus 27n7, 69n78, 141n6, 153n44 Herchenroeder, Lucas 102n7 Hermippus 128 Herodotus 84, 86, 93, 121, 125, 158, 160, 164 Hesiod 26t6, 33, 52, 68n71, 72n98, 76n146, 121n57, 144n9, 151n31, 155n58 hibernation 36, 39 Hindermann, Judith 124n88 hippopotamus 24, 64 History of Animals 6, 64n52, 66n62, 71n93, 72n97, 73n113, 77n149, 81, 81n198, 81, 85–8, 88n298, 89, 90n320, 90–1 Homer 28n8, 34n14, 43n26, 44n26, 48n32, 85n249, 86, 101, 102n8, 102, 104n20, 115n6, 117n24, 170, 173–4; and Odysseus 53, 97–102, 105–10, 114–18, 121–2, 124, 127, 174; Odyssey IV 117n25, 125n94; Odyssey IX 117n24, 117n25, 127n107; Odyssey V 71n88; Odyssey VI 91n338; Odyssey VIII 71n86, 118n28; Odyssey X 97, 102n8, 115n2, 115n3, 115n4, 115n5, 115n6, 116n12, 118n27, 121n55, 160n4; Odyssey XII 102n8, 115n2, 143n6; Odyssey XIV 78n160; Odyssey XIX 122n63, 127n109

Homeric 72, 115, 125; epics 118; poems 80, 118; scenes 101, 144 homosexual unions 98, 123 homosexuality in animals 103n12 horned owls 23, 62 horses 21, 23, 26–7, 34, 41–2, 48, 52, 66, 77, 82, 89, 108–9, 113, 118 Hortensius (Roman orator) 84 Horty, Philip Sidney 17n21, 17n21 houses 5, 32, 52, 157, 163 Hubert, C. 116n16, 119n34, 126n106, 151n32 human beings 3–11, 13–18, 51–2, 55–70, 75–6, 79–85, 90–3, 96–104, 107–14, 116, 118, 120–7, 131–7, 143–51, 157–67; accorded a moral standing denied to the remainder of animal creation 7; acting with bravery 98; caring about luxuries 98, 122n64; considered by the Stoics as having no obligations toward nonhuman animals 71n85; graduate in their cruelty toward other animals 165n28; jaded 161; loved 124; mating at all hours 123; rational 5, 9–10, 67; sensing their kinship with other humans 58 human form 97, 106, 115 human happiness 167n43 human incontinence 98 human labors 147 human life 5, 9, 27, 69, 99–100, 104, 131, 144n8, 144n9, 145n13, 146n17, 152n38, 161n11 human morality 5, 17, 148 human-non-human animal relations xii, 1, 10–11, 129, 154, 167 human society 162 humanity 142, 153 hunger 21, 112, 120, 138–9, 146 hunters 28–30, 56, 70–3, 78 hunting 2, 10, 20, 28–9, 37, 54, 55n55, 55, 55n55, 55–6, 67, 70–2, 83, 113n9, 172–3; Plutarch’s attitudes on 56n6; practice of 2, 55, 166; Soclarus’ designation of 56n6; tactics 73t113 Iliad 71, 74, 77, 85–6, 89, 117, 119–20, 122 immortality 101, 154 impulse 4–6, 22–3, 102n41, 104n17

181

INDEX

incontinence 98, 157, 161 Indelli, Giovanni xi, xvn1, xvin13 injustice 6–7, 18, 24, 26–8, 67, 69, 131, 133, 147, 149, 159, 161 intellect 3, 6, 8, 17, 21, 23, 32–3, 55, 60, 99, 114, 118; endowments 1, 6, 63, 65; superior 11, 13, 17–18 intelligence xv, 1, 14, 16, 18, 20, 29, 43, 53–4, 73–4, 82–3, 87–8, 113, 148, 170 intemperance 24, 112, 124 intercourse, sexual 98, 110, 112, 121 interests xii–xiv, 1, 3, 5, 10–11, 15, 78, 127, 134, 149, 154; common 48; inordinate 103; potential 9; scientific 17 interlocutors 9, 55, 57, 96, 130; Alexander 103; Heracleon 54; Nicias 119; Solon 18, 69, 131, 160 internal reason, (logos endiathetos) 37n19, 81, 149 interspecies unions 80n186, 124n86 Inwood, Brad 143n4, 145 irrational animals 5–6, 67, 70, 116, 135, 158–9, 166–7 jays 12, 38, 73, 80–2, 171 Jewish philosophers 103 Juba, King 43n25, 79n179, 79n180, 86n259 judgment 4, 7, 49, 59–60, 116; moral 61; and opinions 23; perverse 60 justice 4–6, 8–10, 17n18, 17n19, 17, 18n25, 25–7, 31–2, 63–8, 68n71, 68, 69n76, 74n122, 98–9, 103; birth of 63, 77; calls for 133; covenant of 5, 9, 16, 67, 148, 159; debt of 8–9, 17–18, 104, 158; discussions of 9, 57, 167; human 65, 68, 104, 165; obligation of 9, 18; reciprocal 68, 74–5, 92; relationship of 8, 34, 59, 65, 67, 69–70; sense of 18, 24, 63, 68, 104; share of 24, 70; topic of 65, 77, 103, 167 Kechagia-Ovseiko, Eleni 69n74 killings 70–1, 153, 166 kindness 34, 153, 164; interpersonal 154; toward animals 153 Kindt, Julia xvn6, 173 King Agamemnon 112, 119n41 King Alcinous 117n24, 117n25 King Cleomenes 22 kinship 5, 17n17, 17n20, 18, 57n17, 58n22, 58–9, 65n57, 67n68, 71n85, 85,

163, 167, 175; innate 18; natural 84; theory 58 Kitchell, Kenneth 15n8, 80n189 knowledge xiv, 22, 46, 64, 82, 99, 101, 113; innate 64; mathematical 46; medical 82 Konstan, David 100 Labarrière, Jean-Louis 53 Laches 119n36 Lamberton, Robert 54n2 land animals 28, 41, 43, 52, 72, 84, 131 land-dwelling animals 14, 21, 24, 34, 41, 84, 130 language xi, xiv, 34, 67, 75–6, 88–9, 92, 104, 130, 149–50; articulate 149; human 81; identical 152, 160; meaningful 67, 92, 104, 149; see also animal language Larmour, David H. 14n3 Latin titles 1, 14, 96, 102, 128 lawlessness 70n79, 156n2, 157 laws 26, 29, 71–2, 103, 109, 112, 158, 162–3 leafcutter ants 74, 75n129 letters 22, 103, 130, 161–2 Lewis, David 121n62 LiCausi, Pietro xvn5, 55, 74n120 life 5, 8–9, 14–15, 26, 64–70, 97, 99–100, 111, 129–31, 140–1, 145–6, 148–53, 156–8, 160–1, 171–3; ageless 106; civilized 67; community 24; meat-free 136; organism’s 161; social 64 lifestyles 5, 23, 117, 136, 143, 164; austere 167; contrasting 104; luxurious 113, 150; meat-free xiii, 128–32, 134, 143; refined 151 linen cloths 41, 84n238 linguistic capacities 116n10 lions 23, 25, 29n10, 35n15, 35, 37n17, 108–9, 113, 115hn3, 125n95, 139, 141 logos (reason) 4, 149 logos endiathetos (internal reason) 81, 149, 162 logos prophorikos (external reason) 81, 150 Lucretius 69n74, 116n15, 116n15, 146n16, 162n11 luxury 98–9, 111, 113, 122n64, 124n89, 144, 146, 146n18, 148, 150, 160n8, 161n11, 162, 162n13n13, 162 Lycomedes, King 123n83 Lycurgus 157n2, 162n14, 163n16

182

INDEX

“madness” 4, 26, 139 Maeonian women 109 manhood 121, 129 Martin, Hubert 55 Mason, Jim 137n21 Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff 61 maternal care 90 mathematics 40, 89n314 mating 49, 90n328, 123n73 McCarthy, Susan 61 meals 67, 98–9, 113, 132–3, 138, 141, 157; easily-attainable 98; enticing 140; tastier 146 meat 26n6, 67, 78, 112n8, 125n91, 128, 130–5, 137–8, 140–1, 143, 146–7, 156, 157n3, 159, 167n42; cooking of 150–1; diet 146n17, 151n35, 152n40, 153n42; dishes 150; marinating 150; raw 151 meat eating xii, 131–4, 137n22, 138, 140n5, 142n2, 143n4, 146n18, 146, 151n33, 152n40, 153n42, 156, 159; origin of 144n8, 160n8; psychology of 134 medicine 82n209, 107, 125n95 memory 7, 22–3, 26, 29n10, 41, 48, 53, 84n232, 114, 125n93 Menelaus, King 117n25 mental xiii–xiv, 4, 7–8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 22–3, 26, 92, 94–5, 97, 101, 116, 133; activities 146; capacities 92; disarrangement 66; disorders 26; processes 23 metempsychosis, doctrine of 130, 132, 154n55, 154n56, 163n18, 163, 165n32, 166n35, 166, 166n41 military campaigns 152n39 milk 27, 67, 156 Minos, King 122n63 modern animal rights 9, 160 moral xv–1, 3–7, 9–11, 13–18, 60–1, 64–5, 67–8, 71, 76, 92–3, 101–4, 135–6, 147–8, 170–2, 174–5; distinctions 6; emotions 61; inferiority 57; philosophy 96, 118; standing 4, 7, 13, 71; status 18, 71, 175; values 7, 9–11 morality 67, 150, 166 “moralization” 6 moralizing character 129 Mother Earth 146n17 mother seals 90 mother turtles 90

mothers 24, 36, 38, 49, 55, 90, 124, 127, 139, 157 motion 23, 32–3, 46, 59, 88; constant 46; perpetual 88; rolling 46 mullet 28, 42–3, 72 murder 33, 76, 134, 159 murderers 33, 52 mythographers 32 mythological creatures 12 mythology 123–4 Natural History (Naturalis Historia) 64n54, 64n54, 73n113, 73n114, 73, 74n117, 74–6, 75n130, 77n157, 78n161, 80n192, 80n194, 91–2, 161n9, 161 nature xii, 3, 5–8, 22, 63, 87, 98; changes of 158; living in accord with 8, 123n75; as teacher 82n209 Nature of Animals 15, 62n38, 62n39, 62n42, 64n51, 64n51, 64n52, 64n54, 73n112, 73n113, 73, 74n119, 79–80, 82–4, 85–9 necessity, and dietary choices 161n11 Nemean Zeus (Temple) 52 nervous systems 13, 150 nestlings 25, 28, 35–6, 38, 78, 81, 109, 114 Niceratus 158 Nicias 119, 158, 165 Nicomachean Ethics 53n1, 68n72, 116, 118, 120n46n46, 120n49n50, 121, 122, 148n24 Nile River 49, 84, 121, 139 non-human animals xi–xiii, 1–13, 15–18, 53–5, 57–72, 74–7, 81–4, 91–2, 94, 96–100, 102–4, 116–18, 122–7, 148–50, 162–4; displaying 98; indulging 98; practicing the three divisions of medicine 125; teaching 126 non-human species xi, xiii, xv, 3–4, 6–7, 9, 11, 15, 17–19, 57–61, 63–4, 120, 123–6, 149–50, 165–6 normative emotions 60 North, Helen 103 noxious animals 166 noxious strategies 13 nutrition 87, 137 observation xi, 6–7, 9, 15, 55, 57n17, 70n84, 71n84, 79n184, 82n211, 127n110, 129, 131, 148, 148n24;

183

INDEX

biological 61; direct 12; eyewitness 78, 81; parenthetical 123; pig’s 99 octopus 28, 44–5, 72, 87, 151; devouring itself 72, 87; raw 141, 150, 152 Odysseus 53, 97–102, 105–10, 114–18, 121–2, 124, 127, 174; described by Gryllus as “King of the Cephallenians” 117n19; father of 117n19, 127; and his companion Eurylochus hesitating to enter Circe’s dwelling 115n3n3; and his father Laertes 117n19; and his wife Penelope 119n43; immortality of 115; leads the Cephallenian fleet to Troy 117n19; predilection for trickery 118n29; reputation for quickness of speech and rhetorical brilliance 121n54 Odyssey IV 117n25, 125n94 Odyssey IX 117n24, 117, 117n25, 127n107 Odyssey V 71n88 Odyssey VI 91n338 Odyssey VIII 71n86, 118n28 Odyssey X 97, 102n8, 115n2, 115n3, 115n4, 115n5, 115n6, 116n12, 118n27, 121n55, 160n4 Odyssey XII 102n8, 115n2, 143n6 Odyssey XIV 78n160 Odyssey XIX 122n63, 127n109 oikeion 5, 9, 58n22, 122n69, 163n18, 167n44 oikeiōsis 5, 7, 10, 16n17, 18n33, 58n22, 60n28, 64n48, 67, 163n18, 167n44 oils 30, 141, 150; see also olive oils olive oils 141 omnivorous sea creatures 72n98 Oppian 86n263, 89n304, 90n322 orators 140, 165 organs 24, 160; see also sensory organs “Origins of Life and Origins of Species” 145n9 ornithologists 73 Orpheus 154n57, 161 Orphic 129, 154n57, 155n57, 175; poems 155n57; religion 155n57; teachings 154 owls 23, 62 oxen 42, 113, 134, 158, 165 oysters 31, 88, 101

Paetz, Bernhard 105n23 pain 23, 27–8, 43–4, 59, 61, 71, 82, 90–1, 120, 122, 137, 149, 154, 156; experience of 22 “paradoxography” 15 parrots 37, 80–1 Parthenon 34 partridges 24, 35, 64, 114, 126 passions 80, 99, 112, 139; external 8; unjust 27 paternity tests 90n326 Pellegrin, Pierre 53n1 Pelopidas 141, 152 Peloponnese 23, 51, 84 Peloponnesian War 165nh29 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 10, 18, 70 Peripatetic school of philosophy 60n25 Peripatetics 6, 9, 26, 68, 95 Persephone 51 Persia 83, 122 Persians 43, 54, 86 PETA see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals Phaedimus 21, 28, 40, 77, 82–6, 88 pharmaceuticals 39n20 pharmaceutics 125n95 philanthropy 92n352 Philo of Alexandria 73, 73n112, 73n113, 73n113, 76n141, 81n194, 81, 81n195, 87, 103, 125–6, 126n99, 126–7, 170 philosophers 4, 11–12, 14n3, 14, 16n10, 16n17, 59–60, 60n35, 61, 92, 120, 153n42, 154n52, 158n4, 159; Antisthenes 119n35; Aristotimus 72n103; Jewish 103; natural 60, 122; Xenocrates of Chalcedon 128 philosophical 7, 11, 13, 129–30, 132; adversaries 4; agenda 97; allegiance 96, 99; antecedents xiii; debates 94; doctrines 164; interests 165; questions 131; schools 95–6; topics 2; traditions 95 philosophy xiv, 54, 60, 89, 102; current animal rights 100; ethical 11, 58; modern animal rights 71; moral 96, 118 phronēsis 17, 53, 98, 125 physicians 113n9, 113, 122n67, 125n94, 152n41 physiological capacities 64n47 physiological inferiority 120n51 physiology 140n5, 151n33

184

INDEX

pigs 18, 21, 89n319, 95–103, 105–7, 113, 115n2, 115n9, 115, 115n10, 116, 116n11, 116–17, 117n20, 141n5; castrating 161; eloquent 97; responses 99; talking 96–7, 100–1 Plato 24, 27, 29, 82–3, 103–4, 120–1, 128, 130, 142, 144, 149, 154, 158, 162, 164–5; dialogue 154; and Laches 119n36; and the Republic 103n10, 103, 144n9, 165n31; tripartite division of the soul 103n10 Platonism 135n2, 143n3 playwrights 142n7 pleasures 21, 23–4, 61n114, 61–2, 109–12, 112n8, 113, 121n59, 121, 156, 159–60, 160n6, 162n11, 162, 162n13; sexual 98; unnatural 123n75, 138n2 Pliny the Elder 15, 64–5, 73–5, 90, 119n34, 120n51, 122–3, 144–5, 145n13, 145, 152, 160n3, 161, 170–1, 173; explains that there is a small worm on dogs 66n63; gives an affecting account of how man is cast forth into the world by nature 65; and Natural History 73n113, 73n114, 73, 74n117, 74–5, 77–8, 80n192, 80n194, 84n236, 85, 88, 90, 90n326, 91–2, 161; provides evidence of the industriousness and hard work of ants 75n127 Plutarch xi–xiv, xv–4, 6–8, 10–15, 16–18, 54–60, 61–2, 63–72, 92–3, 95–6, 100–1, 102–4, 129–36, 143–54, 161–5; animal treatises of xi–xiii, xv, 12, 64; argues case for abstention in On Eating Meat 130, 132–3, 143, 151; arguments 10, 126, 133, 148; case for an ethical relationship between humans and other animal species 10; case for rationality in non-human animals 126; challenges the Stoic contention that non-human animals are devoid of reason 4, 6; estimation of the intellect of non-human species 17n22; expresses revulsion at tasting animal flesh 143; and the rational faculty in animal species 3, 8, 65, 99, 126; reliance on anecdote and anthropomorphization 11–12; skepticism on the validity of the doctrine of metempsychosis 166;

treatises on animals xi–xii, 8, 10, 14, 54, 98, 103, 131, 147; works of xii, xiv–xv, 14, 54, 96, 102, 129, 135, 147; zoological lore 12, 18 poetry 78, 89, 116, 123, 146, 171 poison 38, 122 Polemarchus 158, 165n31, 165n31 polemics 59, 148 Politics 6, 58n21, 59n24, 121n61, 149n27 Pomelli, Roberto xvn5, 55, 74n120, 104n21 Porphyry xii, xv, 56n12, 60n26, 80–1, 91, 128, 130, 144, 146, 150, 152–3, 160, 162, 164; assertions on the vocalizations of the jay 82; Neoplatonic philosopher xi, 16, 128; records sacrifices had been restricted to crops 56 Porus, King 34, 77n156, 82n212 Poseidon 50–1, 91 Presocratic philosophers 15 Priam, King 111, 121n62 priests 34, 39, 41, 51, 91 Prometheus 17n22, 27, 63n43, 70n80, 120n51, 144n7, 151n31, 171 Protagoras 120n51 Ptolemy, King 41, 83n223 Puech, Bernadette 14n5 punishment 23, 27, 44, 61, 75, 98, 151, 155, 159, 161 Pyrrhus, King 33, 34n14, 40n22, 76n143, 76n144 Pythagoras 27, 57, 70, 84, 129–30, 136–8, 143–4, 152–3; advocacy of abstention 143, 152; doctrine of metempsychosis 132, 166; and Empedocles 157–8, 163–4; objection to meat eating 142 Pythagoreanism 21, 57, 129, 135–6, 143, 153, 175 Quaestiones naturales 82n209 Quaestionum convivalium libri 72, 130, 160 qualities 3, 29, 95, 97, 108, 114, 117, 135; abortifacient 39; intellectual 117; manly 29; moral 14 rabies 4, 26, 66 rational animals 101–2 rational capacities 57

185

INDEX

rationality xiii, 2–8, 11–14, 17, 22, 57–8, 62, 126, 148–9, 166; animal 2, 7–8, 17, 57, 63, 173; degree of 14, 148; share in 3 reason xiii–xiv, 3–11, 16–19, 22–31, 33, 37–8, 53–7, 62–8, 80–1, 99, 104, 113– 14, 125–6, 135–6, 148–50; imperfect 63; innate 63, 125; inner 149; internal 37n19, 81; shared 99 reciprocity, and justice 68n72 red mullet 51 Regan, Tom 10, 18n31, 133, 136n21, 148n25, 149n25, 149, 160n6, 160, 175 relationships 13, 101; all or nothing 57; ethical 1, 8, 10; juridical 167; uncertain 96 religions 101 Republic 103n10, 103, 144n9, 165n31 rhetoric xiv, 3, 20t1, 59c24, 69c78, 129, 136n8 rights see animal rights River Nile 49, 84, 121, 139 rivers 32, 35, 47–9, 76, 113, 139, 160 Roberts, Rhys 153n43 Ryder, Richard xiii, xvn11, 130, 136n12 sacred offerings 21 sacrifice of animals 37, 56, 143–4 Safina, Carl 146 salt 35, 103, 158 salt water 39; see also water Samarkand 164 Santese, Giuseppina xi, xvn3, xvi, 17n22, 18, 101n4, 145n11, 145, 148, 154, 154n55, 166n34, 170, 175 scholars xii–xiii, 2, 5, 7–8, 14, 16, 54, 63n43, 63, 95–7, 99, 116–17, 129–30, 143, 163–4 schools 4, 46, 56, 64, 69, 93, 99–101, 104; ancient philosophical 162; exercises 56, 66; lessons 107 Schorcht, Claudia 135, 164, 172 Schuster, Max 2, 14n4, 56n8 scientists xiii, 11–12, 61, 92, 118 Scully, Matthew 133, 161n10 sea-creatures 1–2, 8, 11, 28, 34, 40–2, 44, 50–1, 54, 56, 66, 72 sea-dwellers 2, 8, 11, 14, 24, 29, 41, 43, 53, 74, 82, 84–5, 130 sea-hares 51, 91 sea-hedgehogs 45 sea scolopendra 85n252

sea snails 89 sea turtles 90 seafood 130 seals 90 Seneca the Younger 64n48, 125n93, 130 sensation 6–7, 22–3, 40, 46, 57, 88, 122, 138, 157, 163 sense organs 162 senses 4, 13, 20–1, 31–2, 37, 41–5, 47, 50, 58, 111, 138, 141, 143, 162 sensory organs 59 sentences 53, 74, 91, 115, 129, 136–7, 142, 147, 152, 165; final 166; first 147; longer 80 sentience 18n33, 71n85 serial killers 134 sex 98, 109, 112, 123–4, 162, 173 sexual indulgences 100 sexual intercourse 98, 110, 112, 121 Shelley, Percy Bysshe 143c5, 151c14 Sisyphus 114, 127n111 Sisyphus’ reputation 127 skills 20, 44, 58, 73, 75, 113, 127, 134, 139, 145; astronomical 87; empty 113; human 55; imitative 38; impressive problem-solving 73; mathematical 75, 83, 88; nest building 73; technological 60, 145; untaught 125 slaughter 20, 51, 56, 131–2, 134, 139, 142, 147, 149, 157–8, 165–6; of animals 113, 133; experience of 136; of harmless species 143, 166 slaughterhouses 136 slavery 109, 118 slaves 24, 27, 63, 108, 121 smells 111, 136 Smith, Steven D. 15n8 sociability 24–5, 29, 34, 36–7, 41, 43, 46–7, 65, 72, 84–5 social union 65 society 7, 65, 70, 162; civilized 65 Soclarus 2, 9, 20–1, 23–8, 53–4, 58, 65, 67–9; assertion that the rational is counterbalanced by the irrational 58n20; believes that non-human animals have a greater natural propensity toward the production and perfection of virtue than do human beings 62, 161; interlocutor 6, 9, 55, 57; interlocutor of Plutarch 6; and non-human animals 64; and the undesirability of regarding other

186

INDEX

species as “possessed of reason and akin to us” 68 Socrates 24, 40, 95, 119, 145, 154, 165 soldiers 86, 109 solemn oaths 121 Solon 28, 69n78, 71n92, 71, 131, 160n8, 161 solstice 45, 50, 90 Sophists 110, 114, 121 Sophocles 21, 53, 72 sōphrosunē (temperance/moderation) 98 Sorabji, Richard 17n19, 68n72, 154n52 Soteles 51n984, 92n348 soul 4, 20–2, 40, 58–9, 81, 103, 108, 110–11, 114, 122, 141–2, 149, 152–4, 158–9; of animals 4–5, 16, 97, 99, 103, 149; human 131, 135, 152; nonhuman 103 sounds 22–4, 32–3, 38, 61–2, 81–2, 84, 93, 97, 141, 153, 162; articulate 81; inarticulate 133; melodious 153; squeaking 81 source 9, 20, 51, 71, 79, 82, 87, 93, 95–6, 100, 112–13, 139, 146–7, 151, 160; classical 132, 151; common 88, 103; potential 95; secondary xiv; unidentifiable 119 sows 109, 111–12, 119, 156, 161 Spartans 54, 60, 117, 151–2; poets 54; warriors 54; women 119–20, 175 species xiii, 1, 3–13, 15–16, 18, 55–7, 65–8, 98, 103–4, 120–1, 123–7, 133–4, 145, 147–50, 163–4; coveted 161; domestic 147; land-dwelling 2; mammalian 150; predatory 147; sociable 27; tame 147 speech 18, 20, 62, 67, 96–7, 100, 104, 107, 116, 121, 140, 147, 149–50, 160, 165; human 80–1; intelligible 81; meaningful 81; openness of 119 sperm 28, 72 spider webs 73n113 spiders 15n9, 30, 39n20, 46, 73n113, 82n207, 82n208 Stadter, Philip A. 102n5, 115n2 Stoicism 5, 60n34 Stoics 2–7, 9, 16n17, 17n18, 17n19, 17, 55, 58–64, 66–8, 81, 118, 126, 149–50, 164, 166–7; accused of hypocrisy in scorning pleasures 167; argue that reason confers value 10; conception

of animal bonding 5; doctrine of oikeiōsis 10, 18, 64–5, 85; position on human treatment of non-human animals 71; punishing their dogs to instill pain in them 61n36; theoretician and logician Chrysippus 4–5, 7, 16–17, 46, 58, 67, 76, 88, 102n9, 163; theory of opposites 58–9; Zeno 59, 68, 163 sunesis (practical intelligence) 6, 116n11, 145c13, 148c24 surgery 39, 82, 125 swallows 23, 25, 30–1, 39n20, 39, 42, 50n35, 50, 52, 73n112, 73, 74n120, 74, 82n207, 82n208 swans 38–40, 156 swine 115, 153n46 synkrisis (judgment) 14n3 Tabarroni, Andrea 66n62 taste 15, 56, 80, 109, 111, 122, 131, 135, 143–4, 147, 161, 167 temperance 18n24, 31n11, 79n186, 98–9, 110, 112, 112n8, 117n22, 121n53, 121n59, 125n92 Terian, Abraham 103n10 texts 54n5, 55, 95, 98–9, 116, 118, 121, 128–9, 145n11, 147n21, 151, 154–5, 163–4, 164n25, 167n45 Thales 35, 78 theater 27, 39, 113, 126, 159, 166 Theater of Pompey 161 Thebes 119, 152 theft 151 Theophrastus 16n10, 16, 16n17, 16–17, 18n29, 45, 60, 70, 87, 122, 130, 137n28, 146n17 “theriophily” (love of beasts) 102n4, 102, 116n16, 171 thinkers 130, 163–4 Thomas, Edmund 93n353, 103n10 Titans 83, 142, 154–5 topics xii–xv, 2–3, 5, 14, 16–17, 21, 82, 124–7, 135–6, 142, 147, 153–4, 158–60, 162, 165–7 tortoises 24, 39, 49, 90, 113, 125 translations xi–xvi, 5, 16, 20, 95–6, 103, 106, 122, 126, 138, 145, 156, 169–70 treatises xi–4, 6, 8, 13–17, 53–7, 60–1, 69–70, 73–4, 94–5, 102, 125, 127–31, 142–3, 159–64, 166–7; animal-centered 125; on animals xii, 128; ethical 130; lost 16, 18, 55, 146; zoological 71

187

INDEX

Troglodytes 26, 67, 144 Trojan Horse 118 Troy 117–19, 121, 123 turtles 90 unions 80, 124; homosexual 98, 123; same-sex 103 urine 25, 42, 64 Uzbekistan 164 vegetarianism 10, 16, 128–30, 132, 135–6, 148, 154, 163, 171–2, 174 vegetarians 56, 84, 128–32, 134–5, 144, 151, 154 vices 8, 12, 63–4 victims 43–4, 76, 89, 113, 122, 147, 161–2 violence 6, 20, 56, 98, 114; heartless 137; human 6, 137; increasing 56; interpersonal 137; unreasoning 55 virtues 5, 8, 12, 15, 18, 24, 29, 31, 62–4, 74–5, 77, 97–100, 103, 107–8, 118–20; human 144; imperfect 63; life of 101, 104; native 113; production of 97, 108 voices 25, 38, 40–1, 81, 138; harmonious 140; human 80, 82; parrot’s 38; untrained 38 war 9, 27, 54, 70, 109, 113, 134, 157–8 war dances 157, 162 warfare 18, 20, 108, 113 water 30, 32, 35, 39, 44–6, 48–9, 53, 84, 86–7, 90, 92, 110, 115, 145, 152; clear

31; frozen 32; productive 139; salt 39; tainted 82 wealth 38, 134, 165, 167 welfare 48n33, 50n35, 53n1, 71n92, 134, 152 whales 47, 88–9 wheat 31 Wiener, Philip P. 102n4 wine 110, 115, 141, 152, 167 winter solstice 45n29 wisdom 17, 24, 31, 53, 63, 65, 74–5, 98–9, 103, 108–9, 111, 117, 125, 145; animal 99; practical 120 women 27, 39, 109–12, 119, 121, 124, 146, 156 Women’s Liberation Movement xii Works and Days of Hesiod 144n9 wounds 20, 43, 99, 138 Wright, Jeremy 137n24 Xenocrates 70, 128, 135, 137, 142, 154, 161; contribution to vegetarian thought in antiquity 121, 154n52 Xenophon 116n14, 120n51, 121, 122n68, 165 Zeno 5, 16n17, 61n34, 76n141, 104n17, 167n42 Zenobius 78n173, 78n175 Zeus 80, 83, 91, 106–7, 119, 124, 139, 151, 154–7 zoological lore 3, 12, 71 zoology 11

188