Ploughing New Ground: Food, Farming & Environmental Change in Ethiopia (Eastern Africa Series, 38) 1847011748, 9781847011749

Citation preview

Eastern Africa Series PLOUGHING NEW GROUND

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Eastern Africa Series Women’s Land Rights & Privatization in Eastern Africa BIRGIT ENGLERT & ELIZABETH DALEY (EDS)

War & the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia KJETIL TRONVOLL Moving People in Ethiopia ALULA PANKHURST & FRANÇOIS PIGUET (EDS) Living Terraces in Ethiopia ELIZABETH E. WATSON

Eritrea GAIM KIBREAB

Borders & Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa DEREJE FEYISSA & MARKUS VIRGIL HOEHNE (EDS) After the Comprehensive Peace ­Agreement in Sudan ELKE GRAWERT (ED.)

Land, Governance, Conflict & the Nuba of Sudan GUMA KUNDA KOMEY

Ethiopia JOHN MARKAKIS

Resurrecting Cannibals HEIKE BEHREND

Pastoralism & Politics in Northern Kenya & Southern Ethiopia GUNTHER SCHLEE & ABDULLAHI A. SHONGOLO Islam & Ethnicity in Northern Kenya & Southern Ethiopia GUNTHER SCHLEE with ABDULLAHI A. SHONGOLO Foundations of an African Civilisation DAVID W. PHILLIPSON

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Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa KIDANE MENGISTEAB & REDIE BEREKETEAB (EDS) Dealing with the Government in South Sudan CHERRY LEONARDI The Quest for Socialist Utopia BAHRU ZEWDE

Disrupting Territories JÖRG GERTEL, RICHARD ROTTEN­ BURG & SANDRA CALKINS (EDS) The African Garrison State KJETIL TRONVOLL & DANIEL R. MEKONNEN

The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction NASEEM BADIEY

Gender, Home & Identity KATARZYNA GRABSKA Remaking Mutirikwi JOOST FONTEIN

Lost Nationalism ELENA VEZZADINI

The Oromo & the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia MOHAMMED HASSEN Darfur CHRIS VAUGHAN

The Eritrean National Service GAIM KIBREAB Ploughing New Ground GETNET BEKELE

Hawks & Doves in Sudan’s Armed Conflict* SUAD MUSA *forthcoming

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Ploughing New Ground Food, Farming & Environmental Change in Ethiopia GETNET BEKELE

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Jarnes Currey is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) www. jamescurrey.com and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com © Getnet Bekele 2017 First published 2017 The right of Getnet Bekele to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-84701-174-9 (Jarnes Currey cloth) This publication is printed on acid-free paper

Typeset in 10 on 12 pt Cordale with Gill Bold display by Kate Kirkwood Publishing Services

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For my parents Bekele Gebreyes and Meseret Kebede and my youngest brother Dawit Bekele

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Contents List of Maps and Tables Acknowledgements  Note on Orthography Acronyms & Abbreviations Glossary 

ix x xi xii xiv

Introduction1

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1  2

Landscape Pastoral The making and remaking of a grassland environment, 1886–1916

22

Negotiating a Landscape Continuity and change in a grassland environment, 1917–1941

41

3

Blurring the Boundaries The ascendancy of crop production in a flexible environment, 1942–1955

60

4

Fresh Encounters and Morphing Strategies The changing organization of production in an era of agricultural intervention, 1956–1965

81

5

Inputs, Outputs and the Farm Transformations in the science, politics and praxis of agricultural development, 1966–1974

104

6

Competition and Co–existence Creating space for small- to large-scale farming, 1966-1974

124

7

Of Production and Production Relations Farming in an era of revolutionary change and socialist development, 1975–1991

141

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viii

Contents

8

Vicious Circle Agricultural development at the time of ‘revolutionary democracy’, 1991–2016

159

Conclusion174 Bibliography Index

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180 201

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List of Figures and Tables Maps 1 The Lake Region and its Coterminous Highlands 2 The Distribution of Medium- to Large-Scale Commercial Farms  in Ethiopia, c. 1969 3 Grain and Pulse Movements in Central Ethiopia, 1971–73 

xvi 127 139

Tables 2.1 The Distribution of Italian Farms and ‘Zones of Influence’ in Ada  49 by Crop Type and Cultivated Area, c. 1939 3.1 Government Land Granted as Rist in the Lake Region, 1945–1953 71 4.1 Ada’s Estimated Livestock Population, c. 1961 87 4.2 Percentage Increase of Price in Major Food Items in Ethiopia’s  98 Largest Urban Centres in 1958 5.1 Total Area and Number of Participating Farmers in the Ministry  108 of Agriculture’s Fertilizer Trial Programme in the Lake Region, 1967–1970 5.2 Inputs Procurement and Distribution in Ada District 112 Development Project Areas, c. 1973 5.3 Credit Intakes by Small-Scale Farmers in Ada, 1973 and 1974  112 5.4 Acquisition of Farm Credit and Modern Inputs by Small-Scale 115 Farmers in the Southern Region Agricultural Development Project Areas, 1971–1973 5.5 Corn [Maize] Yield per Hectare in the Southern Region  116 Agricultural Development Project Areas, 1970–1973 6.1 Rate of Expansion of Commercial Farms in Arsi Nagelle County,  129 1968–1973 6.2 Percentage of Crop Distribution within Farms in Shashamane  133 and Arsi Nagelle Counties, 1964/65 to 1973/74 6.3 Percentage of Crop Distribution in Maqi River Valley 134 6.4 Percentage of Crop Distribution in Ada Farms, 1960–1974 135 6.5 Average Crop Yield per Unit Area in Ada and the Rest of Ethiopia,  136 c. 1971 7.1 The Distribution of Peasant Associations and Producer  145 Cooperatives in Shashamane County in 1985.

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ix

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Acknowledgements

x

I am grateful for the generous support that individuals and institutions gave to this project. A Horowith Fellowship from the International Institution of Education funded a year-long field work journey in Ethiopia in 2001/02. At Oakland University (OU), the Provost’s Research Fellowship in 2009/10 was crucial for the resumption and progress of my work after many years of interruption and derailment. The US Department of Education-funded Africa Oral History project at Michigan State University gave me yet another opportunity to travel back to Ethiopia for a total of eight months in 2011 and 2012 and to conduct additional interviews that turned out to be useful for the completion of my work. My greatest debt is to my informants whose warm hospitality, intellec­ tual curiosity, and critical insights animated my research almost at every level. While I have acknowledged their contributions and inputs in the pages to follow, I wish to thank in particular Nini Abino, Baqala Nado, Bute Qawati, Dabashe Kebret, Damayo Tuba, Dalu Yemenu, Yerga Walda Gabrel, Tulluro Abam and Abagaz Chure and their families for their hospitality and for helping me feel at home during my many rounds of field trips to the lake region. I am extremely indebted to also the host of Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) personnel based in Addis Ababa and in different parts of the lake region for facilitating my research in every way that they could. This project would not have succeeded without their and my informants’ support. At OU, I benefited immeasurably from the collegiality and support of my colleagues at the Department of History. As Chair, Professor Karen Miller was willing to give me a reduced teaching load for one semester and to arrange also a sabbatical leave that helped me to focus on my research and writing in 2012. I thank her, and my colleague and friend Professor Mary Karash, who took the time to read and comment on the book’s first draft in 2013. Thanks to my colleague Professor George Milne for lending his hand for preparing the three maps that I have used in this book. I wish to thank also Associate Dean Kathy Moore for writing letters of support to me and Jan Baker, my College’s Business Manager, who found a way to provide travel monies for me during my annual sojourns to Ethiopia for the last many years.

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Acknowledgements/Note on Orthography 

xi

In Addis Ababa, the professional support and assistance accorded to me by Tigist Wuhib, the chief librarian at the MoA’s main library and documentation centre, deserves my special thanks. I am also thankful to Professor Tekalign Wolde-Mariam, then Academic Vice President at Addis Ababa University (AAU), for arranging office space for me on Campus. I wish to thank also my relatives and closest friends, including Tadesse Bekele, Mesfin Abebe and his wife Amelework, Nigatu Ayele, Zenebe Taddesse, Hannah Shibre and my partner Miesgana Surur for their unfading hospitality and support. My siblings here in the United States and in Ethiopia and my parents have always been extremely supportive of my work. I don’t have words to express my gratitude and indebtedness. Thank you. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to two of the publisher’s anony­ mous reviewers, whose incisive comments and suggestions saved me from many errors and helped me to significantly revise the manuscript. All the remaining mistakes and shortcomings are of course my own.

Note on Orthography

A book of this sort requires working across a number of languages, cultures and types of source material. I have used the Ethiopian alphabet (Fidel) for transcribing words in that country’s languages. When trans­ cribing consonants, I used gn and ch to represent the palatalized n and c, respectively; q to represent the ejective k; and double consonants to indicate germination. In all other cases, I have used the Library of Congress’ Romanization table without the diacritics. Hence I have rendered vowels of the 1st to 7th orders in Fidel as a, u, i, a, e, e, o, respectively. However, the e of the 6th order is dropped when silent, so as to allow the reader a better chance to pronounce the word relatively accurately. Non-English words are italicized. For the names of persons and places I have followed the same rules of transcription, although in a few cases I have kept the most commonly recognized version, so as to minimize potential confusion.

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Acronyms & Abbreviations

xii

AAISC Awasa Agro-Industrial Share Company AAU Addis Ababa University ACTC Awasa Community Training Center ADB Agricultural Development Bank ADDP Ada District Development Project ADLI Agricultural Development-led Industrialization ALDC Adamitullu Livestock Development Center AMC Agricultural Marketing Corporation ARDU Arsi Rural Development Unit CADU Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit CDC community development centre CSA Central Statistical Authority (later Agency) DA development agent DAP di-ammonium phosphate EA extension area E.C. Ethiopian Calendar EGC Ethiopian Grain Corporation EGTE Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise ELF Eritrean Liberation Front ENC Ethiopian National Corporation EPID Ethiopian Project Implementation Department EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FDI foreign direct investment FFYDP First Five Year Development Plan FO Foreign Office GTP Growth and Transformation Plan ha hectare HSIU Haile Selassie I University IAR Institute of Agricultural Research IDR Institute of Development Research IES Institute of Ethiopian Studies IRD integrated rural development

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Acronyms and Abbreviations 

xiii

kg kilogram LSLAs large-scale land acquisitions MDG Millennium Development Goals MLRD Ministry of Land Reform and Administration MoA Ministry of Agriculture MoARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development MCDSA Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs MESC Middle East Supply Centre MSU Michigan State University n.a. not available NAEIP National Agricultural Extension Intervention Program NCCP National Committee for Central Planning No. number NORAD Norwegian Aid for Development NPK nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium OETA Occupied Enemy Territory Administration OSU Oklahoma State University OU Oakland University PA peasant association PADEP Peasant Agricultural Development Program PADETES Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System PASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty PC producer cooperative q/ha quintal per hectare RRC Relief and Rehabilitation Commission SATEC Société d’Aide Technique et de Cooperation SD State Department SFYDP Second Five Year Development Plan SIDA Swedish International Development Agency SG 2000 Sasakawa Global 2000 SORADEP Southern Region Agricultural Development Project SRI Stanford Research Institute T&V training and visit TFYDP Third Five Year Development Plan USAID United States Agency for International Development WADU Wolamo [Wolayta] Agricultural Development Unit WPE Workers Party of Ethiopia

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Glossary

xiv

asrat  Tithe – one-tenth of harvest paid to the state in kind in lieu of income tax; later (in 1967) replaced by the agricultural income tax awra  One or figurehead awraja District balabbat  Local ruler appointed or reappointed by the state. Often autonomous, balabbat provided the link between local communities and the cen­tral government. Their main responsibilities included tax collection, administration of justice and land distribution balabbat-siso  Land left under the direct jurisdiction of local rulers (balabbat or malkagna). Such properties grew in the parts of the country where statesponsored land measurement (qalad) practices had succeeded after 1879 beta-rist  A specific type of land owned directly by the royal family (including the emperor and his extended family) chisagna  Tenant farmer (share cropper) ehel baranda  Grain market erbo One-fourth

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faranji  Slang for white people. often written and pronounced without the last ‘i’ gabbar  A generic term for tax- or tribute-paying farmer gada  A politico-cultural institution organized and used for administrative purposes by a number of communities residing in different parts of present-day southern Ethiopia at different points in time (but mainly before the twentieth century). Refers also to the person at the helm of that administrative structure gasha  Literally shield. Also refers to a type of land (mainly in eighteenth and nineteenth century Shewa). Later (after 1879) used as a unit of land measurement that ranged in size from 30 to 40 acres, depending upon the land’s level of cultivation geber  Tribute. Also refers to feast or banquets gotara  Grain storage bin (granary) gwaro  Garden, mainly for vegetables hudad  Land directly owned by the government and used

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specifically for food production and supply to the state khat  Chata edulis (also chat or qat) kilil  Post-1991ethnically-based regional states komite  Committee/s lam  Developed or well-cultivated land; fertile (not necessarily referring to organic matter) lam-taf  Partially developed, partially cultivated (semifertile) madarya  Land given by the state to its servicemen and women on a temporary basis (as long as the individual remained in active government duty) madbet  Literally kitchen; land earmarked for the exaction of food materials by the royal court malkagna  Local/regional ruler who retained the power and legitimacy to the office either through military prowess and/ or through (re-)appointment by the state. Also refers to the institution or the office itself maret  Generic term for land

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Glossary 

xv

masa  Major part of farmland, used for grain crops and legumes meslane  Personnel in charge of administering madbet and the provisioning of food and related materials to the state granary in Addis Ababa qalad  Refers to land measure­ ment and sale as conducted by first the Shewan state and then by the Ethiopian state beginning in 1879 and 1897, respectively quintal  100 kg or 220 lbs quter gabbar  A phrase used to refer to tax-paying farmers that had ownership rights on the land already under their control rist  Ancestral or partible land samon  Land under the control of the church or land over which the church exercised tributeexacting rights siso One-third taf  Uncultivated land warada County wara-ganu  Pasture field under state control or jurisdiction zamacha  National Development through Cooperation Campaign

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Map 1 The Lake Region and its Coterminous Highlands

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Introduction

Has Ethiopia become all of a sudden the next legible frontier of ‘agroimperialism’? The American journalist and writer Andrew Rice seems to think that way. In a scintillating article that he published in 2009, Rice, like many after him, revealed how: ‘Fearing food shortages, investors from Saudi Arabia and other wealthy countries are snapping up land in poor countries like Ethiopia in order to grow food there’1 and ship it back home in large quantities. They wondered if such practices amounted to ‘neocolonialism’ or ‘development’?2 If the majority of the studies that invoked that binary tended to focus on global, macropolitical and macroeconomic issues, what concerned other groups of writers and critiques, including the internationally active rights groups such as GRAIN and the Oakland Institute, was the threats that the resultant practices, most notably the proliferation of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) and large-scale commercial farming pose on the micro-environment and the livelihood practices of ‘indigenous’ populations.3 Consequently, they presented evidence and arguments contradicting the official Ethiopian government and World Bank view that exaggerated the virtues and potential of largescale commercial farming.4 To be sure, there is nothing sui generis or unprecedented in the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)’s policy on large-scale commercial farming. Aside from being a global phenomenon, the theory and practice of large-scale commercial farming has also a relatively long, albeit convoluted, history in Ethiopia, one that can be traced back to the first three decades of the twentieth century. Yet, what is remarkable about that history is not its longevity. It is, rather, largescale commercial farming’s inability to thrive, endure and become a viable undertaking in Ethiopia during in the twentieth century that is remarkable. Rice, 2009: 46-51 Robertson and Pinstrup-Anderson, 2010. See also Mulleta et al., 2014. Makki, 2014. Lavers, 2012. Dessalegn Rahmato, 2011. Abbink, 2011. 3 Oakland Institute, 2013; GRAIN, 2008. 4 MoARD, 2009; World Bank, 2004. 1 2

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2

Ploughing New Ground

On the contrary, smallholder agriculture has proved to be the most durable, most versatile and socially most sustainable sector in Ethiopia all along. In addition, smallholder agriculture has rendered meaning and direction to the science, politics and practice of agricultural development in Ethiopia for most of its history. Strikingly, these were the trends and the realities that EPRDF has sought to occlude, reverse and alter drastically when it made the decision to pivot large-scale commercial farming as the epitome of its so-called Agricultural Development-led Industrialization programme (ADLI) in 2008. As records show, the more than 3.5 million hectares of land that the Ethiopian state set aside for large-scale commercial farming that year was one of the largest in Africa.5 No less colossal have been also the multiple territories that the state has stealthily reclaimed and enclosed for other types of development projects in the course of the last two decades. Noteworthy among these have been the sizeable enclosures that were formed in the wake of the launching of the government’s equally ambitious plan for damming most of the country’s major rivers, including Tekeze, Gibe, Omo and Abbay (Blue Nile), beginning in the mid to late 1990s. Similarly, the pressure exerted on local resources and local populations by the state’s foray into the organization of brand new sugar estates specifically for ethanol production was considerable. A relatively new addition to that list of state-created enclosures can be found in the ‘industry parks’ that have started to crop up in the outskirts of some of the country’s major cities after 2011.6 It is important to note that in Ethiopia the state is by law the ultimate proprietor of all landed properties, including those in the urban areas. When seen from that angle, the speed at which the state was able to organize such expansive enclosures around the country was anything but surprising. Yet these were also the policies and practices that faced strong cords of resistance and resentment from local populations almost everywhere. Nothing illustrates that point better than the wave of mass riots that erupted in many parts of Ethiopia between November 2015 and October 2016. These riots were of particular concern to the ruling party because of their predominantly rural constituency and their tendency to litigate and negate the state’s much publicized and politically charged development agenda that has been in place since 2005. Consequently, the administration responded to these land riots with full force and by declaring a countrywide state of emergency that became official on 9 October 2016. That number has tripled since, and the official figure stands now at around ten million hectares. MoARD, 2009: 1-2. For scholarly studies dealing with that subject matter, see Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; De Schutter, 2011; Geisler, 2012. See also Hall et al., 2015; Wolford et al., 2013; Cotula, 2011; Cotula and Vermeulen, 2009. 6 For a summary of these projects and the rationale, see MoFED, 2010. 5

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Introduction

3

It may be too early to decipher the law’s short- and long-term impact on Ethiopian politics and economy. Nevertheless, the riots’ onset and propagation revealed a couple of major points that are worthy of our attention. First, these riots and their magnitude exposed rather dramatically the fragility and precarious nature of the extant political situation in Ethiopia. Second, the riots’ predominantly rural constituency and the dispossessions that catalysed them have also an even greater academic import in that they brought to sharp focus the underlying currents and contradictions in the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment. In this book I make the case for a spatially mediated interpretation of the history of agrarian politics and of agricultural and environmental change and transformation in Ethiopia in the course of the modern era. This is an important undertaking because thus far most of the focus has been on global determinants, the national political economy and the interplay of climatic and demographic factors. The contribution that studies focusing on one or more of these subjects and others have made to our understanding of the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment is huge. However, there are still a lot of ‘grey areas’, ‘dark spots’ and unanswered questions that deserve careful scrutiny. For example, little is known about the nexus between spatiality and agrarian and environmental change and transformation in the history of modern Ethiopia. Understanding that nexus is this book’s primary thrust.

MUTATION OF A SCHOLARSHIP It is important to note that in Ethiopia, as in most other parts of Africa, agriculture is not only the mainstay of the national economy. Rather, it is a way of life for the majority of the populations. That majority is considerably large, comprising at the present time nearly 80 per cent of Ethiopia’s more than 90 million population.7 Alas, no other sector of the Ethiopian economy has been able to engage and to support such large groups of populations as agriculture has done for centuries or millennia. Put another way, nowhere else have Ethiopia’s diverse groups of populations been most successful in their day-to-day activities as they have been in agriculture. Their level of success has been impressive, at least by African standards. Yet few other subjects have conjured as many different and often contradictory images in the scholarship as has the history of Ethiopian agriculture for the last many decades. Just as many a scholar and writer have been accustomed to depicting that history in a positive light, often by emphasizing the salubrious nature of the country’s predominantly highland environment and the antiquity, diversity and potential of its 7

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The Ethiopian censuses are notoriously unreliable. For the last census data, see CSA, 2012: 78-81.

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Ploughing New Ground

agriculture, others liked to present a picture that amplified its myriad problems, challenges and weaknesses.8 Strikingly, this second view has dominated the scholarship for most of its history.9 Complicating our understanding of the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment have been some of the entrenched narratives, frameworks and assumptions regularly encountered in the secondary literature. Of these, evidently the most influential had been the narratives that told the history of Ethiopian agriculture, populations and landscapes in light of certain rigidly defined and immutable dichotomies, such as north versus south, Semitic versus Cushitic/ Omotic/Nilo-Saharan, cereal and cattle complex, and centre and periphery. The majority of these dichotomies owed their origin to the European missionary and colonial literature that spanned the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries.10 Despite their relatively distant and often controversial origin, these dichotomies and the narratives that they fed were able to endure and to attain also near teleological status in the literature beginning in the 1960s and early 1970s. No less pervasive and influential has been the so-called feudal para­digm that has also an equally long history in Ethiopia.11 European missionaries of the late-nineteenth century may have been the first to use the term ‘feudal’, when referring to the tributary (gabbar) regimes then widely spread in Ethiopia. But it was only after the mid-1930s that the feudal paradigm was able to gain a foothold in the literature. Its major promoters had been the group of Italian colonial officials and writers that stumbled on Ethiopia during the five-year occupation period (1936-41).12 The paradigm appealed to them for the same reason that ‘abolition’ and ‘commercialization’ did to their mid- to late-nineteenth century counterparts then active in the parts of Africa where the European drive for colonization had succeeded the most. Moreover, as if to compensate for the lost half century, the Italians were now ready to not only invest heavily in the area of infrastructure For a useful review of the literature, see McCann, 1991; Crummey, 1990. See Cohen and Weintraub, 1975; Stahl, 1973. See also Timberlake, 1985. 10 Among these certainly the most productive and the most influential were Italian scholars and fascist intellectuals-turned-full-time Ethiopianists in the post-World War II period. Representing these two groups of Italian scholars and writers were, respectively, Conti Rossini and Enrico Cerruli, who could well be described as the founding fathers of Ethiopian history, ethnography and linguistics. This is particularly true for Rossini, whose pioneering works on Ethiopian history was responsible for the course the historiography took in the following many decades. Aside from renewing the Italian dominance in the historiography, Cerruli and his contemporaries were able to present also a counter-narrative of equal significance. Indeed, their scholarship was what set the stage for the rise of what may be referred to as the colonial thesis in the historiography. For a useful review of the Italian colonial literature in Ethiopian agriculture, see Larebo, 1994: 13-27. 11 For a useful critique of that paradigm, see Ellis, 1976. For comparison, see Crummey, 1980. 12 On Mussolini’s use of that term and Haile Selassie’s objections, see Zewde Reta, 2013: 152-58. 8 9

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Introduction

5

development but also to produce large bodies of literature dealing with Ethiopian history, agriculture and ethnography over the course of just few years. One of their primary objectives was of course the production of counter-narratives that worked to their advantage. Their feudal paradigm owed its origins to that undertaking. Not without paradox, that was also one of the analytics and narratives that was able to survive the end of the occupation period relatively intact. This was mainly because of its appeal to the generation of students and academics that came of age in Eritrea and Ethiopia after 1960. According to this paradigm, the Ethiopian state had been for most of its history an inherently feudal yet overly centralized institution. Moreover, it had been a predatory, exclusionist and irresponsible state almost at every stage of its development. To paraphrase, that state was not only parasitic by nature but its primary raison d’être was also to bleed its ‘host’ to death. The host in this case was none other than the ‘downtrodden’ mass of peasants that tilled the land and paid ‘astronomically high’ rates of tributes or taxes to the feudal lords, whose interest the state was bent on protecting and promoting by any means possible. When seen from that angle, the history of Ethiopia in general and that of its agriculture in particular has been, therefore, a history of domination and exploitation of one class by another. In short, it was a history of class struggle. If viewing history strictly through the narrow lenses of class domination and class struggle was an exclusively Marxian affair, Marx’s ideas about ‘modes of production’ were what appealed to the scholars that liked to apply his thoughts and teachings to the Ethiopian case with little or no modification.13 The fact that the past and present of Ethiopian agriculture have been subjects of overriding interest and scrutiny across many disciplines means that it is difficult to do justice to the scholarship in a review like this. Nonetheless, it is possible to reconstruct the scholarship’s genealogy and history based on certain tractable benchmarks. Two different groups of writers were responsible for laying the foundation for that scholarship in the first three decades of the twentieth century. To the first group belonged the generation of Ethiopian writers that had the opportunity to travel to and study in Western Europe and Russia beginning in the late-nineteenth century.14 Interestingly, agriculture and the food supply chain were among the subjects that concerned them the most right from the outset. This was

Cohen and Weintraub, 1975; Stahl, 1973; Gebru Tareke, 1991; Addis Hiwot. 1975. A corollary to the feudal paradigm has been the interpretation of Ethiopian history through the lens of ‘national domination’. Like the feudal paradigm already mentioned, the notion of national (tribal) domination had its origins in the works of Italian fascist intellectuals and colonial officials of the 1930s. 14 For a full-length study of the lives, works and aspirations of this group of Ethiopian writers, see Bahru Zewde, 2002. See also Tekalign Wolde-Mariam, 1995: 172-86. For an English translation of one of Gebrehiwot Baykadagne’s manuscripts, see Tenkir Bonger, 1995. 13

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Ploughing New Ground

not necessarily because of their academic training. More important was, rather, the worsening food condition in Addis Ababa that they came to witness first-hand following their repatriation from Europe in the years leading up to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Interestingly, food and agriculture were among the subjects that concerned the second group of writers as well. To this group belonged the host of Italian writers and colonial officials of the occupation period. It is important to note that in terms of qualification, there was in fact very little or no difference between this group of Italians and their Ethiopian predecessors already mentioned. Likewise, their modernist precepts were not different from each other. Yet the prism through which they inter­ preted the past, present and future of Ethiopian agriculture could not be any different. For example, unlike the Ethiopian writers that did not doubt their country’s ability to modernize its agriculture, the food supply chain and state administration, albeit mainly by adopting Western ideas, institutions and technologies, to their Italian protagonists that goal could only be achieved with metropolitan intervention and colonization. Simi­ larly, the pseudo-scientific ideas about race and tribe that the Italian writers and colonial officials had affectionately espoused were antagonistic to the views enshrined by their Ethiopian predecessors. As already indicated, the colonial alternative advocated by Benito Mussolini succeeded in Ethiopia for only a brief five-year period. Yet the Italian colonial discourses and narratives were able to outlive the occupation period by many decades.15 The same was true for the ideas propounded by the aforementioned groups of Ethiopian writers, which, despite the setback that they faced during the Italian occupation period, were nonetheless able to recover and to remain popular in scholarly and political circles alike for many decades to come. Indeed, it is difficult to understand the path that the scholarship on Ethiopian history and agriculture traversed in the post-World War II period without taking into consideration the influence coming from these two groups of writers. Such continuities notwithstanding, the changes that had started to take place in Ethiopia and internationally after 1945 permitted also the production of a new genre of reports, surveys and studies dealing with one or another aspect of Ethiopian agriculture. These studies can be divided into two different categories. To the first category belonged the range of surveys and studies conducted between 1952 and 1975 by the specialists affiliated with the newly reorganized Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the California-based Stanford Research Institute (SRI), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the British Land Resource Division and similar internal and international institutions.16 If the majority of these reports and studies were developmentalist by For more on this subject, see for example Erlich, 2002. See, for example, Westphal, 1975; Carl F. Miller et al., 1968; Huffnagel, 1961; Ministry of Agriculture (Ethiopia), 1953; Miller, 1953.

15

16

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Introduction

7

nature, those in the second tier that joined them about the same time were different in terms of their places of origin and their objectives. This was particularly true for the academic studies originating in Ethiopia’s fledgling institutions of higher learning and research after 1954. In addition to teaching academic subjects, these institutions, namely the Imperial College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts that opened in Alamaya (near Harar) that year, and Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) in Addis Ababa, were able to become important centres of scholarly research and publication fairly quickly. Furthermore, these institutions were able to host international scholars and fellows that maintained interest in the study of Ethiopian agriculture and farming communities. Consequently, the next two decades witnessed the publication of an increasingly large number of scholarly articles and monographs dealing with the antiquity, cultural history, politics and economics of Ethiopian agriculture.17 When seen from that angle, the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution in September 1974 was a major disappointment. To be sure, the military administration (the Derg) that seized power in Addis Ababa at the revolution’s onset that year was not anti-intellectual. Yet its policies and politics had a shrivelling effect in the institutions that had been major centres of agricultural research and publication in Ethiopia for two decades. That setback notwithstanding, the revolution years saw nonetheless the publication of a sizeable number of articles and monographs of varied significance.18 But unlike the previous two decades, most of the focus now shifted to only a small number of subjects. Of these famine was certainly the undisputed winner.19 Grain marketing and villagization were the other two subjects that garnered greater attention in the scholarship beginning in the early- to mid-1980s.20 It is striking to note that in Ethiopia there was often direct correlation between politics, government policy and the subjects of interest in the agricultural literature. Additional evidence to that argument can be found in the scholarship of the last two decades that responded well to the political and policy related changes that materialized at the macro level following the Derg’s demise in May 1991. If first liberalizing the food market and then promoting agricultural extension services were two of the subjects that concerned its successor EPRDF administration in the For studies that focused on land tenure and related matters, see Mantel-Niećko, 1980; Bauer, 1985; Hoben, 1973; Weissleder, 1965. For a relatively recent addition to that list, see Crummey, 2000. 18 See, for example, Hansson, 1995; Mesfin Wolde Mariam, 1991; Watt, 1988; Hurni, 1988; Alemneh Dejene, 1987; Hoben, 1996. See also Christopher Clapham, 1988, a near definitive study of the structural changes that took place in Ethiopia’s politics and economy in the revolution years. 19 Jansson et al., 1987. For politically charged studies, see Dawit Wolde, 1989; Kaplan, 1988; Clay and Holcomb, 1986. On the 1973/74 famine, see Nolan, 1974. On the 1958/59 famine, see Mesfin Wolde Mariam, 1984. ­20 Alemayehu Lirenso, 1983; Cohen and Isaksson, 1987. 17

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Ploughing New Ground

next decade, these were also the subjects that became the scholarship’s major staples in the 1990s and early 2000s. Similar was also the effect that the government’s latest policy on large-scale commercial farming had on the relatively different direction that the scholarship has taken in the course of the last decade.21 From these, it is clear that the scholarship on Ethiopian agriculture has a relatively long history. Yet, for most of its history, that scholarship remained the exclusive prerogative of trained agronomists and economists. Anthropologists, archaeologists, geographers and political scientists started to join the debate after 1960. Historians followed suit almost two decades later. Among the subjects that concerned this pioneering group of historians, certainly the most important had been land tenure, cash crop production and exchange, famine and farming systems.22 If these were also the subjects that had enjoyed greater attention in the social science literature of the previous three decades, the historians’ intervention was important for certain notable reasons. These include their relatively different methodology and their interest in exploring the agricultural histories of the populations and the parts of the country that had rarely been the focus of rigorous study in the past. Noteworthy also is the historians’ success in bridging the gap that developed between the Ethiopianist and Africanist literature since the 1960s. Without a doubt, the scholarship on Ethiopian agriculture is one of the largest. Yet there is still a whole lot that we do not know about its history. For example, little is known about the changes and transformation that have taken place in Ethiopian agriculture and environment between 800 and 1800 CE. Even though the modern period has fared relatively better than the others, there are still many parts of the country, and a host of subjects, that have remained outside of the scholarship’s gaze to this day. A notable case in point is livestock production, which, despite its remarkably long history, has remained nonetheless as one of the least studied subjects to date. Ethiopia was not the original centre of animal domestication in the world. That distinction goes to Eurasia.23 However, it is difficult to understand the history and diversity of Ethiopian agriculture and environment in a satisfactory manner without taking into consideration livestock production. In fact, unlike the crops that responded well to certain types See, for example, Kassahun Berhanu, 2012; Belay Kassa, 2003; Rashid and Asfaw Negassa, 2012; Berhanu Abegaz, 2004. 22 The best example of that comes from the studies that James C. McCann conducted after 1995. Aside from breaking away from the political economy school of thought that had dominated the scholarship in the previous several decades, McCann was able to study such subjects as demography and climate more rigorously than ever before: McCann, 1995. See also Ezekiel Gebissa, 2004; Crummey; 2000; Tekalign, 1995; Daniel Ayana. 1995; Gulema Gemeda, 1996; Adhana Haile Adhna. 1996. 23 Diamond, 2005; Ehret, 2002. 21

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Introduction9

of climates and soil types than to others, livestock production seems to have been an almost all-Ethiopia affair since prehistoric times.24 This was particularly true for cattle, goats, sheep and donkeys, which were among the animals that the majority of Ethiopian farmers used to successfully breed for thousands of years. Camels and horses were the other animals that figured prominently in the Ethiopian region since at least the middle of the first millennium CE. However, unlike cattle and donkeys, which seem to have had a much greater geographic representation in Ethiopia, the adoption and use of camels and horses tended to show significant variation across space and time. This was not only because of microclimatic and disease-related factors alone. No less important had been also the cultural and political factors that morphed constantly over time. Unlike livestock production, the crop side of Ethiopian agriculture has been the focus of numerous studies.25 This was particularly true for enset, coffee and khat, which had been the focus of numerous studies in the last half century.26 A relatively new addition to that list pertains to corn/maize.27 Unlike corn/maize – which was a New World crop – coffee and khat were indigenous to Ethiopia. Yet more than their indigeneity, it was, in fact, their cash crop status and the kind of demand that they had enjoyed in the international market that augmented coffee and khat’s place in the scholarship in the last many decades. Enset is different from that in that it is still a uniquely Ethiopian cultivar. Indeed, that distinction and the plant’s geographic propagation with in Ethiopia were what made enset – much like coffee and khat – such an attractive subject to the scholars specializing in the Ethiopian south. According to the group of scholars that focused on coffee, the dramatic surge in cash crop production and marketing that started to take effect in Ethiopia beginning in the last two decades of the nineteenth century marked a watershed moment in that country’s history. On the one hand, these decades witnessed the birth of the modern Ethiopian state in a process that many a scholar was tempted to equate with that of the rest of Africa then under European control. On the other hand, the same period saw the country’s successful integration into the newly reorganized international economic order on equally fresh grounds. In both cases, coffee was presumed to be at once the subject and object of Ethiopia’s proverbial march to the south and an enabling factor in its bid for integration into that economic order. In short, coffee was, according to that view, the one For some useful beginnings, see Phillipson, 1993; M. Alberro and S. Haile Mariam, 1982; Zaphiro Tesfaye, 1951. For works that deal with the modern period, see Scoones and Wolmer, 2002; Gryseels and Anderson, 1983. For comparisons with other parts of Africa, see Webb, 1995. 25 For a pioneering study dealing with that subject matter, see Vavilov, 1951. See also McCann, 1995. 26 Brandt, 1997; McClellan, 1988, 1980, 2002; Olmstead, 1974; Shack, 1966; Simmonds, 1958; Peters, 1952; Greenway, 1947. 27 McCann, 2005; Abebe Gobezie et al., 1975. 24

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Ploughing New Ground

crop that ensured the economic grounding of empire in Ethiopia, the same way as peanuts, cocoa, cotton, viticulture and livestock did in the parts of Africa where the European drive for colonization had succeeded the most in the late-nineteenth century. This book embraces a different methodology and perspective. First, contrary to the little or no attention that the politics and practice of food production and supply has received in the cash crop literature, my study seeks to position them at the centre of the debate on the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment. Second, rather than embracing the aforementioned dichotomies, such as north and south, or Semitic, Cushitic, Omotic and Nilo-Saharan as established and irrefutable facts, this book reveals their discursive origin and their irrelevance to our understanding of agricultural and environmental change and transformation in the history of modern Ethiopia. Third, unlike the studies that gave too much emphasis to structural factors and the international economic order, my analysis seeks to pivot agency. Yet rather than indulging on the structure versus agency debate that has pervaded the Africanist literature since the 1990s, my analysis attempts to transcend that binary by enunciating the notion of governmentality.28 Finally, and most importantly, this book takes spatiality seriously.29 Economic and human geographers may have been among the first to apply that analytic to the African situation beginning in the 1990s.30 Noteworthy are also the anthropological studies that have come to fruition in the course of the last decade. The best example of that comes from the book that Donald S. Moore published on Zimbabwe in 2005. His study is important because it marked a clear departure from the classical anthropological view of ‘rooting culture to place’.31 Consequently, his historically grounded study revealed how ‘cultural practices, social relations, and political economic processes meld with the materiality of milieu, producing place’.32 Building on Moore’s analysis, my study seeks to place spatiality at the centre of the debate on causation and change in the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment. This is an important point because in Ethiopia, as in most other parts of Africa, agriculture had never been a purely industrial enterprise that could then be studied strictly from the vantage point of what modern economists had referred to as ‘factors of production’. In addition, it is difficult to pigeonhole some of the ‘factors’ in that bundle as ‘objects of production’, the same way as the scholars that embraced the This is a useful analytic because it helps us to understand how ‘political technologies guide, encourage, and orchestrate actions among subjects, whose agency became deployed – rather than destroyed – by government’: Moore, 2005. 29 Casey, 1997; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Feld and Basso, 1996; Lefebvre, 1991; Foucault, 1984. 30 Peters, 1994; Carney and Watts, 1990. 31 Moore, 2005: 18. 32 Ibid.: 19. 28

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Marxian school of thought have attempted to do in Ethiopia in the course of the last half century. One of my major objectives in this book was, therefore, to look at the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment not only from the vantage point of commodity production and exchange, but from that of spatiality as well. The analytic appealed to me not because it is an innovative and game-changing theory in and of itself. Rather, it is because of the opportunity that it gave me to describe and interpret the causes and directions of agricultural and environmental change and transformation in Ethiopia in relatively new light that spatiality was able to appeal to me, as I was preparing this manuscript for publication.

MAPPING, SITUATING AND DEBATING A LANDSCAPE In a book chapter that he published in 2001, the historian David Ludden demonstrated the comparative advantage that a regionally grounded study could offer to our understanding of the agricultural histories of nonWestern societies around the world.33 Ludden was responding to the socalled subaltern studies that had proliferated in South Asia (most notably in India) in the previous several decades. Unlike the subalterns that interpreted the history of Indian agriculture almost exclusively from the vantage points of the ‘local’ and the ‘social’, Ludden pitched a ‘regional’ and ‘cultural’ approach. Interestingly that has also been the perspective that has come to enjoy greater currency in the Africanist scholarship in the course of the last three decades.34 This book embraces the same methodology and perspective. Its major area of focus is Ethiopia’s lake region, the predominantly agricultural area that straddles present-day Debre Zeit (Bishoftu), Awasa (Hawassa), Nazareth (Adama) and Buta Jera towns in the north, south, east and west, respectively.35 On the map and on the ground the area that I have referred to here as the lake region flies in the face of the equally artificial territories and boundaries that Ethiopia’s past and present administrations have repeatedly delineated and demarcated, if mainly for controlling populations and resources by manipulating space. The lakes are one of this region’s easily distinguishable markers, even from outer space. They can be divided into three groups. Clustered around the region’s northern part, the first group of lakes comprises Hora, Bishoftu and Kuriftu. Geologists have termed these as ‘crater’ lakes because of the natural processes that were responsible for their formation millions of years ago. The second group of lakes is different from the first in terms Ludden, 2001. See, for example, Anderson, 2002; Giles-Vernick, 2002; Guyer, 1997; Scoones and Wolmer, 2002; Maddox et al., 1996; Feierman, 1990. 35 Recently the Ethiopian Government has been busy renaming some of the country’s cities all over again. In this book I use the names that had been in official use at the time of my fieldwork. 33 34

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Ploughing New Ground

of their origin and their relative location in that region. According to geologists, this group of lakes trace their origin to the fault that created the Great Afro-Arabian Rift Valley sometime in the mid-Pleistocene era. Most of the lake region and its second tier of lakes, namely Zway, Langano, Abijata, Shalla and Awasa, are situated within that valley. In terms of sheer size and level of alkalinity as well, the rift valley lakes are significantly bigger than and markedly different from their northern counterparts.36 Then there is Lake Qoqa (Galila), which is different from the others in that it is artificial. It owes its origins to the major hydroelectric dam that the Ethiopian state built at the confluence of two of the lake region’s major rivers, Modjo and Awash, in 1958. If in the past these two rivers had served as the natural boundaries of the northern and southern clusters of lakes already mentioned, the dam’s construction that year was important because it blurred that division by creating an artificial lake in their midst and in the part of the lake region that had been devoid of such large bodies of water for millions of years. These lakes are certainly this region’s unique markers. Yet, when seen from the vantage point of the local populations’ livelihood practices, these lakes are not as important as they appear from a distance. More important are, rather, the rivers, which have been major sources of drinking water to humans and animals. Among these, certainly the most important have been the region’s largest rivers that included Dukem, Modjo, Awash, Bulbula, Maqi, Gidu, Daddaba and Belate. The fact that these rivers have been the primary sources of drinking water meant that the valleys near and around them were what had been major sites of human settlement and productive activity for centuries.37 Rainfall was the other factor that has contributed to the organization of habitats and sites of production in the lake region over the centuries. As the available meteorological data, which covers only the last half century, suggests, this region, like most other parts of Ethiopia, has a bimodal rainfall pattern. It receives most of its rains during the wet (summer) season, which lasts from June to September. Also important are the showers that come and go in March and April. Yet not all parts of the lake region receive the same amount of rainfall each year. While the rainy season is shorter and the showers more erratic in the region’s central part (near Lakes Zway and Langano), that trend changes significantly in its northern, western and southern parts, where the rate of precipitation is much higher. On average, the total amount of rainfall that this region annually receives ranges from 600 to 1000 millimetres, depending upon the location. In general, the For a geological and bio-geographic study of these lakes, see Ethiopian Institute of Geological Surveys, 1985. See also Last, 1962. 37 My summary here is based on evidence acquired from oral informants. Interviews: Azmach Dallu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001; Buta Qawati, Shashamane, 9 January 2001; Tulluro Abam, Marajo, 12 June 2000. 36

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intensity and durability of the rains tend to progressively increase as one moves away from the central part near Lake Langano.38 In Ethiopia altitude is a major determinant of climate.39 The lake region’s altitude is more regular than most other parts of the country. With few exceptions, this region has an altitudinal range of 5,250 to 5,905 feet (1600 to 1800 metres) above sea level. From the same meteorological data, the mean annual temperature in the region’s lower altitudes oscillates around 20.7 Celsius, a good five to six degrees centigrade higher than the average figure obtained from the areas located in the opposite end of the altitudinal spectrum. During the dry season, which normally extends from October to March, the average monthly temperature near Lake Langano jumps to 31 Celsius, which is the highest for that region. Although they were not able to measure them in degrees the same way as scientists do, local populations, too, were able to develop their own matrix to distinguish these climatic differences. Hot or dry (qolla) is the term they used to refer to the low laying areas, such as those near the rift valley lakes and the rivers Awash and Belate. The qolla areas are different from the milder and transitional areas (wayna-daga) and the highlands (daga) by their lower altitudes and the relatively small amount of rainfall they annually receive. Just as climate in Ethiopia is often a function of altitude, it was also one of the factors responsible for the shaping of the lake region’s flora over time. As far as one can tell from the available oral evidence, this region’s mid- to late-nineteenth century natural vegetation comprised a wide range of wild grasses, trees, shrubs and other kinds of plants. Of these the wild grasses appear to be one of the oldest and, until recently, the most dominant vegetation types in that region. The same was true for the acacia trees that seem to have had an equally long history in that region. As a rule, the acacia trees tended to grow taller in the region’s driest parts, where their density was also the highest. Yet in the wetter areas, these trees were not only small in size but they had difficulty also in dominating the landscape the same way as they did in the driest parts, such as those near Lakes Zway and Langano. Historically, local populations tended to view the acacia trees and the wild grasses that proliferated in that region as the natural barometers of climatic and rainfall variations. The grasses that annually sprouted and dried were to them the best indicators of the seasons. Similarly, the acacia trees heights and density suggested the variations that had existed in the lake region in terms of climate and ecology. Although not as conspicuous, this region’s climate and flora had also direct bearings on the soils, whose texture and chemistry was equally subject to variation and change across space and time. Yet, unlike climate and rainfall, soil quality was a subject that did not linger constantly in the 38 39

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My summary here is based on data acquired from Zway Meteorological Station. For a useful study on the relationship that had existed in Ethiopia between altitude and climate, see Daniel Gemechu, 1977.

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Ploughing New Ground

local populations’ epistemologies and every day practices up until modern times. This is striking because presently soils are among the resources that the majority of the lake region’s farmers cared about the most and for whose sustenance they were willing to spend the lion’s share of their annual income year after year. Prior to the expansion of crop production in the twentieth century, however, local pastoralists cared more about the grasses that grew above the ground rather than in what lay beneath them.40 Presently, subject populations measure soil quality based on certain indicators. These include the soils’ water retention ability and potential for crop production. The colour-coded labels – dubbed ‘white’, ‘red’ or ‘brown’, and ‘black’ – that they now use for these purposes originated in those contexts. The term ‘white’ applies to the sandy soils that are known for their low moisture and mineral contents. On the opposite side of the soil spectrum were the ‘black’ soils, which, despite their relatively high mineral content, are nonetheless susceptible to water logging. Somewhere in the middle were the ‘red’ or ‘brown’ soils that, aside from being ubiquitous in the lake region, are also the most celebrated precisely because of their suitability for crop production. Like their farmer counterparts, scientists too were adept at classifying these soils based on certain identifiers. That is, for example, what the pioneering American soil scientist H.F. Murphy sought to accomplish in Ethiopia during his tenure at the Imperial College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts that lasted from 1956 to 1969. According to him, in terms of soils, the lake region can be divided into three distinct parts: the northern part (the area to the north of the Modjo River), the central part (the area that straddles the Awash River and Lake Langano), and the southern part (which refers to the part of the lake region south of Arsi Nagelle and north of Lake Awasa).41 From Murphy’s study, it appears that the soils in the lake region’s southern part were made up of volcanic ash, pumice and weathered ignim­ brite. Because of those reasons, they tended to be richer in potassium (K) but deficient in nitrogen (N) and phosphorous (P). Although products of the same volcanic activities, the soils that Murphy encountered in the region’s central part proved to be pale in colour, coarse in texture and poor in structure. In terms of mineral content as well, these soils turned out to be highly deficient in NPK. From the same study, it appears that the geological processes that had shaped the soils morphology and texture in the lake region’s northern part were different. Yet, in terms of their chemical composition and quality, these soils shared a lot in common with their southern counterparts. Noteworthy among these were their relatively high potassium and low nitrogen contents that appeared to Murphy to be universal. On the contrary, the scientist found the preponderance of the vertisols or ‘black’ soils to be unique to the lake region’s northern part. 40 41

Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. Murphy, 1968.

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But, as Murphy must have recognized, this region’s soils do not lend themselves to easy classifications. In fact, it is not unusual to find greater variations in the soils’ chemistry, quality and texture in shorter distances. Rather than being immutable objects, soils and their use value were also subject to change and transformation from time to time. For example, the expansion of crop production and the arrival of certain cultivars, such as those that can better process nitrogen from the atmosphere, as well as the growing availability of synthetic fertilizers, were able to alter the soils’ chemistry and meaning in equally discernable ways. This is an important point because it is only by historicizing them and by acknowledging their constantly changing meaning and significance that one can begin to understand the soils’ place in the history of the lake region’s agriculture. What is true for the soils is equally true for the majority of the natural resources already described. The lake region is today one of the most cultivated and densely popu­ lated parts of Ethiopia. In addition, it has been for most of its recent history a major producer and supplier of food materials to Addis Ababa, the signpost of Ethiopia’s pursuit in agricultural development, and an attractive site for investors interested in large-scale commercial farming. But in the nineteenth century the lake region was a predominantly pastoral and sparsely populated landscape.42 What factors contributed to this shift and transformation in that region’s agriculture and landscapes? What do the changes that have taken place in the lake region in terms of land use and the organization of production and exchange tell us about the causes and directions of agricultural and environmental change and transformation in Ethiopia? What does the evidence from the lake region tell us about the challenges and opportunities that Ethiopian agriculture and the food supply chain had faced and continues to face at the present time? These are some of the questions that this study seeks to answer.

SOURCES, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS This study required the utilization of a wide range of source materials. These sources can be grouped into two broad categories, referred to here as ‘internal’ and ‘external’, if mainly for interpretive purposes. Setting these two types of source materials apart was the amount of time that their curators and bearers had spent in the lake region prior to their or reproduction. Whereas the subjects that produced or reproduced the materials listed under the first category had the opportunity to live in that region for most of their lifetime or for an extended period of time, those in the second category had a relatively brief encounter with the topics and the phenomena that they discussed. 42

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For a traveller’s account of the state of the lake region’s agriculture and demog­ raphy toward the close of the nineteenth century, see Wellby, 1901: 30-42.

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Ploughing New Ground

This book relied heavily on the internal sources. Among these certainly the most important to my study has been the evidence acquired from oral informants. I conducted my interviews by dividing the lake region into several distinct parts, described in this book as northern, central, western and southern. From each part, I was able to identify a total of three sites that then became the primary loci of my fieldwork. In addition to these 12 sites, I was able to conduct additional interviews in a total of six other locations as well. In doing that, my aim was to minimize as much as possible the biases that could arise from such a deliberate, as opposed to a purely random sampling of the research sites. My informants consisted of two groups. The first group comprised the informants that were nominated to me by insiders. This group of informants was easy to identify and work with because in all the places I visited local people and Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) officials were ready and quick to name two or more individuals that they considered were ‘knowledgeable’ about that region’s agricultural, political and social history better than most others. These were mostly long-time residents of that particular locality, and often they seem to have commanded greater respect and popularity in the community to which they belonged because of their age and lifetime achievements. The informants belonging to the second group were different from these in that their candidacy to my interviews hinged on such factors as the specific location of their farm, their age, gender, marital status and related factors, rather than on what they knew or presumed to have known in advance. In all, I was able to conduct more than 54 one-to-one (or ‘person-centred’) and nine group-based interviews in the lake region alone. In addition, I conducted numerous interviews in the highlands near and around the lake region and in Addis Ababa. The informants’ testimonies were important because they gave me the opportunity to ethnographically locate my study and to account for the subject matters and the time periods that did not figure prominently in most of the external sources summarized below. Similarly, I was able to tap into the evidence acquired from archival sources. The Ministry of Finance and the now defunct Ministry of Internal Administration were first in organizing their branch offices in the lake region beginning in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The MoA followed suit after 1962. Despite their poor handling and their disorganized nature the archival materials deposited in these offices and their headquarters in Addis Ababa were large and they offered valuable information and perspective on the evolution of the lake region’s agriculture and political economy in the ensuing decades. Also useful to my study has been the voluminous monograph that one of Ethiopia’s technocrats-turned-writer, Mahtama Selassie Wolde Masqal, published in 1968 under the title Zekra Nagar. Although authored by him, this monograph is in fact a collection of what appears to be a small portion of the imperial archives of the pre-1936 period. Its publication proved to be important because it made

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Introduction

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some of these hitherto unclassified archives accessible to researchers in a relatively concise form. The lake region did not become a major destination for the legion of European travellers, missionaries and diplomats that found their way to one or another part of Ethiopia beginning in the early nineteenth century. Yet the few that made it to that region toward the century’s end were able to document their observations and impressions the same way as their counterparts had been doing in other parts of Ethiopia and Africa about the same time. A notable case in point was the British traveller M.S. Wellby, who may well be the only European to traverse south of the Modjo River before the century’s end. Also important to my study were the newspaper articles, monographs, memoirs and reports that the aforementioned group of Ethiopian and European (but mainly Italian and British) writers had published beginning in the early twentieth century. Although not focused specifically on the lake region, these materials offered useful information on the political and social factors that contributed to the relatively different direction that state policy on Ethiopian agriculture and the food supply chain took in the course of the first half of the twentieth century. Compared with the previous half century, the decades after 1950 witnessed the production of relatively large bodies of literature dealing with one or another aspect of Ethiopian agriculture. Of particular significance to my analysis had been the agronomic and developmentoriented studies that the groups of trained specialists affiliated with the MoA, the FAO, the Ethiopian Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (MLRA), the SRI, the British Land Resource Division and similar other institutions had conducted in the lake region in the 25 years from 1950. When seen from the perspective of the scientific and developmentoriented studies, the years of the Ethiopian revolution were times of major disappointment. Nonetheless, these years were marked by the production of a relatively large body of archival materials that proved to be extremely useful to my study. This is particularly true of the letters, reports and surveys deposited in the MoA’s main library and documentation centre in Addis Ababa, and in its branch offices scattered around the lake region. Written by technocrats and trained specialists of various qualifications, these documents and surveys offered quantifiable information and data on such subjects as land use, demography and crop yield per unit area that are difficult to find in other sources. That is also the trend that continued without interruption after May 1991. In general, the source materials that can be used for reconstructing the history of the lake region’s agriculture and environment are rich. However, nowhere do these sources speak for themselves or were they without any limitations. Undoubtedly important, some of the oral materials, particularly those dealing with local politics, seem to have been the subject of constant editing, revision and modification depending upon the time. Somewhat different are the written materials, including the accounts generated by

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Ploughing New Ground

the European travellers of the nineteenth century, and the archives, which are difficult to indefinitely revise and modify. Yet they, too, were products of their times, and more often than not they reflected back on the aspirations and interests of the individuals and the institutions that produced them in the first place. These limitations are not immaterial. However, they do not completely rob these sources off their value and significance. In fact, it is possible to interrogate, crosscheck and objectify the information acquired from these sources, with various degrees of success. I believe that the diversity and tenacity of these source materials and the information they provided have enabled me to have a fairly good grasp of the constellation of the historical factors and social actors that shaped the lake region’s agriculture and environment in the contemporary period. Even then, I do not, by any stretch of the imagination, pretend to have written a definitive account of that region’s agricultural and environmental history. In fact, one of my aims in writing this book was not to utter the final word on the lake region’s and Ethiopia’s modern day agricultural and environmental history. Rather, my aim was to kindle a new round of debate by presenting evidence from one of the least studied parts of Ethiopia.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE BOOK This book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the factors that contributed to the organization and growing sustainability of a pastoral landscape and way of life in the lake region in the decades leading up to 1916. Chief among these were the historical factors, such as those pertaining to the rules and practices governing access to places, spaces and valued agricultural resources. Several groups jostled for control over these resources. These included the populations specializing in livestock production and those that sought to utilize the region’s landscapes and resources for the purpose of crop production. Complicating the situation further was the interest that the Ethiopian state developed in the lake region’s populations and resources beginning in the late-nineteenth century. The Ethiopian state was territorial. In addition, it had a huge appetite for food. Despite its efforts, the Ethiopian state was unable to easily and quickly submerge the local populations’ knowledge, interests and productive activities. On the contrary, subject populations were able to deflect, tweak and appropriate some of the state-generated rules and regulations to their advantage right from the outset. This is an important point, because their success, and not necessarily the sheer power of the physical environment, was what contributed to the retrenchment and propagation of a pastoral landscape and way of life in the lake region in the contemporary period. Like the previous many decades, the 25 years from 1917 were marked by the retrenchment and expansion of a pastoral landscape and livestock production in the lake region along previously existing and new lines.

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Introduction

19

Nonetheless, this period saw also the taking shape of fresh developments that did not exist in the past. Noteworthy among these was the slow expansion of crop production in that region beginning in 1917. The agriculture’s major promoters were two groups of populations. By far the largest in number had been the populations originating in the western highlands of Silti and Gurage that found their way to the lake region’s western part beginning in the second half of the twentieth century. Accompanying them were also the small number of venture agriculturalists originating from Addis Ababa and Europe. Setting these two groups of populations apart was not their sheer number or their places of origin. More important were, rather, the methods that they used to gain access to farming land in that region. If the populations belonging to the first group, like their pastoralist counterparts, were dependent on locally inscribed rules and practices, what worked for the farmers of urban origin were the state-sanctioned rules and regulations governing access to farming land. At the field level as well, what concerned the farmers of urban origin was the prospect of marketed food production. Chapter 2 builds on these points to understand the factors and the social actors contributing to agricultural change and transformation in the lake region between 1917 and 1941. Unlike the previous half-century, the post-1942 period permitted the expansion in the lake region of crop production on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Feeding the agriculture’s expansion were a number of interacting factors that ranged from the technological to the social. Technologically, this period witnessed the arrival in that region of a new set of field technologies (including farm tools and cultivars) that did not exist in the past. In social terms as well, this period saw the continuation and changing configuration of the competitions and negotiations for access to places and valued agricultural resources. Among the factors that contributed to the different direction that such competitions and negotiations took in the lake region in that period, certainly the most important had been the state-sponsored land grants that became official in Addis Ababa in 1942. Their beneficiaries were the populations that traced their origin to urban Ethiopia. Local populations responded to the pressures that these land grants exerted on them and their agriculture in certain practical ways. Most notable among these was their new-found interest in crop production, which was, in fact, the strategy they used to reposition themselves on the land at this time of competition and negotiation. Chapter 3 focuses on these points to understand the causes and directions of agricultural and environmental change and transformation in the lake region in the dozen years ending in 1955. Several factors contributed to the relatively different direction that the lake region’s agriculture and environment took in the following decade. Most notable among these was the arrival in that region of brand new cultivars and improved seed varieties beginning in the early 1950s. Also important had been the competitions and negotiations for access to farming land, labour and product that morphed into new levels of intensity

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Ploughing New Ground

and significance at about the same time. Feeding these competitions and negotiations were once again the state-sponsored land grants that continued without interruption in the contemporary period. Similar also were the criteria that the government used to identify the groups of populations that qualified for these land grants. Yet in terms of objectives there was nonetheless major difference between the populations that took the land from the government before and after 1956. Unlike the former that showed interest in settling and farming the land just like their local counterparts had been doing in the same period, what motivated their successors was the prospect of rent exaction. Consequently, they became the major promoters of sharecropping in the lake region. Chapter 4 deals with these subjects. It primary object is to understand the factors that contributed to the lake region’s emergence as one of the major centres of crop production and supply and of agricultural innovation and transformation in Ethiopia in the contemporary period. In Ethiopia, as in many other parts of the developing world, the decade after 1966 witnessed the organization of large-scale agricultural development programmes and the trickling of farm credit and Green Revolution technologies in a manner that was different from the past. In the lake region these technologies were able to become increasingly popular among subject farmers fairly quickly. But in Addis Ababa, this decade saw the polarization of the politics of agricultural development in equally dramatic ways. Chapter 5 seeks to understand the factors that contributed to the bifurcation of development politics in Ethiopia and, most importantly, development’s impact on the evolution of the lake region’s agriculture in that decade. Agriculture has been for most of Ethiopian history the exclusive prerogative of smallholder farmers. When seen from that angle, some of the developments that started to take place in the lake region and many other parts of the country particularly after 1968 were different. Noteworthy among these was the expansion of medium- to large-scale commercial farming on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The practice’s major promoters were a relatively distinct group of venture agriculturalists that traced their origin to urban Ethiopia. Their primary gateway was the rural land market, whose expansion they encouraged by one means or another. To the small-scale farmers, most notably the share tenants already present on the land, the expansion of the land market and of commercial farming was a matter of serious concern. Yet rather than succumbing to them, this group of farmers was able to come up with a set of tactics and strategies that enabled them to stay on the land and to succeed in farming all over again. Chapter 6 focuses on these points, seeking to understand the impact that the expansion of the land market and commercial farming had on the evolution of the lake region’s agriculture in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution in September 1974. To the tenant farmers that have become also the majority in most parts of the lake region in the course of the previous two decades, the revolution’s

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Introduction

21

outbreak that year was a welcome development. This was mainly because of the opportunity that the major land-reform edict that the incumbent military administration (the Derg) promulgated in March 1975 gave them to renew and consolidate their control over land, labour and product under a relatively new set of conditions. But in the meantime the revolution years saw also the grafting of new rules and practices that had far-reaching implications on the way that subject farmers organized places, production and exchange. Specifically, the impact that the Derg’s unrelenting interest in food exaction, villagization and environmental conservation had on their productive activities was considerable. Chapter 7 unravels the dominant role that the nexus between spatiality, technological factors and the politics and practice of food production and supply played in the shaping of the lake region’s agriculture and environment between 1975 and 1991. The last chapter deals with the post-1992 period. Setting this period apart from the previous 17 years was a number of factors. Noteworthy among these was the growing availability of modern inputs, improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers, and extension services to subject farmers on a scale that was unprecedented in the history of the lake region. In addition, the last dozen years witnessed also the expansion in that region of flower farming and viticulture at an equally remarkable speed. The practice’s major promoters have been a relatively distinct group of commercial farmers originating from Addis Ababa and Europe. But more than their places of origin, it was in fact their voracious appetite for land and the manner in which they have acquired it from the Ethiopian state that have become subjects of intense scrutiny and controversy at the local level. As such they give us a new window of opportunity to understand the crucial role that spatial factors play in the history of the lake region’s agriculture and environment.

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1 Landscape Pastoral: The Making and Re-making of a Grassland Environment 1886–1916

The patchwork quilt of intensively cultivated fields, an impressive array of cultivars, chemically fertilized soils and marketed food and flower production that characterized Ethiopia’s lake region’s agro-environment at the dawn of the third millennia contrasted sharply with the situation that had prevailed on the ground nearly a century ago. At the close of the nineteenth century, this region was in fact a predominantly pastoral landscape. In addition, it was a fiercely contested territory. Its major protagonists included an increasingly diverse group of populations – both pastoralists and cultivators – residing in the lake region and its coterminous highlands and lowlands on a permanent or seasonal basis. Also active in that race for territory and resources was the Ethiopian state, whose advent after 1889 marked an important turning point in that region’s history. This was mainly because of the state’s voracious appetite for land and for food, which it wanted to enclose and to exact by one means or another. Despite its efforts, the Ethiopian state nonetheless had difficulty accomplishing its goals in that region in with any speed. Conversely, subject populations were in a position to quickly develop the mechanisms that helped them to co-opt, subvert and appropriate to their advantage some of the rules and practices that the state was trying to promote in the lake region after that year. This is an important point because, as this chapter seeks to demonstrate, their success, rather than the sheer power of the micro-environment, was what contributed to the retrenchment and propagation of a pastoral landscape in the lake region in the contemporary period.

POPULATIONS, PLACES AND INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

22

A person travelling in the lake region sometime in the mid- to latenineteenth century would have encountered a predominantly grassland environment that was home to diverse groups of populations that spoke

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different languages and different dialects of the same language.1 Two or more dialects of the Oromo language were what the populations residing north of the Modjo River, portions of the Maqi River Valley, and in the triangular area that stretched from Mito (a village south of present-day Zway town) to Arsi Nagelle and Aje spoke in that period. Likewise, the Sidama language was likely the most dominant in the highlands that straddled Lake Awasa and Daddaba, the river that marks the southern limits of present-day Arsi Nagelle town. Then there was the Maraqo language that figured prominently in the region’s western part (the Maraqo ridge).2 Spoken by a relatively small number of populations inhabiting Lake Zway’s main island, alternatively known as Zay or Tullu Guddo, Zay was the other language that gave diversity to this region’s linguistics.3 If, as one can argue, linguistic diversity was a product of history, so were also the clans – major social markers of the lake region in that half century.4 My attempt to enumerate these clans was only partially successful. This is not surprising because neither the clans nor the factors that ensured their organization and reproduction were immutable. Rather, they were subject to change and adjustment almost on a regular basis. For example, in the region’s southern part, namely the area that straddled Mito, Arsi Nagelle and Aje, such clans and clan-based settlements seem to have grown in number from an estimated three or four to eight or nine in the course of the nineteenth century.5 Yet the fact that the organization of such clans was a slow and intricate process meant that not all parts of the lake region were able to attract equal numbers of people at the same time and at the same speed. While some of the places, including Ada, Modjo, Maraqo, Mito, Arsi Nagelle and Aje had been major centres of population settlement and concentration, 1

2

3 4 5

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Although important, these linguistic and dialectal differences were not, however, unique to the lake region. Rather, they were and still are common phenomena in polyglot Ethiopia. Likewise, the lake region did not have any kind of monopoly over these languages and dialects at any time in its recent history. This was particularly true for Sidama and Oromo that were and still are spoken by large groups of populations residing in other parts of Ethiopia as well. The same can be said for the Zay and Maraqo languages, which, although unique to the lake region, had nonetheless their closest relatives in, respectively, the western highlands of Silti and Gurage and of Alaba. On the geography and classification of Ethiopian languages, see Bender, 1976. My discussion here is based on evidence acquired from oral informants. Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 14 July 2011; Azmach Damayo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2000; Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Malaku Gabramaryam, Zay, 13 May 2001; Baqala Nado, Modjo, 1 April 2001. On the history and linguistics of Zay speaking populations, see Tuma Nademo, 1982. Interviews: Badaso Roba, Ada, 14 July 2001; interviews: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 14 July 2011; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001.

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Landscape Pastoral

others remained at the margins of that process for most of the nineteenth century. Even then, subject populations seem to have entertained and maintained elastic and less bounded visions of landscapes and territory. In demographic terms as well, the clans that they organized were fungible. This is not surprising because clans were first and foremost products of social as opposed to purely biological factors.6 As the available oral evidence suggests, these clans were able to wield considerable degree of autonomy for most of their history. This was particularly true on matters pertaining to internal administration and resource control and distribution. While that was an important point, the clans’ presence and the kind of autonomy that they enjoyed locally did not occlude, however, trans-clan interactions. On the contrary, most clans and their members had the propensity to establish some sort of contact and relationship with each other and with populations that lived near and far from them. For example, the eight or nine clans that thrived in the lake region’s southern part were able to forge and maintain close contact and relation­ship with most of their neighbours, including those residing in the eastern, western and southern highlands.7 Similarly, the populations inhabiting Ada’s highlands in the north were in a position to establish direct contact and relationship with several of their closest and more-distant neigh­bours, including those in Shewa, since at least the mid- to late-eighteenth century.8 In addition to forging such horizontal relationships with each other and their neighbours, the lake region’s populations were able to organize also supra-clan institutions at various points in time. Most successful in that endeavour had been the populations residing in the region’s southern part, where they were able to organize a supraclan institution that bore the name gada.9 The institution’s major architects were members of the Ebeno clan that claimed seniority and precedence in that part of the region, in terms of both genealogy and settlement. Interestingly, that was the claim that enabled the clan’s adult male members to monopolize gada’s leadership positions right from the outset. If their monopoly remained uncontested, they had nonetheless difficulty quickly extending their power and influence outside of the region’s southern part. In fact, in demographic and social terms, their gada institution’s constituencies comprised only the popu6 7 8 9

Interviews: Dagale Maqiso, Maraqo, 16 June 2000; Tulluro Abam, Maraqo, 12 June 2000; Azmach Damayo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2000. Ibid. For a first-hand account of Ada’s earlier relations with the Shewan state, see Harris, 1844. See also McCann, 1995: 197-99. Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 14 July 2011. Unfortunately, the gada institution has not been the subject of historical research to this day. Most of our knowledge of that subject matter comes from the studies that a generation of anthropologists conducted in southern Ethiopia in the 1970s; see Hinnant, 1977; Asmerom Legesse, 1973.

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lations that traced their genealogy to a distant patriarch that bore the name Arsi.10 To be sure, this was not the only part of the lake region where gada was able to thrive in the contemporary period; the institution seems to have had an equally long history in the region’s northern plains as well. The only major difference was that, unlike in Jiddo (near Mito), which remained an important locus of gada power, the changes that have taken place in Ada’s highlands over the centuries seem to have undermined the institution’s relevance and power to one degree or another. This was important because, in Ada’s highlands, strong leaders that drew their legitimacy not from gada or a gada-like institution, but rather from other sources including military prowess, have come to wield greater power and influence beginning in the early- to mid-nineteenth century.11 Interestingly, that was also the trend that was developing in Maraqo and the Sidama highlands about the same time.12 Undoubtedly important, neither the rise of such strong leaders in Ada, Maraqo and northern Sidama, nor gada’s continued presence in Jiddo was able to seriously undermine, however, the kind of autonomy and acceptance that the various clans and their leaders had enjoyed across that region in the nineteenth century. To the scholars that had studied similar developments in other parts of Africa, the presence of such clans and clan-like associations suggested the fragmentation of local society.13 Clearly, political fragmentation was one of the lake region’s hallmarks for most of the nineteenth century. Yet clan leaders were in a position to legislate and enforce in their respective territories a set of rules and regulations pertaining to the most important question of access to places and of valued agricultural resources with considerable degrees of success. Likewise, those at gada’s helm and their counterparts in Ada, Maraqo and northern Sidama were in a position to enact and enforce laws as well as to wage wars and to broker peace with outside powers and groups of populations as necessary. What they were not able to do, however, was to impose and collect tributes or taxes from subject populations anytime in that century. In addition, none was able to develop the mechanisms to enable them to mobilize subject populations for the purpose of surplus production. When seen from those angles, the lake region’s nineteenth-century history was, therefore, markedly different from that of the parts of Ethiopia that had been important centres of state growth and development. While that was an important distinction, the absence in this region of such organized states did not mean, however, the absence of peace and order. In fact, by the standards of many other parts of Ethiopia, including those Interviews: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 14 July 2011. ­11 Interviews: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Azmach Damayo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2000. 12 Ibid. 13 Ruedy, 2005: 2-5. 10

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Landscape Pastoral

that had been important centres of state growth and development, this region was for most of the nineteenth century a relatively peaceful place. This is an important point because that relative peace and tranquillity was one of the factors that contributed to the organization and propagation of cultural communities in the region in that century.14

THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION IN CULTURAL COMMUNITIES Often times, pastoralist populations appear in the scholarship as others and as victims and losers. Yet in the lake region of Ethiopia, no other groups of populations were able to bring under their control and jurisdiction so much land, resources and territory as pastoralist populations had done in the course of the last two centuries or more. The only major exceptions were the highlands of Ada and northern Sidama, and Zay Island, which remained outside of their control during that period. It may be appropriate to refer to these places as borderlands because of their location and their relatively small size. First ‘discovered’ and settled by a small group of marauding Christians in the early sixteenth century, Zay Island is not only small in size but most of its landscapes are also covered with rocky mountains that have proved difficult to cultivate. When seen from that angle and given the island’s relatively dry climate, the success that its populations had in crop production was remarkable. As the available evidence suggests, finger millet and sorghum were the two crops that they grew in the field annually over the centuries.15 If these were rich only in carbohydrates, it was by catching and consuming fish that Zay’s populations were able to compensate their lack of protein over the centuries, the island being devoid of livestock. Fishing in the Maqi River, which is Lake Zway’s major tributary, may be one of the reasons that led them to venture outside of the island occasionally. Despite such periodic sojourns, Zay populations were not, however, able to permanently settle the mainland at any time before the early twentieth century. This was not necessarily because of their small number, although that may have been a contributory factor. More challenging to them were, rather, the real or perceived threat that they faced from the pastoralist populations that lived near and far from Lake Zway on a permanent or seasonal basis.16 Compared with their counterparts in Zay Island, the populations residing in the northern Sidama highlands were not only large in number but they had also greater space for crop production. Yet, like those in My interpretation here was shaped by Mahmood Mamdani’s reflections on the forging of cultural, economic and political identities in African history: Mamdani, 1996. 15 Interview: Malaku Gabramaryam, Zay, 13 May 2001. 16 Interview: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001. 14

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Zay, the farmers residing in these highlands focused on the production of only a small number of cultivars, of which enset was certainly the most important to them. Like Zay’s two cultivars, enset is rich only in carbohydrate. For protein, the farmers in Sidama’s northern highlands were dependent mainly on beef, milk and by-products, which they extracted from the relatively large number of livestock that they raised at the household level.17 The agriculture that prevailed in Ada’s highlands in the second half of the nineteenth century was at once similar and different from that of its northern Sidama counterpart in certain conspicuous ways. The most obvious similarity pertained to the co-existence of crop and livestock production in both highlands. Yet, in terms of field technology, Ada’s agriculture was significantly different. Among the crops that loomed large in Ada’s cultivated fields in that period probably the most important had been barley, tef and chickpeas.18 If these cultivars were different from Sidama’s enset and Zay’s finger millet and sorghum, so were also the farm tools that Ada’s farmers utilized for productive purposes. Chief among these was the oxen-drawn plough, which was different from Sidama and Zay’s digging stick (or stick plough) in terms of its technology and ecological impact (see Chapter 2). Most of the evidence for reconstructing the history of the lake region’s agriculture and environment in the second half of the nineteenth century comes from oral sources. The only major exception was Ada, which, like some other parts of Ethiopia, was able to become a major attraction to the generations of European travellers and missionaries, beginning in the 1840s. Ada appeared in their gaze at least in part because of its geographic proximity to Shewa, the region that was becoming an important centre of power and international diplomacy in Ethiopia after 1840. But Ada had also its own unique attractions. These included its park-like landscapes and, perhaps most importantly its ancient church located in Mount Zequala. James McCann was able to tap into their written accounts and related sources to summarize the state of Ada’s agriculture in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century. If [crop production] was well established [in Ada] by the third quarter of the nineteenth century, it coexisted with a powerful and still largely autonomous livestock economy, still only weakly integrated with ox-plow farm economics. Ada’s extensive livestock herds grazed on fallow fields and along cultivated borders. In the dry season, pasture existed in relative abundance, much of it lower-lying, virgin, and vertisol plains. The dry seasons pasture on dried, black soil chafe maret (seasonally marshy fields) provided abundant forage on land, too labor intensive to attract cultivation. These open, yet fertile, pastures which still existed during Menilek’s time and early in the reign of Haile Selassie, composed the primary arena of competition and innovation for cropland in the late twentieth century.19

Interview: Hayeso Belamo, Wondo Ganat, 3 March 2001. Interviews: Badaso Roba, Ada, 14 July, 2001; Bayu Gudata, Ada, 19 June 2001; Badada Jarre, Ada, 18 June 2001. 19 McCann, 1995: 203. 17 18

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As McCann has rightly noted, already by the late-nineteenth century most of Ada’s highlands had become important centres of crop production. Yet compared with woodlands, meadows and pasture fields, the actual size of Ada’s cultivated fields remained the smallest in size even by the century’s end.20 This was not necessary because of environmental or technological factors. More important were, rather, the social factors. Of these, arguably the most important had been the competition that these farmers had faced from their pastoralist counterparts rather constantly. The pastoralists were not a homogenous group. While some were permanent residents others trekked to one or another part of the lake region only seasonally. Among these probably the most conspicuous and the most enterprising had been the pastoralists originating in the eastern (Arsi) highlands and lowlands. According to my informants, salt was certainly the one resource that this group of pastoralists had sought to extract from that region since earlier times.21 If they found such salt deposits in Lake Abijata’s shores, that was also the place that became their primary destination during their annual or bi-annual migration to the lake region. The fact that they were travelling with their livestock meant that the pastoralists were able to coordinate their trips with the seasons. That is why that they became most conspicuous in the region’s central part during the summer months. Like many other parts of Ethiopia, Arsi’s highlands received most of their rains between June and September. The rains’ level of intensity was such that these pastoralists were willing to vacate the highlands for most of the summer months. This was mainly because of the damage that these rains could cause to their livestock and the highlands’ pasture fields. In addition to their quest for salt, it was, therefore, the difference that they saw between the lake region’s central part and the highlands in terms of altitude and climate that dictated the course that their migration took each year.22 Also active in that endeavour had been the populations that traced their origin to the north-eastern lowlands, the area just to the south and east of present-day Nazareth town. In my informants’ lexicon, these were mainly Karayu pastoralists that lived in the middle Awash Valley on a permanent basis.23 Like their counterparts originating in the eastern highlands, this group of Karayu pastoralists, too, had only a seasonally adjusted interest in some of the lake region’s places and resources, of which the pasture fields that they located north of the Awash River were certainly the most important to them. Similarly, they did not need to seek anybody’s permission to exploit these resources for up to three months each year. Interviews: Badaso Roba, Ada, 14 July 2001; Bayu Gudata, Ada, 19 June 2001; Badada Jarre, Ada, 18 June 2001. 21 Interviews: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Azmach Damyo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2000. 22 Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. 23 Interviews: Badada Buta, Modjo, 15 May 2001; Baqala Nado, Modjo, 3 April 2001. 20

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A relatively new development in the lake region in the second half of the nineteenth century pertained to the expansion of small-scale game hunting.24 The practice’s major loci in that region were the woodlands and grasslands that figured prominently near the rift valley lakes of Zway, Abijata, Shalla and Langano. As the available oral evidence suggests, these lakes, woodlands and grasslands had been important habitats for wild game and birds, including ostriches, elephants, gazelle and rhinos. Yet more than the birds and the animals’ sheer presence, it was in fact the demand that such products as ivory and ostrich eggs came to enjoy in the fledgling trans-regional trade of the post-1840 period that paved the way for the practice’s expansion in the lake region after that year.25 My informants were not exactly sure about the hunters’ identity or places of origin. As far as one can surmise from their speculations, the majority seems to have originated in such places as Silti, Wolayta and the Indian Ocean ports of Zeila and Berbera.26 The hunting economy’s expansion is relevant to our discussion not because of its size, which was in fact small, but rather because of the opportunity that it gives us to understand the rules and practices governing access to the lake region’s places and resources in the contemporary period. This is an important point because, despite their relatively different sites of origin, these groups of hunters, like their pastoralist counterparts already discussed, seem to have enjoyed unfettered rights of access to that region’s places and resources in that period. This was mainly because of their economy’s real or presumed compatibility with the local pastoralists’ livelihood practices and ideas about space. But these were not the only groups of populations that vied for the lake region’s resources in the contemporary period. No less demanding and enterprising had been also the farming populations residing in the western highlands of Alaba, Silti and Gurage. Interestingly, it was by constructing their own narratives of landscapes and territory that they made the effort to legitimize and optimize their rights of access to the lake region’s places and resources in the same period. According to these narratives, some of the places that the pastoralist populations now controlled in the southern, western and central parts amounted to ‘lost territory’ that could then be ‘recovered’ at will when circumstances permitted. Moreover, some among the highlands populations maintained the view that depicted certain parts of the region, such as those near and around the Maqi River Valley and the Maraqo ridge’s southern part, as vacant and therefore available for future settlement and agriculture.27 Wellby, 1901: 36-41. On the history and magnitude of these trades and trade routes, see Harr, 1990; Mordechai Abir, 1964. 26 Interview: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001. 27 Interviews: Bashir Aleto, Alaba Qulito, 30 May 2011; Ahmad Alijad, Wulbareg, 23 April 1992. 24 25

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Despite their claims and their growing demand for agricultural land, the farmers residing in these highlands had difficulty in securing rights of access to the lake region’s places and resources. This was mainly because of the opposition that their relatively different interest in the land that harkened back to crop production had constantly faced from the pastoralist groups scattered around that region.28 Consequently, these territories became major sites for inter-community rivalry and conflict beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.29 The British traveller M.S. Wellby may have been the first to comment on these conflicts in his writing toward the century’s end.30 According to him, these conflicts were endemic. Moreover, they were products of innate tribal differences that were difficult to easily reconcile. But as the available oral evidence suggests, these conflicts were neither recurrent nor were they caused by tribal differences. Rather, they were intermittent and their history was also embedded in the different kinds of interest that subject populations had sought to promote in the land both in the short and long terms.31

ENCOUNTERING LARGE-SCALE POLITICAL FORCES An equally important development in the lake region’s history after 1840 pertained to the growing involvement of organized states and statelets in its internal affairs. Of these, evidently the most successful in exerting, albeit progressively, its power and influence on that region’s populations was the state of Shewa that first Sahla Selassie (r. 1814-48) and then Menilek (r. 1868-89) had organized and ruled.32 As the available evidence suggests, Sahla Selassie’s primary object was to bring Ada under his state’s jurisdiction. Indeed, that was what he was able to accomplish in 1843.33 But Sahla Selassie died only five years later. Because of that reason and because of the setback that it had faced internally after that year, the Shewan state was unable to strengthen and to consolidate its control over Ada and many other of its newly acquired territories during the next two decades. That changed drastically after Menilek’s accession Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. 29 Interviews: Bashir Aleto, Alaba Qulito, 30 May 2011; Ahmad Alijad, Wulbareg, 23 April 1992. 30 Wellby, 1901: 36. 31 Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001; Ahmad Alijad, Wulbareg, 23 April 1992. 32 Also active in that endeavour had been the highland states of Wolayta and Qabena-Gurage. Despite their efforts, neither of these states was able to accomplish that goal the same way as Shewa did in the course of the next half century. Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. On Shewa, see, for example, Ege, 1996; Darkwah, 1975. On Qabena-Gurage, see Worku Nida, 1999. On Wolayta’s history, see Altaye Alaro 1982. 33 Harris, 1844: 376-81. 28

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to the Shewan throne in 1868. Aside from renewing Ada’s tributary status relatively quickly, Menilek was able to extend the Shewan state’s power and sphere of influence to other parts of the region and beyond, beginning in the early 1880s.34 The man in charge of that task in the lake region south of the Awash River was Gobana Daci, who may as well be described as the co-architect of the Shewan state that Menilek ruled between 1868 and 1889. When confronting the gada officials based in Jiddo and their equally autonomous counterparts in nearby Maraqo, Gobana embraced a carrot and stick strategy.35 Central to his carrot strategy was the granting to these leaders of total autonomy on matters pertaining to internal administration as long as they were willing to submit to him peacefully and without delay. In return, Gobana requested from them a couple of major concessions that were equally important to him. These included their acceptance of Shewan supremacy and their preparedness to pay tributes to the Shewan state on an annual basis. As a native speaker of the Oromo language, Gobana did not have any difficulty in communicating his demands to the gada leaders as clearly as possible. Yet more than his fluency in that language, it was, in fact, the major concessions that he was willing to offer on such matters as internal administration that sealed the deal in his favour. As it turned out, Gobana’s military and diplomatic victory in Jiddo and Maraqo coincided with Addis Ababa ’s founding and Menilek’s accession to the Ethiopian throne in 1886 and 1889, respectively.36 At the time of his coronation as Emperor of Ethiopia in 1889, Menilek had a two-decadeold experience in state administration. That was the experience that he used to rule Ethiopia from then onwards. Also important to him were the lessons that he seems to have learned from the failures and achievements of his two predecessors: Emperors Tewodros (r. 1855-68) and Yohannes (r. 1872-89). For example, like Yohannes before him, who ruled from Tigray, Menilek chose to rule the country not from Gondar, the city that had served as Ethiopia’s capital for three centuries, but from his power base in Shewa. Addis Ababa’s growth was a product of that factor. Given the little or no experience that Ethiopia’s diverse groups of populations had in organizing large-scale urban centres, the speed at which Addis Ababa became a primate city in that country was remarkable. Still, the capital’s finding and growing centrality meant different things to different people. To some, Addis Ababa provided fresh opportunities to succeed in life and to prosper economically. To others, including the diplomatic community that flocked to it from different parts of the world that city was a place of high politics. Yet, to the farmers residing in the countryside, including those in the lake region, the capital revealed itself the most by its insatiable demand for food. For a useful discussion of this period of Shewan history, see Marcus, 1975. Interviews: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Azmach Damyo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2000. 36 On the origin and early history of Addis Ababa, see Garretson, 2000. 34 35

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FACING AND EFFACING A ‘KITCHEN’ CITY Presently, markets (gabaya), kitchen (madbet) and the dining table (gabata) are what Addis Ababans directly associate with their places of food acquisition, preparation and consumption. Yet, during its formative period that lasted from 1886 to 1916, Addis Ababa had very few markets and an exceedingly large number of kitchens and dining tables. In fact, for food the capital was heavily dependent on provisioning.37 Although remarkable, the city’s dependence on that method of food acquisition and redistribution was not, however, unprecedented. As the available evidence suggests, food exaction and redistribution had, in fact, a remark­ably long history in Ethiopia.38 Indeed, food was the single most important resource that Ethiopian emperors, kings and many of their local and regional counterparts, as well as the Christian clergy, had sought to extract, redistribute and consume on a regular basis since earlier times.39 Similarly, provisioning was the one method that appealed and worked for many an African leader in the pre-colonial period.40 Addis Ababa inherited its provisioning method of food exaction and supply from Shewa. What was striking about the Shewan prototype was the success that its kings had in organizing a distinct category of food districts that catered edible materials and firewood directly to the royal court. Sahla Selassie may be, if not the first certainly the most successful, Shewan king to organize a relatively large number of such food districts, otherwise known as madbet (lit. kitchen) and wara-ganu (royal pasture), in Shewa beginning in the 1820s or early 1830s.41 Yet no other king was able to perfect that system of food provisioning and to give it new meaning and significance in Shewa as Menilek did in the decade before and after 1889. In addition, Menilek was able to organize quasi-state farms called hudad, first in Shewa and then in some of his newly acquired territories about the same time.42 His rate of success was such that already by the close of the nineteenth century the Grand Palace in Addis Ababa had under its jurisdiction more than 44 madbet, wara-ganu and hudad scattered around the central highlands and adjacent lowlands.43 Tekalign, 1995: 139-43. For a study that accounts for the important place that food exaction and redistribution (geber) occupied in Ethiopian history, see Teshale Tibebu, 1995: 71-104. 39 For comparison with other parts of the country, in this case Gedeo (Sidamo), see McClellan, 1988. 40 See, for example, Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005: 85. 41 For a first-hand account of these food districts and the agricultural situation in Shewa toward the end of Sahla Selassie’s reign, see Graham, 1844. For a study focused on land tenure and social issues in that period of Shewan history, see Ege, 1996. 42 Mahtama Selassie Walda Masqal, 1970: 133-38. 43 Ibid.: 23, 26, 133-38. See also Tekalign, 1995: 107-24. 37 38

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Of these, madbet were not only the largest in number but they were responsible for supplying the lion’s share of the grains and firewood that reached the state’s granary in Addis Ababa each year. If madbet were for grain and firewood, wara-ganu were for livestock and livestock products. The case of hudad was different from these, not by the kind of food materials that the state sought to extract from them, but rather by their organization and stature. In fact, hudad were state property in the real sense of the term. That means the Ethiopian state had full proprietorship on the land and the bulk of the products originating in hudad at the end of each production cycle. Like hudad, most wara-ganu belonged to the state. Yet they had to be leased out or sub-contracted to individual farmers and pastoralists if they were to become a viable source of food exaction to the state. As records show, already by 1900 the Palace Administration was in a position to exact on average more than 7,000 quintals of grain and over 21,400 human loads of firewood from its madbet districts each year. Contributing the largest share were the districts of Mecha, Becho, Ankober, Tegulat and Yifat, supplying on average 640 quintals of grain and 2,760 human loads of firewood to that palace per annum. Next in line were Ada, Meta, Chore and Gaja that supplied anywhere between 370 and 450 quintals of grain and 700 to 1,400 bundles of firewood annually. At the bottom of the list were such districts as Dambi, Danaba, Guda, Qaliti and Addis Ababa Zuria that catered to that palace less than 300 quintals of grain and between 130 and 600 human loads of firewood each year. In terms of the actual number of tribute-paying farmers as well, the districts listed in the first category led the others by significant margins. For example, Tegulet’s 2,295 and Ankober’s 2,284 farmers (gabbar) were the largest in all categories. On the opposite end of the food spectrum were Qaliti’s 71 and Danaba’s 225 gabbar. Somewhere in the middle were such districts as Ada and Chore, registering a total of 960 and 506 gabbar respectively.44 As a rule, the Grand Palace used most of the food materials that it annually received from these madbet districts and from other sources strictly for remunerative purposes. Its clientele were two groups of popu­ lations that lived in Addis Ababa on a permanent or temporary basis. The first group comprised the populations that served the Ethiopian state full time. Most notable among these were those actively serving in the state’s military and civilian institutions, some of which were still at their infancy. If this group of populations were in government payroll, food was what they received from the state each month as a form of salary.45 44 45

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Mahtama Selassie, 1970: 26. One quintal is equal to 100 kg (220 lbs). In addition to food, those on the government payroll, and the clergy, had also state-sanctioned rights of access to agricultural land, which they used for the same purposes. Referred to respectively as madarya and samon, the presence of such categories of land was among the factors that bolstered Addis Ababa’s food supply for many decades to come. For a useful discussion of these categories of land in Shewa, see Tekalign, 1995: 151-54; Haile Gabriel Dagne, 1972. See also Gebre-Wold Ingida Worq, 1962.

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The second group of food recipients consisted of guests, visitors, the clergy, foreign diplomats and lay people that attended the mass banquets (geber) organized by the Grand Palace fairly regularly.46 Our primary source, Mahtama Selassie’s Zekra Nagar, does not specify the actual number of populations that benefited from these two methods of food distribution in the decades before or after 1900. Yet from the same source and related accounts it is clear that their number was large and constantly growing. Consequently, food became the single most important resource that exchanged hands in Addis Ababa for many decades to come. Likewise, food was arguably the single most important resource that came to define the capital’s relationship with the countryside during the same period. In the lake region, Ada’s highlands were the first to join Menilek’s list of food districts in the 1880s.47 In addition, his administration was able to organize several wara-ganu (amounting to a total of 6,600 acres) and a 160-acres hudad in that region in the decade after 1897.48 With 4,280 acres (107 gasha), Qoqa’s wara-ganu was the largest of its kind in the country. Likewise, Maraqo’s hudad was one of the largest. Despite their presence, none of this region’s wara-ganu and hudad was able to emerge as important sources of food supply to the Grand Palace within a short period of time.49 In fact, the lake region’s madbet in Ada was the only category of food districts that was able to function according to plan. Their different outcomes notwithstanding, the enclosures that Menilek’s administration had organized in the lake region for the purpose of food exaction was large in size. In terms of management as well, they were different from the territories that the state had organized and left under the jurisdiction of local rulers that bore the title balabbat (father of the land). The latter included Liban (in Ada), Lume (which referred to the area near and around the Modjo River), Maraqo and Jiddo.50 If these territories had been important centres of power and of population settlement in the previous decades, these were also the criteria that Menilek’s administration used when organizing them as self-governing or balabbat territories in the first place. Because of their autonomous status and the manner in which they had submitted to state rule in the late 1880s, these territories and their resident populations were exempted by law from most of the tribute regimes now in place in such For a descriptive first-hand account of such banquets, see Powell-Cotton, 1902: 121-32; see also Marcus, 1970b: 57-62. 47 Mahtama Selassie, 1970: 26. 48 Ibid.: 133-8. 49 This was precisely because of the state’s failure to attract to these enclosures large number of would be gabbar in a short time. Interviews: Azmach Damayo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2001; Baqala Nada, Modjo, 3 April 2001. 50 Interviews: Sheberu Kasa, Udasa, 19 June 2000; Azmach Daqaba Roba Zway, 7 April 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Baqala Nado, Modjo, 3 April 2001. 46

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districts as madbet. In fact, their only obligation pertained to the tithe (asrat), the universal tax code that Menilek’s administration introduced in 1893.51 Compared with the oldest and newly organized madbet districts, where the amount of tribute that individual farmers paid to the Ethiopian state stood at around one-fourth of the annual harvest, the tithe’s one-tenth requirement was small. Yet the fact that the same balabbat-ruled territories were home to relatively large groups of populations meant that the total amount of tributes (tithe) that the state could obtain from them each year was considerable. While that was true in theory, in practice the Ethiopian state nonetheless had diffi­culty accomplishing that goal promptly and as planned. This was mainly because of the relatively easy success that subject populations had in dodging the tithe. Among the factors that helped them to accomplish that goal, evidently the most important was the different trajectory that the state’s new-found interest in land measurement and sale (qalad) took in that region after 1897. When making qalad a state prerogative first in Shewa and then in many other parts of the country after 1879 and 1897,52 Menilek’s aim was to accomplish simultaneously at least three interrelated objectives.53 First, qalad was one of the strategies that Menilek used to generate muchneeded state revenue by selling land to its prospective users. Second, Menilek saw in qalad the best opportunity yet to organize and propagate a relatively different group of farmers to cultivate the land, grow crops and pay tributes, not to the local rulers as was generally the case in the past, but rather to the state. Third, qalad was one of the strategies that Menilek’s administration used to undermine the power of the strongest local and regional rulers that had been active in bringing more land, territory and tribute-paying farmers under their jurisdiction and control in the previous decades. It is not by accident therefore that, when implemented, qalad targeted the balabbatruled territories that had proliferated in Shewa and many other parts of the country at various points in time. Indeed, it was by appropriating up to two-thirds of the territories formerly under balabbat control and jurisdiction that Menilek’s administration was able to create new kinds of enclosures that came under the state’s direct control and supervision, at least for the time being. In the lake region, qalad started to take effect first in Ada (in the 1880s) before it became a universal practice after 1897. Yet unlike, for example, most parts of Shewa, where qalad was largely a success, in the lake region the Ethiopian state was unable to speedily find large numbers of buyers. In fact, except for Ada’s highlands, where local farmers showed interest in Mahtama Selassie, 1970: 332. Ibid.: 127-30. 53 For a detailed discussion of qalad’s itineraries in Shewa in the 1880s and 1890s, see Tekalign, 1995: 71-75. 51 52

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qalad,54 elsewhere in that region pastoralist populations chose to shun the practice altogether.55 This was mainly because of qalad’s incompatibility with their traditional land-use practices. For example, qalad’s propensity to encourage individual ownership of land was not only new to these pastoralists but it was also counter-productive to their ongoing interest in livestock production, which they liked to undertake by organizing collectively owned and shared pasture fields that were also large in size. Furthermore, the pastoralists were aware that, once purchased, such properties could give the Ethiopian state greater chance and opportunity to enforce and collect the tithe and the land tax more successfully than had previously been the case. Compared with the lake region, qalad fared much better in the nearby highlands of Alaba, Arsi and Sidama. Yet rarely were the state-sponsored land measurement and sale practices able to materialize on the ground the same way as Menilek’s administration had anticipated. In fact, in the majority of cases, regional rulers chose to sell the land not to tributepaying farmers, as the law had stipulated, but rather to the highest bidder, which often meant their closest relatives and supporters. Although not appreciated in the secondary literature, these divergent practices and the conflicting reports that had started to trickle to Addis Ababa were what prompted Menilek to impose a moratorium on qalad in 1906.56 The fact that qalad and some of the mechanisms that the Ethiopian state had adopted for the purpose of food exaction had floundered in the lake region does not mean that they were without any consequence. In fact, it is difficult to understand some of the changes and transformations that had started to take place in its agricultural, spatial and demographic history after the 1880s without taking into consideration the advent of state rule and the onset of tribute and land exactions. This was particularly true for the tithe, the 10 per cent tax Menilek’s administration imposed on all groups of farmers after 1893. It is important to note that, like qalad, the tithe was one of the strategies that Menilek embraced to not only bolster the state’s income but also to systematically chip away some of the power and prerogatives of the local rulers. Nonetheless, the tithe’s introduction had also some intended and unintended consequences on the ground. The best evidence to that argument comes from the kind of response that its implementation generated on the part of a growing number of the lake region’s pastoralist populations. Emblematic of that response was their decision to dodge the tithe by any means possible. Among the strategies that they quickly McCann, 1995: 205. Interviews: Sheberu Kasa, Udasa, 19 June 2000; Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Baqala Nado, Modjo, 3 April 2001. 56 That moratorium remained in effect until 1917 (see Chapter 2). On its imposition in 1906, see Gabra Selassie Walda Aragay: 335-6; Mahtama Selassie, 1970: 11213. 54 55

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embraced for that purpose certainly the most effective had been their relocation in the territories that they knew were exempted from the tithe at least for the time being. When seen from that angle, qalad’s introduction and the kind of setback that it had faced after 1897 were important because they enabled subject populations to easily identify and delineate on the ground such de facto tax havens relatively quickly.57 This is an important point because their presence was what pointed the direction that these population relocations took after 1897. Strikingly, the groups of populations that had shunned qalad were the ones that developed interest and succeeded in settling the newly organized state reserves in a progressive manner. The only difference was their unwillingness to pay for the land as the state-imposed laws had stipulated. In the eyes of the local rulers that were losing them steadily, the popu­ la­tions that chose to relocate to these newly enclosed state reserves were becoming persona non grata. But that status appealed to subject populations. This was mainly because of the opportunity that such relocations gave them to avoid payment of the tithe and other kinds of tribute to the Ethiopian state for some length of time. In spatial terms as well, what this group of populations had accomplished by embracing that practice was significantly different from what the state had envisioned, when introducing qalad. Indeed, their relocations were what contributed to the organization of relatively new settlement sites and social spaces in one or more parts of the lake region in the contemporary period. The best example of that comes from parts of the Maqi River Valley and of the Maraqo ridge that became major attractions to the populations relocating from some of the balabbatruled territories already mentioned.58 Among these, probably the most enterprising were the groups of populations that traced their origin to the western (Silti and Gurage) and eastern (Arsi) highlands and adjacent lowlands. If the different trajectory that qalad took in Arsi was what forced a growing number of the local populations to vacate their traditional habitats for good, its dismal failure in the Maqi River Valley was what dictated the course that their relocation took in the decades after 1897.59 The case of the populations originating in the western highlands of Silti and Gurage was slightly different from that in that what forced them out were the additional tributes that the Ethiopian state had imposed on them, mainly in retribution for ‘rallying behind’ the war that their one time leader Hassan Injamo and his forces had chosen to fight with Gobana Daci in 1889.60 Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. Interviews: Sheberu Kasa, Udasa, 19 June 2000; Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Baqala Nado, Modjo, 3 April 2001. 59 Despite their onset, such relocations did not become, however, major phenomena until after 1917. Interview: Ganaso Dale, Maqi, 9 May 2001. 60 Interviews: ibid.; Ahmad Alijad, Wulbareg, 23 April 23 1992. 57 58

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Despite their intensity and different spatial configurations, such reloca­ tions were able to become nonetheless common phenomena in other parts of the lake region as well. Yet the fact that such relocations were taking place at an incremental rather than dramatic fashion meant that they remained largely inconspicuous to the Ethiopian state, which lacked the means to closely monitor and regulate such activities to any meaningful degrees. Contributing to such lapses was also the state’s decision to keep these reserves outside of the balabbats’ direct control and jurisdiction. These were important points because they enabled subject populations to take matters into their own hands as they made the decision to relocate in the newly organized state reserves at one point or another. If, as was often the case, such relocations took place with little or no difficulty, in rare cases they tended to aggravate previously existing tensions and conflicts over resources. Perhaps the best example of that comes from the battle that erupted near the Maraqo ridge in 1911 between the group of farmers originating in the western highlands and their pastoralist protagonists based in that part of the lake region.61 As the available evidence suggests, that battle was probably the largest of its kind in recent memory. But this time around, it was the populations originating in the highlands that won that battle decisively. Their victory was important because it enabled the farmers originating in these highlands to make significant inroads to portions of that ridge, which they then made increasingly important sites for settlement and crop production in the course of the next three decades (see Chapter 2). According to the group of scholars that studied this period of Ethiopian history from the vantage point of colonialism and its variants, what guided the Ethiopian state’s ‘southern marches’ in the late-nineteenth century was the precept of ‘national domination.’62 In terms of the outcome as well, this group of scholars was adept at depicting a picture that suggested the wanton destruction and dismemberment of existing power structures and the livelihood practices of local populations.63 Clearly, most of the ideas, rules and practices that the Ethiopian state sought to promote in the lake region and many other parts of the country in that period were new. However, nowhere did that state encounter a pliant group of populations and a blank slate from which to operate. In fact, in the majority of cases subject populations were able to deflect, undermine and subvert the statesanctioned rules and practices to various degrees of success. Likewise, many a local ruler (balabbat) was able to seize the moment and to build a rewarding career for himself while working for the state under that title. That was, for example, what Tuke Mama succeeded in doing in Jiddo following his appointment as balabbat in 1889.64 Tuke belonged to the Nori and Hirpa, 1987. Donham, 2002: 3-48. 63 To be sure, not all the contributors to the Southern Marches shared the same view on that subject matter. For a dissenting view, see Turton, 2002. 64 Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 61 62

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community of pastoralists that had organized a working gada institution in the lake region’s southern part long before the advent of state rule in the 1880s. Yet neither the state’s advent nor the organization under Tuke’s leadership of the brand new balabbat institution at the local level was able to soon undermine and nullify gada. On the contrary, gada was able to adapt, mutate and remain as a viable institution in Jiddo for many decades to come. Moreover, Tuke and his associates were able to deploy their power and their new-found partnership with the Ethiopian state successfully in their quest for renewing and strengthening the local populations’ rights of access to and control over land and territory all over again. Noteworthy is also the interest that Tuke and his counterparts based in other parts of the lake region developed in national politics fairly quickly. As the available evidence suggests, several of the region’s balabbat and their horsemen and militia were among those that participated directly in the major wars that Menilek fought, first with Tona’s Wolayta state in 1894, and then the advancing Italian colonial forces in northern Ethiopia in 1896.65 Menilek was not only appreciative of the support that he garnered from his new allies but he was ready also to reward them handsomely. Perhaps the greatest trophy went to Tuke, whom he reappointed the following year as balabbat (administrator) of a much bigger territory that spanned from Alaba in the west to the highlands of Arsi in the east and from Maqi River to the northern shores of Lake Awasa in the south. Likewise, the kind of partnership that he forged with Menilek’s state was what enabled the Lume balabbat to carve out and administer a relatively large chunk of territory in the lake region’s northern part that bears his name to this day.66 Given its relatively late arrival, the success that the Ethiopian state had in creating rapport with local rulers (balabbat) and their constituencies was impressive. This was particularly true on matters pertaining to internal administration and the mobilization of local forces at times of national crisis. With respect to the equally important question of food exaction, however, the state’s rate of success in that region was modest at best. To the majority of the local populations, now subject to food and other kinds of tribute exaction, the state’s inability to translate into practice most of its policies on land and product was a welcome development. When seen from the vantage point of Addis Ababa’s food supply chain, that was a major disappointment. Equally disappointing was the state’s inability to predict provisioning’s incompatibility with the capital’s constantly growing demand for food. It is not by accident, therefore, that contrary to the kind of stability that it had enjoyed in the previous two decades, Addis Ababa started to face serious food shortages shortly after Menilek’s death in 1913. Interestingly, these shortages and the politics that they fed were what encouraged the growing diversification of the 65 66

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Interview: Azmach Damayo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2001. Interview: Baqala Nado, Modjo, 3 April 2001.

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city’s food supply chain in the following decades. As shown in the next chapter at some length, the same reasons and their articulation with the local factors were what contributed to the relatively different direction that the organization of places, spaces and production took in the lake region after 1917.

CONCLUSION This chapter sought to understand the factors that contributed to the shaping of the lake region’s agriculture and environment in the several decades ending in 1916. What is unique and not so unique about this period was the success that local populations had in forging a pastoral landscape against the backdrop of the increasingly intense competition that they had faced from other groups of populations. Among their major protagonists, certainly the most unrelenting had been the populations that sought to settle and to utilize the land for crop production. Complicating the situation further was the new rules and practices that the expanding Ethiopian state sought to promote in that region. The scholars that studied this period of Ethiopian history from the perspective of colonialism and the international economic order gave too much emphasis to the structuring effects of large-scale political and economic forces. This chapter embraced a different perspective. Aside from unscrambling the success that subject populations had in deflecting and appropriating to their advantage some of the state-sanctioned rules and practices, the chapter has also demonstrated the dominant role that spatial factors and the politics and practice of food production and supply played in the shaping of the lake region’s agriculture and environment up to 1916.

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Negotiating a Landscape: Continuity and Change in a Grassland Environment 1917–1941

In the lake region of Ethiopia, the 25 years from 1917 – like the quarter century that preceded it – were marked by both the retrenchment and growing maturity of a pastoral way of life and of livestock production along previously existing and new lines. While that continuity was important, this period permitted also the slow expansion of crop produc­ tion in certain parts of the region. The major promoters of this had been two groups of farmers that traced their origin from different places. To the first group belonged the farmers relocating from some of the nearby highlands, of which Arsi, Gurage, Silti and Shewa were probably the most important for this period. The populations belonging to the second group were different from that because of their small number and their places of origin, which were Addis Ababa and Italy. Setting these two groups of populations apart were not only their number and their different places of origin. More important were, rather, the different methods that they used to gain rights of access to farming land in their new sites of settlement and occupation. If the populations belonging to the first group relied on socially constructed rules and practices, what worked the most for the farmers of urban origin, namely those originating in Addis Ababa and Italy, were the state-sanctioned rules and regulations governing access to farming land. Also different was their objective in farming, which drew its inspiration from Addis Ababa’s fledgling food market. Like the provisioning method that preceded and accompanied it, Addis Ababa’s food market was a product of political factors. Interestingly, the lake region was one of the many places where struggles over the capital’s evolving politics of food were fought and lost, and then won after 1917. This chapter focuses on these points. Its primary object is to understand the factors that contributed to continuity and change in that region’s agriculture and environment in the two-dozen years ending in May 1941.

POPULATIONS, PRODUCTION AND POLITICS If, as shown in Chapter 1, livestock production had been the dominant

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practice in the lake region for the last half century, that trend also con­ tinued without interruption in the 25 years after 1917. Supporting evi­ dence for this comes from the observations made by the German anthro­ pologist Max Gruhl, who had the opportunity to visit the region a decade later. Gruhl described his trip south from Modjo in 1928 as a ‘wonderful journey … across a wide plain populated by numerous herds of cattle’.1 Interestingly, that was also the phenomenon that he witnessed along the way to his final destination near Lake Zway. While ‘sitting on a rocky perch’ one morning in a field near present-day Adami Tullu town he observed [a]n entire Arussi clan [migrating] with their belongings – cattle included – in search of new pastures. This country is in a state of continual change – the move­ ment of whole nations, clans, and individuals. These migrations are rendered necessary by the difficulties attendant upon the flight for a living. Agriculture is impossible to any important extent in the sterile lands of the Great Rift. A pastoral life is the only feasible one here; and that means nomadism. Even white settlers must submit to this decree if they wish to live and work in this country.2

Unlike the British traveller M.S. Wellby, Gruhl had the advantage of travelling to the lake region by rail from Addis Ababa. From Modjo, which was one of the railway’s major terminuses, he was able to travel south by car on a gravel road following roughly the same path that Wellby had taken in 1898. Yet their two remarks on that region’s agriculture and environment could not be more different. To Wellby, it was endowed with abundant water resources and fertile soils. When seen from that angle, the absence in that region of crop production appeared to him as one of the greatest anomalies that he had seen in Ethiopia that year.3 Yet to Gruhl, nothing qualified the parts of the region he visited in 1928 for crop production. In fact, to him the nomadic way of life and the environment that he observed south of the Modjo River were perfect matches that could not be altered even by prospecting white settlers. To be sure, some of the areas that Gruhl visited in that region that year, most notably Zway, were among the driest. However that factor alone did not deter the populations inhabiting Lake Zway’s main island from cultivating the land and growing crops in the field for centuries (see Chapter 1). If most of the lake region was still a pastoral landscape at the time of Gruhl’s visit in 1928, it was mainly because of historical rather than purely environmental factors. Furthermore, neither the pastoral way of life nor the factors that had sustained it for centuries were as static or as immutable as they appeared to him. Although inaccessible to him, some of this region’s oldest grasslands, such as those in the westernmost parts of the Maraqo ridge and the Maqi River Valley, were in the process of becoming important sites of crop production beginning in the 1920s.4 1 2 3 4

Gruhl, 1977: 33. Ibid. Wellby, 1901: 36-40. Interviews: Daliso Enboro, Koshe, 14 June, 2000; Azmach Damyo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2001.

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A number of factors contributed to agriculture’s expansion in parts of that ridge and that valley in the contemporary period. Among these, probably the most important factor pertained to the success that the farmers originating in the nearby highlands of Gurage and Silti had in settling them beginning in the second decade of the twentieth century. Their success predicated on the victorious battle that they had fought against their pastoralist protagonists in 1911.5 Initially, the challenge was how to tame the grasslands so as to make them suitable for crop production. No less challenging to this pioneering group of relocating farmers were also the altitudinal and climatic differences that existed between the Maraqo ridge and the western highlands already mentioned. For example, unlike the altitudinal variations that had existed in Silti and Gurage, Maraqo’s climate and landscapes were relatively monotonous. In addition, Maraqo’s plains were endowed with long grasses and acacia trees that required a relatively different kind of work and field preparation before they can be used for crop production. If this group of relocating farmers was willing to face these challenges head-on, it was mainly because of certain practical reasons. Noteworthy among these was the opportunity that such relocations gave them to deflect and overcome the pressures that the state-sanctioned tribute regimes had exerted on them and their highland agriculture after 1889 (see Chapter 1). Interestingly, its temporary exemption from such tribute regimes (mainly because of its inclusion in the category of land that the government had designated as state reserves following qalad’s introduction in 1897) was what made Maraqo an increasingly attractive site of settlement and crop production for them in the contemporary period. Also successful in that endeavour had been the pastoralists originating in the Arsi highlands that came to settle the Maqi River Valley in increasingly large numbers after 1917. If that year witnessed qalad reinstitution, its successful implementation in these highlands was what forced this group of pastoralists to vacate their traditional habitats in highland Arsi and to permanently relocate in that valley in such large numbers after that year. The only major difference was their continued interest in livestock production and a pastoral way of life.6 Recorded evidence is lacking to calculate the exact number of the populations that chose to relocate in these two sites before or after 1917. According to two of my informants from Maraqo, the total number of the farmers relocating from the nearby highlands was probably small and remained so for the next two and a half decades as well.7 Perhaps because of that reason and the environmental factors already mentioned, the amount of land they brought under cultivation remained small, and it remained so 5 6

7

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Ibid. See also Nori and Hirpa, 1987. Interviews: Gnamo Leenjiso, Maqi, 16 June 2009; Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001; Ahmad Alijad, Wulbareg, 28 April 1992; Argaw Wuqbato, Emdeber, 11 March 1992. Interviews: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Koshe, 13 June 2000; Bashir Kadir, Koshe, 6 August 2000; Abagaz Chure, Zway, 5 April 2001.

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until the early 1940s (see Chapter 3). Yet when seen from the perspective of the social and environmental challenges that they now faced in their new areas of settlement, their rate of success was impressive. Interestingly, it was by cultivating only small portions of the land and by socializing labour that they were able to succeed in that endeavour in those years.8 Specifically, the contribution that their adoption of the stick plough has made to crop production’s expansion in parts of the Maraqo ridge and the Maqi River Valley ridge was considerable. Compared with its oxen-drawn counterpart, the stick plough was best suited for preparing the grasslands for crop production in a relatively short period of time. Furthermore, the digging stick was more attuned to teamwork than was the ox-plough. This is not surprising because by its very nature the stick plough required the collaboration of at least four farmers, if it were to become effective for field preparation. Like the stick plough, the crops that this group of farmers started to grow in portions of the Maraqo ridge originated in the western highlands and lowlands. Noteworthy among these was sorghum, beans and peas, which were the first tier of crops they started to grow in that ridge begin­ning in the second decade of the twentieth century.9 Compared with most of the highlands’ major crops, such as enset, barley, khat and coffee, sorghum had a greater propensity to withstand moisture stress. In addition, sorghum’s labour and land requirements were smaller than the other crops already mentioned. Consequently, it was able to become the dominant field crop in Maraqo’s cultivated fields fairly quickly.10 The case of beans and peas was not any different from that of sorghum because their attractiveness hinged at least in part on their relatively small demand for land and labour, which, as already noted, was one of the prerequisites that these farmers took into consideration in their selection of crops in the first several decades. But initially these legumes thrived only as garden vegetables, planted near around residential houses. Livestock (most notably cattle) production was the other practice that appealed to that group of farmers during the same period.11 Livestock production appealed to them for the same reasons that it did to fellow farmers and pastoralists residing in both sides of the ecological divide. Most notable among these were the cattle’s contribution to the populations’ everyday diet and their significance as capital. Next only to Ada, Zay and the diminishing ecology of the northern Sidama highlands and lowlands – diminishing because of the success that the populations specializing in livestock production had in occupying them at one point or another – the Maraqo ridge and the Maqi River Valley’s western parts were the only two places that became an increasingly important site for crop production in the lake region in the contemporary Ibid. Interview: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Koshe, 13 June 2000. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 8 9

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period. The other was the narrow corridor that straddled Ada and the southern shores of Lake Zway. If agriculture’s expansion in parts of the Maraqo ridge and the Maqi River Valley took place under the auspices of local farmers, its incidence in that corridor was the work of a small yet equally enterprising group of farmers that traced their origin to Addis Ababa and Italy.

FARMERS OF URBAN ORIGIN As the available evidence suggests, the family of one of Menilek’s most trusted foreign advisors and confidents, the Russian Babicheff may be the first in organizing a commercially oriented farm in the lake region in the contemporary period.12 When organizing that farm from scratch in Ada’s highlands, the Babicheffs were not emulating madbet verbatim. Rather, the family’s intended or unintended objective was to chart a different course in the history of Addis Ababa’s food supply chain. Put another way, their farm was a product of that city’s fledgling food market. Interestingly, the market’s expansion was what contributed to the organization of similar farms in other parts of the region in the following two decades. Organized in a 40-acre (1-gasha) piece of land near the southern shores of Lake Zway, one of these farms belonged to the family of Herr X.13 Very little information is available on the Herr X family’s biography. The little we know about them comes from the accounts of Max Gruhl, the German anthropologist mentioned earlier in this chapter. Gruhl’s reluctance to address his host family – it was, in fact, to visit the Herr Xs that he made his trip to the lake region in 1928 – by their surname was not helpful. Nevertheless, his remarks are difficult to find in other sources. According to Gruhl, Herr X was a German chemist-turned-farmer in Ethiopia in the interwar period. Although Gruhl was reluctant to mention exactly when and why the Herr Xs choose to leave their homeland, it is clear that already by then they have made Ethiopia their adopted home. Yet it was in agriculture rather than in chemistry that Herr X and his wife were able to build a career in Ethiopia. At first, their focus was geared to pig and cattle farming. But later, they were able to venture into production of vegetables (mainly tomatoes) as well. In addition, the Herr Xs were quick in developing interest in buying from the local farmers’ livestock products, such as milk and butter, which they wanted to ship to Addis Ababa in increasingly large quantities. Unlike the pastoralists that were unwilling to accept any payment for the edible products that they wanted to share with Wellby three decades ago, the populations that the Herr Xs now encountered in the lake region were ready to sell them for cash.14 For a brief discussion of that farm, see McCann, 1995: 208. Gruhl, 1977: 34. 14 Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. 12 13

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To the local pastoralists specializing in livestock production, the pigs that the faranji (white) farmers raised were unattractive almost in every respect. Equally unattractive to them were the tomatoes that the Herr Xs might have started to grow in the farm later in their career. On the contrary, the methods that the faranji farmers used to extract and drain water to the cultivated fields were able to become the talk of the villages almost instantaneously. Equally captivating to the populations that had the opportunity to interact with the Herr Xs were the two houses that they had built, which, although covered with grass were, nonetheless, circular, much bigger and better-plastered than the others.15 Evidence is lacking to measure the exact number of livestock and other kinds of food materials that the Herr Xs were able to raise, grow and transport to Addis Ababa before or after Gruhl’s visit in 1928. According to one of my informants, the difficulty that the faranji had in recruiting farm workers and the damage that a mysterious bug had caused on the vegetables (mainly tomatoes) that they sought to grow in the field were among the factors that undermined the Herr Xs chances of success in farming.16 The informant was not sure about the techniques that the Germans had used to overcome these challenges. According to him, the faranji were most successful in raising livestock (mainly pigs) rather than in crop production. Like that of the Herr Xs, the majority of the commercial farms that sprung up in the lake region in the two decades from 1917 were owned and managed by individuals of European descent then living in Addis Ababa on a permanent or semi-permanent basis.17 The only exception to that rule was the farm that the regent Tafari (Haile Selassie) had organized in Ada in 1917. As in politics, Tafari had a deep-seated interest in commerce and agriculture. Because of that reason, many of his admirers and critics were tempted to call him the ‘merchant prince’.18 That was probably the adjective that he liked to cherish as well. This was because to him the boundaries between politics, commerce and agriculture were rather thin. Furthermore, Tafari was sure that for him to succeed in Ethiopia’s other­ wise convulsive political environment, investment in commerce and agricul­ture was a matter of paramount importance. That is why, unlike the majority of his predecessors and adversaries that liked to focus on tribute exaction, Tafari was able to develop a firm interest in trade and agriculture at a young age. Yet, when organizing a 400-acres (10-gasha) farm in Ada’s plains in 1917, Tafari was responding to Addis Ababa’s deteriorating food condition in a practical way. In fact, one of his objectives was to make his Ada farm a prototype and a major supplier of food crops to Addis Ababa’s fledgling market. To that end, he was able to hire two trained agronomists of Ibid. Ibid. 17 For a complete list of these farms, see Pankhurst, R., 1968b: 208-9. 18 Marcus, 1987: 559-68. 15 16

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European origin. The specialists had at their disposal a couple of tractors, brand new wheat varieties (imported from Europe) and the political and material support of an ambitious merchant prince.19 Lack of adequate supply of labour was among the challenges that Tafari’s Ada farm faced at first. Noteworthy were also Ada’s grasslands and marshy fields, which proved difficult to tame in a short period of time. Although accurate statistics are lacking, already by 1930 Haile Selassie’s farm was able to not only overcome most of the challenges that it had faced in the previous dozen years but it was successful in transporting what appear to have been large quantities of wheat and tef to Addis Ababa in the half decade leading up to the onset of the Italian occupation period in May 1936.20

SETTLERS AND CONTRACT FARMERS IN A COLONIAL SETTING As the works of several scholars have shown, the organization of mediumto large-scale commercial farms – of the kind the Herr Xs and Tafari/Haile Selassie had organized in the lake region in the previous decades – was one of the subjects that concerned the Italian colonial administration as well.21 Contrary to the administration’s expectations, Ethiopia was not able to become, however, a major attraction to metropolitan agribusiness companies and a large number of Italian settlers anytime during the five-year occupation period. For that reason the colonial administration was forced to relinquish its original plan and to embrace the alternative strategy that bore the name ‘military colonization’. Unlike the principle of ‘demographic colonization’ that preceded it, the so-called ‘military colonization’ programme envisaged the settlement as farmers of demobilized Italian soldiers in selected parts of Ethiopia. Interestingly, Ada was one of only two (the other being Holeta, a district just to the north of Addis Ababa) places that the colonial administration was able to identify and organize for that purpose after January 1938.22 The Italian settlement site in Ada grew in Haile Selassie’s confiscated farm and the additional properties that the colonial administration had enclosed as state reserves in that district after June 1936.23 In addition, the administration was able to undertake major infrastructure development activities so as to make Ada attractive to Italian settlers. These included the building of a relatively large number of modern residential houses and a tarmac road connecting Ada with Addis Ababa. Noteworthy is also the administration’s willingness to foot the bill for importing from Italy Pankhurst, R,. 1968b: 208. Interviews: Raya Talila, Ada, 23 July 2001; Badaso Roba, Dire, 14 July 2001; Lagasa Ayala, Dibandiba, 17 May 2000. Pankhurst, R., 1968b: 208. 21 Quaranta, 1939: 40-48; Haile Larebo, 107-37; Sbacchi, 1985: 99-106. 22 For more on this subject, see Haile Larebo: 107-37. 23 Quaranta, 1939: 40-51. Pankhurst, R., 1968a: 148-50. See also Haile Larebo: 102-4. Sbacchi, 1985: 47. 19 20

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dozens of tractors for use by the settler farmers, as well as improved wheat varieties, namely Mentana and Quaderna.24 In doing so, the administration’s ultimate objective was to make Ada not only a major centre of Italian settlement but also an important site for food production and supply to Addis Ababa.25 Despite the huge attention that it had received from the colonial adminis­ tration, the ‘military colonization’ scheme had difficulty succeeding in Ada as planned. In fact, only 44 of the estimated 1,000 Italian servicemen were able to settle in Ada between 1938 and 1941.26 This was mainly because of the project’s unattractiveness to these servicemen. Instead, the majority chose to reorient their attention to trade and other kinds of business rather than to agriculture. Complicating the situation further was also the colonial administration’s hands-on policy on all matters pertaining to settler agriculture. According to that policy, settler agriculture had to be self-contained almost in every respect. Self-containment referred to a practice that imagined the separation both in physical and cultural terms of settler agriculture from its ‘native’ counterpart.27 If that policy was at once racist, polarizing and counter-productive, the small number of Italian farmers that had chosen to settle in Ada were among the first to shun it altogether. The alternative ‘zone of influence’ strategy that the colonial administration quickly embraced after 1938 was a product of that factor.28 Unlike its predecessor, this second strategy envisioned the enlisting of ‘native’ farmers for the project’s success in Ada. To that end, the Italian farmers were willing to provide capital (mainly in the form of seeds) to the group of ‘native’ farmers that showed interest in working with them in contractual terms. Where implemented, such arrangements gave the Italians the monopoly to buy most of the surplus product originating in the farms organized by the ‘native’ farmers. Whenever such arrangements took place on the portions of the land now under the control of the Italian farmers, as they sometimes did, the ‘natives’ had also the obligation to pay back their rent in kind (often calculated on the basis of one-third of the total harvest).29 As Table 2.1 summarizes, this strategy was able to modestly succeed in Ada beginning in 1939. Wheat was certainly the one crop that benefited the most from the Italian organization of ‘zones of influence’ that year. In addition, both groups of farmers were able to grow also other types of crops as well. These included chickpeas, tef and barley, to mention the most important. Yet, compared with wheat, the total amount of land that the Italian farmers allocated for chickpeas and tef production was small. Haile Larebo: 120-24. Pankhurst, R., 1968a: 148-50. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.: 13-27. 28 Pankhurst, R., 1968a: 148-49. 29 Interviews: Raya Talila, Ada, 23 July 2001; Badaso Roba, Dire, 14 July 2001; Lagasa Ayala, Dibandiba, 17 May 2000. 24 25

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Table 2.1 The Distribution of Italian Farms and ‘Zones of Influence’ in Ada by Crop Type and Cultivated Area, c. 1939 Crop Type

Cultivated Area in Hectares by settler-farmers by ‘native’ farmers

Wheat 642 76 Chickpeas 184 66 Tef 105 32 Peas – 37 Barley 10 16 Vegetables 12 1 Corn [maize] 4 5 Beans – 2 Herbs 2 – Other 1 – Total 1,160 235 Source: R. Pankhurst, 1968a: 148.

Unlike them, the ‘native’ farmers were able to allocate roughly the same amounts of land and energy for the production of wheat, tef, chickpeas and peas that year. Aside from their food value, the legumes’ nitrogen fixing quality was what made them attractive to Ada’s farmers since earlier times. Far less attractive to both groups of farmers were the other types of cultivars listed in that table. These included corn/maize, beans and herbs, which did not become important field crops in Ada for some time. In terms of sheer size, the more than 1,100 hectares of land that the Italian farmers cultivated in Ada in 1939 was three times bigger than the area that came under their ‘zones of influence’. Yet that gap was offset to some extent by the similar kinds of farms that the ‘native’ farmers that did not subscribe to the Italian idea of ‘zones of influence’ had organized in Ada the same year.30 Noteworthy is also the huge difference that existed between the Italian and ‘native’ farmers in terms of the amount of land that they possessed and cultivated. For example, compared with the 25 hectares or more land that the individual Italian farmers brought under cultivation, their ‘native’ counterparts within or outside of the ‘zones of influence’ had under their jurisdiction less than one-quarter of that figure.31 Another way to look at that subject matter may be to compare the Italian farmers and their activities in Ada with that of their predecessors, namely the first group of commercial farmers to arrive in the lake region in the decades before 1935. It is striking to note that in terms of sheer number, the Italian farmers were seven times more than their predecessors. Likewise, According to my informants, for every one farmer that worked with the Italian settlers in that district during the last years of the occupation period there were probably three or four that did not. Interviews: Raya Talila, Ada, 23 July 2001; Badaso Roba, Dire, Ada, 14 July 2001; Lagasa Ayala, Dibandiba, 17 May 2000. 31 Interviews, as Note 29. 30

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the amount of land that they controlled and cultivated in Ada was much bigger than that of the combined total of the previous group. However, in terms of objectives and the methods that they used for securing rights of access to farming land, there was very little or no difference between these two groups of farmers of urban origin. In fact, for land they were dependent on the state-sanctioned rules and regulations. In terms of objectives as well, their aim was geared to the organization of large-scale commercial farms. Such an enterprise appealed to them because of certain concrete reasons, of which arguably the most important factor pertained to the expansion of Addis Ababa’s food market in the decades from 1917.

REORGANIZING A FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN It is striking to note that already by 1917 Addis Ababa had become at least demographically the largest and perhaps also the most cosmopolitan city both in Ethiopia and the entire Horn of Africa region.32 Yet one of the downsides of that growth and transformation was seen in the capital’s food supply chain, which started to encounter serious problems about the same time.33 The severity of the problem was such that food became a major political subject in that city almost overnight. Perhaps the best evidence to that argument comes from the folklore that started to circulate around Addis Ababa shortly after Zawditu and Tafari’s rise to power in November 1916: ‘At Iyasu’s time [we had] loafs of bread as pillows. [But] under Tafari’s [we could not find even] leftovers [to eat].’34 For Tafari and his supporters, who were busy painting Iyasu [r. 1913-16] as an irresponsible and inept leader, that folklore was extremely damaging. But the food shortages that Addis Ababa now faced were not of their making. As the pioneering group of Western-educated writers, namely Afaworq Gebreyesus, Gebrehiwot Baykedagne and Takala Hawaryat had vicariously argued, these shortages were, rather, manifestations of a systemic problem in that city’s food supply chain and in Ethiopian agriculture that needed to be corrected and overcome without delay.35 Unlike the folklore that has not garnered enough attention in the scholarly literature, the articles and monographs that this group of writers published have been the subject of major studies.36 Because of that reason Caulk, 1986: 714-15. For a useful discussion of that subject matter, see Tekalign, 1995: 187-97. 34 The Amharic saying goes like this: ‘BaIyasu dabo naw terasu; BaTafari teffa ferefari’. Interview: Emat Esay A. Delnasaw, Addis Ababa, 12 May 2000. 35 See, for example, Berhanena Salam, 24 May 1928, 15 April 1928, 26 March 1925; Gebrehiwot, 1960: 79-98. Asbe Hailu’s oft-quoted article belongs to this category. However, his commentary is full of innuendos and exaggerations. Because of that it has to be read carefully. For a full text of Asbe’s commentary, see Berhanena Salam, 24 July 1927. 36 Bahru, 2002; see also Tekalign, 1995: 187-97. 32 33

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it is not important for me to review that body of literature in detail in this chapter. Nonetheless, it is relevant for us to highlight some of the points that have not been sufficiently addressed in the secondary literature to date. First, like the folklore that accompanied them, the articles and monographs published by this group of Western-educated Ethiopians owed their origin to the food problems that had gone from bad to worse in Addis Ababa from 1917. Second, while the majority of the views that this group of writers expounded was new to Addis Ababa, they had nonetheless their intellectual and theoretical origin in the works of nineteenth-century European philosophers and economists. When seen from that angle, the writers’ primary contribution was seen in their attempt in utilizing and reformulating these ideas, so as to explain the Ethiopian situation.37 According to Afaworq, the primary culprit for the food shortages that Addis Ababa has now faced was the provisioning (gabbar) system lurking in many parts of Ethiopia.38 Because of that reason he became the leading proponent of the view that called for the practice’s abandonment and eradication without delay. Like Afaworq, Gebrehiwot and Takala were highly critical of that system. Yet their proposals for undoing provisioning were slightly different from Afaworq’s proposed top-down method of reform. In fact to them, the best way to eradicate that practice was to encourage the modernization of Ethiopian agriculture, the food supply chain and state administration in a coordinated yet progressive manner. Consequently, they advocated the promotion in Ethiopia of such practices as agricultural rent, modern farming and a food market in the shortest possible time.39 Interestingly, the organization of a food market was among the subjects that appealed to another group of writers and observers as well. Yet, in their case, certainly the best way to ensure the food market’s growth and expansion was to focus on road building.40 On the opposite side of that debate was the group of politicians that saw the simmering food shortages in Addis Ababa as mere glitches that should correct themselves in due course. To this group belonged the empress Zawditu and many of the regional and local rulers that had a stake in provisioning and the institutions that supported it, which they wanted to defend by any means possible.41 Unlike them, Tafari was not only ready to take the food problematic seriously but he was receptive of also the ideas propounded by the first group of writers already mentioned. This is not surprising because already by then provisioning and the gabbar system that sustained it were facing increasingly tough criticisms Getnet Bekele, 2009b: 99-100. Berhanena Salam, 16 May 1929. 39 For a useful review of this body of literature, see Tekalign, 1995: 170-86. 40 See Berhanena Salam, 26 March 1935; 25 August 1928; 24 May 1928; 5 April 1928. 41 On Zawditu’s politics, see Kabada Tasama, 1962: 64-93; interview: Emat Esay A. Delnasaw, 12 May, 2000 availed comment on Zawditu’s positions on madbet. For a useful discussion of this period of Ethiopian history, see Marcus, 1987: 78-147. 37 38

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from other circles as well. Specifically, the criticisms coming from the diplomatic community based in Addis Ababa and the accounts written by a growing number of European travellers that had the opportunity to travel to different parts of the country in the contemporary period were difficult for Tafari to simply ignore.42 According to these critics, Ethiopia’s provisioning (gabbar) system was comparable, if not actually identical, with slavery.43 Consequently, some among them and their superiors in Europe became major opponents of Ethiopia’s continued membership in the League of Nations. This was particularly true for Benito Mussolini, who worked relentlessly to ensure Ethiopia’s dismissal from that body barely half a decade after its admission in 1923. This was an important subject to him because already by the late 1920s, Mussolini was contemplating the organization of an Italian colony in all or parts of Ethiopia. As Harold G. Marcus has convincingly argued, the hovering colonial threat coming from Mussolini’s administration was not only serious but it was also the major factor that influenced most of Haile Selassie’s domestic and international policies and actions for the half decade after 1930.44 No less crucial, however, had been the internal factors. That Addis Ababa’s power structure (including the structure of power in the various regions and districts around the country) was built on the control of land, farmers and product (most notably food) was not hidden from Tafari and his closet supporters. In fact, he was sure that for him to succeed in Ethiopia’s otherwise complex and rugged political landscape he had no choice but to systematically destroy the building blocks of the old power structure step by step. Indeed, that calculation – and not his presumed interest in building a capitalist economy, as some scholars have suggested – was what made him one of the major critics of provisioning and a leading proponent of a food market in Ethiopia from 1917.45 Still, Tafari was careful not to antagonize Zawditu’s group upfront at this point in time. That is why that during his first ten years in office Tafari chose to focus on only the less controversial subjects, such as those pertaining to qalad (reinstated in 1917), corvée (unpaid) labour (outlawed in 1918) and the tithe (revised considerably in 1922), when pressing his reforms.46 Indeed, it was only after he became first king (negus) and then king of kings of Ethiopia in, respectively 1928 and 1930 that Tafari/Haile Selassie was able to attack provisioning and its supporting institutions more openly and forcibly. His most radical edicts on agricultural land, Getnet, 2009b: 98-101. See also Haile Larebo: 1-27. Haile Larebo: 1-27. 44 Marcus, 1970a: 559-68. 45 For a different take on that subject matter, see, for example, Addis Hiwot, 1975: 68-77. Although he did not focus on the food-side of Tafari/Haile Selassie’s politics, Harold G. Marcus (1970a) was able to discuss this period of Ethiopian history relatively differently from most others. 46 On the state’s efforts to outlaw corvée labour, see Caulk, 1979: 489. 42 43

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labour and tribute exaction, that became official in 1929, 1932 and 1934, grew in that context.47 Scholars have discussed these edicts and the others from different angles. Yet few were able to capture Tafari/Haile Selassie’s motives and aspirations as accurately as the Polish scholar Mantel-Niećko did half a century later.

The imperial regulations … were dictated by the interests the Emperor [Haile Selassie] had in the fullest possible utilization of the land in the individual peasant farms, who being obliged to fulfill services for the MELKENYA [the local ruler] in accord with his limitless demands were not able to cultivate [the] land and at the same time [to] fulfill their individual obligations towards the state. [These] regulations … are the expression of the subordination of the local administration to the central authority, which extended its control over the agricultural production of individual farmers [in a manner that was different from the past].48

In Addis Ababa as well, Tafari/Haile Selassie initiated a set of comple­ mentary measures during this period. These included his new-found interest in downsizing and limiting the number of state banquets and, equally importantly in commuting into cash the in-kind salaries that the government had been paying to its servicemen and women each month.49 Yet his greatest assault on that practice came after his coronation in 1930, when he made the decision to dismantle the madbet and wara-ganu districts all at once.50 In infrastructural and social terms as well, some of the changes that started to take place in Addis Ababa from 1917 were not only unprecedented but also their contribution to the expansion of the capital’s food market was equally considerable. Noteworthy among these was the completion of the Djibouti to Addis Ababa railway that year. Yet the railway was meant for facilitating Ethiopia’s import-export trade rather than its domestic counterpart. While that distinction is important, the railway’s construction had nonetheless far-reaching implications in the expansion of trade and urban growth in Ethiopia. A good 50 miles of the railway cuts across the lake region’s northern part. Interestingly, its presence was one of the factors that contributed to the birth of the region’s first towns, namely Nazareth and Modjo, after 1917.51 Likewise, it would be difficult to understand the region’s growing attractiveness to the aspiring group of commercial farmers discussed earlier in this chapter without taking into consideration the railway’s successful arrival in Addis Ababa that year. Unlike the railway, which had a different history, the roads that first Haile Selassie and then the Italian colonial administration built in Ethiopia had On the edict’s contents, see Mahtama Selassie, 1970: 89, 128-30. Mantel-Niećko, 1980: 197. 49 Interview: Emat Esay A. Delnasaw, 12 May 2000. For a detailed and critical look at most of Tafari/Haile Selassie’s pre-war policies and actions, see Tekalign, 1995: 187-208. 50 Interview: Emat Essay A. Delnesaw, Addis Ababa, 12 May 2000. 51 For a focused study of two of the lake region’s largest towns, namely Nazareth and Shashamane, see Gutema Imana, 1996; Bjerén, 1985. 47 48

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their origin at least in part to Addis Ababa’s worsening food problem already discussed.52 In the lake region, Tafari/Haile Selassie’s road development plan materialized in two different phases. The first phase targeted Ada, Modjo and Nazareth, and by the time of his coronation in 1930 this portion of the road was ready for use. The second phase of his southern road project started from Modjo town. Its primary object was to connect the railway and Addis Ababa with the resource-rich Sidamo province located just to the south of the lake region. Like the first, it took Haile Selassie’s administration less than three years to complete this portion of the road as well.53 As the available evidence suggests, construction of the roads was one of the factors that contributed to the development of some of this region’s southern towns, including Shashamane and Arsi Nagelle in the next two decades.54 Yet, when seen from the perspective of the lake region’s spatial and agricultural history, qalad’s reinstitution and the responses that it gener­ ated on the part of the local populations, rather than the construction of the railway and the roads, was what have had the greatest impact in the two decades from 1917. When restoring qalad that year, Tafari’s aim was to continue the practice that had started in Shewa and many parts of the country in the decades before 1906. In fact, his aim was to use qalad for the purpose of nurturing a different group of farmers that cultivated the land and that grew and supplied grain directly to Addis Ababa’s fledgling food market roughly the same way as the small number of commercial farms now present in the region had started to do from 1917. There is no recorded evidence to account for the exact amount of land that the Ethiopian state was able to sell in the lake region between 1917 and 1935. From the available oral sources, it is clear that now, as in the decade before 1906, it was unable to sell most of the land under its jurisdiction in that part of the country.55 On the contrary, Haile Selassie’s administration was able to renew and to bolster the state’s ability to exact tributes from subject farmers after 1930. This was mainly because of its success in renewing and strengthening its partnership with the local rulers (balabbat) whose numbers continued to grow significantly after that year.56 Tafari/Haile Selassie’s road-building project started in earnest in 1924. His plan was to connect Addis Ababa with the major agricultural areas by building roads in three (north, west and south) directions. His plan left out the eastern flank because of the railway. 53 On the administration’s road-building activities before the Italian occupation period, see The Public Record Office (London) – Foreign Office (FO): Addis Ababa Intelligence Report for the Quarter ending 31 December 1932, FO 371/16997; Addis Ababa Intelligence Report for the Quarter ending 30 June 1934, FO 371/18031. See also Imperial Highway Authority, 1964. 54 Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 55 Interviews: Alamu Gafarsa, Dire, Ada, 12 June 2001; Badada Buta, Modjo, 15 May 2001; Buta Qaweti, Chebi Dedagnata, 9 January 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 56 Interview: Azmach Daqaba Roba, Zway, 7 April 2001. 52

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The implication that these three factors, namely qalad’s resumption, the renewed enforcement of the tribute regimes and the strengthening of the balabbat institution, had on the way subject populations understood and interpreted the important question of rights of access to places, spaces and valued agricultural resources was considerable. Indeed, the con­summation of these factors was what lent fresh momentum to the population movements and relocations that had started in the lake region in the previous decades. The fact that there were still many unsold state reserves out there meant that these groups of populations, like their pre­ decessors had very little or no difficulty in organizing relatively new sites of settlement and production in that region in the contemporary period as well.57 Interestingly, that was also the trend that started to take shape in Addis Ababa from 1917. Therefore, unlike, for example, the first two to three decades of its history, when a significant proportion of the city’s population consisted of servicemen and women that were also heavily dependent on provisioning for their monthly sustenance, the majority that had made Addis Ababa home after that year seem to have had a relatively different pedigree and affiliation. To this group belonged day labourers, homebuilders, weavers and small-scale traders that started to relocate in that city from 1917 either on a temporary or permanent basis.58 Indeed their growing number, their constantly growing demand for edible materials and their independence from the state-controlled provisioning system were among the factors that contributed to the expansion of Addis Ababa’s food market in the two decades from 1917.59 Arada, the open-air food and commodities market that grew at the city’s centre beginning in the second decade of the twentieth century, was a product of that factor. Its level of growth and significance was such that by the time the British diplomat Hermann Norden visited it in 1928, Arada had become, in fact, the largest market in Addis Ababa, if not also in Ethiopia as a whole.60 To Tafari/Haile Selassie, who had envisioned the organization of an alternative food supply chain to Addis Ababa, the market’s growth and expansion was a welcome development. Furthermore, he was sure about the efficacy of his latest policies in bringing about much-needed change and transformation in the conditions of Ethiopian agriculture and state administration. Yet, to his Italian critics, Haile Selassie was incapable of and unqualified for achieving these goals in a prompt and satisfactory manner. Consequently, they advocated the colonial alternative, which Interviews, as Note 55. On Addis Ababa’s changing demography and economy in the decades leading up to 1935, see Pankhurst, R., 1962. 59 Ibid. 60 Norden, 1930: 35-38. See also Bentinick to Chamberlain, Addis Ababa, 18 Decem­ber 1926, The Public Record Office (London) – Foreign Office (FO): FO 371/12339. For a focused study of the history of Arada in the early twentieth century, see Kiros Adera, 1983. 57 58

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they argued would be the best available option for Ethiopia to quickly and successfully modernize its agriculture, the food supply chain and state administration. The irony is that most of the tactics and strategies embraced by the Italian colonial administration for modernizing Ethiopian agriculture and the food supply chain were not any different from those of Haile Selassie.

MUSSOLINI’S QUEST FOR AN AFRICAN FOOD COLONY Scholars debate the circumstances that led the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to invade Ethiopia in October 1935. Some explained his motiva­ tions and deeds in light of the defeat that Italian forces had faced in Ethiopia four decades earlier. To others, certainly the most important reasons pertained to the social, economic and political challenges that Italy faced both in the home front and internationally, particularly after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929.61 One need not have to question the validity of these and the other explanations put forth by different groups of scholars in order to underscore the important role that food played in Mussolini’s pursuit in an Ethiopian colony. Some of the similarities that had existed between Rome and Addis Ababa for most of the interwar years were striking. This was particularly true for food, which became an increasingly scarce and highly politicized subject in both cities in that period. The severity of the problem in Rome was such that the fascist state was forced to spend more than two billion lira per annum for food imports, beginning in 1930.62 To Mussolini, the food imports and the huge cost that they incurred were unsustainable. In political terms as well, the food imports worked against fascist propaganda, which promised self-sufficiency in almost all respects. Ethiopia loomed large in Mussolini’s imagination for certain tractable reasons. Aside from being one of only two parts of the continent that is still being ruled by Africans, Ethiopia’s predominantly highland environment was most suited for the kind of colony that he wanted to organize overseas. This is an important point because to Mussolini Ethiopia was first and foremost a food colony. Because of that reason and because of his fascist ideology Mussolini was ready not only to invest heavily in Ethiopia but also to rule it heavy-handedly. If he was aware of the challenges that such an enterprise had faced in other parts of Africa in the previous half century, he was equally sure about his chances of success. Success is a subject that does not lend itself to easy interpretation. If one were to measure success by number of years Mussolini’s colonial enterprise in Ethiopia was a complete failure. In fact, no other European power lost an African colony in such a short time as Italy did with Ethiopia in May 1941. If, however, one were to 61 62

For a summary of these views and others, see Haile Larebo: vii-xi. Sbacchi, 1985: 101-6.

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look at that subject matter in terms of colonialism’s long-term impact, the Italian occupation of Ethiopia was anything but an abject failure or a mere interlude. From roads to political discourses and to the historiography few other phenomena were able to leave a lasting mark on Ethiopia as Italian colonialism did in a span of just five years. Road building was certainly one of the areas in which the Italians succeeded the most in Ethiopia. Indeed, the 4,000 miles of tarmac roads that they built across Ethiopia were many times bigger and superior to what was already there in May 1936.63 Interestingly, it was by appropriating and upgrading Tafari/Haile Selassie’s road development plan that the Italian colonial administration was able to revolutionize Ethiopia’s road networks during the five-year occupation period. Contributing to the Italian success were the billions of lira that the metropolitan state allocated for that purpose. Also important was the colonial administration’s ability to mobilize and deploy first-rate Italian surveyors and engineers as well as tens of thousands of day labourers from different parts of Ethiopia and Italy’s oldest colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.64 The Italian colonial administration was equally committed to eradi­ cating the provisioning (gabbar) system in Ethiopia once and for all. Here, too, the Italians got most of their ideas from Tafari/Haile Selassie and the writings of the pre-war generation of Ethiopian writers already dis­cussed. If, as this group of Ethiopian writers had vicariously argued, provision­ing’s entrenchment was what discouraged local farmers from maximizing food production and exchange, that was also one of the ideas that convinced the Italian colonial administration to take such a firm stand against the gabbar system in June 1936.65 The problem was rather than abating, the food shortages that Addis Ababa had faced intermittently in the previous two decades became even worse after that year. This was at least in part because of the crisis of adjustment that followed the Italian military invasion that started in October 1935. More consequential was, however, the huge pressure that the presence of hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers and ascaries (‘native’ colonial soldiers of Eritrean and Somali origin) now posed on Ethiopia’s existing food supply chain. This was an important point because, in terms of sheer numbers alone, the actual size of the Italian colonial army now present in Ethiopia was significantly bigger than Addis Ababa’s current population. In addition, the Italian demand for wheat was something Ethiopian farmers were ill prepared to quickly meet.66 The colonial administration tried to overcome these food challenges by adopting a range of tactics and strategies, some of which were also new to this period. These included the administration’s decision to import Quaranta, 1939: 74-93. Pankhurst, R., 1971a. 65 For more on this subject, see Haile Larebo: 63-76. 66 According to contemporary Italian accounts, the level of wheat production in Ethiopia before 1936 was disappointingly low. See Quaranta, 1939: 15-16. 63 64

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large quantities of food materials (mainly wheat and wheat flour) from overseas.67 In addition, the administration made the effort to organize a food-marketing parastatal and to reinstate also the tithe (asrat) barely a year after its abandonment in June 1936.68 Politically as well, these food shortages had far-reaching implications in metropolitan policy. Indeed, their growing severity and the pressure that they exerted on the Italian treasury was what forced Mussolini to abrogate his original plan of building a food colony in Ethiopia and to replace it with the alternative doctrine that bore the name agricultural autarky.69 Personifying this shift in metropolitan policy was the Duke of Aosta, whose appointment as Governor General in December 1937 marked an important turning point in the colony’s history. Aosta was the first civilian to be appointed by Mussolini in that position since May 1936. An ardent supporter of fascist ideology and the ‘civilizing mission’, the Duke was nonetheless a pragmatic administrator.70 Perhaps the best evidence to that argument comes from his new-found interest in the development of ‘native’ agriculture, which turned out to be markedly different from the policies that his predecessors had formerly pursued in Addis Ababa. Also different were his willingness to reappoint and work with the local rulers (balabbat) and his success in organizing fully-fledged agricultural offices across Ethiopia.71 In terms of crops, Aosta’s primary objective was geared to the promotion of wheat and coffee production in Ethiopia on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Despite the little attention that it has received in the secondary literature, this was also one of his administration’s major areas of success in Ethiopia during its short-lived tenure that lasted until May 1941. This was particularly true for wheat, whose level of production grew significantly after 1939.72 Contributing to that surge in production were a number of factors. Of these arguably the most important factor pertained to the introduction and adoption by local farmers of the Kenya 1 wheat variety after that year. First bred and tested in Kenya’s highlands, that variety proved to be superior to its predecessors, including Mentana and Quaderna, almost in every respect.73 The variety’s rate of adoption and cultivation was such that already by 1940 Ethiopia was able to become self-sufficient Interestingly, importing food from abroad was one of the strategies that appealed also to Tafari’s administration in the late 1920s. On the Italian food imports, see Sbacchi, 1985: 99-100. 68 For contemporary reports on the parastatals’ obtrusive activities, unpopularity in Ethiopia, see New Times and Ethiopian News, 1940. See also The Ethiopia Star, 1941, 1942. 69 For more on this subject, see Getnet, 2009b: 101-5. 70 For a critical look at the Duke of Aosta’s administration in Addis Ababa, see Haile Larebo: 54-56, 103-06, 162-65. 71 Ibid. 72 For more on this subject, see Haile Larebo: 253-59. 73 IAR, 1972. 67

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in wheat production for the first time in four years.74 As the available oral evidence suggests, the food market was among the areas that benefited directly from that surge in wheat production and the arteries of roads that the Italians had built around the country after 1936.75 If the organization of a food supply chain that worked according to market principles was one of the subjects that concerned them right from the outset, that was also one of the areas that the Italians had succeeded in accomplishing the most in Ethiopia toward the end of the occupation period in May 1941.

CONCLUSION This chapter has attempted to understand the factors that contributed to continuity and change in the lake region’s agriculture and environment between 1971 and 1941. Emblematic of that continuity was the prepon­ der­ance of livestock production and a pastoral landscape across that region, similar to the previous half century. Nonetheless, this period wit­ nessed also the slow expansion of crop production as well. The agricul­ ture’s major promoters were two different groups of populations. First among these were the populations relocating from some of the nearby highlands and lowlands, of which Silti and Gurage were certainly the most important for this period. Also active in that endeavour had been the small number of venture agriculturalists that traced their origin to Addis Ababa and Rome. Setting these two groups of farmers apart were the specific tactics and strategies that they used to secure rights of access to farming land and their divergent interests in agriculture. For example, unlike their local counterparts that relied on socially inscribed rules and practices to secure such rights, the farmers of urban origin (including the Italian settler farmers) were dependent on the state-sanctioned rules and regulations that continued to morph constantly. As this chapter has tried to demonstrate, the changes that have started to take effect in the region’s agriculture and environment in the contemporary period were products of these factors. The next chapter focuses on the post-1942 period. Its primary object is to understand the circumstances that contributed to the region’s emergence as one of the major centres of crop production and supply in Ethiopia over a matter of just a few years. 74 75

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Haile Larebo: 253-59. Interview: Emat Essay A. Delnesaw, Addis Ababa, 12 May 2000.

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3 Blurring the Boundaries: The Ascendancy of Crop Production in a Flexible Environment 1942–1955

If, as shown in the previous two chapters, the lake region had been for the last half century a predominantly pastoral landscape, the situation started to change dramatically from 1942. Nothing illustrates that point better than the speed at which crop production expanded in that region in the next dozen years. Its major promoters had been an increasingly diverse group of populations, some of whom were also new to this region. Yet by far the most enterprising had been the local populations, most notably the pastoralists that developed interest in crop production more fondly than ever before. Although unprecedented, their new-found interest in farming was not, however, fortuitous. Rather, it was the strategy that they deliberately parlayed for contesting, renewing and asserting their entitlement rights on the land all over again. This is an important point, because the post-1942 period witnessed the escalation of the competitions for places and valued agricultural resources along previously existing and new lines. Among the factors that contributed to that escalation certainly the most important has been the demand for agricultural land and product that reached qualitatively new levels in Addis Ababa from 1942. Interestingly, it was by abandoning some of their traditional methods of land use and productive activity and by venturing in crop production that local pastoralists were able to cope with and thwart the pressures that they saw coming from Addis Ababa after that year. When seen from that angle, crop production was for them a means to a bigger end rather than an end in and of itself.

THE CONTOURS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF CROP PRODUCTION By the time the joint Allied forces, mainly British and Ethiopian, drove the Italians out from their East African Empire in May 1941 the lake region was still a predominantly pastoral landscape. Supporting evidence to that argument can be found in the report that the British General Joyce published two years later.1 Joyce was a ranking member of the Occupied 60

1

J. de Joyce, 1943.

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Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) that the British had organized in Addis Ababa following the Italian departure. Furthermore, he was responsible for assessing the current state of Ethiopian agriculture and the food supply chain in the shortest possible time. These subjects concerned the OETA’s British officials for the same reasons that they did their Italian predecessors during the occupation period that lasted from 1936 to 1941. In addition, the OETA and the British War Office that supervised its activities from a distance were eager to use Ethiopia’s food largess for the war effort in equally discreet ways. Because of the Italian- built roads, Joyce had the advantage of navi­ gating Ethiopia’s rugged landscapes relatively swiftly. Although concise and based mainly on roadside observations, his 1943 report was not only timely but it was also one of the most comprehensive to date, and it is clear that at the time of Joyce’s visit in 1942 the lake region was still a predominantly pastoral landscape. In addition, it was endowed with relatively large numbers of livestock and the ‘best’ grass types in the country. Consequently, the General was tempted to declare this region as the best candidate for the development of Ethiopia’s livestock sector in the ensuring years and decades.2 A relatively different picture emerges from the remarks that the presiding director of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) made on the lake region’s agro-environment at the conclusion of his official trip to Ethiopia in 1955. Like Joyce before him, the FAO director’s primary object was to assess first-hand Ethiopia’s potential in food production and supply to the international market. Interestingly, the region was one of the few places that he was able to visit during his brief stay in Ethiopia that year. From his remarks, it is clear that already by then this region had become a major site for crop production and supply in Ethiopia. The level of development of the agriculture was such that the FAO director was tempted to equate the region with Australia’s Queensland and the Corn Belt of the USA.3 Although only 12 years separated Joyce’s and the FAO director’s visit to the lake region, their testimonies on that region’s agro-environment cannot be much more different. If Joyce’s testimonies were consistent with the descriptions that we encounter in the similar surveys formerly conducted by Italian agronomists during the occupation years, what the FAO director came to observe in 1955 was testament to the changes and transformations that started to take place in the region’s agriculture and landscapes beginning in the early 1940s. What is striking about these changes and transformations was not only the different trajectory that they took in the contemporary period. No less striking were also the factors that underpinned them, which turned out to be large in number and constantly evolving. In geographic terms as 2 3

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Ibid. Chamber of Commerce, 1955: 196.

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well, the majority of these factors and the populations that participated in the shaping of the lake region’s agriculture and landscapes in that period traced their origin to many parts of Ethiopia. This was true not only for the structural factors discussed later in this chapter, but it was true also for the field technologies that proved to be crucial for the expansion of crop production in that region after 1943.4 These included cultivars, farm tools and soil management techniques, whose adoption by subject populations was indispensable for the agriculture’s expansion in that period. From the available oral evidence, it is clear that sorghum and corn/ maize were the first tier of crops that appealed to the farmers inhabiting the lake region south of the Maqi River.5 No less attractive to them were also the second tier of cultivars, including sweet potatoes, chilli peppers, peas, beans, tef and wheat that found their way to this part of the region about the same time. Separating these two sets of cultivars were their relative place in the farm and their different rates of adoption by the local farmers. This was particularly true for the second tier of cultivars, which had a significantly variable rate of adoption from place to place. Despite their growing availability, the chillies found their expressions only in the region’s western part, namely in the Maraqo ridge and the Maqi River Valley. Similarly, the sweet potatoes were able to appeal to only the farmers inhabiting the region’s southern part, including Arsi Nagelle, Aje and parts of Shashamane County. Even more circumscribed in terms of geography were tef and wheat that debuted only in the relatively wet areas near and around the bustling Shashamane town. On the opposite side of the crop spectrum were such cultivars as peas, beans, sorghum and corn/maize, which were able to become universal crops in that part of the region within a few years.6 Interestingly, it was by importing seed materials from other parts of the country, most notably from the nearby highlands that this region’s pastoralists-turned-farmers were able to succeed in farming after 1943.7 As the available oral evidence suggests, Wolayta was almost certainly the primary source of the corn/maize seeds and sweet potatoes that found their way to the lake region’s southern part after that year. Likewise, the immediate origins of the chillies, beans and peas that accompanied them were the western highlands (mainly Silti and Gurage). By contrast, tef and wheat had their origins in the eastern (Arsi) and central (Shewan) highlands – including also Ada.8 Interviews: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shasha­ mane, 24 January 2001; Azmach Damayo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2000; Badada Buta, Modjo, 15 May 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 5 Interviews: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001; Azmach Damayo Toba, Koshe, 13 June 2000. 6 Ibid.­ 7 Ibid. 8 Far less clear is the case of tef and wheat that remained almost exclusive to only parts of Shashamane County during this period. According to one of my 4

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Like the cultivars, most of the farm tools and soil management techniques that the farmers in that part of the lake region now embraced for the purpose of crop production originated from the same highlands. The best examples of that come from the stick plough and manure use, which were also among the technologies that appealed to these farmers as they did to their counterparts residing in the highlands of Wolayta, Silti and Gurage for centuries or millennia. This is not surprising because the stick plough proved to be most appropriate and most suitable for taming the region’s grassland environment than was, for example, the oxendrawn plough, which had also an equally long history in some of Ethiopia’s highlands. Interestingly, it was by coupling the stick plough with manure use that the farmers in this part of the lake region like their counterparts residing in the surrounding highlands, including Sidama, Alaba and Hadiya were able to succeed in farming after 1943.9 The fact that this part of the lake region was still endowed with relatively large numbers of cattle meant that local populations had very little or no difficulty in securing access to manure, which they wanted to apply to the cultivated fields on a regular basis. However, unlike the decades before 1943, when livestock spent the day and most of the nights near the seasonally exploited pasture fields, some of which were also far removed from the residential areas, now these farmers made the decision to reverse course and to organize makeshift barnyards near their fledgling sites of crop production. Yet, rather than transporting the manure to the crop fields the same way as their counterparts in the surrounding high­ lands had been doing for centuries, those in the lake region developed a strategy that enabled them to cultivate the fields in rotation.10 Without a doubt, the contribution that the successful transfer of these field technologies made to the changes that started to take place in the lake region’s agriculture and landscapes after 1943 were profound. Yet the agriculture that had started to take effect in the lake region in the contemporary period was not a mere replica of that of the surrounding highlands already mentioned. In fact, the region’s farmers were not only selective of the field technologies that they wanted to embrace but they were able to give them also new meaning and significance along the way. For example, none of the highlands’ perennial crops, including enset, coffee and khat, was able to appeal to this region’s farmers within a short period. This was in part because of the cultivars’ real or presumed incompatibility with the region’s microclimate. In part, too, it was their relatively high demand for land and labour that made the highlands’ perennial crops unattractive to the region’s farmers right from the outset. Most attractive to them were the annual crops, such as those already mentioned. In informants, their introduction in that part of the lake region can be traced to Addis Ababa’s food market. Interview: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. (contd)

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addition to microclimatic factors, it was, in fact, the crops’ contribution to their evolving food needs and requirements, their relatively low demand for land and labour, and their synergy with the kind of interest that they maintained in livestock production that made these annuals attractive to subject farmers right from the outset. As the available evidence suggests, these were also the factors that augmented crop production’s expansion in the lake region’s northern part, namely in Ada and Lume in the contemporary period. As already noted, Ada’s highlands had been, in fact, one of the oldest centres of crop production in Ethiopia. Yet the changes that started to take place in Ada and Lume’s agriculture and landscapes from 1942 proved to be different from the past. The best example of that comes from the speed at which crop production expanded outside of these highlands after that year. Likewise, it is difficult to understand the agriculture’s expansion into Ada and Lume’s plains and lowlands without taking into consideration the important role that technological factors continued to play at the field level.11 Sorghum was one of the crops that became increasingly popular in Ada and Lume from 1942. Yet in demographic and geographic terms, the crop appealed to only a small number of the local farmers residing in the low laying areas, such as those to the south of the Modjo River. The same was true for corn/maize, chillies and sweet potatoes, which failed to appeal to the majority of Ada and Lume farmers before or after 1942. In fact, in terms of cultivars, tef and wheat were what underwrote and benefited from the agriculture’s expansion in that part of the lake region in the contemporary period. Second in line were the set of legumes, including chickpeas, peas, beans and lentils, whose relative place in the farm continued to grow significantly together with the agriculture’s expansion in Ada and Lume’s plains after that year. The fact that most of these first and second tiers of cultivars had been present in Ada’s highlands for quite some time meant that seed acquisition did not become a major problem for the local farmers now bent on cultivating these plains on an increasingly large scale. Yet the same group of farmers, like their predecessors, was willing and ready to embrace new cultivars and seed varieties as long as they suited their interests.12 That is, for example, what the history of tef and wheat production tells us in Ada. As shown in Chapter 1, these two crops had a remarkably long history in Ada’s highlands. However, the dominant tef and wheat varieties that Ada and Lume farmers grew at the field level in the 1940s and early 1950s turned out to be significantly different from their predecessors both in terms of quality and their places of origin. In the case of the Kenya 1 variety of wheat, that place was in fact far removed from Ada (see Chapter Interview: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Dakabora, 22 May 2001; Baqala Ababa Tamerat, Modjo, 15 May 2001. 12 Ibid. 11

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2). Once popular, it took only a decade for that variety to lose its field-level dominance to the newly arriving Kenya 5 lakech (lit. superior) varieties, which debuted after Ada in 1952. Their promoter was the modern centre of crop research and experimentation that the Ethiopian state organized in the outskirts of Bishoftu (Debre Zeit) town that year.13 Like its Kenya 5 and lakech counterparts, tef’s magna (white) variety was new to Ada and Lume.14 Originally from neighbouring Menjar, a district in south-eastern Shewa, it was, however, after 1963 that magna was able to become the dominant tef variety in Ada for the first time.15 In both cases, the contribution that Bishoftu’s afore­mentioned centre of crop research and experimentation has made to the variety’s introduction and propagation in Ada and Lume’s highlands was considerable (see Chapter 4).16 The case of peas, beans and lentils was different from these in that, like sorghum and chillies, they did not become the subject of scientific research and experimentation in Ethiopia anytime soon.17 In addition, their place in the farm turned out to be markedly different from that of wheat and tef. If the latter were able to become the dominant field and food crops in Ada and Lume, the legumes’ place in the farm hinged on their nitrogen fixing quality and the complementary role that they played in the farmers’ cuisine.18 Somewhat different were the factors that ensured the expansion of livestock production in Ada and Lume in the contemporary period. Live­ stock production continued to appeal to this generation of Ada and Lume farmers for the same reasons that it did to their counterparts residing in many other parts of Ethiopia.19 Aside from their contribution to their food needs and requirements, in fact, these farmers liked to accumulate livestock as capital. In addition, livestock production gave the same farmers yet another opportunity to exercise usufruct rights on the commons, roughly the same way as crop production has enabled them to On the establishment of such crop research and experimentation centres in Ethiopia, see Getnet Bekele, 2009a. See also Chapter 4 in this volume. 14 My summary here is based on information acquired from interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Dakabora, 22 May 2001; Baqala Ababa Tamerat, Modjo, 15 May 2001. For the list of the improved seed varieties and brand new cultivars that the modern centres of crop research and development sought to promote in Ada and around Shashamane, see Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, 1955. On lakech, see also McCann, 1995: 231; McCann was likely referring to the B1 wheat variety that came to replace lakech after 1970. See also Chapter 5 in this volume. 15 Interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Dakabora, 22 May 2001; Baqala Ababa Tamerat, Modjo, 15 May 2001. 16 Ibid. 17 To be sure, corn/maize was among the crops that joined the first tier of crops, namely wheat and tef, in short order. But that happened only after 1960. 18 Interviews as Note 15. 19 Ibid. 13

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do in the individually owned and cultivated fields. However, unlike their southern counterparts Ada and Lume farmers did not develop interest in manure use anytime soon. In fact, for soil management they were heavily dependent on such practices as intercropping, crop rotation and fallowing.20 Also different were their farm tools. Noteworthy among these was the oxen-drawn plough, whose rate of adoption and use in Ada and Lume were markedly different from the parts of the lake region where the digging stick remained as dominant farm tool up until the middle of the twentieth century. Historically, the oxen-drawn plough appealed to only the farmers that specialized in grain production. In all other cases, the stick plough and the hoe rather facilitated the expansion of crop production across space and time. This was particularly true in the areas where the production of perennial crops, such as enset and coffee, remained as the dominant practice over the centuries. When seen from that angle, the developments that took place in the lake region south of the Maqi River in the 1940s were different in certain notable ways. These included the success that subject farmers had in forging a new kind of relationship between the stick plough and the annual crops that they grew at the field level in that decade. Interestingly, that was the relationship that they bequeathed following their adoption of the oxen-drawn plough beginning in the middle of the twentieth century. Their choices were not without consequence. In fact, their adoption of the ox-plough and together with it brand new varieties were what ensured corn/maize’s emergence as a major field (as opposed to garden) crop south of the Maqi River in the decade after 1955. The same was true for wheat’s unrivalled dominance in Lume, which took effect only after lakech’s arrival a few years earlier. The FAO director visited the lake region at that juncture. Yet the corn/ maize and wheat fields that he came to observe in that region in 1955 were not products of the factors that had made Ohio and Queensland such success stories in the world of capitalist agriculture both before and after that year. Rather, they were the work of an increasingly diverse group of small-scale farmers that had developed interest in crop production and grain marketing in their own right and for reasons that were markedly different from that of their Western counterparts.

RELABELING THE LAND, UN-LEVELLING THE ‘PLAYING’ FIELD As shown in the previous chapters, the lake region had been for most of its recent history a fiercely contested landscape. When seen from that angle, what happened in that region from 1942 was not any different from the past. The only major difference pertained to the changing composition of the populations that vied for this region’s places, spaces and valued agricultural resources, the reasons that instigated them and the specific 20

Interviews: ibid.; Yerga Walda Gabrel, Dakabora, 22 May 2001.

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tactics and strategies that they used to satisfy their growing lust for these resources after that year. These are important points because their interaction was what dictated the course agricultural and environmental change and transformation that took place in the region at that time. Several groups of populations and institutions jostled for the lake region’s places and valued agricultural resources from 1942. First among these were the local populations (including those originating in the nearby highlands and lowlands) that intensified their quest for places and valued agricultural resources along previously existing and new lines. Second in line were the populations that traced their origin to the capital Addis Ababa and other parts of urban Ethiopia. Despite their different places of origin and their lack of precedence, this second group of population was able to become a force to reckon with in the region and many other parts of the country fairly quickly.21 This was mainly because of the support that they got from the post-war Ethiopian state, by then willing to relinquish under new pretences its nearly half-century-old proprietorship of agricultural land. Symbolizing that shift in government policy were the series of landgrant edicts that Haile Selassie’s administration promulgated beginning in 1942.22 These edicts have been the subject of numerous studies. Because of that reason it is not necessary for me to discuss them in detail in this chapter. Suffice it to highlight only some of the key points that are relevant to my discussion below. First, both in theory and in practice the edicts’ promulgations marked the abrogation of qalad and its replacement by a different set of laws and regulations governing access to the landed properties that had been under direct government control since the late-nineteenth century. Second, compared with the pre-war period when qalad envisioned, at least in theory, the selling of such properties to tribute or tax-paying farmers, now the Ethiopian state was willing to redistribute land to prospecting individuals for free or according to the dubious criteria of ‘service to the country’. Third, contrary to the view that has been popular in the secondary literature, the land grants were made in the form of rist (heritable land) rather than that of private property.23 If the latter implied full proprietor­ ship of the land, including the right to lease or sell the land to a third party, that was something that Haile Selassie’s land grants did not permit, at least for the time being. In terms of sheer size as well, 40 acres (one gasha) On the contents of the series of land-grant edicts that Haile Selassie’s adminis­ tration promulgated from 1942, see Ministry of Internal Administration (MIA). ‘Comprehensive report.’ 2075/54. See also Tekalign, 1995: 239-47. 22 For studies that looked at the land grants from the vantage point of class interest and class domination, see, for example, Cohen and Weintraub, 1975: 59-61. See also Addis Hiwot, 45-46. 23 Tekalign may have been the first in making that distinction more clearly and vividly than most others: Tekalign, 1995: 239-47. 21

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of land was the maximum that the individuals that fulfilled the stated criteria could obtain from the government in their lifetime. Fourth, few, if any, of the so-called state reserves that became the subject of the land grants from 1942 were as vacant or unkempt as the official government records had suggested. Rather, they had been and they were becoming important sites of settlement and production by local farmers almost everywhere. This was true not only in the parts of the country where qalad had succeeded the most but it was true also in such as the lake region, where the state-sponsored land measurement and sale practices of the prewar period had failed to materialize to any meaningful degree. Even then, the onset of these state-sponsored land grants were not a fait accompli, as many scholars have suggested. Rather, they were products of certain unpredictable factors. The best evidence to that argument comes from the ‘crown speech’ that Emperor Haile Selassie delivered to the nation in October 1941, just five months after his return from European exile. Pursuant to our [my] plan to enable all Ethiopians possess rist land, we [I] have ordered the Ministries of Interior and Agriculture to [expeditiously] complete the inventory of government land so as to facilitate their sale [to those who needed them]. As soon as that inventory has been completed, those who have [faithfully] served the government [during the Italian occupation period] will be accorded the right to buy the land. In addition, those who have been disabled due to their [military] service [in that period] and those in retirement age will be given as pension [a piece of agricultural] land [in rural Ethiopia in a prompt manner].24 (Emphasis added)

From that speech it is clear that Haile Selassie’s initial aim was to resume qalad all over again and with only some major and minor modifications and changes. Yet when they became law in 1942, what the land grants sought to accomplish proved to be markedly different from his initial plan. In fact, rather than selling such public lands to a third party, as was generally the case in the pre-war period, now his administration was ready and willing to abandon that practice altogether for the sake of the land grants that worked according to the principle of ‘service to the country’.25 It is important to note that like qalad before them, the land grants became official state policy in Addis Ababa in the wake of national crises. As shown in Chapter 1, qalad became a nation-wide practice only after the major war that Ethiopian forces had fought against the advancing Italian colonial army in 1896. Likewise, it is difficult to imagine the land grants’ onset in 1942 without taking into consideration the political and social changes and tension that the Italian occupation period and its unexpected end had precipitated in many parts of Ethiopia, including Addis Ababa, in the previous six years. This is an important point because the populations that had fought or claimed to have fought the Italian colonial forces were 24 25

Quoted in Gebre-Wold, 1948: 79-80. For studies that interpreted the policy’s short- and long-term impact on Ethiopian agriculture in light of the traditional view, see Cohen and Weintraub, 1975: 59-61; Dessalegn Rahmato, 1986: 80-91.

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the ones that benefited the most from Haile Selassie’s land grants in the decade from 1942.26 Better known by the generic name ‘patriots’, this group of populations was large in number. Yet more than their sheer number, it was, in fact, the liberation politics that they concocted successfully that made them a force to reckon with in Ethiopia’s post-war politics. If Haile Selassie was wary of the danger that their presence and politics had posed on his power, he was nonetheless able to co-opt and silence them by one means or another. Indeed, that was exactly what the land grants had helped him to accomplish from 1942. Although dominant, the patriots were not, however, the only groups of populations that benefited from these land grants. No less successful had been also members of Haile Selassie’s newly organized cabinet in Addis Ababa and of the leading political families based in other parts of the country.27 Included in that list were also the displaced, the day labourer and those returning from exile in foreign countries after May 1942, including Kenya, Sudan, Israel and European countries. That is, for example, the impression one gets from Joyce’s 1943 report. These people [i.e. the populations wondering around in some of Ethiopia’s urban and rural areas] cannot be [easily] absorbed in the labour market … I have seen too much good, unused and unoccupied country in the course of my travels to believe there can be any insurmountable difficulty in putting these people back on the land. There they can at least support themselves and contribute, through their agricultural produce, to the revenues of the country. …Some, no doubt, have been absorbed in the Army and Police services. … [B]ut who can blame those who are left [out] to shift for themselves if they become ‘Shiftas’ [brigands] in their own right?28

As can be surmised from Joyce’s report, this population group was large in number. Yet only few among them were able to improve their lot by enlisting into Haile Selassie’s fledgling military and police forces the same way as some of the patriots had done after 1941. In fact, to the majority, these institutions of power and state control remained either inaccessible or totally unattractive. This was particularly true for the demobilized army of day labourers that had been employed formerly in some of the mega projects, such as road building that the Italian colonial administration has undertaken during the five-year occupation period. They were also among those that did not seek the government’s support to make the necessary adjustments and transition after May 1941. Least successful in that endeavour had been the displaced and those repatriating from selfimposed exile in Kenya and the Sudan. Ministry of Internal Administration (MIA): ‘Comprehensive report’, 2075/54: 1-16. See also Nigatu Lakew, 1970: 207-17. 27 For example, one of Haile Selassie’s closest supporters and advisors, Walda Giyorgis Walda Yohanes, was able to receive from the government 320 acres (8 gasha) of land in Ada in the late 1940s or early 1950s. Interview: Baqala Ababa Tamerat, Modjo, 15 May 2001. 28 Joyce, 1943: 177. 26

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This ‘wandering’ group of population and some of the patriots cap­ tured Joyce’s gaze because of not only their relatively large number but because of also the real or presumed danger that their presence and demobilization could pose to the ‘country’s security’. In fact, Joyce was fearful that if left to fend for themselves they could force the incumbent Ethiopian administration to resort back to the old practice of ‘tying the irregular soldier to the farmer’. Consequently, he became one of the major proponents of the idea that envisioned their relocation and settlement in some of the ‘unused and unoccupied’ lands scattered around the country. To what extent Joyce’s report was able to influence Haile Selassie’s postwar policies on agricultural land is not clear. What is clear is the report’s congruence with the Emperor’s new-found interest in the land grants that became official the same year. An equally important aspect of the land grants was their continuity and the relatively different direction that they took after 1952. This year was important because it witnessed the onset of what may be referred to as the second round of the government-sponsored land grants that had started a decade before.29 Their major beneficiaries had been the populations actively serving in Haile Selassie’s fledgling military, police forces and bureaucracy. This is a surprising development because already by then the Emperor had committed himself to the idea of building a bureaucratic state in Ethiopia. Yet neither his commitment for such an enterprise nor their growing professionalism was able to deter this generation of servicemen and women from seeking and obtaining fringe benefits from the state in the form of agricultural land.30 As records show, the lake region was one of the many places that became particularly attractive to these two groups of land seekers right from the outset. This was mainly because of the presence in that region of relatively large tracts of land that belonged to the category of state reserves. Compounding that factor were also the region’s proximity to Addis Ababa and its potential for crop production. The land seekers measured that potential based on certain benchmarks, of which precipitation was likely the most important to them. Indeed, that was one of the factors that contributed to the variations that had existed in the region in terms of the intensity of land grants. Also important was the government’s geographically circumscribed policy. The best example of that comes from Ada and Lume, which remained inaccessible to the majority of the pioneering group of land seekers that arrived in the region between 1945 and 1953 (see Table 3.1). As Table 3.1 summarizes, the total amount of land that these two groups of populations of urban and semi-urban origin obtained in the lake region In the lake region, as in other parts of the country, the land grants started to take effect after 1945 and they continued without interruption for the next two decades. This chapter deals with only the decade ending in 1955. 30 On the contents of the 1952 edict, see Ministry of Internal Administration, 2075/54: 4-5. 29

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Table 3.1 Government Land Granted as Rist in the Lake Region, 1945-1953 District County No. of beneficiaries Granted land (Awraja) (Warada) in gasha* Hyqochena Buta Jira Yararena Karayu Total

Adami Tullu Shashamane Ada Lume

631 2,293** 153 269 3,346

631 2,293 153 269 3,346

* As the available evidence suggests, 1 gasha varied significantly from place to place and from time to time. This was mainly because of the tenure of the law, which measured size in relative rather than absolute terms. The more cultivated the land, the smaller the gasha and vice versa. But in general, 1 gasha of land was equivalent to 40 acres. ** The original document does not specify this number. I extrapolated this figure based on the corresponding ­number because one gasha was the maximum that one could obtain from the government in that period. Source: Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, 1967: 54-55.

in the form of land grants was considerable. In fact, never before was the Ethiopian state able to redistribute so much landed property in that region to such a large group of populations as it did between 1945 and 1953. While that was an important point, not all parts of the region were able to attract this generation of land seekers on the same scale. For example, the more than 2,290 gasha of land that they grabbed in Shashamane County was twice as big as the combined total of the figures that we get from the other parts of the region. At the bottom of the list were Ada’s and Lume’s 422 gasha of land. Adami Tullu’s more than 600 gasha was five times smaller than Shashamane’s. Yet it was bigger than Ada’s and Lume’s combined total. Undoubtedly important, these differences were not, however, products of accidental factors. Rather, they owed their origin to a number of inter­acting factors that ranged from the environmental to the political. Precipitation was one of the subjects that this group of land seekers care­ fully examined when selecting their sites of land grabbing in the lake region in the contemporary period. Indeed, that was the reason why such places as the Maqi River Valley, the Maraqo ridge, Adami Tullu, Arsi Nagelle, Shashamane County and Aje came to attract the largest number of this group of land seekers in the decade after 1945.31 Influencing their decisions were also the political factors. The best example of that comes from Ada and Lume, which remained inaccessible to the majority of the land seekers in that decade. This was mainly because of the administration’s reluctance to redistribute the state reserves that its predecessors had organized in that part of the region since the late-nineteenth century. In fact, only the most powerful and the most connected were able to acquire such properties in Ada and Lume in the contemporary period.32 Interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Dakabora, 22 May 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Telahun Duri, Hursa, 13 January 2001; Shiberu Kasa, Udasa, 19 June 2000; Imam Wudu Abam, Moderena Alibo, 17 June 2000. 32 Interviews: Raya Talila, Ada Liben, 23 July 2001; Alamu Gafarsa, Dire, 12 June 2001; Baqala Nado, Modjo, 3 April 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, January 24, 2001. 31

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Noteworthy are also the differences that existed within this group of land seekers in terms of their overall objectives. If the majority, most notably those that had acquired the land before 1952 were ready and willing to settle and farm the land just like their local counterparts had been doing, what appealed the most to their successors was the prospect of rent exaction. Consequently, they became major promoters of sharecropping in the lake region after their arrival in 1953 and the few years that followed it.33 These differences were important. However, rarely were they able to garner in the scholarship the kind of attention that they actually deserved. Similarly, rarely were scholars able to explain in a satisfactory manner the factors that had contributed to the growing popularity of this new policy of land grants in such places as Addis Ababa at that time. In fact, to many a scholar, the land grants were products of a state policy that was bent on promoting capitalist agriculture and capitalist relations of production in Ethiopia on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The problem with that line of argument is its incongruence with the reality on the ground. As shown below in some detail, what the land grants encouraged was, in fact, the propagation of small-scale farms.34 In terms of causation as well, these government-sponsored land grants were products of certain tangible factors, of which arguably the most important factor pertained to the relatively different direction that the politics and practice of food production and supply took in Ethiopia from 1942.

THE FOOD MARKET AS AN ORGANIZING AND DESTABILIZING FORCE As shown in Chapter 2, the organization of a food supply chain that worked according to market principles was one of the subjects that concerned Haile Selassie’s administration and that of its Italian adversaries in the previous two decades. If their rate of success was at best modest, the changes that took effect from 1942 were important because they ensured the market’s expansion in hitherto unprecedented scale. The land grants that we discussed in the previous section took place not only in that context but also for that reason. This was particularly true if we were to look at that subject matter from the perspective of the populations that lobbied for and benefited from the state-sponsored land grants. Several factors contributed to the expansion of Ethiopia’s food market from 1942. Most notable among these was the sharp rise in international demand for food materials that reached a new level following the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Specifically, the impact that the famine that struck Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, February 11, 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. 34 Ibid. 33

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the Middle East in 1941 had on the postcolonial dimension that Ethiopia’s food market and Haile Selassie’s politics of food took in the following years was considerable.35 Likewise, that war and the Middle East famine had farreaching implications in the way the major powers, including the US and Great Britain came to understand the place food occupied in international politics. Perhaps the best evidence to that argument comes from the speed at which they organized what came to be known as the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) the same year.36 Based in Cairo, Egypt, the MESC’s primary purpose was to facilitate the delivery of food and other kinds of relief materials to the famished populations at least until the war’s end. Yet as a wartime institution, the Centre had to overcome numerous challenges if it were to accomplish that goal in a satisfactory manner. Specifically, the threat that the German submarines posed to Allied shipments over the high seas was something that the MESC could not afford to easily ignore. The Centre tried to overcome that challenge by avoiding altogether the submarine-infested oceans and by purchasing its food largess from the areas that were closer to the famished Middle East.37 Ethiopia appeared in the MESC’s radar at least in part because of that reason. No less important had been also the country’s oft-talked about potential for food production and supply and its current status as Occupied Enemy Territory.38 To the ex-Italian colonial administration, the Allied powers’ new-found interest in Ethiopia’s food largess was a re-enactment, if not also a vindication, of Mussolini’s failed policy in organizing a bread colony in Ethiopia. But to Haile Selassie, the Allied demand for food was anything but colonialism by other means. In fact, to him this was a payback time for the military and political support that he had received from the Allies in his second bid for the Ethiopian throne that became a reality in May 1941. Moreover, the food market was to Haile Selassie a liberating, liberalizing and empowering enterprise almost in every respect. When seizing the food market as a new form of strategy, Haile Selassie was not reinventing the wheel all over again. Rather, his post-war politics of food was a continuation of past ideas and practices. If, as shown in Chapter 2, organizing a food market was one of the strategies that Tafari/ Haile Selassie had used for the purpose of undermining the powers and prerogatives of many of his internal competitors and adversaries in the Wilmington, 1971: 1-9. Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 American Embassy to Department of State, 5 June 1952, ‘Report on the external trade of Ethiopia’. The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 475.00/6-552; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1954; Getnet, 2009b: 1059. On OETA and British positions on that trade, see, for example, Bethell, ‘Commerce in Ethiopia’, in FO 371/41463. See also Talbot Smith, ‘Conditions in Ethiopia, September 1942’, Asmara, October 8, 1942, State Department 865. D.01; Talbot, 1958: 1-17. 35 36

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two decades before 1936, that was also what he sought to do with it when confronted by the OETA and the British War Office after May 1941. His interest in slyly organizing a grain-trading parastatal that bore the name the Ethiopian National Corporation (ENC) had its origins in that context.39 Officially registered as public, as opposed to a state-run trading company, the ENC had as its board members Haile Selassie’s most trusted and high-ranking officials, including the commerce minister Makonen Habtawald.40 His appointment as the ENC’s head was a controversial move because, according to official Allied rules, the food market was meant to function ‘freely’ and independently from the offices that the OETA and Haile Selassie’s junior administration had organized after May 1941.41 While complacent of these rules, neither of the two administrations was ready, however, to respect them fully and to relinquish the food market to the other party at will. It is important to note that, like Haile Selassie, OETA’s interest in Ethiopia’s expanding food market was firmly rooted in politics. Similar were also some of the tactics and strategies that its officials had used to reorient that market and bring Ethiopia’s export trade under their control and jurisdiction. Among these, certainly the most alarming to Haile Selassie was the success that the OETA had in organizing after May 1941 a total of four major trading entrepôts near Ethiopia’s international borders with Eritrea, the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland. To that point must be added, the administration’s success in making the pound sterling the territory’s official currency that same year. OETA complemented these practices by stationing a relatively large number of British troops in the Ogaden and the Haud, and by promoting also the view that advocated the repartitioning of Italy’s ex-empire in the Horn along new lines. Of particular interest to the OETA’s British officials and the War Office was the prospect of creating a Greater Somalia by unifying what were before British and Italian Somaliland and by adding to them Ethiopia’s Ogaden and the Haud on the basis of language and ethnicity. Likewise, the same officials and that office were unrelenting in promoting the view that called for the unification of Ethiopia’s northernmost province of Tigray with the former Italian colony of Eritrea under the same pretences. Haile Selassie fought back at OETA and the British War Office’s latest interests and intransigence in Ethiopia and the broader Horn of Africa region by embracing a multi-pronged strategy. His new-found interest in organizing an autonomous and functioning administrative apparatus in Addis Ababa and around the country was at least in part a product of that strategy. As records show, it was by recruiting a new generation of administrators and by reappointing many of the local rulers (balabbat) to their previous positions that he was able to succeed in that front Ethiopian Grain Corporation, 1966. Getnet, 2009b: 106-9. Getnet, 2009a: 33-38. Bahru Zewde, 1988. 41 Bethell, FO 371/41463. For a general yet useful study of this period of Ethiopian history, see Harold G. Marcus. 1983. 39 40

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after May 1941. Noteworthy is also his success in forging a new kind of relationship and partnership with the US about the same time. This was an important development because the support coming from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration was one of the factors that enabled Haile Selassie to win the international diplomatic battle against his OETA and British rivals and adversaries relatively quickly. Despite the little or no attention that it has received in the scholarly literature, it was, in fact, Ethiopia’s growing involvement in the international food market after that year that helped Haile Selassie to garner Roosevelt’s support in a timely manner. This is not surprising because the famine that struck the Middle East was one of the subjects that concerned Roosevelt’s administration right from the outset. In addition, the President had a deep-seated, albeit politically motivated, interest in global food security that he made one of his priorities after 1943. Roosevelt’s level of interest in that subject matter was such that he was quick in organizing an international conference on food and agriculture that year. Represented by the presiding Minister of Finance Yilma Deresa, Ethiopia was one of the countries that participated in Roosevelt’s conference in 1943.42 If that conference was what set the tone for the new direction that US-Ethiopia relations took after that year, its linchpin was Ethiopia’s growing involvement in the international food market already discussed. Interestingly, that was also the factor that convinced Roosevelt to meet Haile Selassie in person at Bitter Lake (Egypt) two years later. As records show, food and the development of Ethiopian agriculture were the two subjects that Roosevelt and Haile Selassie discussed at length in that meeting. Aside from thanking Haile Selassie for his country’s contribution to the war effort, which came in the form of food supply to the famished Middle East, the American President made the pledge also to support Ethiopia’s pursuit of agricultural development in the upcoming years. The Emperor was not only thankful of the President’s graciousness and pledge, but he was ready to renew and reaffirm also his and Ethiopia’s commitment for global food security in the war’s aftermath.43 In addition to its political significance, the expansion of the food market was one of the factors that contributed to the recovery and growth of the Ethiopian economy in the 1940s and early 1950s. The market’s size was Yilma Deressa to Secretary of State, 24 June, 1943, in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 884.24/111. Zewde Reta, 2013: 489-500. 43 It is important to note that one of Roosevelt’s ‘Four Points’, notably his reflections on ‘freedom from want’ anticipated promoting food security around the world after World War II. Food was also the one subject that dominated Roosevelt and Haile Selassie’s discussion at Bitter Lake. See Paul H. Alling to W.G. Hayter, in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 884.24/110. For a useful discussion of that subject matter, see Getnet, 2009a: 37-38. For the developments that took place in Ethiopia after 1943, see enclosures in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 884.34/111. See also Zewde Reta, 2013: 501-13; Talbot, 1958: 10-17. 42

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such that the country was able to export on average over 75,000 tons of food materials per year between 1942 and 1955. The highest figure, amounting to more than 170,000 tons, was recorded in 1947. The lowest recorded figure comes from 1955, when Ethiopia exported only 1,000 tons of food materials to that market.44 Another way to look at the food market’s size is to compare it with that of coffee, the cash crop that had become a major staple in Ethiopia’s export trade since the late-nineteenth century. It is striking to note that in terms of volume, the country was exporting more food materials than coffee for most of the 1942 to 1955 period. In terms of the amount of foreign currency that the export market generated as well, coffee trailed food materials by significant margins for most of this period. In fact, it was only after 1952 that coffee’s relative share in Ethiopia’s export earnings began to surpass that of food materials for the first time in ten years. This was mainly because of the relatively high price that the cash crop started to fetch in the international market following the setback that coffee production and supply faced in Brazil for several years to come. Yet in terms of volume, food materials continued to account for the largest share in Ethiopia’s export food market until after 1955.45 Even more spectacular was the speed at which the domestic food market expanded during that period. Contributing to the market’s expan­sion was a number of interrelated factors, some of which had their origin in the previous half-to-one decade. Noteworthy among these was the declining importance of provisioning and the expansion of Ethiopia’s road networks, both of which morphed into new levels during the fiveyear Italian occupation period. In addition to propelling the national economy, the food market created also fresh opportunities for the rise of an independent group of grain traders in Ethiopia after 1945. Haile Selassie’s administration encouraged their trade by embracing a handsoff policy on that market and by organizing brand new marketplaces around Addis Ababa after that year. The majority of the capital’s food trading quarters, most notably those that are known by their suffixes, such as tara and gabaya, owed their origin to these factors.46 As the available evidence suggests, the contribution that this indepen­ dent group of grain traders made to the food market’s expansion after the ENC’s dismemberment in 1945 was considerable. Yet neither their efforts nor those of the ENC would have succeeded without the contribution of the small-scale farmers scattered around the country. Indeed, these farmers were what produced and sold the food materials that first the ENC Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report. Getnet, 2009b: 105-9. Tekalign, 1995: 369-78; Bahru, 1988; Marcus, 1983: 46. 45 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Report. 46 My perspectives here were shaped by evidence acquired from oral informants. Interviews: Emat Essay A. Delnesaw, Addis Ababa, 12 May 2000; Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. 44

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and then the independent group of grain traders supplied to the domestic and international markets. Somewhat indifferent, if not also openly critical to the food market’s growth and expansion, were the populations that had a vested interest in the old method of provisioning. In fact, to them the food market was not only different from the provisioning method now under duress, but its organization had also a damaging effect on their and their families’ rights of access to edible materials. Consequently, they became major proponents of the land grants almost everywhere. This was mainly because of the opportunity that the land grants gave them to circumvent the food market and to enjoy direct access to consumable products in roughly the same way as their predecessors had done before 1936. To what extent Haile Selassie had understood their obviously different intentions and the potentially damaging impact that most notably the rent seekers’ land grabbing activities could have on the food market’s continued growth and expansion is difficult to tell. If he was nonetheless willing to accommodate their demand for land and rent, it was mainly because of the greater political capital that they had accumulated both during his exiled absence from the country in the five-year Italian occupation period and in the years that followed its unexpected end in May 1941.

FARMING FOR THE LAND, FEEDING THE MARKET It is striking to note that the areas directly targeted by the land grants also became major sites of crop production and supply in the lake region from 1942. Conversely, the rate of expansion of agriculture remained slow in the areas where the resource-based competitions that these land grants precipitated remained small. These differences in terms of agriculture’s rate of expansion as well as the factors that underpinned it were neither immaterial nor were they products of environmental and technological factors alone. Rather, they were manifestations of the different tactics and strategies that local populations had developed and used for the purpose of deflecting and overcoming the pressures that the land grants had exerted on them and their livelihood practices right from the outset.47 If most of the properties that the land grants now targeted appeared in the official records as vacant or unkempt, simply because of their use for other purposes than for crop production, that was also the premise and the principle that the pastoralists sought to challenge and undermine, when they made the decision to cultivate the land. Similarly, their desire to stay on the land and/or to secure greater access to farming land in the areas that had been formerly outside of their control and jurisdiction were what prompted many a local farmer, including those relocating from the 47

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Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shasha­ mane, 24 January 2001.

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surrounding highlands and lowlands, to embrace sharecropping as a new form of strategy about the same time. When brokering such sharecropping arrangements, the tenant farmers were not forfeiting their claims on the land. Rather, sharecropping was one of the strategies that they used to contest and renew their entitlement rights on the land by other means. In the lake region, as in many other parts of Ethiopia, the rent seekers – the majority of whom were also absentee, so called because of their absence from the land – calculated their share of the final product based on the principle of one-fourth (erbo).48 According to that principle, cropbased agriculture required a total of four factors of production. These included farming land, farm tools (such as the ox-plough, the hoe and the sickle), farm labour and seeds. Since farming land was ostensibly the only factor of production that the rent seekers were ready to contribute to the production process, their share of the final output was limited to only one-fourth. Conversely, the tenant farmers had the largest (three-fourths) share of the annual harvest precisely because of their responsibility in supplying the remaining three factors of production, including farm labour, farm tools and seeds, to that process year after year. When negotiating these terms of rent, the absentee landowners and the share tenants worked from different angles. To the absentee landowners, such properties were inalienable rist. Therefore, to them the tenant farmers that had developed interest in settling and cultivating the land had only usufruct, as opposed to ownership, rights on that piece of property. Yet to the tenant farmers ‘ownership’ was more of a practical rather than purely theoretical or legal matter. In fact, to them, share tenancy was first and foremost a labour rather than a land-based arrangement. That means rarely did the share tenants doubt their entitlement rights on the land, no matter how they or their rent-seeking protagonists had acquired it in the first place. In terms of field activity or production organization, share tenants wielded also considerable autonomy.49 When seen from that angle, there was, therefore, very little or no difference between this group of farmers and those that cultivated the land that they owned. This is an important point because that autonomy was one of the factors that contributed to the expansion and entrenchment of diversified agriculture in the lake region in the contemporary period. As its name implies, diversified agriculture entailed the production of a relatively large number of crops in the same field. In addition, diversification enabled the farmers to pay equal attention to livestock production. This was true not only for farmers that had developed interest in manure use in the cultivated fields but it was true also for their counterparts in Ada and Lume that embraced different strategies for the same end. Therefore, as in many other parts of Ethiopia, the expansion of crop production did not lead to the extinction 48 49

Ibid. Ibid.

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of its livestock counterpart anytime soon. On the contrary, these two activities were able to co-exist and to co-evolve right from the outset. The only difference was the secondary status that livestock production started to acquire in that region following the expansion of crop production in the post-war period. An equally important development in the lake region’s agriculture since around the middle of the twentieth century pertained to the division of the farm into two constituent, albeit unequal, parts, namely field (masa) and garden (gwaro).50 The term masa referred to the farm’s largest and major part. This was also the portion of the farm that the farmers allocated for the production of grain crops, such as tef, wheat, corn/maize and legumes, including chickpeas, beans and peas. Located near the residential houses, the garden (gwaro) portion of the farm was small in size. However, in terms of plant variety gwaro were more heterogeneous than their masa counterparts. In addition to serving as testing grounds for newly arriving cultivars and, in some cases, too, for the organization of seed beds, gwaro was the portion of the farm that subject farmers used for growing vegetables.51 In the lake region, as in many other parts of the country, diversified agriculture encompassed a range of activities, including land use. Further­ more, diversification seems to have bolstered, rather than under­mined, the farmers’ level of interaction with the food market to one degree or another.52 This is not surprising because in terms of crops there was in fact very little or no difference between what the local farmers consumed at the household level and what they were willing to sell in the market. Still, the speed at which the lake region became one of the major players in Addis Ababa’s food market was remarkable.53 As records show, tef, wheat, chilli pepper, lentils, chickpeas, peas and beans were the major crops that one or the other group of this region’s farmers were able to supply to that market.54 According to the diplomatic sources, natural factors, such as those pertaining to the regularity of the rains, were what contributed to the new surge in crop production and supply that Ethiopia experienced in the 1940s and early 1950s.55 A relatively different picture emerges from the As the available evidence suggests, this was common practice in some other parts of the country as well. See, McCann, 1995: 57. 51 Interviews: Baqala Ababa Tamerat, Modjo, 15 May 2001; Abara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. 52 Ibid. 53 American Embassy to State Department, ‘Economic Highlights of Ethiopia from July to December 12, 1956’, in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 875.00/12-1256. 54 Interviews, as Note 51. 55 American Embassy to State Department, ‘Economic Highlights of Ethiopia from July to December 12, 1956’ in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 875.00/12-1256. 50

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reports originating in the MoA and the FAO offices in Addis Ababa. From these reports, it appears that the expansion in terms of total area of land allocated for crop production was what contributed to that surge.56 The evidence from the lake region supports the second view.57 Crop production appealed to the local farmers because of the opportunity that it gave them to stay on the land at a time when the competitions and negotiations for access to places and valued agricultural resources had morphed into yet another level of intensity and significance beginning in the early 1940s.

CONCLUSION In the lake region, the dozen years from 1942 were marked by the expansion of crop production on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The practice appealed to local farmers because of the opportunity that it gave them to negotiate and renegotiate access to places, spaces and valued agricultural resources on relatively new grounds. This was an important subject to them because this period witnessed the escalation of the competitions for such resources across the lake region and many other parts of the country. Among their protagonists certainly the most difficult to cope with were those that benefited from the state-sponsored land grants that became official in Addis Ababa in 1942. The land grants were controversial. However, they were not meant for promoting the development of capitalist agriculture and capitalist relations of production in Ethiopia, as the dominant neoMarxist literature had suggested. What these land grants encouraged was, rather, the propagation of small-scale farming under a relatively new set of conditions. As shown in the next chapter in some detail, that was also the trend that remained in place in the decade from 1956 as well. 56 57

Miller, 1953. Interviews: Baqala Ababa Tamerat, Modjo, 15 May 2001; Abara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001.

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Fresh Encounters and Morphing Strategies: The Changing Organization of Production in an Era of Agricultural Intervention 1956–1965

In the lake region the decade from 1956 was marked by the expansion and growing maturity of crop production along the lines that had started in the previous dozen years. Feeding that expansion were once again the competitions and negotiations for places, spaces and valued agricultural resources that entered into yet another level of intensity and significance in that decade. Also important had been the technological factors that underwent some meaningful change and transformation beginning in the early 1950s. This was particularly true for the seed technologies, namely the brand new cultivars and improved seed varieties of the major food crops, including tef, wheat and corn/maize that originated from the modern centres of crop research and development that the Ethiopian state and its international allies had organized in the lake region and few other parts of the country after 1948. As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, the interaction of these two factors, namely the social and the technological, was what underpinned agricultural and environmental change and transformation in the region in the period examined.

SEEDS OF CHANGE Already by the middle of the twentieth century, the majority of the lake region’s farmers seem to have become self-sufficient in terms of seed capital. Yet neither that factor nor their success in crop production was able to deter them from embracing a new set of cultivars and seed varieties along the way. Of these, certainly the most attractive to them had been the varieties originating in the newly organized modern centres of crop research and development and community farms that started to grow in that region and some other parts of the country in the decade after 1948. First among these was the school farm that the Seventh-day Adventist Mission organized in its Kuyera campus (located just to the north of

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Shashamane town) shortly after its establishment in 1948.1 Also important had been the community and demonstration farms that a group of retired soldiers and the Awasa Community Training Center (ACTC) organized in the northern outskirts of Awasa town in 1958 and 1962, respectively.2 Yet by far the most consequential had been the experimental farms that Ethiopia’s fledgling centres of crop research and development organized in the outskirts of Bishoftu (Debre Zeit) and Shashamane towns between 1952 and 1956.3 The Adventist Mission’s primary raison d’être was of course proselytization. Yet, like many of its African counterparts, that Mission was able to build a school and to organize also a community farm of equal significance. The aim was to make this farm a major source of food production and supply to the Mission community – including boarding students, teachers, preachers and administrative staff – which continued to grow in size year after year. Similarly, the ACTC’s primary objective was geared to training students that would then become community service specialists around the country after their completion of a two-year long vocational training in its Awasa campus. In addition to classroom instruction, the Center was able to organize a demonstration farm used for the purpose of teaching students the arts of modern farming on a hands-on basis. The community farm that a group of retired soldiers organized in the northern outskirts of Awasa town was different from this in that it owed its origins to the community development programme that Haile Selassie’s administration made official following its declaration of the First Five Year Development Plan in 1957 (see below). The FFYDP’s inauguration that year was important because it opened a new chapter in the history of agricultural development in Ethiopia. However, this was not the first time that the notion of agricultural development had appealed to Haile Selassie’s administration. As shown in the previous chapter, agricultural development had been, in fact, one of the subjects that concerned his administration since 1943. Similarly, the development of ‘native’ agriculture had been an integral part of the Italian colonial administration’s policy after the Duke of Aosta’s appointment as Governor General in December 1937 (see Chapter 3). Haile Selassie was able to not only inherit some of Aosta’s ideas but he was ready to give them also new meaning and direction shortly after his return to power in May 1941. His new-found interest in forging close partnership with first the US Government and then the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) grew in that context and the changing aura of international politics after World War II. As records show, the financial support that he received from the US Government was what enabled Haile Selassie to organize and execute the first large1 2 3

Interview: Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. For an insider’s account of the Mission’s history, see Truneh WoldeSelassie, 2006. Ministry of National Community Development, 1960. On the organization of these farms, see Getnet, 2009a: 39-41.

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scale livestock vaccination campaign in Ethiopia in 1948. Likewise, the generous monetary and technical support that he received from President Harry Truman’s administration and its Point 4 Program was what enabled his administration to build the first-ever degree-level agricultural college in Ethiopia six years later.That was preceded and accompanied by the partnership that Haile Selassie had forged with the FAO beginning in 1946. That partnership paid off because it helped his administration to organize modern centres of crop research and development in Ethiopia in the course of the next decade.4 Three of the first five centres of crop research and development that Haile Selassie’s administration now organized were developed in the lake region. These included Bishoftu’s (Ada’s) two centres and their southern counterpart based just to the north of Shashamane town.5 The centres’ primary purpose was to identify, breed and distribute disease resistant and improved seed varieties to the farmers that needed them. In Bishoftu, the focus was on tef and wheat.6 The case of the Shashamane centre of crop research and development was different in that its primary object was geared to the improvement and dissemination of a host of cultivars, of which cotton and corn/maize were certainly the most important.7 The trained specialists affiliated with these centres and the Ethiopian Government explained their crop choices in certain unambiguous terms. According to them, these crops were important because they tallied with the farmers’ existing field-level activities. The only exception was cotton, which was, in fact, new to that region. If the Shashamane centre chose to include cotton in its arsenal, it was mainly because of the crop’s presumed potential for generating cash to the local farmers specializing in the production of such cultivars as corn/maize, which, although important to their diet, were not, however, able to enjoy as great a demand in the food market as, for example, Ada’s tef and wheat did at that time. As the available evidence suggests, Bishoftu’s two crop research and development centres grew in the property that had been vacated by the prospecting Italian settlers of the occupation period.8 Like its Bishoftu counterparts, the Shashamane crop research station and the community and demonstration farms that sprung up in the lake region’s southern part under the auspices of the Adventist Mission, the group of army retirees and the ACTC farmed in portions of the land that the Ethiopian Government had designated as state reserves since the late-nineteenth century. When seen from that angle, the rules that led to the organization of these experimental farms were not any different from those that grew 4 5 6 7 8

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Luther, 1958. Watson, 1958: 294. Getnet, 2009a: 39-41. Miller, 1953. Ibid. Interview: Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001.

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in other parts of the lake region following the implementation of the land-grant edicts that Haile Selassie’s government had promulgated from 1942.9 The only major differences pertained to their size, their different mandate and their proprietorship, which turned out to be markedly different from that of their counterparts, namely the smallscale farms that the local farmers had organized across that region. This was particularly true for the experimental farms of the three modern centres of crop research and development mentioned, which, aside from being large in size, were able to enjoy direct financial support from the Ethiopian Government and to deploy trained agronomists and supporting staff right from the outset. Moreover, these centres were able to create rapport with the local community fairly quickly.10 This is surprising because none of these centres was able to organize fully-fledged extension services in the lake region within a short period of time. If they were nonetheless able to communicate some of their ideas and technologies with the local farmers, it was mainly because of other factors. These included the centres’ overwhelming dependence on the local farmers’ labour to undertake their day-to-day activities. Aside from creating part-time job opportunities to those interested in taking them, such practices were among the factors that contributed to the bridging of the gap that was developing between these centres and their prospective clients after their organization. Even more important were the Field Days that these centres organized annually beginning in the mid-1950s. Staged in their premises, the farmers’ days were what enabled the centres’ personnel to communicate their ideas and technologies with the local farmers more directly.11 Perhaps the best way to measure the centres’ success may be to look at the level of adoption of their technologies by local farmers. These included wheat’s lakech, tef’s magna and the H511 varieties of corn/maize, as well as potatoes (known in some places as ‘Irish potatoes’) and sunflowers, all of which debuted in more than one part of the lake region at about the same time and for of the same reasons. Tef’s magna and wheat’s lakech varieties originated from the two Bishoftu centres of crop research and development already mentioned.12 If these centres’ major areas of activity were Ada and Lume their Shashamane counterpart focused on the region’s southern part, of which Arsi Nagelle was certainly the most important location. In terms of crops as well, the centres’ primary interest was geared to the breeding and dissemination of improved corn/maize and cotton varieties rather than those of tef and wheat.13 The case of sunflowers and potatoes was different Ibid. Ministry of National Community Development, 1960: 2-6. Interviews: Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001; Duchiso Tasama, Dibandiba, 21 May 2001; Bashir Kadir, Koshe, 6 August 2000. 11 Miller, 1969: 3-5. 12 Ibid. See also IAR, 1972. 13 Ibid.: 3-5. 9

10

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from that in that they were gifts of the farm that the Adventist Mission organized in its Kuyera campus about the same time.14 Unlike cotton, sunflowers and potatoes that were new, tef, wheat and corn/maize were among the crops that one or more groups of the local farmers had been cultivating in the past to various degrees of importance. Yet genetically, the improved seed varieties originating in these modern centres of crop research and development were different from their traditional counterparts. Also different was their rate of adoption by the local farmers in the following years.15 This was at least in part because of the cultivars’ and the varieties’ compatibility with the micro-environment, their demand for labour and their use value, which were among the factors that local farmers took into consideration when making the decision to adopt or not to adopt them at any given time. The best example of this comes from cotton, which failed to appeal to the local farmers precisely because of its inability to fulfil one or more of these criteria in a satisfactory manner. In fact, the crop’s higher demand for labour, land and water was something subject farmers were unwilling to tolerate. Equally intolerable to them was cotton’s incongruence with the range of crops that they liked to grow in their fields year after year.16 Also unlike cotton, corn/maize’s H511 variety, the potatoes, and to some extent also the sunflowers were able to appeal to an increasingly large number of the local farmers fairly quickly. Like sorghum and its flint predecessor, the H511 variety could grow well in most parts of the lake region. Yet unlike sorghum, which took nearly a year to mature, H511 has a much shorter maturing cycle, lasting only six months. In addition, that variety proved to be a perfect match in the field for those farmers interested in creating space for other types of cultivars, such as potatoes and sunflowers. Consequently, many a farmer was ready and willing to supplant sorghum and replace it with the latest variety of corn/maize, beginning in the late 1950s. As a result, H511 was able to become the dominant variety south of the Maqi River in a matter of a few years.17 The same was true for wheat’s lakech and tef’s magna varieties, which became popular in Ada and Lume beginning in the mid-1950s.18 To their critics, these improved seed varieties had an adverse impact on the crops’ genetic diversity and the future of diversified agriculture in the lake region.19 If subject farmers were nonetheless willing to embrace Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2011; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Interviews: Raya Talila, Ada Liban, 23 July 2001; Alamu Gafarsa, Dire, 12 June 2001; Yerga Wolda Gabrel, Dakabora, 22 May 2001. 19 For a useful summary of the critics’ views, see Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, 1955. For a critical look at the same phenomenon, see Gholl. 1961. 14

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these varieties it was mainly because of certain practical reasons. Indeed, these farmers were appreciative of the familiarity of these seeds and the opportunity that they gave them to optimize and maximize crop production per unit area more than before. Furthermore, none of the cultivars and varieties that they now embraced required these farmers to make major changes and adjustments in terms of field organization. Perhaps because of that reason, their level of adoption and impact remained inconspicuous to outside observers at least for some time.

The Yerer-Kereyu Highlands of Shoa [which included Ada and Lume] with extremely swelling and shrinking soils are for a large part under cultivation (especially between 1,500 and 2,200 m) and they form a very important grain region. The main cereals are t’ef, wheat and barley; maize and sorghum are less important. In addition, many pulses are grown: chickpea, pea, lentil, grass pea, horse bean; also Niger seed, safflower and linseed. Field preparations start in March or April with ploughing. Burning of fallow land is often practiced. In general, fields are ploughed three times [a year] … Barley and sorghum are sown during the small rains (March-April), followed by chickpea and horse bean, and in July quite often by some wheat. In … August … wheat is sown on black soils; chickpea and lentil follow by end September on red soils. T’ef is planted mid-July on black soils. … On fields sown with chickpea and lentil in April, a second crop of grass pea or chickpea will be sown. Grass pea is usually cultivated on land that lies fallow that season. Pulses sown in April or end of September are harvested end July or end December. Barley and sorghum, sown in April, are harvested [in] midSeptember and December, respectively. Wheat sown in mid-June or beginning of August [can be harvested between] mid-November [and] December. T’ef is harvested in January.20

Roughly identical is the picture that emerges from the survey that a team of FAO specialists conducted in the lake region and many other parts of Ethiopia in 1960. From their remarks, it is clear that already by then the agriculture of the region’s southern part had come to resemble that of the areas that had a long history of grain crop production in Ethiopia. Yet in terms of field organization, the FAO team observed some important differ­ ences between them. Noteworthy among these was the degree to which manure use has spread in the region’s southern part during that time.

During the last [several] decades, the pastoral [populations in the southern parts of the lake region] were forced to engage … in agriculture [in increasingly large numbers] In this region, at ca. 1500 m or higher, the same crops are found as in Shoa (especially cereals and pulses, some oil crops) with sometimes sweet potatoes and potatoes, [but] enset and other crops are absent. Unlike [their counterparts, such as those] in Shoa, the Arussi [populations residing in the lake region’s southern part] use manure [in the cultivated fields]. Between Lake[s] Shalla and … Awasa their main crop is maize; sorghum, tef, wheat, barley, common bean, horse bean, pea, chickpea, lentil and grass pea are also cultivated, but linseed, Niger seed and sunflower are important. Fields near the houses are well manured [sic] and [they are] used for maize [production], often for several [consecutive] years, until the yields drop, after which horse bean is planted followed again by maize. For other crops a rotation is practiced with 2-3 years fallow during which the land is used as pasture.21

20 21

Quoted in Westphal, 1974: 101. Ibid.: 107.

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To be sure, none of the specialists were able to acknowledge the impor­ tant contribution that the seed technologies originating in the modern centres of crop research and development, as well as the community and demonstration farms discussed earlier in this chapter, had made to the evolution of the lake region’s agriculture in the 1950s and early 1960s. Nonetheless, their studies offered pertinent information regarding the changing state of the region’s agriculture after the advent of the brand new cultivars and improved seed varieties already discussed. Furthermore, these surveys and studies demonstrated the preponderance of diversified agriculture in that region even after the technologies’ arrival beginning in the early 1950s.

SCALING LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT History has, for many centuries, tended to favour livestock production in the lake region. When seen from that angle the developments that took place in that region in the decades before and after 1956 were different in that they permitted the expansion and dominance of crop production on a hitherto unprecedented scale. While that transformation was conspicuous, the expansion of agriculture in the post-war period did not discourage livestock production in that region in any major way, shape or form. Rather, local farmers were able to create a space for that component of their agriculture during the same period. This was true not only in the areas that had become important centres of crop production in that region only after the early 1940s, but it was true also for Ada as well. Table 4.1 Ada’s Estimated Livestock Population, c. 1961 Area Garbicha Kajima Liban Tulludimtu Zequala Total

Total Number of Livestock and Pack Animals

Cattle

Horses, Mules and Donkeys

Sheep and Goats

4,851 6,370 60,024 10,347 11,049 92,641

1,516 2,165 3,468 2,652 765 10,566

3,720 2,198 10,754 3,588 3.037 23,297

Source: G.E. Gholl, ‘Report to the Government of Ethiopia on Ada District Sample Survey’, 1961

As Table 4.1 summarizes, cattle were certainly the most dominant type of livestock that Ada’s farmers raised at the household level in 1961. In terms of sheer numbers alone, their cattle were four times more than sheep and goats. That margin grew to eight times when compared with pack animals – horses, mules and donkeys. Noteworthy are also the variations that we see within Ada in terms of livestock population. The best example

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of that comes from Liban, which had the largest number of livestock in Ada that year. That was followed by Zequala and Tulludimtu, which stood respectively second and third in that list. Garbicha and Kajima ranked last in terms of aggregate cattle population. In regard to sheep and goats, however, those differences were less stark except for Liban, which topped the list in all the categories listed in that table. Unfortunately, there is very little recorded evidence to measure the exact size and composition of the lake region’s livestock population outside of Ada. Yet, from the available oral sources, it is clear that livestock production was among the subjects that concerned the farmers and the pastoralists inhabiting the region’s central, western and southern parts as well. The pastoralists’ primary loci were the region’s central part, which did not soon become a major site for crop production. Even then, it was only in terms of per capita livestock population that the pastoralists were able to outperform their counterparts, namely the farmers inhabiting other parts of the region.22 In fact, in aggregate terms the areas that had become major centres of crop production, rather than the pastoralist areas, were what exhibited the largest number of livestock population in that region at that time.23 This was probably because of the huge disparities that had existed within the region in terms of human population density. This is an important point, because despite the challenges they faced, the region’s farmers were able to maintain interest in livestock production for many decades to come.24 Interestingly, the development of the livestock component of the lake region’s agriculture was among the subjects that concerned Haile Selassie’s administration as well. Consequently, this decade witnessed the organization in that region’s central part of what came to be known as the Adamitullu Livestock Development Center (ALDC) in 1957.25 According to the official plan, the ALDC was meant to be the cattle equivalent of the crop research and development stations that had started to grow in other parts of the region in the previous decade. In other words, the Center’s primary aim was to breed and distribute to the local pastoralists and farmers improved cattle varieties on an increasingly large scale. In theory that was a useful undertaking. However, in practice, rarely was the ALDC able to distribute improved cattle varieties to subject popula­tions as planned. Rather, its major accomplishments pertained to the livestock vaccination services that it provided on a regular basis. These services were important because they were able to immunize the livestock from rinderpest and anthrax more successfully than any of the previous attempts and traditional practices had accomplished in the past. Indeed, these vaccinations were what made livestock pandemics Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2011; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. 23 Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. 24 Interviews, as Note 22. 25 On the history of the ALDC see Ministry of Agriculture, 1984: 208-11. 22

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an increasingly rare phenomena in that region in the second half of the twentieth century.26 It is important to note that in terms of sheer size, the more than 1,600 acres (40 gasha) of land that the ALDC brought under its control and jurisdiction in the following decades was the largest of its kind in the lake region. Yet more than its sheer size, it was, rather, the ranch’s inaccessibility that concerned local populations the most. According the official view, the organization of this centre and the services it provided were important for developing the area’s livestock sector. Likewise, the strict rules that the ALDC’s administrators put in place regarding the utilization of the ranch’s resources, most notably its large pasture fields, were meant to be consistent with modern rules and practices. However, to the majority of the local populations these rules were prohibitive and controversial.27 As records show, the rules’ incompatibility with the local populations’ traditional land use practices, and not so much the centre’s sheer presence and its developmental ideals, were what antagonized local populations.28 In fact to them, there was very little or no difference between the properties that had come under the ALDC’s jurisdiction and those that had been the subject of the land grants since 1945. Yet, unlike the former, which remained inaccessible to them, local populations were able to develop the mechanisms that enabled them to negotiate new terms of access to farming land in the properties that had been the subject of the land grants since 1945. These differences were not without any consequence. If the government was reluctant to relinquish its proprietorship of the portions of the land that had come under the ALDC’s jurisdiction after 1957, that was also one of the factors that undermined the expansion of agriculture in the lake region’s central part in the following decade. Noteworthy are also the technological and environmental factors, such as those pertaining to low precipitation, whose impact on the rate of expansion of agriculture in that region was equally considerable. The fact that the region’s central part was also the driest meant that local populations and their newly arriving protagonists, namely the individuals that had benefited from the government’s ongoing land grants, had difficulty utilizing most of the same properties for crop production while relying on existing technologies. A relatively different development in the lake region’s central part during this period pertained to the expansion of charcoal making. According Ibid. See also Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. Hizkias Tasama to Hayqochena Buta Jira Awraja E.Sa. Pa. Sehfat Bet, 30/6/80 EC, File No. 235/AtuA80. 27 Hizkias Tasama to Hayqochena Buta Jira Awraja E.Sa. Pa. Sehfat Bet, 30/6/80 EC, File No. 235/AtuA80. 28 The available evidence suggests that these relationships tended to deteriorate significantly at times of drought, such as those in 1973/74 and in 1984/85. See, for example, Arsi Nagelle Warada Agar Gezat Sehfat Bet, Yamaret Yezota Fayl, Ministry of Internal Administration, File No. 14. 26

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to one of my informants, the Italians were probably the first to promote the practice of tree cutting and charcoal making in the region during the occupation period.29 Yet it was only after the early 1950s that the practice was able to expand near Zway for the first time. Its major promoters had been the group of populations of urban origin that arrived in Zway in the wake of the implementation of the second round of Haile Selassie’s land grants in 1952. Unable to start farming or rent exaction because of the limitations posed by technological and environmental factors, this group of populations resorted to tree cutting and charcoal making, in order to supply this to Addis Ababa on an increasingly large scale. The fact that the region’s central part had the largest concentration of acacia trees meant that they had very little difficulty in pursuing that practice on a large scale after that year. More challenging to them were, rather, the labour shortages that they now faced. Interestingly, it was by recruiting day labourers from such places as Wolayta, Kambata and Addis Ababa that they were able to overcome that problem relatively successfully. In the process, they were able to make Zway and the surrounding areas one of the major centres of firewood and charcoal production and supply to Addis Ababa within a few years.30 Zway town grew at least in part because of these actvities. Like Zway, all the major towns that grew in other parts of the lake region before and after 1956 owed their origin to the developments dis­ cussed in the previous two chapters. Noteworthy among these were the railway and the roads, whose construction had far-reaching implications in urban growth and development in that region. Also important had been the modern centres of crop research and development already discussed, whose contribution to the growth and expansion of some of this region’s towns, most notably Debre Zeit and Awasa, is difficult to underestimate. Yet, by far the most important factor pertained to the expansion of crop production and the food market. Aside from being important consumers of food, some among the populations residing in this region’s bustling towns, including Debre Zeit, Nazareth, Modjo, Zway and Shashamane, were also able to become active in the new race for agricultural land that morphed into yet another level of intensity and significance from 1956.31

THE NEW RACE FOR FARMING LAND AND PRODUCTS As shown in the previous chapters, the race for places and farming land in the lake region has had not only a truncated and multi-layered history but it was also the catalyst for agricultural change and transformation. Interestingly, that was also the nexus that continued to dictate the course Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. Ibid. 31 Ibid. 29 30

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taken by agricultural and environmental changes in the decade from 1956. Likewise, there is very little difference between the methods that subject populations, including those originating in the urban areas, used to secure access to agricultural land in this region and in many other parts of rural Ethiopia before and after 1956. The most obvious examples of that come from the government-sponsored land grants that continued without interruption in the decade from 1956 as well. If these were the practices that enabled the populations originating in urban Ethiopia to grab land in the region, their continuation revealed also the special place that land and agriculture continued to play in Ethiopian politics in that decade – as it did, in fact, over the centuries. It is important to note that already by 1956 the threat that Haile Selassie had faced from his European, but mainly British, rivals was all but gone. In fact, the previous four years witnessed the total withdrawal of British forces not only from south-eastern Ethiopia, namely the Haud and the Ogaden, but from also Eritrea, the Sudan and Egypt at a speed that surpassed even Haile Selassie’s expectations. The Emperor celebrated that victory by promulgating a revised constitution in 1955, imagining a bright future for himself and for his country. Yet the next five years turned out to be one of the most difficult for him. Among the challenges that he faced, certainly the most troubling for him at first was the setback that Ethiopia’s export food market faced beginning in 1956. That was followed two years later by a major famine and inflation that struck parts of rural Ethiopia and the urban food market particularly severely. Then there was the failed coup attempt of 1960, which nearly ended his tenure in office in a manner that mirrored his rise to power over four decades earlier. These are relevant points to our discussion because of their impact on the evolution of government policy on land, agriculture and the food market at the time. Contrary to the little attention that it received in the scholarly literature, the waning of British power in Ethiopia and most of the Horn of Africa region after 1952 was one of the factors that contributed to the relaxing by Haile Selassie’s administration, for the first time since May 1941, of some of its relatively stringent policies on agricultural land. As shown in some detail in Chapter 6, that shift in policy was one of the factors that contributed to the organization by foreign companies of largescale commercial farms in Ethiopia after 1954. Similarly, the outbreak of famine, as well as the challenges faced by Ethiopia’s domestic and export food markets at about the same time, directly impacted government policy on agricultural land and the food supply chain. The same can be said for the failed coup attempt of 1960 and the annulment just two years later of Eritrea’s federal status, both of which also left their own impression on some of the political and social changes that started to take shape in Ethiopia in the following years. For example, it is difficult to understand the renewal and growing intensity of the government-sponsored land grants from 1956 without taking into consideration one or more of these factors.

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The 1960 coup attempt was the first major threat that Haile Selassie faced since the OETA’s withdrawal from Addis Ababa in 1945. If the monarch was able to survive that coup attempt and to nullify also Eritrea’s federal status two years later, it was precisely because of the support that he got from Ethiopia’s armed and police forces and from Asmara’s leading politicians and administrators during that period.32 Haile Selassie reciprocated their support and loyalty by embarking on new rounds of land grants. To what extent the presence of the Air Force base in Debre Zeit town had tilted the balance against the lake region is not clear. What is clear is the preponderance of military titles in the list of the individuals that benefited from the latest round of land grants that started in earnest after 1960.33 The case of the Eritreans was different in that they did not have any precedence in the lake region before their arrival in 1962/63. In fact, with the probable exception of the few that had the opportunity to obtain land in that region from the government in the previous decade (mainly as repatriating exiles from Kenya and the Sudan), this was the first time that individuals of Eritrean origin were able to participate in the land grants in the region on a relatively large scale.34 Except for the portion of the land that Haile Selassie had set aside for ‘repatriating’ Jamaicans north of Shashamane town over a decade before, this was also the first and only time that his administration made the decision to grant the state reserves to groups of populations that identified themselves with a particular geography or ethnicity.35 Yet neither of those factors mattered to Haile Selassie when he conferred such land-grant rights available to the qualifying groups of populations before or after 1962. What mattered to him the most was, rather, the principle of ‘service to the country’. Indeed, Interestingly, both the export difficulties and the coup attempt happened about the same time, and have been the focus of numerous studies. Unlike most similar phenomena and, despite its bloody nature, the scholarly literature treats the 1960 coup attempt in Ethiopia in a positive light. Likewise, the dominant view tends to portray the Eritrean federation and its eventual dismemberment in a linear way and in a manner that is consistent with that of the Eritrean insurgent groups. For a different and informative account on that subject matter, see Zewde Reta, 2000. 33 See, for example, Ada warada Ager Gezat Sehfat Bet, ‘YaMaret Balagudayoch’, Ministry of Internal Administration, File No. 1/54. 34 To be sure, such properties were made available for distribution as early as 1948. That year, Haile Selassie set aside over 500 acres (200 hectares) of land for settlement and use by the group of African-Americans that had rallied behind his cause for Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian colonization. According to my informants, a small number of this group of seems to have responded to that call on a timely basis. Yet none chose to settle in Shashamane as their successors, namely those originating in Jamaica, had done beginning in the mid-1960s. Interviews: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 35 Interview: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. 32

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their contribution to the unification process already mentioned, rather than their geographic or cultural identity were what qualified this group of Eritreans for the land grants after that year. Better known by the generic name sema-ter (distinguished) Hamasen, after a district in their home region, the amount of land that this group of individuals of Eritrean origin grabbed in a place called Gimbo (near Arsi Nagelle) alone was considerable: the 8,000 hectares of land was half the size of the total properties under the jurisdiction of the local farmers that year.36 Yet, unlike their local counterparts that cultivated the land by deploying their own and their families’ labour, Gimbo was to the semater Hamasen a site for rent exaction. When seen from that angle, there was therefore almost no difference between them and their predecessors, namely the absentee landowners that had been active in rent exaction in that region and elsewhere in the country since at least the early 1950s. The only minor difference pertained therefore to the sema-ter’s relatively unique concentration in Gimbo. That may be the reason why one of my informants liked to refer to Gimbo, with humorous perspicacity, as ‘the lost territory of the sem-ayteru [ordinary or anonymous] Eritreans’.37 If Gimbo was attractive to sema-ter Hamasen, portions of Ada-Lume, the Maqi River Valley, the Maraqo ridge and Aje were what became major attractions to their cohorts, namely to the group of land seekers that drew their legitimacy from their active service in Haile Selassie’s slowly expanding army, police force and bureaucracy. The problem was that the landscape and the farming populations they now encountered in the lake region were markedly different from the early 1940s. The fact that most of the land had already been cultivated by local farmers meant that it was difficult for them to easily reclaim it as their predecessors had done in that decade. As the available evidence suggests, court litigation was one of the major tactics and strategies that many among them now used to succeed in that front.38 Their preys were the groups of farmers that had difficulty presenting documentation that proved their ownership of the land. Next in line were the local rulers (balabbat), whom they accused of grabbing more land and territory than the state had granted them in the past. Also vulnerable had been the group of farmers that had benefited from the first round of land grants that continued until 1952. If many among them had A retired official in the Ministry of Interior (formerly Ministry of Internal Adminis­tration) brought this point to my attention. He was generous enough to give me a copy of the relevant documents at his disposal. I have omitted his name for privacy reasons. The documents were taken from the archives of the now defunct Arsi Nagelle Warada Agar Gezat Sehfat Bet, Yamaret Yezota Fayl, Ministry of Internal Administration, File. No. 14. 37 Interviews: GM, Gimbo, 19 July 2010. Initials changed due to the informant’s request for anonymity. 38 Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shasha­ mane, 24 January 2001. 36

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been active in bringing more land under their control and jurisdiction than the official papers suggested, that was also the loophole that their newly arriving protagonists sought to use against them in the state courts after 1960. The confusion and acrimonies that these practices accentuated in the lake region were huge. However, they were not able to discourage and deter this group of land seekers from pursuing their goals.39 For example, in one part of the Maraqo ridge alone an estimated 16 high- and low-ranking military officers were able to acquire such properties from 1961 to 1964.40 Although accurate statistics have been difficult to obtain, the trend that developed in other parts of the region, including Ada, Lume, Maqi, Zway, Arsi Nagelle and Aje was not any different from that.41 Once again, local populations responded to the pressures that the continuation of the land grants exerted on them by deploying similar and different tactics and strategies. Interestingly, court litigation was one of the tactics that they used for that purpose, particularly after 1959 (see below). Yet this was a method that appealed and worked for only a small number of the local farmers.42 Likewise, relocating to other places did not appeal to the majority this time round. This was precisely because of their long years of investment in the land and in crop production. For that reason they resorted to a practice that was also relatively new to that region. Their interest in negotiating sharecropping arrangements with their newly arriving protagonists was a product of that factor. In addition, sharecropping was the strategy that many among them, including those originating in the nearby highlands and lowlands as well as some other parts of the country, used to secure rights of access to farming land in the region for the first time. As a rule, sharecropping required subject farmers to pay to the land­ owners an estimated one-fourth of the total harvest as rent each year. If that was a price they were willing to pay for staying on the land, some of the challenges that they faced down the road proved to be difficult for them to easily overcome. The best example of that comes from the edict that Haile Selassie’s administration promulgated in 1959.43 That edict targeted all the properties that had been and would be acquired from the government in the form of a land grant. This was a controversial edict Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, 1970a: 6-9. Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. 40 Ibid. 41 Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shasha­ mane, 24 January 2001. 42 Ibid. 43 This was likely one of only few land-related edicts that Haile Selassie promul­ gated by dint of executive power after 1955 (after the promulgation of Ethiopia’s second constitution, which rendered legislative power to parliament). On the edict’s contents, see Ministry of Internal Administration (MIA), ‘Compre­hensive Report’, File No. 2075/54. 39

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because it lifted all the restrictions that the same administration had put in place on all state-granted land since 1942. In other words, unlike the past when such lands could be acquired only as rist, now the law permitted their retention, transfer and sale to third parties, just like any other kind of private property. In theory this was a major change in the tenure of the law. However, in practice it did not change the reality on the ground because the majority of the populations that had benefited from the land grants lacked the interest to sell their rist to a third party anytime soon. That reality aside, the edict’s promulgation had nonetheless far-reaching implications in the way the contending parties, namely the share tenants and the populations that had benefited from the land grants, interpreted their place on the land. Indeed, that edict was what complicated further the tenuous relationship that had existed between the rent collectors and the share tenants for nearly a decade. It is important to note that already by 1965 share tenants (chisagna) had become the largest group in many parts of the lake region. Next in line were the quter gabbar. This term applied to the group of farmers that owned the land they cultivated and paid the land tax directly to the Ethiopian state on an annual basis. To this group belonged the descendants of the farmers that had the opportunity to buy the land when it was made available for sale by the Ethiopian state in the pre-war period. Included in that group were also the populations that had made the decision to settle and farm the properties they had acquired from the government in the form of the land grants after 1945. Then there was the group that bore the name gabbar. To this group belonged the populations residing in the portions of the land the government had left under the direct jurisdiction of the local rulers (balabbat).44 Setting these groups of farmers apart from each other was their different entitlement rights on the land. Even though the quter gabbar and gabbar had inalienable right on the land now under their control, only those in the quter gabbar category could claim it as their rist and/or personal property depending upon the time. On the contrary, the gabbar’s right on the land was limited only to usufruct. At the bottom of the social pyramid were the tenant farmers (chisagna), whose usufruct right on the land predicated on rent payment. Unsurprisingly, quter gabbar was the category that almost all groups of farmers wanted to belong to, precisely because of the opportunity that it gave them to claim the land as personal property.45 Yet that was the category that eluded them the most. This was mainly because of the cessation of the government’s land-sale practices in 1935 and their replacement Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, 1970a: 6-9. See also Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, 1967: 17, 33. 45 Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shasha­ mane, 24 January 2001. 44

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with the land grants in the post-Italian occupation period. To be sure, the implementation of the land grants was able to bolster the number of quter gabbar in the lake region to one degree or another. However, the fact that these land grants were discriminatory meant that few, if any, of the local farmers were able to join that group after 1945. Because of that reason, quter gabbar remained one of the least elastic categories in that region. Like its quter gabbar counterpart, the gabbar category was inelastic. As records show, balabbat was among the institutions that Haile Selassie’s administration sought to reorganize and maintain in the post-war period also.46 Because of that reason the number of balabbat was able to triple in the lake region between 1942 and 1955. Yet that growth in the balabbat’s actual number did not pave the way for the propagation of balabbat-siso and that of gabbar. This was mainly because now, unlike the decades before, the balabbat institution was becoming more of an administrative rather than territory-based arrangement. Unlike gabbar, the tenant (chisagna) category proved to be fungible in the region. This is not surprising because, in terms of sheer size alone, the properties that became the breeding grounds for this category of farmers were becoming many times bigger than the others following the land grants’ implementation in the post-war period. Without a doubt, the contradictions and controversies that the land grants had set in motion in the lake region and many other parts of the coun­try in the decades before and after 1956 were unprecedented. However, neither the land grants nor the promulgation of the 1959 edict were able to ensure the birth of easily distinguishable and antagonistic social classes in rural Ethiopia. This was as true for the populations that had benefited from the land grants as it was also for the local farmers. As already indicated, the former comprised of populations that maintained different and sometimes competing interests in the land. Likewise, there was significant difference between them in terms of their objectives and the political capital they mustered. While some were powerful individuals in Haile Selassie’s admin­is­tration, the majority were nonetheless ordinary people in search of farming land or rent. In addition, their rate of success in land grabbing and rent exaction varied significantly across space and time. Even though the majority was able to succeed in both fronts, that factor alone did not help them to become a formidable feudal or capitalist class in the region any time soon. The same can be said for the local populations that did not benefit from the land grants in any direct way before or after 1956. To be sure, these decades witnessed the rise of a relatively distinct group of share tenants that lacked ownership rights on the land that they cultivated. Yet in their midst lived also the other groups of farmers, mentioned above, that bore in the tax records the name quter gabbar and gabbar. In economic and social terms as well, it is difficult to lump all groups of local farmers in any one category based on a single criteria. In fact, rather than homogenizing them, the changes that took place in the lake region’s agriculture in the 46

Ibid.

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decades before and after 1956 seem to have encouraged the growing diversi­fication and stratification of farming populations along previously existing and new lines. If there were similarities between the different groups of farmers already described, they manifested themselves in other areas. These included their unrelenting commitment to staying on the land by one means or another, their organization of production and their growing interest in the food market. As shown below in some detail, the food market’s expansion was also what dictated the course that the land grants and the government’s interest in agricultural development took in the region and many other parts of the country during this period.

SETBACKS AND ADJUSTMENTS It is important to note that already by 1956 markets had become the primary, although not necessarily the only sources of food acquisition in urban Ethiopia. While that was a remarkable development, the market’s expansion entailed also certain risks. The best evidence to that argument comes from the setback that the food market faced from 1956. Two of these setbacks are relevant to our discussion in this chapter because of their magnitude and their impact on the market’s organization and Haile Selassie’s ongoing politics of food. The first manifested itself in the export food market, which evaporated after that year as dramatically as it had started a dozen years ago.47 The second was different in that it revealed itself in the form of major famine and inflation that struck different parts of Ethiopia beginning in 1958.48 If, as shown in Chapter 3, international conflicts were what paved the way for the expansion of Ethiopia’s export food market from 1942, the factors that precipitated its decline over a dozen years later were the same. Indeed, the outbreak of the Suez Crisis and the Red Sea’s closure for maritime trade were what led to the market’s unexpected decline in 1956.49 Unlike the Suez Crisis, which owed its origin to political factors, drought was what precipitated the outbreak of a major famine in parts of Ethiopia two years later.50 In terms of sheer size, the populations and the regions that this famine directly affected were small. These included parts of Eritrea, the Ogaden and Tigray, of which the first two had been under British control and ‘protection’ up until 1952 and 1954, respectively.51 When seen from American Embassy to the State Department, 1958. ‘Economic Survey, Ethiopia, July-September, 1958’, in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 875.00/11-1358. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 For a useful study of that famine, see Mesfin Wolde Mariam, 1984. 51 See enclosure in Thomas Recknagel to State Department, 9 February 1959, in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 775.00/3-2058. 47

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Table 4.2 Percentage Increase of Price in Major Food Items in Ethiopia’s Largest Urban Centres in 1958 (compared with the previous year) Crop Type Tef Wheat Sorghum Corn [maize] Barley Chickpeas Lentils Haricot beans Horse beans Linseeds Niger seed Average

Addis Ababa Asmara 37 18 42 68 - 19 39 5 42 25 40 33.5

43 37 34 30 - 6 40 - 25 7 30 28

Desie 40 29 50 49 48 42 49 13 50 18 22 37.27

Gondar Nazareth Average 43 - 25 - - 58 - - - 30 53 41.8

42 - - 89 42 - - 15 - - - 47

41 28 38 59 45 31 43 11 39 20 36 -

Source: American Embassy to Department of State, ‘Economic Survey, Ethiopia, July-September, 1958’; see also Ethiopian Economic Review, 1959, 1: 63

the perspective of Ethiopia’s food market as well, none of these famineafflicted regions had been major players in the previous decade.52 Yet the impact that the 1958-59 famine had on the food market was huge.53 In fact, the famine’s incidence was what precipitated the inflation that struck the urban food market beginning in 1958. As Table 4.2 summarizes, the rate of growth of inflation was signifi­ cantly high for all the crops except haricot beans. Specifically, that rate was much higher for tef, sorghum, corn/maize, lentils and horse beans, all of which registered on average over 36 per cent gain that year alone. City-wise, Nazareth, Gondar and Desie had the highest average gain in 1958. Although located further away from the areas that had been directly affected by that drought and famine, Addis Ababa’s over-33-per-cent inflation rate was significantly higher than Asmara’s 28 per cent. Lack of recorded evidence notwithstanding, this inflation was probably the worst of its kind in Ethiopia’s recent history. In addition, its onset had far-reaching implications in national politics and government policy on Ethiopian agriculture and the food supply chain. That is, for example, what a closer look at the ideas presented in the editorial and ‘public opinion’ columns of the national daily Addis Zaman suggested.54 What is striking about the numerous articles that the daily published after 1958 was not only the kind of special attention that the inflation now received in that paper but also the markedly different positions that the writers took on its causes and the way out. According to the majority view, the inflation American Embassy to the State Department, 1958. ‘Economic Survey, Ethiopia, July-September, 1958’, in The National Archives (Washington D.C.) – State Department: 875.00/11-1358. 53 Ethiopian Economic Review 1, 1959: 63. 54 See, for example, Addis Zaman, Tahesas 10, 17 and 24, 1953 E.C. 55 Ibid. 52

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that struck the urban food market after that year was anything but the product of unforeseen circumstances. Rather, it was a manifestation of the backward state of Ethiopian agriculture that needed to be modernized without any delay.55 The minority view was different from that in that it put most of the blame on the allegedly greedy grain traders, whom they accused of manufacturing the shortages by hoarding the food materials in their silos and stores scattered around the country.56 Also, unlike their counterparts that called for agricultural modernization, this second group of writers was sure about Ethiopia’s ability to feed itself even under existing technology. In fact, to them, the best way to combat inflation in Ethiopia was to organize a grain-trading parastatal that would then undercut the grain traders’ malicious practices almost at every level. Like their pre-war predecessors (discussed in Chapter 2), the majority of these writers and commentators comprised educated men residing in Addis Ababa on a permanent basis. No less active in that debate had been, however, yet another group of stakeholders that entertained different ideas for solving the same problem. To this group belonged some of Haile Selassie’s high-ranking military and civilian officials, businessmen and diplomats representing in Ethiopia some of the Western and Middle Eastern countries. According to them, the setback that the country’s food market was facing in the contemporary period was unfortunate. However, it could be overcome by other means, of which the liberalization of the land market and the promotion of commercial farming were certainly the most important paths that the government should follow without delay.57 Haile Selassie responded to these divergent views and opinions and the setback that Ethiopia’s food market had now faced in different ways. Noteworthy among these was his new-found interest in economic plan­ ning, which became a reality with the promulgation of the First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP) in 1957.58 Furthermore, the monarch was willing to reverse course and organize in a span of half a decade two major food buying and selling institutions that bore the name the Grain Board and the Ethiopian Grain Corporation (EGC).59 If Haile Selassie’s interest in organiz­ing these marketing institutions were identical with that of the minority view that we discussed earlier, his FFYDP entailed provisions that resonated well with the majority view. Likewise his 1959 edict, which lifted the restrictions that his administration had put in place on the sale of all landed properties that had been acquired from the government as a result of the land grants discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 3, was consistent with the proposals put forth by the third group as discussed above. Ibid. Interviews: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001; Emat Essay A. Delnesaw, Addis Ababa, 12 May 2000. 58 Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1956. 59 On their establishment and early activities, see Ethiopian Economic Review 3, 1961. See also Ethiopian Grain Corporation, 1966. 56 57

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Scholars have debated Haile Selassie’s FFYDP from different angles. Yet more often than not the scholarship treats that plan and the others as the only games in town on matters pertaining to the important question of agricultural development in contemporary Ethiopia. Furthermore, the scholarship has failed to unravel the circumstances that had led Haile Selassie’s administration to embrace economic planning in the first place. This is an important point because it is difficult to understand Haile Selassie’s new-found interest in economic planning without taking into consideration the relatively new direction that his political priorities had started to take after the total withdrawal of British forces from Ethiopia in 1954 and, most importantly, the export food market’s otherwise unexpected decline two years later.60 In terms of theory or economic orthodoxy, Haile Selassie’s FFYDP was not any different from its counterparts scattered around the developing world. As a closer look at that plan reveals, it was, in fact, by embracing the internationally popular paradigm of ‘community development’ that his administration sought to modernize Ethiopia’s small-scale agriculture in the following five years.61 In political and diplomatic terms as well, the plan’s inauguration coincided with Haile Selassie’s growing interest in joining what came to be known as the non-alignment movement. For example, unlike in the previous decade, when the Emperor sought to get technical and material support and assistance from the West (most notably from the USA and FAO), now he was willing to diversify his contact and relationship with other countries as well. His latest diplomacy with the USSR and Joseph Tito’s Yugoslavia were products of that thinking. Interestingly, a team of Yugoslav economists was what played the leading role in drafting Haile Selassie’s FFYDP in 1956.62 Planning is one thing. Implementing it is quite another. When seen from that angle, the FFYDP plan was more of a failure rather than a success. Haile Selassie was among those that officially acknowledged the huge discrep­ancy that existed between the planning and execution phases of the FFYDP. Yet the monarch explained that discrepancy and failure in terms of financial constraints rather than any other factor. In addition, he blamed the plan’s derailment on the ‘unfortunate’ and ‘unexpected’ challenges that the country had faced following the outbreak of a major famine and inflation in different parts of the country, just one year after its inauguration in 1957.63 For more on this subject, see Getnet, 2009a: 45-46. For a useful discussion of the evolution of the theory of agricultural development at the international scale, see Staatz and Eicher, 1990: 3-41; see also Arndt, 1987. On the Indian experience in agricultural development, see Gupta, 1998. 62 Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1956: 4-11. 63 ‘H.I.M. Haile Selassie I Address to the Nation, 11 October 1962’, reprinted in Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1962: 7-8. 60 61

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These setbacks aside, the plan’s promulgation had, nonetheless, its own impact on the evolution of development thinking and institution building in Ethiopia. In institutional terms alone, the plan’s promulgation in 1957 was what paved the way for the birth of the Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs (MNCDSA) the following year.64 Like the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) that owed its reorganization in 1948 to the new direction that Haile Selassie’s interest in agricultural development took in the post-World War II period, the MNCDSA was a product of the ‘community development’ paradigm that his administration embraced following the FFYDP’s inauguration in 1957. To Haile Selassie, the MoA and the MNCDSA’s primary task was to facilitate the development of Ethiopia’s small-scale agriculture by any means possible. To that end, these offices embraced a couple of divergent strategies that became their hallmark right away. While the MoA focused on the strategy that came to be known as ‘agricultural development’, the principle that appealed the most to the MNCDSA was that of ‘community development’. The Awasa community farm and the Awasa Community Training Center that we discussed earlier in this chapter owed their origin to the latter factor. Noteworthy are also the two-dozen community development centres (CDCs) that the MNCDSA organized in different parts of the country after 1959.65 Next only to Awasa, Ada was the second district that the MNCDSA targeted for that purpose after that year.66 The district caught the MNCDSA’s attention because of the presence in Bishoftu of two major crop research and experiment stations that we mentioned earlier. Also important was Ada’s potential for agricultural development. As records show, Ada’s CDC was one of the most successful in the country. Indeed, its organization was among the factors that facilitated the adoption by the local farmers of some of the new technologies, most notably the improved wheat and tef varieties, originating in the crop research stations discussed.67 If the underlying tenets of the FFYDP were consistent with the notion of community development then popular around the world, its successor, the Second Five Year Development Plan (SFYDP), drew its theoretical inspira­tion from the alternative ‘agricultural development’ paradigm already mentioned.68 These two approaches were different from each other in terms of methodology and of organization rather than by what they sought to accomplish. Also important were their different institutional affiliations and the manner in which these institutions sought to execute Ministry of National Community Development, 1960: 1-2. Ibid. 66 For more on the organization and early activity of Ada’s CDCs, see Borton et al., 1969: 23-56. 67 Borton et al., 1969: 23-56. See also interviews: Tulluro Abam, Moderena Alibo, 12 June 2000; Duchiso Tasama, Dibandiba, 21 May 2001; Ayo Dadi, Tulure, 16 May 2001. 68 Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1962. 64 65

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their development programmes at the ground level. For example, unlike the MNCDSA, which sought to utilize local resources and local knowledge, the MoA’s newly adopted programme of ‘agricultural development’ was highly technical and capital intensive. Institutionally as well, the SFYDP’s inauguration was important because it contributed directly to the MoA’s reorganization and transformation after 1962. Marking that transformation were the provincial and district level offices that the MoA now organized around the country. The available evidence is inconclusive to determine the degree to which the organization of these offices was able to bolster the MoA’s interventionist activities at the farm level in the coming years. What cannot be doubted is, however, the greater opportunity that the SFYDP’s inauguration had given the MoA and its officials to become increasingly visible and active in rural Ethiopia in a manner that was different from the past.69 In addition to embracing economic planning as a new form of strategy, Haile Selassie’s administration made the effort also to bolster the state’s level of intervention in the food market. His interest in organizing the Grain Board and the EGC were products of that factor and the challenges that Ethiopia’s food market had faced from 1956. In theory, the Grain Board and the EGC’s organization marked an important turning point in state policy on the food market. However, in practice neither of these institutions was able to become a major player in that market during that period. In fact, their share in the food market never exceeded the 5 per cent mark anytime in that period.70 Rather, their major accomplishment pertained to the speed at which they were able to improve the market’s infrastructure in the next two decades. The best examples of that come from the grand granary (gotera), the grain market (ehel baranda) and the many silos that they built in Addis Ababa in the half decade from 1956.71 Their construction is important to our discussion because it revealed the important place that food continued to occupy in Haile Selassie’s politics during the period discussed in this chapter.

CONCLUSION In the lake region, the decade from 1956 was marked by the propagation of small-scale farming and the expansion of crop production along the lines that had started in the previous dozen years. A host of factors that ranged from the social to the technological contributed to the expansion of agriculture in the region during that period. Specifically, the impact that the continuation of the government-sponsored land grants and the responses that they generated on the part of the local farmers had on the Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. Ministry of Agriculture, 1973b: Appendix 9. 71 Ethiopian Economic Review: 3. See also Getnet, 2009a: 45-46. 69 70

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changes that took place in the region’s agriculture in that decade was considerable. No less important were the technological factors. This was particularly true for the brand new cultivars and improved seed varieties originating in the modern centres of crop research and development that the Ethiopian state and its international allies had organized after 1952. In addition to exploring these subjects at some length, this chapter reflected back on the evolution of state policy on agricultural development. Contrary to the view that we get from the secondary literature, the development of Ethiopia’s small-scale agriculture was, in fact, one of the subjects that concerned Haile Selassie both before and after 1956. This was mainly because of his awareness of the sector’s significance to the fulfilment of his ongoing politics of food and Ethiopia’s pursuit of food self-sufficiency, which to him could be measured mainly by the size of the food market. The next chapter focuses on the evolution of the science and politics of agricultural development in Ethiopia and its impact on the transformation of the lake region’s agriculture between 1966 and 1974.

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5 Inputs, Outputs and the Farm: Transformations in the Science, Politics and Praxis of Agricultural Development 1966–1974

A relatively new development in the history of the lake region’s agriculture between 1966 and 1974 pertained to the growing availability and adoption by the local farmers of modern inputs, chemical fertilizers and improved seed varieties, on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The technologies’ major promoters had been the state-organized and internationally finan­ ced ‘fertilizer trial’ and the fully-fledged ‘regional’ development pro­ grammes that became operational in that region and other parts of the country in that period. The Green Revolution technologies that these inter­vention programmes provided were not only different but they also became increasingly popular among a growing number of the local farmers. However, in Addis Ababa, agricultural development became an increasingly controversial and polarizing subject almost overnight. In fact, to Haile Selassie’s critics, such technology-focused intervention pro­ grammes were misplaced, if not also damaging to the farmers’ short- and long-term interests. This chapter seeks to understand the degree to which the percolation and bifurcation of the politics and practice of agricultural development impacted ecological change and transformation in the region during this period.

POINTS OF CONVERGENCE In terms of agricultural development, the mid- to late-1960s were, in Ethiopia as in most other parts of Africa and the rest of the developing world, times of high expectations and great enthusiasm.1 Feeding that enthusiasm at the global scale were two factors that had their origins in the previous half decade. These were the coming to an end of European colonial rule in most parts of Africa and the advancement that was made in 1

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For a superb study of the evolution of the science of development economics at the world scale and its ramifications, see Easterly, 2013. For a useful study of the history of development in Africa during the colonial period, see Van Beusekom et al., 2000. See also Staatz and Eicher.

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major international research institutions in terms of engineered, improved seed varieties of some of the major staples, such as wheat and corn/maize, and new fertilizer packages of equal significance.2 The implication that these two factors had in the future of the science, politics and practice of agricultural development in Africa was Janus-faced. On the one hand, these technological breakthroughs tended to affirm the accuracy of the popular view that posited agricultural development as an intrinsically bio-scientific and production-centred endeavour.3 On the other hand, the political changes that had started to take place in Africa after the end of colonial rule tended to revamp and strengthen, rather than undermine, state power in agricultural development. In addition, development served as also a modus vivendi for emerging sovereign states in Africa that, for one reason or another, maintained keen interest in forging new kinds of partnerships with major powers and powerful international institutions, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As one of only few countries to exercise sovereign power in Africa in the decade after 1945, the Ethiopian state had a head start in that endeavour. The bilateral agreements that Haile Selassie’s administration signed with FAO and the US Government in, respectively, 1947 and 1952 were at least in part products of that factor. The first of their kind in Africa’s recent history, these agreements had at once a symbolic and practical significance to Haile Selassie. Indeed, the technical and material support received from FAO was what enabled his administration to organize almost from scratch Ethiopia’s oldest institutions of crop research and development, beginning in 1948 (see Chapter 4). Likewise, it is difficult to understand the path that the science, politics and practice of agricultural development took in Ethiopia in that period without taking into consideration the partnership that Haile Selassie’s administration had negotiated with its US counterpart at about the same time. As records show, the financial and technical support obtained from the latter under the general rubric of what was known as the Point Four agreement was what enabled his administration to build Alamaya College of Agriculture (near Harar – Ethiopia’s first degreelevel institute of its kind) in 1954. From the same sources, it is clear that the majority of the first batch of professionals that came to teach at Alamaya came from the Oklahoma Agriculture and Mechanical College, later renamed Oklahoma State University (OSU). Aside from being one of the USA’s pioneering land-grant universities, Oklahoma College (under its President, Henry G. Bennett) had earned a different kind of reputation worldwide because of its endorsement of the notion of 2 3

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For more on this subject matter, see Getnet, 2009a. Oklahoma State University, 1969. US Operations Mission in Ethiopia, 1954. For the history and magnitude of international development aid to Ethiopia in the two decades before 1966, see Getachew Belayneh, 1971.

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international development as enshrined in US President Harry Truman’s speech in 1949.4 Because of the plane crash that took his life prematurely while travelling overseas to promote that cause, Bennett did not live long enough to see the fruits of his labour. Yet in Ethiopia he was survived by the partnership that remained in place between Oklahoma and Alamaya Colleges for the next 15 years (1954-69). That partnership proved useful because, among other things, it helped Alamaya College to inherit and experiment the US land-grant tradition in Ethiopia. It did so by organizing several fullyfledged crop research stations that then became launching pads for its experimental extension services and the Field Days that became regular phenomena in many parts of Ethiopia during that period.5 Through their research, publications and the courses that they offered, Alamaya College’s predominantly expatriate faculty was able to become a leading proponent and promoter of scientific ideas and of agricultural development in Ethiopia in its own right. Perhaps the most dramatic example of that comes from their overwhelming success in promoting soil science in Ethiopia for the first time ever. Undoubtedly important, their interest in that science was not, however, a fait accompli. Rather, it had its genesis in the trend that has developed internationally in the wake of the American Dust Bowl crisis of the 1930s.6 If Oklahoma’s panhandles were among those that had suffered the most from that crisis, one of the Dust Bowl’s enduring ramifications was seen in the kind of greater attention that soil science and soil conservation came to enjoy at Oklahoma College (as in many others) for many decades to come. Interestingly, these were also among the subjects that the aforementioned group of Oklahoma scientists sought to promote at Alamaya after 1954. The studies that the indefatigable US soil scientist Professor E. Murphy conducted in Ethiopia in the dozen years ending in 1968 were at least in part products of these factors.7 Murphy’s studies were path breaking in that they challenged the traditional view that underscored the fertility of Ethiopian soils. In fact, his findings revealed the soils’ deficiency in key minerals – including nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium (NPK) – that are essential to plant growth. Even though these deficiencies showed significant variation from place to place, they were nonetheless recurring phenomena in most parts of the country, including the least cultivated grasslands, such as those in the south and south-east. Consequently, Murphy and his colleagues at Alamaya became leading proponents of the idea that called for an 4 5 6

7

Getnet, 2009a: 40-41. Oklahoma State University, 1969: 30. For a year-by-year analysis of the college’s activities, see Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, 1954-68. On the American Dust Bowl, see, for example, Lookingbill, 2001. On the Dust Bowl’s long-lasting impact on the scholarship and policy making in other parts of the world, see, for example, Beinart, 1984. Murphy, 1968: 3-9. See also Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, 1954: 11-14.

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intervention programme that had soil fertility and soil conservation as one of its primary areas of concern. In doing that, their aim was not to antagonize and undermine the Ethiopian Government’s and FAO’s two-decades-old development policy that had focused specifically on such subjects as land use and seed quality. Rather, their primary object was to inform and enhance the debate on the development of Ethiopian agriculture by making the case for soil quality and soil conservation. The scientists’ rate of success was such that already by the mid-1960s soil erosion and soil quality had become major subjects of interest and fascination in both scholarly and political circles.8 Indeed, it is difficult to understand the onset of Ethiopia’s fertilizer trial programme in 1967 with­ out taking into consideration that factor. Yet, already by then, Alamaya College had relinquished by law its former mandate for organizing and leading any such intervention programmes and extension services in Ethiopia to the Ministry of Agriculture. Made public in 1962, that law was part and parcel of the Government’s new-found policy on organizing a national university in Ethiopia. If that was the policy that led to the birth of Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) that year, one of its fallouts was seen in Alamaya College’s inability to grow and mature as a major land-grant university in Ethiopia. Not coincidentally, the restructuring precipitated the termination of the Alamaya-Oklahoma Colleges’ partnership in 1969.9

LAYERS OF DEVELOPMENT If, as already argued, Alamaya College’s otherwise brief experience in organ­izing extension services showcased the rise and fall of the landgrant paradigm in Ethiopia, the launching of the fertilizer trial programme in 1967 suggested the triumph of the alternative approach to agricultural development. Trialled first in South Asia (most notably in India and Pakistan), this second approach owed its origins at least in part to the success that scientists had in engineering brand new and productionboosting Green Revolution technologies, improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers, of great consequence. Yet in the main that approach was a product of the politically popular view that underscored the state’s ability to organize and coordinate agricultural development programmes in poor countries like India and Ethiopia more successfully than any other institution. Accompanying these factors was also the growing availability of international development aid and credit, which became a reality in many parts of the developing world about the same time and for the same reasons. Interestingly, the interaction of these factors was what contributed to the realization of the fertilizer trial programme in Ethiopia after 1967. 8 9

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FAO. 1978a: 1-12. Oklahoma State University, 1969.

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Table 5.1 Total Area and Number of Participating Farmers in the Ministry of Agriculture’s ­Fertilizer Trial Programme in the Lake Region, 1967-1970 Centre Shashamane Debre Zeit Nazareth Arsi Nagelle Buta Jira Modjo Total

1967/68 Hectares Participants 71 29 26 - - - 126

1968/69 Hectares Participants

45 16 16 - - - 77

287 89 36 88 - - 500

148 58 17 51 - - 274

1969/70 Hectares Participants 698 227 71 510 36 143 1685

305 109 26 297 31 71 839

Source: FAO, Report on the FAO/NORAD, 1978b: 81-82.

Made possible by the financial aid that Haile Selassie’s administration had secured from the newly organized Norwegian Aid for Development (NORAD) and co-administered by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and FAO, the fertilizer trial programme took effect in almost all parts of the country known for grain production.10 The lake region qualified for that programme at least in part for that reason,11 but the first year the focus was on the counties surrounding Debre Zeit, Nazareth and Shashamane towns. With the addition of Arsi Nagelle, Buta Jira and Modjo, these centres grew to six in number in the course of the next three years. As Table 5.1 summarizes, the total number of the fertilizer trial centres that the MoA organized in the lake region and the farming populations that participated in them at their onset in 1967 were small. However, by the programme’s end three years later these centres and the number of farmers that took part in the fertilizer trials grew to six and 839, respectively. Out of the six centres listed, Shashamane and Arsi Nagelle counties had the highest number of participating farmers in 1970. Conversely, Nazareth and Buta Jira had the smallest numbers in both categories. Although late in coming, the centre near Modjo was able to succeed in that region at a much faster rate than, for example, its Nazareth counterpart. Somewhere in between was the Debre Zeit centre, which saw only a modest growth in the number of participating farmers in the three years after 1967. According to the official MoA records, these variations were inevitable because of the farmers’ lack of experience in fertilizer use.12 That may be partly the case because the farmers that had some level of experience in manure use in the past were among those that showed greater interest in using the chemical fertilizers after 1967. While that may be an important contributing factor, it was nonetheless the chemical fertilizers’ synergy with the type of crops that these farmers had been growing in the field that played a major role in that differentiation and variation. That is why, FAO 1978b. Ibid.: 81-82. 12 Ibid. 10 11

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for example, the fertilizers’ rate of adoption turned out to be the highest in the areas where wheat production had expanded the most than in others. These included parts of Ada, Lume and Shashamane County, where the crop had a relatively long history in the region. The only major exception was Arsi Nagelle County, which became an increasingly important site for wheat production in that region after the arrival of chemical fertilizers in 1967 (see below).13 The fertilizer trial programme is important to our discussion for one other reason as well. Its onset was one of the factors that legitimized and hastened the organization of Ethiopia’s first-ever regional development programmes between 1968 and 1971. By far the largest of them all was the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) that became operational in western Arsi (just to the east of the lake region) in 1968. When organizing this in collaboration with the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Haile Selassie’s aim was to replicate in Ethiopia with equal vigour South Asia’s much-talked-about Camilla Project, both in form and substance. CADU has been the subject of numerous studies.14 Because of that reason and because of its geographic location, it is not important for me to discuss CADU’s history in detail in this chapter. Suffice it to mention only a couple of general points that are relevant to my discussion. The first point relates to CADU’s relatively unique place and stature in the history of agricultural development in Ethiopia. In fact, no other development programme was able to match CADU in Ethiopia at least for the next three decades. Second, CADU’s organization showcased the regional dimension that Haile Selassie’s development programmes have taken after 1968. Third, CADU revealed also the underlying currents and contradictions in the history of agricultural development in Ethiopia. This was particularly true if we were to look at that history from the perspective of the social contradictions that CADU’s intervention programme had accentuated at the local level. The best evidence to that argument can be found in the tenant evictions that became reality in Chilalo after CADU’s inauguration in 1968.15 The severity of the problem was such that in the first three years alone several hundred of Chilalo’s tenant farmers were forced to relinquish the land that they had been cultivating for decades.16 This was mainly because of the threat and the kind of competition that they faced from a different group of venture agriculturalists that developed interest in commercial farming. Incidentally, the growing availability of farm credit and of Green Revolution technologies was one of the factors that motivated them to venture in commercial farming at this point in time.17 Interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 14 Cohen, 1987: 39-60; Sileshi Sisaye, 1979; Tesfai Tecle, 1976. 15 Stahl, 1973: 103. 16 Ibid.: 136. 17 For more on this subject, see Chapter 6 in this volume. 13

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The impact that the onset of such tenant evictions in Chilalo and some other parts of the country had on the future of agricultural development programmes in Ethiopia was direct. Complicating the situation further was also the Swedish Government’s abrupt change of position regarding the future of development assistance to Ethiopia. Setting the stage for that change of policy was the Swedish Government’s unofficial endorsement of the politics of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), barely half a decade after its onset in 1962. The result was their decision to halt its development assistance to Ethiopia unless Haile Selassie’s administration was ready to make a concerted effort in solving the simmering Eritrean problem peacefully and also to legislate in the shortest possible time a land reform that protected the rights of tenant farmers in Chilalo and other parts of the country.18 To Haile Selassie this shift in policy on the part of the Swedish Govern­ ment was a major disappointment. If he was nonetheless able to save CADU from dismemberment, it was mainly because of the support that he was able to garner from SIDA. The Emperor won SIDA’s support by presenting a convincing argument that suggested the decoupling of the Eritrean question from Ethiopia’s ongoing pursuit in agricultural development. In addition, he promised to facilitate the enactment by the Ethiopian parliament of a tenancy reform bill to address the concerns of many development specialists, including those affiliated with SIDA, in a satisfactory manner. Also appealing to SIDA officials was the Emperor’s compliance with the latest proposal that they had put forth regarding the future organization of agricultural development programmes in Ethiopia. The series of tenancy bills that Haile Selassie’s administration submitted to parliament for deliberation and action between 1968 and 1973 owed their origin to the first factor.19 Likewise, Haile Selassie’s endorsement of the alternative ‘minimum’ development programme in 1969 had its origins in the second factor.20 In conceptual and organizational terms, the ‘minimum’ development programme was significantly different from its counterpart, namely the ‘maximum’, ‘comprehensive’ or more appropriately ‘integrated’ rural development (IRD) programme already underway in Chilalo.21 According to CADU’s IRD, agricultural development required not only the delivery of Green Revolution technologies but also the building of roads, schools and clinics in rural Ethiopia. Therefore, Chilalo’s IRD was not only capital intensive but it proved to be also difficult to replicate in many For more on this subject, see Sileshi Sisaye, 1979: 23-31. It is important to note that a good number of the Ethiopian officials and trained specialists working for the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) were of Eritrean origin. In addition, Sweden, through its missionaries, had a long presence in Eritrea, dating back to the late-nineteenth century. 19 On the contents of the draft tenancy bills, see Stahl, 1973: 159-67. 20 Bisrat Aklilu, 1976. See also Adams, 1970. 21 Cohen, 1987: 39-60. 18

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parts of Ethiopia under existing conditions. The alternative ‘minimum’ programme was different from that in two important ways. In fact, the ‘minimum’ programme was meant to cover most parts of the country, but excluding Eritrea. In addition, the same programme sought to focus only on the delivery of Green Revolution technologies and extension services rather than on infrastructure development as CADU was doing in Chilalo. In financial terms as well, the ‘minimum’ programme was meant to be a scaled-down version of its ‘maximum’ counterpart already mentioned.22 The various agricultural development programmes that Haile Selassie’s administration had organized in the lake region and other parts of the country after 1969 owed their origin at least in part to that factor. These included the Ada District Development Project (ADDP), the Southern Region Agricultural Development Project (SORADEP) and the Ethiopian Project Implementation Department (EPID), which became active in the lake region after that year. As shown below in some detail, their organization and the Green Revolution technologies that they provided were among the factors that contributed to the renewed expansion and growing maturity of crop production in that region in the next half decade.

TOWARD DEVELOPING ADA’S AGRICULTURE In the lake region, Ada was the first district that became the focus of Haile Selassie’s latest efforts in agricultural development. Yet his interest in that district goes back to 1917. The Italian colonial administration followed suit two decades later, when it made Ada one of only two major sites of settler agriculture (see Chapter 2). In the post-war period, Haile Selassie wanted to do more for and in Ada. Indeed, Ada was the only part of the country that came to host two major centres of crop research and development in Ethiopia in the 1950s. Interestingly, the presence of these research centres, its experience in the fertilizer trial programmes that we discussed earlier, and more importantly its contribution to Ethiopia’s food market, were what made Ada one of the best candidates for Haile Selassie’s latest interest in agricultural development that became official in 1968. As records show, securing international aid for the development of the district’s agriculture was one of the major subjects that concerned Haile Selassie during his much publicized visit to the USA that year.23 However, it took him over two years to secure US financial support for his plan for the development of Ada’s agriculture. In the interim, the US Government dispatched an assessment team to study the feasibility of Ada’s agricultural development programme as proposed by Haile Selassie’s administration. That team comprised of specialists affiliated with the California’s Stanford Research Institute (SRI).24 As with the Tesfai Tecle, 1976: 1-6. Ministry of Agriculture, 1970a. 24 Ibid.: 2-4. 22 23

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Table 5.2 Inputs Procurement and Distribution in Ada District Development Project Areas, c. 1973 Type of Farmers Tenant-farmers Others Total

No. of Farmers (in birr)

Seeds Purchased (in birr)

Average Credit (in birr)

240 172 412

1,679.05 1,807.50 3,486.55

97.96 241.69 339.65

Fertilizer Average Purchased Fertilized (in kg) Land (in ha) n.a. n.a 40,173.45

2.54 5.93 4.24

Source: African Rural Employment Research Network. 1974, November. ‘Plan of Work for the IDR/MSU Research Program in the Ada District of Ethiopia.’ Note: Differences from the original are due to corrections.

Table 5.3 Credit Intakes by Small-Scale Farmers in Ada, 1973 and 1974

Number of Creditors

Year Total 1973 1974

412 1,085

Tenant Farmers (%) 58.25 53.80

Other Groups of Farmers (%) 41.75 46.20

Source: African Rural Employment Research Network. 1974, November. ‘Plan of Work for the IDR/MSU Research Program in the Ada District of Ethiopia.’

project proposal that Haile Selassie’s administration submitted to the US Government in 1968, the SRI’s specialists were able to appreciate and approve the district’s potential for agricultural development without any reservation.25 Yet unlike the administration’s proposal, the SRI specialists’ reports underscored also some of the challenges that Ada’s agriculture was facing in those years. According to this group of specialists, Ada’s agriculture had suffered greatly from ‘rapidly increasing population, rising land rents, low level of productivity, rising unemployment, and a high rate of rural to urban migration’. In addition, the same specialists underscored the ‘primitive’ state of Ada’s agriculture and the ‘old and un-improved’ nature of the inputs that the local farmers used for productive purposes year after year.26 If these specialists presented a gloomy picture on that district’s agriculture, their report was nonetheless instrumental in wooing the US Government to endorse without delay Haile Selassie’s proposal for the development of Ada’s agriculture. The ADDP was a product of those factors. At its inception in 1970, the ADDP’s projected goal was to reach out to 80 per cent of Ada’s estimated 12,000 farming households within ten years.27 To that end, the ADDP commenced its activities by establishing a total of ten service stations that bore the name ‘multi-purpose development See, for example, Miller et al., 1968. Ibid.: 3-4. 27 Ministry of Agriculture, 1970a. 25 26

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centres.’ The ADDP’s office based in Debre Zeit town and its personnel used these centres for the purpose of recruiting on a voluntary basis what came to be known as ‘model’ farmers. The aim was to use these ‘model’ farmers as focus groups and their farm as ‘demonstration sites’ to the larger farming community that they wanted to reach out in a progressive manner.28 As Tables 5.2 and 5.3 summarize, the number of participating farmers in the ADDP areas grew from 412 to 1,085 in one year (between 1973 and 1974). In addition, the same farmers were able to spend on average birr 339 in 1973 (about US $163 at the time) for buying modern inputs, improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers from the ADDP office. In social terms as well, the participating farmers included share tenants and others, namely those that cultivated the land that they owned. As records show, the ADDP’s aim was to reach out to at least 500 famers the first year, and up to 1,000 farmers in each of the next three years. After the fifth year that number was expected to grow exponentially, to reach the targeted 12,000 mark before 1980. However, in reality, the 1,085 farmers that took credit from the ADDP in 1974 comprised only one-third of the projected figure for that year. According to the ADDP’s personnel, this discrepancy resulted from the farmers’ lack of understanding of the fertilizers’ potential, which, they argued, was something that should change in due course.29 Somewhat different is the view acquired from local informants. According to them, the fertilizers’ incompatibility with some of Ada’s major crops, most notably tef, rather than their lack of experience in fertilizer use, was what discouraged farmers from participating in that programme in large numbers. To be sure, the tef plant was able to respond positively to the fertilizer regime that the ADDP had put in place after that year. Yet by enabling it to grow fast and tall, these fertilizers tended to prematurely expose the tef plant to wind and related environmental hazards. Because of that reason the fertilizers failed to appeal to the farmers that focused on tef production. In fact, it was only in the areas where wheat production was well underway that the chemical fertilizers appealed to the local farmers in increasingly large numbers.30 Complicating the problem further was the false rumour that started to circulate around Ada that the chemical fertilizers had a damaging impact on the soils’ long-term fertility.31 To these factors must be added the absentee landowners’ reluctance to negotiate long-term lease agreements with the tenant farmers. The available evidence is inconclusive to determine the rumour’s precise origin. According to the official ADDP sources, the primary culprits may be the absentee owners of the land that Ada District Development Project. 1972: 1-5. See also Teshome Mulat, 1974. Teshome Mulat, 1974. 30 Interviews: Raya Talila, Ada Liban, 23 July 2001; Yerga Walda Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001. 31 Ibid. 28 29

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sought to sabotage the programme by one means or another. Also active in disseminating that rumour locally might have been the independent group of farmers, namely those that cultivated the land they owned. To what extent this false rumour was able to impact the chemical fertilizers’ rate of adoption by local farmers is hard to say. Likewise, it is difficult to tell to what extent the tenancy reform bill that Haile Selassie’s administration submitted to parliament in 1969 had antagonized and discouraged the absentee landowners from signing long-term lease agreements with share tenants as planned. Either way, none of these two factors was able to completely deter a growing number of Ada’s farmers from embracing the chemical fertilizers on a timely fashion. This was particularly true for the share tenants that became also the ADDP’s major clientele in that district right from the outset (see Table 5.3). Likewise, some of its technologies, most notably the improved tef and wheat varieties, were also able to appeal to the group of farmers that did not have the opportunity or the interest to enlist in the ADDP’s intervention programme. This was an important development because adoption of the technologies was one of the factors that contributed to the changes that started to take effect in Ada’s agriculture in the contemporary period.

OLD IDEAS, NEW PACKAGES Unlike the ADDP, which grew in the context of the contradictions that had started to take shape in Chilalo after 1968, SORADEP was a product of relatively old and recycled ideas germane to the notion of community development that had been popular around the developing world in the 1950s. The Project’s major sponsors and caretakers were the French Société d’Aide Technique et de Coopération (SATEC) and the Ethiopian Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs (MNCDSA) that Haile Selassie’s administration organized following the promulgation of the First Five Year Development Plan in 1957.32 In geographic terms as well, SORADEP’s area of activity was confined to the lake region’s southern part and the northernmost part of what was then Sidamo province and the swathes of land that straddled Zway and Dilla towns in the north and south, respectively. According to SORADEP’s French specialists, any attempt at modern­ izing Ethiopian agriculture required the organization of an intervention programme that targeted both the productive and marketing activities of subject farmers.33 Their production-based strategy was intended to facilitate on a large-scale the adoption by the local farmers of Green Revolution technologies, improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers. Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs and Société d’Aide Technique et de Coopération, 1975: 7-12; Borderon, 1973. 33 Ibid. 32

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Table 5.4 Acquisition of Farm Credit and Modern Inputs by Small-Scale Farmers in the ­Southern Region Agricultural Development Project Areas, 1971-1973 Year

No. of Farmers

1971 1972 1973

1,650 6,020 13,130

Total Expenditure (000 birr) 19.2 91.0 194.1

Inputs (000 birr) Corn [maize] seeds only Corn seeds Haricot beans Fertilizer Farm-equipment Corn seeds Haricot beans Fertilizer: DAP Urea

19.2 45.5 5.5 30.0 10.0 96.0 19.5 58.2 20.4

Source: Ministry of National Community Development and Société d’Aide Technique et de Coopération, SORADEP, 1974: 35

If that strategy was identical with that of the ADDP, their market-based intervention programme was unique to SORADEP in that it called for the commoditization of farm labour and products along new lines. In fact, their aim was to integrate as much as possible the region’s small-scale agriculture with that of Awasa’s fledgling commercial farms. Among these, certainly the most attractive to SORADEP’s French officials was the farm that the Awasa Agro-Industrial Share Company (AAISC) had organized outside of that town nearly a decade earlier. Organized in 400 acres of land, the AAISC farm’s major aim was geared to the production of cash crops, including sisal that it wanted to process and export to the international market as much as possible. In addition, the same company was quick to develop interest in buying from the local farmers other products, such as coffee and grain crops that it wanted to supply to the same market in equally large quantities.34 The AAISC caught SORADEP’s attention for certain specific reasons. On the one hand, the project office saw the AAISC’s commercial farm as an important job provider for the local farmers during the off-peak seasons. On the other hand, the same office wanted that company to become a major buyer of the farm products that the local farmers should be able to sell in the marketplaces at the end of each production cycle. In return, the project office expected AAISC to become a major provider of farm credit to its farmer clientele. In short, SORADEP’s officials’ ultimate objective was to make agricultural development a community-led (as opposed to a government-led) enterprise.35 As Table 5.4 summarizes, corn/maize was certainly the one crop that 34 35

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Ibid. See also Addis Zaman, 17 Hedar, 1959, E.C. Since the area south of Awasa town is outside of the lake region, my discussion here focuses on only the Project’s northern part, namely the agricultural area that straddles Awasa and Zway towns. Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs and Société d’Aide Technique: 9-11.

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Table 5.5 Corn [Maize] Yield per Hectare (in Quintals) in the Southern Regional Agricultural Development Project Areas, 1970-1973 Stage A B C D







1970 10



1971 9 13 21

1972 9 11 19 32

1973 8 15 28 38

Source: Ministry of National Community Development and Société d’Aide Technique et de Coopération, SORADEP, 1974: 28, 46

came to symbolize SORADEP’s intervention programme in the lake region. Next in line were wheat, sunflower and haricot beans, which the same programme sought to promote in that region mainly because of their marketability. In both cases it was by focusing on the organization of credit facilities and extension services and by forging close partnership and alliance with the ACTC and, even more importantly, with the newly organized Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR) based in the northern outskirts of Awasa town, that SORADEP made the effort to promote these technologies in that region right from the outset.36 From the same table, it is clear that the number of farmers that worked with SORADEP grew from 1,650 in 1971 to 13,130 two years later. Noteworthy is also the amount of credit that they acquired and spent on synthetic fertilizers, which rose in value from birr 30,000 in 1972 to over birr 78,000 the following year. The same was true for the amount of cash that the participating group of farmers were able to spend for improved seed varieties, which grew from birr 70,000 in 1971 to over birr 115,000 two years later. At the field level as well, SORADEP pursued a strategy that was unique to it. Noteworthy among these were the so-called ‘stages of development’. Itemized as A, B, C, D and E, these stages designated the various techniques and technologies that the participating group of farmers were required to embrace in the field in as many years. Stage A, referred to as the ‘primitive stage of cultivation’, involved the use of local corn/maize varieties through broadcasting and without applying any kind of fertilizers in the cultivated fields. Stage B, or the ‘improvement stage’, involved the planting of the improved corn/maize varieties – most notably A (Awasa) 632 variety – in portions of the farm without applying manure or synthetic fertilizers. The next two stages, C and D, were different from the others in that their implementation required the use of improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers, di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) and urea for two consecutive years. The last stage (E) was meant for reckoning and evaluation. At this stage, the farmers had the right to choose the technologies that they wanted to apply in the field after their graduation and independence from SORADEP’s tutelage and guidance at the end of the fifth year.37 36 37

Ibid. Ibid.: 23-26.

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Table 5.5 summarizes the variations that had existed at the farm level in terms of corn/maize yield per hectare following the programme’s inauguration in 1970. From that table, it is clear that corn/maize yield per unit area jumped significantly at stages C and D, namely after the farmers had started to use the prescribed improved variety and DAP. In fact, compared with stage A, the yields were able to grow by nearly five times at stage D. Aside from enabling them to maximize yield per unit area, the introduction and adoption of the latest variety of corn/maize seems to have helped the same farmers to bring more land under cultivation. This was at least in part because of the variety’s ability to quickly mature, which was also one of the criteria that the farmers used when making decisions on land use, particularly in what were before marginal areas of crop production.38 In addition to corn/maize, which was its signature crop, SORADEP sought to promote also the production of sunflower and haricot beans as a form of cash crops. Its level of success was such that upwards of 4,000 farmers were able to embrace sunflower production in a matter of just a few years. Even more spectacular was the speed at which the production of wheat and haricot beans expanded in that region after 1970. Consequently, these two cultivars were able to become major field crops in the lake region southern part fairly quickly.39 In fact, with the probable exception of corn/maize’s traditional (flint) variety that debuted first around Arsi Nagelle in the 1940s, no other cultivar was able to gain so much ground and popularity in that part of the lake region as wheat and haricot beans did between 1970 and 1973. If manure use was among the factors that facilitated the expansion of corn/maize production in the previous decades, now it was the growing availability of the chemical fertilizers that hastened the adoption by local farmers of such cultivars as wheat and haricot beans in the contemporary period. Unlike its production-based intervention programme, SORADEP’s market­ing strategy did not bear fruit in the lake region at all. This was mainly because of the local farmers’ lack of interest in selling their products to the AAISC as planned and because of the tough competition that SORADEP’s marketing strategy faced from the independent group of grain traders that continued to dominate the scene as before.40 If, on the other hand, SORADEP’s technologies were able to appeal to a growing number of this region’s farmers, including those that did not participate in that programme in any direct way, shape or form, it was mainly because of the opportunity that they gave them to optimize space and to maximize yield per unit area in the major crops. These were important points because, as ­ Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. Nini was among those that took part in one of the training sessions that the SORADEP office organized for that purpose in 1970. 39 Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs and Société d’Aide Technique, 32. 40 Interviews, as Note 38. 38

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was the case also in Ada, the technologies’ presence and adoption was one of the factors that encouraged the expansion of specialized agriculture in that part of the lake region after 1968.

A ‘MINIMUM’ APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT SORADEP is unique in Ethiopia not for what it did but for what it failed to do. Had its marketing strategy succeeded as planned, it would have laid the foundation for a different approach to agricultural development in that country. Its failure meant that in Ethiopia, as in other parts of Africa, agricultural development remained a state prerogative. The highest point in that nexus between state and agricultural development in Ethiopia came with EPID’s inauguration in 1970. Next only to the fertilizer trial programmes already discussed, EPID was, in fact, the first nation-wide intervention programme that Haile Selassie’s administration organized in the post-war period. Yet unlike the various regional development programmes that relied heavily on foreign assistance, the bulk of EPID’s capital came from Ethiopian Government coffers. To what extent the introduction in 1968 of the agricultural income tax was able to bolster the government’s ability to undertake such a nationwide agricultural intervention programme is not clear. What is clear is the special attention that the so-called minimum intervention programme gained on the part of Haile Selassie’s administration after that year. The programme’s caretaker institution was EPID, which was able to organize a remarkably large number of extension areas around the country in the course of two years.41 In the lake region, EPID commenced its work by opening its offices in Maqi and Buta Jira towns.42 If the areas that these offices targeted for the purpose of agricultural development were outside of the ADDP and SORADEP’s purview in the previous two years, that was also the factor that EPID took into consideration when setting up these two offices in 1970/71. The aim was to use them as staging grounds for reaching out to the farmers residing in the Maqi River Valley and in the Maraqo ridge and the surrounding highlands. Those geographic differences aside, the technologies that EPID sought to promote at the farm level in these parts of the lake region were not any different from that of SORADEP.43 Unfortunately, there is very little recorded evidence to tabulate the exact number of farmers that participated in EPID’s intervention programme The only exception was Eritrea, which remained outside of EPID’s jurisdiction because of the political reasons discussed earlier in this chapter in connection with CADU and the Swedish Government’s endorsement of the Eritrean Libera­ tion Front’s cause after 1968. On EPID’s activities in other parts of the country, see EPID, 1974, 1973. 42 EPID, 1973: 12-13. 43 Ibid.: 2-5. 41

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around Maqi and Buta Jira towns between 1971 and 1974. According to official MoA sources, this lack of evidence resulted from the destruction that certain members of the local farming community perpetrated on EPID’s two offices and their archives at the onset of the Ethiopian revolution in 1974. From the same sources, it appears that it was the need to destroy the evidence relating to credit arrears that led the alleged perpetrators to set fire to these offices one Sunday night.44 This is a charge that is difficult to verify based on evidence acquired from independent sources. Several of my farmer informants were aware of that catastrophe. However, they were not sure about the identity of the culprits, whom they suspected might as well be looters originating in the urban areas rather than in the countryside as the first charge alleged.45 The materials’ absence is restrictive. Nonetheless, it is possible to reflect back on that subject matter based on oral sources. According to several of my informants from Maraqo, EPID’s time can be measured by two major activities.46 These were its success in building dry-weather roads connecting rural villages, and the effort it made to popularize Green Revolution technologies, chemical fertilizers and improved wheat varieties in that county beginning in 1971. Interestingly, these were also the two major points that my informants in Maqi liked to emphasize when discussing that subject matter. According to them, EPID’s intervention was important because it paved the way for the introduction of the chemical fertilizers that were instrumental for the expansion of production of wheat and haricot beans in these parts of the lake region for the first time. The A632 variety of corn/maize was the other cultivar that found its way to Maraqo and around Maqi about the same time. Yet in this case it was not EPID’s intervention but the farmerto-farmer contact that facilitated the technology’s transfer from Awasa to Maqi after 1969.47 In the lake region, EPID was certainly a junior partner in agricultural development. Nonetheless, its organization was crucial for bridging the spatial gap that was developing in that region in terms of the availability of microcredit services and Green Revolution technologies after 1968. As was the case in Ada and the region’s southern part, the services that EPID provided near and around Buta Jira and Maqi towns were becoming increasingly popular among subject farmers. Yet, in Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie’s agricultural development programmes and development priorities were becoming the subject of intense criticism and controversy. These criticisms and controversies deserve our attention because they revealed the relatively different direction that the politics of agricultural development took in Ethiopia at that time. Interview: TM, Maqi, 8 July 2010; initials changed due to the informant’s request for anonymity. 45 Ibid.; Bashir Kadir, Koshe, 6 August 2000. 46 Interview: TM, Maqi, 8 July 2010. 47 Ibid. 44

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POINTS OF DIVERGENCE To Haile Selassie and his international allies, agricultural development was certainly the best panacea for meeting Ethiopia’s growing demand for food and for modernizing its small-scale agriculture in tangible ways. Indeed, these were the ideas that set the tone for Haile Selassie’s Third Five Year Development Plan (TFYDP) that became official in 1968.48 Because of its relatively different tone and the greater emphasis that it gave to the development of Ethiopian small-scale agriculture, the TFYDP was able to garner special attention in the scholarship. Far less appreciated have been, however, the similarities that had existed between Haile Selassie’s three development plans. These included their synergy with his evolving politics of food and with the evolution of development orthodoxy around the world. When seen from that angle, some of the differences that existed between his three five-year development plans were anything but surprising. A couple of general points can be made about Haile Selassie’s TFYDP. The first point is methodological in that it relates to the strategy that his administration embraced for translating into practice the agricultural component of the TFYDP. As the available evidence suggests, it was in fact by organizing large-scale development programmes that his administration sought to accomplish that goal after 1968. The majority of the regional development programmes that materialized in one or another part of the country, including the lake region, after that year owed their origin to that shift in methodology. The second point pertains to the plan’s overarching philosophy. Accord­ ing to that, the challenges that Ethiopian agriculture and farming popula­ tions faced at the present time could be divided into two ostensibly distinct parts: the ‘problem of production’ and that of the ‘peasantry’.49 The former referred to the reputedly backward or undeveloped nature of the technologies that Ethiopian farmers have used for crop and livestock production since earlier times. The problem of the peasantry was different in that it focused on property rights and the rules governing access to agricultural land in the parts of the country where share tenancy prevailed. The tenancy reform bills that Haile Selassie’s administration submitted to parliament for ratification between 1969 and 1973 were products of that factor and of the pressures exerted on him by donor agencies, of which the FAO and SIDA were certainly the most important. Yet that was also the one ‘problem’ that his administration was unable to solve in a timely manner. This was mainly because of the kind of opposition that the proposed tenancy bills had faced in parliament repeatedly. Contrary to his recalcitrance in addressing what the TFYDP had referred to as the ‘problem of the peasantry’, Haile Selassie did not waste 48 49

Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1968. Ibid.: 189-90.

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time in responding to the corresponding ‘problem of production’ mantra. The various regional agricultural development programmes that his administration organized after 1968 owed their origin to that factor. Yet the same years that saw the launching of these intervention programmes witnessed also the polarization of the politics of agricultural development in Ethiopia in equally dramatic ways. Feeding that polarization were the opposite views that Haile Selassie’s administration and its critics upheld on the past, present and future development of that country’s agriculture. In fact, unlike the official government view that underscored the primacy of technological factors to overcoming the challenges that Ethiopia’s agriculture had faced, its critics were unrelenting in promoting the alternative prognosis and solution that put ‘relations of production’ at the centre of the debate. Perhaps the best way to capture the ideas that had informed the govern­ ment’s position may be to quote Abebe Retta, then Minister of Agriculture. I have been alarmed by a figure quoted in this country, which estimates losses through soil erosion to be about 1,000,000,000 tons of soil per annum. I am told that this amount of topsoil would contain about 1,000,000 tons of Nitrogen. Since a portion of these losses originates from the Ethiopian plateau, the Nitrogen deficiencies [seen in most Ethiopian soils] must be attributed to it, at least partially. Such deficiencies here and there can be effectively and rapidly remedied by the application of fertilizers. Shifting cultivation, the most extravagant method of land use, might be considered as the most suitable for the traditional type of agriculture. However, shifting agriculture is low-yield agriculture. Therefore, any attempt to improve agricultural production [in Ethiopia] should include work, which aims at making areas of shifting cultivation more productive. It is apparent that fertilizer use, soil conservation, and changes in shifting cultivation are closely interconnected.50

The Minister made those remarks on the opening session of the Third Conference on Soil Fertility and Fertilizer Use in Africa that convened in Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) in 1970. His remarks are relevant to our discussion not so much because of their statistical accuracy but, rather, because of the clues that they give us to understand the degree to which technological factors in general, and soil quality and soil erosion in particular, have become major subjects of interest in government circles and the scientific community in the contemporary period. But to Haile Selassie’s critics and opponents, Abebe’s remarks and the kind of emphasis that the government has given to technological factors for solving Ethiopia’s ongoing agrarian problems were not only misplaced but they were also counter-productive almost in every respect. In fact, to them, the primary culprits of those problems were the relations of production emanating from the feudal mode of production that had existed in the country for centuries. Consequently, they became major proponents of the idea that called for the dismantling of the existing ‘feudal’ or ‘feudocapitalist’ mode of production in Ethiopia by any means possible.51 50 51

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Abebe Retta, 1970: 6. Balsvik, 1985: 17-24.

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Scholars have used the generic term ‘students’ to refer to this group of Haile Selassie’s critics and opponents. Their designation is appropriate because the majority of them were full-time students in the country’s premier institutions of higher learning, of which the agricultural college at Alamaya and HSIU in Addis Ababa were the most important at this point. Nonetheless, their ranks included also schoolteachers, university lecturers, bureaucrats, technocrats and other groups of professionals. Linking them together was their growing attraction to the theory of Marxism-Leninism and their shared interest in bringing about social and political change in Ethiopia by revolutionary means.52 Like those of Haile Selassie, the views propounded by this generation of student activists were modernist in tone and perspective. But that was the only thing that they shared in common. In all other matters, however, their two views cannot be any different. For example, the students’ call for a radical land reform was distinctly different from Haile Selassie’s gradualist and cautious approach already discussed. Likewise, their leftist ideology and their creeping ideas that contemplated the building of a socialist state, economy and society in Ethiopia were diametrically opposed to his. Because of their immediate and long-term impact on Ethiopian politics, these two opposing views have been the subject of numerous studies. Far less appreciated have been, however, the farmers’ views, which the scholars took for granted. But as the evidence from the lake region suggests, the farmers’ priorities and objectives were not only diverse but they were also different from those of the politicians vying for state power in Addis Ababa. On the one hand, subject farmers were ready and willing to adopt and utilize for productive purposes the Green Revolution technologies that were made available to them by the development programmes that Haile Selassie’s administration and its international partners were providing after 1968. On the other hand, these farmers, most notably the share tenants had difficulty differentiating between the so-called problem of production and that of the peasantry in the same way Haile Selassie’s TFYDP had done in 1968. In fact, their actions and responses suggested the degree to which the state-sanctioned rules and practices governing access to farming land, labour and products had become unpopular in that region.53 Even then, the majority was not in a position to fully understand and embrace the students ’ ‘land to the tiller’ mantra with equal enthusiasm. This was true not only for the group of farmers that cultivated the land that they owned but it was true also for the share tenants, whose underlying ideas about property rights looked different from those of the students.54 For a useful discussion of that subject matter, see Bahru Zewde, 2014: 127-38. See also Messay Kebede, 2008: 1-20. 53 Interviews: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. 54 Ibid. 52

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Without a doubt, the students were the most passionate and the most vocal in the debate on a major land reform in Ethiopia. However, they did not have any monopoly over that subject matter. In fact, land reform was among the subjects that concerned many a development specialist beginning in the late 1950s.55 Despite their insistence and different recommendations, and contrary to its own promises, Haile Selassie’s administration was, however, unable or unwilling to tackle head-on the problem of the peasantry. The best it could offer was the drafting of a tenancy bill, which never became the law of the land because of its defeat in the lower house of parliament on two different occasions.56

CONCLUSION Between 1966 and 1974 Haile Selassie ’s administration was able to organize a total of four development programmes in the lake region. Although different in terms of scale and the specific areas that they targeted, the methods and technologies that these programmes used for developing the lake region’s agriculture were identical. Moreover, the Green Revolution technologies that they provided were able to become popular among subject farmers and to make also a difference at the field level over the course of just a few years. Yet, in Addis Ababa, the same years witnessed the sharpening and polarization of the politics of agricultural development in equally dramatic ways. In fact, to Haile Selassie ’s critics the primary culprits for the backward state of Ethiopian agriculture and the impoverishment of its farming populations was none other than the feudal mode of production that they believed needed to be destroyed by any means possible. Somewhat different were the farmers’ views. On the one hand, these farmers were eager to embrace the Green Revolution technologies with­ out any hesitation. On the other hand, they, most notably the share tenants, were becoming highly critical of the existing rules and practices governing access to farming land, labour and products. Complicating the situation further was the arrival of a relatively different group of venture agriculturalists bent on the organization of large-scale commercial farms in that region. The kind of pressure that their voracious appetite for land exerted on local farmers was unprecedented in that region’s history. The next chapter deals with that subject matter, so as to understand its contribution to the changing state of agrarian politics and of ecology in the lake region during the same period. 55 56

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Lawrence and Man, 1966: 7-31. See also Borderon, 1973: 2. Stahl, 1973: 159-67.

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6 Competition and Co-existence: Creating Space for Small- to Large-scale Farming 1966–1974

In Ethiopia, agriculture had been historically the exclusive prerogative of smallholder farmers. When seen from that angle, the changes that started to take place in the two decades after 1954 were remarkable in that they permitted the organization of large-scale commercial farms on a hitherto unprecedented scale. First to succeed in that endeavour were the small number of European agribusiness companies that came to specialize in sugar, tobacco and cotton production, with the aim of supplying in large quantities both the domestic and international markets. More important to my discussion in this chapter were, however, the second type of commercial farms that Ethiopian nationals started to organize after 1968. As the evidence from the lake region reveals, the pressure that the expansion of commercial farming exerted on smallholder farmers was considerable. Yet rather than succumbing to that pressure local farmers, most notably the share tenants, were able to come up with a set of tactics and strategies that enabled them to stay on the land and to succeed in farming all over again. Their new-found interest in specialized farming and their willingness to negotiate new (higher) terms of rent with their oldest and latest protagonists, namely the absentee landowners of the previous two decades and the newly arriving group of commercial farmers, were products of that factor. As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, the impact that these developments had on the evolution of the lake region’s agriculture and agrarian politics in that period was profound.

FARMING BIG IN THE LAND OF SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURE

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One of the most enduring themes in the history of Ethiopian agriculture pertained to the pre-eminence of small-scale farming. Indeed, it was only in the course of the twentieth century that medium- to large-scale commercial farms were able to grow in Ethiopia for the first time. Even then, such farms had difficulty enduring and thriving in Ethiopia to any meaningful degrees before 1950. This was mainly because of political

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factors. For example, the assault that the pioneering group of commercial farmers faced from the Italian colonial administration’s nationalization policy in June 1936 was direct. Consequently, the farms that they had organized in the previous two decades in certain parts of the country, including the lake region, fizzled out prematurely as a result of that assault. The fate of the commercial farms that the Italian settler farmers had organized in Ada and Holeta in the last years of the occupation period was not any different. They too were victims of the political changes that took place in Ethiopia following the occupation period’s end in May 1941 (see Chapter 2). As it turned out, it took another dozen years for large-scale commercial farming to become a worthwhile activity in Ethiopia once again. This was mainly because of two disparate factors. The first relates to the political fallout that resulted from the continued presence of British military forces in south-eastern Ethiopia and in Eritrea up until the early 1950s. The second factor was different from that in that it owed its origins to internal factors. Chief among these was the new demand for agricultural land that found its greatest proponents in the group of patriots discussed in Chapter 3. If the influence that these two factors had in the shaping of Ethiopian politics after 1941 was direct, so was also their impact on Haile Selassie’s post-war policy on agricultural land.1 Indeed, these were the factors that led Haile Selassie’s administration to embrace a stringent policy on large-scale land acquisitions both by Ethiopian nationals and foreign companies for many years to come. It was, in fact, after the subsidence of the patriots’ demand for agricultural land and, perhaps more importantly, the withdrawal of British forces from most of the Ogaden and from Eritrea in 1952, that his administration was willing to relax and to lift those restrictions for the first time since 1941. Not coincidentally, that shift in policy was what paved the way for the organization by European agribusiness companies of large-scale sugar, cotton and tobacco farms in Ethiopia after 1954.2 It is important to note that, for the first 15 years, European agribusiness companies remained the most dominant players in large-scale commercial farming in Ethiopia. Conversely, Ethiopian nationals started to invest in that sector in large numbers only after 1968. Even then, the differences that had existed between the two differently owned farms remained 1

2

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For a useful discussion of the impact that British policy and the presence of British forces in Ethiopia had on Haile Selassie’s post-war politics, see Talbot, 1958: 1-17. See also Marcus, 1983: 1-21. It seems that initially Haile Selassie was reluctant to grant any such rights to companies originating in Italy, Britain and France, the three major colonial powers that had been active in the Horn of Africa since the late-nineteenth century. That may be part of the reason why Dutch companies were able to benefit from his land concessions and to dominate that sector in Ethiopia in the 1950s. For a useful discussion of the history of the Dutch farms in Ethiopia, see Bondestam, 1974. See also Bahru Zewde, 1984.

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stark.3 For example, unlike the sugar, cotton and tobacco estates that the European agribusiness companies had organized after that year, what concerned this generation of Ethiopian commercial farmers the most was the production of marketable food crops and coffee. Noteworthy are also the differences that existed between the farms in terms of sheer number, per capita land acquisition, capital investment and their major areas of activity within Ethiopia. In terms of capital investment and farm size, the sugar, cotton and tobacco estates were many times bigger than the commercial farms that Ethiopian nationals organized in one or another part of the country. However, in terms of sheer number, the former trailed the latter by huge margins. Also different were the methods that they used to secure rights of access to farming land. This is an important point because, unlike the European agribusiness companies that depended on the government’s largess and free will, the majority of the Ethiopian nationals now interested in commercial farming relied on the rural land market that was still in the early stages of development in Ethiopia. As the evidence from the lake region suggests, that market was able to grow and expand only after the cessation of the government-sponsored land grants in 1966.4 Its major promoters and benefactors had been the newly arriving group of commercial farmers and the absentee landowners specializing in rent exaction.5 On the opposite side of the social spectrum were the majority of the smallholder farmers who did not develop interest in selling the land to third parties at that time.6 In the lake region, the amount of cash that the commercial farmers were now willing to pay for a piece of farming land was considerable. For example, in Ada, 40 acres (1 gasha) of land fetched up to birr 40,000 in 1968.7 Even in the region’s central part, which had been the least cultivated in that region to date, the same amount of land can cost up to birr 10,000 or more.8 Somewhere in between were such places as Aje, Arsi Nagelle, Maraqo, Maqi and Shashamane, where the average price of a wellcultivated (lam) land stood around birr 20,000 per gasha that year.9 These price differentials were in the main products of the law of supply and demand.10 But that law did not function in a vacuum. Rather, these My summary here is based on evidence acquired from numerous sources. See, for example, Chamber of Commerce, 1973. For a theoretically grounded study of that subject matter, see Dessalegn, 1986. 4 Interview: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. 5 Ibid.; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 7 Interview: Yerga Wolde Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001. 8 Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemenu, Zway, 4 April 2001. 9 Interview: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. 10 In general, it was by tapping into their private savings that this group of commercial farmers was able to buy land in the lake region and other parts of the country in that period. Interview: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. 3

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Map 2 The Distribution of Medium- to Large-Scale Commercial Farms in Ethiopia, c. 1969 (numbers of tractors) Source: Adapted from Ministry of Agriculture, 1969, p. 33a

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price differentials revealed the variations that had existed in the lake region in terms of precipitation, topography, soil type and the historical factors that had influenced the organization of social spaces in the previous many decades.11 It is not by accident therefore that in the lake region the size of the land market and together with it commercial farming’s rate of expansion remained small where, for example, the rate of precipitation was low and the percentage of the quter gabbar was the highest. Map 2 shows the geography of commercial farming in Ethiopia and the number of agricultural machines, tractors and harvesters, that the commercial farmers had mobilized for that purpose in 1969. It indicates that, in terms of geography, the Ethiopian rift valley and some of the lowland areas, such as those in the north-west and south-east, were what then became the epicentres of commercial farming in that country. Yet that variation was not a product of geographic factors alone. Most important, rather, were the historical and environmental factors already mentioned. In social terms as well, the populations that had developed interest in commercial farming were different from their predecessors in certain notable ways. Supporting evidence to that argument can be found in the study that the Swedish political scientist Michael Stahl conducted in the lake region and other parts of Ethiopia in 1973. The trend is [today] towards large-scale commercial farming. Shashamane and [Arsi] Nagelle Woredas [counties] have become centers in this process, which is a result of the Government’s policy of encouraging large scale, mechanized farms as a vehicle of [agricultural] development …The existence of a domestic market demand for cereals in the towns made a number of wealthy people respond to the Government sponsored credits and subversions and drew them into agricultural production. The cash crops grown have been wheat, maize, teff and … haricot beans … One presumed effect of large-scale mechanization is the fast increase in foodstuffs available for domestic consumption. The increase in production has reduced the import of wheat and wheat flour. But this increase in production has not benefited the [consumers]. Surplus production has been bought by large merchants and stored for speculative reasons. The result has been increase in consumer prices.12

As Stahl correctly observed, the majority of the commercial farmers that found their way to the lake region after 1968 comprised a relatively distinct group. In fact, the majority of them were not only new to that region but they do not seem to have had any prior experience in farming. In regard to the most important question of access to farming land, they were dependent on the fledgling land market.13 Noteworthy is also their equally different legitimizing creed. If, as already argued, the discourses On the distribution of the commercial farms in the lake region and other parts of the country, see Map 2. For an observation on the commercial farmers that grew in the lake region, see Makin et al, 1975: 85-91. See also Ellis, 1972: 126-31. 12 Stahl, 1973: 133. 13 Despite their obvious differences, the scholarship was unable to differentiate this generation of commercial farmers from the group of rent collectors discussed in Chapter 4. See, for example, Addis Hiwot, 1975: 81-88; Cohen and Weintraub, 1975: 59-61. 11

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Table 6.1 Rate of Expansion of Commercial Farms in Arsi Nagelle County, 1968-1973 Year

Tractors*

Harvesters*

Land Devoted to Commercial Farming (in hectares)**

1968 1969 1970 1971 1973

3 5 19 37 150

1 3 5 12 36

320 620 1,900 3,700 16,650

Source: *Stahl, 1974: 134; ** Ministry of Agriculture; Arsi Nagelle District MoA Office, YaTawarasu YaErsha Masariyawoch, File No. A1.

of liberation and of service to the country were what had worked for their predecessors in the previous two decades, what appealed to these com­ mercial farmers was the politics of agricultural development that had morphed into relatively new levels of complexity and significance both in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa and the developing world after the mid1960s.14 Although unappreciated in the secondary literature, one of the com­ mercial farmers’ unbeknownst intentions was, by any means possible, to displace their protagonists, most notably the existing group of absentee landowners. To be sure, nothing forbade the latter from venturing in commercial farming if they wanted to do so. As records show, that was, in fact, what some among them chose to do in the lake region after 1968. However, their number was small. This was at least in part because of their lack of preparedness and the additional cost that commercial farming incurred, which proved difficult for the majority to easily overcome. In addition, many an absentee owner found it difficult to ignore the attractive prices that the commercial farmers were willing to pay for the land in lump sum. Consequently, they chose to sell the land to the highest bidder and to relinquish their claims on the land and share tenants altogether. Yet, for every absentee landowner that was ready and willing to do that, there was at least one other that remained committed to the old practice of rent exaction.15 The commercial farmers tried to overcome the challenges that the haphazard development and expansion of the land market posed on their The commercial farmers borrowed their language from Haile Selassie’s TFYDP, which became official the same year. This plan appealed to the commercial farmers because of some of the material incentives that it provided to them. These included tax exemptions on imported agricultural machines and modern inputs, and access to credit from the newly reorganized Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank. On the dispensation of bank credits, see Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, 1966-74. On the Bank’s establishment and early activities see Getnet, 2009a: 40; Pankhurst, S., 1959; Huffnagel, 1961: 460-3. 15 Interviews: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 14

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agriculture by other means. Their interest in negotiating long-term lease agreements with some among the willing group of absentee landowners – those that were reluctant to abandon their ownership of the land – was a product of that factor. In addition, the majority of them were ready to revise their original plan and focus instead on the organization of medium- (as opposed to large) scale commercial farms. In doing that, they were responding to the challenges that they now faced on the ground. Of these, certainly the most difficult challenge pertained to the land market’s uneven development, already mentioned. The magnitude of the problem was such that even the most successful had difficulty in buying and/or leasing more than 300 acres (7 gasha) of land at any one place and at any time during this period.16 In fact, the majority of them were able to buy and accumulate only 120 to 160 acres (3 to 4 gasha) of land each.17 The best evidence to that argument comes from Arsi Nagelle County, where the rate of expansion of the land market and commercial farming turned out to be one of the highest in the lake region during that period. As Table 6.1 summarizes, the total amount of land that the commercial farmers were able to acquire in Arsi Nagelle County alone grew dramatically, from 320 to 16,650 hectares from 1968 to 1973. Likewise, the number of agricultural machines, tractors and harvesters that they mobilized for that purpose grew from 4 to 186 during the same period. Yet in terms of per capita land size and capital investment these farms, like those in other parts of the region, belonged to the category of medium rather than large scale.

RECALIBRATING SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURE To the majority of the small-scale farmers, most notably the share tenants that had become the dominant group in the lake region in the course of the previous two decades, the expansion of the land market and of commercial farming after 1968 were matters of serious concern. This is not surprising because like the land grants that preceded it, the land market remained inaccessible to them right from the outset. This was mainly because of financial factors. The fact that the land prices were so high meant that none of the share tenants was in a position to compete against the newly arriving group of commercial farmers that were willing and ready to pay cash for land without hesitation. No less worrisome to the tenant farmers was the commercial farmers’ new-found interest in farm mechanization, which, if successful, could lead to the tenant farmers’ eviction and displacement from the land without any recourse. If, as shown in Chapter 3, their monopoly of labour was one of the factors that had enabled the 16 17

Ibid.; Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001. Ibid.; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. For a preliminary yet useful study of the court cases in one part of the lake region, namely Lume, see Bililign Mandefro, 1966.

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tenant farmers to negotiate usufruct rights of the land in the previous two decades, that was exactly what farm mechanization tended to seriously undermine and jeopardize almost everywhere. In theory, these challenges were insurmountable but, in practice, nowhere were they willing to relinquish their entitlement rights on the land without a fight. Court litigation was one of the strategies that appealed to many a tenant farmer after that year.18 But that was a strategy that did not actually work for the majority. This was partly because of the procedural, logistical and financial reasons that made the urban-based courts largely inaccessible to the share tenants. Most prohibitive was, however, the tenure of the law, which required all parties to present documentation that proved ownership rights on the land. The fact that the majority of the local farmers were unable or unwilling to buy the land from the state at the time of qalad and, equally importantly because of their exclusion from the government-sponsored land grants of the previous two decades meant that only few were able to readily produce that documentation, as required by law.19 Unlike the court cases that rarely ended in time and in their favour, some of the field-level strategies that the tenant farmers now deployed for that purpose proved to be effective. These included their willingness to negotiate new (higher) terms of rent with their oldest and also newly arriving protagonists and competitors. According to the new rule, the tenant farmers were to pay as rent one-third (siso) rather than one-fourth (erbo) of the annual harvest each year if they were to stay on the land as before. This was a difficult choice for the tenant farmers to make. If they were nonetheless willing to accept the rent hikes as proposed, it was precisely because of the opportunity that they gave them to stay on the land.20 To the absentee landowners, particularly to those torn between the idea of selling or not selling the land to a third party, siso was an attrac­ tive proposition. Indeed, its introduction was one of the factors that convinced them to shun the land market and to repeat the old practice of rent exaction all over again. In addition, the rent hikes also appealed to the commercial farmers that had difficulty establishing large-scale, fullyfledged mechanized farms in the region.21 The most documented evidence to that argument comes from the commercial farm that one Tadla Dasta organized in Ada after 1968.22 Prior to his arrival in Ada that year, Tadla had worked as sales representative for a company called International Tractors and Harvesters, and for many years in the Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa offices of the Ethio-Djibouti Interviews: Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. See also Stahl, 1973: 1335-6. 19 Interviews, as in Note 18. 20 Ibid. See also Stahl, 1973: 105, 135; Ellis, 1972: 113-14, 123-26. 21 Interviews, as Note 18. 22 Ellis, 1972: 126-27; Borton et al.: 74. See also McCann, 1995: 228. 18

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Railway Company. In other words, prior to his arrival in Ada, Tadla seems to have had very little if any experience in farming. As records show, it was in fact by purchasing and leasing a total of 180 acres (4½ gasha) of land from several of the absentee landowners that he was able to establish his commercial farm in Ada. In addition, Tadla was able to deploy half a dozen tractors and harvesters that he probably had purchased from his previous company on loan. Clearly, his level of preparation was impressive. No less impressive was also his readiness to modify and adjust his plan depending upon the circumstances that he encountered on the ground. For example, contrary to his initial plan that sought to organize a fullyfledged mechanized farm requiring, among other things, the displacement of the existing group of tenant farmers, Tadla was willing to keep them on the land as long as they were willing to comply with his new terms and conditions, including rent hikes.23 Although Tadla’s case is unique in that it is one of the most documented, his interest in keeping the tenant farmers on the land was anything but unique to him. Rather, it was a strategy that many a commercial farmer was willing to embrace.24 The only major exceptions had been the relatively small number of commercial farmers that pursued their original desire of tenant eviction without hesitation, which, as the available evidence suggests, started in the region after 1970.25 This was particularly true for Arsi Nagelle and Shashamane counties, which became eviction’s major hotspots in that region during the following three years. According to Stahl, up to 400 tenant farmers (approximately 4-5 per cent of the tenant population) were forced to vacate the land in these counties because of that reason.26 Even though eviction was a threat that most tenant farmers faced, the rate of prevalence remained nonetheless considerably low in other parts of the region.27 When told to vacate the land, the tenant farmers were given only a short notice that expired at the end of the then-current production season. Furthermore, none was paid any kind of compensation for their losses. In fact, their only recourse was to relocate to new areas and start farming from scratch. Among the areas that attracted them, certainly the most In addition, Tadla required the tenant farmers to subscribe to the machine (tractor and harvester) rental service that he provided. For the tractors and harvesters, he charged these farmers birr 25 and 30 per gasha, respectively (c. US $10 and $12, at the time). Borton et al.: 74. 24 See, for example, Kebede Tesema, 1972. See also Makin et al, 1975: 45-46. Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, 1970a: 9-12. For a useful discussion of the strategies that the tenant farmers developed and used for renewing their usufruct rights on the land in other parts of the country during the same period, see Stahl, 1973: 127. 25 Interviews: Tashoma Ture, Shashamane, 15 January 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. 26 Stahl, 1973: 135-6. 27 Kebede Tesema, 1972: 45-46; Ministry of Land Reform and Administration, 1970a: 9-12.

23

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Table 6.2 Percentage of Crop Distribution within Farms in Shashamane and Arsi Nagelle Counties, 1964/65 to 1973/74 Crop Corn [maize] Wheat Tef Haricot beans Other Total

1964/65 32 30 16 0 22 100

1965/66 1968/69 32 30 19 0 19 100

27 36 22 4 11 100

1971/72 1973/74 21 41 25 10 3 100

18 41 22 16 3 100

Source: Ministry of Agriculture: Arsi Nagelle District MoA Office, YaErsha Estatistiks, File No. 1; Shashamane District MoA Office, Ersha Lemat, ELe: 3.

important had been the mountainous and driest areas, such as those near the Belate River and the rift valley lakes. These places appealed to them because of their unattractiveness to the commercial farmers now interested in organizing mechanized farms. The fact that most of these properties were still under the Ethiopian state’s nominal control meant that this evicted group of tenant farmers had very little or no difficulty in claiming and utilizing them as necessary. But even then, nowhere were they able to overcome the material, psychological and other kinds of losses that eviction had caused on them and their families during its peak from 1970 to 1974.28 The majority of the tenant farmers, however, were able to develop a set of strategies that enabled them to continue staying on the land. The only caveat was their obligation to pay a higher rent (siso) than was the case in the previous two decades. Also different was the pressure that such rent hikes and the new rounds of competitions and negotiations for access to farming land exerted on their organization of production. Consequently, the post-1968 period witnessed the expansion of specialized farming across the lake region. Its major promoters were the same group of farmers and their commercial counterparts already discussed. Yet the practice was able to appeal to also a growing number of the independent group of smallscale farmers, namely the quter gabbar as well.29 As its name implies, specialized farming refers to a practice that required these farmers to grow only a small number of cultivars in the field year after year. The practice is different from monoculture in that it did not encourage the production of a single crop in the farm anytime during this period. However, unlike diversified agriculture that preceded it, specialized farming required the farmers to allocate more space, time and capital for the production of a small number of crops in the cultivated field for several years in a row. Specialized farming appealed to the majority of the small-scale farmers, most notably the share tenants, because of 28 29

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Stahl, 1973: 136. For first-hand accounts on the expansion of specialized farming in the lake region in that period, see Ellis, 1972: 126-7; Makin et al, 1975: 43; Borton et al.: 74. See also McCann, 1995: 228.

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Table 6.3 Percentage of Crop Distribution in Maqi River Valley (selected years)

 

Corn [maize] Haricot beans Chili pepper Tef Other Total Sources:

1965* 42 0 14 3 41 100

1972** 47 22 16 6 9 100

* Ministry of Agriculture, Zway District Office, Teklala Mazgab, File No. M2 ** Makin et al., Development Prospects in the Southern Rift Valley, 1975: 118

the greater opportunity that it gave them to optimize agricultural space and to maximize yield per unit area at this time of rent hikes and renewed competition for farming land. As Table 6.2 summarizes, wheat and haricot beans were the crops that directly benefited from and underwrote the expansion of special­ ized farming in Shashamane and Arsi Nagelle counties after 1968. Consequently, wheat’s percentage share of the land grew from 30 per cent in 1964/65 to 41 per cent a decade later. Likewise, the haricot beans’ share grew from zero to 16 per cent during the same period. As a result, these two crops were able to cover up to 57 per cent of the cultivated fields in that part of the lake region in 1973/74. Conversely, the relative share of corn/maize declined significantly, from 32 to 18 per cent during the same period. Even more dramatic was the rate at which the percentage shares of the ‘other’ type of crops, such as sweet potatoes, beans and peas, declined, from 22 to 3 per cent in a matter of just ten years (1964 to 1974). From the older set of crops, only tef was able to not only retain but also to increase its relative share in the land after 1968. As a result, it was able to become the second-most important crop in Shashamane and Arsi Nagelle counties in 1973/74. As Table 6.3 summarizes, the pattern that was developing in the Maqi River Valley in these years was not any different from that of Shashamane and Arsi Nagelle counties already discussed. Clearly, the speed at which the production of haricot beans expanded in that valley was impressive, as it jumped in terms of acreage from 0 to 22 per cent in a matter of just six years (between 1965 and 1972). Tef was the other crop that doubled its percentage share during the same years. Likewise, the relative share of corn/maize in the field grew by 5 per cent in that period. Somewhat different was the case of the chillies, which did not gain significant ground in the field in these years. On the opposite side of the crop spectrum were the ‘other’ type of cultivars, including peas and horse beans that lost significant ground in that valley’s cultivated fields following the advent of specialized agriculture in 1968. In fact, their rate of decline, from 41 to 9 per cent, was the highest for this period. Even more striking was wheat’s nearly total absence from Maqi’s cultivated fields in that period.

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Table 6.4 Percentage of Crop Distribution in Ada Farms, 1960-1974 Year

Crop

Tef Wheat Chickpeas Peas Barley Sorghum Corn [maize] Horse beans Other Total

1960

1968

1970

1974

21.95 14.93 8.10 7.43 8.45 2.13 15.20 7.64 14.17 100.00

36.96 19.39 19.56 2.17 8.87 2.17 4.35 6.53 - 100.00

62.0 12.0 13.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 1.7 3.4 - 100.00

69.0 11.0 10.0 4.5 2.1 1.7 1.2 0.5 100.0

Sources: Ellis, ‘Man or Machine’, 1972: 17; Gholl, ‘Report to the Government of Ethiopia on Ada District Sample ­Survey’, 1961: 58; Ministry of Agriculture, ‘An Application to the United States Agency for International Development for Ethiopia: The Ada Agricultural Development Project’ 1970a

The picture one gets from Ada’s cultivated fields was not any different from other parts of the lake region (see Table 6.4). The table summarizes tef’s unrivalled dominance in the field and the huge losses that some of the other cultivars had incurred at the field level following specialized farming’s expansion in Ada after 1968. For example, compared with the previous eight years, the total amount of land that Ada’s farmers allocated for tef production that year was not only large but it was also comparable to that of chickpeas and wheat combined. That amount had grown by more than four times just two years later. Consequently, tef’s percentage share in the cultivated fields was able to quickly surpass that of the combined total of the other crops listed in that table. Equally spectacular had been also the rate of decline of such cultivars as sorghum, corn/maize and beans (not haricot), whose relative share of acreage declined sharply, from 39 to less than 2 per cent between 1960 and 1974. Aside from the opportunity that it gave subject farmers to successfully cope with the relatively different kinds of challenges that they now faced, their new-found interest in specialized farming augmented the expansion of crop production across the lake region. The best example of that comes from Zway district, where the rate of expansion of agriculture had remained the lowest in that region in the decades before 1968. As the survey conducted by a team of British and Ethiopian specialists suggests, the contribution of specialized farming to the expansion of crop production near and around Zway was considerable. The basic pattern of agriculture is similar throughout the Zwai area. The natural conditions favour the culture of haricot beans, and this crop has become the main source of cash income for many farmers. The proportion of farm area under haricot beans tends to increase with farm size. Among smallholders, maize occupies about 55% of the cropped area, and [haricot] beans 35%, the remainder being under other cereals, lentils and [chilli] peppers. Average smallholder farm size is

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Table 6.5 Average Crop Yield per Unit Area in Ada and the Rest of Ethiopia, c. 1971 Crops Tef Wheat Barley Corn [maize] Sorghum Chickpea Horse beans Field peas Lentils White beans

Yield (quintals per hectare) Ada Ethiopia 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.2 6.5 6.2 7.7 6.5 4.8 7.9

6.1 7.7 8.7 10.9 8.8 6.4 9.8 9.5 6.3 9.1

Source: Humphreys, ‘An Empirical Investigation of Factors Affecting Peasant Crop Production, Based on a Survey of Ada Wereda, Ethiopia’, 1975: 17. Note: Humphreys obtained his data from the Ethiopian Statistical Abstract that came out the same year.

1.9 ha, made up of 2 plots. Crop yield may be poor even in years with adequate rain (haricot beans 8q/ha; maize 6-9q/ha) and in other years [when the rains are not adequate] cropping is extremely uncertain.30

Clearly, the factors that encouraged the expansion of specialized farming in the lake region were new. In addition, the practice was able to appeal to the majority of that region’s small-scale farmers right from the outset. Yet to its critics, specialized farming had more of a negative rather than a positive effect in the evolution of the lake region’s agriculture. That is, for example, the impression one gets from the study that the agronomist Richard Borton conducted in Ada in 1969. According to him, specialized farming tended to undermine the farmers’ ‘age-old’ and useful practices, such as those pertaining to intercropping and fallowing.31 To be sure, these were some of the practices that the expansion of specialized farming tended to undermine in Ada and other parts of the region after 1968. However, subject farmers were able to ameliorate these effects by making the necessary adjustments. Noteworthy among these was their preparedness to adopt modern inputs, improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers more rigorously than previously. If these were the technologies that contributed to the expansion of specialized farming in Ada and other parts of the lake region after that year, their overall impact on farm productivity was equally direct. It is not by accident, therefore, that in terms of the important question of crop yield per unit area, Ada’s farmers were able to perform better in their specialty crop, namely tef, rather than in others. As Table 6.5 summarizes, in terms of yield per hectare Ada exceeded the national average only in tef production. In all the other crops, however, 30 31

Makin et al, 1975: 85. Borton et al.: 74.

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Ada’s figures were lower than the national average by small to large margins. The smallest margin (less than one quintal per hectare) was registered in two of Ada’s second-tier specialty crops, namely wheat and chickpeas. The highest margin (more than one quintal per hectare) was registered in the non-specialty crops, including corn/maize, sorghum, beans, peas and lentils. The trend that was developing in other parts of the lake region was not any different from that. As a quick look at the tables presented in Chapter 5 reveals, the 13 to 15 quintals of corn/maize and the 8 to 9 quintals of wheat – also specialty crops – that the farmers in the region’s central and southern parts harvested per hectare each year were significantly higher than the national average listed in Table 6.5. With respect to the nonspecialty crops, however, the figures that one gets from these districts were significantly lower than the national average.

THE MARKET AND THE FARM AND THE FARMERS’ MARKET It is important to note that, already by the late 1960s, the market had become the primary source of food acquisition for the majority of Ethiopia’s urban populations.32 In addition, these years witnessed the recovery and expansion of Ethiopia’s export food market for the first time since its abrupt decline over a dozen years earlier.33 The impact that these developments had on the lake region’s agriculture was considerable. For example, it is difficult to understand the commercial farmers’ new-found interest in agriculture without taking into consideration these two factors. The markets’ influence in the organization of specialized farming was equally profound. The best evidence to that argument comes from the crops, such as haricot beans, wheat, tef and chillies, that became attractive to this region’s farmers mainly because of their marketability. As shown in Map 3, the areas that have become major centres of commercial farming were among those that supplied the lion’s share of the foodstuffs that found their way to Ethiopia’s export market during this period. Most notable among these was the area extending from Awasa town in the south to southern Wollo in the north, and from eastern Wollega to Awash town in the west and east, respectively. Also important had been the north-western lowlands that became major centres of crop production and supply (mainly oil seeds) in Ethiopia after 1968.34 In addition to the fledgling commercial farms, the domestic and export markets were beneficiaries of the surplus products originating in the districts that became the focus of Haile Selassie’s regional development See, for example, CSA, 1972. Chamber of Commerce, 1973: 17-18, 61-85. 34 Ministry of Agriculture, 1973b: 5-32. 32 33

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programmes after 1968.35 Also important were the former madbet districts and such places as Gojjam and Gondar, which continued to supply large quantities of food materials, including grains and pulses to Addis Ababa’s market in the same period.36 To that list must be added the regions that supplied livestock and livestock products to that market in equally large numbers. These included Shewa, Hararge and Sidamo (Wolayta and Borana) provinces, which had been major sources of livestock (mainly cattle and/or sheep) and livestock products (notably butter) to Addis Ababa’s food market for decades.37 The urban-bound food market was certainly the largest of its kind in Ethiopia. No less important had been the small-scale and locally bound farmers’ markets that had proliferated around the country in equally dramatic ways.38 The latter differed from the former in certain notable ways. These included their relatively small size, their periodic nature and the different groups of populations that they served. In addition, the farmers’ markets were in the main the works of women, who were also their major clientele. As a rule, these women fetched the bulk of the food materials that they sold in these locally organized farmers’ markets from the garden (gwaro) portion of the farm. Yet their primary aim was not to make profits by selling large quantities of food materials. Rather, these markets were important outlets for these women, enabling them to exchange their surplus products for cash, which they could then use for buying food and other household consumer products.39 Just as women dominated the farmers’ markets, men were the major players in their translocal counterparts.40 At the farm level as well, the products originating in the masa (the farm’s major and largest portion) were what fed the translocal or urban-bound markets almost everywhere. These two types of markets differed from each other in other ways as well. Most notable among these were their different size and organization; the distance that the locally produced crops travelled each time to reach the marketplaces; and the markets’ overall impact on the farm. For example, unlike the masa portion of the farm that became a major site for specialized farming, gardens (gwaro) remained as important centres of diversified agriculture throughout this period. Moreover, the products obtained from gwaro were exempted from rent assessment and rent exaction.41 For the list of the major crops in Addis Ababa’s food market in that period, see Addis Zaman, Miazia 23, 1958 E.C., 17 Sane, 1958 E.C., 17 Hedar 1959 E.C., 2 Magabit, 1959 E.C.; Ministry of Agriculture, 1973b: Appendix 9. See also Eichberger, 1968. 36 See, for example, CSA, 1972. 37 Ibid. 38 Interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001; Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. 39 Interviews: Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001; Yerga Walda Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001; Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. 40 Interviews, as Note 38. 41 Ibid. 35

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Map 3 Grain and Pulse Movements in Central Ethiopia, 1971–73 Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Findings of a Market Structure, 1973: 203.

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Recorded evidence is lacking to measure accurately the food markets’ actual size at any point during this period. Neither the individual farmers nor the grain traders were able to develop the practice of record keeping. Yet, from the available oral sources, it is clear that already by the 1960s the lake region had become one of the major suppliers of food materials to Addis Ababa’s food market.42 Ada’s association in that city with the magna tef variety, Modjo’s with wheat, Maqi’s with vegetables, Maraqo’s with chillies, and Arsi Nagelle’s and Shashamane’s with wheat and corn / maize took place in that context and because of that reason. A relatively new addition to that list of crops were haricot beans, which, despite their late arrival, were able to become one of this region’s major export staples beginning in 1968.43

CONCLUSION My primary objective in this chapter has been to understand the circum­ stances that had contributed to the expansion of medium- to large-scale commercial farming in the lake region during its heyday that lasted from 1968 to 1974. Geographically, the populations that succeeded in organizing such farms in that region traced their origin to the urban areas, of which Addis Ababa, Debre Zeit, Modjo, Nazareth and Shashamane were certainly the most important for this period. If the expansion of Ethiopia’s food market was what encouraged them to venture in commercial farming, the method that they used to gain access to farming land was the same. Indeed, it was by relying on the expanding rural land market that they were able to accomplish that goal in that region in a timely manner. To the majority of the small-scale farmers, most notably the share tenants already present on the land, the arrival of this group of commercial farmers and the land market’s expansion were matters of serious concern. Yet rather than capitulating, local farmers were able to come up with a set of tactics and strategies that enabled them to stay on the land and to succeed in farming again. Their new-found interest in specialized farming was a product of these factors. Interestingly, their adoption of the same practice was one of the factors that enabled them to optimize agricultural space and to maximize crop yield per unit area in the half decade leading up to the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution in 1974. The next chapter seeks to understand the forces and directions of agricultural and environmental change and transformation in the lake region during the years of the Ethiopian revolution. Interviews: Shimaket Arga, Addis Ababa, 30 August 2001; Dabashe Kebrat, Shashamane, 24 January 2001; Shisama Birada, Addis Ababa, 17 July 1999. 43 Interviews: Dabashe Kibret Shashamane, 24 January 2001; Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 11 February 2001. See also, Ministry of Agriculture, 1973b: 203. 42

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Of Production and Production Relations: Farming in an Era of Revolutionary Change and Socialist Development 1975–1991

To the lake region’s small-scale farmers, most notably to the share tenants – the majority – the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution in September 1974 was a welcome development. This was mainly because of the oppor­ tunity that the major land-reform edict that the incumbent military administration (the Derg) promulgated in March 1975 gave them to enjoy almost inalienable usufruct right on the cultivated fields already under their control. In addition, the same edict outlawed private ownership of agricultural land and the land market, the organization of individually owned medium- to large-scale farms, and the exaction of agricultural rent altogether. Yet the fact that this edict put all landed properties under ‘public’ or state control meant that now as before the rules and practices governing access to agricultural land had to be constantly debated, acted upon and negotiated. The result was the propagation and retrenchment of small-scale farming across the lake region and most other parts of the country on a hitherto unprecedented scale.

‘LAND TO THE TILLER’ AND THE TILLERS’ RESPONSE It took the Derg only six months to promulgate a major land-reform edict in Ethiopia in March 1975.1 When promulgating that edict, the military administration was responding proactively to the notion of ‘land to the tiller’ that the student harbingers of the revolution had embraced since the mid-1960s. Interestingly, some of these former students and their closest supporters were among those that had been active in drafting that edict a decade later. If dismantling what the students had referred to as the social, economic and political foundations of the ancient regime was one of the reasons that made ‘land to the tiller’ their movement’s rallying cry in the first place, that was also what the land-reform edict was able to accomplish on their behalf when it became law that year. Called and mobilized by the Derg under the banner of the National 1

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Negarit Gazeta, 29 April 1975.

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Development through Cooperation Campaign, better known by its Amharic term zamacha, the same group of college students and their high school counterparts were among those that directly partook in the edict’s implementation in rural Ethiopia in the following year.2 The fact that ‘land to the tiller’ was one of the topics that they have been debating at length while still in college campuses and school compounds meant that the zamacha students were sure about their mastery of that subject matter when they marched en masse to different parts of rural Ethiopia in 1975. To those who made it to the lake region, the existence of absentee landowners, sharecroppers and commercial farmers was important because they proved to them the accuracy of their discourses and the land reform’s indispensability in bringing about much-needed social and agricultural change and transformation in rural Ethiopia as quickly as possible. Scholars have studied that reform and its overall impact on Ethiopian agriculture and farming populations extensively and from different angles.3 Because of that reason it is not necessary to delve into that subject matter in great detail in this chapter. However, it is important to summarize, albeit briefly, some of the reform’s major tenets and ramifications, so as to set the stage for the discussion below. First, this reform was not only one of the most radical and the most comprehensive in Ethiopian history, but it was also widely popular in the lake region. This was mainly because of the force with which the edict abolished existing land rent practices, such as erbo and siso, and because of its propensity to acknowledge and codify the smallholder farmers’ (including the share tenants) usufruct rights on the land. Second, despite its rhetoric, the edict did not prohibit subject farmers from developing and deploying socially inscribed rules and practices governing access to farming land. Third, rather than undermining it, the edict had the intended effect of bolstering state power on matters pertaining to agricultural land and farming populations, to be similar to the situation in the decades before 1975. It is striking to note that, unlike the previous two decades when enacting such laws had been the parliament’s prerogative, now the Derg was able to monopolize both legislative and executive powers in Ethiopia without any recourse. Indeed, that was the power that gave the Derg the opportunity to legislate such a major land-reform edict in Ethiopia that year. While it was a remarkable development, implementing the edict on the ground remained nonetheless the prerogative of other branches of government and of local officials. Noteworthy among these was the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), which became one of the most visible state 2

3

Given the huge impact that it had on the unfolding political situation in Ethiopia the scanty attention that the zamacha has attained in the scholarship is surprising. My summary here is based on information acquired from one of the student activists who participated in that zamacha during his final year in college. Interview: SK; initials changed as per the informant’s request. See Bereket Kebede, 2008; Kidane Mengisteab, 1990; Dessalegn Rahmato, 1984; Aster Akalu, 1982.

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institutions at the local level as a result of that practice. In addition, the edict’s promulgation and implementation paved the way for the birth of brand new institutions, of which the Peasant Associations (PAs) that sprung up around the country were certainly the most important for the discussion in this chapter. To the zamacha students that organized them from scratch, to their successor MoA officials and to the Derg, these PAs and the komite (for committee/s) that presided over them were the farmers’ rightful repre­ sen­tatives. In addition, the komite were, to the Derg, tax collectors and the instruments of socialist power, socialist jurisprudence and socialist mobilization at the grassroots level. To the farmers that had ‘elected’ them to these offices, however, the komite were first and foremost the proximate and the most visible mediators, grantors and distributors of farming land at the local level. This was an important subject to them because, in the lake region as in many other parts of the country, the 1975 land reform was more of a process rather than a single event. Nothing illustrates that point better than the land measurement and redistribution practices that remained in place for most of the revolution years. According to the official view, these acts of land measurement and redistri­ bution were important because they enabled the responsible authorities to accommodate the constantly growing demand for agricul­ tural land caused by population growth. Although that may have been true at times, often times such practices owed their origin to political factors.4 Supporting evidence to that argument comes from their frequency, their otherwise unpredictable schedules and the composition of the populations that had benefited from them the most each time.5 Among these, reportedly the most enterprising had been komite members and the politically active members of local society that did not shy away from slicing bigger portions for themselves, their relatives or their supporters under various guises. Included in that list of beneficiaries had been also the group of farmers that had joined the Derg’s militia and military beginning in 1977. On the opposite side of the political and social spectrum were the majority of the farmers, whose primary interest was geared to retaining as much as possible the portions of the land already under their control and jurisdiction.6 Complicating the situation further was the Derg’s new-found interest in organizing producer cooperatives (PCs) around the country.7 The Derg 4 5

6 7

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Interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001; Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001; Abara Tafara Yadate, Arsi Nagelle, 6 February 2001. According to several of my informants, the authorities were able to conduct at least four such acts of land measurement and redistribution in the lake region between 1975 and 1986. Interviews: ibid. Ibid. Because of the kind of favouritism that they enjoyed from the Ethiopian Government and the Ministry of Agriculture’s branch offices, there is a relatively large archival material dealing with the Producer Cooperatives and their performance after 1979. See, for example, Arsi Nagelle Warada Gebrena Sehfat Bet, Amrachoch, File No. A4.

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borrowed its ideas about PCs from the Soviet Union and China, where farm cooperativization had a relatively long history. According to the Stalinist and Maoist views, small-scale agriculture was not only inefficient but it was also a menace to socialist transformation and socialist development. Therefore, it had to be systematically destroyed and replaced by mediumto large-scale farms that would then be managed by the newly organized farmer communes. That was also what the Derg had sought to accomplish, when it made farm cooperatization one of its priorities after 1979.8 The government’s aim was to organize such PCs in three different stages.9 Dubbed malba, the first stage required the farmers to commit their ‘primary means of production’ – such as plough oxen and farm tools – and their labour for the common good. At this stage, the farmers had the right to maintain control over the portion of the land they cultivated individually. In addition, they had the unique advantage of organizing cooperative farms on separate plots of land that they acquired from the government for free. Whereas cultivating the privately owned farms was the exclusive prerogative of the individual farmers, taking care of the cooperative portion of the farm was meant to be a collective responsibility. The second (walba) stage was different in that the farmers had to solicit their means of production, labour and the portions of the land already under their control for the collective good. Yet the individual farmer’s share of the final product was contingent upon their inputs and their level of contribution to the farm’s success. The third and final stage (waland) was different from its immediate predecessor by what the farmers got out of the farm rather than by what they contributed for its organization and success. In fact, at this stage not only have the farmers succeeded in organizing fully-fledged or large-scale farms but also they have committed themselves and their farm to the Marxian principle of ‘from each according to his ability to each according to his needs’. Despite their efforts and the material and political support that they received from the Ethiopian state, MoA officials had nonetheless difficulty organizing large numbers of PCs in the lake region in a short space of time. This was mainly because of the farmers’ apathy to cooperativization, as exampled by the evidence from Shashamane County. This county is relevant to our discussion because it witnessed the organization of the largest number of PCs per capita in the lake region during that period. Yet when compared with their PA counterparts, the county’s PCs remained small in number and population size. In fact, only in the category of per capita ‘registered capital’ and ‘land size’ did the PCs fare better than the PAs in that county in 1985 (see Table 7.1). To their MoA organizers, the PCs’ small number and their growing unpopularity were matters of serious concern. Yet almost always these officials liked to explain that phenomenon in purely political terms. In fact, to them the ‘propaganda campaign that certain counter-revolutionary 8 9

Ministry of Agriculture, 1979. Ibid.

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Table 7.1 The Distribution of Peasant Associations and Producer Cooperatives in Shashamane County in 1985 No. of Associations PAs 8 PCs 3

Total Number Registered of Registered Capital Members 21,092 521

1,161,259.81 313,104.97

No. of Tractors Owned 1 1

Land Size in Hectares* 0 597.98



*This column refers to the amount of land that the farmers collectively owned, and not to the plots of land that they individually controlled and farmed. According to the same source, the County’s total land area in 1985 measured around 96,000 hectares. Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Shashamane District Office, Atakalay Maraja, File No. 1

elements’ had waged against them was what made the PCs unpopular in that region.10 My informants offered a different explanation. From their testimonies, it is clear that cooperativization’s incompatibility with the farmers’ long-standing interest in maintaining direct control over farming land, labour and product rather than the political factors that the MoA officials described were what made the PCs widely unpopular in the lake region. ‘It still puzzles me’, one of my informants remarked, as to ‘why [the] Derg wanted to give us land first [in 1975] and then wanted to take it back [a few years later] in the name of collectivization’.11 When asked to answer the question why then did even a small percentage of the farming population choose to join the PCs, his response was equally emphatic. According to him and several of his fellow informants, the PC members comprised the ‘laziest, least-successful, and advantage-seeking’ group of farmers. In other words, the PCs were, according to them, the methods that this group of farmers used to gain greater and preferential access to farming land and modern inputs. Just as the farmers belonging to the PAs were quick in labelling their counterparts that had joined the PCs lazy and advantage seeking, those in the latter category were adept at branding their critics as ‘too con­serva­ tive’ or simply as ‘enemies of the revolution’.12 Even then, they remained reluctant to organize the PCs’ second (walba) and third (waland) stages any time soon. If organizing these two stages required them to willingly relinquish their individual claims on the land for the sake of collectivization, that was exactly what they, like their counterparts belong­ing to the PAs, were unprepared and unwilling to do. In fact, what appealed to the small number of farmers that organized such PCs in the lake region was the first (malba) stage. See, for example, the various letters and reports enclosed in Ministry of Agricul­ ture – Arsi Nagelle: Warada Gebrena Sehfat Bet, Amrachoch, File No. A4. See also Alemneh Dejene, 1987: 76. 11 Interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001. For a poetic account of the same phenomenon in Gojjam, see Getie Gelaye, 2000. 12 Interviews: Yerga Walda Gabrel, Daqabora, 22 May 2001. See also Ministry of Agriculture – Shashamane: Atakalay Maraja, File No. 1. 10

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As the available evidence from Shashamane County suggests, the tensions that had existed between these two groups of farmers were palpable. This is not surprising because it was in fact by uprooting and relocating some of the farmers belonging to the PAs and by appropriating portions of the commons for the same purposes that MoA officials were able to organize uninterrupted places for the PCs in the first place.13 Unlike their counterparts, those that organized PCs were entitled by law to enjoy also preferential access to modern inputs.14 If that was one of the strategies that MoA officials embraced to entice farmers to join the PCs voluntarily, their actions had nonetheless the unintended consequence of exacerbating the tensions and animosities that were developing between the two groups of farmers already mentioned.15 Outside the jurisdiction of the MoA, the PAs and the PCs, although not necessarily out of their gaze, were the enclosures that remained under state control. These included the Adami Tullu cattle ranch, the Abijata Shalla national park, the forest reserves of eastern Arsi Nagelle and Wondo Genet and the fields of crop research and experimentation that had proliferated in the outskirts of Debre Zeit and Awasa towns in the previous decades. These enclosures were not only large in size but they remained also inaccessible to the local farmers throughout the revolution years. The case of the commons was at once similar and different from the enclosures in certain notable ways. On the one hand, their presence suggested the local farmers’ renewed interest in preserving and utilizing such commons for the purpose of livestock production. On the other hand, these were the properties that became one of the primary targets of the officially sanctioned land measurement and redistribution practices of the post-1975 period. In addition, some of these commons became also the focal points of the various environmental conservation projects, such as tree planting that the Ethiopian state sought to undertake in a campaign mould beginning in the mid-1980s. As shown later in this chapter in some detail, the impact that these practices had on that region’s pasture fields was considerable.

COMMANDING AND COMMERCIALIZING A FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN Next only to agricultural land and farming populations, the food supply chain was what the Derg had sought to bring under its direct command and supervision right from the outset. In some ways, the military adminis­ tration’s interest in that supply chain was a continuation of past practices. As shown in the previous chapters, food was, in fact, one of the major resources that the administrations that preceded it (including the Italian Interview: Mamo Estifo, Shashamane, 23 June 2001. Ministry of Agriculture, 1979. 15 Interview: Mamo Estifo, Shashamane, 23 June 2001. 13 14

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colonial) tried to exact from local farmers by one means or another. While such continuities were important, the Derg’s politics of food had also its own unique characteristics and objectives, by-products of a number of interacting factors that were also unique to this period. Noteworthy among these were the two major famines that struck many parts of Ethiopia in 1973/1974 and 1984/85, whose impact on the Derg’s politics of food was beyond comparison. No less consequential had been also the many wars that the Derg had fought with insurgent groups; the huge army that it had organized for that purpose; and its interest in using food as a political weapon both in the urban and rural areas. Perhaps the best way to understand the Derg’s new-found politics of food may be to look at the institutions that grew in its wake. These included the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) and the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) that became official in 1975 and 1977, respectively.16 As its name implies, the RRC’s major responsibility included the gathering, accumulation and distribution of relief food materials to famished populations, whose numbers continued to grow and multiply as the revolution progressed. The RRC may have been a household name in the parts of the country where the frequency and level of severity of famines remained the highest. However, in the lake region the Commission revealed itself by its absence rather than by its presence.17 Likewise, ecology defined the AMC’s horizons almost everywhere. Therefore, in geographic terms the Corporation remained active only in certain parts of the country. These included the predominantly grainand oilseed-producing parts of Gondar, Gojjam, Shewa, Wollega, Arsi and Bale. Outside of the AMC’s purview and jurisdiction had been the war-torn regions of Tigray and Eritrea, the parts of the country where livestock production remained the dominant activity, and those that specialized in the production of perennial (as opposed to annual) crops, such as enset, coffee and khat.18 As the works of several scholars have revealed, the AMC’s policies and actions had a deleterious effect in the performance of Ethiopia’s food market.19 Despite the financial and political support that it had garnered from the Ethiopian state, the AMC was not, however, able to bring the domestic food market under its total control and jurisdiction at any time On the history of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), see Shimelis Adugna, 2005; YaErdata Mastababaryana, 1975. On the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC)’s establishment, see Negarit Gazeta, No. 112, 1977. For a general discussion on the AMC and its activities at the national scale, see Mulumebet Mitiku, 1994. 17 According to one of my informants, the RRC was able to distribute relief food materials to needy populations in the lake region’s central part and the neighbouring areas at the time of the 1984/1985 drought and famine. Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. 18 Ersha Sabel, 1990. 19 Franzel et al., 1989; Alemayehu Lirenso, 1987: 32-65. 16

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in its history. This was mainly because of the competition that it faced from the independent group of grain traders right from the outset. To be sure, the challenges that this group of traders faced in this era of command economy were huge. Labelled as ‘greedy merchants’, some among them, most notably those specializing in the marketing of some of the most coveted products, such as tef and chilli peppers, were among those that faced severe criticism and punishment both in the government-controlled media and the military-like tribunals that started to proliferate in the urban areas in the first several years of the revolution.20 However, they and the alternative networks of food supply that they had organized proved resilient.21 The best evidence to that argument comes from Addis Ababa’s ehel baranda and its counterparts scattered around urban Ethiopia that continued to perform almost as before. Furthermore, the revolution years witnessed also the propagation in most parts of urban Ethiopia (including Addis Ababa) of makeshift produce and commodities markets called gullet on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The fact that there were now many players in the marketplaces meant that no one institution or group was able to completely monopolize and to dominate Ethiopia’s food supply chain anytime in the revolution years. If anything these years witnessed the supply chain’s bifurcation along clearly discernable lines. As shown later in this chapter, the restructuring of the food supply chain was one of the factors that contributed to the relatively different direction that the organization of production and exchange took in the lake region during this period. Likewise, the impact that the changing state of the politics and practice of agricultural development had on that region’s agriculture was considerable.

REFRAMING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT Given its huge appetite for food, the little attention that the Derg chose to give to agricultural development was surprising. This was particularly true for the first ten years of the revolution, when agricultural development programmes became rarities in Ethiopia. The only major exceptions were Arsi, where the Derg was able to organize a successor programme to CADU that bore the name Arsi Rural Development Unit (ARDU), and the small number of livestock development centres that remained in place and that continued to function almost as before.22 To its credit, the Derg was able to multiply the number of modern crop research and development centres in Ethiopia by a factor of three (from My summary here is based on evidence acquired from a number of grain traders in Addis Ababa and Shashamane. Interviews: Feqadu Tadasa, Shashamane, 16 July 2010; Shisama Birada, Addis Ababa, 17 July 1999. 21 Interviews: Feqadu Tadasa, Shashamane, 16 July 2010; Shisama Birada, Addis Ababa, 17 July 1999. 22 Cohen, 1987: 178-84. See also Ministry of Agriculture, 1984. 20

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eight to 24) in the decade after 1979.23 While that was an important achievement, rarely was, however, that growth in number matched by substantive changes in the centres’ inner workings and organization. For example, contrary to their predecessors that received significant amounts of financial and technical support from international sources, the crop research and development centres that the Derg organized functioned with only meagre resources. Likewise, their personnel comprised fresh college graduates that had very little experience and expertise in plant breeding. In terms of objectives and their targeted clientele as well, the crop research and development centres of the revolution years turned out to be markedly different from their predecessors. In fact, the majority focused on the development of improved coffee and tea varieties rather than food crops. Even though some among these centres continued to specialize in food crops, their major clientele turned out to be the small number of state farms and PCs of the revolution years.24 The situation started to change significantly after the subsidence of the 1984/85 famine.25 This year coincided with the revolution’s tenth anniversary and the Derg’s mutation from a military into an ostensibly civilian administration under the guise of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Interestingly, it was at the conclusion of the WPE’s founding congress in Addis Ababa in 1985 that Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam’s administration promulgated its first and only ten-year development plan with equal haste and urgency.26 Like its predecessors, namely the three five-year development plans that Haile Selassie’s administration had successively promulgated after 1957, Mengistu’s ten-year plan was overly ambitious. Yet unlike the first ten years of the revolution, when most of the focus was on restructuring the existing relations of production, now his administration was willing and ready to entertain and to embrace alternative ideas and strategies on matters pertaining to agricultural development. The result was the administration’s adoption of a total of four different yet interrelated initiatives that became the foundation of the ten-year development plan already mentioned. These initiatives included villagization, agricultural extension, environmental (soil and water) conservation and resettlement.27 Mengistu borrowed his ideas about villagization from Tanzania, where President Julius Nyerere had been doing the same for over a decade. On the location of these research stations and sub-stations, see Tennaissie, 1985: 18. On their activities, see Ministry of Agriculture, 1986: 3-16. See also Desta Hamito, 1982. 24 Ministry of Agriculture, 1994: 3-16. 25 Jansson et al., 1987; Kaplan, 1988; Clay and Holcomb, 1986. 26 National Committee for Central Planning, 1985. 27 Because of their greater application in the lake region, my discussion focuses on only the first two initiatives. For a useful discussion of Mengistu’s environmental conservation policies and actions, see Hoben, 1996. On resettlement, see Pank­ hurst, A., 1992. 23

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Villagization appealed to Mengistu because of its presumed relevance for bringing about meaningful agricultural and social change and trans­ formation in rural Ethiopia roughly the same way as the land-reform edict had done in 1975. In addition, villagization was meant to correct some of the underlying problems in the country’s agriculture that the land-reform edict was unable to address in a satisfactory manner. Among these, certainly the most important to Mengistu’s administration had been the kind of ‘land fragmentation’ that the land-reform edict had inadvertently encouraged, particularly in the densely populated parts of the country. Also worrisome to his administration was the ‘fragmentation’ of the farmers’ villages such that it had proved difficult for the state to organize and conduct meaningful development and modernization programmes in rural Ethiopia, as needed. In short, villagization was the strategy that Mengistu’s administration embraced for the purpose of restructuring, regrouping and modernizing rural places and farmer villages according to certain preconceived ideas and priorities.28 As an institution in charge of that task, the MoA was able to organize large number of farmers’ villages around the country in a matter of just a few years.29 This was particularly true in the parts of the country, including the lake region, where subject farmers specialized in the production of seasonally (as opposed to perennially) maturing crops. Numbers aside, the villagization programme was, however, anything but a success. In fact, it was highly unpopular among the populations that were now forced to relocate to newly organized villages without their consent. Furthermore, many a farmer in the lake region perceived villagization as a grand government scheme in land alienation. Their interpretations were flawed; they were not, however, without merit. If living on the farm was one of the strategies that these farmers used to affirm and reaffirm their entitlement rights on the land in the past, that was exactly what the villagization programme tended to deny them after 1986. As one of my informants remarked: ‘if the government had the power to tell farmers where to sleep, what would stop it from taking the land [from us altogether] when it pleased?’30 Somewhat different was the view expressed by the second informant. According to him, villagization was ‘probably’ the precursor of the ‘cooperative farms that Mengistu was fond of organizing around the country’ for quite some time.31 Interestingly, the things that Mengistu sought to accomplish with his villagiza­ tion programme renders additional evidence to James C. Scott’s formulations of legible territories, which is a term he used to describe the methods that most modern states use to make places and societies measureable and manipulable. Scott. 1998: 2-3. 29 Ministry of Agriculture, 1989. 30 Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 13 July 2010. See also Alemayehu Lirenso, 1990. 31 Interviews: Ababu Neda, Ada Liban, 22 June 2001; Alamitu Lecheba, Shasha­ mane, 25 January 2001. 28

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Aside from being controversial and unpopular, the onset of villagization had also far-reaching implications in the way subject farmers perceived and interacted with the government’s newly organized agricultural extension programme that bore the name Peasant Agricultural Development Program (PADEP). In structural and organizational terms, PADEP was an Ethiopian version of the travel and visit (T&V) extension programme that had been widely popular internationally since the late 1970s.32 Likewise, the World Bank was what became T&V’s major advocate and sponsor in Ethiopia.33 In the lake region, PADEP inaugurated its intervention programme in a total of three counties. These included Lume, Arsi Nagelle and Shashamane counties.34 The focus was on the promotion of the use of chemical (DAP and Urea) fertilizers and improved seed varieties of the major food crops, including tef, wheat and corn/maize by the participating group of farmers, whose numbers were expected to grow year after year. Included in that package was also PADEP’s interest in promoting agro-forestry – the planting at the farm level of fruit-bearing perennial trees, such as papayas and mangos – so as to enable farmers to combat soil erosion and water loss on the portions of the land already under their jurisdiction and control. On paper these were useful ideas. However, in practice their implemen­ tation did not proceed in the lake region as planned. This was mainly because of operational and technical reasons. Noteworthy among these was the subject farmers’ uneasiness about the intervention programme’s long-term impact on their entitlement rights on the land. This is not surprising because it was the rights to the land that they had to sign as collateral in order to qualify for the microcredits and the modern inputs that the MoA provided on an annual basis. That was a risk that local farmers were reluctant to take.35 The second factor was slightly different in that its origins were intimately associated with the confusion and the kind of disturbance that the onset and progress of the villagization programme created. This was Bindlish and Evanson, 1997; Benor et al., 1984. Ministry of Agriculture, 1988, 1983. First envisioned in 1983, travel and visit extension (T&V) did not come to fruition in Ethiopia until after the Peasant Agriculture Development Program (PADEP)’s organization in 1985. This was at least in part because of the disagreement that prevailed between the World Bank – T&V’s targeted sponsor – and the Derg over the conduct of the Ethiopian food market. The World Bank was among those that called for the market’s liberalization in that period. But this was a proposal Mengistu was not at that time ready to embrace. See Clapham, 1988: 166-7. 34 Gabra Yohanes Estifanos to Central Zone Agricultural Development Office, 4/4/81, in Ministry of Agriculture – Shashamane: File No. 341/P1/81; Kasahun Mamo to Debub Shewa Astadadar Akababi YeGebrena Lemat Mamrya, Zway, File Name, Mert Masadagyawoch 617/8/1/17. For national figures, see Agricultural Input Supply Corporation, 1988. 35 Interviews: Haymanot Mangasha, Modjo, 29 July 2001; Alamayehu Tilahun, Arsi Nagelle, 10 February 2001. 32 33

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particularly true for the first two years, when most of the MoA officials and the farmers’ focus had shifted to dismantling existing villages and organizing new ones from scratch. Aside from being time consuming, the whole enterprise revealed to the farmers the erosion of their power and autonomy in making long-term decisions on matters pertaining to land use and agriculture.36 When seen from those angles, the changes that started to take effect in the lake region after 1989 were different. That year was important because it saw the official or unofficial abandonment of the government’s ongoing interest in farm collectivization, villagization and grain marketing, all at once. Setting the stage for that change in government policy were the Cold War’s unexpected end and the crumbling of the communist bloc of which Ethiopia had been part since 1977. Interestingly, these were also the factors that prompted Mengistu to entertain the so-called mixed economy alternative in 1989, a mere dozen years after he had publically rejected it. Subject farmers were not only aware of the changes that were taking place in Addis Ababa but also they were able to take matters into their own hands in equally drastic ways. The best example of that comes from the speed at which they abandoned the forcibly organized villages and relocated back in their farms after 1989. In addition, the same year witnessed the farmers’ growing interest in participating in the microcredit and extension services that PADEP had reorganized in collaboration with the state-owned commercial banks scattered around that region. As records show, the total amount of loans that subject farmers took from these banks in the next three years alone was unprecedented in the lake region’s history.37 Interestingly, the relaxation of the credit markets and the growing availability and adoption of modern inputs by subject farmers was one of the factors that contributed to some of the changes that started to take effect at the field level after the late 1980s (see below).

THE VIEW FROM THE FARM If the factors influencing agricultural and agrarian change and trans­ formation derived from different places, their greatest ramifications were seen nonetheless at the field level. This was particularly true for cultivars, whose place in the farm underwent some meaningful change and trans­ formation in the revolution years. These cultivars can be divided into three 36 37

Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 13 July 2010. Commercial Bank of Ethiopia to Debub Shewa Astadadar Akababi Gebrena Mamrya Sehfat Bet, Ministry of Agriculture – Zway: Miazia 4, 1982 E.C., File No. Ma 3-39. See also Ada Liban Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ataqalay Maraja, File No. AMa 1. For similar developments in other parts of the lake region, see, for example, Shashamane: Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ministry of Agriculture, YaWarada Estatistiks, File No. S2.

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different categories.38 To the first category belonged the cultivars that gained significant traction in the cultivated fields after that year. These included jalapeños, tomatoes and onions, which, despite their relatively late arrival and their relative insignificance to the farmers’ everyday diet, were able to become nonetheless important niche cultivars in the lake region’s southern part beginning in the late 1970s. The second category consisted of the region’s oldest cultivars, including corn/maize, potatoes, chillies, lentils, tef and wheat, whose place in the farm underwent some major and minor change and transformation in the same period. The cultivars belonging to the third category included haricot beans and sunflowers. Setting these last two crops apart from the others was their quick disappearance from the lake region beginning in the late 1970s. To be sure, the revolution years were not the first and only times that this region’s farmers had demonstrated lack of interest in the production of one or more cultivars in the farm. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, that was, for example, what happened with sorghum in the 1960s. Yet compared with the haricot beans and the sunflowers of the post-1977 period, sorghum’s rate of disappearance from most of the lake region’s cultivated fields in that decade was not as dramatic. In addition, the factors that contributed to sorghum’s growing marginalization from the field in the 1960s were markedly different from that of haricot beans and sunflowers. In sorghum’s case, it was, in fact, the kind of competition that it faced from the newly arriving and quick-maturing corn/maize varieties that made the difference on the ground in that decade. The case of haricot beans and sunflowers was different in that their disappearance was induced by political factors. As export items, haricot beans and sunflowers were, in fact, the first tier of crops that the AMC directly targeted in the lake region. Subject farmers responded to these challenges by abandoning these crops altogether in a matter of just a few years.39 Somewhat different was the fate of the cultivars that belonged to the second category mentioned. These included tef and wheat, whose level of production in the lake region underwent some meaningful change and transformation at about the same time. As shown in Chapter 6, these were among the crops that had benefited from and that had underpinned the expansion of specialized farming in that region in the half decade after 1968. This was particularly true for Ada, Lume, Maqi, Maraqo, Arsi, Nagelle and Aje, where tef and/or wheat were able to attain that status fairly quickly. Strikingly, that was also the status that they lost in many parts of the lake region in the decade after 1977. An extreme example of that comes from the My discussion here is based on evidence acquired from various sources. See Koshe Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja. Shashamane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport. Zway Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ministry of Agriculture, YaWarada Estatistiks. Ada Liban Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ataqalay Maraja, File No. AMa 1. Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) archive: Lume Warada Gebrena Sehfat Bet, Amatawi Estatistiks. 39 Shashamane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport. 38

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Maqi River Valley and Maraqo, where tef lost the largest ground (over 50 per cent) in that decade.40 Even more spectacular was wheat’s rate of decline, which stood around 80 per cent in such places as Arsi Nagelle and Maraqo during the same period. If wheat was one of the crops that had benefited the most from the growing availability of modern inputs and the expansion of commercial farming in that region in the half decade after 1968, the setback that they faced after 1975 was what contributed to its dramatic decline in the following years. No less consequential had been also the pressure exerted on local farmers by the AMC, whose appetite for wheat was second only to that for haricot beans and sunflowers.41 On the opposite side of the crop spectrum were such cultivars as corn/ maize, chilli pepper and potatoes, which were able to gain significant ground in the lake region during the same period. Contributing to the resurgence and growing popularity among this region’s farmers of corn/ maize were a number of factors that ranged from the agronomic to the political. For example, unlike the previous decade when the crop faced tough competition from wheat and tef, now it was able to recover its losses and to become the dominant field cultivar in the lake region south of the Maqi River more than ever before.42 Also important was the unattractiveness of corn/maize to the AMC, which was, in fact, one of the factors that subject farmers took into consideration when making fieldlevel decisions after 1977. To these factors must be added its prodigious genetic quality and the kind of demand that the crop came to enjoy in the urban food market in the revolution years. Feeding that demand to one degree or another was, in turn, the growing scarcity in the urban areas of the major food staples, including tef and wheat that became even more evident after the late 1970s.43 Similarly, chilli peppers and potatoes were able to perform well at the field level for most of the revolution years.44 If these had been also among the cultivars that had faced tough competition from wheat, haricot beans and sunflowers in the decade before 1977 their growing marginalization or disappearance from the cultivated fields after that year proved important because it contributed to the expansion at least in terms of sheer area of the production of chillies and potatoes in, respectively the lake region’s southern and western parts. In purely agronomic terms as well, these two cultivars proved to be perfect matches to corn/maize, which, as already noted, was becoming the dominant field crop in the lake region south of the Maqi River after 1977. Also important had been the cultivars’ Koshe Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja. Ibid. MoA archive – Zway: Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWarada Estatistiks. Shashamane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport. 42 Ibid. Koshe Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja. Shasha­ mane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport. 43 Interview: Emat Essay A. Delnesaw, Addis Ababa, 12 May 2000. 44 MoA archive: Koshe Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja; Shashamane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport. 40 41

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unattractiveness to the AMC and the kind of demand that they continued to enjoy in the urban food market, whose impact on the farmers’ field-level decisions was equally direct.45 Interestingly, these were also the factors that encouraged a growing number of the lake region’s farmers to pay greater attention to the produc­ tion of a relatively new set of cultivars for the first time in their recent history. These included jalapeños, onions and tomatoes, which became important niche cultivars in that region’s southern part after 1977. The jalapeños were the first of this tier of vegetables to arrive in that region shortly after the revolution’s onset in 1974.46 Next in line were tomatoes and onions that attained similar status in that part of the lake region in the course of the next decade. According to my informants, the onions origininated in Wolayta, where they had been a major cultivar for quite some time.47 The tomatoes had a relatively different history in that their major promoters were, at least initially, the part-time farmers that started to organize peri-urban farms in the outskirts of Zway town beginning in the mid-1980s. From there, their production was able to expand in a northerly direction in the course of the next two decades. Their level of adoption was such that by the century’s end this part of the lake region had become one of the major centres of tomato production in Ethiopia.48 The picture one gets from the lake region’s northern part, namely Ada and Lume, is not any different from that of its southern and western counterparts already discussed. This was particularly true for wheat, whose production started to decline precipitously both in Ada and Lume after 1977.49 Compared with wheat, tef was able to retain its dominant position in those areas as before. Yet in terms of sheer area and total output, tef’s share in Ada and Lume’s agriculture showed significant decline after that year. In fact, the 20 per cent loss that tef registered in Ada in the decade after 1977 was unprecedented in its twentieth-century history.50 Compensating that loss to one degree or another were such cultivars as lentils, beans and peas, which gained significant ground in Ada’s and Lume’s cultivated fields in the same period.51 This was at least in part because of the cultivars’ unattractiveness to and independence from the AMC’s otherwise obtrusive methods of grain exaction that remained in place up until 1989. The implication that these changes and adjustments had on the state of the lake region’s agriculture was considerable. Perhaps the best evidence to that argument comes from the disappearance of specialized farming and the rise in its wake of diversified agriculture beginning in 1977. Diversified Ibid. Interview: Nini Abino, Arsi Nagelle, 13 July 2010. 47 Ibid. 48 Interview: Azmach Dalu Yemanu, Zway, 4 April 2001. 49 Interview: Ababu Neda, Ada Liban, 22 June 2001. 50 Ada Liban Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ataqalay Maraja, File No. AMa 1. 51 Ibid. Interview: Ayala Asagedaw, Ada, 13 June 2010. 45 46

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agriculture appealed to subject farmers for a number of interrelated reasons. Indeed, that was the strategy that they used to overcome the pressures that the obtrusive methods of food exaction that the Ethiopian state put in place had exerted on their agriculture for most of the revolution years. In addition, diversified agriculture was the method they used to override the different kinds of pressures that the growing scarcity of modern inputs, chemical fertilizers and improved seed varieties had exerted on their farm-level activities in that period. In both cases, it was, in fact, by focusing on the production of a set of cultivars that were less dependent on modern inputs and that they knew were unattractive to the AMC that this region’s farmers were able to overcome those pressures and challenges to various degrees of success. Noteworthy are also the changes that started to take effect in the lake region’s agriculture after 1986, which proved to be equally synergetic to broader patterns such as those already outlined. The best example of that comes from wheat, which was able to regain most of its lost ground and to become also an increasingly attractive cultivar to that region’s farmers for the first time in ten years. Contributing to the crop’s comeback was a couple of factors. These included the growing availability of farm credits and modern inputs and the food market’s liberalization beginning in 1989. Consequently, wheat was able to become the dominant field crop in most parts of the lake region in a matter of a few years.52 The only major exceptions were the region’s central part, where corn/maize retained that position, and Ada, where wheat failed all over again to overcome the competition that it continued to face from tef.53 In terms of land use as well, the changes that took effect in the lake region in the revolution years were equally dramatic. According to the official MoA sources and several of my informants, certainly the best way to understand that subject matter may be to measure the ratio of the cultivated to uncultivated fields. It is important to note that, like the many edicts that preceded it, the 1975 land-reform edict too treated all uncultivated lands, particularly those outside of the predominantly pastoralist areas, as vacant or unkempt. Because of that reason, pasture fields were what the MoA officials and the komite that worked with them targeted the most when conducting their many rounds of land measurement and redistribution already discussed. It is not by accident, therefore, that in the lake region pasture fields became increasingly rare, beginning in the late-1970s and early 1980s. For example, from Ada’s officially registered 161,056 hectares of My summary here is based on information acquired from various sources. See, for example, Ada Liban Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ataqalay Maraja, File No. AMa 1. Shashamane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ministry of Agriculture, YaWarada Estatistiks, File No. S2. Interviews: Amelework Engeda, Addis Ababa, 2 August 2010; Feqadu Tadasa, Shashamane, 16 July 2010. 53 Zway Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ministry of Agriculture, YaWarada Estatis­ tiks. 52

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land, pasture fields constituted only 3 per cent (5,395 hectares) in 1991. Conversely, the total area that the district’s farmers allocated for crop production that year measured 66 per cent (106,607 hectares).54 In the region’s western part, which includes parts of the Maqi River Valley and Maraqo, the pasture and cultivated fields accounted for, respectively 5 and 77 per cent of the available agricultural area that same year.55 The 13 per cent accounted for that year by the pasture fields in the region’s southern part that includes Arsi Nagelle, Aje and Shashamane County was greater than the corresponding figure obtained from the region’s western and northern parts combined. Yet their size was nearly five times smaller than the total area that subject farmers had allocated for crop production in 1991.56 Although not comparable, that was also the trend that had started to develop in the region’s central part particularly after 1986. Nonetheless by the time of the collapse of Mengistu’s regime in May 1991 most of the region’s central part, i.e. the swaths of land near and around the rift valley lakes, was still a predominantly grassland and woodland environment.57

CONCLUSION Like the three decades that preceded it, the post-1975 period permitted the expansion in terms of sheer area of crop-based agriculture in most parts of the lake region. The agriculture’s major promoters had been the smallholder farmers whose number as well as the portion of the land that they allocated for crop production continued to grow in size and proportion rather dramatically after that year. Feeding that process was, in turn, the new race for farming land that morphed into yet another level of intensity and importance in the wake of the implementation of the major landreform edict that the incumbent military administration (the Derg) had promulgated in 1975. The edict’s promulgation and implementation had far-reaching implications in the way subject farmers organized places, production and exchange at the local level. In addition, the same edict had the intended or unintended impact of bolstering the Ethiopian state’s power on agricultural land and farming populations. Indeed, its promulgation was what gave the Derg the power and the legitimacy to impose new regimes of food exaction on subject farmers after 1977. Subject farmers responded to the new set of challenges that they now faced in certain practical ways. Their renewed interest in bringing more land under cultivation was at least in part a product of the different kinds of competitions for places and The remaining 31 per cent were listed under the categories of ‘barren’, ‘forest’, ‘mountain range’ and ‘villages, towns, and lakes’. See Ministry of Agriculture – Debre Zeit: Ada Liban Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Planena Program, 115/2. 55 MoA archive: Koshe Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja. 56 MoA archive: Shashamane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport; Zway Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWarada Estatistiks. 57 MoA archive: Zway Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport. 54

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farming land that the land-reform edict had encouraged after 1975. This is not surprising because now as before, it was, in fact, by cultivating the land and by living on and off it, rather than by relying simply on the statesanctioned rules and regulations, that local farmers were able to assert and reassert their rights of access to agricultural land in the revolution years. The last chapter seeks to understand the forces and directions of agricultural change and transformation in the lake region after May 1991.

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8



Vicious Circle: Agricultural Development at the time of ‘Revolutionary Democracy’ 1991–2016

In Ethiopia the more things change the more they look the same. This was particularly true in regard to the politics of agricultural development and the rules and regulations governing access to farming land, which continued to evolve along previously existing lines after the demise of the Derg and the rise to power of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991. Like its predecessor, EPRDF was unrelenting in its efforts to renew and consolidate the state’s grip on agricultural land and farming populations. Likewise, EPRDF’s interest in making agricultural development a state monopoly and an avowedly techno-scientific enterprise had its origins in the previous half century. While these continuities are important, the period after May 1991 wit­nessed also the grafting of new rules and practices that had farreaching implications in the way farming populations organized places, production and exchange at the local level. For example, the impact that the renewed liberalization of the food market and the growing availability of modern inputs and extension services have had on the evolution of Ethiopia’s smallholder agriculture in the last two decades and a half has been considerable. A relatively new development in Ethiopia after 2005 pertained to the expansion of medium- to large-scale commercial farming on a hitherto unprecedented scale. This chapter situates these developments in the social space of the lake region, so as to understand the relatively new direction that agrarian politics, together with agricultural and environmental change and transformation, have taken in Ethiopia since May 1991.

OLD IDEAS, NEW TIMES If revolutions are products of ideas, the ideas that produced Ethiopia’s second revolution in May 1991, also had their origin in the student move­ ment of the 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, this revolution, like the one that preceded it, was led by a group of politicians that had subscribed to

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the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao at some point in their relatively long political careers. Specifically, the influence that the writings and deeds of the noted Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha had on the shaping of some of the ideas and policies of EPRDF’s long-time leader the late Meles Zenawi (r. 1991-2012) was profound.1 Furthermore, Meles seems to have tapped into the literature that Italian colonial officials and intellectuals had produced on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa over half a century before. Perhaps the best evidence to that argument comes from his interpretation of Ethiopian history, which was in fact an imitation of the Italian colonial perspective. Meles’ and his party’s rise to power in May 1991 coincided with the end of the Cold War and the crumbling of the USSR-led communist bloc, of which Ethiopia had been a part since 1977. Because of that reason and because of his realization of the unpopularity of doctrinaire MarxismLeninism in Ethiopia, Meles was ready to abandon some of the ideas that had propelled his party to power. His attraction to the doctrine of revolutionary democracy owed its origins at least in part to those factors. As a quick look at party documents suggests, revolutionary democracy’s underlying principles and objectives were markedly different from the Derg’s version of socialism.2 Yet when it comes to the important question of the rules governing access to agricultural land, both administrations shared a lot in common. Nothing illustrates this better than Article 40 of EPRDF’s 1994 constitution.3 According to that Article, ‘ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the state and peoples of Ethiopia’. That means subject farmers and pastoralists have only usufruct rights on the land. While ‘right of birth’ could invoke these rights almost everywhere, exercising such rights had to conform, however, to the rules and regulations that could be separately legislated by the newly organized and ethnically partitioned regional states called kilil (reservations). Except for a short-lived experimentation during the five-year Italian occupation period (1936-41), the organization of such ethnically defined territories is in fact an entirely new phenomenon in Ethiopian history. According to its proponents, the organization of kilil suggested Ethiopia’s metamorphosis from a unitary into an ethnically subsumed federal state. In theory, this metamorphosis was a welcome development because it suggested the decentralization of state power for the first time in Ethiopia’s recent history. However, in practice, nothing forbade the Ethiopian federal state and the ruling party from freely exerting their power and influence on kilil and subject populations almost as before. In regard to the important question of property rights, Article 40 has an overriding authority over all the laws, regulations and policies originating from each kilil. 1 2 3

Lefort, 2013; Vestal, 2012; Clapham, 2009. See also Young, 1997. EPRDF, 1999. For a useful study of governance and government policy on the Ethiopian economy in the 1990s, see Vestal, 1999. FDRE, 1995.

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Scholars have debated Article 40’s basic tenets and its impact on Ethiopian agriculture from different angles.4 According to the dominant view, state ownership of agricultural land have a deleterious effect on the farmers’ sense of security and productive activity. Consequently, they became major proponents of the idea that called for land privatization. To some, such an undertaking was a matter of urgent priority because of privatization’s proven propensity to provide ‘the strongest incentive for agricultural investment and the greatest flexibility for generating optimal farm size’.5 But to others privatization has also an equally important yet least appreciated social and political merit in that it provides ‘the first line of defense against the impunity of political elites whose capture of state power has yet to face an effective domestic restraint from an enfeebled civil society’.6 The problem with these lines of argument and points of view was not their speculative stance or their disregard for the lessons of Ethiopian history. Rather, the problem was their incompatibility with EPRDF’s underlying political philosophy and objectives. Chief among these was the ruling party’s overarching interest in reconstructing the Ethiopian state and society along rigidly defined ethnic or tribal lines. When seen from that angle, any policy that encourages private ownership of land and by extension the expansion of the land market was counter-productive and antagonistic to EPRDF’s overarching politics of space. For that reason the party’s leadership remained highly suspicious of and fiercely opposed to the economic-centred ideas that advocated the privatization of agricultural land in Ethiopia both in the short and long terms. Unlike that on agricultural land, EPRDF’s policy on agricultural products has been pro-market. Initially, the focus was on undoing and dismantling the laws and the institutions of the command economy of the Derg era. First in that list of targeted institutions was the already fabled Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC), which underwent major restructuring after 1993. Renamed the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), that institution became a shadow of its past almost in every respect. In fact by the time of its merger with the Ethiopian Oil Seeds and Pulses Export Corporation in 1999, EGTE’s market share (estimated at less than 4 per cent) stood at par with that of the Ethiopian Grain Corporation of the pre-1974 era.7 If the dismemberment of the AMC suggested state withdrawal from the business of grain marketing and transaction, few were however able to predict accurately the direction that agricultural development programmes would take in Ethiopia after May 1991. In fact, at first EPRDF appeared 4 5 6 7

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See, for example, Dessalegn Rahmato, 2009. See also Berhanu Nega et al., 2003. Berhanu Abegaz, 2004: 315. Ibid. For a brief yet useful discussion of the structure and performance of the Ethiopian food market after May 1991, see Rashid and Asfaw, 2012. See also Dawit Alemu, 2011.

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to be confident about the stimulating effect that its market liberalization programme would have on the farmers’ productive activities and the food supply chain for many years to come. For that reason, and because of the time it took to consolidate its power in Addis Ababa and around the country, the ruling party was willing to entertain the idea that suggested the outsourcing of Ethiopia’s agricultural development programmes to a third party, at least for the time being. That may be one of the factors that ensured Sasakawa Global (SG) 2000’s arrival in Ethiopia in 1993.8 Funded by a Japanese billionaire and philanthropist, SG 2000 owed its origins to the devastating drought and famine that struck Ethiopia and the African Sahel nearly a decade before. Yet, unlike the majority of its counterparts that focused on relief and relief-related activities, SG 2000 and its partner, the Atlanta based Carter Center, embraced a strategy that enabled them to become active players in the area of agricultural development as well. Although accurate information is lacking, Jimmy Carter seems to have had some level of contact and relationship with Meles Zenawi dating back to at least the mid-1980s. That was the relationship that paved the way for SG 2000’s arrival in Ethiopia. According to SG 2000, certainly the best way to overcome the challenges that Ethiopian agriculture had faced in the past was to facilitate the adoption by smallholder farmers of newly developed Green Revolution technologies in the shortest possible time. These technologies comprised improved seed varieties of tef, wheat and corn/maize; chemical fertilizers (DAP and Urea); and herbicide that ‘needed to be delivered’ to the farmers ‘on time and at reasonable prices’. To that end, SG 2000 came up with a package that prescribed the application of 50 kg of DAP, 50 kg of Urea and 17 kg of improved seed varieties per hectare each production season.9 As a rule the trained extension agents mobilized by SG 2000 for that purpose recruited their subjects on a voluntary basis and based on certain criteria. These included the participating farmers’ willingness to allocate at least a quarter of their farm for the programme’s cause, and their preparedness to pay in advance 25-50 per cent of the cost of the modern inputs ahead of the production season’s onset in June. To many a farmer these criteria proved to be difficult to fulfil and so, almost everywhere, only the relatively affluent groups of farmers and those that had at their disposal relatively large plots of land showed interest in participating in the programme.10 Despite those differences, the programme’s organizers, extension agents and outside observers alike were encouraged by the trend that they saw developing at the farm level. In fact, they were bold in declaring their intervention programme as ‘extremely successful in demonstrating the Sasakawa Global 2000, 1996. See also Mekonen Getaneh and Yaekob Mersha, 1993; Ministry of Agriculture, 1985. 9 Sasakawa Global 2000, 1996: 2-4; James Keeley and Ian Scoones, 2000: 1 (quota­ tion). See also Mekonen and Yaekob, 1993: 11. 10 Howard et al., 1998: 1-4, 8. 8

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powerful impact that improved technology can have on raising yields and household incomes’.11 Interestingly, their assessments and SG 2000’s track record were among the factors that convinced EPRDF to revisit and revise its policy on agricultural development. Its Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES) was a product of these factors. When organizing PADETES in 1995,12 the government’s primary objective was to reclaim agricultural development and to bring it under direct state supervision and control. This is not surprising because, as history has repeatedly shown, agricultural development has proved to be a too lucrative and politically malleable subject to be left to non-state actors for an extended period of time. Yet in purely technological and methodological terms, PADETES’ goals from that year onwards were no different from those of SG 2000. The only major difference was that, unlike the previous two years, PADETES’ creditor, the state-owned Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), was entitled by law to collect 10 per cent interest per annum on the loan that it dispensed to subject farmers each year.13 As the evidence from the lake region suggests, PADETES was able to attract increasingly large number of farmers right from the outset. This was particularly true for the first six years, when the number of participating farmers in its programme continued to grow dramatically. Yet, in the three years after 2002, that number started to stagnate and then decline. According to several of my informants, certainly the best way to understand that decline was to pay close attention to a couple of interrelated factors:14 the price hikes and the price stagnation that came to characterize, respectively, the fertilizer and the food markets after that year.15 Complicating the situation further were also the farmers’ growing indebtedness and the draconian methods that Ministry of Agriculture officials now used when collecting credit arrears each year. These methods ranged from suspending delinquent farmers from the credit system altogether to forcible confiscation of movable property (most notably livestock) as collateral. Subject farmers responded to these challenges and the others in different ways. Some decided to lease their farms to third parties and withdraw themselves from farming for a brief period of time. Others, particularly those who could afford it, chose to abandon the credit system altogether. Yet, what appealed to the majority was a third strategy. This required subject farmers to be selective of the types of inputs that they wanted to purchase and apply in the farm each year. Consequently, many Ibid.: 41. Spielman et al., 2012. See also Abeje Berhanu, 2009. 13 Belay Kassa, 2003. 14 My summary here is based on evidence acquired from oral informants; interviews: AD, Ada, 19 June 2010; AN, Arsi Nagelle, 12 July 2010; initials changed due to the informants’ request for anonymity. See also Planel, 2014. 15 This was particularly true for corn/maize, whose farm gate price declined sharply in 2002. For more on this subject, see Rashid and Asfaw, 2012: 128. 11 12

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embraced a strategy that enabled them to abandon the improved seed varieties altogether while maintaining interest in the use of chemical fertilizers in the field. Even then, they were ready to reduce the amount of chemical fertilizers that they used by 25-30 per cent.16 These adjustments and improvisations were crucial because they rescued PADETES from collapsing prematurely under its own weight. It is against that backdrop that one can begin to understand the impacts of the intervention programme and its technologies on the evolution of the lake region’s agriculture during that period. This is an important point because adoption of the technologies was one of the factors that enabled subject farmers to optimize agricultural space and to maximize crop yield per unit area both before and after 2002. Consequently, in Ada, the average tef yield jumped from 1.0 to 1.5 tons per hectare between 1992 and 1998.17 Similarly, corn/maize yields in Arsi Nagelle and Shashamane counties grew from around 3.2 to nearly 6 tons per hectare during the same period.18 Yet, in purely spatial terms, no other crop seems to have benefited from these technologies and the liberalization of the food market the same way as wheat did after 1995. That crop’s level of production was such that, already by the end of PADETES’ term in 2005, it had become the dominant field crop in the lake region south of Ada.19

ENCLOSURES OF DEVELOPMENT In a confidential report that it prepared on Ethiopia in 2004, the World Bank was pretentious enough to identify what it called ‘areas of growth potential, where increased public investment in specific geographic and development areas might make optimal contribution to economic growth’ in the subsequent years.20 According to that report, these ‘areas of growth potential’ were relatively easy to map and delineate based on certain quantifiable ‘indicators’ of which population density and land use were certainly the most conspicuous to its writers. Consequently, they produced a development map that divided Ethiopia into four different and mutually exclusive parts or ‘agro-ecological zones’. Labelled Zones 1 and 2, the first two parts encompassed the densely populated and intensively cultivated Interviews: Shinbiro Koromango, Udasa, 8 August 2010; Tufa Turu, Dibandiba, 21 May 2001; Makonen Getahun, Arsi Nagelle, 12 February 2001. 17 Howard et al., 1998: 11. 18 Ministry of Agriculture – Arsi Nagelle: Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja. See also MoA archive: Shashamane Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Amatawi Riport. 19 The only exception was the region’s central part, namely the area near Lakes Langano and Zway, where corn/maize retained its dominant position during this period as well. Zway Gebrenana Gatar Lemat Biro, Ministry of Agriculture, YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja. 20 Quoted in Makki, 2014: 83; see also World Bank, 2004. 16

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parts of the Ethiopian highlands, most of which had been also PADETES’ loci in the previous decade. Located in the western and eastern lowlands, Zones 3 and 4 were very different in terms of their conspicuously low population density, their relative proximity to sources of water (namely major rivers) and their ‘undeveloped’ agriculture. These differences were important because they led the World Bank to envision two divergent strategies for the development of Ethiopian agriculture. These included the commercialization of smallholder agriculture in the first two zones and the promotion of large-scale commercial farming and of livestock production in the other two.21 To what extent the Bank’s report and recommendations were able to influence EPRDF’s policy on the future of Ethiopian agriculture, or vice versa, it is difficult to tell. What cannot be doubted is, however, their glaring similarity. This is a striking development because for most of the 1990s EPRDF’s leadership, if not apathetic, was certainly reluctant to open up Ethiopia’s agricultural spaces for large-scale commercial farming. Yet, beginning in 2001, that leadership was willing to reverse course and embrace large-scale commercial farming as a viable strategy for the development of Ethiopian agriculture along new lines. The best evidence to that argument comes from the semi-confidential document that started to circulate within party circles at the year’s end.22 According to that document, the time had arrived to revisit and revise revolutionary democracy’s basic tenets and objectives in accordance with the changes and developments that had taken place internationally during the previous decade. The document summarized these changes and developments in the language of market triumphalism and the triumph of the principles of liberal democracy on the world stage, which, it noted, had to be reckoned with if EPRDF were to continue as a viable force of meaningful change and transformation in Ethiopia. In regard to policy options pertaining to the future of Ethiopian agriculture, some of the points that this document discussed and sought to promote turned out to be different from the thinking of the past. Experiences of developed economies clearly show that as an economy grows there is a tendency for some small[holder] farmers to quit the sector and seek employment in other sectors. This implies that there is a direct correlation between agricultural growth and the role of private investment in the sector. This in turn means … a role change. The key actor in the sector’s development will be relatively large-scale private investors and not the semi subsistence small farmers. [Therefore,] the focus of attention should be on attracting foreign investors.23

This was arguably the most liberal of the documents that EPRDF’s leadership had produced to date. Although focused primarily on macro­ economic factors, it seems to also have had an impact on the future of Ethiopian politics. Indeed, the ideas that ensured the document’s Makki, 2014: 83-84. See also Fana Gebresenbet, 2016: 528. For an English translation, see MoFED, 2003. 23 Quoted in Desalegn Rahmato, 2011: 9-10. 21 22

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production were what also contributed to the opening up of the political space in Ethiopia in the run up to the May 2005 parliamentary elections. These elections were certainly the most democratic in Ethiopia’s recent history. Yet, contrary to Meles’ and his party’s expectations, the majority of the electorate, including those in most parts of rural Ethiopia, chose to cast their votes for the opposition. Unprepared and unwilling to accept a different outcome, Meles resorted to a campaign of intimidation, mass incarceration and mass killing that many an observer was tempted, with the appellation ‘Red Terror 2’, to equate with the Derg’s Red Terror of the late 1970s. But neither that comparison nor the criticism and condemnation that he now faced from many circles, including the European Union, were able to deter Meles from unleashing his two-pronged assault on the democratization process from June 2005. Distinguished by its draconian, extra-judicial and heavy-handed methods, his first campaign sought to dismantle the opposition, civil society and the fledgling free press all at once. The battlegrounds of the accom­panying second front turned out to be government- and partycontrolled mass media and international summits of various provenances. Discursively, one of the campaign’s primary objectives was to litigate, deride and caricature the theory and practice of liberal or neoliberal democracy and economic thinking in order to render it beyond repair. The campaign’s primary objective was geared to tarnishing and nullifying the theory and practice of liberal or neoliberal democracy and economic thinking, so as to set the stage for Meles’ new-found doctrine of the ‘developmental state’. That was exactly what his 2007 document sought to accomplish.24 In that document, Meles interpreted the modern capitalist state from two opposite angles, which he denominated ‘developmental’ and ‘rentseeking’. The latter was the term that he used to refer to advanced capitalist states in the Western Hemisphere that had built their economies based on the principles of laissez-faire economics and individual rights. The developmental state’s underlying themes and objectives were different from that in certain discrete ways. For example, in a developmental state, the ruling party and government have the untrammelled right and responsibility to play a leading and dominant role in the country’s economy. Moreover, the party in power draws its legitimacy and mandate not from elections and popular consent but from a political philosophy that is rooted in economism. In short, development was to the developmental state what liberty has been to its liberal counterpart. Therefore, in a developmental state, democracy becomes willy-nilly a bête noire, a nuisance and a luxury that can then be torpedoed, bracketed out and shelved indefinitely or until the fight against poverty has been won at some point in the future. Even though that moment of victory is hard to easily predict, it is nonetheless possible to measure the progress of development based on certain benchmarks. Of these, certainly the 24

EPRDF, 2007. See also Meles Zenawi, 2006.

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most intelligible and most attractive to Meles were the benchmarks that became synonymous with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) after 2000. In addition, his administration came up with its own benchmark that imagined Ethiopia’s graduation into a middleincome country by 2025. I took some space to reflect back on these two documents because the policies that they inspired and underpinned were what paved the way for the legalization of large-scale land transfers and the organization of brand new large-scale commercial farms in Ethiopia after 2005. These farms can be divided into three different categories. To the first category belonged the medium-scale farms that came to specialize in the production of cut flowers and viticulture. Geographically, these farms tended to establish themselves in the parts of the country that were known for their relatively reliable water resources and their proximity to roads and airports. But, politically, these farms owed their origin to the state-sanctioned policies and directives radiating from the first of the two documents already discussed. Likewise, the ideas espoused by Meles’ 2007 document were what paved the way for the organization of the second type of commercial farms in Ethiopia after that year. These farms were different from those belonging to the first category in certain notable ways. These included their huge appetite for land and their major areas of concentration, which corresponded to the World Bank’s Zones 3 and 4 mentioned above. In terms of crops as well, their primary objective was geared to the production of major staples, such as rice and wheat, and of biofuels, which they wanted to supply to the international market in large quantities. This is an important point because, in purely economic terms, the majority of the agribusiness companies that have ventured into large-scale commercial farming in Ethiopia in the last decade have drawn their inspiration from the global food and energy crises of the post-2005 period. Neither Meles nor the World Bank was able to predict ahead of time the crises’ onset and magnitude. But, like the ‘war on terror’, these crises proved to be a godsend for Meles. On the one hand, he was prepared to use these crises and the financial meltdown that precipitated the Great Recession two years later as evidence for his argument against neoliberal economic and political thinking. On the other hand, he was ready to tap into the investment opportunities that these crises and the recession had created internationally. In fact, his administration was one of the first in Africa to muster policies that turned out to be extremely attractive to transnational agribusiness and capital now in search of land for agriculture and investment in areas not linked to volatile equities and bonds of developed markets, such as those in the West. If land was what these investors had wanted to acquire the most in Ethiopia, Meles’ administration was ready to supply it to them at nominal or ‘give-away’ prices. Also enticing to this group of investors were the leases’ duration – from 25 to 50 years – and the

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tax holidays and related privileges that the Ethiopian state was willing to grant to them in the name of development.25 Misleadingly labelled as ‘heretofore unutilized’, the properties that Meles’ administration now enclosed for large-scale commercial farming measured around 3.5 million hectares in 2008.26 If the enclosures size was large and constantly growing, so were also the number and composition of their clientele. These included an increasingly diverse group of investors from different parts of the world, including India, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, Turkey, Italy and Israel, to but mention the most enterprising.27 Consequently, the total number of foreign-financed agricultural projects (both small and large) grew from around 400 to over 800 in three years, in effect making Ethiopia one of the epicentres of large-scale land acquisi­ tions (LSLAs) on the world stage.28 Also active in that scramble, albeit on a much smaller scale, had been Ethiopian nationals and individuals of Ethiopian descent repatriating from their adopted homes in the West, including the USA, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany, to do business in Ethiopia.29 Yet their level of investment and intervention was dwarfed by that of the Ethiopian state and the corporations that the ruling party organized under various guises beginning in the early 1950s. Although accurate information is lacking, these corporations numbered around 15, and their level of capital investment and intervention in various sectors of the Ethiopian economy, including agriculture, has been able to grow exponentially since 2005. Similarly, the state’s power and stake in the economy has continued to grow in leaps and bounds during the same period. This was particularly true after the promulgation of the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) in November 2010. The first of its kind since EPRDF’s rise to power nearly two decades earlier, this plan singled out the state’s major areas for focus and investment for the five years 2011 to 2016.30 These included large-scale industrialization, energy production and infrastructure development.31 Consequently, those years have witnessed the launching of an increasingly large number of mega projects worth billions of borrowed dollars. For more on this subject, see Dessalegn Rahmato, 2011: 14-16. Ibid, 10. MoARD, 2009: 11. 27 For more on this subject, see Dessalegn Rahmato, 2011: 13-14. 28 Deininger and Byerlee, 2011: xxxii. The last figure as reported by United Press International, 2010. 29 Wa Githinji and Gebru Mersha, 2007. 30 The Growth and Transformation Plan’s predecessor was the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). When embracing it, the government’s aim was ‘to lay out the directions for accelerated, sustained, and people-centered economic development as well as to pave the groundwork for the attainment of the MDGs by 2015’ (MoFED, 2010: 4). 31 The government estimated the plan’s total cost to be between $75 to $79 billion (MoFED, 2010: 4). 25 26

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Understanding the impact that the launching of these state-led and state-managed projects had on Ethiopian politics, society and economy is beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to mention only a couple of relevant general points. First, like the privately owned and managed commercial farms, these state-led projects, including the so-called urban renovation and rehabilitation programmes now underway in Addis Ababa and other cities and towns in the last decade have been not only capital intensive but have proved to be socially disruptive almost everywhere. This is not surprising, because the projects’ organization piggybacked on the assumption that has made dispossessions and deportations or relocation of subject populations to new places matters of only legal and cartographic importance. Second, these projects and the politics that underpinned them have revealed also the relatively new direction that the nexus between development, power relations and spatiality has taken in Ethiopia during this period.

DENOUEMENT As was languidly the case after 1917, 1937 and 1957, and more profoundly in the seven years after 1967, the decade after 2005 again witnessed the organization of an increasingly large number of medium- to large-scale commercial farms in the lake region. This was a striking development, at least in part because of the setback that large-scale commercial farming had faced in that region and elsewhere in the country during the previous three decades (1977-2005). The only major exception in the region was the farm that the Ethiopian-born Saudi billionaire Mohammed al Amoudi organized in the northern outskirts of the city of Awasa after 1999.32 One of the first of its kind to be developed anywhere in Ethiopia since 1975, al Amoudi’s Awasa farm owed its origins to the reportedly cosy, if not also politically entangled, relationship that the tycoon had established with Meles Zenawi shortly after EPRDF’s seizure of national power in Addis Ababa in May 1991. The tycoon’s level of success was remarkable because, as already indicated, for most of the 1990s official Ethiopian Government policy remained ambiguous, if not actually antagonistic to the organization from scratch of any such privately owned large-scale commercial farms in the country. Yet, from in the early 2000s, the ruling party was willing to revise and change their policy to be in favour of largescale commercial farming. Among the major beneficiaries of this change, 32

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When it became operational few years later, al Amoudi’s Awasa farm specialized in the production of tomatoes, onions, peppers, broccoli and other fresh produce, intended specifically for the international market. Presently, most of the farm’s focus has shifted to the production of major staples, such as wheat and corn/ maize. Very little information is available in the public sphere at the time of writing to reflect at length on the farm’s inner organization.

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certainly the most enterprising had been at first the agribusinesses that specialized in floriculture and viticulture. Sher Ethiopia Ltd, a subsidiary of Sher Holland BV, was the first to organize such a farm in the lake region in 2005.33 Its gateway was the 350 hectares of land leased from the Ethiopian Government near Zway town at a reportedly minimal cost. In addition to growing roses for the international market, Sher became, almost overnight, also the largest builder and provider of turnkey projects, including greenhouses, irrigation and central spraying units for the fledgling cut flower farms in Ethiopia. Additionally, the company became active in the importation and distribution of inputs and also in providing pertinent logistical services, such as transportation and storage facilities to farmers of similar vistas and interest. In the process, Sher became, by design or by default, one of the largest promoters of floriculture in Ethiopia during the following decade. Contributing to the sector’s growth and development were also a host of interacting factors ranging from the political to the economic and from the local to the global. Noteworthy among these was the Ethiopian Government’s new-found policy that sought to attract international investors to the country’s agricultural sector by any means possible. Made public in 2003, this policy provided lucrative incentives to prospecting foreign investors specializing in the production of so-called high-value export crops, such as cut flowers.34 These incentives included cheap land, soft loans (amounting to up to 70 per cent of the start-up capital), a fiveyear tax holiday and customs duty exemptions, to but mention the most important. Also attractive to this group of prospecting investors was the comparative advantage that they now saw in Ethiopia in terms of water resources, cheap labour and climate, which permitted the production of ‘high-quality flowers in diverse varieties in the highlands and at a range of altitudes’ in short order.35 Consequently, the decade after 2005 witnessed a dramatic surge in the number of cut flower farms in Ethiopia, from four to 103.36 Records indicate that, by 2010, foreign firms owned over 50 per cent of the cut flower farms in Ethiopia.37 Of these certainly the most dominant were Dutch firms.38 Likewise, the Netherlands is the major importer of the flowers originating in Ethiopia. Yet recently that market has started to slowly diversify and, in the last several years, Ethiopian grown flowers have found their way to other parts of the world, including Germany, Japan, Russia, USA and Scandinavia, as well as the Middle East.39 But, Ayelech Tiruwha and Helmsing, 2010: 48; and 44 for a useful discussion of the history of flower farming in Ethiopia. See also World Bank. 2004. 34 FDRE 2003a, 2003b. 35 Ayelech and Helmsing, 2010: 45. 36 Triodos Facet, 2013: 11, 45. 37 Ayelech and Helmsing, 2010: 47. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.: 44, 53. 33

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inside Ethiopia, the flower farms tended to congregate within a 180 miles radius from the international airport in Addis Ababa.40 Interestingly, the lake region was one of the places that quickly became one of the epicentres of flower farming in the country. Its degree of attractiveness was such that this region hosts the largest number of cut flower farms per capita in Ethiopia.41 Initially, the focus was on the plains of Zway and Debre Zeit, but recently it has been possible for the flower farms to be set up in such places as Qoqa, Awash and near Lake Awasa, where the government is building a new airport. Because of its dramatic growth and expansion, Ethiopia’s fledgling cut flower industry has been the subject of numerous studies. Yet most of the focus to date has been on a couple of economics-related subjects. These included foreign direct investment (FDI)’s contribution to economic growth, and the role of the cut flower industry in strengthening and enhancing local capabilities in commodity production and marketing in the country. These were, for example, the subjects that concerned the study that Ayelech Tiruwha Melese and A.H. J. Helmsing published in 2010. According to them, already by 2007 cut flowers had become the ‘sixth largest export commodity’ in Ethiopia.42 But when seen from the perspective of endogenization, which is a term that encapsulates ‘the progressive development of local capabilities and local control over an export base’, the sector’s contribution has been negligible. In fact, rather than promoting endogenization, the FDI-driven cut flower industry in Ethiopia seems to have encouraged enclave formation.43 Although not focused exclusively on the floriculture sector, a number of studies have demonstrated also the adverse impact that the expan­ sion of large-scale commercial farming could have on the future of Ethiopia’s smallholder agriculture, the country’s ongoing quest for food self-sufficiency, and the important question of biodiversity. Tapping the evidence from Gambella, one of the regions that have become major hotspots of LSLA and commercial farming in Ethiopia in the last decade, Fouad Makki underscored how the ‘shift from smallholder-based poly­ culture to a capital- and chemical-intensive monoculture is likely to accele­ rate biodiversity loss while shifting the burden of environmental costs onto communities’.44 In addition, he questioned how a development strategy that privileges transnational agribusinesses can ‘promote domestic food security or generate the much-needed revenue to promote diversification of the national economy’,45 either in the short- or long-term. Similarly, Dessalegn Rahmato was critical of government policy on agricultural develop­ ment. But, according to him, certainly the most important Ibid.: 45. Ibid.: 45. Triodos, 2013: 11, 45. 42 Ayelech and Helmsing, 2010: 44. See also Baumgartner et al., 2015. 43 Ayelech and Helmsing, 2010: 40 (quotation), 41, 61. 44 Makki, 2014: 94 (quotation): 95. 45 Ibid.: 96. 40 41

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question to ask relates to the ‘issue of land rights of communities and the state power dynamics that are intertwined with such rights’.46 He argued that in Ethiopia, as in other parts of Africa, the ‘global land grab will have had the effect of enhancing the dominance of the state at the expense of citizens and grassroots communities’.47 A number of my informants were able to reflect back on that subject matter to various degrees of importance.48 According to them, the incidence of commercial farming was one of the factors that have antagonized local populations. This is not necessarily because of sentimental reasons or because the smallholder farmers were hermeneutically opposed to any kind of commercialization. What made commercial farming a subject of growing resentment and opposition in the lake region were, rather, the contradictions and the ambiguities that local farmers have seen in the state-sanctioned rules and practices governing access to farming land. Of these, certainly the most controversial were two of the policies that the ruling party had sought to implement in that region and around the country after 2005. The first policy required the farmers to adhere to the land registration and certification programme that the government made official that year.49 The second policy was slightly different from that in that its primary object was the forging of new kinds of enclosures that came under direct state control and jurisdiction.50 Subject farmers responded to these policies in certain notable ways. On the one hand, they were ready to comply with the first policy precisely because that was the only way that they could once again renew their entitlement rights to the land. On the other hand, local farmers remained highly suspicious of the government’s underlying objectives and intent when it made such practices a priority all of a sudden. Complicating the situation further was their timing, which coincided with the election debacle of May 2005. Even more antagonizing were the provisions that made agricultural land de facto government property. The land leases that the second policy encouraged took effect in those contexts. To many a farmer these policies revealed the government’s renewed interest in tightening its grips on farming populations and future elections while, conversely, the ruling party was unrelenting in promoting the view that suggested the primacy of economic factors in the making of its latest policies and actions. According to that view, the most pressing problem in present-day Ethiopia pertains to poverty rather than to democracy.51 But Dessalegn Rahmato, 2011: 4. Ibid. 48 Interviews: Diliso Enboro, Koshe, 14 June 2010; Shinbiro Kormango, Udasa, 8 August 2010. 49 FDRE, 2005. 50 Interviews: TR, Arsi Nagelle, 11 July 2010; AD, Ada, 19 June 2010; initials changed due to the informants’ request for anonymity. 51 For more on the subjects of land registration and certification, see Deininger et al., 2008. 46 47

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that is the binary and the diagnosis that is being tested and vehemently challenged by the disenfranchised and marginalized groups of populations that are also in the majority.

CONCLUSION Unlike its predecessor, Ethiopia’s second revolution was a product of war. Yet, when seen from the vantage point of the rules and practices governing access to farming land, what has transpired in the lake region and other parts of the country after May 1991 was not any different from the situa­ tion that had prevailed in many parts of rural Ethiopia in the previous one decade and a half. That continuity notwithstanding, the post-1991 period permitted also the introduction and propagation of relatively new ideas and practices that had far-reaching implications in the way subject farmers organized places, production and exchange. For example, the impact that the renewed liberalization of the food market and the growing availability of Green Revolution technologies and extension services had on the evolution of the region’s agriculture was considerable. An equally important development in the decade after 2005 pertained to the expansion of medium- to large-scale commercial farms. To the smallholder farmers already present on the land, the commercial farmers were their worst competitors. This was mainly because of their voracious appetite for land and the manner in which they acquired it from the government. But, to the Ethiopian state, the organization of such farms was indispensable for the realization of its agricultural-development-led industrialization programme. If the commercial farms were to succeed, as the government wants them to, their success will mark an important turning point in the history of Ethiopian agriculture and the food supply chain. Yet as history has repeatedly shown, large-scale commercial farming had difficulty endearing and enduring in Ethiopia for an extended period of time. This has been mainly because of its vulnerability to the country’s serenely unpredictable political shocks and changes. Only time will tell if the twenty-first century is going to be any different from the past.

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Conclusion

As I was revising this conclusion, news broke out in Ethiopia attesting the ‘suspension of the issuance of new licenses’ in land lease for largescale commercial farming.1 Already by then the Ethiopian state had leased out, at a deliberately deflated price of on average $0.90/hectare, over 2.43 million hectares of farming land to a total of 5,700 domestic and foreign firms.2 If that rate tended to suggest the feasibility and efficacy of the government’s decade-old policy on large-scale land transfers for commercial farming, many of its clientele had nonetheless difficulty in ‘developing’ and utilizing most of the acquired properties for productive purposes in a prompt manner. From the same source, it is clear that these firms were able to bring under cultivation only a fraction (estimated between 15 and 30 per cent) of the leased land. Interestingly, that was the discrepancy that the Ethiopian state used as rationale, when it made the decision to halt the ‘issuance of new licenses in land lease’ for commercial farming effective 25 March 2016. To its critics and opponents, this was only the second time that the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was able to heed to popular demand and to reverse course on such a major policy matter since coming to power in May 1991. The first instance, they argue, can be found in the administration’s willingness to scrap the newly adopted master plan for Addis Ababa in December 2015.3 As the available evidence suggests, one of the master plan’s primary objectives was to significantly expand the city’s boundaries in all directions. This was a controversial move because as a veritable exercise in land grabbing the master plan has tended to jeopardize and undermine the rights and livelihood practices of the smallholder farmers inhabiting the targeted territories. Politically as well, the master plan’s adoption revealed the tensions and contradictions that had existed in Ethiopia’s ethnically 1

174

2 3

Maasho, 2016a. Ibid. Chala, 2016.

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subsumed federal structure.4 If that was the arrangement that had kept Addis Ababa under the jurisdiction of the federal state, administering the territories that the proposed master plan had sought to appropriate for that city was the exclusive prerogative of the ostensibly autonomous regional state called Oromia. When seen from that angle, what that master plan had sought to accomplish in these territories amounted to a direct infringement and violation of state rights. Interestingly, local and state-level politicians – some already implicated in the corruption that the booming land market had bred in the previous years – were among the first to unequivocally renounce that master plan even before it was made official. Their resentment and opposition quickly got the support that it needed from the rural youth and other groups of local society. The so-called Oromo riots that erupted near and around Addis Ababa in November 2015 traced their origins to these factors. When scrapping that master plan the following month, the government’s aim was, therefore, to cut these riots in the bud. Yet, rather than abating, the riots continued to reverberate in many parts of the country, spreading rather quickly. Their level of propagation and intensity was such that in Ethiopia 2016 turned out to be a year of mass unrest and political instability. Like the so-called Arab Spring and the Occupy movement of the previous decade, the riots that erupted in many parts of Ethiopia that year were peaceful. However, in a few instances these riots turned violent and they led to the wanton destruction of properties. Most vulnerable to that rage and that destruction had been the flower farms and the resort hotels lurking in rural Ethiopia. According to news reports, the rioters were able to destroy in part or in full at least two such hotels and a total of seven flower farms in late September and early October 2016.5 The government retaliated by imposing a nation-wide state of emergency, a sort of martial law that became official on 9 October 2016. When declaring that law, the government’s aim was to quell these riots by military means. Yet, rhetorically, the ruling party was unre­ lenting in promoting the view that suggested the riots’ external origin. According to that view, these riots, including those that had started and ended peace­fully, were not only illegal but they were also the works of a disgruntled group of diasporic politicians that had made use of social media to promote their ‘lost causes’ in Ethiopia by overt and covert means. But, as already remarked, these riots were first and foremost products of internal factors. In fact, they were, I argue, manifestations of competing politics of space that have metamorphosed into yet another level of complexity and significance in present-day Ethiopia in the context of surging ethno-nationalism, ‘millennial developmentalism’ and one (awra)-party rule. 4 5

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For a critical look at Ethiopia’s federal structure, see Assefa Mehretu, 2012. Maasho, 2016b.

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Conclusion

To echo Foucault, ‘space is fundamental in any exercise of power’.6 Moreover, as Henri Lefebvre insisted, ‘[s]pace as locus of production, as itself product and production, is both the weapon and the sign of … struggle.’7 My wager in writing this book was that the best way to under­ stand the causes and directions of agrarian and environmental change and transformation in the history of modern Ethiopia was to pay close attention to spatiality.8 Geographically, my study focused on the lake region, the predominantly farming area that straddles the bustling cities of Debre Zeit, Awasa, Nazareth and Buta Jira, in the north, south, east and west, respectively. Yet my approach was trans-regional. Such an approach posits the view that in the lake region even the seemingly most localized and spasmodic ideas and practices affecting land use, the organization of production and exchange and resource conservation were ‘translocally routed, not essentially rooted’.9 Accordingly, I traced practices from farmers’ fields and crèches to ecological niches, government offices, state granaries, marketplaces, centres of crop research and development and experiences of extension agents. Ethiopia’s farming populations often appear in the scholarship as hapless victims of state policy and the international economic order. This was particularly the case in the works of the scholars that had embraced the Marxian analytic of mode of production and the once popular theory of ‘centre-periphery’ to understand the forces and directions of economic and cultural change and transformation in the history of modern Ethiopia. This book embraced a different perspective. Consequently, it positioned the lake region farmers and their farms not at the periphery but, rather, at the centre of the debate on the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment. When centring the periphery, I was not subscribing to the notions of localism and nativism that have become increasingly popular in the ranks of the scholars and rights groups that have studied and debated the fate of ‘indigenous’ populations strictly from the vantage point of the pressures exerted on them by globalization and capitalism. As this book has revealed, neither of these forces was able to successfully submerge the farmers’ knowledge, interests and actions. In fact, more often than not, subject farmers were able to deflect, tweak and appropriate to their advantage the ideas and practices lurking in major centres of political and economic power. Therefore, agency underpinned my analysis. Yet my understanding of that analytic canvassed also nonhuman entities, including the micro-environment. As the book’s title indicates, one of my objectives in this study was to bring the politics and practice of food production and supply back to the debate on causation and change in the history of Ethiopian agriculture and environment. To be sure, food was not totally absent from that debate. Yet 6 7 8 9

Foucault, 1984: 252. Quoted in Moore, 2005: 20. Casey, 1997; Lefebvre, 1991; de Certeau, 1984. I borrowed the quoted expression from Moore, 2005: 18.

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more often than not it was in light of the crisis situation caused by drought and famine that most of the scholarship has tried to understand food’s place in the history of Ethiopian agriculture.10 Compounding the problem further was the special attention that cash crop production and exchange has attained in the scholarship beginning in the 1970s.11 Without a doubt, the production and exchange of cash crops – most notably coffee and khat – was one of the subjects that appealed to a growing number of Ethiopian farmers beginning in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Yet, when seen from the vantage points of land use and the percentage of the farming population, no other activity had concerned the majority of Ethiopia’s smallholder farmers as food production has done over the centuries. Likewise, the food problematic was what dictated the course that state policy on Ethiopian agriculture has taken for most of the modern era. Because of those reasons this book conceived Ethiopia as a ‘cereal’ rather than a ‘coffee’ republic. This book has I hope shown the important place that livestock production has occupied in the history of Ethiopian agriculture.12 The sector’s level of development is such that presently Ethiopia leads its counterparts in other parts of Africa in terms of aggregate cattle population.13 In addition, the market for livestock and livestock products, including hides and skins, is one of the largest in Ethiopia.14 Strikingly, the areas that had been important centres of crop production were also the ones that continued to supply most of the livestock and livestock products that found their way to the marketplace in the last many decades.15 How was that possible? To answer that question and, most importantly to understand the place that livestock production had occupied in the lake region’s agriculture, my interpretation has deployed the notions of diversification, co-existence and co-evolution. Contrary to the little attention that it has received in the historiography, this book paid close attention to also the history of large-scale commercial farming in Ethiopia. I have argued that in Ethiopia the sector’s development hinged on at least three interrelated factors. These included the expansion of a food and commodities market, the organization of a relatively distinct category of land that remained under state control and jurisdiction, and For a relatively recent addition to the long list of studies dealing with famine in Ethiopia, see, Alemneh Dejene, 1990. 11 For a pioneering study on the economics of coffee production and marketing in Ethiopia, see Teketel Haile Mariam, 1973; also McClellan, 1988. 12 But this has been one of the least studied subjects in Ethiopia. For useful excep­ tions, see, for example, Scoones and Wolmer, 2002. See also McCabe, 1986; Gryseels and Anderson, 1983. For a historically grounded study on the changing state of livestock production in Ethiopia’s central highlands and adjacent lowlands since the middle of the nineteenth century, see Getnet Bekele, 2002. 13 Gryseels and Anderson, 1983: 3. 14 CSA, 2014. 15 Gryseels and Anderson, 1983: 3-5. 10

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the influx of urban and international capital to rural Ethiopia beginning in the early twentieth century. The discussion has revealed the political, economic and ecological factors that have made large-scale commercial farming a potentially viable yet increasingly contentious and volatile enterprise in Ethiopia. Agricultural development was the other subject that concerned this book. I traced its history in Ethiopia to the late 1930s and early 1940s. In doing that, my discussion placed a corrective emphasis on the scholarship that had interpreted its history in Ethiopia strictly from the vantage point of Haile Selassie’s five-year development plans that lasted from 1957 to 1974. Moreover, this book has paid greater attention to development practice. Consequently, it has revealed the degree to which development knowledge and the growing availability of modern inputs, improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers, have contributed to the transformation of the lake region’s agriculture in the last half century. As Timothy Mitchell has argued, ‘the politics of national development and economic growth was [at its core] a politics of techno-science, which claimed to bring the expertise of modern engineering, technology, and social science to improve the defects of nature, to transform peasant agriculture, to repair the ills of society, and to fix the economy.’16 Yet, like most politics, the politics of development has also had its own local and localized vignettes and assemblages. In fact, that interface between the local and the global was what has dictated the course that the science, politics and practice of development have taken around the world in the postcolonial period. Among the factors that have contributed to the revitalization of development orthodoxy at the international level in the last two decades, certainly the most important have been the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that the UN and most of its member countries ratified in 2000 and 2015. Feeding that orthodoxy were two major assumptions. These included development’s problematization as an exclusively technoscientific enterprise and a belief in state power in bringing about the desired outcome at the country level. If these were the assumptions that had justified and legitimized the MDGs after 2000, the impact that the war on terror and the rise of China have had on the politics of development around the world was not any different. Like its twentieth-century predecessors, the war on terror has encouraged the securitization of Western aid and international development under new pretences.17 Similarly, the impact that China’s rise had on the bifurcation of development politics globally was equally profound.18 This was particularly true in Africa, where the Chinese model has become increasingly attractive to the continent’s new breed of autocrats and dictators. Mitchell, 2002: 15. For a useful discussion of that subject matter with reference to Ethiopia and other parts of Africa, see Fisher and Anderson, 2015. 18 For a general study relating to that subject matter, see Shambaugh, 2013; also Dawit and Scoones, 2013. 16 17

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Ethiopia is one of the countries that has benefited immensely from these transformations of global vintage. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the net flow of Western development aid and assistance to Ethiopia per annum jumped from US $2.1 billion to $3.56 billion (UK £3.82 to £5.86 billion) between 2005 and 2014.19 Although accurate statistics are lacking, the amount of cash that Ethiopia annually received from China in the form of direct aid and loan in the same period was reportedly one of the largest in Africa. Most of the infrastructural and related changes that have materialized in Ethiopia in the last decade owed their origin to these factors. Politically as well, the Chinese model was what appealed to Meles and his party, particularly after the election debacle of May 2005. Meles responded to that debacle and the setback that his party had faced in that election in certain dramatic ways. These included his denunciation of the so-called Washington consensus of the US Government and Bretton Woods institutions (with its economic policy prescriptions and ‘standard packaging’) and his endorsement of the alternative doctrine of the developmental state with equal haste and determination. Consequently, statism and economism became veritable state ideologies in Ethiopia after 2005. Meles seems to have learned most of his lessons on development from the words and works of his Chinese contemporaries and two of South Korea’s most accomplished and controversial leaders: Park Chung Hee and Chun Do Wan. Yet, unlike its Asian counterparts, Meles’ developmental state mantra foregrounded a power politics that is rooted in primordial ethnicity. If, as this book has argued, the enunciation of the doctrine of the developmental state was one of the factors that have paved the way for the legalization and proliferation of large-scale land acquisitions and of large-scale commercial farming in Ethiopia, their overall impact was not, however, the ‘asymmetrical integration of the mass of Ethiopia’s farmers into a hierarchically structured global agro-industrial complex’.20 Rather, the policy’s overriding objective was, I argue, the restructuring of the Ethiopian economy in accordance with Meles and his party’s ultimate aim of building the corporatist state in Ethiopia. Determining that state’s future, and together with it combatting at their source the inequalities that are lurching headlong into both the rural and urban areas, constitute the greatest challenges of our times. 19 20

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OECD, 2016. Makki, 2014: 80.

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ARCHIVES Ministry of Agriculture (Ethiopia) Addis Ababa: 44/4/2/2101; 31/2075; 2075/54; 44/4/2/2104; 2103/55; 238. Arsi Nagelle: Qu 117/70, 17; 221/76; Misoma Midhanii 3; Yanafta Feqad 17; Da 2; BaRa. 1; 235/AtuA80; Ri. 41; Kabt Arbiwoch; YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja Awasa: MaMa 6; MaMa 30; AaErLe 11; File No. A251. Buta Jira: Eta 31; E 52; Ma 41; Ri 40; 71. Debre Zeit: Amatawi Estatistiks; Ataqalay Maraja, File No. AMa 1; PePe 115/2; LeTe 16; MaAt 1-13, Ma 4; AzLe 22; Mert Mabalsagya, File No. 341/P1/81. Koshe: YaWaradaw YaAzreet Maraja; Amrachoch, File No. A4. Modjo: Amatawi Estatistiks; RaSa 15; Pa 7; YaYe 51; YaMa 18. Shashamane: Amrachoch/52; Atakalay Marajawoch, File No. A125; YaWarada Estatistiks, File No. S2; 154/78; 640/552/76; 341/P1/81; 698/552/77; 727/552/76. Zway:Aa 1/18; Aa 1, 1/4: 11;Aa 2-23; Aa 5-119; E 1-1; Aa 11; Da 52; Ensesat Mano, P 1-2; Ma 1-14; Ma 3-39; YaGebrena Zade; Yarsha Lemat Meleekt; YaWarada Estatistiks; 25-1994; Aa 1/18; Aa 1/4; 1; 11; YaGebrena Zade; W-60; Ma 46; Ma 47; Ta 37; ESa 113; Aa 125; 110; 26; Amatawi Riport; Mert Masadagyawoch, File No. 617/8/1/17. Ministry of Internal Administration (Ethiopia) Addis Ababa: 2075/54. Arsi Nagelle: 14 Buta Jira: 2/2; 2/3; 2/8; 2/9; 2/14. Debre Zeit: 1/54 Modjo: 440/58. Nazareth: 1/2; 1/3; 1/4; 2/12; 2/13; 2/21; 3/52; 3/74; 3/151; 3/176. Shashamane: 1/2. Zway: MaYe 1/55-64; 3/1; 3/2; 3/6; 3/117; 3/118. The Public Record Office (London) Foreign Office (FO): 371/7365; 371/12339; 371/16997; 371/18031; 371/27514; 371/27524; 371/31597; 371/31602; 371/31603; 371/31606; 371/31608; 371/35603; 371/36514; 371/36527; 371/41463; 371/41466; 371/41470; 371/4470; 371/46049; 371/46050; 371/53461; 371/53462; 371/63172. 180

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The National Archives (Washington D.C.) State Department: 475.00; 775.00; 865.01; 865 D. 01; 875.00; 884.00; 884.00I; 884.24; 884.6131; 884.6363.

SELECTED LIST OF INFORMANTS Name Age Place of Interview Abagaz Chure Abara Tafara Yadate Ababu Liban Abbabu Neda (W/ro) Alamitu Lecheba (W/ro) Alamu Gafarsa Alamu Tadasa Asmamaw Balata Ayala Asagedaw Ayo Dadi Badada Buta Badada Jare Badaso Dachaso Badaso Roba Banata Agato Baqala Ababa Tamrat Baqala Nado Bashir Kadir Bayissa Jalle Bayu Gudata Buene Abab Bune Batasa Buta Qaweti Dabashe Kebrat Dagale Maqiso Daliso Enboro Dalu Yemanu (Azmach) Damyo Toba (Azmach) Danye Terfe Daqaba Roba (Azmach) Dibaba Aletu Dichiso Tasama Edo Danisa Ensane Meta Esay A. Delnasaw Falaqa Gashaw Faranjo Ganato Galata Wariso Galgalo Chura Gamachu Kilole Gamachu Ramato

Bekele 01.indd 181

61 72 51 49 58 71 67 71 56 70 84 52 58 64 61 76 82 64 66 59 57 64 76 72 71 78 74 89 59 81 52 64 51 56 81 57 47 61 58 54 66

Zway Arsi Nagelle Dukam Ada Liban Shashamane Dire Sabata Menjar Ada Liban Tulure Mojo Hidi Qarsa Turg Dire Turufe Mojo Mojo Koshe Adaba Tita Dukam Abosa Adami Tullu Chabi Dadagnata Shashamane Udasa Koshe Zway Koshe Shashamane Zway Turufe Dibandiba Bulbula Abosa Addis Ababa Debre Zeit Turufe Dakabora Adaba Tita Ada Liban Turufe

First Date 5 April 2001 6 February 2001 1 July 2001 22 June 2001 25January 2001 12 June 2001 2 August 1999 21 July 2001 13 June 2001 16 May 2001 15 May 2001 18 June 2001 18 February 2001 14 July 2001 10 February 2001 19 May 2001 3 April 2001 6 August 2000 14 February 2001 19 June 2001 20 April 2001 6 April 2001 9 January 2001 24 January 2001 16June 2000 14 June 2000 4 April 2001 13 June 2000 10 January 2001 7 April 2001 13 February 2001 21May 2001 8 April 2001 14 April 2001 12 May 2000 16 June 2001 20 February 2001 1 June 2001 16 February 2001 24 June 2001 12 February 2001

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Gamada Buriso Gamado Bayana Ganaso Laqe Germa Tafara Germa Yehun Getachew Gabra Hana Gnamo Leenjiso Gudata Abamo Gudina Bayisa Hadeta Wayiso Haile Hadara Haymanot Getahun Hirpo Batale Hussein Hameso Kaba Gudina Kadiro Idao Ketsela G. Lante Lagasa Ayala Makonen Getahun Malaku Gabramaryam Mamo Estifo Mangasha Tantu Mangestu Alamu Nini Abino Nureto Hameso Raya Talila Salamon Yerga Shibru Kasa (Mamre) Shimaket Arga Shimales Takalegn Shinbiro Kormango Shisama Birada Tadewos Lachebo Tadewos Shano Tajudi Umer Tashoma Kasahun Tashoma Ture Telahun Duri Telahun Gadamu Tekeshu Areka Tikishu Lachebo Tufa Turu Tulluro Abam Tomba Agato Yaqob Marsha Yohanes Erdello Wayiso Saqaqo Wudu Aba (Imam) Yasin Ahmad Yerga Walda Gabrel

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61 54 57 56 39 58 77 52 83 73 71 33 53 64 71 59 69 76 44 72 51 72 65 63 61 66 42 65 67 44 45 57 59 56 46 36 67 62 50 57 57 49 74 58 54 52 58 62 63 68

Toga Arsi Nagelle Zway Zuria Jirru Mojo Zway Maqi Dakabora Qarsa Turge Adaba Tita Kuyara Mojo Chabi Dadagnata Hursa Adaba Tita Alii Wayoo Addis Ababa Dibandiba Arsi Nagelle Zay Shashamane Wolayta Moderena Alibo Arsi Nagelle Koshe Ada Liban Mojo Udasa Addis Ababa Mojo Udasa Addis Ababa Zway Zway Zuria Addis Ababa Arsi Nagelle Toga Hursa Shashamane Shashamane Arsi Nagelle Dibandiba Moderena Alibo Koshe Shashamane Koshe, Dibandiba, Moderena Alibo Gina Agar Dakabora

16 January 2001 23 February 2001 9 April 2001 6 August 1999 23 May 2001 13 April 2001 16 June 2009 24 May 2001 25 February 2001 7 February 2001 22 February 2001 15 May 2001 27 January 2001 22 January 2001 12 May 2000 9 February 2001 2 August 1999 17 May 2001 12 February 2001 13 May 2001 27 January 2001 9 March 2001 1 August 2000 11 February 2001 2 July 2000 23 July 2001 15 May 2001 19 June 2000 30 August 2001 15 May 2001 8 August 2000 17 July 1999 11 April 2001 11 April 2001 26 July 1999 12 February 2001 15 January 2001 13 January 2001 16 January 2001 29 January 2001 19 February 2001 21 May 2001 12 June 2000 20 June 2000 27 January 2001 12 August 2000 26 May 2001 17 June 2000 27 July 2001 22 May 2001

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NEWSPAPERS Addis Zaman. 28 Genbot 1940 E.C.; 16 Hamle 1940 E.C.; 21 Ter 1941 E.C; 17 Tahesas 1946 E.C.; 17 Hedar 1955 E.C.; 2 Genbot 1955 E.C.; 6 Sane 1955 E.C.; 7 Sane 1955 E.C.; 17 Ter 1957 E.C.; 8 Yakatit 1957 E.C.; 17 Yakatit 1957 E.C.; 20 Genbot 1957 E.C.; 2 Nahase 1957 E.C.; 23 Nahase 1957 E.C.; 19 Ter 1958 E.C.; 9 Hedar 1958 E.C.; 16 Hedar 1958 E.C.; 8 Tahesas 1958 E.C.; 13 Yakatit 1958 E.C.; 23 Myazya 1958 E.C.; 2 Magabit 1958 E.C.; 6 Magabit 1958 E.C.; 13 Miazia 1958 E.C.; 17 Sane 1958 E.C.; 6 Hamle 1958 E.C.; 17 Hedar 1959 E.C.; 2 Magabit 1959 E.C.; 20 Hamle 1959 E.C.; 9 Teqemt 1960 E.C.; 1-30 Hedar 1960 E.C. Berhanena Salam. 17-18 Magabit 1917 E.C.; 2-3 Ter 1920 E.C.; 27 Hedar 1921 E.C.; 17-18 Nehase 1921 E.C.; 26-27 Genbot 1922 E.C. The Ethiopia Star. No. 2, 26 October, 1941; No. 11, 1 April, 1942. Federal Negarit Gazeta. Proclamation No. 245, 2005. GlobalPost. 5 October 2010. The Guardian, 14 January 2016. Negarit Gazeta. 15th year No. 2, 4 November 1955; 24th year, No. 12, 21 June 1965; 29 April 1975; 45th year, No. 15, 14 December 1975; 47th year, No. 112, 30 April 1977. New Times and Ethiopia News. 26 November 1936; 7 December 1940; 21 September 1946. New York Times. 16 May 1952. Reuters. 8 October 2016; 25 March 2016; 14 January 2016. United Press International. April 2010.

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Index

Abbay (river), 2 Abebe Reta, 121 Abijata (lake), 12, 28; national park, 146 absentee landowners, 78, 113, 124, 129, 130, 131 acacia trees, 13, 43 Ada: contact with Shewa, 24, 30; crop rotation in, 27, 66; expansion of crop production in, 27, 44, 62, 64, 65; geographic description, 27: history of agricultural development in, 109, 111, 112-13, 164; Italian farming in, 47, 48-9, 111, 125; land grants in, 70-71; livestock production in, 27, 65, 78, 87; as madbet, 34, 35; road building in, 54; settlement history, 24 Ada District Development Project (ADDP), 111, 112, 115, 118 Adama, 11 Adami Tullu, 42, 71 Adamitullu Livestock Development Center (ALDC), 88-9, 146 Addis Ababa, 41, 45, 90, 175; debates on development in, 20, 104, 119, 120, 124, 152; food shortages in, 5, 39, 50, 56, 57; and food supply chain, 5, 32, 33, 34; food market in, 41, 45, 46, 50, 53, 55, 138; foundation and growth, 31, 50, 55; master plan for, 174, 175; population structure, 50, 55 Afaworq Gebreyesus, 50, 51 agency, 10, 176 agrarian politics, 124, 159 agriculture: in the scholarship, 2-3, 4, 5, 6-7, 8, 10, 11 agricultural development: in Africa, 104-5; in Ethiopia, 2, 20, 103, 104, 107, 148, 149, 159, 165, 178; in the

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lake region, 123, 164; in other parts of the world, 120, 178; politics of, 119, 120 Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), 163 Agricultural Development-led Industrialization (ADLI), 2, 173 agricultural extension, 7, 21, 84, 107,1 116, 49, 159 Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC), 147, 153-5, 161 agro-ecological zones, 164 agro-forestry, 151 agro-imperialism, 1 Aje, 23, 62, 126 Alaba, 29, 39, 63 Alamaya, 7 Alamaya College, 7, 105-6, 107 Al Amoudi, Mohammed, 169 Allied forces, 60, 73, 74 Aosta, Duke of, 58; agricultural policy, 58, 82 Arsi, 39, 41 Arsi highlands, 28, 37, 43, 109 Arsi Nagelle, 23, 54, 62, 108, 126, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 140, 151 Arsi Rural Development Unit (ARDU), 148 Awasa, 11, 90, 169, 176 Awasa Agro-Industrial Share Company (AAISC), 115 Awasa Community Training Center (ACTC), 82, 116 Awasa (lake), 12, 23, 39 Awash (river), 12, 28, 31 Ayelech Tiruwha Melese, 171 Babicheff, 45 balabbat, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 54, 93, 96

201

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Index

barley, 27, 44, 48, 49 beans, 44, 49, 62, 65, 134, 135, 137 Belate (river), 12, 133 Bennet, Henry G., 105-6 Berbera, 29 biodiversity, 171 biofuel, 167 Bishoftu, 11; and crop research centers, 65, 82, 83 Bishoftu (lake), 11 Bitter Lake, 75 Blue Nile, 2 Borana, 138 Borton, Richard, 136 Bretton Woods institutions, 179 Britain, 73; military presence in Ethiopia, 60, 74, 91, 100, 125 British Land Resource Division, 6, 17 British War Office, 61, 74 Bulbula (river), 12 Buta Jira, 11, 108, 118, 119, 176

camels, 9 Camilla Project, 109 Carter Center, 162 Carter, Jimmy, 162 cash crop production, as a scholarly subject, 8, 177 cash crops, 115 cattle, 9; in the lake region, 42, 44, 45, 63 center-periphery, 4, 176 Cerruli, Enrico, 4 n. 10 charcoal making, 89-90 chickpeas, 27, 48, 49, 64, 137 Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), 109, 148 chili pepper, 62, 64, 65, 134, 135, 137, 140, 153, 154 china, 144, 168, 178 clan, 23, 24, 25, 42 coffee, 9, 44, 63, 66,115, 147, 177; as export crop, 76; as a colonial crop, 58 Cold War, 152, 160 collectivization, 152 commercial farms, 124, 167, 169; geography of, 127, 137, 167; in the lake region, 46, 50, 169 commercial farmers, 21, 125, 128, 137, 173; in the lake region, 49, 53, 123, 129, 140 commercial farming, 1, 2, 8, 15, 20, 109, 125, 128, 129, 137, 140, 159, 165, 168, 169, 171; 172, 173, 174, 177-9 commercialization, 165, 172

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commons, 146 community development, 82, 100, 101, 114; trained specialists in, 82 Community Development Centres (CDCs), 82, 101 constitution, 91, 160 cooperativization, 144, 145, 150 corn/maize, 9, 49, 62, 64, 66, 81, 115, 128, 134, 135, 137, 140, 154; varieties, 83, 85, 105, 115, 116, 117, 119, 153, 156, 162 corporatist state, 179 cotton, 9, 83, 85, 124, 125, 126 court litigation, 93, 94, 131 cropping patterns, 86, 133, 134, 135; changes in, 153-4 crop research and development centers, 65, 81, 82, 84, 106, 148-9, 176 crop-rotation, 66 crop yield, 116, 117, 136, 137, 140, 164 cultural communities, 26 Cushitic, 4, 10 Daddaba (river), 12 dam building, 2, 12 Debre Zeit, 11, 108, 140, 176; and crop research, 82; urban growth, 90 democracy, 166, 172 Dessalegn Rahmato, 171-2 Derg, 7, 21, 141, 142, 143, 145, 157, 159, 160, 161; and food policy, 146-7; policy on agricultural development, 148 development, 1, 2, 20, 106, 169 developmental state, 166, 179 Diammonium phosphate (DAP), 116, 151, 162 Dilla, 114 dispossessions, 2, 3, 169 diversification, 78, 79, 85, 133, 138, 155-6, 177 donkeys, 9 Dukem (river), 12 Dust Bowl, 106 Ebeno clan, 24 economism, 166, 179 Egypt, 73, 75, 91 Ehel baranda, 102, 148 elections, 166, 172, 179 enclosures, 2, 34, 35, 47, 146, 164, 168, 172 endogenization, 171 enset, 9, 26, 44, 63, 66, 147

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Eritrea and Eritreans, 5, 74, 91, 92, 93, 125, 147 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 92 n. 32, 110 Ethiopian Grain Corporation (EGC), 99, 102, 161 Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), 161 Ethiopian National Corporation (ENC), 74, 76 Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 1, 7, 159, 169, 174; land policy, 160, 161, 172; and national planning, 168; policy on agricultural development, 2, 161-2, 163, 165; policy on the food market, 161; policy on large-scale commercial farming, 1, 2, 165, 169, 173 Ethiopian Project Implementation Department (EPID), 111, 118-19 Ethiopian Revolution, 7, 20,119, 140, 141, 149 European Union (EU), 166 extension agents, 162, 176 eviction, 109, 110, 130, 132, 133

factors of production, 10, 78 fallowing, 136 famine, in Ethiopia, 91, 147, 149, 162; in the Middle East, 72-3; in the scholarship, 7, 8, 177 farmers of urban origin, 19, 41, 45, 50, 59 farmers’ market, 137, 138 farming systems, 8 farm mechanization, 129-30, 132, 133 farm tools, 27, 61, 63, 78 fertilizers, 15, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 136, 151, 164; and prices, 163 Fertilizer Trial Program, 106, 107, 108, 109, 118 feudal paradigm, 4-5 Field Days, 84, 106 field technology, 60, 62, 63 finger millet, 26 First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP), 82, 99-100, 114 flower farming, 21, 22, 167, 170, 171, 175 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 6, 17, 80, 105, 108 food market: academic and political debates on, 51; expansion in Ethiopia, 41, 50, 59, 72, 75-6, 97, 128, 137, 139, 140, 177; inflation, 91, 98-9,

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Index 

203

128; in the lake region, 139, 140; liberalization of the, 7, 156, 159, 173; opposition against, 77; stagnation and decline, 91, 97, 163 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 165, 171 forests, 146 Foucault, Michel, 176 fragmentation, 150 gabbar, 4, 33; categories of, 95-6 gabbar system, 51-2, 57 gada, 24-5, 31, 38-9 Gambella, 171 Gebrehiwot Baykadagne, 50, 51 Germany, 73, 168, 170 Gibe (river), 2 Gidu (river), 12 Gimbo, 93 global food and energy crisis, 167 goats, 9 Gobana Daci, 31, 37 Gojjam, 138, 147 Gondar, 138, 147 Gotera, 102 governmentality, 10, 10n.28 GRAIN, 1 Grain Board, 102 grain marketing, 7, 76, 161 grain traders, 76, 99, 148 grassland, 42, 47, 157 Great Recession, 167 Green Revolution, 20, 104, 109, 110, 111, 114, 119, 122, 123, 162, 173 Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 168 Gruhl, Max, 42, 45, 46 Gurage, 19, 29, 37, 41, 43, 62, 63 gwaro, 79, 138

Hadiya, 63 Haile Selassie, 46, 122; and agricultural development, 82, 88, 91, 111, 120; farm in Ada, 46-7; food politics, 50, 52, 73-4, 75, 99, 110; land policy, 53, 54, 67, 68, 91, 94, 122, 125; postwar diplomacy, 75, 82, 100; postwar administration, 70, 91 Haile Selassie I University (HSIU), 7, 107, 122 Hararge, 138 haricot beans, 116, 117, 128, 134, 135, 137, 140, 153 Hassan Injamo, 37 Hee, Park Chung, 179

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204

Index

Helmsing, A.H.J. (Bert), 171 Herr X., 45, 46, 47 Holeta, 47, 125 Hora (lake), 11 Horn of Africa, 160 horses, 9 Hoxha, Enver, 160 hudad, 32, 33, 34 hunting economy, 28-9

Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, 7, 105-6, 107 India, 11, 107, 168 industry parks, 2 inputs, 21, 104, 112, 113, 115, 136, 145, 151, 156, 159, 162, 164 Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR), 116 Integrated Rural Development (IRD), 110 intercropping, 66, 136 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 105 Israel, 69, 168 Italian colonial administration, 47; agricultural policy, 47, 48, 56, 58; intellectuals, 4 n. 6, 10, 55-6, 160; officials, 6, 160; perspectives on Ethiopian agriculture and history, 4-5, 4 n. 10, 5 n. 13, 6, 160; policy on the food market, 59, 147 Italian occupation period, 4, 6, 47, 57, 60, 77, 160 Italian settler farmers, 47, 48, 49, 83 Italy, 41, 45, 56, 168 Iyasu, 50 Jalapenos, 153, 155 Japan, 170 Jiddo, 25, 31, 34, 38, 39, 54 Joyce, J. de, 60, 61, 69-70

Karayu, 28 Kenya, 69, 74, 92; as a source of seed acquisition, 64-5 khat, 9, 44, 63, 147 kilil, 160 komite, 143, 156 Kuriftu (lake), 11 Kuyera, 81

labour, 21, 43, 47, 52, 53, 63, 78, 84, 85, 90, 130 lake region, 15, 19; agricultural

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development in, 15, 83-4, 88, 178; altitude, 13; clans, 23-4; climate, 13; expansion of crop production in, 15, 41, 59, 60, 61, 77, 79-80, 85, 135, 157; flora 13; as a food source to Addis Ababa, 15, 34, 79, 140; geography, 11; history, 25, 30; land categories, 34; land market in, 126, 128, 130, 131, 140; languages, 23-4; as a pastoral landscape, 15, 18, 22, 40, 41, 42, 59, 60, 89; population relocations in, 36-7, 41, 43, 59; rainfall pattern, 12-13; as a site for flower farming, 171; soils, 13-14 land grant, 19, 20, 68, 69, 70, 92, 97; edicts, 67; in the lake region, 70-71, 77, 91, 93, 131; local responses to, 19, 60, 77-8, 80, 89, 94; scholarly debates, 72 land grant college, 106, 107 land market, 20, 126, 128, 129, 130, 140, 141, 161 land measurement and sale/redistri­ bution, 35, 36, 68, 71, 146, 156 land privatization, 161 land reform, 21, 122, 123, 141, 142, 143, 150, 156 land registration and certification programme, 172 land seekers, 70-71, 72 land tenure, 8 ‘land to the tiller’, 122, 141, 142 land use, 15, 60, 80, 89, 107, 156-7, 164 Langano (lake), 12, 13 Large-Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs), 1, 125, 167, 168, 171, 174, 179 League of Nations, 52 Lefebvre, Henri, 176 lentils, 64, 65, 135, 155 liberal democracy, 165, 166 liberation politics, 69 livestock production: history of, 8, 9, 61, 138, 177; in the lake region, 41-2, 43, 44, 63, 64, 65, 78, 87, 88, 177; as a scholarly subject, 8, 177 livestock vaccinations, 83, 88 Ludden, David, 11 Lume, 34, 39, 64, 65, 66, 71, 78, 109, 151; as centre of wheat production, 66, 155 madbet, 32, 33, 34, 35, 45,53, 138 Magna (tef variety), 65, 140 Mahtama Selassie Wolda Masqal, 16 Makki, Fouad, 171

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Makonen Habtewold, 74 Mantel-Niecko, Juanna, 53 manure, 63, 66, 78, 108,109 Maqi, 85, 118, 119, 126, 134, 140 Maqi (river), 12, 26, 39, 43, 62, 66, 85 Maqi River Valley, 23, 29, 37, 134, 154; expansion of agriculture in, 42-3, 44-5 Maraqo, 25, 31, 34, 43, 118, 126, 154 Maraqo (language), 23 Maraqo ridge, 23, 29, 37, 38; expan­ sion of agriculture in, 42-3, 44-5, 62, 140 Marcus, Harold G., 52 Marx, Karl, 5, 160 Marxism-Leninism, 122, 160 masa, 79, 138 mass unrest, 2, 175 McCann, James C., 8 n. 22, 27, 28 Meles Zenawi, 160, 162, 166, 167, 169, 179 Mengistu Haile Mariam, 149, 150, 152 Menilek II, Emperor, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39 Menjar, 65 microclimate, 63, 64 Middle East, 73, 75, 170 Middle East Supply Centre (MESC), 73 Middle Income, 167 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 167, 178 ‘minimum’ development programme, 110, 111, 118 Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), 6, 16, 17, 80, 102, 108, 119, 139, 142, 150, 163 Ministry of Internal Administration (MIA), 17, 70 n. 30 Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (MLRA), 17 Ministry of National Community Development and Social Affairs (MNCDSA), 101, 114 Mitchell, Timothy, 178 Mito, 23 Modes of Production, 5, 121, 123, 176 Modjo, 42, 53, 54, 90, 108, 140 Modjo (river), 12, 23, 42 Moore, Donald S., 10, 176 Murphy, H.F., 14, 15, 106 Mussolini, Benito, 4 n. 12, 6; colonial interest in Ethiopia, 52, 56, 58, 73

national domination, 5 n. 13, 38 Nazareth, 11, 28, 53, 54, 90, 108, 140, 176

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Index 

205

neo-colonialism, 1 neoliberal, 167 Netherlands, 168, 170 Nilo-Saharan, 4, 10 Nitrogen (N), 14, 106, 121 Norden, Hermann, 55 Norwegian Aid for Development (NORAD), 108 NPK, 14, 106 Nyerere, Julius, 149

Oakland Institute, 1 objects of production, 10 Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA), 60-61, 74, 92 Ogaden, 91, 125 oil seeds, 137, 147 Oklahoma State University (OSU), 105-6, 107 Omo (river), 2 Omotic, 4, 10 onions, 153, 155 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 178-9 Oromo (language), 22, 31 oxen-drawn plough, 27, 44, 63, 66 Pakistan, 107, 168 Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES), 163, 164, 165 pastoralists, 22, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 43, 44, 45, 60, 61, 62, 77, 88 pasture fields, 28, 146, 156-7 patriots, 69, 125 peas, 44, 49, 62, 65, 134, 137 Peasant Agricultural Development Program (PADEP), 151, 152 Peasant Associations (PAs), 143, 145, 146 perennial crops, 63, 66 Phosphorous (P), 14, 106 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to end Poverty (PASEDEP), 168 n. 30 Point Four (4) Program/Agreement, 83, 105 politics of food, 41, 50, 72, 73 population, 15, 22, 67, 69, 88, 143, 164, 165; mobility and relocation, 37-8, 43, 55, 70 Potassium (K), 14, 106 potatoes, 84-5, 153, 155 poverty, 172 power relations, 169

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206

Index

problem of the peasantry, 120, 122,123 problem of production, 120-21, 122 Producer Cooperatives (PCs), 143, 144, 145, 146, 149; in the lake region, 144; in Shashamane County, 144-5, 146 provisioning, 32, 39, 41, 51, 52, 55, 57, 74, 77 pulses, 138 qalad, 35, 68,131; conduct in the lake region, 35-6, 37, 43, 54, 68; other parts of Ethiopia, 36, 67, 68 Qoqa dam, 12 Qoqa (lake), 12

railway, 53, 54, 90, 130-31 Red Terror, 166 relations of production, 80, 149 Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), 147 rent, 20, 48, 51, 72, 77, 78, 90, 124, 126, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 138 rent seeking, 78, 166 revolution, 159, 173 Revolutionary Democracy, 160, 160, 165 rice, 167 Rice, Andrew, 1 Rift Valley, 12, 128; and lakes, 11, 12, 133, 157 rights groups, 1 riots, 2, 3, 175 rist, 67, 71, 78 road building, 51, 53-4; during the Italian occupation period, 47, 57, 69 Rome, 56 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 75 Rossini, Conti, 4 n. 10 Russia, 5, 170 Sahla Selassie, 30, 32 salt, 28 Sasakawa Global (SG) 2000, 162, 163 Saudi Arabia, 1, 168 Scandinavia, 170 Second Five Year Development Plan (SFYDP), 101-2 seed quality, 107 Semitic, 4, 10 Seventh Day Adventist Mission, 81 Shalla (lake), 12 sharecropping, 20, 72, 78, 94 share tenant, 20, 78, 95, 96, 122, 124, 130, 131, 132, 133, 140 Shashamane, 54, 62, 71, 108, 109, 126,

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128, 132, 134, 140, 151; crop research in, 82, 83 sheep, 9 Sher Ethiopia Ltd., 170 Shewa, 24, 27, 30, 32, 35, 41, 62, 138, 147 Sidama highlands, 24, 25, 63; agriculture in, 26-7, 44 Sidama (language), 23 Sidamo, 54, 138 Silti, 19, 29, 37, 41, 43, 62, 63 siso, 131 smallholder agriculture, 1-2, 20, 66, 80, 100, 101, 124, 130, 135, 141, 143, 144, 165, 171 Socialism, 160 Société d’Aide Technique et de Coopération (SATEC), 114 soil, 9, 13-14, 15, 22, 42; conservation, 106, 107, 121, 149, 151; erosion, 121, 151; management techniques, 62, 63, 66; science, 106 Somaliland, 74 sorghum, 26, 44, 62, 64, 65, 135, 137, 153 South Korea, 179 Southern Region Agricultural Development Program (SORADEP), 111, 114, 115, 116, 118 Soviet Union (USSR), 144 space: analytical elaborations of, 175, 176; politics of, 161, 175 spatiality, 2, 10, 11, 21, 40, 169, 176 specialized farming, 118, 124, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 155 Stahl, Michael, 128, 132 Stanford Research Institute (SRI), 6, 17, 111 state farms, 32, 149 state of emergency, 2, 175 state reserves, 38, 43, 47, 67, 68, 71 statism, 179 stick plough, 27, 44, 63, 66 student movement, 122, 159 Sudan, 69, 74, 91, 92 Suez Crisis, 97 sugar estates, 2, 124, 125, 126 sunflower, 84-5, 116, 153 sweet potatoes, 62, 64, 134 Sweden, 110 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 6, 109, 110 Tadla Dasta, 131-2 Tafari Makonen, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57

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Takala Hawaryat, 50, 51 tef, 27, 48, 49, 62, 64, 113, 128, 134, 135, 136, 137, 154, 155; varieties, 645, 81, 83, 84, 140, 153, 156, 162 Tekeze (river), 2 tenancy bill, 110, 120, 123 tenant farmers, 20, 112, 113, 122, 133, 140, 141; eviction of, 109, 110; 132 Tewodros, 31 Third Five Year Development Plan (TFYDP), 120, 129 n. 14 Tigray, 31, 74, 147 tithe, 34, 35, 36, 37, 52; rates, 34 tobacco, 124, 125, 126 tomatoes, 45, 46, 153, 155 Travel & Visit (T&V), 151 tribute, 5, 31, 35; exaction, 36, 39, 46, 53, 54; regimes, 34, 37, 43 Truman, Harry, 83, 106 Tuke Mama, 38-9 Turkey, 168 United Kingdom (UK), 168 United States (USA), 73, 75, 168, 170 Urea, 151, 162 USSR, 160

villagization programme, 7, 21, 149-50, 151, 152 viticulture, 21, 167, 170 Wan, Chun Do, 179 wara-ganu, 32, 33, 34, 53

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Index 

207

war on terror, 167 Washington consensus, 179 Wellby, M.S., 15 n. 42, 17, 30, 42, 45 wheat, 47, 167; adaptation and production in the lake region, 49, 62, 64, 81, 109, 128, 134, 137, 140, 153, 154-5, 155, 156, 164; as a colonial crop, 48, 57, 58; imports, 58; shortages of supply, 57; varieties, 47, 48, 58, 64, 81, 83, 84, 116, 162 Wolayta, 39, 62, 63, 90, 138, 155 Wollega, 137, 147 Wondo Genet, 146 Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), 149 World Bank, 1, 105, 164, 165, 167 Yilma Deresa, 75 Yohannes, 31

Zamacha, 142 Zawditu, 50, 51 Zay Island, 23, 26; agriculture in, 26, 42, 44 Zay (language), 23 Zeila, 29 Zekra Nager, 16, 34 Zequala (mountain), 27, 88 Zimbabwe, 10 zones of influence, 49 Zway, 23, 42, 90, 114, 135, 155, 170 Zway (lake), 12, 13, 26, 42, 45

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EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES These titles published in the United States and Canada by Ohio University Press

Revealing Prophets Edited by DAVID M. ANDERSON & DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON East African Expressions of Christianity Edited by THOMAS SPEAR & ISARIA N. KIMAMBO The Poor Are Not Us Edited by DAVID M. ANDERSON & VIGDIS BROCH-DUE Potent Brews JUSTIN WILLIS Swahili Origins JAMES DE VERE ALLEN Being Maasai Edited by THOMAS SPEAR & RICHARD WALLER Jua Kali Kenya KENNETH KING Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya BRUCE BERMAN Unhappy Valley Book One: State & Class Book Two: Violence & Ethnicity BRUCE BERMAN & JOHN LONSDALE Mau Mau from Below GREET KERSHAW The Mau Mau War in Perspective FRANK FUREDI Squatters & the Roots of Mau Mau 1905-63 TABITHA KANOGO Economic & Social Origins of Mau Mau 1945-53 DAVID W. THROUP Multi-Party Politics in Kenya DAVID W. THROUP & CHARLES HORNSBY Empire State-Building JOANNA LEWIS Decolonization & Independence in Kenya 1940-93 Edited by B.A. OGOT & WILLIAM R. OCHIENG’ Eroding the Commons DAVID ANDERSON Penetration & Protest in Tanzania ISARIA N. KIMAMBO Custodians of the Land Edited by GREGORY MADDOX, JAMES L. GIBLIN & ISARIA N. KIMAMBO Education in the Development of Tanzania 1919-1990 LENE BUCHERT

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The Second Economy in Tanzania T.L. MALIYAMKONO & M.S.D. BAGACHWA Ecology Control & Economic Development in East African History HELGE KJEKSHUS Siaya DAVID WILLIAM COHEN & E.S. ATIENO ODHIAMBO Uganda Now • Changing Uganda Developing Uganda • From Chaos to Order • Religion & Politics in East Africa Edited by HOLGER BERNT HANSEN & MICHAEL TWADDLE Kakungulu & the Creation of Uganda 1868-1928 MICHAEL TWADDLE Controlling Anger SUZETTE HEALD Kampala Women Getting By SANDRA WALLMAN Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buganda RICHARD J. REID Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits HEIKE BEHREND Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar ABDUL SHERIFF Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF & ED FERGUSON The History & Conservation of Zanzibar Stone Town Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF Pastimes & Politics LAURA FAIR Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa Edited by KATSUYOSHI FUKUI & JOHN MARKAKIS Conflict, Age & Power in North East Africa Edited by EISEI KURIMOTO & SIMON SIMONSE Property Rights & Political Development in Ethiopia & Eritrea SANDRA FULLERTON JOIREMAN Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia ØYVIND M. EIDE Brothers at War TEKESTE NEGASH & KJETIL TRONVOLL From Guerrillas to Government DAVID POOL Mau Mau & Nationhood Edited by E.S. ATIENO ODHIAMBO & JOHN LONSDALE

A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991(2nd edn) BAHRU ZEWDE Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia BAHRU ZEWDE Remapping Ethiopia Edited by W. JAMES, D. DONHAM, E. KURIMOTO & A. TRIULZI Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia Edited by DONALD L. DONHAM & WENDY JAMES A Modern History of the Somali (4th edn) I.M. LEWIS Islands of Intensive Agriculture in East Africa Edited by MATS WIDGREN & JOHN E.G. SUTTON Leaf of Allah EZEKIEL GEBISSA Dhows & the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar 1860-1970 ERIK GILBERT African Womanhood in Colonial Kenya TABITHA KANOGO African Underclass ANDREW BURTON In Search of a Nation Edited by GREGORY H. MADDOX & JAMES L. GIBLIN A History of the Excluded JAMES L. GIBLIN Black Poachers, White Hunters EDWARD I. STEINHART Ethnic Federalism DAVID TURTON Crisis & Decline in Bunyoro SHANE DOYLE Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa JAN-GEORG DEUTSCH Women, Work & Domestic Virtue in Uganda 1900-2003 GRACE BANTEBYA KYOMUHENDO & MARJORIE KENISTON McINTOSH Cultivating Success in Uganda GRACE CARSWELL War in Pre-Colonial Eastern Africa RICHARD REID Slavery in the Great Lakes Region of East Africa Edited by HENRI MÉDARD & SHANE DOYLE The Benefits of Famine DAVID KEEN

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BEKELE

‘...an important contribution ... [that] depicts in detail the pressures to which the local population was subjected by those seeking farmland from the neighbouring highlands. Yet, it portrays the target population not as passive recipients of these intrusions but as active agents negotiating new patterns of livelihood.’ – Bahru Zewde, Emeritus Professor of History at Addis Ababa University

Cover photograph: Oxen trample the cereal crop tef to remove the grain, lake region, Ethiopia (© John Warburton-Lee Photography / Alamy Stock Photo)

an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com www.jamescurrey.com

Ploughing New Ground

Getnet Bekele is Associate Professor of History at Oakland University.

FOOD, FARMING & ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN ETHIOPIA

FOOD, FARMING & ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN ETHIOPIA

In October 2016, the Ethiopian administration declared a State of Emergency in response to anti-Government demonstrations and mass riots. While the Government claimed the riots stemmed from subversive activities among large diasporic populations in the West, the evidence suggests that they were provoked by widespread internal dissatisfaction. Land deals by the Government with foreign investors, the building of vast hydroelectric dams, sugar estates and industry parks, and urban sprawl have put pressure on agricultural, rural areas. Today, dispossessions, drought and social unrest surround fears of the worst food shortages in decades. Examining these developments in Ethiopia’s lake region, the author shows how transformations in state-society relations and the organization of production and exchange have impacted on a population of smallholder farmers for whom agriculture is not only the mainstay of the economy but a way of life.

Ploughing New Ground

Getnet Bekele