Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: the Methodology of a Commentator 9780715635001, 9781472521460, 9781472521453, 071563500X, 1472521455

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius

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PHILOSOPHY AND EXEGESIS IN SIMPLICIUS The Methodology of a Commentator

Han Baltussen

B L O O M S B U R Y LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com First published in 2008 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. © Han Baltussen, 2008 Han Baltussen has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-0-7156-3500-1 ePUB: 978-1-4725-2146-0 ePDF: 978-1-4725-2145-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Contents Abbreviations Preface

viii ix

Introduction. Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity 0.1 Philosophy in Late Antiquity: eclecticism, syncretism and ‘post-classicism’ 0.2 Simplicius of Cilicia: life and works 0.3 Method and outline of this study

10 12 14

1. The Scholar and His Books 1.1 The author: philosophical and intellectual context 1.2 Scholarly pursuits: exegetical objectives and practices 1.3 A puzzle about location 1.4 Of books and men: Simplicius’ scholarly method

21 24 31 48 51

2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom 2.1 What we have thanks to Simplicius 2.2 Two views on unity and plurality: Parmenides and Empedocles 2.3 A special case: Anaxagoras 2.4 The unity of Greek philosophy 3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics 3.1 Succeeding Aristotle, understanding Aristotle 3.2 Teaching Aristotle: Theophrastus and Eudemus 3.3 Simplicius and the early Peripatetics 4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias 4.1 Two commentators, two traditions 4.2 Alexander the pioneer: exegetical format and style 4.3 Simplicius’ use of Alexander 4.4 Disagreeing with Alexander 4.5 The ghost in the machine and the making of commentary

v

1

54 63 68 78 84 88 89 91 104

107 111 114 121 129 132

Contents 5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration 5.1 A new Platonism: Plotinus 5.2 Harmonising strategies: from Porphyry to Proclus 5.3 Simplicius’ teachers 5.4 Two outsiders: Galen and Themistius 5.5 Platonist exegesis from Plotinus to Simplicius 6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology 6.1 Polemic and philosophy: a very brief history 6.2 Against the Christian Philoponus: defending Platonism or paganism? 6.3 Extensive quotation and disagreement: Alexander revisited 6.4 The rhetoric of interpretation Epilogue. Simplicius and Greek Philosophy: The Last Pagan Gospel? 7.1 The commentator’s craft 7.2 Simplicius on Simplicius: self-image and self-presentation 7.3 Exegesis and philosophy: a complex relationship 7.4 The methodology of a commentator: a final appraisal

136 140 147 158 166 169

172 173 176 188 193

196 197 198 201 208

Appendix I The ‘Library’ of Simplicius Appendix II A. New Evidence on Alexander B. Distribution of Alexander References in in Phys. Appendix III Sumphônia in Simplicius

211 216 217 218

Notes Bibliography Index Locorum Index of Names Subject Index

221 257 283 288 290

vi

For

RICHARD SORABJI ‘philosopher, poet and expounder of mysteries’

Abbreviations ACA = Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth, 1987- ) CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (Berlin: Reimer, 1882-1909) DK = H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds) Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1903 and many reprints) D.L. = Diogenes Laertius, Lives of philosophers (c. 200 CE) Enn. = Plotinus’ Enneads, Loeb edn, trans. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966-) FHSG = W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R. Sharples and D. Gutas (eds) Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, 2 vols (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992) in Cat. = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories in DA = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima (authorship disputed) in DC = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo in Phys. = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics KRS = G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) SVF = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-24) TLG = Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, searchable database on CD-ROM and online V.Plot. = Vita Plotini, ‘Life of Plotinus’, biographical sketch by Porphyry in Enneads 1 V.Procl. = Vita Procli, ‘Life of Proclus’, biographical sketch by Marinus Works of ancient authors (esp. Plato and Aristotle) are as a rule given according to the form used in LSJ = Liddell-Scott-Jones, Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford).

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Preface This study offers an general assessment of the nature and purpose of the works of Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 480-c. 540 CE), a Platonist author of late antiquity. I came to this body of writings while studying the transmission of Greek philosophical views. I went looking for a convenient study on the sources, approach and methodology of Simplicius. Alas, such a study did not exist in English or any other language. With the ever increasing production in recent times of monographs and articles on the Platonism of Late Antiquity and a growing interest in the formal features of these texts, I decided the time was ripe for an accessible book on Simplicius. This investigation, then, is the response to a genuine desideratum: it aims to present Simplicius’ methodology in a comprehensive account and in the best possible light in order to enhance our understanding of his value as a scholar, exegete and philosopher. To write a scholarly book on an ancient commentator in this day and age may seem unusual and perhaps old-fashioned, but meta-narrative and exegesis are still very much with us.1 Moreover, the commentaries fulfil a special role in the continuation of the pagan religious perspective and thus in the perennial debate on what constitutes the best spiritual outlook on life. Current debates on the role of religion in society have hardly quietened down and seem to tend in a direction opposite to that of Simplicius, who as a pagan was forced to come to terms with the dominant role of the Christian faith. The importance of Simplicius for the history of early and classical Greek philosophy and the history of the philosophical commentary is widely acknowledged, but only partially studied or understood. Many have written on an aspect of his work, either in the context of translating parts of his commentaries, or while evaluating the materials he preserves of Greek philosophers. Yet anyone trying to understand the nature of Simplicius’ reports of Presocratic and Peripatetic thinkers must obtain a more ‘organic feel’ for the choices and strategies in these remarkable writings. The important exception of a more focused investigation is the collection of papers edited by I. Hadot (1987). The books on the Categories commentary under her direction (2000-1) have also been valuable guides for this project. I could not have foreseen when I started work on Simplicius in 1996 and this book in 2002, that during the process of writing the study of late Platonism would experience such an upsurge, so that keeping up with new publications over the past few years has proved quite difficult.

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Preface The decision to prioritise work on Simplicius has slowed down another project (my commentary on Theophrastus’ doxographical fragments, for which Simplicius is a major source), but it is hoped that this ‘detour’ will not be seen as a distraction, but rather as a reculer pour mieux sauter, in particular for a better understanding of Simplicius’ interpretive strategies in handling and incorporating earlier sources. Writing this book has been an extended exercise in selecting from an abundance of materials. In it I omit much and pass over more than I would like (or like to admit), and it is hoped that the book will at least serve as a catalyst for more work on this rich source for advanced students, scholars and historians of philosophy. This book has a rather long history and even longer antecedents. Work on the sources for the Presocratics (PhD thesis 1988-1993) and involvement with a project revising SVF (J. Mansfeld and K.A. Algra, Utrecht 1993-96) had prepared me for methodological issues of source criticism, fragments and complicated relations between texts. Next I studied Simplicius’ use of early Peripatetics, especially Theophrastus and Eudemus, during a stay at the Centre for Hellenic Studies in Washington DC (1996-97). The project soon gained importance and momentum of its own, while I analysed passages in his commentaries preserving Peripatetic materials (Baltussen 2002b, 2002c, 2006). Discovering Simplicius’ value for many other periods of Greek philosophy opened up a new world of ideas, genres and schools of thought. I cannot claim to have acquired full expertise in all the areas I had to venture into – the subject matter of each chapter could have been a book by itself – but during my time at the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle Project in London (1997-2002) I was in a position to learn much more and faster, profiting from the work of others who had more experience in commentary studies and Neoplatonism. This period strengthened my resolve to pursue this interesting figure living in a crucial time for pagan philosophy. Three additional chapters took shape during my sabbatical in Princeton (IAS 2006). The ancestry of Chapters 2-6 goes back to Baltussen 2002a-b-c, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a (with thanks to Meir Sternberg, editor of Poetics Today, for permission to re-use material), and the introduction to my forthcoming FHSG commentary. Acknowledgements A book cannot be completed without financial support of institutions and encouragement of colleagues and friends. I owe a great debt to Richard Sorabji, a major force in ancient commentary studies, and a great source of advice and support over the years, during my years at the ACA project and after. David Konstan also offered his friendly advice and warm encouragement. Bob Sharples was always helpful in answering queries on Alexander (Chapter 4) and other matters. I gratefully acknowledge finan-

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Preface cial assistance from the University of Adelaide: my research assistant Meaghan McEvoy (BA, Hons Adelaide, MPhil, DPhil Oxford) expertly processed the data of some 350 Alexander references in Simplicius and provided helpful notes (Small Research Grant 2003, Faculty of Humanities); Ms. Kelly Slape created a useful card index of Greek exegetical terminology (Student Summer Scholarship for Undergraduates, Faculty of Humanities 2004-5); Benjamin Madden did a great job checking the bibliographical details in all chapters. In addition, two small subsidies came from the (now defunct) Centre for European Studies and General Linguistics Initiative Fund, enabling me to do much needed library work in the Fisher Research Library at the University of Sydney (2003, 2004), and to attend a workshop on ancient philosophy in Melbourne (November 2003). The use of TLG CD-ROM D and E from the University of Irvine has been truly indispensable in pinpointing important words and phrases across the Greek corpus, but especially Simplicius’ 3,000 pages of commentary. Finally, I was awarded a travel grant for my study leave in 2006 (Special Studies Program, Faculty of Humanities). Many colleagues have been generous over the years in giving advice or support: Peter Adamson, Dirk Baltzly, Sylvia Berryman, Istvan Bodnár, Tad Brennan, Silvia Fazzo, Dimitri Gutas, Verity Harte, Malcolm Heath, Christoph Helmig, Paul Keyser, David Konstan, Inna Kupreeva, Peter Lautner, Jaap Mansfeld, David Runia, David Sedley, David Sider, Ineke Sluiter, Harold Tarrant, Robert Todd, Robbert Van den Berg. I thank them all sincerely for their generosity. And I thank my colleagues at the University of Adelaide for humouring me in the pursuit of a specialised and slow-paced scholarly project amidst today’s fast and generalist culture of measurable ‘outputs’. A most welcome opportunity for undisturbed study arose when I was fortunate to be accepted as Member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (first term, 2006-7). There an interesting group of scholars provided stimulating conversation and food for thought. Helpful suggestions on the history of science, Persian history, commentaries, Arabic reception, Renaissance scholarship and more general questions of ancient philosophy came from other Members, in particular Emma Ganagé, Jairus Banaji, Mario Biagioli, Jim Hankins, Chris Hailey, Michael Lackner, Mark Schiefsky, Matthew Stanley, and Philip van der Eijk. Heinrich von Staden (IAS) proved a great host and offered his time and thoughts in a most constructive and generous manner at our informal ‘commentators lunches’, seminars and in conversation. This period proved instrumental for further study of uncharted areas, starting on two new chapters and pulling the threads together of the work produced in the past five years. The library staff deserve special mention for their exemplary assistance in acquiring obscure titles and searching for hidden treasures in the collections. A brief visit to Toronto (4-5 December 2006) was another helpful occasion for presentations in the graduate seminar and the Collaborative Program of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. I am especially grateful to

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Preface Rachel Barney, Lloyd Gerson, Danny Goldstick, Brad Inwood and Jennifer Whiting, who in discussion asked pertinent questions and made helpful comments. Whether or not I have fulfilled the IAS requirement of producing ‘work of significance and originality’, I leave up to the readers to decide for themselves. If I have, it is in no small measure thanks to these wonderful resources and people. Suffice it to say that without the support of this IAS scholarship, the book would not have reached its telos so expeditiously. I should thank my editor, Deborah Blake at Duckworth, for a pleasant cooperation and her angelic patience with my belated draft and for guiding it through the editorial process towards a publishable manuscript most efficiently. I am especially grateful that she found Christian Wildberg (Princeton) willing to read the manuscript for the press; he saved me from making some rash inferences and overconfident claims. For this I am in his debt. It is most gratifying to see my own book added to the distinguished list of Duckworth publications on the Ancient Commentators beginning with R. Wallis’ Neoplatonism (1971). Last but not least, I am much indebted to my wife, Angélique, and my children, Sanne and Thomas, who cheerfully tolerated my long hours in the office and (worse) my claim on the computer at home. I hope they will forgive me for dedicating the book to Richard Sorabji, whose immense learning and generous support did much to give my work in this area direction and inspiration. University of Adelaide 15 November 2007

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Introduction Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity Until then I had thought each book spoke of the things, human or divine, that lie outside books. Now I realised that not infrequently books speak of books: it is as if they spoke among themselves. In the light of this reflection, the library seemed all the more disturbing to me. It was then the place of long, centuries-old murmuring, an imperceptible dialogue between one parchment and another, a living thing, a receptacle of powers not to be ruled by a human mind, a treasure of secrets emanated by many minds, surviving the death of those who had produced them or had been their conveyors. (Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose)

Simplicius of Cilicia in Syria (c. 480-c. 540 CE) was one among a group of late Platonists who lived and worked in Alexandria and Athens. They strongly believed that Plato’s philosophy provided the best means to having a good life, leading to its ultimate goal, assimilation to god (Theaetetus 176A). Plato’s thought had by now undergone several transformations and reinterpretations – as much a testimony to its flexibility as to its ambiguities. During the third, fourth and fifth centuries the rise of elaborate and highly sophisticated exegesis among Platonists would come to define the way in which this pagan ‘sect’ chose to preserve and disseminate their understanding of Plato’s ideas. As Eco’s description intimates, once literacy and learning reach new levels of complexity and inter-textuality, books speak about books, and this elaborate discourse is the product of a particular stage in intellectual history. The new Platonism was such an advanced culture of the book, even if it retained strong oral attitudes towards studying Plato. It is often referred to as ‘Neoplatonism’, but in this study I will limit use of this modern term mostly to refer to the philosophical doctrine, while preferring the label ‘late Platonists’ for the thinkers belonging to the Platonic tradition after Plotinus. Plato’s wisdom became clarified, supplemented and expanded in their learned notes (hypomnêmata) to the texts which they considered authoritative in matters of both the sublunar region (natural philosophy) and lunar region (theology). In the process they also enlisted other authors in their works for the purpose of clarifying and shoring up Plato’s system, most famously Aristotle, whose views in logic and physics came to be regarded as in harmony with Plato’s. Such learned notes could take different formats, but the most common type was what we would now call ‘running commentary’. Simplicius is a prime example of this culture of commentary and in this

1

Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity study I aim to show that his voluminous output is more than the precious record of 1,000 years of philosophical discussion or of late Platonist philosophy: I want to show how in these works Simplicius symbolises both the pinnacle of scholarly commentary and the demise of pagan rational theology as embodied in the Platonist school.1 My analysis of his methodology will reveal a connection between his commentaries and the historical context in which he found himself. Simplicius’ commentaries, though certainly not unique, are exceptional for at least four reasons.2 First, his commentaries are very instructive about the exegetical and didactic practices of the Neoplatonic school (how exactly remains to be determined); secondly, they are a rewarding resource on centuries of Greek philosophy from the Presocratics up to his day. In addition, they present us with a particular stage of the interpretation of Aristotle and Plato, and provide an insight into the transition from antiquity to the Middle Ages. These are all good reasons to focus on such an author, particularly if one’s interests lie within the scope of the issues we are concerned with here: the history of Greek philosophy, the nature of philosophical exegesis, and the role of late antiquity in the transmission of Greek thought. Recent studies have brought out some of these aspects, and new lines of investigation have emerged from interdisciplinary interactions which prompt further research.3 It is nonetheless my claim that Simplicius’ methodology deserves a more comprehensive study, since he is one among several philosophers of late antiquity who have come to be used to clarify the bridging periods between antiquity and medieval thought. Until recently several major obstacles have stood in the way of such an enterprise. The corpus is rather inaccessible; with some 3,000 pages extant, its sheer size makes the task of reading his work daunting. Its language and content are difficult on account of its pedigree and complex heritage. Simplicius also preserves important material from early sources on astronomy, mathematics and meteorology, and enhances our understanding of work in ancient physics by Aristotle and others. Those who have studied the texts recently have focussed more on the philosophical content and less on the methodological (i.e. philological and historical) aspects. And if these technical features were not enough of an obstacle, the commentaries were not considered to be works contributing to philosophy in their own right. This study attempts to contribute to the recent surge in scholarship on the commentators, placing special emphasis on the philological and historical features of an author who is often viewed as a mere mediator of earlier thinkers. The view that the commentaries of late antiquity have contributions to make on philosophical problems has become more accepted at least among students of late antique philosophy. As a result they are no longer viewed merely as secondary and derivative pieces of work that lack the ambition to make original contributions. But much remains to be done to bring out the value of these commentaries, even though they

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity are now being translated into English (with explanatory notes), so that a major resource and aid for understanding these difficult Greek texts is becoming available.4 This book will contribute to the growing attention on the complexities of the transmission and reception of philosophical thought in late antiquity. The larger picture of Simplicius’ reception confirms the relative neglect his works have suffered. Until the late nineteenth century he received little attention for his own contribution to the ancient philosophical debate, and modern appreciation has been overshadowed by prejudice against late Platonism as a school of thought (Neoplatonism) or by the view that he was merely a preserver of early Greek philosophy. There was little or no interest in his own philosophical ideas, because he appeared to have none.5 There was also little or no interest in his methodology, because it was seen through the lens of medieval scholasticism and considered an uninteresting example of atrophied dogmatism. We need to move beyond such prejudice and misguided views to appreciate the importance of Simplicius as a philosopher and scholar. To do this we must reassess his works and the historical record and show that his works can be used for more than one purpose. It is significant that by 1992, in his introduction to the collection Platonism in Late Antiquity (Notre Dame), Stephen Gersh could write (p. 3): ‘Happily, the prejudices which for a long time hampered the study of late ancient philosophy now seem on the wane.’ Christian philosophers and commentators on Aristotle of the (so-called) Middle Ages did use his work to understand the meaning of the master’s writings better. Thomas Aquinas (twelfth century CE) used Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories for his own work on language, relying on the Latin translations produced by the prolific William van Moerbeke.6 Some of his commentaries were also known to the Arabs.7 For instance, the mathematician Abu al-Abbas an-Nayrizi (ninth century CE) wrote commentaries on Euclid making use of (what he thought was) Simplicius’ commentary on that author.8 A revival of Platonism occurred when Ficino (1433-1499) translated works of Plato and later Platonists into Latin.9 With the new scientific developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Aristotle’s cosmology came to be seriously challenged, Simplicius too came under attack, the most famous case resulting from a deliberate misrepresentation. When in February 1632 Galileo published his Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems (Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo), the work which contains a convincing exposition of the Copernican system with an account of Galileo’s discoveries about falling bodies, he named one of his main characters Simplicio, who is presented as a diehard but intelligent Aristotelian. In the debate Simplicio is defeated by Salviati, the Copernican, who forces him into retreat. Simplicio ends up using the Pope’s argument that God’s works are unintelligible to humans – a view met with silence from his interlocutors.10 Galileo himself claimed a link between this character and the late

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity Platonist Simplicius.11 We can understand how his characterisation presents a clear insult to Aristotelians only if we realise that the late Platonists, and Simplicius in particular, were prone to harmonise Plato’s and Aristotle’s views, which may be why Galileo saw no problem in emphasising his Aristotelianism. Incidentally, the insult to the Church and the Pope (whose words ended up in Simplicio’s mouth) was also unmistakable, and the work was confiscated in November of the same year it was published.12 Clearly Simplicius was the victim of caricature in the conflict between science and the church. Simplicius has not had a very good press in modern scholarship either. Views range from neglect to clear contempt. In 1928 E.R. Dodds remarked dryly that ‘the last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelligently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development there are still some lamentable lacunae’ (p. 129). Dodds had already made an attempt to change this by producing a collection of translations (1923). The introduction is a fine example of his thorough understanding of Plotinian thought, but the publisher (SPCK, or Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge) reveals how this material was classified. The general judgment on the late Platonists (which is what they called themselves) also holds for Simplicius. The most important reason for this is probably that he has been regarded mainly as a source for other philosophers and the upholder of a ‘scholastic’ tradition that misinterprets Aristotle and Plato. The latter judgment, based on commentaries from the fifth and sixth centuries CE, had been given the label ‘Neuplatonismus’ (Neoplatonism) by the eighteenth-century encyclopaedists keen to pigeonhole these works within a wider range of ancient literary writings.13 Of course anything receiving the prefix ‘neo-’ is presumed to be of lesser value than whatever it is qualifying.14 This, it seems, is how the nineteenthcentury German scholar Hermann Diels saw Simplicius: his presentation of the transmission of early Greek philosophy, in which Simplicius is given a very important role, was concerned mostly with recovering the fragmentary remains of Presocratic thought scattered across a vast range of sources – in particular in Hellenistic textbooks (the so-called placita literature) and second- to sixth-century CE commentaries on Aristotle. This approach determined the view of Simplicius as a ‘conduit’ or ‘mere commentator’ for a long time.15 More recently methodological concerns have been raised over the selection and presentation of nineteenth-century scholarship in this area, with their tendency to cut-and-paste the (presumed) quotations from their context with too little regard for the agendas of the quoting authors. The treatment of these source authors has undergone a critical change with a number of studies attempting to deal with these and related problems.16 It is only in very recent times that late Platonism has again caught the attention of the scholarly community for its own sake. Early interpretative

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity studies on Neoplatonism more generally and Plotinus in particular were by Richard Wallis, Hilary Armstrong, Eric Dodds, L. Westerink, Henri Blumenthal and Stephen Gersh, to name the most important pioneers in England. In France Henry Courcelle, Father Saffrey, and for Simplicius the studies by Ilsetraut Hadot appeared in the 1970s. Next three thematic monographs on late antique philosophy by Richard Sorabji (1980, 1983, 1988) appeared, and a large-scale translation project into English of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle was instigated (London 1989-, General editor: Richard Sorabji). The translations in particular created wider attention, something the early pioneering studies could not quite achieve. But ambivalence and (occasional) misuse persisted outside a small group of dedicated scholars. Several causes contributed to this unfortunate state of affairs. The prejudice against ‘Neoplatonism’ as a philosophical movement caused many to continue the misunderstandings and misrepresentations, taking their views as oriental mysticism and distortions of classical Greek philosophy. Dodds had already outlined the erroneous perspective of nineteenthcentury scholarship in which these thinkers were read as oriental imitators of ‘true Greek philosophy’. He called for caution since such hasty conclusions were clearly based on suspect assumptions regarding the true nature of Greekness and Greek philosophy, and not grounded in clear textual evidence.17 I suggested earlier that the length of the commentaries can in part be blamed for the ‘love-hate’ relationship scholars tend to develop when studying them. To take one recent example as an illustration for the kind of lingering unease in Simplician studies, James Hankinson has recently made an laudable attempt at a slightly more balanced appreciation of the commentator, but his phrasing leaves little doubt about the ambivalence one apparently still experiences in dealing with these commentaries: Simplicius’ own discussions are sometimes tedious and unilluminating; but from time to time he will cast genuine light on a difficult passage, and introduce interesting and original ideas of his own. And if he is often ploddingly pedestrian, he is rarely simply silly.18

I am not disputing that to the modern eye there is something jarring and unattractive about these extensive close readings, which seem to spell out the Aristotelian train of thought in such great detail that they hardly seem to differentiate or prioritise between important and unimportant passages, or between philosophically interesting or less interesting material. Note, however, that this assessment seems to ignore that these written comments to Aristotle’s text (hypomnêmata) may have been intended for neophytes, beginners in Platonism, so to speak, who needed a basic yet detailed explication of Aristotle’s text.19 In addition, Hankinson’s use of

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity phrases like ‘interesting and original ideas’ and ‘pedestrian’ betray strong modern predilections in relation to what may be considered philosophically interesting or original. I don’t want to deny modern scholars their preferences, but when most teachers (and of course students) are aware that their introductory courses and lectures are not always very interesting and original, why should we criticise the ancient professors on this point? Moreover, the works of Simplicius contain enough evidence for us to be more charitable, provided that we apply a non-judgemental approach in trying to appreciate his perspective. It is with these considerations in mind that I intend to present Simplicius in a more positive light. This is motivated not so much by a sense of indignation, but rather by the conviction that Simplicius still is the victim of certain misunderstandings, in particular regarding the aims and objectives of his project and the options open to him in his lifetime. I am not trying to give an unconditional endorsement of Simplicius’ views as invaluable and his works as mandatory reading. But we will not appreciate his works properly unless we come to understand better two of their defining characteristics: his scholarly approach and his over-arching objective. The former has received haphazard attention and will be treated in detail as part of my study of his broader methodology; the latter has re-emerged as a serious explanation more recently and is connected to the religious perspective (‘theology’) of late Platonism which should not be overlooked in his motivation for writing these commentaries (see Chapter 6). So in subsequent chapters it is Simplicius the scholar with whom I am primarily concerned. This is, I believe, a treatment which mirrors in due measure the extent to which Simplicius pays explicit attention to certain principles of textual exegesis and its eventual pay-off for the philosophical evaluation of Aristotle’s thought as he envisaged it. The historical Simplicius of Cilicia, a Platonist of the early sixth century CE and heir to an impressive philosophical and spiritual tradition, is not quite the dogmatic diehard Galileo makes him out to be, but someone who shows strong allegiance to his teachers, while also trying to find his own way in the discourse on god, the world, and humankind. An important passage to which we shall return more than once illustrates his rather subtle attitude to the commentator’s qualities and tasks (in Cat. 7.23-32; transl. Chase 2003): ‘The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings } should [not] obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher’s school.’ So when Galileo named one of the characters in the dialogue on cosmology after him (1632), his character is clearly a caricature intended to send up the Aristotelian ‘tribe’ (the name possibly a pun on the Italian simplicio – ‘simple, naïve’ – although the character is not really a simpleton), thus misrepresenting the historical figure in his attempt to promote Copernican cosmology.20

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity As indicated above, scholars of the eighteenth century perpetuated the strong classical perspective on ancient writings by creating the label ‘Neoplatonist’ in an attempt to categorise these recently recovered commentaries of late antiquity.21 The term inherently denigrates the phenomenon it describes as new-fangled, derivative and unoriginal. This judgement did much to relegate the late Platonist writings to the status of second-rate works, thus canonising the view that they are parasitic by nature (as if existing only to comment on another author) and a confused type of philosophy, neither Platonic nor Aristotelian. As Gerson has pointedly remarked, it is ‘an empty term’ but still used as a ‘term of abuse’.22 It was not until 1882 that the first modern edition of Simplicius’ commentaries began to be published, inaugurating a massive publishing project of the Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin to edit all known late Greek commentaries. This was the first and only modern edition of the Platonist commentaries on Aristotle, published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century under the general editorship of Hermann Diels. Diels’ realisation that some of these long works could actually be useful for other areas (Presocratic philosophy in particular) helped with the production of some twenty-five fat volumes (c. 15,000 pages) between 1887 and 1910. The edition includes commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics and Ethics by the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE), and Platonists Simplicius (c. 530 CE), Philoponus (c. 530 CE), Olympiodorus (c. 650 CE) and others. But Diels’ objective to mine these texts for precious fragments (a kind of antiquarianism which has gone out of fashion) already betrays his skewed interest in this corpus. The edition’s title emphatically announces the works as Greek commentaries on Aristotle (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca). This label contributed further to the identification (or perhaps stigmatisation) of these works as derivative in form and a confused type of Platonism in doctrine, since the modern notion of commentary obscured the fact that the ancient works have features that are quite different from their later counterparts. In other words, they were seen as secondary at best, while more severe assessments would regard them as parasitic. Such a view presumes a heavy-handed preference for the classical (Plato as a thinker ‘contaminated’ by, or drowned in, syncretistic scholasticism and in need of rescuing) and places a rather modern, but misguided, emphasis on originality as the single most important criterion for philosophical discourse. The new interest in archaeological excavation and stripping away layers may have played a role too. This post-Romantic and one-sided view of the late Platonists has come under attack more recently. There are sufficient reasons to consider the late commentaries as distinct, creative and sometimes even original pieces of writing.23 Hermann Diels’ original plan to recover early Greek philosophy from the many sources already studied by his teacher Usener led to a special

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity interest in extracting the invaluable Presocratic passages from Simplicius’ Physics commentary.24 Unfortunately, the edition is compromised by hasty execution and flawed collations of the manuscripts in part dependent on researches of others.25 Important studies by French scholars have pioneered the study of Simplicius’ life and works since 1978.26 Since 1989 comprehensive translations of his works have begun to appear, and it is expected that all his commentaries in Greek will be available in English before long.27 The reasons for a monograph on Simplicius can therefore be summed up as follows. Reassessing the importance of Simplicius will work best by viewing his works as the last and most impressive stage of a long exegetical tradition for the works of Aristotle by Platonists in the Greek language. My argument will aim at a revision of his reputation as an antiquarian or ‘channel’ of Greek philosophy by trying to assess his methodology in the composition of the extant commentaries, with particular emphasis on his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. The brief history of the reception of Simplicius’ work given above has made it clear, I hope, that he has received a rather uneven treatment as an author. Yet Simplicius has had a presence of sorts in some quarters of Classical studies. Those who study ancient philosophy will have heard of him in the tagline to numerous fragments laid out in Diels’ Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1st edn 1903), a collection of fragments of the so-called Presocratic philosophers. Thus many scholars in ancient philosophy are aware of him without really knowing much about him.28 This narrow focus on him as the preserver of the ideas of other thinkers is one reason for writing this book. So a second aim is to counter the somewhat fragmented understanding of his value for late Greek philosophy. A further, less obvious, reason for this study is that Simplicius holds a quite special place among his commentator colleagues. As indicated at the outset, his working method, programmatic statements and wealth of source material in his works amount to an overall approach which is quite sui generis. One line of argument in this book (in part made implicitly by the arrangement of chapters) aims to show that Simplicius is in fact worth knowing about as a scholar, and not just because his works are a thesaurus of Greek philosophical ideas and fragments. Studying these works with more sympathetic eyes (instead of purist classical ones) will greatly assist in appreciating the author’s motives and aims. My third major reason for writing this book is what I consider the most original part of the investigation: I intend to provide new insight into the link between the hermeneutical and philosophical approach in the commentaries of Simplicius. I will argue that our understanding of Simplicius’ methodology will be greatly enhanced if we study how in various ways his scholarly approach impacts on his philosophical exegesis. His commentaries will be placed in their intellectual context, while several case studies will shed light on his critical treatment of earlier philosophers and his (at

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity times polemical) use of existing commentaries. The investigation thus not only clarifies the objectives, presuppositions and impact of his strategies, but also illustrates how Simplicius, as a competent philosopher explicating Aristotelian and Platonic ideas, continues and develops a method which pursues philosophy via clarification of early and classical philosophy. He keeps alive the tradition of philosophical exegesis marked by its doctrinal complexity and scholarship, which in his case is unusually self-conscious, learned and rich in its sources. An aspect which plays a vital role throughout this enquiry is the role of authority and how Simplicius deals with this aspect: the multi-layered documents he produced contain a varied mix of primary sources and secondary voices, in which different types of authority determine the selection, placement and exegesis of the text. Simplicius will be seen to juggle all these ingredients skilfully. It is the way in which he constructs his exegeses and the outcomes of that strategy which need to be brought out in a general account of his methodology, revealing also that Simplicius is not just a collector of ‘fragments’ (as Diels’ Vorsokratiker might lead us to think, perhaps implicitly), nor the author of ‘commentary’ in the modern sense (his ‘written comments’ belong to the genre of hypomnêmata), nor merely someone who ‘channels’ information from his predecessor commentators (as the introduction to his in Cat. might suggest). With my central aims in mind, a very important question needs to be raised: what was the purpose of these expansive and detailed clarifications to Aristotle’s works? If Simplicius was writing after 532, when pagans were no longer allowed to teach in Athens, the generally accepted view that these are products of an educational environment is problematic. In addition, the nature of the works as more scholarly and overly learned also seems to militate against the view that they could be intended for students, as Praechter already saw. Yet if an actual teaching practice was non-existent, he could still have written for an imagined one, perhaps because he was assuming or hoping that a future situation might arise in which his work could be used. Depending on how we frame the question, enquiring after the purpose of Simplicius’ works can mean two things: first, his immediate objective can be one of explaining Aristotle; secondly, a more over-arching aim can be at stake, which is part of the broader enterprise of late Platonism, in particular the use of Aristotle as an introduction to Plato’s thought. The first is more closely connected to an audience, the second to a larger vista of the philosophical life and its ultimate end. As the heir to a long tradition of sophisticated and scholarly exegetes and as one of the ‘last’ pagan philosophers in an increasingly Christian world, Simplicius took up the baton for pagan philosophy, and wrought a corpus that could serve several purposes. His rather extreme position of harmonising all Greek philosophers (sumphônia, sunaidein) is his dominant concern, which we can interpret as an attempt to counteract the Christian rhetoric of stressing

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity the disagreement among pagan philosophers – a strategy cleverly adapted from the sceptical tradition.29 His work can thus be read as an attempt to counter the common strategy among Christian authors of exploiting the many disagreements among pagan philosophers to argue that Christianity was superior because it was a unified doctrine. It is likely that he based his verdict on ‘doxographical’ lists which were influenced by the sceptical tradition in which an emphasis on the disagreement (diaphônia) among philosophers was exploited to reach ‘suspension of judgement’ (epochê).30 Working from these considerations I will challenge the still current view on all four points, based on a new analysis of the historical evidence and of the internal evidence of his approach in the commentaries. I will suggest that his aim was to supply teachers with the material to explain Aristotle: thus both the didactic motive and the scholarly nature can be explained satisfactorily. In the remainder of this introductory chapter I shall explain how this study will contribute to our understanding of Simplicius’ exegetical and philosophical methodology by sketching the intellectual context (§0.1), what we know about Simplicius’ life and works (§0.2), and what my own method is, before giving an outline of the book (§0.3). 0.1 Philosophy in late antiquity: eclecticism, syncretism and ‘post-classicism’ Philosophical commentaries by Platonists from late antiquity (250-700 CE) are unusual works: they are long, complex and esoteric. Their claim to be Platonic in inspiration has had a mixed reception, because early modern interpreters considered them the product of a process of amalgamation and re-interpretation (what we would now call eclecticism and/or syncretism). Such labels are the crutches for academic categorisations, attempts to deal with schools of thought in the ‘post-classical’ era. The form of Platonism Simplicius adhered to takes its character from the re-interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, pre-eminently by the philosopher Plotinus, a Hellenised Egyptian who started his philosophical career in Alexandria in the third century CE, and undergoing further revisions up to Proclus in the fifth century. It is characterised by a number of different elements and influences, producing a tradition which is uniform in taking Plato’s works as the major point of reference, yet quite varied in other respects.31 It would for this period be more appropriate to speak of ‘Platonisms’, but for practical purposes I shall continue to refer to the phenomenon as (late) Platonism. ‘The essence of Plotinus’ system’, Dodds shrewdly observed, ‘lies in the new meaning which the whole imposed on the parts; its true originality is not in the materials but in the design } to appreciate this kind of originality you must read your author in extenso’.32 Plotinus did ‘channel’ much of the preceding Greek ideas in a peculiar way, and scholars did not easily accept the new stance emerging from this process

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity of assimilation: if we go looking for Plato and Aristotle in Plotinus and his successors, we end up disappointed. The transformative power of Plotinus’ mind would not allow for this kind of purificatory exercise without distorting both. Unless ‘Plotinism’ is read as a philosophical system in its own right, we will be asking the wrong questions and get confusing answers. Simplicius followed in the footsteps of interpreters of Plotinus, who reserved the right to develop and transform his ideas once more, and the commentaries reflect this doctrinal complexity in all its richness. These changes were brought on by individual tastes as much as external pressures: to attract students and find an interest in their community, competing schools of thought, especially Christianity, were major factors in the two centuries leading up to Simplicius’ time. Among classicists one aspect in particular has started to draw the attention recently: the scholarly nature of these commentaries.33 The writings can, from hindsight, most easily be understood as the result of several developmental stages and creative moves in the continuous attempt to understand Plato’s thought as well as respond to contemporary needs and pressures. Philosophy and science were now taught in organised contexts and progress was a matter of interpretation of texts.34 With Plotinus, Platonism’s focus became emphatically otherworldly, but without fully rejecting nature. While the physical world is of secondary importance, their analysis of physics is anything but irrelevant. Their perspective is religious as well as philosophical: a deeper understanding of, and concomitant respect for, the creation was a form of worshipping god (or the One), and an aid to achieving their ultimate goal, the ‘return’ to god. Thus theology becomes identified with metaphysics.35 Late Platonism after Plotinus developed along two distinct lines, which proceed in parallel: on the one hand there is the increasingly scholarly nature of the doctrine, which complicates retracing influences and sources; on the other hand, there is the notion that true knowledge has become gradually overlaid with misguided views and thus corrupted. This brought on another revival of Pythagoreanism and Iamblichus’ attempt to show (like Porphyry before him) that Plato and Aristotle derived their ideas from Pythagoras. Iamblichus, however, had a very systematic conception of the nature of Greek philosophy, more so than most of his predecessors.36 If the idea of harmonising Greek philosophy arose quite early, Iamblichus provided a convenient new model which ensured a unitarian vision: Platonism now became strongly Pythagorean in outlook.37 Clearly, then, by the fifth century late Platonism had a unity based on authority and ancient wisdom, which seemed backward-looking and intent on perpetuating an established doctrine. In explicating Aristotle’s philosophy, later Platonists in fact use commentaries as a vehicle for philosophical and scientific thought, and studying Aristotle prepared students in the Neoplatonist curriculum for the study of Plato. Although Praechter already signalled that Simplicius

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity would certainly express his personal views on matters,38 this view has found favour only in more recent years.39 The same holds for the work on Philoponus, a contemporary working in Alexandria, who has been shown to be a truly original thinker.40 The ancient ‘commentary’ is in fact not so much a choice of genre for its own sake, but rather the natural by-product of the ongoing dialogue between teachers and pupils, past and present with at the core the presumed or real authority of a pioneering thinker.41 As I will show in Chapter 1, the historical Simplicius is not quite the dogmatic diehard Galileo wants us to believe.42 0.2 Simplicius of Cilicia: life and works Not much is known about the life of Simplicius of Cilicia, and even his dates are somewhat tentative. The bare facts are quickly laid out. Given his education (see below), a birth date of c. 480 CE is probable. The terminus post quem for his death is thought to be after 538, when his commentary on the De caelo was written (Hadot 1987b). Thus we end up with c. 540 CE as a likely year for his death, since there is no evidence for him after this date. So far as can be gleaned from the surviving corpus and a variety of reports in Greek, Latin and Arabic sources, Simplicius’ works were many and varied. He wrote several long commentaries on Aristotle’s works, a commentary on Epictetus’ Manual, and on some scientific works. The first group is immensely important, as these works preserve important material from early Greek philosophy, Platonic and Peripatetic philosophers, Stoicism, and scientific texts.43 His work enhances our understanding of work in ancient physics, astronomy and ethics. Ilsetraut Hadot (1987b; cf. 2001, xxxiv-xl) has presented the most detailed account of his works known to be extant and lost. She has plausibly argued that he wrote his commentaries c. 533-40 CE (where is still very much disputed, see §1.3). His extensive commentaries reveal little about his life and whereabouts, and what little there is has been mostly cause for controversy. On the basis of external sources we can sketch a few important moments of his life and travels representing the current state of knowledge, but many of the details remain uncertain, including the latest discussions of his stay in Syria after the trip to Persia when teaching in Athens became banned (529 CE).44 A pupil of Ammonius in Alexandria and Damascius in Athens, Simplicius was educated in the curriculum of (late) Platonic thought. This philosophical system had by now been established, after the pioneering work of Plotinus (210-275 CE), the religious graftings of Pythagorean thought of Iamblichus (and continued by Syrianus), and further systematising reworking of the emerging system of thought by Proclus (d. 485 CE). To be a part of such a tradition meant to be part of an institutionalised school of thought in which continuity was important in a direct chain of teacher-pupil connections.45

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity After Justinian’s edicts which led to closure of the pagan schools in 529 CE in Athens, Simplicius and some colleagues joined the head of the school,

Damascius, and travelled to Persia (probably in 532).46 This historic event, marking the end of the Platonic Academy in Athens, has become a hotly debated topic, as it is riddled with difficulties. Of our main sources for the episode, Malalas mentions the edicts, while the Byzantine historian Agathias gives a very biased account against the Persians. The modern debate has focused on a thesis put forward by Tardieu (1990), that the philosophers founded a school in Harran (ancient Carrhae) in Syria, which supposedly lasted for three centuries. Although it is likely that these Platonists – most of whom were Greek-speaking non-Greeks – reached Harran after leaving Persia, the thesis about a continuing school there has not found favour with many, and has been rejected outright in particular by Arabic scholars (Lameer 1997, Gutas 1998). I shall return to the issue in Chapter 1.3. The bulk of Simplicius’ known works are the so-called commentaries on Aristotle: On the heavens, Physics (written after 538),47 and Categories (written after the Physics commentary).48 In addition there is the commentary on the Encheiridion of the Stoic Epictetus (c. 55-c. 135 CE), and he may have written on Hermogenes’ Technê. I. Hadot has argued that there might have been a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (see below).49 The later reports add further titles and fragmentary remains to the list of his works. Like many other late Platonists Simplicius had an interest in scientific matters, though perhaps the primary motivation for this part of their studies was fundamentally theological and philosophical. He provides us with sources on astronomy, mathematics (Eudoxus, Eudemus, Sosigenes), and meteorology (Poseidonios from Geminus’ summary).50 In addition, there are two pieces of evidence, only extant in the Arabic sources, which seem to attribute to Simplicius commentaries (or at least a commentary) on a medical work.51 One is the Fihrist (vol. 13, 159.9), a bio-bibliography by ibn al-Nadim (tenth century CE), which simply lists Simplicius along with several other names as ‘commentators on Hippocrates up to the time of Galen’ (sic), without indicating what he commented on. The more interesting passage is in Abu Bakr al-Razi’s Kitab al-Hawi fi al-tibb (Comprehensive book on medicine),52 which names Simplicius as the author of a commentary on the Hippocratic work Kitab al-Kasr (presumably ‘On Fractures’).53 Hunayn b. Ishaq (808-873 CE) knew of two distinct commentaries on this work by Galen, and the Fihrist states (I, 388.14 Flügel) that Hunayn translated the first book of Galen’s Hippocrates commentary. This remarkable Arabic line of transmission requires some further comment. It is unusual that Simplicius should wish to comment on a medical work (especially a practical treatise like the On fractures), and the erroneous chronology in the Fihrist also raises some suspicion. Could this tradition be transmitting a spurious or mistaken attribution? Ullman has

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity suggested that we are dealing here with a different Simplicius, but this would be unsatisfactory as an argument from silence.54 Another possibility is perhaps a confusion over titles or authors: elsewhere Simplicius mentions Hippocrates of Chios in connection with a mathematical problem (in Phys. 69.22-3). But that must mean that the confusion arose before the Arabic authors got hold of this information, given that they present the comment in a list of medical works. The Arabic titles are unambiguous here: ‘commentators on Hippocrates’ books, coming after him until Galen’s time: Sinbliqiyus, Santalus, Disqurudus the First’ (transl. E. Gannagé). On the available evidence we cannot confirm or deny whether he wrote such a commentary, but it does constitute an anomaly. Thus we see that Simplicius had a wide-ranging interest in science and philosophy, a reflection of the broad education he received in Alexandria and Athens. His circumstances after 531 CE may have been a contributing factor for him to write extensively on philosophical and scientific matters and explicating the ideas of ancient authorities. His legacy reaches far into later times as a worthwhile source for clarification of Aristotle in the Middle Ages, and as a prime defender of the concordia (Greek harmonia, sumphônia) between Aristotelians and Platonists in the Renaissance, to the most important source for Presocratic materials since the late nineteenth century. 0.3 Method and outline of this study The main parameters of my approach to Simplicius and his works are determined by recent scholarship on late antique philosophy, making use of the insights that have been emerging. As the division of chapters indicates, the organising principle is chronological as well as by those authors which play a significant role in his narrative. There can be no doubt that I skate over a lot of thin ice and deal only with the most significant aspects of this vast topic. This investigation, then, is both a synthesis and a new treatment of Simplicius the scholar. Here I give priority to those aspects which have not been discussed comprehensively in the scholarly literature. The approach is new in that, instead of presenting him merely as a source for Greek philosophy, it focuses on the author himself with a particular interest in the questions how and why is he crafting his commentaries. Answering these questions will provide insight into at least four important aspects. I aim to bring out: (1) the underlying assumptions of his working method in order to reveal the important context and his motivation for preserving the invaluable information contained in these works; (2) the socio-cultural and intellectual framework of the extant body of writing, so we come to see how important it is to assess an author on his own terms;

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (3) the wider appeal of this author by taking a mixed approach of philological, literary and argumentative background to what is traditionally considered a philosophical text – thus illustrating that these texts contain material of interest to classicists, historians, and philosophers alike; (4) the value of the contextualising approach which emphasises the use of context in a source author for the study of those authors who are important as sources for early Greek thought. A further question, also connected to (2) and the issue of the purpose of these works (above, p. 6), is whether they originate in, or were meant for, teaching. The seemingly obvious answer is that they did, given that the bulk of such hypomnêmata arose when a master would expound the set texts in the curriculum. Yet many distinctive features in Simplicius’ works, such as their learning, lavishness, style, and authorial voice, differ greatly from other commentaries of this period which are often selfdeclared notes from lectures (apo phônês, i.e. notes taken by students ‘from the voice’ of the teacher). Obviously, Simplicius’ reputation should neither depend on a seventeenth-century caricature nor – what is perhaps worse – on the side-effects of his treatment by eighteenth-century prejudice or nineteenth-century scholars, who mined him for his reports and quotations of Presocratic and other philosophers. His works may be more a methodically executed exegesis than a riveting read, but viewed from a vantage point that better appreciates his aims and objectives we may produce a less harsh judgment. No one can deny that they contain a fascinating mixture of scholarship, exegesis and late Platonist thought. It is my claim that all three aspects will benefit from a synoptic analysis so that the different layers present in the work and the various forces informing Simplicius’ approach can be uncovered and thus contribute to an understanding of his project, before we attempt to deal with the thinkers he has incorporated. The underlying assumption is that a reported view is often only as good as the reporter: we are at the mercy of the latter’s selectivity, manipulation even, in presenting the materials. Simplicius ‘manages information’ in a way which can be understood only from his own principles and practice. The challenge here – and this is not an original thought – is to try and make sure that we become (more) aware of the assumptions, ideological or otherwise, which have determined the method of the source author. This will often be a matter of degree, since it is almost impossible to reconstruct an author’s motivations and predilections completely. Yet with Simplicius we can go a long way, in part because of the large corpus and contemporary materials, in part because we can gain considerable insight on what he thinks his project is. That said, a few comments must be made on the scope and method of this study. The points discussed in the foregoing sections emerge from my

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity focus on Simplicius’ works as the products of a specific agenda. But the topic is potentially inexhaustible: the commentaries are very long works, and Simplicius belongs to a tradition in which extensive and complex writings precede his; they had become a fixed ingredient of the philosophical practice. So it will be very important to narrow down the scope of this investigation in several respects. To establish a historical context and some basic facts about his life will not be a high priority. A considerable amount of work has been done on the meagre facts of his biography, and recent work on the historical context of the late Roman Empire and the Byzantine period as well as the Persian Empire in the fourth to seventh centuries CE can help to update the accepted narrative. A radically different account is not to be expected. The guiding principle of organisation will be twofold: on the one hand I will use Simplicius’ own programmatic statements about the aim of his commentaries as a working hypothesis to understand what his aim was in writing such extensive scholarly works and how his methodology contributes to this. On the other hand, I shall arrange the materials according to our modern concern with his role as an important source of ancient philosophical thought – crucial in the case of some Presocratics, but no less important for many later thinkers such as Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Xenarchus, Boethus in the case of the early Peripatetics, and Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Syrianus, Iamblichus, Ammonius and Philoponus in the case of the later Platonists. Any discussion of earlier thinkers will have to start from the Simplician text, so that a roughly chronological arrangement imposes itself. But this approach will be combined with a more thematic one, in that the overall argument tries to show how the presence of earlier thinkers is subordinated to Simplicius’ programme of showing the harmony among philosophers. With the objective to study the significance of Simplicius’ commentary style on his presentation and interpretation of the material, we need to raise awareness of the ways in which Simplicius is embedding the ideas of others into his works. If we can apply appropriate qualifications for filtering out the ‘information’ he provides, our understanding of the ‘fragments’ he transmits should also benefit from such an approach. Ultimately one hopes to use Simplicius’ reports as a window onto the views of earlier thinkers whose survival depends fully or substantially on his commentaries.55 It will exceed the scope of this study to implement such insights, but for the Presocratics I will suggest that the boundaries between A and B fragments is not as clear-cut as the Diels-Kranz selection implies. It is clear that the ‘colouring’ of Simplicius’ reports requires sensitive reading. In an attempt to defuse bias (whether ancient or modern) our reassessment concerns both the nature and the constitution of his narrative: we should ask how the views incorporated into his exegesis contribute to a new whole. The appropriate image for this process is perhaps that of weaving: the ‘fabric’ of the commentaries often strikes the reader as varied

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity and multi-coloured in its composition, with different strands skilfully woven into the overall ‘pattern’, but also with some less fitting additions which seem to disrupt the natural progression or train of thought. No matter what image we use, the complexity of Simplicius’ activity as a scholar, philosopher and exegete requires careful study for a proper characterisation. It is my claim that the relationship between his approach as a scholar and his philosophical exegesis deserves more attention than it has received, and it is this aspect in particular that I have set out to clarify in this book. Relevant questions here are: Is the commentator creating a new interpretation or rehearsing existing ones? Is he at the mercy of his sources? Who is he writing for? How does he view his own project? By emphasising the socio-cultural and intellectual framework of the corpus, we try to assess how important it is to judge an author on his own terms. In addition we can show that it is possible to go across established boundaries of disciplines, by making clear that in many texts usually studied only by philosophers or historians of philosophy and science contain material of interest to non-philosophers (e.g. classicists, historians of scholarship), and to make a strong case for the contextualising approach which studies those authors who are important as sources for early Greek thought, on the basis of their own motives and background, while clarifying the motives, means and outcomes of Simplicius’ working method. Additional points of interest, relating to the historical context in which these works were written, the genre of the works, and the transmission of early Greek philosophy will be dealt with alongside the main argument. The investigation will thus open up connections with broader issues, in particular the reception of Presocratic philosophy within the commentary tradition, the nature and purpose of these commentaries, and the demise of pagan philosophy. Simplicius represents an intriguing stage in the development of commentaries in antiquity. Although he conforms in general to the exegetical tradition of writing detailed comments on Aristotle, his methodology seems to stand out in a significant number of ways. However, the original context in which his commentaries arose can be established only from general contextual evidence of the time without exact knowledge of his whereabouts. This leads to the question what purpose these works served. I will argue that we can get closer to understanding his objective(s) if we study his scholarly approach in conjunction with his philosophical exegesis. His outlook and working method are crucial to assess the way in which he weaves his philosophical exegesis out of the material he had at his disposal. This will not only enable us to put his work in context, but also to put the reported material into perspective, from the Presocratics, Theophrastus and Eudemus through to Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE), Porphyry (c. 300 CE) and Damascius (c. 500-30 CE). *

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity In outline the study falls into two parts: Chapters 1-3 detail how Simplicius comments on, and makes use of, early and classical Greek philosophy, in particular his attempt to forge a unified interpretation of Greek philosophy as a whole. Here Presocratic, Platonic and Aristotelian ideas become part of a comprehensive exegesis of the world by arguing for an essential harmony among all Greek philosophers despite certain disagreements among them (in Phys. 29.3-5). It requires him to re-interpret Presocratic thought as a premonition of Platonic thought (as he sees it) and to impose his Neoplatonic views in the light of his own intellectual background. These three chapters thus consider how Simplicius is offering an extended exegesis of early and classical Greek thought with a comprehensive purpose in mind. Chapter 1 prepares the way for the analysis by providing historical context and considerations regarding the practical circumstances of his scholarly pursuits. Chapter 2 starts the analysis with the Presocratics and how they are handled by Simplicius. Chapter 3 looks at the interpretive moves for understanding Aristotle with the aid of his immediate successors, Theophrastus (c. 380-c. 287 CE) and Eudemus (c. 350-c. 290 CE). This is the last section of Part I and it marks the transitional stage in which Aristotle’s works slowly begin to gain canonical status, so that exegetical work done by his successors can be taken as the first attempts to reach a more stable meaning of his overall system by way of textual analysis. Chapters 4-6 (the second part of the book), on the other hand, look at the ‘secondary’ sources which assisted Simplicius in this interpretation, by sampling the most important early Peripatetic and Platonist philosophers as well as his predecessors in the commentators genre. Here we learn much about the antecedents of his format and style, the major influences on his working method and his interpretation, and how the philosophical running commentary grew as a genre. Along the way attention will be paid to a number of additional aspects, such as the variety and styles of exegetical terminology (and their background), his position within the tradition, his appreciation of earlier commentators, and his importance for our knowledge of Greek philosophy. Chapter 4 shows the pervading presence and influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, an illustration of the process of harmonisation and the ease with which a Peripatetic commentator could influence Platonist exegesis. Chapter 5 will selectively retrace Platonist exegetical developments and links with Simplicius’ method. Chapter 6 will highlight the importance of rhetoric and polemic in exegetical debates, with particular attention to the acrimonious conflict between Simplicius and Philoponus. This debate shows how the issue over the beginning of the world is paramount in the conflict of religious perspectives in the early sixth century. To round off this study the Epilogue aims to draw together the different strands from both parts and to build a picture of the methodology of our author. The three major aspects under investigation, scholarship, exegesis and philosophy, will be shown to be intricately linked.

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Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity In sum, I hope the reader will come to agree with the view that Simplicius is one of those rare authors who is of interest to ancient philosophers, historians and classicists. He is a competent philosopher who explicates Aristotelian thought and at the same time continues and develops an exegetical method which has its roots in the Platonic Academy of the Hellenistic period, but with significant developments under Plotinus and his followers. He thus keeps alive the tradition of exegesis which is remarkable for its complexity in amalgamating different schools of thought, while he also represents a stage in the history of scholarship which is remarkably self-conscious, learned and rich in its sources. With roughly 3,000 pages of his commentaries extant, there is still much that invites further study and analysis. By studying how his methodology determines his exegesis I hope to contribute to adjusting the negative judgement of him still present in modern scholarship, and to creating a new profile for an author who has been rather neglected and, to some extent, misunderstood.

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The Scholar and His Books The composition of long and complicated works is not a simple matter in any period, but it is clear that ancient authors had to cope with some special practical problems which could make or break such an endeavour. Simplicius’ voluminous commentaries on Aristotle provide us with an opportunity to study a scholar with his books at work. A good starting point for our enquiry is to determine what kind of activity Simplicius is involved in, in both a mechanical and an ideological sense. The first aspect is central for our purpose of providing a broad account of the methodology of Simplicius. The term ‘methodology’ is used here in a quite specific way. If we come to Simplicius assuming that we are looking at a philosopher, we are at risk of an oversight that will seriously disadvantage our investigation: Simplicius belongs to a particular philosophical tradition, Platonism, which comes to the study of the world with deeply religious motives as well as certain technical skills of a scholarly nature that accompany the philosophical activities of the late Platonists.1 It can be argued that the religious dimension became more important in late antiquity as a result of the rise of a new spiritual force, Christianity. Platonism would now have to clarify its message in competition with this new ‘doctrine’. Simplicius thus stands at the end of a powerful tradition of textual exegesis of pagan theology. A proper understanding of his working method requires us to study his approach as a blend of philological, philosophical and theological positions. This chapter starts by looking at Simplicius as a scholar, studying his use of texts as they were available to him and the manner in which they become incorporated into, and assimilated to, the ambitious writings we now call his commentaries. In this study ‘methodology’ will serve as a broad term for the strategies an author uses to reach his goals. Simplicius’ immediate objective is to clarify Aristotle’s thought, but also to maintain that Aristotle’s ideas are helpful in understanding Plato’s thought, which should ultimately lead to the higher experience of the divine truth.2 Philosophical analysis of texts is thus also a religious activity, which is supposed to have an impact on people’s individual lives. I will also distinguish methodology from scholarship proper, the concrete means to an end: the activity of collecting and evaluating information on its formal aspects, making notes, planning and arranging the layout of the work are important elements of Simplicius’ scholarship. Although most studies of Presocratic philosophers will have some comments on the approach for the particular fragments (and in rare

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius cases the wider context), there is good reason to present a broader analysis: the circumstances and practical contingencies of philosophical authors from the early sixth century CE deserve our special attention, and I shall consider a select set of statements (discussed elsewhere) as a springboard for further exploration and elaboration.3 The questions that will occupy us in this and subsequent chapters range from practical issues such as manuscripts and access to sources (which kind, how many), to also more theoretical concerns, such as the nature and methodological underpinnings of commentary. These issues are both intimately linked with the questions why and where Simplicius would have composed his long works. The issue of his whereabouts has generated considerable debate and although I do not intend to replicate it, no one dealing with the amount and diversity of Simplicius’ sources can avoid saying something about it. My argument will summarise the more recent contributions which tend to respond sceptically to the thesis put forward by Tardieu (1987). Another important issue is that of Simplicius’ source referencing. In the scholarly literature Simplicius’ use of quotations, and in particular his generosity in quoting, is mostly taken for granted instead of explained.4 For a long time his works have been used as quarries and understandably the important question of reliability has dominated the discussion. Scholars agree that his longer quotations are reliable (though not free from error), but are less clear about the reasons for their presence in the commentaries. Was this sixth-century Neoplatonist just an antiquarian delighting in writing long commentaries? Or did he have specific reasons for his elaborate quotes, perhaps as the result of serious reflection upon his own method? My answer will affirm the latter option and my thesis is that Simplicius’ works do not quite fit the pattern of existing commentaries up to his day (for historical and textual reasons): the different formats found in other commentaries, such as notes taken at lectures (apo phônês), probing question and answer (aporiai and solution), and problem-based tracts (problêmata or zêtêmata), are quite different from what we find in his works. These questions can be addressed by focussing on Simplicius the scholar and his use of sources, in particular the ways in which he selects and interprets other texts in any given context. As Simplicius wrote his commentaries at a time when pagan religion and philosophy had been losing so much ground to Christianity, we must also be aware of his frustration over the role of Platonism: the pagan religio-philosophical outlook seemed to be in a desperate state. I will suggest that the extensive works he created seem to present a large-scale attempt to turn the tide and also, as I hope to show, to assist others in doing so. In other words, I argue that the comprehensive and detailed commentaries he provides for the Aristotelian works constitute the material to assist later generations to sustain a pagan theology: they are almost the equivalent of an elaborate textbook, intended for future teachers.5

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1. The Scholar and His Books Much of Simplicius’ material and approach is influenced by other commentaries available to him. The motives for using such an enormous range of sources was until quite recently one of the little studied aspects of his remarkable working method. In talking about the relationship between the scholarly and the philosophical we as modern readers are trying to appreciate the fascinating mixture of scholarship, exegesis and Neoplatonic philosophy in these works. Ideally all three aspects should be involved in a synoptic analysis. But one thing which has always come to the fore is his emphatic use of quotations. For modern scholars this may seem an almost obvious thing to do in historical research. But is it for a sixth-century Platonist? It clearly wasn’t for his colleagues or many other ancient writers before him. So on that score too certain questions need to be addressed: How does his scholarship relate to his philosophical exegesis? What can we say about his use of sources? Why does he insist on using quotations? How does he quote and process them? What is the relation between paraphrase and quotation? These and other questions still await answers. In a first attempt to tackle this problem I give an account of Simplicius’ attitude(s) towards writing scholarly comments and using quotations. In §1.2 I shall first demonstrate that he had considered views about quotation, and next that he provides clues as to why he thinks direct quotation is important; I shall conclude by speculating about the question why he thought ipsissima verba are important. I suggest his motive is an implicit one which may connect his philological method to his philosophical outlook. This three-step analysis will help to contextualise Simplicius’ method and in a way it tells us as much about Simplicius’ procedure as it does about our own presuppositions concerning the process of transmission and interpretation of texts.6 His elaborate use of ‘secondary literature’ raises a further point in this context, that of authority versus innovation. Originality is not among the much-praised objectives in late antique philosophy: whenever the phenomenon turns up, it is referred to in rather negative terms. Simplicius points to the influence of his teachers, Ammonius, Syrianus and Damascius, claiming that he adds little to the doctrines and argument presented, but merely repeats their great insights. This claim is actually not to be taken at face value, partly because it is a topos, partly because it is a matter of respect and acknowledgement of belonging to a tradition: it does not exclude originality. This attitude does, however, require us to be more sensitive to the oblique and subtle ways in which new ideas were introduced. At the same time it is clear that Simplicius does not always shy away from stating that he is making suggestions on his own behalf, but he will often use turns of phrase that look like hesitation or doubt.7 An additional complicating factor is of course the concept of philosophy and its history: working with the assumption that there is a body of work which represents a canon, that is, a set of ideas which represents the true

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius account of the universe and everything in it, does not create a lot of room to manoeuvre, or so it seems. One can easily see that this will create a situation in which innovations will have to be introduced under a different label or description so as to create the impression that it belongs to the discussion, or what is even better, was there all along. In short, this chapter aims to prepare the analysis of Simplicius’ methodology by paying attention to three interrelated issues: the background of philosophical commentary (§1.1), the significant claims about method and the practical aspects of his commentary activity (§1.2), and the puzzle about the location of his writing activities (§1.3). It will be necessary to ask what his sources were, how they could be available to him, how important they are, and how much of them he preserves. This will take us from the discussion of the sources in his works to his role in their preservation. Some of these questions are about the ‘logistics’ of ancient scholarship, others about the historical circumstances that Simplicius found himself in. Did he have a big library at his disposal? If he was travelling (as we think he was at least from 531 to 533), how did he manage to quote so many books (and in what form)? What was his method of organising and using these sources? Not only is the range of sources remarkable, but he seems to have had access to (copies of) ancient works of the earliest stages of Greek philosophy, the Presocratics. This mapping out of approach and material (including a tree diagram of sources and their interrelations) serves two purposes: (1) to give a convenient overview of the range and kinds of sources used by Simplicius; (2) to illustrate the level of scholarly methodology present in his works. 1.1 The author: historical and intellectual context Contextualising late antique commentaries is necessary in order to preempt a fundamental misunderstanding that the word ‘commentary’ may generate, and to allow for this examination to be properly placed within recent and current research in this area. As a member of the Platonist movement of the early sixth century CE, Simplicius belonged to a highly literate and tradition-conscious movement, which had taught and studied philosophy by elaborate comments on, and explication of, Aristotle’s and Plato’s works for several centuries. His teachers in both Alexandria and Athens were themselves trained in reading texts with close attention to detail – an ancient tradition of interpreters possessing great skills in scholarship. It is a reasonable assumption that the techniques of literary criticism, which previously had blossomed in Alexandria in the third and second centuries BCE, left their mark on the scholars and philosophers of the Imperial age, continuing into late antiquity.8 Although standard accounts of scholarship tend to follow the pagan strand only, it is becoming more and more evident that the advances of literary criticism left their mark on authors engaged in religious and scientific research and exegesis

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1. The Scholar and His Books in Alexandria, as the connexions between philosophy and literature exhibit striking similarities from Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus (first century BCE?) up to the time of Simplicius.9 Showing how Simplicius was a part of this tradition will clarify how much he takes on board and contributes himself. I start with a brief sketch of the development of the philosophical commentary and its roots.10 Philosophical exegesis, the practice of interpreting the oral and written ideas of those from the past and present, started to emerge in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE as part of the polemical discourse among Presocratics and Sophists and reached a more focused and ‘professional’ quality in Hellenistic times, when the writing of so-called ‘running’ commentaries on philosophical texts became part of the philosopher’s task. Early on, text (rhêton) and subtext (dianoia/huponoia) became lexical reflexes of physical phenomena and their deeper meaning: ‘the appearances are a glimpse of the obscure’ is a slogan attributed to several Presocratics, in particular Anaxagoras (B21a DK) and Democritus (B117 DK). Particularly striking features, to name the most important points in the repertoire of these early ‘exegetes’, are the distinguishing of a word’s different meanings, the assumption that a text has a hidden meaning or huponoia (literally ‘under-meaning’),11 and a general concern for the plausibility of the text in how it represents the world. In Alexandria the study of Homer led to hermeneutical techniques in literary and philological circles, and no doubt some of the interactions among scholars assisted the progression in the technical aspects of exegesis, a cumulative process which would bring philology and philosophy closer together. Although this development can hardly be described as linear, we can trace some of the more important stages through time up to the late antiquity, the focus of this study. After the earliest exegetical exploits by Homeridae and the Sophists Plato stands at the crossroads of oral and literate forms of expression.12 Seen within the broader intellectual context his dialogues appear at a time when certain exegetical tactics are already well established, but they do not yet belong to a self-conscious, scholarly enterprise with formal rules. It is with Aristotle that we reach the more systematic level that begins to exhibit awareness of the complexities of language and meta-language involved in interpreting texts. The continuation of textual exegesis is mostly traceable in the Christian tradition and Bible interpretation. Philo, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Jerome and Eusebius are among the figureheads of this quite varied tradition, all developing in some way the sophistication of exegetical approaches. They share with the Greek exegetes an interest in detailed analysis in the service of a broader attempt to illustrate the coherence and unity of the authoritative text they focus on.13 Clearly, then, the commentary tradition – the exegetical engagement with philosophical texts considered canonical – had a long history before Simplicius and continued to thrive after him.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius To have at least a general understanding of the aim of Simplicius’ project of commenting on Aristotle two preliminary points must be made. First, it is not obvious why Simplicius and his colleagues, who regarded themselves as Platonists (Platônikoi) devoted so much time to explaining Aristotle. Starting with Plotinus (c. 210-75 CE) a new ‘curriculum’ for would-be Platonists was designed; this was developed further by Plotinus’ pupil and biographer Porphyry, marking a new stage in the history of Greek philosophy.14 Again we find ourselves in an educational context where direct teacher-pupil interaction remained crucial, but with a surprising twist: instead of upholding a sharp contrast between Plato and Aristotle, the Platonists started using Aristotle’s work as the introduction to Plato’s thought, and commentary on both authors became the preferred mode of education. As Sorabji (1990: 5) puts it: ‘Not for the only time in the history of philosophy } a perfectly crazy position (harmony) proved philosophically fruitful.’ Another important development was the strategy for reading Plato’s and Aristotle’s texts.15 Under the guidance of a spiritual master, books were read and interpreted (sunanagnôsis).16 It indicates how the Platonist school activity led to a fixed curriculum with the emphasis on a well-regimented approach to these texts. These standard topics which crystallised out in the later tradition, such as the purpose or subject (skopos), the title (epigraphê), the usefulness (khrêsimos), order (taxis), whether the work is genuine (gnêsios17), or how to divide the text in smaller parts (tmêmata), have been studied extensively in recent years.18 Steadily expanded and refined, this list acquired the status of prerequisites for evaluating Aristotle’s works and would thus structure the reading of these texts. Simplicius uses it consistently in all three commentaries on Aristotle (see §1.2.1). Teacher and student(s) would deal with important issues of authenticity and purpose and would lay the basis for detailed page-bypage, sometimes line-by-line, commentary. Such an approach, grounded in generations of discussion, required a scholarly environment and the habitual use of books. It also reflects the focus on a body of writings regarded as a fixed set of texts representing an authoritative body of knowledge used in teaching – that is, a canon. Developments within the Academy after Plato and his immediate successors brought a sceptical phase (Arcesilaus to Philo), but by the late second century a return to dogmatic readings of the dialogues emerged under Antiochus (fl. 110 BCE), who adopted a more liberal attitude to the different ‘schools’ and their positions. A new Platonism developed which combined Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and (in the fifth century) Pythagorean elements into a whole new system (see diagram on p. 30).19 To establish the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers had to think up new ideas and the result was an amalgam different from either of the two original philosophies. Gerson clarifies why this was possible: ‘Platonists, for the most part, did not regard Aristotle as an anti-Platonist.’20 It is a

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1. The Scholar and His Books remarkable development in this school of thought that since Porphyry, the pupil of Plotinus and editor of the latter’s works, the Neoplatonists are seen to harmonise the views of Aristotle and Plato openly and actively; we know for instance that Porphyry wrote a work (now lost) entitled On Plato and Aristotle being adherents of the same philosophy (Suda 4.178.24-5 = fr. 240T Smith), though he also wrote on the differences between them). Whatever we think about this, we should accept that Aristotle’s works were taught as an introduction to Plato and thus had a place in the Neoplatonic curriculum.21 One immediate result of such a strategy is of course that the more extreme doctrinal differences need smoothing over. And in fact more often than not we find that they will either be explained from superficial differences, verbal misunderstandings or explained away.22 But the basic position which became a deeply felt conviction of most Platonists was that the differences between Aristotle and Plato were negligible (because mostly illusory), and the similarities significant. In other words, Aristotle was regarded more or less belonging to the Platonist tradition with a few divergent views. What we have here, then, is a new perspective which places a particular emphasis on certain doctrines, and how they were intended, and a framework which de-emphasises doctrinal disagreements. The teaching practice of explaining the texts of the main thinkers (especially Plato and Aristotle) remained very much oral through the ages, but with the additional benefit (if that is the right word) of preserving discussions and lectures in written form.23 In the case of Simplicius, it concerns a special kind of approach to texts resulting from the highly sophisticated literate environment to which he belonged. The commentaries are multi-layered documents in which notes from oral presentation become overlaid with revisions and added interpretations. We should therefore not take the domains orality and literacy as always being mutually exclusive in a strict sense: they are compatible and co-existent phenomena which operate and interact in different ways and at different levels. The importance of Simplicius’ works for recovering the words of many ancient philosophers is undisputed. His commentaries on Aristotle contain massive paraphrase and quotations (see diagram on p. 30). But the analysis of such habits too often leads to conclusions which are the result of modern projections about quotation from written sources, including the mistaken assumption that accuracy was as important to the ancients as it is to modern scholarship. This is not to say that Simplicius was incapable of quoting accurately, but it should be remembered that the circumstances in which these authors worked were difficult and decidedly different from ours: questions about availability of sources, the working method for ‘processing’ them, and the role of the objectives the author has for his works need careful consideration. Since the latter can for now only be established on very general grounds, we will have to focus first on the sources and the way in which they are treated.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius That Simplicius used a great range of sources from practically all major periods of Greek philosophy is as impressive a feature as it is complex and puzzling. It is impressive, because their sheer number as well as diversity must have created a logistical problem of archiving and managing them. Yet Simplicius succeeds in handling this quite well, as I will show in Chapters 2-5. It is, however, also puzzling in the sense that we cannot easily explain how he could have so many books (scrolls? codices?) available at a time that he is said to be in exile and not allowed to teach in Athens as a result of the Justinian rulings regarding pagan teachings. The so-called exile of the Platonists from Athens around 531-3 CE is a poorly documented and much discussed episode, which has not been definitively described (see §1.3). For the Presocratics Simplicius has played a crucial role in recovering important parts of their works, and the statistics support this (see §2.1). His references to their ideas illustrate how much material (whether quotations, titles or other references) can be found in his commentaries,24 from sources ranging from the Presocratics (sixth/fifth century BCE) up to his own time (early sixth century CE).25 Combined with a continuing tendency to make Aristotle’s views agree with Plato (in Cat. 7.26-30), Simplicius generally manages to present Aristotle’s views as admirably clear and, after appropriate clarification, ‘unproblematic’. (He does however express caution regarding the acceptance of Aristotle’s views and brings a critical perspective to the text.) Nevertheless, there is a persistent and intriguing tendency to speak of the obscure nature (asapheia) of the views of Aristotle (and others). This way of thinking could in fact use clarity as a criterion against authenticity. Such an esoteric reading of Aristotle could reinforce the cult-like status of the Platonist community, in which the view was taking hold that explication of Plato was like an initiation into a deep wisdom – a view clearly stated by Proclus in the late fifth century.26 Having established these features as the most important aspects of Simplicius’ works, we must now ask: Who was he writing these commentaries for? This point is linked to the issue of his whereabouts. Since Praechter it has become the generally accepted view that Simplicius’ commentaries were designed as scholarly works and for a readership.27 As I argue, this claim can be shored up more accurately, but it also needs to be qualified in some respects. For one thing, the term ‘scholarly’ can mislead us into assuming too much and too little: too much regarding the technical level of exegesis as presupposed in the modern use of the term, too little in that it is taken for granted that Simplicius had a scholarly method, but one that is not really worth studying, perhaps because it is assumed to be less sophisticated than ours. For another, the term ‘readership’ can also mislead. Reading among Platonists was a very structured activity, as indicated above, and it mostly took place under the guidance of a master (above, p. 26) according to a set of strict guidelines. So it will be important to find out to what extent the commentaries reflect an

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1. The Scholar and His Books expectation of this type of reader or whether a quite different audience is targeted. It will be of considerable importance to get a detailed grasp of the scholarship in the case of Simplicius’ working method at a concrete level. It is clear that he had to have access to an elaborate collection of ‘books’ (whether codices or manuscripts or both) as the diagram on p. 30 shows. The diagram does not even include all authors referred to by Simplicius. To illustrate the very great number and range of texts – some of which are now unique among our sources for ancient Greek philosophy – I provide two modes of presentation: the diagram maps out the chronological relations, while Appendix I gives a fuller listing of authors and works cited. In addition, the works suggest a context which could accommodate the didactic drive present in his comments, even if some kind of teaching activity was not a real possibility. In general the assumption that a teaching environment is involved holds for the majority of late commentaries on Aristotle published in the CAG, but not necessarily for all commentaries: Simplicius seems to be one such exception.28 The important point here is that the historical circumstance almost certainly precluded him from actual teaching activity, so that we may hypothesise that his writings could only be aimed at a potential audience. This suggests that his motivation and method for writing these commentaries may have come about for the same reasons as those of Porphyry, Syrianus and Proclus, yet the practical circumstances would dictate their distinctly unique features as longer, more comprehensive and devoid of an immediate audience. Although he conforms to the practice of the exegetical tradition of writing detailed comments on Aristotle, Simplicius’ working methods seem to differ from the standard pattern in significant ways. He concurs with recent and current practice in accepting the authorities in exegetical works (see Chapter 3), in his use of the so-called isagogic questions, and in providing detailed clarifications from the new Platonist perspective developed by Plotinus, Porphyry and Ammonius, such as the use of ‘lemmata commentary’, harmonising philosophical exegesis, and awareness of philological issues (see Chapters 4-5). We should note that, with so many exegetical works available, he does not consider a new commentary redundant.29 But next to these ‘traditional’ elements there are also more idiosyncratic features, most clearly visible in his scholarship (methodical referencing, richness of sources) and the astounding synthesising effort he tries to impose on all his material. Such an awareness of the tradition he is a part of seems motivated by factors other than simply an antiquarian interest in books and history. One further striking difference, emphasised in modern scholarship, between Simplicius’ works and other late commentaries is the fact that his are not apo phônês (‘from the voice of a teacher’), that is, lecture notes taken, and often published, by a student.30 Published lecture notes are one of the more frequent formats in the surviving evidence of the Alexandrian

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius

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1. The Scholar and His Books and Athenian Platonists. But care must be taken here in making distinctions: on occasion there are mixed signals as to the provenance of his material. It is not impossible that some material is based on lecture notes. The possibility we need to leave open is one based on a distinction between the claim of the author himself that the work as a whole originates in lecture notes and the claim that the work is theirs, but with the use of additional exegetical sources, including lecture notes. In this sense his commentaries can be partially apo phônês. Some passages suggesting this will be discussed in Chapter 5. 1.2 Scholarly pursuits: exegetical objectives and practices When it comes to method, philology and philosophy had a lot in common in antiquity. Although my earlier comments suggested that the practices of philological and philosophical analysis started quite early – probably in the sixth century BCE, but most clearly in the Sophistic period31 – the two notions were not fully defined until quite late: in the first century CE a famous complaint by the Stoic philosopher Seneca (Ep. 108.23: ‘thus what was philosophy becomes philology’32) signals awareness of the distinction and a judgement based on their relative value. When Plotinus in the third century refers to Longinus as ‘a philologos, not a philosophos’ (V.Plot. 14.20), we probably see the advanced viewpoint of a long development in which both activities had become distinctive and sufficiently well-known. Presumably the distinction was initially related to the educational activities of teaching basic skills of writing (grammatikos) and reading (philologos) where interpretation of epic and poems became more and more relevant.33 We can trace the literary strands more easily than the philosophical ones, but both exhibit a growing sophistication and complexity, in the increase of technical terms, the attention to minute detail at several levels of the text (grammar, semantics, syntax), and the more ambitious interpretive techniques. Interestingly, Simplicius states quite clearly how important he thought the writing process was in philosophical analysis: he regarded writing as an important tool for interpretation and reflection on a text. His interest in deliberate use of quotation, while also showing his awareness of his scholarly responsibility for future generations, is stated on a few occasions (see §1.2.3 below). It is of course important that we take these authorial remarks seriously if we want to judge Simplicius by his own standards and intentions. Even if methodological principles are clearly thought out and stated, their application may leave something to be desired and they do not solve all the problems one encounters in the process of writing extensive comments on complicated texts. The cumulative effect of using earlier commentaries introduces an issue that is far more difficult to cope with:

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius that of size. Yet Simplicius and his colleagues had clearly developed ways of coping with the amounts of material as found in their works. Simplicius’ working method in the commentary on the Categories is our best (and often quoted) source for his programmatic statements on how an exegete ought to proceed.34 As we shall see below, he also outlines the qualities of an exegete, which recall familiar characteristics of the philosopher found in Plato and Aristotle.35 To sum up, we may conclude that Simplicius’ important and impressive commentaries stand out from his contemporaries and immediate predecessors in several respects: (1) As already mentioned, most of the Platonist writings are notes taken during a lecture (or perhaps private tutorial36), the so-called scholia apo phônês ‘notes taken from the (teacher’s) voice’ – thus representing the words of the teacher, not the author; Simplicius’ works are scholarly, written comments (hypomnêmata) in propria voce on a text most likely meant for readership. Thus they may be considered as a more edited type of work representing mostly his own views, not those of a teacher.37 (2) Unlike most Neoplatonists, he has a habit of using explicit named references to his sources.38 (3) A point of interest to modern scholars is that much of the material he provides is found nowhere else (especially on the Presocratics). (4) In many cases we are able to distinguish fairly well between context and quotation, which creates the impression that these are direct quotations.39 It is clear then that Simplicius’ commentaries are the scholarly products of extensive literary activity, distinct from other Platonist commentaries. He not only creates a new narrative of his own, but also maintains a certain independence of judgement on the text. It will be our task to unravel how he positions himself in relation to the accumulation of learned comments from the past. This would mean that references to previous attempts at exegesis of the ‘sacred texts’ of Plato and Aristotle would continue to increase among philosophical exegetes. The practice of commenting on Aristotle in some form or other started with the Peripatetics (see Chapter 3) and was taken up by the Platonists (see Chapter 5), as is clearly visible in Plotinus’ approach and documented by Porphyry (V.Plot. 14), an important testimony to which I shall return.40 It was also Plotinus who initiated the assimilation of the comments of Alexander of Aphrodisias into his own exegesis (see Chapter 4). To the modern eye this move of consulting an Aristotelian for the interpretation of Plato may seem unusual, but the tension (as the modern perspective sees it) between Plato and Aristotle is not felt to the same extent by the later Platonists. Recent studies (Gerson 2005, Karamanolis 2006) have highlighted the problem-

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1. The Scholar and His Books atic nature of viewing Aristotle and Plato as complete opposites, a skewed view of their relationship which was not common in antiquity. A Platonist exegete has a formidable task in juggling different elements to unite them into one coherent exegesis. That Simplicius felt prepared for the task is clear from the description of the ideal exegete found in his commentary on the Categories. 1.2.1 The ideal exegete according to Simplicius The much-quoted mission statement on the exegete’s tasks in the commentary on the Categories is a clear formulation of his intentions, and also clarifies well how he wants his readers to view his enterprise. It will allow a selective account of some of the commentators Simplicius draws on for his own exegetical activity and the ways in which these earlier examples of exegesis may have influenced his own method. The passage is worth quoting in full (in Cat. 7.23-32): The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings must not fall wholly short of the latter’s (i) greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have (ii) experience of everything the Philosopher has written, and must be (iii) a connoisseur (epistêmôn) of Aristotle’s stylistic habits. (iv) His judgement must be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, } should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher’s school. [The good exegete] must, I believe, (v) not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter (lexis) of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (nous), and track down (anikhneuein) the harmony which reigns between them on the majority of points. (tr. Chase 2003)

These five ‘principles’ still strike us as sound and balanced: they represent a set of guidelines or ‘rules of thumb’ which are clearly the result of a long development of contemplation on the exegetical process: expertise in the style and ideas of Aristotle is to be combined with impartiality(!) and a kind of principle of charity, in which the ‘spirit’ (nous) of the text is invoked in contrast to the ‘letter’ (lexis).41 We should, however, not simply take just his word for it: a clear statement of intent does not free us from the need to further investigate whether Simplicius sticks to his programme: ancient authors often enough make certain methodological claims without adhering to them in the work in which they are made.42 We can use this statement as a working model, on the assumption that Simplicius was not just giving a description of an ideal, but also a self-characterisation. With far fewer explicit statements in the commentaries on the Physics and the On the heavens, and the now accepted chronology of the three commentaries placing the commentary on the Categories last, we are faced with the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius challenge of showing whether these principles had slowly emerged during the writing of these works, or whether this profile of the ideal exegete was something which Simplicius had in mind all along, but came to formulate explicitly only when he wrote the commentary which occupied the first place in the Neoplatonic curriculum (in Cat. 1.1-2). Working through the text methodically is another major feature of Simplicius’ working method. He uses in all three extant commentaries the isagogical topics, preliminary points introducing the reading of a text. As we saw, for in Cat. we find discussed aim (skopos, 1.1 and 3.13ff.), title (epigraphê, 4.8-16), usefulness (khrêsimos, 4.17ff.), order (taxis, 5.27-31), whether the work is genuine (gnêsios, 5.32ff.), etc., and their occurrence is equally systematic in the other two commentaries. Are these signs of teaching practice? Possibly, but one may well wonder whether they are from Simplicius’ own student days or from his own teaching.43 In his comments on Aristotle’s Physics 3 (in Phys. 395.20-1) he indicates how he is alert to textual problems, but also determined not to let these get in his way: It should be known that at many places there are different readings in the text of this book (en pollois khoriois diaphoros hê graphê toutou pheretai tou bibliou). But we must move to the discussion of the text passage by passage (epi ta kata meros tês lexeôs). (tr. Urmson 2002)

This is one of several comments in which we can see his methodical agenda expressed, his thorough knowledge of the text illustrated, and his determination to write a series of ongoing comments on the text, keeping to its original order. This gradual progression through the text is one good reason to assume that his commentaries have a didactic motive. Moreover, the comment seems to prove that the division of distinct books was already established, even if the larger subdivision of thematic units was still disputed, as with the Physics, which was divided by some as ‘five books On natural principles, and three On motion’ (in Phys. 6.5-10 Adrastus; cf. 801.13-16 ‘Aristotle and the associates of Aristotle’, 1358.8-9), while others adhere to a four-four division (e.g. Porphyry, see in Phys. 802.8-11).44 Although it is not unusual for the lemmata to be added later, one can easily follow the text of Aristotle in the paraphrases of the commentaries, and the referencing forward and backwards in both texts (i.e. Aristotle’s and Simplicius’) show his astounding control of both argumentative narratives. The level of detail in the comments seem partly inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias. As we shall see in Chapter 4, Alexander had paved the way for a meticulous and exhaustive evaluation of the text in almost all its aspects. Alongside the detailed comments, Simplicius has a thorough command of the overall plan of the work and its structural coherence. The books often begin and end with connecting narratives clarifying the thematic

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1. The Scholar and His Books links as well as the purpose of each book and how it relates to the whole work. For instance, he begins book 2 (in Phys. 259.3ff.) with a brief statement on what went before in book 1 (principles and causes, including a review of opinions) and ends it with a summary partly based on Alexander;45 in the opening lines of book 3 (394.3-5) he gives a summary statement of book 2 (nature as cause and principle of change), the importance of defining crucial terms, praising Aristotle for his exemplary treatment (395.14-15, ‘transmits these matters more clearly than the commentators’), before moving into the present book (and the next), explaining that these are about change, the unlimited (Phys. 3) and place, void and time (Phys. 4), because they are ‘common’ (i.e. generic) aspects of nature and need to be discussed first. As will become very clear in this study, Simplicius will constantly keep an eye on what previous exegetes had to say. He may refer to them by name individually or as ‘the commentators’ collectively – which clearly indicates the range of sources available to him (at 414.15-19 he contrasts Aristotle with ‘the commentators’) or say that he is using one or several particularly rich sources which include other ‘voices’. The phrase ‘the commentators’ (hoi de exegetai) at 406.28 ends up being referenced as ‘Porphyry’s philological interpretation’ (407.4 = Test. 152F Smith). Book 4 opens with a full review of books 1-3 (519.316), announcing the new topics of place and time, while also indicating how the approach in Aristotle is a reasonable one as dictated by the materials and the existing opinions on these. Book 5 opens with a link to book 3 and its discussion of change (801.3-6), suggesting that now (nun, 6) a more precise definition of change will be employed for the analysis of metabolê as a more generic term. It ends with rather a long epilogue (920.4-922.19) in which Simplicius wants to give a summary of the main points (ta kephalaia autou suntomôs). The summary is a very accurate recounting of the book’s argument and includes an indication of the kind of problems Aristotle poses and solves. Book 6 opens with a rather unexpected treatment of how Peripatetics do their book numbering: this book, Simplicius notes, is rightly given the number six (represented by the letter zeta). It may well be that the division in two parts (1-5 Physics, 6-8 On motion) discussed earlier (and again here) triggers this: Simplicius goes back to this point and now brings in a letter from Eudemus to Theophrastus about a small issue in the text. Although it is unlikely that the letter is genuine, Simplicius takes it seriously and its contents are quite informative: Theophrastus deemed book 5 a part of the Physics, thus providing justification for the 5/3 division of the work (923.15f.). To this Simplicius adds the evidence from Aristotle himself, quoting comments in which he refers back to earlier parts, such as Physics books 2, 3, 5 (923.17-924.4), ending with the conclusion that this settles the question whether 1-5 should be referred to as Physika (924.5-6). A separate argument is then devoted to showing clearly (saphôs, 6) that the remaining three books are called On motion. Here he not only appeals to

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Aristotle’s works (e.g. Cael. A.5 at 924.7), but also to a comment from the (otherwise unknown) biographer of Eudemus, Damas (13-14). In the proem to book 7 Simplicius again mentions the numbering (H, eta) and indicates that he will proceed to discuss the problems and proofs presented in it, just as ‘the exegetes of Aristotle’ did. He notes that Eudemus skipped this book (1036.13-15) as it overlaps with the last book. But Simplicius still insists that it will be good preparation (1037.4) to study what this book has to offer (9-10), partly because Alexander and Themistius did consider its content.46 At the end of book 7 Simplicius goes through the main points again in a very elaborate summary (1111.29-1116.14). Book 8 opens by stating that this is the last book (number theta).47 Finally, near the end of the commentary to book 8 Simplicius gives a very pointed summary of the whole of the Physics (1359.5-8).48 These comments found at convenient junctures of the work are part of the meticulous attention to the organisation of the work (diarthrôsis) and underline the fact that in Physica is a concerted effort to treat Aristotle’s text from beginning to end. How important is it for us to confirm for an author like Simplicius that he is writing a running commentary? Just as it would be too facile to say that his commentaries are obvious candidates for use in teaching, so it is too easy to assume that a running commentary of the sort we have here is the best format, especially if we were to argue that it was intended for teaching purposes. The references do illustrate how detailed clarification of the text is the main concern of our commentator. It seems quite plausible to say that they are also the concerns of a teacher. But such an inference will require further elaboration on the manner of commenting and the assumptions underlying his comments. Finally, it is also of interest to see how Simplicius views, and on occasion labels, Aristotle’s method. We have already seen that Simplicius advocated an objective attitude to Aristotle. Beginning with the early sections of in De caelo, we can observe that the single skopos of each work is presumed a valid point, in part on the basis of Alexander’s comments, glossed as ‘looking at one thing and making the rest subordinate to it’ (3.14-16, cf. 4.26f.). The coherence of Aristotle’s outlook is emphasised by invoking his own words and lavish cross-referencing to his other works, for example at 3.30-4.4 a quotation is announced and used against some other exegetes.49 The argument that Aristotle uses (scientific) proof is at one time supported by the authority of the astronomer Ptolemaeus (apodeixis, 9.29). Aristotle’s far-reaching agreement with Plato is argued for in a detailed discussion on points of doctrine or by claiming mere verbal differences that can easily be ‘clarified’ (e.g. 23.2). He may need some help occasionally, and here other commentators, especially Alexander, can be brought in to ‘oblige’ (in DC 24.19-20 against the problems raised by Xenarchus).50 Note however that Aristotle may also need help against Alexander’s attacks (e.g. 44.9). Aristotle’s own words can weigh up against lengthy exegetical expositions of commentators: ‘why write out (para-

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1. The Scholar and His Books graphontas) the long comments of the commentators, when it is possible to adduce (paragein) his own clear view which reveals all a little after the start of his On generation and corruption }’ (169.28ff.). Since Simplicius usually speaks in the first person singular when proposing his own objections or interpretations, it is worth asking who is meant when he sometimes speaks of ‘we’; e.g. at in DC 110.24 we find him question Aristotle’s approach to an issue: ‘why does Aristotle not, as we do (hôsper hêmeis), reason that the augmentation happens on account of food’. This point will be dealt with in the context of inquiring after the different voices present in the commentary (below, Chapters 4-5). The early sections of in Physica contain a few more pieces of information worth adding here. Simplicius’ claims that the skopos of the Physics is easy to discover, if one adheres to Aristotle’s distinctions made regarding physics. Simplicius begins by offering ‘the whole division of intellectual inquiry’ (1.5-6, tên holên tên kat’ auton tês philosophias dihairesin). In addition, Aristotle’s coherent look at the physical world becomes clear in the first pages in which Simplicius draws connections between the Physics and other works (DC 2.12, HA 3.8) indicating how the Peripatetics divided the natural world into ensouled and soulless things (3.4). Twice in these first pages he expresses disagreement with Alexander on how to interpret this (2.5, 2.17). In view of Alexander’s role in his commentaries, these are significant moments of dissent that bear further scrutiny (see Chapter 4). The actual discussion of the skopos occurs at 3.13ff., and from the initial description – things underlying all physical entities – Simplicius goes on to talk about ‘principles’ (arkhai, 3.15); here we see the first comments on how Aristotle and Plato present views on principles: the vocabulary reveals the Platonic perspective. Arkhai are causes, both primary (kuriôs, 3.16) and secondary (sunaitia, as in Plato Tim. 46D). Aristotle listed four which according to the Platonic scheme divide into main causes (formal and final) and secondary or concurrent causes (formal and material). Plato is then said to have added (protithêsi, 3.19) the paradigmatic cause among the first group, and the instrumental cause (organikon) among the second. Aristotle’s views are then backed up by two quotations (Phys. 184a14, 200b21). The discussion of the content of the work continues up to 16.7 and lists the topics of the books, explaining how they are required within the framework of Aristotle’s investigation. Thus we see the programmatic vision take form in the introductory pages, which demonstrate how Simplicius proceeds by clearly setting out general outline, specific themes and, what is hardly surprising, a Platonist perspective on the Aristotelian material. If this should raise suspicion in making the modern reader think that such a outlook implies a distortion of the Aristotelian views, we should remember that these pages also show Simplicius’ consistently applied method of quoting from the texts he studies, in particular when he wants to shore up his interpretation. This also gives us control over the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius lemmata which are inserted, a feature typical of the hypomnêma (notes or comments on a text), which in some cases were added much later in the transmission.51 Our evaluation of Simplicius’ treatment of Aristotle must take this into account, as indeed it must not forget his explicitly stated commitment to objectivity. We cannot simply declare his linguistic updating of the material for a contemporary audience wilful manipulation. At the same time, it is of course clear that his interpretive manoeuvres lead to representations of earlier doctrines which to us are patently coloured by his Platonist beliefs. That makes us aware that his idea of ‘objectivity’ is not identical to ours. What is of interest here is to try and clarify what causes this mismatch between ancient and modern hermeneutical principles. 1.2.2 Exegetical practices: manuscripts, textual criticism, terminology After so many centuries of exegetical practice among both pagans and Christians, it is to be expected that the technical level of exegesis in Greek philosophical commentaries of late antiquity was very high. It included, as we have seen, a number of fundamental considerations about language and meaning as well as wider hermeneutical principles for evaluating claims made in the text measured against a philosophical doctrine. Exegesis also included the assessment of text constitution, variant manuscripts, conjecture, and a range of technical terms labelling these processes. Already Porphyry (c. 233-c. 310 CE) was a most accomplished and learned scholar among the Platonists. We may review some of these broader categories here to illustrate the skills present in philosophical analysis – leaving some of the details for later chapters. The activity of commenting and the terms for commenting / interpreting can range from straightforward ‘explaining’, ‘clarifying’ (such as exêgêsis 457.12-13; cf. exêgêtês, exêgeisthai) to less emphatic exegetical efforts, as in the case of akouein in the sense of ‘listen’ or ‘read’ (e.g. 538.6 linked to Alexander). The term for ‘written comments’ or ‘commentary’ is usually hypomnêma (e.g. in Phys. 60.8, 332.20; in DC 530.16), but for his own works he also uses scholai (used at 461.15 to refer back to in Phys. 1). Labels for types of writings are also of interest: we also find suggramma (530.15), monobiblion (short treatise, in DC 9.21). Perhaps there is a clue to be found in the way that Simplicius refers to his own works. While he does use the more common term hupomnêmata for the works of others (in DC 168.18), he labels his own comments as skholai (in Phys. 393.13, 461.15, 1326.39, 1328.11).52 As a term that signals notes of an additional or complementary nature, this is perhaps in line with his topos of modesty that he is not doing original work in these exegeses.53 The scholarly nature of Simplicius’ method is especially revealed in his frequent discussion of manuscript versions and different readings of the

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1. The Scholar and His Books text. The quotation given above (p. 34) revealed special awareness of the problems in the Physics. Significantly he uses information from previous commentators for such comments most of the time and Alexander of Aphrodisias is again quite prominent. For this reason the terminology seems more technical and established, but it is important to note that the discussion of philological problems is not undertaken for its own sake: it is included because variants happen to be there, and his predecessors sometimes already knew of them. The standard term for manuscript is antigraphos (e.g. 414.19, 422.20, 423.14, 427.34 etc.; see Chapter 4), for a particular reading or textual variant the word graphê is used (see e.g. 414.19, 423.21, 436.19) or lexis (436.13). We may also compare in Physica 207.7 where a term for ‘passage’ (to khôrion) appears (literally ‘spot’, cognate with ‘place’, khôros, cf. 273.15, 308.12, 329.19, 374.32, 472.8, 563.29); it must be a late term of art within a culture of reading, linked to a notion of locating text on the page in written form. The awareness of variety in a text’s constitution brings with it the need for decision and, if necessary, correction. Of course one exegete’s correction is another’s manipulation. The terminology covers all aspects of such textual handling. Manipulation of a text can be expressed in several ways, as we find a number of terms referring to some form of intervention: for instance at in Physica 526.17 we find the unusual term metagraphei, meaning ‘alter the text’.54 Others include ‘impose a reading by force’ (biazein, 437.19 on Alexander), ‘cross out, erase’ (diagraphein, 428.2), ‘expunge, delete’ (athetein, 44.28, 32), ‘declare a phrase ungrammatical’ (akatallêlia, 329.15, 349.27, 429.27, 1244.15). Some of these have a long pedigree, such as athetein, familiar from Alexandrian scholarship;55 some may originate in earlier philosophical commentators.56 In order to assess the technical level of his exegesis we may briefly look at (a) manuscripts, (b) textual criticism, and (c) some technical terms, leaving the use and method of quotation to the next subsection (§1.2.3). I select passages to illustrate general patterns here, again leaving some details for later. (a) Manuscripts Ancient books (papyrus scrolls, codices) are a notoriously vulnerable medium and could suffer from all kinds of mishaps, such as physical damage, miscopying and re-use (‘recycling’).57 Philosophical texts are of course no exception. Whatever the cause, the counter-measures taken to redress textual problems could include a number of technical strategies; comparing different manuscripts was a more common technique. It goes back to the Hellenistic period (third century BCE) and is widespread, as is exemplified by cases in philosophical, literary and medical circles.58 From the first century we find concern with authenticity and proper version of the corpus in the Aristotelian tradition, famously with Andronicus’ ‘edition’ of Aristotle’s works, which fixed the order and number of works. As Gottschalk notes: ‘the main emphasis was no doubt on Aris-

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius totle’s writings, their authenticity, internal structure, the connection between them and their place in the Aristotelian corpus’.59 Here already we find an indication of the influence of Alexandrian scholarship, as the catalogues he produced contain incipits, indication of the length of the works, and an interest in personal documents such as letters which might throw light on certain problems.60 Simplicius seems to weave textual issues into his argument quite casually and sometimes even unexpectedly. References to manuscripts (antigraphoi) or different readings (lexeis, graphê) abound, but are most frequent when he builds on other commentators. There is some indication that the technique of evaluating textual problems was well-established but, rather than merely traditional, also considered important by him and his colleagues: both form and content matter in exegesis. The most prominent predecessors found in contexts where the text constitution is discussed are Alexander, Themistius and Porphyry.61 A few examples may illustrate the nature and quality of their discussion of such matters (further cases will be treated in later chapters). The choice of these interesting cases, especially common in his commentary on Physics book 4, will illustrate how well aware these authors were of the importance of textual criticism. If not referring to the more general act of ‘reading the primary text’ (e.g. in Phys. 6.31), lexis may refer to the wording of a phrase, sentence or passage. When this important and recurring issue of wording is brought up, it is clearly triggered by different versions found in other commentators. For instance, at in Physica 416.27-32 Simplicius emphasises the lexis of Alexander accompanied by a quotation ‘in his own words’ (autei lexei), an important feature to which I shall return. At 436.13ff. Aspasius’ reading (lexis) is mentioned, as it is in 936.25 for Alexander (with Aspasius). At 416.19 and 25 Alexander knows of one particular reading, but he prefers a different one, i.e. Alexander has two versions of this text. While commenting on change (Phys. 3), Simplicius points out that several definitions are at stake for Aristotle, yet the text as he knows it seems confused, so he infers his own reading (in Phys. 450.32-6): for Aristotle is manifestly accepting it as the third definition of change, even if the text (lexis) added in the book as from a marginal note (hôs apo paragraphês) seems to be muddled.62

This passage and ibid. 691.3 with its interesting comment on the marginal note are, so far as I am aware, quite unique.63 They nicely illustrate meticulous observation on the content in conjunction with the textual evidence. The comment on an added note ‘as if from the margin’ adds further insight into the experience with textual problems. It also reveals how Simplicius can use philological considerations as an exegetical device to create an interpretation that gives him all possible room to manoeuvre.

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1. The Scholar and His Books Once we delve deeper into this kind of issue, a whole range of textual problems can be found to have a place in the exegetical process. Simplicius’ deliberations may make him weigh up the alternatives and the authorities supporting them. At in Physica 423.12-13, 20-1 a quite subtle argument develops with regard to earlier suggestions on the text: perhaps Aspasius’ reading is safer; } I do not know why Alexander thinks what follows accords better with the latter reading (graphê) than with the other. For I think (oimai) that the internally initiated appears new here in the examples, which are from the crafts, even if health and disease are in some way natural. (tr. Urmson 2002)

If ‘safer’ is the right way to translate asphalestera, we see Simplicius cast doubt on Alexander’s interpretation (modestly expressed as ‘I do not know’) and characterise Aspasius’ suggestion as preferable. A similar case not much further along (427.34) also reveals how quotation and multiple interpretations can play a role in Simplicius’ deliberations. Alexander has a different reading here and the discussion focuses on the lack of clarity as a possible reason for confusion, while his view is compared with those of Porphyry and Themistius (cf. 1051.5). Simplicius seems to want to say that the difference is merely verbal and that he does not accept unclarity as a blanket method for rejection: ‘if unclarity were to be struck out, much of Aristotle would be struck out’.64 As I shall discuss Alexander’s role in Chapter 4, a brief comment will do for now: it is clear that he also has a major role in these discussions of textual variants. Simplicius is often exploring the suggestions and comments of his predecessor, and is not afraid to voice his disagreement, frustration or puzzlement.65 We need not assume that this is because Alexander is a Peripatetic and therefore a target: one could point to in Cat. 41.22ff. where Simplicius defends Alexander against the ‘much admired Iamblichus’ faulty reading of Alexander, and } even confesses (107.5ff.) that he cannot understand him’.66 In other words, his evaluation of Alexander’s exegesis is not generic, but taken on a case-by-case basis, and he does not accept everything on authority from a famous and influential Peripatetic predecessor. Even this selection of instances clearly shows that a philosophos could also be a philologos, perhaps more so in the modern sense of being able to deal with textual issues which require our attention for establishing the meaning of a text. The general framework is not one of established and agreed rules on how to evaluate readings or select one’s authorities. (b) Textual criticism With this degree of precise engagement with the text, it is unsurprising to find the commentators dealing with textual criticism. The cases we find in Simplicius suggest that textual matters can range from word analysis to

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius punctuation. It seems that these often originate with both Alexander and Porphyry (e.g. in Phys. 70.5, 399.19). The verb for punctuating (stizonta, stixanta, in Phys. 399.19, 400.7; cf. Porph. Quaest. hom. Il. 8.323, line 8) is one familiar from the early Alexandrians and later scholia; in most cases it concerns parsing or typographical problems. Syntax may also feature occasionally, as we see at in Phys. 178.8-11 on Aristotle’s text: ‘twice Alexander clarified (exêgêsato) the syntax of the wording (tên suntaxin tês lexeôs)’. The concern over authenticity is another major issue and one of the standard ‘isagogical questions’ posed in reading Plato and Aristotle.67 One has to assume that this point could be raised only after some generations had passed since the school’s founder had written his works, but it is also highly plausible that the question of authenticity would arise from debates with competing schools of thought.68 As to doctrinal fidelity and originality, we must avoid seeing the Platonists as a homogeneous group. There was considerable room for disagreement in all philosophical schools, but what matters is the way in which this is expressed. To begin with, the gaps and inconsistencies in the ‘system’ would need fixing and this could lead to further interpretive issues in the form of elaborations and additions. In general the students and successors of Plato and Aristotle felt confident that they were working ‘within the framework’ of the established dogma, yet with hindsight modern readers will dismiss such declarations of allegiance as misguided and self-deluded. What is interesting in all this is the manner in which they tried to make their interpretive direction fit the received doctrine. As we shall see (Chapter 5), their tactic is to employ all means available to them. All these features could easily lead to misunderstanding the nature of commentary of this era. The main proviso therefore is to avoid a quasi-modern picture of the commentator and to strive for a well-informed judgement on his method and motives which is grounded in the text. 1.2.3 The art of quotation69 In the learned literature on Simplicius one basic but important question has – so far as I am aware – not been asked: why does Simplicius use quotations in the way he does? As we shall see, he offers quite long quotations, which are given an air of authenticity either by claiming that they are ipsissima verba or by paraphrasing in such a way that the change of style and vocabulary indicates he is using another source. In this connection it is worth noting that there are several remarks from which it can be gleaned that he often gives us long quotations when he needs not do so. Thus a more specific question also arises: why did he choose to give accurate quotations and was he not more selective, e.g. by suppressing the words of earlier thinkers? It appears that Simplicius had developed clear views about the use of quotations, both regarding the use of original

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1. The Scholar and His Books sources and in the criteria of selection. In this section I present an interpretation of this aspect of his methodology, which is important for our assessment of the sources in his commentaries. There are at least three clear remarks which indicate what Simplicius thought about the writing of commentaries: they show that he regarded writing as an important tool for interpretation. First, he states (in Cat. 3.4-6) ‘my aim is } to acquire by way of writing } a more accurate understanding of what Iamblichus said’. Secondly, an even stronger view is found in his commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion 194.57-60:70 ‘For he who writes will become both more sensitive to the words and also gradually convinced of their truth’. Even if both statements express his own involvement in the learning process by way of a ‘leading of the soul’ (psukhagôgia) towards a progressed level of understanding (the emphasis is on the content of the text studied), this process is clearly facilitated by the use of writing (ek tou graphein akribesteran tôn eirêmenôn katanoêsin).71 The third example is an interesting remark in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics where there is some, though slight, evidence that Simplicius distinguished between the accuracy of prose and verse; after a discussion of Parmenides’ obscure poem, Melissus’ writing in prose is singled out as allowing a more accurate interpretation because of its clarity72 (in Phys. 111.15-17): But since Melissus wrote in an archaic style but not unclearly, let us set down those archaic sentences themselves so that those who read them may more accurately judge among the more appropriate interpretations. (tr. Barnes 1987)

These three remarks provide some general idea of his method concerning the writing of commentaries (cf. n. 10), but they already indicate that this is an author who reflects on his interpretive procedure and wants his audience to know that he does (we are still to decide whether ‘audience’ means listeners or readers). We should therefore move on to evidence for specific motives in quoting. How does Simplicius introduce his quotations and what can we learn from his remarks? We find a variety of explicit motives, as is only to be expected from a man with a complex scholarly and philosophical background using such a variety of sources. Yet the majority seem to have one or two features in common which are relevant for our purposes. I list a selection of cases connected to specific thinkers (mostly from his Physics commentary), but will return to this intriguing point later when discussing individual predecessors (below, Chapters 3-5). In an ad hominem objection against Philoponus with whom he was engaged in a fierce polemic about several issues (especially the beginning of the universe) he states (in Phys. 1333.33, after a long quote from Philoponus): ‘I have quoted so much of his words in order to show what

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius kind of man he is’. Here the polemical context induces him to use an argument from character to make his point, namely that this person is rambling and not worth our attention.73 In a number of cases he tries to adduce evidence to make his argument more persuasive. For instance, he may want to show abundance of evidence by indicating that there is more material than he is actually going to quote: ‘and one could find more of that sort of views to quote from Empedocles’ physics’ (in Phys. 331.10 after several quotations), or to substantiate a paraphrase in order to indicate that his reporting in paraphrase is adequate: ‘to make sure that I do not seem to be making empty claims (kenas makarias), I shall give a short quotation from Empedocles’ poem’ (in DC 140.30-2). Once again the emphasis is on direct quotation as a useful tool in proving one’s point. Two further remarks which may have earned him the label of antiquarian are worth noting. One is on the Pythagorean Archytas (in Cat. 352.22-4): ‘because of the rarity of Pythagorean writings I shall copy out the whole passage of him on this topic’; another (famous) remark is that on Parmenides’ poem in which his intention to preserve material from oblivion is expressed (in Phys. 144.25-8): at the risk of seeming tedious (gliskhros), I would like to transcribe in this commentary (hypomnêmasin) Parmenides’ verses on the one being (they are not many), both to justify what I have said about the matter and because of the rarity (spanin) of Parmenides’ treatise. (tr. Barnes 1987, modified)74

From these examples we can already see that his procedure is inspired by sound considerations of argument, clarity of interpretation and historical awareness.75 Here he no doubt was inspired by Aristotle himself, going against a recent trend (or so it seems) to use testimonia as a demonstration (in Phys. 1318.10-15): it is Aristotle’s habit after demonstrations to introduce the testimonies of his predecessors as agreeing with his demonstrations, in order on the one hand to teach and compel his readers through his demonstrations, and on the other to make the belief more certain in his hearers through the testimonies; he does not employ the testimony of predecessors as demonstrations, as is the habit of more recent writers. (tr. McKirahan 2000)

In other words, testimonies serve to illustrate and reinforce rather than prove a point at issue. Note how this also implies that he regards quotation-plus-interpretation as the correct format for his exegetical strategy. Further study of passages such as these provides an interesting insight into how he marks out direct quotations with two particular verbs. Clearly then Simplicius did reflect on his methodology, had specific criteria for selecting quotations, and was quite particular about the importance of ipsissima verba. We may look at some peculiar features of his

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1. The Scholar and His Books method of signposting this narrow set of quotations, while also drawing together some work of other scholars. And it is at this point that I propose to adopt a particular stance on his method: I take his handling of quotations as somehow related to the Platonic view on the spoken and written word. Two kinds of considerations point us in this direction. First, as we saw in some interesting examples (more or less implicitly expressed), Simplicius clearly regarded quotation as an essential part of his exegetical procedure.76 It is also clear when he gives longer quotes than strictly necessary, and actually adds excuses for ‘going on a bit’, notably for a rather learned audience. Thus at in Phys. 29.3-5 he says: Perhaps there is nothing wrong in my digressing (mêkunai) somewhat in order to demonstrate to those with a rather great desire for knowledge, how despite the apparent disagreement concerning their doctrines on the principles, the ancients are nevertheless in harmonious agreement. (tr. Perry 1983)

Simplicius here dismisses those who use certain lists of views as evidence that they disagreed.77 At in Phys. 80.16-17 he criticises the commentator Alexander: ‘I am forced to be more elaborate (mêkunai) because of the rather unimaginitive (xêroteron) and careless way (aphereponôs) in which the quite expert commentator on Aristotle, Alexander, understands the views’. Secondly, and more importantly, Simplicius in many cases clearly marks direct quotations: apart from paraphrasing and introducing quotations with verbs of speaking (legei, phêsi), he uses two specific and markedly different verbs for signposting his quotations. The first is paratithesthai (comparable to paragraphein) which may mean ‘to mark as a quote’, ‘to quote’. In a very short but interesting article Christian Wildberg has pointed out that in the commentators this verb is almost always used to introduce fairly accurate quotation.78 As far as I have been able to verify this also holds for Simplicius (e.g. in DC 82.10-14, in Phys. 144.25-8 quoted above). But we can go one step further. A second verb of interest is akouein. Often the two basic meanings of the verb, (1) hearing and (2) understanding, operate separately, and sometimes they are bound up with each other. But in a number of cases akouein has a specific meaning: when combined with the participle in the genitive of a verb of speaking or writing it merely introduces a quotation. What should we make of this? Is this a literary fiction? Or were these notes meant to be read and listened to in the classroom as has been suggested?79 Such considerations would go against the common view that Simplicius’ commentaries ‘were composed for reading and not, like most of the school’s output, for delivery as lectures’.80 There is another way to interpret these occurrences. Dirk Schenkeveld81 has persuasively argued that the prose usage of the verb akouein in

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius combination with a participle in the genitive (e.g. legontos) can be interpreted as ‘to read what X has said/written’; as Schenkeveld did this on the basis of examples from the Hellenistic period until the fourth century CE, we should ask whether this also holds for Simplicius. It would seem that his use of the verb has the same function – I should perhaps add that it makes no significant difference whether we take it as ‘to listen’ or ‘to read’. What is important is that Simplicius is saying with emphasis that the original words matter in certain cases.82 A couple of examples must stand for a considerable dossier: because they did not assume these principles of the bodies fully in all respects, listen to [or: read] what Plato says } (akoue tou Platônos legontos) (in DC 566.4-5) because Alexander writes ‘or the matter [is] in the things that come to be’, we should also listen to [or: read] his exegesis (toutou exêgêseôs akousteon) (in Phys. 363.16)

These cases (and there are many more83) mark a quotation with akouein. They emphasise the deliberate use of quotation as a means of proving a point, and very often when he is polemically engaged. So not only do we find Simplicius using different ways of introducing quotations, and possibly suggesting different levels of accuracy, but he also gives particular pride of place to direct quotation. It would be rash, however, to explain Simplicius’ approach from our point of view as one of aiming for historical accuracy or as a correct way of acknowledging the work of others – though it is fair to say that what we see here are the first signs of such a ‘modern’ approach. Nor would it be helpful to say that Simplicius was right in quoting as he did, but for the wrong reasons. So I turn to my last point on this issue and speculate briefly on another possibility, which I present as an hypothesis for further investigation. The important question why Simplicius thought direct quotation important has not been answered, even if we have highlighted one aspect of his quotation habits, which may counter to some extent his reputation as an antiquarian. A further suggestion can be made, which offers a not implausible (but possibly controversial) line of investigation for this question: the evidence may perhaps connect this attitude to the view, also held by Plato, Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, that the spoken word and discourse are extremely important in philosophy, and more appropriate than writing to philosophise and reach an understanding of reality. Some additional considerations can be adduced to clarify this idea. The well-known and paradoxical Phaedrus passage states a view on the appropriate use of speaking and writing, and the strong qualifications formulated there on doing philosophy in written form.84 The particular paradox inherent in this passage was well formulated by M.M. MacKenzie:

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1. The Scholar and His Books It has long been recognized that this passage is odd. Here is Plato writing a book which repudiates the writing of books. } Socrates says it, but Plato writes it. If he writes to convince, he writes that writing should not convince us; if what he writes does convince us, it convinces us that it should not convince us.85

Plato has here created an awkward situation in which he seems to reject (in writing) the use of writing in philosophy. We should take note, however, of the fact that there is an embarrassed silence in the Platonic tradition on this passage. The one exception is a very short remark in a commentary from a lecture of Syrianus, Proclus’ teacher, recorded by Hermias, On Plato’s Phaedrus 275A-C.86 If we can establish there was a changing attitude towards the role of writing among Platonists up to Proclus in the fifth century CE, it would be of interest to see how this manifests itself. As David Sedley has pointed out, Proclus’ remark on mimêsis (‘re-enactment’) may represent the culmination of a line of thinking about the role of the proems in Plato’s dialogues. The late Platonists had two basic positions regarding the proems: they were meant ‘to draw moral lessons from the dramatic presentation of the characters (Porphyry) or they would teach us about the subject studied in the dialogue (Iamblichus)’.87 So they took the proems as (implicit) guides for ethical conduct (very much like the Middle Platonists): Plato uses the actual imitation (mimêsis) of the best men to sketch to us the main outline features of appropriate actions. And these have a much more powerful effect than things stored away in bare rules. For imitation has its own special way of shaping the lives of those who read it. (Proclus, On Plato’s Timaeus I 16.6-12 Diehl; tr. Sedley 1997)

The point here is that Plato teaches by example (which is an ‘outline’, hypographê, interpreted as in his Republic 548D2) rather than by prescriptive rules: we can read about them but they are not the full and finished product, since these actions have to be internalised in order to be functional. In other words, they are first of all meant to change one’s attitude and state of mind, which can only be the result of going through a process rather than just reading them: in short, individuals have (to learn) to think for themselves by actively engaging in thinking. Could Simplicius’ emphasis on the original words perhaps be inspired by the thought that teaching by the living voice (viva voce) was superior to writing,88 as was suggested in a programmatic way by Plato (Phaedrus 276-8, cf. Seventh letter 342A-44D)? Such a suggestion would perhaps make sense of the de facto approach found in the examples discussed above; we should in addition not forget that it was Ammonius Saccas,89 the Alexandrian teacher of Plotinus, who wrote nothing (V.Plot. 20) and thus presumably practised what Plato preached. And even Plotinus himself is said to have written very little until late in his life, writing

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius up his thoughts in Rome, probably after 260 CE and within a very brief time span (V.Plot. 5). Though speculative, this possible motive behind the direct quotations would fit in with Simplicius’ insistence on using these both as the appropriate first step in the process of grasping the meaning of their words and as proof that (in his view) he uses these words responsibly. But it also leaves us with an interesting paradox: the long quotes in Simplicius may be a deliberate attempt to ‘recreate’ the living voice through ipsissima verba, but how then should we explain their occurrence in a written commentary? Should we conclude that the oral tradition, for better or for worse, had become enshrined in writing – i.e. in works referred to as hypomnêmata, aides-mémoire or ‘reminders’, notes in the form of a running commentary? Possibly.90 It raises further questions about Simplicius’ intended audience and his objectives in writing these commentaries.91 There can be little doubt that the cumulative effect of learning – itself stimulated by the use of writing – had outgrown the human capacity for memorising. Obviously the (re)presentation of the views of others will produce a type of orality or ‘oral teaching’ different from the Platonic philosophy as such, or from the different stages of the writings preserving oral teaching (where revisions could enter into the lecture notes), i.e. it would have a subsidiary role in the overall framework. But it seems that this would be a difference of degree rather than of kind: if doing philosophy is essentially an activity of living souls (Phaedrus 277b-c; Szlezák 1994: 40), it remains true that whatever is written down cannot be sufficient for conveying ideas in all their richness of detail, especially when combined with the interactive process of continuous feedback in philosophy, which ideally leads to a mental state, that is, a flexible attitude rather than a fixed belief. 1.3 A puzzle about location The exile of the Platonist philosophers is considered ‘one of the real chestnuts of the period’.92 It is connected with the closing of the Academy as a result of Justinian’s edicts (529-30 CE), which first forbade pagans to teach their ideas and then impounded their property and buildings so that staying in Athens became precarious. This decision was regarded as an act of religious intolerance on the part of Justinian.93 It can be seen as the culmination of a long process of growing tensions between the pagan and Christian communities (on which more in Chapter 6). This traditional interpretation thus sees the exile as imposed by the Emperor’s laws. But more recent suggestions point to another possibility, in which the exile was self-imposed. This may be just a matter of emphasis, but it does signal that things are not straightforward. As the location and travels of Simplicius may have some bearing on the scope and source availability of his scholarly work, I will have to devote

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1. The Scholar and His Books some space to this topic. The problem is one of practicality: where did Simplicius go after leaving Athens and how was he able to write these long commentaries filled with materials from numerous other books while he was either travelling or living (as was proposed by Tardieu), in a provincial border town (Harran)? It is of particular interest that the most recent contributions have not just continued to refute Tardieu’s thesis, but have usefully extended the historical and geographical perspective. This has not ‘solved’ the central question as to where Simplicius wrote these commentaries, but it has enriched the understanding of the time and place and redirected our attention to other matters, such as the feasibility of his resuming a teaching role and the (supposed) importance for that role of an institutional base. It may be possible to address the question whether these exiled philosophers had opportunities for scholarly activity of the kind we see on display in Simplicius’ works, irrespective of location. So how do we respond to the question: where did Simplicius write his long works? This is not of mere historical value, but is intrinsically related to the ways in which we may or may not envisage the literary composition of these commentaries: were they intended for educational use? Could they have been written without a well-stocked library? I have postponed treatment of a few problematic issues in the biographical material, which complicate the picture I have been trying to draw out of Simplicius’ work as a scholar and exegete. They relate to one of the central questions the present study tries to elucidate, that is, the purpose of these commentaries. Sluiter’s opening remark (2000: 1) ‘The existence of a commentary on any given text is evidence that that text was used in teaching’ may not apply fully to Simplicius, although it is clear from many of his comments that his motive is also didactic. The issue can be dealt with only rather briefly, since it involves a conspicuous lack of explicit evidence, much speculation, and a divided scholarly community. The first question concerns the location of his writing activity, a second and related question enquires after the scholarly resources he had available. The features of his works highlighted above, such as the wealth of authors, evoke the question whether his works did in fact arise in the context of teaching. The use of so many books almost implies he had a good library to consult. But does the external evidence support this inference? The main source for the period 529-33 is Agathias’ rather biased account in his History 2.29.1ff. It consists of a fairly straightforward claim that the Platonists left Athens for Persia after the Justinian edicts excluded pagan philosophers from teaching in 529-31, and then left Persia in c. 533.94 The issue which was dominating the scholarly debate concerns the difficult question where they went after leaving Persia. The French scholar Tardieu made the (now controversial) suggestion that they went to and stayed in Harran in North Syria (Roman Carrhae) where in his view they founded a Neoplatonic school which was to last into the Islamic period (thirteenth century CE).95 The first point is not easily dismissed, as the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius whole group consisting of individuals originating in the Near East (Syria) may well have taken the obvious trade route through a mountainous landscape via Harran. The second point has been refuted. The trip to Persia will not have happened immediately upon closure of the schools in Athens.96 The choice of destination is said to have been motivated by the fact that the new king, Kushrow Anorshirvan (Latin: Chosroes), had a reputation for enlightened rule and an interest in philosophy.97 But Kushro was not yet on the throne in 529 CE, so one must assume either that it would take at least one or two years after his accession (531 CE) for his reputation as an ‘enlightened ruler’ to spread or that his reputation for philosophical interests preceded his coming to power. Moreover, enforcement of the Justinian edict cannot have happened from one day to the next, but more importantly, so long as the school was entitled to its grounds and buildings, its members could in fact continue their work in the privacy of their institution until the additional edicts announced a total ban on non-Christian teachings, or as one edict expresses it, ‘those sick with the madness of the impious Greeks’.98 The next problem, how long Simplicius and his companions stayed in Persia and where they went after leaving, has elicited some debate and the suggestion by Tardieu that they settled in Harran (Carrhae) in Syria, where there presence led to a Neoplatonic school with a long-lasting influence into the Arabic era.99 This interpretation has come under attack from Arabic scholars (Lameer 1997, Gutas 1998) as well as more recently from Greek historians (Luna 2001, Lane Fox 2005, Walker 2006), and as a result Tardieu’s thesis of a continuing Harran school has become seriously weakened.100 When a treaty was signed between Persia and the Byzantine Empire (September 532 CE) it included a clause allowing the pagan philosophers to return home.101 Whether or not they did cannot be ascertained beyond doubt, since it is hard to imagine how such an agreement would be enforced. As Walker’s illuminating overview of the scholarship shows (Walker 2002), the subject clearly requires an interdisciplinary perspective to do justice to the historical situation (particularly the Persian sources). His book makes clear that the mobility of philosophers was considerable, but it cannot be dealt with here beyond a few comments. A new analysis by Hällström has tried to place a different emphasis on Justinian’s motivation, in particular because the traditional view contains a number of problematic aspects.102 Instead of seeing the edicts as the means to settle a purely religious issue, Hällström regards them as targeting educational institutions. In his review of the volume in which the paper appeared, Gregory (1995: 549) suggests that Hällström’s conclusion ignores one other option flowing from his analysis, that ‘the Athenian schools were simply not closed at all’. Watts still maintains that the school closed, given the particular stipulations of the laws.103 He also points out that there were quite a few more pagan communities in Asia Minor (e.g. Edessa, Baalbek, Aphrodisias), which could be sustained

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1. The Scholar and His Books partly because the Roman state did not succeed in mounting an ‘effective empire-wide persecution against paganism’.104 These points at least show that Harran was not uniquely placed to offer a safe haven for the Platonists in the 530s. A secure solution is hardly possible, as Watts admits, but some final speculations may help to see that there are in fact few options.105 Disintegration of the group as an educational context at this stage, with the scholarch in his seventies, is not implausible. Simplicius’ works presuppose access to a very good collection of texts and a major library would be an obvious explanation. Harran apparently possessed libraries, as its location made it one of the busiest trade route cities of its day. Since Alexandria seems less plausible in the light of the embattled position of the pagan philosophical schools, it is possible that Simplicius returned to Athens.106 Even if his whereabouts remain unknown, the internal evidence (to be reviewed more fully in Chapters 2-6) seems to suggest at least the following: (1) he had a considerable library at his disposal; (2) he had the leisure to write extensive interpretive works; (3) the ‘political’ situation, and the complexity and massive detail of the commentaries, make it unlikely that his aim was to address students directly. If Simplicius was still travelling or at least not stationed in one of the learned centres of the early sixth century (Alexandria, Athens, Aphrodisias, Damascus), we need to assume he had a well-stocked personal library from which he could produce the commentaries we are studying. Such an assumption also creates difficulties from a practical point of view: either he really had all the works he cites (see Appendix I) or he was using excerpted material written up in notebooks (personal ‘florilegia’? small codices? marginal commentary written in microscript?107), or a combination of the two. I am not convinced that excerpts only could suffice as an explanation for the specific references and the amount of information contained in the commentaries, but there is evidence that can support this for some sources.108 Finally, Hankinson has made the interesting suggestion that after returning to Athens, Simplicius was in a kind of virtual exile, because he was unable to teach.109 In other words, he could have been writing for an imaginary student body. This position will be developed further in Chapters 2-6. 1.4 Of books and men: Simplicius’ scholarly method110 It will be helpful to sketch a preliminary picture of Simplicius’ methodology on the basis of the foregoing explorations. Its purpose is to give a provisional description of the main components of his method, while highlighting his philological engagements with texts in the service of his religio-philosophical agenda on the basis of his more considered views and his de facto approach. It can only be a broad description of Simplician ‘principles’ of exegesis at this stage, since the following chapters will

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius contribute further points to the analysis of Simplicius’ methodology based on his applied method. As may have become clear by now, my account aims at a revision of the reputation of Simplicius: he was neither an antiquarian nor a kind of ‘modern commentator’ nor even a faceless imitator of his predecessors. The remainder of this study is a first step to do him justice in all the aspects of his methodology. Poised as the interpreter of the text, Simplicius views (and to some extent constructs) the Aristotelian text as a closely knit network of coherent arguments and internal ‘reminders’ (e.g. in Phys. 424.14) which require only proper explication to be understood. This strategy aims to lend the work consistency and an almost seamless unity, and is strengthened by the close reading that he performs on the text – a feature which suggests that the commentaries could be aimed at students. Assuming for the moment that Simplicius falls within, and makes use of, the late Platonist school practices (though some reservations still hold),111 a general characterisation of his approach will help to create a certain expectation of his mode of exegesis. Simplicius’ programme of comprehensive explication of the text geared towards a particular reconstruction of Greek philosophy as a unified and harmonious tradition is composed of several strategies. In broad terms he makes use of (1) philological moves, as is clear in the textual criticism, the attention to detail, and his ability to use the ambiguities of the text to his advantage. Next, we find (2) interpretative moves, as is evident from his broader principles (explicit and implicit), the recurrent formalism (rephrasing arguments as syllogisms), his philosophical assessment of Aristotle and the Presocratics, and the intention to reach ‘harmony’ among Greek thinkers. Moreover, (3) the appeal to authority (or authorities) illustrates his inclusive approach to his available sources which could be usefully employed in the service of his wider aims and objectives (early Peripatetics, earlier commentators, his teachers). Finally, (4) his use of polemical argument and invective adds a rhetorical flavour, as is especially clear from his attacks on his Christian rival Philoponus. Most of the time these modes of presentation make up different aspects of one overarching strategy, so that they cannot always be separated out clearly; often they complement each other, or one may shore up another. But for the sake of clarity it will be a useful to have a provisional distinction, because so far only (2) and (4) have received some attention, whereas (1) and (3) have remained undiscussed. Still, this division will enable us to incorporate new observations into this broader framework. Our survey of the scholarly side of Simplicius’ method so far can be summed up as follows. (a) The analysis in his commentary aims to clarify Aristotle who in Platonist circles had become regarded as a suitable introduction to Plato; we know that within the school the students started out by reading Aristotle first (especially logic, ‘the smaller Mysteries’), then progressed to

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1. The Scholar and His Books physics and psychology, and finally metaphysics (‘the Greater Mysteries’). His allegiance is to Plato and his attitude towards Aristotle is anything but docile and obedient. We can remind ourselves of his statement on Aristotle (in Cat. 7.27-9) where he urged a non-partisan approach to the founder of the Peripatos.112 (b) For Simplicius as for many Neoplatonists there is a close relation between religion and philosophy (pushed further since Iamblichus’ theurgic approach and Proclus’ overall attitude as illustrated in Marinus’ Life of Proclus). Simplicius even regards writing as having therapeutic value (in Cat. 3.4-6, cf. §1.2.3) in the sense of Plato’s Phaedrus, where he describes the leading of the soul through intellectual stages. Their interpretations reveal how they create, knowingly and unknowingly, room to manoeuvre. Despite a whole range of logical and hermeneutical conditions they have set themselves, their working habits clearly lack the kind of constraints that would prevent them from taking such liberties as modern interpreters have come to avoid: the mingling of religion and science, of ritual and reasoning, of logical argument and partisan polemic have in modern scholarship been banned, or ‘streamlined’ into separate domains (e.g. disciplines, books, articles, reviews). Clearly the ancient thinkers did not adhere to such a clear separation of activities. They offer a comprehensive treatment of base text, previous interpretations, and counter-attack when deemed necessary. Rules of fair play apply only unevenly, in particular when one’s religious affiliation and traditional lifestyle are at stake. There are, it must be said, arguments for and against either approach – but it is crucial that in our assessment of Simplicius’ method we do not project, unwittingly and unfairly, our own understanding of the rules of scholarship, reasoning, and the importance of religion onto his practice. (c) With regard to the incorporation of source material, Simplicius variously used paraphrase and quotation (separate and combined); about these two modes (which he shares with Porphyry) he entertained considered views, first, on how to use them, and secondly, on what role they could play. His method of quoting certain authors reveals an awareness of the importance of using those authors’ own words in discussing their views. Phrases such as têi lexei tois rhêmasin (e.g. in Phys. 1325.24) or kata lexin (in DC 499.7; in Phys. 60.27, 140.29, 1125.11) as a lead-up to quotations indicate that Simplicius is interested in making these distinctions, and with good reason. This illustrates his interest in deliberate use of quotation, based on an acute awareness of his scholarly responsibility for future generations and an heightened sense of scholarly method.

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2

Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom Early Greek philosophy is still regarded as the foundation and starting point of Western thought, representing a new rationalism that emerged from the multi-cultural hotbed of the Greek coastal cities of Asia Minor in the sixth century BCE. Historical accounts of beginnings can be somewhat misleading in that we cannot look much beyond the surviving evidence, and a major problem with this early period is our dependence on fragmentary and often biased evidence. Referred to as ‘Presocratics’, a convenient but inaccurate label, since publication of Diels’ Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker in 1903, these natural philosophers have been studied intensively for over a century. The past two decades have seen an increased awareness that the cultural and intellectual context of the source authors needs more attention than a collection of fragments normally allows. Many have already adopted such an approach in trying to acquire a more ‘organic feel’ for the snippets of Presocratic thought and thus no longer rely solely on fragment collections, no matter how useful they are. My deliberate reference to Catherine Osborne’s book (Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics) in this chapter’s title pays tribute to such a contextualising style of inquiry. In her book Osborne made a provocative attempt to evaluate Heraclitus in the work of the Church father Hippolytus, showing how difficult it is to escape the framework and selection of the source author when studying fragmentary texts. My use of her title, which at the time set an agenda for modern scholarship, now describes Simplicius’ approach to early Greek philosophy. Simplicius follows a particular agenda in his treatment of the Presocratics, ‘rethinking’ their ideas to make them fit the general picture he wants to present of Greek philosophy as a whole. But the question mark in the title is there to signify that the process is not straightforward: ‘rethinking’ contains an ambiguity that we need to spell out, as it complicates the interpretation of the Presocratic material. I will not be offering a new interpretation of the Presocratics, but will rather try to outline Simplicius’ viewpoint and how it clarifies the problems that arise for modern readers.1 It is hard to deny that there is a certain bias in his interpretation, but to apply such a modern notion of historical research is not always helpful (the British historian John Vincent recently remarked that historical accounts might be assessed quite differently if on occasion

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom we were to write ‘commitment’ instead of ‘bias’).2 Here I fully agree with Gerson when he states that ‘the Neo-platonists were referring to Plato as they understood him, not as we do’.3 The same holds for their view of the Presocratics. There is also a redeeming factor in all this, namely Simplicius’ use of quotations, which guarantees that the material he preserves plays a crucial part in reconstructing Presocratic thought. But direct quotation should not be overly privileged at the expense of other mediating formats. It may assist in appreciating style, word choice and any literary peculiarity, but to capture the essence of a philosopher’s views paraphrase will often be a very acceptable alternative. In fact, an interpretive paraphrase can be more informative than a quotation, so long as it can be seen to relate to the ‘original’ words – the proviso being that we will probably never be sure to what extent and how accurately we can recover original words. Clearly we need to evaluate each case on its own merits. The question mark in my chapter title, then, indicates that Simplicius’ ‘rethinking’ is done from a very unusual angle: ‘rethinking’ needs to be viewed as a kind of transformation, an attempt to read the earliest Greek thinkers as the first holders of the venerable doctrines preserved by the late Platonists, in other words to present them almost as Platonists avant la lettre. Like Aristotle he uses the age-old strategy of claiming that their ideas are presented in enigmatic form (ainigmatôdôs, in Phys. 36.30), so that only a proper decoding will reveal their ‘real’ message.4 Here he disagrees with both Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius’ role in the transmission of Presocratic philosophy would by itself justify a separate study of his scholarly method.5 His elaborate source material as reflected in lavish quotations and discussions of earlier philosophers makes his work a treasure trove for the study of Greek philosophy across the centuries. His importance in this context has rightfully earned him a place in many fragment collections of Greek philosophers, but this itself means that his work as a whole has suffered fragmentation and thus became invisible. Simplicius’ role in providing pertinent information regarding the Presocratics is also exceptional, and on this front considerable progress has been made to assess the quantity and quality of the material he provides.6 But more work is needed to understand his methodology properly and consider how this might advance our knowledge of his value for reconstructing the Presocratic material or even some of the intermediary stages by which the information reached him (e.g. via Theophrastus at in Phys. 9.7). Long chunks of text from Empedocles, Parmenides and Anaxagoras are found in his commentaries, for example, but they are not always treated within the original context and with attention to the agenda and idiosyncrasies of the source author. It would seem, therefore, that a more contextualised approach to the quotations in Simplicius can make a contribution to understanding his criteria for selecting and quoting. His evidence constitutes the far end of

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius the chronological scale of available sources on Greek philosophy used in Hermann Diels’ influential Doxographi Graeci (Berlin 1879). What makes Simplicius special, even if not above reproach, is his exceptional effort to use actual quotations, which illustrates unusual source access and exemplary reportage. This suggests that he, unlike many doxographical sources, had direct access to the Presocratics and Theophrastus, and implies that he has a remarkable methodology in quoting, selecting and using his sources. The importance of these two characteristics cannot easily be overstated: despite the considerable chronological distance between Theophrastus and Simplicius, they provide us with an unusual link between two extremes of a textual transmission that straddles almost a thousand years. The complexity in the case of the Presocratics necessitates considerable care in interpreting the material. What is even more remarkable is that, despite having certain specific reasons for quoting directly from the earliest philosophers, Simplicius often chooses to quote more than is strictly necessary.7 Once we acknowledge that Simplicius has a specific agenda in his discussion of the Presocratics, we are better placed to separate out the different factors involved in his approach. His most important aim in interpreting Aristotle is to gain a comprehensive understanding of his works, which in turn may lead to the preparation of our souls in order that they may return to the highest level of Being, the One (in Cat. 6.6-18, cf. in Epict. 35, 111.48ff.).8 His second most important aim is to convince his audience that this understanding emerges from the unity of Aristotle’s works and of Greek philosophy in general. In other words, by his more elaborate inclusion of pre-Aristotelian thinkers he tries to show that philosophical thought is the medium for a single venerable and ancient message, to be found as much in the Presocratics as in later Greek philosophers. This perspective will allow us to revisit the short passages presented in fragment collections and probe their role and value from Simplicius’ own perspective. We need to ask about the why and how of his approach, but the question of his access to source material must also be addressed (see §2.1.1). As prime examples of special interest to Simplicius I shall discuss Parmenides and Empedocles, whose broader metaphysical ideas seem to contain particularly useful proposals for showing the appropriateness (and ancestry?) of the monistic model of true reality that we encounter in Plotinus and the late Platonists. A third example (Anaxagoras) is used to show how exegetical techniques managed to extract a range of meanings from ancient theories to suit the mould of new theories. A complicating factor in the case of the Presocratics is that Simplicius may have had access both to Theophrastus’ reports on the Presocratics and to the Presocratics themselves, which could cause contamination of the sources. He may have obtained some material via Alexander, but it is fairly certain that he had direct access to Theophrastus. In particular

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom cases he justifies his habit of quoting more than the context requires: thus he clarifies his approach to Parmenides with the by now famous statement (in Phys. 144.25-8) that the work is hard to get hold of: In order not to seem too pedantic I will here quote the verses of Parmenides } in order to justify my comments on this matter (dia te tôn pistin tôn hyp’ emou legomenôn) and because his treatise is becoming quite rare (dia tôn spanin) [my italics].

Apart from a sensible strategy of providing supporting evidence, we can see here the concerns of a scholar who is aware of his responsibility towards future generations of readers. Such use of evidence was in fact quite a recent phenomenon, as I shall explain below. On other occasions he may want to provide proof for his interpretation after having provided paraphrases, as with Empedocles (in DC 140.2-3; cf. 528.32-3): And to make sure that I do not seem to be making idle claims (kenas makarias anaplattein), I shall quote some of Empedocles’ words (tôn Empedokleous epôn parathêsomai [there follows a citation of six full lines, 141.1-6].

He has yet other reasons for quoting from Alexander and Philoponus, but we can deal with these later.9 The examples here well illustrate the special role Simplicius has in providing us with information on a range of Greek philosophers across seven centuries. And his views on direct (literal) quotations seem unparalleled for this period of Late Antiquity.10 A further passage which illustrates this nicely can be found in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, where he expresses a view on Aristotle’s method (in Phys. 1318.10-15):11 It is Aristotle’s habit to introduce testimonies from his predecessors after his proofs, as if they were agreeing with these, with a view to, on the one hand, instruct and persuade his readers, but on the other, to render the beliefs of his audience more stable with the help of views from others; but he does not use such testimonies of his predecessors as proofs, unlike more recent authors.12

Two points emerge from this passage: according to Simplicius quotations serve to justify and reinforce proofs, not to replace them. In addition, with this judgement on his near contemporaries he seems to be saying that a combination of quotation and interpretation is the best strategy to use in written discussions. Simplicius can thus serve a double purpose in our quest to reconstruct early Greek thought: by establishing his relation to the works and method of Theophrastus, (1) he provides a route to the recovery of the reports on the Presocratics, and (2) he emerges also as having more direct information on the Presocratics.13 But how can we use him, for example, to disentangle the muddle

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius regarding the different titles, which may refer to one work of Theophrastus? These titles (one of which is in Simplicius) make it rather difficult to identify which works of Theophrastus he used. One example must suffice for present purposes. We can perhaps argue along the same lines as we can regarding the resemblance between Theophrastus and the doxographical collection in Aëtius’ Placita: if the arrangement and sequence in the first book of the commentary on the Physics reflects those in Theophrastus in any way, it is reasonable to assume that this correspondence can provide a more reliable insight into the early sources. Usener and Diels have already started this line of argument (Usener 1858, Diels 1879). In Simplicius in Phys. 22-8, we find a discussion of the first principles of physics, and Theophrastus is mentioned as a source (in Phys. 20.19; cf. in DC 1.8). Near the end of the discussion, Simplicius remarks (in Phys. 28.30-2): This brief summary of investigations into first principles has been arranged, not in chronological order, but by way of ‘kinship’ (kata sungeneian).

If Simplicius claims a principle of kinship here, should we take that to mean that he is changing the arrangement of Theophrastus (against a tacit expectation among his readers of a chronological treatment) or adopting it? By itself the passage does not allow us a firm conclusion as to which option is the better one. The references in the first book of the commentary would point to Theophrastus’ Physics as a source, but it is still debated whether that work is the only source at that point in Simplicius’ account. At any rate, the reports on the Presocratic opinions emerge as a parallel line of transmission: these are brief passages perhaps taken from a (richer) collection which Theophrastus used at different times for different purposes. And even though Simplicius was aware of a type of work which contained compilations, he is rather dismissive of them as unreliable.14 So while Simplicius clearly had a vast array of excellent sources at his disposal (see diagram above, §1.1), it is a surprising omission that he never mentions the Theophrastean work we now think contained considerable information on the Presocratics and very probably bore the title Physikai doxai. Theophrastus’ critical evaluations of earlier philosophers (Presocratics, Platonists) are extant in short passages, his Metaphysics, and the treatise On sensation, believed to be part of a larger work (perhaps his Physical opinions, D.L. 5.48, or his Reply to natural philosophers, D.L. 5.46, which is possibly the same as the work mentioned in Plutarch Against Colotes 14 = F245 FHSG). Such interpretative passages represent important aspects of his methodology and influence on the (early) history of philosophy. Not only do they show an increased awareness of the philosophical enterprise as a continuous discourse by methodical preservation and assessment of past achievements, but they also make clear to us, through his criticisms

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom and convenient organisation of materials, the reason for his impact on following ages. Although its dissemination cannot be traced in every detail, his work in this area contributed to consolidation and preservation of philosophical debates in the Hellenistic schools. Some particular strands of the reception of his pioneering collections can be seen in the so-called placita literature, a kind of schoolbooks with listings of philosophical views under particular headings or themes (doxai in Greek, placita in Latin).15 The most recent strand to have been clarified is the one linked to Epicurus, who in his meteorology and ‘doxographical’ reports relied on Theophrastus’ Physikai doxai.16 The particular thesis Lucretius is arguing against in DRN V.1 is that of ‘creation but no destruction’. In other words, he rejects the idea that the world is created but not destroyed – as one would expect from someone who is a believer in the atomistic model where only atoms and void exist (in the true sense of ‘exist’). The crucial question, against whom this argument might be directed, Sedley answers in favour of Plato. Why the target has to be Plato can be argued for on several grounds, but the most important reasons are as follows: (1) it cannot be the Stoics because they believed in a destruction of the world (conflagration), (2) this thesis, which Sedley calls ‘asymmetrical creationism’ (p. 75) was known to be the idiosyncratic view of Plato (Timaeus). In addition, the teleological element, that the world will not be destroyed ‘thanks to the benevolence of its creator’, is clearly found in Timaeus 32C. A complex web of connections are presented by Sedley between the early Academy (Polemo), Epicurus and Theophrastus to show that the interpretation found in the latter two are part of an early exegesis of the Timaeus.17 The complexity of this one case may suffice to show how difficult it is to give this material a proper treatment. The view that Simplicius has revisited the works of the Presocratics in the process of commenting on Aristotle was not always accepted. Zeller still held the view that the material in book 1 of his commentary on the Physics came mostly from Alexander’s treatment in his (lost) commentary.18 This position has been successfully challenged by a number of partial studies (e.g. O’Brien 1969, Sider 1981 [20052], Laks 1983, Perry 1983), some results of which will be integrated into the argument of this chapter. It is important for our assessment of the Presocratic materials not to jump to conclusions or extrapolate conclusions from one area to others. To generalise in these matters can easily mean to over-generalise: as we shall see, Simplicius’ approach is strongly influenced by his sources – both original sources and earlier commentators – in various different ways. The account in this chapter focuses primarily on his commentary on the Physics, because it is still the primary evidence for our assessment of Presocratic materials in natural philosophy. Our view of Simplicius’ relation to Theophrastus is still determined by the view proposed by nineteenth-century scholarship (Usener 1858, Diels

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius 1879, Zeller 1886). The most urgent problem concerning the Placita is to establish what its purpose and function might be in relation to the major work Theophrastus is thought to have written about his predecessors. Usener thought he had shown that we can distinguish between Theophrastus’ ‘history’ of philosophy and the doxographical collection (Usener 1858: 25f.). But Steinmetz (1964: 335ff.) and Mansfeld (1989) have shown that this interpretation, for the most part based on a specific reading of book titles, rests on a misunderstanding. Usener and Diels seem to have been convinced that the De sensibus (their preferred title) was part of a work they refer to as Opinions of the natural philosophers. Their arguments are not very convincing, but it would take too long to go into this problem here, so I will mention only those points which can help us to understand the importance of the issue.19 It requires little argument to explain how difficult it can be to deduce anything about the content of a work from a title. The relevant texts – subsumed under the label Physicorum opiniones by Usener and Diels – are of varied provenance and do not allow any firm solution to the problem.20 They can be classified into three groups: they belong to Physics, or to the Physikai doxai, or they are impossible to attribute to either or both.21 Moreover, the available evidence for the title of the work is inconclusive for deciding what kind of work could have been the main source for Presocratic material: Calvenus Taurus (F241B FHSG), Alexander (in Metaph. 31.7-8 = F227C FHSG), Plutarch (and Galen’s Commentary on Hippocrates’ Nature of man XV.25 Kühn = F231 FHSG) all cite different titles: On the physical opinions, Replies to the natural philosophers, Summaries of physical opinions, Physics. Presumably what these titles suggest – that a work containing the opinions of the Presocratics was still in circulation among Peripatetic and Platonic authors of the second century CE (Taurus, Plutarch, Galen) – can hardly be decisive for Simplicius. While the references give us the impression of a work describing a broadly defined area of research (physics) on the basis of book titles, it is much harder to make any definite comments on its content. For now the most plausible (or least problematic) hypothesis concerning these titles is the one proposing that the genitive plural in peri tôn phusikôn doxôn (found in Taurus and Galen) should be resolved as phusikai doxai – that is, taken as the title of a work with systematic content dealing with ‘physical’ views (i.e. views related to natural philosophy), which could be used in dialectical evaluations.22 The role of the Presocratics in the first book of Simplicius’ Physics commentary is significantly more prominent than one would expect on the basis of their treatment by Aristotle. This is clear not only from a simple comparison between the base text and the commentary, but also from the way in which Simplicius talks about their importance in his own overall (re)construction of their philosophical endeavours. Aristotle’s habit of surveying earlier views at the start of his investigations is well-known: he

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom was keen to assess existing views in order to establish the questions and problems to be considered in a particular subject and to determine, by elimination, which considered views were still worth while.23 We may refer to this approach as ‘pragmatic dialectics’. By this I mean that Aristotle looks for direction and parameters in his own investigation on the basis of the accumulated insights of previous generations, thus profiting from the obstacles they encountered and the solutions they proposed.24 Simplicius’ attention on the Presocratics seems to have a different focus and motivation. His primary interest in the early Greek thinkers is one which he has inherited from Porphyry, Plotinus and of course Aristotle. But given that he is producing commentary on Aristotle, we would expect only passing comments on their views in the first books, where Aristotle himself discusses them. So we must ask what brings about the unusual elaborations on the Presocratics, especially Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and a few others. He adduces materials from other Aristotelian works and revisits some of their views in later parts of the commentary. It is unusual because his contemporaries were less inclined to do this kind of research (Philoponus being a significant exception). It can in fact be argued that he did not have to comment on them at all: since Aristotle was the crucial author as an introduction to Plato, one would expect the commentary to be predominantly about him. Instead he not only gives them considerable attention, but also makes an effort to chase up their original works and present long quotations from these. Are these merely the habits of a well-trained scholar? Or is there another reason for his elaborate source hunting and lavish use of quotations? Is it in fact a deliberate strategy to extend the harmony among Greek philosophers? I shall suggest an answer to these questions by analysing his discussion of a selection of Presocratic thinkers. The importance of the Presocratics can be clarified from the broader perspective of Greek philosophical thought as a whole. The striking account he gives of the basic harmony between the early Greek philosophers and Plato, Aristotle and others is unprecedented and demands our attention. In the process of discussing this issue it is worth indicating how these reports came to be extracted in modern times, and how they have been treated by modern scholars. The question of harmonisation (so dominant in the debate over how Aristotle and Plato can be shown not to disagree) will also play an important role in our analysis of the early thinkers, because of the way in which Simplicius seems to impose a comprehensive unity on Greek philosophy by assimilating the earliest Greek philosophers into the ‘mainstream’ of Platonist historiography of philosophy. The phusikoi are in agreement regarding the need for inquiring after the basic principles of nature, according to Simplicius (in Phys. 21.14).25 This may strike us as a travesty of reality, but we should not forget that Proclus already pursued this aim; that ancient accounts of philosophical views are notoriously a-historic; or that our view of the evidence is clouded by the limited access

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius we have to it, with the compounding problem that it is Simplicius who is providing us with a large part of the crucial materials. This does not mean that I disagree with the commonly held view that Simplicius’ way of ‘reading’ the Presocratics as ‘proto-Platonists’ is forced. My point is merely that, whatever the fundamental objections we have to Simplicius’ approach to early Greek philosophy, Simplicius’ particular perspective deserves consideration. This chapter is thus given further focus: Simplicius’ viewpoint, brought out in his attempt to synthesise the whole of Greek philosophy as being in ‘harmony’ (symphônein, sunaidein). Strong harmony among the pagan philosophers was by now a much-needed commodity to counter the Christians in their claim that Christian doctrine drew its strength from its unity, combining this claim with an attack on Greek philosophers as suffering from disagreements and thus lack of unity. Considered from this angle, earlier studies of Simplicius’ treatment of the Presocratics can guide us, in addition to the more recent contextualised interpretations of philosophical texts surviving only in fragments.26 We may first glance at his momentous importance for early Greek philosophy before we look at some significant examples in which his selection criteria disclose his interests (2.1). There can be little doubt that the pivotal motive underlying his approach is this (to us rather extreme) version of harmonisation with the aim of bringing the early Greek philosophers into the fold of the Platonist narrative of intellectual and religious history. This strategy of reverting to the ‘ancient wisdom’ of Pythagoras and thinkers of his era involves a reinterpretation of the Presocratics: by interpreting early Greek philosophy as he does, Simplicius attempts to make the Presocratics fit a configuration of ideas of late Platonism, which is itself an amalgam of Plotinian, Iamblichan and Proclan revisions (cf. Sorabji 1990: 4f.). He may have followed Plotinus, who saw the Presocratics as his ‘precursors’,27 but there are other influences detectable from, e.g., Alexander, Porphyry and Proclus (Iamblichus) to help us understand this perspective, starting with Parmenides and Empedocles (2.2), and the remarkable thesis of Anaxagoras (2.3). The argument will prove to be both a vindication of Osborne’s broader thesis of contextual adaptation – but now based on a different author – and an adjustment of it in that Simplicius’ approach goes much further than Hippolytus’ Christian adaptation. In the process of assimilating the Presocratics, Simplicius uses certain procedures which are of interest for our assessment of the preserved texts, since they reveal Simplicius’ method of handling and incorporating sources into the larger narrative of his commentary. What was at stake for him was nothing less than the survival of the pagan perspective, an objective which was to be achieved by demonstrating the unity of Greek philosophy as a whole (2.4).

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom 2.1 What we have thanks to Simplicius It has often been stated, and rightly so, that without Simplicius the study of Presocratic thought would be speculation for the most part, especially when it comes to the preservation of ipsissima verba. As we have seen (§1.2-4) Simplicius has done future generations of philosophers and scholars a huge favour by considering the issue of quotation carefully and deciding that there are good reasons to supplement paraphrase (a more common mode of writing among the Platonist teachers) with elaborate and frequent citation of the authors under discussion. However, in the scholarly literature Simplicius’ use of quotations, and in particular his generosity in quoting, is mostly taken for granted rather than explained. For a long time his works have been used as quarries and understandably the question of reliability has been dominant. Scholars agree that his longer quotations are reliable, but are less clear about the reasons for their presence in the commentaries. Should we frame the question in such a way that we consider this sixth-century Platonist as simply an antiquarian who delighted in writing long commentaries? Or did he have specific reasons for his elaborate quotations, perhaps as a result of serious reflection upon his own method? A reminder of the statistics will make clear how much we owe Simplicius for the preservation of Presocratic material: our text of Parmenides owes about 100 of 154 extant Greek verses to Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,28 in the case of Empedocles29 it is around 150 of 450 lines surviving from an estimated total of 3,000 of his cosmological poem; for Anaxagoras twelve ‘verbatim’ fragments of a total of 22 come from Simplicius.30 For Diogenes of Apollonia31 we can rely on at least six fragments in his review and ten for Melissus. His regular appearance in the main sources for Diels-Kranz (an indicator of selection) and their distribution across the A and B fragments demonstrates our reliance on his works. This is represented in comparative fashion in the table overleaf: I have highlighted Aëtius, an early source between Simplicius and Theophrastus, and Simplicius, to indicate how remarkable his evidence is for an author writing in the early sixth century CE.32 In themselves impressive, such numbers are of course only of limited value to us in assessing why Simplicius quotes from these authors, or how (or even how reliably). Moreover, Diels’ approach in his collection of fragments of Presocratic philosophy (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th edn, 1922-) clearly chose to privilege the ‘direct’ quotations (‘B’ fragments) over and above the ‘paraphrases’ (‘A’ fragments), but has been found to be flawed.33 The main reasons for wanting to re-edit DK are three: (1) the separation of quotations from their contexts diminishes their information value; (2) DK is no longer a comprehensive collection; (3) the presumption that ‘B’ fragments are more important undeservedly undercuts the value of ‘A’ fragments. That said, it is probably unlikely that anyone will in fact re-edit DK, since that would leave the old conceptual framework in place.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius DK

Aëtius D.L. Sextus Ps. Plut Simpl. other

(A+B)

A/B

A/B

A/B

A/B

A/B

Thales 23

7/–

1/–

–/–

–

1/–

Anaximander 30

12/2

1/–

1/–

–

4/1

Anaximenes 23 8/2

1/–

–/–

–

2/–

Xenophanes 52 10/2

5/–

–/5

1/1

1/2

A/B

Heraclitus 23

9/1

1/12 –/3

–/17

2/-

Parmenides 54

11/–

5/–

–

3/2

6/9

Melissus

–

–

–

–

–/10

Anaxagoras

24/–

5/–

1/–

8/2

5/16

34/2

1/4

1/7

2/37

1

Ar. 17

4/11

7/3

Suidas 3 Clement 2, Arist. 36, Theophr. 10; Aelianus 6

Ar. Thphr. Hipp. Alex. Galen Clem.

/6

Diogenes Apoll. Empedocles 98

Thphr. 1

Democritus 170 25/–

4/19 9/10

The important issues of context and closeness to the ‘original’ can only be resolved for each individual case when there is independent evidence. It would go too far to do this for all Presocratics in the present context, so the three short case studies presented below will illustrate the process of assimilation of Presocratic thought into the Simplician narrative. It makes sense to concentrate on Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, since they are singled out by Simplicius as having done a better job than other Presocratics by distinguishing physics from metaphysics much like the much-revered Pythagoreans did (ta phusika apo tôn huper physin diakrinontes, in Phys. 20.29-21.19).34 Parmenides and Empedocles I shall treat together, because they appear in his discussion largely as a result of his interest in their metaphysical monism (2.2). Simplicius’ interest in Anaxagoras is due mainly to the latter’s claims about the importance of mind (nous) and will thus illustrate how the bold and grand statements of early Greek philosophy had a major influence on later thought (2.3). All three were important figures among the early Greek philosophers because of their original contributions: Parmenides and Empedocles are generally viewed as the early champions of monism and pluralism, debating the main constituents of matter, the possibility of motion, and the reality of sensory perception.35 Of course we should not forget that we rely heavily on the Aristotelian evidence for this judgement. Ancient accounts before Simplicius had already pitted Empedocles and Anaxagoras against

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom one another, as for instance in Aristotle’s On generation and corruption (314a24-b1) and Theophrastus’ De sensu, where they are the main representatives of the theories explaining perception by like or opposites respectively.36 Such labelling or ‘type-casting’ of the early philosophical positions as distinct theories of major significance already allowed the Peripatetics to develop explanatory models based on convenient binary divisions into two major groupings.37 With such precedents of historiographic modelling Simplicius might have adopted a similar approach. As we saw above, the evidence for Theophrastus’ work on earlier Greek philosophy (represented in several titles) does not allow to resolve the problem of his role in Simplicius’ material, but we can explore the issue of Simplicius’ access to Presocratic material. 2.1.1 The art of quotation once more The first question we need to ask is whether Simplicius had direct access to Presocratic works. If access was direct, not only will it enhance his reputation as a scholar, it could potentially make us reassess the materials he preserves, including his paraphrases. The issue is rather tricky. At this stage of our analysis asking the question allows us to test further our general characterisation of why and how Simplicius reflected on his quotation method (§1.2.3) by looking at individual cases. The earlier examples showed how some notion of a difference between prose and poetry was clear when he spoke about Melissus (who wrote in prose). There was also a clear emphasis on the need to reproduce the ‘words themselves’ of these earlier authors as a way of reaching greater accuracy and clarity in interpretation (in Phys. 111.15-17). In all cases, in particular where polemic and criticism come into it, a careful reading of each case must precede further inferences regarding his general methodology. Evidence to substantiate our claim of access (direct or indirect) to the works of Presocratics is of two types: first, Simplicius provides indirect comments on the provenance of his materials which strongly suggest that he had copies of the works in front of him (and not, pace Zeller, just Alexander’s commentary, a verdict perhaps based on Diels’ introduction to the Simplicius edition, CAG vol. 9, p. v, n. 1). This material ranges from comments on the location of passages in the original work to elaborate paraphrases and quotations from these works surviving nowhere else – some to be discussed below. For instance, Simplicius indicates when material is coming from (near) the beginning of a work, as he does with Diogenes of Apollonia or Anaxagoras.38 Second, the amount and nature of the ipsissima verba are in themselves a counter-argument for thinking he did not have access to good copies. The first point (amount) I have described above, the second (nature) will be discussed in what follows. Over and above these factors there is the comparatively high presence of Presocratic materials when placed next to some of the other important

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius doxographical sources as shown in the table given above. It specifies only the most important sources, yet it clearly shows how the Presocratic thinkers are distributed across the sources, with a clear role for Simplicius and specific thinkers. I have highlighted the sources towards the outer ends of the tradition (Aëtius,39 Simplicius) to give some indication of how the transmission of material has undergone change over 400 years: only Aëtius has Thales, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Parmenides (all testimonies in DK, i.e. ‘A’ fragments); Simplicius on the other hand abounds in references to Anaximander (‘A’ fragments), Anaxagoras (‘B’ fragments) and Melissus (‘B’ fragments). Quotation, then, features in several significant ways: for justification (e.g. to substantiate a paraphrase: in DC 140.32-3, 298.21-2), for clarification (e.g. when statements containing technical or other obscure terms have been rephrased, 25.26-30), or for evidentiary reasons (e.g. in Phys. 331.10). It was also noted earlier that Simplicius objects to using testimonia as a demonstration (in Phys. 1318.10-15), a position that carries the important implication that he regards quotation-plus-interpretation as the correct format for his exegetical strategy (as did Porphyry, see below). His more practical motivation, reflected in two well-known references to the scarcity of certain works (spanin, in Phys. 144.25-8; in Cat. 352.22-4), is significant for the man and his mindset, but should not be over-emphasised. One is reminded of the method of the Alexandrian church fathers of the third and fourth centuries, in particular Origen and Eusebius, who pioneered the use of quotation in their exegetical activities.40 Further details of Simplicius’ quotation technique can corroborate this line of interpretation. Specific verbs underline the conscious distinction he makes between taking up the words of the authors and other ways of representing their views (paraphrase, summary, criticism, rephrasing in contemporary language). The crucial lexical evidence is limited but indispensable: quotations are announced by paratithesthai or paragraphein, and may be introduced by verbs of stating, saying, remarking, etc. There are strong indications that in the commentators paratithesthai and paragraphein (literally ‘marking a text with signs’) are almost always used to introduce (fairly) accurate quotations (exceptions exist, see e.g. Themistius in DA 107.30). One of the famous passages of Empedocles, from his poem (B17 DK41), is also introduced with the same verb (paratithesthai) and signals the very interesting implication that Simplicius does not distinguish between the basic meaning of paratithesthai/ paragraphein (in the margin) and ‘quoting’, so that it is even possible that Simplicius himself marked citations in the text, as in Cat. 64.20-5 may suggest (more examples exist).42 The use of these verbs in this sense was not new, as is clear from earlier examples. Some cases often retain the meaning of ‘put side by side, compare’, as for instance in the evaluative comment by Plutarch Aristides 26.4 ‘although he customarily and properly records such things and sets

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom forth his written sources’, which signals the proper use of documentary evidence,43 or in his De Stoic. repugn. 1051E to avoid repetition: ‘often written and said by them so no need to adduce their (own) words’ (toutôn pollakhou graphomenôn kai legomenôn par autois ouden edei lexeis paratithesthai). Other cases can be translated simply as ‘quote’, such as [Plut.] Consolation to Apollonia 115E, or Galen PHP 5.3.31 (saphêneias heneka } paratithesthai kairos), De compos medic. 13.455.11 (parathêsomai tên graphên autois tois hup’ ekeinou gegraphomenois stikhois [quotation from Damocrates follows]), ibid. 774.9 (kata lexin). As well as these examples from pagan writings we also find the Church fathers making use of the verbs, such as Clement of Alexandria,44 Origen45 and Eusebius.46 The verb paratithesthai has also been found in marginalia of much later periods, one from the late seventh century CE, the other from c. 800 CE, where the verb ‘indicates the normal position of notes in the margin without implying anything about their origin or complexity’;47 they are the basis for marginal commentaries on classical texts. Clearly writers such as those living at the start of or during the Second Sophistic and Alexandrian Church fathers represent a strand of ancient philosophical and theological scholarship in which the tools of the trade shine through: the bookish nature of their literary output is nicely illustrated by the shared use of technical terms in the context of source evaluation and quotation. Against the background of these earlier authors it becomes clear how scholars educated in the great centres of learning could come to regard quotation as an essential part of their exegetical procedures, although it cannot easily be traced as a systematic component of their methodology before Eusebius. For Simplicius, who was educated in this Alexandrian tradition, two further points can be made.48 To begin with, his use of quotation and paraphrase may have been inspired in particular by Porphyry (c. 232-305 CE), whose work he refers to frequently. Porphyry used paraphrase-cumquotation to great effect in his exegetical comments on the harmony between Plato and Aristotle, unprecedented as to the manner and quantity of quoting.49 Moreover, a strong argument in favour of seeing Simplicius as an innovator is the fact that his quotations are frequently longer than is required in the context. This is clear from his apologies for ‘going on a bit’ (mêkunai, in Phys. 36.25, 80.15, 233.3, cf. in DC 11.25) presented as a necessary part of his explication, perhaps because he wants to avoid trying his audience’s patience.50 But his meticulous signposting of quotations with special verbs and his occasional comments exhibiting a clear awareness of their value in philosophical discourse based on historical materials, also underline the unusual place his method has in the history of late antique scholarship. My earlier suggestion (§1.2.3) that it is connected to the Platonists’ preference for oral education in philosophising (linked to the notion of the ‘living voice’, viva voce/ apo phônês) provides only a partial answer to the question why Simplicius thought direct quotation is important.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Such insights into his quotation method can assist us in determining how Simplicius arranges and values his materials. He is keen to offer the words of certain thinkers where possible and appropriate. Moreover, the use of the future tense parathêsomai, with which he conveniently announces upcoming passages, suggests that he had been pre-arranging his materials. It would be of interest to understand more about his planning of the commentary, which is not simply determined by following the Aristotelian text. Some comments relevant to this point will be made along the way. I shall now turn to the first case study of early Greek thinkers. 2.2 Two views on unity and plurality: Parmenides and Empedocles As prime examples of monism and pluralism respectively, Parmenides and Empedocles receive considerable attention from Simplicius. Their proposals on the reduction of the world (and our impressions of it) to, on the one hand, a contrast between ‘what is’ (ti estin) and ‘what appears’ (Parmenides) and, on the other, four main constituents of matter (called ‘roots’, rhizômata) directed by two additional forces ‘Love’ and ‘Hate’ (Empedocles), were ambitious models for explaining the plurality of the world and its origin. The explanatory power of these theories lies as much in their imaginative rethinking of natural phenomena as it does in its forceful reduction of the universe to a very limited set of factors. Simplicius was no doubt led by earlier Platonist interest in the Presocratics, as found in Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus. He shows particular interest in those aspects which are amenable to Plotinian physics and metaphysics. In these areas Plato’s Parmenides and Timaeus were taken as the guiding works, with a strong emphasis on the fundamental unity of the cosmos while still accommodating a hierarchy in the levels of being (a ‘topdown model’). Plotinus’ monism has been linked to earlier thinkers as a concept, but his version owes most to Parmenides and Numenius.51 His notion of an all-encompassing source of the whole universe, the One, is an efficient as well as a final cause (e.g. Enn. 3.8.11.40, 5.3.15.28-30). It constitutes a more comprehensive application of monism than the material principles the Presocratics came up with as a starting point or principle of the physical universe (arkhê), yet it resembles Parmenides’ conception of metaphysical monism in that its reductionism is comprehensive and total (28B8.5-6 DK). As Rist has pointed out (1965: 338), Plotinus manages to maintain his metaphysical monism alongside his ethical dualism. The One can be described only by way of its powers and impact, since the One is beyond words, ‘ineffable’ (Enn. 5.3.13.1). His way around this problem is usually to allow for negative statements about the One, that is to say, to state what it is not.52 It is however quite clear that his monism contains elements also found in earlier Greek philosophical doctrines, but they have been recast into a new role within a new system. His own acknow-

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom ledgement of this partial dependence does not detract from his originality. In following him Simplicius will have taken up the interpretive direction of Plotinus, Porphyry and Syrianus regarding the relevance of the Presocratic doctrines as well as their important push for the harmonisation of Greek philosophy. 2.2.1 Parmenides (c. 515-450 BCE) Parmenides marks a new and radical approach to thought and nature. This was not just an important step in the progression towards fuller rationalistic analysis, constituting a break with argumentative habits as found in the earliest explanations of the world. It also set the parameters for a new discourse on nature and metaphysics for the next two hundred years. As Burnet put it: ‘Philosophy must now cease to be monistic or cease to be corporealist. It could not cease to be corporealist, because the incorporeal was still unknown.’53 The Homeric and Hesiodic accounts, reflecting ‘primitive’ attempts at rationalising the workings of the universe, clearly belong to the oral tribal cultures of the late Bronze Age and early Archaic period, in which mythological elements abound and logical consistency was not a priority. Argumentative patterns are implicit, cosmogony and cosmology the dominant focus of explanatory discourse, and the form of delivery is still in narrative structures which show no self-conscious reflection on whether there could be a more justified or naturally preferred mode of presentation or explanation.54 As the standard account has it, Parmenides changed the philosophical landscape by making thought itself an important object of study, and he is regarded by many as the first philosopher in a strong sense, in particular for his awareness of the need for metaphysical causes and the use of rigorous deductive reasoning. Although this characterisation of the ‘origin’ of philosophy is a view typical of the Aristotelian tradition, it cannot be denied that Parmenides was hugely influential on later thinkers, mainly because of the obstacles he had put in the way of deducing plurality from a single cause. He was acutely aware that the activity of thinking is often determined by presuppositions that go unchallenged and that argumentation is structured by certain rules of engagement. His famous analysis of ‘is’ and ‘is not’ (B8-9 DK) as the main factors in our misguided way of thinking signals his powers of abstract thinking and lies at the heart of his revolutionary new approach. His analysis demonstrates how we think we know the real nature of things, but raise a screen between ourselves and the world by using language, in particular language that is misleading unless we acknowledge that the verb form ‘is’ should be taken as a predicational mode of attributing properties, not as an existential mode conveying Being.55 Parmenides was trying to put stricter conditions in place to allow for the proper understanding of reality. This (pseudo)logical and metaphysical focus is the first strong case for

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius a monistic stance which radically denies the sensory evidence as a source for knowledge.56 Parmenides’ rigorous deductions lead him to argue that pure reason is the proper tool, while its powers of deduction help to persuade us that change is impossible.57 Henceforth any thinker wanting to claim that perception does provide a basis for knowledge would have to take issue with this position. Empedocles tried to overcome this by reinstating the trustworthiness of the senses with his ‘ingenious doctrine of pores and effluences’;58 the atomists tried to salvage the situation indirectly by explaining the distortion of the phenomenal world from its imperfect link to an underlying reality, an invisible true reality consisting of atoms (which give rise to a range of secondary qualities that vary at perceptual level) and void, a kind of ‘non-being’ which also had existence. Plato and Aristotle came up with more forceful refutations of a logical and metaphysical nature, both with different purposes in mind. Thus the next generations of Greek thinkers, grappling with the questions of physics and its causes, had to deal with Parmenides’ extreme position in order to find a way forward. Parmenides’ emphasis on logic and a priori knowledge produced fruitful obstacles, but obstacles nonetheless. Simplicius comes to Parmenides from two different directions. His commentary on Aristotle needs to interpret the latter’s doctrine, including his view on Parmenides (whom Aristotle considers to belong to metaphysics rather than physics: Phys. 184b25-85a1, Metaph. 986b12-17). But he also inherited a positive attitude to Parmenides from his predecessor commentators: Plotinus (Enn. 5.9.1), Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius all show a deep interest in the metaphysical principles they took Parmenides to uphold. However, their dependence is largely indirect in that they relied heavily on Plato’s Parmenides, and hence on ‘Plato’s Parmenides’ (e.g. Damascius De princ. 1.150.1). So Simplicius’ return to the ‘real’ Parmenides is another sign that his approach is out of the ordinary by his time.59 The intrinsic unity of reality was a prime concern of the late Platonists, starting with Plotinus. This interest stems from Plato’s preoccupation with unity as a preferred metaphysical principle for making sense of the multiplicity of the sensible world. Parmenides used strict logical reasoning to persuade his audience of its necessity. He described the ultimate ‘singularity’ in extremely positive terms: a sphere, uncreated and imperishable, single, unshaken and perfect, of one kind (B8.1-4). Here seemingly endless possibilities are reduced to only one. The terms used fulfil a priori requirements for something so fundamental ontologically: it cannot be deficient or have any of the qualities we associate with imperfection, incompleteness and diversity. Since Xenophanes the appropriate predicates worthy of the divine had found their place in the more secular context of rational theology (F17 DK). Even if Aristotle thought that Parmenides’ views belong to metaphysics, he refers to them frequently. Thus we see Simplicius discuss these in his commentaries on Physics and On the heavens.60 He has gone out of his

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom way to collect the passages he thinks are most relevant, often referring to both Parmenides and Melissus. A brief review below will make this clear. Length of quotations ranges from one line up to 51 lines (B8). Thus we may say that the extraordinary preservation of many Parmenidean passages in Simplicius seems to result from two converging tendencies in his approach: (1) the (inherited) interest in monism; (2) the deliberate use of quotation as a means to illustrate and strengthen his argument. The fact that Parmenides wrote in hexameters helps us to detect his voice in the prose of the commentaries. Diels’ edition of the in Phys. makes this abundantly clear by separating out the Parmenidean text from Simplicius’ prose, even starting a new line each time he gives Parmenides’ words. The total of these passages in Simplicius (approximately 100 lines) stands out against other sources that complement them.61 They provide us with a substantial glimpse of the work and the ideas therein (in Dielsian categories: fragments A7, 10, 14, 28 [life and works]; A34, B1, 2, 6-9, 11-13 [doctrine]). Without Simplicius’ excerpts we would know far less about Parmenides’ Homeric style and imagery, his emphasis on argument and proof, the division between the Way of Truth and that of Seeming, and his rigorous method of coming to conclusions about the truth. Textual divergences could occur: we know of one passage for which Simplicius had a different version from the one used by Proclus (412-85 CE).62 It has also been pointed out that the phrasing in B8 has two versions in his text (the world as mounogenes 30.2 or hologenes 137.15). In the early parts of his poem (B1 = Sextus Empiricus vii.111ff. + Simplicius in DC 557.20-558.2), we learn about a journey upwards to ‘the goddess’, going through the ‘gates of Night and Day’, an exchange with the goddess, the injunctions to judge ‘things that seem to be’, and to apply his reasoning skills to the ‘proof uttered by me’. Clearly the suggestion is that this wisdom is a divinely inspired one and that his account has ‘prophetic’ meaning. Such a presentation, reminiscent of the ‘shamanic’ style used by traditional priests and wise men, was not unusual among the early Greek theorists; it shows how ‘philosophy’ was still emerging from the traditional and tribal communities for whom systematic rational analysis of the world had not been central to their concerns. Passages that have been included among the quotations show how Simplicius gives Parmenides a broader airing: in DC 557.25ff. (B1 DK, but most of it from Sextus Empiricus) we find some lines from the long proem which sketches in semi-mythical images the journey the author has taken to reach his new insights. Simplicius introduces the material at in Phys. 116.25ff. (= B2) and we learn that he introduces and quotes a section as proof of his proper representation of Parmenides’ words (ei tis epithumei kai autou tou Parmenidou } akousai) on the routes of right thinking. Then at in Phys. 117.2ff., 144.29ff., 147.28, 179.31 (B6-963) he gives us the actual argument regarding the ‘is’ and ‘is not’ and expounds the reasoning for Parmenides’ dichotomy into the two domains of ap-

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius pearance and the truth, including some of Aristotle’s criticism (who declared Parmenides’ reasoning fallacious). Interestingly, the first passage (117.2ff. = B6) is preceded by a reference to Porphyry’s interpretation (116.6-18) which comes immediately after the discussion of Aristotle’s treatment of Melissus and Parmenides (lemma 186a24ff.). Simplicius indicates that Porphyry uses Parmenides’ words (6) and Aristotle’s (7) and goes on to paraphrase Porphyry’s before he writes out Parmenides’ verses (116.27-117.1, 4-13). Porphyry’s rendering of the argument is considered similar to Aristotle’s (19, eoike houtô pôs apomnêmoneuein). In short, the authorities agree – always a very satisfactory result. Finally, in DC 556.12ff., 559.20ff., in Phys. 39.12-20, 39.18 (B11-13 DK) provide further short phrases on the cosmogony.64 Thematically most of these passages clarify the cosmological claims, expand on Aristotle’s discussion, and contextualise Parmenides’ ideas within a Platonist outlook. Simplicius’ various comments contain information not always in Aristotle, which proves that he had access to additional sources and used them. Some basic facts about the life and affiliations are given in passing: Parmenides was a student of Xenophanes (in Phys. 22.27-9 = 31A7). The inclusion of in Phys. 115.11ff. as A28 (i.e. among the testimonia) seems unfortunate. Even if not a ‘fragment’ by Diels’ own implicit definition, it contains valuable information on sources and doctrine: it discusses the central thesis of ‘is’ and ‘is not’ and reports Eudemus’ version (via Alexander) of the core statement which seems to have been stylised into a syllogism, as Aristotle (and Alexander) will often do. Eudemus’ role is of interest here, because Simplicius puts great store in his views as an early Peripatetic, but also because he is one of the earliest exegetes on Aristotle and the Presocratics.65 In this case Simplicius reports his version of the Parmenidean statements via Alexander (115.11) and from Eudemus’ own physics (115.15), adding the latter because the brief report of Alexander is not considered clear. A useful statement in paraphrase (in Phys. 39.10ff. = A34, text 2) is a further example of how Diels’ division into testimonia (paraphrase) and fragments (quotation) is difficult to maintain. The paraphrase is corroborated by Plutarch (A34, text 1) and provides valuable context for the quoted words: it reports the two domains of opinion and truth. As I indicated earlier in this chapter, privileging direct quotation over paraphrase at all times leads to the loss of a contextualised view of the materials and may as a result give a distorted representation of the evidence. The distribution of the passages in Simplicius’ text gives us some indication of how he constructs these parts of his commentary. The initial trigger for elaborating on Parmenides is of course Aristotle’s text and comments, after which further evaluations are added on the basis of the additional research he has done with the help of a more extensive source for the Presocratic under discussion. Support for this can be brought in by

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom looking at what he adds over and above Aristotle, and especially where he deems a quotation useful or appropriate. From in Phys. 21.18 onwards Parmenides is given considerable attention, often named in tandem with Melissus (as in Aristotle), but clearly with greater emphasis on quotations from Parmenides. The following passage gives us crucial information on how Simplicius approaches these early thinkers (21.16-19): Those who have done philosophical investigations into arkhai have searched for principles of existing things, some in a poorly defined way, not distinguishing the physical things (ta phusika) from those above nature (huper phusin), others distinguishing , such as the Pythagoreans and Xenophanes and Melissus and Parmenides and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, escaping the attention of the multitude due to lack of clarity (asapheiai).

This passage reveals three interesting features of his working method: (1) Platonists have special understanding of the ancients which eluded the multitude; (2) he works in the style of Aristotle by using categorisation via division (dihaeresis); (3) it hints at the late Platonists’ tactic of claiming that the old wisdom in the texts of earlier theorists merely needs ‘uncovering’ because it has been expressed in an obscure (asapheiai) or riddling way (anigmatôdê, 7.3).66 According to his immediate predecessors and teachers Iamblichus, Syrianus and Damascius, there was no ‘history of the Truth, only a history of its manifestation and of its unveiling’.67 The division in two groups is also striking, and follows on from Aristotle’s comments that some natural philosophers had not yet reached a proper understanding of the causes of nature. Then a further division of early thinkers by the number of causes is presented, which goes over and above what we find in Aristotle (Phys. A.2-4), and it has been plausibly suggested that Simplicius builds on Theophrastus’ Physics (mentioned 9.7-8) in order to reach a ‘more complete dihaeresis’ (22.20) with some additions of his own.68 Parmenides features among the monists – those who claim the world can be reduced to one basic cause – and is considered valuable for his grasp of the dual reality we face: here the old distinction between the perceptual and the conceptual of human cognition is being read in Plotinian terms and transported onto a vertical plane, where truth and reality belong to the upper realm in line with the Platonic scheme. Parmenides is also considered special because of his rigour in argument (116.2-4). Both these characteristics make Parmenides most suitable to elaborate on. What is also of interest is the discrepancy between what Simplicius reports and what we know about Parmenides from other sources. The material extant in other sources (B-section DK: Sextus Empiricus, Clement, Plutarch, Galen, Proclus) is often overlapping with it or very specialised (e.g. medicine). But we can still see some author-specific

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius interests that explain the choices they have made in selecting and quoting from Parmenides: Sextus Empiricus will focus on epistemology (B); Clement’s quotation shows an emphasis on knowledge; Plutarch addresses his cosmology in his polemic against Colotes, who apparently claimed Parmenides had done away with natural causes (Adv. Col. 1114b = B10). These are obvious points to make, but this pattern suggests that Simplicius’ omission of these aspects further underscores his own particular preferences. It is also noteworthy that it is from Parmenides’ poem that Simplicius quotes beyond what is required for his immediate purpose. Moreover, Simplicius seems able to keep track of his quotations, as is evident from backward references to earlier passages (e.g. proteron parethemên, in Phys. 38.29, 437.1). As we saw in §1.2, one reason he gave (not used for any other Presocratic) was the rarity of the work (dia tên spanin, 144.26), but another reason given in the same statement reveals a further concern over his methodology: he aims to be persuasive in his presentation of evidence (pistin, ibid.), and quotation is his way of achieving this. The material is clearly selected for the specific purpose of showing how Parmenides can be appropriated within the Platonist doctrine. The interpretation reached combines ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources and is based on an evaluation of all of these. Of the latter group Alexander is prominent for interpretive suggestions, as are Porphyry and Eudemus. Somehow Theophrastus contributes fewer evaluative comments, but whenever he does, his authority is never questioned. Thus Aristotle’s lead is closely followed, and the Parmenidean passages are aligned with his interpretations, either as illustration or for preservation. 2.2.2 Empedocles (c. 493-35 BCE) Empedocles’ legacy to philosophy is considerable and was strongly motivated by his desire to eliminate the obstacles Parmenides’ theory had generated, even if he accepted some of the parameters the latter had put in place. His preference for the principle of ‘like is known by like’ made it a powerful notion in theories of human cognition. His four-element theory has been very influential in both the philosophical (four causes) and medical traditions (four humours). Instead of picking just one of the four basic ‘stuffs’ in the world as most had done before him, Empedocles’ model used all four elements as basic ungenerated components of the world, making the process of generation and destruction of physical objects a mechanical one, that of combining and separating such basic materials (see Furley 1987, ch. 7 and below, p. 77). Thus he provided the natural philosophers with a tool to reinstate change and motion, so radically denied by Parmenides and Zeno.69 But his other innovation is also relevant here: the additional factors Love and Strife suggest that he too realised that a theory of matter without a source of motion would make his universe inert, unless one could find a way to explain change and motion

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom as arising from matter itself. Love (or attraction) and Strife (or repulsion) could provide such an explanation, leaving him with six principles (in Phys. 154.6-9, 188.30-1). The result is a very dynamic universe in which cyclical processes generate organs, limbs, organisms and major cosmic transitions. Thus material and non-material factors contribute to the creation of a cosmology that can make sense. Like Parmenides, Empedocles displays traits of the shaman and miracle-worker, and his claims to the truth can look rather apodictic and dogmatic. But the religious overtones of their presentation was probably another attractive aspect of their outlook for the late Platonists, whose analysis of the world seamlessly fuses the rational and the spiritual.70 Simplicius’ discussion of Empedocles’ poem also takes its cue from Aristotle who espoused a theory of four causes, but he adds Theophrastus, Eudemus and Alexander to the mix. Empedocles is presented as closely connected to Parmenides (in Phys. 25.19-21)71 and the Pythagoreans (in Phys. 25.21, in DC 140.25-7), but also as having things in common with Heraclitus (in DC 294.32-3, 307.16-17, 367.12). He may be linked to the former for his belief in reincarnation (B115, 117), and to the latter for his view that there is change (alloiôsis) in nature, not real destruction (phthora). Simplicius seems to know Empedocles’ work intimately, and refers to it as ‘his Physics’, even indicating it was in two books (in Phys. 381.29 mentions a ‘second book of his physics’). The important fragment B17, one of the longest among the quotations, has now been partly confirmed and recognised as belonging to the early part of the poem on the basis of the recently discovered papyrus text.72 We can also point (again) to how Simplicius has a strong awareness of his own use of the material, evidenced by forward (20.8) and backwards (358.8) references. Our knowledge of Empedocles’ writings is incomplete, and the debate over the number of his works in natural philosophy still continues. In particular the work that we have substantial quotations from, the poem On nature, poses some puzzles: it has been suggested that the evidence points to two separate works, one on cosmology, the other on a religious topic. The titles peri phuseôs (‘on nature’) and katharmoi (‘purifications’) could be read in such a way, but a recent proposal by Richard Janko has made a persuasive case for taking them as alternative titles, or rather as a title and a more descriptive indication of content.73 The decisive argument Janko uses is how the modern distinction between ‘physics’ and religion seems to have prevented interpreters from considering how these are never separated in early cosmologies, for which he refers to Heraclitus and the Derveni papyrus as strong parallels. There is evidence to think that Simplicius’ interpretation and that of his teachers echo the Platonising interpretation initiated by Porphyry, in which the cosmic cycle(s) in Empedocles are read as a non-literal representation of the emanations of the One.74 As the main causative force in the universe, the One conveys its motive and formative powers by way of

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius emanation, very much like a spring which is inexhaustible and undiminished (cf. Plotinus Enn. 5.1.6). This ‘flowing forth’ of Being is thus viewed as an explanation for all that we think exists, but also for the levels of Being (hypostases) ‘between’ the One and us. This reality is not merely physical in the traditional sense, but also psychological (or noetic). Contemplation in Plotinus is a creative force, which generates all things; human contemplation of the One will bring us closer to it, indeed can bring about a return (or reversal) to the One – the ultimate goal of Plotinus and his followers. Another unusual difference from earlier cosmologies is that the ‘beginning’ is not seen as a point in time: the causal relation between the One and the derivative reality humans see is one of dependence rather than temporal and originative. It is with these broader principles in mind that we have to try to understand Simplicius’ reading of the Presocratics. As Denis O’Brien has shown persuasively, Simplicius’ conclusions are in some cases based on a mistaken interpretation.75 Again the preoccupations of Simplicius – his use of a Neoplatonic lens, so to speak – lead to a specific focus by way of either over- or under-emphasising particular elements. For instance, on the question whether the universe is at rest or not, Simplicius assumes that Empedocles posits two periods of rest, probably on the basis of the descriptions and quotations in Aristotle and Eudemus. O’Brien has given a detailed analysis to show that the Sphere was at rest, as Aristotle had surmised.76 He also shows how Simplicius argues against Aristotle that Love is active in the sensible world (O’Brien, 151). Aristotle would reject the notion that Empedocles proposed alternating stages of Love and Strife.77 His interpretation of the four cosmic stages was accepted by Alexander.78 The unified state of the world under the rule of Love may well have reminded ancient readers of the sphericity of Parmenides’ cosmos. The problem with the opposing pair of cosmic forces in Empedocles’ view is that there will hardly ever be complete harmony (B27), although the language he uses does suggest that it is as devoid of human deficiencies and as much of a uniform nature as Parmenides claimed for his One (B29, 134).79 It is also quite interesting to note how the words of Empedocles are often given qualifying tags when quoted: according to Simplicius’ presentation, he suggests things by his owns words (in DC 293.23 sêmainei), makes claims (586.10 phêsi, legei passim), clarifies (160.15 dêloi, 19-20.24 edêlôsen – presumably his own views), and teaches (in Phys. 31.19 didaskôn).80 In Aristotle he is often contrasted with Anaxagoras, but Simplicius suggests on occasion that Aristotle preferred Empedocles, for instance, because he held there was a finite number of elements (in Phys. 1254.22-3, compare the quotation above, p. 73). In one respect Simplicius differs significantly from Aristotle here: the pairing up or contrasting of particular thinkers in Aristotle is quite dogmatic and limited to a few ‘sets’. Empedocles and Anaxagoras are commonly contrasted (on sense perception and matter), but there is also Democritus versus Plato (sense

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom perception), or Parmenides and Melissus versus Empedocles and Democritus (number of principles). These oppositions arise within the very strict framework of Aristotelian physics, in which the predecessors are measured by the ‘new standard’ of Aristotelian ideas. Simplicius’ approach is much more inclusive and open-minded, so that another range of contrasts and comparisons can be made (Anaxagoras and Democritus both posit infinite causes, in Phys. 458.30; Democritus, Empedocles and Anaxagoras share an approach in cosmology, houtô gar kai Dêmokritos kosmopoiei kai Empedoklês kai Anaxagoras, 1120.20). The choice of material in Simplicius warrants some further comment. As we saw with Parmenides, Simplicius’ interests are quite specific, yet his quotations are still lavish. This can again be shown by comparing him with other sources. Sextus’ special interest in epistemology is evident in his quoted materials (B1, B3). Clement’s focus shares such interests, but he also reports on matters more easily associated with the religious perspective on the origin of life and fate of humanity (B38, 124). Plutarch too seems to report predominantly on details of a diverse nature in part determined by his own immediate discussion, whether it is of astronomy (Roman questions 288b = A60, Platonic questions 1006e = B48), religious pollution (On exile 607c = B115) or flavours (Table talk 663a = B90). Aëtius’ Placita provides us with further minutiae not in Simplicius. We cannot make too much of this discrepancy (the value of arguments from silence is limited), but it reinforces the very different focus and working manner of Simplicius in selecting and quoting. The length of Simplicius’ quotations ranges from one line to 34 lines (B17). The expansiveness of the quotations cannot always be explained, as he does not always comment on it, but it may be another clue to the importance he attaches to them. It will be worthwhile to review the passages and their context briefly, to see how in this case the ‘original’ text is thought to be important for the overall account. In the context of Aristotle’s overview of causes (Phys. A.4, lemma 187a21 at in Phys. 153.25ff., B17) we learn about the four ‘roots’ as ‘equal in age’, about their continuous alteration, about cosmic processes under the influence of Love and Strife, and about how under Love everything unites (158.1-159.4). The debate about the number of causes that precedes this dealt with Anaxagoras and Empedocles, interlacing paraphrases with short quotes (phrases and words, 154.3-157.24). Simplicius’ access to these materials may again be based on Theophrastus, but his mention of the Peripatetic at 154.14 does not allow us to determine more accurately which comments and quotes Theophrastus provides (or inspires). One suspects, however, that his presence here could originate in a different work from the earlier mention (9.7) where his own Physics is the source, compared to ‘in his physical enquiry’ here (154.17). We cannot exclude other influences, as Porphyry and Alexander crop up in the same context. This discussion of principles was anticipated in the early pages of the commentary when introductory comments were made. Some useful

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius contextual comments occur at 25.21-6 (A28) in which the four material elements are listed and the immaterial causes are singled out as deserving of the name ‘principles’ in a more primary sense (ta de kuriôs arkhas, compare 3.16). The unifying force of Love is spelled out in our present context, as is the divisive power of Strife (159.13-26 = B21; 160.1-11 = B22). This issue is again discussed at 1124.20ff. where Simplicius rejects Alexander’s interpretation. The interpretive strategy seems to be one which aims to provide lavish evidence for the exegesis offered. After a long quotation at 158.1-159.4 (B17) and 159.13-26 (B21) on the roles of Love and Strife and the basic generative force of the four elements, Simplicius introduces the next quotation by stating that Empedocles offered a ‘clear proof’ (enarges paradeigma paretheto) – possibly echoing the opening line (159.13) in which Empedocles himself claims to offer ‘evidence’ (epimartura). Simplicius is here attempting to clarify Empedocles from Empedocles in order to demonstrate his own interpretation is preferable to Aristotle’s. Of the total of c. 150 lines that Simplicius provides us with, we find 76 concentrated in pages 158-61. Yet Simplicius extracts only a limited amount of points from these:81 he emphasises the divisive (individuating?) role of Strife, the unifying role of Love, the use of combination (sunkrisis) and separation (diakrisis) for the process of coming-to-be and destruction, and the double nature of the cosmos (160.22). All this is supposed to be quite clear from Empedocles’ own words (the verb for clarifying occurs at 160.15,18,24; 161.8). The cosmological emphasis in these passages stands in contrast to a religious interest found in other authors (Hippolytus B115 on pollution and atonement) or on sense perception (Plato A92, Aristotle B109, Theophrastus A86; Ammonius B134) or zoogony (Proclus B69). Given references to other topics in other works (e.g. [Simpl.] in DA 118.9 against Plutarch), it seems reasonable to assume that Simplicius is adhering to the particular context of physics, selecting his material from Empedocles accordingly. 2.3 A special case: Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BCE) Whereas Parmenides and Empedocles provided ample material, predominantly to do with metaphysical unity and physical plurality, to be re-modelled and absorbed into the Neoplatonic construct of a unified universe, Anaxagoras offered a quite different attraction: the notion of an intellectual force ruling the universe. Simplicius makes the most of the evidence, and once again he goes beyond what his ‘secondary’ sources (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Alexander) provide. Simplicius’ interest in Anaxagoras’ idea that ‘mind’ (nous) is an important force in the universe was not new. Even if nous is not the highest power in the Neoplatonic cosmos, it still is one of the main metaphysical entities with a crucial role to play at a cosmic and human level. The idea

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom famously contributed to Socrates’ turning away from natural philosophy. This is at least how we now think Plato’s account in the Phaedo has determined the reception of Anaxagoras (see below). The account is about Socrates’ celebrated ‘ethical turn’ (deuteros plous), in which the character Socrates is presented as expressing great disappointment over Anaxagoras’ (non-)use of his original idea that there is a cosmic mind governing the universe. But what exactly is it in this notion that attracts Simplicius and how does he envisage its role in his own account of the universe? It will be helpful to establish in brief what Anaxagoras’ role was in the philosophical landscape of the fifth century before we assess how Simplicius is trying appropriate him. Our knowledge of Anaxagoras depends heavily on Simplicius.82 The historical and philosophical importance of Anaxagoras (fl. 450-30 BCE) has been clarified well in the past decades, yet there still is considerable debate about the details of his doctrines.83 Most famously his connexions to high-profile contemporaries such as Pericles and Socrates show that natural philosophers were no solitary characters lacking social connections. It made him a prominent name in Athens and, as it turned out, an easy target for persecution. In Apology 26D-E (A35 DK) Plato has Socrates mention him in the context of being accused of making claims similar to Anaxagoras’, namely that the moon and the sun are rocks, ‘heretical’ views Socrates is in fact distancing himself from. His views in natural philosophy, then, became embroiled in political and religious debates, and exile was imposed on him in c. 431 BCE.84 We need not doubt that Simplicius had access to a copy of his work, as the number of quotations seems to indicate.85 The ancient sources seem to confirm that Anaxagoras wrote one work on nature. In D.L. 1.16 he is listed among ‘those who wrote only one book’ (but it may have been contained in two rolls). It is generally referred to as a work on natural philosophy: ‘first [book] of his physics’ (in Phys. 155.26 = B1), or ‘in his physics’ (Plut. De fort. 3, 98F = B21b). The availability of the work is consistent with other Presocratic authors, where Simplicius’ greater reliability in reporting and quoting has been shown to be based on autopsy of original works.86 Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras wants to maintain against Parmenides that change and motion are possible. He therefore has to arrange for the pluralist world view to allow the generation of new organisms, while having a limited set of causal principles. His solution is as ingenious as it is controversial: he postulates that ‘all things are in all things’ (in Phys. 155.26 = B1.187), that is, he maintains that most physical objects as we know them come about from beginnings that are potentially everything.88 The use of an Aristotelian term here is justified, for already Plotinus spoke in exactly these terms about Anaxagoras’ views (Enn. 2.4.7.2-4): ‘saying that it is all things potentially’ (panta energeiai ekhein legôn; cf. in Phys. 162.28 têi dunamei). As with the four-element theory (Empedocles) and

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius the atoms (Leucippus-Democritus), this model makes the bold claim that change is possible, but dependent on invisible entities which by rearrangement (mechanically or otherwise) make up the items we see around us. His notion of homoeomerous bodies – bodies where any part is of the same type as the whole, e.g. flesh, bone etc. – leads to an interesting theory of matter at the perceptible level, which was of considerable interest to Aristotle (e.g. GC 1.1, 314a18-19 = A46 DK). It ‘solved’ the problem Parmenides created of how something new can arise from something that did not yet exist (defined as belonging to ‘non-being’), since this theory of matter actually ensures that ‘coming-to-be’ is possible from pre-existing entities, even if coming-to-be is understood in a qualified sense. Things ‘separate out’ from the primordial chaos from the inside out in a whirl, but remain contained within the mind. Thus Anaxagoras ends up with a very dualistic world view, something his pupil Archelaus89 must have disliked, as he is known for his compromise in claiming ‘ensouled air’ (pneuma) as the primary component of the world, thus avoiding Anaxagoras’ dualism.90 Simplicius’ contribution to the body of evidence (twelve quotations) reveal his keen interest in Anaxagoras.91 The bulk of material on mind occurs some way into the first book of the Physics commentary, although one crucial quotation on the role of nous appears much later (in Phys. 300-1). The quite revolutionary (but initially unsuccessful) idea Anaxagoras proposed was to postulate a mind (nous) which has the important role of creating and maintaining the universe: it ‘kick-started’ (êrxato ho nous kinein, apo tou kinoumenou pantos apekrineto, in Phys. 300.32 = B13.2-3) and governed the cosmic processes (ekratêse, 157.7-9 = B14). Plato and Aristotle had each formulated their objections to it, the former voicing the reproach that Anaxagoras did not really make much use of it (Phaedo 97B-C), the latter raising the more substantial criticism that it could not do the work that Anaxagoras wanted it to do (Metaph. A.4, 985a17-20). On the latter point Alexander seemed to disagree, at least with regard to generation (in Phys. 300.27, cf. Alex. in Metaph. 32.16, nous a cause of well ordered production). But in another context Aristotle praises him for the idea that ‘intelligence is unaffected (apathes) and free from admixture since he regarded it as a principle of movement’ (Phys. 8.5, 256b24-6). In his own account, which is working up to the unmoved mover (267b19, 25), Aristotle precedes the late Platonists in his attempt to see premonitions of his own system in the earlier theorists. Within Anaxagoras’ overall cosmology nous is therefore exceptional, in that it does not, as most other physical things, have a part of everything in it, nor does it necessarily have a place in all with its greater independence (B11-12). Simplicius’ interpretation of Anaxagoras may have been influenced by the positive endorsement Plotinus gave him, echoing Aristotle’s appraisal (Enn. 5.1.9.1):

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom Anaxagoras, stating that nous is pure (katharon) and unmixed (amiges) and singular (haploun), himself also posits the one as first and separable, and he conveys a true and ancient insight.

Reduced to such bare essentials, it is not hard to see how these features resemble the Parmenidean requirements for the One. In this particular assessment the significant phrase is ‘also’. Plotinus has just mentioned Plato and Parmenides and looks for similarities in their characterisation of the One. But the manner of placement in Simplicius is determined by Aristotle’s narrative. At in Phys. 148-64 (B12, 14; commentary to Phys. A.4) several long quotations provide us with the best material on the role of mind. Simplicius is here engaged in commenting on Aristotle’s critique of Anaxagoras, which he seeks to defuse. At 188a5-18 Aristotle had discussed Anaxagoras’ notion of cosmic mind and called it ‘absurd’ (atopos, a9), suggesting that the assumption of having everything in everything leads to all kinds of illogical results. He also did not, according to Aristotle, understand why the separating out will never be complete. One or two examples of his ‘rescue mission’ may illustrate Simplicius’ strategy. In pages 148-64 he may be basing his comments on some other commentators. Alexander (151.6), Nikolaos (151.21), and Porphyry (151.24) are mentioned, but Theophrastus also re-appears (149.32, 154.14).92 The latter is the starting point for the discussion, when Theophrastus is reported as having assimilated (sunôthôn) Anaxagoras and Anaximander in their views (154.15-23); this is illustrated with a quotation from Theophrastus’ Physical inquiry. The paraphrase that follows combines details from this quotation and Aristotle’s account at A.4, outlining the system of Anaxagoras and Empedocles (154.23ff.), especially how their ideas are shared and different (26, 28). Next Alexander is quoted on a small point of textual interpretation as to whether Anaxagoras wants his basic matter to contain contraries (155.4-7). Further paraphrases and quotations follow (156ff.), and apart from a comment on how one ought to interpret Empedocles ‘according to his own character’ (160.25-6), there is no real dissent on Simplicius’ part. This changes at 161.23, where Simplicius makes a claim about Aristotle’s approach: Aristotle, in a bid to emulate Plato’s balanced judgment, wants to adduce the ancient and famous men as not saying illogical things, nor to overlook that they are judged without defence, but he sets out some reasonings, according to which they became grieved as to their views seeming to be inconsistent. (161.23-162.2; lemma A.4, 187a26-31)

By imputing such intentions to Aristotle Simplicius reveals the vantage point he is working from. The subsequent argument seeks to illustrate this with two points, the first claiming that Aristotle brought Anaxagoras in

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius after the thinkers who posit being as one, because he intends to investigate scientifically (basanizein) those who posit them as infinite. This is clarified by another paraphrase in which the opinion that the first principle is singular and unmoved ‘seems rather absurd’ (atopôtera gar } dokei, 4), while the second point represents the view that principles are unlimited as underdefined and unknowable (cf. Phys. 187b8). Interestingly Simplicius now draws comparisons with Parmenides and Melissus after mentioning Aristotle’s explanation for Anaxagoras’ homoeomeries, that is, ‘that all things that come to be have their coming-to-be from being’ (162.11). The link with Parmenides is created via this statement, especially the phrase ‘from being’ (ex ontos), alluding to the generally accepted view in early Greek philosophy that things cannot arise from nothing (11-12, cf. 16, 29): ‘for Parmenides too demonstrated that the true being is ungenerated }’, further illustrated with a quotation. Melissus used the same principle, as another quotation shows.93 It is striking that Aristotle does not make this link at this point in the argument, even if he does refer to the principle invoked. The comments on this lemma end with reference to, and material from, Alexander (163.10) in combination with a crossreference to Aristotle’s criticism (GC 314a13f.) regarding the terminology of the natural processes (diakrisin, sunkrisin). Porphyry also makes another appearance (16) commenting on the origin of the terminology (16-18): Porphyry retraces ‘all things were in all’ to Anaxagoras, but ‘coming-to-be is changing’ to Anaximenes, the terms sunkrisis and diakrisis to Democritus and Empedocles.

The terminological point is perhaps anticipated by Anaxagoras, who chided ‘the Greeks’ for being wrong in their views of genesis and destruction (163.19-20, B17 follows).94 Not only does this episode reveal Simplicius’ partisan treatment of some early Greek thinkers – defending them against Aristotle when necessary – but also his use of the ‘secondary sources’ to achieve this. At 164.11ff. another episode of evaluating Aristotle’s objections occurs (lemma 187b7). The terminology indicates that Simplicius sees Aristotle as using a rather formal approach (13, ekthemenou sumperasmata ê axiômata). Aristotle’s procedure is frequently characterised in terms of syllogisms, premises and conclusions – an application of the techniques of scientific reasoning laid out in works the late Platonists considered part of Aristotelian logic (Topics, Prior and Posterior Analytics).95 Here it is said to consist of two parts: first, he expounded the probable in Anaxagoras’ views (to pithanon prôton tês A. doxês, 11), and now he ‘turns to the refutation of him’ (epi tên anairesin trepetai, 12f.). Simplicius refers to Aristotle’s comments as antilegein, a term connected to rhetoric and sophistic which signifies dispute and opposition. The first part of this analysis (164.14-166.13)96 looks at the claim about what comes out of the

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom ‘cosmic origin’ which contains everything (homou panta khrêmata): these are ‘unlimited in number and smallness’. Interlacing his text with phrases of both, Simplicius goes on to follow through the points Aristotle is making against Anaxagoras on the unlimited nature of these ‘seeds’ of all things and the problem of how we can know anything about them (165.5-7). Porphyry is quoted as stating that the attack is in fact also against Leucippus, Democritus and Metrodorus, since they too claimed that the elements were unlimited (8-10). Whether or not the next lines are still Porphyry’s, we can see how Simplicius tends to broaden the scope beyond the immediate context. The section points to the connection between Anaxagoras and the atomists, and expands Aristotle’s ‘compact refutation’ (165.22) in a ‘hypothetical’ reconstruction (logos } dunamei toioutos esti). The section ends with another reference to Porphyry’s earlier point widening the argument’s target to all pluralists (166.3), an good indication that what precedes does go back to him, while Alexander is said to have considered it as being against Anaxagoras only. Thus this passage, which must stand for several others, illustrates a number of interesting aspects of the method of Simplicius in his treatment of the Presocratics: (1) it shows how quotation and paraphrase serve his purpose of basing his interpretation on the text; (2) it also shows how he combines different interpretations from earlier commentators without slavishly adopting their views; (3) it shows his independence regarding Aristotle’s exegesis of Presocratics, whose words he adduces not just to elucidate Aristotle’s point, but also to extend the discussion and pursue his own agenda. In his overall interpretation of the Presocratics it would seem that Simplicius is applying the basic line of approach announced earlier in his account, in which he disapproved of the selective (!) criticisms of the early natural philosophers (above, p. 73). This applies in particular whenever he feels compelled to counter the suggestion that there is genuine disagreement among them (in Phys. 36.24-31): But we have been forced to elaborate further because of the cavalier reproach of disagreement (diaphônia) among the ancients. Since we shall hear of Aristotle that he is refuting the opinions of the earlier philosophers, and since before Aristotle Plato has clearly done the same } one has to understand that they concerned themselves with things superficially understood (epipolaioteron akrouômenon), and they rejected only the apparently absurd in their arguments, because the ancients had a habit of expressing their views in a quite enigmatic way.97

Clearly Simplicius does not simply adopt the earlier criticisms, but finds a way around them. In this particular case we find him use this point as a justification (or should we say: excuse?) to elaborate a bit more.98 He takes Plato and Aristotle to be arguing against (antilegontes) the Presocratics,

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius when both, according to Simplicius, try to supply what has been left out and to clarify what is said without clarity (37.3, pote to paraleleimenon anaplêrountes, pote to asaphôs eirêmenon) and use several other approaches which makes them think they refute the ancients (loc. cit.). Yet in Simplicius’ eyes Aristotle seems to have had some notion (huponoôn) of the depth of their wisdom (37.1, bathos autou tês sophias), and he therefore decides to go up against his explicit refutations (37.7-8, peirêsometha toutois kai hêmeis ephistanein en tais pros hekaston tou Aristoteous antilogiais). It is characteristic of Simplicius’ perspective that, when trying to salvage ‘superficial disagreements’ in the objections of Plato and Aristotle against the Presocratics, he uses antilegô (e.g. 89.1; 132.20; 147.17, 18; 148.12; 164.14 etc.) often combined with a main verb ‘seeming’ (dokein or phainomai). In this way he can construct the debate as one of degrees and according to his own rules, allowing him to make a case for the deeper meaning of ancient wisdom, but which is superficially understood. Even in the case of Alexander he employs this method, claiming that one can see his protestations as things well said and still hold the view that ‘the ancient wisdom remains irrefutable’ (77.11, hê palaia philosophia menei anelenktos). Clearly the origins of ancient wisdom deserve a more positive airing, he implies, as Plotinus had already suggested (above, p. 62), while the harmonising strategy is here extended to all Greek philosophers. In this he goes beyond what his teachers had aimed for. 2.4 The unity of Greek philosophy The main purpose of this chapter was not to offer a new interpretation of the Presocratics, because the amount and complexity of the relevant material would require a separate study. My assessment of Simplicius’ treatment of the Presocratics has been highly selective and aims at answering a particular set of questions that illustrate important aspects of his methodology: to what extent did he have access to their works? How does he use these sources in the commentaries on Physics and On the heavens? Rather than simply sing his praise as a source for early Greek philosophy, I have opted for a more pragmatic approach to illustrate Simplicius’ method in dealing with three Presocratic theorists in natural philosophy. The three case studies, for all their sketchy and tentative features, must stand for a wider set of material and should be seen as a first step towards further explorations of this material. Without the constraining perspective of a modern interpreter who merely wants to retrieve the views (‘fragments’) of the Presocratics, we put ourselves in a better position to appreciate the creative ways in which Simplicius achieves his goal. The results present insights into how and why he writes the way he does about the Presocratic philosophers. In looking at how he handles the

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom materials, we have been able to put the commentary on Physics into a broader context and thus widen our perspective on the rather mixed range of motives. His immediate objective, to comment on the text of Aristotle, can without a doubt serve a pedagogically driven goal, that of clarifying his ideas to the budding Platonist. In addition, he is going beyond the Aristotelian text and interpretation, first by adducing more material than in the base text, and secondly by assimilating the early Greek ideas to his Neoplatonic world view. This may entail going against Aristotle. The review of how Simplicius chose to assimilate the ancient wisdom (palaia philosophia) into his own commentary is the result of a position forged among his immediate predecessors. It leads up to a more important question regarding the motivation of Simplicius’ analysis: why does he want to maintain the (to us absurd) claim that the earliest natural philosophers are in broad agreement with Plato and Aristotle? To answer this question we need to bring in the notion of harmonisation again: with early beginnings under Antiochus in the fourth Academy, a full scale syncretism of Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras and the Chaldaean Oracles developed under Iamblichus, Plutarch of Athens and Syrianus in the fifth century CE, followed by Proclus and Damascius.99 My argument (to be developed further in this study) intends to show that Simplicius’ approach constitutes an extension of this long development: Simplicius’ harmonisation strategy is to bring all Greek philosophers into the fold. It seems to me that in doing so Simplicius aims for the unity of the whole of pagan theologico-philosophical thought in contradistinction to Christianity. In writing commentaries on Aristotle’s works Simplicius – like many of his contemporaries – combined philosophical erudition with considerable skills of scholarship. But he is quite unique in his scholarly sensibility, with a striking appreciation of the value of the text and direct quotations.100 This does not mean that he will always report the views of others in a neutral way, but rather that he was consciously using certain criteria, according to which he made an effort to let the text speak for itself before he would express his disagreement or criticism.101 Some of the principles in this approach were highlighted in quotations. Recent studies have illustrated what might in fact have been expected, namely, that Simplicius is perfectly capable of selective quoting if it serves his overall purpose.102 Despite this kind of ‘bias’, his quotations have been shown to be superior to Aristotle’s (and Theophrastus’). His attitude towards Aristotle does in fact go some way towards the kind of objectivity he advocated (in Cat. 7.23-32). With a proper understanding of his use of the Presocratic materials within the framework of later Platonism, this should allow us to make good use of his contextual comments as well as his exegetical proposals. Further research will have to determine whether certain assumptions and preconceptions about texts, sources and the mechanism of transmission must be revised. One view in particular has emerged as untenable:

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius the idea that more recent sources are less important than older ones. This position, first attacked in the study of stemmatology for manuscripts, has been quite an obstacle in reassessing the transmission of ancient philosophy, and in particular the doxographical tradition – so crucial for the preservation of Presocratic materials. The outer limits of the Dielsian ‘doxographical universe’ consist of Theophrastus (d. 278 BCE) and Simplicius. It was Usener who first suggested that Theophrastus is the single source of the philosophical tradition of doxai-collections.103 This position was never seriously challenged by Diels, based in part on the correct assumption that Theophrastus made a collection of views in physics. When we consider all the texts relevant to the tradition discussed in the Doxographi Graeci, the hypothesis seems too neat and unrealistic. A reassessment of this strand of the tradition will be an obvious spin-off from the present study, once we have obtained a better grasp of how Simplicius is operating. In addition, we speculated about possible motives for this approach. By making writing an important part of his method, as indicated twice (quoted above, p. 43) Simplicius may have sought to circumvent the paradox involved in the critique of writing found in Plato – if not consciously than perhaps intuitively. Despite the lack of explicit evidence for this suggestion, it seems a helpful hypothesis to make sense of the question why the late Platonists show no awareness of the tension between philosophising in written and spoken form.104 After all, their oral teaching continued in parallel to the scholarly and learned expression of their teachings. Plato had tried to solve the problem of how to convey and perpetuate his philosophical ideas by writing dialogues – a strategy which is now thought to make the point through content as well as form.105 Simplicius seems to have extended this strategy even further by merging the (Aristotelian) use of testimonies with the exposition of philosophy in writing, but rather than quoting straight from the philosopher’s mouth, he had to make do with ‘voices from the past’ taken straight from the philosopher’s pen. In sampling passages concerning those early theorists which clearly exerted the strongest attraction on the Platonists, we looked at some texts empirically in order to assess what Simplicius’ approach was, and extended existing research on the exegetical use of earlier texts. Special attention was paid to the way in which quotations are introduced, in particular the use of special verbs which mark quotations in such a way that they become privileged as being somehow more ‘direct’ than others. But we also noted the length of quotations as unusual because Simplicius often deliberately provides more material than is required for the context. As such these works clearly represent an advanced form of literacy, which incorporates second-order thoughts on, and differentiates between, exegetical paraphrase and direct (or approximate) quotation. The different motives we examined fit the explanatory model of his ‘extreme’ harmoni-

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2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom sation best. It was from Plotinus onwards that the process of reinventing the Platonist stance and assimilating others to reach a unified vision of reality determined the methods of this particular school of thought. In spite of the scholarship, highly developed philosophical techniques underpinning their deeper religious aims, there still was enough room for the kind of syncretism with which they could assimilate a variety of opinions into their own doctrinal system without viewing this as problematic. What to the modern eye looks like an amalgamation of highly incompatible elements of religion, philosophy and poetic inspiration, they regarded as instantiations of a unified metaphysical reality. They saw it as their task to show how all these were simply different modes of expressing different facets of being. It is only a small step to extrapolate from the specific statement in the discussion of ‘place’ at in Phys. 640.16-17 where such a position is suggested, namely that one can show that the many aspects of ‘place’ have been clarified by many different men,106 to the broader project we see emerging in his treatment of the Presocratics. At the time of his writing activity Simplicius seems to have added a polemical drive which may contribute to this broader strategy, as part of the attempt to save pagan philosophy from the dominating presence of the Christian faith and its highly vocal and ingenious advocates: as Iamblichus before him, this tactic could, at least in their eyes, offer a religious doctrine more venerable and unified than any other religion. As we shall see (Chapters 5-6), his strenuous efforts in unifying the tradition and polemicising against the Christian Philoponus suggest that he was aware that he was fighting a rearguard action.

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3

Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics After Aristotle’s death, philosophical activity within the Peripatos consisted to a large degree of a concerted effort to continue the work begun by the school’s founder. This took the form of clarification, expansion and correction. It was a considerable challenge to cover the breadth and depth of Aristotle’s work, and we must remember that continuation of the school was by no means guaranteed.1 The history of the Aristotelian corpus is fraught with difficulties: our evidence for his followers’ engagement with it is fragmentary, and much of it is found in later sources.2 This external assessment is complemented by a range of modern interpretations regarding the internal coherence in the Aristotelian body of ideas: the early Peripatetics Theophrastus, Eudemus, Strato, Lyco and Dicaearchus all in some way or other take Aristotle as their starting-point and clarify or develop his positions further. But they are also seen to disagree with certain aspects of his ideas, illustrating that Peripatetic doctrine was not a static and unified body of knowledge, but a dynamic set of proposals to understand the world. This chapter looks at this process of consolidation and continuation in relation to Simplicius’ use of the works of early Peripatetics in his commentaries. By advancing as well as elucidating the works of their scholarch, his successors were forced to probe the meaning and value of the treatises and the theories contained in them. Consistency became one of the concerns in reviewing a body of work which had grown over the period of a long working life. As we shall see, Simplicius took the early Peripatetics very seriously in their interpretive efforts, using them as authorities in building his own exegesis. He frequently quotes them and prefers their views to those of later commentators. The different ways in which the use of the successors of Aristotle shapes his own exegesis are of considerable interest for our purposes: first, their value seems to come from their closeness to the master, although the justification for attributing this kind of authority to them is not always made explicit; secondly, while Aristotle’s successors were busying themselves clarifying the work and thus (unknowingly) contributing to the establishment of a canon, Simplicius’ use of their interpretations ignores the emerging nature of such a canon and mostly accepts their input as important exegetical aids to an established corpus. In keeping with the evidence from the commentaries I shall look mostly at the second scholarch, Theophrastus of Eresus, and his contemporary

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics and competitor for the post, Eudemus, who after coming second in a bid for succession returned to Rhodes where he continued to study and teach Aristotelian thought. A few words will also be said about Theophrastus’ successor, Strato. I start by looking briefly at the motivation and method of the process of consolidation (§3.1), after which I concentrate on the two Peripatetics (§3.2-3) and their role in Simplicius’ exegesis. In the final section I try to draw some conclusions from these enquiries and attempt to answer the question how these early interpretations determined the shape and nature of the corpus as well as its reception among later exegetes (§3.4). 3.1 Succeeding Aristotle, understanding Aristotle On the face of it the special interest in Aristotle and his students among late Platonists may seem unusual: if the works of Plato are at the core of their intellectual pursuits, why study Aristotle? We can explain this inclusive attitude to a considerable degree on historical and philosophical grounds. First, it is rooted in a stance which arose in the so-called Fifth Academy, when a more flexible approach initiated by Antiochus (c. 110 BCE) paved the way for a syncretistic way of thinking regarding the relation between Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought.3 This approach was grounded in the conviction that Plato should not be read as a sceptic, as had become the norm under Arcesilaus (c. 316-241 BCE) and Philo of Larissa (c. 159-84 BCE). Antiochus came to oppose this way of reading Plato’s works and would focus on minimising or de-emphasising the points of disagreement between the two thinkers, while concentrating on overlaps and points of agreement. Thus by the time the Anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus is written (first century CE?), we can observe an advanced stage of assimilation and a more liberal use of Aristotelian and Stoic ideas and concepts in the comments on Plato’s text.4 This intriguing process of borrowing and redefining philosophical concepts and terms is a transformative process, which was started by faithful followers soon after the death of famous scholarchs and would continue in different traditions all the way through antiquity and beyond. Secondly, Plotinus (c. 210-270 CE) who taught philosophy in Rome and saw himself as a Platonist, made use of Aristotle’s treatises and conceptual apparatus to discuss Plato’s work in the classroom (V.Plot. 14).5 As he became the figurehead for this new way of interpreting Plato, he thereby sanctioned the use of Aristotle in the study of Plato (see Chapters 5-6). His interest in the categories of Aristotle inaugurated a new trend in the ‘curriculum’ of Platonising philosophers, further developed by his learned pupil Porphyry, in which this Aristotelian work became the foundation of Platonist education.6 This is understandable in that the work can be seen as a fundamental starting-point for understanding the world and/or language. Logic as a starting point was already proposed by Andronicus when

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius he set the order of the corpus. In fact the main issue for Plotinus in interpreting this work was the question whether it described a way of carving up the world into ten different kinds or was a method of describing objects in the world in ten different ways.7 For the Platonists, understanding Aristotle in the Hellenistic and Imperial era was driven by at least these two factors: there was a concern about correctly understanding Plato and a willingness to take advantage of Aristotle’s insights, considered of special value on account of his closeness to the master. Harmonising the views of Plato and Aristotle was becoming a major concern, but it also required a special effort and a new style of hermeneutics (see §5.2). In addition, a certain pragmatism had crept in under pressure of a sustained critique from the sceptical Academy to diminish the conflicts and disagreements among philosophers in order to show that epistemological problems could be solved. The Sceptics had cleverly exploited the disagreements among ‘schools’ to argue that these signalled the intrinsic impossibility of obtaining positive knowledge. Conflicting perceptual evidence further underlined this position, presenting practical proof, so to speak, of the lack of secure evidence for stable and reliable knowledge of the world. At a later stage we shall see this problem return when Christian intellectuals use this lack of unity among pagan philosophers to argue for the superiority of a unified doctrine of Christianity (see Chapter 6). In view of his main objective – writing clarifications of the text of Aristotle – Simplicius adopts a sensible strategy from the start: he uses the close followers of Aristotle as his aids in clarifying Aristotle. That is to say, he seems to have realised that in order to understand Aristotle, there would be no better guides than the latter’s contemporaries who witnessed his lectures, collaborated with him on numerous projects, and had the opportunity to interrogate the founder and first head of the Lyceum. At one point Simplicius refers to them as ‘having views on and teaching (didaxantes) the same things as Aristotle on time’ (in Phys. 788.34-6). This marks an innovation compared to Plotinus, who seems to show little interest in the early Peripatetics.8 Platonists after Porphyry were willing to expand the exegetical enterprise by increasing the number of participants in the ongoing debate about the available evidence: thus clarifying Plato was done by using Aristotle’s comments, who himself can be clarified by using his students’ comments, and so on. In Simplicius we see the culmination of this interpretive approach: his commentaries form a multilayered, intertextual extravaganza geared towards revealing an ancient spiritual wisdom by rational means, in other words, a theology with philosophical underpinnings mixed with spiritual insights and religious rituals. Its ultimate aim was to prepare the (fallen) soul for the return to the divine, the ineffable One (e.g. in Phys. 533.28). It is doubtful whether the immediate successors of Aristotle undertook their philosophical pursuits with such religious zeal, even if the teachings

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics can be said to culminate in theology (his Metaph. 12.10). Their task was to ensure that the school and its particular perspective on the world would continue. Their first priority was to teach Aristotelian ideas. From the lists of his works in D.L. we can easily see how Theophrastus was able to follow in Aristotle’s footsteps in most areas, and we are fairly certain that he developed his positions in many of them. Broadly speaking he writes about the inanimate (e.g. winds, stones, fire) and physiology (e.g. sweat, dizziness, fatigue), and from the fragments we see additional activity in the area of meteorology, biology, epistemology and psychology. As has been observed since the earliest modern edition of his extant work (F. Wimmer, Paris 1848), Theophrastus’ work is clearly complementary to Aristotle’s, a view which may even go back to the Roman period with the revival of interest in Aristotle’s esoteric writings.9 As a close collaborator for over forty years Theophrastus would have been very much under the influence of his master. Eudemus worked on physics, religion and geometry and it is in the first subject that we find some critical notes, perhaps because he was working on Rhodes to which he returned after the succession was decided in favour of Theophrastus (Aulus Gellius Attic Nights 13.5 = F5 Wehrli). But it took another generation to create the kind of doctrinal distance that would allow for clearer dissent and disagreement. 3.2 Teaching Aristotle: Theophrastus and Eudemus Simplicius’ use of Theophrastus is patchy and difficult to characterise in one general statement. His name is mentioned some 37 times in the Physics commentary alone, and the occurrences are fairly spread out.10 Most of these passages discuss his views immediately relevant to an issue Simplicius is dealing with. As we saw in Chapter 2, in the commentary on Physics Theophrastus is first brought in when Simplicius is surveying the views of the Presocratics.11 The material he provides seems complementary to Aristotle’s and in the past has been construed as coming from a ‘history of pre-Aristotelian philosophy’ by Theophrastus, but which may be from his Physics.12 Other materials concern Theophrastus’ own views which often contain minor divergences or formulate serious problems, e.g. on motion (107.12), change and alteration (566.18), place (583.10, 604.5, 612.5, 639.14), and time (700.18, 788.34-789.1, 860.19-861.23).13 The discussion of place is an interesting case, because we see Simplicius and other Platonists grapple with Theophrastus’ doubts concerning Aristotle’s concept of place, and Simplicius develops a view which goes beyond the Theophrastan material (see below, §3.2.1).14 Often Eudemus is mentioned alongside him, or another Peripatetic (e.g. Strato at in Phys. 788.36), or even a later commentator (Alexander at 700.19; Damascius and Iamblichus at 642.18), which confirms Theophrastus’ special status. It also suggests a particular arrangement of the source material into thematic clusters grouping authors together.15

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Whereas it can be demonstrated that Simplicius had access to Eudemus’ work on physics (see §3.2.2), this is less clear in all cases concerning Theophrastus. Doubt has been raised as to whether Simplicius takes all his material on early philosophers from Alexander.16 Direct access to Theophrastus is suggested, however, by the different types of titles or where specific titles of his works are given.17 But again there are some problems in determining which works are meant. Some materials certainly could come from an intermediate source, for instance from Alexander of Aphrodisias (see below), or when Eudemus and Theophrastus are lumped together to label one particular view (e.g. in Phys. 566.18, 583.10, 606.33). While many details will remain obscure, this chapter will consider the role that Simplicius attributes to Theophrastus and Eudemus in his exegesis. Their philosophical activities must be viewed as resulting from teaching Aristotle as well as further developing his ideas in research activities. ‘Systematisation’ probably describes their attitude and approach fairly well: they occupied themselves with filling in the gaps, clarifying connexions between works and certain views, resolving inconsistencies, and extending the different areas which Aristotle had pioneered and defined.18 Regarding many parts of the Aristotelian corpus we have evidence that both Theoprastus and Eudemus formulate disagreements with Aristotle. Yet their expression of disagreement is usually muted or hidden in questioning his statements or raising serious difficulties (aporiai).19 Theophrastus is well-known for his aporetic approach, most palpable in his short treatise on metaphysics where one specific target is to explore the limits of Aristotelian teleology.20 It is possible that in some of these cases their reluctance to voice dissent is in line with the unwritten rule in classical antiquity not to mention (living) contemporaries when arguing against them. It is, however, not easy to establish a chronology for all cases, so this consideration is hardly decisive as to whether Aristotle was still alive. A stronger argument is probably that their allegiance to the school’s founder played an important role. But there are subtle differences and as time progressed, a more independent attitude towards the Aristotelian viewpoint became more pronounced. That said, we must neither preclude nor regard as odd that disagreement was possible – an attitude which we shall also find in Simplicius and his colleagues. Whatever the reason, we see limited dissent in the extant works and fragments of both of these early Peripatetics. As always, we are dependent on an incomplete body of evidence: even if one does not subscribe to the Jaegerian view that Aristotle may have divided up the research activities among his students – Theophrastus dealing with the ‘history’ of physics and plants, Eudemus with science, Menon with medicine – what remains of their extensive research will create just that impression. That the writings which are not extant would give us a much

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics richer and broader scope of their interests is beyond doubt.21 In doctrinal matters, we see them develop their work in tandem with explicating Aristotle’s work. The exegetical tradition began in a way in the first generation, however these successors did not consider themselves as ‘mere’ exegetes, but as the heirs of a fluid system of thought and a work in progress. 3.2.1 Theophrastus (d. 287 BCE)22 The ancient and modern perception of Theophrastus is a variable one, but in general the modern perspective is slanted towards a rather negative assessment. The perception seems to be that Theophrastus is a secondrate thinker – a verdict based either on the stylistic (de)merits of his works or on the quality of thought found in the sparsely preserved remains of his once considerable output. This is rather unfair, especially in relation to his scientific and philosophical merit. In ancient times his work was certainly better appreciated, although his close association with Aristotle’s works may have prevented a propor appreciation because his works sometimes became incorporated into the lists and collections of his master.23 Henri Blumenthal once commented that in late antiquity ‘the general consensus of the commentators after Themistius seems to have been that Theophrastus was a major figure in the history of philosophy whose opinions could nevertheless be ignored on most matters’.24 Since this judgement is based exclusively on the commentators on Aristotle’s De anima, it cannot be taken as a balanced assessment of Theophrastus’ role in the exegetical tradition, but it does capture an important aspect of the Theophrastan corpus: it is like a moon, circling ‘planet Aristotle’. Only in outline can we recapture the breadth of his work on a wide range of subjects, in which he pioneered the classification and taxonomy of plants in his Researches into plants (HP) and Causes of plants (CP), adjusted physical theories, extended hypothetical syllogisms, and produced a ‘history’ of philosophy in which he discussed pre-Aristotelian views critically.25 Theophrastus’ ancient reputation is one of philosophical excellence (D.L. 5.36) and rhetorical elegance (Cicero De fin. V.12-13). His most significant proposals for adjusting Aristotelian positions are found in three areas: physics, ethics and logic. In physics he dealt with general questions of method and subject as well as specific topics within the general framework of Aristotle’s thought (F142-54 FHSG or his Metaph.). He placed special emphasis on the importance of sense perception (F301A FHSG), and with it on the diaphorai and dunameis, the distinctive features and powers, of natural entities to be discriminated by the senses (F301B FHSG). His discussion of first principles has attracted considerable attention recently, since it shows how he deals with fundamental issues while also justifying aspects of Aristotle’s ideas that Aristotle himself merely assumed as given.26 Among the elements he allocated a special place to fire

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (On fire 1-227) and heat, giving the role of general agent to the sun (ibid. 16), formulating a theory of flow (16-1828). Further, he is also seen to admit multiple explanations, perhaps a sign that he no longer believed in the possibility of a definitive assessment of things.29 This is suggested in part by his greater emphasis on the limits of physical enquiry.30 In ethics and logic there is a similar trend towards systematisation, but also expansion of particular positions.31 Simplicius is less interested in these areas and we therefore find far less material on topics relevant to these subjects. Theophrastus’ role in the later tradition has two sides: his discussion of theories of sense perception (De sensu), which includes analysis and critique of Plato’s Timaeus 45-7, 61-8, and a different set of comments relating to the Timaeus preserved in some twelve fragments, which throw light on the unexpected place the second head of the Peripatos acquired in the later Platonist tradition. I have discussed these elsewhere, but want to revisit them briefly, not only because they say something about the perception of his comments in (late) antiquity, but also because of the renewed interest in the harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle so eloquently discussed by Gerson (2005). Theophrastus’ role in the Platonist tradition has often been overlooked. To the question ‘when could an interpreter arise?’ Harold Tarrant32 replied that it involves distance from the prime author commented upon, and that therefore the interpretive activity is most significantly done on texts. The implicit assumption here seems to be that Plato’s first interpreters are only to be found within the Platonic tradition of exegesis, though he does not subscribe to a possible corollary, that these were all interpreters acting in defence of Plato. Aristotle and Theophrastus are nowhere mentioned, taking ‘interpreters’ (so it seems) to refer only to sympathetic readers, those who consider themselves his followers. If this is the correct way to read Tarrant’s approach, the label ‘interpreter’ (from the Greek exêgêtês) is taken in a fairly limited sense. In the light of recent arguments favouring a serious look at the position that Aristotle could be harmonised with Plato, I would prefer it if the Peripatetics were included in this account of ‘interpreters’ of Plato. It is well worth asking whether or not we have uncritically adopted the view of Proclus that Crantor was the ‘first interpreter’ of Plato (Proclus On the Timaeus I, p. 76, 2.277,8 Diehl). His use of the label exêgêtês may be a not fully justified retrojection of the notion of commentator as it might have been viewed in Proclus’ time, but it seems highly plausible that the term is meant to describe an activity of commenting on the Timaeus, in this case probably on parts of it, not the whole work.33 One discrepancy between Simplicius and other Platonist commentators is relevant here. In an earlier study I demonstrated that Theophrastus was taken very seriously in the interpretation of the Timaeus.34 From Calvenus Taurus (second century CE, preserved in Philoponus) and Plutarch of Chaeronea (second century CE) to Proclus (fifth century CE),

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics Philoponus and Simplicius (sixth century CE), specific references show that Theophrastus’ comments on Plato’s Timaeus became incorporated into Platonist exegesis. In some cases it means using Theophrastus’ views (a) to corroborate a reading, or (b) to provide an argument from authority, or (c) to refute an objection made by Theophrastus against Plato.35 We should accept Bob Sharples’ plausible suggestion that ‘fragments 242, 243 as well as 161AB and 159 (esp. ll. 1-8 and 31-2) come from Theophrastus’ On heaven’.36 These passages bear witness to Theophrastus’ ongoing and critical dialogue with Plato’s views, and the inclusion of his critical judgement (easily suppressed) is a tribute to him. So, although not all cases imply agreement with Theophrastus, we can safely say that his views were taken seriously within the Platonist discussions of Plato’s primary work in physics, either for an inclusive interpretation or as a view worth refuting. For our present purposes this result can now be pushed further by pointing out that the later Platonists’ ability to regard Aristotle as a Platonist (Gerson 2005), clearly also holds for Theophrastus. Knowledge of the sources or how they were available of course does not solve the more important problem of how Simplicius chooses to select and use them. The marked difference in the amount of material taken from Eudemus individually (132 fragments to date37) as compared to Theophrastus (36 named occurrences, with far fewer quotations) is statistically significant. In addition, the progression through the books of the Physics is sequential for both Aristotle and Eudemus (see §3.2.2 below), but for Theophrastus there is no such parallelism.38 For instance, at 860.19, commenting on book 5 of the Physics, Simplicius quotes Theophrastus from the ‘first book of his own Physics’, a strong indication that Theophrastus’ comments are not used in parallel to the Aristotelian text as they are in the case of Eudemus.39 It suggests a more selective and perhaps haphazard use of the work of the second scholarch. We can only speculate about the reasons: does Simplicius consider Theophrastus of lesser importance regarding the physical theory (though crucial on the Presocratics)? Or is this state of affairs the result of indirect access to source materials? Here we may note that the fragments now printed in FHSG (1992) illustrate the difficulty of allocating fragments under specific headings or areas: for instance, the texts on the Timaeus are found in the section ‘fragments on physics’ as well as ‘fragments on physical doxography’.40 Though we saw that the material certainly does not come from one work discussing the Timaeus, some of these fragments may in fact belong to either section (or both). Simplicius’ engagement with Theophrastan material in other areas is rather more complex. In Chapter 2 I discussed the relation between Theophrastus and Simplicius regarding the preservation of philosophical views – often placed under the heading of ‘doxography’. It is clear that most of the time Theophrastus is providing information (historei ‘reports’, e.g. in Phys. 25.6, in DC 576.14, 602.6,41 641.8 etc). We also see Simplicius refer

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius to a few other works by Theophrastus: On the coming-to-be of the elements (in DC 700.7), On the elements of speech (in Cat. 10.25), On passions (in Cat. 235.9),42 a work on dialectic (‘Theophrastus in his own Topics’, in Cat. 415.15-16). His Physics is mentioned a number of times (in Phys. 9.7, 604.5; book 1: 20.20, 860.19 and 27, 861.23; book 3: 1236.1), which indicates that it might have been available to Simplicius.43 In some cases it is possible that separate titles such as On motion (in Phys. 107.12, 934.30-1, 986.5-6 [bk 1], 413.1 [bk 2], 413.5 [bk 3]) or Natural enquiry (ibid. 115.12, 149.32) could refer to his Physics or parts thereof.44 Especially in the case of the Natural investigation (phusikê historia) there are strong suspicions that this material is reaching us via Alexander who appears in the immediate context at 113.28 and 115.11. In those cases where Simplicius’ comments suggest he uses written notes (‘Theophrastus writes/wrote’, graphei 154.16; gegraphen 413.5; compare the participle form graphôn 166.18) we are naturally tempted to infer that he consulted the original. With the comment at 115.11 ‘as Alexander reports, Theophrastus sets out the Parmenidean argument in the first book of the Natural investigation’ this could cast doubt on the origin of his materials. But it is not impossible that this way of referring to a work is Alexander’s way of labelling Theophrastus’ Physics. I shall end this section by looking at a few examples of doctrinal evaluation, in which Simplicius is seen to appeal to Theophrastus for the discussion of Aristotle’s text, in addition to reports of Theophrastus’ disagreement or new direction. Theophrastus’ appearance in the commentaries is more often than not a sign of his authoritative views on Aristotle (see also n. 14). He is given several epithets that confirm this: ‘leader of his students’ (koruphaios, in Phys. 964.30),45 ‘best among students’ (ariston, in Cat. 435.26), and together with Eudemus as ‘companions’ (hetairoi, in Phys. 788.35). Characteristically he will raise problems (aporei, ibid. 604.6) or is seen to agree with Aristotle (612.5, 789.1) or even with Damascius and Iamblichus (642.18f.). Here he certainly seems to live up to the reputation already hinted at in D.L. 5.39 in which Aristotle is quoted as having said that Theophrastus ‘interpreted all his meaning with an excess of cleverness’.46 The verbs used by Simplicius indicate Theophrastus’ authority quite clearly, as does the extent of the paraphrases and quotations: he ‘is a witness’ to the interpretation offered (marturei), or provides the same name or label (kalei), or is said to prove the point at issue (apedeixen, in Phys. 21.10). But on a few matters Simplicius notes with some relish the dissent or novelty of the second head of the Peripatos. Three instances are of particular interest for our purposes. In the first we find Theophrastus raising questions (aporiai) about Aristotle’s notion of place, in the second he does not do the same with regard to time but his successor Strato does, and in the third we see Simplicius trying to demonstrate that Theophrastus’ interpretations square with his own. (1) At in Phys. 601.1ff. Simplicius is presenting a long overview and

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics discussion of known theories about place (topos), a digression from the main narrative of the commentary.47 His stated motive here is the interesting point that Aristotle’s account ‘contains many difficulties’ and evoked ‘many lines of examination to those who came after him’.48 But he adds that his account would not be complete unless he will cover the faulty argument of Aristotle on place as well as the other views after him and the objections that have been brought against him (601.4-7). Theophrastus’ aporiai on place are taken from his Physics (604.5, en tois Phusikois aporei) and Simplicius inquires as to whether these are in agreement with the definition provided (11-12, ei sumphônos estin ho apodotheis tou topou horismos). His actual account divides the positions into two camps (those who view place as body and those who view it as incorporeal, 14-15) and includes Plato, Aristotle and the Peripatetics, Damascius, Democritus, Epicurus and Strato. Theophrastus’ aporiai concerning Aristotle raise issues over a number of aspects, but in particular that of natural place (F146, 149 FHSG).49 While Aristotle held the view that natural place had a power of its own (Phys. 208b11), Theophrastus suggested aporetically that the natural movement of the four elements could be explained by viewing the world as an organism re-adjusting its limbs when out of place. This implies a shift from place as an agent of change to the world (the ‘organism’). Syrianus, Proclus, Damascius and Simplicius seem to have adopted this idea of the organism, but considered it to be too much of an inert notion, and attributed to place the power to arrange the four elements into their proper regions. Note that Simplicius’ final proposal is also in disagreement with the view of his own teacher Damascius, preferring to take place as a substance (ousia) which is extended, and the upshot is that ‘his dynamic view of place in fact reverses Theophrastus’ position’.50 He thus creates a compromise of sorts between the views of the first and second scholarch of the Peripatos, an outcome that is characteristic of the syncretistic tendencies in Simplicius and other commentators. Disagreement per se is not problematic so long as the point of contention can be explained or explained away. (2) The so-called corollary on time (in Phys. 773.8ff.) is the second excursus in the commentary on Physics. Here Theophrastus (788.33789.2) is said to follow Aristotle in almost everything, while Strato is said to take ‘a different path’ (789.1-2, kainoteron ebadisen hodon). This distinction between the two successors to Aristotle may be a significant one, since the third head of the school is certainly known for his more physicalist approach. He is nicknamed ho phusikos in D.L. 5.58 and 61, and described as a man who ‘excelled in every branch of learning, and most of all in that which is styled “physics”, a branch of philosophy more ancient and important than the others’ (D.L. 5.64, tr. Hicks). On place, time and matter he came to hold quite different views to those of Aristotle and Theophrastus.51 Strato called time ‘the quantitative aspect of motion’ (in Cat. 346.14 = F151A.1 FHSG), while Theophrastus defines it as ‘some

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius accidental attribute (of motion)’ (15-16 = F151A.2 FHSG). Yet before bringing up Strato’s divergent view in the present context Simplicius claims Theophrastus and Eudemus hold the same view as Aristotle on time (F151B FHSG). In his commentary on this fragment Sharples makes the helpful comment that thanks to Iamblichus’ report (F151A FHSG) we can say that ‘Theophrastus comes down on the side of holding that time and motion could be separated, where Aristotle is undecided’.52 Strato seems to replace Aristotle’s definition, while Theophrastus’ position, which regards time as an accidental property, may well be intended to clarify Aristotle’s definition.53 Thus, one generation on, Strato was able to detach himself from Aristotle’s doctrine on several points. Simplicius, true to his initial words in the preface to this excursus, makes sure to highlight this turning away from the scholarch as part of the survey of the ‘many lines of examination by those who came after him’ (601.1-2). As he does not consider Aristotle’s position infallible (in Cat. 7.27-9, quoted above §1.2.1), he is also not averse to charting the internal discussions in the Peripatetic school. Clearly he did not see these as a threat to the Platonist position or to the harmonising strategy involved in supporting it. (3) A third passage nicely illustrates how Simplicius may pit thinkers against each other in his attempt to turn the argument his way. At in Cat. 435.17-436.3 (= F153 FHSG) he brings in Theophrastus into the discussion of movement (Aristotle Cat. 14). Although the perspective here is of course more conceptual and linguistic, the discussion has considerable overlap with the account in the Physics commentary (cf. 427.24-8). The six species of movement defined in Aristotle Cat. 15a13-33 are reviewed and analysed with the help of several earlier exegetes, including Theophrastus.54 The puzzle Simplicius considers here is a development from the preceding pages, in which he has raised two specific questions regarding the relation of motion to time.55 First, he asks why permanence (stasis) as a form is not opposed to movement (kinêsis) as a form. Earlier Plotinus and Boethus were paraphrased on this issue, the former noting that ‘rest is a negation of being moved’ (433.20, cf. Enn. 6.3.27), the latter doubting that ‘the state of rest opposed to movement in respect of quality is a quality’ (433.28-9). Simplicius’ inquiry aims to determine how the six species of motion relate to the ten categories, and in doing so is clearly pressing the text too hard. He held that there is change in all categories.56 His cross-reference to the commentary on Physics (23-4, pros men ekeinous tous apologismous epeirathên ti legein en tais eis ekeinên tên pragmateian skholais) shows the clear connection and chronology of the works.57 But Sharples rightly questions the way in which Simplicius uses Theophrastus, since his comments seem concerned with the general definition, as is clear from the quotation from his first book of Physics: It is not difficult to specify the common and universal account of movement, and say that it is a certain incomplete operation of what is potential, qua

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics such, in respect of each genus of the categories, and this is also more or less apparent from perception. (tr. Gaskin 2000)

Simplicius’ claim that he could demonstrate that Theophrastus ‘the best among Aristotle’s students’ agreed with his own suppositions (26-7, ethelô kai ton ariston tôn autou mathêtôn ton Theophraston epideixai tais emais huponoias sumpsêphizomenon) seems to mistake an introductory statement of a discussion for a preliminary outline.58 Clearly Theophrastus’ authority as ‘the best among Aristotle’s students’ is here used to overcome the possible criticism Simplicius might incur for disagreeing with Aristotle. Simplicius’ use of Theophrastus is thus characterised by a respectful attitude and the assumption that his evaluative comments and aporetic musings can assist in clarifying Aristotle. His knowledge of Theophrastus’ works is limited, as is its actual use in doctrinal discussion. His usefulness for the recovery of early Greek philosophy is illustrated by his important role in those parts of the commentaries where Presocratic opinions are reviewed. For Simplicius the second head of the Peripatos was an established voice in the historiographical and philosophical discourse of Platonist commentary. 3.2.2 Eudemus of Rhodes (c. 370-300 BCE) The transmission of Eudemus’ work depends almost entirely on the later commentators, in particular Alexander, Proclus, Philoponus and Simplicius. The current edition (Wehrli 1969) is outdated and incomplete, as is illustrated by the omission of a number of references found in Simplicius (Baltussen 2002b). Like Theophrastus, Eudemus has been assigned the ambiguous role of clarifying Aristotelian passages considered problematic in the eyes of Simplicius. In Simplicius’ Physics commentary Eudemus is mentioned more frequently than Theophrastus and with considerable respect. The fragments show Eudemus as an exegete and interpreter of Aristotle’s Physics, whose main concern is to clarify and systematise. It is generally assumed that they were lecture notes used by Eudemus to teach Aristotle’s physics in his own ‘school’ in Rhodes.59 This may also explain why Eudemus’ comments seem to possess a dogmatic and systematising tendency. He is seen to follow the order of Aristotle’s treatise closely (on which more below), and Simplicius already notes that he passed over book 7.60 From the remarks in Simplicius we can get a fairly good idea of how many books Eudemus wrote, and in what order, since Simplicius provides references for his quotations to the individual books of Eudemus’ work.61 I have discussed the references to individual books elsewhere.62 In outline, Eudemus’ work seems to have consisted of four or perhaps five books, in which he discussed subjects dealt with by Aristotle in Physics books 1-6 and 8.63 It is clear that he needed fewer books than did Aristotle, and from this it has

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius been assumed that Eudemus’ Physics was an abbreviated and reworked version of Aristotle’s.64 What form the work might have taken is still to be considered. But first we may go a little further in examining the nature of Eudemus’ exegesis as reported by Simplicius. The issue of the completeness of Simplicius’ copy of Eudemus’ work has been raised by scholars because some remarks in Simplicius suggest that he had a less complete copy than did Alexander.65 The amount and detail of Simplicius’ information (especially the numerous references to the individual books) certainly make it probable that he possessed a copy of Eudemus’ work. But the situation is complex, since Simplicius is referring to and quoting from Eudemus’ comments alongside those of, e.g., Alexander, Porphyry and Themistius, and Alexander also quotes from Eudemus.66 Thus Simplicius several times not only reports Eudemus via Alexander (e.g. 930.34 = F100; 115.11 = F43),67 but also states that he was unable to find the words which Alexander quotes from Eudemus (e.g. in Phys. 133.26 = F44 hôs Alexandros phêsi: egô gar ouch hêuron en tôi Eudêmeiôi tên lexin tautên). Three suggestions have been made to explain this: Simplicius had a less complete version than Alexander’s (Schöbe 1931: 72); Alexander’s paraphrase obscured the Eudemian material (Wehrli 1968: 95); Simplicius is criticising Alexander for extreme brevity (Sider 1981: 26, ‘a not very oblique criticism of Alexander’s scholarship’). I find the second unlikely, mainly because it is not very different from the third, except for the fact that it makes Simplicius unaware of Alexander’s supposed obscurity. And since the third option (Sider’s) seems rather forced, I prefer the first as the most probable. The passages discussed by Sider will not all fit into this explanation: even if he is probably right about F37a68 – i.e. that Alexander is criticised for ‘his condensation of Eudemus’ – this does not mean that the phrase exhêuron en tôi Eudêmeiôi tên lexin tautên (F44)69 should be taken as criticism of Alexander instead of a phrase indicating where he found the statement.70 However, in view of Simplicius’ use of the verb (‘finding’, heurein) it is preferable to think that Simplicius’ text may have had some gaps (first option). One further testimony in favour of this is F122b (1355.28ff., not mentioned by Sider in this context), where use of the verb in a positive formulation is clearly locative: Alexander states that Eudemus says that the first mover in the largest circle through the poles; for that moves fastest. but I found the statement thus in the Eudemian : [quotation follows]

There seems to be no reason to read remarks like this in any other way than as evidence that Simplicius’ information on Eudemus comes from both Eudemus and Alexander. It is moreover likely that Simplicius would probably use another verb for Alexander’s interpretive failure: in several

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics cases in which he rebukes Alexander for not ‘understanding’ the views he discusses Simplicius uses the verb akouein (e.g. in Phys. 644.25; more on this passage in Chapter 4). Consequently we cannot exclude the possibility that Simplicius’ copy of Eudemus’ work on physics was less complete than Alexander’s.71 Possibly one of the reasons why Simplicius (and perhaps Alexander and others before him) found Eudemus’ comments useful is that his approach to Aristotle’s text may have been helpful in understanding it.72 The fact that ‘helpful’ could mean his comments assisted Simplicius in his own preferred line of interpretation should not surprise us. When coming to Simplicius the reader knows that he is partie pris in his discussion, so one should expect an agenda and an overall attitude to Plato and Aristotle which had been forged over a long period of debate and evaluation of the views of both scholarchs. In all Eudemus’ remarks an attempt to clarify Aristotle’s words is present: like Theophrastus, Eudemus is drawing out implicit or tacit assumptions and reformulating them as explicit stages in his reasoning. Simplicius’ qualifying remarks before quotations from Eudemus seem to support such an interpretation: Eudemus is said to follow Aristotle closely in the main topics of his treatise (in Phys. 924.18 = F98, paraxeôn; 1036.13 = F109, parakolouthein). Or he proceeds by shortening paraphrase (1206.27, paraphrazôn } suntomôn = F113; cf. 74.18 = F35). Summaries can occur without necessarily losing clarity (in DC 497.24 = F149 W., suntomôs kai saphôs historêsen) and he may also approach a problem in an expansive way (in Phys. 48.6-7 = F34, philokalôs tên problêma) and be praised for his clarity (48.26-27 = F34, lexin saphôs ektithêmenên).73 Finally, he may set out a problem in an ‘unfailing fashion’ (in Phys. 1355.28 = F122b, asphalôs). Such is the range of judgements by which Simplicius indicates his praise for Eudemus, despite some potential tensions between these labels. The aspect emphasised here, Eudemus’ clarity, is not unambiguous. Does ‘clarity’ here mean ‘expressed more clearly’ or ‘fitting the Platonist agenda better’? If we take it as ‘expressed more clearly’, it could mean a form of ‘spelling out’ the message or the problem, as the case may be (cf. 48.26-7 = F34), which would fit other comments in which Simplicius refers to the ‘overall meaning’ of a passage (holê ennoia vs. kata lexin/ kata meros at, e.g., 129.16, 150.25, 210.28, 216.10, 888.16). Even when we make allowance for the subjective nature of some of these assessments, Simplicius’ elaborate use of Eudemus is in itself an argument in favour of the latter’s value. Eudemus’ comments apparently make him a good guide for later students of Aristotle’s Physics. Simplicius is clearly also thinking of the relationship between teacher and pupil, which in the Platonic tradition is a crucial link for the transmission of the truth (viva voce, see §5.2). One statement which supports this is found at in Phys. 68.32-3 (not in Wehrli): ‘regarding Hippocrates of Chios one does better to permit to Eudemus that he knows, given that he is closer in time and a pupil of Aristotle’.74

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius But the nature of these notes also seems to indicate that the ‘title’ ta phusika, when used by Simplicius in connection with Eudemus, refers to a work of a different character from Aristotle’s Physics. From Simplicius’ descriptions one is inclined to think of these lecture-notes as a shorter version of Aristotle’s Physics with some evaluative comments added, since they are both shorter in terms of the general line of argument (note for instance kephalaiôs at in Phys. 1036.13 and the number of books), and longer in terms of clarification (philokalôs, saphôs, asphalôs).75 Scholars are rightly hesitant to infer that Eudemus had written some sort of ‘commentary’, and although it may largely depend on definition, it seems wise to think of it as interpretive paraphrase with added considerations and arguments.76 We can at least conclude that he seems quite independent towards the treatise (more so than Theophrastus, apparently), creating a reworked version of some of Aristotle’s ideas on physics while keeping to the main lay-out and structure of that work. The reason that we may hesitate to translate Eudemus’ ta phusika as Physics is that the features discussed above suggest that we should avoid thinking of a full-blown treatise.77 As there is a very thin line between a reworked paraphrase and a shortened version with added remarks or ‘notes’ this may seem a rather academic point. Yet to characterise the work as ‘notes on (Aristotle’s) Physics’ might imply that Aristotle’s text was considered to be canonical.78 Sharples (2002) has shown that there are several possible ways of interpreting Eudemus’ work as well as the differences between Eudemus’ and Theophrastus’ approaches to Aristotle’s Physics. From Eudemus’ remarks it is clear that he may be trying to reformulate Aristotle’s work – possibly in an attempt to clarify the dense prose – whereas Theophrastus is commenting in a more aporetic fashion, perhaps because he was using the works of Aristotle in teaching where questions provide a good didactic tool and starting point for further research.79 It is important to remember that Theophrastus’ development of Aristotle does not always mean that he is challenging him.80 We have no way of checking what the original ‘title’ of Eudemus’ phusika was (if there was one), but it is plausible that Simplicius labelled it ta phusika by analogy with other Peripatetic works. It is well-known that, despite Aristotle’s variable use of the adjective phusikos, Simplicius mostly uses physikê akroasis for the Physics.81 It may in addition be pointed out that the common practice of printing ancient ‘titles’ as modern titles (with capital initial) is misleading: ta phusika may, it seems, have several different shades of meaning, all of them sharing the basic idea of (writings on) physical matters. It may seem a trivial point, but all too often a wrong label introduces a number of questionable connotations, which may then lead to questionable assumptions.82 The foregoing discussion of the Eudemian material as it is found in Simplicius is meant to set the scene for a better understanding of how Simplicius makes use of it. Eudemus seems to have stuck fairly closely to

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics Aristotle’s views on nature, but as with his contemporaries he may find himself formulating new proposals in the process of systematising Aristotle’s thoughts.83 Eudemus is also responsible for the preservation of scientific views, many of which must have originated in his Geometric investigation (geometrikê historia). Simplicius’ interest extends into such areas, as science and mathematics were an important part of the Neoplatonic curriculum. The role of Eudemus can be summed up on the basis of our investigation into the contextual comments and his frequent appearance in the commentaries for particular topics, using some results published elsewhere (Baltussen 2002b, 2006a). Many short references, which should be added to the surviving fragments for the sake of completeness, produce no new insights of major import.84 This is not surprising, because the material is limited and taken from the same source as most of the known texts. They can nevertheless be taken as further evidence that Simplicius is reading Eudemus’ notes closely alongside Aristotle’s text, as the brevity of such references suggests that Simplicius is on the look-out for useful comments and adding them whenever they occur (e.g. in Phys. 118.5-20). Moreover, some of the closing statements, which follow (and fall outside) the actual quotations, do teach us more about Simplicius’ method of demarcating (or ‘bracketing’) his quotations and draw attention to certain features of Eudemus’ approach (in Phys. 48.26-9, 63.19-20, 74.29-30, 725.19-24).85 We also find details which further clarify aspects of Eudemus’ role in the exegetical tradition. For instance, at in Phys. 11.16-17 we see Simplicius formulate objections against both Eudemus and Alexander, an unusual move since he normally prefers the former to the latter and in general disagrees with Alexander only in a limited number of cases (roughly a quarter: see Chapter 4). In two cases (in Phys. 48.26-9, 717.14-20) Eudemus’ value in clarifying a problem is noted. These insights arise from including more of the context of the source text, thus using a broader approach towards the study of fragments. A set of longer passages omitted in Wehrli (T8-12 in Baltussen 2002b) yield five further ‘quotations’, or at least passages supposedly reporting Eudemus’ words (signalled by verbs such as paratithesthai, graphein, legein). They give us additional glimpses of his working method.86 Further quotations in other authors (Themistius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus) add to our knowledge of the engagement with and transmission of Aristotle’s text among Simplicius’ immediate successors and also signal the further absence of Arabic sources in Wehrli: Themistius and Philoponus confirm a text we have from Simplicius (F79-80 W.), with an additional quotation. Above all, most additions offer quite valuable insights relevant for the transmission, interpretation and editing of the Eudemean fragments. Thus stronger support can be offered for the view (hinted at by Wehrli 1969: 88) that it was the value of the Eudemean material as an exegetical aid for Simplicius that ensured the survival of so much material. Sim-

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius plicius almost treats him as a ‘colleague’ who also aims at clarifying Aristotle’s difficult prose. The higher ratio of references to Eudemus (some 132) as compared to references to Theophrastus (37) might be an indication of just that: Eudemus’ clarifications of Aristotle’s thought in physics seem more useful – a convenient explanation for why they found their way into later exegetical writings.87 My suggestion (2002b: 148), that Simplicius perhaps thought of Eudemus’ comments as a useful cure for Aristotle’s unclarity, would explain the emphasis placed on clear exposition (witness the frequent use of saphôs), perhaps to counteract Aristotle’s – supposedly intended – unclarity (asapheia, in Cat. 7.1-22).88 Specific reference to the mode of expression in Eudemus also indicates that he makes confident and reliable contributions: he is a ‘witness’ (marturein, martura legôn) who skips parts of Aristotle’s work, recounts or clarifies (48.26-8, tou Eudemou lexin saphôs ektithemenon; 118.3-20, mnêmoneuse, edêlôse; 433.13-18 exetheto), understands (121.9, sunidôn), and states things in writing (717.15, gegraphotos; 121.9, graphei). Thus we find that a renewed study of the evidence with more emphasis on context, even duplicate passages, can improve our understanding of Simplicius’ approach. All in all, Simplicius considered Eudemus a reliable source offering an authoritative contribution to the explication of Aristotle’s text. The underlying principle of attributing greater value to an author contemporary with Aristotle is one which makes sense to the modern eye, but must probably be explained by the view, common among late Platonists, that personal contact between teachers and students was the best way to interact in philosophy. With an educational context in mind, we can understand why Simplicius wanted to use Eudemus’ comments consistently throughout his own commentary. It is plausible to infer that Eudemus rewrote the Aristotelian text into a leaner form with an overall narrative which brought out both the structure and the meaning of the original more clearly. 3.3 Simplicius and the early Peripatetics If Theophrastus and Eudemus offered the late Platonists an opportunity to explore and exploit the earliest interpretive engagements with the Aristotelian corpus, this can be explained to a large extent by the dynamics of canon-formation, or at least the beginnings of such a process in the early Peripatos. Simplicius declared Theophrastus ‘the best among Aristotle’s students’ and regarded Eudemus as a useful aid to shed light on difficult passages. Such laudatory epithets were not used for any other early Peripatetics and signal his admiration and trust in them as reliable sources for interpreting their master’s thoughts. They had contributed de facto to the formation of a canon (in the sense of an emerging consensus about his works) in that Aristotle can be understood best either from his own works or from those who had had the privilige of sunousia – the

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3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics Platonist term for intensive teacher-student interaction.89 Either way the presumption of consistency and coherence of the Peripatetic viewpoint imposes itself: Simplicius does not seem to be concerned about the new directions in the Lyceum. Gottschalk’s comments on the importance of Andronicus (first century BCE) for the final step in establishing a canon are of particular relevance here: Andronicus performed his task well. He not only established the form and canon of Aristotle’s writings which, with comparatively slight modifications, we still use today, but initiated a way of doing philosophy which was to predominate among Aristotelians to the end of antiquity and to spread to adherents of other schools. Their work was firmly centred on the Aristotelian writings. Much of it consisted of straight exegesis and even where they disagreed with Aristotle’s doctrine or were dealing with different problems from his, they often chose to present their views as an interpretation or development of his ideas. Philosophical debate could take the form of an argument over the authenticity or meaning of a text.90

The existence of a substantial body of work is in itself neither a reason nor a guarantee that it will achieve the status of a canon, that is, of an authoritative and definitive expression of a truth or truths. Canonisation of a philosophical corpus requires both authority and a conviction among faithful followers that there is, in principle, little to add to the form and meaning of the writings. Such a conviction can hardly be attributed to Theophrastus, Eudemus and other early members of Aristotle’s school. From the start critical evaluation was part of the internal debates, but these are not always easily recognised or reconstructed, because expressing disagreement with the scholarch was regulated by tacit rules about how this could be done. In the case of Theophrastus it has been pointed out that he is rather indirect in disagreeing with Aristotle: his view on the so-called fifth element implies a divergent view, but it has to be extracted from the subtle treatment he gives.91 On other issues too he preferred to pioneer new areas with a particular emphasis on the inanimate parts of the universe (apsucha: his tracts on stones, winds, fire, metals etc). Even when he focused on a fairly new area such as plants and set out to chart it comprehensively he is seen to model his approach on Aristotle’s studies on animals – sensibly, a sympathetic reader might say, or slavishly, as a more critical observer might maintain. The standard account of the Peripatetic school after Theophrastus describes it as undergoing a change of focus, from the abstract and metaphysical concerns of the founder to more concrete and physical interests of his successors. Although this developmental picture is grounded in ancient representations, going back to Diogenes Laertius (e.g. D.L. 5.58, 61, Stratôn ho phusikos), things are more complicated than can be acknowleged in brief surveys of the subject. On the one hand, we must accept that Aristotle’s writings represent a great achievement, though one that was

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius far from complete. On the other, we must also take into account that individual choices were made by his followers, pursuing particular interests of their own. However, most of the time their proposals remained within the main parameters of Aristotle’s system, a geocentric universe ruled by specific physical and metaphysical causes. Their work can be seen as continuing to philosophise in the Aristotelian manner, while the notion of canon as established doctrine is probably the result of a shift in the first century BCE.92 Simplicius’ keen interest in these early exegeses can be credited to his desire to make the most of all the available evidence, which he must have sought out and studied carefully. In our account of his sources we have seen that with regard to the Presocratics and the Peripatetics his library is already quite extensive: the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and other Presocratics, a range of works by Theophrastus and Eudemus and other Peripatetics were probably in his possession.93 Strato plays an important role in the discussion of place, diverging considerably from Aristotle. In their relation to the Aristotelian corpus, the earlier interpreters were engaged in developing an existing body of thought cooperatively, while Simplicius, coming to Aristotle from a completely different angle, aimed more at finding sufficient evidence to support and/or demonstrate his particular viewpoint. The early Peripatetics are to some extent considered as colleagues, offering ‘privileged information’ for the immediate explication of Aristotle’s text. In the light of the Neoplatonic aim of preparing oneself for the Platonic ‘Greater Mysteries’, Aristotle’s ‘Smaller Mysteries’ were well served by his close collaborators, who in one sense were also his first exegetes. Simplicius does not cover up, nor does he show any special concern for, the internal disagreements in the Peripatetic school, but rather tries to exploit their exegetical comments. Although not stated, this approach suggests that he follows a line of thinking we encountered in connexion with the Presocratics (and will see again among late Platonists), by which such disagreements could be considered as superficial and easily clarified or defused. Simplicius also shows little awareness of the phenomenon I referred to as the emergence of a canon (p. 88), but employs (or projects) the notion of an established canon to evaluate the earliest clarifications of Aristotle’s prose. It seems that for him ‘clarification’ stood for ‘extracting the meaning which is already present in the text’. The early Peripatetics thus fulfilled the roles of well-informed interpretive sources close to Aristotle and those of ‘colleagues’ contributing to the educational objective of spreading the Platonist message.94

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Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias [it is] profitable for those who choose to understand and explain Aristotle’s thought by way of Alexander’s commentaries, to examine what he said. (in DC 297.8-10, tr. Hankinson 2006)

Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE) has a more dominant presence in Simplicius’ commentaries than any other commentator on Aristotle. The frequency with which he is quoted, referred to and criticised exceeds that of all others, while there is some evidence that he is also behind a number of comments where his name is not given. The evidence for this is substantial and clearly collecting and elucidating the ‘fragments’ of Alexander from Simplicius would be a book project in itself (see n. 1). In this chapter I open a line of investigation which explores this influence in its different guises, both explicit and implicit. The two broader questions steering my exploration are the following: (1) why is Simplicius relying so heavily on Alexander? and (2) how is it that a died-in-the-wool Peripatetic philosopher and commentator has such an important role in a Platonist commentary? I call this an ‘exploration’ because the subject is too big to claim comprehensiveness either in scope or depth, and recent and ongoing work makes definitive statements premature.1 My conclusions in this chapter, although based on a full review of the Alexander occurrences for in Phys. and in DC, remain provisional and tentative to the extent that a more complete assessment of the Alexander fragments must await until a more comprehensive analysis has been completed.2 In focusing on Alexander we turn our attention from the discussion of early and classical Greek philosophers (Chapters 2-3) to Simplicius’ predecessors who lectured on Plato and Aristotle and as a result produced extensive comments laid down in lecture notes and commentaries (Chapters 4-6). This division between the two parts of the present study is based on a distinction not unlike that made in modern scholarship between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. Anachronistic as these terms may sound, they help to bring out more sharply how we can determine the primary function of an author mentioned in Simplicius’ works. The works of the Presocratics and Aristotle fulfil the role of texts commented on (‘target texts’), while the commentaries from Alexander onwards are more formal in their exegesis and thus constitute a kind of ‘auxiliary’ texts (Chapters 4-6). Aristotle’s immediate successors (§3.2) lie somewhere in between these two categories – transitional authors, so to speak, who are

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius themselves engaged in explaining Aristotle (one could call their works texts with an ‘auxiliary role’). To the modern eye (and probably in their own minds) Theophrastus and Eudemus were not writing commentaries in the formal sense of the word: their engagement with the works of Aristotle is as cooperative as it is complementary.3 Yet they can be seen to establish, slowly but surely, a meaning in the texts of their teacher which will eventually assist in clarifying the supposed connections between works and their functions within a larger system of thought. The effect was that, by way of exegetical evaluation and by filling in the blanks and gaps, they helped create a canon in the sense of an authoritative corpus, even if this was not their primary concern. The need for a detailed study of the role of Alexander of Aphrodisias in Simplicius’ working method (and especially in his Physics commentary) is obvious: not only does he represent an element which on the surface seems alien to the Platonist commentary tradition (Aristotelianism), but his importance extends beyond the Greek tradition into Arabic philosophy as well. As this is a huge topic it requires careful and selective reading of the available materials. Here I offer a first attempt at tackling this topic, though I do not assume that it will constitute the last word. I am of course not the first to advocate the importance of Alexander for Aristotle, since studies by Robert Sharples and recent translations (in the ACA series) have been praised for clarifying that relationship, among other things. In this connection Gerson has rightly pointed out that Alexander was useful for his patient clarifications in reading the text in sequence and very much on its own terms; we know that he also tried to read the Metaphysics as a coherent work.4 Alexander was already part of the very scholarly tradition in which by his own admission doing philosophy meant using lots of books.5 Presumably referring to book rolls, Alexander makes this point in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics 27.12-14 when explaining the dialectical procedure set out in Aristotle’s major mission statement of dialectic (Top. 101a26-36): This kind of speech was customary among the older philosophers, who set up most of their classes in this way – not with reference to books, since at the time there were not yet any books of this kind. After a thesis has been posited, they trained their aptitude at finding argumentative attacks by producing attack arguments about this thesis, establishing and refuting the position through what is approved.6

Simplicius’ use of such ‘secondary’ sources already well illustrates his skill and innovation in clarifying Aristotle. The weaving of many different voices into the fabric of his commentaries may be compared with the writing of a symphony, a skilful orchestration of different components. Simplicius would have liked this image in view of his aim to show there exists considerable agreement (symphônia in Greek) between Plato and

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias Aristotle. To support his argument he variously uses paraphrase and quotation, two devices which we saw he used for specific reasons (atypical for the Neoplatonic school, though present to some extent in Porphyry and Proclus), in particular based on the view that accurate citation can be more useful than paraphrase (discussed in §§1.2 and 2.1). Among the many references to his commentator-predecessors, Simplicius mentions Alexander almost 1,200 times, of which c. 700 occur in the 1,300-page commentary on the Physics.7 That amounts to an average appearance of once every other page! This makes him by far the most quoted source in Simplicius. A detailed study of Alexander’s role in the Physics commentary should therefore look in particular at (a) how the high frequency of his comments in the making of this commentary affects the nature of it, and also at (b) the way in which Alexander is quoted, when he is being praised or scolded. So far as I am aware, one of the experts on Simplicius’ works has remained unchallenged in stating that regarding the Presocratics Simplicius’ ‘citations far exceed the need to illustrate Aristotle’s text and Simplicius did not borrow such quotations from Alexander of Aphrodisias or from any other earlier commentator’.8 I will show, among other things, that viewed from a broader vantage point the quotations from Alexander himself also exceed that need and thus in a number of cases can be compared in this respect with those of the Presocratics, provided one specifies ‘need’ in a certain way. It is also significant for our understanding of the commentary tradition to become aware of Alexander the Peripatetic commentator within the Platonic tradition. This phenomenon can be traced back to Plotinus (217275 CE) who used him as an integral part in the exegesis of Plato and Aristotle along with Severus, Numenius, Aspasius, Adrastus and others as noted in Porphyry, Vita Plotini 14.14. The passage is intriguing because of the detailed description of Plotinus’ approach: he is said to have reacted to commentaries being read to him (14.11-12 aneginôsketo autôi ta hypomnêmata), after which he would swiftly absorb its meaning and respond succinctly. In doing so Porphyry claims considerable originality for him, although his teacher Ammonius is also given a role in this process: his ‘insight’ (noun 14.16) is used in the process of exegesis. Rist (1967: 171) has speculated that Plotinus followed him in expounding philosophy ‘out of a natural flair for his subject-matter’, dealing with the problems not the textual issues. He often used question and answer (e.g. his lost commentary on the Categories), a technique not liked by all auditors: in this connection one wonders about the meaning of the phrase used with regard to a certain Thaumasius when he requested that Plotinus, instead of using question and answer, speak eis ta biblia (13.14). Armstrong has translated ‘in the manner of a set treatise’ (Loeb), but is a more literal translation ‘to(wards) books’, to be understood as ‘put into books’? The combination of ‘speaking’ and ‘books’ is somewhat unusual, and ‘speaking to books’ might prompt us to think of commentary. If that is what Thaumasius meant, the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius contrast presumably is one between question and answer, debate and monologue. Whatever the meaning, Plotinus is described as a meticulous and sharp interpreter of philosophical thought. It is generally accepted that Plotinus’ decision to make Aristotle again important in his study of Plato was hugely influential upon the Platonist tradition. Thus the process of (re)assimilation or, as is the more common term, harmonisation, i.e. to prove sumphônia between Plato and Aristotle, required additional ‘input’ from the Aristotelian tradition, a role to which Alexander was very well suited. We have seen that Simplicius stated that the search for harmony is one of the tasks of the ideal commentator (above, §1.2.1). But Plotinus was far more critical of Aristotle than, for instance, Porphyry. The work of some of Alexander’s antecedents, from the period after Eudemus (third century BCE, see Chapter 3) to Alexander’s time (early third century CE), cannot be covered here for practical reasons: not only is the material in question highly fragmentary and complex (some Aristotelians, the so-called Middle Platonists), but there are now at least two book-long discussions of the main figures covering many aspects of Platonist exegesis from Antiochus to Porphyry. I will briefly highlight some important contributions from this period in Chapter 5.9 In attempting to enquire into the reasons for the dominant position of Alexander, we enter, so to speak, into an ‘archaeology’ of exegesis in the Platonist tradition, with an important role for Plotinus’ style of commenting on Aristotle, as is hinted at by D’Ancona when she lists recent work on the influence of Alexander on Plotinus.10 But we need to do more than hint in this case: the analysis needs to bring out in more detail how the commentary format was given shape in the period between Plotinus and Simplicius. In addition, the analysis will selectively present the results based on a broad examination of the Alexander passages.11 The exact nature of his method is worth investigating, without projecting our modern understanding of scholarly working methods. This case study will thus prove useful in showing how, with a more empirical analysis, we can gain further insight into which sources Simplicius used directly and indirectly and how he used them. The first point requires asking pertinent questions about his scholarly strategy, the second brings in the issue of how his hermeneutical procedures relate to his philosophical activity. In outline this chapter proceeds as follows. First, a brief general section looks at the place of both protagonists within the commentators tradition (§4.1). Their methods and motives differ considerably, not only because they are three centuries apart, but also because (strictly speaking) they belong to different traditions, Alexander to the Aristotelian, Simplicius to the Platonist school (with various contributions by Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius). For those studying classical philosophy this may be surprising, but syncretistic movements in ancient philosophy had already started in the Hellenistic period12 and with the rise of Neoplaton-

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias ism in the third century CE, Plotinus initiated a perspective by which Plato and Aristotle were fused into a fruitful synergy.13 Next some remarks on Simplicius’ methodology will be helpful to set up the analysis of the Alexander passages in the commentary on the Physics (§4.2). Simplicius is of interest for his scholarly outlook and expresses some very interesting views on how to proceed when writing philosophical prose. The point I shall try to bring out above all is that he is tacitly assuming that Alexander can be used for the exegesis of Aristotle within the new framework of late Platonism. The evidence from the Physics commentary lends itself best to surveying and analysing the different ways in which Alexander features within the exegetical framework, in particular the types of usage and their frequency, while taking some additional aspects on board, such as their relation to the importance of the argument at issue, the exegetical terminology and the groupings of quoted sources, and where disagreement is expressed (§§4.3-4).14 The final section draws some preliminary conclusions, and outlines further tasks and prospects of the wider project (§4.5). 4.1 Two commentators, two traditions The importance of Alexander of Aphrodisias in formal exegesis is clear from the fact that he is labelled ‘the commentator’ in later times.15 His presence is of far-reaching importance, because it brings into relief Simplicius’ dependence on him and forces us to determine his own contributions to the exegesis of Aristotle. The Simplician commentaries also give us many quotations from Alexander’s commentaries: in the Commentary on Physics this is presumably his equivalent work on the Physics, which does not survive in Greek independently.16 Recent work has recovered some new fragments of it from an independent source in addition to the passages in Simplicius, indicating that Simplicius’ reporting is not always impartial.17 But this should not surprise us: it has long been known that ancient authors did not abide by scholarly and argumentative rules in considered natural or necessary today: the contrast between lavish quotations on the one hand, and manipulative techniques in using them on the other, is a common feature of ancient writing, but it does not go down well with modern scholars.18 Yet if the manipulation of texts causes surprise, it is most likely a sign of our wrong assumptions regarding ancient practices. Nevertheless, Simplicius is still one of the most impressive scholars in antiquity even by modern standards.19 Alexander of Aphrodisias, known as ‘the commentator’ (in Phys. 700.9), is referred to by Simplicius as ‘most knowledgeable of Aristotle’s exegetes’ (in Phys. 80.15) or ‘the most careful of Aristotle’s partisans’ (in DC 378.201).20 His commentaries are of exceptional quality in clarifying Aristotle’s philosophical views and in providing a consistent picture of the scholarch’s philosophy. He wrote exegeses on many of Aristotle’s works in different formats. Not all are continuous commentaries: he also composed so-called

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius dialectical discussions (problêmata) and shorter essays.21 His surviving works show him as a patient and meticulous thinker and commentator, firmly placed within the Aristotelian tradition. This is not to say that he unconditionally agreed with everything Aristotle wrote. On certain issues he is known to have diverged from Aristotelian orthodoxy, for instance on the immortality of the soul.22 But for our purposes it is more important to hold on to the general consensus that his outlook in his exegetical activities was that of an Aristotelian. Although the two authors approach Aristotle from very different angles, the dynamic between the two is a fruitful one, which allows us to chart the progress in the history of interpretation of Aristotle, but also in the history of exegesis in general. Simplicius must have had a convenient method for locating the right passage at the right time in the many authors he cites. The arrangement of certain authors in each other’s vicinity (‘clusters’) are most likely the result of a particular way of note-taking keyed to themes or topics, or they must have been present in another source (Porphyry? Proclus?). This is one aspect to which I shall return. In addition, Simplicius’ use of technical terms will give us further clues as to how he may have constructed his commentaries in practical terms. The survey of his works given above (Chapter 1) confirmed the unusual wealth of Simplicius’ library. Significantly it also seems to have included copies of several works by Alexander. So far as we can see, the works of Alexander known to Simplicius were commentaries discussing Aristotle’s Physics, On the soul, and On the heavens (in Phys. 1292.2-3), and also Alexander’s own treatise De mixtu (in Phys. 530.15), a polemic against Zenobius the Epicurean (in Phys. 489.21), and perhaps a commentary on On generation and corruption.23 Simplicius may have had access to such works while in Athens, either before or after he wrote the commentaries (see §1.3). By continuing the practice of explicating Plato with the help of Aristotle, Simplicius stands firmly within the Athenian Platonist school.24 It is significant that, apart from the commentary on Epictetus, his surviving works all deal with Aristotle. It is again the school’s syncretism which is relevant here. In aiming for the harmonisation of the views of Plato and Aristotle, the peculiar view that Aristotle’s works are a good introduction to Plato became standard.25 This position was not new (see n. 10), but it received its most explicit advocate in Porphyry, while the Plotinian system underwent its most thorough synthesis under Proclus (d. 485 CE). As we saw, Simplicius goes even further in this respect by claiming that the Presocratics are basically in harmony with Plato, despite certain superficial differences (in Phys. 28.32-4; 29.3-5, above, p. 83). I have suggested that this claim is in part motivated by his aim to defuse the potentially damaging conflicts found in ‘certain overviews’ (anagraphais), which according to him overemphasise disagreements (28.34-29.5, 29.14). This was a well-known strategy among some Christian authors who attempted to exploit these disagreements, following the sceptics’ ploy of listing major

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias epistemological problems to show how unceasing disagreement about such issues proved the impossibility of knowledge (Sextus Empiricus).26 In the case of Alexander, Simplicius seems to be taking his material as he moves through the text of Aristotle, often using Alexander’s comments as a starting point for a new topic. This suggests that he takes Alexander as his main guide – as we shall see, this is the most plausible working hypothesis. Alexander’s dominant role can thus in part be explained by the parallelism of base text (Aristotle) and commentary (Alexander). Alexander’s first occurrence in the Physics commentary is rather casual and signals an apparent exception to Simplicius’ good scholarly methods: he does not introduce Alexander properly in recognition of his contribution to the discourse. I do not mean by name and place of birth, as he does with many of the Presocratics, e.g. Xenophanes of Colophon (7.3-4) or Anaxagoras of Klazomenai, because this has been plausibly attributed to Simplicius’ source for this material, Theophrastus.27 Yet he does not name him in a list of sources available to him, as he did in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories when outlining the task of a commentator (7.23-32 Kalbfleisch, quoted above, §1.2.1). Yet Alexander, the commentator and the most quoted author in his works by far, gets no special mention or introduction at all. The first occurrence of his name is a simple ‘Alexander’ (in Phys. 2.5), and it is not until the eighteenth occurrence that a further label, relating to the place of provenance, is found (‘of Aphrodisias’, 19.5, cf. 44.11, in DC 176.33-4, 297.8). In fact, in in Phys. Simplicius does not refer to Alexander’s works in any concrete form until 332.20, where he speaks of ‘the written comments of Alexander’ (ta tou Alexandrou hypomnêmata; cf. 430.3, 530.16; in modern translations usually rendered ‘commentaries’). What are we to make of this? Some have suggested that the Categories commentary is the most accomplished and complete because it was the starting point of all teaching in the (Neo)platonic school, and so teachers and students would have spent the most time on it28 – hence the elaborate introduction and the methodological refinement in both stating and executing the overall strategy. By contrast, it is suggested, the Physics commentary represented a later stage in the curriculum. Because its intended place was after that on the Categories,29 Simplicius may not have felt the need for special introductions, or he may not have been able to finalise it.30 Given Alexander’s prominence as an exegete, it seems odd that he does not get official ‘credit’ for his role in the commentary. I take this reticence to be a sign of Simplicius’ tacit assumption that Alexander’s role in a commentary needs no further justification. As we have seen, it is because of the harmonising (or syncretistic) strategy of the Platonists that Simplicius can incorporate the views of the Aristotelian Alexander at all (more on this point in Chapter 5). At the same time, since Alexander belongs to his own tradition (Aristotelianism), the act of incorporating him into a Platonist narrative is bound to create tensions, and it is here that

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius even Simplicius will admit to disagreement with his illustrious guide. Strictly speaking, Alexander is not part of the harmonisation process as such, but does contribute to the process as an external voice. Since the extent of his disagreements has not yet been studied properly, I shall touch on this aspect in the next two sections (but see also §6.3). From this analysis we can confirm that Alexander’s importance is simply assumed by Simplicius, even if he remains more critical and independent than it would seem on the surface. In addition, Alexander’s presence in the text is more complicated than might be expected. But first it will be important to assess Simplicius’ technical approach in order to illustrate how the formal commentary experienced its decisive stage under Alexander. 4.2 Alexander the pioneer: exegetical format and style As indicated in the previous chapters, the exegetical tools Simplicius had at his disposal were the result of a long tradition of textual interpretation (going back to the grammarians)31 and of the specific Neoplatonic way of reading Aristotle, especially through Plotinian, Iamblichan or Proclean eyes. This practice produced an interesting range of terms which map out the different activities and intentions of the commentator. Some of these tools will become especially clear from the exegesis of Alexander passages. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish verbs of clarifying and explaining, nouns indicating comments or commentary, expressions of agreement, disagreement, dissent, error, and philological moves. The order of treatment reflects roughly the logical order of exegesis: Simplicius will be seen to establish the type of work, consider textual variants, make his initial exegetical moves, and may then resort to various forms of meta-commentary. The last refers to comments that connect specific remarks to a global argument of the doctrine, or to the other commentaries in a comparative spirit. Measuring Alexander’s importance and influence is best done via an empirical examination of the frequency and nature of quotations we find in Simplicius’ commentaries. We can start by considering his role in the development of philosophical commentary. While formal commentary started some time before Alexander, Cristina D’Ancona has rightly emphasised that Alexander’s choice of the lemmata style of running commentary decisively determined the subsequent tradition. With Plotinus his works start to play a role in the philosophical discussions of the educational context,32 and in other passages traces of his influence have been detected.33 In other words, Alexander’s commentaries, though not the earliest surviving Aristotelian works of this nature, no doubt became influential for all the reasons we might expect: they were detailed, sensible discussions of the text and not overly partisan or obsequious in their interpretation.34 Although it is

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias nowhere stated in so many words, Simplicius may have been especially appreciative of this attitude; he himself admonished the would-be commentator to be objective in his approach to Aristotle (in Cat. 7.26-9). Still, the commentaries on De anima did often accuse Alexander of interpreting Aristotle ‘un-Platonically’, which they considered a perversion.35 These commentators on the De anima were especially keen to distinguish ‘the boundary between higher, rational, and lower, irrational soul’. Alexander’s claims about the unity of body and soul and the nature of the intellect are critical and thus not always helpful in pursuing the Plotinian agenda.36 The format of selecting short passages (lemmata) and commenting on them in the original order of the base text was a prominent feature, by which Alexander (and before him, Aspasius)37 effectively established the running commentary within the Aristotelian exegetical tradition, although he does not always follow the base text line by line or page by page, often sampling them selectively.38 At the same time Alexander manages to maintain a clear view of the overall purpose of a work he discusses, which makes his commentaries not just a loosely connected (and incoherent) set of notes on individual passages. It is very likely that these commentaries are linked to his role as a teacher of Peripatetic philosophy in Athens. His works are thus partly pragmatic and partly ideological: pragmatic in that this approach allows for a discussion of segments of text which are manageable and thematically cohesive, ideological because he is committed to the Aristotelian cause.39 It is possible that his position as public teacher in Aristotelian philosophy in Athens (created by the Emperor Marcus Aurelius around 176 CE), to which Alexander was appointed at some time between 198 and 209 CE, gave his work additional authority. In short, Alexander had much to offer a student of Aristotle’s works: consulting his commentaries meant making use of a rewarding aid to a critical yet fair exploration of Aristotelian doctrines. Moreover, Alexander’s independence with regard to Aristotle’s views, feeling free to criticise him, or at least to question him and disagree on various issues, could be exploited, since some issues concern fundamental points of doctrine.40 Such behaviour within the Aristotelian school started quite early and should not surprise us: in Greek philosophical schools a sense of allegiance would never cramp a student’s capacity for critical scrutiny, an attitude which was acceptable so long as it was presented as a cooperative gesture. What mattered was the way in which one expressed dissent: we saw Theophrastus formulate doubts and questions (aporiai), presumably because he was close to Aristotle, while Eudemus and later students, whether as a result of geographical or chronological separation, were more explicit about the problems in his work and distanced themselves from the master on a number of issues.41 Alexander’s careful (non-confrontational) explication of Aristotle probably facilitated his use in the Platonist school, and his close allegiance to Aristotle allowed him to be regarded as amenable to the Platonists’ views in the same way that

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Aristotle was. The commentaries are as much determined by his allegiance to Aristotle’s thought as they are by the debates current in his day. The format of lemmata commentary may in itself seem an obvious tool for exegesis, but it is the way in which it is given shape that counts: the selection of a particular section or ‘slice’ of the text reveals the commentator’s skill or ability to divide a text up meaningfully and sensibly. It is to be noted that the predilections of ancient commentators for what can be considered ‘thematically cohesive’ do not coincide with modern preferences. One reason for this is that phrases can be singled out for comment when they are considered difficult or obscure. The discursive style and detailed explications of the text illustrate an awareness of the dense prose in Aristotle’s treatises as well as the need for elucidation of the thoughts enclosed in them. Style is also a point worth looking into in so far as we want to determine who the intended audience might be. As the official public teacher in Aristotelian philosophy in Athens Alexander would be plying his trade as a ‘professor’ of philosophy. Do these works fit that profile? If teaching was his primary activity, it must be considered the major driver behind his writings. Given the polemic against Stoics and Sceptics, it would seem reasonable to see them too as a platform for settling important questions in current debate and defending Aristotelian doctrine. For instance, there are some observations on the Stoics in Quaestiones F1-2 (Sharples 1994: 89-94) where Alexander’s comments on the so-called sorites (a logical problem on what constitutes a ‘heap’) and on the incorporeality of the soul are found. With regard to the first, Alexander notes that it is a sophism; as to the second, he states that ‘there is more disagreement in respect of these matters between the Stoics and Plato than between Aristotle [and Plato]’ (op. cit. 93). He does clarify that Aristotle and Plato agree on the incorporeality of the soul but not on its immortality. In Quaestio 3.12 an argument relating to the question whether reality is limited or not occurs. It uses the imaginary action of stretching one’s hand out beyond the limits of the world; the presence of void outside the world was a feature of Stoic and Epicurean doctrine. To further illustrate the importance of Alexander in the multi-referenced universe that is Simplicius’ work, we may briefly compare the overall use of sources and their distribution across the work. The sources clearly marked in Simplicius’ commentaries were reproduced, with some additions and corrections, in a diagram (above, p. 30). This not only illustrates what a well-stocked library he had at his disposal, but also allows us to gain some statistically significant information about the arrangement and presentation of his sources. Here I want to call attention to his preferences and the distribution of commentators mentioned. That Alexander seems to be his preferred starting-point for discussing Aristotle is especially apparent from the first lines of the Commentary on Aristotle’s On the heavens (in DC). The introduction of this commentary is a complex mixture of source discussion and arguments from authority,

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias both in Alexander’s reported comments and in the way these become incorporated into Simplicius’ account. The opening comment (1.1-2: ‘Alexander says that the subject (skopos) of Aristotle’s treatise On the heavens is the world’) sets the agenda for the initial pages, in which Simplicius first allows Alexander to state his view more fully (in DC 1.1-13 with a reference to Theophrastus as a supporting ‘witness’), and next elaborates on the proposed overall interpretation of this treatise by further clarifying the proposal (‘conjecture’, hypothesis, as he calls it), giving reasons for his view. He clearly follows the broader agenda of the ‘preliminary questions’ in reading Aristotle when he details the skopos (discussed and criticised at 3.11-4.5, reiterated at 201.26-8), the order of reading (taxis, 5.36-7) and the division of the works (divisio, 6.8-28). Only then are more recent commentators brought in, allowing him to deal with the divergent views on the skopos of the work. Iamblichus (c. 245-325 CE) proposes the ‘heavenly and divine body’ (universe) as the ‘subject’, Syrianus (d. 437 CE) the ‘heaven proper, i.e. the eternal, revolving body } not accepting Alexander’s claim that its subject is the world’. Thus this opening section represents a typical example of Simplician exegesis, in which a chain of commentators on Aristotle going all the way back to Theophrastus (in this case, via Alexander) is used to set the scene and define the topic. It often strikes modern scholars as odd that Simplicius does not always choose one particular view. In this case he looks for a compromise, ending a critical discussion of Alexander’s position with the conclusion that both the universe (Iamblichus) and the four elements (Alexander) are the theme of the work (in DC 4.26-30). After he has listed the views he does formulate criticisms on the individual positions (‘against the others’, in DC 4.5; cf. Alexander 45.5). The decision, if that is the right word, comes at 5.35-6, when he evinces the view that ‘this would be the subject of the present treatise, being named after its most important part, which is that on which the rest depend’. On the position (‘chronology’) of the work he approvingly cites the general consensus of the exegetical tradition: ‘Both Aristotle and his exegetes reasonably determine its position in the order of reading as being after the treatise on Physics’ (in DC 5.36-7). Why does Simplicius start with Alexander here? If he was merely after a chronological survey, one would expect him to start with Theophrastus, unless he did not have access to his On heaven (peri ouranou). He does make it a point to report Alexander’s mention of Theophrastus, which confirms his interest in the second scholarch. He also signals the disagreement between Alexander and others, and sets them against each other (as, e.g., at 4.22-5), all of which would suggest his knowledge of Theophrastus is indirect. But as we have already seen in Chapter 3, Simplicius had some knowledge of Theophrastus’ relevant works as it transpires from the fragmentary remains (fragments 165B-D, 169, 171, 176 FHSG), locating On heaven as the third book of his Physics (in Phys. 1236.1-2 = F176

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius FHSG). Eudemus and Theophrastus are both regulars in Simplicius’ quotation pattern and not infrequently appear together with Alexander (e.g. at 700.19 on Plato). Independent access to Eudemus and Alexander can hardly be doubted. Would Alexander’s commentary be the only comprehensive running commentary among Simplicius’ samples? As in the case of the Metaphysics, partial commentaries by the later Platonists were written.42 The core commentaries were on Cat. and Metaph., so it is possible that Phys. and Cael. were not given equal attention. A further factor could be more recent commentaries which show an interest in Alexander’s method, such as Syrianus’ adoption of lemmata commentary or Ammonius’ use of Alexander in interpreting important concepts (see below). After Alexander Porphyry is a good second among the preferred exegetes in Simplicius, even if his name occurs only some 126 times. As we have already seen (pp. 41-2), he often is mentioned in the vicinity of Alexander, Eudemus and Themistius: at 728.10-14 manuscript versions are discussed by ‘Porphyry and Themistius and Alexander’ (the latter is quoted). Themistius and Alexander also appear as equally valuable contributors to the discussion at in DC 62.12-13, 176.32; in Phys. 169.24, 400.1 (includes Porphyry), 414.17, 684.2 (Themistius rejected: touto de adunaton), 854.20, 864.15 (Porphyry added), 918.13 (with Porphyry, on a textual matter), 950.4 (with Aspasius, on a textual matter), 1130.3-6 (Philoponus adducing both in his silly attempt to impress the naïve), 1253.7 (both think there is a necessary eternal motion). Note, however, that at 70.32 Themistius’ agreement (sunaidei) with the exegesis is mentioned and that at in Phys. 986.30 Themistius’ non-acceptance of Alexander’s interpretation is noted: The clever Themistius does not accept from Alexander [the statement] that even in things that seem to change all at once, as in the case of freezing milk and a darkening body, one part changes earlier, and another later. For he says [192.8-9] that perception proves that there occur some all-at-once changes and transformations of bodies. But we may reply that evidence from perception in these things is not safe. (tr. Konstan 1989)

Simplicius here cautiously offers a critical comment on the issue of instantaneous change, adding further comments on Alexander and another quotation from Themistius (969.14-24 = Them. in Phys. 192.12-22) in which he argued that ‘things that possess no parts’ cannot undergo this particular kind of change. Porphyry’s role in all this is not easily defined: his position in such clusters varies, and he is often singled out for criticism. Disagreements between them may also crop up. At in Phys. 407.4-6 Simplicius disagrees with Porphyry about moving a phrase after ‘the commentators’ (adding a quotation of ten lines). More will be said on Porphyry and Plotinus in the

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias next chapter, but for now it is to be noted that they seem to occur more prominently in cases in which the material is clearly of fundamental importance to Neoplatonic philosophy. Ammonius also features in such contexts, as for instance in the discussion regarding first ‘principles’ (arkhai) at in Phys. A.7: With regard to the second point [lines 5-6] our teacher Ammonius said:43 ‘we are looking for the true being (hypostasis) of substances, in which also the other categories have being’, [a point] which Alexander also calls attention to (epestêse) giving an interpretation: ‘at the same time it is impossible for there to be more primary oppositions, for substance as one genus is identical’ such as being is primarily in substance, in second instance it sends out from it also being for other things in accordance with those as from the one and to the one, [192.20] so the oppositions of other genera will also acquire being from [the opposition] in substance.44

Alexander is here quoted via Ammonius, who is keen to incorporate some of his comments into his own commentary. Clearly Alexander’s interpretation is taken on board as a useful perspective on the issue. He continues: First, it will fit to speak of form and privation in the case of the opposition according to substance, with a second description in the case of the changes in other categories; for those too there is form on the one hand, privation on the other. One would not say ‘in every individual category’ (cf. 189a32) with regard to the genus which is instantly divided into species. For the opposition on this basis would not be primary, even if that genus is primary. The first opposition must need be primary to the other oppositions.

Alexander’s suggestion here emphasises the importance of form and privation as polar opposites that define the scope and subdivision of a genus, in particular with reference to the genus of being (ousia). The second passage shows how Alexander’s position is paraphrased approvingly, culminating in the claim of there being a first opposition over and above all other oppositions. With regard to the distribution of sources it is of some interest to explore the significance of the groupings of authors. The practicalities of ancient scholarship have been studied for some individual authors.45 Preparatory notes and how they end up in the final product may differ from case to case, but it would seem that we have some opportunity to recapture this aspect of the working method by looking at when certain sources occur and whether their closeness to others could be significant. The sources in the Physics commentary are famously varied in provenance and background. Does Simplicius use separate individual works for his sources, or are some dependent on or derived from others? In other words, did he consult all the works cited, or did he also have indirect access using compilations or reports in intermediaries? For instance, in the commentary on the De

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius anima, he combines Plutarch and Alexander on several occasions.46 Here it is likely, as Blumenthal has pointed out, that he used the commentaries of both, since we know that several commentators (Philoponus, Stephanus) still had access to Alexander’s commentary on De anima. Blumenthal goes on to claim that ‘the Neoplatonist commentators confronted Alexander on matters where differences could hardly fail to arise’.47 At this stage we should remind ourselves of a point made earlier about the lack of an official ‘mission statement’ on sources in the Physics commentary: nowhere does Simplicius state explicitly what the provenance is or what the main approach will be. As stated in the introductory pages, this is in stark contrast to the commentary on the Categories, where Simplicius opens his account with a statement of the purpose and method of the work (in Cat. 2.23-32, above §1.2.1). It is assumed that the Categories commentary is of a later date, and Hoffmann rightfully poses (but leaves unanswered) the question whether this ‘programmatic’ profile of the ideal commentator was in Simplicius’ mind all along, or spelled out only for this particular work.48 The argument could in fact go both ways: the Categories commentary became the first in a planned curriculum of the Platonists.49 So even if it is probably not the first to have been written, once it was written, it would be a suitable place to include such a programmatic statement. On the other hand, if written earlier, the comments about the ideal commentator would be taken as understood and thus redundant in later parts of the ‘syllabus’. A second point to be noted was made recently by Silvia Fazzo.50 Commentaries which are part of such a self-conscious tradition tend to have many layers which may accrue onto a stock of basic comments. This process of accrual will not go on indefinitely, since overlaps with, and rejections of, previous positions may lead to obliteration of early commentaries (partial or whole). Significantly, in Simplicius the genre does not seem to have reached its ‘saturation point’ yet: Simplicius seems determined to give a comprehensive synthesis of all significant views, with an equally laudable attempt to give many of them a hearing. In sum, we have seen how Alexander is at the forefront of Simplicius’ mind when constructing his exegesis: he appears at the outset of in Phys. and in DC as an important and distinct voice, setting the agenda for the discussion, though not necessarily determining its outcome. His proposals get serious attention but are evaluated against later commentators, and can thus be criticised and even rejected. This method of offering different perspectives on the base text would seem fitting for an educational context or purpose. The extant works of Alexander allow us some insight into his usefulness for someone looking for convenient and helpful insights, particularly if such insights could be used in an educational programme or syllabus. Alexander was part of the Platonist exegetical discourse from Plotinus onwards and is found in several commentators after him up to

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias Simplicius, who in turn seems to continue this pattern without questioning it. His impartiality, lemmata format and elaborate attention to detail made him a very suitable author to be exploited for Simplicius’ purposes. It is becoming more and more likely that an educational objective was included among these. Alexander can therefore certainly be considered a pioneer in these aspects of commentary. 4.3 Simplicius’ use of Alexander This section offers a typology of usages to illustrate some of the characteristics of the influence of Alexander. My account so far suggests that Alexander’s influence is considerable, in particular when it comes to the format and doctrinal evaluation of the Aristotelian doctrines. Syrianus had taken up this approach in his commentaries, so Simplicius’ attitude can possibly be seen as conforming to the newly established convention within the Platonist school. Yet such conformism may not sufficiently explain his interest in Alexander. We need not over-emphasise the choice of the lemmata format, one among several in the Platonist school, which can hardly look very different once chosen. The majority of his references to Alexander concern points where Simplicius shows agreement with him. Alexander’s commentaries were probably the most detailed and authoritative discussions of Aristotle to be found before Plotinus. Even Plotinus must have seen that when he decided to make use of him in his teaching. So in considering the question how pervasive Alexander’s influence is – perhaps as a kind of prototype for Simplicius’ commentaries – it is my primary objective here to establish what Simplicius’ main reasons might be for incorporating Alexander’s comments on such a grand scale. With his name appearing on practically every other page and quotations from him abounding, one would expect this to inform us about his importance in the eyes of Simplicius. But can we be more precise in determining what exactly brings Simplicius to consult Alexander all the way through his commentaries? The broader characteristics of Alexander’s commentaries sketched above (§4.2) would easily assist anyone seeking accurate and comprehensive clarification of Aristotle’s compact and complicated theories. So his works provide sufficient reason for use in learned and didactic discourses.51 One possible implication is that none of the intervening commentators up to Simplicius were as helpful as Alexander in as many ways as he was. It thus becomes of interest to consider how Simplicius positions Alexander in comparison to other authors. On occasion he makes a broader distinction between Alexander on the one hand and the other commentators on the other. He also appeals to Alexander as he defends the reading of a definition ‘against some’ (in Phys. 437.11), especially when Alexander clearly agrees with his own position (ibid. 31). It is striking that Eudemus and Porphyry often appear in the vicinity of Alexander quotations.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius So let us turn to Simplicius’ use of quotations attributed to Alexander. Quotation as a frequent and deliberate tool, if handled appropriately, must be based on a clear understanding of the quoted text as an independent and distinct entity. Simplicius will distinguish clearly between the text of the source under discussion (e.g. lexis) and the exegetical notes. For instance, in the case of Alexander he is very aware of the author’s own preoccupations and how these affect his interpretations. At in Phys. 77.9-10, in an uncharacteristically general statement, Simplicius states reproachfully ‘that Alexander’s own preoccupations caused him to oppose those who said being is one’.52 One senses a degree of disappointment, but also a great understanding of the way in which authors come to see things the way they do. On other occasions Simplicius is half-apologetic about his critical comments against Alexander (see quoted text below, p. 126). Frequency and style of quotation are not the only useful criteria to use in tackling this issue. To sharpen up the assessment we should also consider context, viewpoint and manner of expression. Context concerns Simplicius’ comments in relation to the nature and/or importance of the argument at issue, while his viewpoint adds a further dimension, in particular whether agreement or disagreement is expressed. Manner of expression refers to exegetical terminology and its significance. Combined with knowledge of the clustering of sources (above) these points will contribute to our understanding of the ways in which the selection and placement of his predecessors’ comments shape his own commentary. This approach can illustrate how this type of analysis can have a philosophical pay-off, because together these points retrace the structural features of composition as well as the doctrinal positioning of our commentator. So far I have outlined the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the approach and we shall see some examples presently. But first I would like to revisit the question regarding the purpose of such manoeuvres: is Simplicius’ work a purely scholarly product written in isolation and real or ‘virtual’ exile or is it a pedagogical document produced to be used in teaching? The first option (the work was written in isolation) would have to make sense of the historical events which indicate that Simplicius, after leaving Athens in 531-2 CE and the Persian court not long after that, started writing his commentaries around or after 533 CE in a location not known to us.53 The second option (educational context) would rest on an argument from analogy (of some sort54) in which it is assumed that these commentaries, just as most other Neoplatonic writings, originate in the school curriculum. I have already suggested elsewhere that this does not seem to hold unconditionally for Simplicius.55 Since the first option (isolated scholarly work) has little chance to progress further unless new evidence emerges or yet another interpretation of the available evidence, I will explore the second option by trying to establish how Simplicius’ methodology regarding the evidence for Alexander might contribute to our assessment of the vexed question in what kind of context the work might have arisen.

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias The Alexander passages offer a clear opportunity to tackle the question, because their high number makes them a statistically significant body of evidence; moreover, the majority represents direct quotations. The different ways in which quotations are presented and qualified is also of interest. As with Eudemus, Simplicius is fond of adverbial tags to qualify a statement he quotes (saphôs, kalôs), and makes a point of emphasising he is giving the exact words of his source. He may also qualify the mode of exposition, as for instance at in Phys. 234.25-9 when he adds comments on the destruction of composites in nature, but maintains that form does not get destroyed, since it is a principle deemed indestructible (25), concluding at 29: ‘this seems to have been said by Alexander in the manner of natural science (physikôs)’. As Alexander appears in places where one does not always expect him, one may well ask what brings Simplicius to insert a reference to, or quotation of, Alexander. The possible answers seem limited here: (1) as an argument from authority: Alexander is brought in to support the view at issue; (2) to give a helpful clarification; (3) to express disagreement: to be refuted (e.g. in Phys. 211.20ff.). Apart from such purposeful usages an additional consideration can be brought in to explain certain incidental occurrences mostly as in (2) above: the Alexander material could have been present in the source Simplicius draws on. We know that Alexander was used widely by earlier Platonists: Plotinus, Porphyry and Ammonius were among the earliest ‘commentators’ to adopt Alexander’s comments and style of lemmatic commentary.56 Syrianus continued this tradition, and O’Meara has persuasively shown that Syrianus relied quite heavily on Alexander in his comments on the Metaphysics, so much so that his own commentary did not cover the whole of Aristotle’s work but was composed as a complementary piece: ‘for a Platonist, a complete new commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is not needed: for parts of the work Alexander’s commentary suffices’.57 This further underlines Alexander’s influence, but does not offer a solution for Simplicius, whose approach can hardly be called ‘complementary’. Should we therefore assume, by analogy, that Alexander’s commentary on the Physics was not considered sufficient? It seems unlikely, but to provide a more secure answer to such a question we will need to have another look at some passages to get a more empirical grasp of Simplicius’ use of Alexander. In what follows I give a selective presentation of preliminary results based on a comprehensive examination of the passages mentioning Alexander arranged by types. There is a risk of over-simplification, but that holds for any typology. Intended as a practical solution to come to grips with a huge body of evidence, appropriate selection of representative types can still offer a solid basis for a qualitative assessment. I shall discuss four types of usage, each illustrated by some examples which I consider representative.58

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius (1) Alexander provides a helpful exegesis of Aristotle. This type of usage entails agreement and shows Simplicius looking for enlightenment from his predecessor-colleague in understanding or clarifying Aristotle’s arguments. There may be some rhetoric involved, in that later commentators will not always claim a clarification as their own, but often the consultation of an authority (see also next point) is genuine and will lead to further discussion of possibilities and textual details. We saw a similar use in the case of Eudemus’ clarifications (§3.2.2), and it is of particular interest to note that Eudemus and Alexander actually occur close together a considerable number of times, with Alexander making use of and building on Eudemus’ interpretations (more on this point below). Clearly Simplicius held both in high esteem, the former as a first clear case of full-blown exegesis, the latter as a contemporary (hence privileged) source for Aristotle’s ideas. One or two passages may illustrate the typical case. At in Phys. 434.367 the position of Aristotle is shored up with Alexander’s comments, which are brought in unreservedly: ‘Now he [= Aristotle] wishes to provide clear examples of things reciprocally changed in initiating it and at the same time, as Alexander says, to separate off the divine body from being reciprocally changed and affected.’ Alexander seems to extend the clarification here by giving ‘clear evidence’ (tekmêria enargê) and a quotation follows introduced with parathesthai (on which see above §1.2.3). Such brief interjections (‘as Alexander says’) are frequent and often signal agreement. Note that Eudemus, who is called ‘lover of truth’ a number of times (e.g. 1024.6), is often preferred to Alexander (see §3.2). Many more examples of this use of Alexander could be provided, in which he helps to clarify the point (e.g. 416.27-31; 437.10; 440.34 includes examples etc.), gives support for a specific interpretation (e.g. 434.36; 443.18f.; 467.1; 472.36 homologei; 937.25ff.), or is the jumping-off point for a comment (e.g. 396.20; 457.13 etc.). On occasion rejection also occurs (e.g. 449.4ff.) and Alexander may be used in the summing up of an argument (e.g. 469.10). Alexander is also represented as solving puzzles (lusin tês aporias, lusai phêsi), quite often those which he himself has raised (tithêsi: e.g. in Phys. 71.5, 83.19, 84.22 etc.; in DC 22.18, 41.7, 51.5, 274.23, 342.20 etc.). But it would be pointless to list all cases here (but see Appendix II.B and §6.3): clearly Alexander is made to serve several purposes, which shows his versatility as a meticulous commentator and that of Simplicius. Some significant cases of disagreement will be revisited below. (2) Alexander is brought in to back up Simplicius’ argument and/or to counter the view(s) of others. This type, again based on agreement, resembles an argument from authority, in that Alexander’s view is invoked explicitly for confirmation and/or

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias is placed in opposition to that of ‘others’.59 One can find the use of the verb akouein, ‘listen to’, in such cases, indicating how Simplicius encourages his audience/readers to take note of Alexander’s comments (e.g. in DC 168.17, 272.21). The verb does not warrant the inference that the commentaries were in fact used in teaching, because frequently akouein can be taken to mean ‘read’ under certain circumstances, as noted in §1.2.3. A good example of using a position for ‘backing up’ one’s own view is, e.g., in Phys. 530.16-23. A case of countering views of others with the help of Alexander’s position is found at 521.10 where he brings an objection against a hypothetical reasoning of some ‘ancient thinkers’ (tôn palaiôn) who take as a common assumption what is only assumed by corporealists. An exceptional case, somewhere in between the previous two examples, can be found at 1358.39-40 against Philoponus. Here Simplicius defends Alexander against an attack by ‘the Grammarian’ (his label for Philoponus, line 39), impugning him with misunderstanding Alexander:60 the Grammarian [i.e. Philoponus] should have noticed that Alexander did not here investigate how the finite fixed sphere is eternal, but how, being finite, it possesses an infinite power of causing motion. (in Phys. 1358.39-40, tr. McKirahan 2000)

In this case his archrival Philoponus (c. 490-570 CE) is criticised for misinterpreting Alexander. As so often, Simplicius’ argument leans on Alexander’s view to counter the view(s) of others.61 This point, based on agreement, can be classed as an argument from authority. The comment against Philoponus is part of a broader polemic, a well-worn part of exegesis (to which I shall return in Chapter 6). Here the strategy is to declare the opponent an inferior exegete. As always a correct understanding of a text is the basis for offering further clarifications. (3) Alexander’s view is criticised and/or rejected, but quoted anyway. At the start of this chapter I indicated that Simplicius is seen to provide quotations in a considerable number of cases, where disagreement with Alexander is expressed.62 I have already mentioned that the critical assessment of those who can still be seen as his main authorities on Aristotle is not unexpected. Urmson has summed up the attitude quite nicely: ‘Despite modern opinion, the later Neoplatonists were critical of and quietly irreverent towards their authorities’.63 This observation raises the question why he would take the trouble to quote a view extensively when he is about to reject it? After all, it had been a long-established practice in philosophical debate to be economical with the truth: a good reason for suppressing evidence is that it would allow a critic to present a convincing refutation of an opponent. Simplicius has been accused of such an approach regarding Alexander on the basis of recently found marginalia, and in this case

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius that verdict seems justified.64 The findings here, however, can qualify that assessment, or curb its generalising force. According to modern standards the quoting of views to be dismissed has merit. Better still is the evidence that Simplicius himself adhered to rules of ‘fair play’ in the scholarly community: when he stated that he would quote extensively from Philoponus, he did so to ensure that readers would not judge him to be making things up (in Phys. 1333.33; similar comment on Empedocles in DC 141.1-6). In addition, it seems plausible to put this attitude down to respect for Alexander’s views: if he is disagreeing in roughly a quarter of the cases in which he mentions him (i.e. he agrees more often than not), and if we take into account how much Alexander’s presence dominates the discussions in the commentaries, that seems to be a reasonable inference. If so, we can deduce that Simplicius does not seem to have a ‘principle of economy’, that is, a rule which might have induced him to keep references to views he disagrees with very brief, hence to be dismissive only. Instead he seems to prefer to elaborate on such passages, indicating what is wrong with Alexander’s view. It is at these moments that he presents such ‘redundant’ quotations. One good example of this type is found at in Phys. 449.6ff.65 The quotation from Alexander runs for several lines and Simplicius squarely contradicts it (449.11-12: ‘I, however, believe it to be }’ using the emphatic nomizô, not the habitual oimai). What is the issue here? Alexander is discussing change and its actualisation from the example of teaching and learning, considered by some to be the same thing (447.11-13). Against this he is reported to have brought some objections, pointing out absurdities resulting from that view. Simplicius runs through this discussion and Alexander’s individual points, but ends by disagreeing with Alexander, after first quoting the latter’s final point (449.5-17): Alexander however explains this also in the same way as the previous ones. He says: ‘for if the activity of both is one in regard to substrate it does not follow at once that teaching and learning is the same; for one thing, the act of learning comes about as one through both of them, but in fact teaching is not the same as learning’. I, however, believe it is to be said with reference to agency and affection, both this and ‘different in account’. But what does he mean by saying that teaching and learning are even one in substrate? It is because the act of learning becomes one through both. For the act of teaching also comes about. In general all of the causes of one thing are not one in substrate, since if so then so are father and mother; but those things are one in substrate because the extension is one and the same from [sic] the agent in the affected. (tr. Urmson 2002)

While Alexander argues on the basis of the substrate’s relation to its dependent instantiations, Simplicius seems to focus on a different aspect (agency and affection) and the general viewpoint on the relationship between causes and substrate. The point they differ on, then, relates to the

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias way in which different causes of actualisation lead to one result and the implication such a perspective has for the nature of the process of change.66 The manner of expressing criticism is of particular interest here. Simplicius’ respectful tone and muted language suggests that he is not keen to attack Alexander openly, but is carefully positioning himself by way of expressing surprise (thaumaston), disbelief, and seemingly tentative alternatives (the use of mêpote ‘maybe’ is a marker for his own view). In those cases in which he does confront Alexander more directly, disagreement is strong and leaves little room for manoeuvre. This aspect of his critique, as well as several unusually long quotations from Alexander, will be revisited in §6.3, where I consider the role of polemic in the exegetical strategies of the commentaries. It constitutes a significant contrast to the critique of Philoponus. (4) Alexander is quoted/mentioned in connection with a variant in the manuscript tradition.67 Although discussion of textual variants can happen within any of the three categories mentioned above, I have added this as a distinct class of passages because it provides us with detailed information on the philological method of the commentators and thus deserves separate treatment. Philological moves are of course not a primary objective of his works, but Simplicius does discuss such issues on many occasions. This may include punctuation (399.9 Porphyry rejecting Alexander’s; 399.19; 400.1), moving words (407.27), grammar (400.1), bracketing of words (e.g. 459.4-5 etc.) and taking variant manuscripts into account – in particular those marked by the keyword ‘copies’ (antigraphoi).68 An intriguing case of a grammatical argument is found at in Phys. 526.16 where active and passive verb forms are discussed and Alexander is accused of changing the meaning (metagraphei episkelesteron ‘changes awkwardly’). When Simplicius is evaluating manuscript variants Alexander’s name crops up frequently.69 A few of these comments on variant readings give us an interesting glimpse of the scholarly habits of the commentators. Discussion of several opinions on a textual problem can involve comparative analysis (hermêneia 400.1 with quotation, cf. 399.19) and a decision to follow Alexander against Porphyry and Themistius (on the issues outlined in §1.2.2: manuscripts, punctuation, grammar, word analysis). Such cases raise questions about how these different authorities were used: certain clusters of names suggest that Simplicius was using thematic note-taking which allowed him to quote these commentators on specific issues: at 422.22, 25 a quotation introduces a dispute on manuscripts between Aspasius and Themistius on the one hand, and Alexander and Porphyry on the other; at 728.5 we find ‘Porphyry and Themistius’. This suggests that Simplicius evaluates their views on a case-by-case basis without prejudice as to whose authority might decide the issue without further analysis.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius At one point Simplicius talks about a marginal note which he suspects may have migrated into the text (in Phys. 450.32-3): for Aristotle is manifestly accepting it as the third definition of change, even if the text (lexis) added in the book as from a marginal note (hôs apo paragraphês) seems to be muddled.70

Clearly the philosopher Simplicius is perfectly capable of the kind of technical textual analysis in the service of interpretation that had been common among grammarians and philosophers alike, illustrating the continuous importance of scholarship.71 He follows Alexander and others in this, if often only for the practical reason that his pursuit of comprehensive coverage creates these potential conflicts between the versions available to him. Thus he regularly reports different readings in Alexander, Porphyry and Themistius ‘and the rest’ (e.g. in Phys. 414.15-18).72 According to Simplicius Alexander is often the better informed scholar in the evidence and explanation he offers (436.19 graphên, exêgeitai) or for giving a clearer reading (lexin, saphestera). This judgment is also found at 443.10, where Alexander’s reading (anagignôskein) is considered clearer and at 748.21 where he interprets (akouei) the reading (graphê) better than others. On lexical and stylistic issues he may use word analysis, but there does not seem to be a consistent pattern, although attention for the lexis is mentioned regularly. In the context of quotation Simplicius quite often proffers external evidence from other texts, Plato’s being the most obvious (e.g. Parmenides at 420.13; Sophistes at 430.12). Within the set order for reading the works under the guidance of a master (sunanagnôsis) in Platonist curriculum, a hierarchy of the Platonic dialogues arose which clarified their relevance for particular issues. The Parmenides is certainly among the much admired dialogues, as was Sophistes. The high frequency of Alexander’s views (in most cases clearly named references) is the kind of information that can be exploited for different purposes. A combination of these aspects can be most usefully analysed in those sections in which Simplicius is seen to disagree rather strongly with the Peripatetic commentator. If we highlight the ratio of the number of times Simplicius disagrees with Alexander in relation to the references and quotations in which agreement is stated or implied, the following preliminary statistics can be presented, which are based on roughly half of the references by Simplicius to Alexander in the commentary on Physics (c. 350 occurrences from books 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.6-10). A survey of these references (including mention of the name only) reveals that in 104 passages Simplicius expresses disagreement (c. 30%), while in 51 of them he gives direct quotations (c. 15%).73 There are some telling statistics here, showing that Simplicius is engaged in an extended dialogue with Alexander and constantly assessing on which points he agrees or disagrees. A

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias further significant outcome is produced when we chart these statistics against two other criteria, i.e. diffusion of references across the work and author groupings. I take up this issue now, returning to some longer quotations in §6.3. 4.4 Disagreeing with Alexander Disagreement is a real litmus test for passages of significance: whenever Simplicius disagrees, it underlines his independence of mind and willingness to challenge authority. It may also indicate his more personal engagement with the issue discussed. As indicated in the typology presented above, once Simplicius gets stuck into interpreting the views of others, he feels free to express agreement or disagreement. Even within the multitude of ‘voices’ of the commentator tradition in his works, he makes his own heard consistently, though his formulations of them might be mistaken for rather diffident comments. Obvious moments of personal comment are those in which he introduces the first person singular to bring in objections (pros touton rhêteon oimai) or reinforce an observation, in expressions such as ‘(as) I believe’ ((hôs) oimai, in DC 11.2, 23.16, 39.20 etc.; in Phys. 2.16), ‘it seems to me’ ([e]moi dokei, e.g. in Phys. 110.23, 126.3).74 These are often not very strong expressions of dissent, as they can look like somewhat hesitant suggestions of an alternative, but the cumulative effect of these moments of reflection provides considerable evidence of resolve to assess the available material critically. Simplicius’ use of ‘maybe’ (mêpote) when introducing a comment seems less straightforward. It is not until one collects these examples more systematically that one realises, again, that the cumulative force of the evidence undercuts the superficial reading of ‘maybe’ as a sign of doubt or diffidence: it is in fact a persistent signal for subtle subversion. Upon closer investigation disagreement occurs far more often than one might suspect. Some cases consider minute details of spelling, grammar or glosses. Others concern details of doctrine, in which Alexander is accused of misreading Aristotle. Not all cases are part of Simplicius’ strategy to harmonise Aristotle with Plato (indicated when relevant). I have also found a range of other expressions which, although not all of a technical nature, do show how he carefully evaluates and makes tentative suggestions in case he thinks there is room for improvement. The following examples will illustrate Simplicius’ interest in, and even respect for, Alexander, which can in itself be inferred from the frequent references to his views and the serious engagement with them. An even clearer testimony is his comment at in DC 301.19-21 (tr. Hankinson 2004) after a long exposition on the destructibility of the world (see below and §6.3), in which Alexander is discussed extensively and Simplicius evaluates him approvingly, but also critically. He ends by saying:

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius I have said these things against Alexander for, while I respect the man and wish him well, I think that honouring the truth the more is dear to him too. Aristotle, as I said, in setting out to refute the apparent sense of arguments if it conflicts with the truth }

Here he not only makes a deft allusion to the famous comment Aristotle made about his relation to Plato and the truth (EN 1096a14-17),75 but also refers to the method of exegesis that he uses regarding the apparent meaning of arguments, implying that the real meaning can be made clear after appropriate interpretive reading. It is a perfect illustration of the method and attitude of Simplicius in dealing with Alexander. Note, however, that his claim that Alexander is misinterpreting Aristotle, and that Aristotle interprets Plato in the same way as Simplicius himself is quite misleading. A range of small issues illustrates the level of detail Simplicius gets into in his treatment of Alexander’s views. While he often expresses modest or partial disagreement (e.g. at 446.13 with a quotation), stronger disagreement is not impossible. For instance, at 697.17-23 Alexander is said to know another reading of the text, but Simplicius disagrees with it, attacking his poor sense of judgment. As we saw above and in Chapter 2, he may on occasion disagree with Alexander on a variant reading (734.12, graphê), the wording of which is reported (rhêsis, pheretai) from other sources. Extensive referencing to three positions on one page, including a quotation, shows Alexander in agreement with the view that an example of mathematical objects is not a distinctive feature (526.16 homologei). Rejection of Alexander’s views is sometimes implied by the verb paraiteomai ‘decline, refuse, deprecate’.76 Two longer passages may illustrate in more detail how Simplicius treats Alexander’s text. At in DC 297.1-301.25 a quotation and discussion of a long Alexander passage (297.10-98.19, some 40 lines) occurs, in which Simplicius also provides an interesting justification for the length of the quotation: I have quoted all of this from Alexander so that those who encounter (tois enteuxomenois) both it and what I am about to say [may arrive] at a judgment (eis epikrisin). So, since the bulk of what he said is directed towards [showing that] Plato said the world was generated not in the sense of its having its being in becoming, but rather in the sense of its having come to be from a temporal beginning, it suffices, I think, to quote a single passage from Plato, parts of which Alexander himself also quoted. (298.20-6; tr. Hankinson 2006)77

What is striking here is, first, that Simplicius seems to say that he wants to offer the reader an opportunity to make up his own mind by offering text and comment as if this were a way of presenting evidence and assessment in a balanced and ‘objective’ way. But there is more: he acknowledges that

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias Alexander is making use of Plato’s text and proceeds to adduce it himself in order to correct Alexander’s interpretation. Over the next two pages he elaborates on the issue of the creation of the world and how Plato intended it to be understood, while questioning Alexander’s view. At 299.4ff. he queries some of Alexander’s suggestions, in particular accusing him of not making the proper distinction between being and coming to be (299.13-14), trying to move away from the temporal beginning that Alexander sees in Plato’s account (299.15-16). But note that Simplicius remains respectful and, rather than squarely contradicting Alexander, continues to detail the particular points that he does not agree with, offering his own view as the preferred one.78 A passage of similar tone can be found at in DC 377.20-34 in which Simplicius takes Alexander to task for his interpretation of Plato. Here too Simplicius makes sure to clarify his long quotation, justifying his approach as one which distinguishes between superficial and careful reading (25-32): Contesting Plato frivolously in a way, he tries not only, as Aristotle also does, to refute the surface only import (to phainomenon monon) of what Plato says, taking simpler into consideration, but he also attacks the ideas of the divine Plato and tries to draw consequences from what Plato says, frequently not even attending to the surface import. Consequently I, setting out the truth, which is dear to god and to Aristotle, will here try to do a careful investigation, putting forward the things which Alexander says are the opinions of Plato about the motion of the soul. I do this because of those who deal with his words in a more superficial way and dare to take from them in a way which is hostile to the views of Plato, which is the same as to say hostile to the views of Aristotle and to divine truth. (tr. Mueller 2004)

Here Alexander is pitted against the two heroes of late Platonism, Plato and Aristotle, by the suggestion that Alexander’s interpretation is misguided because it is superficial. Yet this distinction between surface and deeper meaning leads to the remarkable result that Simplicius criticises Alexander for not accepting the deeper meaning, implying that Aristotle does so without mentioning Plato in this context. Thus Alexander’s position is undeniably one of major importance and influence in a range of aspects relevant to our study of Simplicius’ methodology. While the general order of progression depends clearly on Aristotle’s text, Alexander’s comments seem to guide the exegesis of that text. He can therefore be called the backbone of the exegetical narrative in Simplicius, at least for the in Phys. and in DC. This does not mean, as has been argued above, that Alexander’s individual interpretations were simply accepted and taken over: Simplicius exhibits a critical attitude, tempered by a sense of respect.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius 4.5 The ghost in the machine and the making of commentary What can we say, on the basis of this selective survey of passages, regarding the role of Alexander in Simplicius? We have seen that the use of Alexander in the exegesis of Aristotle was not really Simplicius’ idea. From Plotinus onwards he appears frequently in the works of late Platonists: Porphyry, Syrianus, Proclus and others rely on him for guidance and debate. This explains at least in part how his format of a running commentary by lemmata came to be adopted by most later commentators. However, such precedents do not explain why Alexander is such a dominant force in Simplicius’ commentaries, which is why this point needed further clarification, especially the two problems highlighted: why does he keep quoting material he disagrees with and why does he phrase his criticism in such a respectful way? As to the earlier commentary tradition there can be no doubt that Alexander is hugely influential in a number of ways. Simplicius has constant recourse to the Alexander commentary, quotes him frequently for help (in clarifying Aristotle), or support (in shoring up his own position or countering that of others), thus making it clear that Alexander is a good basis to start from and elaborate upon. But we also saw that he expresses disagreement in a fair number of cases: these range from strong disagreement (rejection) to offering alternatives and improvements on interpretive positions as well as textual problems.79 The balancing act of following an authority and staying master of one’s own judgment is well played out in this case. We must conclude that Alexander’s importance is due to this established position, but also to the view that if Aristotle can be taken in as a preparation for Plato, his ‘most reliable and faithful exegete’ can too. That Simplicius regarded this connection as an uncontroversial lineage is most clearly expressed in his comment on the question whether it is better for the souls of gods to be apart from bodies (in DC 378.20-2): ‘These were not only Plato’s views, but also those of that most genuine of the disciples of Plato, Aristotle, and of that most careful of Aristotle’s partisans, Alexander.’ The text here in fact suggests that what they agree on is the claim that the souls of gods will never be apart from their eternal bodies (in the case of Aristotle and Alexander, this will apply to the sphere-souls).80 Alexander’s overall perspective on Aristotle as presenting a coherent philosophical system will have been much to the taste of Simplicius, as too was probably Alexander’s quite objective stance, exemplified in his criticisms of Aristotle on some central positions (soul, heaven, intellect). These and other traits are good reasons to believe that Simplicius regarded Alexander as coming quite close to the ideal commentator he had outlined in his commentary on the Categories. At the same time Simplicius’ respectful approach in both agreeing and disagreeing with Alexander is the result of the established position of the Peripatetic commentator: he could not be

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias ignored and any criticism against him required properly presented and valid arguments. It goes without saying that ‘properly presented’ and ‘valid’ were not neutral standards, but had to meet Neoplatonic criteria. These points raise the question how Simplicius saw his own contribution to the exegesis of the Physics, since that commentary has absorbed and assimilated an abundance of earlier commentators (in particular Eudemus, Alexander, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Porphyry and Damascius), whether positively in suggesting a line of interpretation or negatively in evoking criticism and rejection of particular positions. Moreover, in the Physics commentary he has not presented us with the ‘topos of modesty’ as he did in the Categories commentary.81 In the latter he insists on positioning himself explicitly vis-à-vis the existing commentaries, stating that Iamblichus is his ‘source of inspiration’ and that he offers only ‘a small number of additions of his own’.82 He also claims that Iamblichus followed Porphyry’s commentary very closely (2.11), which dealt with ‘all traditional aporiai raised up to his date, notably those of Lucius and Nicostratus’. In other words, Simplicius places himself very explicitly within this tradition, suggesting that his commentary is a mere synthesis of all his learned predecessor-commentators from the second to the fifth century CE with little input on his part. This stance has proved to be a conceit which cannot be taken at face value. Yet it illustrates neatly that on the surface there was no ambition for innovation and originality, or to put it more accurately, Simplicius had no interest in presenting himself as offering any new ideas – thus continuing the mode of presentation already taken by Plotinus in his Enneads (5.1.8). As a result his works are multi-layered documents with certain methodological and philosophical tensions. We should also reflect on the nature of commentary as a response to an authority.83 Noting down one’s thoughts in response to an authoritative treatise may seem ‘parasitic’ to us, but it was a justified and well-established way of philosophising in the late Platonic school. The idea that one can contribute to the understanding of a philosophical work by building on authoritative explications of others seems unproblematic to Simplicius and his colleagues. We are dealing with an unusual philosophical and cultural attitude, in which originality is not the focus: even Plotinus was adamant that he was not creating anything new – although, as Porphyry was aware (and we can observe), his contribution is actually very original in many ways. The approach to Aristotle and Plato was to clarify, explore and interpret their work.84 But they regarded the commentary as a legitimate way of bringing out what Plato actually thought. Yet Simplicius’ elaborate running commentaries are different in at least three ways: the detailed and exhaustive treatment of the text, the generous attitude to earlier exegetes (Platonists and others), and a ‘catholic’ interpretation of Greek philosophy. The first point may be related to his decision to take Alexander as his main guide, as we have seen in this

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius chapter, but, as I shall argue in the following chapters, he also seems to be on a mission to leave future generations with a complete set of tools to read the Aristotelian corpus in the correct light. The second point fits both the Platonist tradition of commentary and the Aristotelian methodology of conducting philosophical investigations: Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syrianus had already espoused the view that the truth had been discovered in ancient times, there was therefore no need for originality, but for the proper skills to unearth it from the authoritative writings available (Chapter 5); Aristotle had advocated the view that scientific progress is a joint venture so that help was at hand from earlier views if properly analysed (Chapter 3 and Baltussen 2000). The third point is possibly the most difficult one, but I suggest that it must be related to the desperate situation Simplicius found himself in as one of the remaining Platonists who were barred from teaching and thus put in a position that came to symbolise the status of pagan theology and philosophy – isolated and threatened with extinction – and the main weakness of the doctrinal stance of Greek philosophy, disagreement. A word must be said on the potential pay-off of the overall analysis presented here: apart from insight into the importance and magnitude of Alexander’s role in the later commentators tradition, I hope to have shown that his influence is pervasive in the format, focus and direction of Simplicius’ commentaries on Physics and on On the heavens. Although many of Alexander’s comments are a positive influence, in that they form the basis for Simplicius’ elaborations and comments, a considerable percentage of his interpretations were questioned or rejected by Simplicius. This pattern puts into sharper focus how Simplicius is carefully working through issues and establishing his own interpretation of the texts. Going up against an authority established over three centuries was not an easy thing to do, which is most likely the reason why Simplicius expresses himself so cautiously. Philosophically his objections make sense from the perspective of keeping Aristotle consistent and in harmony with Plato. We have also seen that Alexander used a wide range of tools in working through the Aristotelian text, showing the way in textual analysis at every level. Whether it concerned punctuation, grammar, textual variants or philosophical doctrine, all are accepted parts of the exegetical method. These preliminary results on Alexander and his role in the Simplician commentaries, based on a broad set of criteria and parameters as well as the first results of a rather large sample of evidence, leave considerable room for further inquiry. Alexander’s role will in fact require a much fuller investigation, and can also be usefully studied for his role in other writers, in particular Philoponus. What is clear is that Alexander’s work was seen as authoritative and that Simplicius has made every effort to extend his work by incorporating much of Alexander’s helpful exegesis into his own, but also to challenge him on those points which stand in the way of harmonising Plato and Aristotle. He is tacitly assuming that Alexander

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4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias the Peripatetic can be used for the exegesis of Aristotle within the new framework of late Platonism – another sign that his review of Greek philosophy is intended to be comprehensive. In short, Alexander appears to be both his benchmark in commentary composition and his beacon in navigating the Aristotelian text. To call Alexander a ghostwriter would be an exaggeration, but his dominant role in Simplicius’ works appositely honours him in his role as a pioneer and prototype of philosophical commentary.

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5

Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration It occurred to me, indeed, both to pose this puzzle in this way and to solve it, since I have found it in none of the commentators } (in Phys. 946.24-6, tr. Konstan 1989)

Simplicius’ Platonist predecessors working in the commentary tradition were of considerable importance in forging the Platonist exegetical strategies to explicate doctrine. Their modes of exegesis varied in response to new circumstances while also imposing personal preferences regarding the focus, tools and direction of their interpretation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical thought. The opening lines of Simplicius’ Categories commentary reveal the extent of work on Aristotle up to his own day: Many authors have set forth many speculations on Aristotle’s book of Categories. This is not only because it is the prologue to the whole of philosophy (since it is the beginning of the study of logic, and logic, in turn, is rightly taken up prior to the whole of philosophy), but also because the Categories is, in a sense, about the first principles (arkhai), as we shall see, in our discussion of the goal (skopos). (tr. Chase 2003)

Simplicius goes on to give a broad characterisation of the different commentators he knows about, indicating their actual style and individual focus (on lexis, concepts, or problems) in their comments on this work. This useful typology especially highlights Porphyry (2.6-8) and Iamblichus (2.9ff., 3.2) for their valuable contributions in solving problems. In so far as these earlier exegetes play a significant role in Simplicius’ working method they are worth discussing for our present purpose. Our review of his treatment of the Presocratics (Chapter 2) as ‘Platonists’ avant la lettre, of the early Peripatetics as important figures paving the way for commentary (Chapter 3), and of the pioneering role of the Peripatetic commentator Alexander as determining the format and technique of the genre (Chapter 4), were the stepping stones to a proper understanding of the full-blown commentary style that developed after Plotinus. Here we need a narrow perspective which arises mostly from practical considerations: to present a full background story for the Platonic tradition here would be quite impossible, apart from the risk of duplicating a number of very recent studies.1 Taking the period after Plotinus (250-500 CE) as the decisive stage of

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration this ‘exegetical tradition’ for Simplicius I shall approach this issue from two very specific angles. First, I will consider the presence of other Platonist commentators and their role in Simplicius’ argument (‘sources’). The focus will be on the question to what extent Simplicius relies on previous commentaries in his broad approach, but also how the presence of an earlier commentator colours individual passages. From my readings of his works it has become clear that very often interpretive issues come ‘under the influence’ of other sources he consults. We saw already in the case of Alexander how his comments determined much of the agenda and direction of the exegesis, over and above the sequential order of the Aristotelian text. With regard to the Platonist predecessors Simplicius’ evaluative comments range from acceptance to partial criticism to rejection. In other words, ‘sources’ of this chapter’s title is here used in a methodological sense: they offer ways of exploring the similarities in exegetical strategy and in presentation of argument. The second aspect (‘inspiration’) intends to reflect the doctrinal side of the account. Here I shall pay attention to Simplicius’ usage of existing accounts and arguments and how these become incorporated into his own. With a topic of such scope I shall have to rely on the judgment of others even more than in previous chapters. So in discussing the commentators that Simplicius draws on for his own exegetical activity we can learn more about how these earlier examples of exegesis may have influenced his own working method. The outcome to the question whether and to what extent Simplicius is at the mercy of his ‘secondary sources’ will assist in drawing up a detailed picture of his exegetical methodology. I am inclined to think that Simplicius is not really at the mercy of his predecessors, but rather making good use of available material for the particular agendas he pursues. What will also emerge is that the Middle Platonists had already come up with the majority of exegetical techniques to interpret Plato’s and Aristotle’s works, but that the period after Plotinus inaugurated a new phase, in which the overall format of commentary became more fixed, more formal and doctrinally more complex. Recent scholarship on the Categories commentary can guide us in this exploration of ‘influences’, since that commentary is the most explicit about how earlier work is taken up and integrated into the fabric of Simplicius’ own writing. Although this procedure may not strike us as unusual, it was quite ambitious, leading to an accumulation of material which could stretch anyone’s logistical skills to their limit (see n. 40). Yet Simplicius did not shy away from this daunting task, since it served his purpose of mounting a massive defence of the pagan outlook. As hinted at above, Simplicius’ introduction to his own commentary on the Categories – one of eight surviving – reveals the ‘impressive and complex history of the commentary tradition’.2 Within a few pages Simplicius provides the reader with a history of the exegesis of this work and a justification for his own approach in this work: he clearly wants to make

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius good use of the existing interpretations and claims to offer little that is new. It thus well illustrates a typical feature of the Platonist tradition, the careful study of transmitted commentaries based on important teacherpupil interactions. The Categories commentary is a thorough and scholarly discussion, which shows the richness of the tradition since Porphyry – most likely a major source for the views rehearsed in Simplicius. Although we can see that the argumentative agenda makes his works much more than summaries, one would be forgiven to think that Simplicius is presenting something resembling a summa in the medieval sense, that is, a comprehensive account of a subject with a strong focus on the ideas and arguments.3 He was carefully assembling the scholarship on this text and evaluating its usefulness through meticulous scrutiny. This is a credit to his overall methodology and a constant reminder of his innovative approach in crafting his commentaries. Simplicius’ claim that he reproduces the views of others rather than contributing himself might lead the reader to believe that his work is nothing more than doctrinal traditionalism or, worse, scholastic antiquarianism: Simplicius’ comment might be taken as one of modesty arising from the realisation that the existing tradition is being canonised and faithfully reproduced. This impersonal trait in Platonism, that is, the tendency to discuss the issues in a traditional and ‘objective’ way without revealing much of one’s personal ideas (or feelings) was already present early in the tradition. As Dillon has pointed out in connection with second-century Platonism, ‘it was not the fashion among Platonists of this period } to compose personal testaments; there is no Platonist equivalent of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius’.4 There are, however, many individual contributions to the discussion by Simplicius, as we saw in the case of Alexander. Traditionalism did not exclude critical judgment: the conceit of limited originality and of acting mostly as a ‘mere’ conduit for earlier views (in Cat. 2.30-3.4, 11-16) is not borne out by the commentaries’ narrative. Considered the best introduction to philosophy, the Categories became the standard beginning of the curriculum. Simplicius’ introduction (in Cat. 3.4-11) outlines his approach in a clear and purposeful way, presenting his own contribution as quite modest: My goal (skopos) in making this copy was, in the first place, to obtain, through the act of writing, as accurate a comprehension (katanoêsis) as possible of what had been said. At the same time, I wished to reduce this man’s [= Iamblichus] lofty spirit, inaccessible to the common people, until it was more clear and commensurate [with the common understanding]. Thirdly, I also wanted to reduce somewhat the vast multitude of variegated writings; not, as the most philosophical Syrianus did, to an absolute minimum, but as far as was compatible while leaving out nothing necessary. (tr. Chase 2003)

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration The last point shows that his account is a compressed representation of the learned literature, while making the effort to preserve those comments that would be helpful in exegesis. As a result of this concern with the preservation and transmission of valuable insights, his commentaries are infused with other voices, and in order to establish how this affects the direction and nature of the argument, the dynamics of adaptation have to be brought out more clearly. The second and first points show his ambition to simplify ‘lofty’ thought after he has clarified the ideas to himself. That is why it is crucial to appreciate that his work is a scholarly project, because such an appreciation can assist in establishing where Simplicius’ voice can be separated out – a key issue for understanding his motivation in his tireless efforts to clarify Aristotle.5 We should note, however, that his intended audience is not specified here. On scientific issues Simplicius thinks that advances are being made (e.g. in Phys. 625.2, 795.33-5).6 He himself significantly alters the cosmological account of Aristotle with full use of post-Aristotelian reactions inside and outside the Peripatos. The rotation of the sphere of fire is called ‘supernatural’. Starting from criticisms by the Peripatetic Xenarchus and a suggestion by Origen (a third-century Platonising Christian) he makes the fifth element influence the motion of fire, while Aristotle considered fire to rotate according to the natural inclination of the fifth element.7 He also refers to an objection, found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, that their rotation on transparent spheres could not explain the occasional closeness of some planets. Like his teacher Ammonius, he made Aristotle’s thinkinggod into a creator-god (Plato Timaeus). He famously polemicises against Alexander and Philoponus about the eternity of the world (see §§4.3 and 6.2). His most original contributions are on time and place, some of which will be discussed later. To narrow down our focus we can deal only with those thinkers who can be seen to make important contributions to the exegetical method in the Platonist school, with an occasional look at earlier evidence. I will start with a summary sketch of the general background of the transformation of Plato and Aristotle8 with a view to the exegetical activities initiated by Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, and the important subsequent stages of enrichment and systematisation of that ‘Platonico-Peripatetic’ practice by Ammonius and Proclus respectively (§5.1). We must also look at the remarkable links between teachers and pupils in their exegetical activities. As will emerge from the discussion, we are dealing here with a tradition of teachers and their pupils from Plotinus all the way down to Proclus: the significance of this ‘chain’, presented as almost continuous, lies not only in the fact that teaching would remain strongly oral and traditional (the latter not to be confused with ‘unoriginal’), but also that the methodology can be seen to develop gradually and to a certain extent consistently. While each individual philosopher may add to the exegetical procedures, the curriculum based on direct personal contact (viva voce)9

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius creates a particularly coherent line of transmission of both form and content. It also has the advantage of engaging with the typically Platonic view that philosophy proper only works orally. At the same time decisions about which earlier voices to allow into the debate, which particular moves and techniques of exegesis to adopt, will determine much of the resulting interpretation(s) of Plato and Aristotle. The chapter ends with two short sections which add further contrast to the Platonist perspective: the one considers a few authors present in the commentaries, but who are outside the ‘golden chain’ of Platonist thinkers for the sake of comparison and contrast (§5.4). The final section (§5.5) summarises the Simplician forms of exegesis in the light of our investigations, ending with some reflections on Simplicius’ position in this tradition of educational explication of texts. 5.1 A new Platonism: Plotinus Although the four major ‘schools’ of Greek philosophy (Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, to a lesser degree Epicureans) had an almost continuous presence in Greece up to 200 CE, from Plotinus onwards the Platonist tradition was to dominate the philosophical scene for some 400 years. This success was partly due to the well-organised curriculum, developed by teachers from the third century onwards.10 Like any other school of thought, Platonic philosophy was a dynamic and serious undertaking: it developed in interaction with, and opposition to, rival positions, a process which led to cross-fertilisation of ideas and terminology. Christianity would also play a role in its success, assimilating Platonic ideas almost by osmosis. A distinctive feature of the post-Hellenistic philosophical discourse is the use of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic terminology across different schools of thought, much of which had become common currency – a result of the continuous debates on fundamental issues such as the origin of the universe, the nature of language and logic, and the best way to live one’s life.11 The issue of how these schools differed would become more acute, but for the Platonists the solution usually was to consider Aristotle and Stoics as being basically compatible with (even indebted to) Platonic views or presenting them in distorted form, while they themselves considered it legitimate to adapt views for the reconstruction of Plato’s philosophy.12 The changes leading up to a new Platonism had already begun under Antiochus (d. 69/8 BCE), who favoured a return to Plato’s dogmatic positions, rejecting the Carneadean attitude which viewed the aporetic dialogues as possessing a sceptical attitude regarding epistemological questions. He already advocated the use of Aristotle and Stoic views to build on.13 Despite this more dogmatic turn Platonism remained a rather diffuse movement with at the core the study of Plato’s dialogues, but with add-on features from other domains. With Plotinus Aristotle’s influence became more noticeable and far-reaching: while Antiochus and others

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration paved the way for a harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus continued to engage with Aristotle’s work and when he passed on the torch to Porphyry, the latter ensured that the importance of Aristotle became enshrined in the school’s curriculum. From now on the Categories and the On interpretation would be the starting-point for aspiring Platonists.14 Thus what seems an upside-down approach historically can in fact make sense didactically and to some extent even philosophically: Aristotle’s method of using clearly defined terms and strategies to do philosophy formed a very good springboard for the more intuitive and inspired perspective of the preferred works of Plato. In the perceptive words of Dodds: His originality showed itself, not in the discovery of new philosophical method, or in the affirmation of a new attitude towards life, but in the constructive power which, starting from certain scattered hints in Plato, the most unsystematic of creators, and certain loose ends in Aristotle, the most inconclusive of systematisers, and utilising whatever seemed valuable in Stoicism and the later Academy, evolved a scheme of Reality at once more comprehensive and more closely knit than anything which had yet been attempted.15

This very pointed characterisation sums up the challenge anyone had (and has) when attempting to interpret Plato and Aristotle. Their original and pioneering ideas were imaginative but not fully systematised in all parts, sketchy and thus incomplete in others; they could therefore benefit from more structure, added clarity and elaborations. Dodds rightly highlights Plotinus’ skill in offering a fundamentally coherent and comprehensive interpretation which by its very nature is creative and new. The route towards the ‘higher mysteries’ was now determined by a didactic and inclusive principle of commenting on the elements of doctrine which were transparent at the surface (i.e. working from clearly stated principles) in order to rise up to the more convoluted and almost mystical insights of the Platonic masterpieces. This religious goal, achieved through a form of spiritual meditation, was facilitated by the rational framework of philosophical reasoning. Proclus eventually declared this tradition as one of teacher-pupil initiation into the secrets of Plato’s wisdom via the ‘dionysiac frenzy’ which his works induce (Theol. Plat. i 1).16 The emergence of a subtle and searching exegetical reading practice in philosophical teaching can be observed in Plotinus, although the extant evidence leaves us guessing about what went before (see below). His working manner was rather intuitive, incorporating comments from earlier thinkers (but he was not prone to mention his sources) into his associative and highly discursive meanderings we can now read in the Enneads.17 The significant role of Alexander in his discussions has already been illustrated (Chapter 4). It was his habit to use a passage in a commentator or the Stoics to kick-start the discussion.18

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius A succession of teacher-pupil transmission started with Porphyry and, although not continuous all the way through, intensified from Iamblichus to Proclus, as each new teacher added a personal touch to the Platonist doctrine and method. In the fifth century CE this (supposedly unbroken) succession became known as the ‘golden chain’.19 The ‘continuity’ also allowed for shifts of focus, thanks to the developing hermeneutics and the need for continual adaptation to the pressures of the political and social environment. When Simplicius began writing his commentaries, he emerged from an education in which elucidation of texts would build on earlier comments. Simplicius is indeed very much a ‘scholar at work’ when we look at his procedures, even if our modern understanding of scholarly working methods cannot be fully mapped onto him and his colleagues. But then the Platonists themselves regarded the engagement with Plato as a matter of exegesis: for instance, when appointed as the school head Isidore’s task is described in terms of exegesis (diadochos } tês platônikês exegêseôs).20 A more empirical analysis should give us better insight into the question which sources Simplicius used directly and which indirectly. It should also give us a more informed sense of their influence, though the wealth of material will still force us to be selective. However much such an understanding is limited, it will allow us to develop a considered view of Simplicius’ methodology through his ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. As argued in Chapter 1, formal commentary did not arise until the late Hellenistic period and it almost always grew to fuller form in the context of teaching activity.21 In addition, the elaborate scholarly commentary was given a particular direction with the works of Peripatetic scholars from the second century CE, such as Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, who determined the format of commentary in lemmata style (see Chapter 4). A further examination of some commentator colleagues of Simplicius will therefore give us insight into two additional aspects of his methodology: the traditional nature of the arguments and some developments in method and doctrine. Considering the shifts and transformative interpretations that occur in the period from Plotinus to Proclus, it would probably be better to speak of ‘Platonisms’ as different instantiations of the Platonic ‘doctrine’. Their relation to each other is determined by the canon(s) that they respond to, thus resembling Aristotle’s notion of the pros hen relation, family resemblance on account of their relation to the same object. One phenomenon which has often baffled modern scholars is the variations in quotation of Plato’s texts, usually explained by the claim that ancient authors quoted from memory. However, for many authors the number of quotations and the range of sources quoted from memory militates against this solution. For the Platonic tradition John Whittaker has offered a far more persuasive argument that a rather counter-intuitive explanation must be accepted: in an illuminating paper, entitled ‘The Art of Misquotation’, he argues that in the Platonist commentators’ tradition

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration text manipulation (as we would say) was quite normal, but that they used this technique for pedagogical purposes, for instance to subvert the audience’s expectation about a passage and thus keep them alert.22 Whittaker highlights several types of variation (e.g. addition, subtraction, new word order) and argues that most are to be explained as the result not of faulty memory but of deliberate variation.23 Such an approach is only possible if we assume that the base text (in this case Plato) is sufficiently well-known to the audience for the strategy to be successful. There is little doubt that this was in fact the case among Platonists. This liberal use of texts can be traced back to an intriguing and little noticed passage in Porphyry’s (lost) collection of Oracles, in which we find the following exegetical ‘ground-rule’ stated (Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica 4.7.1 des Places = 303F Smith, p. 352): I swear by the gods that I have neither [i] added (protetheika) nor [ii] subtracted (apheilon) anything from the sentiments (noêmata) used, except that I have [iii] corrected (diorthôsa) an occasional erroneous reading (lexin hêmartêmenên), [iv] altered (metabeblêka) the text in the interest of clarity (pros to saphesteron), [v] completed (aneplêrôsa) a line in which the metre appeared defective, or even on occasion [vi] deleted (diegrapsa) what seemed irrelevant to the present purpose, and that I have [vii] preserved the spirit (nous) of the words. (translation mine, partly based on Whittaker’s paraphrase)

The Greek terms used by Porphyry show how the language for textual analysis is technical and subtle: addition, subtraction, metre and relevance are the specific points referred to. As Whittaker rightly emphasises, it is striking that ‘Porphyry does not deny that he has altered the wording of the Oracles but only that he has not changed their noêmata’ (1989: 69). This clear distinction between form and meaning is by now established and fully exploited and we see how the motive of clarification (see iv) justifies alteration. Moreover, there is a more than fleeting resemblance to the Pauline contrast between letter and spirit (2 Corinthians 3:6; cf. Romans 2:29 and 7:5-6) – a contrast still present in Simplicius’ mission statement of the commentary on the Categories.24 He also notes that there is an inconsistency in the points listed, since there is in fact alteration of the text (point vi) despite the claim he has not subtracted anything (point ii). Clearly the former is not seen as being a violation of the latter. Porphyry offers a striking justification for rephrasing the text of the Oracles, implying that changing the wording will not affect the meaning. Such an elastic conception of the interpretive process seems over-generous, but it does provide the kind of welcome margin for manoeuvring in a context where assimilation of other doctrines is a significant part of the exegetical effort. That Porphyry had made himself vulnerable to another reproach, namely that he was being irreverent towards Apollo, is clear

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius from the comments of Theodoret (c. 393-460 CE) who accused him of attributing to Apollo ‘incorrect usage, lack of clarity, and halting metre’.25 Note, however, that ‘Porphyry’s editorial procedure’ is not really criticised for its liberal approach to the text. Compared to Plotinus, Porphyry was much more scholarly and systematic about working out the details of interpretive issues. Plotinus is not interested in scholarship per se, as his much-quoted judgement of Longinus makes clear. His comment ‘Longinus is a philologist, not a philosopher’ (V.Plot. 14.20) assumes a fairly clear distinction between the two types, and confirms the more positive label of ‘most judicious’ (kritikôtatos) he received from others.26 Clearly Plotinus found himself surrounded by learned men eager to engage with texts; his priority, however, was not one of general text appreciation (literary criticism), but of philosophical analysis which could include exegesis. It implies a different emphasis with important consequences: he was not interested in correcting his works, which he started writing down on the request of his pupils. Some of the scholarly techniques from before Plotinus are worth reviewing here to give Simplicius’ method proper background. We have some intriguing reports on some of the Platonists of the post-Hellenistic period (the so-called Middle Platonists), who use creative interpretation (some might say ‘manipulation’) of text as a convenient element in their reportage and exegesis. Allegory was another popular tool to extract meaning from texts already from the earliest Homer exegetes in the sixth century BCE (Chapter 1) continuing with the Stoics and finding a niche in the late Platonist curriculum.27 Selective quotation, word analysis and semantic stretching were also used, consciously or unconsciously. The evidence from the period between Antiochus and Plotinus (often referred to as Middle Platonism) is mostly fragmentary and hence limited, but we can nonetheless glean some interesting information from that evidence regarding exegetical activities. In all periods comments on Plato’s works occur and the emphasis on an ethical interpretation is paramount, framed by a combination of ‘Plato’s metaphysics, Stoic-Academic ethics and Peripatetic-Stoic logic for which Middle Platonism is well-known’.28 Four brief instances can illustrate some of the tendencies and approaches in the hermeneutical activities of this period: Eudorus of Alexandria (c. 50 BCE), the so-called Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus (50 BC/CE?), Plutarch of Chaeroneia (c. 100 CE), and Harpocration of Argos (c. 150 CE). Eudorus of Alexandria (c. 50 BCE), who seems to have been a strong advocate of harmonising Plato and Aristotle, is referred to by Simplicius as ‘the Academic’ (ho Akadêmikos, in Cat. 187.10).29 His position is dogmatic (like Antiochus, whom he may have tried to outdo),30 but in a different way, with Stoic and Pythagorean elements added (in ethics and physics respectively). In physics he adhered to a monism ‘more extreme

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration than that favoured in later Middle Platonism’ and he wanted to limit ousia to the material substance; in this connection his work on Aristotle’s Categories (we know that he probably wrote a commentary) is relevant, since by rearranging their order he made them irrelevant to true being and the intelligible world.31 Given such elaborate analyses on the basis of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic ideas, it comes as no surprise that he also dealt with textual issues: there is evidence that suggests he forged a passage in Aristotle Metaphysics.32 The conclusion of Moraux after discussing this passage is that Eudorus’ intervention was not ideological, as had long been thought, but purely textual or philological, thus rehabilitating the reading of the vulgate tradition.33 The Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus found on papyrus holds a special place in the history of exegesis.34 Its uniqueness lies in its date as much as in its survival as a specimen of commentary. Experts have dated it to the first century BCE or CE, which makes it the earliest ‘running’ commentary on a Platonic work we possess, and Eudorus of Alexandria has been named as a possible candidate for authorship.35 Whoever the author, he clearly belongs to the Middle Platonist period, since he shows all the signs of amalgamating into the interpretation of whole Platonic dialogues Stoic and Peripatetic terminology and concepts which were common after Antiochus of Ascalon.36 He discusses aspects that later commentators will use routinely in fixed sequence: the introductory passages of the dialogue for its relevance as context to the main theme, that is, the skopos (or prothesis), i.e. the subject or aim of the dialogue, occur at col. 2.11ff.; the issue of authenticity at col. 3.29-37 (part of the proem); the question of genre at col. 3.37-8; and an analysis of character (dramatis personae) at col. 3.40ff. Thus the methodology of Anonymous foreshadows some of the topics standardly treated in later commentaries. Although they have often been credited to Proclus, they are clearly traceable in writings from much earlier periods.37 Plutarch of Chaeroneia (c. 100 CE) was a learned and voluminous writer and a strong advocate of Platonic doctrines.38 This is not the place to give a complete picture of Plutarch’s exegetical approach, but he was clearly a sophisticated and experienced reader of the classical authors, and had mastered issues of interpretation and philosophical polemic. He succeeds in maintaining an interest in Aristotle, while he also prefers the sceptical stance in epistemology. His involvement with exegesis, which can be seen from his discussions of Plato’s Timaeus and other philosophers, occurs mostly within ‘monographic’ treatments of a particular idea or school (monobiblion): Epicurus is under attack in his That it is impossible to live a pleasant life in accordance with Epicurus’ view (Non posse suaviter }), the Stoics are assailed for their inconsistent arguments in On Stoic contradictions (De Stoicorum repugnantiis). Or he discusses problems in the tradition of zêtêmata, problêmata, aporiai as in Platonic problems (Quaestiones Platonicae), On the creation of the soul in the Timaeus,

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Dinner discussions (Quaestionum convivialium libri), Natural problems (Quaestiones naturales).39 His Platonist exegeses include many critical comments on Aristotle. His knowledge of the corpus is extensive and his treatment shows him criticising some views but, as has been argued recently, without rejecting Aristotle fully. A good example of his wide reading and polemical skill can be found in his attack on Colotes, in which he tries to counter the Epicurean’s attack on all other philosophers. At Adv. Col. 114F-115C he reproaches Colotes of using poor methods, of lacking proper knowledge of the ancient authors, and, as a result, of misinterpreting Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on the Forms.40 These comments indicate how Plutarch expects a serious scholar to take the books under discussion in hand and study them attentively. Another famous polemic he mounted is that against the Stoics, in which he tries to show that their doctrines are full of contradictions. His scholarly attitude is also illustrated by his importance for our knowledge of the Presocratics. Finally, the work of Harpocration of Argos, a pupil of Atticus,41 survives in scraps of his comments on Plato in later commentators. The limited evidence (all with name attached) suggests that his method had all the trappings of the style and methods of later surviving commentaries, such as determining the aim of a passage, and solving aporiai whether inherited or newly devised.42 We also find the clarification of historical and terminological points, and the intention of giving an ethical interpretation – consistent with other cases such as the Anonymous Commentary on Theaeteteus and Alcinous’ Handbook of Platonism (second century CE). Typical of the later commentators, lacking in Middle Platonists, is the elaborate use of metaphysical and symbolic elaborations and proems.43 He was credited with a commentary (hupomnêma) on Plato in 24 books (Suidas s.v.). Dillon’s discussion and reconstruction of the work from sixteen fragments gives us a good indication of this process of assimilation. These examples show what were considered important issues worth taking on with a clear division between literal and analogical types of argument. But critical evaluation and occasional correction could also occur. Olympiodorus (sixth century CE) will criticise Harpocration for suggesting that he is one among many who are ‘acknowledged’ for particular suggestions, and their mention is in a way a tribute to their work. Aeneas of Gaza (Theophr. 12.1ff. = Dillon fr. 7 [1990: 136]) will mention Harpocration together with Plotinus, Boethus (Peripatetic) and Numenius (second century CE). The last, in particular, has been shown to be very influential on Plotinus.44 The fragmentary survival of Harpocration’s work also reflects a typical feature of the learned commentary tradition: as a rule previous comments will be absorbed into the new treatises, thus often eclipsing the original works.45 The use of such techniques may seem unsurprising, until we realise that philology and philosophy tended to be considered quite separate activities (see p. 148 below [Plotinus]). Here we see that in practice

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration such a disjunction did not exist, mainly because the commitment to reach a certain interpretation of the texts, consisting – as they do – of words strung together into rational arguments, would lead the exegete to look for any tool that was useful for that end. Philology supported philosophy, and philosophy religion. There are several other important contributions which would deserve a longer treatment here, but that would exceed the scope of this investigation. Mention should be made, though, of Calvenus Taurus (c. 150 CE) who read Aristotle in his classes (Gellius Noct. Att. XIX.646) in a format which gave detailed comments on consecutive passages, while he distinguished between general discussion and discussion of separate passages, a sensible approach which in later commentaries developed into a fixed division, labelled theôria and lexis.47 In sum, the Middle Platonist period allows us to retrieve a practice of hermeneutics which includes a number of important components such as semantic and lexicographical analysis, philosophical evaluations of previous comments, aporiai and solutions, and different ways in which the doctrinal inclination to harmonise Plato and Aristotle are implemented: the claim that the one is foreshadowing the other; maximising any overlaps; declaring disagreements illusory; defusing criticism. The eclectic way in which Aristotle could be criticised or praised indicates that most Platonists made up their own minds to a considerable degree about how to clarify his Platonist leanings. The next stage would add even greater philosophical complexity to this practice, beginning with Plotinus and Porphyry. 5.2 Harmonising strategies: from Porphyry to Proclus Although he was to become the figurehead of a new school of thought, Plotinus was a late convert to philosophy under Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria in the mid third century CE. We find the school practice of Plotinus’ circle usefully described in the biographical sketch penned by Porphyry (V.Plot. 1-14).This forms the best starting point for finding out how scholarship and philosophy were working in tandem to inaugurate a ‘culture of commentary’.48 Of course Plotinus is not a commentator in a strong sense, since his ruminations on Plato and Aristotle show us how he developed an original philosophical system in a dynamic interaction with these classical thinkers: his work exhibits an emerging combination of philosophical evaluation and the philological manipulation necessary to make the interpretation work. But he was not a scholar or a highly methodical thinker. A typical passages is Enneads 4.8.3: The work of the more rational Soul is thought, but not thought alone: how else should Soul be distinct from Intelligence? The Soul ceased to make part

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius of the Divine Intelligence when beside intuitive thought she got another character, by virtue of which she assumed her proper substance. She has her own work as have all things that possess reality. (tr. Dodds 1923)

Contemplative, searching, and emphatic, his thought makes one suspect that there are many more assumptions informing his comments. Moreover, his thought is marked by its aporetic nature, resulting from his discursive method, his ‘thinking out loud’ so to speak, and a resistance to dogmatism. Within his circle scholarship and philosophy also became considered as distinct and sometimes competing forces. Yet the fusing of scholarship and philosophy progressed steadily as a necessary consequence of the accumulation of comments and elucidation by scholarchs as part of the ongoing disagreements on the texts and their meaning. This built-in fluidity in his thought has made interpreting his doctrines more difficult, but experts agree that his works exhibit a unity of thought that reflects a mature thinker – an assessment which fits the chronology of his writing activity from the age of about 40 (V.Plot. 4). Plotinus is also an example of east meeting west: although his coyness about his origins keep us in the dark about the details, his early studies in Alexandria indicate he was probably Egyptian49 and we know that he admired the unusual views of Numenius, which included a belief in ‘ecstatic’ contemplation, a state of union with the Absolute, which Plotinus is said to have reached four times in his life.50 The influence of his teacher Ammonius Saccas is pervasive and palpable in all his works, as he acknowledges at regular intervals. If he insists that all he is doing is bringing out what is a very old doctrine (Enn. 5.1.8), he introduces a topos of modesty that endures in the ensuing tradition, brought in with reference to accepted authorities.51 In this respect Simplicius also follows in his footsteps, although he had far more reason to be impressed by the number of authorities which had given their views on texts that were considered special and sacred. Far from wanting to exaggerate what is sometimes called the ‘Eastern’ influence, it deserves our attention that many late Platonists originate from countries located in the eastern Mediterranean (Cilicia, Lycia, Syria, Egypt). It can help explain (at least in part) the peculiar combination of mysticism and rationalism in Plotinus and others, and the interest in ‘magic’, theurgy and rituals. Some of these aspects take their cue from Plato’s comments in various passages. Fowden’s seminal study on the pagan holy man has not had the impact it should have had in philosophical circles, simply because modern philosophers feel justified in separating philosophy (as they see it) from ‘religion’. The modern view of Plotinus and late Platonism has long over-emphasised the rational philosophical approach at the expense of the religious and spiritual side: there are good reasons to think that the philosophical armament is auxiliary and part of the more important preparation for the ultimate goal, a return to the

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration divine. Only recently have some scholars returned to the view that their doctrine is as much religious as it is philosophical (e.g. Fowden 1982, Sorabji 1983: ch. 11, Hoffmann 1987b, Athanassiadi 1993). The problem here is twofold: first, there is no appropriate terminology to discuss the pagan religious stance without prejudice, because most of the words we would want to use retain their Judeo-Christian connotations and represent the current dominant perspective informed by that tradition. One sign of this is the negative connotations still attached to the term ‘pagan’ as opposed to Christian. Thus the word ‘religion’ seems not quite apposite, in that it may impose expectations of, for example, a unique revelation absent from Platonism. The term ‘philosophy’ also has its downside, because it tends to exclude anything remotely non-rational in the traditional Western sense of the word, whether religious or any other ‘mystical’ experiences. ‘Theology’ only goes some way to mediate between these extremes, but it too has acquired a particular sense of rational and systematic thinking about religion. Clearly these labels will remain unsatisfactory. To take Platonism seriously, we would need a term between philosophy and religion to convey pagan rational spirituality as well as intuitive (non-rational) understanding of the world, but without evoking negative reactions towards elements that became included such as theurgy and Pythagoreanism. We can compare the distinction of Christian versus pagan (as religion versus superstition) to that of languages versus dialects: in the latter case what is considered a ‘proper’ language is more correctly (but perhaps cynically) called ‘a dialect with an army and a navy’ – expressing the reality of how the paradigm of language is a result of political power rather than a natural state of affairs.52 In much the same way, a religion might be referred to as ‘a superstition with an army’, as is perhaps clear from the fact that ‘Christian’ will be spelled with a capital C, while ‘pagan’ remains lower case. In other words, the establishment will determine how to apply the labels: the religious view that is dominant has the right to marginalise any other system of religious beliefs – as is shown in the case of other terms which attempt to label religious groups considered to be outside the mainstream (sect, caste, superstition etc.). Secondly, late Platonism (Plotinism?) was one of the many alternatives available to non-Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries, and given the increasing pressures the pagans were under, we can see Platonism being forced to compete with the Christian religion in how it comes up with additions to the Plotinian core.53 If we de-emphasise or marginalise the religious strands in late Platonism – which is strongly linked to its overall motivation and aim – we risk turning them into secular (analytical) philosophers, whose philosophical nous would make them seem interested only in analysing the world through language and logic. Our elaborate evidence for such analysis (commentaries on the Categories) should not make us forget the religious motivation of their efforts. I shall return to this matter in the next chapter.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius What can we say about the role of Plotinus in Simplicius? Contrary to what might be expected, Plotinus is not an all-dominating figure, but one among many commentators with a rather understated presence. Plotinus can in principle be expected to loom large in this tradition, as he legitimised the assimilation of Aristotle, but apart from his criticisms of Aristotle, this process of assimiliation comes in the form of allusion, paraphrase, ideas embedded in later commentators and near-quotations without source acknowledgment. As Porphyry noted, Aristotle’s views are hidden in Plotinus’ writings (V.Plot. 14.5-8). He is considered to belong to the ‘more recent’ thinkers Simplicius makes use of, as his comment en tois neôterois Plôtinos phainetai prôtos } (in Phys. 790.30) indicates – with characteristic vagueness in his chronological determinations. On occasion referred to as ‘the great Plotinus’ (ho megas Plôtinos, in Cat. 108.22, 275.10, in DC 20.12) or the ‘most divine Plotinus’ (theiotatos, in Cat. 73.27), Simplicius brings in comments and objections from Plotinus on a range of issues which often correspond to passages in his Enneads. Some 106 named references spread across the extant commentaries place him among the top five of quoted authorities.54 Does Simplicius quote him directly and with approval? The occurrences in the Commentary on the Physics are of special interest for our purpose. While named references point us to certain occurrences easily, others have their limitations when no name is given.55 For the former Simplicius seems to have limited direct reference to a small set of topics, for instance prime matter having no features such as shape or magnitude (229.12, perhaps cf. Enn. 1.8; 2.4), potentiality (398.32; Enn. 2.5), motion as genus (403.10, 432.17; perhaps cf. Enn. 6). After these early occurrences his name does not resurface until 706.26 with an increased frequency at 790-2 on motion of the cosmos, before another two passages mention him regarding perception and alteration (1072.8, 1079.12; Enn. 1.1). A quite scattered presence, one might say. But this is not all we can find: quotations of Plotinus abound in which he uses a range of passages from Platonic dialogues and Aristotelian works: at 432.20f. Plotinus is quoting from Tim. 57Eff. (announced in 431.5-6); at 433.14 and 733.4 we find an account dealing with Aristotle, followed by a quote; the same goes for 1165.20, 1132.26f. (quote follows). Simplicius is also familiar with Plotinus’ habit of raising problems (aporiai), as is clear from his comment at in Phys. 769.6 (êporêkenai). These passages show under what circumstances Plotinus is considered relevant to the topics under discussion. There is little to suggest a particular pattern here and Simplicius is very likely proffering these views on the basis of his readings in Porphyry, Iamblichus and Damascius. However, it is perfectly possible that he had direct access to the Enneads, as may be suggested, for example, by in Phys. 790.34-5 where we are urged to ‘listen to [i.e. read] the intelligible words of Plotinus’ (akousai noêrôn rhêmatôn). If the amount of materials seems limited, such a claim can be supported

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration by the nameless echo which occurs at in Phys. 1.7 (see below). It is noteworthy that he does not refer to the work by its Porphyrian title (Enneads) as we now do, but uses the titles of individual tracts, such as On the kosmos (in DC 12.12), On the kinds of being (in Cat. 2.3), the first book of On being (in Cat. 127.12). In addition, Plotinus regularly appears in the vicinity of other thinkers: Andronikos (in Cat. 270.2), Alexander, Ptolemaeus and Xenarchus (in DC 20.21), Ptolemaeus and Proclus (in DC 37.33), Porphyry (in Cat. 2.3), Porphyry and Iamblichus (in Cat. 2.27), Iamblichus (in Cat. 191.10). One suspects therefore that Simplicius is using notes in which views on specific themes are collected with names of those who have expressed a view on the matter, perhaps of the kind we find in ‘doxographical’ collections. A long extract from the Enneads seems the basis for a passage in Phys. 1.7-8, in which the use of close paraphrase and near-quotation shows how Simplicius brings in Plotinian material from the Enneads in a discussion of the primary causes or principles (arkhai). It is an unusually long quotation-cum-paraphrase and, what is more, uses interpretive comments which by their frequent technical terminology betray an additional influence (i.e. another author). This additional influence may perhaps be explained from Simplicius’ use of another work or possibly notes taken at a lecture given by one of his teachers. If so, we would have to assume the input of Iamblichus, Syrianus or Damascius. Full discussion is not possible here, but a few more comments will help to put the passage and Plotinus’ role in it in context. The likely source for the Plotinian passages, indicated by Diels in his apparatus, are Enneads 2.1 On the heavens and 4.8 On the descent of the soul into bodies, but others qualify as well.56 The first discusses the life span, nature and characteristics of the universe with obvious reference to Plato’s Timaeus. The second looks at the soul’s presence in human bodies and the implications of such a descent. Thus psychology and cosmology are here combined in an analysis of Aristotle’s statements on matter and how we can know it (the lemma to which this is added is Phys. 191a7 ‘the underlying matter can be known by analogy’). What is unusual here is that Simplicius’ analysis moved seamlessly from his paraphrase of Aristotle into the Neoplatonic analysis, typically containing a range of paraphrastic descriptions couched in rather technical vocabulary. We already saw that Plotinus’ On the heavens occurred early on in the commentary on Aristotle’s On the heavens (12.12), but there the title was provided and only a very brief quotation given. A few more occurrences can be found in the same commentary and many more in the commentary on Physics.57 It is most likely that the nature of the topic (first principles) necessitated the presence of the fundamental discussion by the founder of the new Platonism. Plotinus’ student and successor Porphyry (c. 232/4-c. 305 CE) was one of the most learned Platonists of his day, perhaps second only to Longinus, described by Eunapius as a ‘living library and walking museion’ (Lives of

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius the philosophers and sophists IV.1.3, 6.13-15). A formidable scholar, he was responsible for refining the interpretation of core Platonist texts. He was probably the first Platonist to write a commentary on Aristotle.58 The late Platonist David (proem to his Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagogê = 6T Smith) reports that the Delphic oracle called him ‘learned’ (polumathês) as distinct from his pupil Iamblichus who is called ‘divinely inspired’ (enthous).59 It is very regrettable that so little of his works survives.60 In Eunapius (fl. 390 CE) Porphyry is credited with offering a ‘medicine’ (pharmakon) against the obscurity (asapheia) with which poets and philosophers tend to cover up their thoughts, thus bringing them into the light (eis phôs).61 The ancient tradition of claiming to ‘uncover’ meaning in the poets continued all the way through Hellenistic and early Christian periods. Also, a special place was given to the notion of ‘obscurity’ or ‘unclarity’ (asapheia), e.g. in Cat. 7.6-8 (presented as intentional), in DC 232.23, 349.21, in Phys. 8.19 (with the justification ‘to ward off superficial students’), 21.19 (attributed to Anaxagoras), 427.35, 429.27 (criticised), etc. It has been shown that this is an important topos in the exegetical toolbox of the commentators and part of the preparatory (or ‘isagogical’) questions in the Neoplatonic classroom reading practice: the deliberate use of obscurity is considered a ploy on Aristotle’s part.62 They attribute to Aristotle’s works an intentional ‘obscurity’, which is there to safeguard knowledge for the initiated, and they deny that this kind of unclarity should lead to the rejection of those parts of his work. The latter notion is nicely expressed at in Phys. 428.2-3 when Simplicius remarks: ‘if we were to cross out the unclear parts, much in Aristotle would be erased’, implying that this is the wrong way to approach the philosopher. Porphyry wrote several commentaries on Aristotle’s logic, a significant illustration of his commitment to the importance of that part of the corpus for Platonists.63 In addition to his own works (few of which survive complete) and the ‘biography’ of Plotinus, he took on the difficult task of editing the writings of Plotinus in re-arranged order so as to give the corpus a thematic organisation, even if it meant breaking up their original chronology. The idea of preserving and organising the writings of Plotinus, effectively establishing a canon for Platonists, is presented as a request from Plotinus himself (V.Plot. 24). Whatever the reason may have been, it was a crucial step towards the creation of a set of writings that could now be used as reference works for further study and debate. Porphyry’s appearances in Simplicius illustrate his influence in two areas: he preserves much of the earlier tradition by learned accumulation of comments, some of which may go back to his Philosophical history, but they also show that debate continued. The so-called ‘golden chain’ of teachers and pupils followed on from these two pioneers of the new Platonism. In addition, he determined much of the curriculum and the manner in which the discrepancies between Aristotle and Plato should be handled.

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration The fate of Aristotle’s role in the Platonist tradition was by no means sealed when Porphyry wrote his Introduction (Eisagôgê) which determined that the De interpretatione and Categories should the first works to be read in the curriculum. During the succession of school heads the matter remained a point of debate. The main protagonists to be looked at in this short section are part of the ‘golden chain’ of Platonists: Plutarch of Athens, Iamblichus (fl. 245), Syrianus (fl. 431), Proclus (d. 485), Ammonius (fl. 490) and Damascius (fl. 520).64 The scholarchs had a distinct influence on school practices and in their reading of Aristotle and Plato determined much of the different strands developing across the postPlotinian era of the school. Thus the individual strengths and weaknesses of the scholarchs were crucial in the survival of the philosophical schools in late antiquity.65 The charisma and leadership of one person often determined how each school – a term that easily overstates its nature – operated. Iamblichus (c. 265 CE) continued the Platonist approach after 305 CE on the death of his teacher Porphyry. An influential figure in the history of Platonist philosophy, he is known for favouring two things in particular: Pythagoreanism and theurgy. He may have been Syrian, but his doctrine is clearly Greek and very much based on rational foundations. His view of Plato as a Pythagorean became very influential, inducing him to attack Porphyry on several occasions as putting forward un-Platonic ideas.66 When Finamore and Dillon comment: ‘his championing of theurgy (which is really only magic with a philosophical underpinning) } introduced a new element into Platonism, which was to continue even up to the Renaissance’, this reveals how modern sensibilities react negatively to the combination of spirituality and logic: ‘really only magic’ clearly aims to debunk the seriousness behind this particular form of religious outlook.67 The neologism ‘theurgy’, a compound of theos ‘god’ and ergein ‘make, do’ expresses an attempt to influence the gods and was connected to the so-called Chaldaean Oracles, ‘a divine revelation in Greek hexameter verse of a cosmological and soteriological system and of a set of moral and ritual rules and instructions’.68 We can also see Iamblichus using formal exegesis in his teaching, building for example on Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories as well as writing several other commentaries.69 He was important not only for giving the curriculum a better-defined and firmer footing, but also for determining the exegetical methods of reading and interpreting the works of Plato and Aristotle. Thus he introduced the (not unproblematic) notion that each Platonic dialogue could be given one single unifying purpose (skopos).70 As one of the seven or eight topics which will become the standard list of ‘isagogical issues’ discussed by most late commentaries71 this approach had a good and a bad side: it imposed a criterion on the evaluation of a work’s objective which could be very restrictive and even misleading, yet at the same time it would streamline the interpretive

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius process and encourage the exegete(s) to think in terms of overall consistency.72 Simplicius treats the topic as a matter of fact in all major commentaries on Aristotle, either reporting the range of views when there is a dispute (in Cat 1.7, 8.15, 9.5-11.1; in DC 1.1-3) or simply presenting the purpose as ‘easy to grasp’ (in Phys. 1.1-3 ton skopon } mathein esti rhaidiôs; cf. 3.13ff.). Iamblichus’ influence is especially detectable in the commentary format as it develops further the Porphyrian approach of running commentary with lemmata, the format Alexander started using consistently.73 Iamblichus’ influence on Platonist philosophy also runs deep. The new direction he chose by bringing in Pythagoras as the exemplary philosopher was far-reaching, and Pythagoreanism once again became an important component of Platonism.74 He wrote a ten-volume encyclopaedic work on Pythagoras, of which four books have survived under individual titles, and considered some of the exegetical principles he used as Pythagorean.75 He thus extended the view that Plato’s works contained ancient wisdom and contributed to the creation of a new dogma, which helped provide a response to the need for a ‘holy book’ in order to create a pagan identity.76 It has been suggested that this amalgamation was partly motivated by his competitiveness with Plotinus and possibly Christianity: by choosing Pythagoras he was able to oust the pioneer of the new Platonist perspective with a figure more venerable than Plato, Socrates or, for that matter, Jesus.77 Whether or not this is part of a competitive streak in Iamblichus, he was often critical of Porphyry’s positions (Finamore-Dillon, 4-5) thus distancing himself from the successor of Plotinus (and by implication from the school’s founder as well). Simplicius refers to Iamblichus some 180 times in the in Cat. alone, against seven times for in DC and thirteen times for in Phys. In most cases he shows great respect, as is evident from the epithet theios (‘the divine Iamblichus’) and more often than not a direct quotation is part of the referencing.78 From these important passages Iamblichus’ interest appears to lie with the Categories as a foundational text, although we must beware of exaggerating the weight of the evidence, which depends on Simplicius’ selection: the limited number of references to in Tim. does in itself not inform us about the importance Iamblichus himself attached to that work. For the commentary on the Physics (which runs to 1,300 pages) Simplicius draws mostly on the Timaeus commentary of Iamblichus, giving references with great accuracy (e.g. in Phys. 639.23 ‘second chapter of the fifth book of his commentary on the Timaeus’), making direct access by Simplicius or his source very likely. Iamblichus’ name appears predominantly at in Phys. 650-700 and 760-95, that is, those later sections of the commentary on Aristotle’s book 4, in which Simplicius elaborates on Aristotle’s theory of space and time (Corollaries), alongside the views of his teacher Damascius and several other Platonists on the question

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration whether the universe has a beginning, the nature of time and the ‘now’ (this discussion is part of the so-called Corollary on time). He disagrees on several points with his teacher, as we shall see (§5.3). It appears, then, that his voice is most appropriate, at least according to Simplicius, when dealing with the metaphysical questions such as space and time, meaning and reference. The epithet theios seems to acknowledge Iamblichus’ theological orientation, further illustrated by the interesting comments Urmson has made to his translation of Simplicius’ Corollaries. He notes that ‘divine’, while usually reserved for Plato (Proclus in Tim. 3.9,22; Simpl. in DC 377.27) and the great metaphysicians among late Platonists (as here for Iamblichus, cf. 564.11), is also used for Pythagoras, in particular to denote his importance as the predecessor of Plato ‘in the Golden Chain of higher truth (Iamblichus Vita Pyth. (Klein) 29.162,3-4; Syrianus in Metaph. 81.31)’.79 Urmson (Coroll. 107 n.) also points out that Aristotle receives the epithet daimonios, a term alluding to the daimôn of Socrates (Apology 40A; cf. Enn. 3.4). Other epithets for his predecessor exegetes can further illustrate their function, as they seem to signify an interesting hierarchy of the members of the ‘golden chain’. Urmson’s footnote was triggered by the unusual attribution of the epithet theios to Aristotle, a unique occurrence suggesting that Simplicius is elevating him for this one instance. Epithets range from hêmeteros hêgemôn and ho philosophos to kritikôtatos, philosophôtatos, megas, daimonios, theios. They do represent a certain hierarchy, but it is not certain that they are all Simplicius’ creations. Their usage suggests a mixture of standardised characterisation and honest respect. The presence of Proclus (d. 485) in Simplicius’ works should not surprise us and yet he is not such a clear voice in the corpus as one would expect from his rigorous treatment of late Platonist thought, in particular if we remember that Damascius, Simplicius’ teacher, is described as expounding Proclus’ work in his teaching.80 He was taught by Syrianus (Marinus, V.Procl. 1), but it has been pointed out that his work exhibits the influence of Iamblichus in particular doctrines (listed in Dodds 1963: xxi) as well as more general (‘structural’) points, such as the triads and multiplication of entities in the universe (ibid. xxii). Proclus was ‘chosen by Syrianus as “the heir capable of inheriting his vast learning”’.81 Dodds also speaks of the salvation that Syrianus brought according to Proclus and rightly stresses the relevance of Proclus’ motives for writing such a work as the Elements of theology (p. xviii). Well into the commentary on On the heavens Simplicius feels compelled to indicate that Proclus ‘lived a little before my time’ (in DC 640.24, oligon pro emou gegonôs), referring to his place of birth, Lycia, four times (in DC 640.24; in Phys. 601.15, 611.11, 795.4). It would seem that Simplicius is mostly using the commentary on the Republic and Timaeus. Proclus was a systematiser; his ambition was to embrace the sum of Platonist thought on the universe with a clear spiritual objective in mind:

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius to offer a convincing and comprehensive form of salvation. Recent scholarship has shown that the hymns that he wrote (traditionally seen as ‘mere’ expressions of religious fervour) can in fact be considered as philosophically meaningful contributions.82 The influence of Proclus is acknowledged by Simplicius when he discusses Iamblichus’ notion of time and adds ‘those after Proclus up until our time (eis hêmôn) almost all follow Proclus not only on this point, but on all other issues’ (in Phys. 795.11-13).83 He set out the principles of late Platonism in two major works, using mathematics as a structuring device in one of them. Such an elaborate scheme of a highly intellectual nature may seem unpromising for the common man, but it was not unprecedented. Plato had set an example with his Timaeus, synthesising much of the preceding tradition in natural philosophy. In the fifth century CE Nemesius of Emesa (Syria) had done a very similar thing, but adding Aristotelian and medical insights, and giving the whole enterprise a Christian gloss.84 Proclus’ commentaries are important specimens in this tradition of teaching Plato and Aristotle by explication of their work by a teacher, and it has been noticed that his works to a certain extent reflect oral discussions. Proclus’ format is not original, despite contributions on his part, in particular the use of a demarcation of passages read (praxeis) and a clear division between general exegesis (theôria) and specific exegesis (lexis).85 His commentary on the Timaeus is a monumental work, which has absorbed much of the foregoing tradition.86 But he was operating in an increasingly hostile environment, in which Christianity, now the official religion of empire, began to encroach on pagan territory and create formal and informal practices which would marginalise pagan ideas and rituals. At one point he went into exile for a year as a result of tensions in Athens and spent time in Lydia studying religious customs there (Marinus Life of Proclus 15). His staunch defence of paganism brought risks when he expressed ‘direct criticism’ of Christian doctrine.87 For Proclus the Chaldaean Oracles were in fact more important than Plato. Simplicius does not quote from Proclus often, but his influence can be detected in different passages, sometimes indirectly.88 Proclus’ dealings with the Presocratics have already been mentioned (Chapter 2). His ‘history’ of Greek philosophy follows Hierocles’ historical reconstruction – probably the first real history of philosophy per se.89 The concern in both is to establish the importance of Platonic thought, and to show that all religious wisdom leads up to and follows from it. His general focus was one of harmonising many religious doctrines.90 Since his extant works are mostly on Plato, he may not have been of direct use for Simplicius’ exegesis of Aristotle. Still, references are not infrequent and Simplicius respectfully refers to Proclus as ‘the philosopher from Lycia and the teacher of my teachers’ (in Phys. 611.11-12, cf. 795.4-5). The majority of cases where he mentions Proclus in in DC indicate he is adducing him for the methodical refutation of objections to

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration and attacks on Plato’s thought by Aristotle and others. It is likely that he uses Proclus’ book which ‘solved the objections’ (in DC 640.24-5, biblion } tas enstaseis dialuon; in most cases the term enstasis ‘objection’ occurs, or an equivalent, e.g. epikheirêma). For in Phys. he is mentioned only in the Corollaries, the excursus in which Neoplatonic views on time and place are trotted out (above, p. 97). Between 611.11 and 614.8 Proclus’ views on place are set out after Aristotle’s, and his theory is said to have been expounded ‘with great originality’ (12, kainoprepê); as the closing comment reveals (614.8, tauta kai toiauta peri topou phêsi ho Proklos), Simplicius has presented a comprehensive account. This passage is the chief source for this theory and, as Urmson argues quite plausibly, may be based on Proclus’ account in his commentary on Plato’s Republic (2.198202 Kroll) where he provides an even more detailed account of the properties of place.91 Simplicius goes on to quote from Proclus’ text (25ff.), justifying the use of ‘his own words’ by saying (25-6) he ‘expounded his opinion clearly and expertly’ (saphôs autên kai sunêirêmenôs exetheto).92 Proclus defends the interval as place after arguing against the views that it was either matter or form and against Aristotle’s view since it produces absurdities. Simplicius goes on to evaluate critically what Proclus said, raising objections to the position of ‘incorporeal interval’ (615.13ff.), suggesting that immateriality can still produce an impression, thus making it visible (616.26-8). It appears, then, that Proclus is not given such a prominent place because he has the best theory, but, first, one that raises difficulties concerning Aristotle’s theory, and secondly, one that offers counter-suggestions that are shared by many existing ‘hypotheses’ (616.31), yet can still not be said to be the best theory available (616.26-32). Novelty may also be a reason for inclusion, since the innovative nature of Proclus’ theory is emphasised here as well as in the case of Damascius (624.3-4). Proclus features again in the concluding paragraphs of the excursus on place, receiving some praise for having established that there are ‘things superior to, and with a more divine body, than this universe’, taking that to be the whole place of the universe (643.36-644.2). But most thinkers reviewed have, according to Simplicius, seen ‘some true conception of place and did not miss its general character’. Thus he generously allows all to contribute. In the end it is Damascius who is held up as having produced the best analysis (see below, §5.3). Such then is the continuum of teachers and their pupils, who in turn become teachers themselves. This ‘golden chain’ consisted of highly individual thinkers who all contributed to the exegetical and philosophical development of late Platonism (Athanassiadi 1993). It is characterised by weighty scholarship, in which Porphyry, as the most learned of them all, acquired the role of ‘model and source book’ on the Categories for succeeding generations.93 Yet due to his immense learning Porphyry’s was a hard act to follow. The assessment of the systematiser Proclus would seem to

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius signal that Platonism was not merely about scholarship and learned commentary, but something altogether more important: the spirituality of divine knowledge as perceived in the Chaldaean Oracles, Plato’s works, and other writings assumed to belong to the Pythagorean tradition (ps. Archytas). Although the late Platonists were not always in agreement about the correct interpretation of Plato’s words, they did attempt to read him in a cooperative spirit – one that was both collaborative and tolerant of diverse interpretations. The unity of the Platonist ‘school’ is a rather diffuse and fluid one which could not always be defined clearly to the outside world. While emerging exegetical strategies contributed to this concerted effort to produce a coherent reading of Plato within the school, external pressures had been solidifying the view that emphasis on the coherence and unity of Platonist ideas was important. After Porphyry, assimilating Aristotle became a more prominent part of this strategy. Simplicius absorbed aspects of method and doctrine into his own commentaries, yet nowhere is there one dominant voice that he follows unconditionally: he incorporates selectively and judiciously. He does however present his own voice most strongly when discussing the views of his teachers. 5.3 Simplicius’ teachers Three figures in particular deserve our special attention for their more immediate influence on Simplicius: his teachers Syrianus, Damascius and Ammonius. As we have seen (§§2.1 and 3.1) there was a venerable tradition from Antiochus onwards of interpreting Aristotle in such a way that much common ground was detected (or claimed) between him and Plato. This important issue of harmonising Plato and Aristotle can be illustrated further in order to clarify how Simplicius continues this tradition. As I hope to show, he also makes his own contribution to it. Himself a pupil of Plutarch of Athens (d. 432 CE), Syrianus is an important figure in the early fifth century CE, succeeding his teacher in 431/2 as head of school until his death in 437. He wrote several works, three of which survive. Proclus (d. 485 CE) is probably the most influential pupil in terms of exegesis, leaving behind a massive commentary on the Timaeus.94 Syrianus had a considerable influence on the commentary style in the fifth and sixth centuries CE.95 As already mentioned, he also adopted Alexander’s method of providing a lemma (literally a ‘snatch’ of text) for commenting, and this format became the norm, in preference to several other forms of presentation.96 Interestingly, as in earlier periods, the text commented upon is often said to use ‘intentional unclarity’ (aspheia): while Orpheus and the poets were said to provide messages in riddles, Aristotle is now said to be deliberately unclear so as to fend off the uninitiated (Ammonius On Aristotle’s Categories 7.10-11 Busse). This argument for

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration the self-legitimisation of the commentator’s task could only lead to expansive supplementation as the main tool for clarification.97 From the important prologue of his commentary on Metaphysics 13-14 a general impression of Syrianus’ view on Aristotle can be gained: we find respect for and acceptance of his teachings in logic, ethics and physics (80.5-7), and he calls Aristotle a ‘benefactor (euergetês) of mankind’ (80.1016).98 Syrianus makes an attempt to reconcile Aristotle’s views with the philosophy of Pythagoras (81.9-11; 25-31) and comments on those parts that deviate from Platonic-Pythagorean views: they are a ‘rectification of Aristotle’s Metaphysics where it diverges from Platonism and Pythagoreanism’.99 Aristotle’s deviations (10.37) are read as bringing disharmony (to diaphônon), because he tried to ‘combine philosophic insight with the received opinion of “the many”’ (60.27-30). Thus we see Syrianus ‘massaging’ the material to fit a particular view of the philosophical tradition, emphasising the derivative nature of Aristotle’s views from ancient sources, with a strong emphasis on the harmonising approach. Yet Syrianus was a great admirer of Aristotle, while also following his own teacher in many respects (at in Cat. 34.14 Simplicius reports he is following the text of Iamblichus). Syrianus presents philosophy as a form of revelation and gives Socrates the role of a saviour.100 In his comments on the Phaedrus (notes authored by Hermeias) ‘Socrates is referred to as a “saviour” who seeks to bring back souls who have fallen from the divine company of the gods’.101 So the beneficial ‘madness’ claimed by Socrates in the Phaedrus becomes linked to the inspired knowledge philosophers possess (cf. above p. 141 [Proclus]). Thus the Pythagorean inspiration is clear, as is the theological focus of Syrianus’ thought. In this, then, he is close to Iamblichus, continuing the pagans’ attempt to offer an alternative to the Christian salvation of humankind. References to Syrianus are sporadic in Simplicius and borrowings are not always well signposted (a typical case is in Phys. 213.24ff. which I shall discuss below). Most quotations are marked by his name, which occurs about twenty times (3 in DC, 10 in Cat. and 9 in Phys.); the majority of these references involve both paraphrase and quotations. Simplicius is showing great respect towards Syrianus, as is clear from epithets such as ‘the philosopher’ (in Cat. 23.13, 164.4, in Phys. 635.12), ‘most philosophical’ (philosophôtatos, in Cat. 3.9), ‘the great Syrianus’ (ho megas, in DC 2.6 and 397.29, in Phys. 192.29, 213.24, 241.22, 618.26), ‘most judicial’ (kritikôtatos, in Cat. 199.17). Some of these look rather perfunctory or conventional: why call him a philosopher, which seems all too obvious? Why use a traditional epithet if these are school books? It is of course possible that the term is used because Syrianus was no longer alive. The respect suggested by such labels is borne out by most passages, since Simplicius is not expressing any strong disagreement in contexts where he mentions Syrianus. It raises the question which of Syrianus’ works are a source for the paraphrases and quotations. Syrianus could have been

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius available to Simplicius directly and indirectly, e.g. via his pupil Proclus. Very few statements are given as possible quotation (in Cat. 72.10, 164.612, 199.17ff., 231.11-12, in Phys. 635.12), which does suggest direct access as less likely. Whatever the source, there are some distinct appearances in the text which we should briefly review to get a sense of Syrianus’ role in Simplicius. Simplicius reports that Syrianus and his followers did not follow Alexander’s proposal for the purpose (skopos) of On the heavens (in DC 2.8-9). This already indicates how different authorities can disagree and be seen to do so when they become included in Simplicius’ review of the debate sine ira et studio. Syrianus’ views on the universe are selectively noted, e.g. on the immortality of the universe where Simplicius subjects the Aristotelian argument to a review and offers Syrianus’ suggestion, that immortality is the activity of the god, because it has ‘reverted towards intellect’ and longs for immortality by seeing it (in DC 397.29-30), as an alternative view. But Simplicius may also cautiously propose minor adjustments to the view stated, as when he talks about the elements and their properties (in DC 711.26-7, note mêpote 26f.). In the in Cat. smaller issues are mentioned, all for support of individual points (72.6; 72.10 with quotation; 164.4-5; 199.17, etc.). For the in Phys. some passages signal strong agreement with the master, although he does not appear until late in the commentary on the first book (192.29) on the issue of first principles, and an objection against his (Neoplatonist) reading at 193.16-19. In this case the terminology clearly betrays the late technical rephrasing of Platonic doctrine in a new framework: In this context it should in addition be said against (pros) the words of the most philosophical Syrianus,102 that if he takes excess and defect (tên hyperokhên kai elleipsin kuriôs akouei) in the specific sense, the appropriate antithesis would belong to quantity only; for in the other categories it also exists by way of quantity.

During a discussion of the main opposition of principles, in particular form and lack of form (‘privation’), Ammonius, Alexander, Porphyry and Syrianus’ ideas are scrutinised and the latter’s notion of opposition (quoted 192.29-31) is questioned in relation to the categories. A few lines later the objection against Syrianus is extended to Alexander as well (193.4). The agenda for this discussion had been laid out at 191.13-17, bringing forward four points which are all dealt with in the subsequent pages on the basis of the authors mentioned – which suggests that their points have in fact set the agenda. Finally, we have seen that the value of Alexander was so great in Syrianus’ mind that he would not write a full commentary on the Metaphysics, because a good one was available already.103 The ‘nameless voices’ mentioned above deserve some further attention. There is at times a striking number of terminological and stylistic vari-

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration ations which strongly suggests that different authorial voices are present in part of his in Phys. In book 1 for example Simplicius is expected to represent much of the preceding tradition and so he mentions certain names, but the terminological evidence as well as the stylistic differences from one section to the next indicate that there is even more intrusion than one might have thought (and of course the situation is not as clear as with in Cat.). As we saw in Chapter 4, some TLG searching confirms Alexander’s influence, but in book 1 we have intrusions without his name being mentioned. In addition Plotinus, Iamblichus (name at 192.14) and Syrianus (name at 192.29) seem to loom behind certain passages. A passage where Syrianus’ own words probably underlie much of what looks like paraphrase is at 213.25ff., an implicit use not indicated in Diels’ apparatus to the text.104 The reasons for taking the passage as a (near)quotation, despite the lack of clear markers in the usual verbs for introducing quotations (discussed in §2.1.3) are manifold. The most significant reason is the quite marked changes in vocabulary and style, signalling that this is a very close paraphrase (hence: near-quotation) of Syrianus’ words (I have tried to indicate this by giving some of the terms used in round brackets): And the great Syrianus also seems to accept such an (213.25) interpretation (exêgêsis): Perhaps there is this division of the things that come to be in a substantial way. The shape is the form and substance of the statue, but not its quality. For the form becomes different but not by way of alteration, if a statue came to be from a sphere. If, however, he had received the other forms, how did alteration in the strict sense, being a change in terms of quality and with a substrate remaining unaltered (atreptos), include the substrate’s radical shift (katatropên) there, which is according to substance? How was it reasonable that after getting rid of the other types of generation he gets back to them again? If he did just that, for what reason did he not accept (parelaben) all in the list, which he had mentioned earlier? Also he mentioned the [category of] relative, the [category of] when and [category of] where. And yet the exegete agrees that this division is also (213.35) unintermittent (aparaleipton).

Although this passage looks like a near-quotation, I have not used quotation marks because it is not clear where the quotation finishes. The lexical elements do however strongly point to Syrianus as the source for this passage.105 In some ways Simplicius’ style also contains signs of oral presentation (see, e.g., 214.13, 216.10), which could mean that Simplicius is using lecture notes going back to any of the aforementioned Platonists (unless we assume they are his own notes taken at lectures as a student). This would be an easier explanation than to conclude that his language sometimes has an oral appearance, again raising the question whether this is connected to his time as a student or his own role as a teacher. Most

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius scholars assume that he never taught again after 529 CE. Should we infer that his expansive but straightforward paraphrases of Aristotle are just one mode of expression, and the Neoplatonist interpretation of the text (with a high rate of technical terms) another, both genuinely his? The signals of personal views (oimai, moi dokei, e.g. in Phys. 207.19, 22, 26) may suggest this. Verb forms in the first person plural are also found, for instance at in Phys. 184.29 there is an unexpected use of mathoimen ‘we may learn’ (the only other cases are 413.25 and 470.1). A similar but more frequent phrase is mathêsometha, ‘we shall learn’.106 Are these signs of oral teaching? Or is it a so-called plural of modesty (pluralis modestatis) in addressing an (imagined) audience of students? Their casual insertion into the narrative does not allow for a clear answer, while their overall frequency is not high enough to make it a significant sample (see n. 106). Presumably this means that we can use it equally well as possible evidence for actual teaching as for imagined (or prospective) teaching. The terminological traces that allow us to detect such ‘intrusions’ must be the immediate result of the method of composition and use of sources available to Simplicius.107 As identifiable cases seem more terminological than stylistic, they can be taken as signals of influence in a strong sense: in these cases the density of technical terms rises dramatically and more questions are included, marking a significant change in presentation of the argument. This can be caused by oral presentation or lecture notes – not surprising since there is good evidence that many commentaries arose in the classroom, where posing questions or puzzles aand inviting alternative explanations of passages are part of everyday practice. Yet all along my argument has been that Simplicius’ works do not quite fit this pattern (for historical and textual reasons): the formats commonly found in other commentaries, such as apo phônês style, question and answer, aporia and solution, and problêmata, are on the whole quite different from what we find here. It may be asked, then, whether Simplicius, in constructing his commentaries, is (also) using lecture notes he took down himself from his time as a student, or someone else’s. And we cannot exclude that such lecture notes were reworked and adopted into commentary proper, as has been shown for Proclus.108 The tools to look into such a vast issue are of limited use. The results from electronic text searches make Plotinian influence likely, but probably via Damascius who often goes unmentioned. For instance, very rare words crop up for which lexical resources (LSJ, TLG) bring up only Simplicius and Damascius as potential sources. Often the commentators will note two readings of a passage and try to make sense of both, to the consternation of modern textual critics, who want them to choose the ‘better’ reading and dismiss the worse.109 As a part of their teaching, the Platonists are taking advantage of alternative readings to help educate the students on how to interpret Aristotle, and so they explain both versions. Unlike this general feature of Platonist com-

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration mentaries, Simplicius’ reports of close contemporaries seem different. Although as before he does not accept their views mechanically, his habitual doubts are less pronounced in some matters. A second influence was Ammonius (d. 517 CE), a pupil of Proclus, who taught in Alexandria and ended up a controversial figure as a result of the difficult situation in that crowded and religiously divided city. The accusation of Damascius (Philosophical history F118B) that he was implicated in the betrayal of some pagans, while he himself was allowed to continue teaching, landed him with the reputation of having struck a deal with the bishop in Alexandria.110 Simplicius consistently refers to Ammonius as ‘my mentor’ (ho emên kathêgemôn, perhaps ‘spiritual leader’) and confirms personal contact with him (in DC 462.20, emou parontos). Simplicius may well be reporting from lectures, since most of the statements by Ammonius are introduced by verb forms in the past tense. He was influenced by him on matters of cosmology, in particular the thesis that Aristotle’s God was an efficient cause.111 In this connection Simplicius refers to a (lost) work by Ammonius, ‘a whole book } offering many proofs that Aristotle considers god also the efficient cause in the whole universe’ (in Phys. 1363.8 biblion holon } pollas pisteis parekhomenon etc.). He admits that he has taken over some of Ammonius’ points, but refers the reader to the book itself for a fuller treatment (teleioteran didaskalian, 1363.11-12). It is intriguing how he assumes the availability of this work (exesti labein, ibid.) which has not survived. In contrast to Alexander’s very frequent and explicit appearance, we find a more shadowy presence in the commentary in the figure of Simplicius’ teacher and colleague Damascius. Damascius’ role is not always acknowledged by Simplicius, except for the sections dealing with time and place (the so-called corollarium de loco and corollarium de tempore).112 In these two Corollaries of the Physics commentary, Simplicius addresses the ideas of Damascius more explicitly. Interestingly, his position is a mixture of acceptance and mild criticism. On place, a two-dimensional surface for Aristotle, Simplicius follows the criticism of Theophrastus who wants a dynamic instead of static concept, and with Damascius he gives place the power to arrange the parts of the world which is viewed as an ‘organism’ with ‘members’ (place is defined as ‘good ordering’ at 644.10-11, and ‘a measure of position’ at 645.4-6). Iamblichus already had postulated that place holds things together, giving each thing a unique place which moves with it. Simplicius and Damascius hold that the power to arrange members of an organism is assigned to place (e.g. 636.8-13, 637.25-30).113 Thus he accepts the dynamic understanding of place as advocated by Iamblichus, Syrianus and Damascius, but disagrees with the notion that place is the measure of positioning and size for things (e.g. in Phys. 625.28; 627.2 and 14-15).114 Sorabji has argued persuasively that Simplicius goes beyond the Theophrastan interpretation, which was taken up by Iamblichus and

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Damascius.115 In the first excursus Simplicius disagrees with Damascius’ idea that measure – a kind of mould (tupos) ‘into which the organism should fit’ – gives things size and arrangement. Each thing has a unique place (idios topos) which moves along with it (629.8-12). A second excursus to book 4, on time, responds to Aristotle’s plain rejection of the paradoxes on whether time exists at all (according to Aristotle its parts do not, so time itself cannot), and whether an instance can cease to exist. The late Platonists posit higher and lower time, the former being ‘above change’ as Iamblichus maintained: the higher kind is immune to paradox, while the lower kind is a stretch of time between two instants. Simplicius reports Damascius’ solution, but merely agrees that time exists as something which continuously comes into being, divisible in thought only. In the discussion on the continuum (Phys. 6) he adds his own solution that time is infinite (without beginning or end), if viewed as a cycle. Simplicius ends up moving away from Theophrastus’ position regarding the control of an organism’s parts (left to form, not place as Damascius would have it). In a more oblique way Damascius’ presence is found in other parts of the commentaries, and although more work is needed, some tentative comments can be made. A close reading of the text will reveal terminological variations which strongly suggest the presence of different authorial voices in, for instance, the second half of in Phys. book 1, as we already saw in our brief discussion of Syrianus.116 Of course Simplicius can be expected to represent much of the preceding tradition and he mentions certain names, but the terminological evidence as well as the stylistic differences from one section to the next suggest that there is even more intrusion than one would suspect at first (and of course the situation is not as clear as with the commentary on the Categories). Alexander’s presence could of course easily be confirmed by searching the corpus electronically for his name (TLG CD-ROM E) even when his name is not mentioned, but in addition Plotinus, Iamblichus (name at 192.14) and Syrianus (name at 192.29) seem behind certain passages. One passage where I have strong suspicion Alexander is in play (partly unacknowledged) is in Phys. 196.10ff. A major difficulty here is that this section of in Phys. (1.5-9, pp. 179-258 Diels) is almost virgin territory: little work has been done on this part, mainly because the first book attracted the attention of those hunting for Presocratic fragments, which limited the immediate interest to the first 170 pages or so. Checking previous ACA volumes by index has only limited effect, as such oblique or subtle influences on the writing style and interpretation of Simplicius by Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syrianus have not been recorded.117 It is thus not easy to establish whether we should simply assume that Simplicius’ expansive but straightforward paraphrases of Aristotle are just one mode of expression, and the ‘Neoplatonist’ interpretation of the text another, both genuinely his. Signals of personal views such as oimai,

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration moi dokei would suggest this (e.g. 207.19, 22, 26 etc.).118 As we saw above, the style in certain parts also indicates oral presentation (p. 162) which could mean that Simplicius is using lecture notes going back to any of the aforementioned Platonists; this would be an easier explanation than to conclude that Simplicius sometimes uses oral language, since most scholars agree that he never taught again after 529 CE, at least not publicly. One example can round off this argument about ‘anonymous’ intrusions with rather tentative results. At 197.12-15, in a long analysis of the principles of physics, we find the unusual intrusion of technical terms which strongly suggest the involvement of Damascius in framing the narrative for this material: And Empedocles at least, although he had assumed two in the oppositions for the elements of hot and cold, dry and wet, united them (sunekoruphôse) to the one [opposition] of two, that of Strife and Love, just as that of necessity to the monad. But the latter [operates] as one, yet Strife and Love as two, and not only as efficient [causes], but also as elemental [causes] such as [197.15] dissolution and aggregation: for it is of equal power to these.

It is again the lexical evidence (underlined) that arouses suspicion here. For instance, the compound verb sunekoruphôse is late (cf. 206.25; apekoruphôse 126.3) and could, given the context, be a calque on the noun koruphê in Empedocles F24.3 (= Plutarch On the obsolescence of oracles 418C) and F157.4 (= D.L. 8.65). However, Simplicius may also be taking his cue from Damascius, who uses the verb at Problems and solutions on the principles 54 and Theological arithmetic 16, himself in turn perhaps working from Iamblichus, Theological arithmetic 20.7 where the topic is three-dimensionality.119 Simplicius reports this some pages further along in the commentary (209.33-210.5): While going over the first difference with reference to the object he says that what survives [in change] is the substrate, but [210.1] what departs from its nature is the privation, finding this the main difference and clearly the causal factor (aitian). For the substrate, because it is not the opposite to the form, remains while moving towards it. But the privation which is opposite and incompatible (asunaktos) with it [i.e. eidos], changes completely when the form comes upon it. Next he adduces [210.5] the difference according to language, [}]

The term translated ‘incompatible’ (asunaktos) occurs only here and at 1174.29 (asunakta) in his polemic against Philoponus (does it originate with Iamblichus? Damascius?). These cases illustrate how the layers and components in Simplicius’ commentaries still require further study: even if he is seen to give sources and quotations for most named references, there are many cases in which he does not, a state of affairs which could

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius have many explanations (lack of revision, sign of inconsistency, interpolations, manuscript corruption). This multi-layered nature of his exegesis cannot always be disentangled or unpacked into its constitutive elements. Yet our heightened awareness of the possible complexities and layers will keep us from simplified inferences about the origin of the different voices present in the text. 5.4 Two outsiders: Galen and Themistius While the Platonist predecessors exerted a considerable (yet selective) influence on presentation, argument and style of exegesis in Simplicius’ commentaries, other authors from outside the Plotinian tradition also contributed. Strictly speaking, these are of course outsiders (i.e. not part of the so-called ‘golden chain’), yet Simplicius has reasons to bring them into the discourse. It is worth asking what purpose this could serve, if indeed it is of his own doing. For instance, Simplicius at one point introduces some objections (to be discussed shortly), which he presents as an interaction between the physician and Platonist Galen (129-c. 219 CE) and the rhetorician and philosopher Themistius (317-387 CE): the former was a Platonising physician pre-dating Plotinus and using advanced exegetical strategies to merge Platonic natural philosophy with Hippocrates’ medical theories; the latter was a fourth-century Aristotelian who wrote interpretive paraphrases of Aristotle’s works.120 Both were quite independent thinkers and commentators, and their role in Simplicius is worth looking into, if only to illustrate how widely he cast his net to find useful resources in his exegetical activity. In the case of Themistius we know that he wrote ‘creative paraphrases’ on Aristotle’s On the soul, Physics, On the heavens.121 After detailing some significant passages I shall try to assess their role and importance in Simplicius’ commentaries. The first appearance of Themistius for in DC comes at 62.12 where he and Alexander are mentioned in a discussion of the natural motion of the elements in the universe. It is clear from further references in the ensuing pages (62-72) that Simplicius refers to Themistius’ work in his polemic against Philoponus who adduced him for support. In most cases references are brief and his suggestions seem presented as an alternative, e.g. at 63.19 after the added requirement Simplicius discussed just before (1118). At 72.10 he gives his epithet as euphrades, ‘eloquent’. It is of interest to note that Simplicius is aware of his Aristotelian leanings (70.10, sumphônôs tôi Aristotelei), but highlights a case where Themistius prefers Plato’s view, notably on whether Plato defined ‘up’ and ‘down’ in absolute terms (in DC 69.9-10). In other passages too Philoponus’ use of Themistius for supporting his own arguments is rejected as frivolous and causing Themistius to contradict Aristotle (kakoskholôs Themistion pros ton Aristotelên sunekrouse, in DC 131.21), and Simplicius is able to build on Themistius’ own words (autos phêsi }, 22-4) to counter this misuse of the

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration Paraphraseis. In the next lines Simplicius defends Themistius’ view by endorsing the implicit reference to the Physics as known to Themistius (eidôs, 25).122 Similar appearances at 176.30-177.9 and 188.6,26,30 confirm this strategy of mounting a defence for Themistius (based on his own words) against his improper use by Philoponus. Clearly, then, in this commentary the occurrence of Themistius is triggered by his role in Philoponus’ commentary, while we can see at the same time that Simplicius claims direct access to Themistius’ work in the process of refuting Philoponus. The situation is different for in Phys. The first appearance of Themistius comes at 42.12 (again with his epithet euphrades ‘eloquent’), a rather sudden mention concerning the lemma to Phys. 184b18, in which those who claim more than one primary cause in nature (the ‘pluralists’) are discussed, and in particular Democritus. Themistius’ paraphrase (paraphrazôn) is here given as an explication of the division of types in Aristotle, presumably because he elaborates on it (principles are ‘either moved, he says, or unmoved and either limited in number or again infinite’, 42.12-13). This is followed by a reference to Eudemus (42.13-17 = F33b W., with a link back to 22.15) and Alexander (18ff.).123 Characteristically, there is no decision as to whose comments are to be preferred. His next appearance is at 44.1, again among a multitude of commentators, who ‘all agree that Aristotle was of the view that Democritus posited that the elements } are of the same genus’ (43.28-9). Here Themistius is placed alongside Porphyry as proposing a different wording; both also seem to concur on where book five ends (they apparently had the same version), while Alexander had additional text in some manuscripts (in Phys. 918.1315). Frequent coupling with Alexander also occurs, mostly showing them in agreement (in DC 62.11-12, 176.32, in Phys. 169.24, 400.1-2, 414.17-18 [textual issue]124, 864.15, 950.4 [textual issue], 1253.7 [textual issue]) or as complementary voices (in Phys. 70.32-3), but only rarely as disagreeing (in Phys. 684.2-3: change is of like into like; 854.20 [text variant]; 968.30). Thus Simplicius’ inclusion of Themistius is confirmation of the latter’s added value, despite what the later term used to characterise his works (paraphrasis) might at first suggest: Themistius’ interpretive ‘paraphrases’ do contribute to the exegetical tradition, following his own well-stated justification that simply repeating what had been said before would be futile (in APost. 1.2-12).125 Whether or not Simplicius was aware of his considered views on how best to clarify Aristotle, he shows a keen interest in his views and had direct and indirect access to his works. For Galen the evidence is perhaps best described as patchy and somewhat disappointing. Simplicius refers to him as ‘the highly learned Galen’ (in Phys. 1039.13, ho philologôtatos Galênos), a description we would subscribe to, especially in the light of recent scholarship that has elucidated Galen’s skills as a philologos and philosophos over and above his contributions to medicine.126 If we add in Phys. 708.27 where he is called

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius ‘the amazing Galen’ (ho thaumasios Galênos) and 718.14 where he is ‘the most learned Galen’ (ho polumathestatos Galênos), one would think that Simplicius is showing great respect on the grounds that he has read Galen’s work and was suitably impressed. However, Simplicius’ description does not seem to be based on direct and broad familiarity with Galen’s works: the epithet is an anomaly (a hapax legomenon in Simplicius’ commentaries) and the passages he occurs in are limited in number, with one title and few quotations of significance.127 Galen’s pioneering work as a commentator (on Hippocrates) and his use of certain well-known topoi in commentary can thus be excluded as a direct influence on Simplicius, and one suspects that the labels used here are taken over from someone else.128 One reference discussing intervals and quoting from Galen talking about the clepsydra (573.19-23) ends in a rejection of his suggestion that one is to ‘suppose } that no other body flows in’ to take the place of the water flowing out. Simplicius chides him for this question-begging proposal when the purpose of the inquiry is to see ‘whether there can be a separate interval’ (24-5). There is no mention of a source in this context, but we know that Galen wrote on the clepsydra in connection with his research into relevance of the pulse for medical diagnosis (On the use of the pulse, On the differences of the pulse). Another passage which gives more than a brief mention is found at 718.14-719.22, where in the discussion of time Galen’s objection on the issue of ‘before’ and ‘after’ is given (‘saying that time revealed itself’), to which a comment by Themistius is added, which proposes to eliminate this objection by two arguments. One reply is that ‘before and after in change are not respectively before and after in account of time but rather create the before and after in time’ (19-21); the second is Aristotle’s point relating time to the categories, namely that ‘before and after is first in place, then in position, then in magnitude’. Next an extraordinary (hypothetical) riposte on Galen’s part is given: In reply to that Galen would say that the before and after in change following on that in the magnitude over which the change takes place is chiefly in position; for the before and after in magnitude was of that kind. (tr. Urmson 1992)129

Themistius has a second point to bring in, arguing that time is not self-revealing: he accuses Galen of rejecting the position on precisely the grounds that should have compelled him to accept it. Since Galen considers time as ‘nothing other than the before and after in change’ (719.5-6), he should not protest against calling before and after just that merely because ‘before and after signify nothing beyond the temporal’ (4-5). The issue Themistius raises seems to be that before the creation of time one cannot speak of ‘before’ and ‘after’.

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration We are left in the dark as to what Simplicius’ source is and the passage may have been clearer in its original (fuller) version. But while the altercation between Galen and Themistius looks rather compressed, Simplicius gives enough of this discussion to show that his interest lies with possible objections and their solutions. As a strategy of fortifying Aristotle’s theory (or what he takes this to be), this makes perfect sense, since it will anticipate possible attacks by dealing with objections (‘weak spots’) beforehand. In the light of these findings we can understand why Galen’s appearances in Simplicius’ commentaries are rather marginal and unpredictable, while Themistius’ role seems confined to the polemic against Philoponus and comments on textual issues. In this case Simplicius seems unaware of their ambitions and achievements in writing commentary. 5.5 Platonist exegesis from Plotinus to Simplicius How will the preceding survey of earlier commentators help us in our understanding of Simplicius? We have seen that Simplicius has managed to incorporate a cornucopia of sources into his detailed commentaries. Incredible as this may seem, this enormous structure of ideas and arguments serves a higher purpose, the preparation of the human soul to ascend to god by acquiring comprehensive knowledge of the universe by way of studying the ‘sacred’ books of Platonist thought. Commentary on Aristotle will lead to the next stage of reading Plato, who as ‘the prophet of the Creator’ (in DC 106.6 prophêteuein, cf. Julian Letter 61c, 423c) reveals his thoughts and deeds. Comprehensive knowledge for Simplicius seems to imply the use of all relevant sources available and as far back as possible. Harmonisation will be a necessary corollary of this position. The issue of harmonisation is a long-standing one among the Platonists, giving those involved a range of arguments and approaches to deal with perceived difficulties. The tendency to harmonise grew in importance within a ‘framework of consensus’ regarding the corpus of books given special significance.130 Recent studies on the Platonic tradition have explored this controversial aspect, to illustrate the details of this tradition in Middle Platonism (Karamanolis 2006) or to show that Aristotle was still considered a Platonist among late Platonists (Gerson 2005a,b). It is crucial to be clear what harmonisation means: it must not be taken to mean that they agreed on everything, but rather that they have a lot in common and – upon closer inspection and with the proper exegetical tools and/or approach – much more than traditionally has been acknowledged.131 After Antiochus and Plutarch of Chaeroneia it was above all Porphyry who attempted to show the role Aristotle could play in the study of Plato, and it has been argued convincingly that this initiated a continuous effort to find ways of harmonising Plato and Aristotle.132 In the period from Plotinus to Proclus exegesis could be expressed in different ways, and harmonisation was not always the focus. Plotinus had

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius criticised Aristotle on many points in the process of elucidating or defending Plato: he disagreed with him about the nature of the soul, the definition of the categories, the use of substance (ousia) for both the pure Form and the enmattered form and this inconsistent notion of eudaimonia.133 We find him attacking Aristotle (and Stoic) views without a clear statement of the relationship between Aristotle and Plato, although he seems implicitly to assume that they share many views. Porphyry wrote a work entitled How Plato and Aristotle are in agreement (Hadot 1974). With regard to the notion of harmonisation Simplicius often makes use of musical metaphor to express this idea of agreement as a kind of attunement (e.g. sumphônia ‘harmony’, sunaidein ‘sing in tune’, i.e. ‘agree’). Proclus had used a similar metaphor when he used the phrase ‘[a] choir who sing the truth of the divine principles’ (Platonic Theology 1.1). My analysis in this chapter leaves much unexplored regarding the role of the predecessor exegetes in Simplicius. What emerges is a quite variable picture of their influence on terminology, format and doctrinal perspective. Each of these aspects deserves further study. Clearly Simplicius’ basic position, which is to give quite a comprehensive account of available interpretations, makes a description of his method in this respect a complex and expansive topic. Now that the core task of Platonists was to explicate a particular set of texts, the commentary had become the repository of the views of many generations, thus accumulating many layers of interpretation and engaging texts in a dialogue. Hankinson’s comments about this ‘centuries-old tradition of Platonist hermeneutics’ are very apposite: It is startling, as well as stimulating and refreshing, to see Aristotle through such an unfamiliar lens; and it may help serve as a valuable correction to the tendency to suppose that the Aristotle of the modern analytically-trained historian is the only intellectually respectable one.134

The relationship between Simplicius and his predecessors in philosophical commentary can thus be described as one which enriches our perspective on, and knowledge of, possible approaches to Aristotle. The first steps taken in this study to map out the different strands and influences will eventually sharpen our understanding of his originality in his exegetical activity. The late phase of Athenian Platonism reveals certain fascinating shifts in emphasis doctrinally and will require more interdisciplinary study, in particular on the importance of its responses to the Christian context, as we are about to find out (Chapter 6). The immediate target of showing how Aristotle’s system was to be understood in the light of Platonic thought served the further purpose of strengthening the Platonist point of view, which itself was a means to an end. In this Plotinus, Ammonius, and Proclus had shown the way. Simplicius reveals sufficient familiarity with their works and arguments for him to have been influ-

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5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration enced in the main direction of Neoplatonic thinking. The climax of his commentary on Physics shows quite clearly the strong appeal to Ammonius in showing how Aristotle (supposedly) considered god both a final and an efficient cause, a position that exhibits the Platonist colouring of the Peripatetic view. On more specific issues Syrianus and Damascius are brought into play, but both are assessed critically, despite the honorific epithets and other seemingly hagiographical labels. The lofty tone (prayer) with which Simplicius ends places the emphasis on the ultimate purpose of Aristotle’s philosophical system (metaphysics), showing how eventually all that has gone before contributes to the grand scheme of a theological nature: the return to, and unification with, the One. Rational theology in the guise of philosophical analysis would prepare the soul, assisted by authoritative interpretations of the visible instantiations of the One, i.e. the universe and everything in it. Because the understanding of the universe requires interpretation, which in Platonist terms more often than not means ‘uncovering, revealing’, many minds are consulted and many voices allowed into the debate. How this process of assimilation and clarification cannot always unfold harmoniously will be explored in the next and final chapter.

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Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology } in practice a religion is just a fossilized philosophy – a philosophy with the questioning spirit suppressed. (S. Blackburn, Plato’s Republic: a Biography 2006: 1)

The role of polemic in Simplicius is an important element within the broader rhetorical context of the purpose of his commentaries. As has been well illustrated by Hoffmann, his philosophical discourse becomes especially aggressive on an issue of immense importance to him. Polemic is thus a useful but underrated aspect to assess an author’s involvement in the problems treated. There are two sides to this notion: polemic can be used as a rhetorical device to attack an opponent’s views, but it can also be used to gauge whether or not the presumed understanding of the opponent’s views emerges from an interpretive effort. In the first case the critique tends to be external to the issue, in the second it can be usefully employed to understand what the interpretive basis is for his critique. In this chapter I shall argue that Simplicius follows a venerable tradition in the use of polemic within philosophical discourse, but also that the motive for the intensity of his polemic needs to be viewed within a specifically rhetorical context to do with his defence of paganism. I will briefly clarify both points. The earliest exegetical activities in ancient Greece were in part shaped by the competitive and oral nature of philosophical discourse among the Presocratics and Sophists in the sixth and early fifth centuries BCE.1 For the Platonists in late antiquity the role of polemic is of course no longer one of emerging philosophical perspectives and terminology as it was originally, yet it is one that can drive and support the overall project of the commentator when he is trying to make his case against rival interpretations in the strongest way possible. In interpreting texts critique and polemic are to be considered not only as a means for refuting opponents, but also for strengthening, directly or indirectly, one’s own position. As we will see, polemic served an even more important role in Simplicius’ strategy of promoting Aristotle and Plato as preferred pagan theorists. The heated arguments we find at times in Simplicius’ commentaries are a useful measure of his commitment to the questions under scrutiny. They show how these long works are far more than scholarly schoolbooks. When the temperature rises, his engagement is more deeply felt, and this I suggest gives us a glimpse of his fighting spirit when it comes to issues of

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology fundamental importance to him.2 As will become clear, Simplicius has a lot riding on his spirited defence of Aristotle, since the stakes have become very high for pagan philosophers to present their views on many important issues, in competition with Christian views. The Athenian school had been forced to cease its teaching activities in 529-30 CE, which meant the end of the long tradition of institutional Platonic philosophy. This was a major blow for pagan philosophy with lasting consequences.3 The celebrated debate with the Alexandrian Christian Platonist Philoponus, in particular the question whether or not the world had been created, stands at the heart of the conflict, the more so because Platonist philosophy and Christian doctrine become merged in his opponent’s exposition. For this central case of our present enquiry I am not so much focussing on the interesting philosophical details (as do Hankinson, Hoffmann, Sorabji, Wildberg and Mueller),4 but rather on the religious nature of the motivation for this debate. I shall argue that the polemical drive behind the arguments has a very specific influence on them. Other ‘skirmishes’ can be adduced, but few are as well documented as the one aimed at Philoponus. I will start by briefly giving some background to clarify how I see the role of polemic in philosophical discourse (§6.1) before I discuss the attacks on ‘the Grammarian’, as Simplicius likes to call Philoponus (§6.2). I return to Alexander briefly in a further section to illustrate some passages in which Simplicius seems to dissent while still giving full quotations – an unusual state of affairs which requires clarification (§6.3). The conclusion will underline the importance of the polemical mode of argumentation in Simplicius’ commentaries which culminated in his vigorous defence of Aristotelian theology. I will conclude that Simplicius’ summa of Greek philosophy is the result of his religious zeal in a symbolical battle over the spiritual hegemony of the ancient world as he knew it.5 6.1 Polemic and philosophy: a very brief history The use of polemic by philosophers goes back a long way, but it is not always acknowledged that there is an important link between interpretation and criticism. To present a critique of someone’s view presupposes some act of interpretation. Disagreement more often than not relies on the presumption of knowing better. It is therefore hardly surprising that philosophical interpretation involves polemic. In fact, the main reputation philosophers had in antiquity is that they never agreed on anything.6 To illustrate the persistence of this role of polemic in the rise of interpretive strategies I shall briefly review the evidence which reveals the extent and importance of polemical confrontations from the earliest beginnings of philosophical enquiry. When Greek natural philosophers set out to clarify the world, their approach was radically different from Homer’s mythical accounts. Refut-

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius ing opponents meant proposing alternative causes or material constituents to explain the natural world. Fragmentary texts show imaginative individuals proposing bold explanations of the world by postulating certain primary stuffs as the origin of everything (Thales: water; Anaximenes: air; Heraclitus: fire). Before long a competitive spirit began to encourage philosophers to probe the linguistic expression of their rivals’ positions, thus also exploring an interpretive and argumentative route in trying to assess whose explanation was superior.7 Such interaction signals the new role of polemic in the interpretation of both the world and the word. For instance, Xenophanes (c. 540 BCE) famously criticised the Homeric gods (F14-16 DK) on the good grounds that an anthropomorphic depiction saddled them with human features unbefitting divine beings (jealousy, greed, etc.). No doubt Xenophanes’ awareness of his audience and of the value of persuasive rhetoric also plays a role here, since his polemic may aim at both refutation and persuasion. Different approaches to interpretation can be identified among the Presocratics, ranging from more systematic explanations of earlier philosophers to highly polemical refutations. As mentioned, Empedocles (c. 500 BCE) was clearly trying to take up the challenge of Parmenides’ arguments against the possibility of motion, but he went far beyond a polemical refutation by giving his own comprehensive and systematic explanation of the physical world and its genesis. Theagenes’ allegorising interpretation of Homer was in part a defence against the moralising criticism levelled at the poet by Xenophanes.8 Heraclitus wanted to counter the misguided idea among his predecessors that ‘knowing a lot of things’ (polymathia F40 DK) would amount to understanding or intelligence (noos). He draws an interesting contrast between the amount of information (polymathia, a quantitative notion) and the right kind of interpretation (noos, a qualitative notion). Such critical assessments clearly illustrate the competitive nature of philosophical debate and presuppose a shared sense of purpose: to give an explanatory account of the world, but (unlike Hesiod or Homer) a rational one. It is in the fifth century BCE that clear evidence for a second-order discourse (in the sense of a text talking about another text) is found in philosophical circles. This is a period in which different strands from rhetoric, religion and philosophical discourse contribute to this new form of ‘commenting on’ other people’s views as a self-conscious and self-contained activity: a written text was viewed as objectivised thought, lending a more fixed character to words and thoughts which had been fluid and expressed in various ways when transmitted orally (Yunis 2003). To trace this new trend we need only look at the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle as the clearest cases of the new frontier (see also next section). Word games and more meticulous analyses, assisted by writing, raised awareness of the processes of thought and argumentation, leading on to linguistic stability and semantic differentiation. For example, terms for types of

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology writing proliferate, and soon distinctions between comments (hypomnêmata) and preparatory notes (hypomnêmatikon) helped describe the compositional stages of interpretive works.9 In a relatively short period of 100 years (480-380 BCE) this trend helped to crystallise certain existing techniques in rhetoric and emerging philosophical argumentation into what was to become philosophical commentary: it involved the methodical evaluative scrutiny of existing philosophical views with the purpose of pushing forward the search for the truth.10 Thus polemic progressed and was absorbed into systematic dialectic. By the time Plato and Aristotle forged their theories of the natural world or morality or metaphysical principles, they would reject many views of their predecessors. Polemics continued to play a significant role in philosophy after Plato. Of course, polemic and refutation are often biased forms of interpretation, but they will nonetheless be based on an interpretive act (or the presumption of such an act), going some way to sharpen the mind and method of those who engage in it.11 Therefore these different early forays into exegesis, no matter how embryonic in character, led to a considerable rise in works with an interpretive objective aimed at refutation and response.12 From the post-classical era onwards commentary became a more welldefined activity which cannot be considered merely parasitic upon philosophy; it is an essential part of doing philosophy. It is an exercise in understanding the works of the school’s founder with the further aim of understanding the world. Authority plays a major role here, and many commentaries simply present their activity as a natural extension of the school founders, with Plato and Aristotle as the prime examples of worthy authorities.13 Over time, ‘authorities’ multiply in exegesis. But the further we move away from the source, the less likely it is that the original text will be openly challenged. With the rise of longer exegetical works in philosophy, interpretive activity continues to include deciding on the meaning of a philosophical text in the light of doctrinal positions and their supporting arguments. But while known techniques continue, there is an increase in the self-conscious use of polemic to establish one’s own position. Ideally such choices are made in a dispassionate way, judging the arguments and relevant information on their own merit. In reality the critical assessment of arguments more often than not include a critique of particular views of individuals. Refuting them is one step in the right direction in the process of developing one’s own views. This is especially relevant when it concerns contemporary views: their critical evaluation often forms part of a heated debate, not necessarily immediate and personal, but certainly linked to real-life confrontations. Plotinus already had to polemicise against contemporaries, in particular the Gnostics: But we have addressed what we have said so far to our own intimate pupils (gnôrimous), not to the Gnostics (for we could make no progress towards

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius convincing them) so that they may not be troubled by these latter, who do not bring forward proofs (apodeixeis) – how could they? – but make arbitrary, arrogant assertions. Another style of writing would be appropriate to repel those who have the insolence to pull to pieces (diasurein) what godlike men of antiquity have said nobly and in accordance with truth. (Enn. 2.9.10.12-14 tr. Armstrong 1966).

His awareness of different styles in expressing and defending one’s views is clear, as is the rather ‘lively’ manner of debate. Broadly speaking, the major philosophical issues in the debate between Platonists and Christians come under three headings: first, ‘the elevation of faith above reason’; second, ‘three points found unassailable by the amateur Platonist philosopher Synesius of Cyrene’, namely the eternity of the world, the pre-existence of the soul and the resurrection of the body; and third, ‘the problems of Incarnation } and of miracles’.14 It is the eternity of the world that Simplicius and Philoponus chose as their battleground, on the heels of Proclus who had tried to prove once and for all that the universe was indestructible. 6.2 Against the Christian Philoponus: defending Platonism or paganism? It seems to have been the custom in antiquity to avoid mentioning contemporaries in writing, although there are exceptions. Identifying the anonymous opponents is not always easy, but in the case of Simplicius’ attack on the ‘Grammarian’ we are well-placed to discuss the details. The conflict between Simplicius and Philoponus has already attracted considerable attention in the scholarly literature, so my aim is to further the discussion by concentrating on the intensity of the debate in the light of my earlier comments on polemic. In addition, I will place particular emphasis on the religious nature of this specific conflict as a symptom of a much broader issue: the intellectual victory of Christianity over institutional pagan theology. Philoponus set out to attack Aristotle in his work De aeternitate mundi contra Aristotelem, and his ingenious method of turning the argument against the pagans in his defence of Christianity’s position that the world was created caused Simplicius a lot of trouble.15 Simplicius had to ensure that he could neutralise or refute the arguments Philoponus had formulated, and he used every means available. The theological issue was to be decided by way of philosophical and rhetorical weapons. I am skating over a lot of thin ice in the early part of this section, because the subject of pagan-Christian interactions is vast and complex. Here I am merely attempting to set the scene for the debate with Philoponus, although my emphasis does not represent a generally accepted view.16 The clash between Christian and pagan intellectuals was not new, but the early sixth century shows a new urgency. Simplicius’ massive commentaries suggest

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology that he took up the challenge to defend pagan theology, and his historical awareness of some of the previous struggles and crises must have driven him to write these elaborate comments as the only means available to him. To illustrate this urgency as he might have experienced it I will mention some significant moments in the rivalry between the two. Interactions between Christianity and paganism started soon after Christian communities formed in the late first century CE.17 The earliest contact we hear about was between individual Christians and Roman authorities: Nero’s scapegoat strategy after the fire in Rome (64 CE) gave Christians an unwelcome negative exposure to the wider Roman public, and Pliny’s correspondence with the Emperor Trajan is one famous example, Paul’s trial in Rome another, of the way in which the new religious fervour of a Jewish splinter group found little understanding for their ‘stubborn superstition’.18 As Christian communities grew (exemplified for instance in Paul’s letters to Rome, Corinth and Ephesus), the ‘dialogue’ became more doctrinal and intellectual. Alexandria contributed much to this development, simply because the intellectual pagan community was both an example for a learned spiritual outlook and a competitor for an audience. Before long the emphasis was on exegesis of sacred texts (Septuagint, the gospels). The new scholarly approach gave the Christian intellectuals a more competitive edge: here too polemic became an important tool to downgrade pagans and talk up the new faith. The martyrs were their ultimate ‘weapon’. A well-known case of someone converting because he was so impressed with the Christians’ willingness to die for unfounded beliefs is Justin Martyr (100-165 CE). The interest in Greek philosophical thought also grew, partly because their education was Hellenic, and partly because Greek thought was admired for its strengths in rhetoric and reasoning.19 But the Platonic heritage was being claimed as poorly representing Christian doctrine, and a competitive streak soon entered the debate over the doctrines of Platonism. It would seem therefore that tracking the progression of exegetical strategies in the early centuries CE also charts the ongoing religious struggle between pagans and Christians, at least on the intellectual side of the debate: not only did the pagan schools of thought need to be mindful of the spectrum of theological alternatives, but they also had to make sure to clarify the value of their own position, increasingly so after Christianity had been endorsed by the state. Plotinus wrote his sharp polemic aimed at the Gnostics (Enn. 2.9, Against the Gnostics – a title added by Porphyry, cf. V.Plot. 16), probably to avoid being confused with them on account of some similarities in doctrine; Porphyry’s long work against the Christians was burnt and hence almost completely lost (except for some fragments and responses in the church fathers),20 and several others in the Platonist tradition sought the ideological confrontation on paper as well as in real life. The notion of the ‘golden chain’, a continuous succession of Platonist

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius thinkers, looks rather similar to the important issue in Christianity of the apostolic succession since the Church’s foundation by Jesus. Eunapius’ Lives of the philosophers and sophists, full of scathing remarks against the Christians, was intended to compete with the lives of saints (see esp. Lives 471-2); and as we will see, the issue of the divine nature and timelessness of Christ looks remarkably similar to the question of the eternity of the world discussed by Proclus and at the core of the polemic between Simplicius and Philoponus; as mentioned in the previous chapter, Syrianus’ image of Socrates took on soteriological features, depicting him as a saviour of humankind which had ‘fallen from grace’. The closure of the Platonist school in 529 CE thus needs to be seen as the culmination of a long process of growing tensions between the pagan and Christian communities, ever since Constantine had exempted the Christian faith from execution (313 CE) – a decision which would eventually result in Christianity being endorsed officially by the state at the Council of Nicaea, producing the Nicene Creed (325 CE). In less than a hundred years the winds had changed and pagans came under threat: while Porphyry had argued c. 300 CE that ‘Christianity is an illegal way of life (zôn paranomôs)’, Theodosius issued a law in 392 CE which made pagan cults illegal.21 During its first two hundred years a growing number of intellectuals among Christians made a considerable difference in how the sect became a more serious force to be reckoned with. Learned men raised in the Hellenic educational system such as Clement of Alexandria, who died c. 215 CE, and Origen, started the scholarly defence of this doctrine which until then had been expressed in simple and crude language; as a movement open to all it had been vilified by its critics as a superstition for the ignorant. The second and third centuries illustrate the divisions among Christians, which made Jerome and Eusebius even more keen to unify the church. Celsus in his Alêthês logos (‘True Word’) had launched a fierce attack on the Christians, as transpires from the counterarguments in Origen. Celsus exploited the comparative method brilliantly to argue that all their claims had been taken from Greek philosophers, reversing the claim of Clement and others that the Greeks had stolen their insights from them.22 Origen and his students had developed the allegorical method as a tool for interpretation – a tactic that allows considerable room for manoeuvre in exegesis. Although not new, allegory was now put to use in the battle for dominance in religious matters. Unfortunately, the persecution of pagans has not yet been properly investigated, as Athanassiadi has recently pointed out, so my comments will be rather tentative and sketchy.23 By the time Justinian closed the Academy, antagonism had been growing for a considerable time and the pagan camp was losing ground fast. A number of Platonists had had a brush with Christian groups and authorities on several occasions. These ‘conflicts’ indicate how difficult it became to maintain a pagan stance in an increasingly Christian world; conflicts

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology raged inside and outside both camps, caused by sectarianism, prejudice and ignorance, because it proved harder and harder to differentiate the sects and ‘philosophies’ that were around.24 Plotinus, reluctant to use revelatory texts, preferred philosophical analysis: but, as mentioned earlier, he had to ward off accusations of being a Gnostic (Enn. 2.9).25 Porphyry’s attack on the Christians (Against the Christians) was a learned refutation of their beliefs based on detailed knowledge of the Bible, which is why the Christians considered it the most dangerous of all and tried to destroy it by burning as many copies as they could find.26 In Alexandria tensions rose to dangerous levels, with Christians, pagans and Jews living at close quarters and in continuous tension, and with the church appropriating pagan temples, the pagans created counter-strikes (e.g. by barricading the Serapeium c. 391/2 CE). After aligning herself with a Christian faction against the bishop Cyril and falling victim to a rumour campaign, the Platonist Hypatia was killed in the street near the Caesarion, a former temple of the emperor cult, by a mob of religious zealots (March 415 CE).27 At the same time it must not be forgotten that other reports speak of pagans turning on their own when they considered their views or acts ‘heretical’.28 Clearly Alexandria was an unruly place and religion was one area in which partisans became easily over-excited about these matters.29 The Alexandrian Platonists were under much pressure in these circumstances and the competitive spirit shines through in some added features of their doctrines. Celsus, a Platonist, had fuelled the conflict with his anti-Christian treatise, which we know indirectly from the response by Origen (185-254 CE). The tensions must have been more widespread: in Athens Iamblichus did not shy away from viewing Pythagoras as more venerable than Jesus and Syrianus cast Socrates in the role of a saviour of souls, openly competing with the Christian saviour and re-defining the pagan holy man as someone with superhuman powers.30 Before him Porphyry had already caused unrest and, much like Celsus, had poured scorn on the uneducated ‘ramblings’ of Christians, revealing the inconsistencies and trivialities in their teachings. Porphyry’s attack was so devastating because he knew the Gospels and Old Testament very well and because he used all his acumen and dialectical skills to show up the logical weaknesses in their doctrines.31 In the 480s Ammonius came to Alexandria to find the school ‘a collapsing and illegal professional institution’.32 He survived a conflict with Alexandrian authorities over a strange incident: when a student of Horappolo’s elite school bought a baby and presented it as ‘divinely granted offspring’, he was found out, causing a conflict in which a detractor appearing at the school condemned his blasphemy.33 Proclus had suffered temporary exile for a whole year when his political activities caused tensions with the Christian authorities.34 Damascius, the last head of the school (or what was left of it) had revived the school, but lacked the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius flexibility and local contacts to save the school from disrespect and eventual exile in 531 CE.35 All these cases send a strong signal regarding the ongoing animosity between the ‘state religion’ and the traditional pagan religion, the dwindling influence of pagan philosophical sects and the growing isolation Platonists found themselves in, whether in Rome, Athens or Alexandria. Brown and Fowden have rightly emphasised the importance of the pagan holy man. But in a forceful description of the way in which pagan leadership failed in the late fifth and early sixth centuries, he makes clear that the isolation of the Academy came about because of the learned nature of the late Platonist outlook. At the end of his first section Fowden sums up the crucial reason for their diminishing appeal: This pervasive spiritual and intellectual traditionalism, together with the association that the pagan mind instinctively made between holiness and knowledge of God, ensured that familiarity with the divine world was in effect limited to those capable of standing on the shoulders of the giants of the past – in other words, to the learned. This observation is bound to be the starting-point for any attempt to write the social history of the holy pagan man; for this sense of attachment to Greco-Roman cultural and religious traditions predetermined his human milieu and even his attitudes of mind.36

The demise of the pagan spiritual outlook as a legally viable stance seemed unavoidable and it is therefore not surprising that Simplicius and his colleagues found themselves with their backs against the wall. As Dodds has remarked in his usual perceptive manner: ‘In the fourth century paganism appears as a kind of living corpse, which begins to collapse from the moment when the supporting hand of the State is withdrawn from it.’37 Different sensibilities and issues were at stake, but it is clear that we are dealing here with a conflict over religious issues, a theological debate which despite its academic and high-minded nature cannot be regarded as mere philosophical discourse nor dismissed as theoretical musings between intellectuals, but should rather be viewed as a matter of conviction and life choice. It has often been thought that the conflict was one between monotheism and polytheism, but it is perhaps better to say it concerned a conflict between logismos (reasoning) versus pistis (blind faith).38 The fact that a group of men seeking wisdom (one way to interpret philosophos) used logic and argumentative tactics does not justify playing down their actual objective to offer a vision on life, the mind and the universe, ultimately framed by the firm belief that everything is subordinated to god(s). Thus the competitive aspect became a dominant factor in the development of pagan and Christian modes of self-representation and interaction. We can once more take Dodds’ judgement as our guiding principle when he characterises this discourse as follows:

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology While Origen and his successors were endeavouring to supplement authority by reason, pagan philosophy tended increasingly to replace reason by authority [}] after Plotinus Neoplatonism became less a philosophy than a religion, whose followers were occupied like their Christian counterparts in expounding and reconciling sacred texts. For them too pistis became a basic requirement.39

This debate clearly gained in momentum and animosity during the third to fifth centuries and the description reveals how this particular discourse generated a curious ‘inverse cross-over’ between the two parties. This reinforces the importance of the religious and spiritual sentiment at the heart of the Platonists’ intellectual endeavours: it should not be relegated to the realm of spiritual mysticism given the religious and intellectual climate of those early centuries of the common era. Nor should their use of logic mislead us into thinking that they were nothing more than ‘philosophers’, let alone philosophers in the modern (analytical) sense of the word. The Platonist school in Athens became very much like a circle of ‘charmed men and women’, an embattled sect which saw it as its task to defend the pagan theological outlook by philosophical and rhetorical means. The weight of their massive output and lasting influence easily misleads us into thinking they attracted great numbers, but the evidence points in the opposite direction: for all its expansive and wide-ranging learning late Platonism was a very small affair, as we see, for instance, in Synesius’ letter (Epist. 136), in which he complained about the lost glory of intellectual life in Athens by c. 400 CE, a passage well worth quoting:40 Athens has no longer anything sublime except the country’s famous names! Just as in the case of a victim burnt in the sacrificial fire, there remains nothing but the skin to help us to reconstruct a creature that was once alive – so ever since philosophy left these precincts, there is nothing for the tourist to admit except the Academy, the Lyceum, and – by Zeus! – the Decorated Porch which has given its name to the philosophy of Chrysippus. (tr. A. Fitzgerald 1926)

From the stray remarks in the biographical material and the fifth-century commentaries we learn that a combative spirit became part of the Platonists’ outlook, and it would seem that to be polemical and on the defence was the most common driver for their writing activity; Syrianus’ aside in his commentary on the Metaphysics is a case in point, when he states: ‘one could call us fighters, since we defend the best and most beautiful of philosophies from the charges brought against us’ (in Metaph. 81.8-10).41 We should also not forget to what extent the Platonists competed in lifestyle with the Christians: asceticism and continence were very important as was the notion of orthodoxy. For the latter we know of a case at the time of Proclus (late fifth century) in which a philosopher called Domninus

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius was struck off the list of diadochi for introducing his own ideas into the clarification of Plato. He fell subject to damnatio memoriae, the expunging of his name from all records; comments by later heads, such as Damascius, were ‘harsh and scornful’.42 Clearly there were heretics on both sides of the fence. Against this background Simplicius’ rather angry treatment of his contemporary Philoponus (c. 490-565 CE) becomes even more understandable. It will prove to be an extreme example of his polemical style and strategy, but more importantly, it can also be read as a symbolic moment in what is probably his last-ditch attempt to make a stand on behalf of the pagan intellectual world view. No doubt this description gives his subjective view of the situation rather than a truthful account of the actual demise of pagan philosophical religion (hence my use of the word ‘symbolic’). Compared to the other critical evaluations he wrote, this case is not really representative of the general style of polemic in Simplicius, but it is especially informative for the importance of the religious motivation for his philosophical exegesis. Hoffmann’s excellent pilot study has led the way in understanding Simplicius’ polemical procedure better, but it does not seem to explain fully the intensity of the invective. We can add to the existing explanations some comments on the fierceness of the polemic: many aspects of the way in which Simplicius goes up against Philoponus are unusually aggressive and ad hominem. Yet the reasons for the invective are actually not absolutely clear, unless perhaps we take some contextual factors into account. Mindful of the pagan-Christian relationship sketched above, I want to suggest that we can use the religious nature of the debate to approach this issue, since it has been unjustly neglected due to the emphasis on the philosophical aspects of the commentaries. The latter view seems to be the result typical of a ‘history of the victors’ (Christianity) as well as the appropriation by modern philosophers of these formidable thinkers as rationalists with a few negligible flaws (e.g. magic, mysticism).43 The role of prayer may illustrate how important the religious aspect of late Platonism is. It is striking (though hardly surprising) that Simplicius uses prayer at specific points in his commentary; for instance, the commentary on Physics opens by emphasising how the accurate knowledge of nature produces a form of awe about the creation (5.18-20, akribous kata noêseôs eis thauma) and a ‘sympathy, insight and hope with regard to god’ (pros ton theon sumpatheian kai pistin kai elpis asphaleis) and his commentary on On the heavens mentions a work ‘on prayer’ by Aristotle (485.21 = F49 Ross), in which he claims that Aristotle knew of a transcendent intellect. The commentary as a whole has been dubbed ‘a paean to the Creator or Demiurge’.44 The passage at the start of the commentary on Physics just mentioned can be read as saying that the study of nature is a form of worship (5.15-20), whereas in the climax of his argument of in

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology Phys. 8 he refers to Aristotle as singing the praises of ‘the prime mover as mind, eternity and god’ (the verb used is humnei). Here ‘physics’ slips seamlessly into a religious mode of reverence and worship. Plotinus had already expressed some thoughts on prayers (Enn. 4.4), and Proclus, who also held prayer meetings and wrote hymns to the gods, including Asclepius, Isis and others, wrote a short work on the subject (Marinus V.Procl. 19).45 The need for an internal spirituality is also clear from the criticism by Simplicius’ teacher aimed at contemporaries: Damascius chided those who think themselves good philosophers when they know rhetoric and syllogisms, but have internalised very little of the correct spiritual attitude.46 The precedent for this attitude is of course Plato, who in the Timaeus has the protagonist state the need for a prayer before beginning their enterprise of describing the universe (27C) or who in the Phaedrus has Socrates utter a prayer to Pan and ‘other deities’ (279BC).47 This may look like a rather mechanical or fortuitous act of reverence, but the late Platonists developed this behaviour into a core component of their theology, one that was clearly different from the popular attitudes to prayer. Iamblichus is probably the best example to illustrate the complexities involved:48 he developed a strategy by which there are three types of prayer which relate to three stages of meditation in the process of unification with god. What is remarkable is that prayer becomes like transcendental meditation in which the praying subject has increasingly less control over the process, but must await ‘contact’ from above. Still, a precondition is one’s preparedness by way of correct sacrificial procedures, making this version of prayer more ‘theurgic’ than conventional prayer.49 Proclus may serve as another brief example, though the list of examples could be extended. Proclus provides a helpful hint at what by his time was considered the goal of such prayers: in the fragments of his Chaldaean philosophy he speaks of an ascent which aims at ‘participation in the fruits of divinity and self-illuminating fulfilment, which is the vision of God’.50 Clearly such activities were considered important and they help remind us of how limited our knowledge of school practices is. While we can observe that those studying late Platonism in recent years have acknowledged its importance, it will still be good to spell out how (to vary Blackburn’s comment with which I opened the chapter) this religious philosophy ‘with its questioning spirit not suppressed’ plays a role in Simplicius’ works, because it was very important for the overarching objective of Platonist philosophy. So what is Simplicius’ strategy in his attacks on Philoponus? At least four connected aspects deserve our attention: in the debate over the nature and creation of the world (1) Simplicius regards Philoponus the Christian as a traitor to his school, but also (2) shows his annoyance because Philoponus goes against Aristotle whose views on the cosmos have great authority, his works having the status of sacred books (comparable to the Bible’s status among Christians); further (3) Simplicius must be regarding

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Philoponus as an influential author whose training has given him access to the Platonist writings so that Simplicius’ agitated tone reveals his exasperation over the fact that Philoponus might actually clinch the power struggle between pagans and Christians on a philosophical level; finally (4) Simplicius’ use of rhetorical and argumentative tools assist in characterising the debate. In other words, it will help to view the debate against a background of the animosity between pagan and Christian philosophers who are competing for the same audience. It is here that the analysis also helps to clarify how this debate is a symptom of the demise of pagan philosophy. We have to be clear about what the real issue is. The specific question Simplicius and Philoponus concentrate on is the eternity of the world. In Aristotelian terms this position rests on arguments concerning both the beginning and the end of the universe.51 It became a major bone of contention in the religious debate for centuries. Is this a matter for philosophy or religion? As it happens, for both: Greek cosmological aetiologies in general deal with theological issues of fundamental importance, and Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover (Phys. 8) is a prime example of natural philosophy merging with metaphysics and theology. The religious debate that is being played out here concerns issues of primary causes, new developments in Platonism (including the issue of harmonisation) and questions concerning the real differences between pagan and Christian doctrine. We should also not forget that real fears of the world coming to an end, part of the prophetic religions of the time, gave such a debate added significance. Yet not all Christians rejected Aristotle’s view, as for instance in the case of Synesius of Cyrene (c. 370-c. 414 CE), who after his conversion could maintain that the eternity of the world (Aristotle) was ‘not incompatible with the notion of a divine Creator and Providence’.52 The issue of allegiance and conversion was not new and could occur in both directions. Social, political and religious dimensions could contribute to people’s motivation, but conversion was still considered an act of desertion (as the technical term automolô indicates).53 Philoponus is generally thought to have converted rather suddenly from a Platonist to a Christian (a thesis now disputed, on which more below), and he is one of many examples of men in Alexandria who remain Platonists after declaring themselves Christian. It seems plausible that Simplicius enters into the bitter rhetorical mode we find in his commentaries because he regarded Philoponus the Christian as a traitor to the pagan cause on religious and philosophical grounds (in DC, in Phys.). This style of attack may have been informed by numerous earlier cases of polemic and vitriol. One may think of Porphyry’s Against the Christians (c. 300 CE), which apart from being condemned to the fire twice, elicited fierce and immediate responses in Methodius of Olympus (d. 311 CE), Eusebius (275-339 CE) and Apollinaris of Laodicea in Syria (d. 390 CE).54 The attack on Philoponus is aggressive. He is accused of talking non-

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology sense (in DC 30.26-34, cf. 58.14f., 190.15-22), or called a ‘raving swine’ (in DC 156.25). But we should note that despite this aggressive tone, Simplicius is not content simply to vilify Philoponus. As we have seen many times before, he emphasises the need for proper quotations and refutation of the arguments. He states repeatedly that he feels compelled to quote Philoponus’ words verbatim: Since I suppose some will not believe that any would-be author could be so illiterate as to be ignorant of these matters, I am forced again to cite what he has said } (F54 tr. Wildberg 1987, my italics)

Philoponus’ conversion was highlighted by Verrycken, but it has received renewed attention more recently with an emphasis on the religious dimension of his circumstances. MacCoull has made the point that some of Verrycken’s arguments aiming to show that Philoponus experienced a sudden change are part of the theological debate among Arrianists. Her account is thus quite different from that of Verrycken, who sees Philoponus as undergoing a conversion, a change of mind from Platonism to Christianity.55 MacCoull, however, argues that this so-called conversion of Philoponus is ignoring his deeper commitment to religious matters very early on, and should be explained as one stage in a natural progression of his religious development. The polemic with Simplicius serves an overarching objective to defend a particular position within the debate of his time, that of the Monophysite nature of Christ. The debate over the nature and creation of the world as (un)created and (un)perishable is perhaps a distant parallel or echo to the Arianist conflict over the nature and creation of Christ. Philoponus’ works show that he was keen to argue against the Platonists following Proclus’ 18 arguments on the eternity of the world as well as against the Nestorians, a Christian group which he considered ignorant and wrong-headed, hence open to the charge of heresy.56 His main purpose was to align pagan philosophical arguments with Christian doctrine. The issue of the eternity of the world was in fact ‘one of Christianity’s most philosophically embarrassing pieces of dogma’.57 By contrast, it was a central part of Platonist philosophy since Plotinus, who clarified how to interpret the creation myth in the Timaeus ‘allegorically’ (Enn. 3.5.9 sees the work as compatible with the eternity of the world). It was therefore no wonder that this particular issue would generate such a passionate debate between the protagonists of both camps. Despite the ad hominem attacks Simplicius also makes an effort to oppose the arguments as well as bring forward additional viewpoints. He informs us that Ammonius had already argued that Aristotle saw God as a creative cause, not just a final one – a possible sign of the later compromise between the Platonist view and that of the Christians.58 Simplicius’ new points are of interest in that they show his attempt to use his

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius opponents’ view against themselves: for instance, at in DC 370.3-5 he points out that even the ‘godless’ (atheoi) place the divine in the heavens. Of course the attempt to reconcile Plato, and in particular the four pure elements in heaven, with Aristotle’s fifth element is one of the tensions to be resolved in this debate.59 The other points made above seem in no need of elaboration: his anger seems to build on the assumption that Philoponus’ work could be damaging and underlines the importance he attributes to this conflict. Simplicius’ rhetorical and argumentative tools consist of a range of devices to demonstrate, as already stated, that Philoponus is a despicable person and a bad philosopher. Central to his attack against Philoponus are rhetorical terms and imagery which have been clarified in more detail by Philippe Hoffmann.60 In it he distinguishes several categories, of which I shall briefly review some aspects before I assess their value for my own argument. First, the use of invective is lavish and direct: Philoponus is called ‘narrow-minded, a user of empty words, insolent, shameless, immature, emotional, ignorant, dishonest’. To go to such lengths makes one suspect that there is an audience for such smears to be heard and appreciated and that Simplicius is taking this debate very seriously. Secondly, the consistent use of indirect address (‘that man’, ‘the Grammarian’) adds effectively to the negative ‘smear campaign’ which attracts attention to the object of scorn without mentioning his name, on occasion extended by wordplay. It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that the term grammatikos, a lowly position in social terms, was adopted deliberately by Philoponus as ‘nom de gueux’ (my term), both to signal humility as a Christian and to hint at his task as instructor of basic ideas.61 Moreover, it is not certain that Simplicius is harbouring a personal grudge: he may just be thinking of his audience and how to educate them. We may also contrast the characteristics attributed to Philoponus with the required attributes of the ideal commentator (quoted above §1.2.1). This can help us understand that the personal attack aims to show that Philoponus has a range of moral and intellectual shortcomings: ‘Philoponus crows in vain against the divine bird of Zeus’ (in DC 42.18); ‘Philoponus is a greenhorn, a novice (nearos) } talking newfangled nonsense (nea phluaria, 201.7)’; ‘Philoponus’ ignorance is boundless, unacquainted with Aristotle and exegetical tradition’; ‘Philoponus is irrational, a late learner (opsimatheis), not a lover of learning (philomatheis)’; ‘he drowns in the flood of eristic chatter and logorrhoea’; ‘the Grammarian is after vainglory (kenodoxia), blasphemous, boastful’ and so on.62 Secondly, the use of literary and mythological allusions shows how a considered literary style is applied: their effectiveness lies in the range of things alluded to, including Plato’s works, which always proved to be a good way of enriching the attack. As to imagery, Hoffmann has highlighted three interesting cases: first, there is a reference to ‘Gardens of Adonis’,

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology which Plato (Phdr. 276B-D) referred to as paidia ‘play things’ – suggesting they are infertile little gardens doomed to die. This makes the doctrine of Philoponus look rather ephemeral and not serious: Christianity will not survive, while pagan views are unshakable. Next, there is the story of Herostratus which symbolises vainglory (kenodoxia), a quality despised by Plato, suggesting he deserves a ban on his name. And finally there is a mention of the Augean Stables, one of Hercules’ labours, which adds a distinct mud-slinging quality to the literary mode of attack (tr. Hoffmann 1987b, 69): since this individual who gives himself the title of Grammarian clearly seeks once again to persuade his peers to think of the world as destructible and as created at a certain moment in time; since he flies up against those who show that the heavens are uncreated and indestructible; since he releases a great mud-bath of arguments against the claim of Aristotle – come let us call the mighty Hercules to our aid, and let us get down to cleansing the filth which is contained in the arguments of our adversary. (in DC 119.7-13) I do not know how, when my intention was to clarify Aristotle’s On the heavens, I have tumbled into the Augean Stables. (in DC 135.31-136.1) since this Grammarian has amassed a bed of dung, let us call Alpheus along with Heracles and purify, so far as we can, the souls which have admitted this filth. (in Phys. 1129.29-1130.3)

It is clear that this polemic against Philoponus is dominated by strong dislike of his positions and that Simplicius believes his ideas have a deleterious effect on people’s minds. But why the rudeness? The broader historical context has to be brought in, since the participants in this particular polemic represent the two major camps of theological debate at the time: pagans and Christians. A salient detail here is of course that Philoponus is both a Christian and Platonist. His inside knowledge of late Platonism would give him an advantage in attacking their ideas. The general view of Christianity among late Platonists was also driven in part by social and intellectual snobbery: Christianity was for the vulgar mob; Christians are not Greeks, but foreigners; they are ‘atheists’ (atheoi, cf. in DC 370.30) and ‘evil vultures’.63 Clearly the high-minded disdain is mixed with plain prejudice, but the exaggeration can also be explained from a rhetorical perspective. Once the decision to attack is made and the target identified, all means are allowed, especially when the stakes are high. The assumption has to be that the audience plays a significant part in all this, either because they are ‘stakeholders’, that is, actual or potential participants of either religious side, or because they are somehow instrumental in how these religious positions are perceived. The situation also makes clear that even if Simplicius was in Athens, he was well aware of the works of Philoponus, written in Alexandria. Since the commentaries

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius have been dated to 517-20 CE, it is likely that he got hold of copies while still in Alexandria. This does not answer the question how he got hold of Philoponus’ polemical works, which have been dated to the late 520s and early 530s.64 We may still assume that a didactic element plays into the polemical approach. The overall impression one gets from these elements is that for Simplicius much depended on the refutation of this opponent.65 So we can agree with Hoffmann that the polemic against Philoponus has a religious motivation, but we must also point to its fierceness, which comes from the importance of the issues for Simplicius arising from the particular context: his efforts to preserve and defend the Platonist perspective may in his view have stood for the whole of pagan rational theology in contrast to and competition with Christian doctrines. He recognised that Philoponus was not ‘constructing a systematic, positive theory of creation ex nihilo, but a systematic, negative critique of Aristotle’s arguments’.66 The political pressure applied to the Athenian Platonist community in 529-32 CE in the guise of an educational policy, and the brief trip to Persia of the seven hopefuls must have contributed to his feeling of frustration and despair over the chances that Platonism would survive. A return to Athens where there still was a ban for pagans to teach would not have helped either: he would have been an isolated figure with a lot of time on his hands, enough to write long commentaries on his cherished authors.67 6.3 Extensive quotation and disagreement: Alexander revisited When we studied the frequent occurrence of Alexander in Simplicius Chapter 4, we found that there were frequent expressions of dissent. These represented cases in which disagreement was not always very strong (or at least not strongly expressed), and in numerical terms the majority of cases showed Simplicius in agreement with Alexander. In this section I return to Alexander to discuss a few interesting episodes in which the disagreement is more engaged. My criteria for inclusion here are particularly long quotations (10 lines or more) and comments in which some disagreement is voiced or suspected. The length of the quotations can be taken as a significant indicator of Simplicius’ special interest in the passage under scrutiny. The phenomenon is also further proof of his considered use of quotation, as length is correlated to the evidentiary value of the text and the force of his argument. This has not yet been looked at and we now know that this unusual treatment is mostly true for Alexander. As announced in Chapter 4, this will challenge the view that Alexander was not subject to unexpectedly long quotation as in the case of the Presocratics.68 A further reason to discuss Alexander in connection with Philoponus is the link between them as suggested by Simplicius’ language. Among the

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology Alexander references there are some which can easily be read as puns on Philoponus’ name (philoponos, ‘lover of toil’). This type of allusion could evoke in an informed reader a connection between Alexander and Philoponus which we may label a ‘good cop, bad cop’ approach. The ‘ironic pun’ is achieved, as Hankinson has already suggested,69 by the well-timed use of the adverb philoponôs, for instance at in DC 316.3-5: thus Alexander painstakingly (philoponôs) expounded and opposed the sense of ‘generated’ to those of ‘ungenerated’. But perhaps the first sense of ‘generated’, which is the most genuine, is also opposed to the third sense of ‘ungenerated’ }

For this example the allusion works very well on account of the topic at issue: as we saw Philoponus was taken on for his attack on Proclus’ arguments in favour of the eternity of the world; by characterising Alexander’s manner of analysing the meaning of the word ‘generated’ and its opposite as philoponôs, the allusion could be picked up by the attentive reader with the added benefit of being especially effective because his analysis includes the genuine sense of ‘generated’. This indicates that Simplicius agrees with Alexander, who is thus implicitly presented as the true philoponos. Two further instances indicate that this is not a systematic punning on his arch-enemy’s name, but they can nonetheless be read as praise for Alexander and further oblique criticism of Philoponus. The first of these (in Phys. 129.32) concerns a compliment of Alexander’s collecting of syllogisms related to ‘place’ (topos), the second (ibid. 291.21) mentions Alexander’s painstaking quotations of Geminus taken from an epitome of Posidonius’ Meteorology.70 While the adverbial tag is a clear sign of respect for Alexander, the quite long quotations from Alexander may by themselves be taken as an implicit sign of this attitude. To illustrate the use of long quotations, showing Simplicius’ keen interest in, and privileging of, Alexander’s work, I shall select for further discussion a few significant passages from in Phys. (3) and in DC (2), in which Alexander is criticised. This part of Simplicius’ approach has not received the attention it deserves: the long quotations from other commentators are as a rule brought in to support or confirm a position, yet in these cases he also attacks his most reliable and trusted guide for the Aristotelian corpus.71 The first passage, in Phys. 403.14-22, introduces Alexander at a point in the comments on Phys. 3 in which Aristotle deals with the definition of change and finitude of the universe.72 Change, Aristotle is taken to say, takes place in things and cannot be separated from the things changed. This close link to things introduces a reflection on the process of abstraction and how in physics this cannot be applied to the full. In addition, the discussion of change is linked to the categories, to which there is no common genus, that is, they do not all share a property that would allow

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius them to be classified together. Aristotle is also compared to Plotinus in regarding change as not a genus, perhaps, Simplicius speculates, because he saw that some people would count it ‘among the categories’ (403.9-10). A quotation is then given in which Alexander makes plausible the point that ‘some things in the same genus can be equivocally named’, an issue raised by Simplicius. Alexander’s argument is rather witty, as he uses as example two instantiations of a man by the name of Alexander, saying perhaps nothing prevents some things that are in the same genus being equivocally named. Surely the Alexanders that are in the category of substance, both the picture and the man, are still named the same equivocally.

He goes on to give other examples to make the same basic point, one on relation (‘being equal’), the other on place. It would seem, then, that Alexander here serves to reinforce the argument with minor adjustments in discussing the same case made at in Cat. 331.23ff. when he discussed incidental and intentional homonymy.73 A second passage at in Phys. 511.30-512.9 introduces Alexander at a point where Simplicius has been talking about geometric proofs and prefacing his account by approving the generally accepted importance of geometry (510.18-20). The broader context is a discussion of the unlimited, and the issue whether the postulates of geometers really prove that ‘there is an unlimited magnitude inexhaustible in increase’. Simplicius is keen to disprove the possibility of an unlimited magnitude and may have consulted Proclus on this matter.74 He then reports Alexander’s reflection on the first theorem of Euclid’s Elements. Alexander is said to have asked how this theorem was not refuted ‘if it is not possible to extend a straight line or to draw a circle also beyond the universe’. It is a case in which Alexander raises a question and then answers it. It is the second part, the response (512.2-9), which is quoted by Simplicius (tr. Urmson 2002): Since that is unlimited of which, taken as a quantity, there is always something to take beyond, as has been proved, it is clear that mathematicians assume that the lines that they assume to be unlimited are such that they can be increased. For those lines are unlimited beyond which there is something. But one cannot increase the diameter of the universe. So they suppose them as less than the diameter, which they assume to be limited, since those to which they can add and which they can extend are unlimited.

The first theorem of Euclid almost seems a mathematical version of the problem of infinitude in that it implies the finite nature of a line,75 and the quotation shows how their treatment, in particular the use of certain assumptions, is set against allowing the actual unlimited. The passage aims to clarify that there are two modes of reasoning; in this short argument conceptual thinking and mathematical objects are contrasted with actual objects/space. The conclusion is that ‘he who abolished unlim-

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology ited place and place in general in no way impedes graphic proofs’. Mathematics, it turns out, serves as a model of abstraction and is used to put in relief how one can reason about the unlimited (hypothetically). The critical stance is less prominent here, in that Simplicius presents Aristotle as having put the reasoning of Alexander on its head (512.10-36). A third and final example from in Phys. gives us what must be one of the longest quotations to be found in the commentaries, an almost continuous quotation of 47 lines at 770.22-771.23.76 This excerpt is part of the concluding section discussing time in Phys. 4. It contains a discussion of numbers and sets of substances: Aristotle tries to explain how sets such as ten dogs and ten sheep are the ‘same’ in number, but not in substance. Simplicius is here especially keen to spell out why Aristotle took up this topic a second time, saying ‘not because he was given to excess verbiage, but because he is trying to articulate more exactly about it, as being open to many objections’ (770.14-15). Earlier he had made another comment on Aristotle’s style of exposition, which shows perhaps how difficult this topic was considered to be: ‘Aristotle was accustomed to help those who were seeking a knowledge of the truth but not grasping it accurately by giving a reasonable explanation of their misunderstanding’ (769.22-4). Alexander’s words are brought in after a brief gloss on the lemma (224a2-17). A few points in Alexander’s long account may be highlighted to clarify his role in this final section on ‘time’, just before Simplicius launches into his Neoplatonic excursus on ‘time’. Alexander first sets out Aristotle’s aim: ‘he is teaching us by this how we should judge which things falling under something identical are different from each other’. The examples that follow are geometrical figures as well as dogs, sheep, and numbers (as in Aristotle), but also ‘Plato’ and ‘Socrates’ (771.8-10) as examples of humans and their differentiae (not in Aristotle), showing how Alexander spells out in great detail how these can help to understand the main claim at the start. He then goes on to expand this for time and place, arguing that ‘the present time is also the same everywhere’ reminding his audience that ‘the differences in time are only being past and future’ (771.19-20). The whole passage is a very useful example of Alexander’s style of exposition and commentary – showing at the same time how Simplicius came to rely so much on him. Simplicius does not express strong disagreement here, but is keen to add to the exposition by clarifying further aspects of identity and difference, with a special interest in the example of humans (Plato and Socrates, 25-31). To round off our discussion of long quotations we may look at one more example, now from the commentary on On the heavens. At in DC 297.10301.25 (mentioned above, p. 130) we gain further insight into the motivation for quoting from Alexander. The section is dealing with Phys. 279b17-21 in which Aristotle considers the issue of the eternity of the world and Plato’s statement on it. Just before this lemma he made a reference to a view of some contemporaries as different from what the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius ancients said about the destruction of the universe (295.26-7). The quotation shows Alexander expound an argument partly on the basis of his discussion of Plato’s Timaeus. Since Simplicius had introduced the episode by saying that Alexander understands the Platonic doctrine not in the same way as did Aristotle, and since Simplicius counts himself among those who want to use Alexander in explaining Aristotle, he undertakes a detailed examination of his words and makes every effort to find a way to make Alexander’s dissent from Aristotle bearable. After the very long quotation (in DC 297.10-298.19) he meticulously redefines Alexander’s interpretation in order to make it less problematic. His reason for quoting so much, given right after the quotation, is ‘so that those who encounter both it and what I am about to say [may arrive] at a judgment’. This is quite surprising, as if he were saying that the reader can make his or her own assessment, especially given that what follows is beyond doubt pushing for the option that the world is not generated. His approach is to quote a text from Plato to show how Alexander has misinterpreted the former. His tone is lively, includes a second-person address (298.31) and runs through the words and meaning of Plato’s text with great care. He also keeps asking about Alexander’s exegesis, working through individual points and offering counter-arguments. First he reproaches him for not distinguishing properly between being and coming to be (299.9-22), since Alexander infers a temporal beginning for the universe. On this point Simplicius seems to get somewhat upset, as he refers to Alexander by the dismissive ‘this man’ (houtos anêr, 299.14), a phrase more commonly used for Philoponus. Next he elaborates on what Plato meant when he spoke of a beginning, namely, the productive cause (299.24-5). Several other issues are taken up, regarding the destructibility of the universe (300.1ff.), which Simplicius counters with refined comments, saying that Plato reserved generation and destruction to the sensible world, but being (in the unqualified sense) to the intelligible world above. He ends by quoting more from Alexander’s exegesis of the predicate ‘is’ as problematic in its applicability to the world, while Simplicius defends this by saying that Plato’s use of ‘is’ with reference to the (sensible) world is based on common usage, i.e. non-technical. Simplicius’ half-apologetic tone after the quotation, in which he tries to explain himself in his criticism of Alexander, shows once more the kind of respect he pays to the Peripatetic commentator, but also reveals the expectation he has that others would be surprised at criticism against him. His clever allusion to a well-known expression by saying ‘honouring the truth the more is dear to him too’ (301.19-2177) is intended to defuse such a reaction from an audience with such a response. In sum, even though he thought Alexander difficult at times (in DC 54.13) or misguided (112.24ff.) or to be making use of the wrong manuscripts (697.17), overall Simplicius considered him the reliable guide and interpreter he thought him to be all along. Disagreement is expressed in muted form and head-on confrontation is rare.

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology We may conclude by observing, first, that the respect paid to Alexander is considerable. This is confirmed by the pervasive presence of his comments, but even more so by the treatment he receives, even when a discordant note is struck occasionally. On the latter point it is also important to note that Simplicius is not as rude to Alexander as he is to Philoponus. This may have several reasons, in particular the Peripatetic allegiance Alexander can be expected to exhibit when it comes to clarifying Aristotle. But we saw that his stance was not obsequious or unreasonably partial, while he also expressed significant criticisms or voices disagreement with Aristotle. Simplicius does not seem keen to capitalise on such disagreements within the Peripatetic camp, but rather to use him for strengthening the broader structure of late Platonist doctrine. That he still could not avoid finding some fault with the ‘most knowledgeable of Aristotle’s exegetes’ (in Phys. 80.15) and ‘the most careful of Aristotle’s partisans’ (in DC 378.20-1) is only to be expected in the course of such a tour de force, which his undertaking undoubtedly was, of harmonising Plato and Aristotle and the whole of Greek philosophical thought as it had come down to him. 6.4 The rhetoric of interpretation It may have come as no surprise that the philosophical discourse of late antiquity had strong rhetorical elements. Rhetoric remained a crucial component of the educational system and would often be taught alongside philosophy, astronomy and other subjects.78 But it was not the purpose of this chapter to argue the view that rhetoric was an unexpected influence on philosophical debates. Rather I have tried to show that Simplicius makes good use of rhetorical strategies, as any author with a mission would, and what is more significant, that the agitated episodes in the commentary, reinforced by polemic, invective and even slander, are important indicators for his level of commitment to the issue under consideration. Philoponus was not only a shrewd and well-informed philosopher whose arguments could do some serious damage, he was also a traitor to the Neoplatonist cause. It is this rhetorical context that deserves to be emphasised. Polemic may be a less formal aspect of rhetorical style, but it is clearly part of Simplicius’ attempt to persuade the readers of the correctness of his point of view and the weakness of that of his opponent. This led to two further insights: by reconsidering the debate with Philoponus as a clash of intellectual cultures, that of Christian and pagan theologies, hence concerned with a religious issue, I have explored what was at stake for both authors. Secondly, it brought home more than before how we should not regard these commentaries as philosophical discussions or mere scholastic schoolbooks without any value for real-life issues (no matter how dry or intellectualised they are at times). Let me take each of these points separately.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius The increasingly religious nature of late Platonism, already highlighted by scholars such as Dodds (1923) and Saffrey (1984), was sketched in Chapter 5 and §6.3 in an attempt to show how the competing sects of Platonism and Christianity seemed to converge in their agendas, but fiercely disagreed on how to implement them. Both were otherworldly in orientation, both had rational arguments to expound and justify their positions, both had remarkable spiritual leaders to show the way.79 In response to political and social turmoil their attention would be directed to particular issues, but once the political establishment came to support the ‘new’ religion, the old ways of pagan practices came under pressure. The argument from tradition and seniority became one of the decisive points over which they locked horns in the fourth and fifth centuries: Iamblichus’ return to Pythagoreanism was strongly motivated by this attempt to make a claim for the oldest and most venerable origin of their ideas, thus hoping to trump competing ‘philosophies’. This label could be applied to groups and ideas engaged in spiritual and intellectual pursuits, whereas we might prefer to separate them out into religion and philosophy.80 It is significant that a central concept used in both camps, pistis (‘belief’), could serve a religious as well as philosophical purpose: in Christianity pistis was one’s firm expression of faith for which they prided themselves on needing no rational arguments; in the pagan philosophical tradition, and especially Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology, pistis was an inferior level of cognition, ‘unfounded belief’, and therefore in need of scrutiny and rational justification.81 Christians would continue to attract the rebuke that they were ignorant (Galen), irrational (Porphyry), or enemies of science (Celsus), but from the third century onwards they had strengthened their faith by presenting a reasoned case.82 For Simplicius too this is relevant, as Rist (1967) has shown, since Plotinus did in fact attribute some value to pistis in one sense, but rejected the common and traditional sense of ‘irrational belief’.83 His view on pistis seems influenced by Epicurean ideas, making it a conviction based on sensory evidence (Rist, 236f.). Simplicius’ reflections on this point follow Plotinus’ and Proclus’ lead, when he opens the commentary on Physics and claims that the study of nature will lead to union with god, and a sense of pistis and hope (Rist, 240). No doubt Rist is right to maintain that here pistis represents a reputable notion which seems a long way away from Plato. Moreover, at in DC 55.1-12 a more theoretical discussion (‘clearly Neoplatonic’, according to Rist, l.c.) of the notion of pistis provides further evidence for an interesting shift in the terminology. Of the two kinds mentioned here one is distinct from demonstration (apodeixis), while the other arises ‘after demonstration and apodeictic syllogism which is secure, irrefutable, and closely allied to the truth’ (55.2-6). In this context Simplicius also brings in sympatheia, another concept Plotinus spoke of, one

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6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology that stands for our connection with the universe and hence the explanatory factor for the possibility of understanding the world. Simplicius is thus seen to represent an advanced stage in the development of the concept of pistis which became more important in their religious pursuits than before. The growing tensions between reasoning and belief is nicely expressed by a third-century writer (anonymous) who states: [Every student ought to pursue] that uncomplicated love for philosophy which lies solely in knowing God through continual contemplation and holy piety. For many confuse philosophy by the complexity of their reasoning } by combining it with various incomprehensible intellectual disciplines through their over-subtle reasoning.84

These sentiments could describe both groups, except that the Platonists did in fact seek to prepare the ‘knowing of God through continual contemplation and holy piety’ by purely rational means using ‘incomprehensible intellectual disciplines’ and ‘over-subtle reasoning’. If we take Simplicius at his word that ‘the study of physics } arouses us to marvel and magnify the maker of the cosmos’,85 his commentaries on Physics and On the heavens are indeed also a form of worship in which his ingenuity and respect for the established tradition contribute to the general effort of clarifying the interpreters of nature (and the interpreters of the interpreters). In trying to defend the Platonist point of view in contradistinction to the Christian outlook he uses polemic to persuade and refute, the comprehensive exegesis to clarify and proselytise. His commentaries thus became one very elaborate protreptic and guide to Aristotle’s works.86

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Epilogue Simplicius and Greek Philosophy: The Last Pagan Gospel? Simplicius’ methodology, as we have studied it in this investigation, has emerged as an impressive programme of exegetical activities to elucidate Aristotle’s works, to show the harmony between Plato and Aristotle, and to prove the unity of the Greek philosophical tradition which culminates in late Platonism. What impresses above all is his command of an enormous corpus of philosophical writings and the scholarly nature of his exegesis, with a striking emphasis on the importance of the text, which is almost invariably offered to the reader to ‘speak for itself’. This strategy may not always be successful by modern standards, but it is unusual for its time and the reason for the survival of so much material in ancient philosophy. It means Simplicius has been judged on his intentions rather than the results he offers in what he takes Aristotle to be saying. The quotation from Umberto Eco at the beginning of the Introduction to this book characterised the mysterious library in his famous novel as a place that contained the intellectual sediment of many centuries, the layers upon layers of meaning and intertextuality, a living entity independent of any mind. Simplicius’ works are very much like this library: they contain the knowledge of centuries of philosophical argument and exegesis, presented in a way that reveals how the discourse continues, despite the weight of the impressive authorities that came before. No summary can do justice to the body of work we have been studying and much could not even be covered. But I hope that my analysis of a carefully selected sample and significant statements from Simplicius’ work can convey the immense skill of his exegetical activity and the dramatic circumstances in which this took place. Against the background of these two aspects the most salient points to be extracted from my analysis concern his position in the commentary tradition and his achievement, a thorough blend of philosophy and exegesis in the service of the Platonist ideal, inspired by Plato Theaetetus 176A, the virtuous life leading to union with god. That such a spiritual journey has its foundation in the meticulous study of texts about nature and the universe and the use of philosophical analysis does nothing to diminish the central importance of his religious inspiration.

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Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy 7.1 The commentator’s craft In a letter to Arthur Greeves (9 January 1930) C.S. Lewis described the pleasure of reading a commentary on Chaucer as follows: What a glory-hole is the commentary of an old author. One minute you are puzzling out a quotation from a French medieval romance: the next, you are being carried back to Plato: then a scrap of medieval law: then something about geomancy: and manuscripts, and the signs of the Zodiac, and a modern proverb ‘reported to Mr Snooks to be common in Derbyshire’, and the precession of the equinoxes, and an Arabian optician (born at Balk in 1030), five smoking room stories, the origins of the doctrine of immaculate conception, and why St Cecilia is the patroness of organists. So one is swept from East to West, and from century to century, equally immersed in each oddity as it comes up.1

This is clearly the view of a scholar who delights in the learned detail and unexpected outcomes of clarifying one text by means of another text. The passage also illustrates that such scholarly commentary for its own sake is a rather mixed bag of disparate notes, where the immediate dependence on another text is the only binding factor. The passage exemplifies the modern scholarly commentary in its most typical form: learned in outlook, but more often than not focused on specific problems and therefore lacking a coherent agenda.2 According to Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (1913 s.v.) the term ‘glory-hole’ signifies ‘an opening in the wall of a glass furnace, exposing the brilliant white light of the interior’, used by a glassmaker when reheating glass. Such a description evokes the intriguing metaphor, so popular among Platonists, of the glimpse of an extraordinary reality of unsurpassed brightness, almost like a revelation and illumination. But this would perhaps be the only connection with the commentaries we are studying. Simplicius is part of a tradition in which commentary is in fact almost the opposite of its modern ‘cousin’, as I have argued in the preceding chapters. Platonist commentaries are a mode of philosophising with an agenda, a cohesive perspective imposed on a philosophical system which in a variety of ways is in need of clarification. That the mechanics of the process (a drawn-out and methodical elucidation of certain texts) and its motivation (preservation and dissemination of a special kind of wisdom) seem odd to us as modern readers, says much about how we choose to understand religion. The modern categories ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’ prove insufficient to describe adequately what is involved here. The barriers between these domains are less strict in antiquity, because although philosophia and theologia refer in principle to the pursuit of wisdom and study of the divine, they were not seen to delineate clearly defined territories but rather different perspectives which could overlap, interact and be complementary. Plotinus used the phrase ‘at once poet, philosopher and

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius expounder of sacred mysteries’ (V.Plot. 15: ton poiêtên kai ton philosophon kai ton hierophantên) in praise of Porphyry when he had read a poem which ‘was expressed in the mysterious and veiled language of inspiration’ (ibid.). So are we dealing with religious philosophy or philosophical religion? Natural philosophy (‘science’) and religion have been complementary and competing entities throughout human intellectual history.3 We need to reconfigure our language and sensibilities in order to get away from the Judeo-Christian perspective created by centuries of scholarship. It has led to marginalisation of any other strategy to deal with the supernatural or divine as superstitions or magic, thus complicating our understanding of the pagan point(s) of view. Philosophical reasoning was certainly important but we can see that it is a means to an end. There was another component to the Neoplatonist stance that is, as we saw, not easily described, because modern terminology tends to impose alien associations. Philosophy had absorbed much of the new attitudes arising in the third to fifth centuries, which included ascetism and a new form of piety that would include prayer and meditation. At times the late Platonists come across as a secretive sect.4 As Most rightly points out, ‘most of those who write commentaries are members of the cultural institutions which are legitimated, at least in part, by their privileged access to the authoritative texts which they protect, divulge, and conceal’.5 The intellectualist approach depended heavily on the importance placed on the philosophical tradition and the attention paid to the study, transmission and preservation of texts. This impulse of higher learning may have originated with the Alexandrians and resurfaced with the Second Sophistic, the broader movement of studying the rhetoric and literature of Classical Athens, but no doubt the Christian insistence on the central role of the gospels as the core repository of wisdom and divine inspiration also played a role. The doctrinal beliefs would drive the commitment of pagan and Christian intellectuals, and it was the competitive edge that would make them go to great lengths to shore up and make unassailable their philosophical system by using constructive argument and aggressive criticisms, anticipatory points against possible objections and many other creative moves of a legitimate and less legitimate nature. 7.2 Simplicius on Simplicius: self-image and self-presentation Self-characterisation is a poor substitute for analysis, but it seems useful to try to offer not so much a psychological profile as an exploration of a few statements not considered so far, in which Simplicius either characterises the wider context within which he operated or further clarifies his project of writing commentary. His own view ought to be included to enhance our understanding of these works in our search for his motives or perhaps even for his intended audience. It has been shown that Simplicius deliberately

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Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy maintains a ‘low profile’, at least on the surface, yet expresses his views on a regular basis in a style which may be mistaken for diffidence or an incapacity to deal with the issues at hand. That such a reading of his remarks would be mistaken can easily be shown by referring to the highly frequent interjection oimai ‘I believe’ (c. 160 times)6 and a host of explicit expressions of dissent with a great number of his predecessors, from Aristotle, Alexander and Porphyry down to Damascius. These are significant statistics, despite the customary restraint of Platonists in their writings when it comes to expressing personal views.7 It is not easy to assess the weight of these personal comments, since they often concern details or semi-aporetic considerations (some were mentioned in Chapters 4-5). But as I said earlier, his seeming diffidence is misleading since he does express his doubts and disagreements regularly. Just as Simplicius would say that Plato and Aristotle should be interpreted ‘from themselves’, he himself deserves to be studied on his own terms. Unsurprisingly, we also find some helpful comments in the two parts of his in Phys. in which he is speaking in his own voice more emphatically, the so-called ‘corollaries on place and time’. As we saw in Chapter 3 (§3.2.1), Simplicius launches into a more elaborate discussion and analysis of place propria voce after discussing Aristotle’s views in book 4 of his Physics. Here Simplicius again proffers the trope of modesty combined with a remarkable reflection on his task as a commentator (601.5-13): There have been other opinions about place since Aristotle, an examination of which he would have handed down to us if they had arisen before him. So he would approve of them also being examined. [}] If I were able myself to contribute to the articulation of our thoughts about place I think that Aristotle would countenance my daring, since he has provided the basis himself. So if I shall seem to exceed the office of a commentator, let those who notice it blame the difficulty and complexity of the problem. (tr. Urmson 1992)

Strongly reminiscent of the passage in which he outlined the task of the commentator (in Cat. 7.23-32), this passage reveals the self-conscious positioning of the author: he clearly feels the need to justify his excursus as contributing to the wider understanding of the topic at hand and its relevance for Aristotle’s analysis. There is also a clear reminder of Aristotle’s own method which provided endoxographical overviews of existing opinions in many of his treatises based on the dialectical techniques expounded in his Topics.8 The trope of modesty is here linked to the ‘articulation of our thoughts about place’ and the presumption that Aristotle would have accepted his attempts, because they would take their starting-point in the scholarch’s account. The last sentence seems to suggest that there was a rather strict understanding of the task of the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius commentator (exêgêtês), but Simplicius’ justification deflects any criticism by claiming that the topic’s complexity must be blamed for his expansive analysis. A second passage relevant for our present purpose is found in his corollary on time (in Phys. 773.8ff.). Here he introduces his excursus on the account of Aristotle’s views with some very interesting remarks (lines 9-19): I have gone through what he has said from the beginning to the end, showing how it all fits together so far as possible. But since our academic training has not the sole aim of learning Aristotle’s opinion concerning the nature of time, but rather of understanding what time is – by which I think that we shall also get a closer grasp of Aristotle’s thoughts on time – let us examine (dieukrinêsômen) that briefly. After that, let us review (episkepsômetha) the opinions of those who have philosophised about time. But since Aristotle at the beginning of his discussion mounted severe attacks (drimeôs epikheirêsantos) on the reality of time and did not defeat these attacks (ta epikheirêmata mê lusantos) it would be useful towards our goal to overcome (dialusai) them as far as possible. For otherwise our discussion of time would remain incomplete. (tr. Urmson 1992)

The passage is illuminating with regard to Simplicius’ method of dealing with Aristotle’s text, claiming that it had received a thorough examination ‘from beginning to end’ to demonstrate its coherence, but also emphasising that his agenda is a more general one, to learn about time per se. The passage ends in a similar fashion to the introductory remarks for the excursus on place, which also involved a ‘criterion of completeness’. What else can we learn from this passage? The aim of understanding time per se is revealing of the philosophical agenda in (this part of) the commentary and seems to require at least three things: first, a review of existing theories on time, which was implied in the previous passage as a fixed feature of his method. Second, the problems that can be mounted against the reality of time must be defused to make the account complete (though no comment is made on the fact that Aristotle did not resolve all problems). Third, Simplicius claims that the understanding of time per se will enhance our understanding of Aristotle’s views on time, showing how the general account of time can illuminate a specific account of time. One further passage of self-characterisation can be adduced. It confirms his strong commitment to set out Aristotle’s ‘searching accuracy of explanation’ of the text and its truthfulness (in DC 566.17-20):9 In what follows I shall set out Aristotle’s investigative precision of such accounts intending to the best of my ability and for each argument to show that the true meanings are not damaged by them.

These passages show us that Simplicius makes a concerted effort (note

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Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy kata to dunaton prothumoumenos) to live up to his own programmatic statement about the tasks of a commentator (see §1.2.1). There he stipulates that one should aim at a comprehensive and lucid treatment without being unduly partial to the Aristotelian doctrine. The passages discussed above also leave little doubt about the didactic element present in the commentaries. Simplicius keeps presenting Aristotle as a teacher, as someone who wants to teach us. This transpires especially from those passages in which he introduces or recapitulates Aristotle’s words with phrases such as ‘Aristotle teaches us }’ (in DC 1.20, 2.25, 6.30 ‘the prooemium teaches us the skopos and the order of the treatise’, etc.) or his works ‘teach us’ (in Phys. 3.5 didaskousi, cf. 15 didaxai; 31.19 didaskôn etc).10 In view of the points I have put forward concerning the unusually elaborate and learned nature of these commentaries, his attitude towards the exegetical ‘tradition’, and the rather uncertain state of evidence regarding Simplicius’ whereabouts in the years 533-40 CE, and also given the historical circumstances and religious debates he found himself in, it would seem appropriate to propose that his hupomnêmata were intended for the instruction of a potential rather than real audience, with the proviso that the works seem more suitable for teachers who could guide students rather than for individual use by students themselves. 7.3 Exegesis and philosophy: a complex relationship The rather ambitious aim of this study was to explore how in Simplicius’ works his exegetical strategies served his philosophical outlook. If exegesis was the major focus, this was mainly the result of its ubiquitous presence, but more importantly, caused by the fact that exegesis and doing philosophy are so inextricably entangled in his commentaries. The relation between exegesis and philosophy was described by Pierre Hadot in an article entitled ‘Philosophy, Exegesis and Creative Mistakes’ which suggested that the Neoplatonist manner of interpretation of Plato and Aristotle can be viewed as creative, even if (or because, in today’s view) it is often mistaken.11 I have also tried to show that Simplicius has a very well-defined purpose in mind while writing his commentaries, which, however, he does not spell out. Despite his elaborate (some might say roundabout) way of explicating Aristotle’s ideas, the commentaries can serve the purpose of reinforcing the Platonist message of the importance of Aristotle for the study of Plato which in turn is meant to lead to the deeper philosophical insight. Two questions were particularly important for this enterprise of coming to grips with his methodology: first, what drove him to write such gargantuan works? and secondly, how much of these commentaries reflects his own contribution? The first question was brought into connection with his training and the

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius circumstances he lived in and aimed at showing that his elucidations of Aristotle both do and do not fit the mould of late Platonism as a product of a school environment. They fit in so far as they are founded on a specific set of doctrinal presuppositions coming out of the late Platonist tradition, stretching from Plotinus to Proclus. They do not fit in so far as they differ in their origin (not student lecture notes), their nature (elaborate and detailed source referencing), and their scale (unprecedented comprehensiveness). An answer to the second question must be based on a review of the specific insights gained in this study. They have arisen from analysing some essential features of Simplicius’ working method and placing his methodology in its cultural and social context. The conclusions of each chapter may be summed up first. As we saw in Chapter 1, even with so many exegetical works available, Simplicius does not consider a new commentary on the Categories, Physics or On the heavens redundant. This is a reason to think that Simplicius felt the need for his works, and it suggests that he was not engaged in the normal teaching activity we know about for his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. When mentioning this point I also referred to the cases of Syrianus and Marinus: the former composed a partial commentary, the latter was advised against writing yet another commentary. Such considerations make more sense in an active educational environment, where other commentaries are available and teachers advise their students. So we can take this consideration as strengthening the idea that Simplicius was not actively involved in teaching, but that his commentaries were still intended for educational purposes. As we saw he may well have been drawing upon his own student notes as well as on the work he had been doing as a teacher before he had to leave Athens. But this approach alerts us to the fact that certain traces of oral teaching in the text can have several different origins and explanations. In Chapters 2-5 I illustrated the exegetical activities of Simplicius in the light of his attempt to construct a summa philosophiae paganae. Some of the main points may be reviewed here. Simplicius’ treatment of some Presocratic views (Chapter 2) was discussed with reference to the debate on the contextualised nature of fragments. This issue will always be an important component in modern scholarship. But while modern scholars have been concerned about the reliability of his reports, the objective here has been to look more closely at how Simplicius operates when introducing and evaluating Presocratic ideas. By selecting the early theorists most easily linked to some of the core ideas of Neoplatonism, I have tried to illustrate how his interest in early Greek philosophy was driven by a mixture of motives: the fact that Aristotle incorporated them into his preliminary discussions of a particular area, which assisted in setting its parameters and key concepts; the established doctrine that ancient learning needed to be uncovered; the need for offering a competitive ‘philosophy’, that is, a spiritual outlook backed up by rational argument in

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Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy order to withstand the marginalisation of pagan thought that resulted from the rise of Christianity. In his most far-reaching attempt to include the Presocratics into a harmonising account of Greek philosophy as a whole, Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras had to be defended against Aristotle’s and Plato’s criticisms, and it is here that we see Simplicius’ skills in trying to iron out ‘superficial disagreements’. We also saw that the successors of Aristotle have a significant role in Simplicius’ commentaries (Chapter 3). Their attitude towards Aristotle’s works is regarded as one of collaborative expansion and elucidation. The issue that became important for them was the unity of Peripatetic thought. In addition they had to find a way to resolve the tensions between philosophical creativity and the process of canonisation. These aspects of supplementation are characteristic of what sociologists of science call the stage of the ‘minders’, the second stage in a three-tiered model which distinguishes pioneering thinkers, care-takers and followers, sometimes summed up in the gnomic phrase: ‘finders, minders and grinders’. Such ‘care-takers’ of an important intellectual legacy find themselves contemporary with a ‘finder’, an intellectual pioneer, whose work is so dominant and overwhelming that it seems to forestall any new and original contributions. This is, however, an exaggeration: it would be misleading to think that Theophrastus and Eudemus were unable to make real and original contributions. Establishing what their contribution is can sometimes be difficult, because they will always be judged in relation to the work of their master; in addition, they are not aiming to compete or overthrow his work, so that in their own mind there is no need to differentiate their ideas from his in an emphatic way. What the model helps to do in a convenient (though superficial) way is to sort out to what extent the roles and contributions of these thinkers are determined by their historical and intellectual environment. Yet the borderlines between the three categories were shown to be less rigid than the terms might suggest. The important role played by Alexander of Aphrodisias was discussed in Chapter 4. His presence was found to be the result of a deliberate choice by Simplicius. The analysis could only give a highly selective account of the pervasive influence of Alexander on choice of topics, structure and exegetical style. While it was also clear that he had been given a place in the Platonist exegetical tradition before Simplicius, the approach to, and use of, Alexander by Simplicius is far more intense and elaborate and places a particular emphasis on the use of quotations. Thus the good use of evidence went hand in hand with the harmonising strategy. On many occasions we could see the extensive quoting and praise as the signs of immense respect for Alexander. At the same time we found out that Alexander’s views were not always taken for granted or accepted unconditionally: criticism, doubts and objections are all part of the treatment, mostly on points which resisted harmonisation between Platonic and Peripatetic views.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius In Chapter 5 I have tried to sketch how the different voices in the commentary tradition are given a place in Simplicius’ comprehensive overview. The Platonists after Plotinus had begun to see themselves as part of a so-called ‘golden chain’, that is, as part of a special group guarding and preserving Plato’s thought. Each one of this rather varied group of thinkers equally engaged in interpreting Plato, but in ways that constituted shifts in emphasis as well as proposals for additions to the core of sacred texts which seem to us rather removed from the original works of Plato. This illustrated the fluid nature of the Platonist doctrines, while also showing how exegetical techniques were capable of interpreting the meaning of texts in many directions; to a degree that would seriously stretch the possible and intended meanings of those writings. A brief discussion of some other ‘commentators’ outside the golden chain added contrast and illustrated Simplicius’ keen eye for useful material to bolster the position by arguments that took care of criticisms of Aristotle. The range of manoeuvres within the golden chain also testifies to the fact that their real objectives were mostly due to external motivations, certain fundamental presuppositions about what the text ought to mean. These must be sought in the role of authority (a ‘canon’) and the belief in the importance of Plato’s message as read by Plotinus. Finally, in Chapter 6 the aspect of competing religious perspectives was brought to the fore in an attempt to clarify the extraordinary effort of Simplicius’ commentary activities. By sketching the background of the relationship between pagan and Christian intellectuals I have placed an emphasis on the religious nature of their interactions, an approach that has recently been gaining ground. The effort of Simplicius to present the Greek philosophical tradition as unified can be clarified from his decision to adopt this attitude acquired in his Alexandrian training and the involuntary defensive tactic of going up against the Christian outlook. This summary has highlighted the main results from earlier chapters and it remains to look at some implications and broader insights emerging from them. It is rather unfortunate that we have no information about where Simplicius wrote his works, but this has proved not to be essential for obtaining a better understanding of his working method. It does, however, remain relevant for our second question, and therefore a plausible working hypothesis has been used to strengthen earlier suggestions that he returned to Athens and wrote his long commentaries in relative peace and quiet.12 The potentially oppressive force of tradition and authority is palpable in these commentaries and may in itself lead to the sense of awe and modesty so often expressed by Simplicius.13 Whether this is something he felt forced to do on account of his immediate environment cannot be established. But the social pressures of paying tribute to the great thinkers and predecessors of the past are clearly a factor. His identity as a commentator is closely connected to the school’s profile as a ‘school of

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Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy thought’ bent on showing the importance of Plato’s ideas. The unity of the school depended first and foremost on the way in which across several centuries all these thinkers took the Platonic works as their starting-point: no matter how many innovative and often alien elements they added, this relationship to the agreed canon forged a much-needed continuity in the Platonist tradition. This attitude allowed for a central core of basic assumptions and doctrines, while at the same time allowing considerable margin for reinterpretations, assimilation and transformations of this and other materials. Viewed in this light, late Platonists stand to Plato in a kind of pros hen relation, the Aristotelian notion of ‘family resemblance’ by which we group together several concepts connected to one central concept, such as health, healthy and medicine.14 From a broader perspective my analysis of Simplicius’ methodology makes at least two significant contributions. First, I have made use of much previous scholarship in order to produce a much-needed synthesis of the modern scholarship on the commentary tradition with a particular focus on Simplicius. As such this study presents an account of the current state of research of an almost Simplician type, incorporating the scholarly discussion of the last fifty years. Secondly, I have contributed to clarifying three important aspects, each of which enhance our understanding of his approach and motivation. (1) To begin with the question of why one would want to write such massive works, I have suggested that circumstance and ideology drive the enterprise. Simplicius fits the general trend of Platonist philosophers to comment on the core texts of their preferred philosophical viewpoint, Plato and Aristotle. But the prevailing attitude in recent decades has been to subject them to (analytical) philosophical investigations. I have argued that the religious dimension of this commentary activity must not be lost sight of. (2) In addition, in order to explain the comprehensiveness of his exegetical programme – comprehensive regarding both the number of commentaries and the degree of detail included – I have suggested that his didactic drive may be viewed as an attempt to provide a resource for teachers. This notion was put forward as a most plausible working hypothesis, because it takes care of both the comprehensiveness and the didactic aspect of the commentaries.15 To call his commentaries a form of protreptic (end of Chapter 6, p. 195) is just another way of expressing that idea. (3) Finally, as a result the specific question as to whether these works originated in the classroom was answered negatively. Here I have suggested that we need to distinguish between the ways in which exegetical notes can relate to classroom activities. There is clearly no doubt that the many commentaries taken down by students are of a different kind when compared to the Simplician works (their learning, elaborateness, style, authorial voice). In addition, it is also clear (and uncontroversial) that the immense learning and detail in Simplicius’ commentaries, unlike other

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius hypomnêmata, are not self-declared notes from lectures, the so-called student notes apo phônês taken ‘from the voice’ of the teacher as in so many extant commentaries. Yet Simplicius’ explications of Aristotle are so comprehensive in scope and attention for detail that we cannot escape the conclusion that these works were suitable for a teaching environment, especially for teachers. These considerations brought me to think of these works as intended for educational use, but not arising from concrete teaching activity. This would in fact take care of A.C. Lloyd’s concern (1967: 448) that his ‘surviving commentaries } are both more learned and more polemic than would have been suitable for students’ (see also Chapter 1, text to n. 80). This shift in emphasis helps to understand the attention to detail at every level in the commentaries, so much so, that many of his comments have sometimes been labelled trivial. But his tendency to explain ‘every little detail’ also suggests that they were not only a resource for teachers, but also for students; after all, the traditional approach among Platonists had been for a teacher and student to read the works together (sunousia, sunanagnôsis). His commentaries might even be trying to provide a complete course for students, in that they could be used for self-study. In other words, I am suggesting that the Simplician commentaries form a natural textbook of late Platonism, in which the primary text and ‘secondary readings’ are all included in the body of the text. The curriculum prescribed the study of Aristotle before Plato (and the Chaldaean Oracles), and for the study of Aristotle the particular order of study had been established by Porphyry, Iamblichus and Syrianus.16 The idea that his works, in their comprehensive and lavish coverage of centuries of scholarship, are like a library rather neatly reinforces the notion he produced a ‘stand-alone textbook’. The commentator’s craft is admittedly also quite technical and includes philological observations, grammatical detail and refined argumentation. But that should not blind us to the more important global aim such technicalities and minutiae serve: the lavish learning and exegetical variety are the result of the historical process of accumulation and scholarship, driven by sensible motives; they acknowledge the cooperative nature of philosophical discourse and the usefulness of different viewpoints and disagreement – already a component of Aristotle’s own methodology.17 At the same time Platonist exegesis was keen to forge a unity out of this diversity that could stand up to scrutiny. Ultimately the over-arching aim and message will emerge and remain visible, if we are receptive to the specific nature of their thought. With Plotinus, Platonism’s focus became distinctly otherworldly, but without fully rejecting the study of nature. While the physical world is of secondary importance, their analysis of physics is anything but irrelevant. This is because their perspective is religious as well as philosophical: a deeper understanding of, and concomitant respect for, the creation was a form of worshipping God, and an aid

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Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy to achieving their ultimate goal, the ‘return’ to God. Simplicius’ use of prayers at certain points in the books is one indication of this underlying objective. Several other statements underline this attitude of associating the inquiry into nature with reverence for god, for instance when he evaluates Alexander’s comments on Plato, he states: Consequently I, setting out the truth, which is dear to god and to Aristotle, will here try to do a careful investigation, putting forward the things which Alexander says are the opinions of Plato about the motion of the soul } (in DC 377.29-31)18

Thirdly, I have in connection with the foregoing points developed the notion (suggested by others before me) that Simplicius’ emphatic attempt at harmonising the whole of Greek pagan philosophy is mainly motivated by his conviction that he must make a stand against Christianity as the now dominant religious outlook. Not only was Christianity in a way responsible for the ban on pagan teachings in Athens (Justinian’s edicts of 529-31 CE), but in its strident polemic it had seized upon a shrewd tactic, namely to declare its own position superior as a result of its unified vision, whilst scoffing at the Greek philosophers for their never-ending disagreements (already exploited by the Sceptics) among themselves as a clear sign of the inferiority of their views.19 Simplicius was not the first to suggest a harmonising strategy, but he certainly pushed it further than anyone else had. Porphyry and Proclus had already made attempts at unifying Greek philosophy: Since Porphyry (third century AD) the Neoplatonists sought to unify the diversity of Greek thought, and particularly its two leading, but antagonistic, authorities, Plato and Aristotle. This ‘harmonisation’ was not a symptom of feeble thinking. It was the critical evaluation of existing philosophies. In analytical fashion only the ones that were deemed coherent were accepted, the rest were rejected or modified radically.20

Simplicius’ working methods, then, seem a mixture of traditional elements (lemma commentary, philosophical exegesis, philological awareness) and idiosyncratic features (e.g. scholarship in an almost modern sense, richness of sources, awareness of tradition he is working in, comprehensive harmonisation). Yet his use of the existing literature did not make him unconditionally depend on it: his independence of thought shows up in the detail and the effort to reach clarity about the fundamental postulates of Platonic and Aristotelian thought. Although he never chose to challenge major authorities openly and forcefully, he showed in more ways than one that he could compose his own grand synthesis (summa), into which the great pagan choir of voices could be absorbed.

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius 7.4 The methodology of a commentator: a final appraisal A final appraisal of Simplicius’ methodology will most usefully focus narrowly on those features of his commentaries that do not fit wellrehearsed characterisations in generalised descriptions of the tradition: his choice of subject, his use of quotation and his reliability.21 The final paragraph will highlight the purpose these elements served. Commenting on Aristotle fits the Platonist curriculum of considering Aristotle as a suitable introduction to Plato, reading Aristotle first, especially logic (‘the smaller Mysteries’), progressing to physics and psychology, and finally metaphysics (‘Greater Mysteries’). For Simplicius, as for many late Platonists, the relation between religion and philosophy had remained a close one after Iamblichus had introduced new forms of communication with the divine (theurgy). I have suggested that this tactic can best be viewed in connection with the competitive nature of the religious debates in the Empire since Christianity began to gain ground. Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius had cultivated this interest by theological focus, but combined it with metaphysical and mathematical considerations. Such mixed approaches defy categorisation in modern terms: religion and philosophy simply cannot be separated out helpfully in the way later centuries have pretended they could. With regard to the incorporation of source material Simplicius has shown himself to be in control of an incredible range of sources from inside and outside the Neoplatonist tradition. We noted the particular approach in his method of quoting authors, which reveals some awareness of the importance of using someone’s very own words in discussing their view. Phrases such as têi lexei tois rhêmasin (e.g. in Phys. 1325.24) or kata lexin (in DC 213.2, 499.7, 597.13) as a lead-up to quotations abound and indicate that Simplicius is interested in making these distinctions and for a reason. He will variously use paraphrase and quotation, at appropriate moments, as mutually supportive modes about which (in a manner uncommon in the Neoplatonic school) he expresses firm views, first on how to use them, and secondly on what role they can play. It has often been overlooked that his use of Neoplatonic school practices does not imply that he himself was writing for an actual school environment. His programme of comprehensive explication of the text geared towards a particular reconstruction of Greek philosophy as a unified and harmonious tradition is composed of several strategies, including philological moves, interpretative moves, the appeal to authority, and polemical arguments. These are geared towards the immediate aim of clarifying Aristotle, and a more distant aim, external to the text, of celebrating the virtuous life and the divine creation. One way to describe his commentary activity would be to say that his philological engagements with texts stood in the service of his philosophical theology. As to the question of reliability, it is obvious that Simplicius is not

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Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy straightforwardly aiming at level-headed objectivity or impartial reporting.22 He is a man on a mission, and he uses whatever means are available to ‘clarify’ Aristotle in a way that springs from late Platonic thought. This may involve manipulations of text and content which to the modern eye are unacceptable: selective quotation, rephrasing, and even misrepresentation. And it is here that the seeming ‘modernity’ of Simplicius’ method is flawed: in the absence of anything like a formal notion of copyright and a firm agreement in the scholarly community to abide by certain rules (of citing, referring, and acknowledging sources23), he and his peers do not have a very formally worked out method of scholarship (although it goes a long way) and they are also still under the spell of rhetorical tactics where such considerations of fair play hardly come up. In addition, there is a tendency to let beliefs dominate the reading of others, whether this is done consciously or not. In this respect the commentary is again unlike the modern equivalent, since it is more a genuine philosophical discussion than a scholarly line-by-line (philological) elucidation. There is even some evidence that Simplicius regards writing as having therapeutic value in the sense of Plato’s Phaedrus where he describes the leading of the soul through intellectual stages. When all is considered it is fair to say that he came quite close to becoming the ideal commentator he had outlined at the start of his commentary on the Categories. The assessment of Simplicius’ working methods, then, seems to have suffered from the presence of traditional and common elements, which stood in the way of appreciating more idiosyncratic features. This study has attempted to reassess what makes Simplicius’ method special, and it is hoped that this can help to inaugurate a revision of the reputation of Simplicius, who was not merely an antiquarian, nor a kind of ‘modern commentator’, nor even a faceless imitator of his predecessors. Clearly Galileo’s Simplicio is far removed from his supposed historical predecessor. Even if the geocentric world picture has been superseded, Simplicius deserves a better press for his responsible scholarship, source criticism, historical sensibility, and exegetical sophistication. And as we have seen, all these were pressed into service to achieve something that had not been tried before, a summa philosophiae paganae, perhaps to create the last pagan ‘gospel’ against the ever-growing presence, and impending victory, of Christianity.

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Appendix I The ‘Library’ of Simplicius This Appendix aims to provide a very general impression of the books Simplicius may have had at his disposal while writing his commentaries. It lists (primarily philosophical) works and authors as mentioned in his commentaries and is arranged by author. It makes no assessment as to whether Simplicius really had direct access to all of these writings nor what the significance might be of the absence of certain works known to us. It also contains authors for whom no work is mentioned (though titles can sometimes be provided from other sources) and works for which no authors are mentioned (under Anonymous or Auctor Incertus). The sources for these entries were the text of the commentaries, TLG-E, and Diels’ indices to CAG 7-10.

Adrastus On the order of the treatises of Aristotle, in Cat. 16.1, 18.16, in Phys. 4.11, 6.5 Alexander of Aphrodisias Against the Epicurean Zenobius, in Phys. 489.22 Commentary on On the heavens, in Phys. 1219.2 Commentary on Physics, in Phys. 430.3, 530.16 De mixtu, in Phys. 530.15 On the soul, in Phys. 1292.2-3 On the heavens, in Phys. 1292.2-3 Ammonius [no title] ‘that Aristotle considers god the efficient cause’, in Phys. 1363.8 biblion holon Anaxagoras Physics, in Phys. 34.29, 55.26, 163.20 Anaximander [no title] (on cosmology and physics) 6.35, 22.12, etc. Anaximenes [no title] (on cosmology and physics) 22.12 (apeiron), 24.28 (air), etc. Andronicus of Rhodes [no title] (on the text and order of Aristotle’s works), in Phys. 440.14, 450.16, 924.20, 923.9

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Anonymous Chaldaean Oracles, in Phys. 613.4, 614.6, 616.1, 616.35, 617.5 Orphic hymns, in Phys. 641.32, 643.30 Antiphon [no title] (on nature), in Phys. 273.36 [no title] (on the squaring of the circle), in Phys. 54.13ff. (ps.)Archytas On the all, in Cat. 2.15, in Phys. 785.15 On general terms (peri tôn katholou logôn), in Cat. 17.26 Aristophanes Clouds, in Phys. 707.23 Aristotle, works other than commented on (cf. Diels Index IV, CAG 9, 1458-61) History of animals, in DC 3.8; in Phys. 3.8 Metaphysics, in DC 116.29, 134.2 (eta), 269.31, 270.5,18 (lambda), 288.24, 422.17,24, 497.9 (lambda), 505.28 (lambda), 617.7, 665.5; in Phys. 8.30, 12.27 (A.1), 48.3, 148.19, 182,31, 219.29 (eta), 234.2, 241.18 (theta), 257.26, 258.18,23, 269.7, 308.37, 364.30, 365.7, 1271.24, 1361.34 On coming-to-be and passing-away, in Phys. 600.36 On Democritus, in DC 294.33-295.24 On memory and sleep, in DC 3.7 On the good, in Phys. 151.10, 453.28 On the soul, in DC 91.5, 279.17, 380.18, 381.5, 442.10 (B); in Phys. 262.19, 263.6, 268.26, 269.3, 286.4, 523.2, 540.9, 660.28, 924.16, 965.26, 1060.22, 1219.10, 1248.31 On the progression of animals, in DC 3.6-7 On philosophy, in DC 289.2-3 [F16 Ross] On prayer, in DC 485.21 On sense perception and the senses, in DC 454.14, 608.3, 611.29, in Phys. 753.11, 1059.7 Physical problems, in DC 505.24 Physics, passim Posterior Analytics, in DC 59.29 Topics, in Phys. 642.6 Aristoxenus [no title] (on music) in Phys. 815.27, 1023.27, 1213.33 Athenodorus Against Aristotle’s Categories, in Cat. 62.25 Auctor Incertus On indivisible lines, in DC 566.25-26 (ho tines eis Theophraston anapherousin) Chrysippus [no title] ‘the Chrysippean book’, in Cat. 403.6 On privative terms (cf. D.L. 7.190), 396.20

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Appendix I Damascius On number, place and time, in Phys. 774.30 On time, in Phys. 775.34, 800.20 Dexippus Commentary on Categories, in Cat. 21.5 Diogenes of Apollonia Meteorology, in Phys. 151.27 On the nature of man, in Phys. 151.27 Physics, in Phys. 25.7, 151.25 Empedocles Physics, 32.1, 157.25, 300.20, 381.29 Epicurus [no title] (on primary and secondary qualities) in Cat. 216.21, 431.24 Euclid Elements 62.27, 65.19, etc (18 occurrences) Eudemus of Rhodes Astronomical investigation (en tôi deuterôi tês astrologikês historias), in DC 488.20 Geometric investigation, 60.22,31 Physics, 10.3, 12.23, etc. [see ch. 3 nn. 61-2] Eudoxus On speeds, in DC 494.9 Galen On klepsydras, in Phys. 573.19 On demonstration bk. 8, in Phys. 708.28 Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato, in Phys. 325.24 Geminus Epitome of Posidonius’ Meteorology, in Phys. 291.22, 292.30 Hermodorus On Plato, 247.33, 256.32 Hesiod Theogonia, in Phys. 527.17 Iamblichus Commentary on Categories, 60.7, 92.20,22, 786.11, 787.4,10,27 Commentary on Timaeus, 639.24, 702.20, 793.24, 794.22, 795.2 Melissus On nature or On being, in Phys. 70.17, 71.10 Nicolas of Damascus On the gods, in Phys. 23.14, 25.1, 151.20 On the philosophy of Aristotle, in DC 398.36ff. On the universe, in DC 3.29 Parmenides Parmenideion suggramma, in Phys. 144.28 Plato On the good (via Alexander), in Phys. 161.6-19

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius Plotinus Enneads bks 1-6, in Cat. passim (cf. Kalbfleisch 564) [no title] (Enn. 1.1.1.12-13), in Phys. 1072.8-9 [no title] (Enn. 1.1.9.15), in Phys. 1079.12-13 On the universe (Enn. 2.1), in DC 12.12 On potentiality and actuality (Enn. 2.5), in Phys. 398.32-3 On the descent of the soul into bodies (Enn. 2.8), in Phys. [no title] (Enn. 3.7.8), in Phys. 706.26 Plutarch Life of Alexander, in Phys. 8.29 Porphyry Against Gedalius, in Cat. 33.11 Eisagôgê, in Cat. 54.26 etc. Commentary on Categories, in Cat. 2.6 [no title] (commentary on Aristotle’s Physics), 9.11, 11.6, 11.23, etc. Commentary on Plato’s Philebus, in Phys. 453.30-454.19 Commentary on Plato’s Republic, in Phys. 615.35 On matter bk 2, in Phys. 231.6 Synopsis of physics, in Phys. 918.13 Posidonius Meteorology, in Phys. 291.22, 292.30 Proclus Letter to Aristocles, in Phys. 615.13 [no title] (investigation into the objections by Aristotle against the Timaeus), in DC 640.24-6 (for the title and details see Proclus in Tim. II 279.2-17) [no title] (commentary on Plato’s Timaeus), in Phys. 601.15-20 [no title] (commentary on Plato’s Republic), in Phys. 613.1 peri topou [On place], in Phys. 611.11-614.71 Ptolemy On dimensions, in DC 20.11 On the elements, in DC 20.11 Optics, in DC 9.22 Sosigenes [no title] (planetary theories), in DC 492.31-510.36 Strato On before and after (monobiblion), in Cat. 418.26 On time (?) (cf. D.L. 5.59), in Phys. 788.35-790.25, 800.17 Syrianus Commentary on Plato’s Laws, in Phys. 618.28 Themistius Paraphrase [of Aristotle’s On the heavens], in DC 68.8 (bk 4), 176.33, 188.30 Paraphrase [of Aristotle’s Physics], in Phys. 70.32, 1132.26 Paraphrase [of Aristotle’s On the soul], in DA 151.14

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Appendix I Theophrastus Epitome? [Simplicius] In DA, 136.29 Investigation ’, in Phys. 149.32, 115.12 (first bk), 154.15-16 On Anaxagoras, in Phys. 166.17f. On motion, in Phys. 107.12, 413.1,5, 986.5, 964.30 On nature, in Phys. 25.7 On the coming-to-be of the elements, in DC 700.6 On the elements of speech, in Cat. 10.25 On the heaven, in DC 1.8 Physics, in DC 564.24, 435.27-8; in Phys. 9.7, 20.20, 604.5-6, 639.14, 860.19; in DA 286.31 Prior analytics, in DC 554.3 Topics, in Cat. 415.15 Xenarchus Against the fifth substance, in DC 20.12 Xenocrates Life of Plato, in DC 12.22-3; in Phys. 1165.35 Zeno [no title] book (biblion), in Phys. 99.8,18 Note 1. Diels’ app. crit. suggests de primo loco (?), but this title is not extant; peri topou is found in Proclus in Remp. II 199.22-3, the Scholion to in Remp. II 199.6 (in Remp. II 380.30); cf. Urmson 1992: 32 n. 24. I owe these references to Dr Christoph Helmig, Leuven University.

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Appendix II A. New evidence on Alexander Two recent discoveries have brought us exciting new evidence regarding Alexander’s life and work. (1) A recently discovered inscription provides new information on Alexander’s life. Angelos Chianotis first published a three-page preview, ‘Epigraphic Evidence for the Philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias’, BICS 47 (2004) 79-81. The abstract found on the ICS website (accessed 17 October 2004) announces the new find from the city of Aphrodisias in Asia Minor in 2001, which presents some important biographical information on Alexander. The actual article, published in AJA 108.3 (2004) 377-416, pays special attention to the inscription mentioning Alexander on pp. 388-9. Sharples has presented an analysis in BICS 2005. (2) The Archimedes palimpsest, rediscovered in the 1990s and containing a unique text by this brilliant Greek mathematician, very recently also revealed two other unique texts, one from the orator Hyperides, the other from a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Dr Marwan Rashed (CNRS, Paris) and Prof. Robert W. Sharples (University College London) believe that the fragmentary passages most likely belong to the commentary by Alexander, thought lost (RWS email 27 April 2007). We knew of its existence from Simplicius in Cat. 1.16 and Olympiodorus in APr. 12.1, 13.31ff. (Sharples 1987: 1185). Sources: personal communication from R.W. Sharples (email); Sharples 1987, 2005; Chianotis 2001, 2003; BBC Science online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6591221.stm

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217 B. Distribution of Alexander references in in Phys. The graph maps the distribution of Alexander (named occurrences) across the in Phys., thus showing his overall presence as well as the density of references in certain books. See also Chapter 4.

Appendix III Symphônia in Simplicius This appendix lists all occurrences of the term symphônia (source TLG-E) to show how its use serves several claims of ‘harmony’ among philosophers (a few cases have sumphônia in the non-personal sense of agreement, e.g. in reasoning between premises). Note how in two out of three commentaries there is a very early mention of the term, signalling its importance (1 and 17). The emphatic attention to harmony in the discussion of the first principles is clear from the cluster of references at in Phys. 179-204 (see also Chapter 2, pp. 61 and 75). In two cases its opposite, diaphônia, occurs in the vicinity to enhance contrast (8 [same line] and 10 [one line earlier]; cf. 14 [290.25]).1 Commentary on Physics (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7) (8)

20.12: the first occurrence claims that Aristotle sees ‘harmony’ (agreement) on the matter of principles of physics as opposites among earliest natural philosophers. 179.29: reconfirms the agreement on the first principles among almost all natural philosophers, while admitting they may disagree on other things. 182.10: recapitulates the reasoning of Aristotle, referring back to the agreement as based on individual points and introduces another argument in favour of agreement ‘by deductive reasoning’. 188.13,16: continues the argument of 182.10 by repeating the earlier point, but now showing that Aristotle also manages to demonstrate that differences noted by others can be reconciled. 204.27: the final mention in this long episode of the discussion concerning principles (179-206), summarising the argument that has demonstrated agreement from deductive reasoning and from ‘other philosophers’ on the view that there must be ‘three elemental physical principles’. 314.29: technical discussion of genus and species in connection with material cause. ‘Agreement’ here refers to the shared property among all items within a genus. 341.27: states that the ‘harmony of all (things/philosophers?) is confirmed’ in connection with the discussion of fate (tukhê) 404.21: A case of clever word-positioning in Simplicius’ representation of the view of Proclus, who wanted to claim a singular

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Appendix III disagreement between Plato and Aristotle on change. His phrasing, which juxtaposes sumphônia and diaphônia, aims to ‘demonstrate agreement in the apparent disagreement if at all possible’. (9) 617.27: [different usage] Proclus has shown ‘agreement of such an hypothesis with the postulates about place’.2 (10) 1121.1: harmony claimed by Aristotle between all natural philosophers regarding the existence of motion (251b15f.) on the basis of the disagreement (diaphônia) regarding the eternal motion as those who claim many worlds say as opposed to those who claim one world and may allow for the absence of motion. (11) 1166.11: after giving Aristotle’s comment that the natural philosophers have not strayed in everything from the truth (apoplanêthentas apo tês alêtheias) he is said ‘to agree now and in other cases with the other philosophers’ according to himself. (12) 1363.31: in a summary of the whole Physics Simplicius here reiterates the claim that Aristotle proves from ‘the practically unanimous agreement of the natural philosophers that motion always exists and neither has been generated without existing before nor will perish’ (tr. McKirahan). Commentary on On the heavens (13) 143.16: a rhetorical question with regard to the eternity of the world and on Plato and Aristotle as not in harmony (diaphônein) but can be shown to agree (tên heautôn sumphônian) (not in Hankinson 2004 or Wildberg 1987a). (14) 287.5: discusses Plato’s reason ‘for there being one world, the one which Aristotle welcomes, was that it was composed of all the natural body there is’ (3-5). Simplicius next wants to show ‘the harmony between Aristotle and his teacher in these matters, which extends even as far as terminology’, and to do so he ‘will set these words down for comparison’ (5-7), with a quotation from Tim. 32C-33A (tr. Hankinson). (15) 297.3: introduction to one of the very long quotations from Alexander, who ‘does not understand Plato’s doctrines as Aristotle understood them, nor does he accept that their views are in agreement’ (tr. Hankinson). Simplicius claims that Alexander has treated Plato unfairly and goes on to quote 40 lines from Alexander after which he tries to refute him. (On the Alexander quotation see above, §4.4). (16) 466.13, 15: concerns the Pythagorean view that the stars make sounds (refuted by Aristotle) and create (musical) ‘harmonies’. Commentary on the Categories (17) 2.21: introductory section mapping out the ‘many speculations on Aristotle’s book’ (1.1) and claiming in this passage that ‘Iamblichus

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Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius had adduced the considerations of Archytas } and demonstrated their accord with the doctrines of Aristotle’. The work Iamblichus believed to be by Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher and mathematician from the fourth century BCE, was entitled Concerning the ten categories and has been shown to be spurious, probably dating to after Andronicus (first century BCE). It contained an attempt to appropriate the Aristotelian categories as an invention of Pythagoras and Archytas. (18) 7.31: part of the famous passage on the ideal exegete (see §1.2.1) in which Simplicius states that ‘the good exegete must not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter (lexis) of what Aristotle says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (nous) and track down the harmony which reigns between them on the majority of points’. A fine expression of a principle of charity that will allow Simplicius to counter narrow literalism and maximise the harmony between Aristotle and Plato. (19) 243.32: discusses a challenge by some to Aristotle on ‘the order of the species of Quality’ (243.29, tr. Fleet 2002). Simplicius counters the challenge by pointing to Aristotle’s self-consistency (agreement with himself, pros heauton sumphônian) with reference to Phys. 265a22. Notes 1. The term diaphônia occurs only 12 times in the commentaries, but the contrast is clearer here than in these passages. See in DC 159.8, 202.20, 290.25, 555.32, 603.11, 640.28; in Phys. 36.20, 36.25, 404.21, 821.21, 1121.2, 1145.6. 2. For Proclus see in DC 7.37, 640.23, 643.13, 645.15, 648.1,19, 649.28, 650.5, 656.6, 658.24, 660.4, 663.3, 663.27, 665.16, 666.9, 667.22, 668.20; in Phys. 601.15, 611.11, 614.8, 643.18, 643.37, 795.4.

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Notes Preface 1. In particular on the internet, as the recent book by Steven Johnson on popular culture brought home to me. About the internet he writes (2006: 274): ‘The meta-commentary sites have endowed these armchair experts with venues where their expertise can flourish in public.’ Cf. McCarty 2002. Introduction 1. But not the end of Platonist teaching full stop, for in Alexandria there was continuing activity at least up to the 560s, see e.g. Westerink 1990, Wildberg 1999. 2. A similar statement in Chase 2003: 1-2. But this view has been a growing consensus for some years now, cf. Hadot 1987a, Tarán 1987 (who mentions two of the four points, 246-7), De Haas 2001b, Baltussen 2002b. 3. See Baltussen 2002c (orality), Lameer 1997, Gutas 1998 (both on the transmission of Greek philosophy into Arabic; relevant for Simplicius’ whereabouts), De Haas 2001a, Hankinson 2002, Lane Fox 2005. For a more general account of Platonism(s) in Islamic philosophy, see D’Ancona 2007, Walker 1994 with further literature. 4. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series (ACA), published by Duckworth, London, including introductions and notes. 5. Dodds 1928 already reviewed the reasons for neglect of the Neoplatonists, as they became known. Cf. Gersh (1978: 10): ‘so it is understandable but not commendable that Damascius and Simplicius are often passed over by historians of philosophy as though they were of very little significance’, and quoting the example of the Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (1967) in which Damascius (not Simplicius!) is dismissed as having added ‘nothing of particular interest’ (op. cit. n. 23). Cf. Walker 2002: 57 with n. 68. 6. Bossier et al. 2004. But the first Latin translation has been traced to Grosseteste (Bossier 1987: 289). 7. E.g. on the Categories, Hadot 1987b: 36; Chase 2003: 3 with n. 17. See also pp. 13-14. In conversation Christian Wildberg has made the valuable point that it must be significant for the reception of his works that Simplicius was known to the Arabs and Byzantine scholars, while he is altogether absent from the Syrian sources. 8. See now Abu al-Abbas an-Nayrizis Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?)Simplicius Kommentar zu den Definitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I (ed. Rüdiger Arnzen, Köln 2002). 9. See e.g. Golitsis 2007, Saffrey 1992: 49-50, Wallis 1971: 170-2, Allen 1984, Kristeller 1943. 10. The requirement emerging from his negotiations with the Pope leading up to the publication was that he should end with this point (Finocchiaro 1997: 41-3). In addition, by publishing his Dialogo he went against the injunction stated in Cardinal Bellarmine’s report of the 1615-16 Inquisition proceedings that he should

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Notes to pages 3-10 abandon his ‘geokinetic thesis’ and not discuss it ‘either orally or in writing’ (ibid., 43). 11. The list of books from his personal library (Favaro 1886: 241ff.) has no mention of Simplicius’ works, only of Ammonius Hermeias (no. 45, commentary in the De interpretatione), Aristotle (nos 46-9), Bonanici De motu and Averroes (no. 51) and Plato (no. 77). But as he is the proponent of the Aristotelian geocentric system it is an obvious inference. 12. Finocchiaro 1989: 291; cf. id. 1997: 46. 13. Brucker 1742 bd. II: 217 ‘secta Platonica reformata’ and ‘eclectica’ (after Hager 1983: 98n.). 14. See further Hager 1983 on the origin and meaning of the term. 15. Cf. Walker 2002: 57. 16. E.g. Cherniss 1934, id. 1944, O’Brien 1969 (see Chapter 2), Laks 1981, Osborne 1987a, Mansfeld 1986, 1990b, 1996 etc. 17. Dodds 1928: 129-31. 18. Hankinson 2002a: 9. 19. Here we touch on a problem which relates to the historical context, or to be more precise, the immediate environment in which these works were created. There is as yet no definitive answer from external evidence to this problem, so that it is my hope that the internal analysis may assist us in getting closer to a solution (see §1.3 and Chapter 7). 20. ‘Simplicio’, see §0.3. 21. Derived from Neuplatonismus (Hager 1983) and probably coined by Thomas Taylor, who was the first to translate Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus into English (1758-1835). 22. Gerson 1996: 1. Cf. Vallance (1999: 223) who highlights that Galen’s and Proclus’ commentaries were unusually independent in thought, labelling them ‘non-submissive’, that is, ‘a model of commentary } in which the commented text is forced into second place’. 23. See Sorabji 1987; id., 1990. This seemingly radical shift had to overcome ingrained views on the importance of the ‘classical’ period. Renewed interest in Hellenistic philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s helped to break the dominant fascination with the classical period (at the exclusion of all others) in modern classical scholarship. We should not forget that it was only in the twentieth century that English literature became a subject of academic study at Cambridge. 24. It is significant that the first volume of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca sponsored by the Berlin ‘Akademie der Wissenschaften’ is Simplicius’ Physics commentary (vol. 9, Berlin 1882; the second volume, no. 10, appeared thirteen years later, Berlin 1895). For a severe critique of his edition see Tarán 1987, who points to many flaws and is preparing a new text for in Phys. The role of the Presocratics in the commentaries will be discussed in Chapter 2. Cf. Most 1999b. 25. Christian Brandis had given Diels his notes from autopsy of the manuscripts (DG 114-18, cf. 104 n. 1, 109 n. 2). The scholarly world is awaiting the new edition of the Physics commentary announced by L. Táran (previous note, cf. his review of Moraux 1973 in Gnomon 1981). 26. Esp. I. Hadot 1978, 1983, 1987a, 2001, 2002; Hoffmann 1987b, 2000. 27. See Baltussen forthcoming-1. 28. For some important exceptions see Kahn 1961, O’Brien 1969, Sider 2005 (1981) and Chapter 2. 29. See e.g. Mansfeld 1990, Karamanolis 2006: 252 (n. 39) and next note.

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Notes to pages 10-13 30. See Mansfeld 1989, 1990 for the role of such lists in the wider philosophical transmission of doxai. Further comments in Chapter 1 (esp. n. 75), Chapter 2 (esp. n. 12) and §6.2. 31. See Gerson 2005a. 32. Dodds 1970 (1965): 129. Endorsed by Gatti 1996. 33. See e.g. Mansfeld 1994; Sluiter 1990, 1999, 2000. 34. Wildberg 1999: 115. 35. As Lang 2005: 156 points out, Plotinus speaks of ‘respect’ for the cosmos (eusebês, Enn. 3.2.7.42-3), Proclus of ‘showing respect’ (eusebein, Eternity of the world 144.12, 146.8). Drawing on these passages she adds: ‘if one pays respect to god, then one must do the same for the cosmos; conversely, to dishonor the cosmos is to dishonor god.’ 36. On the idea of corruption see O’Meara 1989: 102; on Pythagoras as the source of later ideas in Plato and Aristotle ibid., 104. Earlier interest in Pythagoras occurred in the first century CE. 37. More on Iamblichus in Chapter 5. The position on ‘ancient wisdom’ as a core component is already present in Plutarch (c. 100 CE), see Boys-Stones 2001. 38. Praechter 1927: 205.54-64; cf. Chapter 1 n. 27. 39. See now Sorabji 2004. 40. Wildberg 1987; id. 1990: 124; cf. Sorabj 1987. 41. Cf. Dillon 1987: 878 on Iamblichus vis-à-vis Plotinus: ‘a sequence of scholastic elaborations arose by a sort of natural process’. 42. See in Cat. 7.23-32, discussed in §1.2.1. Cf. Sedley 1997. 43. Similar assessment in Tarán 1987: 246-7, who calls the commentary on the Physics ‘the best extant ancient commentary and its intrinsic high quality makes it the best commentary on the Physics even today’. 44. A vexed question reopened in Lane Fox 2005b (cf. the comments on his paper in Classical Review 2006-1), Watts 2004, 2005, Walker 2006. See §1.3. 45. The link between continuity and institutional presence is explored by Watts (2005: 288), who goes on to argue (to my mind persuasively) that for the late Platonists after Proclus continuity seems dependent on a teacher, not a location. See also §§1.2-3. 46. See Lane Fox 2005b: 231-5 and Watts 2005: 286. Walker 2006: 183 has ‘ca. 532’. 47. See e.g. Praechter 1927: 204; Sorabji 1990: 18; Hadot 1990b: 278ff. 48. Cf. e.g. Lautner 1997: 4. 49. Hadot 1987a: 225-45; this is, however, rejected by Rashed 2004. 50. For Eudemus see Wehrli 1969 and Fortenbaugh and Bodnár 2002. For Eudoxus see Gregory 2003a. 51. I am grateful to Dr Peter Adamson (King’s College London) and esp. Dr Emma Gannagé (St. Joseph University, Beyruth) for their help with the Arabic materials discussed in this section. 52. According to L.E. Goodman, Encyclopaedia of Islam VIII, 474-7, he was ‘known in the West as Rhazes, al-Razi (864-930 CE) and the most authoritative physician of medieval times before Ibn Sina (Avicenna). His al-Hawi (Comprehensive book) represents his notebooks in 25 volumes and is probably the most extensive work ever written by a physician. It includes Greek, Syrian, and early Arabic medical knowledge in their entirety. It was translated into Latin under the auspices of Charles I of Anjou by the Sicilian Jewish physician, Faraj ibn Salim (Farragut) in 1279 and was repeatedly printed from 1488 onwards. Al-Hawi was known as Continens in its Latin translation.’

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Notes to pages 13-25 53. Ullmann lists it under Peri agmôn (1970: 31, no. 12). The Hippocratic work is also known in Arabic as Kitab al-Jabr (‘On Setting [Bones]’). 54. ‘Kommentar eines sonst unbekannten Simplikios’ (1970: 31). Cf. Badawi 1968: 111. 55. I am here thinking of, for example, Theophrastus, Eudemus of Rhodes, the Presocratics, and others. The evidence for distortion of later material has already been described by Rashed (1997) on the basis of marginal glosses which present us with precious materials from Alexander’s lost commentary, and which reveal some discrepancies (or manipulation?) between Simplicius’ citations of the same material. See further Chapter 1 n. 60, Chapter 4 and also De Haas 2001a. 1. The Scholar and his Books 1. First emphasised by Dodds 1923 (see quotation §0.1); more emphatically put forward by Hoffmann 1987a (reiterated 2006: 599), endorsed by Wildberg 1990: 117; cf. Sorabji 1990: 5-15. 2. Plato is considered the ‘expounder of truth’ (in DC 131.1). 3. The hypothetical nature of the sketch presented here will be subject to continuous evaluation in the process. In addition, it will provide the reader with a framework, which can help build up a certain expectation of how Simplicius proceeds. 4. Clearly noted in Táran 1987: 247 and n. 2. Exceptions to some extent are O’Brien 1969; Sider 1981; Perry 1983. 5. While it was clear to me that the commentaries are didactic, their size and complexity seem to militate against seeing them as targeting only students. When I put this question to the audience at a seminar in Toronto (5 December 2006), the idea of a focus on teachers was tentatively mooted by Danny Goldstick. I am grateful for his suggestion, which I have adopted as a most plausible working hypothesis, because it does take care of both the comprehensiveness and the didactic aspect of the commentaries – as I intend to illustrate in subsequent chapters. 6. On methods of scholarship see e.g. Blumenthal 1996: ch. 3; Sluiter 1999 passim. 7. One of his favourite terms is mêpote ‘perhaps’, when formulating an alternative view. See §§4.1 and 5.2. 8. See Sandys I,105-64; Pfeiffer 1968: chs III-VI; on late antiquity see Slater 1982, Lamberz 1987, Mansfeld 1994, Sluiter 1999, D’Ancona 2002, Fazzo 2004, Hoffmann 2006. 9. See Grafton and Williams 2006 on Origen (Chapter 2) and Eusebius (Chapter 3); Von Staden (forthcoming) on the Hellenistic medical commentaries, and Chapter 5. 10. I will here summarise and at times rephrase Baltussen 2007a, which forms the blueprint for a future book on the history of ancient philosophical commentary. 11. Richardson 1975: 66-7. 12. Some detect the signs of transition already among the Presocratics (e.g. Havelock 1982; Robb 1983). For important critical notes on the Presocratic role in the growth of literacy, see Ferrari 1984. 13. I lack the space and expertise to cover Judaeo-Christian biblical as well as later Arabic commentary activities here (for some comments see Chapter 6), but plan to return to the subject in the framework of another book on the history and development of the ancient philosophical commentary (see above, n. 10).

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Notes to pages 26-29 14. Sorabji 1990: 5-10. This section is based on Baltussen 2007a, part 4.1. 15. Hadot 1987a; cf. Chase 2003: 93 who notes precedents in Alexander and Porphyry. I have argued elsewhere (Baltussen 2004) that the notion of a skopos is already to be found in Plato Protagoras 341E1-2, where the interpretation of a poem by Socrates includes two hermeneutical principles in embryonic form, (i) the importance of consistency (what became known in later times as the ‘Homer from Homer’ principle; for which see Schäublin 1977), and (ii) the assumption that one can attribute an overall purpose to a poem rather than simply interpreting single words, phrases or passages. Cf. Mansfeld 1994, Sluiter 2000, and below, Chapter 4 n. 20 and text thereto. 16. This technical term for the reading of a text with a master in e.g. Elias On Aristotle’s Categories 107.24-6; cf. Sorabji 1990: 5 n. 28, Mansfeld 1994: Chapter 1. 17. See e.g. Müller 1969, Moraux 1974, Mansfeld 1994. 18. E.g. Hadot 1987, Mansfeld 1994, Blumenthal 1996, Barnes 1997, Post 1998, Hadot 2002b: 167-76. 19. The use of this tree model is of course not new. It is standard in manuscript studies, but also in other contexts (see especially J. Mansfeld 1998). Its value for the analysis of the relationships between authors or works is limited and mainly meant to give a convenient graphic representation of chronology and the interrelations (in the first instance based on content resemblance). 20. Gerson 2005a: 270. He also rightly emphasises that ‘to be in harmony } must be sharply distinguished from the view, held by no one in antiquity, that the philosophy of Aristotle was identical with the philosophy of Plato’ (271). 21. See Chapters 5-6. 22. E.g. in Phys. 13336.35ff. See Sorabji (1990: 5): ‘Syrianus had Proclus study Aristotle as the “Lesser Mysteries” serving to introduce the “Greater Mysteries” of Plato.’ Cf. Simplicius in Cat. 7.23-32 where he claims the task of a commentator is to show the general agreement between the two philosophers (discussed §1.2.1). The Academy had come a long way since Antiochus (c. 130 BCE) advocated this direction, see Dillon 1996: 57-8, Gerson 2005b: 3-10, and §5.2. 23. On the school practice see Dillon 2005. All texts referred to and translated are in the standard edition of Aristotelian commentators, the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG, 1882-1907) published by the Berlin Academy under the direction of Hermann Diels. 24. See Appendix I. 25. A slightly longer list of authors in Simplicius in Tarán 1987: 247. 26. See p. 158. 27. RE III A.1 (1927) 205.54-64 s.v. ‘Simplikios (10)’. This view is usually repeated without change, see e.g. Hadot 1987a, introduction, Blumenthal 1987: 95 n. 18. See also next note. 28. Sluiter 1999 maintains that the existence of commentary always means there was teaching activity. I agree, but for our purposes it will be helpful to specify in each case whether the work has traces of actual teaching context or whether (as I believe may hold for Simplicius) the motivation to write is more a matter of habit and with a view to possible teaching activity. I shall return to this question in §1.2.3 and §7.2. 29. As had happened in the recent past, e.g. in the case of Marinus, who received the advice from Proclus that the new commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics was unnecessary; he burnt it. O’Meara (1989: 120) points out that Syrianus considered his complementary to Alexander’s: he pays particular attention to the anti-Platonic books, with an emphasis on theology and metaphysics of Pythagoras/Plato.

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Notes to pages 29-34 30. E.g. Porphyry published Plotinus’ lectures, Proclus those of Syrianus, Philoponus those of Ammonius. The seminal article on apo phônês lectures is M. Richard 1950. The expectation in late antiquity that students would publish the thoughts of their teachers seems present in Eunapius’ comments on Alupius (Lives of philosophers and sophists 460). 31. See Baltussen 2007a. 32. Itaque quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est. 33. E.g. Marrou 1982: 160-9. 34. When referring to an ‘exegete’ no doubt in this context Simplicius understood this to mean ‘a Platonist exegete writing on Aristotle with the particular aim of clarifying his thought as minor mysteries in preparation of the Greater Mysteries of Plato’. 35. See e.g. Rep. V, Tht. 144A, Aristotle EN 6.1, 6.8, 6.12-13. Cf. Anon. in Tht. cols IV-V, IX-XI. 36. The latter holds, as Richard Sorabji kindly reminded me, of Proclus being taught by Syrianus (cf. previous note) at the latter’s house, see Marinus V.Procl. chs 12-13. 37. On acroamatic, hypomnematic writings see I. Hadot and Ph. Hoffmann 1990: 22, 65, 67-75. The two cannot be kept separate in every case, because the lecture notes could be reworked into a commentary, see Lamberz 1987: 1-20 and the Oxford Classical Dictionary 3rd edn 1996 s.v. ‘scholion’. Simplicius refers to his own work occasionally as scholia, see below, n. 45. 38. See Blumenthal (1981: 213): ‘The later Neoplatonists are, to varying extents, prone to reproduce material from their predecessors, without acknowledging its provenance.’ 39. Two qualifications are necessary here: (1) we cannot infer that ‘direct’ implies ‘accurate’. In addition, Simplicius and Alexander report that they had access to different manuscripts with different versions of the text, and on many occasions they discuss the merits of the variant readings. We should not forget that Simplicius would not have at his disposal the modern editorial techniques to separate out quotation from the main narrative (either in his sources or in his own work), although Christian Wildberg has made an interesting case for the early use of quotation marks (see below, n. 78). (2) There are of course many problems in separating out quotation from context in the case of prose writers, see e.g. De Haas 1998: 171-89. 40. For the early Platonist exegetical tradition I am indebted to Blumenthal 1996, Dillon 1996, Sedley 1997, and to Karamanolis 2006 on the appropriation of Aristotle in the Middle Platonic tradition from Antiochus (c. 100 BCE) to Porphyry (c. 300 CE). For the question of harmonisation among late Platonists see Gerson 2005a,b, and §5.3. For Aristotelians I rely on M. Frede 1999b and Sharples forthcoming-1, -2 (see also Chapter 3). 41. The contrast between letter and spirit is of course famously that of Paul in his letter to the Corinthians (see now F.L. Jong 2004). Its history is outlined in Grant 1957. Presumably Simplicius became familiar with it during his Alexandrian training – see §0.2 and §1.1. 42. Aristotle is a famous example. The frequency with which this happens has often puzzled modern scholars; Quandt 1983 offers a plausible interpretation, showing how Aristotle may be advocating principles in one work which he applies in another. 43. For skopos in the Physics commentary see 8.32, 83.29, 220.14, 221.6, 302.23, 303.30, 310.35, 314.16, 317.33, 318.23, 357.13, 367.25, 372.26, 578.20, 867.22,

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Notes to pages 34-40 907.19, 914.13, 1022.14, 1024.18, 1117.14, 1135.34, 1146.19, 1182, 30, 1241.31, 1327,12,23, 1329.13 (from TLG-E). See also Luna 2001a: Introduction, who reveals an interesting divergence in the arrangement of topoi for both Simplicius and Philoponus when compared to other commentators. 44. Simplicius expresses surprise over this (thaumazô } pôs en têi sunopsei tou pemptôi toutou bibliou), but it is unclear to me that his comment ‘Porphyry } although he wisely reports on the division of the eight books, namely that all call the five Physics, the three On motion, himself still says that the four books from the fifth to the eighth coming after constitute the treatise on motion and is entitled idiosyncratically On motion’ really means that it was Porphyry’s idea to give this title to that section of the manuscript. See also McKirahan 2000: n. 558 ad loc. 45. I note that he ends by referring to his comments as ‘skholai to Aristotle’s second book of Physics’ (393.12-13), not hupomnêmata. See also below, n. 53 and text thereto. 46. The issue of the authenticity of Physics 7 is also discussed in modern scholarship: see Manuwald 1971, Wardy 1990. 47. Presumably the emphasis on the numbering for books 6-8 is connected to the division discussed earlier (5-3 or 4-4), and makes sense if we still want to see the physics as one coherent treatise (pragmateia, 1117.2). 48. Noted by Gerson 2005b: 112. 49. Other examples: in DC 20.15 (other book of the same work), 41.17, 116.28, 122.10, 199.31, 200.18 (all refer to Phys. 8), 111.30 (refers to Cat.), 121.20, 129.30, 199.3 (all refer to Phys. 1), 271.7 (refers to Metaph.). 50. On Xenarchus see Hankinson 2002-3. 51. Lamberz 1987: 7-11. Cf. Bossier 1992. 52. It is the end of book 2. He uses the term also for Porphyry (in DC 503.34, in Cat 2.12, 435.24). Cf. next note. 53. Cognate forms are skholikos (in Cat. 3.15), skholazô (in Phys. 25.2, 51.11 of Presocratics), skholê (in Cat. 65.7, in Phys. 271.27). Lamberz 1987: 5 (with n. 18) notes that since Galen skholion is attested in the sense of ‘explanatory note to a passage’. 54. Cf. Moraux 1969: 494-5 and n. 55. See Pfeiffer 1970: 124-90; 213-85. 56. On the question which of these may originate with Alexander of Aphrodisias, see Chapter 4. 57. A famous example is the recently edited Empedocles papyrus (P. Strasb. gr. inv. 1665-1666) which was recycled to support a funerary crown (see Martin and Primavesi 1999, and §2.2). 58. Philosophical: Epicureans read and re-read their master‘s foundational texts and dealt with textual difficulties, as is clear from, e.g., the discussion of cruces in P. Herc. 1012 (Sedley 1998: 78); literary: the Alexandrian scholars Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus in their Homer exegesis (Sandys 1903: ch. VIII, 125-35); medical: von Staden’s pioneering work on conjectures for editions (ekdosis), commentaries, and glossaries mentions commentators from the Hellenistic period such as Zeuxis the Empiricist, Bacchius of Tanagra, Andreas of Carystus and Xenocritus of Cos (paper presented at Columbia University, New York, 8 December 2006). 59. Gottschalk 1990: 59 with n. 21. For the early scholarship on Plato we have the Anonymous Commentary on Theaetetus (see § 5.1) and the important evidence in D.L. 3.65-7.

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Notes to pages 40-45 60. Gottschalk notes (1990: 59 nn. 20-1): ‘we know hardly anything of his treatment or the internal arrangement of his work } [with reference to Düring and Moraux]. We can still see, however, that he employed the techniques of Alexandrian scholarship. His catalogues included incipits and information about length, in lines, of the works he listed, and letters and personal writings were listed at the end. No doubt he compared different manuscripts, although positive evidence is rare.’ Simplicius also mentions an apocryphal letter of Eudemus to Theophrastus on a textual problem (in Phys. 923.10-16). 61. Gottschalk (above, n. 59) in his n. 21 points out that Dexippus’ discussion of Cat. 1a1 at in Cat. 21.18ff. should not be read as his own contribution, but as Porphyry’s on comparing manuscripts, as can be seen from Simplicius’ commentary ad loc. Similarly, the variant at Phys. 202a14 in Simplicius in Phys. 404.14 presented as from Andronicus ‘may be due to conjecture or carelessness’. He also notes that those mentioned in Brandis (1833: 273) are not on textual criticism. 62. Urmson 2000: n. 177 points to parallels at in Cat. 88.25-7; 228.1-3. 63. TLG-E search (online) produces only two further results: Basilica, Scholia in Basilicorum I-IX (9-13 CE) and Constantinus VII Porphyrogenitus (10 CE). 64. On asapheia see esp. Mansfeld 1994: 16, 25-6. Cf. Whittaker 1971 and in Phys. 734.12, 936.22, 1017.20, 1054.29, 1056.15, 1078.5-6, 1086.22, 1093.13,22,27 etc. 65. See e.g. in Phys. 428.17-18: he fails to understand Alexander’s position; 429.25-430.3: Alexander deemed confused (cf. 332.20); 448.21 Alexander comments on a phrase. 66. Chase 2003: 12 n. 48. 67. Mansfeld 1994 with earlier literature. 68. On concerns over authenticity see Sorabji 2004,3 [2.d]; Mansfeld 1994: 14-15, 37, 40; Moraux 1974: 265-88; Müller 1969: 120-6. 69. This section is a revised version of part of Baltussen 2002b. 70. Edition of I. Hadot, 1996. 71. I am grateful to Frans de Haas for discussion of these passages, which helped to improve my wording, though he may not fully agree with my interpretation. 72. It is perhaps a moot point whether Simplicius intends to distinguish between literary modes rather than individual styles, which happen to be either in verse or prose, but the internal opposition with regards to Melissus between ‘archaic, yet not unclear’ implies that he does at least differentiate between clarity of style and thought. 73. For the polemical strategy of Simplicius against Philoponus, see §6.2. 74. In the case of Parmenides there is a problem as to the transmitted version of some of his verse lines: see §2.2.1 with Whittaker 1971. 75. On the relative decline of education and literacy in late antiquity see Harris 1989: ch. 8. 76. Cf. Perry 1983: 128, 264-5, 267. Recently Sedley has noted a similar approach in the anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus (first century BCE or CE). He concludes (1997: 129): ‘He wants to vindicate Plato’s authority } It is done by devoting the closest possible attention, page by page, to the ipsissima verba of Plato’s text.’ 77. He mentions anagraphais historikais (in Phys. 28.33-4). See below, Chapter 2 n. 12 and Chapter 6. 78. A possible exception is Themistius, in DA 107.30 Heinze; compare for instance the famous Empedocles passages from his poem (31B17 DK) which is

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Notes to pages 45-49 introduced with the same verb (in Phys. 161.14); see also Wildberg 1993: 187-99, esp. 193-4 with notes; at 193 n. 20 Wildberg translates ‘ganz genau zitieren’ (which is not the same as verbatim) and points out the very interesting implication that Simplicius does not distinguish between the basic meaning of para-tithesthai/para-graphein, ‘mark a text on the side with signs’ (in the margin) and ‘quote, cite’, so that it is possible that Simplicius himself marked citations (adducing in Cat. 64.20-5). For more examples see Baltussen 2002b, 2006a. 79. See e.g. Barnes 1991: 6. 80. Wallis 1971: 138-9. Cf. Lloyd 1967, 448: ‘His surviving commentaries } are both more learned and more polemic than would have been suitable for students.’ 81. Questioned by Usener 1994: 164 n. 39 (I owe this reference to R. Sharples). Schenkeveld 1992 gives a thorough overview of Greek prose texts up to the fourth century CE. Earlier but less extensive analyses in Schroeder and Todd (1990: 25-9) with reference to previous comments on the issue (I owe this reference to R. Sorabji). More recent contributions have tried to narrow down further the meaning of the verb in certain occurrences, casting doubt on whether akouein can mean ‘read’, but as Sharples and Opsomer (2000: 254 and n.) admit, cases of akouein legontos as a rule refer to views taken from texts. 82. One proviso regarding the ‘original words’ always holds: accuracy is a moot point here. We should think of ‘original words’ as the words Simplicius thought to be the original words, or as he presented them as the original words. That he was capable of misrepresenting views has been shown in recent publications (Rashed 1997). 83. A full dossier would be too long: see e.g. in Phys. 363.15-6, 644.25-6 (in the excursus on ‘place’); in DC 454.24,29-30, 168.15-18; 169.2-3. 84. For an interesting interpretation of this aspect of Plato’s position see Th. Szlezák 1999: chs 12-16, whom I follow in the main points. 85. MacKenzie 1982: 65. 86. I use the edition of P. Couvreur 1901. A similar omission is in the discussion of this work in Simplicius, who only refers to part of the passage in passing, see in DC 25.34-6 with Hoffmann 1987b: 66-7. 87. Sorabji 2004,3: 2.b(ii), p. 51. 88. Essential reading on this topic is Richard 1950. 89. Not to be confused with his namesake Ammonius, son of Hermeias, who wrote a number of monobibloi and some commentaries, and of whom we have apo phônês writings by Philoponus with some additional comments by the latter (see Westerink, 1990: 326-7). 90. At Phaedrus 275A writing is labelled a ‘cure for memory’, hypomnêseôs pharmakon. Presumably Plato is implying that writing might replace (the power of) memory, taking this as a negative development. One wonders whether his works could have the additional function of self-advertisement, as Tarrant has suggested for the works of the earlier Greek thinkers (1996: 135). Tarrant’s punchline is particularly interesting: ‘One’s oral teaching was what one wanted the reader to hear, one’s written teaching little more than a provocative preview.’ 91. See Harris 1989: 294-5. 92. Gregory 1995: 548. 93. See Cameron 1969: 7. 94. Chosroes came to power on 18 August 531 (Cameron 1969-70: 110). Cf. Cameron 1981, Foulkes 1978. Walker 2002: 59-60 is inclined to take Kushrow’s interest in philosophy seriously on the basis of sources other than Agathias. Watts 2006: 128-38 interprets the first edict (Codex Just. 1.11.9) as a ban on all activities

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Notes to pages 49-53 to do with divination suggested by Malalas’ listing of philosophy, astronomy and casting of dice (131-2), and the second (ibid. 1.11.10) as a clear ban on pagan activities (138f.). Cf. Cameron 1969: 10. 95. See Tardieu 1987, 1989; accepted by Hadot 1987a. 96. See Walker 2006: 183-4. 97. Agathias Histories 2.28.1 Keydell. Walker 2006: 184 warns that Agathias’ ‘cultural chauvinism’ is unjustified and not to be followed (cf. Cameron 1970: 114-17; id. 1969-70: 176 on Procopius who ‘shared the hostility’ towards the Persian king); the short stay of the Platonists is not an indication of ‘the superficiality of Sasanian philhellenism’ (n. 73 with additional literature). Grignaschi 1966: 16-45 provides independent evidence for Kushro’s interests on the basis of his autobiographical account, in which, however, there is precious little about the visit of the Greek philosophers. (I owe this reference to Prof. Jairus Banaji, Jawaharlal University, New Dehli.) 98. The story has been told and retold and from different perspectives. See Chase 2003: 2-3 with further literature on Simplicius; Combès in his introduction to Damascius On principles (1986: xviii-xxvi). Definitive blows to the Harran stay in Luna 2001c, summarised and extended with Arabic materials by Watts 2005: 290-8. 99. Tardieu 1987, 1990. 100. Lane Fox’s critique (2005b: 231-44) is particularly devastating, as it refutes the thesis of the Harran school point by point. Lameer 1997 and Gutas 1998 have usefully evaluated the Arabic evidence, which also produces a negative conclusion. See also Walker 2002: 57-60 with lavish sources. 101. It is the so-called ‘Eternal Peace treaty’ (Agathias 2.31.3-4), revoked in 540 CE (Procopius Wars 2.3-4). 102. Hallström 1994: 144-7. 103. Watts 2005: 299-300 with notes. 104. Watts 2005: 302-3. 105. What follows is in part based on Watts 2005: 305ff. 106. Cameron 1969; Sider 2006; cf. Blumenthal 1996. Doubtful, Hankinson 2003: 12. 107. The use of microscript is suggested by Hoffmann 2006: 616. 108. All this, by the way, is still based on the Hadot chronology of his works; Watts (2005: 286) considers Cameron’s view that the in Epict. might be from 529-31, given the views on how philosophers are being maltreated (on the historical connection cf. O’Meara 2004: 89-90, 94ff.). 109. Hankinson (2002a: 12 n. 3): ‘cut off from an organized school and from formal teaching may without hyperbole be described as a form of exile’. For Simplicius’ ideas on the role of philosophers in the city see O’Meara 2004. 110. This section builds on and expands my previous discussions of Simplicius’ method (Baltussen 2002c, id. 2003) and has in addition benefited in particular from the valuable insights of Hoffmann 1987a, 1987b, 2000, 2006, De Haas 2001a, Chase 2003. I note that Rappe in her book Reading Neoplatonism (2000), although she contributes much to our understanding of exegetical strategies in Neoplatonism, hardly ever mentions Simplicius (see her Index s.v.). 111. For a qualifier that his use of Neoplatonic school practice does not imply he himself was in fact writing for a school environment himself, see n. 28. 112. Cf. Sedley 1997: 110, who usefully exploits this sentiment of caution in his study of Plato’s authority in the Platonist tradition.

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Notes to pages 54-60 2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom 1. A new project at the University of Cambridge aims to revisit the Presocratic material from in Phys. book 1. A full translation of book 1 is forthcoming from the London ACA Project. 2. Vincent 2003: 77, where he also notes that ‘our culture has a bias against bias’. 3. Gerson 1995: 261. 4. On the presumption of a text’s hidden meaning claimed by allegorists and Sophists see Plato Protagoras 316D-E, 317A, with Baltussen 2004, 2007a and above, p. 25. The point was also made in Mansfeld 1994: 25f., 149f.; Sedley 1997; Wildberg 1990: 116. Cf. in Phys. 453.30, 454.18 (Porphyry). 5. Among existing studies O’Brien 1969 is the best example of a thorough discussion of Simplician material. See also n. 64 below. 6. See references in §2.2. 7. E.g. in DC 142.25, 565.26f., in Phys. 48.27, 1137.26. He may even explicitly avoid such lengthy quotes (in DC 121.22). For the range of different reasons, see below and Chapter 4. 8. See Brittain and Brennan 2002: 7-9. Cf. Hoffmann 2006, Gerson 1997. 9. For Alexander see Chapter 4, for Philoponus see §6.2. 10. The attitude towards direct quotation as a conscious choice also requires further research: authors such as Plutarch (see W.C. Helmbold and O’Neil) and Eusebius (see Gustafsson 1961) come to mind as important earlier cases in whose works quotations play a special role; see also n. 44. 11. Passage already discussed in Baltussen 2002a and above, p. 44. 12. ‘Predecessors’ translates proterôn, a conjecture by Diels for neôterôn of the manuscripts. 13. ‘more direct’ does of course not necessarily mean ‘more accurate’. On quotation-cum-paraphrase, see also n. 49 and §6.2. 14. He mentions anagraphais historikais (in Phys. 28.33-4) in the same context. These ‘lists’ may belong to the doxographical tradition, which (in a sense) started with Theophrastus (see Baltussen 2000: 234-45), then became stock in trade of the sceptical tradition (Sextus Empiricus), and inspired Christian authors (e.g. Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius) to prove the permanent disagreement (diaphônia) among Greek (pagan) philosophers. See also Chapter 6. 15. See Mansfeld 1990, Mansfeld and Runia 1997. 16. See Mansfeld 1994, Sedley 1998: ch. 6. There is also reason to believe that Cicero preserved some useful pieces of information in his doxography in Lucullus (see F240 FHSG and Mansfeld 1989). In addition, a persuasive case has been made for an early version of a placita-collection known to Chrysippus and his audience (Mansfeld 1990). Later authors who may have had (indirect) access to some works relevant to physiology are Galen (cf. Sharples 1985) and perhaps Sextus Empiricus. 17. For a fuller exposition of Sedley’s illuminating argument see Baltussen 2003. 18. Zeller 1963: 819n. Burnet simply states that Simplicius ‘of course had the library of the Academy at his command’ (1975: 171). Hadot 1978: 26-7 is not convinced. 19. A more elaborate treatment is in preparation (Baltussen forthcoming-3). 20. Usener 1858: 25-7; Diels 1879: 102ff.

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Notes to pages 60-67 21. This section is based on Baltussen 2005, §3. 22. Mansfeld 1989: 148-9 with n. 49 (his p. 157). 23. On these (en)doxographical preludes see esp. Cherniss 1935; Mansfeld 1989, 1994; Baltussen 2000 with further literature. 24. See Baltussen 2000: ch. 2 for a fuller account. 25. He is especially emphatic about the ‘agreement’ on the issue of first principles, as is shown by the use of harmonia at 182.10, 188.13, 188.16, 204.27. For all occurrences of sumphônia see Appendix III. 26. Although going back to Cherniss’ studies of Aristotle (1934, 1944), the greater emphasis on the importance of the intellectual and subjective context of fragments really took off in the second half of the twentieth century, see e.g. Laks 1981, Osborne 1987a, Mansfeld 1990, 1997, Baltussen 2000, 2005. 27. Enn. 4.8.1, 5.1.8, 5.1.9 (Sorabji 1990: 4-5 with n. 22). 28. On Parmenides see Perry 1983: 6. For Empedocles we suspect that his poems contained 3,000 lines. Cf. O’Brien 1969: 150. He suggests on the basis of the Suda 2,000 lines for the poem on physics, the rest on the Purifications (Katharmoi) – but doubt has been cast on this by Osborne 1987b. See below, n. 71. 29. See now the exciting new publication of the Strasbourg papyrus by A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg (Berlin, 1999) in which further implications regarding the total length of Empedocles’ poem are formulated. 30. Perry 1983; Tarán 1987: 246-66; Sider 2005 (1981). 31. Laks 1981. Simplicius had the work of Diogenes to hand (in Phys. 25.7 to eis eme elthon autou suggramma Peri Phuseôs epigegrammenon). 32. Table was first published in Baltussen 2005, based on autopsy and Runia 1989. 33. See Laks 1998; Mansfeld 1999b. 34. Cf. text quoted below, p. 73. Another reason for selectiveness is the existing detailed treatment of the sources for Anaximander (Kahn 1960, repr. 1994) and Diogenes of Apollonia (Laks 1981). 35. Cf. Aristotle Phys. 184b15-17; Metaph. 986b9-87a2. 36. Aristotle GC 314a7-b11; Theophrastus DS 1-2; cf. 12-24 and 36-9. 37. Mansfeld 1989, 1996; Baltussen 1992. 38. Compare his remarks regarding Eudemus (§3.2) and Sider 2005: 52. 39. See Mansfeld and Runia 1997, Baltussen 2005. 40. See Mansfeld 1994: 56; Grafton and Williams 2006, chs 2-3. 41. in Phys. 161.14; Martin and Primavesi 1999: 112 n. 5 translate ‘cité’. Wildberg (1993: 193f.) translates ‘ganz genau zitieren’ – even though he does not want that to mean verbatim (see his n. 20). 42. See e.g. Simpl. in DC 135.15, 637.12, 644.5; in Phys. 161.15 [less relevant 225.22, 1173.32]; also in Phys. 83.28, 97.9, 175.33, 725.23, and 432.20f. [announced in 431.5-6]; 433.14, 733.4 (subject is Aristotle, and a quote follows); 1165.20, 1132.26f. (quote follows); 1333.33 (after a long quote from Philoponus). 43. kaiper eiôthôs epieikôs graphein ta toiauta kai parathesthai tous historountas (quoted and translated in Higbie 1999: 47). 44. E.g. Strom. 2.18.79.4 (marturias paratithesthai), 4.8.66.4 (paratithesthai graphên), 5.14.139.2 (muria epi muriois epirrei moi paratithesthai), 7.14.84.2 (polla men kai alla ek graphês marturia epeisi paratithesthai). 45. E.g. Philocalia 21.6.6 (verb). 46. E.g. Hist. Eccl. 4.18.4. 47. Wilson 1984: 108.

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Notes to pages 67-73 48. Cf. Chapter 1 n. 44. 49. Karamanolis 2006: 257, 265. At 266 Karamanolis highlights the use of quotation for illustrating a point, in particular when comparing authors. Moreover, he makes the valuable point that this approach was already pioneered by Origen and Eusebius in comparing Christian and pagan views (ibid. n. 73). 50. Cf. makrêgorein as in [Plut.] Consolation to Apollonius 115E muria d’epi muriois an tis ekhoi toiauta pros taúton kephalaia, all’ ouk anagkaion makrêgorein and Alexander in Metaph. 816.35. 51. Rist 1965. Cf. Dodds 1928: 132ff., Whittaker 1971. 52. The influence of Parmenides’ argumentative approach is clear. See esp. Schroeder 1996. 53. As quoted by Rist 1965: 329. 54. The contrast between these two groups also occurs in Simplicius, albeit on another aspect (in DC 598.2-3). 55. See e.g. Curd 1998: 4-5. Cf. Sanders 2002. 56. Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1984: 257 (‘a form of monism’); Curd 1998: 65-6 (‘predicational monism’). 57. For the general account of Parmenides I rely on Burnet 41975, Gallop 1984, Curd 1998, Shields 2003. 58. Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1984: 310. Cf. 31B2-3 (Sextus Emp. 7.122-4); 31A86, A92 DK. 59. Damascius calls him ‘the great Parmenides’, De princip. 1.24.14-15; 1.214.3. See also Damascius De princip. 1.95.25, cf. Dodds 1928, Rist 1962: 398 (summary), Dodds 1960, id. 1963 and Chapter 5 below. 60. In DC 556-62 has a particularly high frequency of his views. At 7.23-4 even points to the connection with in Phys. On Parmenides’ position in the division of natural philosophers see Kerferd 1991. 61. Sources range from Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus to Philodemus, Aëtius, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Strabo in Greek, and Tertullian, Censorinus and Lactantius in Latin. 62. See Whittaker 1971: 16-32 (with earlier literature). 63. This part has been quoted by many other authors, as DK show in their notes to the entry: Plato (Soph., Tht.), Aristotle (Metaph., Phys.), Clement (Strom.), Eudemus (ap. Simplicius 143.4), and Simplicius. 64. If we retrace our steps in the fragments as arranged by Diels (DK), but rearrange them according to the Simplician text, a rather disorganised sequence emerges from it: the sequence in DC 557.25-58.2; in Phys. 30.6-10, 16-19, 22-31.2; in Phys. 117.2ff.; in Phys. 143.4,6 [= Plato Soph. 244E]; in Phys. 147.13f. (homou to pan; repeated often, see Sider 2005: 69); in Phys. 147.28; in Phys. 179.31ff. relates to B1.28-32, B8.53-9, B6, B8.42, B8.43-5, B8.52, B8.42. This does not necessarily mean that the reconstructed sequence in Diels is wrong, but if it is right, it signals the peculiar manner of Simplicius’ referring to Parmenides. I note that KRS give the wrong reference to in Phys. for their no. 297: what they print at the bottom of p. 250 is 143.3 + 145.23-6 (not 144.29). 65. Eudemus comes into Simplicius’ observations on Presocratics on several other occasions (Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Empedocles), based on his work in the history of science. Sider (2005: 46) acknowledges that Eudemus consulted the text of Anaxagoras thus going ‘beyond Aristotle’. O’Brien 1969: 151 also thinks Eudemus had a copy of the poem. See also §3.2. 66. See above, p. 55. 67. Hoffmann 2006: 599. See also Chapter 5 below.

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Notes to pages 73-80 68. Mansfeld 1989; cf. McDiarmid 1953, Wiesner 1991. A more synthetic account will be given in Baltussen forthcoming-3. 69. Basic collection of passages with translations in KRS 280-321. General interpretations in O’Brien 1969, Wright 1995, Inwood 2002, Trepanier 2004. Good summary outline in Campbell 2006. 70. On Empedocles’ shamanic and mystical aspects see Kingsley 1995. 71. He is called ‘an emulator and associate of Parmenides’ (zêlôtês kai plêsiastês tou Parmenidous) which seems slightly odd: an attempt to characterise their competitive relationship from hindsight? According to Frohn 1980: 123 Alexander does not seem to have added new material. 72. A marginal note marks line 300 in P. Strasb. gr. inv. 1665-1666, found in 1991, published in 1999 by A. Martin and O. Primavesi. 73. For a summary of the debate on titles and the new proposal see Janko 2005. 74. See Kohlschitter 1990, who also shows how this reading is taken up by the Arabic historian Sahrastani (1076-1153 CE). Cf. Syrianus in Metaph. 13-14, 171.11-15 where he claims that Plato and Parmenides agree. 75. O’Brien 1969: 19-30, esp. 25, 28-30. 76. Cf. Phys. 252a7 = A38. But, as Frohn 1980: 129 notes, Aristotle does not actually mention a sphere. For this we need to look to other sources, e.g. Eudemus at in Phys. 1183.13 (= fr. 110 Wehrli), Hippolytus (below n. 79). 77. A view endorsed by Tannéry 1887 and others after him (cf. Long’s review of O’Brien, JHS 1970: 238). 78. Frohn 1980: 123. 79. Note that this information is not from Simplicius: B29 = Hippolytus Ref. Her. 7.29.13.3-5; B134 = Ammonius in Cat. 249.6-10. 80. A verb normally reserved for Aristotle, passim, or Plato, e.g. in Phys. 1073.4. It occurs some 8,576 times in in Phys. and in DC (search for didaskei- in TLG-E online). 81. The ratio of exegetical narrative to the number of lines from Empedocles is 31:76. 82. My main source of information for this section is Sider 2005, chs 1-2. 83. By capable scholars such as Schofield 1980; Sider 2005 (reviewed by J.E. Sisko, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2005.11.13). Pioneering study in Vlastos 1950 [= Vlastos 1995: 303-27]. For a newly discovered fragment (not in DK or Sider) see Scholten 2005. 84. For the discussion of his precise dates see O’Brien 1969; Mansfeld 1979 (pt I), 1980 (pt II). 85. Sider 2005: 39-40 with some doubt (‘S. intends us to believe that he had the work }’), but more positively at 42 (‘access to the original text of A.’). 86. On Anaximander, Kahn 1960; Empedocles, O’Brien 1969; on Diogenes of Apollonia, Laks 1981; on Democritus, Taylor 1999; on Ion of Chios, Baltussen 2007b. See also n. 89 below. 87. According to in Phys. 163.7-8, this phrase stood at the start of his work (arkhomenos euthus tou suggrammatos). 88. The modern equivalent of this kind of potentiality is perhaps stem cells, which by their nature can differentiate, at some point in their development, into any type of cell of any body part. 89. According to Ion of Chios (D.L. 2.16 and 23; Simpl. in Phys. 27.23 = A5 DK) the teacher of Socrates (c. 470-399 BCE). See Baltussen 2007b and next note. 90. On Archelaus see KRS 386-89 (esp. 388 n. 1: D.L. 5.42). 91. Sider (2005: 35) has established that all of B1-17 (except B10) come from

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Notes to pages 81-88 book 1. Sider’s discussion of Simplicius’ method is still fundamental for our understanding of the transmission (37-52, esp. 43f.). 92. The relation between Simplicius and Theophrastus is rather complex, see above, pp. 63-5 and §2.1. Sider (2005: 43) rightly points out that Theophrastus’ reports offer very few actual words of Anaxagoras – a marked difference compared to Simplicius. 93. The account in Simplicius relating to Melissus’ arguments depends heavily on Alexander, see Frohn 1980: 102-15 (for his possible dependence on Theophrastus see 112f.). 94. Porphyry seems to accept Aristotle’s here in attributing the terms (cf. Sider 2005: 44). 95. Such formalisations of Aristotle’s account (not readily approved of in modern scholarship, cf. Weil 1975: 292) often go beyond the text, but signal how the late Platonists believed that Aristotle’s own argumentative rules could be found in his more systematic treatises (cf. Alexander ap. Simpl. in DC 108.10). I have argued elsewhere that their approach could in these contexts be an application of the claim in Top. A.2, that the dialectical method for discovering foundations can be used in the doxai-discussions of Aristotle’s introductions, such as Metaph. A.2-10, De caelo A.10, De anima A.2-4, Phys. A.2-4 (Baltussen 2000: 32-3 with n. 8). 96. Simplicius continues to evaluate other arguments up to 178-9 (near the end of Phys. A.4), but we do not have the space to deal with all of them here. 97. I use Wildberg’s translation (1990: 116) for lines 26-30. Cf. line 20 for diaphônias. 98. epi pleon ênankasthêmen mêkunein. On the verb for ‘elaborate’ see above, p. 45. 99. See Saffrey 1992: 38-41; Hoffmann 2006: 598-600; and Chapter 5. 100. See O’Brien 1969, Sider 2005, Baltussen 2002a, Hankinson 2003. 101. A more detailed analysis of this aspect in Baltussen 2002a and Baltussen forthcoming-3, Theophrastus of Eresus. Fragments in Physical Doxography FHSG 225-45 (E.J. Brill: Leiden). 102. A case in point is the discussion by Marwan Rashed (1997), who discovered lost parts of the Physics of Alexander of Aphrodisias (200 CE) in the margin of a manuscript. This allowed him to compare those marginalia with quotations in Simplicius, from which he inferred that Simplicius was deliberately omitting material. Alexander is one of Simplicius’ most important sources (see Chapter 4). 103. Cf. Mansfeld 1990, 1994, Mansfeld and Runia 1997; Baltussen 2000b and id. forthcoming-3. 104. They did think that the writing of dialogue was acceptable – despite Plato’s rejection of plays – because in dialogues the characters are subjected to examination, according to Olympiodorus’ commentary on Gorgias 1,7-19 Westerink (see Sorabji, 2004, vol. 3 Logic, ‘methodology’, section 2.B (i)). But they do not seem to object to writing as such. 105. On the relevance of the form of dialogues for Plato’s philosophising see Gill and McCabe 1996. 106. polueidous de ontos allon kat’ allon ti tôn eidôn tou topou theasasthai kai ekphênai. 3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics 1. Cf. Gottschalk (2002: 26): ‘Aristotle died in Chalcis } his school was in abeyance and his will gives no hint that he expected it to survive.’

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Notes to pages 88-92 2. For the accounts regarding the succession and his library we rely for the most part on Strabo and Diogenes Laertius, and modern scholars still have not reached agreement on all the details (see esp. Gottschalk 1985; Barnes 1997). 3. Dillon 1996; De Haas 2001a; Karamanolis 2006. 4. On Stoic ideas in the Anonymous Commentary on Theaetetus see Sedley 1997. 5. He also uses Stoic terms and ideas; see Graeser who notes (1972: xiii) that Porphyry was already aware of this (V.Plot. 14.4-5), although Platonism in general may not necessarily always have realised to what extent it became removed from ‘its own generic roots’ (1972: 2-3). 6. See Sorabji 1990, Hadot-Hoffmann 1990, De Haas 2001b, Sharples forthcoming-1. 7. On this particular issue see De Haas 2001a, Sorabji 2004,3: 3 [a], [b], [d]. 8. Plotinus was less prone to mention his sources anyway (Wallis 1971: 42 mentions his ‘refusal to refer by name to any philosophers later than Epicurus’). Compare Proclus who according to the TLG refers to Eudemus only once in his commentary on the Timaeus (3.63.30 in connection with the trajectory of the sun and moon, a hypothesis attributed to Anaxagoras) and six times in his commentary on Euclid (125.7, 299.3, 333.6, 352.14, 379.2, 419.15). 9. For this point see Sharples 1998: 229. For his complementary role see e.g. Regenbogen 1940: 1547.13-20, 44-60; 1548.8-27, 33-5, 39-43; 1549.22-38 (physics); 1550.14-19; Steinmetz 1964: 7, 324; Sharples 1998: 227-30; Baltussen 2006a. Compare the ancient assessment in Cicero De fin. V.12-13 (with Runia 1989), Strabo xiii.609, Plutarch Sulla 26.2.2, Quintilian Inst. or. 3.8.62 (= F694 FHSG), Boethius in De interpr. 12.3-16 (= F72a FHSG), and Priscian Metaphr. 7.20-4 Bywater (= F275A FHSG). 10. He is also mentioned in the other commentaries: in Cat. (2) and in DC (4), in DA (2), in Epict. (1). See also n. 17 below. 11. Most of these materials occur in Phys. pp. 22-7 Diels; but compare 115.11, 118.2, 149.32, 154.14 where Parmenides, Anaxagoras and others return, see also below and §2.2-3. 12. The hypothesis is most emphatically proposed by Usener 1858 and Diels 1879 (above Chapter 2, p. 58; cf. Introduction, pp. 7-8). On its history and weaknesses see Mansfeld 1990b, Mansfeld-Runia 1997, Baltussen 2000 (ch. 2), and forthcoming-3 (commentary on FHSG 225-45), and above, §2.1. 13. On the doctrinal treatment of Theophrastus by Simplicius, see also Sharples 1998, Algra 1995, Sorabji 1992. 14. See also §5.1.1. 15. An issue to which I shall return, see Chapter 5. 16. See the astute remarks in Sider 2005: 39-48 on this problem of transmission. 17. E.g. ‘in his On the heaven’, in DC 1.8; ‘the first book of his Prior Analytics’, ibid. 554.3; ‘his Physics’, ibid. 564.24; ‘in his work On the coming-to-be of the elements’, ibid. 700.6; ‘in his own Topics’, in Cat. 415.15; ‘in his first book of Physics’, ibid. 435.27-8; ‘at the beginning of his own Physics’, in Phys. 9.7; ‘in the first book of his Physics’, ibid. 20.20; ‘in the work that has reached me, entitled On nature’, ibid. 25.7; ‘in his first book On motion’, 107.12, 986.5; ‘in his Investigation ’, ibid. 149.32; ‘he writes in his Natural investigation’, ibid. 154.1516; ‘writing this in his second book On Anaxagoras’, 166.17f.; ‘in the Physics’, 604.5-6, 639.14, 860.19; ‘in his own Physics’, in DA 286.31. 18. This is the general consensus, found in many of the papers published in the Project Theophrastus publications since 1983 (Rutgers Studies in the Classical Humanities, New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers).

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Notes to pages 92-95 19. See Sharples 1985, id. 2002. 20. Sharples 1998: 228 with n. 645 for further literature. 21. For the lists of their work see D.L. book 5.42-50 and Wehrli 1969: 79-123 respectively. 22. This section is based on a revised (and in some respects expanded) version of Baltussen 2003 and parts of Baltussen 2006b. 23. See Regenbogen 1940: 1378.28-31. Cf. Gottschalk 1990; Sollenberger 1992: 3853-55. 24. Blumenthal 1996: 10. 25. Theophrastus’ groundwork in collecting views on many topics may have been exploited for the composition of reference books in Hellenistic times, when schoolbooks and other didactic material became necessary. Current research is still producing new insights into the transmission of the material originating in Theophrastean works, see Mansfeld-Runia 1997, Baltussen 2000, id. forthcoming-3. 26. Discussion of first principles, see F141-4 FHSG with Sharples 1998: 35-47 (and further literature). 27. See Steinmetz 1964: 111ff. 28. Steinmetz 1964: 138-9. 29. Regenbogen 1940: 1554.3-7 described him as a scholar who shows signs of resignation that a full synthesis of an increasing body of knowledge was no longer possible (‘T. } mit dem wachsenden Erkenntnisumfang eine leichte Resignation bezüglich der Möglichkeit letzter synthetischer Erkenntnisse verbindet’ with special reference to in Phys. 18.32 (= F142 FHSG). 30. Sharples 1998: 36. 31. See Fortenbaugh 1984 for ethics, Barnes 1985 for logic. 32. In his Plato’s First Interpreters (London: Duckworth 2000). Cf. Baltussen 2003. 33. Sedley 1997; Dillon 1996: 42. 34. Baltussen 2003: 63-9, cf. id. 2005. 35. (a) Taurus in Philoponus On the eternity of the world vi.8 (145.20-4 Rabe) = F241A FHSG but with added context; (b) Taurus in Philoponus On the eternity of the world vi.27.5 = F241B FHSG; (c) Taurus in Philoponus On the eternity of the world xiii.15 [520.4-521.6 Rabe] = F161A FHSG; cf. Simplicius in Phys. 18.29-34 = F142 FHSG; Proclus Comm. on Timaeus 35E, 120.8-22 Diehl = F159 FHSG. Cf. Laks 1998: 152-3. 36. Sharples 1998: 97 n. 267 referring to FHSG fragments. In F159 FHSG Proclus actually refers to the On the heavens, cf. Simplicius in Phys. 1236.1. The reference at lines 31-2 could, however, be a later addition (Baltussen 2003: 68 n. 54). 37. See Baltussen 2002b, 2006a. Further texts may still be found as, e.g., the (anonymous) paraphrase at Themistius in Phys. 221.9 = F188 W. (I owe this reference to Robert Todd). 38. Cf. Sharples 1998: 3 n. 24. 39. Other references to individual book are at 964.30 and 986.5 (first book of the On motion), 1236.1 (third book of the Physics = his On the heaven, cf. Steinmetz 1964: 158, Sharples 1998: 3 n. 24; 118). But of course they are somehow relevant thematically. 40. A point already made in Baltussen 2003: 71. 41. In this particular case (= F281 FHSG) the crucial verb ‘reports’ (historei) is evidence that the stated view is not Theophrastus’, hence this passage should be moved to the doxographical fragments in FHSG.

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Notes to pages 96-99 42. Note that this could be in any number of areas, since the ‘affections’ are a part of the study of nature (Sharples 1998: 42 after Sedley’s comments on Cael. 268a1-7). 43. Diels’ Index (CAG vol. 10: 1447) gives most occurrences. Sider 2005: 47-8 notes that Diels thought access occurred via Alexander, but warns that this is not proven. See also n. 17 and n. 39 above. 44. On this issue of separate titles for individual books of Theophrastus’ Phys. see pp. 59-60. 45. In politics it is also a term for party leaders (Polybius 28.4.6); in drama for the leader of the choros (cf. Arist. Pol. 1277a11 in his account of excellence of the good citizen). So far as we know Theophrastus was not given the label gnêsiôtatos ‘most genuine, most sincere’, which is reserved for Xenocrates’ relation to Plato (in DC 12.22, in Phys. 1165.24), Aristotle to Plato (ibid. 378.21), and for Alexander’s status as commentator on Aristotle (in Phys. 258.16). 46. kath’ huperbolên oxutêtos pan to noêthen exermêneuontos. Cf. D.L. 5.35: among Aristotle’s many pupils he was ‘the most distinguished’ (diapherôn malista); 5.36: he was ‘a man of remarkable intelligence and industry’ (anêr sunôtatos kai philoponôtatos). 47. See Sorabji in Urmson 1992: 2ff., id. 1988: 202-15. 48. Tr. Urmson 1992: 17. 49. My account is based on Sorabji 1988: ch. 12 and id. 1992: 2-5. For additional discussions and disagreements on details see also Algra 1995: 231-48 (who defends Theophrastus’ discussion as coherent and expressing a more general concern, against Sorabji 1988), Sambursky 1962. 50. Sorabji 1992: 4. 51. For Strato’s theory of the void see the detailed discussion in Algra 1995: 61-9. 52. Sharples 1998: 63. Cf. Arist. Phys. 223a24. 53. Sharples 1998: 63. 54. He refers to Nicostratus’ criticisms at in Cat. 428.3, 429.13, Plotinus at 433.20, Boethus at 433.28. Alexander appears some 43 times in this commentary, but according to TLG not after 429.28 (for the recent find of fragments thought to be from his own Categories commentary see Appendix II.A). 55. This section has benefited considerably from R. Gaskin’s translation of Simplicius in Cat. 9-15 (ACA 2000: introduction, translation and notes), and Sharples’ 1998 commentary on fragments in ‘Physics’ (137-223 FHSG). 56. Cf. Sharples 1998: 71 with n. 182, id. 2002: 111. 57. Gaskin 2000 (above n.55): 244 n. 1086 refers to in Phys. 408.15ff. and 859.16ff. 58. Sharples 1998: 72 n. 184 after Steinmetz 1964: 154. 59. Wehrli 1969: 10 (F6), 87-8; Sharples 2002: 109-10. 60. in Phys. 1036.14-15, see Baltussen 2002b: 130. On the problems concerning the history of the book division of the Physics, see Ross 1961, 1-19; Moraux 1973: 115-16, and above, Chapter 1. 61. Simplicius refers to books 1-4 and possibly to a fifth book (see also next note). 62. Discussed in Baltussen 2002b: book 1 at 10.3 (F32 W, cf. F34), 133.21 (F44, cf. F50); to book 2 at 411.15 (F59, cf. F62); to book 3 at 533.14 (cf. F81, F85-7), 732.24 (F88), book 4 at 942.18 (F101, cf. F104-5). Wehrli does not attempt to reconstruct the structure of Eudemus’ work in detail. 63. Wehrli 1969: 87-8. Regarding the Greek letters used to number the books see Baltussen 2002b: 131 n. 16.

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Notes to pages 100-102 64. Wehrli (1969: 87) calls it ‘verkürzenden Bearbeitung der aristotelischen Physik, welche deren Anordnung und Problemstellung beibehält und nur in Einzelheiten der Behandlung selbständig ist.’ 65. See Sider 2005: 25f. whom I partly paraphrase here. 66. See e.g. context of F32-3 (in Phys. 42.5-26), and of F36 (in Phys. 83.10-24). 67. F43 is puzzling, see Baltussen 2002b: 135 n. 28. 68. Sider 2005: 26 quotes in Phys. 99.12-18 (part of F37a on Wehrli p. 27), but mistakenly labels it ‘fr. 38’. 69. See also Chapter 4 on Alexander. 70. If Sider means that the subtext is ‘this is not what Eudemus wrote’, I simply disagree. How could Simplicius reproach Alexander with bad scholarship, unless he had Eudemus’ text to check his version? 71. Even if – as both Sharples (2002, 115 n. 25 on F82a) and Sider (personal communication) have pointed out to me – in this instance Simplicius is relying on Alexander for information. Since we know from several examples that manuscripts did come in different versions, it is not unlikely to have been the case here (see e.g. in Phys. 167.33ff. where at 168.19-21 the Greek text proves that Alexander had a more elaborate text than Simplicius regarding Anaxagoras (15). I shall say more on manuscripts and Alexander in Chapter 4. 72. Cf. Wehrli 1969, 88: ‘Die } erhöhte Verständlichkeit machte E.s Physik zum bequemen Ausgangspunkt der Aristoteleskommentatoren’ and n. 19. 73. Compare 83.28-9 = F36 W. enargôs; 433.13 saphesteron exetheto tên Aristotelous apodeixin [not in Wehrli]). Alexander expressed a similar verdict in Metaph. 83.9-11 (cf. Fortenbaugh 2002: 69). 74. mallon epitrepteon Eudêmoî ginôskein enguterôi tois khronois onti kai Aristotelous akroatêi. See Baltussen 2006a: 9 for further comments on this passage. 75. Wehrli 1969: 88 also infers that, because of both shorter and longer treatment that Eudemus must have skipped those bits which resisted his systematising tendency. Both remarks are tendentious and ill-founded: the first seems to imply carelessness, but Simplicius never tires of pointing out that in Eudemus conciseness and clarity go hand in hand (see passages just quoted in the text); the second accuses Eudemus of ‘doctoring’ the material, but no detailed argument is offered to support this. 76. Algra (1995: 248) is an exception: they are ‘something more than a merely exegetical commentary’, ‘a shortened paraphrase } with additions and clarifications’. See further Baltussen 2002a. On Andronicus see now the extensive analysis with minimalist conclusions by Barnes 1997. 77. This and because of the uncertainty of which descriptive labels are actual ‘titles’ in antiquity are reasons for not printing these with a capital initial. 78. The risk of taking ‘notes on’ in this way was kindly pointed out to me by Bob Sharples (e-mail 6 May 1997). 79. In reply to my question whether he thinks the brevity of Theophrastus’ physika is caused by the aporetic approach Sharples wrote (e-mail 6 May 1997): ‘Or is it } that he is writing for/ speaking to people who have read Aristotle’s text, whereas Eudemus is seeking rather to replace the latter? (The two explanations aren’t incompatible, indeed.).’ The matter needs further study. 80. A point made with regard to logic by Fortenbaugh in Sharples 1998: 49 n. 118. 81. See Ross 1960: 1-2 for variants. Cf. also CAG 10 index s.v. ‘Theophrastos’ (p. 1447), ‘Loci Aristotelici’ (p. 1459f.). 82. There is the further proviso that references to titles tend to become ‘more

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Notes to pages 103-108 secure’ as time progresses, even when it is obvious, as for instance in the case of peri physeôs with reference to the Presocratics, that they will not have used fixed labels as titles. 83. Algra 1995: 248-58. 84. T 1-6 in Baltussen 2002b. 85. T2-3, 5, 7 in Baltussen 2002b. 86. For details see Baltussen 2002b, section 4 ‘Conclusions’. 87. Blumenthal (1996: 10) gives as a possible reason for the neglect by later commentators that ‘Theophrastus gave no help to those seeking to impose Platonist constraints on Peripatetic psychology’. Whether this holds for Eudemus needs further analysis. 88. On asapheia in Aristotle and the commentators see Barnes 1992: 268-70 and Mansfeld 1994: 24, 29 etc. (see his index s.v.). 89. See Plato Protag. 318B, Phaedo 83E, Sophist 217E; Wallis 1971: 138. 90. Gottschalk 1990: 64-5. In n. 53 he mentions that it was criticised by Seneca Ep. 108.23. On Andronicus and his role in the formation of the canon see also Barnes 1997. 91. Sharples 1985 discusses such a case for the On the heaven. 92. As Sharples impressed upon me (email, cf. Sharples forthcoming-2). 93. Cf. e.g. the Peripatetic Xenarchus whom Simplicius polemicises against in in DC book 1, discussed in Hankinson 2002-3. See Appendix I for a full list of works mentioned in his commentaries. 94. For their role as interpretive sources see e.g. D.L. 5.39 exhermêneuontos (above, n. 46 and text thereto); for their closeness to Aristotle, in Phys. 68.32-3 enguteros tois khronois (above, n. 74 and text thereto); for their status as ‘colleagues’ contributing to the educational objective see in Phys. 788.34 didaxantes (above, §3.1, pp. 89-90). 4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias 1. Rashed 1997, 2007 and forthcoming (2008, fragments for Alexander’s Physics 4-8), cf. Tieleman 1998, Kupreeva 2003, Chianotis 2004b, Rescigno 2004 and forthcoming (fragments for his in DC). See also next note and n. 8 below. See for distribution of references Appendix II B. 2. I am hoping to use the groundwork already done on the fragments from in Phys. elsewhere. 3. Cf. Barnes et al. 1991: 5 with n. 31; Algra 1995: 231ff. and my Chapter 3. 4. Gerson 1995: 261-2, adding that the latter may be a disputable enterprise. Cf. Sorabji and Dooley 1989: 3. See Rashed 2007 [regrettably not yet available to me at the time of completing this study]. 5. After Barnes 1997: 45. 6. Tr. Van Ophuijsen 2001, slightly modified. I have translated epi biblia as ‘with reference to books’ to keep the phrase more neutral and allow for the ambiguity of the interpretive act the use of such books might entail. Compare my comment on Plotinus, Chapter 4, pp. 138-9. Van Ophuijsen (2001: 351 n. 268) considers the possibility that the text might have been different, suggesting that toiauta biblia (‘books of this kind’) could have been tosauta biblia (‘so many books’), but he ends by saying that all Alexander might have wanted to say is that ‘there were no books for use in dialectical classes before Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote them’.

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Notes to pages 109-112 7. This number (1114 for in Phys. and in DC) is based on TLG-D search for ‘Alexand(r)-’, and is therefore giving only explicit occurrences of the name (and all its case endings). There is some evidence that Alexander is used without mention of his name and indirectly, but for those cases to be included in the statistics we need a survey of all the works. 8. Tarán 1987: 247 n. 2. 9. See §5.1; cf. Dillon 1996 (1977), Karamanolis 2006. 10. D’Ancona 2002: 206; she adduces the celebrated passage V.Plot. 14.10-14; and on pp. 208-9 n. 22 lists previous literature in which the influence of Alexander on Plotinus is discussed. I shall return to some of these studies below (§4.2). 11. See §4.3 below. It is somewhat puzzling that modern scholars insist that Alexander’s commentary on the Physics is lost ‘except for the new fragments recently found by M. Rashed’ (in Sorabji 1997: 181-95). It must be ‘short-hand for “does not survive as a text in its own right, but only in second-hand reports”’ (as Bob Sharples pointed out, personal communication, 9 November 2007). Among the references in Simplicius several hundreds contain quotations from the ‘lost’ commentary, illustrated by the elaborate paraphrase presented in Moraux (below n. 16). An edition (partial reconstruction) of this commentary is being prepared by Marwan Rashed (forthcoming 2008). 12. For instance within the ‘Third and Fourth Academy’ under Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon; see e.g. Dillon 1996: 57f. On the syncretistic tendencies among the later Platonists, now referred to as Neoplatonists, see below §4.2. 13. Cf. Sorabji 1990: 5. 14. Some reference to the other commentaries will be included, but only to the extent that space allows for it. Selectivity is here motivated by the realisation that we cannot deal with the mass of evidence in a convenient way unless we focus on types. See also Rescigno 2004 for the fragments from in DC. 15. E.g. in Phys. 707.33, 1170.13, 1176.32; compare Philoponus in APr. 136.20. This is possibly an honorific title (one reserved for Averroes in the middle ages, Sorabji-Sharples 1989: 2 n. 3), though this is disputed by Barnes et al. 1991, 4 n. 28, with some justification. Blumenthal 1987: 96 does not see these as ‘merely lip service’. 16. An assumption palpable in Moraux 2001: 129-80, when he discusses the passages by paraphrasing them, in some sense ‘reconstructing’ the content of the work (cf. next note). For the Arabic traces of the Physics commentary see D’Ancona 2000, below n. 31. 17. Rashed 1997 and forthcoming (2008). 18. See, for instance, the extensive discussion on citation techniques by Inowlocki 2006: ch. 2 and her references in the notes. 19. Cf. Sider 2005 and my conclusions in the Epilogue. 20. Simpl. in Phys. 707.33-4 Alexandrou tou exêgetou tôn Aristotelous. On in DC 378.21-2 see also below text to n. 80. Barnes et al. 1991 demur on its honorific function (above n. 15). See also the quotation on p. 107. 21. We should here distinguish between Quaestiones (ed. Ideler) and Problêmata (not all by Alexander, cf. Sharples-Kapetanaki 2006). See also Sharples 1994: 3; Sharples 1987: 1177-1225 (bibliography 1226-43); id. 1994, 2003, 2004. D’Ancona 2002. The remains of a commentary on the Cat. (thought lost) have now turned up as part of the Archimedes palimpsest (see Appendix II A). 22. See for this issue Sharples 1987: 1202-4, Blumenthal 1996: 15-17. 23. Its existence is not in doubt: GC II.2-6 was translated by the Arabic version of Gabir b. Hayyan (eighth century CE) with four extensive discussions of Alexan-

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Notes to pages 112-119 der, confirmed by another Arabic source, Ya’qub b. Ishaq (fl. 1202), see Gannagé 1998: 35-6, 43-65; it is also extensively quoted by Philoponus (Gannagé 36 n. 4, 42; Sharples 1987: 1185-6). Cf. Hankinson 2002a: 114-15 (n. 116), Zeller 1963: 801 n. 24. Also practised in Alexandria by Ammonius and his students (Philoponus, see §6.2). 25. See Fazzo 2004: 5-6 and the comment on Andronicus above, §3.3. 26. Mansfeld 1989. 27. See in Phys. 7.1. These incidental references to Presocratics do not form part of exegetical comments; on pp. 22-8 (Diels) a significant increase of patronymics occurs, see Mansfeld 1989. 28. See Hadot 1987a, Mansfeld 1994. 29. Aristotle had already indicated the sequence in which to conduct the study of nature in his Meteorology A.1 (see also Hadot 1987). Cf. Frohn 1980: 21ff. 30. The latter option seems unlikely, simply because in every other way the introductory pages reflect standard topics of preliminary discussion, see §1.2. 31. See Sluiter 1990, Atherton 1993, Ford 2002. 32. Mentioned by Porphyry in the life of Plotinus, above n. 10. Cf. D’Ancona 2002: 206. At 238-42 she lists the Arabic evidence on Alexander’s commentaries, in particular (at 238 with nn. 160-1) for the commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (lost in Greek, see also Rashed 1995, 1997). More on this connection below, §4.3. 33. Blumenthal 1987 (with reference to earlier literature, e.g. Henry 1960, Blumenthal 1968, Szlezak 1979, Schroeder 1984). See also Tieleman 1995, Corrigan 1996, Tieleman 1998, Kupreeva 2003, Gerson 2005b, Karamanolis 2006. 34. I admit that the latter point arises from the modern perspective, since the ancient commentators would not actively seek to disagree or criticise if he could avoid it. Alexander’s critical evaluation of some of Aristotle’s doctrines is in itself not an obvious part of exegesis. 35. Blumenthal 1987: 96. 36. Blumenthal 1987: 101. 37. Aspasius lived c. 100-150 CE. See Alberti and Sharples 1999. 38. One exception is the commentary on Metaphysics 4 which was important enough (it defines the subject matter of metaphysics) to study it ‘almost line by line’ (tr. Madigan 1993: 2). 39. On the topos of dividing up the text see Mansfeld 1990: 10-11, 34-6; Barnes et al. 1991: 7-8. 40. As Gottschalk points out, he was preceded by Galen in this (1987: 1166 with n. 413). 41. See §3.2 for Theophrastus and Eudemus. A lost work of Alexander was entitled On the disagreement between Aristotle and his associates concerning [syllogisms with] mixed premisses (id. in APr. 125.30-1, after Sharples 1987: 1196). Strato, Theophrastus’ successor, would build on the latter’s queries and state new views on place, extension, and matter. 42. See §5.1.2. 43. At 192.16ff. Alexander is brought in via Ammonius; then follows Syrianus (29ff.) who also quotes Porphyry. This clearly concerns a serious issue that generated debate. 44. Tr. Baltussen forthcoming-2, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9 (Duckworth). For Alexander’s interest in principles see also his extensive discussion at in Metaph. 12.15-15.19; 19.23ff. 45. See Dorandi 1991 on papyri; Skydsgaard 1968 on Varro; French and Greenaway 1986 on Pliny.

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Notes to pages 120-127 46. The authorship of this commentary is disputed (Hadot 2002b: Simplicius; Steel 1997: Priscian), but it is clearly of the same time period (early sixth century CE), so the issue need not be discussed here. 47. Hoffmann 1987b, Blumenthal 1987: 105. 48. Hoffmann 1987b: 59-60. 49. Westerink 1990. 50. Fazzo 2004: 5-6. 51. Interestingly, Alexander was also used by Philoponus of Alexandria, Simplicius’ contemporary and archrival (see §6.2). 52. Blumenthal 1987: 99. 53. Harran, on which see §1.3, which includes Arabic sources: Lameer 1997, Gutas 1998, Luna 2001c, Lane Fox 2005b. The whole complex of problems is conveniently laid out and summarised in Thiel 1999, with additional insights in Watts 2006. 54. Cf. Sluiter 1999. Sluiter makes the existence of a commentary in itself an indication that we are dealing with the product of a school activity. I am not convinced this holds universally, see below p. 83. 55. Baltussen 2002c: 183-4. Cf. Hankinson 2002a: 5. 56. On the use of Alexander see nn. 43, 51 above. On the style of commentary D’Ancona 2002: 221 (Syrianus, Philoponus), 222 (Olympiodorus), 225 (Simplicius). 57. O’Meara 1989: 120; cf. Luna 2001b: 72-98. A similar view is already reported for Themistius (Blumenthal 1987: 97). 58. The categories established here are provisional and in no way meant to be definitive and fixed: they intend to map out broad groups and to make the point of the diversity of use for one individual source. One correlation which might be especially significant is that between length of quotation and whether or not they agree (see also §6.3). 59. For appeal to authority see e.g. Eudemus F59 with Wehrli’s comments, in which Theophrastus is mentioned as having more authority: ‘Die Zitate aus Theophrast, welchen Simplicius noch mehr Gewicht beimißt als denjenigen aus E., lauten }’ (p. 99). See also pp. 154 and 156 (Dillon 1973 on Proclus / Iamblichus). 60. Some additional examples can be found in 582.21; 584.4. 61. Cf. Kahn 1994 (1960): 13 n. 2. 62. I am basing myself on a provisional listing of all passages. There is a partial parallel in later commentators of the early Renaissance, where reference to Alexander is dictated mostly on account of disagreement, see Fazzo 1999, 48: ‘Alexander is often the starting point for their work, but they mentioned him by name mainly on controversial issues, in particular when they want to argue against his interpretations’ (my emphasis). 63. Urmson 1992: 107 n. 40. 64. See Rashed 1997: 186, 188-9. 65. See also 407.21ff. 66. For a summary of specific points of disagreement see Hankinson 2002: 6-9 (in DC). In this context Simplicius also claims that Aristotle and Plato do not disagree on change (451.2-4). 67. For earlier analysis of variants see Whittaker 1971, 1973, 1989; Dillon 1989. 68. A TLG search produces 50 occurrences for antigraph- (noun and verb forms): see below, Chapter 6 n. 76. 69. E.g. at in Phys. 414.16; 422.25; 423.14, 20; 427.34; 429.23-4; 440.12-15 a difference in manuscripts is mentioned, with Moraux 1985: 231f., 446 etc. Cf. also Alex. In de sensu 86.2-5.

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Notes to pages 128-133 70. Cf. Urmson 1994, who (n. 177) compares in Cat. 88.25-7; 228.1-3; see also 481.28-34 where a scribal error is suspected by Simplicius (‘muddled’, in the Greek: sunkekhusthai). 71. See above, Chapter 1 above; Grafton and Williams 2006, chs 2-3. 72. ‘in some copies they found the text to read }’. At line 20 Simplicius disagrees with Alexander, but a little later he praises him for a specific remark (36); 459.5-6 Alexander explains ‘so-called’ in another way (allôs) (Urmson 2002); cf. 459.25-8 Eudemus in the second of the Physics (Urmson). 73. Disagreement (for books listed above respectively): 3, 17, 14, 27, 8, 21, 9, 7, 8 = 104; quotation: 2, 6, 6, 10, 6, 6, 7, 3, 5 = 51 [based on notes prepared by M. McEvoy]. 74. A TLG search produces 423 occurrences for in Phys. (263) and in DC (160). That this is not a neutral interjection is clear from the fact that objections are quite often accompanied by evaluative terms such as comparative adjectives (e.g. ‘better’, ameinon, in Phys. 2.16, 577.6, 673.31, 713.13, kallion 20.26; ‘not appropriate’, oukh hikanon 60.6; ‘more accurate’, akribesteron 83.33, saphesteron 413.5) or approving adverbs (e.g. saphôs in Phys. 26.18, 550.25, pithanôs 116.7, kalôs 513.31). 75. Immortalised in its medieval Latin version amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas, and also a variant on the comment Plato makes about Socrates at Rep. 595C; Phd. 91C. Guerlac 1978: 631 traces this version to the Dutch scholar Ulpius as added to Erasmus’ Adages in the posthumous edition of 1579 (H. Estienne, Paris). 76. See LSJ9 1311 s.v. II.2. Among its 18 occurrences it is linked to Alexander three times (in Phys. 41.1, 483.1, 602.6; others include Philoponus, Damascius, Aristotle). 77. Regarding the point of enabling the reader to form a judgment there is an intriguing parallel in Jerome (347-420 CE) when he describes the purpose of a commentary (Sluiter 2000: 199 with n. 69). 78. Could the passage be based on Proclus? I have no answer. Additional comments in §6.3. 79. This judgment is based on preliminary statistics I have compiled. 80. in DC 378.22-4 tauta gar ou tôi Platôni monôi edokei, alla kai tôi gnêsiôtatôi tôn Platônos akroatôn tôi Aristotelei kai tôi epimelestatôi tou Aristotelous spoudastêi tôi Alexandrôi. Cf. ibid. 297.8-10, quoted at the start of this chapter. As Sharples helpfully pointed out to me, in Simplicius’ view Alexander gets Aristotle wrong, so that his very prestige makes it necessary for Simplicius to set the record straight. See in Phys. 964.14-15 (also discussed in Rashed 1997) and 1262.3-5 for good examples of Simplicius’ treatment of Alexander focused on the mortality of the soul. 81. For what follows see in Cat. 2.30-3.17 with quotations from De Haas 2001b, 3-4. Hoffman 1987a. 82. As is standard in the post-Hellenistic tradition (Sluiter 1999: 173-4). For a clear parallel to this topos (conceit?) compare his contemporary and colleague Priscian in his Metaphrasis of Theophrastus’ Discourse On the soul: ‘to clarify } the views of Theophrastus, both if he adds anything beyond what Aristotle has handed down } and if in raising difficulties, he offers us anything’ (F275A.1-4 FHSG). 83. On this question I take my cue from Sluiter 1999. 84. The Greek verb exêgeisthai may be more neutral than our ‘exegesis’ or ‘interpret’, in that it suggests a ‘leading the way out’ of the confusion and problems,

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Notes to pages 136-143 which does not imply the construing or imposing of a certain view. This does not mean of course that Plotinus was incapable of manipulating the meaning of the text sometimes: he just did not want to be seen to be doing so. disputed by Barnes et al. 1991, 4 n. 28, with some justification. 5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration 1. Karamanolis 2005, Gerson 2006, Edwards 2006, Gavray 2007 (not available to me), Rashed 2007 (not available to me), id. forthcoming, D’Ancona 2007. 2. I quote the phrase from Gerson 2005: 76 n. 1. See now the meta-commentary by Hadot 1990b, Luna 2001b and Barnes 1992 (review in OSAP). 3. A comment made in conversation at IAS by Prof. Michael Lackner (Erlangen, Germany). 4. Dillon 1986: 228 (= 1990a, XIII). Cf. Fazzo’s comment on assimilation of predecessors (n. 45). 5. By describing his activity in this way I do not mean to recast him into the role of a modern scholar; but I would like to bring out how much skill and thought had to go into this project to produce these commentaries – a point which is too easily passed over. 6. Sorabji 1988: 15, 116-17. 7. Sorabji 1988: 241. 8. Cf. Sorabji 1990: 3-15. 9. See Mansfeld 1994; Westerink 1962 and further below. 10. Cf. Gerson 1995. Cf. Sheppard 1985: 34 (Rep. not on Iamblichean reading). 11. On post-Hellenistic philosophy see Boys-Stones 2001 and Boys-Stones and Brittain (forthcoming). 12. Karamanolis 2006: 3-4, 217-18. A more general account of this period in Frede 1999b. 13. Dillon 1996: 56-9 (with further literature), Karamanolis 2006: ch. 1. 14. Westerink 1962, Dillon 1996, Boys-Stones 2001, De Haas 2001b, Sorabji 2005. 15. Dodds 1923: 10. Cf. Rist 1967: ch. 13. 16. With Fowden 1982: 34. Cf. the comment by the late Platonist David in his Introduction to philosophy (sixth century CE) 1.4-12 ‘pulled towards these [philosophical] arguments by some kind of sane madness and in their souls evoke a love for them by the knowledge of things that are’ (my italics). Wildberg 1990: 39 introduces this passage by calling it ‘oddly pathetic’, but perhaps the link with Proclus might mitigate this assessment somewhat. 17. For a clear account of the style and intentions of Plotinus see Dillon 1992. 18. Edwards 2006: 33 referring to V.Plot. 14.10-13. 19. As Athanassiadi 1993: 4 explains, the ‘theory of the golden chain’ arose from the concern to create ‘a pagan identity’ as a result of ‘Christian aggressiveness’. 20. Vit. Isid. (EP) quoted in Athanassiadi 1993: 6 n. 17. 21. Seminal paper is Sluiter 2000. See also Baltussen 2007a. 22. Whittaker 1989: 63-95. On p. 70 n. 5 he mentions another article (or book chapter) on a text problem for a Parmenides quotation (fr. 8,5-6) and the discussion by the late Platonists of the variant readings. For Porphyry’s use of allegory and symbolical exegesis of Homer see Pépin 1966. 23. These categories are in fact ancient and known to the grammarians (1989: 71 with n. 16). 24. Discussed above, p. 33. The Alexandrian exegetes of the early Christian

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Notes to pages 144-148 period already worked with this distinction, in particular Origen (185-245 CE), Eusebius (c. 275-339 CE), and Jerome (c. 350-420 CE). 25. Cure for Greek maladies (Graecarum affectionum curatio) 10.17f. (after Whittaker 1989: 70). 26. For a fine portrait of Longinus see Edwards 2006: 27-9, whose comment (28) I quote here. The adjective is also used by Simplicius for Iamblichus and Syrianus (see below). On the use of superlative epithets indicating their position in a hierarchy of authorities see Wildberg 1990: 116-17 and text to n. 79. 27. Long 1992 (Stoics), Grant 1957: 121-3 (pagans and Christians), Lamberton 1986 (Neoplatonists). 28. Dillon 1971: 126 (= Dillon 1990a, Study XIV, 126). Standard account of the period in Dillon 1996. 29. Indications for this are the lack of criticism in the fragments surviving in Arius Didymus (Dillon 1996: 126), though one can detect an anti-Peripatetic tendency in the down-grading of external goods (ibid. 124). 30. Dillon 1996: 120. 31. Ibid. 116 (ousia); 134 (categories). 32. Dodds 1928: 139n. 33. Moraux 1969 (missed by Dillon 1977, but added in the Afterword to the reprint of 1996: 436). 34. I refer to the latest edition of Bastianini-Sedley 1995. 35. BCE: Tarrant 1983: 180-1; CE: Bastianini-Sedley 1995: 254-6. This has been disputed by Mansfeld 1991: 543-4. It is of course not the earliest commentary known to us: for the Derveni Papyrus see Betegh 2004, 2005. Another example of Plato exegesis with critical signs has been found in a papyrus antedating D.L. 3.65, see Solmsen 1981: 108. 36. The label ‘Middle Platonists’ is mostly chronological of inspiration. Dillon defends the term in his new ‘Afterword’ on practical grounds (‘remains, I think, valid and useful’), although he admits that ‘being a middle anything is a rather troublesome state’ (1996: 423). 37. For Proclus see Lamberz 1987. For earlier examples Mansfeld 1994, Baltussen 2004. Cf. above n. 24 and below n. 42. 38. Karamanolis 2006: 92, 98, 121 etc.; cf. Dillon 1990a. 39. Complete list of philosophical works in Dillon 1996: 187. 40. See Karamanolis 2006: 93-4. 41. Proclus In Tim. 1.305.6. It is unclear (Dillon 1990a: 126 n. 2) whether he is the grammarian mentioned in Julius Capitolinus (Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Verus II.5). 42. For skopos see his comments to Phaedo 69AC from Olympiodorus in Phaed.; or aporiai to Phaed. 68BC (both at Dillon 1990a: 131-2). 43. Dillon 1990a: 126. 44. See Dodds 1960; Frede 1987. 45. Fazzo 2004: 5-6 (see Chapter 4, text to n. 50). 46. Karamanolis 2004: 102, ‘anticipating’ as he puts it ‘Plotinus’ future teaching tactic (V.Plot. 14.4-14)’. 47. Dillon 1996: 246-7. See also Chapter 3 n. 35 on his importance in the reception of Theophrastus. 48. I borrow the term from Sluiter 1999. For Plotinus’ biography see also Rist 1967: ch. 2. 49. But his name is Latin (Dodds 1923: 7 n. 1). Cf. Dillon 1992: 190 ‘from Lycopolis in Upper Egypt’, information which is not found in Porphyry’s V.Plot.

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Notes to pages 148-153 but in two other sources: our knowledge of his life is based on V.Plot., Eunapius’ biographies (c. 390 CE; ‘from Lyco’) and the Suda, a ninth-century CE encyclopaedic work. For the comments on his parents see V.Plot. 1. 50. Porphyry V.Plot. 23. Dodds 1960: 7-11. 51. Dillon 1992: 189. 52. The phrase is often associated with Max Weinreich who reported it as a suggestion from the audience when he had given a lecture (YIVO Bletter, 23.3 [May-June 1944] 420-1). 53. On Iamblichus’ theurgy, Syrianus’ soteriology see O’Meara, n. 99 below. On Proclus’ theurgy see Sheppard 1982, Dillon 2002. On the influence of Platonism on Christianity, see Smith 2004: ch. 8. 54. Occurrences: 5 for in DC; 84 for in Cat; 14 for in Phys. (retrieved from TLG online 28.05.07). 55. The totals (see previous note) signal the importance of the Categories again. 56. For both titles see Porphyry V.Plot. 5.47 and 4.33. Diels did not really consider this matter in depth, since other passages can be adduced as relevant to this remarkable episode: e.g. the peculiar terms eskhêmatismenon kai memegethusmenon (‘shaped and provided with magnitude’) at 229.16 turn out to be Plotinian and have parallels in Enn. 2.4.8,12 for both terms, and in 2.4.10,24; 2.4.12,3 and 7 for the second term (source: TLG-E online, accessed June 2007). 57. A striking distribution and very limited total of 15. The name occurs at in DC 20.12, 21 (with Ptolemaeus, Xenarchus), 115.30; in Phys. 229.12, 398.32, 403.17, 706.26, 769.6, 790.30, 790.35, 791.28, 792.2, 792.20 (with Iamblichus), 1072.8, 1079.12. 58. Karamanolis 2004: 118-19, Moraux 1968. 59. See also Shields 1990 for his influence on Boethius. 60. For the fragments see Smith’s 1993 Teubner edition (563 pp.). A list of complete extant works can be found in Smith 1974. 61. Eunapius Lives of the philosophers and sophists III-IV 2 (= 1T Smith). Plotinus would comment on obscure expressions in Aristotle (e.g. Enn. 3.7.13.1318, after Karamanolis 2006: 239). See also §3.3. 62. Mansfeld 1994: 25-6, 149-54. 63. Karamanolis 2004: 108-9. 64. Dillon 1990a, Watts 2005: 288-90. Cf. Dillon 1973, Athanassiadi 1993, de Haas 2003, Barnes 2003, Finamore-Dillon 2002: 6ff., Sorabji 2004, ‘Introduction’. 65. Persuasively argued by Watts 2006. On the problematic term ‘school’ see also Marrou 1963: 132f.; on the term hairesis, Karamanolis 2006: 250-3. 66. Athanassiadi 1993: 1-29 points to the new ‘revelatory wisdom’ propounded by Iamblichus, yet reiterates ‘renovated paganism of the Hellenised Syrian, Egyptian or Arab which combined an acceptance of all local cults with a moral, intellectual and spiritual teaching that was recognisably Greek’ (ibid. 3, my emphasis). On his criticism of Porphyry see esp. Dillon 1973: 28-9. 67. Finamore-Dillon 2002: 7. At 20-1 n. 52 they report inaccurate quoting. 68. Athanassiadi 1999: 149; cf. Blumenthal 1993. 69. Finamore-Dillon 2002: 6-7 list his works and exegetical activities. See Blumenthal 1997 on his commentary activity. 70. E.g. Westerink 1990: lxvi, Mansfeld 1994: 10-11, 21, 31-3, 118-19. Sluiter 2000: 201. Chase (2003: 93) has suggested it already appears in Alexander and Porphyry (no source given). I would point to Harpocration (above, text to nn. 28-31) and ultimately to Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras (Baltussen 2004: 30).

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Notes to pages 153-158 71. Athanassiadi 1999: 149. The current edition of the Chaldaean Oracles is Theiler 1942 (id. 149 n. 1). 72. On the isagogical issues see Hadot 1978, Mansfeld 1994. 73. Porphyry’s Commentary on the Timaeus (reconstructed by Sodano 1964), a view endorsed by Dillon 1973: 54. For other forms of commentary see Chapter 1 nn. 30, 37, 45, 53, 58; below n. 96. 74. Dillon 1987: 878-80; id. 1973: 26ff. 75. Edwards 2006: 38 (based on Dillon 1973) lists the works, including many elucidations to Plato and Aristotle. For the point on exegetical principles see O’Meara 1989: 98-101. 76. Athanassiadi 1993: 4. 77. O’Meara 1989: 214-15. 78. In Phys. 60.7; 639.23; 642.18; 702.19; 767.20; 786.11; 787.4,11,27; 792.20; (793,22-3 = Sorabji 2004,2: 11 [e.18]); 795.3,6,16. 79. Urmson 1992: 31 n. 80. He would pay particular attention to Proclus’ reading of Iamblichus, see Watts 2006: 126-7. 81. Dodds 1963: xxiii (quoting from Marinus V.Procl. 12). 82. Van den Berg 2001, Saffrey 1984. 83. Cf. Hadot 2001, introd. xlviiff.; Dodds 1963; Barnes 1992 ‘Simplicius follows Proclus’. 84. See R.W. Sharples and P.J. van der Eijk, Nemesius, On the Nature of Man (forthcoming, Liverpool University Press 2008). 85. Lambertz 1987: 1-2 who distinguishes between lecture notes (‘Vorlesungsnachschriften’, 2) and commentary proper (‘von den Exegeten selbst redigierten Kommentare’ which Proclus himself calls hypomnêmata); cf. Dillon 1973: 54, Festugière 1963, Lamberz 1987. Early use was noted for Calvenus Taurus, above n. 47. 86. See most recently Cleary (2006: 147): ‘it is clear that Proclus is conscious of standing at the end of a long tradition of interpreting Plato’s Timaeus that goes right back to the Academy, and obviously this tradition dominates his whole interpretation of the dialogue’. A translation is being produced by H. Tarrant and D. Baltzly for Cambridge University Press (so far vols 1 and 3 have appeared). 87. See Dodds xxviii n. 4, who adds examples from Damascius Life of Isidore 48.11ff., 92.26ff. and Simplicius in DC 370.29. Cf. Watts 2004 and 2006. 88. E.g. his view on kat’ ousian on which see Cleary 2006: 147. 89. Westerink 1987. 90. Saffrey 1992. 91. Urmson 1992: 32 n. 24; plausible given the mention of Rep. at 613.1. Cf. Sorabji 1988: 207 on Proclus’ interpretation of place as a ‘kind of body’ (614.10). 92. This, as Urmson points out, is ironic, since Simplicius’ references to other texts are quite vague. But the whole section shows that other authors/texts are involved: Chaldaean Oracles, Timaeus, Theophrastus. 93. Falcon 2005 (§4). See also the opening quotation of this chapter. 94. On his influence see Dodds 1963; Gersh 1986, 2005. The growing literature on Proclus is now conveniently listed at http://www.hiw.kuleuven.ac.be/dwmc/plato/proclus/probiblio.htm Simplicius acknowledges Syrianus as Proclus’ teacher at 618.27 (ton tou Lukiou Proklou kathêgemona). For further literature see Sorabji 1990: 500, 503. 95. D’Ancona 2002: 208-11. 96. For instance, lecture notes (‘from the master’s voice’, apo phônês), or

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Notes to pages 159-162 discussion divided into theôria and praxis (Olympiodorus, c. 650 CE), or interpretive paraphrase (Themistius, c. 317-87). Cf. above, p. 156. 97. Cf. Sluiter 2000. For the argument from riddles in Christian circles see Grant 1957: 120 (ainigma). 98. O’Meara 1989: 120-1. 99. O’Meara 1989: 122. He adds: ‘Aristotle, we are told, owed his book On Generation and Corruption to the “Pythagorean” Ocellus; his physics in general to Plato’s Pythagorean, Timaeus; his Categories to Archytas.’ (See his n. 11: 175.8-11; 192.16-21; cf. in Hermog. II 58, 23-5.) According to Suda (s.v.) Syrianus also wrote on the agreement (sumphônia) between Platonic and Pythagorean philosophy (lost). See Karamanolis 2006: 251-2. 100. O’Meara 1989: 123, 127-8. 101. O’Meara 1989: 125. 102. The most common epithets for (near-)contemporaries are philosophos, daimonios, and thaumasios; it is not clear whether Simplicius is adding any himself. 103. See Chapter 4 n. 57. For Syrianus and Alexander see Luna 2001b: 72-98. In Gillian Clarke’s review of Athanassiadi (CR 50-1 [2000] 33) a similar comment from Isidore to Marinus is mentioned: when asked whether he should publish his extensive commentary on Plato’s Philebus (Philos. hist. F38A), Isidore is reported to have said that Proclus’ commentary on the Philebus was quite sufficient; Marinus burnt the book. Here, however, the reason was probably that Marinus was considered a mediocre philosopher. 104. Previous ACA volumes (index) have limited comments in terms of such oblique or subtle influences on the writing style and interpretation of Simplicius by Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syrianus. Richard Sorabji pointed out to me (personal communication, email Nov. 2006) that for Epictetus it has been noted that there are long Neoplatonist excursûs and short Epictetan paraphrases (see BrennanBrittain 2002), while in the In Cat. 5-6 Iamblichus is the reason for a very different style, and one that is well marked (De Haas 2001a). 105. Perhaps it ends at line 34 kaitoi or at 35 the second mêpote (although mêpote usually introduces Simplicius’ opinion, cf. line 25 and above p. 127). Note the verb paralambanein appearing here four times (verbal form: lines 28, 30, 32; adjectival form: line 34), cf. Syrianus in Metaph. 62.19; 184.25; 185.6; 192.23. Also note the idea of ‘turning’ (trepô) as ‘changing’ (atreptos, katatropê, line 29; according to a TLG search, the latter occurs only here), cf. his in Metaph. 42.3 (atreptôs); and finally aparaleipton for which LSJ gives this passage in Simplicius (123.34) as well as Syrianus in Metaph. 132.23 (cf. 140.17; 150.4, all adverbial) and Proclus in Parm. p. 833 Stallbaum [= 1061.17 Cousin; cf. 1062.8 and in Remp. 2.2.9 Kroll (adverbial)]. 106. in Phys. 15.11, 20.6, 20.9, 37.21, 54.6, 182.3, 207.34 etc. (a total of 39 cases for in Phys. and in DC). 107. On this issue David Konstan noted (email Nov. 15, 2006): ‘there is the question of different stylistic registers for different kinds of argument or exegesis, and here I can confirm your intuition: Aspasius’ discussion of the nature of emotion, for instance, is in quite a different style from his line by line comments on Aristotle’s text, which are in the prosy manner of the commentators generally.’ I am grateful to him for sharing his thoughts on this matter, some of which have been incorporated into this section. 108. Lamberz 1987: 6. 109. As David Konstan reminded me in an email exchange (see n. 107) on the style and teaching practices in the commentator tradition.

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Notes to pages 163-168 110. Athanassiadi 1999: 30ff. A different take on the event in Sorabji 2005: 205f. 111. Hankinson 2004: 6, who also refers to in Phys. 1361-63 where Ammonius’ arguments are summarised. 112. Combès 1986 (introduction to his Budé edition). 113. Sorabji in Urmson 1992: 2-3. 114. After Sorabji 1983: 208 with nn. 40-5; cf. id. 2004, 2: 13(a). 115. Sorabji 1983: 209-10. On Theophrastus’ role in late Platonism, see also §3.2. 116. I am preparing a translation of in Phys. 1.5-9 for the ACA series (forthcoming). 117. In addition, the indices of the CAG volumes are known to be flawed (R. Todd 1974). One recent contribution on this part of the commentary is Tornau 2000 (on Moderatus at 230.34ff.). 118. The total number (160) suggests his personal engagement is higher than often suspected. One particularly clear example is found at in Phys. 946.24-7 (noted by Champion 2004, 22 n. 12): ‘It occurred to me, indeed, both to pose this puzzle in this way and to solve it, since I have found it in none of the commentators, but if anyone should address [it] in a more plausible way, he wins as a friend rather than an enemy [cf. Plato Tim. 54A5]’ (tr. Konstan [ACA] 1989: 40). 119. On the latter’s cosmology and the use of akra etc. in the mapping out of the world see Dillon 1987: 900. See also in Phys. 206.25, 220.30 (with notes in Baltussen forthcoming-2 [ACA]). 120. See Blumenthal 1996 on Themistius’ relation to Aristotle and Plato. 121. The first two are extant in Greek (see Todd 1996, 2004), the last survives only in Hebrew (Hankinson 2002a: 121 n. 226). As to precedents for paraphrase Sluiter (2000: 200) points to Plato’s account of Iliad 1 in the Republic. 122. Wildberg 1987a: 83 n. 93 refers to Phys. I.7 at Cael. 279a17. 123. We seem to have here a cluster of the kind discussed earlier (§4.1): Simplicius exhibits a specific knowledge of comments on specific topics from different earlier exegetes of Aristotle. 124. At in Phys. 422.20 Aspasius’ and Themistius’ text are said to concur. 125. Fuller account in Todd 1996: 2-7. 126. On his commentaries see Smith 1978, Mansfeld 1994, chs 4-5, Sluiter 1995, Vallance 1999: 230-1. 127. At in Phys. 708.28 he mentions ‘the eighth book of his On demonstration’ (Apodeiktikês ). This Galenic work, already rare by the time of Hunain ibn Ishaq around 850 CE (Nutton 2004: 6-7), does not survive except in a few fragments (id. 222); Nemesius On the nature of man ch. 21 mentions On demonstration book 3. The limited knowledge of Galen’s medical work in the commentators has been pointed out by Todd 1977. Cf. Vallance 1999: 230-1. 128. See Mansfeld 1994: 161-73 for Galen’s comments on the requirements for a commentator. As Galen only appears in the commentary on the Physics, one suspects that Porphyry is the source. Moraux 1985 has made it highly plausible that Porphyry wrote a detailed commentary on books 1-4, and a summary paraphrase of books 5-8. The praise for Galen’s as ‘most learned’ in three out of six passages and with three different adjectives, and logic as one of the areas would fit Porphyry’s profile and interests. 129. It is not clear which work Galen’s ideas on this point come from: Sorabji discusses his ideas on time and motion in his study on time (1983: 82-3, 271), but considers the evidence from a late Arabic source suspect (83), and thinks it possible that Galen followed an interpretation like that of Atticus, in which disorderly motion of the universe precedes the creation of orderly motion (270-1).

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Notes to pages 169-177 130. For the phrase ‘framework of consensus’ see Dillon 1973: 28. 131. Gerson 2005a plausibly argues that the interpretation of Aristotle has been rather one-sided (for a good example see 67ff. regarding On philosophy) and offers his interpretation as a way to counter-balance that dominant approach (290). See also the very useful synopsis in Share 2003 ‘Introduction’. For a balanced review see Baltzly 2005. 132. Karamanolis 2006: ch. 2. 133. On all these issues see esp. Karamanolis 2006: 229-41. 134. Hankinson 2002a: 8. 6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology 1. See Baltussen 2007a for a fuller argument. A seminal article on philosophical polemic is Owen 1983. 2. Cf. Hankinson 2002a: 3 ‘when he deals with Philoponus, Simplicius’ normally dry style becomes greatly enlivened with the characteristic Greek relish for personal abuse’. 3. Cf. Watts 2006, discussed above, §5.2. 4. Sorabji 1983: 193-209 and 1988: 106-22; Hoffmann 1987a; Wildberg 1987a: ch. 11; Wildberg 1990; Hankinson 2002, 2004; Mueller 2004. For Simplicius’ discussion of the Peripatetic Xenarchus, see the illuminating case study by Hankinson 2002-3. 5. I am thus developing an idea already mooted in Hoffmann 1987b: 63. For some general comments on Platonists and Christianity see Sorabji 2004 (vol. 2): 19-25 and ch. 5. 6. Frede 1999. For the polemical nature of medical commentaries on Hippocratic works, see von Staden Herophilus ch. 9, 14 [after Vallance 1999: 231 n. 18]. This section is based on Baltussen 2007a, §§1-3. 7. See Cherniss 1977. 8. Janko 2002-3: 7-8; Lamberton-Keaney 1992. 9. See Dorandi 1991. For a thumbnail history of exegesis see Obbink 2003: 177-8. 10. Cf. Mansfeld 1986 and Nehamas 1990. 11. There were no rules of fair play in debate (Long 1992: 50). The seminal article on polemic in this context is Owen 1983. See also Baltussen 2003b, 2004. 12. For a more detailed account of the role of polemic in the development of philosophical commentary see Baltussen 2007a. 13. Sluiter 2000. 14. I paraphrase and quote from Wallis 1971: 101 (referring to Synesius Epist. 105) and 102. 15. Sorabij in Wildberg 1987a: 20. 16. My main guides in this difficult territory are de Labriolle 1948, Momigliano 1963a, Dodds 1970 (1965), Wallis 1971: 100-10, Fowden 1982, O’Meara 1982, Lane Fox 1986, Hadot 1978, Athanassiadi 1993, Pearson 1996: 55-71, MacMullen 1997, Smith 2004, Rhee 2005 (ch. 2), Edwards 2006: 146-61. 17. Wallis 1971: 100-1. 18. See Pliny the Younger, Epist. 10.96, in which he refers to it as ‘inflexible stubbornness’, ‘depraved superstition’, or a ‘contagious superstition’ (pertinaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem } superstitionem pravam et immodicam } superstitio istius contagio).

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Notes to pages 177-182 19. Rhee 2005: 50-61. For the reception of Socrates in Christian circles see Frede 2006. 20. Discussed most recently by T.D. Barnes 1994, Berchman 2005. See also De Labriolle 1948 and below. 21. For Porphyry see Barnes 1994: 65; for Theodosius, Momigliano 1963b: 10. 22. De Labriolle 1942: 118-19. Cf. Numenius who called Plato an ‘atticizing Mozes’ (ibid. 228) on which see also Whittaker 1967. For the enormous range of criticisms of Christian doctrine see the informative paper by Courcelle 1963 (most primary sources in his notes). Synesius’ struggle with ‘enemies of culture’ (e.g. monks) epitomises the problem of ‘the emergence of professional philosophy within the Christian Church’ (Marrou 1963: 144-5). 23. Athanassiadi 1993: 1. Her paper discusses the evidence in Damascius, see below. MacMullen 1997 covers some aspects of persecution (esp. his ch. 1). See also Benko 1980, Bradbury 1994. 24. In his discussion of the problematic term ‘school’ (cf. Chapter 5 n. 65) Marrou makes the interesting point (1963: 134 with n. 3) that in a papyrus from c. 490 CE (P. Cairo Maspero 67295, i.15) there is talk of ‘museums’ and ‘academies’ in the plural (mouseious, akadêmias). It shows the diversity of religious groups active at the time. Cf. Haas 1997: 131-2. 25. See Katz 1954. 26. On the extant fragments, see T.D. Barnes 1994 and Berchman 2005. Cf. Wallis 1971: 101. 27. See esp. Dzielska 2001 (1995): 79-93. On the violence in Alexandria in the fourth and fifth centuries see also Athanassiadi 1993: 13-17 (Hypatia at 16), Haas 1997: 128-72 (for Hypatia see 313-16). 28. See Marrou 1963: 136-7, who mentions a story in Zacharias in which ‘pagan students lynched one of their fellows, Paralios, who was about to become a convert to Christianity for having dared to defame publicly their great goddess Isis’ (137). 29. Haas 1997: 130-8 on problems of defining the pagan and Christian communities. 30. Fowden 1982. 31. De Labriolle 1942: 262-4; Dodds 1970 (1965): 108-9. 32. Athanassiadi 1999: 30. Cf. Synesius’ report in his letter from c. 400 CE (below, n. 39). 33. Athanassiadi 1999: 27-9. For the issue of whether or not he betrayed his school members see id. 31 (we will never know for sure) and Sorabji 2005: 205-8 (the concession only concerned the religious, not the doctrinal). 34. Watts 2006: 111. See Marinus V.Procl. 15. 35. Watts 2006: 128, 136-8; at 140 and nn. he mentions that Damascius had earlier chosen exile over cooperation with the hostile Christian community. 36. Fowden 1982: 38 (italics his). Cf. Brown 1971, 1998. 37. Dodds 1970 (1965): 132. 38. Dodds 1970 (1965): 120. Cf. below, n. 83 (Rist). 39. Dodds 1970 (1965): 122. Cf. MacMullen 1997: 78-90. Momigliano 1963a. 40. Cf. Haas 1997: 154f. For a useful assessment of Synesius’ position see Marrou 1963. 41. See Athanassiadi 1993: 6-7 for this quote (n. 27) and many more illuminating comments on the nature of the Platonist community as an ascetic caste. 42. See Athanassiadi 1993: 11 with n. 66. 43. Athanassiadi (1993: 1) puts it far more elegantly: ‘no pagan church emerged out of the turmoil to canonise its dead and expound a theology of martyrdom’.

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Notes to pages 182-189 44. Hoffmann 1987a: 57; 1987b: 83 n. 145 on in DC 91.7-13. See also Wildberg 1987b: 197. 45. On the hymns and their philosophical role see Van den Berg 2001; a very useful (but far from comprehensive) treatment of prayer in late Platonism is available in Dillon 2002b. 46. Vita Isidori (Photian epitome) 17, see Athanassiadi 1993: 2 with n. 4. 47. Dillon 2002b: 279. 48. This brief summary is based on Dillon 2002b: 286-90 which has more detail. 49. Dillon 2002b: 287. 50. Dillon 2002b: 292. On their treatment of Homer as ‘theologian’ see Lamberton 1986. 51. For the philosophical arguments see esp. Sorabji 1983, ch. 13. 52. Verbeke 1982: 45. On the importance of Synesius for Alexandrian Platonism see Marrou 1963. Cf. Wildberg 1987: 27-31, 70-3. 53. Cf. Athanassiadi 1993: 6 on Damascius’ judgement of Horapollo’s conversion. The verb does not occur in Simplicius. 54. Porphyry’s work is dated by Barnes 1994. De Labriolle 1948: 243-4. First under Constantine (mentioned in a letter after the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE, see Socrates Hist. Eccl. I.9) and then again under Valentinian II and Theodosius in 448 CE. Clearly some copies had survived the first ban. 55. Verrycken 1990; MacCoull 1995. See Pearson 1999: 12 n. 11 for other critics of Verrycken. 56. Bradbury 1994, Pearson 1999: 127-31, Lang 2005. Marrou (1963: 148) notes that Zacharias Scholasticus (c. 485 CE) already criticised Ammonius, son of Hermeias, in his Ammonius or the creation of the world. Cosmas Indicopleustes also attacked Philoponus. 57. Pearson 1999: 128. 58. See in DC 271.19-20, 1363.8-12; Verbeke 1982: 46, McKirahan 2000: 152-4. 59. See Hoffmann 1987b: 76-9, Baltzly 2002, and Mueller 2004: 131 n. 43. 60. Hoffmann 1987b. 61. Pearson 1999: 11. 62. Hoffmann 1987a: 60-1. On the remarkable richness of the vocabulary see id. 62 n. 34. 63. Hoffmann 1987b: 60. Cf. Dodds 1970 (1965): 116-19 about how close their views were. 64. On the dating see Evrard 1953 and Wildberg 1987b: 200-7. 65. Cf. Hoffmann 1987b: 63 n. 43. I note that in Hadot 1990a (Commentaire sur les Cat. p. 169) the table shows how both Simplicius and Philoponus are exceptions to the general sequence of isagogical topics. Simplicius claimed (in DC 26.17-19) he never met Philoponus (cf. Sorabji 1987: 23-4). 66. Pearson 1999: 137. 67. Cf. Cameron 1969: 25 ‘} the leisure to refute Philoponus’. 68. As is for instance Tarán’s position, see above, Introduction, n. 43. 69. See Hankinson 2006: 96 n. 192 indicating the possible wordplay on Philoponus. Cf. Hoffmann 1987b: 83, where he points to the punning on Philoponus’ name by the third council of Constantinople in 860 CE (mataioponos: ‘man whose labour is lost’), a sign that his efforts were considered fruitless. Ridiculing people for their name is clearly an ancient game. 70. in Phys. 291.21-2: Alexandros philoponôs lexin tina Geminou paratithêsin

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Notes to pages 189-198 ek tês epitomês tôn Posidôniou Meteôrologikôn exêgêseôs tas aphormas apo Aristotelous labousan. 71. See p. 111 with n. 20 and pp. 123-9. Some reasons for long quotations from the Presocratics are given above, §2.1.1. 72. Cf. Sorabji in Urmson 2002: 1. The second topic is in a way a ‘prequel’ to the debate of the eternity of the universe. 73. Noted by Lautner in Urmson 2002: 148 n. 40. Cf. in Phys. 526.16-26, where he is used to show how understanding mathematical objects helps in understanding that differences in place are naturally determined, hence that place is something. 74. Not surprisingly this issue is also treated in Proclus, in his Elements of theology which was set out with mathematical precision as Lautner has pointed out (Urmson 2002 n. 355) namely in ‘El. theol. 6; 64; 113-15; 135-9; 149’. 75. ‘Let it be granted that a straight line can be drawn from any point to any other point’, i.e. it has two ends and is therefore finite. 76. Additional ‘over-long’ quotations can be found, for instance, at 753.10ff. which has 20 lines quoted on the topic of time and contains information on different manuscript readings (antigrapha); 765.4ff. contains two quotations and a reference to Themistius; 964.14ff. has 12 lines quoted and hints at possible distortion in Alexander (suggested by the participle helkôn) and mentions Theophrastus and Strato; 968.16ff. has 37 lines quoted (the topic is linked to 966) and shows there is not all agreement among commentators (again mention of Themistius). See also Appendix II B. 77. Briefly discussed above, Chapter 4, text before n. 75. 78. See Sorabji 2004-2: chs 19-24; Haas 1997: 152-6. 79. On the holy men see Fowden 1982, Brown 1998. 80. MacMullen (1997: 85-6 and n. 24) helpfully illustrates the semantic shift of the word philosophia to ‘ascetic piety’ by this time. It meant that philosophy (in the traditional sense) and religious doctrines were regarded on equal footing, and just two among many ‘schools of thought’ (see also n. 22 and Syrianus’ comment in the text to n. 41). 81. Cf. above, p. 180 (with n. 38, Dodds’ quotation on logismos and pistis). 82. See Dodds 1970 (1965): 121-2 for a more detailed account. 83. Rist 1967: ch. 17. 84. MacMullen 1997: 85 translating Anon. Asclepius 1.12f. 85. Rist 1967: 240, paraphrasing in Phys. 5.19. 86. We can compare the later Prolegomena philosophiae of commentators such as Elias and David which ‘are often strikingly reminiscent of more renowned examples of ancient protreptic literature’ (Wildberg 1990: 34 and 42). Epilogue. Simplicius and Greek Philosophy: The Last Pagan Gospel? 1. I owe both the quotation and the clarification to Michael Gilleland who publishes his thoughts on obiter lecta at http://laudatortemporisacti.blogspot.com. 2. The irksome features of modern commentary are fragmentation, parallellomania, and the reference-book function, as Gibson 2002 has well brought out. 3. See, e.g., Grant 1999. Often religious doctrines were referred to as ‘philosophies’ (plural), e.g. Eunapius Vit. philos. 5.3.10, P. Cairo Maspero 67295, i.15 (see Chapter 6 n. 24), Syrianus in Metaph. 81.9 (quoted above, §5.3). 4. The apocryphal letter of Alexander of Macedon to Aristotle reproaching him

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Notes to pages 198-209 for publishing the Metaphysics is a good example (in Phys. 8.16ff.; cf. Plutarch Life of Alexander). On the pagan holy men, see Brown 1980, Fowden 1982. 5. Most 1999a: ix. 6. It might be interesting to cross-reference these passages with the occurrence of ‘I’ (egô). 7. Compare Chapter 4 n. 4 and text thereto. 8. See above, p. 61 and Baltussen 2000: ch. 2. 9. Key phrases are: exetastikên tou Aristotelous akribeian, diarthrôsai, epikheirêma, ennoias. 10. A TLG-E (online) search produced these results: 80 occurrences of didaskei-, 60 occurrences of didax- for in DC and in Phys. 11. Hadot 1995; accepted in Hoffmann 2006. Comparable statement in Sorabji 1990: 5. 12. Cameron 1969: 24-5. 13. in Phys. 601.10-13, in Cat. 7.23-32 (quoted in §1.2.1). 14. The concept and example are from Aristotle Metaphysics 3.2. 15. Cf. Chapter 1 n. 3. 16. Cf. Westerink 1962, Wallis 1971: 19. 17. Baltussen 2000: ch. 2. 18. Cf. pp. 182-3 on Plotinus and Proclus (including in DC 485.21 which mentions a work by Aristotle On prayer). 19. See Karamanolis 2006: 57n. 20. Urmson 1992: 86-7 n. 4 (based on Westerink 1990). For Syrianus and Proclus harmonisation was far less of a concern than it was to Simplicius, as Sorabji has noted: ‘Those least inclined to harmonise were perhaps Syrianus and his pupil Proclus’ (2004, 3: 37). Syrianus was interested in harmonising Plato with Orpheus and Pythagoras (see Chapter 5 n. 99). 21. This section builds on and expands my previous discussions of Simplicius’ method (Baltussen 2002c, id. 2003) and Hoffmann 1987a, 1987b, 2000, 2006, De Haas 2001a, Chase 2003. I note that Rappe 2000, although she contributes much to our understanding of exegetical strategies in Neoplatonism, hardly ever mentions Simplicius (see her Index s.v.). 22. Rashed 1997 and forthcoming. 23. For some clear examples see e.g. O’Brien 1969; Gaskin 1997: 100 n. 23, 104 n. 33; De Haas 2001a: n. 155; Rashed 1997.

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282

Index Locorum References to page and note numbers of this book appear in bold. Bold italic numbers indicate that the passage is translated on that page. AENEAS OF GAZA

AULUS GELLIUS

Theophrastus 12.1ff.: 146

Attic Nights 13.5: 91; 19.6: 147

AGATHIAS

BOETHIUS

Histories 2.29.1ff.: 49; 2.28.1: 230n.97; 2.31.3-4: 228n.101

Commentary on Aristotle’s On interpretation 12.3-16: 236n.9

ALEXANDER

CICERO

De finibus V.12-13: 93

Commentary on Metaphysics 32.16: 80; 83.9-11: 239n.73 Commentary on Topics 27.12-14: 108 Quaestiones 3.12: 116

DAMASCIUS

Life of Isidore 48.11ff.: 248n.87 Philosophical History (Athanassiadi) 118B: 163 Problems and Solutions on the Principles 1.24.14-15: 233n.59; 1.54: 165; 1.150.1: 70; 1.214.3: 233n.59 Theological Arithmetic 16: 165

AMMONIUS

Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 7.10-11: 158-9 ANAXAGORAS (DK)

A35: 79; A46: 80; B1: 79; B11-12: 80; B13: 80; B14: 80

DAVID (ELIAS)

Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagogê proem: 152

ANONYMOUS

Asclepius 1.12f.: 195 ANONYMOUS

DIOGENES LAERTIUS

1.16: 79; 2.16 and 23: 234n.89; 3.65-7: 227n.59, 246n.35; 5.36: 93; 5.39: 96, 240n.94; 5.42-50: 237n.21; 5.46: 58; 5.48: 58; 5.58, 61: 97, 105; 5.64: 97; 8.65: 165

Commentary on Theaetetus col. 2.11ff.: 145; col. 3.29-37: 145; col. 3.37-8: 145; col. 3.40: 145 ARISTOTLE

Categories 15a13-33: 98 History of Animals 3.8: 37 Metaphysics 985a17-20: 80; 986b12-17: 70 Nicomachean Ethics 1096a14-17: 130 On Generation and Corruption 314a18-19: 65, 80 On the heavens 2.12: 37 Physics 184a14: 37; 184b25-85a1: 70; 187a21: 77; 188a5-18: 81; 191a7: 151; 200b21: 37; 202a14: 228n.61; 208b11: 97; 223a24: 238n.52; 256b24-6: 80; 279b17-21: 191 Topics 101a26-36: 108-9

ELIAS

Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 107.24-5: 225n.15 EMPEDOCLES (DK)

A28: 78; A86: 78; A92: 78; B1: 77; B17: 66, 77, 78, 228n.78; B21: 78; B22: 78; B24: 165; B27: 76; B29: 76; B38: 77; B48: 77; B90: 77; B109: 78; B115, 117: 5, 77, 78; B124: 77; B134: 76, 78; B157: 165 EUDEMUS OF RHODES

283

Fragments (Wehrli) 32-3: 239n.66; 33b: 167; 34: 101; 36: 239n.66; 37a: 100; 43: 100; 44: 100;

Index Locorum 79-80: 103; 98: 101; 100: 100; 122b: 100; 188: 237n.37

PLOTINUS

Enneads 1.1: 150; 1.8: 150; 2.1: 151; 2.4.7.2-4: 79, 150; 2.4.8,12: 247n.56; 2.4.10,42: 247n.56; 2.4.12,3: 247n.56; 2.5: 150; 2.9.10.12-14: 175-6; 3.5.9: 185; 3.2.7: 223n.35; 3.7.13.13-18: 247n.61; 3.8.11.40: 68; 4.8.1: 151, 232n.27; 4.8.3: 47-8; 5.1.6: 76; 5.1.8: 133, 232n.27; 5.1.9.1: 80-1, 33, 232n.27; 5.3.15.28-30: 68; 5.3.13.1: 68; 5.9.1: 70; 6.3.27: 98

EUNAPIUS

Lives of philosophers and sophists IV.1.3: 152; IV.6.13-15: 152; 460: 226n.30 EUSEBIUS

Praeparatio Evangelica 4.7.1: 143 GALEN

PHP 5.3.31: 67 De comp. medic. 13.455.11: 67 HERMIAS

On Plato’s Phaedrus 275A-C: 47 IAMBLICHUS

PLUTARCH OF CHAERONEA

Against Colotes 1114F: 74 Aristides 26.4: 66 De fort. 98F: 79 De Stoic. Repugn. 1051E: 67 On the obsolescence of oracles 418C: 165 Roman Questions 288b: 77 Sulla 26.2.2: 236n.9

Vita Pythagorae (Klein) 29.162,3-4: 155 Theologia Arithmetica 20.7: 165 JULIAN

Letter 61c (423c): 169 MARINUS

V.Procl. 1: 155;12-13: 226n.36, 248n.81; 15: 156; 19: 183 NEMESIUS

[?] PLUTARCH

On the nature of man 21: 250n.127 OLYMPIODORUS

Consolation to Apollonius 115E: 67 PORPHYRY

Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias 1,7-19: 235n.104

Fragments (Smith) 303F (= Eus. PE 4.7.1): 143 Quaest. Hom. Il. 8.323: 42 Testimonia (Smith) 152F: 35 V.Plot. 1: 247n.49; 4: 148; 5: 48; 14.4-14: 246n.46; 14.5-8: 150; 14.14: 32, 109; 14.20: 31, 32, 89, 144; 15: 198; 20: 47; 24: 152

PARMENIDES (DK)

A7: 72; A34: 72; B1: 71; B2: 71; B6-9: 71; B8: 68, 69, 70-1 ST PAUL

2 Corinthians 3:6: 143; Romans 2:29; 7:5-6: 143 PHILOPONUS

PRISCIAN OF LYDIA

Fragments (Wildberg) 54: 185 PLATO

Apology 26D-E: 79; 40A: 155 Phaedo 83E: 240n.89; 97B-C: 80 Phaedrus 276-8: 47, 48, 187; 279B-C: 183 Protagoras 316D-E: 231n.4; 318B: 240n.89; 341E1-2: 225n.15 Republic 548D: 47 Seventh letter 342-4: 47 Sophist 217E: 240n.89 Theaetetus 144A: 226n.35; 176A: 196 Timaeus 27C: 183; 32C: 59; 46D: 37; 57Eff.: 150

Metaphrasis 7.20-4: 236n.9 PROCLUS

Platonic Theology 1.1: 141, 170 Commentary on Plato’s Republic 2.198-202: 157 (cf. 248n.91) Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (Diehl) 1.16.6-12: 47; 2.277,8: 94; 3.9,22: 155; 3.63.30: 236n.8; 120.8-22: 237n.35; 1.305.6: 246n.41 PROCOPIUS

Wars 2.3-4: 230n.101 SENECA

Letters 108.23: 31 SIMPLICIUS

Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 1.1-2: 34; 1.1-4: 136;

PLINY THE YOUNGER

Letters 10.96: 251n.18

284

Index Locorum 103, 104; 121.9: 104; 126.3: 165; 129.16: 101; 129.32: 189; 137.15: 71; 140.29: 53; 144.25-8: 44, 45, 57, 66; 144.29ff.: 71; 147.28: 71; 149.32: 96; 150.25: 101; 151.6, 21, 24: 81; 153.25ff.: 77; 154.3-157.24: 77, 81; 154.14: 77; 154.16: 96; 154.17: 77; 155.4-7: 81; 155.26: 79; 157.7-9: 80; 158.1-159.4: 77, 78; 159.13-26: 78; 160.1-11: 78; 160.25-6: 81; 161.23-162.2: 81; 162.11-12: 82; 162.28: 79; 163.10: 82; 163.16-18: 82; 164.11-166.13: 82; 165.5-7: 83; 65.22: 83; 166.17f.: 236n.17; 166.3: 83; 167.33ff.: 239n.71; 169.24: 118, 167; 178.8-11: 42; 179.31: 71; 184.29: 162; 188.30-1: 75; 191.13-17: 160; 192.4: 161; 192.14: 160, 161; 192.14-21: 119; 192.29: 159, 160; 193.16-19: 160; 193.4: 160; 196.10ff.: 164; 197.12-15: 165; 206.25: 165; 207.7: 39; 207.19, 22, 26: 162, 165; 209.33-210.5: 165; 210.28: 101; 1.20ff.: 123; 213.24: 159; 213.24ff.: 161; 214.13: 161; 216.10: 161; 216.28: 101; 229.12: 150; 233.3: 67; 234.25-9: 123; 241.22: 159; 258.16: 238n.46; 259.3ff.: 35; 273.15: 39; 274.23: 124; 291.21-2: 253n.70; 297.8: 113; 297.8-10: 107; 300.27: 80; 300.32: 80; 300-1: 80; 308.12: 39; 329.19: 39; 331.10: 66, 31; 332.20: 38, 113; 342.20: 124; 349.27: 39; 358.8: 75; 363.16: 46; 374.32: 39; 378.20-1: 111; 381.29: 75; 393.13: 38; 394.3-5: 35; 395.14-15: 35; 395.20-1: 34; 396.20: 124; 398.32: 150; 399.9: 127; 399.19: 42, 127; 400.1: 118, 127, 167; 400.7: 42; 403.9-10: 150, 190; 403.14-22: 189; 404.14: 228n.61; 406.28: 162; 407.4-6: 118;407.4-16: 35; 407.27: 127; 413.1: 96; 413.5: 96; 413.25: 162; 414.15-18: 128; 414.17: 118; 414.17-18: 167;

1.7: 154; 2.6-8: 136; 2.23-32: 6, 33, 120, 199; 2.30-3.4: 138; 3.4-6: 53; 3.4-11: 138; 3.13: 34; 4.8-16: 34; 4.17ff.: 34; 5.27-31: 34; 5.32ff.: 34; 6.6-18: 56; 7.1-22: 104; 7.6-8: 152; 7.23-32: 6, 33, 85; 7.26-30: 28, 115; 7.27-9: 53; 8.15: 154; 9.5-11.1: 154; 10.25: 96; 23.13: 159; 41.22ff.: 41; 64.20-5: 66; 72.10: 160; 107.5ff.: 41; 108.22: 150; 127.12: 151; 164.4-5: 159, 160; 187.10: 144; 191.10: 151; 331.23ff.: 190; 346.14: 97; 352.22-4: 44; 415.15-16: 6n.17, 96; 428.3: 238n.54; 429.13: 238n.54; 433.20: 98; 433.28-9: 98; 435.17-436.3: 98-9; 435.26: 96; 435.27-8: 236n.17; 733.4: 150; 790-2: 150 Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 1.1-3: 154; 2.5: 113; 3.13ff.: 154; 4.22-5: 117; 5.18-20: 182; 6.31: 40; 6.5-10: 34; 7.3: 73; 8.19: 152; 9.7: 55, 73, 77, 96; 11.16-17: 102; 19.5: 113; 20.8: 75; 20.19: 58; 20.29-21.19: 64, 73; 21.14: 61; 21.16-19: 73; 21.19: 152; 22.20: 73; 25.6: 95; 25.19-21: 75; 25.21-6: 78; 28.30-2: 58; 28.32-4: 112, 228n.77, 231n.14; 29.3-5: 45, 112; 30.2: 71; 31.19: 76; 36.24-31: 83; 36.25: 67; 36.30: 55; 37.3: 84; 37.7-8: 84; 38.29: 74; 39.10ff.: 72; 39.12-20: 72; 39.18: 72; 42.5-26: 239n.66; 42.13-17: 167; 43.28-9: 167; 44.1: 167; 44.11: 113; 44.28, 32: 39; 48.6-7: 101; 48.26-7: 101, 103, 104; 48.26-9: 103; 60.8: 38; 60.27: 53; 62.12: 166; 63.19: 166; 63.19-20: 103; 70.5: 42; 70.10: 166; 70.32: 118; 71.5: 124; 74.29-30: 103; 77.9-10: 122; 77.11: 84; 80.15: 67, 111, 193; 80.16-17: 45; 83.19: 124; 84.22: 124; 107.5: 41; 107.12: 13; 110.23: 129; 111.15-17: 43; 115.11: 100; 115.12: 96; 116.2-4: 73; 116.6-18: 72 116.25ff.: 71, 72; 117.2ff.: 71-2; 118.3-20: 102,

285

Index Locorum 789.1: 96, 97; 790.30: 150; 790.34-5: 150; 795.4-5: 155, 156; 795.33-5: 139; 801.3-6: 35; 801.13-16: 34; 802.8-11: 34; 854.20: 118, 167; 860.19: 95, 96, 236n.17; 860.19-861.23: 91; 861.23: 96; 864.15: 16, 167; 888.16: 101; 918.13: 118; 920.4-922.19: 35; 923.7-924.4: 35; 923.10-16: 228n.60; 923.15-16: 35; 924.5-6: 35; 924.6: 35; 924.7: 36; 924.18: 101; 930.34: 100; 934.30-1: 96; 936.25: 40; 937.25ff.: 124; 946.24-5: 136; 950.4: 118, 167; 964.14-15: 244n.80; 964.30: 96, 237n.39; 968.30: 167; 969.14-24: 118; 986.5-6: 96; 986.30: 118; 1024.6: 124; 1036.13: 101, 102; 1036.13-15: 36, 238n.60; 1037.4: 36; 1039.13: 167; 1051.5: 41; 1072.8: 150; 1079.12: 150; 1111.29-1116.14: 36; 1120.20: 76; 1125.11: 53; 1129.29-1130.3: 187; 1130.3-6: 118; 1132.26-7: 150; 1165.20: 150; 1174.29: 165; 1206.27: 101; 1236.1: 96, 237n.36, 39; 1236.1-2: 117; 1244.15: 39; 1253.7: 118, 167; 1254.22-3: 76; 1292.2-3: 112; 1253.7: 118, 167; 1262.3-5: 244n.80; 1318.10-15: 44, 57, 66; 1325.24: 53; 1326.39: 38; 1328.11: 38; 1333.33: 43; 1355.28ff.: 100; 1358.5-8: 36; 1358.8-9: 34; 1358.39-40: 125; 1359.13-15: 36; 1363.8: 163; 1363.11-12: 163 Commentary on Aristotle’s On the heavens 1.1-3: 117, 154; 1.5-6: 37; 1.8: 58, 236n.17; 2.5: 37; 2.6: 159; 2.8-9: 160; 2.17: 37; 3.11-4.5: 117; 3.14-16: 36; 3.19: 37; 3.30-4.4: 36; 4.5: 117; 4.26-7: 36, 117; 4.26-30: 117; 5.35-6: 117; 5.36-7: 117; 9.21: 38; 9.29: 36; 11.25: 67; 12.12: 151; 12.22: 238n.45; 20.21: 151; 22.18: 124; 24.19-20: 36; 30.26-34: 185; 37.33: 151; 41.7: 124; 42.18: 186; 44.9: 36; 45.5: 17; 51.5:

414.19: 39; 416.19: 40; 416.27-32: 40, 124; 422.20: 39; 422.22: 127; 423.12-21: 41; 423.14: 39; 423.21: 39; 423.24: 39; 424.14: 52; 427.34: 39, 41; 427.35: 152; 428.2: 39; 428.2-3: 152; 429.27: 39, 152; 430.3: 113; 431.5-6: 150; 432.17: 150; 433.13-18: 104; 433.14: 150; 434.36-7: 124; 436.13ff.: 40; 436.19: 39; 437.10: 124; 437.11: 121; 437.19: 39; 443.10: 124, 128; 449.5-17: 126; 450.32-3: 128; 450.32-6: 40; 457.12-13: 38, 124; 458.30: 77; 459.4-5: 127; 461.15: 38; 469.10: 124; 470.1: 162; 472.8: 39; 472.36: 124; 489.21: 112; 510.18-20: 190; 511.30-512.9: 190; 512.2-9: 190; 519.3-16: 35, 190; 526.16: 127; 526.17: 39 530.15: 38, 112; 530.16: 113; 530.16-23: 125; 533.28: 90; 538.6: 38; 563.29: 39; 566.18: 91; 573.19-23: 168; 583.10: 91; 601.1ff.: 96; 601.5-13: 199, 255n.13; 601.15: 155; 604.5: 96, 97; 604.6: 96; 606.33: 92; 611.11: 155, 156, 157; 612.5: 6, 96; 614.8: 157; 615.13ff.: 157; 616.26-32: 157; 616.31: 157; 618.26: 159; 618.27: 248n.94; 625.2: 139; 625.28: 163; 627.2: 163; 629.8-12: 164; 635.12: 159, 160; 636.8-13: 163; 637.25-30: 163; 639.14: 236n.17; 639.23: 154; 640.16-17: 87; 642.18: 92; 642.18f.: 96; 643.36-644.2: 157; 644.10-11: 163; 644.25: 101; 645.4-6: 163; 684.2: 118; 684.2-3: 167; 691.3: 40; 700.9: 111; 700.18: 91; 700.19: 91; 706.26: 150; 707.33-4: 241n.20; 708.27: 167; 708.28: 250n.127; 717.14-20: 103; 717.15: 104; 718.14-719.22: 168; 719.5-6: 168; 725.19-24: 103; 728.10-14: 118; 728.5: 127; 733.4: 150; 769.6: 150; 770.22-771.23: 191; 773.8ff.: 97, 200; 788.33-789.2: 97; 788.34-6: 90, 96; 788.36: 91;

286

Index Locorum 124; 55.1-12: 194; 58.14-15: 185; 62.11-12: 167; 62.12-13: 118, 166; 69.9-10: 166; 82.10-14: 45; 106.6: 169; 110.24: 37; 119.7-13: 187; 131.21: 166; 135.31-136.1: 187; 140.2-3: 57; 140.25-7: 75; 140.30-2: 44, 57; 140.32-3: 66; 168.17: 125; 168.18: 38; 169.28ff.: 37; 176.30-177.9: 167; 176.32: 118; 176.33-4: 113, 118; 188.6,26,30: 167; 190.15-20: 185; 201.7: 186; 201.26-8: 117; 232.23: 152; 272.21: 125; 274.23: 124; 293.23: 76; 294.32-3: 75; 297.8: 113; 297.8-10: 107, 244n.80; 297.10-98.19: 130, 191; 298.20-6: 130; 298.21-2: 66; 299.13-14: 131; 301.19-21: 129-30; 307.16-17: 75; 316.3-5: 189; 342.20: 124; 349.21: 152; 367.12: 75; 370.3-5: 186; 377.20-34: 131, 207; 377.27: 155; 378.20-1: 111, 193; 378.20-2: 132; 378.22-4: 244; 397.29: 159; 397.29-30: 160; 462.20: 163; 485.21: 182, 255n.18; 497.24: 101; 499.7: 53; 528.32-3: 57; 530.16: 38; 554.3: 236n.17; 556.12ff.: 72; 556.17-20: 200; 557.20-558.2: 71; 557.25ff.: 71; 559.20ff.: 72; 564.11: 155; 564.24: 236n.17; 566.4-5: 46; 566.17-20: 200; 576.14: 95; 586.10: 76; 602.6: 95; 640.25: 155; 641.8: 95; 700.6: 236n.17; 700.7: 96; 711.26-7: 160; 773.8ff.: 97; 788.33-789.2: 97; 969.14-24: 118 Commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion 111.48ff.: 56; 194.57-60: 43

PS.SIMPLICIUS

Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima 118.9: 78; 286.31: 236n.17 SOCRATES SCHOLASTICUS

Church History I.9: 253n.54 STRABO

xiii.609: 236n.9 SUDA 4.178.24-5: 27 SYNESIUS

Letters 105, 102: 251n.14; 136: 181 SYRIANUS

Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 42.3: 249n.105; 62.19: 249n.105; 80.5-6: 159; 81.8-10: 181; 81.31: 155; 84.25: 249n.105; 192.23: 249n.105 THEMISTIUS

Paraphrasis on Posterior Analytics 1.2-12: 167 Paraphrasis on De anima 107.30: 66, 228n.78 Paraphrasis on Physics 192.12-22: 118; 221.9: 237n.37 THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS

Fragments (FHSG) 72A: 236n.9; 141-4: 237n.26; 142: 237 nn.29, 35; 146: 14, 97; 149: 14, 97; 151A-B: 97-8; 153: 98; 159: 237n.36; 161A: 237n.35; 165B-D: 117; 169: 117; 171: 117; 176: 117; 231: 60; 240: 231n.16; 241AB: 237n.35; 241B: 60; 245: 58; 275: 236n.9; 277C: 60; 281: 237n.41; 301A,B: 93; 694: 236n.9 On fire 1-2: 94 XENOPHANES OF COLOPHON

B17: 70

287

Index of Names Abu Bakr al-Razi, 13 Adrastus, 109 Aeneas of Gaza, 146 Aëtius, 58, 63, 77 Agathias, 49 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 60, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 92, 96, 100, 103, 107-35, 139, 160, 167, 188-93, 216 Alexandria, 24, 179 Ammonius, 12, 29, 47, 78, 118, 119, 123, 139, 147, 153, 160, 163, 179 Anaxagoras, 55, 64, 65, 76, 77, 83, 106, 152 Anaximander, 81 Andronicus, 105 Antiochus, 26, 88, 140-1, 144, 145 Aphrodisias, 50 Arcesilaus, 26, 89 Archelaus, 80 Archytas, 44 Aristotle, 36, 80 Aspasius, 40, 41, 109, 115, 118 Atticus, 146, 250 n.129 Baalbek, 50 Boethus, 98, 146 Calvenus Taurus, 60, 94, 147 Carrhae, see Harran Celsus, 178, 179 Clement of Alexandria, 25, 67, 77 Colotes, 146 Damascius, 12, 91, 96, 97, 133, 153, 155, 163-4, 179 David, 152 Democritus, 76, 80, 83, 97, 167 Derveni, 75 Dexippus, 228 n.61 Diels, Hermann, 4, 7, 59, 63, 72 Diogenes of Apollonia, 63, 65

Eco, Umberto, 1, 196 Edessa, 50 Empedocles, 44, 55, 56, 63, 64, 74-8, 81, 106, 165 Epictetus, 12 Epicurus, 59, 145 Eudemus, 16, 72, 75, 91, 98, 99-104, 106, 115, 118, 121, 124 (‘lover of truth’), 133, 167 Eudorus, 144-5 Eunapius, 151-2, 178 Eusebius, 25, 66, 67, 178 Fihrist, 13 Gabir b. Hayyan, 241 n. 23 Galen, 60, 166, 167-9 Galileo, 3 Harpocration of Argos, 146-7 Harran, 49-50 Heraclitus, 75 Hermogenes, 13 Hierocles, 156 Hippocrates of Chios, 1011 Hippolytus, 78 Homer, 173 Hunayn b. Ishaq, 13, 250 n.127 Iamblichus, 11, 16, 41, 87, 91, 96, 117, 133, 139, 153, 154-5 Isidore, 142, 249 n.103 Jerome, 25, 178 Jesus, 154 Justin Martyr, 177 Justinian, 49-50, 178 Leucippus, 80 Lewis, C.S., 197 Longinus. 151 Lucretius, 59

288

Index of Names Marcus Aurelius, 115 Melissus, 43, 63, 72, 82 Metrodorus, 83 Moderatus, 250 n.117 Moerbeke, Willliam van, 3

Proclus, 10, 12, 16, 62, 68, 71, 94, 97, 139, 145, 153, 155-7, 207 Ptolemaeus, 36 Pythagoras, 154 Pythagoreans, 64, 75

Nemesius of Nemesa, 156, 250 n.127 Nero, 177 Nikolaos, 81 Numenius, 109, 146, 148

Severus, 109 Sextus Empiricus, 71, 73, 77 Sinbliqiyus (Simplicius in Arabic), 14 Socrates, 154, 159 Stephanus, 120 Strato, 89, 91, 97-8, 105, 106 Synesius, 181, 184 Syrianus, 12, 16, 47, 97, 117, 118, 121, 123, 133, 153, 155, 158-63 (epithets at 159), 160

Olympiodorus, 146 Origen, 66, 67, 139, 179 Osborne, Catherine, 54 Parmenides, 43, 55, 56, 63-4, 69-74, 82, 106, 174 Peripatetics, 35 Persia, 50 Philo Judaeus, 25 Philo of Larissa, 89 Philoponus, 43, 87, 120, 124-5, 126, 176-88 Platonists, 26 Plotinus, 10, 16, 29, 56, 68, 81, 89, 98, 109, 114, 123, 146, 150-1 Plutarch of Athens, 158 Plutarch of Chaeronea, 60, 94, 120, 145-6 Porphyry, 16, 27, 29, 35, 38, 40, 41, 62, 67, 68, 72, 75, 81, 100, 109, 118, 121, 123, 127, 139, 151, 154, 160, 167, 177, 179, 207 Presocratics, 16, 62, 156

Thaumasius, 109 Theagenes, 174 Themistius, 40, 41, 100, 118, 127, 166-7 Theophrastus, 16, 56, 58, 59 (Physikai doxai), 73, 75, 77, 78, 81, 86, 93-9, 115, 118, 163 Thomas Aquinas, 3 Usener, Hermann, 7, 59, 86 Xenarchus, 16, 36, 139 Xenophanes, 72, 174 Zeller, 65 Zenobius, 112

289

Subject Index adverbial tags, 101, 123 akouein (listen, interpret), 45, 128 allusion, 150 anonymous commentary, 145 antigraphos (manuscript, copy), 39, 112, 127 antilegô (refute), 83-4 apo phônês, 29, 67, 162, 206; see also viva voce apodeixis, 36 aporia, 92, 96, 115, 145, 150 arkhai (principles, causes), 37, 73, 119, 136 asapheia (obscurity), 28, 73, 104, 152, 158, 228 n.64 assimilation, 64, 146, 171 astronomy, 77 audience, 162, 201 authenticity, 42, 105, 145 authority, 41, 96, 98, 116, 124-5 (argument from), 127, 175 axiômata, 82 canon(isation), 104, 105, 152, 153, 203, 205 cause, 37, 68, 69, 75, 77 Chaldean oracles, 85, 156, 158, 206 change, 91 citation, see quotation clarity, 84, 101 clepsydra, 168 clusters, 91, 112, 122 commentary, 24, 108 (like weaving or composing a symphony), 109, 111; forms of, 116, 118, 136, 162, 207 commentator(s), 35, 110, 117, 120, 123; ideal, 33-4, 132, 197 concordia, 14 consolidation, 88 corollaries, 155, 163 cosmic stages, 76 cosmology, 72 creationism, 59

creator-god, 139, 182 demonstration, 44 dialectic, 61, 175 differences (diaphorai), 93 digress (mêkunai), 45, 67 disagreement (diaphonia), 10, 37, 83, 90, 92, 97, 112, 114, 118, 125, 128 division (dihaeresis), 73 dogmatism, 148 doxai (opinions), 59, 86 doxographical, 60, 86 doxography, 95 dualism, 80 elements, 68, 117, 160, 167 endoxographical, 199 enigmatic (ainigmatôdôs), 55, 73, 83 ennoia (notion, meaning), 101 epithets, 96, 111, 151, 154, 155 (hierarchy of), 159, 163, 166, 167 erase (diagraphein), 39 eternity, 139 evidence (pistis), 74, 78, 124 exegete (exêgêtês), 33, 35, 94, 98, 136 faith (pistis), 180 flavours, 77 form, 119, 160 geometry, 91 god, an efficient cause, 171 golden chain, 139-40, 152, 153, 155, 157, 177 grammar, 127, 129 Grammarian, the, 125, 173, 176 grammatikos, 31 graphê, 39 harmonisation, 61, 86-7, 90, 141, 144, 156, 169, 193, 203 harmony (sumphônia), 27, 29, 62, 97, 218-20

290

Subject Index headings (kephalaia), 35, 102 heap (sorites), 116 hermeneia, 127 hermeneutical, 25, 38 holy book, 154 homoiomeries, 82 hypographê (outline), 47 hypomnêma, 15, 34, 38, 109, 113, 146, 201 hypostases, see levels of being impose a reading (biazein), 39 incipits, 40 ineffable, 90 interpreter, 94 (first interpreter of Plato) invective, 182 ipsissima verba, 23, 44, 48, 63, 65 isagogical questions, 42, 117, 152 khôros, 39 koruphaios (leader), 96 lemma, 29, 115-16, 118, 121, 158, 207 levels of being, 68, 76, 119 lexis, 33, 39, 40, 101, 122, 136, 147, 156 like-by-like, 74 Love, 78 magic, 153 manuscripts (antigraphoi), 22, 29, 38, 39-41, 127, 167 marginal note, 40, 125, 128; marginal commentary, 67 martyrs, 177 megalonoia, 33 mêpote (maybe), 127, 129, 160 methodology, 21, 31ff., 132-5, 143, 146-7 Middle Platonists, 110, 137, 144-7 misquotation, 142-4 monism, 64, 144 monobiblion, 38 mysteries, 52, 106, 141, 198, 208

originality, 23, 133, 157 pagan, 149, 154, 173 paradoxes of time, 164 paragraphein (mark the text), 45-6, 66-8 paraphrase, 42, 44, 72, 81, 82, 83, 100, 101, 150, 151, 159, 164, 166, 208, 250 n.121 paratithesthai, 45, 66-8, 103, 124 philologos, 31 phusikoi, 61 pioneer, 135 pistis, see evidence place, 91, 97, 157, 163 Plato, prophet, 169; expounder of truth, 224, n.2 Platonism, 140-7, 149, 156 Platonisms, 142 pluralism, 64 poetry, 65 polemic, 65, 125 pollution, 77, 78 prayer, 182-3, 207 primary text, 40, 77 principles, 35, 37, 38, 61, 79, 93, 119, 156, 160 privation, 119, 160 problêmata, 112, 145 prophet, 169 prose, 43, 65 prototype, 135 protreptic, 195 psukhagôgia (leading of the soul), 43 punctuation, 42, 127 punning, 189, 253 n.69 purifications, 75 (katharmoi) Pythagoreanism, 11, 154 quotation, 22, 37; art of, 42-8; reasons for, 65-8, 44, 82, 99, 109, 111, 121, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 142-4, 144, 150, 188-93, 208, 218

Nicene creed, 178 nous, 33, 64, 78, 80-1, 149

refutation, 83 reincarnation, 75 riddles, 249 n. 97; cf. enigmatic roots, 68

obscurity, 100; cure for, 104; see also asapheia

salvation, 155 scarcity (spanin), 66, 74

291

Subject Index sceptic, 112 scholai, 38, 98, 227 n.45, n.53 science, 138 skopos (subject), 26, 34, 36, 37, 117, 145, 153, 154, 225 n.15, 226 n.43 sources: discussion of, 116; access to, 34, 40, 42, 56-60, 63-4, 70-1, 73, 75, 77-8, 79, 92, 95-6, 100, 150 Stoics, 140, 141, 145 Strife: 78 (divisive role) style, impersonal, 138 subtext, 25 subversion, 129 summa, 138, 202, 209 summary, of main points (kephalaia), 35; of whole Physics, 36 sumphônia (agreement), 9, 62, 108, 117, 118, 121, 124, 170, 218-20 (=App. III) sunanagnôsis, 26, 128, 206 sungramma, 38 sunousia, 104-5 superstition, 149, 177 surface meaning, 83, 106, 131 symphony, 108 syncretism, 87, 97 syntax, 42

taxis, 26, 34, 117 testimonia, 44 textbook, 22 textual criticism, 41-2, 71, 118, 127, 143, 145, 167 theurgy, 153, 208; and prayer, 183 time, 91, 97-8, 156, 163, 168 titles, 59-60, 102, 151, 236 n.17 topos of modesty, 38 treatise, 50 ungrammatical, 39 unity: of reality, 70; of the world, 76; of Greek philosophy, 84-6, 207; of body and soul, 115 universe, 151 unveiling, of the truth, 73, 152 verse, 43 views, Simplicius’ own, 12, 129 (oimai), 162, 199; see also mêpote viva voce, 47, 67, 101, 139; see also apo phônês wisdom, 71 (ancient), 84, 134, 156 witness (marturein), 96, 104, 117 writing, 43

292