Philosophy & Rhetoric The Greeks, Pragmatism, and the Endless Mediation of Rhetoric and Philosophy [4 ed.]

Citation preview

The Greeks, Pragmatism, and the Endless Mediation of Rhetoric and Philosophy Edward Schiappa Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 50, Number 4, 2017, pp. 552-565 (Article)

Published by Penn State University Press

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/678360

[ Access provided at 25 Jun 2021 19:44 GMT from UFPB-Universidade Federal da ParaÃba ]

The Greeks, Pragmatism, and the Endless Mediation of Rhetoric and Philosophy Edward Schiappa

a b s t r ac t This article begins by revisiting the Greek origins of the terms “rhetoric” and “­philosophy” from a nominalist and antiessentialist perspective. Though both terms were given early shape by Plato, Isocrates offered a different take on philosophia that arguably is equally legitimate, even if largely neglected historically. In contemporary scholarship, the question is not what is rhetoric or what is philosophy, but what can be gained by deploying rhetorical and philosophical vocabularies to describe and understand the world. Given the problems facing us today, philosophers and rhetoric scholars should engage each other to address challenges where our interests converge. Keywords: Plato, pragmatism, rhetoric, philosophy, Rorty

then Once upon a time, there were no academic disciplines. There were no definitions, either, at least as we understand them. Plato and Aristotle changed both of those situations in ways that continue to influence Western thought. If Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts are to be trusted, Socrates and Prodicus also deserve credit for early efforts to define words, thereby helping to formulate the classic Socratic/Platonic question “What is X?” And here we are, twenty-four hundred years later, still occasionally wrestling with how to describe rhetoric, philosophy, and the relationship between the two. Drawing on my thirty-five years of thinking and writing about the classical and contemporary mediation of philosophy and rhetoric, I wish Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2017 Copyright © 2017 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

endless mediation of rhetoric and philosophy

to use the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Philosophy and Rhetoric to summarize and advance my thoughts in the form of a series of claims. The ultimate objective of these claims is to stress what Richard Rorty (1989) describes as the “contingency of language” as it applies to rhetoric and philosophy for readers of this journal. First, prior to Plato, there is no evidence of the use of the word “rhētorikē” in Greek texts. and the word has the markings of a Platonic creation (Schiappa 1990, 1999, 2016). This philological datum is significant, as it suggests a different reading of fifth century BCE figures such as the Older Sophists than has been dominant for most of the past twenty-four hundred years. The preplatonic study of logos by the Older Sophists arguably combined interests we now separate with the labels “rhetoric” and “philosophy.” How we understand the texts of such figures as Protagoras and Gorgias is altered in nontrivial ways once we set aside the traditional interpretive lens of “rhetoric versus philosophy” (Schiappa 1999, 2003b). A  particularly dramatic example is Gorgias’s reconstructed text On Not Being; or, What is Not. As Jonathan Barnes notes, “Some scholars make Gorgias a profound thinker, a nihilist and a sceptic; others treat What Is Not as a serious and witty reductio of Eleatic metaphysics; others again take it for a rhetorical tour de force” (1982, 173). I have argued in the pages of this journal that such competing interpretations of Gorgias’s On Not Being are typically predicated on assumptions about the disciplinary status and relevance of philosophy and rhetoric (Schiappa 1997). More broadly, I have opposed disparagement of the activities and surviving texts of the Older Sophists based on the assumption that they were not motivated by what we now call philosophical purposes but solely (“merely”?) rhetorical ones and that theoretical contributions later recognized as having philosophical significance were “more or less accidental” (Classen 1976, 247). To the extent that certain historical claims about the meaning and importance of pre-Platonic texts depend on such problematic assumptions, challenging those assumptions calls for more historically valid and nuanced hermeneutic strategies that question the appropriateness of the interpretive lens of philosophy or rhetoric. For example, a logical formalization of Gorgias’s On Not Being compared to a similar formalization of Parmenides results in an enhanced appreciation of Gorgias’s philosophical and rhetorical sophistication (Schiappa and Hoffman, 1994). Space does not allow an exhaustive review of recent scholarly literature that revisits texts from the fourth and fifth centuries BCE without drawing on the rhetoric versus philosophy frame. Nonetheless, I want to highlight 553

edward schiappa

an important essay by classicist Michael Gagarin that deserves far more attention than it has received. His provocative argument concerning the Older Sophists eschews the philosophy/rhetoric binary completely, and his conclusion is one that represents a dramatic challenge especially for those who equate rhetoric with artful persuasion: “Persuasion may be a goal of some sophistic works, but it is not their primary goal; and teaching the art of persuasion was not a major concern of the Sophists” (2001, 275). Rather, “For the Sophists, logos was more a tool for thinking than for persuading” (2001, 291). I also wish to point to a collection edited by Robin Reames titled Logos Without Rhetoric: The Arts of Language before Plato (2017) as research illustrating that framing matters to how such texts are received and understood. Second, the word “philosophia” can be found in writing before Plato, but he can be credited with providing the earliest substantial literature describing and defending it as a discrete activity (see Lampert 2010). As Richard Kraut puts it: He was not the first thinker or writer to whom the word “philosopher” should be applied. But he was so self-conscious about how philosophy should be conceived, and what its scope and ambitions properly are, and he so transformed the intellectual currents with which he grappled, that the subject of philosophy, as it is often conceived—a rigorous and systematic examination of ethical, political, metaphysical, and epistemological issues, armed with a distinctive method—can be called his invention. (2015) One important way that Plato advances his view of philosophia is by providing an increasingly “disciplined” understanding of rule-governed dialogue, transforming the sophistic practice of holding conversation—dialegesthai— into a teachable art of dialectic—dialektikē. In Plato’s earlier works, such as Gorgias, dialegesthai is described as rule governed, a defined event that features a question and answer and that aims at a decision (Timmerman and Schiappa 2010, 26). But by his later works, Plato seeks to differentiate his approach to dialogue from his predecessors in order to turn it into the philosophical art we now know as hē dialiketikē technē. Richard Robinson claims it is the art that enacts philosophy: “It was not a tool that you might or might not choose to use in philosophizing. It was philosophy itself ” (1953, 71). Aristotle continued the process of disciplining dialectic (see, e.g., Evans 1977 and Fink 2012), in part by identifying, most notably in Topics, appropriate norms for conducting dialectical interactions. 554

endless mediation of rhetoric and philosophy

Third, Isocrates advanced a view of philosophia that is quite different from Plato’s. Though Isocrates is often cast in the recurring drama known as rhetoric versus philosophy, a different and more philologically grounded way of understanding that drama is as competing approaches to higher learning as philosophia. Isocrates, himself, as far as we can tell, never used the word “rhētorikē” to describe his art or his teaching. Fourth, if we can agree that there are no “essences” or ideal forms of philosophy and rhetoric and instead embrace a nominalist approach (a position I can only assert in this context), then we must concede that there is no prima facie reason to ignore Isocrates’s description of philosophia. There is a long scholarly tradition of trying to deny Isocrates any legitimate status as a philosopher and to force him into the category of rhetorician. W. K. C. Guthrie asserts that by philosophia Isocrates “meant above all rhetoric” (1975, 309). John Poulakos similarly claims that Isocrates “often uses philosophy to mean rhetoric” (1993, 116). Likewise, Jacqueline de Romilly rewrites Isocrates when she states that Isocrates contrasts “philosophy (that is rhetoric) and gymnastic” (1975, 56). The translators of the Loeb edition of Isocrates even go so far as to translate the Greek word philosophia as “oratory” or “rhetoric” at times (Norlin 1928, 1:124; Van Hook 1945, 3:438).1 Fifth, Plato’s and Aristotle’s linguistic interventions have both philosophical and rhetorical importance. That is, regardless of whether we agree with the particulars of either philosopher’s views, the vocabulary they set forth continues to influence Western consciousness. Isocrates’s vision of the means and ends of higher education was more successful than his ability to control the vocabulary with which he described that education. That is, the organization of much of Greek and Roman higher education can be described primarily as a rhetorical education, the ultimate goal being, as described by Quintilian, to produce orators who are good men that speak well. Isocrates’s logon paideia sought to cultivate the mind and to develop practical wisdom through the production of logos or civic discourse, tempered by ethical ends (Timmerman and Schiappa 2010, 54). From the standpoint of creating a model of education, Isocrates arguably proved more influential than his rivals for centuries. But Plato’s and Aristotle’s categorizations of the verbal arts proved definitive for most of the history of philosophy. Throughout much of Western history, there have been many iterations of how the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric can be described (see, for example, Ijsseling, 1976). So let’s fast forward about twenty-four hundred years and see where we are now. 555

edward schiappa

now First, we need to acknowledge that the terminology of experts and the vocabulary of the nonacademics are two different things. The development of terms of art and specialized vocabularies has always been an important and arguably constitutive element of what we would now call “disciplines” (Timmerman and Schiappa 2010). Thus, to speak of philosophy and rhetoric today is to invoke a range of denotative and connotative meanings primarily relevant to academics. Second, again I invoke the spirit of nominalism and antiessentialism to insist that there is not an absolute (in the sense of timeless and certain) correct answer to the questions “What is rhetoric?” or “What is philosophy?” For reasons I elaborate on at length in Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning (2003a), I advocate a pragmatic approach to definition whereby we would replace the Socratic/Platonic question “What is X?” with such questions as “How ought we use the word X given our needs and interests?,” “In whose interests are we defining X?,” and “What is the purpose of defining X?” The agreed-upon meanings, or definitions, of philosophy and rhetoric should not be thought of as “correct” or “incorrect” but rather as contingent rules that answer the question “What should count as X in context C?” Or, in terms of the topic at hand, “What should count as philosophy or rhetoric in our specific academic contexts?” Such an approach to definition is indebted, in part, to William James’s vision of pragmatism. James sought to replace the idea of essence with the idea of value, thus what counts as “essential” about a given definition is an evaluative question of importance rather than a question of metaphysics. Indeed, when we hear the word “real” used as an adjective as in “real X” (ranging from uses as diverse as “real art” to “real change” to “real philosophy” to “real Americans”) the term almost always is a veiled evaluation that can be glossed as “the kind of ‘X’ I prefer and value most.” Or as James puts it, “The essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest” (1981, 961, emphasis in the original). Third, though such a claim may be seen as in tension with the name of this journal, I propose it may be productive to steer away from the nouns “rhetoric” and “philosophy” and instead focus on the adjectives “rhetorical” and “philosophical.” The advantage of such a linguistic preference is that we can avoid certain traps that nominalization encourages. One such trap is the tendency to see X as an independent object, unified class, or thing that has 556

endless mediation of rhetoric and philosophy

a timeless essence (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 127–28, cf. 294). Such a tendency often is reinforced in canonical histories of disciplines. It is no accident that there is no entry for Isocrates, despite his historical importance and self-description as a teacher of philosophia, in such canonical works as the classic Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edwards 1967) or the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Another such trap is a sort of animating or anthropomorphizing that is expressed when the noun is followed by a verb, such as “philosophy does X, or “rhetoric does Y.” If philosophy and rhetoric are labels—linguistic creations that we employ to meet specific needs and interests—then it is we are who are doing things, not “them.” Using adjectives reminds us that we are talking about identifiable attributes rather than self-subsistent things (assuming, of course, that we do not succumb to the Platonic temptation to put a definite article in front of an adjective, such as “the rhetorical”). To describe a phenomenon as “rhetorical” or “philosophical” is to invite others to notice certain features of that phenomenon rather than others. It is an invitation to see or think about something as rhetorical or philosophical rather than make a metaphysical claim of what it is. Fourth, I propose that we think of humanistic scholarship primarily as a matter of (re)description with distinctive vocabularies. To develop this point, I turn to Rorty’s version of pragmatism. Rorty stresses that antiessentialism means that we scholars are not grasping after “the thing itself ” or engaging objects of analysis absent contextualization but “only inquir[ing] after things under a description” (1991, 100). Basically what we do in the humanities is create art and/or employ discipline-specific vocabularies to describe relevant phenomena. The relevant phenomenon might be a text, a person, a group of people, a group of texts, a set of interactions among people, or among people and texts, or among people and objects, and so forth. Rorty suggests: “Suppose we are antiessentialist all the way. Then we shall say that all inquiry is interpretation, that all thought consists in [redescription and] recontextualizaton, that we have never done anything else and never will” (1991, 102). Any given phenomenon X can be described with any number of disciplinary vocabularies. What we do in rhetorical studies (for example) can be thought of as describing various phenomena (texts, practices, events) with a vocabulary informed by a shared history of rhetorical theory. Rhetoric may not have an essence, but rhetorical theory, practice, and pedagogy do have a history that can be traced back to ancient Greece and a rhetorical vocabulary that can be culled from a wide variety of efforts over the centuries. 557

edward schiappa

A common objection to the position that anything can be described as rhetorical or philosophical is that it makes rhetoric and philosophy ubiquitous and hence trivializes them as disciplines. My former advisor, Thomas B. Farrell, railed for years against what he calls a monistic approach to rhetoric, issuing a self-named dictum that the broader the scope of rhetoric, the more trivial one’s conception of rhetoric is (1990, 82). Similarly, William Keith, Steve Fuller, Alan Gross, and Michael Leff claim: “If everything is rhetoric/rhetorical, then it is neither informative nor interesting [to] be told that a practice/discourse/institution is rhetorical. Si omnia, nulla [if everything, nothing]” (1999, 331). Our situation, however, is no different from other disciplines. Could not a political theorist make the case that just about anything involving people or animals could be described as “political”? The same could be argued about psychology, sociology, or anthropology. Consider recent textbook definitions of these disciplines: “Psychology is the science of behavior and the mind” (Gray 1999, 3); “Psychology is the systematic study of behavior and experience” (Kalat 1999, 5); “Sociology is a wide-ranging discipline, concerned with understanding human social life” (Lie 1996, 1); Sociology “can be defined as the scientific study of the patterns and processes of human social relations” (Stark 1998, 6); “Sociology is the study of human social life, groups, and societies” (Giddens 1996, 1); anthropology “is the study of the human species and its immediate ancestors” (Kottak 2000, 4); or “Anthropology calls itself the study of humanity and is clearly the broadest in scope and most generalizing of the disciplines” (Bodley 1996, 9). (Schiappa 2001, 269) One can imagine describing, say, a research paper by a physicist, in sociological, psychological, economic, political, philosophical, chemical, biological, physical, or rhetorical, terms. As Rorty puts it, there are as many possible descriptions “as there are purposes to be served,” and all descriptions have to be “evaluated according to their efficacy as instruments for purposes” (1999, 134). Just because anything or everything could be described with these various vocabularies does not mean that any one of them is less valuable or useful than any other. Fifth: philosophical and rhetorical vocabularies can be judged by their utility in serving disciplinary interests (and inter- and transdisciplinary interests). The unity of science movement failed in part because 558

endless mediation of rhetoric and philosophy

no theory-independent observation language could be devised and in part because the needs and interests of different scientific disciplines led to a proliferation of specialized vocabularies that could not be reduced to the language of physics. In short, there are pragmatic reasons for disciplines to develop and refine their own specialized vocabularies. Rhetorical and philosophical vocabularies, as practiced in a given historical moment, advance our understanding of phenomena in their own way. We evaluate claims advanced using such vocabularies in terms of our own needs, interests, and prior narratives and beliefs. “The only issue is whether describing the planets,” for example, “in one language or the other lets us tell stories about them which will fit together with all the other stories we want to tell” (Rorty 1991, 82). The differences among disciplines is a matter of interests, not cognitive, epistemological, or metaphysical status. In a move that certainly did not originate with me, we can think of different disciplinary descriptions as similar to different maps: The redescriptions produced by different disciplines (or theories within a discipline) function in a manner that is analogous to the way different maps work (Dorling 1997). The same domain can be mapped in a variety of ways—metereological, demographic, economic, biological, topographical, transportation, geological, hydrological, bathymetric, historical, political, etc. It is pointless to ask about a “pecking order” of maps, or to ask which depicts reality as it “really is.” Maps are necessarily selective, “partial,” and are constructed to serve specific interests and purposes (Wood 1992). They can be judged for their usefulness only with respect to such interests and purposes. Even such notions as “accuracy” only make sense relative to the specific function of a map (Monmonier 1991). Rhetorical studies is but one of many possible “maps” of our social world: The fact that science and philosophy are now included within that map merely adds to its complexity, but does not diminish, degrade, or “reduce” other maps in the least. (Schiappa, Scott, Gross, and McKerrow 2002, 114) To be sure, the view of the world mapped out by contemporary academic philosophers and rhetoric scholars is quite different, and the two only occasionally manifest shared interests and purposes. This fact becomes especially clear to me when reviewing promotion and tenure cases on our school council; the samples of work in dossiers by my colleagues in philosophy 559

edward schiappa

strikes me as esoteric. Even when a colleague appears to be driven by similar interests, such as philosophy of logic or philosophy of language, I find the vocabulary off-putting and the ultimate point of some projects uninteresting. This is my problem, not theirs, but it is testimony to an interesting contrast. Namely, that while in theory the vocabularies describe coextensive worlds (figure 1), the daily practices of philosophers and rhetoric scholars are quite different (figure 2), with only partial overlap. Fifty years ago, the Rhetoric Society of America was formed. The initial charter set the goal of having roughly equal representation of scholars from

Fig. 1. 

Fig. 2. 

560

endless mediation of rhetoric and philosophy

communication, English/composition, and philosophy. Though philosophers have belonged to the association since it was founded, they have always been a small minority. This disparity is a reflection of what appears to be a lingering belittlement of rhetoric by most—though certainly not all—academic philosophers. For whatever reason, the association simply does not serve the needs and interests of philosophers as much as those in communication and English/composition with an explicit interest in rhetorical studies. So be it. Also fifty years ago, the journal Philosophy and Rhetoric was established at Pennsylvania State University. The origins of the journal can be described and appreciated with a sociological vocabulary, among others. Colleagues, most notably Carroll Arnold and Henry W. Johnstone Jr., from the speech communication and philosophy departments, respectively, were housed close to each other and often engaged in conversation about their shared interests and points of agreement and disagreement (Hauser 2007). The journal, edited by Johnstone for thirty years, was an enormously successful and productive outcome of those conversations. This leads me to my final point. Sixth: interdisciplinary dialogues such as those fostered in Philosophy and Rhetoric are valuable and increasingly necessary. To be sure, for a discipline to earn status and to be productive, it must specialize, and that specialization sometimes can discourage interdisciplinary conversations. As someone who has published in five disciplines, I know that the price of travel visas can be steep. Historically, Philosophy and Rhetoric has concerned itself with what the founding editor once described as “a quest for the philosophical foundations of rhetoric” ( Johnstone 1990, xvii; cf. Cherwitz 1990). Given that Johnstone saw philosophy as providing the foundation or source of “authentication” of rhetoric, it is not surprising that more philosophers have published in the journal over its fifty-year history than scholars representing any other single academic discipline, and this pattern was especially clear in the journal’s early years. Johnstone had little patience for what he wonderfully described as “philosophy without tears,” by which he meant engaging philosophical texts and in philosophical argument without adequate mastery of languages other than English and training in formal logic. He noted in 1990 that “many more people in Speech are now interested in professionally acceptable philosophy than were in 1952, but not always for the right reasons. I find many students of Speech Communication—­ especially graduate students—who seem to have chosen their major at least partly in the belief that it is ‘philosophy without tears.’ They take an interest in philosophical issues—as undergraduates they may have even majored in 561

edward schiappa

philosophy—but they are unable or unwilling to do the work or hard thinking that worthwhile philosophical studies demand” (xvii). This disciplinary hierarchy he forwards aside, Johnstone is right to encourage argumentative rigor and “liberation from the otherwise inevitable predicament of being misled by translators” (1990, xvii). For years I have encouraged graduate students who want to engage classical Greek rhetoric to learn Greek or students who want to engage Foucault or Derrida to learn French, not because philosophers said we should but because it makes our scholarship better. On a personal note, whenever I worked on classical rhetoric I always wrote with the toughest audience to persuade in mind, which for my money is classicists rather than philosophers. But the point is that writing for interdisciplinary audiences produces stronger arguments that can reach broader audiences and have greater scholarly influence, and that can be worth a few tears (Schiappa 1995). I mentioned earlier that philosophers are the most frequent contributors to Philosophy and Rhetoric, but that is only part of the story. Of the nearly one thousand articles and discussion notes published in the journal’s fifty-year history, nearly two-thirds were not written by authors affiliated with philosophy departments.2 Other academic homes represent a panoply of subjects, including communication, English, classics, law, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, comparative literature, linguistics, religious studies, history, and various romance languages. Clearly, the conversations taking place in the pages of this journal are serving philosophical and rhetorical interests that travel across disciplines. If I may push the spatial metaphor a bit further, my point is that such travel may be “expensive” but it is desirable, sometimes vital, and a significant number of scholars are willing to pay the price. As Rorty explains, “Pragmatism treats every such division of the world into ‘subject matters’ as an experiment, designed to see if we can get what we want at a certain historical moment by using a certain language” (1991, 91). We live in an unusual time, a time when issues involving the power of persuasive messages, the rhetorical construction of facts, and the status of knowledge claims literally can have life and death consequences. At such a time, it would behoove us to remember just how contingent the labels “philosophy” and “rhetoric” are and not let them get in the way of addressing the problems confronting contemporary academics. In his provocative rereading of Plato, Ramsey Eric Ramsey suggests that in the Phaedrus there emerges a hybrid technê—“Both rhetoric and philosophy together are needed for the care of the soul” (1999, 258). Indeed, to save our collective 562

endless mediation of rhetoric and philosophy

“souls,” professional rhetoric and philosophy scholars, who face multiple challenges where our interests converge, must proceed jointly, judiciously, and expeditiously. Comparative Media Studies/Writing Massachusetts Institute of Technology

notes My thanks to Gerard A. Hauser, John T. Kirby, Ramsey Eric Ramsey, David M. Timmerman, and the participants of the 2017 New York University spring workshop in ancient philosophy, “Between Philosophy and Rhetoric,” for feedback on earlier drafts of this article. 1. Fortunately, such attempts to constrain our understanding of Isocrates has not prevented substantial recent scholarship that seeks to recover his various contributions to Greek intellectual and political life. See, e.g., Bouchet and Giovannelli-Jouanna 2015, Halliwell 1997, Poulakos and Depew 2004, Schiappa, Timmerman, and Laurén 2016, Too 1995, and Wareh 2012, among others. 2. A tally of the home disciplines identified by authors of articles and discussion notes in the fifty years of Philosophy and Rhetoric in print suggests that about 35 percent of the authors self-identify as hailing from philosophy departments, 35 percent from various speech, communication, or rhetoric units, 15 percent from English departments, and 15 percent from other disciplines. My heartfelt thanks to Ana Aguilar, Brittany Knutson, and Keren Wang for their efforts in producing this tally.

works cited Barnes, Jonathan. 1982. The Presocratic Philosophers. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bodley, J. H. 1996. Cultural Anthropology. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield. Bouchet, Christian, and Pascale Giovannelli-Jouanna, eds. 2015. Isocrate: Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques. Lyon: Collection études et rechercheches sur l’occident romain. Cherwitz, Richard A. 1990. “The Philosophical Foundations of Rhetoric.” In Rhetoric and Philosophy, ed. Richard A. Cherwitz, 1–20. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Classen, Carl Joachim. 1976. “The Study of Language Amongst Socrates’ Contemporaries.” In Sophistik, ed. C. J. Classen, 215–47. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. De Romilly, Jacqueline. 1975. Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dorling, Daniel. 1997. Mapping Ways of Representing the World. London: Longman. Edwards, Paul, ed. 1967. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 8 vols. New York: Macmillan.

563

edward schiappa Evans, J. D. G. 1977. Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Farrell, Thomas B. 1990. “From the Parthenon to the Bassinet: Death and Rebirth Along the Epistemic Trail.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1): 78–84. Fink, Jakob Leth, ed. 2012. The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gagarin, Michael. 2001. “Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?” Rhetorica 19 (3): 275–91. Giddens, Anthony. 1996. Introduction to Sociology. New York: Norton. Gray, Peter. 1999. Psychology. New York: Worth. Guthrie, W. K. C. 1975. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Halliwell, Stephen. 1997. “Philosophical Rhetoric or Rhetorical Philosophy? The Strange Case of Isocrates.” In The Rhetoric Canon, ed. Brenda Deen Schildgen, 107–25. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Hauser, Gerard A. 2007. “Philosophy and Rhetoric: An Abbreviated History of an Evolving Identity.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 40 (1): 1–14. Ijsseling, Samuel. 1976. Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical Survey. New York: Springer. Isocrates. 1928. Isocrates. Vol. 1. Trans. George Norlin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1945. Isocrates. Vol. 3. Trans. Larue Van Hook. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, William. 1981. The Principles of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Johnstone, Henry W., Jr. 1990. Foreword to Rhetoric and Philosophy, ed. Richard Cherwitz, xv–xviii. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Kalat, James W. 1999. Introduction to Psychology. Belmont: Wadsworth. Keith, William, Steve Fuller, Alan Gross, and Michael Leff. 1999. “Taking Up the Challenge: A Response to Simons.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 85 (3): 330–38. Kottak, Conrad P. 2000. Anthropology: The Exploration of Human Diversity. New York: McGraw-Hill. Kraut, Richard. 2015. “Plato.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/plato. Lampert, Laurence. 2010. How Philosophy Became Socratic: A Study of Plato’s “Protagoras,” “Charmides,” and “Republic.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lie, John, David Hopping, and Judith Pintar. 1996. Sociological Outlooks: A Workbook. New York: Norton. Perelman, Chaïm, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. Poulakos, John. 1993. Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Poulakos, Takis, and David Depew, eds. 2004. Isocrates and Civic Education. Austin: University of Texas Press. Ramsey, Ramsey Eric. 1999. “A Hybrid Technê of the Soul? Thoughts on the Relation Between Philosophy and Rhetoric in Gorgias and Phaedrus.” Rhetoric Review 17 (2): 247–62.

564

endless mediation of rhetoric and philosophy Reames, Robin, ed. 2017. Logos Without Rhetoric: The Arts of Language Before Plato. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Robinson, John. 1973. “On Gorgias.” In Exegesis and Argument, ed. E. N. Lee, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, and Richard Rorty, 49–60. Assen: Van Gorcum. Robinson, Richard. 1953. Plato’s Earlier Dialectic. London: Oxford University Press. Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1991. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Vol. 1, Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1999. Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin. Schiappa, Edward. 1990. “Did Plato Coin Rhêtorikê?” American Journal of Philology 111 (4): 457–70. ———. 1995. “Interdisciplinarity and Social Practice: Reflections on Dow, Condit, and Swartz.” Communication Studies 46 (1): 140–47. ———. 1997. “Interpreting Gorgias’ ‘Being’ in On Not-Being or On Nature.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (1): 13–30. ———. 1999. The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ———. 2001. “Second Thoughts on the Critiques of Big Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 34 (3): 260–74. ———. 2003a. Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. ———. 2003b. Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric. 2nd ed. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. ———. 2016. “Twenty-five Years After ‘Did Plato Coin Rhêtorikê?’: An Episodic Memoir.” Rhetoric Review 35 (1): 1–9. Schiappa, Edward, David M. Timmerman, and Giles Laurén, eds. 2016. Jebb’s Isocrates. Middletown, DE: Sophron Editor. Schiappa, Edward, Robert L. Scott, Alan G. Gross, Raymie McKerrow. 2002. “Rhetorical Studies as Reduction or Redescription? A Response to Cherwitz and Hikins.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 88 (1): 112–20. Schiappa, Edward, and Stacey Hoffman. 1994. “Intertextual Argument in Gorgias’s On What is Not: A Formalization of Sextus, adv Math 7.77–80.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 27 (2): 156–61. Stark, Rodney. 1998. Sociology. Belmont: Wadsworth. Timmerman, David, and Edward Schiappa. 2010. Classical Greek Rhetorical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Too, Yun Lee. 1995. The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wareh, Tarik. 2012. The Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies. Wood, Denis. 1992. The Power of Maps. New York: Guilford Press.

565